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TSA: SECURITY GAPS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 3, 2015 

Serial No. 114–99 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

JENNIFER HEMINGWAY, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

MICHAEL KIKO, Subcommittee Staff Director 

ARI WISCH, Counsel 

WILLIE MARX, Clerk 

SARAH VANCE, Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on November 3, 2015 ........................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Peter Neffenger, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 23 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 25 

Ms. Jennifer Grover, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 51 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 53 

APPENDIX 

Written Statement for the Record from Rep. Gerald E. Connolly ....................... 116 

Peter Neffenger Responses to Questions for the Record ...................................... 118 


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TSA: SECURITY GAPS 

Tuesday, November 3, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan, 

Walberg, Amash, Gosar, Gowdy, Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, Buck, 

Walker, Blum, Hice, Russell, Carter, Grothman, Hurd, Palmer, 

Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Lynch, Connolly, Cartwright, 

Duckworth, Kelly, DeSaulnier, Welch, and Lujan Grisham. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. 

I appreciate the participants today on an important topic that we 

need to have vigilant oversight on, dealing with the TSA and the 

security gaps in the critical part of our culture. The 9/11 Commission concluded in their report, ‘‘The most important failure was one 

of imagination. We do not believe leaders understood the gravity of 

the threat.’’ That report underscored the need for government leaders to do a better job of preparing for security threats that can only 

now be imagined. It’s no secret that people interested in harming 

America are coming up with creative ways to circumvent the existing security measures. 

The battle for aviation security is fought daily by the thousands 

of men and women who serve in the TSA’s workforce. Every day, 

2 million passengers at nearly 440 airport across the country depend on TSA to help hold the line and keep them safe. That’s why 

passenger screening at checkpoints are so important. State-of-theart screening technologies are not necessarily the magic bullet. 

There’s also a human component and other methods and things 

that are used throughout the world that we should be paying attention to and implementing ourselves, but all aspects of passenger 

screening process, including luggage and carry-ons, must be working in concert. It is a vital part of what we do to protect this Nation, and thus the hearing today. 

I’d like now to yield time to the former chairman of the Transportation Infrastructure Committee, he’s the chairman of our subcommittee here, Mr. Mica of Florida. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our ranking member 

and our witnesses today. Having been around since we formed TSA 

and one of the original authors of the legislation, we have 14 years 


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behind us, and unfortunately, we don’t have much progress and 

success of the major purpose that we set out for, and that was to 

make certain that we are safe and secure, and that we have a system of, particularly passenger and baggage screening, that ensures 

that for the traveling American public. 

Now, you heard what I just commented on. The GAO report from 

this week just confirms that in just about every area of operations. 

We’ll hear in a few minutes from the Inspector General, and on 

page 3 is a sort of a summary. He says, ‘‘Our most recent covert 

testing in September 2015, the failures included’’—this is TSA failures—‘‘included failures in the technology, failures in TSA procedures, and human error. We found layers of security simply missing. It would be misleading to minimize the rigor of our testing or 

to imply that our testing was not an accurate reflection of the effectiveness of the totality of aviation security.’’ That is very alarming. 

This report is very alarming. 

And where we’ve come, we’re back from, again, 2007, some information leaked, and this was in the—this reporting from USA 

Today that screeners failed 75 percent of the time in finding dangerous materials and items that posed a threat, 75 percent of the 

time with 30,000 screeners. We’re now at 46,000 screeners. And 

most recently, we’ve had this leak where the failure rate had been 

as high, and this is a report publicly obtained, of 95 percent failure. 

I think we need a complete overhaul. I think we need to address 

risk. I think we are hassling 99 percent of the people who pose no 

risk and still have no means of differentiating. We need to get TSA 

out of the screening business. They will never be able to recruit, 

they will never be able to train, they will never be able to retain, 

they will never be able to manage, but what they should be able 

to do is set the standards. And we have private screening under 

Federal supervision for a host of other activities, our highly secure 

nuclear facilities, our DOD facilities, and other facilities, and we let 

the private sector do what it does best, and we set the parameters 

and then we audit and we make the changes. Because, again, I 

don’t care what I hear today, I’m convinced that you cannot fix this 

system that will continue to fail. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

The Administrator, along with the thousands of people who serve 

in the TSA, need to own the system, and if problems arise, then 

they must be attended to swiftly and appropriately, but we also ask 

that they work in a proactive way so those threats are mitigated 

prior to getting to the airport, and certainly prior to getting on an 

airplane. I look forward to the hearing testimony today. 

We’ll now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings of 

Maryland, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s very important hearing. And let me welcome Mr. Roth, 

the Inspector General. It’s good to have you here again on this very 

critical issue. Let me also welcome Ms. Grover from the Government Accountability Office, which does very important and excellent work for the committee on this and many other topics. 

I also want to welcome Administrator Neffenger. When I served 

as the subcommittee chairman on the Coast Guard and Maritime 


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Transportation Subcommittee, I admired Mr. Neffenger’s technical 

expertise and the steady, determined leadership he brought to the 

Coast Guard’s most significant challenges, including dealing with 

the horrible Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 

I am sure he remembers how we called the Coast Guard back 

again and again and again and again and again, to ensure accountability, and every single time, you were up to the task, and I am 

so, so glad that you’ve been chosen for this task. And I thank him 

for his decades of service, and I applaud President Obama’s decision to appoint him to this very critical position. 

When it comes to the security of our airlines and our flying public, we must always push to stay ahead of the terrorists, and anyone else who would do us harm. We must take nothing for granted. 

We must test ourselves constantly, and we must put the lessons we 

learn into urgent action. I’ve often said that so often we spend a 

lot of time talking about testing, and how things are going to work 

when we have an emergency. And so often what happens, and we 

saw this, to some degree, Mr. Neffenger, in Deepwater Horizon, we 

constantly say there will come a time when you’ll see it works 

when the rubber meets the road. And when that moment comes, 

so often, we discover there is no road. 

Above all, we must never become complacent. We must treat 

every single day as if lives depend on the urgency of our actions, 

because they do. 

Unfortunately, until last spring, it appeared almost routine for 

senior leaders at the Transportation Security Administration to receive reports of security gaps in the Nation’s air passenger screening operations. These reports came from the Inspector General and 

GAO and specialized red teams at TSA itself, and they described 

that this round of testing revealing yet more gaps. 

The question today, I believe, is whether TSA and the Department of Homeland Security are responding with the urgency this 

situation demands. As the President often says, are they responding with the urgency of now? Based on their actions over the last 

several months, I believe they are. However, their work is far, far 

from complete, and it is incumbent on both the agency and this 

committee to continue our oversight efforts in order to ensure that 

improvements are put into place. 

Last spring, Secretary Johnson ordered a comprehensive top-tobottom review of all of TSA’s practices and procedures to understand why the agency’s performance was falling short of its own 

standards, and our expectations here in Congress. He required senior leaders to report to him every 2 weeks about the root causes 

of these shortfalls, as well as the solutions being implemented to 

address them. 

Over the summer, TSA developed and began implementing a 10- 

point plan to revamp all aspects of the screening procedures, personnel training processes, and equipment maintenance practices. It 

is clear that the agency has been aggressively working to change 

its culture, and I am very encouraged by the steps DHS and TSA 

have taken to date. 

However, we are early in the process. This agency has more than 

42,000 employees responsible for ensuring security at about 450 

airports. Making comprehensive changes in an agency of this size 


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is not easy, and ensuring that these changes are effective and efficient in improving the agency’s day-to-day performance requires a 

sustained, long-term effort. We must ensure that TSA establishes 

a new baseline with clear and specific metrics to measure performance. This committee must hold TSA’s leadership accountable for 

the achievement of these new metrics. 

As I close, Administrator Neffenger, I think you know what I’m 

about to say: Just like at the Coast Guard Subcommittee, you 

should get used to seeing us on a regular basis. This committee’s 

job is to oversee the implementation of TSA’s transformation. We’re 

going to be inviting you back again and again, because the American people are depending on us to get it right. 

Finally, let me close by noting that the airlines and others also 

play a critical role in ensuring our security. We need to take a hard 

look at decisions by the airline industry that are making the TSA’s 

job more difficult. For example, we have learned that the new fees 

airlines are charging to check bags are causing huge increases in 

the volume of carry-on luggage. Although this may result in significant new revenue for the airlines, it is also putting significant new 

strains on our screening operations, and I hope you will address 

that, Mr. Neffenger. 

I hope we will have an opportunity to discuss these issues in 

more detail today, and at future hearings before the committee. 

And I just want to be clear, I have full confidence that we will get 

this right. We have no choice. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. We’ll hold the 

record open for 5 legislative days for any members who would like 

to submit a written statement. 

We’ll now recognize our panel of witnesses. First, we have Mr. 

Peter Neffenger, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration at the United States Department of Homeland Security. We’re also joined by the Honorable John Roth, Inspector General of the United States, Department of Homeland Security; and 

Ms. Jennifer Grover, Director of Homeland Security and Justice at 

the United States Government Accountability Office. 

We welcome you all. And pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn before they testify. If you will please rise 

and raise your right hands. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

Thank you. Please be seated. And let the record reflect the witnesses all answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate it if 

you would limit your verbal testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire 

written statement will be entered as part of the record. 

Mr. Neffenger, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF PETER NEFFENGER 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking 

Member Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee. 


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I thank you for the opportunity to testify on my vision for evolving 

the Transportation Security Administration. My leadership perspective is shaped by more than three decades of military service 

and crisis leadership. Fundamental to my approach are a well-defined statement of the mission, clear standards of performance, 

training and resourcing that enable the workforce to achieve success, appropriate measures of effectiveness, and an unwavering 

pursuit of excellence and accountability. 

I want to thank Inspector General Roth and Director Grover for 

the oversight that they have provided at TSA. And I want to specifically thank Mr. Roth for his encouraging assessment of our new 

direction. 

That direction is a reflection of my vision on how we approach 

the continuing evolution of TSA. I’m now 4 months into the job, 

and I’ve traveled to dozens of airports and Federal Air Marshal offices across the country. I’ve also visited our European partners in 

the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, and I’ve met 

with stakeholders from the airlines, travel industry, and airport operators. I’ve engaged surface stakeholders in passenger rail and 

light rail across the country and in Europe. 

I have been thoroughly impressed with the professionals who occupy our ranks, and I’ve been equally impressed with the collaboration across the transportation enterprise and the range of capabilities our Federal, State, and local partners bring to bear across 

every mode of our transportation system. These complex systems 

require that we examine them and consider them as a whole, that 

we integrate the wide range of public and private capabilities to 

close gaps, reduce vulnerabilities and counter threats, that we 

benchmark and apply best practices across the enterprise, and that 

we seek global consistency. 

However, as I have stated in previous hearings on this topic, my 

immediate priority has been to pursue solutions to the Inspector 

General’s recent covert testing findings, which were, unfortunately, 

leaked to the media in May of this year, and we are making significant progress in doing so. 

The Inspector General’s covert tests focused on an element of the 

aviation security system, specifically the Advanced Imaging Technology capability within the checkpoint. These tests identified 

areas for improvement, with which we concurred. The system, as 

a whole, remains effective, and as a result of these tests, has only 

gotten stronger. 

In response, TSA implemented an immediate action plan to ensure accountability, improve alarm resolution, increase effectiveness, and strengthen procedures. We’ve also responded vigorously 

by implementing Secretary Johnson’s 10-point plan, as previously 

referred to. And to ensure we don’t repeat past failures, of utmost 

concern, from my perspective, was determining root causes of the 

problem. 

Our conclusion is that the screening effectiveness challenges 

were not merely an office or performance problem, nor were they 

a failure of the Advanced Imaging Technology. The AIT has greatly 

enhanced our ability to detect non-metallic threats, and continues 

to perform to expected standards when deployed and used properly. 

As we look at the people, processes, and technology, strong drivers 


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of the problem include leadership focus, environmental influences, 

and gaps in system design and processes. 

There was significant pressure to quickly clear passengers at the 

risk of not completely resolving alarms. Our analysis also revealed 

that our officers did not fully understand the capabilities of the 

equipment, and several procedures were inadequate to resolve 

alarms. We have trained our officers to understand and use equipment properly, and we have corrected our procedures. 

Solutions require a renewed focus on security, revised procedures, investments in technology, realistic and standardized training, a new balance between effectiveness and efficiency, and support for our frontline officers. We will continue to partner with the 

airlines, airport operators, and the trade and travel industry to 

identify solutions that can reduce the stress on the checkpoint, and 

we must right-size and resource TSA appropriately. 

We’ve begun that process in earnest, and I can report that we 

have a principled approach in place designed to correct the immediate challenges while ensuring that this problem doesn’t happen 

again. Our mission essentials training conducted in August and 

September, with every frontline officer and leader across TSA, has 

helped reset our focus on security effectiveness, and most critically, 

we have enhanced our officers’ knowledge and understanding of the 

screening system. 

Longer term, our self-examination has given insight into how we 

must evolve. We face a critical turning point in TSA, both to address these recent findings, and to begin our investment in a more 

strategic approach to securing the transportation sector. We need 

to measure security to drive an institutional focus, and what we 

measure is what our leaders and officers will pay attention to. Our 

approach needs to be adaptive and risk-based, constantly reassessing assumptions, plans, and processes, and we must be able to 

rapidly field new ways of operating. We must rethink how we invest in technology. Our adversaries remain intent on attacking the 

transportation sector, and our investment in new tools must exceed 

the speed of the enemy’s ability to involve. 

Most importantly, we must deliver an effective system and earn 

the confidence of the traveling public through competence, disciplined performance, and professionalism. I’ve conveyed these 

standards to our workforce, and I commit to you that we will continuously pursue these objectives. 

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, I want to assure you that TSA is an intelligence-driven, counterterrorism organization, and I know that we are up to the challenges we face. We 

are on the front lines of a critical counterterrorism fight, and our 

workforce is willing and able to do the job. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Neffenger follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Inspector General Roth, you’re now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ROTH 

Mr. ROTH. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and members—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. If you could maybe just bring the microphone straight up to your—that would be great. 

Mr. ROTH. My apologies. 

Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, 

and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here to 

testify today. 

Throughout this year, I have testified, before this committee and 

others, regarding my concerns about TSA’s ability to execute its important mission. I highlighted the challenges TSA faced. I testified 

that these challenges were in almost every area of TSA’s operations: Its problematic implementation of risk assessment rules, including its management of the pre-check program; failures in 

checking—in passenger checkpoint and baggage screening operations; its control over access to secure areas, including management of its access badge program; its management of its workforce 

integrity program; its oversight of its acquisition and maintenance 

and screening equipment; and other issues we have discovered in 

the course of over 115 audit and inspection reports. 

We may be in a very different place now than we were in May, 

when I last testified about this before this committee. I believe that 

Administrator Neffenger brings with him a new attitude about 

oversight. Ensuring transportation safety is a massive and complex 

problem, and there is no silver bullet to solve it. It will take a sustained and disciplined effort. However, the first step to fixing a 

problem is having the courage to critically assess the deficiencies 

in an honest and objective light. 

Creating a culture of change within TSA and giving the TSA 

workforce the ability to identify and address the risks will be the 

Administrator’s most critical and challenging task. I believe that 

the Department and TSA leadership has begun the process of critical self-evaluation, and aided by the dedicated workforce of TSA, 

are in a position to begin addressing some of those issues. 

In September, we completed and distributed our report on our 

most recent round of covert testing. While I cannot talk about the 

specifics in this setting, I am able to say that we conducted the 

audit with sufficient rigor to satisfy our professional auditing 

standards, and that the tests were conducted by our auditors without any specialized knowledge or training, and the test results 

were disappointing and troubling. We ran multiple tests using different concealment methods at eight different airports of different 

sizes, including large category X airports across the country, and 

tested airports who were using private screeners. The results were 

consistent across every airport. Our testing was designed to test 

checkpoint operations in real-world conditions. The failures included technology, TSA procedures, and human errors. 

