JSOU Report 11-3 Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context Barrett

Yemen: 

A Diff erent Political 

Paradigm in Context

Roby C. Barrett

JSOU Report 11-3 May 2011

Joint Special Operations University

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MacDill AFB FL 

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and the Strategic Studies Department

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Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director

Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Juan Alvarez, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; 

William C. Jones, GS-15, CIA, Ret.—Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro 

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret. 

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr. 

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr. 

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan 

Ph.D., Comparative Politics 

University of Central Florida 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr. 

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering 

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham 

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret. 

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley 

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/ 

Southeast Asian Studies 

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger 

Ph.D., History, Ministerial Reform Analyst; 

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and JSOU Senior Fellow

John B. Alexander 

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., Middle 

Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski 

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham 

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen 

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard 

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Adjunct Faculty, Defense Critical Language/

Culture Program, Mansfield Center, University 

of Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst 

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

18th USAF Special Operations School 

Commandant

James Kiras 

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow 

William W. Mendel, 

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow
On the cover: Sana’a Old City. This photo and those in the report are by 

Dr. Barrett. 

JSOU Report 11-3

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2011

Yemen: 

A Different Political 

Paradigm in Context

Roby C. Barrett
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.socom.

mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are invited and should 

be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621. 

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 

the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for your 

interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-57-1
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the United 

States Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University. 
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vii

Contents

Foreword ...............................................................................  ix

About the Author ...................................................................  xi

Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context ................... 1

1. Yemen, the Pre-Islamic Era to 1500 ..................................... 7

2. Yemen and the Age of Empires, 1500 to 1918 ................... 17

3. Yemen, Old Paradigms and New Realities ......................... 25

4. Setting the Stage, Yemen 1953 to 1962 ............................. 35

5. The Yemens’ Post-Imamate 1962 to 1979 .......................... 45

6. The Saleh Regime, Survival and Self-Interest ..................... 59

7. Yemen, a Nation-State? ..................................................... 69

8. Conclusion, U.S. Interests and the Yemens ........................ 89

Endnotes ............................................................................ 105

ix

Foreword

Dr. Roby Barrett’s sweeping study of Yemen’s historical legacy and its 

current social, economic, and political systems is essential reading for 

all who would seek to understand the challenges to U.S. security interests in 

southern Arabia and reassess current U.S. strategy in light of recent turmoil 

there. Knowledge of the political, economic, social, and cultural context is 

fundamental to the development of a realistic counterinsurgency strategy 

based on the possible and affordable as opposed to the ideological or theoretical. Whatever the immediate or tactical outcome, Dr. Barrett argues that the 

ultimate outcome in Yemen is most likely not in doubt. The central theme 

of Dr. Barrett’s monograph is that in Yemen, power is based on family, clan, 

and tribal relationships and not a national identity. Dr. Barrett builds the 

case that Yemen as a nation-state is a fiction that largely resides in the minds 

of Western bureaucrats and analysts. Central authority has been maintained 

only in balance with tribal, sectarian, and political groups that align with 

central leaders based on a system of patronage. He advises that throughout 

Yemen’s history there always have been “multiple Yemens with fundamental 

social, cultural, and sectarian differences” and to view Yemen differently 

creates a “stumbling block” in the way of developing and executing coherent 

policy and strategy. Lines on a map do not constitute a nation-state. 

Whoever rules Yemen today faces significant challenges beyond maintaining power by political juggling. There is an insurgency in Sa’ada Governorate 

by Huthi rebels, who are Zaydi Shi’a upset with government policy, but a 

different Zaydi clan and tribe from that of the Hashid al-Ahmars and Saleh 

himself. Some Huthi are ideologically motivated, others are armed groups 

with financial motivations, and still others are motivated to defend their 

land and heritage. There is also an active protest movement in the south 

where coastal Sunni Shafais are upset with the governance of Saleh and his 

Shi’a Zaydis from the interior highlands.1 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP), a threat in Yemen, leverages Yemen’s loosely governed rural areas for 

its training and staging activities. But AQAP is viewed far more seriously by 

the United States and its Western allies than by many in Sana’a government, 

which has been able to live and come to terms with the AQAP presence for 

extended periods. In addition, Saudi Arabia views Yemen’s instability as a 
x

threat that requires a strategic in-depth defense. As a result, the Kingdom 

has played a strong role in Yemeni affairs, principally through the patronage 

of northern tribes, the Sunni tribes and factions in the south and east, and 

various Yemeni politicians. Although problematic at times, this involvement 

has by and large protected both Saudi and Western interests.

From a Western perspective, the United States has an interest in countering and containing AQAP in Yemen. U.S. policy objectives toward Yemen 

are “to strengthen the Government of Yemen’s ability to promote security 

and minimize the threat from violent extremists; and to bolster its capacity 

to provide basic services and good governance.” 2 “Our...strategy seeks to 

address the root causes of instability and improve governance.” 3 But beyond 

U.S. concern for AQAP, Dr. Barrett points out that the Yemenis understand 

full well that U.S. strategic interests in Yemen are “tangential to other political and strategic interests.”

The insights provided in Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm In Context

plus recent events in Yemen suggest that the time is ripe to reconsider U.S. 

approaches toward Yemen. Dr. Barrett suggests that Yemen cannot be transformed. Good governance, as Western nations would define it, is most likely 

unachievable. Our policy must deal with multiple Yemens with conflicting 

historical, political, economic, and cultural heritages. These are Yemens 

with identities and values hinged upon familial, clan, and tribal loyalties. 

Dr. Barrett, however, argues that while Yemen may be a failed state, it is not 

a failed society. This suggests that U.S. policy goals for addressing the root 

causes of instability and improving governance will have to reach beyond the 

central government and weak institutions to engage tribes and clans and to 

achieve a balance among the multiple Yemens that are in virtual continuous 

conflict. Dr. Barrett suggests that perhaps the only improvement possible in 

Yemen is a fluid equilibrium between the various groups and whoever dominates the government in Sana’a, a situation that may in fact mirror in many 

respects the future for other areas including Afghanistan.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D. 

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 
xi

About the Author

Dr. Roby C. Barrett is a senior fellow 

with the JSOU Strategic Studies 

Department. He has over 30 years of government, business, and academic experience in 

the Middle East and Africa. Dr. Barrett is 

the president of a consulting firm, specializing in technology applications and systems 

for national defense and security. He has 

extensive experience in space systems, 

nuclear issues, police and security systems, 

command and control, technology development, and weapons acquisition as they 

relate to both U.S. and foreign governments. 

The current focus of his research is strategic 

security issues in the Persian/Arabian Gulf, including Iran and the Arabian 

Peninsula. He is a former Foreign Service officer in the Middle East with a 

strong background in the cultural and political dynamics of historical Islamic 

and political development. His posting and other assignments included 

Tunisia, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Arabian Gulf.

As a founder of the National History Center within the American Historical Association, Dr. Barrett specializes in the application of broad historical 

and conceptual paradigms to issues of ongoing political and military conflict 

and the projection of future trends. He is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East 

Institute (MEI) in Washington, D.C. He provides domestic and international 

media commentary on a range of issues from the Palestinian territories to 

nuclear proliferation and the challenges of Russian policy in the Middle East 

and North Africa. Initially trained as a Soviet and Russian specialist, Dr. 

Barrett brings unique insights to the regenerated competition between Russia, 

China, and the United States in the Middle East and Africa. 

He also serves as the senior advisor to the Board of Directors of the Bilateral Arab-U.S. Chamber of Commerce, an organization whose members 

include major foreign and domestic petroleum companies. He is the lead 

panelist on Middle East and South Asian Policy. He also participates in the 
xii

Congressional Fellowship Program, American Political Science Association, 

and Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has been a featured panelist for the German Council on Foreign 

Relations on Middle East and Gulf Affairs. Dr. Barrett also serves as a lecturer 

on Gulf affairs, Iraq, and U.S. foreign policy for the Air Force Special Operations Command and in response to special requirements. 

Dr. Barrett was an Eisenhower-Roberts fellow of the Eisenhower Institute in Washington D.C., a Rotary International fellow at the Russian and 

East European Institute at the University of Munich, and a Scottish Rite 

Research fellow at Oxford University. He holds a B.A. in History and Political Science from East Texas State University and an M.A. in Political Science 

and Russian History from Baylor University. He is a graduate of the Foreign 

Service Institute’s intensive 2-year Arab Language and Middle East Area 

Studies program and the Counterterrorism Tactics course and took part in the 

Special Operations course. He has a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern and South Asian 

History from the University of Texas (UT)–Austin. Other honors include the 

Guittard Fellowship (Baylor), the Dora Bonham Graduate Research Grant 

(UT-Austin), the David Bruton Graduate Fellowship (UT-Austin), the Russian 

Language Scholarship (Munich), and the Falcon Award from the U.S. Air 

Force Academy. 

