A Masterpiece of 

Counterguerrilla Warfare:

BG J. Franklin Bell in the 

Philippines, 1901–1902

Robert D. Ramsey III

The Long War Series

Occasional Paper 25

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

OP 25
Robert D. Ramsey III

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

OP 25

A Masterpiece of 

Counterguerrilla Warfare:

BG J. Franklin Bell in the 

Philippines, 1901–1902
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ramsey, Robert D., 1946-

 A masterpiece of counterguerrilla warfare : BG J. Franklin Bell in the 

Philippines, 1901-1902 / by Robert D. Ramsey III.

 p. cm. -- (Long war series occasional paper ; 25) 1. Bell, James Franklin, 

1856-1919 2. Counterinsurgency. 3. Counterinsurgency--United States--

History--19th century. 4. Philippines--History--Philippine American War, 

1899-1902. I. Bell, James Franklin, 1856-1919 Telegraphic circulars. II. Lieber, 

Francis, 1800-1872. Instructions for the government of armies of the United 

States in the field. III. Title. IV. Title: J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-

1902. V. Series.

 U241.R36 2007

 959.9’031--dc22

 2007042624

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history 

topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication 

are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. A 

full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available 

for downloading, can be found at http://usacac.army.mil/

CAC/csi/RandP/CSIpubs.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this 

document as an official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use the CSI 

official seal on any republication of this material without the expressed written 

permission of the Director of CSI.

This is the Official US Government edition of 

this publication and is herein identified to certify 

its authenticity. Use of the 978-0-16-079503-9 

ISBN prefix is for US Government Printing Office 

Official Editions only. The Superintendent of 

Documents of the US Government Printing Office 

requests that any reprinted edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the authentic 

work with a new ISBN.

F ro as le t yb eh S epu ri tn e edn tn fo D co mu e tn S.U ,s G . evo r emn tn P ri itn O gn ffice I tn er en t: tskoob ro e P vog.opg. enoh : lot l f ree ( )668 -215 ;0081 D C a re ( a )202 -215 0081

Fa :x ( )202 -215 aM 4012 il: I potS DCC W , ihsa tgn no D , C -20402 1000

ISBN 978-0-16-079503-9
iii

Foreword

Combat Studies Institute (CSI) presents Long War Series Occasional 

Paper (OP) 25, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin 

Bell in the Philippines, 1901–1902, by Robert Ramsey. OP 25 is a companion to OP 24, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the 

Philippines, 1900–1902. In OP 24 Ramsey analyzed case studies from two 

different Philippine military districts discovering several themes relevant 

to today’s ongoing operations in the Long War. In OP 25 he focuses on the 

philosophy that guided Bell in the conduct of one of those campaigns.

Over the ages military historians have employed many types of 

research and writing to understand, and ultimately learn from, the past. 

These methods range from studies of grand strategy to studies of small 

unit tactics to, most recently, studies of the history of war and society. 

OP 25 takes a different approach, one whose origins are old and rather 

infrequently practiced today. This technique examines the inner thinking 

of a commander in an attempt to understand how he viewed the operation 

he was conducting. In reading Bell’s words today, it becomes clear he displayed at least two of the key attributes that constitute Clausewitz’s concept of military genius—the inner light or vision that points a commander 

toward victory in the fog of war and the determination to act decisively in 

the face of danger.

Mr. Ramsey, in his introduction, makes note of British Field Marshal 

Sir Archibald P. Wavell’s endorsement of this kind of history: “The real 

way to get value out of the study of military history is to take particular 

situations, and as far as possible get inside the skin of the man who made a 

decision, realize the conditions in which the decision was made, and then 

see in what way you could have improved upon it.” This quote captures 

the intent of this study.

The collected messages and circulars issued by Bell to his subordinate 

commanders, and the text of the US Army’s famous General Orders 100 

from which he drew that guidance, provide the means to accomplish what 

Clausewitz and Wavell urged us to do. We believe this Occasional Paper 

will be a valuable addition to the education of all military professionals. 

CSI—The Past Is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Contents

Page

Foreword ................................................................................................iii

Introduction .............................................................................................1

Map of Tagalog region ......................................................................6

Section I. Bell’s Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders..................21

Section II. General Orders 100 ........................................................... 117

About the Author .................................................................................143



Introduction

The contrast between the campaigns of Generals Bell and 

Smith was striking in almost every important element. 

Bell’s operation, unlike Smith’s, was a credit to the 

American Army in the Philippines and a masterpiece of 

counter-guerrilla warfare.

John M. Gates (1973)1

Both Smith and Bell waged particularly ruthless 

campaigns of concentration and mass destruction. . . . 

Of the two campaigns, Bell’s was better organized and 

quickly won acclaim throughout the Army as a model 

counterinsurgency operation.

Andrew J. Birtle (1998)2

Indeed, one of the few things both MacArthur and Taft 

agreed on was that Bell was the most outstanding general 

in the archipelago. . . . In a series of field and telegraphic 

orders and in a . . . speech to his top subordinates Bell 

outlined the most coherent and well-organized pacification 

campaign of the war.

Brian M. Linn (2000)3

During research for the Long War Series Occasional Paper 24, Savage 

Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippine, 1900–

1902, a copy of Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders, Regulating 

Campaign Against Insurgents and Proclamations and Circular Letters, 

Relating to Reconstruction after Close of War in the Provinces of Batangas, 

Laguna, and Mindoro, Philippine Islands (hereafter Telegraphic Circulars 

and General Orders) issued by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell was 

located in the archives of the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. Commenting on the reluctance of the US Army to 

address its experiences in the Philippine Insurrection,4

 a historian from the 

Center of Military History noted:

One of the most serious casualties in this process was the 

Telegraphic Circulars, a compilation of the orders that 

General Bell had issued during the final Batangas campaign. The pamphlet was a gem reminiscent of Crook’s 

Resume of Operations Against Apache Indians, in that it 

contained not only Bell’s orders, but also a discussion of 
his counterinsurgency philosophy. Although the pamphlet 

was inserted into the record by a congressional committee 

investigating the war, the Army itself did not distribute it 

beyond the archipelago, allegedly because of the sensitivity of the subject matter.5

To address this shortcoming, the Combat Studies Institute Press decided 

to reprint Bell’s Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders along with 

General Orders 100, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 

United States in the Field.” Although written over a hundred years ago, 

these documents provide insights for today’s military professionals into 

how an experienced brigade commander successfully tackled a difficult 

counterguerrilla situation.

Brigadier General James Franklin Bell

J. Franklin Bell, “probably the finest Army commander in the Philippine 

War,”6

 served continuously in the Philippines from 1898 to 1902. Born in 

Kentucky in 1856, Bell became a cavalry second lieutenant on graduation 

from the US Military Academy in 1878. Posted to the 7th Cavalry after 

the Little Big Horn disaster, Bell served in various regimental assignments 

for almost 20 years. From 1886 to 1889, he was the Professor of Military 

Science and Tactics at Southern Illinois University. While there, he studied 

law and was admitted to the bar. Assigned to the 7th Cavalry at the end 

of 1890, Bell was promoted to first lieutenant. He served as aide to the 

commander of the Department of California from 1894 to 1897 before 

returning to regimental duty at Fort Apache, Arizona, in 1897. At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Bell became a major of volunteers 

and the engineer officer for the Philippine-bound VIII Corps forming in 

San Francisco.7

Bell, one of the first American soldiers to arrive in the Philippines, 

served as the VIII Corps chief of military information or intelligence officer. In 1898, he earned a reputation for daring and competence during personal reconnaissances of the Spanish defenses of Manila. In addition, Bell 

worked with many leaders of the Philippine resistance at Manila. When 

the Philippine Insurrection broke out in early 1899, Bell, assigned as the 

engineer of the 2d Division, aggressively led numerous reconnaissance 

operations during the spring campaign north of Manila. Time after time 

Bell found weaknesses in the insurrecto defensive positions and exploited 

them to the benefit of the American forces. In March, still serving as a 

major of volunteers, Bell was promoted to Regular Army captain in the 

7th Cavalry after over 20 years of service. In the summer of 1899, Bell 
became a colonel of volunteers. He raised, trained, and commanded the 

36th US Volunteer (USV) Infantry Regiment, one of two infantry regiments created in the Philippines from discharged veterans of the departing state volunteer regiments. A subordinate who served in the 36th USV 

Infantry and who retired as a major general after World War I wrote, “In all 

my service since, I have never known an officer who was held in such high 

regard by the officers and men of his command as was Colonel Bell.”8

 He 

credited the 36th USV Infantry’s accomplishments during the fall 1899 

campaign to Bell’s

. . . uncanny ability . . . to value correctly the powers and 

limitations of the enemy, and to the professional knowledge and courage to take advantage of his weaknesses. 

The Colonel organized, equipped, and trained the 36th 

Infantry for the character of service it was to be called to 

perform. But behind it all was the Colonel’s exceptionally 

able leadership of men in war. The officers and men loved 

him personally. They had almost divine confidence in his 

military judgment and decisions. They whole-heartedly 

did whatever he suggested without a doubt of its correctness. Accompanying this he had the ability to convey to 

the officers and men his views and policies, instruction, 

and directions in a quickly understandable manner.9

Bell earned the Medal of Honor leading an attack near the town of Proac 

in September 1899. With the dispersal of the insurrecto army in November 

and the end of combat operations, the 36th USV Infantry occupied 

Pangasinan province.

In December Bell was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers and 

assigned command of the 4th Brigade of the 2d Division, which was reorganized in early 1900 as a district under the Department of Northern Luzon. 

As district commander Bell noted that in addition to the routine tasks of 

taking care of soldiers, gathering intelligence on activities throughout the 

district, and establishing security by pursuing insurrectos or bandits, his 

duties included: 

. . . apprehension, collection of evidence, trial, 

disposition, and imprisonment of criminals; the reestablishment of civil government, of schools, mail, 

and telegraphic communications; the re-construction of 

roads and bridges; the collection of revenue taxes and 

insular statistics; supervising the affairs of provincial 
and municipal governments; the investigation of claims 

of all descriptions; and the discharge of all other duties 

heretofore performed by civil officials.10

Bell, and many American commanders, found that pacification and occupation duties in the midst of an alien and unfriendly population proved “far 

more onerous . . . than they were when the insurrection was in its greatest 

activity.”11

By mid-1900, Bell found himself assigned as the Provost Marshal 

General in Manila, responsible for security within the city. In that position, 

just as during the siege and battle for Manila in 1898, Bell worked closely 

with the Filipinos. In December 1900, Major General Arthur MacArthur, 

the Philippine Division commander, instituted martial law throughout the 

Philippines under provisions of General Orders 10012 and began a harsher, 

less benevolent pacification campaign.13

 At that time, Bell addressed his 

officers in Manila that he had often heard the opinion “that no good had 

been accomplished”14

 by the previous benevolent pacification policy but 

that

I cannot concur in that opinion, for I feel convinced that 

this policy has had a good effect. Had we been building 

for a day only or solely in order to put an end to hostilities, 

a different policy might have been indicated, but . . . we 

have got to continue to live among these people. We have 

got to govern them. Government by force alone cannot be 

satisfactory to Americans. It is desirable that a Government 

be established in time which is based upon the will of the 

governed. This can be accomplished satisfactorily only by 

obtaining and retaining the good will of the people. . . . 

Our policy heretofore was calculated to prevent the birth 

of undying resentment and hatred. This policy has earned 

for us the respect and approval of a large majority of the 

more intelligent and influential portion of the community. 

We cannot lose their support by now adopting measures 

as may be necessary to suppress the irreconcilable and 

disorderly.15

Bell described the new policy to his officers as not one of “harsh and indiscriminate persecution,” but one of “considerate firmness” directed against 

those Filipinos who opposed American pacification.16

In February 1901, Bell became the youngest brigadier general in the 

US Army when promoted directly from Regular Army captain to Regular 

Army brigadier general. At the same time, he was assigned to command 
ongoing operations in the First District, Department of Northern Luzon, 

located in the Ilocano region of northwest Luzon. Bell continued his predecessor’s pressure against the insurrecto infrastructure in the towns and 

against the guerrilla bands in the countryside. Resistance ended there on 

1 May.17 Reflecting the attitude of the time, Bell reported that Filipinos 

. . . are the most skillful dissimulators on earth, and many 

of our officers, fresh from the States, had the wool so 

completely pulled over their eyes as to be incompetent to 

cope with these able deceivers. They have a great many 

good qualities but a wonderful lot of customs and habits 

which must be trained out of them before we should ever 

be able to make a creditable people of them.18

Despite this general view of Filipinos, Bell’s primary role in the Ilocos 

campaign has been described as being “willing and able to escalate the war 

to a level that the revolutionary leaders found intolerable and, once they 

surrendered . . . to reconcile them to American rule.”19

 Bell remained in 

command of First District until November 1901.

Bell’s Counterguerrilla Campaign in Southwestern Luzon, 

1901–1902

On 28 September 1901 at Balangiga on the island of Samar, 

insurrectos commanded by Vincene Lukban attacked and destroyed the 

74-man American military garrison resulting in 44 killed, 22 wounded, 

4 missing, and 4 uninjured. The Governor of the Philippines, William H. 

Taft, and the Philippine Division commander, Major General Adna R. 

Chaffee, responded to the “Balangiga massacre” with military operations 

designed to end insurrecto resistance on Samar and Luzon once and for all. 

To conduct these operations, Chaffee chose two of his most experienced, 

capable, and proven commanders: Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith to 

destroy Lukban’s insurrectos on Samar and Bell to end the resistance of 

Miguel Malvar and his subordinate Pedro Caballes in the Tagalog region 

of southwestern Luzon to include the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and 

portions of Tayabas (see map). Both Smith and Bell employed similar 

methods, but in different manners. Both were successful in ending 

insurrecto resistance in their areas of operations. “Hell-Roaring Jake” 

Smith’s campaign on Samar generated criticism that led to a Congressional 

inquiry and to courts-martial. In contrast, Bell’s campaign—described 

by historians as “a masterpiece of counter-guerrilla warfare,” “a model 

counterinsurgency operation,” and “the most coherent and well-organized 

pacification” conducted in the Philippines—was praised by both civilian 

and military leaders.
Bell’s new assignment was fraught with difficulties. A member of the 

Philippine Commission noted that Bell indicated he

. . . was under specific orders, which while they seem 

necessary, do not furnish him an especially agreeable 

task. . . . [He] is sent to Batangas to make peace, and he 

proposes to do so even if the peace which he establishes 

must be the peace of desolation. He seemed to be in a 

somewhat reflective and subdued frame of mind in the 

presence of an undertaking which might bring destruction 

to a once rich province and great suffering to a large body 

of people. While the task is not of his choosing, it is clear 

that although he may expect to be vilified and have to bear 

the responsibility of action in many cases which he cannot 

control, still he seemed to have a deep determination to 

carry out his orders and to end rebellion in Batangas.20

Despite his misgivings, Bell was determined to accomplish his assigned 

mission in the 3d Separate Brigade area of operations as quickly and as 

completely as possible.

N

Manila

San Pablo

Tiasan

CAVITE

Maricaban

Island

Batangas

Bay

South

China

Sea

Alaat

Island

Balayan

Bay Tayabas

Bay

Manila

Bay

Lamon

Bay

LAGUNA

TAYABAS

Santa Cruz

Scale

0 10

miles

Lobo

Batangas

Taal Tiaong

Santo Tomas

Balayan

Paete

Lake

Taal

Bauan

Tayabas

Mabitac

Calamba

Cavite

Mt. Banahao/

Mt. San Cristobal

San Juan

de Bocboc

Tanauan

Mt. Lobo

Mt. Maquiling

Laguna

Bay

BATANGAS

Lipa

Map of Tagalog region.
With 3-years’ experience in the Philippines, Bell understood that 

what worked in one region did not always work in another. Initially, he 

gathered information to understand the specific problem in his brigade 

area. Bell spent his first week interviewing “every prominent Filipino 

within my reach who had the reputation of really desiring peace” and 

concluded “that the only way that I could possibly succeed in putting an 

end to insurrection within the territorial limits of the brigade would be 

by cutting off the income and food of the insurgents, and by crowding 

them so persistently with operations as to wear them out.”21

 At the port of 

Batangas on 1 December, Bell met with his officers to explain what he had 

learned from his experience in the Philippines, what his initial assessment 

of the problem in the brigade area of operations was, and what he intended 

to do under martial law in accordance with General Orders 100.22

Bell’s basic concept of operations was to separate the population from 

the guerrilla units through a series of measures designed to concentrate 

the population in protected zones near the major towns and to attack the 

insurrecto infrastructure in the towns during December. This was to be 

followed on 1 January 1902 by increased combat operations to maintain 

pressure on the guerrilla bands. On 6 December, Bell issued the first of 

38 telegraphic circulars to his post commanders that set the conditions 

for success against both the insurrecto infrastructure in the towns and 

guerrillas in the field. During December, Bell issued 24 of his telegraphic 

circulars before increased combat activity commenced. The range of 

activities and the specific instructions the telegraphic circulars provided 

to his post commanders showed Bell’s grasp of how he intended to attack 

both the insurrecto infrastructure and the guerrilla bands. The circulars 

demonstrated his method of ensuring both his subordinates and the local 

populace understood these instructions, their legal basis in General Orders 

100, and his expectations of compliance. Unlike Smith’s operations on 

Samar, Bell’s campaign “was highly organized . . . [he] maintained control 

of the overall direction of operations at all times. Determined that the 

Filipinos should not misunderstand the American policy, he impressed 

upon his officers the importance of warning the people before instituting 

any repressive measures.”23

On 26 December 1901, Bell provided his immediate superior, Major 

General Loyd Wheaton, an update on the status of his preparations. In his 

lengthy telegram, Bell also provided his concept for the counterguerrilla 

operations that were to commence on 1 January 1902.
Batangas, December 26, 1901—11 a.m.

General Wheaton, Manila:

Your message requiring my opinion as to the benefit 

of peace negotiations by Manila and other conspirators 

in suppression of insurrection in Batangas is received. 

Respectfully report that I have become convinced that 

within two months at the outside there will be no more 

insurrection in this brigade, and nothing for conspirators 

to negotiate about. We may not have secured all the guns 

or caught all the insurgents by that time, and the present insurrection will end and the men and the guns will 

be secured in time. My only fear is that they will bury 

their guns and scatter, sneaking away individually into 

other provinces to await a more favorable temperature at 

home, or they may march with their guns northward into 

Morong, Bulacan, or Nueva Ecija [provinces], or southeastward into General Grant’s brigade. I am practically 

sure they can not remain here in Batangas, Laguna, and 

a part of Tayabas. The people are now assembled in the 

towns, with all the visible food supply, except that cached 

by insurgents in mountains. For the next six days all station commanders will be employed hunting insurgents 

and their hidden food supplies within their respective 

jurisdictions. Population of each town will be turned out, 

and all transportation that can be found impressed to bring 

into Government storehouses all food that is found, if it 

be possible to transport it. If not, it will be destroyed.

I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2,500 men, 

who will be used in columns of about 50 men each. I 

expect to accompany this command. Of course no such 

strength is necessary to cope with all the insurgents in 

the Philippine Islands, but the country is indescribably 

rough and badly cut up, the ravines and mountains. I 

take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly 

searching each ravine, valley, and mountain peak for 

insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy everything 

I find outside of towns, all able-bodied men will be killed 

or captured. Old men, women, and children will be sent 

to towns. This movement begins January 1, by which time 

I hope to have nearly all the food supply in the towns. If 
insurgents hide their guns and come into the towns it will 

be to my advantage, for I shall put such a pressure on 

town officials and police that they will be compelled to 

identify insurgents. If I catch these I shall get their guns in 

time. I expect to first clean out the wide Loboo peninsula 

south of Batangas, Tiasan, and San Juan de Boc Boc road. 

I shall then move command to the vicinity of Lake Taal 

and sweep the country westward to the ocean and south of 

Cavite; returning through Lipa, I shall scour and clean up 

the Lipa Mountains; swinging northward, the country in 

the vicinity of San Pablo, Alaminos, Tanauan, and Santo 

Tomas will be scoured, ending at Mount Maquiling, which 

will then be thoroughly searched and devastated. This is 

said to be the home of Malvar and his parents.

Swinging back to the right, the same treatment will be 

given all the country of which Mount Cristobal and Mount 

Banahao are the main peaks. These two mountains, Mount 

Maquiling, and the mountains northeast of Loboo are the 

main haunts of the insurgents. After the 1st of January no 

one will be permitted to move about without pass. I shall 

keep the country full of scouting detachments and give 

insurgents no peace. I feel morally certain that they can 

not stand the strain and the lack of food that will ensue 

for two months. The ten companies of the Ninth Cavalry 

would be most valuable in these operations. If this does 

not bring about a surrender we will get the guns and insurgents also little by little. We have several towns on our 

side begging for mercy and organizing in opposition to 

insurgents. They have formed volunteer companies to 

control their towns and have notified insurgents that they 

must surrender or the people themselves intend to join the 

Americans in their operations.

The insurgent army in this province was made of town 

contingents, each town being supplied with so many guns 

and being required to maintain so many soldiers. All the 

guns, except about a dozen formerly pertaining to the town 

of Bauan, have already been captured by Captain Hartman, 

mainly through the efforts of the townspeople themselves. 

This was the first town on which Captain Boughton laid 

his heavy hand as brigade provost-marshal and provost 
10

court. We expect to have every town in these provinces in 

the same attitude shortly. As for peace commissioners, if 

Sixto Lopez or any other man of equal influence could be 

trusted to work honestly and sincerely, there is no doubt but 

what he could bring about peace, for, with few exceptions, 

it can be now truthfully said that everybody wants peace, 

even the insurgents. Malvar and a few irreconcilables 

like himself may not be ready to cry quits, but insurgent 

soldiers are coming in every day claiming to have been 

serving involuntarily and to have escaped from their 

leaders. They come in notwithstanding they know they 

will go into the carcel. Despite these conditions, however, 

it is doubtful if any peace commission, from Aguinaldo 

down, could secure a thorough surrender of all the guns. 

The breaking away at the last minute of disaffected parties 

would occur as it did in the Cailles surrender, or all the 

best guns would be buried or concealed. Such results 

following a peace brought about by peace commissioners 

prior to the suffering by these people of the real hardships 

of war would almost certainly be followed by another 

insurrection within the next five years.

These people need a thrashing to teach them some good 

common sense, and they should have it for the good of 

all concerned. Sixto Lopez is now interested in peace 

because I have in jail all the male members of his family found in my jurisdiction, and have seized his houses 

and palay and his steamer, the Purisima Concepcion, for 

use of the Government. As for the peace commissioners 

sent by the Manila Peace League, they have accomplished 

nothing that I know of. Paterno got 30 passes, good for 

anybody to whom he chose to give or send them, as they 

were only numbered, in order that they might be good 

in anyone’s hands in which he or his agents might place 

them. I fear that a number of insurgent officers who have 

committed barbarous crimes may have availed themselves 

of these passes to escape from the country. This may possibly be a necessary preliminary to success on the part 

of the peace commissioners. Paterno stated in his letter 

of application that he wanted to furnish each messenger 

with three passes. Notwithstanding all these passes expire 

December 31, the only peace commissioner who reported 
11

himself to me prior to December 19 was Señor Velarde, 

who about the middle of the month reported himself at 

Calamba, and within a few days thereafter telegraphed me 

that he had returned to Manila on business with the Peace 

League. On the above date, December 19, six peace commissioners arrived here on the Ysla de Negros, a chartered 

transport, with seven passes. It looked to me as though a 

number of men had managed to get themselves back into 

closed ports on the passes.

The names of the six were taken from the manifest, and 

they were permitted to go about their business, whereupon they immediately disappeared. It was then discovered that one of the six men named on the manifest, 

Mariano Mendoza, had not come, but that one, Luciano 

Lucas, whom I remember as an irreconcilable prisoner of 

war when I was provost-marshal-general, had come in his 

place. He had been insurgent colonel under Pio del Pilar, 

and while a prisoner at Postigo was several times reported 

to me as an insurgent agitator among the prisoners. The 

citizen, Williams, whom the division commander sent 

here, informed me that this Luciano Lucas, after having 

been released at Manila and taking the oath of allegiance, 

had come here to Batangas and had smuggled his way to 

Mindoro on a mission to the insurgents while Williams 

was there. A native who served me at Manila, an exceptionally intelligent and strong-minded man, was sent 

down to assist me by Buen Camino. I asked him to ascertain and let me know what these six peace commissioners 

were doing. He could locate but two of them, who had 

gone to Bauab, and stated that they were very deliberate 

in their movements; notwithstanding it was then the 23d 

of December and their passes expired on January 1, they 

had as yet done nothing, but they were proposing to find 

the insurgents and offer to make peace with them for the 

Government on the basis of immunity for all past crimes.

It is needless for me to add that I have little faith in the 

success of peace commissioners who are sent out by such 

unscrupulous tricksters as Paterno, Poblete, et al.

J.F. Bell,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.24
12

By the time military operations began in earnest at the beginning of January 

1902, many guerrilla bands had been scattered. Bell reported that after 

10 January, no significant military clash with insurrecto guerrillas occurred 

in the brigade area of operations.25 Isolated from their support structure in 

the towns, the guerrillas were run to ground and the countryside stripped 

of supplies to sustain them. At the same time, the insurrecto infrastructure 

in the towns was systematically attacked.

Insurrectos began surrendering almost immediately. As military 

operations cleared Batangas and Laguna provinces, guerrillas fled into 

the mountains of northern and western Tayabas province. Bell, personally supervising operations in the field, pursued the guerrillas wherever 

they went. On 11 February he reported his findings of insurrecto activity 

in parts of the civilian administered and supposedly pacified province of 

Tayabas. 

Batangas, February 11, 1902—12.25 p.m.

Adjutant-General Department North Philippines, Manila:

Finished my inspection of the towns in province of 

Tayabas yesterday morning, and leaving there arrived 

here last night in order to start Eleventh Cavalry into the 

field promptly. Political conditions in Tayabas exceedingly unsatisfactory. Have given orders to commanding 

officer of towns requiring the adoption and enforcement in full of measures which have been efficacious in 

Batangas, and the adoption of which was heretofore left 

to their discretion in Tayabas. There is no possible question but what Laguna insurgents have been encouraged to 

continue the struggle by their ability to get food supplies 

from towns in Tayabas and from Manila, through the open 

ports of Tayabas. Their ability to do this has led many 

insurgents to flee from Batangas and Laguna to Tayabas, 

which province they use as a base of operations in Laguna 

and Batangas.

An insurgent government has also been organized at 

Binangonan, province of Infanta, and agents sent to 

communicate with Malvar and Caballes. Stringent measures are necessary in Tayabas and will be fully taken 

within the limits of my authority. I expect to return to 

Tayabas with a large field command just as soon as the 

last stretch of country in Batangas has been fully searched 
13

and cleaned up, namely, the stretch of territory between 

Calamba-Batangas road and eastern shore of Lake Taal. 

I came back here on horseback, and while riding through 

San Juan de Boc Boc met Luis Luna, Malvar’s adjutantgeneral, coming in to see the commanding officer about 

surrendering. Had conference with him. Was willing to 

surrender unconditionally, but had no arms. Was informed 

that he would have to remain a prisoner of war until he 

surrendered his entire following. Stated that being only 

chief of staff of Malvar, from who he separated January 

22, he had no men under his control, but offered to use his 

influence to do whatever he could to bring about the pacification and render any service I might stipulate in turn for 

his liberty. He offered to hunt for Malvar and try to influence him to surrender. Authorized commanding officer, 

San Juan de Boc Boc, to let him go with another native 

here, hunting for Malvar.

I feel much encouraged to believe that if the ports of 

Tayabas could be suddenly closed without warning that 

this measure, in conjunction with those I have already 

adopted, might convince Caballes and Malvar of the futility of further continuance of the struggle, and something 

beneficial might result. It is also possible that the insurrection can be brought to an end without closing the ports 

of Tayabas, but it is worse in that portion which lies in 

the Fourth Brigade than it is in this. Halfway measures 

only tend to prolong the war, and vigorous measures 

were never more desirable, even though the war might 

be ended in time without them. Respectfully recommend 

that all ports in province of Tayabas be closed until further 

orders and that I be authorized, in case I find it necessary, 

to push my operations into the southern and eastern portion of the province of Tayabas, now included in Fourth 

Brigade. After I whip them out of the western end they 

can subsist themselves in the eastern end unless the same 

measures are adopted to prevent it which now exist in my 

brigade. I expect to leave here again in a few days.

J.F. Bell, Brigadier-General.

26

Counterguerrilla operations did not occupy all of Bell’s attention. He 

continued to issue telegraphic circulars to post commanders regarding 
14

treatment of the population and prescribed actions to ensure the destruction of the insurrecto infrastructure in the towns. On 16 April Malvar, one 

of the last insurrecto holdouts, surrendered. By mid-May Bell declared the 

resistance ended, reopened the ports to commerce, and on 23 June returned 

control of Batangas and Laguna provinces to civil government.27

Military and civilian leaders in the Philippines considered Bell’s 

campaign “pacification in its most perfected form”28 and recognized 

it as “the most thorough and complete district pacification” during the 

Philippine Insurrection:

Using telegraphic circulars to enunciate his policies, Bell 

implemented a complete counterinsurgency campaign 

designed to separate the guerrillas from the population. 

