DOE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS 

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INVESTIGATIONS 

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 24, 2016 

Serial No. 114–119 

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DOE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 24, 2016 

Serial No. 114–119 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

Chairman 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Chairman Emeritus 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

Vice Chairman 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILL FLORES, Texas 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

Ranking Member 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KURT SCHRADER, Oregon 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III, Massachusetts 

TONY CA ́ RDENAS, California 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

Chairman 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

Vice Chairman 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILL FLORES, Texas 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio) 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Ranking Member 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III, Massachusetts 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey (ex 

officio) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Tim Murphy, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania, opening statement ................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the state of Michigan, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 53 

Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of 

New Jersey, prepared statement ........................................................................ 54 

WITNESSES

Norman Augustine, Co-Chairman, Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise ...................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 312 

Richard Mies, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired), Co-Chairman, Congressional 

Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise ......... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18 

Answers to submitted questions 1 ................................................................... 313 

Jared Cohon, Co-Chairman, Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the 

National Energy Laboratories ............................................................................. 31 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 323 

TJ Glauthier, Co-Chairman, Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the 

National Energy Laboratories ............................................................................. 31 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

Answers to submitted questions 2 ................................................................... 324 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Document binder ...................................................................................................... 56 

1 Mr. Mies and Mr. Augustine submitted a joint response which begins 

on page 314. 2 Mr. Glauthier and Mr. Cohon submitted a joint response which begins 

on page 325. 

(1) 

DOE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a.m., in room 

2322 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tim Murphy (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Murphy, McKinley, Griffith, 

Flores, Brooks, Mullin, Cramer, DeGette, Schakowsky, Tonko, Kennedy, and Welch. 

Staff present: Leighton Brown, Deputy Press Secretary; Charles 

Ingebretson, Chief Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; A.T. 

Johnston, Senior Policy Advisor; John Ohly, Professional Staff, 

Oversight and Investigations; Chris Santini, Policy Coordinator, 

Oversight and Investigations; Dan Schneider, Press Secretary; 

Peter Spencer, Professional Staff Member, Oversight; Gregory Watson, Legislative Clerk, Communications and Technology; Andy 

Zach, Counsel, Environment and the Economy; Ryan Gottschall, 

Minority GAO Detailee; Rick Kessler, Minority Senior Advisor and 

Staff Director, Energy and Environment; Chris Knauer, Minority 

Oversight Staff Director; Una Lee, Minority Chief Oversight Counsel; and Elizabeth Letter, Minority Professional Staff Member. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. MURPHY. Good morning. Today we will begin to examine how 

well the Department is prepared to meet its responsibilities for the 

21st century in this hearing of the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. This includes what is 

necessary to enhance the performance of the department’s national 

laboratory system, which harbors the technological tools and knowhow for advancing our nuclear security as well as the nation’s edge 

in important science, energy, and environmental missions. 

Indeed, a strong national laboratory system, well managed and 

overseen, increases the prospects for a strong DOE mission performance across the board. I know from my own experiences with 

the National Energy Technology Laboratory, located in my district, 

which has developed carbon capture storage technology that has alVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Jan 10, 2017 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 114\114-119 CHRIS
2 

lowed the nation to achieve its lowest carbon emission rates in over 

two decades, the essential role our national laboratories can play 

to meet the nation’s needs. 

When it comes to the various missions for DOE, none surpass in 

importance the Department’s critical responsibility for maintaining 

the nation’s nuclear deterrent and technological superiority on all 

aspects of nuclear security. 

This morning we will hear why enhancing and sustaining U.S. 

nuclear and technological leadership is vital for confronting the 

complex challenges of the dangerous age we live in—with potential 

adversaries modernizing their nuclear arsenals; with threats of 

Iran, other nation-states; with emerging new nuclear technologies 

and proliferation risks. 

Unfortunately, we will also hear that efforts to place DOE’s nuclear security operations on a sustainable track have been coming 

up short for decades. Part of the problem has been the complicated 

relationships through which DOE pursues its various missions. 

Most of its work is performed by contractors at the national laboratories and production sites. 

The benefit of this contracting approach is that it harnesses the 

best scientific, engineering, and management expertise of industry 

and academia; the downside is that it creates difficult oversight 

and accountability requirements—from DOE headquarters to the 

site offices to the contractor management to the operators in the 

field. In our hearing last summer on a radiological incident that 

began at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, we saw a vivid example of how oversight and contractor accountability breakdowns 

led to a costly $500 million incident. 

The most dramatic effect to address the management problems 

in the nuclear weapons complex occurred in late 1999. Congress, in 

reaction to serious security, project management and safety issues, 

created the National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, as 

a semi-autonomous agency within DOE aimed at focusing mission 

oversight to improve mission performance. Yet the new agency did 

not improve oversight or accountability. In some respects, the complexity increased, with more offices, more audits, more lines of reporting—increasing costs, obscuring communications, confusing decision-making accountability. 

Problems persisted—billion dollar cost overruns, delayed and 

cancelled projects, deferred maintenance, serious safety and security mishaps, and oversight failures at the Department, site office, 

and contractor level—all documented in this committee’s oversight. 

Three years ago, in the wake of across-the-board oversight failures at NNSA’s Y–12 site, Congress created the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

The independent, bipartisan panel examined and made recommendations concerning the management of NNSA’s nuclear operations and alternative governance models. 

Let me quote the panel’s diagnosis, released just over a year ago: 

‘‘One unmistakable conclusion is that NNSA governance reform, 

at least as it has been implemented, has failed to provide the effective, mission-focused enterprise that Congress intended. The necessary fixes will not be simple or quick, and they must address sysVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Jan 10, 2017 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 114\114-119 CHRIS
3 

temic problems in both management practices and culture that 

exist across the nuclear enterprise.’’ 

That panel said the lack of sustained leadership focus on the nuclear security mission contributes to virtually all the observed problems. Other problems contributing to the failures include overlapping DOE and NNSA headquarters staffs and blurred ownership 

and accountability for the nuclear enterprise missions, and dysfunctional relationships between mission-support staffs and between the government and its contractors operating the sites—all 

issues very familiar to this committee. 

Today’s hearing will focus on the path to position DOE to take 

on its critical nuclear security responsibilities. A key element is to 

examine how to strengthen and sustain cabinet secretary’s ownership of the nuclear security mission and reduce bureaucratic overlap. 

We have four distinguished witnesses who can outline the roadmap for reform: the co-chairmen of the Congressional Advisory 

Panel who can explain what is necessary to cut a path forward to 

clarify roles, responsibilities and accountability, reduce duplicative 

offices, and improve the nuclear security mission. 

We will also hear from the co-chairmen of the congressionally 

chartered Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National 

Energy Laboratories. This Commission, which released its comprehensive report this past October, identified challenges across 

DOE laboratory system that relate to oversight, micro-management, and related problems we see most visibly in the nuclear 

weapons programs. 

In many respects, the thoughtful recommendations from these 

panels complement each other and can serve this committee as a 

guide for identifying what is necessary to address DOE governance 

and management shortcomings going forward. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY

Today, we will begin to examine how well the Department is prepared to meet 

its responsibilities for the 21st Century. This includes what is necessary to enhance 

the performance of the department’s national laboratory system—which harbors the 

technological tools and know-how for advancing our nuclear security as well as the 

nation’s edge in important science, energy, and environmental missions. 

Indeed, a strong national laboratory system, well managed and overseen, increases the prospects for strong DOE mission performance across the board. I know 

from my own experience with the National Energy Technology Laboratory, located 

in my district, which has developed carbon capture storage technology that has allowed the nation to achieve its lowest carbon emissions rates in over two decades, 

the essential role our national laboratories can play to meet the nation’s needs. 

When it comes to the various missions for DOE none surpass in importance the 

department’s critical responsibility for maintaining the nation’s nuclear deterrent 

and technological superiority on all aspects of nuclear security. 

This morning, we will hear why enhancing and sustaining U.S. nuclear and technological leadership is vital for confronting the complex challenges of the dangerous 

age we live in- with potential adversaries modernizing their nuclear arsenals; with 

threats of Iran, other nation-states; with emerging new nuclear technologies and 

proliferation risks. 

Unfortunately, we will also hear that efforts to place DOE’s nuclear security operations on a sustainable track have been coming up short for decades. Part of the 

problem has been the complicated relationships through which DOE pursues its various missions: most of its work is performed by contractors at the national laboratories and production sites. 

4 

The benefit of this contracting approach is that it harnesses the best scientific, 

engineering, and management expertise of industry and academia; the downside is 

that it creates difficult oversight and accountability requirements-from DOE headquarters to the site offices, to the contractor management, to the operators in the 

field. In our hearing last summer on a radiological incident that began at the Los 

Alamos National Laboratory, we saw a vivid example of how oversight and contractor accountability breakdowns lead to a costly, 500 million dollar incident. 

The most dramatic effort to address the management problems in the nuclear 

weapons complex occurred in late 1999. Congress, in reaction to serious security, 

project management and safety issues, created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a semi-autonomous agency within DOE aimed at focusing 

on mission oversight to improve mission performance. Yet the new agency did not 

improve oversight or accountability. In some respects, the complexity increased, 

with more offices, more audits, more lines of reporting—increasing costs, obscuring 

communications, confusing decision-making accountability. 

Problems persisted-billion dollar cost overruns; delayed and cancelled projects; deferred maintenance; serious safety and security mishaps; and oversight failures at 

the Department, site office, and contractor level-all documented in this committee’s 

oversight. 

Three years ago, in the wake of across-the-board oversight failures at NNSA’s Y– 

12 site, Congress created the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of 

the Nuclear Security Enterprise. The independent, bi-partisan panel examined and 

made recommendations concerning the management of NNSA’s nuclear operations 

and alternative governance models. 

