September 2009

Environmental Technology 

Verification Report

AVANTE INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY,

INC. PANASEC MOBILE PERSONNEL AND ASSET 

VISIBILITY SYSTEM

Prepared by

Battelle

Under a cooperative agreement with

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
September 2009

Environmental Technology Verification

Report

ETV Advanced Monitoring Systems Center

AVANTE INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY, INC. PANASEC MOBILE PERSONNEL AND ASSET VISIBILITY 

SYSTEM

by

Ryan James, Brian Boczek, Zachary Willenberg, Amy Dindal, Battelle

Deborah Kopsick, Carlos Rincon, Michelle Henderson, and John McKernan, U.S. EPA 
ii

Notice

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, through its Office of Research and Development, 

funded and managed, or partially funded and collaborated in, the research described herein. It 

has been subjected to the Agency’s peer and administrative review and has been approved for 

publication. Any opinions expressed in this report are those of the author (s) and do not 

necessarily reflect the views of the Agency, therefore, no official endorsement should be inferred. 

Any mention of trade names or commercial products does not constitute endorsement or 

recommendation for use. 
iii

Foreword

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is charged by Congress with protecting the 

Nation’s land, air, and water resources. Under a mandate of national environmental laws, the 

Agency strives to formulate and implement actions leading to a compatible balance between 

human activities and the ability of natural systems to support and nurture life. To meet this 

mandate, EPA’s research program is providing data and technical support for solving 

environmental problems today and building a science knowledge base necessary to manage our 

ecological resources wisely, understand how pollutants affect our health, and prevent or reduce 

environmental risks in the future. 

The National Risk Management Research Laboratory (NRMRL) is the Agency’s center for 

investigation of technological and management approaches for preventing and reducing risks 

from pollution that threaten human health and the environment. The focus of the Laboratory’s 

research program is on methods and their cost-effectiveness for prevention and control of 

pollution to air, land, water, and subsurface resources; protection of water quality in public water 

systems; remediation of contaminated sites, sediments and groundwater; prevention and control 

of indoor air pollution; and restoration of ecosystems. NRMRL collaborates with both public and 

private sector partners to foster technologies that reduce the cost of compliance and to anticipate 

emerging problems. NRMRL’s research provides solutions to environmental problems by: 

developing and promoting technologies that protect and improve the environment; advancing 

scientific and engineering information to support regulatory and policy decisions; and providing 

the technical support and information transfer to ensure implementation of environmental 

regulations and strategies at the national, state, and community levels. 

This publication has been produced as part of the Laboratory’s strategic long-term research plan. 

It is published and made available by EPA’s Office of Research and Development to assist the 

user community and to link researchers with their clients.

Sally Gutierrez, Director

National Risk Management Research Laboratory
iv

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of the New Mexico Border Authority for

hosting this verification at the Santa Teresa Port of Entry (POE) and, in particular, the efforts of 

Mr. Marco Herrara in providing his export expertise in support of this verification test. We thank 

Dr. Barry Thatcher of BorderWriting, for supporting this verification test, but specifically for his 

coordination with the Mexican Customs officials along with all other local participants. Also, we 

acknowledge the cooperation of the New Mexico Department of Public Safety in providing read 

locations and Servicio de Transporte Internacional y Local in providing a truck and driver and 

Ivan Calzada of the Texas Transportation Institute. Finally, we thank Ms. Debra Tellez, Ms. 

Katrina Varner, and Mr. Israel Anderson of the U.S. EPA, Mr. Stephen Niemeyer of the Texas 

Commission on Environmental Quality, and Mr. José Mario Sánchez Soledad, Comisión de 

Ecología y Protección Civil, Gobierno Municipal De Juárez for their review of the test/QA plan 

and/or this verification report. 
v 

Contents

Foreword ..........................................................................................................................................iii

Page

Acknowledgments............................................................................................................................ iv

List of Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... vii

Chapter 1 Background ...................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2 Technology Description .................................................................................................. 2

Chapter 3 Test Design and Procedures ............................................................................................ 4

3.1 Test Overview ........................................................................................................................ 4

3.2 Experimental Design .............................................................................................................. 5

3.2.1 RFID Tags and HAZMAT Waste Containers ............................................................ 5

3.2.2 Waste Container Configuration in the Semi-Trailer ................................................... 5

3.2.3 Meteorological and Shock Data .................................................................................. 6

3.2.4 Collision Test .............................................................................................................. 7

3.2.5 Truck Routes and Descriptions of Round Trips ........................................................ 7

3.2.6 Route Deviation ........................................................................................................ 11

3.3 Qualitative Evaluation Parameters ....................................................................................... 12

Chapter 4 Quality Assurance/Quality Control ............................................................................... 13

4.1 Audits ................................................................................................................................... 13

4.1.1 Technical Systems Audit ......................................................................................... 13

4.1.2 Data Quality Audit .................................................................................................... 13

4.2 QA/QC Reporting ................................................................................................................ 13

4.3 Data Review ......................................................................................................................... 14

Chapter 5 Statistical Methods ........................................................................................................ 15

5.1 Accuracy ............................................................................................................................. 15

5.2 Precision .............................................................................................................................. 15

5.3 Influence of Possible Confounding Factors ........................................................................ 16

Chapter 6 Test Results ................................................................................................................... 17

6.1 Accuracy .............................................................................................................................. 17

 6.1.1 External Reader Accuracy .........................................................................................17 

 6.1.2 Relayer Uplinked Accuracy .......................................................................................19 

6.2 Precision ............................................................................................................................... 21

6.3 Interference of Other RFID Signals ..................................................................................... 21

6.4 Influence of Confounding Factors ....................................................................................... 22

6.5 Operational Factors .............................................................................................................. 23

Chapter 7 Performance Summary .................................................................................................. 25

Chapter 8 References ..................................................................................................................... 28
vi 

Figures

Figure 2-1. AVANTE’s RFID Tags................................................................................................2 

Figure 2-2. AVANTE’s External Readers ......................................................................................3 

Figure 2-3. AVANTE’s Uplinked System (Relayer) ......................................................................3 

Figure 3-1. RFID tag affixed to poly drum. ................................................................................... 5 

Figure 3-2. Tightly-packed configuration .......................................................................................6 

Figure 3-3. Loosely-packed configuration ......................................................................................6 

Figure 3-4. Collision Tags ..............................................................................................................7 

Figure 3-5. Stationary Tag Read with External Readers ................................................................8 

Figure 3-6. U.S. route used during testing (border area enlargement). ..........................................8 

Figure 3-7. U.S. route used during testing. .....................................................................................9 

Figure 3-8. Mexico route used during testing (border area enlargement) ....................................10 

Figure 3-9. Mexico route used during testing. ..............................................................................11 

Figure 6-1. Screenshot from AVANTE’s Software ......................................................................24

Tables

Table 3-1. Summary of Round Trips ........................................................................................... 11 

Table 6-1. Accuracy – External Readers ..................................................................................... 18

Table 6-2. Accuracy – In-truck Reader and Uplinked Communication .......................................20 

Table 6-3. Data Completeness Due to Continuity of Data Unlink ...............................................21 

Table 6-4. Overall Accuracy ± Standard Deviation of Each RT ..................................................21 

Table 6-5. Collision Test Results ..................................................................................................21 

Table 6-6. Accuracy Results by Container Type (in percent) ......................................................22 

Table 7-1. Accuracy and Precision Summary for the PAVS ........................................................25 
vii 

List of Abbreviations

AMS Advanced Monitoring Systems

AVANTE AVANTE International Technology, Inc

EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency 

ETV Environmental Technology Verification 

GPS Global positioning system

GPRS General packet radio service

GHz Gigahertz

HAZMAT Hazardous materials

LRB Laboratory record book 

MHz Megahertz

mph Miles per hour 

MX Mexico

NMBA New Mexico Border Authority 

NMDPS New Mexico Department of Public Safety

NRMRL National Risk Management Research Laboratory

PAVS PanaSec Mobile Personnel and Asset Visibility System

poly Polyethylene

POE Port of Entry 

QA Quality assurance

QMP Quality Management Plan

RFID Radio-frequency identification

RT Round Trip 

SATCOM Satellite communication

SD Standard deviation 

STIL Servicio de Transporte Internacional y Local

TQAP Test Quality Assurance Plan

U.S. United States

VDC volts direct current 
1 

Chapter 1 

Background

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) supports the Environmental Technology 

Verification (ETV) Program to facilitate the deployment of innovative environmental 

technologies through performance verification and dissemination of information. The goal of the 

ETV Program is to further environmental protection by accelerating the acceptance and use of 

improved and cost-effective technologies. ETV seeks to achieve this goal by providing highquality, peer-reviewed data on technology performance to those involved in the design, 

distribution, financing, permitting, purchase, and use of environmental technologies. 

