The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. 

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: 

Document Title: Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans 

Author: David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, Ebrahim 

Moosa 

Document No.: 229868 

Date Received: March 2010 

Award Number: 2007-IJ-CX-0008 

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to 

traditional paper copies. 

Opinions or points of view expressed are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice. 
AntiTerror

Lessons of

Muslim-Americans

DAVID SCHANZER

SANFORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

DUKE UNIVERSITY

CHARLES KURZMAN

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL

EBRAHIM MOOSA

DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION

DUKE UNIVERSITY

JANUARY 6, 2010

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 2 — 

This project was supported by grant no. 2007-IJ-CX-0008, awarded by the National Institute 

of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this 

document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or 

policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

Project Supported by the National Institute of Justice 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Executive Summary.......1 

Introduction.......4 

Part 1. Homegrown Terrorism: Rhetoric and Reality.... ..6 

Part 2. Muslim-Americans’ Anti-Radicalization Activities.....18 

Part 3. Conclusions and Recommendations.....40 

About the Authors.....46 

Acknowledgments.....47 

Endnotes.....48 

Appendix: Muslim-American Terrorism Offenders, 2001-2009.....53 

Sidebars 

Research Site Profiles.....12-16 

North Carolina Terrorism Arrests.....17-18 

“I Called the FBI”.....23-24 

“Venting Sessions”..........26 

“We Monitor Our Masjids”..........27 

“What Will Harm Them, Will Harm Us”..........35 

“We Are Not Against America”..........36 

Charts 

Age..... 10 

Citizenship Status.... .11 

EtEthnicity.... .11 

Incidents..........11 

Table of Contents 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 1 — 

Executive Summary 

PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT 

In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 

2001, and subsequent terrorist attacks elsewhere 

around the world, a key counterterrorism concern 

is the possible radicalization of Muslims living in 

the United States. Yet, the record over the past 

eight years contains relatively few examples of 

Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned 

toward violent extremism. This project seeks to explain this encouraging result by identifying characteristics and practices in the Muslim-American community that are preventing radicalization and violence. 

This objective was pursued through interviews of 

over 120 Muslims located in four different MuslimAmerican communities across the country (Buffalo, 

Houston, Seattle, and Raleigh-Durham), a comprehensive 

review of studies and literature on Muslim-American 

communities, a review of websites and publications of 

Muslim-American organizations, and a compilation of 

data on prosecutions of Muslim-Americans on violent 

terrorism-related offenses. 

A review of these materials has led to recommendations on how the positive anti-terrorism lessons of 

Muslim-American communities can be reinforced. 

FINDINGS 

This research resulted in a number of related findings: 

Increased Anti-Muslim Bias. Since 9/11, there has 

been increased tension among Muslim-Americans 

about their acceptance in mainstream American society. 

Muslim-Americans perceive a stronger anti-Muslim bias 

from both their day-to-day interactions and the media, 

a bias that is confirmed in public opinion polling. While 

Muslim-Americans understand and support the need 

for enhanced security and counterterrorism initiatives, 

they believe that some of these efforts are discriminatory, 

and they are angered that innocent Muslim-Americans 

bear the brunt of the impact of these policies. 

Low Numbers of Radicalized Muslim-Americans. 

Although the vast majority of Muslim-Americans reject 

radical extremist ideology and violence, a small number 

of Muslim-Americans have radicalized since 9/11. In 

the eight years following 9/11, according to our project’s 

count, 139 Muslim-Americans committed acts of terrorism-related violence or were prosecuted for terrorism-related offenses that involve some element of violence. This level of approximately 17 individuals per 

years is small compared to other violent crime in American, but not insignificant. Homegrown terrorism is a 

serious, but limited, problem. 

Practices of Muslim-American Communities Prevent 

Radicalization. Our research shows that a variety of 

practices of Muslim-American communities may be 

helping to prevent and address instances of radicalization. 

These practices include the following: 

• Public and private denunciations of terrorism 

and violence. Muslim-American organizations and 

leaders have consistently condemned terrorist violence here and abroad since 9/11, arguing that 

such violence is strictly condemned by Islam. Our 

research found that these statements were not 

just for public consumption, but were supported 

by local Muslim religious and community leaders, 

who consistently condemned political violence in 

public sermons and private conversations. These 

statements represent powerful messages that resonate within Muslim-American communities. 

• Self-policing. Muslim-Americans have adopted 

numerous internal self-policing practices to prevent 

the growth of radical ideology in their communities. 

The practices range from confronting individuals 

who express radical ideology or support for terrorism, 

preventing extremist ideologues from preaching in 

mosques, communicating concerns about radical 

individuals to law enforcement officials, and purging 

radical extremists from membership in local mosques. 

Muslim-Americans have also adopted programs 

for youth to help identify individuals who react inappropriately to controversial issues so they can 

be counseled and educated. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

•	 Community-building. The creation of robust Muslim-American communities may serve as a preventative measure against radicalization by reducing 

social isolation of individuals who may be at risk of 

becoming radicalized. The stronger such communities are, in terms of social networks, educational 

programs, and provision of social services, the 

more likely they are to identify individuals who are 

prone to radicalization and intervene appropriately. 

Undermining radicalization is frequently not the 

primary goal of these community-building activities, 

which are generally aimed at strengthening community resources in response to the increased 

social and governmental pressure that MuslimAmericans have experienced since 9/11. However, 

our research indicates that these activities may 

have the positive side effect of reducing the 

likelihood of radicalization. 

•	 Political engagement. Heightened political activity 

of Muslim-Americans since 9/11 is also a positive 

development for preventing radicalization. Political 

engagement channels grievances into democratic 

forums and promotes integration of Muslim-Americans into an important aspect of American life. At 

the national level, Muslim-Americans are following 

the example of other American minority groups by 

creating advocacy organizations to express their 

political goals. At the local level, community leaders 

work through political avenues to pursue community 

interests. These activities demonstrate to Muslims 

in the United States and around the world that 

Muslims are able to participate in the full range of 

American life and that their grievances can be effectively addressed through peaceful means. Like 

community-building, increased participation in 

democratic politics did not occur for the purpose 

of preventing radicalization, but it too may have 

had the same positive side effect. 

•	 Identity politics. The expression of a MuslimAmerican identity has taken on an increasingly assertive tone in the years since 9/11. While some 

observers are concerned that heightened expressions 

of piety may be a sign of impending radicalization, 

our research suggests otherwise. The assertion of 

Muslim-American identity follows the precedent 

of other racial, ethnic, and religious groups in the 

United States: they have embraced the compatibility 

of minority and American identities. Increased piety 

among Muslim-Americans also serves to undercut 

the radical message that American values and 

practices are hostile to Islam. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Research findings suggest that radicalization in the 

United States can be minimized by taking the following steps to reinforce successful anti-radicalization 

activities of Muslim-American communities and 

create a more positive environment for MuslimAmericans: 

1. Encourage Political Mobilization. Increased political mobilization is the most important trend identified 

by this study, as it both stunts domestic radicalization 

and provides an example to Muslims around the world 

that grievances can be resolved through peaceful democratic means. We recommend that policymakers in 

the major political parties embrace this mobilization by 

including Muslim-Americans in their outreach efforts 

and by organizing them to gain their support, as they 

do with other ethnic and religious groups. Similarly, 

public officials should attend events at mosques, as 

they do at churches and synagogues. Muslim-American 

groups should also be fully included in American political 

dialogue. 

2. Promote Public Denunciations of Violence. 

Denunciations of terrorism and violence are an important 

reflection of Muslim-American opinion and values. The 

Muslim-American community should disseminate these 

statements widely. Public officials should reference these 

statements whenever possible and the media should 

include them in their coverage of terrorism and security 

issues. 

— 2 — 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

3. Reinforce Self-Policing by Improving the Relationship Between Law Enforcement and MuslimAmerican Communities. Muslim-American communities 

are taking a variety of measures to prevent radicalization. 

While there have been important achievements in 

building a cooperative, trusting relationship between 

Muslim-Americans and law enforcement, there have 

also been tensions due to controversial law enforcement 

techniques, lack of communication, and breakdowns 

in trust. Muslim-American communities and law enforcement agencies must make efforts to cooperate 

more closely to overcome mutual suspicions and achieve 

common goals. An important element of increased 

cooperation would be to initiate a candid dialogue between law enforcement and Muslim-American communities about the handling of criminal cases and the 

use of informants. Law enforcement agencies should 

develop policies on the appropriate use of informants 

in Muslim-American communities and discuss these 

policies openly with community leaders. Muslim-Americans, for their part, should understand that the use of 

informants is an accepted, long-standing law enforcement practice and may be necessary in appropriate 

cases to gather evidence on individuals who are a potential danger. In addition to addressing grievances 

about law enforcement tactics and operations, the relationship could be strengthened and solidified by 

hiring more Muslim law enforcement officers, increasing 

outreach to non-religious entry points to the community, 

and expanding the FBI’s Bridges Program and Citizen’s 

Academy. 

4. Assist Community-Building Efforts. Strong communities can provide education to Muslims who may 

be uninformed about Islamic opposition to terrorism, 

provide guidance and positive experiences for youth, 

and identify individuals at risk of radicalization. We recommend that all levels of government make additional 

efforts to provide community-building resources such 

as youth centers, childcare facilities, public health clinics, 

and English as a Second Language courses in disadvantaged Muslim-American communities. These resources are especially important in isolated immigrant 

communities. 

5. Promote Outreach by Social Service Agencies. 

Our research suggests that Muslim-American communities desire collaboration and outreach with the government beyond law enforcement, in areas such as 

public health, education, and transportation. Moving 

toward this type of engagement acknowledges that 

Muslim-American communities have needs and concerns 

other than contributing to the nation’s counterterrorism 

efforts. 

6. Support Enhanced Religious Literacy. This research reinforces the generally accepted observation 

that Muslim-Americans with a strong, traditional religious 

training are far less likely to radicalize than those 

without such training. Since it would be inappropriate 

for government to play a role in this area, the MuslimAmerican community should invest in developing seminaries, leadership programs, and on-line educational 

courses. Foundations and universities should assist in 

these efforts. 

7. Increase Civil Rights Enforcement. Enhanced 

civil rights enforcement will contribute toward addressing 

Muslim-American concerns about increased discrimination since September 11, 2001. 

— 3 — 
— 4 — 

In his speech at Cairo University, President Obama 

proclaimed, “Islam has always been a part of America’s story.”1 He noted that Muslim-Americans have 

“fought in our wars, they have served in our government, they have stood for civil rights, they 

have started businesses, they have taught at our 

universities, they’ve excelled in our sports arenas, 

they’ve won Nobel Prizes, built our tallest building, 

and lit the Olympic Torch.” Underneath links to 

the text of this speech, on the White House website, 

was a short video about three Muslim-Americans 

serving in the United States government. One of 

them, Afeefa Syeed, who moved to the United 

States as a young girl and now serves in the State 

Department, explained that she found “no contradiction between being a Muslim and being an 

American. ... [T]he comfort zone that I have is here 

in America, because of the simple seamless connection between the two identities that forge into 

one.”2 

In contrast, two weeks earlier, the nation focused 

on the foiled terrorist plot of four men from Newburgh, 

New York, who are accused of attempting to bomb 

two synagogues in the Bronx and shoot down military 

aircraft with surface-to-air missiles. The four were described by authorities as Muslim converts. According 

to the criminal complaint, each said he was willing to 

engage in “jihad,” and one of the plotters justified his 

action by saying that the military is “killing Muslim 

brothers and sisters in Muslim countries, so if we kill 

them here with I.E.D.s and stingers, it is equal.”3 

Massive media coverage of the arrests amplified what 

New York Police Department Commissioner Raymond 

Kelly described as “our concern about homegrown terrorism.”4 

These two divergent examples of Muslim-Americans—the comfortably assimilated federal employee 

and the radicalized, anti-American jihadist—have dominated the national discourse about Muslim-Americans 

since 9/11, a discourse that has amplified since a spate 

of arrests and incidents involving Muslim-Americans in 

2009, most notably, the shooting spree by Nidal Hasan 

at Fort Hood that killed 13 people and seriously 

wounded dozens more. 

Despite the massive publicity that accompanies any 

instance of “homegrown terrorism,” it is widely acknowledged that the vast majority of Muslim-Americans 

are ordinary, hard-working citizens and legal immigrants 

who make up part of the American cultural tapestry 

while practicing their minority faith. At the same time, 

there are a small number of Muslim-Americans who 

have adopted extremist radical ideologies and engaged 

in illegal, and sometimes violent, conduct to advance 

those views. 

Most research about Muslim-Americans since 9/11 

has tried to explain what might prompt an individual 

enjoying all the advantages of living in the United 

States to adopt a radical, violent ideology.

5 Other 

research has examined governmental efforts to gain 

the assistance of Muslim-American communities in identifying potential terrorists and thwarting terrorist plots.6 

Introduction 

“Islam has always been 

a part of 

America’s story.” 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

This project addresses the topic from a different 

perspective. Instead of analyzing what has happened 

to the few Muslim-Americans who have radicalized 

and broken the law, we examine why so few MuslimAmericans have followed the path of radicalization 

and violence. Instead of trying to assess the effectiveness 

of the government’s outreach efforts in MuslimAmerican communities as a means of preventing terrorism, this project examines what Muslim-Americans 

communities are doing themselves to prevent radicalization and acts of violence. The goal of the project is 

to learn how Muslim-American communities have been 

dealing with the threat—to themselves as well as the 

broader American community—posed by extremist 

ideologies. These insights provide the basis for recommendations about additional steps government agencies 

and Muslim communities should take to meet the 

threat of domestic terrorism. 

In place of speculation, this project has generated 

social-science evidence about how and why MuslimAmerican communities have resisted radicalization and 

political violence. Why have there been relatively few 

examples of Muslim-Americans who have engaged in 

terrorist activity? What characteristics of Muslim-American 

communities have enabled them to counter the radical 

Our research focused on Muslim-Americans in four 

communities: Seattle, Houston, Buffalo, and 

Raleigh/Durham (see “Research Site Profiles,” beginning page 12). These communities were chosen because 

they are moderate sized and have not been subject to 

prior research efforts. Members of our research team 

lived in each of these communities for two- to threemonth periods and conducted more than 120 indepth interviews with community leaders and other 

Muslim-Americans. Interviews probed how individuals, 

parents, and community organizations, including 

religious organizations, have dealt with the challenge 

of Islamic radicalism. Interviewees were asked about 

the steps their communities have taken to prevent 

radicalization and their views on governmental outreach 

efforts and counterterrorism policies. In addition to 

these interviews, data has also been drawn from an 

extensive review of Muslim-American publications and 

websites of major Muslim-American organizations. 

We believe this collective research yields anti-terror 

lessons critical to the success of our national counterterrorism effort. Up to now, law enforcement efforts 

have effectively stymied most of the small number of 

homegrown terrorists that have planned or attempted 

to execute attacks in United States. Our national goal, 

Our national goal ... must be to ensure that 

even fewer individuals head down the path of 

radicalization and political violence 

message that is being transmitted across the globe? however, must be to ensure that even fewer individuals 

What policies should be adopted to reinforce Muslim- head down the path of radicalization and political vioAmerican communities’ successes? What can Muslim- lence. Understanding the factors within MuslimAmerican communities do to reinforce and extend American communities that are effectively stunting the 

these successes? growth of radicalization within the United States will 

be the key to achieving this important objective. 

— 5 — 
1. THE MUSLIMAMERICAN EXPERIENCE SINCE 9/11 

The attacks of September 11, 2001, were a national 

trauma for the United States, and they were 

especially traumatic for Muslim-Americans. Muslim-Americans were subjected to the same fears as 

other citizens regarding personal security and potential future attacks, and their lives as MuslimAmericans became severely complicated because 

the perpetrators identified themselves as Muslims. 

One form of backlash against Muslim-Americans 

expressed itself as social pressure, including hate crimes 

and widespread suspicion by other Americans. Hatecrimes against Muslims rose from 28 in 2000 to 481 

recorded incidents in 2001, and current levels remain 

about five times higher than prior to 9/11.7 A poll five 

years after 9/11 found that 39 percent of Americans 

believed that Muslims living in the United States were 

not loyal to the United States, 34 percent believed that 

they were sympathetic to al-Qaida, and 44 percent reported that Muslim-Americans were “too extreme in 

religious beliefs.”8 

To address the fears Muslim-Americans were experiencing, President Bush visited the Islamic Center of 

Washington, D.C., six days after the attacks. In his 

statements at the mosque, President Bush acknowledged 

these fears and noted the difficulties faced by women 

who exercised their religious freedom to wear a 

headscarf or other covering: “I’ve been told that some 

fear to leave [their homes]; some don’t want to go 

shopping for their families; some don’t want to go 

about their ordinary daily routines because, by wearing 

cover, they’re afraid they’ll be intimidated. That should 

not and that will not stand in America.”9 Bush commented that those who “take out their anger” against 

“our fellow citizens ... represent the worst of humankind 

... and they should be ashamed of that kind of 

behavior.”9 Throughout his presidency, Bush made a 

point of visiting mosques and commemorating the 

contributions of Muslim-Americas with the nation.10 

Iftaar dinner has become an annual tradition at the 

White House. 

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Congress 

also expressed its support by enacting a resolution 

that condemned acts of violence and discrimination 

against Arab-, South Asian-, and Muslim-American 

communities, noting that they “are a vital part of the 

Nation.”11 

Law enforcement officials also made substantial 

efforts to reach out to the Muslim-Americans after 

9/11. In June, 2002, FBI Director Robert Mueller spoke 

before the Muslim-American Council (AMC), despite 

protests by some commentators that the AMC had 

links with terrorist organizations.12 Mueller said: 

I am here because we must all be in this 

war against terrorism together and because 

a sound and trusting relationship with the 

Muslim community can only bear the fruit 

of a safer nation for us all. I appreciate the 

help and support many in the Muslim-AmerPart 1. 

Homegrown Terrorism: 

Rhetoric and Reality 

— 6 — 

The attacks of September 11, 2001, 

... were especially traumatic 

for Muslim-Americans 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 7 — 

ican communities have already given us, 

especially over the past nine months, and I 

call on you, as Americans, to continue working with us to defeat terror.

13 

Mueller added that Muslim-Americans had cooperated with investigations, provided information, participated in community meetings with FBI agents, and 

even volunteered to quit their jobs to become translators 

for the FBI.14 

A second form of backlash involved government 

anti-terrorism programs that had a severe impact onMuslim-American communities, including: 

• The FBI investigation of the 9/11 attacks resulted 

in the detention of at least 1200, mostly Muslim, 

citizens and aliens based on FBI investigative leads 

and “anonymous tips called in by members of the 

public suspicious of Arab and Muslim neighbors 

who kept odd schedules”;15 

• The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 

(NSEERS), required registration, fingerprinting, and 

photographing of approximately 84,000 aliens from 

25 Muslim and Arab countries;16 

• Two Justice Department initiatives to interview 

8,000 young Middle Eastern men for information 

relating to terrorism;17 

• A secret program to conduct radiation monitoring 

at hundreds of mosques and other prominent 

Muslim sites in five cities; and18 

• The closing of seven U.S.-based Muslim charities 

and the raiding of six others.19 

These programs have resulted in thousands of detentions and deportations, hundreds of arrests, but 

only a handful of prosecutions on non-violent charges. 

At the same time, these policies have generated considerable fear among Muslim-Americans that they are 

being singled out for heightened scrutiny, and that 

their innocent conduct could be improperly construed 

as support for terrorist activities. While this was not the 

intended effect of the government’s policies, it is necessary to acknowledge that these fears are deeply felt 

among many Muslim-Americans. In the words of sociologist Louise Cainkar, who conducted hundreds of interviews in the Chicago area, Muslim-Americans suffer 

from a very real sense of “homeland insecurity.”21 Engaging Muslim-Americans in future counterterrorism 

efforts must take this background into account. 

In the words of sociologist Louise Cainkar 

... Muslim-Americans suffer from a very real sense of 

“homeland insecurity” 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
2. FEAR OF 

THE “HOMEGROWN THREAT” 

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, America perceived the terrorist threat as having three potential 

sources: 1) al-Qaida or other extremist groups 

located abroad, 2) sleeper cells of al-Qaida members 

living secretly inside the United States, and 3) individuals living inside the United States who might 

radicalize and initiate attacks, either on their own 

or at the direction of foreign groups. 

Concerns about the third source, so-called “homegrown terrorism,” have been prevalent since 9/11, but 

the concerns have grown in relation to the other categories as time has passed without any additional largescale attacks inside the United States. The public’s fear 

of homegrown terrorism became especially acute after 

the July 2005 bombings in London, perpetrated by 

Muslims born in the United Kingdom. Many in the 

United States applied the logic that if young men born 

in a free and open society like the United Kingdom 

could be inspired by radical ideology to commit terrorism 

against their fellow citizens, then the same could 

happen here. 

Similarly, some public officials have made statements 

identifying homegrown terrorism as a high level security 

threat. In a speech in 2006, FBI Director Robert Mueller 

claimed, “Today, terrorist threats may come from smaller, 

more loosely-defined individuals and cells who are not 

affiliated with al-Qaida, but who are inspired by a 

violent jihadist message. These homegrown terrorists 

may prove to be as dangerous as groups like al-Qaida, 

if not more so.”22 Later that year, Mueller noted, 

“Among this world of threats, the prevention of another 

terrorist attack is our number one priority. We are particularly concerned about the threat of homegrown 

terrorist cells.”23 He estimated that the FBI was investigating “certainly hundreds” of people within the 

country.

24 

Members of Congress also identified homegrown 

terrorism as a dangerous and growing concern. Representative Jane Harman commented, “Domestic radicalization that leads to violence in the American homeland is one of the greatest emerging threats to the 

United States. In recent years, we’ve seen numerous 

cases of American citizens actively planning to murder 

their neighbors—including you, me, and our relatives 

and friends.”25 Fear of radicalization within the United 

States led to the “Violent Radicalization and Homegrown 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007,” based on the premise 

that “[t]he promotion of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically-based violence exists 

in the United States and poses a threat to homeland 

security.”26 This anti-terrorism act passed the House of 

Representatives by a vote of 404-6, but the Senate did 

not take it up. 