As an author, Dr. Barrett’s works range from books to articles on the Arab 

League and digital research techniques: 

a. The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy under 

Eisenhower and Kennedy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

b. “Intervention in Iraq, 1958-1959” in MEI Policy Briefs, 2008

c. The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy: The Past as Present, the Present 

as Future (JSOU Press, April 2009)

d. “The Aftermath of the 1958 Revolution in Iraq” in Ultimate Adventures 

with Britannia (I. B. Tauris, 2009)

e. “Gulf Security: Policies without Context” in MEI Bulletin, 2010.

He is also writing two new books, one on Gulf Security in Context and the 

other on Oman to be published in the near future.

Dr. Barrett was a guest speaker at the Bahrain MOI Gulf Security Forum 

(2008), the SOF Conference at the opening of the King Abdullah Special 

Operations Training Center (Amman 2009), and the Bahrain SOF Conference 

(2010). Through deployment briefings and other forums, Dr. Barrett supported 
xiii

numerous military units; five examples are the 5th Special Forces Group, 101st 

Airborne both in the U.S. and Iraq, Naval Special Warfare Command both 

in the U.S. and the Arabian Gulf, 4th Psychological Warfare Group, and 19th 

Special Forces Group. 

His commentary has also appeared in the U.S., Latin American, European, 

and Middle East Press—for example, Voice of America English and Pakistan 

Services, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, Canadian 

National Broadcasting System, BBC Arabic Service, Gulf News, and The 

National Abu Dhabi. 

1

In late April 2011, Yemen is a topic de jour for the government, beltway think tanks, and the media. Instability and questions about the fragility of the 

regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, his departure after 30 years of rule, and the 

eminent emergence of Yemen as a failed state—the “new Somalia”—have 

become the new fodder for the prognostications regarding Al Qaeda’s next 

round of attacks or safe havens. Recent popular unrest in Tunisia and Egypt 

have ratcheted up the pressure on the Saleh government, and a press release 

on 23 April announced an agreement between Saleh and the opposition. Saleh 

has apparently agreed to step down in return for immunity for himself and 

those in his government for past actions. Saleh may depart, but Saleh’s regime 

will very much remain the dominant influence 

if not the outright political power in Yemen. The 

regime will endure because it was never so much 

a reflection of Ali Abdullah Saleh but rather 

Saleh was a reflection of the Yemeni historical 

and political reality. Now, the opposition with many of the same names from 

the past—whose fathers and grandfathers opposed the Yemeni imams and 

military rulers, and themselves had ambitions to rule Yemen—have in fact 

brought Yemen to the cusp of change at the very top. However, like those who 

have gone before them, the opposition will likely fail to bring real change to the 

Yemeni political paradigm. As you read this monograph, think carefully about 

the present and ask yourself if perhaps it has all happened before. Perhaps at 

a fundamental level, Yemen is merely being Yemen and that is the problem.

Can these assertions be taken at face value, or does the deeper as well as the 

contemporary historical experience indicate a higher likelihood of a different 

outcome? At the same time, discussions in some quarters about saving Yemen 

Yemen: 

A Different Political 

Paradigm in Context 

... Saleh was a reflection 

of the Yemeni historical 

and political reality.
2

JSOU Report 11-3

have taken on a potentially dangerous dynamic of their own. Yemenis benefiting from the current system want help in preserving their gains; those who 

do not benefit—probably a majority—simply want to change a regime, not a 

system. Yemen is precisely what Tahseen Bashir, the Egyptian diplomat, was 

referring to when he coined the phrase “tribes with flags.” 1 But Yemen, like 

Afghanistan, is an area where attempts to impose outside solutions or even 

indigenous central authority in the form of a functioning modern nationstate have always failed. 

The history of the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula is littered with 

the bones-wasted treasure of those who became too deeply involved, believing 

that they could control or transform Yemen. The Ethiopians, the Byzantines, 

the Persian Sassanians, the Ottomans, the Portuguese, the British, and the 

Egyptians were the most prominent of the past 3,000 years. Competing calls 

for the use of soft power, hard power, or smart power are based on muddled 

perceptions of what Yemen has been, what it is today, and in all likelihood 

will be in the future. 

A fundamental understanding of the deeper Yemeni context is essential 

and should provide a sobering reading for those advocating a larger United 

States (U.S.) role. At the same time, contracting central authority in Yemen may 

Figure 1. Yemen, showing administrative districts. Adapted from

public domain maps accessed from the University of Texas at

Austin Web site, www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/.
3

Barrett: Yemen

require the U.S. to respond — protect its real strategic interest, the stability of 

Saudi Arabia. However, it must be done with a clear-headed understanding of 

Yemen’s past, how that relates to Yemen’s present, and the severe limitations 

that both place on any attempt to alter or manage its political, economic, or 

social landscape now or in the future. 

As a cohesive political, economic, social, and cultural entity, Yemen apparently has never existed. To conceptualize policy or operational objectives based 

on the false premise — that is, anything other than multiple Yemens where 

confl icting historical, political, economic, and cultural heritages exist — is 

to invite policy and operational objectives that will fail. Conversely, understanding the complex context of the Yemens fosters a measured, conservative 

approach to methods and goals that, while far more modest, actually have 

some chance for success. 

Th is study has a twofold argument: 

a. Yemen has experienced all of the advantages and disadvantages of a 

fl uctuating balance between tribe, clan, and central authority. 

b. Each succeeding period of political interaction has remarkable parallels with a previous one. 

Figure 2. Being 1,400 

years old, the Grand 

Mosque of Sana’a is 

considered to be the 

oldest mosque in the 

world. It was originally 

built on the direct 

order of the Prophet 

Muhammad himself. 
4

JSOU Report 11-3

Yemeni rulers have attempted to create legitimacy by borrowing elements from 

an imagined past. As Benedict Anderson stated in Imagined Communities:

One should therefore not be much surprised if revolutionary leaderships, consciously or unconsciously, come to play lord of the manor. 

...such leaderships come easily to adopt the putative nationalnost 

[characteristics] of the older dynasts and the dynastic state.2

Rather than uniting and creating a nation-state, Yemen’s past has exacerbated 

historical divides and fomented more conflict. Unlike Anderson’s states that 

have created a widely accepted “nationalist allusion,” the differences in the 

Yemen identity have precluded the creation of nation-state. Every ideological group, sect, tribe, clan, and sect wraps itself in its own version of Yemeni 

identity, leading inextricably to a recurring cycle of conflict that makes chronic 

instability the norm in political and economic life.

This study focuses on what Yemen is and is not. It has never been a nationstate with a civil national identity but rather has multiple political, social, and 

cultural identities using the same label—that is, Yemeni. Is the Republic of 

Yemen (ROY) in fact a failed state? The short answer is no, because one would 

presume that at some point it was a nation-state. This fact is the fundamental 

problem for those who equate the current government in Yemen with a nationstate. The Yemens, however, have not necessarily been failed societies. Max 

Weber, the German political scientist, argues that a modern nation-state has 

a “monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.” 3 This aspect has never been 

true in Yemen and will almost certainly never be true. 

Politically, economically, and culturally Yemen has functioned for three 

millennia as a fluid equilibrium between central authority, tribal autonomy, 

and differing cultural and religious allegiances. Lines created arbitrarily 

with a pen or by force of arms form a jurisdictional and political façade; 

they are largely divorced from the historical, political, economic, social, 

and cultural reality on the ground. 

Identity and political loyalty have 

virtually nothing to do with shared 

institutional nationalism but rather 

reflect familial, clan, tribal, and to 

some degree subregional identification. Those calling themselves Yemeni often 

have dramatically different interpretations of what that means. Blood and clan 

ties enhanced by patronage have trumped institutional civil loyalty and civil 

Those calling themselves Yemeni 

often have dramatically different 

interpretations of what that means. 
5

Barrett: Yemen

responsibility. The state and its institutions are simply tools through which 

more traditional groupings mask their corporate pursuit of power, wealth, 

and self perpetuation. 