ETV works in partnership with recognized testing organizations; with stakeholder groups 

consisting of buyers, vendor organizations, and permitters; and with the full participation of 

individual technology developers. The program evaluates the performance of innovative 

technologies by developing test plans that are responsive to the needs of stakeholders, 

conducting field or laboratory tests (as appropriate), collecting and analyzing data, and preparing 

peer-reviewed reports. All evaluations are conducted in accordance with rigorous quality 

assurance (QA) protocols to ensure that data of known and adequate quality are generated and 

that the results are defensible. 

The EPA’s National Risk Management Research Laboratory (NRMRL) and its verification 

organization partner, Battelle, operate the Advanced Monitoring Systems (AMS) Center under 

ETV. ETV AMS Center verifies the performance of technologies for monitoring, sampling, and 

characterizing contaminants and natural species in a variety of matrices including air, water, and 

soil. The AMS Center evaluated the performance of the PanaSec Mobile Personnel and Asset 

Visibility System by AVANTE International Technology, Inc. (AVANTE), a web-based real-time 

locating and reporting system, in tracking hazardous materials (HAZMAT) being returned to the 

U.S. from Mexico under terms of the La Paz Agreement. Under this agreement, all HAZMAT 

waste generated by raw materials shipped into Mexico for use in foreign-owned factories (called 

maquilas) must be shipped back to their country of origin. Mexico does not classify the returned 

material as hazardous, but as a returned product, and therefore does not submit a Notice of Intent 

to the United States for the export of such HAZMAT waste. The current process makes it 

difficult to develop an accurate accounting of HAZMAT waste entering the United States from 

the maquilas and does not provide for timely identification of shipments that do not reach their 

designated receiving facilities. The lack of tracking of these wastes creates the possibility for 

waste to be illegally abandoned. An enhanced tracking system that provides accurate, timely data 

to regulatory officials would be beneficial in preventing this from occurring. This verification 

test evaluated the performance of such tracking technologies. 
2 

Chapter 2 

Technology Description

This verification report provides results for the verification testing of AVANTE’s PanaSec 

Mobile Personnel and Asset Visibility System (hereafter referred to as PAVS). Following is a 

description of two configurations of AVANTE’s PAVS that were used during this verification 

test based on information provided by the vendor. 

PAVS is a web-based real-time locating and reporting system that provides real-time tracking of 

HAZMAT in transit or in storage as well as the whereabouts of the responsible personnel. This 

HAZMAT transportation tracking system and solution incorporates patented radio-frequency 

identification (RFID) technologies coupled with global positioning system (GPS)-general packet 

radio service (GPRS) cellular data communications to assist in HAZMAT transportation 

security. The AVANTE data center server stores all transit and condition data to facilitate realtime tracking of the HAZMAT. 

 

Each container of HAZMAT is individually tagged with an active ZONERTM tag. Figure 2-1 

shows these active RFID tags that get attached to containers with pressure-sensitive adhesive or 

other mechanical fasteners. The identity of each 

container is linked to the active tag identification. 

During verification testing, AVANTE’s PAVS used two 

different methods for RFID tag reading and 

communication: (1) external roadside readers and (2) an 

uplinked system using a vehicle mounted and powered 

RELAYERTM. 

External Readers. The roadside reading configuration 

of the PAVS consisted of pole-mounted antennae 

coupled with an external tag data storage device. These 

are shown in Figure 2-2 and are referred to in this report 

as external readers. The external readers are located in 

a fixed position (e.g., on the side of a road or at the 

entrance to a facility); this location is referred to as a 

read location. As the RFID tags come within range of 

the external readers (e.g., as the truck drives past), the 

external readers collect the information transmitted by 

the RFID tags and records this information onto a 

secure digital memory card loaded into the external 

reader. The information collected by the external reader 

is collected by removing the memory card and 

downloading the information to a computer. 

Figure 2-1. AVANTE’s RFID Tags
3 

Uplinked System. The ZONERTM-RELAYERTM

configuration (referred to as “Uplinked System”) 

is capable of collecting information from RFID 

tags while the shipment is either stationary or in 

transit. It functions by equipping each carrier 

with a monitoring reader/transponder unit called 

the RELAYERTM-CTCR (Relayer) (shown in 

Figure 2-3) that communicates with all of the 

active RFID tags inside the container or trailer. 

Each Relayer is equipped with GPS and GPRS

and/or SATCOM capabilities. The Relayer

transmits all transit and condition data to the 

AVANTE data center servers. This information 

may then be viewed using a world-wide web 

application providing near real-time viewing. 

The uplinked system also allows for the use of personnel badges that identify him/her along with 

their proximity to the Relayer and the “panic button” feature. 

Prior to the start of the verification test, 

AVANTE was responsible for setting up the

PAVS technology using both the external readers 

and the uplinked system according to their 

recommended configuration for optimal 

performance. This included configuring the 

system to ensure that read events occur at each of 

the testing route read points. Both the external 

readers and Relayer are powered by 12 VDC and 

backup battery. The Relayer system was 

configured to download the RFID data to the 

AVANTE data center server via cellular 

telephone communication link. 

Figure 2-3. AVANTE’s Uplinked 

System (Relayer)

Figure 2-2. AVANTE’s External 

Readers
4 

Chapter 3 

Test Design and Procedures

3.1 Test Overview 

This verification test was conducted according to procedures specified in the Test/QA Plan for 

Verification of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) for Tracking Hazardous Waste Shipments 

across International Borders(1) (TQAP) and adhered to the quality system defined in the ETV 

AMS Center Quality Management Plan (QMP).(2) Battelle conducted this verification test with 

support from the New Mexico Border Authority (NMBA), New Mexico Department of Public 

Safety (NMDPS), Texas Transportation Institute, U.S. EPA Region 6 El Paso Border Office, 

U.S. EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, BorderWriting (a New Mexico 

company that coordinated participation of the local collaborators prior to the ETV test), and 

Servicio de Transporte Internacional y Local (STIL).

This verification test simulated shipments of HAZMAT waste contained in polyethylene (poly) 

drums, metal drums, and corrugated boxes through routine land transportation routes and across 

international ports of entry in the El Paso/Ciudad Juárez trade area. Originally, this ETV test 

was planned with the expectation that all of the trucking routes would include border crossings. 

However, due to concern of local authorities related to the violence in Ciudad Juarez during the 

test, there were some difficulties in obtaining permission to cross the border into Mexico (MX), 

so two of the trucking routes did not cross into MX and two routes included crossing the border 

into MX. RFID tags were attached to various containers and loaded onto a truck at the U.S. 

loading dock at the NMBA facility using a standard 53-foot semi-truck and trailer provided by 

STIL, a local trucking company. Throughout the testing, the containers were arranged in the 

trailer in either a tight-packed or loose-packed orientation. The PAVS included the RFID tags 

(attached to HAZMAT waste containers) and readers (roadside external or an in-truck reader 

(referred to as the Relayer) that resided in the cab of the truck and uplinked data to a central 

server in near real-time. The truck then left the NMBA loading dock, drove a prescribed route 

either solely in the U.S. or across the U.S. – MX Border. RFID tag reads were recorded 

electronically throughout each truck route. 

