78880 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 235 / Monday, December 7, 2020 / Notices 

Register on August 26, 2020 (85 FR 

52643) for a 30-day public comment 

period. The public comment period 

closed on September 25, 2020. Two 

public comment submissions were 

received by the end of the public 

comment period. These comment 

submissions expressed agreement with 

the DG–1351, Revision 1 and 

recommended final issuance of the RG. 

III. Congressional Review Act 

This RG is a rule as defined in the 

Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 

801–808). However, the Office of 

Management and Budget has not found 

it to be a major rule as defined in the 

Congressional Review Act. 

IV. Backfitting, Forward Fitting, and 

Issue Finality 

RG 1.239 provides guidance on 

licensee actions to address 

nonconservative technical 

specifications. Issuance of RG 1.239 

does not constitute backfitting as 

defined in 10 CFR 50.109, ‘‘Backfitting,’’ 

and as described in NRC Management 

Directive (MD) 8.4, ‘‘Management of 

Backfitting, Forward Fitting, Issue 

Finality, and Information Requests;’’ 

constitute forward fitting as that term is 

defined and described in MD 8.4; or 

affect the issue finality of any approval 

issued under 10 CFR part 52, ‘‘Licenses, 

Certificates, and Approvals for Nuclear 

Power Plants.’’ As explained in this RG, 

applicants and licensees are not 

required to comply with the positions 

set forth in this RG. 

V. Availability of Documents 

The documents identified in the 

following table are available to 

interested persons through ADAMS 

under the respective ADAMS Accession 

numbers identified in the table. 

Document ADAMS 

accession No. 

RG 1.239, Licensee Actions to Address Nonconservative Technical Specifications. ........................ ML20294A510 

DG–1351, Dispositioning of Technical Specifications that are Insufficient to Ensure Plant Safety, 

July 2018.

ML18086A690 

Regulatory Analysis, Draft Regulatory Guide, DG–1351. ................................................................... ML18086A685 

DG–1351, Revision 1, Licensee Actions to Address Nonconservative Technical Specifications, August 2020.ML20142A489 

NEI 15–03, Revision 2, Licensee Actions to Address Nonconservative Technical Specifications, 

September 2017.

ML17276A642 

Summary of October 17, 2019, Meeting with NEI Regarding DG–1351. ........................................... ML19298B110 

Draft NRC Staff Responses to Public Comments on DG-1351. ......................................................... ML19267A108 

NEI 15–03, Revision 3, Licensee Actions to Address Nonconservative Technical Specifications, 

March 2020.

ML20100G899 

(Package) 

Comment (1) of Brian Mann on Licensee Actions to Address Nonconservative Technical Specifications.ML20247J650 

Comment (2) of Timothy Riti on behalf of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) on Licensee Actions to 

Address Nonconservative Technical Specifications.

ML20255A302 

Management Directive 8.4, Management of Backfitting, Forward Fitting, Issue Finality, and Information Requests.ML18093B087 

Dated: December 2, 2020. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Meraj Rahimi, 

Chief, Regulatory Guidance and Generic 

Issues Branch, Division of Engineering, Office 

of Nuclear Regulatory Research. 

[FR Doc. 2020–26844 Filed 12–4–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards Charter Renewal 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of renewal of the charter 

of the advisory committee on reactor 

safeguards. 

SUMMARY: The Advisory Committee on 

Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) was 

established by the Atomic Energy Act 

(AEA) of 1954, as amended. Its purpose 

is to provide advice to the Commission 

with regard to the hazards of proposed 

or existing reactor facilities, to review 

each application for a construction 

permit or operating license for certain 

facilities specified in the AEA, and such 

other duties as the Commission may 

request. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Russell E. Chazell, Office of the 

Secretary, NRC, Washington, DC 20555; 

telephone: (301) 415–7469 or at 

Russell.Chazell@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The AEA 

as amended by Public Law 100–456 also 

specifies that the Defense Nuclear Safety 

Board may obtain the advice and 

recommendations of the ACRS. 

