U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

Office for Victims of Crime 

Responding to September 11 Victims:


Lessons Learned From the States 


Calif ornia • Massachusetts • Ne w J erse y • Ne w York • Pennsylvania • Virginia 

“Putting Victims First” 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

810 Seventh Street NW. 

Washington, DC 20531 

Alberto R. Gonzales 

Attorney General 

Tracy A. Henke 

Acting Assistant Attorney General 

John W. Gillis 

Director, Office for Victims of Crime 

Office of Justice Programs 

Partnerships for Safer Communities 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov 

Office for Victims of Crime 

www.ovc.gov 

NCJ 208799


The Office for Victims of Crime is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which 

also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National 

Institute of Justice, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 
RESPONDING TO


SEPTEMBER 11 VICTIMS: 


LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE STATES

Cover photos 1 and 2 courtesy of Pelco; photo 3 courtesy of Brian Schrock, Daily American, Somerset, PA; 

photo 4 courtesy of Chief Petty Officer Johnny Bivera, U.S. Navy. 
Message From the Director


On September 11, 2001, thousands of people going about their daily lives became crime victims in a 

matter of hours. As an unprecedented demand for assistance and compensation services unfolded, 

victim service providers across the country began to address the complexities of responding to an overwhelming number of victims in need of swift, compassionate, professional, and coordinated assistance. 

In particular, staff from victim assistance and victim compensation programs in New York, Virginia, 

Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and California realized that they would play an integral role 

in addressing victims’ needs. 

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) provided 

these states with approximately $65.2 million in emergency and supplemental grant funds to assist 

victims, emergency responders, and their families. State Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) administrator 

agencies were awarded grants to administer the funds. The agencies provided myriad assistance and 

compensation services directly to victims, while coordinating with countless other agencies at the federal, state, and local level. State VOCA administrator agencies faced significant challenges and overcame numerous obstacles to provide comprehensive, timely assistance. Undoubtedly, valuable lessons 

can be learned from their experiences. 

OVC and the state VOCA administrator agencies believe it is important for all state victim assistance 

and compensation programs, as well as other entities involved in responding to mass criminal victimization, to be aware of their experiences. To accurately document the states’ challenges, lessons learned, 

and promising practices in responding to victims’ needs, OVC supported the development of this 

report, which describes their efforts. OVC plans to use this valuable information to help inform program and policy development. 

OVC knows that other state VOCA administrator agencies provided important victim assistance and 

compensation services that are also worthy of recognition. Thus, OVC would like to thank not only 

the state agency representatives directly involved in developing this report, but also all of the victim 

assistance professionals at the federal, state, and local level who devoted their time, expertise, and 

financial resources to assisting September 11 victims, emergency responders, and their families. We 

commend and thank you all for your valiant efforts. 

John W. Gillis 

Director 

Office for Victims of Crime 

iii 
Acknowledgments


First and foremost, the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) would like to acknowledge the efforts of 

program staff from the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) state administrator victim assistance and compensation programs who made substantial contributions to this report. Following the bombing of the 

Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, OVC chronicled the response efforts to 

that tragedy in a report and approached the September 11 state VOCA administrators with the idea of 

a report to document their efforts. OVC believed it was important to allow the VOCA administrators 

to present this information from a state perspective. 

OVC would like to take this opportunity to thank the following programs and individuals for their 

contributions to this report and dedication to meeting the needs of September 11 victims: Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, Office of Victims’ Services (Carol Lavery, Lori Sywensky, 

and Lynn Shiner); New York State Crime Victims Board (Joan Cusack, Anne Marie Strano, Christina 

Hernandez, and Ron Dickens); Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, Victims Services Section (Mandie Patterson, John Mahoney, and Karen Thomas); Virginia Criminal Injuries Compensation 

Fund (Mary Vail Ware); New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy 

(Sandra McGowan, Theresa Martinac, and James Reilly); New Jersey Victims of Crime Compensation 

Board (Richard Pompelio, Jacob Toporek, and James Casserly); Massachusetts Office for Victim Assistance (Janet Fine, Brenda Noel, Allison Tassie, Sandra Field, and Karen Dempsey); California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board (Karen McGagin, Catherine Close, and Anita Ahuja); 

Network of Victim Assistance of Bucks County, Pennsylvania (Barbara Clark and Susan Bizon); and 

Oklahoma Crime Victims Compensation Board, District Attorneys Council (Suzanne Breedlove). 

We would also like to thank the author of the report, Patricia Hoag, with the OVC Training and 

Technical Assistance Center (TTAC) for a job well done, as well as OVC TTAC staff members 

Penny Tinsman, Rick Custer, and Johane Celestin for their assistance in completing this project. 

Finally, we would like to thank OVC Principal Deputy Director Carolyn Hightower for her leadership 

and support of this initiative and Barbara Johnson and Brad Mitchell of OVC’s Terrorism and International Victim Assistance Services Division for their overall management of this project, their efforts 

immediately following the terrorist attacks to address the needs of victims and service providers, and 

their continued efforts to provide technical assistance support and to facilitate the coordination of 

resources to the September 11 state VOCA administrators. 

v 
Contents


Message From the Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Purpose of This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Sources Consulted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Lessons Learned From State VOCA Administrator Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Promising Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Training and Responder Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Professional and Volunteer Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Hotlines/Helplines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Emergency Operations Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Family Assistance Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Case Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Counseling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Mental Health Counseling, Support Groups, and Community Healing Rituals . . . . . . . . . . .7

Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Challenges to Meeting Victims’ Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Different Requirements for Compensation and Victim Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Difficulty Responding to the Massive Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Lack of Uniform Standards and Criteria for Financial Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Victim Identification and Communication Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Barriers to Serving Special Victim Populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Geographical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Emotional Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Fragmentation of Service Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

vii 
viii 

Responding to 

the States 

Conclusion

September 11 

Victims: Lessons 

Learned From 

Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 

Develop a National Perspective on Consequences of Mass Criminal Victimization . . . . . . . . . . . .13 

Prepare To Respond to Immediate, Intermediate, and Long-Term Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 

Set Assistance Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 

Formalize Response Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 

Reach Out to All Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 

Monitor and Evaluate Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 

Balance Planning and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 
Executive Summary


After the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, the Office for Victims of 

Crime (OVC) awarded crisis response 

grants and subsequent appropriated funding to a 

number of state Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) 

administrator agencies to provide a broad range 

of services to victims of the attacks. At a meeting 

from December 7–8, 2003, those grantees had an 

opportunity to describe their experiences and the 

lessons they learned as they mobilized to meet 

the demand for victim assistance and compensation after September 11. This report reflects the 

frontline perspective on victim assistance services 

by these state VOCA administrator agencies and 

offers lessons learned to state, federal, and private mass violence: 

decisionmakers for organizing effective responses ✦ to possible future mass criminal victimization. 

Even though grantees had solid resources in place 

before September 11 for victim compensation ✦ and assistance, they were challenged by the 

severity and magnitude of victims’ needs. They 

found that although there were similarities, the volunteers. needs of victims of mass criminal events were 

unique compared with the needs of victims of ✦ other crimes. Displaced workers, individuals 

affected by subsequent economic fallout, and victims and responders who face unknown long­ ✦ 

term health hazards require special services 

following mass criminal incidents. The grantees centers. 

also discovered that existing systems for emergency management or terrorism planning were ✦ 

based primarily on a public safety model of disaster response that focused on saving lives and 

ensuring citizens’ immediate safety. For the most ✦ 

part, these models were not developed to take 

into account the human impact of mass criminal 

incidents and did not recognize the social, psy- ✦ 

chological, and economic toll that might manifest itself in physical or emotional symptoms. 

