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U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 

December 2010 

From the Administrator 

In the 1970s, less than half the states 

reported gang problems. By the turn 

of the 21st century, however, every 

state and the District of Columbia 

were facing this challenge. 

Helping communities combat gang 

activity is a leading priority for 

the Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), 

and our Gang Reduction Program 

has been a key initiative to that end. 

A comprehensive, integrated, and 

coordinated approach to preventing and reducing gang activity, the 

program emphasizes addressing the 

needs of youth and affecting change 

in families, organizations, and 

communities. 

This bulletin draws on findings 

from an independent evaluation, 

conducted by the Urban Institute, 

of the Gang Reduction Program's 

impact in Los Angeles, CA; Milwaukee, WI; North Miami Beach, FL; 

and Richmond, VA, to examine how 

effectively these sites implemented 

the program. 

The findings reported in these pages 

have greatly augmented our understanding of the program's achievements and will guide our efforts to 

enhance the effectiveness of OJJDP's 

antigang model. 

Jeff Slowikowski 

Acting Administrator 

Jeff Slowikowski, Acting Administrator 

Findings From the Evaluation of 

OJJDP’s Gang Reduction Program 

by Meagan Cahill and David Hayeslip 

Highlights

Researchers from the Urban Institute conducted an independent evaluation 

of the impact of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s 

(OJJDP’s) Gang Reduction Program (GRP) on gang-related crime in Los 

Angeles, CA; Milwaukee, WI; North Miami Beach, FL; and Richmond, VA. 

The evaluation focused on program implementation and outcomes in each of 

the four cities. Following are some of the authors’ key findings: 

•	 In contrast to many previous crime prevention and reduction efforts, 

all sites successfully implemented the GRP model. Three of the four 

sites also implemented plans to sustain elements of the program as 

federal funding expired. 

•	 Successful outcomes related to crime reduction were seen in most of 

the sites although results varied. 

•	 Strong leadership of a site coordinator, close oversight by OJJDP 

during the strategic planning and implementation phases, and the 

availability of technical assistance contributed to implementation 

progress at the sites. 

•	 GRP is not a one-size-fits-all approach to gang prevention and 

reduction. The model is flexible enough that sites can adapt it to 

local conditions yet remain true to the original design. 

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention ojjdp.gov
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DeCeMber 2010 

Findings From the Evaluation of OJJDP’s 

Gang Reduction Program 

by Meagan Cahill and David Hayeslip 

Introduction 

Youth gangs have existed in various forms since at least 

the 19th century, although the nature and extent of their 

activity has evolved over time. Over the past 25 years in 

particular, gangs have expanded rapidly both in size and 

their areas of operation. Gangs today are more violent, 

their activities are more widespread and pervasive, and 

they are more entrenched within the community. 

Research highlights the relationship between gang involvement and increased criminality; gang-involved 

youth engage in more frequent and more serious criminal 

activity than they do prior to joining or after they leave a 

gang (Thornberry, Huizinga, and Loeber, 2004; Browning, Thornberry, and Porter, 1999; Battin et al., 1998; 

Thornberry and Burch, 1997; Esbensen, Huizinga, and 

Weiher, 1993). A number of individual, family, and community risk factors increase one’s likelihood of becoming 

involved with a gang (Thornberry, Huizinga, and Loeber, 

2004; Thornberry, 2001; Hill, Lui, and Hawkins, 2001; 

Esbensen, 2000; Browning, Thornberry, and Potter, 

1999; Howell, 1998). Although anti-gang programs have 

traditionally addressed these risk factors through prevention, intervention, or suppression activities, recent approaches have employed more comprehensive strategies 

that incorporate different elements into a flexible model 

for organized gang crime reduction. Evaluations suggest 

that these comprehensive models are particularly difficult to implement; nevertheless, they continue to garner 

increasing attention and warrant extensive implementation 

and outcome evaluations. 

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP’s) Gang Reduction Program (GRP) is one 

such comprehensive program, an outgrowth of previous 

comprehensive approaches to reduce and prevent gang 

activity at the local level. In 1994, following a review of 

promising anti-gang programs and interventions, Dr. 

Irving Spergel and colleagues from the University of 

Chicago introduced the Comprehensive Community-Wide 

Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression, more commonly referred to as the “Spergel Model” 

(Spergel et al., 1994b). This multifaceted approach to 

gang reduction emphasizes addressing the needs of individual youth and making changes in the families, organizations, and communities around them. The Spergel Model 

is unique among anti-gang programs because its prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts are coordinated 

(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 

2009; Spergel et al., 2004; Spergel et al., 1994a). The 

model was applied to school violence under OJJDP’s 

Gang-Free Schools and Communities Initiative (Office 

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2008). 

OJJDP’s Gang Reduction Program is the most recent adaptation of the Spergel Model. This bulletin presents findings from the Urban Institute’s independent evaluation 

of GRP—a $10 million, multiyear initiative (2003–08) 

to reduce crime associated with youth street gangs in Los 

Angeles, CA; Milwaukee, WI; North Miami Beach, FL; 

and Richmond, VA. The evaluation focused on program 

implementation and outcomes in each of the four cities. 

The implementation component assessed the progress of 

the initiative in each site from its launch in the spring of 

2003 through mid-2008. The outcomes component considered the effects of the program in each site from implementation through early 2008 and examined whether each 

site experienced significant changes in gang-related crime, 

serious crime, and other outcome measures associated with 

the goals of GRP. 

Background 

OJJDP’s primary goal in implementing GRP was to 

reduce gang crime and violence (see figure 1). To achieve 

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this goal, OJJDP sought to implement programs that were 

“comprehensive, integrated, and coordinated.”1

OJJDP selected four target communities of limited geographic area (about 2 to 5 square miles) in which to implement its comprehensive gang-reduction model. According 

to OJJDP, these communities were chosen because they 

were areas of substantial gang activity and sites of previous crime-prevention efforts. The target sites were Boyle 

Heights in Los Angeles, Metcalf Park in Milwaukee, the 

entire city of North Miami Beach, and the Southside community in Richmond. 

The program’s multipronged implementation approach 

required community stakeholders to develop local plans to 

address family, peer, school, and community needs. Next, 

stakeholders identified local resources that they could use 

to meet these needs. After these 

planning objectives had been met, 

communities could use federal sup- Figure 1. The GRP Framework port to enhance delivery of appropriate resources and services to meet the 

identified needs. 