Membership on the Committee 

includes individuals experienced in 

reactor operations, management; 

probabilistic risk assessment; analysis of 

reactor accident phenomena; design of 

nuclear power plant structures, systems 

and components; materials science; and 

mechanical, civil, and electrical 

engineering. 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

has determined that renewal of the 

charter for the ACRS until December 2, 

2022, is in the public interest in 

connection with the statutory 

responsibilities assigned to the ACRS. 

This action is being taken in accordance 

with the Federal Advisory Committee 

Act. 

Dated: December 2, 2020. 

Russell E. Chazell, 

Federal Advisory Committee Management 

Officer, Office of the Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2020–26804 Filed 12–4–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–289 and 50–320; NRC– 

2020–0217] 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC; 

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, 

Units 1 and 2 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Exemption; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has issued 

exemptions in response to a request 

from Exelon Generation Company, LLC 

(Exelon, the licensee) regarding certain 

emergency planning (EP) requirements. 

The exemptions eliminate the 


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requirements to maintain an offsite 

radiological emergency preparedness 

plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP 

activities at the Three Mile Island 

Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (TMI), 

based on the reduced risks of accidents 

that could result in an offsite 

radiological release at a 

decommissioning nuclear power 

reactor. 

DATES: The exemptions were issued on 

December 1, 2020. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2020–0217 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2020–0217. Address 

questions about Docket IDs to Jennifer 

Borges; telephone: 301–287–9127; 

email: Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301– 

415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@

nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number 

for each document referenced (if it is 

available in ADAMS) is provided the 

first time that it is mentioned in this 

document. 

• Attention: The PDR, where you may 

examine and order copies of public 

documents is currently closed. You may 

submit your request to the PDR via 

email at PDR.Resource@nrc.gov or call 

1–800–397–4209 between 8:00 a.m. and 

4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Theodore Smith, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–6721; email: Theodore.Smith@

nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of 

the exemptions are attached. 

Dated: December 1, 2020. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Bruce Watson, 

Chief, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, 

Division of Decommissioning, Uranium 

Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of 

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. 

Attachment—Exemption 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

[Docket Nos. 50–289 and 50–320] 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC 

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, 

Units 1 and 2 Exemptions 

I. Background 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC 

(Exelon, the licensee) is the holder of 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC, the Commission) Renewed 

Facility Operating License No. DPR–50 

for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, 

Unit 1 (TMI–1). Three Mile Island 

Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI–2) has a 

possession-only license and is currently 

maintained in accordance with the 

NRC-approved SAFSTOR condition 

known as post-defueling monitored 

storage. Exelon maintains the 

emergency planning responsibilities for 

TMI–2, which is owned by GPU 

Nuclear, Inc., through a service 

agreement. These licenses are subject to 

the rules, regulations, and orders of the 

NRC. The licensed facilities consist of 

permanently shutdown pressurizedwater reactors (PWR) located in 

Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. 

By letter dated June 20, 2017 

(Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) 

Accession No. ML17171A151), Exelon 

submitted a certification to the NRC that 

it would permanently cease power 

operations at TMI–1 on or about 

September 30, 2019. On September 20, 

2019, Exelon permanently ceased power 

operations at TMI–1. By letter dated 

September 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML19269E480), Exelon certified the 

permanent removal of fuel from the 

TMI–1 reactor vessel. In accordance 

with paragraph 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR), upon the docketing of these 

certifications, the license for TMI–1 no 

longer authorizes operation of the 

reactor or emplacement or retention of 

fuel into the reactor vessel. The facility 

is still authorized to possess and store 

irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. 

Spent fuel is currently stored onsite in 

the TMI–1 spent fuel pool (SFP). A dry 

cask independent spent fuel storage 

installation is under construction to 

store the TMI–1 spent fuel. Since the 

license for TMI–2 had previously been 

modified to allow possession but not 

operation of the facility, the 

certifications of permanent cessation of 

operations and permanent removal of 

fuel are, by rule, deemed to have been 

submitted for TMI–2. Spent fuel for 

TMI–2 has already been removed from 

the site, though residual contamination 

and radiological materials exist. 