The Department’s response to our most recent findings has been 

swift. For example, within 24 hours of receiving preliminary results 


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of OIG testing, the Secretary summoned senior TSA leadership and 

directed that an immediate plan of action be created to correct deficiencies uncovered by our testing. TSA has put forward a plan, consistent with our recommendations, to improve checkpoint quality in 

three areas: Technology, personnel, and procedures. This plan is 

appropriate because the checkpoint must be considered as a single 

system. The most effective technology is useless without the right 

personnel, and the personnel needed to be guided by the appropriate procedures. Unless all three elements are operating effectively, the checkpoint will not be effective. 

We will be monitoring TSA’s efforts and will continue to conduct 

covert testing. Consistent with our obligations under the Inspector 

General Act, we will report our results to this committee as well 

as other committees of jurisdiction. 

I believe that this episode serves as an illustration of the value 

of the Office of Inspector General, particularly when coupled with 

the Department leadership that understands and appreciates objective and independent oversight. This review, like dozens of reviews 

before it, was possible only because my office and my auditors had 

unfettered access to the information we needed. 

I believe I speak for the entire IG community in expressing my 

gratitude to this committee for the legislation currently pending in 

the House, H.R. 2395, The Inspector General Empowerment Act of 

2015. This legislation would fix the misguided attempt by the Department of Justice to restrict access to records, and would restore 

IG independence and empower the IGs to conduct the kind of rigorous, independent, and thorough oversight that the taxpayers expect and deserve. 

This legislation would also improve and streamline the way we 

do business. For example, my written testimony gives an example 

of the powerful results we can obtain from data matching, which 

the legislation would streamline. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome 

any questions you or other members of the committee may have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

And Director Grover, we’re pleased to have you here with us 

today, and you’re now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER GROVER 

Ms. GROVER. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and other members and staff. Thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss how TSA can improve the effectiveness of 

airport passenger screening. 

In the past 6 years, GAO has made 80 recommendations to TSA. 

TSA has concurred with nearly all of them, and has taken action 

to address most of them; in fact, TSA has fully implemented more 

than three-quarters, yet every year, our reports continue to find 

vulnerabilities in the system, many related to questions of security 

effectiveness. Why is that? 

Our body of work over the past several years shows that TSA has 

consistently fallen short in basic program management in several 

aspects. Three shortcomings stand out: First, failing to fully and 

rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of new technologies and programs; second, not establishing performance measures that fully 

reflect program goals; and third, failing to use program data to 

identify areas for improvement. 

There are many GAO reports that illustrate the shortfalls in 

each area. I will provide one example for each. 

First, TSA should fully evaluate effectiveness prior to adoption, 

to ensure that acquisitions and programs work, and to make sure 

that monies are well spent. In one example, in our review of TSA’s 

body scanning technology, known as AIT, we found that TSA evaluated these systems in the laboratory for effectiveness, but had not 

addressed how airport screeners were using the systems in the airport environment. If airport screeners don’t carry out pat-downs 

properly to follow up on the potential threats that are signaled by 

the AIT, and we know that this is an ongoing challenge, then the 

effectiveness of the overall screening will be diminished. 

A related issue is that when TSA is designing studies of effectiveness, it’s critical that they follow established study design practices 

to make sure that the results that they get at the end of the day 

are valid. TSA has struggled with this. In one example from 2013, 

we found that a DHS study of behavioral detection indicators did 

not demonstrate their effectiveness because of study limitations, including the use of unreliable data. 

My second point is that TSA should adopt performance measures 

that reflect program goals to make sure that the programs are operating as intended after they’ve been stood up. As an example, in 

2014, we found that TSA did not have performance measures to determine the extent to which the secure flight program accurately 

identified passengers on the no-fly selectee and other watchlists, 

one of the programs key goals. 

My third point is that TSA should put systems in place to monitor the data it collects in order to identify areas for improvement. 

As an example, in 2013, we found that TSA officials collected data 

on the effectiveness of their canine program, but were only considering overall pass and fail rates. TSA was missing the opportunity 


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to determine if there were specific search areas, or types of explosives in which the canine teams were more or less effective, and 

to identify training needed to mitigate deficiencies. 

TSA is consistently responsive to GAO’s recommendations, and 

TSA has addressed, at least to some degree, most of the examples 

I just mentioned. For example, TSA has modified its AIT testing 

to more fully evaluate effectiveness, and has implemented new procedures to analyze canine testing data. In addition, TSA is in the 

process of testing its behavior detection activities and developing 

new secure flight performance measures. But addressing GAO’s 

findings, one by one, will not solve the underlying problem of an 

organizational culture that has allowed programs to be stood up 

without sufficient evidence of their effectiveness. 

It is critical that TSA systematically address the cross-cutting 

program management weaknesses that I just described, through 

well-designed evaluations of their programs and acquisitions, and 

continuing reliance on appropriate performance measures that 

allow them to monitor key program goals over time, TSA would be 

well-positioned to achieve longstanding improvements in aviation 

security effectiveness and other operations. 

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, this concludes 

my statement. I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Grover follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. We thank you. We’ll now move to the question portion. We’re going to start by recognizing the gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking member. 

Administrator, I’m pleased to have you aboard. You come aboard 

when there’s been unprecedented amount of criticism and findings 

of failure with your agency, so—and I know you’re very intent, I 

had a chance to talk to you, on trying to improve things and correct 

these things. But I think what—again, looking at this over 14 

years and our objective, our objective is to keep the American people safe. In your statement, I guess, and statements we’ve had, you 

screened 660 million passengers last year, I guess it was? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. That’s right. 

Mr. MICA. Yeah. And what percentage of those folks actually 

pose a risk? It’s got to be less than 1 percent. Would you agree with 

that? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. A very small percentage of people pose a risk. 

Mr. MICA. Yes. It’s a very small percentage. But most of our re- sources are spent on building a bureaucracy, and there’s over $2.3 

billion on TSA bureaucracy to manage the 46,000 screeners that 

Congress has put a cap on. We’ve actually seen a failure rate disclosed publicly with—from 30,000 screeners to 46,000 screeners 

where things have gotten worse. 

You stated in your testimony, there are a number of actions that 

have been completed, including the following: Requiring screening 

leadership at each airport, oversight AIT operation, and training 

and things of that sort. I’m telling you, even when you get this 

done, you’ve just—you have created a system that doesn’t address 

the risk. Your chances of failure are almost 100 percent with the 

current system, even with the training that you employ. I can 

thwart the AIT machines. 

It took me 2 years to get TSA just to look at the AIT machines, 

you don’t know the history of that, because I knew what we had 

in place. The puffers didn’t work, and I knew the threat was there 

for explosives, and it’s still there, but we—you all—and we’ve tried 

to put in different programs to make up for the layers that fail. 

Behavior detection. $1 billion was spent on behavior detection. 

We have hundreds, thousands of officers. And here’s a report here 

by the Freedom to Travel USA, it says, ‘‘In the airports where it’s 

used, 50,000 travelers have been flagged. Zero of these were terrorists. Sixteen known terrorists passed through the behavior detection airports on at least 24 occasions.’’ 

My whole point here is that you need to get out of the personnel 

business, back into the security business, turning TSA back into 

doing the things that will save us, the intelligence gathering, setting the parameters for someone else. You’re not a very good personnel agency, nor will you be. The turn—the recruitment’s horrible, the training’s horrible, the retention is horrible. It just goes 

on and on. 

So, again, no matter what you do, if you don’t address the risk 

and put our resources—we should be putting our resources—every 

instance in which we’ve stopped them has been first the public, the 

public. Since 9/11, since that—that morning when they found out 

on Flight 93, they attacked those terrorists and took them down. 


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Richard Reid, it was the crew and passengers that stopped him, in 

every instance. The liquid bombers, they woke me up in Texas and 

told me about that. That was British and Israeli intelligence. But 

it’s got to be our intelligence that saves the day. Refocusing that, 

get you out of the personnel business, get back into the security 

business, addressing that 1 percent. 

What’s scary, too, is the 1 percent, the no-fly list and the other 

lists, we still don’t have that right, according to some of the folks 

who have testified, some of the evidence that I’ve seen. 

So, again, I don’t mean to give you a hard time, but, I think, 

please consider this. I sat, when we devised this system with the 

head of—and I told you this story, of maximum security facilities, 

and they—when you go into those, you get body cavity searches. 

And they told me even with that, which you’re not going to do to 

659,000—or 659 million Americans, this still—stuff gets through, 

contraband, drugs, weapons. 

So, again, I look forward to your response. You don’t have to give 

it today, but I think if we change that out, get you out of the personnel business, into the security business, that’s the best use of 

our resources. 

Mr. Chairman, too, I’d like to put this report in the record, if I 

may. It’s the Freedom to Travel USA, TSA Failures by the Numbers. I think it’s very enlightening, if you would grant that request. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’ll now recognize the gentleman from 

Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, and I thank the distinguished 

ranking member, my friend, Mr. Cummings. 

Administrator Neffenger, welcome. And I really welcome your ascension to this office. My confidence in you was reinforced when I 

read your testimony about the determination of TSA on root 

causes. And you said the underlying screening effectiveness and 

technology challenges, you’ve said, a disproportionate focus on the 

past has been on screening operation’s efficiency rather than security effectiveness, which is, after all, the mission. Would you expand on that? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Thank you, Congressman. As I mentioned in my 

opening statement and in my written statement, the—as we looked 

at root causes—and you really do have to look at root causes in trying to determine, you know, why it is that we saw the same failures repeatedly over time. So when you—when you have an operating agency that observes the same things over and over, it tells 

me that you haven’t really figured out what the problem was. 

And so, when you look at root causes, it goes beyond just whatever happened at the checkpoint that failed. You have to determine 

what—what is it in your culture and in your organizational approach. 

If you recall in the early days of TSA, there was a great concern 

about the wait times, and there was a great deal of pressure on 

TSA to get people through the screening checkpoints faster. And 

there’s a good reason for that. You don’t want a lot of people packing up outside the sterile area. I think you have to be very careful, 

though, when you change—when you inject a concern like that to 


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an organization, because what you measure is what you’re going to 

get for performance. 

And, so, I really do believe that over time, what happened was 

a great deal of effort to ensure wait times were kept to a minimum, 

people were pushed through the checkpoint, that puts pressure on 

the screeners to clear passengers versus resolving the alarms that 

they present. 

And, so, in that slight nuance of difference between clearing a 

passenger versus resolving something that the passenger presents 

can change the effort you’ve put into looking for that, and we found 

that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think it’s really important the point you’re 

making, because it’s very easy, bureaucratically, to check a box and 

say, well, what do you mean? We’ve improved efficiency 600 percent. Yeah, but that isn’t the goal. That’s a means toward reaching 

the goal. And keeping one’s eye on the mission, making the main 

thing the main thing, is really important, and I thank you for doing 

that. 

Mr. Roth, and/or Ms. Grover, GAO has issued more than 25 TSAspecific reports in the last 5 years. The catalyst for this hearing 

was covert tests that your agency, Mr. Roth, conducted of passenger screening process. What—what did you find from that covert operation? 

Mr. ROTH. The specific results, of course, are classified, so I can’t 

discuss them in this hearing, but what we found in a series of 

tests, which took place across the country at different airports of 

different sizes, using a variety of concealment methods by individuals who are auditors with no specialized training or skill, is a universal, disappointing performance by the TSA screening checkpoint. 

And, again, what we look at is the entire screening checkpoint 

system. It’s not just the AIT, it’s not just the people, it’s not just 

the procedures, but how they work together. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would it be fair to say, without compromising security, that some significant breaches occurred? 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Very troubling. 

And, Mr. Neffenger, presumably you’re aware of those findings? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Yes, I am. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And has the agency taken corrective steps to try 

to address what Mr. Roth and his team discovered covertly? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir, we have. One of the first things I did— 

actually, when this became public, it became public during my confirmation process between the first and second confirmation hearings, I had a chance to meet with Mr. Roth, and then I met with 

Mr. Roth again after swearing in as Administrator, after being confirmed and swearing in. And one of the first things I wanted to do 

was understand the exact nature of the failures that occurred, how 

they represented, and so that we could begin to address the root 

causes, as you had mentioned earlier. 

We have put a tremendous amount of effort into not just determining the instant failures, but reaching back through the organization to figure out what systemically was going on that brought 


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this to it, because as you may also be aware, we have had other 

such discoveries of failures in the past. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, it may be useful at some point to 

have a classified briefing where we get fully briefed on that. 

One final question I’m going to sneak in in my last 18 seconds. 

But Mr. Neffenger, one of the problems, and you’ve raised it, too, 

that has occurred is, you know, because it’s now a lucrative business to charge for baggage, it has forced passengers to try to compensate by bringing in overhead luggage as much as possible. This 

affects your business and your mission. Could you just address 

that? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. There’s a lot more baggage coming through the 

checkpoint now than there used to be, and that baggage is much 

more packed with gear than it used to be. This is a challenge for 

anybody to screen it. I know that the airlines have been trying to— 

trying hard to enforce their one-plus-one rule, but sometimes that 

enforcement doesn’t take place until you get to the actual loading 

gate and that—and so, multiple bags have come through the checkpoint. 

So we’ve been working very closely with the airline industry and 

with the airports to see what we can do to reduce some of that 

stress on the checkpoint, but it’s just a fact of modern life that 

there’s more stuff arriving at a checkpoint than used to arrive. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the panel 

for being here. 

I wasn’t—I wasn’t here in Congress when TSA was instituted, 

and I don’t have a lot of answers to how you do it. I just know that 

when I enter the airport in Detroit, I go through multiple contacts 

with multiple agents, including TSA. I would also hasten to say at 

a meeting like this, while there are concerns and there are problems we have to deal with, overwhelmingly, I’ve been treated well 

by TSA even when they didn’t know I was a Member of Congress. 

And the fact of the matter is that only two incidences can I remember the exact airport where I was not treated well: Los Angeles and 

Dulles. That says, for the most part, your personnel, doing a job 

I wouldn’t want to do, are at least attempting to work with—and 

I want to applaud you for that. We can—we can jump on you, but 

I think there is also something to say about having an untenable 

job to do, where you have to be right all the time. 

And fortunately since 9/11, as a result of TSA’s efforts and others’ efforts, including airlines and passengers, we have not had a 

downed plane, and we want that to continue. 

But I do want to ask you some questions. Mr. Neffenger, in our 

hearing today, you have pledged to fix some things. During other 

public crises, other TSA administrators have pledged to fix things. 

What will be different this time? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Thank you for that question. It really goes to 

what I was saying earlier, and that is, when you have—so my experience is—I’ve been in operating—an operator my whole career. I 

spent 34 years in the United States Coast Guard. In many respects, a lot of similarities between the Coast Guard and the TSA 


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in this sense: both have—are mission-based organizations, both 

have, in some respects, missions that have a no-fail quality to 

them, both have a distributed frontline workforce that’s responsible 

for carrying out that mission. 

So in my experience, what—what makes operating agencies challenging and exciting at the same time is, challenging in that you 

have something you have to do every single day, and that tyranny 

of the right now can lead you to simply address the problem in 

its—in its presentation. By that, I mean you have a failure at a 

checkpoint, you work with the team at that checkpoint, you work 

with the team at that airport and you say, Look, you failed, here’s 

how you failed, don’t do it again. That may seem like it fixes the 

problem, but it really doesn’t over time. 

