TRANSFORMING TO EFFECTS-BASED 

OPERATIONS:

LESSONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

EXPERIENCE

Andrew M. Dorman

January 2008

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ISBN 1-58487-338-8
iii

FOREWORD

The United Kingdom has remained one of the oldest 

and closest U.S. allies. It has continued to engage in 

a variety of operations across the globe in countries 

ranging from Afganistan and Iraq to the Balkans and 

Sierra Leone and has undertaken these tasks within 

a defense budget that has continued to decline as a 

percentage of gross domestic product. This has meant 

a series of changes to the traditional approach to 

defense that has gone much further than that of the 

United States and many of its European counterparts. 

As part of this process, the United Kingdom’s Ministry 

of Defence and Armed Forces have officially sought to 

adopt an effects-based approach to operations within 

the context of an overall “comprehensive approach” 

that supposedly brings together the various organs 

of government. The author of this monograph, Dr. 

Andrew M. Dorman, evaluates the relative success the 

United Kingdom has had in adapting to this change, 

identifying a number of successes and pitfalls from 

which other countries could well learn.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANDREW M. DORMAN is a Senior Lecturer in 

the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, 

London, based at the United Kingdom’s Joint Services 

Command and Staff College. He previously trained 

as a Chartered Accountant with KPMG Peat Marwick 

at their Cambridge office, qualifying in 1990 before 

returning to academia. He has previously taught at 

the Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich, and at the 

University of Birmingham. He has published widely 

and specializes in British defense and security policy, 

defense transformation, and European Security. Dr. 

Dorman is on the governing councils of the International 

Security Studies Section of the International Studies 

Association and the International Security and Arms 

Control Section of the American Political Science 

Association. He is also the Founding Chair of the 

APSA’s Kenneth N. Waltz Dissertation Prize and Editor 

of World Defence Systems. Dr. Dorman holds a masters’ 

degree and Ph.D. from the University of Birmingham. 
v

SUMMARY

Outside the United States, the United Kingdom 

(UK) has led the way in seeking to transform its 

military forces to meet the new strategic context in 

which it finds itself. Like so many of its counterparts, 

it has sought to do this within a defense budget that 

has continued to decline as a percentage of gross 

domestic product. This has meant a series of changes 

to the traditional approach to defense that have gone 

much further than the United States and many of its 

European counterparts. In essence, for good or ill, the 

UK has pushed ahead with changes to areas such as the 

use of contractors, both at home and on the battlefield; 

acquisition reform involving leasing and PublicPrivate Partnerships; the disposal of surplus defense 

real estate; and the role of sponsored reserves. As the 

same time, a considerable amount of attention has been 

given to how operations are conducted. As part of this 

process, the UK’s Ministry of Defence and Armed 

Forces have officially sought to adopt an effects-based 

approach to operations within the context of an overall 

“comprehensive approach” that brings together the 

various organs of government. 

For the United States, the UK’s approach to military 

operations is important for a number of reasons. First, 

the UK frequently engages in a variety of similar 

type operations from which there are lessons that 

may be applicable to the United States either now or 

in the future, such as counterinsurgency in Northern 

Ireland or nation-building in Sierra Leone. Moreover, a 

number of authors have argued that there is a distinctly 

“British way in warfare” which is particularly suited 

to such unconventional operations.Second, since the 
vi

United Kingdom is one of the United States’ closest 

allies, the UK armed forces are frequently engaged 

in operations in partnership with the United States. 

These have ranged recently from the Balkans to 

Afghanistan to Iraq. In fact, the only noticeable time 

the British were not involved in a U.S.-led operation 

since the end of the Cold War was in Somalia. The 

vast majority of these operations have involved sizable 

British commitments and a close integration of the 

British military in all the stages from planning through 

to nation-building. Interest in future British policy was 

most recently evident in the debate surrounding the 

transition of power from Prime Minister Tony Blair to 

Prime Minister Gordon Brown. 

Third, the UK is a member of various military 

alliances, coalitions, and partnerships which place it 

in a strong position to influence how others conduct 

operations. These include the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO); the European Union (EU); 

America, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 

(ABCA); the Five Power Pact in the Pacific; and the 

Commonwealth. In the case of NATO, it was General 

David Richards, the commander of the largely British 

Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) headquarters, 

who deployed to Afghanistan in 2006 and oversaw the 

expansion of NATO’s role, including, for the first time 

since the end of World War II, leading a significant U.S. 

contingent. 

This monograph therefore seeks to examine the 

extent to which the UK has transitioned to effects-based 

operations to ascertain (1) areas where the U.S. Army 

could draw lessons from UK policies; (2) areas where 

the U.S. Army and the British Ministry of Defence could 

develop integrated or complementary approaches and 

doctrines towards transformation for future alliance/
vii

coalition operations; and (3) implications for the U.S. 

Army for working with the UK. 

This monograph has been subdivided into four 

parts. Section 1 undertakes a review of the evolution 

of British defense policy since the end of the Cold War 

and evaluates the degree to which it has adopted an 

effects-based approach. Section 2 examines the British 

operational experience since the end of the Cold War, 

including an analysis of the lessons learned and its 

experiences in working with allies. Section 3 analyses 

the UK’s capability development through its doctrine 

and acquisition strategies. Finally, Section 4 evaluates 

the implications of these findings for the U.S. Army 

and makes 17 main recommendations.

1

TRANSFORMING TO EFFECTS-BASED 

OPERATIONS:

LESSONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

Outside America, the United Kingdom (UK) has 

led the way in seeking to transform its military forces 

to meet the new strategic context in which it finds 

itself.1

 Like so many of its counterparts, it has sought 

to do this within a defense budget that has continued 

to decline as a percentage of gross domestic product.2

This has meant a series of changes to the traditional 

approach to defense that have gone much further than 

those of the United States and many of its European 

counterparts. In essence, for good or ill, the UK has 

pushed ahead with changes to areas such as the use 

of contractors, both at home and on the battlefield, 

acquisition reform involving leasing and PublicPrivate Partnerships, the disposal of surplus defense 

real estate and the role of sponsored reserves.3

 At the 

same time, a considerable amount of attention has been 

given to how operations are conducted. As part of this 

process, the UK’s Ministry of Defence and Armed 

Forces have officially sought to adopt an effects-based 

approach to operations within the context of an overall 

“Comprehensive Approach” that brings together the 

various organs of government.4

For the United States, the UK’s approach to military 

operations is important for a number of reasons. First, 

the UK frequently engages in a variety of similar type 

operations from which there are lessons that may be 
2

applicable to the United States either now or in the 

future, such as counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland 

or nation-building in Sierra Leone. Moreover, a number 

of authors have argued that there is a distinctly “British 

Way in Warfare” that is particularly suited to such 

unconventional operations.5

Second, as one of the closest U.S. allies, the UK’s 

armed forces are frequently engaged in operations in 

partnership with the United States. These have ranged 

recently from the Balkans to Afghanistan to Iraq. 

In fact, the only noticeable time the British were not 

involved in a U.S.-led operation since the end of the 

Cold War was in Somalia. The vast majority of these 

operations have involved sizeable British commitments 

and a close integration of the British military in all 

the stages from planning to nation-building. Interest 

in future British policy was most recently evident in 

the debate surrounding the transition of power from 

Prime Minister Tony Blair to Gordon Brown. 

Third, the UK is a member of various military 

alliances, coalitions, and partnerships that place it 

in a strong position to influence how others conduct 

operations. These include the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), 

and the Five Power Pact in the Pacific and the 

Commonwealth (America, Britain, Canada, Australia 

and New Zealand, or ABCA). In the case of NATO, it 

was British commander General David Richards who 

led the largely British Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 

(ARRC) headquarters that deployed to Afghanistan 

in 2006 and oversaw the expansion of NATO’s role, 

including, for the first time since the end of World War 

II, leading a significant U.S. contingent. 

This monograph therefore seeks to examine the 

extent to which the UK has transitioned to effects-based 
3

operations to ascertain: (a) Areas where the U.S. Army 

could draw lessons from UK policies; (b) Areas where 

the U.S. Army and the British Ministry of Defence 

(MoD) could develop integrated or complementary 

approaches and doctrines towards transformation 

for future alliance/coalition operations; and, (c) 

Implications for the U.S. Army for working with the 

UK. 

This monograph has been subdivided into four 

parts. Section 1 undertakes a review of the evolution 

of British defense policy since the end of the Cold War 

and evaluates the degree to which it has adopted an 

effects-based approach. Section 2 examines the British 

operational experience since the end of the Cold War, 

including an analysis of the lessons learned and its 

experiences of working with allies. Section 3 analyses 

the UK’s capability development through its doctrine 

and acquisition strategies. Finally, section 4 evaluates 

the implications of these findings for the U.S. Army 

and makes a number of recommendations.

SECTION 1

Introduction.

Like most of the countries of the west, the UK has 

found that its defense policy has undergone profound 

changes since the end of the Cold War. Indicative of 

this is the title of the most recent defense white paper, 

“Delivering Security in a Changing World,”6

 which 

emphasizes that the armed forces contribute to the 

provision of security rather than provide defense. In 

other words, the UK has moved to a position in which 

defense is competing alongside other government 
4

departments, such as the Foreign and Commonwealth 

Office (FCO) and the Department for International 

Development (DFID), for resources to provide for 

Britain’s security and achieve the effects the government 

wants. The MoD is no longer a monopoly supplier 

of security, with defense being only one tool in the 

government’s toolbox. Yet, it is worth noting that it is 

defense, rather than any of the other departments of 

state, that is driving the British Government towards 

adopting the so-called “Comprehensive Approach,” 

which seeks to coordinate all the various levers of 

national power to maximum effect. In other words, 

as part of its adoption of an effects-based approach, 

defense is also trying to drive the rest of government 

in the direction of a similar comprehensive and 

coordinated response.

To understand how the UK has reached this 

position, it is necessary to review the evolution of 

British defense policy. To undertake this task, the 

analysis within this section has been subdivided into 

four parts: (1) Cold War context (1945-89)—the Soviet 

threat; (2) First wave of defense reforms (1989-96)—

continuation of the threat-based approach; (3) Second 

wave of defense reforms (1997-2001)—the shift towards 

a capabilities-based approach; and, (4) Third wave of 

defense reforms (2001- )—the move towards an effectsbased approach.

Defense Policy in the Cold War.

For the UK, the Cold War was one of immense 

change. By 1989 only a few vestiges remained of what 

was once the world’s largest empire. Europe, rather 

than the Empire, had become the focus of British 

foreign and defense policy.7

 The perpetual challenge 
5

for policymakers lay in Britain’s financial weakness. 

As a result, successive British governments concluded 

that the only way to deter the Soviet Union was to 

use the United States as a counterweight.8 Thus, 

emphasis was given to the creation and maintenance 

of NATO. Moreover, as the political landscape became 

increasingly bipolar, it was inevitable that Britain’s 

relations with the United States became a major 

determinant of British defense policy in Europe. The 

price of the NATO commitment was a significant part 

of the defense budget being allocated to support forces 

allocated to NATO at the expense of other areas. 

