U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

National Institute of Justice

Julie E. Samuels, Acting Director

continued...

The Measurement of Police Integrity

By Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, William E. Harver, and Maria R. Haberfeld

May 2000

individual approach, sometimes called

the “bad apple” theory of police corruption, has been subject to severe criticism

in recent years.

This Research in Brief summarizes a

study that measured police integrity in 30

police agencies across the United States.

The study was based on an organizational/occupational approach to police

corruption. Researchers asked officers

for their opinions about 11 hypothetical

cases of police misconduct and measured

how seriously officers regarded police

corruption, how willing they were to support its punishment, and how willing they

were to report it. The survey found substantial differences in the environments

of integrity among the agencies studied.

The more serious the officers considered

a behavior to be, the more likely they

were to believe that more severe discipline was appropriate, and the more willing they were to report a colleague for

engaging in that behavior.

Contemporary approaches

to corruption

Pioneered by Herman Goldstein,1 contemporary theories of police corruption

are based on four organizational and

occupational dimensions. Each is

described below.

As the history of virtually every police

agency attests, policing is an occupation

that is rife with opportunities for misconduct. Policing is a highly discretionary,

coercive activity that routinely takes

place in private settings, out of the sight

of supervisors, and in the presence of witnesses who are often regarded as unreliable. Corruption—the abuse of police

authority for gain—is one type of misconduct that has been particularly problematic. The difficulties of controlling

corruption can be traced to several factors: the reluctance of police officers to

report corrupt activities by their fellow

officers (also known as “The Code,” “The

Code of Silence,” or “The Blue Curtain”),

the reluctance of police administrators to

acknowledge the existence of corruption

in their agencies, the benefits of the typical corrupt transaction to the parties involved, and the lack of immediate victims

willing to report corruption.

Until recently, police administrators

viewed corruption primarily as a reflection of the moral defects of individual

police officers. They fought corruption

by carefully screening applicants for police positions and aggressively pursuing

morally defective officers in an attempt

to remove them from their positions before their corrupt behavior had spread

through the agency. This administrative/

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Brief: Research exploring police officers’ understanding of

agency rules concerning police misconduct and the extent of their support for

these rules. The survey also considered

officers’ opinions about appropriate

punishment for misconduct, their familiarity with the expected disciplinary

threat, their perceptions of disciplinary

fairness, and their willingness to report

misconduct. The results of this survey

have important implications for researchers and policymakers, as well as

for police practitioners.

Key issues: Until recently, most studies of police corruption were based

on a traditional administrative approach—one that views the problem

of corruption primarily as a reflection

of the moral defects of individual police officers. This research, however, is

based on the organizational theory of

police corruption, which emphasizes

the importance of organizational and

occupational culture.

Researchers asked officers in 30 U.S.

police agencies for their opinions about

various hypothetical cases of police misconduct, thereby avoiding the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt

behavior would likely provoke. The survey measured how seriously officers regarded police corruption, how willing

they were to report it, and how willing

they were to support punishment. By

analyzing officers’ responses to the survey questions, researchers were able to

rank the police agencies according to

their environments of integrity. The capacity to measure integrity in this way is

especially significant for police administrators, who, this research suggests,

may be able to influence and cultivate
2

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

only among police agencies but also

within police agencies. Particularly in

large police agencies, the occupational

culture of integrity may differ substantially among precincts, service areas,

task forces, and work groups.

Public expectations. The fourth dimension of police corruption that contemporary

police theory emphasizes is the influence

of the social, economic, and political environments in which police institutions, systems, and agencies operate. For example,

some jurisdictions in the United States

have long, virtually uninterrupted traditions of police corruption. Other jurisdictions have equally long traditions of

minimal corruption, while still others have

experienced repeated cycles of scandal

and reform. Such histories indicate that

public expectations about police integrity

exert vastly different pressures on police

agencies in different jurisdictions. These

experiences also suggest that public pressures to confront and combat corruption

may be successfully resisted.

Methodological challenges to

the study of police corruption

Although many theories can be applied to

the study of police corruption, the contemporary organizational/occupational culture

theory has an important advantage over the

traditional administrative/individual badapple theory: The organizational/occupational approach is much more amenable

to systematic, quantitative research.

Corruption is extremely difficult to study

in a direct, quantitative, and empirical

manner. Because most incidents of corruption are never reported or recorded,

official data on corruption are best regarded as measures of a police agency’s

anticorruption activity, not the actual

level of corruption. Even with assurances

of confidentiality, police officers are unOrganizational rules. The first dimension concerns how the organizational

rules that govern corruption are established, communicated, and understood. In

the United States, where police agencies

are highly decentralized, police organizations differ markedly in the types of activities they officially prohibit as corrupt

behavior. This is particularly true of marginally corrupt or mala prohibita behavior, such as off-duty employment and

acceptance of favors, small gifts, free

meals, and discounts. Further complicating the problem, the official policy of

many agencies formally prohibits such

activities while their unofficial policy,

supported firmly but silently by supervisors and administrators, is to permit and

ignore such behavior so long as it is limited in scope and conducted discreetly.