What you find is that—is that typically, if you have failures like 

that in a dedicated frontline workforce, and I really appreciate the 

words you had to say about that workforce, then it means you’ve 

got something more systemic going on, and it’s hard sometimes for 

an operating agency to take the time to do that. I really—— 

Mr. WALBERG. How will you monitor that bigger picture, then? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, it starts by recognizing that there is a bigger picture, and saying it out loud, so that’s something I said when 

I first came in. Any time you have multiple failures that look the 

same over time, that means something else is going on. And, so, 

we’re going to stop, we’re going to look at the entire approach of 

the organization, how well do we understand our mission? How 

well have we articulated that mission in terms of what it needs to 

succeed? How well have we deployed the equipment that we think 

addresses that need? How well have we trained our people to work 

that equipment? And what kinds of processes have we given them 

and procedures? For example, we found that there were 3,100 independent tasks that we expected a screener to memorize. That’s an 

impossible task. You can’t do that. 

So we—it gets additive over time. So you’ve got to step back to 

first principles and say this is about the mission, first and foremost, and it’s about the performance of that mission in an environment in which we have so much at stake. It pays—you have to look 

at what’s already been done by third-party independent auditors. 

I greatly value the work of the GAO and the IG’s offices, because 

they give me a third-party independent assessment of what are 

some of those challenges, and I can use that as a way to go back 

and begin to dig into the deeper issues in the organization. 

Mr. WALBERG. Let me add on to what my friend, Mr. Connolly, 

started with you, and I think it goes to this idea of bigger picture. 

How will you work with airports, airlines, and others to disrupt the 

incentives that can emphasize speed over security? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, as I mentioned, I’ve met with a number 

of those of the—actually, all the major airlines in the U.S. as well 

as their associations and other stakeholders. It starts by recognizing that this is an interactive system. TSA doesn’t work alone 

inside the aviation system. It works in conjunction with all the 

other players, and everyone has a role to play in the security of the 

system. 

And, so, it’s not simply a hand-off in a transaction from one entity in the system to the other. It’s a continuous interaction. And 


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that interaction requires that they be aware of the challenges that 

their system imposes upon our responsibility for security, just as 

we have to be aware of the challenges that our security responsibilities impose on them. I will tell you that they’ve been very receptive to that. 

There’s a lot more work we can do to connect more effectively to 

the various players in the system. And so, I’ve established a number of regular meetings now with my counterparts in the private 

sector as well as across the system to begin to address what I think 

are these longstanding, overarching issues that have been, not necessarily ignored, but have not been attended to appropriately. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. WALBERG. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. 

Cummings, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Director Grover, when you were talking about the problems, I 

wrote two words, and I wrote the words ‘‘culture gap.’’ In other 

words, I think from just listening to you, a culture has been established, and I think that culture is, in part—and I want you all to 

comment on this. I’m just listening and reading. You know, the 

chairman will tell you again when we, when dealing with the Coast 

Guard—not the Coast Guard, but the Secret Service, one of the 

things that we worried about was a culture of complacency. Not 

just people are not good people, but you get used to nobody jumping over the fence at the White House, so you—because everything’s going to be all right. 

And, so, what happens is that people get sort of lulled and slow, 

but it’s a culture, and they—things are going to be all right. And 

then, Administrator, when you combine that with this thing about 

making sure you get the people through quickly and you put the 

quickness over, you know, the mission, then, I think, you have a 

combination for problems, and I think those kind of problems are 

very difficult to address, and I’m trying to figure out—first of all, 

would you comment on that, Ms. Grover? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. Thank you for the opportunity. 

So TSA was originally stood up in a culture of crisis, where they 

had to be responsive, and they had to be responsive fast. But at 

this point, it is time to transition to a culture of accountability for 

effectiveness. I am—TSA definitely is aware of the importance of 

ensuring their programs are effective, and I appreciate Administrator Neffenger’s remarks about enhancing that culture throughout the workforce. But at the end of the day, for GAO, it comes 

down to a very simple question, which is: Does the program work? 

And how do you know? And no matter how much the staff are educated in the current failures or retrained, no matter how much 

there is an emphasis on new SOPs, at the end of the day, there 

has to be measurement, like the Administrator said, and they have 

to have a systematic process to follow through to make sure their 

programs work, and that is what lies beneath a strong culture of 

accountability for effectiveness. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You don’t know what you’ve just said. I think 

you hit—you just hit the nail quite well. So they started with a culture of emergency, and so everybody’s, we got to make sure that 


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we protect ourselves, and then when the emergency seems to wane, 

you can slowly move into what I talk about, the culture of complacency. But now we’ve got to change our whole dynamic and create 

a new normal, and that is a new normal of accountability. 

Now, you—you’ve got a plan, right? You have a plan? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you plan to implement it by March of 2016? 

Is that right? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, there are a number of steps in that, 

but—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That’s what I wanted to ask you. What will we— 

what will the status of the screening process be at that date? Will 

it have reached what you envision as peak effectiveness, or will it 

still be in the process or improving mode? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, so in answer to that question, let me say, 

I think that you have to always be in a continuous improvement 

mode, I think you hit it on the head, otherwise you do go complacent. The day you think you get the screening process or security 

process right is the day you’ll be defeated, and I believe that entirely. So this is continuous focus on the mission, continuous focus, 

and continuous evaluation through key measures of your performance of that mission. 

Now, that said, what have we done to address these immediate 

challenges? We’ve retrained the entire frontline workforce. And I 

know that sounds easy to say, but let me explain what that means. 

We went—we called it mission essentials threat mitigation, and we 

called it—I wanted to call it mission essentials for a reason. It’s 

about reminding people that we have a mission, first and foremost, 

and it is truly a no-fail mission in the aviation system, and to remind them and to reactivate that desire in them that they exhibited when they raised their hand and said, I swear to support and 

defend the Constitution of the United States. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And how do you do that? How do you do that, 

what you just said? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, I think you do—first, you say it out loud. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Right. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. It starts by at the very top of the organization 

saying what you do is critically important, and I’m going to make 

sure that everything I do is designed to make sure you succeed at 

your mission, to focus, first and foremost. So I start at the mission 

every day and I work backwards. That means I start with the junior-most person in this organization that’s standing on a screening 

line, and I think about what it means for that individual to do 

their job effectively, and what do I need to do and what does everybody between me and that individual need to be focused on to 

make that happen? This isn’t about me as an individual, it’s not 

about making myself look good or anybody between me and that 

person; it’s about every one of us remembering that we serve a 

higher order here, and we engage in a higher order. 

That is surprisingly important for a frontline workforce to hear. 

I learned that in my years in the Coast Guard. That—it may seem 

simple, but that’s the most powerful thing you can—you can tell 

somebody, is what you do is important, and it’s so important that 


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I’m going to spend every waking moment paying attention to getting that done right. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just one last comment, Mr. Chairman. 

I hope that you took note of what Director Grover said, and I 

hope that in your discussions with your staff, that you—that you 

remind them about this, what she said: One time it was a culture 

that was about emergency, now it’s about accountability, because 

I think that that makes a lot of sense. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And hopefully we’ll get another chance to ask a 

few questions. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Neffenger, we’re all, I guess, kind of creatures of our own 

personal experience, but I’ll tell you, having—most of us travel on 

a regular basis. And the airports that I use, which are primarily 

Greenville, Spartanburg, and South Carolina, Charlotte, and DCA, 

I have never had anything other than professional encounters with 

TSA folks, ever. There’s not a single instance where I can think of 

where it wasn’t A-plus in terms of professionalism. 

So, you know, we’re only creatures of our own—and I don’t wear 

a member pin, so don’t anybody think it’s because they figured out 

what I do for a living. They didn’t. And I don’t, thank the Lord, 

look like most of my colleagues, so I don’t think that it was for that 

reason. 

I think it’s tough being in law enforcement, period. I think, quite 

frankly, without digressing into a broader conversation about that, 

I think it’s become even tougher in the last couple years to be in 

law enforcement. 

So what I want you to tell me is where are your applicants coming from? What is the source of the poor morale, other than that 

you only make the news when something goes wrong? If there’s a 

TSA agent who is involved in stealing, or if there’s a TSA agent 

that does something wrong, that’s when you make the news. But 

you don’t ever make the news for just simple professionalism. So 

what’s the source of the morale issues? Where do you draw your 

applicants from? And what is your plan on bolstering morale? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, thanks for your question, Mr. Gowdy, and 

thank you for your good words about our workforce. 

I will echo the fact that I think the majority of the TSA workforce, particularly the screening workforce, are truly dedicated, responsible and—and patriotic Americans. These are people who, as 

somebody has already mentioned, have taken an oath to do a job 

that many people in this country would not want to do and very 

few people would choose to do. 

That said, so what’s the source of morale? Again, my experience, 

it’s a well-defined mission statement and a clear mission of importance. I think we have a clear mission of importance. I don’t know 

that we’ve always clearly defined that to our workforce. So it’s reconnecting the workforce to the desire that they had in the first 

place to join, to become part of something that’s important, that 

means something and that means something to our Nation. That’s 


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first and foremost. That’s what—that’s what—that’s what the military is all about, and that’s what my experience there tells me. 

Then it’s having clear and unequivocal standards of performance. 

And what I mean by that is what causes high morale is if people 

know that they’re held to a high standard of performance, and that 

people who don’t meet those standards aren’t going to be part of 

your workforce anymore. So I think you have to—and you have to 

be consistent across that, across the organization. 

And then you have to train them appropriately; that is, you train 

them, train them in not just how to do their job, but how to engage 

the system, how the system works. I think we need to do some 

work on that score. 

One of the things that we discovered in the course of the root 

cause analysis after the covert testing failures was that we actually 

had not explained to the majority of the frontline workforce what 

the technology capabilities were, so what can the machines do, 

what can’t they do. 

No one ever did that to me when I was in the military. They 

never handed me a piece of equipment and said, just go figure out 

how it works. So when you connect them to their system—and we 

never asked their opinion on what they thought of the challenges 

of working that checkpoint. You need feedback from your frontline 

workforce. This isn’t just a one-way transmission. You’ve got to engage them. 

So I think the components of morale are clearly important mission; support for that mission; training to accomplish the mission; 

understanding of the equipment that we give you to do that; and 

then engaging you and getting some feedback from you and letting 

you be part of the solution that goes forward. There’s nobody who 

knows that mission better than the people who are conducting it 

every day. 

So those are the things that we’re start—that we’re putting into 

place. It takes some time to see the results of that, but I see lots 

of opportunity on those points to really reengage the workforce in 

a much more effective way and to actually activate, as I said, 

that—that which brought them to the job in the first place. 

With respect to recruiting, we currently use a third-party contractor to help screen recruits, but we recruit from all over the 

country and we recruit from all walks of life. The astonishing thing 

is the talent that exists within the workforce. I have people with 

Ph.D.’s who are frontline screeners who have retired and come 

back into the workforce, I have people with music degrees, I have 

people from all walks of life. So there’s a—as you might expect in 

a workforce of 44,000 screeners, you have a broad range of people 

at all ages. 

Mr. GOWDY. One last question, because my time’s almost up. If 

we were to interview 100 folks who had left, not for cause, but just 

left, what would be—what would be the dominant reason they cited 

for why they—either their expectations weren’t met, or they lost interest? Why do folks leave? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, I’ll give you some thoughts I have, because I haven’t—I haven’t done those interviews myself. I think it’s 

probably a combination of factors. You always have some people 

who just decide that it’s not the job for them, and they move on. 


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But let’s address some of those concerns that you have with morale. I think it’s not feeling like you’ve—you’re doing the mission 

that you thought you were going to be hired to do. 

So I think if I’m a screener and I think it’s about effectiveness 

and screening properly, and I’m being told to move people through 

the line more effectively, that’s probably going to cause me to say 

I’m not sure that this organization cares about the things that they 

said they did. It’s, did I get the proper training? Do you feel like 

I’m being supported? Do I feel like I have advancement opportunities? And do I get continuous development over the course of my 

career. 

I think all of those are the things that go into deciding whether 

or not you’re with an employer you’d like to stay with, or you want 

to move on and look for some other opportunity. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the ranking 

member. Thank you to our panelists, Mr. Neffenger and Inspector 

General Roth and Ms. Grover. Thanks for your help. I think you’ve 

been very honest in your testimony, both with the strengths and 

failures. 

Just following up on Mr. Gowdy’s questions, Mr. Neffenger, have 

you ever thought about offering a bonus or a bounty for a screener 

that actually gets somebody with a gun coming through the checkpoint or with some malicious intent? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, you know, we’ve actually looked at all 

sorts of new incentive—potential incentive programs. I’m a big fan 

of incentivizing the right behavior. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. I want to move on, because I have got some 

other questions. This is such a target-rich environment; we have so 

many problems. I actually reviewed the—I went to the classified 

briefing with the chairman and other members, the ranking member. And while Inspector General Roth has used the word, you 

know, ‘‘disappointing’’ and ‘‘troubling,’’ I would—I would use ‘‘pathetic’’ in looking at the number of times people got through with 

guns or bombs, you know, these covert testing exercises. It really 

was pathetic. 

And when I say that, I mean pitiful, the number of times people 

got through. I mean, I fly a lot, my family flies a lot, and just 

thinking about the breaches there, it’s—it’s horrific. So one of the 

things we can do is just be honest about the degree of the breaches 

and the scope of it, and I think you’ve got at that. I think you’ve 

really looked at the cultural problems here and what we’ve got to 

get at, and I appreciate that. So I’m supporting you. I’m not just 

criticizing you. I’m supporting you in your changes. 

Mr. LYNCH. But the nature of the threat has evolved as well. So 

now you have ISIS asking for lone wolf attacks which, you know, 

probably presents a greater vulnerability to rail, passenger rail security, than it does to airlines perhaps. But I just—I’m just wondering about what we’re doing to evolve with that threat? And the 

other big gap that I see is in terms of people with credentials in 

airports in secure areas, we’re having major gaps there. We’re letting people in that have connections with terrorism. There’s indicia 


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of connections with terrorism, and they’re getting through our 

screening process and getting into secure areas of the airport, and 

being awarded credentials. I think we had 73 instances of that. 

Are we re-doing this? And also, you know, I’d like Inspector General Roth also to speak to that issue, because I know you’ve been 

relentless and you’ve been very good about this. In the past, there’s 

been denial. I don’t think we’re hearing that from you, Mr. 

Neffenger, I don’t think we are at all. But in the past, there has 

been a culture of denial. And we need to get at this. We’re going 

to have a major, major disaster here on a commercial airline or on 

a train, and we’re not going to be able to—well, people will say we 

didn’t see that coming, but we did, we did, we have, we see it now. 

And I’m just wondering what our response is going to be to address 

that issue? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Let me see if I can address a couple of the 

points you made there with respect to what we’re doing. Let me 

start with the last point first, on the insider threat concern, people 

with badges in airports. As you know, there’s been some concern 

about the security of the badge population. This is a trusted population, or should be a trusted population. So how do you determine 

whether your trusted population is truly to be trusted? So what 

safeguards do you put in place? I think there’s work to be done 

there. And I’m encouraged by Secretary Johnson’s reach to, earlier 

this year, prior to my confirmation, he had asked the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which is a standing statutory committee of industry members that advise the Department and the 

Administrator. 

They took a hard look at this problem, and they came up with 

28 recommendations, with which TSA fully concurred and is in the 

process of looking for an implementation plan for that. That said, 

what did they say was the challenge? First of all, it’s having realtime access to the appropriate databases to screen people. TSA 

does, in fact, recurrently vet against terrorist databases. One important point to note with respect—— 

Mr. LYNCH. We’ve got gaps in that. You’re taking an awful lot 

of time to give me very little answers. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. With the 73 members, it’s actually 69 discreet 

individuals, they were not actually on the terrorist—any terrorist 

watchlist, but they had incomplete indicia in what is called the 

Terrorist Information Datamark Environment. But their—but that 

information wasn’t sufficient to raise to known or suspected terrorist status. I’m not just mincing words. It’s just clear that they 

were not—and we don’t make those determinations, that’s an FBI 

determination. 