He established population reconcentration zones, sent 

large expeditions into guerrilla strongholds, used provost 

marshals to break up town infrastructures, destroyed food 

supplies, and forced the native elite to commit themselves 

to the Army. These counterinsurgency policies had their 

desired effect, and guerrilla resistance collapsed within a 

few months.29

At the time, Army officers in the Philippines requested copies of Bell’s 

telegraphic circulars. In response to this demand, in December 1902 they 

were published, along with other materials, as Telegraphic Circulars and 

General Orders.

30 In 1903, the Philippine Commission passed a reconcentration act capturing Bell’s procedures in Philippine law for use in areas 

with chronic lawlessness.31

However, Congressional hearings generated by Smith’s operations on 

Samar tainted Bell’s campaign. Bell felt compelled to write a Senator that 

he believed “what I was doing was the most humane thing I could do 

under the circumstances, and that my policy was inspired by sympathy and 

kindness and not by resentment or a desire to punish.”32 In a cover letter to 

a copy of the Telegraphic Circulars that he sent to Secretary of War Elihu 

Root, Bell stated, “Everything I did during the campaign in Batangas, 

and nearly always the motive therefore, is indicated in the enclosed 

small pamphlet. . . . I gave no verbal orders or authority for anything not 

authorized in this pamphlet. I should be gratified if you would find time 

to personally read it.”33 Root responded: “I hope you will give yourself no 

uneasiness regarding the appreciation and approval which our course in the 

Batangas campaign receives from the War Department. An examination of 

the orders issued by you has developed no reason for changing the opinion 
15

expressed in a telegram [conveying President Roosevelt’s congratulations] 

immediately after the surrender of Malvar.”34

Shortly thereafter Bell began a 4-year tour as commandant of the 

Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. On 14 April 1906 

Bell became Chief of Staff of the US Army. He was promoted to major 

general in January 1907. During his 4-year tenure as Chief of Staff, he 

secured an increase in the size of the Army and the Reserves, commanded 

the Army of Cuban Pacification, and oversaw the relief efforts after the San 

Francisco earthquake. He returned to Manila to serve as the Department of 

the Philippines commander from 1911 to 1914. From 1914 to 1915 Bell 

commanded an experimental 2d Division (Tactical) that assembled at San 

Antonio, Texas. He went on to command the Western Department from 

1915 to 1917, the Eastern Department in 1917, Camp Upton and the 77th 

Division from 1917 to 1918, and the Eastern Department until his death on 

8 January 1919.35 In 1958, the new home of the US Army Command and 

General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was named 

the J. Franklin Bell Hall. The CGSC resided there until 2007.

Bell’s Campaign Instructions

The following documents provide a unique opportunity to follow 

advice offered in 1930 by Field Marshal Wavell: “The real way to get 

value out of the study of military history is to take particular situations, 

and as far as possible get inside the skin of the man who made a decision, 

realize the conditions in which the decision was made, and then see in 

what way you could have improved upon it.”36

Section I, Bell’s Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders

Demand from officers in the 3d Separate Brigade and throughout 

the Philippines for copies of Bell’s telegraphic circulars prompted 

Captain Milton F. Davis, Bell’s adjutant, to compile the materials that 

were published 1 December 1902 as Telegraphic Circulars and General 

Orders (section I). Davis organized the work into nine parts: a topical 

index to the telegraphic circulars, an explanation (by Davis) of the genesis 

of the collection, an introduction that consisted of a transcript of Bell’s 

1 December 1901 address to the officers of the brigade, the 38 telegraphic 

circulars issued to post commanders between 6 December 1901 and 

16 May 1902, a telegraphic memorandum on vaccinations, selected 

General Orders, proclamations and circular letters issued between May 

and July 1902, an appendix with thanks for assistance and congratulations 

to the 3d Separate Brigade for its success, and memoranda by Bell of his 

reflections or lessons learned during the campaign.
16

Each part provides information useful for understanding how Bell 

saw his problem, how he crafted a solution, and how he sequenced 

his operations against both the guerrilla bands in the countryside and 

their support infrastructure in the towns. Three sections are critical to 

understanding the campaign. First, the transcript of Bell’s meeting with 

his officers provides his analysis of the problem, intent, and use of General 

Orders 100 as the military or martial law within the brigade area. Second, 

the telegraphic circulars demonstrate Bell’s attention to detail, his repeated 

referral to articles of General Orders 100 to justify and explain his actions 

to his commanders and the populace, his sequencing of operations in 

moving the populace into protected zones in preparation of the battlefield 

for intensified combat operations, and his methodical adjustments to 

tighten pressure on the insurrectos. Last, Bell’s memoranda at the end of 

the publication provides his reflections on the campaign with explanations 

of what worked and what could have been done better.

Section II, General Orders 100

Bell, just as other American commanders in the Philippines, relied on 

the Lieber Code or General Orders 100, “Instructions for the Government 

of Armies of the United States in the Field” (section II), as the basis for 

martial law. Written during the American Civil War, this internationally 

recognized code placed requirements and restrictions on an occupying 

army and on an occupied populace. Failure by either to meet its requirements provided justification for action with loss of rights and protections. 

Bell, a member of the bar in Illinois, used the provisions of General Orders 

100 not to limit what he could do, but to define what he was required to 

do. For example, a fundamental tenet underlying General Orders 100 was 

“the notion that an occupier had a moral obligation to protect the people 

under its control from undue hardship and to provide them with basic 

governmental services.”37 This duty to protect became Bell’s justification 

for concentrating the population into what he called protected zones near 

American-controlled towns. In his telegraphic circulars, Bell frequently 

referred to specific articles of General Orders 100 to explain the legal basis 

of his actions; to ensure compliance by his commanders; and to educate 

the Filipino populace on its duties, responsibilities, and liabilities for noncompliance under martial law. To understand Telegraphic Circulars and 

General Orders, it is necessary to comprehend the appropriate articles of 

General Orders 100. For this reason, General Orders 100 has been provided 

in section II, and the articles Bell referred to in the Telegraphic Circulars 

and General Orders are identified in bold type.
17

Summary

Today the American military is conducting counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and recently the Army chief of staff described 

the future of the military as one of persistent conflict. This reprint of 

Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders and General Orders 100 provides a unique opportunity to explore insights for today by examining the 

thinking and actions of Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell in a campaign 

described as “a masterpiece of counter-guerrilla warfare.”38 Topics to consider include how Bell sought to understand the problem in his area of 

operations, what he concluded and how he addressed that problem, how he 

structured and sequenced his concept of operations to separate the population from the guerrillas, how he ensured his intent was understood by his 

commanders and the populace, how he used General Orders 100 to define 

and explain what Americans and Filipinos must and could not do, how he 

supervised the campaign, and what lessons he learned. While some of the 

methods used by Bell would be unpopular or not permissible today, the 

value to be gained from studying Bell’s telegraphic circulars comes from 

focusing not so much on what Bell did, but from focusing on his analysis 

and instructions.
18

Notes

1. John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the 

Philippines, 1898–1902 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 263.

2. Andrew J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency 

Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military 

History, 1998), 134.

3. Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence, KS: 

University of Kansas Press, 2000), 300–301.

4. The term “Philippine Insurrection” meant the Filipino rebellion or 

resistance against American rule. The term had a broader meaning than the term 

“insurgency” does today. The Philippine Insurrection had two phases: a conventional phase of American army against Filipino army and a longer guerrilla phase 

of American army against Filipino guerrillas. During both phases, the Filipino 

fighters were called insurrectos.

5. Birtle, 138–139. Birtle is correct in that most of Bell’s telegraphic circulars were included in the Congressional records. However, as its full title suggests, the Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders published in the Philippines 

in December 1902 contains more than the telegraphic circulars issued by Bell. 

Bell’s “counterinsurgency philosophy,” addressed in the Telegraphic Circulars 

and General Orders but not in the Congressional record, included an address Bell 

made to the officers of the 3d Separate Brigade on 1 December 1901 and a memoranda Bell wrote after the campaign reflecting lessons learned.

6. Brian M. Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine 

War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 

59.

7. For an overview of Bell’s military career, see http://www.army.mil/cmhpg/books/cg%26csa/Bell-JF.htm (accessed 4 October 2007).

8. Ewing E. Booth, My Observations and Experiences in the United States 

Army (Los Angeles, CA: n.p., 1944), 47.

9. Ibid., 54.

10. Report, 29 April 1900, Bell to Adjutant General, Department of Northern 

Luzon, quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 199.

11. Ibid. See also footnote 4 on the term “insurrection.”

12. Reprinted in section II.

13. See Robert D. Ramsey III, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 24:

Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902 

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 55–58.

14. Report, 31 December 1900, Bell to Adjutant General, quoted in Gates, 

214.

15. Ibid., 214–215.

16. Ibid., 215.

17. See Ramsey, 59–63.
19

18. Report, 17 May 1901, Bell to Adjutant General, US Army, quoted in 

Glenn A. May, Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War (New Haven, 

CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 247.

19. Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency, 59.

20. Diary entry, 29 November 1901, Bernard Moses, quoted in May, 248.

21. May, 248.

22. For a brief overview of the 3d Separate Brigade operations, see Ramsey, 

95–102. For additional information, see Gates, 256–263; Linn, Philippine 

War, 300–305; Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency, 152–161; May, 

242–269.

23. Gates, 259.

24. Telegram, Brigadier General Bell to Major General Wheaton, 

27 December 1901, in US Congress, Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands. 

Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate

(Senate Document 331, part 2, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902), 1690–1692.

25. John R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States: 

A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction, Volume II, May 1, 

1898 to July 4, 1902, 26. This galley proof of an unpublished War Department 

manuscript is in History of the Philippine Insurrection against the United States, 

1899–1903: and documents relating to the War Department project for publishing 

the history (Washington, DC: National Archives, 1968), roll 9.

26. Telegram, Brigadier General Bell to Adjutant-General, Department 

North Philippine, 11 February 1902 in US Congress, Senate, Affairs in the 

Philippine Islands. Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the 

United States Senate (Senate Document 331, part 3, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 

1902), 1717–1718.

27. War Department, Annual Report of Major General Adna R. Chaffee, 

United States Army, Commanding the Division of the Philippines, September 30, 

1902 (Manila, PI, 1902), 12.

28. Gates, 288.

29. Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency, 165.

30. Reprinted in section I.

31. Gates, 288.

32. Bell to Senator Albert Beveridge, 16 August 1902, quoted in May, 284.

33. Bell to Secretary of War Root, 6 December 1902, quoted in May, 284.

34. Root to Bell, 3 February 1903, quoted in May, 284.

35. For an overview of Bell’s military career, see http://www.army.mil/cmhpg/books/cg%26csa/Bell-JF.htm (accessed 4 October 2007).

36. Field Marshal Earl Wavell, 1930, lecture to officers at Aldershop. Quoted 

in Peter G. Tsouras, Warrior’s Words: A Quotation Book, From Sesostris III to 

Schwarzkopf, 1886 BC to AD 1991 (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1992), 202.

37. Birtle, 101.

38. Gates, 263.

21

Section I

Bell’s Telegraphic 

Circulars and 

General Orders*

*Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders Regulating Campaign Against 

Insurgents and Proclamations and Circular Letters Relating to Reconstructions 

after Close of War in the Provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro, Philippines 

Islands. Issued by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, US Army, 1 December 

1902.

23

Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders,

Regulating Campaign Against Insurgents and

Proclamations and Circular Letters,

Relating to Reconstruction after Close of War in the Provinces of

BATANGAS, LAGUNA and MINDORO,

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

Issued by

Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, U.S. Army,

COMMANDING BRIGADE,

FROM DECEMBER 1ST, 1901, TO DECEMBER 1ST, 1902,

COMPILED BY

Captain M.F. Davis, 1st U.S. Cavalry,

ADJUTANT GENERAL,

WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING

Telegrams of Thanks and Congratulations

FROM

THE PRESIDENT

AND FROM THE

DIVISION, DEPARTMENT AND BRIGADE COMMANDERS.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE,

Batangas, Batangas Province, P.I.,

December 1st, 1902.

25

INDEX TO TELEGRAPHIC CIRCULARS.

-----o-----

Circular.

A

Assassination, Suppression of .............................................................1, 5.

 “ Retaliation and punishment for .............................3, 5, 20.

 “ Measures against ..................................................3, 5, 20.

Atrocities, Resorts to by insurgents, enumerated ....................................5.

 “ Punishment for ......................................................................5.

Assassins, Evidence against to be forwarded by

Municipal Officials......................................................................... 20.

Animals, Captured, disposition of ..........................................................7.

Ambush, Precaution against ..................................................................12.

Arms, Concealment of in barrios ..........................................................20.

 “ To obtain possession of, surrender of, etc. ................................21.

American Flag, Respect for exacted .....................................................20.

Arms, Payment of rewards to spies, etc. ...............................................21.

 “ Report of, captured and surrendered, etc. .................................26.

 “ Surrendered, payment for ..........................................................34.

B

Brigade Com’dr, Intention to visit stations ............................................ 1.

 “ “ Purpose to send telegraphic circulars ........................ 1.

 “ “ Announces policy to be followed in case of 

assassination of defenceless Americans 

and friendly natives ..............................................5.

 “ “ Reminds all of necessity of vigilance and 

precaution against surprise ................................ 12.

 “ “ To regulate prices of food supply ....................... 2, 16.

 “ “ Announces departure from Batangas ...................... 29.

Barrios, Near town, included within zone ............................................. 2.

Bridges, Destruction of by insurgents, measures of punishment for ..... 6.

Bolos, Possession of forbidden disposition ......................................... 23.

C

Contributions, Levied by insurgents .......................................................2.

Commanding Officers, To establish military zone ..................................2.

 “ “ To regulate prices of necessities .......................2.

 “ “ To instruct inhabitants regarding danger of 

living outside zone ....................................2.
26

Circular

Commanding Officers, To use discretion in adopting measures 

of warfare authorized by G.O. 100, 

A.G.O. 1863 .................................................3.

 “ “ Payment of Municipal Police by ......................4.

 “ “ To impress transportation to carry food 

supplies .......................................................10.

 “ “ Treatment of inhabitants by.................Appendix.

Constabulary, Operation with .................................................................3.

Caballes .................................................................................................24.

Correspondence, Captured ......................................................................8.

Crops, Gathering and replanting of, under protection of 

patrols and within zones ..............................................14, 17, 20.

Commerce, Restrictions on ...................................................................15.

Copra, Manufacture of, forbidden ........................................................15.

Cocoanuts, Preservation of, etc. ............................................................15.

Chinamen, Purchase of food supplies ...................................................16.

Cabezas, Arrest of, etc. ...................................................................18, 20.

Cockfighting, Prohibition of .................................................................19.

Carabaos, Seizure of for means of transportation .................................19.

Curfew, Estabilished .............................................................................19.

Commissaries, Supply of rice by, etc. ...................................................31.

Congratulations, On result of campaign ....................................Appendix.

D

Death Penalty, Not to be infliced without authority from 

superior commanders .................................................................4.

Discipline, Measures to be enforced .....................................................20.

Denunciation, False, punishment for ....................................................28.

F

Food, Supplying insurgents with, punishment for ..................................3.

 “ Supplies captured, disposition of ..................................................7.

 “ Supplies outside zone, seizure of ................................................10.

 “ Supplies and regulation of prices ............................................2, 16.

 “ Gratuitious issue of and rules regarding ......................................17.

 “ Supplies cached by insurgents to be hunted for, and 

disposition of ............................................................................30.

G

Gen’l Orders No. 100 1863, A.G.O., To be strictly adhered to ..............3.
27

Circular

Gen’l Orders No. 100 1863, A.G.O., Violation of by insurgents ...........5.

 “ “ “ “ “ “ Starvation of belligerents ...........7.

 “ “ “ “ “ “ Measures of retaliation 

against treachery ..................13.

 “ “ “ “ “ “ Provisions of adopted and 

Comdg Officers to see 

no abuse grows out of ..........19.

 “ “ “ “ “ “ Forbids killing of persons 

who can be captured ............33.

Guns, Payment of surrender ..................................................................34.

Government, Civil, Establishment of ........................................Appendix.

H

Houses, Removal of within zone ............................................................2.

Horses, Native, Soldier, Native or American Scout or Q.M. 

employee not permitted to own .............................11.

 “ “ Disposition of .............................................................11.

Hunger, Prevention of .....................................................................30, 32.

I

Inhabitants, Furnished protection within military zone ..........................2.

 “ Concentration of within zones of protection 

Dec. 25th, 1902 .............................................................2.

 “ Instructions to be given regarding danger of living 

without zone ..................................................................2.

 “ Pretension of wealthy to desire peace ...................................3.

 “ Wealthy, importance of punishment of ..................................3.

 “ Peaceable, starvation of not considered justifiable or 

desirable ........................................................................7.

 “ Wealthy, burden of feeding poor imposed upon ....................7.

Insurrection, Policy to be followed to suppress ......................................3.

Insurgents, Reign of terror established by ..............................................5.

 “ To be deprived of food supplies ............................................7.

 “ Information of movements of ................................................8.

 “ Entering towns in disguise, information of to 

commanding officers ..................................................18.

Inhabitants, To be in houses and off streets by 8:00 P.M. .....................19.

 “ Discipline of ......................................................................22.

 “ Arrest of in Manila ............................................................25.

 “ Prevention of hunger and want arising ..............................30.
28

Circular

Inhabitants, Measures of welfare of, etc. ..................................Appendix.

Intelligence Officers, Instructions to .........................................Appendix.

L

Looting, Discouragement of .................................................................22.

Leniency ................................................................................................32.

M

Municipal Officials, Hostile to U.S. arrest of, disloyal ...............6, 18, 20.

Malvar, General, Election of town officials influenced by ...............3, 24.

Municipal Officials, To furnish evidence against assassins ..................20.

Merchandise, Found outside of protected zones, 

disposition of ..................................................................................14.

Markets, Public, Closing of ..................................................................19.

Military Prisons, Maintenance of ..............................................Appendix.

N

Neutrality, Toleration of ..........................................................................3.

O

Offensive, Best defence made by assuming the ....................................12.

Oaths of Allegiance, Administration of ................................................21.

P

Property, Liability of to confiscation and destruction found 

outside zone ......................................................................................2.

Passes, To leave towns required ............................................................14.

Peace, To compel people to want, policy to be followed ........................3.

 “ Proclamation of ............................................................Appendix.

Police, Loyal, use of ................................................................................3.

Presidentes, Violation of oath of office, action to be taken ...............20, 3.

Police, Chief of, To notify Commanding Officers of 

presence of insurgents ......................................................................3.

Presidentes, To notify Commanding Officers of 

presence of insurgents ....................................................................20.

Padres, Insurgent sympathizers ...............................................................3.

Provost Courts, Establishment and operation of, disposition 

of fines ........................................................................................3, 27.

Police, Municipal, Removal of arms from ..............................................4.

 “ “ Extra pay of ..............................................................4.
29

Circular

Paupers, Registry of and supply of food to .............................................7.

Prisoners of War, Use of, to carry food supplies 

to garrison towns ................................................10.

 “ “ “ Description of ..............................................Appendix.

Police Force, Arrest of members ...........................................................18.

Palay, Distribution of to natives ............................................................31.

Pack Train, Instructions for .......................................................Appendix.

Q

Quartermaster Dept., To furnish money for payment of 

surrendered arms ............................................................................21.

R

Rice, Captured, disposition of ...........................................................7, 10.

 “ Supply of by Commissaries and distribution 

of to natives, etc. ..........................................31, 37, & Appd.

 “ Purchase of as a speculation forbidden .......................................15.

Rewards, Paid spies for capture of insurgents officers .........................21.

Roads, Repair of by native labor ...........................................................19.

 “ Repair of, officer and C.O. in charge of ...................................19.

Reports, Arms, Officers and men captured and surrendered ..........26, 36.

Registration, Of poor families ...............................................................17.

S

Spies, Use of ...........................................................................................3.

Scouts, Native, Use of .............................................................................3.

Sympathizers, Insurgents, punishment of ...............................................3.

Store Houses, Building of .......................................................................7.

Surprise, Precaution against ..................................................................11.

Soldiers Cavalry, To wear revolvers .....................................................12.

Soldiers, Infantry, To wear bayonets .....................................................12.

Spanish Law, Old, requiring labor or tax in lieu, enforced ...................19.

Surrender, Terms of, etc. .......................................................................21.

Surrenders, Reports regarding ..............................................................36.

T

Telegraphic Circulars, Purpose of .................................................... 1, 22.

 “ “ Filing of ............................................................. 1.

 “ “ Transfer of to successors ................................... 1.
30

Circular

Telegraphic Circulars, Acting on, authority or instructions to 

individual Station Commanders .................. 1.

 “ “ Inspection of by Brig. Commander ................... 1.

 “ “ Entry of in Station records ................................. 1.

Telegraph Wires, Cutting of by insurgents, measures 

of punishment .................................................................................. 6.

Treasurer, Municipal, Capture of ........................................................... 9.

Treachery, People to be warned in consequence of ............................. 13.

Towns, Destruction of by fire as a measure of retaliation 

against treachery .............................................................................13.

Traffic, Outside protected zone forbidden ............................................14.

Trade, Restriction of .............................................................................15.

Thanks, Telegrams of ................................................................Appendix.

Taxes, Collection and disbursement of .................................................18.

Transportation, Means of, seizure of, impressment of, 

and payment for ........................................................................19, 35.

Troops Information of movements of furnished insurgents ..................20.

Talibons, Possession of forbidden, disposition of .................................23.

U

United States, Generosity and forbearance exercised by ........................5.

Uniform, Soldiers, in possession of natives to be seized ......................20.

W

War, Policy to be followed to put a prompt end to .................................3.

 “ Laws and usages of, violated by insurgents ...................................5.

Wood, Failure of inhabitants to supply .................................................20.

War, Burden of on disloyal .............................................................22, 30.

Z

Zones, Of protection, establishment of ...................................................2.

_________
31

EXPLANATION.

Since the war ended in this Brigade, requests have been received from 

a large percentage of the officers (who served therein during the last campaign) for copies of Telegraphic Circulars, etc., issued for the purpose of 

regulating military operations. A number of similar requests have also 

been received from persons outside of the Brigade.

Very few surplus copies were originally made and these requests 

could not be complied with, but, as they continued to come, I undertook 

the preparation of this compilation in order to at least comply with the 

requests of those who took part in the campaign.

With several exceptions, the following Telegraphic Circulars, General 

Orders, Proclamations, Circular Letters and Telegrams were originally 

dictated to a stenographer, and the transcribed notes of most of them carefully corrected and revised by General Bell. But, in transmitting them by 

wire and in making a mimeographic stencil for reproducing mail copies, a 

number of errors occurred which were never corrected because of lack of 

time and opportunity and because they were generally unimportant. Most 

of them were typographical, but there were some inadvertent omissions 

and substitutions (of erroneous words) by stenographers, type writers and 

operators.

It was found by experience also that some of the explanations and provisions contained therein were not sufficiently comprehensive and explicit 

to preclude the forming of erroneous impressions by persons unacquainted 

with the local conditions and precedents bearing upon the subject referred 

to.

Though there have been no material changes in their contents as originally issued, the proof sheets of this pamphlet have been carefully revised 

by General Bell, for the purpose of correcting the errors and deficiencies 

above mentioned, and it is believed that its contents will be found substantially correct.

Respectfully,

MILTON F. DAVIS,

Captain, 1st Cavalry,

Adjutant General.

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROV., P.I.,

 December 1st, 1902.
32

INTRODUCTION.

-----o-----

On December 1, 1901, all the Officers stationed at Batangas, 

Batangas Province, P.I., called on General Bell in a body. Chairs were 

brought into the room, and after the Officers were seated General Bell 

addressed to them the following remarks, which were taken down by two 

stenographers:—M.F.D.

_________

Gentlemen:—I presume, as is natural, you would like to know just 

why I have been sent here and what policy I expect to pursue and enforce. 

I have something to say to you on this subject and am very glad to meet 

all of you today and to have this opportunity of explaining my views and 

purposes. I am very well acquainted with the difficulties you have had to 

contend with, and clearly understand that I shall need not only loyalty to 

my views and purposes, but also your cordial and energetic co-operation 

to succeed in the task that has been assigned me. I have been sent here 

with instructions to put an end to insurrection and re-establish peace in the 

shortest time practicable. As I am well aware that American officers and 

soldiers have an individuality and opinions of their own, and can always 

co-operate with much greater zeal, cordiality, energy and satisfaction when 

they feel that their Commanding General’s views are correct, just and best 

calculated to accomplish our purpose, it is natural that I should want your 

views to coincide with mine. I shall therefore take pains to explain my 

views to you at some length, in the hope that you may become convinced 

that they are sound and reasonable.

The average American officer and soldier is kind-hearted and sympathetic, and, unless he has been in these Islands sufficiently long to have 

graduated from all the various schools of experience, it is very difficult 

for him to give thoroughly loyal and unflinching support to a policy which 

appears to be inconsistent with his kind and sympathetic feeling toward 

the ignorant and misguided people of these Islands. Therefore, in the first 

place, I want to ask you not to conclude that because I expect to radically 

change the policy which has heretofore been pursued, that I disapprove or 

am inclined to criticise that policy. I am not. Our general policy has heretofore been one of great benevolence and forbearance, a policy of attraction and conciliation, and I have always sympathized with and vigorously 

upheld this policy because I think it right in principle. I am sorry to have 

to acknowledge, however, that in a number of instances this policy has not 
33

been as successful or efficient as I had hoped it might always be. In order 

to give you a clearer comprehension of my present convictions, I shall 

now review some of the details of our past policy.

All of you who were here in the early days will doubtless recall that 

before the first Peace Commission arrived in these Islands no definite policy had ever been announced. Except in the city of Manila, the government 

throughout the Islands was in the hands of insurgents. As we had not come 

for the purpose of fighting Filipinos, we all had instructions to be kind, 

considerate and just to them, and our natural sympathy and kindly feeling 

for them made that policy agreeable to us. But unfortunately, from the very 

beginning, the natives entirely misunderstood this policy and attributed it 

to fear and weakness. They became very arrogant, conceited and aggressive. Those of you who were in the city of Manila when it was practically 

beseiged by insurgents, will remember that they taunted us with being 

cowards and were exceedingly anxious, to all appearances, to try conclusions with us. By January of 1899 they had become so bold and certain 

of their comparative strength that feeling and enthusiasm on their part ran 

high and they tried in every conceivable manner to provoke us into making 

an attack upon them.

A conviction began to gain ground in the army, first among the soldiers, who came in more intimate contact with the people, then among the 

officers, that our policy was an error and that sooner or later we would be 

compelled to give the Filipino army a sound thrashing in order to inspire it 

with some sense and cause the people to realize that they were trifling with 

a power far greater than they had any conception of. It soon became perfectly apparent to every one that war had to come, and when it was finally 

precipitated it came with a rush. The army, stung to the quick by taunting 

insults of arrogant, conceited, presumptions and ungrateful enemies, went 

at them with such vigor that they were swept like chaff out of our way. 

Then with a full realization of their utter weakness and folly, benevolence 

and sympathy succeeded excitement, and, if anything, greater consideration was shown them than ever before, in the vain hope that after their 

one drastic lesson they would come to their senses and see the futility of 

prolonging an unequal struggle. In those days, having no prisons, all prisoners captured were speedily liberated. We captured, searched and turned 

them loose minus arms but plus rations and advice. We frequently received 

instructions to turn them loose on the battle field after disarming them. I 

have thus liberated many, some of whom promptly returned to their army 

and were captured over again. I have captured letters written to insurgents 

by apparently peaceful residents of towns we were occupying who had 

pretended to be our best friends. These letters gave full and complete 
34

information of our movements and expressed the utmost sympathy for the 

cause. I would show such letters to the individuals who wrote them, advise 

them sarcastically to hereafter be more cautious and transact such business 

by word of mouth, and then admonish them to go and sin no more.

In the Province of Pampanga this policy of benevolence and consideration was entirely efficacious, but I know of no other case in which it 

succeeded in accomplishing the desired result. But, as I have previously 

stated, I believe in that policy and always continued to practice it until 

it became clearly demonstrated that a change was necessary in special 

localities.

We all soon saw that we would have to commence to imprison captured insurgents and the disloyal element of the population, and that we 

would have to punish war rebels and war traitors. As long as the benevolent and conciliatory policy succeeded, I advocated a strict adherence 

to it, but my experience finally convinced me that it alone could not be 

efficacious in dealing with Tagalos. In fact I think that we have all had 

sufficient experience to conclude that this policy cannot work with them 

without modification. They are unquestionably the smartest and best educated of all the tribes in the Philippines Islands, but at the same time they 

are the most cunning, unscrupulous and conscienceless. They are the most 

agreeable and attractive, but the most enamoured with independence and 

license which they mistake for liberty.

Batangas is the very heart of the Tagalo region. Cavite is the cradle of 

insurrection and the birthplace of many of the political and military leaders. Laguna and Tayabas are but little less addicted to insurrection than the 

other two. Batangas is the hub of this Brigade. The insurrection has been 

more vigorously and numerously sustained here, I think, than elsewhere, 

because Batangas, being richer, has contributed more members to foreign 

juntas than have the other provinces. These leaders advise their families 

and friends here to continue the struggle.

