alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Frieda Canniff, Respondent, v. E. Hatch Wilcox et al., Appellants, and Special Funds Conservation Committee, Respondent. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal by the employer and his carrier from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Board discharging the Special Fund under subdivision 8 of section 15 from liability. On August 30, 1957 claimant, a cleaning woman, sustained a fractured left femur when she fell from a ladder during-the course of her employment. Eventually an award was made for 110% weeks of protracted temporary total disability and for permanent partial disability for a 20% loss of use of the left leg. The propriety of this award is not here disputed, nor was it disputed before the board, nor is the fact that the employer had knowledge of a long standing pre-exiisting condition involving the same leg. The sole question is *676whether there is substantial evidence to uphold the board’s finding that *“*the evidence fails to establish that the pre-existing permanent physical impairment added to the work injury .resulted in a combined permanent disability materially and substantially greater than the injury of August 30, 1957 alone would have caused.” It is sufficient to point out that Dr. vom Saal, the carrier’s own witness, testified specifically that, such was the case. While it may seem inconsistent for1 the board to acknowledge a 20% permanent loss of use and at the same time base its decision on the issue here involved on Dr. vom Saal’s opinion that claimant had returned to *status quo ante*insofar as the use of the leg is concerned, it must be remembered as previously noted that *the*propriety of *the*award rendered is not here before us. On the issue here involved the board was free to adopt Dr. vom Saal’s testimony of a return to the *status quo ante*albeit inconsistent with the award for permanency. Similarly there would be no liability on the part of the Special Fund for the 110% weeks of temporary total disability since subdivision S of section 15 requires specifically that in measuring liability the disability must be of a permanent character. Furthermore the Fund would not be here liable for any portion of the permanent award since liability attaches only after 104 weeks of permanent disability whereas with a 20% loss of use of the limb the applicable period would be. only 57-6/10 weeks. The fact that the total permanent loss of use is 80% is immaterial here since only 20% is subject to an award chargeable to the carrier. Decision affirmed, with costs to the Special Disability Fund. Present — Coon, J. P., Gibson, Herlihv, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ.
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 340 

To amend the Clean Air Act to prohibit stationary sources located in ozone 

nonattainment areas from purchasing nitrogen oxide emission credits 

under the Environmental Protection Agency’s nitrogen oxide trading 

program without the consent of the State in which such source is located, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 25, 2005 

Mr. MORAN of Virginia introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend the Clean Air Act to prohibit stationary sources 

located in ozone nonattainment areas from purchasing 

nitrogen oxide emission credits under the Environmental 

Protection Agency’s nitrogen oxide trading program without the consent of the State in which such source is 

located, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 340 IH 

1 SECTION 1. NOX EMISSION TRADING BY SOURCES IN 

2 OZONE NONATTAINMENT AREAS. 

3 Section 126 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7426) 

4 is amended by adding the following new subsection at the 

5 end thereof: 

6 ‘‘(d) NOX Trading.—No stationary source of oxides 

7 of nitrogen that is located in an ozone nonattainment area 

8 may purchase nitrogen oxide emission credits under any 

9 emissions trading program established by the Environ10 mental Protection Agency or use any other authority pro11 vided by rules promulgated by the Administrator that 

12 would permit emissions of oxides of nitrogen from such 

13 source in excess of emission limits for that air pollutant 

14 otherwise applicable to that source under the State imple15 mentation plan and section 407 of this Act.’’. 

Æ
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-7100

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MARK ALEXIS, a/k/a Al, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (CR-93-64) Submitted: October 12, 2000 Decided: October 20, 2000 Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Mark Alexis, Appellant Pro Se. Laura Marie Everhart, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Mark Alexis seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2000). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and findno reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Alexis , No. CR-93-64 (E.D. Va. July 5, 2000). We deny Alexis’ motions for stay of deportation and for preparation of transcripts at government expense. We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-7229
KEITH EARL GODWIN, Petitioner - Appellant, versusRONALD J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. J. Calvitt Clarke, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-96-865-2) Submitted: April 29, 1998 Decided: May 14, 1998 Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Keith Earl Godwin, Appellant Pro Se. Robert H. Anderson, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court'sopinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Godwin v. Angelone , No. CA-96-865-2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

Weconsent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement (No. 333-132998)on Form S-8 of CommunitySouth Financial Corporation (formerly known asCommunitySouth Bancshares, Inc.) pertaining to the CommunitySouthBancshares, Inc. 2005 Stock Incentive Plan of our report dated February 26,2010, relating to our audits of the consolidated financial statements, whichappear in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of CommunitySouth FinancialCorporation for the year ended December 31, 2009.  Our report dated February 26,2010 relating to the consolidated financial statements includes an emphasisparagraph relating to an uncertainty as to the Company’s ability to continue asa going concern.

