NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0270n.06 No. 09-3349 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
JI MMI E B UT L ER, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. COOPER S TANDA RD AUTOMOTIVE, I NC., Def endant- Appellee , T IM O T H Y R
. B A R

N H IS E L, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

T H E N O R T HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

B EF OR E: SI L ER, RO GE RS, a nd Mc KE AG UE , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. ROGERS, Ci rcuit Judge. Jim mie Butler appe al s t h e d istrict court’s g rant of summar y jud g me nt f

or Coo pe r- Sta

nd a rd Au tom oti ve an d a s up ervi so r atCo op er-S tan dard , T im ot hy Barnh isel , on Butler ’s claims of r ace discrimination, a hostile work envir onment, and re taliation in violation of fe dera l and Oh i o l aw . The district cour t gr anted summary

judgme nt for Cooper- Standard a nd B arnhis e l a ft e r d e te rm ini ng that B utl e r cou ld not

sh owthat Co op e r’ s le g iti ma te re a so ns fo r h is termination wer e mer ely

pre t ex t for racia l discrimination or retaliation and that Butler ha d not alleg ed discrimination seve re a nd pervasive enoug h to cre ate a hostile work environme nt. After Butler filed his initial brief befor e this c ourt, Cooper-Standa rd filed for bankruptc y

p ro t ec t ion, trig g eringan automatic sta y of all cla ims ag ainst Cooper-Standar d and leaving B utler’s state-lawNo. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 2 - claims ag ainst Ba

rnhisel as the only

active c laims in the case. B eca use B utler has n o t shown that Ba rnhisel was r esponsible for a ny adver se employ

ment actions take n ag ainst Butler on acc ount of
rac e or in r etaliation for Butler ’s claims of rac e discrimination, a nd beca use Butler has not developed
any argume nts a s to wh y the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ng su mma

ry jud g me nt f

or the de fe nd a nts on Butler ’s hostile work envir onment claim, the district c ourt proper ly g rante d summary

judgme nt with respec t to Bar

nhisel. B utl e r w a s e mpl oy e d a s a

mand re l op e ra tor in C oo pe r - S t a

n d a r d ’ s B o w l i n g

G r e e n , O h i o p lant, from June of 1996 until S eptember of 2007, whe n he wa s terminated by the company . Mandre ls are
ra c ks of me ta l f or ms u se d by Co op er- Sta

nd ard to s ha pe ru bb e r h os e s f

or us e in a uto pa rt s. As a mandre l operator, Butler ’s main job duties wer e setting up supplies used during a shift, loading and unloading mandre ls from the autoclave (a larg e cur ing ove n), transpor ting mate rials to and fr om the autoclave , and cha

ng ing r acks of m an d re ls. During a norma l shift, mandrel oper ators ar e
c on tr a c tua lly

re qu ir e d to com

ple te a min imum of eig hte e n loa ds , b ut o pe rator s so me tim e s c omp le te more, sometim es l ess. Mandre l operators normally work in pools of two or thre e, and the g ener al prac tice is that the oper ator with the most seniority deter mines the pac e of the work. Timothy Ba rnhisel was a

n employ ee at Coop er -Standard w ho eventua lly beca me a shift supervisor. B arnhisel wor ked in the mandrel depa rtment as super

visor on the first shift, but Ba rnhisel would s erve as Butler’s supervisor on occa sions when B utler worke d overtime or w hen Ba rnhisel filled in for a

nother super

visor on the sec ond shift. Butler a ll ege s t h at Barnhisel dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t B utl e r a nd oth e r A fr ic an- Am e ri c an e mpl oy e e s at t he pl ant an d th a t th isNo. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 3 - dis c ri min a tio n u lti ma te ly

re su lte d in

B utl e r’ s te rm inatio n. B utl e r es se nti a lly make s thr e e argume nts in support of his claim that Ba rnhisel discriminated a g ainst him. First, Butler cla ims that, in an effor t to ge t Butler to quit or be fired, Ba rnhisel would assig n Butler to ext ra w ork whe never

possible, and that the pra ctice beca

me so perva sive that the undesirable jobs a round the plant bec ame known a s “Ji mmie J obs.” Second, B utler cla ims that his t ermination was t h e result of discrimination by Ba rnhisel bec ause B arnhisel wa s the supervisor on duty during one of the two in ci d en t s t h at the company used to support Butler ’s termination, and that Ba rnhisel furthe r fa cilitated the ter mination by repor ting B utler for

