Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about Joint Special Operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations of national security professionals and Special Operations Forces’ 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense leadership. 

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the US Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The mission of 

the Joint Special Operations University is to educate SOF executive, senior 

and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international 

security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, 

outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. 

JSOU provides education to the men and women of Special Operations 

Forces and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department 

where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and these operational 

priorities: 

• Preempting global terrorist and CBRNE threats

• Enhancing homeland security

• Performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conven-

 tional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries

• Conducting proactive stability operations

• Executing small-scale contingencies

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency and US military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsou.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem

President

Dr. Brian A. Maher

Vice President

Strategic Studies Department

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon

Director

James D. Anderson

Director of Research

Previous Publications of the JSOU Press

2004–2005 JSOU/NDIA Essays, April 2005

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, June 2005

Russian Special Forces, August 2005

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

The Evolving Requirements of the 

Canadian Special Operations Forces, September 2005

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Operationalizing COIN, September 2005

Joseph D. Celeski

Theoretical Perspectives of 

Terrorist Enemies as Networks, October 2005

Robert G. Spulak and Jessica Glicken Turnley

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005

Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005

James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006

Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro
JSOU Report 06-1

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2006

The Changing

Nature of Warfare,

the Factors Mediating 

Future Conflict, 

and Implications 

for SOF

John B. Alexander
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the U.S. 

Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or the Joint Special 

Operations University. 

*******

Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. 

Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-

2763; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.

af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-00-8


vii

Foreword

USSOCOM is synchronizing the Global War on Terrorism for 

the Department of Defense. This global initiative expands 

the boundaries of traditional war fighting in order to coordinate an attack against dispersed, flexible, and innovative enemies. 

Incapable of confronting US military power on the battlefield, today’s 

enemies use asymmetrical techniques to 

strike our homeland as well as our troops 

in the field. In turn, we strike back using 

innovative approaches to combat them, 

such as countering extremist ideologies 

with strategic communications initiatives, 

dismantling terrorist networks, and isolating terrorist organizations from sources of support. But these kinds 

of activities are artful variations on traditional combat and give little 

insight into the “Changing Nature of Warfare” as suggested by Dr. 

John Alexander in his visionary paper.

Dr. Alexander suggests that the nature of war has changed—profoundly. It is now possible to achieve war time policy objectives without 

resorting to physical violence. While we will need to maintain capable 

combat units well into the future, he suggests that major conflicts in 

the future are not going to be resolved mainly by use of arms.

The coming changes in the nature of warfare are already apparent. The use of information operations to influence the military and 

the polity of one’s enemies come to mind. Economic warfare can lead 

to the ascendant position of one nation over another, and Dr. Alexander identifies China as a future problem for the US in this regard. 

The demise of the Soviet Union reminds us of the impact of economics upon the national security of a country. Currently, China is facilitating an economic environment whereby Americans are cheerfully 

spending their way into submission to a Chinese future of global 

hegemony. And all this can be achieved without firing a canon, Dr. 

Alexander’s paper suggests.

If Dr. Alexander is right, Special Operations Forces will need to 

expand SOF capabilities in addition to the current capacities for sur-

... today’s enemies use 

asymmetrical techniques to strike our 

homeland as well as 

our troops in the field.
viii

gical strike missions, strategic reconnaissance and civil military operations. The use of non-lethal weapons will likely become increasingly important. Dr. Alexander suggests that future wars can be at 

once “decisive but nonviolent,” and that SOF will need to hone its 

capabilities for conducting information warfare and influencing people in countries around the world. In the Alexander vision of future 

conflict there will be a central role for SOF.

Dennis P. Kilcullen

Acting Director, Strategic Studies Department

Joint Special Operations University 
1

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

The Changing Nature of Warfare, 

the Factors Mediating Future Conflict, 

and Implications for SOF

John B. Alexander, Ph.D.

Introduction

This paper challenges the prevailing sentiment regarding the 

nature of war. Designed to generate discussion on topics where 

little or none has been acceptable, it pushes the envelope of 

traditional political and military science thinking. It argues that the 

nature of war has changed at a fundamental level—that of definition. 

Further, information technology is so pervasive and interpenetrating 

that its impact cannot be relegated to mere alteration in the techniques by which war is prosecuted. Rather, information technology 

facilitates new social structures, exacerbates competing hierarchical beliefs, and, combined with other factors, enhances the ability 

of powerful nations, or other philosophical organizations, to impose 

their will on adversaries. It is this ability for imposition of will, not 

the level of violence inflicted, that will determine whether or not a 

conflict has been won or lost.

Other sacred cows are gored in this monograph by stating:

The nation-state is a failing concept with limited utility and 

great liability

Boundaries, once thought to be absolute, are in reality arbitrary

Ideology, not materialism, motivates many people and therefore sources of conflict and terrorism cannot be eliminated 

solely by reducing poverty 

Personal allegiance(s) will no longer be assured

Violence, while it will remain prominent, will be optional in 

future conflicts 

Issues of Definition 

Much debate has gone into the question of whether or not the nature 

of war has changed. Traditionalists cling tenaciously to the Clausewitzian view that the nature of war remains constant, but how it is 

•

•

•

•

•
2

 JSOU Report 06-1

prosecuted does vary over time. This conclusion flies in the face of 

common sense, the basis of the debate, and reality. 

This classic view, espoused by Gray, Peters, Echevarria, and others, accepts that war has a binary nature; one objective, the other 

subjective—but the nature of war does not change.1,2,3 Discussing 

Clausewitz, Echevarria addresses the objective nature as including 

elements “such as violence, friction, chance, and uncertainty—that 

all wars have in common.” He further notes that the “subjective nature of war encompasses those elements such as military forces, 

their doctrines, weapons, as well as environments (land, sea, air, and 

danger) in which they fight—that makes each war unique.” 4 Gray argues, with circularity, “If war’s nature were to alter, it would become 

something else.” He denotes the four elements of the climate of war 

that are permanent are “danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance.” 

Further, he states that, “Above all else, Clausewitz insists that war is 

an instrument of policy.” If so, how does he define policy, and what 

attributes are necessary to make policy? 5

Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, when addressing the US Congress, has also stated that the “fundamental nature of 

war is constant,” while methods and techniques frequently change. 

He further notes that we are currently engaged in a “war of ideas,” 

which at face value seems to be in conflict with the notion that violence is an element of war.6 As a result of such high level pronouncements, the constant nature of war phrase is now found embedded in 

many briefings. While the nature of war may appear to be constant 

for some military officials, that sentiment does not carry over into the 

general public domain. 

As stated, I argue that the nature of war has changed at the 

most fundamental level, that of definition. Definition of war has been 

attempted many times. At best the task is abstruse, and at worst, 

unachievable. There is no binding definition of war.7 Most definitions 

address conflict between opposing states or groups with violence 

prosecuted by military organizations. The question that now arises 

is whether or not those tenets remain necessary to engage in war. 

In addition to military interest in defining war, there are economic incentives as well. For instance, insurance companies normally 

have disclaimer clauses that exclude payment of benefits if losses 

are caused by acts of God or war. Therefore, they have a vested interest in holding that the incident occurred during a war, thus releasing 

them of a financial obligation. 
3

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

In reality, most members of Western society no longer understand 

the premise of war as it once stood. Wars were often all-out conflict 

engaged in for subjugation by a dominant society over one or more 

other groups. For many people willingly, or unwillingly, brought into 

these conflicts, it was a fight for physical survival. The outcome determined their destiny as individuals and as a society. While limited 

wars were acknowledged, it is the great battles that are remembered 

as they altered the course of history. Of course other events also 

have changed social evolution. Some of those, including geophysical events, have been violent, yet not war related. Other nonviolent 

factors have involved technological advances such as information, 

transportation, energy, and health. Complex juxtaposition of largescale societal interactions and restructuring, infused with technological advancement, have permutated the basic constructs of war. 

Through gross overuse and misapplication of the word, the concept of war, for most people in the technically developed world, has 

been relegated to something more akin to a concerted effort in a 

specific field of endeavor. As examples, in the United States we formally have pronounced war on drugs, war on cancer, war on terror, 

and even war on poverty. Less formally there are references to war 

on fat, war on journalism, war on spam, war on academic freedom, 

and even war on rational discourse.8 There are articles that attempt 

to dismiss these examples as figures of speech.9 That explanation is 

too simple, and the application too pervasive, to be acceptable except 

to a small cadre of academics and military purists.

None of these so-called wars concern a struggle for institutional survival. Even now the chronically proclaimed war on terror, at best, has marginal 

repercussion on the lives of most Americans. 

At that, the impact is generally a matter of inconvenience. Some examples include, higher 

gas prices, airport security takes longer, and 

we have had to expand our knowledge of geography in order to follow the news. Unfortunately, for a select few, personal survival is at stake, but the outcome 

of their fate rarely radiates beyond family and friends.

Even our dictionaries have ameliorated the concept of war. Take, 

for example, the definition found in the American Heritage Dictionary. “War: 1 A state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nations, states, or parties. 2. Any condition of acEven now the chronically proclaimed war 

on terror, at best, has 

marginal repercussion on the lives of 

most Americans. 
4

 JSOU Report 06-1

tive antagonism or contention.” 10 It is the second definition that has 

become widely accepted by people in modern societies with “active 

antagonism or contention” being defined most broadly. In addition, 

even the notion that conflict between nations would be prolonged 

has changed. Examples include the Six Day War, between Israel and 

Egypt, and Desert Storm during which ground combat last less than 

four days. This differs from the tensions in the aftermath that have 

lasted for decades.

Of great importance is that the perceptions of individual citizens 

pertaining to war are radically different from the past. This change 

has happened relatively rapidly over the last fifty years. As a personal example I refer to my experience as a young boy growing up in 

a small Midwestern town, La Crosse, Wisconsin. During World War 

II everyone was actively engaged in the war effort. Meat and gasoline 

were rationed. We engaged in blackout drills, even though no air 

threat could possibly reach our location. Metal was collected from 

the public to be melted down for war materiel. Husbands and brothers went off to the military, and many did not return. War was something tangible, visceral, and well understood. Everyone contributed 

to the effort and it dominated our lives. 

The conflicts with US involvement since then have been very different. For legal reasons the fighting in Korea was called a conflict, 

not a war. While fighting in Vietnam was widely known through television, it had little impact on the daily lives of families who did not 

have members directly involved. Politically sensitive, great care was 

taken to avoid calling reserve forces to active duty. In fact, it was that 

avoidance of engagement by the Reserve Components that signaled 

our national lack of resolve to the North Vietnamese. In a telling 

interview for the Wall Street Journal, General Bui Tin stated that 

when the US did not activate reserve forces in response to General 

Westmoreland’s call for more troops, they knew they could win the 

war.11

With the possible exception of periodic spikes in oil prices, our 

recent conflicts have rarely registered more than a minor inconvenience on the American public. Military forays into Panama, Grenada, Haiti, and Bosnia were barely blips on the screen of US history. 

Desert Storm brought more attention due to the number of troops 

involved and the dramatic demonstration of technological superiority 

that had been acquired by our military.
5

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan dropped quickly from public attention, even though casualties continue to climb 

three years after the invasion. In an attempt to assuage the mounting 

negative public perception of the situation in Iraq, on 1 May 2003, 

just 44 days after launching Operation Iraqi Freedom, President 

Bush announced an end to major conflict. He had just landed on 

the deck of the USS Lincoln, and displayed behind him was a huge 

sign stating, “Mission Accomplished.” 12 Despite his very premature 

pronouncement, casualties have soared and senior leaders finally, 

albeit reluctantly, later acknowledged that a full-blown insurgency 

was underway. 

Of course, one of the factors influencing public opinion was the 

post hoc change in the justification of the invasion. The preemptive 

strike against Iraq initially was authorized to remove the imminent 

threat of weapons of mass destruction. When none were found, other 

issues were raised supporting regime change including threats to 

regional stability, Saddam’s support for terrorists, and the need to 

establish a democracy in the Middle East. 