At the same time, it was also recognized by 

successive governments that the United States might 

not be prepared to sacrifice itself for the defense of the 

UK, and therefore the UK must have its own nuclear 

capability. The basic requirement was to be able to 

inflict sufficient damage on the Soviet Union to deter 

any attack on the UK and its interests. To achieve this, 

the requirement was set to successfully target Moscow 

as the center of government, along with a number 

of other Soviet cities and military and industrial 

targets.9 The initial system comprised an indigenously 

developed force of manned bombers equipped with 

freefall bombs.10 These were subsequently replaced by 

nuclear submarines equipped with U.S.-built Polaris

missiles in 1968 and by the Trident force in the 1990s.11

Successive British governments have also seen 

the UK having a wider role in the rest of the world, 

and this, in a sense, is what Blair alluded to in his 

1999 Chicago and 2007 Plymouth speeches.12 The 

1948 Defence Estimates highlighted this world view: 

“the United Kingdom, as a member of the British 

Commonwealth and a Great Power, must be prepared 

at all times to fulfil her responsibility not only to the 
6

United Nations but also to herself.”13 While not a 

superpower in its own right, Britain’s military and 

civilian presence throughout the world, particularly 

through its continuing Empire, led many to assume 

that the world role would continue, particularly given 

the relative inexperience of the United States in many 

regions.14 However, this assumption about influence 

was undermined by events between 1945 and 1989, 

particularly the Suez Crisis of 1956.15 It was the 1982 

Falklands War that arrested this decline and led to the 

reemergence of the idea of a world role.16

During the Cold War, events and ongoing fiscal 

pressures produced a series of defense reviews in the 

UK. In general, they aimed to support the existing 

defense policy within a steadily decreasing proportion 

of total government expenditure earmarked for 

defense.17 Periodically significant capabilities were 

lost, such as the decision in 1966 not to build a new 

generation of large fixed-wing aircraft carriers,18 and 

these reviews left the UK with the following priorities 

for its armed forces by 1989:

• Maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent 

of four Polaris submarines.

• The defense of the Central Front in Europe.

• The defense of the United Kingdom.

• The protection of transatlantic shipping.

• Maintaining a minor out of area (beyond Europe) 

power projection capability.19

The irony of this list of priorities is that in the 18 

years that have followed, this has effectively been 

reversed. British armed forces are now focused on 

expeditionary warfare—the idea of “going to the crisis 

before it comes to you.” Home defense has a secondary 

role, and although there continues to be an army 
7

presence in Germany, this has been much reduced and 

looks set to end. Debate remains about the role of the 

strategic nuclear deterrent.20

First Wave of Post-Cold War Change, 1989-96.

Following the end of the Cold War the UK effectively 

conducted three reviews between 1990 and 1996 as part 

of its first wave of change. They continued to adopt a 

threat-based approach fearing some form of resurgent 

Soviet Union and comprised of Options for Change, 

1989-91;21 Modifications to Options for Change, 1992-93;22

and Frontline First: The Defence Costs Study, 1994.23

“Options for Change” focused on achieving considerable defense savings set against the background 

fear of a resurgent Soviet Union returning towards a 

more antagonistic relationship to the west. It therefore 

left the armed forces with the same basic mix of forces 

but on a significantly reduced scale. Almost as soon as 

the main decisions of the “Options for Change” process 

were announced in July 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. 

The subsequent lessons drawn from this campaign, 

an increase in the commitment of military forces to 

Northern Ireland, and the beginning of deployments to 

the Balkans, raised question marks about the review.24

What emerged was a defense policy officially based on 

three defense roles, each comprising a series of Defence 

Tasks.25

Defence Role One was largely about home defense 

and the defense of Britain’s dependent territories. In 

reality, it was almost entirely about the preservation 

of an independent nuclear deterrent and support 

for the civil authorities in Northern Ireland. Other 

aspects, such as the air defense of the UK, were further 
8

reduced.26 Defence Role Two proved to be the main 

role and focused on the defense of Europe through 

NATO. Planning revolved around coping with some 

form of resurgent Soviet Union and the development 

of NATO’s new UK-led ARRC. Defence Role 3 swept 

up the remaining missions, in particular the out-of-area 

role and support for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 

missions. It was viewed as the least important although, 

ironically, it would prove to be the most significant in 

terms of operational deployments and long-lasting 

commitments. 

With the economy still in recession, further savings 

were required and a further review was undertaken.27

Three main elements can be identified from this 

review. First, there was the recognition that future 

operations were likely to be joint, i.e., involving more 

than one service. There was, therefore, a need to 

improve the ability of the services to operate together, 

and the relative size of the U.S. Marine Corps made 

it a potential role model. Thus a number of initiatives 

were undertaken to increase jointery within the armed 

forces and save money. These included the creation 

of a permanent joint headquarters (PJHQ) and the 

formation of a single joint staff college. In addition, 

the Joint Rapid Deployment Force was formed as the 

UK’s rapidly deployable land force. It was based on 3 

Commando and 5 Airborne Brigades and comprised 

some 20,000 personnel in all.28

Second, the review concluded that the management 

of the MoD could be made far more efficient. Designed 

to consider all aspects of the department, 20 major and 

13 minor studies were commissioned.29 Significant 

savings were identified, and cuts were made to the 

defense budget, including staff reductions of 7,100 by 

2000.30 The most controversial of these was the study 
9

on medical care, and its implementation had a serious 

impact on retention of medical personnel.31

Third, the pace of contractorization of many of the 

support functions was to be increased and the Private 

Finance Initiative (PFI) applied to defense.32 It was 

hoped that this would free personnel for front line 

tasks, allow improvements to be brought forward by 

using the private sector to raise the necessary capital, 

and reduce the cost of defense in general. Initially, the 

most controversial area in which this was followed 

was defense housing, with virtually the whole of the 

defense housing estate handed over to a commercial 

company, which then leased the accommodation back 

to the MoD.33

Second Wave of Post-Cold War Change, 1997-2001.

The election of Labour into office in 1997 led to the 

Strategic Defence Review (SDR) being published in 1998. 

It represented a shift away from specific threat-based 

planning towards a more capabilities-based approach.34

In many ways, SDR was the first fundamental post-Cold 

War defense review. It aimed to look ahead to 2015, i.e., 

a little further than U.S. Joint Vision 2010 of 1996 but not 

as far as the 2000 Joint Vision 2020. It reflected a much 

broader vision of security and defense related issues 

than previously. It built on a conference run by the MoD 

in 1995 that embraced a broader security agenda.35 The 

armed forces were no longer to be constructed to deal 

with specific threats, such as from the Soviet Union or 

a nuclear attack against NATO, instead they were to 

have a series of capabilities that would enable them to 

be used in a variety of circumstances. 

To achieve this, it was decided that the armed 

forces should be capable of conducting one large 
10

scale operation (divisional level) or two medium scale 

operations (brigade level) within 6 months of one 

another. However, the type of operation in which these 

were formulated was entirely predictable. The large 

scale operation focused on a rerun of the 1991 Gulf 

War, and the medium level deployments were based 

on the deployments to the Balkans. In other words, they 

represented what had happened before rather than 

any consideration of what might happen. Moreover, 

relatively little attention was paid to either network 

centric warfare or asymmetric warfare. Instead, the 

MoD chose to ignore the latter and maintain a watching 

brief over the Revolution in Military Affairs debate 

in the United States, which was still in its relative 

infancy.36

Nevertheless, SDR’s changes were also linked to 

other elements of government reorganization. This 

included the removal of the Overseas Development 

Administration from the Foreign and Commonwealth 

Office and its reconfiguration into the Department 

for International Development (DFID) as a separate 

department of state.37 This bureaucratic change raised 

the profile of international development and issues 

of humanitarianism assistance, with consequential 

challenges for defense.38 More significant was the 

changed outlook of DFID compared to its predecessor. 

It now saw itself as an international aid organization 

rather than a department of state charged with pursuing 

the national interests, and this has had a considerable 

impact on subsequent operations. 
11

Third Wave of Post-Cold War Defense Policy 

Change, 2001-.

Almost as soon as the SDR was published in 

1998, the UK found itself involved in Kosovo as part 

of the NATO operation.39 The British-led ARRC was 

deployed and controlled the international ground 

forces that went into Kosovo in June 1999. The UK 

also found itself involved in Operation DESERT FOX 

with the United States against Iraq in 1998, and in 

May 2000 the UK conducted an operation in support 

of the government of Sierra Leone and the UN, which 

involved the largest purely national deployment of 

forces since the 1982 Falklands War.40 All these raised 

questions about the validity of SDR. However, it was 

the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), that had the 

most profound impact.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United 

States, the MoD published The Strategic Defence Review: 

A New Chapter in 2002.41 The goal was to “Move away 

from always assessing defense capability in terms of 

platforms or unit numbers. It is now more useful to 

think in terms of the effects that can be delivered—

we must consider what effect we want to have on an 

opponent and at what time.”42 While the new chapter 

took a number of steps forward, notably embracing 

network-enabled capability (NEC) and the threat posed 

by asymmetric warfare, it did not fully embrace the 

concept of effects-based warfare.43 This was not fully 

undertaken until the two-part defense white papers, 

Delivering Security in a Changing World, that followed in 

2003 and 2004.44 They drew on the experience of Kosovo, 

Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq and argued that 

only by adopting a comprehensive security approach, 
12

of which defense was but a part, would British interests 

be best served. 

This has led to a number of changes. The first shift 

was the overt move in approach from input-based 

measures to output-based measures of effectiveness. 

For many commentators, this was little more than a 

smokescreen for further defense cutbacks as some 

unit numbers were reduced. For defense and the 

armed forces, it meant a major rethink of what they 

were there to achieve and what was needed to achieve 

this. Perhaps inevitably, they quickly tried to resort 

to input measures such as infantry regiments, fighter 

squadrons, and ships, and the process has not been 

completely successful. 

The second shift was a change in focus within the 

forward defense strategy. Up to and including the SDR, 

the focus had primarily been on Europe and an “arc of 

concern” stretching from North Africa to the Middle 

East. This arc had effectively become Britain’s post-Cold 

War variant of the Inner-German border. However, the 

experiences of Sierra Leone, and especially Afghanistan, 

showed that such a geographical limitation was 

inappropriate, as the challenges to Britain’s defense 

and security policy have become more diffuse and 

more widespread. It was recognized that no British 

government can ignore parts of the world that are 

failing because they may become bases for international 

terrorism, as Afghanistan showed. Moreover, the UK’s 

need to trade provides an obvious requirement for 

Britain to remain fully involved internationally45 while 

the moral dynamic, outlined in the 1999 “Doctrine of 

the International Community” speech of Tony Blair 

and typified by the operation in Sierra Leone in 2000, 

will continue to play a part in future operations.46
13

The third shift was a focus away from traditional 

interstate war to other challenges. The belief is that 

traditional interstate warfare is likely to occur far less 

often because of western advantages in traditional 

warfare. This assumption clearly reflects the ongoing 

commitment of British forces to operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. In the longer term, the assumption is 

more questionable, and it would seem that the MoD 

is tending towards the Rupert Smith view of future 

conflict rather than that espoused by the likes of Colin 

Gray.47 That said, the MOD’s acquisition strategy, as 

section 3 will show, is more ambiguous.

The fourth shift was the emphasis now placed on 

the speed of response and follows the line of thinking 

espoused by the likes of former U.S. Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Emphasis is now on 

acquiring three key elements: sensors capable of 

identifying targets; a communications network able to 

transfer this information to commanders to decide on 

a response; and the strike assets capable of accurately 

hitting the target within the requisite timeframe.48 This, 

in part, explains the drive towards developing an NEC 

that brings these elements together.49

The fifth shift was in the relative balance in British 

interests between America and Europe, and between 

its formal and informal alliances. In other words, 

given the choice between working with the United 

States and the rest of Europe, the British government 

has chosen the former.50 However, it does not believe 

in practical terms that it has had to make this choice, 

simply because it cannot envisage Europe agreeing to 

a significant deployment without America. Instead, the 

new working assumption is that any that any European 

involvement will most likely be on a much smaller 

scale in Africa and explains the British emphasis on the 
14

Anglo-French initiative to create rapidly deployable 

EU battle-groups of around 1,500 personnel.51 Less 

publicized has been the shift towards more informal 

alliances. In announcing the 2003 defense white paper, 

then Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon referred to Britain 

as having two special relations, the traditional one with 

the United States and a second one with Australia. What 

we have also witnessed as part of the transformational 

process has been a shift away from NATO towards 

a more traditional informal alliance involving states 

such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand working 

alongside the United States. In other words, a return 

to its more traditional alliances based on the English 

speaking world.