minor or fa lsifie d violations of company policy , which blig hted B utler’s employ ment re co rd. F inally , Butler claims that evidenc e showing that Ba rnhisel discriminated ag ainst other Af

rica n-Amer ican e mploy ees at the plant supports the discrimination claims. Butler alleg es three incidents in which B arnhisel discr iminated ag ai n st other Afr icanAmeric an employ ees at the plant. Michae l Brow nlee, a n Afric an-A merica

n employ ee w ho was then
wo rk ingin t

he fi nis hing dep artme nt, te sti fi e d in his de po sit ion

that B arnhis e l a dmo nis he d h im i n 1999, befor e B arnh i s el bec ame a supervisor, f

or g etting pa

rts from the pa

rts-wa shing a

rea in the mandre l depar

tment. Although B rownlee admitted he wa s not supposed t o g et parts from that are a without permission from a super visor, he testified that he later obse rved Ba rnhisel witness another employ ee ta

ke par ts from the ar ea a

nd that Ba

rnhisel did not admonish the other employ ee. Br ownlee a lso testified that in 2006, Bar nhisel approa ched B rownlee and Sean Walker , ano t her Afric an-A merica

n employ ee, to confr ont Walker for not wea ring safe ty

g lasses. B rownlee testified that Ba rn h i s el had stated that Brow nlee looked like he had something to say , and B rownleeNo. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 4 - re sp on de d b y

a sk ingwh y

B arnhis e l w a s e ve n ta lki ng to him
. Whe n B ro wn le e thr e a te ne d to dis c us s any issues betwee n the t wo wit h manag ement, Barnhise l said, “F or what? So y ou can g o up there and play the ra ce c ard a g ain? ” B rownlee also alleg ed that at some point during the con v er s ati on, Ba rnhisel told Brow nlee that he should “come ba ck to the mandre l de partment so we can do you like we did Roy

[W illiams] .” Roy Wil liams was an Af

rica n-Amer ican e mploy ee a

t Cooper-Standa

rd who Butler be lieves was fir ed as a

result of discr imination. W illiams raised rac ial co n ce rns two day s after being disciplined for lea

ving his pool with overf

lowing ba skets, and wa s terminated for re achingzero attendanc e points less than a mont h afte r the mee ting to addr ess his conce rns. Althoug h Butler alleg es that Will iams never rec eived the r equire d n o t i fi cation that he ha d rea ched f our attenda

nce points and there is some dispute a s to whether the notification that Wil liams had rea ched f our attendanc e points was p ro v ided in a timely fashion, Cooper- Standard provide d documentation, sig ne d b y Willi a ms, of no tif

ic a tio n that Willi a ms ha d re a c he d fo ur and the n o ne a tte nd anc e po int s. After Wil liams was terminate d, Butler was the only

Afric an-A merica

n employ ee in the ma

ndrel depar tment f o r f iv e ye a r s, and there wer e no Af

rica n-Amer ican e mploy ees in the ma ndrel de partment afte r B utler’s ter

mination. I n addition to these eve nts, Butler a lleg ed that Barnhise l discriminated ag ainst Butler persona lly
. Butler alleg ed that Ba rnhisel would assig n Butler the most undesirable jobs and e x tra work whe n Butler

worke d on Ba

rnhisel’s shift and that the prac tice bec ame so c ommonplace that the most undesirable jobs beca me known as “J immie J obs.” Althoug h sever al employ ees, inc ludingNo. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 5 - Ba rnhisel claimed to ha

ve hea rd the ter m, an employ ee named Br ock Tong claimed to ha ve coine d the phra se to ref

er to work around the plant that Butler ref used to perf

orm. I n his own deposition, Butler testified that Ba

rnhisel did not assig n Butler jobs outside of the normal duties of a mandre l op e rator , a

nd that th e re wa s a lw ay s a

wh ite e mpl oy e e to w ho m B arnhi sel wou ld assi g n th e same tasks as assig ned to B utler. Butler filed t hree char g es of discr imination with t he EEOC a lleg ing unla wful discrimination. I n Aug ust of 2006, Butler filed his fi rs t co m plaint with the EEOC, which stated that “ [t ]he
su pe rv iso r h ara ss[e s] me e ve r[y ] ch anc e he g e ts, ” and de sc ri bin g an inc ide nt wh e re B arnhis e l g ot i n Butle r ’ s f a c e an d to ld h im to “ s h u t th e f u * * u p ” an d w h e r e B ar