In fall 2003, OJJDP made a onetime, 5-year, $2.5 million award to 

each site. The mayor’s office in Los 

Angeles and state agencies in the 

three other sites administered the 

awards. A local GRP coordinator 

served as the primary point of con­ Identify 

Target 

Population 

Identify 

Needs tact for each site and was responsible 

for planning, developing, and implementing the program. The coordinators also developed and maintained 

collaborative relationships with local 

leadership that included representatives from community organizations, 

service providers, police precincts, 

schools, and social service agencies. 

These local leaders often shared their 

expertise through participation in 

either a GRP executive board or a steering committee. 

From late 2003 to early 2004, each site conducted an 

initial strategic planning process to lay the groundwork for 

longer term plans to implement the complete GRP model. 

This planning process was very short—sites had 6 months 

to complete their plans, seek OJJDP approval of the plan, 

and begin implementing the program. Although sites were 

required to complete this phase prior to funding or implementation of any program component, OJJDP allowed 

each site to use a maximum of $80,000 in grant funding 

to complete this phase. OJJDP also offered sites technical 

assistance through the National Gang Center2 in support 

of this phase and during later program implementation. 

Following plan approval, OJJDP limited sites’ GRP activities in summer 2004 to those of a short-term nature. 

Each of the sites successfully implemented several shortterm programs (e.g., alternatives to suspension, midnight 

basketball, Boys & Girls Clubs programming, college 

preparation); however, the number of clients that these 

programs served was relatively small. Even though the 

sites incorporated some of these programs into the larger, 

comprehensive plans they implemented following further 

strategic planning over the next 6 months, these early 

activities did not appear to be clearly and logically connected to the larger GRP plans. Instead, sites chose these 

programs because they could quickly implement them and 

they required modest initial funding. 

Primary 

Prevention 

Secondary 

Prevention 

Proven Practices 

Identify 

Resources 

Apply 

Resources Intervention 

Gang 

Suppression 

Reentry 

Reduced Youth 

Gang Crime 

and Violence 

Following OJJDP’s approval of their expanded strategic 

plans in late 2005, each site began implementing the program. Although each of the sites generally adhered to the 

overall GRP model, the emphasis on each of the components necessarily varied from site to site based on differing 

local contexts, community factors, and characteristics of 

each site’s gang problems. Prevention received the greatest 

emphasis in terms of the numbers of individual programs 

and funding support across the sites. After exhausting 

federal funding, Milwaukee ceased GRP operations in fall 

2007. Implementation continued through at least 2008 in 

the other three sites. (See sidebars throughout the bulletin 

for brief backgrounds on each of the GRP implementation 

sites.) 

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Methodology 

Evaluation of the Implementation 

Component 

Researchers employed several methods to collect data to 

document implementation in each site. The first was direct 

observation of GRP planning activities, both onsite and 

at OJJDP-convened meetings. Researchers also collected 

and reviewed relevant documents from each site, including 

progress reports, strategic plans, budgets, and requests for 

proposals from potential local service providers. 

Los AngeLes 

Although levels of overall crime in Los Angeles decreased 

early in the GRP effort, gang crime rose 14 percent citywide 

in 2006 and city officials promised to increase their efforts to 

address gang crime (Archibold, 2007). By some estimates, 

there were nearly 40,000 gang members throughout the city, a 

large portion of whom operated in the 15-square-mile division 

of East Los Angeles that the Los Angeles Police Department 

(LAPD) Hollenbeck Division patrols (Winton, 2005). The area 

includes the neighborhoods of Lincoln Heights, El Soreno, and 

Boyle Heights and was thought to have the highest concentration of gang activity in Los Angeles with an estimated 34 

gangs and 6,400 LAPD-documented gang members. Gang 

detectives estimated that an additional 2,000 to 3,000 gang 

members operated in the Hollenbeck Division. These gangs 

were intergenerational and claimed territory block by block. 

Located in 2 square miles of the southeastern-most corner 

of Boyle Heights, the GRP target area was home to approximately 25,000 people, many of whom lived in one of the 

In addition, an evaluator conducted one-on-one and 

small group interviews with GRP coordinators, steering 

and implementation subcommittee members, and local 

stakeholders. The sessions were designed to gather individuals’ observations and opinions about how strategic and 

implementation groups were formed, how the planning 

process unfolded, and how decisions were made about 

specific programs to be funded. Other major topics addressed in the interviews were the participants’ views on 

lessons learned (both positive and negative) and program 

sustainability once federal grant funds expired. Researchers 

conducted followup interviews with committee members every 6 months to a year throughout the evaluation 

period. 

The complex nature of programs such as GRP often makes 

concepts such as collaboration and functioning difficult to 

gauge. Researchers designed and conducted three waves 

neighborhood’s two large apartment complexes. Although 

largely residential, Boyle Heights also hosts several prominent 

commercial zones of “mom and pop” establishments and 

an industrial area on its southwestern edge. The area was 

home to approximately 2,000 documented and suspected 

gang members belonging to 4 major gangs and had received 

significant media attention for its gang activity in recent years 

(CNN, 2005; McCarthy, 2005; ABC News, 2004; PBS, 2001). 

The suppression component of the Los Angeles GRP was 

unique from that in other sites because similar suppression 

activities existed in the target area prior to the introduction of 

GRP. The suppression component was implemented through 

a partnership with an existing multiagency law enforcement 

collaborative, the Community Law Enforcement And Recovery (CLEAR) program. The federally funded CLEAR program 

began in the Boyle Heights target area in 2003 and coordinated resources in areas of high gang crime to decrease gang 

violence. The decision to co-locate the GRP site with CLEAR 

maximized the synergy between the two programs. 

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“The program’s multipronged implementation approach 

required community stakeholders to develop local plans to 

address family, peer, school, and community needs.” 

of a Web-based survey3 of site coordinators and committee 

members (both current and former) to measure collaboration among partners, examine how well GRP functioned in 

each site, and assess how the perceptions of those involved in 

GRP changed over time. Although these types of surveys 

are rare in evaluations of programs such as GRP, the data 

gathered are important to understand how well the program worked. 

Evaluation of the Outcomes Component 

Researchers collected a variety of community-level outcome measures in each site with data from local police 

departments forming the central element of the outcome 

analysis. This bulletin focuses solely on the violent and 

gang crime outcomes in each site. Results from the analyses of the additional outcome measures in each site will be 

available in a forthcoming final evaluation report. 

