SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0853-15T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRIAN CARTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________________

Argued December 13, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Messano, Guadagno and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, 

Municipal Appeal No. 15-028.

Daniella Gordon argued the cause for appellant 

(The Gordon Law Firm, attorneys; Ms. Gordon, 

on the briefs).

Jeffrey St. John, Assistant Prosecutor, argued 

the cause for respondent (Christopher J. 

Gramiccioni, Monmouth County Prosecutor, 

attorney; Keri-Leigh Schaefer, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Following a de novo trial in the Law Division on appeal from 

the Red Bank municipal court, defendant Brian Carter was found 

guilty of three summonses charging him with failing to possess his 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

June 27, 2017
2 A-0853-15T1

driver's license, vehicle registration and insurance 

identification card, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29; another summons charging 

him with failing to properly signal, N.J.S.A. 39:4-126; and a 

complaint charging defendant with obstructing the administration 

of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). The judge imposed certain fines and 

monetary penalties.

In the municipal court, defendant moved to suppress evidence 

alleging a lack of "probable cause for the [motor vehicle] stop 

and subsequent arrest." The municipal court judge considered the 

testimony of Red Bank police officer Thomas Doremus, as well as 

the motor vehicle recording (MVR) from a camera in Doremus's police 

car.1 Doremus testified that on the morning of April 8, 2013, he 

was on patrol driving westbound on Monmouth Street near its 

intersection with Shrewsbury Avenue. Defendant's car was ahead 

of Doremus's vehicle proceeding in the same direction. 

Doremus testified defendant made a left turn, southbound onto 

Shrewsbury Avenue, accelerated quickly and came within two-andone-half feet of the vehicle in front of him. Doremus saw 

 

1 "[A]ppellate review of a municipal appeal to the Law Division is 

limited to 'the action of the Law Division and not that of the 

municipal court.'" State v. Palma, 219 N.J. 584, 591-592 (2014) 

(quoting State v. Joas, 34 N.J. 179, 184 (1961); State v. Oliveri, 

336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001)). However, in this 

case, the legal issues raised on appeal require a detailed 

recitation of the testimony in the municipal court and the findings 

and legal conclusions of the municipal court judge.
3 A-0853-15T1

defendant follow the car in front of him too closely for 

approximately sixty-five feet. Doremus also turned left and 

proceeded south on Shrewsbury before he saw defendant's car 

"abruptly pull to the curb . . . without using the turn signal." 

Doremus activated his overhead lights and approached, requesting 

defendant's credentials.

The MVR video was played in court. As defendant's car 

approached the intersection of Monmouth and Shrewsbury before 

turning left, the judge asked Doremus "do you see any blinker or 

anything . . . on that automobile?" Doremus responded, "I don't, 

at the time, I don't recall." Defense counsel noted defendant was 

not charged with failing to signal at the intersection but only 

when he later pulled to the curb. In addition, she insisted the 

video actually showed defendant signaled a left turn. An extended 

colloquy ensued between defense counsel and the judge as the judge 

repeatedly reviewed the video. 

On cross-examination, Doremus testified that a car and truck 

followed defendant's car southbound on Shrewsbury before Doremus

turned, meaning defendant's car was the third vehicle ahead of the 

police unit.2 Doremus testified that defendant's abrupt turn to 

the curb without signaling caused other cars behind him to brake 

 

2 In actuality, the video shows two cars followed defendant's 

vehicle.
4 A-0853-15T1

suddenly. However, Doremus admitted the MVR did not show the 

vehicle immediately in front of the police car ever applied its 

brakes, nor did it show defendant's abrupt turn to the curb. 

Doremus acknowledged that defendant's car was already parked at 

the curb when he approached.

Defense counsel argued it was impossible for Doremus to have 

observed defendant following too closely or failing to signal as 

he parked at the curb. As she began to argue that Doremus's 

estimations of defendant's speed and distance were mathematically 

impossible, the judge interrupted:

I don't even have to address the issue 

as to whether he's driving too close. . . . 

[T]here [were] two summonses issued. . . . I 

find. . . there was a reason for the stop 

. . . and I'm not even addressing the issue 

of him driving too closely.

I find, from what I viewed on the video, 

that [defendant] failed to use a signal to 

make a left hand turn . . . within 100 feet 

of the intersection. . . . I never saw a 

signal being put on his vehicle before he made 

his left turn.

On that basis alone, . . . I find that 

there's a reason for stopping him on that 

date. Period, that's it. . . .

. . . .