Furthermore, the grantees pointed to thorough 

planning and coordination of resources as vital 

components for enhancing victim assistance as 

well as a need for federal support to perform both. 

Promising Practices 

The state VOCA administrator agencies 

launched a variety of innovative strategies to 

quickly and efficiently meet victims’ needs, and 

they credit several of these approaches with having a positive effect on September 11 victims’ 

lives. From their perspective, the following practices brought substantial benefits to all victims of 

Providing emergency training that combines 

preparedness for the physical, psychological, 

and emotional effects of a disaster. 

Assigning tasks before, during, and after 

a disaster that capitalize on the specific 

strengths of both professionals and 

Setting up toll free hotlines for access to 

assistance, compensation, and referrals. 

Integrating victim compensation and assistance personnel into emergency operations 

Establishing centralized victim resource sites 

at local family assistance centers. 

Adopting a case management approach to 

coordinating and delivering services. 

Supplementing compensation and mental 

health services with counseling on legal, 

financial, and other daily concerns of 

victims. 

ix 
x 

Responding to 

the States 

✦ Offering victims and emergency responders a 

range of stress management and psychological care techniques to use as the process of 

post-event trauma unfolds. 

✦ Streamlining compensation processes to 

✦ Scheduling public events as outlets for community expressions of grief and opportunities 

for healing. 

Lessons Learned 

In responding to the extraordinary demand for 

victim services prompted by the September 11 

cies faced several challenges that warrant consideration for planning and implementing future 

response protocols. They identified the following 

challenges: 

✦ Compared with emergency management 

and response to natural disasters, mass criminal victimization demands specialized 

response strategies that address the complex 

toll on people. 

✦ The impact of the crisis and the scope of 

victims’ needs were not anticipated, severely 

straining existing resources and jeoparassistance. 

✦ Financial responsibilities of state agencies 

and local organizations toward victims were 

unclear because of the numerous governmental and charitable programs and 

resources available to victims. 

✦ The lack of a centralized database that 

would provide information about payments 

made by government agencies and prominent charities complicated determinations 

of what expenses should be covered by state 

compensation programs. 

September 11 

Victims: Lessons 

Learned From 

accommodate a high volume of claimants. 

terrorist attacks, state VOCA administrator agendizing effective compensation and victim 

✦�Identifying and communicating with victims 

was hampered because VOCA administrator 

agencies could not share information about 

victims with charitable agencies and other 

government programs that provided similar 

services and financial assistance. This was 

primarily due to privacy and confidentiality 

concerns. 

✦�The diverse needs, beliefs, and lifestyles of 

special victim populations had an impact on 

service delivery. 

✦�Victims who lived far from the attack sites 

felt isolated and confronted barriers to 

receiving services. 

✦�Depression and fatigue affected victim compensation and assistance staff who had to 

balance the emotions and demands of 

September 11 victims with those of other 

victims. 

✦�A lack of coordinated resources impeded 

smooth delivery of services to victims, and 

any collaborations that were formed after 

September 11 were based on personal relationships among service providers rather 

than on institutional procedures and/or 

agreements. 

Recommended Actions 

Input from state VOCA administrator agencies 

also revealed several potential actions that may 

improve the response to mass criminal victimization. Among the top recommendations were the 

following: 

✦�Consider emergency management not only 

from a prevention or intervention perspective, but also from a standpoint that takes 

into account the aftermath of the crisis. 

✦�Balance funding for prevention, intervention, and aftermath services. 

✦�Set aside funding to support advance development of a disaster response structure. 
✦�Integrate victim issues seamlessly into emergency preparedness planning, training, and 

implementation. 

✦�Adopt standardized emergency management 

procedures to formalize collaborative agreements that foster efficient service delivery 

and ensure a high level of accountability, particularly with state agency leadership. 

✦�Address the unique needs of victims of mass 

criminal events through continual care that 

is backed by rigorous planning, prompt victim identification, and thorough outreach. 

✦�Take prudent, measured action to ensure adequate but appropriate services to optimize 

response to victims’ needs, rather than following a “one-size-fits-all” approach. 

✦ Balance the needs of victims of 

mass criminal incidents with the 

needs of other victims. 

✦ Conduct data collection and evaluation to 

inform decisionmakers and providers about 

the nature, duration, and effectiveness of victim services. 

agencies agreed that carefully crafted federal 

action will complement and enhance the efforts 

of state agencies to provide comprehensive services to victims of mass violence and will further 

the capacity of all Americans to cope with any 

future domestic incidents. 

xi 

Without exception, state VOCA administrator 

Executive Summary 
Chapter 1


Introduction


The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 

resulted in the largest mass victimization 

in American history, with approximately 

3,000 deceased,1 thousands injured, and scores of 

survivors of the deceased. The Office for Victims 

of Crime (OVC), which had experience working 

with communities that responded to five previous 

incidents of terrorism and mass violence, was 

identified to administer funds and programs to 

assist victims of the September 11 attacks. 

Within days of the tragic events, OVC allocated 

funds from its Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve 

to assist victims in the three states where the 

crimes occurred, ultimately awarding about $3.1 

million in victim assistance funding and $13.5 

million in victim compensation funding to the 

State of New York and the Commonwealths of 

Virginia and Pennsylvania. The governorappointed victim assistance and/or compensation 

agency in each jurisdiction received OVC funding to coordinate with state and federal agencies 

in assessing immediate needs and assisting victims through crisis counseling and other direct 

services and to offset out-of-pocket expenses 

incurred by victims and their family members for 

medical and mental health services, funeral and 

burial costs, and lost wages. 

In addition to the 120-day crisis response grants, 

the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 

of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-117) authorized $68.1 

million to address immediate and long-term 

needs of the September 11 victims. Congress 

specifically directed OVC to award grants for 

counseling programs to assist victims, family 

members of victims, and crisis responders. 

1 According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Crime in 

the United States 2001. 

Because funds could be used to support 

community-based victim service programs that 

provided crisis counseling, crisis intervention, 

mental health counseling, and peer support, 

funds were awarded to five state victim assistance 

agencies that administer victim assistance formula grants awarded annually by OVC. OVC awarded grants to two state crime victim compensation 

programs, also the recipients of annual formula 

grant awards. Nine grants were awarded directly 

from OVC to nongovernmental, nonprofit organizations that did not receive funding from any 

other federal source. In total, 6 states and 55 

nonprofit organizations received funding from 

OVC to assist victims of the terrorist attacks. 

As of May 2003, nearly 22,000 victims, crisis 

responders, and family members had been assisted 

by state agencies and local programs using OVC 

funds. Approximately 37,000 victims were assisted through OVC’s 24-hour, toll free call center 

with referrals for financial, housing, and counseling assistance. In addition, 1,800 victims and 

family members traveling to funerals and memorial services received support via OVC’s Victim 

and Family Travel Assistance Center. 

From December 7–8, 2003, OVC convened a 

meeting attended by representatives of state Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) administrator agencies that were involved in managing OVC grants 

to provide assistance and compensation services 

to victims of the September 11 attacks. State representatives from California, New Jersey, New 

York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia participated in 

the meeting, which was held in Baltimore, Maryland. Representatives from Massachusetts were 

unable to attend because of severe weather. 

1 
2 

Responding to 

the States to strengthen the partnership they established 

with the initial 120-day crisis response grants 

and the subsequent $68.1 million in funding from 

the Defense Appropriations Act of 2002. 

