Air University

CURTIS E. LEMAY CENTER FOR DOCTRINE

DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION

Taking the Lead

Russia, the United States, and

Nuclear Nonproliferation after Bush

Stephen J. Cimbala

Research Paper 2008-2

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6026

December 2008
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine 

Development and Education, Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of 

Defense, or any other US Government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) papers and Air University monographs are occasional studies written by 

Air Force researchers at large and military defense analysts assigned to the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education at Air University and 

beyond. The purpose of the AFRI papers is to provide 

useful ideas and independent analysis of issues of current or potential importance to Air Force commanders 

and their staffs. This monograph and others in the 

series are also available electronically at the Air University Research Web site https://research.maxwell.af

.mil/ and the Air and Space Power Journal Web site 

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil.
iii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

TAKING THE LEAD: RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AFTER BUSH . . . . 1

Arms Control­—A Large Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Context Is All—And History Still Matters . . . . . . . 4

Approach and Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Illustrations

Figure

1 Total strategic weapons, United States–Russia,

1,000 limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2 Arriving retaliatory weapons, United States–Russia,

1,000 limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3 Generation stability, United States–Russia,

1,000 limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4 Launch-on-warning stability, United States–Russia,

1,000 limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

5 Total strategic weapons, controlled proliferation

model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

6 Arriving retaliatory weapons, controlled proliferation

model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

7 Generation stability, controlled proliferation

model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

8 Launch-on-warning stability, controlled proliferation

model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

v

Foreword

Dr. Stephen Cimbala is the author of numerous books and 

articles on national security issues, including several on deterrence—a subject of great concern to the current leadership of 

the Air Force. In 1998 Praeger published his The Past and 

Future of Nuclear Deterrence, and the same year, Texas A&M 

University published Coercive Military Strategy.

The acerbic atmosphere in Russian and American political 

relations that confounded various attempts at nonproliferation 

discussion, and even existing agreements on employment of 

nuclear forces, caught the attention of Dr. Cimbala, distinguished 

professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University. 

Dr. Cimbala’s credibility in terms of military knowledge is evident 

from his years of lecturing, attending military exercises, and conducting research visits to military commands and schools. He 

has consulted on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the US Department of State. He sees the 

new administration as an opportunity to bring forward agreements on nuclear proliferation. The Bush administration, citing 

the difficulties with deterring or targeting terrorism, raised the 

need for preemptive strike, thereby derogating the antiballistic 

missile treaties and elevating the potential for employment of 

nuclear weapons in military strategy, in the view of Cimbala. 

Cimbala seeks to reestablish relations on nuclear weapons 

control between the United States and Russia. He briefly describes arms control history to illustrate the complexities of 

building agreements as well as to find a relationship that leads 

to the satisfaction of both sides. He makes the point that more 

than just good relations between Russia and the United States 

is at stake. He suggests that when both Russia and the United 

States reach agreement about nuclear weapons, the case for 

controlled nonproliferation among the other nuclear powers can 

proceed, and that is to the good of everyone.

JOHN A. SHAUD

General, USAF, Retired, PhD

Director, Air Force Research Institute

vii

About the Author

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University (Brandywine Campus). His 

teaching and research interests include international politics and 

foreign policy, defense and security studies, arms control, peace 

operations, conflict termination, and information warfare.

Dr. Cimbala is the author of numerous books and articles in 

professional journals on topics related to national security. His 

books include The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence (Praeger Publishers, 1998) and Coercive Military Strategy (Texas 

A&M University Press, 1998). He is co-author of the textbook 

US National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics with 

Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams.

Dr. Cimbala is an award-winning teacher, having received 

the Pennsylvania State University’s Eisenhower Award for Distinguished Teaching in 1995. He was selected for inclusion in 

2000 Outstanding Scholars of the 20th Century by the International Biographical Centre, Cambridge, England, and is a member of Omicron Delta Kappa Leadership Honor Society.

Dr. Cimbala serves on the editorial board of five professional 

journals, and his recent lectures to military audiences include the 

US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and Headquarters, US Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida.

He has participated in numerous exercises, studies or other 

research visits involving military commands and schools, including: NATO military headquarters, Mons, Belgium; US Army 

war games (OPFOR) at Ft. Irwin, California; US Naval War College Global War Game, Newport, Rhode Island; and a US Air 

Force chief of staff panel on the Future of Aerospace Power at 

the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Dr. Cimbala has served as a consultant on arms control to 

the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1997–99), to 

the US Department of State (1999), and to private defense contractors. He is a faculty associate of Penn State University’s 

Institute for the Study of Nonlethal Defense Technologies.

He lives in Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania, with his wife Elizabeth 

Harder Cimbala, sons David and Christopher, numerous stuffed 

animals, and several aging vehicles.

ix

Acknowledgments

Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James Scouras for 

use of his AWSM@ model for making calculations and graphs 

used in this study. Dr. Scouras is not responsible for its use 

here, nor for any arguments or opinions.



Taking the Lead

Russia, the United States, and Nuclear 

Nonproliferation after Bush

Nuclear arms control between Russia and the United States is a 

necessary condition, although insufficient for accomplishment of 

US and allied objectives in nuclear nonproliferation. New leadership in Russia in 2008 and in Washington in 2009 opens the door 

to progress, but where to begin and how far to go? 

This discussion proceeds in three sections. First is a summary 

of pertinent policy background, emphasizing recent issues of 

contention between the United States and Russia; second, the 

significance of history, especially as seen from the Russian perspective; and third, an analytical model is used to examine a 

candidate Russian-American post–Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), or a new Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty 

(START), arms-control regime. This post-SORT regime is then 

employed as a building block for development of a controlled nonproliferation regime involving eight powers.