But, notwithstanding their advice, the people of Batangas can have 

peace whenever they want it, and it should be our mission to make them 

want it as soon as we can by legitimate methods.

It is not possible to convince these irreconciliable and unsophisticated 

people by kindness and benevolence alone that you are right and they are 

wrong, nor could you likewise convince the ignorant tao that what you 

advise him to do is best and what his principale orders him to do is wrong, 

because the only argument the majority of either class can understand and 

appreciate is one of physical force.
35

To successfully deal with the common people, the head men, the leaders, the principales are the ones we need to influence. The common hombre is dominated body and soul by his master, the principale. He is simply 

a blind tool, a poor down-trodden ignoramus, who does not know what is 

good for him and cannot believe an American. We cannot appear to him 

direct. It is impossible. You can no more influence him by benevolent persuasion than you can fly. He is going to do whatever he is told to do by his 

master or his leaders, because he is incapable of doing anything else.

Therefore, to succeed in our purpose, we must make it to the interest 

of his leaders to order and counsel him to do that which we want him to do. 

To bring this about we must make the principale the object of our especial 

study and effort.

In order to carry such a policy to a successful issue it will, in all probability, be generally necessary to adopt drastic measures, but it is not necessary to be harsh, humiliating or overbearing in manner to enforce drastic 

measures. If you can persist in maintaining a firm and relentless policy 

with the manner of a Chesterfield, so much the better.

Be considerate and courteous in manner, but firm and relentless in 

action. Say little, and let acts, not words, convey your meaning. Words 

from us count for nothing. The more an officer talks the less they think he 

is going to do. The more he does and the less he says the more apprehensive 

they become while waiting for what is to happen next. Except when necessary to give due warning, do not tell them what you are going to do, but do 

it. Above all things do not threaten. Threats are invariably interpreted as a 

sign of weakness. When necessary to give warning, tell them in a mild and 

dispassionate way what is forbidden and what will be the consequence of 

disobedience. The more dispassionate your language, the more cool and 

collected your manner, the freer from excitement and calmer your tone of 

voice, the more influence your words will have. But they very soon judge 

by acts, not words, and this fact should never be forgotten.

I hardly think it necessary to caution those of you who have been in 

these Islands as much as two years that these people are past masters in 

the art of deception; that you cannot afford to believe what they say about 

their relations with the insurrection unless it be backed up by some act 

which has so committed them to the side of Americans as to greatly antagonize insurgents. When a native has done something of that kind, he can be 

trusted not to deceive you for the benefit of insurgents, but when, without 

having committed an open act of friendship for Americans, he comes with 

profuse professions of friendship and offers to do all he can for you, keep 
36

an eye to his motives and watch his actions closely. Whenever he is the 

first to offer you a house, a bed or other necessity, with profuse protestations of friendship and abuse of insurgents, you should not go to sleep and 

cease efforts to fathom his real sentiments. Such conduct is frequently 

an indication of a desire to throw you off your guard and thus enable the 

schemer to aid your enemies in safety.

I beg you will not think me over suspicious. I do not like suspicious 

people; I very much dislike those who base ordinary actions upon suspicion; such conduct is very repugnant to us all, but, gentlemen, we are here 

to conduct war, and, under such circumstances as surround us, we cannot 

do it successfully without some times acting on suspicion as a necessary 

precaution.

I have learned this sad fact by experience, for I am naturally unsuspicious. I have frequently let men go and greatly regretted it afterwards 

when I plainly saw that I ought to have held them a reasonable time for 

investigation and for hunting evidence against them. I have released men 

found on the battle field because they told me a plausible story, had no 

uniform on and because no evidence was at hand showing that they were 

insurgents. In some cases I subsequently learned that I had released important officers, and when too late I recognized that I had been foolishly sympathetic and lenient. It is very disagreeable to hold natives on suspicion, I 

even grant that it seems unfair and unjust, but, under such circumstances 

as surround us, it is unquestionably a military necessity and therefore in 

accordance with the laws of war.

In the Province of Pangasinan, which has always been celebrated for 

disorder and ladronism, the organized insurrection broke up. Insurgents 

deserting with their arms, scattered into small bands, and the province was 

soon at the mercy of a horde of armed cut-throats and robbers. The people became so terrorized they did not dare to help us. Anyone suspected 

of sympathy or friendship for Americans was promptly assassinated. We 

could get no information and could accomplish nothing. There was no 

organized insurrection, but those who possessed the guns were living in the 

towns by day and raiding the countryside by night. The necessity for garrisoning every town, in order to give protection to those peaceably inclined, 

soon became apparent. The troops were obtained and the towns were garrisoned. When the people saw we were able to protect them they began to 

help us, and through persistent efforts in detecting, arresting and confining 

the scheming, murdering, unscrupulous leaders and ladrones among the 

people, and through running down and capturing the arms, the province 

became very tranquil and peace reigned supreme. This was not accomplished, however, without having to do many disagreeable things. At one 
37

time more heartless murderers and political assassins had been convicted 

and hung in that province than in all the rest of the Islands put together. 

One day, referring to necessary executions, the Division Commander told 

me, with much concern, that circumstances had forced him to approve 

more death sentences, he thought, than any one man who ever lived; that 

such a thing was keenly distressing to him, but that he could see no possible way to avoid it and do his duty.

I was ordered from Pangasinan to Manila, at that time the hot-bed of 

insurgent intrigue, their base of supply and a safe haven of rest and recuperation for insurgents who were worn out and sick from continuous pursuit 

in the provinces. I was required by the Division Commander to institute a 

severe and drastic policy there for the purpose of ridding the city of insurgents, schemers, sympathizers, aiders and abetters. I have never done any 

duty in my life which was quite so disagreeable, but after six months of 

such a policy the city was completely changed in political attitude. When 

I left there I do not believe there was an active insurgent in it and inactive 

sympathizers were afraid to operate. Just before my departure some active 

insurgents from the provinces arrived in Manila for rest and recuperation. 

No former friend or sympathizer could be found who dared to give them 

food or shelter, and they were finally forced to voluntarily surrender to the 

Provost Marshal General, and when they did so they confessed they had 

surrendered because they had no place to live and nothing to eat.

All this was accomplished by a determined and persistent effort to 

ferret out and punish the guilty, who were held in prison with relentless 

firmness.

It will unquestionably be necessary for us to adopt in this Brigade a 

policy similar to that which was enforced in the Province of Pangasinan 

and in the City of Manila. We owe the pacific people protection and must 

adopt some way of demonstrating our ability to give it. We must then show 

our intention to punish insurgents and those who aid and assist them. In 

doing this we will unquestionably be required, by a sense of duty, to do 

much that is disagreeable. But after all armed insurgents are forced to 

submit to constituted authority and peaceful conditions are re-established 

within the Brigade, we can then be benevolent and generous again and 

convince the people that we are their real friends. Without first whipping 

them and convincing them that we are able to accomplish our purposes by 

force if necessary, we can never gain their friendship, because otherwise 

we can never command their respect.

In connection with the enforcement of such a policy, I want to mention 

certain serious difficulties I have encountered in the past which can easily 
38

be avoided: The lack of information concerning prisoners of war has always 

been a source of much embarrassment. Though it may be necessary to 

confine prisoners on suspicion and may not be possible to investigate their 

cases promptly, a record can and should be kept by the commanding officer 

of every station, which should show, concerning every prisoner, his full 

name, town and barrio in which he lives, date of arrest, by whom arrested, 

and for what arrested. In case arrested on suspicion of what he is suspected 

should always be stated in full. All these things are absolutely essential in 

making subsequent disposition of prisoners. A permanent record must be 

kept of every prisoner, and when he ceases to be a prisoner the disposition 

made of him should be noted. Whenever released the date thereof and by 

whose order the action was taken should be shown. I have known some 

officers who merely scratched a prisoner’s name from the record when 

releasing him. This is wrong. Full and complete information concerning 

every prisoner should be retained in the permanent record so it may be 

available for future reference. It is especially necessary and desirable to 

give in a column of remarks as full and complete a political history of each 

prisoner as possible.

I expect to have temporary prisons prepared in all towns as soon as 

possible. The lack of adequate facilities for confining prisoners has been 

one of the greatest drawbacks to our success in the past. I am aware that 

it will be very difficult to provide adequate facilities in most towns for 

confining many prisoners, but now that the dry, cool season is coming on 

they can be confined in sheds inside of stockades. Our leniency or failure 

to hold or punish them has encouraged ignorant people to continue the 

struggle. They can only understand restraint which is imposed by force, 

and in the absence thereof they continue to do as they prefer. I promise that 

each commanding officer shall have facilities for confining prisoners, and, 

without exceptional reasons, no prisoner shall be released until after the 

officer who captured and confined him has been consulted. It may become 

apparent that the release of certain prisoners will best serve our purpose, 

but no prisoner shall be released whose presence in his accustomed haunts 

or whose influence would be embarrassing to the operations of the officer 

who arrested him. Except in the clearest cases of wrong identity or evident error, prisoners of war will not be released until it is shown that their 

release will serve the interests of the government.

I have a personal prejudice against burning for the reason that I never 

thought it did much good. On the contrary it has appeared to me that it did 

more harm than good in most cases. I recognize the impossibility, however, of depriving insurgents of shelter in the mountains without destroying the shelter which is there. With reference to houses and other shelter 
39

used as cuartels there, I shall subordinate my preference and scruples 

to the judgement of commanding officers as to what may be necessary. 

Fortunately there are few private houses there and these are small grass 

and nipa shacks.

We have only one purpose, and that is to force the insurgents and 

those in active sympathy with them to want peace. In accomplishing this 

we must pay particular attention to the attitude of principales who live in 

towns under our protection and are the eyes and ears and business agents 

of insurgents outside. These are the people we most need to investigate. 

We must get evidence of their complicity and keep them in prison until 

they are tired of helping to maintain the insurrection and ready to work for 

peace. We must deprive the insurgents of supplies and prevent their getting 

more. But in order to inflict the least hardship practicable upon the people, 

we must adopt some means by which we can afford protection to those 

who really desire to be peaceful. We must garrison every town, and I shall 

secure sufficient additional troops to do this as soon as possible. It will do 

little good to chase our troops around the country hunting insurgents until 

we have chased the spies and unarmed pickets out of the towns and barrios. We will simply wear out our men, and the insurgents, well advised 

in ample time, will continue to avoid us by hiding and make merry over 

our inability to find them. I presume here, as elsewhere, they have a barrio 

hombre continually stationed on every prominent height who gives them 

ample warning of approaching troops.

We have been through all of this up north where I have just come from. 

There every pueblo, barrio and sitio was well organized by the Katipunans 

[members of the Filipino Secret Society]. At first it was impossible to get 

any information, but by patience and perseverance we finally learned their 

system, completely broke up their secret organizations in the towns and 

barrios, and then the insurgents had to surrender. We hope to pursue the 

same policy here. We soon found we could not get near insurgents living in 

the mountains by means of movements in the day time. When we learned 

the paths and trails sufficiently well, we moved only at night, avoiding the 

barbios and barking dogs.

In the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Sur some of the people living 

in the foot hills and mountains and localities distant from the pueblos, 

wearying of the oppressive exactions of insurgents, moved into the towns. 

Surprising as it may possibly seem to you, in nearly every town in Ilocos 

Norte the people, tiring of the insurrection and wishing to protect themselves against the oppressions of insurgent foraging parties, maurauding 

by night, built bamboo fences around the outskirts of their towns. It is 

hard to believe that they can build a stockade fence of bamboo from 12 to 
40

14 miles in length in less than a week, but nevertheless it is a fact. When 

I first saw these fences it seemed to me they could do little good, but the 

tops of the bamboo poles were sharpened and it was practically impossible 

to get over them or cut a hole through the fence without making so much 

noise as to attract attention. They turned the entire population out to work. 

Some dug the ditches, some cut and sharpened bamboo poles and others 

set them up in the ditches. When the fences were built the people moved 

inside and went out only in the daytime. Few gates were left and municipal 

police guarded these by night. Through this voluntary assistance, we were 

soon able to starve the insurgents out, as they no longer had their supply 

organization, for knowing that our troops were covering the country at 

night their secret agents and spies dare not go out with food.

We found that much of the money paid the people by the government 

was divided with insurgents, and I presume the same condition is existing 

here. I shall ask the government to suspend the payment of rents for the 

present and also to close the ports to prevent insurgents from bringing supplies from the outside.

As many poor people are engaged in furnishing sacati, wood and other 

supplies to the troops, I think it best to pay them. But if, after our policy 

is changed, they should refuse to work for pay, it is almost certain that 

they are intimidated by someone. To combat such a move, we will have to 

arrest the principales and local officials and make them get the supplies as 

prisoners of war unless they are willing to induce the common people to 

furnish them as usual. When an ignorant hombre thus suddenly changes his 

attitude there can be no doubt he does it because he is ordered to do so.

Assassination in broad daylight and at other times must stop. We must 

adopt such measures as will make the life of an Americanista safer than 

that of any insurgent in this Brigade. We must demonstrate to those who 

would be friendly our ability to protect them.

I have requested of General Chaffee 300 copies of G.O. 100, and when 

received a copy will be furnished to every officer in the Brigade. We shall 

hereafter conduct war in accordance with that order, and I shall confer 

upon each officer authority to do any reasonable and just thing which is 

authorized by that order. It authorizes executing prisoners of war, without 

trial, in retaliation against assassination, but inasmuch as I do not wish to 

place this heavy burden of responsibility upon other shoulders than my 

own, I shall forbid such executions without my authority.

When we make a radical and drastic change of policy by adopting as 

our guide G.O. 100, it is very probable that great resentment will at first 

be aroused among the people, and they may at once begin a policy of 
41

lawless assassination of American soldiers and civilians, Americanistas

and native employees, necessitating this severe measure of retaliation. I 

shall probably apply some other remedial action in Tanauan and Bauan 

where Americanistas have so recently been assassinated in public places 

in broad daylight, as before adopting such a radical measure I think fairness demands due warning.

It is impossible to announce a general policy equally applicable to all 

conditions, but the basis of my policy will be to require respect for the 

American flag and submission to constituted authority. To do this it is not 

necessary for any one to conduct himself in an ungentlemanly manner, 

but he must be quick and firm. But whenever one becomes angered and 

excited it is better to postpone action, to sleep on the matter and act next 

day. If absolutely essential to act more promptly let anger be controlled 

and action be moderate but firm.

I presume there are a few people in the Brigade who have rendered 

Americans such service as to have aroused the bitter resentment of insurgents and subjected their lives to danger. I shall ask that especial efforts 

be made to protect these people against assassination. They should also be 

protected from misrepresentation by revengeful sympathizers with insurrection. Be on the watch for false denunciation and intrigues against them. 

Natives frequently forge letters implicating our best friends and drop 

them where they will be found by us. Be cautious and investigate carefully before any man is arrested who has been serving us. The revengeful 

enemy apparently never forgets and frequently abides his time and waits 

until all the officers who are acquainted with the character and services 

of friendly natives are ordered away. Then when a new garrison arrives 

some insurgent will worm himself into the confidence of the new commanding officer for the sole purpose of getting even with those who have 

really helped us in the past. In order to preclude the possibility of this, 

every commanding officer ordered away should, before leaving, write a 

report of the services that such men have rendered and leave it with his 

successor, sending a copy thereof to these Headquarters. We must avoid, if 

possible, arresting men who have rendered us friendly services in the past 

and those who would like to serve us if they felt that we could give them 

proper protection.

So far as insurgents are concerned, whenever captured or arrested I 

shall want them held. Turn none of them loose without good reason. If 

an individual insurgent soldier come in and surrender with a gun, accept 

his surrender and turn him loose to encourage others to do likewise, but 

if they come to surrender without guns confine them in prison and keep 

them there until the guns are forthcoming. We want guns much worse than 
42

we want insurgents, and if they should find that they could surrender and 

obtain liberty without surrendering their arms we would obtain mighty 

few. When we get all the arms there will be no more insurrection.

I do not want to be understood as advocating any policy which involves 

unauthorized methods as a means of extracting information. Information 

so obtained is generally worthless. It sometimes results in getting a gun 

but seldom leads to important results. We want to accomplish our purpose 

without resorting to any methods that are liable to demoralize our men and 

that always do more harm than good.

Prisoners in need of prison discipline may be confined a limited time 

in dark cells, provided they and the cells are healthy, or be placed in solitary confinement on bread and water for limited periods of time. But doctors should regularly examine them with a view to guarding against doing 

any permanent injury.

If you have evidence that the officials of any town are concealing 

information or sending out same to the enemy, they should be tried or 

properly disciplined. As subjects of the United States these men all owe 

allegiance to the government, but as public officials who have taken an 

oath to be loyal and well and faithfully perform their duties, they are under 

an additional obligation to render loyal service.

I presume it will seem to your judgment, as it does to mine, impossible for a political assassination to occur in any town, in broad daylight, in 

public places, without every local official and principale knowing who did 

it within 24 hours. If they do not, they can easily find out. Local officials 

who do not apprehend such assassins, or at least give full information as to 

their identity to commanding officers, should be arrested and held responsible for neglect of duty.

I have never known an insurgent officer to order a presidente to build 

a bridge or do something else, that it was not promptly done. I have frequently known presidentes to make many promises but find it impossible 

to conclude any necessary public work ordered by commanding officers. 

To correct such conditions it will only be necessary to use a bit of determination and firmness. Confine the delinquent official in order to teach 

him you mean what you say and you will doubtless have little trouble in 

the future.

By cruel ontrages and inhuman expedients, insurgents have created a 

reign of terror in these Islands which intimidates the people against giving 

us any assistance, but by legitimate means we must produce sufficient fear 

of our power to at least prevent their helping insurgents. We cannot resort 
43

to assassination for this purpose as they do, but by retaliation we can and 

must render the life of every friendly native and American at least as safe 

as that of an insurgent anywhere. I shall certainly do all that can be accomplished by legitimate means in this direction. It is my purpose, by giving 

them proper protection, to turn the inhabitants against the insurrection and 

secure their earnest and loyal assistance in efforts to re-establish peace. 

This was accomplished in the north and I believe it can be accomplished 

here, notwithstanding these people are all Tagalos.

As soon as I have studied the situation a few days, I shall begin the 

issuance of definite written instructions.

_________

45

TELEGRAPHIC CIRCULARS.

NO. 1. December 6th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

It is my purpose to send in circular form by wire a number of instructions pertaining to the policy to be pursued in the campaign in this Brigade; 

copies by mail will follow. It is important that these copies be kept on a 

separate file to facilitate transference to all successors in case of change 

of station. In such contingencies these files will, without fail, be turned 

over to successors and their receipts taken therefor. There will likewise 

be entered in this file any general authority sent to an individual station 

commander to pursue any particular policy with reference to his station or 

district. I hope to visit every station in the Brigade as soon as practicable 

and will inspect this file of instructions to ascertain if it is complete. The 

Brigade inspector will be required to do likewise. All station commanders 

will improvise a file for filing these instructions separately, and will, in 

addition, have them entered in station records or company books where 

only one company is present and no post files are kept. Any answer sent to 

telegram signed by me personally may be addressed to me direct.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 2. December 8th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

In order to put an end to enforced contributions, now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts, by means of intimidation and assassination, commanding officers of 

all towns now existing in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, including 

those at which no garrison is stationed at present, will immediately specify 

and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a 

zone within which it may be practicable, with an average sized garrison, 

to exercise efficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants 

(who desire to be peaceful) against the depredations of armed insurgents. 

These limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town 

to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include 

some ground on which live stock can graze, but so situated that it can be 

patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon 

as troops become available.

Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and 

distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over 
46

which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits and that unless they move by December 25th 

from outlying barrios and districts with all their movable food supplies, 

including rice, palay, chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the 

zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts 

should they desire to do so, to construct temporary shelter for themselves 

on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will 

be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so.

In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities 

of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking 

protection.

As soon as peaceful conditions have been re-established in the Brigade 

these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 3. December 9th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

A general conviction, which the Brigade Commander shares, appears 

to exist that the insurrection in this Brigade continues because the greater 

part of the people, especially the wealthy ones, pretend to desire, but in 

reality do not want peace. That when all really want peace we can have 

it promptly. Under such circumstances it is clearly indicated that a policy 

should be adopted that will as soon as possible make the people want 

peace and want it badly.

It is an inevitable and deplorable consequence of war that the innocent 

must generally suffer with the guilty, for when inflicting merited punishment upon a guilty class it is unfortunately at times impossible to avoid 

the doing of damage to some who do not individually deserve it. Military 

necessity frequently precludes the possibility of making just discriminations. This is regretable, but it should be borne in mind that the greatest 

good to the greatest number can best be brought about by putting a prompt 

end to insurrection. A short and severe war creates in the aggregate less 

loss and suffering than benevolent war indefinitely prolonged. For reasons 

here indicated which are well known to all, and chief of which is the delay 
47

and difficulty in ascertaining the exact truth, it will be impossible to wage 

war efficiently and at the same time to do abstract justice in operations 

unquestionably essential to putting down an insurrection which has long 

continued in the territory of this Brigade.

Natural and commendable sympathy for suffering and loss and for 

those with whom friendly relations may have been maintained, should 

therefore take a place subordinate to the doing of whatever may be necessary to bring a people, who have as yet not felt the distressing effect of 

war, to a realizing sense of the advantages of peace.

War in the disturbed portions of this Brigade, and, when manifestly 

necessary, in those portions supposed to be peaceful or which are under 

civil government, will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of 

General Order 100, A.G.O., 1863, which publishes instructions for the government of the armies of the United States in the field. The provisions of 

this order will be strictly adhered to, but no station commander will put any 

one to death as a matter of retaliation for assassination under Sections 27, 

28, 84, and 148, without obtaining authority from a superior commander, 

nor will the death penalty be inflicted in any case without similar authority. 

General Order 100 is now being reprinted at Division Headquarters, and 

when copies are received they will be distributed. Particular attention is 

invited to the last paragraph of Section 52, in particular reference to possible repetitions of the Balinguiga [Balangiga] affair.

Commanding officers are urged and enjoined to use their discretion 

freely in adopting any or all measures of warfare authorized by this order 

which will contribute in their judgment toward enforcing the policy or 

accomplishing the purpose above announced.

It is not necessary to seek or wait for authority from these headquarters 

to do anything or take any action which will contribute to the end in 

view. It is desired that sub-district commanders accord to subordinate 

commanders and officers a degree of confidence and latitude in operations 

similar to that herein conferred upon them. Such restraint and supervision 

only should be exercised as is dictated by sound discretion, and as may be 

essential to securing concert of action and co-operation when desirable, 

adherence to authorized methods, and a uniform policy and harmonious 

action in working for a common end. Subordinate commanders and 

young officers of experience should not be restrained or discouraged 

without excellent reason, but should be encouraged to hunt for, pursue 

and vigorously operate against armed bodies of insurgents wherever 

they may be found. Considering the comparative moral of our troops and 

insurgents and the lack of reliable ammunition and training on the part 
48

of the latter, it is not believed there exists any just cause for exceptional 

caution or apprehension in attacking them boldly. At any rate, under present 

conditions, legitimate chances should be accepted, as excessive caution 

will do us incalculable harm. Except when the advantage in position and 

numbers is overwhelming, on the side of the enemy, our troops should 

always assume the offensive and advance on and pursue them vigorously. 

The best defense against these people is to assume a vigorous offensive at 

once. To retire in the presence of this enemy is generally hazardous and 

discouraging to our troops.

Nothing herein contained will be so interpreted as to warrant or excuse 

carelessness or a lack of well known and proper precautions. Though troops 

should be aggressive, they should be military in methods, and precautions 

against surprise and ambush should never be neglected.

In addition to maintaing [sic] active operations against armed bands of 

insurgents, persistent and systematic efforts will be made through the use 

of spies, loyal police, native scouts, intelligence officers, provost marshals 

and provost courts to discover, apprehend and punish all agents, collectors, organizers, contributers and sympathizers who secretly aid, assist and 

extend encouragement or comfort to those in arms. Many such persons 

will unquestionably be found among municipal officials and councils and 

tenientes or cabezas of barrios.

It is so probable as to amount almost to a certainty that the election 

of all town officials in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna have been 

dictated by Malvar or other insurgent leaders and that they would never 

have been permitted to discharge their functions without molestation had 

they not continued to be subservient to the will of the insurgent leaders 

and been acting as their agents or at least have done nothing inconsistent 

with their interests.* It is perfectly safe and easy for town councils to enact 

the most violent legislation against the insurrection and, sending copies 

thereof to the insurgent leaders, to secretly inform them that the legislation 

was enacted under compulsion of Americans or in order to deceive and lull 

them to sleep, but that the town officials propose to continue their aid of 

the insurrection secretly just as heretofore. It can be adopted as a rule without danger of error, that whenever an insurgent sympathizer writes a letter 

or takes any action under pretense of opposition to the insurrection, that he 

will immediately secretly convey to the insurgent officials the information 

that he was compelled to do so or did so to mislead Americans. The loyalty 

of persons should not be judged by such acts or by words alone, nor should 

the public enactments of councils in favor of peace and against insurrection be accepted as conclusive proof of the loyalty of town officials.
49

The only acceptable and convincing evidence of the real sentiments of 

either individuals or town councils should be such acts publicly performed 

as must inevitably commit them irrevocably to the side of Americans by 

arousing the animosity and opposition of the insurgent element. Such acts 

are reliable evidence, but mere words are worthless. No person should 

be given credit for loyalty simply because he takes the oath of allegiance 

or secretly conveys to Americans worthless information and idle rumors 

which result in nothing. Those who publicly guide our troops to the camps 

of the enemy, who publicly identify insurgents, who accompany troops 

in operations against the enemy, who denounce and assist in arresting the 

secret enemies of the government, who publicly obtain and bring reliable 

and valuable information to commanding officers, those, in fact, who publicly array themselves against the insurgents and for Americans should be 

trusted and given credit for loyalty, but no others. No person should be 

given credit for loyalty solely on account of his having done nothing for 

or against us so far as known. Neutrality should not be tolerated. Every 

inhabitant of the Brigade should either be an active friend or be classed as 

an enemy.

Presidentes and chiefs of police against whom sufficient evidence can 

be found to convict them before a court of violating their oaths by acting 

as agents for insurgents, or by aiding, assisting or protecting them in any 

way, should be arrested and confined, and should ordinarily be tried by 

Military Commission. Charges should be preferred and forwarded with 

that in view. Other town officials guilty of similar offenses might be tried 

by Provost Courts unless their offense be too grave for adequate punishment thereby.

Another dangerous class of enemies are wealthy sympathizers and 

contributors who, though holding no official position, use all their influence in support of the insurrection, and while enjoying American protection for themselves, their families and property, secretly aid, protect and 

contribute to insurgents. Chief and most important among this class of disloyal persons are native priests. It may be considered as practically certain 

that every native priest in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna is a secret 

enemy of the government and in active sympathy with insurgents. These 

are absolutely our most dangerous enemies—more dangerous even than 

armed insurgents—because of their unequalled influence. They should be 

given no exemption on account of their calling. On the contrary, whenever 

sufficient evidence is obtainable, they should be brought to trial. Should 

well founded suspicion rest against them, in the absence of competent evidence, they should be confined and held as a necessary military precaution 
50

to preclude further activity or bad influence on their part. The same course 

should be pursued with all of this class, for to arrest anyone believed to be 

guilty of giving aid or assistance to the insurrection in any way or of giving food or comfort to the enemies of the government, it is not necessary 

to wait for sufficient evidence to lead to conviction by a court, but those 

strongly suspected of complicity with the insurrection may be arrested and 

confined as a military necessity and may be held as prisoners of war in 

the discretion of the station commanders until receipt of other orders from 

higher authority. It will frequently be found impossible to obtain any evidence against persons of influence as long as they are at liberty, but once 

confined, evidence is easily obtainable.

The apprehension and punishment of one individual of the above 

mentioned classes (men of wealth and standing and officials) is of greater 

importance and will exercise greater influence than the punishment of a 

hundred ignorant hombres for whose suffering no principale cares a straw. 

The wealthy and influential and town and insurgent officials are therefore those against whom our most energetic efforts should be directed. 

The common people amount to nothing. They are merely densely ignorant 

tools who blindly follow the lead of the principales. When guilty they 

must be arrested and confined in order to put an end to further activity on 

their part, but whenever it is possible to reach their chief or leader through 

their testimony they may be promised immunity from trial for such simple 

offenses as aiding or assisting or being insurgents. They should not be 

released, however, unless they are willing to demonstrate their loyalty by 

public participation against their former leaders.

The policy herein indicated need not be applied, should commanding 

officers by convinced it is inadvisable, in those portions of the Brigade 

where peaceful conditions have been completely re-established, as in 

Marinduque for example. Discretion should also be exercised as to the 

degree of rigor to be employed in its enforcement in those portions of the 

Brigade where civil government exists and where no organized insurrection or intrigue is discoverable.

