2024 IL App (1st) 240746-U

No. 1-24-0746B 

Order filed June 3, 2024 

Fifth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

DIONTE BAGGETT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 24600132001 

Honorable 

Jerome C. Barrido, 

Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Where aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is not an offense 

eligible for pretrial detention, we reverse the circuit court’s detention order and 

remand the matter back to the circuit court to determine the appropriate conditions 

of pretrial release.

¶ 2 Defendant Dionte Baggett was charged with aggravated battery of a child resulting in 

bodily harm. Following a pretrial detention hearing, the circuit court found that he had committed 

an offense eligible for pretrial detention and ordered him detained while awaiting trial. Baggett 

now appeals the court’s detention order and contends that the offense is not detainable pursuant to 
No. 1-24-0746B 

- 2 - 

Public Acts 101-652 and 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness 

Act (Act), which amended Article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 

ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)). Because we agree that aggravated battery of a child resulting 

in bodily harm is not a detainable offense, we reverse the court’s detention order and remand the 

matter back to the circuit court to determine the appropriate conditions of pretrial release for 

Baggett. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In March 2024, Baggett was arrested and charged with aggravated battery of a child 

resulting in bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(2) (West 2022)). The felony complaint alleged 

that Baggett hit the victim, a minor under the age of 13 years old, on the buttocks multiple times 

with a belt and intentionally caused the victim bodily harm. On the felony complaint, next to the 

name of the charged offense, it stated that the offense was “domestic related.” Thereafter, the State 

filed a verified petition to detain Baggett while awaiting trial and asserted that aggravated battery 

of a child, which was “domestic” in nature, was detainable under the Act as a “domestic 

battery/aggravated domestic battery” under section 110-6.1(a)(4) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(a)(4) (West 2022)).

¶ 5 The circuit court subsequently held a detention hearing, where the State sought leave to 

amend its petition to allege that Baggett’s charge of aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily 

harm was also detainable under the Act as a “forcible felony” under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the 

Code (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5)). Over the objection from Baggett’s defense counsel, the circuit court 

allowed the State’s amendment. Following the State’s proffer and the parties’ arguments, the 

circuit court found that Baggett had committed a detainable offense under both subsection (a)(1.5), 

as a forcible felony, and subsection (a)(4), as a form of domestic battery. The court also found that 
No. 1-24-0746B 

- 3 - 

the proof was evident, or the presumption great, Baggett committed aggravated battery of a child, 

that he posed a danger to his children and their mother, and that no conditions or combination of 

conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat. The court therefore ordered Baggett

detained while awaiting trial. 

¶ 6 This appeal followed. 

¶ 7 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Baggett contends that the circuit court erred in finding he committed an offense eligible for 

pretrial detention.

1 This issue requires us to interpret section 110-6.1(a) of the Code (id. § 110-

6.1(a)), which lists the various offenses that are eligible for pretrial detention. In interpreting a 

statute, our primary objective is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. People v. 

Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832, ¶ 39. In doing so, the best indicator is the plain language of the 

statute. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323 (2007). If the statute’s language is unambiguous and 

clear, we must apply the statute as written. Id. We review an issue of statutory interpretation de 

novo. People v. Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 21. 

¶ 9 As noted, section 110-6.1(a) lists the various offenses that are eligible for pretrial detention. 

725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022). In this case, the circuit court found aggravated battery of a 

child resulting in bodily harm—charged under section 12-3.05(b)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 

(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(2) (West 2022))—was detainable under sections 110-6.1(a)(1.5) and 110-

6.1(a)(4) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5), (4) (West 2022)). 

1 The State did not file a responding memorandum. 
No. 1-24-0746B 

- 4 - 

¶ 10 We begin with whether aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is a detainable 

offense under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code. That section provides, in relevant part, that a 

defendant is eligible to be detained pretrial if he 

“is charged with a forcible felony, which as used in this Section, means treason, 

first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a 

child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, 

aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary where there is use of force against another 

person, residential burglary, home invasion, vehicular invasion, aggravated arson, 

arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily 

harm or permanent disability or disfigurement or any other felony which involves 

the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or 

disfigurement.” Id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5). 