SECTION 2

Introduction.

Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has found its 

forces engaged in virtually continuous and increasingly 

complex operations around the globe. These have 

ranged from traditional war fighting in Iraq in 1991 

and 2003 to so-called low intensity operations in places 

such as Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland, and the Balkans 

to humanitarian operations and nation-building in 

places such as the Balkans, Northern Iraq, East Timor, 

and Afghanistan. The frequency, intensity, complexity, 

and geographical spread of these operations has 

increased over time. The result has been that Britain’s 

armed forces now find themselves engaged in a series 

of simultaneous operations that they struggle to fully 

support even with the normalization of the security 

situation in Northern Ireland and their drawdown in 

Bosnia.52 A leaked memo of the Chief of the General 
15

Staff was published by The Daily Telegraph and outlined 

the current plight of the army.53

A number of lessons have been drawn from these 

experiences that have influenced defense policy and 

capability development. It is not the intention of this 

section to examine each individual operation in turn. 

Rather, the general lessons drawn by the British armed 

forces are examined together with their implications. 

While it has always been known that the general 

configuration and balance of units in an army for 

armored warfare and low intensity operations was 

different, it remained the assumption within the British 

Army that forces configured for World War III on the 

North German Plains could always be reconfigured 

for other lower intensity operations. During much of 

the second half of the Cold War, the army regularly 

used armored, artillery, and other units in the infantry 

role in Northern Ireland to sustain the operation. In 

fact, the British Army’s first and last fatalities were 

suffered by the Royal Artillery, and reconfiguring 

specialists to the infantry role was continued as the 

commitment to Bosnia began. However, Bosnia and 

subsequent operations have shown that while the likes 

of Northern Ireland was relatively infantry heavy and 

forces could be switched to this role, humanitarian 

or cosmopolitan style operations place far higher 

demands on the specialists and it was not possible 

to switch infantry towards these roles. The result has 

been certain specialists, such as engineers, medics, 

logisticians, and intelligence, have been confronted 

with an unsustainable level of commitment, which has 

led to poor retention rates exacerbated by the fact that 

they are also the areas with skill sets that are easiest 

to transfer to the civilian sector.54 This has raised 

fundamental questions about the army’s overall force 
16

structure and where its focus should be, given the 

inevitability of resource constraints.

The second lesson drawn was that significant 

advantages may well follow from the early and effective 

use of military capabilities. The most frequently cited 

example of this remains the deployment of British 

forces to Sierra Leone in May 2000.55 Here the official 

line is that British troops deployed over the course of 

a weekend succeeded in evacuating all the entitled 

personnel who wanted to leave the country; restored 

order in the capital, Freetown; restored the crumbling 

UN peacekeeping mission; and prevented the 

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from occupying the 

capital and carrying out further atrocities. The reality 

is a little less certain, with doubts still remaining about 

what the RUF actually intended. 

The tragic events of 9/11 in the United States 

appeared to reinforce this view about preemptive 

action. Moreover, the early operations in Afghanistan 

reinforced the view first set out in the 1998 Strategic 

Defence Review that it is better to go to the crisis than 

wait for it to come to you. The events of July 7, 2005, 

in London have again shown the vulnerability of 

western societies to terrorist attacks. It has, therefore, 

been concluded that it is better to try to preempt the 

crisis by using the full range of measures available 

to government, including the military dimension. 

However, the buildup to war in Iraq in 2003 also 

reminded ministers that the military tool also brings its 

own range of limitations.56 For the UK, the deployment 

of a 3-brigade division to Kuwait in March 2003 was 

unsustainable in anything but the immediate short 

term. As a result, while the French Government and 

others pushed for an extension in the time given to 

the weapon inspectors, British ministers were aware 
17

that their armed forces either had to be used or the 

numbers in theater significantly reduced. Iraq clearly 

showed the problems of directly linking the threatened 

use of military force with the diplomatic process, and it 

is unlikely that there will again be such a willingness to 

so tightly link a military buildup with the diplomatic 

process. 

Third, the use and/or threatened use of the military 

is not nearly as neat as political leaders would wish. 

The British Armed Forces are frequently deployed in 

situations where policy has failed and they are the 

default last resort. This is nothing new. The initial 

deployment of troops onto the streets of Northern 

Ireland in 1969 was for 48 hours to restore law and 

order and protect the catholic minority. Some 39 years 

later, normalization has finally happened. In Bosnia, 

the first British troops were deployed simply because 

the UK needed to be seen to be doing something, 

although what, no one was sure. Thus, the idea of 

effects-based operations is problematic when the 

forces are invariably deployed in a political vacuum 

with no clearly articulated end state. It also means that 

the character of any military contribution will vary 

depending on its context and will definitely change 

over time. An effects-based approach means dealing not 

only with the effects but also the causes of the conflict, 

and this was articulated in the discussion document 

that preceded “The Strategic Defence Review: A New 

Chapter.”57

Fourth, the ability to react rapidly and use force 

decisively involves the acquisition of three key 

elements: sensors capable of identifying targets; 

a communications network able to transfer this 

information to commanders to decide on a response; 

and the strike assets capable of accurately hitting the 
18

target within the requisite timeframe.58 This explains 

the emphasis on a NEC.59 However, past operations 

have shown that such a speed of response requires 

rapid decisionmaking processes, both military and 

civilian, which has not always proven to be the case.60

It has also meant that increasingly commanders in the 

field have had authority delegated to them. Where 

possible this has been shared by a senior diplomat or 

political figure in theater such as an Ambassador or 

High Commissioner.

Fifth, in future there will be a balance to be struck 

between peacetime presence and the ability to deliver 

a surge capability. There are a number of arguments 

in favor of maintaining a forward presence. These 

include the role of military assets in support of defense 

diplomacy through training missions, visits, and the 

diplomatic signals that are sent by having units in 

a particular region. Moreover, a forward presence 

allows a more rapid response to a crisis. For example, 

the presence of the Amphibious Ready Group in the 

Mediterranean and the Illustrious carrier group in the 

Eastern Atlantic was vital to rapid deployment to Sierra 

Leone in May 2000. The maritime deployment to Iraq 

in 2003 was built on the back of a previously planned 

deployment of a carrier group and Amphibious Ready 

Group to the Indian Ocean and Pacific region scheduled 

for the first half of 2003. The surface ships deployed in the 

Northern Atlantic were able to support humanitarian 

operations in the wake of the various hurricanes that 

struck the Caribbean during the summer of 2004, while 

those in the Indian Ocean supported Sri Lanka in the 

immediate aftermath of the tsunami in December 2004. 

In addition, having units permanently in theater can 

reduce this response time as was evident in September 

2000 during the hostage rescue mission in Sierra Leone, 
19

where the lack of a staging point immediately off-shore 

for the CH-47 Chinooks meant that they had to be held 

back until the last minute to avoid detection. 

Equally, the maintenance of a permanent presence 

ties up a considerable number of forces. Various 

estimates have been made of the number of ships 

required to maintain one deployed ranging from three 

upwards. There are other dangers, such as reduced 

surge capability, which was the lesson drawn from 

the 1956 Suez Crisis where British forces were so 

overcommitted elsewhere that there was little available 

capability to respond immediately to President Nasser’s 

nationalization of the Suez Canal.61 Such forces may 

also act as targets for terrorists. Presence frequently 

brings with it knowledge and understanding of the 

operating environment that rear basing can lose. For 

example, prior to May 2000 the British military had lost 

its understanding of the peculiar operating constraints 

of West Africa, and these had to be rapidly relearned. 

Recourse to mass documentation dated back to 

literature produced between the two world wars when 

helicopters, for example, were not in use. 

Sixth, as early as 1994 “Frontline First: the Defence 

Costs Study” emphasized the importance of jointery—

the ability of the UK’s three separate services to 

work together routinely—which was identified as 

being of increasing importance for future operations. 

During the latter years of the Cold War, interaction 

between the different environments—sea, land 

and air—had effectively been coordinated through 

Britain’s commitment to NATO. In both the Falklands 

Campaign and the 1991 Gulf War, the UK had used an 

ad hoc command structure to manage the respective 

campaigns.62 It was realized that this situation was 

unsatisfactory and that the armed forces had to be 
20

brought together at all three levels of war—tactical, 

operational, and strategic.

Seventh, recent operations have highlighted the 

importance of host nation support—the provision of 

bases or facilities by other countries to facilitate the 

conduct of operations. The creation and support of 

the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

commitment in Afghanistan has been undertaken 

entirely by air, and, without these transitory rights, the 

operation would not have been possible. Even where 

a country is not landlocked, such as Sierra Leone or 

Iraq, there is frequently the requirement to transit over 

another state’s territory to be able to get there with any 

degree of speed, as well as the requirement for a fallback 

should aircraft need to divert. Turkey’s decision not 

to allow British forces to pass through Turkey caused 

a major readjustment in the plan against Iraq in 2003. 

The initial deployment to Sierra Leone saw permission 

to transit other states’ territory being obtained literally 

while the helicopters and aircraft were in the air because 

of the speed of the military response. This required 

close cooperation between the MoD and the Foreign 

and Commonwealth Office.

Overseas bases have the benefit of host nation 

support without the conditions that may be attached 

to their use. British bases in Cyprus and Gibraltar 

continue to provide an invaluable resource for the 

UK. They can act as Forward Operating Bases for 

operations in and around the Mediterranean; provide 

a useful staging point on the way to the Middle East 

and beyond, or as a means for staging forces further 

forward and beginning the acclimatization process for 

warmer climates. 

Eighth, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have shown 

both the benefits and limitations of operating within 
21

a coalition. No country wants to be isolated when it 

undertakes military operations, and the benefits of 

membership of an alliance or coalition are clear. The 

weight of a number of states coming together and 

calling for or undertaking action is far more significant 

than those by an individual state, even if that state is 

a superpower. Moreover, there are times when the 

wider world community cannot achieve consensus, as 

was the case in both Kosovo and Iraq, when a coalition 

or regional organization can provide the unifying 

element. Such agreements are particularly important 

in both the buildup to and following a conflict when 

the diplomatic and military dimensions are brought 

together.63 From a military perspective, the value 

of additional partners can include the provision of 

additional or supplementary capabilities. Moreover, 

the military importance of coalitions and alliances lies 

not only in the conduct of warfighting tasks. They also 

help to sustain continuing commitments such as those 

in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 

Alliances or coalitions do, however, come with 

a cost. Decisions can be slowed or reach deadlock. 

Working with others brings added military risk, as 

different militaries have to coordinate with one another. 

This partly explains the examples of so-called friendly 

fire in Iraq and elsewhere.64 The challenge for the UK 

will be in anticipating in advance which countries are 

likely to be involved and what force capabilities they 

are prepared to allocate.65

For the UK, forming a coalition with the world’s 

only superpower is an increasing technological 

challenge. Nevertheless, for the short term at least, the 

British Government has concluded that:
22

The most demanding expeditionary operations, 

involving intervention against state adversaries, 

can only plausibly be conducted if U.S. forces are 

engaged, either leading a coalition or in NATO. 