In September, 2006, the Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security launched a five-hearing investigation 

into the threat of homegrown terrorism, culminating 

in a 2008 report entitled “Violent Islamist Extremism, 

the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat.”27 

— 8 — 

“We are particularly concerned about 

the threat of 

homegrown terrorist cells.” 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 9 — 

The report conceded that the radicalization process 

necessary to homegrown terrorism “has been less likely 

to occur in the United States than in other countries,” 

noting factors such as “the cultural influence of the 

‘American experience,” “the absence of a sympathetic 

audience in the United States,” and America’s “longstanding tradition of absorbing varied diaspora populations.”28 Nonetheless, the Committee warned that 

“radicalization is no longer confined to training camps 

in Afghanistan or other locations far from our shores; it 

is also occurring right here in the United States.”29 

The Committee cited a “recent rise in acts of homegrown 

terrorism planning and plotting” and hypothesized 

that this “may be an early warning that domestic radicalization, inspired by violent Islamist ideology, has become more likely in the United States.”30 

In August 2007, the New York City Police Department 

issued a comprehensive study of radicalization and the 

homegrown threat, concluding, “Muslims in the U.S. 

are more resistant, but not immune, to the radical 

message.”31 The study examined 11 case studies of 

individuals and groups that radicalized in the West and 

identified four stages of radicalization through which 

initially unremarkable individuals move to the point 

where they engage in planning or executing a violent 

attack. According to this study, the radicalization process 

is marked by an increasing commitment to the “jihadi 

ideology,” which “combines the extreme and minority 

interpretation [jihadi-Salafi] of Islam with an activist-like 

commitment or responsibility to solve global political 

grievances through violence.”32 This ideology, the 

authors noted, “is proliferating in Western democracies 

at a logarithmic rate.”33 Starting the radicalization 

process does not mean that an individual will engage 

in a terrorist act, but radicalized individuals “may serve 

as mentors and agents of influence to those who 

might become the terrorists of tomorrow.” The study 

recommends increased investments in intelligence collection because “the subtle and non-criminal nature of 

the behaviors involved in the process of radicalization 

makes it difficult to identify or even monitor from a law 

enforcement standpoint.”34 

In 2009, a confluence of events refocused attention 

on the homegrown threat. Authorities revealed that a 

group of young Muslims from Minneapolis had traveled 

to Mogadishu in 2007 and 2008 to join the radical organization Shabaab. One of them became America’s 

first suicide bomber, killing 30 in Northern Somalia.35 

In July, federal authorities announced the arrest and 

guilty plea of a Muslim-American convert from Long Island, who had received missile training in Afghanistan 

and had provided information to al-Qaida about the 

Long Island Rail Road system.36 Later that month, the 

FBI arrested seven Muslims from North Carolina, who 

are accused of plotting to commit suicide attacks 

abroad and stockpiling a cache of weaponry. These 

events prompted federal authorities to issue a bulletin 

expressing concern “about the danger posed by littlenoticed Americans traveling abroad to learn terrorism 

techniques, then coming back to the United States, 

where they may be dormant for long periods of time 

while they look for followers to recruit for future attacks.”37 

“Muslims in the U.S. are more resistant, 

but not immune, to the 

radical message.” 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Commenting at the end of the eventful month of 

July 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder said, “The 

American people would be surprised at the depth of 

the [homegrown] threat,” adding that “the whole 

notion of radicalization is something that didn’t loom 

as large a few months ago ... as it does now. And 

that’s the shifting nature of threats that keeps you up 

at night.”38 

The spate of events continued into the fall. Over 

the 9/11 anniversary, New York City was thrown into 

tumult by the investigation of former city resident Najibullah Zazi, who was eventually arrested and charged 

with planning a bombing plot. Later in September, 

two Muslims were arrested in plots to bomb buildings 

in Dallas and Illinois. In October, two other Muslims 

from Chicago were charged with plotting to murder 

employees of a Copenhagen newspaper that published 

cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed. Then, on November 5, Army psychiatrist Nidal Hasan opened fire 

on fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 and 

wounding scores more. Reports have indicated that 

Hasan had communication with a radical cleric abroad 

and had expressed radical views to his medical colleagues. 

In December, David Headley, previously arrested in 

relation to the Copenhagen plot, was charged with 

assisting the 2008 terrorist rampage in Mumbai. 

3. MUSLIM-AMERICANS AND 

TERRORISM-RELATED PROSECUTIONS 

Projected through the lenses of politics and national 

security, intensive media coverage tremendously 

magnifies the terrorist threat. This is especially true 

of homegrown terrorism, where individual suspects 

are often known in their community and domestic 

arrests and incidents heighten the sense of vulnerability. A close look at the data on homegrown 

terrorism is necessary to put the magnitude of the 

threat in perspective. 

To measure the extent of the homegrown threat 

arising from violent jihadi extremism, this project created 

a dataset of Muslim-Americans who, since 9/11, have 

1) perpetrated a terrorist act; 2) been convicted of a 

terrorim-related offense that involved some aspect of 

violence (including planning or directly supporting violence); or 3) been arrested or sought on such a charge. 

These criteria were selected to capture indivduals who 

have moved to the later phases of the radicalization 

process, which, according to the FBI, requires both 

adoption of radical ideology and development of the 

willingness to engage in violent extremist activity.

39 

This study identified 139 Muslim-Americans with a 

linkage to terrorist violence between September 11, 

2001, and December 31, 2009, an average of about 

17 people per year. (See the Appendix for a list of these 

individuals and the criteria used to create this list.) Although many of these individuals did not actually 

commit acts of violence, the charges against them indicated that they were planning, or had a willingness, 

to do so. 

The dataset contains information about both the 

offenders and the nature of their activity. All but one of 

the offenders are men. Their average age is 28. Almost 

two-thirds (65%) are under 30. 

— 10 — 

“[T]he whole notion of radicalization is 

something that didn’t loom as large 

a few months ago ... as it does now.” 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 11 — 

forcement before their plots came to fruition or had 

even matured to a dangerous state. Indeed, 33 of the 

individuals, most of whom were charged with material 

support for terrorism, were arrested before they had 

joined a specified terrorist plot. 

The activities of most of these individuals were targeted abroad. Only 51 (37%) individuals executed or 

plotted actions with targets in the United States. The 

criminal activity of 47 offenders took place exclusively 

abroad, and for more than half the offenders, at least 

some aspect of their criminal conduct happened outside 

the United States. 

Well over half (78) of the individuals were arrested 

as part of groups who appear to have radicalized 

together and either traveled abroad for training or 

began to plot attacks in the United States. These 

groups include the following: 

• The Lackawanna group, which traveled to 

Afghanistan and attended an al-Qaida training 

camp;40 

• The Portland group, which attempted to join forces 

fighting against the United States in Afghanistan;41 

• The northern Virginia group, which engaged in 

military-style training domestically in support of 

mission to join Lashkar-e-Taiba. Some individuals 

traveled to training camps in Pakistan;42 

• The California prison group, which radicalized while 

in prison and plotted to attack domestic and international targets;43 

• The group from Liberty City, Florida, which plotted 

to bomb the Sears Tower;44 

Almost two-thirds of the individuals are U.S.-born 

(63) or naturalized citizens (22). Twenty-five are legal 

residents and only 10 were in the United States illegally. 

The ethnicity of the offenders is diverse: 32 are 

Arab, 24 are African-American, 24 are South Asian, 20 

are Somali, and 20 are Caucasian. Just over one-third 

(47) of the individuals are converts to Islam. Twentyfour of the converts are African-American; ten are Caucasian; three are Latino. 

There has been no pattern or trend in terms of the 

level of arrests and incidents per year since 9/11. Undoubtedly, there has been a spike of incidents and 

arrests in 2009. A great deal of this is attributable to 

the young Somali-Americans that left Minneapolis to 

join the Shabaab. Even without this troubling episode, 

there has been an abnormal amount of activity this 

year. 

It is noteworthy that of the 139 individuals, only 40 

(29%) were successful in executing attacks (15) or 

joining a foreign fighting force (25). Thus, seventy 

percent of the offenders were preempted by law enThis document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
• The Toledo/Chicago group, which trained and 

plotted to attack U.S. troops in Iraq;45 

• The group from Cherry Hill, New Jersey, which 

plotted to attack Fort Dix;46 

• The Minneapolis group, which includes young 

men who traveled to Somalia and appear to have 

joined the radical group Shabaab;47 

• The group from Newburgh, New York, which is 

charged with attempting to bomb synagogues in 

the Bronx;48 

• The North Carolina group, which is charged with 

plotting to engage in terrorist acts in Israel;49 and 

• The group from northern Virginia, which traveled 

to Pakistan to join a jihadi group.50 

The existence of these groups supports the theory, 

promoted in the New York City Police Department 

report and by scholar Marc Sageman, that the radicalization process often relies to a great extent on group 

dynamics, where a bunch of disaffected young men 

are attracted to a charismatic leader and, as a group, 

isolate themselves from the mainstream and move towards violence. 

The geographic diversity of the offenders also 

suggests that there is no single “hot-bed” of radicalism 

in the United States that is generating large numbers 

— 12 — 

This research project focused on four mid-sized 

Muslim-American communities around the United 

States. We omitted the largest Muslim-American 

communities, such as in Detroit or New York, and 

instead selected mid-sized communities where our 

researchers would be able to contact and interview 

leaders at most of these sites’ Islamic organizations. 

Furthermore, because each of these communities 

has had some experience with isolated instances of 

radicalization, each offers opportunities to examine 

how Muslim-American organizations have in general responded to the challenges surrounding radicalization and homegrown terrorism. 

There are approximately 30,000 to 50,000 Muslims in Greater Seattle. Most are first-generation immigrants, with sizeable numbers from Somalia and 

Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first mosque in the region, 

now known as the Islamic Center of Washington, 

was founded in 1981. For two decades, the Center 

was the focal point of Muslim cultural life and Islamic educational programs in Seattle. Today, there 

are more than 12 mosques in the greater Seattle 

area representing a diversity of Islamic perspectives. 

Some, such as the Muslim Association of Puget 

Sound and the Ithna-Asheri Muslim Association of 

the Northwest, have adopted more liberal approaches, while others, such as the Islamic Center of 

the Eastside in Bellevue, Masjid Omar al-Farooq in 

Mountlake Terrace, and the Islamic Center of Kent, 

are more conservative. There are two full-time Islamic schools in the area: the Islamic School of Seattle and the Madina Academy in Redmond, Washington. There is also an active chapter of Council of 

American-Islamic Relations, a national civil-rights 

organization based in Washington, D.C. 

The religious landscape of the city is buzzing 

with interfaith activities in which many Muslims 

participate. Most of our interview respondents 

identified strongly as Muslim-Americans and spoke 

fiercely against ideological or violent radicalization. 

They distanced themselves from the incidents of 

radicalization that have emerged in the region since 

the 1990s. The first of these incidents involved 

James Ujamaa, a civil rights leader turned Islamist 

who led a group of local Muslims—mostly converts—to practice target shooting in Blaine, Oregon; 

Ujamaa later pled guilty to material support for a 

foreign terrorist organization. A second case occurred in July 2006, when Naveed Haq, a PakistaniAmerican from Eastern Washington, shot and killed 

one person at the offices of a Jewish organization in 

Seattle. 

Research Site Profiles 

Seattle, Washington 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 13 — 

of homegrown terrorism cases. Only 14 percent of 

these individuals lived in the four largest MuslimAmerican communities in the United States: the Chicago, 

Detroit, Los Angeles, and New York metropolitan areas. 

(This relatively low percentage confirms our project’s 

decision to focus on mid-sized Muslim-American communities.) There were 43 offenders from the South, 38 

from the Northeast, 30 from the Midwest, 23 from the 

West, and 3 from the Southwest. 

Of the 61 Muslim-Americans in the dataset who 

were not part of the major groups, there is no single 

pattern to how they radicalized. Only a few, like Ali alMarri, had close enough connections to al-Qaida to 

be considered a member of a “sleeper cell.” Some, like 

Kobie Diallo Williams and Adnan Mirza—two men from 

The Buffalo metropolitan region is home to approximately 20,000 to 30,000 Muslims. Major ethnic communities include African-Americans and 

African refugees in Buffalo proper, Yemenis and 

Palestinians in Lackawanna, South Asians throughout the suburbs, and a small Arab community in 

Niagara Falls. The African-American Sunni community is one of the oldest in the United States, and 

the Yemeni community, which arrived in the area 

after World War II to work in the steel and automobile industry, is one of the most significant Arab 

groups in the country. Many of them arrived after 

the 1965 Immigration Act, as in other areas in the 

country. Much of the community lives in workingclass neighborhoods, while some of the more recent 

and more highly-educated immigrant families live 

in wealthier suburbs. 

There are 10 active mosques in the area, with 

two more due to open soon. Most of the mosques 

are ethnically based. The Islamic Society of the Niagara Frontier (ISNF), perhaps the best-attended 

mosque in the region, is predominantly South Asian 

but also includes a significant number of Arab and 

other congregants. The next largest congregation in 

the area is Masjid Zakariya, part of the DarulUloom al-Madania, the largest Deobandi seminary 

in the United States. This seminary operates a grade 

school that combines religious education with a 

standard New York State public-school curriculum, 

as well as a bachelor’s-level program that trains 

imams and other religious scholars. ISNF also operates an Islamic school, which prides itself on its innovative approach that stresses preparation of students for professional success in American society. 

In addition to these two full-time schools, most 

mosques in the area run weekend classes and a variety of programs for children. Sports play an important role in youth work. ISNF holds midnight 

basketball games; Lackawanna has soccer clubs for 

younger and older youth. 

Several organizations now connect different ethnic groups within the Muslim community. The most 

prominent of these is the Muslim Political Action 

Committee of Western New York (MPAC-WNY), 

which grew out of activism in the 1980s when a 

group of local Muslims began to reach out to Buffalo’s civic and religious institutions. In recent years, 

this group affiliated itself with MPAC, a Californiabased organization that has sought to increase Muslim-Americans’ political integration and representation. The Buffalo-area chapter is now the second 

most active branch of the national organization. 

The Imams Council was formed in 2008 as a way to 

link various mosques in the region. Almost all of the 

imams in the area are represented in the group. In 

addition, the Muslim Students Association at the 

University of Buffalo also serves to connect various 

ethnic communities, as well as to bridge liberal and 

conservative religious affiliations. 

However, Muslim-Americans in Buffalo are most 

widely known for the case of the “Lackawanna Six,” 

a group of young Yemeni-Americans that attended 

al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan in early 

2001. According to a book on the subject by journalist Dina Temple-Raston, there was little evidence 

that these men had plans to engage in terrorist violence in the United States, but their association with 

al-Qaida was a startling reminder of the possibility 

of radicalization among Muslim-Americans. 

Buffalo, New York 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Houston who trained to fight against the United States 

in Afghanistan—may have radicalized together in a 

small group. Others, like Hesham Mohamed Ali Hadayet, 

who opened fire at the El Al counter in the Los Angeles 

airport, were disturbed loners, whose motives for their 

actions remain unclear. Some, like Russell Defrietas, 

charged with plotting to blow up fuel tanks at JFK 

Airport, lived in the United States for decades, while 

others, like Ahmed Mohammed, the student who put 

an instructional bomb-making video on YouTube, were 

more recent arrivals. Nidal Hasan, accused of murdering 

13 in a shooting rampage at Fort Dix, adopted a 

radical ideology, but there appears to have been a 

complex interaction of forces—some ideological, and 

some resulting from his position as a Muslim soldier 

about to be deployed to Afghanistan—that moved 

him toward violence. 

There is no single profile or a common warning 

sign that signifies a “homegrown terrorist.” The diversity 

of the demographics, ethnicities, and life experiences 

makes the problem of detecting the homegrown 

terrorist an extremely difficult one for law enforcement. 

Critics may claim that this dataset overstates the 

extent of the problem of homegrown terrorism in the 

United States. Cases are included in which the perpetrators are not American citizens, so long as there is 

evidence that they lived in the United States for an extended period and that they likely radicalized while in 

the United States. The dataset includes individuals for 

whom evidence indicates their violent action resulted 

from mental illness rather than adoption of a radical 

ideology. Cases are also included where there has 

been an arrest, but the trial is still pending. Finally, as 

noted above, the offenders have executed violent 

— 14 — 

An estimated 70,000 to 100,000 Muslims live 

in the Houston metropolitan area. While most are 

of Pakistani origin, there are Muslims from elsewhere in South Asia, Iran, Arab countries, West 

Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia. African-American 

Muslims are also prominent in the community. 

The community has grown significantly since the 

1960s, when the Islamic Society of Greater Houston 

(ISGH) was founded by Pakistani immigrants. The 

ISGH is the main umbrella organization for Muslims 

in the Houston area. It operates dozens of mosques, 

as well as several large, full-time Islamic schools. 

The ISGH also helped to establish the Shifa Clinic in 

Houston, where local Muslim physicians volunteer 

to do pro bono work for poor residents of the area, 

both Muslim and non-Muslim. Today, Houston is 

home to over 40 large Islamic centers, with numerous other places where Muslims congregate for daily or Friday prayers. 

In addition to religious organizations, Muslims in 

Houston have established numerous ethnic associations, such as the Pakistani Association of Greater 

Houston, the Arab American Cultural Center of 

Houston, and the Egyptian American Association of 

Houston. Educational institutions include youth 

groups such as Crescent Youth and more traditional 

seminaries such as the Arees Institute. The Pakistani 

community also has a weekly newspaper in Urdu 

and a 24-hour radio station in Urdu. The Pakistani 

community in Houston has been successful in engaging the local political process, represented by 

their own city council member, Masroor J. Khan. 

Houston has experienced several isolated incidents of Islamic radicalization. Two local men, Kobie Diallo Williams and Adnan Babar Mirza, were 

indicted for providing support for the Taliban. 

Williams pled guilty, and Mirza’s case is still pending. Another Muslim-American, Daniel Joseph Maldonado, who had lived in Houston for several 

months, was arrested in East Africa for allegedly 

participating in terrorist acts in Somalia. Houston 

was also the site where Sarfaraz Jamal established 

an Internet chat room, ClearGuidance.com, which 

was shut down for allowing terrorist communications, though Jamal himself has not been indicted. 

The only instance of extremist violence in the Houston area was committed by Mohammed Ali Alayed, 

a college student who murdered an Israeli friend in 

2004, though it is unclear to what extent the attack 

was religiously motivated. 

Houston, Texas 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 15 — 

actions in only 30 percent of the cases. In many cases, 

plots were at such an early stage that it is not at all 

clear that the offenders would have engaged in violence. 

Other critics might claim that the dataset understates 

the problem. Individuals who were charged with a terrorist crime but were acquitted at trial are, of course, 

excluded. The dataset also does not include cases involving exclusively non-violent activities, such as fundraising, even though these individuals provided forms of 

material support to foreign terrorist organizations. 

These cases are excluded because, in our view, individuals 

have not fully radicalized unless they are willing and 

have taken steps toward violent action to further their 

radical views. Further, this dataset does not include 

Muslims living in the United States for an extended 

period who were deported on suspicion of having 

links to terrorism. Complete data on these individuals 

are not available from open sources. Even if this data 

could be compiled, deportation would be an extremely 

unreliable measurement of the extent of genuine radicalization. Most individuals suspected of a linkage to 

terrorism have been deported based on technical immigration violations. No proof of the validity of suspicion 

of terrorism has been required for deportation. For example, hundreds of Muslims, some of whom had 

longstanding ties to the United States, were deported 

in connection with the investigation of the 9/11 attacks. 

None of them were actually prosecuted for a terrorism 

crime. Some of them may have been violent extremists; 

some may be entirely innocent: it is impossible to know. 

In sum, the dataset includes all cases in which a 

person 1) is reported to be a practicing Muslim, 2) has 

lived in the United States for an extended period, and 

3) has engaged in terrorism, has been successfully 

prosecuted for a terrorist offense that involved an 

element of violence, or has been arrested on such a 

charge. We believe that this dataset of 139 cases— 

The Research Triangle, encompassing Raleigh, 

Durham, and Chapel Hill, North Carolina, is home 

to an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Muslims. The 

community is proud to trace its roots back more 

than two centuries—North Carolina was home to 

many African Muslims enslaved in the United 

States. Most famous among them was Omar Ibn 

Said (1770-1864), the author of the only surviving 

Arabic slave autobiography written in the United 

States. Few of the slaves’ Islamic traditions or identities survived, but the Triangle area later became a 

vibrant center for the Nation of Islam and the Sunni movement that emerged out of it. Another 

group of Muslims arrived in the 1960s, many of 

them international students at local universities. 

The largest Muslim institution in the area, the Islamic Association of Raleigh, was founded by students and graduates of North Carolina State University in Raleigh. With the help of donations from 

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, they built a mosque, the 

Islamic Center of Raleigh, in 1985. As the Islamic 

Center’s members became successful professionals, 

it became independent of foreign donations. While 

the initial leadership of the Center was primarily 

Arab, it now includes among its volunteers, leaders, 

and attendees Muslims from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, several African regions, African-Americans, 

white and Latino American converts, Malaysians, 

Chinese, and even some Tibetan Muslims. 

The Center has grown to include two part-time 

and one full-time school. It has established a yearly 

health fair for the neighborhood, and it supported 

the founding of the Mariam Clinic, a full-time 

medical center for needy Muslims and non-Muslims. The Center also participates in and organizes 

interfaith events and dialogues with local politicians and law enforcement. In recent years, the 

Center has become active in voter registration and 

outreach to non-Muslim communities, including 

the predominantly African-American neighborhood 

in which the Center is located. 

This increased involvement in public life is evident at most of the eight mosques in the Triangle. 

Two local African-American 

Muslims have been elected concluded next page 

Research Triangle, NC 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
while imperfect—provides the most accurate reflection 

of the the problem of homegrown violent jihadi extremism currently available from open sources. 

When examining the data and discussing the extent 

of this terrorist threat, it is important to consider the 

context of overall security. That this many MuslimAmericans radicalized while living in this country and 

engaged in or plotted violence is discomforting. Even 

more disturbing is the possibility that had they not 

been arrested, many of them may have perpetrated 

serious acts of violence here or abroad. Nonetheless, 

in terms of overall levels of violence in America, the 

amount of radicalization and violence that has been 

perpetrated by Muslim-Americans over the past eight 

years is quite small. To put this in perspective, there 

have been more than 136,000 murders in the United 

States since 9/11.51 Thirty-one—a fiftieth of one percent—of these murders were committed by persons 

listed in the dataset. 

The media attention that accompanies nearly every 

arrest or thwarted plot involving Muslim-Americans 

magnifies our perception of the homegrown terrorism 

threat. Homegrown terrorism is certainly a serious and 

potentially dangerous problem, but it is a limited 

problem. The recent spike of cases in 2009 is disturbing, 

but it is far too early to know if this is an aberration or 

a trend. Even if the levels of radicalization of MuslimAmericans do increase, it is important to emphasize 

that the numbers of individuals engaged in these activities are extremely small. 

