Self-Audit Checklists • National Survey Results

• Resource Materials • Case Studies

U.S. Department of Justice

National Institute of Corrections

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to

Prison Emergencies
U.S. Department of Justice

National Institute of Corrections

320 First Street, NW

Washington, DC 20534

Morris L. Thigpen

Director

Larry Solomon

Deputy Director

George M. Keiser

Chief, Community Corrections/Prisons Division

Randy Corcoran

Project Manager

National Institute of Corrections

World Wide Web Site

http://www.nicic.org
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to

Prison Emergencies

Self-Audit Checklists • National Survey Results 

• Resource Materials • Case Studies

Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D.

Cynthia Barry, Ph.D.

LETRA, Inc.

Campbell, California

June 2005

NIC Accession Number 020293
This document was funded by cooperative agreement number 02P11 from

the National Institute of Corrections, U.S Department of Justice. Points of view

or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official opinion or policies of the U.S. Department

of Justice.

Cover photos: Left photo courtesy of the Office of Law Enforcement Technology

Commercialization, Wheeling, West Virginia. Middle photo ©Photodisc Illustration/

Getty Images. Right photo ©Corbis.
iii

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix 

Section 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 

Development of This Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 

Section 2: Conducting an Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Purpose and Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 

Preliminary Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 

How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 

Section 3: Self-Audit Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37–180

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP-1 

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-1 

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-1 

Section 4: Report on the National Survey of Emergency 

Readiness in Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .181 

Section 5: Resource Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .201

Leadership Issues During Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205 

Prevention of Prison Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215

Emergency Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227

Prisons and Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241 
iv

Section 6: Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .255

Fire in a New Institution: Taney County, Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .257

Lucasville Prison Riot: Ohio Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 

Helicopter Intrusion/Escape: Colorado Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . 271

Riot at Max: Montana State Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .277 

The 1993 Midwest Floods: Missouri Loses Renz Correctional Center . . . . . . 289 

The Morey Unit Hostage Incident: Arizona Department of Corrections . . . . . .293 

Hurricane Andrew: Florida Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 

Contents (continued)
v

In 1996, the National Institute of Corrections

(NIC) published its monograph Critical Analysis

of Emergency Preparedness: Self Audit

Materials. In introducing that monograph, I

wrote:

Emergency preparedness is a crucially

important topic for every state department of corrections and for every correctional institution. Large-scale inmate

violence or a natural disaster can

threaten the lives of both the institutional staff and inmates. In hours, a major

emergency can cost a state tens of millions of dollars and result in many years

of litigation. The negative publicity surrounding a major institutional crisis can

also be overwhelming and almost

interminable. 

Emergency preparedness is often not

afforded the priority that it needs and

deserves. In some cases, this may be due

to complacency. In other cases, it happens because establishing a comprehensive system of emergency preparation

and emergency response is not easy. It

requires budget, time, equipment, interagency coordination, and long-term

management attention.

Nearly a decade later, those comments still ring

true. However, the field of corrections has made

a great deal of progress regarding emergency

preparedness. A number of state departments of

corrections have committed to comprehensive

initiatives designed to improve their emergency

readiness at both the departmental and institutional levels. As a result, substantially more correctional agencies are well prepared today for

the possibility of a major crisis situation, and

fewer remain complacent and/or unprepared. 

Obviously, the world around us has changed dramatically in recent years. The bombing of the

federal building in Oklahoma City, the events

of September 11, 2001, the subsequent anthrax

incidents, and, as this is written, the train bombings in Madrid, Spain, and the killing of hundreds of school children in Russia serve notice

on American corrections about a whole new

range of risks that cannot be ignored. Bomb

threats or even the possibility of an outside

assault designed to free an inmate are not new

considerations for prisons or jails. However, the

threat of concerted terrorist activity with sophisticated planning, coordination, and even munitions represents a challenge that is categorically

different from our traditional concerns about situations involving inmate violence or natural disasters. It is NIC’s hope that this new guide will

help state and local correctional agencies continue to improve their preparedness for traditional

emergencies and will also provide a starting

point for considering the emerging realities of

terrorist threats.

This guide builds on the self-audit instruments

that were at the heart of the 1996 monograph.

Those instruments, together with a related series

of NIC-sponsored seminars, were designed to

Foreword
vi

help state departments of corrections evaluate

their readiness, at both the institutional and

departmental levels, to handle major crisis situations. The 1996 monograph proved to be

extremely popular and useful, and NIC continues to receive requests for it to this day. One

measure of its success is that departmentconducted self-audits of emergency readiness

have largely replaced what had been a growing

trend of NIC-funded assessments conducted by

outside experts. 

We hope that this new guide will be even more

useful. It is much more than a simple update of

the earlier monograph. The self-audit materials

have been substantially modified, refined, and

expanded, and the rest of the guide is essentially

new in scope and character.

Morris L. Thigpen

Director

National Institute of Corrections
vii

Preface

It is instructive to review the introduction to the

prison emergency preparedness self-audit materials published in 1996 as an NIC monograph.

The monograph noted a number of positive

changes that had occurred in the previous 20 to

30 years with regard to prison emergencies, and

it also underscored several problems and challenges that remained widespread. The 1996

monograph reviewed the trend toward serious

emergency preparedness at most state prisons

and drew contrasts with earlier times when comprehensive emergency planning was the exception rather than the rule. It singled out the

emphasis on prevention of crises and emergencies as another major improvement. On the

other hand, the 1996 monograph was candid

about the number of institutions and departments in which emergency preparedness was not

taken seriously or existed only on paper, not in

reality. The prevailing belief in such places was

“it can’t happen here.” The monograph also

noted a more specific problem: the tendency of

departments and institutions to base their emergency planning almost solely on riot and

hostage situations.

More than 8 years have passed since that monograph was published—not a long time in the

evolution of a discipline like corrections.

Predictably, many of the observations in the

1996 monograph still hold true today. However,

some things have changed substantially, and a

few have changed quite dramatically—as

reflected in the content of this guide. One substantial change is the much broader appreciation

today of the need to prepare for crises that arise

not from inmate violence but from incidents

such as fires, floods, and hurricanes. Thus, this

guide includes a separate checklist for assessing

prison readiness to deal with natural disasters. 

With regard to dramatic change, terrorism has

taken front and center stage. When the 1996

monograph was published, the events of

September 11, 2001, were, for most people and

most agencies, simply unimaginable. It is clear

that since September 11, some things will never

be the same. Considerations of terrorism now

seem to be a part of our daily lives. Therefore,

this guide includes a separate checklist for

assessing counterterrorism efforts and planning

in prisons—the first self-audit checklist of its

kind, but likely not the last. 

In today’s world, the forces that define prison

emergencies continue to change, sometimes

very rapidly. Thus, this guide clearly cannot be

the final word on prison emergency preparedness. The purpose of the materials in this guide

is to help move the field of corrections forward

in understanding the demands of prison emergency and crisis situations and in understanding

current best practices with regard to emergency

plans, policies, and practices.
viii

The goals of this guide, then, are simple but

important. It is hoped that the guide will result

in improved prevention efforts, planning, and

response, so that some emergencies may be

averted entirely and others may be mitigated. If

this guide helps prevent violence in just a few

locations and if it minimizes injuries, deaths, or

escapes during just a few prison crises, then it

will have fully satisfied its objectives.

Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D.

Cynthia Barry, Ph.D.

LETRA, Inc.

Campbell, California
ix

This guide is the result of a cooperative agreement funded by NIC. The guide could not have

been developed without the efforts of many individuals and the active participation of the majority of state departments of corrections (DOCs)

across the United States. 

Seven consultants worked on this project: Rich

Cruickshank of the Nebraska DOC; Richard

(Dick) Franklin, now retired and most recently

of NIC’s Prisons Division; Bill Gentry, Director

of Person County (North Carolina) Emergency

Services; Brad Hansen of the Nebraska DOC;

Richard Holder, retired from the Oregon DOC;

Marty Jones, retired from the California DOC;

and Charles Stewart of the North Carolina DOC.

This group of consultants represents more than

150 years of experience in corrections. More

importantly, each individual has a great deal of

highly specialized experience in dealing with

prison crises, major emergencies, and natural

disasters. The collective wisdom of this group

encompasses not only emergency planning and

preparation but also firsthand experience in

responding to and managing prison crisis and

emergency situations. The consultants worked

individually and in small groups to improve the

self-audit materials from the earlier monograph,

develop new materials, and critique drafts. We

are indebted to them for their generous contributions to this guide.

Randy Corcoran of NIC’s Prisons Division

served as the Project Manager throughout the

development of the guide. Randy monitored the

progress of the project and handled a variety

of administrative tasks for the Institute. Randy

was an experienced warden in the Maryland

DOC before he joined NIC’s Prisons Division

and was always willing to roll up his sleeves and

make substantive contributions to the guide in

addition to carrying out his administrative

responsibilities. Everyone who worked on this

project thanks Randy for his involvement, his

patience, his commitment, and his many specific

contributions. 

Susan Hunter, the long-time Director of NIC’s

Prisons Division, became seriously ill and died

in early 2004. She had been personally involved

in this project from its conception. As with so

many things at NIC, Susan’s hand is upon this

guide, and we are grateful for the time and energy she devoted to this project. 

NIC developed this monograph through a cooperative agreement with LETRA, Inc., of

Campbell, CA. LETRA is a nonprofit training

and research organization with more than 30

years of experience in working with law enforcement and correctional agencies across the United

States and Canada. Importantly, LETRA has

specialized in developing comprehensive emergency systems for prisons and jails and in training prison staff on emergency preparedness for

the last 25 years. A number of people associated

with LETRA supported this project and made

contributions to this monograph, and we gratefully acknowledge that assistance.

Dionne Niemi was LETRA’s office manager

throughout this project and had primary

Acknowledgments
x

responsibility for preparing draft materials, providing logistical support to project staff and

consultants, and formatting the materials in the

guide. She also carried out a wide range of other

duties that kept the project moving forward.

Two of the project consultants made an important additional contribution to the guide. Brad

Hansen and Rich Cruickshank, both of the

Nebraska DOC, had collaborated with the

Project Director and Deputy Director on the

development of a training curriculum designed

for managers at the level of warden and above.

That curriculum was completed a few years

before this guide was developed. Three chapters

from the curriculum, “Leadership Issues During

Crises,” “Prevention of Prison Emergencies,”

and “Emergency Teams,” are reprinted in section 5 of the guide, with the permission of the

authors. We also want to express our gratitude to

Harold Clarke, Nebraska’s former Director of

Corrections, and to the Nebraska DOC for their

important contributions to that training curriculum in general and to the three reprinted chapters specifically.

Of the country’s 50 DOCs, 33 agreed to participate in this project by sending emergency plans,

policies, and/or procedures for review. These

DOCs also responded to a lengthy written survey inquiring about emergency practices, policies, plans, and procedures within their prisons.

(The guide includes a detailed report on the

results of that survey, which was the first of its

kind.) The DOCs’ contributions to the guide are

very much appreciated. On a related note, it is

important to acknowledge that this guide

reflects a much larger body of knowledge about

large-scale crises and emergencies in prisons

and that this body of knowledge is derived in

large part from the practical experiences of a

great many correctional professionals.

Publications are like fine food. Good ingredients

are not enough: preparation and presentation are

also essential. For this monograph, we were

extremely fortunate that NIC provided the services of Aspen Systems Corporation of

Rockville, MD. Lynn Marble and Janet

McNaughton, both of Aspen, not only corrected

grammar and punctuation and clarified syntax,

they reorganized material and sometimes reframed discussions, always moving the monograph toward increased clarity. In addition,

Lynn, Janet, and designer C. Denise Collins are

primarily responsible for the cover design, the

page layout, and the graphics in this monograph,

and they suggested important format changes in

the emergency checklists themselves, which

made those instruments more “user friendly.”

This monograph has benefited in many ways,

some obvious and some subtle, from the firstrate professional editing services of Aspen, and

we are most grateful to them.

Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D.

Project Director

Cynthia Barry, Ph.D.

Project Deputy Director

LETRA, Inc.

San Jose, California
Section 1

Introduction
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Prisons and Major Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Assessing Emergency Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

The 1996 NIC Self-Audit Monograph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Prison Emergencies and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) . . . .6

Development of This Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Why the Guide Was Developed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

How This Guide Differs From the 1996 Monograph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

In This 

Section
3

Prisons and Major Emergencies 

Emergency preparedness is a central, even critical issue throughout American corrections.

Today, most public agencies must have emergency plans, and even private businesses have

turned to disaster preparedness and business

recovery planning. Prisons, however, are not like

other public agencies. They are responsible for

the safety of large numbers of individuals who

are usually locked up and cannot protect themselves in many emergency situations. Further,

and perhaps ironically, the very people who are

locked up and whose safety must be assured are

the source of the most frequent and the most

serious prison emergency situations. Finally, the

first priority for every prison is community protection, which means that even in the chaos of a

major emergency, prisons must ensure against

escape.

No prison is immune from large-scale emergencies. A minimum-custody facility housing shortterm inmates may be at very low risk for riot and

disturbance situations, but a minimum-security

designation is no shield against fire, earthquake,

chemical spill, or staff walkout.

A complicating factor is that the twin risks that

an emergency will happen, and that it will go

badly, are heightened by population overcrowding and decreases in staffing levels and other

resources, as well as by the elimination of some

programs that help stabilize prisons (e.g., earned

good time). These conditions are ubiquitous in

American corrections. As a result, most state

prison systems are in a more precarious position

with regard to major emergencies than they were

15 or 20 years ago.

Another factor affecting how prisons deal with

major emergencies is the changing composition

of the correctional workforce. Recent years have

seen the wholesale retirement of staff who began

their careers in the late 1960s and 1970s—staff

with 25 or 30 years of experience, many of

whom had been through riots and hostage incidents and had demonstrated leadership under

fire. Today, prisons promote staff much more

quickly than once was customary. A captain may

have 8 years of service now, whereas 20 years

ago a “young” captain in the same department

would have had 16 to 18 years of experience. In

the absence of experience, agencies are far more

dependent on policy, plans, and formal training.

However, not everyone recognizes that reality.

If the likelihood and dangers of large-scale crises

in prisons are widely acknowledged as real, does

it not follow that almost all state prison systems

would commit serious time, resources, and

thought to emergency preparedness? In fact, that

is not the case. The reasons are complex.

One reason that most prison systems have not

placed high priority on emergency preparedness

is that planning for emergencies does not seem

as pressing as day-to-day problems—until there

is an actual emergency. Second, most people

judge emergency situations by their outcome—

whether they ended well—rather than looking at

how the situations were handled—whether staff

Background
4

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

performed properly, the right training and equipment were in place, policies proved valid, etc. In

too many systems, no serious scrutiny or review

takes place unless a situation ends in tragedy.

Third, effective, comprehensive emergency preparedness is demanding and difficult to achieve.

Fourth, some traditions in corrections work

against effective emergency preparedness:

● Management by personality rather than by

procedure and policy. 

● Separate plans for various types of emergencies, with no requirement that the plans be

integrated or consistent. 

● A deep-rooted belief that riots and hostage

situations are the only prison emergencies

that really matter.

● An equally deep-rooted belief that planning

really isn’t important because every emergency situation will be different.

Assessing Emergency Readiness

Effective planning plays a crucial role in preventing major emergencies and, more commonly, in containing crisis situations once they arise.

With good planning, some situations—planned

disturbances, some kinds of fires, some types of

hostage incidents—may not occur in the first

place. Good planning can also result in early

intervention that resolves small, localized crises

before they escalate into major emergencies that

threaten the entire institution. The lack of effective emergency preparedness may increase the

likelihood both that a major emergency will

occur and that if a large-scale crisis does occur,

it may go more badly than necessary.

If a state department of corrections (DOC) does

not have the level of emergency preparedness

that it wants or needs, assessment is the logical

first step. Traditionally, administrators have

either asked their own people to conduct an

assessment or contracted with outside consultants

to do the job. Both approaches have drawbacks. 

Involving the management staff of an institution

or a department in evaluating the strengths and

weaknesses of their own emergency preparedness (policies, procedures, plans, equipment,

etc.) may be all the motivation they need to

begin to improve their emergency systems. On

the other hand, staff may lack the objectivity to

point out areas in which “the Emperor has no

clothes.” Even if they are objective, in-house

staff may not notice obvious problems because

they have lived with the conditions for so long

that they think of them not as problems but as

the natural state of affairs. Further, internal staff

are unlikely to be aware of the breadth of alternative solutions available across the 50 state correctional systems. In addition, politics and

personalities can impede an internal assessment. 

A different set of problems arises if external

consultants are engaged. First, consultants cost

money, and a serious evaluation may be expensive. Second, most consultants have specialized

areas of expertise. Some are very good with fire

prevention and firefighting systems, others with

CERT and SWAT, and still others with training

hostage negotiators—but very few people in the

country have indepth experience and expertise

with the entire gamut of comprehensive emergency preparedness issues. Third, management

staff may see outside consultants as “walkthrough experts” and not take them seriously.

Finally, political rather than purely constructive

motives may govern how a department or institution uses a consultant’s report.

The 1996 NIC Self-Audit

Monograph 

Since many DOCs rely heavily on self-audit

procedures in other areas of their operations, it

followed that a well-designed self-assessment
Section 1. Introduction: Background

5

instrument to analyze emergency preparedness

could be extremely useful. Such an instrument

could help to address some of the drawbacks of

self-assessment mentioned in the preceding section. Thus, the primary focus of NIC’s 1996

monograph on emergency preparedness was the

development of a detailed, comprehensive selfassessment instrument for evaluating emergency

preparedness in both state DOCs and individual

correctional institutions. Further development of

this tool remains one of the central objectives of

this guide. 

Validating the 1996 Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist

Three states participated in a validation study to compare self-audit results with findings from an

evaluation by experienced consultants. Each state selected one maximum-security institution and

one minimum- or medium-security institution for the study. The state administered the NIC selfaudit materials at the two institutions and at the departmental level. Then senior project staff members and project consultants conducted an onsite evaluation of emergency readiness, touring each

institution and reviewing institutional emergency plans and departmental policies, emergency

equipment, emergency staffing and specialists, etc. Project staff reviewed the results of their

onsite evaluations with top departmental and/or institutional managers. These findings were then

compared with the results of the self-audits. 

In general, the two methods—self-audit and consultant review—produced remarkably similar

results. Both methods quickly identified institutions that had little emergency readiness. Both methods also consistently found a much better state of readiness in institutions that demonstrated a

strong commitment to emergency preparedness and significant work on emergency issues. The

two methods also tended to agree at a much more detailed level. For example, both methods

revealed any lack of provisions for hostage negotiation or tactical capacity for hostage rescue.

Some important differences between the two methods did emerge: 

● The self-audit checklists proved more detailed and thorough than the consultant evaluation.

Even when two experienced consultants spent a full day reviewing a moderate-sized institution,

they did not have time to inquire about every area covered in the self-audit checklists. The consultants also skipped some of the details contained in the checklists.

● The consultant evaluation did a better job of identifying when things were in place but substandard, or when appearance and reality differed sharply.

● At institutions with minimal involvement in emergency issues, a review meeting with outside

consultants appeared to motivate management to consider the results of the evaluation seriously, whereas the self-audit materials did not. Clearly, self-audits will not be effective unless management is committed to conducting an honest and rigorous evaluation.
6

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

NIC has received substantial feedback about

the self-audit materials in the 1996 monograph.

Almost all of the feedback has been extremely

positive. The monograph continues to be

frequently requested and used, and its popularity

suggests the need for new, improved self-audit

materials that reflect the many changes in the

correctional environment since 1996. 

Prison Emergencies and the

National Incident Management

System (NIMS) 

Some correctional administrators are already

familiar with NIMS or with the Incident Command System (ICS). Both are generic, multiagency systems for responding to major

emergency incidents (although NIMS is generally a broader approach than ICS). A brief review

of NIMS and how it relates to prison emergencies and to this guide provides important context

for the guide’s users.

Background

Prior to the 1970s, there was no nationally recognized system for managing emergency incidents or natural disasters. ICS was developed by

fire departments in the early 1970s as a system

for coordinating the response of multiple agencies to the same fire or group of fires. The heart

of ICS was a command-and-control system, and

ICS was intended to overcome many of the traditional problems associated with multipleagency responses, such as ambiguous or unclear

lines of authority, incompatible communication

systems, and lack of standardized equipment

and terminology. From its inception through the

1980s and 90s, offshoots of ICS evolved in

some agencies and states. ICS was also adapted

for use by law enforcement agencies in a number of state and local jurisdictions. 

After the events of September 11, 2001, a

primary concern of the newly established

Department of Homeland Security was coordination among agencies that would potentially

respond to a terrorist event. A presidential directive charged the new department with establishing standards for a national emergency system.

That system, called NIMS, is largely an outgrowth of ICS. NIMS represents a major step

forward: for the first time, the nation has a unifying system for coordinating the response to

incidents as diverse as a forest fire, a tornado, or

a terrorist bombing. 

How NIMS Relates to Prison Emergencies

For corrections officials, and for this guide, the

key question is: what is the relationship of

NIMS to prison emergencies? The answer is that

NIMS is both a help and a challenge. 

NIMS is a help in several obvious ways. When a

correctional agency assists in the response to a

community disaster, radio frequencies of the

various responding agencies are more likely to

be compatible, and information about the

emergency is more likely to be shared in plain

English rather than in codes. Jurisdictional

issues are more likely to have been worked out

in advance. Coordination and planning may

well have been tested during drills and exercises. The same issues of coordination, planning,

communication, command, and logistics also

apply when a correctional agency has a major

emergency itself and needs assistance from fire,

police, and other external agencies. Thus, correctional agencies clearly should embrace NIMS

and become familiar with its concepts and

terms. 

The challenge for corrections officials is to

recognize that NIMS is a generic interagency

structure; it is not procedural, and it does not

speak to specific correctional issues. Nothing in

NIMS tells a correctional institution how to

evacuate the segregation unit of a large prison

(just as nothing in NIMS tells a fire department
Section 1. Introduction: Background

7

how to put out a petroleum fire). Thus, while

NIMS provides important and necessary assistance in areas such as interagency coordination,

resource allocation, and planning, a correctional

agency still needs all of the corrections-specific

expertise that has traditionally existed within a

correctional emergency system.

An analogy may be in order. To compose a

document on a computer, you use a wordprocessing software program that determines 

how you move text and format the document.

However, you also need another software program: the computer’s operating system. Although

it has little to do with the specifics of composing

the document, the operating system sits above the

word-processing software and allows it to run on

the computer. NIMS is like an operating system

in that it provides the framework and architecture

in which all of the corrections-specific emergency

provisions reside.

A correctional agency has two alternatives with

regard to NIMS. It can adopt NIMS and then set

about developing its own corrections-specific

policies, procedures, and other emergency system requirements, tying all of that to various

components of NIMS. Or it can adopt NIMS

and use a comprehensive correctional emergency system within NIMS to provide the substance and content that make an emergency

system useful in a prison. If it chooses the second alternative, it must take care that its emergency system is consistent with the NIMS

framework. For example, the Nebraska DOC

has worked with LETRA’s corrections-specific

emergency system for 10 years, but it has also

been identified as the state’s lead agency for

homeland security and is in the process of training staff on NIMS. Nebraska’s experience is that

the two systems—NIMS and a correctionsspecific emergency system—are compatible,

not contradictory. 

How This Guide Relates to NIMS

Users of this guide will find that it is consistent

with NIMS. In particular, the three freestanding

self-audit checklists that constitute the heart of

the guide (see section 3) include items that

cover every aspect of NIMS, ranging from risk

assessment to interagency coordination to

requirements for drills, exercises, and simulations. The checklists include even more items

that are corrections specific and are not part of

NIMS. For example, the general emergency preparedness checklist includes many questions

about hostage negotiation teams and tactical

teams. Almost all of these questions are corrections specific; because NIMS is generic, it does

not provide policy direction for a hostage negotiation team or direction for operating a tactical

team. 

In summary, this guide is consistent with NIMS,

and it directly addresses a number of key provisions and concepts within NIMS. However, it is

comprehensive with regard to expertise about

correctional emergencies and should not be

regarded, directly or indirectly, as a systematic

presentation of NIMS issues.
9

Why the Guide Was Developed

Two primary reasons prompted the development

of this guide. The first was that the success of

the 1996 monograph suggested the need to

improve on that earlier publication by expanding

the scope, building on experience with the 1996

checklists, and generally updating the materials.

The second reason was the need to account for

changes since 1996 in the conditions that give

rise to emergencies and crises in prisons, most

particularly with regard to terrorism.

Improving the Materials 

As correctional professionals became familiar

with the 1996 self-audit materials, a number of

criticisms, suggestions for improvements, and

ideas for reorganization emerged. The authors

had informally kept track of these suggested

changes, and other updates and modifications

resulted from the process of drafting and reviewing this guide (see “How the Guide Was

Developed”).

Reflecting Changes in Conditions 

When the 1996 monograph was drafted, today’s

pervasive concern with terrorism could not have

been foreseen. After the events of September 11,

2001, no publication on emergency preparedness

for prisons would be complete without comprehensive consideration of counterterrorism strategies. In addition, developments since 1996 point

to the need for greater emphasis on natural disaster preparedness. For example, the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and

its state and local derivative agencies have

become an increasingly sophisticated and unified

system of emergency planning and response.

That system’s heavy emphasis on natural disasters is not reflected in the 1996 monograph. In

addition, situations involving hazardous materials, covered briefly in the 1996 monograph, have

become the focus of fines and other enforcement

actions at some jails and prisons.

How This Guide Differs From the

1996 Monograph

This guide is very different from the 1996 monograph. In fact, the guide is more accurately

viewed as a new document than as a revised edition of the earlier work. 

The 1996 monograph included two generic

emergency preparedness self-audit checklists:

one designed for correctional facilities and the

other designed for the state DOC’s central office.

This guide combines these two generic checklists into a single generic emergency preparedness self-audit checklist that is designed

primarily for institutions but includes a section

on departmentwide issues. This change was

made because the single checklist is more efficient and avoids the redundancy that characterized the two previous checklists. In addition,

experience with the 1996 monograph demonstrated that the checklists almost always were

used by institutions and seldom were used solely

at the departmental level.

Development of This Guide 
10

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

How the Guide Was Developed

The checklists in the 1996 monograph provided the foundation for the new checklists in this guide.

Those earlier checklists were mailed to all seven project consultants and the NIC program manager, along with suggestions for additions and other changes that the authors had accumulated since

the publication of the 1996 monograph. All members of the project team were asked to review the

existing materials and the suggestions for changes and to consider potential reorganization of the

checklists at a global level, changes in format, specific modifications of individual checklist items,

and any other revisions that seemed justified.

A 3-day project planning meeting was then scheduled at LETRA’s offices in Northern California, and

all members of the project team attended. Each individual offered a number of suggestions for

changes and additions, some global and some very detailed. The team discussed the central questions of the guide’s scope and organization at length. Almost all decisions were arrived at by consensus. Practical questions about the layout and use of the checklists received extensive

consideration, in part because most team members had actually used the 1996 checklists and had

strong feelings about what should be kept and what needed to be changed. During the meeting,

team members reviewed the 1996 checklists item-by-item. At the end of the meeting, the project

consultants were split into two- and three-person teams and given responsibility for creating initial

drafts of the natural disaster/hazardous materials (HAZMAT) checklist, the counterterrorism checklist, or the general emergency preparedness checklist.

As the subgroups within the project team completed their draft checklists, the drafts were sent to

all other team members for comment and review. The project director and deputy director then

integrated all of the responses into working drafts of each checklist. In a parallel process, the project director and deputy director distributed drafts of the guide’s four resource papers to the other

members of the project team. Three of these papers came from LETRA’s recent training program,

and one was written specifically for this guide. The director and deputy director also completed the

section presenting results from the national survey of 50 state DOCs on emergency preparedness

policies and practices and distributed it in draft form to the project team members.

The working drafts of the checklists and other sections were then sent to NIC for review and modification by the NIC project manager in consultation with the project director and deputy director, all

of whom then reviewed a final draft at a meeting held at NIC offices in Washington, DC. NIC publications manager Georgette Walsh coordinated the final phase of the preparation of the guide,

working with editing and graphics specialists from Aspen Systems Corporation and the project

director and deputy director.

A Note About Field Testing: No “field testing” was conducted with the checklists in this guide. That is because they were

developed from the 1996 checklists, which were field tested and used extensively across the country. In a sense, then,

the checklists in this guide have received extensive field testing—because the field experience with the earlier checklists contributed to their development.
Section 1. Introduction: Development of This Guide

11

The guide also adds two new freestanding 

self-audit checklists: one on natural disasters,

HAZMAT incidents, and fire; the other on counterterrorism. The natural disaster/HAZMAT/fire

checklist is intended for use by individual institutions. The counterterrorism checklist is appropriate for institutions and for state DOCs. 

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Checklist 

The decision to present natural disaster and

related items in a separate checklist rather than

incorporating them in the generic emergency

preparedness checklist reflects several important

considerations:

● This format underscores the importance of

planning for natural disasters. Many prisons

have done substantial work planning and

preparing for inmate violence (disturbances,

hostage incidents, etc.) but have not paid

serious attention to the possibility of a natural disaster.

● With a freestanding checklist, natural disaster and HAZMAT issues will not be camouflaged by the more dramatic, traditional

prison concerns with inmate violence. 

● The level of preparation required to achieve

reasonable readiness to handle natural disasters and HAZMAT situations is extensive.

The freestanding checklist makes that

immediately apparent and focuses attention

on extremely challenging issues, such as

offsite evacuations, that are unlikely to arise

in an emergency involving inmate violence

but have a much greater probability in

response to a natural disaster.

● If natural disaster and HAZMAT items were

added to the generic emergency preparedness self-audit checklist, that already-large

document might become too cumbersome to

be useful.

In addition to these practical considerations, a

philosophic issue guided the decision to create a

separate checklist for natural disasters. The

generic emergency preparedness checklist

makes no attempt to provide detailed coverage

of every kind of major emergency that might

befall a prison. It is intended to reflect overall

planning, preparation, and response for emergency situations and crises. If the specifics of

natural disasters, HAZMAT situations, and fire

Redundancy 

A clear drawback to presenting the natural

disaster and counterterrorism checklists as

freestanding documents is the potential for

redundancy with the generic emergency

preparedness checklist. Arguably, to be

complete and logical, the two new checklists would need to include almost everything from the generic checklist. That

strategy would make the new checklists so

large that their specialized focus would be

lost. It would also cause extensive repetition. On the other hand, some items in the

generic checklist are so central and relevant to the specialized checklists that their

omission would make the specialized

checklists less than meaningful. Thus,

although some repetition is necessary, it is

minimal. The vast majority of items appear

in just one checklist. Only items that are

essential for logic or continuity are repeated. The individuals who use this guide will

judge whether, as hoped, the relatively

small amount of repetition is necessary and

helpful.
12

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

safety were added to that checklist, why then

would the checklist not also include equally 

specific treatment for other types of prison

emergencies (bomb threats, epidemics,

explosions, etc.)? 

Counterterrorism Checklist 

The creation of a freestanding checklist on

counterterrorism was guided by similar concerns

but was, perhaps, an easier decision. Unlike natural disaster issues, counterterrorism matters are

quite new to most prisons. Additionally, in a

high-threat-level environment, counterterrorism

efforts could potentially redefine the entire operation of a prison. Even the potential risks and

threats associated with terrorism are quite different in nature and scope from those posed by

more traditional prison emergencies. The freestanding self-audit checklist on counterterrorism

helps a prison or a state department of corrections focus on its policies, procedures, plans,

and general readiness in this relatively new area.

Checklist Format and Content 

Those familiar with the earlier checklists will

note several modifications of the format and

content. 

● More items. Many new items have been

added to the generic emergency preparedness checklist. 

● More space for comments. Many users of

the earlier checklists said the space for comments next to individual items was inadequate. The checklists in this guide provide

substantially more room for comments.

● Portrait instead of landscape format. The

1996 checklists were in landscape format,

which proved cumbersome. The checklists

in this guide are all in portrait format. 

● Standards vs. criteria. Individual items

within the checklists are now referred to as

“criteria” rather than “standards.” This

change is important because NIC does not

promulgate standards. Some national organizations do issue correctional standards.

Local, state, and federal correctional agencies may chose to adopt nationally available

standards, to develop their own standards, or

not to acknowledge any particular set of

standards—that is an agency-by-agency

decision. Referring to each checklist item as

a criterion more accurately reflects NIC’s

objective of providing “food for thought” to

help state and local agencies conduct their

own evaluations, without implicitly or

explicitly suggesting that NIC is proposing a

set of standards.

● Verifying methods. The checklists ask the

audit team not only to make a judgment

about the status of each item (“meets criterion,” “partially met,” etc.) but also to state

the method used to verify that status (“document review,” “staff interview,” etc.). 

Survey Report

A survey of emergency preparedness was conducted in 33 of the 50 state departments of corrections. The guide presents detailed findings

from this survey, which was the first of its kind.

Readers will find a wealth of data on common

(and less common) approaches to emergency

readiness, the extent to which agencies commit

resources to emergency preparedness, how many

agencies train and maintain their own tactical

teams and negotiators, and many other aspects

of current practices.

Resource Materials

The “Resource Materials” section offers four

important new papers on leadership during

crises, prevention of emergencies, prison emergency teams, and counterterrorism. These new

papers are very different from anything offered

in the 1996 monograph.
Section 1. Introduction: Development of This Guide

13

● Leadership Issues During Crises. Although

this paper specifically concerns leadership

in prison crises and emergency situations,

much of its discussion could apply to crisis

management in any setting. Furthermore,

experienced prison wardens who have read

the paper have noted that the issues discussed are relevant not only during crises but

also during day-to-day operations.

● Prevention of Prison Emergencies. This

paper argues that although prison administrators commonly talk about preventing

emergencies, often little is being done

specifically for that purpose. The paper

demonstrates the scope of measures that can

decrease risks and potentially reduce the

likelihood that a major crisis will happen.

● Emergency Teams. This paper discusses the

most common types of specialized teams

required in prison crisis and emergency situations: tactical teams, hostage negotiation

teams, and crisis intervention teams. Rather

than considering the specifics of organizing,

training, equipping, and operating such

teams, the paper attempts to provide a highlevel management perspective, exploring

potential strengths and common pitfalls and

focusing on requirements for successfully

managing these teams.

● Prisons and Counterterrorism. This paper

discusses terrorism threats and incidents as

they relate to prisons. Before the events of

September 11, 2001, U.S. prisons had little

reason to be concerned about terrorism.

Thus, even the basic concepts of the subject

may be unfamiliar to correctional staff.

Now, terrorism is a “hot topic” in international news and in novels, motion pictures,

and television dramas. Unfortunately, neither news reports nor fictional accounts

translate into practical measures a state

prison should consider as part of a counterterrorism strategy. The decision to include

both a counterterrorism checklist and this

paper in the guide was prompted by the

urgent need for prisons to gain familiarity

with this topic.

Case Studies

The last section in the guide presents seven

case studies illustrating how prisons have

responded to different types of emergency and

crisis situations. Four of the studies—Helicopter

Intrusion/Escape (Colorado DOC), 1993 Midwest Floods (Missouri Loses Renz Correctional

Center), Hurricane Andrew (Florida DOC),

and Fire in a New Institution (Taney County,

MO)—are updated carryovers from the 1996

monograph. The other three—Morey Unit

Hostage Incident (Arizona DOC), Lucasville

Prison Riot (Ohio DOC), and Riot at Max

(Montana DOC)—are new in this guide. 
Section 2

Conducting an Audit
Purpose and Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Purpose of an Emergency Preparedness Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Preliminary Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Deciding To Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Who Should Conduct the Audit? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Standards for Auditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Disclaimers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Examples of Completed Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

In This 

Section
17

Purpose of an Emergency

Preparedness Audit 

Conducting emergency preparedness audits of

institutions is important for a number of reasons.

Some reasons are obvious, others more subtle.

An audit validates a comprehensive emergency

preparedness system. For a prison, comprehensive readiness for crises, natural disasters, and

major emergencies is no easy matter; it is a farreaching effort that can take years to fully develop and can require large amounts of money, staff

time, management attention, and other scarce

resources. An audit specific to emergency preparedness makes a strong statement that all of

the work undertaken to develop and maintain the

emergency system has been intended, planned,

and coordinated.

Perhaps the most obvious reason for an audit is

that it provides management with an objective

assessment of the progress and status of the

emergency system. Because a prison’s emergency system is necessarily large and multifaceted, nothing short of a systematic audit

procedure will effectively evaluate the system.

An institution’s emergency preparedness coordinator may be familiar with several substantial

problems and may also have several initiatives

awaiting funding or management commitment.

However, the coordinator is inevitably too close

to the system—too involved in the system and

too familiar with what is in place—to serve as

an independent evaluator. To varying degrees,

the same will be true of the institution’s

managers and emergency specialists, who may

be quite familiar with its emergency preparedness and response capabilities. An objective and

detailed audit process can surmount these limitations. For management, then, the emergency preparedness audit offers the opportunity to identify

weaknesses, deficiencies, developing problems,

areas of vulnerability, inconsistencies, and simple mistakes in the facility’s emergency preparedness efforts.

The audit also provides an opportunity to evaluate or reevaluate resource allocation. For

example, a prison’s CERT program may have

become more and more expensive because of

costs associated with increased training time and

shooting practice, while its hostage negotiators

have stopped training regularly and have not

worked together for more than a year. It may be

time for the institution’s administrators to revisit

the priorities reflected in the allocation of their

training resources. Such questions of resource

allocation and relative priorities run throughout

a comprehensive emergency system. 

Relatively frequent audits can help the correctional leader identify tendencies toward complacency and “cutting corners” in critical

practices. Audits can also offset the dangerous

consequences of faster turnover in management

and supervisory positions. Rapid turnover means

a loss of knowledge and experience in important

areas. Without regular audits, an institution’s

policies and post orders may come to bear little

resemblance to actual practice.

Purpose and Philosophy
18

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Another central purpose of an emergency preparedness audit is to verify compliance with

standards and policies. Regardless of whether

the standards or policies involved are at the

departmental or facility level, or whether the

standards are external (e.g., from the American

Correctional Association) or internal, the point is

that the organization has adopted them and

expects them to be followed. Compliance with

stated standards and policies goes hand in hand

with accountability, which is essential to any

management endeavor. However, even if a policy

is well written, disseminated, discussed, and

reinforced by training, compliance is not guaranteed. Although first-line supervisors generally

carry the primary responsibility for day-to-day

compliance with policies, and institutions often

need to reinforce an individual policy or check

on how it is being followed, the best way to

ensure compliance with policies, standards, and

written procedures in a broad area such as emergency preparedness is to conduct an areawide

audit. 

An audit may also be an excellent staff development tool and increase staff awareness of crucial

issues related to emergency preparedness. This

function of the audit applies not only to the audit

team members but to the institution’s staff at

large. As the audit team reviews records, asks

about emergency procedures, observes emergency responses, and focuses on the less visible

aspects of emergency readiness, the institution’s

staff read the message clearly: management

thinks emergency preparedness is important and

is checking to see if things are as they should be.

Inevitably, staff other than audit team members

spot deficiencies as the audit progresses. In addition, when management takes corrective actions

after reviewing audit findings, those actions are

likely to have greater impact because of the

staff’s heightened awareness of emergency issues.

Further, employees who have not understood why

some procedures were necessary for emergency

readiness may come to appreciate the rationale

for those procedures. Finally, the audit offers the

institution staff a chance to learn “best practices”

with regard to emergency preparedness. 

All of these reasons point to the same conclusion: an audit of an institution’s emergency preparedness system provides an opportunity to

improve the system. That is the ultimate goal. If

management does not subscribe to that goal,

then there is little point to engaging in a vigorous, demanding, and detailed evaluation of the

emergency system. (The same can be said of any

kind of large-scale institutional audit, and this

guide’s focus on emergency preparedness in no

way suggests that an audit in this area is more

important than, or conceptually different from, a

security audit or other kinds of major audits.)

Philosophy 

Protecting the community is the primary mission

of all state DOCs and of the individual institutions within those departments. An audit of

emergency readiness is entirely consistent with

that mission. In fact, with the exception of some

highly specific aspects of prison operations such

as perimeter security, one would be hard pressed

to find an activity more closely related to protecting the public than evaluating the institution’s readiness to handle large-scale crises and

major emergencies.

Emergency preparedness audits involve philosophic considerations beyond the institution’s

mission. If the institution and the department are

policy-driven organizations, then audit procedures necessarily will be philosophically consistent with that orientation. It also follows that in

a personality-driven organization or an organization that has no consistent orientation with

regard to actual decisionmaking, audit processes

may be less helpful or even counterproductive. 
Section 2. Conducting an Audit: Purpose and Philosophy

19

More specifically, an audit should be a “winwin” approach to improving emergency readiness. A prison’s level of emergency readiness is

what it is, and an audit should define current

conditions and offer opportunities for improvement. However, if an audit becomes a kind of

witch hunt (“who screwed up, and where and

when?”), then it will not be a positive exercise.

Worse, if administrators regard the audit as an

opportunity to assign blame for the prison’s

shortcomings, then staff will be defensive and

the audit results will almost certainly be inaccurate and incomplete. This point is critical:

Sending the wrong message to staff about the

purpose and philosophy of an emergency preparedness audit will invariably compromise the

audit findings. 

Similar considerations apply to the concept of

“audit scores.” Some audits and audit procedures, such as audits of American Correctional

Association standards, produce an overall

numeric score for the institution. Wardens and

other administrators often speak proudly of such

scores (“we got a 99.2% and that is the highest

score any institution in our state has ever

received”). For the emergency preparedness

audits presented in this guide, however, such a

view of scores would be meaningless or worse.

Every staff member involved in these audits

should understand from the outset that there is

no acceptable overall score. The individual items

in the self-audit checklists are not presented in

any particular relationship to each other and are

not of equal weight or value. In fact, different

institutions probably will place different weights

and values on the items, and that is as it should

be. Thus, an overall score or average rating is

meaningless, and may be misleading or even

dangerous. As Richard Franklin pointed out in

an NIC monograph on security auditing, “It is

quite possible to drown in a river that has an

average depth of six inches.”

Before an emergency preparedness audit begins,

its underlying philosophy should be discussed

and disseminated. That philosophy should

include the following goals:

● To support the mission of the institution in

general and the institution’s emergency preparedness system specifically.

● To increase staff awareness of emergency

preparedness and provide opportunities for

staff development.

● To provide management with rigorous,

objective, detailed, professional assessments

of the current status of the emergency preparedness system, with particular attention

to unusual strengths and weaknesses. 

● To provide opportunities for recognition of

innovation and excellence.
21

Deciding To Audit 

Using the self-audit materials in this guide to

assess the emergency preparedness of a prison

will be demanding, and the results may be

daunting—especially if the institution has not

previously placed high priority on emergency

readiness. Before deciding to conduct an emergency preparedness self-audit, prison management should first consider all of the implications

and be ready to support the process fully.

Prison management should also closely examine

some very specific considerations before initiating an emergency preparedness audit:

● What else is going on in the institution? If

another activity is demanding large amounts

of staff time and pushing staff hard, expecting an audit to proceed smoothly at the same

time is unreasonable. The audits in this

guide, though not extremely lengthy, should

begin only when they are likely to be “the

only game in town” for several days.

● Can audit team members focus exclusively on the process until it is completed?

Management must make the commitment

that, barring some absolute emergency, the

small number of staff assigned to the audit

team will be free to complete the audit without interruption. This means avoiding the

all-too-common practice of assigning staff to

a project and then reassigning them before

they complete the project. If management

fails to honor its commitment of staff time,

an otherwise serious audit effort will be

compromised.

● Is management committed to reviewing

the audit findings? Sometimes management

tends to regard an audit as completed once

the team has finished filling out the forms.

The most important work in the audit

Audit Decisions at the

Department Level

If a state department of corrections simply

mandates emergency preparedness audits

at all prisons in the state without first discussing the subject with facility managers

and giving them time to consider it, the

audits will take place but the timing may

not be good and the process may not be

supported at the facility level. An audit initiated by administrative decree from above is

likely to produce resentment from facilitylevel management, and that resentment will

informally but effectively be transmitted to

institution staff. As a result, the audit effort

is unlikely to be a positive learning experience, and the results may be inaccurate and

incomplete. Thus, it is prudent for department administrators to involve facility-level

management in the decision to conduct

emergency preparedness audits statewide.

Preliminary Considerations
22

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

process doesn’t begin until the checklists

have been finished. The single most important product of the audit process is management decisionmaking—at review meetings

in which audit findings are discussed and

analyzed—that develops a plan of corrective

action and followup. Managers must commit to participating in the review process.

Top managers should recognize that the

review will be time consuming. Before the

audit begins, managers should agree to an

initial review meeting and should understand that, barring emergencies, they will

need to attend all review meetings. 

Who Should Conduct the Audit? 

The audits in this guide are better performed by

a team than by an individual. Once a team completes the general emergency preparedness

audit, it may be acceptable for an individual,

even the institution’s emergency preparedness

coordinator, to conduct one or both of the more

specific audits (natural disasters and counterterrorism). Optimally, however, all audits will be

completed by a team. 

It is not necessary that an institution conduct all

three audits, at least not simultaneously. In fact,

often it will be most productive to first complete

the general emergency preparedness audit, wait

a few months or more (until the general emergency preparedness issues have been resolved),

and then complete the other two audits. Further,

some institutions may not think the counterterrorism audit is a high priority, or even necessary. 

Although having a single team complete all of

an institution’s audits may be the most efficient

approach, using a different team for each audit

has distinct advantages. Most obviously, more

staff develop interest in and ownership of emergency readiness; secondarily, the institution benefits from two or three independent assessments,

which may reveal problems that would not have

come to light had a single team been used. 

The audit team should have two to four

members. Management should appoint one

member as team leader. If the institution has

an emergency preparedness coordinator, that

individual should be part of the team but

should not serve as team leader. (Issues of

ownership, defensiveness, ego, lack of perspective, etc., might interfere with a coordinator’s ability to lead the team objectively.)

The team leader must have sufficient rank or

other status to have access to all relevant data

and all areas of the institution. 

Ideally, at least one member of the audit team

will be from another institution within the

department or from the department’s central

office. This may not be practical, and it is not

essential, but it does contribute to the independence and objectivity of the audit. At least one

member of the team should be from the institution’s management or midmanagement level. In

general, team members should be chosen on the

basis of experience, credibility, knowledge of

custody and security operations, and, to a lesser

extent, familiarity with emergency operations.

To avoid compromising the audit’s objectivity,

management should not create an audit team

composed predominantly or entirely of emergency specialists (e.g., a four-person team consisting of the institution’s CERT team leader,

armory officer, emergency preparedness coordinator, and chief negotiator).

The audit team members should meet with the

institution’s top managers before beginning the

audit. Members should clearly understand their

recourse if they encounter serious resistance

or other trouble as they conduct the audit.

(Typically, a team will have negotiated the right

to call an impromptu meeting with top administrators to review such situations and will wait

until management intervention clears the way

before proceeding with the audit.) The team

members should meet at the end of each day
Section 2. Conducting an Audit: Preliminary Considerations

23

while the audit is in process. They should meet

face-to-face with top management as soon as

they complete the self-audit checklists, before

the management review meetings take place.

During this prereview meeting, the team gives

top management an informal “read” on how the

audit progressed, the most important conclusions, and any particularly surprising findings. It

should be the verbal equivalent of a written

“executive summary.”

Standards for Auditors

As noted earlier, the self-audit checklists do not

attempt to impose standards for emergency preparedness but rather provide criteria by which

prisons can measure their own preparedness.

However, certain basic standards of conduct

should guide the efforts of the audit team.

1. Maintain confidentiality. Audit findings

and information are confidential, to be

shared initially with the institution’s top

management only. How the findings are

disseminated from that point should be

determined by the administration of the

institution and the department.

2. Be considerate. To the extent possible,

auditors should not interfere with the ongoing operation of the institution. They should

respect other staff responsibilities.

3. Report dangerous situations. If auditors

encounter an imminent life-threatening condition or situation, they should report it

immediately to the warden or superintendent.

4. Be discreet. When auditors find a problem

or potential deficiency in an area, they

should not explain it or point it out to staff

in the area unless asked. However, if asked,

audit team members should provide accurate, straightforward answers about what

they are looking for and what they are finding. They should limit the information to the

question asked and should not encourage

discussion. If the issue is confidential (e.g.,

a plan for responding to an employee work

stoppage or job action), the auditors should

say that they are looking at a confidential

matter and should provide no information.

5. Be professional. Auditors must not use their

role, information, or findings to impress

other staff or create dissension.

6. Try not to single out individuals. To the

extent possible, auditors should not report in

a way that singles out individual staff members. However, if the reported problem

results from complacency, cutting corners,

ignorance of policy, or other violations of

sound practice or policy, auditors may have

to cite specific persons or posts in need of

training or supervisory attention.

7. Be ethical. Auditors should not create artificial situations to detect deficiencies in practices (e.g., hide keys left lying around or

tamper with documents to see how long the

change goes unnoticed by staff). Instead,

they should seek legitimate opportunities to

evaluate practices (e.g., fire drills, emergency counts). There is an important difference between openly “testing” a policy or

procedure (“would you show me the insulin

syringes so we can verify the count against

the inventory balance in the log?”) and “setting up” staff (planting contraband to see if

it is discovered). The former is good auditing; the latter is not.

8. Audit rigorously. Auditors should be rigorous and demanding. They do a disservice to

the institution if they assume something is

acceptable without verification, gloss over

problems, or “give the institution a pass” on

an item they know to be deficient to some

extent.

9. Choose appropriate methods. Direct

observation of practices is the best way

to audit individual items. Observation
24

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

generally is a more reliable method than

reviewing records and policies or interviewing staff and inmates. It often is necessary

to use both observation and documents to

ensure that practice and policy are consistent.

10. Maintain objectivity. Auditors should

maintain objectivity, professionalism, and

perspective. No one is perfectly objective,

but auditors should neither hope to find

problems with almost everything nor hope

for extremely positive findings The easiest

way to ensure objectivity is to focus on the

evaluation criteria and not on personal

preferences.

11. Be a reporter, not an advocate. The auditor’s job is factfinding, not decisionmaking.

Top management decides what will be done

concerning the audit findings. Although

auditors can and should recommend and

advise when they believe they have insight

about a deficiency, their primary role is to

present the facts as they found them. The

audit team and its work product may lose

credibility if top management perceives that

auditors are advocating strongly for certain

decisions and are heavily invested in what is

done with the audit findings. 

Disclaimers 

Before moving on to the specifics of how to use

the self-audit materials in this guide, readers

should be aware of some fundamental points

about the nature of these materials and about

prison audits in general:

● This audit system does not represent advice

from NIC about what an institution’s emergency system should or should not include.

That is a decision for the institution and its

department of corrections.

● The self-audit checklists in this guide are

not the only method for evaluating emergency readiness in a prison. One alternative

is to retain consultants to perform such an

analysis. Another is to conduct comprehensive critical incident reviews when serious

situations occur. 

● An emergency preparedness audit is not a

security audit. The two types of audits

should complement each other, but one cannot be substituted for the other. Both are

extremely important undertakings in a

prison. NIC has developed a comprehensive,

sophisticated security audit manual, which

interested readers are encouraged to consider as the foundation for an indepth evaluation of institutional security policies,

procedures, and practices.

● Some departments engage in policy audits,

and many conduct their audits against

some national or state set of correctional

standards—most commonly, the American

Correctional Association standards. Because

such audits cover so many areas, they are

not detailed or comprehensive with regard

to emergency preparedness (or about institutional security, for that matter). A prison

may “pass” all of the emergency preparedness items on a national standards audit and

yet be woefully unprepared for a large-scale

crisis. 

● Institutions and agencies must be absolutely

clear about what type of emergency preparedness audit they are conducting and

must be equally clear in communicating this

information to staff. Is it a policy audit, an

operational audit of practices, or both? If an

institution passes a policy audit, the staff

may assume all is well when in fact the

institution has major problems with practices, procedures, and operations, which

were not within the purview of the policy

audit. Clarity about the purpose and scope

of an audit is essential. (The audit materials

in this guide cover both policies and

practices.)
25

Overview

The intent of the self-audit checklists in this

guide is to help a state department of corrections

or an individual institution evaluate its readiness

to contend with a major emergency. The three

checklists—general emergency readiness,

natural disaster/HAZMAT/fire, and counterterrorism—are extensive but they are not allinclusive. They cannot cover every emergency

preparedness-related issue and detail, and some

of the issues and details that are not covered may

be crucial for a particular agency or institution.

The ultimate decision about what is important in

emergency preparedness must be the province

of each individual department or institution.

Similarly, the fact that an institution does not

meet some of the criteria in the checklists does

not necessarily mean that the institution is

wrong or in jeopardy. For example, if the institution has thoughtfully decided not to purchase

certain equipment or not to include certain policies or procedures, there may be an excellent

reason for that decision. Conversely, however, if

the institution has decided that certain criteria

are important but has not complied with them

or if it simply has never considered some of the

criteria, then the checklists may serve a useful

purpose in stimulating corrective action or consideration of new possibilities.

The checklists in this guide can provide a

framework for a thorough review of emergency

preparedness. Before getting started, however,

the institution or department contemplating such

a review should carefully consider the following

points:

● If the self-audit is not going to be taken seriously and conducted rigorously, it probably

should not be done at all. An audit that

glosses over problems or fails to report deficiencies can create an illusion of emergency

preparedness and may be more dangerous

than no assessment at all.

● The manner in which a department or institution approaches the audit is most important. If top management expects a grade or

scorecard from the audit, then that perspective will be transmitted to subordinate staff,

and the audit process is unlikely to be productive. Management should emphasize that

these are self-audits designed to help the

department or institution review highly

important areas. The audits should be a

source of ideas and constructive change,

not criticism.

How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists

All managers who will be involved with

the self-audit of emergency preparedness

should read these instructions thoroughly

before proceeding. (Some issues discussed

in this section were raised in previous

sections of the guide but bear repeating

here.) 
26

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

● The old computer adage about “garbage in,

garbage out” holds true for these self-audits.

If they are not done carefully and accurately, the results will be misleading. If auditors

are unsure about an item, they should check

it out or leave it blank. Guessing and assuming will defeat the purpose of the audit.

● Top management should schedule a meeting

to review audit findings as soon as the audit

team has completed the checklists. All

appropriate administrators and managers

should attend. During the extensive fieldtesting of the self-audit materials, review

meetings were strongly correlated with the

usefulness of the self-audit process to the

department or institution involved. Without

such meetings, a department or institution

might never address the problems a careful

self-audit can reveal.

These audits are not intended to take a long time

to complete. In field testing, the time required

for audit teams (typically two to four staff) to

complete the earlier version of the largest checklist ranged from 8 hours to 2 days. 

What will actually be needed to conduct a selfaudit? Each of the three audits will require two

to four assigned staff (see “Who Should

Conduct the Audit” for staff qualifications).

Auditors will require 1 to 2 days of uninterrupted time to complete each checklist. They will

need full access to all areas of the institution, to

staff who manage specialized functions in an

emergency (e.g., the CERT leader and hostage

negotiators), and to all relevant policies, procedures, and other written documents. (Access to

all areas during all shifts is especially critical

because, as stated earlier, it is more important to

audit practices than to audit documents.) The

self-audits will not require any specialized

equipment or unusual resources.

A Note About Minimum-Security

Facilities

A small or minimum-security facility typically does not have the same set of risks for

emergency situations as a large, highsecurity prison. (This fact illustrates the

importance of good risk assessment as a

starting point for emergency preparedness.) A minimum-security facility may have

a relatively low risk of large-scale disturbances or planned hostage incidents and so

may understandably choose not to maintain

its own tactical teams. However, such situations certainly are possible in a minimumsecurity facility, and if a facility does not

have its own tactical team, it needs to

know who would provide one if needed.

