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OVERSIGHT HEARING: THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION’S PRELIMINARY RESULTS 

OF THE NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW IN THE 

UNITED STATES FOLLOWING THE EMERGENCY 

AT THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI POWER PLANT 

IN JAPAN 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR 

SAFETY 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 16, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

BETTINA POIRIER, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

RUTH VAN MARK, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

BARBARA BOXER, California, (ex officio) 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, (ex officio) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

JUNE 16, 2011 

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ........................ 1 

Barrasso, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming .......................... 3 

Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ................... 4 

Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee ................... 6 

Sanders, Hon. Bernard, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont ....................... 7 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 8 

Merkley, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon ................................ 14 

Lautenberg, Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey .................... 14 

Sessions, Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 116 

WITNESSES 

Jaczko, Gregory, B., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ...................... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 27 

Senator Baucus .......................................................................................... 37 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 44 

Senator Vitter ............................................................................................ 62 

Senator Sessions ........................................................................................ 116 

Accompanied By: ......................................................................................................

Svinicki, Hon. Kristine L., Commissioner 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 118 

Apostolakis, Hon. George, Commissioner 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 121 

Magwood, Hon. William D., IV, Commissioner 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 124 

Ostendorff, Hon. William C., Commissioner 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 127 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT HEARING: THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION’S PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW 

IN THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING THE 

EMERGENCY AT THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI 

POWER PLANT IN JAPAN 

THURSDAY, June 16, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, 

Washington, DC. 

The full committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 

406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer (chairman of the full committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Boxer, Inhofe, Carper, Lautenberg, Sanders, 

Merkley, Barrasso, Alexander, Boozman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Good morning, everybody. The Committee will 

come to order. 

Just to go over the way we are going to operate this morning, 

each of us Senators has 5 minutes to make an opening statement. 

And then we will go to the panel, and the Chairman will have 5 

minutes and every other member three. So try to stick to it. There 

will be lots of questions. We will go back and forth from one side 

to the other. So your heads will be bobbing like a tennis match. But 

hopefully it will be as enjoyable as that and not too contentious. 

So let me begin. It has been over 3 months since Japan was hit 

by a devastating earthquake and tsunami. It is expected to take 

additional time before cold shutdown of all reactors at the 

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power will be achieved. The emergency 

in Japan serves as an important wake-up call for the United States 

and the rest of the world. We cannot afford to ignore it. 

If there is one lesson to be learned, and this is the lesson I think 

is the most important, we must plan for the unexpected. Because 

as the Japanese told us, they planned for the expected, not for the 

unexpected. 

I am pleased to see that the NRC is taking initial steps to reevaluate current assumptions about the safety and the security of 

nuclear power plants in the U.S. in light of what has happened in 

Japan. And these are the things that I am pleased about. The 

2 

NRC’s inspectors have inspected and issued reports on the 105 operating nuclear reactors and their readiness to address power 

losses or damage following extreme events. And the NRC is in the 

middle of a 90-day task force review of its processes and regulations in light of the events in Japan. 

I want to talk a bit about the two nuclear plants in California, 

which I visited recently. The most recent inspections of California’s 

two nuclear power plants turned up numerous problems that need 

to be corrected. Among other things, NRC’s inspections at Diablo 

Canyon power plant found that State highways and access roads 

needed to reach diesel fuel and an alternative seawater source for 

cooling may be inaccessible after an earthquake. And hoses needed 

to get cooling water from the reservoir to the plant were blocked 

by a security fence. 

Now, I want to correct myself. The Diablo, I haven’t visited in 

a while. But San Onofre, I recently visited. And as a matter of fact, 

I met one of the commissioners there, who was extremely helpful. 

NRC’s inspections at San Onofre Generating Station, and this is 

a plant that is surrounded by millions of people within 50 miles, 

what did we say, 7 million? About 7.4 million within 50 miles. This 

is what you found. A lack of a written agreement for a fuel oil supply to support emergency diesel generators for more than 7 days. 

And you found that some firefighting equipment was stored in locations that could be impacted by an earthquake. 

Now, firefighting equipment that is stored in a place that can’t 

be located, if there is an earthquake, doesn’t do us any good. 

I have additional concerns about seismic issues at both California 

plants. Diablo Canyon has submitted its application to the NRC for 

license review. The 3D seismic studies need to be considered as 

part of the license renewal at Diablo. It is very important, I find 

it very strange that they would try to get a license before they have 

the latest information. And the latest information will be part of 

the 3D seismic study. 

And also, 3D studies should be part of NRC’s review of San 

Onofre’s license renewal application, once it is submitted. They 

haven’t submitted it yet, as you know. And I lauded them for that, 

because I think there is more work that needs to be done. 

I expect the NRC to closely examine the results of these inspections in California and other States across the Country, as well as 

reexamine the current regulations, such as what is considered in 

the NRC’s review of license renewal applications. And I expect the 

Commission to implement the task force recommendations. It 

doesn’t help us to have these recommendations if you don’t implement them. The health and safety of all Americans hangs in the 

balance. 

I applaud the Commission for making the results of its inspections of the nuclear power fleet available to the public immediately 

after compilation by NRC staff in May and June. I believe it is critical for public confidence in the safety of our nuclear facilities that 

the results of the 90-day task force report be available to the public 

as soon as it is compiled by NRC staff in July. 

To me, complete openness, transparency and prompt disclosure 

are vital to maintaining the Federal Government’s credibility and 

the confidence of the American people. I want to thank all five 

3 

members of the Commission for being here today to provide us with 

preliminary results of the nuclear review that is underway. As 

Chairman of this Committee, I will continue to provide vigorous 

oversight to make sure that we learn all we can from the 

Fukushima emergency. The safety of the American people, above 

all, is our No. 1 priority. I look forward to working with each of 

you to make sure that the United States of American has taken 

every appropriate precaution to ensure our nuclear power plants 

are managed in the safest possible manner. 

Senator Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I 

appreciated especially your comments about the safety of the American people being a No. 1 priority. Madam Chairman, the storage 

of nuclear waste should be a top priority for Congress and the Administration in the wake of Japan’s nuclear disaster. 

As you know, spent fuel rods stored at Fukushima overheated, 

causing explosions, fires and radiation leaks. This occurred when 

the power was knocked out and backup generators failed at the 

plant. The American people who watched the coverage of the nuclear crisis in Japan are looking to Congress and to the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission to prevent similar instances form happening here. 

Congress took action years ago to begin addressing the problem 

of buildup of nuclear waste stored at nuclear plants throughout the 

United States. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act passed by Congress 

designated Yucca Mountain as the only candidate site for a national repository of nuclear waste. Congress has voted a number of 

times to retain Yucca Mountain as the national repository. Fifteen billion dollars, $15 billion has been spent on the project. 

But this Administration has seen fit to walk away from the project. 

As the Washington Post points out in an article entitled, At 

Yucca Mountain, ‘‘At Yucca Mountain, money down a hole.’’ This 

was in yesterday’s paper, Wednesday, June 15th, 2011. At Yucca 

Mountain, money down a hole. This is what they said: ‘‘When 

Barack Obama ran for President and sought the five electoral votes 

of the swing State of Nevada, he vowed to kill Yucca. In early 

2009,’’ the article says, ‘‘Steven Chu, Obama’s energy secretary, announced that his department did not feel that Yucca was a workable option.’’ The article continues: ‘‘The Department of Energy terminated the jobs of several thousand Federal workers and contractors, while hastily abandoning offices in Las Vegas and transferring dozens of truckloads of furniture, computers and other equipment to local schools.’’ 

The article states: ‘‘The project dates back three decades.’’ It goes 

on, ‘‘It has not solved the problem of nuclear waste, but has succeeded in keeping fully employed large numbers of litigators. Is 

that the Administration’s idea of job creation?’’ 

The end result of this saga is a five-mile long, 25-foot wide hole 

in the Nevada desert. It was meant to store America’s nuclear 

waste. But instead, because of politics, it stands as a monument to 

bureaucratic waste of taxpayer dollars. 

4 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is before us today, 

has not officially resolved this issue. During his opening remarks 

at the meeting of the NRC’s Japan Task Force, the chairman, who 

is here today, stated ‘‘I believe it is important that our safety review proceeds systematically and methodically, but with the appropriate sense of urgency given the important safety issues being examined.’’ 

I do not believe that the actions of this Administration or the 

Chairman have demonstrated the sense of urgency with regard to 

the issue of storing spent nuclear fuel. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I look forward to the testimony. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

We are going to call on Senator Carper, because he chairs the 

subcommittee that oversees the NRC. And Senator Sanders was 

very kind to yield to him. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS CARPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very, very much. Thank you, Madam 

Chair. 

I just want to come back to something that our colleague from 

Wyoming has said. You have heard me say, everything I do I know 

I can do better. I think that is true of all of us. I was not a member 

of the Congress in 1982, when the Congress voted basically to say 

we are going to have a repository, we are going to put it in one 

State. I was a Member of Congress later on when the vote was 

taken to designate Yucca Mountain in the State of Nevada. 

I think originally the county, and even still the county in which 

Yucca Mountain was located was a willing host for the repository. 

Since that time, the State has turned against the idea, and for the 

most pat, the elected officials, Governors and congressional delegation, as you know have opposed it. The delegation here in the Senate led for a number of years by Senator Reid and Senator 

Ennison, Democrat and Republican, have on a bipartisan basis 

strongly opposed the establishment of the repository. 

When I say everything I know I do I know I can do better, if we 

had to do this all over again, if we had to do this all over again, 

we should be smart enough to do actually what they have done in 

France. What they have done in France is to incentivize communities in that country to be repositories and to provide really terrific economic opportunities, job opportunities for the communities, 

and for some of the people who work there. 

If in this Country, we could actually have States standing in line 

to be prisons, sites for prisons, to take prisoners from Delaware or 

Tennessee or any other States, if we can do that and get communities to be willing to be host for inmates from all over this Country, we should be able to find or provide an incentive system so 

that States would willingly, unlike Nevada, would willing say, 

please, put your nuclear spent fuel here in our State. 

Meanwhile, we have, as you may recall, a blue ribbon Commission that has a lot of smart people, some of them the commissioners know, they have been working, they have been over to 

France to see what the French are doing in terms of reprocessing 

and recycling spent fuel. They are going to come back to us and 

5 

say, this is what we think we should do for a path going forward 

in this Country. 

In the meantime, if you take all the spent fuel rods at 104 nuclear power plants, my recollection, and I am going to ask Senator 

Alexander to correct me on this if I am wrong, but if we took all 

the spent fuel rods in 104 nuclear power plants across the Country, 

I think if we put them on a football field, they would fit on a football field maybe about 20 feet high. Is that about right? 

That is about right. So 104 plants is not a small amount of spent 

fuel. But for now, what the experts are telling us is we can safely 

store for 30, 40, 50, 60 years onsite the spent fuel. Does that mean 

we never need a repository, a place to recycle and reprocess this 

fuel? No. And when we are smart, I hope we are a lot smarter in 

siting those places than we were in siting the repository at Yucca 

Mountain. So there. 

Now, having said that, let me find my place here. Let me just 

say to all of you here today, thanks a lot for coming. Thank you 

for your service. We are very anxious to hear what you have to 

share with us. 

We have a great opportunity, you all have heard me say before, 

quoting Albert Einstein, in adversity lies opportunity. Heck of a lot 

of adversity in Japan, in Miyagi Prefecture with the terrible tragedy that they faced, also a great opportunity. And the great opportunity is for us and for the rest of the world to learn what they 

did wrong, so that we won’t make that mistake in this instance. 

And we have worked, as a bunch of you know, on this Committee, and George Voinovich and I worked for a whole lot of years 

before that to try to establish within those 104 nuclear power 

plants what we call a culture of safety. And commissioners have 

heard me say a million times, we want to not only establish that 

culture of safety, we have established it, we want to strengthen it 

and we want to make sure that if it isn’t perfect in terms of adhering to safety, if it isn’t perfect, we make it better. 

And despite all the protections we have in place for nuclear reactors, the tragedy in Japan should serve as a clear warning that we 

can’t be complacent when it comes to nuclear safety, and that a disaster like that could happen any time here as well. 

Anyway, we have asked for a comprehensive review, Senator 

Boxer and I have, and we are pleased that we are getting that. We 

are going to make sure that every precaution is being taken to 

safeguard our people from a similar nuclear incident, similar to 

that of Japan. Today I am anxious to hear the first readouts from 

the Commission on this review. We look forward to working with 

you to incorporate the right lessons across our nuclear fleet in this 

Country. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, and Senator Sanders, thank you so 

much for yielding to me. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Subcommittee Chairman 

Carper. 

And now it is Senator Alexander. 

6 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. First, let me 

thank, welcome the Commissioners and thank the Chairman and 

Senator Carper for having this hearing. I have said before, I think 

the more oversight hearings we have with the Commissioners, the 

better. The more Americans know about nuclear power, the better. 

Both from a safety point of view and how important it is to our future. 

The subject in America today is jobs. We want jobs. We have to 

have large amounts of reliable, low-cost electricity. And we now 

have to add clean to that. So it is important to have a hearing so 

that Americans know that 20 percent of all our electricity comes 

from 104 nuclear plants. It is important that we have hearings so 

that Americans know that 70 percent of our carbon-free, sulfurfree, nitrogen-free, mercury-free electricity comes from nuclear 

plants. 

It is important to have these hearings because it is important for 

Americans to know that there has never been a death at a civilian 

reactor in the United States, that there has never been a death in 

connection with a reactor in one of our 104 Navy reactors. It is important for Americans to know that even though Three Mile Island 

was our worst Nuclear accident in the United States at a civilian 

reactor, no one was hurt at Three Mile Island. 

It is important for Americans to know this is complex, these big 

operations, these nuclear plants. And it is important for them to 

know that we taking very seriously, especially those of us who can’t 

imagine a future for the United States without many more nuclear 

reactors than we have today, that we are taking very seriously the 

importance of continuing to make their operation safer and safer. 

We have learned a lot from Three Mile Island, for example, even 

though no one was hurt there. The safety record is even better, as 

a result of those lessons. It will take months and years to learn 

from what happened in Fukushima. But we ought to do our best 

to do that. 

Senator Carper’s comments on the repository are important. We 

both are former Governors. I had the problem of locating prisons, 

we were stuck on prisons in Tennessee when I came in. Nobody 

would take one, until I announced I only had one and there would 

be a competition for it. Then we had a line of people who wanted 

it. 