Where the UK chooses to be engaged, we will 

wish to be able to influence political and military 

decisionmaking throughout the crisis, including 

during the post-conflict period. The significant 

military contribution the UK is able to make to 

such operations means that we secure an effective 

place in the political and military decision-making 

processes. To exploit this effectively, our Armed 

Forces will need to be interoperable with U.S. 

command and control structures, match the U.S. 

operational tempo and provide those capabilities 

that deliver the greatest impact when operating 

alongside the U.S.66

This assumption is not new. It was first enunciated in 

1966 in terms of Britain’s use of force East of Suez, but 

in practice, it had been accepted policy since the Suez 

disaster of 1956. 

SECTION 3

As indicated in section 1, there has been a 

considerable change in Britain’s defense capabilities. In 

1989 the defense priorities were, in descending order: 

1. Maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent of 

four Polaris submarines.

2. The defense of the Central Front in Europe.

3. The defense of the UK.

4. The protection of transatlantic shipping. 

5. Maintaining a minor out of area (beyond Europe) 

power projection capability.

Today this has effectively been inverted, with 

priority given to expeditionary warfare followed by 
23

home defense and the maintenance of a strategic nuclear 

capability. To achieve this, there has been a massive 

outpouring of doctrine and acquisition reforms. This 

reprioritization has come with some risks. Funding 

has continued to dominate defense policy with the 

result that, as emphasis has been given to developing 

an expeditionary capability, there have consequently 

been considerable reductions elsewhere, particularly 

in terms of home defense.

Doctrine and Concepts.

No longer does the UK rely almost exclusively on 

memory and NATO. The creation of the Joint Doctrine 

and Concepts Center (now DCDC) as the center piece 

reflects the importance of adapting doctrine to the 

changing circumstances in which the UK finds itself 

committing its forces.67 The UK now has a fairly complete 

framework from the grand strategic to the tactical 

levels geared towards a variety of contingencies.

Two main weaknesses remain. The first is in the 

cross-governmental arena where other departments 

of state have failed to agree on an integrated doctrine. 

There has been much conversation across government 

about the idea of a “comprehensive approach,” and 

ministers regularly use the term. There has also been 

a good deal of practical experience as members of 

the MoD, FCO, and DFID have worked together 

in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, with the 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan being 

examples of this. However, the reality has been far 

less satisfactory. At the strategic level, there is a clear 

ideational difference between the MoD and DFID, 

with the latter having a fundamentally different view 

of their role as a department of state from the MoD. 
24

Operationally, this has proven to be difficult, with DFID 

personnel, for example, being quite circumspect about 

operating in potential war zones. Moreover, much of 

their funding is committed a number of years into the 

future, resulting in relatively small available funding 

for Iraq and Afghanistan. This has had a significant 

effect on nation-building work, and British forces have 

been forced to resort to U.S. funding to help bridge 

some of the deficit.

The second area lies in the tension between DCDC, 

which views itself as the central repository for all 

doctrine and concepts, and the various environment 

warfare centers (air, land, and maritime), which see 

themselves having an important role at the tactical 

and operational levels. The overlap, largely at the 

operational level, has not been universally harmonious, 

and concern has been raised that DCDC is not best 

placed to develop environment specific doctrine. 

This has led to a good deal of institutional rivalry. 

Moreover, as Colin McInnes has argued, there has 

been a tendency for doctrine to become too dogmatic, 

with an assumption that the British have a particular 

expertise towards these nontraditional conflicts.

Nevertheless, at the operational and strategic 

levels recent operations have shown that significant 

progress has been made in terms of command 

and control. The creation of the Permanent Joint 

Headquarters as a mechanism for managing joint and 

combined operations has been remarkably successful. 

In 2000, Brigadier Richards was able to use his 

Operational Reconnaissance and Liaison Team from 

Permanent Joint Headquarters as the basis for his 

operational headquarters in Sierra Leone. Although in 

Kosovo the command system operated through NATO, 

the Permanent Joint Headquarters was intimately 
25

involved in force generation and the planning for 

ground operations. Most recently in Iraq, an entirely 

joint national component command was deployed 

and overseen by Permanent Joint Headquarters with 

agreed joint procedures. This has been assisted by the 

culture of jointery that has developed in part through 

the creation of the Joint Services Command and Staff 

College. 

At the more tactical level, there have previously 

been joint initiatives. After the 1982 Falklands War, 

there were moves to try to create an out-of-area 

division combining 3 Commando Brigade with the 

then 5 Airborne Brigade. This failed for a number of 

reasons, including interservice rivalry. Yet by 2003, 

3 Commando Brigade formed an integral part of 1 

(UK) Division in Iraq. It was delivered into combat 

by helicopters of the UK’s Joint Helicopter Command 

comprising helicopters from all three services, having 

launched in part from the sea and also from bases 

ashore in Kuwait. The brigade included an armored 

reconnaissance squadron from the army and later a 

squadron of the army’s Challenger main battle tanks. 

More recently it has been agreed to place an army 

infantry battalion permanently within 3 Commando 

Brigade’s order of battle to give it a fourth maneuver 

unit and thus conform to current land doctrine. 

Defense Acquisition.

Acquisition policy has been the subject of constant 

change since the early 1980s. A number of trends 

are clearly evident. Firstly, while there is an implicit 

assumption that all contracts should be competitively 

tendered, there is now growing recognition that a purely 

market-driven approach is not always in Britain’s best 
26

interests, and there will be occasions where Britain’s 

wider interests rather than purely defense interests 

may be served through the acquisition of a particular 

product. For example, a previous Secretary of State for 

Defence intervened in the acquisition of the program 

to begin acquiring the next generation of advanced 

trainer aircraft. He directed that instead of the cheapest 

option being taken, it was in Britain’s wider interests 

to acquire new Hawk trainer aircraft from BAE Systems 

in order to preserve the production line and secure an 

Indian order for these aircraft. More recently, giving 

the defence secretary the portfolio of Scotland, as well 

Prime Minister Gordon Brown, has created a potential 

clash of interests. For example, the recent naval base 

review has left things as they were when many within 

the navy had pushed for the closure of the base on the 

Clyde.

Second, there is an increasing need to outsource 

contracts as a mechanism for saving money but 

rather than outsource individual elements to different 

contracts, it is now better practice to outsource support 

services as a whole to an overall contractor who can 

then subcontract as necessary. The reasons for this 

are three-fold. It avoids issues of responsibility when 

contracts fail, it allows an overall contractor to achieve 

economies of scale, and it reduces the level of the 

MOD’s capital stock, thereby reducing the overall 

interest charges the MoD has to pay to the Treasury.68 

The issue of contractorization or the “privatization 

of defense” has been the subject of much political 

debate on both sides of the Atlantic.69 The questions 

for defense in the UK include: Can the allocation of 

work outside the MoD be more cost effective and free 

resources for reinvestment in other areas of defense? 

Can such policies free up military personnel and reduce 
27

the overall pressure on personnel of maintaining 

existing commitments? Are there skills or services that 

only the private sector can provide? In more complex 

operations, are there certain capabilities that the 

military simply do not have or contractors are better 

able to provide? 

In Kosovo the armed forces quickly built refugee 

camps but then handed them over to nongovernment 

bodies, such as the UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR) and Red Cross, who had far greater 

experience of running them. In Iraq, oil workers capable 

of dealing with oil fires accompanied the forces as 

they seized the key oilfields and infrastructure. These 

capabilities are most likely to be used in humanitarian 

operations and the post-hostilities phases of conflicts, 

as the military are used outside their traditional 

warfighting roles.

There is a delicate balance to be drawn, bearing in 

mind the need to maximize the resources, both personnel 

and financial, available to defense, while minimizing 

the risk that the use of contractors may entail. To help 

lock in contractor support, the MoD has signed a 7-year 

enabling contract for Contractor Logistics Support 

with Kellogg, Brown, and Root to help facilitate rapid 

response.70 The obvious risk in using contractors 

is what happens when they fail to meet the agreed 

contract terms. Litigation may eventually provide 

financial compensation, but it is not the ideal means 

of redress on the battlefield. While contractor support 

for Operation TELIC was generally excellent, there 

were two examples of contractor personnel refusing to 

deploy to theater prior to the commencement of the 

combat phase. This is an obvious area of concern.71

Moreover, the experience in Iraq highlighted that 

there is increasingly less likelihood of there being a 
28

definite frontline. As opponents increasingly resort to 

asymmetric tactics, the targeting of contractors is likely 

to be of growing concern. In Iraq, two Kenyans working 

for the MoD’s main food supplier were captured and 

displayed on Iraqi television.72 The increased targeting 

of contractors by opponents could be used to exploit 

vulnerable areas and domestic public opinion. 

The over-provision of equipment in one area 

necessarily means that in a world of finite resources, 

there will be insufficient resources available elsewhere. 

That is the central dilemma for policymakers. 

Operations in Iraq showed this when the requirement 

for desert equipment proved greater than that 

previously envisaged and held in stock. In its review of 

Operation TELIC, the National Audit Office concluded 

that: 

We found that Operation TELIC was a significant 

military success, particularly in the deployment 

and combat phases, and the MoD has identified 

lessons that could reduce the risks associated with 

future operations. Planning for the Operation 

was responsive and flexible, reacting quickly 

when it was decided to enter the main UK force 

through southern Iraq rather than the north. A 

large and capable force was deployed quickly 

to the Gulf and within four weeks of the combat 

phase starting the Ba’athist regime fell. Overall, 

UK personnel and their equipment performed 

impressively. There are, however, important 

lessons for future operations, mostly about the 

need to review what our forces should be ready 

to do at short notice, ensuring that frontline 

forces receive appropriate levels of equipment 

and supplies and in managing the transition from 

conflict to the post-conflict phase.73
29

But the report also noted that:

For Operation TELIC, forces were stretched to 

make good gaps in the much shorter time available 

than was expected. This raises questions about the 

link between current planning assumptions and 

holdings of operational stocks and whether the 

balance between stocks on shelves and “just-in 

time deliveries’ was drawn in the right place.74

One mechanism that the MoD has chosen is to 

rely on industry to provide some capacity at short 

notice by issuing Urgent Operational Requirements 

(UORs).75 This allows the MoD to place urgent orders 

for equipments for specific operations using money 

provided by the Treasury for that operation. In 

Afghanistan, 155 million pounds was spent on urgent 

military capability enhancements to fund the initial 

warfighting and ISAF set up.76 This necessarily involves 

risk. The delivery of equipment immediately before 

the outbreak of hostilities also minimizes the amount 

of training time available to acquaint personnel with 

the new capabilities.77 Moreover, the Sierra Leone 

operation literally occurred over a weekend, resulting 

in the forces deployed using their existing equipment.

Moreover, the recourse to off-balance sheet finance 

via mechanisms such as Public-Private Partnerships 

is having further complications. While such contracts 

tend to fix the price of assets and allow defense to gain 

capabilities earlier than they might otherwise have 

been able to, it comes with three further costs. First, the 

contractor will have included a profit element within 

the contract with substantial fees for any contract 

variation. Inevitably the MoD, having found a capability 

useful, wants more. Second, as assets are transferred to 

the private sector, there are less and less quiet jobs that 

operational personnel can be switched to when they 
30

are on down time. Moreover, it also means that there 

is no spare capacity, and the defense will have lost the 

know-how for a particular asset. Third, the fixed nature 

of fees means that an increasingly large proportion of 

the defense budget is effectively mortgaged for years 

ahead, thereby reducing defense planners’ flexibility 

in the event of change. 

