U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

20–066 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–114] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING 

ON

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 2017 

OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE BUDGET 

REQUEST AND READINESS POSTURE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 17, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Vice Chair 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARGARET DEAN, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Howard, ADM Michelle J., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy; 

VADM Philip H. Cullom, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet 

Readiness and Logistics; and VADM John C. Aquilino, USN, Deputy Chief 

of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy ................................ 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Howard, ADM Michelle J., joint with VADM Philip H. Cullom and VADM 

John C. Aquilino ........................................................................................... 32 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J. .................................................................................. 31 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 47 

Ms. Stefanik ...................................................................................................... 47 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 2017 OPERATIONS AND 

MAINTENANCE BUDGET REQUEST AND READINESS 

POSTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, March 17, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:37 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. WITTMAN. The Subcommittee on Readiness of the House 

Armed Services Committee. I want to thank everybody for joining 

us today. And our hearing today is going to be on the Navy’s 2017 

operations and maintenance [O&M] budget request and readiness 

posture. 

This is the final of our series of four hearings on the services’ 

budget request and readiness postures. This week, Admiral Howard, you testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that 

sequestration, in your words, is the ‘‘greatest threat to our future 

readiness. It has a ripple effect for us through the years.’’ 

Today, I look forward to hearing how the Navy’s budget request 

enables a readiness recovery plan and where we continue to take 

risks calculated in terms of both risk to the force and risk to the 

mission. 

I would like to welcome all of our members and the distinguished 

panel of senior Navy leaders present with us today. This morning, 

we have with us Admiral Michelle J. Howard, U.S. Navy, Vice 

Chief of Naval Operations; Vice Admiral John Aquilino—I will get 

it right—don’t worry, Admiral—U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy; and Vice Admiral 

Philip H. Cullom, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 

Fleet Readiness and Logistics. 

Thank you all for testifying today, and we look forward to your 

thoughts and insights on these important issues. The purpose of 

this hearing is to clarify the Navy’s choice for its budget requests, 

to address funding priorities and mitigation strategies, and to gather more detail on the current and future impacts of these decisions 

on operations, maintenance, training, and modernization. Most importantly, does the Navy have the resources it requires in order to 

improve its state of readiness? 
2 

Once again, I want to thank our witnesses for participating in 

our hearing this morning, and I look forward to discussing these 

important topics. 

And now I would like to turn to our ranking member, Madeleine 

Bordallo, for any remarks that she may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling 

this hearing. 

And I would like to also welcome Admiral Howard, Vice Admiral 

Aquilino, and Vice Admiral Cullom. I want to thank you all for 

your service to our great Nation and for being here today. 

This is the fourth and the final service-oriented hearing that we 

are holding in this subcommittee to examine the fiscal year 2017 

budget request. We have heard several common themes echoed by 

commanders in your sister services. And I will be interested to 

hear if they ring true from your perspectives as well. 

Budget constraints and continued funding unpredictability, resulting from years of sequestration and continuing resolutions 

[CRs], have hampered the ability of the services to man, train, and 

equip the forces they need to fill critical mission requirements. 

We have also heard how installation readiness has been compromised and long-term projects have been shelved in favor of more 

pressing needs. This has secondary and great impacts and will create more significant funding requirements for military construction 

in the years to come. 

And, as I have mentioned before, I do remain concerned about 

depot-level maintenance capabilities, including dry-dock capabilities in the Western Pacific. I believe these capabilities are lacking, 

and the Navy is not investing enough to support its forward deployed fleet in the Western Pacific. We have these requirements 

and we must make the right investments, as this is a key to readiness in the region. 

In particular, I have serious concerns about the Navy’s assessments and will continue working to ensure that our forward deployed assets have quality and secure maintenance that American 

workers and equipment provide without losing weeks of presence. 

Through our discussion today, I hope that we can gain a better 

understanding of how the Navy plans to maintain readiness 

through personnel, training, and infrastructure improvement. 

So, again, ladies and gentlemen, I thank you, again, for your 

service, and I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Bordallo. 

Admiral Howard, I have been told that you will be making one 

opening statement on behalf of all the witnesses, so please feel free 

to proceed. And, as a reminder, your written testimony has already 

been made available to the members and also will be entered as 

an official part of the record of today’s hearing. 
3 

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHELLE J. HOWARD, USN, VICE CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY; VADM PHILIP H. CULLOM, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR 

FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS; AND VADM JOHN C. 

AQUILINO, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR 

OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND STRATEGY 

Admiral HOWARD. Thank you, Chairman Wittman. 

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the committee, it is my honor to represent the 

thousands of Navy sailors and civilians who sustain operations 

around the globe. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the current state of 

Navy readiness and the projected changes to that readiness with 

the fiscal year 2017 budget request. This budget submission provides the resources for our deployed forces and supports our continued readiness recovery efforts. 

This submission also contains the hard choices and tradeoffs we 

made to achieve future warfighting capability. In a design for 

maintaining maritime superiority, the Chief of Naval Operations 

[CNO], Admiral Richardson, has challenged the Navy team to meet 

the demands of our mission along four lines of effort. 

First, the readiness funding account directly contributes to the 

line of effort strengthening naval power at and from the sea. Navy 

readiness organizations are actively engaged in efforts to meet the 

second line of effort to achieve high-velocity learning at every level 

by investing in our sailors through new and reinvigorated training 

programs. We support the third line of effort, to strengthen our 

Navy team for the future, by employing innovative training methodologies to accelerate productivity of new shipyard employees. 

Lastly, we strive to expand and strengthen our network of partners in order to meet our most critical challenges. We have reached 

out to industry to address our shipyard and aviation depot workload. Our budget request supports this design and, if executed, will 

result in continued operational excellence throughout our Navy. 

The demand for naval assets by the global combatant commanders remains high. And Navy continues to provide maximum 

sustainable global presence. Supporting this posture requires a 

commitment to protect the time and funds needed to properly 

maintain and modernize our force. Full recovery of the material 

readiness of the fleet is likely to extend beyond 2020. Stable funding, improvement in on-time execution of ship and aviation depot 

maintenance and steady state operations are required to meet our 

fleet readiness goals. 

As we proceed on the road to recovery for our afloat operational 

units, we continue to do so by taking conscious risk in the maintenance of our shore infrastructure. To mitigate impacts ashore, 

Navy has made difficult decisions and focused on items directly 

tied to our primary missions. 

As a tradeoff, Navy continues to postpone much-needed repairs 

and upgrades for the majority of our infrastructure. Continued 

shortfalls in our facility sustainment will eventually have effects on 

our at-sea readiness model. Failing to plan for these necessary 

investments will continue to slow our future recovery. 
4 

We are still paying down the readiness debt we accrued over the 

last decade, but more slowly than we would prefer and at continued risk to our shore infrastructure. Powered by exceptional sailors 

and civilians, your Navy is the world’s finest, and we are committed to retaining our superiority. 

This budget represents a margin of advantage over our adversaries. That margin could be lost if we do not achieve stable budgets. We will only maintain our status as the world’s greatest navy 

with constant vigilance, dedication to restoring our readiness, and 

a commitment to sustained forces around the globe. 

I extend my thanks to this committee for your efforts and continued support. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Howard, Admiral Cullom, and Admiral Aquilino can be found in the Appendix on page 

32.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Howard, thank you. I appreciate all the 

hard work the Navy has done in restoring readiness. 

My question along those lines is, as you look at the Navy’s readiness recovery plan and how it defines setting the conditions for 

readiness recovery, a couple of different elements come to mind. 

First of all is, can you lay out for us the timeframes and when you 

will get to full-spectrum readiness? I think those are important to 

understand the steps we need to take and how long it takes for us 

to get there. 

Secondly is, along the way—and you—the Navy has assumed 

some risk in previous years. On the path to restoring readiness, 

there will also be some core functions where you assume some risk. 