Based on personal experiences accrued during these various 

armed interventions, the public has come to draw their own conclusions about the meaning or significance 

of the conflicts. For most civilians, these 

relatively remote, impersonal encounters 

have congealed their concepts of war into 

something dramatically less than it was 

during World War II and earlier. 

Definition of war is not just an academic debate, although it is often treated as such in military research papers. 

Rather, having a commonly accepted 

definition is critical in gaining and maintaining public support. It should be remembered that it was a widespread lack of public support that led to Congress cutting the funding that stopped American participation in Vietnam.

Definition and concepts of the meaning of words change over 

time based on common usage. That is unequivocally demonstrated 

by the dramatic change in the meaning of gay. A century ago, describing a man as gay addressed his general attitude toward life or 

his demeanor at a specific moment. Calling a man gay today, especially in the military, has an entirely different meaning. The word 

For most civilians, these 

relatively remote, impersonal encounters have 

congealed their concepts 

of war into something 

dramatically less than it 

was during World War II 

and earlier. 
6

 JSOU Report 06-1

straight has undergone similar perturbation. While it may be grammatically correct to describe an individual as gay or straight based 

on the dictionary’s first definition (gay = merry, straight = free from 

curves or direct) in the most commonly used vernacular today, one 

is describing the person’s sexual orientation.13 The English language 

is replete with other words that have undergone major colloquial 

redefinition. The common understanding about war is one of those 

concepts.

Many of the definitions of war address violence as a necessary 

component. A United Kingdom MOD document states that, “War 

and armed conflict are often treated as synonymous.” They go on to 

note that, “War can be defined as an extreme form of armed conflict 

and usually takes place between states.” 14 The US Marine Doctrine 

states, “War is a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by use of military force.” While usually 

these involve nation-states, this doctrine acknowledges other nonstate groups may engage in the conflict.15

A fundamental question that arises is whether or not physical 

violence remains as a necessary component of 

war. In recent years Information Warfare has 

gained momentum both within our military 

and throughout the rest of the world. Attacks 

against the US information infrastructure have 

occurred with alarming frequency. The insidious nature of these attacks makes it extremely 

difficult to discriminate between an independent hacker and an organized effort directed 

against American interests.

In traditional conflict, information warfare is a critical component to both the offensive and defensive military operations. Thus IW 

can be said to support a violent effort against an adversary. However, 

the intrusions and degradations of our government, business, industrial, and communications information systems, that occur very 

frequently, rarely have a direct relationship to physical violence. Still 

they can be extremely damaging to the computer systems attacked, 

many of which are not associated with the Department of Defense. 

Proponents of information warfare tend to cast a broad net when 

defining their realm of responsibilities and capabilities. Protecting the 

country’s critical infrastructure is high on the list of requirements. 

It might be possible theoretically for an adversary to make such a 

A fundamental 

question that 

arises is whether 

or not physical 

violence remains 

as a necessary 

component of war.
7

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

devastating IW attack as to precipitate an armed counterstrike, but 

that seems unlikely. In general, these battles are conducted in cyberspace with few, if any direct physical casualties.

Given current realities, it might be better to develop a definition 

of war based on outcomes. Such outcomes might include physical 

destruction of an enemy, but it is more likely to describe an endstate favorable to the victor. To this point Gray addresses Clausewitz’ 

notion of war being an instrument of policy. Gray states, “What that 

means is that war should not be waged for the goal of victory, necessary as it usually is, but rather for the securing of an advantageous 

peace.” 16

In writing about non-lethal weapons I have noted that, “war is 

not about killing, rather about imposition of will.” 17 Imposition of 

will means that the terms of the outcome are compulsory, obtrusive, 

or forced upon others. It infers that the vanquished does not have a 

choice in accepting these terms of settlement. Armed conflict is but 

one option in imposing will, and we have traditionally called this war. 

Only recently has technology created the ability to achieve the same 

results by alternative means. 

Economics and Philosophy

Two emerging concerns eclipse all others as either demonstrated or 

potential threats to US national interests. One is philosophical—fundamentalist Islamic application of terror characterizes it, though the 

problem is far broader than acknowledged. The other is economic—

an inchoate struggle for world economic preeminence. 

The most important factor in competitive situations is the ability 

to determine the outcome of interactions with other parties. Normally 

such transactions are accomplished through mutual understanding 

and negotiations. However, as globalization of economic interests has 

increased, the need to maintain freedom of movement in monetary 

markets has assumed greater importance. Economic power has long 

been accepted as a pillar of national strength and security. Therefore 

it is of paramount importance that American businesses remain engaged and competitive in world market. Failure to do so will endanger our national security, just a surely as would armed conflict. 

It is in the economic arena that our national interests are more 

likely to be challenged seriously than on the battlefield. The US has 

demonstrated the ability to defeat any conventional adversary in direct armed conflict. Therefore asymmetric means, including terror-
8

 JSOU Report 06-1

ism, have dominated our potential adversaries’ attention. Strategically, the biggest threat to the US influence over global finance is the 

rapid emergence of China’s economy and the outrageous balance of 

trade deficit that we have established. While this growth limits the 

likelihood of armed conflict between giants, there should be reason 

for concern that dominance by China might be an undesirable outcome for US interests. This will be addressed in more detail later.

Tom Barnett, in The Pentagon’s New Map, argues that the primary cleavage in the world today is between those countries and peoples 

who have been integrated into the developed world, and those who 

have been left out.18 He calls this schism “the gap,” and urges that we 

take the steps necessary to reduce this gap thus decreasing the probability of the need for armed intervention by US 

forces. Barnett’s economic-based model of the 

world fails the test of reality, as it does not adequately account for people, and social organizations, not motivated by acquisition of material 

wealth. Still, this thesis is willingly accepted by 

those who are driven by these Western-oriented 

values and epitomize the slogan, “Who dies with 

the most toys wins.” They simply do not understand the new social 

structures that are emerging or their underlying beliefs and values. 

Reducing the enormous economic disparity that exists between the 

haves and have-nots may assuage some level of civil discontent and 

even diminish the probability of US armed interventions to some 

degree. 

However, this approach fails to account for ideologically motivated individuals and groups who actively reject our commonly held 

Western value system. Attempting to promote economic homeostasis 

may lessen, but will not eliminate, the probability of future conflict. 

The nascent macro-economic struggle to which I referred, while elevating the titans, will do little to ameliorate the lives the massive 

number of people living in poverty.

In proffering the view of economic domination of conflict it must 

be noted that I am not suggesting violence will be totally excluded. 

Quite the opposite, there will be many armed clashes, mostly in response to asymmetric attacks. However, the strategic issues will be 

resolved by means other than violence. Therefore, the nature of war 

has changed and we should redefine the context accordingly. 

Barnett’s economic-based 

model of the 

world fails the 

test of reality ...
9

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

The Problem of Defining the Adversary

Who are THEY? To successfully engage the general public in the 

concept of an ongoing war, there is a need to firmly identify the adversary. In several recent conflicts this has been difficult. Those military analysts grappling with the concept of low intensity conflict long 

have debated this problem. A fundamental question is what level 

of criminal activity crosses the threshold to constitute insurgency 

or low intensity conflict. In the incipient stages of an insurgency, 

the guerilla forces often engage in limited murders/assassinations 

to remove key opposition members and robberies to finance their objectives. However, common street crime occurs, to one degree or another, in all societies. Recognizing the transition from random crime 

to an organized effort with a political objective can be quite difficult.

The events following our intervention in Iraq offer an example of 

the difficulty in identifying these transitions. For months after the 

officially declared end to major combat US military commanders refused to describe the armed interactions in which our forces routinely engaged as an insurgency. Finally, General Sanchez used that 

word in a formal briefing. 

There are political and legal consequences attendant to vocabulary. Despite three decades separation, the specter of Vietnam still 

haunts America. To accept the term insurgency drew parallels that 

many military leaders did not want. The press was describing the actions as insurgency long before the official recognition that we were 

fighting an organized resistance force. Contemporaneously the word 

quagmire was being used to infer that US forces would become engaged in an endless conflict with little chance of a clear outcome. 

Like insurgency, quagmire too has its philosophical roots in our experience in Vietnam and is associated with negative consequences of 

that endeavor. 

The military always wants a clearly defined objective. To that 

end, the adversary needs to be identified or identifiable. Insurgencies 

and terrorism blur these lines as combatants fluidly transition between roles and their support mechanisms are often nearly invisible. 

Worse, the constituencies they represent are usually in a constant 

state of attitudinal flux and can concurrently embrace competing 

ideological positions. 

Similar issues exist in order to gain and maintain public support 

for the conflict. These are of enormous concern as ultimately it is our 

citizens, through their elected representatives, who will appropriate 
10

 JSOU Report 06-1

the resources to sustain the conflict. On a macro-psychological basis 

it is necessary that the public be able to identify the adversary and 

firmly understand the threat they impose.

War on Things and Behaviors

Obviously there is great difficulty in conducting war when the enemy cannot be clearly articulated. War on inanimate nouns, such 

as drugs, poverty, or terror, flies against all accepted definitions, 

as there are not two parties or groups engaged in mutual conflict. 

Rather, these endeavors are organized efforts to alter behavior that 

is being conducted by disparate groups of people who may, or may 

not, be engaged in a common goal. Worse, those administrating the 

conflict tend to do so quite selectively. As an example, terrorism has 

been commonly practiced by the Maoist guerillas in Nepal, yet very 

little attention has been paid to that area of the world. 

Although President Bush announced the war on terror following 

the attacks of 11 September 2001, it quickly became apparent that 

defining the enemy was problematic. The Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan were obvious targets and easily identifiable. Carefully selected 

individuals were named as targets, but establishing the parameters 

of the conflict remains elusive.

Terrorism is a tactic that has been employed for as long as conflict has existed. To be successful, suppression of terror sometimes 

becomes exceedingly brutal. In recent years, addressing terrorism 

frequently has come into opposition with human rights issues. Because of the emotionally laden atmosphere following major terrorist incidents the public will tolerate, and frequently demand, tighter 

restrictions on individual freedoms. In reality, this is a sliding scale 

mediated by the severity of the attack plus geographic and temporal 

proximity. That is, at the time of the incident there are few objections 

to greater restrictions. As the memories of the effects of the incident 

fade, the same restrictions become less tolerable. Similarly, those 

located closest to the site of the incident are usually most tolerant of 

continuation of those restrictions.19

Not all terrorist acts need be violent. Once a capability to strike 

has been demonstrated effectively, mere threats may be sufficient 

cause disproportionate reactions in target audiences. In recent 

years our communications and economic infrastructures have become increasing vulnerable. This fact is generally well known. Therefore, threats against these systems can affect large scale responses. 
11

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

Therefore, small, nonviolent actions can translate into imposition of 

the enemy’s will. These nonviolent threats are another indication of 

change in nature of war.

Anachronistic Delineations

Boundaries are a key issue. It is notable that many definitions of 

war include the caveat that it takes place between states. Take for 

example, the verbose definition from the British Defense Doctrine 

that defines war as, “When differences between states reach a point 

at which both parties resort to force, or one of them does acts of violence, which the other chooses to look on as a breach of the peace, 

the relation of war is set up in which the combatants may use regulated violence against each other until one of the two has been 

brought to such terms as the enemy is willing to grant.” 20

The status of the nation-state as primary building block of geopolitical relations is questionable and will be discussed in more detail 

later. While it has been a useful construct for the past two centuries 

or more, new relationships have arisen that suggest that the concept 

of primacy of nation-state is failing. Advances in information and 

communications technology are accelerating this process. 

The differentiation between categories of adversaries has been a 

difficult issue. Exactly when war begins is equally problematic, and 

quite important. Competition between persons, groups, and even nations is a natural condition of existence. However, there are tipping 

points at which acceptable competition transitions and becomes unacceptable behavior. Unfortunately, exactly when that transition occurs is often recognized only in retrospect. Precipitating events, such 

as the attack on Pearl Harbor, are frequently regarded as the defining 

moments in history. Contrary to the recollection of most Americans, 

World War II began long before 7 December 1941. In fact, America 

was both making preparations to enter the conflict by developing the 

industrial base necessary and contributing volunteers to European 

nations for several years prior.

