U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

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Engaging the Private 

Sector To Promote 

Homeland Security: 

Law Enforcement-Private 

Security Partnerships 

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Law Enforcement in the Post­9 11 Era
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

Alberto R. Gonzales

Attorney General

Regina B. Schofield

Assistant Attorney General

Domingo S. Herraiz

Director, Bureau of Justice Assistance

Office of Justice Programs

Partnerships for Safer Communities

www.ojp.usdoj.gov

Bureau of Justice Assistance

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

NCJ 210678

Written by Andrew Morabito and Sheldon Greenberg

This document was prepared by the International Association of Chiefs of Police,under cooperative

agreement number 2003–DD–BX–K002, awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of

Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or

recommendations expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily

represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also

includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.
Engaging the Private 

Sector To Promote 

Homeland Security: 

Law Enforcement-Private 

Security Partnerships 

September 2005 

NCJ 210678 
Acknowledgments

Post­9/11 Policing Project Staff 

The Post-9/11 Policing Project is the work of the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), 

National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA), National 

Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives 

(NOBLE), Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), 

and Police Foundation. Jerry Needle, Director of 

Programs and Research, IACP, provided overall 

project direction. 

■	 International Association of Chiefs of Police 

Phil Lynn served as IACP’s Project Director, 

managed development and publication of the 

four Promising Practices Briefs, and authored 

Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional Partnerships for 

Meeting Regional Threats. Andrew Morabito 

coauthored this monograph, Engaging the 

Private Sector To Promote Homeland Security: 

Law Enforcement-Private Security Partnerships, 

and analyzed Post-9/11 survey data. Col. 

Joel Leson, Director, IACP Center for Police 

Leadership, authored Assessing and Managing 

the Terrorism Threat. Walter Tangel served as 

initial Project Director. 

Dr. Ellen Scrivner, Deputy Superintendent, 

Bureau of Administrative Services, Chicago 

Police Department, contributed to all phases of 

project design and cofacilitated the Post-9/11 

Roundtables with Jerry Needle. Marilyn 

Peterson, Management Specialist–Intelligence, 

New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, 

authored Intelligence-Led Policing: The New 

Intelligence Architecture. 

■	 National Sheriffs’ Association 

Fred Wilson, Director of Training, directed 

NSA project activities, organized and managed 

Post-9/11 Roundtables, and worked closely with 

IACP staff throughout the course of the project. 

NSA project consultants included Chris Tutko, 

Director of NSA’s Neighborhood Watch Project; 

John Matthews; and Dr. Jeff Walker, University 

of Arkansas, Little Rock. 

■	 National Organization of Black Law 

Enforcement Executives 

Jessie Lee, Executive Director, served as 

NOBLE’s Project Director and conducted most 

staff work. 

■	 Major Cities Chiefs Association 

Dr. Phyllis McDonald, Division of Public Safety 

Leadership, Johns Hopkins University, directed 

the work of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. 

The MCCA team included Denis O’Keefe, 

Consultant; Corinne Martin, Program Coordinator; 

and Shannon Feldpush. 

Dr. Sheldon Greenberg, Director of the Division 

of Public Safety Leadership, coauthored this 

monograph—Engaging the Private Sector To 

iii 

■ 

Promising Practices Reviews

Promote Homeland Security: Law EnforcementPrivate Security Partnerships. 

The Police Foundation 

Edwin Hamilton directed Police Foundation 

project activities and managed Post-9/11 survey 

formatting and analysis, assisted by Rob Davis. 

Foundation consultants included Inspector Garth 

den Heyer of the New Zealand Police and Steve 

Johnson of the Washington State Patrol. 

Promising Practices drafts were critiqued and enriched 

by a series of practitioners/content experts, including 

Richard Cashdollar, Executive Director of Public 

Safety, City of Mobile, AL; George Franscell, 

Attorney-at-Law, Franscell, Strickland, Roberts and 

Lawrence, Los Angeles, CA; Mary Beth Michos, State 

Mutual Aid Coordinator, Prince William County, VA; 

David Bostrom, Manager, Community Policing 
Consortium, IACP; John P. Chase, Chief of Staff, 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, 

Department of Homeland Security; John M. Clark, 

Assistant Vice President/Chief of Police, Burlington 

Northern Santa Fe Railroad; John A. LeCours, 

Director/Intelligence, Transport Canada; Ronald W. 

Olin, Chief of Police, Lawrence, KS; Ed Jopeck, 

Analyst, Veridian; Jerry Marynik, Administrator, State 

Terrorism Threat Assessment Center, California 

Department of Justice; and Bart Johnson, Office of 

Counter-Terrorism, New York State Police. 

Executive Oversight

The Post-9/11 Policing Project was initially 

conceptualized by the Office of Justice Programs, 

U.S. Department of Justice. Since its inception, the 

project has been guided throughout by the chief 

executive officers of the partner associations: 

■	 Daniel N. Rosenblatt, Executive Director, 

International Association of Chiefs of Police 

iv 

■	 Thomas N. Faust, Executive Director, National 

Sheriffs’ Association 

■	 Jessie Lee, Executive Director, National 

Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives 

■	 Thomas C. Frazier, Executive Director, Major 

Cities Chiefs Association 

■	 Hubert Williams, President, The Police Foundation 

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Guidance

We gratefully acknowledge the technical guidance 

and patient cooperation of executives and program 

managers who helped fashion project work: James H. 

Burch II, Deputy Director; Michelle Shaw, Policy 

Advisor; and Steven Edwards, Ph.D., Senior Policy 

Advisor for Law Enforcement. 
Contents

Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

The Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Local and Regional Programs and Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Other State and Local Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Federal Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Endnotes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

v 
Executive Summary

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, law enforcement-private security partnerships have 

been viewed as critical to preventing terrorism and 

terror-related acts. Because the private sector owns 

and protects 85 percent of the nation’s infrastructure, 

while local law enforcement often possesses threat 

information regarding infrastructure, law enforcementprivate security partnerships can put vital information 

into the hands of the people who need it. Thus, to 

effectively protect the nation’s infrastructure, law 

enforcement and private security must work 

collaboratively because neither possesses the 

necessary resources to do so alone. 

Law enforcement-private security partnerships are 

not new. Prior to September 11, the International 

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), National 

Sheriffs’ Association, and ASIS International (formerly 

the American Society for Industrial Security) joined 

together, with funding from the U.S. Department of 

Justice, Office of Justice Programs’ Bureau of Justice 

Assistance (BJA), to launch “Operation Cooperation,” 

a national effort to increase collaborative efforts 

between the private sector, particularly private 

security, and state and local law enforcement agencies. 

But efforts such as this one must expand beyond a 

crime-and-disorder focus to include homeland 

security-related issues if the policing community is 

to prevent future terrorist acts. 

Law enforcement and private security have strengths 

and weaknesses that must be considered to form 

realistic expectations of what each can bring to 

collaborative partnerships. Partnerships offer a number 

of benefits to both sides, including creative problem 

solving; increased training opportunities; information, 

data, and intelligence sharing; “force multiplier” 

opportunities; access to the community through private 

sector communications technology; and reduced 

recovery time following disasters. Partnerships, 

however, are not without their obstacles. The primary 

ones are barriers to information sharing, mistrust, and 

misinformation. 

Even though a reported lack of trust and mutual 

knowledge has inhibited the formation of law 

enforcement-private security partnerships in the past, 

gains have been made. The goal of partnerships is 

collaboration, in which partners recognize that their 

missions overlap and work to share resources and 

achieve common goals. Successful collaborative 

partnerships include common tasks, clearly identified 

leaders, operational planning, and a mutual 

commitment to provide necessary resources. 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

has issued recommendations for jurisdictions seeking 

to improve collaboration with their private sector 

agency counterparts. To prevent terrorism, DHS 

recommends that public and private agencies 

(1) prepare memorandums of understanding and 

formal coordination agreements describing 

mechanisms for exchanging information regarding 

vulnerabilities and risks; (2) use community policing 

initiatives, strategies, and tactics to identify suspicious 

activities related to terrorism; (3) establish a regional 

vii 

research and guidelines. Each of these areas contains a 

Selecting the right person as a liaison is an important, 

prevention information command center; and (4) 

coordinate the flow of information regarding 

infrastructure. 

Police chiefs and sheriffs should consider formalizing 

relationships with their private security counterparts. 