During normal power reactor 

operations, the forced flow of water 

through the reactor coolant system 

removes heat generated by the reactor. 

The reactor coolant system, operating at 

high temperatures and pressures, 

transfers this heat through the steam 

generator tubes converting nonradioactive feedwater to steam, which 

then flows to the main turbine generator 

to produce electricity. Many of the 

accident scenarios postulated in the 

updated safety analysis reports for 

operating power reactors involve 

failures or malfunctions of systems, 

which could affect the fuel in the 

reactor core and, in the most severe 

postulated accidents, would involve the 

release of large quantities of fission 

products. With the permanent cessation 

of operations and the permanent 

removal of the fuel from the reactor 

vessels at TMI, such accidents are no 

longer possible. The reactor, reactor 

coolant system, and supporting systems 

are no longer in operation and have no 

function related to the storage of the 

spent fuel. Therefore, emergency 

planning (EP) provisions for postulated 

accidents involving failure or 

malfunction of the reactor, reactor 

coolant system, or supporting systems 

are no longer applicable. 

The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, 

‘‘Emergency plans,’’ and Appendix E to 

10 CFR part 50, ‘‘Emergency Planning 

and Preparedness for Production and 

Utilization Facilities,’’ continue to apply 

to nuclear power reactors that have 

permanently ceased operation and have 

permanently removed all fuel from the 

reactor vessel. There are no explicit 

regulatory provisions distinguishing EP 

requirements for a power reactor that is 

permanently shut down and defueled 

from those for a reactor that is 

authorized to operate. To reduce or 

eliminate EP requirements that are no 

longer necessary due to the 

decommissioning status of the facility, 

Exelon must obtain exemptions from 

those EP regulations. Only then can 

Exelon modify the TMI emergency plan 

to reflect the reduced risk associated 

with the permanently shutdown and 

defueled condition of TMI. 

II. Request/Action 

By letter dated July 1, 2019 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML19182A104), Exelon 

requested exemptions from certain EP 

requirements in 10 CFR part 50 for TMI. 


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Specifically, Exelon requested 

exemptions from certain planning 

standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding 

onsite and offsite radiological 

emergency preparedness plans for 

nuclear power reactors; from certain 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) for 

the establishment of plume exposure 

and ingestion pathway emergency 

planning zones for nuclear power 

reactors; and from certain requirements 

in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV, which establish the elements that 

make up the content of emergency 

plans. In letters dated October 9, 2019, 

and December 10, 2019 (ADAMS 

Accession Nos. ML19282C285 and 

ML19344C115, respectively), Exelon 

provided supplemental information and 

responses to the NRC staff’s requests for 

additional information concerning the 

proposed exemptions. 

The information provided by Exelon 

included justifications for each 

exemption requested. The exemptions 

requested by Exelon would eliminate 

the requirements to maintain formal 

offsite radiological emergency 

preparedness plans reviewed by the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) under the requirements of 44 

CFR part 350 and would reduce the 

scope of onsite EP activities at TMI. The 

licensee stated that the application of all 

of the standards and requirements in 10 

CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 

CFR part 50, Appendix E is not needed 

for adequate emergency response 

capability, based on the substantially 

lower onsite and offsite radiological 

consequences of accidents still possible 

at the permanently shutdown and 

defueled facility, as compared to an 

operating facility. If offsite protective 

actions were needed for a highly 

unlikely beyond-design-basis accident 

that could challenge the safe storage of 

spent fuel at TMI, provisions exist for 

offsite agencies to take protective 

actions using a comprehensive 

emergency management plan (CEMP) 

under the National Preparedness System 

to protect the health and safety of the 

public. A CEMP in this context, also 

referred to as an emergency operations 

plan, is addressed in FEMA’s 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 

101, ‘‘Developing and Maintaining 

Emergency Operations Plans,’’ which is 

publicly available at http://

www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/ 

npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. Comprehensive 

Preparedness Guide 101 is the 

foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, 

and local EP in the United States. It 

promotes a common understanding of 

the fundamentals of risk-informed 

planning and decisionmaking and helps 

planners at all levels of government in 

their efforts to develop and maintain 

viable, all-hazards, all-threats 

emergency plans. An emergency 

operations plan is flexible enough for 

use in all emergencies. It describes how 

people and property will be protected; 

details who is responsible for carrying 

out specific actions; identifies the 

personnel, equipment, facilities, 

supplies and other resources available; 

and outlines how all actions will be 

coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to 

as a synonym for ‘‘all-hazards 

planning.’’ 