Similarly, the attacks of 11 September 2001 constituted defining moments for the American people in the war on terror. However, 

there had been a series of terrorist incidents against US interests 

preceding that date. While of concern to some Americans, they had 

failed to galvanize the public support necessary to initiate a concerted effort against the adversaries. Conversely, Osama bin Laden 
12

 JSOU Report 06-1

was formally at war with us since 1998, but we did not take his fatwa 

seriously enough to reciprocate.21

New Building Blocks: Demise of the Nation-State

The assumption of the continued supremacy of the nation-state as 

the primary building block of macro-societal groupings is flawed. 

While nations will remain the macro-organization of choice in the 

near future, social restructuring based on beliefs, ethnicity, and 

other interpersonal relationships will increase. Concomitantly, geographic boundaries will decline in significance as the primary contextual factor for social and business interactions.22 This notion will 

not be popular with politicians or academicians as several centuries of history supports and has solidified the nation-state model. 

Even considering new large-scale social orders will seem illogical and 

frightening to conventional thinkers. They have little experience outside the nation-state construct and see no viable alternative model 

under which to operate. Several factors will dramatically alter the 

global social structure tapestry. These include continued devolution 

of old states, globalization of economic interests, continued widespread immigration, and formation of social groups based on common ideology that is ubiquitously communicated around the world. 

Ascendances of powerful groups that are not geographically defined 

have already begun to alter large-scale social interactions. They also 

will impact contests of will between such groups thus leading to a 

change the nature of warfare. Specifically, these conflicts may be 

dominated by non-violent, but imposing means, such as information 

or economic intimidation.

The past few decades have seen considerable social reorganization throughout the world. New countries have emerged as larger 

agglomerations disintegrated. With the independence of India from 

Great Britain emerged Pakistan, which then split off Bangladesh. 

Southern Africa has many countries not located on maps fifty years 

ago. The fall of the former Soviet Union brought independence to 

many areas previously dominated by the USSR and the Balkan states 

devolved along nearly forgotten ethnic boundaries. While some of the 

delineations made sense under historic precedence, others did not. 

Geographic borders imposed on Africa a century or more ago by Europeans have contributed to brutal conflicts that still continue.

Concurrent with devolution of former geographic entities has 

been significant migration, usually from poorer areas to richer ones. 
13

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

Initially these appeared to be symbiotic relationships as lower-paid 

laborers move into Europe and the United States. This provided 

cheaper labor for the industries in Western countries, and money 

sent back to poorer ones. However, as the immigration increased, 

it stressed the resources of the host nations and began to create or 

exacerbate internal tensions. Over a few decades, many of the immigrants became citizens of the host countries leading to dramatic 

shifts in demographics. In some regions new immigrants assimilated 

into the local societies. In a many areas immigrants tended to remain 

relatively isolated. In their homes they spoke their original languages, retained former customs and beliefs, while specialized shopping 

areas provided goods to which they were accustomed. In democratic 

countries the new residents acquired voting rights and soon were 

able to elect representatives from their own minority ethnic groups. 

In the US, due to explosive and disproportionate population 

growth, political parties on a national level actively seek Hispanic 

and Latino voters. In some areas of the country Oriental voting blocks 

have become important to winning elections. Several states no longer 

have a defined ethnic majority population. European countries also 

have experienced changing demographics and now have members of 

the legislative bodies with ethnic ties that differ from the traditional 

historic roots of the area. 

Realignment of large-scale social grouping will have profound 

impact on our concepts of war. If national interests are no longer 

preeminent, then the need and means to defend them will change. 

Physical violence will never disappear entirely as it seems to be part 

of the human condition. While competition will remain omnipresent, 

the manner in which groups impose their will on other individuals or 

groups will change. 

Philosophical war

While American leadership clings tenaciously to 

an anachronistic geographically based concept 

of war, our adversaries have adopted a philosophically based construct. In Iraq and Afghanistan, American leaders and the press continuously stress the presence of foreign fighters, and 

blame them for interfering with the internal situation within those 

countries.23

... our adversaries have adopted 

a philosophically 

based construct.
14

 JSOU Report 06-1

Traditionally, Americans think as absolutists. For the majority of 

our citizens most issues, no matter how complex, can be clearly differentiated into black or white categories. Things are viewed as right 

or wrong, good or evil, and favorable or unfavorable. As an example, 

President Bush pronounced that, “either you are 

for us or you are with the terrorists,” in the war 

on terror.24 We look upon boundaries as if they 

are sacrosanct edits mandated by God when, in 

fact, they are often quite arbitrary. For example, 

laws have been enacted that mandate distinct 

differences between things foreign and domestic. 

While this may sound like a logical demarcation, 

one that can easily be determined, it is in reality 

extremely complex.

Examples of boundary issues include where a country’s borders 

begin. Control of areas claimed at sea varies based on the limits established by each country. There is, of course, overlap where countries have common ground boundaries and extend them into the 

ocean. River boundaries are more evasive as the flowing water often changes the bank configuration. Immigrants reaching US shores 

have different status than those attempting to arrive by boat but who 

are interdicted at sea. Thus there are people jumping over the sides 

of boats when close to shore so that they can each American soil. But 

where that soil begins is questionable when waves are moving in and 

out, sometimes exposing the sand, sometimes covering it.

More problematic conceptually is what constitutes American 

products, including weapons systems. It is common for industrial 

conglomerates to have subsidiaries in several countries. To reduce 

costs, many components of end items are manufactured and/or assembled in countries that have lower operating expenses, especially 

pay of employees. Through administrative manipulation, these same 

end items that are created abroad may become officially designated 

as American products.

Use of computer microchips has proliferated into thousands of 

commercial products and they are broadly integrated in weapons 

systems. Of concern to many military analysts is the reliability all of 

those chips since they were often designed, and programmed abroad. 

Vulnerability of these subsystems to viruses, worms, and Trojan 

horses is worrisome despite established reliability checks. 

President Bush 

pronounced 

that, “either you 

are for us or 

you are with the 

terrorists,” in the 

war on terror.24
15

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

Even the identity of our people is becoming more difficult. As 

Samuel Huntington notes in his book Who Are We, there has been 

dramatic shifts in demographics and self-identification in the past 

few decades. He claims that for many years some people identified 

themselves as hyphens, but that is changing to ampersands.25 As 

examples, it was popular, and politically acceptable, to call people 

African-American, Irish-American, Italian-American, etc. The connotation was that they were Americans first and foremost, while the 

preceding descriptor identified their ancestry. Huntington suggests 

that this has changed. The ampersand means that the person is a 

member of both groups simultaneously. Many people hold duel citizenship. Some people legally hold more than two passports. This, of 

course, invites visceral conflict that may be difficult to rectify when 

faced with completing complex international issues. There is a trend, 

he notes, toward more people formally having divided loyalties. This 

situation also applies to the US military, which invites selected foreigners to join the ranks as a means achieving citizenship.

The ampersand situation naturally leads to competing hierarchical belief systems. Each individual decides which of his personal 

values is more important than the others. These people, consciously or unconsciously, then rank orders all of their beliefs. For those 

considered ampersands espousing different nationalities, they must 

determine which one they will act upon and support the political 

decisions of that nation. 

It cannot be assumed that they will always choose to support 

the American position. Several factors, including personal and family 

loyalty, economic advantage, moral agreement with the cause, and 

convenience may enter the decision process.

Geography of Convenience

The political geography of the world, as we know it today, was largely 

determined over a century ago near the end of colonial exploitation 

of large geographic areas. Countries on several continents owe their 

demarcation to European cartographers who created them to support the best interests of the colonial powers. European interests 

in control and access to natural resources superceded questions of 

sociology and ethnography. Though the colonial powers eventually 

withdrew from direct control of these areas, the artificially imposed 

countries continued to exist with varying degrees of stability. Much 

of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were consigned to conditions of 
16

 JSOU Report 06-1

near perpetual turmoil because of the lack of consideration given to 

the importance of the ethnicity, beliefs, and values of the people who 

lived in the area.

As a result of these imprudent and shortsighted decisions, hostilities emerged that transcend established borders. These are too 

complex to be simply relegated to transnational conflicts and we 

have been very hypocritical in our condemnation of philosophical 

wars. When it was to the US advantage to foster these conflicts, we 

have done so. 

The most notable of these might be our support of the mujahideen when they were fighting the former Soviet Union forces in Afghanistan. The mujahideen waged a jihad, or holy war, against the 

foreign Soviet invaders and the Afghan government that they had installed. Being anti-Soviet anywhere in the world 

was believed to be in America’s interest. In the 

Afghanistan jihad, many fighters were trained 

and supplied from US-funded bases in Pakistan. 

The jihadists came from many countries including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan, and 

other Muslim countries of the world. Their willingness to fight the Soviets under extremely 

harsh conditions was remarkable and symbolic of their dedication to 

the cause. Little if any thought was given to notion that the jihadists 

were foreign fighters who were deploying to a philosophical cause. 

Rather, being anti-Soviet was sufficient to garner US support.

American support for the foreign jihadists fighting in Afghanistan 

was substantial. The single most important technical intervention 

was supplying Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, which many military 

analysts believed turned the tide of the war. The Stingers allowed 

the mujahideen to hold at bay Soviet air power and allowed them to 

concentrate on ground battles that they could win.26 This support allowed a thirty mile-long ambush along the Silk Road between Kabul 

and Jalalabad. Organized and led by General Rahim Wardak, that 

ambush inflicted such heavy casualties that it was instrumental in 

the Soviet decision to withdraw from the country.27 In short, throughout the campaign against the Soviets, employing and supporting the 

mujahideen as foreign fighters was highly desirable.

It is most ironic that it is the US leadership, and members of 

the Afghan government, who are complaining about foreign fighters 

crossing the border from Pakistan. In the case of the Afghan leadBeing anti-Soviet 

anywhere in the 

world was believed to be in 

America’s interest. 
17

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

ership, those making these complaints, including President Karzai, 

and Minister of Defense Wardak, themselves were operating from 

Pakistan for many years. Some of the older jihadists who are now 

conducting cross-border operations are the same people who fought 

against the Soviets. For them, everything is the same except for some 

changes in the adversary. 

The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has little reason to 

exist and offers a classic example of the problems in the region. Ethnically, the people in Eastern Afghanistan and Northwestern Pakistan are dominantly Pashtuns. They have more in common than do 

the Pashtuns in Afghanistan with the Tajiks and Uzbeks that make 

up the other large ethnic groups of that country. For at least three 

millennia this region has been an intercivilization buffer area. Yet 

today Western powers insist that these countries establish independent governments based on externally imposed border concepts.

Iraq was created similarly. Europeans drew the boundaries at 

the end of the Ottoman Empire, albeit to meet their own needs. The 

borders are long and open. There are ethnic and religious ties between groups that supercede these artificial delineations. Still, the 

US insists on identifying as foreigners, people whose happenstance 

of birth occurred in another contrived country. The intent is to brand 

them as external agitators who do not have a rightful place in the 

conflict. Conversely, these insurgents view themselves as mujahideen. Therefore, based on their philosophy (religious conviction) they 

are simply moving to the battle wherever it may manifest. 

The philosophically based war concept is spreading and has extremely significant implications. As has been demonstrated in the 

war on terror, attacks are not constrained to any given geographical 

area. Few areas of the world have not been touched in some manner 

either directly or indirectly. Being tested are the legal parameters of 

the antiquated constructs differentiating foreign and domestic.

Conflicted Loyalty

The arrests following the bombings in London illustrate this issue. 

The people involved in the bombings had several common characteristics. Young Muslim males carried out all the bombings. The attacks were related to British involvement in Iraq. But the bombers 

were British citizens.28 These bombings were examples of the competing hierarchical belief systems mentioned earlier. In these cases, 

the bombers placed a higher value on supporting extremist Islamic 
18

 JSOU Report 06-1

causes by attacking the British transportation infrastructure than in 

supporting traditional democratic values of debating and voting for 

policy changes. 