Formalization shows both law enforcement and 

private security employees that the partnership is 

an organizational priority. Law enforcement-private 

security partnerships tend to revolve around 

networking, information sharing, crime prevention, 

resource sharing, training, legislation, operations, and 

homeland security and terrorism prevention element. 

and often overlooked, responsibility. The success of 

a partnership can often depend on the liaison. The 

selection of private security personnel for this position 

can be complicated by a lack of prescreening, 

standards, and training. 
viii 

Four years after September 11, few jurisdictions have 

homeland security-driven law enforcement-private 

security partnerships. Instead, most focus on proven 

crime prevention-driven partnerships. The chapter 

titled “Local and Regional Programs and Initiatives” 

includes examples of both crime prevention- and 

homeland security-driven partnerships with the 

understanding that the principles behind crime 

prevention transfer well to homeland security. 

Government at the federal, state, and local level 

must actively collaborate and partner with the 

private sector, which controls 85 percent of 

America’s infrastructure . . . the nation’s 

infrastructure protection effort must harness the 

capabilities of the private sector to achieve a 

prudent level of security without hindering 

productivity, trade, or economic growth. 

—The President’s

National Strategy for Homeland Security

Police are not experts when it comes to site 

security. Partnerships between the police and 

private security are necessary to assist in these 

types of homeland security efforts. 

—Post­9/11 Policing Roundtable participant

Current estimates of public sector policing strength 

by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that 

there are 16,661 state, local, and county law 

enforcement agencies in the United States, and 

they employ a total of 677,933 sworn officers. 

Studies on private security staffing indicate there 

may be as many as 10,000 private security agencies 

employing slightly less than 2 million private 

security officers in the United States. Clearly, if 

these numbers are accurate, then private security 

officers are a vast potential resource that can assist 

law enforcement agencies in fulfilling our mission. 

—Joseph Samuels, Jr., former Chief of Police,

Richmond, California, and Past President, 

International Association of Chiefs of Police

All disasters are essentially local. There is no such 

thing as a Homeland Security Department, disaster 

or an FBI disaster; there are only New York City, 

Los Angeles, Chicago, or even Des Moines 

disasters. Yes, their impact matters and relates to 

the larger community. If we are to be successful 

in developing a more productive anti-terrorist 

environment, both the public police sector and the 

private security sector need to change their client 

culture from one of mere security awareness or 

knowledge to that of security ownership and 

responsibility. 

—Charles P. Connolly, former Assistant Commissioner,

New York City Police Department, and 

Vice President in Charge of Security, 

Merrill Lynch Corporation
The Issues

With the push in local policing throughout the 1990s toward a new model of service delivery 

that focused on problem solving and partnerships 

(called community policing), sheriffs’ offices and 

police departments engaged community organizations, 

neighborhood residents, other government agencies, 

and the private sector in collaborative partnerships to 

reduce crime and disorder. Law enforcement tapped 

into resources and expertise previously unavailable 

to them, with a focus on a shared vision, shared 

responsibility, and shared success. These partnerships 

reduced crime and encouraged a public trust that had 

been dormant in some communities for decades. 

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, law 

enforcement-private security partnerships have been 

viewed as critical to preventing terrorism. Local law 

enforcement and private security organizations 

working together is vitally important to homeland 

security; the private sector owns or protects the 

overwhelming majority of the country’s infrastructure, 

but local law enforcement tends to possess any threat 

information regarding that infrastructure. In short, 

because neither law enforcement nor private security 

can protect the nation’s infrastructure alone, law 

enforcement-private security partnerships are essential 

to bridging the gap. Even though existing partnerships 

may need improvement, we can build on the lessons 

learned from community policing. 

Law enforcement-private security partnerships are 

not new. The International Association of Chiefs of 

Police’s (IACP’s) Private Sector Liaison Committee 

has been in place for almost 20 years. ASIS (formerly 

the American Society for Industrial Security) 

International established a Law Enforcement Liaison 

Council to promote understanding and cooperation 

between private security and law enforcement. 

Recognizing a gap in homeland security, IACP 

called a national policy summit on the issue. Prior 

to September 11, IACP, the National Sheriffs’ 

Association, and ASIS joined together, with funding 

from the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice 

Programs’ Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), to 

launch “Operation Cooperation,” a national effort to 

increase collaboration between the private sector, 

particularly private security, and state and local law 

enforcement agencies. The document that emerged 

from that work, Operation Cooperation: Guidelines 

for Partnerships Between Law Enforcement and 

Private Security Organizations, is as relevant today as 

when it was published in 2000. The document focused 

on how the public and private sector could pool their 

resources to reduce crime and public disorder. The 

principles it elucidated are particularly important to 

our nation’s focus on homeland security since 

September 11. With chemical, biological, nuclear, 

and traditional terror threats a reality, the need 

for collaborative partnerships between local law 

enforcement and private security is as great today as 

it ever has been. 

The record shows that neither public law enforcement 

nor firefighters were the first to respond to the attack 

on the Twin Towers in 2001; private security personnel 

stationed in the two buildings and nearby facilities 

rapidly and selflessly became the first responders. 

Since September 11—and as a component of the 

national and world focus on preventing terrorist 

acts—the discourse on private security and its 

relationship to law enforcement has assumed a 

more complex dimension and reached new heights. 

The 9/11 Commission estimated that 85 percent 

of the nation’s infrastructure is privately owned.1 

Infrastructure includes not only physical assets, such 

as buildings, but also energy production facilities and 

assets, utilities (e.g., water and waste management), 

and transportation and communication networks. 

The number of people employed by private security, 

moreover, is at least three times larger than the number 

employed by public law enforcement.2 The amount of 

money spent on private security is many times greater 

than state, county, and local law enforcement 

expenditures combined. The growth in private 

protective forces ranges from mobile community 

patrols to executive protection personnel. 

1 
Two further considerations attest to the urgency of 

public-private security partnerships: the sheer size of 

the United States and terrorists’ expressed interest in 

inflicting mass casualties on its people. 

Because partnerships are a core component of 

community policing, the Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services (COPS) supported a 

national policy summit3 on partnerships in 2004. More 

than 140 representatives, ranging from chiefs of police 

to private security executives, concluded that law 

enforcement partnerships with private security have 

not evolved to the same degree as they have with 

community organizations. Law enforcement officials 

who meet regularly with neighborhood leaders, 

representatives of the faith community, and others do 

not routinely meet with corporate security directors 

or others in the security industry. Enormous strides 

were made in reducing crime and disorder through 

community partnerships in the 1990s. Further 

successes in public-private security partnerships will 

depend on leadership, planning, and relationship 

building. 

This document provides important background 

information on law enforcement-private security 

partnerships; discusses why these partnerships are 

important to homeland security and supplies 

information that enables police chiefs and sheriffs to 

make partnerships successful; and profiles a number 

of law enforcement-private security partnerships that 

local and state agencies might consider replicating. 

Private and Public: Definitions

and Background

While some overlap in the missions of public law 

enforcement and private security exists, the two 

groups are not the same. To explain how local law 

enforcement and private security can better protect the 

country, this section starts by clarifying the difference 

between public and private security. “Public policing” 

consists of services offered by local, state, tribal, and 

federal agencies, i.e., local and state police, tribal 

agencies, and sheriffs’ offices. These agencies provide 

the bulk of policing services across the United States. 

“For the most part, they are not concerned with 

corporate internal problems; they are concerned 

primarily with street crimes.”4 

Private security services, on the other hand, fall into 

two categories: (1) proprietary or corporate security; 

and (2) contract or private security firms. Corporate 

security generally refers to the security departments 

that exist within businesses or corporations. Contract 

security firms by contrast sell their services to the 

public, including businesses, homeowners, and banks. 

Private security is not a monolithic entity. Just as 

differences exist between state and local law 

enforcement, private security performs functions that 

can differ considerably. IACP’s summit report notes 

that “[a] security practitioner could be an experienced 

director of security at a major multinational 

corporation, a manager of contract security officers at 

a client site, a skilled computer crime investigator, an 

armed protector at a nuclear power plant, or an entrylevel guard at a retail store.”5 For local police chiefs 

and sheriffs, some or all of these classes of private 

security might be appropriate to incorporate into their 

homeland security strategies, depending on the 

characteristics of their jurisdictions. 