Arguably, Yemeni political identities are largely removed from the concept 

of a shared civil national consciousness. The Sunni Shafais from the Tihama 

region along the Red Sea and Arabian Seas were very much a part of the 

cosmopolitan Indian Ocean and Red Sea commercial milieu. They also shared 

the African political, economic, and social milieu of the Swahili cultures of 

East Africa. Thus talk of Somalis as a foreign element within the current 

Yemen dynamic reflects a fundamental historical, political, economic, and 

social lack of understanding of the relationships of Indian Ocean cultures and 

for the Yemeni and African diasporas. In similar fashion, the Sunni tribes 

on the fringe of the Rub al-Khali in eastern Yemen and the Hadramawt have 

a close affinity with not only the coastal culture but also with the Bedouin 

cultures in what is now Saudi Arabia. In contrast, the Zaydis of the northern 

highlands not only have a different sectarian heritage but also a very different social, cultural, and political outlook. The interchange of ideas that came 

with commercial intercourse altered their views of themselves and what they 

meant when they described themselves as Yemeni. Thus, identity constitutes 

an abstraction resulting more from geographical proximity than any sense 

of national unity or even shared cultural heritage. 

This study will explore these complexities and is divided into seven main 

chapters: 

a. Chapter 1 provides a snapshot of Yemen from the pre-Islam era through 

the advent of Islam and in the medieval period. It focuses on the nature 

of central authority and its relationship to the tribal structure and to 

external power centers. The chapter has a brief discussion of the advent 

of Islam and Yemeni role in the triumph of the Umayyad Caliphates 

in Damascus and later in Spain and second, in the emergence of Zaydi 

Yemen and the imamate. It also includes a brief explanation of the differences and frictions between the Sunni Shafai and “Fiver” Shi’a Zaydi 

traditions. These differences, although perhaps couched in different 

terms, are still relevant today. 

b. Chapter 2 addresses Yemen in the Age of Imperialism—roughly 1500 

to 1918—and the power struggle between Ottomans and British. It 

underscores the frustrations and failures that outside imperialist 
6

JSOU Report 11-3

powers faced in attempting to mold or to control Yemen’s fractured 

political landscape. 

c. Chapter 3 covers 1918 to 1953. The end of World War I signaled fundamental change in the political dynamics of the Arabian Peninsula. 

Yemen was caught between the new aggressive Saudi regime of Abdal-Aziz ibn Saud (Ibn Saud) and British interests in South Arabia. This 

chapter examines the rise of pan-Arab nationalism and Nasser’s impact 

on Yemen, Aden, and the protectorates. 

d. Chapter 4 explores the period of the Civil War, 1962–1970, and the Yemen 

Arab Republic (YAR) to 1979. The Yemen Civil War pitted Imam Badr, 

the tribes, and Saudi Arabia against the revolutionary government in 

Sana’a and an Egyptian expeditionary force. Yemen’s contemporary 

security environment emerged during this period with Saudi Arabia 

viewing the northern tribes as a security buffer and opposing both 

the Nasser-backed YAR and the Soviet-backed Peoples’ Democratic 

Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The early years of the YAR are also covered. 

e. Chapters 5 through 7 deal with Yemen since the rise of Ali Abdullah Saleh and the current precarious political situation arising from 

unification in 1990 and the Civil War of 1994. The Yemeni view of the 

current situation is examined as well as the increasing Saudi concern 

and involvement in the ROY. What do the Saudis see as their priorities regarding Yemen and how did President Ali Abdullah Saleh use, 

or perhaps fan, those concerns to his advantage? The chapter includes 

a discussion of the succession issue and the government as a family 

enterprise. What will also emerge is appreciation for the principle 

protagonists in Yemen and how they view their interests regardless of 

what the U.S. may think. 

The conclusion, Chapter 8, explores U.S. interests and attempts to view the 

limited U.S. options. A cautionary tale, it suggests that deeper involvement 

should be evaluated carefully in light of the historical track record of others 

who thought they could remold Yemen.
7

Barrett: Yemen

1. Yemen, the Pre-Islamic Era to 1500

At one time or another, Yemen claimed territory from the Dhofar region in what is now Oman along the coast of the Arabian Sea to the Bab 

al-Mandeb and up the Red Sea coast to include Asir and Najran, now provinces in Saudi Arabia. Inland it extended from the shore of the Arabian Sea to 

the edge of the Rub al-Khali or Empty Quarter and from the Red Sea inland 

to Marib and Najran. Although linked, coastal and interior Yemen have 

always had characteristics and interests that differed sharply. Coastal Yemen, 

bordering the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, has historically been an integral part 

of the Indian Ocean community with strong commercial and cultural ties 

with East Africa. The Yemen highlands, which eventually emerged as Zaydi 

Yemen, developed as an insular mountain tribal society while the interior 

tribes and urban centers were more closely linked to the overland caravan 

routes and the desert-based city-states of the spice trade. From earliest times, 

these differences defined the inhabitants of what we now call Yemen and to a 

great extent reflect fundamental differences that continue to exist today. As a 

result, even a rudimentary understanding of the contemporary complexity of 

the Yemens requires exposure to ancient Yemen because that milieu has a real 

relevance to the political, economic, social, and cultural complexities of today.4

Pre-Islamic Political Modalities and Structures

References to Yemen or South Arabia emerged sometime in the third millennia BCE (Before the Common Era). Babylon and Egypt, both cultures with 

highly developed ritualized burials, established control of trade in frankincense 

and myrrh—aromatic gum resins—found in the Dhofar region. Outsiders 

dominated the trade until around the second or first millennia BCE, when 

migrations from the Fertile Crescent created a population with a skill base 

in agriculture, trade, hydrology, and metallurgy. At this point, settled areas 

began to emerge. In the first millennia, five so-called kingdoms emerged in 

the region. Ma’in on the edge of the Rub al-Khali and Qataban flourished 

simultaneously from the 10th to the 7th centuries BCE. Somewhat later the 

Hadramawt Kingdom centered on Shawba emerged. The Sabaean state in the 

4th and 5th centuries BCE produced the highest level of trade, wealth, and 

prosperity in Arabia not exceeded until the 8th century. 
8

JSOU Report 11-3

Th e kingdoms were in fact city-states. Th ey lacked the trappings of the 

empires of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India. Th ey thrived because of their 

location on the trade routes.5 Th ey shared similar trading center cultures and 

were the only region in Arabia to enjoy agricultural self-suffi ciency due to 

irrigation expertise based on structures like the great Marib Dam of 500 BCE. 

Mecca, Yathrib (Medina), Palmyra, and Petra developed as caravan cities in 

the southern Arabian trade network. Yemen became known as Arabia Felix

(Happy Arabia).6 Despite urban centers, they were also a culture dominated by 

familial, clan, and tribal ties. By the end of the 3rd century BCE, inscriptions 

on Sabaean monuments increasingly referred to the Hamdan tribal confederation and the Hashid and Bakil tribal groupings.7

 Th ese tribal confederations 

still represent key elements in the fl uctuating political equilibrium that exists 

today. Central authority was fundamentally family rule and limited by localized tribal and clan loyalties. 

In the 1st century BCE, the Himyarite Kingdom — last of the pre-Islamic 

city-states — emerged. Its history was one of general instability interspersed 

with brief periods of control, all of which was exacerbated by invasions and 

the declining spice trade. Th e tribes continuously challenged each other for 

infl uence and the rulers for control. Himyarite political control expanded 

and contracted based on the abilities of each ruler and the tribal and external 

Figure 3. An archaeological ruin in the region northeast of Marib is a reminder 

of the city-states of ancient Yemen. 
9

Barrett: Yemen

pressure. In 24 BCE, the Romans under Aelius Gallus, the prefect of Egypt, 

captured Najran and pushed to within a few days march of Marib before 

inexplicably turning back.8 In the 4th century CE, Himyarite kings extended 

their control into Arabia but were checked by the Byzantine and Sassanian 

empires. In the 6th century, the forced proselytizing to Judaism brought an 

invasion from Christian Ethiopians and their destruction. An invasion and 

occupation by the Sassanian Persian ruler, Chosros I, followed. In the century 

before the advent of Islam, southern Arabia was already a fragmented tribal 

society:

The pattern of tribal divisiveness and the strongly polarized geographic and religious allegiances that characterized Yemen...were 

already established in its pre-Islamic period. The ancient oligarchic 

kingdoms, intent only on securing wealth, had never attempted to 

organize or control the region further than was necessary to protect 

commercial interests.9

Those characteristics have carried into the 21st century.

Another characteristic that emerged in the pre-Islamic period is worth 

noting: Yemen was a connector between larger, more powerful neighbors—a 

type of land bridge. Stability and prosperity rested on the skill of individual 

rulers—that is, their balancing external forces while preserving the internal 

political equilibrium. The biblical Queen of Sheba (Saba) needed good relations with the Israelite King Solomon. The city-states needed good relations 

with Rome and Egypt. Eventually, when Rome and later Byzantium bypassed 

southern Arabia, Himyarite prosperity and influence crumbled. The Himyarite conversion to Judaism may have been an attempt to maintain neutrality 

between warring Christian Byzantium and Zoroastrian Persia. Good relations forestalled invasion and political meddling and sustained prosperity.10

Yemen’s importance was based on its geographic location as opposed to its 

intrinsic importance—another attribute of the 21st century.