Prevention and control mechanisms.

The second dimension of corruption emphasized in contemporary approaches is

the wide range of mechanisms that police

agencies employ to prevent and control

corruption. Examples include education

in ethics, proactive and reactive investigation of corruption, integrity testing, and

corruption deterrence through the discipline of offenders. The extent to which

agencies use such organizational anticorruption techniques varies greatly.

The Code. The third dimension of corruption, inherent in the occupational culture of policing, is The Code or The Blue

Curtain that informally prohibits or discourages police officers from reporting the

misconduct of their colleagues. The parameters of The Code—precisely what behavior it covers and to whom its benefits

are extended—vary among police agencies. For example, The Code may apply to

only low-level corruption in some agencies and to the most serious corruption in

others. Furthermore, whom and what The

Code covers can vary substantially not

environments of integrity within their

agencies.

Key findings: Based on officers’

responses to questions relating to 11

hypothetical case scenarios involving

police officers engaged in a range of

corrupt behavior, the following conclusions emerged:

● In assessing the 11 cases of police misconduct, officers considered

some types to be significantly less

serious than others.

● The more serious the officers

perceived a behavior to be, the

more likely they were to think that

more severe discipline was appropriate, and the more willing they

were to report a colleague who

had engaged in such behavior.

● Police officers’ evaluations of the

appropriate and expected discipline

for various types of misconduct were

very similar; the majority of police

officers regarded the expected discipline as fair.

● A majority of police officers said

that they would not report a fellow

officer who had engaged in what

they regarded as less serious misconduct (for example, operating an

off-duty security business; accepting

free gifts, meals, and discounts; or

having a minor accident while driving under the influence of alcohol.

● At the same time, most police

officers indicated that they would

report a colleague who stole from

a found wallet or a burglary scene,

accepted a bribe or kickback, or

used excessive force on a car thief

after a foot pursuit.

● The survey found substantial differences in the environment of integrity

among the 30 agencies in the sample.

Target audience: Criminal justice

researchers and policymakers, legislators, police administrators, police

officers, and educators.

Issues and Findings

continued...
3

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

responses to the survey questions

suggests that all six integrity-related

questions measured the same phenomenon—the degree of police intolerance for corrupt behavior.

Offense seriousness. The 11 case

scenarios fall into 3 categories of perceived seriousness. Four cases were

not considered very serious by police

respondents: Case 1, off-duty operation of a security system business;

Case 2, receipt of free meals; Case 4,

receipt of holiday gifts; and Case 8,

coverup of a police accident that involved driving under the influence of

alcohol (DUI). The majority of police

respondents, in fact, reported that the

operation of an off-duty security system business (Case 1) was not a violation of agency policy. Respondents

considered four other cases of misconduct to be at an intermediate level of

seriousness: Case 10, the use of excessive force on a car thief following a

foot pursuit; Case 7, a supervisor who

offers a subordinate time off during

holidays in exchange for tuning up his

personal car; Case 9, acceptance of

free drinks in exchange for ignoring

a late bar closing; and Case 6, receipt

of a kickback. Respondents regarded

the remaining three cases—those that

involved stealing from a found wallet

(Case 11), accepting a money bribe

(Case 3), and stealing a watch at a

crime scene (Case 5)—as very serious

offenses.

Discipline. In general, police officers

thought that the four cases they regarded as not very serious warranted

little or no discipline. Officers thought

that the four cases involving an intermediate level of seriousness merited a

written reprimand or a period of suspension, and that the three very serious cases merited dismissal.

likely to be willing to report their own

or another officer’s corrupt activities.

Unlike the administrative/individual

approach, an organizational/occupational culture approach to the study of

police integrity involves questions of

fact and opinion that can be explored

directly, without arousing the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt behavior are likely to provoke.

Using this approach, it is possible to

ask nonthreatening questions about

officers’ knowledge of agency rules and

their opinions about the seriousness of

particular violations, the punishment

that such violations would warrant or

actually receive, and their estimates of

how willing officers would be to report

such misconduct.

Moreover, sharply different goals and

visions of police integrity characterize

these two approaches to understanding

corruption. The administrative/individual theory of corruption envisions

the police agency of integrity as one

from which all morally defective individual officers have been removed and

in which vigilance is maintained to prevent their entry or emergence. By contrast, the organizational/occupational

culture theory envisions the police

agency of integrity as one whose culture

is highly intolerant of corruption.

Methodologically, the consequences of

these two visions are critical. For example, although it may be possible to

use an administrative/individual approach to measure the level of corrupt

behavior, the number of morally defective police officers, and an agency’s

vigilance in discovering misconduct,

the obstacles to doing so are enormous.

Using an organizational/occupational

culture approach, by contrast, modern

social science can easily measure how

seriously officers regard misconduct,

how amenable they are to supporting

punishment, and how willing they are

to tolerate misconduct in silence.

