Pur su ant t o F e de ra l Ru le of Civ il Pr oc e dure 25 (d ), Ar ne Dunc an is subs tit

ute d as Sec re tary

fo r h is 1 prede cessor , Marg are t Spellings, Secre tary of the De partment of E ducation. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

) JOHN GAR

D, ) ) P laintif f, )

) v. ) Civil Action No. 07-2303 (RM C) ) UN ITED STA TES D EP AR TM EN T OF EDUCATION, e t al

. , )

) ) Defendan ts. ) )
M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION On De c. 2 1 , 2 0 0 7 , P l ai n t i ff J o h nGa rd , p ro ce ed i n g pr o s e , filed this action ag ainst the U.S. Depar

tment of Edu ca t i on and its Secre tary , Arne Dunca n, alleg ing violations of the 1 Rehabilitatio n Ac t o f 1 9 7 3 (“Reha bilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. , T itl e VI Iof the Civ il Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI I ”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , the Privacy Act of 1974 (“Privac y Act”) , 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2 a, and the Fifth Ame ndment to the U.S. Consti tution, among other things. He amende d his complaint on April 18, 2008 [Dkt. # 9], and Defe ndants moved to dismiss on J une 20, 2008. The Court g rante d Def endants’ motion i n part on Oc tober 2, 2008, findingthat Mr. Gar d had failed to c omply

with Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and dism issed the amende d complaint without prejudice. See Dkt. # 22. The Court orde red Mr . Gar d to file an amended c omplaint
corr ectingthe def

iciencie s identified i n its Orde r di smissi ng the complaint no later than Novembe r 3, 2008. Mr. Gar d failed to do so, and this c ase was dismiss ed without pr ejudice on November 24,-2-

2008. Mr. Gar d moved for r econside ration on Marc h 12, 2009, arguing that he did not have notice of the Court’s October 2 or November 24, 2008, Orde rs until Mar ch 2009. I n an Orde r date d Marc h 17, 2009, the Court, finding it in th e i n t er es t of justice to ac cept Mr. G ard’ s expl anation, g rante d his motion and ordered him to file an amende d complaint in compliance w ith Rul e 8 no later than April 17, 2009. See Dkt. # 28. Mr. Gard filed hi s second a mended c omplaint on April 9, 2009, Dkt. # 29, and De fenda

nts moved to dismi ss on J une 1. See Dk t. # 32 . M r. Ga

rd re sp on de d w ith
a cr oss-motion for summary judgme nt. See Dkt. # 40. For the re ason s s et forth below, the Court wi ll g ra nt D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to d ism iss in p art

and de ny it i n p art , a

nd wi ll d e ny

Mr . G ard ’s c ro ssmot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. I. F AC TS Mr. Gar d is an employ ee of the Depa rtment of Educa

tion. He alleg es that he suf fer s from chr onic pain, nar colepsy , and Post Traumatic Stress Disorde r (“ PTSD”), all of which are “interr elated a

nd what happe ns in one disability /impairment aff

ects the condition and contr ol of the other disabilities/impairments and Plaintiff’s major life a ctivities.” Second Am. Compl. [ Dkt. # 29] ¶ 58. He states that Def

endants “ we re fully

awa re” of these disa

biliti es whe n they

hired him, and that they “conside red Plaintiff to be ha ndicappe d , t re at ed P laintiff as be ing ha ndicappe d and p ro v i d edP l ai n t i ff

wi th re as o n ab l e a cc o m m o d at i o nfr o m ap p ro x i m at el y Ap ri l 1 , 1 9 8 9 t h ro u gh November