One possible reason for the small number of radicalized, violent Muslim-Americans involves the demographics of the Muslim-American population in the 

United States. Unlike Muslim minorities in many countries 

of Western Europe, Muslim-Americans have attained 

higher education and middle-class incomes at roughly 

the same rate as society as a whole. Their lives are less 

segregated than in Western Europe, and their political 

views on most issues are similar to other Americans. 

— 16 — 

to public office—North Carolina State Senator Larry 

Shaw and Durham City Councilman Farad Ali—and 

immigrant communities encourage their members 

to become more active citizens. One notable example of this development is a 2008 intensive summer course for young Muslims in the Triangle 

Youth Leadership Program, which was organized in 

partnership with Duke University’s Hart Leadership 

Program by volunteers from Islamic Association of 

Raleigh, the Shaw University Mosque, the Islamic 

Association of Cary, and the Ibad ur-Rahman 

mosque in Durham. This program trained more 

than 20 Muslim high school and college students 

in political and civic activism, in what the organizers hope will be an ongoing event. Other Islamic 

organizations, such as the Raleigh chapter of Muslim American Society (MAS) and Muslim American 

Public Affairs Council of North Carolina—like many 

similar Muslim advocacy groups—also engage in 

civic education. 

Until this year, the Triangle has had only one incident of radicalization: Mohammad Reza TaheriAzar, a recent graduate of the University of North 

Carolina at Chapel Hill, drove through a crowded 

part of campus in an attempt to run people over as 

a protest against U.S. foreign policy toward Muslim 

countries. Taheri-Azar pled guilty to nine counts of 

attempted murder, one for each of the people 

whom he hit. However, by his own account and reports from local Muslim-Americans, Taheri-Azar 

was not a member of any local Islamic organizations, and our interview respondents dismissed his 

actions as those of a psychologically unstable loner. 

The recent arrests of seven Muslim-Americans in 

the Raleigh area, on charges of preparing to engage in terrorism overseas, strike more directly at 

the heart of the Muslim-American community, 

since the suspects had formerly been active in local 

Islamic organizations. (See “North Carolina Terrorism Arrests,” beginning next page.) 

Research Triangle (cont.) 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 17 — 

The arrest of seven Muslim men on terrorism 

charges in August, 2009, in the Raleigh-Durham, 

NC, region—a community studied during this project—presents many of the issues regarding homegrown terrorism that confront law enforcement and 

Muslim-American communities across the nation. 

The indictment charged that American Daniel 

Boyd—a Muslim convert—his two sons, and four 

other men, conspired to “advance violent jihad” by 

participating in and providing support for terrorist 

activities outside the United States, including murder and suicide bombing.1 The government alleges 

that some of the defendants traveled to Israel, Jordan, Pakistan and Kosovo to commit violent acts 

and illegally stockpiled weapons and engaged in 

military style training in North Carolina to prepare 

for jihadi activities.2 Boyd was allegedly recorded 

saying, “I love jihad. I love to stand there and fight 

for the sake of Allah. Muslims must be protected at 

all costs.”3 More than 27,400 rounds of ammunition, gas masks, and a handbook on how authorities respond to acts of terrorism were seized from 

Boyd’s home.4 

As with many homegrown terrorism cases across 

the country, the Muslim community initially expressed surprise and skepticism about the government’s charges, worried that there would be a 

backlash against the community due to the arrests, 

and denied that any radicalization emanated from 

their mosques or the community in general. 

Boyd’s wife stridently proclaimed her husband’s 

innocence and was supported by the local Muslim 

American Society (MAS), which called on the media 

to respect the presumption of innocence and asked 

Americans not to cast aspersion on the Muslim 

community as a result of the as yet, unproven 

charges. When asked about Boyd’s alleged views 

that Muslims had a religious duty to engage in violence in defense of Islam, a MAS spokesperson responded, “there is no Islamic leader and no Islamic 

community in this country that would back 

that.”5 Outside the courtroom where the defendants’ preliminary hearing was held, a 

community member, 37-year-old Shagufta 

Syad, said, “Maybe there’s some bad Muslims in 

there, but just because you have a head scarf and 

faith in your heart doesn’t mean we’re aliens. ... I 

just want justice to be served. I’m here concerned 

as a Muslim; as an American, I need to know what’s 

going on.”6 

Although the indictment noted that the defendants stopped attending prayer services at the 

Raleigh masjids in 2009 “due to ideological differences,”7 evidence that the defendants had attended 

the largest mosque in the region, the Islamic Center 

of Raleigh, raised questions about the mosque’s 

level of cooperation with law enforcement. A Muslim graduate student who formerly attended the Islamic Center told CNN that two of the defendants, 

Omar Aly Hassan and Ziyad Yaghi, had said during 

discussions at the mosque that Osama bin Laden 

was a great scholar and fighter and that suicide 

bombings benefiting Muslims were permissible.8 

The student told mosque authorities about Hassan 

and Yaghi’s radical talk. The Islamic Center later 

confirmed that it reported a person’s “violent 

threatening action” to the 

FBI.9 

North Carolina Terrorism Arrests 

concluded next page 

Many immigrants—who, according to various estimates, 

compose about one-half to two-thirds of the MuslimAmerican population—came to the United States for 

educational or economic opportunities, and this population still retains an optimistic view of the United 

States as a land of opportunity. However, demographic 

differences are not the whole story. Surveys and other 

studies have found significant pockets of poverty, segregation, discrimination, and resentment among Muslim-Americans.52 Yet these phenomena have not led 

to violence on a large scale. The next section of this 

report examines what Muslim-American communities 

have done to ensure that this scale remains limited. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
It is important for policymakers to understand the 

factors internal to Muslim-American communities 

that have helped to prevent violent radicalization 

of Muslim-Americans. Thus far, our law enforcement 

efforts have thwarted almost all of the small number 

of Muslim-Americans who appear to have been 

willing to perpetrate terrorist violence in the United 

States. In addition, this report highlights the preventative measures that have been taken, and 

continue to be taken, within Muslim-American 

communities. Our research has identified five significant ways in which Muslim-American communities have counteracted radicalization, ranging 

from statements to concrete actions: 

• Public and private denunciations of terrorism 

and violence 

• Self-policing 

• Community building 

• Political engagement 

• Identify politics 

Some of these steps were taken directly in response 

to concerns about radicalization; others were taken 

to pursue goals such as community-building or 

political empowerment, but may have had the 

side-effect of reducing the potential for radicalization. 

After describing the project’s research methods, 

this section discusses each of these five steps in turn. 

For each of the four research sites, the project compiled a list of all Muslim-American organizations in the 

metropolitan area, based on websites, directories, and 

personal contacts. The project reviewed as many print 

and electronic publications associated with these organizations as could be obtained. During the fieldwork 

portion of the project, the project’s research assistants 

—graduate students with advanced training in interview 

methods—contacted as many of these organizations 

as possible and requested interviews with organizational 

leaders and members, as well as with other individuals 

in the local Muslim-American community. Interviewees 

gave written consent for audio-recorded interviews 

and selected whether they wished to be named or re-

— 18 — 

Despite statements that mosque leaders contacted law enforcement about a community member, 

commentator Robert Spencer, without citing facts to 

support his view, insinuated that Boyd and his followers were exposed to radical ideology at the Islamic Center of Raleigh. Writing in the on-line publication Human Events, Spencer asked rhetorically: 

“What was taught to Daniel “Saifullah” Boyd in the 

Islamic Center of Raleigh that led him to embark 

upon a path of betrayal of his homeland and people?”10 He then accused law enforcement authorities of “passivity” for not requiring mosque authorities to provide “a more honest and thoroughgoing 

confrontation of the jihad doctrine and Islamic supremacism [sic].”11 

This is a typical pattern in many of the arrests of 

Muslim-Americans on terrorism charges since September 11. An arrest is announced, but because 

the case is at an early stage, there if often little direct evidence that the accused engaged in or had 

actively plotted violent activities. The Muslim-American community denounces terrorist violence, but 

voices skepticism about the charges 

and calls for impartial justice. Angry 

voices on the internet then use the 

unproven charges to lash out against 

the defendants and cast aspersion on the broader 

Muslim-American community. 

As we have seen with the North Carolina case— 

and now the Fort Hood shootings—any new 

episode of suspected homegrown terrorism gains 

massive media attention and causes security concerns in the local communities and across the country, leaving Muslim-Americans frustrated and disillusioned, both by the actions of their fellow Muslims and how the specter of homegrown terrorism 

disrupts and complicates their lives as MuslimAmericans. 

North Carolina Terrorism Arrests (cont.) 

Part 2. 

Muslim-Americans’ 

Anti-Radicalization Activities 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 19 — 

main anonymous in the research. All of the interviews 

were conducted at private locations chosen by the respondents. 

The project sought to interview both men and 

women, members of different generations and major 

immigration and citizenship statuses, all of the major 

ethnicities and nationalities within the local MuslimAmerican community, and members of both religious 

and non-religious organizations. The project wound 

up with an imbalance in the gender of respondents 

(approximately two-thirds male and one-third female), 

but achieved its targets in other demographic characteristics, including approximately one-quarter of respondents of Arab descent, one-quarter of South Asian 

descent, one-quarter of African and African-American 

descent, and one quarter of other backgrounds, such 

as respondents of European, Iranian, Turkish, and 

Southeast Asian descent. Since the project involved indepth interviews, rather than survey questionnaires, 

the number of interviews was limited to approximately 

30 individuals in each of the four research sites. With 

this small sample size, the respondents were not 

intended to be statistically representative of MuslimAmerican communities. 

The interview began with general questions about 

the respondent and the local Muslim-American community, including the respondent’s view of the major 

accomplishments and concerns of Muslim communities 

in the area? We then turned to the issue of radicalization: 

“Our research project is interested in learning about 

efforts within American Muslim communities to prevent 

radicalization. What efforts in this area do you think 

we should highlight?” We then asked: “Some Americans 

are clearly concerned about possible radicalization 

within Muslim-American communities. Some have referred to the potential for ‘homegrown terrorism.’ Do 

you share these concerns? Why or why not?” As a follow-up, the interview then asked whether the respondent had heard of alarming statements or activities in 

the local community, and how the community had responded in these instances. The interview then asked 

what else the respondent suggested that local Muslims 

should do to make sure that radicalization does not 

occur in the future. 

The interviews were not intended to probe for 

illegal activities, and none was disclosed. However, 

given the sensitivity of the issues in the interview, 

some respondents may have wished to provide an 

overly rosy image of the local Muslim-American community. To mitigate this possibility, the project crosschecked information with additional respondents and 

with digital searches of local newspapers. No significant 

discrepancies were discovered. 

1. PUBLIC AND 

PRIVATE DENUNCIATIONS OF VIOLENCE 

We have found that an important anti-radicalization 

activity of Muslim-American communities since 

9/11 has been the active denunciation of terrorist 

violence. Muslim-Americans have done so in public 

and in private, drawing on both religious and 

secular arguments. Much of this has gone unnoticed 

in the mainstream press, and many Americans 

wonder—erroneously—why Muslims have been 

silent on the subject. New York Times columnist 

Thomas L. Friedman, for example, wrote in 2005, 

“The Muslim village has been derelict in condemning 

the madness of jihadist attacks.”53 Such comments 

overlook the fatwa issued on September 27, 2001, 

by senior Islamic scholars in the United States and 

the Middle East, urging Muslims to support military 

action against the perpetrators of 9/11: 

All Muslims ought to be united against all 

those who terrorize the innocents, and 

those who permit the killing of non-com-

“All Muslims ought to be united 

against all those 

who terrorize the innocents....” 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

batants without a justifiable reason. Islam 

has declared the spilling of blood and the 

destruction of property as absolute prohibitions until the Day of Judgment. ... [It is] 

necessary to apprehend the true perpetrators 

of these crimes, as well as those who aid 

and abet them through incitement, financing 

or other support. They must be brought to 

justice in an impartial court of law and [punished] appropriately. ... [It is] a duty of 

Muslims to participate in this effort with all 

possible means.54 

This was one of numerous similar statements by 

many prominent Muslim leaders around the world.55 

In the United States, Muslim-Americans also expressed 

outrage at the attacks, then and later. One such document, drafted by the Fiqh Council of North America 

and endorsed by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Islamic Society of North America 

(ISNA), the Muslim American Society (MAS), the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), the Association 

of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE), the Muslim 

Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and more than 130 

Muslim organizations, mosques and leaders in the 

United States, stated this forcefully: 

We have consistently condemned terrorism 

and extremism in all forms and under all circumstances, and we reiterate this unequivocal position. Islam strictly condemns religious 

extremism and the use of violence against 

innocent lives. There is no justification in 

Islam for extremism or terrorism. Targeting 

civilians’ life and property through suicide 

bombings or any other method of attack is 

haram—prohibited in Islam—and those who 

commit these barbaric acts are criminals, 

not ‘martyrs.’ 56 

Muslim American websites and publications routinely 

repeat these views. 

Muslim American Society: 

In the wake of a second series of blasts to 

hit London just two weeks after the July 7 

bombing, the Muslim American Society renews its condemnation of such evil acts 

and commitment to exonerate Islam from 

such acts in order to deny terrorists any religious, ideological or political legitimacy. 

MAS categorically denounces all terrorism 

regardless of affiliation or national origin.57 

Islamic Circle of North America: 

These violent acts by those who claim to 

represent Islam are against the teachings 

of Islam and the practices of the prophet 

Mohammad.58 

Council on American-Islamic Relations: 

We, the undersigned Muslims, wish to state 

clearly that those who commit acts of terror, 

murder and cruelty in the name of Islam 

“These violent acts by those who claim to represent 

Islam are against the teachings of Islam 

and the practices of the prophet Mohammad.” 

— 20 — 
— 21 — 

are not only destroying innocent lives, but 

are also betraying the values of the faith 

they claim to represent. No injustice done 

to Muslims can ever justify the massacre of 

innocent people, and no act of terror will 

ever serve the cause of Islam. We repudiate 

and dissociate ourselves from any Muslim 

group or individual who commits such brutal 

and un-Islamic acts.59 

Muslim Political Action Committee: 

It is our duty as American Muslims to protect 

our country and to contribute to its betterment. Since September 11, 2001, intelligence 

reports indicate that international terrorist 

networks continue to plan attacks against 

the United States. In the face of such a 

frightening possibility, and being aware of 

the disastrous consequences that may befall 

the country as a whole and the Muslim 

community in particular, it is obvious that 

Muslims should be at the forefront of the 

effort to prevent this from happening.60 

The Minaret: 

Peace is not an alternative; it is a necessity 

for the true comprehension of the divine 

message. One does not attack those who 

are the intended recipient of the divine 

message. If we want to show our commitment to peace, then we must go beyond 

words and rhetoric. The least that we can 

do is express our condemnation of the 

killing done in the name of religion regardless 

of the victims and perpetrators.61 

There is only one Muslim-American organization, a 

tiny group called the Islamic Thinkers Society, that openly 

espouses violence—abroad, not in the United States. It 

denounces all of the larger Muslim-American organizations 

as “so-called Muslim organizations and their spiritually 

impotent and politically retarded ‘leadership.’”62 

Some observers fear that these denunciations are 

intended solely for public consumption by non-Muslims 

and do not reflect Muslim-Americans’ true beliefs. Our 

fieldwork suggests that this is not the case. In North 

Carolina, for example, the local imam warned congregants against pamphlets that he considered “dangerous.” 

In Buffalo, a local group ran an anti-terrorism workshop 

for Muslim-Americans. In each of the four research 

sites, Muslim-Americans frequently characterized terrorists 

as mentally ill. 

Among religiously liberal Muslim-Americans, denunciations of violence emphasized the themes that 

they viewed as the spirit of Islam, including tolerance 

of diversity, intercommunal coexistence, and support 

for democratic politics. Quotations from the Qur’an 

and the hadith—eyewitness reports of the sayings 

and actions of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions—are common in discussions of these topics. 

Religiously conservative Muslim-Americans are just 

as vehement in denouncing violence. Their critique 

Religiously conservative Muslim-Americans 

are just as vehement 

in denouncing violence 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 22 — 

often centers on the importance of ethical practices, 

with an insistence on the “middle path” (as opposed 

to extremism) and “correct” orthodox belief, which 

they understand to mean apolitical piety. Conversations 

on these topics often referred to Qur’anic verses and 

hadith reports that require obedience to the laws of 

the land, sober and modest comportment, and proper 

treatment of strangers. These themes are especially 

visible among Salafi communities in the U.S. The term 

Salafi, which means a follower of the first generations 

of Muslims (the salaf), has been adopted by some 

terrorist groups in the Middle East and elsewhere.63 

However, the term is far more commonly used to refer 

to an intense form of personal religiosity, with no 

political implications. With this understanding in mind, 

according to a survey of American mosques conducted 

in 2000, almost 70 percent of mosque administrators 

identified “the teachings of the righteous salaf” as an 

important source of authority.

64 This came to be misinterpreted in the American media as “Salafi teachings,” 

which supposedly provide “a lot of quiet help—as well 

as a hiding place [for] would-be terrorists.”65 By 

contrast, the self-described Salafis that our project interviewed were among the most hostile to radical 

Islamic movements, which they considered haram, religiously impermissible. “We are not really concerned 

with politics, you know, those are affairs you can’t 

change,” one self-described Salafi imam told us. “Change 

really comes from Allah, you know. ... A lot of that stuff 

[politics] gets people distracted from what’s really important.”66 

Our research indicated that Muslim-Americans do 

not support terrorism directed at the United States or 

innocent civilians. At the same time, some of our interviewees were less quick to condemn other acts of violence outside the United States in instances where 

they considered the targets to be part of a genuine 

armed conflict. Because this project focuses exclusively 

on domestic terrorism, we did not attempt to gauge 

the extent of this support or probe interviewees on 

these issues. 

2. SELF-POLICING 

Our project finds that Muslim-Americans’ statements 

denouncing terrorism have been reinforced with 

concrete actions in their communities to monitor 

signs of radicalization. The rarity of terrorism in the 

United States means that few Muslim-Americans 

have ever encountered an actual terrorist, or even 

an individual who has expressed a willingness to 

engage in violence. Nonetheless, our research indicates that Muslim-Americans are engaged in a 

heightened level of self-policing against radicalization 

that may help to account for the infrequency of 

terrorist activities by Muslim-Americans. 

Even before 9/11, terrorist organizations considered 

Muslim-American communities to be unlikely collaborators. Although a variety of radical Islamic movements 

sought to raise funds in the United States for their revolutionary campaigns abroad, there has been little recruitment of Muslim-Americans for domestic terrorism 

in the United States. In fact, according to interrogation 

summaries made available by the government, Khalid 

Sheik Mohammed forbade the 9/11 hijackers from 

Even before 9/11, terrorist organizations 

considered Muslim-American communities 

to be unlikely collaborators 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 23 — 

confiding in Muslim-Americans. He “explicitly told Mohammad Atta and the other pilots and muscle operatives 

not to speak with any Muslims once in the United 

States. The only exception to this rule was concerning 

Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, whom he instructed to contact an Islamic Center or Mosque to 

help them get settled in the country since they did not 

speak English.”67 To our knowledge, no Muslim-Americans have been indicted for knowingly aiding or 

abetting the 9/11 attacks. 

Since 9/11, Muslim-Americans have been attentive 

to possible radicalization when it appears. In Houston, 

for example, a Muslim religious leader harshly scolded 

a man who “told me that he would’ve been proud if it 

was his sons [who were responsible for 9/11]. ... I 

whupped the hell out of him, afterwards he left with a 

different disposition. Now, we don’t know where 

people come from, we don’t know what experiences 

they’ve had that have shaped them. So, I’m not going 

to judge him, because when he got the right information, 

his disposition changed.”68 In North Carolina, another 

religious leader said he called the FBI when a young 

man in the community appeared to be on the verge of 

violence (see “I Called the FBI,” this page). Another 

man said he called the authorities when a friend of his 

started talking angrily about possibly avenging civilian 

casualties in Iraq: 

He was talking about how bridges are going 

to be blown up into the sky, and stuff, and I 

was really thinking, somebody is going to 

do something like this, the way this friend 

A young person who came from a broken family 

... he had just finished high school and had come 

back to Raleigh, where he went to middle school. 

The one who really noticed his radical views was his 

roommate. And that was very good. When he came 

and met with me, he 

said, “I have to talk 

with you about some 

very important issues.” I said, “What 

is the problem?” He said, “One of my roommates, I 

feel like he has some radical views.” I said, “It’s 

good that you came.” He said, “Will this be confidential?” I said, “Don’t worry about confidentiality. 

Anything you say here, this is a trust with God, with 

Allah. We will never tell this person, but we will try 

to help, because if you don’t tell us, maybe it will 

turn into something worse.” He finally told me 

about the person, so I knew exactly what the issue 

was. Now that I had the information, what did I do 

with it? We have a youth counselor, and I talked to 

him, he is in charge of our youth programs, and so I 

said, “You know that person?” He said, “Yeah.” I 

said, “What is with him?” He said, “He is not from 

our community, he just came here a few months 

back.” I said, “I have some information about him 

that worries me. He has some radical views.” He 

said, “No, he jokes sometimes.” I said, “No. Because sometimes people start joking, and nobody 

corrects them, and it becomes a fact—especially at 

that age. ... 

We knew a person who worked with him—he 

was a construction worker. He [the youth counselor] 

talked to the person who hired him, at least he 

would know what is going on, if he noticed any of 

those issues, at least he can come and see me and 

we can talk to him. I said that I am ready to talk 

with that person, but not at the beginning, because 

of the age gap, he would say, “Why does that old 

man want to talk with me?” Let’s just give it time, 

but at the same time, we have to watch all of his 

actions and statements, maybe it would lead to 

things we can help him with. ... 

The man who hired him came and said, “I have 

some news.” I said, “What is going on?” He said, 

“You remember the person we were talking about?” 

I said, “Yes.” He said, “His mom”—the mom of the 

youth, she doesn’t come to the masjid—she came 

to him, to his employer, from the masjid, and said, 

“Please help me—my son, I don’t have any control 

over him any more. He 

could become very radical. 

I Called the FBI 

concluded next page 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
of mine was talking. I was suspicious of the 

way he was talking with me. I called the FBI 

myself, and I told them this person, this name, 

this telephone number. ... 

The way he talked, it wasn’t comfortable 

for me. He wasn’t saying, “I’m going to 

blow up and kill people,” but the way he 

talked, from seeing what’s going on in Iraq, 

he was so unhappy with all this killing in 

Iraq, all the children. And he was upset. I 

thought he would do something wrong. 