In an effort to measure the occupational

culture of police integrity, a systematic,

standardized, and quantitative survey

questionnaire was designed and pretested. The survey sought information

in key areas that constitute the foundation of an occupational/organizational

culture theory of police integrity. At the

same time, the survey responses could

be used to satisfy certain basic informational needs of practical police administration. The survey attempted to

answer the following questions:

● Do officers in this agency know the

rules governing police misconduct?

● How strongly do they support those

rules?

● Do officers know what disciplinary

threat they face if they violate those

rules?

● Do they think the discipline is fair?

● How willing are they to report

misconduct?

For a more detailed description of the

survey methodology and samples, see

Survey Design and Methodology. The

actions taken to enhance the legitimacy

of the survey results are discussed in

Validity of Survey Responses.

Survey results

The results of the survey, reported in

exhibit 1, show that the more serious

a particular behavior was considered

by police officers, the more severely

they thought it should and would be

punished, and the more willing they

were to report it. The extraordinarily

high rank-order correlation among the
4

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Survey Design and Methodology C ase scenarios. The survey questionnaire presented officers with 11 hypothetical case scenarios. Displayed in

exhibit A, the scenarios cover a range of

activities, from those that merely give an

appearance of conflict of interest (Case 1)

to incidents of bribery (Case 3) and theft

(Cases 5 and 11). One scenario (Case 10)

described the use of excessive force on a

car thief.

Respondents were asked to evaluate each

scenario by answering seven questions

● Two related to severity of discipline—

one addressed the discipline the respondent felt the behavior should receive

and the other addressed the discipline

the officer felt it would receive.

● Two concerned willingness to report

the misconduct—one addressed the

respondent’s own willingness to

report it, and the other concerned

the respondent’s perception of other

officers’ willingness to report it.

The remaining question asked respondents whether the behavior described

in the scenario was a violation of the

agency’s official policy.

The incidents described in the scenarios

were not only plausible and common

forms of police misconduct, but ones that

were uncomplicated by details that might

introduce ambiguity into either the interpretation of the behavior or the motive

of the officer depicted in the scenario.

Some scenarios were based on published

studies that had employed a case scenario

approach.a

 Others drew on the experience

of the authors. Respondents were asked

to assume that the officer depicted in each

scenario had been a police officer for 5

years and had a satisfactory work record

with no history of disciplinary problems.

Survey sample. The sample consisted of

3,235 officers from 30 U.S. police agencies. Although these agencies were drawn

from across the Nation and the sample

was quite large, it was nonetheless a convenience sample, not a representative

sample. The characteristics of the officers

in this sample are summarized in exhibit C.

The majority of the police officers surveyed

were employed in patrol or traffic units

(63.1 percent). The overwhelming majority

of respondents were line officers; only

one of five police officers was a supervisor.

The mean length of service for the entire

sample was 10.3 years.

(see exhibit B). Six of these questions were designed to assess the normative inclination of

police to resist temptations to abuse the

rights and privileges of their occupation. To

measure this dimension of police integrity, the

six questions were paired as follows:

● Two questions pertained to the seriousness of each case—one addressed the

respondent’s own view and the other

concerned the respondent’s perception

of the views of other officers.

Exhibit A. Case scenarios

Case 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security

devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.

Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value

from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse

the generosity of those who give gifts to him.

Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal

gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.

Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and

restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts

of food and liquor.

Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed,

and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes

a watch, worth about 2 days’ pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been

stolen during the burglary.

Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the

owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral,

he receives payment of 5 percent of the repair bill from the shop owner.

Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work

during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to

tune up his supervisor’s personal car. Evaluate the supervisor’s behavior.

Case 8. At 2:00 a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted

road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He

approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident

and offense, he transports the driver to his home.

Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past its

legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to

accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.

Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an

automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending

him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both

officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and

resisting.

Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money

equivalent to a full day’s pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property

but keeps the money for himself.
5

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

The sample has some biases, including

overrepresentation of particular types of

police agencies and particular regions of

the country. Because it includes no State

police agencies, only one sheriff’s agency,

and only one county police agency, the

sample overrepresents municipal police

agencies. The sample also overrepresents

police agencies from the Northeast. Although the sample does include agencies

from the South, Southeast, and Southwest,

it does not include agencies from the West,

Northwest, or Midwest.

The sample likely has another bias because

not all agencies that were asked to participate in the study accepted the invitation.

The reason for an agency’s refusal to participate could include a fear of revealing

something untoward. Agencies declined

to participate despite assurances that their

participation in the survey would be kept

confidential; that all individual respondents

would remain anonymous; and that respondents would be asked about only

their opinions, not any actual misconduct.