Third, there is a need to preserve certain core 

capabilities, and this can only be achieved through 

a partnership relationship with industry.78 Defense 

remains a key element in the UK’s remaining manufacturing base, and, if the MoD wishes to ensure that its 

UORs can be met, then there is a need to retain certain 

surge capacity. The existing Defence Industrial Strategy 

listed a series of areas, but this is thought insufficient 

and the current revised strategy due out by the end of 

the year is likely to be significantly larger. However, 

the reliance on UORs is problematic. Industry has 

responded as best it can, but the lead times have left 

personnel vulnerable in various operational theaters 

and meant that the services have suffered a higher 

casualty rate than they need have. 

Fourth, technology transfer with the United States 

remains a big issue. As the UK looks to increasingly 

integrate its forces with those of the United States, there 

is a great push to allow a greater flow of information 

between companies. The UK is not alone in this, and 

it has caused problems in coalition operations where 

various units have not been able to integrate with one 

another.

Defense Capabilities.

Overall, these changes have impacted on Britain’s 

armed forces in a number of ways. At the warfighting 

end of the spectrum, the challenge is to focus on “the 
31

way we want to use our forces against a determined, 

mobile, often disparate, and elusive enemy.”79 To 

achieve this requires the ability to find, to decide on 

action, and to strike an opponent accurately and very 

quickly. Kosovo highlighted weaknesses in the UK’s 

precision attack capability. This was in large part 

corrected by the time of Operation TELIC some 4 years 

later.80 The UK had been limited in its ability to support 

air operations over Kosovo, and this diminished 

its overall influence on the entire campaign as the 

European members of NATO looked to the United 

States to provide the requisite capability. 

For the navy, the emphasis on delivering effects 

from the sea was first articulated in 1995 in the navy’s 

doctrine BR-1806: the Fundamentals of British Maritime 

Doctrine.

81 To achieve these effects, the doctrine argued 

that the navy needed to focus on three core capabilities: 

maritime air, nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) 

equipped with Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles 

(TLAMs), and its amphibious capabilities.82 The navy 

believes that only by retaining all three core capabilities 

can it provide the full range of naval effects that any 

British government would need. The incoming Labour 

government has clearly bought into this agenda as part 

of its Strategic Defence Review, and all three are being 

developed at different rates. However, the short-term 

need to service the deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan 

has meant that the navy has, along with the air force, 

been pushed to find savings for investment in the land 

forces. 

Nonetheless, the government remains committed 

to the acquisition of two large aircraft carriers to 

replace the existing force of three smaller Invincibleclass vessels. These were formally announced in July 

2007 and will be some 65,000 tons, i.e., each will be 
32

more than the combined displacement of the existing 

force.83 Originally the in-service dates were set at 2012 

and 2015, but this has been deferred to 2014 and 2016. 

It is envisaged that these will be equipped with the 

Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant 

of the new Joint Strike Fighter under development 

with the United States.84 Concern has been expressed 

about whether full operational independence would 

come with this acquisition, and Minister for Defence 

Procurement Lord Drayson indicated that if access 

to the relevant source codes was withheld, then the 

British long-term commitment of the UK to the project 

would end. This situation appears to have been 

resolved. However, doubts remain about this whole 

capability. There are several reasons for this. First, a 

number of commentators have questioned why such 

a program is going ahead, given the UK’s official line 

that no large-scale operations would be undertaken 

without express U.S. involvement. They argue that this 

mean that a U.S. carrier would therefore be available. 

Lesser scale operations, such as the 2000 deployment 

to Sierra Leone, can be conducted with smaller carriers 

and even assault carriers such as HMS Ocean. The 

proponents of the carrier program argue that such a 

capability is needed if a Falklands-type operation were 

to be undertaken again although it is difficult to see 

where this would happen.

Second, there is a query over the acquisition of the 

STOVL version of the JSF. Critics have argued that, 

given the size of these carriers, it would be far better if 

the conventional take off and landing (CTOL) version 

were acquired which has a far greater range and capacity 

to return unused munitions. The reasoning for not 

adopting this option represents the coming together of 

a series of interests. Within the navy, there is concern 
33

about the catapult technology (they lost their expertise 

with steam when HMS Fearless left service), and doubts 

remain about the unproven electro-magnetic catapults. 

Moreover, this would increase the crew size marginally 

which adds up over the 50-year life cycle. The air force 

is equally adamant that the STOVL variant should be 

adopted. To adopt the CTOL variant would provide a 

capability very similar to that which the air force wants 

to replace—its existing Tornado strike force—and they 

do not want JSF. Thus, the variant adopted may well be 

suboptimal in terms of capability but placates various 

factions within the armed forces. 

Third, there are doubts that the navy would ever be 

able to crew both ships and that a single carrier would 

have little chance of being in the right place at the right 

time. Moreover, given the investment in it, there will be 

insufficient protection for it, and it will therefore have to 

remain far out to sea and rely on shore-based air-to-air 

refuelling aircraft, especially with the adoption of the 

STOVL version of JSF. Thus the arguments about the 

need for independence of foreign basing are weakened 

as the carriers become tied to the availability of landbased support aircraft. Moreover, as there will have 

been close to a decade’s gap between the Sea Harrier

leaving service and JSF entering service, there remains 

a big question mark about why such a sophisticated air 

defense system is needed.

Fourth, there is a question mark over the size of 

the air group. The current Harrier force comprises 4 

squadrons equipped with a mixture of Royal Navy and 

Royal Air Force personnel. These are almost exclusive 

tied to supporting operations in Afghanistan, and the 

navy is currently borrowing a USMC squadron to 

exercise one of its carriers.85 Even if the Harrier force 

loses its Afghanistan mission, the overall size of the 
34

force, even if replaced on a one-for-one basis, is barely 

sufficient to support a single carrier air group. In other 

words, it is extremely unlikely that either of the new 

carriers will ever go to sea with a full air group, which 

raises a further question mark over their size.

The second core capability is that the UK’s nuclearpowered attack submarines will be equipped with 

Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles. The existing force of 

eight boats is becoming old, and the next generation 

of nuclear-powered attack submarines—the Astute

class—is late in delivery, with the first having just 

recently been launched.86 Neither the existing force 

or the new Astute force have vertical launch tubes for 

these missiles, so their capacity to carry these weapons 

remains limited, as does the overall fleet stock acquired 

to date. To help maintain this capability into the future, 

the United Kingdom is co-funding with the United 

States studies into equipping the next generation of 

TLAM for firing through existing torpedo tubes. The 

size of the submarine force looks set to continue to fall 

as costs continue to rise, and there is concern whether 

the size of the force has become unsustainable, given 

the cost of the associated nuclear infrastructure.87 At 

the moment, there are three Astute class SSNs under 

construction with long lead items ordered for a fourth. 

Even if the four strategic nuclear boats are included, 

the total force numbers a mere 12 boats.88

The amphibious warfare capability has seen the 

greatest change of any military capability since the 

end of the Cold War. From being a Cinderella part of 

the Royal Navy, it has now become one of its two core 

components. The capability continues to be modernized 

with the entry into service of the second Landing Pad 

Dock, HMS Bulwark, designed to embark, transport, and 

deploy as well as to recover troops and their equipment 
35

by air and sea and provide the headquarters for the 

Amphibious Assault Force. In addition, four Bay-class 

Auxiliary Landing Ship Dock, which are twice the size 

of their predecessors, are also entering service.89 Their 

principal role is to carry personnel and equipment and 

deploy them by air and sea. There are also six roll-on/

roll-off ships available for the rapid deployment of 

forces and their equipment by sea. When matched with 

3 Commando Brigade, this capability is significant. 

The current problem facing the navy is the virtual 

continuous use of elements of 3 Commando Brigade 

on operations ashore as specialized mountain warfare 

infantry. This means that at best it has an Amphibious 

Ready Group based around a single battalion available 

at any point in time.

In the background, the balance between presence 

and surge capacity is tending to favor the latter and a 

reduction in the overall size of the destroyer/frigate 

fleet was announced in July 2004 from 31 to 25. The 

new Type 45 destroyer will provide more capability 

with six ordered and plans for a total of eight ships. The 

Type 45 class “will be the largest and most powerful air 

defense destroyers ever operated by the Royal Navy 

and the largest general purpose surface warships 

(excluding aircraft carriers and amphibious ships) to 

join the fleet since World War II cruisers.”90 However, 

these ships look remarkably underarmed, being fitted 

for but not equipped with TLAM for example. Concern 

has already been expressed as overall fleet numbers 

have fallen below those of France. 

Land.

The Strategic Defence Review created a land force 

of six heavy brigades—three armored and three 

mechanized, together with an air assault brigade. It 
36

had been intended that the three mechanized brigades 

would ultimately become medium-weight brigades 

and that all six heavy brigades would be placed within 

two divisions (the three armored in 1 Division in 

Germany and the three mechanized in 3 Division in 

the UK) and rotated in their mission allocation over 

a 3-year period. In addition, there is 16 Air Assault 

Brigade and the Royal Marines (RM) 3 Commando 

Brigade in the light role. At any point, the Joint Rapid 

Reaction Force could, in theory, call on 16 Air Assault 

Brigade, 3 Commando Brigade, plus the high readiness 

armored and mechanized brigades. 

These recent operations have shown that the 

overall structure of the army is not appropriately 

balanced in a number of respects. The Strategic Defence 

Review focused operational command at the divisional 

level. While this may be right for larger operations 

such as Iraq, it is not always appropriate. In Kosovo, 

Lieutenant-General Mike Jackson chose not to use the 

deployed 3 Division headquarters to command the two 

British brigades but instead commanded them directly 

from the Allied Command Europe ARRC. This was 

again being replicated with the ARRC deployment 

to Afghanistan, although 6 Division headquarters 

is currently being set up to support the Afghanistan 

deployment.91 Earlier in 2001 in Afghanistan, a much 

smaller force was deployed, which included elements of 

both 16 Air Assault and 3 Division headquarters. Given 

the constraints on lift, a single headquarters capable of 

commanding the ISAF force would have been more 

useful. In Sierra Leone Brigadier Richards effectively 

operated with just a single battalion overseen by the 

Operational Reconnaissance and Liaison Team, with a 

brigade headquarters taking over in the campaign. 

This question of the right command level has 

placed a practical limitation on the number of 
37

British deployments, with only two active divisional 

headquarters and seven army brigade headquarters. 

The new White Papers reflect a change in emphasis 

towards the brigade level of command. This level of 

command is likely to be the principal one except on 

large-scale operations. It will now be given greater 

independence with its own integrated logistic and 

engineer capabilities along the lines of the Royal 

Marines Logistical Regiment. The Royal Marines, with 

army support and assistance, have created a third 

divisional headquarters and the recent announcement 

of the formation of 6 Division will make a fourth. 