n h is e l s tate d th a t h e would find a
rea son to send Butler

home. The c omplaint also alleg ed that Barnhisel treated other A fricanAm e ri c an emp loy e e s in a sim ila r mann e r. At a me e tin g wi th mana g e me nt to ad dr e ss t he c omp la int , Ba rnhisel apolog ized to Butler for telling B utler to shut up, but Ba rn h i s el d enied ever using profa nity . Ba rnhisel also stated that he had admonished a white employ ee in a

simil ar ma

nner. Butler filed a second char g e of discrimination w ith the EEOC afte r he was called ni**** by
a co- w o r k e r n a me d B r o c k T o n g . B u tl e r

s tate d th a t h is s u

p e r v is o r , Chu c k

H aw k e n , w a s standing rig ht there but did nothing about the incident. Tongtestified at his deposition that he h ad called B utl er a “la z y ni*** *” a ft e r B utl e r c a lle d T on g a “ fu ** ** * w e a se l” se ve ra l ti me s. To nga lso testified that he ap o l o gi z ed to Butler r epeatedly and that he w as suspende d for the r est of the da y afte r the incide n t and wa s require d to watch a nd discuss a har assment video with a membe r of Cooper-Standa

rd’s human r esourc es depa rtment.No. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 6 - I n Aug ust of 2007, Butler

and anothe r mandre ls e mploy ee named Troy Uzelac we re involved in the first of two incide n t s t h at resulted in Butler’ s termination. After Butler and Uzelac wer e assig ned to work in the same pool, they had a dispute about how m any loads they wer e g oing to f ire. Acc ording to Uzelac, they had bee n one short of the require d minimum eig hteen loads, but Butler had only wanted to c omplete sevente en loads that day beca use of a sche duled company meeting . The following day , when Uzelac and Butler ag ain worke d in the same pool, the y ag ain clashe d over the number of loa ds they

should complete. Uzelac , who had more seniority than B utler, wa nted to fire more than eig hteen loads but Butler wanted to do only the minimum eightee n loads. They argued,
and a ft e r U zel a c c la ime d th a t B utl e r c a us e d Uze la c to be burn e d b y pu sh ingho t ma

nd re l ba rs int o Uzelac’ s side of the pool, Uzelac t h reatened to “ja ck slap” Butler if it happene d ag ain. Uzelac
r e p o rt e d t h e i n c i d e n t t o d e p art m e n t m an a g e r R i c h ar d M e e k s , w h o h a p p e n e d t o b e s t an d i n g n e a r

b y. Meeks or g anized a meeting among himself, Butler , Uzelac, Ba rnhisel, who wa s the shift supervisor at the time of the inc ident, and a union r epre sentative. Following this me et i n g, b oth employ ees w ere g iven an “ information only ” employ ee
corr ective a ction notice in which they wer e tol d that they neede d to work with other e mploy ees, do their best, improve the ir communication, and f ire as m an y

loads as possible. Sever al day s later, Dewe y May nard, the plant manag er, me t with both employ ees individ u ally in the prese nce of

a repr esentative from the human r esourc es depa rtment and a

repr esentative from t

h e u n io n . M a y nard’ s notes of his meeting with Butler indicate that Butler beca me agitated when May

nard told B utler that the pla nt c ou ld n ot h a ve pe op le re fu sin g to d o th e ir be st and pr e ve nti ngoth e rs fr om d oin g the ir be st.No. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 7 - When Butler c laimed that eve ry one wa s ly ing, Ma y nard told Butler that human resource s had spoken with the witnesses B utler sug g ested a nd that those witnesses stated that Butler ’s behavior was not proper . May

nard told B utler that any further incidents woul d result i n Butler ’s suspension or termination. I n September of

2007, But le r

w a s te r mi n a te d following an incident that oc curr ed while B utler
was wor king in a pool w ith Micha el St. Clair and J ohn Br ose. Acc ording to St. C lair, he a nd Butler reque sted that Br ose slow down so that they could per form indirec t labor ac tiviti es. St. Clair then testified that B rose ig nored him, at t empt ed to fire another load, and then w ent to g et a supe rvisor afte r “Jimm ie like g ot in his way or something .” B rose testified that he orig inally ag ree d to slow down, but then proce eded to f ire another load until B utler pre ssed the eme rg ency stop button, which shut down the autoclave and pr evente d the load fr om firing
. Butler rec eived an employ ee c orre ctive action notice f

or pre ssing the E-stop button to keep B rose f rom firing another

load. Following an investigation, Cooper-S t an d ard terminated B utler for interfe ring with the productivity of anothe r
wo rk e r. Th e un ion