The Advent of Islam

In Yemen, the coming of Islam enhanced cultural and tribal differences and 

created an even more exceptionalist self-image. After the death of the Prophet 

Muhammad in 632, the Dar al-Islam fractured into three rival groups, the 

Sunni, the Shi’a, and the Kharijites.11 Yemen converted quickly to Islam, and 
10

JSOU Report 11-3

Yemen tribal levies became the backbone of the Muslim conquest. Th ey also 

took part in all of the internecine wars of the early Islamic community. Th e 

Umayyad caliph, Mu’awiya, used Yemeni tribes “long domiciled” in Syria 

as the backbone of the armies with which he would defeat the last Rashidun 

Caliph Ali. Yemeni commanders and troops played an important role in the 

Umayyad Sunni defeat of Ali in 661. In Spain, Yemeni commanders supported 

the Umayyids that fl ed there aft er the destruction of their Damascus-based 

Caliphate in 750, and they later supported Abd-al-Rahman III in founding 

a second Umayyad dynasty in Andalus.12 Two centuries later emirs in Spain 

Figure 4. Yemen, showing population density (2002) and the former 

border between the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the Peoples’ 

Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Note also the Saudi Arabian 

provinces Jizan, Asir, and Najran. Adapted from public domain maps 

accessed from the University of Texas at Austin Web site, www.lib.

utexas.edu/maps/. 

Former YAR-PDRY Border
11

Barrett: Yemen

continued to call themselves Yemeni. It was a matter of personal and family 

identity, not political loyalty.

Loyalties in the umma (Islamic community) were complicated as subdivisions appeared among the Sunni and the Shi’a. Among the Sunni, four schools 

of Islamic law emerged: the Hanafi, the Shafai, the Maliki, and the Hanbali. 

Among the Shi’a, eventually three major sects emerged: 

a. The Twelvers, the most numerous, believe that the 12th imam—Hasan 

al-Askari—hid himself (occultated) in Samarra, Iraq in 873 and will 

return on judgment day. 

b. The Seveners (Ismailis) believe that Ismail bin Jafar al-Sadiq occultated 

in 799. They refused to accept that Ismail had predeceased his father 

Jafar and refused to accept Jafar’s other son Musa as the 7th imam. 

c. The Fivers (Zaydis) resulted from a split in the family of the 4th imam 

Zaynu’l-Abidin. His son Zayd and another son Muhammad al-Baqir 

(the 5th imam) argued over several points of Islamic doctrine. Zayd’s 

theological position was close to that of Sunni traditionalists, particularly 

the Mutazilites who fused classical thought and reason with Islamic 

theology. Zayd also refused to recognize predetermined designation 

or hereditary as a requirement to become an imam. The imam had 

to be a descendant of Hasan or Husayn, the sons of Ali, but that was 

it.13 He argued that the descendant of Ali who was best able and most 

capable should lead the Shi’a community.14 Zayd was killed in a revolt 

against the Umayyad Caliph Hashim in 740, but the imamate continued because it had no direct hereditary requirement. The Fiver Shi’a 

became known as Zaydis.

The Implications of the Rise of Zaydi Shi’ism

In Yemen, the majority of Muslims were Sunni Shafai with many practicing 

Sufi mystical religious rites. To achieve a oneness with God, Sufis used dance, 

music, and other mysticism in their worship.15 Eventually, the Sunnis evolved 

into an agricultural community centered in the coastal areas and lowlands of 

the south and east.16 After the death of Zayd, numerous Zaydi revolts occurred 

in Mesopotamia and Persia, and small short-lived Zaydi microstates emerged. 

Repression finally forced the Zaydis further afield, and at the beginning 

of the 10th century, Imam Yahya ibn Hussein al-Rassi founded a Zaydi state 

in Yemen centered in Sada’a. Although “overrun on numerous occasions,” 
12

JSOU Report 11-3

the Zaydi imamate survived.17 An exceptionalist Yemeni identity was further 

reinforced by the preexisting southern Arabian views on ethnology. They 

viewed themselves as descendants of al-Qahtan or Hud. 

Al-Qahtan was a semi-mythical ancestor who was ethnically purer than 

northern Arabs who descended from Ishmael through Adnan. In Yemen, 

the distinction is important and can still contribute to feuds and political 

disputes. In recent history, the importance of the issues of ethnic heritage have 

been downplayed, but the fact that senior government officials periodically 

continue to refer to the issue indicates that the distinction still exists.18

Thus identity in multifaceted forms became a critical element in defining legitimacy in southern Arabia.

Political, social, and cultural modalities of identity came into existence three millennia ago. The importance of identity as both an element 

of inclusion and exclusion continue today. The principle tribal confederations—the Hamdan that included the Hashid and Bakil—predate 

the coming of Islam. During the pre-Islamic period, Yemen was split 

not only by tribal and dynastic rivalries but also ideology. Internal 

strife and recurring instability was the norm. In addition, prosperity 

and internal stability existed as a byproduct of trade. 

As middlemen, south Arabians had to balance their interests against 

those of larger more powerful external forces — Egyptian, Roman, 

Byzantine, Ethiopian, Sassanian, and others. The situation required 

playing more powerful neighbors against each other while living with 

the threat of invasion. A competent leader might manage this complexity, followed by one who could not. Issues of succession were critical 

to survival. The selection process became an ordeal because Zaydis 

distrusted any hint of familial succession. Islam actually exacerbated 

the ethnic, cultural, tribal, and religious divisions and by 1500, the 

differences had solidified. Most Shafais and Zaydis saw themselves as 

fundamentally different, an attribute of society that, although often 

encoded in different languages, endures to this day. 

Yemen and the Shafai Identity

The original Islamic influence in Yemen was primarily Sunni Shafai, colored 

to some degree by Sufism. The best example of a Shafai-dominated political 

system occurred during the late Middle Ages. The Rasulid dynasty (1229–

1454) controlled littoral Yemen through a strong central government. This 
13

Barrett: Yemen

government was not a true nation-state, but it possessed the most sophisticated administration and bureaucracy yet seen in South Arabia. The Rasulid 

rulers contained the Zaydi tribes in the highlands but made no real effort to 

occupy the highlands. It simply was not worth it.19 A true Indian Ocean culture 

based on the monsoonal trade, Rasulid Yemen benefited enormously from 

the most shattering event in central Asian history. In the 13th century, the 

Mongols swept into the Middle East, subjugating Iran and in 1258, destroyed 

the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. The destruction of urban areas and trading centers, and economic dislocation, transformed Rasulid Yemen into the 

key transit point for trade between India and the Mediterranean. 

From 1279 to 1280, the Rasulids—to the consternation of local tribal 

rulers and merchants—conquered Dhofar and placed customs agents in 

all the ports from Aden to Dhofar in modern Oman. The trade produced 

staggering wealth. “Aden was now regarded as the emporium of Asia.” 20 In 

Figure 5. Above, one of hundreds

of villages and inlets on the Red

Sea and Gulf of Aden that thrive

on fishing and smuggling and

have belonged for millennia to

the Indian Ocean “monsoonal

trade culture” that ties the Yemeni

littoral to Africa. Right, a closer

look at a Red Sea dhow (traditional sailing vessel).
14

JSOU Report 11-3

addition, Rasulid success spawned Shafai outposts—and even states on the 

African coast as well—as enclaves in India and Southeast Asia.21 During the 

height of Rasulid rule, political power passed relatively smoothly from father 

to son. Prosperity and political stability rested on geography and good luck. 

The Rasulid state declined in the early 15th century when ports in the Persian 

Gulf siphoned off Yemeni trade and Egypt moved to monopolize Red Sea trade 

routes and bypass Yemen. Like the Sabaeans in the 1st century, the Rasulid 

dynasty collapsed when trade patterns changed. Their rule was replaced by 

the Tahirid dynasty whose ambitions focused on Aden proper.22

Rasulid prosperity and stability contrasted sharply with the Zaydi north. 

Each succession to the Zaydi imamate usually involved 10 or more figures 

representing different clans and tribes all claiming the right to rule. The 

Zaydi north remained immersed in tribalism with a weakened imamate. This 

situation merely reinforced the already stark political and cultural contrasts 

between the Shafai south, the Tihama, and the Zaydi north.23 One Yemen 

looked inward—focused on family, tribe, clan, and personalized rule. The 

other functioned through institutions that had the trappings of a centralized 

state.