We are going to need repositories. We need to recycle used nuclear fuel. That means there will be even less of it. And then we 

will need to find, either reopen Yucca Mountain or find some other 

ones. We shouldn’t keep collecting billions of dollars from ratepayers and not using it for its intended purpose. 

I hope we learn from this hearing more about spent fuel storage. 

We have heard from Secretary Chu, a Nobel physicist, who is our 

Energy Secretary, and we have heard from the Chairman, who is 

here today, that spent fuel can be stored safely onsite for up to 100 

years. It is important for Americans to know that and to hear that 

from the top two officials in our Country who know about such 

things. 

7 

But we need to bring to a close the discussion about whether 

spent fuel pools or dry cask storage or long-term repository is the 

right way to deal with the fuel that we have. And we need to take 

advantage of this distinguished panel the President has appointed 

to recycle used nuclear fuel in an even better way. 

We need to explore and learn from our Commissioners how the 

next generation of reactors can improve safety capabilities, for example, with passive technologies. We need to learn how the small 

nuclear reactors, the ones that might be 125 megawatts and 150 

instead of 1,140, how they might be a way for the United States 

to get back in the business of leading the world in developing a 

technology we invented, the peaceful use of atomic weapons, peaceful use of the nuclear process. 

Then I would like to know more about how the Commission itself 

functions, the Chairman’s use of emergency power, the gathering 

of information about reactors. So it is very useful, Madam Chairman, to have all of the Commissioners here. I would suggest that 

maybe every quarter is to often, but every so often, either the Subcommittee or the full Committee ought to hear from the Commissioners, the American people ought to listen and be assured not 

just of the safety of our 104 civilian reactors, but that we are on 

a track to begin to build more and to provide the low-cost, clean, 

reliable electricity that nuclear power does for this Country. 

Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator SANDERS. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BERNARD SANDERS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Senator SANDERS. Thank you, Madam Chair. Welcome, Commissioners. Thanks for being here. 

Madam Chair, I want to spend a moment discussing an issue of 

great concern to the people of the State of Vermont, and that is the 

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, which is located in the very 

southern part of our State. 

Madam Chair, Vermont Yankee is one of 23 plants in our Country with the same design, General Electric Mark 1, as the 

Fukushima plants that experienced partial or full meltdowns in 

Japan. As my colleagues may or may not know, the State of 

Vermont has a unique position in this Country with regard to nuclear power. As a result of an agreement signed between the State 

and Energy, the owner of the nuclear power plant in Vermont, this 

agreement was signed when Entergy purchased Vermont Yankee 

in 2002. Our State legislature and Public Utility Commission have 

a legal say of whether the Vermont Yankee plant is relicensed for 

operation beyond 2012, when its license expires. That is unique in 

the Country. 

The plant is nearing 40 years of age. It is my firm view that 40 

years is enough. But that is not just my view. Far more importantly, the Vermont State Senate, representing the people of the 

State of Vermont, voted on a bipartisan basis 26 to 4 not to grant 

an extension to Vermont Yankee. And in my view, that vote in fact 

represented the wishes of a vast majority of the people in our 

State. 

8 

We know that Vermont Yankee has had serious problems in the 

last number of years, including a collapse of its cooling towers in 

2007 and radioactive tritium leaks in 2005 and 2010. The tritium 

leaks came from pipes plant officials claimed, under oath, did not 

exist. Which did not, by the way, further the confidence of the people of the State of Vermont in Entergy. 

In support of the Vermont legislature, the Vermont congressional 

delegation has been clear that Entergy should respect Vermont’s 

laws. We understand that Entergy’s well-paid corporate lobbyists 

and lawyers have been pushing for the Federal Government to get 

involved in the lawsuit Entergy filed against Vermont. We have 

seen the class letter from Entergy’s CEO, Wayne Leonard, who is 

among the best-compensated electric energy CEOs at $18 million 

a year, saying that if Vermont successfully defends its rights to decide whether Vermont Yankee is relicensed that we will see States 

opting out of, among other things, the Voting Rights Act. 

He could not be more wrong or out of touch. That is why the 

Vermont congressional delegation was heartened to learn that 

Chairman Jaczko, who I believe is a fair-minded and diligent public servant, even if we occasionally disagree, told Vermonters publicly that the NRC should not intervene in any legislation between 

Entergy and Vermont. I believe his position is the right one. The 

NRC regulates safety. That is what your job is. It is a difficult job. 

It is an important job. And in fact, many people in the State of 

Vermont think you are not doing that job very well. 

But the NRC is not an arbiter of political or legal disputes between a huge energy company like Entergy and the people of the 

State of Vermont. Frankly, that is not your business. You have 

enough on your plate to deal with the very complicated and important issue of maintaining safety. 

There was a story in the New York Times today of great concern, 

raising issues that maybe we are not doing a good job in this Country in protecting people in the event of a shutdown of all electric 

power. Pay attention to that. Do not get involved in telling the people of the State of Vermont what they should be doing or should 

not be doing. 

In that regard, I was extremely disappointed to learn that the 

NRC voted yesterday on whether to recommend to the Justice Department that the NRC take Entergy’s side in this litigation and 

that the result of that vote was not public. I want to know today 

that you will make the result of that vote public. If you voted to 

have the DOJ, the Department of Justice involved, then at least 

you should tell the people of the State of Vermont how you voted 

and what that vote was. We would like the relevant materials associated with that vote. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

And now my Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. I am going to apologize in advance to this Committee, this is a very significant hearing we are having right now. 

9 

But it is also the markup in the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

and I am the second ranking there. So I apologize for being late. 

Let me start by thanking you and honoring your commitment to 

act on the renomination of Commissioner Ostendorff for a full 5- 

year term. Our Country is best served when we have a complete 

commission, and I am hoping this will happen soon. 

I just want to thank you for having this hearing. It has been over 

3 months since the earthquakes and the tsunami that devastated 

Japan and resulted in the world’s second largest nuclear accident 

in history. I am pleased that we will finally hear from all five Commissioners on the agency’s actions to ensure the safety of our nuclear plants, based on lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. 

But first, I want to take a moment to acknowledge a report by 

the NRC Inspector General into the NRC Chairman Jaczko’s conduct with regard to the Yucca Mountain license application. I was 

concerned about this very situation in 2005, when he appeared before this Committee for the first time, that his prior work in opposition to Yucca Mountain would impair his ability to act fairly as 

a Commissioner. So I asked him to recuse himself. His conduct has 

clearly damaged the credibility of the agency and warrants oversight hearings by this Committee. 

However, what I find most disconcerting in the IG’s report is an 

image of a Chairman who withholds information from his colleagues, acts unilaterally and rules by intimidation. While the IG 

may have focused on the chairman’s involvement with Yucca 

Mountain, I believe misconduct extends beyond that. This first became apparent to me while preparing for our last hearing on April 

12th, when I heard that the majority was breaking with the Committee precedent of having a full Commission testify. I was surprised to learn that we would only hear from Chairman Jaczko because he was exercising his emergency powers under Section 3 of 

the Organization Plan of 1980. 

Even more unbelievable was that he had not only failed to inform me of this decision on the last two occasions, but he had also 

failed to inform his colleagues. Furthermore, in exercising this 

emergency authority, he acted unilaterally without a firm legal 

basis, failed to keep his colleagues fully informed and prohibited 

them from entering the operations center where much of the agency’s post-Fukushima work was conducted. 

These actions are strikingly similar to some of the IG’s conclusions regarding the Chairman’s conduct on Yucca Mountain. More 

importantly, he chose not to utilize the expertise of his fellow commissioners when confronted with the world’s second largest nuclear 

accident. A true leader, when facing such extraordinary challenges, 

would marshal all resources at his disposal and seek out the best 

expertise that he can. 

That would be my expectation of any chairman responsible for 

ensuring nuclear safety. Instead, we have a chairman who, under 

statute, ‘‘shall be governed by general policies of the Commission,’’ 

and yet selectively ignores Commission procedures, discounting 

them as merely guidelines when questioned by the IG. 

In the nuclear industry, procedures exist to ensure nuclear safety. The Chairman should show the same respect for procedures 

10 

governing his actions that he would expect from licensees. The public deserves nothing less. 

I thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Full 

Committee and Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety joint hearing entitled, ‘‘Oversight Hearing: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Preliminary Results 

of the Nuclear Safety Review in the United States following the Emergency at the 

Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant in Japan.’’ 

Thursday, June 16, 2011 10 o’clock am Chairman Boxer, I’d like to begin by 

thanking you for honoring your commitment to act on the re-nomination of Commissioner Ostendorff for a full, 5-year term. Our country is best served by a complete 

Commission with each member contributing their diverse views and acting as a collegial body. Commissioner Ostendorff’s expertise is invaluable and given the unanimous vote in this Committee, I hope he will be confirmed immediately. 

I also want to thank you for having this hearing. It has been over 3 months since 

the earthquake and tsunami devastated Japan and resulted in the world’s second 

largest nuclear accident in history. I am pleased that we will finally hear from all 

five commissioners on the agency’s actions to ensure the safety of our nuclear plants 

based on lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. 

But first, I want to take a moment to acknowledge a report by the NRC Inspector 

General (IG) into NRC Chairman Jaczko’s conduct with regard to the Yucca Mountain license application. I was concerned about this very situation in 2005 when he 

appeared before this Committee for the first time: that his prior work in opposition 

to Yucca Mountain would impair his ability to act fairly as a commissioner and so 

I asked him to recuse himself. His conduct has clearly damaged the credibility of 

the agency and warrants oversight hearings by this Committee. 

However, what I find most disconcerting in the IG’s report is the image of a 

Chairman who withholds information from his colleagues, acts unilaterally, and 

rules by intimidation. While the IG may have focused on the Chairman’s involvement with Yucca Mountain, I believe misconduct extends beyond that. This first became apparent to me while preparing for our last hearing, on April 12th, when I 

heard that the Majority was breaking with the Committee precedent of having the 

full commission testify. I was surprised to learn that we would only hear from 

Chairman Jaczko because he was exercising his emergency powers under Section 3 

of the Reorganization Plan of 1980. Even more unbelievable was that he had not 

only failed to inform me of his decision on at least two occasions, but he had also 

failed to inform his colleagues. 

Furthermore, in exercising this emergency authority, he acted unilaterally without a firm legal basis, failed to keep his colleagues fully informed, and prohibited 

them from entering the Operations Center where much of the agency’s postFukushima work was conducted. These actions are strikingly similar to some of the 

IG’s conclusions regarding the Chairman’s conduct on Yucca Mountain. More importantly, he chose not to utilize the expertise of his fellow commissioners when confronted with the world’s second largest nuclear accident. 

A true leader when facing such extraordinary challenges would marshal all resources at his disposal and seek out the best expertise he can. That would be my 

expectation of any Chairman responsible for ensuring nuclear safety. Instead, we 

have a chairman who, under statute, ‘‘SHALL BE GOVERNED BY GENERAL 

POLICIES OF THE COMMISSION’’ and yet selectively ignores Commission procedures, discounting them as merely ‘‘guidelines’’ when questioned by the IG. In the 

nuclear industry, procedures exist to ensure nuclear safety. The Chairman should 

show the same respect for procedures governing his actions that he would expect 

from licensees. The public deserves nothing less. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. If I could just say, I am going to put 

into the record the statement made by the Chairman on the report. 

I just, there is a disagreement between the Ranking Member and 

myself and the characterization that he has put forward. Because 

my understanding clearly that the IG found that the actions that 

the Chairman took were consistent with the law, guidance and his 

authority. 

11 

So there is just a difference here on that. 

Senator INHOFE. Sure. 

Senator BOXER. And I think that is, I have to put that in the 

record. 

[The referenced information follows:] 

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Senator INHOFE. And that is the first time we have ever had a 

difference. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BOXER. I know. And it won’t be the last. 

But I just feel it is important, because it was just such an attack. 

I was a little taken aback by it. 

Senator Merkley. 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to 

yield my time to Senator Sanders to complete his comments. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Senator Sanders has an additional 5 minutes. 

Senator SANDERS. I am not going to take the whole 5 minutes, 

and I thank my friend from Oregon very much for yielding. 

Madam Chair, the point I am going to stay on this morning is 

an enormously important issue for my State. In the State of 

Vermont, people have been extremely dissatisfied with the role that 

Entergy has been playing. They do not have confidence in that nuclear power plant, for a whole lot of very valid reasons. 

When Entergy purchased Vermont Yankee, an agreement was 

reached with the State that the State could be involved, and would 

be involved, as to whether or not a 40-year old plant would be relicensed. That was the agreement, Madam Chair. That is unique in 

America. 

And then the State legislature recently voted by a 26 to 4 vote 

to say no, we do not think it is in the best interest of the people 

of Vermont to extend that contract. We want Vermont Yankee shut 

down. And in doing that, I believe they were reflecting the wishes 

of the people of our State. Vermont wants to move in a new way 

in terms of energy. We are No. 1 in the Country in terms of energy 

efficiency. We are moving aggressively in sustainable energy. 

Now, you may disagree with us, but that is the direction the 

State of Vermont wants to go. 

Now, the issue is, what is the role of the NRC in that discussion 

? Is it appropriate for the NRC to get involved with one of the largest utility companies in the United States of America, Entergy, a 

$14 billion company, pays its CEO $18 million a year, to get involved in a legal case between the State of Vermont and Entergy? 

Entergy wants to stay open. They want to make more money. I understand that. People of Vermont want to shut it down. I believe 

in that. I agree with the people of my own State. Why should you 

be involved in that? 

What disturbs me very much, and I want to pursue this later, 

is my understanding is that yesterday, by a three to two vote, this 

Commission decided to urge the Department of Justice to get involved in that fight. Now, I don’t care what your view is on what 

Vermont Yankee should or should not be doing. In my very strong 

opinion, it is not your business to get involved in that fight. You 

have to worry about the safety issues of nuclear power. It is not 

your business to tell the people of Vermont that they have to keep 

open a nuclear power plant that they don’t want. That is not your 

business. 

So I am going to pursue, during my questioning period, and I am 

going to ask each of you how you voted on that issue, I want to 

thank Chairman Jaczko, he has been public in the past in saying, 

14 

and he is a strong advocate of nuclear power, he does not believe 

it is the NRC’s business to be involved in that debate. 

So Madam Chair, this is an issue that is very disturbing to the 

people of the State of Vermont. We have enough on our hands taking on one of the large powerful utilities in America. We do not 

need the NRC to get involved in this debate. 

So I want to thank my colleague from Oregon, and I yield back 

to him. 