Nevertheless, the sample includes some

seriously troubled police agencies. Key

contacts in a number of such agencies,

including senior officers and high-ranking

union officials, exercised sufficient influence to arrange the participation of these

agencies in the survey.

a. A number of studies of police corruption

have employed a research strategy that asked

police officers to evaluate hypothetical corruption scenarios. These include Fishman, Janet

E., Measuring Police Corruption, New York:

John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1978;

Martin, Christine, Illinois Municipal Officers’

Perceptions of Police Ethics, Chicago: Illinois

Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1994;

Huon, Gail F., Beryl L. Hesketh, Mark G. Frank,

Kevin M. McConkey, and G.M. McGrath, Perceptions of Ethical Dilemmas, Payneham, Australia: National Police Research Unit, 1995;

and Miller, Larry S., and Michael C. Braswell,

“Police Perceptions of Ethical DecisionMaking: The Ideal vs. The Real,” American

Journal of Police 27 (1992): 27–45.

Exhibit C. Characteristics of the police agency sample

Mean

Agency Size Percentage Percentage Length of

(number of of National Sample Supervisory Patrol/ Service

sworn officers) Sample Size Percentage Traffic (in years)

Very Large (500+) 59.9 1,937 14.8 64.2 9.18

Large (201–500) 19.7 638 23.2 60.3 12.05

Medium (76–200) 9.0 292 29.9 59.0 12.29

Small (25–75) 8.5 275 30.8 66.1 11.70

Very Small (<25) 2.9 93 35.9 64.8 11.29

Total/Average 100.0 3,235 19.8 63.1 10.30

Exhibit B. Case scenario assessment options

1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?

Not at all serious Very serious

12345

2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be?

Not at all serious Very serious

12345

3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?

Definitely not Definitely yes

12345

4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if

any discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow?

1. NONE 4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY

2. VERBAL REPRIMAND 5. DEMOTION IN RANK

3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND 6. DISMISSAL

5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if

any discipline do YOU think WOULD follow?

1. NONE 4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY

2. VERBAL REPRIMAND 5. DEMOTION IN RANK

3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND 6. DISMISSAL

6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely not Definitely yes

12345

7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow

police officer who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely not Definitely yes

12345
6

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Validity of Survey Responses

he validity of the survey’s results

hinges on the honesty of police officers

when responding to the survey questions.

Several steps were taken to enhance the

legitimacy of the survey results. First, officers were asked only about their attitudes,

not about their actual behavior or the actual behavior of other police officers. They

also were assured that their responses

would remain confidential, although police respondents are naturally suspicious of

such promises.

To further allay officers’ fears that their

identities might be discovered, they were

asked only minimal background questions:

their rank, length of service, and assignment and whether they held a supervisory

position. They were not asked standard

questions about age, race, gender, or

ethnicity in an effort to assuage fears that

disclosing such information, in combination

with their rank, assignment, and length of

service, would make it possible to identify

them.

In addition, at the end of the survey,

each police respondent was asked two

questions about the validity of the responses. The first was “Do you think

most police officers would give their

honest opinion in filling out this questionnaire?” The second was “Did you?”

In answer to the first question, 84.4 percent of police respondents reported that

they thought most officers would answer the questions honestly, and 97.8

percent reported that they themselves

had done so. The responses of the 2.2

percent of police officers who reported

that they had not answered the questions honestly were discarded when the

survey results were analyzed.

The survey questions also were designed

to minimize any temptation for officers to

manipulate responses to create a favorable impression on the public or on their

T supervisors. Some officers, for example,

might have been inclined to report that

certain types of misconduct were more

serious than they actually thought them

to be. At the same time, however, these

officers would be unlikely to report that

misconduct should be punished more

severely than they thought appropriate

because of the possibility that they might

one day be subject to such discipline, if

administrators believed that they were

recommending it.

Furthermore, if any substantial manipulation of answers had occurred, it would

have been evident in differences in correlation coefficients among the questions

about seriousness, discipline, and willingness to report. In fact, the rank order

correlation between all six questions is

extraordinarily high. Indeed, one could

predict with great accuracy the ranking of

a scenario on any one of the six questions

by knowing the ranking for any other.

To measure how officers perceived

the fairness of discipline, the scores

on the “discipline would receive”

scale were subtracted from the scores

on the “discipline should receive”

scale. A difference of zero was interpreted to mean that the respondent

thought the discipline was fair. If the

difference was greater than zero

(positive), the respondent thought that

the discipline was too lenient. Conversely, if the difference was less

than zero (negative), the respondent

thought that the discipline was too

harsh.2

 In 7 of the 11 cases, the overwhelming majority of police officers

in the sample thought that the discipline that would be imposed was in

the “fair” range. But in the remaining

four cases, including three that officers considered not serious—Case 2

(accepting free meals and discounts

on the beat), Case 4 (accepting holiday gifts), Case 8 (coverup of police

DUI), and Case 10 (excessive force on

car thief)—more than 20 percent of

police officers believed that the discipline administered by their agencies

would be too harsh.

Parameters of The Code. An examination of the parameters of The Code of

Silence, as revealed in the responses of

police officers in the sample, indicated

that the majority would not report a police colleague who had engaged in behavior described in the four scenarios

considered the least serious. At the

same time, a majority indicated that

they would report3 a fellow police officer who had engaged in behavior they

deemed to be at an intermediate or high

level of seriousness.