Summary

The city-states of pre-Islamic Yemen were dynastic entities that lacked the 

trappings of the more sophisticated river valley empires of the period. Their 

principle goal was not the control and administration of territory but rather 

the control of trade routes. As a result, what central authority that did exist 

frequently exercised control through alliances with the various tribes rather 

than through direct authority. This ancient paradigm, with its obvious limitations, continues to be an attribute of indirect political authority in Yemen.24

The principle challenges to the authority and survival of these dynastic regimes 

were the tribes and powerful empires in the region. This begs the question, 

has anything really changed? 

Even the Rasulids in the 13th century ruled as a family dynasty. Using 

their wealth, they co-opted rivals and paid for an administrative bureaucracy 

that often utilized a traditional Yemeni indirect approach to authority. While 

Rasulid Yemen developed some state attributes, it was still a family enterprise 

based on blood, clan, and tribal ties focused on controlling trade routes as 

well. The social and political structure was based on maintenance of equilibrium between tribe and central authority. Along the coast of the Arabian 
15

Barrett: Yemen

Sea, rulers maintained their tribal and local authority as long as they did not 

interfere with the Rasulid customs and tax collectors. The situation encouraged 

Yemen’s fundamental political, economic, and social divisions and perhaps 

more importantly, it established patterns for the distribution of political and 

economic power on the basis of identity that are arguably still present today. 

17

Barrett: Yemen

2. Yemen and the Age of Empires, 1500 to 1918

The arrival of the Portuguese in the late 15th century introduced the first of a set of new players to the region. Then in 1517, the regional political paradigm changed. The Ottoman Emperor Selim I (1512–1520) conquered Egypt, 

destroying the Mamluk dynasty. The Arab rulers of the Hejaz—including 

the Sharif of Mecca—quickly pledged their fealty to the Ottomans, allowing 

Selim to take the title of “Servant and Protector of the Holy Places.” 25 The 

Egyptians’ earlier positions in coastal Yemen under the Fatamids and later 

the Ayyubids provided the new conquerors of Cairo a pretext for asserting 

Ottoman authority in the region, including Yemen. That provided the excuse; 

the real driver was the activities of the Portuguese, later the Dutch and the 

British in the Indian Ocean. As the struggle would evolve, eventually the 

British would replace the other Europeans and struggle with the Ottomans 

over a period of 400 years for influence and control. 

Yemen and the Ottomans

Once again Yemen possessed critical access to the trade routes of the east. 

The Portuguese had crippled Mamluk Egypt by monopolizing trade with 

Calcutta in Bengal. Their fleet blockaded both the Persian Gulf at Hormuz 

and the Red Sea, forcing trade between India and Europe to use the trade 

route around Africa, a route that they controlled. Suleiman the Magnificent 

(1520 to 1566) was now on the Ottoman throne in Istanbul. Despite pressing 

wars with the Hapsburgs in Europe and the Shi’a Safavids in Mesopotamia, 

he built fleets in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. In 1538, the Red Sea expedition under Hadum Suleiman Pasha—the governor of Egypt—secured the 

coastal areas of Yemen, opening the trade route to India. In 1547, the Ottomans 

captured Sana’a.26 Once beyond strategic coastal bases, the Ottomans soon 

learned that occupying Yemen simply was more trouble than it was worth.

Draconian attempts by the Ottomans to intimidate the tribes only 

succeeded in restoring the Zaydi imamate to prominence by providing a 

foreign presence against which the imams could unite the tribes.27 In 1567, 

the Zaydi tribes retook Sana’a only to lose it to the Ottomans again in 1568. 

Despite a Turkish hearts-and-minds campaign that obtained the “allegiance” 

of the tribes around Sana’a, the Zaydis continued to control the mountain 

regions and harass the Ottoman garrisons.28 From the mountains, the Zaydis 

mounted attacks at will against the Ottomans. The Ottoman expeditions 
18

JSOU Report 11-3

or “sweeps” were largely ineffective. By 1590, Al-Mansur Billah al-Qasim, a 

20-year-old descendant of seven Zaydi imams, emerged as the resistance leader 

and in 1597 he was elected imam. That same year, using “Arab agents,” the 

Ottomans with a surge of new troops temporarily broke the Zaydi rebellion 

only to have it reemerge in 1608, forcing a compromise truce. The agreement 

allowed free movement between the largely Turkish-controlled Shafai areas 

and the Zaydi regions. Imam Qasim took up open residence in Sana’a, and 

the Turks were allowed to conduct Yemen foreign policy. 

In 1629, Qasim’s son Muayyad Muhammad resumed the revolt against 

the Turks. With a deteriorating economic and political situation at home, the 

Turks made a cost-versus-gain analysis and withdrew from Yemen in 1636. By 

1658, the Zaydi imamate had recaptured all of Yemen, which included most 

of the south and Dhofar in modern Oman. Much of the control was in fact 

indirect through the tribes. This conquest became the basis for Zaydi claims 

to legitimate rule over all of southern Arabia. During the next 60 years, as 

Zaydi influence predictably slipped, the south regained total independence 

due to the British extension of “protection.” 29

Figure 6. The old Turkish fort at Sumarah Pass, near Ibb in central Yemen, is a

reminder of the historical Turkish role in Yemen as well as their role as protectors of Sunni orthodoxy against Zaydi Shi’a domination in this predominantly

Shafai Sunni area.
19

Barrett: Yemen

Yemen in the British Imperial Context

At the end of the 16th century, coffee provided the catalyst for a British presence and brought another economic boom to Yemen. For the first time in centuries, Yemen actually produced something of commercial value. It attracted 

the seagoing powers of Holland and England. The Europeans, particularly 

the English, participated in the coffee trade; and the flow in specie—particularly silver—attracted Arab, English, French, and Dutch pirates bent on 

participating in the economic boom to the Red Sea and Arabian Sea. Just as 

the Ottomans were trying to establish a truce with the Qasimi imamate, a 

British ship called at Aden and Mocha. In 1618, the East India Company established a trading post or factory at Mocha. Initially, the British constituted a 

benign alternative to Zaydi domination. The British presence continued but 

by the 1720s, alternative sources had reduced the coffee trade to a fraction 

of what it had been.30 With the collapse of coffee, coastal Yemen reverted to 

fragmented local rule and the fractious Zaydi tribal society in the north. Just 

as interest in Yemen reached its nadir, the first global conflict—the Seven 

Years’ War (1756 to 1763)—broke out. At its end, the British controlled most 

of North America, the rich Caribbean, and finally the jewel in the crown of 

the British Empire, India.31

To protect India, the British extended their control into the Arabian Gulf, 

along the coast of the Arabian Sea and down the coast of Africa to the Cape 

Colony. London would fight innumerable wars and police actions in Africa, 

Arabia, and southwest Asia over the next 180 years to protect India and the 

trade routes.32 “The shortest route to India from Europe was clearly that 

from the Mediterranean through the Middle East and the northern Indian 

Ocean.” 33 At the same time, the three great Muslim empires—the Ottoman, 

the Safavid, and the Mogul—faced growing regional resistance abetted by 

Europeans who were intent on expanding their empires.34 During this period, 

all the ruling families of the Gulf emerged.

The French invasion of Egypt led by Napoleon, which involved French 

commerce raiders out of Mauritius, focused on Whitehall and the British 

East India Company. Furthermore the rise of Saudi Arabia loosed the zealous Wahhabis from “the upper Red Sea to the very gates of Bombay.” The 

British reasserted their influence. In 1802, a treaty was signed with the Sultan 

of Aden. In 1820, after an altercation over British prerogatives, Mocha was 

bombarded. The imam was compelled to sign a commercial treaty. British 
20

JSOU Report 11-3

India suppressed the Wahhabi pirates and encouraged trade between India 

and the Arab coast.35 In January 1839, fearing an Egyptian occupation of 

Aden, the British under S. B. Haines occupied Aden.36 Because of its eventual 

strategic importance, Aden became a crown colony rather than having the 

more common status of a protectorate.37

The British-Egyptian confrontation over Aden resulted from a series of 

events in the Najd Desert in Arabia.38 In 1744, Muhammad bin Saud (who 

died in 1765) linked his fortunes to the religious reformer Muhammad ibn 

Abd-al-Wahhab (1703–1792) to form the first Saudi state. “Preaching and 

raids progressed simultaneously,” quickly making the Saudi state a force to 

be reckoned with across the Arabian Peninsula.39 The Saudis raided into Iraq, 

sacked Karbala—the Shi’a holy city, and threatened Damascus. They also 

threatened the imamate in Yemen. However, when they invaded the Hejaz 

and occupied both Mecca and Medina, their reach exceeded their grasp. The 

Sultan in Istanbul asked his independent viceroy in Egypt, Muhammad Ali, 

to end the Wahhabi menace. Between 1816 and 1818, his resourceful son Ibrahim Pasha—leading an Egyptian army—expelled the Wahhabis from the 

Hejaz. He also captured Diriyah and the Saudi ruler; they were sent to Istanbul and executed. It was not until 1826 that Wahhabi control in the Tihama 

was totally removed.40 The developments pleased London, but Muhammad 

Ali’s ambitions made them apprehensive about his ultimate intentions.41 His 

Francophone tendencies added to the unease in London and that contributed 

to the British occupation of Aden in 1839.42

During the 19th century, the inability of the Zaydi sayyids to agree on 

an imam brought on a period referred to as ayyam al-fasad (days of corruption in the north). The tribes were often blamed for reasserting control and 

spreading tribal authority into new areas. In fact, it was a reassertion of tribal 

prerogatives in lands that had been nominally theirs for centuries. It occurred 

because central authority collapsed and the tribes moved to fill the structural 

political void.43 In effect, the tribes served as a societal buffer, an institutional 

alternative, to failed central authority in Yemen. The time of corruption only 

ended with the second Ottoman reconquest and occupation of Sana’a in 1872. 