 

 
| /s/  Elliott Davis, LLC     |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Greenville,  South Carolina |   |
| February 26,  2010     |   |

 

----
----

| (1)   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: November 8, 2010 |   /s/ John M. Lowber |
|------------------------|---------------------------|
|                   | John M. Lowber            |
|                   | Chief Financial Officer   |
|                   | GCI, Inc.                 |

----
(No. 84-CC-2100

#### Illinois Constructors Corp., Claimant, *v.*The State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Opinion filed April 21, 1987.*

O’Brien, O’Rourke, Hogan & McNulty, for Claimant.

Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Erin O’Connell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

Raucci, J.

This cause coming before the Court on a stipulation for entry of judgment submitted by the parties. This is a breach of contract claim arising out of the construction of the South Waukegan Harbor Project (“the Project”) CDB Project No. 722-010-001.

Claimant was the Phase II contractor. Because the phases were sequential, Claimant could not commence its Phase II work until Phase I was completed.

*149On October 7, 1982, Claimant received authorization from CDB to proceed with Phase II contract work at the project. Claimant could not commence its work until December 6, 1982. The delay occasioned by the tardy completion of Phase I resulted in increased costs to Claimant. Claimant has alleged that it suffered in the amount of $119,000.00 associated with its increased cost of performing its work under the contract.

After extensive review of Claimant’s supporting records by representatives of CDB and following lengthy negotiations between the parties, CDB has stipulated and agreed that Claimant was prevented from proceeding with its work on a timely basis and for purposes of this claim only, admits liability under the complaint.

Because of the time and expense of trial and the vagaries of proof associated with this type of claim, the parties have stipulated and agreed that judgment should be entered in Claimant’s favor in the amount of $90,000.00.

Although this Court is not bound by any stipulation, it is not the practice of this Court to interpose controversy between the parties where none seems to exist. The instant stipulation appears to have been entered into after careful consideration of facts and applicable law by authorized representatives of the parties regarding delay damage claims under State construction contracts. The amount agreed upon seems to have resulted from the give and take associated with arms-length bargaining. This being the case, this Court sees no reason not to honor the stipulation of the parties.

It is hereby ordered that Claimant, Illinois Constructors Corporation, be awarded the sum of $90,000 *150(ninety thousand and no/100 dollars) in full and complete satisfaction of all its claims herein.
Exhibit 4.143




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ARTICLE 1. DEFINITIONS
    
    
    3ARTICLE 2. SECURITIES INVESTMENT AND CONSULTANCY INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT
    
    
    3ARTICLE 3. TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICE FEE
    
    
    4ARTICLE 4. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
    
    
    4ARTICLE 5. CONFIDENTIALITY
    
    
    4ARTICLE 6. GOVERNING LAW AND EVENTS OF DEFAULT
    
    
    4ARTICLE 7. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
    
    
    5ARTICLE 8. EFFECTIVENESS
    
    
    5ARTICLE 9. NO SUBSEQUENT OBLIGATION
    
    
    5ARTICLE 10. TRANSFER LIMITATION
    
    
    5ARTICLE 11. AMENDMENT
    
    
    6ARTICLE 12. COUNTERPARTS
    
    
    6ARTICLE 13. MISCELLANEOUS
    
    
    6EXHIBIT 1 CONTENT OF THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICES
    
    
    7EXHIBIT 2 TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICE FEE
    
    
    8
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11/29/201 0 11:25 FAX 2024935142 FAA + DMS 1001/00 2 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

• I^ARTMENT OF 

\NSP0RTAT10N 

i'.tT OPER/\! IONS 

•^OV 2 ^ A 11- 3 0 

IN THE MATTER OF 

FLIGHTSTAR AIRCRAFT SERVICES, INC. 

FAA DOCKET NO. (not yet assigned) f (?/() C l pt^ l 

(Civil Penalty Action) ' l ^ 

DMS NO. (not yet assigned) ^ 

FAA CASE NO. 2008-GL-05-0045 

Judge not yet assigned 

Agency Response In Opposition to 

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 

Now Comes the Agency in accordance with Section 13,209 of the Rules of Practice in 

FAA Civil Penalty Actions (14 CFR 13.209), and states the following: 

Respondent has alleged that the Agency's Complaint is untimely. In support of that 

allegation the Respondent cites Section 13.208 of the Rules of Practice in FA/^ Civil 

Penalty Actions (14 CFR 13.208), which provides in pertinent part, that absent good 

cause that a complaint in a case where the pertinent act occurred more than 2 years 

prior to the issue of the Notice of proposed civil penalty, may be subject to dismissal. 

