*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
BRIAN DOLAN v. DEBRA DOLAN

(AC 43602)

Moll, Clark and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

granting his motion to modify his unallocated alimony and child support

obligation. In his motion, the plaintiff requested to modify certain provisions of the parties’ separation agreement, which had been incorporated

into the judgment of dissolution, on the basis of, inter alia, his loss of

employment and decrease in income. The parties’ separation agreement

provided in relevant part that the plaintiff was required to pay unallocated alimony and child support to the defendant, which was calculated

on the basis of the plaintiff’s ‘‘pre-tax compensation from employment’’

and included a minimum payment per month. The separation agreement

defined ‘‘pre-tax compensation from employment’’ to include any and

all earnings of any nature whatsoever actually received by the plaintiff

in the form of cash or cash equivalents, or which the plaintiff is entitled

to receive, from any and all sources relating to the services rendered

by the plaintiff by way of his current or future employment. At a hearing

on the plaintiff’s motion, the plaintiff claimed that he had no income,

but, when asked, testified that he receives interest and dividend income

that he had failed to list on his financial affidavit. The court subsequently

granted the plaintiff’s motion, finding that there was a substantial change

in the parties’ circumstances. The court ordered, inter alia, that the

plaintiff was not required to pay the defendant a minimum amount of

unallocated alimony and child support per month. The court also

ordered, as proposed by the defendant, that the definition of ‘‘pre-tax

compensation from employment’’ set forth in the parties’ separation

agreement be modified to include income from all sources, including

passive income from capital gains, interest and dividends, and income

from business interests and other investments. Held that the plaintiff

could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion

in modifying the definition of ‘‘pre-tax compensation from employment’’

in the parties’ separation agreement: although the plaintiff argued that

the court’s inclusion of capital gains, interest and dividends, and income

from business interests and other investments conflicted with our

Supreme Court’s decision in Gay v. Gay (266 Conn. 641), that case

was materially different from the present case in that it involved a

modification pursuant to statute (§ 46b-86 (a)), which required the court

to consider certain statutory (§ 46b-82) criteria and did not involve a

separation agreement like the one in the present case, which expressly

defined the term ‘‘pre-tax compensation from employment’’ and set forth

specific, contractual parameters for modifying that definition; moreover,

it was clear that the parties here, in their separation agreement, intended

to give the court broad discretion to modify the definition of ‘‘pre-tax

compensation from employment’’ to ensure that they were treated fairly

in accordance with the spirit of the agreement, not in accordance with

the criteria set forth in § 46b-82.

Argued December 7, 2021—officially released June 7, 2022

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Hon. Stanley Novack, judge trial referee, rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief

in accordance with the parties’ separation agreement;

thereafter, the court, M. Moore, J., granted the plaintiff’s

motion to modify unallocated alimony and child sup-
port; subsequently, the court, M. Moore, J., denied the

plaintiff’s motion for reargument and reconsideration,

and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Logan A. Carducci, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

CLARK, J. In this matter arising after the dissolution

of the parties’ marriage, the plaintiff, Brian Dolan,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting a

postjudgment motion to modify his unallocated alimony

and child support obligation to the defendant, Debra

Dolan. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court

erred in modifying the definition of ‘‘pre-tax compensation from employment’’ in the parties’ separation agreement, which was incorporated by reference into the

judgment of dissolution, to include ‘‘income from all

sources, including passive income from capital gains,

interest and dividends, and income from business interests and other investments.’’ In the plaintiff’s view, the

court’s modification of the definition ran afoul of our

Supreme Court’s decision in Gay v. Gay, 266 Conn. 641,

835 A.2d 1 (2003). We disagree and affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

The following procedural history and facts are relevant to our resolution of the appeal. The parties were

married in 1993 and are the parents of four children

issue of the marriage.1 On May 9, 2013, the trial court,

Hon. Stanley Novack, judge trial referee, rendered judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage that incorporated

by reference the parties’ May 8, 2013 separation agreement (agreement).