If you could, lay out where you see risk being assumed and what 

you are doing to manage that, in the best way possible, as you are 

re-establishing readiness. 

And then thirdly is, the fiscal year 2017 budget that you spoke 

about provides you the resources in the readiness recovery. Does 

that do enough for you to get back to a state of full-spectrum readiness as quickly as you believe is attainable by the Navy? 

Admiral HOWARD. Thank you, Congressman. 

In order to talk about the timeframe, I need to explain how we 

invest in our forces in order to maintain a ready fleet. We have a 

fleet where we prioritize the readiness of the units that are forward 

deployed and the readiness of the assets that are going out the 

door. 

We generate forces that are fully prepared to do the full spectrum of operations. And so for us, it is as if we have this team of 

assets but, like every good team, we have a bench. And that bench 

is the assets that are the next ready to go or the assets we have 

if we ever have to get into a war fight. We refer to that bench as 

our surge capability. 

So we invest to make sure that, as people are required to do 

their daily operations, they are ready. Where we have made 

choices, our ability to surge, that bench, has become smaller. We 

have lowered the readiness of those assets and, in some cases, the 

readiness was lowered because we consumed that readiness. 

Over the last 10 years, we have operated at a higher operational 

tempo and we have had more ships out there. And we have had 

ships out there for much longer deployments than we had seen in 
5 

the previous 10 years. It was not unusual for ships to be on 9- and 

10-, and get extended sometimes, to 11-month deployments. 

And so, then, as those ships came back, we had to start working 

our way through getting them through maintenance. And, as we 

operated longer and harder, then the work we needed to do in the 

overhaul started to increase. 

With this budget, we will start working through the maintenance 

requirement to reset the force. The force will be fully recovered 

sometime just outside of the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. But there is another piece that is really important for the 

Navy to recover their readiness. We are required to still operate 

but, in order for us to get to an end state where the entire fleet 

is recovered, we have to manage the amount of fleet that is out. 

So we have determined that we can have about one-third of the 

fleet out and about while we are maintaining and then training the 

rest of the fleet but that, in the end, when you look at a 36-month, 

from maintenance-to-deployment cycle, it means our deployments 

need to be at about 7 months in order to get those ships back, to 

get to maintenance, in order to have the time to train the crew 

back up for the next deployment. 

So we have gone to an Optimized Fleet Response Plan [OFRP], 

where we will deploy the ships in 7-month deployments. And we 

have to be disciplined and hang onto that plan in order for us to 

get to recovered readiness. 

And then I would like to allow Admiral Cullom—see if there is 

anything—other specifics he would like to add. Thank you. 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes, sir. 

What I would like to add on the—because on the second part of 

your question you asked about what the risk areas were. And one 

of the principal areas, as we try to support as many of the things 

that we can forward, is what do we have back home where we can 

take a conscious risk in, a deliberate risk, and be able to utilize 

those to be able to ensure that whatever goes forward, in support 

of our sailors and marines, actually is at that high-end and capable 

of full-spectrum. 

So, where we have taken a lot of that risk, really, is in three 

areas on the shore—the recapitalization of the shore, maintenance 

of the gear that we already have out there and, in some cases, the 

operations as well. 

Now, we have tried to protect the things that are really important, things that are important for our personnel—the child development centers and unaccompanied housing for our personnel. We 

have also tried to put a great focus on the nuclear enterprise, because those things are essential for actually contributing to the operations out there. 

Anything that is fully supportive of those things, communication 

centers, you name it—all of those things have a great sense of priority for us. And we try to garner our dollars in the shore area, in 

those areas to the critical infrastructure, the critical components 

within the critical infrastructure and then, in that way, try to keep 

those things at the highest level we can. 

We are monitoring every facility and every component within 

those facilities as well and then listening to the operational commanders out there, the fleet commanders, to make sure that we are 
6 

not neglecting things that are essential for rebuilding that readiness—in the shipyards, in particular. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, thank you. I appreciate you kind of laying 

out how the Navy does readiness in the tiering method to where 

the forward deployed units are ready to go, 100 percent ready, and 

then, as they come back, they go into a down mode and then a predeployment mode, so we appreciate that. 

The Optimized Fleet Response Plan, I think, is critical to make 

sure that that is followed, and I couldn’t agree more. And I understand the world gets a vote in that, so. 

But doing that not only helps in the infrastructure of the fleet 

but it also helps, too, in the retention of sailors because there is 

nothing worse for a Navy family, then, to say, ‘‘Hey, listen we are 

planning on a 7-month deployment’’ and, guess what, it turns to 8 

months or 9 months or 10 months. 

So, to make sure we keep those great sailors and their families, 

I think OFRP will go a long way to do that. So, we appreciate you 

laying that out. And, obviously, it takes a while to mitigate the risk 

that you assume for those units that come back and are waiting to 

get into the pre-deployment cycle. 

And, as you said, that surge capacity, then, has a different aspect 

to it if you are looking at it as far as what you can project forward 

as far as force. 

So we really appreciate that. And I want to come back and ask 

you some questions. I want to dive in a little bit more on the infrastructure issues because I think they are important too, which is 

where you have assumed some risk and what we are doing to rebuild that back into our readiness recovery plan. 

But, with that, I will go to Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Howard. Did I say General Howard? 

Admiral HOWARD. Yes, ma’am, but I get paid the same. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral Howard, it is right here in my notes. 

Since 2006, the Navy has nearly doubled the percentage of the fleet 

assigned to overseas home ports which, among other effects, results 

in economic losses in the United States shipyards as maintenance 

work shifts overseas. 

How has shifting the maintenance workload abroad for ships 

homeported overseas impacted the United States shipyard health 

and productivity? And in addition to economic losses, what risks to 

national security are accepted by having integral maintenance completed by foreign workers in overseas shipyards? 

Admiral HOWARD. Ma’am, although we have shifted our fleet, the 

sad news is, the size of our fleet has actually gotten smaller when 

you look at the last 15 years. On 9/11, we were probably at well 

over 300 ships and we are at 272 today, ships and submarines. We 

are working our way back up to a recovery of 308 ships. 

The strength of the Navy is our mobility, and we still do a lot 

of our repair work in our fleet concentration areas. For the health 

of the shipyards, we have recognized the functional workload has 

been going up. 

And then, this last year, thanks for the support from this committee and others, we have started—we have gone on and continued to hire up to 3,500 shipyard workers. And we have also, for our 
7 

aviation side, continued to hire the artisans in order to do aircraft 

depot work. 

When we have a ship that is overseas, we have different maintenance models for those different ships. So some of the ships do 

come back stateside for work. Some of them we have, U.S. workers 

are on flyaway teams that go out to do the repair work of the ship. 

And then, in some cases, particularly for voyage repairs, if it is too 

difficult for the ship to get back stateside, we will, of course, have 

to work with our allies to make sure that those repairs are done. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. Well, what about the security aspect? 

Admiral HOWARD. Ma’am, whenever we go into port, whether it 

is for repairs or anything else, we are very conscious about the security of the ships and the assets. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, even if they are allies, still, we are going 

into foreign shipyards with foreign workers. What would be the 

reason? Is that because of the lower wages and the cost? 

Admiral HOWARD. So, ma’am, when we are working our way 

through maintenance, just like here, stateside, for maintenance, we 

competitively bid out these contracts. We are required to be responsible stewards of the taxpayers’ money and make sure that we get 

good repair work for the appropriate cost. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral, I have another question for you. 

The Navy’s fiscal year 2017 budget is predicated on three enabling legislative initiatives in order to free up funds to recover 

readiness. 

Now, how will the Navy respond and recover readiness if the 

Congress does not agree to deactivate a carrier air wing, induct 

seven cruisers into phased modernization, or eliminate the National Defense Sealift defense? 

Admiral HOWARD. Ma’am, first of all, I appreciate the dialogue 

and the conversation in this area. 