In 1902, a joint Anglo-Turkish Boundary Commission met to delineate the 

border between Ottoman and British territory. The tribes and “the difficult, 

mountainous terrain made progress extremely slow.” Two years later in 1904, 

the boundary had only been delimited from the Bab al-Mandeb to a point 

near Qa’taba. At that point, the Ottomans and British gave up and drew a line 
21

Barrett: Yemen

from Qa’taba at a 45-degree angle into the Rub al-Khali and then north to the 

base of the Qatari Peninsula. Yemeni rulers would understandably claim that 

they were not bound by an agreement made by occupying colonial powers.44

The Rise of the Hamid al-Din Dynasty

In 1904, Yahya Muhammad Hamid al-Din became imam and founded the 

last royal dynasty in Yemen. He organized a very large tribal army, besieged 

Sana’a, and called on the Zaydi north to repel the Turkish invaders. In 1911 in 

the Treaty of Da’an, the Ottomans recognized Imam Yahya’s control north 

of Sana’a, agreeing to the following:

a. Yahya is the recognized spiritual and temporal leader of the Zaydi 

community.

b. Shari’a Law is the recognized legal code in the Zaydi districts.

c. Yahya appoints all governors and judges in the Zaydi districts.

d. Yahya controls taxation and is exempt from taxation for 10 years.

e. Yahya receives a yearly subsidy from the Ottomans for tribal security 

payments.

The Ottomans retained control of the Sunni Shafai areas, further emphasizing the differences between Zaydi and Shafai.45 In effect, the Turks admitted 

that no matter how many troops were sent to Yemen and no matter how much 

money was spent in Yemen, they could not win a military victory. During 

World War I, the imam maintained his agreements and supported the Turks, 

causing the British in Aden considerable tribal problems. With the Ottoman 

collapse in 1918, the imam regained control of areas in the west and south 

with the help of former Ottoman troops that joined his service. In effect, he 

reestablished the balance between central authority and the tribes that had 

been lacking in the 19th century.46

State Structure and Yemen to 1918

What can we learn from this snapshot of 3,000 years? First and perhaps foremost, when taken in composite, none of the so-called kingdoms and states 

that have ruled in Yemen since the Sabaeans and Himyarites has been a state

in any modern sense or even when compared to the ancient riverine empires. 

The ancient oligarchic Kingdoms, intent only on securing wealth, 

had never attempted to organize or control the region further than 
22

JSOU Report 11-3

was necessary to protect commercial interests. With each succeeding rule the tribes were granted more local autonomy, circumscribed 

only when their accustomed anarchy threatened the ruling power. 

The Islamization of the area, which would occur in the 7th century 

instead of creating a larger association of allegiance, produced further 

factionalism without erasing the old animosities.47

In those few cases where central authority seemed to have the trappings 

of state, as in the case of Rasulid in southern Arabia, it was based on an 

externally generated economic prosperity—the Mongol invasion and new 

trading patterns. Central political authority was a temporary facade that 

overlaid the traditional structure of tribal or local notable rule rather than 

replacing it. Central authority constituted the equivalent of a temporarily 

more dominant tribe or clan. 

In 3,000 years, Yemenis had developed an approach to identity; however, 

their sense of identity tended to separate by the family, clan, and tribe. Identity 

validation—the concept of other—became an art form. The entire Qahtani 

Figure 7. A mountain Zaydi village naturally fortified the tribal irregulars whose role in Yemen politics provided tribal sheikhs with the

armed leverage to make and break rulers in both the imamate and

republican eras.
23

Barrett: Yemen

versus Adnani argument has been a means used by Yemenis to set themselves 

apart from other Arabs. Then the Zaydi, Shafai, and even Ismaili sectarian 

differences (not to mention a very large Jewish population) further divide 

politics, society, and culture. The sayyids’ line of descent from the Prophet 

has also been obviously important. This line of course is followed by the tribal 

differences—for example, between Bakil and Hashid. Whether an individual 

sees himself in what could be an invented genealogy is a real issue of identity. 

Added to this situation are the economic and educational differences that have 

often occurred along the Zaydi-Shafai divide, further emphasizing societal 

partitions. Where an individual stood with regard to external forces—for 

example, Ottoman, British, Egyptian, and Wahhabi—became an integral 

part of identity. What exists is an incredibly complex fractured political, 

social, and cultural landscape.

Summary

The Yemeni identity that entered the post-1918 era was anything but a national 

identity. Yemen was not a state by any recognizable definition, particularly a 

Western definition, but it was a remarkably resilient society. Despite invasions 

and occupations, the rise and fall of various ruling groups, economic prosperity and collapse, internal tribal and sectarian differences, the fundamental 

tribal and clan structure provided a unique political, social, and economic 

structure that endured. As this study moves forward into the 20th and 21st 

centuries, and then views the future within a broader historical context, the 

reader should seriously consider whether a societal structure that took three 

millennia to develop has fundamentally changed in the last century or has 

merely taken on new forms.

25

Barrett: Yemen

3. Yemen, Old Paradigms and New Realities

After 1918, the differences took on more definition as two officially recognized Yemens emerged. South Yemen, initially controlled by the British or British tribal allies, later became the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of 

Yemen (PDRY). The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) or North Yemen grew out 

of the old imamate. The third element was the entry of Saudi Arabia in the 

equation. This chapter discusses the relationship between revitalized Hamid 

al-Din Yemen, British Aden and the protectorates, and Saudi Arabia. It ends 

in 1953 rather than with the revolution in 1962. In 1953, Gamal Abdul Nasser 

emerged as the new oracle of Arab nationalism, and Abd-al-Aziz al-Saud 

died, ushering in a new generation of Saudi rulers.48 After 1953, the imamate 

attempted to protect itself and take advantage of the new dynamics in the 

Arab world using traditional Yemeni methods—cooperation, confrontation, 

and the tribal structure. 

Political Structure and Hamid al-Din Yemen

What was Hamid al-Din Yemen? Was it a nation-state? Was it an absolute 

monarchy? Dresch provides a good response: 

The imamate was conducted according to its own rules, which were 

not those of the nation state or even of states in Europe around the 

time of the Renaissance. Nor do the definitions, attached to the word 

state as a technical term in archaeology or political science, apply 

readily. The state in this latter sense seems almost an epiphenomenon of Zaydi history.49

Central political authority emerged as a byproduct of other events and the 

reaction of the Zaydi tribes to them. The external threats and internal chaos 

opened the door for the reemergence of some type of central authority, and 

the only Zaydi paradigm was the imamate. 

Of necessity, the imam functioned as a personal ruler who made most of 

the decisions himself, supported by a rudimentary judicial system.50 Because 

any sayyid in theory could become imam, the imam’s few trusted advisors 

were close family or loyal commoners because other Zaydi sayyids posed a 

constant threat.51 Just as the imam retained as much personal political power 

as possible, subsequent republican rulers have done the same. In theory 

and practice, the presidency of Yemen has had three real qualifications: the 
26

JSOU Report 11-3

person must be a Zaydi, a military officer, and finally be capable of “dancing 

on the head of a snake.” 52 In theory, any senior military officer can become 

president. The military has become the new sayyid class. In contemporary 

Yemen, it is almost unthinkable that the next president will not be a former 

military officer. No matter the ruler or the century in Yemen, “uneasy lies 

the head that wears the crown.” 53 Many argue that the modern era began in 

1962 as the revolution flipped a switch and “anachronistic” and “backward” 

Yemen changed; it did not.54 Such a conclusion is to misunderstand Yemen 

both before and after the events of September 1962. 