Senator BOXER. The remaining 2 minutes? You are welcome. 

Three minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OREGON 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I would just briefly note that I would like, if anyone has any 

comments about why the hydrogen, when it was vented, why it exploded. Obviously the venting process is intended to avoid a situation where the plant is damaged. Obviously that didn’t happen in 

Japan with at least three hydrogen explosions. 

I also wanted to note that I think it is very important that a lot 

of research be done on different models of nuclear reactors, and in 

particular, modular systems, systems that employ passive measures, the types of passive measures that would have made it irrelevant whether power had been knocked out to a plant or irrelevant 

whether it was flooded with a tidal wave. 

I have a lot of doubts about nuclear power, being able to be competitive, by the time you take in costs, by the time you take into 

account addressing potential terror threats, natural disaster and 

human error. But I also think it is very important to look at all 

options as we wrestle with ways to generate non-carbon power. So 

any comments in that vein would be helpful. 

Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Senator Lautenberg, we haven’t heard from you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. I 

am pleased that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is here to 

present the preliminary results of its safety review. 

Since Japan’s nuclear disaster began unfolding in March, Americans have asked with a good deal of trepidation, could it happen 

here. This ongoing safety review is intended to give them the answer, and that is why we have to make sure that the final product 

is complete, comprehensive and thorough. The NRC’s top priority 

has to make sure that our Country’s nuclear facilities are safe and 

secure, and that means leaving no stone unturned during the review. 

And that is especially important to the people in my home State. 

New Jersey’s four nuclear power reactors provide our State with 

half of its electricity. And one of those reactors, located in Oyster 

Creek, is the Country’s oldest, and shares the same design as the 

damaged reactors in Japan. 

15 

So we need the NRC to let us know what risks, if any, are 

present in American communities with the older nuclear reactors, 

and what we have to do to reduce these risks and protect the public. We also need the NRC to do a better job of making sure that 

Americans know what to do in the case of a nuclear emergency. 

Now, I was deeply troubled in March when our Country was told 

that American citizens in Japan should stay at least 50 miles away 

from the site of the meltdown. We have had this discussion before. 

Here in the United States, the NRC’s emergency guidelines only require plants to evacuate people to an area 10 miles from a plant. 

And it is confusing and we ought to not be sending mixed signals 

to the public. Stakes are too high. 

At the same time, we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that nuclear 

power has the qualities that we like to see, emissions-free energy 

source, providing one-fifth of our Country’s electricity. And we have 

a pretty good nuclear safety record. There have been few nuclear 

accidents and few injuries here in the United States. The bottom 

line is that nuclear power can be part of an energy future. 

But as the tragedies in other countries have taught us, nothing 

can be taken for granted where nuclear power is concerned. Japan, 

a world leader in technology, and it believed that the Fukushima 

plant was strong enough to withstand a worst case scenario. And 

now we know it wasn’t. Likewise, Chernobyl demonstrated the effects of a single nuclear accident that can linger for generations. 

We have to pay attention to these lessons, learn from others’ mistakes, and each one of you, as members of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, has a responsibility to ask the hard questions, but to 

make sure that the American public gets the answers that we deserve. I have to say that I think on balance, a great job has been 

done. 

But I think as we find these new circumstances that come up as 

a surprise, when in Japan, the accident happened as it did. Regardless of the elements that created it, the fact of the matter is, we 

shouldn’t permit it to happen. 

So Madam Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Senator. 

Now we go to our distinguished panel. We are going to start with 

the Chairman, 5 minutes, then each of you has three. Go right 

ahead, Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ACCOMPANIED BY: THE 

HONORABLE KRISTINE L. SVINICKI, COMMISSIONER; THE 

HONORABLE GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS, COMMISSIONER; THE 

HONORABLE WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD, IV, COMMISSIONER; 

AND THE HONORABLE WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF, COMMISSIONER 

Mr. JACZKO. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, Chairman Carper and Ranking Member Barrasso and 

members of the Committee. 

On behalf of the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to provide an update on the response of the NRC 

to the nuclear emergency in Japan. 

16 

At the current time, the Japanese utility and the Japanese government are still in an active accident mitigation phase at the 

Fukushima Daiichi site. Plant conditions are slowly stabilizing. At 

this time, the reactors and spent fuel pools do not appear to be 

changing in a way that creates additional concerns. 

Some structural conditions have recently been identified that are 

receiving increased attention, such as the structural integrity of the 

Unit 4 spent fuel pool, which is being shored up to strengthen its 

resistance to earthquakes. There are radioactive release paths that 

are continuing at various degrees in the three reactors that were 

operating at the time of the event. 

The Japanese utility is working to install reliable closed loop 

cooling system for the reactors and spent fuel pools, improving environmental conditions inside the plant and installing a treatment 

system to clean up the contaminated water that currently exists at 

the site. 

Many challenges in the recovery activities include the high radiation fields and humidity levels inside the reactor buildings, which 

make it challenging for the workers to operate, large amounts of 

radioactive water in the turbine building basements and a considerable amount of contaminated debris across the site. 

The rainy season is underway in Japan, and the immense cleanup challenges resulting from the tsunami itself add to the difficulties of dealing with the radioactive contamination area. But overall, 

the Japanese are certainly making significant progress in moving 

forward in what is a very difficult and challenging situation. On behalf of the Commission, we continue to express our sympathies for 

the people of Japan who are dealing with a very significant crisis. 

As you know, the decision to recommend a 50-mile radius evacuation of U.S. citizens near the Daiichi site has been a topic of much 

discussion. The concerns about the spent fuel pool in Unit 4, which 

have received attention recently, were only one element of the dynamic situation in which information was scarce, sketchy and uncertain. 

The more reassuring recent assessments of the situation in the 

Unit 4 spent fuel pool is countered by the confirmation of significant core damage to Units 1, 2 and 3, and ultimately does not invalidate our earlier decision. This decision was based on limited information and the best assessment of conditions as we understood 

them at the time. We are, however, continuing to reevaluate and 

review the 50-mile recommendation. 

Now, turning to the actions here in the United States, since the 

events of Fukushima Daiichi began to unfold in early March, the 

NRC has been relaying information to our Country’s nuclear power 

plants. We issued instructions to our inspectors calling for immediate independent assessments of each plant’s level of preparedness. The instructions covered extensive damage mitigation guidelines, station blackout and seismic and flooding issues, as well as 

severe accident management guidelines. 

We also issued a bulletin which was a communication to our licensees to provide information on a broad range of issues. Once receiving this information, the agency will determine whether additional actions are necessary. 

17 

We have also convened a senior level task force made up of a 

number of the agency’s experienced and expert staff. Their review 

is proceeding on a short-term and a longer-term timeframe. This 

task force is examining issues including seismic events, flooding 

and other natural hazards, how to maintain power during these 

types of extreme events, how to mitigate the potential losses of 

power and emergency preparedness. 

The time constraints of the short-term review have limited stakeholder involvement. But during the longer-term review we will engage the public, licensees and other key stakeholders to a greater 

extent. The final report will be reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 

In terms of accident prevention, we are evaluating the requirements and safety margins for seismic and flooding events and other 

external events that might inflict widespread damage to a plant 

and lead to an extended station blackout. In addition to prevention, 

we are re-examining effective mitigation strategies for severe accidents. We are also examining cross-cutting considerations related 

to a plant’s ability to mitigate a long-term station blackout event. 

As part of our review, the NRC is also examining implications for 

emergency preparedness, especially in possible situations involving 

widespread infrastructure damage. 

[Interruption to proceedings.] 

Senator BOXER. I am sorry to interrupt you. I am sorry, we understand that you care about nuclear safety, but we really ask you 

to put down your signs. You could either put them down and stay 

or you can leave with the signs. It is up to you. Whatever you wish 

to do is fine with us. Oh, you are leaving. OK. We are sorry to lose 

you. 

Mr. Chairman, you have 30 seconds more. 

Mr. JACZKO. Thank you. As part of our review, as I said, the 

NRC is also examining the implications for emergency preparedness, especially in possible situations involving widespread infrastructure damage, multi-unit events at a single site, and long-term 

station blackouts. The NRC is committed to proceeding as openly 

and as transparently as possible. It is holding a series of three public meetings at the 30-day, 60-day and 90-day marks. We just had 

the 60-day meeting yesterday to discuss the progress of the nearterm review. 

The third public meeting is scheduled for July 19th, when the 90- 

day report will be presented. This report will provide important 

recommendations and outline the strong vision for the longer-term 

review. It will also begin that longer-term component of our safety 

review, which we expect to be completed within an additional 6 

months. 

Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper, 

Ranking Member Barrasso, and members of the Committee, this 

concludes my formal testimony. Thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you, and we would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaczko follows:] 

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Senator INHOFE. Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Yes? 

Senator INHOFE. Could I make a request? To accommodate my 

problem with the Armed Services Committee, Senator Barrasso has 

been kind enough to agree to take my 5 minutes in addition to his 

5 minutes, and I have given him my questions. If we could do that, 

I would appreciate it. 

Senator BOXER. Sure, of course. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you so much. 

Senator BOXER. Absolutely. We will miss you very much. 

OK. We are going to move along now, to each of you, for 3 minutes each. Our next commissioner is Hon. Kristine Svinicki. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, Chairman Carper 

and Ranking Member Barrasso and members of the Committee, for 

the opportunity to appear before you today. Chairman Jaczko has 

addressed the breadth of the NRC’s ongoing activities in the written statement he has submitted on behalf of the Commission. The 

events at Fukushima in Japan are a sober reminder that nuclear 

technology is unique and its use requires an unwavering commitment to nuclear safety. We must learn the lessons that these tragic 

events preset. 

The NRC has initiated a systematic review of the events in 

Japan, while maintaining its focus on the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities here in the U.S. The NRC staff also 

continues its work on the many routine licensing, rulemaking and 

inspection activities before the agency. The NRC has been entrusted with the important missions of nuclear safety and security. 

During my service as a Commissioner, I have found the NRC to be 

an organization of dedicated safety professionals who are mindful 

of their important obligations to the Nation. I strive, as a member 

of the Commission, to enable them in advancing this cause. 

Thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, and we move to the Commissioner that I was happy to meet in California, he was visiting 

the San Onofre plant when I was there. I think that was a very 

good visit. So it is an honor to welcome you back here, Mr. 

Apostolakis. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe and 

members of the Committee, good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I will summarize my impressions of the Fukushima events to 

date as follows. First, the performance of the NRC staff. I have 

been a commissioner a little over a year now. During that time, as 

well as during my 15 years as a member of the NRC’s Advisory 

Committee on Reactor Safeguards, I had plenty of opportunities to 

interact with the NRC staff at all levels. 

I have always been impressed by their technical excellence and 

dedication to our mission of protecting public health and safety. 

Our team in Japan confirmed what I already knew. I am told that 

both the U.S. Ambassador in Japan and the Japanese government 

have great respect for our team and its advice on technical matters. 

I am proud of the NRC staff and honored to be an NRC commissioner. 

87 

Second, the value of conservative decisionmaking. The plants at 

Fukushima were subjected to incredibly destructive natural forces 

exceeding the plant’s design limits without reported acute health 

effects resulting from radiation exposure. In my view, this reflects 

at least in part the conservatism built into nuclear reactor designs 

in terms of safety margins. This is a valuable lesson for me as I 

consider the application of conservatism in our regulatory family. 

Third, the importance of decisionmaking during emergencies. 

The terrorist events of September 11th, 2001, and the aftermath of 

the Katrina Hurricane, had already brought the issues related to 

emergency preparedness to the forefront in this Country. The 

Fukushima accident demonstrated once again the need for a clearly 

defined decisionmaking process during emergencies. 

Fourth, a lesson in humility. There have been numerous safety 

studies of light water reactors worldwide. I believe that, as a community of safety analysts, we were pretty confident that there 

would be no new surprises. Fukushima has challenged that belief. 

We must retain a questioning attitude and ensure that confidence 

does not translate into complacency. 

Thank you, Chairman Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you for those remarks. 

We welcome Commissioner Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Thank you, Chairman Boxer. Thank you, Senator 

Carper and Senator Barrasso. It is a pleasure to be here this morning to speak to you about these important issues. 

The vital importance of understanding and responding appropriately to the lessons of Fukushima weighs heavily on the minds 

of all who serve on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Also, may 

I add that we continue to send our best wishes to the people of 

Japan, as they continue the hard work of recovering from the 

March 11th earthquake. 

NRC is a learning organization. We have and will continue to 

learn from Fukushima. That said, I recognize it will take months 

and possibly years before all the technical facts associated with the 

events of Fukushima are fully assessed. While we will learn much 

from a complete understanding of what happened to the plant and 

its systems after it was battered by the earthquake and tsunami, 

we know enough today to review the nuclear regulatory framework 

of the United States with a critical, post-Fukushima eye. From 

what we know now, I believe that we will need to make some 

changes in a variety of areas. 

It is our responsibility to take new knowledge and new perspectives and review our regulatory framework. I also believe that the 

regulated community takes safety seriously and is stepping up to 

its responsibility to preemptively identify safety issues in the aftermath of Fukushima. 

While, as the staff reported to us yesterday, we remain quite confident in the safety of all U.S. nuclear power plants and also in our 

overall approach to assure safety into the future, there may be opportunities to improve defense in depth. If those opportunities exist 

and enhance safety, we should seize them. 

As our efforts proceed over the coming months, I believe a strong 

role for experts and stakeholders outside of the NRC will be essential. Many observers have raised important and challenging quesVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:00 Feb 07, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\21145.TXT VERN
88 

tions, and I believe we should engage them directly to assure that 

our review benefits from their insights. This includes the full engagement of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 

As smart and talented as the NRC staff is, even they may not 

have all the answers. We will, as we have always done, benefit 

from the open process. Once again, thank you for holding today’s 

hearing. I look forward to working with this Committee as we go 

forward, and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. And now, Commissioner Ostendorff. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I also thank 

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso, for the chance to be 

here today. 

I am fully supportive of the Task Force the Commission chartered back in March, and I am committed to a systematic, methodical review of the events of Fukushima. I know that if we need to 

make changes, and I am sure there are some changes we will need 

to make, the Commission will. 

The full Commission received a public briefing yesterday in Rockville on what the Task Force has learned so far in the near-term 

review. The Task Force informed the Commission of its results to 

date, including the results of our inspections at all 104 reactors, 

and several key themes in the application of our defense in depth 

safety philosophy. Those key themes include assessment of protection of equipment from external hazards, mitigation strategies to 

prevent core damage or spent fuel damage, emergency preparedness and last, how to apply our regulations in a consistent and coherent manner. 