Let me quote the panel’s diagnosis, released just over a year ago: 

‘‘One unmistakable conclusion is that NNSA governance reform, at least as it has 

been implemented, has failed to provide the effective, mission-focused enterprise 

that Congress intended. The necessary fixes will not be simple or quick, and they 

must address systemic problems in both management practices and culture that 

exist across the nuclear enterprise.’’ 

That panel said the lack of sustained leadership focus on the nuclear security mission contributes to virtually all the observed problems. Other problems contributing 

to the failures included: Overlapping DOE and NNSA headquarters staffs and 

blurred ownership and accountability for the nuclear enterprise missions; and dysfunctional relationships between line managers and mission-support staffs and between the government and its contractors, operating the sites-all issues familiar to 

this committee. 

Today’s hearing will focus on the path to position DOE to take on its critical nuclear security responsibilities. A key element is to examine how to strengthen-and 

sustain- Cabinet secretary’s ownership of the nuclear security mission and reduce 

bureaucratic overlap. 

We have four distinguished witnesses who can outline the roadmap for reform: 

the co-chairmen of the Congressional Advisory Panel, who can explain what is necessary to cut a path forward to clarify roles, responsibilities and accountability, reduce duplicative offices, and improve the nuclear security mission. 

We will also hear from the co-chairman of the congressionally chartered Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National Energy Laboratories. This Commission, which released its comprehensive report this past October, identifies challenges across DOE’s laboratory system that related to oversight, micro-management, 

and related problems we see most visibly in the nuclear weapons programs. 

In many respects, the thoughtful recommendations from these panels complement 

each other, and can serve this committee as a guide for identifying what is necessary to address DOE governance and management shortcomings going forward. 

Mr. MURPHY. So I thank all the witnesses for attending, and I 

now recognize the ranking member from Colorado, Ms. DeGette, for 

5 minutes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you have heard me 

say before, I have been on this subcommittee now for, I am in my 

20th year on this subcommittee, and unfortunately, the long view 

doesn’t improve the situation regarding the NNSA. This agency 

was created more than a decade ago as a semi-autonomous agency 

within the Department of Energy because of the systemic and complex problems that were facing the labs and a belief that by somehow creating this agency it would solve the problems. 

5 

At the time, my mentor and the former chairman, John Dingell, 

and others, cautioned that this move would not solve the complex 

management and structural issues that faced the nuclear weapons 

complex and national labs, and would likely lead to greater problems, and lo, their prediction proved true. 

Over the course of the next decade, this very subcommittee investigated and held hearings about the weapons labs, examining 

accidents, missing or mishandled classified materials, management 

and staff clashes, and mismanaged projects that would ultimately 

cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars to fix. At one of those 

hearings, Chairman Barton said, ‘‘NNSA was a management experiment gone wrong.’’ 

So here we are again today looking at ongoing challenges and 

issues facing the nuclear security enterprise in national labs and, 

more specifically, organizational and structural issues affecting the 

NNSA. What is different, however, is that rather than focusing on 

any particular mishap, we now today have a highly regarded group 

of experts who have authored two major reports with recommendations that can make the labs and the NNSA function better. 

So at the outset, gentlemen, let me thank you for the work that 

you and your colleagues have done in this undertaking. Both reports, one that focuses on the labs as a whole and one that focuses 

on reforming the NNSA, offer an exceptional blueprint on what is 

needed to improve the functioning of the labs and the NNSA. 

I am particularly interested in discussing the findings and recommendations by the Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. That panel, spearheaded by Admiral 

Mies and Mr. Augustine, concluded what many of us have long believed: the current structure of NNSA is not working. As stated in 

the interim report, the NNSA experiment involving creation of a 

semi-autonomous organization has failed. 

Mr. Chairman, that is a sobering finding. NNSA is a critical 

agency, its weapons labs are responsible for the nation’s nuclear 

deterrent, and as the panel pointed out, this is no time for complacency. That is because as the report also concludes, nuclear forces 

provide the ultimate guarantee against major war and coercion. It 

is time that Congress really rolls up its sleeves to address the multitude of problems that we have known about for far too long but 

have failed to correct. 

The work of Mies-Augustine highlights several key areas where 

attention is needed. For example, the panel’s final report concluded 

that the relationship between line managers and mission support 

staff at NNSA is broken and is damaging the management culture 

within the agency. The panel also found that there continues to 

exist, a dysfunctional relationship between the government and the 

contractors that operate NNSA sites which has created a dysfunctional form of oversight. 

Finally, the panel concluded that the creation of NNSA as a separately organized, quasi-independent agency within DOE is not 

working. Again, I am particularly concerned about this last finding. 

The panel closely examined the current arrangement of NNSA as 

a semi-autonomous entity within DOE. It concluded that the solution was not to seek a higher degree of autonomy for the agency, 

6 

but to reintegrate it back into the DOE and place its mission on 

the shoulders of a qualified secretary. 

Mr. Chairman, this is a very important hearing. I want to thank 

you for having it. But as I said it earlier this month at the hearing 

that we had on biodefense, we can’t do justice with this topic with 

just one or two hearings. Today’s panel reports, like the bioterrorism blueprint, offer us a road map for addressing the multitude 

of problems plaguing the labs and NNSA. I have seen this for 20 

years now. We can’t make progress if we don’t conduct regular 

oversight of this agency and everything that it oversees. 

So similar to our last hearing, I am asking that this panel follows through with the recommendations before us today and conducts aggressive oversight on all of these issues that are raised in 

these reports. NNSA’s core mission is to develop and maintain the 

very tools and capabilities that keep our nation and allies secure. 

It is time we addressed these challenges, and what our panelists 

have provided to us are two of the best playbooks we have seen on 

these issues. 

I will also say, like so many of the things this panel deals with 

this is a completely bipartisan issue. And so I think what we could 

do working forward is we could really do a deep bipartisan dive 

into this. We could help implement some of these panel’s recommendations, and if we do the result of that is increasing our nation’s security and I think that is the most important thing we 

could do. I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well said. We don’t have any more opening statements on our side. Do you have any more on your side? 

Ms. DEGETTE. No. 

Mr. MURPHY. If not, we will proceed with our panel. But I also 

want to ask unanimous consent that the members’ written openings statements are introduced into the record, and without objection, the documents will be entered into the record. 

So I would now like to introduce the witnesses for today’s hearing. The first witness today on the panel is the Honorable Norman 

Augustine. Mr. Augustine is the retired chairman and CEO of 

Lockheed Martin. He has held positions in government, industry, 

academia, and nonprofit sector. He has been chairman of the National Academy of Engineering; was a 16-year member of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. Mr. Augustine is here today in his capacity as co-chair of the Congressional 

Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

And we thank you, Mr. Augustine, for preparing your testimony 

and we look forward to your insights on these matters. 

We also want to thank Admiral Richard W. Mies. I am a shipmate. I served in the Navy concurrently, and oftentimes this summer we would stand on the deck of the USS Ronald Reagan watching the submarine races at night. You can imagine the excitement 

of that because you are a submariner or two, right. 

He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval Academy. Admiral 

Mies completed a 35-year career as a nuclear submariner in the 

U.S. Navy and commanded the U.S. Strategic Command for four 

years prior to retirement in 2002. Admiral Mies served as co-chair 

to the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the NuVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Jan 10, 2017 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 114\114-119 CHRIS
7 

clear Security Enterprise, and we thank him for his service to our 

country and look forward to learning from your expertise today. 

Next, I would like to introduce Dr. Jared Cohon, a co-chair of the 

Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National Energy 

Laboratories. Dr. Cohon is also president emeritus of Carnegie Mellon University, where I have gotten to know him over the years 

and have a great deal of respect, and he currently serves as director of the Wilton E. Scott Institute for Energy Innovation. In 2012, 

Dr. Cohon received the national engineering award for the National 

Association of Engineering Societies, and author, co-author or editor of more than 80 professional publications and a member of the 

National Academy of Engineering. We look forward to your testimony this morning. 

And finally, we also welcome the Honorable TJ Glauthier, a 

former deputy secretary of the Department of Energy and current 

co-chair of the congressional Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National Energy Laboratories. Mr. Glauthier is president of TJG Energy Associates, LLC, where he is an advisor and 

board member for public and private organizations to the energy 

sector. 

During his distinguished career, Mr. Glauthier has been awarded 

medals for distinguished service from NASA, Department of Energy, and the executive office of the President and Office of Management and Budget. We appreciate his time today, and once again 

thank all the witnesses for being here. 

As you are all aware, this committee is holding an investigative 

hearing, and when doing so has had the practice of taking testimony under oath. Do any of you object to testifying under oath? 

And seeing no objections, the chair then advises you that under the 

rules of the House and rules of the committee, you are entitled to 

be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel during your testimony today? And seeing no requests for that, in that 

case would you all please rise, raise your right hand, and I will 

swear you in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. And all the witnesses have entered 

they do, so you are now under oath and subject to the penalties set 

forth in Title 18 Section 1001 of the United States Code. 

We are going to start off with Mr. Augustine for your five-minute 

summary of your written statement. Turn the mike a little bit closer to you and watch the lights there, because when they turn red 

that means your five minutes is up. Thank you, sir. 

8 

STATEMENTS OF NORMAN AUGUSTINE, CO-CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON THE GOVERNANCE OF 

THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE; ADMIRAL RICHARD 

MIES, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED), CO-CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON THE GOVERNANCE OF THE 

NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE; JARED COHON, COCHAIRMAN, COMMISSION TO REVIEW THE EFFECTIVENESS 

OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY LABORATORIES; AND TJ 

GLAUTHIER, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION TO REVIEW THE 

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY LABORATORIES 

STATEMENT OF MR. AUGUSTINE 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Well, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, 

thank you very much for this opportunity to present the results of 

the Congressional Advisory Committee on the Governance of Nuclear Security Enterprise. And as you pointed out, Admiral Mies 

and I served as the co-chairs of that endeavor. 