The army equipment program continues to largely 

revolve around the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) 

program and a series of UORs to provide in-theater 

capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is also hoped 

to improve their target and information gathering 

capabilities through the acquisition of unmanned aerial 

vehicles. The army recognized that it needed to be able 

to provide more balanced forces over the full conflict 

spectrum and that the force construction developed by 

the Strategic Defence Review needed to change. It plans 

to move one of its armored brigades to the light role 

and to partially lighten the medium brigades through 

the transition of one of their armored squadrons to the 

armored reconnaissance role. It is envisaged that the 

FRES of armored vehicles will create a highly capable, 

fully networked medium weight force, which is more 

rapidly deployable.92 The lack of available of light 

forces and operational headquarters has also led to 

the commitment of one of the home-based regional 

brigades, 52 Brigade to succeed 12 Mechanized Brigade 

in Afghanistan.93 This means that with 3 Commando 

Brigade there are 9 maneuver brigades with effectively 

two deployed on operations at any one time.
38

The Iraq experience has also highlighted the 

problems of having different peacetime and wartime 

configurations. According to Paul Beaver, “What you 

have to remember is that our force structures are wrong 

in the UK. We have a peacetime structure and a war 

fighting structure, we should only have a war fighting 

structure, because that is what we do.”94 Most infantry 

battalions, for example, have only three companies in 

peacetime and have to borrow a fourth from another 

regiment for wartime. Similarly, the armored brigades 

have three 3 maneuver groups (armor/infantry 

battalions) in peacetime but their doctrine envisages 

four in wartime.95 Thus when 7 Armored Brigade 

deployed to the Gulf in 2003, it had to borrow an 

additional armored regiment. Moreover, the army has 

operated the “Arms Plot” system in which it has sought 

to rotate its infantry battalions between roles over 

time to ensure that its personnel can obtain different 

training experiences.96 The fundamental problem with 

this system was that at the time of the Iraq deployment 

in 2003, 19 of the infantry battalions were in the process 

of retraining and therefore unavailable for operations.97

The army has decided therefore to abandon the Arms 

Plot and reconfigure its existing regimental structure 

to provide more readily available forces capable of 

deploying throughout the world.98 The aim is to return 

to a more traditional regimental structure containing 

multiple battalions and to rotate individuals over time 

rather than whole units, thereby maintaining units 

at their wartime strength. In theory this will allow 

regiments to fight together and maintain regimental 

ethos rather than be cut and pasted together under 

nominal titles. In practice this is not so clear, the process 

threw up a series of exceptions, and units are still not 

being manned to their wartime configurations, which 

means they continue to borrow from one another.
39

The important role that Special Forces play has 

been recognized in the 2004 Defence White Paper which 

stated “We are increasing the strength of our Special 

Forces and investing in new equipment for them.”99 A 

number of initiatives are currently underway. These 

include the creation of the Special Reconnaissance 

Regiment, a new unit in the Special Forces Group, 

tasked with meeting the growing need for special 

reconnaissance capability. In addition, the army’s 

reorganization has involved the refocusing of 1st 

Battalion of the Parachute Regiment into a new Joint 

Special Forces Support Group something akin to the 

U.S. Ranger role.100 This means that it can provide more 

direct support to Special Forces as elements of 45 RM 

Commando did in Iraq.

Air.

Under the latest Defence White Paper, the Royal 

Air Force has recognized the need for change and has 

chosen to move away from an emphasis on having 

main operating bases in the UK supporting forward 

deployments, in favor of operating with a much more 

expeditionary focus along the lines of the U.S. Air Force 

Air Expeditionary Force concept.101 This aims to create 

a balanced air force capable of deploying overseas and 

sustaining itself on operations for a specified period 

of time. In response the air force has created nine 

expeditionary air wings. That is only one aspect of the 

changes that have taken place. Reflecting on recent 

operational experience, Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief 

Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup has highlighted some of the 

changes that have been occurring:
40

In Telic last year, we deployed about 30 percent 

fewer fast jets than we did for the Gulf War in 

1991, and yet the force was far more powerful 

and capable than in 1991 because we focused on 

the right things over that period, modern sensors, 

particularly precision, and we will see the same 

sort of gearing through investing in network 

capability.102

The air force is therefore focusing on an effectsbased approach. This is having a considerable impact 

on its force makeup and overall size. While the Tornado

was the main strike platform both in 1991 and 2003, 

its capabilities had been transformed. New highly 

accurate missiles and bombs have given it a far greater 

capability. There is a new emphasis on the ability of 

platforms to exchange information. As the 2003 Iraq 

War showed, there is now a requirement for a much 

more rapid and accurate response. The UK forces must 

be capable of operating in the same airspace as its 

principal allies, particularly the United States, without 

undue risk.

Some changes will be fairly predictable. The 

limitations of the UK fighter force have been recognized 

for some time. The Tornado F3 was designed for the Cold 

War scenario of intercepting Soviet bombers equipped 

with cruise missiles at long range. Its replacement, the 

Typhoon, is just entering service and will now give the 

armed forces a highly agile fighter aircraft. Moreover, 

the new Typhoon will be multirole, having the capability 

to perform several tasks, sometimes simultaneously. 

Other changes will be less predictable. The potential 

for unmanned aircraft is still being explored and 

developed while the RAF Regiment is moving away 

from providing for the air defense of RAF airfields 

towards a focus on the need to protect them from 

surface attack.
41

Recent operational examples have highlighted 

the continuing importance of timely information. 

There is nothing new about this fundamental aspect 

of war. Operation TELIC, however, showed that new 

technologies are providing the opportunity for a step 

change in capability. This was partly recognized during 

the Strategic Defence Review, but recent operations have 

reinforced the requirement to further improve UK 

capabilities. Improvements to UK airborne surveillance 

capabilities include the acquisition of the Airborne 

Stand-off Radar (ASTOR) ground surveillance system 

which links into the American Joint Surveillance and 

Attack Radar System (JSTARS) program. For the 

Tornado GR4 force the Reconnaissance Airborne Pod 

for Tornado (RAPTOR) long-range reconnaissance 

sensor pod has been acquired, providing both a day 

and night time capability. Modifications are also in 

hand on the UK fleet of E-3D Sentry airborne early 

warning aircraft to give them a command and control 

capability. The United Kingdom is also updating the 

electronic reconnaissance capability of its Nimrod MR2 

force.103 The Nimrod MR2 force is also being heavily 

used, and it is clear that none of these capabilities is 

sufficient to sustain the current levels of commitment.

The Strategic Defence Review emphasized logistics 

including air and sealift. The importance of such 

capacity is clearly evident, and the Government has 

decided that the short-term lease of four C-17s will 

be followed by their permanent acquisition and the 

purchase of an additional two aircraft. These aircraft 

will work alongside the A400M when it enters 

service, representing a significant enhancement in 

airlift capacity to a level last seen in the early 1970s.104

However, the A400M has been further delayed until 

2011. The replacement strategic tanker aircraft program 
42

has been delayed, and the RAF continues to struggle to 

support its commitments. Worst still is the problems 

with the support helicopter force, which is insufficient 

for current requirements. Some short-term measures 

have been taken, such as the purchase of 6 EH101 

Merlins from Denmark and the planned modification of 

8 Special Forces Chinook helicopters, which have been 

in store for several years. However, much of the fleet, 

especially the Pumas and the navy’s Sea King HC4s are 

very old and struggling to cope with the climates in 

which they are now operating. 

SECTION 4

The ongoing transformation of British defense policy and its impact on Britain’s armed forces has been 

examined. This section reviews the implications of this 

transformation for the U.S. Army and the wider U.S. 

defense community.

Areas where the U.S. Army Could Draw Lessons 

from UK Policies.

1. While a good deal is spoken about jointery, 

the British have found that through force of circumstance, both operational and financial, they have had 

to become increasingly joint, and that this only really 

works when the issues of understanding and culture 

are addressed. For example, it is worth noting here 

that the traditional tension between the Royal Marines 

and British Army has largely been set aside as operational needs and overstretch have forced compromise. 

The British Army has actively supported increases in 

the capabilities of 3 Commando Brigade by adding a 

fourth army infantry maneuver unit to it, together with 
43

enhancements to various areas of combat service support. It has also assisted in creating a third divisional 

headquarters (HQ) from HQ Royal Marines and thus, 

with the raising of the new 6 Division headquarters, 

has created 4 divisional level headquarters to sustain 

ongoing operations. This has largely been achieved 

through restructuring and effectively making elements 

from the three services work alongside one another. 

For example, the creation of the Joint Helicopter Command responsible for overseeing the deployment of 

the tactical and support helicopters for all three services immediately allowed rationalization of the number 

of helicopters deployed to the Balkans theater and 

thus eased the overall pressure on the helicopter force. 

This cultural change has been facilitated by the creation of the Joint Services Command and Staff College 

which has brought together staff training at the war 

college level. The result has been the production of a 

generation of officers who have been affected by a joint 

culture and developed their own personnel networks 

that stretch beyond their own service. This familiarity 

has enhanced understanding and trust and broken the 

worst elements of inter-service prejudices.

2. While a technological lead can have great benefits, transformation and achieving an effects-based 

approach is highly dependent on the individuals involved, frequently at a very junior level. Quite often 

UK forces have lacked capabilities and have sought to 

compensate through the quality of their people. Mission command is very real, particularly in the land dimension, where the experience of Northern Ireland has 

encouraged a decentralized approach to operations. It 

is also a legacy of Empire where small detachments 

were dispatched on individual missions and explains 

why in the British Army, for example, individual com-
44

panies are commanded by majors and not captains. 

Moreover, much of the core experience lies within 

the senior noncommissioned officer cadre, and it is 

also worth noting that approximately one-third of the 

British Army’s officer corps were formerly ordinary 

soldiers. 

3. There is, however, a fundamental difference between knowledge and information and one of the biggest challenges is to convert information into knowledge and thus provide understanding. It is clear that 

the British system of post-action reports and lessons 

learned continues to provide important learning tools. 

However, a cultural problem has also been shown. 

Too often such reports identify what went wrong in 

order that this might be corrected. Too few reports actually identify what went right and thus the knowledge that is provided by such exercises is negative 

knowledge—what went wrong—and there is a need 

to capture the positive knowledge of what went right 

to avoid this going wrong in the future. The issue of 

corporate memory is not solely a military one, but it 

is clear from successive British operations that there 

is a poor procedure for retaining the inherent knowledge. The standard procedure after a successful campaign is to break up the team that ran it and dismantle 

the associated infrastructure. Rebuilding knowledge 

sets is difficult, and there is not always time. For example, the British had forgotten about the unique 

challenges associated with operations in West Africa 

and literally had to rediscover them in the midst of 

their no-notice deployment to Sierra Leone. Fortunately the opposition proved to be far less problematic than was first thought, and thus the British weaknesses were not exploited. The U.S. Army would be 

wise to reflect on how it captures and maintains the 

knowledge set associated with its own operations. 
45

4. Nevertheless, technology is a clear force multiplier. Without it, the U.S.-led forces would not have been 

so successful in the conventional phase of the war in 

Iraq in March-April 2003. It also means that commanders can take greater risks knowing that they can exert 

escalation dominance, as the operation in Sierra Leone 

showed. It is therefore important that key U.S. allies 

are fully integrated with U.S. forces. This needs to occur at a variety of different levels including the defense 

industrial. In Iraq and on a number of other operations 

British forces did not have a full operational picture, 

and there were a number of ways in which coalition 

forces sought to get around these problems. Nevertheless, their efforts were suitably hamstrung, and this, 

in part, explains the emphasis that has been placed by 

the British government on addressing the transatlantic 

technology transfer issue. It is also clear that some of 

the blue-on-blue incidents might have been prevented 

if the relevant technology had been available. For example, if the British forces had continued to use Blue 

Force Tracker, the tragic loss of 6 Royal Military Police 

might have been prevented by other forces coming to 

their assistance. It is noteworthy that the British media 

were particularly vociferous when such incidents involved U.S. forces, and this sensitivity is likely to be reflected across coalitions. It is therefore important that 

U.S. Army plays its part in assisting in and encouraging interoperability of ideas and equipment. 