I'm not granting your motion to suppress, 

and I'm basing it on his failure to signal 

when he came to the intersection . . . .
5 A-0853-15T1

The balance of the trial ensued, with Doremus testifying 

about what happened after he approached defendant's alreadystopped car and asked for his credentials. The driver's window 

was open and, without producing any documentation, defendant 

picked up his cellphone, claimed he was calling the United States 

Marshall, refused to provide his credentials and raised the window. 

Defendant continued to ignore Doremus's request for documentation. 

Doremus called dispatch and requested assistance. 

Police Officer Jorge Torres testified that when he arrived 

and approached defendant's vehicle, defendant lowered the window 

and asked for a supervisor. Torres requested a supervisor respond 

to their location. After a third officer arrived and defendant 

continued to refuse to produce his credentials, Doremus "reached 

in [through the window,] unlocked the door, unbuckled [defendant] 

and had him exit the vehicle." Police arrested defendant and 

transported him to headquarters.

The prosecutor asked Doremus why he charged defendant with 

obstruction. The officer explained:

Because while I'm in the process of the motor 

vehicle stop I requested his license, 

registration and insurance numerous times. 

[Defendant] refused numerous times, in not 

providing information and refused any action 

by me. He would not have any interaction, and 
6 A-0853-15T1

refuse[d] to give anything, any information 

at all.3

The judge acquitted defendant of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-89, 

following too closely, but convicted him of the other motor vehicle 

offenses. As to the obstruction charge, citing N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, 

the judge reasoned defendant was required to produce his 

credentials pursuant to a "good faith traffic stop." The judge 

determined Doremus was "in the performance of his duties" and, 

based on the judge's prior ruling, had "probable cause for the 

initial motor vehicle stop." Citing our decisions in State v. 

Camillo, 382 N.J. Super. 113 (App. Div. 2005), and State v. 

Perlstein, 206 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div. 1985), the judge 

concluded defendant's failure to produce his credentials was an 

"independent[] unlawful act." See N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) ("A person 

commits an offense if he purposely obstructs, [or] impairs . . . 

the administration of law or other governmental function or 

prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully 

performing an official function by means of . . . physical 

interference . . . or . . . any independently unlawful act."). 

Defendant appealed to the Law Division. 

 

3 The complaint-summons actually stated defendant obstructed "by 

means of physical interference, specifically by, refusing to roll 

down his vehicle window and provide the uniformed . . . officer 

with his information during a motor vehicle stop." 
7 A-0853-15T1

At the start of those proceedings, the judge viewed the MVR 

recording. He noted that the municipal court judge made no 

findings regarding Doremus' credibility, "[p]robably for good 

reason," because the officer "couldn't have seen" what he claimed 

was the reason for stopping defendant's car. However, the judge 

concluded after viewing the video that defendant "did not signal" 

as he turned left onto Shrewsbury Avenue.

The judge asked defense counsel why defendant refused to 

produce his license for Doremus. When she responded with 

uncertainty, the judge referenced defendant's driver's abstract, 

a document not produced in the municipal court, that revealed 

defendant had no New Jersey driver's license and had not obtained 

a New York driver's license until a few days after this incident. 

In rendering his oral decision, the judge concluded there 

were "allegedly" two bases for the motor vehicle stop. Like the 

municipal court judge, the judge found Doremus was not in a 

position to see how closely defendant was following the car in 

front of him. Rejecting the second alleged reason, the judge 

noted the MVR showed "[t]he intervening two vehicles between the 

front of [Doremus's] car and the rear of the defendant's car 

precluded the [o]fficer from making any observation as to whether 

[defendant] did or did not turn at that point." 
8 A-0853-15T1

However, because the summons did not specify when defendant 

failed to signal, i.e., whether at the intersection or at the 

curb, and Doremus did not recall whether defendant had signaled 

left at the intersection, the judge concluded the "video bec[ame] 

the best evidence." Based on his review of the video, the judge 

concluded the officer had a "factual basis" for determining 

defendant failed to signal left before turning. 

With regard to the obstruction charge, the judge stated 

"Perlstein [was] on all fours with [this] particular case." He 

concluded defendant committed an "independent unlawful act" and 

therefore was guilty of obstructing. The judge imposed various 

fines and penalties and this appeal followed.

Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

I. EACH OF MR. CARTER'S CONVICTIONS SHOULD 

BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED 

IN MAKING AN IMPLIED FINDING THAT THE OFFICER 

HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE TRAFFIC 

STOP, WHERE THE OFFICER DENIED SEEING AN 

ALLEGED FAILURE TO SIGNAL LEFT VIOLATION, AND 

WHERE THE OFFICER'S OTHER STATED REASONS FOR 

THE STOP WERE DEEMED INVALID.

