00-Frontmatter 3x5 book.indd 4 8/9/07 
Vantage Points

Perspectives on 

Airpower and the 

Profession of Arms

Compiled by

Charles M. Westenhoff

Colonel, USAF, Retired

Michael D. Davis, PhD

Colonel, USAF

Daniel Mortensen, PhD

John L. Conway III

Colonel, USAF, Retired

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

August 2007

00-Frontmatter 3x5 book.indd 1 8/9/07 
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily 

represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. 

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

All photographs are courtesy of the US government.

Air University Press

131 West Shumacher Avenue

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5962

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil

Cataloging Data

Vantage points : perspectives on airpower and the profession of arms / compiled by Charles M. Westenhoff . . . [et al.]

 p. ; cm.

ISBN 978-1-58566-165-7

1. Air power—Quotations, maxims, etc. 2. Air warfare—

Quotations, maxims, etc. 3. Military art and science—

Quotations, maxims, etc. I. Westenhoff, Charles M.

355.4—dc22

ii

00-Frontmatter 3x5 book.indd 2 8/9/07 
iii

Contents

Pa

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Theory of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Patriotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Air, Space, and Cyber Power . . . . . . . . . . . 

Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Education, Training, and

Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Preparedness, Security, and

Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Leadership and Professionalism . . . . . . . 

Character and Leadership Traits . . . . . . 

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Information and CommunicationS . . . . . . 

Joint Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Coalition Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Airpower at War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Irregular Warfare/

Counterinsurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

00-Frontmatter 3x5 book.indd 3 8/9/07 
00-Frontmatter 3x5 book.indd 4 8/9/07 
v

Foreword

There is no finer learning organization than t

United States Air Force. At the tactical level, a

crews thoroughly debrief every sortie, superviso

carefully brief their shifts, and units maintain m

ticulous records. The Air Force uses precision 

strumentation to record every test and debrief eve

Red Flag mission—these and other measures e

sure the integrity of what we learn. We collect wh

we’ve learned in databases, lessons learned, tact

manuals, histories, and professional journals—

accumulate useful knowledge so we can serve mo

effectively. Whether newly enlisted or general o

cers, we continue to learn every day—we mas

what’s important to attain professional excellenc

As we enter Air Force service, our prima

learning goal is to become experts in our fie

That’s the first step toward leadership. As we ma

ter our individual duties, we gain insight into t

broader organization. By the time an air traffic co

troller is qualified, he or she has learned abo

weather, radios and radar, airfield engineerin

navigational aids, aircraft operations, and ma

other fields. The wider our professional grasp, t

better our decisions. 

Thousands of years before any aircraft fle

profound masters of the profession of arms encou

aged learning. We inherit a practical focus fro

those soldiers, sailors, and statesmen: study su

cesses and failures to understand what works. 

Airmen have added tremendously to this seve

school of study. The third dimension adds unpre

dented vision, speed, range, and freedom of actio

The application of air and space power in conc

with other arms created joint operations, a distin

00-Frontmatter 3x5 book.indd 5 8/9/07 
vi

g

tribute a unique perception of time, a penchant for 

maximizing the effects of scarce resources on a 

theater scale, and a habit of looking ahead—“leadturning events.”

This book presents both timely and timeless 

thoughts on our profession. It pairs them with images of Airmen who embody those thoughts and 

prove them in action. It is a reminder that professional growth is something we owe to other Airmen 

and our nation. We treasure the lessons we’ve 

learned because so many have been paid for in 

blood. In turn, we apply them—to fly, fight, and 

win—don’t you ever forget it!

T. MICHAEL MOSELEY

General, USAF

18th Chief of Staff

00-Frontmatter 3x5 book.indd 6 8/9/07 


Theory of War

To Be Prepared for War

When blows are planned, whoever contrives the

with the greatest appreciation of their conse­quenc

will have a great advantage.

—Frederick the Great (Frederick II) (1712–86), 

king of Prussia, 1740–86

The purpose of all war is peace.

—Saint Augustine (354–430), theologian and think

In order for a war to be just, three things are nec

sary. Firstly, the authority of the sovereign. . 

Secondly, a just cause. . . . Thirdly, . . . a right

intention.

—Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–74), 

theologian and thinker

01-Text.indd 1 8/15/07 
ries. The supreme excellence is to subdue the armies 

of your enemies without having to fight them.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 BC

Nobody dislikes war more than warriors. 

—Gen Daniel “Chappie” James Jr., commander in 

chief, North American Aerospace Defense 

Command/Aerospace Defense Command, 1975–

77; first African-American Air Force four-star 

general

Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a 

mistake.

—Gen Napoléon Bonaparte (1769–1821), Corsicanborn general during the French Revolution; 

emperor of the French, 1814–15 (20 Mar–22 June 

1815)

You win battles by knowing the enemy’s timing, and 

using a timing which the enemy does not expect.

—Miyamoto Musashi (1584–1645), Japanese samurai; 

The Book of Five Rings, 1645 

Generally in war the best policy is to take a state 

intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the 

enemy’s army is better than to destroy it.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 BC

Thus, what is of extreme importance in war is to 

attack the enemy’s strategy; next best is to disrupt 

his alliances; [and] next best is to attack his forces. 

The worst policy is to attack his cities; do so only 

when there is no alternative.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 BC

01-Text.indd 2 8/15/07 
y y 

looked upon as a whole from the very outset, a

that at the very first step forward the command

should have the end in view.

—Gen Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), Prussia

general and military theorist; On War, 1832

The expenses required to prevent a war are mu

lighter than those that will, if not prevented, be a

solutely necessary to maintain it.

—Benjamin Franklin (1706–90), American 

philosopher and Founding Father

You will usually find that the enemy has three cours

open to him, and of these he will adopt the fourth

—Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, 

chief of staff, Prussian army, 1857–87

Forces that cannot win will not deter.

—Gen Nathan F. Twining, chief of staff, US Air Forc

1953–57; chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1957–6

Everything is very simple in war, but the simpl

thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate a

produce a friction which no man can imagine e

actly who has not seen war.

—Gen Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), Prussia

general and military theorist; On War, 1832

Nothing is more important in war than unity 

command.

—Gen Napoléon Bonaparte (1769–1821), Corsic

born general during the French Revolution; 

emperor of the French 1814–15 (20 Mar–22 Ju

1815)

01-Text.indd 3 8/15/07 
y y 

planning, unity of common item procurement, and 

unity of doctrine are equally necessary.

—Gen H. H. “Hap” Arnold (1886–1950), taught to 

fly by the Wright brothers, 1911; first five-star 

General of the Air Force

The spot where we intend to fight must not be made 

known; for then the enemy will have to prepare 

against a possible attack at several different points; 

and his forces being thus distributed in many different directions, the numbers we shall have to face 

at any given point will be proportionately few.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 BC

How many a dispute could have been deflated into 

a single paragraph if the disputants had just dared 

to define their terms.