22, 2004.” Id. ¶¶ 54- 55. At s o m e p o i nt prior to October 1998, for r easons not spec ified in the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Ga rd appe ars t o h av e t aken le ave f rom his employ

ment. He state s that fr om O c tob e r t

hr ou g h D e c e mbe r 1 99 8, he wa s e ng a g e d in “ re tur n- to- wo rk ” discus sio ns wi thTh e se a dd iti on a l e xhibi t nu mbe rs re fe r t o e xhibi t numbe rs us e d b y Mr . G ard in p ri or c omp la int s 2 and occ asionally

ref ere nced in the curr ent Second Amended Complaint. The documents ref ere nced in this opi nion are all attache d t o t h e Second A mended Complaint as one e x hibit, but t he orig inal numbers ar e ofte n found in the bottom right ha nd corne r of the spe cific doc uments in question. -3- Def endan t s , during which time Def endants ha d on file “a ) Plaintiff’s medica l rec ords, and b) Def endants’ r easonab l e acc ommodation determinations and the r easona ble ac commodation authorized.” Id. ¶ 42. He returne d t o wo rk i n Dec ember 19998 pursuant to a Return- to-Work Ag ree ment dated De cembe r 14, 19998. Id. ¶¶ 44-45. He states that he disclosed “ external g rante e and De fenda

nts’ internal e mploy ee f

raud to Mr. J ack Martin, Chief Financial Office, and Mr. John Hig g ins, I nspector Gener al, Defenda nts,” in J uly and August of 2004. Id. ¶¶ 47-48. I n November 20 04 , D e fe nd ants no tif

ie d M r. Ga

rd that the re a so na

ble a c c omm od a tio n h e ha d b e e n p ro vid e d w ou ld no longe r be pr ovided. Id. ¶ 49. Mr. Gar d filed a “ formal [EEO] handicap r efusa l to continue
rea sonable a ccommodation complaint ag ainst Defe ndants o n M arc h 14, 2005.” Id. ¶¶ 16.C., 50. There afte r, he a lleg es his difficulties in secur ing a r easona ble ac commodation for his disabilities incre ased. Id. ¶ 50. He notes that other e mploy ees r ece ived re asonable acc ommodations during the period in which his re quests wer e denie d. Id. ¶ 51.

On September

5, 2006, Mr. Gar d emailed De fenda nts, attaching what he de scribed
as m edica l documentation and pr ior reque sts for re asonable acc ommodations. See id. , E x . 1 ( E x. 442: Sept. 5, 2006 email from Gar d to L i n d a S t ra cke et al .). De fenda nts replied that they

wer e 2 unable to locate “r ecor d of any written approva l for a r easona ble ac commodation reque st from [Mr. Gar d].” Id. , Ex. 1 (E x. 44 3- 1: Se pt. 20 , 20 06 e ma il f ro m Str a c ke to G ard ). Th e y we nt o n to state that if Mr . G ard ’s me dic a l c on dit ion re qu ir e d a

re a so na ble a c c omm od a tio n, De fe nd ants woul d consider his re quest upon the rec eipt of updated “ (i.e., last thre e months)” medic al documentation.44 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. 3 -4- Id. Mr . G ard

re sp on ded th at prio r a g e nc y of fi c ia ls h a d d e te rm ine d h e re qu ir e d a re a so na ble
acc ommodation, that Defe ndants had no rig ht to revoke that acc ommodation, and that he had previously

responde d t o De fe n d an t s ’ re quests for medic al re cords. Id. , Ex . 1 (Ex. 444-1: Oct. 3, 2006 email from Ga

rd to Stracke ). He stated that De fenda nts’ reque st for fur

ther doc umentation was pr oo f t hat th e y ha d v iol a te d th e Pr iva c y Ac t and Re ha bil itatio n A c t by

de str oyingor

fa ili ngto maintain his recor ds. Id.

Defen d an t s aga i ns t at edt h at t h ey h ad“n o re co rdo f a nage n cy d et er m i n at i o nthat” Mr. Gar d wa s “a qualified individual with a disability or of a ny decision to provide [him] with any
rea sonable accommodation of a disability .” Id. , Ex
. 1 (Ex. 445: Nov. 24, 2006 email fr om Stracke to G ar d )
. M r . G ar d

r e a d s th is e ma il a s a

d e n ia l f r o m D e f e n d an ts th a t h e e v e r

s u b mi tt e d me d ic al
re c or ds to De fe nd ants , re qu e ste d a re a so na ble a c c omm od a tio n, or