This verification test was conducted from March 24-26, 2009 at the NMBA Santa Teresa facility 

and other field locations throughout the El Paso/Ciudad Juárez trade area. The PAVS was 

verified by evaluating the following parameters:

• Accuracy – proper identification of the tagged containers at various locations, at various 

truck speeds, on corrugated boxes or steel and poly 55-gallon drums, and in tightly 

packed and loosely packed loading orientations. Specifically, proper identification is 

defined as the retrieval of all information available about the tagged item according to the 

vendor’s standard procedures. 
5 

• Precision – standard deviation (SD) of percent accuracy RFID tag read results.

• Interference of other RFID signals (collision test) – ability to discriminate the tags on the 

HAZMAT waste containers from other commercially-available RFID tags.

• Influence of confounding factors – container type, packing configuration and placement 

of tags/containers, environmental conditions, and internal trailer conditions.

• Operational factors – ease of use, technology cost, user-friendliness of vendor software, 

troubleshooting/downtime, etc. 

3.2 Experimental Design 

3.2.1 RFID Tags and HAZMAT Waste Containers

At the beginning of each day of testing, verification staff verified the function of 12 AVANTE 

RFID tags to be used as part of this verfication testing by measuring the frequency and the 

effective radiated power of the tag using a Rhode and Schwartz FSH6 spectrum analyzer with a 

435 Megahertz (MHz) antenna. This was done by placing all the RFID tags involved in the test 

into the trunk of an automobile thereby isolating the signals emitted by each RFID tag from the 

spectrum analyzer. Next, a single RFID tag was removed from the trunk, the trunk was again 

closed, and the RFID tag was taken into the NMBA office building where the frequency and the 

effective radiated power was measured using the spectrum analyzer. This process was repeated 

for all 12 AVANTE RFID tags and the four RFID tags used for the collision test. 

According to current shipping data, most of the HAZMAT entering MX from the U.S. are 

contained in either poly or steel 55-gallon drums, and much of the HAZMAT waste returning 

from the maquilas and entering the U.S. is solid and packaged in one-cubic yard corrugated 

boxes or as drummed liquids. Therefore, when the functioning of the RFID tags had been 

confirmed, four RFID tags were secured to 

poly 55-gallon drums, four were secured to 

the steel 55-gallon drums, and four were 

affixed to corrugated boxes for a total of 

twelve individual containers. One tag was 

affixed to each individual container. Figure 

3-1 is a photo of an AVANTE RFID tag 

affixed to a poly drum. In the interest of 

safety, no actual HAZMAT waste was 

transported during the verification test. Each 

poly and metal 55-gallon drum used in the 

verification testing was filled with tap water 

and each corrugated box was filled with 

loosely folded cardboard. RFID tags were 

secured to the top of each poly and metal 

drum and to the side of each corrugated box 

using Velcro tape. 

3.2.2 Waste Container Configuration in the Semi-Trailer

Each round trip (RT) conducted in the U.S. was performed using a tightly packed configuration 

of the HAZMAT waste containers. Each RT into MX was performed using a loosely packed 

configuration. 

Figure 3-1. RFID tag affixed to poly drum
6 

Each packaging configuration consisted of 12 individual containers. Two metal drums were 

placed on a pallet and the drums were shrink-wrapped to secure the drums during transport. The 

process was repeated for the poly drums as well. Therefore, four pallets of drums were created; 

two pallets of two metal drums each and two pallets of two poly drums each. The corrugated 

boxes were not affixed to a pallet but placed directly on the floor of the trailer. The corrugated 

boxes and the pallets of drums were then positioned inside the truck trailer in a tightly-packed 

configuration. For the loosely-packed configuration, each pallet contained one of each kind of 

drum. Figures 3-2 and 3-3 show diagrams of tightly packed and loosely packed container 

configurations. 

Regardless of packing configuration, each corrugated box was positioned such that one RFID tag 

faced each side of the trailer (i.e., one RFID tag faced the driver’s side, the passenger’s side, the 

front, and the rear of the trailer). 

3.2.3 Meteorological and Shock Data 

After the palletized poly and metal 55-gallon drums and the corrugated boxes were loaded into 

the trailer and positioned in the correct packaging configuration, a ShocklogTM RD 298 system 

(Shocklog) was installed directly onto the floor of the trailer and a calibrated hot wire 

anemometer (TSI Incorporated, VelociCalc 9555-P Multi-function Ventilation Meter), capable 

of measuring temperature, barometric pressure, and relative humidity, was affixed to the 

passenger’s side of the trailer approximately two feet above the floor. At the end of each day of 

verification testing, the electronic data generated and captured by the Shocklog and the 

anemometer were transferred from the instrument to a computer by means of a portable drive. 

F igur e 3-2. T ypical tightly packed 

packaging configur ation.

Figure 3-3. Loosely-packed 

configuration 

Figure 3-2. Tightly-packed 

configuration 
7 

3.2.4 Collision Test 

A collision test was performed during each RT to evaluate the ability for the PAVS to 

discriminate the AVANTE RFID tags from other commercially available active tags. Battelle 

supplied four commercially available tags for collision testing; the collision tags were 433 MHz, 

the same frequency at which the PAVS operated, active tags (Wavetrend® TG801). The 

collision tags were affixed to a wooden block as shown in Figure 3-4. At the beginning of the 

day of testing, the function of each collision tag was verified separately by measuring the 

frequency and the effective radiated 

power of the tags using the 

spectrum analyzer.

A collision test was performed 

during each verification test run at 

the NMDPS truck inspection 

facility. The truck conducted its 

first pass of the 25 and 15 mph read 

locations. The truck then began its 

second pass of the 25 mph read 

location. After passing the 25 mph 

read location the second time, the 

truck stopped, the trailer was 

opened, and the collision tags were 

added to one of the one-cubic yard 

corrugated boxes. The trailer doors 

were then closed and the truck 

proceeded past the 15 mph read 

location. After passing the 15 mph read location, the truck stopped and the collision tags were 

removed. 

3.2.5 Truck Routes and Descriptions of Round Trips

The TQAP1

 was written with the expectation that the same trucking route would be used 

throughout the verification test and that the route would include crossing over into MX. 

However, there was some difficulty in obtaining permission to cross the border into MX, so two 

of the truck RTs were performed within the U.S. and when the proper permission was obtained, 

the other two RTs were performed crossing the border into MX. Also, the TQAP was written 

with the assumption that the technologies to be evaluated would have external readers that would 

be set up at various read points throughout the trucking route. While this was the case for 

AVANTE, AVANTE’s technology also had a feature that uplinked the RFID data, as well as 

GPS coordinates, to a server via a cellular telephone communication link at approximately one 

minute time intervals, reporting the presence and location of each RFID tags at each time

interval. Therefore, fixed read locations were used for the AVANTE external readers and the 

uplinked data were reported every minute to provide additional tag identification and location 

data throughout the RTs than specified in the TQAP. The two RTs performed in the U.S. and the 

two RTs including the border crossing into MX are described below.

Figure 3-4. Collision Tags
8 

U.S. Trucking Route. The U.S. routes (RT 1 and 2) were selected to mimic, as much as possible, 

the read locations presented in the TQAP and to challenge the PAVS under similar test 

conditions specified in the TQAP. 

The HAZMAT waste containers 

were loaded into the trailer and 

placed in the tightly-packed 

configuration for both of the U.S. 

RTs. The truck began all of the RTs 

(U.S. and MX) at the NMBA facility. 

Prior to embarking on each RT, an 

external reader was situated on a 

stand at 90° with respect to the road

with the stand placed four feet from 

the side of the front bumper. This is 

shown in Figure 3-5. At that time, 

RFID tag reads were made at 

distances of 5, 15, 30, 50, and 70 feet 

from the front bumper of the 

stationary truck by moving the 

external reader straight forward from 

the initial placement of the reader. 

The external readers were kept at 

each distance for approximately one 

minute. Following the stationary 

RFID reads, the reader was moved to 

the exit of the NMBA and the truck 

embarked on its RT by first driving 

past the reader for a slow moving 

read. During only the start of the 

first U.S. RT, a second reader was 

placed at 45° with respect to the 

road, in addition to the reader at 

each read point that was placed at 

90°. 