With respect to ensuring that we pay attention to the evolving 

threat, I am directly connected to my counterparts across the intelligence community. I get a daily intelligence briefing. It’s a synthesis of what everyone is seeing. I’m very concerned about how 

complex and dynamic the threat environment is. I think, in some 

respects, it’s the most complex we’ve seen since 9/11. And what 

makes groups like ISIL particularly concerning is that they are intending to inspire, and the intent to operation phase is compressing. 


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Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Chairman, could I ask the Inspector General if 

he would give his version of that? I didn’t hear a lot there. But I 

still think we’ve got a problem. And I’m still worried about it. And 

I’m not hearing, you know, decisive action being taken in that regard. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’re well over time. But if the Inspector 

General would care to comment. 

Mr. ROTH. Just briefly. And thank you for the question. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

Mr. ROTH. This goes to sort of what I call beyond the checkpoint. 

Certainly, our focus has been on the checkpoint. But there’s a lot 

of security risk that is out there that is beyond the checkpoint. 

Aviation worker vetting is one of them. For example, we did an 

audit of TSA’s job as a regulator. In other words, the airports have 

the duty to manage the sight of badges, the restricted access 

badges and adjudicate criminal histories of those aviation workers. 

And, yet, what we found in a recent audit, for example, is that as 

a regulator, TSA only examines, perhaps, 1 percent of all the adjudications that the airports do. 

So any time you have an issue where the airports have part of 

the responsibility, and TSA has part of the responsibility, you have 

those seams in there. That’s what worries me. So the fact that you 

have those seams, as well as how TSA is doing as a regulator, I 

think we’re going to be paying more attention to that as time goes 

on. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I’ll now recognize myself for 5 

minutes. And, Administrator, quick, quick answers if we could. If 

you try to bring a gun through a checkpoint and you get caught, 

what happens to that person? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Depends on the State that you’re in and the airport you’re at, but it’s turned over to local law enforcement. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But do they go on a database that you administer? Do you note that person in your database? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. We do, we do note that individual’s name, yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do they go on a no-fly list? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. They do not necessarily go on a no-fly list. It depends upon the nature of the, of how they present it. The no-fly 

list, as you know, is a terrorist watchlist. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Right. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. And it’s managed by, primarily by the FBI. So 

the no-fly list, you specifically put on based upon your connection 

as a known or suspected terrorist. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So trying to bring a gun onto an airplane 

does not put you into a category of potentially a nefarious terrorist 

type of person, correct? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. It will ensure that you get increased scrutiny 

when you travel. And you’ll lose—if you’re a pre-check member or 

an expedited screening member, you’ll lose that. And you’ll lose 

that—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. For how long? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. For a minimum of 90 days. It depends upon the 

nature of the incident. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. So you try to bring a gun on a plane, 

whether it’s an accident or not, and just for 90 days you just don’t 

get pre-check, that’s the penalty? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. You’ll get additional, you’ll get significant additional screening, which will include—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But you go day 91, you get back into prescreen. I saw somebody who was pretty well-known in Utah, they 

were found to have a gun. They said it was an accident. I’m sure 

it was. But I also saw that person back in pre-check pretty quick. 

And life goes on. If you’re on a no-fly list, does that mean you can’t 

fly? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Unless they’re given a specific waiver request 

that comes from the FBI, yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So if you’re on the no-fly—how many people are on the no-fly list? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I’ll have to get you that number. I don’t know. 

I don’t know off the top of my head. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What percentage of the TSA’s time is spent 

on aviation? And where are the other areas in which you’re allocating resources? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. The vast majority of our effort is spent in the 

aviation security system, because it’s the Federal responsibility. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Right. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. So if you’re just looking at allocation of resources, you’ve got a large personnel component of that, which 

takes a great deal. It’s over 90 percent of our resources are on the 

aviation—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But what other things is the TSA spending 

their time on? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. We have a responsibility across all surface 

modes of transportation, so passenger and light rail, over-the-road 

motor carriers and buses, pipelines, and maritime. But maritime 

we do in conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Tell me a little bit more, if you could, I 

want to go Director Grover. There are some things that have been 

on this list that you’ve been concerned about for year after year 

after year. And I really did like, as Mr. Cummings did, how you 

solve that cultural problem. But does anybody have any consequence if they fail in this mission? I mean, are they holding people accountable? 

Ms. GROVER. We have a study underway on that issue right now. 

There are annual exams that the screeners have to pass in order 

to keep their jobs. Beyond that, there are requirements for retraining if there are errors. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What about—and maybe the Inspector 

General or the director can answer—the behavioral profiling part 

of this, the SPOT part of the program, can you comment on this 

real quick, how well that’s being implemented? 

Ms. GROVER. Sure. This is about $200 million a year, and it is 

for behavioral detection activities. And the premise is that the officers will be able to spot individuals who pose a threat to the Nation’s security. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Does it work? 


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Ms. GROVER. TSA doesn’t have evidence that is sufficient for 

GAO. So we don’t know. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We don’t know? 

Ms. GROVER. We don’t know. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Inspector General, have you looked at this 

at all? 

Mr. ROTH. We looked at this in May of 2013. What we found is 

that there were no metrics that TSA had provided as far as what 

success looks like in the program. They had very poor data collection. They had insufficient training of the BDOs. I mean, keep in 

mind what the whole idea behind this is, that you’re going to be 

able to take this population and figure out who it is that’s the 

greatest risk. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Now, are they putting too many—sorry, I’m 

jumping because my time has run out. Are they putting too many 

people into the TSA pre-lines? 

Mr. ROTH. That was our concern. And based on several, sort of, 

audits that we did in the spring of this year, we believe that the 

administrator has taken fairly significant and drastic action to reduce the number of individuals in the pre-check who had not been 

individually vetted. We made a number of recommendations. The 

prior administrator had rejected those recommendations. But since 

Administrator Neffenger has come in, there has been a change as 

to whether or not those recommendations are adopted. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And this is—again, my concern here is that 

the behavioral profiling is an important part of what we’re doing. 

But how to train and implement that is a critical component. I’m 

also a big fan of the K–9 teams. They’re mobile. There’s a perception that they are able to detect things that I think would make 

somebody very nervous. The presence of a K–9 in conjunction with 

behavioral profiling, going through a metal detector, would be 

much more effective and efficient. It’s certainly what the military 

came to the conclusion of doing. And I think we need to pay keen 

attention to that. My time has expired. I now recognize Ms. Kelly 

for 5 minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good morning. Screening 

lanes designated as pre-check lanes are available at more than 150 

airports, according to TSA’s Web site. Travelers who go through 

such lanes receive expedited screening. There are several ways that 

travelers can access the pre-check lanes. Under one procedure, individuals apply to the program, pay a fee, provide data on themselves, and undergo background checks. If an applicant is determined to be a low-risk flyer, the applicant is enrolled in the precheck program. However, TSA has been directing some travelers to 

the expedited pre-check lines, even if they did not enroll in the program. Specifically, travelers can be directed to the pre-check lanes 

through procedures that have been called managed inclusion 1 and 

managed inclusion 2. 

Administer Neffenger, in your testimony, you wrote that at your 

discretion, TSA has phased out the practice known as managed inclusion 2. Can you discuss what this program was and why it was 

ended, and what has been the impact of the elimination of this program on passenger volume in expedited screening lines? 


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Mr. NEFFENGER. Yes. The managed inclusion 2 program that you 

referred to was a term given to the practice of randomly assigning 

people that were in a standard screening lane to the expedited 

screening lane. And it was simply done with a random generator. 

You would get a yes/no, and they would move people in. That was 

pushing at its peak about 14 percent of average daily travelers 

through expedited screening lanes. And these are people who had 

not been through the pre-check, through any kind of a pre-check 

vetting. There were some things that were done that were intended 

to buy down the risk of those individuals, some additional randomized measures that were taken after you got pushed into that lane. 

It was my opinion, when I took over, that that was an untenable 

risk. And so I discontinued that practice. And as of September 12, 

it was eliminated completely. We had to ramp it down slowly so we 

didn’t shock the system. But we eliminated that completely. 

Ms. KELLY. How long did that go on? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. How long did that process go on? I think it was 

about a year and a half or so that that was run. There’s another 

form of moving of people into expedited screening lanes, a much 

smaller number, you referred to it as managed inclusion 1. But 

what it really is is the use of passenger-sniffing K–9s to randomly 

assign some people from standard screening into the expedited 

screening lanes, but using the K–9s. And then additional screening 

measures are applied to each of them. That’s a very small percentage of the daily travelers, and I’ll get you the exact number on 

that. But I’m a big fan and a big proponent of a fully-vetted population in an expedited screening lane. I think the only way we 

can—going back to the earlier comments about risk-based security, 

I really want to know as much as I can about an individual traveling as they come through, given that the vast majority of people 

are safe to do so. 

So the goal is to significantly expand the truly vetted pre-check 

population over the coming months, and to completely eliminate 

the random assignment of anyone in the pre-check lane who’s not 

already been vetted precise. 

Ms. KELLY. Maybe I missed this, but do you feel that more people are going through the pre-check program so they are, they can 

go through the faster lines? Because it seems like the last couple 

of times I’ve traveled, there’s been many more people on the precheck line, and I’m at O’Hare, so. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, we’re seeing a huge spike in enrollments 

over the past couple of months. So we’re averaging about 50,000 

enrollments a month right now, which is encouraging to me. And 

that’s before the response to our recent request for proposals to expand the marketing opportunities for up to three additional private 

sector vendors to look for more retail opportunities to enroll in precheck. 

I know that I’ve worked with—talked with the airlines and the 

travel industry. They’re advertising, and if you’ve flown recently, 

you may have seen on the in-flight screens advertisements for precheck. So the industry is working very hard to increase enrollments 

as well. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. Inspector General Roth, you wrote that 

you were pleased to report that we have recently made significant 


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progress in getting concurrence and compliance with recommendations. The Inspector General’s Office has made regarding pre-check, 

but that TSA is continuing to use some risk-assessment tools you 

have recommended that they discontinue. To that extent, can you— 

in this open setting, can you discuss the recommendations your office has made to the TSA regarding access to expedited screening 

processes that TSA has not acted on at this point? 

Mr. ROTH. Certainly. And thank you for that question. Just as 

an overlay, we had a number of open recommendations, or recommendations that TSA did not agree with. And those are set 

forth, I think, starting at about page 20 of the appendix of my testimony. And one of the things that I wanted to do was highlight 

in bold those that have changed in the last 6 months. And it is significant. There’s almost no disagreement now between TSA and the 

Office of Inspector General as to what needs to be done. 

There is a fairly narrow point, and unfortunately, because this 

is an open setting, it’s not possible to discuss it, but there’s a certain risk profile, a certain type of passenger that we believe should 

not be on expedited screening. But we are in discussions with TSA 

about it. These are good-faith discussions as to what is an appropriate level of risk. And I’m highly confident we’re going to get to 

a place that both protects the American people but also moves passengers in an expedited way. 

Ms. KELLY. I have one more. And does TSA—am I past the time? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Ms. KELLY. Oh, I’m sorry. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman 

from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank each of you 

for your testimony. Inspector General Roth, I’m glad to hear that 

you say that a lot of the disagreement has disappeared. Because 

previously, that was a major concern, as we had GAO and the IG 

making recommendations, and yet, TSA somehow believes that 

they had their Carnac hat on, and they’re able to figure out what 

to anticipate and what not to anticipate. 

So I would encourage that continued, I guess, partnership. But 

speaking of partnerships, I want to focus on the partnership for 

public service, and specifically, with regards, Administrator, to low 

employee morale. We have held hearings in this very room about 

some of the worst places to work, which, perhaps, that title was not 

the best title to pick. But we’ve also found that there is a tremendous opportunity in terms of employee morale on how to encourage 

the workforce. Your survey has consistently—well, let’s just say 

that it’s not something that you would try to attain. 

Do I have your commitment today to reach out to some of those 

agencies that get good marks on that survey to find out the best 

practices that they have? NASA, in particular, continues to get 

high marks? Do I have your commitment to do that? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. And so does the workforce. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Let me go a little bit—Director Grover, let 

me come to you, because I’d like you, if you could, briefly summarize some of your concerns as it relates to the AIT machines, and 

the procurement thereof, and some of the challenges that we’ve had 

there. 


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Ms. GROVER. That’s a really important issue because it is one of 

the main technologies that TSA relies on for screening passengers. 

What we originally found was that TSA had considered the effectiveness of the technology in a laboratory, but hadn’t considered 

the broader picture of the employees who use them in the airport 

environment. And they have taken steps to address that in the procurement of the next version of the AIT systems. 

They have begun measuring the effectiveness of the entire system, and looking at the detection rate of the entire system working 

together, and that’s really important. One recommendation that we 

still have open is that TSA should pay close attention to its understanding of the false alarm rate on those machines. It is significant. And it has repercussions for both security effectiveness, because if screeners are used to a high false alarm rate, then they 

begin to think that there may not be anything there when the 

alarm goes off. 

And it also has repercussions for financing. Because every time 

the machine alarms, that person has to go through a pat-down. So 

if the false alarm rate could be reduced, then it would have financial implications as well. And that is something that TSA is working on. But they do not yet have system-wide understanding of the 

operational false alarm rates. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So, Administrator, I see you shaking your head. 

You’re willing to work with GAO on that and make sure that we 

come up with a matrix on how to—here’s one of the concerns I 

have. We all talk about how we’re going to work on it. And, yet, 

we don’t really put parameters in there to judge whether we’re successful or not. So will you work on a matrix that satisfies GAO as 

it relates to false alarms? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Not only that, but we’re actually, we’ve been 

working very hard to completely restructure the process we use for 

doing this. I think that Director Grover has raised some important 

points. And they’re key to—they are the key challenges that we 

face. But you can’t do it unless you change the way you do business. So it’s really given us an opportunity, it’s given me an opportunity to completely restructure the way we do business. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Let me, when we talk about restructuring the way that we do business, one of the things that happens 

a lot is administrators come here and say we just need more 

money. And I think that on, in a bipartisan fashion, we’re willing 

to give you the resources necessary to do it if you’re willing to look 

at not only the recommendations that the IG and GAO have looked 

at, but look at recreating the way that you do business from a security standpoint. 

The chairman mentioned K–9 units. Is there a plan to look at K– 

9s, to bring them in during those high-peak, high times of travel, 

you know, not 1 a.m. In the morning, you know, when you have 

two TSA personnel there, but during those—to help alleviate some 

of the backlog? Are you willing to come up with a proposal and submit to this committee on how you might implement that? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I will. In fact, I think I have a good story to tell 

this committee with respect to K–9s. One of the first things I did 

was look at the current disposition of K–9s units, K–9 teams across 

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eled airports to the large, high-volume airports. We’re bringing a 

number of new teams on board this year. I will get you a full report 

for the committee, because I think it’s a good report, and it shows 

that we’re moving, I believe, in the right direction with respect to 

thinking of the system. 

And I just want to make one comment with respect to your comment, I absolutely agree with you that you have to take a systemic 

view of this. If you look at discrete elements of the system, all 

you’ll do is look at discrete elements of the system, and you won’t 

think about how they interact with one another. So it’s looking at 

the entire environment that we call aviation security, and understanding how all of these components interact with one another 

and how effective they are. It speaks to everything from false 

alarm rates to the proper use of K–9s to other things. And I’m 

happy to provide a much fuller brief at the committee’s discretion 

on how we’re doing that. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. I will now recognize 

the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton, for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is an 

important hearing. Before I ask my questions, Administrator 

Neffenger, this is a copy of the District of Columbia license. We’ve 

had to have the Administrator in, the Deputy Administrator in, because it changed from saying Washington, D.C. to saying District 

of Columbia. And, apparently, this really befuddled the screeners. 