Before September 11, 2001, the grantee states 

had well-established resources, tools, and relationships for providing services to victims of 

attacks and the resulting mass victimization 

forced them to adapt existing systems rapidly on 

an unprecedented scale. The following is a brief 

service program: 

✦ 

(VCP) is the largest in the Nation. Since its 

inception in 1965, the program has paid out 

more than $1 billion to victims of violence 

and their families. VCP provides help for 

California residents regardless of where the 

crime occurred and for nonresidents who 

become victims of violent crime within the 

ling, grandparent, grandchild, or household 

connected to VCP through funding or 

administration, they are the ambassadors of 

the compensation program at the local 

ties and the City of Los Angeles turn to 

advocates in victim assistance centers to 

gain information about victim compensation. In addition to helping victims navigate 

the criminal justice system and access community resources, advocates help victims 

apply for compensation and act as representatives to the program on behalf of the vicServices funds the victim assistance centers. 

September 11 

Victims: Lessons 

Learned From 

The meeting of state VOCA administrators was 

designed as an opportunity for grantees and OVC 

from OVC’s Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve 

Background 

crime. However, the magnitude of the terrorist 

description of the structure of each state’s victim 

California’s Victim Compensation Program 

state. The program also assists the victim’s 

spouse, domestic partner, child, parent, sibmember. While victim advocates are not 

level. Crime victims in California’s 58 countim or claimant. The Office of Emergency 

✦�The Massachusetts Office for Victim Assistance administers the federal VOCA victim 

assistance program, providing funding for 

state and community-based organizations to 

offer free mental health counseling and a 

range of other specialized services for crime 

victims. Each year, more than $7 million in 

VOCA funds are distributed to more than 

100 programs across Massachusetts to help 

survivors of homicide victims, children who 

witness violence, and victims of child abuse, 

domestic violence, sexual assault, drunk 

driving, hate crimes, elder abuse, and political torture. 

✦�New Jersey’s Victims of Crime Compensation 

Board, established in 1971 as an independent 

executive branch agency, covers nonreimbursable medical expenses or loss of earnings 

due to crime-related injuries, as well as funeral expenses or loss of support from a deceased 

victim. The board provides secondary coverage for New Jersey residents injured by acts 

of crime outside the state. The board works 

closely with the state’s Office of VictimWitness Advocacy, Office of the Attorney 

General, which maintains victim-witness 

units in 21 county prosecutors’ offices. The 

victim-witness units are staffed with trained 

professionals who accompany victims 

through every step of the criminal justice 

system from the initial phases of arrest and 

prosecution to the final outcome of a case, 

including the parole process. They also help 

victims obtain other assistance services. 

✦�The New York State Crime Victims Board 

provides emergency awards and regular compensation to victims across the state. The 

board also supports grants to almost 200 

programs in community-based organizations 

statewide that offer victim assistance services, 

including the YWCA and grassroots groups 

as well as local government, state, and 

national programs. The board funds 80 

programs in New York City’s five boroughs, 

including homicide counseling programs, 

victim/witness programs within prosecutors’ 

offices, and hospital-based programs that 

provide counseling services. 
✦�In Pennsylvania, the Office of Victims’ Services is a component of the Pennsylvania 

Commission on Crime and Delinquency and 

promotes victims’ rights and services. The 

office administers the Victims Compensation 

Assistance Program, which originated in 

1976 and handles VOCA assistance grants 

for Pennsylvania. The Office of Victims’ 

Services also provides statewide education to 

victim service professionals and outreach to 

the public as well as support for the Victims 

Services Advisory Committee and its numerous subcommittees. 

✦�The Virginia Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund (CICF) was created by the Virginia General Assembly in 1977 to pay 

unreimbursed expenses of victims who suffer 

personal physical injury or death as a result of 

a crime. CICF is administered by the Virginia 

Workers’ Compensation Commission and is 

funded by court fees, assessments on offenders, and restitution; it also receives federal 

funds. Since its inception, the fund has 

processed more than 25,000 claims from 

Virginians who have been victims of violent 

crime. CICF receives about 1,800 claims and 

awards approximately $3 million annually to 

assist victims with medical costs, lost wages, 

funeral expenses, and counseling costs that 

are not covered by any other source. Virginia 

administers victim assistance through its 

Department of Criminal Justice Services, 

which oversees victim assistance program 

development, management, and monitoring, 

a victim resource center, training and mentoring for victim service providers, and a toll 

free statewide crime victim assistance information line. 

Purpose of This Report 

This report documents the lessons learned from 

state efforts to respond to the diverse needs of 

September 11 victims. It presents a summary of 

promising practices, challenges, and lessons 

learned from select state VOCA administrator 

agencies whose firsthand experiences in addressing victims’ needs may assist others in their 

strategic planning. The report also describes the 

Introduction 

scope and impact of victim services 

offered and underscores their importance to victims. It details post-September 

11 patterns for organizing, identifying audiences for, developing timetables for, and implementing a comprehensive response to victims’ 

needs while pinpointing best practices. The 

report can provide useful information for state 

VOCA administrator agencies nationwide, OVC 

leadership, and other federal, state, and local 

organizations as they plan and launch collaborative actions to respond to future mass criminal 

victimization. 

Sources Consulted 

This report is based on a review of a written summary of the December 2003 meeting of state 

VOCA administrator agencies, indepth interviews with VOCA administrators from the six 

states, and content analysis of a variety of internal and external documents from the September 

11 state VOCA grantees. 

Before the state VOCA administrators’ meeting, 

participants were encouraged to prepare responses 

to a set of focused questions designed to prompt 

open discussion at the plenary and group sessions. 

Attendees were asked to consider details about 

the resources, tools, relationships, and other key 

variables that had an impact on victim services 

in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist 

attacks. Highlights of the topics discussed in 

those sessions were presented in the Meeting 

Summary Report of the September 11th Grantees 

Meeting for State VOCA Administrators. 

To continue the dialogue between grantees and 

OVC that took place during the state VOCA 

administrators meeting, a series of 10 indepth 

telephone interviews were conducted within 2 

months of the meeting. VOCA representatives 

from each of the six states were interviewed to 

further explore the lessons learned from their 

perspectives. 

Additionally, interviewees from California, Massachusetts, and Virginia supplied sample written 

documentation including memos, activity reports, 

performance reports, resource guides, letters, press 

3 
4 

Responding to 

the States 

releases, advertisements, and program agendas 

developed or distributed by agencies that contributed staff and resources to September 11 victim assistance or compensation services. The 

documents supplemented the comments of meeting participants and interviewees and supported 

the key points they had made. 

September 11 

Victims: Lessons 

Learned From 

While the information obtained through these 

methods is substantive and informative, it reflects 

the experiences of only a limited number of 

states. Nevertheless, their experiences shed significant light on the current and emerging mass 

criminal victimization issues confronting state 

VOCA administrator agencies across the country 

and offer direction for planning, implementation, 

and evaluation. 
Chapter 2 

Lessons Learned 

From State VOCA 

Administrator Agencies 

Until September 11, 2001, the 1995 

bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City had 

been the largest scale terrorist incident on U.S. 

soil, prompting an extraordinary effort to help 

victims. One of the lessons agencies learned from 

this experience was that victims of terrorism 

share many of the needs of other victims of violent crime, but they also face unique challenges, 

as do the victim service providers and allied professionals who respond to them. 