Upon exit from the NMBA, the 

truck travelled to the NMDPS

facility. Figure 3-6 shows the path 

of the truck between the NMBA 

and the NMDPS facility. The total 

distance between the two locations 

was approximately 0.75 miles. 

External readers were placed at two 

locations at the facility. The first 

reader was designated as a 25 mile 

per hour (mph) read location and 

the second reader was designated a 

15 mph read location. The readers 

used here were also placed at 90° 

Figure 3-6. U.S. route used during testing (border 

area enlargement)

0.5 miles

F igur e 3-5. Stationar y T ag R ead with E xter nal 

R eader s

Figure 3 5. Stationary Tag Read with External 

Readers
9 

with respect to the plane of the truck 

As the truck approached both the 25 

mph and 15 mph read points, the 

speed at which the truck was 

travelling was measured using a 

Stalker SportTM 24.15 Gigahertz 

(GHz) Doppler radar gun. The truck 

then exited the NMDPS facility and 

doubled back to make a second pass. 

After passing the 25 mph read 

location, the truck was stopped, the 

trailer doors opened, the contents of 

the trailer inspected for any shifting 

of the load, and collision tags were 

added. The truck then passed the 15 

mph read location. After passing the 

15 mph read location, the truck was 

stopped, the trailer doors opened, and 

the collision tags were removed. As 

was the case with the first pass of the 

truck through the NMDPS facility, 

the speed at which the truck was 

travelling past the 25 mph and 15 mph read location was measured using the radar gun. 

The truck then proceeded to the Sunland Park Racetrack and Casino parking lot (referred to as 

the casino read location) as is shown in Figure 3-7. This location was selected because the route 

to the casino (approximately 13 miles) provided highway and city driving and the parking lot at 

the casino provided adequate space for the external reader to be set up as well as space for the 

truck to turn around. From the NMDPS facility, the truck travelled northbound on Peter V. 

Domenici Boulevard, east on Airport Road, southeast on McNutt Road (NM-273) and finally 

north on Sunland Park Drive to the Sunland Park Racetrack and Casino parking lot. The external 

reader was placed at the entrance of the parking lot and upon arrival, the truck passed the reader 

for a slow moving read. Again, the reader was situated at 90° with respect to the road. The 

speed of the truck passing this read location was not dictated to the driver, but was documented 

on a data sheet (from a speedometer reading) by a passenger in the truck. 

The truck left the Sunland Park Racetrack and Casino parking lot and proceeded northbound on 

Sunland Park Drive. The truck next travelled northwest on Doniphan Road, west on Aircraft 

Road and south on Peter V. Domenici Boulevard. During one of the U.S. Route runs, two read 

locations were placed on Peter V. Domenici Boulevard to allow for tag reads at speeds of 55 

mph and 40 mph using external readers. The truck then returned to the NMBA facility. 

The final read location of the RT was at the entrance to the NMBA facility. The truck passed the 

read location for a slow moving read. Following the tag read at the entrance to the NMBA 

facility, tag reads were made at distances of 5, 15, 30, 50, and 70 feet from the truck and trailer 

as they had been prior to the RT. 

In addition to the external reader data collected during the U.S. RTs, the PAVS uplinked 

communication system was also verified. The difference between this system and the external 

readers is that instead of a fixed location that defines the read location (at which the RFID tags 

Figure 3-7. U.S. route used during testing

3 miles
10 

are read to confirm their presence), the RFID tags are read and their presence and location (as 

latitude/longitude coordinates) recorded to a central database approximately every minute, 

regardless of location. Therefore, additional data were collected in addition to the fixed read 

points defined by the location of the readers. However, because of a malfunction with that 

system, these data were not collected during the first U.S. RT. and approximately half of the data 

were missing from the second U.S. RT. 

Mexico Trucking Route. The MX route was slightly different from what was planned in the 

TQAP(1), but was selected to mimic, as closely as possible, the route in the TQAP and to 

challenge the PAVS under similar test conditions specified in the TQAP, which included 

crossing the border to evaluate an considerations regarding the technology in an actual border 

crossing. 

The HAZMAT waste containers 

were loaded into the trailer and 

placed in the loosely-packed 

configuration for both of the MX

RTs. The external reader 

locations used during the MX

route are identified in Figure 3-8 

and Figure 3-9. These were only 

used during RT3 as AVANTE 

opted to not use readers and only 

the uplinked technology during 

RT4. As for each U.S. and MX

RT, the truck began its route at the 

NMBA facility. Prior to 

embarking on the first MX RT, tag 

reads were made at distances of 5, 

15, 30, 50, and 70 feet from the 

truck. Following the stationary 

RFID tag reads at various 

distances, the reader was moved to 

the exit of the NMBA and the truck embarked on RT3 by first driving past the external reader for 

a slow moving read. 

The truck then proceeded south through the Jerónimo, MX POE and into MX. A read location 

was located at the south end of the Jerónimo POE and the truck passed the read location for a 

slow moving read. After passing this external reader, the truck proceeded for approximately 12 

miles southbound on the Samalayuca-El Oasis Highway (Carratera Samalayuca-El Oasis). 

The third read location (referred to as MX Turnaround) on the MX Route was located 0.6 miles 

north of the intersection of the Samalayuca-El Oasis Highway and MX Highway 2. After 

passing this read location, the truck performed a U-turn and proceeded northbound on the 

Samalayuca-El Oasis Highway, passing back into the U.S. through the Santa Teresa POE and 

through U.S. Customs. 

After passing through U.S. Customs, the truck then proceeded to the NMDPS facility and

encountered the same read locations that had been included for the U.S RTs. Two read locations 

F igur e 3-8. M exico r oute used dur ing testing 

(bor der ar ea enlar gement)

0.5 miles
11 

were located at the facility. In all, the truck passed a 25 mph read point and a 15 mph read point 

and then doubled back to pass them again, with the collision tags added before the second pass 

by the 15 mph read point. As was the case during the U.S. RTs, the speed at which the truck was 

travelling past the 25 mph and 15 mph read location was measured using a radar gun. The truck 

then proceeded back to the NMBA 

read location. The RT was 

completed after passing an external 

reader upon re-entry to the NMBA 

and then a final stationary read at 

distances between 5 and 70 feet from 

the front bumper of the truck. Each 

of the four RTs are summarized in 

Table 3-1. 

Table 3-1. Summary of Round Trips

Truck Route Read Locations of Round Trips Information about RT

RT 1 U.S.

Began at NMBA, NMDPS Facility (25 and 15 

mph, collision test), Casino, completed at 

NMBA

Tightly packed configuration, uplinked data 

not collected because of system malfunction, 

stationary tag reads at various distances 

performed at NMBA before and after RT

RT 2 U.S.

Began at NMBA, NMDPS, Facility (25 and 15 

mph, collision test), Casino, 40 mph and 55 

mph highway reads, completed at NMBA 

Tightly packed configuration,some uplinked 

data collected, stationary tag reads at various 

distances performed at NMBA before and 

after RT

RT 3 MX

Began at NMBA, MX Port of Entry, MX 

turnaround, NMDPS Facility (25 and 15 mph, 

collision test), completed at NMBA

Loosely packed configuration, uplinked data 

collected, stationary tag reads at various 

distances performed at NMBA before and 

after RT

RT 4 MX

Began at NMBA, MX Port of Entry, MX 

turnaround, NMDPS Facility (25 and 15 mph, 

collision test), completed at NMBA

Loosely packed configuration, external 

reader data not collected because AVANTE 

opted not to have them used, uplinked data 

collected, stationary tag reads at various 

distances performed at NMBA before and 

after RT

3.2.6 Route Deviation 

The AVANTE uplinked system had an optional feature to provide indication when the RFID tags 

had traveled outside a pre-programmed route. To test this feature, during RT 4, the truck was 

diverted by approximately one mile and then directed to return to the planned route. The test 

evaluated whether or not the proper alert for such a route deviation was made.