Law enforcement and private security have strengths 

and weaknesses that must be considered to form 

realistic expectations of what each can bring to 

partnerships. Private security is often criticized for 

absent or inadequate preemployment screening, 

training, standards, certification, and regulation, and 

high turnover rates. However, recent findings indicate 

that private security has made gains in these areas.6 

Private sector security also has significant strengths. 

The sheer number of private security officers makes 

it an important force. It often is able to protect small 

geographic areas with large numbers of officers or 

guards, something law enforcement cannot afford. 

Some private security officers, moreover, possess 

specialized technical capacity, including the 

knowledge and ability to protect computer networks, 

chemical plants, financial institutions, health care 

institutions, and retail establishments. Law 

enforcement often does not possess this knowledge or 

only the largest agencies possess it.7 More generally, 

the large and growing security industry “is armed with 

considerable and often sophisticated resources to deter 

crime and prevent other losses.”8 

The public law enforcement community is 

substantially smaller in size. Yet it is strong where 

private security is weak. To begin with, public law 

enforcement powers are far greater than those of 

private security. The selection process for becoming a 

2 
deputy or police officer, moreover, is vigorous and 

includes a thorough background investigation. Law 

enforcement officers are well trained, receiving 

academy, field, and inservice instruction. Officers tend 

to stay at the same agency for the duration of their 

careers, and officers in agencies that practice 

community policing are likely to have established 

rapport and trust with local citizens and business 

groups that can share information with them. Trust and 

information are invaluable for preventing terrorist acts. 

Law enforcement agencies, however, like private 

security, have limitations. They sometimes lack the 

financial resources of private firms because of tight 

budgets. Law enforcement response time can also lag: 

In rural jurisdictions it is not unusual for a service call 

to require a considerable drive; in urban jurisdictions, 

on the other hand, a considerable delay in response 

can result from a heavy call load. 

The IACP’s summit report notes that in some respects, 

“the line between public law enforcement and private 

security [can be] blurred.”9 It is not unusual for law 

enforcement executives at local, state, and federal 

levels to start a second career in private security. 

Sheriffs’ deputies and police officers work part time in 

private security to supplement their incomes. Colleges 

and universities are also much more likely to possess 

“private sector, sworn law enforcement agencies” than 

they were 20 years ago.10 

Benefits of Law EnforcementPrivate Security Partnerships

The advent of radical terrorism in the United States 

has placed great pressure on the law enforcement 

community. Specifically, agencies have been searching 

for a way to balance homeland security and traditional 

crime and disorder responsibilities. Limited and 

sometimes scarce resources must be allocated based 

on need, leading some chief executives to 

acknowledge that they are having considerable 

difficulty conducting this balancing act. Private 

security officials are experiencing a similar 

phenomenon. While their traditional responsibility 

to protect people, property, and information has 

continued, they are now also expected to be active 

participants in the national effort to protect the 

country’s infrastructure.11 

Clearly, law enforcement and private security have 

much to gain from each other. Law enforcement can: 

■	 Prepare private security to assist in emergencies. 

■	 Coordinate efforts to safeguard the nation’s critical 

infrastructure. 

■	 Obtain free training and services. 

■	 Gain additional personnel and expertise. 

■	 Use the private sector’s specialized knowledge and 

advanced technology. 

■	 Obtain evidence in criminal investigations. 

■	 Gather better information about incidents (through 

reporting by security staff). 

■ Reduce the number of calls for service. 

Private security can: 

■	 Coordinate plans with the public sector regarding 

evacuation, transportation, and food services during 

emergencies. 

■	 Gain information from law enforcement regarding 

threats and crime trends. 

■	 Develop relationships so that private practitioners 

know whom to contact when they need help or 

want to report information. 

■	 Build law enforcement understanding of corporate 

needs (e.g., confidentiality). 

■	 Boost law enforcement’s respect for the security 

field. 

Working together, private security and law 

enforcement can realize impressive benefits: 

■	 Creative problem solving. 

■	 Increased training opportunities. 

■	 Information, data, and intelligence sharing. 

■	 “Force multiplier” opportunities. 

■	 Access to the community through private sector 

communications technology. 

■	 Reduced recovery time following disasters. 

3 
Obstacles to Law EnforcementPrivate Security Partnerships

While the benefits of law enforcement-private security 

partnerships are many, a chief executive must know 

that these partnerships are not without obstacles: 

barriers to information sharing, lack of trust, and 

misinformation are the primary problems. 

Barriers to Information Sharing

Corporations hire former law enforcement, FBI, 

and CIA employees as security staff because these 

individuals typically retain strong information 

networks. Although these information networks are 

clearly valuable, information sharing of this type is 

normally limited and often inefficient. Law 

enforcement and the private sector must work 

together to cultivate more effective systems of 

information sharing.12 

Barriers to information sharing between law enforcement and private security clearly exist. Starting with 

private security limitations, law enforcement staff 

should bear in mind the for-profit nature of businesses. 

Specifically, because the private sector is in the 

business of making money, companies often do 

not want to release, give away, or otherwise share 

privileged business information that could ultimately 

hurt profitability. For example, if company 

representatives speak candidly at a public meeting, 

business competitors could exploit this information, 

as it may become publicly available through Freedom 

of Information Act requests. Law enforcement 

agencies, by the same token, have their own 

difficulties: They may be reticent to share information 

with companies owned by foreign enterprises and may 

also not be able to do so legally. When it comes to 

sharing information, however, the two greatest barriers 

are a lack of trust and misinformation. 

Lack of Trust

Although there are exceptions, one obstacle to creating 

effective partnerships may be a lack of trust between 

law enforcement and private security. Despite 

considerable discussion about partnerships between 

the two groups, overlapping missions, and the need to 

work together, the level of trust is reported to be quite 

low. The two sectors often view each other as having 

separate goals and have even viewed each other as 

competitors. 

Both sides must overcome the trust obstacle. Peter 

Homel, Director of the Crime Prevention Division of 

the New South Wales Attorney General’s Department, 

asserts that partnerships cannot endure that are not 

based on mutual trust. If trust does exist, it is often 

based on the working relationship of top executives 

seeking to establish a law enforcement-private security 

partnership. In many cases, these executives have 

worked together in the past because many security 

managers and directors serve in local law enforcement 

agencies prior to joining private industry. But trust at 

the top among a couple of key players cannot 

overcome decades of distrust across the professions. 

To develop trust, police chiefs, sheriffs, and their staffs 

must: 

■	 Create a vision and passion that brings workers 

together. 

■	 Deliver what is promised. 

■	 Ensure consistency. Constant change or change that 

is not understood destroys credibility. 

■	 Communicate. 

■	 Draw out and address past suspicions and concerns. 

■	 Pay attention to detail. 

■	 Train. 

■	 Ensure equity and equality. Both sides must produce 

their share of work and be recognized for it. 

■	 Reinforce the importance of the partnership (with 

an emphasis on sharing the credit for successes). 

■	 Admit mistakes and learn from them. Both sides 

will make errors. 

Misinformation and Misunderstanding

One of the major causes of lack of trust is 

misinformation and misunderstanding. Often, neither 

law enforcement nor private security has an accurate 

understanding of what the other does or can do. This 

can be problematic with regard to crime and disorder, 

but in the area of homeland security and terrorism it 

can be perilous. Even smaller scale terrorist acts can 

cause considerable physical, psychological, and 

economic damage. As noted in Perspectives on 

4 
Preparedness, “the private sector’s current lack of 

integration into domestic preparedness programs is 

dangerous.”13 Every law enforcement officer needs to 

know how private security can help with homeland 

security and he or she must know this before an 

incident occurs, not after. The best way to gain this 

information is from the source: private security 

professionals in their community. 

If law enforcement-private security partnerships are 

to be effective, law enforcement executives must 

work with their private security counterparts to 

communicate clear and consistent messages not 

only to each other, but also down through their 

organizations to the line-level officer or guard. At 

the national policy summit, joint training was 

recommended so that each side knows what the other 

has to offer. Training can also broaden the knowledge 

of line-level employees (e.g., private security guards 

could receive training on homeland security, crime 

prevention, and problem solving). 

Where We Stand Today—The 4 C’s

In the past, lack of trust and knowledge has inhibited 

the formation of law enforcement-private security 

partnerships. This is not to say, however, that gains 

have not been made over the years. As the Operation 

Cooperation guidelines noted, “law enforcement 

agencies and private security operations (both contract 

security providers and corporate security departments) 

have increasingly come together, pooling their 

strengths to prevent and solve crimes.”14 Today, 

however, these partnerships must not simply prevent 

and solve crimes, they must also prevent terrorist acts. 