Provost Courts cannot operate in the Provinces of Cavite and Tayabas, 

but any disloyal person escaping from Batangas or Laguna into other provinces of the Brigade may be there arrested by the military authorities and 

be sent back for trial by military courts in the province from which they 

escaped. Insurgents or armed ladrones residing in Cavite or Tayabas, and 

operating across the line in Batangas or Laguna, or other persons living 

in Cavite or Tayaba who furnish aid or assist the insurgents in any way, 

or who engage in insurrectionary intrigues or operations, will be arrested 

and reported to these Headquarters for further instructions. Any station in 
51

Batangas or Laguna at which a Provost Court does not now exist will be 

reported and an officer recommended as such.

Wherever the constabulary have been organized, cordial co-operation 

will be extended to and solicited from them. Commanding officers will 

promptly transmit by wire to other commanding officers any information 

which may possibly be of assistance to them and are expected to seek 

co-operation and concert of action from each other whenever such may 

appear to be desirable.

Additional telegraphic instructions will follow suggesting expedients 

or policies which are believed to be efficacious in particular contingencies. 

Acknowledge receipt.

J.F. BELL.

____________

*It was subsequently ascertained that this was true and applied to the province of Tayabas as well.

____________

NO. 4. December 11th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

It is understood that municipal police in some of the towns of the provinces of Batangas and Laguna are armed with rifles or carbines. It is not 

known at these Headquarters by what authority such arms were put in the 

hands of municipal police, but the Brigade Commander desires that they 

be taken away from all municipal police except those who have actually 

fought by the side of Americans or have done other things mentioned in 

Circular Telegram No. 3, which irrevocably commits them to the side of the 

Americans by arousing the animosity and opposition of the insurgents.

It is also his wish that hereafter no extra pay be given to any municipal police as a mere matter of form or routine or simply because heretofore it may have been paid without discrimination, pursuant to a system 

established under other conditions. Quartermasters will obtain the funds 

as usual, but it will be paid in the discretion of the Commanding Officer 

to those policemen only who publicly render really valuable service to the 

government against insurgents.

Wherever arms are taken up under this authority, they will be immediately turned over to those accountable for them, an informal receipt being 

given, for their protection, to those who have been responsible for them.

J.F. BELL.
52

____________

NO. 5. December 13th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

The United States Government, disregarding many provocations to 

do otherwise, has for three years exercised an extraordinary forbearance 

and patiently adhered to a magnanimous and benevolent policy toward the 

inhabitants of the territory garrisoned by this Brigade. Notwithstanding 

this fact, opposition to the government has been persistently continued 

throughout this entire period by a majority of its inhabitants. The enemy, 

long realizing their inability to maintain themselves without the unanimous co-operation and support of the entire population, have, in order to 

keep up their useless struggle, established a reign of terror by resorting to 

atrocities and expedients which violate the well known laws and usages of 

war as announced in G.O. 100, A.G.O., 1863, approved and published by 

order of President Lincoln, for the government of the armies of the United 

States in the field.

1st. They have accepted local offices from the government and taken 

the oath of allegiance solely for the purpose of improving their opportunities and facilities for deceiving American officials and treacherously aiding and assisting the cause of the insurrection, in violation of Section 26.

2nd. They have, with bolos and other weapons, killed helpless prisoners and soldiers lying on the ground wholly disabled by wounds which 

prevented their defending themselves in any way, in violation of Sections 

49, 56, 61 and 71.

3rd. In order to confuse their identity and thereby be able the more 

safely to conduct their skulking operations, they have adopted the uniform 

of our army and native troops without any plain, striking and uniform 

mark of distinction of their own, in violation of Section 63.

4th. They have improvised and secreted in the vicinity of roads and 

trails rudely constructed infernal machines propelling poisoned arrows or 

darts, in violation of Section 70, thus placing themselves beyond the pale 

of the laws and usages of war.

5th. Men and squads of men without commission, without being 

part or portion of the regularly organized hostile army, without sharing 

continuously in the war, but with intermittent returns to their homes and 

avocations, and with frequent assumption of the semblance of peaceful 

pursuits, divesting themselves of the character and appearance of soldiers, 
53

have committed hostilities by fighting and making raids of various kinds, 

after which, concealing their arms, they have returned, posing as peaceful 

citizens, and secretly lived in the same towns with garrisons of our troops, 

in violation of Section 82.

6th. Armed prowlers have stolen within the lines of our army to cut 

telegraph wires and destroy bridges. Armed assassins, designated and 

controlled by the enemy, have come, disguised as peaceful citizens, into 

the very presence of our garrisons and have assassinated, in broad daylight 

in crowded market places, persons unlawfully condemned to death by 

the enemy for being friendly to or assisting the legitimately organized 

government—the fear, sympathy or co-operation of the entire population 

effectually preventing our apprehension and punishment of the assassins. 

This in violation of Section 84.

7th. The apparently pacific inhabitants of towns occupied by the 

American army have treacherously risen in arms against it, in violation of 

Section 85.

8th. A large percentage of the population, though owing allegiance to 

the American government under the provisions of Section 26, have acted 

as spies and war traitors, in violation of the provisions of Sections 88, 90 

and 92.

9th. A very great number of insurgent officials, soldiers and other aiders and abettors of the insurrection, after voluntarily surrendering and after 

having been captured, have been pardoned, and released from confinement 

upon taking the oath of allegiance or given paroles, and have subsequently 

violated their oaths or paroles without scruple by again entering the service of the insurgent army, or aiding and assisting the same, in violation of 

Sections 26, 124 and 130.

Against but one of these flagrant violations of the laws of war, namely, 

murder, has the United States Government ever adjudged or executed 

the severe penalties authorized by the sections of the law above cited, 

in the vain hope that, by this exercise of forbearance and generosity, the 

people might be conciliated and become reconciled to and convinced of 

the benevolent purposes of the government. Instead of having the desired 

effect, however, this policy in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna has 

apparently failed to appeal to even the keenest and most appreciative intellects. On the contrary, it has been interpreted by many as an evidence of 

weakness and fear, and puffed up by a childish and ignorant conceit over 

what they are pleased to consider successful resistance of our power, the 

people have become so arrogant that they look down upon our government and scorn its kindliest efforts at pacification. We consequently find 
54

ourselves operating in a thoroughly occupied terrain against the entire 

population, united in a hopeless struggle, using, conniving at or tolerating 

barbarous methods which almost reach the limit in outraging the laws and 

usages of legitimate warfare.

The reckless expedients adopted by the enemy, especially the policy 

of intimidation and assassination, leave to the Brigade Commander no 

other means of protecting either the lives of his subordinates, or those of 

peaceful and friendly citizens, or the interests of his government against 

the repetition of barbarous outrage, except the enforcement of the penalties authorized by the above cited laws of war, and he has reluctantly 

concluded it to be absolutely necessary to avail himself of the right of 

retaliation under the provisions of Sections 59 and 148, whenever the duly 

and carefully ascertained conditions and circumstances warrant the same 

under the restrictions prescribed in Section 28.

The Brigade Commander therefore announces for the information 

of all concerned, that wherever prisoners or unarmed or defenseless 

Americans or natives friendly to the United States government are murdered or assassinated for political reasons, and this fact can be established, 

it is his purpose to execute a prisoner of war under the authority contained 

in Sections 59 and 148. This prisoner of war will be selected by lot from 

among the officers or prominent citizens held as prisoners of war, and will 

be chosen when practicable from those who belong to the town where the 

murder or assassination occurred.

It is also his purpose to severely punish, in the same or a lesser degree, 

the commission of other acts denounced by the aforementioned articles. In 

this connection the attention of all American officers is invited to the last 

paragraph of Section 29 and to the provisions of Section 134. Commanding 

officers are authorized to enforce the provisions of this latter section wherever they may deem it just and practicable.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 6. December 13th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

In the case of armed prowlers and others who cut telegraph wires and 

destroy bridges within the provisions of Batangas and Laguna, the measures and degree of retaliation will be left to the discretion of sub-district 

commanders, who, in the measures adopted, will observe the principles 

announced in Section 28, G.O. 100. In order that these measures may be 
55

uniform and consistent in contiguous localities, no station commander will 

execute any measure of retaliation for this violation of Section 84, G.O. 

100, without first having obtained from the sub-district commander, general instructions on the subject.

The following expedients have been tried with success: Wherever the 

line was cut or bridges were burned in such close proximity to cities or 

barrios as to raise a strong presumption that it was done by the hostile 

element of those places, a number of houses of that place, proportioned 

to the damage done, were burned. Another expedient which has been very 

efficacious elsewhere has been numbering each telegraph pole and assigning those within the jurisdiction of any town or barrio to the presidente or 

cabeza of the said town or barrio for special care and supervision, with 

instructions to assign a native of the town or barrio to each pole, whose 

duty it should be to replace it immediately if destroyed.

Inasmuch as there is no doubt that, in the provinces of Batangas and 

Laguna, the municipal officials almost without exception are hostile to us, 

it is deemed expedient that any destruction of property in retaliation for 

damage to telegraph lines or bridges should include the houses of the said 

officials, exception being made only in the case of those officials who have 

already demonstrated their loyalty by acts at the time the damage is done.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 7. December 15th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Though Section 17, G.O. 100, authorizes the starving of unarmed hostile belligerents, as well as armed ones, provided it leads to a speedier 

subjection of the enemy, it is considered neither justifiable nor desirable 

to permit any person to starve who has come into towns under our control 

seeking protection. Although many of these persons can unquestionably 

be classed as enemies with perfect justice, it is too difficult to discriminate 

between the hostile and those who really desire peace to inaugurate or permit any policy of starvation under such circumstances. Every proper effort 

will be made at all times to deprive those in arms in the mountains of food 

supplies, but in order that those who have assembled in the towns may not 

be reduced to want it is absolutely essential to confiscate, transport to garrisoned towns and save for future contingencies, whenever possible, every 

particle of food supply which may be found concealed in the mountains 

for insurgents or abandoned at a distance from towns.
56

Therefore, instead of destroying animals and food products, found by 

troops under such circumstances, commanding officers will make every 

possible effort to see that such animals and food are brought into the nearest town and kept under control of the military authorities for future use. 

In accomplishing this, all means of transportation may be seized and every 

able bodied male impressed and marched under guard to transport said 

food products into towns.

Though it is recognized that it may be difficult at times to accomplish 

the above instructions, it is expected that every reasonable effort will be 

made to do so, even at the expense of time, care and labor, and that no 

rice or food will be destroyed except where absolutely impracticable to 

get it to towns. It should not take more than a week to completely clear all 

outlying districts of food products. Station commanders will begin at once 

to hunt for and bring in these supplies. Food abandoned may be given to 

those townspeople who will bring it in, if impossible to get it in for the 

government.

Storehouses in which to store these products will be taken possession 

of, or when none are available the presidente will be required to build 

one with labor and material of the town without compensation from the 

government. These products will be carefully preserved by the garrison 

for future issue in accordance with a system to be announced hereafter. 

The rice of persons believed to be disloyal, beyond an amount necessary 

for themselves and dependents, may be confiscated and preserved for the 

same purpose.

No rice or food supplies thus seized will be fed to public animals, nor 

will any of it be consumed by troops except in case of emergency and 

necessity. None of this food will be issued gratis to well-to-do people who 

have means and property on which they can raise money to buy it, but 

when such people have no rice and are unable to purchase it elsewhere, 

these government stores may be sold in small quantities at a reasonable 

rate. The money thus accumulated will be used to purchase other rice in 

Manila to be transported by the government and resold at the same price 

or issued gratis to paupers.

The utmost care will be taken in registering paupers and the members 

of their families, in order that frauds may be prevented in the gratuitous 

issue of food.

In the discretion of sub-district commanders, after consulting station 

commanders, a uniform scale may be established, regulating the prices that 

may be charged by merchants for ordinary and necessary food supplies. 
57

Sub-district commanders may also transfer any surplus of government 

stores from one town to another which needs it worse.

It is the purpose of this order to place the burden of feeding the poor 

upon the wealthy classes, whose disloyalty has brought on and maintained 

this war, and upon those who still remain disloyal, especially upon those 

who are actively sympathizing, contributing to, and otherwise aiding and 

assisting the insurrection. See provisions of Sections 21, 37, 38 and 156, 

G.O. 100.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 8. December 17th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Information has frequently been received at this office relating to 

movements of insurgents and taken from captured correspondence, without mentioning the date of said movements or of correspondence from 

which information is taken.

Information given by natives to local officers has also been repeated 

here, and on investigation the information was found to be weeks or 

months old.

The attention of all officers is invited to the fact that it is impossible 

to judge of the value or significance of such information without knowing the date thereof, which is of first importance. The hour should also be 

given, if practicable, when insurgents were observed moving or in camp 

in any locality.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 9. December 17th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Whenever the treasurer of any town is arrested, the commanding officer will immediately designate an officer who will secure the treasurer’s 

books and accounts and take charge of any funds in his possession, giving 

him an informal receipt therefor for his protection. This action will then 

be reported to these Headquarters with a statement of amount of money 

on hand. If the local commanding officer thinks it wise or safe to do so he 

may nominate another native treasurer and report his name for confirmation by the Brigade Commander.
58

These instructions will apply in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna 

only. No municipal treasurer will be arrested in those provinces under civil 

government without first having obtained authority and instructions from 

these Headquarters.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 10. December 20th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Commanding officers in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna will 

prepare to send out commands on the 26th of December and every day 

thereafter until January 1st, for the especial purpose of hunting insurgents 

and disloyal persons and confiscating and bringing into government storehouses all rice and food supplies found within the jurisdiction of their 

town and outside the zone of protection. Rice found in the possession of 

families so situated will, if practicable, be moved with them to towns; that 

found abandoned or apparently stored in mountains or other places for 

insurgents will be confiscated and brought in for the government.

In accomplishing this, commanding officers are authorized to impress 

every possible means of transportation, including able bodied males, as 

burden bearers, and the use of prisoners of war. When large quantities of 

rice are found so located as to render it possible to transport it to town, a 

guard will be left over it until sufficient transportation can be secured for 

moving it. The families of poor people, women and children, of the town, 

may be notified that they can go out and take for their own use as much of 

the rice as they can transport.

It is desired that all commanding officers make an especial effort during these six days to accumulate as large a store of rice within the towns as 

possible, but whenever it is found absolutely impossible to transport it to a 

point within the protected zone, it will be burned or otherwise destroyed. 

These rules will apply to all food products.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 11. December 20th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Hereafter, except by special authority from these Headquarters, no 

enlisted men of this command, or native or American scouts, or natives or 
59

Americans employed by the military authorities, will be permitted to own 

or have in their possession any native horses or stock of any description.

If there are any such persons who now own such animals, for which 

they have bills of sales, commanding officers will see that they dispose of 

them at once. In case they have no bills of sale, their ownership will be 

carefully investigated and unless they can clearly prove legitimate title, the 

animals will be turned into the Quartermaster’s Department, be branded 

“U.S.,” and be taken up on the returns.

There may be a few American and native employees whose duty 

requires them to be mounted and who may have horses for use in their 

work; there may also be a few natives employed by the government who 

own and have horses for their family use. Such cases will be reported 

and explained in detail, requesting authority to retain them, should commanding officers deem it necessary or desirable that they retain them. The 

Quartermaster’s Department will furnish public mounts to others who 

need them. All stock captured or taken up will at once be turned into the 

Quartermaster’s Department and be taken up and accounted for. After this 

order has been complied with, individuals mentioned in first paragraph 

will not be permitted to claim stock so acquired under any circumstances 

whatever.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 12. December 21st, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Though the Brigade Commander is desirous that officers should be 

bold and aggressive in their work, and work fearlessly with small parties 

at night, he desires to remind all of the necessity for unceasing vigilance 

and for the usual precautions against surprise and ambush.

He again wishes to repeat that ordinarily the best defense can be made 

by assuming the offensive, that if small parties are caught by an overwhelming force, it is better to stand their ground, if any suitable position 

whatever can be obtained, than to undertake to retreat in plain view. An 

orderly retreat might be accomplished when there is ample cover to conceal the movement, or at night, but it is exceedingly hazardous for small 

parties in the day time to scatter and undertake to retreat individually.

Inasmuch as the change of policy which has recently taken place is 

calculated to arouse strong resentment on the part of the enemy, all persons 
60

should expect greater aggressiveness and activity on their part. For the 

present, commanding officers should not permit very small detachments 

of footmen to undertake operations by daylight so far away as to render 

reinforcement in a reasonable time impossible.

The telegraphic instructions of recent date requiring all cavalry soldiers to wear their revolvers and infantry soldiers to wear their bayonets 

sharpened when they go about towns, will be strictly enforced. No soldier 

should be permitted to go beyond the immediate vicinity of the garrison 

alone under any circumstances.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 13. December 21st, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

On account of the large number of people who have assembled in 

towns seeking the protection of American troops, and to guard against 

treachery, all commanding officers in the provinces of Batangas and 

Laguna, and of those towns in Tayabas where people have so assembled, 

will notify them, through their proper representatives, that if the people 

of the town should treacherously arise against the troops, the town will 

be completely destroyed by fire as a measure of retaliation against such 

treachery, under the provisions of Section 27 and the last paragraph of 

Section 52, G.O. 100.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 14. December 21st, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

On and after January 1st, 1902, all traffic on roads or trails outside 

of the protected zones, for any purpose whatever, all passing of persons 

or merchandise to and fro between towns will be strictly forbidden by all 

commanding officers in the towns of Batangas and Laguna. No persons 

will be permitted to leave the town without a written pass from the commanding officer thereof, said pass to show length of time the said individual has permission to be absent, where permitted to go and for what 

purpose. If the pass is to go to a neighboring town, the holder will be 

required to present it to the commanding officer thereof, who will note this 
61

fact and the hour on the pass. Unless the holder is back by the expiration 

of the specified time, arrest and confinement will follow. No pass will be 

given to any able bodied male for any purpose whatever, except in case 

of extreme necessity, and no pass will be given an able bodied male to go 

anywhere to do anything which a woman can do equally well.

An exception will be made in those towns where it may be practicable to permit the people to gather standing crops, under the protection of 

patrols or detachments of soldiers.

Any able bodied male found by patrols or scouting detachments outside of protected zones without passes will be arrested and confined, or 

shot if he runs away. No old or feeble man or any woman or child will be 

shot at pursuant to this rule.

Any merchandise found outside of protected zones after January 1st, 

1902, will be confiscated for the government or destroyed.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 15. December 23rd, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

In addition to the provisions of Telegraphic Circular No. 14, the following restrictions upon internal trade and commerce will be enforced 

throughout the provinces of Batangas and Laguna:

1. The manufacture of copra is hereby forbidden in these two provinces, until further orders, and commanding officers will see that cocoanuts are preserved as food supplies to guard against anticipated necessities. 

The cocoanuts of any person found violating the above prohibition will be 

confiscated by the government and stored for issue to the poor in case of 

necessity.

2. Information has been received from Manila that business firms of 

that city, heretofore engaged in the business of buying country produce in 

these provinces, have sent large sums of money to their agents with a view 

of continuing purchases of produce during the period of closed ports and to 

accumulating them against the day when the ports will again be reopened. 

Inasmuch as this proceeding would partially defeat the purpose of closing 

the ports and be a great impediment to the successful issue of military 

operations, commanding officers will close all establishments conducted 

by Chinos and others which make a business of purchasing country produce and absolutely prohibit all further commercial transactions on their 
62

part. The manager or managers of any such establishment caught violating 

this prohibition will be arrested and reported to these Headquarters for 

further instructions, together with a detailed statement of their offense.

3. No one will be permitted to purchase rice or food supplies in large 

quantities for the purpose of speculation or selling at a high figure should 

food products become scarce.

4. No rice or food products will be permitted to leave the limits of 

protected zones except by special permission of the military authorities, 

which will be given only under such circumstance as will preclude its falling into the hands of insurgents.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 16. December 23rd, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Commanding officers of towns in the provinces of Batangas and 

Laguna are reminded of the provisions of Telegraphic Circular No. 3, 

which authorizes them to regulate the prices of food products in case of 

necessity. They will accordingly keep a close watch on such prices for the 

purpose of preventing extortion, and if, after regulating them, Chinos and 

others are found violating said regulations, drastic measures will be used 

to preclude such violations in the future. There are no persons doing business in these provinces who have not from time to time contributed to the 

insurrection and thereby rendered themselves liable to suffer the hardships 

of the war, under the provisions of G.O. 100.

Chinamen especially will be warned against buying up food products 

for the purpose of securing a monopoly and establishing a high price, and, 

if they undertake to violate regulations in this regard, commanding officers will require them to sell out at public auction, close up their establishments, and deport them from the Brigade to Manila.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 17. December 23rd, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

All commanding officers in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna 

are warned against beginning to issue food gratuitously until want and 
63

privation absolutely necessitates it. Wherever government stores of rice 

are held it is best to preserve the same until the current supply in the town 

has been used up at regulated prices, then the government rice may be sold 

at the same regulated prices to those who are able to buy it. Many of the 

very poor people who have no food nevertheless have money with which 

they can buy it, and none should be issued gratuitously until it has been 

thoroughly determined by a searching investigation that the individuals 

applying for charity have no means with which to purchase food.

Such persons, with the membership of their families, will be carefully registered and will be issued very limited supplies of food at frequent 

periods, preferably daily. In issuing rice each adult member of a family 

will be allowed for the present one chupa per day, and the same amount 

to each two children. A chupa measure can be found in any retail shop. 

Great pains will be taken not to unduly pauperize the people, for if they 

discover any unwise or excessive liberality in the free issue of food, the 

entire population (excepting the rich and well-to-do) will certainly flock 

around and claim to be paupers in order to obtain free issues of food. All 

officers should carefully husband their supplies in anticipation of a period 

of real want and suffering.

Wherever there are standing crops still ungathered, it is desired that 

commanding officers give protection to peaceful people in order to enable 

them to gather their palay. It is also desired that, whenever conditions 

become favorable for the planting of new food crops, commanding officers likewise give protection, and such assistance as may be practicable, 

to those who have gathered at towns (seeking our protection) in order that 

they may re-plant their land.

 J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 18. December 23rd, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Wherever similar action has not already been taken, commanding officers of all garrisoned towns in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, 

on the first day of January, 1902, or as soon there after as practicable, 

will, with the exceptions hereinafter noted, arrest all native municipal officials, including cabezas of barrios, leading principales, members of police 

force (who have not fully complied with their duty by actively aiding the 

Americans and rendering them valuable service) and any other person in 

the community who is known to be or is strongly suspected of being an 
64

active aider or abbettor of the insurrection, or a sympathizer therewith 

who uses his influence against the American government. Though all such 

persons will be arrested without distinction, it is especially desirable that 

no guilty principales or prominent persons escape.

Exception may be made of any one of the persons above mentioned 

who has demonstrated his loyalty by methods mentioned in Telegraphic 

Circular No. 3, or who has given secret aid and information of value to the 

commanding officer, but no neutrals will be spared. The secret repetition 

of idle rumors or information that everybody knows is to be considered 

valueless.

All persons not so arrested will be given to clearly understand that the 

time has now come when the principal people of each town have either 

got to go to prison as suspects or organize and work for peace by notifying 

insurgents that they will no longer aid or assist them, but will aid the government by denouncing insurgents who secretly enter towns in disguise, 

by giving to commanding officers all information of insurgent plans and 

movements that come to their notice, by refusing to contribute any longer 

either money or food, by assisting in defending the towns against attack, 

and by doing other things mentioned in Telegraphic Circular No. 3 to demonstrate their loyalty.

It is not intended by this circular to deprive station commanders of discretion, but it is desired that under its provisions they adopt an advanced 

and stringent policy and maintain it relentlessly.

In case of necessity, commanding officers are authorized to appoint 

new municipal officials, or, in their discretion, to detail an officer or noncommissioned officer to conduct the affairs of the town. The taxes will be 

collected as usual and disbursed for the benefit of the pueblo. Whenever 

an officer is not specially detailed for the purpose, the commanding officer 

will exercise close supervision over the collection and disbursement of the 

revenue, the usual taxes at the usual rates being collected in each town. 

In this connection attention is invited to the provisions of Telegraphic 

Circular No. 9.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 19. December 24th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

In order to make the existing state of war and martial law so inconvenient and unprofitable to the disloyal people that they will earnestly desire 
65

and work for the re-establishment of peace and civil government, and for 

the purpose of throwing the burden of the war upon the disloyal element, 

pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 21, 37, 76 and 156, G.O. 100, 

the following expedients may, in the discretion of sub-district and station 

commanders, be adopted throughout Batangas and Laguna:

1st. Until the re-establishment of civil government and the making 

of provisions thereby for the repair of roads and performance of other 

public work, the old Spanish law, requiring either fifteen days free labor or 

three pesos tax in lieu thereof, may be enforced and road work be begun 

as soon as it is practicable or safe to do so. Station commanders will see 

that Engineer officers in charge of road construction are furnished free 

labor, and the money collected pursuant to this provision will be used 

to purchase rice for those who labor. Wherever no Engineer officer is at 

work, and there is a piece of road needing repair, station commanders 

will, when practicable, detail an officer to supervise the repair and put 

the people to work, and will furnish the officer so detailed with sufficient 

assistance of soldiers and non-commissioned officers to give protection to 

and require those working to labor faithfully and intelligently. Where no 

officer is available, a suitable non-commissioned officer will be detailed 

in charge of the work. The object of this provision is to give beneficial 

occupation to the able bodied men concentrated in towns and to compel 

them to earn food for themselves and families. With this purpose in view, 

lists will be immediately prepared of all the principales, who will have the 

privilege of either paying three pesos or working, but all poor people (able 

bodied males) will be required to work in turn, it being undesirable to take 

money from them. Those who work on the road will be daily supplied, 

by arrangement with the officer in charge of the work, with sufficient rice 

for themselves and families from confiscated rice on hand and from that 

bought with the three peso tax on the well-to-do.

2nd. Cock-fighting, as now conducted in these two provinces, has 

been a source of very considerable revenue to insurgents and a convenient means of enabling the insurgent element to secretly mingle, impose 

upon and intrigue with the portion of the people who may prefer to be 

peaceful. Upon receipt of these orders, all commanding officers will forbid 

further cock fighting until authority to renew the same is obtained from 

these headquarters. It is proposed to again tolerate cock-fighting as soon 

as peace is re-established throughout the Brigade, or whenever satisfactory conditions are re-established in any towns, the privilege may again 

be tolerated in those towns. Whenever station commanders become satisfied that the sentiment of the town has entirely changed, and the people 

have arrayed themselves publicly and sincerely against the insurrection, 
66

a recommendation to tolerate the renewal of cock-fighting, explaining the 

conditions and circumstances on which the recommendation is based, will 

be considered at these headquarters.

3rd. Whenever station commanders are convinced that collections 

are being made for the benefit of the insurgent cause, in public markets, 

they are authorized to close the same with the consent and approval of subdistrict commanders. Inasmuch, however, as this is the only means some 

poor and inoffensive people have for gaining a livelihood, this expedient 

should be resorted to only when it is considered essential to preventing 

the abuse mentioned. By proper discipline of municipal police, thereby 

compelling them to do their duty and arrest collectors and other insurgents 

who enter market places, this expedient ought not to become necessary.

4th. Whenever necessary for the success of field operations, commanding officers of troops are authorized to seize and use, without compensation at present, carabao, ponies and other means of transportation, 

including the impressment of burden bearers or the use of prisoners of war 

for the same purpose, pursuant to the provisions of Section 76.

5th. When on active campaign, and troops run out of rations, commanding officers are authorized to levy necessary contributions of food on 

the inhabitants of hostile sections, and at all times sufficient rice may be 

obtained to feed burden bearers or prisoners used as such, under provisions 

of preceding paragraph. Animals seized for temporary use will not ordinarily be fed on palay, but the people may be required to cut and deliver 

sacate for them, without compensation, when troops are in the field.

6th. Until further orders the people of all towns and protected zones 

will be required to enter their habitations not later than 8 p.m., and to 

refrain from again appearing upon the street or outside of habitations 

before the break of day the following morning. Patrols will be frequently 

sent out in different directions at night and will arrest and confine all persons discovered out and about at night.

All commanding officers will exercise care that no authorized acts or 

abuses grow out of the enforcement and application of the foregoing provisions. An exception will always be made in the case of those who have 

demonstrated their loyalty in the manner explained in Telegraphic Circular 

No. 3. Their lives, families and property will not only be given protection, 

as far as practicable against insurgents, but will be carefully respected by 

our troops and great care will be taken in seeing that as little damage is 

done their interests as is consistent with the success of the government. 

Whenever it is found that their property has been seized for use by mistake 
67

it will be returned to them as soon as the necessities of the government 

will admit.

The provisions of this circular apply to the provinces of Batangas and 

Laguna only.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 20. December 24th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

In the discretion of commanding officers the following measures of 

discipline may be enforced in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, 

against disorderly persons and officials:

1st. Presidentes and cabezas will be required to notify the nearest 

military commander at once whenever insurgents are discovered to be 

within the limits of their jurisdiction. For any failure in this regard they 

will be tried and punished by Provost Court. In addition to this punishment any presidente or cabeza discovered to be concealing or protecting 

the enemy or furnishing false information or guides may be impressed as 

guides themselves and may be marched on foot daily at the head of columns or detachments until they have had a drastic lesson.