Figure 3-9. Mexico route used during testing

5 miles
12 

3.3 Qualitative Evaluation Parameters 

Operational factors such as ease of use, technology cost, user-friendliness of vendor software, 

and troubleshooting/downtime, etc. documented based on observations by Battelle, Border 

Writing, and U.S. EPA staff. 
13 

Chapter 4 

Quality Assurance/Quality Control

QA/QC procedures were performed in accordance with the TQAP for this verification test(1) and 

the QMP for the AMS Center(2). As noted throughout Chapter 3, there were some deviations 

from the TQAP, but the work was performed as described in the previous sections. None of the 

deviations from the test/QA plan resulted in any adverse impacts on the quality of the data 

produced by this verification test. All deviations were reviewed with the EPA ETV AMS Center 

Project Officer and EPA ETV AMS Center Quality Manager. QA/QC procedures and results are 

described in the following subchapters. 

4.1 Audits

Two types of audits were performed during the verification test: a technical systems audit (TSA) 

of the verification test procedures, and a data quality audit. Because of the nature of RFID 

measurements, a performance evaluation audit, as is usually performed to confirm the accuracy 

of the reference method, was not applicable for this verification test. Audit procedures for the 

TSA and the data quality audit are described further below.

4.1.1 Technical Systems Audit 

The Battelle AMS Center Quality Manager performed a TSA during the test to ensure that the 

verification test was performed in accordance with the TQAP for this verification test(1) and the 

QMP for the AMS Center(2). The TSA noted no adverse findings. A TSA report was prepared, 

and a copy was distributed to the EPA AMS Center Quality Manager. In addition, the EPA 

AMS Center Quality Manager was present during the majority of the verification test and also 

performed a separate TSA. 

4.1.2 Data Quality Audit 

At least 10% of the data acquired during the verification test were audited. The data were traced 

from the initial acquisition, through reduction and statistical analysis, to final reporting to ensure 

the integrity of the reported results. All calculations performed on the data undergoing the audit 

were checked. 

4.2 QA/QC Reporting 

Each audit was documented in accordance with Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 of the QMP for the 

AMS Center.(2) Once the audit reports were prepared, the Battelle Verification Test Coordinator 

ensured that a response was provided for each adverse finding or potential problem and 
14 

implemented any necessary follow-up corrective action. The Battelle Quality Manager ensured 

that follow-up corrective action was taken. The results of the TSA were submitted to the EPA.

4.3 Data Review 

Records generated in the verification test received a one-over-one review before these records 

were used to calculate, evaluate, or report verification results. Data were reviewed by a Battelle 

technical staff member involved in the verification test. The person performing the review added 

his/her initials and the date to a hard copy of the record being reviewed. 
15 

Chapter 5 

Statistical Methods

The statistical methods used to evaluate the quantitative performance factors listed in Section 3.1 

are presented in this chapter. Qualitative observations were also used to evaluate verification test 

data. 

5.1 Accuracy

A primary objective for this verification test was to determine the accuracy of PAVS

performance with reading tags under critical variables and test conditions. Accuracy is a 

measure of the agreement between a measured value and the “true” value. For this verification, 

accuracy was determined as a percentage according to the following formula:

A = (1 - E/N) × 100 (1) 

where A is the percent accuracy of the RFID system reader, E is the total number of tags that 

were not properly recognized by the reader, and N is the total number of tagged HAZMAT 

containers. The accuracy of the system was determined for each read point and packaging type. 

The highest percent accuracy possible is 100%. 

5.2 Precision

Precision is a measure of agreement among repeated measurements. The precision of tag reads 

completed the PAVS was determined by calculating the standard deviation of the accuracy at all 

possible read locations (i.e., from the accuracy at each external read location when external 

readers were used or the accuracy at each uplinked tag read event when the uplinked data system 

was used). The standard deviation of the accuracy measurements was calculated using the 

following formula:

( )2 n

1k

n ii,k

1

i,N ∑ AA =

S = −

where, SN,i is the standard deviation of all accuracy measurements in verification test run i, n is 

the total number of possible read events in verification test run i, Ak,i is the percent accuracy of 

the RFID system reader for read event k during verification test run i, and Ai is the overall 

arithmetic mean percent accuracy of the RFID system during verification test run i. 
16 

5.3 Influence of Possible Confounding Factors 

The influence of the different container types on the accuracy of container identification was 

evaluated by calculating the accuracy in each container during each RT. Then a paired t-test was 

performed to determine if significant differences existed between the accuracy of the 

identification of steel drums, poly drums, and cardboard boxes. Other possible confounding 

factors included meteorological and environmental conditions. These data were reviewed 

qualitatively in attempt to identify possible correlations where statistical approaches should be 

considered. 
17 

Chapter 6 

Test Results

As mentioned previously, this verification test included both quantitative and qualitative 

evaluations. The quantitative evaluation was conducted to assess the accuracy and precision of 

PAVS, as well as by testing the influence of confounding factors and its ability to discriminate 

the HAZMAT waste tags from other commercially-available active tags. The qualitative 

evaluation was performed to document the operational aspects of PAVS when it was used during 

verification testing. The following sections provide the results of the quantitative and qualitative 

evaluations. 

6.1 Accuracy 

As described in Section 3.1, two configurations of the Mobile PAVS technologies were tested. 

One configuration included roadside readers that read the RFID tags in the truck at fixed 

locations and a second configuration that include a reader (referred to as the Relayer) that resided 

in the cab of the truck and communicated (uplinked) the container identifications each minute to 

a central database via a cellular phone connection. Both configurations of the PAVS were tested 

simultaneously and the results are presented separately below. 

6.1.1 External Reader Accuracy

Table 6-1 gives the accuracy results for the external reader configuration of the PAVS 

technology. The left column of the table gives each read location as described throughout 

Section 3.2 and the top row of the table gives the RT number, what route was followed, and 

whether the load was packed in a tight or loose configuration. Because the truck contained 12 

HAZMAT containers with vendor RFID tags, each read location had the possibility of 12 correct 

tag identifications. Each tag was identified with a unique eight digit number (e.g., 40000020) 

that was labeled on the outside of the tag. This number was also the piece of information that 

was recorded by the RFID reader upon a successful read event. Therefore, the accuracy of each 

read location is presented as a percentage of correctly read tags based on a total of 12 possible 

correct tag reads at each read location. AVANTE opted not to include the external readers in the 

second RT into MX (RT4). As was described in Section 3.2, during the stationary reads at 

various distances prior to RT 1 and the initial exit from NMBA, the external readers were placed 

at angles of 90° and 45° with respect to the road. At that time, AVANTE indicated a likely 

interference between the two readers so use of readers at both angles was discontinued. Upon 

review of the data, it did not appear that there was any interference between the two readers so 

the available results for both reader angles are shown. Some of the read locations given in the 

table were not used during every RT. The casino read location was only used during the U.S.