And although significant progress has been made in 

establishing partnerships, some partnerships are 

more comprehensive and effective than others. 

Understanding the 4 C’s—communication, 

cooperation, coordination, and collaboration—is 

crucial to achieving effective partnerships. 

Readers can think of each of the 4 C’s as a step on the 

way to full partnering. Communication, the exchange 

of information and ideas, is the first step in 

establishing a relationship between two organizations. 

The second step, cooperation, involves partners 

undertaking a joint project or operation such as the 

sharing of personnel. Coordination, the third step, is 

achieved when the partners adopt a common goal, for 

instance, to reduce crime in a certain neighborhood. 

The final and most comprehensive step, collaboration, 

occurs when partners understand that their missions 

overlap and adopt policies and projects designed to 

share resources, achieve common goals, and 

strengthen the partners. The goal of public-private 

partnerships, described in greater detail below, is to 

achieve collaboration. 

What We Need To Do—The 12

Components of Partnerships

Understanding that law enforcement-private security 

partnerships are important to the nation’s security is 

only a first step. Defining and operationalizing a 

partnership are the critical next steps. What do chief 

executives need to do to engage in these partnerships? 

First, they must understand what a partnership is. 

Although this may seem too simple a factor to 

consider, people often overlook the basics. And 

agencies seeking to achieve collaboration must 

understand the components that their partnerships 

will contain. 

A successful public-private partnership has 12 

essential components: 

■	 Common goals. 

■	 Common tasks. 

■	 Knowledge of participating agencies’ capabilities 

and missions. 

■	 Well-defined projected outcomes. 

■	 A timetable. 

■	 Education for all involved. 

■	 A tangible purpose. 

■	 Clearly identified leaders. 

■	 Operational planning. 

■	 Agreement by all partners as to how the 

partnership will proceed. 

■	 Mutual commitment to providing necessary 

resources. 

■	 Assessment and reporting. 

5 
Executives need to agree on these components before 

the partnership moves forward. For the police chief 

or sheriff, this may include not only working with a 

corporation’s security director but also with the 

corporation’s chief executive or similar designee. 

Private security professionals at the summit, both 

executives and others, expressed great interest in 

collaborating with local law enforcement to protect the 

nation’s infrastructure. They simply need to be asked. 

Executives should also be mindful of adopting 

policies that only partially contribute to successful 

partnerships. For instance, although the following can 

be elements in a partnership, in and of themselves 

they do not constitute a public-private collaboration: 

■	 Executives attending partner meetings. 

■	 Officers attending partner meetings. 

■	 Individual projects undertaken with private security. 

■	 Joint grants undertaken with private security. 

Attending meetings and working on projects can be 

integral parts of a partnership. In fact, meetings are 

often used to share information and plan activities. 

Likewise, working together on projects or grants is 

often of value. However, these activities do not add 

up to the 12 threads that tie groups together in 

collaborative partnerships. 

How We Do It—The Nine

Guidelines for Collaboration

DHS Guidelines for Collaboration

While public-private cooperation can take many 

forms, collaborative partnerships are more defined; 

collaboration requires common goals and tasks, 

clearly identified leaders, and the other components 

described above. Cooperation, as suggested on page 

5, might simply entail government contracting with 

private security for services traditionally performed by 

law enforcement agencies, or the employment of offduty police officers or sheriffs’ deputies by private 

security agencies. However, these activities only 

scratch the surface of what the two sides can do to 

foster public safety. Homeland security arrangements 

between law enforcement and private security require 

much more than cooperation. 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

has issued recommendations for jurisdictions seeking 

to improve collaboration with their private sector 

counterparts. DHS suggests that agencies: 

■	 Recognize the need for prevention. 

■	 Establish a system, center, or task force to serve 

as a clearinghouse for all potentially relevant 

domestically generated terrorism information. 

■	 Ensure timely interpretation and assessment of 

information. 

■	 Prepare Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) 

and formal coordination agreements between 

public and private agencies. MOUs should describe 

mechanisms for exchanging information about 

vulnerabilities and risks, coordination of responses, 

and processes to facilitate information sharing and 

multijurisdictional preemption of terrorist acts. 

■	 Use community policing initiatives, strategies, and 

tactics to identify suspicious activities related to 

terrorism. 

■	 Explicitly develop “social capital” through 

collaboration among the private sector, law 

enforcement, and other partners so that data, 

information, assistance, and “best practices” may 

be shared and collaborative processes developed. 

■	 Coordinate federal, state, and local information, 

plans, and actions for assessments, prevention 

procedures, infrastructure protection, and funding 

priorities to address prevention. 

■	 Establish a regional prevention information 

command center and coordinate the flow of 

information regarding infrastructure. 

■	 Include prevention and collaboration measures in 

exercises.15 

Outreach and Trust

The key to success is implementation. When 

implemented properly, collaborative partnerships can 

minimize (and sometimes avoid) duplicative efforts 

and leverage limited resources. Once a sheriff or 

police chief has decided to engage a private security 

entity in a partnership, initial outreach will be 

necessary. Outreach is easiest when trust levels are 

6 
high. In these instances, the public sector chief 

executive will likely have established a relationship 

with his or her private sector counterpart as trust is 

normally built over time. For those chief executives 

who have not engaged their private sector counterparts 

before, an initial gesture of goodwill, respect, 

commitment, and purpose can go a long way. 

Formalization and Memorandums of

Understanding

Once trust has been established, police chiefs and 

sheriffs should formalize the new relationship by 

signing an MOU. Formalization shows employees 

that the partnership is a priority. At the national level, 

summit participants called on public and private sector 

leaders to make a formal commitment to partnerships 

and to endorse “the implementation of sustainable 

public-private partnerships as a preferred tool to 

address terrorism, public disorder, and crime.”16 As 

part of this effort, law enforcement chief executives 

should expect, measure, and reward efforts. 

Formalization helps institutionalize homeland securitydriven partnerships. As steps toward achieving this 

goal, summit participants encouraged: 

■	 The Commission on Accreditation for Law 

Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and state 

accreditation bodies to require public-private 

partnerships as an accreditation standard. 

■	 Law enforcement agencies and private security 

organizations to institutionalize communication by 

sharing personnel directories with each other; to 

make collaboration an objective in their strategic 

plans; and to require monthly and annual reporting 

of progress.17 

As part of writing an MOU and general startup, 

partners will need to identify the partnership’s goals, 

establish their expectations, and educate and train 

personnel and other stakeholders. The goals of 

partnerships can be quite varied. The Operation 

Cooperation guidelines noted eight areas in which 

law enforcement and private security can collaborate: 

■	 Networking. 

■	 Information sharing. 

■	 Crime prevention. 

■	 Resource sharing. 

■	 Training. 

■	 Legislation. 

■	 Operations. 

■	 Research and guidelines. 

Each of these areas contains a homeland security or 

terrorism prevention element. 

Networking: An example of networking might be 

breakfast and lunch meetings to discuss the common 

problems both groups have in protecting critical 

infrastructure. These meetings could elicit not only 

a constructive exchange about the pressures, 

motivations, and constraints on both the public and 

private sides of the equation, but also possible 

solutions. 

Information sharing: The lifeblood of any policing 

agency is information; thus, information sharing (and 

its analyzed counterpart, intelligence sharing) should 

be a central component of any law enforcementprivate security partnership. Information sharing 

includes planning for critical incident response, 

protecting infrastructure, enhancing communications, 

minimizing liability, and strategically deploying 

resources. Information should flow in both directions 

between law enforcement and private security. 

Crime prevention: Crime prevention is terrorism 

prevention.18 The links between crime and terrorism 

are well understood—whether that connection has to 

do with document fraud or the illegal drug market. 

Terrorists often commit a number of lesser crimes 

toward their goal of the actual terrorist act. Based on 

what is known of terrorist groups and their penchant 

for “casing” targets (sometimes years in advance), it 

is not unreasonable to assume that terrorists might 

trespass on private property for these purposes. While 

private security may have in the past simply barred 

such individuals from returning to the property, they 

might now photograph trespassers and share the 

photographs with local law enforcement. Even without 

unlawful activity, private security should share any 

information about anything that is unusual or 

suspicious with law enforcement, especially when it 

involves the photographing of critical infrastructure. 