wa s p ro vid e d w itha

re a so na ble
acc ommodation. Id. ¶¶

34 -36. De fe nd ants a lso re fu se d to pr ov ide Mr . G ard wi th a re a so na ble
acc ommodation at that time, citing lack of curr ent m edica l documentation upon which to base such
ac co m m odation. See id. , E x. 1 ( E x. 4 4 5 : N o v . 2 4 , 2 0 0 6 e ma il f r o m Str a c k e to G ar d )
. Mr. Gar d
rea ds this as an admission that Defe ndants fai l ed t o maintain, destroy ed, and/or ref used to restore his official re cords. Id. ¶¶ 38- 39. He also alleg es that De fenda nts failed to sec ure, de stroy ed, or ref used to restore his mil itary retire ment rec ords during settlement neg otiations in early 2007 which
wer e par t of a P rivac y

Act ca se he f

iled in 2000. Id. ¶¶ 31- 32. On these f acts, Mr. G ard a lleg es
v io lati o n s o f

th e Pr iv a c y

A c t, Re h a

b il it a ti o nA c t, T it le V I I , th e F e d e r a l R e c o r d s A c t, u n s p e c if ie d 3 Equal Employ

ment Opportunity

Commi ssion reg ulations, unspecified O ff i ce of Personne l Manag ement re g ulations, and the F ifth Amendment. See id. C o u n t s I- V II.-5- II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Rule 8 Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 8 re quires that eve ry complaint include “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief” and that “e ach a verme nt of a ple ading be simple, conc ise, and dire ct.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (e )(1) . “[T] he plea ding sta ndard Rule 8 announce s does not require ‘deta iled fac tual allegat i o n s , ’ but it demands more than a n unadorne d, the-de fenda

nt-unlawfully -har

med-m e ac cusation. A pleading that offe rs ‘labe ls and conclusions’ or ‘ a for

mulaic recitation of the e lements of a c ause of action will not do.’” As hc ro ft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . 1937, 1949 (2009) ( internal c itations omi tted). F eder al Rule of Civil P roce dure 41 (b ) p e rm its the Co urt to di sm iss e ith e r a c la im o r a

n a c tio n b e c a

us e of the pla int if

f’ s f a ilure to comply with the Fe dera l Rules “or any order of [the] court.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 41(b); Cirals ky v . CIA , 355 F.3d 661 , 6 69 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Dismissal under Rule 8 “‘ is usually rese rved f

or those ca ses in which th e co m p l aint is so confused, ambiguous, va g ue, or othe rwise unintellig ible that its true substance, if

any , is well disguised.’ ” Cirals ky , 3 5 5 F. 3 d at 6 7 0 n . 9 (q u o t i n g Sim mo ns v . A br uz zo , 49 F.3d 83, 86 ( 2d Cir. 1995)).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) A motion to dis miss pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) cha lleng es the adeq u ac y o f a c omplaint on its fac e, testing whether a plaintiff ha s proper ly

stated a c laim. A complaint must be sufficie nt “ to g ive a defe ndant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the g rounds upon which it rests.” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (in t er n al ci t at ions omitted). As under Rule 8, a plaintiff’s oblig ation to provide the g rounds of his entit lement to relief “re quires more than labels a nd conclusions, and a formulaic rec itation of the e lements of a c ause of-6-

action will not do.” Id. The fa ct s al l ege d “mus t be enoug h to raise a rig ht to relief a

bove the speculative level.” Id . “[A ] co mpl a int ne e ds some inf

or ma tio n a bo ut the c ir c ums tanc e s g ivi ngri se to the claims.” Aktieselsk abet Af 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fam e Je ans, Inc. , 525 F.3d 8, 16 n.4 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (e mphasis in origina l).

