IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50654

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ELIAS A. ESTRELLA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:13-CR-222-2

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and PRADO and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Elias A. Estrella pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one 

count of possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine

and was sentenced to 240 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised 

release. The appeal waiver provision in Estrella’s plea agreement does not bar

this appeal because the Government has not sought to enforce it. See United 

States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2006).

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 3, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-50654

Estrella argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying 

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He cites his repeated claims of actual 

innocence; the failure of the Government to substantiate its claim of prejudice 

resulting from a withdrawal of the plea; the district court’s erroneous reliance 

on a busy docket when finding that a withdrawal would inconvenience the 

court and waste judicial resources; and ineffective assistance of counsel which 

contributed to an unknowing and involuntary plea.

Once the district court accepts a defendant’s guilty plea, the defendant 

has no absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea. United States v. Grant, 117 

F.3d 788, 789 (5th Cir. 1997). A district court may grant a motion to withdraw 

a guilty plea upon a showing of “a fair and just reason for requesting the 

withdrawal.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B). This court reviews the district 

court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2014).

In determining whether a district court has abused its discretion in 

denying withdrawal, this court traditionally employs the seven factor test set 

out in United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343-344 (5th Cir. 1984), considering 

whether (1) the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) the Government 

would suffer prejudice if the motion were granted; (3) the defendant has 

delayed in filing his motion; (4) the withdrawal would substantially 

inconvenience the court; (5) the defendant received the close assistance of 

counsel; (6) the original plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) the 

withdrawal would waste judicial resources. These factors are not exclusive, 

and, ultimately, this court makes its determination based on the totality of the 

circumstances. Id. at 344.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Estrella’s 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Estrella’s assertion of innocence, without 

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No. 14-50654

identification of any specific evidence to substantiate his claim, was 

insufficient to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea. See United States v. Clark, 931 F.2d 292, 294-95 

(5th Cir. 1991). In addition, the district court correctly determined that 

Estrella delayed in filing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea given that he

waited two months after his rearraignment and he followed with two 

subsequent withdrawals and filings of the same motion. See United States v. 

London, 568 F.3d 553, 563-64 (5th Cir. 2009); Carr, 740 F.2d at 345.

Although Estrella contends that the passage of time has not impeded the 

Government’s ability to bring him to trial, “the absence of prejudice to the 

Government does not necessarily justify reversing the district court’s decision” 

to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. United States v. McKnight, 570 

F.3d 641, 649 (5th Cir. 2009). In light of its extremely busy docket, the district 

court correctly determined that granting Estrella’s motion to withdraw would 

inconvenience the district court and waste judicial resources. See McKnight, 

570 F.3d at 650. The district court also did not err when it found that Estrella

had close assistance of several attorneys during the pendency of his criminal 

case. Finally, his statements at the rearraignment hearing show that he 

entered a knowing and voluntary plea. Estrella’s declarations are entitled to 

a strong presumption of verity. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 

(1977).

Based on the totality of the Carr factors, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion when it denied Estrella’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See 

Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d at 364.

AFFIRMED.

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 Case: 14-50654 Document: 00512955186 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/03/2015