7 
Resource sharing: Lending expertise is an excellent 

example of resource sharing that can benefit terrorism 

prevention. As noted earlier, private security companies 

often have considerable technical knowledge that the 

local law enforcement community may lack. 

Training: Lending expertise has clear connections to 

training. Another way to include training in a 

partnership is to host speakers on topics of joint 

interest, which can be extremely beneficial to law 

enforcement and private security, broadening the 

knowledge base of both. 

Legislation: Law enforcement and private security 

can work together to track legislation that is important 

to both. More importantly, they should help legislators 

at the local, state, and national levels understand how 

legislation can affect, impair, or assist homeland 

security—not the least of which might be related to 

the sharing of certain types of sensitive information. 

Operations: For line-level officers, investigators, 

and command staffs, the greatest opportunities for 

collaboration with private security are in the operational 

areas. Terrorism-related opportunities for collaboration 

include critical incident planning, the investigation of 

complex financial fraud or computer crimes (i.e., 

cybercrime), and joint sting operations (e.g., those 

targeting cargo theft). 

Research and guidelines: The review and distribution 

of and action on research papers and protocols are 

areas in which law enforcement and private security 

can collaborate. Research and guidelines might be 

related to product tampering, closed-circuit television, 

security personnel standards, or whatever happens to 

be the homeland security issue of most importance to 

a region. 

These examples are not intended to exhaustively 

illustrate the types of collaborative activities in which 

private security and law enforcement might engage. 

Many other examples exist for each of the eight areas, 

some of which will be discussed in the chapter “Local 

and Regional Programs and Initiatives.” Regardless of 

activity, it is important to keep the 4 C’s in mind: 

communication, cooperation, coordination, and 

collaboration. Each “C” represents an increasingly 

sophisticated component of the partnership. The end 

goal always is to collaborate. 

Choosing Liaison Officers

Once both sides agree to form a partnership and set 

common goals and objectives through an MOU, 

selecting the right person as a liaison officer is an 

important, and often overlooked, responsibility. The 

success of a partnership often depends on the liaison. 

No substitute exists for a well-informed officer who 

is committed to and passionate about a partnership. 

These officers become invaluable resources, 

motivating others to accomplish the goals and tasks of 

the partnership, improving information sharing, and 

fostering lasting relationships—all-important elements 

in a successful partnership. 

Executives should also bear in mind that selecting 

the wrong law enforcement officer to represent the 

department—even for a single meeting—can be 

devastating. Unfortunately, officers are sometimes 

thrust into liaison roles without adequate preparation, 

understanding, or commitment. They are not briefed 

on how or why the partnership was begun or its goals. 

Police chiefs and sheriffs should take the following 

steps to select and support their liaison: 

■	 Involve supervisors in the selection process— 

supervisors are the closest management rank to 

officers and most often best know the strengths and 

weaknesses of the officers under their command. 

Before the selection is made, supervisors should 

develop or be given criteria on the type of 

involvement and time commitment required for the 

position, and its projected outcomes. Supervisors 

should take a lead role in the selection process. 

■	 Fit officers to the assignment. “Fit” should be 

based on a candidate’s personal interests, prior 

experience, and commitment. 

■	 Give as much notice as possible before asking 

officers to represent the department as liaison. This 

allows them time to prepare. 

■	 Inform officers of the desired outcomes of the 

partnership. 

■	 Explain expectations clearly at the start of the 

process. 

■	 Educate officers on the “who, what, when, where, 

why, and how” of partnerships. Officers should 

know how to facilitate a partnership and support its 

mission. 8 
■	 Introduce officers to key players. 

■	 Follow up regularly on participation by officers. 

Followup demonstrates a commitment by people 

other than the liaison and provides additional 

perspective on the partnership’s progress. 

Additional guidance can be given to the liaison. 

Just as selecting the wrong law enforcement officer as 

liaison can lead to failure, selecting the wrong private 

security guard or officer can do the same. The problem 

in selecting private security personnel is perhaps 

more complicated. As noted above, private security 

prescreening, standards, and training are often 

lacking. Law enforcement and private security 

executives both recognize these deficiencies. Summit 

participants noted that the “protection of the nation’s 

critical infrastructure depends substantially on 

the competence of private security officers” and 

recommended that an advisory council work to 

improve the selection and training of private security 

officers.19 

9 
Local and Regional Programs and Initiatives

Four years after September 11, few jurisdictions have homeland security-driven law enforcementprivate security partnerships. Instead, most agencies 

focus on crime prevention partnerships, which have 

proved effective over the past decade. As law 

enforcement-private security partnerships continue to 

emerge as an area of interest in terrorism prevention, 

however, numerous homeland security partnerships 

will likely materialize over the next few years. In the 

interim, and to encourage the process, this chapter 

describes several examples of successful local and 

regional public-private security partnerships. Based on 

information that has been collected during this project, 

these descriptions are offered to law enforcement 

executives as examples of law enforcement-private 

security partnerships they might consider replicating. 

The principles in the crime prevention-driven 

partnerships are not only transferable to homeland 

security-driven partnerships, but are interrelated and 

inseparable from them. 

Area Police/Private Security

Liaison (APPL)—New York, 

New York

APPL, created in 1986, enhances public-private 

security cooperation. It aims to protect persons and 

property, encourage the exchange of information 

between police and security, and eliminate issues of 

credibility and misperception. While it started with 

only 30 private security organizations, it now boasts 

more than 1,000. Since September 11, APPL’s 

mandate has widened and taken on new importance. 

APPL is linked with the Crime Prevention and Recruit 

Training sections (RTS) of the New York Police 

Department (NYPD). The Crime Prevention section’s 

mission “is to provide crime prevention services and 

programs to the citizens and businesses of New York 

City that include but are not limited to conducting 

security surveys, lectures, the administration of crime 

reduction programs, and various forms of outreach.”20 

Officers attend APPL meetings and work with private 

security to identify issues and solutions. The RTS 

trains both recruits and citizens, among which are 

APPL members. 

Because New York City is a high-priority target for 

terrorists, NYPD operates under a heightened state 

of awareness. The police work with APPL to review 

police security alertness at member facilities. Their 

joint recommendations include the following 

admonitions: 

■	 Pay special attention to employee and visitor 

identification, suspicious packages, and all 

entrances and exits, particularly those that are not 

commonly used. 

■	 Give careful scrutiny to all vehicles entering 

facilities and those parked in the immediate area. 

■	 Review building evacuation plans to ensure that 

they are up to date. 

11 

■ 

statement to the 9/11 Commission that the police 

This is accomplished principally through an e-mail 

Remind security directors to not hesitate in calling 

911 if they encounter suspicious individuals, 

packages, automobiles, or trucks. 

NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly noted in his 

have “worked extensively with private security 

professionals from major facilities and corporations 

under APPL, [and that the program] gives the NYPD 

an instant communications network through which we 

can send out terrorism bulletins and security updates.” 

network established for APPL members. For more 

information, go to www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/home.html. 

Tabletop Exercises—Arlington,

Virginia

The Arlington County Police Department recently 

began conducting tabletop exercises (e.g., hypothetical 

scenarios) with the private sector in two of the 

county’s busiest commercial centers. Private sector 
participants—for instance, building security personnel, 

engineers, and managers—are chosen based partly on 

their decisionmaking authority. But participants also 

include office workers, who constitute the majority of 

office building occupants. 

County tabletop exercises normally start with smoke 

drifting past an office building, which requires the 

participants to respond. The exercises often highlight 

the fact that most participants aren’t prepared for such 

incidents. Instructors encourage participants and 

ensure that they are ready should an incident occur or 

should they observe something suspicious. Facilitators 

prepare the participants to make decisions they have 

not considered previously and flag vulnerabilities. 

The exercises also acquaint the audience with the 

capabilities and limitations of the police, fire 

department, and other county agencies so that 

participants have realistic expectations of what the 

government can deliver in an emergency. 

As part of this process, police officials direct 

participants to information on the county web site 

and promote an initiative called the Arlington Alert 

System. In the event of a terrorist attack or other 

emergency, this system sends notifications, updates, 

and alerts to citizens’ cell phones, pagers, Blackberrys, 

PDAs, and e-mail. For more information, go to 

www.arlingtonva.us. 

Center City District—

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

As with many large cities, Philadelphia’s downtown 

suffered from decades of deterioration, neglect, and 

resident flight to outlying areas. To reverse this trend, 

city police provided services that helped lay the 

foundation for the downtown area’s stabilization and 

renewal. 