The researchers worked with law enforcement and stakeholders to select a suitable comparison area for each GRP 

target area. Outcome data were collected for both the 

target and comparison areas in each site and analyzed.4 To 

analyze the crime and gang-related crime outcomes5 across 

the four sites, the evaluation team investigated the trends 

in each outcome measure over time, examined maps of the 

measures over time, and conducted time series analyses to 

test whether any observed trends were statistically significant. Given that suppression activities were most likely 

to have immediate and short-term effects on outcomes, including reduction of serious violent crime and gang crime, 

the evaluation team focused on the periods immediately 

before and after suppression activities began in each site. 

The crime outcome measures analyzed included monthly 

figures before GRP began in 2003 through early 2008. 

Analysis of GRP outcomes posed several challenges. The 

researchers expected that suppression activities, if effective, would impact the average number of criminal incidents in a target area. However, using information from 

law enforcement about the timing, nature, and intensity 

of their GRP-sponsored gang suppression activities, the 

research team was unable to formulate hypotheses about 

exactly when the effect, if any, of the suppression activities 

would begin. This uncertainty was the result of several 

factors. First, the team did not have detailed information on the number of man-hours the police departments 

devoted to gang-suppression activities over time. In 

addition, the team expected that the suppression activities might become more effective over time as the police 

refined their tactics, improved their gang intelligence, and 

became more familiar with the target communities. Lastly, 

the researchers expected that other interventions—such as 

the introduction of the Milwaukee Police Department’s 

new data management system or the enactment of civil 

injunctions against gangs in Los Angeles—likely affected 

the outcome measures. However, the team had even less 

information about these interventions, such as their exact 

timing, to account for them in its models, and thus could 

not ascertain when those effects would take place or what 

actual effect those interventions would have. 

To meet these challenges, the researchers adopted a 

method of statistical analysis that allowed them to find 

those points in time, known as break points, where the 

average number of crime incidents per month changed 

significantly—either increasing or decreasing.6 They then 

interpreted these break points in the context of each site’s 

implementation timeline. For example, if the analysis detected a decrease in gang-related crime in the target area 

shortly after GRP activities began and found no similarly 

timed drop in the comparison area, that finding was interpreted as being consistent with the hypothesis that GRP 

had reduced gang-related crime. 

For each site, the research team constructed separate 

monthly time series composed of counts of each of several 

categories of crime, such as serious violence7 and gangrelated incidents for the target and comparison areas, and 

tested for any number of months where the mean of crime 

incidents changed significantly.8 In the section on Findings 

below, the researchers report only those months where the 

mean level of crime incidents changed significantly.9 They 

then compared their knowledge of site activities to the statistical break points to determine whether GRP activities 

may have influenced the changing crime levels. The results 

of these analyses follow below. 

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MILwAukee 

The north side of Milwaukee, once home to much of the city’s 

middle class, deteriorated greatly during the 1980s coincidental to the decline of the manufacturing sector and the rise of 

the city’s crack cocaine epidemic. In the wake of this upheaval, these neighborhoods became nearly synonymous with 

unemployment, poverty, and crime. Traditional youth gangs 

such as the Vice Lords and Gangster Disciples operated a 

thriving narcotics trade and violently feuded over territory. 

The Milwaukee GRP target area covered all or parts of the 

Midtown, Metcalfe Park, and Amani neighborhoods. Eightynine percent of the roughly 8,000 residents in the target area 

were African American and 45 percent of the population lived 

below the poverty line. The area was economically depressed, 

and the population had declined significantly over the past 

decade despite attempts at economic revitalization. The 

Findings 

In general, each of the four sites implemented a wide 

range of promising and viable approaches to address its 

gang problem. These approaches were the result of strong 

local leadership and considerable local-level effort in most 

of the sites. However, the sites also faced significant challenges implementing the GRP model, particularly early in 

the program. Findings related to violent and gang-related 

crime were mixed; some measures showed decreases associated with GRP, but other measures showed no change 

at all surrounding the period of GRP implementation. 

Evidence of a positive effect of GRP on crime and gang 

measures appears strongest in the two sites—Los Angeles 

and Richmond—that most effectively implemented the 

model and either developed or built upon strong local 

partnerships across the various GRP components. The 

evaluation findings focus on three areas: implementation, 

outcomes, and sustainability. 

socioeconomic woes of the target area were compounded by 

the high rate of high school dropouts: more than 40 percent of 

the adult population older than 25 did not graduate from high 

school. 

The gang problem in the target area was typical of gangs on 

the north side of Milwaukee and consisted of loosely organized groups of young African American males mainly focused 

around the drug trade. The groups were nonhierarchical and 

members were not easily identified by their clothes or other 

symbols, a fact that frustrated law enforcement efforts to 

eradicate them. The lack of gang organization on the north 

side of the city, however, did not mean the gangs were any 

less violent. A majority of Milwaukee’s homicides were routinely concentrated on the north side of the city as opposed to 

the south side, where gangs followed a more typical, hierarchical structure. 

Implementation 

Each of the demonstration sites focused on different 

types of gangs, gang-related problems, and community 

conditions. Only Los Angeles applied the GRP model to 

combat “traditional,” multigenerational, urban territorial 

gangs. The other sites considered gangs in the selected 

target areas to be relatively new or recently emerging. 

Because of these differences, the cities had to adapt implementation of the GRP model to meet local needs and 

problem-solving approaches. For example, North Miami 

Beach and Richmond had to take into account the large 

number of undocumented immigrants and their reluctance 

to trust government agencies. As a result, specific programs funded through GRP in those cities were selected 

to address these issues. Moreover, the three cities other 

than Los Angeles had paid little attention to gangs in the 

past (some reported not having any gang problems until 

recently) and targeting gang crime and violence was a 

relatively new undertaking for stakeholders. 

“The GRP model has been shown to work well in a wide range of 

community contexts, including areas with nontraditional gang problems.” 

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The implementation evaluation examined the role of the 

steering committees; assessed the sites’ strategic planning 

process, program management and leadership, collaboration, and functioning; as well as the obstacles and successes 

they faced during program implementation. 

Steering Committees. Despite the limited organizational 

direction that OJJDP provided, the sites all developed 

similar planning bodies, referred to as steering or advisory 

committees. Several factors appeared to contribute to 

the development of and reliance on steering committees. 

First, GRP emphasized maximizing program funding and 

minimizing administrative or overhead costs. Thus, most 

coordinators came to rely on steering committees for management and decisionmaking support. In addition, all of 

the sites had past experience with other U.S. Department 

of Justice crime and violence-reduction programs, such 

as Weed and Seed, which specifically called for the formation of local committees or task forces to assist in program 

planning and implementation. Finally, OJJDP advised sites 

to form groups of local stakeholders to assist in the early 

GRP planning meetings; this advice naturally led to the 

sites’ reliance on committees. 