Americans too have been directly involved with Al Qaeda. These 

include John Walker Lindh who was captured fighting in Afghanistan. Another is Jose Padilla, who was trained by Al Qaeda and arrested in Chicago in 2002. Padilla was designated an enemy combatant and has been held without charges ever since. The 4th Circuit 

Court of Appeals has affirmed the government’s position, thus igniting a huge legal controversy concerning rights of US citizens. Probably the most infamous of these is Adam Gadahn who has served 

as a spokesperson for them. Gadahn, a former resident of Orange 

County, California, has been filmed making specific threats of terrorist attacks against Los Angeles. 

At least one similar case has occurred in the US military. During 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, a sergeant in the 101st Airborne Division 

stationed in Kuwait threw grenades into an operations tent killing 

Captain Christopher Seifer and wounding fifteen other soldiers. Sergeant Asan Akbar was a recent convert to Islam and demonstrated 

the problem of competing and incompatible belief systems. Of concern should be support by other Americans for his cause and glorification of him as a “war hero!” 29

The problem of conflicted loyalties will grow rapidly. Massive immigration has occurred in Europe and the United States and will 

continue as long as the severe economic imbalance exists. The belief 

and value systems of the immigrants are often at odds with long 

accepted norms. Therefore, when presented with ethical decisions, 

many of these people are likely to side with their established beliefs 

and ancestral relations. This means that the potential for philosophical based conflict remains high and authorities must be prepared 

to defend against internal and external threats simultaneously. The 

existing legal systems of the world are not adequate to handle this 

contingency. The issue of confused boundaries and loyalties is substantially different from recent historical precedence in war and contributes the notion that the nature of war has changed.

Legal Constraints

A fundamental issue is whether or not the existing legal systems will 

prove effective in addressing crimes perpetrated under the emerging 

patterns of conflict. It is arguable whether they have had success in 
19

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

prior wars. The complexity of future conflicts will severely stress even 

the most diligent legal system. 

As noted earlier, there are legal implications for formally describing a conflict as a war. Throughout history, there have been crimes 

committed during wars. For large-scale injustices, such as authorization of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and massive abuse of prisoners, including using them as laboratory experimental subjects, some 

leaders have been held accountable and charged with war crimes. 

Following World War II, several members of the German and Japanese hierarchy were eventually sentenced to death and hanged. Still 

other officials were convicted of crimes and received long prison sentences.

In more recent years key individuals, such as Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and several others, have 

been charged with war crimes and crimes 

against humanity.30,31 Those who have 

been captured were taken to be tried by 

the International War Crimes Tribunal 

in The Hague. Compared to the severity 

of their crimes, sentences were quite light. None received a death 

sentence as European nations in general are in opposition to capital 

punishment.

At best, the International War Crimes Tribunal is a cumbersome 

process. It often takes years to bring a suspect to trial. It may then 

take months to years to conduct the trial. During that process, defendants are usually provided with a forum from which they can 

pontificate about the egregious mistakes made by those bringing the 

charges against them. The rules of evidence are difficult, especially 

in mass murder cases in which few, if any, willing witnesses are 

left alive. The paradox is that this tribunal process, while failing to 

evoke fear in despots, may actually have a deleterious effect. The 

legal process makes it clear to potential transgressors that all steps 

necessary should be taken to insure that no evidence of their crimes 

remains, especially eyewitnesses.32

Proponents of permanent war crimes tribunals argue that they 

would act as a deterrent as they would offer a rare chance to hold 

world leaders accountable for their actions. Given the results of past 

trials, there does not seem to be much evidence to support this theory. The amount of effort and expense that it takes to conduct these 

... key individuals, such 

as Slobodan Milosevic, 

Radovan Karadzic, and 

several others, have 

been charged with war 

crimes ...
20

 JSOU Report 06-1

judicial proceedings needs to be balanced against some measurable 

standard of result. For the most part, the main outcome has been allowing victims to retell their horrific stories in public. Unfortunately, 

many of the victims are voiceless because they are dead.33

Another problem is the use of the International Tribunal as a political tool. For instance, there have been attempts to indict members 

of the US Executive Branch citing various armed interventions as 

war crimes. The positions most frequently named for indictment are 

the President and the Secretary of Defense.34,35

Some despotic leaders have had trials in other venues. Pol Pot, 

the Khmer Rouge leader, was tried within Cambodia. Although he 

was responsible for an estimated two million deaths, he only was 

sentenced to house arrest. Pot succumbed to a heart attack in 1998. 

African war criminals often face harsher sentences when tried by 

local jurisdictions. International courts, empowered by the United 

Nations, tend to be relatively lenient in sentencing and eschew the 

death penalty. 

Current international law is based on the nation-state as the 

primary building block of larger social grouping. International laws 

recognize the sovereignty of nations and assume that governments 

will be responsible for the actions of their citizens and have authority 

over non-citizens residing within their geographic boundaries. This 

concept is preeminent in the accountability and the basis of the laws 

currently governing conflict. However, there are many unstable areas 

of the world in which the central 

government has little control over 

disparate segments of their population. It is not uncommon for such 

areas to countenance terrorists 

while providing a breeding ground 

for the next generation of recruits. 

Often called rogue states, their inherent instability undercuts the 

notion that legal sanctions can be imposed, or will have any effect 

when adjudicated.

Theories addressing just wars abound.36 While comforting to 

politicians who authorize war, and intellectually titillating to political scientists and jurists who study war, they usually are of little 

consequence to the people caught up in the conflict. The dead of all 

persuasions have no interest in legalistic determinations. Retribution and reconciliation are for the living. Astute theorists can always 

... there are many unstable 

areas of the world in which 

the central government has 

little control over disparate 

segments of their population. 
21

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

manipulate facts surrounding any situation so as to make that conflict justified or unjustified. The winner usually appoints determination of facts. Those facts often change over time. The realization 

of this incongruence is becoming more apparent to those studying 

conflicts from a historical perspective. This realization, now spread 

via information technology, will alter the basic precepts under which 

a determination of whether or not to enter conflict is made.

There is an often repeated, yet false claim by Western countries, 

that states we are nations of laws. In reality, we are nations of people 

who happen to use laws as guidelines for living. The difference is the 

emotional component inherent in all human beings. While emotions 

will vary from one individual to the next, they are fundamental to our 

nature. Our institutional responses similarly have emotional components as they function as an extension of the people that comprise 

them. The future is pain mediated. As more pain is experienced our 

emotional response will increase and the likelihood of authorizing 

violent response rises. However, there are threats that do not induce 

pain directly but yield outcomes that could affect our national interests. It is the response to those threats that reflects a change in 

nature of war. 

Is Violence a Necessary Component of War?

The single most significant issue regarding war is whether or not 

there is the necessity to employ violence. If it is the politically acceptable outcome of conflict that determines whether or not victory 

is achieved, then the use of violence to accomplish that objective 

becomes optional. Further, modern technology has both increased 

the capacity for inflicting physical violence while diminishing the 

need to use it. Therefore, the fundamental question is whether or 

not violence is a basic component of war. Certainly it was under the 

traditional definition of war.37 Now, if we consider war in a more general manner, that is the ability of an adversary to impose will, then 

violence may not be required. The outcome, however, may be just as 

devastating as submission due to physical invasion. 

It may be useful to consider violence as a function of force over 

time (V=F/T). For this purpose force is the amount of energy applied 

against a target. This can be thought of in terms of explosives/ordnance used against the enemy. Violence does not connote whether or 

not the desired effect is achieved. Instead it addresses the amount of 

effort expended in any specified encounter or conflict.
22

 JSOU Report 06-1

Factors such as target acquisition, precision, and defensive 

mechanisms determine whether or not the violence employed has 

the desired effect on the target. Physical destruction of the target is 

one measurement of effectiveness. Less tangible measures include 

the willingness of the adversary to reengage our troops, or degradation of popular support by their citizens.

Over the past few decades, great technological leaps have occurred in weapon technology and dramatically increased our ability 

to employ violence. Periods of direct sustained combat between US 

forces and the enemy have decreased from years, as in World War II, 

to days as demonstrated in Desert Storm and operation Iraqi Freedom. This change has been brought about primarily through better 

sensors, precision-guided munitions and enhanced command and 

control.

There is an example cited by Colonel John Warden, architect of 

the air campaign in Desert Storm that makes this point. During the 

first day of the air attacks in Desert Storm, more significant targets 

were destroyed in Iraq than were struck in any year of conventional 

bombing in WW II. This happened because of our ability to quickly 

establish air supremacy and to strike designated targets with accuracy.38 It is notable that since Desert Storm, sensors of target acquisition and precision guidance have improved even more. 

The second factor of this violence equation, time, was demonstrated in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Most military analysts all over 

the world, including those working for Saddam, anticipated a substantial air campaign prior to the ground invasion. However, they 

were wrong. Shortly after the air strikes began, land elements crossed 

the border from Kuwait and began racing toward Baghdad. It was 

the speed of the invasion that took everyone by surprise. Thus, by 

employing violence, a great amount of force for a short duration, the 

Iraqi opposition crumbled in short order.

In traditional wars violence has been a key aspect, often lasting 

for many years. The success of American application of high-density 

violence has caused potential adversaries to seek out asymmetric 

methods for confrontation. On occasion, such as 9/11, these actions 

have a component of violence. When amortized over time, the violence levels are quite low. Thus, it is reasonable to question whether 

or not terrorism and counterterrorism measures rise to a level that 

can constitute war.
23

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

There is not doubt that it is appropriate to take all actions necessary to reduce the threat and eliminate known terrorists, but that 

probably does not constitute war in its classical sense. Similar problems arise when attempting to determine whether or not guerrilla 

activities can rightfully be considered wars. Military analysts have 

danced around this topic with terms including, insurgencies, limited 

war, or small wars. While our military is prepared to engage in operations across the spectrum of conflict, only those requiring extensive 

use of force have been designated formally as wars. Thus, the notion 

of levels of violence is useful for military deliberations. However, such 

precise delineations have not entered into the terminology or thinking of the general public.

In the past, war in the traditional sense was often brought about 

by competition for resources or a desire to dominate people or territory. This has been described as “a clash between opposed wills.” 39

What has transpired in recent years is the ability of powerful forces 

to impose their will without the use of violence. One could argue 

that if a desired political end-state can be achieved without using 

violence, then war has not occurred. However, there are now means 

of applying power, which while not violent, are just as effective for 

imposing will. The issue becomes whether or not the end-state is derived through mutual consent, a political solution, or via application 

of power be that violent or nonviolent.40

The Violence Paradox

The paradox that emerges pits the need for physical security in a 

violence-prone world, against an idyllic norm that is probably unattainable. The more physical power we attain, the less able we are to 

employ it due to constraints driven by political, social and target illusiveness issues. Projecting and employing power is not a problem for 

the US as we have overwhelming capability. Using force within the 

myriad of competing parameters does give rise to consternation. 

Except for the entertainment industry, in recent years there has 

been a concerted effort in American society to eschew physical violence. Federal and state legislators have made virtually all nonconsensual physical contact between people a crime. Contact sports 

aside, even minor voluntary touching may constitute criminal activity. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the uber-politically correct 

notion of domestic violence. In the post-OJ environment, law enforcement agencies are hypersensitive to potential suits and claims 
24

 JSOU Report 06-1

of the slightest touching are likely to result in arrest. In general, 

individuals cannot use force to protect their property. In many jurisdictions no fleeing felon can be shot unless they provide a clear 

danger to another person. Even if a criminal breaks into your home, 

threatens you and your children, then flees outside the home, it is 

illegal for even the police to kill the intruder.41

Use of force over moral issues is totally off-limits to individuals. 

The age-old stalwart of movies, in which the hero cleans house because the villain affronted him or his values is taboo. While it is permissible for the US military to fight on foreign soil, it is not permissible for individuals to engage in fisticuffs when American values are 

disdained. It was not long ago, when it was deemed proper to openly 

protect the flag or other deeply held symbols of freedom.