Agency contrasts in the

culture of integrity

Measurements of the inclination of U.S.

police to resist temptations to abuse the

rights and privileges of their occupation

are likely to prove useful for academic,

historical, and cross-cultural studies of

police.4 For police administrators, however, measurements of the culture of integrity of individual police agencies are

more relevant than national averages,

which often mask significant differences among agencies.
7

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Exhibit 1. Police officers’ perceptions of offense seriousness, appropriate and expected discipline, and willingness to

report, ranked by officers’ perceptions of case seriousness*

Seriousness Discipline Willingness to Report

Own View Other Officers Should Receive Would Receive Own View Other Officers

Case Scenario Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Mode Score Rank Mode Score Rank Score Rank

Case 1. Off-Duty

Security System

Business 1.46 1 1.48 1 1.34 1 None 1.51 1 None 1.37 1 1.46 1

Case 2. Free Meals, Verbal Verbal

Discounts on Beat 2.60 2 2.31 2 2.13 2 reprimand 2.37 2 reprimand 1.94 2 1.82 2

Case 4. Holiday Gifts Verbal Written

From Merchants 2.84 3 2.64 3 2.53 3 reprimand 2.82 3 reprimand 2.36 4 2.28 3.5

Case 8. Coverup of Suspend Suspend

Police DUI Accident 3.03 4 2.86 4 2.81 4 without pay 3.21 4 without pay 2.34 3 2.28 3.5

Case 10. Excessive Suspend Suspend

Force on Car Thief 4.05 5 3.70 5 3.76 6 without pay 4.00 6 without pay 3.39 5 3.07 5

Case 7. Supervisor: Written Written

Holiday for Tuneup 4.18 6 3.96 6 3.59 5 reprimand 3.43 5 reprimand 3.45 6 3.29 6

Case 6. Auto Repair Suspend Suspend

Shop 5% Kickback 4.50 7 4.26 7 4.40 8 without pay 4.46 8 without pay 3.95 8 3.71 8

Case 9. Drinks to Suspend Suspend

Ignore Late Bar Closing 4.54 8 4.28 8 4.02 7 without pay 4.08 7 without pay 3.73 7 3.47 7

Case 11. Theft From

Found Wallet 4.85 9 4.69 9 5.09 10 Dismissal 5.03 10 Dismissal 4.23 10 3.96 10

Case 3. Bribe From

Speeding Motorist 4.92 10 4.81 10 4.92 9 Dismissal 4.86 9 Dismissal 4.19 9 3.92 9

Case 5. Crime Scene

Theft of Watch 4.95 11 4.88 11 5.66 11 Dismissal 5.57 11 Dismissal 4.54 11 4.34 11

* Scores are based on officers’ responses to the integrity-related survey questions.

To uncover these differences and allow

comparisons to be made, a system was

devised for ranking the responses of

officers in each agency. To determine

an agency’s overall ranking on how its

officers perceived the seriousness of a

particular offense, the mean score of all

responses by officers in that agency to

each of the 11 case scenarios was compared to the mean scores of the remaining 29 agencies. The agency was then

awarded 3 points if its mean score

placed it among the top 10 agencies on

any question, 2 points if it scored in

the middle 10, and 1 point if it scored

among the lowest 10. These scores were

then totaled for all 11 case scenarios.

Using this scaling system, an agency’s

score on its officers’ perceptions of the

seriousness of the offenses could range

from 11 (if it ranked in the lowest third

of agencies on all 11 cases) to 33 (if it

ranked among the highest third of agencies on all 11 cases).5

These summary scores formed the basis for placing agencies in rank order

from 1 to 30 (with 1 being the highest

integrity rating), making it possible to

say that an agency ranked “n out of

30” in its officers’ perceptions of offense seriousness. This procedure was

used to calculate a summary score and

an integrity ranking for each agency’s

responses to each of the six questions

about offense seriousness, discipline

that should and would be received,

and willingness to report the offense.

Exhibit 2 summarizes those rankings.

The environment of integrity in

two agencies. To illustrate how environments of integrity differ across U.S.

police agencies, it is useful to contrast

the responses of officers from two of

the agencies in the sample. Agency 2,

which ranked 8th in integrity of the

30 agencies surveyed, and Agency 23,

which ranked in a 5-way tie for 24th

place, are both large municipal police

agencies. Agency 2 has a national reputation for integrity, is extremely receptive to research, and is often promoted

as a model of innovation. Agency 23

has a long history of scandal, and its

reputation as an agency with corruption

problems persists despite numerous reform efforts. Although a local newspaper once dubbed Agency 23 “the most

corrupt police department in the country,” six other agencies in the sample

appear to have integrity environments

that are as poor or worse.
8

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

In both agencies, the correlation of the

scores’ rank ordering among the categories was very high, as it was for all 30

agencies surveyed. For every agency,

the mean rank order of officers’ responses to the six integrity-related

questions was nearly identical. Furthermore, the rank ordering of the scenarios

differed little among the agencies.

Although differences in the rank ordering of the scenarios were minimal,

both within and between the two agencies, discrepancies in the agencies’

absolute scores reflected significant

differences (see exhibits 3 and 4).