And so some of them asked for their passport because they—this 

license had no sense of the place where you are now wasn’t recognized. So I want to provide you with a copy of this before you leave 

so that kind of periodic reminders can be made. This was a change. 

I understand it was changed from Washington, D.C., and there was 

an attempt by the Administrator, the Deputy Administrator 

worked closely with me. Since you’re new, I want to make sure that 

this doesn’t have to come up on your watch. 

Mr. Neffenger, I have sat, for example, and seen what we have 

experienced at the airport, mentioned with respect to screeners 

who try to get, who sit, for example, at the Capitol or in Federal 

buildings. I must say, I think this needs a study by psychologists, 

people who know something about the human mind and how it operates, because all you have to do is ask for a GAO study, and you 

will always get that they, in fact, don’t catch bombs, they don’t 

catch pistols. 

We need to learn more, instead of just trying to catch people, because we are getting the same results no matter where they are, 

whether they’re magnetometers or whether they are TSA. For example, for TSA, we have had people who bring bombs in shoes to 

try to detonate their shoes. We’ve had a so-called underwear bomber. And it’s interesting to note that with respect to those items, 

that they went through multiple layers of security. And it was passengers, not TSA, who, in fact, were called on to put down those 

very dangerous people. 

This leads me to ask whether or not TSA is really equipped—for 

example, to discover these, we had this matter before the Congress, 

these plastic handguns. I mean, if they can’t find ordinary items 


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like bombs and pistols, and they are, as you can see, very inventive, what I’m wondering is, does TSA have access to the intelligence to meet their adaptiveness in light of emerging threats? 

They’re not going to do the same thing that passengers took 

them down for before. Do you have access to that intelligence? Or 

do you have to depend upon some other agency? And if so, how do 

they relay to you what the emerging intelligence reveals? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Thank you for that question. And, first, just to 

be clear, the underwear bomber and the Richard Reid shoe bomber, 

those were not screened by TSA because they came from overseas 

in. 

Ms. NORTON. Yeah. I understand that. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. So those—and it’s one of the reasons that we 

were—we became concerned about the non-metallic threat. I do 

have access to intelligence. And as I noted earlier, every morning 

I get an intelligence briefing. And it’s a compilation of intelligence 

from across the intelligence community. I meet regularly with other 

members of the community. And we have people embedded in all 

of the major intelligence components, so the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Targeting Center, the CIA, NSA. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you screen yourselves instead of waiting for an 

outside agency to do it? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. We do. We do the recurrent vetting of the trusted populations, as well as the current vetting of people in the secure flight—that enter into secure flight, put a passenger reservation in, and then continuous recurrent vetting of individuals who 

are in the trusted traveler programs. 

Ms. NORTON. No, I understand that your screeners often pass 

their own tests when you do your own internal vetting. That is why 

I ask this question about trying to understand, particularly people 

who have to stand in one place for several hours, doing the same 

thing, seeing the same thing. Don’t we need to know more about 

how the human brain operates with respect to that kind of work, 

so that we can better equip screeners to do this, frankly, very boring job? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I think that’s a key point, and one of the things 

that we looked at, as we looked at the—at what are the repeated 

causes of these things that we keep seeing over and over again? 

Ms. NORTON. So who was looking at that? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, we initially looked at it through an assigned team. The Secretary referred to it as the tiger team, but I’ve 

inherited it. It’s really the team—the root cause analysis team. And 

the next thing you have to do then is say, okay, now that I’ve found 

these root causes, can we correct them ourselves, or do we need 

help in doing so? 

Ms. NORTON. I’m just going to ask you, finally—I know my time 

is up—if you would consider getting an outside study from people 

equipped to understand the human brain and how it operates after 

repetitiveness of this kind, so that we can get ahold of this? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Yeah, I think it’s important to look at human 

factors. You’re absolutely right. So I would consider it. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes. 


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Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you for 

being here today. We appreciate your presence. Mr. Roth, I understand that some of this information may be classified. And, certainly, if I overstep my bounds, I’m sure you’ll let me know. But 

I would appreciate your cooperation. I would like to ask you what 

I would consider a little bit more detailed question. And that is, 

first of all, it’s been reported that the undercover investigators 

were, what areas were they specifically looking at? Was it the typical area that a passenger goes through? 

Mr. ROTH. For this round of covert testing, what we did was simply act like an ordinary passenger and try to get prohibited items 

through the checkpoint. So, that would be either the AIT machine, 

the Advanced Imaging Technology machine, or, for example, if they 

were part of managed inclusion, through no sort of action on their 

own but was simply sent to a magnetometer, going through that 

way as well. So they just acted like normal passengers, except they 

had things concealed on them. 

Mr. CARTER. So this particular operation did not really look at 

where the employees are going or anything outside, it was just typical passengers? 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. We did some covert testing 2 years ago on 

that very issue, that is, trying to get into the very secure areas, you 

know, sort of unguarded access to aircraft or jet baggage and that 

kind of thing. And the results were disappointing. 

Mr. CARTER. You mentioned the imaging machines. Were there 

actually guns or simulated bombs that you were able to get 

through? Did they go through the imaging machine as well? 

Mr. ROTH. I can’t talk about the specifics unfortunately. But we 

did test the imaging machine, and we did test it with significant 

numbers of prohibited items. And, again, the results were disappointing. 

Mr. CARTER. As well as the X ray machines? 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. Mr. Roth, earlier this year, you testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security. And during that 

time, you said that your office, the testing found layers of security 

simply missing. And then you seemed to indicate that those results 

were expected. Is that true? 

Mr. ROTH. One of the things that—yes, the results were expected. The degree of the results, I think, were a bit surprising to 

us. But keep in mind that we’ve done covert testing over the years 

with very similar results to the ones that we did this year. And I 

would add that once we did the results this year, we discovered 

that TSA itself had done covert testing with very similar results. 

So everything had been consistently poor for a number of years, 

which, of course, was both exasperating and troubling to us. 

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Neffenger, given these results and these findings, what are your plans? What do you plan to do to address what 

has been called missing layers of security? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. First, it’s a full-system review. It started with 

understanding the nature of the failures that existed, to look at 

how those were similar to other discoveries in past years, and as 

I had mentioned before, to really figure out what’s the systemic 

reason for this? Because if you have, if you assume you have a genVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:12 Jan 04, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\22989.TXT APRIL

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erally talented workforce that really wants to do a good job, but 

they’re failing, then it tells me that there’s something else going on. 

And I do think we have a generally talented workforce that wants 

to do a good job, that wants to come to work to protect this Nation 

on a daily basis. 

So there must be a reason or something for repeated failures of 

the same type system-wide. First of all, it’s recognizing that it’s a 

system that operates, and not just a point failure at a given airport, or a given number of airports. Second, it’s looking back over 

the way in which your—what is your leadership of the organization? What are the environmental influences? And so on and so 

forth. And then beginning to reevaluate from core essential mission 

facts, you know, what is it we are supposed to do? Do we understand our mission the way we should? So we’re in the process of 

doing that right now. 

Mr. CARTER. And all that is good and fine. But what about specifics? Can you tell me something specifically, we changed this or 

we changed that? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. So proper use of the technology. So we 

dramatically changed the way people use that technology. Because 

as it turns out, we hadn’t taught them how important it was to use 

it properly. And without getting into classified details, and I would 

be happy to provide those in a closed session, I could tell you specifically why some of those failures existed. So we fixed that. We 

actually told them how the equipment works. That was something 

we had never done before. We streamlined the number of procedures that we expected them to memorize. I mentioned there were 

3,100 separate tasks, and 88 different forms of pat-downs. So that 

was just, it’s impossible. There’s no one who can do that. So we’ve 

now streamlined that down to about a 25-page quick-response 

guide which outlines in very specific detail with pictures, here’s exactly what you do. And we’ve significantly improved our ability. So 

we trained specifically to do things very differently at the checkpoint. 

Mr. CARTER. My time has expired. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. PALMER. [presiding.] The chair recognizes Mr. Cartwright for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, TSA 

is a frontline counterterrorism organization. And its transportation 

security officers, those TSOs we’ve been talking about, they have 

to get it right every time. Mr. Neffenger, thank you for being here. 

I want to ask you, do TSOs receive annual performance review 

testing? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. They do. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Do the TSOs typically know when they’re going 

to be tested for their annual employee performance reviews? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Typically, yes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Okay. And on average, how do they perform 

during these annual performance review tests? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. On average, they perform well. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. But, yet, what we find out is that the covert 

tests conducted by the Inspector General, GAO, and your own internal teams, revealed significant problems in screener’s performance. It seems as though TSOs tend to bring their A game when 


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they know the test is coming, but not so much at other times. Inspector General Roth, nice to have you back in our committee 

room. Would you say covert tests of screener skills and knowledge 

bear out this concern I’m talking about? 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Now, according to TSA documents, of the 38 

metrics used to assess the performance of field leadership at airport checkpoints, the majority have been focused on wait times for 

passengers, rather than safety concerns. And I want to ask all of 

our witnesses, including you, Director Grover, would you agree that 

if TSA employees were told they’re being judged, at least in part, 

on how expeditiously they move passengers through the system, 

this may signal to screeners that speed takes priority over other 

considerations? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Is that question for me? You’re absolutely right. 

I couldn’t agree with you more. That’s exactly what I found in the 

course of our analysis of the issue. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. And I note that under TSA’s new plan, it appears to put the focus back on security. Am I correct in that? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. You’re correct. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. In responding to the new ‘‘safety before speed’’ 

goals, one TSA employee was reported to be glad that, ‘‘The agency 

finally is going back to basics, emphasizing security over customer 

service and wait times.’’ But another employee doubted the new 

plans will be implemented. And he or she thought that management will still be very focused on wait times and throughput. And 

I want to ask you, Mr. Neffenger, how will you convince frontline 

employees that the metric on which they will be evaluated will be 

security? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, I suppose, I mean, you have to get a little 

trust up front and you teach them over time. But I will assure you 

that one of the first things I did was to eliminate wait time as a 

primary measurement. Now, it’s not that wait time isn’t important. 

There’s some issues associated with people packing up outside the 

sterile area. But effectiveness and security is the primary measure. 

And what I’ve said to, not just my leadership team, but to everybody in the organization, and I’ve done it through direct contact, 

through video messages, through weekly messages from me, I’ve 

said, Your number one job, if you’re a screener, is to screen effectively. 

I will let management—it’s management’s responsibility to work 

with the airports and the airlines and others to do queue management. But we were putting that burden on the backs of the screeners. And it’s no surprise to me that if you hold them accountable 

for moving people more effectively, more efficiently through the 

line, that they’re going to do just that. You get what you measure. 

And you get what you emphasize. It’s also no surprise that they do 

really well on the performance test and do poorly in the other way, 

because that’s about keeping your job. So it tells me they’re capable 

of doing their job well. We just have to give them that—we have 

to back them in that score 100 percent. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. All right. Fine. Let me ask you this, Administrator Neffenger: When will performance assessments using the 

new metrics begin to be used? And will any aspects of the performVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:12 Jan 04, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\22989.TXT APRIL

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ance evaluation process change to track performance over time 

rather than performance on a single test? In other words, how are 

you going to ensure TSOs are at the top of their game every day, 

not just when their job performance reviews are happening? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, those performance metrics have already 

changed. And they’ve been explained and announced to the workforce. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. All right. Now, finally, let me ask you how will 

you balance increased wait times with the focus on security, and 

ensure that security considerations don’t give way when balanced 

against increased wait times, particularly during busy travel periods like the upcoming holiday season? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, we are seeing an increase in wait times, 

not, not—and it’s SPOT-significant. But, two things: One, I really 

want to grow this trusted traveler population. And I want to do it 

in the smart way, which is a true vetted population. And so we’re 

working very hard with the—both with the current vendor, who 

you may have seen some of the opportunities in the airports, and 

we’re looking to expand it considerably through a request for a proposal that’s out. Also working with the industry itself to look for 

opportunities to market it more effectively. And we are seeing a 

significant increase in enrollments. That’s one way of doing it. The 

second is to provide surge staffing to those airports that we know 

are going to be under the greatest pressure during the upcoming 

travel season. But at the same time, not to put any of that burden 

on the backs of the screeners, but to move that into the management team where it belongs. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. All right. I’m out of time. And I yield back, 

Chairman Palmer. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

chair recognizes Mr. Hice from Georgia. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you for 

being here with us here today. In my short time in Congress, I 

have already seen and heard far too many reports, be it from the 

Office of the Inspector General or GAO, wherever, dealing and detailing TSA’s prohibitively expensive technology, either not working 

to properly screen passengers, or the TSA agents not properly reading the technology one way or the other in the various red tests, 

red team tests that have taken place. 

As you well know, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, hundreds of thousands of people every day flying out of there, 

one of, if not the most busiest airport in the world. I fly out of there 

myself almost every week. And I could not agree any more with my 

colleagues here today that the recommendations that have come 

from OIG and GAO, it’s just vitally critical for these to be implemented. 

And you, Mr. Neffenger, just being in this position 4 months, 

hats off to you. I thank you for your comments here today and your 

willingness to admit the problems that you’re facing, and the willingness to attack those head on. 

As some of the results have come back from some of the various 

tests, a word was used earlier describing those results as ‘‘pathetic.’’ And you, yourself, I think, are fully aware of that. Another 

word that hit me earlier is the word ‘‘culture’’ that’s been within 


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TSA. And I believe Inspector Roth said that culture is the most important issue that you saw that needs to change immediately. So 

that being said, what have you done to this point to transform the 

culture at TSA in such a way that the vulnerabilities are adequately addressed? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Mr. Hice, thank you for that question. And that 

is a key point. You know, as I looked at TSA, I tried to understand, 

so I come from an agency with 225 years of culture, the United 

States Coast Guard. And that’s a lot of time to build an identity 

for an organization in the sense of who you are. TSA is still largely 

an amalgam of the cultures of the places that everybody came 

from. It really hasn’t had time to grow a leadership core from within. And so you have this combination of people. 

So what do you do to jump start the culture in an organization? 

I think there’s a couple key things you can do, and it comes from 

both the top and the bottom. Let me start with the bottom. First, 

I think one of the greatest challenges TSA has amongst its workforce is that we train on the job across 75 different airports. So if 

you hire into TSA right now, if you hire into Atlanta, you actually 

just join the Atlanta-Hartsfield workforce. It’s not clear to me that 

there’s a—that there’s a real engagement with the broader sense 

of who you’re part of. 

So one of the things I’ve proposed and I’ve asked for in the FY 

’16 budget, is to begin almost like a boot camp training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia, so that 

I can conduct all new hire training there. That’s one way to begin 

to engage from the bottom up this connection to a larger organization and a sense of culture, and to begin to inculturate people. 

At the top level, it takes somebody at the very top of the organization, and that’s me right now, saying this is important—first of 

all, saying the word ‘‘culture’’ out loud, and identifying where the 

culture isn’t connected, and then identifying what you expect that 

culture to be. So I’m about to issue my administrator’s intent in 

which I, very clearly, in a few succinct pages, outline what the culture of our organization is, and what I intend it to be, and how we 

intend to work towards that. 

And then you have to then begin working on that on a daily 

basis. So there’s a series of efforts that I have planned over the 

coming months to begin to talk and train in the culture that you 

expect. 

I think that’s the best way to begin to jump start it. And then 

it has to take root and grow over time. But it takes continuous attention. This is one of these things that will fade away if you don’t 

pay attention to it. 