So, for example, let me start with the cruiser modernization. This 

is one where, when we look at the requirement for 88 large surface 

combatants, which is part of our force, our most recent force structure assessment, we tend to think about the size of the Navy just 

across the FYDP because we are having a budget discussion. 

But in the end, that 308-ship Navy and the different ships with 

the different missions—we need to have that across the future 

Navy as well. 

And so, I know you are aware, we put out a 30-year ship plan. 

We keep our ships for 30, 40, or 50 years. 

What we see is based on when we built the ships and how many 

we bought at one time. We were starting to see a bathtub in our 

large surface combatants out in the 20s and 30s. 

We now have 11 carrier strike groups—the potential for that, 

with 11 carriers. The cruiser is primarily the air defender for the 

carrier. So we realize we can keep 11 cruisers online, one for each 

carrier strike group, and then place 11 into a modernization cycle. 

So then when those first, the ones that are still online, go offline, 

that cruiser that has been modernized and upgraded will now take 

its place. Then that allows us, then, to extend the service life of 

half of the cruisers out across the 40s preventing that bathtub. 

In the end, just with that one program, the cruiser modernization program, if we do not get congressional support, we would be 
8 

looking at trying to generate $3 billion across the budget in order 

to pay for those cruisers instead of having them modernized, trying 

to keep them as active units. And that will impact other areas, potentially our readiness account and our personnel account. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. 

I have another question, but I am going to—I know you are—the 

vote is coming up, so Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

We will now go to Ms. Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the panelists for being here today to testify 

and for your service to our country. 

Today, as you are well aware, America’s Navy faces major issues 

like longer deployment schedules while managing a shrinking fleet, 

the volatility of the ship repair industry, and the ongoing strike 

fighter inventory management challenges. 

So, as our Navy and our sailors are facing great fiscal constraints, I am concerned with the new Unisex Uniform Initiative, 

which will not only burden the Navy with an estimated $7 million 

bill but, on top of that, only our female sailors will be encumbered 

with out-of-pocket expenses collectively totaling $4 million, a hefty 

price tag of $400 per individual female sailor. 

Wouldn’t you agree that this money would be better spent on necessities like household costs, groceries, and utilities? And do you 

think it is fair that only our female sailors are encumbered with 

this out-of-pocket $400 cost? 

Admiral HOWARD. Ma’am, I have been in the Navy a long time 

and have gone through many uniform changes over my lifetime. 

And, in this case, the uniforms will be phased in, just like they are 

phased in so that we look at not trying to make the sailors, all at 

once, pay for the costs. But then that allows them—as their older 

uniforms get through wear and tear, they were going to have to 

buy another uniform anyway, and then we move them into the 

newer uniform. 

The Uniform Initiative, to get us to have a common appearance— 

I need to let you know that when I was a midshipman at Annapolis 

and I was in my whites, that looked very different from the men. 

I didn’t understand why. 

I also came into a Navy that initially didn’t have trousers for 

women. And it is just a pure functional aspect of actually going to 

sea and being able to do the job that there are certain uniforms 

and the way they look have got to support all of us, male and female, so that we are safe at work. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Admiral Howard, I understand and I am very 

thankful for your service and leadership to your country. 

But I am concerned that there was a 71 percent dissatisfaction 

rate among the Navy’s own test group with these proposed 

changes. Does that concern you that 71 percent of our sailors do 

not support this initiative? 

Admiral HOWARD. Ma’am, I will have to go back and look at that. 

I do know that the one uniform, the pilot on the chokers, was very 

well received. But I will go back and look into the dissatisfaction 

rate, absolutely. 

Ms. STEFANIK. I would like to follow up with you on that. 
9 

Admiral HOWARD. Absolutely. 

Ms. STEFANIK. So I appreciate that. And then I want you to explain to us today—and you touched on it, but what is the operational necessity that these changes reflect? 

Admiral HOWARD. Ma’am, the issue of good order and discipline, 

when you think about—and it is—I wouldn’t phrase it in operational. I would phrase it in our service and who we are, as culturally, and who we are as an ethos. 

The sense of uniformity and being a part of a team is central to 

all of our military. And then, for me, it is the functionality of the 

uniform and making sure that it is appropriate for both our men 

and women, that they can do their job, specifically. 

Ms. STEFANIK. So is there an operational necessity? 

Admiral HOWARD. Ma’am, for all of us, for our uniforms, they 

identify who we are, and they are part of—— 

Ms. STEFANIK. But specifically the changes—no, not just the uniforms, but the proposed changes—is there an operational necessity 

that is driving these proposed changes? 

Admiral HOWARD. Ma’am, when we talk about uniforms and 

operational necessity, I am not sure that is the way to frame the 

question. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Okay, I appreciate that. I look forward to getting 

your response on—— 

Admiral HOWARD. On the dissatisfaction rate? 

Ms. STEFANIK [continuing]. On the 71 percent dissatisfaction rate 

among our Navy sailors. 

Admiral HOWARD. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 47.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. And I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Stefanik. 

We will now go to Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you all for being here. 

And, Admiral Howard, of course, I have to say, we greatly appreciate your being such a strong role model and have attained this 

position. It is quite remarkable and we appreciate it. 

I wonder if you could talk a little bit about sort of translating 

some of this to our constituents and certainly even to some of our 

colleagues that are in other committees. 

We know that readiness really doesn’t have a constituency. And 

on this committee we have really had an opportunity, I think, to 

look at readiness, probably more than in other years that I have 

been sitting here on the committee and been in the Congress, since 

2001. 

And how would you, in as quick a way as possible, give one example of why it is so important for us to focus on readiness but, 

more than that, to fix the budget mess that we are in? 

Admiral HOWARD. Ma’am, the lifeblood of our Navy is our people. 

And the sailors deserve assets. The ships they serve in have got to 

be ready to fight. The gear they have has got to be ready to fight. 

And they have to be trained to be ready to fight. And they deserve no less than the best in quality that we can provide them. 

So, in some ways, those sailors who represent every State, territory 
10 

and, honestly, countries from around the world—we have sailors 

who are not U.S. citizens. They have given—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Many actually. 

Admiral HOWARD. Yes. They have committed to this Navy and to 

this Nation to protect the Constitution. But, as I have traveled and 

I have looked at the individual elements of readiness, I am astonished, just as our sailors are, from around the country. When you 

look at the shipyards, we think of them as being on the coast. But 

then, you look at all the parts that go into ships, those, also, are 

from around the country. 

And there are some—I went to visit Milwaukee Valve Company 

in Wisconsin. And I went there because I read about them in a 

newspaper article. They make most of the valves for our carriers. 

It wasn’t until I went there, in Prairie du Sac, Wisconsin, that I 

found out they make most of the valves for all of our amphibious 

ships. 

And they make 2,000 valves for each of the Virginia-class submarine. This is a treasure in the middle of the Nation. And those 

public workers—those, literally, are making a difference to my 

Navy by what they produce. 

And so we are the sons and daughters of this entire country. And 

readiness means that we are ready to fight and we are ready to operate. And our sailors deserve no less. 

Admiral CULLOM. Ma’am, if I can add one other point to that? 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. 

Admiral CULLOM. If we fail to properly support readiness for our 

sailors, in the event of a crisis, then the units that are on that 

bench, they may end up being called to deploy on very short notice, 

almost immediately, in some cases, or it will take us additional 

time to be able to prepare those forces to go respond. 

And what does that really mean? It means risk to our mission, 

accomplishing it safely and properly. And that risk to the mission 

translates directly back to risks to our people. 

And so that is the importance for our sons and daughters from 

everywhere around the Navy that come from every State and territory. And that is why we owe it to them to do that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Admiral CULLOM. Thank you, ma’am. 