Our report was submitted about 15 months ago. It was put together by 12 members of our commission. It was unanimous. It 

drew upon many decades of experience of those 12 members. We 

reviewed thousands of pages of documents. We visited probably 

most of, if not all of the major facilities of the nuclear enterprise, 

and we had the benefit of a large number of witnesses that appeared before our group. 

We should state at the outset in no uncertain terms that the viability of America’s nuclear deterrent today is not questioned in any 

way. It is absolutely sound and based successfully on the efforts 

today of science based stockpile stewardship. No nation should 

question it. 

On the other hand, in spite of the enormous technical innovation 

capabilities of NNSA scientists, in spite of their contributions to 

nonproliferation efforts, in spite of the truly enormously successful 

efforts of the Naval Reactors organization of NNSA, the remainder 

of NNSA to a very large degree is highly inefficient and has been 

poorly managed for many, many years as you have stated in your 

opening remarks. 

At the time we did our work, Secretary Moniz and General Klotz 

had been here only a brief time. I would have to say they’ve made 

a great deal of progress since they took their offices, but they have 

a very long way yet to go. 

We thought it would be useful to describe four major events that 

have occurred since we submitted our report that we believe validate it further, the findings and recommendations we made. The 

first of these of course would have to be that Russia and China and 

North Korea and others around the globe have been providing convincing proof that like it or not America’s going to be in the nuclear 

deterrent business for as long as any of us can see. 

A particular concern in that regard is the deteriorating firewall 

between conventional and nuclear warfare particularly as being espoused by Russia. Our nuclear deterrent forces are of the utmost 

importance in preventing strategic warfare and coercion that goes 

with it, and furthermore, our allies depend upon this nuclear umbrella, if you will, and should they have reason to doubt its viabilVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Jan 10, 2017 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 114\114-119 CHRIS
9 

ity they may well decide to provide their own nuclear capabilities, 

further leading to nuclear proliferation. 

Secondly, the President’s nuclear negotiations with Iran and the 

deep involvement of that in those negotiations of Secretary Moniz 

and the contributions made by the laboratories of the Department 

of Energy seem to reaffirm the importance of a close tie at the cabinet level of the Department of Energy given the importance of this 

issue and that this has been a very successful formula during this 

past year’s negotiations. 

Forty three percent of the DOE’s budget pertains to the nuclear 

enterprise, and that would seem to suggest to us that it’s all the 

more important that the Secretary of Energy have a background in 

nuclear matters as well as energy matters, furthermore that the 

Department be led by a person with scientific credentials and at 

the cabinet level. 

Finally, the lessons of the so-called WIPP, or the Waste Isolation 

Pilot Plant, incident tend to underscore the need for a better operating culture in the nuclear security environment. You’re familiar 

of course that in February of 2014, a drum containing radioactive 

waste ruptured inside of the WIPP facility. The DOE’s own afteraction review reads very much like our report did some time before 

that. There was a complex wave of responsibilities pointed out, 

lapses of leadership and accountability. I was asked by Secretary 

Chu to investigate the Y–12 incident with which you’re all familiar, 

and I found exactly the same sort of issues there. 

Finally, we would point out the need for your support in bringing 

about the reforms that are required in the NNSA endeavors. The 

words of one witness before our panel at that time said that the 

course to improve the nation’s nuclear security enterprise seems 

clear and the National Nuclear Security Administration has not 

been on it. It will only be with your strong support and the President’s strong support that we will be able to solve the sorts of problems that have been befuddling the nuclear security enterprise. 

With that Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would turn to 

my colleague Admiral Mies who would describe some of the findings and the recommendations of our committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Augustine follows:] 

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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Your time has expired. We will now 

turn to Admiral Mies for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL RICHARD MIES 

Admiral MIES. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, let me add 

my thanks as well for giving the four of us the opportunity to testify. I’ll try and briefly summarize the thrust of our recommendations in each of the five areas addressed in our report. 

First, the first area is to strengthen national leadership focus, direction, and follow-through. And at the root of all the challenges 

faced by the nuclear enterprise, frankly, is the loss of focus on the 

nuclear mission since the end of the Cold War. Bluntly stated, nuclear weapons have become orphans in both the executive and legislative branches. And this lack of senior leadership attention has 

resulted in public confusion, congressional distrust, and a serious 

erosion of advocacy, expertise, and proficiency across the enterprise. Sustained national leadership attention is needed to rebuild 

the foundation. 

Hence, our panel recommends first that the President adopt a 

number of new mechanisms designed to provide oversight and 

guidance to direct and align nuclear security enterprise-wide policies, plans, programs and budgets across the departments. Additionally, our panel recommends that Congress establish new mechanisms to strengthen and unify its oversight of the enterprise. Such 

efforts should seek improved coordination across missions as well 

as between authorizers and appropriators and thus better synchronize the work of multiple subcommittees. These recommendations include adding the Senate Armed Services Committee approval to the confirmation and reporting requirements for both the 

Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy. 

Our second area is to solidify cabinet secretary ownership of the 

mission. Again as has been previously stated, despite the intent of 

the NNSA Act to create a separately organized NNSA within DOE, 

the act as implemented has failed to achieve the degree of clarity 

in enterprise roles and mission ownership. 

In retrospect, this should come as no surprise. No cabinet secretary could be expected to relinquish control over a mission that 

constitutes over 40 percent of his department’s budget, a mission 

that involves significant environmental safety and security risks, 

and a mission that produces a capability critical to our national security—a capability for which he or she is personally responsible to 

annually certify its safety, security and performance to the President. 

In its deliberations, the panel explored a range of organizational 

options including the status quo and an independent agency, and 

we concluded that these were clearly inferior to placing the responsibility and accountability squarely on the shoulders of the secretary. Hence, our recommendations are designed to clarify the secretary’s responsibilities for all of DOE’s missions and to clear away 

the redundancies, confused authorities and weakened accountability that have resulted in the attempt to implement a separately 

organized NNSA within DOE. 

To achieve the right leadership structure, a cabinet secretary 

who sets policy and then an operational director who’s empowered 

16 

to implement the policy, our panel recommends amending rather 

than appealing the NNSA Act to replace the separately organized 

NNSA with a new office, an Office of Nuclear Security within the 

Department. 

Additionally, we recommend that the secretary establish a management structure that aligns and codifies roles, responsibilities, 

authority, and accountability across DOE and eliminates redundant and overlapping DOE and NNSA staffs. And finally, we recommend that the secretary and director do a comprehensive reform 

of DOE regulations to strengthen risk management and adopt accepted industry standards where appropriate. 

In the third area, we focus on adoption of proven management 

practices to build a culture of performance, accountability and 

credibility. And as our report describes, NNSA is an organization 

with many pockets of talented technically competent people operating within a dysfunctional culture. Our panel identified a number 

of management best practices based on high performing benchmark 

organizations that if implemented could bring about the needed reform, and prominent among them are a capable, empowered leadership with well defined roles and responsibilities. 

Our panel’s recommendations include adoption of industry best 

practices, strengthening program management and cost estimating 

expertise, simplification of budget controls, and development of a 

comprehensive plan to reshape the weapons complex and workforce. In the fourth area, we seek to maximize the contributions of 

the M&O organizations to perform a safe and secure mission execution. 

Again that open collaboration and mutual trust that has historically existed has eroded over the past decade to an arm’s length, 

customer to contractor and occasionally adversarial relationships, 

so our panel recommends a major reform of those relationships continuing on steps already begun by the current administration. 

And finally, fifth, the fifth area is to strengthen partner collaboration to rebuild trust and a shared view of mission success. 

There’s been a tremendous loss of credibility and trust with other 

stakeholders, primarily DoD and Congress, through insufficient 

communications, collaboration, and transparency. The enterprise 

can’t succeed if they aren’t aligned on major goals and priorities. 

So our panel recommends stronger collaboration between the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to foster better alignment and to 

strengthen the Nuclear Weapons Council and to increase the role 

of that Council in the drafting of Presidential guidance and an annual assessment to the NNSA. 

I apologize for running over. In conclusion, there is little new in 

our panel’s report. We inherited approximately 50 past studies and 

reviews of DOE and NNSA that reached very similar findings and 

recommendations regarding cultural, personnel, organizational, policy, and procedural challenges that have historically existed within 

the DOE and now NNSA. And many of these continue to exist because of a lack of clearer accountability, excessive bureaucracy, organizational stovepipes, lack of collaboration, and unwieldy, cumbersome process. 

What DOE and NNSA need are robust, formal mechanisms to 

evaluate findings, assess underlying root causes, analyze alterVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Jan 10, 2017 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 114\114-119 CHRIS
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native courses of actions, formulate appropriate corrective action, 

and effectively implement enduring change. 

Let me just emphasize that our panel’s findings and recommendations emphasize the need for cultural change rather than 

simple organizational ones. I personally believe it was naive of 

Congress to think that by simply creating NNSA as a semi-autonomous organization they could legislate an enduring solution without addressing the more fundamental, underlying cultural problems. I believe we have a unique opportunity now under Secretary 

Moniz. He’s an individual well qualified in national security with 

previous DOE experience who cares passionately about the nuclear 

security mission and who’s surrounded by an exceptionally strong 

leadership team. 

What is not needed is a congressional mandate for more studies. 

What we really need is congressional support to help enable Secretary Moniz to make the bold and decisive changes that are necessary so those changes can be institutionalized beyond his tenure. 

Thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mies follows:] 

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Mr. MURPHY. I thank the gentleman. Because you are an admiral 

and not a commander I let you run over for a few minutes. 

Dr. Cohon, I think you are going to testify for both yourself and 

on behalf Mr. Glauthier, so you are recognized now for your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JARED COHON 

Mr. COHON. I will indeed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my 

understanding is I’ll be granted 10 minutes since I’m speaking on 

behalf of both of us? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. 

