NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

DEPARTMENT STORES NATIONAL 

BANK; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-16085

D.C. No. 3:13-cv-03131-WHO

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

William Horsley Orrick III, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 25, 2016**

Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. 

Fareed Sepehry-Fard appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims relating to a state court 

debt collection case. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 7 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 14-16085 

novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We 

affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Sepehry-Fard’s claims against 

defendants Patricia M. Lucas, Mary Arand, and Mark H. Pierce on the basis of 

judicial immunity. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)

(“Judges . . . are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in 

their official capacities.”).

To the extent that Sepehry-Fard’s claims sought review of a prior state court 

judgment, the district court properly dismissed those claims as barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(Rooker-Feldman bars de facto appeals of a state court decision and constitutional 

claims “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decision); see also Reusser v. 

Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (a de facto appeal is one 

in which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or 

require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural 

rules” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Sepehry-Fard’s claims for declaratory 
 3 14-16085 

relief, accounting, violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 

Act, and violation of the California Unfair Competition Law because Sepehry-Fard 

failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 

341-42 (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must 

present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

Sepehry-Fard’s contentions that the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over this action, lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants, was 

biased, or violated Sepehry-Fard’s rights to a jury trial, due process, or equal 

protection by dismissing this case, are unpersuasive.

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters 

not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett 

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Sepehry-Fard’s pending requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.