c on du c te d its own

inv e sti g a tio n a

nd de te rm ine d th a t Co op e r- Sta nd ard ha s ju st
cause under the collective ba rg aining ag ree ment to terminate B utler. Follow in g h is te r

mi n a ti o n , B u tl e r f

il e d a th ir d E E O C c o mp la in t, c la im in g th a t h e was terminated f

or ca lling a c o-worke r a cry baby and stating that an employ ee who had pr eviously called h i m a ni**** had r ece ived no discipline. Butler ’s complaint stated that B utler fe lt he had bee n te rm inate d in

vio la tio n o f t

he Civ il Ri g hts Act of 1964 . B utl e r t he n f ile d th is l aws uit

a g a ins t Ba rnhisel, Cooper- Standard, a nd Br ock Tong , alleg ing violations of both O hio and fe dera l law forNo. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 8 - rac e discrimination, re taliation, and a hostile work e nvironment. Although B utler orig inally broug ht bo th T itl e VI Iand

state -l aw cla ims a g a ins t B arnhis e l, B utl e r d ro pp e d h is T itl e VI Ic la ims a g a ins t Ba rnhisel, and a ll of the claims ag ainst Br ock Tong . Count T h re e of B utler’s c omplaint, which contained the state-law

claims ag ainst Ba rn h isel, alleg ed that “D efe ndants imposed additional burdens upon [Butler ] i n his e mploy ment, require d him to endure a hostile work environme nt and terminated his employ

ment on the basis of his r ace , all in violation of Ohio law, including , but not limit ed to Sections 4112.02(A) and 4112.99 Rev ised Code .” Cooper-Standa

rd and B arnhisel moved for summary judgme nt on all claims and the district court g r an te d th e mo ti o n in a me mo r an d u m o p in io n . T h e c o u rt d e te r mi n e d th a t B u tl e r h a d

not
c re a te d a quest io n of fact as to w he the r r a c e pla y e d a ro le in h is t e rm inatio n o r a ny oth e r a dv e rs e
e mpl oy me nt d e c isi on , th a t B utl e r h a d n ot pr e se nte d any e vid e nc e that Co op e r- Sta nd ard ’s le g iti ma te
rea son for Butler’ s termination was mer ely prete x t for discrimination, and that B utler had not a lleg ed sufficie nt rac ial hara ssment to cre ate a hostile work environme nt based on a single rac ial slur Butler experience d while working at Cooper- Standard. B utler filed this timely appea l. Whi le this appea l
was pending , Cooper-Standa rd filed for

Chapter 11 ba

nkruptcy protec tion. Cooper-Standard f iled
no tic e wi th t

his c ourt that the a

uto ma tic sta

y pr ote c tin g Coo pe r- Sta

nd ard fr om p ro se c uti on

of thi s
ca s e wa s t h en i n ef

fe ct
. Bu t l er ad dre s s ed t h e b an kru p t cy s t ay i n h i s re p l y b ri ef t o t h i s co u rt , s t at i n g, “As the D efe ndant-Appe llee, Cooper- Standard Automotive, Inc., filed f or bankr uptcy protec tion on Au g us t 3, 20 09 , a

nd the mand a tor

y sta y ha s no t y e t be e n lif

te d, thi s r e ply

br ie f i s d ir e c te d s ole ly

to Def endant- Appellee , Timothy Ba rnhisel . . . .”No. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 9 - The mandatory

stay protec ts Cooper-Standa

rd, but not Ba

rnhisel, from “the commenc ement

. . . o f a jud ic ia l, a dmi nis tr a tiv e , o r o the r a c tio n o r p ro c e e din g a g a ins t th e de bto r t hat w a s o r c ou ld have be en commenc ed bef ore the commence ment of the c ase unde r this titl e.” 11 U .S
. C
. § 362. B utl e r’ s c la ims a g a ins t B arnhis e l r e ma in a c tiv e be c a us e the mand ato ry

sta y do e s n ot a

pp ly to

“ se pa rate le g a l e nti tie s su c h a s c or po rate a f f i l i a t e s , p a r t n e rs in d e bto r p a

rt ne rs hip s, or

to c od e fe nd a nts in pending liti gati on.” Patton v. Bearde n , 8 F.3d 343, 349 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted; emphasis re moved). In unusual circ umstances, some c ourts have e x tended the pr otection of the mandatory stay to c odefe ndants in a suit, se e A. H. Ro bb ins Co. v . P ic c ini n , 788 F.2d 994 ( 4th Cir. 1986), but Ba