Furthermore, compared to many large,

high-security institutions, a small or

minimum-security facility may be at greater

risk for loss of life from some other kinds of

emergencies (e.g., fires, tornadoes). The

point is that most items in the self-audit

checklists for emergency preparedness are

relevant for small or minimum-security

facilities, even though these facilities have

unique considerations (e.g., staff may be

responsible for multiple functions in an

emergency, and the facility may depend

heavily on external resources). In this

sense, emergency readiness is often a

greater challenge for the small or minimumsecurity institution than for the large, highsecurity prison that has far greater

resources.
Section 2. Conducting an Audit: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists

27

Directions

This section provides specific directions for

beginning an audit, completing the audit checklists, and completing a “summary of noncompliance items” for each checklist. (Underlined

words are the actual terms the checklist and

summary forms use to label spaces for entries.)

Examples of completed checklist and summary

pages follow the directions. 

Getting Started

1. The guide contains three assessment documents (self-audit checklists). The first is for

individual institutions and departments of

corrections to use in assessing/evaluating

general emergency readiness. The second

is for individual institutions to use in evaluating preparedness for natural disasters,

HAZMAT situations, and fire. The third is

for institutions and departments to use in

measuring preparedness for terrorist threats

or incidents. Each checklist is separate and

freestanding. Make sure you have the right

document.

2. Make as many photocopies of each checklist

as needed. For example, if you will be

auditing seven institutions and you want

two copies for each institution, plus some

extras, you may want to start by making

20 copies of the original. Retain the original, unmarked, for future reference and use.

3. Also make copies of the noncompliance

summary sheet at the end of each checklist.

Auditors complete this summary for use by

management in reviewing the audit results.

In field testing, auditors typically needed

between 5 and 15 of the summary sheets for

each checklist. A particular institution may

need fewer or more, depending on how

many items are “partially met,” “not met,”

or “not applicable” (see below). Note that

the format of the summary sheet is the same

for all three checklists, but the title at the top

is different for each, to prevent confusion.

4. One person should be in charge of the audit.

That person need not conduct the entire

audit alone but should direct and supervise

every aspect of it. The person selected to

lead the audit should be high enough in the

organization to be aware of all necessary

information. The selection should send the

appropriate message to staff regarding the

importance of the audit to the institution or

department.

5. Plan to conduct the audit without interruption, in a relatively short period of time. It

should not take months to complete, and it

should not stop while individual items are

A Note About Sections 4–6 in This Guide

Reading the sections that follow the checklists—National Survey of Emergency Readiness in

Prisons, Resource Materials, and Case Studies—is not a prerequisite for completing the selfaudits. These materials are intended to provide additional background information, a thoughtprovoking source of new ideas and approaches, and some “lessons learned” in responding

to prison emergencies. However, because terrorism is a relatively new concern for prisons,

correctional decisionmakers and auditors should find it useful to read the monograph “Prisons

and Counterterrorism” (see section 5, Resource Materials) before undertaking a counterterrorism

self-audit.
28

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

fixed or brought into compliance. (However,

as noted earlier, if the team discovers a lifethreatening problem, it should report the

situation to management immediately.) 

6. Before attempting to complete a checklist,

read the “Glossary of Terms” that follows

these directions. Every department has some

unique terminology, and the same term may

mean two different things in two different

departments. Some ambiguity about terminology may be inevitable in these generic

checklists, but the glossary should help to

minimize this problem. 

Completing the Checklists

7. On the first page of the checklist, enter the

facility name, the audit team leader’s name,

and the names of everyone on the team.

Print the names. 

8. Each item on the checklists has two blanks

to be filled in: status and method. The items

do not have to be taken in the order presented, but all items must be completed. 

9. Status. For every item, enter a code in the

status box: MC (“meets criterion”), PM

(“partially meets criterion”), NM (“criterion

not met”), or NA (“not applicable”). Choose

just one status code for each item. Make

no other entry in the status box. 

Determining status. For some items, the distinction between MC and PM, for example,

will be a difficult judgment call. In assigning status to items, try to be rigorous and

consistent. Remember that an item checked

MC probably will not be reviewed further.

Items checked with any of the other three

status codes should, however, be subject to

further discussion and review.

Substitutes. If the institution or department

does not have the specific item mentioned

in the checklist but has something else that

serves the same purpose, enter NM for that

item rather than MC. The management

review will determine whether what is in

place is comparable to or better than what

is specified in the checklist.

Written policies. Several checklist items ask

for specific written policies. Do not check

MC just because almost all staff understand

something to be informal policy (even

though it is not written) or just because a

group of related items are scattered throughout procedural manuals (where they would

be of little use during an emergency). The

institution or department may follow a particular procedure regularly, but if the checklist asks whether that procedure is “required

by policy” and it is not part of written policy, then the status box should show NM.

10. Method. For every item, enter in the

method box the code(s) for the method(s)

used to determine status: OB (“observed”),

DR (“document review”), SI (“staff interview”), II (“inmate interview”), and/or OT

(“other”). You may enter more than one

method. This is not like the status box,

where only one entry is permissible. Enter

all of the methods actually used. If you

enter OT, specify the other method used. 

11. Comments. Use this field to record notes

about an item’s status or the audit process.

Keep in mind that the noncompliance summary (see below) requires explanations for

any items not coded MC. The comments

field also provides extra space for describing “other” audit methods (OT entries in

the method box). 

12. When every item on a page has been completed, the audit leader should print his or her

name at the bottom of the page and date it

(unless another audit team member has completed all items on the page, in which case

that team member should sign and date the

page at the bottom).
Section 2. Conducting an Audit: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists

29

13. NC#. When the entire checklist is complete,

the audit team leader should fill in the NC#

(noncompliance number) boxes at the far

right of the form. The objective here is to

create a numbered list of items subject to

management review. Starting on the first

page of the checklist, use the NC# boxes

to number consecutively all items except

those with the code MC.

Summary of Noncompliance Items

14. At the end of each checklist is a page titled

“Summary of Noncompliance Items.” The

purpose of this summary is to list all items

that did not fully meet criteria (i.e., all items

coded PM, NM, or NA) and to explain the

reasons for noncompliance. As noted above,

management will use this summary in its

review of the audit results. The audit team

leader completes the first three columns of

the summary (entries may be typed or handwritten). The other columns are completed

during the management review. 

15. Audit team leader. Using as many copies

of the summary page as necessary, list every

item numbered in the NC# boxes in the

checklist (i.e., every item not coded MC).

First, enter the NC# (entries should be in

NC# order). Below the NC#, enter the

status code and the method code. (Thus,

for each noncompliance item, you will

make three entries in the first column:

NC#, status code, and method code.) Under

Item Description, briefly summarize the

item (as a convenience, so reviewers will

not have to refer back to the checklist).

Under Reason for Noncompliance, explain

why the item was marked PM, NM, or NA.

(Be brief, clear, and forthright. If there is no

clear reason, leave the space blank. Do not

invent an explanation.) At the top of each

page, enter your name, the date the page

was completed, and the page number. 

16. Management review. Use the noncompliance summary to document management

response for each noncompliance item.

Under Assigned To, enter the name of the

person assigned responsibility for bringing

the item into compliance (leave blank until

the item is reviewed and an assignment is

made). Under Due Date, enter the date

compliance is to be completed (enter a date

only if the item has been assigned). The

administrator responsible for reviewing the

audit results should sign his or her name

under Approved By and date the signature

under Approval Date after he or she has

reviewed and approved the corrective action.

(Typically, the reviewer should not be a

member of the audit team. Different administrators may review different items, or one

administrator may review all items.) 
30

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

The Management Review Meeting: Translating Audit Results Into Action

The management review meeting may be the most crucial element in the entire emergency audit

process. If the meeting is not attended by the "right" people (the institution’s top managers) or if management’s consideration of the audit results is superficial or defensive, the entire audit effort may be

rendered useless. 

For most institutions, the management review process will be lengthy—two or more meetings may

be required to complete the work. Management must be willing to consider policy and practices in

detail. For any particular item, it may be tempting to conclude that "what we are doing is more than

adequate." However, managers should never reach that decision without understanding why the

audit instrument includes the criterion in question—i.e., specifically how the criterion relates to best

practices in emergency preparedness and how the institution’s practices differ from the criterion. 

As with so many other areas of corrections, there is no substitute for strong leadership in management reviews of emergency audit results. If the warden or other top manager is in and out of the

review meeting and appears superficial, uninterested, or dismissive in responding to the audit team’s

findings, other staff will follow that lead and the results will be less than constructive. On the other

hand, if the leader clearly is determined to translate audit results into action, other staff will be

inspired to share that commitment.
Section 2. Conducting an Audit: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists

31

Examples of Completed Forms

Completed Page of Self-Audit Checklist
32

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Completed Summary of Noncompliance Items
Section 2. Conducting an Audit: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists

33

Glossary of Terms

After action report: see critical incident

review.

Chain of command: A prioritized list, by job

title, of the individuals who would assume command of the institution in an emergency.

Chain of custody: Procedures and documentation that verify who is in possession of evidence, the location of the evidence, and the

integrity of the evidence at every point in time.

Command post: The location from which the

emergency operation is directed and controlled.

It is almost always in or at the institution experiencing the emergency and is the place from

which the commander works.

Commander:

Initial commander: The person in charge

of the institution and the emergency at the

beginning of a large-scale crisis.

Ultimate commander: The individual, by

job title, who assumes and maintains authority over the institution and the emergency

once he or she arrives and is briefed. The

person who remains in charge until the

emergency has been resolved.

Contingent contracting: A formal agreement

for crucial services that may only be required

during or after an emergency. Typically, the

agreement includes either an annual retainer or a

rate of compensation that is substantially above

market, to guarantee that the institution will

receive highest priority for the services or equipment in an emergency.

Correctional Emergency Response Team

(CERT): See tactical team.

Cover group: A group of staff sent to the location of a reported emergency, with responsibility

for isolating and containing the emergency.

Critical incident review: A comprehensive and

factual review of a major emergency, with

emphasis on “lessons learned.” Also referred to

by some agencies as an “after action report.”

Critical indicator system: Mathematical or

other analytic procedure that produces a summary of the frequency of certain events and the

trend of those frequencies over time. Such

events may include grievances per month,

inmate-inmate assaults per month, inmate disciplinary actions per month, percentage of

inmates in protective custody by month, etc.

Deactivation checklist: A list of actions and

procedures to be followed immediately after the

resolution of a major emergency. See also stepdown plan.

Defend in place: Also called “safe harbor.” An

alternate strategy to mass evacuation of a facility to another location, used when time or circumstances make mass evacuation impractical.

This strategy differs with type of emergency but

usually involves concentrating inmates and staff

in the easiest locations to defend and then further mitigating risk with equipment, supplies, or

specialized procedures.

Desert island operations: A plan to operate an

institution for an extended period of time without

contact or assistance from outside the facility—

for example, if a hurricane and flood cut off all

road access and communications, and air access

is impossible because of severe weather.

Disturbance control team: A sublethal force

team, or riot squad, that is trained to clear a yard

or retake a cell block where there is an inmate

disturbance. A disturbance control team usually

trains with shields, batons, and chemical agents.

It is distinguished from a tactical team that

trains with firearms.
34

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Emergency operations center (EOC): A 

physical location—a situation room or “war

room”—set up and staffed to provide high-level

administrative support in an emergency, usually

at a headquarters or regional office. The EOC is

distinguished from a command post, which is

usually set up onsite to direct the emergency

operation. 

Emergency post orders: A job description for a

specialized function that only exists in an emergency, or for a function that is different during

an emergency than it is day to day.

Emergency staff services (ESS): A planned

operation providing comprehensive support and

assistance to traumatized staff members and

families of staff, during and after an emergency.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA): By law, each state must maintain a

state emergency management agency that coordinates with FEMA, the federal agency charged

with building and supporting the nation’s emergency management system. The names of the

various state emergency agencies differ

markedly. 

Fireloading: The amount of potentially combustible material available to contribute to the

growth of a fire. In prisons, this term is often

used to refer to the amount of inmate personal

property (magazines, clothing, etc.) in cells, but

more properly it also includes material in corridors, storerooms, or anywhere else a fire might

reach.

Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) team: A

team that is trained to deal with toxic gas releases, chemical spills, etc. HAZMAT teams may be

public or private and vary widely in training and

capabilities.

Initial response checklist: Also known as command post checklist. A prioritized list of actions

to be taken by the initial commander at the

onset of an emergency. It should include

columns for initials and time next to each item.

It is generic rather than specific to a particular

type of emergency.

Intelligence function: In day-to-day operations,

a person or persons in charge of coordinating

information about certain types of security

threats and problems for the entire institution. In

an emergency, the intelligence function is an

operation designed to help resolve the situation

by developing information about motives, plans,

identities, etc., of the inmates or victims

involved.

Job action: A strike, “blue flu,” or other crisis

caused by staff acting in concert and intentionally interfering with the operation of the

institution.

Planned use of force: The use of force in a situation where time and circumstances allow

some degree of planning, marshaling of

resources, and supervisory or management

review and direction. The opposite of “reactive

use of force.”

Plot map: Also called a plat map. For a prison,

a map or diagram of the grounds or compound

showing buildings, fences, and other developments to scale. “As built” plans and diagrams

often differ from “initial design” plans and diagrams; current “as built” plans and diagrams are

preferable for almost all emergency purposes.

Risk assessment: An examination of an institution’s relative exposure to various types of

emergencies. Determines which emergencies are

most probable and which areas of the institution

are most vulnerable. See also vulnerability

analysis.

Safe harbor. See defend in place.

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team:

See tactical team.
Section 2. Conducting an Audit: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists

35

Step-down plan: A plan for how an institution

will return to normal operations after an emergency. See also deactivation checklist.

Sublethal force: Force that is not reasonably

expected to produce death or permanent bodily

injury. Sublethal force includes use of chemical

agents, pain-compliance holds, batons, electronic immobilizing devices, water hoses, etc. Also

referred to as “less than lethal” or “less lethal”

force.

Table-top exercise: An emergency simulation

involving a small group of staff and conducted

verbally or with paper and pencil but without

any role playing or use of actual prison facilities

or extended agencies. Essentially, a hypothetical

problem given to staff to work on in an office

setting.

Tactical team: A weapons team trained for situations such as hostage rescue and firearms

assault. Distinguished from a disturbance control team or sublethal force team. Many tactical

teams are called SWAT (Special Weapons and

Tactics), CERT (Correctional Emergency

Response Team), or some similar acronym.

Tone: The “climate” or interpersonal atmosphere of an institution, sensed by experienced

staff when walking through the institution.

Turnout gear: Outer clothing worn for firefighting. Typically a jacket and pants, worn with

a hat and high boots. Key characteristics are a

waterproof/water-resistant outer fabric and the

ability to protect the skin from burns and blistering due to radiant heat.

Vulnerability analysis: A detailed review of an

institution’s areas, functions, people, equipment,

procedures, etc., to determine relative risks and

the attractiveness of various targets. This term is

commonly used with regard to counterterrorism

activities, whereas risk assessment—a similar

concept—is more frequently used with regard

to general emergency readiness and natural

disasters.
Section 3

Self-Audit Checklists
Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist

Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP-Outline

Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP-1

Summary of Noncompliance Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP-Noncompliance Summary

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist

Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-Outline

Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-1

Summary of Noncompliance Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-Noncompliance Summary

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist

Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-Outline

Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-1

Summary of Noncompliance Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-Noncompliance Summary

In This 

Section
EP-Outline

I. Emergency System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–1

II. Role of Central Office During Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–7

III. Emergency System Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–10

IV. Prevention of Major Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–12

V. Institutional Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–19

VI. Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–21

VII. Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–22

VIII. Staff Specialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–27

IX. Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–35

X. External Agency Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–36

XI. Emergency Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–40

XII. Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–51

XIII. Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–53

XIV. Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–56

XV. Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–63

XVI. Extended Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–65

XVII. Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–66

XVIII. Emergency Staff Services (ESS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–70

XIX. Medical Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EP–72

Emergency Preparedness 

Self-Audit Checklist: Outline
EP-1

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist

INSTITUTION(S): _____________________________________________________________ DEPARTMENT: ________________________________

TEAM LEADER: ______________________________________________________________

AUDIT TEAM: _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

I. Emergency System

A. Is there a philosophy statement or 

mission statement governing major 

emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Is there a statement of the institution’s 

goals or objectives in major 

emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Emergency Policies

1. Command

a. Does policy specify who is in initial 

command of the institution in an 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy specify who is in 

ultimate (final) command of the 

institution in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy specify the 

institutional chain of command 

in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-2

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

d. Does policy state any limitations 

on the authority of the person in 

command during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Does policy specify how to 

change command in an 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Notifications

a. Does policy specify the 

notifications to be made by 

the institution in a major 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy include a priority 

level or order in which those 

notifications will be made?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy mandate notification 

of the department’s central or 

regional office in the event of 

a major emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy specify the role of 

the central office during an 

emergency and the relationship 

of the institution to the central 

office during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-3

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

3. Use of Force

a. Does policy differentiate between 

planned use of force and reactive 

use of force?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy state the conditions 

under which the institution may 

engage in the planned use of 

lethal force during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy state the conditions 

under which the institution may 

engage in the planned use of 

sublethal force during an 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. If planned use of lethal force is 

necessary, does policy state 

who will use such force?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. If planned use of sublethal force

is necessary, does policy state 

who will use such force?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

f. Does policy specify minimum 

standards (training, equipment, 

etc.) for individuals who may 

engage in planned use of lethal 

force?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-4

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

g. Does policy specify minimum 

standards (training, equipment, 

etc.) for individuals who may 

engage in planned use of 

sublethal force?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Public Information

a. Does policy identify who at the 

institution will deal with the media 

during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy specify who at the 

institution has the authority to 

release information during a major 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy explain how media 

operations will be coordinated 

between the institution and the 

department’s central or regional 

offices during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy identify who will 

manage rumor control during 

an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Does policy identify who will be 

responsible for communicating 

with the local community in an 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-5

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

5. Training

a. Does policy provide minimum 

requirements for training all staff 

in emergency preparedness?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy provide additional 

minimum requirements for training

staff at shift command level and 

above?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy include specific 

requirements for training various 

staff specialists (negotiators, 

public information officers [PIOs], 

etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy provide standards for 

both initial and annual/refresher 

training for emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Does policy specify training 

standards for inmates (fire 

evacuation, tornado, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Deviation From Policy

a. Does policy identify which 

individuals have the authority 

to deviate from policy?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-6

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

b. Does policy outline responsibilities 

of a staff member if he/she is 

ordered to deviate from policy 

in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Does policy require that one individual 

at the institution have overall 

responsibility for emergency 

preparedness?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Does department policy require one 

individual to be responsible for 

emergency preparedness 

departmentwide?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Evacuation

a. Does policy require detailed plans 

for an offsite (out-of-compound) 

evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy require detailed plans 

for an onsite (out-of-buildings) 

evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Hostage Incidents

a. Is there a policy statement 

specifying that persons taken 

hostage have no rank or authority 

and that staff will not comply 

with orders from a person held 

hostage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
b. Is there a policy statement listing 

nonnegotiable items?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Employee Job Action

a. Does the institution maintain a plan 

(or an appendix to a generic 

emergency plan) for responding 

to a strike or other employee job 

action (e.g., “blue flu”)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Is each institution required to keep 

its plan for employee job actions 

confidential and to distribute the 

plan only to a designated group of 

top managers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

II. Role of Central Office

During Emergencies

A. Does the department’s central office 

have its own emergency plan for an 

institutional emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the plan outline rules and 

responsibilities for various individuals 

in the central office?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are interagency responsibilities detailed 

in the plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Criterion Comments

EP-7

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-8

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

D. Does the central office’s emergency 

plan include a public information plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the central office’s emergency plan 

include a resource allocation plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the plan specify how the central 

office will communicate with unaffected 

institutions during the emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the central office’s plan outline 

responsibilities for communicating with 

the Governor’s office and the legislature?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Does the central office’s plan include a

duty officer system or other 24-hour 

notification method?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

1. Does the central office’s plan call for 

establishing an EOC during an 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the location of the EOC specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-9

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

3. Are an adequate number of telephones 

(or telephone jacks) at that location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is adequate radio communication 

available at that location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Can an open phone line be maintained 

between the EOC and the institution 

experiencing the crisis?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are current emergency plans for 

each institution available in the EOC?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Is the EOC equipped with diagrams 

of each institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Does the EOC have broadcast and 

cable television, an am/fm radio, and 

a video recorder?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Does the central office’s plan outline 

EOC security procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-10

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

10. Is the EOC large enough for the 

number of individuals necessary 

to staff it?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Does the central office have a separate 

plan or plans for an emergency that 

occurs in the central office (fire, natural 

disaster, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

III. Emergency System Review

A. Audit Procedure

1. Is there a departmentally specified 

procedure for auditing each 

institution’s emergency system?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the institution conduct an 

annual review or audit of its 

emergency preparedness system?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does that review or audit team 

include individuals from outside 

the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Emergency Tests/Drills

1. Is there a standard for how often the 

institution must run emergency 

tests/drills?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-11

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

2. If yes, has that standard been met 

during the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are monitors always assigned to 

evaluate emergency tests/drills?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are monitors and/or evaluators trained 

and authorized to temporarily or 

permanently stop an emergency 

exercise, drill, or simulation in the 

event of a serious safety or security 

problem?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are monitors trained to evaluate 

tests/drills and provide both verbal 

and written assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Do policies or procedures require 

monitors and/or evaluators to debrief 

staff involved in drills and exercises, 

pointing out strengths and 

weaknesses observed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are written evaluations of every 

test/drill required from those 

monitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-12

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

8. Are recommendations required as 

part of each monitor’s evaluation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Are the monitors’ evaluations and 

recommendations of emergency 

tests/drills routinely reviewed and 

approved by someone in authority?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Does policy require that some 

emergency tests/drills be conducted 

on evenings and weekends and on 

all shifts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Is there a requirement that emergency 

tests/drills be based on a wide variety 

of emergency scenarios and based 

on the risk assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

IV. Prevention of Major Emergencies

A. Management Philosophy 

1. Is prevention of major emergencies 

stressed at management meetings?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Do managers consistently review 

prevention issues with subordinates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does management stress early 

intervention in problem situations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-13

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

4. Does management stress the need 

for frequent, open communication 

between staff and inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Does management monitor staff/

inmate communication issues?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Does management aggressively 

monitor the “tone” (climate) of the 

institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Does each institution top manager 

visit and review all areas of the 

institution at least twice per month?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Are visits by institution top managers 

to various areas of the prison 

documented?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are all staff trained to recognize the 

traditional signs of impending trouble 

(stockpiling commissary items, more 

racial grouping than usual, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-14

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

C. Does the institution use a “critical 

indicator system” (mathematical/

statistical charting of trends in inmate 

grievances, assaults, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Is there an institutionwide formalized 

intelligence function (as distinguished 

from security threat group operations or 

institutional investigations)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Classification

1. Is there an objective inmate 

classification system?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the classification system followed 

rigorously?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Is there a system that identifies and 

manages high-risk inmates (escape 

risks, racists, violent psychotics, 

assault risks, security threat groups, 

etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is there an intelligence file containing 

names and pictures of those inmates 

likely to plan serious violence or 

likely to become inmate leaders 

during an insurrection?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-15

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

F. Security

1. Does the institution do random 

urinalysis testing of inmates for 

illegal drugs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is there some other (other than 

urinalysis testing) specified drug 

interdiction program?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does the institution define 

contraband?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Does the institution perform random 

cell searches for contraband?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Is there a minimum standard for the 

number of random cell searches 

performed in a given time period?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Has that cell search standard been 

met during the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-16

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

7. Is there a log for the institution or for 

each area that lists all random 

searches of cells or areas of the 

prison?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Does the institution perform random 

security inspections of cells (bars, 

locks, vents, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is there a minimum standard for 

the number of random security 

inspections of cells performed in 

a given time period?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Has that cell security inspection 

standard been met during the last 

12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Is there a log for the institution or for 

each area that lists all random 

security inspections?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Are day-to-day security issues 

monitored closely and regularly by 

managers and supervisors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-17

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

13. Are supervisors and managers 

required to file written reports 

regularly evaluating security 

practices?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Are staff held accountable for 

security lapses through the use of 

corrective actions, remedial training, 

counseling, or discipline?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

15. Is security equipment organized and 

maintained in good working order?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. Are there inspections of the internal 

and external areas of each housing 

unit on a daily basis?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

17. Are such daily housing unit 

inspections logged or otherwise 

documented?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

18. Is there a standard specifying the 

frequency of inspections of the 

perimeter security checks, vehicle 

and pedestrian entrances, gates, 

sally ports, visiting areas, control 

centers, and administration areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
Criterion Comments

EP-18

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

19. Are all of those security inspections 

logged or otherwise documented?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

20. If there is such a standard (item 18 

above), has the institution met that 

standard for the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

21. Is there a security inspection/review 

of tool control and key control at least 

monthly, and are such inspections/

reviews documented?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Inmate Grievance System

1. Is there an inmate grievance system?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Has the inmate grievance system 

been certified or reviewed and 

approved by an outside agency such 

as the U.S. Department of Justice or 

the courts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does management stress the 

importance of treating all inmate 

grievances seriously?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-19

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

4. Does management regularly review 

the substance of inmate grievances?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Is there a monthly summary of all 

grievances, including subject, area 

of institution, and numbers upheld 

and denied?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

V. Institutional Emergency Plans

A. Does the department require institutional 

emergency plans to be written in a 

standardized format?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the department have a formal 

approval procedure for institutional 

emergency plans?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the approval procedure for 

institutional emergency plans include a 

requirement that a manager from the 

department’s central or regional office 

review and approve each institutional plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution have a single, 

comprehensive emergency plan 

(versus individual plans for various 

emergencies)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-20

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

E. Did the institution’s emergency plan go 

through a formal approval procedure, 

and is the plan signed and dated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Has the institution’s emergency plan 

been formally reviewed during the 

preceding 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the plan include a distribution list 

showing locations and/or individuals 

who have copies of the plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is each copy of the plan identified by a 

unique number or letter, and is there an 

inventory system for the copies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Does the emergency plan include a 

procedure for documenting changes 

and updates to the plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Checklists

1. Does the plan include an initial 

response (command post) checklist?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the plan include procedures for 

specific types of emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#

Criterion Comments
Criterion Comments

EP-21

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

3. Does the plan include job-specific 

checklists to be used during 

emergencies (emergency post 

orders)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Does the plan include a deactivation 

checklist?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Is the institution emergency plan tailored 

to that specific institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

VI. Risk Assessment

A. Does the institution’s emergency plan 

require an annual risk assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are executive staff and emergency 

specialists required to review the 

annual risk assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Is the section on risk assessment 

specific to that institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the risk assessment include 

identification of those emergencies 

judged most likely to occur at that 

institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-22

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

E. Does the risk assessment identify 

institutional “hot spots”?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the risk assessment include 

evaluation of the security of control 

centers, armory, emergency generators, 

and perimeters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the risk assessment include 

provisions for mitigating those risks that 

could be reasonably reduced?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Does the risk assessment include an 

evaluation of changes in the inmate 

population and how those changes 

affect risk and vulnerability? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

VII. Preparation

A. Emergency Notifications

1. Are home phone, cell phone, and 

pager numbers of key staff 

immediately available in the initial 

command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Are home phone, cell phone, and 

pager numbers available for staff 

specialists (PIOs, negotiators, etc.) 

as well as for top managers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-23

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

3. Are key emergency staff and top 

management staff contact phone 

numbers maintained separately from 

general staff recall phone lists?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are general staff recall phone 

procedures organized by geographic 

proximity to the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are staff emergency notification lists 

(next of kin) updated annually?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are staff emergency notification lists 

available to the commander in an 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are there special ID cards to expedite 

entry of outside emergency 

personnel?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Is there a system to minimize the 

number of calls the control center 

must make in an emergency (e.g., 

phone trees)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Are there phone lines that can be 

restricted to only outgoing calls 

in the event of an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-24

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

10. Does the institution have rapid-dial 

or auto-dial equipment to assist with 

emergency staff recalls?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Plot Plans

1. Are plot plans/blueprints for every 

area of the institution available in the 

command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Do plot plans show location and type 

of all emergency utility cutoffs 

(electric, water, gas, oil, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Do plot plans show all secondary fire 

access doors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Do plot plans show the size or volume 

of all rooms and buildings in the 

institution (in case chemical agents 

must be used)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Do plot plans show direction doors 

and windows open?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Do plot plans show emergency 

escape routes for various areas of 

the institution in case of a hostage 

incident or insurrection?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-25

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

7. Do plot plans show all fire 

extinguishers, standpipes, and fire 

hose locations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Does the institution have current 

video of all areas showing entry, 

egress, windows, door operation, 

and floor layout?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is there a mechanism to update 

emergency plot plans if routine or 

scheduled maintenance is done?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Can the institution disable all inmate 

pay phones and/or outside phones?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. In an emergency, can staff disable 

inmate access to television?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are all roofs painted with numbers or 

letters for helicopter identification? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-26

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

F. Are all buildings labeled with large 

letters or numbers on all sides for 

immediate identification by outside 

agency staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is an inventory of serious staff medical 

conditions available to the commander 

during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is a list of staff blood types available 

to the commander in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Is there a written plan for dealing 

with inmate family members who may 

come to the institution during an 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Is there a plan for providing phone 

information on the status of individual 

inmates to family members during a 

lengthy emergency or evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Is there an inventory of staff foreign 

language skills (including sign 

language) available to the command 

post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-27

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

L. Is there a group of staff trained in 

search and rescue for individuals in 

the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Are there written procedures for 

command post security during an 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Is there a plan for operating food 

service during a major emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Is there an emergency plan for 

facilities maintenance engineering? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

VIII. Staff Specialists

A. Tactical Teams

1. Does the institution have a tactical 

team trained to respond to emergency 

situations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. If the institution does not have its own 

tactical team, have clear, detailed 

arrangements been made with an 

external tactical team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-28

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

3. Are the tactical team structure and 

minimum size specified in writing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is the tactical team currently at or 

above minimum strength?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Does the tactical team have an 

identified leader and assistant 

leader?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are the minimum training standards 

for the tactical teams specified in 

writing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Is the tactical team currently in 

compliance with its minimum training 

standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Is there a medical person (nurse, 

med tech, etc.) attached to the 

tactical team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is there a video operator attached to 

the tactical team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-29

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

10. Are equipment standards specified for 

the tactical team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Does the tactical team’s equipment 

currently meet those standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Does the tactical team train with 

command-level staff and negotiators?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Does the tactical team practice with 

a wide variety of scenarios?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Are tactical team members available 

by pager?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

15. Does the tactical team include 

snipers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. Are snipers trained to work with 

spotters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-30

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

17. Are team members’ leave and 

vacation schedules coordinated to 

ensure team availability?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Disturbance Control

1. Does the institution have a 

disturbance control team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. If the institution does not have its own 

disturbance control team, have clear, 

detailed arrangements been made 

with an external disturbance control 

team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are the disturbance control team 

structure and minimum size specified 

in writing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is the disturbance control team 

currently at or above minimum 

strength?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Does the disturbance control team 

have an identified leader and 

assistant leader?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are the minimum training standards 

for the disturbance control team 

specified in writing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-31

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

7. Is the disturbance control team 

currently in compliance with its 

minimum training standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Is there a medical person (nurse, 

med tech, etc.) attached to the 

disturbance control team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is there a video operator attached to 

the disturbance control team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Are minimum equipment standards 

specified for the disturbance control 

team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Does the disturbance control team’s 

equipment currently meet those 

standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Are all team members current with 

baton training?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Are all team members current with 

chemical agent training?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-32

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

14. Have all team members had training 

in restraint and transport techniques?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

15. Are all team members current with 

CPR and first aid training?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Hostage Negotiators

1. Does the institution have its own 

trained negotiators?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. If not, does the institution have 

detailed arrangements with external 

negotiators who would be used in 

an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. If the institution relies on external 

negotiators, do the arrangements 

guarantee the availability of the 

negotiators to the institution on a 

24-hour basis and with an acceptable 

response time?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is there a written standard for the 

minimum number of negotiators 

available to the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Does the number of currently 

available negotiators meet this 

standard?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-33

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

6. Is there an identified chief negotiator

and assistant chief negotiator?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are there minimum standards for 

initial and refresher training for 

negotiators?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Do all of the institution’s negotiators 

currently meet these training 

standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is the working structure of the 

negotiating team specified in 

writing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Do the negotiators have a portable 

audiotape recorder, throw phone, 

and preprinted negotiation log forms?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Is negotiator availability guaranteed 

by coordinating leave and vacation 

schedules?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Do the negotiators train with the 

command-level staff and with the 

tactical team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-34

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

D. Public Information Officer (PIO)

1. Does the institution have an identified 

PIO?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is there at least one alternate or 

assistant PIO?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are there minimum training standards 

specified for the PIO?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Does the PIO meet these training 

standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Is there a written overview or 

description of the institution available 

for distribution to the media in an 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Is there a procedure for logging and 

returning media phone calls in an 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are there written procedures for 

identifying and escorting media 

personnel in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-35

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

8. Do procedures exist to establish an 

800 information line during an 

extended emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is the required equipment available 

for the identified media center during 

an emergency (podium, easel, 

microphone and sound system, 

departmental seal, phone jacks, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

IX. Training

A. Do new security staff receive at least 

8 hours of training on the emergency 

plan and emergency procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does this training include hostage 

situations, riots, disasters, and other 

emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Do new civilian (nonsecurity) staff 

receive at least 4 hours of training on 

the institution’s emergency plan and on 

emergency preparedness?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Have all institution staff at the level of 

shift commander and above received 

at least 20 hours of formal training on 

emergency preparedness?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-36

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

E. Have all institution staff at the level of 

shift commander and above participated 

in emergency preparedness exercises/

drills?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Have all institution staff received at 

least 4 hours of training on emergency 

situations during the last 2 years?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Has the institution conducted emergency 

exercises or simulations during the last 

year that involved external (mutual aid) 

agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

X. External Agency Agreements

A. Does the institution have written 

agreements for assistance during an 

institutional emergency with the 

following external agencies

1. State police?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Local police?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Local sheriff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-37

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

4. Nearby correctional institutions 

(including county jails, federal 

prisons, U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. National Guard?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. State/federal emergency 

management agency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Local fire department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Nearest hazardous materials 

(HAZMAT) team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Local phone company?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Utility company(ies)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-38

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

11. Local hospitals?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Ambulance services?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does each written external agency 

agreement include the following

1. Emergency contact names and 

24-hour phone numbers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Services the agency can provide?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Equipment they can provide?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Restrictions on assistance?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Reporting (staging) locations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-39

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

6. Command relationships?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Provision for annual review of 

agreement?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Provision for involvement of the 

external agency in emergency 

simulations and drills at the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Provision for the institution to provide 

assistance in the event of a 

community disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have interagency 

agreements with other institutions 

within the department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Are there written agreements with 

external agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are there specific ordinances, 

regulations, statutes, or verbal 

agreements covering interagency 

operations in emergencies? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-40

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

F. Within the last 12 months, has the 

institution held meetings with all 

external agencies to review and update 

emergency plans and procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XI. Emergency Equipment

A. Is there a comprehensive inventory of 

emergency equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Is such an inventory available to the 

command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the emergency equipment inventory 

current within the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does the inventory include the 

location of each item?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is emergency equipment stored in an 

area accessible to staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Is emergency equipment secured to 

prevent access by inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-41

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

6. Is there an emergency equipment 

testing program to ensure that all 

equipment is serviceable and ready 

for use when needed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Is there a comprehensive motor vehicle 

inventory for the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Is such an inventory readily available 

to the command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the vehicle inventory updated for 

accuracy at least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are the vehicles accessible after 

business hours?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is vehicle fuel available after 

business hours?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Armory

1. Are there written policies and 

procedures for the armory?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-42

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

2. Does policy or departmental 

regulation specify all approved types 

of weaponry, chemical agents, 

ammunition, and other defensive 

equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does policy or departmental 

regulation specify minimum quantities 

of each such weaponry, chemical 

agents, and other defensive 

equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is the armory currently in compliance 

with these policies and procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Is the armory secure from rioting 

inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are armory keys restricted from 

inmate areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Do on-duty staff have immediate 

24-hour access to the armory?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Is the armory inventoried at least 

monthly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-43

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

9. Are discrepancies in the armory 

inventory investigated and 

reconciled?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Is the armory inventory reviewed by 

management?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Is the armory inspected by a 

management-level staff person at 

least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Are ammunition and firearms 

inventoried?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Is there a written procedure for 

checking out weapons and other 

armory equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Is there a procedure to ensure that 

an individual staff member is 

currently qualified in firearm and/or 

chemical agent use prior to issuing a 

firearm and/or chemical agent to that 

individual (except for training or 

qualification purposes)? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

15. Chemical Agents

a. Are there sufficient chemical 

agents to control a large riot at 

the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-44

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

b. Are the pyrotechnic, blast, barrier, 

and aerosol formats available in 

both projectile and throwing 

grenade types?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Are all chemical agents clearly 

dated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Are all chemical agents (except 

those for training use) within 

manufacturers’ shelf life?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Are those chemical agents 

designated for training use clearly 

labeled as such to differentiate 

them from the general inventory 

of chemical agents?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

f. Has the department specified a 

minimum number or percentage of 

security staff who must be 

currently qualified in the use of 

chemical agents, and is the 

institution in compliance with that 

requirement?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

g. Is there a policy requiring 

immediate medical screening/

treatment for offenders and staff 

who have been exposed to 

chemical agents?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-45

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

h. Are chemical agents stored in a 

secure location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

i. Do duty staff have immediate 

24-hour access to stored 

chemical agents?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. Firearms

a. Considering the size and nature 

of the institution, is there an 

adequate supply of firearms?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Are the types of firearms and 

ammunition appropriate for the 

nature of the institution and for 

the location and function of armed 

posts at the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Are all firearms cleaned, 

inspected, tested, and sighted on 

a regular schedule?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Has the department specified a 

minimum number or percentage of 

security staff who must be 

currently qualified in the use of 

firearms, and is the institution in 

compliance with that requirement?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-46

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

e. Do duty staff have immediate 

24-hour access to stored firearms?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution’s emergency 

equipment include the following:

1. An adequate supply of flexcuffs 

(four times the entire inmate 

population)? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. An adequate supply of steel 

restraints?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. A supply of binoculars?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. A supply of flashlights and batteries?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Distraction devices (flash-bang 

grenades)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Bomb blanket?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-47

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

7. Long-handled corner (90-degree) 

mirror?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Loud hailers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. High-visibility clothing 

(fluorescent vests, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Portable smoke ejectors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Portable emergency generator? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Portable lighting?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. High-speed cutting torch?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Bolt cutters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-48

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

15. Radio with a tactical channel?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. An adequate supply of riot shields?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

17. An adequate supply of helmets with 

face shields?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

18. An adequate supply of riot batons?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

19. An adequate supply of potable 

water (48–72 hours)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

20. Fire axes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

21. An adequate supply of gas masks?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-49

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

22. Stun shield(s) or taser(s)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Emergency Keys

1. Are there emergency key rings for all 

buildings and areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is there a set of emergency keys 

outside the perimeter of the 

institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are emergency keys and locks color 

coded for quick identification (red for 

fire, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are emergency keys and locks 

notched for night identification?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are emergency key rings soldered 

or welded closed to prevent 

unauthorized removal of keys?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Do emergency key rings include a 

metal ring disk (“chit”) stamped with 

the name of area the ring accesses 

and the number of keys on that ring?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-50

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

7. Have all emergency keys and locks 

been tested in the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Emergency Generators

1. Is there an emergency generator? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the emergency generator adequate

to run critical areas of the institution 

and critical equipment safely for 

24 hours?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are the critical areas and equipment 

powered by the emergency generator 

documented and annually tested to 

confirm that power is adequate?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is the emergency generator secure 

from inmate sabotage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are staff trained to know which 

systems will be run on emergency 

power and which will be inoperable 

during a main power outage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Is there battery-powered lighting in 

the emergency generator areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-51

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

7. Are the emergency generators 

full-load tested for 10 minutes or more 

at least quarterly to determine that 

they are in proper working order, and 

are such tests documented?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Do all emergency generators have 

sufficient fuel to run for a minimum 

of 72 hours continuously?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. If the emergency generators must be 

started manually in the event of a 

main power outage, are there staff 

on duty on a 24-hour basis who are 

trained to start and operate those 

generators?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Is the diesel fuel for the emergency 

generators checked for mold on a 

regular basis?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XII. Locations

Are the following locations specified in 

the institutional emergency plans:

A. Command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Alternate command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-52

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

C. Command post location outside 

compound?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Media room and/or staging area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Staff/family support area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Inmate family area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Staff staging/reporting area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Mutual aid staging area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. External traffic control points?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-53

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

J. Mass casualty/triage area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Disturbance control team dressing/

assembly area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Tactical team dressing/assembly area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Morgue?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Heliport?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Staff break areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XIII. Procedures

A. Does the institution have a general 

procedure for responding to major 

emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-54

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

B. Do procedures call for audio recording in 

the command post during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Do written procedures specify who will 

keep a log during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Do written procedures call for doubleposting key locations in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does procedure call for relieving staff 

from noncritical posts in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Are there written procedures for 

emergency counts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are there written procedures for 

emergency lockdown?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is there a standard procedure for 

sending staff to investigate a report of 

a developing emergency (a cover group)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-55

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

I. Are there procedures that specify 

accounting for staff, visitors, volunteers, 

etc., in the event of an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. At the onset of a major emergency, could 

the institution quickly account for all 

staff within the institution and determine 

the identities of staff not accounted for?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. At the onset of a major emergency, 

could the institution quickly account for 

all visitors within the institution and 

determine the identities of any visitors 

not accounted for?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Are emergency traffic-control 

procedures specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does procedure call for cutting off 

inmate telephones at the onset of a 

major emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Is there a procedure for briefing on-duty 

and returning staff about the nature of 

an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Does procedure call for informing the 

inmate population of emergency 

conditions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-56

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

P. Is there a procedure for limiting the 

initial staff response to a reported 

emergency to avoid set-up or distraction 

(as opposed to a procedure whereby all 

available staff respond as quickly as 

possible to the location of the reported 

emergency).

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Q. Does the institution have a system of 

first responders?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

R. Does the institution have a system of 

second responders?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XIV. Evacuation

Note: The Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire 

self-audit checklist also includes questions 

pertaining to offsite evacuation plans and 

fire prevention and response. 

A. Is there an evacuation plan for all areas 

of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does every area of the institution have 

a secondary evacuation route?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are evacuation routes posted in all 

areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-57

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

D. Are there battery-powered or emergency 

generator-powered emergency exit 

lights in all living and program areas of 

the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 

(SCBA) Units

1. Are SCBAs available in or adjacent to 

all living areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Are SCBAs stored or hung on walls 

in pairs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are SCBAs examined annually for 

functionality?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are all SCBAs inspected, chargechecked, and tagged at least 

quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Have all staff been medically cleared 

to wear and use SCBAs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Have all staff been trained in the use 

of SCBAs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-58

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

7. Does the SCBA training for all staff 

include donning the SCBA, achieving 

a seal, and then breathing for some 

period of time?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Are staff trained to use SCBAs in 

pairs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Have all staff in the institution had 

refresher training on SCBA use within 

the past 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Fire Drills and Other Fire Safety Measures 

1. Are staff trained in fire evacuation 

procedures for areas currently 

assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Are inmates given orientation on fire 

evacuation procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are fire drills unannounced?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-59

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

4. Are all fire drills 

a. Monitored?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Timed for clearing the area 

in which the drill was held?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Timed for clearing a count of 

inmates evacuated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Evaluated in writing by 

monitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are fire drills conducted on 

all shifts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are there minimum standards for how 

often fire drills must be conducted in 

each area of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Have all areas of the institution met 

this standard within the last 12 

months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-60

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

8. Are fire drill reports, evaluations, and 

plans for improvement reviewed and 

approved by management?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Are fire drill reports and evaluation 

records kept in one central location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Has the local or state fire marshal 

inspected the facility within the past 

year for compliance with state/local 

fire codes and regulations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Has the local or state fire marshal 

approved the number, type, and 

location of fire extinguishers 

throughout the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Are all fire extinguishers inspected, 

charged, and tagged at least 

quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Are all fire hoses and standpipes 

inspected, tested, and tagged at 

least annually?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Does the institution know the actual 

response time for the local fire 

department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-61

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

15. Has fire-fighting equipment been 

brought into institutional areas to 

make sure the equipment can be 

connected and effectively used in 

each area? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. Does the institution have its own fire 

brigade (trained inmates or staff)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

17. Has the institution considered training 

a fire brigade that would serve as a 

first-response force until the fire 

department arrived?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are manual unlocking devices and/or 

backup keys available onsite for 

unlocking every living area of the 

institution 24 hours a day?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is there an offsite evacuation plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. If yes, does the offsite evacuation plan 

include the following:

1. Potential destinations? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-62

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

2. Specific transportation alternatives?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Security procedures during 

evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Which inmate records must be moved 

with inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Procedures for providing medical 

services during and after the 

evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Provisions for coordinating with local 

and state police during the 

evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Arrangements for meal service at the 

new location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Arrangements for inmate 

identification and count at the new 

location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-63

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

9. Arrangements for housing and 

security at the new location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Predetermined evacuation routes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Procedures for protection or 

destruction of confidential records 

that cannot be evacuated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Are there defend-in-place (“safe harbor”)

procedures, equipment, and supplies to 

protect the inmate population in 

emergencies when evacuation is not 

necessary, feasible, or possible?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Have areas been designated as 

defend-in-place within the facility, 

based on the types of potential hazards 

identified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Is facility staff trained on the 

predesignated defend-in-place areas 

and the preparation needed, if any, to 

activate them?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XV. Organizational Structure

A. Is an emergency organizational structure 

defined in detail?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-64

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

B. Are responsibilities specified for 

managing the unaffected portions of the 

institution during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are supervision and direction of the 

cover group (staff initial response group) 

specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Is supervision of perimeter staff during 

an emergency specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Is the responsibility for coordinating 

on-duty and returning staff identified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Is the responsibility for emergency 

equipment detailed and assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is the responsibility for liaison with 

external agencies assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is the intelligence function described 

and responsibility for it assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
Status

Method

Criterion Comments

EP-65

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

I. Is the responsibility for the tactical 

function defined and assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Is the responsibility for coordinating 

emergency staff services (ESS) 

assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Are there written guidelines 

(emergency post orders) available for 

each specialized emergency assignment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Is there an emergency checklist 

available for each specialized 

emergency assignment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XVI. Extended Emergencies

A. Is there a written plan for staffing in an 

extended emergency (beyond 12 hours)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Is responsibility for assignments and 

scheduling in an extended emergency 

assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. In an extended emergency, is the length 

of shift specified by assignment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-66

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

D. Does the plan for extended emergencies 

include provision for staggered relief of 

key positions including the emergency 

response commander?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the plan for extended emergencies 

include arrangements for onsite bivouac 

of key staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the plan for extended emergencies 

include arrangements for bivouac of 

staff on emergency call-back duty?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are relief procedures specified for key 

staff during an extended emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XVII. Aftermath

A. Are damage assessment procedures 

outlined and responsibilities assigned 

in the emergency plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are report writing and debriefing 

procedures detailed in the emergency 

plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Is there a review and approval procedure 

for all reports?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-67

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

D. Is there a procedure for collecting 

audiotapes, videotapes, photos, and/or 

logs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Is there a chain-of-custody procedure 

for all reports, logs, photos, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Is there a procedure for gathering staffgenerated inmate disciplinary reports?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is there a procedure for gathering 

external agency reports?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is a short-term step-down procedure 

required before key staff are relieved 

of duty?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Are crime scene preservation 

procedures specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Are criminal evidence collection and 

preservation procedures detailed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-68

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

K. Is immediate liaison with criminal 

prosecution authorities required?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Is civil liability review mandated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the plan include procedures for 

managing released hostages?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Are medical and psychological 

screenings required for key and/or 

traumatized staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Is a critical incident review mandated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

P. Are critical incident review procedures 

specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Q. Are critical incident reviews shared with 

all institutions in the department? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

R. Is a review of insurance issues 

mandated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-69

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

S. Does the emergency plan specify 

developing a media relations plan as 

part of the aftermath activities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

T. Do procedures specify the identification, 

segregation, and interviews of inmate 

suspects and witnesses?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

U. Do procedures specify releasing 

information to all staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

V. Do procedures specify releasing 

information about emergency status to 

inmate populations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

W. Do procedures require developing a plan 

for communications with the local 

community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

X. Do procedures require a plan for 

regularly briefing central office and 

other branches of government?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Y. Is there a procedure for establishing 

emergency purchasing authority in the 

wake of a major crisis or natural 

disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-70

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

Z. Does the emergency plan include 

procedures to prevent staff retaliation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

AA. Does the emergency plan include 

procedures to deactivate the 

command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XVIII. Emergency Staff Services (ESS)

A. Is there a general plan for ESS?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are responsibilities for ESS during 

emergencies assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are ESS resources for specialized help 

(e.g., trauma counseling) identified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the family support plan include 

child care provisions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the family support plan include 

transportation provisions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the family support plan include 

emergency financial assistance?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-71

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

G. Does the plan include liaison assigned to 

each family of hostage/injured staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is a staff family briefing area identified in 

the ESS plan and is it separate from 

the inmate family area and the media 

briefing area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Does the plan include provision for 

individual and group trauma counseling 

within 48 hours of the incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Does the plan include procedures for 

rehabilitating traumatized staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Are there arrangements for secure 

motel/hotel housing for staff families 

during the incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Is administrative leave mandatory for 

hostage/traumatized staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the plan include death notification 

procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-72

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

XIX. Medical Services

A. Is there a comprehensive medical plan 

for an institutional emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the plan include mass casualties/

triage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are staff trained in blood-borne 

pathogen precautions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Are supplies for safely handling blood or 

other body fluids provided or readily 

available?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the plan include evacuation 

procedures for nonambulatory or 

critically ill inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Is a location other than the infirmary 

identified for mass casualties/triage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the institution have an emergencyequipped medical crash cart?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
EP-73

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

H. Are there adequate numbers of gurneys?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Are backup medical resources for 

emergencies identified in the 

community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC#
EP-Noncompliance Summary

Review of all items on this page completed: Yes________ No________

NAME: _________________________________________________________

SIGNATURE: ____________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

SUMMARY OF NONCOMPLIANCE ITEMS

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist

AUDITOR: ______________________________________________________ PAGE _________ OF __________ 

DATE: _________________________________________________________

Assigned Due Apprvd Apprval

NC # Item Description Reason for Noncompliance To Date By Date

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:
I. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-1

II. Vulnerability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-5

III. Offsite Evacuation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-6

IV. Recovery Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-7

V. Tornado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-8

VI. Earthquake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-10

VII. Flood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-13

VIII. Chemical Spill/HAZMAT Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-14

IX. Hurricane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-16

X. Severe Winter Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-18

XI. Fire Prevention and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-20

ND-Outline

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire 

Self-Audit Checklist: Outline
ND-1

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist

INSTITUTION(S): _____________________________________________________________ DEPARTMENT: ________________________________

TEAM LEADER: ______________________________________________________________

AUDIT TEAM: _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

I. General Considerations

A. Does the institution have policies in 

place specific to natural disaster 

planning, response, and recovery 

operations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution conduct routine 

training in natural disaster response, 

including drills and exercises?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution conduct an annual 

vulnerability analysis (risk assessments) 

for natural disasters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution mitigate the threat of 

natural disasters, where possible, based 

on the vulnerability analysis?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are natural disaster shelter areas 

identified that will maximize protection 

for inmates, staff, and visitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the institution have current mutual 

aid agreements with outside agencies to 

coordinate response activities during a 

natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-2

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

G. Does the institution have emergency 

response plans and checklists specific 

to natural disaster response?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Do the specific emergency response 

plans and checklists include a “defendin-place” strategy for situations where 

evacuation may not be practical or 

possible?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Has the institution identified supplies and 

equipment that may be needed in a 

natural disaster (water, tents, portable 

toilets, portable lighting, blankets, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Does the institution have agreements to 

obtain critical equipment and supplies 

that are not available onsite or that may 

become inoperable during a natural 

disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Does the institution have evacuation and 

relocation plans, alternative sites 

selected, and arrangements and 

agreements for natural disasters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Does the institution have and conduct 

routine tests of early warning systems 

for natural disasters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the institution have a plan to 

operate the institution with reduced 

staffing levels should a natural disaster 

make that necessary?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-3

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

N. Does the institution have an emergency 

staff services (ESS) program available to 

respond to staff and staff family needs in 

the event of a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Does the institution have a public 

information strategy prepared in the 

event of a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

P. Has the institution planned for “desert 

island operations” (operating for an 

extended period without contact or 

assistance from outside) in the event of 

a natural disaster? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Is the institution prepared to maintain 

security and essential services, in the 

event of loss of power or other 

utilities, for as long as 72 hours?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the institution have a 3-day 

supply of potable water onsite or an 

alternate water supply system?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does the institution have a 3-day 

supply of food that would not need 

cooking?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Does the institution have a 3-day 

supply of medications for inmates 

onsite?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-4

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

5. Have staff been encouraged to 

maintain a 3-day supply of their 

medications and an extra pair of 

eyeglasses on site? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Q. Are staff trained in initial response 

procedures specific to natural disasters? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

R. Do staff and inmates participate in severe 

weather drills?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

S. Do the emergency response plans and 

checklists for natural disasters include 

notification of and coordination with the 

department emergency operation center?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

T. Does the institution have current copies 

of the county emergency management 

agency’s emergency operating plan, and 

are those copies kept with or part of the 

institution’s emergency plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

U. Are staff encouraged to maintain a 

family emergency preparedness kit at 

home?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

V. Are staff encouraged to identify family 

relocation areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-5

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

W. Are staff encouraged to identify an 

out-of-area relative or friend for family 

phone contacts and to relay messages? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

II. Vulnerability Analysis 

A. Has the institution’s vulnerability analysis 

been distributed to both county and state 

emergency management agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the vulnerability analysis include 

conditions affecting the institution 

(understaffing, overcrowding, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the vulnerability analysis cover all 

natural disasters for which the institution 

is at risk and include an assessment of 

the degree of risk for each disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the vulnerability analysis include a 

historical review of natural disasters that 

have affected the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the vulnerability analysis include 

an assessment of which people, property, 

facility functions, etc., are at particular 

risk with regard to specific types of 

disasters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Have the vulnerability analysis and 

institution emergency response plans 

for natural disasters been reviewed by 

the county and state emergency 

management agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
Status

Method

Criterion Comments

ND-6

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

G. Have other emergency services external 

agencies reviewed the institution’s 

vulnerability analysis and emergency 

response plans?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

III. Offsite Evacuation Plan

A. Do the institution’s offsite evacuation 

plans account for expected civilian 

evacuation routes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Do the institution’s offsite evacuation 

plans include procedures for maintaining 

security of the facility after evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Do the institution’s offsite evacuation 

plans include procedures for reoccupying 

the facility after the natural disaster 

has concluded?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. If yes, do these procedures include the 

following:

1. Testing of security systems?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Testing of all life lines (telephone, 

electricity, water, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Gradual phase-in of the inmate 

population?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-7

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

4. Evaluation of medical and food 

service facilities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Do the institution’s offsite evacuation 

plans include provisions for moving 

crucial inmate records with the inmate 

population?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Do the institution’s offsite evacuation 

plans include provisions for securing or 

backing up noncrucial inmate records 

that will not be moved during the 

evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the institution have different offsite 

evacuation plans for different types of 

natural disasters (e.g., are the plans for 

a flood different from those for an 

earthquake)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

IV. Recovery Operations

A. Does the institution have a detailed and 

thorough plan for conducting a damage 

assessment after a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution have a plan for 

conducting search and rescue 

operations after a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have a plan for 

management and treatment of mass 

casualties resulting from a natural 

disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-8

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

D. Has the institution identified resources 

(internal and external) necessary for 

cleanup and immediate repair to barriers 

and security systems damaged in a 

natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the institution have written 

procedures for working with insurance 

carriers and/or the state government’s 

risk management agency in the 

aftermath of a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does policy specify that the institution 

will apply to the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) for 

assistance in the aftermath of a natural 

disaster, and does policy designate 

responsibility for submitting that 

application?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

V. Tornado

A. Are there specific tornado procedures in 

the institution’s emergency plans?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution’s vulnerability 

analysis include an evaluation of each 

building’s ability to withstand a tornado?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Have tornado shelter areas been 

identified within the institution? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Do the institution’s response plans 

distinguish between tornado watch and 

tornado warning, and are staff trained 

on this distinction?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-9

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

E. Does the institution have mandatory 

procedures that are enacted in response 

to a tornado watch or warning for the 

area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Are there procedures for evacuating 

towers or other vulnerable staff posts 

in the event of a tornado watch or 

warning?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are there procedures for bringing in 

outside inmate work crews and/or 

moving inmate groups at risk to safety 

in response to a tornado watch or 

warning?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Does the institution have written 

procedures mandating that the yard and 

other outside areas of the facility be 

inspected each spring for objects or 

supplies that might become airborne 

and hazardous in a tornado?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Do staff practice tornado drills at least 

once per year?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Do inmates receive orientation on tornado

response and participate in tornado 

drills at least once per year?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-10

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

K. Do the institution’s emergency plans 

include safety precautions for staff or 

inmates who may be in offices, 

classrooms, or other areas at risk from 

flying glass during a tornado?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Does the institution have a National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA) radio with battery backup and 

warning alarm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Are there tie-downs for trailers and 

portable buildings, anchoring them to 

concrete foundations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Do tornado response plans include 

provisions for sheltering/evacuating 

visitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Do tornado response plans include 

procedures for evaluating damage to 

the security perimeter and making 

short-term repairs as needed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

VI. Earthquake

A. Does the institution have a specific 

response plan for earthquakes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Has the institution evaluated its 

earthquake risk based on proximity to 

fault lines and seismic history of the 

area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-11

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

C. Has the institution evaluated the 

structural ability of each building to 

withstand earthquakes of various 

severities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Has the institution evaluated the 

vulnerability of the following to 

earthquakes: 

1. Emergency power generators and 

fuel storage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Water supply and primary power 

supply?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Natural gas lines and/or propane 

storage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Communication systems, perimeter 

security, armory, infirmary and 

emergency medical services, etc.? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are the institution’s earthquake 

plans based on the ability to be 

self-sufficient onsite for as long 

as 72 hours?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-12

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

F. Are the institution’s maintenance 

plans, diagrams, and architectural 

records available onsite?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are bookcases, appliances, and high, 

heavy objects tied down or anchored 

against walls to mitigate risk in the 

event of an earthquake?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Have hanging objects been identified 

and secured or removed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Has the institution completed a 

structural engineering review of 

earthquake-vulnerable buildings to 

design potential retrofitting with 

foundation ties, sheer wall, foundation 

beams, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Have staff received specific training on 

response to earthquakes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Have inmates received specific training 

on response to earthquakes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Does the institution have contingent 

contracts with structural engineers or 

any other special provision for evaluating 

structural integrity of buildings in the 

aftermath of an earthquake?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-13

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

VII. Flood

A. Has the institution identified and 

posted county emergency management 

agency phone numbers in control rooms 

and other appropriate locations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Has the institution conducted a thorough 

risk assessment of vulnerable areas and 

equipment in the event of rising water?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have detailed plans 

for a complete offsite evacuation in the 

event of a flood?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Have those offsite evaluation plans been 

reviewed carefully within the past 

12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Has the institution practiced or drilled 

with a flood-related offsite evacuation 

scenario within the past 24 months, at 

the level of table-top exercise or above? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the institution have a plan for 

moving expensive or crucial equipment 

in the event of rising water?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is the institution’s offsite evacuation plan 

for flood developed in stages, so it could 

be enacted in response to predetermined 

flood stages or severity of warning?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-14

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

H. Does the institution have access to small 

boats or rafts that could be used for 

search and rescue operations with rising 

flood waters at the facility?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Do the institution’s flood plans include 

an analysis of which access and egress 

routes would be rendered unusable at 

various flood stages, along with 

alternate access and egress plans for 

those flood stages?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Do the institution’s response plans 

distinguish between flood watch and 

flood warning and are staff trained on 

this distinction? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

VIII. Chemical Spill/HAZMAT Incident

A. Has the institution analyzed the 

surrounding area for potential hazardous 

material situations such as chemical 

factories, fertilizer manufacturing, and 

chemical storage or transportation 

routes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. If such an analysis of the area has been 

done, does it include prevailing wind and 

weather patterns?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have staff who have 

been trained in HAZMAT first responder 

procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-15

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

D. Does the institution have interagency 

agreements or arrangements with a 

nearby HAZMAT team that is fully 

trained and equipped?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Has the external HAZMAT team toured 

the institution to familiarize themselves 

with structural and operational issues?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Has the external HAZMAT team 

participated in an emergency drill, 

exercise, or simulation at the institution 

within the last 3 years? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Do the institution’s HAZMAT response 

plans include contact information for a 

laboratory that could quickly identify an 

unknown substance that is potentially 

hazardous?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Do the response plans include defend-inplace provisions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Has the institution conducted table-top 

exercises involving HAZMAT situations 

and defend-in-place strategies within 

the last 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Has the institution conducted a 

functional exercise or full-scale 

simulation involving a defend-in-place 

strategy with a HAZMAT incident within 

the last 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-16

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

K. Has the institution set aside any supplies 

and/or equipment specifically for a 

defend-in-place response to a HAZMAT 

incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Has the institution’s storage and/or 

disposal of chemicals and/or hazardous 

materials been reviewed by any external 

agency within the last 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

IX. Hurricane

A. Does the institution’s risk assessment 

include an evaluation of the likelihood 

of hurricane?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Has the institution conducted an 

analysis of all buildings to determine 

their ability to withstand hurricane-force 

winds?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have supplies and 

plans for reinforcing/protecting 

vulnerable areas such as windows?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Do hurricane response plans include 

provisions for moving out of buildings 

that would be structurally unsound 

during a hurricane or that cannot be 

adequately protected?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Is there a plan for managing the inmate 

population while waiting to see if a 

hurricane actually will hit the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
Status

Method

Criterion Comments

ND-17

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

F. Has the institution retrofitted buildings 

with tie-downs or other structural 

improvements, where possible and 

practical, to increase protection against 

hurricanes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the institution inspect the yard and 

other outside areas annually, prior to the 

start of hurricane season, for objects 

and materials that could become 

airborne and dangerous with extremely 

high winds, and remove or secure such 

items?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Have staff received any training 

specifically on preparing for and 

responding to a hurricane within the 

last 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Have inmates received orientation 

specifically on hurricane response 

within the last 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Do the institution’s hurricane plans 

include an assessment of potential for 

localized flooding?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Do the institution’s hurricane plans 

include an assessment of the 

vulnerability of various utilities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
Criterion Comments

ND-18

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

L. Does the institution have a NOAA radio 

with a battery backup and warning 

alarm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Are staff trained on the distinction 

between hurricane watch and 

hurricane warning?