The US legal system is doing everything possible to eviscerate 

emotions from society. While these actions may be high on the cognitive scale, they run counter to long-engrained genetic programming. 

As an outcome of such legalistic determinations, we are producing a society that is extremely violence averse. The paradox arises 

in that aggression and violence is part of our 

genetic heritage. In fact, being able to overcome all obstacles in violence-prone situations was a positive aspect in a world that 

was literally ruled by the code of survival of 

the fittest. 

This paradox impacts societal decisions on whether or not to engage in armed conflict when national interests are threatened. Withdrawal from Vietnam came after public sentiment turned strongly 

against the war. Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom has steadily 

declined, especially after no weapons of mass destruction were located. The people support the troops engaged in OIF, but not the basic 

premise. As attrition of our soldiers continues, the less the public 

supports the conflict.

Violence-aversion conditioning impacts societal acceptance of 

physical intervention. It may also create an environment that is more 

susceptible to intimidation from powerful, but nonviolent, institutions. Such acquiescence will strengthen an adversary’s ability to 

impose will without physical confrontation, thus impacting the nature of war. 

As an outcome of 

such legalistic determinations, we are 

producing a society 

that is extremely 

violence averse.
25

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

Technology and the Nature of War 

Advances in technology have played pivotal roles in the prosecution 

of war. From relatively simple inventions, such as the stirrup, and 

gunpowder, to the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, these 

advances have changed the tactics and methods of warfare. In recent 

decades, strides have been made in enhancing lethality of conventional munitions. Enhanced sensors, target acquisition and precision 

guidance have facilitated striking the desired target while limiting 

collateral casualties. Force protection technologies, including body 

and vehicle armor, signal suppression, and threat warning systems 

have reduced American injuries. Even the introduction of non-lethal 

weapons has allowed troops to employ measures to control groups 

that otherwise might pose a threat to them. 

None of those technologies altered the fundamental nature of 

conflict. Therefore, the traditional view has held that while military 

techniques may change, the nature of war remains constant. It is 

then reasonable to ask whether or not any technological advance 

could change the nature of war. 

I believe the answer to that question is yes. There is a single common factor that runs throughout the examples listed. That is they all 

rely on some level of violence to achieve their objective. If we accept 

the supposition that the objective of war is the ability of one group 

to impose its will on an adversary, then it is no longer necessary to 

use violence to reach victory. This decisive change is brought about 

by the rapid advances and application of information technology and 

extends well beyond the bounds of what is normally called information warfare.

To be sure, information technology (IT) has played a significant 

role in the development of all of the weapon systems listed above. 

Thus IT has supported the application of violence. But it is a field 

that is so pervasive as to impact some aspects of the lives of nearly 

everyone on the planet. IT has materially altered the social structures of Western societies as evidenced by the rise of multinational 

conglomerates and outsourcing of routine tasks from the US to Third 

World countries. Consider how frequently your calls for assistance 

are answered in India, South Africa, or other distant land. Domestically, there is a trend to remote information processing from centralized offices to individual homes. Even indigenous peoples in remote 

areas of the world have been impacted. As examples, itinerant yak 

herders of Tibet have satellite television; cell phones are in wide use 
26

 JSOU Report 06-1

in Kabul, and impoverished coca growers have communication networks and warning systems.42

The transformative impact of IT is found in global communications, transportation, and economic systems. A paradox exists in 

that while half the people in the world have never made nor received 

a phone call, the planet is nearly totally covered by satellite communications that can link every country.43

The Importance of Influence

With advances in information technology new forms of news media 

have proliferated. On the positive side has been the ability to acquire 

and disseminate information very rapidly. Using the Internet one 

can access dozens of newspapers and official government sites from 

around the world and elicit contrasting points of view. On the negative side has been the enormous amount of erroneous information 

that is put forth on a daily basis. Determining if sources are veridical is difficult especially for time-sensitive material. Unfortunately, 

rumors gain ersatz importance, are quickly re-disseminated, and are 

often acted upon by both individuals and institutions without authentication. 

Information has always been an important component of warfare. 

However, new IT technologies have elevated dramatically the level of 

prominence ascribed to information of all sorts. Tomes have been 

written about the use and abuse of the power of the press. Manipulation of information, including that coming from traditional sources, 

has become an issue of paramount importance. While most Americans firmly believe that our First Amendment Rights are among the 

most sacred, our adversaries have learned how to convert that great 

freedom into an effective countermeasure.

The fact of the matter is that the news media have become strategic weapons. In future conflicts the ability to form and maintain international coalitions will be crucial to the prosecution and outcome. 

Similarly, generation of popular support of the American people 

plays an important role in determining whether or not any campaign 

can be initiated. Once operations of substantial duration are undertaken, maintenance of that support is a critical factor. 

Prior attempts to manipulate power can be seen by reviewing media participation prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). On a daily 

basis headlines around the world carried some aspect of the story. 

Influential leaders of all persuasions were quoted as to their opinions 
27

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

of the impending actions. Supporters of Iraq sought to separate those 

countries that could assist in US efforts in the impending conflict. 

Even Iran, an adversary of Iraq, warned they would side with their 

old enemy. This turned out to be nothing but a ploy. Members of 

the Bush administration publicly outlined the case against Saddam 

and his motivation for acquiring weapons of mass destruction at the 

UN and on television and in press interviews. Russia, a traditional 

friend of Iraq, used the press to warn the US against armed intervention. The European media, from countries with various motivations, 

voiced concerns about the legitimacy of an attack. Even Nelson Mandela, though not directly involved, made headlines decrying impending actions. Later he was quoted as saying that it was the United 

States that posed the greatest danger to world peace. While the media frenzy did not stop OIF, it did greatly impact the constituency of 

the invading force as well as influencing world opinion. 

Public opinion has always played a supporting role in decisions 

concerning conflict. At the core of that conviction is the trust and 

confidence of the people in the institutions involved, especially governmental and media sources. In recent decades both institutions 

have been severely tarnished by their actions. Both institutions repeatedly have been caught fabricating truths and misrepresenting 

the facts. These issues have been compounded by the availability of 

the Internet and an environment in which speed of delivery is more 

important than confirming authenticity. Accessible to anyone, unverified information may be instantaneously transmitted around the 

world. The combination of lower trust in established institutions and 

capability for rapid dissemination of information is unparalleled in 

history. These unstable situations will add complexity to the emerging battlefields of the future. In shaping this dimension of the total 

environment of conflict it should be acknowledged that one creating 

favorable or unfavorable opinions may decide the outcome.44

In such a world, news media, both credentialed and bloggers, 

will play increasingly important roles as future conflicts evolve. They 

will manipulate, and will be manipulated, in extremely sophisticated 

orchestrations exquisitely designed to wield influence in determining 

the outcome of contentious situations.45 Though clearly nonviolent 

in nature, successful information interventions, through news media 

and other information sources, may provide an adversary the ability 

to impose its will on other groups. The tactics include aggregation or 

division of potential forces, gathering or dispersing popular support, 
28

 JSOU Report 06-1

and/or intimidation of the adversary or its allies. When successful, 

by definition, such imposition of will on an adversary constitutes war. 

Thus it demonstrates that the nature of the conflict is changing. 

Known as the Fourth Estate, the American press espouses the 

notion that they serve as arbitrators between the government and 

the people. Regarding armed conflicts they frequently pontificate on 

issues that concern whether or not use of our troops is justified. 

They exert their influence by the frequency, timing, subject matter, 

and vocabulary used in these articles. Any astute reader can ascertain that the American media has gone far beyond reporting the 

news and is attempting to shape future actions. Though generally 

unstated, they too have political agendas. 

Closely coupled with use of information as a weapon is our inadequate educational system. One issue is the training provided those 

entering the news media profession.46 Fundamentally flawed is the 

notion that anyone who can write or talk well can automatically become a subject matter expert in any topic. Gone 

are the days when reporters truly specialized in 

the issues that they covered. Instead, Lexus and 

Nexus can provide any reporter a cursory overview in a matter of minutes. Lacking is in-depth 

understanding of the issues that surround the 

situation. Unfortunately, few have learned that 

no bad story, no matter how thoroughly refuted, is ever killed. The 

same misinformation that fed the original story is omnipresent and 

it is a matter of how an Internet search engine prioritizes information that determines what the investigator will see and in what order. 

Often under intense pressure to get the story out reporters rarely 

read past the first seemingly articulate entry. Without their own expertise on which to rely, they frequently choose poor sources, often 

on name recognition. Even prestigious institutions and individuals 

get the facts wrong. 

The other aspect of poor education pertains to those who receive 

information. Unfortunately, Americans in general have little sense of 

history or geography. It is rare when the public can identify states in 

the middle of the continent let alone locate foreign countries. 

Many people in the US simply do not comprehend the importance 

of history and consistently focus on near-term solutions based on 

symptoms. Rarely do citizens attempt to understand causal relationships. If the problem can’t be stated in a twenty-second sound bite, 

Gone are the days 

when reporters 

truly specialized 

in the issues that 

they covered. 
29

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

there is a general tendency to just forget about it. Simple slogans 

gain inordinate power whether they make sense or not. They form 

the basis of opinion polls. Opinion polls are followed daily on Capitol Hill. Votes frequently are cast accordingly, especially if an election is approaching. While proclaiming the wisdom of the American 

populace, politicians well understand the need to dumb down their 

messages. The unfortunate reality is that some of them are not much 

better educated on current topics than their constituents. 

Applications of Influence 

It is clear that our potential adversaries understand the importance 

of perception management. Public relations are no longer the sole 

domain of countries or large organizations with sophisticated staffs. 

With computers and fax machines in every corner of the world, any 

savvy operator can gain access to the outside world and present their 

case to a world that does not discriminate between credible and noncredible sources.

During the conflict in the Balkans it was not uncommon for faxes 

to be sent from cities under siege. The senders have access to the fax 

numbers for news agencies and groups likely to be sympathetic to 

their cause. Concurrently messages sent on the Internet proliferate 

at phenomenal speed. Messages from unknown sources state that 

they are under attack at that moment and ask for help in getting 

the US Government to intervene on their behalf. Frequently there 

is a personal appeal, or a linkage established between the sender 

and receiver. A common ploy is to state the sender is an American 

student who returned home only to become trapped in a desperate 

situation.

Groups such as Al Qaeda are very sophisticated in their material designed for public consumption. The recruiting tapes they send 

out are extremely well forged and tailored for their target audience.47

Even the tape that graphically detailed the execution of Daniel Pearl 

hit its mark and was enthusiastically received in some sectors. While 

most people in the Western World were shocked at the notion that 

anyone would videotape and display the decapitation of an innocent 

civilian, the act was cheered in some areas of the world. The messages sent from Osama bin Laden following the 9/11 attacks were 

full of symbology and adroitly crafted for the disenfranchised youth 

of fundamentalist Islamic countries. 
30

 JSOU Report 06-1

Economic Influence and Imposing Will

Economic factors have always been an important component of war. 

Historically, purchasing weapons and other military materiel, as 

well as personnel costs, were the primary financial issues. Several 

wars have been fought in order to gain control of natural resources or fatten the coffers of the aggressor. However, in recent years 

there have been major changes in the economic infrastructure of the 

world. Electronic transfer mechanisms and standardization of monetary exchange have led to globalization in which economic strife in 

one geographic area may have profound impact in other continents. 

Similarly, trade between nations has expanded greatly, especially between the developing countries and those that are technologically 

more advanced, primarily due to labor cost differentials. Globalization has transmuted economics from a supporting role in conflicts to 

that of a predominant center of gravity, one that is decisive in determination of the outcome. 

While essentially nonviolent, economic confrontations have the 

potential to allow the regnant party to impose their will on others. 

Again, if the outcome-based definition proposed earlier is accepted, 

then macroeconomic interventions that cannot be resisted by the 

weaker party support the notion that the nature of war is changing. 