But when I called the FBI, they laughed at 

me. They didn’t even care about it. They 

wouldn’t even take a name. They wouldn’t 

even take a phone number. My friend, he’s 

married with four children, and I don’t think 

— 24 — 

anything about it now, but he was upset at 

that moment, and I thought, maybe he’ll 

go too far.

69 

Of the more than 120 interviews conducted for 

this project, only one respondent expressed hesitancy 

about reporting a potential act of terrorism to the authorities. 

In the African-American and African-American Muslim community, all we are concerned 

about is taking care of your family. That’s all 

we’re concerned about. ... We need to eat— 

we ain’t got the time to be concerned doing 

the police’s job. ... 

It’s like this, I’ll tell you from the heart. If I 

knew of a plot that a thousand airplanes, 

I saw that he doesn’t even respect me. He doesn’t 

talk to me about any of these issues, but I am starting to feel that he is a radical.” This is his mom. 

“Please 

help 

me to 

save 

him, 

and maybe talk to the imam to see if he can talk to 

him.” It came from Allah’s heart, directly. Then, 

when we started talking about these issues, he left. 

A few days later, he just left for New York. His idea 

was to go and make an explosion, or to harm society, somewhere. And I said, “Now it’s become serious, it’s a threat, we should not take it lightly. I 

know we have no chance to fix the person, but at 

least we should call the authorities.” And really, 

that’s when I called the FBI. I said, that’s it, this is 

the information we have. And they were very cooperative. They took down all the information, and 

they said, “Don’t worry. We’ll get all the information.” ... 

I don’t know what the FBI did, because later, 

they said, “We took care of it, don’t worry.” And 

the other FBI agent, he knows his father, from New 

York state. And somehow they approached the father. And they really took it seriously. ... I reached 

the point where I felt, I have to report this to the 

authorities, because if, Allah forbid, if he left and 

did something, even just harming himself, I would 

be liable before Allah, why didn’t I tell the authorities so that they could stop him. ... They handled it 

very well, professionally. They talked to his father, 

and told him to be careful. We talked to his boss 

here, we asked him to come, because we didn’t 

want him to go out of the region, because we didn’t 

know in New York, who he is linked with. And he 

brought him back. He said, “We have work for you, 

inshallah.” And I said, “At that age, you have a future”—because he is not studying at a university, he 

just finished high school. “At least he can work with 

me, I can give you a good salary, because working 

in the construction field, inshallah in the future you 

will work for yourself, you will find a wife.” And he 

came back, with that kind of treatment. And now, 

he has become a very good person. Even the FBI 

called me after he came back and said, “With that 

procedure, he has become a better person.” 107 

I Called the FBI (cont.) 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

all at once, were to fall out of the sky—if I 

knew that there was another Timothy 

McVeigh was going to rise up, and I had 

absolute knowledge of it—I wouldn’t care. 

Interviewer: Really? 

I wouldn’t care. I say that as an AfricanAmerican and as a Muslim. 

Interviewer: But... 

I wouldn’t care. 

Interviewer: What about saving human 

lives? 

tell you right now that I’ll call the police 

right now. And you can call me a snitch or 

a rat, but call me a Muslim.” 71 

Other Muslim organizations have not waited passively 

to learn about possible radicalization, but have instead 

organized events with teenagers and young adults, raising 

controversial topics that might identify potential problems. 

In Seattle, for example, an Islamic Sunday school raised 

such issues in order to counsel students who overreact. 

[The teachers] bring up very, very critical issues that you see in the media, that you see 

out there, and they are doing it on purpose, 

to see the response of the youth, to see 

how they are reacting. Are they reacting in 

“I’ll tell you right now that I’ll call the police right 

now. And you can call me a snitch or a rat, 

but call me a Muslim.” 

Saving what? I’m concerned about me. I’m 

concerned about me and my family.

70 

Other studies have found similar views among 

African-American Christians (i.e., not wanting to have 

anything to do with law enforcement officers, even 

some guilty pleasure about the victimization of white 

Americans),71 but we saw no further evidence of it in 

our study. The other respondents in the area—including 

African-American Muslims—who were asked about 

this respondent’s opinion, rejected it entirely. One of 

the community’s leading Islamic scholars, an AfricanAmerican man, said, “I would say that that individual 

does not understand Islam.” 

When I give khutbas, I tell people, “Look, 

don’t come here with that foolishness. I’ll 

a very violent manner? If they see that, typically after class they pull the youth over to 

the side, not like in terms of, “Oh, you stay 

after class.” But afterwards, everyone gathers 

in the masjid, you know, they are playing 

around and doing different activities. Typically, the teacher takes them for a chai [tea], 

and starts talking about the topic, saying, 

“You know, Imam Ali said this [this means 

that the mosque is Shi‘a, not Sunni], the 

Prophet Muhammad, may peace be upon 

him, said this.” and so on and so forth, 

trying to have them understand that these 

things are not really options. If it persists, 

I’m very sure that those teachers would be 

speaking to the parents, because there are 

— 25 — 
parent-teacher conferences every three 

months or so. I think they make it very, very 

clear, because they write extensive reports 

on the students.73 

In Houston, an organization that works with Muslim-American youths arranged what one of the group’s 

founders called “venting sessions.” (See “Venting Sessions,” this page.) These sessions encourage participants 

— 26 — 

In terms of directing their anger, that is something that is a part of our objective. ... We help 

them direct and vent their anger properly. Meaning, 

we’ll have circles and we’ll talk, “So what do you 

think about this killing of Jews?” Or, “Do we hate 

the Jews?” “Are we supposed to hate them?” When 

the firebombs in Gujarat [India] happened, we talked 

about that. ... Let’s 

talk about it openly. 

It would be done in a private setting. No parents allowed. No imams allowed. No administration allowed. No adults allowed. And we would just talk 

and vent. ... 

That removes people spitting thoughts into their 

heads or Shaytan [Satan] coming into their heads 

and saying you need to do something, and you 

need to do X, Y, and Z. It removes them talking to 

their cousins or relatives in Gaza or Karachi or Lahore or Islamabad, saying “I hate this,” and them 

saying, “Well, if you want to do something about it, 

come here and let’s do something here.” It removes 

any unnecessary anger that they might display in 

school. Any kinds of acts of racism that might come 

from them, whether it be vandalizing synagogues or 

churches. Whatever it may be, we don’t want to fall 

into that trap. ... 

We’ve never seen anyone that goes to these destructive measures. This is a prevention program. 

We have not seen anyone that has gone into it. 

We’ve seen people talking trash. ... They talk trash, 

but it’s nothing substantial. You know, there are 

people at these rallies who are singing the Hezbollah or Hamas songs and you are like, “What’s going 

on?” But it’s nothing substantial. 

[At the sessions,] first we incite emotions from 

them. We say, “So what do you think about killing 

the Jews? ... I heard so and so talk about killing the 

Jews and started thinking about it, what do you 

think we should do?” Or, “We heard someone talk 

about Gujarat or Chechnya, these Russians?” And 

we’ll get them to say, “Yeah, yeah.” Okay, then they 

talk and once they’re done, I mean they know why 

they are there, so we can properly vent. So, after 

that the first thing we do is to discuss why Allah 

causes destruction, why these things are meant to 

happen, why does Allah allow, you know, the people of New Orleans to be wiped out. So we go back 

and talk about the people of ‘Ad and Lut and talk 

about why Allah allows these sort of things to happen because sometimes people lose hope and 

they’re like, “Why does God do this?” “There is no 

God,” so we talk about hope and fear, that there 

should be a balance between these two things. 

And then we talk about what the Prophet, peace be 

upon him, said about rebelling against the rulers. 

And that it’s completely forbidden ... and then we 

talk about it’s a pact in this country that you have 

to stay calm, and then we talk about patience. 

Everything that we have said to you, Satan still 

comes to you, you have to remain patient and see 

the bigger picture. Don’t look at the smaller picture, 

look at the bigger goal. Then, we talk about how 

Muslims are guaranteed victory, how Imam Mahdi 

[the Messiah] is going to come. Jesus is going to 

come. We don’t have to do anything, we have to 

wait. And that is the “greater jihad” to wait. To 

struggle against oneself.

108 

Venting Sessions 

to express feelings of anger, prejudice, and hostility 

about difficult issues in order to counteract them. This 

approach is controversial, since it raises raw emotions 

that could potentially instigate radicalization rather 

than calm it. However, the outcome seems to have 

been effective. While it is disturbing that negative 

attitudes exist, none of the participants in these 

sessions, to our knowledge, has ever been accused of 

terrorist activity. In addition, these sessions are proThis document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 27 — 

active attempts in the community to address potential 

radicalization, not just responses to instances after 

they occur. 

Muslim-Americans have also become more cautious 

about the content of messages delivered in mosques. 

In Seattle, one mosque reviews the texts of sermons in 

advance of Friday prayers: 

With our Juma [Friday midday prayer], we 

have a khutba [sermon] committee, and 

we screen our khateebs [lecturers] to make 

sure that the khutba is inspiring instead of 

mongering fear among the Muslims, so I 

think that helps with keeping us balanced. 

... So far we haven’t had to tell a khateeb 

that they are not welcome back, but we 

are willing to do that.74 

The Islamic Society of Greater Houston, which operates most of the mosques in the area, also screens 

prayer leaders. 

There is a khateeb committee which certifies 

local people who give them the training, 

what to say, what not to say, what is allowed, 

what is not allowed, educate them that the 

audience are from every school of thought. 

... If there is somebody coming from out of 

town, who the community does not know, 

then they have to go through the screening 

from the executive body, from the president 

and the executive. They have a list from the 

State Department of blacklisted organizations 

and blacklisted people, so we do see that 

they don’t belong to any of those, and then 

we get statements from them that they are 

not associated with any of those organizations that are blacklisted.75 

In Buffalo, where Muslim-Americans have been 

under intense scrutiny since the conviction of the Lackawanna Six, mosques perform significant background 

checks on proposed speakers. Even before the Lackawanna case, local mosques were uneasy about radical 

We monitor the groups that come through 

our masjids. There’s no other way to say it. We 

monitor our masjids. If you want to speak at our 

masjids, we want to know who you are and 

what you’re going to talk about. You’re not just 

going to come in and speak to our youth and 

we’re going to be disappointed with certain 

things after you start talking. That’s not going to 

happen anymore. 

Interviewer: Is this a result of Lackawanna? 

Yes, a direct result. 

Interviewer: Are all the masjids in the area 

involved in this? 

Yes. We told the imams, “Look, you have to 

know who comes and talks at your mosque, and 

we want to know what you talk about. We’re 

not going to let somebody talk after the prayer 

and then you radicalize them. We’re not going 

back to that—those are the old days, they are 

over.” ... 

Interviewer: Can you give me an example of 

a case when you monitored the masjids and you 

saw somebody who came in and you thought 

was not appropriate and you asked them to 

leave? 

Yes, we did. We asked them to leave—peacefully. Let me back up. It was an individual. Before we could physically remove him, we had to 

find out what were our rights with law enforcement. So we talked to the law enforcement on 

what steps we should take. And we took those 

steps. They can go to another masjid, but 

they’re going to be monitored there too. So we 

asked him kindly, saying we’re not comfortable 

with this, and if not, we’re going to forcefully remove this person. 

There is no nice way about this [removing 

someone], I don’t know how you can be nice 

about this. It’s a problem because Muslims are 

very nice people, but there is really no nice way 

of removing a person out of the masjid. In a case 

like this, you have to confront the person and ask 

him to leave.109 

We Monitor Our Masjids 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
imams who occasionally visited the area. One imam 

who came through in early 2001 and spoke of revolutionary jihad at the main Yemeni mosque was immediately banned from the premises. The militant who recruited six local youths to attend training camps in 

Afghanistan in early 2001 did not use the mosque for 

his meetings, but a nearby apartment instead.76 Since 

then, Muslim-Americans in Buffalo have not left this to 

chance, as one community leader explained (see “We 

Monitor Our Masjids,” previous page). 

On at least one occasion, self-policing by MuslimAmericans apparently interfered with law enforcement 

intelligence operations. In 2007, the Islamic Center of 

Irvine, California, won a temporary restraining order 

barring Craig Monteilh from the mosque. Monteilh 

had worried mosque officials by advocating violence 

and attempting to recruit congregants for potential 

terrorist plots. Monteilh subsequently claimed to have 

been an informant for the FBI. While the FBI did not 

confirm this claim, the Bureau relied on Monteilh’s testimony at a bail hearing for a Muslim-American from 

the mosque who was charged with immigration violations.77 This case was publicized widely among Muslim-Americans in early 2009 when Monteilh went public 

with his claims, and it served to confirm suspicions 

among many Muslim-Americans that government informants are widespread in mosques around the 

country. 

After another incident in 2009, in which a government 

informant recruited four Muslim-Americans in Newburgh, 

New York, and allegedly plotted with them to bomb a 

synagogue in the Bronx, the imam of the Newburgh 

mosque went on a national speaking tour to warn 

Muslims to be on the look-out for entrapment. A flyer 

advertising one of his appearances stated, “He is encouraging Muslims to avoid entrapment by reporting 

— 28 — 

any suspicious and radical talk heard in their presence 

to the authorities.” 

While some of the motivation for self-policing by 

Muslim-Americans is clearly self-preservation—not 

wanting to be caught up in a sting operation or be associated with anybody who is causing trouble—selfpolicing does not appear to be reducible simply to 

strategic calculations of self-interest. In addition to 

anxiety that another act of terrorism in the U.S. could 

result in collective punishment against all Muslim-Americans, our respondents also cite ethical principles and 

sacred sources when speaking of self-policing, suggesting 

that this is simply proper religious comportment. 

3. COMMUNITY-BUILDING 

Of Muslim-Americans who have engaged in terrorist 

violence since September 11, 2001, there is no 

single pattern concerning the extent to which the 

were integrated into their communities. Some of 

them were loners who had little connection to 

any community at all; some had deeper connections 

abroad than locally; and some had stronger ties 

with a handful of buddies than with their community 

as a whole; and finally, some, like the Lackawanna 

Six, were well known and turned in by a community 

member. In the case of the Muslims from North 

Carolina indicted in 2009, it appears that the individuals were initially integrated into the community, 

but as they radicalized, they left their masjids and 

became more isolated. 

In order for Muslim-American communities to bring 

collective pressure on individuals inclined to radicalize, 

they must draw those individuals into the organizations 

and social networks that counter radical beliefs, such 

as mosques, Islamic centers, religious bookstores, ethnic 

[S]elf-policing does not appear to be 

reducible simply to strategic calculations 

of self-interest 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 29 — 

institutions, civil rights organizations, and other communal 

associations that draw Muslim-Americans together. 

This image runs counter to some of the concerns 

expressed by non-Muslim Americans about Islamic organizations in the United States, which they perceive 

are channels for radicalization. Our evidence suggests 

the opposite: Muslim-American community-building is 

a significant factor in the prevention of radicalization. 

Muslim-American community-building includes a 

variety of activities, some openly religious and some 

not, such as the following: 

• Religious: Mosques, Islamic centers, lectures. 

• Athletic: Basketball tournaments, soccer leagues. 

• Cultural: Fashion shows, religious festivals, 

ethnic festivals, national-heritage holidays such 

as Pakistan Independence Day and Iranian 

New Year. 

• Social: Charity events, dances, mixers. 

• Organizational: Local, regional, and national 

associations and conferences, training sessions. 

• Political: Lobbying, media-relations, voter-registration, electoral campaigns. 

Our interview respondents and almost all observers 

agree that Muslim-Americans have stepped up community-building in all forms over the past two decades, 

especially since 9/11. 

The direct goal of these activities is not to prevent 

radicalization, though that appears to have been an 

unintended outcome. Instead, these activities are intended to strengthen Muslim-American communities 

and serve community goals, which include protecting 

Muslim-Americans’ rights, deepening community members’ faith, and spreading the message of Islam to 

non-Muslims. 

Of particular concern to Muslim-Americans in community-building activities are Muslim-American youth. 

Many Muslim-American adults, both immigrants and 

U.S.-born, express concern that Muslim youths may 

drift away from their Islamic identity due to immersion 

in mainstream American culture. One young man described this as an existential problem that threatens 

the survival of Muslim-American communities. 

For me, from my perspective, growing up 

in public school, you tend to lose your 

identity and assimilate, a lot of people assimilate, especially when you’re a minority. 

I remember growing up, in school, there 

were some Muslims that didn’t act like they’re 

Muslims, it was like, you wanted to fit in. A 

lot of people wanted to assimilate and fit it 

and not act according to what their religion 

is. I’ve even seen some eat pork -- eat pepperonis [on their pizza], wouldn’t even pull 

them off. ... 

You’re dealing with a lot of ignorant people, 

a lot of people who don’t grow up with 

mothers and fathers, a lot of people who 

don’t even know their fathers. So the way 

they act, and the way that the media amplifies the ignorance—all of a sudden, you may 

have two parents who love you and treat 

The direct goal of these activities is not 

to prevent radicalization, though that appears to 

have been an unintended outcome 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
you with respect and show you how to be 

a man, but you want to be out there with 

your pants hanging down on your butt just 

so you fit in, you know.

78 

According to another young Muslim-American, addressing these influences is a higher priority than addressing the potential of radicalization. 

I don’t think in [our] community we’ll have 

anything to worry about [radicalization]. As 

a matter of fact, their greater concern is 

people losing faith in religion. The young 

generation is getting hooked on drugs, getting drunk, getting in car crashes—that’s 

happened a lot, so I think that’s more of 

their concern. ... I think that our community 

is more trying to combat youth looking at 

porn sites than radical Islam sites. ... 

What the mosque has been trying to do is 

really focus on the youth, really focus on 

letting them have a place where they can 

be, where people in this situation don’t have 

to be in a particular socio-economic status, 

everything is open, everything is free—try to 

unite them on things that they can, like 

playing basketball, going on trips, things that 

the mosque pays for, so that they won’t have 

to, [things like] youth centers.79 

At the same time, the student observed, these 

mosque-sponsored activities also serve to reduce alienation in rare cases of potential radicalization. 

The community is prepared to deal with 

[this], because there have been like two or 

three instances, and they would deal with 

it in the same way [as youths who are 

looking at porn sites]. They would try to 

take this person aside, talk to them, try to 

incorporate them into the community atmosphere, try to get them involved in more 

youth activities in the community. 

Muslim-Americans’ community-building activities 

also focus on recent immigrants. Some long-time residents, as well as some American-born Muslims, view 

— 30 — 

These mosque-sponsored youth activities 

also serve to reduce alienation 

in rare cases of potential radicalization 

recent immigrants as less educated and less familiar 

with American institutions than immigrants from a 

generation ago. 

We have disintegrated, unfortunately, as 

time went on, because, unfortunately, we 

were a lot better 50 years ago, 40 years 

ago. We were a small group, most of us 

were educated—we came here as students, 

going to universities. We understood that 

Islam, the community, was our insurance. 

When somebody [in your family] died, somebody was going to help you. When someThis document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 31 — 

body got married, when somebody got sick, 

you knew somebody was going to help 

you. Now, unfortunately, we’ve got a lot 

of—I’m not bad-mouthing them—but we’ve 

got a lot of uneducated people coming 

from countries which are divided, and when 

they came, they brought their problems to 

us.80 

I feel that there are lots of children that 

come from low-income families [of immigrants]. ... Their parents have very little 

knowledge of the American system, of the 

language, of the culture, and they themselves 

have a very low education level, no matter 

what they may have signed [on the immigration forms saying] that they have a bachelor’s [degree], but it’s really nothing close 

to the bachelor’s you achieve in this country. 

They are basically semi-literate. They work 

very long hours, and the children in the 

meantime are being neglected, they are 

facing dangers the parents have no idea 

about. They are going to a school system 

they don’t understand they have a say in, 

they can question the problems. For example, 

a very simple example, many of them don’t 

even know that there is something called a 

parent-teacher conference.81 

A lot of immigrant Muslims—they have some 

habits and tendencies that don’t always 

mesh well with American Muslims, and 

whether that’s American as in African-American or Caucasian-American, or whether 

that’s even American-born Muslim, period, 

you see a clash. And I think we’re trying to 

step outside the box, in terms of, for example, 

immigrant Muslims are suspicious of law 

enforcement. Well, we have to be a little 

more pro-active in terms of saying, well, 

these are the people that are brought in to 

serve us.82 

In a process of Muslim-led assimilation that aims to 

preserve religious faith, these respondents and others 

work to include newer immigrants in Muslim-American 

institutions and help them to navigate the legal system, 

the schools, and unfamiliar cultural phenomena. The 

case of the approximately 20 young men from Minneapolis who traveled to Somali to join the Shabaab 

demonstrates how immigrant assimilation efforts have 

not always been successful and how those efforts 

need to be strengthened, especially in communities 

isolated by language, culture, and economics. 

In addition to acculturating its youth and new immigrants, Muslim-American community-building also 

incorporates ex-convicts, especially men who converted 

to Islam while in prison. Since they have only experienced 

Islamic life while incarcerated, these new Muslims have 

never attended a mosque or joined a Muslim celebration, 

and they have little idea of what it means to maintain 

a Muslim identity outside of prison.83 Muslim-Americans 

have worked to integrate these people into their com-

“I think we’re trying to step outside the box ... 

[about how] immigrant Muslims 

are suspicious of law enforcement.” 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
munities. One national organization, the Muslim Alliance 

in North America, has made this one of its top priorities; 

this group runs workshops to help local groups train 

staff and develop programs that support Muslim-American prisoners before and after their release.84 In the 

Buffalo area, a local organization has extensive experience 

with this work. 

We try to build in the whole idea of reentry 

throughout their incarceration, and when 

they come out, we try to continue it—in 

other words, how to be a good father, how 

to be a good husband, how to be a productive community member, how to obtain 

a job, how to prepare for employment, 

those are the kinds of things we try to 

teach. We try to hold them accountable for 

their Islam, most importantly, because as a 

prisoner, as an inmate, it’s easy to be a good 

Muslim in there, because if you don’t, the 

other guys, they might beat you up or something. There is social pressure on you. But 

when you come out here, nobody really 

cares if you don’t go to a jum‘a [Friday 

prayer]. So if you’re not strong enough to 

be the Muslim that’s in your heart, that’s in 

your head, then you might become another 

statistic in terms of recidivism.85 

A Muslim-American leader in North Carolina said 

that he and his mosque directly confront the hostility 

that some African-American ex-convicts express toward 

white America. 

It’s mainly because of the black experience, 

not the Islamic experience, because they 

are relatively new to Islam—they think that 

America is against African-Americans, and 

they say, well, America is against Muslims, 

so they try to put those two together. They 

try to use their feelings of being mistreated 

and discriminated against by America to 

say “Death to America,” that type of thing. 