Mr. COHON. Thank you. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Murphy, 

Ranking Member DeGette, Vice Chairman McKinley, other members of the subcommittee, and others interested in the national energy laboratories. We’re very pleased to be here to discuss the final 

report of the Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National Energy Laboratories. 

Congress created the Commission in the fiscal year 2014 Appropriations Act. The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 

Technology, or PCAST, developed a list of potential nominees, and 

the Secretary of Energy selected the nine commissioners from that 

list. The two of us, TJ and I, served as the co-chairs of the Commission for almost 18 months. We were privileged to serve with an 

outstanding group of commissioners with strong backgrounds in 

the science and technology enterprise of this nation. 

We’re pleased that it was a consensus report. We received excellent cooperation and support from DOE, other relevant congressional committees, the White House, the national laboratories 

themselves, and many others. During the course of our work we 

visited all 17 national laboratories, heard from 85 witnesses in 

monthly public hearings in the field and here in Washington, and 

reviewed over 50 previous reports on this topic from the past four 

decades. 

We entitled our report, ‘‘Securing America’s Future: Realizing the 

Potential of the National Energy Laboratories.’’ Our overall finding 

is the national laboratory system is a unique resource that brings 

great value to the country in the four mission areas of the DOE: 

nuclear security, basic science research and development, energy 

technology research and development, and environmental management. However, our national lab system is not realizing its full potential. 

Our Commission believes that can be changed. We provide 36 

recommendations that we believe, if adopted, would help the labs 

become more efficient and effective and have even greater impact, 

thereby helping secure America’s future in the four mission areas 

of the DOE. Our most fundamental conclusions deal with the relationship between the DOE and the national labs. We find that the 

trusted relationship that is supposed to exist between the federal 

government and its national labs is broken and is inhibiting performance as you just heard from Admiral Mies. We note that the 

problems come from both sides, the labs and the DOE. 

We want to be clear though. We want to emphasize that this situation is not uniform across the labs. In particular, the labs that 

are overseen by the Office of Science generally have a much better 

32 

relationship with the DOE than do those in other program offices. 

Many of our recommendations address this fundamental problem. 

We conclude that the roles need to be clarified and reinforced, 

going back to the formal role of the labs as federally funded research and development centers. Under this model, the two parties 

are supposed to operate as trusted partners in a special relationship with open communication. 

DOE should be directing and overseeing its programs at a policy 

level specifying what its programs should achieve. The labs for 

their part should be responsible for determining how to carry out 

and to achieve what the DOE has identified. In doing so, the labs 

should have more flexibility than they do now to implement those 

programs without needing as many approvals from DOE along the 

way. In return of course, the labs must operate with transparency 

and be fully accountable for their actions and results. 

This flexibility, in our view, should be expanded significantly in 

areas such as the ability to manage budgets with fewer approval 

checkpoints; managing personnel compensation and benefits; entering into collaborations with private companies including small businesses without having each agreement individually approved and 

written into the lab’s contract; building office buildings on sites 

that are not nuclear, not high hazard and not classified; conducting 

site assessments that are relied upon by DOE and others to minimize redundant assessments; and sending key personnel to professional conferences to maintain DOE’s work in leading edge science 

and for their professional development. 

In the congressional charge to us, we were asked to examine 

whether there was too much duplication among the national laboratories. We looked into this in detail and have included two recommendations in this area. The first regards the NNSA laboratories, where we conclude that it is important to the nation’s nuclear security that the two design labs and their capabilities continue to be maintained in separate and independent facilities. 

The second recommendation in this area regards the way the Department manages through the life cycle of R&D topics from conception to maturity. In our view, the DOE does a good job of encouraging multiple lines of inquiry into the early discovery stages 

of new subjects and they’re good at using expert panels and strategic reviews to manage mature programs. However, at the in-between stages, the Department needs to assert its strategic oversight role earlier and more forcefully to manage the laboratories as 

a system in order to achieve the most effective and efficient overall 

results. 

Let me turn to some of our recommendations for how we believe 

Congress can help to improve the performance of our national labs. 

We’d like to cite four in particular here in our opening statement. 

First, we conclude that the Laboratory Directed Research & Development, or LDRD, is vitally important to the labs’ ability to carry 

out their missions successfully, and we recommend that Congress 

restore the cap on LDRD funding to the functional level that it was 

historically up until the year 2006. 

Second, to support strong collaboration between businesses and 

the national laboratories, Congress may need to take action to clarify that the labs have sufficient authority to enter into CRADAs 

33 

and other forms of collaboration with domestic companies without 

DOE approval of each one. 

Third, we urge Congress to continue to recognize the importance 

of the role of national labs in building and operating user facilities 

for use by a wide range of researchers in universities, other federal 

agencies and the private sector. 

Fourth, there does seem to be a serious shortfall in funding for 

facilities and infrastructure at the national labs. However, the 

scope and severity of that shortfall are not well defined. We recommend that the Congress work closely with DOE and OMB to 

agree, first, upon the size and the nature of the problem, and then 

upon a long term plan to resolve it through a combination of additional funding, policy changes and new innovative financing mechanisms. 

We’d especially like to highlight our final recommendation. We 

found that in our past four decades there have been over 50 previous commissions, panels, and studies on the national labs, as you 

know well. It’s our view that Congress and the Administration 

would be better served by some sort of standing body of experienced people who could provide perspective and advice on issues relating to the national laboratories without having to create new 

commissions or studies every time. 

Since releasing our report in late October, we’ve been very interested in what actions DOE is taking to follow up on our findings 

and recommendations. We’re encouraged that Secretary Moniz and 

the current lab directors seem truly committed to reforming the relationship between DOE and the national labs to restore trust and 

transparency. In the past few days, the secretary has sent to Congress his response to our report. Overall, he is quite supportive of 

our recommendations and he and his staff have provided a very 

thoughtful and detailed explanation of actions they have taken and 

are taking in a continuing way in every area of our report. 

We the Commission are encouraged by these actions and intentions, but we recognize, as do you, the problems that the labs have 

developed over many years and they won’t be reversed quickly. We 

urge the Congress to support all of the efforts that the secretary 

and future secretaries have taken and will take, and to hold them 

accountable for meaningful changes in all of the areas that we’ve 

addressed. 

We do want to add one final comment before closing. As I just 

noted a little while ago, we recommended the creation of an independent standing body which would provide oversight of the implementation of our recommendations and ongoing advice to Congress 

as well as to the secretary. The secretary’s response to Congress indicates that he plans to utilize existing committees including the 

Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, or SEAB, rather than create 

a new independent body. 

The Commission supports this for creating advice and ongoing 

advice to the secretary, but notes that no existing body including 

SEAB can provide the independent advice to Congress which we 

envision. On behalf of our nine commissioners, we want to thank 

you for this opportunity to serve the country on this important 

Commission. We hope our work will be helpful, and we’re happy to 

34 

answer questions and to discuss our findings and recommendations. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohon follows:] 


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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I thank all the panelists, and I will 

begin by recognizing myself for 5 minutes of questions. First, for 

Mr. Augustine and Admiral Mies, the members of the advisory 

panel you chaired reflected a broad range of views and substantial 

experience with DOE, defense, and other nuclear matters; do I 

have that correct? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURPHY. OK. And the advisory panel made findings and recommendations that were unanimous; they were a unanimous vote? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURPHY. And Mr. Augustine, you say in your testimony that 

DOE governance and practices are inefficient, and in some instances ineffective which puts the entire nuclear enterprise at risk. 

Can these deficiencies be fixed and the benefits of DOE’s technical 

and engineering abilities be fully leveraged by, sustained by leadership alone? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. I’m sorry. I didn’t hear the last sentence. 

Mr. MURPHY. Could the abilities be fully leveraged and sustained 

by leadership alone? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. I would say not. Leadership is of course absolutely essential. There are also organizational issues that have a 

bearing, and there are many government practices, governmentwide practices that I think contribute to the problems that have 

been encountered in NNSA. As an example, one of the main 

failings, in my view, has been the lack of accountability. When I 

was involved in the Y–12 investigation, the people, the company 

that was in charge of the issues at the time was fired. The senior 

management was fired. I haven’t to this day been able to find out 

what happened to the people in the government. They sort of just 

moved from one job to another. That’s partly because of the civil 

service rules that were set up with very good reasons, but there are 

constraints that make it very difficult to impose accountability to 

the government. 

I spent 10 years working in the government, most of my career 

in industry, some in academia, and it is very hard to provide the 

leadership in government. Having said that I think that leadership 

is absolutely critical, but there are a lot of other things that need 

relief. The lack of a capital budget is one that comes to mind immediately. 

Mr. MURPHY. Is the key then as you are saying, and Admiral 

Mies, I would like a comment on this too that could you comment 

about what needs to be done with leadership; as soon as this gets 

fixed here. We can put a man on the moon; we can’t make a microphone work in a congressional hearing room. Sorry. I am going to 

do my best. 

So Admiral Mies, your panel’s unanimous finding is that NNSA’s 

current governance structure failed to accomplish what Congress 

intended, so you recommended essentially reintegrating NNSA 

more fully back to the DOE umbrella. So looking at what needs to 

be done structurally and leadership, Congress can’t necessarily 

mandate that someone be a good leader, but we can identify a 

number of things as mentioned as accountability in there. So, but 

in what you are saying, what are the benefits of doing this? 

Admiral MIES. What are the benefits of doing this? 

40 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, if we—— 

Admiral MIES. Well, I think the benefits to a certain degree 

should be obvious to all of us based on the 50 previous reports and 

their findings and recommendations. 