III. Discussion 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, 

‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ the Commission 

may, upon application by any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50 when: (1) The exemptions 

are authorized by law, will not present 

an undue risk to public health and 

safety, and are consistent with the 

common defense and security; and (2) 

any of the special circumstances listed 

in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These 

special circumstances include, among 

other things, that the application of the 

regulation in the particular 

circumstances would not serve the 

underlying purpose of the rule or is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. 

As noted previously, the EP 

regulations contained in 10 CFR 

50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 

50 apply to both operating and 

shutdown power reactors. The NRC has 

consistently acknowledged that the risk 

of an offsite radiological release at a 

power reactor that has permanently 

ceased operations and permanently 

removed fuel from the reactor vessel is 

significantly lower, and the types of 

possible accidents are significantly 

fewer, than at an operating power 

reactor. However, the EP regulations do 

not recognize that once a power reactor 

permanently ceases operation, the risk 

of a large radiological release from 

credible emergency accident scenarios 

is significantly reduced. The reduced 

risk for any significant offsite 

radiological release is based on two 

factors. One factor is the elimination of 

accidents applicable only to an 

operating power reactor, resulting in 

fewer credible accident scenarios. The 

second factor is the reduced short-lived 

radionuclide inventory and decay heat 

production due to radioactive decay. 

Due to the permanently defueled status 

of the reactor, no new spent fuel will be 

added to the SFP and the radionuclides 

in the current spent fuel will continue 

to decay as the spent fuel ages. The 

spent fuel will produce less heat due to 

radioactive decay, increasing the 

available time to mitigate a loss of water 

inventory from the SFP. The NRC’s 

NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety and 

Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR 

[Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR 

Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ dated August 1997 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML082260098), and the 

NRC’s NUREG–1738, ‘‘Technical Study 

of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 

Decommissioning Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ dated February 2001 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML010430066), 

confirmed that for permanently 

shutdown and defueled power reactors 

that are bounded by the assumptions 

and conditions in the report, the risk of 

offsite radiological release is 

significantly less than for an operating 

power reactor. 

In the past, EP exemptions similar to 

those requested for TMI have been 

granted to permanently shutdown and 

defueled power reactor licensees. 

However, the exemptions did not 

relieve the licensees of all EP 

requirements. Rather, the exemptions 

allowed the licensees to modify their 

emergency plans commensurate with 

the credible site-specific risks that were 

consistent with a permanently 

shutdown and defueled status. 

Specifically, the NRC’s approval of 

these prior exemptions was based on the 

licensee’s demonstration that: (1) The 

radiological consequences of designbasis accidents would not exceed the 

limits of the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) early phase 

Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of one 

roentgen equivalent man at the 

exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the 

highly unlikely event of a beyonddesign-basis accident resulting in a loss 

of all modes of heat transfer from the 

fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient 

time to initiate appropriate mitigating 

actions, and if needed, for offsite 

authorities to implement offsite 

protective actions using a CEMP 

approach to protect the health and 

safety of the public. 

With respect to design-basis accidents 

at TMI, the licensee provided an 

analysis demonstrating that following 

permanent cessation of power 

operations at TMI–1, the radiological 

consequences of the remaining designbasis accidents with potential for offsite 

radiological release (a fuel handling 

accident in the Fuel Handling Building, 

where the SFP is located for TMI–1, and 

a fire in the Reactor Building with the 

Reactor Building Purge System in 

operation for TMI–2) will not exceed the 


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limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion 

area boundary. 