2nd. Should the inhabitants of any town fail or refuse to furnish sacate

or wood, and there be no assignable reason for said failure or refusal apparent to commanding officers, said failure or refusal may, without danger of 

error, be attributed to the influence or threats of disloyal principales or 

officials. In such a contingency, commanding officers may arrest principales and officials believed to be disloyal, and joining them with insurgent 

officers and prominent and influential persons held as prisoners of war, 

march them out under guard and require them to cut and deliver sacate

until they are willing to induce the poor people to furnish it for compensation as usual.

3rd. If there are any local officials who desire to resign and who are 

serving under compulsion, they should be notified that if they run away or 

try to evade or neglect such duty, they will be punished by imprisonment. 

Should any of them try to escape, all neighboring commanding officers 

will be notified at once to arrest them if found.

4th. Whenever it is ascertained beyond a doubt that guns have been 

concealed in barrios or on premises of disloyal persons, they will be 
68

notified to turn them in within a given time on pain of having the barrio or 

premises burned in case they fail to do so.

The utmost pains should be taken, however, to be certain that guns 

have been so hidden before the notification is given.

5th. All officers will exact respect for the American flag, and for officers and bodies of troops as representatives of the great nation to which 

they pertain. It has resulted from the lenient policy which the government 

has heretofore pursued that the people of these islands look down upon 

the representatives of the government to such an extent as to pass by them 

and their flag with sullen disdain. Hereafter all natives of this brigade, 

irrespective of standing, will be required to show that respect which is due 

from the people to the government of occupation.

6th. Commanding officers will have all parts of the uniform of 

American soldiers, found in the possession of natives, not authorized to 

wear them, seized, and soldiers and native troops caught selling any portion of their uniform should be severely punished.

7th. Hereafter, whenever sequestration or assassination takes place in 

towns in broad daylight and in crowded places (as has frequently occurred 

heretofore), commanding officers will immediately call upon local officials to ascertain and report without delay the names of the assassins with 

the evidence necessary for their conviction, and to arrest them if possible. 

If said officials do not know, they can certainly ascertain who such assassins are. If they fail to do so under such circumstances, they should be 

brought to trial for neglect of duty by Provost Court.

Commanding officers will promptly report to these headquarters all 

sequestrations and assassinations, detailing facts and circumstances, in 

order that further instructions may be given.

8th. The attention of all local officials and others who have been in 

the habit of furnishing the enemy timely information of the movements of 

American troops, should be called to the provisions of Sections 90 and 91, 

G.O. 100, and the attention of all foreigners should likewise be called to 

the provisions of Section 98.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 21. December 24th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

The primary and most important object of all our operations in this 
69

Brigade is to obtain possession of the arms now in the hands of insurgents 

and disloyal persons, and incidentally to capture as many insurgents as 

possible, especially those accused of grave offenses against the laws of 

war.

1st. As the surrender of individuals (who have not been guilty of 

assassinations and violations of oaths of allegiance) without procuring all 

their arms is a matter of very slight importance to us, it is not considered 

desirable to accept the proffered surrender of any insurgents unless at the 

same time they surrender all the guns under their control. The following 

exceptions will be made to the above rule: The surrender of individual 

soldiers presenting themselves with serviceable guns will be accepted and 

they will be turned loose, after taking the oath of allegiance. The unconditional surrender of staff officers, collectors and other agents may be 

accepted, without arms, in case it is believed they have none, but, in such 

cases, they will be confined and will be retained in confinement until they 

have rendered valuable service against the insurgents and demonstrated 

their loyalty in the manner explained in Telegraphic Circular No. 3.

2nd. All surrenders of line officers must likewise be unconditional, 

and prior to permitting line officers to earn their liberty it must be as 

correctly ascertained as possible whether they have had any arms under 

their control, and the securing of these arms must be a condition of their 

release. The full number of guns that they have had in their possession 

will be exacted before their release will be favorably considered at these 

headquarters. Whenever insurgent officers and soldiers are captured they 

will, as a rule, be brought to trial by Provost Court for violation of the laws 

of war by participating in guerrilla warfare, unless they immediately render 

such valuable service to the government as may be considered sufficient to 

merit leniency.

3rd. The following rewards will be paid to agents, spies, guides, etc.: 

To those who either secure insurgent guns or give information and furnish 

guides which enable detachments of our troops to secure them, thirty (30) 

pesos for each serviceable gun; to those who capture insurgent officers or 

give information and guide our troops in such a way as to enable them to 

capture said officers, five (5) pesos will be paid for every officer captured 

below the rank of major, and ten (10) pesos for every officer above the 

rank of captain. For information leading to the capture of general officers, 

greater rewards, to be agreed upon, may be offered.

4th. No oaths of allegiance will be administered to anyone simply 

and solely for the purpose of giving them additional security against 

responsibility for their past conduct. Only those who have demonstrated 
70

their loyalty by methods mentioned in Telegraphic Circular No. 3 will be 

permitted to take the oath of allegiance. It will be refused to all others who 

apply for it.

Before any insurgent, who has been operating in another jurisdiction 

than that in which he surrenders, is permitted to take the oath of allegiance 

and released, the commanding officer at the post at which he surrenders 

will telegraph to the commanding officer of the town near which he has 

been operating and ascertain whether there are any charges against him for 

violations of the laws of war.

The money to pay for guns will be obtained from the Quartermaster’s 

Department; rewards for the capture of officers will be paid from secret 

service funds. 

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 22. December 24th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

The purpose of the preceding telegraphic circulars of instruction has 

been to place the burden of the war on the disloyal and to so discipline 

them that they will become anxious to aid and assist the government in 

putting an end to the insurrection and in securing the re-establishment of 

civil government. Their provisions are based upon the assumption that, 

with very few exceptions, practically the whole population has been hostile to us at heart. In order to combat such a population, it is necessary to 

make the state of war insupportable, and there is no more efficacious way 

of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people in such a 

state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such conditions will 

soon become unbearable.

Little should be said; the less said the better. The making of threats 

which cannot be carried out should especially be carefully guarded against. 

Let acts, not words, convey intentions. The more an officer does and the 

less he says about what he is going to do the more apprehensive and anxious will become those who are guilty and who wait for what is next to 

happen. When it becomes necessary to give warning or publish instructions, it should be done dispassionately, and not in a threatening way.

The main object of the policy being to cause the people to change their 

minds and to conclude that it is best to help the government to put down 

this insurrection, a tendency in this direction will be encouraged, and as 

soon as officers observe that the people have come to their senses, they 
71

may modify the rigor of enforcement of this policy so far only as may be 

necessary to encourage and welcome those who might really and sincerely 

be desirous of lending assistance.

Officers are again cautioned, however, not to judge or be mislead by 

words alone. They must rely solely upon acts in order to form a correct 

judgement of sincerity. The benefit of every doubt should be given to the 

government.

Those people who have demonstrated their loyalty and sincere desire 

to assist, by methods mentioned in Telegraphic Circular No. 3, should be 

spared, and protected as much as possible, in order to make a distinction 

between them and the disloyal.

Though it is intended and desired that the policy to be enforced shall 

be as rigid and relentless as it properly can be, until the people have 

changed their policy and completely turned against the insurgents, the 

Brigade Commander relies upon the sense of duty of every officer and 

non-commissioned officer, and the personal pride and gentility of every 

enlisted man, to effectually preclude looting and other abuses committed 

for personal advantage. He feels certain that officers and men who have 

so important a duty to perform, and who are forced to adopt such radical 

measures to accomplish it, do not wish to reflect serious discredit upon 

their motives by seeking or desiring any personal advantage.

 J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 23. December 28th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Hereafter no one in the territory of this Brigade will be permitted to 

use or have in their possession war bolos or talibons, that pattern of bolo 

which is long and sharp-pointed like a sword, except municipal police, 

constabulary, native scouts and others duly authorized to carry them.

In the provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Tayabas all such bolos 

found in possession of others than those mentioned above will be seized 

by troops and will be turned in to the commanding officers of scout companies, constabulary or municipal police until all such organizations are 

fully supplied with an equipment of bolos, which they should be required 

to carry on all occasions in case they have no bayonets.

In the province of Cavite peaceful citizens who have in their possession war bolos or talibons, left over from the war period, may be permitted 
72

to retain them, provided they accompany troops or soldiers detailed for the 

purpose to a blacksmith to have them cut off so as to leave the blade square 

and blunt at the outer end and not exceeding fourteen inches in length. All 

war bolos of those who do not wish to have them so modified will be taken 

up and turned in to the government. Unoffending citizens who are friendly 

to the United States in those portions of Tayabas which may be considered 

peaceful will be accorded the same privilege as that accorded above to the 

peaceful citizens of Cavite.

No one will interfere with the right of municipal police, native scouts, 

interpreters or soldiers to carry war bolos when properly authorized to do so.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 24. December 28th, 1901.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

All municipal police, cabezas and local officials of garrisoned towns 

in this Brigade should be warned that they will be held responsible for 

neglect of duty if they knowingly permit Malvar, Caballes, Gonzales, 

Casala, Dimaculangang, Marques or any other insurgent leaders or soldiers to enter or take refuge in their towns or barrios (if occupied by 

people) without arresting them or immediately reporting their presence to 

the military authorities. In the provinces of Batangas and Laguna persons 

offending against the provisions of this order will be immediately brought 

to trial by Military Commission or Provost Court, depending upon office 

held and the degree of culpability in the offense committed.

In case local officials or police report the presence of insurgents who 

are found gone on the arrival of troops, commanding officers will make 

a searching investigation with a view to ascertaining whether they have 

not been warned before their presence was reported and will take steps to 

effectually preclude the possibility of a repetition of such duplicity. In any 

case that can be clearly proven the officials or police guilty of the duplicity 

will be brought to trial by Military Commission.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 25. January 2nd, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

If there are any persons from the provinces of Batangas and Laguna 

who should be arrested for complicity in the insurrection and who have left 
73

and gone to Manila, they can be arrested and returned as prisoners of war 

if their names are telegraphed to these Headquarters. When telegraphing 

information, all that is known about the person’s whereabouts in Manila, 

where his relatives live, etc., and in what way he has been complicated in 

the insurrection will be stated.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 26. January 3rd, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

In view of the possibility that negotiations for a general surrender in 

this Brigade may follow operations now being conducted, it is desired to 

compile at these Headquarters as accurate statistics as possible relating to 

all persons who are now serving as officers in connection with the insurrection and relating to the total number of guns which are supposed to be 

under command of Malvar at the present time, in order that a complete surrender of all guns and officers under his control, as commander-in-chief, 

may be exacted.

With this in view, all station commanders will immediately telegraph 

to these Headquarters the names of all officers now out who pertain to 

their towns, and the number of guns in possession or under control of such 

leaders. Where a number of guns have been turned over to towns by insurgent leaders in the past this number should also be stated and the number, 

if any, that have been captured out of said lot.

Owing to delay in communication, it is important that this information 

be furnished promptly on receipt of this message.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 27. January 3rd, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Any unexpended balance of Provost Court fines, which may be in the 

possession of station commanders in this Brigade, will be used to purchase 

rice or palay at once before it becomes scarce and high-priced, which rice 

and palay will be stored and carefully kept for issue to paupers and people 

who are absolutely without means, under the provisions of General Orders 

No. 64, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, series 1900. Officers 

will attend to this matter at once.
74

Acknowledge receipt and report action.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 28. January 9th, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Information reaching these Headquarters indicates that the hardship 

and pressure which has been brought upon the people by the campaign has 

caused them, in seeking revenge or means of self defense, to resort to their 

well known expedient of false denunciation. Inasmuch as this custom is a 

pernicious nuisance and might become a serious impediment to the success 

of military operations, commanding officers in the provinces of Batangas 

and Laguna will promptly bring to trial by Provost Court, for conduct 

prejudicial to good order and military operations, any person who makes 

a false denunciation, whenever it can be established to the satisfaction of 

the commanding officer that said false denunciation has been knowingly 

and viciously made for purposes of revenge, of self defense, of clouding 

the real issue, of throwing discredit upon the transactions, motives or testimony of material witnesses, or for any other purpose.

Inasmuch, however, as it is not intended to prevent or discourage the 

making of legitimate complaints, commanding officers will take great 

pains to investigate carefully and bring no one to trial until it has been 

clearly ascertained that they have made false denunciations knowingly 

and purposely with vicious intent.

Any kind of defiance of the government or disloyal manifestation 

against measures adopted by it, to put an end to the insurrection in this 

Brigade, will be suppressed at once. The people must be taught the necessity for submission to the legally constituted authority and this can be 

properly done in one way only—by firm and relentless repressive action.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 29. January 9th, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

I am leaving Batangas tomorrow for the field, to be gone probably for 

some weeks. It is desired that officers study their instructions carefully 

and try to settle all questions to the best of their own judgement without 

applying here for further instructions, except where it may be absolutely 

essential.
75

In case I must be communicated with, address telegrams to Adjutant 

General, Batangas, who will be kept informed of my whereabouts.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 30. January 23rd, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

In order to keep the enemy constantly on the move, wear them out, 

and deprive them of food, detachments will continually be sent out from 

all towns, scouting for the enemy, and hunting for food supplies cached by 

insurgents. Whenever these supplies cannot possibly be saved, and when 

a guard cannot be left until transportation can be sent for, they will be 

destroyed, but the Brigade Commander again desires to call the special 

attention of all officers to the urgent necessity of saving all food supplies 

and increasing the same as much as possible by planting, in order to preclude the coming of hunger and want.

The Brigade Commander hopes that all officers, especially station 

commanders, will understand and realize that care in preventing hunger 

and want among the people who have voluntarily assembled within zones 

of protection, has become, under conditions existing now, quite as important an obligation on their part as the conduct of military operations. Fully 

as much credit will attach to successful efforts in this regard as to the faithful performance of other military duties.

To this end the following measures may be adopted wherever the people have assembled within protected zones:

1st. It will be made known to the people, men, women and children, 

that they may accompany scouting parties for the purpose of securing food 

and will be permitted to retain all they can transport or carry. In case no one 

desires to go, some able bodied men with pack ponies will be impressed 

and compelled to accompany detachments.

Any available transportation at the post which can be spared and used, 

without conflict with the interests of the service, may be used in bringing 

in caches of food supplies, which will be retained and stored for future 

issue. None of this food will be used for government purposes.

2nd. All standing crops will be harvested under such protection and 

supervision as can be given by patrols.

3rd. Should it become necessary or desirable, in the provinces of 

Batangas and Laguna, all available food supplies may be taken possession 
76

of by the government and be equitably and economically distributed for 

the benefit of all alike.

4th. As many of the inhabitants as possible will be assigned plots of 

ground on which to cultivate new crops, within protected zones, preferably by equitable arrangement with the owners thereof, but irrespective 

of ownership if necessary in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, and 

no matter whether the people want to work or not they will be required 

to plant pieces of land assigned them. Land owned by absentees may be 

assigned for cultivation without reference to them.

5th. All owners will be permitted and encouraged to plant food crops 

on land not situated so far within the mountains as to render it impossible 

to give laborers any protection whatever. Such laborers will be required to 

leave within protected zones all their stores of food supplies, taking with 

them to their work only such small quantities at a time as may be necessary for their daily subsistence.

6th. The attention of all officers is invited to the contents of Sections 

7, 14, 21, 37, 38, 155 and 156, G.O. 100. Inasmuch as it can be safely 

assumed that at one time or another since this war began, every native in 

the provinces of Batangas and Laguna (and in the provinces of Cavite and 

Tayabas also) has, with exceedingly rare exceptions, taken some part in 

aiding and assisting the insurrection against the United States, they have 

all rendered themselves liable to being compelled to bear their share of 

the burden and hardship of a war for which they are directly responsible. 

Therefore, whenever it may become necessary to prevent hunger, want or 

starvation, in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, war contributions 

may be levied upon all persons of means to provide for the necessities of 

those who have been brought to a condition of want by the results of a war 

really promoted and brought about by the wealthy and influential classes. 

But it is not intended that this method of feeding the poor shall be adopted 

except as a last resort, and before adopting any such method, local commanding officers will communicate with these Headquarters, explaining 

the necessity therefore and the plan it is proposed to follow.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 31. January 26th, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Arrangements have been made with the Chief Commissary of 

the Division to supply second grade rice of good quality on calls from 
77

commissaries for sale to the inhabitants of all towns where the food supply 

may become exhausted in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, and 

where, on account of closed ports, no food can be otherwise imported. 

The Chief Commissary has made a contract for a large number of pounds 

of this rice at $1.58 gold per hundred pounds, or about four pesos and a 

half per cavan. It will be obtained and distributed through the Subsistence 

Department under the provisions of the following regulations:

1st. All local and regimental commissaries will make requisition for 

the quantity which can undoubtedly be disposed of (and no more) upon the 

distributing commissaries from whom they have been in the habit of securing their subsistence supplies. These requisitions will be made by telegraph, 

on receipt of this circular, stating about when the rice should be delivered. 

Towns which are sub-posts to others or have no local commissaries should 

obtain their supply of rice from the commissary of their main town.

These commissaries who have been drawing their rations direct from 

Manila are authorized to communicate direct with the Chief Commissary 

of the Division, with reference to rice so needed.

2nd. All distributing commissaries in Batangas and Laguna will consolidate the estimates received and telegraph the amounts to the Chief 

Commissary of the Division direct. In case any one of the posts which 

local, regimental or distributing commissaries supply (either on ration 

return or by invoice) fails to make an estimate as directed above, they will 

telegraph to the commanding officer or commissary at that post for the 

purpose of ascertaining whether any rice will be needed, before forwarding their estimates.

3rd. The commissaries at Batangas, Calamba and Santa Cruz will 

act as distributing commissaries, in this connection, for all towns to which 

they now ship subsistence supplies.

4th. On arrival of the rice by water at towns or distributing points, it 

will be transferred by government land transportation, when sufficient is 

available, to the point from which it was called for, free of cost. Whenever 

there is not sufficient land transportation for this purpose, commanding 

officers are authorized to impress and pay a reasonable price for such 

transportation as may be available at the town in order to bring from the 

point of landing the rice ordered for sale to the people, but no addition will 

be made to the selling price on account of the use of this or government 

transportation.

5th. Rice thus transferred will be invoiced to local commissaries, or 

wherever there are no local commissaries, the commanding officer must 
78

collect from the town sufficient money to pay cash for rice ordered when it 

leaves the subsistence storehouse at the distributing point. Where it is not 

practicable to do this, and commanding officers are willing to have the rice 

charged to them personally, local, regimental and distributing commissaries are authorized to make credit sales to said commanding officers, to be 

paid for when sold by them, it being understood that all accounts must be 

fully settled at the end of each month, as is usual in credit sales.

In every such town rich people or dealers can usually be found who 

will agree to take from commanding officers, at the invoice price or more 

any surplus rice remaining unsold and thus no risk of loss need be run by 

commanding officers, who, after there is no further need of sales direct to 

the people, will be authorized to dispose of any balance to the wealthy or 

dealers.

In no case will any of this rice be sold to natives on credit, and officers 

actually making sales to natives will be held accountable that the government is paid the invoice price of every pound sold by them.

6th. Until further orders, none of this rice will be sold without special authority to dealers or anyone else in large quantities at one time. It 

is expressly desired and intended that, as long as present conditions last, 

the rice shall be sold in small quantities at a time and under the direct 

supervision of army officers and their military agents, under such restrictions as will effectually prevent any of it coming into the possession of 

insurgents.

7th. To the laboring class and poor people this rice will be sold at 

a small advance over cost price, but to all other persons a profit will be 

charged of about 25 per cent., as a rule, charging more or less only where 

circumstances justify or necessitate it.

8th. A strict and accurate account will be kept of all such rice sales, 

showing profit made after paying the Subsistence Department the invoice 

price therefor, and this profit will be retained in the hands of commanding 

officers as a reserve fund for the purpose of purchasing rice for gratuitous 

issue to paupers, who are unable by reason of age or infirmity to work, or 

for issue to people absolutely without means, in return for labor, in case 

such issue should become necessary.

9th. In no case will any gratuitous issue of rice be made to those who 

are able to work without exacting a corresponding amount of labor on 

roads, bridges or other public utilities, as a daily rate of compensation not 

exceeding a day’s ration of rice for those who labor and for such actual 

members of their families as are too old or too young or too infirm to be 

able to labor.
79

All able bodied members of the family, both male and female, will be 

expected to work for food which may be issued the family free of cost.

10th. A strict enforcement of the foregoing provisions is of the utmost 

importance. No one can foresee how long it may be necessary to care for 

the population and prevent hunger, and officers are cautioned not to make, 

under any circumstances, gratuitous issues of rice to persons who are able 

to buy or work for the same. The common people of these Islands easily 

become pauperized and would, without hesitation or scruple, accept subsistence and remain idle as long as the government would continue to feed 

them. Officers should exercise the utmost economy of their resources and 

not become liberal and generous simply because they have accumulated 

a considerable fund and because it seems no longer necessary to practice 

rigid economy. Any funds which may be left on hand may be badly needed 

to purchase seed for poor people or assist them in other ways in recovering from the effects of the war. It is intended that all this money shall be 

finally expended for the benefit of the people, and they should be made to 

understand that the government is not pretending to give them an amount 

of food which is equivalent to a day’s wages, but that it means to require 

them to work for a living only, until such time as the insurrection ends and 

they may be able to resume their normal pursuits in safety, without military protection.

11th. The attention of all officers is invited to the fact that they may 

collect three pesos from all those who are able to pay, and prefer not to work 

on roads, which money is available to pay wages to those who do work, 

said wages not in any case to exceed a peseta per day, and it is hoped that 

this provision, in connection with those announced in Circular Telegram 

No. 30, will enable the people to buy food and be sufficient to preclude the 

necessity of involving the government in any expense whatever.

12th. For adult paupers, and children too young to work, no more that 

two chupas of rice per day for the former and one for the latter will be 

issued gratis at present. Children over twelve years of age should work, 

and for each man, woman and child who works not exceeding two and 

one half chupas of rice for adult and two chupas for children will be 

issued.

13th. The palay and rice heretofore gathered and stored for future disposition by the government will be disposed of under the provisions of this 

order, two measures of palay being issued in lieu of one of rice.

14. Officers are again cautioned not to begin gratuitous issues of rice 

or issues in lieu of labor until want makes it absolutely necessary and to 

take every precaution to prevent abuses and impositions.
80

To this end, accurate registers of families will be prepared with the 

assistance of local native officials, and great care will be taken to see that 

children or other persons are not registered as belonging to more than one 

family and that children are not borrowed in order to swell the size of 

issues due.

15th. Captain George H. Morgan, 3rd Cavalry, Acting Chief 

Commissary of the Brigade, is hereby placed in general supervision of the 

enforcement of the provisions of this circular and those contained in No. 

30, and the commanding officers of Santa Cruz, Calamba, Batangas and 

Balayan, will each designate an officer to assist him in the supervision of 

districts which will later be defined by him.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 32. January 26th, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

To insure success in the important consideration of preventing hunger 

and want, the Brigade Commander has, in the provisions of Circulars 30 

and 31, authorized methods which may possibly create in the minds of 

some an impression that greater leniency in enforcing the policy heretofore adopted is desired.

To prevent any misapprehension in this regard, the Brigade Commander 

desires it understood that he considers a firm adherence to the stringent 

measures outlined by previous circulars (and amplified but not modified 

by these two) is absolutely essential to our success in this Brigade.

He therefore enjoins upon all commanding officers that they permit 

no relaxation in the strict enforcement of orders, unless especially authorized from these Headquarters, and such authority will be given, as a 

rule, only in those towns which have become completely loyal and have 

secured the surrender to the government of all the guns contained in their 

jurisdiction.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 33. February 12th, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

The attention of all officers in this Brigade is invited to the provisions 

of G.O. 100, which preclude the killing of any person who can be captured 
81

and a strict compliance with the spirit of that order is hereby enjoined 

upon all.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 34. February 12th, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

The attention of officers is invited to the desirability of promptly paying for all guns surrendered or turned in by any person, as said payment 

is sure to encourage renewed efforts on the part of natives to secure the 

surrender or turning in of guns. Orders direct the payment for serviceable 

guns only, but, in interpreting this order, guns which would not be considered sufficiently serviceable to arm American troops can nevertheless be 

paid for as, in the hands of natives, they are all sufficient to accomplish 

their purpose in terrorizing and imposing upon the population at large.

It is our purpose to obtain all guns, irrespective of class or caliber, 

as any gun in the hands of ladrones is a source of terror to the people 

of barrios and sparsely settled outlying districts. Shot guns and obsolete 

weapons may therefore be paid for and revolvers may also be purchased 

at twenty pesos each.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 35. February 15th, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

The provisions of Circular Telegrams, authorizing officers to impress 

transportation whenever necessary for field service, was not intended to 

preclude payment of a reasonable compensation.

It is desirable that said transportation be paid for in order to enable the 

people to buy food. It is also intended that those who are required to labor 

on roads be paid three pesos each for their 15 days labor from the funds 

collected for that purpose from those who pay in preference to working. 

Engineer officers supervising work in this Brigade will pay for labor at the 

same rates as prescribed herein, and will take steps to see that an accurate 

account is kept and that each person who labors 15 days gets credit and 

pay therefor.

J.F. BELL.
82

____________

NO. 36. February 15th, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

In accepting surrenders, all commanding officers will have tabular 

lists prepared showing names of persons, grades, corps or companies, 

residence, including barrio and pueblo, class of guns, chief of column or 

company, whether surrendered or captured, with place and date, and also 

remarks.

Those surrendering will be required to surrender documents, and the 

list referred to above will include the names of all collectors, agents and 

civil officials associated with those surrendering. The lists will likewise 

include the names of all persons who have ever belonged to or been associated with such bodies of troops, indicating what disposition has been 

made of them, and if captured, dead or surrendered, showing when and 

where. This information should all be obtained from those surrendering.

After the surrender is concluded, copies of these lists will be forwarded 

direct to to the Provost Marshal of the Brigade.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 37. April 7th, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

Owing to the changed condition of affairs throughout the Brigade, it 

is no longer considered necessary or desirable to enforce the restrictions 

heretofore placed upon the quantity of rice which might be sold to any 

person at one time.

It has been observed that these restrictions have made it difficult for 

the people to obtain rice, necessitating their losing much time waiting their 

turn to purchase daily supplies, thus depriving them of opportunity to use 

this time in earning money with which to buy.

It is desirable that every commanding officer now address himself to 

the problem of distributing the rice in such manner as to involve the least 

practicable loss of time to the people in securing it.

With this end in view, all restrictions will be removed as to quantity 

to be sold at one time, inasmuch as it will make little difference at present 

whether some of it gets into the hands of insurgents or not. Precaution should 

be taken, however, to prevent the purchase of rice in quantities exceeding 

the family necessities of the purchaser, for speculative purposes.
83

With a view of facilitating a prompt and satisfactory distribution 

thereof, it may be transferred at a wholesale price to certain authorized and 

reliable persons, who will agree to give bond not to sell it at more than a 

fixed rate. Such persons should be required to sell at all hours of the day at 

a price not exceeding 25 cents Mex. per ganta when sold at retail, or $6.00 

Mex. per cavan when sold by cavan or larger quantities. To such persons 

the commissary is authorized to sell the rice at not exceeding $5.50 Mex. 

per cavan, but the privilege of thus retailing it will be accorded to Filipinos 

only, and not to persons of other nationalities.

It should be understood by all venders that any violation of the conditions of their privilege, especially charging more than the fixed price for 

rice, or giving short measure, will forfeit the amount of the bond, which 

should in no case be less than $200.00 Mex., and where large quantities 

are sold, not less than $300.00 Mex.

The number of venders should be fixed so that purchasers can be accomodated without undue loss of time, and they should be so distributed as 

to be most convenient to the entire pueblo.

A close inspection should be maintained on the weights and measures 

of venders and in order that they may have no excuse for overcharging, 

rice should be sold to them by weight, 140 pounds (including weight of 

the sack) being considered a cavan. One cavan is supposed to be placed in 

each sack shipped by the Subsistence Department in Manila but on arrival 

at stations it is generally found to have wasted some pounds. All wastage 

and losses should fall on the profit which is gained in its sale, and not be 

permitted to fall on the government.

It is possible that in some small pueblos as soon as the restriction as 

to quantity purchasable at one time is removed, it may not be necessary to 

adopt the method herein outlined, as it may be found that the government 

can distribute direct with sufficient facility and promptness, but wherever 

necessary to accomodate the people promptly, two or more distributing 

stations where the rice can be secured, should be established under charge 

of reliable soldiers or non-commissioned officers.

J.F. BELL.

____________

NO. 38. May 16th, 1902.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS:

In view of the fact that all insurgents have now surrendered in 

Batangas and Laguna, it is desired to put a complete end to every war 
84

measure heretofore authorized and enforced and to re-establish a feeling 

of security and tranquility among the people as rapidly as possible. With 

this end in view:

1st. All secret service agents will be discharged and all investigations will be stopped, excepting such as relate to the crime of assassination. These will be continued only in cases where American prisoners have 

been assassinated, or where aggrieved relatives appeal for justice.

2nd. The amount of secret service funds now on hand will be reported 

to these Headquarters by wire and will be sent as soon as possible and 

invoiced to 1st Lieutenant Daniel Van Voorhis, 3rd Cavalry, Aide de Camp 

to the Brigade Commander.