I would just comment first of all that the national security enterprise to begin with is much, much larger than just NNSA and it 

encompasses both, Congress, the executive branch, White House, 

elements of DoD and the broader DOE, not just NNSA. And so 

again, building a structure that promotes greater collaboration and 

coordination across the enterprise is really critical. As Norm indicated, leadership, first of all, is probably the most important element. 

But as we indicated in our report, most of the problems are cultural not organizational, and simply changing the wiring diagram 

and changing the NNSA Act alone is not going to deal with the 

fundamental problems of a very risk-averse and entrenched bureaucracy. And so there are a lot of cultural issues that I think 

need to be addressed that can improve the technical competency, 

the collaboration, the relationship between the M&Os and the federal workforce in a much more collaborative way than presently exists. So again I think it’s addressing those cultural changes. 

To build on Dr. Cohon’s testimony, I would tell you that as a sign 

of the secretary’s commitment to institutionalizing some of the reforms he’s asked both Dick Meserve and I to co-chair a subpanel 

of the Secretary of Energy’s Advisory Board to oversee not just our 

report, but all of the previous past reports’ findings and recommendations on how the Department is responding to them. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I will let Ms. DeGette go next because 

I only have a few seconds left, but I will come back to that later. 

Ms. DeGette, 5 minutes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the major conclusions of the Mies-Augustine report is that the current NNSA 

governance model has failed to provide the effective mission focused enterprise that Congress intended. I would like to walk 

through some of those key findings with you, gentlemen, so I can 

understand how this affects NNSA’s ability to accomplish its mission. Now I only have 5 minutes so I am going to appreciate yes 

or no answers. 

Mr. Augustine, your interim report states ‘‘one unmistakable conclusion of the panel’s fact finding is that as implemented the NNSA 

experiment in governance has failed.’’ Is that correct? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Correct. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And in fact, your report concluded that the NNSA 

Act, which intended to create a separately organized NNSA within 

DOE, did not achieve the intended degree of clarity in enterprise 

roles and mission ownership; is that correct? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Yes. I believe that’s true. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And in fact, the creation of the NNSA has caused 

a number of structural issues between it, the DOE and the weapons labs; is that correct? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. I believe that’s true. 

Ms. DEGETTE. For example, your report found that there is still 

an overlapping of staffs between the NNSA and the DOE. This can 

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ability when it comes to managing the nuclear enterprise. Is that 

correct, Mr. Augustine? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Yes. That is our view. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now I could go on here, but your report concludes, 

‘‘significant and wide ranging reform is needed to create a nuclear 

enterprise capable of meeting the nation’s needs.’’ That is one of 

the key findings in your report, isn’t it, Mr. Augustine? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Yes, indeed. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So, let us talk about how to begin fixing those 

problems. The panel recommends that the nuclear enterprise would 

be most effective in performing its mission if led by an engaged 

cabinet secretary with ownership of the mission Department wide; 

is that correct? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Absolutely. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now in other words, Mr. Augustine, the current 

relationship among NNSA, the Secretary of Energy, and DOE 

headquarters is not meeting the mission of the nuclear energy enterprise, therefore we should bring NNSA back into DOE under the 

secretary; isn’t that correct? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. That is our belief. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So, Mr. Augustine, in your testimony you talk 

about the President’s nuclear negotiations with Iran to underscore 

the importance of having a qualified DOE cabinet secretary be in 

control of the nuclear enterprise. And we clearly saw this, I think 

you mentioned this, under Secretary Moniz. 

Tell us why having the NNSA led directly by a full cabinet secretary is so important for the country’s nuclear mission and for our 

national security. 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Very briefly, the nuclear mission is one of the 

most important missions that our country engages in. Given that 

it should be represented at the highest levels of our government if 

it’s to be impactful. Two, if the enterprise is spun off as an independent, self-standing entity, it’s our belief that we’ll have neither 

the authority, the presence nor the ability to attract and keep top 

level people. It needs a seat at the cabinet table, and it also needs 

to draw upon the other labs in the DOE. 

So we looked at four different options. We believe the one we’ve 

described is clearly the best. That’s our unanimous findings. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So thank you. Admiral Mies, something that you 

have said now twice in your testimony today really struck me. 

What you said is that you can’t just fix this by fixing the structure. 

You have to fix the culture, correct? 

Admiral MIES. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, so here—— 

Admiral MIES. I mean—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK, hang on a minute. Here is the thing though. 

If you have overlapping ownership, if you have overlapping and unclear accountability, if you have a lack of clear leadership from the 

top from a cabinet secretary who knows what he or she is talking 

about, then that only helps feed the culture, isn’t that right? So I 

would say fixing the structure will begin to help fixing the underlying culture. 

Admiral MIES. Certainly they go together, but I think ultimately 

the ownership, the leadership-ownership of the mission and also 

42 

the cultural changes that are necessary not just within NNSA but 

DOE wide—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. 

Admiral MIES [continuing]. Are critical to the successful more effective implementation of the mission. 

Ms. DEGETTE. I totally agree with you. Thank you. I thank all 

of you. And I didn’t get a time to talk about to you other gentlemen, but maybe we will talk about you later. I really think that 

this is important that the panel follow through on both of your panels’ recommendations. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. The gentlelady’s time has expired. I now recognize 

Mr. Cramer from North Dakota for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the panel for 

your expertise and for being with us and for the very hard and 

good work that has been done. It is hard to get to one or two 

points. 

I might just say as a point of reference, my interest besides oversight and just concern for the entire situation is of course that 

North Dakota hosts two-thirds of the nuclear triad but we do have 

submarine named after us, so at least we would like to take all 

three. But I want to get a sense of the urgency of all of this, because obviously there is a lot of work that has gone into this. It 

is very comprehensive; a lot of good recommendations. The leadership stuff, I think we could spend a lot of time just talking about 

the leadership issues, but we all view it through the lens of a particular person or a particular administration, and you are dealing 

with structure that hopefully enhances culture. 

Tell us about the urgency. What if these recommendations or 

some of these proposals aren’t enacted? What would be the most 

important ones and in what order that we would have to get to like 

tomorrow if we could? Could somebody sort of give us a sense of 

the urgency of each or all of these recommendations? And whoever 

wants to take it first can go for it. 

Mr. GLAUTHIER. Sure. I’ll be happy to since I haven’t had the opportunity to speak earlier. I think that the culture change that Admiral Mies talked about underlies all of the things that we’re dealing with and if we don’t get this relationship right, we run the risk 

of the life extension programs, for example, for nuclear weapons 

getting off track. There’s been a significant amount of progress in 

the last year getting them back on schedule, but that depends upon 

some individuals. And it really has been a difficult project to manage those things. 

Our recommendations are that we need to return the whole system to the FFRDC model, and that is the relationship of the laboratories and the M&O contractors to the government needs to be 

the one that Jared Cohon described in the testimony, whereas the 

government is specifying what it is that needs to be done, what the 

mission needs to accomplish, and then give the laboratories more 

flexibility, more freedom to carry it out, but being transparent and 

accountable. 

And we don’t have that relationship right now, and as a result 

it risks not being effective. Too many people are in charge and 

therefore nobody’s in charge. And it also is less efficient and we’re 

43 

spending more money than we would need to do if we get this 

right. 

Mr. CRAMER. Others? That was very well said, although I could 

apply it to several agencies and divisions of agencies, but critically 

here. So on my urgency point then this is the start. This would be 

the start that perhaps could lead to all kinds of other benefits obviously. 

I want to get to the oversight issue a little bit too then, and I 

appreciate Ms. DeGette’s point of the oversight, because some of 

what you are talking about is certainly on the advisory side. I appreciated the emphasis on existing advisors, OK, but maybe not in 

this sense, we need independence. 

What I worry about, and I think what a lot of Members of Congress worry about, is that advisory committees, advisory councils, 

commissions within agencies tend to adopt the bureaucracy rather 

quickly. And as Members, the independence is a really big deal because we don’t want to be overly duplicative, then that sounds 

overly duplicative. We don’t want to have duplication, but at the 

same time this independence thing is a really big deal, I think, and 

it gives us a sense of comfort if we know that they are advising us 

with the same clarity and expertise and honesty as they would be 

advising the secretary or anybody else. And I don’t assume that 

anymore. I think that is just maybe human nature, but yes, sir? 

Mr. COHON. If I could speak to that? 

Mr. CRAMER. Please. 

Mr. COHON. I’m very glad you raised it and that Ranking Member DeGette raised it. I think it’s a critical issue. As you’ve heard 

several times and as you know well, there have been more than 50 

studies of the energy laboratories in the last 40 years. Furthermore, as we learned in our review of those studies, each subsequent commission or committee made basically the same recommendations because the last ones hadn’t been implemented. 

One thing we can predict almost with certainty is if you don’t do 

something else you’ll create another commission pretty soon and 

the same thing will happen, so this is exactly why we proposed 

what we did. Now we don’t have an answer as to how one should 

situate such a commission or where you put it. National Academies 

was one institution that we identified as a potential home for it. 

It’s hard to figure out, but I’m very glad you raised it and stressed 

what you did. Independence is the key, and I think Congress and 

the nation need it. 

Admiral MIES. I would like to make one comment about the independence. I think, I have recently been asked to join the Secretary 

of Energy’s Advisory Board, and I can assure you under the leadership of people like John Deutch it has not adopted any of the bureaucratic culture within the Department. It is clearly independent. Its members represent a diverse population of expertise 

much like our Commission. So I think you should have at least confidence that the secretary has an advisory board who really is giving him independent advice. 

I would also give you an analogy as a submarine commander. On 

a submarine I had three major departments: an engineering department, a weapons department, and a navigation department— 

44 

and I don’t think I could have successfully run a submarine if one 

of those departments was semi-autonomous. 

