Affirmed and Opinion Filed January 17, 2018 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-01354-CV 

AGNES PHILLIPS, Appellant 

V. 

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-16-04279-B 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Myers, and Schenck 

Opinion by Justice Bridges 

In this forcible detainer action, appellant Agnes Phillips appeals the trial court’s judgment 

in favor of appellee Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). On appeal, she 

appears to challenge underlying summary judgments previously decided against her in this 

Court1

 and whether she received adequate notice pursuant to section 24.005 of the Texas 

Property Code to vacate the Property at issue. After liberally construing Phillip’s pro se 

amended appellate brief, we conclude she has not shown reversible error and affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

 1 See Phillips v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 05-15-01332-CV, 2017 WL 1908621 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 9, 2017) (mem. op.). 
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Background 

In 2006, Phillips purchased the Property at issue by obtaining a loan secured by a deed of 

trust. In February 2011, she filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy case was 

dismissed and reinstated multiple times. 

After a December 2013 bankruptcy dismissal, Nationstar Mortgage LLC sent Phillips a 

notice of acceleration and substitute trustee’s sale for the Property. On January 7, 2014, 

Nationstar purchased the Property at issue for $178,093.86. Nationstar conveyed the property to 

Fannie Mae by warranty deed on January 30, 2014. 

Fannie Mae initiated eviction proceedings in early January 2015. Phillips then filed suit 

seeking to quiet title to the Property and to enjoin the eviction proceedings. Nationstar and 

Fannie Mae filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment arguing Phillips 

received proper notices and the automatic bankruptcy stay was not in effect at the time of the 

necessary foreclosure proceedings and the foreclosure sale. Phillips did not respond to these 

motions, and the trial court granted judgment in favor of Nationstar and Fannie Mae. Phillips 

appealed the summary judgments arguing the property was listed in her bankruptcy filing as her 

homestead, and “she assumed it was protected from foreclosure.” 

While that case was pending on appeal in this Court,2

 Fannie Mae sent Phillips a notice to 

vacate and demand for possession on June 17, 2016. After Phillips refused to vacate, Fannie 

Mae filed its original petition for forcible detainer on August 26, 2016. 

During trial, Fannie Mae offered into evidence, without objection, the following 

documents: (1) certified copy of the deed of trust; (2) certified copy of trustee’s deed from the 

2014 foreclosure sale; (3) certified copy of the warranty deed conveying property from 

 2 See Phillips, 2017 WL 1908621, at *1. 
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Nationstar to Fannie Mae; and (4) Fannie Mae’s June 17, 2016 notice to vacate and demand for 

possession. 

Phillips testified in her own defense that she was the owner of the Property, but when 

Nationstar foreclosed on the Property, she was in bankruptcy. She asked the trial court to stay 

the current litigation until this Court resolved the underlying appeal. Fannie Mae argued the 

deed of trust contained a tenant-at-sufferance clause; therefore, her argument regarding title of 

the Property did not impact the court’s ability to determine possession. The trial court took the 

matter under advisement, but signed a judgment of possession in favor of Fannie Mae on 

October 19, 2016. Phillips now appeals the trial court’s order granting Fannie Mae possession of 

the Property. 

Discussion 

Phillips is not represented by counsel on appeal. We construe liberally pro se pleadings 

and briefs. However, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and 

require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 

211, 211–12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 

S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978)); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9 (briefing rules construed 

liberally). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is 

represented by counsel. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d at 212. 

This Court notified Phillips of several deficiencies in her original brief and she filed an 

amended brief correcting some, but not all, of the defects. Much of Phillips’ brief seemingly 

reargues summary judgment and bankruptcy issues previously decided by this Court.3

 See 

Phillips, 2017 WL 1908621, at*1. Because we have previously decided these issues, we need 

 3

 For example, under “Issues Presented,” she states, “Did any of the lower courts err when considering Appellant’s pleadings or evidence, 

or granting Appellee’s summary judgment?” “Is there genuine material dispute?” “Is Appellant Phillips entitled to Summary Judgment as a 

matter of law?” “What standards of review or evidence did the lower courts use to grant Summary Judgment to Appellees?” 
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not address them again. See Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986) (initial 

determination of questions of law generally govern case throughout subsequent stages under 

“law of the case” doctrine). Moreover, the judgment and record before us involves the forcible 

detainer action and not the previous summary judgment proceeding. 

Construing her remaining arguments liberally, Phillips contends the evidence is factually 

insufficient to support Fannie Mae’s compliance with the notice requirements of section 24.005 

of the Texas Property Code, and Fannie Mae used fraudulent measures to foreclose on the 

Property. 

When a trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law after a bench 

trial, all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by evidence are implied. BMC 

Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). When the appellate 

record includes the reporter’s and clerk’s record, as is the case here, these implied findings are 

not conclusive and may be challenged on appeal for factual sufficiency. Id. In reviewing factual 

sufficiency, we consider all the evidence in a neutral light and will set aside the judgment only if 

it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. 

Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). 

The only issue in a forcible detainer action is which party has the right to immediate 

possession of the property. Shutter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 318 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2010, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). Whether the sale of the property under a deed of trust is 

invalid may not be determined in a forcible detainer and must be brought in a separate suit. Id. 

To prevail and obtain possession in its forcible detainer action, the law required Fannie 

Mae to show: (1) the substitute trustee conveyed the property by deed to Fannie Mae after the 

foreclosure sale; (2) Phillips became a tenant-at-sufferance when the property was sold under the 

deed of trust; (3) Fannie Mae gave proper notice to Phillips requiring them to vacate the 
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premises; and (4) Phillips refused to vacate the premises. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 

§§ 24.002(a)(2), (b), 24.005; see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Freeney, 266 S.W.3d 623, 625 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Based on the unobjected-to exhibits Fannie Mae introduced 

at trial, Fannie Mae established its right to immediate possession of the property. See Shutter, 

318 S.W.3d at 471 (establishing right to possession by presenting substitute trustee’s deed, deed 

of trust showing tenant-at-sufferance status, and notice to vacate property). Phillips did not 

present any contrary evidence. To the extent Phillips complains about lack of notice or fraud, 

any such alleged errors are not relevant in an eviction suit. See Booth v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 

No. 01-16-00188-CV, 2017 WL 444444, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 2, 2017, no 

pet.) (mem. op.) (lack of notice not relevant to an eviction suit). Moreover, she has not 

supported her fraud allegations with citations to any evidence in the record and our review of the 

record has found no such evidence other than her conclusory statements. Accordingly, the 

evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. 

Conclusion 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

161354F.P05 

 

/David L. Bridges/ 

DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

AGNES PHILLIPS, Appellant 

No. 05-16-01354-CV V. 

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 

ASSOCIATION, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 2, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-16-04279-B. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. 

Justices Myers and Schenck participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION 

recover its costs of this appeal from appellant AGNES PHILLIPS. 

Judgment entered January 17, 2018.