rnhisel has not moved for protec tion under the stay or otherw ise “broug h t fo rt h any
e vid e nc e of

un us ua l c ir c ums tanc e s w hic h w ou ld j us tify exten din g the a uto ma tic sta

y to [h is] protec tion.” Patton , 8 F.3d at 349. Butler cannot show th at B arnhisel unlaw fully discriminated ag ainst Butler on acc ount of rac e beca use B utler has not created a que stion of fac t as to whether any adver se employ

ment actions we re the produc t of discrimination by Ba rnhisel ag ainst Butler
. “The Ohio Supreme Court has r uled that fe de ra l c a se law i nte rp re tin g and a pp lyingTi tle VI Iis g e ne ra lly a pp lic a ble to ca se s in vo lvi ng[R.C. Chapter] 4112.” Genaro v . Central Tr ansp., Inc. , 703 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ohio 1999) . Howeve r, beca use the de fi n i t i on of employ er f ound in the Ohio code is broa der tha n that of Title VI I , “a supervisor/mana g er ma

y be held jointly

and / o r s everally

liable with her/his employ er f or discriminatory

conduct of

the s upervisor/mana g er in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112.” Id. at 787-88. There fore , “individual supervisors a nd manag ers a

re a ccounta

ble for th ei r own discriminatoryNo. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 10 - conduct occur

ring in the workplac e envir onment.” Id. at 787. Under this broader

standard, how ever , Butler cannot show that Ba

rnhisel is liable for his ter mination b ec au s e Butler

has not cre ated a qu e sti on of fa c t a s to whe the r his te rm inatio n wa s th e pr od uc t of B arnhis e l’ s d isc ri min a tor y c on du c t.

Of the two e vents supporting Butler ’s termination, Ba rnhisel was involved in only one. As the supervisor f

or the shift in which the alterc ations betwee n Uzelac and B utler occ urre d, Ba rnhisel was involved in mee tings to discuss the incident. When Uzelac and Butler cla shed on their se cond day of workingtoge ther, it was de partment mana g er Richa rd Mee ks to whom Uzelac re ported the incident. Alt houg h Ba

rnhisel attended the m eeting that followed, Meeks and a union repre sentative
w e r e a l s o p r e s e n t
. F o l l o w i n g t h i s m e e t i n g , U z e l a c an d B u t l e r b o t h r e c e i v e d

“ i n f o r m a t i o no n l y”
e mpl oy e e c or

re c tiv e a c tio n n oti c e s. Se ve ra l da y s l a t e r, De we y

May na rd , th e pla nt m ana g e r, me t w ith both employ ees individuall y i n the pre sence of a r epre sentative fr om human resour ces a nd a repr esentative from th e u n i on. May nard’ s notes of his meeting with Butler indicate that B utler be c a me a g itate d wh e n May na rd tol d B utl e r that the pla

nt c ou ld no t have pe op le re fu sin g to d o th e ir best and pre venting others fr om doing their best. When Butler informed May nard tha t ever y one wa s ly ing, Ma y nard told B utler that people from human r esourc es had inter viewed the witnesses B utler
s u g g e s t e d b e i n t e r v i e w e d , an d

t h o s e w i t n e s s e s a l l s t a t e d t h a tB u t l e r ’ s b e h a v i o r w a s n o t p r o p e r . It
wa s o nly duri ngthi s me e tin g that th e pla nt m ana g e r i nf

or me d B utl e r t

hat any fu rt he r i nc ide nts c ou ld result in termination.No. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 11 - Butler does not alleg e that Barnhise l was at a ll involved in the incident with Brose in which Butler was a lleg ed to have preve nted Br ose from firing another load by pressing the E-stop button. Moreove r, there is ample evidenc e in the record to support the claim that Butler was ter minated for violation of company

policy
. Following Butler ’s t ermination t he union conduc ted an indepe ndent inquiry and dete rmined t hat t he company had jus t cause to terminate B utler. Althoug h Butler alleg es that Cooper-Standa

rd g ave inc onsistent explanations for his termination, Cooper-Standa rd has be en consistent in maintaining that Butler was ter minated for inter fer ing w ith the productivity of fe llow employ ees. This wa s the rea son Cooper-Standar d articulated in the termination notice, the motion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, and

on a pp e a l. A c c or din g ly , B utl e r h a s n ot c re a te d a qu e sti on of fa c t a s to whether his termination was the produc t of discriminatory conduct by