Admiral AQUILINO. Ma’am, if you don’t mind, I think the best answer is we are ready to take whoever you would like out to see the 

fleet in action. And that is, I think, the best way to understand it, 

although no constituency is what is required to put a Navy to sea. 

Today your Navy is 272 ships, as the Vice Chief said. I will tell 

you that, as we sit here right now, 148 of them are either forward 

deployed, forward stationed, or underway training. That is, 54 percent of your Navy, as we sit here today, is operating. And the best 

way for people to understand that is come out and see, and we can 

help you with that if you would like. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Great. Thank you. I think that we are going to move 

on, because we are trying to get some more done. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, appreciate it. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. 

We will now go to Mr. Russell. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
11 

And thank you, Admirals, for being here today. 

What do you see as the greatest threat to readiness? I would be 

curious of each of your opinions. 

Admiral HOWARD. I would like to start, Congressman. Thank you 

for that question. 

For the Navy, particularly because we are capital ships, we need 

stable budgets. We sometimes are required to purchase in a multiyear. But I will tell you, when we sequestered in 2013, we not only 

had to cancel deployments—I was down at fleet—we had to delay 

the deployment of the Truman to generate savings in our O&M account, and then we had to delay maintenance. And having our 

ships repaired is at the heart of readiness. 

So if we cannot get out of—underneath this shadow of sequestration, and then if we end up sequestering, that will have a terrible 

impact on our operational ability. But we also need stable budgets 

and so that we can plan and build ships for the Navy of the future. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes, sir. And what I would add to what the 

Vice Chief said is that—what she mentioned about sequestration 

and what happened with that. As you all well know, the money 

came from all the wrong places, and that had second- and thirdorder effects that have followed us for a number of years after that. 

The stability of the budgets is very critical and important as well. 

But another very challenging footnote to all of this, as well, is 

the continuing resolutions, because if we are unable to be able to 

quickly move ahead each year on a budget, then we are waiting 

until way too far into the year and then we end up sub-optimizing 

where that money can ultimately go in a whole range of different 

accounts. 

And so we could—we certainly appreciate what you are trying to 

do to help us in that regard, and thank you for the question. 

Admiral AQUILINO. And, sir, I will give you the operational snapshot of that, is, again, your Navy, based on those numbers, we are 

not only trying to reset readiness, but we are doing it in stride. 

So no peace dividend where everybody came back and we are trying to get the ships fixed. We are still deployed at virtually the 

same rate we were during the height of the two wars with less 

numbers of ships. 

So the challenge is in understanding how the Navy is trying to 

reset readiness while, at the same time, understanding we remain 

forward. We are providing leadership options in time of crisis. We 

are providing deterrence against increasing number of adversaries, 

I would say. We are assuring and reassuring our allies. 

So all of those things, if you understand how we are operating, 

that will help you get to, I think, the financial answers that the 

Vice Chief and Admiral Cullom gave. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And I appreciate those answers. That was my own 

experience in my decades in the service that the budgets commanders end up having to have knee-jerk reactions. You are onethird into the year before you have any kind of spending, then you 

are rushing to waste the dollars to try to catch up. It has a lot of 

volatility on the warriors. 

With regard to those convulsions, as we continue to take risks 

with our Nation’s defense, I believe, beyond our ability—I will say 
12 

it—I think we are cutting too deep. I think we are putting our Nation at risk. 

How do we retain the sailors that have the experience? We can’t 

create them overnight when we see emergencies happen. Sailors 

and marines, soldiers, will have to stay alive long enough until the 

Nation can catch up to them. 

And that, typically, historically, from tricorne hats to today, has 

taken about 2 years. How are you mitigating this and trying to retain the best sailors’ experience in these cuts and have you been 

able to address it? 

Admiral HOWARD. So, Congressman, we are, in terms of where 

we are in our end strength, in a slightly different place then our 

counterparts. From the time 9/11 started over the last—the first 10 

years, our Navy actually came down in size. As I said, we were 

above 300 or well over 300 ships. We were at 14 carriers. And now 

we are down to 272 ships. 

Our force size came down as well, several thousand people. We 

have stabilized at around 322,000 to 324,000 people over the last 

few years. And we are projecting we are probably going to stay at 

that. And then, as we build up into a 308-ship Navy—with this 

budget we should be at 308 ships by the end of the FYDP—then 

we might have some changes in that force structure. 

So, right now part of this is, as Congressman Wittman pointed 

out, stable deployment cycles, steady state predictability to our 

sailors is very important—that they, in an operational tempo, that 

they can have the proficiency but it doesn’t exhaust them. 

And then, in terms of actual retention, we started looking at this 

a couple of years ago and came up with ‘‘Sailor 2025.’’ We are a 

technologically focused force and, for us, when the economy is good, 

our nuclear powered engineers, our aviators, all of our engineers 

have other options where they don’t have to deploy and get separated from the family. And, quite frankly, they will get paid more 

money for the skills, these wonderful skills and education that they 

have. 

So we have looked at the quality that we provide of life and service that we provide our sailors and have looked at education programs, internships outside of the Navy where they can get some 

experience and bring innovative ideas back into the Navy. 

For quality of life, we have expanded child development center 

hours. You will appreciate this. We finally have started to expand 

our fitness centers so that the sailors can go in at any time, and 

we are working our way across the fleet. And then we have gone 

to a 12-week maternity leave to allow our sailors to manage parenthood and that work-life balance. 

Thank you for the question. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Russell. 

We will now go to Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the witnesses. 

And, Admiral Howard, your testimony kind of lays out the balancing act that the Navy has right now in terms of shipbuilding, 

operations and maintenance. 

And then, I think, sometimes it is hard for people to decipher exactly where the hit is. But I would like to just sort of focus on 
13 

pages 5 and 6 of your testimony, which is on the shore infrastructure, which, Admiral Dixon Smith was here earlier this year and, 

again, sort of walked us through—how, with MILCON [military 

construction] you have had to really sort of prioritize where those 

dollars are going, more towards implementing construction for new 

systems and new platforms as opposed to sort of the regular blocking and tackling of MILCON in terms of the shore infrastructure. 

So I wonder if you could just kind of talk about that a little bit 

because, again, I think it is important for members and also people 

watching this to realize that there has really been this sort of trend 

where that kind of MILCON has kind of paid the bill over the last 

5 or 6 years or so. And so maybe you could talk about that a little 

bit. 

Admiral HOWARD. Thank you, Congressman. 

So our MILCON has—our military construction dollars has gone 

down as we have tried to get to a balanced budget. And so, where 

we would completely recapitalize, that forces us to make a priority 

list. And then the items that go to the top of the priority list are 

going to be the items that are for the health and safety of the Navy 

or the larger community. So we realize there are going to be utility 

services or water treatment plants that are going to have to be replaced. 

Then, sometimes, when you get into facility sustainment, an 

HVAC [heating, ventilating, and air conditioning] system might 

have to be replaced for the health of the people, and then the warfighting effectiveness goes. So if we have a runway that is ashore 

that is used for training before people go out to sea, that runway 

will take priority. 

But then there are other items that, as the dollars—we know 

work needs to be done, whether it is reworking quarters for our 

sailors, training facilities, all those—we are accumulating a backlog 

of work, because we don’t have the dollars to get at it. 

And I would like to have Admiral Cullom provide some more specifics. 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes, sir. 

What I would like to add to that is that, as you were pointing 

out, where we are at, and that is that area where we have taken 

a portion of that risk and we have triaged where that goes. And 

I think Admiral Smith may have talked about this a little bit in 

his testimony. We are at the lowest point since 1999 in terms of 

the funding to it, but, where we prioritized it to, were the things 

that the combatant commanders need out there. 

So whether it is in Djibouti or in Guam or in the coastal campus 

in California, Seal Beach; things in San Diego; Keflavik, Iceland— 

those are all things that the combatant commanders have specifically asked for. 