Imam Yahya ruled the imamate in a balancing act with the tribes, clans, 

and external players as had his predecessors. Using an established tactic for 

tribal rule, he established an “unparalleled degree of order in the countryside 

by imprisoning an enormous number of hostages.” 55 The treatment of the 

hostages “was dependent on the current behavior of the particular tribe to 

which they belonged.” 56 A contemporary German observer noted that the 

institutionalized “hostage system allowed the imam to maintain peace, order, 

and security.” 57 In 1918, Yahya attempted to free himself from dependence on 

tribal levies and hire a professional army of Ottomans: 

The military establishment, which Yahya created, cannot be compared to the armies of more advanced states....Even today the mountainous Yemeni terrain and the tribesmen, who are the country’s 

most effective fighters, determine the nature of the military tactics 

in Yemen.58

Figure 8.

Sand dunes

in Yemen’s

empty quarter.
27

Barrett: Yemen

Positions were given as a reward for loyalty to the imamate. The downside for 

the imam was that the army ultimately became a competing center of power.59

The most pressing problem for Yahya was the end of the Turkish subsidy, 

which he used to buy peace with the tribes. Fortunately his son Saif al-Islam 

Ahmad bin Yahya proved to be a competent army commander, and the 

new army provided leverage over the tribes. Nevertheless, Yahya almost 

immediately faced a series of revolts. Between 1922 and 1933, revolts north 

of Sana’a—in the Wadi Jawf near Marib—and then serious Shafai revolts 

in the Tihama against Zaydi rule threatened to create an independent state. 

The core resistance in the form of the Zaraniq tribe only succumbed when 

their capital at Bayt al-Faqih fell after a year-long campaign. The Tihaman 

campaign had hardly ended when another revolt in the Jawf required an 

extended campaign to capture Marib, an autonomous province since 1640, 

followed by another campaign in the northeast against the Dhu Husayn and 

Dhu Muhammad tribes.60 In Yemen, this situation is what an unparalleled 

degree of order looks like.61

Yemeni-Saudi Friction: The First Round

In the northeast, Imam Yahya attempted to annex Najran, bringing him into 

conflict with Abd-al-Aziz al-Saud (Ibn Saud). During World War I, Ibn Saud 

bided his time and hoarded British-supplied arms and gold. Rather than 

fight the Ottomans as London and 

British India had hoped, Ibn Saud 

fought for control of Arabia after 

the Ottoman collapse. In 1920, 

he eliminated Muhammad ibn 

Rashid, his oldest rival in central 

Arabia. In 1924, Ibn Saud also defeated and deposed Sharif Hussein ibn Ali 

al-Hashem in the Hejaz. Then in 1926, Ibn Saud established a protectorate 

over the Idrisi Sultanate of Asir. This action led to clashes between Yemeni 

and Saudi-backed tribes. As late as 1923, and a problem for Yahya, the Idrisi 

harbored rival imams. Their allies included powerful sheikhs of the Hashid 

confederation. In addition, the Shafais preferred Sunni Idrisi rule as did Bakil 

tribes at odds with the imam. It was the Saudi protectorate of 1926 that pushed 

the Idrisi into an alliance with Yahya.62 In 1932, Crown Prince Ahmed occupied Najran but was promptly ejected by Saudi forces. Two years of inclusive 

border negotiations, punctuated by Yemeni border raids and no progress on 

Rather than fight the Ottomans as 

London and British India had hoped, 

Ibn Saud fought for control of Arabia 

after the Ottoman collapse. 
28

JSOU Report 11-3

Imam Yahya’s claim to Asir and Najran, ensued.63 Yahya also jailed visiting 

Saudi negotiators. In 1933, the Idrisi sultan fled Asir and asked for Yahya’s 

support against Ibn Saud. Yahya also declared that Asir was “indivisibly a 

part of Yemen.” 64

Simultaneously, Yahya moved against tribes in the Aden protectorate. 

Interestingly, the entire issue of the disposition of the protectorates had 

sparked a debate in London over the costs and value of attempting to control 

the tribes in the protectorate. Some British argued that paying the tribes and 

rebelling sheikhs was as expensive as maintaining and equipping a police 

force. If the imam had responsibility for them, they would be his problems 

and not that of colonial Aden. This advice was rejected, and the British opted 

for a “forward policy” in the protectorate. To counter the British strategy, 

the imam fomented a series of disturbances.65 Reluctantly, the British armed 

the Shafai tribes, provided air support, and sent them north toward Sana’a.66

Yahya quickly recognized his strategic error, agreed to a settlement with the 

British, and signed the Treaty of Sana’a in 1934 that more or less reaffirmed 

the Anglo-Turkish boundary because he was now facing a two-front war.67

In 1934, an exasperated Ibn Saud ordered a two-pronged invasion of Yemen. 

The first column under Crown Prince Saud struggled in the Zaydi highlands 

against the forces of Crown Prince Ahmed. The second column under Prince 

Feisal overwhelmed opposition in the Tihama, captured the port of Hudaydah, 

and headed toward Sana’a. Imam Yahya called for help. The French, British, 

and Italians dispatched warships as a show of solidarity against Saudi expansion. Concerned about British intervention, Ibn Saud settled for the Treaty 

of Taif, which stipulated that Asir and Najran were Saudi territory. Relations 

normalized with the Yemenis nursing their territorial grudge and the Saudis 

“keeping an eye on and a hand in Yemeni affairs.” 68

Saudi intervention in Yemeni affairs after 1934 reflected real concerns about 

border security and Yemeni revanchist claims to Asir and Najran. In addition, various Yemeni tribes at odds with the imamate sought Saudi support. 

Yahya’s departure from traditional Zaydi succession practices and attempt 

to establish hereditary rule became another source of internal discontent.69

Ibn Saud shared their views because he detested Crown Prince Ahmed and 

suggested to Yahya that he should “persuade” Ahmad to relinquish his claims 

to the imamate. The issue of Ahmed aside, Ibn Saud had staked out a position 

consistent with that of the traditional Zaydi elites, particularly the sayyids.

70
29

Barrett: Yemen

The Hamid al-Din, the Free Yemenis, and the British

Despite problems with Yahya, the British attempted to maintain good relations. The 1934 Treaty of Sana’a reduced border tensions and Aden depended 

on food stuffs and supplies from the north. In addition, after 1939, Aden 

became a critical allied transit point between theaters of operations, and the 

war effort came first. Then in 1944, two leaders of the newly declared Free 

Yemeni Party (FYP), Ahmed Muhammad Nu’man and Qadi Muhammad 

Mahmud al-Zubayri, sought refuge in Aden from the imam’s arrest warrants. Nu’man, a Shafai—and Zubayri, a Zaydi—called for reform and the 

overthrow of the Imam Ahmed. The British did not want to upset the status 

quo with the imamate. Nonetheless, Nu’man and Zubayri were allowed to 

stay on the condition that neither engaged in political activities against the 

imamate. Ironically, the imam and even some FYP members assumed that 

the British financed the FYP. Facing a daily struggle to survive, the FYP in 

Aden knew differently. The British put an effective damper on Free Yemeni 

political activities until the end of 1945.71

The Free Yemeni leadership concluded that reforming the Hamid al-Din 

regime required Imam Yahya’s forced removal. In 1946, a U.S. Navy medical team examined Imam Yahya, giving him only a few months to live. This 

diagnosis sparked furious activity among the opponents of the regime and 

forced the imam to compromise on a number of issues. He expanded diplomatic relations and ended Yemen’s almost total isolation. He sent students 

abroad from the most important families for an education and brought in 

Egyptian teachers. He refused to step down and allow a Zaydi sayyid council 

to appoint a new imam. He wanted a hereditary Hamid al-Din succession. 

In opposition, Zubayri’s Barnamij al-Islah (Reform Program) flatly called 

for “the elimination of the rule of Imam Yahya and his sons” but not an end 

to the imamate. More radical opponents ridiculed these demands as “half 

measures.” 72

The FYP feared that if nature were allowed to take its course, the more 

competent Crown Prince Ahmed would be firmly in power. The FYP inside 

Yemen decided to act. Zaydi sayyid Abdullah al-Wazir assumed leadership of 

the plot to remove Imam Yahya. The price for his role was to be placed ahead 

of Crown Prince Ahmed for the crown. The other conspirators needing money 

for bribes approached Ibn Saud for support. Unable to tolerate Ahmed, the 

Saudi monarch agreed on the condition that nothing would happen to Imam 
30

JSOU Report 11-3

Yahya. This proviso did not extend to Ahmed. Eliminating an irksome claimant to the Yemen throne was one thing, killing the sitting ruler was another. 