II. THE CONVICTION FOR FAILURE TO SIGNAL 

SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE MVR DOES NOT 

SHOW BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. CARTER 

FAILED TO SIGNAL LEFT AND MR. CARTER WAS NEVER 

GIVEN NOTICE OR DISCOVERY REGARDING A CHARGE 

WITH THIS ALTERNATE FACTUAL BASIS.

III. WITH RESPECT TO THE CHARGE OF 

OBSTRUCTION, IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO 

FAIL TO MAKE ANY FINDING THAT THE OFFICER 
9 A-0853-15T1

ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN STOPPING MR. CARTER, 

WHERE THE OFFICER'S GOOD FAITH IS AN ELEMENT 

OF A CHARGE OF OBSTRUCTION.

IV. THE EVIDENCE IS FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY 

INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR 

OBSTRUCTION WHERE MR. CARTER HAD REASON TO 

BELIEVE THAT HE WAS SUBJECT [SIC] OF A 

VOLUNTARY FIELD INQUIRY, NOT A MOTOR VEHICLE 

STOP.

V. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT TO 

REFER TO MR. CARTER'S DRIVING ABSTRACT ON ITS 

OWN INITIATIVE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A TRIAL 

DE NOVO ON THE RECORD IN ORDER TO MAKE 

INFERENCES ABOUT MR. CARTER'S GUILT AND 

MOTIVE, WHERE THE ONLY APPROPRIATE REFERENCE 

TO A DRIVING ABSTRACT IS FOR SENTENCING, NOT 

FOR A DETERMINATION OF GUILT.

We have considered these arguments in light of the record and 

applicable legal standards. We reverse and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

In conducting our review of defendant's conviction following 

a de novo trial in the Law Division, "[w]e defer to the judge's 

fact finding, and our 'review is limited to whether the findings 

made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible 

evidence present in the record.'" State v. L.S., 444 N.J. Super.

241, 247-48 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J.

368, 382-83 (2015)). "We owe no deference, however, to the 'trial 

court's interpretation of the law . . . and the consequences that 

flow from established facts[,]' which we review de novo." Id. at 
10 A-0853-15T1

248 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J.

249, 263 (2015)). We first consider whether the stop of 

defendant's automobile was lawful.4

"To be lawful, an automobile stop 'must be based on reasonable 

and articulable suspicion that an offense, including a minor 

traffic offense, has been or is being committed.'" State v. 

Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017) (quoting State v. Carty, 170 N.J.

632, 639-40 (2002)). "To satisfy the articulable and reasonable 

 

4 As the Court recently instructed in State v. Rosario, __ N.J. __ 

(June 6, 2017) (slip op. at 13-15), before determining the 

lawfulness of an automobile stop, a judge must determine whether 

the police encounter was a voluntary field inquiry or an 

investigative stop where a reasonable person would not "feel free 

to leave." In Point IV of his brief, defendant contends he "had 

reason to believe that he was the subject of a voluntary field 

inquiry, not a motor vehicle stop" because he was already parked 

on the side of the road when Doremus pulled up and Doremus did not 

provide a reason for the credential's request; therefore, he was 

not obligated to engage in a discussion with Doremus or provide 

Doremus with his driver's credentials. In Rosario, the Court held 

the interaction between the defendant and the officer was an 

investigative detention because the defendant would not reasonably 

feel "free to leave" where she was parked lawfully outside her 

home when an officer blocked her in with his vehicle, directed the 

patrol car's alley light to shine into her car, and then approached 

the driver's side to ask for her credentials. Id. at 4-5, 12-15. 

Here, under similar circumstances, we conclude the stop was clearly 

an investigative detention where Doremus parked behind defendant, 

flashed his emergency lights, approached defendant on the driver's 

side, and blocked his driver's side door; such "police activity 

reasonably would, and should, prompt a person to think that [he] 

must stay put and submit to whatever interaction with the police 

officer was about the come," i.e., not feel "free to leave." Id.

at 12. 
11 A-0853-15T1

suspicion standard, the State is not required to prove that the 

suspected motor-vehicle violation occurred." State v. Locurto, 

157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). That is, "the State need prove only 

that the police lawfully stopped the car, not that it could convict 

the driver of the motor-vehicle offense." State v. Heisler, 422 

N.J. Super. 399, 413 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting State v. Williamson, 

138 N.J. 302, 304 (1994)). 

Also, an officer's belief that a traffic violation actually 

occurred must be objectively reasonable. State v. Puzio, 379 N.J. 

Super. 378, 383 (App. Div. 2005). However, "the fact that 

information an officer considers is ultimately determined to be 

inaccurate" does not invalidate the motor vehicle stop. State v. 