Mr. HICE. Well, and it is a huge task. And in the middle of that, 

you have both the safety issue and the efficiency issue trying to get 

passengers through. You mentioned some metrics a while ago that 

you are currently already implementing. I want to know from Mr. 

Roth and Ms. Grover, do you believe those metrics are adequate to 

both provide safety, security that we need, and also efficiency? 

Mr. ROTH. I agree with the Administrator that you get what you 

measure. So, certainly, if you measure the right things, you’re 

going to get the right things. As part of our audit process, what 

we’ll do is 90 days after the completion of our report, we’re going 


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to look back on it in sort of a rigorous, systematic way to determine 

whether or not these metrics are going to work. Until then, we’re 

going to be skeptical about it because that’s our job is to be skeptical. So we will keep the Congress informed as we go forward. 

Ms. GROVER. Time will tell. Our biggest task for TSA at the moment would be to make sure they put in place a systematic, coherent approach to measuring the outcomes that they want to achieve, 

and then monitoring them and following up on them with the 

workforce. Because that’s the only way to make sure that they get 

improved, consistent effectiveness. 

Mr. HICE. Again, I thank each of you for your accountability and 

working, partnering together. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the 

time. I yield back. 

Mr. PALMER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The chair now 

recognizes Mr. DeSaulnier. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Neffenger, let 

me just say how encouraging it is to hear your forthrightness, and 

also your comments about going to root cause and human factors. 

So when we look at human factors, I know when I talk to people 

in my district in the national laboratories, or, I should say, in the 

edges, who do studies on human factors in different environments 

and all they’re learning from neuroscience, one of the things that 

comes up is making sure that those individuals can focus on what 

their jobs are. 

And that also reinforces the things you say about culture, that 

you’re trying to eliminate things that are distracting them. So, for 

individuals who aren’t getting paid a lot of money but are dealing 

in a stressful retail environment where the customers aren’t always 

the great—always in the best mood, I wanted to ask you questions 

about your relationship with the airline industry. 

So it strikes me that, having been a frequent traveler for many 

years, going through the experience, you don’t go to TSA to find out 

what’s the best way for you as a customer to go through wherever 

you’re going, whether it’s the general customers going through, or 

pre-check. But the more we continually reinforce this is what you 

should expect, this is what you need to do; and on the back end, 

your conversations with the airline industry, and specifically, for 

charges for checked baggage, which you have mentioned, stated 

that this trend, and more checked baggages creates a stressed 

screening environment at airport checkpoints. 

So both of those things. How do you deal with the airlines so that 

when some of the airlines start charging for check baggage, and we 

have more and more people trying to carry on more, it seems to— 

just as an observer—create more stress for the screeners. And then, 

secondarily, how do you help with the airline so that when we’re 

going to our apps to understand for people who don’t fly frequently, 

they are helping you reinforce how to get customers and educate 

customers how they can best be prepared to get through the line? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Thank you for that question. And I think that— 

so I’m still relatively new in the game, but I’ve been—I’ve met— 

I’ve spent a lot of time over the past 4 months meeting with both 

industry representatives, the association that represent them, as 

well as the individual CEOs of each of the major U.S. airlines. I’ve 

been very encouraged with their openness and their response. They 


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recognize some of these same challenges. I think that there’s a 

great deal of work we can do to tie ourselves more closely together. 

There’s nobody with a higher vested interest in security of the system than the people who are flying in the system. And I think that 

recognizing that, that gives you a lot of grounds for, we have the 

same objective in mind, even if we approach it from different motivations and different requirements. 

So I’m encouraged that a number of airlines and the travel associations that support them have begun to do more to advertise the 

trusted traveler programs like global entry and pre-check. I think 

there’s a lot we can do to simplify the application procedures and 

to make them more common across the various programs that the 

Government offers. I think that you can never market that enough. 

But I do believe that it really comes down to understanding that 

we’re all in the same system together. We have different roles to 

play, but we can play those roles in a complementary fashion. The 

airlines have been working very hard to enforce the 1+1 rule, 

meaning the one carry-on bag and one handbag or one briefcase. 

They’re challenged as well. 

You know, it’s not my business to address their business model, 

but I can tell you it’s just a fact that a lot more stuff is arriving. 

It’s packed more—full of more things. People have electronics in 

there. All of that poses a challenge for the screeners to deal with. 

And they have to be very attentive to it. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. But you work with the airline industry, so that 

you knew these changes were coming, or your predecessor knew, 

that it had the potential to put more pressure on the screeners 

when they were going to start charging for checked baggage? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I mean, I think that would have been the expectation. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Do we have a mechanism to do that going forward? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Absolutely. I’ve asked the—and the airlines 

have promised to work closely together. I think both sides have to 

be aware of the impact of the decisions they make. And I’m interested in the decisions and the business models of the airline industry and how it affects our business, because we support that business. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. And also they may be transferring costs that 

you might pick up that they would normally expect to be part of 

their costs? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. At a minimum, to let them know what the consequence of that decision will be, that it may, indeed, lead to slower 

throughput at checkpoints, because we have to screen and clear 

these bags. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. But, in this instance, would there be some kind 

of analysis that they are making more money by checking—charging for checked bags, but it’s costing us more money, either because 

it’s putting more stress on the system, you’re adding more people, 

they’re working overtime? And do you have a relationship with the 

revenue stream that’s going in there? Should they compensate you 

for that if there’s a cost benefit that shows that there is? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, I have not looked at the specific cost analysis. So I would have to take that back for action. But I think that, 


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certainly, I would want to know what the impact is on me; if it requires me to have additional resources, then I need to be aware of 

that. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Neffenger. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. PALMER. The chair recognizes Mr. Russell from Oklahoma. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here today and your dedication for trying to help secure our 

republic. And, Administrator Neffenger, thank you for your long 

and dedicated service to our republic. With regard to some of the 

issues on the screening partnership program, would you say that 

the partnerships have been better or worse performers than TSA? 

And what concerns do you have about that, if any? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. In my initial look at the difference, or the potential differences between private sector screeners and the public, 

we haven’t seen any significant differences in performance, assuming that they’re trained appropriately and the like. If I have any 

concerns at all, it’s that we have a clear set of standards and expectations, and that those are consistently maintained across that program. But, again, I don’t see any evidence that there’s any particular performance differences between the two. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. With regard to the turnover, what percentage of new hires would you say turn over within 1 year, or 2 

years, just a ballpark? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. You know, I just saw these numbers. I’ll have 

to get you the exact number. But it’s a fairly high turnover rate. 

Well, it depends. Part-time is different from full-time. So in the 

full-time workforce, it’s about 10 percent I think is the number. 

And in the part-time workforce, it’s been as high as about 25 percent. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And you had mentioned some of the reasons before. 

But, obviously, that’s got to be a drain on your experienced, longtime personnel because they’re constantly having to break in new 

employees, and you have the expense of training them. So these 

are really dollars that are lost. How will you mitigate that in the 

future? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I think some of it goes back to that overarching 

discussion we had about connection to mission, connection to agency. As I think about what is it that would make somebody decide 

that this is not for them, aside from the odd individual who just 

says that’s just not what I thought I was signing up for. It’s typically, did the thing I thought I was going to do, is that what the 

agency actually expects me to do? So am I connected to the mission? Am I connected to my agency? And do I see a future in the 

agency? Are there opportunities for training? Further advancement? And so forth. 

I think all of those are components of turnover, I think, some of 

which can be addressed, are beginning to be addressed by establishment of a common training program, and an engaged sense of 

belonging to something larger than you. I think it continues with 

a clearly-defined sense of progression in the organization, an understanding of what your opportunities are, and incentivizing performance, understanding if I perform well, I’ll get rewarded for it, 

and a feeling of engagement with my leadership. 


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Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. What concerns do you have with cargo 

screening? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, cargo, as you know, has been a concern 

for some time. There have been a number of procedures put in 

place for that. I think that the question is a recognition of the fact 

that this is a much larger system than just the checkpoints. Even 

assuming you get the checkpoint 100 percent right, there are many 

other potential vulnerabilities in the aviation environment, cargo 

being one of them. 

We have a very robust set of requirements for cargo on domestic 

aircraft, as well as cargo that is coming inbound to the U.S. on foreign and domestic carriers coming from outside the U.S. And that 

reaches all the way back to the individuals who are actually packing the cargo container for shipment. It is an ongoing challenge. 

It’s an ongoing threat. And it’s one that you can’t take your eyes 

off at any point. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I guess on the TSA pre-program, a lot of issues 

have been addressed with that. I mean, I understand the benefits 

of certainly having low-risk travelers set aside for expedited screening. And you made it a point to, in your testimony here today, to 

try to stop the managed inclusion where people are benefiting from 

the program, but really have no vetting whatsoever. Based upon 

the needs and the shortfalls of the pre-program, how much of that 

was from managed inclusion by vetted passengers? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Are you speaking with respect to the covert 

testing failures? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, I think that it is the case that some of 

the—without getting into details—that, as Inspector General Roth 

noted, some of the people who were coming through the system 

were diverted into it. And that may have contributed to some of the 

failures that we saw. 

I felt that the managed inclusion, as I said before, injected unacceptable risk into the system. I didn’t know anything about these 

individuals. And I thought that they were best put back into standard screening until such time that they presented themselves in a 

direct way for vetting to come into the program. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

Mr. PALMER. The chair recognizes the gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Lujan Grisham. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 

all very much for your testimony today. Mr. Neffenger, I’m a big 

supporter and proponent of evaluative testing and review of large 

employee organizations, because it can be very difficult, particularly when it’s so broad-based, and it’s a national organization, to 

really get at the heart of what is occurring at a day-to-day basis; 

and in my own State, created undercover or anonymous care evaluations of long-term care facilities. I think today it’s still the only 

State-authorized, or I think the authority exists, but we have a 

statute that re-confirms that not only does the authority exist, but 

it should be encouraged, and you should undertake these anonymous care evaluations. 

And I appreciate very much that your leadership recognized that 

this might be a way to either confirm the data that you have, 


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which, at the time, suggested that things were operating fairly 

well, and you might have some complaints, or an anomaly, or you 

would have the opposite, right, which is exactly what occurred here 

that you’ve identified that you’ve got significant issues. 

And in the course of your responses to questions, and certainly 

in your testimony, you’ve—and I appreciate that—have accepted 

that there’s a culture problem in the organization that needs to be 

addressed. And you’ve got a 10-point plan. 

And so I’m really interested in, even implementing that plan, it 

is very difficult—it’s challenging to create, in large organizations, 

I think, a kind of top-to-bottom, bottom-to-top culture shift, because 

I think too often, people believe that it’s a temporary investment, 

and then it’s easier to kind of go back to the way that it was, particularly if you think random efforts at looking at one region, or 

one area, or one airport, or one screening system versus another. 

It really depends on the leadership in that particular organization. 

What have you learned from this experience that, A, we can help 

you with in terms of really having a sustainable culture change 

shift with the leadership and rank and file employees? What can 

we take from that and use it for other Government entities that we 

have the same issues, Secret Service, the Veterans Administration, 

several others in Federal Government that I think could really use 

this kind of approach? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, thank you. There’s a lot in that question, 

but I think it’s really important, and you’ve hit on a number of the 

key concerns and thoughts that I’ve had with respect to this. You’re 

absolutely right, that it’s challenging to do cultural change. But, 

you know, but we have one great benefit, we have a really, really 

important mission, and it’s a very defined and very specific mission. And so, that’s a huge rallying point to begin cultural change, 

unlike an organization that might have, you know, a couple hundred different things to do. 

So I like that. And it’s a mission that people care passionately 

about and you can tie them to it. And I never forget that everybody 

in this workforce raised their hand and took an oath of office, and 

you can activate that. So that’s one great advantage that you have, 

but it’s not enough. And it’s not enough for me to say I want cultural change, but no one individual makes it happen. But it is important for me to say it, because it has to start at the very top of 

the organization. The organization that raised their hand and took 

the oath has to believe that the person leading that organization 

took the same oath and cares about it. And so I have yet to say 

that out loud. 

And then you have to build some institutional structures that actually support it. I mentioned a couple today. I think it’s critical 

that I begin to do new hire training in a consistent, standardized, 

you know, singular way. And I think that that will do great value 

in building culture over time. It’s not immediate, but as you do 

that—— 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. I agree with that, and I hope you’re going 

to, and I think that’s a great idea, but that you—the accountability 

balance with incentivizing and creating long-term shifts, having an 

immediate shift that people believe is really taking place, is the 


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harder part, I think, and I’m really interested to hear more about 

that. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, the other thing I did is, and apparently 

for the first time ever, I brought the entire, what I termed the leadership of TSA together, that is, both the senior leaders at the headquarters office here in the D.C. area, as well as all of the Federal 

security directors, the regional directors, and then my—my regional 

directors, who are posted in overseas locations together, that was 

about 175 people. 

So first time in the history of TSA we’ve done that. I spent 2 

days with them, and it was 2 days of connection to culture. And 

during that 2 days, we talked about how we collectively define the 

culture of the organization. So I can say—— 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. I’m out of time. I applaud your efforts. And 

I would, with the chair’s discretion, just encourage you balance accountability with incentivizing and creating a clear operating system, because I don’t believe it’s sustainable unless you do. Thank 

you very much for your leadership. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. [Presiding.] I thank the gentlelady. I recognize Mr. 

Palmer. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We’ve had a lot of discussion about equipment technology, and 

we’ve gotten into the personnel issue as well. The Inspector General has stated that the TSA’s problems come, I think, largely from 

a lack of training. Mr. Roth, is that correct? 

Mr. ROTH. That is certainly one aspect of it. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Neffenger, how do you plan to address the 

training issues? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, we did immediate address of the current 

results, and we—we did what were called mission essentials training, it was an 8-hour block of training across the entire workforce. 

And it started with the frontline workforce, we did this over the 

course of August and September. We trained every single screener, 

and now we’re in the process of doing the same for the leadership 

of the organization. And that was designed specifically to talk 

about what were the nature of the failures, and then to talk about 

systemically why those failures existed and how they existed across 

the organization. 

Now we have to go back and measure the effectiveness of that 

training, and we’re in the process of doing that now, and we’ll do 

that going forward. That is a program that we’re putting into place 

for—on a routine basis now. We are going to do quarterly mission 

essentials training. And then we’re looking at across the organization at all levels, what are the progressive levels of developmental 

training and repeated training that has to be done to ensure that 

you—that you identify problems before they become systemic, before you get into massive failures like we saw earlier. I think that 

time will tell as to how effective it is, but I’m encouraged that some 

initial anecdotal results show that significantly improved performance in those areas where we recently tested. 

Mr. PALMER. Now, are you referencing the use of the Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Center? Is this your front—training for 

frontline people? 


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Mr. NEFFENGER. It’s one—it’s one aspect of that training that— 

we used it to—to bring all of our trainers in during the month of 

July to train them and then push them out to on-the-job training 

for our workforce. The—what I’d like to do at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is really move our new hire academy 

full-time to there—beginning in 2016, and then develop additional 

training opportunities and developmental training throughout 

someone’s career in the TSA. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Roth and Ms. Grover, you both can respond to 

this, but do you believe this basic training will help? Is it going to 

get us where we need to be? 

Mr. ROTH. It absolutely will help, both in the sense of mission 

and community that Administrator Neffenger referenced, but also 

some of the very basics that we found weren’t being followed with 

regard to checkpoint operations. So I’m a firm believer in training, 

and that is one of our recommendations, so we’re gratified that Administrator Neffenger is following through on that. 