The use of steering committees appeared to be a mixed 

blessing in some of the sites. The program’s parameters 

initially were not clear to the sites, and thus, some local 

government agencies, service providers, and community 

groups developed unrealistic expectations. Committee 

outreach and participation initially included some organizations that, upon announcement of the GRP funding, 

expected to secure substantial sums from the grants for 

their own agencies. As a result, planning and GRP implementation were, in some situations, disrupted because 

of individual agency or organizational priorities rather 

than collective interest in consensus building to fulfill the 

GRP’s mission. 

Strategic planning for the implementation of GRP took 

place in two phases. During the second phase, the role 

of the steering committees became less clear and a number of members in different sites expressed concern over 

the committees’ future responsibilities. In fact, over the 

course of the second phase of implementation, the active 

participation of steering committees and subcommittees 

declined. However, in the case of North Miami Beach, 

local coordinators required their committees to oversee 

funded programs and participate in sustainability efforts 

for the site. This expanded role resulted in continued 

active participation of some members, particularly those 

most dedicated to the overall GRP mission. 

Strategic Planning Process. Both phases of the strategic 

planning process were intended to accelerate the placement of programs in the target communities. In addition, 

because the target areas were predefined, the assessments 

of gang problems were very limited. As a result, at the 

beginning of GRP, the sites vaguely defined community 

problems as the presence of gangs engaging in criminal 

activities in the target area. Moreover, most sites found 

it difficult to precisely define the target populations and 

specify concrete goals and objectives, particularly early 

in the planning process. After the initial planning phase, 

program coordinators and local committees in each site 

realized that they needed additional information about 

the nature of local problems and resources and evidencebased practices that might be most effective. To address 

these shortcomings, each site spent additional time and 

effort on the planning process, which substantially delayed implementation during phase two. It appeared that 

a number of implementation challenges could have been 

avoided if OJJDP had allowed sites additional time to engage in more indepth and thorough problem and resource 

assessments. 

GRP Management and Leadership. OJJDP chose 

state agencies for three sites and the mayor’s office in Los 

Angeles as fiscal agents for GRP, and program coordinators, hired as employees of each fiscal agent, were selected. 

OJJDP hypothesized that this arrangement would allow the coordinators to avoid being influenced by local 

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politics, thereby protecting them from local agencies’ 

influence over funding and other project decisions. Strong 

leadership was indeed an important factor for the successful implementation of the program. In large measure, 

the successful implementation of the GRP model over its 

first 5 years was attributable to the coordinators’ leadership. However, this leadership appeared to derive from 

the individual coordinators’ skills and experience rather 

than because they were employees of the chosen fiscal 

agents. In fact, where implementation was most successful, 

local stakeholders reported coordinator leadership as one 

of the most important contributing factors. In addition, 

coordinators in three of the sites exercised some degree 

of independent decisionmaking authority. In Milwaukee, 

however, the coordinator shared decisionmaking authority 

with an active executive committee, which included representatives from the fiscal agent and local policymakers. 

This made it significantly more difficult for the coordinator to assume a leadership role, and local stakeholders 

consistently reported confusion over who was in charge. 

During 2007, the local coordinators at three of the sites 

left their positions. In Los Angeles, the coordinator assumed a new gang coordination role within the mayor’s 

office and was replaced. However, the original coordinator remained closely involved in the city’s gang-reduction 

efforts—including those in the GRP target area—through 

her new position. In Richmond, the coordinator was similarly promoted within the Office of the Attorney General 

and was replaced. However, the new coordinator left soon 

after assuming the position, and the program management 

role reverted back to the original coordinator. In Milwaukee, the coordinator left for another position in state 

government approximately 6 months prior to the end of 

the site’s planned operation period and was not replaced. 

The original coordinator in North Miami Beach remains 

in her capacity under GRP, although the organization itself 

was recently incorporated as an independent nonprofit 

agency. With the exception of Milwaukee, coordinator 

turnover did not appear to have much of an effect on GRP 

efforts, which could be because of the strong leadership 

of the original coordinators who continued to maintain 

significant roles in the project. In Milwaukee, however, 

the coordinator’s departure left a void that exacerbated 

existing management and decisionmaking problems. The 

absence of strong, local leadership hindered the program’s 

efforts toward sustainability, and it ceased most of its 

gang-reduction activities when OJJDP funding ended. 

Collaboration and Functioning. As noted earlier, 

although OJJDP did not mandate it, each of the demonstration sites developed steering committees and subcommittees to help guide strategic planning and program 

implementation. As conceived, the sites expected these 

various committees to involve interested local stakeholders 

who would develop partnerships to address the goals and 

objectives of the GRP. 

The researchers found that the level of collaboration and 

communication in the early stages of planning and implementation was not equal within or across sites. In general, 

suppression-focused stakeholders seemed to function more 

collaboratively and effectively. This was likely because 

law enforcement and other suppression-focused agencies 

frequently seek out and develop interagency partnerships. In other words, these agencies and individuals had 

worked together successfully in the past and understood 

the importance of collaboration and open communication. 

In Los Angeles, for example, many of the participants had 

worked together previously on the CLEAR10 initiative. In 

Richmond, the Office of the Attorney General had also 

coordinated a number of anti-gang programs, including a 

summer camp that involved multiple agencies. 

On the other hand, those groups that focused on prevention and intervention did not appear to function as well 

together at this stage of the implementation process. This 

was likely a result of their lack of experience working 

together toward common goals and/or because in the past 

these groups had often competed with one another for 

limited local resources. 

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“Each site experienced significant success at building 


partnerships to address local gang and crime issues.”
 

These variations in collaborative functioning led to a 

number of changes in local planning and implementation groups over time. First, at sites where functioning 

was more problematic, member attrition and turnover 

tended to be more prevalent and member absenteeism was 

reported more often. Second, more senior level decisionmakers delegated membership in the various committees 

to middle-level program managers or other practitioners. 

Los Angeles was one exception to changing composition; its membership and participation remained relatively 

stable. This was once again likely a result of past experience 

working on collaborative initiatives in the target area. 

Despite these early challenges, collaboration among 

partners and the functionality of the local committee and 

other working groups generally improved during GRP 

implementation. Although experience working together 

contributed to this improvement, strong GRP coordinator 

leadership also appeared to improve local functioning and 

committee members often cited it as an important factor. 