Pursuant to the agreement, the plaintiff is required

to pay unallocated alimony and child support to the

defendant until her death, remarriage, or cohabitation,

or until May 14, 2023, whichever occurs first. The percentage of his ‘‘pre-tax compensation from employment’’ that he is required to pay to the defendant each

calendar year is based on the amount of pretax compensation from employment that he receives in that given

year. Specifically, in accordance with paragraph 4.2 of

the agreement, the plaintiff is required to pay the defendant each calendar year as unallocated alimony and

child support as follows:

[The Plaintiff’s] PTCE

Percentage to [the

Defendant]

$0-$250,000 50%

$250,001-$450,000 35%

$450,001-$600,000 25%

$600,000 and above 0%

Paragraph 4.2 further provides that, ‘‘[u]nless and

until modified by [the] [c]ourt, or agreed to by the [p]arties, the [plaintiff] shall pay the [defendant] a minimum

of [$10,416] per month.’’

Under paragraph 4.4 of the agreement, ‘‘ ‘pre-tax compensation from employment’ ’’ is defined as ‘‘any and

all earnings of any nature whatsoever actually received

by the [plaintiff] in the form of cash or cash equivalents,
or which the [plaintiff] is entitled to receive, from any

and all sources relating to the services rendered by the

[plaintiff] by way of his current or future employment,

including, but not limited to, salary and bonus, exercisable stock options, stock grants, equity units, contract

payments, commission payments, voluntary payments

to qualified and non-qualified retirement plans, disability income, board of directors’ fees, severance payments, excess compensation, consulting fees, director’s

fees and restricted stock and stock options granted

after the date of dissolution of marriage, received by

the [plaintiff] from employment. Income from restricted

stock and stock options shall be considered [pre-tax

compensation from employment] in the year the [plaintiff] must report this income on his federal tax return.

Capital gains, interest and dividends and all other

income earned by the [plaintiff] due to his investment

of assets or sale of stock distributed to him in connection with the divorce proceeding or earned by the [plaintiff] based upon assets acquired outside of his employment by the [plaintiff] in the future shall not be

considered in the definition of the [plaintiff’s pre-tax

compensation from employment] herein.’’

Paragraph 4.3 of the agreement provides in relevant

part that ‘‘[t]he alimony payments under the terms of

this [a]rticle IV shall be non-modifiable so as to extend

the duration of said payments, and any decree of any

[c]ourt incorporating any or all of the provisions hereof

shall preclude such modification. The amount of the

alimony payments under the terms of this [a]rticle IV

shall be subject to modification as to amount pursuant

to . . . [General Statutes § 46b-86 (a)], except: in any

calendar year, the [defendant] shall be entitled to

receive [pre-tax compensation from employment] in an

amount of [$35,000] or less without such occurrence

constituting a substantial change in circumstances. In

any hearing for modification of alimony, the court shall

not consider the first [$35,000], of the [defendant’s] [pretax compensation from employment] in any calendar

year in determining whether a substantial change of

circumstances has occurred. Proration for any year in

which alimony is owed for only part of that year, shall

apply to the provisions of this [p]aragraph.’’

In regard to modifying the definition of ‘‘pre-tax compensation from employment,’’ paragraph 4.5 of the

agreement provides: ‘‘Any court of competent jurisdiction, upon motion by either [p]arty, shall retain jurisdiction to modify the definition of [pre-tax compensation

from employment] so as to ensure that both [p]arties

are treated fairly in accordance with the spirit of this

[a]greement. Neither [p]arty shall be required to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances with regard

to any such modification.’’

On January 4, 2019, the plaintiff filed the subject

motion to modify, requesting that the court ‘‘modify

articles IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII’’ of the agreement that
was incorporated into the May 9, 2013 dissolution of

marriage judgment. In support of that motion, the plaintiff represented to the court that a chronic medical

condition forced him to leave his high paying job, which

resulted in a dramatic decrease in his income. Accordingly, he requested various changes to the agreement,

including, inter alia, that the court delete the provision

in article IV of the agreement that requires him to pay

the defendant a minimum of $10,416 per month. He

argued that modification of this provision was necessary because two of the parties’ children had attained

the age of majority and completed four year, postsecondary degrees and, ‘‘[m]ore importantly, the minimum

monthly payment dictated by the above requires [the

plaintiff] to pay the defendant over 90 percent of his

disability income.’’ The plaintiff also requested that the

percentages of pretax compensation from employment

he owed to the defendant under the agreement be

reduced, that the amount of life insurance he was

required to maintain be lowered, and that the court

replace the parenting plan in the dissolution judgment

with a new plan as outlined in his motion.