Arms Control—A Large Menu

The United States and Russia concluded “two plus two” meetings between their respective foreign affairs and defense ministers in March 2008. The agenda for these discussions included 

a number of arms control questions that called for prompt attention. The START, agreed between the former Soviet Union 

and the United States during the Cold War, was set to expire in 

2009 unless extended or replaced by a substitute. The verification regime for START was also required to validate compliance 

with the SORT, signed in Moscow in 2002 and set to go into 

effect at the end of December 2012. Overhanging the fates of 

START and SORT was the nagging question of US national 

missile defenses (NMD) that drove then-president Vladimir Putin and his Russian military advisors “ballistic” in 2007.1

In addition to START, SORT, and NMD, the acerbic atmosphere 

of Russian-American relations in 2007 also complicated prior 

agreements on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and interme-
diate nuclear forces (INF), both holdovers from the Cold War. Putin suspended temporarily (but indefinitely) Russian cooperation 

on CFE on the grounds that the revised version had not been 

ratified by NATO. Russian political and military leaders also questioned whether the INF Treaty was still viable in a world of increasing ballistic missile weapons spread. Under the INF Treaty, 

Russia foregoes the deployment of an entire class of land- and 

sea-based intermediate- and medium-range missiles (those with 

maximum ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers) despite Russia’s 

military doctrine that calls for the prompt use of nuclear weapons 

in situations other than response to a prior nuclear attack.

The preceding agenda of nuclear-related questions was further bollixed by the problem of nuclear proliferation and the 

prior commitments of the United States and Russia under the 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The inability of Russia 

and the United States to conclude a stable regime of long-range 

nuclear arms limitation could only serve as an incentive to recently outed, nascent, or aspiring nuclear states such as North 

Korea and Iran. The failure of the United States and Russia to 

build upon START and SORT would also bypass the opportunity to engage the existing and acknowledged nuclear powers 

in multilateral nuclear arms control or even disarmament. A 

frozen Russian-American nuclear arms control process could 

also encourage additional nuclear weapons spread in Asia, 

which already includes the nuclear weapons states of China, 

India, Pakistan, and (pending its compliance with the six-power 

agreement of 2007) North Korea.2

Adding to the complexity of the Russian-American arms control picture were uncertainties related to change of government 

in Washington and Moscow in 2008. In March 2008 Dmitri 

Medvedev was elected to succeed Vladimir Putin as president 

of Russia. Putin was named prime minister in May. Medvedev 

was expected to continue Putin’s policies by many observers, 

although his own views on arms control issues were not obviously transparent. The US presidential election in November 

2008 would replace the administration of Pres. George W. Bush, 

whose two terms in office left an impact on arms control issues 

that would carry forward, at least temporarily, into the future. 

The Bush administration rejected the approach of its Cold War 

and post–Cold War predecessors to the negotiation of Russian-


American arms agreements. The detailed specification of compliance provisions and verification measures was replaced by 

the preference for short wording and generic limitations on 

weapons and launchers. Bush also abrogated US adherence to 

the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and began construction 

of a global missile defense system supported by a research and 

development program for limited ballistic missile defense 

against rogue-state attacks or accidental launches. Finally, 

Bush’s national security policy and nuclear posture statements 

moved in the direction of front-ending nuclear weapons onto 

usable military options compared to prior administrations.

US nuclear policy under Bush emphasized a “new triad” of 

nuclear and advanced-technology conventional forces, missile 

defenses, and improvements in national defense infrastructure 

as the new configuration of support for security strategy. Emphasizing the difficulty of deterring or targeting terrorists, the 

Bush administration placed the option of preemption at center 

stage in its discussions of US declaratory policy. The capability 

and will to carry out preemptive attacks would assist in deterring those attacks. Skeptics of the Bush emphasis on preemption warned that it could easily be conflated with preventive 

war, an idea with far more controversy among military professionals and political establishments.

In most prior military and arms-control thinking, preemption had been narrowly defined as carrying out a “first strike in 

the last resort.” Preemption was judged necessary when (1) an 

adversary had made an irrevocable decision in favor of attack, 

(2) the attack was imminent or actually in progress, and (3) the 

defender had actionable and persuasive intelligence about the 

decision for attack and its timing. Preventive war, in contrast to 

preemption, was undertaken by one state in the expectation 

that another state could attack the first state at a future and 

more inopportune time. A preventive attack is therefore not 

predicated on intelligence about an imminent attack but on the 

expectation of a probable future attack, albeit with uncertain 

timing.3 Great powers, challenged by rising medium powers, 

have sometimes favored preventive war strategies to maintain 

their places in the international hierarchy. International lawyers have tended to look less favorably on justifications for preventive as opposed to preemptive attacks, although the line 


between the two can be shady because both are species of the 

genus “anticipatory attack.”

These complexities in policy and strategy related to nuclear 

arms control leave the issue of retooling START and SORT as 

intimately related to progress, or lack thereof, on nuclear nonproliferation, backing as well into the issue of nuclear first use 

and first strike with respect to long-range or other nuclear forces 

deployed by the United States and NATO, by Russia, or by other 

nuclear powers. Since politics drives strategy, the status of political relations between the United States and Russia thus drives 

forward, or in reverse, the loosely coupled but compartmented 

arenas of vertical and horizontal nuclear arms control (reducing 

the sizes of arsenals versus limiting the spread of weapons to 

new states). Therefore the stakes in “SORT-ing out START” and 

in moving toward a more favorable rapprochement on NMD, especially with respect to US plans for missile defenses deployed in 

Eastern Europe, are multilateral and go well beyond Europe. 

How to capture some of this complexity and the choices that follow from it are addressed in the next section.

Context Is All—And History Still Matters

Discussions about nuclear arms control and nonproliferation often take place within a sterile environment. Historical 

and political context are subject to nullification in favor of the 

natural tendency of bureaucracies to count things. Policy makers and media commentators are driven by the issues du jour 

and the polls of yesterday. Historians and political scientists 

must, to the contrary, emphasize the various contexts within 

which nuclear arms control will or will not succeed. These contexts include the historical context; the political context; the 

geographical or geostrategic context; the sociocultural context, 

especially strategic culture and ethno-national demographics 

pertinent to defense policy; the economic context, including the 

resources available to states for the support of defense overall 

and for maintaining a nuclear weapons complex; the technological context, including currently available and foreseeable 

innovations that may apply to military power; and, certainly 

not least, a military-strategic context that includes international power balances and domestic civil-military relations.4
The United States and Russia bring to the negotiating table 

different historical experiences and memories, strategic cultures, patterns of civil-military relations, economic structures, 

and emphases in military-related technology innovation. They 

are not simply two missile farms. For example, the Soviet military experience in World War II was very different from the 

American one. Consider the losses suffered by the two states. 