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Does the institution have portable 

water pumps?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

X. Severe Winter Storm

A. Do the institution’s emergency response 

plans include severe winter storms?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. If the institution were to lose heat 

during extended below-freezing weather, 

does the facility have a backup system 

or backup plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have its own 

snow-clearing equipment, and is it 

heavy enough to operate in an extreme 

winter storm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution have specialized 

clothing for staff who would need to 

operate snow-clearing equipment or 

do other outside work under extreme 

winter blizzard conditions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-19

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

E. Does the institution have an adequate 

supply of heavy jackets, blankets, etc., 

for the inmate population during an 

extreme winter storm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Has the institution evaluated which 

utilities would be most vulnerable to 

failure during an extreme winter storm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is the institution’s primary water supply 

at risk in an extreme winter storm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is the institution dependent on perimeter 

electronics that would be likely to fail 

in an extreme winter storm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Is there a specific and detailed plan for 

managing the inmate population during 

an extended period of extreme winter 

weather?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Is there a plan for transporting staff to 

and from the institution in small groups 

or in pairs, for their own safety, during 

extreme winter weather?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Does the institution’s response plan 

include provisions to switch to 12-hour 

shifts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-20

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

L. Has the institution analyzed the 

compound for areas and equipment that 

would be at risk during long-term 

subfreezing conditions or from the 

weight of large amounts of ice?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the institution keep an adequate 

supply of sand and salt for walkways 

and essential vehicle access areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Does the institution maintain a supply of 

chains for use on its vehicles during 

extreme winter weather?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XI. Fire Prevention and Response

A. Fire Loading

1. Does the institution have written 

standards for the amount of inmate 

property permissible in cells or 

dormitories?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Are these written standards 

consistent with minimizing fire 

loading in living areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are inmate cells and other living 

areas inspected at least once per 

month for compliance with this 

standard?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
Criterion Comments

ND-21

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

4. Is the standard strictly adhered to?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are all other areas of the institution 

inspected at least once per month to 

determine if there is excess fire 

loading?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. If excess fire loading is discovered, is 

there a procedure that mandates 

reporting the situation to 

management?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Does the institution maintain written 

records of inspections for fire loading 

and of corrective efforts when 

excessive fire loading is discovered?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Is there a mandatory review for 

flammability and toxic smoke during 

fire, for all supplies and materials 

ordered for the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Ignition Control

1. Are inmates permitted to keep 

matches or lighters in their cells 

or dormitories?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Do inmates have open access to 

matches or lighters in day rooms or 

other common areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-22

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

3. Are electric outlets and accessible 

wiring in inmate living areas and 

common areas inspected at least 

monthly for tampering or maintenance 

problems?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are housing areas and common areas 

accessible to inmates inspected at 

least monthly to review proximity of 

flammable items to heat sources such 

as electric lights?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Fire Safety Review

1. Does the institution have a staff 

member in charge of fire safety?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the institution’s fire safety officer 

report directly to a person at 

management level?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are all areas of the institution 

inspected at least monthly to 

determine if fire doors are operable 

and fire exits and evacuation routes 

are kept clear?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are written records required for 

these reviews?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. When a problem is encountered 

during a fire inspection and is not 

immediately corrected, is there a 

policy or procedure that mandates 

bringing the problem to management 

attention immediately?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-23

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

6. Does the institution, on at least an 

annual basis, review all living units 

and other occupied areas to ensure 

that there are at least two exits in the 

case of fire?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Has the local or state fire marshal 

inspected the institution within the 

past year for compliance with state/

local fire codes and regulations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Has the local fire department 

inspected the institution within the 

past year to discover potential fire 

problems and to become familiar 

with the physical plant?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Fire Drills and Fire Evacuation

1. Is there an evacuation plan for all 

areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does every area of the institution 

have a secondary evacuation route?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are evacuation routes posted in all 

areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are there battery-powered or 

emergency generator-powered 

emergency exit lights in all living 

and program areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-24

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

5. Are staff trained in fire evacuation 

procedures for areas currently 

assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are inmates given orientation on fire 

evacuation procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are fire drills unannounced?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Are all fire drills

a. Monitored?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Timed for clearing the area in 

which the drill was held?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Timed for clearing a count of 

inmates evacuated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Evaluated in writing by 

monitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-25

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

9. Are fire drills conducted on all shifts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Are there minimum standards for how 

often fire drills must be conducted 

in each area of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Have all areas of the institution met 

this standard within the last 12 

months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Are fire drill reports, evaluations, and 

plans for improvement reviewed and 

approved by management?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Are fire drill reports and evaluation 

records kept in one central location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Fire Equipment 

1. Has the local or state fire marshal 

approved the number, type, and 

location of fire extinguishers 

throughout the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Are all fire extinguishers inspected, 

charged, and tagged at least 

quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-26

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

3. Are all fire hoses and standpipes 

inspected, tested, and tagged at 

least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 

(SCBA) Units 

a. Are SCBAs available in or 

adjacent to all living areas of 

the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Are SCBAs stored or hung on 

walls in pairs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Are SCBAs examined annually 

for functionality?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Are all SCBAs inspected, 

charge-checked, and tagged at 

least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Have all staff been medically 

cleared to wear and use SCBAs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

f. Have all staff been trained in the 

use of SCBAs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-27

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

g. Does the SCBA training for all 

staff include donning the SCBA, 

achieving a seal, and then 

breathing for some period of 

time?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

h. Are staff trained to use SCBAs 

in pairs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

i. Have all staff in the institution had 

refresher training on SCBA use 

within the past 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are fire doors or fire door locks color 

coded for easy match to fire keys?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are fire door locks and emergency 

keys notched for identification in 

dark or smoke-filled conditions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are manual unlocking devices and/or 

backup keys available onsite for 

unlocking every living area of the 

institution 24 hours a day?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Does the institution have two or 

more sets of turn-out gear?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
ND-28

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

F. Fire Response

1. Does the institution know the actual 

response time for the local fire 

department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the institution have its own fire 

brigade (trained inmates or staff)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Has the institution considered training 

a fire brigade that would serve as a 

first-response force until the fire 

department arrived?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC#
ND-Noncompliance Summary

Review of all items on this page completed: Yes________ No________

NAME: _________________________________________________________

SIGNATURE: ____________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

SUMMARY OF NONCOMPLIANCE ITEMS

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist

AUDITOR: ______________________________________________________ PAGE _________ OF __________ 

DATE: _________________________________________________________

Assigned Due Apprvd Apprval

NC # Item Description Reason for Noncompliance To Date By Date

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:
I. Consideration of Terrorist Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-1

II. Emergency System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-2

III. Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-8

IV. Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-11

V. Security Threat Groups (STGs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-16

VI. Inmate Visitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-17

VII. Inmate Telephone Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-18

VIII. Inmate Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-19

IX. Specialized Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-20

X. Response to a Terrorism Incident in the Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-21

XI. Institutional Intelligence Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-22

XII. Response to Notification of Terrorist Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-23

XIII. Response to Cyber Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-27

Counterterrorism

Self-Audit Checklist: Outline

CT-Outline
CT-1

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist

INSTITUTION(S): _____________________________________________________________ DEPARTMENT: ________________________________

TEAM LEADER: ______________________________________________________________

AUDIT TEAM: _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

I. Consideration of Terrorist Strategies

A. Have the department and institution 

planned for the possibility that prisons 

might be targeted for a terrorist attack 

either because of the density of people 

in an isolated location or because the 

facility is a symbol of government 

control and stability?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Have the department and institution 

planned for and analyzed the potential 

for terrorists to target an institution for 

mass escape, either to create panic or 

to demonstrate the vulnerability of 

government controls?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Have the department and institution 

planned for and analyzed the potential 

for terrorist groups to recruit “soldiers” 

from the inmate population?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Have the department and institution 

planned for and analyzed the potential 

for an inmate strategic threat group 

(STG) to affiliate with a terrorist 

organization or to plan terrorist activity 

on its own?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-2

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

II. Emergency System

A. Is there policy in place that requires 

the department and institution to 

conduct an annual risk assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the risk assessment specifically 

evaluate the risk of a terrorism 

emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Has the institution completed a risk 

assessment in the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does policy require that action plans be 

developed to mitigate deficiencies 

identified in the risk assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are those action plans monitored 

throughout the year to determine 

progress and completion?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Emergency Policies

1. Command

a. Does policy specify who is in 

command in a terrorism event?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-3

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

b. Does policy specify command and 

coordination with local law 

enforcement, the local health 

department, state police, the state 

emergency management agency, 

the FBI, and the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy specify where the 

command post will be situated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy specify who will be 

allowed in the command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does policy require mutual aid 

agreements and/or letters of 

understanding with outside agencies 

regarding counterterrorism 

policies and procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Notification

a. Does policy specify which 

agencies to notify during a 

terrorism event?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy specify which 

services/functions each 

external agency is expected 

to provide?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-4

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

c. Do the notifications include local 

law enforcement?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Do the notifications include the 

state police?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Do the notifications include the 

state emergency management 

agency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

f. Do the notifications include 

the FBI?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

g. Are telephone numbers of 

external agencies kept current 

(verified annually or more 

frequently)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

h. Does policy specify that 

emergency manuals contain 

contact information (businessand after-hour telephone numbers, 

as well as cell phone and pager 

numbers) for all mutual aid 

agencies? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-5

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

4. Public Information

a. Does policy specify who is to 

speak for the department/ 

institution during a terrorism 

event?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy specify how 

information will be shared with 

outside agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy specify “one channel 

out” (a single source controlled 

by the commander) for 

communicating information to 

the media?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy require mutual aid 

agreements and/or letters of 

understanding with outside 

agencies regarding management 

of public information?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Does policy specify where a joint 

public information center will be 

located?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Training

a. Does policy require 

counterterrorism emergency 

exercises at least annually for 

the department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-6

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

b. Does department policy require 

counterterrorism emergency 

exercises at least annually for 

each institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy require a functional 

and/or full-scale counterterrorism 

exercise at least every 3 years for 

the department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy require a functional 

and/or full-scale counterterrorism 

exercise at least every 3 years 

for the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Does policy require that outside 

agencies (FBI, Department of 

Homeland Security, state police, 

state emergency management 

agency, and local health, law 

enforcement, and fire departments, 

at a minimum) be invited to 

participate in counterterrorism 

functional or full-scale exercises?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

f. Does policy require evaluation of 

counterterrorism exercises, 

written identification of areas that 

need improvement, and monitoring 

of those areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-7

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

g. Are all staff trained in awareness 

of potential terrorist threats?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

h. Are all staff trained in early 

detection and intervention 

strategies to prevent terrorist 

events?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

i. Are all staff trained in specific 

action steps expected if a terrorist 

event takes place?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

j. Are first responders trained 

specifically in precautions to take 

if a terrorist event is suspected?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

k. Are mailroom and warehouse staff 

trained in how to identify a 

suspicious package or substance 

and what to do in response?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

l. Are specialized staff trained in 

decontamination procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-8

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

m. Are institution staff trained in basic 

fire suppression (in the event that 

local fire agencies are not 

available to respond because of a 

community terrorism incident)? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

III. Emergency Plans

A. Does the institution have specific 

emergency plans for responding to a 

physical assault from outside the facility?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution have emergency 

plans for responding to a biological 

attack on the facility?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have emergency 

plans for responding to a biological 

attack in the community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution have emergency 

plans for responding to a chemical 

attack on the facility?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the institution have emergency 

plans for responding to a chemical 

attack in the community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-9

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

F. Does the institution have emergency 

plans for responding to a suspicious 

package or substance received by an 

individual staff member or the mailroom?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the institution’s emergency plan 

specify how to isolate and treat staff 

who may have been contaminated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Do institution emergency plans specify 

how to preserve crime scenes and 

protect evidence?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Does the institution have emergency 

plans that describe steps to take in a 

mass casualty emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Does the institution have emergency 

plans that specify how daily operations 

will be carried out during a utility failure?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Do the department’s central office and 

the institution have plans for responding 

to a cyber attack?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-10

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

L. Does the institution have emergency 

plans for responding to bomb threats?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the institution have emergency 

plans that specify how to respond if a 

bomb is found or is detonated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Do institution emergency plans specify 

where inmates and staff are to be 

evacuated if necessary in a terrorist 

attack?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Do institution emergency plans specify 

what will be done regarding staff families 

in the event of a terrorist attack in the 

community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

P. Do institution emergency plans specify 

how to respond to an aircraft impact or 

vehicle impact/explosion?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Q. Do the central office and the institution 

have a plan for operating with reduced 

staffing levels if a terrorist attack in the 

community prevents staff from reporting 

to work?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-11

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

IV. Mitigation

A. Do post orders specifically require that 

officers monitor the exterior of the 

institution to detect unusual activities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are specially selected and specially 

trained counterterrorism staff assigned 

to armed posts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are food and water storage areas 

secured and protected from outside 

tampering?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Have arrangements been made for 

critical equipment and supplies (potable 

water, portable toilets, packaged meals, 

etc.) in the event of a terrorism incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are deliveries closely inspected and 

screened before they enter the 

institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Are vendors and contractors required to 

submit to background checks before 

they enter the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-12

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

G. Are blueprints/site plans signed for by 

the contractors and returned to the 

institution after projects are completed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Are emergency generators and regular 

power and water supplies outside the 

perimeter secured from public access? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. In an emergency, can the power plant 

emergency generators and water supply 

be operated without inmate labor?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Are the front entrances and vehicle sally 

ports monitored by video cameras? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Has the institution analyzed its 

vulnerability to car bombs or vehicle 

intrusion and erected vehicle barriers 

to mitigate high-risk threats? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Does the institution have onsite 

explosive detection equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the institution have onsite x-ray 

equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-13

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

N. If the institution does not have x-ray or 

explosive detection equipment, does it 

have written agreements with outside 

agencies to obtain that equipment if 

needed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Are National Crime Information Center 

(NCIC) checks conducted on all new 

staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

P. Is staff parking separated from visitor 

parking?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Q. Can the staff parking area be readily 

secured under emergency conditions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

R. Are procedures for high-risk inmate 

escort/travel orders reviewed annually?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

S. Are visitor vehicle license plates checked 

at random periodically for outstanding 

arrest warrants? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

T. Do the site plans show the institution 

“as built” rather than “as designed”?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-14

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

U. Does the institution have video or 

photographs of each building, with 

indications of square footage, distances, 

utilities, entry/egress points, keys, 

phones, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

V. Do staff check visitor areas (including 

lockers) before and after each visitation 

period? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

W. Does the institution update its staff 

emergency notification/information 

sheets at least annually and keep staff 

photos current?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

X. Are staff encouraged to maintain a 

personal emergency preparedness 

checklist in their home? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Y. In the event of an emergency, are utility 

shut-off locations available to responding 

police, fire, and utility company staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Z. In the event of an emergency, do 

authorized personnel have 24-hour 

access to building plans?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-15

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

AA. In the event of an emergency, are 

special ID cards available to expedite 

entry of outside emergency personnel? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

BB. In the event of a heightened terrorism 

alert, are there plans for increased 

perimeter security patrols? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

CC. In the event of a heightened terrorist 

alert, are there plans to provide special 

armament and equipment to perimeter 

patrol staff and traffic checkpoint staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

DD. Does equipment for these staff include 

rifle, shotgun, sidearm, aerosol chemical 

agent, flashlight, lantern, florescent vest/

jacket, protective vest, and handcuff/

flexcuffs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

EE. Are driver photographs, driver license 

numbers, and truck license plate 

numbers for regular delivery vehicles 

available to institution staff at extended 

traffic checkpoints?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

FF. Is an area identified for offloading 

deliveries and supplies outside the 

institution’s secure perimeter, and is 

there a plan to use this area if necessary.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-16

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

GG. Does the institution’s inventory of state 

vehicles include license plate numbers, 

and is it updated at least annually?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

V. Security Threat Groups (STGs)

A. Is there a formalized plan to identify and 

monitor STGs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are all staff trained to recognize STGs 

through language used, signs, and 

tattoos? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are possible threats by STGs regularly 

identified and monitored?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Do staff monitor STG recruitment 

activities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are staff aware of significant holidays 

observed by STGs and do they monitor 

activities of STG members during those 

times?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-17

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

F. Are STG members denied access to 

certain jobs and/or areas of the 

institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is the mailroom staff trained to monitor 

written materials for STG activity?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is incoming mail for STG members 

monitored more frequently or more 

closely than mail for general population 

inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Is there a reporting protocol established 

with the FBI and state police regarding 

STGs and members?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Are STG member phone calls monitored 

more frequently than phone calls for the 

general population?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

VI. Inmate Visitation

A. Are inmate visitors checked for 

outstanding arrest warrants?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
Criterion Comments

CT-18

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

B. Are inmate visitors checked against a 

database of former inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are visitors of STG members (and/or 

other high-risk inmates) subjected to a 

higher level of screening/security checks 

than other inmate visitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Are inmate visitations randomly 

monitored for conversation content?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are visitations of high-risk inmates 

monitored more frequently or more 

closely for conversation content than 

visitations of general population inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

VII. Inmate Telephone Calls

A. Are phone calls restricted to an 

approved list of individuals for each 

inmate?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are individuals on inmate phone lists 

screened for warrants?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are individuals on inmate phone lists 

screened against a database of former 

inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-19

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

D. Are individuals on high-risk inmate 

phone lists subjected to a higher level of 

security screening than individuals on 

general population inmate phone lists?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Is there a standard for the percentage 

of an inmate’s phone conversations that 

are monitored? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Are high-risk inmate phone 

conversations monitored more frequently 

than phone conversations of general 

population inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are all inmate phone conversations 

electronically recorded to provide a 

perpetual database of at least 10 days’ 

duration? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

VIII. Inmate Mail

A. Is mail to inmates monitored for coded 

information or terrorist information/

activity?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are publications identified that are 

aligned or associated with terrorist 

groups or activities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-20

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

C. Is mail for high-risk inmates subjected 

to a higher level of screening than mail 

for general population inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Is there a protocol for reporting adverse 

or potentially dangerous terrorist 

information obtained from inmate mail?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

IX. Specialized Equipment

A. Does the institution conduct annual 

equipment assessments specifically to 

determine needs and accessibility with 

regard to terrorism incidents?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Is emergency equipment tested on a 

monthly/quarterly/annual basis, with 

documentation of those checks?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Do staff have immediate access to 

personal protective equipment in the 

event of hazardous material 

contamination? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Have staff been trained in the use of this 

equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
Criterion Comments

CT-21

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

E. Does the institution have bomb detection 

equipment or bomb-sniffing dogs 

available?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. In the case of an explosion, is search 

and rescue equipment readily available 

to the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the institution have equipment 

and/or systems that provide 

communication among all key external 

emergency organizations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Does the institution have an adequate 

supply of radios that share a frequency 

with local and state law enforcement 

and the local fire department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

X. Response to a Terrorism 

Incident in the Community

A. Does the institution have a plan for 

supplying the community with food and 

other provisions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution have a plan for 

loaning out staff in response to a 

community terrorism incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Does the institution have a plan to 

supply medical staff/equipment to 

the community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-22

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

2. Does the institution have a plan to 

send specialized teams such as CERT 

to assist in a community terrorist 

incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have a plan to make 

inmates available to the community to 

assist with cleanup?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution have a plan to 

make transportation available to the 

community if needed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Do the institution’s emergency 

preparedness specialists train with 

the local and state emergency 

management agencies at least 

annually?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XI. Institutional Intelligence Function

A. Does the institution have an identified 

intelligence operation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does department-level policy or 

procedure specify coordination of 

institution intelligence operations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Have staff assigned to the intelligence 

function received training in identifying 

terrorist activity and in responding to 

terrorist threats and incidents?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
Status

Method

Criterion Comments

CT-23

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

XII. Response to Notification of

Terrorist Threats

A. Does the institution have different levels 

of alert (or readiness) defined in policy?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution have different levels 

of alert (or readiness) specified in its 

emergency plans?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. In responding to notification of a 

credible and serious terrorist threat, 

does the institution have emergency 

policies that specify the following:

1. Security for employee parking?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Methods to increase screening of 

delivery vehicles?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Methods to increase security of mail 

and package delivery and storage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Provisions for increasing security of 

vehicles on grounds?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
Status

Method

Criterion Comments

CT-24

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

5. Procedures for identifying/locating 

abandoned packages, suitcases, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Procedures for verifying staff and 

visitor identification? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. A plan to reduce points of access to 

the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. A plan to increase inspections of all 

internal and external physical 

premises?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. A plan to arm (or increase the 

arming of) the perimeter?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Provisions for erecting temporary 

vehicle barriers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-25

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

11. Procedures for informing 

management staff families about 

receipt of suspicious 

packages/mail?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Provisions for increasing liaison with 

local, state, and/or federal law 

enforcement?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Plans to move vehicles, crates, large 

trash receptacles, and other things 

that could conceal explosives or 

weapons away from buildings and 

critical areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Provisions for increasing external 

security patrols?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

15. Plans to place emergency specialists 

on standby?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. Plans to suspend inmate programs, 

outside work crews, onsite 

construction, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

17. Plans to notify contractors, vendors, 

and/or visitors of restricted or 

cancelled access?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-26

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

18. A plan to move into hard lockdown?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

19. A plan to establish a traffic control 

point (or to move it farther from the 

institution)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

20. A plan to increase computer security?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

21. A plan to increase random security 

spot checks of vehicles, visitors, 

packages, staff, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

22. A plan to notify staff and staff families 

of higher alert levels to reduce rumors 

and family anxiety?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

23. A plan to add security for and 

decrease access to critical resource 

areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-27

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

24. A plan to discontinue all inmate 

transfers in/out and to transport 

inmates to community hospitals and 

courts only in emergency situations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Is there a protocol established for 

reporting relevant terrorist information 

to the state police and FBI?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

XIII. Response to Cyber Attack

A. Have the institution and the department’s 

central office analyzed vulnerabilities 

to cyber attack?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Have the institution and the central office 

identified crucial records and crucial 

databases?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Have the institution and the central 

office designated “hot sites” (locations 

with an operating computer system that 

can accept and maintain software and/or 

database information from a disabled 

site) distant from their own locations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Are all crucial databases and records 

within the department backed up offsite?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#
CT-28

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).

NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

E. Are there detailed plans for data 

recovery?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Are there detailed plans for operating 

with primary servers, databases, and 

programs disabled?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC#
CT-Noncompliance Summary

Review of all items on this page completed: Yes________ No________

NAME: _________________________________________________________

SIGNATURE: ____________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

SUMMARY OF NONCOMPLIANCE ITEMS

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist

AUDITOR: ______________________________________________________ PAGE _________ OF __________ 

DATE: _________________________________________________________

Assigned Due Apprvd Apprval

NC # Item Description Reason for Noncompliance To Date By Date

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:
Section 4

Report on the National Survey of 

Emergency Readiness in Prisons
Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183

Survey Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .184

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .184

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198

In This 

Section
183

Discussions of emergency preparation and

response in prisons typically address what is

done, what is in place, what is commonly

accepted, and what is missing, with no recourse

to systematic evidence or a body of data. Rather,

such discussions typically reflect the experience

of individuals who may be familiar with departments of corrections (DOCs) in a few states and

sometimes are based simply on unexamined

assumptions and biases. Believing that data on

the current state of emergency preparedness and

practices in prisons nationwide would benefit the

field, the project team decided to develop a comprehensive survey for state DOCs with questions

ranging from prevention and policy to equipment

and personnel.

Method

Once the survey was developed, the project team

recognized several barriers that might keep

DOCs from completing it:

● The survey asked for a substantial amount of

information and would require several hours

of staff time to complete. 

● Some departments have an individual in

charge of emergency preparedness departmentwide; others do not. Moreover, the titles

of these positions vary from state to state,

and the positions may be located in the

department’s central office, at a specific

institution, or at a training academy. Thus,

there was no ready answer to the question

“To whom should this survey be sent?”

● The survey asked for information about several areas that many departments regard as

sensitive and/or confidential (e.g., tactical

team training).

To overcome these barriers, the project team

implemented a two-step strategy. First, a letter

describing the overall project, the purpose of the

guide, and the survey was sent to the commissioner (or director or secretary) of each department. The letter invited the department to

participate in the survey and asked the commissioner to identify either the person in charge of

emergency preparedness or the person who

would be designated to complete the survey. The

project team would then work directly with that

individual rather than continue to work through

the commissioner’s office. The letter also

emphasized that the project was being conducted

under the aegis of NIC. This fact served to

assuage department concerns regarding confidentiality, even in states where the commissioner

was unfamiliar with both the organization conducting the project, LETRA, Inc., and with

individual members of the project team. 

Once a commissioner agreed to participate in the

survey and identified a contact person within his

or her department, the project team corresponded

with the contact person and sent the survey

itself. If the contact person did not return the

completed survey in approximately 6 weeks, the

project team followed up with a reminder letter.

If several more weeks passed with no response,

a member of the project team telephoned the

Report on the National Survey of

Emergency Readiness in Prisons
184

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

department contact person to encourage completion of the survey. 

Survey Limitations

Accuracy

Like most surveys, this instrument was designed

for self-report—that is, the information the

responding departments provided could not, for

the most part, be verified. The survey instructions did ask the departments to return backup

information such as copies of emergency policies and emergency response plans along with

the completed survey, and these documents confirmed most of the responses of most of the

departments. However, the project team was not

always in a position to know whether a department’s state of emergency readiness was as good

as the department claimed. Similarly, if a department answered a question inaccurately because

the person filling out the survey misunderstood

the question, the project team had no way to

identify the error.

Completeness

Some departments that filled out and returned

the survey did not answer every question. Most

of these departments provided no explanation for

responses left blank. Possibly, the unanswered

questions seemed inapplicable to the person filling out the survey or too time consuming or difficult to answer.

Timeliness

These survey results were obtained in 2002–

2003 and reflect the national status of emergency

readiness in state DOCs at that time. The results

will be less representative as time passes and

departments change.

Results 

Participating Departments

Of the 51 departments asked to complete the

survey (the 50 state DOCs and the Federal

Bureau of Prisons), 41 initially agreed and 34

actually returned completed surveys—that is, 7

departments whose commissioners agreed to

participate did not return completed surveys,

despite additional correspondence and phone

calls encouraging them to do so. Several of these

departments continued to state their commitment

to participate but simply did not find time to

actually complete the survey. A few departments

did not communicate with the project staff in

any way after the commissioner’s initial commitment to participate. Of the remaining 10 of the

51 departments, 1 declined to participate and 9

never responded to the initial letter or to followup letters. 

Overall, 34 of the 51 departments—exactly 

two-thirds—completed the survey, providing a

large sample. Given the amount of information

the survey asked for and the confidential nature

of some of the information, the response rate

actually exceeded the project team’s most optimistic initial estimates. The sample includes four

of the five largest DOCs in the country as well

as an excellent cross section of medium-sized

and small departments. All geographic regions

of the country are also represented.

Characteristics of Sample

Of the 34 departments, 3 have full peace officer

powers for their security staff, 12 have partial

peace officer powers, and 19 have no peace

officer powers. Seven of the participating departments are combined jail and prison systems.

Only 3 of the responding departments include

juvenile institutions, while 29 do not. Some form

of probation and parole is provided by 25

departments, 19 of which have probation and

parole staff within the department. 
Section 4. Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons

185

Emergency System 

The terms “emergency plan” and “emergency

system” should not be confused. “Emergency

plan” most often designates the planned

response to an emergency at a particular institution, whereas “emergency system” usually designates a department’s comprehensive preparations

for emergencies. Emergency systems may

include philosophy and goals in emergency situations, emergency policies, organizational structure, plans for addressing aftermath issues, staff

training on emergency topics, prevention strategies, and risk assessment, in addition to individual institutional emergency plans that focus on

response procedures, emergency equipment, and

emergency teams.

Twenty-eight of 33 departments (85 percent)

reported having a departmental emergency

system in place at each institution in the state

(table 1). Although the other five departments

did not have departmental emergency systems,

it was evident from their answers to other questions in the survey that they do have some emergency plans, policies, and procedures at their

institutions. For these five departments, emergency planning is entirely an institutional

function. With no departmental framework,

requirements, or template, emergency preparation and response may vary widely from prison

to prison, and issues such as mutual aid may be

more problematic.

Of the 14 departments that reported developing

their own emergency system (table 1), 7 stated

that the system either was modeled on that of

another state or that they had used materials

from another state. Several of these departments

cited the Oregon DOC’s emergency system as

their model or as one of the primary sources for

the development of their system. Three departments reported basing their system on some variation of the Incident Command System (ICS)

originally developed for fire departments. One

of these departments cited a local fire department as its source, and the other two mentioned

the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA). The majority of state DOCs whose

emergency systems were used as models by

other states use the LETRA system themselves.

Ten of the twelve departments that did not develop their own emergency system reported using

LETRA’s Emergency Preparedness for

Interpretation of Survey Results

Although 34 state departments of corrections returned completed survey forms, the

number of responses to a specific question

may be fewer than 34. There are two reasons for the variance in the number of

responses. First, as noted above, some

departments did not answer every survey

question. The second reason is that some

survey responses were difficult to interpret.

If the project team was not reasonably certain about the meaning of a response to an

item, the response was excluded from the

data and analysis presented in this report.

The number of respondents (N) is noted in

tables when appropriate.

Table 1. Most departments do have some type

of emergency system

Characteristic of Departments

Emergency System Yes No

Departmental system 28 5

System developed internally 14 12
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Correctional Institutions.1 Several other state

DOCs reported using as a model a state that

uses the LETRA emergency system without citing LETRA directly. No other proprietary systems were mentioned.

Emergency Plans

Emergency plans differ dramatically from

department to department, in form as well as

content. Although emergency plans are institution specific in most correctional agencies, they

are departmentwide in a few. For most DOCs,

the term “emergency plan” is synonymous with

each institution’s emergency manual (or manuals). However, there are departments in which

emergency plan refers to a section of the departmental policies and procedures. Many prisons

have emergency plans that are several hundred

pages in length, but it is also possible to find

prison emergency plans that are fewer than 10

pages. It is tempting to assume that all prisons

have an emergency plan, whether large or small,

good or bad. Although that is true for the vast

majority, some prisons have no emergency plan

at all. For example, the inquiry after the 1993

insurrection at the Montana State Prison (see

Section 6, Case Studies, “Riot at Max: Montana

State Prison”) discovered that the warden had

been working on a draft emergency plan at the

time of the riot, but that no plan was or had

been in place.

The survey data reflect two fundamentally different approaches to emergency planning (table

2). For many years, the traditional way to develop an emergency plan was to create a separate,

independent plan for each type of emergency

considered. When compiled, the separate plans

became the overall institutional emergency plan.

More recently, some departments have changed

to a single, comprehensive plan (sometimes

called an “all-risk” plan) that is the basis for

responding to any emergency or large-scale

crisis in the prison. This generic plan is supplemented by appendixes or emergency-specific

additions that specify how the plan will be augmented or modified for a particular type of

emergency. The rationale for using a generic

plan is as follows:

● Most of the steps that must be taken in

response to any major crisis are the same

(emergency lockdown, command notifications, staff callbacks, use of mutual aid

agencies, etc.).

● It is easier to train staff in one generic plan

than six or eight different plans.

● Different plans may actually provide conflicting directions when an emergency situation involves more than one type of crisis. 

Nearly half of the departments reporting have

changed to the generic plan approach, either

solely or in combination with some form of

individual plan. 

The responses regarding the specific types of

emergencies addressed in emergency plans were

somewhat surprising (table 3). It was predictable

that most DOCs would have emergency plans

Table 2. Most departments have separate

plans for different types of emergencies 

Departments

Type of Emergency Plan(s) in Use (N = 34)

Generic plan for all emergencies 10*

Separate plans for different kinds 

of emergencies 30

Both generic and separate plans 6†

* All 10 departments use the LETRA emergency system.

† It was not possible to determine from these departments’

responses whether they have generic plans combined with

specific emergency additions or traditional separate plans

accompanied by some departmental provisions that are more

general. 

1 The comprehensive emergency system developed by LETRA,

Inc., for correctional institutions is described in Emergency

Preparedness for Correctional Institutions, 3d edition (Campbell,

CA: 2004).
Section 4. Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons

187

that specifically considered fire, hostage incidents, riot, and mass escape. However, less than

one-third of the responding departments had

engaged in any specific planning for terrorism

or terrorist threats, even some 2 years after the

attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Similarly,

less than half the departments reported any specific plans for responding to an outside assault

on the prison, although such situations have

occurred several times around the country, typically as an attempt to break specific inmates out

of the prison.

The format of an emergency plan is an important consideration, one that goes far beyond

questions of style. The advantages to using the

same emergency plan format at all institutions

in a DOC are obvious when an institution is in

the midst of a large-scale crisis and needs staff

or other resources from other institutions in the

department. Additionally, the uniform format

will enable central office staff to review the

emergency plans of the institution experiencing

the crisis without research or analysis, thus saving precious time. A uniform emergency plan

format also allows staff transferring from one

institution to another within the state to understand the new institution’s emergency plans

quickly and easily. The data in table 4 indicate

that 82 percent of the responding departments

require a uniform emergency plan format at

each institution.

Recognition has also increased over the past 25

years that checklist-driven emergency plans are

more practical and user friendly than plans that

use a narrative format. Thirty-one of the 33

departments responding to this question (94

percent) use emergency plans that are either

predominantly checklist based or that combine

checklists and narrative (table 4). Only two

departments reported using emergency plans

that are entirely narrative in format.

As expected, only a relatively small percentage

of departments (15 percent) reported using

emergency systems that are computerized to

any substantial degree (table 4). No department

reported an emergency system that is exclusively computerized. In private industry, computerized approaches to disaster planning are quite

common, and many companies now base their

disaster planning efforts around a proprietary

software program. An important distinction is

that for many private industries, the emphasis

is on disaster planning and disaster recovery,

whereas for correctional institutions, the greatest

Table 3. Departments varied greatly in the

number of specific types of emergencies

addressed in their emergency plans

Type of Emergency Departments

Addressed in Plan (N = 34)

Fire 31

Hostage incidents 30

Severe weather 28

Riot 28

Mass escape 28

Hurricane 12

Outside assault 12

Terrorism or terrorist threats 11

Table 4. Most DOCs employ a consistent

format for emergency plans 

Departments

Format of Emergency Plans (N = 33)

Uniformity of plans

Same at each institution 27

Vary from prison to prison 6

Format of plans

Checklist and narrative 26

Predominantly checklist 7

Entirely narrative 2

Computerized emergency system

In use and available to each institution 5

Not used 28
188

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

emphasis must be on responding to the emergency in real time. Nevertheless, it seems probable that future directions in prison emergency

planning will rely increasingly on software and

automated systems for some aspects of emergency planning and response.

Large-scale crisis situations also frequently

require highly specialized functions. The majority of the responding departments reported having written plans for some specialized functions

within their overall emergency response procedures (table 5). As might be expected, the number of departments varied with the type of

specialized function.

The results in table 5 are very encouraging.

They reflect a sharp increase in the degree of

sophistication of DOC emergency plans across

the United States.2 Two-thirds of the responding

DOCs indicated that their emergency plans

included specific procedures for posttraumatic

incident support for staff, and two-thirds also

have specific procedures for emergency counts.

Almost half the departments reported procedural

consideration for mass casualty situations. These

results reflect a degree of sophistication not

found as recently as 10 years ago.

Emergency Teams

The responses on the use of emergency teams

are surprising (table 6). Of 32 departments

responding to the question, 31 (97 percent) said

they maintain one or more emergency teams,

suggesting that the use of emergency teams has

become close to universal in state prison systems. This finding is another indicator of the

sharply increasing sophistication of the corrections field in the area of emergency readiness.

Just over two-thirds of the responding departments also said they rely on external teams at

some of their institutions. That is, a DOC may

have its own CERT teams and hostage negotiation teams at its major institutions but rely on

local or state law enforcement emergency teams

to provide these functions at its smaller and

more isolated prisons—typically those that are

lower security institutions. Such a strategy is

practical and efficient but requires a great deal

of planning, coordination, and training to be

effective.3

Departments were asked to describe the types of

emergency teams they maintained. These data

are not precise because some departments use

the same name for different types of teams,

whereas other departments use very different

names for teams with essentially the same function. In particular, some departments maintain

marksman/observer teams (snipers), but because

Table 5. Most emergency plans include

procedures for specialized functions

Specialized Function 

Represented in Emergency Plans Departments

Inmate death 29

Emergency count 26

Emergency lockdown 23

Posttraumatic support for staff 23

Mass casualties 16

Officer-involved shooting 11

Table 6. Most departments have their own

emergency teams

Departments

Use of Emergency Teams Yes No

Department has one or more teams 

(CERT, SORT, hostage negotiators, etc.) 31 1

Department relies on external 

teams at some of its institutions 21 9

3 The topic of emergency teams is also discussed in the chapter

by that name in Section 5: Resource Materials.

2 This observation is based on the project director’s personal

review of emergency readiness in more than half of the state

DOCs during the past 20 years.
Section 4. Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons

189

these teams are attached to or part of the tactical

team, the departments may not have identified

them separately. Thus, it is likely that marksman

teams are underrepresented in these data.

Similarly, almost all departments had some form

of tactical and/or disturbance control team 

(table 7). The survey distinguished between

these two types of teams as follows:

● Tactical team: Team members train with

firearms. The team’s function includes missions such as hostage rescue. It is a lethal

force team, although it is also trained and

equipped to use sublethal force.

● Disturbance control team: Team members

typically train with batons and shields and

with chemical agents and practice formations but do not train with firearms. The

team’s identified missions do not include

hostage rescue and dynamic entry with

firearms. It is a sublethal force team.

If a department responded by describing a

CERT or SORT team and its description did not

clarify whether the team should be classified

as a tactical or disturbance control team, the

department was arbitrarily counted as having a

tactical team. As a result, these data may overestimate the number of tactical teams and underestimate the number of disturbance control

teams.

In most cases, the tactical teams were statewide

or regional and the disturbance control teams

were institution based; however, there were

exceptions. 

The responding departments used a wide variety

of names for both hostage negotiation and posttrauma teams. The responses also identified

several other teams unique to a particular

department, such as public information teams

and mounted horse teams.

Table 7 demonstrates state DOCs’ almost complete acceptance of tactical and disturbance

control teams as essential to emergency preparedness. Only one department responded that

it had neither a tactical nor a disturbance control

team. It may well be that this department has

decided to use law enforcement tactical teams

when the need arises. On the other hand, one

department did not answer this survey question,

and there is almost certainly a sampling bias in

these survey results. That is, DOCs that have

emphasized emergency preparedness were more

likely to respond to this survey than departments

that have ignored or given short shrift to emergency readiness. Thus, it is reasonable to surmise that some of the 17 DOCs that did not

participate in this survey have not developed or

maintained emergency teams and may have

made no alternate arrangements (e.g., with law

enforcement agencies within their state). 

Seventy-nine percent of the departments have

their own hostage negotiation teams. These data

reflect more than simply an increase in sophistication about hostage incidents in the field of

corrections. They indicate a change in philosophy. In the 1970s and 1980s, many DOCs did

not have hostage negotiation teams. In some

cases, the absence of a hostage negotiation team

was a result of a lack of knowledge or lack of

specialized expertise but, in many cases, it was

because the department leadership had taken the

stance that “we don’t negotiate” (sometimes

Table 7. Most DOCs have tactical teams and

hostage negotiation teams

Departments

(N = 33)

Type of Emergency Team Number Percent

Tactical 32 97

Disturbance control 18 55

Hostage negotiation 26 79

Posttrauma or peer counseling 6 18

Marksman (“sniper”) 5 15

K–9 4 12
190

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

expressed as “If they take hostages, we are

going to assault—period!”). The history of

hostage incidents in American prisons and

jails has demonstrated that most hostage situations can be resolved successfully through

negotiation—although some cannot—and that

when negotiation can be used successfully,

doing so is decidedly a much safer alternative

for the hostages. The change in the general

approach to dealing with hostage incidents

demonstrated by the survey data reflect a broad

awareness of this history.

Only six departments (18 percent) reported

maintaining posttrauma or peer counseling

teams. It is tempting to interpret this relatively

small percentage as a negative reflection on the

field. However, that conclusion is not warranted

because a relatively large number of departments indicated elsewhere in the survey that

they depend on external resources (e.g., contract

mental health professionals) rather than on

departmental teams for these services. These

data do suggest that relatively few departments

use both specialized private psychological service providers for posttrauma care and peer support groups for additional capacity to screen,

debrief, and work with potentially traumatized

staff. Such a combined approach may deserve

more attention than it appears to have received. 

Emergency Training

The findings on emergency preparedness training for new recruits are discouraging. The

survey results show the length of the average

recruit academy to be almost 51/2 weeks, with

only 6 hours devoted to emergency preparedness

(table 8). Emergency preparedness is both an

unusually broad topic and one in which “the

devil is in the details.” For recruit training on

emergency preparedness to be effective, newly

hired staff must come away from the academy

training program with a clear understanding of

the specific procedures required in various

types of crisis situations. How that goal can be

accomplished in 6 hours or less is difficult to

understand. 

The commitment represented by a 51/2-week

training program for new recruits must be

acknowledged, however, as a direct manifestation of a profound change that has taken place

in corrections. State corrections has gone from

being a largely nonprofessional endeavor as

recently as three to four decades ago to being

a professional field with rigorous standards for

personnel and training. In some departments,

older staff still talk about reporting for their first

day of work and receiving a set of keys and a

warning to “be careful while you’re figuring it

out,” with no training whatsoever. Although

those days were 25 to 35 years ago in most

departments, the use of lengthy and comprehensive recruit academy training programs has only

evolved much more recently. 

The responses on inservice training on emergency preparedness reflected three distinct

approaches:

● A substantial initial inservice training program, typically between 8 and 16 hours,

Table 8. The average recruit academy is more

than 5 weeks’ duration

Criteria Hours*

Average length of recruit academy 213†

Average time spent on general 

emergency preparedness in recruit 

academy 6‡

* Thirty departments responded to this question.

† The responses ranged from a low of 36 hours to a high of 720

hours.

‡ Most departments identified a few emergency subjects, such as

fire, riot, and hostage situations, to which they give a small number of hours of additional specialized emphasis. Each of these

topics averages 2 hours’ coverage within the recruit academy

curriculums. No other emergency subject area was identified by

as many as five departments.
Section 4. Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons

191

followed up with annual refresher training,

ranging from 4 to 8 hours. 

● Annual inservice training ranging from 2 to

4 hours, with no substantial initial block of

training on either an inservice or preservice

basis.

● Little or no inservice training (1 hour or

less).

Of the 30 departments responding to the question about inservice training, 8 (just over onequarter) were in the last category. One hour or

less per year of emergency preparedness training is obviously inadequate for prison staff. This

lack of commitment to ongoing emergency

training can itself create unacceptable risks.

In contrast to the results on inservice training

for general staff, the data for mid- and upperlevel managers are quite positive. The majority

of the responding departments provide additional training on emergency preparedness to staff at

middle management level and above—a finding

that reflects awareness that prison staff at these

levels serve as shift commanders. In almost all

prisons, it is the shift commander who is in

charge of the institution during evenings and

weekends and who may suddenly be in command if an unexpected crisis occurs. It follows

that these staff members need far more depth

of preparation for responding to emergency

situations than the front-line staff member or

first-line supervisor. For these reasons, it is

encouraging to find that 23 of the 30 responding

departments (77 percent) provide managers at

mid-level and above with at least 2 hours of

emergency training annually beyond that provided for general staff (table 9).

Given the high percentage of DOCs that provide

additional refresher training on emergency preparedness for mid- and upper-level managers,

the responses regarding additional initial emergency training for these managers are somewhat

surprising. Only 12 of 30 departments (40 percent) provide more initial emergency training

for their mid- and upper-level managers than for

their general staff (table 9). Some departments

clearly indicated not only that they provided

additional training for management staff on

emergency and crisis issues, but that the training

was specifically tailored to the responsibilities

of higher ranking staff. In many cases, however,

the departments’ descriptions of their training

programs and curriculums were too idiosyncratic or lacking in sufficient detail to allow the

project team to draw further conclusions.

Emergency Drills and Simulations

All departments responding to the survey indicated they conduct fire drills of some sort, but

two departments did not indicate how frequently

(table 10). The majority of the departments conduct some actual timed evacuation drills and

some simulations (staff walkthroughs) (tables 11

and 12). The following patterns were the two

most commonly cited:

● Conducting all fire drills as actual evacuation drills, except for those in restricted or

segregation housing units, which are handled with staff walkthroughs. 

Table 9. Most departments provide additional

training on emergency preparedness at the

middle management level and above

Hours of Additional Emergency Departments

Preparedness Training (N = 30)

Initial training

8–16 7

1–4 5

None 18

Refresher training (hours/year)

More than 10 2

6–10 5

2–4 16

1 or less 7
192

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

● Conducting actual evacuation drills on one

shift per quarter per housing area and staff

walkthroughs on the other two shifts in each

housing area each quarter. 

One fire drill issue deserves special mention, as

it remains controversial: Should fire drills in a

prison’s highest security areas (e.g., administrative segregation) and areas most difficult to move

(e.g., an infirmary) be conducted as actual, timed

evacuation drills or as staff walkthrough simulations? Some prison administrators would

never consider actual evacuation drills for such

areas because they believe the risks are too high.

Others feel just as vehemently that without conducting actual evacuations, procedures exist

only on paper and there is no way to discover

problems or adequately prepare staff for the

eventuality of a real evacuation. Administrators

that subscribe to the latter rationale typically

deploy extra staff and use extra planning when

conducting evacuation drills in high-profile

areas. The survey did ask specifically about

areas excluded from evacuation drills, but the

question proved not to be well-enough defined,

and the answers were not consistent enough to

be interpreted numerically.

Excluding fire drills, at least some other type of

emergency exercise or simulation is required by

policy in 23 departments (table 12). These

include tabletop exercises, functional exercises

(defined by the survey instrument as involving

role playing in real time without the participation of external agencies), and full-scale simulations (major exercises in real time using actual

areas of the facility and actual emergency equipment and involving the participation of external

agencies). Most of the departments conduct

functional exercises and full-scale simulations

annually at each institution, although a small

number indicated that they conduct them quarterly. The data in table 12 also indicate that

some of the departments regularly conducting

emergency exercises and drills do not require

that activity by policy.

Table 13 shows the general requirements for

emergency drills and simulations reported by

the 29 departments in the survey that conduct

them. When asked whether they conduct emergency exercises on each shift, 16 departments

said “yes,” 13 said “no,” and 5 did not answer

the question. This result reveals a longstanding

bias. Emergency drills and emergency plans

Table 10. All departments require fire drills

Departments

Frequency of Fire Drills (N = 34)

Once a month on each shift in each 

housing area (36 drills per year per area) 1

Once per quarter on each shift in each 

housing area (12 drills per year per area) 13

Once per quarter per housing area 

(4 drills per year per area) 18

Frequency not reported 2

Table 11. Most departments time and

evaluate evacuation fire drills

Departments

Requirements for Fire Drills Yes No

Timed evacuation and written critique 

of drill’s strengths and weaknesses 32 2

Monitors or evaluators must be present 28 4

Observation/assessment by community 

fire officials in all or some drills 7 27

Table 12. Most departments require some

program of emergency drills and exercises

Departments

(N = 34) Type of Emergency Exercise 

or Simulation Yes* No

Tabletop exercises 23 (12) 11

Functional exercises 29 (20) 5

Full-scale simulations 21 (16) 13

* The number of departments that require the given type of

exercise by policy is given in parentheses.
Section 4. Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons

193

tend to be written on the assumption that crises

and disasters will strike on the day shift between

Monday and Friday, and prison administrators

often operate under the same assumptions.

History says these events tend to happen during

the evening and on weekends.

Emergency System Audits

Twenty departments reported using a written

emergency system audit form or protocol and

13 said they did not have or use such an

instrument. The most common frequency of

emergency system auditing was annually (13

departments), followed by biannually (6

departments).

Basic Security and Operational

Information

Security audits, random urinalysis testing of

inmates, and inmate grievance systems are wellaccepted best practices, and the survey’s documentation of their widespread use is encouraging

(table 14). The results also show increasing

acceptance of the crucial role the public information function plays, not only in prison crises, but

in day-to-day correctional management. Of 34

departments responding, 20 (59 percent) have

designated public information officers at each

institution. All 20 of these departments also

have a department-level public information

officer. 