New platforms—as we are bringing the new ones online, we have 

to have the facilities for those. So we have taken a great priority 

for the Growler, the maintenance hangars for that. F–35, obviously, 

needs some things to support it so we are putting priority to 

projects there. The Triton, the unmanned systems, they need similar types of things. 

And then the next one is kind of utility upgrades because those 

are things that, when they go bad, they go bad very badly, and you 
14 

have fires and you destroy lots of things. So we are really trying 

to focus on ensuring that we replace those things that we know and 

MILCON projects that upgrade power plants at PMRF [Pacific Missile Range Facility] out in Hawaii, up at Balboa, Sasebo, Bangor, 

a number of things there. 

And then shipyards—and shipyards have a very high priority because we can’t really do our job unless those shipyards are able to 

be as efficient as they humanly can, because that is how we are 

going to get that reset of those, the capital ships, done. 

So we focused very heavily on not only the public yards, which 

we have in Bangor and Bremerton and Portsmouth, to do a lot of 

refit facilities and fix things that—a lot of that infrastructure is 

very, very old. 

And then, finally, things on weapons of mass destruction. We 

have a training facility that we needed to do there. So that is 

where that first tranche of it went. After that we have many other 

things on MILCON projects, as the Vice Chief articulated. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great, thank you. 

Again, I am not being critical at all. I just think it is sort of helpful to sort of lay it out so people can understand, while we are not 

in the same environment for MILCON that we were when I first 

came to Congress back in 2006 and 2007. And this is helpful. 

So, I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

We will now go to Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ma’am, gentlemen, thanks for being here. 

And one of the things that I think we don’t talk about enough 

is the fact that the U.S. coastline is our largest border, and that 

is the most likely place that we would be, I believe, attacked from. 

I think it would be unlikely for an enemy to come through Canada 

or Mexico without our ability to certainly see it coming and address 

it before it got to the U.S. It is the Navy that protects that coastline. 

And I think we should talk about that more, and how big that 

coastline is and just how much of the sea that you have to guard 

to protect Americans. 

Admiral Cullom, you answered this question a little bit, but if 

you could speak again to the fact, the uncertainty creates as many 

problems, if not more problems, as the actual funding reduction 

and the lack of timeliness and what the continuing resolutions 

have done with regard to the inefficiencies. 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question because I, 

hopefully, will explain a little bit more about what those uncertainties were. What we have seen happen—— 

Mr. SCOTT. In fact could you speak, also, to specific examples 

of—can you give us specific examples in that, of how it hurt your 

mission requirements? Thank you. 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

One of the clearest examples I think I can bring to that is that— 

two, I will give you. One is on ship maintenance. So when we have 

these uncertainties and we don’t yet know how much we are going 

to have to deal with and we have had to cancel—like we did during 
15 

sequestration—cancel availabilities until we would have clarity on 

that. 

We have tried to do what we can, which is to do the preplanning 

for those availabilities, because it will eventually have to happen. 

Now, they will change. The longer we wait, if we don’t do it when 

we are scheduled to actually do it, then there is going to be a lot 

more growth of additional work. There is going to be more rusting 

out of deck plates and tanks and things like that. So that will 

change, but getting that work done puts it on a shelf. 

But, if we wait too long, then we will actually not have the physical time to actually do the jobs that we need to do to actually be 

that part of that resetting of the force after 10 years of war. And 

when we only have the opportunity to bring ships into a shipyard 

about once—into a dry dock once every 8 years—pretty important 

that we get those things done absolutely right. So that is a shipboard example of it. 

On the shore side of the house, with our facilities sustainment 

and our restoration and modernization accounts on the shore, if we 

have the uncertainty of not knowing whether or not we have the 

money to be able to do that, then we can’t start those projects until 

much, much later in the year. 

When that ends up happening, then we, likely, will miss the opportunity to actually start that project. And you either have to execute what you can, which is to pave over a runway when you know 

you really need to go back in and do a dry dock. 

Mr. SCOTT. One of the things that we talk about is full-spectrum 

readiness, and that is certainly one of our goals. With regard to 

your aviation level of readiness, where are we in regard to fullspectrum? I know that you have given some indications of 

timelines that it would take to actually get to full-spectrum but the 

question I have is, when do we expect the readiness level to actually begin to improve? 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes, sir, I will take that one. 

And this is one, I think, when you have heard the Vice Chief testify before and the CNO testify with the Commandant—we are 

locked at the hip, on aviation readiness, with the Marine Corps on 

this because, as a Department of Navy, we have to manage this together. And that challenge is a pretty big one, as you have clearly 

articulated. 

There are a lot of moving pieces to getting that to the right place. 

You have aircraft that are on the flight line, you have other aircraft that are going through depot and through the FRCs [Fleet 

Readiness Centers]. You have to get parts to the right place at the 

right time, so the parts accounts have to be balanced right. We 

watch these things. The Naval Aviation Enterprise watches it very, 

very carefully to ensure that we are getting those things at the 

right place. 

We are—each of the type/model series of aircraft, if it is a strike 

fighter aircraft, if it is an FA–18, a legacy Hornet—we have a lot 

of hours on those aircraft. We have to make sure that those are 

able to get done on time. The Commandant, I think, spoke quite 

a bit about his rotary aircraft and the CH–53s, and those are a real 

challenge, too. 
16 

To the full-spectrum piece, those things have to eventually be 

able to get those back onto the flight line for the training to rebuild 

the bench piece that the Vice Chief talked about. Everything that 

is going out there is ready, and it is ready to the degree it needs 

to be and they are firmly right. But it is the ones that are on the 

bench that we need to be able get that training time back for the 

pilots so that they could be prepared. 

And that is also key, to that point, when she said it is after 2020. 

But so many variables, so many type/model series and they have 

to integrate with the shipbuilders. 

Mr. SCOTT. What percentage is on the bench may be the better 

way to phrase the question then. We are, obviously, not at fullspectrum. Are we at 50 percent? Are we at 60 percent? Is that a 

number that can’t be disclosed in this setting? And then my question is, obviously, it takes many, many years to get back to fullspectrum, but, if we stay under the current budget scenario, when 

would it actually begin to improve? 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes, sir. That is a very challenging question 

because there are so many pieces to it, because, to give you the detailed answer that that deserves, if we could take that for the 

record—— 

Mr. SCOTT. That is fine. 

Admiral CULLOM [continuing]. And provide that answer for you, 

sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 47.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your service. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Vice Admiral. 

Part of this strategic planning guidance for developing next 

year’s budget includes disaggregating large, costly platforms to 

smaller vehicles that are capable of achieving military tasks. 

And, I apologize; I am going to have to ask that, for you to—for 

you all to answer quickly because we have votes. While large capital platforms will always be necessary, I am concerned about future operational environments that could hold them at risk such as 

the advancement in cruise missile capability by some of our potential adversaries. 

So the Navy’s budget continues to be pressurized for the traditional stock. I would like to know how it can better achieve distributed fire power. In a broader sense, I am also asking what our capital stock will be worth in another 15 to 20 years and if we are 

moving quickly enough to diversify our capabilities. I mean, whoever wants to take that. 

Admiral HOWARD. All right, thank you, Congressman, for that 

question. So you got to the crux of the challenge of this very budget, this capability versus capacity question. And if you look at 

where we invested—looking at an anti-access/area denial, you will 

see that we invested in electronic warfare improvement. We invested in buying more of a greater mission capability missile in the 

SM–6. 
17 

And so we looked at programs that would improve the capabilities of our platforms to fight in that environment, and we will continue to invest in those areas. Is there a capacity to have more of 

that and modernize more quickly? Yes, there is. But in the end, as 

we are trying to balance, we could not buy all of what we wanted 

to get. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Okay. 

Admiral HOWARD. Thank you. 