Estimates of offense seriousness were

consistently higher for Agency 2 than

for Agency 23. The differences were

especially large (between 0.5 and 1.0

on a 5-point scale) for three scenarios:

Case 6 (auto repair shop kickback),

Case 9 (drinks to ignore late bar closing), and Case 10 (excessive force on

car thief). Police officers from Agency

2 evaluated each of these cases as

substantially more serious than did

officers from Agency 23.

The mean scores for discipline indicate

that, in almost every case, police officers in Agency 2 not only expected

more severe discipline than did officers

in Agency 23, but they also thought

that more severe discipline was appropriate. The differences in perceptions

of discipline were especially great for

the most serious types of corruption,

such as the scenarios described in

Case 3 (bribe from speeding motorist),

Case 5 (crime scene theft of watch),

and Case 11 (theft from found wallet),

as well as for Case 10 (use of excessive

force). While officers in Agency 2

thought that dismissal would result

from the four most serious cases, officers in Agency 23 expected that dismissal would follow only one scenario,

Case 5 (theft from a crime scene).

The most systematic and dramatic difference between Agencies 2 and 23,

however, is evident in their attitudes

toward The Code of Silence. In both

agencies, few officers said that they or

their police colleagues would report

any of the least serious types of corrupt behavior (Cases 1, 2, 4, and 8).

Officers from Agency 2 reported that

they and their colleagues would report

the behavior described in the seven

other cases. In Agency 23, however,

there was no case that the majority of

officers indicated they would report. In

sum, while The Code is under control

in Agency 2, it remains a powerful influence in Agency 23, providing an

environment in which corrupt behavior

can flourish.

Exhibit 2. Composite scores on seriousness of offense, discipline, and

willingness to report, rank-ordered by agency

Other Other Summary

Own Officers’ Discipline Discipline Own Officers’ Score/

Agency Opinion of Opinions of Should Would Willingness Willingness Integrity

Number Seriousness Seriousness Receive Receive to Report to Report Ranking

1 3 3 33 3 3 18/1

3 3 3 33 3 3 18/1

4 3 3 33 3 3 18/1

6 3 3 33 3 3 18/1

10 3 3 33 3 3 18/1

17 3 3 33 3 3 18/1

30 3 3 33 3 3 18/1

2 3 2 33 3 3 17/8

18 2 2 33 3 3 16/9

7 3 2 22 3 3 15/10

11 3 3 22 2 2 14/11

12 3 3 31 2 2 14/11

5 2 2 23 2 2 13/13

19 3 2 22 2 2 13/13

20 3 2 22 2 2 13/13

29 2 3 21 2 2 12/16

26 3 2 22 1 1 11/17

27 2 2 21 2 2 11/17

24 2 2 11 2 2 10/19

21 1 1 23 1 1 9/20

22 1 1 22 1 2 9/20

9 2 1 21 1 1 8/22

16 1 1 11 2 2 8/22

13 1 2 11 1 1 7/24

14 1 1 12 1 1 7/24

15 1 1 11 2 1 7/24

23 1 1 12 1 1 7/24

25 1 1 12 1 1 7/24

8 1 1 11 1 1 6/29

28 1 1 11 1 1 6/29
9

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Exhibit 3. Agency 2 vs. Agency 23: Officers’ own perceptions of seriousness of misconduct, discipline warranted, and

willingness to report offense

Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 2 (A2) vs.

Agency 23 (A23) Agency 23 (A23) Agency 23 (A23)

Perception of Seriousness Discipline Should Receive Willingness To Report

A2 A23 Difference t test A2 A23 Difference t test A2 A23 Difference t test

Case 1. Off-Duty Security -2.82 -3.60 -4.78

System Business 1.57 1.36 0.21 p<.05 1.47 1.24 0.23 p<.001 1.57 1.22 0.35 p<.001

Case 2. Free Meals, -1.80 -2.48 -6.67

Discounts on Beat 3.04 2.85 0.19 p<.01 2.50 2.31 0.19 p<.01 2.42 1.75 0.67 p<.001

Case 3. Bribe From -3.72 -6.28 -16.09

Speeding Motorist 4.94 4.78 0.16 p<.001 5.02 4.44 0.58 p<.001 4.67 3.02 1.65 p<.001

Case 4. Holiday Gifts -2.47 -1.35 -6.24

From Merchants 3.07 2.79 0.28 p<.01 2.73 2.59 0.14 NS* 2.74 2.05 0.69 p<.001

Case 5. Crime Scene -4.21 -12.64 -15.97

Theft of Watch 4.97 4.79 0.18 p<.001 5.85 4.90 0.95 p<.001 4.92 3.36 1.56 p<.001

Case 6. Auto Repair -6.74 -6.47 -15.63

Shop 5% Kickback 4.58 4.02 0.56 p<.001 4.41 3.74 0.67 p<.001 4.38 2.71 1.67 p<.001