Philadelphia’s officials recognized that the city would 

not rebound unless its downtown could be revitalized: 

The downtown area accounted for 33 percent of city 

tax revenue and more than 250,000 jobs. Moreover, 

the location of downtown next to the city’s historic 

district, which contains such national treasures as 

Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell, meant that its 

revitalization would also improve the city’s important 

tourist industry. In 1989, concerned citizens founded 

the Central Philadelphia Development Corporation 

(CPDC), which persuaded area businesses to accept a 

property tax to fund redevelopment and raised $6 

million in 2 years. In 1991, CPDC helped designate 

80 blocks next to the city’s historic district as the 

Center City District. 

But this was only the beginning. To change 

perceptions about Center City, the city police 

department focused manpower and resources in the 

area to reduce crime. The department staffed its 

Center City substation with 57 patrol officers, 

who supplemented, rather than replaced, existing 

neighborhood car patrols. Officers worked in 

tandem with a newly created corps of community 

representatives (referred to as “clean and safe” 

workers) to help revitalize the district. Based in a 

central facility, police, private security personnel, 

sanitation workers, and community representatives 

cleaned up the district, improved public safety, and 

made thousands of contacts with district residents. 

At the same time, the city implemented a marketing 

campaign to spread the word about improving 

conditions in Center City. 

Results have been impressive: the number of crimes 

in the district declined; more companies acquired 

space in the area and the number of jobs stabilized; 

bookings at the city convention center, located in the 

district, rose; and new construction began. Perhaps 

most telling, other cities, such as Baltimore and 

Richmond, have taken note of the improvements 

and modeled their own revitalization programs on 

Philadelphia’s efforts. Clearly, Philadelphia’s Center 

City initiative serves as an example of a successful 

public-private partnership. For more information, go 

to www.centercityphila.org. 

Law Enforcement and Private

Security Council of Northeast

Florida 

Started in St. Johns County in 1996, the Law 

Enforcement and Private Security Council of 

Northeast Florida now includes organizations and 

jurisdictions throughout the greater Jacksonville area. 

The council does not require an organization to reach 

a certain size before it can join the partnership— 

several counties, cities, law enforcement agencies, and 

smaller jurisdictions are members, including the local 

U.S. Department of Defense police departments and 

the National Guard. 

12 
The partnership has expanded dramatically since 

September 11, shifting its focus from private security 

companies to individual security guards, community 

crime watch groups, and any individual who serves 

a security function. The other major change since 

September 11 has been the partnership’s focus on 

information exchange between members. 

One of the founding assumptions of the council 

was the need to increase public-private security 

collaboration. The law enforcement partners on the 

council recognized that the number of private security 

professionals was far greater than the number of 

police, that private security spends exponentially more 

money on security and protection than does public 

law enforcement, and last, that private security 

professionals bring valuable expertise and experience 

that the police sometimes do not have. 

The St. Johns Sheriff’s Office notes two principal 

council successes. First, relationships between the 

public and private sides of local security are being 

developed. The goal is to encourage a private security 

guard to approach or call a deputy or officer when 

he or she has information to share, and vice versa. 

Second, the Security Communications Assistance 

Network (SCAN) has been created. SCAN provides 

radios with alternate frequencies to private security 

personnel so that they can contact local law 

enforcement if an incident occurs or if they have 

information to share. 

Other successes include setting up a council web site, 

expanding the fax notification program to e-mail so 

that messages are shared as quickly as possible, and 

sending a representative to or placing a brochure at all 

ASIS meetings, IACP events, and other local security 

meetings. 

Council representatives now participate in the Local 

Domestic Security Task Force. The task force works 

regionally on a number of homeland security efforts, 

including security preparations for the 2005 Super 

Bowl in Jacksonville. Like the council, the task force 

also has private sector representation; members from 

Northrop Grumman and Blue Cross/Blue Shield 

participate in the task force because of the size and 

criticality of their organizations’ facilities. The 

information from the task force feeds back into the 

council’s information exchange through briefings and 

faxed information. Information is shared whenever it 

relates to the job responsibilities of the private 

security partner. 

The council has grown in part because its members 

have worked to keep things interesting for participants. 

Leaders work hard to select guest speakers who 

interest professionals individually, but who can also 

speak to the partnership as a whole. As a result, 

partners recognize that both public and private 

security forces have valuable contributions to make. 

For more information, go to the St. Johns County 

Sheriff’s Office web site at www.sjso.org/emer_prep/ 

homeland.htm. 

North Texas Regional Law

Enforcement and Private

Security (LEAPS) 

LEAPS began in 1983, but lasted only a few years 

due to staff turnover. In 1993, Dallas Police Chief 

Benjamin Click revisited LEAPS and pulled together 

20 dedicated individuals from both the police 

department and the private security community; 

the partnership has been in effect ever since. 

The events of September 11 reinforced to LEAPS 

the importance of what it had been trying to do. 

Although the partners always understood the need for 

13 

meetings. 

communication and collaboration, the terrorist attacks 

motivated them to redouble their efforts. 

LEAPS offers workshops for the training academy 

and for inservice officers. A balance of private 

security and police officers attend LEAPS quarterly 

LEAPS security officers receive four core training 

sessions and are eligible to take a number of elective 

training sessions. Once the private security officer has 

completed core training, he or she receives a badge 

that indicates the officer has received training over 

and above what is required. 

LEAPS officers can be “activated.” In situations in 

which police need additional people who do not have 

to be peace officers, the department calls LEAPS and 

requests private security personnel. 

LEAPS reports two primary successes. First, the 

initiative has established a trust that allows 
relationships to build. In fact, when problems arise 

between private security and police, LEAPS staff are 

often asked to intervene to settle the problem. Second, 

LEAPS partners have shown a propensity to share 

information, which has led to a number of arrests. 

Information is shared in both directions through fax, 

e-mail, quarterly meetings, and, especially, personal 

contact. Board meetings are open so that any issue can 

be brought to the table immediately. 

The partnership has been institutionalized as a result 

of these successes; both sides recognize the benefits of 

LEAPS. With only a few hundred police officers on 

duty at any given time, the large number of private 

security professionals who can be tapped greatly 

augments the police department’s capacity. For more 

information, go to www.leaps.us. 

NET Teams, WatchMail, and Crime

Free Mini­Storage—Irvine,

California

The Irvine Police Department (IPD) has embarked on 

a number of programs designed to bring stakeholders 

(e.g., private security, apartment managers, and storage 

facility personnel) together around crime and terrorism 

prevention. Because IPD views community awareness, 

education, and reassurance as essential in the fight 

against terrorism, these programs offer training, 

including terrorism-related tips, to stakeholders. 

IPD has helped create a strong and growing relationship 

among law enforcement, private security, and local 

business. It takes a multifaceted approach, going 

beyond one or two showcase programs to proactively 

partner with city agencies and the private sector. For 

more information, go to www.cityofirvine.org/ipd/ 

divisions/crimeprev. 

NET Teams 

Irvine is divided into three service areas, supported 

by the city’s geo-based system. A Neighborhood 

Enhancement Team (NET), consisting of representatives 

of various city agencies including the police, serves 

each area. NET teams take the lead in preventing and 

resolving problems. 

WatchMail 

Similar in concept to Neighborhood Watch, WatchMail 

provides effective dissemination of crime and disaster 

information. Residents, private security firms, and 

businesses obtain information rapidly, stay informed, 

and become active participants in neighborhood safety. 

WatchMail expands the power behind Neighborhood 

Watch, which often involves a block captain and 

residents who patrol their neighborhood and share 

information through a phone tree. WatchMail, on the 

other hand, goes beyond the block. A host broadcasts 

crime- and disaster-related information via e-mail to 

neighbors, sharing information with perhaps 300 to 

500 homes. In this way, WatchMail complements 

Neighborhood Watch, but is not dependent on it. 

And because approximately 80 percent of the Irvine 

population has access to e-mail, WatchMail holds out 

the promise of alerting most of the city’s residents. 

Although the police department does not manage 

WatchMail on a daily basis, it does identify 

neighborhood recruit hosts, provides training, and 

assists with startup. Communities oversee operation 

and maintenance, often with support from private 

businesses, which sustain the system’s e-mail 

technology. IPD is included in each host’s e-mail 

database so that police can monitor information. The 

police department in turn provides crime and disaster 

information to hosts, who forward the information to 

other participants. 