—Aristotle (384–322 BC), Greek philosopher; 

student of Plato; teacher of Alexander the Great 

The point to understand is what the ultimate objective is, and instead of applying that objective to a 

land war and then organizing joint forces around 

the land war, let’s look at how we can apply military 

power directly to the objective.

—Maj Gen Charles D. “Chuck” Link, commandant, 

Air Command and Staff College, 1989–90; 

commandant, Air War College and vicecommander, Air University, 1990–91

Process is no substitute for careful thought.

—Gen John Shaud, chief of staff, Supreme 

Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, 1990

01-Text.indd 4 8/15/07 
y g 

as warfare based on either a strategy of annihi

tion or of attrition and focused on engaging t

enemy in close combat to achieve a decisive batt

Air and space power, if properly focused, offers o

national leadership alternatives to the annihilati

and attrition options.

—AFDD 1

An effects-based approach should logically tie eve

action taken to objectives at all levels of war a

should consider the imperatives imposed by tho

higher levels, even when planning tactical action

—AFDD 2

In the final analysis, victories are achieved becau

of the effect produced, not simply because of t

effort expended.

—Brig Gen Haywood S. “Possum” Hansell Jr., 

memorandum to Army Air Force chief of staff 

Gen Hap Arnold, 26 July 1944

Defending the United States, of course, has be

the number one priority of the U.S. military sin

the founding of the republic.

—Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, 

7 May 2002

The gravest danger our nation faces lies at t

crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our en

mies have openly declared that they are seeki

weapons of mass destruction, and evidence in

cates they are doing so with determination.

—Pres. George W. Bush, 17 Sept 2002

01-Text.indd 5 8/15/07 
United States against all enemies, foreign and 

domestic.

—Excerpt from oath taken by all Airmen

Always presume that the enemy has dangerous designs and always be forehanded with the remedy. 

But do not let these calculations make you timid.

—Frederick the Great (Frederick II) (1712–86), 

king of Prussia, 1740–86

No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed from the enemy until it is ripe for execution.

—Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, 1521

O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you, 

we learn to be invisible; through you, inaudible; 

and hence, hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 BC

Strategy is the employment of battle to gain the end 

in war; it must therefore give an aim to the whole 

military action, which must be in accordance with 

the object of the war.

—Gen Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), Prussian 

general and military theorist; On War, 1832

It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us 

the freedom of the press.

—Father Dennis Edward O’Brien, sergeant, 

US Marine Corps

01-Text.indd 6 8/15/07 
y 

study them: theory facilitates practice. The lifetim

of one man is not enough to enable him to acqu

perfect knowledge and experience. Theory helps 

supplement it, it provides a youth with prematu

experience and makes him skillful through t

mistakes of others.

—Frederick the Great (Frederick II) (1712–86), 

king of Prussia, 1740–86

Inserting ground forces in a region today may c

ate more problems than it resolves.

—Dr. Richard P. Hallion, 1998; chief AF historia

It is fighting at a great disadvantage to fight tho

who have nothing to lose.

—Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540), 

Storia d’Italia, 1564

01-Text.indd 7 8/15/07 
Patriotism

The Survival and Success of Liberty

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or 

ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, 

meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any 

foe, to assure the survival and success of liberty.

—Pres. John F. Kennedy, inaugural address, 

20 Jan 1961

The person who has nothing for which he is willing 

to fight, nothing which is more important than his 

own personal safety, is a miserable creature and 

has no chance of being free unless made and kept 

so by the exertions of better men than himself.

—John Stuart Mill, 

British philosopher and economist

01-Text.indd 8 8/15/07 
stage by people who do not like what we stand f

and that is, freedom, democracy and the fight again

disease, poverty and terrorism. 

—Madeleine Albright, secretary of state, 1997–200

first woman appointed

We have to build trust in peacetime so that we c

assume it in wartime.

—Maj Gen Gary “Dutch” Dylewski, 

US Air Force, retired

Being a warrior is not an AFSC (Air Force specia

code), . . . it’s a condition of the heart.

—Gen John P. Jumper, 2003; chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 2001–5

An officer’s ultimate commanding loyalty at 

times is to his country, and not to his service or 

his superiors.

—General of the Army George C. Marshall (1880

1959), architect of the Marshall Plan for the 

reconstruction of Europe; Nobel Peace Prize, 19

01-Text.indd 9 8/15/07 
10

Air, Space, and Cyber Power

Offense is the Essence of Air Power

Offense is the essence of air power.

—Gen H. H. “Hap” Arnold (1886–1950), taught to 

fly by the Wright brothers, 1911; first five-star 

General of the Air Force

Space is a realm in which many military operations 

are conducted more efficiently than by terrestrial 

systems.

—Gen Chuck Horner, commander, US and Allied 

Air Forces, Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm

We have learned and must not forget that, from 

now on, air transport is an essential of airpower, in 

fact, of all national power.

—Gen H. H. “Hap” Arnold (1886–1950), taught to 

fly by the Wright brothers, 1911; first five-star 

General of the Air Force

01-Text.indd 10 8/15/07 
11

y y 

principles can rely is that you must be master 

your own air.

—Winston Churchill (1874–1965), 

WWII British prime minister

Air superiority is not the God-given right of Ame

cans. It doesn’t just happen. It takes a lot of peop

working hard to produce the capabilities that p

vide it for US forces.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

Air control can be established by superiority 

numbers, by better employment, by better equ

ment, or by a combination of these factors.

—Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz (1891–1974), first 

chief of staff, US Air Force, Sept 1947–Apr 194

What I hope we’re beginning to understand is a

power’s ability to destroy enemy forces without g

ing the enemy as much to shoot at.

—Maj Gen Charles D. “Chuck” Link, commanda

Air Command and Staff College, 1989–90; 

commandant, Air War College and vicecommander, Air University, 1990–91

Air power is, above all, a psychological weapon

and only short-sighted soldiers, too battle-minde

underrate the importance of psychological facto

in war.

—B. H. Liddell Hart (1895–1970), British militar

historian; captain, Royal Army, WWI 

01-Text.indd 11 8/15/07 
12

gg

—Slobodan Milosevic (1941–2006), overheard 

looking at an Air Force cruise missile at the Air 

Force Museum, 1995; former president of Serbia 

(1989–97) and Yugoslavia (1997–2000)

Once the command of the air is obtained by one of 

the contending armies, the war must become a 

conflict between a seeing host and one that is blind.

—H. G. Wells (1866–1946), English novelist, 

The War in the Air, 1907

There are still those who fail to stand back and reflect on the fact that air assets operate in the one 

medium that surrounds the earth and that touches 

100 percent of the earth’s population, political 

capitals, and centers of commerce. Because of the 

long history of surface warfare and, perhaps, of our 

very existence on land, air power is not an easy 

concept to grasp.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

Aerial forces menace all the territory comprised in 

their radius of action. They can set off from different points and arrive “en masse” on a chosen point. 