Mr. GALLEGO. And following up on the last question, do we really—do we need to rethink our capacity requirements like the target 

of reaching 308 ships or is this just a numbers game that takes 

into account the demand signals from our geographic combatant 

commanders? Or is it a top line ship goal reflective of a strategic 

purpose of, this is how many ships we need to accomplish our 

world missions? 

Or, in general, my concern is that the capabilities are not adequately being met because we are picking arbitrary numbers that 

aren’t really reflective of our national security need. 

Admiral HOWARD. So the Navy goes through a force structure assessment and it accounts for all of those factors that you talked 

about. What is the current demand? What is the operational plans 

of the combatant commanders? How are we postured? And then 

what do they need to win in the war fight? 

And then that also accounts for the shipbuilding industry and 

the capacity to build ships. So the last baseline force structure assessment was in 2012. It had an update in 2014, and the CNO has 

directed that we quickly look at that. 

And the last view came up with 308 ships as the right number 

to meet the current demand signal and provide mission capacity for 

the combatant commanders but then also have enough surge capacity to be able to win in a war fight. 

So we are going to relook at that and make sure that is the right 

number. I will tell you, my sense is, when you look at the—between 

now and the last couple of years, with the resurgence of Russia, 

China is still a main issue; North Korea, which, for us translates 

to ballistic missile defense, one of our homeland defense missions; 

and Iran—it is quite possible we will be looking at a requirement 

for a greater number. 

But also, particularly for Russia and China—China building an 

undersea fleet and Russia modernizing a fleet—I think it is quite 

likely that this requirement of 48 SSNs [attack submarines] might 

also go up. 

Thank you for the question. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Admiral. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gallego. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Chairman, may I make a quick announcement—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Of—— 

Ms. BORDALLO [continuing]. Before you recess? 

Admiral Cullom, you are retiring, is that correct? 

And this is your last hearing? 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes ma’am, I believe this will be my last hearing. 
18 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, good luck on your retirement. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Congratulations. 

Admiral CULLOM. Thank you, ma’am. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I will ask the witnesses to indulge us. We have 

a series of votes that is going on right now. It will take us approximately 15 to 20 minutes to pursue that series of votes and then 

come back. So we would ask your indulgence to hang in there with 

us because we would like to finish with a few more questions. 

Admiral HOWARD. Absolutely, Congressman. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. We will recess and reconvene in 20 

minutes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. We will reconvene the Subcommittee on Readiness 

of the House Armed Services Committee. I would like to thank our 

witnesses for their patience and indulging us so we can go to the 

floor and accomplish our voting duties. So we appreciate that. 

I did want to ask you to elaborate a little bit on the infrastructure issues. As you know, we had some previous hearings about the 

importance of infrastructure and facility support in helping the 

Navy and the other branches generate readiness. 

And I understand that, in many of the areas, where you look to 

accept risk may be in some of those particular projects, MILCON 

and others. But I do want to ask about some of what I think are 

fundamental elements of infrastructure maintenance which should 

fall outside of a MILCON project. 

And I just met with some folks the other day at the Norfolk Navy 

Yard, and they were concerned about just basic elements—bathrooms not working, childcare facilities being just inundated with 

children, more than the capacity for them to deal with them. And, 

to me, those are critical elements for the workforce. If they are 

looking at those basic elements then, to me, there is a fundamental 

issue there. It is more than the elements of MILCON. 

There are some MILCON issues there with leaking roofs and 

those sorts of things and buildings. And I understand trying to 

prioritize those things on the Navy’s list, but I do think it is fundamental, as you talk about not just our sailors but also our civilian 

workforce that are there, maintaining those ships. 

I would like to get your perspective on how you see the laydown 

of the Navy pursuing these infrastructure projects—both MILCON 

and, obviously, I know you are accepting some risk there, but also 

some of the basic maintenance elements that, I think, are critical 

to everybody across the Navy family. 

So just want to get your perspective about how those issues are 

being addressed. 

Admiral HOWARD. Thank you, Congressman. 

So, we have had to prioritize over what has direct warfighting effects and then, obviously, for our shipyards, that has direct 

warfighting effects. We have a mandate to invest about 6 percent 

into the shipyards. And this last fiscal year, we are probably going 

to hit 8.1 percent. And we have budgeted in 7.1 percent, and that 

is where you get out repairs for dry docks, caissons, infrastructure 

upgrades in the dry docks. 

And then we do have this backlog of administrative buildings 

and other facilities that we have knowledge that they need repair, 
19 

but we continue to—that list continues to grow as we focus on the 

direct warfighting aspect. 

In some of the quality of life issues, though—I do want to address that separately—so, for example, with the child development 

centers. We recognize this is a huge quality of life and an ability 

for someone to be able to work and know their kids are taken care 

of. And so that was the impetus behind us, and we—this is also 

in the budget to extend our child development centers. 

We started last year, as a pilot, and we are working to get that 

through all our fleet concentration areas focused on—we are, we 

have been looking at some of our members have 90-day wait lists— 

how do we get those wait lists down. 

And we have found some of that can be done by working with 

all of the other services and making sure we understand who is applied where and who is accepted and making sure children are enrolled as quickly as possible. 

And then, the same—providing more hours can sometimes alleviate some of the strain—the same with our fitness centers. But, yes, 

we have been taking risk in the next tier level down support facilities. And we recognize that that is eventually going to come home 

to roost. 

And then I would like Admiral Cullom to give a few more specifics. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral Cullom. 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

To add to that, in addition to the MILCON that we had talked 

about before and as the Vice Chief said, these other accounts 

whether they be the facilities restoration and modernization, 

sustainment of the facilities, or the base operations support—and 

those are the big three other components that we have—every one 

of those accounts, we have taken risk in. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Admiral CULLOM. Now, again, we try to triage the risk that we 

take in those accounts so that we don’t end up having things that 

are very essential and important for our sailors that do not represent the standard to which we want to have them be able to have 

they and their families live by, particularly for things like childcare 

and the housing. 

Now, that said, by the risks that we have taken there—and the 

Vice Chief talked about what that backlog is—that backlog is about 

$5.6 billion of backlog, and that will grow. It will continue to grow 

if we maintain these levels, continue to have to take this risk, by 

about $600 million a year. So we will just keep adding to that. 

Now, what that really means, to be able to triage down to maintain our systems as best we can, is that we have to put it, again, 

to where those facilities are the most important to sustain and to 

help our operations. 

And so, again, we concentrated very heavily on shipyards because we know how important they are to the mechanics of just 

being able to get, to make OFRP work—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Admiral CULLOM [continuing]. And to be able to get those ships 

back to sea. But it isn’t just that, it is also about the sustainment 

that we have to do to the runways and airfields and the dry docks 
20 

as well. And those things kind of fall into that restoration and 

modernization accounts. 

And we, again, have prioritized to the ones that most support the 

operations. Now what that really leaves is a whole bunch of other 

things. There are administrative facilities and other places that 

will, in fact, have to go to a different standard. 

Now, many of us that have been in the Navy a long time remember where that was in the late 1970s or early 1980s, and it was 

very challenging. And so we know that is the ground, that is where 

we are headed to, if we have to keep going this direction for very 

long. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I think those are important points. When we did 

our hearings on infrastructure and facilities support, one of the 

issues that was brought up by the installation commanders, like 

places at Oceana, is when you are needing to put aircraft in the 

hangars and aircraft hangar space isn’t available because of leaks 

in the roof or malfunctioning or non-functioning fire suppression 

systems, then your ability to generate aircraft readiness, to make 

sure they get in for routine maintenance, gets affected. So you see 

the direct effect on readiness there, and that is that scenario where 

I understand trying to manage risk there. 

But when it gets to that level and then another situation—these 

are just examples—but where, Oceana, we had electrical failure 

with the lighting on the landing areas there. So now landings and 

takeoffs get delayed now for about an 8-hour period as they fix 

that. 