Focusing on neighborhoods that could benefit from 

the service, IPD has helped five communities set 

up WatchMail. The police conduct interviews, 

background and fingerprint checks, and monthly 

training for hosts. 

The host obtains e-mail addresses from neighbors and 

businesses; creates and maintains the e-mail database; 

takes calls about unusual or suspicious occurrences; 

analyzes reports for accuracy and validity; and, if 

necessary, broadcasts the information to the WatchMail 

group. If circumstances warrant, a “reporter” contacts 

the IPD dispatch center or calls 911. Hosts spend from 

1 to 5 hours a month serving the team. 

Neighborhood participants observe unusual activity, 

collect descriptive information, and, when needed, call 

the host to request a broadcast. Participants are also 

connected with neighbors who do not have access to 

e-mail or the Internet so that they may send them 

bulletins and information. There is communitywide 

acceptance of and reliance on WatchMail. 

14 
Crime Free Mini­Storage 

Many mini-storage facilities are secured in such a way 

that patrol officers can make only a passing check of 

the property. The potential for crime is compounded 

because many facilities allow customers round-theclock access. The Crime Free Mini-Storage Program 

helps mini-storage facilities keep criminals off their 

property by implementing effective screening and 

teaching owners and managers how to deal with crime. 

Specifically, the program prevents offenders from 

renting storage space, decreases time delays from 

crime to discovery, and increases property recovery. 

The program has reduced crime and calls for service 

in mini-storage properties. 

As one law enforcement executive noted, terrorists 

“need somewhere to keep their stuff.” The program 

can help prevent terrorism-related activity by ensuring 

an open exchange of information between facilities 

and IPD personnel, who rarely are onsite. 

In addition to educating renters, the program offers 

training to managers and employees of the facilities. In 

the first phase, managers learn to spot problems before 

they occur and deal with them without police 

involvement. 

Reducing Crime Against

Tourists—Las Vegas, Nevada 

Las Vegas, a growing city with a population of nearly 

480,000, had more than 35 million visitors in 2001. 

Approximately 4 million were convention delegates, 

making Las Vegas one of the largest convention cities 

in the nation. The impact on the local and state 

economy is staggering: tourists spend more than 

$31 billion a year. 

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

(FBI’s) Uniform Crime Reports, Las Vegas has the 

highest crime rate of the five cities that U.S. tourists 

most visit. Most of the crime stems from tourism and 

includes theft and alcohol-related incidents. To help 

deal with the problem, Las Vegas hotels employ more 

than 7,500 security personnel and 1,000 surveillance 

specialists. Such an environment cannot be secured by 

the police alone. Partnership with private security is 

not simply desired—it is a necessity. 

The police department’s Tourist Safety Unit (TSU), 

begun in 1995, manages police response to touristrelated crime and provides quality service to victims. 

TSU targets pickpockets and check forgers, assigning 

each officer to between 5 and 12 hotels. He or she 

works directly with hotel security directors, 

investigators, and security officers. 

For example, officers who follow a pickpocket into a 

hotel rely on the hotel’s security personnel to assist 

in observing the suspect, most often via electronic 

surveillance. Security personnel will detain the suspect 

if they observe criminal behavior before the police do. 

In another example, police may set up a sting on a 

maid suspected of stealing to keep the hotel from 

having to handle the problem. In emergencies, highspeed fax systems allow the police to send alerts to 

100 hotels in less than 3 minutes, which facilitates 

rapid use of hotel security. 

The result of this close teamwork is an excellent 

working relationship between police and frontline 

hotel security personnel. But the partnership extends 

farther, into areas like training. 

The police department and private security are 

taking advantage of each other’s resources to provide 

superior training to their staffs. The police train hotel 

security personnel and often develop specialized 

programs to deal with emerging crime trends, such as 

a sudden increase in credit card fraud. In turn, the 

local security industry provides instruction to police 

on crimes unique to casinos and other areas in which 

it has expertise. Las Vegas hotels require security 

personnel to undergo training in areas such as report 

writing, detection, the use of force, and the law. 

As a result, security personnel in Las Vegas are highly 

skilled and are recognized as such by the police. Close 

communication, joint training, and shared authority 

foster mutual respect. 

TSU accepts hotel security reports on the victim’s 

behalf and, as a courtesy, sends them to the insurance 

company. Plans call for the courthouse to be wired so 

that felony victims who live out of state can testify via 

closed-circuit television over the Internet. 

The police department takes other steps to maintain 

the relationship: (1) it encourages detectives to give 

security personnel their home phone numbers; and 

(2) it holds police and security personnel to the same

standards when interacting with business people. For 

example, when officers stop for meals at a hotel, they 

15 
eat in the same facility as security employees, rather 

than in tourist areas. 

The Las Vegas Security Chiefs Association and police 

representatives meet monthly to discuss training, crime 

trends, and security problems. Personnel from 90 

hotels attend. 

One of the benefits arising from the partnership is that 

it provides a mutual source of applicants. Security 

officers employed by hotels offer a source for recruiting 

new officers for the police department. By the same 

token, police personnel often retire to assume positions 

in private security. For more information, go to 

www.lvmpd.com/Tourist_Safety. 

Transit Crisis Resolved—Durham,

North Carolina

Turning to private security to fill a role traditionally 

assumed by local law enforcement is becoming more 

common. In Durham, police contracted with private 

security and worked closely with corporate officials 

to help stem a crisis in the transit system. 

In early 2003, a series of shootings occurred on 

Durham Area Transit Authority buses, garnering 

considerable publicity. Fear set in, and many 

passengers stopped riding the buses. Transit Authority 

employees in turn shared the public’s concern. 

Police lacked the resources to place officers on every 

bus and at every bus stop, although many residents and 

political leaders demanded this. To stem the tide of 

fear, increase ridership, and, ultimately, rebuild trust 

in the bus system, the city turned to a private security 

enterprise, the Wackenhut Corporation. 

Uniformed Wackenhut officers began patrolling bus 

stops and riding buses. The private officers were well 

trained and, like police officers, had power of arrest. 

In addition, the security officers were armed and their 

uniforms were distinctly different from those worn by 

police. The presence and visibility of these security 

officers helped reduce fear among residents. 

Wackenhut maintained close contact with the police 

and city officials. The effort evolved from a simple 

contract to a security service to a full partnership 

involving common goals, a commitment to achieving 

the goals, and a positive working relationship. Neither 

the police nor Wackenhut security officers could have 

accomplished the task without each other’s support. 

People quickly realized that fewer crimes were 

occurring along bus routes. Ridership increased and 

people’s satisfaction with the bus system improved. 

Although there is still much to be done, the 

improvements have endured. 

Metropolitan Atlanta

Technological Crimes Task Force

(MetroTech)—Atlanta, Georgia

In 1995, an increase in the theft of laptop computers 

and other technology-related crimes in Atlanta led to 

the establishment of MetroTech. MetroTech began 

with five members, but this sharply focused group, 

which brought together police and corporate 

representatives, quickly grew into one of the nation’s 

largest public-private partnerships dedicated to 

reducing crime. Today, MetroTech has 800 members 

representing private corporations and law enforcement 

organizations, extending beyond Atlanta to include 

Georgia and the southeastern United States. 

MetroTech improves communication between 

corporate security services and local, state, and federal 

law enforcement, combating organized criminal 

factions and seeking to resolve crimes such as fraud, 

forgery, counterfeiting, and cargo theft. The task force 

aims to break down traditional barriers that exist 

between police and corporate security. 

Of particular interest to MetroTech when it was 

organized were industrial and financial crimes, which 

many corporate and security officials believed were 

not getting appropriate police attention: difficult and 

time-consuming to investigate, they rarely received 

media attention. It was believed that many police 

officials assigned these crimes a low investigative 

priority. 

Monthly meetings, direct communication, and an 

e-mail network managed by the Emory University 

Police Department underpin MetroTech. The key to 

the partnership’s success is the speed with which the 

members share important information on criminal 

investigations. Information sharing in MetroTech 

focuses on developing investigative leads, distributing 

lookouts, identifying patterns and practices, 

identifying criminal factions or groups, and soliciting 

16 
assistance from other members with expertise. 

Attendance at monthly meetings is optional; the 

atmosphere is informal and participants are 

encouraged to share information openly. Meetings 

are closed to the public and media. 