They lend themselves to the offensive because they 

leave the adversary, until the last moment, in uncertainty as to their objective.

—Arsene Vauthier, paraphrase of Giulio Douhet

01-Text.indd 12 8/15/07 
13

y y 

by shallow water. It’s not limited by mountains 

mountain passes or rivers, shallow or deep. It’s n

limited even by distance. 

—Gen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 2005–

In-flight refueling converts the tactical fighter in

a strategic, long-range participant. It sustains co

bat air patrols, enables indirect routing, exten

interdiction and strategic penetration depth a

increasingly is an integral component of front-li

strength. 

—Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason, Royal Air Force

Link air and space force together. Under the stra

gic principle that the one who controls outer spa

can control the Earth, superpowers and milita

giants are expanding their strength in outer spa

and the function of [their] air force[s].

—Maj Gen Zheng Shenxia and Senior Col Zhang 

Changzi, People’s Liberation Army Air Force

You could give the same airplanes to two differe

air forces—one of them totalitarian and the oth

one under a democracy, and the democracy’s goi

to win every time because the air war is about fr

dom of choice, it’s about maneuver, and it’s abo

a regime that’s able to entrust a handful of m

with a great deal of power.

—Maj Gen Charles D. “Chuck” Link, commanda

Air Command and Staff College, 1989–90; 

commandant, Air War College and vicecommander, Air University, 1990–91

01-Text.indd 13 8/15/07 
14

are one and indivisible, and should be controlled by 

a single homogeneous force.

—Alexander P. de Seversky, Russian-born 

American aircraft designer; author of 

Victory through Air Power, 1942

Air superiority is not the God-given right of Americans. It doesn’t just happen. It takes a lot of people 

working hard to produce the capabilities that provide it for US forces.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

The Air Force’s real strength no longer is the airplanes. The good old days of two incredibly maneuverable planes dogfighting are over and have been 

overtaken by data links, computers, and satellites.

—Richard L. Aboulafia, aviation analyst, 

Teal Group Corporation, 2005

The lesson from the last war that stands out clearly 

above all others is that if you want to go anywhere 

in modern war, in the air, on the sea, on the land, 

you must have command of the air.

—ADM William F. “Bull” Halsey (1888–1959), 

US Navy Third Fleet commander, WWII; House 

Armed Services Committee Report, Oct 1949

01-Text.indd 14 8/15/07 
15

y

can’t beat an air force with a navy. But you c

beat either of those with an air force. It has to 

with physics.

—Maj Gen Charles D. “Chuck” Link, commanda

Air Command and Staff College, 1989–90; 

commandant, Air War College and vicecommander, Air University, 1990–91

The US Air Force provides the Nation a unique c

pability to project national influence anywhere 

the world on very short notice. Air and space forc

through their inherent speed, range, and flexibili

can respond to national requirements by deliveri

precise military power to create effects where a

when needed.

—AFDD 1

The first principle that should guide air and spa

professionals is the imperative to control the hi

ground. This has been a rule of warfare ever sin

the dawn of time.

—The Honorable Peter B. Teets, undersecretary 

the Air Force, Nov 2002

If you don’t control the air, you’d better not go 

war.

—Gen Chuck Horner, commander, US and Allied 

Air Forces, Operations Desert Shield/Desert 

Storm

01-Text.indd 15 8/15/07 
y 

dominant characteristics. . . . Given centralized 

control of air forces, this flexibility brings with it an 

immense power of concentration which is unequaled 

in any other form of warfare.

—Air Marshal Lord Arthur William Tedder 

(1890–1967), Royal Air Force, 

deputy Supreme Commander, D-day invasion; 

Air Power in War, 1947

Air and space superiority provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack. Success in air, 

land, sea, and space operations depends upon air 

and space superiority.

—AFDD 1

Space power operates differently from other forms 

of military power due to its global perspective, responsiveness, and persistence.

—An Airman’s perspective on space power (AFDD 2-2)

Space is an integral part of everything we do to 

accomplish our mission. Today, the ultimate high 

ground is space.

—Gen Lester P. Lyles, commander, Air Force 

Materiel Command, 2000–2003

The air force has become the hammer of modern 

warfare on land. . . . Aviation gives modern battle a 

third dimension.

—Lt Col Ferdinand Otto Miksche, infantry officer 

and military strategist, writing in 1942

We are not preparing the battlefield, we are destroying it.

—Sign posted in the “Black Hole” planning cell 

during Desert Storm

16

01-Text.indd 16 8/15/07 
17

y

partments, you merely pull it to pieces and destr

its greatest asset—flexibility.

—Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery (1887

1976), WWII British army commander; led Alli

victory over Rommel at el Alamein

It is easier and more effective to destroy the enem

aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs 

the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the a

—Giulio Douhet (1869–1930), Italian airpower 

theorist and contemporary of Billy Mitchell; 

advocated the theory of strategic bombing in 

Command of the Air, 1921

Space superiority is as much about protecting o

space assets as it is about preparing to counter 

enemy’s space or anti-space assets.

—Gen John P. Jumper, 2003; chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 2001–5

The proverbial first shot of space warfare has 

ready been fired with the advent of jammers d

signed to defeat the capabilities our airmen der

from space.

—The Honorable James G. Roche, former 

secretary of the Air Force, 2001–5

The future battle on the ground will be preceded 

battle in the air. This will determine which of t

contestants has to suffer operational and tacti

disadvantages and be forced throughout the bat

into adopting compromise solutions.

—Gen Erwin Rommel, Germany’s leading panze

commander, WWII

01-Text.indd 17 8/15/07 
18

—Gen William W. Momyer, commander, 

Tactical Air Command,1958–61; 

Airpower in Three Wars

Air power is the total aviation activity—civilian and 

military, commercial and private, potential as well 

as existing.

—Gen H. H. “Hap” Arnold (1886–1950), taught to 

fly by the Wright brothers, 1911; first five-star 

General of the Air Force

To fully exploit Air Force technological advances 

and operational capabilities, we must merge air, 

space, intelligence and information operations into 

a seamless capability.

—Gen Hal Hornburg, commander, 

Air Combat Command, 2001–5

The very flexibility of air forces makes true cooperation essential. Air forces, at short notice, can be 

switched from one sort of target to another and, 

within limits, from one type of operation to a quite 

different type. There is, therefore, a constant temptation to use them piecemeal to meet an immediate 

requirement, rather than to use them on a longterm joint plan.

—Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor, 

chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, 1950–52

Without a reasonable degree of air superiority, no 

air force can effectively assist land or sea forces or 

strike at the enemy’s war potential.