Subsection (a)(1.5) refers to 18 specifically enumerated felonies that constitute a forcible felony 

and includes a residual clause for non-specifically enumerated felonies “involv[ing] the threat of 

or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement,” which also constitute 

a forcible felony. Id. The offense of aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is not 

one of the 18 enumerated offenses. See id. As such, aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily 

harm can only constitute a forcible felony if it is “any other felony which involves the threat of or 

infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” Id. 

¶ 11 People v. Grandberry, 2024 IL App (3d) 230546, is instructive in resolving this question. 

There, the appellate court found that aggravated battery to a peace officer and aggravated battery 

to a nurse were not forcible felonies under subsection (a)(1.5). Id. ¶¶ 11-13. In so finding, the 

appellate court determined that, when subsection (a)(1.5) refers to “ ‘any other felony,’ ” this
No. 1-24-0746B 

- 5 - 

“means any felonies other than those listed” precedingly. Id. ¶ 12. “As the statute specifically 

enumerated a subset of aggravated battery as a forcible felony (aggravated battery resulting in 

great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement), ‘other felony’ must refer to felonies 

other than aggravated battery, not different subsets of aggravated battery like we have here.” 

(Emphasis in original.) Id. The appellate court further observed “that the list of forcible felonies 

includes some felonies without qualification, like robbery and aggravated robbery, and others with 

qualification, like aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or 

disfigurement and burglary where there is use of force against another person.” Id. According to 

the appellate court, “[h]ad the legislature intended to include all aggravated batteries” as forcible 

felonies, “it would have done so.” Id.; see also People v. Brooks, 2024 IL App (4th) 240503, ¶¶

20-21 (agreeing with Grandberry and concluding that aggravated battery based solely on the 

location of the conduct at issue was not a forcible felony under the Act); People v. Brookshaw, 

2023 IL App (4th) 230854-U, ¶¶ 12-15 (concluding aggravated battery of a peace officer not a 

forcible felony under the Act).

¶ 12 We find the reasoning of Grandberry persuasive and agree that our legislature intended the 

residual clause of subsection (a)(1.5) to refer to felonies other than the specifically enumerated 

ones. As such, aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm cannot be considered “any 

other felony” for purposes of the residual clause. Consequently, the offense is not a forcible felony 

under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)), and Baggett 

could not be detained on that basis.

¶ 13 Having found that aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is not detainable 

under subsection (a)(1.5), we now turn to whether the offense is detainable under subsection (a)(4).

Section 110-6.1(a)(4) of the Code provides, in relevant part, that a defendant is eligible to be 
No. 1-24-0746B 

- 6 - 

detained pretrial if he is “charged with domestic battery or aggravated domestic battery under 

Section 12-3.2 or 12-3.3 of the Criminal Code of 2012.” Id. § 110-6.1(a)(4). Although the State’s

proffer at the detention hearing showed that the victim was Baggett’s son and the allegations 

against Baggett seemingly could form the basis for a domestic battery charge, the State did not 

charge Baggett with domestic battery or aggravated domestic battery under section 12-3.2 or 12-

3.3 of the Criminal Code of 2012. Rather, the State charged Baggett with aggravated battery of a 

child resulting in bodily harm under section 12-3.05(b)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 

5/12-3.05(b)(2) (West 2022)), which is not one of the two enumerated sections of the Criminal 

Code of 2012 in section 110-6.1(a)(4) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2022)). 

Consequently, Baggett’s charged offense was not a detainable offense under subsection (a)(4). 

¶ 14 Asthe State did not charge Baggett with an offense eligible for pretrial detention, the circuit 

court erred in granting the State’s petition for pretrial detention. Therefore, we remand the matter 

to the circuit court to determine the appropriate conditions of pretrial release for Baggett. See 

Grandberry, 2024 IL App (3d) 230546, ¶ 13. Additionally, because we conclude that Baggett 

cannot be detained while awaiting trial, the mandate in this case shall issue instanter. See People 

v. McDonald, 2024 IL App (1st) 232414, ¶ 44. 

¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and 

remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 17 Reversed and remanded.