Case 7. Supervisor: -1.24 -0.72 -8.68

Holiday for Tuneup 4.16 4.05 0.11 NS* 3.58 3.51 0.07 NS* 3.68 2.66 1.02 p<.001

Case 8. Coverup of -4.32 -2.69 -5.66

Police DUI Accident 3.16 2.68 0.48 p<.001 2.85 2.57 0.28 p<.05 2.67 2.03 0.64 p<.001

Case 9. Drinks to Ignore -9.96 -10.45 -16.02

Late Bar Closing 4.68 3.77 0.91 p<.001 4.10 3.17 0.93 p<.001 4.21 2.48 1.73 p<.001

Case 10. Excessive -10.12 -8.30 -13.42

Force on Car Thief 4.45 3.49 0.96 p<.001 3.97 3.15 0.82 p<.001 4.02 2.53 1.49 p<.001

Case 11. Theft From -6.85 -14.17 -17.41

Found Wallet 4.94 4.55 0.39 p<.001 5.42 4.13 1.29 p<.001 4.74 2.95 1.79 p<.001

* Not significant.

Conclusions and implications

Redefining the problem of police corruption (i.e., the abuse of police authority for gain) as a problem of police

integrity—the normative inclination

among police to resist temptations to

abuse their authority—enables the direct measurement of the major propositions of an organizational/occupational

theory of police integrity. The research

reported in this Research in Brief demonstrates that police attitudes toward

the seriousness of misconduct, the discipline that should and would result,

and the willingness of officers to tolerate misconduct in silence can be measured. Moreover, the measurements

reported in this national sample are

relatively easy to collect. At the same

time, they demonstrate substantial

differences in the environments of

integrity in U.S. police agencies.

The ability to measure environments of

integrity in police agencies holds great

potential for academic studies of police and for practical police administration. For researchers, quantitative

cross-cultural, historical, and national

comparisons that were previously unthinkable have now become feasible.

Equally important, such measurements

have direct implications for practical

police administration because each of

the propositions of an organizational/

occupational theory of integrity implies a specific administrative response. If officers do not know whether

certain conduct violates agency policy

or what disciplinary threats the agency

makes, administrators have a clear

responsibility to communicate this

information to officers. If officers do

not regard certain misconduct as sufficiently serious, if they regard discipline

as too severe or too lenient, or if they

are willing to tolerate the misconduct

of their police peers in silence, administrators have an obvious obligation to

find out why. A police administrator

can take specific actions to deal with

each of these problems.

The survey instrument used in this

study was designed to assess only one

aspect of police integrity. In all case

scenarios but one—the use of excessive force—the misconduct described

was motivated by personal gain. In

discussing environments of integrity,

Case Scenario
10

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

therefore, this survey makes no observation about abuses of discretion in arrests, order maintenance, discourtesy

to citizens, or other police misconduct

not usually motivated by temptations

of gain. A second generation of this

survey will explore those problems.6

A final note

This survey does not measure the extent of corruption in any police agency

or institution. Rather, it measures the

culture of police integrity—the normative inclination of police officers to resist the temptations to abuse the rights

and privileges of their office. The survey does not identify either corrupt or

honest police officers; nor does it provide any evidence of abusive or dishonest practices—past, present, or future.

The survey findings do describe, in a

fairly precise way, the characteristics of

a police agency’s culture that encourage its employees to resist or tolerate

certain types of misconduct.

Notes

1. Goldstein, Herman, Police Corruption: Perspective on Its Nature and Control, Washington,

DC: Police Foundation, 1975; and Goldstein,

H., Policing a Free Society, Cambridge, MA:

Ballinger, 1977. See also Sherman, Lawrence

W., Scandal and Reform, Berkeley: University

of California Press, 1978; Marx, Gary, Surveillance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 1991; Punch, Maurice, Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction of Police Deviance and Control, London: Tavistock, 1986;

and Manning, Peter K., and Lawrence

Redlinger, “The Invitational Edges of Police

Corruption,” in Thinking About Police, edited

by Carl Klockars and Stephen Mastrofski,

New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993: 398–412.

2. Note that the notions of “greater than zero

(positive)” and “less than zero (negative)” are

merely shorthand for discipline perceived as

too lenient and too harsh, respectively. In other

words, because the data are ordinal, positive or

negative differences will not be used in any algebraic context. Rather, these differences will

be used solely as indicators to classify respondents into three groups—those who perceive

discipline to be fair, too lenient, or too harsh.

3. The frequency distribution of responses to

the question about officers’ own willingness to

report a particular offense was analyzed. The

five-point scale of offered answers ranged from

1=“definitely not” to 5=“definitely yes.” A cumulative frequency above 50 percent for 1 and

Exhibit 4. Agency 2 vs. Agency 23: Officers’ perceptions of how most police would assess offense seriousness, discipline

that offense would receive, and whether most police would be willing to report offense

Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 2 (A2) vs.