—Air Marshal Lord Arthur William Tedder 

(1890–1967), Royal Air Force, 

deputy Supreme Commander, D-day invasion; 

Air Power in War, 1947

01-Text.indd 18 8/15/07 
19

event. You either win it or you get your ass kicke

When you get your ass kicked in the air, yo

people are getting their ass kicked on the ground

—Maj Gen Charles D. “Chuck” Link, commanda

Air Command and Staff College, 1989–90; 

commandant, Air War College and vicecommander, Air University, 1990–91

We don’t need to occupy an enemy’s country to de­f

his strategy. We can reduce his combat capa­bilit

and in many instances defeat his armed forc

from the air.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

The successful prosecution of parallel war requir

more than compressing sequential attacks into o

simultaneous attack. Parallel war exploits thr

dimensions—time, space, and levels of war.

—Maj Gen David A. Deptula, Effects-based 

Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare

Teamwork allows us to be an effective fighti

force—a rapid expeditionary force capable of d

ploying anywhere in the world in a minimum 

time and in austere conditions—not operating fro

where we are stationed, but from where we a

needed, not when we can, but when we must.

—Gen Michael Ryan, chief of staff, US Air Force

1997–2001

01-Text.indd 19 8/15/07 
20

g 

organization working as a team with but one purpose in mind . . . to make certain of the destruction 

of the selected target at exactly the right time and 

place.

—Air Force Manual 51-44, Fighter and FighterBomber Employment in Tactical Air Operations, 1953

Space Superiority has to roll off the tongue as easily 

as Air Superiority.

—Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff, US Air Force, 

2001–5

01-Text.indd 20 8/15/07 
21

Doctrine

At the Very Heart of 

Warfare Lies Doctrine

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It rep

sents the central beliefs for waging war in order 

achieve victory.

—Gen Curtis E. LeMay, commander, Strategic A

Command, 1949–57; chief of staff, US Air Forc

1961–65

If we should have to fight, we should be prepared 

do so from the neck up instead of from the ne

down. 

—Gen Jimmy Doolittle (1896–1993), leader of th

“Doolittle Raid” on Japan, 18 Apr 1942

01-Text.indd 21 8/15/07 
22

man learns from the experience of others.

—Confucius, Chinese philosopher (551–479 BC)

I have flown in just about everything, with all kinds 

of pilots in all parts of the world—British, French, 

Pakistani, Iranian, Japanese, Chinese—and there 

wasn’t a dime’s worth of difference between any of 

them except for one unchanging, certain fact: the 

best, most skillful pilot had the most experience.

—Brig Gen Charles E. “Chuck” Yeager, 

US Air Force; broke sound barrier, 14 Oct 1947

We must not allow centralized control/decentralized execution to devolve to centralized control/

centralized execution. That construct breeds excessive cautiousness at all levels, stifles initiative, and 

it is instructive to remember that it was the Soviet 

command model.

—Lt Gen David A. Deptula, 2001, principal air 

planner, Operation Desert Storm, 1991

Those who are possessed of a definitive body of 

doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions upon it 

will be in a much better position to deal with the 

shifts and surprises of daily affairs than those who 

are merely taking short views, and indulging their 

natural impulses as they are evoked by what they 

read from day to day.

—Winston Churchill (1874–1965), 

WWII British prime minister

If you think education is expensive, try ignorance.

—Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, 

1971–91

01-Text.indd 22 8/15/07 
23

y y

doctrine is always wrong. The side that wins is t

one whose doctrine is the least wrong and the o

that has a system . . . flexible enough to adapt 

doctrine once combat reveals [its] flaws.

—Dr. David R. Mets, professor emeritus, 

Air University School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies

The success of our Air Force in meeting the ch

lenges of this rapidly changing world depends 

our understanding and applying our doctrine.

—Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff, US Air For

2001–5

Doctrine consists of the fundamental principles 

which military forces guide their actions in supp

of national objectives.

—AFDD 1

01-Text.indd 23 8/15/07 
24

Education, Training, and 

Lessons Learned

Leaders Are Not Born; 

They’re Educated

I’m firmly convinced that leaders are not born; 

they’re educated, trained, and made, as in every 

other profession. 

—Gen Curtis E. LeMay, commander, Strategic Air 

Command, 1949–57; chief of staff, US Air Force, 

1961–65

Any officer who aspires to hold high command in 

war must understand . . . the use of air power. 

—Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery

01-Text.indd 24 8/15/07 
25

gg gg

always done it this way.

—RADM Grace Murray Hopper “Grand Lady of 

Software,” pioneer computer programmer and 

co-inventor of COBOL (common-businessoriented language); compiler inventor; special 

advisor to commander, Naval Data Automation 

Command, 1977–86 (when she involuntarily 

retired at age 80)

In no other professions are the penalties for e

ploying untrained personnel so appalling or irrev

cable as in the military.

—General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (1880

1964), chief of staff, US Army; Supreme Allied 

Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, WWII; 

received the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay

Sept 1945

War is not an affair of chance. A great deal 

knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary 

conduct it well.

—Frederick the Great (Frederick II) (1712–86), 

king of Prussia, 1740–86

In sum the leader has to achieve a balance betwe

the essential need for professional competence 

his own technical field and that broader und

standing of human problems which can only 

achieved from a wide and largely self-acquir

edu­cation.

—Stephen Wentworth Roskill (1903–82), 

British naval historian

01-Text.indd 25 8/15/07 
26

gg 

Draw upon all advanced and beneficial military 

thinking; make foreign experiences serve . . . [your] 

purposes; and enrich and develop . . . [national] 

military theories.

—Gen Fu Quanyou, chief, People’s Liberation 

Army General Staff

War makes extremely heavy demands on the soldier’s 

strength and nerves. For this reason, make heavy 

demands on your men in peacetime exercises.

—Gen Erwin Rommel, Germany’s leading panzer 

commander, WWII

If you can’t get them to salute when they should 

salute and wear the clothes you tell them to wear, 

how are you going to get them to die for their country?

—GEN George S. Patton “Old Blood and Guts” 

(1885–1945), flamboyant commander of the 

Third Army in WWII

01-Text.indd 26 8/15/07 
27

Preparedness, Security, and 

Force Protection

Prepared for War, Preserving Peace

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectu

means of preserving peace.

—GEN George Washington (1732–1799), 

first US president

01-Text.indd 27 8/15/07 
28

fense and counterattack. This is not just for the 

sake of being prepared. Of equal or greater importance is the fact that the visibility of our preparedness will deter attacks against us.

—Gen Curtis E. LeMay, commander, Strategic Air 

Command, 1949–57; chief of staff, US Air Force, 

1961–65

The great lesson to be learned in the battered towns 

of England and the ruined cities of Germany is that 

the best way to win a war is to prevent it from occurring. That must be the ultimate end to which 

our best efforts are devoted. Prevention of war will 

not come from neglect of strength or lack of foresight or alertness on our part. Those who contemplate evil and aggression find encouragement in 

such neglect. Hitler relied heavily upon it.