We’ve been very, very firm with people who 

come here, to this mosque. We make it very 

clear to them what our expectations are, 

this is the behavior we expect from you, 

and let it be known that that kind of thinking—that America is a great satan, because 

America is “the Beast,” as some black radical 

might say—is not welcome. Now you have 

a choice to come integrate into society, and 

we will help you.86 

The primary goal of this outreach is to encourage 

Islamic piety, but a side effect, as one Muslim-American 

leader in Seattle noted, is to counteract potentially 

radical visions of Islam that some prisoners may have 

been exposed to. 

Some of them are educated over the internet. 

... They have their way of thinking and understanding things, so we have tried to tell 

them to work on the basics and the spiritual 

side. Some of them understand this. I think 

by visiting them, they appreciate that. Otherwise, they will become internet scholars, 

which is dangerous for the future. 

I personally went for a haircut, and met this 

person who had been released from prison, 

telling people that you have to make hijra 

[emigrate] from this country. I said to him, 

“Why are you telling people this?” Then, 

after a few years, I met him again, and he 

said, “Now I know why you said that.” He 

had a pretty radical view. I tried to make 

him understand, but I don’t think at that 

time he understood me. Afterwards, he understood.87 

— 32 — 

“That kind of thinking— 

that America is a great satan ...— 

is not welcome.” 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 33 — 

Of special interest is this discussion of MuslimAmerican community building are the social isolates— 

loners, sometimes struggling with mental problems— 

who are not active participants in communal life. Some 

Muslim-Americans who have radicalized since 9/11 to 

become terrorists appear to fit this description. In North 

Carolina, for example, Mohammad Taheri-Azar—who 

drove his car through campus in March 2006, trying to 

run people over to avenge U.S. foreign policies toward 

Muslims—had almost no connection with other Muslim-Americans. He had occasionally attended meetings 

of the Muslim Students Association at the University of 

North Carolina in Chapel Hill, but, according to a fellow 

student, he did not feel welcome there. As a result, 

Taheri-Azar “self-excluded himself.” “[Other MuslimAmerican students] thought he was crazy from the beginning. ... People would avoid him, but at the same 

time, he avoided others.”88 The local police and the FBI 

interviewed a variety of people who had known him over 

the years, apparently concluding that none of them had 

any foreknowledge of his plot. According to Taheri-Azar 

himself, in letters written from jail while he awaited trial, 

he was so isolated at the time of his plot that he could 

not produce even three friends to attest to his good 

moral character on a handgun permit application.89 

Several of our interview respondents said that their 

communities were reaching out to socially isolated individuals to ensure that they did not engage in negative 

behaviors. “When you don’t get engaged in positive 

stuff, you’re going to get engaged in self-defeating 

stuff,” a community activist in North Carolina told us. 

“A lot of messages were given out: Do your own thing, 

don’t get engaged, there is no hope. ... Disengagement—I don’t think it has led to much radical action, it 

has led mainly to self-defeating action, by making this 

society or this community seem to be an unacceptable 

community.”90 

More than a year prior to Taheri-Azar’s attack, one 

of the largest Islamic organizations in North Carolina 

had partnered with public-health students and faculty 

from the University of North Carolina to assess the 

major issues facing the local Muslim-American community, and had concluded, among other things, that 

one priority was the provision of more counseling 

services for community members who were struggling 

with social, financial, or psychological difficulties.91 

“Everything you see in American society is there [in 

Muslim-American communities],” the professor supervising the project told us. Four years after the report 

was completed, local Muslim American organizations 

now had several psychologists on staff, but there was 

more to be done. “We still as a community need to develop that competence.”92 

It is worth noting a trend that runs counter to 

Muslim-American community-building efforts: the impulse to expel potential trouble-makers from community 

organizations. This trend grows out of the community’s 

desire to self-police, to protect its members from the 

actions of the troublesome individual or from suspicion 

or backlash if the individual were to break any laws. 

Several of our respondents noted that the recent 

climate of heightened security concerns has made 

some people wary of being associated in any way 

with individuals who might be the focus of law enforcement operations. These concerns undermine the 

social connections that might allow the community to 

moderate or, in worst case scenarios, monitor individuals 

who express radical views. In the words of one respondent, “I think the FBI needs to make it very clear 

that by you helping us combat terrorism, you will not 

be harmed.”93 

Their communities were reaching out to 

socially isolated individuals to ensure that they 

did not engage in negative behaviors 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
4. POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 

A further set of efforts that Muslim-Americans have 

undertaken since September 11, 2001, involve 

participation in the democratic politics of the United 

States. As with other activities of Muslim-American 

communities, the primary goal is not preventing 

radicalization, but is, instead, the defense of the 

rights and interests of Muslim-Americans in a 

political environment that they experience as threatening. Nonetheless, this political mobilization has 

the effect of channeling grievances into democratic 

forums and integrating Muslim-Americans into the 

democratic system. 

This pattern follows in the footsteps of other minority 

and immigrant groups in the United States, such as 

the Irish in the mid-19th century, Jews in the early 

20th century, and African-Americans in the mid-20th 

century. Muslim-Americans often liken their current 

situation to the trajectory of these other groups. At 

times the analogy is with the African-Americans. “The 

civil rights movement succeeded because all AfricanAmericans were united in their demand for constitutional 

rights,” one national Muslim-American organization 

emphasized in a call to Muslims to involve themselves 

in electoral politics. “Given our low level of political engagement preceding the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we 

found very few friends in the government in the aftermath of the 9/11, the legacy of which is still felt 

today.”94 At other times, the analogy is with IrishAmericans, who are also classified as white by the U.S. 

Census, but who have historically been considered 

non-white and suffered racial discrimination.95 Some 

Muslim-Americans have also drawn an analogy with 

Jewish-Americans, who have achieved a significant 

role in U.S. politics despite their small numbers.96 

One avenue for Muslim-American political participation draws directly on the model of civil rights activism 

of other groups, such as the NAACP. The most famous 

of this sort of organization, the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations (CAIR), issues a steady stream of press 

releases and annual reports that publicize and denounce 

hate crimes and other instances of discrimination 

against Muslim-Americans.97 The Council contacts government officials to make sure that anti-discriminatory 

laws are passed and enforced, works with attorneys 

to bring lawsuits on behalf of Muslim-Americans who 

have suffered discrimination, and holds workshops 

around the country to train Muslim-Americans to 

defend their rights. In a recent CAIR newsletter, leaders 

linked these activities directly to the legacy of other civil 

rights movements in the United States: 

Muslim-Americans recognize that the predicament they are in today is not isolated but 

lies within a larger context of civil rights 

struggles in America. Muslim-Americans are 

not the first group to face widespread prejudice and systemic discrimination. Jewish, 

Hispanic and Japanese-Americans have had 

their share of injustices leveled against them. 

And no other community has come close 

— 34 — 

Political mobilization has the effect 

of channeling grievances 

into democratic forums 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 35 — 

to the long-standing suffering of the AfricanAmerican community. Now, Muslim-Americans are among those at the forefront of 

the civil rights movement. This movement 

asks for a society subject to the rigor of law, 

governed by a system of transparency and 

accountability wherein the constitution applies to all equally.

98 

In addition, Muslim-American organizations have 

become increasingly active in electoral politics. Several 

Muslim-American groups have followed the example 

of other minority groups, conducting voter-registration 

drives and issue-advocacy campaigns at the state and 

national levels. Muslim-Americans engaged in an unprecedented level of political activity during the presidential 

election season of 2008.99 

The efforts of national organizations are supplemented by those of local Muslim-American groups. In 

keeping with the quintessentially American pattern of 

civil-society associations, these groups have proliferated 

to the point that they must compete with one another 

for the support of Muslim-American communities. This 

sometimes leads to acrimony, but it also teaches 

pluralism and coalition-building. These groups have 

come together to support Muslim-American candidates, 

We asked the attorney, what can we do? And he 

said, “Listen, this society is built on the power of 

two things. Money and politics. You already have 

the money, because you hired me as an attorney 

and you pay me very well, and I will earn it. But 

the other thing, politics—the power of voters over 

the legislators—you don’t have this.” ... 

It took us about one and a half years to go 

through this whole process, on that advice. And of 

course, we could not get involved, because we are a 

non-profit organization, so we established—the 

community, not me— ... a political organization to 

practice our voting process. And it was very successful, with the blessing of Allah. ... 

The next voting process was in November, and 

both of those two guys [on the city council who had 

opposed the mosque expansion] were completely 

out, and the one who had really supported our 

project came into office. And now it was very clear. 

... We are citizens. We pay the same taxes as other 

people, but our shortcoming was that we were not 

voting. But when we had that organized effort, it 

was very successful. ... 

Interviewer: Just a few years ago, I used to hear 

some Muslims say that involvement in politics is not 

something they should do, because this is a nonMuslim country. 

That is exactly what we used to say, but what we 

do today—theoretically, it is very easy 

to say [avoid political involvement], but 

practically, we consider Islam as a dynamic faith. You have no case in your 

life for which Islam doesn’t have an answer. Even Ibn Taymiyya, one of the 

great Islamic scholars at the time of the Mongols ... 

gave a very good answer [to this question of political involvement in non-Muslim governments]. He 

said, “Of course, originally, you should not. But in 

this case, if you find yourself taking that position, 

reducing the harm to the public, now it has become 

not only lawful but an obligation, an Islamic obligation. ... I delivered a khutba [sermon] on these issues at that time, it was very good. Yes, this is not 

allowed in the beginning, but when we are facing 

some type of evil or harm, what can you do? And 

that is really the dynamic nature of our shari‘a. ... 

I still look at it like we still are in the beginning 

stages. We are not being organized properly in the 

political arena. Because really, we are part of this 

society, we are citizens. What will harm them, will 

harm us, and sometimes what will harm them 

harms us first. So how can I isolate myself from the 

entire society?110 

What Will Harm Them, Will Harm Us 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
some of whom have been elected to office in nonMuslim-majority districts, including a state senator in 

North Carolina, a city councilor in Houston, and school 

board members in the Buffalo region and elsewhere. 

Perhaps more importantly, Muslim-Americans have 

mobilized around local issues that they consider serious 

grievances for their affected communities. 

In North Carolina, for example, a mosque sought a 

building permit to expand to accommodate the growing 

Muslim-American population in the region. Two city 

council members blocked the permit. The imam did 

not believe that it was religiously justified for Muslims 

to participate politically in a non-Muslim country, but a 

conversation with the mosque’s attorney changed his 

mind, and he later drew on Islamic jurisprudence to 

bolster this position (see “What Will Harm Them, Will 

Harm Us,” previous page). In the Buffalo area, where 

Muslim-Americans have been a significant presence 

for several generations, political participation has historically been limited, but that is changing. One young 

man, a third-generation Yemeni-American, described 

his Muslim-American identity and the beginnings of 

political involvement at the local level, where the most 

pressing issues involve potholes and schools (see “We 

Are Not Against America,” this page). In Seattle, as 

well, political involvement is only just emerging. One 

community leader identified lobbying as the primary 

outlet for these efforts. 

Most Muslims are scared stiff. Most Muslims 

are first-generation Muslims who come from 

the old country, wherever that is. We come 

from a country that is a dictatorship, that is 

a tyranny and a despotism. You raise your 

head in that country and they will whack 

your head off. And we come to this country 

and we still think that if we say anything, 

we’ll get our heads whacked off. So most 

of us keep our heads down, we go to work, 

we come back, we pretend that nothing is 

happening, hoping that nothing will happen. 

A few of us make the noises. A few of us 

— 36 — 

We are not against the government. We are 

not against America. We look at ourselves as 

part of the American people. We want to help 

this country because this is the country we live 

in. ... My grandfather came to the United States 

in the 40s. I’m here because he came here. And 

believe it or not, there were two instances after 

9/11 where somebody told me, “Go back to 

your country.” I am in my country! If I want to 

go somewhere else, I have to get a visa from 

there. For example, if I wanted to go to Yemen. 

This is my country. Where do you want me to 

go? Once I heard this from a guy who got out 

of his car and wanted to fight me. “I’m probably 

more American than you. Probably you’re second generation. I’m third generation!” But the 

government is not helping—it’s worsening the 

situation by fostering the impression that Islam 

is associated with terrorism. ... 

Interviewer: Would you say that local government pays attention to your community’s 

voices? 

They do, but they don’t respond to it. Like, 

we have a street here, if you drive down one 

these roads here, 90 percent of that street is 

Muslim-owned houses, working Americans, taxpayers, and we want that street fixed. I mean, 

it’s like a roller coaster. We invited county authorities and housing people, and they say, “Oh 

yeah, we’ll take care of it.” But there is delay after delay after delay. However, you see in other 

places, where the majority are white, the streets 

get repaired over and over and over. 

Interviewer: I wonder, somebody might say 

maybe it’s time for you to elect a local politician 

from your community. 

I don’t know. We have currently two people 

that we elected to the school board last year, because we were concerned about education of 

our children. That was our focus. We pushed for 

these two people. We gathered behind them 

and elected them to the school board, one in 

the high school and one on the middle school. 

So we try to get involved.111 

We Are Not Against America 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

While some observers are concerned that heightened 

expressions of Muslim-American piety may be a sign of 

impending radicalization, there is evidence to the contrary 

are going around talking to decision-makers 

and saying, “You can’t do this.” 

Interviewer: Do you think these voices are 

effective? 

Oh, yes, absolutely. If they weren’t effective, I 

would give it up. Just one major accomplishment we had was a meeting with the police 

chief. ... Our problem is: I don’t mind if our 

law enforcement people are trained about 

religion, so long as that course is about religion 

and more than one religion is being discussed 

there. I don’t mind if law enforcement is being 

trained about terrorism. They should be trained 

about terrorism and criminal behavior. Our 

problem is: You cannot be training any law 

enforcment, or anybody really, in criminal behavior and one race, religion, or national 

origin in the same class. Because without 

saying it, what you’re saying is, “Let’s talk 

about terrorism, and let’s talk about Islam,” 

and the connection is made. You don’t have 

to say there is a connection. And he agreed 

completely. He issued a memo just a couple 

of weeks ago saying to his senior staff, Please 

don’t approve courses that teach criminal behavior and a race, religion, or ethnic group at 

the same time.100 

These mechanisms for political representation enable 

the experience of discrimination and other grievances 

to be directed toward the government, where they 

can be addressed. Such political self-assertion treats 

democracy as part of the solution, not part of the 

problem. Some Muslim-Americans express impatience 

with these solutions, just as some African-Americans 

expressed impatience with the civil rights movement in 

the 1960s. Now, as then, the question is whether 

political action will yield sufficient returns to keep 

militancy at bay. 

5. IDENTITY POLITICS 

The expression of a Muslim-American identity has 

taken on an increasingly assertive tone in the years 

since the 9/11 attacks. This trend has taken the form 

of young women wearing headscarves at political 

rallies, young men growing beards as an embodiment 

of their faith, workers in various industries claiming 

the right to take breaks for prayers; parents sending 

their children to Islamic schools, and other public expressions of Islamic piety. 

While some observers are concerned that heightened 

expressions of Muslim-American piety may be a sign 

of impending radicalization, there is evidence to the 

contrary. The Pew Research Center’s 2007 survey of 

Muslim-Americans found that respondents who said 

religion was very important in their lives were onethird less likely than other respondents to consider 

attacks on civilians to be sometimes or often justified 

“in order to defend Islam from its enemies.”101 (Justifications of these attacks were very unlikely—under 10 

percent—among both sets of Muslim-American respondents. By way of comparison, according to a separate poll of a national sample, 24 percent of Americans 

considered “bombing and other types of attacks intentionally aimed at civilians” to be sometimes or often 

justified.)102 

Muslim-American identity is itself a product of Americanization. For generations, Muslims in the United 

States were not “Muslim-American”—rather, they identified themselves by ethnicity, such as Arab or Tatar. 

— 37 — 
With the emergence of hyphenated American identities 

in the 1960s, many Muslims in the U.S. also adopted 

hyphenated identities along ethnic lines, such as ArabAmerican. Only since 9/11, spurred by national security 

programs, has “Muslim-American” become a popular 

self-designation. Like other recently invented panethnic identities in the U.S., such as Hispanic-American 

and Asian-American, Muslim-American identity was 

promoted in part by a political movement that sought 

to aggregate sub-groups in order to increase visibility 

and influence. The organizations that have taken this 

name in their title or mission statements, such as the 

Muslim American Society, are among the leaders in 

mobilizing their constituency for political participation. 

The assumption of a Muslim-American identity may 

have resonated in part because it reflects the new 

social configuration of Islam in the United States. Over 

the past several decades, immigration and conversion 

have turned Muslim communities into far more multiethnic sites than the homogenous enclaves of a generation ago. According to a survey of more than 400 

mosques in 2000, one third had no majority of participants from any single ethnic group.103 Immigrants 

from numerous countries come to know one another 

far more than they would have in their home countries, 

creating a new Islamic identity that is distinct from the 

narrower sense of ethnic identity, as described by one 

young Muslim-American leader: 

I think the cultural traditions or the cultural 

norms largely have been almost dropped 

from the youth generation, but many of 

the youth have held on to their Islamic identity, and maybe—I don’t want to say abandoned—they have given their [ethnic] heritage or their lineage less importance. But 

at the same time many youth have given 

their Islamic identity more importance. So 

you’ll find a lot of youth who are good 

American Muslims, who are very American 

by their culture, by their norms, but who 

still at the same time hold on to their Islamic 

identities. ... 

[Local institutions] play an important role 

in differentiating between what is something 

that we as Muslims can’t give up and what 

is something that is cultural and isn’t necessarily part of the religion. For me, as a 

Muslim, to give up part of my religion is unacceptable to me, but for me to give up a 

certain custom that my family has held or 

that people from Egypt do isn’t as big a 

deal.104 

An immigrant in Seattle noticed the same phenomenon with his American-born children: 

I can tell you about my kids, they like to 

think of [themselves as] mainstream Americans. They are American Muslims. I’m not 

sure about other families, but my family, 

that’s how I see them. They don’t want to 

— 38 — 

Only since 9/11, spurred by national security 

programs, has “Muslim-American” become 

a popular self-designation. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 39 — 

associate themselves with any ethnic group 

per se. They don’t want to think of Muslims 

as ethnic people. Islam is a faith, it’s a religion, 

there is no specific ethnic group that is associated with it. There are all kinds of Muslims. 

So they think of themselves as Americans 

and Muslims.105 

This pan-ethnic Muslim-American identity has deeproots in Islamic history, originating in debates in the 

first generations of Islam over whether non-Arabs could 

be considered full Muslims. Today, many Islamic groups, 

including terrorist groups, claim to speak on behalf of 

the entire umma, the global community of Muslims. 

However, the pan-ethnic identity of Muslim-Americans 

serves to undermine terrorism by emphasizing the 

compatibility of Muslim-ness and American-ness. These 

are not two civilizations on a crash course, but instead 

two civilizations overlapping and melding. A recent 

book offers an outspoken vision of this double identity: 

This anthology is about women who don’t 

remember a time when they weren’t both 

American and Muslim. ... We wore Underoos 

and watched MTV. We know juz ‘amma 

(the final thirtieth [chapter] of the Qur’an) 

and Michael Jackson’s Thriller by heart. We 

played Atari and Game Boy and competed 

in Qur’anic recitation competitions. As we 

enter our twenties, thirties, and forties we 

have settled into the American Muslim identity that we’ve pioneered.106 

One of our respondents, a religiously conservative 

young man who was born and raised in New York 

State, echoed this double identity, drawing out its implications as a bulwark against radicalization: 

Muslims who grow up in this country, who 

know Americans and who know America, 

who consider themselves American—I consider myself American, my kid will be an 

American. Why would he hate himself? ... 

See, people would look at me and they’d 

think, this guy is a radical, and I understand 

how they would come up with that conclusion, because they look at what they see 

on TV and they look at me and they put 

two and two together. So I hope to see a 

Muslim revival among Muslims and among 

non-Muslims in the United States. I hope to 

see more Muslims practicing Islam and proud 

of their Islam. ... I’d like to see a religious 

revival among American Muslims, but that 

doesn’t mean radicalization, it doesn’t mean 

that they are going to hate America and 

everything that we as Americans stand for.

107 

Our conclusion is that Muslim-Americans are becoming more American, not less American, as they engage in identity politics. The formation of MuslimAmerican Boy Scout and Girl Scout troops is a powerful 

example of this process. On one hand, these groups 

are a form of separatism, marking Muslim-American 

youths as distinct from other American children. But 

the fact that these groups emerged within the American 

scouting movement is a sign that they are embracing, 

not rejecting, their American-ness. So far as we can 

find, no Muslim-American scout has ever engaged in 

an act of terrorism—and we feel it is a safe bet to 

predict that none ever will. 

Muslim-Americans are becoming more American, 

not less American, 

as they engage in identity politics 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
This research project found that Muslim-American 

communities strongly reject radical jihadi ideology, 

are eager to contribute to the national counterterrorism effort, and are fiercely committed to integration within the mainstream of American social 

and economic life. As explained in Part 2 of this report, Muslim-American communities are taking a 

variety of positive steps that help prevent radicalization within their communities: 1) they consistently 

denounce terrorism directed at the United States; 

2) they engage in self-policing by prohibiting radical 

sermons in their mosques and taking action against 

radical views expressed by outsiders or community 

members; 3) they are building strong institutions 

within their communities to direct their youth in a 

positive direction; 4) they are addressing their 

grievances through political mobilization; and 5) 

they are emphasizing their identity as MuslimAmericans. In addition, Muslim-Americans have 

developed strong working relationships with federal 

and local law enforcement agencies. 

Nonetheless, there is an uneasy tension in the relationship between Muslim-Americans and other Americans that causes concern. Whether it is from public 

opinion polls, media coverage, commentary by angry 

voices on the Internet and talk radio, or portrayals of 

Muslims in popular culture, Muslim-Americans sense 

an element of hostility towards both Islam and Muslims 

emanating from at least a portion of American society. 

Also, while Muslim-Americans accept the need for en-

— 40 — 

hanced security measures, they also perceive many 

government counterterrorism, security, and immigration 

policies to be unfair and discriminatory in their application 

to Muslims-Americans. Finally, they have many disagreements with American foreign policy. These disagreements have been present for many decades, but 

due to 9/11 and subsequent events over the past 

eight years in the United States, the Middle East, and 

South Asia, these issues have become more relevant 

and the schisms more intense. 

The presence of these tensions does not, in our 

view, imply widespread radicalization among MuslimAmericans or the potential for widespread radicalization 

in the future. However, isolated instances of radicalization 

may continue to occur in the corners of society because 

small groups or individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization or who are socially isolated may misinterpret 

and magnify the discontent and unease among mainstream Muslim-Americans. 