RTs, the MX POE and MX turnaround read location were only used during the MX RTs, 
18 

Table 6-1. Accuracy - External Readers

Round Trip (RT) Number RT 1 RT 2 RT 3

Truck Route US US MX

Packaging Configuration: Tight Tight Loose

Read Location

New Mexico Border Authority 

(NMBA) Distance/Angle Reads:

5ft, 90° 100% (12/12) 83% (10/12) 83% (10/12)

5ft, 45° 100% (12/12) (1) (1)

15ft, 90° 100% (12/12) 83% (10/12) 92% (11/12)

15ft, 45° 100% (12/12) (1) (1)

30ft, 90° 92% (11/12) 83% (10/12) 83% (10/12)

30ft, 45° 92% (11/12) (1) (1)

50ft, 90° 92% (11/12) 83% (10/12) 83% (10/12)

50ft, 45° 92% (11/12) (1) (1)

70ft, 90° 92% (11/12) 83% (10/12) 92% (11/12)

70ft, 45° 92% (11/12) (1) (1)

NMBA Exit, 90° 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12)

NMBA Exit, 45° 100% (12/12) (1) (1)

Casino 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12) (2)

MX Port of Entry (2) (2) 100% (12/12)

MX Turnaround (2) (2) 100% (12/12)

55 mph pass (3) 100% (12/12) (2)

40 mph pass (3) 100% (12/12) (2)

NMDPS Truck Inspection Facility

25 mph pass 92% (11/12) 75% (9/12) 17% (2/12)

15 mph pass 92% (11/12) 100% (12/12) (4)

25 mph pass 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12) 33% (4/12)

15 mph pass (collision test) 100% (12/12) 75% (9/12) (4)

NMBA Entrance (3) 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12)

5ft, 90° 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12)

15ft, 90° 83% (10/12) 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12)

30ft, 90° 83% (10/12) 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12)

50ft, 90° 83% (10/12) 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12)

70ft, 90° 83% (10/12) 92% (11/12) 100% (12/12)

Overall External Reader Average 94% (248/264) 93% (211/228) 86% (166/192)

(1) 45° Read angle not used following RT 1

(2) Read location not applicable for this RT

(3) Read location not used because readers not in place during RT 1

(4) Data not collected for undetermined reason; reader was in place and seemingly recording, but no data stored.

and the 55 mph and 45 mph read locations were only used during the second U.S. RT. The 

stationary reads at various distances were performed before and after each RT at the NMBA and 

there were two read locations (25 and 15 mph) at the NMDPS facility. The truck passed the 

NMDPS facility twice during each RT.

For all of the RTs, when a container was identified correctly, the identification number of its 

RFID tag was read and documented by the external reader. If it was not identified, the tag 

identification number was not read and documented. During RT 1, there were 22 possibilities 

for the PAVS external reader configuration to make 12 correct reads of the tagged containers. 

All 12 containers were identified in 10 instances, 11 out of 12 containers were identified in eight 

instances, and 10 out of 12 containers were identified in four instances. Over the entire RT, 248 

out of 264 containers were identified correctly for an overall accuracy of 94%.

During RT 2, there were 19 read locations to make 12 correct reads of the tagged containers. All 

12 containers were identified in 11 instances, 11 out of 12 containers were identified in one 
19 

instance, 10 out of 12 containers were identified in five instances, and 9 out of 12 containers 

were identified in two instances. Over the entire RT, 211 out of 228 containers were identified 

correctly for an overall accuracy of 93%. Prior to the RT, the stationary reads at various 

distances from the truck produced 10 out of 12 correct identifications at each distance, but 

following the RT, the same test produced 12 out of 12 correct identifications at all but the 

furthest distance. Also, this was the only RT that included a 40 mph and 55 mph read location 

and the results for both were 100% accuracy. Two 75% accuracy reads occurred at the NMDPS

facility, one at 25 mph and one at 15 mph. There was no discernable reason for the diminished 

accuracy at these locations given that the read locations immediately before and after these read 

locations produced 100% accurate results. 

During RT 3, there were 16 possibilities to make 12 correct reads of the tagged containers. All 

12 containers were identified in 9 instances, 11 out of 12 containers were identified in two 

instances, and 10 out of 12 containers were identified in three instances, and two instances that 

generated results that were less than 50%. There were two completely unique read locations 

during this RT, the Mexican POE and the MX turnaround point. The MX POE read location was 

located in a place that truck traffic waited in line to enter MX therefore, the external reader was 

passed at a low rate of speed (~5 mph). The MX turnaround read location was approximately 12 

miles south of the MX POE in a location just north of where the truck turned around to return to 

the U.S. The truck was traveling at 30 mph when it passed the external reader. Both of these 

read locations produced 100% accurate identifications. Upon the return to the U.S., the truck 

passed the 25 mph and 15 mph read locations at the NMDPS facility. For a reason that was not 

able to be determined, no data were collected at the 15 mph read location during this RT. The 

results for the two 25 mph read locations during this RT were 17% and 33%, respectively, with

no discernible reason for the relatively low levels of accuracy given that the rest of the RT had 

accuracies between 80% and 100%. Over the entire RT, 166 out of 192 containers were 

identified correctly for an overall accuracy of 86%. 

6.1.2 Relayer Uplinked Accuracy

This configuration of the Mobile PAVS technology included an RFID tag reader (referred to as 

the Relayer) that was located in the cab of the truck. The RELAYER also served as the 

communication link by uplinking the collected data via cellular to an AVANTE computer server 

once per minute during each RT. Because the tags were being read every minute, regardless of 

location, it eliminated the need to pass by an external reader at a single location. However, 

because the data for both configurations were being collected simultaneously, the results are 

presented in the same fashion, recording the accuracy of the container identification at the times 

that the truck was at the various read locations. Performing reads at various distances from the 

truck, an aspect of testing that included only the external readers, was not conducted for this 

configuration of the Mobile PAVS technology. 

Table 6-2 presents the results for the uplinked data in a similar fashion as in the previous section 

for the external reader data. The uplinked data were collected for only RT 2, RT 3, and RT 4 as 

data were not collected for RT 1. According to AVANTE, this gap in data was due to a gap in 

cell phone service coverage preventing the transmittal and storage of the tag identification and 

GPS tracking data. In addition to the missing data from RT1, uplinked data were only collected 

for the first 40 minutes of RT 2. At that point in the RT, there was a gap in cell phone coverage 

and the PAVS was unable to restart the communication when the truck travelled back in to an 

area with cell phone service. Data collected for RT2 included the NMBA exit, three of the four 

read locations at the NMDPS facility (data were not collected for the second 25 mph pass) and 
20 

part of the way to the casino. The RT lasted from approximately 4:00 p.m. until 5:25 p.m., but 

data were collected only until 4:45 p.m. Throughout this time period, there were 233 correct 

identifications of containers out of 348 possibilities for an overall accuracy (while the technology 

was functional) of 67%. 

Table 6-3 gives the data completeness for RT 2-4. Data completeness is defined as the fraction 

of the total duration of the RT that the continuous data uplink was occurring (less than two

minutes between data uplinks). RT 2 had a data completeness of 37%. Most of the missing data 

occurred during the final 40 minutes of the RT, but there was also 11 minutes of missing data 

surrounding the second 25 mph read location. 

The accuracy of RT 3 ranged from 75% to 100% at the various read locations, but during the 

time period that data were being collected properly, the overall accuracy was 1,594 correct 

container identifications out of 1,786 possible identifications for an overall accuracy of 89%. In 

addition, the data completeness for this RT was much higher than for RT2 as data were uplinked 

at least once every two minutes for 86% of the RT. According to AVANTE, the missing data 

were again due to a lack of cell phone coverage, but prior to RT 3, they were able to make a 

change to the PAVS firmware to accommodate the restart of data transmission when the truck 

returned into an area with adequate cell phone coverage. This restarting of data transmission was 

observed following a time period of missing data during RT 3. 

The accuracy at the various read locations during RT 4 was 100% with the exception of the 

second 25 mph pass which did not identify two of the containers within the truck for 83% 

accuracy at that location. However, during the time period that data were being collected 

properly, the overall accuracy was 804 correct container identifications out of 850 possible 

identifications for an overall accuracy of 95%. In addition, the data completeness for this RT 

was 81% as there were 17 minutes of missing data when the truck was in MX. The time period 

of missing data included the MX turnaround so there was no data collected for that read location. 

The reason for the missing data was again a lapse in cell phone service coverage which was 

apparently regained by the end of RT 4 as data collection resumed.