—US Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report 

(Europe), 30 Sept 1945

If I see a troop walking across tent city and ask . . . 

what he or she is thinking about, I expect to hear 

an alert answer about security and force protection. Every Airman is a sensor.

—Gen John P. Jumper, 2003; chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 2001–5 

We cannot become confused about the fundamental purpose of our armed forces. That purpose is 

their readiness to fight and win our nation’s wars. 

As we reshape and train our forces, it must be for 

this purpose above all others.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

01-Text.indd 28 8/15/07 
29

y

has provided a high degree of control through t

history of the United States nuclear weapons p

gram. Perhaps one of the biggest dangers fac

from new nuclear powers is a lack of a sophis

cated system to control their nuclear weapons.

—Richard A. Paulsen, The Role of US Nuclear 

Weapons in the Post–Cold War Era

We can’t be the best at building airplanes and su

marines and second or third best at protecting o

men and women.

—GEN John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Join

Chiefs of Staff, Nov 1996

01-Text.indd 29 8/15/07 
30

Planning

Have a Plan for Everything

Have a plan for everything. A plan for practice, a 

plan for the game. A plan for being ahead, and a 

plan for being behind 20–0 at the half, with your 

quarter­back hurt and the phones dead, with it 

raining cats and dogs and no rain gear because the 

equipment man left it at home.

—Coach Paul “Bear” Bryant (1913–83), head 

football coach, University of Alabama (1958–82); 

led Alabama to six national championships

Take time to deliberate, but when the time for action arrives, stop thinking and go on.

—MAJ GEN Andrew Jackson (1767–1845), seventh 

US president; defeated numerically superior British 

forces at the Battle of New Orleans, 8 Jan 1815

Vision without action is a daydream. Action without vision is a nightmare.

—Japanese proverb

01-Text.indd 30 8/15/07 
31

y y

of high intention, sincere effort, intelligent dir

tion, and skillful execution; it represents the w

choice of many alternatives.

—Willa A. Foster, American philosopher

The main thing is to have a plan; if it is not the b

plan, it is at least better than no plan at all.

—Lt Gen Sir John Monash, commander of all 

Australian forces in WWI; knighted on the 

battlefield by King George V (1918), the first to 

be so honored in 200 years

Our intent is not just to paint a picture of the 

ture—interesting though such a picture might be

but to lay out the paths toward the most promisi

capabilities, and to then build this long-range pla

ning focus into the staff on a permanent basis.

—Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, secretary of the Air Forc

1993–97; first woman to lead an entire branch 

the US military in the DOD

A good plan executed now is better than a perf

plan next week.

—GEN George S. Patton “Old Blood and Guts” 

(1885–1945), flamboyant commander of the 

Third Army in WWII

01-Text.indd 31 8/15/07 
32

Leadership and 

Professionalism

A Few Great Captains

When we study the lives of the great captains, and 

not merely their victories and defeats, what do we 

discover? That the mainspring within them was 

originality.

—Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller (1878–1966), British 

military historian and interwar (1918–39) 

advocate of mechanized warfare; ironically, his 

ideas formed the basis for the German concept 

of blitzkrieg

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what 

to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.

—GEN George S. Patton “Old Blood and Guts” 

(1885–1945), flamboyant commander of the 

Third Army in WWII

01-Text.indd 32 8/15/07 
33

y g

difficulties, and campaigns and battles are nothi

but a long series of difficulties to be overcome. T

lack of equipment, the lack of food, the lack of th

or that are only excuses; the real leader displa

his quality in his triumphs over adversity, howev

great it may be.

—General of the Army George C. Marshall (1880

1959); architect of the Marshall Plan for the 

reconstruction of Europe; Nobel Peace Prize, 19

I must have assistants who will solve their ow

problems and tell me later what they have done.

—General of the Army George C. Marshall (1880

1959); architect of the Marshall Plan for the 

reconstruction of Europe; Nobel Peace Prize, 19

There are no “battle management” magic bull

that will substitute for the ability of on-scene co

manders, soldiers, and airmen to make appropria

decisions based on the ebb and flow of events.

—Dr. Richard P. Hallion, 1998; chief AF historia

The staff is simply the servant of the general for

it exists but to further the welfare of the fighti

establishment. Those within it are remiss if th

fail to keep this rule uppermost.

—S. L. A. Marshall (1900–1977), 

US Army WWII historian and author

Leadership means being good at what you do, a

much more. It means building teams, nurturi

and setting the example for others to follow.

—Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, secretary of the Air Forc

1993–97; first woman to lead an entire branch 

the US military in the DOD

01-Text.indd 33 8/15/07 
34

y 

reality.

—Warren Bennis, American scholar and organizational consultant; pioneer in leadership studies

Leadership is the art and science of influencing and 

directing people to accomplish the assigned mission.

—AFDD 1-1

People are the assets that determine our success or 

failure. If you are to be a good leader, you have to cultivate your skills in the arena of personal relations.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

True genius resides in the capacity for the evaluation 

of uncertain, hazardous, and conflicting information.

—Winston Churchill (1874–1965), 

WWII British prime minister

The final test of a leader is that he leaves behind 

him in other men the conviction and will to carry on.

—Walter Lippmann, American writer and political 

commentator; helped President Wilson draft his 

“14 Points” after WWI

01-Text.indd 34 8/15/07 
35

Character and

Leadership Traits

Do Your Duty in All Things

Duty is the sublimest word in our language. 

your duty in all things. You cannot do more. Y

should never do less.

—GEN Robert E. Lee (1807–70), commander of t

Army of Northern Virginia during the Civil Wa

1861–65

Congress can make a general but only communic

tions can make him a commanding general.

—GEN Omar N. Bradley (1893–1981), 

General of the US Army; first chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949

01-Text.indd 35 8/15/07 
36

gy y 

service in a free society. Without integrity, the 

moral pillars of our military strength, public trust, 

and self-respect are lost.

—Gen Charles A. Gabriel (1928–2003), 

chief of staff of the Air Force, 1982–86 

Core values make the military what it is; without 

them, we cannot succeed. 

—Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, secretary of the Air Force, 

1993–97; first woman to lead an entire branch of 

the US military in the DOD

Few orders are best, but they should be followed up 

with care.

—Marshall Maurice de Saxe (1696–1750), 

Marshal of France, later Marshal General of 

France; Mes Reveries, 1757

The power of excellence is overwhelming. It is always in demand and nobody cares about its color.

—Gen Daniel “Chappie” James Jr., commander in 

chief, North American Aerospace Defense 

Command/Aerospace Defense Command, 1975–

77; first African-American AF four-star general

The most important thing I learned is that soldiers 

watch what their leaders do. You can give them 

classes and lecture them forever, but it is your personal example they will follow.

—GEN Colin J. Powell, chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 1989–93; secretary of state, 2001–5 

01-Text.indd 36 8/15/07 
37

yyy 

private life. Never spare yourself and let your troo

see that you don’t in your endurance of fatigue a

privation. Always be tactful and well-mannere

Avoid excessive sharpness or harshness of voi

which usually indicates the man who has sho

comings of his own to hide.