Promising Practices 

During a mass criminal incident, saving lives and 

ensuring citizen safety are the preeminent considerations. Subsequently, the response shifts to 

treating the effects of violence, as victims seek a 

variety of immediate, short-, and long-term services. As state VOCA administrator agencies 

began to provide those services to September 11 

victims, a number of practices emerged that were 

particularly effective in helping victims stabilize 

their lives and cope with the impact of the event. 

Training and Responder Preparedness 

Emergency response training traditionally has 

focused on response to and recovery from the 

physical impact of a disaster. Therefore, some 

emergency responders were insufficiently prepared to handle the significant human impact of 

the September 11 events. As one interviewee put 

it, “We were just completely taken by surprise.” 

However, some states were able to launch a swift, 

efficient response to victims’ needs with resources 

that were already in place, highlighting the 

importance of thorough advance training for victim service providers and emergency responders. 

One state activated its existing crisis intervention 

team whose solid training, professionalism, and 

performance enabled them to act as liaisons 

between victims and those who made decisions 

about compensation. 

Other states rapidly mobilized post-September 

11, capitalizing on professional alliances and personal relationships to set in motion a comprehensive response to victims’ needs. One state funded 

a daylong training session at which representatives from numerous agencies identified their 

particular areas of expertise. With visual support 

from a large map, agency personnel were 

matched with a specific victim’s family members 

based on geography and anticipated need. 

Another state trained military casualty officers 

who then supported agency staff in helping victims fill out applications for compensation. 

In some states, training for emergency responders 

extended to addressing their own unique needs. 

Unlike direct victims, emergency responders are 

more likely to be exposed to the aftermath of a 

crisis for a longer time, which can build on past 

exposure to trauma. Also, emergency responders 

are not always taught how to cope with their own 

emotional responses to traumatic events and 

therefore may require more support services in 

the future. One VOCA administrator agency collaborated with a hospital to develop a series of 

training sessions about general health and wellness, which included both the physical and mental challenges facing rescue personnel. 

Professional and Volunteer Alliances 

All of the grantees relied on volunteers extensively to optimize victim assistance and compensation, particularly in the days immediately 

following the terrorist attacks. One state’s crisis 

response team represented a mix of professionals 

5 
6 

Responding to 

the States 

and volunteers who were prepared to mobilize 

quickly to reach a crisis site with many victims. 

They also were trained to recognize and respond 

to the broad range of emotions, feelings, and 

physical symptoms that traumatic victimization 

can generate. 

sonnel from other state agencies who volunteered 

their time to complete tasks such as data entry for 

compensation claims or to answer telephones 

dination with the state bar association, also 

offered pro bono legal services to victims and 

surviving family members. 

Hotlines/Helplines 

All of the grantees established hotlines, some 

assistance, compensation, and referral informament a hotline that was housed at DMV headtechnology resources, the toll free line was established within 14 hours and could be staffed by up 

to 30 operators (both DMV employees and 

victim/witness agency personnel). DMV staff 

screened calls, making referrals as necessary to 

victim/witness staff, and developed a resource and 

referral list to direct callers to appropriate serfeatured a database that reported hourly on the 

number of calls, the number of rings, the purpose 

of the call, and resolution of the call, as well as 

the name, address, and phone number of the 

For police, fire, and medical personnel trained to 

respond to dangerous situations, setting up an 

emergency command center is common practice. 

states with crash sites worked with their respective state departments of emergency services, 

most for the first time, to establish disaster 

September 11 

Victims: Lessons 

Learned From 

One VOCA administrator agency relied on peruntil midnight or later. Each state, some in cooralmost immediately, to give victims access to 

tion. One VOCA administrator agency collaborated successfully with its state’s Department of 

Motor Vehicles (DMV) to plan, staff, and implequarters. Drawing on the DMV’s extensive 

vices. In addition, DMV’s automated resources 

caller. 

Emergency Operations Centers 

However, because the September 11 events were 

also crimes, VOCA administrator agencies in 

field offices. With federal, state, military, 

and volunteer resources also on hand, victim 

assistance and compensation experts staffed 

emergency operations centers. They also coordinated data collection and ensured the number of 

claims received and paid was incorporated into 

daily situation reports for governors and federal 

agencies. 

Family Assistance Centers 

Three state VOCA administrator agencies 

described the family assistance centers that 

served as a positive precedent and model for consolidating services in one location. Set up in public or private facilities near the attack sites, family 

assistance centers gave victims one-stop access to 

a host of resources, including attorneys to assist 

with custody and probate issues, insurance companies, charities, personnel from the FBI and the 

Social Security Administration, and representatives from airlines. Clergy, therapists, therapy 

animals, childcare (while families completed 

applications and other paperwork), DNA draw 

sites (where DNA samples were collected from 

relatives to help identify the deceased), and 

onsite memorials were also available at the 

centers. 

Equipped with computer terminals and Internet 

access, family assistance centers were staffed by 

compensation and victim assistance professionals, 

including those from urban areas and those with 

significant experience working with families of 

homicide victims. They linked people with grief 

counseling and made referrals to local victim/ 

witness agencies, recognizing the anticipated 

need for ongoing counseling for some victims. 

Military personnel and victim/witness professionals from other states supported local personnel 

who were handling regular caseloads in addition 

to processing September 11 victim claims. 

Case Management 

State VOCA administrator agencies unanimously 

and vigorously supported a case management 

model with assigned case managers who advocated on behalf of victims, allowing them to bypass 

many complications and barriers to receiving 

comprehensive services. Two states cited the 
effectiveness of a case management model for 

coordinating and delivering services to September 11 victims. Following an advocacy case management approach, state VOCA administrator 

agencies developed individual recovery plans to 

help victims return to predisaster status as quickly 

as possible by providing referrals to counseling, 

support groups, legal services, immigration services, job training, placement agencies, and other 

resources that matched an individual’s specific 

needs. 

Case managers also handled professionally many 

of the emotionally draining tasks that families 

faced. In addition to collecting DNA samples 

and transporting families to assistance centers 

and memorial services, case managers arranged 

for such basics as food, heat, and clothing when 

paychecks stopped and other assistance had not 

begun. They also assisted local police with death 

notification when the FBI confirmed identification of a loved one’s body part. They helped families access the daunting array of charitable 

organizations that offered financial assistance and 

other services, and they campaigned for scholarships and additional remedies for families with 

college-age children. 

One state VOCA administrator agency appointed case managers to work exclusively with particular victim categories, such as people who were 

at the World Trade Center, or those who were 

directly affected by one of the plane crashes. Case 

managers worked closely with survivors, family 

members, and rescue workers to coordinate benefits and services with charitable organizations and 

alternative funding sources. They explained benefits and claims eligibility requirements, managed 

and attended peer support group meetings, facilitated pro bono legal assistance, and simply listened compassionately. 

Counseling 

Immediately after September 11, state VOCA 

administrator agencies, particularly those that followed the case management model, collected 

information about local, state, and federal 

resources that could provide practical assistance 

for victims. They identified financial support 

entities with whom they typically had not 

Lessons Learned 

From State VOCA 

worked and devised resource lists that Administrator 

included a broad range of services, from Agencies 

attorneys who would donate pro bono 

services for handling compensation claims or 

immigration issues to volunteers from benevolent associations who would rake lawns. 

Two state VOCA administrator agencies commented that although the practical resources 

developed and the relationships fostered were 

beneficial to families, they were unique to the 

events of September 11 and in their current format would not likely be useful in the future. They 

suggested that states create more formal, comprehensive mechanisms for coordinating with other 

agencies in an effort to safeguard against misinformation or inappropriate victim referrals. 