The breakdown of information in table 14 on

how security audits are conducted reveals that of

32 departments, only 6 (19 percent) rely primarily on external consultants, whereas 26 (81

percent) use some combination of their own

staff and other departmental staff. The overall

security audit data represent another important

change in the field: As recently as 15 years ago,

regular security auditing was not a common

practice among state DOCs.

Table 13. Emergency exercises are typically

planned, evaluated, and critiqued 

Departments

(N = 29) General Requirements for 

Emergency Drills and Simulations Yes No

Monitors or evaluators must be 

present 26 3

Written plan for exercises required 

with objectives stated 25 4

Written critique of strengths and 

weaknesses discovered during the 

exercise required 27 2

Controllers employed to monitor 

safety of exercise and stop it if 

conditions become unsafe or a real 

emergency develops 28 1

Table 14. Almost all departments conduct

security audits and urinalysis tests and

operate an inmate grievance system

Departments

Security Procedure Yes No

Regular security audits 32* 2

Combination of one or more of the 

following methods 26 —

Self-audit 16 —

Security managers from other 

institutions 13 —

Participation of staff from the 

central office 26 —

External security consultants 6 —

Random urinalysis testing of inmates for 

illegal drugs† 34 0

Random urinalysis testing of staff for 

illegal drugs 8 18

Formal inmate grievance system 34 0

Monthly summaries by area of institution, 

shift, and nature of grievance 30 4

Departmental public information officer 24 10

Public information officer at each 

institution 20 14

Note: —, not applicable.

* Most departments stated that they conduct audits annually.

† The percentage of the inmate population tested each month

ranged from 2 to 40 percent, for an average of 10 percent.
194

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

These results do raise a troubling question: How

do DOCs define a security audit? Most corrections professionals with specific expertise in

security auditing would assume that a security

audit is a rigorous, detailed, comprehensive

examination that covers a great number of an

institution’s security procedures and practices as

well as its security equipment, logs, reports and

other documentation, and more. As a practical

matter, that kind of audit is far too demanding to

be performed monthly. Thus, the DOCs reporting monthly security audits may be referring to

security inspections or some other review that is

far less thorough than what is generally understood by the term “security audit.”

Emergency Policies and Specific 

Response Plans

The survey responses on emergency policies,

procedures, and response plans held few surprises. Most departments indicated specific policies,

procedures, and response plans for many of the

predictable aspects of a crisis or emergency situation (table 15). Only 12 of 30 departments

responding (40 percent) reported the use of any

kind of risk assessment process—a somewhat

surprising result, because risk assessment should

be the starting point for emergency planning at

any institution. Without performing a risk

assessment, it is impossible to prioritize

resources, planning, and training time to match

the relative probabilities of specific types of

emergencies at the facility. 

Table 15. Most departments have specific policies, procedures, and response plans for the

predictable aspects of a crisis or emergency situation

Departments

Specific Emergency Policies, Procedures, and Response Plans Yes No

Written policy/procedure for emergency counts 29 4

Written policy/procedure for emergency lockdowns 20 14

Crucial emergency locations identified at each institution (e.g., media area) 31 3

Specific response plans

Offsite evacuation 25 9

Defending in place* 18 16

Natural disasters 27 5

Specific policies/procedures

Prevention of major emergencies 23 11

Natural disasters 18 15

Terrorist threats or response to terrorism 11 23

Command post checklists used 30 4

Risk assessment processes 12 18

Emergency assessment form used to evaluate a developing emergency 15 19

Assessment form used to gauge readiness for natural disasters 10 24

Policy requiring institutional emergency plans to be reviewed or approved outside 

the institution 23† 11

* Maintaining a defensive position within the facility rather than evacuating.

† Twenty-two of these departments require the review and approval process to occur annually.
Section 4. Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons

195

Table 15 shows a puzzling discrepancy in the

data on planning for natural disasters. Of 32

departments responding, 27 (84 percent) said

they have specific response plans for natural

disasters. A response plan for natural disasters

would certainly include some specific procedures, yet only 18 of 33 responding departments

(55 percent) replied that they have specific policies or procedures for natural disasters. Possibly

some departments that stated they had natural

disaster response plans did not then respond that

they had specific policies and procedures for

natural disasters because they believed the

previous response had already answered the

question—that is, the apparent discrepancy may

be an artifact of the sequence of questions. The

low percentage of departments reporting specific

policies and procedures for dealing with natural

disasters was, however, a major factor in the

decision to include in this guide a freestanding

self-audit checklist for natural disasters, fires,

and HAZMAT situations.

Twenty-five of 34 departments (74 percent)

indicated that they had specific response plans

for offsite evacuation. It is worth noting that 

offsite evacuation is a very easy concept but a

very complex and challenging reality. 

Finally, LETRA’s emergency preparedness system began 25 years ago to advance the concept

that checklist-driven emergency plans are more

user friendly during a crisis. The data in table 15

showing that 30 of 34 departments (88 percent)

use a command post checklist suggest that

acceptance of that principle is now almost

universal.

Any thoughtful analysis of prison emergency

situations will conclude that some of the wellaccepted standard policies and procedures used

to direct day-to-day operations will not work

well in emergencies or large-scale crises. For

example, an institution’s policies and procedures

typically assign responsibilities for certain functions by rank or specific position within the

institution. In an emergency, however, specific

individuals or any staff of a specific rank may

be off duty, on annual leave, or otherwise

unavailable. Nevertheless, the function in question must be managed immediately or the overall response to the emergency situation may fail.

In such circumstances, emergency plans must

include emergency post orders or a similar

mechanism that allows an available staff member to be assigned to an emergency responsibility for which that staff member may have

minimal training and preparation. The data in

table 16 suggest that most DOCs now recognize

the distinction between day-to-day policy and

procedure and emergency policy and procedure.

The survey responses demonstrated a high level

of emphasis on postemergency procedures (table

17). Predictably, a reporting process for documenting emergencies was the deactivation procedure mentioned most often, cited by 32 of the

34 participating agencies (94 percent). Many

departments also reported plans for emergency

deactivation and policies or plans for returning

to normal operations (“stepdown” plans) (76

percent and 79 percent of responding departments, respectively). The least frequently cited

postemergency policy or procedure was a

method for using “lessons learned,” reported by

only 17 of 30 of responding departments (57

percent).

The somewhat lower frequency of use of lessons

learned compared with other deactivation and

postemergency procedures probably reflects a

hesitancy to analyze and document weaknesses

and failures that occurred during a crisis. Although some of this hesitancy may be ascribed

to defensiveness on the part of the department or

individuals leaders, much of it is likely rooted in

fear of litigation. A department may recognize

that it is professionally important to disseminate

a thoughtful critique of its performance in an

emergency situation but may be less sanguine

about creating a roadmap for potential plaintiffs.
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Thoughtful administrators recognize that almost

nothing escapes the discovery process in civil

litigation and that it is far more important to

learn from mistakes than to hoard information

that could avert a future emergency.

All 34 departments participating in the survey

reported using some form of employee assistance program (EAP), whether state government,

department, or institution based (table 18).

Twenty-one departments—a significant 62

percent—also provide some type of specialized

crisis intervention help for traumatized or

injured staff or staff families, and 14 departments (41 percent) provide peer counseling or

peer support group assistance for injured or

traumatized staff. These data demonstrate a

marked shift from the traditional stance of “You

have to get back in the saddle,” and “If you

aren’t tough enough to deal with this, maybe you

aren’t tough enough to work here.” Most departments’ posttrauma programs or services have

been developed within the past 20 years, and

this change in the field is another that is emblematic of a philosophical shift. (The apparent

Table 17. Most departments have detailed procedures for the aftermath of an emergency

Departments

Postemergency Policies and Procedures Yes No

Emergency deactivation plan 25 8

Policy or plan for “stepping down” from emergency conditions to normal operations 26 7

Standardized reporting process for documenting emergencies 32 2

Policy mandating a postemergency strategic response that includes identifying and addressing

the factors that caused the emergency 20 14

Standard method for finding and disseminating lessons learned from emergency situations 17 13

Table 16. Many emergency policies and procedures differ substantially from day-to-day policies

and procedures

Departments

Standard Policies and Procedures That Change During an Emergency Yes No

Designated command structure for emergencies that is different from the 

day-to-day organizational structure 31 3

Emergency post orders or similar vehicle used to specify command duties during 

an emergency 31* 3

Emergency policies that are separate and distinct from everyday policy 27 6

Public information policy for emergencies 11 23

Policy on change of command during an emergency 24 10

Policy plans for the treatment of hostages after release 26 8

Specific staff position for coordinating emergency readiness and response 

Department level 20 14

Institutional level 17† 7

* These are the same departments that responded “yes” to the previous question.

† All of these departments also have a departmental emergency preparedness coordinator.
Section 4. Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons

197

discrepancy between these findings and the data

reported earlier indicating that only six departments maintain peer support or peer counseling

teams may be a gap between policy and reality.

That is, some departments may have policy and

plans specifying that peer support will be provided in the aftermath of a traumatic situation

but may never have organized a team to provide

such support or may have initially formed a

team and then allowed it to lapse. The authors

have had experience with that state of affairs,

not only with peer counseling teams but also

with hostage negotiation teams.)

Reliance on outside agencies is not a new concept. It is probably as old as prisons themselves.

Prisons have always relied heavily on local fire

departments to respond to major fires and on

state and local police to help respond to large

inmate riots and prison disturbances, or even to

take over in responding to these events. A riot or

a hostage situation has always meant that ambulances and support from local hospitals might

be essential. Thirty or forty years ago, that kind

of help would have been unplanned—that is,

details of the assistance would have been

worked out on the spot, in the heat of the crisis.

The data in table 19 show this is another area

that has seen major change.

Today, reliance on external agencies for assistance during a crisis is most often an integral

part of a prison’s emergency planning and is

written into the institution’s emergency manuals.

In this survey, 24 of the 33 departments responding to this question (73 percent) indicated

that written interagency agreements are included

in the institution’s emergency plans. Responses

to two other questions reported in table 19 also

reflect major changes that have occurred over

the past 10 to 20 years in American prisons: 15

of 33 departments (45 percent) stated that they

have trained inmates to provide some form of

community assistance in the event of certain

types of community disasters, and 11 of 32

departments (34 percent) have written agreements describing that kind of community assistance. Using inmates to help with community

disasters is not a new or recent idea, but planning for that eventuality is an outgrowth of the

recent emphasis on developing comprehensive,

detailed, and realistic emergency policies and

plans.

Table 18. All departments offer an employee

assistance program, and the majority provide

additional specialized posttrauma care

Postemergency Staff Departments

Support Services (N = 34)

Employee assistance program (EAP)* 34

State government program 22

Department program 15

Institution program 9

Services in addition to EAP

Peer counseling 14

Specialized crisis intervention 

services 21

* Some departments have more than one form of EAP.

Table 19. State DOCs rely in part on external

agencies for emergency assistance

Departments

External Agency Agreements Yes No

Emergency plans include interagency 

agreements 24 9

With state police 22 —

With local police 20 —

With local fire departments 19 —

Written interagency agreement to 

provide services to community in event 

of disasters 11 21

Inmates trained to provide community 

assistance in event of disasters 15 18

Working relationships with other agencies

State emergency management agency 29 3

County emergency organization 16 16

National Guard 19 13

Note: —, not applicable.
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Thirty-two departments responded to a series of

questions about working relationships with other

agencies. Of the responding departments, 29 (91

percent) reported having a working relationship

with their state emergency management agency,

and 16 (50 percent) reported a working relationship with their county emergency organization.

Many of these relationships have been forged

since 9/11 and the advent of the Department of

Homeland Security. Since FEMA was organized

at the national level, some state emergency management agencies have had access to extraordinary emergency resources. However, until the

1990s—and until the events of September 11,

2001, in some cases—state DOCs had no working relationship with their state emergency

agencies and had no awareness of the kinds of

resources available to them through those agencies. The survey results show that this is no

longer the case and that the National Incident

Management System is being well incorporated

into prison emergency planning. 

The response pattern was quite different when

departments were asked about terrorism and terrorist threats (table 20). The data on specific

counterterrorism measures are quite consistent

with the survey data on training on terrorism

and terrorist activity. Notably, only 10 of 34

departments responding (29 percent) reported

any specific policy, response plan, or procedure

designed to respond to terrorist threats or a terrorist incident. These data are not encouraging

when compared with the level of counterterrorism planning in fire departments and law

enforcement. At the time of this survey, in 

the aftermath of September 11, almost every

medium-sized or large local or state law

enforcement agency and fire department would

have answered this question in the affirmative.

The first item in table 20 is more positive. Of 34

departments responding, 24 (71 percent) were

regularly participating in interagency meetings

on counterterrorism at the time of the survey.

Continued participation of state DOCs in interagency counterterrorism meetings and task

forces should lead departments to incorporate

counterterrorism concerns, policies, and procedures more frequently into their emergency

planning.

Summary 

Fifteen years ago, it is doubtful that one-third of

the state DOCs had any kind of serious system

of emergency preparedness and response. The

survey results suggest that today this figure is

above 70 percent and perhaps closer to 85 percent. Corrections has come a long way in emergency preparedness if it has indeed reached the

point where having a few old, unrealistic emergency plans on the shelf in the warden’s office

is no longer acceptable and where a true system

of preparation and response designed for correctional institutions is the norm. That is not to say

every department in the country takes emergency readiness seriously. Some 15 percent of

the departments responding in this survey

Table 20. Specific counterterrorism measures

remain infrequent among state DOCs

Departments

(N = 34)

Counterterrorism Measure Yes No

Regular participation in interagency 

meetings on terrorism 24 10

Specific policy or response plans/

procedures for terrorist threats or 

terrorism 10 24

Equipment acquired specifically for 

threat of terrorism 3 31

Policies/procedures for integrating 

FBI into department’s response to 

terrorist activity 3 31
Section 4. Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons

199

acknowledged having no departmentwide emergency system, although they did have some

degree of planning at the institutional level, and

it is reasonable to assume this percentage would

rise if the DOCs of all 50 states were examined. 

Fifteen to twenty years ago, almost all DOCs

used separate and distinct plans for different

kinds of emergencies, and emergency plans at

different institutions in the same department

typically bore no relation to each other. The survey results show that both of those factors are

now changing. The majority of the responding

DOCs reported that they specify a departmentwide format for emergency plans, an approach

that has several advantages. The results also

show the beginning of a clear trend away from

developing separate plans for separate emergencies and toward the use of a single generic or

comprehensive emergency plan with appendixes

containing emergency-specific information, as

first pioneered some 25 years ago in LETRA’s

proprietary approach to comprehensive emergency systems designed specifically for correctional institutions.

Another encouraging sign is the prevalence of

well-defined emergency teams, which were the

exception rather than the rule as recently as 

10 years ago. The survey data show that highly 

specialized tactical teams (CERT or SORT),

institution-based disturbance control teams, and

teams of hostage negotiators are now the norm

for state DOCs. There is also a clear trend

toward peer counseling and posttrauma services

designed to deal with staff needs after an incident. The creation of these emergency response

teams and services represents a significant

investment in and commitment to emergency

preparedness on the part of the state DOCs. 

The data on training may help separate the

departments that are most serious about emergency readiness from those that are less so.

Many departments have plans, policies, and

even well-thought-out emergency teams but do

not provide their rank-and-file staff with a reasonable level of training in the emergency system. However, many agencies do provide staff at

the rank of shift commander and above with

specialized training in emergency preparedness.

This is important because it makes little sense to

invest heavily in developing and training sophisticated emergency teams but to do little or no

work with the shift commanders and higher

ranking staff who will be in command of the

situations in which those specialized teams are

to be used.

The same pattern is seen with regard to drills

and exercises. Although all the DOCs that

responded to this survey conduct fire drills and

most reported the right things about evaluators,

monitors, written assessments, and the like,

some departments appear to have no substantial

program of emergency drills and exercises. On

the other hand, a surprising number of departments are committed to an ongoing program of

tabletop exercises, functional exercises, and fullscale simulations and have specified standards

for these exercises in policy. This, too, is a

major change in the field.

Planning tools such as specific response plans,

emergency post orders, deactivation and stepdown procedures, risk assessment tools, and

prevention plans are now commonplace. The

number and variety of specific planning tools

and response mechanisms consensually accepted

by the responding DOCs indicate that the corrections field is moving toward a common

understanding of emergency preparation and

response in prisons.

The one surprisingly negative note in the survey

results was the relatively low percentage of

departments that had developed specific preparations or response plans with regard to terrorism. It is not clear whether most state DOCs

have simply been slow to respond in the wake
200

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

of the September 11 attacks or whether they

believe terrorism is not a prison issue. The participation of most of the responding state DOCs

in law enforcement-led task forces on terrorism

is, therefore, an encouraging finding. Their

involvement in these task forces may well lead

to more specific and focused preparation for

dealing with terrorist threats and responding to

terrorism. 

Overall, the survey found a healthy level of

emergency preparedness in the nation’s prisons.

Undoubtedly, some departments may have

responded to some items rather liberally,

attempting to put forward the most positive face

possible. However, even when the possibility of

some positive bias is taken into account, the

nationwide improvement in prison emergency

preparedness over the past 8 to 10 years is

unquestionable. At the same time, there remains

room for, and substantial need for, improvement

in this national picture. The various discussions

in the “Results” section have raised specific

problems and omissions, but the two most general weaknesses reflected in these survey data

are the failure of many departments to engage in

a systematic program of emergency drills, exercises, and simulations and the lack of adequate

initial and refresher emergency preparedness

training for front-line, supervisory, and management staff. A similar survey conducted 10 years

from now would hope to find these deficits

corrected and new areas of strength apparent.
Section 5

Resource Materials
Leadership Issues During Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205 

Importance of Leadership During Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205 

Status of Leadership Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205 

Preparation for Crisis Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205 

The Isolation of the Leader During a Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206 

Crisis Leadership Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207 

Dynamics of a Crisis Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .208 

Elements of Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210 

Aftermath and Deactivation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .213 

Prevention of Prison Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215 

Commitment to Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215

Can Prison Emergencies Be Prevented? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .216

Specific Measures Designed To Prevent Prison Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .217

Ongoing Operational Issues That Play a Role in Prevention of Emergencies . . .222

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .225

Emergency Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227 

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227

General Management Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .228

Tactical Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230

Hostage Negotiation Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235

Crisis Intervention Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .238

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239

In This 

Section
Prisons and Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241

Role of Prisons in a National Counterterrorism Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242

Counterterrorism Preparedness and Response in Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .245

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253
205

This paper is intended as a “think piece” about

leadership during crises and major emergencies.

Although the paper focuses on prison and jail

crises, most of the discussion is also relevant to

leadership in other emergency services such as

law enforcement and fire fighting.

The literature on leadership is extensive. Much

of it is concerned with leadership in industry,

and many books are devoted entirely to qualities

of leadership. This discussion, then, is not exhaustive; rather, it is intended to raise some of the

most crucial issues concerning leadership during a crisis. The authors have not attempted to

explore each issue in detail and also recognize

that many aspects of leadership are not explored

herein at all.

Importance of Leadership 

During Crises 

The importance of leadership in an emergency or

a major crisis cannot be overstated. The actions,

decisions, style, presence, and direction of the

person in charge will often determine the outcome of a situation. At a personal level, a

leader’s performance during a time of crisis may

define his or her future, not only with regard to

career, but also with regard to broader matters

having to do with health, family, and life goals.

In the world of corrections, a major crisis (e.g.,

the inmate uprisings at Attica and Santa Fe) can

define for decades not only an institution and its

leaders but the entire larger organization. 

Status of Leadership Development

Fortunately, in the wake of large-scale inmate

insurrections (e.g., Attica, Santa Fe, Lucasville,

Camp Hill), most state prison systems and

medium-sized and large jail organizations now

engage in serious and comprehensive emergency

preparedness efforts. Unfortunately, many of

these same organizations do not believe that they

have the time, budget, or other resources to

engage in serious leadership development.

Leadership during crisis has received precious

little attention within management development

efforts and often receives short shrift even within

emergency preparedness and crisis management

training. 

Preparation for Crisis Situations

Preparation for emergencies is essential, but

every crisis will be different. In fact, no two

prison or jail emergencies will ever be close to

identical. A crisis in a prison or jail is, by definition, complex, and each situation is unique in

many important aspects. This is not an argument

against planning or preparation. To the contrary,

the challenge is to find common elements that

make it possible to generalize across crisis situations so that policy, procedure, equipment, and

training can be developed and meaningfully

applied. That proposition also holds true for

Leadership Issues During Crises

Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency

Preparedness, by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry

(Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc., 2002), by permission of the

authors. Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia

Barry.
206

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

leadership. The leader who has planned for

emergencies and is personally and organizationally prepared is far more likely to succeed than

the leader who has not. The common wisdom is

that “leaders are born, not made.” Yet, the individual who is not a natural leader but is well

trained and prepared for crisis situations may be

more successful and may exhibit more leadership than the individual who is a “natural” leader

but lacks training and preparation. 

On the other hand, a leader in a crisis situation

can do everything right and still have a negative

outcome or do everything wrong and have a positive outcome. After a riot, natural disaster, or

other major emergency, judgments by the public,

media, and political elements—and, often, even

most of the corrections organization itself—are

based on the outcome. Usually, however, only a

few people actually know the details of what

happened and recognize whether leadership was

strong and positive and whether decisions were

justified given the information available to the

leader at the time.

It would be foolhardy to ignore the

importance of attributes such as

common sense, judgment, maturity,

and even luck in a crisis, but that

does not disparage the importance

of planning, training, and other

preparation. Simply put, crises are

situations in which it can be better

to be lucky than good. The enlightened leader hopes to be both lucky and good but

recognizes that he or she can only control the

latter.

For the leader, it is crucial to recognize the role

of luck (or “fate,” if one prefers), the fact that he

or she will be judged primarily on the outcome

of the crisis, and the fact that no amount of planning and preparation can anticipate everything

that will be encountered in a real emergency.

Consideration of these factors should occur

before the leader actually manages a crisis.

Otherwise, if a crisis ends badly, the aftermath

can be personally devastating. These are not lessons best learned by trial and error.

The Isolation of the Leader 

During a Crisis 

In addition to making the key decisions during a

crisis, the leader is also setting the tone for the

rest of the staff (and sometimes the inmates as

well). The leader is “on view” during the entire

crisis, typically surrounded by staff from beginning to end. Staff members may not offer alternatives while a decision is being made but may

then quickly criticize that decision if the situation deteriorates. The leader experiences not

only constant pressure from the situation itself

but also constant scrutiny by staff.

Despite being surrounded and scrutinized by

staff during an emergency, the leader is in a

sense alone. Staff may offer fewer suggestions

and participate less actively than the leader

anticipated. The reasons are simple. Staff see the

awesome responsibility of making life-and-death

decisions; many are intimidated, and some are

reluctant to become involved. Recognizing the

pressure on the leader, staff may also be hesitant,

fearing their contributions may interfere with the

leader’s work. 

Strong teamwork can help to reduce the leader’s

sense of isolation. In general, it will not be possible to establish a good working team of top

managers during a crisis unless those individuals

have a history of teamwork and trust. Similarly,

if the culture of the organization has been predominantly negative, staff will find it difficult to

support each other during an extended emergency. There are some exceptions. Regardless

of past relationships, staff sometimes rise to the

occasion in a crisis, particularly in a short-term

emergency. Also, emergency conditions do tend

Despite being 

surrounded and 

scrutinized by staff 

during an emergency, 

the leader is in 

a sense alone.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Leadership Issues During Crises

207

to bring out the best in many people. However,

over time, particularly during an extended emergency, the history and the culture of the organization will exert a strong influence on behaviors

during the crisis. 

After an emergency has ended, some crisis managers walk away nonchalantly and say something like “I’m fine. I did what I had to do and it

didn’t affect me.” (Some will dismiss that reaction as denial, and readers are free to draw their

own conclusion.) However, most leaders emerge

from a crisis and acknowledge a dramatic, sometimes profound, personal impact. Yet, in this

“enlightened” era in which corrections has finally acknowledged the importance of posttrauma

care and other emergency services for staff, it

is disturbing that the one individual frequently

omitted from psychological screening, employee

assistance programs, posttrauma debriefing, and

the like is the leader.

Crisis Leadership Attributes

In the “good old days,” a booming voice and

stern demeanor were the qualities associated

with effective leadership in prisons and jails. An

intimidating physical presence (and a coffee cup

welded to one hand) seemed to help as well.

Although corrections has not completely abandoned the old stereotypes, most professionals

recognize that strong leadership has nothing to

do with size or gender.

The word “strong” is important. In times of crisis, strong but flawed leadership may be preferable to weak leadership or no leadership at all.

Almost all organizations depend on and reflect

their leadership, and in paramilitary organizations such as correctional institutions, the central

importance of leadership is heightened because

of the enormous risks inherent in operating these

organizations and because staff expect decisive

direction. 

No single set of characteristics defines the ideal

leader. Those who are “natural” leaders seem to

come in a wide variety of personality types:

stern or humorous, quiet or verbal, etc. Similarly,

those who have worked, trained, and studied to

become effective leaders are a varied group.

Individuals can be themselves and still develop

and enhance qualities associated with effective

leadership.

What are the crucial qualities of effective leadership during a crisis? Integrity is the core and

foundation. Decisiveness is obvious, as are calmness and support

for subordinate staff. Many crucial

qualities are not so obvious.

Patience is near the top of the list;

however, staff may misinterpret

patience as indecisiveness. Maturity

is a necessity; ego involvement and

testosterone-driven behavior have

the potential, quite literally, to be

fatal. Tenacity, physical endurance, mental flexibility, and the ability to tolerate ambiguity are

also high on the list. Communication skills,

often overlooked in discussions of crisis management, are important; listening well and

expressing oneself clearly and succinctly are

skills that any crisis situation will test repeatedly.

Understanding and compassion must be on the

list, and analytic thinking may be a crucial quality. On the other hand, lack of judgment or lack

of common sense can render any of these qualities and attributes ineffectual.

Because second guessing, Monday morning

quarterbacking, and blunt criticism are inevitable

in extended crisis situations, self-confidence and

grace under pressure might be excellent qualities

to add to the list. Effective leaders need to know

themselves and be able to draw on inner

resources because, at the end of the day, no one

else may be there. Once the crisis is over, they

need to live comfortably with their decisions and

. . . the history and the

culture of the

organization will exert 

a strong influence on

behaviors during the 

crisis.
208

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

performance and must be able to continue to

lead, which is often the greatest challenge.

Dynamics of a Crisis Situation

Cycles, waves, phases, stages—all of these

terms characterize the progression of a crisis situation through time. Certain dynamics are characteristic of crisis situations, and these dynamics

change as the crisis unfolds. To some extent, the

dynamics of a crisis are predictable.

The Early Phase

The initial phase of an extended crisis situation

(or the entirety of a short crisis or emergency)

typically is quite different from the rest of an

extended situation. If planning,

preparation, and training have been

good, much of the initial response

is almost reflexive. A host of steps

commonly taken when a crisis first

arises—lockdowns, emergency

counts, dispatching staff to try to

resolve or to isolate and contain the

situation, notifying top staff, etc.—

may be carried out relatively easily

because they have been planned and practiced.

At this point, the leader’s challenge typically is

to figure out what has happened and what is

continuing to happen. Early information is

always incomplete or inadequate, and often

some of the crucial information available early

on turns out later to be simply wrong. Also, the

early stages of crises usually are characterized

by some degree of chaos, which makes it difficult to interpret available information. 

Interpreting Available Information

During a prison crisis, every staff member typically has some specific task or defined responsibility. The only person who by necessity must

take the long view and the broad view is the

leader. That is, only the leader may have access

to all of the information from all areas of the

institution. If the leader does not recognize an

important pattern in the events (indicating, perhaps, that the crisis is a planned mass escape

rather than a spontaneous disturbance), no one

else is likely to do so, and the actual nature of

the problem may go unrecognized for a long

time, with disastrous consequences. It is up to

the leader to identify the broad parameters of

the situation as soon as possible. How much of

the institution is involved? Was this planned? Is

“another shoe” about to drop (and if so, what

might that “other shoe” consist of)? The leader

is in the unenviable position of directing an

immediate and almost all-consuming response

while at the same time functioning as the only

strategist in the situation and as a data analyst.

Avoiding the “Ambiguity Trap” 

Early in many crises, the leader is likely to

encounter a specific trap. (In the later stages of

Important Qualities of Leadership During a Crisis

• Integrity • Patience and maturity • Support for staff

• Decisiveness • Physical endurance • Communication skills

• Calmness • Mental flexibility and creativity • Compassion

• Tenacity • Tolerance for ambiguity • Analytic thinking 

If planning, 

preparation, and 

training have been 

good, much of the 

initial response is 

almost reflexive.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Leadership Issues During Crises

209

a crisis, staff may press the leader to resolve

the situation with a decisive use of force even

though conditions do not warrant such an

action.) In the early stage, the leader may face

pressure to adopt a view of the emergency that

is inconsistent with the available information. It

is an ambiguity trap. The leader and many staff

may want the certainty of knowing what they are

confronting. However, because early information

is typically incomplete, contradictory, or just

wrong, it may not be possible to know the true

nature or extent of the crisis in the early stages.

The leader must be able to tolerate ambiguity

and reject the allure of false clarity that may lead

to unfortunate outcomes.

Helping Staff Remain Calm

During the early phase of a crisis, the leader

must be careful not to allow panic to set in

among staff, particularly if the crisis threatens to

overwhelm the initial response. In guiding staff

through this intense period, the leader must be

decisive without becoming impulsive. He or she

must listen well but be resolute, even in the face

of pressure or emotion from subordinate staff. 

As the Crisis Unfolds

In an extended crisis, staff reactions will change

predictably as the early adrenaline rush gives

way to anger, anxiety, and doubt, along with

moments of enthusiasm and even elation.

Different staff will, of course, react differently.

The volatility of the crisis situation itself and of

the staff reactions to the situation make it essential that the leader remain steady and portray

confidence and professionalism. 

Serving as a Role Model

Although a sense of humor, if used judiciously,

can be invaluable, a crisis is not a time for

jokes. Nor is it a time for cynical observations,

profanity, or expressions of anger. When staff

realize that the crisis, with its attendant dangers

and personal risk, may continue for a long time,

the leader must function not only as the chief

decisionmaker but as a highly visible role model. 

In an extended crisis, the leader may also serve

directly or indirectly as a role model for inmates.

For example, in a large-scale hostage-taking

incident, the leader’s steady, measured responses

may calm highly agitated inmates and bring

down their emotional tone, which in turn may

lessen the danger to the hostages. Additionally,

the leader’s steady demeanor may begin to

build the inmates’ trust toward the institution

or department leadership, and that trust may be

an essential ingredient in later attempts at

resolution. 

Meeting Staff Needs

The effective leader also recognizes the need to

build staff confidence during the actual crisis

event. Keeping in mind that the occasional mistake or bad behavior is always easier to recognize than the many things done correctly or

unusually well, the leader must consciously look

for ways to be positive with subordinate staff

and to reinforce their actions and decisions—

Fiction vs. Real Life

Television and movies often portray

extremely dramatic, high-risk initiatives as

the only way to successfully resolve emergencies. The wise manager recognizes that

television and movie scripts are written to

be compelling and that real-life emergencies often require thoughtful, measured,

low-risk initiatives that are quite the opposite from what Hollywood might choose.
210

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

even if doing so means swallowing some

doubts. 

At the same time, some individuals can “come

apart” under the pressure of crisis conditions,

and it is seldom possible to predict who will be

unusually strong in a crisis and who may fall

apart. Inappropriate anger or incapacitating anxiety is a sign that a staff member is losing emotional control, and the leader must be aware of

these signs. If a staff member is losing control,

the leader usually will not have time to help and

should be prepared to have the individual

removed, quickly and firmly, from the crisis

situation. 

The Resolution

As a crisis continues, the pressure on the leader

builds. If the situation involves inmate violence,

the leader almost always is urged to assault—to

use a sniper or in some other way commit to a

tactical initiative that will end the crisis. If a

response was dismissed early in the crisis as too

dangerous, the mere passage of time will seldom transform that option into a

much better response. Nevertheless, the leader may be under

pressure from many sources to end

the situation. A tactical team may

lobby for action, saying that they

can assault quickly and take control with minimal risk. Political decisionmakers may be asking when they can expect something decisive to

happen. Rank-and-file staff may strongly feel

that doing something is better than doing nothing. Seldom does it help for the leader to

explain that waiting, talking, planning, and further analyzing available information is far different from “doing nothing.”

The leader’s greatest pressure at this point may

come from within. Managers have commonly

reported that after some period of time in a crisis, they began to feel that it didn’t matter

whether the situation ended badly or well, as

long as it ended. That reaction may be typical

and instinctual, but some crisis situations may

demand an opposite and counterinstinctual

posture. For example, during the 2-week siege

of the federal prisons at Atlanta and Oakdale,

Michael Quinlen, then Director of the Federal

Bureau of Prisons, said “my patience is endless.” Larry Meachum, the former Director of

Corrections for both Oklahoma and Connecticut,

later pointed out in print that “endless patience is

active management.” This concept is an especially important one for a leader to understand,

particularly in an extended crisis situation.

Elements of Strategy 

In an extended crisis, strategy is essential. The

frantic pace of the emergency can easily consume everyone’s time and attention, and staff

can easily mistake tactics for strategy. It is up to

the leader to take specific steps to focus on strategy, because it won’t happen by accident. The

leader may choose to take full responsibility for

strategy, to work with one or more top staff

members on strategy (a “crisis management

team” approach), or to develop a separate group

to formulate and evaluate strategy alternatives

(a “strategic planning group”). Any of these

alternatives will demand some of the leader’s

time and attention.

A common problem in formulating strategies is

failing to consider risks as well as benefits. The

leader must identify and weigh the risks of various strategies contemplated. (“You said with

this kind of dynamic entry, your team has an 

80-percent chance of controlling the hostage

takers before they can reach the hostages. If you

aren’t successful, what do you expect we will

have in injuries and deaths if we are in that 20

percent? And then how long will it take to control the situation? Is there any risk that other

people may come under threat?”)

“[E]ndless patience is 

active management.”
Section 5. Resource Materials: Leadership Issues During Crises

211

Another common problem is simply failing to

identify and evaluate additional strategies, particularly those that may be unusual and creative.

A leader can easily lose perspective and concentrate too soon on a single, obvious strategy. 

The leader must remember that crisis conditions

tend to constrict creative thinking. This tendency

may be an argument for using a strategic

planning group, particularly during extended

emergencies. 

Aftermath and Deactivation Issues

Once a crisis has been resolved, the leader’s

responsibilities as a role model for staff may

take precedence over decisionmaking responsibilities. The leader knows, from training,

experience, and preparation, that the aftermath

of a major crisis is often longer and sometimes

more dangerous than the crisis itself. A huge

amount of work remains to be done (e.g., preserving evidence, protecting the crime scene,

developing a short-term step-down plan, isolating key witnesses), and much of it cannot be

postponed simply because staff are physically

tired and emotionally drained. The leader must

make it clear by direction, but also by example,

that this work requires immediate attention. 

Responding to Criticism

This is also the point when instant media analysis of the event often leads to internal and external criticism, recriminations, and even outright

expressions of guilt and anger. Here, the leader

must walk a fine line. The leader must thank

staff for their efforts and, where it is reasonably

clear that work has been good, acknowledge

that. On the other hand, in the case of controversial issues, media criticism, and inmate complaints, the leader cannot make snap judgments

and simply exonerate staff out of hand. The

leader must see to it that these matters are

investigated promptly, thoroughly, and honestly.

Although others may press the leader to say

“staff did nothing wrong,” that statement, combined with “the causes of the disturbance are

still under investigation,” clearly signals savvy

observers that the “investigation” is actually a

whitewash. The leader needs to support staff,

particularly after a lengthy and emotional crisis.

However, “supporting staff” does not mean

exonerating them before the facts are known.

Tactics vs. Strategy 

Strategies and tactics are both plans or

courses of action. In general, whereas tactics are narrower, shorter term, and more

limited in their objective, strategies are

often intended for the duration of the situation; they are broad in scope, and their

objective is to resolve the matter. The

expression “we won the battle but lost the

war” suggests good tactics but bad strategy. 

In a developing prison disturbance, one

strategy might be “let’s contain it and then

let it dissipate on its own”; another might

be “we need to regain control as soon as

possible before the inmates get better

organized.” These two very different

(almost opposite) strategies would lead to

very different tactics, and either strategy

will suggest a rather large number of specific tactics. 

Finally, when a tactic is unsuccessful, it is

usually possible to try a different tactic.

However, if the overall strategy is wrong,

the entire venture may be lost. 
212

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Driving the Agenda

The single most important principle to guide the

leader in the aftermath of a major crisis is “drive

your own agenda or someone else will drive

theirs.” Even if the leader is devastated and the

institution is in shambles, the

leader must develop a game plan

and pursue it aggressively. Otherwise, other forces, usually external,

will step into the vacuum, and the

leader and the institution will find

themselves in a reactive, rather

than proactive, position. Like so

much else in this paper, however,

driving the agenda is easier said than done. It

involves myriad tasks, including the following:

● Developing a thoughtful, detailed step-down

plan. 

● Beginning a comprehensive inquiry into the

events of the crisis itself.

● Initiating a careful study of damage control

and establishing repair priorities.

● Taking firm control of media relations and

establishing a proactive media plan.

● Holding staff briefings and attending to staff

morale.

● Communicating frequently with the inmate

population.

● Preventing staff retaliation. 

● Briefing departmental officials and political

decisionmakers frequently and candidly.

Energetically undertaking these and other deactivation tasks allows the leader to maintain

control in the aftermath of the crisis. It also has

a beneficial byproduct: staff are engaged and

challenged and begin to reestablish their own

balance and confidence. 

The Road Not Taken

It is always hardest to analyze alternate

strategies that are furthest from what is

currently underway. 

For example, in the midst of a long, very

difficult hostage siege, the commander,

through a well-trained negotiator, is making

no progress deflecting the leader of the

hostage takers from a time ultimatum tied

to a threat to harm the hostages. While the

commander tries different approaches with

the leader, someone else suggests using a

different negotiator and asking to talk with

all the hostage takers at once, as a group.

Surprisingly, it works. The leader is the

most aggressive and committed of the

hostage takers; as a group, the inmates are

“easier” and less focused. Changing negotiators does not undermine the rapport

between the original negotiator and the

inmate leader, and the change provides a

logical reason for asking to talk with the

group. This successful strategy might never

have occurred to the commander, who was

“locked in” to the confrontation with the

inmate leader and was no longer evaluating

alternative approaches. 

It is the leader’s responsibility to see that

“the road not taken” is at least fully

considered.

. . . in the aftermath

of a major crisis . . .

“drive your own agenda or someone else

will drive theirs.”
Section 5. Resource Materials: Leadership Issues During Crises

213

Addressing Human Needs

Good emergency plans include comprehensive

preparation for dealing with the special needs of

staff and their families in a crisis and separate

procedures for dealing with traumatized inmates

and their families. Such plans should also provide for services or procedures to help the

leader cope in the aftermath of a major crisis.

Often, it is best if this assistance for the leader is

kept separate from the department and from the

leader’s colleagues, so the leader can work out

personal issues privately. (Once again, the twin

themes of the isolation of the leader in crisis and

the extraordinary demands placed on the leader

by the crisis are both apparent.)

Conclusion

Awareness of the issues discussed in this paper

can help prepare a correctional manager or

administrator for leadership during a major

institutional emergency. However, because every

crisis is unique, even the most thorough preparation cannot guarantee a positive outcome.

Recognition of that fact provides some of the

realistic perspective the leader needs to function

effectively during and after a crisis. 
215

Prevention of Prison Emergencies

An emergency in a prison is a serious matter.

Even a relatively brief prison emergency can

leave a wake of deaths, serious injuries, and

millions of dollars in damage. Regardless of

whether an emergency involves inmate violence,

the stakes are always high, for obvious reasons:

● Population densities in prisons are very

high. 

● Inmates typically are locked into their cells

or living units or onto the prison compound

and cannot protect themselves in many

emergency situations. 

● In any kind of emergency, some inmates

may attempt to capitalize on the situation,

complicating matters and escalating risks. 

● Efforts to respond to or control an emergency in a prison must be weighed against

security interests and the prison’s overriding

mission of preventing escapes and protecting the public.

These issues are the rationale for a familiar

adage in corrections: “The best way to deal with

prison emergencies is not to have them in the

first place.” Although not every emergency can

be prevented, serious prevention efforts can stop

some crisis situations from occurring at all and

will mitigate other incidents so they do not

develop into full-scale crises.

This paper first discusses the level of commitment to prevention in corrections and then

addresses the question of whether prison emergencies can indeed be prevented. The bulk of

the paper focuses on specific measures designed

to prevent emergencies and on day-to-day operational issues that play a role in prevention.

Commitment to Prevention

Given the issues discussed above, it seems reasonable to expect a universally strong commitment to preventing emergencies and large-scale

crises in prisons. That is not the case. Certainly

the rhetoric is there. Almost every prison administrator and high-level correctional executive

talks about the importance of preventing emergencies. However, the level of commitment to

prevention in most institutions and agencies, if

measured by allocation of resources, management attention, or degree of accountability, is

surprisingly low. This generally negative assessment has two significant qualifications, both

related to current prison practices.

First, one of the most important ways to prevent

prison emergencies is to be well prepared to

respond to emergency situations and to situations that have the potential to escalate into

emergencies. Today, most prisons and most state

departments of corrections (DOCs) do engage in

serious, broad-scale efforts to maintain a high

level of preparation for emergency situations. In

that context, they are also engaging in important

preventive activity. 

Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency Preparedness,

by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry (Campbell, CA: LETRA,

Inc., 2002), by permission of the authors. Copyright 2002 by

Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry.
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Second, many prison practices have the effect of

lowering the probability of a riot, a hostage situation, or some other major crisis involving

inmate violence. However, prisons engage in

most of these practices because the practices

represent good day-to-day operations and are

recognized as effective ways to run prisons—not

because the practices have a preventive role. 

It can be argued that such distinctions are 

unimportant—that as long as a desirable practice

with a preventive effect is in place, it does not

matter why it is in place. Evidence suggests,

however, that prevention of major emergencies

does not receive the priority it

deserves. A number of prisons have

excellent inmate grievance systems,

emphasize positive staff/inmate

relationships, and generally use

day-to-day procedures that tend to

reduce the probability of inmate

violence. By comparison, efforts that are not

common to day-to-day prison management but

that focus narrowly and clearly on prevention

are largely lacking.

Thus, prevention of major crises is far better

today than it was 20 or 30 years ago, but primarily because today’s prisons are generally

much better managed and because most of

today’s prisons engage in comprehensive emergency preparedness. A great deal of room

remains for increased emphasis and improvement with regard to pure prevention efforts.

Can Prison Emergencies Be

Prevented?

This question is more complex than it first

seems. The answer is “yes and no.”

Some prison emergencies obviously cannot be

prevented. We cannot prevent an earthquake, a

tornado, or a tsunami. Most natural disasters fall

into the “unpreventable” category. Even if a

natural disaster conceivably could be averted

(e.g., a flood), the necessary measures are generally beyond the influence or jurisdiction of

correctional officials. 

However, other kinds of large-scale crises and

emergencies in prisons are potentially preventable. The most common of these are situations

that involve inmate violence—riots, disturbances, sit-downs, hostage incidents, etc. Fire is

another common, potentially preventable emergency. (Forest fires are a separate matter.

Although many prisons are not at risk from forest fires, a smaller number of prisons could be

devastated by a serious forest fire. Some forest

fires, such as those caused by lightning strikes,

cannot be prevented; others can. However, the

prevention of forest fires is not within the

purview of correctional agencies.) A number of

less common situations, ranging from staff job

actions to food poisoning, are also potentially

preventable. Finally, some crises fall into both

categories. For example, prisons may be able to

prevent a toxic material spill within the compound but they cannot prevent a similar event

outside prison property.

“Potentially” preventable is an important distinction. No emergency is completely preventable. Even the best run prison may have a

hostage incident or a riot. A devastating fire can

happen even if a prison minimizes combustible

loading and ignition possibilities and conducts

frequent, serious fire drills. Nevertheless, common sense dictates that even though many kinds

of prison emergencies cannot be totally prevented, good prevention efforts can reduce the probability that they will occur. 

Another important element of this discussion is

mitigation. Good emergency preparedness can

result in both prevention and mitigation. For

example, a prison may not be able to foresee a

power surge that creates an electrical fire. If the

fire starts in an area equipped with sprinklers,

Good emergency 

preparedness can 

result in both prevention and mitigation.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prevention of Prison Emergencies

217

no emergency may ensue; good preparation has

completely prevented a crisis. If the fire starts in

an unprotected area and begins to spread, but

the prison has minimized combustibles that

would fuel the fire, and the prison’s fire alarm

system, fire-fighting response, and evacuation

drills are all excellent, then the prison may

experience a relatively minor emergency instead

of an institutionwide crisis or even a disaster; in

this case, emergency preparedness has resulted

in mitigation.

It is easy to envision hypothetical situations in

which good emergency preparedness may mitigate a disturbance or a hostage situation. Even

with unpreventable situations such as natural

disasters, good preparation efforts can make it

much easier for the prison to contend with the

emergency.

The importance of preparedness in preventing

prison emergencies cannot be overstated.

Preparedness may seem to be primarily concerned with responding to an emergency that

has already occurred—at a point when it is too

late to be concerned with prevention. Closer

examination reveals this not to be the case. For

example, after a prison riot in which lives have

been lost and millions of dollars in damage has

occurred, it may become clear that the crisis

started with an unplanned fight among a few

inmates, which escalated into a full-scale riot

throughout the facility. Better emergency preparedness might have produced an earlier, better

response. Perhaps the initial fight could have

been stopped. Perhaps the disturbance could

have been isolated within just one living unit or

at least contained within one building. If the

prison translates its experience into better emergency preparedness, it may be able to prevent a

major riot in the future. In addition to prevention and mitigation, good emergency preparedness may also mean faster resolution of a major

emergency and/or more successful resolution. 

Specific Measures Designed To

Prevent Prison Emergencies

Measures designed specifically to prevent prison

emergencies include training staff to recognize

early warning signs, avoiding agency-initiated

crises, creating a prevention-specific intelligence

function, being alert to “hot” issues likely to

cause dissension among inmates, and implementing automated early warning systems.

Proactive management, though less specifically

related to prevention, nevertheless plays a critical role. 

Traditional Warning Signs

This is the one prevention initiative that almost

all prisons use, and it is primarily a matter of

staff training. Correctional staff have long recognized a number of warning signs of impending violence in a prison. The list of traditional

warning signs may vary somewhat, but almost

all DOCs have such a list and teach it to staff as

part of the recruit academy curriculum. Some

departments revisit the list as part of inservice

or refresher training. 

Warning signs are part of many experienced

staff members’ “sense and feel” of the institution. When an experienced staff member walks

into a familiar prison and notices that the noise

level, inmate groupings, and staff-inmate interactions are out of the ordinary, the staff member

quickly registers that something is amiss, perhaps without articulating exactly what led to

that conclusion. (This and other aspects of institutional “tone” are further discussed below,

under “Ongoing Operational Issues That Play a

Role in Prevention of Emergencies.”)

Training staff in the traditional warning signs of

impending violence is an important preventive

measure, particularly with new staff. The problem is that in many prisons, it is the only initiative targeted specifically at preventing

emergencies.
218

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Agency-Initiated Crises

A number of now-infamous prison crises resulted from some change or other action by the

prison administration. For example, the 11-day

hostage siege at the Southern Ohio Correctional

Facility in Lucasville, OH, which resulted in the

murder of one staff member and nine inmates,

can be traced to a decision by the Ohio DOC to

conduct skin tests for tuberculosis on the entire

inmate population throughout the department.

Other states can point to prison riots that began

with a decision to introduce a no-smoking policy, to restrict visits or packages, to change food

service providers, etc. 

Unfortunately, too many prison crises have been

initiated by decisions at the institution or departmental level. The problem is not with the decisions themselves. Although some may not have

been the best choices (or even wise), they were

properly within the authority of the prison or the

department. The problem is that a negative and

potentially explosive reaction from inmates was

foreseeable, but nothing was done to prevent

that reaction. 

A good case in point is the decision to change a

prison to a no-smoking (“tobacco-free”) environment. Such decisions are a relatively recent

phenomenon but may already be the classic

example of an agency-initiated crisis. Some

prisons have decided to make the change,

announced the decision and the effective date,

done nothing else, and then had a serious inmate

disturbance. Other prisons have made the same

decision but then developed plans for minimizing the impact on inmates and communicated

frequently with inmates about the change.

(Many prisons in this latter group have used

phased-in approaches and offered smoking cessation classes and/or cessation patches and gum,

etc.) Very few prisons that engaged in preventive

efforts had any serious problem making the

change. The question appears to have been not

whether those efforts were good, better, or the

best but rather whether the prison did anything

at all.

The issues in this no-smoking policy example

appear to apply to a broad range of policy decisions and other changes that a prison may institute. Experienced correctional professionals can

easily foresee which changes have a high potential for angering inmates. Once this potential is

recognized, it is often a fairly straightforward

matter to plan ways of introducing the change

that will make it more likely to gain inmates’

acceptance. Still, it can be extremely challenging to find ways to “soften the blow” when a

change is necessary but likely to elicit a strong

Traditional Warning Signs of

Impending Violence

• Inmates hoarding food or canteen goods. 

• Inmates refusing to go to the yard. 

• Increase in requests for protective 

custody status.

• A sharp increase or decrease in the 

number of inmate grievances.

• Increase in racial grouping of inmates.

• Increase in inmate sick calls and 

attempts to get to the infirmary. 

• Inmates sending personal items out of 

the institution. 

• A substantial change in the noise level in 

the institution. 

• Inmates wearing extra clothing in the 

yard. 

• Decrease in inmate visiting.

• Decrease in staff/inmate interaction.

• Inmates actually warning well-liked staff 

not to come to work.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prevention of Prison Emergencies

219

emotional reaction from inmates. Even in these

cases, what appears to be most important is that

the prison recognize the situation in advance

and make its best effort to communicate and

implement the change as constructively as

possible. 

A Day-to-Day Intelligence Function

The term “intelligence” means different things

in different institutions and departments. It may

mean information from inmates, particularly

from known informants. It may mean information about gangs. In some institutions, the staff

member assigned to “intelligence” is the gang

coordinator (or “security threat group coordinator”). In others, “intelligence” refers to the

prison investigator or to the staff member who

works with law enforcement agencies and with

other institutions. These definitions are not

mutually exclusive.

Intelligence as it pertains to prevention of prison

emergencies is none of the above. Rather, it

refers to a staff member (or group) responsible

for reviewing security data and inmate information across the institution’s areas, shifts, and

functions. Many prisons do not have this kind of

intelligence function. For example, an incident

that occurs on the day shift between two

inmates in an education classroom may not be

serious enough to require much attention. That

same evening, another incident occurs in the

gymnasium, involving one of those two inmates;

that incident is also not particularly serious by

itself. The next morning, a fight breaks out in

the dining room involving inmates who are

close friends of two of the inmates involved in

the two earlier incidents. None of these three

incidents is by itself surprising or predictive of a

major problem. However, any experienced staff

member in the institution, looking at all three

incidents together, would have an “oh no!” reaction and be quite certain that large-scale violence was likely. The question is whether the

prison has assigned a staff member the specific

responsibility of looking for such patterns. 

Some prisons would answer “yes” but then go

on to explain that recognizing dangerous patterns is the responsibility of the warden (or the

deputy warden), who sees all the reports and is

responsible for everything. The problem with

this response lies in the last three words of that

explanation. The warden is responsible for

everything and therefore cannot focus enough

attention on incident reports and on information

from staff and inmates to reliably identify patterns like the one in the example described

above.

An effective intelligence function can be one of

a prison’s most important means of preventing

large-scale crises and emergencies. However,

the prevention-focused intelligence function

must be something quite different from, and in

addition to, investigations and gang information.

“Hot” Issues

Experienced correctional staff know that a few

issues, if sufficiently mishandled, have the

potential to start a riot or disturbance almost

immediately. Food is one of them. Several years

ago, for example, the Kansas DOC had three

different prison disturbances occur concurrently

because of a statewide change in food service

and problems with the new food service

provider immediately after the change. Clearly,

food-related issues—changing inmates’ food,

feeding them too little, or feeding them food

they hate—can easily cause a riot.

Several other areas—visitation, medical services, recreation, mail—are also highly sensitive

issues for inmates. Prison staff, especially management, need to pay particularly close attention

to any developing problems or incidents in these

areas. 
220

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

As emphasized in the discussion of agencyinitiated crises, quickly recognizing a problem

in one of these “hot issue” areas appears to be

the largest part of the battle. Once the problem

is recognized, managers should usually find it a

straightforward matter to either fix the problem

quickly or communicate clearly and frequently

with the inmate population about the problem

and about the steps being taken to address it.

Automated Early Warning Systems

An automated early warning system is a

software-driven computerized system specifically designed to “crunch numbers,” analyze

data, and alert prison staff when the data indicate that trouble may be brewing. The earliest,

most impressive work on such a system was carried out by the Pennsylvania DOC in the aftermath of the Camp Hill riots. 

The Pennsylvania DOC looked retrospectively

at a small number of key indicators at the Camp

Hill prison: the number of inmate-on-inmate and

inmate-on-staff assaults per month, the number

of grievances per month, the number of disciplinary reports, staff use of sick leave, etc. The

research found dramatic changes in these indicators during the months leading up to the Camp

Hill riots. 

Based on this research, Pennsylvania developed

a software-driven system in which each of the

state’s prisons collects data on critical indicators

every month and sends the data to the DOC’s

central office for entry into a database. Because

the data are monthly numerical totals, this

process is quick and easy. The software then

analyzes the data from each prison, measuring

changes from previous months and, since some

indicators follow a cyclical or seasonal pattern,

from the same month of the previous year. The

software “flags” any indicator with a significant

change and produces a printed report for review

by department administrators and prison

managers. 

In some cases, indicators might be flagged for

predictable reasons. For example, a major

increase in grievances about food service might

result if an institution remodels its kitchen and

changes to two cold meals a day until the

remodeling is completed. If the prison took

steps to communicate these changes to inmates

in advance and to mitigate the impact of the

changes on the inmates (thereby avoiding an

agency-initiated crisis), the flag may not be

cause for concern, because some inmates will

file grievances under these circumstances no

matter what steps the prison takes. However, if

several key indicators are flagged at a highsecurity prison, and the warden, in discussions

with departmental officials, cannot identify any

particular incident or change that might have

caused a dramatic shift in those indicators, then

actions designed to prevent a crisis should begin

immediately. 

This approach has great potential for preventing

prison crises. Experienced prison staff like to

think they understand everything that is going

on within the institution, but no one can make

The “Turkey a la King Riot” 

In Hawaii, “luau” food (Kahlua pig, lomi

lomi salmon, poi, etc.) is the traditional fare

on Hawaiian holidays, the most important of

which is King Kamehameha’s birthday.

Many years ago, perhaps the largest riot in

Hawaii prison history occurred on that holiday, when many prison officials had the day

off, no one remembered to plan appropriate

food, and the old Oahu prison attempted to

serve turkey a la king for dinner. In Hawaii,

it is still referred to as the “turkey a la king

riot.”
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prevention of Prison Emergencies

221

sense of so much information all of the time.

Computerized methods for regularly analyzing

crucial information may bring to light serious,

imminent problems that otherwise would be

overlooked. 