Finally, some early members whose primary reason for 

participation appeared to be acquiring funds for their own 

agencies withdrew from participation after finding out that 

they would not receive GRP funds. This reduced competition and disruptions, thereby also improving local committee functioning. 

Obstacles. Members of GRP planning and implementation teams and all GRP coordinators reported that they 

had to overcome numerous challenges and obstacles 

throughout the implementation period. The accelerated 

strategic planning process was the first major challenge 

that all sites faced. Participants stated that the preselection 

of the target areas and their lack of a precise understanding 

and definition of the problems they would address made 

informed strategic planning more difficult. The OJJDPmandated short turnaround time for the initial planning 

stage resulted in the implementation of some activities 

that served few clients. With some exceptions, these 

activities were also generally extensions or modest expansions of programs that were already in place. Each site 

spent a substantial amount of time and effort during this 

initial implementation phase collecting and assessing 

information about the nature of its gang problems and 

identifying evidence-based practices that they might 

employ to address those unique and, in some cases, new 

problems. More emphasis on a strategic planning process 

informed by reliable data on crime, gangs, and existing 

community resources might have improved implementation during these early stages. 

Local implementation teams across all four sites consistently cited government bureaucracy and “red tape” as 

major obstacles. Local interview and survey respondents 

identified OJJDP as one source of bureaucracy. A number of strategic planning committee members and those 

responsible for implementation found OJJDP’s basic GRP 

model too rigid and not adaptable to local problems and 

issues. Contrary to this perception, however, the evaluation team found substantial variation in the actual strategic 

implementation plans across sites. Even though sites were 

restricted to implementing programs within the general 

OJJDP framework, they emphasized different component areas and chose different programs based upon local 

needs, particularly in the later implementation phases. The 

sites pointed to GRP reporting requirements as obstacles 

at the federal, state, and local levels. However, those sites 

with little past experience participating in a large-scale, 

federally funded program such as GRP were most likely 

to express this perceived burden. 

The sites also saw OJJDP’s accelerated timeline for implementation as an obstacle. All four sites found it difficult 

to adhere to OJJDP’s expectations for a short initial planning process and immediate implementation of programs. 

As a result, all the sites experienced delays during both 

stages of implementation, and little significant programming was put in place during the early stage. At sites 

where no preexisting relationship between potential GRP 

partners was present, coordinators had to put forth a great 

deal of effort to build a comprehensive and representative 

partnership. In retrospect, the sites may have benefited 

from a lengthier planning period that did not require them 

to rush into program selection and implementation. Later 

implementation delays may have been reduced or avoided 

altogether had the sites’ leadership dedicated more effort 

Juvenile Justice Bulletin 9 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

during the earlier stages toward planning, capacity building, and partnership development, including communication, collaboration, and consensus building. 

The biggest delay in implementation in all four sites 

was the requirement to follow fiscal agent policies and 

regulations for selecting and contracting with service providers. This meant that once the sites had finalized their 

implementation plans, they then had to identify service 

providers to implement different elements of those plans 

through a competitive application process. This typically 

meant that coordinators had to develop specific requests 

for proposals (RFPs) for services. The sites had to publish 

these RFPs and rate each proposal received on objective 

criteria before they could select individual providers, after 

which they had to follow an often lengthy subcontract 

process. In the case of Los Angeles, an additional step was 

required: city council committees reviewed all proposed 

subcontracts before the council formally approved them. 

Local procurement laws and regulations had several negative effects on GRP implementation. The first was that the 

timeframe for actually getting services and programs up 

and running in the target communities was much longer 

than the parties involved, including OJJDP, had anticipated. Indeed, some contracts for services were awarded in 

late 2007 with little time in the official GRP grant period. 

The second effect was a number of potential providers 

with little experience in the competitive bidding process 

missed deadlines or submitted incomplete applications 

that resulted in their disqualification, despite the fact that 

they were thought to be the most qualified providers. 

This was particularly true in Richmond, where a series 

of RFPs had to be reissued for providers. In other cases, 

some providers thought to be the best qualified did not 

apply because they were deterred by the complicated 

10 Juvenile Justice Bulletin 

application procedures or because they viewed the amount 

of available funds to be insufficient to be worth their effort. (Los Angeles, for example, initially did not receive 

enough bids for some program components.) Thus, RFPs 

for certain components had to be reissued in some sites. 

A substantial amount of GRP administrative resources was 

expended on this process. 

Successes. Despite the obstacles and the long implementation delays, all four sites experienced similar implementation successes: 

•	 All sites developed strategic implementation plans that 

were acceptable to OJJDP and generally consistent with 

target area needs and gang problems. The local plans 

generally were also true to OJJDP’s GRP model. 

•	 Despite early challenges with the planning process and 

initial program implementation, management of the 

initiative in each site steadily improved as did partnerships among core members as the program developed 

(although, as noted above, implementation outcomes 

varied among the sites). 

•	 Coordinator outreach to government agencies, service providers, and community groups generally 

resulted in a broad participation in GRP planning and 

implementation. 

•	 Each target area ultimately funded specific program 

activities and services across the main prevention, 

intervention, and suppression components of the GRP 

comprehensive model. 

•	 Outreach to these communities improved communication on gang issues within the target areas and researchers found evidence of improved communication among 

organizations involved in GRP, such as between law 

enforcement and service providers. 

•	 Each site successfully adjusted the GRP model to local 

conditions. This demonstrates that GRP is not a onesize-fits-all approach to gang prevention and reduction. 

It can and must be flexibly applied to different gang 

problems and in different environments. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Outcomes 

The observed effects of GRP on crime 

and gang-related crime outcomes were 

mixed across the four sites. 

Los Angeles. An analysis of the association between the implementation of 

GRP and crime in Los Angeles revealed 

that pre-post implementation trends 

for serious, violent gang crime and calls 

reporting shots fired were consistent 

with hypothesized declines in the target 

area. For these measures, decreases were 

seen in both the target and control 

areas following GRP implementation, 

but the declines were steeper for the 

target area and structural break analysis 

found these declines to be statistically 

significant. 