I n d e c idi nga

mot ion un de r Rule 12 (b )( 6) , a cou rt may c on sid e r the fa c ts a lle g e d in the complaint, documents attached to the c omplaint as exhi bits or incorporated by ref ere nce, a nd
matt e r s a b o u t w h ic h th e c o u rt ma

y ta k e ju d ic ia l n o tice. A b he &Svoboda, Inc . v. Chao , 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
. To survive a motion to dismiss , a complaint must contain suffic ient fac tual matter, a cce pted as true , to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on it s fac e.” Twom bly , 55 0 U .S. a t 57 0. Whe n a pla int if f ple a ds fa c tua l con te nt that allo ws the c ourt to dr aw the re a so na ble infere nce that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduct alleg ed, t h en t h e claim has fac ial plausibilit y . Iqbal , 1 29 S. Ct
. at 19 49 . “ Th e pla us ibi lity sta nd ard is n ot a kin to a ‘p ro ba bil ity require ment,’ but it asks for more than a she er possibility that a de fe n d an t has ac ted unlawf ully .” Id
. A c ourt

mus t tr e a t th e c omp la int ’s fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns a s tr ue , “eve n if

do ub tf ul i n fac t.” Twom bly , 5 50 U. S. at 55 5. B ut a co ur t nee d not ac c e pt as tr

ue le g a l c on c lus ion s se t f

or th i n a complaint. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . at 1949. “Thr eadba re r ecitals of the el em en t s of a c ause of action, supported by

mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice .” Id . “While leg al conc lusions can provide the fr a me wo rk

of a c omp la int , th e y

mus t be su

pp or te d by fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns . Wh e n th e re are we llpleade d fac tual alleg ations, a cour t should assume their v er ac i ty and then de termine whe ther they plausibly g ive rise to an e ntitlement to relief.” Id . at 1950.-7- C. Rule 56 Under Rule 56 of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure, summary judgme nt must be g rante d when “ the pleading s, depo s it io n s , a n s w e r s to in

te r r o g atories, a

nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff

idavits, if any , show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fa ct and that the
mov ing pa

rt y is e nti tle d to a

jud g me nt a s a

ma tte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); An de rso n v . Li be rty Lobby, Inc. , 4 77 U. S. 2 42 , 2 47 (1 98 6) ; se e als o Diamond v. Atwood , 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 ( D.C. Cir. 1995). III . A NA LY SIS

A. Com plian ce with Rule 8 I n an Or der dated Marc h 17, 2009, this Court “impl ore[d] Mr. Gard to consult and
c omp ly wi th R ule 8 o f the F e de ra l Rule s of Civi l Proc e dure ” in fi lin g his a me nd e d co mpl a int . Dkt
. # 2 8 at 3. De fe nd ants argue tha t Mr . G ard

ha s ig no re d the Court ’s Or de r a nd on c e a g a in f

a ile d to adher e to the F eder al Rules. Def s.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“De fs.’ Mem.” ) [Dkt. # 32] at 10. C o mp l a i n t s f i l e d b y pro se litigants are held to le ss stringe nt standards than f ormal pleading s dra ft ed b y

lawy ers. See H

aines v. Kerne r , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Eve n pr o s e litigants, howeve r, must c omply with the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e. Jarrell v. Tisch , 6 56 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Mr. Ga rd’s Sec ond Amended Complaint is 30 pag es long w ith 88 para g raphs and seven counts, plus 132 pag es of “exhibi ts” which a ppear to be comprised la

rg ely of
corr espondenc e betw e e n

M r . G a r d a n d the Depa rtment of Educ ation and fa ctual stateme nts proffe red by Mr. Gar d reg ardinghis alleg ed disabilities. Despite its le n gt h, howeve r, the Sec ond Amended Complaint i s pare d down sig nificantly from its previous inca

rnation, which totale d 232 pag es, 880-8-

para g raphs, a

nd 22 counts. See Dkt. # 9. Although D efe ndants are corr ect that the Sec ond Amended Complaint at times “ rambl[es] and
. . . lack[s] chronolog ical cohe renc e,” see De fs .’ Me m. a t 11 , it is evident that Mr. Ga

rd attempted to delete cer

tain irrele vant i nformation and eliminate some of the redunda ncies that plagued his previous c omplaints. The Court finds that three of Mr. Ga rd’s c laims have b ee n al l eged w ith sufficient clar i t y t o m eet the require ments of Rule 8 — his claim reg ardingthe maintenanc e of his re cords
un de r the Pr iva c y Ac t and his c la ims of re ta liatio n a nd dis c ri min a tio n und e r t

he Re ha bil itatio n A c t. Mr . G ard ’s Pr iva c y

Ac t c la im ( Counts I , I I , an d I I I ) is ba se d on h is b e lie f t hat D e fe nd ants fa ile d to
se c ur e , a nd pe rh a ps des tr oy e d, his pe rs on ne l r e c or ds , in c lud ingme dic a l and mil ita ry re c or ds
. Se c on d A m. C omp l. ¶