Table 6-2. Accuracy – In-truck Reader and Uplinked Communication

Round Trip Number RT 2 RT 3 RT 4

Truck Route US MX MX

Packaging Configuration Tight Loose Loose

Read Locations

NMBA exit 75% (9/12) 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12)

MX POE (1) 100% (12/12) 100% (12/12)

NM Casino (2) (1) (1)

MX Turnaround (1) 83% (30/36) (2)

NMDPS Truck Inspection 

Facility

25 mph pass 58% (7/12) 83% (10/12) 100% (12/12)

15 mph pass 83% (10/12) 83% (10/12) 100% (12/12)

25 mph pass (2) 92% (11/12) 83% (10/12)

15 mph pass (collision test) 100% (12/12) 92% (11/12) 100% (12/12)

55 mph pass (2) (1) (1)

40 mph pass (2) (1) (1)

NMBA entrance (2) 75% (9/12) 100% (12/12)

Overall Road Driving 67% (233/348) 89% (1594/1786) 95% (804/850)3

(1) Read location not applicable for this RT

(2) Data not collected for undetermined reason, data collection halted completely after 40 minutes of the RT

(3) 25% of the misidentifications may have been due to a wet RFID tag (see Section 6.4)
21 

Table 6-3. Data Completeness Due to Continuity of Data Uplink 

Round Trip Number RT 2 RT 3 RT 4

Route US MX MX

Elapsed Time (min) of route 81 162 91

Duration of continuous data 

uplinks (min) 30 140 74

Data completeness 37% 86% 81%

6.2 Precision 

The precision, or repeatability, of the RFID accuracy data were determined as described in 

Section 5.2 and is given in Table 6-4 along with the overall accuracy for each RT. 

Table 6-4. Overall Accuracy ± Standard Deviation of Each RT 

Truck Routes External Reader ± SD Uplinked Data ± SD

RT1-US 94% ± 6% (1)

RT2-US 93% ± 10% 67% ± 32%

RT3-MX 86% ± 25% 89% ± 15%

RT4-MX (1) 95% ± 7%

(1) Read location not applicable for this RT

For the external readers, the standard deviations were 10% or less for RT 1 and 2. The uplinked 

data became more precise over the three RTs, with RT 2 generating a SD of 32% and RT 4 

generating a SD of 7%.

6.3 Interference of Other RFID Signals

The collision test was performed as described in Section 3.2.4 by placing four RFID tags into the 

trailer along with the containers that were tagged with the AVANTE RFID tags. Thereafter, the 

truck passed the second 15 mph read location at the NMDPS facility. The data for that read 

location are shown in Table 6-5. Overall, three out of the five available data sets resulted in 

100% accuracy, one had 92% accuracy, and one had 75% accuracy. While difficult to determine 

conclusively with this small data set, these results were similar to the non-collision test results 

presented in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 in that some non-collision test read locations resulted in 

accuracy percentages of 75%, 92%, and 100%. These similarities, while not a quantitative 

evaluation, suggest that the presence of the collision tags did not negatively impact the accuracy 

results.

Table 6-5. Collision Test Results

15 mph pass - 

Collision Test RT 1 US RT 2 US RT 3 MX RT 4 MX

External Readers 100% (12/12) 75% (9/12) (1) (2)

Uplinked Data (1) 100% (12/12) 92% (11/12) 100% (12/12)

(1) Data not collected for undetermined reason; reader was in place and seemingly recording, but no data stored.

(2) Read location not applicable for this RT
22 

6.4 Influence of Confounding Factors

Container type and packaging configuration. The RFID tags were placed on three different 

types of containers during the round trips. The accuracy results are presented in Table 6-6 by 

container type. The container identification accuracy ranged from 59% to 100% with an average 

of 85% for the steel drums, 72% to 99% with an average of 89% for the poly drums, and 69% to 

100% with an average of 88% for the cardboard boxes. A paired t-test was performed on the 

results by container type and no significant differences were determined at a 95% confidence 

interval. As shown in Table 6-2 above, the overall accuracy of the uplinked data during RT 2 

was considerably lower than RTs 3 and 4. This is consistent with the container-specific accuracy 

Table 6-6. Accuracy Results by Container Type (in percent)

Configuration Round Trip #

Steel

Drum

Poly

Drum

Cardboard 

Box

External 

Readers

RT1 100 93 89

RT2 96 91 91

RT3 83 86 91

RT4 (1) (1) (1)

Uplinked

RT1 (1) (1) (1)

RT2 59 72 69

RT3 85 94 89

RT4 85 99 100

Average 85 89 88

SD 14 9 10

(1) Read location not applicable for this RT

data shown here as the accuracies for RT 2 are lower for all three RTs. RT 2 was the only RT 

for which uplinked data were collected when the containers were in a tightly-packed 

configuration so the lower container identification accuracies could be attributed to packing 

configuration. However, the uplinking data system stopped functioning 45 minutes into RT 2, 

and upon review of the raw data, there was an increased number of missed container 

identifications just before it stopped functioning, suggesting that the problem with the equipment 

was more likely the contributing cause rather than the packing configuration. In addition, the 

external readers did not exhibit the same diminished accuracy with the tight configuration.

Meteorological and other environmental conditions. Throughout the two days of testing, the 

temperature inside the truck never exceeded 25.1 degrees Celsius (°C) and never dropped below 

15.8 °C. The relative humidity ranged from 12% to 19%, and the barometric pressure ranged 

from 25.4 inches of mercury (in Hg) to 26.1 in Hg. Upon a qualitative review of the accuracy 

data, there was no suggestion that meteorological conditions impacted the results in any way so 

no statistical analyses were performed. However, high winds caused sandstorm conditions 

during the testing which caused difficulty in reading the memory cards used for data collection 

on the external readers. Instead of using the memory card, the data were downloaded using an 

ethernet port. Similar to the meteorological conditions, there was no suggestion of a correlation 

between the Shocklog data collected during each RT and the accuracy results so no statistical 

analyses were performed. 

Other factors. Following RT 4, the verification staff noticed that one of the tags was very wet

(from water that had splashed out of the drum it was attached to) after the truck returned from the 
23 

RT. Review of the tag specific data revealed that of the 46 incorrect container identifications 

(out of 804 possible identifications) during RT 4, 25 of them had been due to the tag that was 

found to be wet. Throughout RT 4, that tag had a 65% accuracy. One other tag (with no similar 

explanation) had 79% accuracy while the others were between 96% and 100%. 

6.5 Operational Factors 

The verification staff found that AVANTE’s PanaSec Mobile PAVS was easy to use. AVANTE

staff set up the external readers and assisted with the application of the RFID tags to the 

HAZMAT waste containers. The Mobile PAVS was setup quickly by powering the system 

through the dashboard 12v power outlet and positioning two small antennae inside the truck’s 

cab. 

As described in Section 6.1, the PAVS technology had a decreased level of data completeness

due to blocks of missing data during the verification test. According to AVANTE, the reason for 

these missing blocks were due to lack of cellular phone coverage. During RTs 1and 2 the loss of 

cell phone service coverage took place in the U.S., during RT 3 the loss of cell phone service 

coverage took place on both sides of the border near the MX POE on the way back in to the U.S., 

and during RT 4 the loss of coverage took place in MX on the way to the turnaround point. 

During RTs 1 and 2, the transmission of tag identification data did not restart when the truck reentered an area with adequate cell phone service coverage. Prior to RT 3, AVANTE was able to 

make a change to the PAVS firmware that allowed for this to take place during RTs 3 and 4. 

This update did not accommodate simultaneous operation with the external reader configuration 

so the external readers were not used for RT 4. In addition, following RT 1, AVANTE staff had 

to repair a faulty GPS receiver within the Relayer. 

AVANTE concluded that the RF conditions at the test location in close proximity to the United 

States – Mexico Border were particularly adverse to the efficiency of communication between 

the RFID tags and the vehicle-based Relayer component of our equipment. This adverse local RF 

environment decreased the nominal read distance between Relayer and RFID tags from 500 ft to 

less than 100 ft. AVANTE believe this RF interference caused diminished tag read accuracy 

during the verification test. AVANTE has taken steps to resolve these problems such as adding 

an amplifier to the Relayer to increase read distances, changing the orientation and type of the 

external antenna, shifting the reception frequency of the antenna, and revising the software to 

allow PAVS to store the tag identification and GPS tracking data and then transmit it when the 

truck returns to an area with adequate cell phone coverage. 

The software that AVANTE uses to handle the data collected by the uplinked data connection is 

web-based and offers a number of optional utilities that were used during the verification test. 