Prior to a hearing on the motion to modify, both

parties submitted proposed orders to the court. The

plaintiff’s proposed orders mirrored the requests he

made in the motion to modify. On August 12, 2019,

the defendant filed her proposed orders, in which she

proposed, inter alia, (1) that the plaintiff’s unallocated

alimony and child support obligation continue in full

force and effect pursuant to the separation agreement,

(2) that the definition of ‘‘pre-tax compensation from

employment’’ set forth in paragraph 4.4 of the agreement be modified to include income from all sources,

including passive income from capital gains, interest

and dividends, and income from business interests and

other investments, and (3) that the plaintiff will not be

required to pay the defendant a minimum of $10,416

per month for a period of one year and, in the event

that the plaintiff earns in excess of $600,000, gross, in

one year from all sources, he will pay the defendant 20

percent of the gross amount above $600,000 as unallocated alimony and child support. The defendant also

made proposals with respect to health insurance for

the parties’ two minor children, in addition to a parenting plan.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to modify

on August 13, 2019, and issued its order regarding the

motion on September 25, 2019. The court found that

for years, the plaintiff enjoyed substantial income to

the point that he was paying the maximum amount of

alimony and child support provided for under the parties’ separation agreement. At the time of dissolution

in 2013, the plaintiff’s gross monthly income was

$20,833, and his net monthly income was $14,750. In

October, 2018, however, the plaintiff’s issues became

overwhelming and he stopped working. The court found
that the plaintiff had struggled with mental health

issues, and suffered from depression, anxiety, panic

attacks, stress, and alcohol abuse for twenty years. He

obtained short-term disability payments, but was

denied long-term disability payments. At the hearing,

the plaintiff testified that he obtained a license to sell

real estate; however, he did not know whether he would

work in that field. He also was unsure of his plans for

the future and was living off his savings. The plaintiff

claimed that he had no income, but, when asked, testified that he receives interest and dividend income that

he had failed to list on his financial affidavit. The court

found that, in 2017, the plaintiff received $12,794 in

dividend income and, in 2018, he received $14,387 in

qualified dividend income. He has weekly expenses and

liabilities of $5586. The total cash value of his assets is

$2,173,300.

With respect to the defendant, the court found that

she is employed part-time outside the home. On the

basis of the child support guidelines calculation, her

net income from employment and qualified dividend

income is $554 per week. She has $3243 in total net

weekly expenses and liabilities and the total cash value

of her assets is $1,119,370. The court found that the

defendant, too, has suffered from mental health issues

and in December, 2018, she was hospitalized. During

her hospitalization, the plaintiff assumed the role of

primary parent for the parties’ minor children.

The court found that there was a substantial change

in circumstances since the most recent court order and

that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either

party to that order. In granting the plaintiff’s motion,

the court found that the presumptive amount of child

support was $92 per week from the plaintiff to the

defendant, but that the application of the guidelines

would be inequitable and inappropriate in the present

case. The court therefore deviated from the guidelines

on the basis of the coordination of total family support

and the parties’ shared parenting plan and ordered that

‘‘the definition of ‘pre-tax compensation from employment’ set forth in paragraph 4.4 of the parties’ separation agreement will be modified to include income from

all sources, including passive income from capital

gains, interest and dividends, and income from business interests and other investments. The [unallocated

alimony and child support payment] formula set forth

in paragraph 4.2 of the separation agreement dated May

8, 2013, will remain in effect, except the [plaintiff] will

not be required to pay the [defendant] a minimum

amount per month.’’ (Emphasis added.) Additionally,

the court ordered the plaintiff to provide to the defendant: (1) notice of any job offers or acceptances; and

(2) documentation of any determination that he has

become completely disabled, along with copies of his

first three disability checks. Furthermore, the court

reduced the amount of life insurance the plaintiff was
required to maintain from $1,250,000 to $500,000, and

modified the parenting plan.

On October 9, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for

reargument and reconsideration of the court’s order.

In his motion, the plaintiff acknowledged that the defendant rightly had brought to the court’s attention income

from dividends and interest that he had not included

on his financial form, but stated that there was no evidence that he has a steady stream of revenue from

capital gains. He contended that the court had misapplied the controlling law by modifying the term ‘‘pretax compensation from employment’’ to include capital

gains, including those from passive investments in business, in violation of Gay v. Gay, supra, 266 Conn. 647–

48. He asked the court to delete ‘‘capital gains’’ and the

phrase ‘‘and income from business interests and other

investments’’ from its order.2 The court summarily

denied the plaintiff’s motion for reargument and reconsideration.