With respect to beyond-design-basis 

accidents at TMI, the licensee analyzed 

a drain down of the SFP water that 

would effectively impede any decay 

heat removal. The analysis demonstrates 

that at 488 days (approximately 16 

months) after permanent cessation of 

power operations, there would be 10 

hours after the assemblies have been 

uncovered until the limiting fuel 

assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic 

heat-up analysis) reaches 900 degrees 

Celsius (°C), the temperature used to 

assess the potential onset of fission 

product release. The analysis 

conservatively assumed that the heat-up 

time starts when the SFP has been 

completely drained, although it is likely 

that site personnel will start to respond 

to an incident when drain down starts. 

The analysis also does not consider the 

period of time from the initiating event 

causing loss of SFP water inventory 

until cooling is lost. 

The NRC reviewed the licensee’s 

justification for the requested 

exemptions against the criteria in 10 

CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as 

described below, that the criteria in 10 

CFR 50.12(a) will be met, and that the 

exemptions should be granted 488 days 

after TMI–1 has permanently ceased 

power operations. An assessment of the 

Exelon EP exemptions is described in 

SECY–20–0041, ‘‘Request by Exelon 

Generation Company, LLC for 

Exemptions from Certain Emergency 

Planning Requirements for the Three 

Mile Island Nuclear Station,’’ dated May 

5, 2020 (ADAMS Package Accession No. 

ML19311C762). The Commission 

approved the NRC staff’s 

recommendation to grant the 

exemptions in the staff requirements 

memorandum to SECY–20–0041, dated 

July 27, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML20209A439). Descriptions of the 

specific exemptions requested by 

Exelon and the NRC staff’s basis for 

granting each exemption are provided in 

SECY–20–0041. The NRC staff’s 

detailed review and technical basis for 

the approval of the specific EP 

exemptions requested by Exelon are 

provided in the NRC staff’s safety 

evaluation associated with this 

exemption (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML19311C762). 

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law 

The licensee has proposed 

exemptions from certain EP 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV, that would 

allow Exelon to revise the TMI 

Emergency Plan to reflect the 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

condition of the facility. As stated 

above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, 

the Commission may, upon application 

by any interested person or upon its 

own initiative, grant exemptions from 

the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The 

NRC staff has determined that granting 

of the licensee’s proposed exemptions 

will not result in a violation of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 

or the NRC’s regulations. Therefore, the 

exemptions are authorized by law. 

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue 

Risk to Public Health and Safety 

As stated previously, Exelon provided 

an analysis that shows that the 

radiological consequences of designbasis accidents will not exceed the 

limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at 

the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, 

formal offsite radiological emergency 

preparedness plans required under 10 

CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for 

protection of the public beyond the 

exclusion area boundary, based on the 

radiological consequences of designbasis accidents still possible at TMI 488 

days after TMI–1 has permanently 

ceased power operations. 

Although highly unlikely, there is one 

postulated beyond-design-basis accident 

that might result in significant offsite 

radiological releases. However, NUREG– 

1738 confirms that the risk of beyonddesign-basis accidents is greatly reduced 

at permanently shutdown and defueled 

reactors. The NRC staff’s analyses in 

NUREG–1738 conclude that the event 

sequences important to risk at 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

power reactors are limited to large 

earthquakes and cask drop events. For 

EP assessments, this is an important 

difference relative to operating power 

reactors, where typically a large number 

of different sequences make significant 

contributions to risk. As described in 

NUREG–1738, relaxation of offsite EP 

requirements in 10 CFR part 50 beyond 

a few months after shutdown resulted in 

only a small change in risk. The report 

further concludes that the change in risk 

due to relaxation of offsite EP 

requirements is small because the 

overall risk is low, and because even 

under current EP requirements for 

operating power reactors, EP was judged 

to have marginal impact on evacuation 

effectiveness for the severe earthquakes 

that dominate SFP risk. All other 

sequences including cask drops (for 

which offsite radiological emergency 

preparedness plans are expected to be 

more effective) are too low in likelihood 

to have a significant impact on risk. 