—Gen Erwin Rommel, Germany’s leading panze

commander, WWII

There is no limit to the good you can do if you do

care who gets the credit.

—General of the Army George C. Marshall (1880

1959); architect of the Marshall Plan for the 

reconstruction of Europe; Nobel Peace Prize, 19

If I can’t go back with my self-respect, I won’t 

back at all.

—Capt Theodore Harris, US Air Force, after 14 

months in solitary confinement as a POW, Kor

Rank does not confer privilege or give power. It i

poses responsibility.

—Peter Drucker, Austrian-born American writer 

on management and management theory

It’s important that people know what you stand f

It’s equally important that they know what y

won’t stand for.

—Mary H. Waldrip, American writer

A desk is a dangerous place from which to wat

the world.

—John LeCarre, English writer of espionage nove

The Spy Who Came in from the Cold, 1963

01-Text.indd 37 8/15/07 
y 

mechanic too busy to take care of his tools.

—Spanish proverb

Say what you mean, mean what you say, but don’t 

say it mean.

—Anonymous

Talent is a gift, but character is a choice.

—Gen Sir John C. Maxwell, British WWI 

general who brutally put down the 1916 

“Easter Rising” in Ireland

One commander’s thoughts on relevance: “Don’t 

build me a watch, just tell me what time it is.”

—Anonymous (AFDD 2-5.2)

Power matters. But there can be no absence of 

moral content in American foreign policy, and furthermore, the American people wouldn’t accept 

such an absence.

—Condoleezza Rice, 66th secretary of state, 2005–; 

national security advisor (first woman appointed), 

2001–5

38

01-Text.indd 38 8/15/07 
39

Technology

Our Technical Skill

Air power alone does not guarantee America’s 

curity, but I believe it best exploits the natio

greatest asset—our technical skill.

—Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg (1899–1954), second 

chief of staff, US Air Force, 1948–53 

A recipient of a PGM [precision-guided munitio

does not know or care if the weapon came fro

near or far, or from what kind of platform, or fro

what kind of base.

—Lt Gen David A. Deptula, 2001, principal air 

planner, Operation Desert Storm, 1991

01-Text.indd 39 8/15/07 
40

y g

in the character of war, not upon those who wait to 

adapt themselves after the changes occur.

—Giulio Douhet (1869–1930), Italian airpower 

theorist and contemporary of Billy Mitchell; 

advocated the theory of strategic bombing in 

Command of the Air, 1921

Above all, PGMs [precision-guided munitions] connect political objectives to mili­tary execution with 

much greater reliability than ever before. . . . This 

is not just a change in air power or even in military 

power; it is a fundamental change in warfare.

—Gen Charles G. Boyd, 1991; 

commander, Air University, 1990–92

Until recently, platforms were militarily crucial: the 

newest ship, plane, or tank. Now what the platform 

carries—sensors, munitions, and electronics—

mat­ters more than the platform itself.

—Mortimer B. Zuckerman, 1997; 

editor in chief, US News and World Report

One machine can do the work of 50 ordinary men. 

No machine can do the work of one extra­ordinary 

man. 

—Elbert Hubbard (1856–1915), American essayist 

of “A Message to Garcia”; died when the British 

liner Lusitania was sunk by the German U-boat 

U-20, 7 May 1915

01-Text.indd 40 8/15/07 
41

y

standoff, intercepting any hostile platform early 

its flight is increasingly important. 

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

01-Text.indd 41 8/15/07 
42

Logistics

Logistics Controls All Campaigns

Logistics controls all campaigns and limits many.

—GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969); 

Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in Europe, 

WWII; 34th US president

Order or disorder depends on organization.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 BC

We move on time lines that simply will not work if we 

have to wait for support for our expeditionary forces.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

The essence of flexibility is in the mind of the commander; the substance of flexibility is in logistics.

—RADM Henry E. Eccles, US Navy, WWII; 

writer on naval logistics

01-Text.indd 42 8/15/07 
43

y g

with the smallest number of supporting troops b

to produce the greatest possible fighting power. 

for any given campaign, this aim can only 

achieved by having a hundred men pump fu

drive trucks, and construct railways behind ea

combatant, then 100:1 is the optimum ratio.

—Martin van Creveld, Israeli military historian

It requires more aircraft to transport a light infa

try division than to move the total number of PGM

delivered during the Gulf War. . . . What moves in

a theater—and when—should be determined by 

ability to effectively influence an adversary.

—Lt Gen David A. Deptula, 2001; principal air 

planner, Operation Desert Storm, 1991

My logisticians are a humorless lot. . . . They kn

if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will sla

—Alexander the Great (356–323 BC), 

king of Macedonia and conqueror of most of 

the known world; tutored by Aristotle

Logistics is the bridge between the economy of the n

tion and the tactical operations of its com­bat forces. 

—RADM Henry E. Eccles, US Navy, WWII; 

writer on naval logistics

In my opinion, there is no one single piece of fo

sightedness that helped our war effort more th

the policy that kept our depots intact and operati

on an efficient basis.

—Maj Gen Oliver P. Echols, chief materiel officer 

the Army Air Force in WWII

01-Text.indd 43 8/15/07 
44

must accompany the plane. . . . One of the elements of victory in North Africa was the speed with 

which our aviation engineers constructed airfields 

behind the front lines and pressed the attack.

—Gen H. H. “Hap” Arnold (1886–1950), taught to 

fly by the Wright brothers, 1911; first five-star 

General of the Air Force

Agile combat support creates, sustains, and protects all air and space capabilities to accomplish 

mission objectives across the spectrum of military 

operations.

—Lt Gen William P. Hallin, US Air Force, retired; 

commander, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, 

1992–95

01-Text.indd 44 8/15/07 
45

Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance

What Is on the Other Side of the Hill

The whole art of war consists in getting at what 

on the other side of the hill, or, in other words, 

learning what we do not know from what we do.

—Andrew Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington 

(1769–1852); British army commander who 

defeated Napoléon at Waterloo, 1815

Precision weapons, in short, are only as good as t

intelligence that gov­erns and guides their use.

—Dr. Richard P. Hallion, 1998; chief AF historia

They knew everything about us. There wasn’t an

thing they didn’t know. If we lit a cigarette they cou

see it. God knows what they were dropping on u

all sorts of bombs. We didn’t expect that in­tensit

—“Milos,” a Yugoslavian soldier, quoted by 

Rory Carroll, The Guardian, 1999

01-Text.indd 45 8/15/07 
46

y 

be employed with very high confidence in their outcome creates a demand for corresponding insight 

in the fields of intelligence preparation and operational planning. 

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

Determine his [enemy] dispositions and so ascertain the field of battle. Probe him and learn where 

his strength is abundant and where deficient.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 BC 

What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. 