Each member knows what is needed and, within the 

limits of law, is committed to sharing all necessary 

data. Information sent to MetroTech is screened by 

task force officials for content, importance, and 

legality before it is shared through the network or 

forwarded to law enforcement agencies. 

MetroTech is administered by a steering committee 

comprising the partnership’s leading members. 

Membership in the committee is balanced between 

corporate security and law enforcement, with an 

emphasis on experience. 

Partnerships like MetroTech took on new meaning in 

the wake of September 11. As other jurisdictions 

began seeking ways to bring private security and 

police together and target crimes such as cargo theft 

and fraud, the Atlanta region was dramatically 

ahead of the curve because of MetroTech, which 

subsequently became a model for the FBI’s InfraGard 

Program, a national infrastructure information 

exchange program (www.infragard.net). 

17 
Other State and Local Programs

The initiatives and programs listed below were also ■ Pooling Resources in Defense of our highlighted in the “Operation Cooperation” Environment (PRIDE): Contact the Southfield 

guidelines. These are promising examples of law (Michigan) Police Department at 248–354–4720. 

enforcement-private security partnerships. 

■	 Washington Law Enforcement Executive 

■	 Austin Metro High Tech Foundation: Contact the 

Austin Police Department’s High Tech Crime Unit 

at www.ci.austin.tx.us/police/htech.htm. 

Forum: Contact WLEEF through the Washington 

Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs at 

www.waspc.org. 

■	 California High Technology Crime Advisory ■ Virginia Police and Private Security Alliance 

Committee.	 (VAPPSA): Contact the Fairfax County Police 

Department at 703–691–2131. 

19 
Federal Programs

Although both of the programs described below are federal initiatives, local and state law enforcement 

executives may consider using them as models. As 

noted earlier, the successful law enforcement-private 

security initiative must have the support of the private 

sector chief executive officers and their corporate 

security directors—a goal that both of these initiatives 

have achieved. The Overseas Security Advisory 

Council (OSAC) has been particularly successful in 

gaining these individuals’ support because its “goal 

(has been) to support U.S. corporations by developing 

efficient and cost-effective security information and 

communication networks that provide the U.S. 

business community with the tools needed to cope 

with security-related issues.”21 Law enforcement chief 

executives must understand that their private security 

counterparts often cannot separate these twin concerns 

of security and cost. Police chiefs and sheriffs should 

bear in mind these high-priority considerations when 

entering into a collaborative partnership with private 

security. 

Awareness of National Security

Issues and Response (ANSIR)

Program

Since the early 1970s, the FBI has worked to 

“reduce the vulnerability of United States persons, 

corporations, and institutions to intelligence and 

terrorist activities.”22 While ANSIR was originally 

designed to protect classified government information, 

property, and personnel, the 1990s saw an expansion 

of the program to include a focus on private sector 

proprietary economic information. When September 

11 occurred, the FBI recognized the immediate need 

to reach nongovernmental organizations and their 

infrastructure, now considered high-priority targets by 

terrorist groups. 

Although the ANSIR e-mail program was 

temporarily suspended in spring 2003, the FBI’s 

counterintelligence division has continued to work 

with private security professionals on national and 

local ANSIR programs that provide services, including 

information sharing. For more information, go to 

www.fbi.gov/programs/ansir/ansir.htm. 

Overseas Security Advisory

Council 

OSAC, created in 1985, is a joint venture that 

develops and maintains effective security 

communications and information sharing between 

the federal government and private sector enterprises 

overseas, including private security. Today, OSAC 

consists of 30 private sector and 4 public sector 

organizations and has an additional 2,300-affiliated 

U.S. companies and organizations, all of which are 

supplied with the tools necessary to effectively 

manage security-related issues abroad. Current OSAC 

committees are: 

■ Transnational Crime and Terrorism. 

■ 

21 

■ 

■ Country Council Support. 

Protection of Information and Technology. 

Security Awareness and Education. 

OSAC considers information exchange paramount 

to security overseas. Its web site, www.ds-osac.org, 

provides member organizations with unclassified 

information issued by the U.S. Department of State 

on security-related incidents and threats overseas, 

including travel advisories, public announcements, 

daily security-related news articles, overseas reports 

on security and crime incidents, terrorist group 

profiles, significant anniversary dates, general crime 

information for cities and countries, locations of and 

contacts at U.S. posts overseas, and updates on new 

or unusual situations. Additionally, OSAC provides 

publications on all facets of security, produced for 

private sector security professionals to incorporate in 

their organizations’ awareness and education 

programs. 
Upcoming Publication

The Police Foundation, with funding support from 

the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), is engaged 

in a collaborative publication project with ASIS 

International titled “Assessment of the Preparedness 

of Private Security in Shopping Malls to Prevent and 

22 

Respond to Terrorist Attacks.” This ongoing project 

assesses state regulation of private security, 

examines state homeland security initiatives and 

recommendations for private security, and determines 

how well private security is prepared to prevent 

terrorist attacks. 
Endnotes

1 The 9/11 Commission. 2004. Final Report, Official 

Government Edition. Washington, DC: GPO. 

2 Reynolds, Morgan O. 2001. Using the Private Sector 

to Deter Crime at www.ncpa.org/studies/s181/s181. 

html, p. 1. 

3 Held in Arlington, Virginia, January 26–27, 2004. 

Participants included law enforcement, private 

security, professional organizations, academic 

institutions, and the federal government. The summit 

formed working groups on crime-, disorder-, and 

homeland security-related issues. 

4 Connors, E., W. Cunningham, and P. Ohlhausen. 

1999. Operation Cooperation: A Literature Review. 

ILJ and Hallcrest Division of SAIC, p. 1. 

5 IACP et al. 2004. Building Private Security/Public 

Policing Partnerships. Washington, DC: COPS, p. 2. 

6 Cunningham, W. 2003. “U.S. Private Security 

Trends.” Presentation. February, p. 1. 

7 National Policy Summit, p. 6. 

8 Cunningham, W. “U.S. Private Security Trends,” 

p. 1.

9 National Policy Summit, p. 6. 

10 Ibid. 

11 The 9/11 Commission Report. 

12 National Policy Summit, p. 16. 

13 Kayyem, Juliette, and Patricia Chang. 2002. 

“Beyond Business Continuity: The Role of the Private 

Sector in Preparedness Planning,” Perspectives on 

Preparedness, August, p. 2. 

14 Connors, E., W. Cunningham, P. Ohlhausen, L. 

Oliver, and C. Van Meter. 2000. Operation 

Cooperation: Guidelines. Washington, DC: Bureau of 

Justice Assistance, p. 1. 

15 Office for Domestic Preparedness. 2003. Office for 

Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland 

Security. Washington, DC: DHS, pp. 6–10. 

16 National Policy Summit, p. 19. 

17 Ibid., p. 23. 

18 National Crime Prevention Council. 2002. “Feature: 

Crime Prevention is Terrorism Prevention,” Catalyst 

22(8). Retrieved July 6, 2005, from www.ncpc.org/ 

ncpc/ncpc/?pg=5882-3200-2630-2632-3108-3276. 

23 

19 p. 24. 

20 

21 

22 

National Policy Summit, 

Mission statement retrieved July 6, 2005 from 

www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/chfdept/ 

chfdept-cprevent.html. 

OSAC web site, www.ds-osac.org, July 7, 2005. 

FBI web site, www.fbi.gov/hq/ci/ansir/ansirhome. 

htm, July 7, 2005. 
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26 
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27 
Bureau of Justice Assistance

Information

BJA’s mission is to provide leadership and services in grant administration and 

criminal justice policy to support local, state, and tribal justice strategies to 

achieve safer communities. For more indepth information about BJA, its 

programs, and its funding opportunities, contact: 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

810 Seventh Street NW. 

Washington, DC 20531 

202–616–6500 

Fax: 202–305–1367 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA 

E-mail: AskBJA@usdoj.gov 

The BJA Clearinghouse, a component of the National Criminal Justice Reference 

Service, shares BJA program information with federal, state, local, and tribal 

agencies and community groups across the country. Information specialists 

provide reference and referral services, publication distribution, participation and 

support for conferences, and other networking and outreach activities. The 

clearinghouse can be contacted at: 

Bureau of Justice Assistance Clearinghouse 

P.O. Box 6000

Rockville, MD 20849–6000 

1–800–851–3420 

Fax: 301–519–5212 

www.ncjrs.gov 

Send questions or comments to http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/ContactUs.aspx. 

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