While it is wrong to view potential for all future conflicts in purely 

economic terms, risk to infrastructure and trade agreements play a 

key role in stabilizing relationships.48 Conversely, those adversaries 

that are not tied to an economic model of society tend to view those 

relationships, which are sometimes fragile, as our vulnerabilities. In 

reality, most sophisticated economies are based on public trust and 

confidence in established institutions, including governments. As 

long as confidence remains high, the global macroeconomic system 

functions smoothly. Once threats to stability are perceived, confidence is likely to diminish. This is precisely the strategic objective 

that Al Qaeda terrorists have targeted.

Therein another paradox emerges. Large countries that could 

pose threats to US interests, such as China, are unlikely to resort 

to physical violence to resolve differences. To do so would both cut 

off a huge amount of trade that is overwhelmingly in their favor, and 

result in very significant damage to their national infrastructure.49

At the same time, these complex, trusting relationships expose our 

vulnerabilities to adversaries that do not participate in trade, or are 

philosophically at odds with our materialistic values. As has been 
31

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

demonstrated by a number of terrorist attacks around the world, for 

most countries, including the US, it does not take a large incident 

to cause an emotionally disproportionate reaction. Those responses 

invariably have economic repercussions and usually included secondary and tertiary effects. It is essential that the US learn from the 

experiences of Israel wherein terrorist attacks occur frequently, but 

public recovery is usually very rapid with minimal impact on daily 

life.50

Evolution of Command and Control

Throughout the history of conflict, command and control systems 

have been key to success or failure. One of the significant advantages of American military power has been the ability to create extremely efficient command and control systems. These systems are 

capable of integrating large diverse forces and responding to rapidly 

developing situations. Emphasis has been placed on “getting inside 

the enemy’s decision cycle,” thus allowing US elements to bring decisive force to bear more quickly than the adversary can counter.

A substantial amount of time and effort has gone into understanding the command and control systems of potential adversaries. Colonel Warden’s Five Ring Theory, which altered American concepts of air warfare, noted that it was most advantageous to strike 

at the leadership of the enemy and destroy their communications 

with fielded forces. Attempts to distance the enemy’s population from 

their leaders are given higher priority than fighting their soldiers. His 

thesis was applied with great success during Desert Storm when a 

prime focus of the air war was on cutting off Saddam’s communication with his troops in Kuwait.51 Unfortunately, the anticipated overthrow of his government, while attempted, was not successful.

Given traditional conflicts, defining and defeating the enemy’s 

command and control system provides war-winning advantages. 

Warden’s thesis fits well when engaged in conflict between nationstates fielding modern military forces. Other conflicts in which the 

enemy employs centralized command and control systems also can 

be effectively targeted. 

While much emphasis is placed on identifying terrorist command 

and control this may not be as useful as thought in the past. Some 

terrorist groups are linked only by philosophy and utility. Their leaders are often fiercely independent but occasionally rely on limited 

external support. It is assumed that since we have been success-
32

 JSOU Report 06-1

ful in creating highly responsive centralized command, control, and 

communications systems, other organizations must follow suit and 

follow a hierarchical model. Based on advances in IT the need for 

a centralized command structure is no longer necessary, if it ever 

was.

The concept of the superorganism should be understood as an 

alternative model for command and control that facilitates dispersed, 

effective action but does not rely on centralized communication. Superorganisms facilitate synergism through agglomeration of smaller 

elements that could not accomplish a given task alone. This somewhat controversial notion comes from simple organisms that apparently do not have the ability to apply complex thought but, under 

certain conditions, those organisms act at an intelligence level above 

their expected capacity. 

An example of a superorganism is slime mold, which is unicellular and lives in moist climates. When periodically faced by drought, 

slime mold cells physically come together. Many of these cells commit suicide by forming a base and allowing other slime mold cells to 

stack on top of them forming tubules that reach into the air. As they 

dry out, wind comes along and blows the top cells to new locations. 

When they land in a moist area the colony is reconstituted. The unanswered question is how does each cell determine the actions it 

should take to support the superorganism? It appears this is from a 

series of simple decisions that are programmed into each cell. There 

is no indication of external command and control that informs the 

cells of individual responsibilities.52

It seems that slime mold cells can detect a threat, make a determination of individual versus collective threat, implement assembly 

orders, voluntarily commit suicide or move to a new location and 

then reconstitute life. Therefore, we must anticipate what human 

terrorists, with far more complex decision-making capability, can accomplish using similar relative simple instructions. If terrorists use 

a superorganism command and control paradigm it makes the task 

of locating them extremely difficult. Each cell must be independently 

identified and neutralized. The clues for findings these cells would be 

different from an organization with a centralized system. 

There is reason to believe that many of the terrorists trained in 

Afghanistan under Osama bin Laden were taught similar dispersion 

techniques.53 They know how to determine a target and probably 

have authorization, if any is needed, to attack independently. 
33

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

Until quite recently, sophisticated weapons and tactics training were only available via on-site instruction. Thus, in the 1990s 

many mujahideen volunteers went to Afghanistan for training under 

Osama bin Laden. Other terrorist training facilities were available in 

Iraq, Libya, Syria and other countries. Now, however, terrorist skills 

may be learned from the Internet as websites post detailed training 

manuals covering all necessary techniques needed to initiate operations. Adaptation of distance learning techniques will facilitate dispersal of organizations that need only philosophical guidance, which 

is easily obtained by watching media outlets espousing commensurate views. While second or third generation terrorists may not be 

as proficient as their more highly trained forerunners, they still are 

effective as their acts rely on evoking fear and overreaction from the 

target audience. 

The implications of superorganism-based command structure 

would be very significant to counterterror operations. Such a system 

would support a geographically dispersed organization that was the 

antithesis of net-centric warfare. It would assuredly alter the prosecution of conflict and arguably impact the nature of conflict.

The China Factor

China is frequently listed as one of the major emerging threats to regional stability in the Pacific, or to the United States. The flashpoint 

is Taiwan. While Taiwan is currently independent, and supported 

by the US, China declares that it is a part of their country. Even we 

endorse a “One China” policy while continuing to arm the breakaway 

island.

Of concern to some military analysts is the increase in weapons 

spending China has been making in recent years. Approaching $90 

billion in 2005, which is three times their official number, they are 

now the third largest in the world.54 Of course that figure pales when 

compared to the $420 billion dollars spent by the US. The official 

Chinese publications emphasize a peaceful rise to characterize their 

emergence as an economic power. It is now the second largest consumer in the world. 

The debate between analysts revolves around the strategy that 

China will follow. Traditionalists point to missile buildups and troop 

deployment close to Taiwan as an impending threat. There are over 

650 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 missiles within range now and an estimated 100 per year increase continuing. More than 700 strike air-
34

 JSOU Report 06-1

craft including new Russian Su-30MKK fighters are available. They 

have a formidable navy with 55 attack submarines. China’s ground 

forces of 2.3 million men have about 375,000 stationed in the area 

across from Taiwan.55

Many Western military analysts probably misinterpret the potential for conflict between China and Taiwan. At a conference held 

by the National Intelligence Council addressing this issue, one attendee, who was ethnic Chinese, described the conflict in terms of a 

“family squabble.” The rift was not similar to Israel and the Palestinians, or others territories where there was bitter resentment of the 

opposition. Rather, he described Taiwan as the prodigal son. Both 

Taiwan and China, he asserted, wanted to reunite. However, Taiwan 

had become rich and did not want reunification at their expense. 

They had observed the cost to West Germany when it was forced to 

bear the burden of absorbing the debts of East Germany during that 

reunification process. Therefore, as The People’s Republic of China 

increases in prosperity, the probability of peaceful reunification also 

increases.56

The importance of economic growth in China cannot be underestimated as it pertains to the likelihood of armed conflict in the region. 

As the largest emerging market in the world, China has reported a 

9.5 percent annual growth rate.57 The bid of China National Offshore 

Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to buy Unocal demonstrated their international economic power and sent shock waves through many in 

America. Energy is a crunch point as China’s demands for fuel are 

rapidly increasing and the US continues disproportionate consumption of the same products. However, American companies are deeply 

involved in acquiring cheaper Chinese goods as well as investing. 

My observations, derived during travel in Tibet and Hong Kong during June 

2005, tend to support the notion that 

economics have supplanted expansion 

by force. Hong Kong has continued to 

advance economically under the Chinese 

rule. The territory is run extremely efficiently as can be attested to by anyone 

arriving at the new airport. The city is as 

modern as any in Asia.

One cannot condone the brutal invasion and suppression of Tibet. The official Chinese version of the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 

My observations, derived 

during travel in Tibet and 

Hong Kong during June 

2005, tend to support 

the notion that economics have supplanted 

expansion by force.
35

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

1950 is simply rewriting history with a big lie.58 However, the current 

development efforts on the Tibetan plateau by the Chinese are both 

telling and have strategic implications. Everywhere we traveled we 

found road construction in progress. The main highway to Nepal, 

which has been an unimproved dirt road, is being expanded and 

paved. The Qinhai to Tibet railroad is being completed at many kilometers per month and is scheduled to be in operational testing by 

2006. When completed, people will be able to travel from Beijing to 

Lhasa in 50 hours. Subsidiary roads are being constructed throughout the valleys. There is more water in the area than I expected and 

the Chinese are making use of it. What was once restricted to subsistence farming due to lack of infrastructure is being converted to 

extensive agriculture. The roads provide the necessary means to get 

produce to the markets in the expanding major cities.

It must be noted that there is a concerted effort to import ethnic Chinese into this province. The high altitude, often 12,000 feet 

or higher, requires acclimatization that many do not find desirable. 

However, incentives, such as relaxation of the one-child rule and 

available homes, are attracting many people. This expansion requires a more robust economy than was previously available. Like it 

or not, China is dragging Tibet out of the Middle Ages and into the 

modern world.59

In the most remote villages there are both limited electricity and 

satellite dishes. The central government has expended substantial 

effort to incorporate even the itinerant yak herders into their society. 

These rural areas are a unique juxtaposition of Communism and 

Tibetan Buddhism. Even Mickey Mouse was displayed in one home 

although the occupants were not aware of the significance of the 

item.

The point is that these efforts in such a remote area suggest the 

emphasis on economic expansion is real. There are, of course, concerns about increased Chinese influence in Nepal, thus putting more 

pressure on India. The current construction in Tibet and dire political and security conditions in Nepal bear watching. It is far more 

likely that they will pressure the US by increased economic output 

and extending their influence, not only on the Pacific Rim, but also 

in most other areas of the Third world. 

China has been rapidly expanding power in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil’s trade is now at about $8 billion with some Brazilian 

manufacturers establishing factories in China. It is acknowledged 
36

 JSOU Report 06-1

that the business agreements are specifically designed to counter 

Western global trade dominance.60 The growing presence of Chinese 

business is commensurate with my personal observations in Brazil 

over the past few years.61 Other examples of incursion in this hemisphere include Argentina’s expanding trade with China. This has 

now reached over $3 billion annually.62 Also, Peru recently signed an 

accord to cooperate in economics, technology, investment, energy, 

and other areas of mutual interest.63

Closer to home, in 2003 Mexico established a strategic alliance 

with China for bilateral cooperation in economics, trade, and investment. The Caribbean area also has been approached for more trade 

and cooperation with China. Trade has reached $2 billion in the past 

year. This increase has been accomplished to the detriment of Taiwan, which has been losing influence in this area. 

Africa is another area of interest to China. Over the past few 

years China has formed or increased alliances with most of the 54 

nations on the continent. This was possible due to the diminished 

presence of the United States and other Western powers. One article 

noted that the, “standard US response in recent years to local conflict in Africa has been to withdraw troops and civilians...” With them 

have gone investors.64 This void is being eagerly filled by China.