5. It is also clear that interoperability of equipment 

is not enough. Militaries often do things in different 

ways as a result of their history. A number of commentators have noted that, for example, the Australian Army transformed itself from one that eschewed a 

British ethos to one that adopted an American one as 

a result of the British withdrawal from East of Suez in 
46

the early 1970s. This is not to say it was wrong, merely 

that if forces do not regularly train together and understand their differences, it will make little difference whether their equipment is the same or not. One 

of the reasons why U.S. and British land forces were 

able to work so well together in the 1991 left hook was 

their familiarity through NATO and preparing to fight 

the Soviet Army. It is therefore essential that key allies regularly train together. The danger of sustaining 

ongoing operations is that this is an area that is often 

neglected.

6. As a result of financial limitations the British defense community has been quite creative in its use of 

private contractors to release personnel and assets for 

operations. These have ranged from the use of contractors close to the battlefield to major elements of defense 

infrastructure. However, as identified in this monograph, this remains a two-edged sword and needs to 

be handled with care. In the case of the UK, the various public-private partnerships (PPPs) have enabled a 

whole series of updates and capabilities to be funded 

earlier than they might otherwise. There are a number 

of potential dangers associated with such contracts. 

First, it means that the defense budget is increasingly 

mortgaged ahead with a sizeable part earmarked to 

support these contracts, thus removing some of the 

flexibility that defense planners had. Second, while 

such contracts release service personnel for operations, 

it also means that there is an overall net reduction in 

service personnel in nonoperational assignments. The 

major limiting factor on ships’ time at sea remains the 

human one. As the Royal Navy has reduced in size, 

an increasingly larger proportion of it is assigned to 

sea billets, which means that these ships are limited in 

their levels of deployment by their crews. Third, there 
47

is an issue relating to the vulnerability of contractors. 

For the British, there are important legal restrictions on 

their ability to bear arms, which may mean that they 

are more vulnerable than regular forces. Finally, there 

is a longer term concern. As private contractors take 

areas of responsibility, the knowledge associated with 

these areas is lost and the customer becomes totally dependent on the service provider. 

Areas where the U.S. Army and the UK MoD Could 

Develop Integrated or Complementary Approaches 

and Doctrines towards Transformation for Future 

Alliance/Coalition Operations.

1. The challenge for any military is to maintain the 

breadth and depth of experience and knowledge to cover the myriad of activities that today’s armed forces are 

expected to undertake. Clearly some militaries have a 

greater lead in some areas than others. In terms of low 

intensity operations, the United Kingdom has clear 

advantages drawn from its greater combat experience 

in this area. This was reflected in an Office of Force 

Transformation and MoD cosponsored study on NEC 

and British low intensity operations that highlighted a 

great number of tactical and operation lessons.105 Nevertheless, the U.S. military forces have shown their 

ability to rapidly adapt, although the approach taken 

needs to reflect the circumstances in which forces find 

themselves. For example, the deployment of the Black 

Watch battlegroup to relieve U.S. Marines for operations against Fallujah highlighted the inappropriateness of British rules of engagement (ROE) designed for 

the Basra area to their new operating environment. 

2. The EU’s battle group concept has been largely 

based on the UK Spearhead Battalion, an on-call light 
48

infantry battalion with supporting arms capable of 

deploying anywhere on light scales at very short notice. The clearest example of its successful use was in 

Operation PALLISER, the deployment to Sierra Leone 

in May 2000. Encouraging the other members of the 

European Union to adopt this and also contribute to 

NATO’s Response Force (NRF) is a sound means of 

inculcating a culture of change within Europe’s militaries. Moreover, it gets them to think increasingly 

about expeditionary warfare, including the resourcing 

and sustaining of such operations over long distances. 

3. The MoD’s ideas about a Comprehensive Approach make a good deal of sense and the concepts 

and ideas behind them are useful. However, the extent 

to which they are actually implemented is more limited. There is little support for this initiative outside 

the MoD, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 

and Department for International Development markedly cool about the idea. Nevertheless, these ideas are 

increasingly being adopted, at least notionally, within NATO, and it is in the interests of both the United 

States and the United Kingdom. 

Implications for the U.S. Army for Working 

with the UK. 

1. For the United Kingdom, an effects-based 

approach is about achieving its national interests. If this 

involves coalition operations, then the United Kingdom, 

like other coalition partners, will be concerned not 

only with how it affects the enemy. It will also be 

concerned about influencing third party opinion. In 

the case of Iraq, this included the general Arab world, 

its coalition partners, particularly the United States, 

and also its own domestic audience. For the coalition 
49

to work, the UK government will expect to be listened 

to. If this does not prove to be the case and the United 

Kingdom is not seen to have a significant impact, this 

will directly impact British public opinion and, hence, 

British support for an operation. The British public 

remain proud of their military and its capabilities; in 

the main warfighting stages of the Iraq War in 2003, 

they were very sensitive to blue-on-blue losses.

2. As probably the second transformational 

power after the United States, the United Kingdom 

has developed quite significant power projection or 

expeditionary warfare capabilities. These are being 

matched to an understanding of an effects-based 

approach, but this thinking remains in its infancy. 

Nevertheless, the United Kingdom struggles to retain 

interoperability, particularly with U.S. ground forces. 

The allocation of Basra and the southeast sector of Iraq 

in 2003 was one way of limiting the problems of lack 

of interoperability, and it is worth noting that if the 

United Kingdom is struggling, then other U.S. allies 

are likely to be in a far worse position.

3. In developing capabilities with the United States, 

Britain will expect to receive access to the full technology 

data so that it can continue to maintain and adapt 

its forces into the future. Operational independence 

remains a key requisite for the British government, 

and dependence is a tricky and sensitive issue for the 

United Kingdom to deal with. This attitude, in part, 

explains the sensitivity felt over access to the codes of 

the Joint Strike Fighter.

4. British forces, like their American counterparts, 

have been supporting two major operations 

simultaneously. This has had a major impact in terms 

of recruitment and retention and there is serious 

concern, particularly within the army, whether this is 
50

sustainable for much longer. There is a considerable 

danger that these forces might break in some form.

5. The British forces will continually suffer from 

resource restrictions. Current force development and 

investment plans do not appear fully sustainable, 

despite the planned increase in defense spending in 

real terms projected for the next 3 years. The Ministry 

of Defence will continue to have to make hard choices 

about its priorities, and it is limited in its ability to 

reallocate resources by the number of Public-Private 

Partnerships it has entered into and some previous 

defense decisions, such as the Tranche 3 buy of 

Eurofighter Typhoon. 

6. In general, the British are able to recruit sufficient 

personnel to support the current size of their armed 

forces, but the retention of personnel is of concern. The 

sustaining of significant overseas commitments, with 

Afghanistan being the largest, is affecting retention 

levels. This means that there is a degree of diminution of 

experience as less experienced personnel are required 

to act above their grade. Among certain specialist areas, 

the situation is of far greater concern.106

7. Of the three environments, the air and sea 

dimensions remain most wedded to traditional 

capabilities rather than those most needed for current 

operations. For example, in examining effects-based 

operations, the Royal Air Force is now moving towards 

“effect” being defined purely in terms of kinetic effect. 

This focus on traditional capabilities is likely to lead 

to suboptimization in acquisition strategies as some 

capabilities are acquired with a particular relevance 

to history, service preferences, and/or domestic 

labor employment. For example, current defense 

policy assumes that only large-scale operations will 

be undertaken in conjunction with the United States. 
51

This has raised serious questions about the navy’s 

rationale behind the acquisition of two 65,000 ton 

aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the decision to acquire 

these behemoths has been approved as part of the 

shipbuilding acquisition strategy. 

8. It is also worth noting that while official policy 

continues to emphasize the importance of NATO and 

the European Union in practice, British defense policy is 

increasingly moving away from its links to its European 

counterparts. Increasingly, the most important partners 

are those within the ABCA community (including New 

Zealand, which is often forgotten about) and Australia 

has officially been named as UK’s second special 

relationship.

ENDNOTES

1. For the latest United Kingdom thinking on this, see Global 

Strategic Trends 2007-2036, London: Development, Concepts and 

Doctrine Center, 2007, www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/5CB29DC4-

9B4A-4DFD-B363-3282BE255CE7/0/strat_trends_23jan07.pdf; Tony 

Blair, Our Nation’s Future—Defence, Speech made January 12, 

2007, Plymouth, www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10735.asp.

2. See Table D-4 on Defense Spending, Allied Contributions 

to the Common Defense, 2004, Washington DC: Department of 

Defense, 2004, p. D-5, www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2004/

allied2004.pdf; see also Defence Statistics, 2006, London: MoD, 2006, 

www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/ukds/2006/pdflist.html.

3. See Matthew Uttley, “Contractors on Deployed Military 

Operations: United Kingdom Policy and Doctrine,” Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2005, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB624.pdf; 

Matthew Uttley, “Contracting-Out and Market-Testing in the UK 

Defence Sector: Theory, Evidence and Issues,” Public Money & 

Management, 1993; Matthew R. H. Uttley, “Private contractors on 

deployed operations: the United Kingdom experience,” Defence 

Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 145-165; Keith Hartley, 
52

“The Economics of Military Outsourcing,” Defence Studies, Vol. 4, 

No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 199-206.

4. “Joint Service Publication 777-Network Enabled 

Capability,” MoD, www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/

CorporatePublications/Reports/OtherPublications/NEC/

Jsp777NetworkEnabledCapability.htm; “The Comprehensive 

Approach,” Joint Discussion Note 4/05, www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/

BEE7F0A4-C1DA-45F8-9FDC-7FBD25750EE3/0/dcdc21_jdn4_05.

pdf.

5. See Colin McInnes, “The British Army’s New Way in 

Warfare: A Doctrinal Misstep?” Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 

23, No. 2, June 2007, pp. 127-141; B. Holden Reid, “Introduction: 

Is There a British Military “Philosophy?” in Major General J. J. 

G. Mackenzie and B. Holden Reid, eds., Central Region Vs. Out of 

Area: Future Commitments, London: Tri-Service, 1990, p. 1; Michael 

Howard, “The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal,” in Michael 

Howard, ed., The Causes of Wars, London, Counterpoint, 1983, 

pp. 189-207; David French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000, 

London: Unwin Hyman, 1990; Lawrence Freedman, “Alliance 

and the British Way in Warfare,” Review of International Studies, 

Vol. 21, No. 2, 1995, pp.145-158; See also special edition of Defense 

and Security Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2007. 

6. “Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White 

Paper,” Cm.6,041-I, London: The Stationery Office, 2003, www.mod.

uk/NR/rdonlyres/051AF365-0A97-4550-99C0-4D87D7C95DED/0/

cm6041I_whitepaper2003.pdf.

7. See, for example, S. J. Croft and P. Williams, “The United 

Kingdom,” in Security without Nuclear Weapons? Different 

Perspectives on National Security, Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 147; see also Michael Dockrill, 

British Defence Policy since 1945, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 

1988; William Jackson, Britain’s Defence Dilemma: An Inside View, 

London: B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1990; John Baylis, ed., Britain’s Defence 

Policy in a Changing World, London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1977; Ritchie 

Ovendale, British Defence Policy since 1945, Manchester: Manchester 

University Press, 1994; Stuart Croft, ed., British Security Policy: The 

Thatcher Years and the End of the Cold War, London: Harper Collins 

Academic, 1991; Peter Byrd, ed., British Defence Policy: Thatcher and 
53

Beyond, Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allen, 1991; Malcolm McIntosh, 

Managing Britain’s Defence, London: Macmillan Academic & 

Professional Ltd, 1990.

8. See John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-84: 

The Special Relationship, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, Second 

Ed., 1984, First Ed., 1981; Tim Dunne, “When the Shooting 

Starts”: Atlanticism in British Security Strategy,” International 

Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5, October 2004, pp. 893-909.