Mental Health Counseling, 

Support Groups, and 

Community Healing Rituals 

No one who witnesses or is victimized by mass 

violence is untouched by it. Accordingly, all state 

VOCA administrator agencies facilitated mental 

health counseling for primary and secondary victims of September 11. 

Because victims were vulnerable in different ways 

to stresses associated with the disaster and experienced distinct concerns and reactions, mental 

health counseling took various forms. In addition 

to contracting for crisis and individual counseling, states coordinated and scheduled support 

groups that generated a sense of closeness among 

participants. These groups were instrumental in 

helping victims deal with grief, guilt, and other 

repressed emotions and in understanding the 

impact of trauma. 

In a pilot project, one state VOCA administrator 

agency collaborated with a university trauma 

recovery center to host a series of regional 

support group meetings, monthly at first and 

quarterly beginning in 2003. 

Several states reported that the structure of support groups was important to addressing the 

needs of survivors who had been at the World 

Trade Center compared with sessions for grieving 

family members. The optimum structure was 

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8 

Responding to 

the States 

found by presenting some components for all 

attendees followed by breakout sessions for subsets of the entire group. Other states pointed to 

administrator agencies, local mental health 

experts continue to note behavioral issues among 

children who lost a parent and the importance of 

providing them with special support. 

Mental health experts found that although survivors of mass criminal victimization react differented memorial services, grief seminars or educational programs, and nonreligious ceremonies 

such as military honors can significantly consponsoring community healing events, one 

agency spearheaded state legislation in 2002 to 

allow the compensation board to pay families for 

wages lost during travel to and from memorial 

services or government events honoring victims. 

The agency also scheduled support group meetings to coincide with a statewide Day of Remembrance and anniversary memorials that included 

interfaith services. 

Compensation 

September 11, it was a challenge for states to 

process the extraordinary number of claims, especially in those states where the events occurred. 

Approximately 3 years after the attacks, payouts 

of up to $25,000 per claim have exceeded $10 

million in one state, primarily for loss of support, 

but also for mental health counseling for survivors and those who were either physically 

injured or directly threatened by the attacks. Several states worked cooperatively for the first time 

as they identified which had primary and secondstate compensation schedules differed, it was 

imperative to determine which expenses (medical bills or loss of support due to physical 

injury or death) were to be reimbursed. 

September 11 

Victims: Lessons 

Learned From 

the need to fund children’s programs in the aftermath of a crisis. According to some state VOCA 

ently to the grief and stress produced by the 

tragedy, public or private rituals, spiritually oritribute to a victim’s recovery. While none of the 

state VOCA administrator agencies reported 

Victim compensation programs had been longstanding in each state. However, for victims of 

ary jurisdiction for claims. Additionally, because 

Having expanded customer service units, states 

assigned victim compensation personnel to staff 

family assistance centers where they helped victims complete applications and determine unmet 

needs. To ensure high-quality service to all 

claimants, one state developed the 9-11 Call Center Resource Guide for customer service representatives and temporary agency staff. Another state 

dispatched its existing mobile compensation program to a crash site and supplemented its grant 

with emergency services funds that allowed the 

program to hire additional staff. All states streamlined their conventional compensation procedures to expedite September 11 claims, and one 

state instituted an abbreviated application for 

urban search and rescue workers who had been 

deployed to attack sites. Another state was successful in initiating a relationship with the governor’s office to pass emergency legislation to 

expedite compensation payments to victims. 

Challenges to Meeting 

Victims’ Needs 

As state VOCA administrator agencies and their 

colleagues addressed the complex needs of victims, they identified and implemented response 

models that not only contributed to the recovery 

of those victims, but also could be replicated for 

other incidents. However, despite the immediate 

and long-term positive impact these services had 

on the lives of victims, the experiences of state 

VOCA administrator agencies highlight several 

challenges that merit attention as planning and 

implementation go forward. 

Different Requirements for 

Compensation and Victim Services 

The inherently unpredictable nature of mass 

criminal victimization distinguishes it from many 

natural disasters and has implications for preparedness and response. Government agencies 

and nonprofit organizations, particularly those in 

high-risk meteorological or geological regions, 

traditionally have emergency management plans 

in effect, but these focus primarily on the safety 

and operational response to natural disasters and 

neglect to address the human impact of a mass 
criminal crisis. State VOCA administrator agencies cited the need to recognize that mass criminal victimization and natural disasters generate 

distinctive circumstances and response requirements. As one interviewee remarked, “[We were] 

in uncharted territory.” 

The events of September 11 prompted a response 

unlike any previous response to a disaster and 

presented a number of challenges for victim service providers. State VOCA administrator agencies discovered that even experienced mental 

health providers were not necessarily adequately 

trained to deal with people struggling with grief 

and posttraumatic stress disorder. In addition, the 

different requirements of mental health providers 

and compensation agencies proved problematic. 

Many mental health providers did not ask clients 

to divulge personal information to receive services. Compensation agencies, on the other 

hand, wanted specific information and documentation of victimization, as required by statute and 

grant reporting specifications, causing some 

clients to become angry or upset. Also, coordinating referrals was jeopardized in some states 

where unlicensed victim assistance providers who 

had training and experience in dealing with grief 

and posttraumatic stress disorder were unable to 

contribute to counseling projects managed by 

mental health organizations that required counselors to be licensed. 

Difficulty Responding 

to the Massive Impact 

Despite awareness of victim service efforts that 

were launched in response to the Oklahoma City 

bombing, the scale of September 11 overwhelmed localities. The terrorist attacks far 

surpassed the 1995 event in Oklahoma City, in 

impact as well as scope of victim services offered. 

State VOCA administrator agencies were called 

on to apply existing procedures, systems, and personnel to address an exponentially greater 

demand for services. 

More than 700 residents of one state died, triggering over 600 claims for compensation. One 

state VOCA administrator agency distributed 

more than 400 applications at the family assistance center. Another served more than 350 

Lessons Learned 

From State VOCA 

residents, providing nearly $4 million Administrator 

in reimbursement, mostly for loss of Agencies 

income or support, to survivors, family 

members, search and rescue workers, and 

victims of hate crimes that occurred after 

September 11. 

Little experience existed to establish and guide 

appropriate services for terrorist-caused psychological trauma. As a result, federal and state agencies providing compensation for mental health 

services varied in terms of eligibility criteria, in 

particular, whether a documented physical injury 

was a prerequisite for support. Programs struggled 

with determining whether rescuers and responders were eligible for compensation, as they were 

not direct victims of the attacks. In addition, 

some state VOCA administrator agencies report 

that even now derivative victims such as rescuers 

are still coming forward to submit claims. 

Lack of Uniform Standards and 

Criteria for Financial Assistance 

The development of financial projections and 

identification of federal, state, and private funding resources is an essential component of a 

comprehensive response to mass criminal victimization. The importance of economic planning is 

underscored by the experiences of state VOCA 

administrator agencies that were forced to organize in a few days an effort that normally would 

take months or years. They pointed to the need 

for adopting standardized criteria for agency funding and financial assistance to victims. 

In one state, existing homicide bereavement programs were called on to expand services without 

additional funds. While they were regarded as the 

state experts at providing direct services to survivors, these programs were underfunded even as 

mental health programs generally enjoyed adequate funding. 

Also, as agencies sorted out financial responsibilities and payout procedures, some of the first victims to apply for compensation received generous 

payments, while those who applied later sometimes had difficulty gaining compensation. With 

no central database that included financial assistance provided by the plethora of charities, 

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10 

Responding to 

the States 

federal agencies and funds, and other state agencies as well as victim compensation programs, it 

was difficult to determine whether a specific 

expense or bill was presented to different sources 

for duplicate payment. 