Concurrent with our near-term review efforts, the NRC’s highly 

qualified resident inspectors have also inspected licensee implementation of severe accident management guidelines around the 

Country to ensure that our licensees are able to deal with the loss 

of power or big damage event to their particular reactor sites. The 

findings from these inspections will help to guide our decisions 

going forward with respect to any warranted regulatory changes. 

For the longer term, our review efforts will focus on other key 

areas related to the Fukushima incident. These areas include, 

among others, station blackout, acts of mitigation, spent fuel pool 

safety and emergency preparedness. I will echo Commissioner 

Magwood’s comments of the importance of the Advisory Committee 

on reactor safeguards for an independent technical review. 

I am looking forward to evaluating the NRC staff’s recommendations in areas where improvements can be made to our regulatory 

framework. Congress and the public can be assured that our findings will be brought to light in an open and transparent fashion. 

I appreciate the Committee’s oversight role. I look forward to your 

questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Before I start my questions, I want to respond on Yucca. Because 

it was important to note that we found out that through a GAO 

report that Republicans asked for that they terminated, the DOE 

terminated the project, because it was not a workable option, and 

that there were benefits associated with this. Now, that is a report 

that was requested by the Republicans in the House. 

89 

And some of the past problems we had with Yucca, the risk that 

water will seep into the repository and cause the casks holding 

high level radioactive waste to rust and break, leaking the contents, earthquake faults in the vicinity, and Lord knows, I know 

too much about earthquake faults and dangerous radiation. 

And of particular concern to me, groundwater from Yucca Mountain flows into my State. And the fact that there were tests that 

showed that water was leaking from the site. 

So to me, it is a closed matter. But since it was raised by the 

Ranking Member on the Subcommittee, Senator Barrasso, I felt it 

was important to bring everybody up to date that a GAO investigation asked for by House Republicans basically said this was an appropriate decision. 

I have some questions here, I am going to focus, starting on the 

Fukushima and then move to California, try to cover all those 

bases. Chairman Jaczko, 34,000 children in Japan have been 

issued personal radiation monitors. Those children live within, they 

live 40 miles from the plant itself, well outside the 12-mile exclusion zone. Why do you think 34,000 kids were given radiation monitors? 

Mr. JACZKO. It is my understanding there has been a lot of discussion about the protective actions for children in Japan, as well 

as in general with all of the people living in Japan. The Japanese 

government continues to evaluate the actions that they have taken 

with regard to protecting all of their population. This is a very complicated situation and I think as the international community begins to look more and more at what happened in Japan, there is 

a lot of interest and effort in attempting to come up with a more 

common set of guideline for what types of protective actions are appropriate. 

Senator BOXER. OK, well, wait a minute, this isn’t about protective. This is about exposure. So I would just say, since we want to 

learn from this, if your answer was because the Japanese government has been bombarded by parents, I would say that is a better 

answer. Because that is my understanding. And let’s just note, we 

can’t have an accident like this, is my point. Because you can’t, 

kids are going to school there. They live 40 miles, and the parents 

don’t feel good. 

Now one of the things, I am going to ask Commissioner 

Ostendorff on this, because I don’t want to give you all the hard 

questions. Because this is a hard one. Help me with this. 

The Japanese government has raised the legal limit for exposure 

since the plant was devastated, since the plant was devastated by 

the March 11th earthquake and tsunami. Prior to the accident, the 

annual permissible dose was 1 millisievert per year, and now it’s 

20 millisieverts. 

Now, that sounds to me very suspicious. Why would you all of 

a sudden find out, oh, we can be exposed to more radiation? Were 

there any studies that were done that said that level is safe and 

that’s why they raised it? Or did they raise it because the people 

were exposed to more than one? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Madam Chair, I am personally not aware of 

there being any studies that informed that decision. But I do not 

have the detailed knowledge of what the Japanese government may 

90 

have considered in that area. I do agree that is a significant change 

to radiation exposure levels. 

Senator BOXER. OK, well, can I just ask the Chairman to work 

with the commissioners and try to see if you can do a little more 

investigation on this? Because I don’t want to see that happen 

where, after an accident, we say, oh, it is OK, you are exposed to 

what we thought was the limit, but we are changing the limit. It 

doesn’t make it OK. 

I wanted to ask you about, Chairman Jaczko, I will get back to 

you. On April 11th, PG&E asked the NRC to delay final processing 

of the Diablo Canyon license renewal application until they complete their 3D seismic studies. I think that was a smart thing they 

did, and the right thing. According to press accounts, the NRC is 

moving forward with safety and other reviews of Diablo in preparation for a ruling on this request. So I guess what I want to ask you, 

is it usual, if they have asked for a delay, do you normally grant 

the delay, or is that something that is not going to be automatic 

unless you take a vote? How does that work? 

Mr. JACZKO. What PG&E asked for specifically was that we delay 

a final decision. They did not actually ask us to delay the review. 

But what we have done is we have moved forward with the safety 

component of the review, but held open a piece of that review pending the analysis of the seismic studies. 

In addition, we have held off and won’t finalize the final environmental impact statement until the final 3D assessment is done. So 

we are effectively waiting for that 3D assessment to be completed 

before we complete our actions on the review. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, let me just say, from a very concerned 

Senator, and I speak for my fellow Senator and for the people in 

my State, if you were looking at a new proposal and it came to you 

on an earthquake site, where we have had studies that show the 

faults are getting worse, not better, and the tsunamis are going to 

get worse, not better, I would assume you would say, take your 

plant somewhere else. What I am hoping that you do is understand. Both of these plants have had enormous increase in population since they were approved, especially San Onofre, which has 

now 7.4 million people living within 50 miles. They are on earthquake faults, they are right along the coast. You have identified 

issues and problems. 

I think it is very important that when you look at this in a humble way, as the commissioner pointed out, and I appreciate so much 

the tone of his remarks, I think we are all humbled by what happened, that you look at this with the eyes of the people living there 

who are in a situation where, when I went to San Onofre, one of 

the women, she was actually a PR person, pulled me aside, and she 

said, you asked what the evacuation plan is there. They don’t really have any. She said, here is our evacuation plan. Rush hour on 

the freeway. 

Now, anyone who has been to Southern California in rush hour 

on the freeway, that is not acceptable. So I am urging you, do not 

rush these. 

We also in California, I don’t know whether Vermont is No. 1 in 

energy efficiency or California, we may be No. 1. But the bottom 

line is, in our State, we have a lot of sun, we have a lot of wind. 

91 

We have a lot of geothermal. And yes, there may be places for nuclear power that are not on earthquake faults or near tsunami 

zones. So please put on those safety hats. We will be working very 

closely with you. I don’t want to see a rush to relicense these 

plants. It would not be fair to the people. 

Senator Barrasso, you have 10 minutes. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I 

am glad to see the full Commission here with us today. I am particularly pleased to see Commissioner Ostendorff, thank you very 

much for being here. I congratulate you on your recent nomination 

by the President to serve again on the Commission. Your background is extensive. Prior to being sworn in as commissioner, you 

worked as an engineer, legal counsel, policy advisor, naval advisor. 

Among your many jobs, you were Principal Deputy Administrator 

at the National Nuclear Security Administration, a member of the 

staff of the House Armed Services Committee, serving as staff director of the Strategic Force Subcommittee, and a captain in the 

Navy, commanding an attack submarine squadron. I could go on 

and on. 

I would like to ask the Chairman, having served with Mr. 

Ostendorff on the Commission, do you believe that the Senate 

should confirm Commissioner Ostendorff as quickly as possible before his term expires? 

Mr. JACZKO. I would leave it up to the Senate to decide that, but 

I certainly have had a good and productive working relationship 

with him and I think he is a valuable member of the Commission. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. It is interesting, because I agree 

with Senator Boxer, in our efforts on safety and our concerns about 

safety, I know that you had spoken at a symposium in Virginia, 

Mr. Chairman, were you said employees, both of the NRC and industry, must feel empowered to ask the difficult questions. Ensuring this happens is at the core of safety culture. And when we look 

at industry, we want safety for workers, for others, for communities. And you have to be able to ask questions. Do you agree with 

that statement? I see you nodded your head yes. 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. 

Senator BARRASSO. And I know you are aware that the Office of 

Inspector General issued a report on June 6th that has been widely 

referenced in the press, your statement on June 8th stated that 

you appreciated the thoroughness with which the Inspector General and his staff conducted this comprehensive review. Do you still 

agree with that issue about the thoroughness? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, nodding your head yes. Well, according to the report, and I have read it, and the New York Times 

has done an extensive reporting on it on June 11th, it says ‘‘Mr. 

Jaczko created a hostile workplace atmosphere with frequent outbursts of temper, favoritism in travel assignments and selective release of information to other members of the Commission.’’ And 

Madam Chairman, I ask that the entire Inspector General’s report 

be made a part of the record. 

Senator BOXER. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The referenced information was not received at time of print.] 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

92 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, if I could just comment, those were not 

findings of the Inspector General. They were comments in the report of individuals that they interviewed. There is a distinction between those as far as the review goes. 

Senator BARRASSO. Well, continuing, I would say that with safety 

and a sense of a feeling of someone being able to speak out and 

feel intimidated or feel pressured to not speak out, where there is 

a finding in a report or a statement of someone who has felt that 

way, they may be less likely to speak out. Because the Inspector 

General’s report goes on, it says, ‘‘Over the course of the investigation, a number of interviewees,’’ as you say, ‘‘a number of 

interviewees conveyed their perception that the Chairman controls 

and restricts the information available to his fellow commissioners, 

and noted concerns about his interpersonal style.’’ It goes on, ‘‘Several current and former Commission staff members said the Chairman’s behavior caused an intimidating work environment.’’ 

A former chairman told the Office of the Inspector General that 

the Chairman often yelled at people and his tactics had a negative 

effect on people. He described this behavior as ruling by intimidation. The former chairman said he—— 

Senator SANDERS. Madam Chair, if I could, I am not clear. Who 

is making these statements? 

Senator BARRASSO. This is in the report—— 

Senator SANDERS. I know it is in the IG, but this is not the IG 

that is making this—— 

Senator BOXER. An unnamed staffer. 

Senator SANDERS. An unnamed staffer? 

Senator BARRASSO. People that are members of the staff and a 

former chairman said—— 

Senator SANDERS. A former chairman? 

Senator BARRASSO [continuing]. described the behavior as ruling 

by intimidation. The former chairman said he verbally counseled 

the chairman—— 

Senator SANDERS. Is the former chairman still active in the 

NRC? 

Senator BARRASSO. The former chairman counseled this Chairman on his behavior on two occasions before leaving the agency. It 

is page 43 of the report. And I don’t want to use my time as part 

of the questioning. 

Senator SANDERS. I am sorry, yes. 

Senator BARRASSO. But I am happy to share this report. And my 

question is, I am focusing on a culture of safety. So I want to make 

sure that we are getting that culture of safety. And if people feel 

intimidated and they work there, I worry about that. I worry about 

that in coal mines, I worry about that in industrial sites, I worry 

about that on the railroads, I worry about that throughout the 

State of Wyoming and I worry about that also from a nuclear 

power issue. 

Yes, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. JACZKO. I worry about the same things. And since I have become Chairman, I have worked very hard to ensure that we have 

an open debate and dialog at the Commission. It is no, I am a very 

passionate and intense person. I have, hold people accountable for 

93 

their actions at the agency. And that is what I have done since I 

became Chairman. 

But I would note that all of those statements that you read were 

not findings of the IG, which means that they were statements that 

some people made and they couldn’t corroborate them, they 

couldn’t substantiate them to the point that they became an official 

finding. 

As I said, as Senator Carper has said, we can always work to 

make everything we do better. And every day I come to the NRC, 

I work to do my job better. And there are going to be difficult 

issues and difficult discussions that we will sometimes have at the 

agency. I feel very strongly that the staff, I have not experienced 

staff being shy around me and being unwilling to tell me they 

think. So while sometimes I express my thoughts about what I 

think to them, I have been very comfortable that we have an open 

and—— 

Senator BARRASSO. Do you agree with the Washington Post that 

Yucca Mountain is a $15 billion hole to nowhere? 

Mr. JACZKO. It is not really something that is in my role and responsibility to comment on. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. You mentioned my colleague from 

Delaware and his comments about the State of Nevada perhaps 

making a decision to change their mind on Yucca Mountain. But 

it seems to me that Nye County, the home county, the folks there 

still did want Yucca Mountain to proceed and still did want those 

jobs and did want that opportunity. 

To get to Senator Inhofe’s questions, and Madam Chairman, if I 

run out of time I would like to just submit the others for the 

record. 

Senator BOXER. Of course. 

Senator BARRASSO. The Energy Reorganization Act that the 

Chairman is exercising his executive administrative functions, it 

says, ‘‘shall be governed by general policies of the Commission. The 

Commission, through its internal Commission procedures sets forth 

procedures for the Chairman to follow in exercising the emergency 

authority under Section 3 of the reorganization plan.’’ I have that 

section here. 

There have been some concerns, because you have used your 

emergency authority. I read it, it says you shall have it for a limited period of time, any chairman, should have it for a limited period of time, and it requires additional reporting to the other members. 

So I would ask the other members who are sitting here if you can 

tell me, when did the Chairman inform you that he ceased using 

his emergency powers under Section 3? Has that happened? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I received no such notification. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I did not, either. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Never received notification. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I have not received any notification. 

Senator BARRASSO. OK. Because the Chairman is required, both 

in statute and Commission procedures, to provide a complete and 

timely report to the Commission on actions taken while exercising 

the authority. So you have not yet received a report, it sounds like, 

if you haven’t gotten notification. 

94 

Mr. Chairman, when you testified before this Committee back in 

April, and these are Senator Inhofe’s questions, when you testified 

back in April you stated that ‘‘most of the activities’’ that you had 

engaged in as part of this response ‘‘have been in my normal supervisory authorities over the staff at the agency and my communication responsibilities.’’ Senator Inhofe asked for a full account of the 

actions that you took outside of your normal authority, because you 

had said ‘‘most of the activities.’’ So will you commit to provide a 

report to this Committee detailing the actions during your exercise 

of emergency authority? 

Mr. JACZKO. Of course. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, also, in your testimony before the House Energy 

and Commerce Committee in May, you stated that you were not 

‘‘required’’ to make a formal declaration of your decision to use 

emergency authority under Section 3(a) of the reorganization plan 

and go on to, I can read the whole plan, but in the interest of time, 

why did you choose to keep secret the fact that you were transferring to yourself functions vested in the Commission? 