Ms. GROVER. I agree it is necessary and critical to both the development of an appropriate culture and enhancing knowledge to support security effectiveness, but it is not sufficient. Administrator 

Neffenger mentioned the plan to follow up to make sure the training itself was getting the desired results, and that is critical. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Russell of Oklahoma asked a question about 

cargo security. I want to ask about checked bags. Mr. Neffenger, 

are you aware of the leak that occurred earlier this year where all 

of the Travel Century luggage keys, which TSA uses, have been released to the public? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I’m aware. I think you’re referring to the photograph of a key that was published in a major newspaper. 

Mr. PALMER. Right. That apparently they can reproduce those 

keys. Are you aware of that? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I am. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PALMER. Can you provide the committee with any Memorandum of Understanding between your agency and the Travel 

Century regarding the master key program? Would you—could you 

do that for us? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I’ll see if we have one, yes, sir. 

Mr. PALMER. All right. And then my last question will be, how 

do you plan, or will you be able to address this issue of baggage 

locks if these Travel Century keys have been compromised? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, I think that—the first thing I would say 

is that it’s clearly a compromise for a potential—for locking that 

bag outside the aviation environment. Those bags are still secure 

to go through the system, because they go through screening into 

the aviation system, so I don’t see it as a threat to the aviation security system, but it’s clearly a potential theft issue outside of the 

aviation environment. I think I need to see what the potential solution is from the Travel Century folks, and then look to see what 

we can institute in the future, but clearly we have to address that 

as a problem. 

Mr. PALMER. And that’s the context of my question. You have 

travelers who think—who are not using locks, because you use bolt 

cutters, and they want to know that their luggage is secure. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 


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Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Grothman, the gentleman from Wisconsin. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Well, I’d like to thank you for coming over 

here. I know it’s a tough job. You know, you’re—it’s got to be a difficult thing to work. I assume you can work there for 30 years and 

never catch somebody who has ill intent. So you must sometimes 

wonder what you’re doing is worthwhile, and you’re also dealing 

with a public that, you know, usually does not consider this a wonderful thing, so you’re dealing with people who aren’t particularly 

happy to have you there. 

First question I have, in general, say, in the last 5 years, have 

you folks caught anybody who you believe, not somebody who accidentally was slipping in, you know, a fingernail clipper or something, but somebody who really had bad intent in the last 6 or 7 

years that you feel—— 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Within the entire system, I would say yes. Remember that there’s a—there’s a security environment in which 

you enter when you—when you first put your name into a reservation system. So I would say we have repeatedly identified people 

with connections to known or suspected terrorists over the years. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. I mean, people who you believe at the airport, 

when I go through these things, if you guys didn’t stop them, they 

were going to try to do a bad thing; not somebody who was one of 

thousands of people on a terrorist watchlist. I mean, somebody who 

you believed that if you were not there, they would have done bad 

things. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I believe we’ve caught—we had a few instances 

that I’ve been—that I’ve been aware of. I hope that the vast majority are deterred from trying in the first place. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right, right. That’s the goal, right. If you could 

maybe forward to the committee later the examples where you 

really feel—— 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. —that you caught somebody who would have 

done a horrible thing if you hadn’t caught them. 

Second question, we had a hearing a while ago on this stuff. At 

least what I took out of it is that, you know, maybe dogs would be 

a better way to go about this, and there were slip-ups. Have you 

done any work with dogs, or used them as a trial? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. We do. Actually we have quite a few K–9 teams 

deployed throughout the aviation system. I noted in an earlier 

question that—I’m in the process of moving some of those teams 

from what I consider to be smaller, lower risk airports to the large 

airports. I don’t really—I think the exact number is somewhere 

around 112 teams currently. We’ve got another dozen or so teams 

coming on this coming year. 

I think dogs are a very important additional element of security 

in the system. They provide a lot of capability, both for cargo 

screening as well as for passenger screening, so I’m a big proponent 

of the use of canine teams. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Could you see the day when we use more dogs 

and less people? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I don’t know that dogs will ever replace the people component. 


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Mr. GROTHMAN. Not entirely, but I mean—— 

Mr. NEFFENGER. But I think that—I think I can see a day for 

using more dogs, and we’re doing that as we go forward. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Would they ever—would they replace some people? Do you see the day where, you know, rather than I go through 

there and I see eight uniformed people, I see two uniformed people 

and a dog? Do you see that day? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, I think there’s a potential, but that—that 

really speaks to the larger question of how that checkpoint evolves 

over time. 

What I do see is a day when the checkpoint looks very different 

from what it does today. We’re still largely dealing with, with the 

exception of the AIT, we’re still largely dealing with the same kind 

of checkpoint we’ve had for the past decade or more, and I think 

we’re on the cusp of a very different-looking checkpoint experience 

in the next 5 years. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. A while back, I know a guy who worked 

for you, and he felt it was a very top heavy organization, or at least 

at the airport this guy worked at. Are you doing things over time 

to reduce the number of administrative staff as opposed to people 

doing the work? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. We have. We’ve come down about a total of 

6,000 people in TSA since the spring of 2013, so in the past 2 

years, almost—now 3 years almost, we’ve reduced the workforce by 

about 13 percent. I think we’ll continue do so. I’ve asked to hold 

steady for the coming year as we look at the impact of the elimination of managed inclusion, and I look to correct what I see to be 

systemic issues in the organization, and then we’ll revisit the staffing standards following—following this year, but I do see that there 

are more efficiencies to be gained always in an organization. I 

think you have to look at that continuously. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. What do you pay your people starting? I 

mean, one of the guys that I see, or gals I see, what is the compensation they get? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. It varies by location, because there’s locality pay 

associated with it, but it’s—it’s roughly equivalent to—to the incoming level for a—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. What is—how much is it? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. You know, I think it runs somewhere around 

28- to $30,000, but I’ll get you the exact figure. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Do you have a hard time finding people or not? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. We’re challenged like any organization to find 

a workforce. We’ve met our recruiting goals every year, but the 

turnover’s higher than I’d like to see it be. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Is there any reason why somebody 60 to 65 

couldn’t do that job, or do you discriminate against them or you’ll 

get—— 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Oh, not at all. We have quite a few people who 

are retirees that are working in the screener workforce. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. I guess I’m out of time. We’ll get one more question. 

Sure. I ran into a guy this weekend who was on your whatever 

list, the trouble list, okay, and he’d been on it for quite a long period of time. He wasn’t as mad about it as I would be. I mean, one 


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time he walked through the thing, and apparently the people all 

ducked down and they called the police on him and, you know, people came in with their guns drawn. He was somebody if you just 

looked at the guy, you’d think, what? I mean, this is some guy who 

lives in a little town in Wisconsin. It was like, really? 

How quickly does it take people to get off this list? I mean, when 

you guys make a mistake like this, how quickly should it be? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, there’s—there’s a redress process that 

we—that we partly manage. It’s managed also by others in the— 

in the law enforcement and intelligence community. What I would 

say is I’m not familiar with that specific. If I can get the specifics 

on that, we can look at that specific case, but there is a process for 

if you think that you have been—been inaccurately placed on a list, 

there’s a redress process. And it’s a pretty fast redress process, as 

I understand it, although it’s a process that you have to go 

through. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Long time for this guy, but I’ll—— 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Yeah. But I’d be—I’d certainly take it for action 

if you’ve got the details for me. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Thanks much. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. 

Mrs. Maloney. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I thank the gentleman for calling this hearing. 

TSA relies on many different pieces of equipment to carry out its 

screening tasks. For example, it uses Advanced Imaging Technology machines, walk-through metal detectors, explosive trace detection machines, bottled liquid scanners, and x-ray machines, 

among other pieces of equipment. 

In May of this year, the IG’s office issued a report that concluded 

TSA is not properly managing the maintenance of its airport 

screening equipment, and one of the IG’s key findings was that 

TSA relies on self-reported data provided by the maintenance contractors, and does not validate the data to confirm that required 

preventive maintenance actions have been taken. TSA also does 

not validate the corrective maintenance data reported by its contractors. 

So my question is to Inspector General Roth. If TSA has not been 

validating the data reported by its contractors, can it be sure that 

all required maintenance has been performed, and that its machines are operating correctly? 

Mr. ROTH. No, they can’t. And you accurately summarized what 

those reports are. It’s the functional equivalent of giving your car 

to the mechanic, but not checking to see whether or not they’ve 

changed the spark plugs. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Yeah. Well, that’s important. 

And, IG Roth, do any of the contractors responsible for the maintenance of TSA equipment have sole source contracts? Is it competitively bid, or is it a sole source contract? 

Mr. ROTH. My understanding is it’s competitively bid, but I think 

I’d need to get back to you to give you a full and accurate answer. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Could you get back to me and the chairman, 

would you, please—— 

Mr. ROTH. Absolutely. 

Mrs. MALONEY. —and the ranking member? 


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IG Roth, have any contractors ever been penalized for failing to 

perform any type of maintenance tasks? 

Mr. ROTH. I’m not aware of any, but, again, let me take that 

back and be sure of the answer. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And what recommendations did your office make 

to TSA to improve maintenance of its equipment, and what is the 

status of these recommendations? 

Mr. ROTH. We did make a number of recommendations with regard to the process that TSA uses to verify this maintenance. That 

is still in process. We typically allow them some time to be able to 

institute those changes, but, again, I will get back to you with the 

specifics on that. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And I’d like to ask Administrator Neffenger: Are 

you confident that TSA now has the systems in place to hold its 

contractors accountable for providing proper maintenance of its 

equipment? And are you confident TSA’s equipment is being maintained and repaired properly? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Thanks for that question. Let me first say that 

I concur completely with the Inspector General’s findings, and I did 

find that we had—not that the maintenance wasn’t being done, but 

we had no way to verify that it was, in fact, appropriate and done, 

so we put the processes in place to do so. We have to—we now have 

to measure whether those processes are adequate to do that, but 

I’m confident that—that certainly I get it, and that the person I 

have is tasked as responsible for ensuring that it happens, understands the importance of having an auditable follow-up trail for everything that’s done to ensure that this equipment is maintained 

to its standards. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, I just must underscore, which I know you 

feel, the responsibility that you have to the American people. We 

know that there are many who want to harm our citizens, and that 

they try to do it for some reason through the airplanes, and they 

are continuing to break our system. Because I check with the airlines in my area, and they have incidents where they’re trying to 

break through. So having the oversight and the audit and making 

sure that this is happening is critically important. 

And I look forward to you getting back to the committee, Inspector General Roth, on the answers that you needed to review more 

for us. I think they’re important questions, and I look forward to 

seeing what your response is. 

Again, I thank you for your public service. Thank you for being 

here today. And I thank the chairman for calling the hearing on 

a very important safety issue. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady. And I’ll finish with a round of 

summary questions here. 

First of all, Mr. Administrator, in previous response to me, we 

discussed who poses a risk, and it’s less than 1 percent of the travelers that are examined of the 660 million. Is that still your position? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I couldn’t put an exact number on it, but I 

would agree with you that—— 

Mr. MICA. The vast majority. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. —the vast majority of travelers are—— 


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Mr. MICA. You’re probably dealing with 20- to 50,000 people on 

some sort of a watchlist or no-fly list that we’re looking to not 

board who may pose a risk, but we’re spending about 95 percent 

of our resources, again, on folks who pose no risk. 

You talked about where you’re going, and I saw some of your report and I was pleased to see that you’re looking to the future. 

Here’s my boarding pass. I’ve been to Europe. Last year I was 

there twice, once in Italy and once in Germany. There was no TSAtype screener at the entry point. I have pictures of it. I’d be glad 

to show you. You go up and you put your boarding pass on, and 

the stile lets you through. If it doesn’t let you through, there is a 

person who would subject you to additional screening. That’s almost commonplace now in Europe in the domestic arena. Maybe 

you saw that when you—— 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I did, yes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Yeah. We have people going through this. Some of the 

dumbest things I’ve ever seen—where’s your cell phone? Let me 

borrow your cell phone a second. You go up and put your cell phone 

down and they let you through, but then you’ve got another TSA— 

if you don’t have it on your electronic device, then you have someone who takes time and they go through and circle each thing. I 

mean, it—there’s just—just things like that, and where we are not. 

Can you name any countries, other than Bulgaria, Romania, or 

Poland, sort of in the more sophisticated countries, that have all 

Federal screening? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I’ll get back to you. I know—— 

Mr. MICA. There are none. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. —most of the—— 

Mr. MICA. There are none. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. —European countries do private screening. 

Mr. MICA. Israel. Yeah, but it’s under Federal supervision. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Right. 

Mr. MICA. I have never said do away with TSA. I have said 

change your role, change the resources to connecting the dots, to 

security. That’s what’s going to get us. And every time we’ve been 

successful in stopping someone, it’s connecting the dots. But, again, 

we are—you said it may be 5 years before we could get to this. This 

should be tomorrow. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, actually, I think we’ll get to that much 

faster. 

Mr. MICA. Yeah. And we should be embedding the information 

here. I saw that in German—in Nuremberg demonstrated in 2003, 

completely operational. It will stop people, they won’t be able to 

board. The systems exist. We just keep falling further behind, adding more people. 

Now you’re saying you’re training them, you’re sending them 

back to basics to a law enforcement training program? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. No. It’s at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. It’s not a law enforcement training program. It’s 

usual—— 

Mr. MICA. Well, I have to make it clear. And some of my colleagues don’t even know that TSA screeners are not sworn personnel, right? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. That’s correct. This is not—— 


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Mr. MICA. Okay. They are not sworn personnel. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. That’s right. 

Mr. MICA. They are screeners. 

Mr. NEFFENGER. That’s correct. 

Mr. MICA. And, again, you have this huge bureaucracy trying to 

recruit. And maybe you’ve gotten better, you know, I—this goes, 

we’re hiring them off of pizza box ads, and above discount gas 

pump advertisements for screeners, that hopefully has stopped. But 

you can recruit all you want, you can train all you want. You have 

actually trained more people than you employ, and—at this time. 

You know that? You’ve actually trained more people. They’re gone. 

Your turnover has been—some places it’s horrendous, other place— 

and granted, some markets are very difficult, but—okay. 

So we’ve got equipment, and this is about equipment. I’ve 

heard—and the AIT failures to maintain, to operate, to train people 

for it, Advanced Imaging Technology. The deployment is a disaster. 

How many machines do we have? 700 and what? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. About 750 machines currently. 

Mr. MICA. 750 machines. They’re at how many airports? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. They’re at—— 

Mr. MICA. 160 is the answer. How many airports do you have? 

Say over 400—— 

Mr. NEFFENGER. About 400 over—about 450. 

Mr. MICA. So about 300, 290 airports that don’t even have an 

AIT machine. I’m Mr. Dumb Terrorist. Okay? Where am I going to 

go under the system? AIT is the best equipment we have, but it 

can be thwarted. I know it can be thwarted. I’ll get it in the airport, but it’s the best device we have available. You’ve made some 

refinements to it, but personnel are human beings, they’re going to 

fail. I will bet the staff a dollar—okay, Mike, I’m going to bet you 

a dollar, they’ll be back here, we’ll do it next September, we will 

do the same hearing, we’ll have covert testing. Maybe you’ll improve slightly, but it will still be a disaster. It’s been a disaster in 

every classified hearing I’ve sat in, the failure rate. If it was publicly known, people would scream for some change. 

So, again, I want to get you out of the personnel business, which 

is that huge—again, they’re not law enforcement, but screening 

team. Again, you need to be in intelligence and connecting the dots 

and security, setting the protocols, the standards, seeing who is not 

performing, getting rid of them if it’s a private firm that’s operating. 

Okay. So here’s our AIT’s, we have 450 airports, we’re at 160 locations. Then you go to the locations when they put them out. It 

was mind boggling. And how are you going to change that? It costs 

hundreds of thousands of dollars for the equipment, then it costs 

the airports and you a fortune to put them in place. 