Ba rnhisel. Butler argues that be ca u s e Ba rn hisel was B utler’s super visor for the shift in which the alterc ations with Uzelac o cc u rr ed a rea sonable jury could infer

that discrimination by

Ba rnhisel could have influence d the termination. B utler re lies on E. E. O. C. v . Ch ry sle r LLC , 610 F.Supp.2d 818, 830 (E.D. Mich. 2009) , for the pr oposition t hat an a lleg edly d i s cr i m i n at o ry

supervisor not involved in disc iplining an employ ee could have influence d the discipline as the supervisor of the
su pe rv isors who in st ig a te d th e dis c ipl ine a g a ins t th e e mpl oy e e s. He re , h ow e ve r, the de c isi on to terminate B utler occ urre d above, not below, Ba rnhisel, and in a ma

nner that makes it unlikely that discrimination by Ba

rnhisel could have influence d the proce eding s. Both the pla nt manag er a

nd the mandre l depar

tment manag er w ere involved in the two meeting s with Butler to discus s the
a lte rc a tio n w ithUze la c . A lth ou g h B arnhis e l w a s se rv inga s sh if t su pe rv iso r a t the tim e of the fi rs tNo. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 12 - inc ide nt, the inc ide nt w a s f ir st r e po rt e d to the de pa

rtment man a g e r, wh o w a s st and ingin c los e proxi mity to the employ ees w hen the e vent occ urre d, Butler and Uzelac both re ce i v ed a mi nor inf or ma tio n- on ly

dis c ipl ine a ft e r t

his me e tin g , a

nd the on ly e vid e nc e B arnhis e l wa s in vo lve d at a ll in the incident was his sig nature , along with the depar tment manag er a

nd repr esentatives from human re source s and the union, on the infor mation-only

discip l i n ary

notice. I t was only

afte r
me e tin g wi th t

he pla nt mana g e r that B utl e r wa s tol d he c ou ld be te rm inate d fo r f utu re mis c on du c t. When that future misconduct alleg edly occur red during Butler’ s dispute with Brose , Ba rnhisel was not at all involved. Butler also claims that B arnhisel’ s alleg ed pra ctice of assig ning B utler t he out of the or dinary j o b d u t i e s t h a t c a m e t o b e kn o w na s J i m m i e J o b s w a s d e s i g n e d t o l e a d t o B u t l e r ’ s t e r

m i n a t i o n . In support of this argument, Butler points to the deposit ion testimony of Mi chae l St. C lair to show that J i m m i e J o b s we re d es i gn edt o get Bu t l er fi re d
. Du ri n g S t
. C l ai r’ s d ep o s i t i o n , t h e f o l l o wi n g ex ch an ge took place: Q: Do y ou reme mber the e x pression Ji mmie projects, or Jimm ie work? A: J immie projects or Jim mie work fr om other people , y eah. Q: Yo u h e ard

oth e r p e op le c omp la in a

bo ut i t? A: Ido n’ t kn owe xac tly wh e re y ou ’r e g oin g wi th t hat. Q: Huh? A: Idon ’t k n o w where that ca me from r eally . Ithought that this was to g et J immie out. Q: Did the J immie projects have – what – did people complaint to y ou about do n’ t me nti on

thi s w he n th e y

me nti on e d Jimmi e pr oje c ts? A: J immie project, like g et him fired. That’s what I was talking about. Q: Was J immie the only person you hea rd t al k about it? Or other people you he ard ta lk a bo ut i t? A: Ihear d some people sa y some stuff but I

don’t know exactly

what they

was ref err ing to e ither thoug h.No. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 13 - Q: Okay . Had you ever observe d that when J immie was wor king w ith y ou, that y ou had to work ha

rder than when Jimm ie wasn’ t working with y ou? A: No, onl y g ot to work as hard as, y ou know, got y our st uff y ou’ve g ot to do. Yo u d o y our s tuf

f. An d if so me bo dy

do e s that or so me thi ngthat Jimmi e might not have been doing , that was their c hoice. I t is un cle ar exa c tly

wh a t St. Cla ir

wa s r e fe rr ingto w he n h e state d “ Jimmie pr oje c t, l ike g e t hi m fired.” St. C lair does not state c lear ly that he believe s the purpose of Ji mmie J obs was to g et B utler fired. Howeve r, St. Clair clear ly stated that he w as not requir ed to do extra work whe n paire d in a pool with Butler. This is consistent with Butler ’s own testimony , which wa s that Ba rnhisel did not assig n him jobs o u t side the duties of a mandre l operator, that white employ ees w ould alway s be
a ssi g ne d th e same ta sk s as B utl e r, and that B utl e r w a s r e qu ir e d to wo rk on ly un til the e nd