Mr. JACZKO. The Commission was fully aware that I was exercising my emergency authorities. I did not keep that secret. I did 

not make a formal declaration, because that is not part of the process. 

The Commission was briefed three times a day by the staff, or 

rather, staff was briefed three times a day during the accident 

about all the actions that were being taken. They were provided 

with situation reports that were, at the outset of the incident, produced at least three times a day. I spoke with them at least once 

a day. Generally, as much as time allowed in the initial part of the 

incident. 

So there was a tremendous amount of communication to my colleagues. They were fully aware of all the decisions that were being 

taken by the agency and then ultimately by me in my role as 

Chairman. 

Senator BARRASSO. So I would like to ask each of the four other 

commissioners, when did you first learn that the Chairman had 

taken on emergency powers? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I did not receive any declaration as the Chairman 

has stated. He made no declaration. 

Senator BOXER. The question was when did you learn about it, 

not whether you received notification. 

Ms. SVINICKI. My understanding is that NRC’s Office of congressional Affairs informed this Committee of the exercise of emergency 

powers. And I believe I learned of it then. 

Senator BARRASSO. Have you been specifically informed by the 

Commissioner that he was taking over? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. No, I was not. 

Senator BARRASSO. Commissioner Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, just echoing Commissioner Svinicki, I first 

heard about it when we heard that the Office of congressional Affairs had notified this Committee. That was the first time I heard 

it. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, I did have a discussion with the 

Chairman on March 31st, in which I understood at that point in 

95 

time that it appeared to me he was exercising emergency powers, 

though there had not been a formal statement to that effect. 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Chairman, final question from Senator 

Inhofe, he sent you a letter outlining his concerns regarding your 

exercise of emergency authority, asked you to provide any legal 

analysis that supports your transfer of Commission functions to 

yourself. He said you have not provided one yet. Are we to conclude 

that you chose to exercise the authorities without seeking any legal 

counsel? And perhaps you want to seek legal counsel and respond 

to Senator Inhofe on that. 

Mr. JACZKO. No, that is incorrect. I sought legal counsel. There 

is no question my authority in this case, and I have plenty of documentation from the general counsel to support that. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

I am going to place in the record a document backing up what 

Chairman Jaczko has stated. There is no requirement for an emergency declaration at all. And we will put the actual language into 

the record. Because this kind of questioning is to me extraordinary, 

asking if you did something that you don’t have to do. And having 

every commissioner say no, he didn’t do it. Yes, you didn’t have to. 

It is mind-boggling around here. 

OK, we are going to turn to the Subcommittee Chairman now, 

Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. I want to go back to what I thought this hearing was to focus on, and that is, what have we learned. Before I 

do that, I just want to encourage all of you in the roles that you 

are playing on the commission, whether it is as a commissioner or 

as the chairman of the commission, one of the best leadership rules 

I ever learned in the Navy and then a lot of other places, including 

my own home, was to follow the Golden Rule, treat other people 

we want to be treated. 

I would just remind all of you, that is the way I try to live my 

life. Sometimes fail miserably. I try every day. I implore you to do 

the same, whether you are the Chair or a member of this Commission. Treat other people the way you want to be treated. 

The Chaplain here, Barry Black, with whom some of us will be 

meeting in a couple of hours, those of us who need special help, 

special guidance from the Chaplain, meet with him on Thursdays 

for half an hour or so. But he always reminds us that the Golden 

Rule is the Cliff Notes of the New Testament. And as it turns out, 

it is the Cliff Notes of just about any scripture of the major religions of the world. 

Having said that, let’s talk about lessons that we have learned, 

lessons that we have learned so far since the tragedies at 

Fukushima. I just want to ask, I will start with you, Commissioner 

Ostendorff, just give us one example of a lesson that we have 

learned that we have or have not begun to act on, to implement 

some followup in this Country because of that. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, thank you for your question. I would 

say one area that has come up by the Task Force at two meetings 

we have had so far has been the need to evaluate the adequacy of 

our existing station blackout rules, which deal with the loss of A/ 

96 

C power onsite offsite. I think that the Commission will probably 

receive from the Task Force perhaps some recommendations in this 

area. That is a concrete example that I provide to you. 

Senator CARPER. All right, thank you. 

Mr. Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I would agree with Commissioner Ostendorff on 

station blackout. I would also add—— 

Senator CARPER. That is good, and for anybody, if you want to 

repeat something that somebody else has said, just for reinforcement, that is a good thing. I appreciate that. But then you still 

have to give me another example. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. One other example, one that I think leaps out at 

many of us, after 9/11 we put in place certain procedures and 

equipment to allow plants to respond to events that require emergency cooling from auxiliary diesel generators to drive pumps to 

provide water to core reactors and spent fuel pools. We require 

those units be just a very short distance away from reactor buildings. Clearly, if we had those procedures in place and had experienced a Fukushima type event, that equipment would have been 

wiped out along with a lot of the other site equipment. That was 

a significant revelation for me and something I think we have to 

address. 

Senator CARPER. All right, thank you. 

Dr. Apostolakis, how are you doing? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I am doing fine, thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Nice to see you. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. One thing that maybe I have learned is that 

we, that I think at least we should go back and look again at the 

distinction between design basis events and beyond design basis 

events. That is a legal distinction. The agency has many, many requirements and inspection requirements and so on for design basis 

events. For beyond design basis events, we don’t really get involved 

too much. 

And of course, nature doesn’t work that way. Nature does not 

distinguish between design basis and beyond design basis events. 

So I think we ought to go back and look at what we are doing now 

with respect to beyond design basis events and maybe get some 

ideas from the staff as to how we can strengthen our involvement. 

This is of course a personal view. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Ms. Svinicki, one lesson? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I certainly agree that we should look at station 

blackout and loss of offsite power. I also agree that we need to relook at the measures put in place after September 11th to deal 

with catastrophic events. 

I would add an area that is fruitful for lessons learned would be 

looking at our coordination between Federal agencies and State 

and local governments, should an event occur. It is always very difficult to have communications in a crisis situation. I think that is 

an area that we can always be exercising and improving. Thank 

you. 

Senator CARPER. All right, thank you. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. JACZKO. Certainly I think they are good comments by my colleagues. The only thing I would add that hasn’t been touched on 

is the significance of spent fuel pools. I think we have had a sinVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:00 Feb 07, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\21145.TXT VERN
97 

gular focus, perhaps, on reactor safety in the event of accidents, 

and have not put enough attention to considering the impact of 

spent fuel pools. Not necessarily for the pools themselves, but for 

how they could possibly impact the ability to carry out response at 

the site. 

The other piece of that I think is just a recognition that our traditional approach has always been to assume a single incident at 

a single reactor. Clearly, Fukushima Daiichi has shown us that we 

have to consider the possibility of multiple units at a single site, 

perhaps multiple spent fuel pools being affected at the same time. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you all. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. Senator Boozman. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. And again, thanks 

for the hearing. 

I guess I would say that our Country is well served when you 

as a Commission function collectively and collegially. When you do, 

you can pool your expertise and more effectively harness the 

knowledge at your disposal. 

I have concerns that the Commission may not be fully utilizing 

the expertise on their Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 

the ACRS. The Advisory Committee is mandated by law and structured to provide a forum where experts representing many technical perspectives can provide independent advice that is factored 

into the Commission’s decisionmaking process. The Advisory Committee again represents a wealth of knowledge in reactor safety 

and severe accident occurrences. I am concerned that they have 

been so far limited to merely reviewing the NRC’s staff’s conclusions at the end of their long-term review of the Fukushima accident. 

My question is, the NRC’s direction for the Fukushima Task 

Force lists no role for the ACRS, other than reviewing the staff’s 

final report and the end of the longer-term review. Mr. Chairman, 

considering the ACRS’s wealth of expertise in nuclear and reactor 

safety and severe accidents, wouldn’t the NRC’s Task Force benefit 

from the insights throughout the Fukushima review? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, the staff has briefed the ACRS once already. 

Very early on in the incident they held a meeting and they briefed 

them. The senior staff members will also be briefing the ACRS, I 

believe next week. So there has been dialog and interaction between the ACRS. But the Commission did provide a role for ACRS 

in the longer-term review. But given the significant task in front 

of us and the very short period of time in which we asked the Task 

Force to work, we really wanted them to focus on their best thinking and utilize and reach out to the people that they thought would 

be most helpful. 

In my discussions with the ACRS, I have encouraged them to 

make their members available to the Task Force if the Task Force 

had questions and wanted to reach out to them. The ACRS was not 

comfortable with that. They preferred for them to meet singly as 

a body. I think that is unfortunate, because as you said, I think 

they have tremendous expertise that could be made available to the 

Task Force. But their interest is not to do that in a way that would 

be most convenient for the Task Force. 

98 

Senator BOOZMAN. Would the rest of you like to comment in that 

regard? Do you feel like increased use of the ACRS would be beneficial? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Senator, as the Chairman noted, the Commission 

did explicitly instruct that one tasking for the ACRS to review the 

final report. But in general, the ACRS Chairman can also initiate 

inquiries and look into matters. I am fully supportive of the ACRS 

doing some self-directed looks at Fukushima as well. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes, I am a former chairman of the ACRS. 

And I can assure you that there is no doubt in my mind that we 

will hear from them and they will give us their frank opinion. 

There is nothing to stop them from writing letters any time they 

want. 

Senator BOOZMAN. And you agree that is helpful? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, Senator, I am fully supportive of a full participation by the ACRS, particularly in the longer-term review. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, I agree with my colleagues. I also 

agree with the Chairman’s comment that the ACRS role in the 

longer-term review is perhaps, as far as our Task Force tasking, is 

appropriate. But as Commissioner Apostolakis says, to the extent 

that they have other ideas as to what might be helpful, I welcome 

those. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Very good. I believe that Chairman Issa sent 

a letter regarding this, are you familiar with that, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes, I am. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Good. I think he asked for a response by June 

9th. Have you sent a response yet? 

Mr. JACZKO. I don’t believe I have yet. 

Senator BOOZMAN. OK. Do you have any idea when that will be 

done? 

Mr. JACZKO. I assume in the next couple weeks. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Would you, again, I am interested also, would 

you share the response with the Committee when that is done? 

Mr. JACZKO. I would be happy to. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Good. Thank you, and I appreciate you all 

being here. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Senator Sanders. 

Senator SANDERS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I believe that it was Commissioner Magwood who, in his remarks, said something to the effect that the NRC can benefit from 

an open process. And I happen to agree very much with what the 

Commissioner said. In that light, let me ask Chairman Jaczko just 

a few questions. Mr. Chairman, your position, as I understand it, 

has been that the NRC should not be involved in preemption 

issues, the legal fight that is currently going on between the State 

of Vermont and the Entergy Corporation. Is that still your position? 

Mr. JACZKO. I certainly, as I have looked at the issues, I don’t 

see an immediate issue here where there is a concern for preemption. I don’t want to get into the specifics, though, of kind of the 

legal question that was in front of the Commission to protect that, 

those frank legal discussion from our staff. 

99 

But as I have said publicly, the States have a role here. The Federal Government has a role. And I think we have taken our action 

with our license extension, and the State has permanent action, 

those things are necessary in order for license. 

Senator SANDERS. So just to say it again, at this moment, you do 

not believe that the State, that the NRC should get involved in the 

legal dispute between the Entergy Corporation and the State of 

Vermont? Am I hearing you say that NRC should not be involved? 

Mr. JACZKO. Again, Senator, I don’t want to comment specifically 

on the matter in front of the Commission, because that is a privileged discussion. But certainly I have seen nothing that would tell 

me that there is a preemption issue here. 

Senator SANDERS. OK. Again, getting back to Commissioner 

Magwood’s very apt statement, which I strongly agree with, that 

the NRC benefits, and we all benefit, from an open process, my understanding is that there was a vote yesterday at the NRC on the 

issue in fact of whether or not the NRC should be involved in this 

case. Can you tell me what the vote was, Mr. Commissioner? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, again, the matter in front of the Commission 

was in our, one of our legal discussions. And we generally like to 

keep those closed matters. Because it preserves the opportunity for 

our legal counsel to give us frank legal recommendations. 

Senator SANDERS. Well, you may not like it, but I am going to 

pick up Commissioner Magwood’s point again about our open process. Your job is to represent the best interests of the people of the 

United States of America on very difficult issues. My understanding is that there was a vote yesterday on whether or not the 

NRC should recommend to the Department of Justice as to whether or not they should intervene on behalf of Entergy. Can you tell 

me if I am right and what the vote was on that? 

Mr. JACZKO. As I said, at this point the Commission has not released those documents. I certainly would be in favor of providing 

them to you, with the understanding until we were to agree to release them publicly that you not release them. 

Senator SANDERS. Well, I don’t want them if they can’t be released publicly. I would like them released publicly and I would 

like a member of the Commission now, Commissioner Magwood, 

you believe in an open process. Will you tell us how you voted yesterday? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I can really only echo what the Chairman just 

said. It is a privileged discussion and it is also a discussion that 

the agency has had with the Department of Justice. It is not something, in fact, we were specifically asked not to comment on it by 

the Department of Justice. 

Senator SANDERS. Well, I am asking you to comment on it. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I am afraid I can’t do that, Senator. 

Senator SANDERS. And one of the reasons, well, let me ask Commissioner Svinicki, will you tell me how you voted yesterday? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Senator Based on inquiries from your office regarding this legal, this ongoing litigation, I asked my counsel to inquire 

and receive advice and confer with the Justice Department. The 

Justice Department asked that I emphasize two things in my response. First of all, that the Justice Department has the litigating 

100 

authority and is the sole decisionmaker on any Federal Government involvement in this matter and they also—— 

Senator SANDERS. But you can and apparently did make a recommendation to the DOJ, is that correct? 

Ms. SVINICKI. There are interagency, the litigation posture of the 

United States is under active deliberation by the Justice Department. And they have asked that in our testimony today we not 

comment any further. 

Senator SANDERS. All right. Madam Chair, I won’t waste a whole 

lot of time asking all the commissioners. I suspect I will get the 

same answer, and I find that a disturbing answer. 

Let me ask Chairman Jaczko if he could tell me, what did the 

non-partisan general counsel’s office recommend to the Commission 

about this matter? 

Mr. JACZKO. Again, in order to preserve the integrity of their advice, I would rather not comment. I would just say personally, I do 

think historically it has been very rare for the agency to get involved in preemption issues. It is a very high threshold for us to 

get involved. And I think it should be a very high threshold for us 

to get involved. 