One feature that was tested was the ability for the software to provide an alert when the truck 

deviated from its planned path by more than one mile. This was performed once during the 

verification test and the alert was provided in real-time to verification staff that were watching 

the computer monitor as well as by text message. In addition to the RFID tag identification data, 

the uplinked data included the GPS coordinates of the Relayer at the time of uplink. Using 

AVANTE’s online software, the coordinates can be mapped in real-time and displayed as is 

shown in Figure 6-1. The path of green shapes show the route of the truck from the NMBA into 

MX. In addition to the GPS mapping, another utility was the use of a wallet sized “Driver’s 

Identification card” incorporating a “panic-button” that can be given to the driver of a truck. 

This can be used as an actual panic button for the driver to alert those monitoring the truck, or 
24 

those designated in advance to receive alert text messages on their mobile phones or via email, in 

the event of a dangerous or threatening situation with a discreet one-second squeeze at a certain 

point on the badge. This card can also be used to send an alert if the driver leaves the truck and 

then send another report when the driver returns. While not a part of the formal testing, 

AVANTE successfully demonstrated each of these utilities during the verification test. The userfriendliness of the vendor software was very apparent as the interface was graphical and 

intuitive. The time needed to train testing staff in the proper use of the system was minimal.

Figure 6-1. Screenshot from AVANTE’s Software.

The uplinked configuration of the AVANTE PAVS can be purchased as a service at a current 

price of $1/day/vehicle which includes the Relayer, one Driver’s identification badge with Panic 

Button, and two RFID tags for cargo or wall mount. The price is based on a two year contract, 

with a $200 security deposit refundable at lease termination. The price includes the utilities 

described above (i.e., route deviation, driver location alerts, panic button functionality, text 

message alerts, etc.). Additional RFID tags are available for purchase at $25 - $32 depending on 

quantity. 
25 

Chapter 7 

Performance Summary

Three RTs were performed using the external reader and uplinked configurations of the PAVS 

system. The external readers were used during the first two RTs that were performed within the 

U.S. and the first RT into MX. Prior to RT 3, AVANTE performed a firmware update to their 

software to ensure the uplinked system worked properly. That update did not accommodate 

simultaneous operation with the external reader configuration. The uplinked system was used 

for all four RTs but had higher levels of data completeness during RTs 3 and 4. No uplinked 

data were collected during RT 1 and data from 63% of RT 2 were not collected due to gaps in 

cell phone coverage required for data transmission. Table 7-1 summarizes the accuracy, 

precision, and data completeness of the PAVS system.

Table 7-1. Accuracy and Precision Summary for the PAVS

Truck Route

External Reader

(Identified Tags/Total Tags)±SD

Uplinked Data

(Identified Tags/Total Tags)±SD

RT1-US 94% (248/264) ± 6% (1)

RT2-US 93% (211/228) ± 10% 67% (233/348) ± 32%

RT3-MX 86% (166/192) ± 25% 89% (1,594/1,786) ± 15%

RT4-MX (1) 95% (804-850) ± 7%

(1) Read location not applicable for this RT

The external readers generated container identification accuracies that were above 90% and had 

SDs of 10% or less for RTs 1 and 2. RT 3 resulted in a lower overall accuracy and a higher SD 

with two read locations as part of RT 3 that resulted in less than 35% accurate results, thus 

impacting the overall accuracy for that RT. All of the other read locations for that RT had 

greater than 83% accuracy. 

The uplinked configuration for RTs 2, 3, and 4 generated accuracies of 67%, 89%, and 95%, 

respectively. Data were only collected for the first 40 minutes of RT 2 for data completeness of 

37% and the frequency of missed reads increased throughout that time period. The results from 

RTs 3 and 4 show that data were collected during more than 80% of the time. According to 

AVANTE, these gaps in data were due to gaps in cell phone service coverage preventing the 

transmittal and storage of the tag identification and GPS tracking data. 

Interference with other RFID signals. The collision test was performed as described in 

Section 3.2.4 by placing four RFID tags into the trailer along with the containers that were 

tagged with the AVANTE RFID tags. Three out of the five collision test data sets resulted in 

100% accuracy, one had 92% accuracy, and one had 75% accuracy. While difficult to determine 

conclusively with this small data set, these results were similar to the non-collision test results 

presented in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 in that some non-collision test read locations resulted in 

accuracy percentages of 75%, 92%, and 100%. These similarities, while not a quantitative 
26 

evaluation, suggest that the presence of the collision tags did not negatively impact the accuracy 

results.

Influence of Confounding Factors. The influence of container type was quantitatively 

considered as a possible factor in PAVS performance. A paired t-test was performed on the 

container identification accuracies as a function of container type and no significant differences 

were determined between the container types. In addition, there was no indication that 

environmental conditions during the testing significantly impacted any of the results. However, 

one tag was wetted by water splashed from a container during a RT. This tag was missed at a 

higher rate compared to other tags. High winds caused sandstorm conditions during the testing 

which caused difficulty in reading the memory cards used for data collection on the external 

readers. Instead of using the memory card, the data were downloaded using an ethernet port. 

Operational Factors. AVANTE staff set up the external readers and assisted with the 

application of the RFID tags to the HAZMAT waste containers. The ease of use of the Mobile 

PAVS was notable as setup could be quickly accomplished by powering the system through the 

dashboard 12 volt power outlet and positioning of two small antenna inside the truck’s cab. 

As described in Section 6.1, the PAVS technology had a decreased level of data completeness 

for the uplinking system due to blocks of missing data during the verification test. The reason 

for these missing blocks were not fully known for RTs 1 and 2, and for RTs 3 and 4, the gaps in 

data collection were due to lack of cellular phone coverage. During RTs 1and 2 the loss of cell 

phone service coverage took place in the U.S., during RT 3 the loss of cell phone service 

coverage took place on both sides of the border near the MX POE on the way back in to the U.S., 

and during RT 4 the loss of coverage took place in MX on the way to the turnaround point. 

During RTs 1 and 2, the transmission of tag identification data did not restart when the truck reentered and area with adequate cell phone service coverage. Prior to RT 3, AVANTE was able 

to make a change to the PAVS firmware that allowed for this to take place during RTs 3 and 4. 

This update did not accommodate simultaneous operation with the external reader configuration 

so the external readers were not used for RT 4. In addition, following RT 1, AVANTE staff had 

to repair a faulty GPS receiver within the Relayer. 

AVANTE concluded that the RF conditions at the test location in close proximity to the United 

States – Mexico Border were particularly adverse to the efficiency of communication between 

the RFID tags and the vehicle-based Relayer component of our equipment. This adverse local RF 

environment decreased the nominal read distance between Relayer and RFID tags from 500 ft to 

less than 100 ft. AVANTE believes this RF interference caused diminished tag read accuracy 

during the verification test. AVANTE has taken steps to resolve these problems such as adding 

an amplifier to the Relayer to increase read distances, changing the orientation and type of the 

external antenna, shifting the reception frequency of the antenna, and revising the software to 

allow PAVS to store the tag identification and GPS tracking data and than transmit it when the 

truck returns to an area with adequate cell phone coverage. 
27 

The uplinked configuration of the AVANT PAVS can be purchased as a service at a current 

price of $1/day/vehicle which includes the Relayer, one Driver’s identification badge with Panic 

Button, and two RFID tags for cargo or wall mount. The price is based on a two year contract, 

with a $200 security deposit refundable at lease termination. The price includes the utilities 

described above (i.e., route deviation, driver location alerts, panic button functionality, text 

message alerts, etc.). Additional RFID tags are available for purchase at $25 - $32 depending on 

quantity. 
28 

Chapter 8 

References

1. Test/QA Plan for Verification of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) for Tracking 

Hazardous Waste Shipments across International Borders, Battelle, Columbus, Ohio, March 

23, 2009. 

2. Quality Management Plan for the ETV Advanced Monitoring Systems Center, Version 7.0, 

U.S. EPA Environmental Technology Verification Program, Battelle, Columbus, Ohio, 

November, 2008