Pennsylvania’s automated early warning system

is a true prevention initiative. It is important to

note that some departments collect data on

almost every aspect of prison operations, and

some then enter all of that information into large

databases. Although valuable for documentation,

accreditation, management review, and other

purposes, that approach is not particularly useful

for early warning purposes and should not be

confused with software-driven critical indicator

or early warning systems. In a comprehensive

database, too much information operates like no

information. It is impossible to sort the wheat

from the chaff. With hundreds of indicators,

most will have nothing to do with predicting a

Institutional Climate Scales 

A number of state DOCs now use some form of institutional climate (or atmosphere) scale to evaluate the “tone” of prisons on a weekly or, more commonly, monthly basis.* These scales are closely

related to the early warning systems discussed in this section, but there are important differences.

The primary difference between institutional climate scales and automated early warning/critical

indicator systems is that the scales tend to be subjective. With an automated critical indicator system, the number of inmate grievances filed in a month, for example, is what it is—it generally is not

subject to interpretation. With an institutional climate scale, a prison manager’s evaluation of the

quality of staff-inmate interactions over the course of a month is profoundly subjective. The authors

have toured state prisons in which wardens “filled in” climate indicators in the same way month

after month after month, an empty exercise that predicts nothing. 

Requiring prison officials to stop and evaluate changes in institutional climate over time has real

merit. Such evaluations can produce information that might not emerge from a computer-driven

early warning system. Both approaches may be important in predicting and preventing prison

emergencies. However, the process for measuring prison climate must involve more than a warden

writing “acceptable” next to every indicator every month. Promising methods share the following

attributes:

• Combining objective measurements with subjective judgments.

• Requiring staff to assess detailed aspects of prison operations rather than making a broad

judgment about the overall climate in the prison.

• Involving the perceptions of at least several staff members from different levels and locations 

within the institution. 

*Institutional tone is also discussed below, under “Ongoing Operational Issues That Play a Role in Prevention of

Emergencies.”
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

riot or disturbance. Further, when data are collected on many different dimensions, some of

those dimensions will show unusual changes

each month simply as a matter of statistical

probability, and those results will be indistinguishable from any results that are true positives. An effective early warning system should

be quick and easy to use and should track fewer

than 10 key indicators. 

Proactive Management 

Proactive management is the least specific of the

methods that may be used to prevent emergencies in prisons. It may not be a specific initiative

at all. Nevertheless, the quality of leadership in

a prison is a crucial factor in every area of management and operation, and prevention of emergencies is no exception. In fact, without

proactive management, a number of the more

specific prevention initiatives discussed above

may be rendered useless.

The relationship between proactive management

and emergency prevention is neither ambiguous

nor theoretical; it is direct and practical. Two

examples may illustrate that relationship. When

staff morale is low and employees are angry

because of a bad incident, proactive management engages employee groups and works to

rebuild communication and trust; in the same

situation, status quo (laissez-faire) management

does little as the situation deteriorates and perhaps an employee job action then throws the

prison into a major crisis. When a prison faces

escalating racial tension, proactive management

aggressively pursues conflict resolution, whereas status quo management denies the problem

exists until a race riot occurs. 

Proactive management is closely related to the

operational issue of early intervention as a philosophy and a skill set for supervisory and frontline staff. This related concept is one of the

issues discussed in the next section. 

Ongoing Operational Issues 

That Play a Role in Prevention 

of Emergencies

In addition to measures designed specifically for

the purpose of preventing emergencies, many

elements of day-to-day prison operations play a

role in prevention. These elements include dayto-day security practices, inmate classification,

early intervention, the tone of the institution,

and staff professionalism. 

Day-to-Day Security Practices

Good day-to-day security practices are crucial in

preventing prison crises such as riots, disturbances, and other incidents involving inmate

violence, including both planned and unplanned

events. For example, were it not for a series of

cascading security breaches and mistakes, the

1993 inmate takeover of the “supermax” unit

at the Montana State Prison in Deer Lodge,

Montana, could not have occurred. That incident, which resulted in the murder of five

inmates, was planned by inmates based on their

knowledge of chronic security lapses by staff.

Fortunately, planned riots and disturbances are

relatively uncommon. Far more common is the

unplanned situation that escalates into a riot or

disturbance. Here too, the role of day-to-day

security practices is central. In many cases, a

security error creates an opportunity that initiates the entire incident. In others, a security

error allows what should have been an isolated

incident to escalate into an institutionwide

crisis. In both cases, the end result is a riot or

disturbance that is truly a “crime of opportunity,” and the opportunity was a security lapse. 

It is tempting to assume that most prisons, particularly higher security institutions, are very

good with basic security procedures and practices. That is a myth. While many prisons have

well-designed security procedures and follow
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prevention of Prison Emergencies

223

those procedures consistently and in detail,

many prisons do not. It is beyond the scope of

this discussion to attempt to identify specific

security practices that are important but frequently violated. However, even the most superficial review of some prisons will reveal

problems such as poor or non-existent key control and/or tool control, munitions stored in

areas where inmates could gain access, sally

port doors operating on override rather than

interlock, and poor escort procedures—the list

goes on. Given such opportunities for unnecessary incidents to occur and for incidents to

escalate unnecessarily, the mystery is why major

inmate disturbances are not more common. 

It is important to emphasize that not only must

staff consistently follow security procedures,

those procedures must be well designed and

effective in the first place. Poor implementation

is far more common than bad procedures, but

bad procedures do exist. Furthermore, despite an

emerging national consensus as to what constitutes good security practices (a byproduct of the

proliferation of security audit processes), specific areas of disagreement remain. In addition,

many prisons maintain security practices on the

basis of custom rather than reason. 

Finally, the centrality of the security audit in

maintaining or improving security practices has

become increasingly clear. A particular institution may have exceptionally good security without conducting audits. However, in general,

departments and institutions that perform

external security audits or even self-audits annually or biannually have substantially better security practices than those that have no means of

comprehensive security assessment.

Classification

Good classification practices—a key component

of effective prison management—are the

foundation of emergency prevention. Two

Common Myths About Prison Security

Myth: Maximum-security facilities have the best security practices. Fact: If “good security” means

procedures appropriate to the security level of the institution, then it is not difficult to find examples

of very good and very bad security at all kinds of institutions—minimum, medium, and maximum

security.

Myth: Security is the responsibility of the prison’s uniformed (custody) staff. Fact: In a correctional

institution, security is every staff member’s first priority.

Myth: A natural tension exists between good security practices and an emphasis on inmate programs and services. Fact: Effective inmate programs and services complement good security practices. Poor or inconsistent security undermines programs and services and forces inmates to worry

about their own safety. Good inmate programs and services reduce idleness and anger and provide

inmate incentives to comply with security practices.

Myth: Staff will be able to tighten security as soon as they realize they are in a major emergency

situation. Fact: If staff security procedures are sloppy day to day, they will predictably be sloppy

during a crisis or major emergency.
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

problems—misclassified inmates and mismatches between inmates and institutions—can lead

directly to crisis situations. If many inmates are

classified at a higher security level than a facility’s design, staffing, and operating procedures

were designed to handle, serious problems may

be inevitable. Another very serious warning signal is frequent overrides of classification rules. 

Early Intervention 

As noted previously, early intervention is conceptually related to proactive management. It is

a matter for front-line and supervisory staff

rather than a management-level concern. Early

intervention is to some extent a result of institutional culture, but it is largely an issue of training. 

In short, the issue is whether staff attempt to

deal with inmate conflicts, confrontations, and

personal crises as early as possible,

or whether staff wait until a problem escalates into a fight or some

other clear disciplinary issue.

When low-level problems are not

dealt with, some will simply go

away but others will not. Those

that do not tend to escalate in

intensity and scope. Yesterday’s

argument is today’s fight. Yesterday’s fight is today’s stabbing.

Yesterday’s two-inmate confrontation is today’s

gang war. Finally, today’s race riot may have its

roots in yesterday’s conflict between two

inmates of different races, even though the conflict itself had nothing to do with race.

Despite these clear connections, some correctional administrators hesitate to commit substantial resources to developing early intervention

skills and practices because the payback—i.e.,

bad things that do not happen—is not visible. In

a twist on the “if a tree falls in the forest and no

one hears it . . .” riddle, the question in a prison

becomes “if an inmate disturbance does not

occur because of our investment of training and

other resources, will anyone recognize that it

would have occurred without the investment?”

Hesitant administrators should keep in mind that

an early intervention philosophy is a worthwhile

objective not only because it helps prevent

major emergencies but also because it produces

two highly visible results: a better running facility and increased staff professionalism.

Tone of the Institution

The “tone” of a prison is also referred to as its

“atmosphere” or “climate.” (Institutional “culture” is quite different. Culture refers to a more

abiding set of attributes, although some overlap

exists between an institution’s culture and its

tone, atmosphere, or climate.) 

An institution’s tone is complex, but, as mentioned in the earlier discussion of “traditional

warning signs,” it is something that experienced

prison staff register quickly (if subjectively).

Many staff are certain that they know when

something is wrong or substantially changed

within a minute of entering a prison, before they

have walked 50 yards. Is it the noise level?

Partly. The way inmates are speaking to and

dealing with other inmates? Again, partly. Does

it also have to do with the nature of staff-inmate

relationships? Absolutely. Most staff (and most

inmates) believe they can feel the difference

between a tense prison and a relaxed prison. 

A prison’s tone also has to do with the way the

facility is run. In a prison operated much more

restrictively than necessary, where staff are

heavy handed, distant, and quick to write disciplinary reports, the tone will differ dramatically

from that in a prison operated as openly as possible for its security level, where staff-inmate

interactions are low key, informal, and generally

positive. 

Unlike a prison’s culture, which generally transcends any single turn of events to remain

Two problems—

misclassified inmates

and mismatches

between inmates and

institutions—can lead

directly to crisis

situations.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prevention of Prison Emergencies

225

relatively stable over time, its tone can change

dramatically because of an incident, a policy

change, or even external events. Thus, a prison’s

tone, which can predict the likelihood of largescale inmate violence (see earlier discussion of

institutional climate scales), can also cause crisis situations. A hostage situation or some other

major disturbance is far less likely to occur in a

prison that is clean, quiet, and run within the

boundaries of constitutional requirements than

in a prison that is dirty, noisy, and run without

regard to the constitutional rights of inmates. It

is the overall tone of the prison that may produce violence in one case and a secure and constructive environment in the other.

Staff Professionalism

As is true with many of the factors and issues

discussed in this paper, staff professionalism

does not exist in a vacuum. It both contributes

to and reflects the tone of the institution. It is

enhanced by proactive management and

strengthened by skills such as conflict resolution, and it helps the institution achieve consistency in security practices. Beyond these

considerations, however, staff professionalism

itself plays a direct role in preventing prison

emergencies.

In most prisons, even though inmates interact

far more frequently with other inmates than with

staff, they depend on staff when something is

wrong. Staff intervene before an inmate is seriously injured in a fight, arrange for medical

assistance when an inmate appears to be in

immediate distress, and provide counseling

when an inmate has a serious personal problem.

In a prison that values and rewards professionalism, staff take these kinds of responsibilities

most seriously; in doing so, they avert more

dangerous problems.

Inmates also rely on staff for many day-to-day

functions. In a minimum-security facility,

inmates with outside jobs may live relatively

independently but still depend on staff to let

them in and out of the facility. Staff take

inmates to parole board hearings, track their

release dates, and arrange for family visits,

among many other tasks. At a high-security

prison, inmates depend on staff for most of the

necessities of daily life—food, clothing, showers. In part because of these dependent relationships, inmates are sensitive to lack of 

professionalism—to the officer who practices

verbal “one-upmanship” as inmates eat or shower or who plays favorites and makes a point of

“writing up” an inmate for personal reasons.

Staff members who behave unprofessionally

toward inmates may never know that their own

behavior initiated an institutionwide disturbance.

When viewed in this light, it is clear that staff

professionalism can help prevent inmate violence (among a number of obvious benefits)

and is also a major factor in staff safety.

Conclusion

As noted at the beginning of this paper, some

prison emergencies cannot be prevented.

However, serious prevention efforts can stop

some crisis situations from occurring and will

mitigate other incidents so they never develop

into full-scale crises. A surprisingly wide range

of initiatives have excellent potential to prevent

prison emergencies, and many of these initiatives

have been underutilized in prison management.

In addition, many aspects of a prison’s day-today operations—especially, perhaps, its security

practices and overall tone—are important preventive factors. 

Good prevention efforts are an important part of

good prison management. The old adage bears

repeating: “The best way to deal with prison

emergencies is not to have them in the first

place.”
227

Emergency Teams

Emergency teams are critical to emergency preparedness in any department of corrections

(DOC). The three types of teams discussed in

this paper—tactical, hostage negotiation, and

crisis intervention—deal with life-and-death

matters. They have saved lives in the past and

there is no doubt that they will continue to save

lives in the future. Tactical teams, sometimes at

great personal risk, have rescued hostages who

otherwise almost certainly would have been

killed. Hostage negotiation teams have worked

out nonviolent surrenders when almost every

observer predicted a bloodbath. Crisis intervention teams have saved staff and their families

from long-term mental anguish and the kind of

downward spiral depicted so poignantly by

Joseph Wambaugh in The Onion Field. Conversely, lives have been lost when a department

lacked one or more of these crucial functions.

However, while there should be no debate about

the importance of these teams, a few management mistakes can turn an emergency team into

a high-profile liability (in the words of some

prison administrators, “emergency teams, can’t

live with them, can’t live without them”). 

Clearly, the subject of emergency teams is

important. This paper is directed to institutional

CEOs and departmental administrators and

focuses on strategic, organizational, and management issues associated with emergency

teams—with particular attention to problems

and pitfalls that may confront a manager or

administrator.

A wealth of material is available on the training

of negotiators and tactical teams. Many emergency teams have voluminous policies and

procedures. This paper does not attempt to synthesize training or procedural materials for the

various types of emergency teams, nor is this

paper intended as a “how to” manual.

Background

Terminology

Most state DOCs and most medium-sized and

large local jails have one or more emergency

teams. However, different departments have different names for their teams, and terminology

can be a major barrier to thoughtful discussion.

The most common of the three

general types of emergency teams

is a tactical team. This paper uses

“tactical team” as a generic name

for various units—disturbance

control, SORT (Special Operations

and Response Team), CERT

(Correctional Emergency Response

Team), SWAT (Special Weapons

and Tactics), and many others—that are specially trained in the use of sublethal and/or lethal

force. 

[Emergency teams]

have saved lives in the

past and there is no

doubt that they will

continue to save lives

in the future.

Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency

Preparedness, by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry

(Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc., 2002), by permission of the

authors. Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia

Barry.
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

The second most common type of emergency

team is a hostage negotiation team. These

teams may also be called “SitCon,” “crisis negotiation,” “crisis intervention,” or various other,

less frequently used names. 

The third type of emergency team is most commonly known as a crisis intervention team,

although some departments use that term to

refer to hostage negotiators. Crisis intervention

team members are specially trained to provide

some combination of support, postincident

debriefing, peer counseling, and posttrauma care

to staff and staff families. These teams have the

broadest range of names, such as “peer counselors,” “critical incident debriefing team,” and

“posttrauma team.”

To summarize, this paper refers to a use-of-force

team as a tactical team, to hostage negotiators as

a hostage negotiation team, and to a group that

provides psychological services and/or support

to staff during and after an emergency as a crisis

intervention team. 

Clarifications

Correctional institutions often have special

teams trained to do cell extractions (also commonly referred to as “forced cell moves”). In

some institutions, cell extractions are performed

by the tactical team (whatever that team may be

called). Other institutions may have a cell

extraction team (or teams) and a completely

separate disturbance control team, CERT team,

or the like. This paper does not address cell

extraction teams or the cell extraction responsibilities of tactical teams.

Confusion also may arise about nomenclature

and organization of duties in tactical teams.

Tactical teams can be viewed as having two

general levels. This paper uses “disturbance

control team” to indicate the first level—a

tactical team trained for some combination of

application of sublethal force, mass arrests, and

use of riot formations. It uses “CERT/SORT

team” to indicate the second level—a tactical

team trained for hostage rescue missions,

dynamic entries (a surprise forced entry into a

barricaded or locked position, typically using

firearms to take control of the situation inside as

quickly as possible), and use of semiautomatic

weapons. Some agencies have a single level or

type of tactical team that performs all of these

functions; others have two levels. Departments

with two levels often make successful participation in the disturbance control team for a period

of time (e.g., 2 years) a prerequisite for joining

the CERT/SORT team. Generally, that has

worked well for selection. 

Finally, this paper does not address “first

responder” systems. (These systems are

designed to provide a controlled response to an

alarm or an officer’s call for assistance while

maintaining some secondary response capability. Typically, first and second responder staff are

identified at the beginning of each shift.) First

responder systems are becoming increasingly

common in prisons throughout the country, but

their function is not within the scope of this

discussion.

General Management Issues

Coordination

Prisons should ensure that emergency teams

understand each other’s missions and the potential importance of each team in resolving an

emergency. Without such understanding, one

team may lack respect for another’s role (e.g.,

a CERT/SORT team responsible for hostage

rescue may regard the hostage negotiation team

as a weak and unacceptable alternative). All

team members must clearly understand their

own roles and be committed to overall departmental policy. 
Section 5. Resource Materials: Emergency Teams

229

Preparing teams to function effectively and

seamlessly in an emergency requires coordination. Ideally, a department-level person will be

assigned responsibility for coordinating all three

types of teams throughout the prison system.

This person needs the authority to ensure that

teams are properly trained, follow departmental

policy, and maintain a positive team culture.

Membership and Selection

The qualifications of emergency team members

are extremely important, and the department

should have a strict policy on membership

requirements for each team. Membership should

be voluntary. The goal is to attract the very best

individuals—those who are concerned about

saving lives and who understand what it may

take to respond to an emergency in a controlled

manner. Applications for team membership

should be reviewed and approved by the team

leader, the institution’s security administrator,

and the warden.

Applicants for emergency teams should have at

least 1 year of experience in the correctional

field. This requirement allows the

applicant to become accustomed to

the correctional environment and

familiar with the department’s mission and philosophy, and it allows

the department to observe and evaluate the employee’s demeanor, professionalism, and approach to

handling inmates in difficult situations. Applicants should not hold

positions with other emergencyrelated responsibilities (e.g., commander, intelligence officer). In addition,

applicants should demonstrate the following:

● Emotional maturity, ability to function

under stress, and willingness to defer decisionmaking to higher authorities.

● Total commitment to the department and

team philosophy.

● A good job history, free of disciplinary

infractions (especially excessive use of

force).

In order to select the right type of employee for

membership on an emergency team, psychological evaluations may be conducted. A psychological evaluation may not be helpful if a thorough

evaluation and background investigation of the

employee are conducted. The question is

whether a “psych” evaluation adds value to the

selection process. If an employee has a clean

Diversity

Emergency team composition should reflect

the importance of diversity as a workforce

issue. Hostage negotiation teams traditionally recruit for diversity (i.e., participation

by women and minorities) because it is well

established that in some situations a female

negotiator, for example, may be effective

where a male negotiator will not. However,

some tactical teams have not wanted

diversity—especially if the department has

not emphasized diversity in its overall

recruiting and selection practices. A tactical team’s mission may place extraordinary

physical demands on members. If that is

the case, the department should specify

those demands and the related selection

requirements. However, departments

should eliminate any membership requirements that are not essential and that tend

to work against diversity of team membership (a minimum height requirement, for

example). 

The goal is to attract

the very best . . . those

who are concerned

about saving lives and

who understand what

it may take to respond

to an emergency in a

controlled manner.
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

work history of several years with the department and is in all other ways well qualified,

should that employee be eliminated because of

a score on, say, the Minnesota Multiphasic

Personality Inventory (MMPI)? On the other

hand, psychological testing sends an unmistakable message about the importance the department places on psychological stability in these

positions. This is not an open-and-shut decision

and is one of the reasons a time period should

be established before a new employee can apply

to become a member of the team. That allows

the supervisor and the administration to focus

on the employee’s behavior and attitude rather

than on a test that may or may not predict that

behavior and attitude.

Tactical Teams

The Importance of Strong Management

The best tactical teams have a most impressive

degree of professionalism in addition to their

technical skills. Even tactical teams that have

not been well equipped or thoroughly trained

have sometimes been able to resolve life-anddeath situations because of their

bravery and commitment. However,

of the three types of emergency

teams, tactical teams present the

greatest risk for management.

There are many well-documented

situations in which a tactical team

has embarrassed its agency, or

worse. Tactical teams have engaged

in and covered up excessive or unauthorized use

of force, worn unauthorized uniforms and carried unauthorized equipment, harassed and provoked inmate populations, alienated themselves

from the rest of the correctional work staff,

threatened to quit en masse if they did not get

their way (and carried out the threat), conspired

to create false overtime or training records, created incidents that made front-page news, and

initiated incidents that led to court judgments or

settlements in six and seven figures. A complete

list of problems prisons have encountered with

tactical teams would be much longer and would

include some truly bizarre incidents. In some

cases, members of tactical teams have gone to

prison for their activities. 

Why are problems with tactical teams so frequent and so serious? The answer is simple:

inadequate management or, more frequently,

complete lack of management. Tactical teams

require strong, active management in addition to

strong leadership. The team leader’s role is crucial, but the leader is a member of the team and

cannot also be its manager. Some administrators

fail to actively manage the tactical team because

they lack the necessary technical background

and feel intimidated by the team. Other administrators are themselves “wannabe” tactical team

members and go much too far in trying to please

the team. Regardless of the underlying reason, if

top management at the institutional and departmental levels is not actively involved in directing the tactical team, serious problems are

inevitable.

Ideally, management would start from scratch

with its tactical team, defining and planning the

mission, philosophy, structure, leadership, training, incentives, and management oversight. In

most departments, however, tactical teams have

been around for years and are not the result of

an analytic process. A team may have been the

pet project of a well-known (and long since

departed) warden or administrator, or it may

have simply managed to stay beneath management’s radar until a well-publicized incident

places it in the spotlight. If a department or

institution does not have the opportunity to

“design” its tactical teams, it needs to work with

existing teams to ensure their professionalism

and effectiveness. 

. . . of the three types

of emergency teams,

tactical teams present

the greatest risk for

management.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Emergency Teams

231

Team Culture 

A clear understanding of mission and

philosophy—shared by the team members and

leader, institutional managers, and departmental

administrators—is fundamental for any tactical

team. Managers can and should insist on a

tactical team that reflects the values of the

overall agency rather than behaving as a rogue

“organization-within-an-organization.” An

example from the law enforcement field illustrates the difference. One of the authors worked

on a project involving a large police department

and a large sheriff’s office in the same county.

At the time, the police tactical team had been on

many consecutive assignments in which no

shots were fired, and the team took great pride

in that record. Conversely, the sheriff’s tactical

team regarded any assignment in which no shots

were fired or force was used as frustration or

failure. The two teams, which were similar in

terms of equipment, staffing size, training hours,

and budget, had totally different levels of professionalism, as reflected in their attitudes,

appearance, language, demeanor, and more subtle attributes. 

Management has many ways of defining the culture and professionalism of its tactical teams. In

addition to emphasizing a positive, professional

statement of team mission, philosophy, and values, management must also scrutinize leadership, selection, and training.

Leadership

Prison managers tend to think that the tactical

team leader should be one of the toughest officers in the institution. Often, however, such an

officer may not be the best candidate for the job.

Integrity, character, judgment, and intelligence

are more important qualities for the tactical

team leader than physical strength, familiarity

with weapons, or training in martial arts. The

leader must be able to deal rationally with team

members’ pressures to use heavier weaponry,

make the team more elite, increase shooting

time during training, engage in “wilder” training

simulations, etc. It takes character not to bow to

such pressures in order to appear tough and

loyal to the team.

Elitism and Anonymity: The Twin

Scourges of Tactical Teams

The twin scourges of tactical teams are elitism

and anonymity. A good tactical team will have

strong identity, cohesiveness, and pride. However, these must not be achieved by team members setting themselves apart from the rest of the

workforce. This can be a difficult balance to

maintain. 

Why Management Matters

Management presence and involvement

are essential in properly maintaining a tactical team. Even if team leadership is excellent, management involvement is important

for several reasons:

• Motivates team members.

• Provides opportunities for the manager 

to transmit personal values directly to 

the team and reinforce the values of the 

organization.

• Allows the manager to personally assess

the team’s style, culture, and tone—

without the team leader’s “filter.”

• Refines the manager’s knowledge of the 

team’s capacities, equipment, training, 

and procedures—knowledge that may 

prove invaluable in an emergency.

• Establishes an informal “open door” 

between the manager and individual 

team members.
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

There is nothing wrong with an identifying

patch on the uniform, or a ribbon or the like.

More than one identifying insignia on the uniform should sound warning bells, and different

uniforms should not be permitted unless they

are a necessity during training or during actual

assignments. If that is true, then the different

uniforms should only be worn for training or

when on assignment as part of the tactical team;

the rest of the time, the team members should

wear the same uniform as other officers. 

Similarly, it is usually not a good idea to organize tactical teams in such a way that between

tactical assignments they perform other specialized duties as a team. Although this is a common way to operate a tactical team, team

members do not do “regular” correctional officer work, elitism is hard to control, and team

members get comfortable talking tough to

inmates from behind smoked-glass helmet

visors. 

As a manager, you know you are in trouble

when you notice that your tactical team uniforms are black (the rest of the department

wears gray and green) and they

rather resemble Ninja outfits.

Another bad sign is when the team

seems to spend most of its time in

their basement ready-room telling

apocryphal stories, talking trash

about other staff, and ordering in

pizza.

A mark of a good tactical team is support for

accountability as a team and as individuals.

However, tactical team members often resist the

idea of individual accountability, usually by

pushing for anonymity. Team members may

argue against having their names stenciled on

helmets or jumpsuits as is done for other staff,

claiming that inmates will retaliate against them

after an incident. Team members may even

rebuff the idea of using identification numbers

or letters on their uniforms. If a manager permits anonymity, a team member may escape

accountability for even the most blatant malfeasance. Perhaps more importantly, when team

members know they are identifiable and

accountable, it often works as a deterrent, preventing bad behavior.

Training

Training tactical teams is a tricky business.

Training needs to instill a set of values in team

members, prepare them for the dangers they

face (without making them paranoid), and

develop multiple skills.

If possible, a department should conduct its own

training for tactical team members. Too often,

external training will not reflect the department’s values and needs. Even if a department

has a policy stating that any contradictions

between external training practices and departmental expectations will be resolved in favor of

the latter, external training can be more detrimental than helpful. For example, in the early

2000s, a midwestern DOC was sending its tactical team members to a larger neighboring state

for initial training at a “CERT Academy.” After

complaints from new team members that the

training was sometimes abusive and humiliating,

and after managers observed that the new team

members had a “special forces” philosophy

about the team, the department committed the

time, money, and other resources to develop its

own tactical team training. 

Training should not focus on terrorist incidents.

It should not be “warmed over” police training.

Nor should it be designed to convince team

members that every inmate in the institution is

plotting their assassination. Rather, tactical team

training should be practical and varied. It should

emphasize skill building, discretionary decisionmaking, and professionalism. Exercises and

simulations should reflect the range of crises,

A mark of a good 

tactical team is 

support for 

accountability as a

team and as 

individuals. 
Section 5. Resource Materials: Emergency Teams

233

emergencies, and disasters that the prison might

realistically expect to confront.

The initial training for tactical team members is

especially important. If new team members

receive training that sets false expectations, the

team probably will develop a culture that is not

what management wants and needs. Initial training for tactical team members is not Marine boot

camp. It should not include hazing. Instructors

should not scream at, swear at, intimidate, or

otherwise demean trainees. Unnecessarily harsh

treatment does not develop mature, thoughtful,

independent decisionmakers. Instead, initial

training must first establish the mission and

philosophy of the tactical team and how that

supports the mission of the institution and

department. Initial training can then go on to

develop basic skills, communication methods,

contingency plan familiarity, and weapons

proficiency. 

Tactical team members need a relatively high

level of competence with a relatively broad

range of skills. In addition to physical fitness

and, for CERT/SORT members, weapons training, teams must know how to use various other

authorized instruments of force and/or chemical

agents. Tactical team members typically need a

higher level of training in CPR, first aid, and

HAZMAT procedures than other staff. Their

training often also includes mass arrest techniques and various formations and disturbance

control procedures. Their firearms training

should go beyond qualifying scores on the

firing range to include weapons familiarity,

“shoot/don’t shoot” contingent decisionmaking,

and overall use-of-force policy. Tactical team

members also need substantial understanding of

tactics and strategies in crisis situations.

Incentives

Most tactical team members are highly motivated with regard to their team duties. Typically,

that is true even for bad tactical teams, although

there are certainly some exceptions. Many tactical team members would serve gladly without

any incentives; however, management should

still attempt to provide incentives, both to attract

qualified applicants and to demonstrate the

importance management places on the team’s

function. The question of incentives is tricky

and a matter of balance: bad decisions can lead

to development of team elitism and individual

prima donnas. Reasonable incentives may consist of a small pay increment, or overtime for

training in an agency in which

overtime is rare, or comp time, or

some more creative solutions. If the

incentives are too great, they will

be resented by the rest of the workforce and develop unrealistic

expectations among team members.

On the other hand, if the incentives

are trivial, team members will

regard them as an insult and the agency would

do better to provide no incentives at all.

Team Size and Structure

With regard to structure and function, several

management issues are worthy of exploration.

There is little or no consensus among tactical

experts about the appropriate size and structure

for tactical teams. Thus, these teams come in a

wide variety of sizes and shapes. Teams sometimes consist of two to four subordinate squads

with squad leaders, an assistant team leader, and

an overall team leader. Some teams do not have

squads. Where there are squads, they may have

specialized functions (e.g., a chemical agent

squad), or every squad may include every team

function. This paper does not endorse any particular team size or structure, although it is recommended that each tactical team include a

medical person and a video camera person. 

The number of tactical teams and the total number of staff trained for tactical team duty will

Tactical team members

need a relatively high

level of competence

with a relatively broad

range of skills.
234

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

vary with the size of the department and the size

and geographic location of its institutions. The

key question is usually “what is the minimum

number of people we will need assembled for

the team to be effective, and how long will it

take to assemble that many specially trained

staff at each of the respective institutions?” (The

same questions are, of course, equally relevant

for hostage negotiation teams.) Similarly, there

is no general rule about whether various emergency teams should be institution based, regional, or statewide. That decision will depend on

the same set of factors described above. It is not

uncommon for departments to have institutionbased disturbance control teams and regional or

statewide CERT/SORT teams. 

Weapons Assault and Marksman

(“Sniper”) Capacity

A prison system cannot avoid the possibility that

it will need to use a weapons assault team.

Similarly, it cannot deny the chance that a

marksman (“sniper”) may be needed. Situations

that need to be handled by a hostage rescue

team using firearms are, fortunately, very rare in

American prisons. Situations that require the use

of marksmen are far more rare. Still, either is

possible. The correctional department that does

not want to develop and maintain either of these

capacities must decide in advance which law

enforcement agency it would call on for that

kind of help. It must then work out any policy

and jurisdictional issues with that law enforcement agency. For example, if the law enforcement agency’s policy requires that its tactical

team commander have overall control of the

entire crisis situation, that would not work for

the correctional department. Such dilemmas

should be resolved in advance. Further, the correctional agency should conduct joint training

with the law enforcement agency to further

ensure a common understanding of the working

relationship and effective coordination. 

Traditionally, a two-person marksman/observer

(“sniper”) team is assigned to the hostage rescue

team. Because of the architectural design of

prisons, this team is much more likely to be

relied on to observe hostage-taker activities than

to take a shot to end a situation. Marksman/

observer teams generally have extensive training

in accurate long-range shooting but much less

training in how to observe situations and provide essential intelligence to the commander.

States should ensure that policies and procedures are crystal clear about authorizing a shot

Backup Planning: The Key to

Handling Simultaneous

Emergencies

The department should have policies and

procedures in place to govern how tactical

teams from different institutions and

regions will back up each other in a crisis.

In general, when a team is called out, at

least one other team should be called out

as backup. (The same logic applies to

hostage negotiation teams.) A good

approach is to have all institutions agree to

a predetermined backup/relief plan that

goes into effect at the outset of a crisis.

The plan immediately mobilizes the team at

the affected institution, sends the team at

the next nearest institution as backup, and

places a specific team at a third institution

on standby. Such an arrangement can be

crucial if emergencies break out at two or

more institutions concurrently, which has

happened on a number of occasions across

the country.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Emergency Teams

235

by a marksman. Similarly, policy and training

need to be clear and consistent about how long

the two-person team can be in place before

being relieved by another team and about how

frequently the marksman and observer should

switch roles. (It is well established that snipers

must be cross-trained for both positions and that

one should not remain “over the gun” for very

long—usually a matter of minutes—at a time.)

These details and procedural issues, although

not treated comprehensively in this paper,

require consideration in great detail. 

Hostage Negotiation Teams

Team Size and Structure

Like tactical teams, hostage negotiation teams

come in many varieties. A team may have two

to seven members, or even more. (Here, “team”

refers to the actual working group assembled to

deal with a specific hostage situation, not to the

total number of trained negotiators available to

the department or institution.) Often, the size

and structure of a negotiation team reflect recommendations that original negotiators received

during their initial training. When this is the

case, the administration and the negotiators may

be unaware of the major differences among various approaches to negotiator training, and the

department probably has never considered alternatives to the current structure of its negotiation

team.

The most crucial negotiating functions are

almost always handled by a two-person unit: the

active negotiator (or “negotiator one”) and the

coach (also called the “passive negotiator” or

“negotiator two”). The team may also include an

“intelligence officer,” “communications officer,”

“recorder,” and other positions. It must be clear

that all other positions exist to support the two

team members—the active negotiator and

coach—who are conducting the actual negotiations with the hostage takers. All team members

must be cross-trained, so that the first two who

arrive on the scene and are briefed can immediately make contact with the hostage takers,

without waiting for the rest of the team to

assemble. 

Reporting Relationships

In hostage negotiations, the reporting relationship is essential. The hostage negotiation team

must report directly to the situation commander.

Not long ago, law enforcement hostage negotiators often were attached to the tactical team and

reported to the tactical team’s commander.

Fortunately, that is no longer common, and one

has to look no further than the FBI handling of

the Branch Davidian siege at Waco, Texas, for

compelling evidence. To weigh options for resolution as carefully as possible, the situation

commander must receive information firsthand

from both the hostage negotiation team and the

tactical team. Even with a coequal reporting

structure, commanders have a strong tendency

Why Marksman Capacity Is

Necessary 

If a DOC refuses to consider the possible

(though unlikely) need for a marksman, the

consequences could be dire. Here is one

scenario. An inmate takes hostages, kills

one or more of them, and then becomes

visible in an area where a marksman could

take a shot and end the situation. But the

DOC has no marksman on hand, either from

its own staff or through arrangements with

a law enforcement agency. The hostage

taker then retreats out of sight and kills

more hostages. The DOC would find it difficult to explain (or live with) this outcome.
236

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

to rely on the tactical team over the negotiating

team. A number of factors play into this tendency: Tactical information is often more dramatic

than negotiation updates, and planning for an

assault and dynamic entry can be very seductive. Unlike on television and in the movies,

real-life hostage negotiations are often lengthy,

“two steps forward, one step backward” affairs.

Finally, most people’s gut reaction to a serious

hostage incident is that it will not be resolved by

talking. If, in addition to these factors, the

hostage negotiation team reports to the commander through a tactical team leader, negotiation most certainly will receive short shrift as a

realistic alternative for resolving the crisis. 

A great deal of attention has rightfully been

placed on the rapport and chemistry that develops between the negotiators and the

hostage takers. However, the chemistry between the commander and

the negotiators is also important,

and that is often ignored. There is a

good reason why modern hostage

phones have provision for a remote

speaker or earphones in the command post. At

some points in a hostage situation, there may be

no adequate substitute for allowing the commander to listen to the tone and quality of the

negotiations firsthand. The same logic suggests

that the commander needs unfiltered access to

the pair of negotiators. Most departments that

rely on two-person negotiator teams do not use

a negotiation team leader concept. However,

departments that use five-person, seven-person,

or larger hostage negotiation teams typically do

include the position of team leader. Where there

is a team leader, he or she may report to the

command post. If the commander’s information

about the negotiations always comes by way of

a team leader, then it reflects that person’s judgments, values, and subjective perceptions. 

Training

A department or an institution often decides to

have a team of hostage negotiators, chooses the

team members, arranges for their initial training,

and then forgets they exist. With promotions,

transfers, and retirements, the list identifying

which negotiators are available at which institutions becomes increasingly inaccurate over time.

If the department or institution is fortunate

enough not to have any situations requiring a

hostage negotiation team, individuals on the list

may grow cynical and bitter about their decision

to volunteer and about the effort they put into

their initial training. In other words, they may

burn out without ever having taken part in a

hostage negotiation. Perhaps more importantly,

The Stockholm Syndrome 

The phenomenon in which hostages begin

to identify with their captors—the so-called

“Stockholm Syndrome”—is well documented. This syndrome can also have a profound impact on hostage negotiators. Part

of the negotiation coach’s role is to make

sure the active negotiator does not overidentify with the hostage takers. If the

department uses a team leader position,

that individual is also responsible for making sure that the two-person negotiating

team is not “losing distance.” However, the

commander bears the ultimate responsibility for determining whether the negotiating

team is over-identifying with the hostage

takers and beginning to blur its allegiances.

That is an important reason for the commander to assess negotiations firsthand. 

The hostage

negotiation team must

report directly to the

situation commander. 
Section 5. Resource Materials: Emergency Teams

237

if a hostage situation arises 3 years after the initial training, the negotiation team is unlikely to

be able to perform in accordance with that training. Hostage negotiators do not need as much

(or as frequent) refresher training as tactical

teams, but they do need regular, serious, wellplanned refresher training.

Conducting some hostage incident simulations

or full-scale exercises that provide training for

both the negotiation team and the tactical team

is an excellent idea. However, because their

training needs are different, the two teams

should not always train together. Varying the

outcomes of joint simulations and exercises is

also important. If the sessions always end with

an assault by the tactical team, negotiators will

come to believe they are irrelevant at worst or a

diversion at best, and the tactical team will get

the wrong message—i.e., success in an emergency means a weapons assault. This state of

affairs is demoralizing for the negotiating team

and counterproductive for the department or

institution, but it is surprisingly common.

Negotiators need experience, and because actual

hostage incidents fortunately are quite rare,

much of a new negotiator’s experience must be

achieved through training. Some of that training

can take the form of having new negotiators participate in critical incidents that do not involve

hostages, such as cell extractions and group confrontations. The negotiators can develop their

skills in establishing rapport, communicating

within limits set by the person in command, and

avoiding making decisions themselves, and the

prison may benefit from their increasing expertise in resolving volatile situations without violence. Some managers regard negotiator training

as entirely a matter of experience (“just get used

to doing it—there are no rights and wrongs, it is

all judgment”). However, negotiators also need

specific skills, and some of their training must

identify what is right and wrong, what is good,

better, and best. This requires specific skill

training, including rigorous critiques of actual

incidents.

Communication Equipment

The hostage negotiation team’s most basic

equipment is the hostage phone. Many kinds of

phones are available, including throw phones

(the handset or part of a hostage phone sent or

thrown into the hostage situation to be used by

the hostage takers), phones with recording capabilities, phones that make it possible to hear

and/or see what is happening inside the hostage

area, and phones that can detect chemical

agents. Prices for hostage phones vary widely,

but none are cheap.

In selecting a hostage phone system, a department must decide what capabilities it needs and

what funds are available. Ideally, the phone system is easily operated, requires minimum maintenance, can record conversations, and can be

used as a freestanding phone or connected to the

institutional phone system. Other capabilities

such as listening devices and cameras can be

helpful, but they are not necessary for successful

negotiations. In fact, some agencies have found

that additional technologies increase the likelihood that the phone will malfunction. 

If an agency purchases technologically sophisticated hostage phones, it must be able to deploy

this equipment quickly to any institution. More

importantly, hostage negotiators must train with

the equipment to the point that its use becomes

second nature and “transparent” (i.e., the negotiators can “look through” the equipment and

focus entirely on the hostage takers at the other

end of the line).

Incentives

Negotiation teams, like tactical teams, deserve

recognition and incentives. Compared with
238

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

tactical teams, the negotiators’ assignment is

more reflective, and their motivation may be

more internal and less dependent on esprit de

corps. Whereas management must watch that

tactical team identity does not go overboard, the

challenge with the negotiation team is to develop cohesiveness and pride. Despite the differences between the two teams, management often

can use the same types of incentives for both

(see “Incentives” in the section on tactical

teams). As with tactical teams, management’s

involvement constitutes a strong incentive for

negotiation teams to perform well, and it also

keeps management in touch with the team’s

capacities and limits.

Crisis Intervention Teams

Crisis intervention teams are not as common as

tactical or hostage negotiation teams, but they

are quickly coming into wider use. These teams

vary far more in structure, mission, and procedures than the other two types of teams. In some

departments, the crisis intervention function is

fulfilled primarily by consultants or local mental

health professionals rather than by a staff team.

The starting point in developing a crisis intervention team is to define its mission and specify

how and when the team will operate. This

entails answering a number of questions:

● Will the team screen employees for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after an

incident?

● Will the team treat PTSD? 

● Will the team interview (debrief) involved

staff after an incident, to give staff someone

to talk with? 

● Will team members refer to or coordinate

with professional resources? 

● Do the psychology and psychiatry staff who

work with inmates have a role in the crisis

intervention team? 

● Is it mandatory or voluntary for staff to be

seen by the team or a team member after an

incident? 

● Can the team guarantee anonymity? 

● When is the team mobilized—at the outset

of a crisis, in the midst of a crisis, or after a

crisis has been resolved?

These questions have important implications.

Although detailed answers are beyond the scope

of this paper, some recommendations are in

order. 

After a large-scale prison crisis or other potentially traumatic event, psychological screening

for staff should be mandatory. However, psychological treatment should be voluntary. That is,

the department has a right to ensure that staff

are able to work and a responsibility to determine whether some staff need professional

assistance and to provide related information to

the staff members involved. However, it is the

right of individual staff members to decide

whether to accept treatment and to determine

what kind of treatment they will receive, just as

would be true of a medical situation.

In most jurisdictions, uniformed correctional

staff will need an alternative to a local or state

employee assistance program (EAP) for assistance after a crisis. Some staff will not use the

EAP even if their need is acute. They may question the EAP’s confidentiality, or they may want

to deal with professionals who have experience

in a correctional environment. Uniformed staff

also are unlikely to accept treatment from professional staff who treat inmates. However,

some jurisdictions have had success with this

approach when front-line staff and supervisors

acknowledge the credibility and expertise of

treatment staff. 
Section 5. Resource Materials: Emergency Teams

239

A few more specific recommendations may

prove useful:

● The crisis intervention team’s mission is

best defined broadly.

● The team’s mandate should include families

of staff members. 

● The team should be mobilized at the outset

of a crisis or a major emergency, not after it

is over. 

● Team members should have no other specialized role in emergency response. 

● Attention to ethics and confidentiality is

crucial for crisis intervention teams and

must be strict and ongoing. 

As with hostage negotiation teams, crisis intervention teams typically are more effective when

they are used frequently, in a broad range of situations. Thus, it makes sense to extend the use

of crisis intervention teams from traumatic incidents and major emergencies to day-to-day

situations involving staff trauma and crisis (e.g.,

a terminally ill staff member). Clearly, however,

a team of this kind can be crucially important

both to staff and staff families during a critical

incident and in its aftermath.

Conclusion

As noted at the beginning of this paper, prison

emergency teams—tactical, hostage negotiation,

and crisis intervention—all deal with life-anddeath matters. Properly managed, these teams

save lives and offer correctional staff paths for

recognition and professional growth. The issues

discussed in this paper provide institutional and

departmental leaders with food for thought in

managing these emergency teams so as to

ensure that they make a positive, professional,

and effective contribution to the department.
241

Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and

the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, terrorism

has been at the forefront of U.S. priorities and

the American psyche. A new Cabinet-level

department of the federal government, Homeland

Security (DHS), was created specifically to combat terrorism. President Bush declared a “war on

terrorism,” and that phrase has become a regular

part of our national vocabulary. 

A complete list of all the activities we have

engaged in on a national level to prevent or

combat terrorism would be very lengthy. The

domestic components of the war on terrorism

have focused heavily on airport security and on

police, fire, and health departments—that is, on

our first responders. Billions of dollars have

already flowed to these agencies and services

for equipment, training, developing new capacities, and augmenting existing capabilities.

For fire departments—which include paramedic

units—and firefighters, the reason for the

resources and focus is quite clear: they will be

crucial first responders in the event of almost

any type of terrorist attack. Whether the situation is a bombing or other kind of explosion

(like the one at the World Trade Center), an

attack that results in massive fire, or an incident

involving chemical agents, biological agents, or

other hazardous materials, firefighters and paramedics are likely to constitute much of the initial

reaction and first line of defense in the wake of a

terrorist attack.

Law enforcement’s role in domestic counterterrorism is also clear, if somewhat broader. Like

firefighters, the police are first responders. It is

difficult to envision any kind of

large-scale terrorist incident in this

country in which local law enforcement would not play a central role

in attempting to apprehend perpetrators, engaging in crowd and traffic control, establishing crime

scene and evidence preservation,

providing security for firefighters and medical

personnel, and more. In addition to its role as

first responders, law enforcement also constitutes the largest intelligence network in the

country—a separate but crucial part of a comprehensive domestic counterterrorism strategy.

There are other agencies and services that have

clearly identified roles in counterterrorist preparation and/or response. Hospitals and ambulance

services constitute another important group of

first responders in the event of a terrorist attack.

Few Americans can remain unaware of the

changes that have been made in airports and

airport security. It is incontrovertible that the

nation has embarked on an extensive counterterrorism effort directly involving more than a

million people, billions of dollars, and a broad

range of activities.

The field of corrections, however, has not yet

been fully considered in the counterterrorism

Prisons and Counterterrorism 

The field of corrections

has not yet been fully

considered in the

counterterrorism 

discussion . . . .
242

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

discussion, although many correctional agencies

participate to some degree with local or state

law enforcement intelligence networks and are

peripherally involved in other counterterrorist

efforts. A strong argument can certainly be

made for the contributions American corrections

can make toward increasing national security

with regard to terrorism, but much of that work

remains to be done. By and large, corrections is

not yet a major component of our domestic

counterterrorism plans or strategy.

This paper examines the role of prisons in a

national counterterrorism strategy and presents

recommendations for how prisons should prepare for and respond to terrorist threats and incidents. Much of this discussion will also be

relevant to city and county jails; however, the

potential roles of other branches of corrections

in the war on terrorism are not considered here

in any detail.

Role of Prisons in a National

Counterterrorism Strategy

Prisons constitute a potential target for terrorist

attack in at least three important ways. First,

prisons are densely populated and difficult to

defend against external assault. The cells, gates,

fences, and other security barriers that keep prisoners inside also make it difficult for both prisoners and staff to evacuate quickly. An attack on

a prison could kill a large number of victims.

Second, unlike many other high-density potential terrorist targets, prisons are symbols of

government authority. As such, they represent

an attractive target for terrorists seeking to create a scenario in which the government appears

unable to protect its citizens, even within its

own domains of power. 

Finally, in attacking a prison, terrorists have the

potential to effect a mass outbreak of hundreds

of high-security prisoners who would represent

a grave danger to surrounding communities. The

predictable widespread panic that would result

might be a more important objective to terrorists

than a high death count. Terrorists might well

regard the death and destruction at the prison

itself as beneficial byproducts to the central goal

of mass escapes, community terror, and chaos. 

Unfortunately, the experience of foreign countries in which terrorist activity has been relatively frequent substantiates these arguments. In

reality, prisons have been targets for terrorists,

as have jails and police stations. For example,

for many years, police in England have been

high-priority targets of the Irish Republican

Army (IRA). Basque separatists have attacked

Spanish police stations. As this is written, Iraqi

police are the frequent targets of insurgents.

As described above, prisons may be a likely target of terrorist attack, and they also have additional potential to contribute to national

counterterrorism efforts. In addition to their

attractiveness as terrorist targets, there are at

Defining Terrorism

Many intelligence agencies and political

entities have attempted to define terrorism.

However, no one definition has been adopted or officially recognized. This paper uses

the FBI’s definition of terrorism: “the unlawful use of force against persons or property

to intimidate or coerce a government, the

civilian population or any segment thereof,

in the furtherance of political or social

objectives.” This definition includes three

elements: (1) Terrorist activities are illegal

and involve the use of force. (2) The actions

are intended to intimidate or coerce. (3) The

actions are committed in support of political or social objectives. Also, these activities may be carried out by one or several

individuals.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prisons and Counterterrorism

243

least three other important reasons to make prisons an integral part of our domestic counterterrorism effort:

● Terrorists may exist within the prison population and could be identified.

● The prison population offers terrorists a

promising pool from which to recruit new

members, allies, or mercenaries.

● The prison population is a potential source

of intelligence about terrorist groups.

These issues, which are explored in the following sections, are either unique to prisons or

more evident within prisons than any other area

of government.

Potential To Identify Terrorists Within

Prison Populations

Many if not most prisoners are apolitical. That

is, the average criminal offender may be a

violent and dangerous high-security inmate with

a long record or a low-security inmate doing time

for a nonviolent crime, but the odds are high in

both cases that the inmate is uninvolved—and

probably uninterested—in national or international politics. In fact, “politics” within a prison

population usually refers to personality dynamics among small groups of inmates and sometimes to prison gangs or prison racial groupings.

However, a small percentage of the prison

population within the United States is intensely

involved in larger political issues. This group of

politically aware and active inmates tends to be

heavily weighted toward the extreme right and

extreme left of the political continuum—the

compass points that produce terrorists.

Committed terrorists may be housed among our

prison population and may not be easy to identify. Active terrorists may be sentenced for some

crime unrelated to terrorism and go unrecognized in prison. Such individuals may be skillful

Role of Other Branches of Corrections in Counterterrorism

The other major branches of corrections have differing relationships to potential terrorist activities

and threats that affect their need for counterterrorism preparedness and role in counterterrorism

response. For example, the risk of probation and parole agencies being targeted for terrorist attack

is extremely low. On the other hand, those same agencies are potentially invaluable in the area of

intelligence because of their detailed knowledge of a wide range of criminal offenders in the community and their active monitoring of the activities of many of those offenders.

Jails, like prisons, are potential terrorist targets—densely populated structures that are difficult

both to defend and to evacuate. In addition to being potential targets of terrorist activity, jails may

be involved with terrorists in other ways. Many of the criminal offenders monitored by probation

and parole officers in the community are also occasionally arrested by law enforcement and then

spend time in county jails, whether for short stays or en route to state prison. Jails also receive

individuals who may be wanted for very serious offenses but have been arrested on quite minor

charges. For these reasons, jails are in a position to make crucial contributions to counterterrorist

intelligence efforts.
244

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

at maintaining their identities as “regular” prisoners. Prisoners who become committed terrorists while in prison, on the other hand, are much

more likely to be less skilled and experienced at

hiding their true philosophies and objectives and

would typically be individuals who were well

known for their extremist views. In any case, the

potential for prisons to identify active and/or

committed terrorists within their own inmate

populations should not be ignored.

Potential for Terrorists To Recruit

Members and Allies

Prisons offer terrorists perhaps the single most

fertile ground in this country for recruiting new

members, allies, or mercenaries. Among the

hundreds of thousands of people

locked up in our prisons are many

smart, tough, disciplined individuals who blame our society, our

laws, and our government for their

ruined lives and for the fact that

they are in the midst of serving

long sentences. Many of them are

angry and alienated enough to be

easily turned from violence for

criminal purposes to violence for

political or even religious purposes.

For terrorists, recruiting these people is a great advantage: They do

not have to be taught to be violent.

In many cases, their criminal

records prove they are capable of

being extremely violent and that

they are psychologically able to cope with committing violence at the level of terrorism. 

It would be folly to ignore the potential for terrorist groups to look to our prison populations

as breeding grounds for recruits and/or allies,

particularly given the history of the late 1960s

and early 1970s, when the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and other groups with

similar philosophies and characteristics were

incubated entirely within our prison system.

There is no obvious reason why history could

not repeat itself. 

The question of mercenaries deserves additional

mention. Finding “hired help” would be much

easier for terrorists than attempting to recruit

new members and allies. If a group were planning an attack or some other terrorist activity

that required larger numbers of people to carry

out than the terrorist group itself had, where

would that group look for “soldiers”? Whereas

only a very small percentage of the prison population might be approached on political grounds

to become members of a terrorist group, a very

large percentage could be approached with

money to do almost anything.

Prisons are an all too obvious source if the need

is simply for people who will do bad things for

a great deal of money rather than people who

are philosophically, religiously, or politically

committed in any way. The question for correctional administrators and for policymakers 

outside the area of corrections is: How well prepared are our prisons and prison staff to recognize terrorist recruiting activities? Unfortunately,

the current answer is not at all. 

Potential To Gather Intelligence 

About Terrorists

For the reasons discussed above, potential intelligence about terrorists is more available in prisons than many other places. Terrorist groups and

terrorist incidents can originate wholly within a

prison or department of corrections (DOC).

Under certain conditions—the influence of leaders who are more political than religious, events

in the outside world (e.g., the United States at

war with a particular country or in a particular

region of the world), or perceived discrimination

against the group itself—religious, ethnic, and

racially affiliated groups have the potential to

become terrorist organizations or to spawn such

The question for 

correctional 

administrators and for

policymakers outside

the area of corrections

is: How well prepared

are our prisons and

prison staff to

recognize terrorist

recruiting activities?

Unfortunately, 

the current answer is 

not at all. 
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prisons and Counterterrorism

245

organizations. In general, knowledge of these

groups and their leaders may be crucial.

It is also true that an organized group of terrorists operating within the United States must do a

number of things outside the law. The group

may be laundering money, obtaining weapons

illegally, purchasing false identification, operating under false identities, or engaging in a host

of other activities that are not central to its violent objectives but that are required to allow the

group to operate in secrecy or to proceed with

its plans. These various illegal activities provide

potential avenues for identification of terrorist

groups. When a terrorist group operating in this

country needs to purchase unregistered or

untraceable weapons, obtain false identification,

or gain access to stolen motor vehicles, it is

most likely to look to the “common criminal” in

our cities and on our streets to arrange the necessary illegal business transactions. 

Government attempts to locate and identify terrorist groups through interdicting these lowlevel criminal transactions have traditionally

focused on intelligence efforts ranging from

local law enforcement to state antiterrorism networks to national organizations such as the FBI.

Consideration of the prison population has been

left out of the equation. Because the prison population is largely transient and because the criminals who sell guns, license plates, false

identification, and so forth tend to cycle from

street crime to prison and back, the prison population is a repository for a large amount of information about the kinds of illegal activities

taking place in the community and the individuals who are involved. Admittedly, a great deal of

rumor and false information circulates among

the prison population, but there is also valid

information. Monitoring this source of intelligence about illegal activities that could support

terrorist groups should be an integral part of our

counterterrorism strategy. 

Counterterrorism Preparedness

and Response in Prisons

The remainder of this paper considers how prisons should prepare for and respond to terrorist

threats and incidents. In short, what constitutes

counterterrorism at a prison?

The starting point for any prison assessing its

capacity to prevent and respond to a terrorist

attack must be its system of emergency preparedness. The news for U.S. prisons is good in

this regard. Unlike 20 or 30 years ago, most

prisons now have well-defined emergency preparedness systems supported by

substantial resources, detailed

plans, specialized equipment, and

extensive staff training. This emergency readiness is the foundation

upon which prison counterterrorism efforts must be built. There is

no practical alternative. The relatively small number of U.S. prisons

that have little or no emergency

readiness will not be able to seriously consider how they would

respond to a sophisticated terrorist

attack until they sort out policy

issues concerning command during

major emergencies, train negotiators (or set up agreements to use

external negotiators), prepare for

dealing with the media during a

large-scale crisis, and address all of the other

components of a detailed and realistic emergency plan discussed in section 1 of this guide

and enumerated in the Emergency Preparedness

Self-Audit Checklist in section 3. 