Our recommendations, therefore, have two goals: 

building on the successes of Muslim-American communities that are associated with low levels of radicalization in the United States and creating a more positive 

environment for Muslim-Americans so their anti-radicalization measures will continue to be effective. 

1. Encourage Political Mobilization 

The most significant positive trend we have identified 

is the increased political mobilization of Muslim-Americans. Participation of Muslim-Americans in political life 

The most significant positive trend 

... is the increased 

political mobilization of Muslim-Americans 

Part 3. Conclusions 

and Recommendations 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 41 — 

has a number of positive impacts: 1) grievances are 

brought into the public sphere and clearly articulated 

so they do not fester and deepen, 2) disputes are 

resolved through debate, compromise, and routine 

political procedures, and 3) political mobilization leads 

to ever-increasing numbers of Muslim-American leaders 

speaking responsibly about difficult issues on both the 

national and international stages. The political mobilization of Muslim-Americans is not only a beneficial 

development in terms of stunting domestic radicalization, 

but it also demonstrates to Muslims around the world 

that Muslims do have a voice in America and are 

working to resolve their grievances through peaceful, 

democratic means. 

We believe that public officials should encourage 

the continued political mobilization of Muslim-American 

communities and take steps to further integrate Muslim-Americans and Muslim-American organizations into 

American political life. Both major political parties should 

organize to actively seek the Muslim-American vote as 

they do with other ethnic and religious groups. Public 

officials should attend events at mosques as they do 

at churches and synagogues. Muslim-American community groups should be invited to participate in community forums and events. It will be beneficial if these 

activities take place at both the national and local 

levels of government. We believe it is in our national 

security interest for members of both parties to appear 

publicly with Muslim leaders, attend events with 

Muslims, attend services at mosques, and promote 

Muslim candidates in elections. 

President Obama has continued the tradition of 

holding an Iftar dinner at the White House which is a 

positive and important statement. He should make a 

special effort to hold other events with MuslimAmericans to address the disappointment many felt 

during the presidential campaign, in which the false 

claim that he is a Muslim was used by some as a 

political weapon and perceived as a political vulnerability. 

Inclusion of Muslim-American organizations in our 

political system is also important and needs to be encouraged. We neither support nor oppose the agendas 

of Muslim-American organizations; we merely note 

that such groups play a valuable role in our political 

system and are one avenue for individuals to express 

themselves and gain representation for their views. 

2. Promote Public Denunciations of Violence 

Public opinion polls in the United States suggest 

that a significant minority of Americans are highly suspicious of Muslim-Americans and seemingly unaware 

of the consistent and strong public denunciations of 

violence by Muslim-American organizations and leaders. 

We believe that these denunciations of violence are 

an important reflection of Muslim-American opinion 

and values. Muslim organizations at all levels should 

continue to issue these denunciations following incidents 

here or abroad, even to the point of redundancy, and 

vigorously publicize them. We recommend that local 

organizations and mosques do so as well. Public 

officials, who often comment on terrorism-related inciAmericans are ... seemingly unaware of the consistent 

and strong public denunciations of violence by 

Muslim-American organizations and leaders 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
dents or arrests, should include these denunciations 

from Muslim-Americans in their commentary. The media 

should routinely include these denunciations as part 

of their coverage. 

3. Reinforce Self-Policing Efforts by Improving the Relationship Between Law Enforcement and Muslim-American Communities 

This project identified initiatives by Muslim-Americans 

to police their own communities against radicalization. 

These efforts can take many forms. In one instance, 

mosque officials worked with law enforcement to 

identify a wayward youth vulnerable to radicalization, 

bring him back into the community, and assist him toward a stable, productive future. There are also examples, 

often underreported or ignored by the press, where 

Muslim-Americans provided information to law enforcement that led to surveillance, arrests, and prosecutions. On other occasions, individuals expressing 

radical ideas have simply been purged, thrown out of 

their mosques and rejected by the broader community. 

The appropriate course of action to be taken when 

evidence is uncovered of possible radicalization will of 

course vary from case to case. There are costs and 

benefits to each of these different approaches. In 

general terms, however, we propose that MuslimAmerican communities and law enforcement agencies 

cooperate more closely to overcome mutual suspicions 

and achieve common goals. This will require affirmative 

steps by both Muslim-Americans and law enforcement, 

as well as renewed pathways for working together. 

For their part, Muslim-American communities must 

recognize that simply purging radicalized individuals 

from their communities is not sufficient. Such action 

may push these individuals even further away from 

mainstream thought, accelerate the radicalization 

process, and possibly lead to violence. Muslim-American 

leaders must promote a culture where cooperation 

with law enforcement is not only accepted, but perceived 

as a duty, to both the Muslim-American community 

and the broader American public. In order to foster 

such cooperation, law enforcement must demonstrate 

that it is capable of dealing with the problem of radicalization in a proportionate and sensitive manner that 

does not always result in arrest and prosecution. It is a 

far better result from all perspectives if individuals 

heading towards radicalization can be—rather than 

arrested and prosecuted—deterred from their actions 

and have their lives re-directed. Law enforcement and 

Muslim-American communities need to discuss the 

type of interventions that might lead to such results 

and develop guidelines for determining when community 

intervention might be appropriate. 

A second source of tension is the perception by 

Muslim-Americans that law enforcement has aggressively 

and inappropriately used informants in their communities 

on counterterrorism cases. Law enforcement agencies 

should recognize that these tactics may be counterproductive if the use of informants causes long-term 

harm to their relationship with Muslim-American communities. Muslim-Americans, for their part, should understand that the use of informants is an accepted, 

traditional law enforcement practice and may be nec-

— 42 — 

Law enforcement must demonstrate that it is 

capable of dealing with the problem of radicalization 

in a proportionate and sensitive manner 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 43 — 

essary in appropriate cases to gather evidence on individuals who are a potential danger. 

To address this issue, we propose a candid dialogue 

between law enforcement and Muslim-American communities about the handling of criminal cases and the 

use of informants. Law enforcement agencies should 

develop policies for when the use of informants in 

Muslim-American communities is appropriate and 

discuss these policies openly with community leaders. 

For this dialogue to be productive, Muslim-Americans 

must acknowledge that there is a continuing, albeit 

low level, problem of radicalization in their community. 

They need to be vigilant in their self-policing and 

continue to build a trusting relationship with law enforcement, which at times may require them to identify 

individuals within their community as deserving of law 

enforcement scrutiny. Turning a blind eye towards potential problems is a counterproductive and potentially 

dangerous path. An open dialogue on a full range of 

issues will help to reinforce the positive self-policing 

efforts by Muslim-Americans that we have identified in 

this project. 

Besides resolving grievances over use of law enforcement tactics, other positive steps can be taken to 

build a stronger relationship between law enforcement 

agencies and Muslim-American communities. 

First, the relationship can be strengthened and solidified by hiring more Muslim law enforcement officers. 

A full range of affirmative steps need to be taken to 

accomplish this task, including recruiting at schools in 

predominantly Muslim areas and institutions. 

Second, the FBI and local law enforcement agencies 

should increase their outreach efforts, which, in general, 

have been received positively. These agencies, however, 

must grasp the diversity of social groups within Muslim-American communities. Current efforts appear to 

focus centrally on mosques, but there is no single 

point of access to the Muslim-American community. 

Ethnic associations, neighborhood groups, youth 

groups, women’s organizations, and other sorts of 

social organizations are also representatives of Muslim-American communities. These communities are not 

defined by their faith alone. Successful programs such 

as the FBI’s Bridges Program and Citizen’s Academy 

should be expanded. We found positive reactions to 

these programs in Buffalo and other locations, and we 

recommend that similar programs be made available 

nationally. 

Third, law enforcement agencies should recognize 

the diversity of ethnicities within Muslim-Americancommunities, which ranges across many nationalities, 

from Arab, to African-American, to recent ChineseMuslim immigrants. The continuous influx of Muslim 

immigrants not only adds to the size of the MuslimAmerican community, but also creates new challenges 

and opportunities. It is important not to approach 

Muslim-Americans with a single ethnic- and religiondriven template. 

[Muslim-American] communities 

are not defined 

by their faith alone 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
4. Assist Community-Building Efforts 

Our research suggests that building strong community institutions helps to prevent radicalization. 

Strong communities can provide educational outreach 

to Muslims who are uninformed about Islamic principles 

opposing terrorism; they can identify those whose 

lives have gone in the wrong direction and are in need 

of assistance; and they can provide positive experiences 

for youth. Many Muslim-American communities have 

the resources to build community institutions without 

assistance; others do not. We recommend that all 

levels of government make additional efforts to offer 

disadvantaged Muslim-American communities such 

community-building resources as funding for recreation 

centers, day care centers, public health clinics, and 

courses in English as a Second Language. There is a 

special need for these resources in isolated immigrant 

communities. 

We also recommend specific attention to one particular need for preventing violence: training to identify 

signs of mental illness. Most of those who have radicalized and plotted or engaged in violence are perfectly 

healthy, but there are some notable instances of Muslim-Americans who were mentally ill and became 

violent. A number of the respondents for this project 

mentioned that the signs of mental illness were not 

well understood in Muslim-American communities and 

that it would be valuable to provide training to recognize 

signs of mental illness. 

5. Promote Outreach by Social Service 

Agencies 

Muslim-American communities desire collaboration 

and outreach with the government beyond law enforcement, in areas such as public health, education, 

and transportation. Moving toward this type of engagement acknowledges that Muslim-American communities have needs and concerns in addition to contributing to the nation’s counterterrorism efforts. 

We recommend greater efforts by government 

agencies at the federal and local level to direct resources 

toward Muslim communities to improve public health, 

education, and transportation. This kind of engagement 

is viewed as an opportunity for Muslim-Americans to 

become stakeholders in the general community. Recent 

immigrants, for example, may not be familiar with 

methods for accessing available social service resources. 

We believe that general engagement in these areas 

will contribute to counter-radicalization efforts by improving community integration and reducing the 

isolation of vulnerable populations. 

Specific issue areas that could be addressed through 

education and other social services, with direct implications for the prevention of radicalization, include internet security (a major portal through which youth 

may become radicalized), identifying and diagnosing 

individuals with psychological and mental health issues, 

and integrating former prisoners into the community. 

— 44 — 

Muslim-American communities desire 

collaboration and outreach with the government 

beyond law enforcement 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Our shared goals are to enhance trust, increase 

public safety, and create a positive social environment 

for Muslim-Americans. With capable leaders acting in 

good faith, we believe these goals are achievable 

6. Support Enhanced Religious Literacy 

This research confirmed what has been observed 

in other studies of Muslim terrorists: most of those 

who engage in religiously inspired terrorism have little 

formal training in Islam and, in fact, are poorly educated 

about Islam.112 At the same time, we have observed, 

as have others, an increased religiosity among MuslimAmericans. This is to be welcomed, not feared. Muslim-Americans with a strong, traditional religious training 

are far less likely to radicalize than those whose knowledge of Islam is incomplete. 

However, our research found a paucity of intellectual 

resources within the Muslim-American community to 

deal with a range of theological issues linked to violence, 

justice, and politics. Due to the levels of theological 

literacy among the religious and lay leadership of Muslim-American communities, Imams, leaders of community 

organizations, and professionals within the community 

were not always equipped to counter radical theologies 

peddled by more politicized members of the community. 

It would not be appropriate for the government to 

play a leading role in this area. The Muslim-American 

community itself should invest in developing seminaries 

and programs for its own leadership. On-line education 

is a fairly inexpensive way to run courses that can be 

offered to Muslim leaders across the country. Foundations 

and universities may be willing to assist in the development of courses that address theological issues to 

assist in countering radical thought. Scholarship resources 

should be made available for graduate and doctoral 

work in these areas. 

7. Increase Civil Rights Enforcement 

There are already firmly institutionalized channels in 

place for addressing societal discrimination. Enhanced 

civil rights enforcement at local, state, and federal 

levels will contribute toward addressing Muslim-American 

concerns. 

* * * 

In the eight years since the attacks of September 

11, 2001, Muslim-Americans and government officials 

have acted to prevent radicalization and build a positive 

working relationship. Yet, there remains work to be 

done. Our shared goals are to enhance trust, increase 

public safety, and create a positive social environment 

for Muslim-Americans. With capable leaders acting in 

good faith, we believe these goals are achievable. 

— 45 — 
— 46 — 

Charles Kurzman is a professor of sociology at the 

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and a specialist 

on Islamic movements in the Middle East and around 

the world. He is author of The Unthinkable Revolution 

in Iran (Harvard University Press, 2004) and Democracy 

Denied, 1905-1915 (Harvard University Press, 2008) 

and editor of Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (Oxford University Press, 1998) and Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A 

Sourcebook (Oxford University Press, 2002). 

About the Authors 

Ebrahim Moosa is Associate Professor of Islamic Studies 

in the Department of Religion at Duke University. His 

interests span both classical and modern Islamic thought 

with a special interest in Islamic law, ethics and theology. 

Moosa is the author of Ghazali and the Poetics of 

Imagination, winner of the American Academy of Religion's Best First Book in the history of religions (2006). 

He was named Carnegie Scholar in 2005 to pursue research on the madrasas, Islamic seminaries of South 

Asia. 

David Schanzer is an Associate Professor of the Practice 

at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University, 

where he teaches and conducts research on counterterrorism and homeland security policy. He is the 

Director of the Triangle Institute on Terrorism and 

Homeland Security, a consortium between Duke, the 

University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, and RTI International. He is also co-director of the Institute for 

Homeland Security Solutions, which conducts applied 

research under a contract with the Department of 

Homeland Security. Before coming to Duke, he held 

counsel and senior staff positions in the Department 

of Justice, Department of Defense, the United States 

Senate, and the United States House of Representatives. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 47 — 

Acknowledgments 

This research was funded by the National Institute of Justice and administered by Duke 

University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. We are grateful for the 

hard work and commitment to this project of our research assistants, Ali Mian and Timur 

Yuskaev, over the past two years. We also thank our our project consultants: Jeff Gullo, 

Aaron Marcus, and Christian Schwoerke. 

Acknowledgments 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
— 48 — 

Endnotes 

PARTS 1, 2, AND 3 

1. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning,” Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt, June 4, 2009, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09. 

2. “Muslim Americans Serving in the U.S Government,” June 2, 2009, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/Muslim-Americans-Serving-in-the-US-Government. 

3. Michael Wilson, “In Bronx Bomb Case, Missteps Caught on Tape,” New York Times, May 21, 2009. 

4. Kim Sengupta, “Official Hype on Terrorism Will Only Stoke Islamic Extremism,” The Independent, May 22, 2009. 

5. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 89–108; Daveed 

Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K. (Washington, DC: Foundation 

for Defense of Democracy Press, 2009); Mitchell D. Silver and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The 

Homegrown Threat (New York: New York City Police Department, 2007). 

6. Dennis L. Jensen, “Enhancing Homeland Security Efforts by Building Strong Relationships between the Muslim 

Community and Local Law Enforcement,” M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006; Nicole J. Henderson, 

Christopher W. Ortiz, Naomi F. Sugie, Joel Miller, Law Enforcement and Arab American Community Relations After 

September 11 (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2006). 

7. Uniform Crime Reports, Hate Crime Statistics 2001–2007, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm. 

8. Lydia Saad, “Anti-Muslim Sentiments Fairly Commonplace,” Gallup News Service, August 10, 2006, 

http://www.gallup.com/poll/24073/AntiMuslim-Sentiments-Fairly-Commonplace.aspx. 

9. George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President at Islamic Center, Washington, D.C.,” September 17, 2001, 

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html. 

10. George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President on Eid Al-Fitr,” The Islamic Center of Washington, D.C., December 5, 

2002, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html; George W. Bush, “President 

Bush Attends Iftaar Dinner,” September 17, 2008, 

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080917-11.html. 

11. H. Con. Res. 227, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001). 

12. Daniel Pipes, “Muslim-American Council: Mainstream Muslims?” New York Post, June 18, 2002, 

http://www.danielpipes.org/423/the-american-muslim-council-mainstream-muslims. 

13. Robert S. Mueller, III, Remarks to the Annual Conference of the Muslim-American Council (June 28, 2002), 

http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech062802.htm. 

14. Id. 

15. Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, “The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks,” April 2003, 

pp. 1–2, 15–16. 

16. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Fact Sheet: Changes to National Security Entry/Exit Registration 

System (NSEERS), David Cole and Jules Lobel, “Less Safe, Less Free: Why America Is Losing the War on Terror?” 

(New Press: 2007), p. 107. 

17. Philip Shenon, “A Nation Challenged: The Interviews; Justice Dept. Wants To Query More Foreigners,” The New 

York Times, March 21, 2002; Cole and Lobel, p. 107. 

18. David E. Kaplan, “Nuclear Monitoring of Muslims Done Without Search Warrants,” U.S. News and World Report, 

December 22, 2005, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/nest/051222nest.htm. 

19. American Civil Liberties Union, “Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity,” June 16, 2009, p. 7, available at: 

http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/humanrights/blockingfaith_execsumm.pdf. 

20. For a review of these policies, see Anny Bakalian and Mehdi Bozorgmehr, Backlash 9/11 (Berkeley, CA: University of 

California Press, 2009). 

21. Louise Cainkar, Homeland Insecurity (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009). 

22. Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Director Robert S. Mueller, III, Federal Bureau of Investigation, The City Club of 

Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, June 23, 2006, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller062306.htm. 

23. Remarks by Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dedication of the Chicago Field Office, 

Chicago, Illinois, September 12, 2006, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/muellerfo091206.htm. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

24.	 Associated Press, “FBI Director: Homegrown Terror Threat Rises,” September 7, 2006, 

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14715980/%5Benter%20 URL%5D. 

25.	 Markup of HR 1955: The “Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007”: Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, 110th 

Congress, 1st Session (2007) (statement of Rep. Jane Harman). 

26.	 H.R. 1955, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) at Section 2. 

27.	 Senate Committee on Homeland Security, “Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist 

Threat,” May 8, 2008, http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf. 

28.	 Id. at 4, (quoting testimony of Mr. Mitchell Silver, Senior Intelligence Analyst, NYPD, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on The Role of Local Law Enforcement in 

Countering Violent Islamist Extremism, October 30, 2007). 

29.	 Id., p. 4. 

30.	 Id., p. 1. 

31.	 Silver and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, p. 82. 

32.	 Id. 

33.	 Id., pp. 82–83. 

34.	 Id., p. 85. 

35.	 David Johnson, “Militants Drew Recruit in U.S., F.B.I. Says,” New York Times, February 24, 2009. 

36.	 William K. Rashbaum and Souad Mekhennet, “L.I. Man Helped Qaeda, Then Informed,” New York Times, July 20, 

2009. 

37.	 Devlin Barrett, “US Extremists with Training Abroad Raise Concerns,” Raleigh News & Observer, July 29, 2009. 

38.	 Pierre Thomas, Jason Ryan, and Theresa Cook, “Holder: Homegrown Terror Threat Increasing,” AbcNews.com, 

July 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=8202511&page=1. 

39.	 Carol Dyer, Ryan E. McCoy, Joel Rodriguez, and Donald N. Van Duyn, “Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A 

Community Responsibility,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, December 2007, 

http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2007/dec2007/december2007leb.htm. 

40.	 Eight individuals in the dataset are part of this group, popularly known as the “Lackawanna Six.” Six men were 

convicted. Jaber Elbaneh never returned to the United States, but is being detained in Yemen. Kemal Derwish, 

who recruited the men, was killed by U.S. forces in a missile attack in Yemen. 

41.	 Six individuals in the dataset are included in this group, popularly known as the Portland Seven. Five men were 

convicted. One successfully joined a fighting force and was killed. October Lewis was convicted of raising money 

to support her husband’s travels to fight against U.S. forces, but was not included in the dataset because her offense did not involve a violent act. 

42.	 Ten individuals in the dataset are part of this group, popularly known as the Northern Virginia Jihad Group. This 

includes nine of the eleven individuals initially indicted and Ali Al-Timimi, who was prosecuted for inciting the group 

to violence. Two of the individuals indicted were excluded; one was acquitted and one, a Yemeni national, was the 

son of a Yemeni diplomat who had not spent much time in the United States. 

43.	 Four individuals in the dataset are part of this group. 

44.	 Five individuals in the dataset are part of the this group, popularly known as the Liberty City Seven. Two individuals 

initially indicted were acquitted at trial. 

45.	 Five individuals in the dataset are included in this group. 

46.	 Six individuals in the dataset are included in this group. 

47.	 Nineteen individuals in the dataset are included in this group. Twelve of them are facing criminal charges. Three individuals are reported to have been killed. One of them, Shirwa Ahmad, likely committed the first suicide bombing 

by a Muslim-American, killing 30 people in an attack outside of Mogadishu. 

48.	 Three individuals in the dataset are part of this group. Four men were arrested in connection with this plot, but 

press reports strongly suggest that one of them was not a Muslim-American. 

49.	 Seven indivdiduals in the dataset are part of this group. 

50.	 Five individuals from the dataset are part of this group. 

51.	 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 2008, Table 1, 

http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_01.html. The total includes the 115,876 murders from 2002–2008, 

— 49 — 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

and adds the monthly average over this period (1379 murders) to each of the 15 months from September 11, 2001 

– December 31, 2001, and January 1, 2009 – December 31, 2009. 

52.	 Council on American-Islamic Relations, American Muslim Voters: A Demographic Profile and Survey of Attitudes, 

October 24, 2006, http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/American_Muslim_Voter_Survey_2006.pdf; Pew Research 

Center, Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, May 22, 2007, 

http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf; Gallup, Muslim Americans: A National Portrait, March 2, 

2009, http://www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/File/116074/AmericanMuslimReport.pdf. 

53.	 Thomas L. Friedman, “If It’s a Muslim Problem, It Needs a Muslim Solution,” New York Times, July 8, 2005. 

54.	 Shaykh Yusuf Qaradawi, Qatar; Tariq Bishri, Egypt; Muhammad S. Awwa, Egypt; Fahmi Huwaydi, Egypt; Haytham 

Khayyat, Syria; Shaykh Taha Jabir al-Alwani, U.S., statement published in The Washington Post, October 11, 2001. 

55.	 See Vartan Gregorian, Islam: A Mosaic, Not a Monolith (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 

104–105; and Charles Kurzman, “Islamic Statements Against Terrorism,” 

http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman/terror.htm. 

56.	 “Fatwa by U.S. Muslims Against Religious Extremism,” July 25, 2005, 

http://www.mpac.org/bucket_downloads/fatwa-on-terrorism.pdf . 