According to military historian David M. Glantz, Russian and 

other reliable estimates of the numbers of Soviet deaths in the 

Second World War range from about 11 to 14 million military 

and from about 25 to 35 million civilians.5 Four years of fighting on the eastern front wreaked societal destruction on a scale, 

and over a geographical expanse, unprecedented in the age of 

mechanized warfare, if not in modern history. And this happened to a people already savaged by Stalin’s repressions of the 

1930s, including the destruction of Soviet agriculture and the 

disemboweling of the Red Army military leadership by purges 

on the very eve of the outbreak of World War II. 

From this perspective, it is quite understandable why Stalin 

and his successors sought to lock down the eastern front and 

to consolidate Soviet control over Eastern Europe during the 

Cold War years. One does not have to justify the evils and absurdities of Soviet communism to see the Cold War Soviet and 

post–Cold War Russian security dilemmas through their own 

geopolitical and historical lenses. The Soviet military forces deployed in Eastern Europe provided a glacis behind which the 

ravaged economy and society of the Second World War could be 

rebuilt. The American and NATO policies of containment, seen 

from the Soviet perspective, called for encirclement and constraint (“containment”) of Soviet foreign policy and stopped just 

short of a direct military confrontation during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Of course, the Soviet leadership was responsible for its own blinkered ideological worldview that exaggerated and commingled all aspects of democratic capitalism as 

necessarily hostile to Soviet aims.

Justifiable or not, the Soviet Union emerged from the Second 

World War with an oxymoronic military mind-set—on the one 

hand, convinced of the inevitable victory of world socialism and 

of the invincibility of its armed forces and, on the other hand, 

paranoid and suspicious about any Western diplomatic or po-
litical initiatives that appeared to have the objective of weakening Soviet power. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union adjusted to the 

realities of a nuclear world with surprising dexterity. Whereas its 

party-political doctrine held (until Gorbachev) that victory was 

theoretically possible, even in a world war involving the use of 

nuclear weapons, Soviet military-operational and militarytechnical doctrine were more nuanced. Soviet diplomacy eventually acknowledged that, despite disagreements with the West 

over military doctrine and strategy in the nuclear age, the de 

facto existence of nuclear military-strategic parity between the 

Soviet Union and the United States was a potentially stabilizing 

force.6 Even the autarchic Soviet economy could not spend an 

infinite amount of money on nuclear or other weapons. The 

Cuban missile crisis sobered up minds in the Kremlin about the 

potential costs of failed nuclear brinkmanship. 

When Putin says that the demise of the Soviet Union was a 

historical tragedy, this statement sounds politically absurd to 

Westerners and obscene in human rights’ terms to the victims 

of the Gulag. Putin himself has indicated that he regards Soviet 

ideology as passé in the modern age. What he is lamenting in 

the departure of the Soviet Union is not the loss of its oppressive character against its own citizens but the absence of Russia’s military strength and political grandeur on the world stage. 

Leaders of Russia from Peter the Great to Putin see Russia as 

the successor to the Byzantine Empire and more; as a rightful 

power player in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia; and as the 

repository of a unique civilization that is both Western and 

Eastern. But its geographical expanse and sociodemographic 

diversity are both strengths and weaknesses, especially in an 

age that privileges asymmetrical warfare, including the possibilities of terrorist attacks with unconventional weapons.

Present-day Russia, attempting to rebuild its economy and 

armed forces from the halcyon days of the 1990s, observes 

NATO as enlarging closer to its state borders with a far superior 

conventional military capability. Along with this conventional 

military superiority, US intercontinental nuclear weapons and, 

now, prospective missile-defense deployments in Eastern Europe appear to challenge Russian deterrence credibility in Europe and globally. Facing east, Russia notices China’s burgeoning economy and modernizing military and Japan’s military 
potential, should it decide to forego its self-imposed restrictions on defense. Russia has favorable political and military 

relations with China, including recently conducted joint military exercises, and nonhostile political relations with Japan. 

Intentions, however, have a way of changing faster than capabilities. To its south, Russia confronts political instability in 

the Caucasus and potentially in former Soviet territory in Central Asia. Few of the neighborhoods in which Russia lives offer 

low-cost security rentals or purchases. 

Seeing Russia’s security dilemmas from the “inside out” does 

not excuse or condone its mistakes and excesses in strategy and 

policy, but it is a necessary exercise to conduct serious business 

with Russia, including nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. The United States must deal with the Russia that is, and 

was; not with an artificial Russian construct created by American think tanks. And, as noted, US-Russian security cooperation is the foundation on which wider agreements depend.

This point is important because of the tendency during the Cold 

War and subsequently to emphasize the common danger created 

by nuclear weapons for one and all states. The point is not contested here. It is necessary to appreciate the shared nuclear danger. But the observation of shared nuclear danger among states is 

a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the appreciation of 

“the possible” in nuclear arms control. The conduct of arms control negotiations and the prevention of nuclear weapons spread is 

a hard business, because nuclear weapons have a devilish appeal 

to dissatisfied state actors—security, prestige, diplomatic swaggering, and “bigger bang for the buck” are among many motives 

for nonnuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons and for nuclear 

weapons states to hold onto them. 

The United States and other nuclear powers may have been 

lulled into a false sense of security about nuclear weapons due 

to Cold War and post–Cold War experience in the avoidance of 

nuclear conflict and by the relatively slow pace of nuclear weapons spread since 1945, compared to the expectations of nuclear 

pessimists. This optimism in the present international system is 

misplaced and dangerous. The Cold War constraints on nuclear 

first use have been weakened, and the possibility of accidental 

or inadvertent nuclear war has increased with the spread of nuclear weapons to states with uncertain civil-military relations 
and problematic political stability. In fact, a tipping point in US 

and allied efforts against nuclear weapons spread may be imminent. Failure to obtain by diplomatic means the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability and the inability to prevent Iran from joining the ranks of nuclear weapons 

states could upset the stability of the Middle East and North 

Asia by unleashing nuclear arms races in both regions.

Approach and Method

Prior discussion has argued the relationship between RussoAmerican nuclear arms reductions and the probability of success in broader efforts toward nuclear nonproliferation. Beyond 

asserting the connection, it might be useful to show its possible 

effects. This will be accomplished in two steps, each making 

use of an analytical model for asking pertinent questions. First, 

the stability of a Russian-American nuclear arms control regime under post–Moscow Treaty constraints will be explored. 