As asserted by the Respondent, the pertinent act in question took place on May 6, 

2008. The Agency issued the subject Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty on April 7, 2009, 

11 months and I day later. Eleven months and 1 day is substantially less that the 

allowed 2 year period to file the Notice of Proposed Civil penalty. Respondent's Motion 

is internally deficient. 

The Agency asserts that Respondent's Motion is without merit, and requests that it be 

summarily dismissed. 

For the Agency 

jlenn L. Brown 

Senior Attorney 
11/23/201 0 11;2 5 FAX 2024935142 FAA ^ DMS @l002/002 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the foregoing pleading has been mailed this date by Certified Mail, Return 

Receipt Requested, to: 

Original and One Copy: 

One Copy: 

Hearing Docket 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S. W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk 

AGC-430, Wilber Wright Building 

Suite 2W1000 

Gregory S. Winton, Esq. 

The Aviation Law Firm 

One Research Court, Suite 450 

Rockviiie, MD 20850 

Dated this 19th day of November, 2010. 

Tammy Gardner 

Legal Technician 

FAA Great Lakes 

KUL>0
THE STATE 

of ALASKA 

G 0 \' 1: R :--1 0 R S 1: A N P A R :-.1 E I. L 

June 20, 2014 

Mr. Kevin Schlemmer 

Chief, EAS and Domestic Analysis Division 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE 

Washington DC 20590 

Re: Chatham and Funter Bay, Alaska 

Docket DOT-OST-1997-3134 

Dear Mr. Schlemmer 

Department of Transportation and 

Public Facilities 

DIVISION OF STATEWIDE AVIATION 

P.O. Box 196900 

Anchorage, Alaska 99519-6900 

Main: 907.269.0730 

Fax: 907.269.0489 

This letter is to express support for the continuation of the Essential Air Service (EAS) program in 

Alaska and the crucial connection it brings to our remote communities. 

Due to the isolated location of these communities and the complete lack of any road system connection, 

this subsidized air service is their only form of scheduled transportation. The communities of Chatham 

and Funter Bay depend on scheduled air freight, passenger, and mail service for basic necessities, 

routine medical and health services, and economic welfare. 

The State of Alaska continues to assert that the local residents are generally best positioned to comment 

on particular schedules or air carriers, and therefore we think the community should provide comments 

to you on those specific areas. 

I respectfully urge USDOT to continue the EAS service at Chatham and Funter Bay, Alaska. 

Sincerely 

,:fukn ~10--

Judy Chapman, C.M. 

Division Operations Manager 

"Get Alaska Moving through service and infrastructure. "
§ 23.5 Conditions governing investigations. ( a ) One complete device together with assembly and detail drawings that show its construction and the materials of which the parts are made, shall be submitted preferably at the time the application for test is made. These shall be sent prepaid to: Approval and Certification Center, 765 Technology Drive, Triadelphia, WV 26059.
( b ) After the device has been inspected by MSHA, the applicant will be notified as to the amount of material that he will be required to supply for the tests and of the date on which testing will be started.
( c ) *Observers at formal investigations and demonstrations.* No one shall be present during any part of the formal investigation conducted by MSHA which leads to approval for permissibility except the necessary Government personnel, representatives of the applicant, and such other persons as may be mutually agreed upon by the applicant and MSHA. Upon granting approval for permissibility, MSHA will announce that such approval has been granted to the device and may thereafter conduct, from time to time in its discretion, public demonstrations of the tests conducted on the approved device. Those who attend any part of the investigation, or any public demonstration, shall be present solely as observers; the conduct of the investigation and of any public demonstration shall be controlled by MSHA. Results of chemical analyses of material and all information contained in the drawings, specifications, and instructions shall be deemed confidential and their disclosure will be appropriately safeguarded by MSHA.
( d ) Formal tests will not be made unless the device has been completely developed and is in a form that can be marketed.
( e ) The results of the tests shall be regarded as confidential by all present at the tests and shall not be made public in any way prior to the formal approval of the device by MSHA.
( f ) No verbal report of approval or disapproval will be made to the applicant. After MSHA has considered the results of the inspections and tests, a formal written report of the approval or disapproval will be made to the applicant by MSHA. The applicant shall not advertise his device as being permissible or approved, or as having passed the tests, prior to receipt of the formal notice of approval.
[Sched. 9B, 4 FR 1555, Apr. 11, 1939, as amended by Supp. 1, 20 FR 2975, May 4, 1955; 43 FR 12315, Mar. 24, 1978; 73 FR 52212, Sept. 9, 2008]
Order entered July 1, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00454-CR

EX PARTE WILLIAM THOMAS NICHOLAS, JR.