1. He a lle g e s t hat De fe nd ants too k p os se ssi on of his pe rs on ne l r e c or ds in J une 1998 and ma intained pos s es s i o n t h ro u g h at least De cembe r 1998, id . ¶ ¶ 4 2- 43 , b ut t

hat in November

2006 Def endants de nied that he had submitted any medical r ecor ds and there fore denied him a rea sonable a ccommodation for h is disabilit ies, thoug h he had pr eviously been g iven such
ac co m m o d at i o n. Id. ¶

¶ 3 4

- 4 1
. T h is is s u f

f ic ie n t t o a ll e g e a

v io lati o no f

th e Pr iv a c y

A c t, w h ich provides a c ivil remedy

wher e an a g ency “fails to maintain any rec ord conc erningany

individual with such . . . completene ss as is nece ssary to assure fairne ss in any

deter mination relating to the .

. . b e n e f i t s t o t h e i n d i v i d

u a l t h a t m a y b e m a d e o nt h e b a s i s o f s u c h r e c o r d , an d

c o n s e qu e n t l y a deter mination is m ade w hich is adver se to the individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g )(1) (C).

Withre sp e c t to the Re ha

bil itatio n Ac t, Mr . Gard a lle g e s a disc ri min a tor y fa ilure to
acc ommodate ( see Count I V) a nd reta liation (Count VI ). Mr. Ga rd suffe rs fro m “chr onic pain,
narc olepsy , and post-tra

umatic stress disorder (PTSD)” a nd he alleg es that De fenda nts were awa

re of the se c on dit ion s. Se c on d Am . Co mpl . ¶ ¶ 5 4- 58 . H e fu

rt he r a lle g e s th a t he re c e ive d a re a so na ble-9-

a c c omm od a tio n f

or his dis a bil iti e s p ur su ant t o a Decem be r 1 99 8 “ Re tur n- to- Wor k A g re e me nt”
ne g oti a te d w ithDe fe nd ants , id. ¶ 46, but c laims that a fter notify ing Def endants of interna l employ ee fra ud in 2004, he was told t hat he would no long er be provided with this rea sonable a ccommodation. Id. ¶¶ 47-49. He c omplains that his difficulties in securinga re asonable acc ommodation increa sed afte r he f iled a for mal EEO complaint ag ainst Defe ndants in Marc h 2005 for their failure to provide him with accommodations for his disabilities. I d . ¶ 5 0
. T h e Reha

bilitation Act incorporate s the standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ ADA” ), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq . See Norden v. Sampe r , 50 3 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 30 , 1 44 (D .D .C. 20 07 ); Duncan v. W ash. Metro. Area Transit

Auth. , 21 4 F .R. D. 43 , 4 9 ( D. D. C. 2 00 3)
. Th e AD A pr ov ide s tha t a fe de ra l ag e nc y sh a ll n ot “ dis c ri min a te ag ai n s t a qu a li f ie d in d iv id u a l o nth e b a s is o f

d is a b il it y . ” 4 2 U
. S. C. § 1 2 1 1 2 ( a )
. D isc rimination includes “not makingrea sonable a ccommodations to the known phy sical or menta l limi tations of an other wise qualified individual with a disability wh o is an applica nt or employ ee, unle ss such
cover ed entity

can de monstrate th at the ac commodation would impose an undue ha rdship on the op e r a t i o n o f t h e b u s i n e s s o f s u c h c o v e r e d e n t i t y . ” 4 2 U
. S
. C
. § 1 2 1 1 2 ( b ) ( 5 ) ( A )
. T h e AD A a lso provides that an employ er shall not r etaliate ag ainst an individual “ beca use such indiv i d u al h as opposed any

act or prac tice made unlawful by this Act or bec ause suc h individual made a charg e, te sti fi e d, a ssi ste d, or

pa rt ic ipate d in

any mann e r i n a

n inve sti g a tio n, pr oc e e din g , o r h e ari ngun de r t his Act.” 42 U .S.C. § 12203(a).