Second, a comparable simulation for a stabilized world of controlled nuclear proliferation, compatible with the RussianAmerican regime developed in the first step, will be postulated 

and examined for pertinent results. 

Beyond, and Below, SORT

For the first step, the nuclear exchange model permits us to 

examine alternative possible force structures for the United States 

and for Russia, under the hypothetical post-SORT limitation of 

1,000 operationally deployed nuclear warheads on intercontinental launchers for each state.7 A post-SORT ceiling of 1,000 warheads allows for significant reductions below the SORT maximum 

and might encourage other nuclear powers to limit the growth of 

their own arsenals. But can 1,000-warhead forces provide Russia 

and the United States a sufficient degree of second-strike survivability and, thus, stable and nonprovocative deterrence? 

To answer this question, we establish four notional forces for 

each state and test them for their second-strike retaliatory 

capability. For Russia, the forces are (1) a balanced triad of 

land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and bomber-delivered weap-
ons; (2) a dyad of land- and sea-based missiles without bombers; (3) a dyad of land-based missiles and bombers without 

sea-based missiles; and (4) a force composed entirely of landbased missiles. For the United States, the alternative forces are 

(1) a balanced triad of land-based missiles, submarine-launched 

missiles, and bombers; (2) a dyad of sea-based ballistic missiles and bombers; (3) a dyad of land- and sea-based ballistic 

missiles; and (4) a force composed entirely of sea-based ballistic missiles. The use of alternative force structures for each 

state permits the investigation of “what if” possibilities outside 

the box of current planning parameters in Washington and 

Moscow. (The time frame for actually fielding any or all of these 

forces is roughly 2012–15, depending on the speed of negotiations and force modernization). An additional point of interest 

is whether each state could preserve credible deterrence despite “conventionalizing” the warheads in one or more of its 

previously nuclear-capable, long-range forces.

In figure 1, the initially deployed forces of Russia and the 

United States are depicted in summary form. These forces are 

notional and heuristic and not predictive of actual deployments, 

and they are projected for a post-SORT world of 2012–15 or so. 

Figure 1. Total strategic weapons, United States–Russia, 1,000 limit

Source: The author gratefully acknowledges Dr. James Scouras for use of his AWSM@ model for 

making calculations and drawing graphs used in figures 1–8. Dr. Scouras is not responsible for any 

of the arguments or opinions in this study.

Balanced 

Triad

No 

ICBMs

No

Bombers

SLBMs 

Only

Balanced 

Triad

No 

Bombers

No 

SLBMs

ICBMs 

Only

ICBMs 300 0 300 0 440 530 470 980

SLBMs 392 686 686 980 264 456 0 0

AIR 308 314 0 0 288 0 530 0

Balance

Triad

No

ICBMs

No

Bombers

SLBMs

Only

Balanced

Triad

No

Bombers

No 

SLBMs

ICBMs

Only

AIR

SLBM

ICBM
10

Figure 2 summarizes the numbers of surviving and retaliating warheads for each state under each of four operational conditions of retaliation: (1) generated alert and launch on warning 

(GEN-LOW), (2) generated alert and riding out the attack (GENROA), (3) day-to-day alert and launch on warning (DAY-LOW), 

and (4) day-to-day alert and riding out the attack (DAY-ROA). 

In general, a retaliator would progressively lose strength in proceeding from condition 1 to condition 4, but not always. Much 

depends upon the mix of forces deployed and the operational 

protocols decided upon by political and military leaders. 

Figure 2. Arriving retaliatory weapons, United States–Russia, 1,000 limit

Inspection of figure 2 reveals that both Russia and the United 

States can preserve stable deterrence at levels significantly below the Moscow Treaty (SORT) ceilings of 2,200–1,700 deployed 

warheads. Only in the case of Russian forces in the DAY-ROA 

condition does the number of either state’s survivable and retaliating warheads fall below several hundred, regardless of 

force structure. The model shows that both states would have 

more than sufficient capability for assured retaliation, inflicting 

“unacceptable” societal damage, and additional ordnance to provide for strikes against a number of other target sets, including 

the other side’s nuclear and conventional forces, commandBalance

Triad

No

ICBMs

No

Bombers

SLBMs

Only

Balanced

Triad

No

Bombers

No 

SLBMs

ICBMs

Only

Balanced 

Triad

No 

ICBMs

No

Bombers

SLBMs 

Only

Balanced 

Triad

No 

Bombers

No 

SLBMs

ICBMs 

Only

GEN, LOW 812 785 826 794 820 846 809 882

GEN, ROA 569 785 583 794 504 458 469 210

DAY, LOW 483 372 642 532 439 551 423 882

DAY, ROA 240 372 399 532 61 85 42 88

DAY, ROA

DAY, LOW

GEN, ROA

GEN, LOW
11

and-control centers, and economic assets supporting its military capability.

Doubtless, some Russian and American negotiators and their 

military advisors would be reluctant to downsize their deployed 

long-range weapons to this extent. Each has potential adversaries other than its American or Russian counterpart that 

may require inclusion in its nuclear targeting plans. Nevertheless, absent a post-Putin flop in its nuclear force modernization 

plans by Russia between now and 2012, the assured retaliation of each side’s balanced triad of nuclear forces is not in 

doubt in the most plausible scenarios. 

As a sidebar, the results summarized in figure 2 also show that 

each state could (hypothetically) consider conversion of at least one 

component of its nuclear triad for conventional long-range strike 

missions. The United States, in fact, plans to convert some tubes 

on SSBNs (fleet ballistic missile submarines) that were formerly assigned to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles for missiles armed with 

conventional charges. Russia objected vehemently to this idea of 

mixing conventional and nuclear weapons aboard one launch platform, arguing that the launch of a conventionally armed ballistic 

missile might be mistaken for a preemptive nuclear strike at or 

near Russian state territory (depending on the missile trajectory). 

One possible American response might be to “conventionalize” part 

or all of its strategic land-based ICBMs instead of its SLBMs. US 

land-based missiles are all deployed in fixed locations in silos and 

thereby invite preemptive attack during a crisis, compared to the 

relatively more survivable sea-based missiles and bombers.