The US is China’s largest trading partner. However, this relationship is a matter of great concern to our Country’s leadership as 

there has been an ever-increasing trade deficit. In 1989, trade was 

estimated at $17.8 billion with a US deficit of $6 billion.65 As of 2004 

that trade total rose to $240 billion. However, the US trade deficit 

had ballooned to $162 billion. Studies have revealed that a significant number of jobs, possibly 1.5 million, had been lost to Chine due 

to their low-cost labor.66 In addition, as was pointed out by Congressman Roger Robinson in hearings held in late July 2005, China has 

been strengthening ties with many of our traditional trading partners including Germany, Israel, and Australia.67

When combined, the trends suggest that China will continue to 

place high emphasis on economic growth. Much of that will be in 

direct competition with US interests both here and abroad. Therefore, it is unlikely that they would be willing to risk damage to the 

country’s infrastructure. Extensive damage would be inevitable in 

a direct military confrontation with the US or other Western powers. Military posturing probably will continue as a means of exerting influence and gaining power throughout the world. China will 
37

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

have supporters, including Russia, in their move to increase power 

as many countries do not wish the US to continue to dominate global 

geopolitics.68

The emerging economic power of China will yield direct confrontation with US national interests in many areas of the world. Traditional military threats to Taiwan cause us to spend resources that 

could be used elsewhere. This would appear to be only a small part of 

a much larger scheme that elevates China’s ability to influence other 

countries and impose its will when desired. 

SOF Implications 

As both the nature and manner of prosecuting war are changing, the 

impact on Special Operations Forces (SOF) will be significant. The 

reputation of SOF for flexibility, determination and adaptability is 

laudable, and will increase in importance in future conflicts. For senior political and military leaders they have become the tool of choice 

for both surgical missions and preparing the battlefield for larger 

forces. That will continue. However, with rapid changes in warfare 

there will be a need for capabilities that currently are not in the 

inventory but the need for which becomes apparent over time. SOF 

units must be prepared to morph as they have the best capability for 

quickly acquiring new skills.

If, as predicted in this paper, some future conflicts prove to be 

decisive but nonviolent, capabilities in information warfare, psychological operations, and penetrating civil infrastructures will become 

paramount. It will be SOF units that should spearhead this effort. 

Concurrently, the highly lethal aspects of their missions must continue to evolve.

At present many SOF units are directly and indirectly involved in 

influencing people in countries around the world. In an information 

intensive conflict, SOF will play several key roles. This does not refer 

only to the use of technology on the digital battlefield. There they will 

take advantage of scientific advances like all military units. Rather, 

their roles will be to guide both friend and foe in manners commensurate with our national interests. How they will prosecute those 

tasks will vary based on the desired outcomes. The decades spent 

developing interpersonal relationships will be instrumental in their 

ability to contact influential individuals in areas of interest. Where 

appropriate contacts do not exist, their skills will be applied in initiating the necessary relationships.
38

 JSOU Report 06-1

It cannot be assumed that all relationships will remain favorable. 

Some may sour due to incompatible interests by either party. Such 

situations could lead to a training paradox.

Several SOF elements have missions to train foreign military 

forces. Their objective is to create a force that can provide stability in 

the area by supporting democratically elected governments. Part of 

the training process includes instilling professional military values 

such as respect for human life, obedience and loyalty to legitimate 

authority.

Great emphasis is placed on basic military skills for all soldiers. 

These include discipline, weapons training and marksmanship, field 

survival skills, basic health medical requirements, and small unit 

tactics. Officers and NCOs receive additional training. The most 

promising are sometimes selected to go to the United States to attend military courses. 

There are several desired outcomes from training in the US. In 

addition to the course curriculum, it is hoped that they will see firsthand how our military works and the value we place on subordination to civilian authority. The attendees also get to see how civilians 

live in a free society. Special bonds are formed between the foreign 

and American students as well as with instructors and administrators. The personal connections can prove very useful in times of crisis.

While not as extensive, similar lessons and relationships can be 

established for the troops receiving training in their own country. As 

professional trainers, SOF personnel take pride in teaching the local 

troops military skills. The question, however, is “How good is good 

enough?” The known paradox is that in unstable areas, situations 

can change quickly. The soldiers we have trained may well become 

our adversaries. 

In tribally dominated areas of the world, it may be expedient to 

train and employ local forces in support of US objectives. This approach proved to be extremely effective in fighting the Taliban and Al 

Qaeda in Afghanistan. Support of the Kurdish Pershmerga proved of 

great benefit in Northern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

One problem that frequently emerges is that these trained guerilla forces may have political objectives that are orthogonal to ours. 

Some of these forces are known to make relationships on convenience. They do not see incongruence in switching sides when a new 

situation appears to make it in their best interest.
39

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

Another perennial issue in training local forces is the selection 

process to insure loyalty to the government. Particularly during insurgencies, it is not uncommon to have the enemy to send in recruits to be trained by US SOF 

personnel. It is a cheap and effective method to 

obtain basic skills training for their own force. 

Desertion during and after training is a significant problem when developing a military in unstable areas. It is difficult to determine whether 

the recruits left for personal reasons, such as 

unwillingness to submit to discipline, or because they are rejoining 

the opposition, albeit with newly acquired skills.

The bottom line for SOF when training foreign forces is that they 

must balance between teaching them the skills necessary to accomplish their missions, while remembering that we may have to fight 

them at a later date.

As mentioned, SOF has the ability to acquire unique skills on 

relatively short order. However, in a world increasingly dependent on 

professional mercenary forces, acquiring these skills is only the first 

step.69 Retention will continue to be a major concern for SOF units as 

competition for highly qualified personnel increases. In recent years 

private security firms have been offering expense incentives for these 

skilled personnel. One report stated that pay was as high as $33,000 

per month for short duration, but high-risk assignments. Of concern 

was a dramatic increase in SOF personnel who were departing well 

short of retirement eligibility. While some SOF members leave the 

service in any given year, that percentage has double in the past two 

years. Innovative retention programs will be required as demand for 

SOF skills increases in other sectors.

Another paradox that will emerge is that of communications. Although the world will be more information intensive, command and 

control capabilities are likely to bifurcate. On one hand there will 

be massive efforts at sensor fusion and the ability to pass data to 

all levels of command. On the other hand, there will be SOF forces 

operating independently, or in environments in which even redundant communications channels may be blocked or inoperative. While 

SOF operatives have always been resourceful, future operations will 

require that many of them possess the skills necessary to function 

with minimal direct guidance.

... it is not uncommon to have the 

enemy to send 

in recruits to be 

trained by US SOF 

personnel. 
40

 JSOU Report 06-1

Already emerging are complex legal issues regarding use of force. 

Several SOF elements have recently been caught up in charges of 

abuse of detainees. Concurrently other soldiers have been charged 

for split-second decisions that resulted in loss of life. In one, an act 

of euthanasia landed Captain Rogelio Maynulet in Ft. Leavenworth 

after a drone taped the incident. In another incident, USMC LT Ilario 

Pantano was charged for shooting two Iraqis whom he believed posed 

a threat. The charges, which were later dropped, emanated from a 

disgruntled junior enlisted man who lied about the incident. However, a lack of public understanding concerning the intensity of combat 

bred debate about the number of shots fired by LT Pantano. Media 

pundits discussed the physical effects the bullets had inflicted as 

the suspects were spun around by a weapon on fully automatic. The 

post hoc debate ensued almost devoid of facts or reality. 

The point of these examples is not 

to revisit specific events, but to illustrate the necessity to firmly establish legal limits before operations commence. 

Public fascination with forensic sciences, ala the acclaimed television program CSI, has transmuted from civilian 

criminal proceedings to microscopic inspection of combat situations. 

Problems associated with second guessing decisions made under extremely stressful conditions will result in American lives lost. Due to 

the nature of many SOF missions, operators are constantly placed 

in hostile, yet frequently ambiguous situations. Allowing rewriting of 

rules after events occur has become epidemic. 

A new issue has been emerging over the past few years. I have 

termed it The History Channel Effect. Of course, it is well established 

that the winner writes the history of conflicts. Currently, however, we 

are witnessing cathartic urges to produce revisionist versions of prior 

events and expose any perceived misdeed in the most egregious light. 

While argued that such presentations are to make a better informed 

public, too frequently they are really stepping-stones for over-zealous reporters. Like all critics, they come well prepared to tell others 

how they should have conducted their affairs. Unfortunately they 

rarely possess the skills or courage to perform the combat operations 

on which they feel perfectly qualified to comment with the clarity of 

20/20 hindsight. The History Channel Effect must be eschewed if 

SOF is to function on the violent side of conflicts.70

The point of these examples is ... to illustrate the 

necessity to firmly establish legal limits before 

operations commence.
41

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

Also, there will be proliferation of interagency relationships. 

Historically, SOF and the Intelligence Community have engaged in 

unique operational interdependence. Due to the changing nature of 

conflict, there will be requirements to establish broader networks 

with other agencies. However, even some US government agencies 

are unlikely to fully understand the roles and missions of SOF. It will 

probably fall to SOF soldiers to establish and guide those new partnerships. Here again, the flexibility and ingenuity of SOF operators 

will play a key role in establishing and optimizing new operational 

capabilities. 

The exact parameters of these emerging capabilities are not yet 

known, and only will be identified through analysis of future SOF 

missions. Certain vectors for required skills are probable. Some examples include advanced computer capabilities, the art of negotiation, comprehensive understanding of microeconomics and mechanisms for alternative finance systems (Hawala and high value goods 

and property transactions), fast, positive identification of targeted 

individuals, operations in environments with rapidly mutating diseases (i.e. Bird Flu), and the ability to accurately detect deception in 

human communications. There may also be missions assigned that 

are not yet within USSOCOM’s charter. For instance, manned space 

operations, probably led by civilian enterprises, will likely expand in 

the near future. It is possible that SOF could be called upon to conduct highly selective missions in that harsh environment.

Extended relationships have also been initiated on foreign missions that brought nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in contact with SOF elements. Future conflicts will produce even more, and 

possibly unusual, relationships between SOF and NGOs. As with the 

training paradox, these relationships are likely to encounter conflicts 

of interest that are difficult to resolve.

These relationship issues suggest that very sophisticated training and education will be required for many SOF operators. Decisions 

normally reserved for senior commanders are likely to be defaulted, 

in a time-sensitive manner, to relatively junior people who do not 

have the luxury of waiting for higher headquarters to respond. These 

highly probable situations dictate that SOF operators at every level 

of command will need a basic understanding of the national interests 

involved in their mission, and how their actions and decisions may 

impact the outcome of the conflict. 
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 JSOU Report 06-1

Finally, SOF organizations will not be immune from the consternation created by pandemic social restructuring. Specifically, SOF 

personnel, like everyone else, will be exposed to competing belief systems. Already discussed was the potential impact on social organizations when individuals are confronted with conflicting and irreconcilable beliefs and values. Based on a hierarchical order, which may not 

even reach the level of consciousness, each individual chooses which 

values he or she will act upon.

Currently SOF has a set of core values, Integrity, Courage, Competence, and Creativity.71 These are recognized and accepted by most 

members of the command. This set of values was established and 

published based on fundamental assumptions about the individual 

acknowledging the constitutionality and preeminence of the United 

States in matters of defense. While understanding that these soldiers 

have family responsibilities, and may have religious affiliations, it is 

the functioning premise that each member of SOF will conduct their 

assigned military duties to the utmost of their ability and in accordance with those core values. 

Previously threats were clearly defined and values surrounding 

issues of defense fairly unambiguous. However, as has been discussed, that has changed. The general population now has access 

to a vast amount of information. Delineation of threats to national 

interests has become more difficult in recent years. With that, people in general are more likely to question participation in specific 

conflicts. It is from this pool of people that the military, including 

SOF, will draw recruits. Confronting an internal threat brings special 

problems that must be addressed.72

The dichotomy is that SOF wants members who are highly knowledgeable on a wide variety of topics and can think for themselves 

while they are also willing to follow orders in ambiguous situations. 