Therefore, granting exemptions to 

eliminate the requirements of 10 CFR 

part 50 to maintain offsite radiological 

emergency preparedness plans and to 

reduce the scope of onsite EP activities 

will not present an undue risk to the 

public health and safety. 

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the 

Common Defense and Security 

The requested exemptions only 

involve EP requirements under 10 CFR 

part 50 and will allow Exelon to revise 

the TMI Emergency Plan to reflect the 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

condition of the facility. Physical 

security measures at TMI are not 

affected by the requested EP 

exemptions. The discontinuation of 

formal offsite radiological emergency 

preparedness plans and the reduction in 

scope of the onsite EP activities at TMI 

will not adversely affect Exelon’s ability 

to physically secure the site or protect 

special nuclear material. Therefore, the 

proposed exemptions are consistent 

with common defense and security. 

D. Special Circumstances 

Special circumstances, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present 

whenever application of the regulation 

in the particular circumstances is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. The underlying 

purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 

50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

protective measures can and will be 

taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency, to establish plume exposure 

and ingestion pathway emergency 

planning zones for nuclear power 

plants, and to ensure that licensees 

maintain effective offsite and onsite 

radiological emergency preparedness 

plans. The standards and requirements 

in these regulations were developed by 

considering the risks associated with 

operation of a power reactor at its 

licensed full-power level. These risks 

include the potential for a reactor 

accident with offsite radiological dose 

consequences. 

As discussed previously in Section III, 

because TMI will be permanently shut 

down and defueled, there will no longer 

be a risk of a significant offsite 

radiological release from a design-basis 

accident exceeding EPA early phase 

PAGs at the exclusion area boundary 

and the risk of a significant offsite 

radiological release from a beyonddesign-basis accident is greatly reduced 

when compared to an operating power 

reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the 

reduced risks at TMI by comparing the 

generic risk assumptions in the analyses 

in NUREG–1738 to site-specific 

conditions at TMI and determined that 


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the risk values in NUREG–1738 bound 

the risks presented at TMI. As indicated 

by the results of the research conducted 

for NUREG–1738, and more recently for 

NUREG–2161, ‘‘Consequence Study of a 

Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake 

Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. 

Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,’’ dated 

September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14255A365), while other 

consequences can be extensive, 

accidents from SFPs with significant 

decay time have little potential to cause 

offsite early fatalities, even if the formal 

offsite radiological EP requirements 

were relaxed. The licensee’s analysis of 

a beyond-design-basis accident 

involving a complete loss of SFP water 

inventory, based on an adiabatic heat-up 

analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for 

decay heat, shows that 488 days after 

permanent cessation of power 

operations at TMI–1, the time for the 

limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 °C 

is at least 10 hours after the assemblies 

have been uncovered assuming a loss of 

all cooling means. 

The only analyzed beyond-designbasis accident scenario that progresses 

to a condition where a significant offsite 

release might occur, involves the highly 

unlikely event where the SFP drains in 

such a way that all modes of cooling or 

heat transfer are assumed to be 

unavailable, which is referred to as an 

adiabatic heat-up of the spent fuel. The 

licensee’s analysis of this beyonddesign-basis accident shows that 488 

days after permanent cessation of power 

operations at TMI–1, at least 10 hours 

would be available between the time 

that all cooling means are lost to the fuel 

(at which time adiabatic heat-up is 

conservatively assumed to begin), until 

the fuel cladding reaches a temperature 

of 1652 degrees Fahrenheit (900 °C), 

which is the temperature associated 

with rapid cladding oxidation and the 

potential for a significant radiological 

release. This analysis conservatively 

does not include the period of time from 

the initiating event causing a loss of SFP 

water inventory until all cooling means 

are lost. 