In fact, conventionalizing part or all of the US strategic landbased missile force could be consistent with the Bush-professed 

“new triad” of long-range conventional and nuclear offenses, antimissile defenses, and improved infrastructure for the conduct of 

military operations, including command-control-communications, 

reconnaissance, and network-centric warfare. From the standpoint 

of nuclear crisis stability, US land-based missiles, unless launched 

on warning, are the least survivable part of the current nuclear 

triad. Their dubious second-strike survivability increases crisis 

time pressures for prompt launch. On the other hand, if the nuclear warheads on American ICBMs were replaced with conventional munitions, they would provide prompt and usable long-range 
12

striking power against a variety of targets, including the military 

assets of state and nonstate actors alike. 

Given the capabilities of US naval and air-launched strategic 

nuclear weapons, conventionalization of the ICBM force would 

still leave considerable nuclear retaliatory capability. For example: in figure 2, the United States, with forces on generated 

alert and riding out the attack (the canonical situation for most 

analysis, although not necessarily the actual decision in any 

particular crisis) provides for 785 surviving and retaliating warheads with its “no ICBM” force. Could Russia do likewise? Russia’s nuclear modernization problems might preclude a decision to delete any entire arm of service from its ranks of 

nuclear-capable forces. But Russia might follow the American 

lead, at least in part. As a contribution to deterrence and crisis 

stability, Russia could maintain its mobile land-based strategic 

missiles as nuclear capable but denuclearize its silo-based 

ICBMs. Russia’s Topol-M, the mainstay of its future long-range 

missile force, was designed from the beginning for both mobile 

and silo basing.8 Of course, both Russian and US forbearance 

in this regard would require verification.

Russia might not want to make this decision—to rely on its 

mobile ICBMs only—if its military planners feared that its mobile ICBMs were as first-strike vulnerable as both American and 

Russian silo-based missiles were thought to be. The secondstrike survivability of mobile land-based missiles was a matter of 

debate throughout the Cold War and remains so. Although the 

silo-based version of the Topol-M has already been deployed in 

significant numbers, comparatively few of the mobile version 

have been deployed and road tested (as of early 2008). US reconnaissance and surveillance, technologically advanced compared 

to its Cold War capabilities, might defy any effort to hide the 

peacetime locations of mobile missiles or to activate their transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) for missile strikes. 

Conventionalization of part or all of the US or Russian longrange missile and bomber forces would not be a “deal breaker” 

for any reconstructed SORT-START regime. Either state can 

fulfill the requirements of assured retaliation with its current 

and planned forces. The more nuanced question is whether 

dangerous degrees of instability remain with respect to the gap 

between the performance of the two states’ forces under condi-
13

Figure 3. Generation stability, United States–Russia, 1,000 Limit

Figure 4 provides information similar to figure 3 for Russian 

and US LOW stability. Each state’s forces are represented by 

two bars. The left bar shows the numbers of surviving and retaliating warheads when ROA as a percentage of the number 

when weapons are LOW under conditions of generated alert. 

The right bar provides the same information about the percentage of ROA to LOW surviving and retaliating warheads under 

conditions of day-to-day alert. Ratio of Arriving Retaliatory Weapons (Day-to-Day Alert: Generated Alert)

Balanced 

Triad

No 

ICBMs

No

Bombers

SLBMs 

Only

Balanced 

Triad

No 

Bombers

No 

SLBMs

ICBMs 

Only

LOW 0.59 0.47 0.78 0.67 0.54 0.65 0.52 1.00

ROA 0.42 0.47 0.69 0.67 0.12 0.18 0.09 0.42

Force Structure

tions of high compared to low alert and under conditions of 

prompt compared to delayed launch. 

Figure 3 graphically depicts the generation stability of the US 

and Russian forces. Each force structure is represented by two 

vertical bars. The left bar shows the number of surviving and 

retaliating weapons on day-to-day alert as a percentage of the 

number of surviving and retaliating weapons on generated 

alert, under conditions of LOW. The right bar for each force 

structure shows the number of surviving and retaliating warheads on day-to-day alert as a percentage of the number of 

surviving and retaliating warheads on generated alert when 

riding out the attack and then retaliating. 
14

The findings summarized in figures 3 and 4 suggest an important warning about nuclear arms limitation. Reducing the 

size of Russian, American, or other nuclear forces does not 

necessarily reduce the degree of nuclear danger. Nuclear danger inheres not only in the numbers of weapons that are deployed or otherwise maintained in arsenals, but also in the 

expectations and operational proclivities for the use of these 

weapons for deterrence (preferably) or in response to attack. 

Examples in the US and Russian cases are provided in figures 3 and 4. In figure 3, both the American and Russian 

“balanced-triad” forces show significant differences in generation stability when riding out the attack compared to launching 

forces on warning. This situation creates a predisposition for 

prompt launch under conditions of uncertainty and perceived 

threat. In figure 4, both Russian and US balanced-triad forces 

show significant differences in LOW stability under conditions 

of generated alert compared to normal peacetime alert. Thus, 

each state has some incentive to accelerate its alerting of nuclear forces during a crisis. The observation of each state’s 

alerts by the other’s intelligence collectors can create a reciprocal process of mistrust and a conflict spiral that results in accidental inadvertent war. Ratio of Arriving Retaliatory Weapons (Ride Out Attack: Launch on Warning)

Figure 4. Launch-on-warning stability, United States–Russia, 1,000 Limit

Balanced 

Triad

No 

ICBMs

No

Bombers

SLBMs 

Only

Balanced 

Triad

No 

Bombers

No 

SLBMs

ICBMs 

Only

GEN 0.70 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.61 0.54 0.58 0.24

DAY 0.50 1.00 0.62 1.00 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.10

Force Structure
15

Notwithstanding these caveats about the need to improve US 

and Russian nuclear crisis stability, the preceding discussion 

provides support for the pursuit of a post-SORT regime or a 

new START agreement that reduces the numbers of operationally deployed weapons below the currently agreed SORT maximum. A force of 1,000 deployed weapons on intercontinental 

launchers provides for two-way deterrence and reassurance 

under any reasonable set of assumptions. What might be unreasonable? First, Russia might fail to modernize its long-range 

nuclear forces so drastically that the United States would acquire a not-incredible first-strike capability. We use the term 

not incredible instead of credible because not incredible implies 

a statistical, not a substantive, judgment. A statistical temptation to first strike or coercion based on first-strike capability 

assumptions is something no prudent US leader would want to 

act on. An American nuclear first strike against Russia is a 

moral and political nonstarter, especially in an era of US global 

primacy in conventional forces.