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 10

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MC15-A0588-L

ORDER

The Court has before it appellant’s June 29, 2015 “Original Writ of Mandamus” in which 

he complains the Dallas County Clerk has violated a ministerial duty by not providing appellant 

with certain documents. He asks that we order the Dallas County Clerk to send him the 

documents he seeks. We will treat this as a motion in the pending appeal rather than a separate 

original proceeding.

On June 25, 2015, this Court ordered the Dallas County Clerk to file a supplemental 

clerk’s record containing the “Court’s Supplemental Order and Findings of Fact and Conclusions 

of Law” that reduces to writing the trial court’s ruling on appellant’s application for writ of 

habeas corpus. We also ordered the Dallas County Clerk to provide written verification that 

copies of the clerk’s record and supplemental clerk’s records were sent to appellant. On June 29, 

2015, we received both the supplemental clerk’s record and the verification that the records have 
been sent to appellant. Accordingly, we DENY appellant’s June 29, 2015 pro se motion to order 

the trial to send appellant the clerk’s record and supplemental clerk’s records.

Appellant’s pro se brief remains due on August 21, 2015.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to the Honorable Roberto Canas, Jr., 

Presiding Judge, County Criminal Court No. 10; John Warren, Dallas County Clerk; and the 

Dallas County District Attorney’s Office.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by first-class mail, to William 

Thomas Nicholas, Jr., TDCJ No. 1680033, Clements Unit, 9601 Spur 591, Amarillo, Texas 

79107-9606.

/s/ ADA BROWN

JUSTICE
### **[CHAPTER 245—REPEALED]**
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

396 

KA 15-01572 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V ORDER

JAMIE ALTMAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

JAMIE ALTMAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE. 

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL),

FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Monroe County Court (Douglas A.

Randall, J.), entered March 2, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed

from, issued superceding orders of protection. 

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed 

(see CPL 450.10; People v Whalen, 49 AD3d 916, lv denied 10 NY3d 940).

Entered: April 29, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### KRUMDIECK et al. v. EBBS.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

November 6, 1903.)

1. Landlord and Tenant—Surrender and Acceptance.

Where the lessee of a building surrendered the keys to the lessor’s janitor, who gave them to the lessor nearly a month before the lessee was to begin the payment of rent, and the lessor leased the premises to another party 15 days before that time, there was a surrender and acceptance, relieving the lessee of liability for rent.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of the Bronx.

Action by William G. Krumdieck and another against Coleman Ebbs. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and BISCHOFF and BLANCHARD, JJ.

*526M. Kamber, for appellant.

J. H. Hildreth, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This action was brought to recover for rent of a store for the month of February, 1903, under a verbal lease from month to month. Defendant pleaded a surrender and acceptance. Plaintiffs had a judgment, and the defendant appeals.

The proof on the part of the defendant clearly establishes the following facts: The defendant removed all his property from the premises in-January, and surrendered the keys to the plaintiffs’ janitor, who gave them to the plaintiffs about February 3, 1903. Prior to February 1st plaintiffs had put a notice “To Let” in the store window. They entered into negotiations with other parties for the leasing of the premises, and allowed those parties to enter upon the premises upon February 15, 1903, although the lessees were not to begin payment of rent until March 1, 1903. Under this state of facts, we think the defendant made out a clear case of surrender and acceptance, and plaintiffs cannot recover. Sherman v. Engel, 18 Misc. Rep. 484, 41 N. Y. Supp. 959.

Judgment reversed. New trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
#### STRESI, Respondent, v. BREIDMYER, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellant Division, First Department.

February 6, 1903.)

Action by Mary E. Stresi against John Breidmyer. E.. W. S. Johnston, for appellant. J. Murphy, for respondent.

No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.
#### § 1210.20 What if I disagree with the burden hour estimates?

Burden hour estimates are included on the ONRR Web site at *http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/FRNotices/FRInfColl.htm-.* Send comments on the accuracy of these burden estimates or suggestions on reducing the burden to the Office of Natural Resources Revenue, Attention: Rules & Regs Team. 1012-XXXX P.O. Box 25165, Denver, CO 80225-0165. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

[73 FR 15892, Mar. 26, 2008, as amended at 74 FR 46907, Sept. 14, 2009; 76 FR 76615, Dec. 8, 2011]