Analyses of calls reporting vandalism, 

serious violent incidents, and overall 

gang crimes were not supportive of 

research hypotheses. As illustrated in 

figure 2, crime levels in the Los Angeles 

target area decreased, as the density of 

crime appears highest in the baseline 

year (2002). The strongest concentrations of violent crime, or “hot spots,” 

diminished following GRP implementation, and their locations changed over 

time, moving from the target area to 

outside areas. A number of violent gang 

crime locations were consistently found 

in the central portion of the target area 

over the evaluation period. In contrast, 

incident locations in the comparison 

tended to become more concentrated 

in the eastern part of the area and the 

primary hot spot diminished in terms 

of intensity but was in the same area in 

2007 as it was in 2002. 

Figure 2. Los Angeles: Density of Serious Violent Crimes, 2002 and 2007 

“OJJDP maintained close oversight during the strategic planning and 

implementation processes and made available extensive technical 

assistance to each site, which also contributed to the success of GRP.” 

Juvenile Justice Bulletin 11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 3. Milwaukee: Density of Serious Violent Crimes, 2002 and 2007	 of the target area within the displacement area. Otherwise, crime locations 

appeared relatively stable over time. 

North Miami Beach. Researchers 

could offer only limited conclusions 

on the effect of GRP for North Miami 

Beach because crime data could not be 

obtained for North Miami, the comparison city. The analysis of serious violent 

crime incidents in North Miami Beach 

showed a substantial decline following 

GRP implementation, although statistical significance was not found, mostly 

because of small monthly frequencies. 

However, gang-related criminal incidents also declined postimplementation 

and were statistically significant. Figure 4 shows that the concentrations of 

serious violence in North Miami Beach 

were relatively unchanged from 2002 to 

2007, although the hot spot in Victory 

Park, where many GRP activities were 

focused, did decline slightly in intensity 

over the course of the evaluation. The 

reader should be careful in interpreting the North Miami Beach findings, 

however, not just because there were no 

comparison crime data, but also because 

the monthly incident levels were quite 

small. 

Richmond. In Richmond, the analysis of crime outcome data revealed a 

number of changes that supported 

the evaluation hypotheses. For serious 

violent crimes, the preimplementation 

trends were relatively stable for both the 

target and comparison areas. Following a marked jump in crime in summer 

2005, violent crime in the target area 

dropped sharply through early 2008, 

while crime decreased only slightly in 

Milwaukee. In Milwaukee, only one crime measure—drug 

crimes—was found to have a possible association with 

GRP. These crimes declined somewhat more in the target 

area than the comparison area after GRP implementation, 

but the change was not found to be significant with statistical analysis.11 As shown in figure 3, prior to the implementation of GRP, serious violence was actually concentrated 

outside of the target area. By 2007, that concentration of 

crime diminished but a new hot spot emerged to the south 

the comparison area. Similar patterns 

were also observed for gang crimes and 

serious, violent gang incidents. In contrast, drug crime incidents increased in the target area after GRP implementation, which was contradictory to the research hypotheses. 

Figure 5 shows that the changes in the spatial distributions 

of serious, violent crime also supported the evaluation hypotheses. From 2002 to 2007, the primary target area hot 

spot diminished and there was a general reduction in the 

concentrations of crime in the target area. On the other 

hand, concentrations of violent crime were relatively stable 

over time in the comparison area. 

12 Juvenile Justice Bulletin 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sustainability Figure 4. North Miami Beach: Density of Serious Violent Crimes, 2002 and 2007 

The Urban Institute reported in its 

interim implementation report (Hayeslip 

et al., 2006) that by the end of 2006, 

the sites had given little consideration 

to sustaining GRP once OJJDP funding 

ended. In fact, the four sites had undertaken very little sustainability strategic 

planning. Progress since then markedly 

improved in three of the sites. 

Los Angeles. Los Angeles incorporated 

the basic GRP model, its organizational 

structures, and planning processes into 

a citywide gang initiative known as the 

Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program. The city implemented 

a strategic planning process similar to 

GRP’s in 2007 and, at the end of the 

evaluation, efforts were underway using local and other funding sources to 

replicate the successful components of 

GRP in other targeted areas throughout 

the city. 

Milwaukee. In 2007, GRP effectively 

ended in Milwaukee because of a lack 

of any concerted efforts to sustain it. A 

variety of organizational and community 

political factors appear to have contributed to the Milwaukee site’s lack of 

sustainability efforts. Leadership was not 

as strong in Milwaukee as in the other 

sites, and the fact that the local coordinator left during the early stages of sustainability planning and was not replaced 

contributed to a “wrap it up” posture 

among local stakeholders, many of 

whom reported being active participants 

primarily for their own organizational 

funding. Furthermore, it did not appear 

that a local GRP brand was established 

or a plan for sustainability developed in 

Milwaukee. Despite the lack of sustainability plans, some local stakeholders reported in late 2007 

that they were still optimistic about continuing certain 

components of the GRP model. One major suppression 

component—community prosecution—has continued with 

local funding support in Milwaukee. 

North Miami Beach. Considerable efforts have taken 

place in North Miami Beach to sustain the GRP initiative 

there. Despite initial setbacks in securing state and county 

funding, GRP in North Miami Beach has incorporated as 

an independent nonprofit organization and actively sought 

funding from a variety of external sources. 

Richmond. Richmond expended a substantial amount of 

planning and effort toward sustainability. Strong partnerships between the Office of the Attorney General and the 

Richmond Police Department, in particular, developed 

under the initiative and the active community policing and 

outreach efforts in the targeted neighborhood appeared 

to have reaped support from the community by the end of 

the evaluation period. In 2008, the program was expanded 

Juvenile Justice Bulletin 13 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 5. Richmond: Density of Serious Violent Crimes, 2002 and 2007 summary of Findings 

Approximately 5 years after the selection of GRP sites and the start of 

program implementation, researchers 

found some evidence that GRP was 

associated with changes in the levels 

of crime and gang-related incidents in 

three of the four demonstration sites. 

However, the strength of that evidence 

varied. Some findings contradicted the 

hypothesized GRP crime outcomes, 

but on the whole, the positive evidence 

appeared to outweigh the negative. The 

nature of the pre-post comparison group 

design, however, precludes concluding 

there were cause and effect relationships 

between GRP and the positive outcomes 

observed. 

Researchers also found that each site 

experienced significant success at building partnerships to address local gang 

and crime issues and raising awareness of 

such issues. Los Angeles had an existing 

network of prevention, intervention, 

and suppression providers who recognized the need to address the local gang 

problem and had experience providing 

services to gang members and youth at 

risk of joining gangs. The GRP effort in 

Los Angeles, therefore, focused more on 

providing services instead of laying the 

groundwork for gang-reduction efforts. 