Now that is—and you know how that goes with flight training 

and all the elements that have to take place, when you back that 

up. And although 8 hours for the normal person doesn’t sound like 

a lot, that creates a wave all the way through the training regimes 

and getting those aircraft out there, and then that is time lost that 

you never make up. 

And that is one of those areas of readiness that, we know, if you 

lose 8 hours there it takes 16 hours to regenerate the readiness 

that you lost in 8 hours. And that is just a microcosm of what happens across the spectrum. 

So I would really encourage you all to let us know, because many 

times readiness is associated with manning. It is associated with 

training. It is associated with maintenance and operation. 

But what we tried to do this year is to point out that infrastructure and facility support is a readiness generator, and where we 

are falling behind there has a direct impact on readiness. So, as 

you all look at how you assume risk there, please point out, at any 

opportunity you can, both to members here on the HASC [House 

Armed Services Committee] but also elsewhere, that that backlog, 

that $5.6 billion backlog gets to a point to be insurmountable. 

And, again, it is another bow wave, too, where even if we got to 

a point to say, ‘‘Okay, let us put $5.6 billion into that,’’ the capacity 

is not there to direct and operationalize that money to be able to 

restore that readiness. So you have not only resources that become 

a detriment, but it is time and how do you actually get that money 

applied in a reasonable and efficient way to actually get these 

things done. 
21 

So that becomes a concern for us, too, if you get that backup in 

work. So I would encourage you to let us know, and we will make 

sure we continue to stay in touch with each of you about where we 

see and hear these inadequacies. 

And I understand that you are doing the best you can to pull out 

the roll of duct tape and the chewing gum and try to keep things 

together as much as you can, but we all know that that only goes 

so far and it doesn’t buy as much time as we would like. 

So we have to make sure that we get to the bottom of this. And 

we are trying to focus on that as far as part of our readiness efforts. 

I appreciate what you all are doing and we will continue to make 

sure we have a dialogue on that. 

So now I want to go Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And it seems that all I have heard for the last few weeks, 

months, is readiness, readiness. It is the focal point of our military 

and, without it, there wouldn’t be anything, I guess, to speak of. 

And we certainly wouldn’t be able to be in a position to match a 

challenge anywhere. So it, truly, is really very, very important. 

So for any of the witnesses here, I want to ask this question. If 

operational tempo were to increase, due to greater requirements for 

operations in the Pacific area of responsibility, for example, to what 

extent would the Navy have the current readiness capabilities to 

meet the needs? 

And we will start with you, Admiral Howard. 

Admiral HOWARD. So ma’am, one of the things that is happening, 

as you are aware, is the rebalance to the Pacific. And if I could just 

step back and talk about that a little bit, strategically, because I 

also have found that when I speak publicly, some of the thought 

process over just rebalancing to the Pacific, I am getting challenged 

on. 

So we have talked about a changing environment. And I will say 

that, when you look at Department of Defense, five new challenges—China has remained, an emerging Russia, North Korea, 

Iran, and counter violence—I point out, if we think of those as the 

five new challenges, four of them are in the Pacific. 

Because people forget about Russia, our strategic relationship 

with Russia, our nuclear deterrence, and they are moving their 

new SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines] out to the Pacific. And so 

it is important for us to continue this rebalance—move 60 percent 

of our assets either to the West Coast route, and move new capability out there. Now, as some of the new capability comes out 

there, how we maintain and how we do that, we are changing processes. 

So, as we move that out there, we manage and look at how we 

keep those ships or aircraft and the newer aircraft up. The fleet 

commander is thinking ahead to the future and, due to the size of 

the Pacific, he is thinking that instead of a more traditional type 

of maintenance capacity, we may need to have a more mobile type 

of maintenance capacity. But in the end that might translate as we 

roll more out there, more maintenance capacity out there. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Vice Admiral Cullom, would you have comments 

to make on that? 
22 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes, ma’am. 

To follow on with what the Vice Chief just said about the mobile 

maintenance capacity and the look that the fleet commander is 

looking at out there, as we do that, we will have to be much more 

agile and much more responsive to be able to handle all those different situations with the assets that we have. 

And to do so, we have been doing a lot of experimentation and 

prototyping of things. We have new vessels that are going out 

there, nontraditional type, auxiliary type ships, and those are the 

vessels formerly called the Joint High Speed Vessel, as well as the 

mobile landing platforms, the ESDs and EPFs. 

And those vessels give us the capability at the routine day-to-day 

type of operations of things that occupy a lot of the fleet commander’s time, the ability to be able to handle some of those challenges with those vessels. And so if they can be able to do that in, 

as we call them, the Phase Zero operations—as that OPTEMPO 

[operations tempo] goes up. 

Now, very different story when you start talking about crisis— 

and then maybe we will shift that down the table here to Admiral 

Aquilino—but that, then, requires a different operation with those 

other USS ships and present a different challenge. 

But I think the mobile maintenance capacity, how that lashes up 

with our distributed lethality that we are talking about, I think, 

are going to be very critical things for the future for us, and we 

are looking at all of those. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Vice Admiral Aquilino. 

Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, ma’am. 

We are deploying right now. The presence that is being deployed 

by the Navy is currently at our maximum sustainable rate. So, as 

the chairman said before, the world gets a vote. The CNO and the 

Vice Chief have developed this model so that we are not only providing presence forward, but we are building surge capacity to respond to conflict and crisis when that occurs. 

So what I would say is, if something needed to be surged, I think 

where we are is we are in a pay me now or pay me later. If a conflict were to occur, we would take a deficit in readiness and push 

those forces forward to win the fight, understanding that we would 

then have to reset and build that readiness after the fact. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good, all right. 

I have another question, Admiral Howard. While the Optimized 

Fleet Response Plan included certain assumptions with regard to 

maintenance and timelines, the unexpected increase in maintenance timelines appears to be having a negative effect on ship 

readiness. Is OFRP still a sustainable model that will ensure future readiness of the Navy, and what risks are we taking by maintaining this plan? What would be the effect of further maintenance 

delays? 

Admiral HOWARD. Ma’am, we have to be able to plan in order to 

get to maintenance periods that we can plan for and then eventually get to on-time execution. 

So the point of the OFRP and understanding that 36-month cycle 

and how much operational availability we can generate was then 

to be able to, one, lock in those maintenance periods and get to the 

most efficient and effective use of the supporting shipyards. 
23 

So the issue, then, of our shipyards not always able to come in 

on time, some of that, is directly attributable to how we have been 

operating the fleet in the past. 

As we open up the ships, we discover additional work because we 

have engendered more wear and tear to the previous OPTEMPO, 

and then we have a decision to make. Do we fix it right then and 

there, or do you just close it back up and wait until the next maintenance eval? And if we choose to fix it right then and there, because it wasn’t work we planned for, that ends up costing us more 

to fix it right then and there. But you want to have a ready ship, 

and so those are the choices. 

We have to work more closely, I think, and look at the processes 

of how we plan and prepare, particularly with our private partners, 

and get that planning process down and get to a more predictable 

understanding of what we think is going to be the state of the ship 

before it goes into the yards, and then that will get us to a better 

on-time execution in the schedule. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

And one further question. The OFRP strives to rotate ships in 

the carrier strike groups and amphibious readiness groups through 

maintenance while ensuring an adequate presence and additional 

response force should a contingency arise. Now what is being done 

to guarantee the health and readiness of our support ships, including the oilers and the supply ships? And is there a need for a similar program aimed at providing security and stability to this section of the fleet? 

Admiral Cullom. 

Admiral CULLOM. Ma’am, I will take that. 

For the support ships, their maintenance model, currently, is and 

has been for many years, very different because of the civilian mariner component that is involved with them. We have been watching 

that actually very carefully with regard to the aging of those ships, 

and that is across both the CLF [Combat Logistics Force] ships as 

well as those ships that are part of the larger ships upon which we 

can draw for sealift. 