Victim Identification and 

their colleagues launched services for September 

11 victims, they were faced with defining which 

populations actually needed assistance and the 

was difficult, as victims’ names were not always 

shared among agencies due to confidentiality 

concerns. One interviewee recalled how staffers 

resorted to reading local newspapers to obtain 

names and other victim information, aiming to 

identify individual victims and victim groups 

whose needs were unmet. 

admitted to struggling with determining how to 

provide the services victims needed without compromising their privacy or overwhelming them. 

For their part, many victims felt they were falling 

through the cracks, but at the same time, 

expressed feelings of vulnerability and reluctance 

to disclose personal information. In one state that 

did not have a crash site, an airport became the 

default gathering place for victims’ families; howadministrator agency encountered barriers to connecting people with resources. 

While many states streamlined filing requirements and reduced application paperwork, 

government agencies differed from private organizations on the documentation necessary for 

obtaining benefits. The result was that individuals could use multiple providers, without documentation, or receive duplicate compensation. 

Also, from a management perspective, unanticipated supplemental federal reporting requirements added to administrative burdens of 

agencies as they balanced the priority of 

September 11 victims’ claims with trying 

victims’ claims. 

September 11 

Victims: Lessons 

Learned From 

Communication Issues 

Once state VOCA administrator agencies and 

optimum methods for contacting people to 

announce service availability. Identifying victims 

All of the state VOCA administrator agencies 

ever, despite vigorous outreach, the state VOCA 

to avoid delayed processing of other 

Barriers to Serving Special 

Victim Populations 

A comprehensive response to a mass criminal 

crisis recognizes the social, emotional, psychological, and economic toll on victims. Several 

state VOCA administrator agencies found that 

services also need to be sensitive to the cultural, 

ethnic, and language considerations of the community and address the diverse and unique needs, 

beliefs, and lifestyles of affected victims. Particularly in communities with a wide variety of cultures and languages, certain ethnic or cultural 

groups can be vulnerable in unique ways and can 

experience distinct concerns and reactions that 

require specialized resources. State VOCA 

administrator agencies also addressed the needs 

of individuals and communities victimized by 

post-September 11 hate crimes. 

Geographical Issues 

Interviewees discussed a particular challenge in 

providing appropriate services to victims whose 

home base was far from the crisis center sites. 

Two state VOCA administrator agencies reported 

that due to their geographic distance from the 

September 11 events, victims within their states 

felt out of the loop and experienced a sense of 

alienation stemming from people who did not 

consider their state affected by September 11. 

With no critical mass of survivors and family 

members in their home communities, these victims felt isolated because others did not understand what they were going through. 

In one large state with a greatly dispersed victim 

population, travel time was a barrier to victims 

attending monthly support groups. The other 

state VOCA administrator agency affected by 

geography also had to address providers’ concerns 

about boundary or territorial issues related to 

handling referrals to victim services. 

Emotional Impact 

State VOCA administrator agencies had to manage the complex sensitivities that emerge in 

citizen/service provider interactions as they withstood, and often internalized, the force of victim 

emotions. Some victims felt that their status as 
September 11 victims superseded the needs of 

victims of domestic abuse, homicide, or other 

victims. Likewise, those other victims, who were 

sympathetic at first, grew increasingly impatient 

as all attention was focused on meeting September 11 victims’ needs. 

All state VOCA administrator agencies reported 

that depression and fatigue, in varying degrees, 

affected staff. However, because people are often 

uncomfortable with terms associated with mental 

health and mental illness, it was important to put 

stress management and psychological care techniques in a context that made people receptive 

to them. For staff, training designed to help “take 

care of yourself” was a useful method of psychological intervention. 

Fragmentation of Service Delivery 

Mistrust or miscommunication among agencies 

within a jurisdiction can lead to fragmentation or 

unnecessary duplication of services and can even 

hamper service delivery. The majority of state 

VOCA administrator agencies cited collaboration and coordination of resources as having a 

significant impact on service delivery. They 

underscored the importance of coordination 

among disciplines and emphasized the need for 

organizations to actively commit to working 

together, drawing on the expertise of previously 

nonallied agencies to deliver timely services to 

victims. 

In some states, victim assistance had not been 

coordinated with victim compensation and, at 

the same time, both entities found themselves 

working with emergency management personnel 

with whom they had virtually no history of 

collaboration. One state VOCA administrator 

Lessons Learned 

From State VOCA 

agency had to schedule meetings with Administrator

federal agencies simply to gain access to Agencies

buildings, particularly those not normally 

open to the public. State VOCA administrator agencies also had to work with federal law 

enforcement organizations to obtain victim lists 

that substituted for police reports and death certificates for families seeking compensation. 

Because they often take different approaches to 

psychological intervention, state VOCA administrator agencies had to persuade some mental 

health professionals of the need for targeted 

counseling in the aftermath of mass victimization. Subsequently, mental health providers welcomed the opportunity to schedule training in 

crisis response and trauma and grief counseling, 

especially when they learned that the mental 

health departments and the state VOCA administrator agencies shared some clientele. 

State VOCA administrator agencies agreed that 

relationships formed after September 11 were tied 

to individuals and overly dependent on particular 

personalities. Since then, however, formalization 

has been launched in some jurisdictions. One 

state has established a team of state agencies, 

coordinated by the emergency management 

agency and chaired by the state’s victim advocate, to develop a protocol for working cooperatively in the future, addressing relevant issues, 

and assigning roles to handle immediate, intermediate, and long-term concerns. Another state 

reported that a similar collaborative model met 

with early enthusiasm but that recent disaster 

planning meetings were less well attended, casting doubt on whether awareness of victims’ needs 

had been raised to the institutional level. 

11 
S

Chapter 3 

Next Steps 


tate VOCA administrator agencies provided a broad range of crisis counseling; 

social, financial and emotional support; 

and referral services to September 11 victims. 

Their experiences reflect current best practices 

and identify areas for improved victim services. 

Their know-how lends valuable guidance to 

other state VOCA administrator agencies across 

the country and to decisionmakers for focusing 

expertise and funds on preparing Americans for 

mass criminal incidents. In addition, their input 

offers a framework for a strategic approach to 

developing multidisciplinary response protocols. 

The following outlines their identified next steps 

to ensure followthrough for enhanced services 

nationwide. 

Develop a National 

Perspective on 

Consequences of Mass 

Criminal Victimization 

Many government agencies have had emergency 

management plans in place that focus mainly on 

the safety and operational response to natural 

disasters but do not address the impact of a mass 

criminal crisis that can be felt over wide or multiple geographic areas. Recommended next steps 

include the following: 

✦�Recognize the importance of comprehensive 

planning, despite the inherently unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of mass 

criminal victimization. 

✦�Integrate a focus on victims’ needs into 

national preparedness planning. 

✦�Merge the response to natural disasters with 

approaches to managing criminal disasters. 

✦�Promote mutual respect and collaboration 

among agencies with disparate focuses (natural versus criminal disasters) and modes of 

operation (handling safety and security versus 

handling people). 

✦�Develop broad written procedural guidelines 

or models for a response to mass criminal victimization, and define required policies, procedures, and protocols and how they will be 

devised. 

✦�Involve top leadership, particularly governors’ offices, in gaining priority status for 

victims throughout a state’s administration. 