By contrast, the other sites (Milwaukee, 

North Miami Beach, and Richmond) 

had to begin their GRP efforts by first 

describing and understanding the local 

gang problems, garnering support and 

participation from local providers, and 

building a partnership of organizations 

to include a neighborhood in the northern part of the city, 

with many of the original partners providing services in 

the new area. Even if the partnership itself is not formally 

sustained in the Southside target area, it is likely that many 

of the programs that arose out of GRP efforts will be continued there. 

that did not have experience providing 

services to gang members or youth at 

risk of gang membership. However, these sites made substantial progress in establishing a consensus understanding 

of their gang problem, building community partnerships, 

cultivating experienced social service providers, and planning to sustain their anti-gang activities. These successes 

may form the groundwork for future gang-reduction 

efforts. 

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noRth MIAMI BeAch 

Throughout spring and fall 2002, a Haitian gang known as 

Eastside allegedly carried out at least 15 drive-by shootings in 

the greater Miami area (Alvarado, 2003). Three murders from 

those drive-bys happened within the North Miami Beach city 

limits. This and other violent occurrences appeared to be early 

signs of the city’s developing gang problem. 

North Miami Beach, which totals 5.3 square miles, is located north of the city of Miami and has experienced rapid 

population growth over the past decade. According to local 

residents, the increasing heterogeneity of the population is 

the result of rapid growth in the Haitian and Haitian American 

populations. In the past decade, the number of Haitian Americans and Haitian expatriates in the city grew significantly: 

the 2000 census found that approximately 50 percent of the 

Implications for Practice 

The findings from the GRP evaluation have several implications for the program model and policy. 

•	 OJJDP should target areas that have a recognized gang 

problem that is severe enough to warrant a comprehensive model. The model requires a significant amount of 

funding, and the greatest success will come where need 

is high and the site acknowledges and understands the 

nature of its unique gang problems. 

•	 Site selection should be based on a variety of factors, 

including details on the gangs to be addressed such as 

turf areas, structure, and size. The number of gang incidents in any potential target area should also be taken 

into account. Other relevant pieces of information that 

should be factored into site selection include potential 

levels of community buy-in for such a program and the 

inventory of existing community resources that can be 

tapped for the effort. 

•	 The model is best suited for sites that already have established partnerships of service providers, city leaders, 

politicians, and other relevant parties. The sites spent 

a lot of time on partnership building; had they been 

able to jump right into implementation, they may have 

experienced more positive results from the initiative in a 

shorter time. 

•	 OJJDP should provide more detailed and indepth guidance on program expectations and steps required to 

achieve implementation success. The manner in which 

population of North Miami Beach was foreign born, with 19 

percent of the population claiming Haitian ancestry. According to service providers, local police, and others involved with 

GRP, this rapidly growing minority population put a strain on 

the city, which lacked adequate services to address the needs 

of its Haitian residents, many of whom did not speak English. 

The number of active gangs composed predominately of 

members of Haitian descent had also increased in the area. 

Relatively little research on Haitian and Haitian American 

gangs exists, but by 2007, there were at least 16 different 

gangs with predominately Haitian membership known to exist 

in the Miami-Dade area. For the most part, the gangs were 

economically motivated and were not hierarchical or territorial 

in structure. In North Miami Beach, involvement in drug sales 

was common among these gangs (Marcelin, 2005). 

the GRP funding awards were announced fostered 

unrealistic expectations among many local stakeholders 

across the sites. As a result, in the early stages of strategic planning, unnecessary competition and conflict 

arose over the distribution of grant funds among potential participants and service providers. Many of those 

involved in GRP strategic planning and implementation 

also expressed confusion over the requirements of the 

GRP awards and what was expected of them. 

•	 The timeline set by OJJDP should be as flexible as the 

model itself. The pressure exerted on the sites to conduct strategic planning on a compressed timeframe and 

implement programs within 6 months was unrealistic. 

OJJDP also should not have expected the sites to implement programs during the first year. 

Recommendations for Future sites 

The GRP model has been shown to work well in a wide 

range of community contexts, including areas with nontraditional gang problems. The lessons learned from the 

development and implementation of the program in the 

demonstration sites should guide future implementation 

efforts. 

•	 Sites considering such a model all will have a unique 

blend of gang problems, community investment, and 

resources that will affect the needs and capacities of 

the community. Even though the GRP model includes 

specific components (i.e., prevention, intervention, and 

suppression) within which sites have to provide services, 

Juvenile Justice Bulletin 15 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RIchMond though only 2 percent of the Richmond population was HisWith a population of fewer than 200,000, Richmond has a 

small-town atmosphere but faces big-city issues, including 

high levels of violent crime. The GRP target area was largely 

residential, characterized by two large apartment complexes 

and a mix of single-family residences, low-rise apartment 

complexes, and townhouses. Several major surface streets 

cut through the target area and the population density was 

relatively high. Much of the economic development in Richmond, however, had focused on revitalizing the downtown 

area; the target area had not enjoyed the same growth as 

other parts of the city. 

Geographically, the target area was located on the city’s 

Southside, home to the city’s small but growing Hispanic 

population. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2000, 

9 percent of the target area population was Hispanic even 

as the demonstration sites illustrate, the model design is 

flexible enough that sites can adapt it to local contexts 

yet remain true to the original design. 

•	 Selecting a strong leader capable of leading a complex 

partnership through a strategic planning process into 

implementation is an obvious first step for localities 

considering adopting a GRP model. Even more important is role definition: program coordinators did best 

in the sites where their roles were clear and all involved 

understood the responsibilities of their position and 

other management positions (including executive and 

steering committees). Close OJJDP strategic planning 

and implementation oversight also played a key role in 

GRP success, and this should be replicated in future 

federal anti-gang initiatives. 

•	 Sites should take advantage of the partnership-building 

aspects of GRP which, in three demonstration sites, 

had positive benefits for the community and could 

have lasting effects beyond the life of GRP. The 

panic. Local officials reported to the Urban Institute that the 

Hispanic population has grown significantly since the 2000 

census. 

The GRP site, administered through the Virginia Office of the 

Attorney General, focused on emerging conflict between local gangs and the city’s growing Hispanic population. Local 

leadership reported that the city’s gang problem was centered 

around African American and Hispanic gangs preying on Hispanic day laborers. In addition, although the community had 

in place a significant number of social service providers with 

the capacity to address gang-related issues, many of those 

providers felt overwhelmed by the influx of immigrants. Local 

GRP leadership in Richmond cited the language barrier and 

the immigrants’ culture of distrust of the government, especially the police, as complications to its ability to serve that 

population. 

partnerships helped to build the capacities of those 

involved; partners learned from each other, made connections with similar organizations, and tapped into 

resources of which they were previously unaware or 

unable to attain. 