of the sh if t. Moreove r, other e mploy ees te stified that they would have to perfor m J immie J obs even w hen they
wer e not assig ned to pools with Butler. U nder the se circ umstances, Butler has failed to esta blish that Ba rnhisel unlawf

ully discriminated aga inst Butler in assig ning w ork in an e ffor t to ge t him fired. Butler ’s evidenc e of B arnhisel’ s interac tions with ot her A frica n-Ameri ca n employ ees at the plant do e s g ive re a so n f

or pa us e , e sp e c ia lly

B arnhis e l’ s a lle g e d s ta te me nt to B ro wn le e that he sh ou ld

“ c ome ba c k to the mand

re l de pa rtme nt s o w e c an d o y ou lik e we did Roy ,” bu t thi s do e s n ot r a ise a question of f

act a s to whether disc rimination by Ba rnhisel play ed a r ole in Butler ’s termination. B arnhis e l w a s a lso e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to B utl e r’ s r e ta liatio n c la ims beca use B utler ca

nnot show that Ba

rnhisel t ook any

adver se ac tion ag ainst Butler based on B utler’s complaints of ra cial har assment. I n addition t o cl ai m i n g that his termination was the re sult of B arnhis e l’ s r e ta liatio n o r d isc ri min a tio n, B utl e r a rgue s that B arnhis e l iss ue d a t le a st f ive no tic e s toNo. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 14 - Butler : (1) a June 10, 2006 attenda nce she et g iven to Butler by Ba rnhisel discussing Butler ’s fa ilure to wear proper hear ing a n d ey e prote ction ; (2) an attendance notification that Butler had re ache d four attendance points signed by Ba rnhisel in 2001; (3) anothe r attenda nce notific ation s i gn ed by Ba rnhisel informing Butler

in 2002 that he had r eac hed fou r attenda nce points; (4) a

n attendanc e sheet sig ned by Ba

rnhisel i nvolving the inc ident betwee n Butler and Uzelac ; and (5) the informationon ly e mpl oy e e c or

re c tiv e a c tio n no tic e g ive n to bo th Uze la c and B utl e r, sig ned by Barnh ise l. Be cause the first three of these events occur red prior to B utler’s initial complaint of discrimination, and beca u s e Bu t l er has not shown that re taliation by Ba rnhisel re sulted in the discipline for the incidents involving Uzelac , Ba rnhisel is entitled to summary judgm ent with respe ct to Butler ’s reta liation claims. To maintain a c la im

f o r r e ta liation, an employ ee must establish that (1) the employ ee e ng ag ed in Title VI I -protec ted ac t ivity ; (2) the de fenda nt knew that the e mploy ee e ng ag ed in protec ted activity ; (3) the de fenda

nt subsequently

took an adverse employ

ment action ag ainst the employ ee; (4) the a dverse action was causa lly related to the protec ted ac tivity
. Ladd v. Grand Trunk W . R.R. , 5 5 2 F. 3 d 4 9 5 , 5 0 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ). He re , Ba rn h i s el ’s d i s ci p l i n e of Bu t l er fo r f ai l i n g t o we ar

ea rp l u gs
and the fi rs t tw o atte nd anc e no tif ic a tio ns a ll o c c ur

re d in June of 20 06 , a nd B utl e r d id not fi le his initial complaint with t he EEOC until August of 2006. The fir st two attendanc e notifications were issued in 2001 and 2002, long befor e Butler ’s initial complaint. Be cause these e mploy ment actions
we re take n p ri or to B utl e r’ s initi a l com pla int s of ra c e dis c ri min a tio n, the y c ann ot s e rv e a s th e ba sis for a reta liation claim, reg ardle ss of whether these events a ctually constituted “adve rse e mploy mentNo. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 15 - actions.” See Lindsey

v. W hirlpool , 295 F.App’ x 758, 769 (6th Cir. 2008)
. Although the last two notices identified by