Pitcher, 379 N.J. Super. 308, 318 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied, 

186 N.J. 242 (2006).5

In this case, neither judge found Doremus made the 

observations he claimed to have made and justified his stop of 

defendant's car, i.e., following too closely or failing to signal 

as he pulled to the curb. In fact, based upon their own 

observations of the MVR, both judges concluded the officer could 

 

5 In State v. Shannon, 222 N.J. 576, 578-79 (2015), cert. denied, 

__ U.S. __ 136 S. Ct. 1657, 194 L. Ed. 2d 800 (2016), an equallydivided Court affirmed our decision, which in turn affirmed the 

trial judge's order of suppression. Because Shannon dealt with 

the arrest of the defendant based upon an invalid warrant, ibid., 

the Court distinguished Pitcher as "inapposite." Id. at 591. 
12 A-0853-15T1

not have made those observations. In other words, this case is 

unlike Heisler, supra, 422 N.J. Super. at 413, where the officer 

made observations that proved legally insufficient to convict the 

defendant of a motor vehicle violation, or Pitcher, supra, 379 

N.J. Super. at 318, where the officer relied upon computer 

information that was not timely deleted from the system. See also

State v. Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. 509, 518-23 (App. Div.) (upholding 

seizure following stop even though facts may not have proven a 

motor vehicle violation), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 547 (2009).

Moreover, there is no authority to support the municipal 

court and Law Division judges' transmutation of their personal 

observations of the MVR recording into a reasonable and articulable 

basis for Doremus to stop defendant's vehicle. Doremus never 

testified that he saw defendant fail to signal at the intersection, 

and there is no doubt that he never thought defendant had committed 

a motor vehicle violation at that point. When asked at trial, 

Doremus candidly answered, "I don't, at the time, I don't recall." 

He was never asked to view the recording to refresh his memory. 

Therefore, while the Law Division judge determined Doremus's 

response left the judge free to view the tape as the "best 

evidence" of the incident, that conclusion did not permit the 

judge to find Doremus actually possessed a reasonable and 

articulable basis for the stop.
13 A-0853-15T1

Additionally, we think it axiomatic that defendant could not 

be convicted of failing to signal at the intersection. Doremus

never testified that defendant failed to signal at that point, or 

that the MVR recording showed that to be the case. Although the 

summons, as issued, did not specify exactly where the infraction 

took place, the State presented the case based upon Doremus's 

claim that the violation occurred when defendant pulled to the 

curb. Defendant was never on notice otherwise. It is 

fundamentally unfair to rest defendant's conviction solely upon 

the independent viewing of the MVR by the judges when the State 

never sought to convict defendant of that offense and proffered 

no testimony the offense had occurred. 

As a result, we conclude based on the record before the Law 

Division that the stop of defendant's motor vehicle was unlawful, 

and the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-126. We reverse his conviction 

and remand the matter for entry of a judgment of acquittal. 

II.

Even though the State failed to prove the lawfulness of the 

motor vehicle stop, we must nevertheless consider whether that 

conclusion compels reversal of defendant's convictions for failure 

to exhibit his driver's credentials, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, and 

obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). Neither the municipal court 
14 A-0853-15T1

judge nor the Law Division judge specifically addressed this issue 

because they both found the stop was lawful. 

N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 provides in pertinent part:

The driver's license, the registration 

certificate of a motor vehicle and an 

insurance identification card shall be in the 

possession of the driver or operator at all 

times when he is in charge of a motor vehicle 

on the highways of this State.

The driver or operator shall exhibit his 

driver's license and an insurance 

identification card, and the holder of a 

registration certificate or the operator or 

driver of a motor vehicle for which a 

registration certificate has been issued 

. . . shall also exhibit the registration 

certificate, when requested so to do by a 

police officer or judge, while in the 

performance of the duties of his office 

. . . .

[(Emphasis added).]

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) provides:

 

A person commits an offense if he purposely 

obstructs, impairs or perverts the 

administration of law or other governmental 

function or prevents or attempts to prevent a 

public servant from lawfully performing an 

official function by means of flight, 

intimidation, force, violence, or physical 

interference or obstacle, or by means of any 

independently unlawful act.

[(Emphasis added).]
15 A-0853-15T1

Both judges concluded the evidence supported a conviction for 

obstruction by "means of any independently unlawful act."6

In Perlstein, police stopped the defendant for having a PBA 

sticker on her windshield. 206 N.J. Super. at 249. The officer 

allowed her an opportunity to remove the sticker, but the defendant 

refused and also refused to provide her credentials. Id. at 249-

50. The officer told the defendant he would issue summonses if 

she refused to produce her license, registration, and insurance 

card. Id. at 250. She did and was subsequently charged with 

obstruction. Id. at 251. 