9. John Baylis, “British Nuclear Doctrine: The ‘Moscow 

Criteria’ and the Polaris Improvement Programme,” Contemporary 

British History, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 53-65.

10. Humphrey Wynn, The RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: 

Their Origins, Roles, and Deployment, 1946-69: A Documentary 

History, London: HMSO, 1964.

11. Peter Nailor, The Nassau Connection: The Organisation and 

Management of the British Polaris Project, London: HMSO, 1988; 

Colin McInnes, Trident: The Only Option?, London: Brassey’s, 

1986.

12. T. Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community,” 

Speech made to the Economic Club of Chicago, Hilton Hotel, 

Chicago, April 22, 1999, www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2316; 

Tony Blair, Our Nation’s Future—Defence,” Speech made January 

22, 2007, Plymouth, www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10735.asp.

13. “Statement Relating to Defence, 1948,” Cm 7,327, London: 

HMSO, 1948, reprinted in Brassey’s Naval Annual, Rear Admiral 

H. G. Thursfield, ed., London: William Clowes and Sons Ltd., 

1948, p. 528.

14. Clive Ponting, Breach of Power: Labour in Power, 1964-70, 

London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1989, pp. 41-42.

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16. Simon Jenkins, Thatcher and Sons, London: Allen Lane, 

2006, pp.74-75.
54

17. See Stuart Croft, Andrew Dorman, Matthew Uttley, and 

Wyn Rees, “Crises and Reviews,” Britain and Defence 1945-2000: 

A Policy Reevaluation, Harlow: Longmans, 2001.

18. “Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1966: The Defence 

Review,” Cmnd.2,901, London: HMSO, 1966.

19. See “Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1989,” Cm.675-I, 

London: HMSO, 1989, pp. 13-21.

20. For current thinking see “The Future of the United 

Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent: Defence White Paper 2006,” 

Cm.6,994, London: TSO, 2006, www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/

AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/PolicyStrategyandPlanning/

DefenceWhitePaper2006Cm6994.htm; Andrew Dorman, “Trident Is 

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2, February 2007, pp. 9-11; Michael Clarke, “Does My Bomb Look 

Big in This? Britain’s Nuclear Choices after Trident,” International 

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21. Tom King, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, 

Statement on Defence “Options for Change,” July 25, 1990, session 

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pa/98990/cmhansard/1990-05-25/Debate-1.html.

22. “Defence Cut by £1.3bn,” The Guardian, November 13, 

1992, p. 4.

23. “Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study,” London: 

HMSO, 1994.

24. James Cusick, “Cuts in Regiments May Be Delayed,” The 

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25. Ministry of Defence, “Defending Our Future: Statement 

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p. 7. 

26. Norman Lamont, In Office, London: Little, Brown and Co, 

1999, p. 305; David Fairhall, “Rifkind Accepts £1.5bn Defence 

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55

27. Fairhall, p. 2; James, p. 4.

28. John Pegg, “Defence Cost Study: The Orders and the 

Cuts,” Army Quarterly & Defence Journal, Vol. 124, No. 3, July 1994, 

p. 262.

29. “Front Line First,” p. 6.

30. Pegg, “Defence Cost Study,” p. 263.

31. “Defence Medical Services: A Strategy for the Future,” 

London: MoD, 1998, www.mod.uk/issues/dms/index.htm; House of 

Commons Defence Committee, “Third Report: Defence Medical 

Services—Report together with the Proceedings of the Committee 

relating to the Report, Minutes of Evidence and Memoranda,” 

HC.142, Session 1996-97, London: HMSO, 1997; John Spellar, 

House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Written Answers, 

December 13, 1999, Session 2000-1, col.24w. See also “Defence 

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uk/publications/dhp.htm.

32. Ross Tieman, “More MoD Projects May Be Awarded to 

Private Sector,” Financial Times, October 14, 1996, p. 1.

33. Robert Shrimsley, “MoD Chiefs Back Plan for £1.6bn 

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the issue of service-supplied accommodation reemerged as an 

issue this winter. See, for example, “General Condemns Forces 

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34. “Strategic Defence Review,” Cm.3,999, London: The 

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35. Gordon Wilson, ed., British Security 2010: Proceedings of 

a Conference Held at Church House, Westminster, November 1995, 

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36. See, for example, Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions 

in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History, London: Frank Cass, 

2002; Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War will be fought 

in the 21st century, New York: The Free Press, 2003; MacGregor 
56

Knox & Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of Military Revolution 

1300-2050, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Elinor 

Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs, Canada: McGill-Queen’s 

University Press, 2002; Ron Matthews and John Treddenick, 

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Macmillan, 2001; Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 

2000 BC to the Present, London: Brassey’s, UK, 1991; Andrew 

Dorman et.al., The Changing Face of Military Power: Joint Warfare 

in an Expeditionary Era, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; 

Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare, 

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000.

37. It had been separated from the Foreign and Colonial 

Offices during Harold Wilson’s first period of Prime Minister. 

Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70: A Personal Record, 

London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971, p. 10.

38. See T. Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community,” 

Speech made to the Economic Club of Chicago, Hilton Hotel, 

Chicago, April 22, 1999, www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2316.

39. “Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis,” Cm.4,724, London: 

TSO, 2000, www.kosovo.mod.uk/lessons; House of Commons 

Defence Committee, “Fourteenth Report—Lessons of Kosovo,” 

HC.347, session 1999-2000, London: TSO, 2000, www.publications.

parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/347/34702.htm.

40. Major General David Richards, “Expeditionary Operations: 

Sierra Leone—lessons for the future,” World Defence Systems, 

Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2001, pp. 134-136; Brigadier David Richards, 

“Operation Palliser,” Journal of the Royal Artillery, Vol. CXXVII, 

No. 2, Autumn 2000, pp. 10-15.

41. “The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter,” 

Cm.5,566, London: TSO, 2002, www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/

AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/PolicyStrategy/

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42. Geoff Hoon, House of Commons Defence Committee, “A 

New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review,” HC.93-I, Report 

of Session 2002-03, 2003, para. 66, www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/93/93.pdf.
57

43. See www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/uk-mod/nec.htm.

44. “Delivering security in a Changing World: The Defence 

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DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/PolicyStrategy/

DeliveringSecurityInAChangingWorldDefenceWhitePaper2003.

htm; “Delivering security in a Changing World: Future 

Capabilities,” Cm.6,269, London: TSO, 2004, www.mod.uk/Defence 

Internet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/PolicyStrategy/

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45. Tony Blair, “Our Nation’s Future—Defence,” Speech 

made Plymouth, January 12, 2007, www.number10.gov.uk/output/

Page10735.asp.

46. Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community,” 

Speech made in Chicago, Illinois, April 22, 1999.

47. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the 

Modern World, London: Penguin, 2006; Colin Gray, Another Bloody 

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48. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Defence White 

Paper 2003,” Third Report of Session 2003-04, HC.465-I, London: 

The Stationery Office, 2004, p. 7.

49. Operations in Iraq: First Reflections, London: MoD, 2003, 

www.mod.uk, p. 24.

50. Geoff Hoon, House of Commons Defence Committee, 

“Defence White Paper 2003,” Third Report of Session 2003-

04, HC.465-II, London: The Stationery Office, 2004, Minutes of 

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51.“EU Battlegroups,” EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, E 

BG01, 2005, consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/BattlegroupsNov

05actsheet.pdf.

52. “Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2005–

06,” HC.57, London: TSO, 2006, www.publications.parliament.

uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/57/57.pdf, p. 10; “Operation 

BANNER Ends in Northern Ireland after 38 years,” Defence 
58

News, August 1, 2007, www.mod.ukDefenceInternet/DefenceNews/

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53. Thomas Harding, “Britain Almost Out Of Troops, Memo 

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54. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Defence White 

Paper 2003,” Third Report of Session 2003-04, HC.465-I, 2004, p. 8; 

Geoff Hoon, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Statement 

on the Future Infantry Structure, December 16, 2004, cols. 1795-

1817, session 2004-5, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/

cmhansard/cm041216/debindx/41216-x.htm.

55. Major General David Richards, “Expeditionary Operations: 

Sierra Leone—lessons for the future,” World Defence Systems, 

Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2001, pp. 134-136; Brigadier David Richards, 

“Operation Palliser,” Journal of the Royal Artillery, Vol. CXXVII, 

No. 2, Autumn 2000, pp. 10-15; “Sierra Leone,” www.army.mod.uk/

para/history/sierr_leone.htm.

56. Operations in Iraq: First Reflections, London: MoD, 2003, 

www.mod.uk, p. 4.

57. “The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter-Public 

Discussion Paper,” London: MoD, 2002, p. 4.

58. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Defence White 

Paper 2003,” Third Report of Session 2003-04, HC.465-I, 2004, p. 

7.

59. Operations in Iraq: First Reflections, London: MoD, 2003, 

www.mod.uk, p. 24.

60. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Defence White 

Paper 2003,” Third Report of Session 2003-04, HC.465-I, 2004, p. 

24.

61. William Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: the 

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Jonathan Pearson, Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant 
59

Gamble, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; W. Scott Lucas, 

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62. Stephen Prince, “Britain’s Command and Control in the 

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4, December 2002, pp. 333-349.

63. Operations in Iraq: First Reflections, London: MoD, 2003, 

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64. National Audit Office, “Operation TELIC—United 

Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq,” HC.60, Session 2003-4, 

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65. “Defence White Paper” Fifth Report of the House of 

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p. 39.

66. “Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White 

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67. See www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organisation/

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68. See “Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper,” 

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69. See P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized 

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70. See news.mod.uk/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=2796.

71. National Audit Office, “Operation TELIC—United 

Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq,” HC.60, session 2003-4, 

London: The Stationery Office, 2003, p. 21.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 2.
60

74. Ibid., p. 3.

75. House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, “Ministry 

of Defence: Operation Telic-United Kingdom Military Operations 

in Iraq,” Thirty-ninth Report for Session 2003-04, HC.273, London: 

The Stationery Office, 2003, p. 4.

76. “The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter—

Supporting Information & Analysis,” Cm.5,566, London: The 

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London: MoD, 2003, www.mod.uk, p.22; for an indicative list, see 

National Audit Office, “Operation TELIC—United Kingdom 

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Stationery Office, 2003, p. 10.

77. National Audit Office, “Operation TELIC,”, p. 14.

78. “Defence Industrial Strategy,” Cm.6,697, London: TSO, 2005, 

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79. Geoff Hoon, House of Commons Defence Committee, 

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Report of Session 2002-03, para. 18.

80. “The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter,” Cm.5,566, 

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81. “The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine,” BR1806, London: MoD, 1995.

82. “Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future 

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83. Andrew Chuter, “Big Moves in Britain,” Defense News, 

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61

85. Chuter, p. 8.

86. Ricard Scott, “Tomahawk Missile Test Failures Spark 

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87. Chuter, p. 8.

88. John F. Schank et al., “Sustaining Design and Production 

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89. See www.mod.uk/dpa/ipt/maritimeshipbuilding/lasa.htm.

90. “About the Type 45,” Royal Navy, www.royal-navy.mod.uk/

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91. “Browne: Purchase of Extra C-17 Will ‘Significantly 

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92. General Sir Michael Jackson, “Defence White Paper,” Fifth 

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62

94. Paul Beaver, House of Commons Defence Committee, 

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95. Paul Beaver, House of Commons Defence Committee, 

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96. Geoff Hoon, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, 

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98. Hoon, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, July 

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101. See www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=198.

102. Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, House of Commons, 

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63

103. John Spellar, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, 

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104. Jon Lake, “Royal Air Force Transports Part 1,” Air Forces 

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