Second, the United States might deploy missile defenses 

that, regardless of actual capability, could frighten Russia into 

an even greater dependency on high alert and prompt launch 

for the survivability of its nuclear deterrent. The political character of missile defenses interacts with assumptions about 

their technical performance. Three abstract possibilities present themselves. Missile defenses that obviously do not work, or 

do not work against any attack larger than a few warheads, 

pose no problem for Russia. In the opposite case, US missile 

defenses that would work perfectly or nearly so would nullify 

Russia’s deterrence, insofar as that deterrence was based on 

ballistic missiles. Russia would still have air-delivered and seabased cruise missiles, but perfect or near-perfect American 

missile defenses would threaten to push Russia into the ranks 

of second-tier military powers.

A third possibility is that US missile defenses improve technically 

but not so much as to preclude Russia’s second-strike capability. 

American missile defenses might then not immediately threaten 

Russia, but Russia might fear the eventual improvement of US missile defenses and the negation of its nuclear deterrent. Russian 

fears could provoke a number of possible responses: (1) increased 

offensive force modernization, including countermeasures against 
16

US missile defenses; (2) Russia’s own missile defense deployments 

growing out of its historical and current experience in high-altitude 

air defenses and limited ballistic-missile-defense deployments during the Cold War; (3) increased Russian political or military pressure against NATO Europe to create divisions among the member 

states of an expanded NATO; or (4) a Russian-Chinese axis of strategic cooperation and coordination already set in motion during the 

George W. Bush administration but given additional importance by 

Russia’s fears and China’s rising ambitions in the Asian Pacific. 

From Vertical to Horizontal—Extending Success

Earlier we asserted that Russian-American cooperation on 

nuclear arms reduction was causally linked to further progress 

on nuclear nonproliferation. The connection between bilateral 

US-Russian “vertical” arms control and multilateral “horizontal” arms limitation is a psychological one, but not only that. It 

is psychological in the sense that downsizing of US and Russian forces establishes a benchmark or precedent that others 

may feel more justified in following. But more than psychology 

is at work here. Russian-American nuclear arms reductions 

can only take place within a political setting favorable to the 

accomplishment of their respective strategic ambitions. Politics 

is the driver of strategy. Therefore, favorable outcomes in nuclear arms control are not the causes of improved RussianAmerican relations (compared to the Putin years) but the symptoms; that is, the effects.

Improved Russian-American political relations are certainly 

possible after 2008. Two new presidents have been elected to 

replace George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin. Although most Russians seem to expect continuity in national security policy from 

Putin to Medvedev, the change in US presidential politics may be 

more profound. The Democratic administration in Washington 

beginning in 2009 may withdraw most US combat forces from 

Iraq within a few years, assuaging at least one sore point in USRussian relations under Putin. More listening to our traditional 

allies in Europe should provide more opportunities for reducing 

the room temperature of topics such as NATO enlargement, missile defenses in Eastern Europe, and Russia’s complaints about 

American unilateralism and hegemony. Of course, much of Pu-
17

tin’s bluster in 2007 was dovetailed for Russia’s domestic political audience, but it also reflected frustration when Russia felt its 

interests were being insufficiently taken into account (Kosovo) or 

its former security space was being pushed back (possible accession of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO). 

A favorable political climate between the United States and 

Russia would also open the door to enlisting other nuclear weapons states into a “grand bargain” that could establish a tiered 

system of constrained nuclear proliferation. Let us imagine one 

such system, consistent with a Russian-American post-SORT 

(or new START) agreement, with each state limited to a maximum of 1,000 operationally deployed nuclear weapons (as 

above). The Russian-American agreement could be the centrifugal reference point around which other nuclear powers agreed to 

group. In the second tier of established powers, Britain, China, 

and France would each agree to limit their numbers of operationally deployed, long-range nuclear warheads to a maximum 

of 500. In a third tier, India, Israel, and Pakistan would each 

agree to a ceiling of 300. In this constrained or controlled proliferation model, it is assumed that Iran is somehow precluded 

from deploying nuclear weapons and that the North Korean nascent program has been effectively rolled back.9

The reasoning behind the three-tiered metric described above 

is as follows.10 Russia and the United States would have no incentive to reduce their forces below SORT levels if other powers 

took advantage of this by growing their own arsenals. Therefore, 

restraint on the part of the other six declared or acknowledged 

nuclear weapons states would be required for the Russians and 

Americans to follow through with their bilateral agreements. The 

postulated numbers are notional, as are the hypothetical forces 

projected for each state in the model below. The exact composition of each state’s forces for the period 2012–15 is unknown, 

and prognostication at this stage would be fatally error-prone.

One immediate difficulty presents itself, and that is the definition of long range and strategic for purposes of establishing equal 

limits among very different states and arsenals. India, Pakistan, 

and China, for example, are sufficiently close to one another to 

inflict considerable nuclear damage without requiring missiles 

or airborne launchers of international range. For states that can 

inflict “strategic” damage with shorter-than-intercontinental 
18

launchers, some negotiations among the powers would have to 

arrive at a metric for transforming “inequality” into “equality.” 

For example, the parties might agree to define as strategic in 

effect any nuclear-assigned launcher capable of delivering a 

weapon to the cities of another nuclear power. Or the nuclear 

weapons states might agree that any nuclear-assigned ballistic 

missiles with maximum ranges at or above 1,000 km were by 

definition strategic in impact. New negotiating ground and verification standards might have to be broken to nail down the 

agreement. One possibility is joint inspections—the Chinese 

and the Americans could each inspect and verify part, but not 

all, of the Pakistani arsenal; the Russians and Americans could 

share the responsibility for India (with the International Atomic 

Energy Agency backstopping both).

Let us suppose that the procedures have been negotiated and 

navigated, and our controlled proliferation regime has been 

brought to life. Figure 5 summarizes the numbers of strategic 

weapons available to each state by category, using the traditional 

category delimiters: ICBMs, SLBMs, and air-delivered weapons. 

In this context, we understand that “ICBM” implies land-based 

ballistic missiles as a category, and “SLBM” means sea-based ballistic missiles as a category. In fact, in this category, states might 

agree to mix ballistic and cruise missiles of comparable ranges, if 

they could get around the problems of verification. 