However, counterterrorism at a prison involves

considerably more than basic emergency preparedness. After a prison has established its

general emergency preparedness plan, trained

its staff in all of the plan’s components, and

embarked on a program of drills, exercises, and

A great deal of rumor

and false information

circulates among the

prison population, but

there is also valid

information.

Monitoring this source

of intelligence about

illegal activities that

could support terrorist

groups should be an

integral part of our

counterterrorism 

strategy. 
246

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

refresher training, it must give further attention

to the following areas critical to preparing for

and responding to terrorist threats and activity:

● Intelligence operations.

● Staff training.

● Target hardening.

● Alert systems.

● Medical services.

● Procedures for responding to alarms.

● Interagency agreements.

● Aftermath.

These topics are addressed in the sections that

follow.

Intelligence Operations

The core of most counterterrorism prevention

efforts in prisons will be the prison’s intelligence operations. Existing intelligence operations in prisons vary widely. Some prisons have

extremely sophisticated intelligence functions,

whereas others have no intelligence capabilities

whatsoever. Not surprisingly, prisons with

sophisticated intelligence operations in place

will be able to incorporate counterterrorism

functions much more easily than those with less

well-developed abilities to gather and analyze

critical information. 

One of the first priorities for a prison seeking to

develop intelligence on terrorism is to explore

and understand local and statewide intelligence

Security Threat Group Operations

Many prisons have a security threat group (STG) coordinator. This person may operate relatively

independently, but in large prisons, he or she may also have subordinate staff. STGs are often

defined as neither more nor less than gangs and may be street gangs or prison gangs. The STG

coordinator’s job includes reviewing new admissions to identify both gang members and inmates

who are not gang members but may be affiliated with particular gangs. The coordinator may

accomplish this through interviews, identification of tattoos, information obtained from other

inmates, the new inmate’s record, and information from local and state law enforcement agencies.

Typically, once gang members or affiliates are identified, they are entered into the STG database

and then tracked and monitored throughout their stay in the prison.

A good STG operation will have safeguards against practices such as overloading a housing unit

with too many members of one particular gang, allowing relatives of members of one gang to

cross-visit at the prison, and permitting the identified gang member to make collect phone calls to

known gang members on the outside. Phone conversations of gang members may be monitored or

recorded and archived. The prison will monitor and attempt to stop gang efforts to recruit within

the inmate population and to control housing assignments, recreation, commissary goods, or other

potential sources of power. The elements of a well-developed STG operation—early identification,

suspect databases, tracking and monitoring procedures, and the capacity to monitor mail, phone,

and visitation—are equally applicable to prison counterterrorism intelligence operations.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prisons and Counterterrorism

247

networks involving law enforcement, the military, staff from county and state emergency

management agencies, federal enforcement

agencies, and other such organizations. The

prison should work to become a full partner in

such terrorism task forces.1

Preventing terrorist activity is a prison’s responsibility, but it is also an external issue. Prisons

and correctional agencies may have little control

over preventing terrorist activity when the threat

is external. For example, if a terrorist group is

targeting a prison for an attack, but no inmates

or other individuals associated with the prison

are involved in the planning or with the group in

any other way, the success or failure of the terrorists’ plans may rest solely with national law

enforcement resources, particularly the FBI. The

targeted prison might not know about the plot

until members of the terrorist group are apprehended or, if law enforcement intelligence

efforts are unsuccessful, until an attack actually

takes place. However, if the plot to attack a

prison also involves inmate collaborators or

plans to free high-profile “political” prisoners,

or if members of the terrorist group have infiltrated either the inmate population or the prison

workforce, then the prison and prison staff

might have the opportunity to foil the terrorists’

plans through effective intelligence operations.

Staff Training

The biggest difference between prison gangs

and terrorist organizations may be summed up

as “sophistication.” While some of the larger,

longer established prison gangs are reasonably

sophisticated, with constitutions, bylaws, and

well-defined organizational cultures, even these

gangs are a far cry from the sophistication of

most terrorist groups. Most correctional staff,

like most law enforcement officers, have little

experience with groups of offenders who are

smart, well funded, highly trained, and disciplined. Prison staff are accustomed to inmate

groups that plan poorly, follow through badly,

and have trouble keeping secrets for more than

30 minutes. Few staff in prisons have any concept of the level of planning, training, resources,

secrecy, and commitment to cause that is

required for an event like the September 11

attacks. It follows that staff training on terrorism

is one of the most important and earliest steps in

building counterterrorism capabilities into an

existing prison emergency preparedness system.

The lack of awareness of an appropriate frame

of reference and of specific knowledge about

terrorism on the part of prison staff is not limited to intelligence operations or other prevention

efforts. The need for staff training specific to

terrorism is equally relevant to planning and

preparation and also applies to building response

capabilities for possible terrorist acts at or in

prisons.

Target Hardening

Once a prison has declared alert status or activated an alert system in response to a terrorist

threat, specific activities and procedures fall into

several categories, the first of which is usually

referred to as “target hardening.” Target hardening includes a wide range of steps that most

prisons can initiate to increase security against

outside assault. As noted above, almost all

prison security is designed from the inside out,

and many high-security institutions that are

extremely well designed to prevent escape have

almost no security systems that are effective

against external threats. Examples of target

hardening include the following measures:

● Establish vehicle- or traffic-control checkpoints at some distance from the main gates. 1 Understandably, small minimum-security prisons may give

counterterrorist intelligence efforts much lower priority than large

medium- or high-security facilities.
248

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

● Change procedures or erect barriers at

vehicle sally ports.

● Tighten or restrict inmate mail or visitation

procedures.

● Institute background checks and positive

identification requirements for delivery

truck drivers and/or inmate visitors.

● Increase external vehicle patrols and arm

those staff.

● Increase night lighting for areas outside

perimeter fences.

The list will vary substantially depending on the

nature of the particular institution and the level

of the perceived threat.

One of the greatest assets available to wardens

seeking to identify opportunities for target hardening is the expertise of their tactical teams.

Many wardens have never analyzed their facility’s degree of vulnerability to external assault. It

is a challenging exercise, and the results are

often disturbing. Wardens who charge their

CERT teams to assume the role of a group of

soldiers of fortune hired to attack the prison to

execute an escape will likely be alarmed at the

vulnerabilities the team identifies. Many of the

risks found will have been unrecognized, and

some may be obvious and severe. The leader

must recognize that the more alarming the information, the more valuable the exercise.

Alert Systems

As used in this paper, the term “alert system”

refers to a method for placing a prison in higher

stages or levels of readiness in response to

heightened threat levels. In our post-September

11 world, almost everyone in the United States

is familiar with the statement “We are now at

threat-level orange,” and people who served in

the military during the cold war are unlikely to

forget “We are now at DEFCON 3.” However, a

prison alert system should not be confused with

the five threat levels of DHS’s color-coded advisory system. The core concept of a prison alert

system is the need for a rational, planned

method for responding to a heightened threat of

terrorist activity aimed at the prison or its surrounding community. All staff must be well

trained in the alert system.

Most state DOCs do not have any sort of alert

system; however, some states have exactly this

kind of system built into their overall emergency

preparedness plans. Notably, New York’s DOC

has a detailed, sophisticated, and well-designed

alert system, and the group of states using

LETRA’s Emergency Preparedness for

Correctional Institutions have an alert system

that is an integral part of that approach.2

There is no single type of prison alert system

that must be used. Because experience with alert

systems in prisons is limited, it would be difficult to make a case for the number of stages of

readiness a prison alert system should have.

There is a good deal of room for creativity and

varied approaches in designing a prison alert

system. However, effective alert systems have at

least one element in common: they are true systems with specific plans and measures in which

staff have been trained. The importance of planning and training cannot be overemphasized.

Prisons cannot expect to figure out how to

respond once they are under serious threat.

Without thorough planning, training, and practice, it is an unfortunate certainty that under

threat and time pressure, the prison will

make avoidable mistakes and forget obvious

procedures. 

The information leading a prison to activate its

alert system may come from intelligence

sources within the prison or from law enforcement or other external sources. Similarly, the

2 The comprehensive emergency system developed by LETRA,

Inc., for correctional institutions is described in Emergency

Preparedness for Correctional Institutions, 3d edition (Campbell,

CA: 2004).
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prisons and Counterterrorism

249

target of the threat identified in the intelligence

may be the prison itself, but it is also possible

that the prison may have to respond to threats to

a nearby city or the surrounding geographic

area.

Responses to declaring alert status or raising the

threat level, if the alert system has stages or levels, include but are not limited to the following:

● Activating emergency command procedures. The prison may need to ensure that

one of its top managers is either onsite or

available in relatively close proximity 24

hours a day.

● Initiating target-hardening measures. For

example, if the intelligence points to the

possible use of a truck bomb, concrete barriers might be erected in front of vehicle sally

ports, and a traffic-control post might be

established at some distance from the institution and staffed around the clock. If the

intelligence points instead to a biological

threat, processing of mail and packages

might be moved to a location outside the

institution’s perimeter.

● Marshalling additional resources, either

through activation or standby status. For

example, intelligence staff may need to

increase their operations, and the administration may need to cancel vacations for

members of CERT teams, hostage negotiators, and other staff with critical jobs during

emergencies. Hostage negotiation and

CERT teams may need to be on phone

standby.

● Activating interagency agreements. For

example, intelligence-sharing activities may

be intensified.

● Developing an initial media strategy if

the prison’s response comes to media

attention. For example, if the intelligence

information received is highly confidential,

the prison will need some acceptable public

explanation of security measures such as

traffic controls, the reduction in inmate visiting, and increased staffing. The same

explanation may need to be given to the

staff and inmate population as well.

● Modifying operations in ways that reduce

exposure to the threat. For example, if the

threat is an attack involving a bomb or an

explosion intended to kill people within the

prison and allow mass escapes, then reduced

programming and some degree of lockdown

may mitigate the risk of mass escape.

Other Benefits of Alert Systems

An alert system, even if developed specifically as part of a counterterrorism plan, has

the potential to serve the institution well in

the more traditional kinds of prison crises

and emergencies. Most prisons operate in

two well-defined modes: normal day-to-day

operations and the crisis mode that goes

into effect in response to any major emergency. There is usually nothing in between.

This situation is problematic in that, for

most prisons, the time spent building up to

or recovering from a major emergency is

usually much longer than the time spent

operating under emergency conditions. Yet

emergency operations are carefully specified in detail, while the much more common

situation of operating under very high tension and at very high risk is handled on a

“catch-as-catch-can” basis, without serious planning or procedures. A wellthought-out alert system can fill this gap.
250

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

The range of options a prison must consider in

response to a credible threat of terrorist attack is

broad. This brief summary of some of the more

obvious actions should illustrate that it is too

late to build that response after the threat is

received.

Medical Services

Whether a terrorist attack at a prison involves

automatic weapons, a bombing or explosion, or

the unleashing of chemical or biological agents,

the potential for mass casualties is very high.

Consequently, a medical services plan developed as part of the prison’s overall emergency

preparedness procedures may be

insufficient to respond to a terrorist

incident. Medical services plans for

prison emergencies are usually

given the same priority as emergency food services plans or emergency facilities and maintenance

plans. The medical services plan

developed for response to terrorist

incidents must be far more detailed

and must envision the possibility of

very large numbers of dead and/or

injured, including both inmates and

staff. 

The most obvious need will be for a large mass

casualty center and an alternate location, should

the primary location be unavailable or disabled

because of the nature of the incident itself.

Large-scale triage operations will have a similarly high priority. The prison should scrutinize

its existing interagency agreements with community hospitals and ambulance services, as

these agreements will likely need to be expanded. 

Procedures for Responding to Alarms

Prisons should also examine their procedures for

responding to alarms and reported emergencies.

Those that already use some form of first

responder system3 will have an advantage in this

regard. Any system that controls staff response

to an alarm should offer some level of protection against a well-planned diversion designed

to bring all available staff into one area of the

prison so that they can be attacked or taken

hostage or so that something else can happen at

the other side of the prison compound. However,

when focusing on counterterrorism capabilities,

prisons should carefully examine even a welldefined first responder system, particularly with

regard to the training of the first responders

themselves. In most prisons, how many initially

responding staff would recognize a potential

anthrax situation and know they should stop further response and attempt to isolate and seal off

the area? If onduty staff at a prison found people sick or dying and suspected chemical or biological contaminants, would any of them know

how to contact the nearest HAZMAT team?

Does the prison have protective clothing or other

safety equipment available for first responders

and other prison staff if a biological or chemical

terrorist incident is suspected? If a potential

bomb was discovered in the prison, would staff

know not to move or handle it? Has the prison

conducted drills or simulations for responding to

a biological attack? A discovered bomb? Are

there specific procedures that would help staff in

these kinds of emergencies?

“Defend-in-place” strategies—remaining in the

facility and coping with the crisis rather than

evacuating—also deserve attention. Many potential terrorist scenarios could require a defendin-place response. With the exception of institutions in areas at high risk for tornados, few prisons or jails place a premium on planning or

practicing defend-in-place strategies. However,

If onduty staff at a 

prison found people 

sick or dying and 

suspected chemical or 

biological contaminants, would any of

them know how to

contact the 

nearest HAZMAT

team? 

3 A first responder system is one in which specific staff are designated as initial responders to an alarm, fight, or other such incident

and other staff are held in reserve as second responders. First

responder systems include a variety of methods other than the old

and traditional approach that calls for every available staff member

in the prison to drop everything and run to the incident as soon as

an alarm goes off.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prisons and Counterterrorism

251

if a terrorist attack is sudden and produces death

and chaos, the nature of the attack may not be

clear, nor may it be clear which direction represents safety and which represents increased

danger. When the risks to community safety

resulting from the unplanned movement of large

numbers of inmates are added to the equation, a

defend-in-place response may be the only viable

alternative. This rationale suggests that defendin-place strategies may need considerably more

attention and practice than they have received to

date in prisons.

Interagency Agreements

Interagency agreements with hospitals, ambulance services, fire departments, HAZMAT

teams, and other agencies are indispensable to a

prison’s counterterrorism preparedness. For

most prisons, however, the most crucial interagency agreements in many types of terrorist

incidents will be those with law enforcement. If

a prison has not yet found a need for detailed

and comprehensive written interagency agreements with state and local law enforcement

agencies, focusing on potential terrorist activity should provide the necessary motivation.

Jurisdictional issues must be carefully considered and worked out in advance, rather than

argued about in the midst of the response to a

bombing. The use of prison staff outside the

boundaries of the prison and the use of law

enforcement officers inside the prison should be

considered with regard to questions such as

arrest powers, authority for use of force, reporting relationships, and extent of authority. After

law enforcement, other very high-priority interagency agreements would include those with

county and state emergency management agencies (many of which already include prisons in

their planning) and the National Guard.

Developing realistic and comprehensive interagency agreements is a substantial amount of

work. However, the good news is the work is

“front-end loaded.” That is, once the agreements

are fully developed, maintaining and updating

those agreements are relatively easy. Both agencies should review the agreements annually for

changes or necessary additions. 

Aftermath

A prison’s general emergency plan should

include detailed policies, procedures, and

resources for dealing with the aftermath of an

incident. Most of these measures will be equally

effective if the incident in question is a terrorist

act rather than, say, an inmate hostage taking.

There are several key differences, however:

● In a terrorist incident, most of the investigation and prosecution will be in the hands of

national rather than state and local agencies. 

Interagency Agreements

Necessary to Prison

Counterterrorism Planning

• Local and state law enforcement 

agencies

• County and state emergency 

management agencies

• Hospitals

• Local utility companies

• Ambulance services

• Fire departments

• Other correctional facilities or agencies 

• HAZMAT teams

• FBI Correctional Terrorism Initiative

• American Red Cross
252

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

● The prison will have much less control than

it does after a “traditional” emergency. For

example, even after the incident is over, a

great deal of information will likely remain

highly confidential and unavailable to the

public and the media. This situation can create strong tensions between the media and

the prison and between the prison and its

own staff and inmates, even though the rules

are not of the prison’s making. 

● Because the incident involves terrorism, its

newsworthiness will likely be magnified to

a degree that prison staff find almost

unimaginable. The coverage of the event

will be international and the scrutiny will

likely continue for months rather than hours

or days. 

● The involvement of elected political figures

is likely to be national as well as local and

statewide. 

These circumstances will strain the prison’s

resources and its emotional stability at a time

when it is fighting to return to normal operations and can ill afford additional pressures,

tensions, or other risk factors. A complete discussion of deactivation and aftermath procedures is beyond the scope of this paper.

However, for a prison attempting to recover

from a high-profile terrorist incident, the

following areas and functions will be critical:

● A sophisticated long-term public information operation.

Drills and Exercises

Without drills or exercises, counterterrorism measures will be largely useless, as is true for other

types of emergency planning. The counterterrorism procedures discussed in this paper are not

“one-time fixes” that can be written or planned and then ignored as if they had already been

accomplished. Although staff must receive refresher training, testing the procedures and other

measures that are developed is even more important. Part of the reason for testing is to help staff

become comfortable and familiar with the new procedures and measures. The other primary purpose is to see whether these procedures and measures can be put into practice under realistic

conditions and, to the extent possible, whether they are effective in accomplishing their objectives.

Accomplishing these goals requires neither more nor less than the kinds of exercises, drills, and

simulations that should be second nature to emergency planners. 

One warning must be added. It is easy to design a terrorism scenario or exercise that is overwhelming and frightening rather than challenging and realistic. Terrorism is inherently a dramatic

and compelling topic for most people, especially correctional and law enforcement staff who are

likely to find themselves on the front lines in the event of a terrorist attack. However, the point of

exercises and drills is to test individual components of a counterterrorism system and build staff

confidence through success. A practice scenario that begins with a tactical nuclear weapon

exploding in the main dining hall of a large prison is unlikely to test anything worthwhile or to

advance staff confidence.
Section 5. Resource Materials: Prisons and Counterterrorism

253

● Ongoing emergency staff services (ESS).4

● Communication with staff and with the

inmate population.

● Stepdown planning (returning prison operations to normal).

● Critical incident review (an analysis of the

nature of the incident and what was done

correctly and incorrectly).

● Assessment and repair of facility damage.

Conclusion

This paper has presented recommendations for

how prisons can prepare to respond to terrorist

threats and incidents. Almost every issue that

has been discussed is also an element of a

prison’s general emergency planning, and an

effective emergency preparedness system must

be the foundation of any prison’s counterterrorism measures. It makes little sense for prisons

with almost nothing in the area of emergency

preparedness and those with emergency plans

and procedures that are outdated and/or ineffective to embark on a counterterrorism initiative

that will be demanding of time, money, effort,

and other resources. The end result would be a

narrowly designed system that is only prepared

to respond to terrorist activity, the probability of

which at any specific prison is extremely small.

For U.S. prisons that have neglected emergency

planning, the threat of terrorism

should serve as a wake-up call to

begin developing comprehensive

emergency preparedness systems

that incorporate counterterrorist

planning. 

American correctional institutions

offer major opportunities for assisting with national security efforts

that are underway, but much of that

work remains to be done. Prisons,

in particular, have the potential to

function as an important and major

component of the national counterterrorism effort. The implications

of this conclusion point in two

quite different directions. On the one hand, most

U.S. prisons are not well prepared for the threat

of terrorist activity. The responsibility for correcting that situation rests with prison administrators. On the other hand, our prisons, with a

few minor exceptions, are not involved with or

contributing to our national counterterrorism

strategies. The potential to change this situation

rests with high-ranking government officials and

those who formulate policy and strategy at a

national level.

For U.S. prisons that

have neglected

emergency planning,

the threat of terrorism

should serve as a

wake-up call to begin

developing comprehensive emergency

preparedness systems

that incorporate 

counterterrorist

planning. 

4 Emergency staff services should include, but not necessarily be

limited to, psychological screening, posttrauma counseling for

staff, assistance for staff families, and aid in filing for insurance

and other benefits.
Section 6

Case Studies
Fire in a New Institution: Taney County, Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .257

Lucasville Prison Riot: Ohio Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261 

Helicopter Intrusion/Escape: Colorado Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . .271 

Riot at Max: Montana State Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .277

The 1993 Midwest Floods: Missouri Loses Renz Correctional Center . . . . . . . .289 

The Morey Unit Hostage Incident: Arizona Department of Corrections . . . . . . .293 

Hurricane Andrew: Florida Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .319 

In This 

Section
257

Taney County, Missouri, is located in a relatively isolated area of the Ozark Mountains.

Forsyth, the county seat, is a town of approximately 1,200. The Taney County Jail in Forsyth

was completed in 1982. It is designed to hold

approximately 32 prisoners, primarily in double

cells. The jail building also houses the County

Sheriff’s Dispatch Center and all of the offices

of the Sheriff’s Department.

The jail is constructed of steel and concrete and

was equipped with numerous fire extinguishers

but no self-contained breathing apparatus, fire

hoses, or sprinkler system. Located behind the

administrative areas and the dispatch room, the

housing areas are entered through a sliding steel

door that then gives access to three separate subhousing areas: the women’s unit, the men’s minimum unit, and a high-security men’s unit. Each

of these areas is accessed by another sliding,

electrically operated steel door. The cells are of

open-front construction, with sliding barred

doors. All of the doors in the jail can be manually operated with a key in the absence of electric

power, but there is no gang unlock and each cell

door must be individually keyed open. 

At approximately 3:45 a.m. on September 14,

1991, some of the minimum-custody prisoners

in cells along the back wall of the jail became

aware of a fire just outside the jail walls and

visible through translucent windows in the housing area. They began yelling and woke the trusty

inmates housed in the cells closest to the doors

to the dispatch room, where the night staff

member is usually stationed. At night, the Taney

County Jail is staffed by one person, a dispatcher/

jailer who runs the county dispatch center and

also handles duties inside the jail. Inmates were

unable to contact this staff member for a substantial period of time. By the time contact was

made, smoke was coming into the jail from the

roof. 

A wooden shedlike structure had been constructed just outside the east wall of the jail

building to house a large emergency generator

for use in the event of a main power failure. The

emergency generator was powered by propane,

and a large propane tank was mounted outside

the wooden shed approximately 1 to 2 feet from

the shed’s northern wall. By state code, the

propane tank should have been at least 10 feet

from any flammable structure. The shed housing

the emergency generator also housed two large

batteries and a battery charger, which was powered with electric lines run from inside the jail.

Although a number of issues surrounding this

fire remain unclear or in dispute, a short circuit

in the battery charger or its wires appears to

have produced the fire that involved the wooden

shed. The roof of the jail is constructed of prestressed concrete, but above that a wooden soffit, or eaves, and a false roof had been

constructed in apparent violation of state codes.

Fire in a New Institution: 

Taney County, Missouri

Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency

Preparedness, by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry

(Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc., 2002), by permission of the

authors. Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia

Barry.
258

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

The fire in the shed spread to the wooden structure above the concrete roof of the jail, and this

wooden roofing apparently produced most of

the smoke that entered the jail. At some point

early in this series of events, the shed fire

burned the wiring on both the emergency generator and the main power lines, and the jail lost

all power.

When the dispatcher/jailer responded to the

outer door of the jail housing areas, he had an

immediate problem. If that door, the inner

doors, and the cell doors were opened to evacuate the inmates, they would be in a corridor

leading to an unsecured outside door to the jail

and might escape. At some point after the power

was lost, the dispatcher/jailer tried to manually

key the main housing area door, but was unable

to operate it. 

Conditions within the cell areas became

extremely bad. Thick smoke was reaching all of

the cell areas. The built-in smoke ejector system

did not work because it was dependent on

power. Although timelines are not clear, reconstruction of events suggested that it may have

been more than 30 minutes after the dispatcher/

jailer was alerted before help arrived. Two or

three jail staff, including the head jailer, and fire

department assistance all arrived in close proximity to each other. After the head jailer tried

unsuccessfully to operate the main housing 

area door manually, a firefighter wearing selfcontained breathing apparatus was finally able

to open the door. The doors of the units also had

to be opened manually, and then cell doors had

to be opened individually. The jail staff and firefighters were able to enter the women’s area and

the minimum-security men’s area and open cell

doors. The maximum-security unit door could

not be operated manually and eventually was

opened with an acetylene torch, causing even

lengthier delays in reaching the cells there.

Three male inmates and one female inmate died

of smoke inhalation. Another female inmate suffered very serious permanent lung damage and

will require oxygen assistance for the rest of her

life. The other 21 inmates housed in the jail suffered smoke-related injuries described as mild to

medium. No serious injuries occurred to jail

staff or firefighters.

The time at which the power and emergency

power were lost has never been established with

any degree of precision. There were allegations

that the dispatcher/jailer had a window of

opportunity after he had become aware of the

fire, and before the power was lost, during

which he could have operated all of the doors

electrically and evacuated all of the inmates, and

that he had failed to do so out of fear about

escapes or simply because he did not know an

evacuation procedure. It was also suggested that

the power went out almost immediately after

the fire was first noticed and well before the

dispatcher/jailer was even notified.

The jail had not conducted fire drills or any sort

of practice evacuations. State code required an

annual fire safety inspection of the jail, with a

written report of the results of the inspections.

No such inspections had been conducted and the

fire marshal did not have jurisdiction over the

jail. The smoke detectors installed in the jail did

not have battery backup and were ineffective.

No comprehensive analysis of what happened,

and why, was attempted in the aftermath of the

fire. With the exception of a short investigation

report by the Division of Fire Safety of the State

Department of Public Safety (consisting primarily of a description of what was found burned,

partially burned, and intact), most of the available documentary information on the fire is

found in deposition testimony resulting from a

large number of lawsuits filed by surviving

inmates and families of the deceased inmates.
Section 6. Case Studies: Fire in a New Institution

259

The lengthiest of the civil cases was concluded

in 1995. Taney County was insured, and the

carrier settled relatively quickly at policy limits.

Out-of-court settlements were also reached with

the company that manufactured the security

doors and the company that installed the propane tank that fed the emergency generator.

When the jail was repaired, the eaves and false

roof were redesigned using nonflammable materials. The dispatcher/jailer who had been on

duty had a severe posttraumatic stress reaction

to the incident and eventually resigned from the

Sheriff’s Department.

Lessons Learned

1. No building is fireproof.

2. Even in a modern facility constructed of

steel and concrete, many items are capable

of producing life-threatening smoke, including mattresses, inmates’ personal property,

carpeting, wall paint, cleaning supplies, and

insulation.

3. Unless procedures are tested with fire drills

that include full-scale evacuation, some

problems may not be identified until they

occur during a real fire, perhaps with disastrous consequences.

4. Local fire departments should participate in

simulated fire emergencies with local correctional institutions.

5. Every correctional institution should have

self-contained breathing apparatuses and

staff trained to use them properly. The primary purpose of this equipment is not fire

suppression but search and rescue.

6. Fire exit signs and smoke and fire detectors

should always have battery backup systems.

7. Inmate housing areas that are isolated from

staff during some portions of the day must

have a method or mechanism for alerting

staff to an emergency. 

8. Where possible, emergency generators

should not be in the same location as the

main power for the institution.

9. Every correctional institution should undergo a thorough fire inspection at least annually, conducted by someone not on the

institution’s staff.

10. A comprehensive critical incident review

should be required after every serious

emergency situation to ensure that problems

encountered do not reoccur and to avoid

other problems.
261

On April 11, 1993, Easter Sunday, the Southern

Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) in Lucasville, Ohio, experienced the start of what has

become the longest prison riot in the past four

decades and the third most lethal disorder in

recent penal history.1 When the riot ended

11 days later, a correctional officer and nine

inmates had been murdered. Nearly 2,000 law

enforcement officers and National Guard troops

were involved in responding to the riot over its

11-day course. In bringing the riot to a close,

state negotiators accepted a 21-point list of

grievances with the promise to review them for

possible improvements to the besieged

Lucasville prison.

At the time the riot began, SOCF held 1,822

inmates, 44 percent of whom were double celled

because the prison was operating over capacity.

As the state’s only maximum-security prison,

SOCF held the most violent and predatory

inmates in a system with a total population of

approximately 40,000.

In the months preceding the riot, the Ohio

prison system had discovered a few active cases

of tuberculosis (TB) among the prison population and decided to administer the tuberculin

skin test to the entire prison population. All

Ohio prisons but SOCF completed the TB testing without major problems. At SOCF, the

Muslim inmates informed the warden that their

religion prohibited skin testing and that they

would not participate or comply. The warden

met with an inmate leader and a Muslim imam

and told them that they would have no choice

and that it would be “my way or the highway.”

(The warden later candidly acknowledged that

his approach was unnecessarily confrontational

and a mistake.) 

The SOCF command staff met on a Thursday

and decided they would lock down the prison

beginning the following Monday morning and

do the skin testing by force if necessary. The

next day, Friday, memos about the lockdown

were drafted and requisitions for extra supplies

were prepared, most of which were typed by

inmate clerks. The inmate population knew that

the lockdown would begin Monday morning,

and they used Saturday to plan a disturbance

that would start on Sunday.

On the afternoon of Sunday, April 11, 1993, two

correctional officers and a recreation officer

were in the L-block corridor as more than 100

inmates from L–6 returned from the recreation

field. Another 180 inmates from L–2 and L–7

and 60 inmates released on passes were also

preparing to enter L-corridor from the yard. An

additional 100 or so inmates from K–6 were

also on the recreation yard at this time. A total

of 76 security posts, including towers and control centers, were scheduled during the second

shift on any day at SOCF; 68 of these posts

were staffed on Easter Sunday. 

Lucasville Prison Riot: Ohio

Department of Corrections

Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency

Preparedness, by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry

(Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc., 2002), by permission of the

authors. Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia

Barry.

1 Only the prison riots in Santa Fe, NM, and Attica, NY, caused

more casualties.
262

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

At approximately 3 p.m., as L–6 inmates

entered L-corridor from the yard, a group of

them launched an assault on an officer, quickly

overcoming him by shear force of numbers. As

other inmates filed in from the yard, they joined

the melee, assaulting other staff in the area.

Inmates outnumbered staff so greatly that the

staff’s initial security and control objectives

were soon replaced by the need to survive and

to keep the uprising from spreading to other

parts of the institution. 

The riot was now under way. Within 15 minutes

of the initial attack, the inmates gained control

of L-corridor and the keys that opened all the

doors to all of the blocks within L-corridor.

They also took hostages and neutralized the

remaining staff inside the block by capturing

them or forcing them out of the area.

Chronology of Events

Day 1: Sunday, April 11, 1993

12 noon. Recreation period begins. Inmates from L–2, L–6, L–7, and K–6—

approximately 400 inmates—are allowed to

enter the yard. Approximately 60 additional

inmates are also given passes for the yard.

2:50 p.m. An announcement to “close” the yard

is broadcast over the public address (PA)

system.

2:55 p.m. The PA announcement to clear the

yard is repeated.

3 p.m. Inmates from L–6 (maximum security,

level 4) begin to enter L-corridor.

3:03 p.m. Several inmates attack the corridor

officer and gain possession of the keys that

open the doors to all of the blocks on 

L-corridor.

The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility had

been a troubled prison since it opened.

Lucasville is located in the most isolated,

rural, and poorest part of southern Ohio, a

region that has more in common with the

Appalachian area of Kentucky across the

Ohio river than with the northern tier of

industrialized cities in Ohio such as

Cleveland, Akron, Toledo, and Canton. The

mix of relatively unsophisticated rural white

staff and streetwise, urban black inmates

was problematic from the beginning. Race

relations at the prison were bad, and the

prison had experienced more than 20 homicides in its relatively short history before

the Easter Sunday riot began. In most

cases, the inmates serving the longest

terms in the Ohio prison system were geographically the most distanced from their

families, making visiting difficult and infrequent. Because of an antiquated phone

switch, inmates had extremely limited

access to pay phones. Moreover, although

the prison held the most serious of the

state’s 40,000 inmates, it was run not like a

maximum-security institution, but more like

a relatively open medium-security prison.

The new warden had changed some of that

but had lost support among staff and in the

local community by proving to be serious

and professional on issues such as use of

force.
Section 6. Case Studies: Lucasville Prison Riot

263

3:04 p.m. Inmates attack four officers nearly

simultaneously. One officer calls control

center 1 and reports “a fight in L-corridor.”

3:05 p.m. Control center 1 radios all units “We

have a fight in L-corridor.”

3:06 p.m. The shift commander responds to the

call and is immediately attacked upon entering L-corridor. An additional lieutenant also

responds and is attacked.

In leaving to respond to the call, the sergeant

from J-block encounters inmates beating an

officer with a side-handled baton (PR–24)

and broom handle near L–6.

Control center 1 radios a report that two

man-down alarms have gone off in L-block.

3:07 p.m. Both lieutenants and the sergeant

fight their way through L-corridor. 

Control center 1 receives a call that an officer needs help in L-block.

A recreation officer in K-block calls for

stretchers after seeing injured officers crossing the yard from L-block to K-block.

3:08 p.m. Control center 1 calls the Ohio State

Highway Patrol for assistance.

3:12 p.m. The two lieutenants and the sergeant

succeed in fighting their way to the lower

crash gate in L-corridor. They order control

center 3 to close the crash gate.

3:15 p.m. A lieutenant radios control center 1,

advising them that “the inmates have taken

L-side.” Inmates are heard chanting “We

have the keys.”

3:05–3:15 p.m. Efforts to call key staff on beepers are hampered because the staff member

making the calls does not realize that a

touch-tone line is required to activate beepers and is using a rotary phone line.

Some L-block officers run to the rear stairwell of L–5 as they have been trained to do.

One officer is attacked in L–6 but manages

to fight his way past the crash gate just

before it is closed. Another officer is taken

hostage when he enters L-corridor.

3:15–4:15 p.m. Tower guards are instructed to

break the seals on their guns. Correctional

When the shift commander (a lieutenant)

and the only other lieutenant in the institution both responded to the fight in progress

along with a sergeant and all three were

engaged in hand-to-hand combat and

injured, the control center and the institution were left with no one at the helm. A

correctional officer might have “stepped up

to the plate” to take charge and organize

the response to the expanding emergency,

but no one did. In the first 20 to 40 minutes

of the disturbance—the traditional window

that determines how much of an institution

is lost and how many inmates become

involved—SOCF was operating with no one

in charge. When the shift commander finally did fight his way out of the cell blocks

and get back to the control center, he was

badly beaten, had broken bones, and was

in no condition to exercise command

authority. Other reports from the institution

indicate that the first high-ranking administrator to get to the institution in response to

callbacks ended up in a tower, divorced

from the action, and exercised no direction

or command.
264

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

officers with shotguns take position at control center 3 to prevent L-block inmates from

advancing further. 

One officer calls for help from the L–5 rear

stairwell where he and another officer have

taken refuge. He makes contact with control

center 1 on four occasions. No one is sent to

rescue the officers.

The chaplain arrives at control center 1 and

offers his assistance. The officer from the

L–5 stairwell calls control center 1 a fifth

time. A different person takes the call and

immediately takes an armed team to attempt

a rescue through the exterior L–5 door. 

Using a weight-lifting bar taken from the

gym, inmates break through the unreinforced

concrete block of the L–5 rear stairwell, capturing the two officers just as the rescue

team arrives at the exterior door—1 hour

after the first call for help.

Inmates break through the rear L–2 stairwell

wall, capturing another officer and an

inmate. The inmate is savagely assaulted

and murdered in front of the officer. (The

inmate’s body is dumped in the yard the following day. An autopsy reveals 163 stab

wounds and major skull fractures.)

Another officer calls the control center from

the rear L–4 stairwell seeking assistance for

himself and a second officer. No one answers

the phone. He tries to call for help a second

time. Someone answers the phone, then

hangs up. By now, inmates have smashed the

window out of the stairwell door and are

spraying the two officers with a fire extinguisher. The inmates manage to smash

through the concrete block wall and take the

officers hostage, beating them severely in the

process.

Inmates erect a barricade against the lower

crash gate in L-corridor to prevent or delay

an assault from the control center 3 area.

Officers lock down K-block inmates wherever they are—in their cells, the shower, or the

dayroom—to permit additional staff to

The housing units at SOCF are two stories high with solid ceilings between the two floors rather

than open tiers. The front of each cell block opens onto a main housing corridor. At the rear of

each housing block is a two-story stairwell with steel security doors on each of the two floors.

Officers carry keys to those doors and are trained from the time they begin working at SOCF to

retreat to the stairwell if they are in trouble on the housing block and cannot get to the main corridor. Once locked in the stairwell, the officer can use the phone there to call the control center,

which, in theory, would then dispatch a group of staff to rescue the officer. The rescue staff would

enter the stairwell via an additional security door from the yard to the first floor of the stairwell.

Block officers do not carry keys to that door because doing so would breach the security envelope. 

A number of officers used the stairwells exactly as they had been trained to do. However, although

some officers called the control center many times over more than an hour, no staff were dispatched to rescue them. All of the officers in the stairwell were eventually beaten and/or taken

hostage by inmates after the inmates broke through the unreinforced ceramic concrete block

construction of the walls surrounding the stairwell security doors.
Section 6. Case Studies: Lucasville Prison Riot

265

respond to the crisis and reduce the chances

for spread of the riot. 

Later, tactical response and disturbance control teams are deployed to K-block to place

all prisoners back in their cells.

4 p.m. The prison duty officer, a unit manager,

arrives at the institution. L-block inmates

cross the yard and scale a fence, gaining

access to the exterior of K-block. Inmates in

the yard smash a window in K-block and

obtain food and blankets from K-block

inmates.

As inmates advance across the yard to 

K-block, armed officers in the towers and in 

K-block are instructed by the control center

not to fire.

4:15–5:15 p.m. The inmates have taken a total

of 11 officers hostage. They assess hostage

injuries, determine that one officer is seriously injured, and, fearing his death, make

arrangements with prison staff to place him

in the L–8 stairwell for rescue by an armed

team. The rescue is carried out.

Inmates secure copies of the prison’s negotiation and disturbance control manuals from a

unit manager’s office.

The SOCF negotiation team is assembled to

negotiate with the inmates, who are now

firmly in control of L-complex.

5 p.m. The SOCF disturbance control team is

assembled (one member is a hostage).

5:15 p.m. The major makes calls to all L-block

rear stairwells but receives no answer.

5:45 p.m. The SOCF tactical response team is

assembled.

7:30 p.m. K-block officers use belly chains to

secure doors in the M–1 gym because

inmates now have M–2 keys, which also

open M–1 doors.

9:16 p.m. Inmates release one correctional officer due to the seriousness of the injuries he

sustained in the takeover. The officer is life

flighted to Grant Hospital in Columbus,

Ohio.

10:36 p.m. Inmates release another correctional

officer who has serious head injuries, and the

officer is transported to the hospital.

11:02 p.m. The bodies of five slain inmates are

placed in the yard and retrieved a short time

later by prison officials.

11:22 p.m. Another seriously injured correctional officer is released and taken to the hospital. The inmates have now released four of

the hostages.

Day 2: Monday, April 12, 1993

1:45 a.m. The last of the inmates roaming in the

yard are cleared and placed in K-block,

which now has as many as 10 inmates to a

cell.

After the riot, serious controversy arose

about whether the warden had been called

and when. Control center staff said that

they made several attempts to reach the

warden by telephone at home and by pager.

The warden testified that he had been

available by phone and pager and that no

one had tried to contact him until hours

after the riot had begun. In the final analysis, the warden did not arrive at SOCF until

approximately 4 hours after the riot had

started.
266

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

10:15 a.m. A reporter from the Cleveland Plain

Dealer is selected by lot to act as an intermediary in inmate negotiations. Prison officials cut off his telephone conversation with

an inmate spokesperson when the inmates

fail to confirm that all hostages are safe.

10:35 a.m. The body of another inmate is put

out in the prison yard and retrieved.

Day 3: Tuesday, April 13, 1993

10 a.m. Prison staff discover the body of an

inmate in a K-block cell. (Later accounts

suggest that this inmate was murdered by

other inmates because his nephew gave

assistance to a correctional officer during the

riot.)

4 p.m. A disturbance erupts in K–8, the closest

K-block wing to L-complex, as inmates in

L–1 shout encouragement to the K–8

inmates to join the riot. Prison staff discharge tear gas to quell the disturbance and

begin to transport inmates from K-block to

other institutions.

Day 4: Wednesday, April 14, 1993

3:50 a.m. A police helicopter crashes while

patrolling the prison complex. Three persons

suffer minor injuries.

9 a.m. Inmates hang a sheet from L-block windows displaying the message that they will

kill a hostage if their demands are not met.

Inmate demands include single cells, more

educational opportunities, and additional

visitation periods.

12 noon. The Governor of Ohio calls up the

Ohio National Guard to provide perimeter

security at SOCF.

5 p.m. Prison authorities provide food to the

inmates in L-block in exchange for assurances that two hostages will be given prescription drugs they take for preexisting

medical conditions.

Day 5: Thursday, April 15, 1993

12:20 p.m. Inmates throw the body of

Correctional Officer Robert Vallandingham

out of L-block. Officer Vallandingham’s

Media representatives using telephoto lenses and binoculars could read the demands and threats

that inmates had painted on sheets and hung out the prison windows. Prison officials were communicating intermittently with media representatives in a briefing area. When the media asked a

deputy public information officer about the time ultimatums and the threat to kill a hostage, she

responded that the inmates had been making such threats and ultimatums since the beginning of

the disturbance and that there was no reason to think these were more serious than the earlier

deadlines and threats. Her statements were broadcast and heard in the cell blocks, where inmates

were monitoring media coverage on televisions and radios. Shortly thereafter, inmates took Officer

Vallandingham, a young officer very popular with both inmates and staff, from his cell and executed

him in cold blood. They then threw his body out to prison staff. Most staff and many other observers

believe this execution was the direct result of the blatant mistake in dealing with the media. It

should be emphasized that the deputy public information officer had no training in media relations

during a crisis and that the department had neither policy nor procedure for such situations. 
Section 6. Case Studies: Lucasville Prison Riot

267

body is recovered and removed from the

prison grounds.

8:20 p.m. In return for being allowed to make a

live radio broadcast—their second of the

day—inmates release a hostage.

Day 6: Friday, April 16, 1993

2:15 p.m. In return for a live television broadcast, inmates release another hostage. During

the television broadcast, a Muslim inmate

repeats the inmates’ demand for elimination

of forced racial integration of cells at SOCF. 

Day 7: Saturday, April 17, 1993

10:40 a.m. In response to inmate demands,

prison officials summon another television

crew for a live broadcast, but negotiations

fall through. Prison officials provide inmates

with additional food and water, along with

medicine for the hostages.

3:40 p.m. Bulldozers are moved to the prison

perimeter, ostensibly to collapse any tunnels

being dug by inmates.

Day 8: Sunday, April 18, 1993

Prison officials invite Cleveland lawyer Niki Z.

Schwartz (no relation to one of the authors of

this guide), who has previously represented

inmates in lawsuits against the prison system, to

SOCF to aid in negotiations with the inmates.

Prison authorities play an audiotape containing

messages from the five remaining hostages for

the hostage families.

Day 9: Monday, April 19, 1993

3:50 p.m. Inmates hang another sheet from Lblock windows with a message saying,

“State lying to you. We’re willing to end this

ordeal and want to meet face to face with our

attorney.”

Attorney Schwartz continues to consult with

inmates through prison negotiators.

9 p.m. Throughout the night, in a scenario reminiscent of the Branch Davidian complex situation in Waco, Texas, prison authorities

broadcast taped messages to the inmates in

L-complex over loudspeakers, advising them

of the warden’s agreement to their demands. 

More than half the prison population at

SOCF was locked down and was not

involved in the insurrection. However, staff

throughout the prison were extremely emotional and angry and treated the uninvolved

inmates so badly that new rioting threatened to break out in uninvolved portions of

the prison on at least two occasions. In

response to a request from the State of

Ohio, NIC sent a top administrator from

another state to SOCF as an advisor. This

consultant, who had considerable experience with prison crises and riots, ended up

helping to manage the unaffected areas of

the prison. In attempting to prevent retaliation against inmates who were not involved

in the rioting, the consultant had an intense

confrontation with one of the prison’s top

managers. Prison staff continued to maltreat the uninvolved inmates even after the

riot ended on day 11. The prison remained

on the verge of additional violence for several weeks, with the threat coming from

inmates who had not been involved in the

riot itself.
268

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Day 10: Tuesday, April 20, 1993

12 noon–3 p.m. Three inmates and Attorney

Schwartz meet with members of the prison

negotiating team at a table set up in the

prison yard.

7:45 p.m. Attorney Schwartz advises reporters

that an agreement is close at hand.

Day 11: Wednesday, April 21, 1993

2:50 p.m. Warden Tate and Attorney Schwartz

announce that an agreement has been

reached, ending the siege.

3:30–10:40 p.m. Inmates begin leaving 

L-complex through the M–2 gym door and

are escorted to K-block for processing by

members of the Ohio State Highway Patrol.

Two additional inmates are murdered in 

L-complex by other inmates.

10:40 p.m. As the last of the inmates clear 

L-block, the remaining hostages walk out

to their freedom.

Lessons Learned

1. Emergency plans and procedures must be

realistic, practical, and well known to staff.

The emergency plans at SOCF met none of

these criteria. They were out of date, contradictory in places, and generally inadequate

for dealing with a major emergency. However, the quality of the emergency plans

turned out to be irrelevant because staff had

not been trained in them and did not know

them. Inevitably, staff found themselves trying to invent emergency response procedures and strategies in the midst of the

crisis.

2. Without effective leadership, other aspects

of emergency preparation may not matter. In

this riot, some staff were taken hostage

and/or beaten simply because no one would

take command and act decisively. Hours

later, when the warden arrived and exerted

strong leadership, the nature of the situation

began to change in favor of staff, although it

was too late to undo much of what had

already occurred.

3. Professionalism must be established from

day to day, long before a crisis occurs.

Professionalism cannot be developed in the

middle of an emergency. At SOCF, retaliation against inmates made a tragic situation

worse and actually increased the risks

involved in the emergency operation itself.

4. Leadership can be extraordinarily painful

and emotional. Officer Vallandingham’s

body was waiting for the coroner in a corridor when an oncoming shift of officers

arrived and entered the institution through

the same corridor. That group of staff then

happened to encounter the warden, who was

away from his office. The officers pleaded

with the warden to authorize an assault and

to end the situation at any cost. The warden

knew that this decision would be popular

regardless of the outcome. He also knew

that the remaining hostages were being held

in three separate groups by three different

inmate factions and that at least two of the

groups of hostages were being moved periodically to keep their location unknown.

Ordering an assault would have been tantamount to a death warrant for the remaining

hostages, and the warden would not do it.

Several days later, the remaining hostages

were released without further physical harm.

Neither the strength the warden’s decision

required nor the toll it took on him can be

overestimated.

5. Although negotiations did lead to a nonviolent surrender and the release of the remaining hostages, the negotiation process and

the negotiators themselves were highly
Section 6. Case Studies: Lucasville Prison Riot

269

unpopular with staff. In fact, the negotiators

had to be escorted out of the institution

under armed guard because of the staff’s

reaction. Correctional staff need to understand the role and mission of negotiators

long before an incident occurs.

6. If staff do not quickly recognize the severity

of an emergency and immediately start to

isolate and contain it, the emergency can

escalate very quickly. Interviews of the rioters indicated, as has been true in some other

major insurrections, that they did not expect

the riot to be as “successful” as it was or to

last as long as it did. The inmates never

thought they could successfully take over

the entire cell block.

7. Officers in the housing units were allowed

to carry keys that opened several different

doors in their housing units and some doors

in other areas of the institution. This practice violated the security concept of the

prison design and posed a serious security

risk. 

8. Under the policy at the time, the shift commander did not have the authority to order

an armed assault. Such orders required the

approval of a duty officer, who at the time

was a unit manager. The duty officer was

not at the institution when the riot started.

Any thoughtful review would have revealed

the existing policy to be deeply flawed.

9. Emergency preparedness training for all

staff is important and necessary. At the time

of the riot, preservice training for SOCF

staff included 1 hour of critical incident

training, in which staff were advised on

methods of handling fight situations, medical emergencies, and disturbed inmates, and

1 hour of hostage situation training that consisted of advice on “how to be a good

hostage.” The tactical team received an initial 24 hours of training from senior staff,

but after that, most training was conducted

on their own time and there was no clear-cut

policy on purchasing of equipment and

clothing.

10. Use-of-force policies must be well thought

out, written, and disseminated to all staff

and should be given considerable emphasis

during preservice training. Although tower

officers in the early stages of the riot were

instructed to break their gun seals, SOCF

had no clear policy or direction regarding

the use of tower weapons. One tower officer

was reported to have stopped L-block

inmates who were approaching K-block by

threatening to shoot, but it was not clear that

any of the tower officers knew whether or

under what circumstances to shoot, other

than in the case of a direct order or to prevent inmates from breaching the perimeter

fence.

11. Contrary to popular correctional thinking,

rival gangs worked together in this riot to

manage negotiations, hostages, and L-block.

For the 11 days of the crisis, the Sunni

Muslims, Arian Brotherhood, and Black

Gangster Disciples managed L-block in a

way similar to the way in which the prison

normally was managed. They divided into

areas, had intermediaries, assigned guard

duties, locked up their worst offenders, and

even traded the hostages back and forth,

based on which group would do the best job

in guarding them. They operated an infirmary and did a reasonably fair job of suturing some inmate wounds.

12. Inmate work assignments must be reviewed

with regard to access to confidential information. Inmate workers at SOCF had jobs

that allowed them to read or hear sensitive

information concerning prison operations

and policies. Inmates worked in the captain’s office, where they had access to staff

records, and in unit offices, where they had

access to telephones, sensitive information
270

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

regarding other inmates, and institutional

documents like the disturbance control

manual.

13. It is generally accepted that staff who treat

inmates badly may be targeted in a riot.

Officer Vallandingham, the officer killed

during the siege, was not among those hated

by the inmates. By all accounts, he was

quite well liked. The Ohio State Highway

Patrol could not identify any personal

vendetta against Officer Vallandingham

to justify his being targeted for death.

14. Media relations are a crucial, even life-anddeath, part of emergency operations.

Preparation for media relations during an

emergency should be serious and extensive,

and the procedures developed should be

carefully distinguished from day-to-day

media relations. During the SOCF incident,

several problems arose with the media in

addition to the tragic mistake that led to the

murder of Officer Vallandingham. At the

start of the riot, a helicopter from a TV

station flew so close to the prison that negotiators could not make out the demands

inmates were yelling over a bull horn. On

another occasion, a helicopter from another

TV station went aloft to televise a live shot

of SWAT units crawling over cell block

roofs preparing to take up positions should

the order come for an assault.

15. The aftermath of an emergency can be the

longest and most difficult part of responding

to an emergency. Just the prosecution of the

inmates involved in the Lucasville riot was

overwhelming. Investigators gathered more

than 4,000 pieces of evidence, 7,000 photos,

more than 120 videos, and countless hours

of audiotape and conducted more than 1,200

interviews. Eventually, the state successfully

prosecuted 48 of the 50 cases presented in

court.

16. Normality may not return for years.

Investigations were still continuing 3 years

after the riot. 
271

On Friday morning, August 18, 1989, at about

9:15 a.m., a helicopter entered the main compound of the Arkansas Valley Correctional

Facility (AVCF) near Ordway, Colorado, and

landed on the ballfield of the prison’s main

recreation yard. Within seconds, two inmates

entered the helicopter and it rose, turned, and

flew out of sight. At approximately 6 p.m. that

day, the two escapees and their two female

accomplices were located driving in a rental

truck toward Holdredge, Nebraska. A shootout

with police ensued, after which both inmates

and both women were taken into custody in

Holdredge.

The AVCF is a modern, medium-security state

prison that opened in 1987. At the time of the

escape, AVCF staff had become used to seeing

helicopters from two television station news

operations flying near the facility, and both of

those helicopters were similar in appearance to

the jet helicopter that made the intrusion on

August 18. 

The helicopter appeared to have circled the

facility prior to crossing the perimeter and entering the compound. Officers on the perimeter

reported the helicopter as it crossed the perimeter of the facility but not before that. At the time

the helicopter entered the compound, there were

15 to 20 inmates on the main recreation yard

and five staff members outside the buildings

supervising inmates. When the helicopter landed

on the ballfield, two inmates immediately

entered the helicopter and two staff members

ran toward it, getting quite close before it took

off. The staff members who approached the helicopter were able to give descriptions of the male

pilot and two female passengers.

The prison superintendent was in his office

overlooking the recreation yard when the initial

radio report indicated the helicopter entry to the

facility. The superintendent gave immediate

orders that if the helicopter lifted off, the

perimeter officers were to stop or disable it with

lethal force. He repeated this order two more

times during the next minute, but no shots were

fired. No armed posts at AVCF have sightlines

or fields of fire to the ballfield. Given the helicopter’s path of ascent and departure from the

area, one of the two towers at best had a partially obstructed view. The position of the armed

perimeter vehicle was also such that it was not

able to fire at the helicopter, in part because of

obstruction from the fence fabric. The other

tower officer should have had a clear view of

the helicopter once it rose over the ballfield and

should have been able to fire several shots but

did not. He was suspended pending investigation

and subsequently discharged.

Staff estimates of the total time the helicopter

took from initially crossing the perimeter of

the facility to taking off from the ballfield and

beginning to leave the institution ranged from 15

to 30 seconds. Estimates placed the helicopter’s

Helicopter Intrusion/Escape:

Colorado Department of Corrections

Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency

Preparedness, by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry

(Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc., 2002), by permission of the

authors. Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia

Barry.
272

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

speed when taking off from the ballfield and

climbing at 40 to 50 miles per hour, accelerating

to 90 to 100 miles per hour as it turned to leave

the compound. Staff witnesses reported that it

was also clear that the two inmates were waiting

for the helicopter when it arrived, perhaps within 10 feet of the spot where it touched down.

There were reports that the inmates wore distinctive bright clothing that could serve as a signal or beacon for the helicopter.

The facility called an emergency count within

5 minutes of the escape, at 9:20 a.m. The emergency count was completed at 9:32 a.m., and the

identities of the two escapees were confirmed.

Department headquarters and the Colorado State

Patrol were both notified of the escape at

approximately 9:30 a.m. The prison remained

locked down (except for inmate kitchen help)

until lunch hour. The incident was entered into

the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

system and state warrants were issued quickly.

“Wanted” fliers with pictures were also

disseminated.

The facility duty officer left the facility to participate in the search, although the facility’s procedures in the event of an escape call for the

duty officer to remain at the prison and complete a specific checklist of responsibilities.

Most of these responsibilities were handled by

the shift commander. Both prison investigators

also left the facility to participate in the search,

hampering the development of intelligence

about the escapees. For example, the escapees’

cell was secured immediately after the emergency count, but the cell was not searched until

the investigators returned. 

The search itself quickly became problematic.

AVCF procedures called for the use of structured search teams for any escape. In this

instance, the structured search teams were not

used, perhaps because of the unusual nature of

the escape. Six vehicles and 14 staff left the

institution on the search, and only half of those

staff were designated search team members. The

primary search commander and all three designated relief commanders joined this initial

search. If the search had continued hours longer,

no relief commander would have been available.

Once the search vehicles were more than 30

miles north of Ordway, they lost all radio communication with the facility control center. Carto-car communication was also difficult to

impossible. Outside law enforcement agencies

were able to provide some information to the

institution about the status of the search vehicles, but the search commander had no information about vehicle positions or directions. Two

search vehicles were participating without the

knowledge of the search commander.

The AVCF armory officer was not in the facility

at the time of the escape, so the shift commander assigned an alternate. It was subsequently discovered that several weapons had been taken

from the armory without an armory officer

present for proper weapons assignment and

documentation.

Within 45 minutes of the escape, the facility discussed the situation with the Air National Guard

commander, who immediately made helicopter

training flights available to help with the search.