The defendant, too, filed a motion for reargument

and reconsideration of the court’s September 25, 2019

order. She argued that the court should have taken

into account the assets of the parties and the plaintiff’s

earning capacity, not only the income from the plaintiff’s assets. The court summarily denied the defendant’s motion for reargument and reconsideration as

well.3 The plaintiff timely appealed.4

We begin by setting forth the legal principles that

inform our discussion and the standard of review pertinent to the plaintiff’s claim. Section 46b-86 (a) provides

in relevant part: ‘‘Unless and to the extent that the decree

precludes modification, any final order for the periodic

payment of permanent alimony or support, an order for

alimony or support pendente lite or an order requiring

either party to maintain life insurance for the other

party or a minor child of the parties may, at any time

thereafter, be continued, set aside, altered or modified

by the court upon a showing of a substantial change

in the circumstances of either party . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.)

When the parties in a dissolution matter have a separation agreement that has been incorporated into a dissolution decree, interpretation of that separation agreement is ‘‘guided by the general principles governing the

construction of contracts.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Issler v. Issler, 250 Conn. 226, 235, 737 A.2d

383 (1999). ‘‘A contract must be construed to effectuate

the intent of the parties, which is determined from the

language used interpreted in the light of the situation

of the parties and the circumstances connected with

the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to

be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction

of the written words and . . . the language used must

be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning

and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject

matter of the contract. . . . Where the language of the
contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be

given effect according to its terms.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘A court will not torture words to

import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves

no room for ambiguity . . . . Moreover, the mere fact

that the parties advance different interpretations of the

language in question does not necessitate a conclusion

that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Eckert v. Eckert, 285

Conn. 687, 692, 941 A.2d 301 (2008). ‘‘The construction

of a contract to ascertain the intent of the parties presents a question of law when the contract or agreement

is unambiguous within the four corners of the instrument.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Taylor v.

Taylor, 117 Conn. App. 229, 231–32, 978 A.2d 538, cert.

denied, 294 Conn. 915, 983 A.2d 852 (2009).

Moreover, ‘‘[a]n appellate court will not disturb a trial

court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the

court has abused its discretion or it is found that it

could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the

facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial

court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption

in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297

Conn. 358, 372, 999 A.2d 721 (2010). ‘‘[T]o conclude that

the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that

the court either incorrectly applied the law or could

not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Emerick v. Emerick, 170 Conn. App.

368, 378, 154 A.3d 1069, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 922,

171 A.3d 60 (2017).

In the present case, the plaintiff argues that the court

abused its discretion when it modified the definition of

‘‘pre-tax compensation from employment’’ in the parties’ separation agreement, which was incorporated by

reference into the judgment of marriage dissolution,

to include ‘‘income from all sources, including passive

income from capital gains, interest and dividends, and

income from business interests and other investments.’’

In his view, Gay v. Gay, supra, 266 Conn. 647–48, as a

matter of law, precluded the court from doing so. We

disagree.

In Gay, after a thirty-two year marriage, the plaintiff

wife brought an action seeking a dissolution of the

marriage. Id., 642–43. The court rendered a judgment of

dissolution that incorporated by reference a stipulation

entered into by the parties dated December 20, 1996.

Id., 643. The judgment provided, inter alia, that the

defendant husband must pay alimony to the plaintiff in

the amount of $730 per month. Id. On September 29,

1999, the defendant moved for a modification of the

alimony payments. Id. In his motion, the defendant

claimed that his retirement, and the accompanying

decrease in income, constituted a substantial change

in circumstances. Id. Furthermore, he noted that the
plaintiff’s income and assets had dramatically increased

so that her circumstances had changed for the better.

Id. After hearing arguments on the matter, the court

reduced the defendant’s alimony obligation to $1 per

year and ordered the parties to exchange copies of their

respective federal tax returns for the following three

years. Id. The court articulated the basis for its conclusion that the parties’ income was now in parity and,

therefore, the alimony award should be modified. Id.