Figure 5. Total strategic weapons, controlled proliferation model

AIR

SLBM

ICBM

Russian

Forces

United States

Forces

PRC

Forces

Israeli

Forces

UK

Forces

Indian

Forces

Pakistan

Forces

French

Forces

Russian

Forces

United 

States 

Forces

PRC

Forces

Israeli

Forces

UK

Forces

Indian

Forces

Pakistan

Forces

French

Forces

ICBMs 400 100 204 100 0 142 144 0

SLBMs 288 624 96 32 288 32 0 288

AIR 312 276 200 168 212 126 156 212
19

Figure 6. Arriving retaliatory weapons, controlled proliferation model

The next step is to subject each of these deployed nuclear forces 

to a first strike and to calculate their respective numbers of surviving and retaliating warheads. Of course, in the “real world” of 

international politics, all of these states would not be involved in 

any war at the same time! The exercise is heuristic for comparative “what if” purposes and not a projected Armageddon. But it is 

a necessary calculation to visualize the implications of unequal 

prewar deployments for postwar options. The outcomes of these 

nuclear force exchanges are compared in figure 6.

The numbers in figure 6 speak emphatically about the most 

essential truth of the nuclear age. It takes only a small number of 

surviving and retaliating warheads to inflict considerable, and for 

most people, unacceptable damage. Deterrence can be secure in 

this three-tiered model of controlled nuclear proliferation if (a decisive “if”) the political setting for the international system is permissive of stability. That means nuclear-capable state actors 

whose political objectives favor the status quo are neither outnumbered nor outgunned by nuclear weapons states with revisionist aims. One other potential problem is the perennial curse 

of nuclear-deterrence model-builders: the actor who is “beyond 

deterrence” or irrational by the standards of the established and 

status quo weapons states favoring controlled proliferation. 

Russian

Forces

United

States

Forces

PRC

Forces

Israeli

Forces

UK

Forces

Indian

Forces

Pakistan

Forces

French

Forces

GEN, LOW 821 797 407 238 388 233 243 388

GEN, ROA 497 716 242 157 388 129 127 388

DAY, LOW 516 429 236 107 47 120 130 47

DAY, ROA 192 348 70 26 23 14 13 23

Russian

Forces

United States

Forces

PRC

Forces

Israeli

Forces

UK

Forces

Indian

Forces

Pakistan

Forces

French

Forces
20

A great deal of ink has been spilled over the issue of what is 

“rational” or “sensible” decision making in security and other matters.11 Rationalities are culturally and socially determined; they 

are not strictly mathematical constructs. States and their leaders 

will fight for all kinds of objectives, and they measure costs and 

benefits differently. Neither a system of controlled proliferation 

nor any other man-made construct can guarantee against war 

brought about by the perennial motives of which Thucydides 

warned: fear, honor, and interest. As suicide bombers of the present era have demonstrated, some attackers are “beyond deterrence” as the term deterrence is commonly understood. 

Most governments, however, will be interested in their own 

survival and that of their societies. Governments have territory and other assets to protect. Those assets and the very 

lives of government leaders can be held at risk. Deterrence 

may not always work, but it can work “well enough” to push 

decision making into the risk-averse, as opposed to the riskacceptant, basket. That may be as much as any system of 

influence, based on the allocation of weapons and tacit or explicit threats, can be expected to accomplish. Deterrence is 

neither a substitute for effective diplomacy nor a cure for incompetent policy making. 

On the other hand, deterrence can be weaker or stronger to 

the extent that it is accident-prone or more, instead of less, 

inviting of high alerts and prompt launch decisions during a 

crisis. So in figure 7, the generation stability of each of the 

eight states’ forces included in the controlled proliferation 

model is depicted. The interpretive scheme follows that of the 

earlier figure 3 for the bilateral US-Russian case. In figure 7 

each state has one force, and each force is represented by two 

bars. The left bar shows the percentage of day-to-day compared 

to generated alert weapons surviving and retaliating under 

conditions of LOW. The right bar for each state shows the percentage of day-to-day compared to generated alert weapons 

surviving and retaliating when riding out the attack. 

 In figure 8, the data for LOW stability for the controlled proliferation model are summarized. As in figure 4 for the US-Russia case, the interpretation follows thus. Each state’s force is 

represented by two vertical bars. The left bar shows the number 

of weapons retaliating after riding out the attack as a percentage 
21

of the number of weapons retaliating after LOW under conditions of generated alert. The right bar for each state shows the 

number of weapons retaliating in ROA as a percentage of the 

number retaliating in LOW for the condition of day-to-day alert.

Figure 8. Launch-on-warning stability, controlled proliferation model

Ratio of Arriving Retaliatory Weapons

(Ride Out Attack: Generated Alert)

Ratio of Arriving Retaliatory Weapons

(Day-to-Day Alert: Generated Alert)

Figure 7. Generation stability, controlled proliferation model

Russian

Forces

United

States

Forces

PRC

Forces

Israeli

Forces

UK

Forces

Indian

Forces

Pakistan

Forces

French

Forces

LOW 0.63 0.54 0.58 0.45 0.12 0.52 0.53 0.12

ROA 0.39 0.49 0.29 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.06

Force Structure

Russian

Forces

United

States

Forces

PRC

Forces

Israeli

Forces

UK

Forces

Indian

Forces

Pakistan

Forces

French

Forces

LOW 0.61 0.90 0.59 0.66 1.00 0.56 0.52 1.00

ROA 0.37 0.81 0.30 0.25 0.50 0.12 0.10 0.50

Force Structure
22

The information summarized in figures 7 and 8 argues 

against complacency. A system of controlled nuclear weapons 

spread has unavoidable built-in inequities. Depending upon 

where and how negotiators “freeze” the frame, some states will 

have larger and more diverse prewar arsenals. If war comes, 

this prewar inequality will obviously manifest itself. However, 

there is no “equal” scheme for controlling nuclear weapons 

other than a total global nuclear abolition or disarmament. 

Therefore, any steps between here and there will involve inequalities, but they are not necessarily inequities that the powers cannot live with. Smaller powers need not feel helpless.