Agency 23 (A23) Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 23 (A23)

How Most Police Agency 23 (A23) Whether Most Police

Regard Seriousness Discipline Would Receive Would Be Willing To Report

A2 A23 Difference t test A2 A23 Difference t test A2 A23 Difference t test

Case 1. Off-Duty Security -1.61 -5.08 -3.12

System Business 1.52 1.31 0.21 NS* 1.70 1.33 0.37 p<.001 1.52 1.31 0.21 p<.05

Case 2. Free Meals, 0.41 -3.27 -3.83

Discounts on Beat 2.53 2.57 -0.04 NS* 2.77 2.51 0.26 p<.05 2.07 1.74 0.33 p<.001

Case 3. Bribe From -4.25 -5.06 -13.89

Speeding Motorist 4.82 4.60 0.22 p<.001 4.90 4.45 0.45 p<.001 4.23 2.90 1.33 p<.001

Case 4. Holiday Gifts -1.10 -1.94 -4.65

From Merchants 2.73 2.61 0.12 NS* 3.07 2.88 0.19 p<.01 2.49 2.03 0.46 p<.001

Case 5. Crime Scene -6.16 -10.33 -14.99

Theft of Watch 4.93 4.62 0.31 p<.001 5.73 4.93 0.80 p<.001 4.63 3.25 1.38 p<.001

Case 6. Auto Repair -6.28 -5.35 -12.51

Shop 5% Kickback 4.31 3.75 0.56 p<.001 4.45 3.91 0.54 p<.001 3.92 2.64 1.28 p<.001

Case 7. Supervisor: 0.04 2.78 -6.80

Holiday for Tuneup 3.85 3.85 0 NS* 3.24 3.52 -0.28 p<.05 3.34 2.60 0.74 p<.001

Case 8. Coverup of -2.61 -4.92 -4.55

Police DUI Accident 2.80 2.54 0.26 p<.05 3.33 2.83 0.50 p<.001 2.40 1.95 0.45 p<.001

Case 9. Drinks to Ignore -9.13 -8.92 -13.89

Late Bar Closing 4.32 3.44 0.88 p<.001 4.11 3.29 0.82 p<.001 3.79 2.35 1.44 p<.001

Case 10. Excessive Force -8.00 -6.86 -9.98

on Car Thief 4.01 3.22 0.79 p<.001 4.11 3.46 0.65 p<.001 3.44 2.38 1.06 p<.001

Case 11. Theft From -8.53 -10.79 -16.20

Found Wallet 4.83 4.24 0.59 p<.001 5.24 4.25 0.99 p<.001 4.38 2.74 1.64 p<.001

* Not significant.

Case Scenario
11

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

2 was interpreted to indicate that police officers would not report the offense. A cumulative

frequency above 50 percent for 4 and 5, on the

other hand, was interpreted to indicate that the

police officers would report the offense.

4. See, for example, Haberfeld, Maria, Carl

Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, and Milan

Pagon, “Disciplinary Consequences of Police

Corruption in Croatia, Poland, Slovenia, and

the United States,” Police Practice and Research, An International Journal 1 (1) (2000):

41–72.

5. An alternative summary ranking system

could, of course, be based on the full range of

30-point rankings for each of the 11 scenarios.

This type of system would create a scale that

could range from 330 (for an agency that scored

the lowest of the 30 agencies on all 6 questions

for all 11 scenarios) to 1,980 (for an agency

that scored the highest of all 30 agencies on all

6 questions for all 11 scenarios). Such a scoring system would, however, magnify small and

primarily meaningless differences in mean

scores, creating a false sense of precision. The

ranking system developed for and employed in

Findings and conclusions of the research

reported here are those of the authors and do

not necessarily reflect the official position or

policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

NCJ 181465

The National Institute of Justice is a

component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau

of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice

Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for

Victims of Crime.

This and other NIJ publications can be

found at and downloaded from the NIJ

Web site (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij).

this research intentionally seeks to blunt any

false sense of precision by allowing agencies

to score, in a sense, only “high,” “middle,” or

“low” on any given question.

6. A summary of the status of progress with this

next generation of measures of police integrity

can be found on the videotape of the Research

in Progress seminar “Measuring Police Integrity,” presented by Carl Klockars at the National Institute of Justice in January 1999.

Copies are available through the National

Criminal Justice Reference Service at 800–

851–3420. Please refer to NCJ 174459.

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Carl B. Klockars, Ph.D., is professor

in the Department of Sociology and

Criminal Justice at the University of

Delaware. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich,

Ph.D., is a doctoral student at

Harvard Law School. William E.

Harver, Ph.D., is assistant professor

of social science in the College of

Arts and Sciences at Widener University. Maria R. Haberfeld, Ph.D.,

is assistant professor in the Department of Law, Police Science, and

Criminal Justice Administration at

the John Jay College of Criminal

Justice, City University of New York.

The study reported in this Research

in Brief was supported by the Office

of Community Oriented Policing

Services and NIJ through NIJ grant

number 95–IJ–CX–0058.

Police administrators interested in

applying the approach used in this

study to measure the environment of

integrity in their own agencies are

advised to contact Professor Carl B.

Klockars, Principal Investigator,

Enhancing Police Integrity Project,

Criminal Justice, University of

Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.