You go to some concourses, and they’ve got two or three of them 

in one concourse. It was never intended for that. It’s intended to 

be a secondary screening device. And then in other concourses, 

even at National you go to, one of our airports in some of the concourses have none. So you have started—I mean, God bless you, 

you’re trying to change a mess, but even the deployment of that important machine has been a disaster. 


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When we spoke, I asked you about reducing some of the overhead. You’ve got thousands of people in overhead, 46,000 screeners. 

It was up to 15,000, we found either within the 46 over here in 

Washington. One time there were 4,000 making $103,000, on average, just within 20 miles of where we’re sitting. And some of those 

may be important responsibilities, but, again, paring that down. 

We have the public-private screening partnership, and I’m a firm 

believer in that. They probably—well, I know they perform a little 

bit better than you, because I’ve had that tested. And they came 

back and told me, you know what the response was when there 

was a fair, open testing? They said that private screening performed—under Federal supervision, private screening under Federal supervision performed statistically significantly better. 

Now, I don’t care how polite your agents are. It’s nice to have 

them polite, you’ve impressed some of the members. What I care 

is if they are able to deter a terrorist from getting through. And 

they are not law enforcement personnel, they are screening personnel. You’ve got your whole billions of dollars, billions of dollars 

focused on people who don’t pose a risk. So we need to get away 

from that model. 

A Member of Congress, Mr. Walberg, who testified, he’s got an 

ID card. Sometimes they don’t even recognize a Federal ID and ask 

you for a driver’s license. But I’ve had hearings here on driver’s license and ID’s, TWIC cards and others that can and have been duplicated. That’s one of the easiest things you can do. And I can take 

and make you the fanciest boarding pass, I’ll challenge you, be glad 

to go out and take one, and I can get through any of your gates 

at National, or anyplace else, with just a little bit of work on a 

computer. 

So, again, we’ve set up a system that is destined to fail. You’ll 

be back here, maybe slight improvement, training some more folks, 

maybe a little bit better retention. 

Back to the partnerships. In Rochester, one of several dozen public-private partnerships, I told you they had, at one time, 15 to 18 

people, most of them making between 60 and 100-and-some thousand dollars. They have 1.1 million passengers. I went to Canada 

and looked at similar operations. They have one Federal person. 

And I think you need a Federal person, someone who’s charged 

with the intelligence, someone who’s charged with conducting the 

oversight audit on a daily basis and making certain it works. 

Is there any hope of getting a reduction of some of the people we 

don’t need at these programs where we have the public-private 

partnership? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. As you know, we actually have reduced the 

number of oversight directly for the partnership, but there’s a—the 

additional responsibility of TSA has members, there’s a surface inspection in transportation, so a number of those people are involved in compliance examinations and the surface examinations. 

Mr. MICA. And there’s anything that can’t be done through a contract—— 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well—— 

Mr. MICA. —written in a contract? But okay. Two, three, four 

people at an airport like Rochester, not 15 or 16. Again—and I 

know the game. You pack it so it makes it look like it costs more 


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or as much for private screening under Federal supervision. We’re 

going to have a report that will be released soon and show some 

of the costs. At least it costs less under that. Not that I’m trying 

to do it on the cheap. They’re just more efficient. I support Federal 

wages, no change in that. I support union membership. I put that 

in the bill in the beginning bill. In fact, in the private screening 

in San Francisco, they had folks belonging to unions long before 

the most recent signup of folks across the area. 

I have another question the chairman wants me to get in. Will 

you let the committee know today, or within the period we keep the 

record open, we want a complete response on when you will—will 

you—you will finish and address all of the recommendations that 

the IG and GAO have put forward. Could you—could you give us 

that today, do you think? Or do you want to give it to us for the 

record? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I’ll give you a schedule for the record. What I 

will tell you is what I told both the Inspector General and Director 

Grover, and that is, that I’m committed to addressing all the remaining open recommendations as well as any that remain that 

are nonconcurrers and getting those closed. 

Mr. MICA. And if you can get the committee in the next—what 

are you going to leave this open, 10 days, Mr.—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, 10 days. 

Mr. MICA. 10 days. Without objection, so ordered. We’ll leave it 

open for 10 days. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. No. I have—— 

Mr. MICA. No, I’m not finished. I was just leaving it open and 

I’m making certain they comply with your wishes, too. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. That’s fine. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. But in any event, 10 days, and we would like 

that made part of the official record, and as exact a date, because, 

again, I’m going to—I’m going to hold a subcommittee hearing if we 

don’t hold a full one within a year, give you a chance. You’re here, 

and I love your attitude, I love your willingness to be open with 

the committee. You’ve inherited one of the most difficult tasks. 

You’re the, what, sixth Administrator? I’ve dealt with them all, 

and I think you’re one of the most capable that we’ve—we’ve been 

fortunate to have, but we need to look at rewriting the ship on this 

whole security thing, get you out of the business that gives you the 

headaches. 

And I know you’ll go back and people will say, oh, Mica’s full of 

it and don’t listen to him, but as long as you keep trying to manage 

a $46,000 HR department, you are going to have problems with recruiting, with training, with retaining, with managing. You will 

never get it right, I can assure you. Not that it’s your fault. You’re 

dealing with human beings. And then using all of that resource to 

go after 99 percent of the people who don’t pose a risk, not expediting their passage, and not redirecting those resources towards 

the bad guys, connecting the dots, security, making certain that 

you set the standards. 

And then as the Inspector General and Director Grover have 

said, that you—you bear down on those that are not meeting the 

standards that you have, you kick their butts out, you fire them, 


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you—and terminate their contract. That’s your—I believe, your 

role. 

So, again, welcome. Isn’t this great? You want to reconsider? No. 

He’s—no. You’re—but you are a true hero to come forward. I have 

the greatest respect for you and what you’re going to try to do. I’m 

trying to get you to see a year from now what you’re going to face 

when you—when you come back here and where we’ll be. 

With that, thank you. And I want to yield to the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank all of you for your patience. I know it has already been a 

long morning, and I only have a few questions. 

As all of you know, our Nation has one standard credential for 

merchant mariners and employees who need access to secure areas 

of ports, it is called the Transportation Worker Identification Card, 

or TWIC card. You said the TWIC was required by the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, and each TWIC is issued by the TSA. 

Administrator Neffenger, I’m curious, given your background 

with the Coast Guard, which model do you think is better? Should 

credentials for access to facilities, secure areas be issued by each 

individual facility, or should they be issued by a national entity 

like TSA? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. I don’t know if I have a good direct answer to 

that. And by that, I mean this: When you have a nationally issued 

ID card, that creates a lot of challenge in managing it and issuing 

it, and introduces some concerns with respect to its—its viability 

across a large organization. 

That said, I think that both systems can work effectively if 

they’re—if they’re—if the oversight is what it should be. I think as 

I look at the badging environment in the airports, airports would 

argue that they like the fact that the badges are different, because 

it means you can’t move from one airport to another and show up 

and get access. You have—you have to have something that says 

your airport on it. 

I think that we can do a lot more to ensure the security of 

those—of those badges, and to ensure the accountability of those 

badges as we move forward. There was an awful lot of information 

that came out of what the Aviation Security Advisory Committee 

study told us about the—the way to manage and to ensure the integrity of those badges going forward, as well as to look at the oversight of those. I think the Inspector General has pointed out some 

important areas for us to consider. 

So I don’t—I don’t really know which—which approach is better. 

I think both approaches can work very effectively, but they need 

a lot of oversight no matter which way you take it. As you know, 

there have been some challenges in the TWIC program as well. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah. Yeah. The—are you confident that full implementation of your plans will ensure that TSA’s screening systems will pass future covert tests by the Inspector General and 

TSA’s own covert testing teams? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, testing will tell, but I—I’m confident that 

we’re on the right track. I hope it means that we will—we will see 

dramatic improvement in the future. I believe it will, but I don’t 

believe that we can just declare it done and move forward. I think 


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that this is a continuous process, and it’s a continuous attention. 

This is one of these things that, as I said before, you can’t just fix 

this and assume you’ve got it right. This is—what it’s allowed us 

to do is see that this is a—this is an ongoing attention that needs 

throughout the entire life of the organization. There is no fixing it. 

There is addressing the challenges, learning from what you’ve addressed, testing yourself, learning from those testing and that continuous improvement as we go forward. 

So what I will tell you is that, certainly for the duration of my 

tenure, that I don’t ever take my focus on continuing to test this 

system, evaluating the processes and training that we put in place, 

the procedures, continuing to adjust them as we discover whether 

they work or don’t work, and then looking for how to distribute 

those—the best practices that we find across the whole system, and 

that includes looking to our international partners for anything 

that they might be doing that can inform the way we do business, 

because this global system relies on global standards and global 

consistency. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, as you’ve heard GAO state today, TSA has 

not always established performance—performance measures that 

clearly align with its goals. How will you know if you have altered 

the pervasive cultural problems in TSA and what performance 

metrics will confirm it? 

Mr. NEFFENGER. Well, we took a look at the—I took a look at the 

entire measurement system, and essentially said, look, the current—the current way we’re measuring isn’t leading us to improving the system. So I think there’s a readiness component. I want 

to know if the workforce is ready, meaning are they trained, do 

they know what the mission is, do they have the support of the 

leadership, and is there ongoing attention to that, and then I want 

to look at their performance. Then I have to test them. Did all that 

stuff work? Did what I think about their readiness actually show 

itself in their performance? 

The system has to have the same sort of measures. You need to 

know is the system ready, meaning, have we maintained it appropriately? Can we verify that we’ve maintained it appropriately? Is 

it meeting the standards before we deploy it that we expect it to 

meet? And all those other things that go into does it work? And 

then the second piece is how well does it perform when you plug 

it into the system? And so then you have to go back and you test 

that as well. 

So you’re testing the people, the processes, and the technology, 

both its readiness to do its mission as well as the actual production 

of that mission, and it’s a continuous process. I will tell you that 

right now I get a report on a weekly basis directly to me on those 

measures. We have a ways to go yet. We’re putting—we’re getting 

the organization used to a new way of thinking, it’s measuring effectiveness, it’s focusing on the security component and the effectiveness of that; it’s defining that mission in a very clear way, and 

then looking to see what we’re learning as we’re—as we’re studying 

it. 

So we’ve actually learned quite a bit already about—about system readiness, both in the workforce as well as in the—in the technology, and it’s leading to some things that we have to do to imVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:12 Jan 04, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\22989.TXT APRIL

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prove that on both scores, and it’s also beginning to point the way 

towards how we’re going to effectively measure performance, and 

that will include working with the Inspector General and the GAO 

as we go forward. 

I see this as a very valuable partnership, even—even recognizing 

that they have to be independent and they’re skeptical, and I want 

them to stay that way, but they give me valuable information 

about how my system’s working. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, let me say this, that the—one of the things 

that I have pushed with the Coast Guard, with the Secret Service 

and the Baltimore city police, is I’ve said that I want them to create an organization which is the elite of the elite. In other words, 

a feeling that we are the best and that our standards are high. And 

I believe that when you have—when you get there, the people who 

are caught up in a culture of mediocrity will fall off, because they 

won’t feel that they belong, period. You won’t have to fire them; 

they’ll leave. Some of them you may have to fire, but most of them 

will just back off. 

So, you know, as I’ve heard the testimony today, one of the 

things that just gnaws at me is the idea that we have now an agency that’s willing to accept the recommendations. And, Director Grover, I keep going back to some of the things you said about accepting these recommendations and then trying to do them. But we’re 

still having those gaps. And, you know, as I was sitting here and 

I was listening to all of this, I was saying to myself, well, maybe 

it’s not just all the things that you’ve just said, but you have to add 

something else to it. See, I think that when you—when we have 

recommendations, and then your agency looks at them and says, 

Oh, yeah, we got to do this, yeah, we missed that, we got to do 

that, it may go back to that whole idea of trying to impress or get 

it done, but not concentrating on why they’re doing it, you know, 

why that’s important. And some kind of way I think to get to the 

elite of the elite, I think people have to have a full understanding 

of why it is and the fact that bad things can happen, and perhaps, 

if you’re not on guard, they will. 

And I keep—for some reason, I keep going back to Katrina. I’m 

telling you, I think about Katrina almost every day, because it’s 

one of those situations, Director Grover, where we claimed that we 

were ready. We couldn’t even communicate across town. And like 

I said, when they said the rubber meets the road, we didn’t have 

a road. And our country is so much better than that. 

And so I think one thing is leadership, I think another is metrics, 

and I’m hoping that—I will talk to Chairman Chaffetz, and we— 

he has been very open to accepting the model that we used in the 

Coast Guard Subcommittee where we constantly brought folks back 

so that we could actually, you know, see where we were going, because one of the things that you heard me say many times, a lot 

of times agencies, and I’m not bringing—I’m not saying you did 

this, but agencies will wait out a Congress and then, you know, 

and so there’s no real accountability, going back to what you said, 

Ms. Grover, Director Grover, you’ve got to have accountability. One 

of the best ways to have accountability is set deadlines, and then 

can come back and report. And it may be that you don’t achieve 

every single thing you want to achieve, but hopefully, we can get 


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in—you know, see our progress. And by the way, I think when the 

agency sees its progress, that, again, helps them feel like the elite 

among the elite. 

And finally, you know, I just—I thank all of you for working together, and I thank you for having the attitude that you have. I 

think one of the biggest mistakes that we make is sometimes we 

act like, you know, the Inspector General and Director Grover, that 

we’re all on different teams. But what you’re saying is that we’re 

all on the same team trying to lift up the American people and 

keep them safe. That’s the team that we’re on. That’s our team. 

And so if I’ve got a member of the team that can see things that 

I can’t see, and can bring them to my attention and help me become better, and, again, become the elite of the elite, I think that’s 

what we ought to be about. And I thank you for having that kind 

of attitude, because that’s what—that’s what’s going to get us 

where we’ve got to go. And I think we’re—and I go back to what 

Mr. Gowdy said a little bit earlier. I’m going to tell you, I have had 

nothing but good experiences with TSA, I mean, everywhere I go. 

And I know that we’ve got some great men and women working for 

that organization, and—but at the same time, I know they’re also 

very—they’re human. 

And so I think we have to constantly find those ways to keep the 

work exciting to keep it—you know, refreshing their skills and reminding them of how important their job is and how we appreciate 

them, because I can tell you, when you’ve got somebody—you’ve got 

hundreds of people every day trying to rush to get to a flight, that 

some of them are very upset, they’ve got the kids, they got the 

stroller and all this, and then they’ve got to be checked, I’m sure 

that’s just an opportunity for people’s frustrations to get out of 

hand, but, yet, it’s still—I’ve seen over and over again where TSA 

officers have just been very patient, understanding, and tried to do 

the right thing at all times and, at the same time, protect us. 

And so again, I thank you all. We look forward to seeing you 

again. Your testimony has been extremely meaningful, and I think 

it can lead us into effectiveness and efficiency. I’ve often said that 

there’s nothing like having motion, commotion, and emotion and no 

results. We have to have results, and I think we can get there and 

I think you all are—have given us a roadmap to get there. Thank 

you. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. I thank the members for participating today. We’ve—we’ve gone through all the membership, 

and you all have been most accommodating. I realize the task that 

you have, Administrator, but I particularly want to thank the Inspector General and also the Director. You have an important role 

with your oversight. The committee conducts some oversight, we 

rely on you and your independence in going forward. And the goal 

here is to keep the American public safe, to make certain that we 

don’t have another 9/11, and that we do the best that we can with 

the resources given to us by the taxpayers. 

So with that being said, there being no further business before 

the committee—I will mention, too, the staff has said that we will 

be submitting to you, all as witnesses, additional questions in this 

interim time for response, so we want you to know those responses 

will also be made part of the record. 


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There being no further business, this hearing of the Government 

Reform and Oversight Committee is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 


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