The airborne surveillance from the Air National

Guard and the Colorado State Patrol was extremely helpful with the search effort and with the

coordination of communications.

At 9:46 that morning (31 minutes after the

escape), a small local airport aviation company

reported that a blue and white helicopter with

two women and a male pilot aboard had landed

at 8:40 a.m. and refueled. At 10:09 a.m., a county sheriff’s office radioed that the helicopter was

spotted on the ground some 35 miles north of

the prison and that suspects had been seen running to a yellow rental truck. A press release

was authorized at 10:24 a.m. At 10:40 a.m., the
Section 6. Case Studies: Helicopter Intrusion/Escape

273

helicopter and pilot were located near an abandoned farmhouse. A National Guard helicopter

was dispatched and, 10 minutes later, the prison

received information that the pilot had been tied

up but was unharmed and that the two women

and two inmates were armed. The prison determined that an older Volkswagen was registered

to one of the inmates’ wives, and at 11:40 a.m.,

the superintendent issued an all points bulletin

for this car and its license plate. Prison officials

speculated that the Volkswagen might be inside

the rental van.

By midafternoon, the escape response at the

prison was focusing on the planning of the

escape and attempting to confirm the identities

of the two women involved. At 2:30 p.m., the

superintendent interviewed the two officers who

had gotten within a few feet of the helicopter

before it lifted off. One of them confirmed the

identity of one of the female passengers as the

wife of one of the two inmates. He recognized

her from her visits to the prison.

As is often the case in such situations, there

were a number of rumors, false starts, and misunderstandings. The sheriff of Arapahoe County,

Colorado, had suggested at 10:30 a.m. that a

female former deputy sheriff who had been fired

from Arapahoe County for becoming involved

with a jail inmate there might have been

involved in the escape. The intelligence operation had been focusing on whether this former

deputy sheriff might be the wife of one of the

two inmates or might be involved in the escape

using an alias. At 4:30 p.m. the sheriff’s office

advised the prison that the female ex-deputy

sheriff and her attorney had appeared there to

verify she was not involved in the escape. 

When the police found the helicopter pilot, he

was untied and claimed he had been able to cut

the ropes using a pocket knife. The police initially were very skeptical. They reported to the

prison that the pilot was likely a collaborator in

the escape, and brought him to the jail as a suspect. It was not until mid- to late afternoon that

it became clear that the pilot was an innocent

victim.

By late afternoon, information about the chartering of the helicopter had become more clear.

The helicopter had been chartered out of the

Centennial Airport, but the two women who

chartered it were actually picked up at the nearby La Junta Airport. They got on the helicopter

carrying large bags and presumably took

weapons from the bags once the helicopter was

in flight. Because Centennial and La Junta are

not commercial airports, no metal detectors or

other commercial aviation security precautions

are in place. It was also learned that the charter

originally had been arranged for 2 days earlier

but had been canceled by the helicopter company because of bad weather. The charter company operator remembered that one of the women

had become irate when the earlier charter was

canceled and that both were upset when the

Friday morning charter was running 10 to 15

minutes late.

At 6:15 p.m., one of the department administrators was advised that the evening television

news had just reported a shootout in Holdredge,

Nebraska. Calls to the Holdredge Police

Department were initially frustrating, as the

Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) was

advised that the Nebraska State Patrol was handling all information about the incident. The

Colorado DOC was unable to get an immediate

status report. By 7:30 that evening, the DOC

had detailed information from the Nebraska

State Patrol and had verified that both inmates

and their female accomplices were in police

custody.

The day after the escape, the prison confirmed

information that one of the two women involved

had been a criminal justice student at a Colorado

college and had done volunteer work at another
274

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Colorado prison the year before as part of an

internship. As an assistant to a case manager,

she conducted tutoring and case management

testing of inmates behind closed doors. She was

terminated by that prison in November 1988,

and in March 1989 she appeared at AVCF with

papers indicating she had married an inmate

(one of the two escapees) “by proxy.” The other

female accomplice was the wife of the second

inmate.

Lessons Learned

1. Most of the problems encountered had to do

with failures to follow the prison’s established plans, policies, and procedures for

escapes, rather than with inadequacies in the

procedures themselves. The initial response

of AVCF after the escape, including the

lockdown, emergency count, and identification of the escapees, was fast, orderly, and

effective.

2. Even with detailed planning, any major

emergency will give rise to some unanticipated problems. An extraordinary situation

such as the one presented here will demand

quick and creative responses. For example,

the search vehicles might have been effective if the inmates left the prison premises

by car, but because of the speed and pointto-point nature of the helicopter’s flight, the

prison search effort was hours behind the

escapees.

3. The problem with the duty officer, the

investigators, and the relief search commanders all inappropriately joining the

search underscores the importance of a

well-trained, well-practiced, disciplined

response to a major emergency. The long

prison tradition of every available staff

member responding to an alarm and trying

to get to the scene as quickly as possible

works against the kind of disciplined

response necessary for managing a major

emergency.

4. Prison security is designed from the inside

out, rather than from the outside in. Prisons

that may be extremely secure against the

typical inmate escape attempt may be highly

vulnerable to an assault from the outside. It

is important for every prison to conduct an

informal survey of its security against

assaults from the outside. The answers to

questions such as the following may be

enlightening:

● Which security systems would be

ineffectual in the event of an outside

assault?

● What areas of the prison might civilian

accomplices breach or disable?

● How easily could someone throw in a

weapon to a waiting inmate?

● Could a heavy vehicle simply drive over

perimeter fences?

● How might an aircraft-assisted escape

be planned?

5. Procedure should require perimeter posts to

notify the shift commander whenever an aircraft is flying unusually low or appears to

be approaching the facility. (A number of

prisons and jails in this country are adjacent

to airports and very close to established

flight paths. For those institutions, notification should be limited to aircraft that appear

to be out of established flight paths and

flight patterns.)

6. The prison had not seriously contemplated a

helicopter escape, although more than 20

such escape attempts from American jails

and prisons occurred during the preceding

10 years. Helicopter escape attempts remain

somewhat exotic because of the planning

requirements but not necessarily because of

resources. In 1989, the five-passenger jet
Section 6. Case Studies: Helicopter Intrusion/Escape

275

helicopter used in this escape was chartered

for $475 an hour, well within the realm of

possibility for many inmates’ friends and

family members.

7. Policy questions about the use of lethal

force to prevent helicopter escapes remain

difficult and somewhat controversial. There

is some consensus that lethal force should

not be directed at a helicopter that is apparently trying to land within a prison compound, in part because the pilot in an escape

attempt will almost always turn out to be a

civilian hostage or because the helicopter

might be having mechanical problems and

simply trying to find a safe place to land.

There is also some consensus that the best

way to deal with a potential helicopter

escape is to prevent inmates from approaching and boarding a helicopter that is hovering or has landed. Many states specify that

lethal force may be used against inmates

who ignore verbal orders and/or warnings

and attempt to move toward or get on board

such a helicopter. There is less consensus

about how to respond if a helicopter is taking off with inmates on board. The competing priorities of protecting the community

against inmate escapes versus the risk that

lethal force will kill the civilian hostage

piloting the helicopter and the risk that the

helicopter might crash into occupied buildings and cause a large-scale loss of life have

led to different policies on this question.

8. This situation was extraordinary in that the

superintendent actually saw the escape in

progress and was able to issue orders to use

lethal force. Most escape attempts that can

be stopped with lethal force will not allow

time for orders from a superior officer. An

officer on a perimeter post will typically

have to make a very quick decision about

lethal force based on the agency’s use-offorce policy and the officer’s prior training,

experiences, and expectations.

9. The situation described here, in which an

officer was properly ordered to use lethal

force but did not shoot, is more common

than might be predicted. Some officers will

“freeze up” and not fire, and it is not possible to predict who will and who will not fire

until the situation occurs.

10. The prison should have several staff who are

intimately familiar with the armory, its contents, its organization, and its procedures.

Otherwise, the institution may have an

emergency when the designated armory officer is unavailable, and critically important

weapons or other equipment may not be

available for staff or may not be adequately

accounted for once the incident is over. In

addition, staff at and above the shift command level should have more than a passing

familiarity with the contents and organization of the armory.

11. An intelligence operation may be as important to solving an escape as the escape posts

and search procedures.

12. Communications systems are seldom adequately tested for emergencies. Interagency

compatibility problems with communications systems are often unaddressed until

after a serious incident in which communications proved to be a major barrier.
277

On Sunday, September 22, 1991, inmates of the

maximum-security compound (“Max”) of the

Montana State Prison (MSP) rioted for several

hours. Five inmates were killed and several were

seriously injured. Five staff members were

trapped and held hostage in a shower area for

the duration of the riot.1

A riot at Max originating in the yard was

planned at least as far back as late July 1991

and likely was being actively considered as

early as May or June. Inmate discussion of a

Max riot was common by the first days of

August 1991. Inmate interview data were consistent with the conclusion that almost all of the

inmates in the Max building knew that a serious

riot was imminent and that it would start in the

yard. Not all of the inmates knew the exact

details of the plan. 

Beginning of the Riot

At approximately 10 a.m. on Sunday, September

22, Max’s five floor officers, including the sergeant, began to “bring the yard in.” One of the

three fenced exercise areas (“cages”) of the East

Yard was empty, and one of the three West Yard

cages held a single inmate. The other four cages

each contained three inmates. The officers

moved the three inmates in the middle cage of

the West Yard through the middle cage gate and

brought them back into the Max building

through the yard door, leaving both the cage

gate and yard door open.

As the floor officers took the three inmates back

to C-block, nine of the ten inmates left in the

West Yard cages broke off pieces of fence in

four separate locations, allowing all nine

inmates to gather in the center cage on the west

side. (For a substantial but unknown period of

time before September 22, four portions of the

fence had been prestressed by being worked

back and forth.) Because the gate to this cage

and the yard door to the west side of the Max

building itself had been left open, the inmates

had clear access to the inside of the building,

and all nine hurried in, rushing the west unit

control cage. A few split off and ran toward the

east unit control cage (the satellite control cage). 

Two inmate orderlies were working in the corridor, and the two sliding corridor doors had been

left open. The inmates from the yard used plastic buckets filled with sand for putting out cigarettes to jam both doors open. They now had

control of the corridors and floor area around

both control cages; however, they could not get

onto any of the six living units (“blocks”). 

Almost immediately, the inmates grabbed metal

fire extinguishers and portable telephones and

began attacking the two control cages. They

soon broke the plate glass glazing that protects

the polycarbonate security material (Lexan).

When this glazing shattered, the control cage

officers believed that the Lexan was giving way

Riot at Max: Montana State Prison

1 This case study is abstracted from “Riot at Max,” the full report

on the incident prepared by a seven-member Administrative

Inquiry Team organized by the National Institute of Corrections at

the request of the State of Montana.
278

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

and that they were about to be taken hostage.

The officers in both control cages now climbed

ladders that lead to escape hatches on the roof. 

The west unit control cage officer had locked

the five floor officers into C-block. These officers observed the inmates build fires from

inmate clothes and blankets and move them

against both control cages. The fire at the main

control cage (west) was extinguished by automatic sprinklers, but the fire at the satellite

(east) cage burned intensely against the cage

door and window, melting an area of the

window in the control cage door. Inmates then

apparently used a broom handle to make or

enlarge a hole in the partially melted window

and reached through this hole to the control

The first Montana State Prison in Deer Lodge was one of the original western territorial prisons, as

were legendary old institutions such as the prison at Florence, AZ, and Colorado’s Old Max in

Canyon City. The current facility opened in 1977, a few miles from the old prison. 

The institution occupies a 58-acre site surrounded by thousands of acres of state land. Its perimeter is secured by a double fence topped with razor ribbon and five towers that are staffed 24 hours

per day. There are 58 acres inside the perimeter fence; the institution includes 838 cells. An additional 40 inmates are housed in a single dormitory. There are three primary compounds within the

perimeter fence:—Low Security Compound; the High Security Compound; and the Maximum

Security Compound (“Max”). Max, a single building, is divided into two sides, east and west, each

of which has a unit control room and three 16-cell, two-level podular living units (“A,” “B,” and “C”

on the west side and “D,” “E,” and “F” on the east side).

In theory, inmates only leave their own compound to go to the infirmary or the Religious Activities

Center. Food is brought into Max on insulated carts, and the inmates receive their meals in their

cells. Staff, official visitors, and inmate visitors all use the same single entrance to the administration building and are searched at the front of the first floor of that building. 

At the time of the riot, the average age of the inmate population at Max was 29; the average sentence was 28 years. The population was primarily white. Native American inmates constituted

between 18 and 20 percent of the total population, and African American and Hispanic inmates

each accounted for less than 2 percent. Before the riot, the number of inmates at MSP ranged

between 1,150 and 1,196.

In 1991, MSP had 428 authorized staff positions (404 inside the main institution and 24 at the ranch

or in industries), of which 275 were uniformed security staff. The inmate to staff ratio in 1990 was

2.76 to 1, up slightly from 1980, when it was 2.7 to 1. The institution had six or seven Hispanic staff

and four Native American or part Native American staff, but no African American staff. There were

14 female correctional officers, including one at the rank of sergeant. 
Section 6. Case Studies: Riot at Max

279

cage keys, which had been left in the inside of

the door lock. Once the inmates were inside the

two control cages, they had access to every living unit and cell in the building.

Initial Emergency Response

Conditions in Max were deteriorating rapidly.

Water on the floor was ankle deep in some

places, and smoke from the fires was getting

thicker in the building. The smoke evacuation

system was inoperative. Part of a sophisticated

fire alarm system that included both the command post power override switches for the control consoles and an intrusion alarm system that

monitored the status of the building’s three roof

hatches and three external doors, it had been

broken for months, but security staff had not

been notified of the problem.

When the shift commander heard that two officers were on the roof of Max, he detailed available staff to the Max compound. Some of the

responding officers helped the control cage officers leave the roof. By the time the officers got

down from the roof, about 10 minutes after the

riot began, smoke was coming out of the roof

escape hatches. The control cage officers confirmed that the sergeant and the four floor officers were locked in C-block and safe at least

temporarily. The shift commander then radioed

the staff surrounding the Max building to report

back to the command post. At about this time,

administrative notifications were begun, starting

with the warden.

Before they received the order to return to the

command post, the officers around Max had

heard an inmate yelling that the inmates were

trying to break into the control cages and that if

they did so, the protective custody (PC) inmates

would all be dead. Staff observed one PC

inmate in his cell appearing bloody and beaten,

an inmate trying to break into a counselor’s

office, and inmates beating on the control cage

windows with mop handles and other instruments. When the group of staff reported back to

the command post, they believed the floor officers were in one of the lower C-block cells. 

The first top administrator to arrive was the

associate warden (AW) for treatment. He did not

assume command of the institution but worked

in parallel with the shift commander, concentrating on events inside Max. The AW directed two

staff members to take an AR–15 rifle and a .357

revolver, go to the lower level of C-block in

Max, break out a window of the cell where the

floor officers were hiding, and use the weapons

to cover their escape. The two officers broke out

a window in lower C–7, but the cell was empty.

Inmates in an adjoining cell wrote a note to the

officers saying that the staff members were in

the lower C shower room, which has no external

window.

Two other officers were sent to the basement

crawl space beneath the Max building. They

found water and smoke problems on both sides

of the building and heard screaming and hollering coming from the east side, whereas the west

side was relatively quiet. At about this time,

staff around the building heard inmates screaming that the inmates had taken over the control

cages. One inmate wrote a note saying that all

of the inmates were out. These events appear

to have occurred some time between 10:30 and

11 a.m. 

The warden arrived at approximately 10:40 a.m.

and went to the command post. He waited until

the shift commander had a few free moments to

brief him, then assumed command clearly and

decisively. Shortly after 11 a.m., the warden

asked for blueprints of the Max building and

directed the assistant commander of the

Disturbance Control Team (DCT) to meet with

his team leaders and other necessary staff to
280

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

develop a preliminary plan for retaking the Max

building. 

At about this time, a sergeant in the command

post succeeded in reaching an inmate in one of

the control cages by phone. The inmate demanded that the inmates be allowed to meet with the

media and told the sergeant that they would

throw a letter over the fence to the media and

that they had control of the officers and the PC

inmates. MSP’s single trained hostage negotiator

was not yet on the scene. Eventually, however,

the negotiator replaced the sergeant and negotiations continued intermittently throughout the

incident, providing additional information about

conditions and events inside the Max building.

The negotiations held out the potential for resolution without force and were later used as a

diversion to help cover the approach of the DCT

assault team. 

At approximately 11:15 a.m., the warden

assigned a captain to contact the state cabinet

secretary and keep his office briefed. At 11:20

a.m., the negotiator called the inmates, telling

them that it was difficult to reach the media

because it was Sunday. At 11:45, the inmates

called back, demanding that correctional officers

move away from the building and fence outside

Max or they would bring up a correctional officer hostage and cut off his head. Ten minutes

later, the negotiator told the inmate on the phone

that media people would be brought in to speak

with the inmates if staff could surround the

building and contain the incident. 

Most of MSP uses low-band radios, and the

prison authorities were concerned that the

inmates in Max could monitor these. The warden ordered all available high-band radios to be

collected and distributed to key staff members,

who were assigned code names. 

Disturbance Control Team 

Retakes Max

By approximately noon, the rest of MSP had

been locked down. Medical facilities had been

checked and readied for emergency cases. A

physician was standing by, ambulances had been

requested, and the first ambulance had arrived at

the institution. Towers had been double posted

and additional high ground spotters and/or

snipers had been deployed. 

The DCT assistant commander returned to the

DCT assembly and dressing area in the armory

as additional DCT members continued to arrive,

were briefed, and outfitted themselves. DCT had

established their plan for retaking Max. They

planned to use an institution fire truck to carry

the team to the back of the building, where they

would enter through the back door. As a diversion, they planned to introduce a staff member

into the Max compound with a video camera

and tell inmates that it was a media person. In

preparation for this plan, an institution fire truck

was driven to the warehouse, where most of its

equipment was removed so it could carry the

team.

In the meantime, the command post received a

report that a beaten and bloody inmate had been

seen at the Max sally port. The negotiator called

the inmates and asked to arrange the removal of

the injured inmate, offering to turn off the water

to the automatic sprinklers. The inmates on the

phone denied the request and repeated their

demand to communicate with the media. They

also said that lights were failing and ceilings

were coming down in the building because of

the water. The warden’s decision to assault Max

appears to have followed the inmates’ refusal to

negotiate over the injured inmate’s release.

In preparation for the assault, radio call signs

were reviewed and confirmed and airspace over
Section 6. Case Studies: Riot at Max

281

the prison was restricted. DCT was reminded to

move directly to C-block, where the staff

hostages were believed to be held. The warden,

who had previously agreed with the secretary’s

office to clear any actions that might be life

threatening, used the open briefing line between

MSP and the secretary’s office to discuss the

impending start of the assault. The secretary

(and through him, the Governor’s office) had

been in regular contact with the warden and by

then was well aware of the broad parameters of

the plan. 

The plan was put into action at approximately

1:10 p.m. The negotiator called the west control

cage to inform the inmates that a media person

was coming in to take pictures. Then, the acting

director of the Corrections Division, who had

been onsite for some time but was unknown to

the inmate population, was given a video camera and went into the Max compound. However,

the DCT team was unable to effect an entry as

planned. When they got to the back of the building, they were unable to locate the proper key

on the emergency key ring. They also found that

the inmates had used belly chains, padlocks, and

other restraints to barricade the doors. Even the

proper key would not have allowed a quick

entry. 

The backup plan involved going down from the

roof and in through the exercise cages in the

Max yard. When DCT members got onto the

roof they found this was unworkable because

the inmates had also chained shut the yard gate

door. The team pried open the roof escape

hatches, which had also been barricaded, and

threw small pyrotechnic tear gas canisters into

the west and east control cages. Entry teams,

heavily armed and wearing gas masks, went

down the ladder into the west control cage. As

members of DCT entered the cage, they realized

that inmates on the loose in the west side of

Max were unaware of their presence. When

sufficient DCT officers were in the cage, they

went directly to C-block, ordering all inmates

encountered to strip and lie down in place on

the floor. Unarmed DCT members secured the

inmates with flex cuffs under gun coverage from

other DCT staff. 

DCT reached the lower C-block shower room

without meeting inmate resistance and found the

five staff hostages still locked in but physically

unharmed. The tear gas was too thick to escort

the five hostages, who did not have gas masks,

to the front door of Max, and the sally port area

inside the front door was also barricaded. DCT

members retreated to C-block with the staff

hostages and took them out through the roof

escape hatch of the west control cage. 

When the floor officers had seen that the

inmates were taking over the control cages

and retreated into the lower C-block shower, they took an inmate mattress and

dragged it through the water on the floor

and then used that to provide a barrier

between the open grill of the shower door

and the rioting inmates. Recognizing that

the hostages’ view was partially blocked by

the mattress, the inmates hung a blanket or

curtain in front of the shower door to further obscure the hostages’ view of the

inside of Max. On the two occasions when

the inmates requested keys from hostage

staff, the officers tried low-level verbal

resistance until the inmates began to

threaten to burn the officers out of their

shower room. Under duress, the officers

cooperated, but only enough to prevent

being attacked. 
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Inside Max, the DCT members regained control

of the building by securing one block at a time.

They encountered no inmate resistance. The

only incident of note occurred when a DCT

member fired a warning shot with his revolver

into the cell door of an inmate who was not

complying. That was apparently the only shot

fired on the day of the riot. 

Inmates told DCT members clearing the west

end of C-block that PC inmates had been killed.

Moving to the east side, the officers found four

dead inmates lying on lower D-block and one

on upper D-block, along with a surviving PC

inmate in very serious condition with a cut

throat and another who had barricaded himself

into his cell. All indications are that DCT quickly recognized the importance of maintaining

the integrity of the crime scene and identified

a command-level staff member to secure the

scene. DCT found two other PC inmates

unharmed in the unit laundry room. These

inmates had used the washer and dryer to barricade the door and had protected themselves by

spraying marauding inmates with laundry

bleach. Another inmate was found badly beaten,

but alive, just inside the front door. 

Staff Retaliation

As DCT finished the job of taking control of the

remaining areas of Max and searching them,

DCT members stripped and flex-cuffed the

inmates on each block. The inmates from a

block were then taken out in a group to the front

door of Max and handed over to the restraint

team waiting outside. Inside Max, groups of

inmates secured by flex cuffs lay on the floor

under DCT gun coverage. Most were naked.

The corridors were filled with water, smoke, and

tear gas, and the floors were thick with broken

glass from various shattered interior windows. 

As DCT officers led groups of mostly naked

inmates to the front door, many suffered glass

cuts on the bottoms of their feet. Inmates

alleged that DCT officers beat, kicked, or used

batons on inmates who were in restraints and

offering no resistance. A substantial number of

inmates were treated later that day for injuries

other than cuts to the feet. 

Outside Max, a sergeant had been assigned to

assemble and coordinate a restraint team. By the

time DCT entered Max, this group of officers

had grown to 60 or 70 in number. The warden

himself led the restraint team as they ran into

the Max compound in a double line that assembled on either side of the front door of Max.

Inmates referred to this group of staff as the

“gauntlet.” The Administrative Inquiry Team2

received numerous, consistent inmate

Protective custody (PC) inmates, who were

used as the unit orderlies, were in frequent

contact with Max inmates. Some staff were

careless about maintaining confidentiality

regarding inmate informants, even teasing

inmates about being “snitches” or “rats.”

Some inmates reported that “getting the

snitches” was a primary goal of the riot

from the outset. Others said that the initial

plan was simply to take over the west side

of Max and the east side if possible, perhaps taking some floor officers hostage in

the process. According to this view, the

inmates did not expect to gain access to

the control cages and the murders of the

PC inmates were crimes of opportunity.

2 The seven-member investigative team NIC assembled some 3

weeks after the riot, at the request of the Montana Governor’s

office and the state attorney general’s office.
Section 6. Case Studies: Riot at Max

283

allegations that the inmates exiting Max, naked

and handcuffed behind their backs, were forced

to run through this gauntlet while the officers in

the double receiving lines hit, kicked, tripped, or

swung batons at the inmates. Subsequently, three

separate staff members verified that handcuffed

inmates coming through the gauntlet were in

some cases kicked, punched, or hit with batons.

The inmates were then taken to “No Man’s

Land” (a yard area under gun coverage from

towers). They were placed face down on the

ground, handcuffed behind their backs. The

small number of inmates still dressed were

stripped at this point, and flex cuffs were

replaced with steel handcuffs. Inmates alleged

staff abuse also took place here, primarily in the

form of staff kicking inmates as they lay on the

floor. Two of the three staff that confirmed the

abuse in the gauntlet also confirmed the abuse of

inmates in No Man’s Land. Inmates were on the

ground for 6 to 7 hours, until they were moved

to the Reception Unit between 8 and 9 p.m.

Approximately 55 inmates were secured in

Reception. 

Treatment of Inmates 

After the Riot

The warden made sure that medical staff were

onsite and mobilized before the assault on Max

took place. As inmates came out of Max after

the riot, gurneys were brought up near the building’s front door, and very seriously injured

inmates were put on the gurneys and promptly

MSP had serious systemic problems long before the riot. Staff salaries were unrealistically low

(the beginning annual salary for a correctional officer in 1991 was $15,563, at least 15 percent

below the national average), staff turnover was somewhat high (just over 19 percent in fiscal year

1991), and staff training was inadequate (there was no separate item in the budget for training).

Correctional officers were not entitled to hazardous duty retirement or line-of-duty death benefits,

although both of these accrued to state law enforcement officers. Critical policies and procedures

were inappropriate, contradictory, or lacking (for example, MSP had no use-of-force policy) and

other policies were regularly ignored. Security was inconsistent and, in many cases, far from rigorous. Perhaps most importantly, staff had no shared understanding of the institution’s mission, goals,

or values.

Staff professionalism at MSP was poor. Some staff regularly swore at, with, and about inmates.

Taunting and demeaning of inmates was common, and little supervisory accountability was

enforced at any level. Inmates housed in Max at the time of the riot described a pattern of physical

abuse by staff; inmates who had been housed in Max during the years immediately preceding the

riot but were no longer housed there corroborated this complaint. The inmates had little redress, as

MSP’s inmate grievance system was unmanaged and ineffectual and lacked credibility with the

inmate population. The inmate disciplinary system also was poorly designed and inconsistently

administered. Medical services were another source of widespread dissatisfaction and anger

among the inmates, exceeded perhaps only by the parole board process. Overall, conditions within

Max could only be described as harsh.
284

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

taken to area hospitals. Inmates with less serious

injuries were taken from No Man’s Land to the

infirmary. Of these inmates, the five or six most

seriously injured stayed in the infirmary and the

others were treated and then returned to No

Man’s Land.

The short-term stepdown plan, arrived at in the

late afternoon and evening of September 22,

included the decision to move the new intake

inmates out of the Reception building and use

this unit for the 50 to 65 displaced Max inmates.

The institution would remain on total lockdown

for the near term. A long-term stepdown plan

was formed in the following weeks.

Max inmates held in the Reception Unit alleged

that they were subjected to the following abuses

for the first several days:

● Neither clothing nor mattresses were provided, and the inmates were denied hygiene

items (e.g., toothbrush, toilet paper, tissues)

and showers.

● Inmates were fed only two meals a day. 

● CapStun (pepper spray) was used on inmates

who refused to talk with the attorney general’s investigative staff. 

● Inmates were denied access to phones, mail,

visitors, legal material, and legal counsel for

3 weeks. 

● Some inmates were left naked and hog-tied

on the floor for extended periods.

Official inquiry corroborated many of these allegations. The Reception Unit log confirms that

the Max inmates were left naked and without

mattresses for 4 to 5 days, although they did

have blankets. The log first mentions towels,

which would allow the inmates to wash in

their cells, 4 days after they were moved to

Reception. Showers appear not to have been

allowed until October 15, more than 3 weeks

after the riot. 

Inmates were fed two meals a day, consisting

mainly of cold sandwiches, primarily because of

the complete lockdown. Without inmate workers

in the kitchen, MSP was unable to produce regular meals. Even the treatment staff was put to

work making sandwiches in order to feed the

institution’s 1,100 inmates, and the improvised

kitchen staff worked 12-hour shifts. 

The Administrative Inquiry Team found that

the Max inmates held in Reception were not

allowed phone calls, visits, recreation, personal

possessions, or legal materials. Furthermore, the

Reception Unit log reflects no attorney visits or

phone calls to any Max inmate prior to October

4 and only a few legal calls or legal visits during

the remainder of the 3 weeks they were held in

Reception. During the week that the Administrative Inquiry Team was onsite, the attorneys

of a few inmates from Max petitioned the court,

claiming that the inmates essentially were being

held incommunicado. The court directed MSP to

allow these clients to see their lawyers immediately for unlimited lengths of time during working hours Monday through Friday.

The inmates’ most serious allegation was that

several inmates were hog-tied naked and left in

that position for a long period of time. The

Administrative Inquiry Team learned that the

Max inmates began to be noisy and verbally

abusive by September 27, after which the

Reception Unit log includes intermittent entries

about groups of inmates becoming loud or

shouting obscenities. Management regarded this

activity as a serious threat of further violence.

The warden met with four of his top staff members to decide how to respond. They concluded

that they had to do something preventative and

decided to place six inmates the staff had

identified as ringleaders in full restraints for

24 hours. The top managers understood full

restraints to mean using handcuffs and leg irons

to hog-tie someone naked on the floor. The MSP
Section 6. Case Studies: Riot at Max

285

policy statement on use of restraints defines “full

restraints” as “the use of handcuffs with belly

chains and leg cuffs.”

DCT was assembled in case there was strong

resistance from the inmates who were to be

placed in full restraints. The six inmates were

stripped, hog-tied, and left naked on the floor

of their cells with instructions not to move or

struggle against the restraints. The application

of the restraints began shortly after 9 p.m. on

October 9. None of the inmates put up any serious resistance, and DCT left the unit shortly

after 10 p.m. The restraints were initially left on

for between 5 and 7 hours and after that were

removed for 10 to 15 minutes at approximately

3-hour intervals. During one break, shortly

before noon the next day, October 10, the

restraints were apparently removed for more

than half an hour to allow the inmates to eat.

After about 23 hours, five of the six inmates

were released from the hog-tie position. One of

the inmates had wriggled in order to get his

hands below the level of his buttocks. He was

reminded that he had been told not to move or

change position and was left hog-tied for an

additional 24 hours.

When the physician member of the Administrative Inquiry Team examined four of the

inmates involved, more than 2 weeks after the

restraints had been removed, he found substantial handcuff wounds and indication of probable

injury to superficial nerves on the hands of all

four inmates. His prognosis was that the handcuff skin wounds would heal with no greater

residual injury than superficial scarring and that

any impairment of nerve function would probably not be irreversible. However, because a

possibility of permanent nerve damage still

remained, he recommended a neurological

consultation for each of the inmates who

complained of numbness in their hands. 

The Reception Unit log also shows other incidents in which inmates were chained, put in

restraints, and/or had their coveralls taken from

them. Nothing indicates that these inmates were

suicidal. In these cases, various requirements of

the MSP policy statement on restraints were violated. Mandatory reports were not written, medical and security checks were not performed

and/or were not logged, and treatment staff were

not consulted.

Staff Support Services

Members of the prison’s treatment and counseling staff provided psychological screening for

staff on the day of the riot. The five staff taken

hostage and the two staff members who had

escaped at the beginning of the riot were seen

first, followed by all DCT members and any

other staff member who had observed the bodies

of the dead PC inmates or the murder scene, or

who gave any indication of being traumatized.

Every staff member sent for psychological

screening was seen at least twice.

Approximately 1 week after the riot, the treatment staff organized a meeting for staff families.

At this meeting, spouses were able to express

their fears that a husband or wife would be

killed in the prison, and feelings about the

inmate deaths and the staff hostages were also

explored. Due to heavy publicity in the small

towns and rural area surrounding MSP, no one

could avoid the topic, including young children.

Thus, the meeting also gave some attention to

how to discuss something like the riot with

young children.

The staff who had been held hostage, including

the two who escaped initially, were away from

work for approximately 3 weeks, during which

they received regular counseling. When they

returned to work, they did not go back to Max,

but were assigned to positions where they would
286

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

not have contact with inmates. A group counseling session was established to allow them to talk

with each other about their adjustment. 

The treatment and counseling staff wrote several

memos that were distributed to all staff. These

memos dealt with topics such as grief, death,

fear, and hostage situations and identified some

of the more frequent kinds of problems that staff

or family members might be experiencing,

thereby giving staff license to acknowledge

those problems.

Lessons Learned

1. No matter how a “supermax” (super maximum-security) unit is built or operated, riots

and inmate takeovers are never impossible.

2. If the tone of an institution is angry and

harsh prior to a disturbance, the disturbance

itself may quickly turn brutal and bloody.

3. No prison should operate without an emergency plan.

4. A committed and dedicated prison tactical

team may be extremely effective, even without the benefit of sophisticated equipment or

extensive training.

5. Chronic lapses in following day-to-day

security procedures and security policies

can render an otherwise relatively secure

facility extremely vulnerable. 

6. Potential warning signs and other intelligence suggesting a serious incident is imminent must be carefully evaluated, even

though any institution will generate its share

of false rumors about impending problems.

7. A perceived unreasonable delay in providing information and access to the media can

quickly turn both the news coverage and the

editorial comment about a correctional

emergency more negative than necessary. 

8. Thoughtful attention to the needs of traumatized staff and staff families in the aftermath

of a major emergency will be much appreciated. Such efforts may be effective even in

the absence of prior planning or prior recognition of their importance.

9. Strong leadership from the person in charge

may be the most important need during a

major prison emergency.

10. It is important that postemergency measures

not be perceived as punitive by those

inmates who have not taken part in the

disturbance.

11. Staff retaliation after an emergency is more

likely when staff professionalism is questionable before the emergency and when

positive, hands-on leadership from administrators and middle managers is lacking.

12. Maintenance problems with security systems must be widely communicated to security staff.

13. All staff involved in an emergency situation

must write individual, detailed reports

before completing their tour of duty, and a

supervisor or manager should review each

such report for adequacy and clarity and

either document approval of the report prior

to relieving the staff member or return the

report to the staff member for additions or

corrections. 

14. In the aftermath of a major emergency,

inmates’ basic needs and rights (e.g., clothing, food, attorney visitation) should be met

as quickly as is practically consistent with

security needs.

15. Protective custody inmates should not be in

regular contact with administrative segregation and disciplinary inmates, particularly

within a maximum-security unit.
Section 6. Case Studies: Riot at Max

287

16. Maximum-security inmates should not be

allowed regular access to outside exercise

areas without visual supervision from staff.

17. A tactical team’s contingency plans for

assault or hostage rescue will seldom go

exactly as planned. Unanticipated problems

are the rule, not the exception. The team

should have a “plan B” in case “plan A”

proves unworkable, and both plans may

need to incorporate great flexibility. 
289

Renz Correctional Center is a medium-sized

(average population 550 inmates), high-security

prison for female offenders situated within the

flood plain of the Missouri River. The prison

was opened in 1961 as Renz Farm and is affected when the Missouri flood stage reaches 29

feet.

In 1993, early spring flooding was very serious

along much of the watershed of the Missouri

and Mississippi Rivers. Eight counties in eastern

Missouri were designated as disaster areas by

Presidential declaration. The early spring floods

were followed by continued rainy weather and

some flooding in the late spring and early summer. Renz fine-tuned its evacuation plans and

prepared for evacuation several times during the

spring and early summer. 

By late June, the facility had moved first floor

property and equipment off the floor and had

begun to move some critical property out of the

institution. The river continued to rise, and on

July 2, the Missouri Department of Corrections (DOC) began to evacuate inmates to the

Chillicothe Correctional Center and the Central

Missouri Correctional Center. Evacuation of all

inmates took 2 days and was accomplished

without violence, injuries, or escapes.

The Central Missouri Correctional Center was

under a federal court order that imposed a population cap of 1,000 inmates. The DOC was able

to obtain quick verbal permission from the court

to exceed this cap because of the emergency

evacuation and subsequently received a formal

order granting the emergency exemption from

the cap.

After the inmates were evacuated, corrections

staff used boats to reenter the facility and

remove as much equipment as possible. They

moved other property and equipment to the

second floor of the three-story main prison

building.

When the Missouri River reached a crest of

approximately 35 feet in mid-July, the staff were

initially optimistic that the institution would be

cleaned up, repaired, and eventually reoccupied

in spite of the substantial damage. That was

not to be the case. Heavy rains continued

unabated in the northern part of the state, and

the Missouri River began to rise again toward 

a new crest. 

At the end of July, the river finally crested at

38.6 feet. Even after the crest, the water took a

long time to recede. A 32-foot-high levy that

protected the Renz complex was flattened, and

after the water receded a new lake, 15 feet deep

and spanning 15 acres, was left on the property. Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency

Preparedness, by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry

(Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc., 2002), by permission of the

authors. Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia

Barry.

The 1993 Midwest Floods: Missouri

Loses Renz Correctional Center
290

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Inspections revealed that the Renz facility was

completely incapacitated and that restoration

would be neither practical nor cost effective.

Most of the property and equipment that had

been moved to the second floor was lost to the

flood waters. The river had raged through the

Renz complex with such force that the entire 

9-foot-high security fence, including 4,000 feet

of razor ribbon, was lost to some unknown location downriver. The flood waters had remained

so long that locks and other security devices

throughout the facility had rusted and were

beyond repair. Storage tanks had disappeared,

and the compressor room had collapsed. The

food service and medical units sustained serious

damage.

The evacuation and rehousing of inmates from

Renz was not the only emergency with which

the DOC had to contend. The floods cut off all

road access to the Algoa Correctional Center,

and employees had to be ferried by boat to work

and back. The rising flood waters in downtown

Jefferson City threatened the Jefferson City

Correctional Center (the old Missouri State

Penitentiary), and inmates at that facility worked

at sandbagging efforts within and around the

prison as well as at other public buildings within

Jefferson City.

During the course of the spring and summer

floods, well over 1,000 inmates helped in community efforts to save flooded areas, sandbag

and reinforce threatened levies, and clean up

flood damage. All of Missouri’s 16 state prisons

were extensively involved in these efforts. The

Missouri DOC documented more than 4,000

hours of staff time supervising inmates in community assistance efforts during and after the

floods.

One hundred seventy-eight staff from the DOC’s

Board of Probation and Parole and 661 probationers and parolees from 28 of 29 district

offices also contributed significantly to flood

relief efforts across the state. Staff completed

1,638 hours and also contributed food, dry

goods, and cash to relief projects. Probationers

and parolees contributed 9,875 hours of relief

work. Probationers ordered by the courts to perform community service contributed significantly to this effort.

Lessons Learned

1. The Missouri DOC’s preexisting emergency

preparedness system and facility emergency

plans provided an appropriate and practical

framework for the emergency response to

the floods. In particular, the detailed evacuation plans at the facility level proved to be

invaluable.

2. Inmate populations were kept well advised

about the status of the floods, and the

inmate reaction was one of cooperation and

assistance.

3. The lack of a statewide communications

system meant that various state agencies

could not monitor each other’s radio traffic

or transmit to each other throughout the

emergency.

4. Communications were taxed throughout the

emergency, and access to phone lines was

often a determining factor in responding to

the emergency.

5. As has been the case during earthquakes,

cellular telephones were one of the most

valuable items during the floods.

6. Staff needed to be kept informed about

many issues outside the affected facility,

including road closings, emergency assistance if their homes were affected, and the

availability of counseling and support.

7. Staff involved in the planning needed to be

briefed regularly. Maintaining staff meetings

was difficult but important. As extra help
Section 6. Case Studies: The 1993 Midwest Floods

291

became available, staff from the affected

facility assumed supervisory and management roles, and outside staff were used in

support roles and for logistical help.

8. Coordination between the DOC, county

jails, and community correctional facilities

should include planning for large-scale natural disasters. In particular, county and local

facilities must have plans for temporary

holding facilities and temporary transportation if they cannot use DOC facilities or

transportation for an extended period of

time.

9. The planning for moving inmates, staff, and

equipment from the facility that was being

evacuated proved far better than the planning for handling the inmates at the receiving institutions.

10. Access to inmate files and other inmate

information and to the roster system for

scheduling staff was compromised by the

emergency. Backup systems would have

been invaluable, and planning in these areas

proved inadequate.

11. Comprehensive maps indicating emergency

routes and primary choices for evacuation

routes would have been most helpful during

the floods, as would some sort of ID card

system for those with major roles in the

emergency response.

12. It is important for the Department to be able

to document each request for assistance, the

external agency it has asked for help, and

the progress of the task.

13. Supplies of emergency food and water were

inadequate to allow the remaining Renz

staff to work within the facility after the

inmates were evacuated.

14. Emergency supplies were inadequate for

the length and severity of the emergency.

Security and accountability for the supplies

were both poor.

15. The Department needed more heavy equipment (e.g., forklifts, dump trucks, flat trailers) than it was able to locate during the

emergency.

16. The DOC director’s leadership was clear

and evident as departmental resources were

made available for community assistance

wherever possible.

17. Staff efforts to assist with local community

problems were extraordinary. Most of these

efforts were voluntary.
293

While there were no escapes or fatalities, the

taking of hostages and the seizure of the tower

reveal critical—and correctable—flaws in

Arizona’s prison system.

In the early morning hours of Sunday, January

18, 2004, inmates Ricky K. Wassenaar, serving

26 years in prison, and Steven J. Coy, serving a

life sentence, attempted to escape from the

Morey Unit of the Lewis Prison Complex located near Buckeye, Arizona, 50 miles southwest

of Phoenix. 

The Morey Unit, which opened in January 1999,

is a cellblock-style facility that houses 840

inmates (designed capacity: 800). The unit houses a diverse population of Level 2, 3, and 4

inmates, including “protective segregation”

inmates, i.e., those who are considered dangerous or in personal danger are segregated from

the general prison population. The protective

segregation population, and the number of

inmates serving life sentences (100), at Morey is

the largest of any unit in Arizona’s corrections

system. 

The two inmates subdued the two correctional

officers on duty and seized the unit’s tower triggering a 15-day standoff, the longest prison

hostage situation in the nation’s history.

An account of the hostage taking and the negotiations that led to the inmates’ surrender and the

safe release of both hostages follows, along with

a summary of findings and recommendations

aimed at preventing future crises and addressing

significant operational, administrative, and fiscal

issues related to the Arizona Department of

Corrections. 

The Hostage Taking

At 2:30 a.m. on January 18, the 19 members of

an inmate kitchen work crew at the Morey Unit

were released from their housing units to report

for duty at the Morey kitchen. 

At approximately 3:15 a.m., the kitchen office

was occupied by Correctional Officer Kenneth

Martin and a female civilian kitchen employee.1

A member of the kitchen work crew, inmate

Ricky K. Wassenaar, entered the kitchen office

through the open door. Another inmate, Steven

J. Coy, followed him in, positioning himself in

the kitchen office doorway and blocking the

only exit. 

Wassenaar and Coy Seize the Kitchen 

Wassenaar was armed with a “shank,” a homemade knifelike weapon. Wassenaar approached

Martin, produced the shank,2 and told him that

The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

The Arizona Governor’s Blue Ribbon Panel Report on

Preliminary Findings and Recommendations

May 4, 2005

Reprinted with permission of the Arizona Department of

Corrections.

1 Martin was the only officer assigned on duty in the kitchen,

consistent with facility operations and procedures.

2 The two inmates underwent a pat-down search by Correctional

Officer John Cooper before they left their housing unit. However,

they were not patted down, as required by post order, upon arriving at the kitchen. Further, at the time this report was prepared, it

was not known whether or not the two inmates were escorted from

their housing unit to the dining facility.
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“this is an escape” and “I’ve got nothing to

lose.” He ordered Martin to remove his uniform

shirt (to which Martin’s Department of

Corrections identification card was attached)

and boots. After Martin complied, Wassenaar

handcuffed Martin to a cage in the toolroom

inside the kitchen office. The other inmate, Coy,

who also possessed a shank, brought the female

worker into the toolroom, ordered her to lie

down on her stomach, and tied her hands and

feet together with electrical wire. 

With Martin and the female kitchen worker

immobilized, Wassenaar and Coy left the toolroom for a short time and then returned. Coy

removed Martin’s pants and gave them to

Wassenaar, who put on Martin’s uniform, boots,

and jacket and then shaved off his beard with an

electric razor.3 Wassenaar asked Martin for the

kitchen telephone number, and Martin complied. 

Wassenaar went to the kitchen work area, where

he advised the other inmate kitchen workers of

his escape attempt and invited them to join him.

When none of them, including the inmates

working outside on the loading dock, accepted

his invitation, he locked them in the kitchen dry

storage area. 

At about 4:15 a.m., an hour after he first entered

the kitchen office, Wassenaar left the kitchen

carrying a 30-inch stainless steel stirring paddle.

Coy remained in the kitchen office. Wassenaar

walked through the dining area and exited into

the Morey Unit’s Red Yard, using Martin’s key

to unlock the door. Shortly after Wassenaar left

the kitchen area, inmate Coy sexually assaulted

the female kitchen worker. 

Wassenaar Seizes the Tower 

At about 4:20 a.m., Wassenaar approached the

Red Yard gate area that surrounds the 20-foot

tower and pressed the access buzzer in the intercom box at the gate. Upstairs in the tower were

Correctional Officers Jason N. Auch and Jane

Doe.4 Auch looked at the monitor and, seeing

what he believed to be a fellow correctional

officer, buzzed the gate open, allowing

Wassenaar to enter the tower area. Wassenaar

then approached the lower tower door, which,

like the entrance gate, was also locked and

remotely controlled by Auch. Auch buzzed the

door open.5

Auch went to the stairs to meet his presumed

colleague. Wassenaar kept his head down as he

climbed the stairs. As he neared the top he

looked up, and Auch realized that he did not

recognize the individual approaching him.

Before Auch could react, Wassenaar struck him

with the stirring paddle, fracturing Auch’s

orbital bone and temporarily incapacitating him. 

Morey Unit, Lewis Prison Complex, Buckeye, Arizona

3 The razor belonged to Wassenaar. At the time this report was

prepared, it was not determined how the razor made its way into

the kitchen.

4 “Jane Doe” is a fictitious name used to protect the female

officer’s identity.

5 The post order for the tower (PO 051) did not require positive

identification procedures.
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

295

Unarmed, Officer Doe attacked Wassenaar, who

overpowered Doe and cuffed her hands behind

her. Wassenaar forced Doe and Auch to tell him

where the weapons were, how to operate them,

and how to operate the control panel. Wassenaar

then ordered Auch to the lower part of the

tower.6

Coy Remains in the Kitchen 

At about 4:45 a.m., with the escape attempt

still unknown to Morey Unit authorities,

Correctional Officer Robert D. Cornett arrived

in the kitchen to relieve Martin, 45 minutes

ahead of Cornett’s scheduled 5:30 a.m. shift. It

struck him as odd that food was on the counters

but he did not see any inmate kitchen workers.

He saw Coy standing by the “food trap,” a

passthrough that is used to slide trays between

the kitchen and the dining area. Coy’s head was

in the trap, and he seemed to be talking with

someone. Cornett and Coy had a brief conversation, and Cornett walked past Coy toward the

kitchen office. As Cornett made his way up the

ramp to the kitchen office, Coy approached him

from behind, pressed a shank against Cornett’s

waist, and ordered Cornett to keep going.

Cornett did so. 

Entering the toolroom, Cornett saw the bound

female worker face down on the floor and

Martin handcuffed to the front of the toolrack.

Coy took away Cornett’s handcuffs and radio,

handcuffed Cornett to the right side of the toolrack, and went to the dining area. A few minutes

later, the kitchen phone rang. Coy returned,

picked up the receiver, said, “CO II Martin,” and

hung up. (It is possible that Wassenaar placed

the call from the tower.) 

A few minutes later, a call came in on Martin’s

radio from Correctional Officer Coy C. Kelley,

checking on Martin’s welfare. Coy held the

radio to Martin’s mouth and, complying with

Coy’s instruction, Martin responded by saying

“Code Four” (indicating “situation normal”). 

Kelley also radioed the tower requesting clearance to move inmates across the yard. Doe,

following Wassenaar’s orders, advised Kelley

that the yard was not clear, effectively denying

Kelley’s request. 

Officer Observes “Horseplay” 

Nevertheless, at about 4:50 a.m., Correctional

Officers Kelley and Elizabeth M. Debaugh

escorted inmates Jack R. Hudson, Jr., and

Michael Sifford from Building Two to early

recreation and chow. Their route took them past

the tower where Wassenaar held his two captives. 

As the officers and inmates walked past the

tower on the Blue Yard side of the “spline” (a

protected walkway) that separates the two yards,

Kelley looked in the window at the base of the

tower. The lights were out, and Kelley saw two

correctional officers wrestling or engaged in

what he later termed “horseplay.” In fact, what

he unknowingly witnessed was Officer Auch

lying handcuffed on the floor of the lower tower. 

Kelley later told investigators that he tried to get

into the Blue Yard tower gate but that the gate

was not operational, and that he tried to contact

6 Tower personnel have access to weapons (an AR–15 assault rifle,

a 12-gauge shotgun, and a 37mm launcher), but the weapons were

neither loaded nor readily available to the officers.

The Lewis Prison Complex. The 800-bed Morey Unit 

(circled) opened in January 1999.
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

the officers in the tower via the speaker box.

Kelley and Debaugh proceeded toward the

kitchen (Hudson had already continued to the

dining area, and Sifford, who did not wish to

eat, went directly to his job in the recreational

area.). 

Kelley and Debaugh entered the dining facility

at 4:53 a.m. Hudson placed his personal items

on one of the tables and went to the food trap.

Hudson knocked on the door of the food trap,

and when no food appeared Kelley and Debaugh

also knocked. The officers then tried to radio

Martin, telling him to open the kitchen door.

There was no response. 

At approximately 4:54 a.m. Kelley again

knocked on the food trap and Debaugh sat at the

first table in the chow hall. After no response at

the food trap, Kelley joined Debaugh at the first

table. Inmate Coy opened the food trap and said

something that sounded like, “Heidi, Heidi, Ho.”

Kelley told Inmate Coy he needed to talk to

Martin. Inmate Coy said, “Alright,” and closed

the trap. Kelley told Debaugh he believed he

saw something through the tower window and

did not feel right about it. Debaugh attempted to

contact the tower via her radio and received no

response. After waiting a few minutes, Kelley

radioed Martin again and received no response. 

The Chase From the Dining Facility 

Five minutes after arriving at the dining facility,

Kelley and Debaugh, who were standing just

outside the kitchen door, heard the rattle of keys

from the other side of the door. At approximately 4:59 a.m., Cornett opened the kitchen door at

the direction of Inmate Coy, who was standing

behind Cornett. Cornett believed he was opening the kitchen door for Inmate Thunderhorse

but found Kelley and Debaugh instead. Officer

Cornett later stated that he decided to try to get

away from Inmate Coy to get help for the other

staff in the kitchen. 

Cornett ran into the dining area past Kelley and

Debaugh, yelling “Call IMS, call IMS.” (An

Incident Management System report alerts staff

of a situation requiring attention.) Coy followed

and pinned Kelley against a wall. When Kelley

tried to jerk the shank from Coy’s hand, Coy

slashed Kelley’s face with the shank and pushed

him to the floor. 

Coy then followed Cornett, who fled through

the exit door onto the Blue Yard. Debaugh

radioed an alert on her radio advising that an

officer was down and an inmate was chasing

another officer on the yard. Her report activated

the unit’s IMS. Kelley and Debaugh then pursued Coy.7

The chase took them near the tower, to a point

close to the blue gate entrance to the tower area,

where Coy was stopped by several officers

responding to Debaugh’s IMS. Coy threatened

the officers with his shank. The officers ordered

Coy to drop his weapon and lie on the ground.

After initially refusing to comply with their

orders, Coy finally lay down with his arms

spread, but he did not release the shank. As the

officers approached him, he got back to his feet

and again swung his shank at the officers. A couple of corrections officers attempted to subdue

Coy with pepper spray, but, it was ineffective. 

Wassenaar Foils Coy’s Capture 

Before the officers could take further action,

Wassenaar, standing 20 to 25 feet away behind

the blue gate near the base of the tower, fired

through the blue gate an undetermined number

of rounds (most estimates ranged from nine to

ten) from an AR–15 rifle toward Jones and the

other officers. Seeing what appeared to be a

7 Immediately after DeBaugh issued the IMS, a male voice on the

radio replied, “Negative, negative, negative.” It is possible that the

voice belonged to Wassenaar, trying to discourage responses to the

IMS. Whether it was Wassenaar or a correctional officer, the “negative” response may have contributed to the belief among some

officers that the IMS was a drill instead of an actual alert.
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

297

uniformed correctional officer holding the rifle,

Jones asked the shooter whom he was firing at.

Wassenaar shouted, “You, (expletive).” Jones

directed all officers to clear the yard. Coy,

standing alone in the yard, went to the Blue

tower gate, from where Wassenaar let him into

the tower. Wassenaar and Coy were now in control of the tower and of their hostages, Auch and

Doe. Shortly after entering the tower, Coy sexually assaulted Officer Doe. 

In all, Wassenaar fired approximately 14 rifle

rounds during the early stage of the incident—

approximately nine from the lower tower and at

least five from the upper tower. While it may

seem remarkable that Wassenaar’s shots, from

relatively close range, failed to hit any human

targets, it is likely that firing through the gate

restricted his ability to effectively aim the

weapon. 

As the other officers withdrew to the

Administration building, Kelley, Debaugh,

Jones, and Sgt. Andrew J. Kneidel ran to the

dining facility, locked the outer door, and went

to the kitchen. Kneidel found Martin and the

female worker in the kitchen office. The officers

also found and performed a head count of the

inmates who had been locked in the dry storage

area. All officers and inmates were removed

from the dining facility by the Tactical Support

Unit. 

At the Administration building, Jones went into

the Deputy Warden’s conference room and started to account for his staff. Two officers were

missing: Auch and Doe. 

DOC Response

Captain Michael Forbeck was conducting

perimeter checks at the Lewis Complex when he

heard the shots fired by Wassenaar. After being

briefed on the situation, Forbeck believed there

was a risk of the two inmates rushing the

Administration area, armed with weapons stored

in the tower, in an attempt to escape. He organized a defense of the Administration area, with

shotguns loaded with birdshot. He also contacted the other Lewis units; ordered a Complexwide shutdown; ordered Tactical Support Unit

(TSU) assistance for the Morey Unit; and

notified the Buckeye Police Department, the

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and the local

fire department. 

At 5:25 a.m. on January 18, approximately 25

minutes after Debaugh issued her IMS from the

Morey dining facility, Department of Corrections

(DOC) Southern Regional Operations Director

Meg Savage received a page from the Lewis

Complex, advising her of a serious, unspecified

inmate disturbance. Within the hour:

● The duty officer at the Lewis Complex was

advised of the hostage situation, as was

DOC Division Director Jeff Hood, who, in

turn, notified Lewis Complex Warden

William Gaspar. 

● The DOC Tactical Support Unit (TSU),

based at Perryville, was activated and placed

on standby. 

● DOC contacted the Arizona Department of

Public Safety (DPS) to request the assignment of hostage negotiators. 

Shortly after 6:30 a.m., Dennis Burke, Chief of

Staff to Governor Janet Napolitano, was notified

of the incident. He in turn notified the Governor

and other key staff members. DOC Director

Dora Schriro, who was out of state at the time

of the incident, returned to Arizona and arrived

at the Command Center at 11:30 a.m. The

Command Center had been established earlier in

the morning at DOC headquarters in Phoenix. 

The DOC Inmate Management System (IMS)

policy establishes a command structure to

respond to critical incidents. The incident

is managed locally by the onsite Incident
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Commander (IC) and, depending on the

seriousness of the situation, also from Central

Office by the agency Incident Commander.