✦�Develop and offer disaster training that 

focuses on the human impact of mass criminal events as well as the physical effects. 

✦�Act collaboratively as members of a community of responders, understanding that victim service organizations need to work in 

tandem. 

✦�Address the geographical and territorial 

issues inherent in a national approach to 

assisting large populations of victims. 

✦�Safeguard the integrity of services to all victims, and ensure that funding for mass criminal victimization does not proportionally 

outstrip funding for other victim services. 

Prepare To Respond to 

Immediate, Intermediate, 

and Long-Term Needs 

Survival, safety, food, and shelter are the primary 

response considerations during a mass violence 

incident, after which the desire for information 

13 
14 

Responding to 

the States 

and the location and condition of family members and other loved ones are the immediate vicpoint to additional immediate, intermediate, and 

long-term services that can diminish the negative 

effects of mass violence among survivors. They 

suggested these next steps: 

✦ Establish a memorandum of understanding 

(MOU) with individual state government 

and nonprofit organizations to provide 

immediate crisis assistance to survivors, 

their families, and community members. 

✦ Look beyond states where events occur to 

account for all potential secondary victims 

and their ongoing needs and to assess where 

resources and services are dedicated. 

✦ Design and deliver flexible services that do 

not conform to a one-size-fits-all approach. 

✦ Develop a service implementation plan that 

adapts to ongoing and changing victim 

needs and allows for smooth adjustment of 

services. 

✦ Build awareness of how post-event trauma 

demands a continuum of care for primary 

and secondary victims. 

✦ Provide services over an appropriately long 

ly return, even as survivors and families 

begin to stabilize their lives and cope with 

the impact of the event. 

✦ Deliver services that address the financial 

and employment concerns that can impede 

✦ Offer crisis counseling related to birthdays 

of victims, holidays, important family 

anniversaries, and the first anniversary of 

the event. 

September 11 

Victims: Lessons 

Learned From 

tim needs. State VOCA administrator agencies 

unfolds over a period of time and how it 

period of time because grief can unexpectedrecovery. 

✦�Craft a community mental health intervention program targeted to reduce long-term 

impairment to those directly and indirectly 

affected by mass criminal victimization. 

✦�Organize and schedule support groups for 

specific populations (e.g., parents who lost 

children), and expand services, such as offering childcare, to victims with highly specific 

needs. 

✦�Educate police, fire, emergency personnel, 

and other responders about the potential 

effects they might experience from assisting 

victims of mass disaster and how these effects 

can last for years and have implications for 

responders’ long-term reactions and the support services they might need. 

Set Assistance Parameters 

Mass criminal victimization generates a broad 

range of emotions, feelings, and physical symptoms that different individuals or groups can 

experience at different times. However, according 

to one state VOCA administrator agency, “If 

you’re counseling 3 days a week 2 years later, it’s 

not about this. Trauma-related things are more 

short-term than that. At some point, you need to 

draw a new line, because instead of helping people with recovery, you may be helping them 

relive their victimization.” These comments 

highlight the difficult decisions state VOCA 

administrator agencies and victim service 

providers face as they help victims transition 

from immediate to long-term support and 

beyond. State VOCA administrator agencies 

recommended the following next steps: 

✦�Develop personalized transition plans for 

moving from short- to long-term assistance, 

taking into account individual reactions to 

tragedy, grieving styles, and recovery rates. 

✦�Incorporate a response to mass criminal victimization into existing service systems. 

✦�Follow a realistic methodology for action 

that acknowledges that initial needs of victims might not be monetary but rather 

counseling, comfort, or support. 
✦�Clarify which individuals and groups are eligible for expanded benefits and services 

(e.g., grandparents, grandchildren, in-laws). 

✦�Delineate in advance who will offer financial support to victims as a first and last 

resort, what it covers, and at what monetary 

levels to avoid duplication of payments and 

ensure identification of unmet victim needs. 

Offer training and technical assistance to 

respective agencies. 

✦�Formulate shared administrative systems 

between states and prominent charities, 

other state agencies, and federal sources of 

assistance so that information on payments 

to victims can be tracked and shared. 

✦�Describe precisely what the mental health 

response to mass criminal victimization will 

be, as referral and long-term response can 

become problematic after the first few days 

following a crisis. 

✦�Prepare a calendar for long-term services 

such as support groups. 

✦�Determine appropriate intervals for followup 

interventions (e.g., 3 months, 6 months, 

event anniversary), and offer services such as 

crisis intervention and transportation associated with anniversary commemorations. 

✦�Create “drop-in” sites for counseling and 

other services for citizens and rescuers 

affected by generalized fear (“walking 

wounded”) when they do not fit into 

traditional categories of victims eligible 

for funded services. 

✦�Expand the categories of allowable activities 

under federal grant guidelines to include the 

provision of respite care for family caretakers of those injured. 

✦�Forecast funding requirements beyond available grants and balance funding allocations 

and services equitably between victims of 

mass violence and other victims. 

Next Steps 

Formalize Response 

All state VOCA administrator agencies 

spoke of the value of formal, standardized practices and procedures to enable agencies within, 

and across, jurisdictions to work effectively in 

cases of mass criminal victimization. In fact, one 

state victim compensation board is now a member of a statewide terrorism task force headed by 

the state’s Office of Emergency Services. It 

includes the Department of Mental Health, 

Office of Criminal Justice Planning, Department 

of Transportation, and additional state agencies. 

Before September 11, the compensation board 

had no continuing relationship with the Office of 

Emergency Services. Afterward, the board gained 

widespread respect for having met the tremendous needs of victims. Now, as members of the 

task force, board representatives help inform and 

influence the planning and direction of disaster 

However, other states report that while positive 

relationships among agencies were formed following September 11, there has been little followthrough. They formed relationships with people 

in mental health, emergency management, and 

other departments but not with the institutions. 

They are convinced that they would have to start 

from scratch in another mass crisis and that, 

while the personal relationships are advantageous, they would operate only if the same individuals were in the same roles. Therefore, state 

VOCA administrator agencies advised taking the 

Hold a series of cross-agency meetings to


develop objectives and identify strategies


and methods for comprehensive disaster


Draft a long-range implementation plan


that clearly defines response roles and


responsibilities to avoid duplication of


Involve local disaster assistance in all plan­


ning activities. Federal and state prepared­


ness and emergency management programs


15 

Channels 

response. 

following next steps: 

✦ 

response. 

✦ 

services. 

✦ 
16 

Responding to 

the States 

notwithstanding, the immediate response to 

mass criminal victimization is generally car­

✦ Develop formal mechanisms for communicating with, hosting, and directing multidisciplinary teams of disaster response and 

victim service professionals and volunteers 

from other states. 

✦ Integrate victim services formally into any 

emergency operations center used by public 

safety agencies to command and manage 

responders. 

✦ Recruit and screen volunteers with the essential training credentials to perform specific 

but inexperienced or untrained individuals. 

Categorize and name the specific qualifications and skills sought. 

✦ Develop volunteer guidelines to define 

responsibilities in relation to other responders and describe performance expectations of 

them during a mass criminal victimization. 

In addition to helping direct victims who suffered 

physical or emotional injuries related to the September 11 crisis, communities responded to secondary or other victims, many of whom lost their 

tor agencies faced some difficulty in finalizing a 

definition of “victim” and in reaching some 

groups and individuals who ultimately were 

deemed eligible for assistance. They recommended the following next steps: 

✦ Develop an instrument to identify potential 

victim groups resulting from specific types of 

mass crisis and their potential needs (e.g., 

evacuees from a chemical attack would not 

placed from a radiological attack might 

never be able to return home). 