Senator SANDERS. My last question, I am running out of time 

now, let me ask the chairman, has Entergy or its representatives 

or the nuclear industry as a whole come in to meet or requested 

to meet with the Commission or the NRC staff about this litigation? 

Mr. JACZKO. There were meetings between Entergy officials and 

staff at the agency. They requested meetings with commissioners 

under guidance from the Department of Justice. I can only speak 

for myself in that regard, I did not take the meeting. 

Senator SANDERS. You did not meet with them, but staff did? 

Mr. JACZKO. I believe that they had a meeting with some of our 

staff, correct. 

Senator SANDERS. Have representatives from the State of 

Vermont met with your staff? Have they been invited to meet with 

your staff? 

Mr. JACZKO. I am not aware of that. 

Senator SANDERS. OK. Madam Chair, I may want to get back 

later, but my time has expired. 

Senator BOXER. We will have another round. 

Senator Merkley. 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you very much. 

I want to turn to some of the issues that were raised by 

Fukushima. One of those is regarding vent systems. And here in 

the United States, there is a point in time in which we recommended that vent systems be hardened and if someone could 

choose to just kind of quickly describe what was done in that hardening and whether that was fully implemented across the nuclear 

power plants across America. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, Senator, I believe all of our boiling water reactors, as ultimately really kind of a voluntary initiative, did harden 

the vents, which ensures that they are able to withstand the pressures in more of a design basis accident scenario. The event in, it 

is still unclear exactly what the source of hydrogen was and the 

challenges with the venting at Fukushima, whether it was a failure 

101 

of the vents themselves or whether there was some other leak in 

one of the systems that would have allowed the hydrogen to accumulate where it did. 

So at this point, it is not clear exactly what role they played. But 

that again is something that our Task Force will be looking at very 

closely. I expect some very significant recommendations on future 

changes to our requirements for the hardened vents and other 

means to monitor and control hydrogen accumulation. 

Senator MERKLEY. So one of the other issues that has been discussed in the past has been automatic depressurization systems. 

And there has been debate over whether a design should be implemented that allows pressure to be automatically decreased or 

whether there should be a human in the link, if you will. And I 

have received some conflicting understandings of what was decided 

and what has been done on nuclear power plants in America in 

that regard. Can you comment a little to that? 

Mr. JACZKO. On that particular issue, I am not as familiar with 

it. But we can get back to you with some detailed information. 

Senator MERKLEY. Is there anyone who is familiar with it? So 

the general understanding at the press level has been that the hydrogen gas that occurred in 1 and 3 came from fuel rods in those 

active reactors that were partially uncovered. Mr. Chairman, you 

are proposing that is perhaps not the reason? What are the other 

potential sources? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, again, the hydrogen would come from some 

type of interaction with exposed fuel in the water and air. That is 

essentially how you generate the hydrogen. So Unit 4 in particular, 

there is still some uncertainty about where the hydrogen came 

from there, whether it was from the spent fuel pool or whether it 

came, what I think is kind of the dominant theory right now is that 

the vent lines themselves, and the actual exhaust stack that goes 

from Unit 3 potentially had a, did not have a valve that prevented 

the hydrogen from flowing into the Unit 3 vent into the Unit 4, and 

therefore it kind of went back through the pipes essentially. 

Senator MERKLEY. So I want to stick to 1 and 3, we will leave 

the mystery of Unit 4 apart right now. The whole point of venting 

is so that the explosion occurs outside rather than inside a vessel. 

And clearly, something went wrong. What do we think went 

wrong? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, certainly the fuel was uncovered. When the 

fuel is uncovered, it is likely going to produce hydrogen. Now, the 

plants are designed so that hydrogen will pool in essentially what 

is called the wet well. And then there is a vent, this so-called hardened vent, that takes that hydrogen from the wet well and releases 

it out into the atmosphere. 

Somewhere in that system, there was a failure and that hydrogen was allowed to accumulate in an area where it shouldn’t have 

accumulated, and therefore there was ultimately an explosion. But 

at this point, the details are still not yet clearly defined as to what 

the exact path of that hydrogen was from the accumulation from 

the fuel. 

Senator MERKLEY. So my understanding is the explosions occurred after the venting began but there is no insight yet as to 

what went wrong in terms of whether the explosion began on the 

102 

outside, ignited the hydrogen inside, so on and so forth? There is 

just a—well, this is a pretty important issue for us to understand. 

Because it is key to a lot of the complexities that have come about 

in the effort to rescue the reactors. 

Commissioner Magwood, you noted that the Fukushima shows 

insights about specific safety improvements. What are the top five? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. What are the top five improvements? 

Senator MERKLEY. Yes, you said that Fukushima gives us insights on the needs we have for specific safety improvements. What 

are the top five for American power plants? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I am not sure I can give you a top five. I think 

that is really what we are expecting this Task Force to do for is. 

But just an overall—— 

Senator MERKLEY. What are a couple that you would highlight 

for us? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Well, an observation I would make is that if 

there is, I think Senator Barrasso asked earlier what it was, or 

maybe Senator Carper, what a lesson was. If there is an overall 

lesson to be learned from this, I think it is that you can’t, as I 

think Senator Boxer said earlier, you can’t predict everything that 

will happen in the future, you can’t predict every earthquake, every 

tsunami. 

But I think the biggest lesson I take form all this is that you 

have to be able to recover from whatever happens. So for me, the 

biggest safety message is to position equipment, have training, to 

have the capability to recover from whatever incident transpires 

and to be able to do so in an effective manner. 

Senator MERKLEY. Well in order to do that—I am over my time 

now. I would just leave you with this thought. In order to do that, 

one has to have an understanding kind of what are the highest risk 

areas, so that the training can be appropriate, the countermeasures 

can be appropriate, the preventive measures are fully pursued. I 

would think at this point, we would have a list of the top five concerns, be they not having backup power that is susceptible to being 

flooded by tsunami, might be one example. 

Thanks. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. In view of 

some of the assertions that we heard that were made, how many 

employees are on the staff of the NRC? 

Mr. JACZKO. Approximately 4,000. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Four thousand. OK. I think it is important 

to note that is a pretty large size organization. 

Mr. Magwood, the GE Mark 1 design that was used at 

Fukushima is also used at U.S. plants, including two reactors in 

my State of New Jersey. Some have said that modifications to the 

design in the United States ensures the safety of the reactor. But 

it now appears that the Japanese plant also previously made the 

modifications like the ones that were made at plants in the U.S., 

and if those modifications could prevent what finally happened in 

the Japanese accident, can we believe that our plants are not similarly vulnerable? 

103 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I think that is a very important question that we 

are all asking ourselves today. By the way, I did visit Oyster Creek 

some months ago and learned a lot about the Mark 1s during that 

visit. I think that what we are finding today is that there are still 

facts dribbling in from Fukushima, there are still some very basic 

things that we are still trying to understand about what exactly 

were the modifications that the Japanese performed at the Mark 

1s in Japan. We really don’t have all those details yet. 

We don’t know, and I think the Chairman was indicating this, 

we don’t really know what happened to the vents during the earthquake and the following tsunami. There are so many factors yet 

that we still have to sort out, that it would be premature to make 

a judgment at this point. But right now, today, the staff has indicated that they believe the plants are safe. Unless we learn something dramatically different from what we know today, we will continue to believe that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I am not sure that is reassuring to the 

public. But Mr. Chairman, do you have anything to say about that? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think the review we are doing is to make 

sure we get this right. And what we want to make sure that we 

do is we don’t follow something that is an incorrect path, that we 

don’t take early information that turns out to be inaccurate and 

pursue it and make changes that ultimately don’t impact safety. 

So as Commissioner Magwood indicated, the venting process is 

still a little bit uncertain. Because there is still too much radiation 

for people to really get into the buildings to begin to remove debris, 

to try and figure out exactly what happened in the units. So right 

now, we have done, as part of the reviews and the Task Force review, we have always asked ourselves the question, are the plants 

still safe, is there anything we need to do today to address that. 

And the answer continues to be, no. We want to get good information. We have time to do that. The likelihood of something like 

this happening in the United States is still very, very, very small. 

Because these are really very, very unlikely types of events. 

So it is very important, 90 days may seem like a very long time 

to do this review. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It does. 

Mr. JACZKO. To the people doing the review, it is going by in a 

millisecond, because they have done so many interviews, there is 

so much information for them to process. But it is important that 

we get it right. I think that so far, they are looking at all the right 

things. I think they are going to come out with very good—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. My concern included the length of time 

that it is taking to do this. But you have already dealt with that. 

The spent fuel, and I address this to any and all of you, the spent 

fuel can be stored in pools, as it was at Fukushima, the plant in 

Japan, or dry casks. Now, we have heard from you that spent fuel 

and dry casks are both, each one is a safe method of storage. But 

is one more reliable than the other, safer than the other? 

Mr. JACZKO. Each of them I would say has different strengths 

and weaknesses. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That is not—I think we should get past 

that and really, can we clearly say yes, one has a safety edge that 

the other doesn’t have? 

104 

Mr. JACZKO. With all the information we have right now, I would 

say no. They both provide a very robust way to maintain spent fuel 

cooling and to maintain the spent fuel. Now, we may find with all 

this new information from Japan that spent fuel pools may provide 

additional vulnerabilities that make them less of an optimal approach for storing fuel in the long term. 

But right now, with the information we have, what we know is 

that they are both very, very safe ways to store fuel. And there 

doesn’t really seem to be an obvious difference between one approach versus another. But again, we are really looking closely at 

what happened in Japan, and we may get some information from 

that tells us that there really is a difference, and if there is, then 

we will do whatever we need to do to our regulations to do that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That universal, each of you, have each of 

you looked at this fairly in depth and come up with the conclusion 

that we have just heard? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I agree with Chairman Jaczko. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I do also. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I agree with the Chairman. I would add one 

other fact. I think that while I believe, I agree with the Chairman, 

there are different aspects of wet and dry storage, and they both 

have their attributes. But probably the less safe thing to do with 

spent fuel is move it around a lot. So before you make a decision 

about whether to relocate spent fuel, you also have to take into 

consideration the risks involved in simply transporting this spent 

fuel around from wet storage to dry storage or whatever you want 

to do, because that’s where the risks are the highest. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, I would agree with the Chairman’s 

comment and Commissioner Magwood’s comment. I would also add 

that our Office of Research is looking right now at a differential 

risk calculation between leaving the spent fuel in a pool as opposed 

to putting it in a dry cask at different periods of time. So that will 

be informing the Task Force recommendations. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank each of you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. We are going to continue, 

going to do another round. 

Chairman Jaczko, it is my understanding that the NRC staff will 

report their recommendations from this initial phase of the review 

to the commissioners on July 12th, and the commissioners will hold 

a meeting concerning those recommendations on July 19th. A lot 

of us are really anxious to see those recommendations. 

Will you assure me that the report containing the recommendations is delivered to my office and Senator Inhofe’s office on the day 

it is delivered to the commissioners? 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. I mean, again, I would say that is a decision probably for the commission, but certainly I would. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I will ask each commissioner. Can you assure me that you will release that report to me and to Senator 

Inhofe? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I support that action. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes. 

105 

Senator BOXER. Excellent. OK. 

Ms. Svinicki, you testified at your confirmation hearing, when I 

asked you a series of questions about Yucca, and I sent it up and 

said, so you didn’t work directly on Yucca, and you said, I did not, 

no. N-O. And I said, OK, very good, thank you. 

Now there is a report out in the media that says as a DOE employee you co-authored a technical report entitled Acceptance of 

Waste for Disposal and the Potential United States Repository at 

Yucca. And this report was used in the site characterization of 

Yucca Mountain, which eventually led to Secretary Abraham and 

President Bush approving it. And also, according to these documents, while at DOE you were tasked by the former Yucca Mountain project director to conduct technical work related to radioactive waste materials that could be stored in Yucca. And there is 

other, you were a member of DOE’s repository task team, tasked 

with resolving technical issues related to Yucca. 

So it is kind of important to me, since I said to you, so you didn’t 

work directly on Yucca, and you said, I did not, no, and now years 

later this comes out. Could you explain this to me? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I am aware of the document that you are referencing, Chairman Boxer, and it has caused me to go back and 

look at my testimony to you and the exchange that we had at my 

confirmation hearing. You asked me to characterize my work at 

DOE, and my answer indicated that I had worked obviously in the 

Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, which was wellknown and was on my resume. 

And I indicated to you that I did not work on the Yucca Mountain license application. I worked on DOE waste inventories and 

transportation of materials in that program. And I drew that distinction in my testimony. I do not agree that the document that I 

believe you are referring to is accurate about stating that the reports I worked on were underlying the Yucca Mountain licensing 

application. I don’t agree that is accurate. 

Senator BOXER. OK, that is fair. I would just like to say, when 

I summed up and said, so you didn’t work directly on Yucca, I 

didn’t mean you were in the mountain taking tests on it. I meant, 

were you working in the whole subject. And you were. 

So I would just say to you, this is troubling to me, I will leave 

it. I will leave it at that. I will leave it at that. 

I believe that the focus should be on ensuring the safe operation 

of the 104 nuclear reactors in communities across our Nation, not 

on old, already-resolved issues. But to ensure that everyone is clear 

that no laws were broken, I am going to ask you, Chairman Jaczko, 

two questions about the leaked Inspector General report. One, did 

the IG find that the NRC’s general counsel supported your decision 

to direct staff to follow the Fiscal Year 2011 budget guidance on 

closing out Yucca, and that your direction was consistent with 

NRC’s statute, OMB guidance and the Administration’s decision to 

terminate Yucca? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Did the IG find that your decision was a budgetary matter within your purview as chairman? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

106 

Chairman, I want to ask you a question off the political side of 

it. According to an article in the New York Times this morning, the 

Chairman of the NRC Task Force review said yesterday that past 

studies by safety experts in the U.S. have analyzed the risk of losing electricity from the grid or from onsite emergency generators, 

but not both at the same time. I understand this scenario, the loss 

of offsite electricity and onsite emergency generators, which happened in Japan, is that correct? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. That is referred to as a station blackout? 

Mr. JACZKO. Correct. 

Senator BOXER. So in light of what happened in Japan, will the 

NRC consider new regulations that will prepare nuclear power 

plants to better handle a station blackout? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, ultimately that will be, I think, a decision for 

the Commission. But my personal view, I think this is an area 

where I suspect we are going to have to make some changes in the 

area of the regulations for station blackout. And I suspect that the 

Task Force will have some recommendations for us in this area. 

