alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Henry Strong *et al. v.*Northwestern Elevated Railroad Company *et al.*

*Filed at Ottawa April 3, 1897.*

This case is controlled by the opinion rendered in *Doane*v. *Lake Street Elevated Railroad Co.*165 Ill. 510.

*Strong*v. *Northwestern Elevated R. R. Co.*64 Ill. App. 533, affirmed.

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding.

Hamline, Scott & Lord, for appellants.

John P. Wilson, and Knight & Brown, for appellees.

Per Curiam:

The questions presented by this record are the same as those presented and decided in *Doane*v. *Lake Street Elevated Railroad Co.*165 Ill. 510, and the decision in that case must control here.

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of the Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Tumbleweed Communications Corp. (the Company) for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Timothy G. Conley, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:
November 9, 2006



|                                                                              
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/S/ TIMOTHY G.
CONLEY                                                         
|Timothy G. Conley Senior Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Officer
#### Valerie K. Harris, Appellant, v Kim S. Melander, Respondent.

Appeals from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered December 22, 1976 in Saratoga County, upon a verdict rendered at a Trial Term in favor of defendant, and (2) an order, entered March 24, 1977, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss a complaint in a subsequent action on the ground of *res judicata.*Plaintiff sustained an injury to her left knee in a fall from her bicycle following a collision between it and an automobile owned and operated by the defendant. After joinder of issue in her action for personal injuries, a bifurcated trial was directed to determine whether her injury met the threshold requirements of subdivision 4 of section 671 of the Insurance Law. Since medical expenses were well below the sum of $500, the only issues to be resolved were whether plaintiff suffered from a "significant disfigurement” or a "permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system” (Insurance Law, § 671, subd 4, par [a]). While it appears from the trial transcript that plaintiff initially sought to elicit proof on both of these questions, it is equally apparent that such proof was not available and evidence was limited to the topic of "significant disfigurement”. The jury was instructed with respect to the statutory language and rendered a special finding of "no significant disfigurement”. The record supports its verdict and we perceive no reason to disturb it. In a subsequent action between the same parties for the same cause, plaintiff then sought to establish a "permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system”. That issue could have been litigated in the prior action, but the proof, for whatever reason, was not then available. The record does not show any request for an adjournment in the former suit, or any agreement between the parties reserving any rights for further proof. Accordingly, whether the rule of *res judicata*or collateral estoppel be applied, plaintiff is in effect attempting to split her cause of action and the judgment obtained in the prior action plainly bars her from any relief in the second *(Stoner v Culligan, Inc.,*32 AD2d 170). Judgment and order affirmed, without costs. Sweeney, J. P., Kane, Larkin and Herlihy, JJ., concur. Staley, Jr., J., not participating.
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ARTICLE 1. DEFINITIONS
    
    
    3ARTICLE 2. TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICES
    
    
    3ARTICLE 3. TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICES FEE
    
    
    4ARTICLE 4. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
    
    
    4ARTICLE 5. CONFIDENTIALITY
    
    
    4ARTICLE 6. GOVERNING LAW AND EVENTS OF DEFAULT
    
    
    4ARTICLE 7. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
    
    
    4ARTICLE 8. EFFECTIVENESS
    
    
    5ARTICLE 9. NO SUBSEQUENT OBLIGATION
    
    
    5ARTICLE 10. TRANSFER LIMITATION
    
    
    5ARTICLE 11. AMENDMENT
    
    
    5ARTICLE 12. COUNTERPARTS
    
    
    5ARTICLE 13. MISCELLANEOUS
    
    
    5EXHIBIT 1 CONTENT OF THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICES
    
    
    6EXHIBIT 2 TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICE FEE
    
    
    7




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### SUBCHAPTER I—BROADBAND GRANTS FOR STATES, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, PUERTO RICO, AND TERRITORIES
#### § 285.650 When may I begin conducting activities under my GAP?

After BOEM approves your GAP, you may begin conducting the approved activities that do not involve a project easement or the construction of facilities on the OCS that BOEM has deemed to be complex or significant.