This suggests that additional emphasis must be placed on the recruiting process. There must be screening mechanisms whereby the 

potential for conflicting beliefs and values will be held to a minimum. Given the proliferation of possible threats, screening for all 

conceivable conflicts will be difficult. In order to insure reliability of 

the forces, actions need be taken to explore methods for upgrading 

the recruiting process. 
43

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

Summary

Contrary to published reports, the nature of war has changed at a 

most profound level, that of definition. Information technology is so 

powerful and pervasive that it has made this fundamental shift possible. Assuming that war is determined by the ability of one entity 

to impose its will on another, then it is now possible to achieve that 

outcome without necessarily resorting to physical violence. Physical encounters will continue to occur and we must be prepared to 

overmatch any potential military threat. However, the outcome of 

conflicts will rarely be determined primarily by military force.

The role of the nation-state is also changing, though it will remain the preeminent organizational structure of choice in the near 

term. However, large-scale social groupings of the future are more 

likely to be established by common beliefs and values, economic 

considerations and alliances, and ethnicity, than they are tied to 

geography. There are those who are motivated primarily by ideology, 

not materialism. Therefore, many people will encounter competing, 

and sometimes irreconcilable, beliefs causing them to act based on 

hierarchical value systems. That means the traditional notion of personal allegiance will be severely tested.

When considering national security, the implications of these 

supervening changes are enormous. The emergence of polymorphic 

threats will mandate highly flexible and innovative responses. Elements of SOF are uniquely capable of adapting to such threats. 

There is an immediate need to predict the additional skills that will 

be required and establish new training an education programs based 

on threat projections. Of major concern will be recruiting and retention of highly skilled SOF operators in an environment in which the 

nature of war is changing and their talents attractive to independent 

organizations.

Endnotes

 1. Colin S. Gray, “How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?” 

Parameters, U.S. Army War College, Spring 2005

 2. Ralph Peters, “Strategic Implications,” Principles of War Culminating 

Seminar, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, held in Arlington, VA 13 April 2005

 3. LTC Antullio J. Echevarria, Jr., “Globalization and the Nature of War,” 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2003

 4. Echevarria

 5. Gray
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 6. GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, & R. L. Brownlee, “Serving a Nation at War: 

A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities,” 

108th Congress, 21 Jul 04

 7. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, Cambridge University Press

 8. These examples are based on a Google search for “war on.”

 9. Dinstein

 10. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Houghton, 

Mifflin Co.

 11. Stephen Young, “How North Vietnam Won the War,” and interview with 

GEN Bui Tin, formerly of the North Vietnamese Army, published in 

The Wall Street Journal, 3 August 1995

 12. “Commander in Chief Lands on USS Lincoln,” CNN, 2 May 2003

 13. The Merriam Webster Dictionary, Simon and Schuster, 1974

 14. Group Capt S.W. Peach, “The Nature of War and Armed Conflict,” 

Chapter 1, AP3000 – British Air Power Doctrine, UK MOD 1999

 15. U.S. Marine Corps Doctrine, Pub 1. 20 June 1997

 16. Gray

 17. John B. Alexander, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First 

Century Warfare, St. Martin’s Press, 1999

 18. Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 

Twenty-First Century, G.P. Putnam & Sons, 2004

 19. HR3 162, “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001,” 

26 October 2001

 20. Peach

 21. “His fatwa was clear: Americans must die, within the next few weeks.” 

ABC News and Starwave Corporation, 10 June 1998

 22. Alexander, “Appendix A,” Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in TwentyFirst Century Warfare, St. Martin’s Press, 1999 

 23. “Foreigners Blamed for Iraq Attacks,” Associated Press, 1 July 2005

 24. President George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress 

and the American People,” United States Capitol, 20 September 2001

 25. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We: The Challenges To America’s National Identity, Simon and Schuster, 2004

 26. Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of 

the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB, Random House 2003

 27. General Rahim Wardak, Afghanistan Minister of Defense, in private 

meetings with John Alexander, December 2003

 28. “London Bombers Were All British,” BBC News, 12 July 2005

 29. “Army Sergeant Asan Akbar, War Hero!” http://www.indybay.org/

news/2003/03/1589042.php

 30. U.N. Case Information Fact Sheet, “Milosevic Case Information Sheet 

(IT-02-54) “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 5 April 2005

 31. Marlise Simons, “Hague War Crimes Tribunal Frees a Convicted General,” New York Times, 30 July 2004 
45

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

 32. Patricia M. Wald, “Punishment of War Crimes by International Tribunals – International Justice, War Crimes, and Terrorism: The U.S. 

Record,” New School for Social Research, Winter 2002

 33. Arusha Times, “Over 1000 Witnesses Testify At The Rwanda War 

Crimes Tribunal,” Hirondelle News Agency, 25 July 2005

 34. Farouk Abu-Eissa, “Conclusions and Judgment of Brussels Tribunal 

ob Reagan’s Foreign Policy,” International Conference on Reagan Administration Foreign Policy, Brussels Belgium, 30 September 1984

 35. Jim Lobe, “Give Rumsfeld the Pinochet Treatment, Say US Amnesty 

Chief,” The Inner Press, 26 May 2005

 36. “Resources on Just War Theory,” http://ethics/acusd.edu/applied/

military/justwar.html

 37. USMC Doctrine Pub 1

 38. John Warden, private communication 28 August 2005

 39. USMC Doctrine Pub 1

 40. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Thomas Cleary (ShambhalaPublications 1988)

 41. Tennessee v. Garner, US Supreme Court, 1985

 42. John Alexander, the examples come from personal observation in 

many areas of the world.

 43. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, address at the 

turn of the millennia, 1 January 2000

 44. Susan B. Glasser and Steven Coll, “The Web as Weapon,” The Washington Post, 9 August 2005

 45. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Media and The Military,” Atlantic Monthly, 

November 2004

 46. John B. Alexander, Winning The War: Advanced Weapons, Strategies, 

and Concepts for the Post - 9/11 World, St. Martin’s Press, 2003

 47. Jim Krane, “Purported al-Qaeda Video Threatens Troops,” Associated 

Press, 9 August 2005

 48. Michael Renner, “Alternative Futures in War and Conflict,” Naval War 

College Review, Autumn 2000

 49. US-China Trade Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics, The 

US-China Business Council, http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html, 28 Feb 05

 50. John Alexander, personal observation before, during, and after a suicide bombing attack in Jerusalem, 22 September 2004

 51. COL John A. Warden III, “Strategic Warfare – The Enemy as a System, 

Air University Press, 1993

 52. Mitchell Resnick, Turtles, Termites and Traffic Jams, MIT Press, 

1993

 53. Danica Kirka, “Experts: No Single al-Qaeda Mastermind,” The Associated Press, 23 July 2005

 54. Ann Scott Tyson, “Chinese Buildup Seen as Threat to Region,” The 

Washington Post, 20 July 2005

 55. “The military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005,” Annual 

Report to Congress by the US Department of Defense
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 56. The author was in attendance at this meeting. Comments by the attendees were for non-attribution

 57. Paul Maidment, “Zero-Sum Games With China,” Forbes Magazine, 20 

July 2005 

 58. For the PRC version of history see www.tibet-china.org/historical

 59. My observations are that the arguments about Tibetan freedom are 

highly politicized and do not reflect the situation in the autonomous 

region. The unspoken truth was that Tibet was “poor, backward and 

feudal.” My comments do not condone the often heavy-handed approach that the Chinese have to running the area today. However, it 

functions much better than the opponents would have you believe. 

 60. Brazil Wins China Trade Support,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/business/3756635.stm

 61. John Alexander, Personal observations during multiple visits to Brazil, 

between 2002 and March 2005

 62. “Huge Potential in Argentina-China Trade: Argentinian President,” 

People’s Daily Online, 29 June 04

 63. “Peru, China sign Eight Cooperation Accords,” www.chinaview.com, 

28 Jan 05

 64. Tina Butler, “Growing Pains and Growing Alliances: China, Timber, 

and Africa,” www.news.mongabay.com/2005/0420x.tina_butler.htlm, 

20 Apr 05

 65. Wayne M. Morrison, “IB91121: China-US Trade Issues, CRS Issue 

Brief of Congress, 13 April 2001

 66. “Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with China,” 

U.S, Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, http://www.census.

gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2004

 67. Roger W. Robinson, Jr. “Opening Statement,” Hearings on China’s 

Global Influence: Objectives and Strategies, US Congress, 21 July 

2005

 68. Herman Pirchner, Jr. “The State of Sino-Russian Relations,” statement 

before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 22 

July 2005

 69. John B. Alexander, “The Evolution of Conflict Through 2020: Demands 

on Personnel, Machines and Missions,” National Intelligence Council 

seminar, May 2004

 70. ibid

 71. “Core Values,” US Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 2003-

2004

 72. Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, “Confronting the Enemy Within,” 

RAND 2004
47

Alexander: The Changing Nature of Warfare 

About the Author

Dr. John Alexander has been a leading advocate for the development of non-lethal weapons since he created renewed interest in the field starting in 1989. An original thinker, he 

has developed other unique concepts for conflict resolution. In 2003 

he served as a mentor to Afghan Ministry of Defense senior officials 

through the Office of Military Cooperation – Afghanistan, (Coalition 

Forces) Kabul.

 He entered the US Army as a private in 1956 and rose through 

the ranks to sergeant first class, attended OCS, and was a colonel of 

Infantry in 1988 when he retired. During his varied career, he held 

many key positions in special operations, intelligence, and research 

and development. From 1966 through early 1969 he commanded 

Special Forces “A” Teams in Vietnam and Thailand. His last military assignment was as Director, Advanced System Concepts Office, 

US Army Laboratory Command. After retiring from the Army, Dr. 

Alexander joined Los Alamos National Laboratory where he was instrumental in developing the concept of Non-Lethal Defense. As a 

program manager, he conducted non-lethal warfare briefings at the 

highest levels of government including the White House Staff, National Security Council, Members of Congress, Director of Central 

Intelligence, and senior Defense officials. He also met with heads of 

industry, presented at academic institutions, including Columbia, 

Harvard and MIT, and recently addressed the German Bundestag.

Dr. Alexander organized and chaired six major conferences on 

non-lethal warfare and served as a US delegate to four NATO studies on the topic. As a member of the first Council on Foreign Relations non-lethal warfare study, he was instrumental in influencing 

the report that is credited with causing the Department of Defense 

to create a formal Non-Lethal Weapons Policy in July 1996. He was 

a distinguished guest lecturer at the US Air Force Air University. He 

has advised the CIA, US Special Operations Command, and the National Intelligence Council. 

Dr. Alexander wrote the seminal material on non-lethal warfare. 

He published articles in Harvard International Review, Jane’s International Defense Review, The Boston Globe, The Futurist, The Washington Post, and several other journals. Articles about him and his 

work can be found in The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, 

Newsweek, The Sunday Times (London), Panorama (Italy), Konrad 
48

 JSOU Report 06-1

(Germany), The LA Times, Wired Magazine, GQ, Scientific American, 

the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and many others. He has appeared 

frequently on television including Dateline, Fox News, Larry King, 

CNN, MSNBC, Newsweek, and international television in Australia, 

Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Brazil, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK, and Japan.

Academically, he holds a M.A., Pepperdine University, Ph.D., 

Walden University, and later attended the Anderson School of Management at UCLA, the Sloan School of Management at MIT, and the 

Kennedy School of Government general officer program “National and 

International Security for Senior Executives” at Harvard University. 

In addition to many military awards for valor and service, Aviation 

Week & Space Technology selected him as a 1993 Aerospace Laureate and in 1997 inducted him into the Hall of Fame at the National 

Air and Space Museum in Washington. He received a Department 

of Energy Award of Excellence for the Nuclear Weapons Program in 

1994, and is listed in Who’s Who in America, Who’s Who in Science 

and Engineering, American Men and Women of Science, and in 2001 

was named to the OCS Hall of Fame at Ft. Benning, Georgia. During 

2001 and 2002 he was a member of the National Research Council Committee for Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and 

Technology.

Currently he is a private consultant and Senior Fellow at the 

Joint Special Operations University. His books include, The Warrior’s Edge, Wm. Morrow, (1990) Future War, with foreword by Tom 

Clancy, St. Martin’s Press (1999), and the sequel, Winning the War, 

published August 2003.