Nuclear weapons are preeminently weapons for nonuse—for 

deterrence of nuclear attack or blackmail and for support of 

other policy objectives by means short of war. A few nuclear 

weapons can support a great deal of deterrence or coercive diplomacy. Consider the United States’ and others’ experience in 

negotiating with North Korea, assumed to be temporarily in 

possession of nuclear weapons, although intelligence is uncertain as to exactly how many and how powerful they are. North 

Korea in 2007 was part of six-party talks involving the United 

States, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China. The great powers in Asia were grouped at Pyongyang’s doorstep because of 

the potential that North Korea’s nascent nuclear capability held 

for destabilization of the entire nonproliferation regime in Asia, 

or beyond. Nuclear weapons are even influential in support of 

a state’s policies before they are acquired, as Iran has demonstrated. Its on-again, off-again negotiations with the United 

Nations and with a SWAT team of European negotiators is empowered by Tehran’s romancing of a nuclear fuel cycle that 

eventually might, or might not, be weaponized. 

Figures 7 and 8 show in this regard that size alone tells us 

very little about nuclear danger. How stable or precarious these 

forces are also depends upon their mix of weapons systems, their 

command-control procedures, and the nature of civil-military 

relations in each state. In addition, the comparison between figures 3 and 4 for a two-state nuclear competition and figures 7 

and 8 for a multistate situation reveals at least one additional 

insight. Optimism that “more is better,” with respect to the 

spread of nuclear weapons among currently nonnuclear states, 

demands heroic faith in deterrence.12 An eight-sided competi-
23

tion involves significantly more uncertainty and includes many 

more decision points than does a two-sided arms race. There are 

more opportunities for Clausewitz’s “friction” and for “Murphy’s 

law” to thrust against deterrence stability. One does not need 

Hollywood to write plausible, if contestable, scenarios for the 

first detonation of a nuclear weapon in anger since Nagasaki.13

Conclusion

Politics determines the larger context within which strategy, 

and therefore nuclear arms control, must operate. The imperative for nuclear arms control, and especially for the effective 

control of nuclear weapons spread, is as incontestable as it is 

difficult to accomplish. Nuclear nonproliferation will not happen simply because it is the right thing to do. Leadership is 

required, and the United States and Russia must assume this 

role, in two aspects—reducing their own nuclear weapons arsenals, especially their long-range strategic nuclear forces, and 

leading the parade of existing nuclear weapons states to contain the nuclear-aspiring and the nuclear-sniffing states interested in or capable of joining the nuclear club.

The present analysis shows that both tasks, however politically arduous, are technically feasible and militarily sustainable. 

The United States and Russia can maintain a stable bilateral 

nuclear deterrent relationship within a deployment constraint of 

1,000 warheads on intercontinental launchers. With this as the 

“anchor” or pivotal construct, a controlled proliferation regime 

could be established among the existing declared and widely acknowledged nuclear weapons states. But the “Allison line” must 

be held for this to work—no weapons for Iran and transparent 

dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and infrastructure.14 The objection that this line discriminates against 

some states in favor of others is valid; strategy is not about fairness, but about survival. 

Notes

1. For a concise listing and discussion of pertinent issues, see Stephen J. 

Blank, Towards a New Russia Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

US Army War College, February 2008), especially pages 5–8.
24

2. The need for Russian and American leadership in nuclear arms control 

and nonproliferation is well argued in Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The 

History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 

2007), passim. See also Alexei Arbatov and Rose Gottemoeller, “New Presidents, New Agreements? Advancing US-Russian Strategic Arms Control,” 

Arms Control Today 38, no. 6 (July/August 2008), http://www.armscontrol

.org/act/2008_07-08/CoverStory.asp.

3. Clarification of the concepts of prevention and preemption and evaluation of pertinent American experience is provided in Karl P. Mueller et al., 

Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in US National Security Policy

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006).

4. This list is adapted for my purposes from Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: 

Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 

International, 2007), 3–6. He is not responsible for its use here.

5. David M. Glantz, “The Soviet-German War on the Eastern Front: Myths 

and Realities” (lecture, Penn State Brandywine, 25 March 2008), author’s notes.

6. Raymond L. Garthoff, Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military 

Doctrine (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990), 6–28 passim. See also 

Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the 

Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); and Andrei A. Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917–91 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

7. The author gratefully acknowledges Dr. James Scouras for use of his 

AWSM@ model for making calculations and drawing graphs. Dr. Scouras is 

not responsible for any arguments or opinions in this study.

8. Nikolai Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization: Past and Future (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 128–29.

9. David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, “Slowly, but Surely, Pyongyang is 

Moving,” Washington Post, 24 January 2008, A19, offers a hopeful assessment. 

On Iran, see, National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, November 2007).

10. For context with respect to future nuclear weapons capabilities and 

intentions, in addition to sources already cited, see Susan L. Craig, Chinese 

Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats (Carlisle, PA: US 

Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute [SSI], March 2007), especially 

36–37; Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications (Carlisle: SSI, January 2002); Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle: SSI, September 1999); Young 

Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds., North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2006); Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, 

North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles (Carlisle: SSI, April 2007), especially 

71–100; D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the 

Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), especially chap. 5; 

Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War (Carlisle: SSI, January 2008); Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., Getting 

Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle: SSI, October 2005), especially chaps. 

7–8; Henry Sokolski, ed., Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats 
25

(Carlisle: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and SSI, June 2006), especially chaps. 1–3; and Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Prevailing in a Well-Armed World: 

Devising Competitive Strategies against Weapons Proliferation (Carlisle: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and SSI, March 2000). Projections for 

Russia are author’s estimates; see also, Pavel Podvig, The Russian Nuclear Arsenal (Palo Alto, CA: Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 2006); and Irina Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current 

Trends (Carlisle: SSI, November 2006), 34–38.

11. Both rational and sensible treatment of these matters appears in Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

2003); and Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: 

University Press of Kentucky, 1996). 

12. Two sides of this issue are argued in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. 

Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 

1995). This study focuses on proliferation and deterrence as related to state 

actors. For the relationship between terrorism and nuclear proliferation, see 

Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe

(New York: Henry Holt and Co.–Times Books, 2004).

13. George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), offers pertinent 

scenarios for the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945.

14. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, 156–71. The “Allison line” includes no loose 

nuclear weapons, no new nascent nukes, and no new nuclear weapons states.

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Title of Paper: Taking the Lead: Russia, the United States, 

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