T EX . R. E V ID . 702 (empha sis added). 1 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O . A P - 76, 019

BILL I E W A Y N E C O BL E , A ppe l l ant

v. THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON DI RE CT AP P EA L F ROM THE 5 4 TH J UDI CI AL DI S TR I CT COURT M c LENNAN CO UNTY

K ELL ER , P .J ., f

i l e d a c onc ur r i ng o pi ni on i n w hi c h M E YE RS , and K EASLE R , J J ., j oi ne d. Rule 702 is not jus t about scientific e vidence : I f scientific , technica l, or other specialized k nowledge wi ll a ssi st the tr ie r o f f a c t to unders ta n d th e e v id e n c e o r

to d e te r mi n e a f a c t i nis s u e , a

w it n e s s qu a li f

ie d a s an expert by knowledg e, skill, expe rience , tra ini ng , or ed uc a tio n may te sti fy

the re to i n the form of

an opinion or otherw ise. 1 We rec og nized in Nenno that expert testimony can be of the “nonscie ntific” varie ty , but that, in any event, it might not be fr

uitful to draw “a

rig id disti nction betwee n ‘har d’ scienc e, ‘sof t’ scienc es, orCOBLE CONCURRENCE — 2

Ne nn o v . S

tat e , 970 S.W .2d 549, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 2 Gr iff ith v . S tat e , 983 S.W .2d 282, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 3 Nenno , 9 7 0 S

. W

. 2 d

at 5 6 0 (q u o t i n g Da ub e rt v . M e rre ll D ow Pha rm ac e uti c als , Inc. , 509 4 U.S. 579, 588 (1993)). See F rye v . United States , 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 ( 1923). 5 Da ub e rt , 509 U.S. at 589. 6 Id. a t 59 1; W

ill iam s v . S

tat e , 895 S.W .2d 363, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 7 Nenno , 970 S.W .2d at 561. 8 Id. 9 Ro dg e rs v . S

tat e , 205 S.W .3d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 10 nonscientifc testimony ” beca use the “distinction be tween va rious ty pes of testimony

may often be blurred.” I n Gr iff

ith , we e x plained that future dang erousne ss testimony can be provided by

a mental 2 health expert base d upon the expert’s “spe cialized education and experience .” 3 Rule 702 was meant to “re lax t he tra ditional barrier s to opinion t estimony .” The rule steere d 4

c ourt s awa

y fr om Frye ’s “g ener al acc eptanc e” standard toward deter mining whether the expert’s 5 6 te sti mony wo uld be he lpf ul t o the tr ie r of fa c t. F or e vid e nc e to be he lpf ul to the tr ie r o f f

a c t, i t mu st 7 be re liable, but reliability need not a lway s be mea sured wi t h t h e ri g or that is applied to the har d scienc es. The re liability

inquiry is “a fle x ible one.” And eve n if “the subjec t matter is within t he 8 9 compre hension of t h e av er age jury ,” “[i]f the witness has some specia l knowledg e or a dditional insight into the f

ield that would be helpf

ul, then the expert ca

n assist the trier of f

act to under stand the evidenc e or to deter

mine a fa ct in issue.” Ex pert testimony that encompa sses a fie ld outside 10 of the ha rd scienc es is admis s i b l e i f: (1 ) the field of e x pertise is a le g itimate one, (2) the subject matter of the expert’s testimony is within t he scope of the fie ld, and (3) the expert’s testimonyCOBLE CONCURRENCE — 3

Nenno , 970 S.W .2d at 561. 11 proper ly relies upon a

nd/or utiliz es the princ iples involved in the field. 11 As the Cour t has o bs e rv e d, Dr . Co on s is a ps y c hiatr ist

wh o h a s b e e n p ra c tic ingfo re ns ic psy chiatry

for thirty -one y ear s. He ha s evaluated the compe tency o r s an i t y of betwe en 8,000 and 10,000 people, he has per formed approxim ately 150 evaluations of future dang erousne ss, and he ha s testified in approximately fifty ca ses. As the Court ac knowledg es, the re cord f urther show s that psy chiatric principles are commonly used in the civil commitment contex t to determine whe ther a p er s o np o s es a d an ger

t o h i m s el f o r o t h er s . Iwo u l d ad d t h at t h e r ec o rdal s o s h o ws t h e f o l l o wi n g: First, while c linical prac tice is a relatively small pa rt of Dr. Coons’s wor

k, he has tre ated ove r 3,000 patients. Second, Dr. Coons subscribes to two journals in fore nsic psy chiatry , g oes to annua l meeting s, and has lec tured on for ensic psy chiatry at the University of Texas L aw School, at various attorney associations, and at continuing leg al educ ation seminars. Withre sp e c t to a sse ssi ngfutur e da ng e ro us ne ss, Dr . Co on s’ s e du c a tio na l ba c kg ro un d a nd his prior experienc e plac e him in a be t t er p o s i t i o n than the ave rag e juror. A s Dr. Coons explained at tr ia l: Idon’t know that there ’s any specific rule or e x terna l measure , um, other than to say that, you kn owe xpe ri e nc e is –

is i mpo rt ant in the se ma tte rs . I t’ s just lik e y ou g o to the ja il a nd y ou ta lk t o a c or re c tio ns of

fi c e r a nd the y say , S o and so is d ang e ro us . Why ? Ijust know they

are , or som e thi ng s that they ’ve said, or whatever . Uh, and the y ’v e ha d ex peri enc e wi th t hat. F or e ns ic ps y c hiatr ist s h ave ha d e xpe ri e nc e wi th howeve r many