September 11 

Victims: Lessons 

Learned From 

ried out locally. 

jobs successfully, eliminating well-meaning 

Reach Out to All Victims 

employment. However, state VOCA administraneed long-term shelter, but residents dis­

✦�Recruit and assign response personnel who 

are culturally sensitive to working with ethnic populations and who are trained to work 

with special populations such as children, 

older people, and people with disabilities. 

✦�Establish standing contracts with diverse 

media to advertise hotline numbers, victim 

services, and other information important to 

victims once a mass crisis occurs. 

✦�Activate an easily accessible national clearinghouse for information about charitable 

giving and services from corporations and 

foundations that offer scholarships, mortgage payments, counseling, children’s services, and other types of support to victims 

and families as well as ongoing donation 

opportunities. 

✦�Write and distribute regular newsletters to 

victims and families to update them on the 

status of issues such as compensation, support organizations, meetings, and events. 

✦�Disseminate information via a secure group 

Web site that also provides a chat feature 

allowing survivors and family members to 

communicate. 

✦�Take an active approach to reaching victims 

by visiting community meetings, church 

services, fire departments, and other sites 

where victim assistance and mental health 

staff can interact with victims. 

✦�Offer debriefing opportunities to emergency 

responders and victim service staff to prevent emotional burnout caused by exposure 

to intense human pain and anger. 

✦�Recognize that some individuals choose not 

to take advantage of victim services and 

that outreach by letter, telephone, or other 

means should not become intrusive or 

overwhelming. 

✦�Acknowledge that all participation in victim services must be voluntary and that 

there is a limit to what can be done to help 

people. 
Monitor and Evaluate 

Interventions 

Systematic data collection and evaluation are 

essential to determining the effectiveness of 

intervention on behalf of victims of mass criminal incidents. Similar to the continuum of care 

that state VOCA administrator agencies referred 

to in discussing the immediate, short-, and longterm needs of victims, a continuum of evaluation 

is a rational model for assessing whether benefits 

and services were helpful to victims and will contribute to decisions regarding the scope, nature, 

and duration of assistance delivered. Interviewees 

urged the following next steps: 

✦�Plan for data collection before, during, and 

after incidents of mass violence. 

✦�Obtain details about current and anticipated reporting requirements of federal agencies to plan for and set protocols to capture 

necessary data. 

✦�Research and draft evaluation protocols and 

reporting requirements. 

✦�Determine the nature, format, and usage 

guidelines for evaluation instruments. 

✦�Capitalize on existing technology resources 

(e.g., DMV automated systems) to establish 

a comprehensive database of victims, 

inquiries, and needs. 

✦�Conduct surveys and schedule focus groups 

with general and specialized victim populations and victim service providers to— 

❖�Identify program components or activities that merit continuation, fine tuning, 

or abandonment. 

❖�Explore whether victims still experience 

the physical and emotional symptoms 

typically associated with traumatic 

events. 

❖�Ensure services remain responsive to 

the changing needs of victims. 

Next Steps 

Determine what is appropriate followup, for whom, and 

over what period of time. 

Balance Planning 

All state VOCA administrator agencies concurred that despite extraordinary efforts and successes in addressing the incomparable needs of 

September 11 victims, focus on the human 

impact of mass criminal violence lags behind the 

concentration on prevention and intervention. 

They understand that institutions traditionally 

have a difficult time dealing with the needs of 

victims during a crisis and that it is easier, on 

many levels, to secure a physical target than to 

help people cope with mental anguish. A complete integration of victims’ issues into emergency management has not been achieved. Some 

states report they have now just begun to catch 

up on September 11 applications for assistance 

and have not yet performed any disaster planning 

for future events. State VOCA administrator 

agencies suggest the following next steps: 

Incorporate victim services into disaster


planning and response protocols, also taking


into account the psychological conse­


quences of such events.


Establish a state emergency management or


a governor’s office antiterrorism task force as


the lead agency to formalize planning and


response channels and ensure built-in


Encourage victim assistance and compensation staff to participate in developing and 

updating state preparedness plans. 

Assign equal importance to victim benefits 

and assistance and to safety and security 

issues in preparedness planning. 

Allocate funding evenly among law enforce­


ment, fire, EMS, and other equipment-


dependent activities, and crisis aftermath


17 

❖ 

and Response 

✦ 

✦ 

accountability. 

✦ 

✦ 

✦ 

services. 
18 

Responding to 

the States 

✦ Revamp preparedness and response plans as 

community variables shift (e.g., housing 

trends, school trends, commercial versus 

residential distribution). 

✦ Schedule regular training sessions for victim 

assistance professionals, mental health 

providers, and emergency management personnel to enhance collaboration among state 

agencies. 

September 11 

Victims: Lessons 

Learned From 

✦�Establish MOUs between state and local 

agencies and encourage participation of professional associations such as state chapters of 

psychological associations. Request assignment of individuals with specialized training 

in victim assistance, particularly those who 

have assisted families of homicide victims 

and have experience with death notification 

and funeral arrangements. 
Chapter 4 

Conclusion


The information gathered from select 

state VOCA administrator agencies supports developing comprehensive interventions on behalf of victims of mass criminal 

incidents. Central to their experiences are several 

themes that transcend unique circumstances of 

particular states. They cite the critical need for 

preparedness planning that recognizes the dramatic human impact of mass criminal victimization and the value of integrating victim services 

seamlessly into disaster response. They also point 

to the importance of understanding the special 

needs and vulnerabilities of victims of mass criminal events, particularly their requirements for 

mental health and emotional support services. 

State VOCA administrator agencies call for 

smooth coordination of services among federal, 

state, and local agencies and organizations and 

for formalizing collaborative relationships at the 

institutional level to define realistic policies, procedures, and protocols. Additionally, they recommend addressing geographical and territorial 

issues inherent to assisting large populations of 

victims, as well as creating centralized databases 

to track compensation and dissemination of services to avoid duplication of efforts. 

State VOCA administrator agencies counsel 

thoughtful, prudent action in providing services 

to victims and encourage adoption of a case management strategy to ensure that services fit precisely the immediate, intermediate, and 

long-term concerns of individuals and groups. 

They also agree that carefully crafted federal 

action will complement and enhance the efforts 

of state agencies. 

Overall, the experiences and insights of state 

VOCA administrators lend sound guidance to 

programming and funding authorities as they set 

priorities, allocate resources, establish protocols, 

and determine accountability criteria for these 

important initiatives in which all Americans 

have a stake. 

19 
Responding to 

September 11 Victims: Lessons 

Learned From the States 

For copies of this monograph and/or additional information, 

please contact 

OVC Resource Center 

P.O. Box 6000 

Rockville, MD 20849–6000 

Telephone: 1–800–851–3420 or 301–519–5500 

(TTY 1–877–712–9279) 

www.ncjrs.org 

Or order OVC publications online at http://puborder.ncjrs.org. 

Submit your questions to Ask OVC at http://ovc.ncjrs.org/askovc. 

Send your feedback on this service via http://tellncjrs.ncjrs.org. 

Refer to publication number NCJ 208799. 

For information on training and technical 

assistance available from OVC, please contact 

OVC Training and Technical Assistance Center 

10530 Rosehaven Street, Suite 400 

Fairfax, VA 22030 

Telephone: 1–866–OVC–TTAC (1–866–682–8822) 

(TTY 1–866–682–8880) 

www.ovcttac.org