Senator BOXER. Is there agreement on the panel on that statement by the Chairman, yes or no? 

S. I will study carefully the Task Force’s recommendations. 

Senator BOXER. OK, so you don’t see a station blackout as a 

problem that needs to be fixed at this time? 

S. There are currently requirements to address station blackout. 

I look forward to the Task Force’s analysis of the adequacy of the 

current requirements. 

Senator BOXER. OK. My understanding is there aren’t, that what 

they deal with in the past are just losing electricity from the grid 

or from onsite, but not both at the same time. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. No. 

Senator BOXER. That is incorrect? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. That is incorrect, Senator. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Please correct the record for me, sir. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Station blackout means that you lose all A/C 

power, including onsite and offsite, and that there is a rule that the 

Commission has promulgated. So it was an issue that was addressed. But there are other questions that are coming up as a result of Fukushima. For example, in most power plants in the 

United States right now, the batteries which are supposed to provide the extra power when you lose both are expected to work 

somewhere between four and 8 hours. And the Japanese incident 

shows that you may have days or even weeks. 

So these are some of the things that we will have to think about 

how to address in the future. But—— 

Senator BOXER. So you don’t agree with the New York Times article where Charlie Miller, the chairman of the Task Force, said 

that studies by safety experts in the United States had analyzed 

the risks of losing electricity from the grid or from onsite emergency generators, but not both at the same time? You are saying 

you have had studies on this? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. This is not a true statement, yes. 

Senator BOXER. OK, well, that is important. And we will let the 

New York Times know. Thank you. 

107 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. JACZKO. Madam Chairman, I would say, I think the intention of that statement by the team was that when you are looking 

at the coping time, which is the important factor in the station 

blackout event, you have to make assumptions about how quickly 

you can restore that electrical power. So that historically has been 

done, they have looked at events in which you had the loss of the 

electric power from a minor disturbance in the electrical grid, and 

that would take a certain amount of time to restore that. That gets 

you to essentially that four to 8 hours of coping time. 

But that idea of the simultaneity in some of the guidance gets 

really to the recovery and how long it would take to recover. We 

would make assumptions that you wouldn’t necessarily both have 

catastrophically lost the use of the generators as well as catastrophically lost the offsite power. 

Senator BOXER. I see. 

Mr. JACZKO. So if you lost offsite power and the diesels didn’t 

work, you would be able to get the diesels back in a normal time 

or the normal expected time for recovery of diesels. Or if it was the 

other way and the diesels weren’t working, then you would have 

a normal way to recover the offsite power. 

Senator BOXER. So if I can get to what both of you have said, 

that you have looked at station blackout, but not for such a long 

duration? 

Mr. JACZKO. Correct. 

Senator BOXER. And I am assuming that Commissioners, you 

will look at, the last two, if you will look at this recommendation 

carefully, if there is one? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I agree. I just want to add one small thing. I 

think the Chairman characterized it correctly. But I think the Task 

Force is also interested in the fact that you could have what we 

would call a common cause failure, both offsite power and the onsite diesel generators. That is something that I think was a new 

thought for many people. I agree with others who said that is 

something we have to look at. 

Senator BOXER. Do you agree? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Madam Chair, I agree this is an area we need 

to look at. 

Senator BOXER. OK, very good. 

All right, Senator Boozman. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you very much. 

Again, I appreciate the hearing. I think it has been very helpful. 

I really do understand, I think the Country understands how important this agency is and I know you have your differences. But 

we do appreciate your working hard together to keep us safe. 

We have a nuclear plant in Arkansas run by Entergy, and they 

do a tremendous job. They are a great citizen and we are very 

proud to have the plant there, again, realizing that everyone working in harmony to make sure that these things function in such a 

manner that they not only produce cheap electricity and help us in 

that way but also again, we don’t have to worry that we are not 

doing the very best that we can for the population. 

The only thing else I would add, I think that probably on the 

Yucca project, there were probably thousands of people that worked 

108 

in a minor way. I think the idea that you, Ms. Svinicki, as a junior 

engineer, being there, working in whatever manner, the idea that 

somehow that laid the foundation for the Bush administration’s decision 6 years later I think is a real reach. So we do appreciate you 

all. Certainly anything I can do to help, I will. I know the Committee feels the same way. And like I said, we appreciate your efforts. And I yield back. 

Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Carper and then Senator Sanders. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

I would like to come back to the issue raised by our Chairman 

about the batteries, the power batteries. It is my understanding 

that in Fukushima things were not that bad as long as the power 

batteries were working. And once, I think they had an 8-hour life, 

as I recall. But whether it was 8 hours or four, the life of those batteries was used up. That is when something hit the fan, if I could. 

I am told that many, maybe most of our facilities, nuclear facilities 

in this Country, have the backup batteries of I think a 4-hour battery life. I don’t know if they are all four, or if there are some that 

are eight. The thought occurs to me, we had a little discussion here 

already, but shouldn’t we be looking at the requirements for the operating life of these batteries and extending that? Is there a place 

called A123, right there in Cambridge, Dr. Apostolakis, but A123, 

the battery folks, the batteries that are going to be in the Chevrolet 

Volt or are in the Chevrolet Volt. But our battery technology is getting a lot better as we go forward, particularly with electric powered vehicles. But shouldn’t we be able to do a whole lot better 

than a 4-hour or 8-hour life battery in the future? 

Let me just ask that of the—I will just say Dr. Apostolakis, why 

don’t you take a shot at that. And Mr. Magwood, would you take 

a shot at that question too, please? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes, you are absolutely right, Senator. This is 

something that we have to look into and take some sort of action. 

I don’t know what that action would be. But clearly, a message 

from Fukushima is that 4 hours or sometimes eight is not sufficient. 

Interestingly enough, when the requirement of four or longer 

hour was put in place, it was actually a conservative estimate. 

They looked at the time it took to recover A/C power, the average 

was about 2 hours. So to be conservative, they doubled it. And now 

we have this accident that shows that it is very inadequate. So that 

is certainly something we have to look into. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, sir. Mr. Magwood? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Not long after Fukushima, when I was talking 

with experts on the staff about this, I was listening to the history 

of how the 4-hour coping time was decided. As Commissioner 

Apostolakis pointed out, the time was deemed to be conservative. 

I remember pointing out to the staff at the time that, I live in 

Montgomery County in Maryland. If I lost power for only 4 hours, 

I would be thrilled. Because often, when I lose power, it is gone for 

2 days. So I wondered, how in the world can you justify 4 hours. 

There is certainly a technical background for the 4-hours. But it 

is clearly something we have to look at. 

109 

Senator CARPER. All right. And the other side of this, not just the 

life of the batteries but also our ability to get additional batteries 

onsite where they are needed, fully charged. Is that something that 

we are considering? 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, if I could say, I don’t want to focus too 

much on the batteries. The focus really is to have the ability to 

have systems move water, or perform whatever safety functions. 

The way the current station blackout rule is written, the batteries, 

they don’t, because of the way pumps are designed, they don’t activate pumps. What the batteries are there for is instrumentation 

and sometimes valves or other control systems. 

So the most important issue is the restoration of electrical alternating current power. That is really the most important factor. So 

the batteries provide a way to cope. But that also requires some 

other system to do the pumping. So that is done with turbines that 

are driven by steam from the reactors. 

So there is lots of ways to look at this problem. It may not necessarily be a problem of coping and dealing with the batteries. But 

it may be, the better, more effective approach may be to have additional ways to provide alternating current power. That may in fact 

be more effective. 

So at this point, it is not clear exactly what the right way will 

be. But the real issue is to get the electrical power back, the alternating current power back. As long as you are on the batteries, you 

are in a coping mode and you are not in an ideal situation. 

Senator CARPER. Well, we will look forward to you report back 

to us later this year to see how this all sorts out. 

One other thing. I spent, along with Captain Ostendorff, we both 

spent some time in the Navy, he was on submarines, nuclear submarines, I was on Navy P3 airplanes trying to find submarines. It 

was very easy to find those Russians, a lot hard to find our guys, 

which was actually reassuring. But we were in aircraft, and I know 

it is true in some ways you are given actually very realistic scenarios to follow. Training exercises, going after, in our case Russian 

submarines. 

We do, in nuclear power plants, in order to prepare for challenges with respect to plant security from hostile forces, or actually 

these force on force exercises in plants across the Country where 

we use good guys, our guys, to sort of take the role of bad guys and 

try to actually do force on force exercises. Pretty realistic. Nobody 

is shooting real bullets, but they are pretty realistic, I am told. 

Do you think we ought to maybe consider something similar for 

inspections and for regular emergency preparedness exercises, 

where plant employees are faced with different scenarios that are 

more realistic than maybe what we do today? And let me say, Mr. 

Ostendorff, Commissioner Ostendorff, Captain Ostendorff, will you 

take a shot at that? And Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Sure. I think the training and qualification 

and the demonstrated ability to carry out response actions is a 

piece of this. It is one thing to do a tabletop exercise, it is another 

thing to actually fight a fire in conditions of flooding where you are 

up to your knees in water where you maybe have very poor lighting, very poor ventilation. I think the training, qualification, comVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:00 Feb 07, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\21145.TXT VERN
110 

mand and control, direction on an individual reactor plant site are 

areas we should look at. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. JACZKO. I would just say, actually, the Commission has kind 

of maybe anticipated your question. We actually just finalized an 

update to our emergency preparedness regulations. And one of the 

cornerstones of that was to incorporate in our emergency planning 

exercises one, more realistic exercises. I would often comment that 

everybody knew when to order lunch, because we always knew 

there was going to be a lull in the exercise at around noon. So the 

exercises are in many ways kind of pro forma and everybody knows 

how they are going to play out. So one thing we have done is made 

them more, we are going to be making them more realistic. 

The other thing we have done is we have added what we call 

hostile action-based drills. So we are now going to incorporate in 

the exercise cycle precisely what you talked about, which is dealing 

with an emergency response when you have a security component 

as well. And the additional confusion and drains on communication 

and command and control, that can be accomplished. So it is actually something the Commission just finalized, and I think it is a 

very strong effort over the last really decade since September 11th. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. 

Madam Chair, I would just say, they are used to, in these exercises, having a lull and during the lull they have lunch. I am just 

wondering, when will they eat lunch now? I am sure they will find 

the time. 

Mr. JACZKO. We will find a way. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Senator Sanders. 

Senator SANDERS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Chairman, you indicated during my last round of questioning 

that representatives of a major multi-national corporation, a $14 

billion corporation, Entergy, which is now involved in a major and 

extremely important legal contest with the State of Vermont, met 

with staff at the NRC. 

Mr. JACZKO. That is my understanding. 

Senator SANDERS. Do you think it is proper, in the midst of a 

major legal dispute, for proponents of Entergy to be meeting with 

the staff of the NRC? 

Mr. JACZKO. I would say, I think in the end, the best way to determine that is to see how the staff handle it. Our staff, I think, 

are very diligent and dedicated and focused on their responsibilities 

to safety. I think we have an effort to be open and to listen to concerns. 

Senator SANDERS. But the issue in this lawsuit is not about safety. It is about the right of the State of Vermont, under the law, to 

not relicense a nuclear power plant. I am just kind of curious, if 

I can ask Ms. Svinicki and other members, have you been contacted by Entergy or the nuclear power industry in anyway, written, verbally, phone, personal meetings, about the Vermont Yankee 

case? Ms. Svinicki? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I have not communicated with Entergy or any 

broad industry group regarding this particular litigation. 

Senator SANDERS. Have they communicated with you? 

111 

Ms. SVINICKI. They have not. As the Chairman mentioned, there 

was a request to meet with commissioners. But that request was 

withdrawn based on, my understanding is the Justice Department 

had concerns, and so Entergy withdrew that request. 

Senator SANDERS. What about representatives of the nuclear 

power industry? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I have not had any meetings with representatives 

of the nuclear power industry on this litigation. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I have not either. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I have had no conversations. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, I also was aware of a request to meet 

with commissioners. And that request, as Commissioner Svinicki 

mentioned, was withdrawn. I have not met with Entergy nor with 

members of the nuclear industry to discuss this matter. 

Senator SANDERS. Nor any communications with them about this 

matter? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. There was a communication that came through 

for a request to meet. We did not meet. 

Senator SANDERS. Right. Thank you. 

What I want to do now is go to a very important Supreme Court 

decision dealing with the role of States in terms of nuclear power. 

Very important decision. I want to read it to you. It will take me 

a moment. 

Senator BOXER. 

[Remarks off microphone.] 

Senator SANDERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It has to do actually with the State of California. This is what the Supreme Court 

said in ruling for a State, in this case the State of California, in 

1983. 

My question, after I read this paragraph is, if you could comment 

on your feelings on this important decision. This is what the Supreme Court said in 1983. It said that ‘‘The promotion of nuclear 

power is not to be accomplished at all costs. The elaborate licensing 

and safety provisions, and the continued preservation of State regulation in traditional areas belie that. Moreover, Congress has allowed the States to determine as a matter of economics,’’ let me repeat that, ‘‘as a matter of economics,’’ not safety, my words, ‘‘as a 

matter of economics, whether a nuclear plant vis-a-vis a fossil fuel 

plant should be built. The decision of California to exercise that authority does not in itself constitute a basis for preemption. The 

legal reality remains that Congress has left sufficient authority in 

the States to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed 

or even stopped for economic reasons.’’ 

In other words, to my understanding, what the Supreme Court 

said in 1983 is, look, forget the safety issue. If a State, California 

or any other State, feels that there is another way to go forward 

that is better for the people of that State in terms of energy, maybe 

they want to buy power from Canada, hydroelectric power. Maybe 

they want to go sustainable energy. Maybe they want to invest in 

energy efficiency. 

From an economic point of view, the Supreme Court has said, 

they of course have that right. You can’t push a nuclear power 

plant on people. It is not a safety issue. Let me go very briefly and 

112 

ask members of the Commission if they would give us their view 

on that Supreme Court decision. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. JACZKO. As I said, I think it should be very rare that the 

Commission is involved in preemption cases. There are clearly, and 

I think I have said this publicly, there are clearly areas that, where 

the States have authority and we should respect those authorities 

as we expect them to respect our authorities. 

Senator SANDERS. Thank you. Ms. Svinicki. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Senator Sanders, although I have not read the decision you were quoting from, I would agree in general with Chairman Jaczko that there areas reserved to the States. And I would 

note I began my career working for the State of Wisconsin at a utility commission. So I am aware of the States’ role in economics. 