3rd. All restrictions upon occupations and privileges usually pursued and enjoyed in times of peace, which were imposed by Telegraphic 

Circulars, will cease to be enforced as directed in instructions heretofore 

given. With the exception of exercising such supervision as may be necessary to an honest collection and expenditure of municipal revenues, to 

the prevention of unauthorized practices, to the enforcement of quarantine 

and sanitary regulations, and to rectifying injustice, it is desired that commanding officers leave the internal government of towns as much as possible to the people or to the officers who have been appointed or elected 

for that purpose.

4th. All authority heretofore given to impress laborers and means of 

transportation is hereby revoked. It is desired that no steps be taken which 

will interfere with the cultivation of fields by the people, and that every 

encouragement and assistance be given to the planting and raising of a 

new crop.

5th. Commanding officers will make an effort to ascertain the owners of all animals now in the possession of troops which have been captured or taken up in the country, and upon proof of ownership, will return 

them to their proper owners. This will be accomplished with as little delay 

as possible.

6th. It is desired that as much assistance shall be given to poor 

natives as may be practicable in the reconstruction of their houses and 

in other industries. Steps will be taken, where needed, to procure palay, 

camotes and corn for planting, and also necessary hand tools for agriculture. Wherever poor funds are available, commanding officers are authorized to spend a portion thereof for this purpose.
85

7th. It is not intended in this circular to revoke the provisions of 

Telegraphic Circulars heretofore published for the purpose of regulating 

the procuring and distributing of rice to natives wherever such government 

assistance may be needed.

J.F. BELL.
86

TELEGRAPHIC MEMORANDUM.

Batangas, P.I., January 16th, 1902.

To all Station Commanders,

Batangas and Laguna:

Following memorandum repeated for your information and guidance:

“DIRECTIONS FOR VACCINATION OF NATIVES.

Surgeons will supervise vaccination within protected zones and subposts tributary to their hospital.

Native vaccinators should work in parties of two, accompanied by 

a detailed soldier. The party should be supplied with 100 units of virus, 

probe with small bulb end, scalpel, alcohol and cotton for cleansing, and 

blank book on which date, street (or barrio), and names of all vaccinated 

should be entered.

Radiating from crowded centers, the party should enter first the most 

crowded houses, and move inmates to the farthest room. Then working 

at doorway, natives are led out singly, and each (of any age) not showing 

pock marks, vaccinated.

The four functions of recording, cleansing (by rubbing a small area 

with a bit of cotton moistened with alcohol), scraping and applying virus 

with probe, should be equally divided between the two vaccinators.

As many, children especially, will evade vaccination, the protected 

zones must be repeatedly gone over till no unscratched arms remain.

Bauan has vaccinated 5,000 natives with 2,500 units of virus. When 

half of the supply of virus is exhausted, the number vaccinated, number of 

working days, and amount of virus left will be reported to this office, and 

an estimate will be forwarded showing how much more is required.

Surgeons should occasionally accompany working parties to insure 

thoroughness and effective rapidity, varying from foregoing details when 

necessary.

Vaccinators proving unsatisfactory should be immediately replaced, 

reporting new names to this office.

Soldiers, padres and influential natives can assist greatly in developing a favorable public opinion, which should immediately realize that this 

compulsory measure is for the good of each and every individual in the 

territory concerned.

(Signed). WM. STEPHENSON,

Major , Surgeon, U.S. Army,

Chief Surgeon.”
87

The prompt vaccination of all persons living within protected zones is 

of the utmost importance, and post commanders will give their personal 

attention to this matter.

Wherever opposition is met by vaccinators, commanding officers will 

detail sufficient troops to round the people up and compel them to submit 

to vaccination.

Whenever the number of vaccinators authorized is insufficient, the 

number hired may be increased.

To the posts of Batangas, Calamba and Santa Cruz, virus will be sent 

for distribution to all posts tributary thereto. At these posts virus must be 

kept on ice until it is sent to the posts to which addressed. It will be transmitted as promptly as possible. All other posts in the district will be furnished virus direct.

Information concerning payment of vaccinators will be transmitted to 

post surgeons by the chief Surgeon of the Brigade.

It can easily be understood by all how serious the difficulty and 

detriment to our plan of campaign would be, should an epidemic of smallpox break out in any protected zone. Therefore the importance of prompt 

completion of this compulsory vaccination should be impressed upon all 

concerned.

Copies of this telegram will follow by mail. Vaccine is en-route and 

must be kept as cool as possible. Acknowledge receipt.

J.F. BELL.

____________

GENERAL ORDERS.

------o-----

February 27th, 1902.

General Orders,

No. 8. 

The following orders governing pack animals carrying ammunition 

will be strictly carried out.

Hereafter, when troops are traveling or scouting in this Brigade, pack 

animals carrying ammunition must be closely watched, or led by an individual detailed for the especial purpose, who will be held accountable for 

any loss of said ammunition by the straying of the pack animal.

}
88

It is enjoined upon all commanders of troops that they use the utmost 

endeavor to have the greatest vigilance exercised in this regard.

By Command of Brigadier General Bell:

MILTON F. DAVIS,

Captain, 1st Cavalry,

A.G.

____________

March 25th, 1902.

General Orders,

No. 12.

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from Headquarters of the Army, 

dated March 2, 1902, and promulgated in letter from the Adjutant General, 

Division of the Philippines, March 4, 1902, the maintenance of Military 

prisons, and the support of military prisoners, including members, or former members, of the military establishment, camp followers, prisoners 

of war and persons convicted by Court Martial, Military Commissions 

or Provost Courts of specific offenses against the laws of war, is a charge 

against the appropriation for the support of the army.

The support of persons, including insurrectos, convicted by Civil 

Courts, Military Commissions, Provost Courts, or other tribunals, of common law crimes, or for violation of the penal code, or the revenue laws, 

or of offenses against public order in the Philippine Islands, is a proper 

charge against Insular appropriations, notwithstanding the charge be laid 

as a violation of the laws of war.

Though natives not in the military service of the United States may be 

convicted by Military Commissions and Provost Courts of crimes mentioned in the 58th Article of War, the crimes being charged as offenses 

against the “laws” of war, (such persons not being subject to trial for violations of “Articles” of War), the maintenance of such prisoners (notwithstanding their convictions of “offenses against the laws of war”) is 

properly chargeable against Insular appropriations, inasmuch as all the 

offenses specified by the said article are common law crimes.

Of natives not belonging to the military service, who are convicted by 

Military Courts, it is intended to charge to appropriations for the support 

of the army the maintenance of only those who have been convicted of 

political offenses (which are not common law crimes), in violation of the 

}
89

laws of war, and when convicted of both political offenses and common 

law crimes the maintenance of the individual will be charged to Insular 

appropriations.

Commanding officers, officers in charge of prisoners, and commissary 

officers, are cautioned to use careful discrimination in complying with 

G.O. No. 90, Division of the Philippines, 1900, and G.O. No 70, Division 

of the Philippines, 1901.

The principal application of this order will be in submitting separate 

ration returns for the two classes, which will be done invariably.

In order that military appropriations may be reimbursed for rations 

issued to prisoners which are chargeable to the Insular treasury, issuing 

commissaries will forward each month, through military channels, certified copies of all ration returns on which rations have been issued to prisoners, whose maintenance is chargeable to Insular appropriations, together 

with a consolidated return of such ration returns.

By Command of Brigadier General Bell:

MILTON F. DAVIS,

Captain, 1st Cavalry,

A.G.

____________

March 27th, 1902.

General Orders,

No. 13.

Intelligence officers will send to these Headquarters reports on slips 

of all important persons of the towns in which they are stationed, whom 

they know to have been implicated in any way with the insurrection. This 

should include active sympathizers, aiders, abettors, contributors, collectors, civil insurgents officials and insurgents who have been soldiers or 

officers, and information should contain all that is known of the individual 

stated in detail.

Similar reports should also be made upon all local municipal officials 

and parish priests, stating whether loyal, disloyal or suspected of disloyalty, giving reasons on which opinions are based.

Other reports should likewise be made on all individuals who have 

rendered any especially valuable service to the Government, stating in 

detail the character of the services rendered.

}
90

}

A card eight inches long and three and a quarter inches wide (similar to 

the card partially illustrated below), will be used in making such reports.

By Command of Brigadier General Bell: 

MILTON F. DAVIS,

Captain, 1st Cavalry,

A.G.

Name 

Married.

Age Race 

 Single.

Residence (Pueblo and Barrio) 

Occupation 

Relations with insurrectos 

(Here follows a brief political history of the 

individual, giving the information called for in the 

order.)
91

December 5th, 1901.

General Orders,

No. 2.

I. To avoid the uncertainty and confusion that must otherwise inevitably arise, all station commanders who have, or may have, native prisoners under their charge, will cause the following information in regard to 

each prisoner to be prepared and kept as a part of the permanent records of 

that station.

Name, age, race (Tagalog or otherwise), residence, occupation, date 

and place of arrest or capture, by whom confined, charges or reason for 

arrest fully stated; whether tried, and if so, by what tribunal, with sentence 

awarded and date of same, date of release or transfer and by whose order.

Prisoners transferred from one station to another will be accompanied 

by descriptive list applicable to their cases.

II. At the end of each calendar month station commanders will forward to the Brigade Provost Marshal at these Headquarters a “Report of 

Native Prisoners”. This report will be a transcript from the records of prisoners at that station.

Prisoners held for investigation for less than a month and released 

before end of month because nothing is developed against them or those 

likewise held as witnesses and released before end of month need not be 

included in this report.

III. Charges against natives triable by Provost Courts may be 

referred by station commanders to the most convenient Provost Court for 

investigation and trial. Such charges will be accompanied by a list of witnesses and all other information obtainable that may facilitate the trial of 

the case.

In this connection the attention of station commanders is invited to the 

last Par. of General Orders No. 356, c.s. Division of the Philippines.

IV. Each Provost Court will keep an accurate record in book form 

of all cases tried by him in which shall be entered the name of the accused 

with occupation and place of residence, charges and specifications, list 

of material witnesses, findings and sentence with date and signature of 

court.

In addition, a brief summary of the testimony in important cases and 

any other information that may be useful for the consideration of the 

Brigade Commander, will be noted.

}
92

V. At the end of each calendar month, Provost Courts will submit to 

the Brigade Provost Marshal a “Report of Cases Tried” together with the 

original charges on which will also be endorsed, the plea, findings and sentence. The report of cases is for transmittal to Department Headquarters. 

The original charges will be filed at these Headquarters.

By Command of Brigadier General Bell:

MILTON F. DAVIS,

Captain, 1st Cavalry,

A.G.

____________
93

PROCLAMATIONS AND CIRCULAR LETTERS.

------o-----

PROCLAMATION.

May 16th, 1902.

To the People of Batangas,

Laguna and Mindoro:

The war is concluded. This proclamation is published to announce 

the desire of the Brigade Commander that peace conditions may be reestablished in these provinces as speedily as possible. For this purpose 

he has directed all of his subordinates to remove all restrictions which 

have been placed upon trade, traffic and travel, and upon fishing and other 

occupations and privileges enjoyed by the people during peace.

All captured animals now in possession of the government will be 

returned to owners who can prove ownership. All other private property, 

excepting such houses as may be necessary for the accommodation of the 

United States forces, will also be returned. The government intends to pay 

a reasonable rent for all houses from the first of May, and to pay back rent 

to all persons who can prove that they did not contribute or take part in the 

insurrection against the United States.

All military authorities in these provinces desire to assist the people as 

much as possible and to settle all just claims.

The Brigade Commander hopes that the people can look upon officers 

and soldiers as their friends, and they are reminded that if they desire the 

friendship of others, they must show themselves friendly to them.

J.F. BELL,

Brigadier General, U.S. Army,

Commanding.

_________________

CIRCULAR LETTER.

May 16th, 1902.

To all Commanding Officers,

Provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro:

As is well known, the vigorous and relentless enforcement of severe 

measures has been repeatedly insisted upon from these Headquarters in 
94

order to accomplish results which, it was believed, could be accomplished 

in no other way. The end in view has now been attained.

Confidently relying upon the well established generosity of American 

officers and men toward conquered enemies, the Brigade Commander 

desires to appeal to all officers and men to use their utmost influence in 

bringing about a complete and radical change in the policy heretofore 

enforced in order that the people may become convinced that the military 

power in these Islands is not only able but willing to befriend them to a 

degree quite as great as its ability to conquer them when necessary. In 

order to accomplish this result the Brigade Commander begs of all officers 

and men co-operation and assistance as generous and spontaneous as has 

been accorded him during the past five months.

In view of the amount of punishment which has been inflicted (by 

hardship and suffering) upon the foolish and stubborn members of the 

community, it is not believed that any generous officer or soldier can fail 

to feel sorry for them, especially for the poor and ignorant. It is therefore 

earnestly requested that officers and men not only make a special effort to 

treat natives with consideration and justice, but that they also endeavor to 

display a kindly feeling whenever brought in contact with them.

An opinion is very commonly entertained that the animosities and 

resentments engendered by war unfit officers and men of the army to 

establish and supervise local governments satisfactory to the people of 

these Islands. I cannot concur in this opinion, and it is my hope that by the 

time civil government is re-established in these provinces the feeling of 

the people toward the military branch of the service will demonstrate the 

incorrectness of this theory.

It seems apparent that one difficulty in gaining the confidence of the 

more ignorant class of natives has been our inability to get into close personal contact with them or to obtain accurate knowledge of their troubles 

and grievances. The presidente, who is the usual source of communication 

with the common people, is not always reliable in this regard. It is therefore suggested to commanding officers, if they can find in their commands 

intelligent non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, able to communicate with natives, who take an interest in their welfare, that they assign 

certain outlying barrios to the especial case of such non-commissioned 

officers and men, and encourage them to spend as much of their time 

therein as may be consistent with the performance of their regular guard 

duties. They should be permitted to visit these barrios and live therein as 

much as possible with a view to becoming thoroughly acquainted with the 

people and gaining their confidence in order that they may have someone 
95

whom they can rely on to represent their needs or grievances to the commanding officer. Of course it is not meant to suggest that the people be told 

the object of this plan, or that grievances or complaints be solicited, neither will it be of any service to encourage or prefer requests or grievances 

which it is impracticable to grant or abate, but the reason no relief can be 

extended should be explained. When poor people have some legitimate 

request or complaint to make and are accompanied to the commanding 

officer by an American soldier to present it for them, they will come to 

believe that officers and soldiers take a real interest in their welfare.

Whenever there are sufficient subordinate officers at a post, the jurisdiction should be divided between them, each being assigned a portion to 

especially look after and to supervise the efforts of the non-commissioned 

officers and soldiers assigned thereto.

It is desired that no arbitrary or unnecessary exactions be indulged 

in or permitted with the people, and that, so far as practicable, the same 

relations be established and adhered to in dealing with them as now exist 

in pacified provinces. It is also desired that the service of secret agents 

be dispensed with and that crimination and re-crimination be discouraged 

and listened to as little as is consistent with the interest of the government in these provinces. It is not considered best to foment, stir up or 

investigate, for the present, past political delinquencies of natives, nor is 

it considered desirable to act on suspicion any longer. Before any action is 

taken looking to the arrest of anyone, who may be denounced in the future 

for intriguing against the government, it would be well be examine carefully into the motive of the accuser, with a view to ascertaining whether 

he is not seeking to satisfy a private grievance or thirst for revenge. Some 

indiscreet talk on the part of foolishly proud but ignorant men, smarting 

under the humiliation of defeat, is to be expected, but in view of the present impotency of the irreconciliable element, it is believed that the interest 

of the government and of peace and tranquility will be better subserved by 

ignoring such harmless ebulitions of bad temper than by seeking to punish hasty and excited expressions, which, though possibly treasonable, are 

without real influence.

This letter will be read to all officers and men of this command.

Respectfully,

J.F. BELL,

Brigadier General, U.S. Army,

Commanding.

__________________
96

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING OFFICERS.

(To Accompany Circular Letter of May 16th, 1902.)

May 16th, 1902.

Such commanding officers as detail non-commissioned officers or 

soldiers to care for barrios, under provisions of accompanying circular 

letter, should caution them that they are not expected to take charge of 

the barrio or in any way to become officious; that they are not sent there 

in the capacity of detectives to get people into trouble or to interfere with 

the peace and tranquility of the barrio; that they should try to become well 

acquainted with and gain the confidence of the cabezas, and that should 

they find them pursuing practices which they know to be prohibited by 

law they should ask to eradicate such illegal practices by counselling and 

advising cabezas rather than by seeking to have them punished. Where the 

abuses are serious, however, and the cabezas are not amenable to advice, 

and where the people feel aggrieved the cabezas should be reported to the 

commanding officer for discipline. They should be cautioned that they are 

not expected to hunt up grievances nor expected to accomplish anything 

suddenly, and that they should not be so vigorous or so zealous in seeking 

evidence touching complaints and grievances as to arouse hatred, antagonism or resentment between residents of the barrio. Wherever practicable, 

disputants should be pursuaded to settle their differences and grievances 

amicably.

They are simply expected to gain the confidence of the people and 

befriend them when necessary, but shall seek to accomplish their results 

with tact, patience and perseverance, with a view to promoting the welfare, 

tranquility and harmony of the barrio rather than to stirring up strife or 

recrimination. They should never act on the statements of one side alone, 

where a dispute between the people is involved, but if complaints are of 

any consequence or merit, should take their time ascertaining the truth by 

consulting the other side and consulting them in such a tactful way as not 

to stir up animosity on their part against their accusers. Unless the service 

is tactfully performed more harm is liable to result than good. The most 

important thing is to exercise patience and perseverance and not to form 

judgements hastily. There is no need of haste and they should take plenty 

of time to learn the real truth. The ascertaining of the truth under such circumstances is generally difficult and requires time.

It is desired that they help and befriend the people as much as possible 

in any way that seems practicable. If some of the people are miserably 

poor and have no seed to plant, these facts should be reported to the 
97

commanding officer, and by him to these headquarters in case he has no 

means of supplying their needs.

_______________

Note.—When this circular letter and memorandum were issued it was understood that civil government would not be re-established for a matter of six months 

or more in Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro.

_________________

CIRCULAR LETTER.

July 4th, 1902.

To the Honorable Civil

Governor of the Province of ______________________

Sir:—

In view of the recent establishment of Civil Government in your province, I desire to express to you and to your associate officials my cordial sympathy with the purposes of the Philippine Commission in your 

nomination and in the establishment of Civil Government in this Brigade, 

and to assure you and your associates that I desire to co-operate in every 

proper way in promoting peace and contentment among the people, and 

the material prosperity of your province. My cordial co-operation in this 

line will always be at your service.

Until civil provincial government is fully established in all respects, 

the military forces must necessarily continue to perform certain functions 

which it is their desire and duty to turn over to the civil administration 

whenever it is prepared to assume such obligations.

During this interval of divided responsibilities, it can scarcely be 

expected that mistakes can be entirely avoided by inexperienced officers 

and non-commissioned officers who have had no previous experience in 

making discriminations between civil and military obligations and prerogatives in such a case of divided responsibility.

Should such mistakes on the part of the military officials occur anywhere within your province, it will only be necessary to represent them to 

the Brigade Commander to have them promptly rectified.

Local presidents should understand that all wrongs or abuses committed by military persons should be promptly reported to the local commanding officer, and that in case this action does not result in a satisfactory 

rectification of grievances, they should refer the matter to you for presentation to the Brigade Commander.
98

I inclose for your information a copy of instructions for the guidance 

of troops which have this day been transmitted to all local commandants 

of towns in this Brigade.

Assuring you of my highest regard and consideration for you and your 

associates, believe me,

Very sincerely and respectfully,

J.F. BELL,

Brigadier General, U.S. Army,

Commanding.

___________________

CIRCULAR LETTER.

July 4th, 1902.

To all Officers,

Third Separate Brigade:

In view of the fact that civil government has been established in this 

Brigade, I desire to invite your especial attention to the following extracts 

from instructions contained in General Orders No. 179, Headquarters 

Division of the Philippines, series 1901:

“I. That where municipal police are organized, and, except as prescribed in Par. 2, of this order, all United States troops * * * * abstain from 

any and all attempts at coercion, control, influence or interference with the 

administration of civil affairs.

The troops will at once be put under an efficient state of discipline and 

instruction, to the end that no disorder may be charged to their account or 

annoyance caused the civil administration by reason of their presence. The 

conduct of the troops should facilitate rather than retard the maintenance of 

order, and all military persons will, by their example, show proper respect 

for civil administration and for all civil officers.

* * * * * *

II. As a rule, interference by the military in civil affairs will correspond to the well known procedure in the United States.

When, under an emergency, the civil governor of the Philippine Islands 

shall make a request upon the Commanding General of the Division of the 

Philippines for the assistance of troops, the latter will be governed by such 

instructions as they may receive from these headquarters.
99

* * * * * *

In this connection the attention of all officers is invited to the general 

regulations governing such duty as outlined in Articles LII, paragraphs 

436–491, inclusive, Army Regulations of ’95, and article LIII, paragraphs 

563 to 568, inclusive, Regulations of 1901.

In cases where the assistance of the military arm has been asked for, 

full report of the fact with attending circumstances, action taken and result 

thereof, will be promptly submitted through regular military channels.”

* * * * * *

All officers should now realize that the relations which have heretofore existed between them and the local civil officials have become radically changed. This relation is no longer that of superior and subordinate, 

but purely a business relation, such as that which should exist between an 

officer and any other person (independent of his authority) with whom he 

is brought into business relations by an exigency of the service.

Should the rights or interest of officers or their commands be deleteriously affected by indifference on the part of local civil functionaries to 

their official obligations, or injuries result from their failure to enforce 

local ordinances and regulations, officers will confine their actions to dispassionate representation of the facts in writing to local presidents, requesting action in abatement of the nuisances or injuries complained of, but it 

is not intended by these instructions to authorize or encourage harassing 

complaints to local officials simply because their conduct of affairs does 

not come up to what the local commander may consider a proper standard, 

especially not in matters which do not directly and materially concern the 

welfare and interest of the commanding officer and his command.

Should this course not result in rectification of grievances, an explanation to that effect, accompanied by a copy of communications to and 

from the local president and by a statement of any other pertinent circumstances, will be forwarded to the Brigade Commander, who will lay the 

matter before the civil governor of the province in case he deems it necessary or desirable.

It is especially desired that all officers conduct themselves with forbearance, consideration, discretion and tact, and require a strict compliance from members of their commands with all local regulations and 

legitimate orders.

When any official or inhabitant complains of abuses or wrongs committed by military persons, the local commander will investigate the matter and in case complaint be found worthy, do what he can to see that 
100

reparation is made or satisfaction is given by the offender, or punish him 

by court martial, and, in case he has not sufficient authority to make complete reparation, he will report the matter to the Brigade Commander for 

further instructions.

It is desired that all military persons seek to maintain friendly relations 

with local civil officials and accommodate them when it can be appropriately done without detriment to the interests of the public service.

Copy of letter this day sent to the civil governor of the province is 

enclosed for your information.

Very respectfully,

J.F. BELL,

Brigadier General, U.S. Army,

Commanding.

___________________

PROCLAMATION.

July 22nd, 1902.

To the People of the

Province of Batangas:

1st. Hereafter, whenever government wagons or pack mules are 

passing along the highways loaded with rice for sale to the people, any 

person living more than one mile from the poblacion of any pueblo may 

offer six pesos to the wagon or pack master and obtain therefor a sack of 

rice.

The rice cannot be thus sold in less quantities, but several families can 

unite in buying a sack. It is strictly prohibited, however, that they pay more 

than six pesos per sack in any case.

2nd. In order to assist poor people as much as possible wagon masters 

and teamsters have orders to permit people found traveling in the road on 

foot to ride in government wagons as far as they wish to follow the road, 

whenever the said wagons are traveling empty or have light loads.

In furnishing this accommodation, preference will always be given to 

women and children. Persons carrying bundles or packages may take these 

burdens with them on the wagons. They will be permitted to dismount 

from the wagons wherever they may wish to do so.

J.F. BELL,

Brigadier General, U.S. Army,

Commanding.
101

___________________

CIRCULAR LETTER.

July 22nd, 1902.

Commanding Officers,

Batangas Province:

In order to accommodate and assist the poor people as much as possible in the distribution of rice, by wagon or pack train, commanding officers, commissaries and quartermasters will hereafter see that the necessary 

orders are given to wagon and pack masters to insure a safe and systematic 

carrying out of the following provisions:

1st. On the payment of six pesos to the wagon or pack master by any 

native who lives more than one mile from the poblacion of any pueblo the 

wagon or pack master will deliver to that person one sack of rice, and on 

arrival at his destination will turn in to the commanding officer or commissary the six pesos in lieu of every sack of rice thus sold. Under no 

circumstances will more than six pesos be charged or accepted.

2nd. Whenever government wagons are traveling on highways empty, 

wagon masters or teamsters will permit the people walking along the road 

to ride, preference being always given to women and children when there 

are more people than the wagon will hold.

Even when wagons are not empty, but loads are light, people will be 

permitted to ride provided roads are not so bad as to inflict an undue burden upon the animals. Teamsters will halt to take on and put off the people 

wherever they may be found desirous of riding or may wish to get off. The 

Brigade Commander hopes that teamsters and wagon masters will take an 

interest in extending this courtesy and accomodation to those whom they 

find walking in the road.

A proclamation in Spanish and Tagalog announcing to the people that 

they may avail themselves of the privileges mentioned in this order has 

been distributed throughout the Province of Batangas.

By Command of Brigadier General Bell:

MILTON F. DAVIS,

Captain, 1st Cavalry,

A.G.
102

APPENDIX.

-------o-----

TELEGRAMS OF THANKS AND CONGRATULATIONS.

______________

December 10th, 1901.

Major Pitcher,

Mindoro:

Referring to your acknowledgement of receipt of Telegraphic Circulars 

1, 2 and 3, it has been my intention to inform you that these circulars 

would be sent to you for your information, guidance and authority in so 

far as they are applicable in your judgement to the situation in Mindoro. It 

is my intention to leave the management of affairs on that Island entirely 

within your discretion, but to furnish you the same authority, assistance 

and support accorded to everyone else. Congratulations upon your good 

work. 

J.F. BELL,

Brigadier General, U.S. Army,

Commanding.

______________

January 6th, 1902.

Chief Signal Officer,

North Philippines, Manila:

I have now sent the last Telegraphic Circular I contemplate sending at 

present, a fact which affords me quite as much satisfaction and relief, as I 

know it will afford the personnel of your corps serving in connection with 

this Brigade. Mail facilities are so very slow and uncertain here that had it 

not been for the exceptionally valuable service rendered me by your corps 

in connection with my work I feel morally certain I could not have accomplished in six months results which have already been accomplished in six 

weeks. I wish to extend to you, and through you to every man and officer 

in your corps, who has participated in this labor, my sincerest thanks for 

the service rendered me and his government in this connection. I have 

not failed to realize that they have been called upon and taxed in quite 

an unusual manner, but I think they will also realize that they have been 

assisting in a very hard campaign, worked out under very unusual conditions. The rapidity of such success as we have attained depends almost 
103

exclusively upon the very exceptional and valuable service the members 

of your corps have rendered me, at least such rapidity could not have been 

achieved without their assistance. Please thank each individual for me.

J.F. BELL,

Brigadier General, U.S. Army,

Commanding.

______________

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARMENT OF NORTH 

PHILIPPINES.

Manila, April 16th, 1902.

Brigadier General J.F. Bell, Lipa:

The Department Commander, Major General Loyd Wheaton U.S.A., 

thanks you and the officers and men of the Third Brigade for the results of 

the operations ending with the surrender of Malvar. The methods pursued 

and the ability, energy and efficiency displayed by you and your command will be a model for future operations against the resistance of semicivilized people to the arms of the United States. By Command of Major 

General Wheaton.

Waltz, A.A.G.”

______________

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARMENT OF NORTH 

PHILIPPINES.

Manila, April 19th, 1902.

General Bell, Batangas:

Following telegram repeated for your information: Headquarters 

Division of the Philippines, Manila, April 19th, 1902. Gen. Wheaton, 

Manila, P.I.: The following cablegram is repeated for your information and 

transmission to General Bell: Washington, D.C., April 17, 1902. Chaffee, 

Manila: Acting Secretary of War directs me to inform you that the President 

wishes through you to express his gratification and the gratification of the 

American people at the results of the campaign of J.F. Bell and officers 

and men of his command in Batangas and Laguna Provinces, which culminated in the surrender of insurgent forces under Malvar and which will 

further extend the territory in which civil government is exercised.

Corbin.”
104

“The pleasure which I feel because of the President’s congratulations 

for General Bell, his officers and men is difficult for me to express in 

words. No body of American troops has ever before been charged with a 

duty more difficult of accomplishment, except (with reference to terrain 

only) our comrades in the Island of Samar. So unique has been the situation in many ways that no one not an actual participant can appreciate 

the conditions met with to be overcome, nor fully determine the necessary means to accomplish the object in view, namely, compel recognition 

of United States authority, that peace and order might prevail in the disturbed section. General Bell and his troops will desire that you, General, 

share with them, as Department Commander, the congratulations of the 

President because of your never failing encouragement and watchfulness 

over their labors. (Signed), Chaffee.” “By Command of Major General

Wheaton.