After making certain adjustments to the net income

reflected on the plaintiff’s financial affidavit, the court

found that the defendant had a net income of $1268

per week and the plaintiff had a net income of $1323

per week. Id. In its articulation, the court indicated that

it had included both short-term and long-term capital

gains in determining the plaintiff’s income for purposes

of the modification. Id. The court further indicated that,

in assessing the plaintiff’s income for 1999, it disregarded capital losses from a prior year that the plaintiff

had, for the purpose of calculating income tax, carried

over into 1999. Id.

On appeal to this court, we concluded that the trial

court had improperly included all of the plaintiff’s capital gains as income without determining how much, if

any, of those gains were generated from assets that

were acquired after the dissolution. Id., 644. As a result,

this court reversed the order of the trial court, and

remanded the case with an instruction to determine

whether the plaintiff had realized capital gains from

assets acquired after the dissolution. Id. The plaintiff

then petitioned our Supreme Court for certification to

appeal, which our Supreme Court granted. Id.

Our Supreme Court held that, ‘‘[a]t least where, as

is generally the case, capital gains do not represent a

steady stream of revenue, the fact that a party has

enjoyed such gains in a particular year does not provide

a court with an adequate basis for assessing that party’s

long-term financial needs or resources.’’ (Footnote

omitted.) Id., 647. The court concluded ‘‘that capital

gains are not income for purposes of modification of

an order for continuing financial support if those gains

do not constitute a steady stream of revenue. This is

true without regard to whether the assets from which

those gains are derived were acquired before or after

the dissolution.’’ Id., 647–48. The court went on to

explain that ‘‘[t]he fact that capital gains on property

distributed at dissolution may not be considered income

under [General Statutes] § 46b-82 does not mean, however, that changes in the value of such property,

whether realized or not, may never be taken into consideration by a court in considering a modification of alimony. The fact that the trial court has no authority to

modify the assignment of property made at dissolution;

see General Statutes § 46b-86 (a); does not mean that

the court cannot consider a change in the value of

that property in determining whether there has been
a substantial change of circumstances justifying the

modification of an alimony award.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 648. Accordingly, the court affirmed this

court’s reversal of the judgment of the trial court on

alternative grounds and ordered this court to remand

the case to the trial court for a new hearing on the

defendant’s motion for modification. Id., 648–49.

Although the plaintiff contends that our Supreme

Court’s decision in Gay is ‘‘on all fours’’ with the issue

presented here, we find Gay materially different from

the facts of the present case. Gay involved a modification of alimony pursuant to § 46b-86 (a), which requires

a court to consider the criteria set forth in § 46b-825

after a determination that there has been a substantial

change in circumstances. See General Statutes § 46b86 (a) (‘‘[i]f a court finds that a substantial change in

circumstances of either party has occurred, the court

shall determine what modification of alimony, if any, is

appropriate, considering the criteria set forth in section

46b-82’’). Our Supreme Court held that capital gains

should not be considered income under § 46b-82 if those

gains do not constitute a steady stream of revenue. See

Gay v. Gay, supra, 266 Conn. 647–48.

Gay did not involve a separation agreement like the

one incorporated by reference into the divorce decree

in the present case, expressly defining the term ‘‘pretax compensation from employment’’ and setting forth

specific, contractual parameters for modifying that definition. In the present case, paragraph 4.5 of the parties’

agreement provides: ‘‘Any court of competent jurisdiction, upon motion by either [p]arty, shall retain jurisdiction to modify the definition of [pre-tax compensation

from employment] so as to ensure that both [p]arties

are treated fairly in accordance with the spirit of this

[a]greement. Neither [p]arty shall be required to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances with regard

to any such modification.’’ (Emphasis added.)

It is clear that the parties, vis-a`-vis paragraph 4.5,

intended to give the court broad discretion to modify

the definition of ‘‘pre-tax compensation from employment’’ to ensure that the parties are ‘‘treated fairly in

accordance with the spirit of [the] [a]greement.’’