And I think again one of the cultural issues is the lack of codified 

roles, responsibilities, authority, and accountability within a department, and putting the responsibility squarely under the ownership and accountability of the secretary, to me, like the captain of 

a submarine, makes eminent sense. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Now I will recognize Mr. Tonko for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Welcome, gentlemen. A key 

finding of the nuclear security panel is that the intent of the NNSA 

Act to create a separately organized NNSA within DOE has not 

worked as originally intended. This has led to a number of structural problems within the nuclear enterprise. For example, the act 

as implemented has ‘‘made organizational changes designed to insulate NNSA from DOE headquarters without specifying the secretary’s roles, without stipulating the relationships between NNSA 

and DOE headquarters staffs, and without requiring actions to 

shift the Department’s culture toward a focus on mission performance.’’ 

And so, Co-chair Augustine, to fix some of these structural problems the panel concluded the NNSA should be brought back under 

the Secretary of Energy and led by a knowledgeable and engaged 

cabinet secretary. The panel also explored a range of other options 

such as making the NNSA a separate independent agency, but the 

panel concluded that each of the other approaches had their own 

significant weaknesses. 

So my question is, can you briefly explain what other alternatives the panel explored and what were their weaknesses? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. I certainly can. There were four options, basically; none are perfect, unfortunately. One option is to create a totally independent NNSA as an agency like a NASA, for example. 

Another option is to leave things as they are, which I need say no 

more about the feelings of that. Another option is to put NNSA 

within the Department of Defense. And our view there is the Department of Defense has so many things on its platter today, furthermore, much of what NNSA does ties in with the rest of DOE. 

We discarded that option. 

And so you come back to the one of why not make it a real part 

of DOE? Today it’s sort of half on half pair. It needs to be either, 

the best option we can see is to make it part of DOE. Put DOE in 

charge. Put a leader in there that understands nuclear matters and 

give them the authority to run NNSA. The second best option 

would be, in our view, to make it an independent agency, but we 

view that as a very inferior second best option. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. And again to our co-chair, co-Chair Augustine, what do you mean by further isolating the nuclear enterprise? In your statement you talked about that further isolation. 

What happens if the nuclear enterprise, and mainly we mean 

NNSA and the weapons labs, are isolated from DOE or a cabinet 

secretary? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. I think with regard to the latter, the isolation 

from a cabinet secretary is that they don’t have a seat at the highest levels of the government, and we think their mission is so imVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:49 Jan 10, 2017 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 114\114-119 CHRIS
45 

portant that they should have that seat. The other problem with 

the isolation is it requires one to create a whole new level of bureaucracy if you will that already exists, or a support structure 

that already exists within the DOE and that the NNSA shares 

much of what the other DOE labs do, the four NNSA labs, the 

other 13 labs. And so it seems to us there’s a very natural tie. 

And I think Admiral Mies and I would be very careful to say that 

this is not perfect. It’s complex, but it’s by far the best option we 

can think of. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, and Admiral Mies. 

Mr. TONKO. NNSA is in charge of the development and testing 

of this nation’s nuclear defense capability. It is critical that we understand the important role NNSA plays in keeping our nation secure and therefore understand the recommendations that your 

panel made in its final report. 

So what is at stake if we do not adequately address the ongoing 

structural problems between DOE and NNSA that you have uncovered? 

Admiral MIES. Well, I think, within DOE, because you have a 

semi-autonomous organization, separately organized NNSA, it’s 

neither fish nor fowl. It’s not autonomous enough to have complete 

autonomy to determine its own direction, but it’s just autonomous 

enough to upset a lot of the people in DOE outside of NNSA who 

support the secretary. 

And as Norm and I indicated, in the Department of Energy 

NNSA controls 43 percent of the Department of Energy’s budget. 

What secretary or secretary’s immediate staff wants to allow that 

to be autonomous and not under the secretary’s direct control, particularly when it involves such a critical element of national security? And particularly when the secretary has to personally certify 

every year to the President the safety, security and performance of 

our strategic stockpile? So again, I think there’s a structural issue. 

But I would argue to, and this is my point about culture, that 

professional, well qualified, technically competent people can overcome organizational deficiencies, but no amount of reorganization 

can compensate for an entrenched, risk-averse bureaucracy with a 

lack of technical competence and a lack of professionalism. And so 

the cultural changes to me are critical, because if you have an organization of well qualified, professionally competent people they 

can overcome some of the organizational inefficiencies that exist, 

and I think that’s true of every organization. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you for your insights, and with that I yield 

back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Griffith of Virginia 

for five minutes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this. This 

is an important hearing, and I apologize to all of you. I have been 

in another important hearing and have just arrived, so forgive me 

if I tread on some territory, although I think I am in an area that 

will be a little different than what you have been asked before. 

I am going to ask all of you, if you will tell me briefly the answer 

when I get there, much of the focus on DOE’s national security programs is directed toward the work undertaken at the three labs 

46 

overseen by the NNSA. However, a number of other labs also support vital national security activities. 

Does the Department recognize the role of the non-NNSA labs in 

supporting the national security mission and are those labs incorporated into the process? In other words, are they in the loop for 

some of the things where they may have an expertise that the 

three NNSA labs do not have as much expertise or where they 

have overlapping expertise? Whoever wants to answer it. 

Mr. GLAUTHIER. All right. OK, sure. Yes, there is a real strong 

effort to make sure that those labs are involved in the joint assessments of the mission needs and the like. A couple of the examples 

would be Oak Ridge in Tennessee and the Pacific Northwest Lab 

up in Washington State, both very actively involved in the nuclear 

weapons programs and all, and the national security nonproliferation programs too. There’s a lot of that sort of integration and 

that’s one of the things that Norm Augustine just mentioned we 

would lose if you moved the NNSA laboratories out, but those other 

labs are still in the Department of Energy. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Yes, I do appreciate that. And it is part of why I 

asked the question, because while as the crow flies I may be a good 

distance away from Oak Ridge, my district is in the Tennessee Valley Authority region so we want to make sure we take care of that. 

In your opinion—I will just continue if I might, and feel free to 

jump in if you have something to add. But in your opinion, do you 

believe the labs work together effectively to support the DOE mission overall? Are you aware that the labs are working cooperatively 

to present joint mission research to Congress? What else do you believe that the labs should be doing to support the DOE mission? 

Mr. GLAUTHIER. This is an area that we did spend a good deal 

of time looking at. We think that the labs are very actively involved in supporting the mission or the missions of the Department. But we also are concerned that there are times that the laboratories do not share as much information with each other and 

with the Department of Energy as they should, and that in early 

stages of new technology or new issues in exploration you want a 

lot of new ideas explored, you want a lot of people to do a lot of 

things independently, but as that matures and becomes a program 

area or an area of more importance, the Department needs to step 

in and assert more leadership in terms of where we’re going to conduct that research, what are the degrees of coordination that you 

want among the laboratories and all, and right now the Department has let that go on too long. There are some activities that this 

secretary has begun to try to integrate that more and he’s got some 

cross-cut activities he talks about as making some progress, but 

that’s an area that we call out for increased attention of the Department and the Department needs to step up to its responsibilities in those areas. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, I appreciate that. The labs have been described as the nation’s crown jewel in reference to basic and applied science work they do. Do you believe, and it sounds like you 

do, but do you believe the national labs have a unique role and 

their work is not duplicated elsewhere? I am talking about all the 

labs, not just the three. 

47 

Mr. GLAUTHIER. Yes, we certainly do, and have come to that conclusion and think that it’s important as you look at all those missions, which the national defense mission, the nuclear’s, the role is 

an important one, but also the whole role in innovation for the 

country and the role in working with the private sector and with 

the universities and the basic research support. These are all very 

important and they are ones that we do not feel are duplicated, but 

rather they complement the other agencies and other roles of the 

government. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Now I have got about 50 seconds left and I have 

a long question here, so I am going to skip the question and just 

say, what else do you think can be done to bring about that process 

where the labs are working together and what should the DOE be 

doing to facilitate that? 

Mr. GLAUTHIER. Well, I’ll go ahead, and since I’ve got the microphone here. I think it’s the relationship of the openness and working in partnership that is really key. And that’s a partnership not 

just with the Department of Energy and the labs, but among the 

labs as well, and that actually is better now than it has been for 

years. I think that again this secretary deserves some credit for 

this, and this set of laboratory directors do too. So continuing to 

support the Laboratory Directors’ Council, supporting their work 

together as a group is very important. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, I appreciate that. If I could take just a 

minute, Mr. Chairman, I used to be a small town lawyer. And it 

sounds like what you are saying is, is that you ought to do something maybe by Skype or by the Internet. But we had a group, 

most of the lawyers in town were in one-, two-person law firms, 

and I think the big one was three, and every Wednesday when I 

was practicing and to this day, the lawyers that were available 

would congregate at the local watering hole, Mac and Bob’s on 

Main Street, and share ideas and best practices and what was 

working and what the judges were looking at and that kind of 

thing. 

Sounds like that is what you want to do for the labs, is give them 

an opportunity to say what is working best and where we are going 

so that we can make this process more efficient. 

Mr. GLAUTHIER. Yes. And they are learning a lot from each other 

and actually improving the whole system. Did you want to add 

something? 

Mr. COHON. I just wanted to add something to what TJ said, 

which goes to your last question but ties back to your very first 

one. That is, one of the things that we recommended, our commission recommended, was that each of the lab create an annual report, yet another report, but this one focused on a very high level 

attempt to integrate all that the lab does. 

The big multipurpose labs, Oak Ridge is a great example, gets 

their support from many different offices within DOE, and there’s 

not been enough effort to try to understand the whole of what Oak 

Ridge does. That would be a very valuable thing to do for the laboratory and for DOE. 

So it goes back to your point about whether we recognize all that 

the non-weapons labs do for the weapons program, yes, but going 

from the other direction I’m not sure we always recognize all that 

48 

the individual labs do, taking it in totality especially the big multipurpose ones. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you very much, I do appreciate it. Mr. 