Waltz, A.A.G.”

______________

HEADQUARTERS THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE, 

DEPARMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES.

May, 16th, 1902.

To the Officers and Men,

Third Separate Brigade:

With profound satisfaction the Brigade Commander announces that 

so far as is known at these Headquarters, every insurgent officer and band 

heretofore operating in the Provinces of Batangas and Laguna has been 

captured, killed or forced to surrender, and it is believed, from the evidence of residents of these two provinces, that conditions therein have 

never heretofore been more peaceful than they are at the present time.

This condition has been brought about by a campaign lasting less than 

four months, and such signal success as has been achieved therein is attributed by the Brigade Commander to the zealous, loyal and uncomplaining 

support which has been given by every officer and man in this Brigade 

to plans and instructions which were formulated for the conduct of the 

campaign.

The Brigade Commander, being fully aware of the difficulties which 

have been encountered and overcome, of the tireless energy and persistence displayed by all and the fatigue and sickness which has resulted 

therefrom, only needs to add that his thanks and appreciation, gratefully 
105

extended to each individual officer and man, are in due proportion to the 

heavy burden of responsibility which has been lifted from his shoulders 

through the success achieved by their untiring efforts and loyal zeal.

By Command of Brigadier General Bell:

MILTON F. DAVIS,

Captain, 1st Cavalry,

A.G.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, DEPARTMENT OF 

LUZON.

Batangas, P.I., October 10th, 1902.

To the Presidente of

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

Sir:—

You doubtless know that a certain sum of money has been accumulated by the sale of rice in this province. It is desired to spend this money 

for the benefit of the inhabitants of the province, and for this purpose we 

have purchased and brought to Batangas some modern agricultural implements very generally used in the United States.

Through the kindness of the Secretary of the Interior and of the Chief 

of the Bureau of Agriculture in Manila, we have been furnished with other 

implements, and have all ready begun some experimental work on a piece 

of land near this town with the ultimate purpose of establishing a permanent experimental station somewhere in the province.

Having already received orders to return to the United States and 

expecting to leave the Islands within a short time, I would like to consult 

the municipal officials of the pueblos, as well as other persons who are 

interested in the welfare of the people and the advancement of agriculture, 

concerning the best manner of employing this money for the benefit of the 

province.

I therefore hope that you will attend the assembly of presidentes in this 

pueblo, which will take place on the 20th instant. Will you please invite all 

the other officials and consejales of your pueblo who might wish to come 

with you.

I would also like you to notify all persons of your pueblo, largely 

interested in agriculture, that the modern implements, of which I have 
106

spoken above will be exhibited in Batangas on the 20th, and possibly the 

21st, instant, and all those who would like to see them will be cordially 

welcomed. If it be possible, practical trials will be made of all the 

implements in order to illustrate to the spectators the manner of using each 

machine.

We have also a variety of American seeds for gardens, fields and haciendas which will be distributed for experimental purposes to those who 

may desire them.

Very respectfully,

J.F. BELL,

Brigadier General, U.S. Army,

Commanding.

_______________

Note:—It was intended to include this circular letter with the others pertaining 

to reconstruction, but its absence escaped observation until after the rest had been 

set up and printed.—M.F.D.
107

MEMORANDA BY GENERAL BELL.

-----o-----

Note: —The following Memoranda are the result of experience 

with operations and administration in this Brigade. They were prepared 

by General Bell, for his own future information, as actual occurrences 

brought the matters mentioned to his attention from time to time. With his 

permission they are included in this pamphlet under the belief that the data 

contained therein might become equally useful to others.—M.F.D.

______________

It has become evident that the purpose which inspired the publication 

of Telegraphic Circular No. 18 was not explained therein with sufficient 

accuracy, clearess or detail. Some commanding officers, apparently possessing a correct impression of the purpose of the order, have been able to 

promptly produce desired results by the arrest and confinement of some 

of the most prominent offenders only. The less prominent ones then completely changed their political attitude and tendered their services for the 

re-establishment of peace for their pueblos.

By thus arresting one or two or a few of the most prominent offenders at 

a time, every day or so, and by giving no explanation of the cause of arrest 

to anyone, less prominent offenders (deprived of the counsel and support 

of these dominant leaders of character and determination) become nervous 

and apprehensive, lose courage, and render assistance for fear their turn 

may come next. Additional information is thereby gained concerning the 

complicity of the more prominent persons who, in the meantime, should 

be held as prisoners and be permitted to communicate with no one, but 

should be informed of what has been learned concerning their acts. In a 

very short time these leaders (who exercise the dominant influnce) realizing the futility of further resistance and concealment, will volunteer to render all the assistance in their power, in order to escape punishment for their 

past political offenses. It will not take them long to become convinced that 

the military authorities have secured sufficient evidence to convict them, 

and this will insure their fidelity to promises.

In this manner, through personal interest, or self protection, the entire 

community can be converted from partisans of insurrection into partisans 

of peace.

On the contrary, some commanding officers, misconstruing the spirit 

and the purpose of the circular (which unfortunately was expressed in 

a rather ambiguous way) arrested on the same day every representative 
108

of the classes mention therein, with few or no exceptions, and without 

sufficient effort to make wise and useful discriminations. Misery loves 

company, and when all the prominent persons of a community find themselves thus incarcerated, they derive strength, consolation, satisfaction and 

support from companionship and from realization that they are all in the 

same boat. Confined together, they can mutually encourage and sustain 

each other and being in close contact, they all become subject to the personal domination of the stronger minded and more determined partisans 

of insurrection. They are thus liable to maintain their nerve and determination to continue resistance.

This wholesale arrest and lack of discrimination also creates resentment and may convert into enemies the few who may be indifferent or 

wavering or secretly desirous of peace. It may unite the entire community 

in one common resolve. For the above reasons it may become much more 

difficult to bring about a break in their ranks or determination and to get 

them started upon voluntary efforts for peace.

Whenever circumstances are such as to render wholesale arrests essential (as is sometimes necessary in cases of wide spread conspiracy or desperate intimidation) efforts should be made to place the more prominent 

offenders in solitary confinement where they cannot communicate with 

anyone or use their influence to dominate the ordinary crowd of followers. 

In fact this method is a very efficacious plan in any case of determined 

resistance where sample facilities are at hand for thoroughly carrying it 

out.

It is of great importance that unceasing efforts be made to ascertain 

as soon as possible who the real dominant leaders of the town are. Also 

whether there is a very general conspiracy to which all are equally committed, or if there be possible partisans of peace. Whether all are united 

by universal sympathy or the majority under the influence of desperate 

intimidation from the few.

Circular 18 should have been revised and explanation of its purpose 

have been made in greater detail.

______________

It is necessary to reach the common people through the influence of 

the dominant classes. Therefore nothing should be done to unnecessarily 

humiliate or arouse the resentment of the latter. For this reason it is a mistake and bad policy to require principales to work in policing their prisons 

and streets as was done in some instances until prohibited.
109

______________

In order to break up the insurgents’ organization, completely destroy 

their influence and convert the people from partisans of war to partisans of 

peace, in towns where the people are characterized by such intelligence as 

enables them to exercise good judgement and common sense, it has been 

found very useful (after they have very generally lost hope of their power 

to continue successful resistance, and have really begun to work for peace) 

to offer all prominent persons of dominant influence an opportunity to 

make a full and complete confession of their connection with the insurrection, under a promise of immunity from punishment for anything they confess. The reason of this is as follows: Many persons, deeply complicated 

themselves, are prevented from making bold and earnest efforts to assist 

in the re-establishment of peace by fear that such a change of policy on 

their part might bring down upon them denunciation from persons whose 

resentment is liable to be aroused by their change of attitude. They are 

consequently reluctant to take the chance of arousing resentment through 

dread of personal consequences. After they have made a clean breast of 

every thing and been pardoned, however, they realize that there is absolutely nothing that they can be denounced for and have thereby acquired a 

suitable status for beginning a radical change of conduct.

Deprived of the further assistance and influence of these persons, after 

this plan has been successfully applied, insurgents become utterly unable 

to re-organize their department of supply, security and information in these 

towns.

In order to preclude partial confessions, those to whom the opportunity is offered should be informed that if anything is afterwards discovered, which they have failed to confess, they will be subject to trial and 

punishment for that particular conduct.

There are some small towns where all the people are too ignorant 

to appreciate such a proposition, and can only be influenced by punishment. It is therefore necessary to exercise discrimination in adopting this 

expedient.

______________

Notwithstanding all the prominent male persons of a very irreconcilable pueblo, who were deeply complicated in the insurrection, had been 

arrested and confined for a considerable time, they remained resolute and 

the entire pueblo persisted in denial of all knowledge of insurgents or their 

whereabouts, insisting that they had not seen or heard of an insurgent for 
110

months. The commanding officer finally discovered that the female relatives of the insurgent leaders of the town were secretly carrying on a 

system of supply and information and were keeping up communication 

between those confined in the pueblo and those in command of troops in 

the mountains. All insurgents were regularly supplied by these relatives, 

who, being women, had no difficulty in sending supplies and warning of 

all that Americans did to husbands, brothers and other relatives belonging 

to the insurgent column of the town.

On discovering this, the commanding officer secured a large dwelling house in the pueblo and built a high stockade fence around the yard. 

Having made his preparations and secured a list of the wives, sisters and 

other close female relatives of insurgent officers and leaders in the pueblo, 

they were arrested and detained in the quarters prepared for them. They 

were well fed and cared but a sentinel was placed at the gate of the stockade and another patrolled around it, absolutely prohibiting any communication whatever with them.

Insurgents in the field, thus cut off from communication with their 

families, became very uneasy, and, unable to longer secure food or maintain a satisfactory understanding with the pueblo, finally surrendered in 

a body to secure the release of their families and friends and to obtain 

food.

______________

A similar enlightening incident occurred in another pueblo where the 

ranking insurgent officer, a colonel, had left his family. The commanding officer treated them with consideration and kindness and soon became 

very friendly with them. He was in the habit of chaffing the wife about her 

insurgent husband and she finally offered to try to induce him to surrender. 

She did not succeed and tearfully informed the commanding officer that he 

really wanted to surrender, but having taken an oath to continue in the field 

as long as the others did, he was ashamed to abandon them.

The commanding officer jokingly remarked that he guessed the best 

way to get her husband was to arrest her, whereupon she appeared to consider this a bright idea and replied that it might not be a bad plan after all.

Securing a suitable house for her accommodation, he arrested and 

detained her there under guard. Early the next morning the husband presented himself in full uniform, and, handing his sword to the commanding 

officer, begged that he release his wife and confine him in her place. He 

was accomodated and held in confinement until he had agreed to use his 

influence and work for peace by inducing his command to surrender.
111

This expedient of the commanding officer had simply presented to 

his mind an obligation which he considered greater than that he owed his 

comrades. He did want to surrender but lacked an excuse to satisfy his 

Quixotic price. The supposed misfortunes of his wife, suffering on his 

account, offered a satisfactory one.

The immortal Don Quixote originated a word to express an old idea 

and conferred upon a nation the reputation of being the most Quixotic in 

the world. The Spaniard is doubtless very Quixotic but his one time ward, 

the educated Filipino, has been a very apt pupil and has gone away beyond 

his teacher in his acquirement of this quality, though possibly in modified 

form. This circumstance should never be forgotten in dealing with him.

______________

Judging from experience in this war, a much greater length of time is 

always required to settle claims and outstanding obligations of the government, after a campaign is concluded, than is required to successfully conclude the campaign itself. After the close of the war in the Ilocano region 

it required six months of the hardest and most disagreeable kind of labor to 

properly dispose of prisoners and to settle all outstanding claims and obligations of the government. This delay and unnecessary trouble resulted 

from the careless way in which officers (burdened by the responsibilities 

and labor of a very active campaign) had universally neglected to make 

proper reports of evidence against prisoners and of operations in seizing or 

taking possession of property for use of the government.

______________

Unending subsequent trouble would be saved if, at the beginning of 

every war and campaign, especial efforts were made to impress upon officers the importance of the following precautionary measures:

In taking possession of buildings or other property for public use, the 

officer ordering the same should put his order in writing and give one copy 

thereof to the owner, if he can be found. The order should plainly show the 

owner’s name, kind of property, date on which taken possession of and for 

what purpose. The property should be described, and, when ascertainable, 

its value, together with daily or monthly rental value, be stated approximately. If it be a house it should be stated whether it was occupied (and in 

what manner) when taken possession of or was vacant.

The political attitude of owner should be stated when positively 

known. When not positively known it should be stated “unknown”. If the 

owner is absent in insurrection, that fact should also be stated.
112

In case of a house appropriated with the owner present, he should 

be required to take possession of and remove all movable property not 

needed for temporary use. Memorandum receipt should be given for all 

movable property retained for the temporary use of troops.

For the protection of the officer, it is advisable that he take from the 

owner an acknowledgment that he is in possession of all his personal and 

movable property except that for which he holds receipt. The inventory of 

property retained for use of the government should be made in the presence of witnesses who should attest it. One copy of inventory, certified 

by witnesses, should be delivered to the owner and one copy retained by 

those in possession of the property. Reports should be made to Brigade 

or District Headquarters at once of all seizures, giving full history of case 

and accompanied by copies of the order of seizure, inventories, etc. It is 

important that this memoranda, concerning property taken possession of, 

be carefully preserved.

______________

Whenever cattle are taken to furnish food to troops, a receipt should 

be given to the owner, if practicable, which should show approximate size 

and value of animals. All food supplies seized for soldiers and grain and 

other forage seized for animals, should be likewise receipted for, showing 

amount in each case and approximate value in community. Owners of all 

means of transportation seized for use of troops should be given receipts 

showing kind and character of transportation, time used and approximate 

value, together with daily or monthly rental value in locality. If staff officers are present with funds, private property seized for use or consumption 

should always be paid for at once.

An officer seizing food supplies and forage for use of his command, 

far in excess of the regulation allowance of same, as shown by ration and 

forage returns, will remain personally responsible for the excess.

______________

Money should never be seized unless there is positive proof that it 

belongs to the hostile government and unless there is a respectable amount 

of it. It is unnecessary and useless to seize very small sums, and they give 

more trouble than they are worth. No one should ever be permitted to seize 

jewelry under any circumstances, unless it be perfectly clear that large 

amounts of public funds have been converted into expensive and valuable jewelry in order to preserve said funds from seizure or to facilitate 

transportation.
113

All money or jewelry necessarily seized should be carefully counted 

and inventoried in the presence of those from whom seized and other 

witnesses, all of whom should sign as witnesses to correctness of 

inventories.

The seizure of valuable jewelry for the purpose of influencing the 

owners to surrender is always liable to lead to scandal, and should never 

be permitted.

______________

Officers who are desirous of avoiding complications or the necessity 

of disagreeable subsequent investigations, will always be careful to take 

no arbitrary action which cannot be justified as a military necessity by the 

laws of war, and, whenever it may become necessary to seize private property for public use, to take possession of it in a systematic and prescribed 

way. They will remember that claims will certainly be afterwards made 

by owners of the property. They will be especially cautious that in case of 

seizure of money, it be turned in with a report to the next superior headquarters as soon as practicable. It is never permissible or safe to make any 

unauthorized use thereof, for it can be assumed as a certainty that claims 

will eventually be made for all money and property seized, and any carelessness or lack of system in taking possession or delay in making reports 

of action in such matters cannot fail to cast reflection upon the officer who 

is responsible therefor.

______________

In destroying property, by way of retaliation or as a military necessity, 

an inventory should always be made and authenticated by witnesses, when 

practicable, showing quantity and assigning approximate values to everything destroyed. A full and complete report should be made at once to next 

higher headquarters of the action taken and the reasons for taking it.

No large quantities of food should ever be destroyed except when 

there is real danger of its falling into the hands of the enemy and when it 

is absolutely impracticable to move and place it under the care of a permanent detachment at the nearest station. If practicable, a guard should be 

left with it until transportation can be sent for or until its location, kind and 

quantity can be reported to the District or Brigade Commander, who may 

wish to make other arrangements to guard or send for it.

______________
114

The foregoing precautions have attained an increased importance 

because of the more liberal provisions for the protection of strictly private 

property adopted by all civilized nations as a result of the Peace Conference 

of 1899 at the Hague. (See G.O. 52, A.G.O., series 1902.)

______________

In hostilities conducted by civilized nations, in accordance with the 

provisions of the laws of war, it is not customary to expect or depend upon 

material aid from non-combatants not regularly employed by the belligerent forces. The important subjects of Security, Information and Supply, 

of civilized belligerents, are attended to by forces regularly designated 

or departments especially organized and conducted for that purpose by 

officers and enlisted men in uniform and by such civilian employees as 

may be hired to assist therein. Except in the case of spies and other secret 

agents, their occupation and employment is not secret but well known. 

The service usually done by war traitors is so well performed by these 

hired spies, and by the department organized for that purpose, that there 

is little need of a pacific citizen becoming a spy or war traitor in aid of his 

government.

As a consequence, it is not a matter of very great importance, in regular warfare, when operating against a civilized nation, whose belligerent 

forces are well organized, to especially hunt for, detect and punish spies 

and war traitors among the non-combatant and apparently pacific inhabitants of the country.

In guerrilla warfare, however, (in the Philippines Islands, as well as 

elsewhere,) it is seldom that an insurgent force has a regularly organized 

department or method of performing the service of Security, Information 

and Supply. It must, perforce, depend upon the voluntary or forced assistance of the inhabitants of its own country for security, information and 

supplies, and for transmitting correspondence and verbal intelligence 

between the component fractions of the insurgent forces.

In the Philippine Islands, it has been very frequently, if not generally, 

the case that a considerable percentage of the apparently pacific population has secretly served insurgents in the capacity of spies, collectors, 

agents, cargadores, etc., for the collection and distribution of information and supplies. Though a part of this service is expected (and exacted 

by intimidation) of all inhabitants in common, some persons are usually 

secretly selected and designed as collectors, spies and special agents, to 
115

make collections and see that those who refuse to contribute, or who aid 

the enemy, are assassinated.

It has also been customary for insurgents to regularly and secretly 

organize all able-bodied, non-combatant, apparently pacific males, of 

towns, barrios and sitios, into militia or reserves. These organizations, in 

addition to other duties, habitually maintain innocent looking outposts, 

unarmed and dressed in ordinary clothing, whose duty it is to secretly 

transmit to armed insurgents timely warning of the presence of any hostile 

force or danger.

In the insurrection against the United States Government in the 

Philippine Islands, it has been very common for municipal officials, 

(including presidentes and other town officials, consejales and cabezas

or tenientes of barrios) who are serving under authority of the American 

Government, to secretly perform exactly the same duty on behalf of the 

insurgent force. Cases have been known where officials have collected just 

double the tax prescribed by law, in order that they might make an impartial division of the revenue between Americans and Insurgents.

To bring a campaign to a successful close within a reasonable length 

of time, or to put a prompt end to insurrection, under such conditions, 

it is of the first importance to adopt and enforce measures for detecting 

and punishing all persons, who, (posing as peaceful citizens) secretly aid, 

assist, protect, collect supplies or give comfort to the enemy in any way, 

with a view to breaking up the insurgent organization for procuring information and supplies.

Such persons should be imprisoned and, when competent evidence is 

obtainable, be brought to trial by provost courts and military commissions. 

In awarding punishment it is advisable that they be given both imprisonment and fine.

It frequently happens that, in order to avoid punishment for complicity, they volunteer and render valuable assistance in bringing the insurrection to a close. Whenever desirable to reward such service with leniency, 

it is advisable, instead of granting them a full pardon, simply to suspend 

their punishment during good behavior.

It has sometimes occured that men sentenced to pay fines, have, as 

soon as pardoned, made claims against the government for damages which 

might have been offset by the fines had they not been revoked by pardon. 

By suspending sentences, the fines can always be used as offsets against 

such claims, and will discourage the making of false and unjust claims.
116

______________

At the end of campaigns, when peace has been re-established, it is a 

so customary to pardon and release all prisoners, convicted of political 

offenses only. For reasons cited in the above paragraph, it is likewise 

advisable to release and, by military order, suspend their sentences instead 

of revoking them by pardon.

______________
117

Section II

General Orders 100*

*Laws of War: General Orders #100, 1863. “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.” 24 April 1863. Appears on 

website www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lieber.htm. Specific articles emphasized by 

Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell in his 1901–02 Telegraphic Circulars to his 

subordinates in southwestern Luzon are highlighted in BOLD print.

119

General Orders 100 [Lieber Code]

GENERAL ORDERS No. 100.

WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL’S OFFICE,

Washington, April 24, 1863.

The following “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 

United States in the Field,” prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., and revised 

by a board of officers, of which Maj. Gen. E.A. Hitchcock is president, 

having been approved by the President of the United States, he commands 

that they be published for the information of all concerned.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E.D. TOWNSEND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF 

THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD.

SECTION I.—Martial law—Military jurisdiction—Military 

necessity—Retaliation.

1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in 

consequence of the occupation, under the martial law of the invading or 

occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring martial law, or any 

public warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not. Martial law is the 

immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest.

The presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law.

2. Martial law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except 

by special proclamation, ordered by the commander-in-chief, or by special 

mention in the treaty of peace concluding the war, when the occupation of 

a place or territory continues beyond the conclusion of peace as one of the 

conditions of the same.

3. Martial law in a hostile country consists in the suspension by 

the occupying military authority of the criminal and civil law, and of the 

domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory, 

and in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as 

in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity requires this 

suspension, substitution, or dictation.
120

The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of 

all civil and penal law shall continue either wholly or in part, as in times of 

peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military authority.

4. Martial law is simply military authority exercised in accordance 

with the laws and usages of war. Military oppression is not martial law; 

it is the abuse of the power which that law confers. As martial law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be 

strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity—virtues 

adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he 

possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.

5. Martial law should be less stringent in places and countries fully 

occupied and fairly conquered. Much greater severity may be exercised in 

places or regions where actual hostilities exist or are expected and must 

be prepared for. Its most complete sway is allowed—even in the commander’s own country—when face to face with the enemy, because of the 

absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount duty to defend the 

country against invasion.

To save the country is paramount to all other considerations.

6. All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual course in 

the enemy’s places and territories under martial law, unless interrupted or 

stopped by order of the occupying military power; but all the functions 

of the hostile government—legislative, executive, or administrative—

whether of a general, provincial, or local character, cease under martial 

law, or continue only with the sanction, or, if deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or invader.

7. Martial law extends to property, and to persons, whether they 

are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government.

8. Consuls, among American and European nations, are not 

diplomatic agents. Nevertheless, their offices and persons will be subjected 

to martial law in cases of urgent necessity only; their property and business 

are not exempted. Any delinquency they commit against the established 

military rule may be punished as in the case of any other inhabitant, and such 

punishment furnishes no reasonable ground for international complaint.

9. The functions of ambassadors, ministers, or other diplomatic 

agents, accredited by neutral powers to the hostile government, cease, so 

far as regards the displaced government; but the conquering or occupying 

power usually recognizes them as temporarily accredited to itself.

10. Martial law affects chiefly the police and collection of public revenue and taxes, whether imposed by the expelled government or by the 
121

invader, and refers mainly to the support and efficiency of the Army, its 

safety, and the safety of its operations.

11. The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad faith 

concerning engagements concluded with the enemy during the war, but 

also the breaking of stipulations solemnly contracted by the belligerents 

in time of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in force in case of war 

between the contracting powers.

It disclaims all extortions and other transactions for individual gain; 

all acts of private revenge, or connivance at such acts.

Offenses to the contrary shall be severely punished, and especially so 

if committed by officers.

12. Whenever feasible, martial law is carried out in cases of individual offenders by military courts; but sentences of death shall be executed 

only with the approval of the chief executive, provided the urgency of the 

case does not require a speedier execution, and then only with the approval 

of the chief commander.

13. Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which is conferred 

and defined by statute; second, that which is derived from the common 

law of war. Military offenses under the statute law must be tried in the 

manner therein directed; but military offenses which do not come within 

the statute must be tried and punished under the common law of war. The 

character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions depends upon the 

local laws of each particular country.

In the armies of the United States the first is exercised by courtsmartial; while cases which do not come within the Rules and Articles of 

War, or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on courts-martial, are tried by 

military commissions.

14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, 

consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for 

securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the 

modern law and usages of war.

15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb 

of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally 

unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of 

every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction 

of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, 

or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life 

from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy’s country 
122

affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the Army, and of such 

deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith either positively 

pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by 

the modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another 

in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible 

to one another and to God.

16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or 

wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not 

admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a 

district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes 

the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.

17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the 

hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier 

subjection of the enemy.

18. When a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock 

of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, 

so as to hasten on the surrender.

19. Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their 

intention to bombard a place, so that the non-combatants, and especially 

the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to 

inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity.

20. Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations 

or governments. It is a law and requisite of civilized existence that men live 

in political, continuous societies, forming organized units, called states or 

nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, and suffer, advance and retrograde 

together, in peace and in war.

21. The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, 

as one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is 

subjected to the hardships of the war.

22. Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last 

centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the 

distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country 

and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been 

more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in 

person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.
123

23. Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off 

to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his 

private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant 

in the overruling demands of a vigorous war.

24. The almost universal rule in remote times was, and continues to 

be with barbarous armies, that the private individual of the hostile country 

is destined to suffer every privation of liberty and protection and every disruption of family ties. Protection was, and still is with uncivilized people, 

the exception.

25. In modern regular wars of the Europeans and their descendants 

in other portions of the globe, protection of the inoffensive citizen of the 

hostile country is the rule; privation and disturbance of private relations 

are the exceptions.

26. Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil 

officers of the hostile country to take the oath of temporary allegiance 

or an oath of fidelity to their own victorious government or rulers, 

and they may expel every one who declines to do so. But whether they 

do so or not, the people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to 

them as long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril 

of their lives.

27. The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civilized 

nations acknowledge retaliation as the sternest feature of war. A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing 

himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage.

28. Retaliation will therefore never be resorted to as a measure 

of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and 

moreover cautiously and unavoidably—that is to say, retaliation shall 

only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence and 

the character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.

Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating rules of regular war, and by rapid 

steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.

29. Modern times are distinguished from earlier ages by the 

existence at one and the same time of many nations and great 

governments related to one another in close intercourse.

Peace is their normal condition; war is the exception. The ultimate 

object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace.
124

The more vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief. 

30. Ever since the formation and coexistence of modern nations, and 

ever since wars have become great national wars, war has come to be 

acknowledged not to be its own end, but the means to obtain great ends of 

state, or to consist in defense against wrong; and no conventional restriction of the modes adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted; but 

the law of war imposes many limitations and restrictions on principles of 

justice, faith, and honor.

SECTION II.—Public and private property of the enemy—Protection of 

persons, and especially of women; of religion, the arts and sciences—

Punishment of crimes against the inhabitants of hostile countries.

31. A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all public 

movable property until further direction by its government, and sequesters 

for its own benefit or of that of its government all the revenues of real 

property belonging to the hostile government or nation. The title to such 

real property remains in abeyance during military occupation, and until 

the conquest is made complete.

32. A victorious army, by the martial power inherent in the same, 

may suspend, change, or abolish, as far as the martial power extends, the 

relations which arise from the services due, according to the existing laws 

of the invaded country, from one citizen, subject, or native of the same to 

another.

The commander of the army must leave it to the ultimate treaty of 

peace to settle the permanency of this change.

33. It is no longer considered lawful—on the contrary, it is held to 

be a serious breach of the law of war—to force the subjects of the enemy 

into the service of the victorious government, except the latter should proclaim, after a fair and complete conquest of the hostile country or district, 

that it is resolved to keep the country, district, or place permanently as its 

own and make it a portion of its own country.

34. As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to 

hospitals, or other establishments of an exclusively charitable character, 

to establishments of education, or foundations for the promotion of 

knowledge, whether public schools, universities, academies of learning or 

observatories, museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific character—such 

property is not to be considered public property in the sense of paragraph 

31; but it may be taxed or used when the public service may require it.
125

35. Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious 

instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, as well as hospitals, must be 

secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.

36. If such works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments belonging to a hostile nation or government, can be removed without injury, the 

ruler of the conquering state or nation may order them to be seized and 

removed for the benefit of the said nation. The ultimate ownership is to be 

settled by the ensuing treaty of peace.

In no case shall they be sold or given away, if captured by the armies 

of the United States, nor shall they ever be privately appropriated, or wantonly destroyed or injured.

37. The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality; strictly private property; the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women; and 

the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be 

rigorously punished.

This rule does not interfere with the right of the victorious invader 

to tax the people or their property, to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, lands, boats or 

ships, and the churches, for temporary and military uses.

38. Private property, unless forfeited by crimes or by offenses of 

the owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity, for the support or other benefit of the Army or of the United States.

If the owner has not fled, the commanding officer will cause 

receipts to be given, which may serve the spoliated owner to obtain 

indemnity.

39. The salaries of civil officers of the hostile government who remain 

in the invaded territory, and continue the work of their office, and can continue it according to the circumstances arising out of the war—such as 

judges, administrative or political officers, officers of city or communal 

governments—are paid from the public revenue of the invaded territory 

until the military government has reason wholly or partially to discontinue 

it. Salaries or incomes connected with purely honorary titles are always 

stopped.