57.	 Muslim American Society, “Muslim American Society’s Campaign to Combat Terrorism,” 

http://www.masnet.org/takeaction.asp?id=2638. 

58.	 Islamic Circle of North America, “ICNA Condemns Attacks on the Jewish Center in Seattle,” 

http://www.icna.org/icna/press-releases/icna-condemns-attacks-on-the-jewish-center-in-seattle.html. 

59.	 Council on American–Islamic Relations, “CAIR’s ‘Not in the Name of Islam’ Petition,” May 13, 2004, 

http://www.cair.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?mid1=777&&ArticleID=8761&&name=n&&currPage=1. 

60.	 Muslim Political Action Committee, “Campaign Mission,” 2005, 

http://www.mpac.org/ngcft/campaign-mission/index.php. 

61.	 Aslam Abdullah, “What Happened to the Sanctity of Human Life?” The Minaret, April 2004. 

62.	 Islamic Thinkers Society, “Press Release on FCNA [Fiqh Council of North America] & Their Pathetic Fatwa,” 

September 3, 2005, 

http://www.islamicthinkers.com/index/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=299&Itemid=2. 

63.	 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, May 2006, Vol. 29, No. 3, 

pp. 207–239. 

64.	 Ihsan Bagby, Paul M. Perl, and Bryan T. Froehle, The Mosque in America: A National Portrait (Washington, DC: 

Council on American-Islamic Relations, April 26, 2001), p. 28. 

65.	 Sarah Downey and Michael Hirsh, “A Safe Haven?” Newsweek, September 30, 2002, p. 31. 

66.	 North Carolina interview #3, May 2008. 

67.	 “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” U.S. vs. Zacarias Moussaoui, defendant’s exhibit 

DX–0941, p. 36, introduced March 28, 2006; posted on-line by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 

http://www.rcfp.org/moussaoui/pdf/DX–0941.pdf. 

68.	 Houston interview #29, February 2009. 

69.	 Buffalo interview #17, January 2009. 

70.	 Seattle interview #15, July 2008. 

71.	 Dwonna Goldstone, “An African American Professor Reflects on What 9/11 Meant for African Americans, and Herself,” The Journal of American Culture, March 2005, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 29–30. However, several studies also found 

African-Americans more affected than white Americans by 9/11 and more fearful of future terrorist attacks. See 

Thai Q. Chu, Mark D. Seery, Whitney A. Ence, E. Alison Holman, and Roxane Cohen Silver, “Ethnicity and Gender 

in the Face of a Terrorist Attack: A National Longitudinal Study of Immediate Responses and Outcomes Two Years 

after September 11,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology, December 2006, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 291–301; and David 

P. Eisenman, Deborah Glik, Michael Ong, Qiong Zhou, Chi-Hong Tseng, Anna Long, Jonathan Fielding, and 

Steven Asch, “Terrorism-Related Fear and Avoidance Behavior in a Multiethnic Urban Population,” American Journal of Public Health, January 2009, Vol. 99, No.1, pp. 168–174. 

72.	 Seattle interview #21, July 2008. 

73.	 Seattle interview #10, July 2008. 

74.	 Seattle interview #20, July 2008. 

75.	 Houston interview, #21, March 2009. 

— 50 — 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

76.	 Dina Temple-Raston, The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in the Age of Terror (New York: 

PublicAffairs, 2007). 

77.	 The Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2009; Whittier Daily News, March 23 and 25, 2009; The Orange County Register, May 9, 2009. 

78.	 Buffalo interview #29, January 2009. 

79.	 North Carolina interview #2, May 2008. 

80.	 Seattle interview #5, July 2008. 

81.	 Houston interview #11, February 2009. 

82.	 Buffalo interview #21, January 2009. 

83.	 Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups,” National Institute of Justice Commissioned Report, December 2007. 

84.	 Muslim Alliance in North America, Community Re–Entry Program, 

http://www.mana-net.org/pages.php?ID=projects&ID2=&NUM=176 

85.	 Buffalo interview #9, December 2008. 

86.	 North Carolina interview #12, July 2008. 

87.	 Seattle interview #3, July 2008. 

88.	 North Carolina interview #1, April 2008. 

89.	 Charles Kurzman, The Missing Martyrs (book manuscript, forthcoming in 2010). 

90.	 North Carolina interview #5, June 2008. 

91.	 Ahmad–Rufai Abdullah et al., “The Islamic Association of Raleigh, Raleigh, North Carolina, An Action-Oriented 

Community Diagnosis: Findings and Next Steps of Action,” Department of Health Behavior and Health Education, 

School of Public Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, May 2005. 

92.	 Ahmad–Rufai Abdullah, North Carolina interview #16, July 2008. 

93.	 Houston interview #13, February 2009. 

94.	 Mukit Hossain, “The Importance of Muslim American Involvement in American Politics,” Muslim American Society, 

Center for Electoral Empowerment, March 6, 2008, pp. 1–2. 

95.	 Caroline R. Nagel and Lynn A. Staeheli, “‘We’re Just Like the Irish’: Narratives of Assimilation, Belonging and Citizenship Amongst Arab-American Activists,” Citizenship Studies, Vol. 9, No. 5, 2005, pp. 485–498. 

96.	 Ali A. Mazrui, “On Being an American and a Muslim: Dilemmas of Politics and Culture,” International Strategy and 

Policy Institute, undated. 

97.	 Until recently, CAIR worked with the FBI on a variety of outreach activities with Muslim-American communities. 

However, due to evidence that arose in a terrorist–financing case, the FBI has recently suspended cooperation 

with CAIR. In a letter to Sen. Jon Kyl, Richard C. Powers, assistant director of the FBI’s Office of Congressional Affairs, explained, “The FBI's decision to suspend formal contacts was not intended to reflect a wholesale judgment 

of the organization and its entire membership. Nevertheless, until we can resolve whether there continues to be a 

connection between CAIR or its executives and HAMAS, the FBI does not view CAIR as an appropriate liaison partner.” Letter of April 28, 2009, entered into the Congressional Record by Rep. Frank Wolf, June 12, 2009. 

98.	 Christina Abraham, civil rights coordinator, CAIR-Chicago, “Reflections of a Civil Rights Activist,” CAIR-Chicago eNewsletter #36, June 30, 2006. 

99.	 American Muslim Task Force On Civil Rights and Elections, 2008 Election Plan, 

http://www.americanmuslimvoter.net/images/special/AMT Election Plan- 2008.pdf. 

100. Seattle interview #8, July 2008. 

101. Data analysis based on Pew Research Center, 2007 Muslim American Survey, May 22, 2007. 

102. WorldPublicOpinion.org, "Public Opinion in Iran and America on Key International Issues," January 24, 2007, p. 10. 

103. Data analysis based on Ihsan Bagby, Paul M. Perl, and Bryan T. Froehle, The Mosque in America: A National Portrait: A Report from the Mosque Study Project, Council on American-Islamic Relations, April 26, 2001. 

104. Houston interview #13, February 2009. 

105. Seattle interview #2, July 2008. 

106. Saleemah Abdul-Ghafur, editor, Living Islam Out Loud: American Muslim Women Speak (Boston, MA: Beacon 

Press, 2005), p. 1. 

107. Buffalo interview #6, December 2008. 

— 51 — 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

108. North Carolina interview #7, June 2008. 

109. Houston interview #20, March 2009. 

110. Buffalo interview #16, January 2009. 

111. Buffalo interview #35, January 2009. 

112. Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi, “Who Are the Islamists?” forthcoming in Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin, editors, Contemporary Islam Between Theory and Practice (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2010). 

SIDEBAR: NORTH CAROLINA TERRORISM ARRESTS 

1.	 United States v. Daniel Boyd, et al., Indictment, July 22, 2009. 

2.	 Id. 

3.	 Mike Baker, “NC Terror Suspect Told Family of Jihad,” News & Observer, August 3, 2009. 

4.	 Id. 

5.	 Talk Islam blog, “Daniel Patrick Boyd,” http://talkislam.info/2009/07/28/daniel–patrick–boyd–the–local–muslim/. 

6.	 Id. 

7.	 United States v. Daniel Boyd, et al., Indictment, July 22, 2009, p. 9. 

8.	 Jeanne Meserve, “Terrorism Suspects’ Acquaintance ‘Wasn't Surprised’ by Arrest,” CNN.com, August 1, 2009. 

9.	 Sheyenne Rodriguez, “Leaders Speak out about Terror Arrests,” WTVD (ABC Eyewitness News, Raleigh-Durham, 

NC), August 2, 2009. 

10.	 Robert Spencer, “Tarheel Jihad,” Human Events, August 6, 2009, 

http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=33022. 

11.	 Id. 

— 52 — 
— 53 — 

NOTES ON METHODOLOGY 

An offender is included in this database if all of the 

following criteria are met: 

1. the arrest or incident took place after September 

11, 2001, and prior to the completion of this report 

on January 1, 2010; 

2. the offender is Muslim-American; and 

3. the offender 

a. has been convicted on criminal charges for 

terrorism-related activity that includes some 

aspect of violence, which may consist of planning or directly supporting violence, or 

b. has been arrested with a trial pending for terrorism-related activity that includes some aspect 

of violence, which may consist of planning or 

directly supporting violence, or 

c. is currently being pursued by law enforcement 

for criminal activity according to public sources, 

or 

d. was killed during a terrorist incident. 

For criterion #2, individuals were considered to be 

Muslim-American if they lived in the United States for 

more than a year prior to the arrest, regardless of their 

immigration status. Immigration status, if known, is reported in the dataset. Offenders are only included if 

the available evidence suggests that the offender 

became radicalized while living inside the United States. 

So, for example, an American citizen who spent most 

of his/her life in Saudi Arabia and then committed a 

terrorist offense would not be included in this dataset. 

Offenders are included if they are identified as being 

Muslim in public sources, or they described themselves 

as being Muslim. 

For criteria #3a and #3b, offenders are included 

based on the charges upon which they were tried and 

convicted, or the official charges pending. Inclusion 

depends on the underlying conduct that constituted 

the basis for the charge. So, for example, individuals 

charged with material support for terrorism are included 

in the dataset if the conduct includes any element of 

violent activity, including attending a terrorist training 

camp, receiving weapons training, or stockpiling 

weapons. Individuals charged with material support 

for terrorism where the underlying conduct was exclusively the provision of financial support are not included. 

Offenders who were killed during an incident are presumed to have engaged in illegal conduct. 

Appendix: 

Muslim-American 

Terrorism Offenders, 2001-2009 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Ethnicity

Caucasian

Arab

Arab

Arab

Arab

Arab

ArabArabArabArab

Arab

AfricanAmericanAfricanAmerican

Arab

Latino

African

AfricanAmerican

Caucasian

SouthAsian 

Convert to 

Islam

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

NoNoNoNo

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No 

Citizenship 

us at st

Citizen

Legalresident

Naturalizedcitizen

Citizen

Citizen

Naturalizedcitizen

CitizenCitizenCitizenCitizen

Legalresident

Illegal

Citizen

Illegal(overstayed studentvisa)

Citizen

Legalresident

Citizen

Citizen

Legalresident 

Age at arrival 

in US

US-born

35

Notknown

US-born

US-born

Notknown

US-bornUS-bornUS-bornUS-born

31

14

US-born

27

US-born

18

US-born

US-born

15 

 of time Age at

k t/attac arres 

20

35

22

29

24

35

26252424

41

17

41

40

31

32

36

15

19 

Engaged in

violent 

/joined act rce fighting fo

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

NoNoNoNo

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No 

Target of 

ion of /locat plot

violence

Abroad

US

None

None

None

Abroad

NoneNoneNoneNone

US

US

US

Abroad

None

None

None

US

US 

ion of Locat

ivity criminal act

Abroad

US &Abroad

AbroadAbroadUS &AbroadAbroadAbroadAbroadAbroadAbroadUS

US

US

AbroadUSUSUSUSUS 

Nature of 

ense f of

Joined and fought with the Taliban. 

Attended terrorist training camp in Pakistan/Afghanistan; agreed to enter US to conduct terrorist activities. Attended terrorist training camp in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Lackawanna Six. Attended terrorist training camp in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Lackawanna Six. Recruited Lackawanna Six. Left US in 2001. Killed in Yemen by US missile strike.Attended terrorist training camp in Pakistan/Afghanistan Member of Lackawanna group, but never returned to US from Afghanistan. Convicted in Yemen for conspiring to blow up an oil facility. Currently detained in Yemen. Attended terrorist training camp in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Lackawanna Six. Attended terrorist training camp in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Lackawanna Six. Attended terrorist training camp in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Lackawanna Six. Attended terrorist training camp in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Lackawanna Six. Opened fire at El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport.

Washington-area sniper.

Washington-area sniper. 

Operated as an al-Qaida support cell. Planned to send material support/commit attacks overseas. Convicted with Jose Padilla.Operated as an al-Qaida support cell. Planned to send material support/commit attacks overseas. Held as enemy combatant based on suspicion of dirty bomb plot—never charged on these activities. Suspected as part of the cell that attempted to set up a terrorist training camp in Oregon at instruction of Abu Hamza al-Masri. Pled to lesser charge. Set up a terrorist training camp in Oregon at instruction of Abu Hamza al-Masri, brought two fighters to camp, accompanied fighter to training camp in Afghanistan. Initially pled guilty to lesser charges in 2003; later violated parole and pled guilty to original charges.Flew Cessna aircraft into a downtown Tampa skyscraper.Suicide note praised bin Laden.Planned on bombing electric plants, National Guard armory, maybe Jewish sites in south Florida. 

 case us of at St

Pled guiltyPled guilty

Pled guilty

Pled guilty

Kill by US in missile attack Convicted inabsentia

Pled guilty

Pled guilty

Pled guilty

Pled guilty

Killed duringincident

Convicted

Convicted

ConvictedConvictedPled guilty,deported

Pled guilty

Killed duringincidentPled guilty 

ficial charges Of

Providing aid to the Taliban, carrying explosivesConspiracy to provide material support toal-Qaida

Providing material support to al-Qaida 

Providing material support to al-Qaida 

None

Providing material support to al-Qaida 

Providing material support to al-Qaida 

Providing material support to al-Qaida 

Providing material support to al-Qaida 

Providing material support to al-Qaida 

None

Capital murder

Capital murder 

Conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maimoverseas; providing and conspiracy to provide material support for terrorists Conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maimoverseas; providing and conspiracy to provide material support for terrorists Indicted on weapons possession and immigration charges, though prosecutionsought a sentence only appropriate in terrorism-linked immigration cases 

Providing material support to terrorists 

None

Conspiracy to destroy property withexplosives and fire 

Year of arrest 

k attac r o 

2001

2001

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

20022002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002 

Name

John Walker LindhAli al-Marri Mukhtar al-BakriSahim AlwanKemal DerwishJaber A. ElbanehFaysal GalabYahya GobaShafal MosedYasein TaherHesham MohamedHadayetLee Boyd MalvoJohn AllenMuhammadAdham Hassoun Jose PadillaSemi OsmanJames UjaamaCharles BishopImran Mandhai 

— 54 — 
Ethnicity

Caribbean

SouthAsianSouthAsianSouthAsian

Arab

AfricanAmericanAfricanAmericanAfricanAmericanAfricanAmerican

Arab

Kurdish

SouthAsian

AfricanAmerican

Arab 

Convert to 

Islam 

NoNoNoNoNo

YesYesYesYes

NoNoNo

Yes

No 

Citizenship 

us at st

NaturalizedcitizenNaturalizedcitizenGrantedasylumLegalresidentLegalresident

CitizenCitizenCitizenCitizen

NaturalizedcitizenLegalresidentNaturalizedcitizen

Citizen

Legalresident 

 arrival Age at

in US 

Notknown

25

16

23

28

US-bornUS-bornUS-bornUS-born

23

2927

US-born

1980s 

 of time Age at

k t/attac arres 

24

34

23

23

38

33252332

38

3347

32

28 

Engaged in

violent 

/joined act

rce fighting fo

No

No

No

No

Yes

NoNoNoNo

No

NoNo

No

No 

Target of 

ion of /locat plot

violence 

US

US

USNone

Abroad

AbroadAbroadAbroadAbroad

Abroad

USUS

US

US 

ion of Locat

ivity criminal act

US

US

US &AbroadUS &AbroadAbroadAbroadAbroadAbroadAbroad

Abroad

USUSUSUS 

Nature of 

ense f of

Planned on bombing electric plants, National Guard armory, maybe Jewish sites in south Florida. Dropped out of conspiracy weeks into plot. 

Planned to bomb Brooklyn Bridge.

Alleged to have had linkages with al-Qaida; possible plot to attack US oil infrastructure and water reservoirs, possible plot to assassinate Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Helped smuggle Majid Khan into US. Shuttled between USand Pakistan frequently, but spent most of his life in Pakistan. Part of “Portland Seven” cell; joined Taliban, killed fighting in Afghanistan.Tried several times to join al-Qaida/Taliban in Afghanistan.Part of “Portland Seven” cell.Tried several times to join al-Qaida/Taliban in Afghanistan.Part of “Portland Seven” cell.Tried several times to join al-Qaida/Taliban in Afghanistan.Part of “Portland Seven” cell.Tried several times to join al-Qaida/Taliban in Afghanistan.Part of “Portland Seven” cell.

Part of “Portland Seven” cell. 

Albany sting operation to assassinate Pakistani UN ambassador. Albany sting operation to assassinate Pakistani UN ambassador. Paranoid schizophrenic who wrote threatening letters toPresident Bush from jail. 

Involvement with al-Qaida activities; suspected for role in numerous domestic plots. 

 case us of at St

Pled guiltyPled guiltyEnemycombatant (atGuantanamo)ConvictedKilled fightingin AfghanistanPled guiltyPled guiltyPled guiltyPled guiltyPled guiltyConvictedConvictedAlreadyconvicted onothercharges; notcompetent tostand trial

At large 

ficial charges Of

Conspiracy to destroy property withexplosives and fire Providing material support to a designatedforeign terrorist organization

None

Providing and conspiracy to provide material and financial support to an foreign terrorist organization; conspiracy to make or receive contribution to/from al-Qaida

None

Conspiracy to levy war against the US;conspiracy to contribute services to alQaida and Taliban; conspiracy to providematerial support to al-Qaida Conspiracy to levy war against the US;conspiracy to contribute services to alQaida and Taliban; conspiracy to providematerial support to al-Qaida Conspiracy to levy war against the US;conspiracy to contribute services to alQaida and Taliban; conspiracy to providematerial support to al-Qaida Conspiracy to levy war against the US;conspiracy to contribute services to alQaida and Taliban; conspiracy to providematerial support to al-Qaida Conspiracy to levy war against the US;conspiracy to contribute services to alQaida and Taliban; conspiracy to providematerial support to al-Qaida Conspiring to aid a terrorist group, provide support for weapons of mass destruction, money laundering, supporting a foreignterrorist organization Conspiring to aid a terrorist group, provide support for weapons of mass destruction, money laundering, supporting a foreignterrorist organization 

Threats against president

Material witness warrant issued 

 arrest Year of

k attac r o

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

200320032003

2003

2003

2003

2003 

Name

Shueyb Mossa JokhanIyman FarisMajid KhanUzair ParachaHabis Abdulla alSaoubJeffrey Leon BattleAhmed Abrahim BilalMuhammad IbrahimBilalPatrice LumumbaFordMaher MofeidHawashYassin ArifMohammed HosseinClifford L. Cousins Adnan el-Shukrijumah 

— 55 — 
Ethnicity

AfricanAmerican

ArabArab

AfricanAmerican

SouthAsian

Caucasian

SouthAsian

Korean

Caucasian

Unknown

Arab

SouthAsianSouthAsian

Somali

Caucasian

AfricanAmerican

Arab

Arab 

Convert to 

Islam

Yes

NoNo

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No 

Citizenship 

us at st

Citizen

Legalresident

Legalresident

Citizen

Legalresident

Citizen

Naturalizedcitizen

Citizen

Naturalizedcitizen

Citizen

Citizen

Citizen

Naturalizedcitizen

Illegal

Illegal(obtainedasylumby fraud)

Citizen

Notknown

Citizen

Naturalizedcitizen 

Age at arrival 

in US

US-born

Notknown

Notknown

US-born

17

US-born

Notknown

US-born

Notknown

US-born

US-born

US-born

2

17

22

US-born

Notknown

US-born

17 

 of time Age at

k t/attac arres 

31

31

26

35

27

30

27

31

27

30

30

40

29

22

32

26

27

22

39 

Engaged in

violent 

/joined act rce fighting fo

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No 

Target of 

ion of /locat plot

violence 

US

None

None

NoneNoneNoneNoneNoneNone

None

None

None

None

US

US

None

None

Abroad

None 

ion of Locat

ivity criminal act

US

US &Abroad

USUS &AbroadUS &AbroadUS &AbroadUS &AbroadUS &AbroadUS &AbroadUSUS &AbroadUSAbroad

US

US

US

USAbroadUS 

Nature of 

ense f of

Killed two fellow soldiers in surprise grenade attack. 

Attended terrorist training camps abroad; trained by playing paintball. Northern Virginia “paintball” group. 

Helped other northern Virginia “paintball” group gain access to terrorist training. Northern Virginia “paintball” group Attended terrorist training camps abroad; trained by playing paintball. Northern Virginia “paintball” group. Attended terrorist training camps abroad; trained by playing paintball. Northern Virginia “paintball” group. Attended terrorist training camps abroad; trained by playing paintball. Northern Virginia “paintball” group. Attended terrorist training camps abroad; trained by playing paintball. Northern Virginia “paintball” group. Attended terrorist training camps abroad; trained by playing paintball. Northern Virginia “paintball” group. Attended terrorist training camps abroad; trained by playing paintball. Northern Virginia “paintball” group. Helped other northern Virginia “paintball” group gain access to terrorist training camps.Attended terrorist training camps abroad; trained by playing paintball. Northern Virginia “paintball” group. Cleric who incited members of northern Virginia group totake up arms, attend training camps. Provided bomb making material, night-vision goggles, funding to al-Qaida and Taliban. Provided support to U.K.fertilizer bomb plot.

Planned on bombing Herald Square in Manhattan. 

Helped Iyman Faris Brooklyn Bridge plot.