(Emphasis added.) Nothing in paragraph 4.5 of the

agreement references § 46b-82 or otherwise demonstrates an intent to require a court to modify the definition of that term in accordance with § 46b-82. See Clark

v. Clark, 66 Conn. App. 657, 665, 785 A.2d 1162 (‘‘[t]he

court is not required, however, to consider all of the

§ 46b-82 criteria when modification of alimony is sought

pursuant to a dissolution agreement’’), cert. denied, 259

Conn. 901, 789 A.2d 990 (2001); see also Fazio v. Fazio,

162 Conn. App. 236, 243–44, 131 A.3d 1162 (‘‘a separation agreement that has been incorporated into a dissolution decree and its resulting judgment must be

regarded as a contract and construed in accordance

with the general principles governing contracts’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 320 Conn.

922, 132 A.3d 1095 (2016). The parties here clearly foresaw that the definition of ‘‘pre-tax compensation from

employment’’ might require modification in the future.

The plain language of paragraph 4.5 demonstrates that

they intended any such modification be done in accordance with the ‘‘spirit of [the] [a]greement’’ to ensure

fairness, not in accordance with the criteria of § 46b82. The remaining language in paragraph 4.5 buttresses

this conclusion. It states that ‘‘[n]either [p]arty shall be

required to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances with regard to any such modification.’’ That

provision conflicts directly with § 46b-86 (a) and is further evidence that the parties did not intend to be governed by the statutes that otherwise apply to requests

for modifications of alimony.

If the parties had wanted to prohibit a court from

modifying the agreement’s definition of ‘‘pre-tax compensation from employment’’ to include passive income

from capital gains, they could have included that limitation in their separation agreement. See Ceddia v. Ceddia, 164 Conn. App. 266, 274, 137 A.3d 830 (2016)

(‘‘[w]hen the parties wished to preclude one aspect of

possible periodic alimony modification, they knew how

to do so’’). For example, in paragraph 4.3 of the agreement, they expressly stated that the duration of alimony

payments ‘‘shall be non-modifiable . . . .’’ Moreover,

if the parties had wanted a court to modify the definition

by taking into consideration all the criteria of § 46b-82,

they could have said so in the agreement. Nation-Bailey

v. Bailey, 316 Conn. 182, 197, 112 A.3d 144 (2015)

(‘‘[i]ndeed, had the parties intended to import the remedial aspect of § 46b-86 (b), in addition to its definitional

portion, they could have used more expansive reference

terms such as ‘in accordance with’ or ‘pursuant to’ ’’).

They did not do so.

In light of the foregoing, we are persuaded that the

parties’ agreement brings this case outside the purview

of Gay v. Gay, supra, 266 Conn. 641. As a result, and

upon our review of the record before us, we cannot

conclude that the court abused its discretion when it

modified the definition of pretax compensation from

employment to include ‘‘income from all sources,

including passive income from capital gains, interest

and dividends, and income from business interests and

other investments.’’

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Only the parties’ two youngest children were minors at the time of the

hearing on the motion to modify.

2 The plaintiff requested that the court amend its order as follows: ‘‘The

court modifies the separation agreement as follows: the definition of ‘pretax compensation from employment’ set forth in paragraph 4.4 of the parties’

separation agreement will be modified to include income from all sources,

including passive income from interest and dividends.’’

3 The defendant has not appealed from the denial of her motion for reargument.

4 On March 10, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation with the
trial court. The plaintiff requested that the court articulate its decision

to modify the definition of pretax compensation from employment in the

separation agreement. The court denied the motion for articulation. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for review with this court. This court

granted the motion for review, but denied the relief requested. This court

sua sponte ordered the trial court to ‘‘rectify the record to include the

parties’ proposed orders, referred to [in the transcript of the hearing held

on August 19, 2019, which were] not included in the trial court file or

exhibits. If the parties stipulate and provide copies of the proposed orders,

the trial court may approve the stipulation and rectify the record without

a hearing.’’ The trial court approved the parties’ stipulation on October

29, 2020.

5 General Statutes § 46b-82 (a) provides: ‘‘At the time of entering the

decree, the Superior Court may order either of the parties to pay alimony

to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b81. The order may direct that security be given therefor on such terms as

the court may deem desirable, including an order pursuant to subsection

(b) of this section or an order to either party to contract with a third party

for periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to the other party.

The court may order that a party obtain life insurance as such security

unless such party proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such

insurance is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay the

cost of such insurance or such party is uninsurable. In determining whether

alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the

court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider

the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the

marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount

and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education,

employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any,

which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the case of

a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the

desirability and feasibility of such parent’s securing employment.’’