•	 A related recommendation is to keep the size of the 

partnership manageable. Although sites should recruit 

a range of partners to represent different community interests, recruiting too many partners can make 

the partnership difficult to manage as was the case in 

Richmond. 

•	 Sites should devote at least 1 year to a comprehensive 

strategic-planning process that allows them to conduct 

a thorough assessment of the gang problem and develop a clear logic model and agenda for the initiative. 

The time needed for strategic planning will necessarily 

vary depending on local context; some sites may have 

the foundation for a partnership in place and may have 

already come to a consensus on the best ways to address 

“GRP is not a one-size-fits-all approach to gang prevention and 

reduction. It can and must be flexibly applied to different 

gang problems and in different environments.” 

16 Juvenile Justice Bulletin 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

gangs, but for most cities, the model’s outcomes will 

improve with more thought put into the local design 

through the strategic planning process. 

•	 Sites must allow plenty of time for the procurement 

process for selecting service providers for each component. Sites should also expect to provide guidance to 

potential applicants on the procurement process and 

should expect some providers to have no familiarity 

with the process. Sites should consider this an opportunity to build local service provider capacity. Local management should also expect to spend time increasing 

its own capacity to navigate the procurement process, 

with some form of technical assistance a likely necessity. 

Addressing these issues early in the process will prevent 

implementation delays later on. 

•	 Once sites move past the strategic planning phase, they 

must redefine the role of committees formed during 

the planning process to maintain the functioning of 

the partnership. In sites where this redefinition did 

not happen, the partnership suffered because committee members did not maintain contact with each other 

and at times reported feeling unconnected to the GRP 

initiative. This sense of disconnection also led partners 

to lose focus of the overall GRP goals. 

•	 Sites should make a concerted effort to collect program 

and client data from the start of program activities, with 

reporting requirements in place for all providers who 

receive funding under GRP. Data on program performance should be monitored closely not just for fiscal 

reasons but also to assess how well the intervention is 

working via the programs selected for funding through 

the monitoring of performance. 

•	 Sites should begin planning for sustainability—keeping 

the initiative going for an extended period of time— 

very early in the implementation process, and OJJDP 

should provide sites with much more guidance on this 

phase. Although three sites have sustained at least parts 

of the initiative, the sites were latecomers to achieving 

sustainability and may have been more successful had 

sustainability efforts started earlier. 

conclusion 

The findings from the evaluation of the Gang Reduction 

Program have contributed a significant amount of understanding regarding the implementation process and potential outcomes of OJJDP’s comprehensive anti-gang model. 

The lessons learned from the evaluation of the GRP model 

in Los Angeles, Milwaukee, North Miami Beach, and 

Richmond provide a foundation from which future sites 

can learn. In addition, the GRP evaluation resulted in 

specific policy implications that can inform future policy at 

OJJDP and other federal agencies in successful implementation of a comprehensive anti-gang program. 

endnotes 

1. In Gang Reduction Program Strategic Planning Tasks and 

Timelines (2003), an unpublished handout for gang reduction program and planning participants, OJJDP defined 

a comprehensive program as one that (1) used the best 

research-based program components to focus on locally 

identified risk domains, (2) applied strategies across all appropriate ages, and (3) included approaches that cut across 

traditional agency boundaries. 

An integrated program was defined as one that (1) identified 

overlapping and underutilized existing services to meet 

local needs, (2) identified gaps in services and sought to 

fill them, and (3) incorporated serving at-risk clients across 

multiple organizations. 

A coordinated program was defined as one that used fiscal and 

other resources at multiple levels, such as federal, state, and 

local, as well as private sources, such as community-based 

organizations, volunteers, and local residents. 

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2. Formerly the National Youth Gang Center; funded 

by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice 

Programs. 

3. See Cahill et al. (2008) for the survey instrument. 

4. In North Miami Beach, the evaluation team identified 

the city of North Miami as the most suitable comparison 

area. However, North Miami collected its own police data, 

and researchers were unable to secure that data. Therefore, 

analyses for North Miami Beach are lacking comparison 

data. 

5. The research team analyzed additional outcome measures for each site, but this bulletin presents only the 

findings from the serious, violent crime and gang crime 

measures for each site. Other outcome data that were 

analyzed include: 

•	 Longitudinal school-level attendance, performance, 

and delinquency data for target and comparison schools 

in each site except Milwaukee. (Milwaukee practices 

school choice, which made it impossible to identify one 

or a few target schools that most school-aged children 

in the target area attended.) 

•	 Longitudinal property tax data in Milwaukee to assess 

the changing property values that may have resulted 

from GRP efforts. 

•	 Patient data from hospitals in Richmond for prenatal 

patients and crime victims. 

•	 Data on North Miami Beach and North Miami juvenile 

referrals to the county Juvenile Services Department. 

6. This time series analysis method is known as structural 

break analysis. 

7. The research team defined “serious violence” to include any murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible 

rape, aggravated assault, or robbery. For crimes against 

persons (i.e., murder, manslaughter, rape, and assault), the 

team counted one crime per victim; for all other types of 

offenses, including robbery, they counted one crime per 

incident. 

8. See Bai (1997a, 1997b) for a complete description of 

the methodology. 

9. The research team used a significance level of p<0.05. 

10. The Community Law Enforcement And Recovery 

(CLEAR) program is a federally funded, multiagency law 

enforcement collaborative to decrease gang violence. 

11. In Milwaukee, there were many months with no reported gang crimes. Consequently, the research team did 

not conduct a time series analysis on the gang crime measure for Milwaukee as the findings from such an analysis 

would have been unreliable. 

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Archibold, R.C. 2007. Officials see a spread in activity of 

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This bulletin was written by Meagan Cahill, Ph.D., Research Associate, and 

David Hayeslip, Ph.D., Senior Research Associate, at the Urban Institute. 

The authors would like to acknowledge Mark Coggeshall and Carly Knight, 

Research Associates at the Urban Institute, for their significant contributions 

to the analysis of outcome data for this bulletin. 

This bulletin was prepared under grant number 

2007–JV–FX–0323 from the Office of Juvenile 

Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), 

U.S. Department of Justice. 

Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of 

OJJDP or the U.S. Department of Justice. 

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