During the Morey hostage situation, three command centers were established: two onsite command centers (one to manage the events

occurring in the tower and another to manage

the day-to-day complex operation and complex

perimeter security and coordinate tactical

maneuvers occurring at the Lewis Complex Rast

Unit), in addition to the agency command center. 

At the Lewis Complex, by 7:45 a.m. TSU

snipers were positioned on buildings surrounding the tower, and DPS hostage negotiators,

operating under DOC authority, and a DPS

SWAT team were onsite. A Command Post was

set up in the Warden’s conference room. (By the

time the incident was resolved, a total of 30

negotiators had been deployed—10 of whom

actually conducted negotiations—from DPS,

DOC, the Phoenix, Tempe, and Glendale police

departments, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Office, and the FBI.) 

Over 16 law enforcement agencies provided

support and assistance during the course of the

incident:

● DPS deployed over 230 officers, with a core

element during the incident of about 75

detectives and officers and surveillance

specialists. 

● The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office

provided over 100 field force personnel. 

● The FBI assigned approximately 100

personnel. 

One FBI commander noted that at any given

time at Lewis there was over 300 years of experience in seeking negotiated and/or tactical

solutions. 

From the moment they were deployed, the tactical teams were authorized to utilize their use-offorce policies. 

Timeline

The following summary chronology and timeline of the 15 days of the hostage situation contains approximate times, and the panel will

continue to examine the various accounts and

will supplement any significant discrepancies as

they are discovered. 

Sunday, January 18 

7 a.m. Wassenaar phones Captain Barbara

Savage, Morey Unit Chief of Security, to

advise her that Auch has a head injury and

needs medical attention. Wassenaar wants

to trade Auch for a lieutenant or sergeant.

Savage refuses. Wassenaar demands a helicopter and a pizza. He also warns that if

either of the inmates is killed, the other will

kill the hostage officers. 

8:05 a.m. A DPS negotiator makes phone contact with Wassenaar. The call lasts seven

minutes. 

8:20 a.m. Wassenaar demands that he receive

handcuff keys and that he be allowed to talk

to Warden Gaspar and Governor Napolitano.

He repeats his demand for a helicopter. 

8:20–11:20 a.m. Negotiators have various

conversations with Wassenaar, in which he

backs off from his demand for a helicopter,

demands an AM/FM radio, describes the

hostages’ injuries, and allows officers to

speak briefly to one hostage. 

11:19 a.m. Negotiators on the phone with

Wassenaar play a tape-recorded message

from his sister, pleading for him to end the

situation peacefully. 
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

299

11:38 a.m. Negotiators share with Wassenaar the

plan to deliver a handcuff key in exchange

for bullets. 

12:36 p.m. Wassenaar demands to talk to a

television news crew. 

12:30–5:30 p.m. Various phone conversations

occur between negotiators and Wassenaar.

5:25 p.m. A DPS robot delivers an AM/FM

radio to the inmates. 

Throughout the day, the Special Operations Unit

of the Arizona Department of Public Safety

developed a series of detailed, comprehensive

tactical resolutions of the hostage situation,

based on a variety of scenarios. 

Evening. Negotiations continue on conditions

for delivering a key to the inmates. 

Monday, January 19 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day.

6:52 a.m. DPS robot delivers a radio battery for

the two-way radio already in the tower, plus

one handcuff key, a radio charger, and

cookies. 

7:52 a.m. Inmates return the handcuff key along

with three shotgun shells and nonlethal rubber ball rounds used for crowd control. 

1:08 p.m. DPS robot delivers cigarettes, hygiene

supplies, bottled water, and styrofoam cups. 

1:18 p.m. Inmates turn in wooden, nonlethal

projectiles. 

3 p.m. At the Command Center, Governor

Napolitano and key staff members receive

their daily briefing from DOC Director

Schriro, key DOC staff, and interagency personnel (Governor’s daily briefing) along with

periodic phone updates throughout the day

and night. 

Tuesday, January 20 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day.

12:30 p.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 

1:22–1:38 p.m. DPS robot delivers one handcuff

key, bottled water, soap, coffee, and cigarettes. In return, inmates allow negotiators to

visually confirm the correctional officers

being held. 

9:51 p.m. DPS robot delivers cheeseburgers,

french fries, soft drinks, cigarettes, and coffee. In return, inmates turn in numerous types

of prescription drugs, two handmade shanks,

a canister of Mace, and a cartridge for a

37mm firearm. 

11 p.m. A health and welfare check is conducted

with hostages via two-way radio. 

Wednesday, January 21 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day. 

8 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 

12:20 p.m. DPS robot delivers Tylenol and three

small cups. In return, inmates return two pepper spray gas canisters. 

12:22 p.m. Inmates fire pepper spray gas into

the yard after they discover that a nearby

fence had been cut. 

7:29 p.m. Negotiators receive voice confirmation of the alertness of both hostages. 
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Thursday, January 22 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day. 

9:30 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 

10:29 a.m. Wassenaar asks to speak to a television reporter, answering questions the

reporter would fax to him. 

12:15 p.m. Negotiators give inmates Interstate

Compact letters from other states to review. 

3:20 p.m. Both correctional officers appear

briefly on the roof, allowing for a visual

welfare inspection. 

9:30 p.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 

Friday, January 23 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day. 

9 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 

4:50 p.m. Wassenaar demands to speak to a

reporter on live radio. 

8:45 p.m. Negotiators discuss with Wassenaar

the terms of releasing one correctional

officer. 

Saturday, January 24 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day.

10 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 

3:15 p.m. DPS robot delivers roast beef, dried

beans, summer sausages, tortillas, potato

chips, soft drinks, cheese, tuna, mayonnaise,

and candy bars. This represents half of the

food the inmates requested. The other half

would be delivered after the safe release of

an officer. 

3:20 p.m. First hostage release. The inmates

release Correctional Officer Auch from the

tower (negotiators had made several overtures to the inmates to release Officer Doe

first). He is examined by medical personnel

and interviewed by TSU members before

being transported by ground ambulance and

helicopter to Good Samaritan Hospital in

Phoenix. Auch was treated for injuries,

including an orbital fracture that required

surgery. He was also interviewed at the hospital by members of the DOC Criminal

Investigation Unit, who were gathering

information to support the eventual criminal

referral against the two inmates. 

3:38 p.m. SWAT team members deliver second

half of the food request: cheeseburgers,

french fries, pizzas, cigarettes, and cheese. 

7:15 p.m. Negotiators hear the voice of

Correctional Officer Doe during a conversation with Coy, confirming her alertness. 

Sunday, January 25 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day. Family

members of one inmate arrive in Arizona to

serve as third-party intermediaries.

10 a.m. At the Command Center, Governor

Napolitano and key staff members receive

their daily briefing from DOC Director

Schriro, key DOC staff and interagency 

personnel. 

Monday, January 26 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day. 

10 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

301

Tuesday, January 27 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day.

10 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 

5:05–5:10 p.m. SWAT team members deliver

towels, blankets, and washcloths. In return,

inmates move Doe to the observation deck,

making her visible to negotiators for a welfare check. 

5:32 p.m. Wassenaar asks to be interviewed on

radio as a term of his release, as confirmation that the State will make good on the

terms. 

Wednesday, January 28 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue on

and off throughout the day. Family members of

the other inmate arrive in Arizona to assist in

negotiations. 

9 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 

12:28 p.m. SWAT team members deliver

hygiene products for the inmates and Doe in

return for a health and welfare check of Doe. 

2:21 p.m. Negotiators hear Doe in the background of a phone call with Wassenaar,

confirming her alertness. 

Thursday, January 29 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day.

9 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 

3:40 p.m. SWAT team members deliver cinnamon rolls, tortillas and cigarettes, in return

for a health and welfare check of Doe conducted by a paramedic. 

10 p.m. Governor and key staff meet with

Director Schriro and key DOC staff regarding the progress of negotiations, including a

demand by Wassenaar to be interviewed on

radio. The Governor recommends that the

radio interview of Wassenaar not be played

live without an agreement by the inmates to

surrender and release Officer Doe safely. 

Friday, January 30 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day.

10 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing. 

3:36 p.m. SWAT team members deliver cinnamon rolls, Pedialite, Gatorade, and cigarettes, in return for a health and welfare

check of Doe. 

7:16 p.m. Doe is interviewed by a physician for

a health and welfare check. 

Saturday, January 31 

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue

from time to time throughout the day.

10 a.m. Key staff to the Governor receive the

daily briefing at the Command Center from

Director Schriro and key Corrections staff

and interagency personnel. 

3:56 p.m. SWAT team members deliver an

onion, bread and Gatorade. 

5:22 p.m. Wassenaar appears on the observation

deck holding a shotgun backwards in his

right hand. 

7:17 p.m. Doe is interviewed via phone by a

physician for a health and welfare update. 

8:08 p.m. SWAT team members deliver tuna,

Pedialite and cigarettes. 
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Sunday, February 1 

9:20 a.m. A third-party intermediary, an uncle

of inmate Coy, is on the phone.

10:04 a.m. Wassenaar identifies the negotiator

with whom he wants to deal and discusses

surrender demands. Additional demands are

made once the designated negotiator is

onsite. 

10:14 a.m. Doe’s voice is heard; she says that

she is “fine.”

11:04 a.m. Cigarettes are delivered to inmates. 

11:29 a.m. Inmates make demands:

● Turn on power for bathroom access. 

● Wassenaar: talk to his sister. 

● Coy: hear a tape of his ex-wife. 

● Property in van.

● Paperwork confirming no DOC or county custody for future court proceedings.

● Clothing. 

● Steak, beer, and pizza.

11:52 a.m. Governor Napolitano arrives at

Central Command. 

12:35 p.m. Negotiators play a tape of Coy’s 

ex-wife. 

12:51 p.m. Doe is observed on the roof of the

tower with Wassenaar. She does not leave

hatch area. 

1:26 p.m. Call with Wassenaar’s sister.

2:04 p.m. Wassenaar calls to say that the power

is not turned on, there will be no contact with

Doe, and he will have additional demands in

24 hours. If, by that time, the power is not

turned on and the additional demands are not

met, there will be no contact for 48 hours,

and he will have additional demands. 

2:39 p.m. The power is switched on. 

2:46 p.m. Wassenaar fires 37mm multiple baton

rounds (nonlethal). 

2:57 p.m. Wassenaar reports no power. 

3:13 p.m. Two inmate uniforms, including

underwear, socks, and shoes, and copies of

revised paperwork are delivered to the

inmates. Wassenaar states that he may have

disabled the power in the tower. Steaks,

baked potatoes, beer, and soft drinks are

delivered to the tower. 

3:39 p.m. DOC Director Schriro gives the

Governor a status report. 

3:41 p.m. A key is delivered to the inmates to

allow them to access the first floor to use the

bathroom and to clear obstacles and traps to

facilitate opening the door and the exit of the

inmates and hostage. 

3:47–4:18 p.m. The key is determined to be

unusable, and a second key is delivered. 

4:25 p.m. Coy is seen at the hatch. 

4:39 p.m. Governor Napolitano calls for an

update. 

5:16 p.m. Contact is initiated to discuss

specifics of the surrender process. Coy says

to call back. 

5:19 p.m. Governor returns to Central

Command. 

5:31 p.m. Contact is initiated to discuss

specifics of the surrender process. Coy says

to call back. 

5:45 p.m. Contact is initiated to discuss

specifics of the surrender process. Coy says

to call back. 

5:52 p.m. Wassenaar calls. There is discussion

about the specifics of exiting the tower. 
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

303

6:17 p.m. Wassenaar appears on the roof in an

orange uniform, signifying that the door is

clear for opening by the tactical team. 

6:20 p.m. The tactical team approaches the

tower, opens the door and props it open with

a sandbag. The team then retreats approximately 10 yards. 

6:25 p.m. Hostage situation comes to an end.

Wassenaar walks out with his hands up. He

complies with the order to turn around and

lay on the ground and is restrained. Doe

exits the tower next; she is recovered by a

tactical team and removed to the Administration building and an awaiting ambulance.

Coy exits the tower and is taken into custody

and restrained. 

6:32–7:08 p.m. Doe is examined and treated in

the ambulance. She is then flown by helicopter to Good Samaritan Hospital in Phoenix,

where she is treated for injuries sustained

during the hostage incident, interviewed by

DOC Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU)

investigators, and reunited with her family. 

6:51 p.m. Governor Napolitano and Director

Schriro depart the Lewis Complex for Good

Samaritan Hospital. 

7:34 p.m. Wassenaar and Coy are taken to the

Morey Unit’s Blue side visitation strip

area/noncontact visitation area, where they

are photographed by DOC CIU investigators,

strip-searched by Bureau of Prison (BOP)

personnel, and provided with BOP jumpsuits. Their clothing and other evidence

seized from the inmates are placed in containers and maintained by a CIU special

investigator. 

Medical staff check the inmates’ vital signs

prior to transportation to the federal corrections institution in Phoenix, where they are

isolated from each other. 

Wassenaar and Coy are served with search

warrants for personal characteristics by a

DOC criminal investigator. The search warrant is executed by SANE (Sexual Assault

Nurse Examiner) staff from Scottsdale

Health Care, who collect the sexual assault

protocol as directed by the search warrant. 

Wassenaar and Coy are advised of their

Miranda rights. Wassenaar invokes his right

to counsel, and Coy declines to be questioned. 

Findings and Recommendations

Governor Napolitano’s February 10, 2004,

action plan for investigating the incident at the

Morey Unit included the appointment of an

Administrative Review Panel made up of law

enforcement and corrections professionals to:

(a) reconstruct the sequence of events leading up

to the inmates’ seizure of the Morey Unit tower,

(b) identify issues that directly or indirectly contributed to the incident or could give rise to similar incidents, and (c) recommend practices to

improve security and staff safety. 

The Administrative Review Panel comprised:

● Roberto Villaseñor, Assistant Chief, Tucson

Police Department. 

● John Phelps, Deputy Director, Arizona

Office of Homeland Security. 

● Michael Smarik, Division Director, Support

Services, Arizona Department of

Corrections. 

The Administrative Review Panel consulted with

the following subject matter experts throughout

the review process: Lt. John Stamatopoulos,

SWAT and Bomb Commander, Tucson Police

Department; Thomas McHugh, Administrator,

Criminal Investigations Bureau, Arizona

Department of Corrections; and Greg Lauchner,

Administrator, Special Services Bureau, Arizona

Department of Corrections. 
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Many of that panel’s recommendations are

incorporated into this section, and the Blue

Ribbon Panel acknowledges, with deep gratitude, the painstaking and professional manner in

which the Administrative Review Panel fulfilled

its mission. 

Contents: This preliminary report’s findings

and 69 recommendations are presented in an

order that parallels the chronology of the

attempted escape and hostage taking. The issues

discussed are:

● A. Inmate security. 

● B. Yard security. 

● C. Kitchen security and procedures. 

● D. Tower security, procedures, and usage. 

● E. Defensive tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. 

● F. Communications. 

● G. Individual and unit response. 

● H. Interagency delivery of tactical,

intelligence-gathering, and negotiation 

activities. 

● I. Resolution of the hostage situation. 

● J. Administrative, policy, and budget 

issues. 

A. Inmate Security 

Lethal weapons in the possession of inmates

constituted a leading causative factor in the

hostage situation. 

Finding: Inmates were searched upon departure

from their housing unit, but the kitchen security

post order requiring a pat-down search of the

inmate kitchen crew upon arrival was not followed. This provided an opportunity for inmates

to retrieve weapons or other contraband secreted

in the yard and to go undetected at the kitchen.8

Finding: Officers conducted hurried and lessthan-adequate pat-down searches of Wassenaar,

Coy, and the other members of the inmate

kitchen crew. The panel concluded from other

officer statements and indicators that the quality

of this pat-down search was not unusual. 

Finding: Same-sex pat-down searches are

preferable but not mandated. 

Finding: Although the panel could not determine how the shanks in this incident were made

or brought into the dining facility, it is clear that

without their use Wassenaar and Coy’s effectiveness would have been greatly reduced. 

Recommendations 

1. Review and enforce search procedures upon

arrival at the kitchen. Determine where

other gaps in search coverage may exist that

would provide inmates opportunities to pick

up contraband and weapons as they transit

areas. 

2. DOC should continue to practice crossgender pat-down searches when necessary. 

3. Establish a Special Contraband Squad

(SCS), either statewide or with one squad in

each of the two regions, the sole function of

which would be to conduct random, unannounced searches of prison units for contraband and weapons. SCS searches would be

supported by the latest available detection

equipment technology and trained canines.

The SCS would be specially trained in the

latest detection methods, uses of equipment,

and methods employed by inmates to secret

contraband. The selected unit would be

8 It is possible that the shanks were hidden in the kitchen.

Although records indicate that a contraband search of the kitchen

occurred at 1:00 a.m., there is no evidence as to the quality and

extent of the search. The inmates may have had their weapons

when they left the housing unit (which would indicate that the patdown was insufficient), or the weapons were in the yard, or the

weapons were in the kitchen, possibly implicating an absent

civilian kitchen worker. 
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

305

placed on lockdown as soon as the SCS

arrives onsite, and the SCS would be

accompanied by unit mid-level and baselevel supervisory staff during the search. All

areas of the selected unit would be searched

during the lockdown. No shift change or

movement of inmates would be permitted

during the search. Only those officials with

an absolute need to know would be informed

of the pending search and then only at the

last minute.

4. All incoming staff, contractors, and visitors

and their possessions should be scanned

and/or searched for contraband prior to

gaining access to the unit. If contraband is

detected, discretionary progressive punitive

measures should be imposed, ranging from

a warning to dismissal and/or prosecution.

5. All post orders should be reviewed to assure

that explicit direction is given relative to

inmate search requirements prior to movement within the unit perimeter and when the

inmate returns from travel outside the unit.

The review should focus on minimizing the

ability of inmates to access hidden contraband prior to entering less secure areas.

Consideration should be given to changing

search methods on a random rotational basis

to disrupt predictability. Search requirements should be strictly enforced by supervisory personnel, including personal

unannounced oversight. 

6. Shanks are a continual and recurring problem in the corrections world. Current procedures and methods for preventing the

manufacture and uncovering the concealment of fabricated weapons must be emphasized and regularly tested. Additionally,

DOC should consider whether state-of-theart detection systems not already employed

could be brought to bear in this area.

Technology notwithstanding, the last line

of defense for the detection of fabricated

weapons is the individual vigilance and

competence of correctional officers and

their leaders.

7. DOC should review protocols for unit contraband searches to emphasize thoroughness, unpredictability and consistency. 

B. Yard Security 

Finding: Inmates may hide weapons or contraband under gravel. 

Recommendation 

8. Consider removing gravel or other soft

materials from the yards and replacing them

with a more stable groundcover that is less

likely to provide cover for weapons or

contraband. 

C. Kitchen Security and Procedures 

The following factors created conditions in the

kitchen area that significantly compromised

security and, thus, contributed to the incident.

Finding: The inmates were too familiar with

officer routines. 

Finding: Kitchen duty was inappropriate for the

two violent offenders. 

Finding: Kitchen office door was left unsecure.

Open access to the kitchen provided the opportunity for inmates to take control of unit personnel, communications systems, and weapons. 

Finding: Delivery of kitchen utensils required

hand-to-hand delivery via open kitchen office

door. The doors to the kitchen and toolroom

must be opened to pass kitchen tools to inmates.

It became impractical and inconvenient to

repeatedly open and lock those doors when the

kitchen was active. 
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Finding: Kitchen post required only one officer.

Inmates could easily overpower the solitary officer on duty during the graveyard shift, unobserved by the rest of the unit. When the incident

began, Correctional Officer Martin by himself

was in charge of 19 inmates. 

Finding: The kitchen area was unmonitored.

Although the dining halls outside the kitchen

areas were monitored by video cameras, there

were no audio or video monitors in the kitchen

area. 

Finding: A contract kitchen worker was absent

without explanation on the morning of the incident and has refused to cooperate with the

investigation.

Recommendations 

9. Rotate inmates’ work assignments and

schedules so that they have less opportunity

to familiarize themselves with officers’

routines and work habits. 

10. Dangerous inmates should be limited in

their work assignments, and inmates with

life or long-term sentences should be strictly

limited in their range of job duties. 

11. DOC or other appropriate authorities should

interview the contracted kitchen staffers

who worked at the Morey Kitchen for at

least six months preceding the hostage

incident. Any potential complicity should

be thoroughly investigated. 

12. The door to the Kitchen Office should

remain locked at all times unless it is

opened to allow a correctional officer to

enter or exit. A standoff distance should be

established in the kitchen that an inmate

cannot cross. If this area is occupied, the

door should remain locked until it is clear

(e.g., a line painted red at the entrance to the

ramp that leads up to the office). 

13. DOC should consider methods that will

eliminate the need to pass kitchen utensils

in a hand-to-hand manner. For example, a

passthrough security drawer to deliver

utensils, operated by the kitchen officer,

could be installed. 

14. Utensils and tools should be secured. This

action may be less necessary at low-level

units, but the administration at such units

should utilize caution before implementing

such a policy. 

15. Two correctional officers should be posted

in the kitchen area at all times. 

16. Place high-resolution video cameras in the

kitchen area to provide visibility of inmate

activities from the facility’s main control

area. Camera feed should be live-monitored

instead of merely being recorded for afterthe-fact review. 

D. Tower Security, Procedures, and Usage 

The following factors created conditions regarding access to the central tower that significantly

compromised security. 

Finding: Excessive tower access points exist.

Multiple entryways into the tower provided

inmates opportunities for access. (Wassenaar

entered from the Red Yard, Coy from the Blue.) 

Finding: There were no established positive

identification protocols. 

Adult Prison Population

• There are approximately 32,000 inmates 

in the DOC system.

• There are 6,146 CO IIs.
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

307

Finding: The tower was subject to multiple uses

for which it was not intended. Uses included

storage of a variety of items, including medicine

for distribution to inmates. The panel believes

that this offered inmates opportunities to gather

intelligence about the tower, such as design,

layout, the function of the spline gates and

doors, etc. 

Finding: Inmate movements were not observed

from the tower. There is no evidence to indicate

that the movement of Wassenaar, Coy, and other

kitchen crew inmates was observed by officers

as they moved from their housing units to the

kitchen. Wassenaar’s exit from the kitchen and

movement to the tower was also unobserved.

Such lack of observation provided opportunities

for inmates to circumvent security and reduced

the unit’s situational awareness. 

Finding: Tower post duties were inadequately

defined. Post order duties lacked specificity and

did not clearly require observation of the yard

at all times, particularly when inmates were

present. 

Finding: Post order instructions regarding

weapons deployment were not followed. Officer

Doe reported that she could not reach the

AR–15 to defend herself from Wassenaar. Even

if she had reached it, the weapon was unloaded

as directed by unit supervisors. 

Recommendations 

17. DOC should review the need to staff the

central towers at Lewis and other architecturally similar institutions in the DOC

system.

Recommendations 17–26 should be considered

if a decision to staff the central tower is

continued. 

18. Nonremovable listening devices should be

installed in the tower.

19. DOC should improve cameras, camera

location and lighting at all controlled entry

points to the tower to allow for positive

identification of persons seeking entry. 

20. The tower should be accessed only at one

entry point. The panel recommends limiting

access from the Administration building

spline. Lewis Post Order 051 should be

revised to include specific instructions on

entry and exit from the tower. The practice

of “buzzing in” people from the upper floors

or not confirming identification on a faceto-face basis should be considered a serious

breach of performance standards. 

21. On the longer term, DOC should review the

operational and tactical merits of maintaining lethal and less-than-lethal weapons and

munitions in a central tower location within

a secured perimeter. 

22. DOC should require post-specific training

pertaining to the tower. 

23. Only shift-assigned tower staff, tower relief

staff and shift supervisors should be allowed

to access the tower without the shift commander’s direct approval. 

24. DOC should review tower design and make

modifications necessary to allow full operations from the second level. 

25. DOC should review, modify as needed, and

strictly enforce tower post orders to ensure

consistency of tower operation, with emphasis on security. 

26. The tower should always be staffed with

two qualified officers, both armed with

sidearms at all times. When granting access

to the tower, one officer should remain at

the observation level while the second officer acquires positive identification.

27. Tower and munitions should be kept at “at

the ready” at all times when the tower is

staffed. Weapons stands are probably the
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

most effective way of keeping weapons

ready accessible. 

E. Defensive Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures 

Finding: Correctional officers were unable to

defend themselves or others using individual or

small unit defensive tactics. This was a major

factor in the ability of the inmates to subdue

officers, escape capture and seize the tower. 

Finding: Use of OC pepper spray canisters was

ineffective. Studies have shown that it is nearly

impossible to use pepper spray to thwart an

attack by an individual armed with an edged

weapon, where the attacker is closer than 21 feet

from the intended victim. Further, an OC canister is an ineffective tool against a knife because

it is not possible to get close enough to produce

the desired results. 

Finding: Post Order 051 is inconsistent with

Department Order 804 Inmate Behavior Control.

Six sections specify when an officer is authorized to use lethal force. Section 1.2.6 is the only

section that discusses serious bodily harm;9 all

other authorized uses of lethal force have to be

predicated on a belief that an inmate is attempting to use lethal force or attempting escape.

Unfortunately, “serious bodily harm” is not

contained in PO 051. Section 051.06.8.1 reads,

“Deadly force is justified when it is immediately

necessary to protect any person from attempted

use of unlawful deadly physical force by another and to prevent an escape.” As the “ultimate

safeguard,” the tower officer and all staff must

have confidence and trust in each other. They

must trust that, if they are attacked by an inmate

posing a threat and showing intent of serious

bodily harm, lethal force will be authorized. 

Recommendations 

28. Modify PO 051.06.8.1 to include

Department Order 804.07.1.2.6. Reinforce

the knowledge and understanding of that

order in training and exercises. 

29. Consider adding other, more effective 

less-than-lethal weapons for day-to-day

operations of correctional officers. This

consideration should be to integrate such

systems into standard operations rather than

limiting those capabilities to special

situations. 

30. All DOC employees and contractors who

directly interface with inmates should

receive realistic training in self-defense tactics. Such training should be integrated into

inservices refresher training programs. 

31. Correctional officers should receive

enhanced and realistic training in hand-tohand, weapons, and small-unit defensive

tactics. Such training should be integrated

into inservices training. Consider requiring minimum qualification standards and

recognition/certification programs for

advanced proficiency, which would be

considered in assignment decisions and

operational planning. 

F. Communications 

Finding: Monitoring throughout the facility

does not appear to take full advantage of

technology. 

Finding: Officers have little ability to covertly

request assistance. After they were taken

hostage, Officers Martin and Doe were forced to

respond over unit communications systems to

other officers in the facility. Their forced

responses falsely indicated that they were

9 secure. “. . . when it is necessary to prevent an inmate from taking

another person hostage or causing serious bodily harm to another

person . . .”
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

309

Recommendations 

32. DOC should review current communication

systems with the emphasis on improving

performance. Such review should include

reducing dead areas, the benefits of encryption, specialized distress capability, battery

dependency, and radio durability. 

33. DOC should review units’ audio and visual

monitoring capabilities and consider retrofitting key facilities with embedded sensors

and cameras for regular monitoring of

activities. 

34. Establish a simple distress signal. Evidence

suggests that inmates had gathered intelligence on communication procedures and

radio codes. A distress signal would therefore need to sound natural and part of a

routine response. 

35. DOC should also consider investment in

personnel monitoring—“man-down” or

personal alarm—systems. 

G. Individual and Unit Response 

Finding: Correctional officers lacked situational

awareness. The collective lack of awareness

regarding this incident not only affected facility

security but exposed officers and facility

employees to harm. 

Finding: There was ineffective response to an

armed inmate in the dining area. When Coy

exited the kitchen, there were three officers in

the dining area. Officers were not equipped or

trained to respond effectively as a team to an

armed inmate. 

Finding: Many officers failed to respond appropriately to IMS calls. The frequency and manner

in which IMS simulations occur led to complacency on the part of most officers on duty at the

time of this incident. No codes or practices exist

to differentiate between an IMS simulation and

actual occurrence. 

Finding: Many officers in the Morey Unit have

less than a year in uniform. 

Recommendations 

36. Training (IMS simulations) should not occur

during duty hours. Occasionally, if supervisors want to test the performance of their

staff on a fire drill or lockdown, on-unit

training would be recommended. However,

training designed to test and evaluate tactical responses, arrest procedures, use of

lethal and less-than-lethal force, and even

medical response should never be conducted

where it could compromise security or be

viewed by inmates. Exceptions may be

made only with the written approval of the

DOC Director. Training should be as realistic as possible, but there should be no doubt

in any staff member’s mind about whether

a situation is a simulation or a real event.

This is accomplished by never blending

duty assignments with training scenarios. 

37. DOC sergeants must be recognized as a

focal point of the agency and given the

power to address issues immediately. The

first-line supervisor is the unit’s eyes and

ears and can identify training deficiencies,

operational issues and performance problems. The sergeant should be highly visible

as he or she moves about the unit and conducts surprise inspections at various posts;

this would help to eliminate reported unauthorized visits to the tower and the leaving

of assigned posts. It would also help address

the allegations of officers bringing food into

the unit from outside the prison, propping

doors open, conducting quick and ineffective pat searches, etc. 

38. On-duty training opportunities should be

explored, such as daily training items that

are presented and discussed at briefings or

when supervisors conduct inspections.

These training items can consist of incident
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

scenarios that are read or presented, requiring officers to discuss their answers with

their supervisors. 

H. Interagency Delivery of Tactical,

Intelligence-Gathering, and Negotiation

Activities 

Finding: State and local law enforcement

agencies regularly convene to practice tactical

maneuvers. DOC does not routinely participate

in those activities, nor do those activities regularly occur on the grounds of a State prison

complex. 

Finding: State and local law enforcement

agencies do not regularly convene to practice

negotiations. DOC does not participate in those

activities when they do occur, nor do those

activities occur on the grounds of a State prison

complex. 

Finding: DOC and State and local law enforcement agencies do not know enough about

State correctional facilities’ amenability to

intelligence-gathering technologies and tactical

maneuvers. 

Recommendations 

39. DOC and State and local law enforcement

agencies should regularly convene to practice tactical maneuvers. Some scenarios

should be conducted regularly on the

grounds of a State prison complex. 

40. DOC and State and local law enforcement

agencies should regularly convene to

practice negotiations. 

41. DOC, with assistance from federal, State

and local law enforcement agencies, should

evaluate DOC’s physical structures to identify in advance of untoward events their

amenability to intelligence collection and

tactical maneuvers. This information should

be kept onsite at each institution and updated regularly. 

I. Resolution of the Hostage Situation 

Finding: It is the policy of DOC that there are

no negotiations with hostage takers. Despite that

policy, in the situation at the Morey Unit there

were ongoing negotiations during the entire 15

days. 

Finding: With regard to the tactical response,

the panel received testimony from correctional

employees (who were not part of the tactical

teams) that they had heard of opportunities to

use lethal force toward the two inmates during

the standoff, but they were foregone due to

alleged counterinstructions from superiors. This

testimony was later refuted by numerous members of tactical teams, including both lead

Tactical Rules of Engagement for

Double Hostage Situations

1. Both inmates on roof, 100% positive 

identification, clear shot: Green light, 

shoot to kill.

2. One inmate with both hostages on roof, 

100% positive identification, clear shot: 

Green light, shoot to kill.

3. Inmate, 100% positive identification, 

appears with lethal force directed at 

hostage(s): Green light, shoot to kill.

4. Inmate appears with lethal force, 

non-threatening: Red light, do not shoot.

5. Inmate appears on roof with one 

hostage: Red light, do not shoot.

In options 2 and 3, activation will also initiate the assault on the tower.
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

311

commanders of the tactical operation, DPS

Colonel Norm Beasley and Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office Assistant Chief Jesse Locksa.

Indeed, Beasley categorically stated to the

panel, “There was never an opportunity to tactically resolve this situation through sniper fire.”

Finding: DOC’s decision to transfer the inmates

out of their system is a common corrections

management practice after hostage situations.

This practice preserves the integrity of the

statewide security system; diminishes the

inmates’ status in the prisoner society; and

reduces potential legal liability. Indeed, DOC

houses approximately 100 inmates from other

state systems, including several as a result of the

Lucasville, Ohio, prison hostage incident in the

early 1990s.

Recommendations 

42. DOC should review the communications

that occurred between negotiators and tactical staff relating to the cutting of the fence

at the base of the Morey tower. 

43. Due to the uniqueness of the situation and

the virtually impenetrable characteristics of

the tower, the lack of acceptable tactical

solutions available to authorities made negotiations a practical necessity. To be consistent with other law enforcement and

correctional agencies, DOC should eliminate its nonnegotiation policy. 

44. The use-of-force provisions of the rules of

engagement (above) were appropriate and

should be applied to future situations where

their use may be applicable.10 At the Morey

Unit, circumstances did not permit the

exercise of those provisions. 

J. Administrative, Policy, and Budget

Issues 

Inmate Classification

Finding: The DOC inmate classification

system11 is cumbersome and unreliable and has

not been evaluated since the 1980s. Other correctional jurisdictions have developed more

effective and efficient systems.

Recommendations

45. DOC should assess its inmate classification

needs and seek national assistance in the

enhancement, overhaul or replacement of its

present system. DOC’s policies and procedures regarding protective segregation should

be reviewed as part of the assessment. 

46. Public and Institutional (P&I) scores should

be more closely examined, and the officers

who work with an inmate should have

meaningful input into that inmate’s score. 

47. Classification scores should be less

vulnerable to override.

48. Create a system that better ensures that

more dangerous inmates do not work in

sensitive areas.

Inmate Assessment, Programming, and

Reentry

Finding: Good prison security and management

require more than just good correctional officers; it takes a team approach. 

Recommendation 

49. DOC should evaluate the methods by which,

upon intake, it assesses offenders’ criminogenic and programming needs. It should further endeavor to provide appropriate levels 10 After the first hostage was released, the tactical rules of engagement were revised to reflect the change of circumstances.

11 Classification determines an inmate’s housing situation, work

assignments, recreational opportunities, and supervision levels.
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

of programming in areas such as mental

health treatment, drug treatment and education. Programming should also be enhanced

to assist offenders in successfully reentering

society upon release from prison. 

Training

Finding: Testimony received from DOC

employees strongly suggests that uniformed and

civilian staff are undertrained and, in some

cases, untrained in many areas, some critical. 

Recommendations

50. As appropriate to carry out their responsibilities and ensure their personal safety, officers, supervisors and civilian employees

should receive continuing education and

practical training in areas that include, but

are not limited to, the following: selfdefense, weapons training, hostage situations, post-specific training, weapons and

contraband searches, Fire Arms Training

Simulator (FATS), cross-training with other

law enforcement agencies, Arizona Peace

Officer Standards & Training (POST) certification, and structured on-the-job training

and mentoring. 

51. At the Correctional Officer Training

Academy (COTA), cadets should receive

one full additional week of training dedicated to self-defense and receive additional

training in hostage situations, rape prevention, and weapons. 

52. Standards for admission to and graduation

from COTA must not be compromised in

response to vacancy rates or other temporary situations. 

53. New COTA graduates should enter service

as a CO I. After a defined probationary period, and additional on-the-job training, they

should become eligible for promotion to CO

II. 

54. DOC should implement a comprehensive

and systematic “Back-to-Basics” (B2B) program to ensure that core elements of security are being adhered to across the board.

The B2B initiative should be designed to

enable every prison to review security in

regard to layout, personnel, habits, traditions, training and other issues. B2B should

include interviews with line staff to find

out how they actually do the job and how

they should do the job, so that it can be

determined whether security is being

Correctional Officer Turnover

A DOC survey covering the two-year period

from November 2001 through October 2003

reveals the following:

• There are 6,146 CO IIs in the DOC system.

• There were 1,721 CO II resignations during 

the survey period.

• Not adjusting for multiple resignations 

from the same position, the two-year 

turnover rate was approximately 28%.

• 570 of the 1,721 resignations (33%) 

occurred during the employees’ first 12 

months on the job.

• 1,008 of the resignations (58%) occurred 

during the first two years.

• 1,268 of the resignations (73%) occurred 

during the first three years.

• Only one in four CO IIs had more than 

three years of experience.

Source: Governor’s Office of Strategic

Planning & Budgeting
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

313

compromised by not adhering to post

orders, or whether officers have devised a

better way to get desired results. 

55. Civilian employees should receive training

to help them understand and function safely

in a prison work environment. 

Experience and Staffing

Finding: Inexperienced officers, when placed

together in high-risk settings, are more likely to

fail in the performance of their core functions

than if they are teamed with more experienced

officers. 

Finding: Correctional facilities are understaffed.

Correctional officer positions remain unfilled

while the prison population grows every month.

At the Lewis Prison Complex, of which the

Morey Unit is a part, about 200 (or 19%) of the

1,029 officer positions are vacant, on some days

forcing management to scramble to provide the

minimum coverage. Of the 800-plus positions

that are filled, half of the officers have two years

or less of service (including their seven weeks

of training at COTA). In many instances, junior

officers are led by other junior officers who

have been prematurely promoted in order to

meet pressing needs. At the time of the hostage

taking, 14 of the 20 officers on duty were hired

in 2003 (i.e., had one year or less of experience). 

Recommendations 

56. DOC should formalize the blending of experienced and inexperienced officers, leading

to “mentor/student” bonding that can

enhance long-term officer success and

retention. The mentoring program should

be formalized as a structured, agencywide

Correctional Training Officer (CTO) program that features formal training and

rewards for experienced officers, at all

levels and positions, who act as mentors. 

57. Additional staffing is necessary for all

assignments within DOC in order to combat

fatigue and burnout and to foster proper

employee inservice training needs. Current

“bare bones” staffing does not allow for the

remediation of any of the above. 

Pay, Recruitment, and Retention

Finding: DOC officers are underpaid, both in

absolute terms and in comparison to the pay

scales of other jurisdictions. The DOC pay scale

leads to family hardships, low morale and high

attrition. A sergeant with ten years of experience

testified at a public forum that he would be eligible for Food Stamps and AHCCCS benefits if

his annual income were only $933 less. He also

suffered a pay cut when he was promoted (most

sergeants are paid less than the officers they

supervise). 

Finding: The Nevada Department of Corrections, which offers higher officer pay, recently

set up a recruiting station at a Circle K near the

COTA facility outside of Tucson to lure academy graduates. After being trained at a cost to

Arizona taxpayers, half of the class went to

work for the State of Nevada. 

Finding: There is pay inequity between new

recruits and experienced officers. Elimination of

the “Correctional Officer I” position during the

previous Administration created a situation in

which a recent academy graduate enters service

as a CO II, perhaps earning as much as a veteran officer at the same grade. 

Finding: Standards have been lowered. Qualifications for sergeant have been diminished in

recent years in order to fill vacancies at that

level. 
314

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Recommendations 

58. DOC should undertake a comprehensive

analysis of its pay scale, including a comparison with the pay scales of federal,

county and municipal correctional entities in

Arizona and of surrounding states. 

59. DOC should consider the reinstatement of

merit increases and longevity pay. 

60. DOC should restore the CO I position, reexamine the qualifications for Sergeant, and

undertake a comprehensive review of

DOC’s promotional policies to ensure they

are based on merit and performance, not

“good old boy” relationships. 

61. Pay must be commensurate with experience

and merit, and any promotion should result

in higher pay. 

62. DOC should consider ways of communicating to the public the difficulty of and danger

associated with correctional service. 

63. Survivors of officers killed in the line of

duty should receive benefits comparable to

the families of police officers and firefighters. 

Professionalism

Finding: At the time of the hostage situation,

the Morey Unit suffered from complacency and

a general lack of professionalism. While most

staff performed admirably during the incident,

there were many administrative errors in the

preceding months and years. During the panel’s

investigation it became evident that numerous

deficiencies in supervision and performance

contributed to the hostage situation. 

Recommendations 

64. The DOC Director should utilize all available information to determine what, if any,

disciplinary action or change of assignment

is appropriate for those staff involved. 

65. A systemwide review should take place to

determine whether this problem is pervasive

in the system and, if so, to identify and

implement steps that could remedy the

problem. 

Operational Audits

Finding: In 2000, DOC discontinued the practice of conducting comprehensive operational

audits of prison facilities. 

Recommendation 

66. Operational audits should be reinstated to

help ensure effective management of prison

facilities. 

Staff/Inmate Communication

Finding: Good staff/inmate communication is

important to maintaining good prison security

and operations. 

Recommendations 

67. DOC is encouraged to take steps to review

current policies, practices, and protocols

that promote indirect, as opposed to direct,

supervision of offenders and that inhibit

good communication between officers and

offenders. 

68. DOC should consider piloting a prison

management system, such as “Unit

Starting Compensation for Correctional 

Officers

Base Hiring Incentive 

Pay Bonus1 Bonus2 Total

DOC $24,950 $2,600 $2,495 $30,045

Maricopa 

County 31,000 0 0 31,000

1Generally expires after the second year of service.

2Available only to CO IIs at Lewis, Florence and Eyman.
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

315

Management,” at a prison that is architecturally and operationally receptive to such

a concept. 

Sentencing

Finding: The DOC system suffers from overcrowding. In the last year, DOC has set the

highest records of overcapacity and the Lewis

facility has regularly housed inmates in excess

of its design capacity. 

Recommendation 

69. The State of Arizona should undertake a

comprehensive review of its sentencing

statutes. 

Conclusion

The hostage-taking incident that occurred at the

Morey Unit was a tragic event that resulted in

serious physical and emotional injury to correctional officers and facility employees. Like

other prison crisis situations in Arizona and

elsewhere, it demonstrated the incredible dangers and challenges faced by corrections

professionals every day. 

The two inmates exploited a series of small but

critical gaps in security that were further compounded by institutional complacency and a collective lack of situational awareness. Once faced

with the reality of the deadly situation inside the

tower—the facility’s most secure and impenetrable feature—correctional officers and their

leaders responded quickly and effectively to

establish the conditions that ultimately led to the

successful release of hostages and recapture of

inmates without loss of life. 

The lessons learned from this incident revalidate

the necessity of adequately and properly resourcing corrections operations. Of equal importance

is the need to acquire the essential qualities of a

competent and proud organization. Such qualities can be obtained only by investing in the people that dedicate themselves to the corrections

mission. They must be well trained and well led;

and recognized often and fairly compensated.

Although one can never guarantee that such an

incident will not occur again, the panel believes

that much can be done to reduce that risk.
316

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

Incident Command

Director Schriro

PIO: Jim Robideau

Victim Rights: Dan Levey

Legal/Legislative Liaison: Amy Bejeland

Law Enforcement Liaison: Bill Lackey 

 Jerry Dunn

Support

Sally Delbridge

Joy Swanson

Christinia Cooper

Dumi Erno

Vanessa English

Heather Price

Judi Book

Recorder

Inv. Buchanan 

Inv. Morris

Inv. Tokosh

Inv. Kelleigh

Jeff Nordaune

 Administration

Day: Mike Smarik

Swing: Todd Gerrish

GY: John Martinez 

 Rich Bluth 

 Ed Encinas

 Operations

Day: Charles Moorer

Swing: David Cluff

GY: Judy Frigo

 Planning

Day: James Kimble

Swing: Donna Clement

GY: Lyle Broadhead

 Logistics

Day: James Kimble

Swing: Chuck McVicker

GY: Judy Frigo

DOC Central Office United Command Structure
Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

317

Arizona DOC Unified Command

Director Schriro

Environmental Quality Control

John Hallahan

Tower Deputy

Incident Commander

Gaspar 0900–2100

Rollins 0600–1800

Flanagan 2000–0800

Liaison

(Runner)

Gay 0800–1800

Fizer 2000–0800

(Family)

O’Neil 0800–2000

Advisor

 SROD Savage 

Federal, State and Local Law 

Enforcement Outside Agencies 

Fall Within This Command Structure

Operations

Staging

Unit Ops

Bachman Ops

Buckley Ops

Rast Ops

Barchey Ops

Morey Ops

Stiner Ops

Planning

Documents

Admin. Logistics

Medical Unit

Food Services

CISD

Family

Hostage

Staff

Recorder

Alex Benlein

Normal Abble

Incident Commander

Jeff Hood, Division Director, 

Offender Services

Institutional

Incident Commander

Vigil 1700–0500

Hennessy 0500–1700

Interpreter

Trujillo 1000–2200

Intel

Investigations

Tactical Negotiator

PIO

Bartos 

Lewis Unified Command Structure
319

On August 21, 1992, information from the U.S.

Weather Service suggested that a tropical storm

named Andrew was taking a route that might hit

the Bahamas and then South Florida. The

Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) sent

out a teletype advising managers throughout the

Department to monitor the storm’s progress. It

also advised each facility within the Department

to designate a contact person in case the threat

worsened. At Dade Correctional Institution (CI),

the superintendent directed the duty officer, the

shift officers in charge, and the control room

officers to monitor the storm’s development by

all means possible, including weather band

radio, commercial radio, and TV.

On Saturday, August 22, the tropical storm had

strengthened into Hurricane Andrew. Its projected path continued to target Florida’s southeast

coast. At Dade CI, the superintendent and assistant superintendent went to the institution to

supervise the securing of the compound. Inmate

workers were used to remove loose items from

the ground or to tie down or otherwise secure

equipment. The superintendent also organized a

contingency plan for a department heads’ meeting at 9 a.m. the following day to discuss evacuation plans.

On Sunday morning, August 23, the hurricane

was so imminent that the state government activated its Emergency Operations Center and

began to evacuate low-lying areas along the

southeast coast. DOC headquarters called a

meeting of key personnel from the facilities

within the likely path of the hurricane to begin

preparation of those institutions. An immediate

decision was made to direct a small facility in

the Florida Keys, Big Pine Key Road Prison, to

evacuate north out of the Keys to Lantana

Correctional Institution. That evacuation was

completed without incident over the course of

the next 9 hours.

At Dade CI, department heads and supervisors

reported for the 9 a.m. hurricane preparation

meeting. The superintendent decided to evacuate

Dade Work Camp (with 293 medium- and

minimum-custody inmates) to the main prison

unit. Two inmates were moved to a local hospital because of the seriousness of their health

problems.

By midday Sunday, Hurricane Andrew carried

winds of more than 150 miles per hour and

seemed highly likely to strike Florida at Florida

City, which would subject Dade CI to the full

force of the center of the hurricane. Dade is

located 20 miles west of the coast but is only

6 feet above sea level, and the force of the hurricane winds was expected to create a coastal

water surge of 12 feet or higher that could travel

many miles in from the coast. At 2 p.m., the

Department decided to evacuate all inmates

from Dade CI to other state institutions.

Hurricane Andrew: Florida

Department of Corrections

Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency

Preparedness, by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry

(Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc., 2002), by permission of the

authors. Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia

Barry.
320

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

To accommodate the approximately 1,000

inmates from Dade CI, DOC located space at

five other state prisons. Two of these potential

transfer sites were then eliminated because they

also were close to the storm’s projected path and

in potential danger. The Central Florida

Reception Center was added to the list of receiving institutions, and all available transfer buses

and vans within the Department were dispatched

toward Dade CI to begin transferring inmates:

approximately 100 to Glades CI, 150 to Martin

CI, 450 to the South Florida Reception Center,

250 to the Central Florida Reception Center, and

approximately 100 to another state facility. 

DOC also decided that the 76 inmates at the

small Copeland Road Prison should be evacuated to Hendry CI—a situation it quickly assessed

as a timing problem. Although DOC had adequate transportation, space, and other resources

to house the relocated inmates on an emergency

basis, it was not immediately clear that these

resources could be put in play in time to stay

ahead of the approaching hurricane.

At Dade CI, classification staff began to sort

inmate transfers by custody level and psychological profile. The administration decided

to move all close-custody inmates first, with

minimum- and medium-security inmates to follow. Staff gathered inmate folders and medical

records to transport with the inmates. Vehicle

security was arranged at the rear gate of the

institution, and additional perimeter security

was added. The institution’s business manager

provided security staff with maps outlining the

travel routes to the various receiving institutions.

Security staff were divided into teams for

screening inmates, searching inmates, and

escorting them to the departure area. As the last

of the inmates were evacuated out of Dade CI,

staff members at the institution began to prepare

for the hurricane. Emergency supplies were

gathered, and staff prepared to ride out the hurricane in the administrative offices and the

medical area.

At 10:30 p.m. on Sunday, the last inmates being

evacuated arrived at the Central Florida

Reception Center. Approximately 1,000 inmates

had been moved on short notice to locations all

over the southern half of Florida with no

injuries to staff or inmates and no escapes. At

Dade CI, the superintendent sent staff home to

evacuate their own families. A small number of

staff volunteered to stay at the institution to prevent possible looting or poststorm damage. At

the South Florida Reception Center the decision

was to “defend in place” rather than to evacuate

inmates. Staff were called to the institution to

help maintenance staff tie down or secure equipment judged to be vulnerable to wind damage.

Food and water were stockpiled within the dormitories, and handcuffs were distributed because

transport to segregation housing would not be

possible during the storm. 

When the hurricane hit, it caused only moderate

damage to DOC facilities, with the exception of

Dade CI, where the damage was severe. No

other facilities were rendered uninhabitable. At

Dade, sections of the roof were ripped away,

allowing the wind-driven rain to soak large

areas of the facility. Windows were broken, the

perimeter fence was essentially destroyed, and

some outbuildings were completely destroyed.

The skeleton staff who stayed at the institution

during the storm were shocked at the extent of

the damage.

Late on Monday, August 24, some Dade CI staff

returned to the institution from the South

Florida Reception Center to try to help the

remaining staff get to safety. They organized a

convoy to get staff out of the institution to their

homes. The superintendent and assistant superintendent toured the institution grounds with
Section 6. Case Studies: Hurricane Andrew 

321

other staff to assess the damage and then

attempted to make contact with DOC headquarters or another institution to request help. An

individual correctional officer arrived from

Broward CI. He had been sent to find out the

status of Dade CI and had walked 5 miles to get

to the institution because of the condition of the

roads.

In addition to the damage it did to the institution, the storm completely destroyed the homes

of approximately 400 Department staff members. The following day, Tuesday, August 25,

the secretary of corrections, along with the

assistant secretary for operations and the inspector general of the Department, arrived at Dade

CI to thank the staff for their efforts in completing the evacuation and to pledge support and

assistance with the many personal problems the

staff were experiencing. The next day, August

26, a meeting was held at DOC’s central office

to begin developing plans for rebuilding Dade

Work Camp (target for completion: 45 days) and

the main prison. 

On August 25, the day after the storm, the Civil

Air Patrol established a radio communications

post at Dade CI, the state fire marshal arrived,

and a National Guard unit set up camp on the

grounds to provide perimeter security. DOC initiated a number of recovery programs for staff,

including providing free gasoline, water, ice,

clothing, food, and household goods, as available. The administrative building of the main

unit was kept open as a shelter for staff and

family members who were without housing.

Tools, roofing materials, electric generators, and

other supplies were made available to employees at no charge. The Department also coordinated applications for Federal Emergency

Management Agency funds and established a

toll-free number for staff and their families to

use in arranging assistance.

DOC began to identify temporary housing locations for homeless staff and their families—a

total of 1,000 people—and coordinated donations of money to assist them. It also made a

major effort to keep track of and communicate

with the staff who were on special assignments

to other institutions. Many of these staff had

storm damage problems with their homes or

other difficult situations resulting from the hurricane. Actual reconstruction work on Dade CI

and the Dade Work Camp was initiated within

48 hours after the damage assessment was

complete.

Lessons Learned

1. The Florida DOC’s comprehensive emergency planning system provided an appropriate framework for responding to the

specifics of the hurricane.

2. Because of the uncertainty of the hurricane’s path and the risks involved in evacuating large numbers of high-security

inmates, it was not practical to evacuate

several institutions, nor was it practical to

evacuate days before the storm hit. These

circumstances made fast, clear decisionmaking and leadership critically important for

DOC once the storm’s landfall was certain. 

3. Staff performed admirably at many locations throughout the state, despite great

stress on some individual staff members.

Staff gave first priority to their duty to DOC

and the state, even in cases where their

homes were threatened or the fate of loved

ones was uncertain. Numerous staff volunteered for particularly hazardous duty, such

as remaining at Dade CI for the duration of

the hurricane. Individual acts of bravery and

compassion were common. 
322

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

4. Inmate cooperation was apparent throughout

the hurricane and its aftermath and was

essential to the evacuation and to the operation of partially disabled facilities after the

hurricane. DOC’s commitment to keeping

inmates well informed contributed to this

cooperative spirit.

5. With some emergencies, particularly some

types of natural disasters, the aftermath may

be more challenging than the response to

the event itself. 

6. After the hurricane struck, communication

with the most seriously damaged areas of

the state was initially impossible and

remained very difficult for a long time.

Cellular telephone service was disabled (a

situation that has not always occurred with

other natural disasters, such as floods and

earthquakes), because so many transmitter

and repeater locations were damaged over

such a wide area.

7. Approximately 2 weeks after the hurricane,

22 staff from Dade CI still had not reported

to the institution or the Department. In a

matter of days, DOC organized teams to go

into the local community to search for these

staff. After the search teams failed to locate

any of the 22 missing staff, further efforts

were instituted to try to find them.

8. Because of the difficulty in establishing

communication after a natural disaster, facilities should establish a date, time, and place

for staff to report before they leave during

an evacuation. For similar reasons, facilities

should establish a toll-free number for

emergency assistance and disseminate that

number to staff before the actual event.

9. A mechanism for tracking employees temporarily assigned to different facilities

would be a useful addition to the Florida

DOC’s emergency plan.

10. After the hurricane, the problems of dealing

with large numbers of homeless staff were

more difficult in many ways, and required

more creativity, than the formidable problems of repairing badly damaged facilities.

11. When a large-scale evacuation of inmates is

anticipated, DOC authorization of an emergency inmate processing and receiving

policy will give the receiving institutions

flexibility in intake procedures. Alternatively,

such an emergency policy may be a regular

part of a Department’s emergency plans.

12. Whenever practical, medical records should

accompany evacuated inmates to the receiving institution. As a backup, it is helpful if

some basic medical information is available

in a database or online so that it can be

accessed from any institution.

13. Lack of potable water will become a crisis

for an institution long before food delays or

cold food cause serious problems. Also,

arranging for food from external sources

during a communitywide emergency is far

easier than arranging for large quantities of

potable water. 

14. Departments should be prepared to move

food items from one facility to another and,

if possible, should have at least one vehicle

(a 24-foot truck, for example) designated for

food service use only.

15. Emergency plans should include provisions

for an expert team that can evaluate food

items for contamination and spoilage in the

wake of a natural disaster.

16. The absence of attendance and leave records

may put the Department in a difficult position with regard to issuing paychecks. The

distribution of paychecks to employees in

the aftermath of a communitywide disaster

may also be challenging, and depositing

paychecks directly to bank accounts may

not be possible either if electronic fund
Section 6. Case Studies: Hurricane Andrew 

323

transfers are not available, as was the case

in Florida during the aftermath of Hurricane

Andrew. In such emergencies, the Department may have to make arrangements to

pay employees in cash.

17. Emergency purchasing authority may be an

absolute necessity following a large-scale

disaster.
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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

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National Institute of Corrections

Advisory Board

Collene Thompson Campbell

San Juan Capistrano, CA

Norman A. Carlson

Chisago City, MN

Michael S. Carona

Sheriff, Orange County

Santa Ana, CA

Jack Cowley

Alpha for Prison and Reentry

Tulsa, OK

J. Robert Flores

Administrator

Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC

Stanley Glanz

Sheriff, Tulsa County

Tulsa, OK

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Assistant Secretary for Children and Families

U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services

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Department of Sociology and Anthropology

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Director

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Minnesota Tax Court

St. Paul, MN

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