Chairman, with that I appreciate your indulgence and yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. The gentlemen yields back. I now recognize Ms. 

Schakowsky of Illinois for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like Representative Griffith, I want to apologize, such a prestigious panel. I too 

was at another hearing, this time with the Secretary of HHS, and 

so I apologize for missing not only your testimony but some of the 

questioning that has been done. So I am hoping—you know how it 

goes, sometimes everything has been asked but not everybody has 

asked it; I may be in that situation. 

But I did want to talk about some of the accidents that have happened and what we may have learned. The major consequences, 

there have been major consequences because of the WIPP accident 

and we understand from the Department of Energy that limited operations might resume in December, had to be shut down. But it 

could cost over half a billion dollars to fully remediate this site. So, 

Mr. Augustine, first of all, let me ask what are the lessons that we 

have learned from the WIPP accident and how do they relate to 

your report’s finding and recommendations? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. I think the lessons I’ve learned from each of 

these incidents are very similar. The first is that someone has to 

be in charge that’s qualified to be in charge. That person has to 

have the authority to cause what needs to be done to be done. They 

have to have accountability which they can pass down through the 

system. 

One of the greatest feelings in government in my view, and as 

I said, I think before you came in, I spent 10 years in government 

and I’m very proud of that but accountability is very hard to find 

in our government. So I think it was TJ who said that everyone 

tends to be responsible for everything and no one tends to be responsible for anything. 

And we often try to solve the problem with organizational 

change, and that’s needed in this case in our view, but that won’t 

begin to solve the problem. This would be a problem that’s relatively easy to solve in the corporate world; it’s very hard to solve 

in the government. But basically what’s needed is qualified people, 

people to talk with leadership—— 

Mr. SCHAKOWSKY. What would be done in the private sector? 

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Well, the private sector, when you’re trying to 

bring about change and I’ve lived through a lot of that you have 

basically three kinds of people, one who are excited about change 

and view it as an opportunity, others who can go along with it, and 

those who will fight it. You fire the ones who are going to fight it. 

It’s as simple as that. You can’t make change with people that are 

going to fight it. And you can’t do that. I spent 4 years, 5 years 

to get rid of one person in the government and finally succeeded, 

and there was plenty of reason. And there’s just not the accountability in government. It’s built in. 

Mr. SCHAKOWSKY. I wondered if anyone else wanted to answer 

that. Yes, go ahead. 

49 

Mr. GLAUTHIER. I think the Y–12 incident may be an interesting 

example. 

Mr. SCHAKOWSKY. I was going to raise that one as well, yes. 

Mr. GLAUTHIER. OK. I think it goes to what is the responsibility 

that you’re giving to a contractor or a laboratory. And if the responsibility is to keep the facility, be secure and safe, then they should 

take that and look at all of the aspects of what it does, what 

they’re required to accomplish that. Instead, if we tell them their 

responsibility is to follow a set of checklists and to be able to do 

all these things and to be sure that they have their inspections 

that check off all the boxes every time somebody comes around, 

then we’re missing the real focus of that. 

And I think that is one of the problems that we have in the Department of Energy that there is a lot of attention to specific directives and rules and approvals and not enough focus on what the 

real objective is in these programs. And you should be giving the 

people at the laboratories the responsibility and accountability for 

actually carrying out the specific actions and roles. 

Mr. SCHAKOWSKY. Right. 

Admiral MIES. I would like to add to that. One of the observations in our report is that most of the contracts, particularly the 

NNSA contracts, involve a significant amount of the fee being 

award fee not fixed fee. And because of the award nature, there is 

a whole body of federal oversight people who are responsible for 

kind of grading how the M&O contractor is performing to earn that 

award fee. And frankly that process has become very wasteful and 

ineffective in terms of the things that the people are overseeing. It 

involves more with contract compliance rather than with mission 

executions, successful mission executions. 

So if you look at Y–12 as just one example, in the run-up to Y– 

12 for a long period of time there were 600 or more alarms per 

day—false alarms, or nuisance alarms in the command center. And 

over a long period of time that built a culture of complacency with 

the security force such that when an alarm occurred the people did 

not respond like you would like to have them respond. 

And as a result of that it’s no surprise, essentially, when you 

have a real security incident with a nun and two elderly assistants 

that the response is not what you would have liked. I would argue 

that on the contractor side you had a problem in that you had two 

separate contracts, a contract for security and a contract for the 

M&O contractor, and so there was a bureaucratic seam there 

which didn’t necessarily have accountability centered in a single organization. And you can criticize that. 

But more to the point, how could all of those federal overseers 

not have gone into the command center and noticed the frequency 

of alarms over a long period of time and reported that and taken 

some degree of action to encourage the M&O contractor and the security contractor to address those issues? There is a very ineffective 

and wasteful transactional oversight system that has evolved, and 

one of our recommendations is do away with award fees, go to fixed 

fees that really are commensurate with the M&O contractors’ responsibilities and the risk and financial risks they take, 

reputational and financial, but hold the M&Os accountable. 

50 

Mr. SCHAKOWSKY. Well, I just want to thank you. My time has 

long expired, but thank you for the good work that you have done 

and the reports that you have issued. I appreciate it and the recommendations. 

Mr. MURPHY. OK. The gentlelady’s time has expired. Each of us 

is going to ask a couple more questions. I don’t know if any of the 

members do, but I know that Ms. DeGette and I do. So let me ask 

this, first, Dr. Cohon. 

As former president of Carnegie Mellon, you understand how to 

ensure an effective organization and you did a great job there. But 

the report before us talks about alignment of responsibilities and 

accountability. A success here would seem to involve this structural 

reporting component and this leadership component which we 

spent a lot of time talking about; am I correct on that? 

Mr. COHON. [Non-verbal response.] 

Mr. MURPHY. So, can you have one without the other and still 

have a fully effective laboratory? I mean, obviously we want to set 

up, make sure there is a system that has the flexibility, rewards 

innovation, gets people to speak up as opposed to just saying I am 

not going to say anything. We have had so many hearings here. 

General Motors, devastating consequences of just people not even 

speaking up when they saw something going wrong and they refer 

to as a ‘‘Gentle Motors shrug.’’ 

We had hearings about Volkswagen where somebody changed 

something in some piece of software and the next thing you know, 

one day they couldn’t meet the standards for diesel engines and the 

next day they could. And I think it was Mr. Collins of New York 

who pointed out, did he at least get a patent? I wondered, did he 

get employee of the month? Did anybody give him a free parking 

space for that? No one seemed to know in the organization. 

So you have to have this leadership and accountability. So how 

critical is this lab leadership for ensuring this increased focus and 

performance of the laboratory research and development in particular? 

Mr. COHON. I think it’s a wonderful question, Mr. Chairman. I’m 

glad you’re focused on that because I think it’s key. It goes to this 

issue of culture that Admiral Mies talked about and the relationship question between DOE and its laboratories. 

To answer you I want to pick up on something that TJ Gaulthier 

was saying before in response to the question about the incidences 

that have occurred. I think he said something very important, and 

let me put it in a different way. 

We visited all 17 labs, and one of the really interesting thing was 

to me, but it shouldn’t be a surprise, is how proud people are to 

work at these laboratories. They have a real sense of mission. They 

have a real sense that they’re contributing to the advancement and 

safety of this nation. They’re extremely proud of that. That’s what 

we’re buying, by the way, by having this relationship that we’ve 

created for 16 of the labs where it’s privately run, but government 

owned. We’re buying into that unique culture that each laboratory 

is able to create. That’s key, I think, to success. And certainly leadership is part of that. You have to have leaders who understand 

that and know how to promote it and to sustain it. 

51 

But just to underscore what TJ was saying, you’re much less 

likely, I think, to have someone put the wrong thing in a barrel on 

its way to WIPP if they are invested in their mission and they understand what they’re doing as opposed to relying on a check sheet 

with someone trying to do it completely by compliance. So what you 

put your finger on, I think, is key to the success of the labs in every 

way, both in terms of their mission and being compliant. 

Mr. MURPHY. I want to talk about one specific lab, the National 

Energy Technology Lab is the one in my district. I understand Secretary Moniz issued his reply to your recommendation to study 

whether NETL should be converted to a government owned contractor operated laboratory, he said so this week. And the secretary 

basically said there can be ways to improve management and performance within the current model and we will pursue that. Now 

do you agree that NETL performance may be enhanced by some of 

the tools provided to similar defense labs? 

Mr. COHON. I do. I admire the secretary’s response. I think it’s 

correct, and I especially appreciate the fact that he understood 

what motivated our Commission. We care less about the specifics 

of how the National Energy Technology Laboratory is organized, 

what we care about it is the increased focus on R&D and making 

it more visible and giving the lab more flexibility. And in both regards I think the secretary’s response is very good. 

Mr. MURPHY. I want to say for the record, multiple times I have 

visited the National Energy Technology Labs near Pittsburgh, and 

I do agree with you. Highly motivated people proud of their work 

and oftentimes wondering, we are doing great work here, why isn’t 

anybody paying attention to it? How do we get this to go up the 

chain of command, because that itself is a stovepipe. Or when I see 

what they have done that deals with methane released on unattended wells; when they say we have advanced a lot with coal technology, carbon sequestration, we can do this; when I hear about 

just a wide range of other things going on there it is pretty amazing to me. 

I know one of our issues—and we will review this. I have been 

talking to my colleague Ms. DeGette about some of the recommendations, legislative recommendations, and we will review 

that carefully. But it still comes down to this point we have realized over the years, we cannot legislate character and we cannot 

mandate morality and we sure as heck can’t litigate common sense, 

but that requires a certain type of leadership. 

But the accountability, generally what happens in a federal office 

is about the only person that has accountability for whether they 

stay or not is the leader, so many other people are there and there 

is some things we have to make sure we deal with. So I thank you. 