Thu s , M r . G ar d ’ s Se c o n d A me n d e d Co mp la in t is s u f f ic ie n t to p u t D e f

e n d ants on notice of his Privacy

Act cla im reg ardingthe maintenanc e of his re cords a nd his Rehabilitation Act claims of discrimination and r etaliation. Se e, e .g ., De lan e yv . D ist ric t of Col um bia , 612 F. Supp. 2d 38 , 4 0- 41 (D .D .C. 20 09 ) (a dd re ssi ng mot ion to dis mis s on the me ri ts w he re Cou rt wa s a ble to i so la te-10-

three identifiable c o u n t s fr o m “amid the mora ss of claims” in pr o s e plaintiff’s “e ighty -two pag e, twenty one count Complaint”). His rema ining claims are insufficiently specific to satisfy Rule 8 as Mr. Gar d fails to link any fac ts in the Second Amende d Complaint t o any part icular statutes or regulations. B. Pr ivacy Act

Although Mr. Ga rd ’s Privacy Act cla im survives Rule 8, it nonetheless must be dis mis se d b e c a

us e it i s b arr e d b y

the statut e of

lim itatio ns a t 5 U .S. C. § 55 2a (g )( 5) , w hic h s ta te s: An ac tion to enforce any l i abil ity cre ated unde r this section may be br ou g ht i n the dis tr ic t c ourt of the Un ite d St a te s in

the dis tr ic t in wh ic h th e c omp la ina

nt re sid e s, or ha s his pr inc ipa l pla c e of bu sin e ss, or in wh i ch t h e agenc y

rec ords ar e situated, or in the D istrict of Columbi a, without reg ard to the a mount in controversy , within two y ear s from the date on which the c ause of action ar ises . . . Mr . G ard ’s Priv a c y

Ac t c la im i s b a se d o n th e a lle g a tio n th a t D e fe nd ants de str oy e d o r f a ile d to safe g uard “ P l ai n tiff’s re quests for r easona ble ac commodation dated Oc tober 19, 1990, De cembe r 16, 1991, Marc h 4, 19 9 2 , J une 20, 1997, Nove mber 1998, a nd Fe bruar

y 2000 and the medic al documentation De fendants reque sted,” a nd Plaintiff’s milit ary

rec ords. See Se c on d A m. C omp l. ¶ 1. B
. Mr
. Ga

rd a lle g e s that thi s c la im, a mon g oth e rs , a ri se s o ut o f a

“ No ve mbe r 2 4, 20 06 , e ma il, Ex hibit 445 wherein De fenda nts denied in writing that Plaintiff had re quested and Def endants ha d approve d rea sonable a ccommodation for Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 17. Mr. Ga rd re ad s t h i s em ai l as an admission that Defe ndants did not secure his medical re cords. Id.

Howeve r, Mr. Ga

rd expressed his belief that his medical r ecor ds had bee n destroy ed in a declaration to the U.S. Office of Specia l Counsel dated Fe bruar y 25, 2005. See Def

s.’ Mem., Ex . 1 (L etter f

rom Gar d to A ng ela Rush, Complaints Ex aminer) at 15. Specific ally , he stated that-11-

he believe d that the ag ency intended to deny

knowledg e of his handic ap, and “ [t ]hat means that: a) my pe rs on ne l fi le ha s b e e n la un de re d, and

