NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

URVANO RUIZ-SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 21-1328

Agency No.

A093-492-459

MEMORANDUM*

URVANO RUIZ-SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 22-1388

Agency No.

A093-492-459

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 23, 2024**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 10 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-1388

Portland, Oregon

Before: WALLACH, CHRISTEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

***

Urvano Ruiz-Sanchez, a native and citizen of Mexico who has lived in the 

United States since 1980, petitions for review of two Board of Immigration 

Appeals (BIA) decisions. The first decision dismissed Ruiz-Sanchez’s appeal of 

an order from an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying his applications for withholding 

of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The second BIA 

decision dismissed Ruiz-Sanchez’s motion to reconsider the finding of 

removability. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the 

agency’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. 

See Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). As the parties 

are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We grant the petition.

In 2018, Ruiz-Sanchez was convicted of possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(a). The 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) then initiated removal proceedings 

against Ruiz-Sanchez by sending him a Notice to Appear (NTA) that lacked date 

and time information. After an IJ found him removable, Ruiz-Sanchez argued for 

the first time on appeal to the BIA that the absence of the date and time for his 

*** The Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Senior Circuit Judge

for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
3 22-1388

hearing on the initial NTA required termination of the proceedings. Ruiz-Sanchez 

argued termination was warranted both because the statutorily defective NTA 

deprived the immigration court of subject matter jurisdiction, and because it 

violated the claim-processing rule in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).

The BIA correctly concluded that a statutorily deficient NTA does not 

deprive the immigration court of subject matter jurisdiction. United States v. 

Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1190–94 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

1 But the 

BIA did not address Ruiz-Sanchez’s claim-processing argument. For that reason, 

we cannot address it in the first instance. See Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 

1046 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Our review is limited to those grounds explicitly relied 

upon by the Board.”); Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (en 

banc).

We also “remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes 

place primarily in agency hands,” so that “[t]he agency can bring its expertise to 

bear upon the matter.” INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002); see 

also Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding to the 

1

 Although the en banc decision in Bastide-Hernandez issued after the BIA’s 

November 15, 2021 ruling, the BIA’s reasoning aligned with this holding, and it 

cited to consistent statements in United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 986 F.3d 

1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 2021) (vacated) and Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 

893–95 (9th Cir. 2020).
4 22-1388

BIA to consider in the first instance the impact of subsequently issued BIA 

standards). In Matter of Fernandes, the BIA recognized that the time and place 

requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) is a mandatory claim-processing rule, which 

if raised in a timely objection, must be enforced. 28 I. & N. Dec. 605, 608 

(BIA 2022). Recent Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court authority is consistent with 

Fernandes. See Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 144 S. Ct. 1637, 1649 (2024) 

(recognizing that initial NTAs lacking time and place information fail to satisfy 

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)); id. at 1651 (describing the importance of this statutory 

requirement and the process to “raise issues regarding incomplete notice”);

Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th at 1193 n.9 (noting that “the supplement of a notice 

of hearing would not cure any NTA deficiencies under § 1229(a)”). We therefore 

grant the petition for review and remand for the BIA to consider in the first 

instance whether Ruiz-Sanchez’s objection to the NTA was timely, and if so, to 

address its merits in light of Fernandes, Bastide-Hernandez, and Campos-Chaves.

See Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 632 (9th Cir. 2024).

2

 

GRANTED.

2 We deny Ruiz-Sanchez’s motion for judicial notice because it relates to the 

removability issue. Dkt. No. 36 in 21-1328; Dkt. No. 14 in 22-1388. 

Ruiz-Sanchez’s removability argument is foreclosed by Tellez-Ramirez v. Garland, 

87 F.4th 424 (9th Cir. 2023), which affirmed removability for an aggravated felony 

based on a conviction for Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1)—the same offense at issue 

in this case.