Attempted to pass intelligence about tanks on to al-Qaida. Seattle barber convicted of non-terrorism offenses, but allegations were that radical rhetoric pervaded his shop. He jumped bail prior to sentencing; ended up in Somalia; posed threats on phone calls; rumored to have been killed in Somalia.Plotted with al Qaida while in Saudi Arabia to assassinate President Bush.Operated as an al-Qaida support cell. Planned to send material support/commit attacks overseas. Convicted with Jose Padilla. 

 case us of at St

Convicted(court martial) 

Pled guilty

Pled guilty

Convicted

Convicted

ConvictedPled guiltyConvictedPled guilty

Pled guilty

Pled guiltyConvictedPled guiltyConvicted

Pled guilty

Convicted(court martial) 

Convicted

Convicted

Convicted 

ficial charges Of

Premeditated murder; attempted premeditated murderAiding and abetting others to conduct military operation; firearms 

Weapons and explosives charges 

Conspiracy to provide material support toan foreign terrorist organization (Lashkar-eTaiba)

Material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba 

Conspiracy to provide material support toan foreign terrorist organization (Lashkar-eTaiba)Conspiracy to provide material support toan foreign terrorist organization (Lashkar-eTaiba)Conspiracy to provide material support toan foreign terrorist organization (Lashkar-eTaiba)Conspiracy to commit an offense againstthe US; weapons charges

Weapons and explosives charges 

Conspiracy to commit an offense againstthe US; weapons chargesCounseling and inducing others to use and carry firearms and explosives, wage war,aid foreign terrorist organization Conspiring to provide and providingmaterial support to terrorists Conspiracy to damage or destroy a subway station by means of an explosive 

Providing material support 

Seeking to aid the enemy in time of war; attempted espionage

Handgun, counterfeiting 

Conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism 

Conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maimoverseas; providing and conspiracy to provide material support for terrorists 

Year of arrest 

k attac r o 

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005 

Name

Hasan AkbarMuhammed AatiqueIbrahim al-HamdiHammad AbdurRaheemAli Asad ChandiaSeifullah ChapmanKhwaja MahmoodHasanMasoud Ahmad Khan Yong Ki KwonRandall RoyerDonald ThomasSurrattAli Al-Timimi Mohammed BabarShahawar Matin Siraj Nuradin AbdiRyan AndersonRuben ShumpertAhmed Omar Abu AliKifah Jayyousi 

— 56 — 
Ethnicity

SouthAsian

Unknown

AfricanAmerican

AfricanAmericanAfricanAmerican

SouthAsian

AfricanAmerican

Caucasian Iranian

SouthAsianSouthAsianAfricanAmerican

Haitian

HaitianHaitianHaitianHaitian

SouthAsian

Arab

Arab 

Convert to 

Islam 

No

Unconfirmed

Yes

YesYes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

YesYesYesYes

No

No

No 

Citizenship 

us at st

Naturalizedcitizen

Citizen

Citizen

CitizenCitizen

Legalresident

Citizen

Citizen

Naturalizedcitizen

Citizen 

Naturalizedcitizen

Citizen

Illegal

CitizenCitizenCitizenCitizen

Citizen

Citizen

Naturalizedcitizen 

Age at arrival 

in US 

6

US-born

US-born

US-bornUS-born

Notknown

US-born

US-born

2

US-born

12

US-born

Notknown

US-bornUS-bornUS-bornUS-born

US-born

US-born

Notknown 

 of time Age at

k t/attac arres

22

30

40

2922

22

26

26

22

30

21

22

26

21223231

19

26

43 

Engaged in

violent 

/joined act

rce fighting fo

No

No

No

NoNo

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

NoNoNoNo

No

No

No 

Target of 

ion of /locat plot

violence 

US

None

None

USUS

US

US

None

US

US

US

US

US

USUSUSUS

US

Abroad

Abroad 

ion of Locat

ivity criminal act

US &AbroadAbroad

US

USUSUSUS

Abroad

USUS

US

US

US

USUSUSUS

USUSUS 

Nature of 

ense f of

Received terrorist training in Pakistan, admitted returning toUS to engage in violence.Training with Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan. Born in Akron, moved to DC in 2000.

Agreed to train al-Qaida fighters in martial arts. 

Planned on attacking US military facilities, Israeli government facilities, and Los Angeles-area synagogues. Planned on attacking US military facilities, Israeli government facilities, and Los Angeles-area synagogues. Planned on attacking US military facilities, Israeli government facilities, and Los Angeles-area synagogues. Planned on attacking US military facilities, Israeli government facilities, and Los Angeles-area synagogues. 

Urged violence against the US on al-Qaida video tapes. 

Drove van through University of North Carolina campus, injuring several students.

Opened fire at Seattle-area Jewish organization. 

Cased sites in DC-area and sent information on to al-Qaidarecruiters abroad.

Plot to throw hand grenades in Chicago-area shopping malls. 

Plot to bomb the Sears Tower. Liberty City Seven. 

Plot to bomb the Sears Tower. Liberty City Seven. Plot to bomb the Sears Tower. Liberty City Seven. Plot to bomb the Sears Tower. Liberty City Seven. Plot to bomb the Sears Tower. Liberty City Seven. 

Cased sites in DC-area and sent information on to al-Qaidarecruiters abroad.Engaged in weapons training, discussed ways to support foreign fighters. Engaged in weapons training, discussed ways to support foreign fighters. 

 case us of at St

ConvictedPled guiltyPled guilty

Pled guilty

ConvictedUnfit to stand trial;receivingpsychiatric treatmentPled guilty

At large

Pled guilty

Convicted

ConvictedPled guiltyConvictedConvictedConvictedConvictedConvictedConvictedConvictedConvicted 

ficial charges Of

Providing material support to terrorists; false statementsProviding material support to foreign terrorist organization Conspiring to provide material support to alQaida

Conspiracy to levy war against the US

Conspiracy to levy war against the US;conspiracy to kill foreign officials Conspiracy to levy war against the US;conspiracy to kill foreign officials Conspiracy to levy war against the US;conspiracy to kill foreign officials 

Treason

Attempted 1st-degree murder 

Murder, attempted murder 

Conspiracy to provide material support toterrorists; providing and attempting toprovide material support to an foreign terrorist organization Attempted use of a weapons of mass destruction against people and property inside USProviding material support to a designatedforeign terrorist organizationProviding material support to a designatedforeign terrorist organizationProviding material support to a designatedforeign terrorist organizationProviding material support to a designatedforeign terrorist organizationProviding material support to a designatedforeign terrorist organizationConspiracy to provide material support toterrorists, providing and attempting toprovide material support to an foreign terrorist organization Conspiring to kill or maim persons outside US; distributing information on explosives to terrorists Conspiring to kill or maim persons outside US; distributing information on explosives to terrorists 

Year of arrest 

k attac r o

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006 

Name

Hamid HayatMahmud Faruq Brental-MutazzimTarik ShahKevin JamesGregory PattersonHammad SammanaLevar WashingtonAdam GadahnMuhammed TaheriAzarNaveed HaqSyed Haris AhmedDerrick ShareefPatrick AbrahamBurson AugustinRothschild Augustine Narseal BatisteStanley Grant PhanorEhsanul IslamSadequeeMohammad AmawiMarwan El-Hindi 

— 57 — 
Ethnicity

Arab

AfricanAmericanSouthAsianAfricanAmericanBosnianAfricanAmerican

Arab

Arab

Arab

Albanian

AlbanianAlbanianAlbanian

ArabTurkish

Latino

SouthAsian

SouthAsian

AfricanAmerican 

Convert to 

Islam 

No

Yes

No

Yes

NoYesNo

No

NoNo

NoNoNo

NoNo

Yes

No

No

Yes 

Citizenship 

us at st

LegalresidentCitizenIllegal(overstayed studentvisa)

Citizen

LegalresidentNaturalizedcitizenForeignstudent 

Legalresident(studentvisa)

NaturalizedcitizenLegalresident

IllegalIllegalIllegal

NaturalizedcitizenLegalresident

Citizen

Citizen

Citizen

Citizen 

Age at arrival 

in US 

19

Notknown

24

US-born

9

NotknownNotknown

Notknown

Notknown

16

614

NotknownNotknown

US-born

US-born

Notknown

US-born 

 of Age at time

k t/attac arres 

25

33

29

43

18

63

26

24

22

24

282326

22

23

27

23

24

31 

Engaged in

violent 

/joined act rce fighting fo 

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

NoNoNo

No

No

Yes

No

No

No 

Target of 

ion of /locat plot

violence

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

US

US

US

None

US

US

USUSUS

US

US

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad 

Location of 

criminal activity 

US

USUS

US &Abroad

US

US

US

US

USUS

USUSUS

US

US

Abroad

USUSAbroad 

Nature of 

ense f of

Engaged in weapons training. 

Had trained with and was sending money to Taliban with intent to fight US troops in Afghanistan. Had trained with and was sending money to Taliban with intent to fight US troops in Afghanistan. 

Plotted bombing of US tourist sites overseas. 

Opened fire in Utah shopping mall. Planned to blow up fuel tanks at JFK Airport. Arrested for having an AK-47 under his coat. Had aHezbollah-praising website with a post entitled “The Start of My Personal Jihad (in the US).”

Made videos showing how to assemble rockets. 

Charged a US Air Reserve base with crude explosives and butcher knives, chanting “Death to America. Was under supervision by psychiatric hospital at the time of the attack; had been on terrorist watch list.Fort Dix terror plot. Convicted of weapons charges--letting his friends use his weapons at a firing range. 

Fort Dix terror plot. Fort Dix terror plot. Fort Dix terror plot. 

Fort Dix terror plot. 

Fort Dix terror plot. 

Received terrorist training in Somalia. 

Sought military training. Wanted to join insurgency in Afghanistan or Iraq.Sought military training. Wanted to join insurgency in Afghanistan or Iraq.Passed information on ship movements to group supportingterrorism. Former member US Navy; most conduct pre-9/11. 

 case us of at St

Convicted

Pled guilty

PendingPled guiltyKilled duringincidentCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trial

Pled guilty 

Charged,awaiting trial

Pled guilty

ConvictedConvictedConvictedConvictedConvictedPled guilty

Pled guilty

Pled guilty

Convicted 

Official charges

Conspiring to kill or maim persons outside US

Conspiracy to contribute services to Taliban

Conspiracy to contribute services toTaliban; weapons charges Conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against US nationals and property overseas

None

Conspiracy to cause death, serious bodily injury and extensive destructionPossession of a loaded firearm; felony firearm

Providing material support to terrorists 

Assaulting US government employee

Providing weapons to illegal immigrants

Conspiracy to murder members of the USmilitary; weapons charges Conspiracy to murder members of the USmilitary; weapons charges Conspiracy to murder members of the USmilitary; weapons charges Conspiracy to murder members of the USmilitary; weapons charges Conspiracy to murder members of the USmilitary; weapons charges Receiving military training from foreign terrorist organization; conspiring to use explosive device outside US 

Providing material support to terrorists 

Providing material support to terrorists 

Material support for terrorism; passing classified information; receiving military training 

Year of arrest 

k attac r o

2006

2006

2006

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007 

Name

Wassim MazloumKobie Diallo WilliamsAdnan Babar MirzaChristopher PaulSulejmen TalovicRussell DefreitasHoussein ZorkotAhmed MohamedTahmeed AhmadAgron AbdullahuDritan DukaEljvir DukaShain DukaMohamad IbrahimShnewerSerdar TatarDaniel JosephMaldonadoKhaleel AhmedZubair AhmedPaul Hall 

— 58 — 
Ethnicity

Somali

Somali

SomaliSomaliSomali

Somali

Caucasian

SouthAsian

AfricanAmerican

Haitian

AfricanAmericanAfricanAmerican

AfricanAmerican

Latino

Caucasian

CaucasianCaucasian

Arab

Kosavar

Bosnian

Arab

Arab/Caucasian 

Convert to 

Islam 

No

Yes

NoNoNo

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

YesYes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NoNo

No

No

No

Yes

Yes 

Citizenship 

us at st

Notknown

Refugee

NotknownNotknownNotknownRefugee

Citizen

Legalresident

Citizen

Notknown

CitizenCitizen

Citizen

Citizen

Citizen 

Citizen Citizen 

Citizen

Legalresident

Naturalizedcitizen

Naturalizedcitizen

Citizen 

Age at arrival 

in US 

Notknown

10

Notknown

7

5

Notknown

US-born

18

US-born

Notknown

US-bornUS-born

US-born

US-born 

US-born

US-bornUS-born

US-born

Notknown

Notknown

Notknown

US-born 

 of Age at time

k t/attac arres 

Notknown

26

19

19

17

22

25

36

44

27

2832

23

26

39

2022

22

24

33

21

25

Engaged in

violent 

/joined act rce fighting fo 

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

NoNo

Yes

Yes

No

NoNo

No

No

No

No

Yes 

Target of 

ion of /locat plot

violence

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

US

US

USUS

US

Abroad

Abroad

AbroadAbroadAbroadAbroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad 

Location of 

criminal activity

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

AbroadUSUSUSUS

US

Abroad 

US &Abroad

US &AbroadUS &AbroadUS &AbroadUS &AbroadUSUS &Abroad

Abroad 

Nature of 

ense f of

Left Minneapolis for Somalia to join Shabaab. Left Minneapolis for Somalia to join Shabaab; killed executing suicide bomb attack. Left Minneapolis for Somalia to join Shabaab. 

Left Minneapolis for Somalia to join Shabaab. 

Left Minneapolis for Somalia to join Shabaab. 

Left Minneapolis for Somalia to join Shabaab. Left Minneapolis for Somalia to join Shabaab. Went missing while visiting Pakistan in 2003; detained in Afghanistan in 2008; attacked US personnel at Afghan policestation.Plot to bomb Riverdale synagogues and shoot down Air Force planes in NY.Plot to bomb Riverdale synagogues and shoot down Air Force planes in NY.Plot to bomb Riverdale synagogues and shoot down Air Force planes in NY.Plot to bomb Riverdale synagogues and shoot down Air Force planes in NY.Shot military recruiters in Little Rock, AR. 

Joined al-Qaida; participated in rocket attack in Afghanistan. 

Plotted to commit acts of violence in Israel, Kosovo. NorthCarolina group, fought in Afghanistan 1989-92. Plotted to commit acts of violence in Israel, Kosovo. NorthCarolina group, son of Daniel Boyd. Plotted to commit acts of violence in Israel, Kosovo. NorthCarolina group, son of Daniel Boyd. Plotted to commit acts of violence in Israel, Kosovo. NorthCarolina group.Plotted to commit acts of violence in Israel, Kosovo. NorthCarolina group.Plotted to commit acts of violence in Israel, Kosovo. NorthCarolina group.Plotted to commit acts of violence in Israel, Kosovo. NorthCarolina group.Joined Shabaab in Somalia; made recruitment videos. 

 case us of at St

Notapplicable

Killed

Notapplicable

Killed

Killed

NotapplicableNotapplicableCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialPled guiltyCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged, atlarge 

Official charges 

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Attempted murder of US military personnel in AfghanistanConspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction within the US and to acquire and use antiaircraft missiles Conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction within the US and to acquire and use antiaircraft missiles Conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction within the US and to acquire and use antiaircraft missiles Conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction within the US and to acquire and use antiaircraft missiles 

Murder and 15 counts of terroristic acts 

Conspiracy to murder US nationals,material support to al-Qaida Conspiracy to murder abroad, material support, weapons charges Conspiracy to murder abroad, material support, weapons charges Conspiracy to murder abroad, material support, weapons charges Conspiracy to murder abroad, material support, weapons charges Conspiracy to murder abroad, material support, weapons charges Conspiracy to murder abroad, material support, weapons charges Conspiracy to murder abroad, material support, weapons charges 

Providing material support to terrorism 

Year of arrest 

k attac r o

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009 

Name

Abdikadir Ali AbdiShirwa AhmadAbdisalan AliJamal Sheikh BanaBurhan HassanMahmoud Hassan Troy MatthewKastigarAafia SiddiquiJames CromitieLaguerre PayenDavid WilliamsOnta WilliamsAbdulhakim MujahidMuhammadBryant Neal VinasDaniel BoydDylan BoydZakaria BoydMohammad Omar AlyHassanHysen SherifiAnes SubasicZiyad YaghiOmar Hammami 

— 59 — 
Ethnicity

Afghani

Arab

Caucasian

Slavic

Somali

Arab

Caucasian/SouthAsian

SouthAsian

Arab

SomaliSomaliSomali

Somali

SomaliSomaliSomaliSomali 

Convert to 

Islam 

No

No

Yes

No

Notknown

No

No

No

No

NoNoNo

No

NoNoNoNo 

Citizenship 

us at st

LegalresidentIllegal

Citizen

Citizen

Notknown

Citizen

Citizen

Legalresident

Citizen

NotknownNotknownLegalresident

Notknown

NotknownNotknownNotknownNotknown 

 arrival Age at

in US 

7

Notknown

US-born

US-born 

Notknown

US-born

US-born

41

US-born

NotknownNotknownNotknown

Notknown

NotknownNotknownNotknownNotknown 

 of time Age at

k t/attac arres 

24

19

29

21

Notknown

28

49

48

39

26

26

32

24

17

24

25

30 

Engaged in

violent 

/joined act

rce fighting fo

No

No

NoNo

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes 

Target of 

ion of /locat plot

violence 

US

US

US

Abroad

Abroad

US

Abroad

Abroad

US

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad 

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad 

ion of Locat

ivity criminal act

US &AbroadUS

US

AbroadAbroad

US

US &Abroad

US

US

Abroad

Abroad

US

Abroad

Abroad

US

Abroad

Abroad 

Nature of 

ense f of

Attended terrorist training camp, assembled bomb making materials in Colorado. Attempted to detonate fake bomb outside Dallas officebuilding.Attempted to detonate fake bomb in Decatur, IL. Attempted to join group related to al-Qaida, sought military training.Left US for Somalia in 2007; killed executing suicide bomb attack. Somali-American from Seattle; attacked African Union base.Plotted to bomb mall in Boston, MA; targets abroad Plot to kill Danish newspaper editors; Conspired to execute Mumbai attacks Plot to kill Danish newspaper editors Ft. Hood shootingsLeft Minneapolis for Somalia; fought with Shabaab 

Left Minneapolis for Somalia to join Shabaab. 

Recruited young Somalis in Minneapolis to join Shabaab; facilitated travel to Somalia 

Left Minneapolis for Somalia to join Shabaab. 

Left Minneapolis for Somalia; fought with Shabaab Recruited young Somalis in Minneapolis to join Shabaab; facilitated travel to Somalia 

Urged violence against the US on al-Qaida video tapes. 

Left Minneapolis for Somalia; fought with Shabaab 

 case us of at St

Charged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialNotapplicableCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trialCharged,awaiting trailCharged,awaiting trialCharged, atlargePled guiltyCharged, atlarge

Pled guilty

Charged, atlargeCharged, atlargePled guiltyCharged, atlarge 

ficial charges Of

Conspiracy to use weapon of mass destruction Attempted use of weapon of mass destruction Attempted use of weapon of mass destruction Conspiracy to provide material support for terrorism; conspiracy to commit murder abroad

None

Conspiracy to provide material support toterrorists Conspiracy to murder and maim abroad;Conspiracy to bomb public place abroad;murder of US nationals abroad; material support to foreign terrorist organization 

Material support to terrorism 

Murder, attempted murder 

Providing material support to a terrorist organization and conspiring to kill, maim, kidnap or injure people outside the UnitedStatesMaterial support for terrorism; conspiracy to kill, maim in foreign country Providing material support to a terrorist organization and conspiring to kill, maim, kidnap or injure people outside the UnitedStates

Providing material support to terrorism 

Providing material support to a terrorist organization and conspiring to kill, maim, kidnap or injure people outside the UnitedStatesProviding material support to a terrorist organization and conspiring to kill, maim, kidnap or injure people outside the UnitedStatesMaterial support for terrorism; conspiracy to kill, main in foreign country Providing material support to a terrorist organization and conspiring to kill, maim, kidnap or injure people outside the UnitedStates 

 arrest Year of

k attac r o

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

20092009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009 

Name

Najibullah ZaziHosam Maher Husein SmadiMichael FintonBetim KaziuUnnamed SomaliAmericanTarek MehannaDavid ColemanHeadleyTahawwur Hussain RanaNidal HasanKhalid AbshirSalah Osman Ahmed Cabdulaahi AhmedFaaraxKamal HassanMohamed Hassan Abdiweli Yassin IsseAbdifatah Yusuf IsseZakaria Maruf 

— 60 — 
Ethnicity

SomaliSomali

Somali

Somali

SouthAsian

SouthAsianEritreanEthiopianArab 

Convert to 

Islam 

NoNo

No

NoNo

No

NoNo

No 

Citizenship 

us at st

NotknownNotknown

Legalresident

NotknownNaturalizedcitizenCitizenNaturalizedcitizenNaturalizedcitizenCitizen 

Age at arrival 

in US 

NotknownNotknown

Notknown

Notknown

4

NotknownNotknownNotknownNotknown 

 of Age at time

k t/attac arres 

2424

43

19

24

22201822 

Engaged in

violent 

/joined act rce fighting fo

YesYes

No

Yes

No

NoNoNoNo 

Target of 

ion of /locat plot

violence

AbroadAbroad

Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

AbroadAbroadAbroadAbroad 

Location of 

criminal activity

AbroadAbroad

US &Abroad

Abroad

Abroad

AbroadAbroadAbroadAbroad 

Nature of 

ense f of

Left Minneapolis for Somalia; fought with Shabaab Left Minneapolis for Somalia; fought with Shabaab Recruited young Somalis in Minneapolis to join Shabaab; purchased weapons in Somalia for Minneapolis recruits Left Minneapolis for Somalia; fought with Shabaab Traveled to Pakistan, allegedly to join a foreign terrorist organization

Traveled to Pakistan, allegedly to join a foreign terrorist organizationTraveled to Pakistan, allegedly to join a foreign terrorist organizationTraveled to Pakistan, allegedly to join a foreign terrorist organizationTraveled to Pakistan, allegedly to join a foreign terrorist organization 

 case us of at St

Charged,awaiting trialCharged, atlargeCharged,awaiting trialCharged, atlargeDetained byPakistani authorities

Detained byPakistani authoritiesDetained byPakistani authoritiesDetained byPakistani authoritiesDetained byPakistani authorities 

Official charges

Providing material support to a terrorist organization and conspiring to kill, maim, kidnap or injure people outside the UnitedStatesProviding material support to a terrorist organization and conspiring to kill, maim, kidnap or injure people outside the UnitedStatesProviding material support to a terrorist organizationProviding material support to a terrorist organization and conspiring to kill, maim, kidnap or injure people outside the UnitedStates

None

NoneNoneNoneNone 

Year of arrest 

k attac r o

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009 

Name

Omer Abdi MohamedAhmed Ali OmarMahamud Said OmarMustafa SalatUmar ChaudhryWaqar KhanAhmad A. MinniAman Hassan Yemer Ramy Zamzam 

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