people they ’ve se en or c ases they ’ve de alt with. And they develop a n experiential body

of knowledg e and inf

ormation and a

pproac h that helps them make the ir de c isi on s. I n making his assessment, Dr. Coons relied upon information from a variety of sourc es: an int e rv ie w w ithL or

na Sue Sawy e r; a

vit a l st a tis tic s death ce rt if ic a te re g ard ingAr

thu r C ob le ; a no teCOBLE CONCURRENCE — 4

Dr . H od g e s d ia g no se d a pp ell ant at ag e fi ft e e n a s h a vin g “ a so c iop a thi c pe rs on a lity 12 disturbance of the dissocial order .” Acc ording to D r. Hodg es, such a diag nosis is for an individual who has “ littl e conc ern a

bout others” and “w ho are conce rned a bout . . . gr atifying the ir own wishes with li t t l e re gar d o f t h e cost in terms of mone y or pain that they

inflict on others.” D r. Hodg es te sti fi e d fur

the r that this dia g no sis inv olv e s “e xtre me se lf -c e nte re dn e ss, ” so me on e wh o is “ ba sic a lly uncar ing a

bout the welfa

re or well-be ing of others.” Dr. Hodg es testified that a later r evision of the DSM manu a l c ha

ng e d th e name of

the dis or de r to “c on du c t diso rd e r” and pr oh ibi te d th e dia g no sis for a ny one under

ag e eig hteen. Court’s op. at 30. 13 from a senior criminal investigator with the prosec utor’s office ; a narr ative summary from the Na val Hos p i t al at San Dieg o reg ardingappellant; a r eport fr om Clay Griff ith, M.D.; a timeline prepar ed by the prosec utor’s off

ice; appe llant’s milit ary personne l r ecor ds; te stimony from appe llant’s prior trial from Dr. Grig son, Mary I vey , and Dr. Mark; appellant’ s writing s from the Polunsky Unit; the g ra nd jur y te sti mony of a

pp e lla nt’ s moth e r an d s ist e r; inc omi ngand ou tg oin g ma il f

ro m th e c ounty jail; and a re port from Dr . Ralph Hodg es. Dr. Coons explained that he alway s uses the same f actor s 12 in e va luatin g da

ng e ro us ne ss a

nd ha s d on e so fo r a

t le a st twe nty

y e ars . Th e e vid e nc e a t tr ia l—D r. Coo ns te sti mon y —s ho ws that f

or e ns ic ps y c hiatr

y is a le g iti ma te field, that pre dicting future dang erousne ss is within the s cope of that field, and that using e ducation

and e xpe ri e nc e to a sse ss f

utu re da ng e ro us ne ss is a pro pe r ap pli c a tio n of t he pr inc ipl e s in vo lve d in the field. Nota

bly , appellant ha s prese nted no evidence to the contrary

. The Court fa ults Dr. Coons fo r f a ili ngto c ite “ bo ok s, art ic le s, jou rn a ls, or e ve n o the r f

or e ns ic ps y c hiatr ist s w ho pr a c tic e in t his

are a ” to s ub sta

nti a te his me tho do log y , wh ile a c kn ow le dg ing that Dr

. Coo ns is “ a g e nu ine fo re ns ic ps y c hiatr ist

wi th a le ng thy me dic a l c are e r. ” B ut a pp e lla nt d id n ot i ntr od

uc e any “ bo ok s, art ic le s, 13 journals, or even other fore nsic psy chiatrists” to testify that, contra

ry to Dr. Coons’s testimony , Dr.COBLE CONCURRENCE — 5

Of c ourse, the f

act that ne ither par

ty prese nted an y “books, articles, or journa ls” at trial 14 has not preve nted the Court from ci t i n g t h o se ty pes of sourc es. Even thoug h the Court does not expressly rely upon those source s for the proposition that Dr . Coons’s methodology is inappropriate , the cour t impli citly

relies upon them to sug g est that there is a substantial body of literatur e that Dr

. Coons should have relied upon in his testimony . Ifind such re l i ance by the Court to be inappropriate, absent some indication in appellate opinions that these sour ces ha ve bee n considere d in an adve rsar ial hear ing, for the reasons e x presse d in my concur ring opinion in He rn an de

z v . S tat e , 116 S.W .3d 26, 32-37 (Te x . Crim. App. 2003) (Ke ller, P.J ., concur ring ). B ut e ven if one adhe red to J udg e Ke asler’ s view that an a ppellate c ourt is free to consider suc h materia ls, s e e id. at 43-52 (Ke asler, J., dissenting), the Court f ails to comprehe nsi v el y consider the issue in light of the materia ls it cites. So t he Court has its cake and eats it t oo: consideringthe exist ence of this off-the

re c or d li te ratur e to f

ind tha t D r. Coo ns ha s f

a ile d to of

fe r s uf fi c ie nt p ro of

th at hi s met hodo log y

is leg itimate, but not considering the contents of these materia ls to de termine whe ther they approve of h i s m e t h o d o l o g y. Coons’s experience -base d method of eva luating f uture da ng erousne ss is inappropriate. 14 Iwould hold that the trial court did not er r in admitting Dr. Coons’s testimony . Ithere fore

concur in the Court’s judgme nt. Filed: Oc tober 13, 2010 Pub lis h