Butler inv o l v i n g Bu tler’s a ltercation with Uz elac and B utler’s e ventual termination did take plac e af ter B ut l er’ s EEOC complaints, they cannot se rve a s the basis for a reta liation claim ag ainst Ba rnhisel bec ause, a s discussed i n relation to Butler’s r ace discrimination claims, Ba

rnhisel’s alleg ed invol vement in these inc idents was not suffic ient to cre ate a fac t qu e sti on a s to wh e the r t

he se no tic e s w e re the pr od uc t of dis c ri min a tio n b y

B arnhis e l. Ba rnhisel was a lso e n t itled to summ ary judgme nt with respec t to Butler’ s hostile work environment c laim beca

use B utler has not deve loped any arguments as t o why the district court e rre d in gr antin g summary

judgme nt on this claim. Butler’s br ief mentions the phra se “hostile wor k
e nv ir on me nt” on ly

thr e e tim e s and

c ite s n o c a se s su

pp or tin g his ho sti le wor k en vir on me nt c la im. I n the fact section, Butler describes the prac tice of assig ning him “Ji mmie J obs” and state s that other
e mpl oy e e s d id n ot w ant t o w or k w ithB utl e r b e c a

us e the y wo uld a lso be re qu ir e d to pe rf

or m “ Jimmie J obs.” Butler

then asser

ts that “[t] his created a hostile work e nviron m en t wh er e oper ators like Uzelac who never worke d with Plaintiff nonetheless r esente d him.” I n the ar g ument section, B utler states, “I t is im possible to neatly cate g orize the ac tions of Ba rnhisel, Espen, Rosenda le and other Cooper employ ees unde r acts of di scrimination, cre ation of a hostil e wor k environment, re taliation,
or jus t e vid e nc e of

dis c ri min a tor

y int e nt. As a

wh ole the sin g ula

r i nte nt w a s, a s a

rt ic ulate d b y

St. Cla ir wa s, ‘g e t him fi re d. ’” F ina lly , B utl e r state s, “ De fe nd ants ’ b e havio r s e rv e d mu lti ple purp os e s, retribution for Plaintiff’ s protecte d activities,
. . . cre ation of a hostile work environme nt calculated to drive Plaintiff from hi s j o b and failing that, the c ourse of action ser

ved Cooper’ s purpose ofNo. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 16 - inf la tin g the , ‘ thi ng s th a t Jimmi e ha d d on e wro ng,’ wh ic h w a s p re se nte d a s a ba sis fo r h is termination.” Now here in the se three sentenc es, or elsewhe re, does Butler addre ss any

rea son the district court er

red in g ranting sum m ar y j udg ment for Cooper -Standard a nd Ba rnhisel. “[I ]ss ues adver ted to in a per functory

manner , unacc ompanied by some eff ort at developed arg umentation, are deeme d waived.” Dillery v. City of Sandusky , 398 F.3d 562, 569 ( 6th Cir. 2005). The situation prese nted by Butler ’s brief is similar to that pre sented in Hu nte r v . S e c re tar y of U nited States Army , 565 F.3d 986, 995 (6th Cir. 2009). The c ourt in that case devoted only four
se nte nc e s to the a

pp e lla nt’ s h os til e wo rk

e nv ir on me nt c la im, statin g : Although H unter’s br ief identifies the d ismiss al of his hostile-work- environment claim as an issue, his brief doe s not specifica lly discuss why

the district court a lle g e dly e rr e d in g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f t he g ov ernm ent o n th is claim. Nor doe s Hunter cite any rele vant authority

on point. The g overnme nt’s brief, acc ordin g ly , d o e s n o t a d dr e s s th e h o s ti le

- w o r k

- e n v ir o n me n t i s s u e a t a ll
. We there fore consider this issue wa ived. Id. a t 99 5. I n h is s ta te me nt o f the iss ue s, B utl e r doe s not ad dr e ss the ho sti le wo rk e nv ir on me nt c la im specific ally
. Although Cooper-Standa rd and Ba rnhisel addre ss the hostile work environme nt issue in the prese nt c ase, they do so mere ly by asser ting that the district c ourt’s resolution of the issue was
corr ect a nd by summa ri z i n g the basis of that opinion. Butler ’s fa ilure to addre ss any err or in the district court’s re solution of the issue is even more n oteworthy for this appe al bec ause the district
co u rt ’s o p i n i o nad dre s s es a s i n gl e i n s t an ce o f r ac i al h ar as s m en t i nwh i ch B u t l e rd o es n o tal l ege Ba rnhisel was at all involved, when B rock Tongcalle d Bu t l er a “la zy ni****.” Butler

has not challeng ed the ba sis of the district court’s opinion reg arding his hostile work environme nt claim and the issue is theref

ore w aived.No. 09-3349

Butler v. Cooper-Standard Automotive , Inc.

- 17 - For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the district cour t gr anti ng summary judgme nt to Timot hy

Ba rnhisel.