Ms. DeGette for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. Well, I don’t have so much questions 

as an observation, which is this agency, the NNSA, was formed in 

large part because of the issues that these two commissions have 

identified. I have here, I was sharing this with the chairman, some 

minutes of one of the many hearings we had. This hearing was almost exactly 16 years ago. It was March 14th, 2000. 

And at that time the chairman, it was the chairman of the Energy Committee of Energy and Commerce said, the history of poor 

52 

security and safety practices at these sites, however long it may be, 

is still recent enough to caution us again letting the NNSA become 

a self-regulating entity. This was 2 weeks after it was passed. And 

that of course was Fred Upton, now the chair of the full committee 

here. 

Then, the chair of this subcommittee, Oversight and Investigations, said even before the NNSA passed, a number of concerns 

were expressed by both Congress and the Administration. For example, and then it goes on and on, then, to talk about we have 

heard both Senator Rudman and the GAO refer to a culture in— 

does this sound familiar, Admiral? A culture in DOE which seems 

to espouse a bureaucratic form of elitism and resistant to substantive change. That was Cliff Stearns, who was the chairman 

several chairmen ago of this committee. 

Now everybody on the Energy and Commerce Committee realized 

the set of problems that we had at these labs before the NNSA was 

passed. We realized the culture, we realized the problems, but 

what happened was in response to the Wen Ho Lee case and some 

other really high profile cases coming out of Los Alamos and WIPP 

and other places, Senator Rudman and others thought, well, this 

will be super great to have a semi-autonomous agency. The members of—and what happened was this agency was established in 

the dead of night. No good ever happens as near as I can tell when 

you go over to the other body and then you establish something in 

the dead of night in a conference committee. But that is exactly 

how this agency was established. 

And members of the Energy and Commerce Committee realized 

at that time, sadly, it would be like a comedy, one of those congressional comedies, if it didn’t deal with our nation’s nuclear security. 

And here we are 16 years later identifying the same culture problems, identifying the same organizational issues. 

And so I think we are just kind of lucky that nothing has happened. We did have the nun and the other people. We have had 

some other breaches, but something really, really serious could 

happen. And it is time that we really work in partnership with all 

of you and your committees to make this happen. 

The proposed legislation that you put as an appendix to your report that is a good start. And I really have talked to the chairman 

and his staff about undertaking a serious effort because it is my 

opinion, I think we all are saying the same thing, is when you have 

a culture that is an embedded culture in these agencies, you have 

to have strong leadership to change that culture. And so that is 

what we are all saying. That is what we don’t have, and we look 

forward—I hope you are not sick of us yet, because we intend to 

make this a continuing relationship. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Mr. Griffith, do you have any final 

questions? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. I do not. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. If I could sum up what they just said, 

I put up two of my favorite cartoons here. This is based upon the 

quote by George Santayana that those who cannot remember the 

past are doomed to repeat it. One is an elderly man sitting next 

to and talking to a young man in a library and he says, those who 

53 

don’t study history are doomed to repeat it, yet those who do study 

history are doomed to stand by helplessly while everybody else repeats it. 

Or imagine two high school students walking out of school one 

day and one student holding his report card says, I failed history 

again. I guess those who don’t learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Another one there too. 

We certainly don’t want that because as was asked by some of 

the folks before and it says so clear in your co-chair reports, this 

can create a dangerous situation. And although we may look at it 

with some—note it to the history also becomes farce if we don’t 

learn from it, these can be tragic consequences and we have to do 

that. 

I really thank you all for the effort you have put into this. This 

is very valuable and we will continue to talk about what we do 

with this and have more briefings and hearings on this. I do want 

to ask the unanimous consent that the documents of this binder, 

which is for the committee, be introduced into the record and to authorize staff to make any appropriate redactions. So without objections, the documents will be entered into the record with any 

redactions the staff determines are appropriate. 

So, in conclusion, thank you all again this very distinguished 

panel, and I want to thank the witnesses and members that participated in today’s hearing. I remind members they have ten business days to submit questions for the record and ask that the witnesses all agree to respond promptly to the questions. 

So with that this subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON

Today we consider the recommendations of two distinguished panels that examined the Department of Energy’s most important functions—maintaining the 

strength of our nuclear security enterprise and the national laboratory system that 

underpins the scientific and technological work that supports nuclear security and 

other DOE missions. 

The work of the department is vital to the nation. The testimony plainly explains 

the stakes if DOE loses its edge on the nuclear deterrent, on nuclear security and 

its naval programs, on its technological superiority. So as we look at DOE’s structure and decision-making for confronting the challenges of the 21st century, we have 

to focus on these fundamental operations to be sure they are working at maximum 

potential. I want to commend the panelists for their work in outlining what should 

be done to meet this goal. 

The story of DOE’s management and performance shortcomings, particularly 

when it comes to its nuclear work, is long and unpleasant. During my time as Oversight Subcommittee Chairman over 15 years ago we took a hard look at agency failures in security and project management, pressuring the agency to reform. Some reforms have worked and some clearly have not taken hold. In recent years, as demonstrated by our oversight of security failures at nuclear weapons production sites, 

safety failures at the national laboratories, and contractor oversight failures overall, 

the reforms of 2000 did not achieve the results Congress envisioned. 

Under my chairmanship, under previous chairmanships, the goal of Energy and 

Commerce has been to ensure the accountability to the president, through the Secretary of Energy, for the safety, security, management, and ultimate performance 

of DOE’s nuclear weapons and nuclear security enterprise. This accountability has 

been put to the test, particularly in the wake of the creation of the semi-autonomous 

National Nuclear Security Administration. 

54 

The panelists today make a very important point: Cabinet-level leadership, by the 

Secretary of Energy, is essential for the success of DOE, particularly its nuclear security mission. we’ll discuss a key recommendation to strengthen the secretary’s 

ownership of this mission today, which will require continued administration and 

congressional focus on making sure future secretaries are well prepared for their 

nuclear security responsibilities. Solidifying secretary’s ownership of his nuclear security responsibility also includes reforms to the governance structure of NNSA. The 

goal is to allow for the best of NNSA’s focused mission and to discard the duplicative, inefficient structures and offices that inhibit operations and restrict the ability 

to benefit from all the technological, operational, management experience of the full 

department. 

This is a worthy goal that we must collectively work toward. The big lesson is 

that DOE’s safety, security, and contract management problems span administrations, span Congresses. From my experience, and as our witnesses will explain, improving DOE’s performance requires long, sustained attention to ensure sustained 

improvement in agency performance. DOE has huge responsibilities that will not go 

away. This committee’s job will be to ensure the department is managed to meet 

these responsibilities, and structured to ensure they are executed to their full potential and in the best interest of the American taxpayer. This hearing continues this 

important work. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR. 

Thank you for holding this important hearing on one of the nation’s most vital 

national security programs. 

The work of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE 

laboratories is critical to keeping this nation and our allies safe. 

DOE’s work maintaining the nation’s nuclear deterrent and advancing science in 

a variety of energy and security fields has also been a cornerstone of the Energy 

and Commerce Committee’s oversight efforts. For example, we have held numerous 

hearings on a wide variety of challenges facing the national labs and examined various solutions to some of the problems we have uncovered. 

Continuing that work, we have the heads of two distinguished panels that have 

completed very thorough reviews of the nuclear security enterprise and of DOE’s national laboratories more generally. The reports produced by these panels underscore 

that the weapons complex and national labs have achieved a great deal in both national security and science endeavors. 

However, ongoing achievements in these areas is neither inevitable nor guaranteed. Both panels highlight a variety of structural and cultural challenges facing 

NNSA and the labs. In particular, the Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise concludes that the current arrangement between DOE and a ‘‘separately organized’’ NNSA has failed to provide the effective, mission-focused capability that Congress envisioned. 

The panel, for example, concludes that overlapping staffs and the lack of clear 

lines of authority and responsibility have created confusion and tensions among 

headquarters, field sites, and contractors, as well as a host of other issues involving 

management and organizational culture. 

As a result, the panel has concluded that NNSA is in need of major reform. 

Members of this Committee are no strangers to the accidents, missed deadlines, 

and massive cost overruns that have plagued NNSA and the nuclear weapons labs 

over the years. Just this past June, we held a hearing on the radiological release 

that closed the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. This facility likely will be reopened, but not before taxpayers will pay more than half a billion dollars or more in cleanup and restoration costs. 

If we fail to address the governance and management issues at NNSA, we risk 

continued accidents and spiraling costs, which ultimately will be borne by the taxpayer. More importantly, given NNSA’s mission, failure to address the problems at 

the agency can ultimately affect our national security. Over the long term, nothing 

less than the overall efficacy of our nuclear deterrent is at stake. We must make 

this right. 

Fortunately, the panel before us today has provided the Congress with an excellent roadmap for reforming NNSA and the labs. The panel recommends, for example, that Congress amend the NNSA Act and adopt related legislation to reintegrate 

NNSA into DOE. The panel also makes a number of other critical recommendations 

across a range of operational and management areas, including empowering leadership with well-defined roles and undertaking major reform of the relationships between DOE, NNSA, and its contractors. 

55 

NNSA was established 16 years ago, but these management challenges began almost immediately. Problems that many leaders at the time predicted—including 

leaders of this Committee and President Clinton—have indeed occurred. 

The mission of maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is too 

important and there are simply too many detailed recommendations to be addressed 

properly in a single hearing. 

I urge the Chairman to take both of these panel’s reports and conduct extensive 

oversight on how to begin correcting the multitude of problems that have affected 

NNSA for too long. In particular, it is critical that we explore how to best enact the 

significant reforms to NNSA’s governance that the panel cites as a first step to getting the nuclear security enterprise on a sustainable path. 

This Committee can make a real difference here, and I stand ready to work with 

my colleagues to take on this work. 

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Æ 


20130.044