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 BC

We need to do a better job of human intelligence. 

There are some things that you are just not going to 

see from space. Overhead imagery is very important, but we should not over-emphasize it. They 

[potential adversaries] know how to conceal the imagery, and that won’t give us the complete picture.

—Dr. Stephen Younger, director, Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency; comments concerning 

intelligence support for precision strike 

capabilities, 2004

How can one man say what he should do himself, if 

he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?

—Lt Gen Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, 1838

01-Text.indd 46 8/15/07 
47

yy yy

need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If y

know yourself but not the enemy, for every victo

gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you kn

neither yourself nor your enemy, you will succum

in every battle.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 BC

Think about where you live at home and then thi

of a place 125 miles from that location. If you we

to move out of your driveway and we were orbiti

125 miles away, we would see you move.

—Maj Thomas Grabowski, crewmember, 2006, 

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

01-Text.indd 47 8/15/07 
48

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] enjoy the enor­mous 

advantage over space-based optical sensors of being able to operate under cloud cover. Given their 

special capabilities, UAV sensors can identify an 

object, when sensors on a satellite can only spot it. 

—Martin C. Libicki, 1996, Senior Fellow, 

Institute of National Strategic Studies, 

National Defense University

01-Text.indd 48 8/15/07 
49

Information and

Communications

Warfare of the Informa­tion Age

In an era where, increasingly, military planne

speak of conducting “information warfare” again

an opponent, the connection between intelligen

sensor suitability, targeting, and combat ope

tions is obvious.

—Dr. Richard P. Hallion, 1998; chief AF historia

Information warfare will be the most complex ty

of warfare in the 21st century, and it will deci

who will win and who will lose the war.

—Chang Mengxiong, systems engineer, People’s 

Republic of China; “Weapons of the 21st 

Century,” 1998

01-Text.indd 49 8/15/07 
50

g

understood will be misunderstood.

—Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, 

chief of staff, Prussian army, 1857–87

Hackers routinely attempt to get into US military 

systems. During the Gulf War, hackers from Denmark, Moscow, and Iraq tried to penetrate these 

systems. Our awareness of these attempts does not 

necessarily prove there were no successes of which 

we are unaware.

—Col James W. McLendon, “Information Warfare: 

Impacts and Concerns,” Battlefield of the Future, 

1995

Our sights must not be fixed on the firepower warfare of the industrial age, rather they must be 

trained on the information warfare of the information age. 

—Maj Gen Wang Pufeng, People’s Liberation Army; 

“The Challenge of Information Warfare,” 1995; 

former director, Strategy Department, Academy 

of Military Science, Beijing

Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, 

nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed.

—Abraham Lincoln, 16th US president

Public affairs operations are a force multiplier by 

analyzing and influencing the information environment’s effect on military operations.

—AFDD 2-5.3

01-Text.indd 50 8/15/07 
51

g

terrence by making foreign leaders and audienc

aware of US capabilities and resolve. 

—AFDD 2-5.3

I will tell you that a commander without the prop

C2 assets commands nothing except a desk. Y

must have the ability to communicate with t

forces under your command. You must have t

ability to exchange information with them free

frequently, and on a global basis.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

01-Text.indd 51 8/15/07 
52

Joint Perspectives

War Is Waged in Three Elements

War is waged in three elements but there is no separate land, air, or naval war. Unless all assets in all 

elements are efficiently combined and coordinated 

against a . . . common objective, their maximum 

potential power cannot be realized.

—GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969), 

Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in Europe, 

WWII; 34th US president

The argument has been advanced that the Air Force 

should be concerned with land objectives, and the 

Navy with objectives on and over the water. That 

distinction is to deny the peculiar quality of the air 

medium, the third dimension. The air is indivisible; 

it covers land and sea.

—Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz (1891–1974), first 

chief of staff, US Air Force, Sept 1947–Apr 1948

01-Text.indd 52 8/15/07 
53

the others. There is a set of components that ha

different tools that a combatant commander us

and out of all of this we should have the closest 

relationships because we’ve all walked through fi

together.

—Gen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 2005–

I do not want General McKiernan to have to st

anywhere between Kuwait and Baghdad unless it 

at a local 7-11 for a chili-cheese dog and a che

limeade.

—Lt Gen T. Michael Moseley to the combined air 

operations center staff three days prior to 

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Nothing could be more fatal to successful resu

than to dissipate the air resources into small pack

placed under command of land formation co

manders, with each packet working on its ow

plan. The soldier must not expect or wish to ex

cise direct command over air striking forces.

—Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery

Of all the lessons we learned about tactical air o

erations, perhaps the most important is that the 

commander, his group and squadron com­mande

must have a sincere desire to become part of t

ground team. The Army must, of course, have t

same dedication to reciprocate. This close liais

can come only from close day-to-day contac

especially at command levels.

—Lt Gen Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada (1904–93), 

first commander of Tactical Air Command; 

led IX Fighter Command at D-day, 6 June 194

01-Text.indd 53 8/15/07 
54

which the air-surface relationship is founded.

—Air Force Manual 1-3, Theater Air Operations, 1953

It was not appreciated, and has scarcely been appreciated today, that the fighting power of an army 

is the product and not the sum of the arms composing it.

—Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller (1878–1966), British 

military historian and interwar (1918–39) 

advocate of mechanized warfare; ironically, his 

ideas formed the basis for the German concept 

of blitzkrieg 

The use of military, naval and aerial forces in war 

should be directed toward a single end, to win. To 

attain maximum effectiveness these forces must be 

coordinated and in harmony with one another. The 

three forces should function as ingredients—or factors—of a single product in which the best results 

can be obtained only by a proper apportioning of 

the ingredients used.

—Giulio Douhet (1869–1930), Italian airpower 

theorist and contemporary of Billy Mitchell; 

advocated the theory of strategic bombing in 

Command of the Air, 1921

I want the American soldier to only have to worry 

about mud on his boots, not blood. At the end of 

the day, the American soldier’s best friend is the 

American airman.

—Maj Gen Charles D. “Chuck” Link, commandant, 

Air Command and Staff College, 1989–90; 

commandant, Air War College and vicecommander, Air University, 1990–91

01-Text.indd 54 8/15/07 
55

Coalition Operations

Both of these attributes of air power—relatively l

force vulnerability and high precision—can a

fortify coalition unity, which is itself susceptible 

disruptions as friendly casualties and collate

damage mount.

—Dr. Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman

RAND Corporation; “Kosovo and the Great Airpow

Debate,” International Security, Spring 2000

The construct that produced airpower . . . for t

Vietnam War came from a conscious decision, 

pursuit of cost-effectiveness, to build a force w

capabilities only incrementally better than the [a

versary’s]. Consequently, the US Air Force alo

lost 16 wings of aircraft in those eight years.