b) e vid e nc e ha s b e e n d e str oy e d b e c a us e my pe rs on ne l f

ile did c on ta in i nf

or ma tio n t hat Ia m ha

nd ic a pp e d a nd did make a re qu e st f

or re a so na ble
a c c omm od a tio n. . . . [My

su pe rv iso r] r e c e ive d s pe c if

ic inf or ma tio n f ro m me in 2 00 4 c on c e rn ingmy handica p and reasonable acc ommodation.” Id. Ad dit ion a lly , in ans we rs to i nte rr og a tor ie s d a te d in September 28, 2005, he st ated that e vidence of his disabiliti es and the rea sonable a ccommodations provided “ would still be documented and in my ag ency rec ords i f ag ency officia ls had not destroy ed my a g e nc y re c or ds
. . . . Ag e nc y

of fi c ia ls h a ve state d/a dmi tte d th a t th ey are un a ble to l oc a te my ag ency rec ords.” Id. , Ex
. 2 (Mr. Gard’s I nterrog atory Response i n the C omplaint of J ohn Gar d and Marg are t Spellings) at 5, 6, 10, & 16. He a lso stated,

Ag e nc y of fi c ia ls do no t h av e anyju st ific at ion to r e que stm y P TSD m edical records as I have volun tarily provided them wi th e v e r y t hi ng t he y ne e d a nd ha v e a r ig htt o know
. T h e fact that ag ency o ff

icials [int entionally ] l ost mispl ace d or destroy ed the medical documentation I provided them, does not mean they are not autho r iz e d

thr o u g h th is E E O c la im ( s ) to r e qu e s t a to ta l b la n ket rele ase of all my medical r ecor ds . . . . Id. , Ex . 2 at 15 (e mphasis and alter ations in origina l).

Mr. Gar d does not alleg e that he submitted any medical or other re cords a fter 2004 and, in fa ct, emails betwe en Mr. Ga rd and Def

endants duringthe fa ll of 2006 indicate that he ref used to provide De fenda

nts with any

further documentation. See Second Am. Compl., Ex . 1 (Exs. 442- 445). Ther efor e, his Privacy Act claim must relate to the same fa ilure to maintain or destruc tion of
re c or ds of wh ic h he c omp la ine d in F e br ua ry and Se pte mbe r of 20 05
. Mr
. Ga rd did not fi le his Complaint here until Dece mber 21, 2007, whic h is more than two y ears afte r he be came awa re of the alleg ed violation. There fore , his Privacy Act cla i m is barre d by

the statute of limitations and-12-

Counts I -I I Imust be dismis sed.

C. Rehabilitation Act Mr. Gar d’s claim of disc ri m ination under the Reha bilitation Act also must be dismiss ed. On Septembe r 20, 2006, De fenda nts told Mr. Gard via e mail that t h ey did not have
rec ord of a

ny prior “w ritten approva l for a rea sonable acc ommodation r equest” and that if he soug ht to r equest a rea sonable acc ommodation he would have to pr ovide “more recen t m edical documentation (i.e ., last three months).” Second Am. C o m p l ., Ex . 1 (Ex. 443-1: S ept. 20, 2006
e ma il f ro m Str a c ke to G ard ). Mr . G ard re sp on de d th a t “ [t]he me dic a l reco rd s a g e nc y of fi c ia ls
re qu e ste d w e re su

bmi tte d to the a g e nc y

and the a g e ncy ’s fa ilure to s a fe g ua rd and ma int a in t

ho se
rec ords is a violation of the Privacy Act and the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. , Ex . 1 (Ex. 444-1: Oct. 3, 2006 email from Ga

rd to Stracke ). Mr. Ga

rd did not submit t h e u p d ated medical information reque sted. Def

endants ther efor e denie d his request for a re asonable acc ommodation on November 2 4, 2006. See id. , E x. 1 ( E x 4 4 5 : N o v . 2 4 , 2 0 0 6 e ma il f r o m Str a c k e to G ar d ) ( “ G iv e n th a t y our alleg ed dis ability

and/or ne ed for

acc ommodation are not obvious to me or your super visor, and we
are unable to locate any rec ord of any ag ency deter mination that y ou are or have ever been a qualified individual with a dis ability , we are unable t o consider your re quest furthe r without curr ent medica l documentation.”)
.