Senator SANDERS. Just out of curiosity, Madam Commissioner, 

were you familiar with this Supreme Court decision? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I have not read that decision. I believe I may know 

the one you are quoting from, but I have not read it. 

Senator SANDERS. Well, it concerns me very much that you may 

not be knowledgeable about this decision. Because as I understand 

it, this Commission just voted yesterday on an issue very relevant 

to what the Supreme Court had to say. 

Mr. Commissioner, are you familiar with it? How do you feel 

about that? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I was not familiar with it, but what you just 

read makes perfect sense. 

Senator SANDERS. Makes perfect sense. Do you think the State 

should have the right, from an economic point of view, to say no, 

we don’t want a nuclear power plant? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes, I do agree. 

Senator SANDERS. Commissioner Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, I also am not familiar with that particular 

ruling, although I will read it when I get back to the office, I make 

that commitment. I agree generally, I think that there is clearly a 

reason we have a Federal Government. The States have a strong 

role in issues such as economics. And as you have described it, it 

seems perfectly reasonable to me. 

Senator SANDERS. Commissioner Ostendorff. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator Sanders, I agree with the Chairman’s 

statement. I would also comment that I am generally familiar with 

that case in the context of discussions I have had with our solicitor, 

with respect to this, the matter of Vermont Yankee. Our authority 

is not based on economics, but rather on nuclear safety. 

Senator SANDERS. Right. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. So preemption, however, where there may be, 

as, in a rare case, as Chairman Jaczko has mentioned, where there 

is an issue of potential nuclear safety issues being raised, then that 

is a situation that might warrant NRC engagement. 

I would like to, Senator, if I can also comment on a comment you 

made during the first round of questions on this topic, and the 

Chairman has appropriately characterized the Department of Justice’s role in this matter as the litigating authority for the United 

States executive branch. I would just like to add that the comments 

to us, or discussions between the Department of Justice and NRC 

are not whether to intervene on the side of Entergy. It is a matter 

113 

of whether or not the NRC has an interest in this case dealing with 

preemption issues. 

So I just wanted to maybe provide a different perspective on 

that. 

Senator SANDERS. I am not so sure. I mean, the reality, the political reality is that the Department of Justice is going to have to 

make a decision. And I think it is quite understandable that they 

would go to you guys and say, NRC, what do you think? What do 

you think? 

But I want to get back to your first point, Commissioner 

Ostendorff, because, correct me if I am wrong, but I am hearing 

you say that if the issue is not safety, which certainly is an NRC 

issue, but the issue about whether or not a plant should be relicensed and kept open then in fact you do not see that as an issue 

that the NRC should be preempting the State on, is that what you 

are saying? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I want to be very careful here with my words, 

but I will answer the question, Senator, it is a very fair question 

to ask. This case is very complex. And I have had a chance to read 

briefings filed by both parties, and to be briefed on the status of 

the case. 

Senator SANDERS. Who briefed you on the status of the case? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I talked to our solicitor, the solicitor for the 

NRC. He is our representative with the rest of the Federal Government, our interface with the Department of Justice. And as Chairman Jaczko mentioned, there are things we cannot discuss here 

today in this session. So each individual case has its own nuances, 

its specific details, its specific issues, contentions. As a safety regulator, our job is to ensure that nuclear power plants are operated 

safely. 

Senator SANDERS. Right. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Whether or not there is a safety issue in a particular case depends on a lot of fact, a lot of details, a lot of arguments made by both parties to the case. And so I think it is hard 

to say in a particular abstract manner whether a particular case 

has a safety nuance or not. 

Senator SANDERS. Let me try. If the people of the State of 

Vermont want to shut down a 40-year old plant that has had numerous problems, want to shut it down, not relicense it, not see it 

continue for years to come, why do you see that as a safety issue 

rather than an economic issue, perhaps, of the State to do that? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, I appreciate the question. And for me 

to respond in that would be counter to what I have been advised 

by our solicitor. 

Senator SANDERS. Thank you, Madam Chair, for giving me more 

time than I was originally scheduled to have. Let me just say this. 

First of all, I do appreciate, I think as I hear it, and somebody 

jump up and tell me if I am wrong, all of the Commissioners’ understanding that States certainly under the Supreme Court decision do have the right for economic reasons to determine whether 

or not they want a nuclear power plant. Not a safety issue, an economic issue. 

Is there anyone who disagrees with that? 

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

114 

Senator BOXER. I am going to followup just with a couple of quick 

questions. Commissioner Ostendorff, you just said in answer to 

Senator Sanders, I hope I heard you right, I want you to clarify if 

I didn’t, that when there is a safety problem you have to listen to 

both sides. That is what you said, is that right? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I am not sure exactly what both sides—we are 

talking—— 

Senator BOXER. Commissioner, can you read that back perhaps, 

what he said? 

OK. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I believe what I may have said, at least what 

I believe I said, Madam Chair, is that whether or not there is a 

nuclear safety issue, in the case Senator Sanders is referring to, requires hearing the perspectives of both parties to a case. 

Senator BOXER. Right. That is right. I want to talk—— 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I did say that, yes. 

Senator BOXER. I want to talk to you about that. Why is that the 

issue? Isn’t the issue whether you find it is safe or not? I don’t get 

that. I didn’t get that. If that is your job, why do you listen to both 

sides? You need to have your staff ascertain whether it is safe or 

not, taking into consideration what both sides are saying. But I 

hope that is what you meant. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Well, certainly that is our job as a regulatory, 

Madam Chair. I don’t dispute that at all. What I am trying to say 

in the context of Senator Sanders’ question as to whether or not 

there is a safety issue that might warrant preemption issues being 

raised by the NRC, I think it is important for us to hear both sides 

of the question—— 

Senator BOXER. It is. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF [continuing]. from all parties. 

Senator BOXER. But please tell me, don’t you have the ability, I 

will ask the Chairman, to decide for yourself if a plant is safe or 

not safe? 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. That is our responsibility and it is ultimately our decision. We strive as an agency to make sure that we 

listen to stakeholders so that we have informed decisionmaking. 

But ultimately it is our decision. 

Senator BOXER. But you are independent. You are independent. 

So when I hear you say, when there is a safety issue raised, we 

are going to hear both sides, that troubles me. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Madam Chair, I—— 

Senator BOXER. I think hearing both sides is fine. But at the end 

of the day, you have to perform your own inspections. Am I correct 

on that? And that is what you do with your people, right? You send 

them out and say, look, one side says it is safe, the other side said 

they are scared. Can you come back and give us a review of what 

is going on? Isn’t that what you would demand, Mr. Ostendorff, 

other than just listening to either side? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I would like to clarify this, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Please. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Thank you for the opportunity. 

Senator BOXER. Sure. 

115 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. It is clearly our responsibility as regulators 

under the Atomic Energy Act to make the final determinations on 

whether a plant is safe or not. 

Senator BOXER. Good. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. The question I was responding to with respect 

to Senator Sanders dealt with whether there is an issue being 

raised in this lawsuit of nuclear safety, or is it purely economics. 

The case that Senator Sanders was citing from the Supreme Court 

in California was dealing with an economic-based aspect. What I 

am saying is that on the decision that I can’t discuss the details—— 

Senator BOXER. Right, right, right. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF [continuing]. the Department of Justice, it is 

important for us as commissioners to hear and listen to the different briefs and our perspectives on how to vote, being informed 

by understanding both sides of the argument as to whether or not 

there is a preemption issue. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, I mean, I just have to say, and I want 

to commend all of you, first of all, for giving us your total focus and 

attention. There have been some tough moments here today. I 

think each of you has conducted yourself just very well and very 

sincerely. 

I want to compliment my colleague. I so identify with his fighting 

for his State. And I share his concerns about transparency and 

openness and intervening in a State’s rights situation. I think that 

if a commissioner votes one way to say, we are going in, and I assume spending taxpayer dollars, would it not be? Taxpayer dollars 

to intervene in a suit, it ought to be a matter of the public’s right 

to know. And I am sure each of you could eloquently defend your 

reasoning. 

So I would question all of you ducking this question, I think it 

is wrong. I think you ought to rethink it. All of you should meet 

and think about it. Think about it. It is too important. You need 

to be as transparent as you can be. 

I want to just close by saying, I looked through this really good 

book, The Information Digest, that you put out. I am sure all of you 

are very, there are very nice pictures of you in here. And it really 

lays out what you do. And I am struck by page 2, where you or 

your writers, and I am sure you have agreed with them, have highlighted the major function of this Commission in a very clear way. 

You took all of the law and you just synthesized it. 

This is what you said: Strategic goals, there are two, safety is 

first. Insure adequate protection of public health and safety and 

the environment. 

What a wonderful job you have. It is the way I look at my job. 

That is sacred trust you have. Sacred trust to the people of this 

great Country, so that we never get into a situation where because 

somebody might have done the wrong thing, we are dealing with 

a Japanese disaster. We just, we just can’t do that. I keep thinking 

back to my two plants and all the people there who really, some 

of them don’t realize how much their very well-being depends on 

you being vigorous on their behalf. I am going to be vigorous on 

their behalf. Senator Feinstein is. And others who, I am sure the 

Governor and all of us. 

116 

But you have the power. You are independent. I can’t tell you 

what to do, I can just urge you to do the right thing. 

Second, security. That is your second strategic goal. Insure adequate protection in the secure use and management of radioactive 

materials. So important. And that is why Yucca keeps being 

brought up, and I remember reading those reports of leakage and 

all kinds of problems there. And I have a county that just is right 

next door, which would get anything that leaked into the river. We 

would get it on our side. 

So I just want to close by saying thank you. This Committee 

cares a lot and we have different views. You saw them all today, 

and that is the beauty of America and democracy. I often say anyone watching us, every point of view is represented. And that is 

really what democracy is. Of course, some of us think our point of 

view is the right one. Each of us thinks that our ideas are the right 

one. 

But we will keep on overseeing the work you do. We wish you 

well. We hope that you as a Commission will be kind to one another, good to one another. Yes, there will be debates, there will 

be arguments. But life is too short to make them personal. That 

is just coming from me as a friend, as a Senator, as a mother, as 

a grandmother. 

So we need you to work together. Disagreements may abound. 

But at the end of the day, you have to work it out. Because you 

are in charge of safety and security for the American people in a 

very important way with these 104 plants. A hundred and four, is 

that right? Yes. Two of which are in my State, and I worry about. 

So worry about those a little bit, too. 

Thank you very much. We hope to see you again. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

[Additional material submitted for the record follows.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA

Thank you, Commissioners of the NRC, for appearing before our committee today. 

We have spent a lot of time in this committee and in other committees in Congress reviewing the earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan in March of this year and 

the implications for nuclear power in the United States. In fact, we have spent so 

much time on the nuclear aspects of this natural disaster that the public may overlook that at least 15,000 individuals were killed and nearly 8,000 were reported 

missing as a result of the earthquakes and tsunamis. Yet I am not aware of a single 

death or injury arising from the overheating of spent fuel stored at the Fukushima 

Daiichi Nuclear Plant. Certainly, there are lessons to be learned from the unusual 

events at the Japanese plants but it does not seem at this point that there are substantial reasons to call into question the overall safety or reliability of nuclear power 

in the United States. I look forward to hearing today about the preliminary results 

of the Commission’s review of this incident. 

According to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the United 

States will need to add 135,000 megawatts (MW) of new generation by 2017 in order 

to meet our economy’s energy needs, but the amount of new generation currently 

planned to come on-line by that date is significant less than what will be required.1 

America needs a comprehensive energy plan that increases domestic American energy production from a variety of sources—nuclear, oil, natural gas, hydroelectric, 

biofuels, and other sources of reliable energy that America can put to good use. Conservation has a very important role as well. America needs an energy policy that 

strengthens our national security by using more domestic energy, fosters economic 

growth by providing plentiful low cost energy, and protects the environment in an 

effective and cost-effective manner. 

117 

I read yesterday that Chairman Jaczko believes, as a result of the Japanese situation, the NRC should issue tougher new regulations. After a thorough review, some 

new safety requirements may be justified. But policymakers in Washington D.C. 

should not get ahead of themselves. An earthquake of historic intensity was centered very near a 40-year old nuclear facility that is located directly on Japan’s Pacific coast. This caused Daiichi reactors 1 through 4 to experience a ‘‘station blackout’’—that is, the facility lost all offsite power and the emergency diesel generators 

were flooded and inoperable as a result of the tsunami. As a result, the cooling systems did not function as designed. In the United States, nuclear plants already 

must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the NRC that the plant can continue to operate safely during a blackout scenario. Existing U.S. regulations also require multiple layers of redundancy to ensure safe operation. 

In Alabama, we saw a potential blackout event first-hand in April of this year 

when severe tornados occurred throughout our state, knocking out the power lines 

that fed offsite power to the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant—the second largest 

nuclear power station in the U.S. The backup power systems at Browns Ferry responded as designed and there was no blackout or meltdown scenario. While there 

will certainly be lessons to learn from the Japanese experience at Fukushima, I believe that we need to remain firmly committed to expanding America’s nuclear 

power fleet today. The new nuclear units currently in the licensing process contain 

safety features, such as gravity-fed cooling systems, that would have been another 

safety redundancy that would have prevented the kinds of problems seen at 

Fukushima. 

That is the case with the Westinghouse AP1000 design. These new designs reduce 

reliance upon mechanical and electrical systems for cooling. As the NRC does its 

work in this regard, it will be critically important that the Commission has a full 

panel of commissioners, and I would continue to urge that Commissioner 

Ostendorrf, whose term expires at the end of this month, receives a confirmation 

vote on the floor of the Senate immediately. 

In my view, the Japanese situation should not lead us to push the pause button, 

especially for licensing new facilities in areas of the country not susceptible to the 

kinds of events that led to the Japanese disaster. Rather, I believe we need these 

newer, safer nuclear units to come on line as soon as possible. Nuclear power is a 

clean source of domestic energy that the American people support. It has an important role to play in reducing our dependence on foreign oil and reducing air pollutants. Nuclear power plants provide long term economic benefits, and the construction of new nuclear facilities creates new, high paying jobs. 

Finally, I am very concerned, Chairman Jaczko, about reports concerning your apparent decision to withhold important and relevant information about the Yucca 

Mountain matter from the other members of the Commission. I am also concerned 

about the way in which you exercised ‘‘emergency powers’’ in the wake of the Japanese incident. Both are troubling situations that merit a full review. 

Thank you. I look forward to our hearing today. 

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