—Gen Larry D. Welch, 12th chief of staff, 

US Air Force (1986–90); president, 

Institute for Defense Analysis

01-Text.indd 55 8/15/07 
56

y 

sustaining expeditionary forces. The Air Force must 

continue to harness information technology, rapid 

transportation, and the strengths of both to ensure 

responsive, dependable, precise support.

—AFDD 2-8

It is astonishing how obstinate allies are, how parochially minded, how ridiculously sensitive to prestige and how wrapped up in obsolete political ideas. 

It is equally astonishing how they fail to see how 

broad-minded you are, how clear your picture is, 

how up to date you are and how co-operative and 

big-hearted you are. It is extraordinary.

—Field Marshal Sir William Slim (1891–1970), 

British army officer in WWI and WWII

01-Text.indd 56 8/15/07 
57

Airpower at War

De­structive One-Sided War

The Gulf War [Desert Storm] brought to the fore t

technology, tactics, techniques, and operation

methods on which the Air Force had been worki

since the Vietnam War. . . . That technology help

to win the fastest, lowest casualty, most devast

ingly de­structive one-sided war in recorded histo

Air Force capabilities had come of age.

—Dr. James A. Mowbray, 1995; professor of 

doctrine, strategy and airpower, Air War Colleg

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

01-Text.indd 57 8/15/07 
g

for mass attacks to achieve a high probability of 

success—a reality evidenced with the dramatic increase of their use in the air war over Serbia.

—Lt Gen David A. Deptula, 2001; principal air 

planner, Operation Desert Storm, 1991

It is this beat, this precise rhythmical cadence, 

which determines the success of an airlift. This 

steady rhythm, constant as the jungle drums, became the trademark of the Berlin Airlift, or any airlift I have operated.

—LT GEN William H. Tunner (1906–83), 

commander, “Hump” Airlift, China-Burma-India 

Theater, WWII; commander, Berlin Airlift, 1948–49

One of the great things that people should have 

learned . . . is that there are times when air power—

not backed up by ground troops—can make a difference.

—Amb. Richard Holbrooke,1996; former US 

ambassador, United Nations

There are certain dates in the history of warfare 

that mark real turning points. Now there is a new 

turning point to fix on the calendar: June 3, 1999, 

when the capitulation of President Milosevic proved 

that a war can be won by air power alone. . . . This 

was a victory through air power.

—John Keegan, British military historian, “So the 

Bomber Got Through After All,” London Daily 

Telegraph, 4 June 1999

58

01-Text.indd 58 8/15/07 
59

destroyed by airstrikes when they were still abo

30 miles from their destination. . . . The Iraqi will 

fight was broken outside Baghdad. 

—Colonel Ghassan, Republican Guard, 

Iraqi General Staff

The air war against Iraq turned out to be an eno

mous success. One of the reasons for this trium

was the integration of the various air forces into 

solid fighting force.

—Miron Rezun, professor of political science, 

University of New Brunswick; Saddam Hussei

Gulf Wars, 1992 

Out of 2,400 main battle tanks, 1,865 were d

stroyed by Coalition airpower. This does not inclu

Iraqi tanks destroyed by US Army Aviation.

—Col Viktor Patzalyuk, former Soviet military 

attaché to Baghdad

From 18–28 January 1991 [in support of Operati

Desert Storm’s famous “Left Hook”], nearly 14,0

troops and over 9,300 tons of cargo were move

General Schwarzkopf said of this fast-paced de

onstration of air mobility: “I can’t recall any time 

the annals of military history when this number 

forces has moved over this distance to put the

selves in a position to attack.”

—Air Mobility Command historian

01-Text.indd 59 8/15/07 
60

during Freedom] and OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom], I can tell you that the tankers [Air Refueling 

Aircraft] were the backbone for the joint and combined effort.

—Gen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 2005–, as combined forces 

air component commander

It was the cumulative effect of NATO air power 

that most influenced [Serbian president Slobodan] 

Milosevic’s eventual decision to come to terms. Air 

power made three crucial contributions: (1) the 

bombing created the political climate within Serbia 

conducive to concessions, (2) the bombing, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest on the part 

of Milosevic and his associates to end the conflict, 

and (3) the perception that any future bombing 

would be unconstrained made settlement seem imperative.

—Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict over Kosovo: 

Why Milosevic Decided to Settle when He Did

01-Text.indd 60 8/15/07 
61

Irregular Warfare/

Counterinsurgency

Security No Longer Ends 

at the Base Perimeter

Security no longer ends at the base perimeter. W

must assume responsibility for a much larger tacti

perimeter that will keep the threat away from o

people and equipment.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of staff, 

US Air Force, 1994–97; first Air Force Academy 

graduate selected as chief of staff 

When there is an enemy to fight in open combat . 

many serve, all applaud, and the tide of patriotis

runs high. But when there is a long slow strugg

with no immediate, visible foe, your choice w

seem hard indeed.

—Pres. John F. Kennedy, address to the 

graduating class, US Naval Academy, 7 June 19

01-Text.indd 61 8/15/07 
62

ggg y 

operating in penny packets in extremely inhospitable terrain which made their detection very difficult demonstrated once again the tremendous flexibility and adaptability of air power to new and 

emerging situations. 

—Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, 

fighter pilot, Pakistan air force

[An] essentially untold story [in Operation Iraqi Freedom] is aeromedical evacuation [AE]. Without missing a beat for every patient in our care, we provided 

incredible medical capability on the ground up close 

to the battle, all the way through the AE system, to 

safe and secure hospitals for continued treatment.

—Gen John W. Handy, commander, 

US Transportation Command and Air Mobility 

Command, Airlift Tanker Quarterly, Fall 2003

Special operations forces succeed, in spite of their 

numerical inferiority, when they are able to gain 

relative superiority through the use of a simple 

plan, carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed, 

and purpose.

—William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in 

Special Operations Warfare

We need a greater ability to deal with guerilla forces, 

insurrection, and subversion. . . .We must be ready 

now to deal with any size force, including small externally supported bands of men; and we must 

help train local forces to be equally effective.

—Pres. John F. Kennedy, message to Congress, 

1961

01-Text.indd 62 8/15/07 
63

g

stands to reason that government measures mu

be directed to restoring government authority a

law and order throughout the country, so that co

trol over the population can be regained and 

support won.

—Sir Robert Thompson, architect of the British 

counterinsurgency victory in Malaya—Malayan 

Emergency, 1948–60

01-Text.indd 63 8/15/07 
01-Text.indd 64 8/15/07 
Vantage Points

Perspectives on Airpower 

and the Profession of Arms

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Jeanne K. Shamburger

Copy Editor

Sherry Terrell

Cover Art and Book Design 

Steven C. Garst

Illustrations 

Daniel Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Ann Bailey

Quality Review

Tammi K. Long

Print Preparation

Joan Hickey

Distribution

Diane Clark

02-Back inside cover 3x5 book.in1 1 8/15/07