And we are looking at some innovative things in terms of how 

we are going to go about recapitalizing those ships as well as the 

maintenance that they get. For right now I think it is those ships 

are probably—over time, you are going to see some fairly significant changes to those. 

And the MLP [mobile landing platform] and the EPF are—EPF 

and the ESD are examples of how that auxiliary force is actually 

changing a fair amount—going to ships that are aluminum construction, no longer steel construction, things that can go up much 

faster than the older ships; in some cases, smaller, but with huge 

amount of cube [cubic space]. 

To get back to your real question, which is really about do we 

need to do an OFRP for them, I think, because of the way those 

things are accrued and the way they are matched up, probably not. 

But we are certainly looking at ensuring that we reset and restore 

that fleet in much the same way that we are looking at resetting 

and restoring the USS hulled ships. 

But their training cycles really end up defining why the OFRP 

is so important, the way it is, and the fact that you are actually 
24 

adding together components from the aviation side, to components 

from the ship side, to, in some cases, components from the undersea side and land side, to bring all of those together for ARGs [amphibious ready groups] or for CSGs [carrier strike groups]—very 

different for our CLF and our sealift ships. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, and I want to thank all 

the witnesses today. It has been very interesting and you have 

given some very concise answers to our questions and I do appreciate it and thank you for your service, and I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you Ms. Bordallo. 

I do want to conclude with one final question, and that is concerning our amphibious force structure requirements, looking at 

what the Navy has done and looking at those under today’s conditions. 

There have been some changes to strategic guidance. There have 

been some operational plans, or OPLANs, that have been revised 

and updated. Can you give the Navy’s perspective on where our 

amphibious force structure needs to be in light of current conditions? 

Admiral HOWARD. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. 

So in our force structure assessments and then working with our 

Marine Corps partners, we have said that we are looking at a need 

for 38 amphibious ships. We currently have 30 ships on the rolls. 

With the 12th LPD [amphibious transport dock] that we have 

added, we are looking at 32 ships in fiscal year 2017, growing to 

33 ships in 2021. 

The Commandant and CNO have agreed that 38 ships is the 

need. And, with 34, we accept some risk so that if we, depending 

on how we were postured, obviously would probably be able to generate 30 out of 34. 

We continue to increase the amphib structure, presuming budgets hold stable. The plan is, continue to increase the number of amphibious ships. But, once again it is, when you look at our ability 

to build ships, it is a slow climb. 

The other real challenge we are going to have is the Ohio replacement. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Admiral HOWARD. So right now, as that submarine comes online, 

if the Navy is required to fund that out of our own budgetary account, it will literally swallow up the entire ship construction account and have impact on the rest of our conventional force. So 

even the Commandant has said that, if we cannot determine a way 

to get to that strategic asset outside of the DON [Department of 

the Navy] account, that obviously will have an impact on our ability to build new amphib ships. 

Thank you for the question. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Admiral Howard. You bring up a great 

point and that is why I think it is incredibly important to have 

something like the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund where we 

can fund it outside of the shipbuilding budget. 

We understand, by the time that boat gets to the fleet, it will be approaching $6 billion in costs. And if we fund it or it is decided 

to be funded in the shipbuilding budget, the boom you hear will be 

the ship building budget exploding, not a missile being launched 
25 

from one of those new Ohio-class replacement submarines. So I understand where we need to be, and we pursued that last year. 

Unfortunately, it got short-circuited in the omnibus budget bill, 

but I can assure you we will continue that effort. We think it is 

indeed a national program. It just so happens that the Navy operates the ship but it is a national asset that is part of that triad, 

and we still think the triad has particularly important significance 

in nuclear deterrence. 

And I understand the Air Force is also pursuing their LongRange Strategic Bombers so some have suggested that that ought 

to be funded the same way. And we don’t necessarily have any 

heartburn with that as long as the resources are there. We are 

going to do that in a deterrence fund, whether you call it sea-based 

or not. There are enough resources there. And then that creates the 

proper focus. 

As you said, you put it into a shipbuilding budget. In the normal 

ways that those things happen, is to put it in the shipbuilding 

budget and say here is $3 billion, Navy come up with the rest. 

And we know that there are not those dollars that are resting 

in other operational accounts, so what will happen is there will be 

delays, long delays, in shipbuilding programs. And some of them 

are locked in so there is not a lot of flexibility in doing—in what 

you can do with some of those programs. 

So that means any other program that is not locked in now gets 

pushed, not just a little bit to the right, but way to the right, to 

the point where it is outside the FYDP or any other forward-looking document to even hope that we are going to get to the point 

of building those ships. So I agree with you. 

Getting amphibious ship decisions on LX(R) [dock landing ship] 

locked in and then making sure we lock in ORP [Ohio Replacement 

Program] outside of the shipbuilding budget, I think, creates a 

long-term certainty and stability for the Navy as far as building 

ships and making sure the capacity is there with the fleets. 

So I appreciate your bringing that up because it is an extraordinarily important part of what we need to do to make these pieces 

fit together. 

So I appreciate all of our panelists today. Vice Admiral Cullom, 

thank you for your service. Admiral Howard, as always, thank you, 

and thanks for the great job you do there on the Board of Visitors 

at the Naval Academy. We appreciate your passion there and what 

you add there, which is significant, and so we appreciate that. 

And Vice Admiral Aquilino, thanks so much for your leadership 

and all the things that you do. 

You all truly have best interests of your sailors at heart in making sure that we not only have the Navy of today but the Navy of 

the future. 

So thank you again, and if you have anything else for the record, 

please don’t hesitate to enter it with us; and if there are no further 

questions, we hereby adjourn. 

[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 17, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 17, 2016 

(31) 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 17, 2016 

(47) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Admiral CULLOM. Naval Aviation is currently experiencing a Ready Basic Aircraft 

(RBA) gap of more than 300 aircraft on the flight line. At this time, Naval Aviation 

is meeting approximately 77% of the RBA requirement. The Fiscal Year 2017 President’s Budget request will incrementally increase the number of aircraft on the 

flight line in our most challenged type/model/series (T/M/S). With steady funding 

and consistent OFRP deployment schedules, the RBA gap is projected to recover by 

2020. You will see full-spectrum readiness improvements as soon as those available 

assets appear on the flight line in significant numbers. [See page 16.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK 

Admiral HOWARD. The 71 percent dissatisfaction rate from wear test participants 

applies to feedback on the original Alternate Combination Cover (ACC) prototype. 

Alterations were made based on wear test feedback, and an improved, more comfortable variant was selected and is currently available for purchase in Navy uniform stores. Other uniform component changes have met with favorable opinions. 

For example, almost 90 percent of respondents liked the appearance of the new female chiefs’ and officers’ Service Dress White (SDW) Choker Coat. 

These uniform changes create savings for the individual Sailor, the Navy, and the 

taxpayer. Enlisted personnel are paid an annual clothing replacement allowance 

(CRA) to cover the cost of required uniformed items. The SDW Choker Coat and 

ACC will only apply to Chief Petty Officers (E–7 to E–9.) The savings for the SDW 

Choker Coat against the current coat is estimated at $85 per item and the savings 

for the ACC is $20 per item. In the future, this will be result in a reduced CRA 

to the individual servicemembers at a total savings of $122K annually. Additionally, 

personnel who purchase these items prior to the expected replacement rate of three 

years will benefit from the lower cost of the replacement uniforms. 

Officers receive a one-time payment of $400 to offset initial uniform costs but are 

otherwise required to pay for their uniforms. The new components will be an outof-pocket expense to female officers estimated at $300. If an officer has to replace 

one of the new items, they will pay less for the new components than they would 

for the previous versions. Price varies by rank for the new cover due to added detail 

for senior officers. For example, at the O5–O6 level, the officer would save approximately $50; while at the O1–O4 level, the savings would be about $20. [See page 

9.] 

Æ