An employ ee se eking an ac commodation for a disability

m ust comply

with an
em p l o y er ’s reasonable r equest for medical doc umentation. See Bramwell v. Blake y , Civ. No. 04- 927, 2006 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 32728, *18 (D.D.C. May 24, 2006) (“ An

e mpl oy e r i s n ot r e qu ir e d to provide a

n acc ommodation prior to r ec ei v i n g medical doc umentation that substantiates the
e mpl oy e e ’s ne e d f

or a c c omm od a tio n. ” ); Carroll v. England , 3 21 F . Supp
. 2d 58, 6 9- 70 (D .D .C.Mr. Gar d also alleg es that De fenda nts refuse d to provide him with a rea sonable a ccommodation 4 be c a us e he dis c los e d f

ra ud wi thi n the De pa

rtme nt. Whil e argua

bly pr ote c te d b y

oth e r s ta tut e s, thi s a c tiv ity is no t pr ote c te d by the Re ha bil itatio n Ac t and the re fo re may no t be c on sid e re d a s pa rt of his re ma ini ngc la im. -13- 2004) (f inding that plaintiff c ould not prove failure to re asonably acc ommodate wher e she de clined to p ro vid e up -t o- date me dic a l do c ume ntatio n u po n e mpl oy e r’ s requ e st) . M r. Ga rd ’s re fu sa l to pr ov ide up date d me dic a l do c ume ntatio n p re c lud e s h is c la im tha t De fe nd ants dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t him wh e n th e y

fa ile d to a c c omm od a te his a lle g e d d isa bil iti e s. Mr. Gar d’s alleg ation of re taliation und e r th e Re h a b il it a tion Act survives to the extent he alleg es that “r easona

ble ac commodation problems incre ased further afte r a) Plaintiff had filed a formal ha ndicap r efusa l to continue rea sonabl e ac commodation complaint ag ainst Defe ndants on Marc h 14, 2005.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 50. Treating the fac ts a lleg ed in the Complaint as true, a s the Court must do in consideringa motion to dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) , Mr. Gar d has stated a cla im for reta liation, de spite his f ailure to c omply with D efe ndants’ rea sonable reque st for medica l documentation. Mr. Ga

rd could p re v ai l on his retaliation claim if he is able to offe r af firmative evidenc e that it was his filing a discrimination complaint, rather than his re fusal to provide me dical
rec ords, that ca

used De fenda

nts to deny

him a rea sonab l e ac co m m o d ation. See , e.g., Zeigler v. 4 P o tter , 6 4 1 F
. Su

p p . 2 d 2 5 , 2 9 ( D
. D
. C. 2 0 0 9 ) ( n o ti n g th a t “ a p la in ti f f ' s g o o d

- f a it h r e quest for
acc ommodations is protected ac tivity and that, ther efor e, the de nial of such acc ommodations c an be reta liatory

even if it is ul timately

deter mined plaintiff is not disabled”). D. P lai nt iff’s M ot ion for Sum m ar y J udgm e nt I n response to Defe ndants’ motion to dism iss, Mr. G ar d m o v ed for summary jud g me nt. Ho we ve r, Mr . G ard fa ile d to pr ov ide a sta

te me nt of un dis pu te d ma te ri a l f a c ts o r e xpla in-14-

wh y he is en tit le d to judg me nt as a ma tte r of law. As e xpla ine d ab ov e , how e ve r, Mr . G ard ’s c la im under the Privacy

Act fa ils as a m att er of

law and he fails to state a c laim of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. No a lleg ed fa ctual dispute ca n alter that. W ith respec t to his retaliation
c la im, the re is a fa c tua l dis pu te re g ard ing De fe nd a nts ’ mot ive fo r de nying Mr
. Ga rd a reaso nab le
acc ommodation. Accor dingly , his moti on for summary judgme nt must be denied. IV . C ON CL USI ON For t h e re asons set for

th above, De fenda

nts’ motion to di smiss [ Dkt. # 32] wil l be g rante d in part and de nied in part. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgme nt [ Dkt. # 40] wil l be denied. A me morializi ng order acc ompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date : Ma rc h 5 , 2 00 9 /s/ ROSEMARY M. COL L YER Un i t edS t at es Di s t ri ct J u d ge