The NRC staff has verified Exelon’s 

analyses and its calculations. The 

analyses provide reasonable assurance 

that in granting the requested 

exemptions to Exelon, there is no 

design-basis accident that will result in 

an offsite radiological release exceeding 

the EPA early phase PAGs at the 

exclusion area boundary. In the highly 

unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis 

accident affecting the SFP that results in 

a complete loss of heat removal via all 

modes of heat transfer, there will be 

over 10 hours available before an offsite 

release might occur and, therefore, at 

least 10 hours to initiate appropriate 

mitigating actions to restore a means of 

heat removal to the spent fuel. If a 

radiological release were projected to 

occur under this highly unlikely 

scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is 

considered sufficient time for offsite 

authorities to implement protective 

actions using a CEMP approach to 

protect the health and safety of the 

public. 

Exemptions from the offsite EP 

requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 

previously been approved by the NRC 

when the site-specific analyses show 

that at least 10 hours is available 

following a loss of SFP coolant 

inventory accident with no air cooling 

(or other methods of removing decay 

heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel 

assembly reaches the rapid oxidation 

temperature. The NRC staff concluded 

in its previously granted exemptions, as 

it does with Exelon’s requested EP 

exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 

hours is available to initiate mitigative 

actions consistent with plant conditions 

or, if needed, for offsite authorities to 

implement protective actions using a 

CEMP approach, then formal offsite 

radiological emergency preparedness 

plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, 

are not necessary at permanently 

shutdown and defueled facilities. 

Additionally, TMI committed to 

maintaining SFP makeup strategies in 

its application. The multiple strategies 

for providing makeup to the SFP 

include: using existing plant systems for 

inventory makeup; an internal strategy 

that relies on the fire protection system 

with redundant pumps (one dieseldriven and one electric motor-driven); 

and an off-site fire truck that can take 

suction from the Susquehanna River. 

These strategies will continue to be 

required as condition 2.c.(17), 

‘‘Mitigation Strategy License 

Condition,’’ of the TMI–1 Renewed 

Facility Operating License. Considering 

the very low probability of beyonddesign-basis accidents affecting the SFP, 

these diverse strategies provide multiple 

methods to obtain additional makeup or 

spray to the SFP before the onset of any 

postulated offsite radiological release. 

For all of the reasons stated above, the 

NRC staff finds that the licensee’s 

requested exemptions meet the 

underlying purpose of all of the 

standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) and 

10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, and satisfy 

the special circumstances provision in 

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the 

greatly reduced risk of offsite 

radiological consequences associated 

with the permanently shutdown and 

defueled state of the TMI facility 488 

days after permanent cessation of power 

operations of TMI–1. 

The NRC staff has concluded that the 

exemptions being granted by this action 

will maintain an acceptable level of 

emergency preparedness at TMI and, if 

needed, that there is reasonable 

assurance that adequate offsite 

protective measures can and will be 

taken by State and local government 

agencies using a CEMP approach in the 

highly unlikely event of a radiological 

emergency at TMI. Since the underlying 

purpose of the rules, as exempted, 

would continue to be achieved, even 

with the elimination of the requirements 

under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal 

offsite radiological emergency 

preparedness plans and the reduction in 

the scope of the onsite emergency 

planning activities at TMI, the special 

circumstances required by 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist. 

E. Environmental Considerations 

In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), 

the Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment as discussed in the 

NRC staff’s Finding of No Significant 

Impact and associated Environmental 

Assessment published in the Federal 

Register on September 22, 2020 (85 FR 

59565). 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12, Exelon’s request for exemptions 

from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 

50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR 

part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as 

summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY– 

20–0041, are authorized by law, will not 

present an undue risk to the public 

health and safety, and are consistent 

with the common defense and security. 

Also, special circumstances are present. 

Therefore, the Commission hereby 

grants Exelon’s exemptions from certain 

EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV, as discussed 

and evaluated in detail in the NRC 

staff’s safety evaluation associated with 

this exemption. The exemptions are 

effective as of 488 days after permanent 

cessation of power operations of TMI– 

1. 

Dated: December 1, 2020. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Patricia K. Holahan, Director, 

Division of Decommissioning, Uranium 

Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of 

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2020–26767 Filed 12–4–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 


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