40. There exists no law or body of authoritative rules of action 

between hostile armies, except that branch of the law of nature and nations 

which is called the law and usages of war on land.
126

41. All municipal law of the ground on which the armies stand, or 

of the countries to which they belong, is silent and of no effect between 

armies in the field.

42. Slavery, complicating and confounding the ideas of property (that 

is, of a thing), and of personality (that is, of humanity), exists according 

to municipal or local law only. The law of nature and nations has never 

acknowledged it. The digest of the Roman law enacts the early dictum 

of the pagan jurist, that “so far as the law of nature is concerned, all men 

are equal.” Fugitives escaping from a country in which they were slaves, 

villains, or serfs, into another country, have, for centuries past, been held 

free and acknowledged free by judicial decisions of European countries, 

even though the municipal law of the country in which the slave had taken 

refuge acknowledged slavery within its own dominions.

43. Therefore, in a war between the United States and a belligerent 

which admits of slavery, if a person held in bondage by that belligerent be 

captured by or come as a fugitive under the protection of the military forces 

of the United States, such person is immediately entitled to the rights and 

privileges of a freeman. To return such person into slavery would amount 

to enslaving a free person, and neither the United States nor any officer 

under their authority can enslave any human being. Moreover, a person so 

made free by the law of war is under the shield of the law of nations, and 

the former owner or State can have, by the law of postliminy, no belligerent lien or claim of service.

44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded 

country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main 

force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may 

seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.

A soldier, officer, or private, in the act of committing such violence, 

and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully 

killed on the spot by such superior.

45. All captures and booty belong, according to the modern law of 

war, primarily to the government of the captor.

Prize money, whether on sea or land, can now only be claimed under 

local law. 

46. Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of their 

position or power in the hostile country for private gain, not even for 

commercial transactions otherwise legitimate. Offenses to the contrary 
127

committed by commissioned officers will be punished with cashiering 

or such other punishment as the nature of the offense may require; if by 

soldiers, they shall be punished according to the nature of the offense.

47. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, 

maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and 

rape, if committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against its 

inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which 

death is not inflicted the severer punishment shall be preferred.

SECTION III.—Deserters—Prisoners of war—Hostages—Booty 

on the battle-field.

48. Deserters from the American Army, having entered the service 

of the enemy, suffer death if they fall again into the hands of the United 

States, whether by capture or being delivered up to the American Army; 

and if a deserter from the enemy, having taken service in the Army of the 

United States, is captured by the enemy, and punished by them with death 

or otherwise, it is not a breach against the law and usages of war, requiring 

redress or retaliation.

49. A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to 

the hostile army for active aid, who has fallen into the hands of the 

captor, either fighting or wounded, on the field or in the hospital, by 

individual surrender or by capitulation.

All soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to 

the rising en masse of the hostile country; all those who are attached 

to the Army for its efficiency and promote directly the object of the 

war, except such as are hereinafter provided for; all disabled men or 

officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who have 

thrown away their arms and ask for quarter, are prisoners of war, 

and as such exposed to the inconveniences as well as entitled to the 

privileges of a prisoner of war.

50. Moreover, citizens who accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as sutlers, editors, or reporters of journals, or contractors, if 

captured, may be made prisoners of war and be detained as such.

The monarch and members of the hostile reigning family, male or 

female, the chief, and chief officers of the hostile government, its diplomatic 

agents, and all persons who are of particular and singular use and benefit to 

the hostile army or its government, are, if captured on belligerent ground, 

and if unprovided with a safe-conduct granted by the captor’s government, 

prisoners of war.
128

51. If the people of that portion of an invaded country which is not 

yet occupied by the enemy, or of the whole country, at the approach of 

a hostile army, rise, under a duly authorized levy, en masse to resist the 

invader, they are now treated as public enemies, and, if captured, are prisoners of war.

52. No belligerent has the right to declare that he will treat every 

captured man in arms of a levy en masse as a brigand or bandit.

If, however, the people of a country, or any portion of the same, 

already occupied by an army, rise against it, they are violators of the 

laws of war and are not entitled to their protection.

53. The enemy’s chaplains, officers of the medical staff, apothecaries, 

hospital nurses, and servants, if they fall into the hands of the American 

Army, are not prisoners of war, unless the commander has reasons to retain 

them. In this latter case, or if, at their own desire, they are allowed to 

remain with their captured companions, they are treated as prisoners of 

war, and may be exchanged if the commander sees fit.

54. A hostage is a person accepted as a pledge for the fulfillment of 

an agreement concluded between belligerents during the war, or in consequence of a war. Hostages are rare in the present age.

55. If a hostage is accepted, he is treated like a prisoner of war, 

according to rank and condition, as circumstances may admit.

56. A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a 

public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional 

infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of 

food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.

57. So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes 

the soldier’s oath of fidelity he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or 

other warlike acts are no individual crimes or offenses. No belligerent 

has a right to declare that enemies of a certain class, color, or condition, 

when properly organized as soldiers, will not be treated by him as public 

enemies.

58. The law of nations knows of no distinction of color, and if an 

enemy of the United States should enslave and sell any captured persons of 

their Army, it would be a case for the severest retaliation, if not redressed 

upon complaint.

The United States cannot retaliate by enslavement; therefore death 

must be the retaliation for this crime against the law of nations. 

59. A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes 
129

committed against the captor’s army or people, committed before he 

was captured, and for which he has not been punished by his own 

authorities.

All prisoners of war are liable to the infliction of retaliatory 

measures.

60. It is against the usage of modern war to resolve, in hatred and 

revenge, to give no quarter. No body of troops has the right to declare that 

it will not give, and therefore will not expect, quarter; but a commander is 

permitted to direct his troops to give no quarter, in great straits, when his 

own salvation makes it impossible to cumber himself with prisoners.

61. Troops that give no quarter have no right to kill enemies 

already disabled on the ground, or prisoners captured by other 

troops.

62. All troops of the enemy known or discovered to give no quarter 

in general, or to any portion of the Army, receive none.

63. Troops who fight in the uniform of their enemies, without 

any plain, striking, and uniform mark of distinction of their own, can 

expect no quarter.

64. If American troops capture a train containing uniforms of the 

enemy, and the commander considers it advisable to distribute them for 

use among his men, some striking mark or sign must be adopted to distinguish the American soldier from the enemy.

65. The use of the enemy’s national standard, flag, or other emblem 

of nationality, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in battle, is an act of 

perfidy by which they lose all claim to the protection of the laws of war.

66. Quarter having been given to an enemy by American troops, 

under a misapprehension of his true character, he may, nevertheless, be 

ordered to suffer death if, within three days after the battle, it be discovered that he belongs to a corps which gives no quarter.

67. The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make 

war upon another sovereign State, and, therefore, admits of no rules or 

laws different from those of regular warfare, regarding the treatment of 

prisoners of war, although they may belong to the army of a government 

which the captor may consider as a wanton and unjust assailant.

68. Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the 

enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, 

indeed, modern war itself, are means to obtain that object of the belligerent 

which lies beyond the war.
130

Unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful.

69. Outposts, sentinels, or pickets are not to be fired upon, except to 

drive them in, or when a positive order, special or general, has been issued 

to that effect.

70. The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, 

or arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare. He that uses it puts 

himself out of the pale of the law and usages of war.

71. Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an 

enemy already wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders 

or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly convicted, 

whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy 

captured after having committed his misdeed.

72. Money and other valuables on the person of a prisoner, such as 

watches or jewelry, as well as extra clothing, are regarded by the American 

Army as the private property of the prisoner, and the appropriation of such 

valuables or money is considered dishonorable, and is prohibited.

Nevertheless, if large sums are found upon the persons of prisoners, 

or in their possession, they shall be taken from them, and the surplus, after 

providing for their own support, appropriated for the use of the Army, 

under the direction of the commander, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Government. Nor can prisoners claim, as private property, large sums 

found and captured in their train, although they have been placed in the 

private luggage of the prisoners.

73. All officers, when captured, must surrender their side-arms to the 

captor. They may be restored to the prisoner in marked cases, by the commander, to signalize admiration of his distinguished bravery, or approbation of his humane treatment of prisoners before his capture. The captured 

officer to whom they may be restored cannot wear them during captivity.

74. A prisoner of war, being a public enemy, is the prisoner of the 

Government and not of the captor. No ransom can be paid by a prisoner of 

war to his individual captor, or to any officer in command. The Government 

alone releases captives, according to rules prescribed by itself.

75. Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or imprisonment such 

as may be deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to be subjected to no other intentional suffering or indignity. The confinement and 

mode of treating a prisoner may be varied during his captivity according 

to the demands of safety.

76. Prisoners of war shall be fed upon plain and wholesome food, 

whenever practicable, and treated with humanity.
131

They may be required to work for the benefit of the captor’s government, according to their rank and condition.

77. A prisoner of war who escapes may be shot, or otherwise killed, 

in his flight; but neither death nor any other punishment shall be inflicted 

upon him simply for his attempt to escape, which the law of war does not 

consider a crime. Stricter means of security shall be used after an unsuccessful attempt at escape.

If, however, a conspiracy is discovered, the purpose of which is a 

united or general escape, the conspirators may be rigorously punished, 

even with death; and capital punishment may also be inflicted upon prisoners of war discovered to have plotted rebellion against the authorities of 

the captors, whether in union with fellow-prisoners or other persons.

78. If prisoners of war, having given no pledge nor made any promise on their honor, forcibly or otherwise escape, and are captured again in 

battle, after having rejoined their own army, they shall not be punished for 

their escape, but shall be treated as simple prisoners of war, although they 

will be subjected to stricter confinement.

79. Every captured wounded enemy shall be medically treated, 

according to the ability of the medical staff.

80. Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giving to the 

enemy information concerning their own army, and the modern law of 

war permits no longer the use of any violence against prisoners in order 

to extort the desired information, or to punish them for having given false 

information.

SECTION IV.—Partisans—Armed enemies not belonging to the hostile 

army—Scouts—Armed prowlers—War-rebels.

81. Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their 

army, but belonging to a corps which acts detached from the main body for 

the purpose of making inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy. If 

captured they are entitled to all the privileges of the prisoner of war.

82. Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by 

fighting, or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, 

without commission, without being part and portion of the organized 

hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do 

so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with the 

occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting 

themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers—such men, or 

squads of men, are not public enemies, and therefore, if captured, are 
132

not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated 

summarily as highway robbers or pirates.

83. Scouts or single soldiers, if disguised in the dress of the country, 

or in the uniform of the army hostile to their own, employed in obtaining 

information, if found within or lurking about the lines of the captor, are 

treated as spies, and suffer death.

84. Armed prowlers, by whatever names they may be called, 

or persons of the enemy’s territory, who steal within the lines of the 

hostile army for the purpose of robbing, killing, or of destroying 

bridges, roads, or canals, or of robbing or destroying the mail, or of 

cutting the telegraph wires, are not entitled to the privileges of the 

prisoner of war.

85. War-rebels are persons within an occupied territory who 

rise in arms against the occupying or conquering army, or against 

the authorities established by the same. If captured, they may suffer 

death, whether they rise singly, in small or large bands, and whether 

called upon to do so by their own, but expelled, government or not. 

They are not prisoners of war; nor are they if discovered and secured 

before their conspiracy has matured to an actual rising or to armed 

violence.

SECTION V.—Safe-conduct—Spies—War-traitors—Captured 

messengers—Abuse of the flag of truce.

86. All intercourse between the territories occupied by belligerent 

armies, whether by traffic, by letter, by travel, or in any other way, ceases. 

This is the general rule, to be observed without special proclamation.

Exceptions to this rule, whether by safe-conduct or permission to trade 

on a small or large scale, or by exchanging mails, or by travel from one territory into the other, can take place only according to agreement approved 

by the Government or by the highest military authority.

Contraventions of this rule are highly punishable.

87. Ambassadors, and all other diplomatic agents of neutral powers 

accredited to the enemy may receive safe-conducts through the territories 

occupied by the belligerents, unless there are military reasons to the contrary, and unless they may reach the place of their destination conveniently 

by another route. It implies no international affront if the safe-conduct is 

declined. Such passes are usually given by the supreme authority of the 

state and not by subordinate officers.

88. A spy is a person who secretly, in disguise or under false 
133

pretense, seeks information with the intention of communicating it to 

the enemy.

The spy is punishable with death by hanging by the neck, whether 

or not he succeed in obtaining the information or in conveying it to 

the enemy.

89. If a citizen of the United States obtains information in a legitimate manner and betrays it to the enemy, be he a military or civil officer, 

or a private citizen, he shall suffer death.

90. A traitor under the law of war, or a war-traitor, is a person in 

a place or district under martial law who, unauthorized by the military commander, gives information of any kind to the enemy, or holds 

intercourse with him.

91. The war-traitor is always severely punished. If his offense 

consists in betraying to the enemy anything concerning the condition, 

safety, operations, or plans of the troops holding or occupying the 

place or district, his punishment is death.

92. If the citizen or subject of a country or place invaded or conquered gives information to his own government, from which he is 

separated by the hostile army, or to the army of his government, he is 

a war-traitor, and death is the penalty of his offense.

93. All armies in the field stand in need of guides, and impress them 

if they cannot obtain them otherwise.

94. No person having been forced by the enemy to serve as guide is 

punishable for having done so.

95. If a citizen of a hostile and invaded district voluntarily serves as a 

guide to the enemy, or offers to do so, he is deemed a war-traitor and shall 

suffer death.

96. A citizen serving voluntarily as a guide against his own country commits treason, and will be dealt with according to the law of his 

country.

97. Guides, when it is clearly proved that they have misled 

intentionally, may be put to death.

98. All unauthorized or secret communication with the enemy is 

considered treasonable by the law of war.

Foreign residents in an invaded or occupied territory or foreign 

visitors in the same can claim no immunity from this law. They may 

communicate with foreign parts or with the inhabitants of the hostile 
134

country, so far as the military authority permits, but no further. 

Instant expulsion from the occupied territory would be the very least 

punishment for the infraction of this rule.

99. A messenger carrying written dispatches or verbal messages from 

one portion of the army or from a besieged place to another portion of the 

same army or its government, if armed, and in the uniform of his army, and 

if captured while doing so in the territory occupied by the enemy, is treated 

by the captor as a prisoner of war. If not in uniform nor a soldier, the 

circumstances connected with his capture must determine the disposition 

that shall be made of him.

100. A messenger or agent who attempts to steal through the territory 

occupied by the enemy to further in any manner the interests of the enemy, 

if captured, is not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of war, and may 

be dealt with according to the circumstances of the case.

101. While deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means 

of hostility, and is consistent with honorable warfare, the common law of 

war allows even capital punishment for clandestine or treacherous attempts 

to injure an enemy, because they are so dangerous, and it is so difficult to 

guard against them.

102. The law of war, like the criminal law regarding other offenses, 

makes no difference on account of the difference of sexes, concerning the 

spy, the war-traitor, or the war-rebel.

103. Spies, war-traitors, and war-rebels are not exchanged according 

to the common law of war. The exchange of such persons would require a 

special cartel, authorized by the Government, or, at a great distance from 

it, by the chief commander of the army in the field.

104. A successful spy or war-traitor, safely returned to his own army, 

and afterward captured as an enemy, is not subject to punishment for his 

acts as a spy or war-traitor, but he may be held in closer custody as a 

person individually dangerous.

SECTION VI.—Exchange of prisoners—Flags of 

truce—Flags of protection.

105. Exchanges of prisoners take place—number for number—rank 

for rank—wounded for wounded—with added condition for added 

condition—such, for instance, as not to serve for a certain period.

106. In exchanging prisoners of war, such numbers of persons of inferior rank may be substituted as an equivalent for one of superior rank as may 

be agreed upon by cartel, which requires the sanction of the Government, 

or of the commander of the army in the field.
135

107. A prisoner of war is in honor bound truly to state to the captor his 

rank; and he is not to assume a lower rank than belongs to him, in order to 

cause a more advantageous exchange, nor a higher rank, for the purpose 

of obtaining better treatment.

Offenses to the contrary have been justly punished by the commanders 

of released prisoners, and may be good cause for refusing to release such 

prisoners.

108. The surplus number of prisoners of war remaining after an 

exchange has taken place is sometimes released either for the payment of 

a stipulated sum of money, or, in urgent cases, of provision, clothing, or 

other necessaries.

Such arrangement, however, requires the sanction of the highest 

authority.

109. The exchange of prisoners of war is an act of convenience to 

both belligerents. If no general cartel has been concluded, it cannot be 

demanded by either of them. No belligerent is obliged to exchange prisoners of war.

A cartel is voidable as soon as either party has violated it.

110. No exchange of prisoners shall be made except after complete 

capture, and after an accurate account of them, and a list of the captured 

officers, has been taken.

111. The bearer of a flag of truce cannot insist upon being admitted. 

He must always be admitted with great caution. Unnecessary frequency is 

carefully to be avoided.

112. If the bearer of a flag of truce offer himself during an engagement, 

he can be admitted as a very rare exception only. It is no breach of good 

faith to retain such flag of truce, if admitted during the engagement. Firing 

is not required to cease on the appearance of a flag of truce in battle.

113. If the bearer of a flag of truce, presenting himself during an 

engagement, is killed or wounded, it furnishes no ground of complaint 

whatever.

114. If it be discovered, and fairly proved, that a flag of truce has been 

abused for surreptitiously obtaining military knowledge, the bearer of the 

flag thus abusing his sacred character is deemed a spy.

So sacred is the character of a flag of truce, and so necessary is its 

sacredness, that while its abuse is an especially heinous offense, great 

caution is requisite, on the other hand, in convicting the bearer of a flag of 

truce as a spy.
136

115. It is customary to designate by certain flags (usually yellow) the 

hospitals in places which are shelled, so that the besieging enemy may 

avoid firing on them. The same has been done in battles when hospitals are 

situated within the field of the engagement.

116. Honorable belligerents often request that the hospitals within the 

territory of the enemy may be designated, so that they may be spared.

An honorable belligerent allows himself to be guided by flags or signals of protection as much as the contingencies and the necessities of the 

fight will permit.

117. It is justly considered an act of bad faith, of infamy or fiendishness, to deceive the enemy by flags of protection. Such act of bad faith 

may be good cause for refusing to respect such flags.

118. The besieging belligerent has sometimes requested the besieged 

to designate the buildings containing collections of works of art, scientific 

museums, astronomical observatories, or precious libraries, so that their 

destruction may be avoided as much as possible.

SECTION VII.—The parole.

119. Prisoners of war may be released from captivity by exchange, 

and, under certain circumstances, also by parole.

120. The term parole designates the pledge of individual good faith 

and honor to do, or to omit doing, certain acts after he who gives his 

parole shall have been dismissed, wholly or partially, from the power of 

the captor.

121. The pledge of the parole is always an individual, but not a private 

act.

122. The parole applies chiefly to prisoners of war whom the captor 

allows to return to their country, or to live in greater freedom within the 

captor’s country or territory, on conditions stated in the parole.

123. Release of prisoners of war by exchange is the general rule; 

release by parole is the exception.

124. Breaking the parole is punished with death when the person 

breaking the parole is captured again.

Accurate lists, therefore, of the paroled persons must be kept by 

the belligerents.

125. When paroles are given and received there must be an exchange 

of two written documents, in which the name and rank of the paroled individuals are accurately and truthfully stated.
137

126. Commissioned officers only are allowed to give their parole, and 

they can give it only with the permission of their superior, as long as a 

superior in rank is within reach.

127. No non-commissioned officer or private can give his parole except 

through an officer. Individual paroles not given through an officer are not 

only void, but subject the individuals giving them to the punishment of 

death as deserters. The only admissible exception is where individuals, 

properly separated from their commands, have suffered long confinement 

without the possibility of being paroled through an officer.

128. No paroling on the battle-field; no paroling of entire bodies of 

troops after a battle; and no dismissal of large numbers of prisoners, with 

a general declaration that they are paroled, is permitted, or of any value.

129. In capitulations for the surrender of strong places or fortified 

camps the commanding officer, in cases of urgent necessity, may agree 

that the troops under his command shall not fight again during the war 

unless exchanged.

130. The usual pledge given in the parole is not to serve during the 

existing war unless exchanged.

This pledge refers only to the active service in the field against 

the paroling belligerent or his allies actively engaged in the same war. 

These cases of breaking the parole are patent acts, and can be visited 

with the punishment of death; but the pledge does not refer to internal 

service, such as recruiting or drilling the recruits, fortifying places 

not besieged, quelling civil commotions, fighting against belligerents 

unconnected with the paroling belligerents, or to civil or diplomatic 

service for which the paroled officer may be employed.

131. If the government does not approve of the parole, the paroled 

officer must return into captivity, and should the enemy refuse to receive 

him he is free of his parole.

132. A belligerent government may declare, by a general order, 

whether it will allow paroling and on what conditions it will allow it. Such 

order is communicated to the enemy.

133. No prisoner of war can be forced by the hostile government to 

parole himself, and no government is obliged to parole prisoners of war 

or to parole all captured officers, if it paroles any. As the pledging of the 

parole is an individual act, so is paroling, on the other hand, an act of 

choice on the part of the belligerent.

134. The commander of an occupying army may require of the civil 

officers of the enemy, and of its citizens, any pledge he may consider 
138

necessary for the safety or security of his army, and upon their failure 

to give it he may arrest, confine, or detain them.

SECTION VIII.—Armistice—Capitulation.

135. An armistice is the cessation of active hostilities for a period 

agreed between belligerents. It must be agreed upon in writing and duly 

ratified by the highest authorities of the contending parties.

136. If an armistice be declared without conditions it extends no further than to require a total cessation of hostilities along the front of both 

belligerents.

If conditions be agreed upon, they should be clearly expressed, and 

must be rigidly adhered to by both parties. If either party violates any 

express condition, the armistice may be declared null and void by the 

other.

137. An armistice may be general, and valid for all points and lines of 

the belligerents; or special—that is, referring to certain troops or certain 

localities only. An armistice may be concluded for a definite time; or for 

an indefinite time, during which either belligerent may resume hostilities 

on giving the notice agreed upon to the other.

138. The motives which induce the one or the other belligerent to conclude an armistice, whether it be expected to be preliminary to a treaty of 

peace, or to prepare during the armistice for a more vigorous prosecution 

of the war, does in no way affect the character of the armistice itself.

139. An armistice is binding upon the belligerents from the day of the 

agreed commencement; but the officers of the armies are responsible from 

the day only when they receive official information of its existence.

140. Commanding officers have the right to conclude armistices binding on the district over which their command extends, but such armistice 

is subject to the ratification of the superior authority, and ceases so soon 

as it is made known to the enemy that the armistice is not ratified, even if 

a certain time for the elapsing between giving notice of cessation and the 

resumption of hostilities should have been stipulated for.

141. It is incumbent upon the contracting parties of an armistice to 

stipulate what intercourse of persons or traffic between the inhabitants of 

the territories occupied by the hostile armies shall be allowed, if any.

If nothing is stipulated the intercourse remains suspended, as during 

actual hostilities.

142. An armistice is not a partial or a temporary peace; it is only 
139

the suspension of military operations to the extent agreed upon by the 

parties.

143. When an armistice is concluded between a fortified place and the 

army besieging it, it is agreed by all the authorities on this subject that the 

besieger must cease all extension, perfection, or advance of his attacking 

works as much so as from attacks by main force.

But as there is a difference of opinion among martial jurists whether the 

besieged have a right to repair breaches or to erect new works of defense 

within the place during an armistice, this point should be determined by 

express agreement between the parties.

144. So soon as a capitulation is signed the capitulator has no right 

to demolish, destroy, or injure the works, arms, stores, or ammunition in 

his possession, during the time which elapses between the signing and the 

execution of the capitulation, unless otherwise stipulated in the same.

145. When an armistice is clearly broken by one of the parties the 

other party is released from all obligation to observe it.

146. Prisoners taken in the act of breaking an armistice must be treated 

as prisoners of war, the officer alone being responsible who gives the order 

for such a violation of an armistice. The highest authority of the belligerent aggrieved may demand redress for the infraction of an armistice.

147. Belligerents sometimes conclude an armistice while their plenipotentiaries are met to discuss the conditions of a treaty of peace; but 

plenipotentiaries may meet without a preliminary armistice; in the latter 

case the war is carried on without any abatement.

SECTION IX.—Assassination.

148. The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the 

hostile government an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any 

captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in consequence 

of such proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations 

look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.

SECTION X.—Insurrection—Civil war—Rebellion.

149. Insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their government, or portion of it, or against one or more of its laws, or against an 
140

officer or officers of the government. It may be confined to mere armed 

resistance, or it may have greater ends in view.

150. Civil war is war between two or more portions of a country or 

state, each contending for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to 

be the legitimate government. The term is also sometimes applied to war 

of rebellion, when the rebellious provinces or portions of the state are contiguous to those containing the seat of government.

151. The term rebellion is applied to an insurrection of large extent, 

and is usually a war between the legitimate government of a country and 

portions of provinces of the same who seek to throw off their allegiance to 

it and set up a government of their own.

152. When humanity induces the adoption of the rules of regular war 

toward rebels, whether the adoption is partial or entire, it does in no way 

whatever imply a partial or complete acknowledgment of their government, if they have set up one, or of them, as an independent or sovereign 

power. Neutrals have no right to make the adoption of the rules of war by 

the assailed government toward rebels the ground of their own acknowledgment of the revolted people as an independent power.

153. Treating captured rebels as prisoners of war, exchanging them, 

concluding of cartels, capitulations, or other warlike agreements with them; 

addressing officers of a rebel army by the rank they may have in the same; 

accepting flags of truce; or, on the other hand, proclaiming martial law in 

their territory, or levying war taxes or forced loans, or doing any other act 

sanctioned or demanded by the law and usages of public war between sovereign belligerents, neither proves nor establishes an acknowledgment of 

the rebellious people, or of the government which they may have erected, 

as a public or sovereign power. Nor does the adoption of the rules of war 

toward rebels imply an engagement with them extending beyond the limits 

of these rules. It is victory in the field that ends the strife and settles the 

future relations between the contending parties.

154. Treating in the field the rebellious enemy according to the law 

and usages of war has never prevented the legitimate government from 

trying the leaders of the rebellion or chief rebels for high treason, and from 

treating them accordingly, unless they are included in a general amnesty.

155. All enemies in regular war are divided into two general 

classes—that is to say, into combatants and non-combatants, or 

unarmed citizens of the hostile government.

The military commander of the legitimate government, in a war 

of rebellion, distinguishes between the loyal citizen in the revolted 
141

portion of the country and the disloyal citizen. The disloyal citizens 

may further be classified into those citizens known to sympathize 

with the rebellion without positively aiding it, and those who, without 

taking up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy 

without being bodily forced thereto.

156. Common justice and plain expediency require that the military commander protect the manifestly loyal citizens in revolted territories against the hardships of the war as much as the common 

misfortune of all war admits.

The commander will throw the burden of the war, as much as lies 

within his power, on the disloyal citizens, of the revolted portion or 

province, subjecting them to a stricter police than the non-combatant 

enemies have to suffer in regular war; and if he deems it appropriate, 

or if his government demands of him that every citizen shall, by an 

oath of allegiance, or by some other manifest act, declare his fidelity 

to the legitimate government, he may expel, transfer, imprison, or fine 

the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves anew as citizens 

obedient to the law and loyal to the government.

Whether it is expedient to do so, and whether reliance can be 

placed upon such oaths, the commander or his government have the 

right to decide.

157. Armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States 

against the lawful movements of their troops is levying war against the 

United States, and is therefore treason.

143

About the Author

Robert D. Ramsey III retired from the US Army in 1993 after 24 years 

of service as an Infantry officer that included tours in Vietnam, Korea, and 

the Sinai. He earned an M.A. in history from Rice University. Mr. Ramsey 

taught military history for 3 years at the United States Military Academy 

and 6 years at the US Army Command and General Staff College. Mr. 

Ramsey is the author of Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18, 

Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and 

El Salvador; Occasional Paper 19, Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and 

Observations from Lawrence to the Present; and Occasional Paper 24, 

Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 

1900–1902.

For related CSI publications, see:

Occasional Paper 18: Advising Indigenous Forces: 

American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 

Salvador by Robert D. Ramsey III

Occasional Paper 17: Out of Bounds: Transnational 

Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare by Thomas A. 

Bruscino, Jr.

Occasional Paper 16: Boots on the Ground: Troop 

Density in Contingency Operations by John J. 

McGrath

Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia by Robert F. 

Baumann, George Gawrych, and Walter Kretchik

My Clan Against the World: US and Coalition Forces 

in Somalia, 1972–1994 by Robert Baumann, Larry 

Yates, and Versalle F. Washington

Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical 

Perspectives: The Proceedings of the CSI 2006 

Military History Symposium, Kendall D. Gott 

(General Editor)

Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American 

Campaigning: The Proceedings of the CSI 2003 

Military History Symposium, LTC Kevin W. Farrell 

(General Editor)

For a complete list of CSI publications, visit our Web site 

at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/INDEX.asp.
Military History / Philippines

The Long War Series

Occasional Paper 25

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

I S B N 978-0-16-079503-9

9 7 8 0 1 6 0 7 9 5 0 3 9

9 0 0 0 0