We reasoned that N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 required the production of 

credentials upon the officer's demand, and N.J.S.A. 39:4-57 

required all drivers to comply with the officer's direction while 

enforcing provisions of Title 39. Id. at 253. As a result, we 

held that refusing an officer's request to show driving credentials 

and failing to comply with the officer's directions are 

"independently unlawful acts" sufficient to support a conviction 

 

6 Defendant does not specifically argue this was error. In any 

event, the court has the authority to amend the precise charge to 

the evidence produced at trial. See R. 7:14-2 (permitting a 

municipal court to "amend any process or pleading . . . for any 

variance between the complaint and the evidence adduced at trial, 

but no such amendment shall be permitted which charges a different 

substantive offense)." Defendant has not argued he was convicted 

of "a different substantive offense."
16 A-0853-15T1

for obstruction of justice under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. Id. at 253-

54. 

In short, we agree with the Law Division judge that Perlstein

is dispositive. Defendant's conduct after Doremus and the other 

officers approached his car was sufficient to convict defendant 

of the motor vehicle offense and obstruction.

Our recent decision in State v. Powers, 448 N.J. Super. 69 

(App. Div. 2016), does not compel a different result. There, we 

concluded the defendant could not be convicted of obstruction by 

an "independently unlawful act," specifically failing to heed an 

officer's command under N.J.S.A. 39:4-57, because the defendant 

was not driving his car at the time, and the officer, who was 

writing a parking ticket, was not enforcing Chapter 4 of Title 39. 

Id. at 75-76. 

However, defendant argues that he could not be convicted of 

obstruction because the State failed to prove Doremus acted in the 

good faith performance of his duties. Regarding the obstruction 

charge, the Court previously held "that a defendant may be 

convicted of obstruction under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 when he flees from 

an investigatory stop, despite a later finding that the police 

action was unconstitutional." State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 

460, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1078, 127 S. Ct. 740, 166 L. Ed. 2d 

563 (2006). "N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 should be construed to require 
17 A-0853-15T1

submission even to an unlawful stop . . . ." Ibid. The Court 

construed the statute's terms — "lawfully performing an official 

function" — to mean the officer must act "in objective good faith, 

under color of law in the execution of his duties." Id. at 460-

61. The Court specified "good faith means 'honesty in belief or 

purpose' and 'faithfulness to one's duty or obligation.'" Id. at 

461 n.8 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 701 (7th ed. 1999)).

Regarding the motor vehicle offenses, while we could find no 

case interpreting the phrase, "while in the performance of the 

duties of his office," as used in N.J.S.A. 39:3-29, it is clear 

that after Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 

L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979), police may not randomly stop motorists for 

credential checks. State v. Carpentieri, 82 N.J. 546, 548 (1980). 

We assume arguendo that the State must demonstrate Doremus acted 

"in objective good faith, under color of law in the execution of 

his duties," when he demanded defendant produce his credentials. 

Crawley, supra, 187 N.J. at 460-61.

Unfortunately, as noted, the issue was not addressed in either 

the municipal court or the Law Division. Defendant argues that 

because neither judge credited Doremus's testimony regarding the 

two reasons he stopped defendant's car, it follows the stop could 

not have been made in objective good faith. However, we do not 

believe one proposition necessarily follows the other. In other 
18 A-0853-15T1

words, the present record does not necessarily foreclose the 

possibility that Doremus acted in a good faith, albeit mistaken, 

belief that defendant had violated the motor vehicle laws.

As a result, we are compelled to reverse defendant's 

convictions and remand the matter for a new trial in the municipal 

court. See R. 3:23-8(a)(2) (permitting reversal and new trial). 

The State is permitted to introduce evidence demonstrating 

Doremus's good faith. See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court 

Rules, comment 1 on R. 3:23-8 (2017) (explaining post-2013 

amendment to the Rule permitting the State to introduce evidence 

at the new trial unless barred by the Constitution or statute). 

In sum, we reverse defendant's convictions. We remand the 

matter to the municipal court to enter a judgment of acquittal on 

the summons charging defendant with violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-126. 

We remand to the municipal court for a new trial on the summons 

charging defendant with violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 and the 

complaint charging him with a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). 

Our conclusion that the stop of defendant's motor vehicle was 

unlawful is binding upon the municipal court.

Reversed and remanded.7 We do not retain jurisdiction. 

 

7 As a result, we need not consider Point V in defendant's brief.