Ibn Saud worried that others might conclude that what had been good for 

the Yemeni goose might also be good for the Saudi gander. When the coup 

actually occurred in February 1948, Ibn Saud quickly reversed himself on the 

grounds that the plotters killed Yahya and were proposing a constitutional 

government.73 Given Ibn Saud’s age, succession—the great test of viability for 

the Kingdom was nearing—Ibn Saud intended that his own Crown Prince 

Saud would succeed him. 

Another issue was looming as well. A shrewd judge of politics, Ibn Saud 

concluded that if Crown Prince Ahmed survived the coup, he would likely 

win. Ahmed was an able military commander and had been Ibn Saud’s pugnacious opponent. On 17 February 1948, tribesmen assassinated Yahya outside 

Sana’a. Al-Wazir was proclaimed imam on the 18th. As for the Yemenis, they 

were hardly shocked: “in Zaydi politics assassination was a perfectly ‘acceptable’ means of removing one imam to make way for another; indeed, it was 

the norm.” 74

Unfortunately, they had no plan to eliminate Ahmed who quickly made 

his way to Hajja where “as governor he had been lavish in his largesse in order 

to prepare for contingencies such as the one he now faced.” He promised the 

tribes that they would be allowed to sack Sana’a and other towns supporting 

the rebellion. Most of the fighting occurred between tribes loyal to either 

al-Wazir or the Crown Prince. During an outing from Sana’a on 17 February, 

Ahmed’s forethought proved decisive. His tribes captured Sana’a and most of 

the conspirators in a few weeks.75 When the Arab League dispatched a delegation to investigate the legitimacy of the regime in Sana’a, Ibn Saud—now 

supporting Ahmed—sidetracked them in Riyadh. Ibn Saud undermined 

their mission by announcing that he and King Abdullah of Transjordan 

recognized Ahmed. Despite their pro-FYP sympathies, the Arab League 

followed suit and recognized Ahmed as king and imam on 21 March followed 

by the British on 22 April.76

Had the coup succeeded, the proposed composition of al-Wazir’s new 

regime would have been instructive. Despite the active opposition of the 

Shafais to the imam, the new government — the Sacred National Pact 

(SNP)—was to be totally dominated by the Zaydis. The serious contenders 

for imam were al-Wazir and Crown Prince Ahmed; the latter was obviously 
31

Barrett: Yemen

in direct contravention of the rebellion’s original goal. The new parliament 

or Majlis had 70 members of which 53 were Zaydis, and 31 of those members 

were sayyids with no important government posts for Shafais.77 Yemen was 

going to remain a Zaydi-dominated state. “Yemen in 1948 evinced no qualitative change of regime, merely a change in the personalities controlling that 

regime and an attempt to regularize the system of government by introducing 

a constitution.” 78

The aftermath of the coup was just as instructive. Key leaders of the FYP

were executed, exiled, or imprisoned under physically and psychologically 

appalling conditions. When execution was not forthcoming, a number of 

detainees—all Shafai—were released. Ahmad Nu’man had written to the 

blind Shafai Mufti of Aden Muhammad al-Bayhani, who interceded on their 

behalf. This action upset the still imprisoned Zaydis and became another 

source of division for Shafais and Zaydis. Several considerations no doubt 

motivated Imam Ahmed’s policy. His new capital was in predominantly Shafai 

Taiz, and the leniency would “curry favor” with the population there. Interrogations revealed that the Shafais were not involved in the actual assassination 

of his father. However, even more important, the Shafais did not pose the same 

threat to the regime as the Zaydi leadership. In Zaydi-dominated Yemen, the 

Shafais lacked the legitimacy and the means to threaten the government.79

His action also split the Zaydi and Shafai wings of the FYP. Political power 

was a function of Zaydi domination, and Ahmed knew it well. 

Post-War Aden and the Protectorates

In British-controlled Aden and the protectorate, another Yemen was emerging 

that was politically, socially, and culturally different from the Zaydi north. In 

the immediate aftermath of the World War II, Aden was the resort for traders, 

which was the original intent of the British policy. Taxes were low and as long 

as British authority went unchallenged, government meddling was minimal. 

The Legislative Council of 1947 served only as an advisor. During the war and 

in the immediate aftermath, a series of political awakenings occurred. The 

FYP emerged as a focal point for opposition to the imamate. Indian Hindus 

and Muslims debated freely about the end of the Raj. After the war, various 

groups in Aden became politicized. In 1947, Muslim Indians in Aden formed 

the Muslim Association. The Jewish community, animated by Jews from 

Yemen transiting Aden on their way to Palestine, provoked anti-Jewish riots 
32

JSOU Report 11-3

that forced a state of emergency and the permanent stationing of British troops 

in Aden. This unsheathing of “the iron fist of British power” from its “usual 

velvet glove” put the British policies in conflict with the Arab population.80

Post-war inflation and an emerging working class in the administration, 

the port, and the refinery brought strikes and political agitation.81 The British 

influence that brought about the emergence of societal elements and nascent 

institutions and organizations, 

which were more representative of economically developed 

societies, served to heighten 

the differences between the 

Shafai south and the Zaydi 

north. In northern Yemen, 

the Zaydis wielded the real political power; however, now the Shafais in the 

imamate looked over the boundary and saw Shafais dealing with the British 

in their own political right. In Aden and the protectorates, higher education 

rates, greater cross-cultural exposure, the emergence of a working class, and 

better internal communications created a more sophisticated, more politically aware population. It was in many ways no less fractured than that of 

the north, but the problems followed 20th century lines and patterns. Tribalism was still present and clan struggles continued, but new political interest 

groups based on labor and ideology also emerged. These differences would 

only sharpen the fundamental north-south differences. The stage was set for 

the contemporary era.

Summary

Putting aside the physical trappings of the imamate and examining the 

political and diplomatic dynamics of the period, it is a refracted image of 

the modern Yemen. All of the elements are there. The highly personal rule of 

the imam was supported by family and tribal loyalists. The army was to be a 

counterbalance to the power of the tribes. The closest, most trusted advisors 

were those totally dependent on patronage for their survival and power. For 

the Hamid al-Din, Saudi Arabia reemerged as a potent external factor with 

internal influence whose interests had to be taken into consideration. The 

1933 war taught Yahya and Ahmed who pushed beyond a certain point that 

Saudi Arabia could prove to be the undoing of their rule. For both Yahya and 

The British influence that brought about 

the emergence of societal elements and 

nascent institutions...served to heighten the differences between the Shafai 

south and the Zaydi north. 
33

Barrett: Yemen

Ahmed, the south—that is, Aden and the protectorates—became a source 

of progressive political ideas that threatened the imamate. The conflicting 

desire to modernize in order to strengthen the regime and yet at the same 

time prevent reforms from overwhelming the status quo eventually brought 

in the outside influences like the Egyptians who would become the catalyst 

for the collapse of the imamate. The tribes’ fractious feuding and resistance 

to intimidation were constantly a challenge to government authority; however, the support of those tribes was vital to the survival of the imamate itself. 

These themes, some crystal and some blurred, are a part of the Yemeni political landscape even today.

35

Barrett: Yemen

4. Setting the Stage, Yemen 1953 to 1962

This period is the age of Nasser when most analysts and observers viewed Pan-Arabism with its promise of a new tomorrow as the “wave of the 

future.” 82 Yemen, the most isolated and backward country in the region, 

managed to find itself a centerpiece in this struggle between traditional societies and revolutionary ones. Most studies view the events of September 1962 as 

a true revolution, overstating what actually occurred. The revolution of 1962 

was in fact more of a coup; instead of reforming and fundamentally changing 

the existing political, economic, and social modalities, it reinforced them. 

Post-1962, the new sayyids in army green were in control in Sana’a. The tribes 

were stronger and richer than they had ever been. Zaydis still controlled the 

government, and the government still lacked the means to control its territory. 

Personal rule through family, clan, and tribe was still largely the rule of the 

day and Yemen continued to be beset by outside influences over which it had 

no control. During the period 1953 to 1962, names and descriptive modalities 

change but the reality of politics, society, and economic well-being remain 

remarkably the same. 

Yemen and the Rise of Nasser

In 1952, a group of military officers in Egypt, led by Colonel Gamal Abdul 

Nasser, overthrew the monarchy and replaced it with an Arab republic dominated by the military and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). In 

1954, Nasser emerged as the leader of the new Egyptian Republic. His priorities were as follows:

a. Remove the British forces from the Suez Canal zone. 

b. Acquire new weapons to defend Egypt from what he saw as Israeli 

provocations. 

c. Modernize Egypt beginning with electrification through the Nile High 

Dam at Aswan. 

In many respects, his first international sponsor was the newly elected Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower believed that Egypt was “obviously the 

key” to solving the problems in Sudan, the Suez Canal issues, the Arab-Israeli 

dispute, and creating an anticommunist Middle East defense organization.83

In 1954, Nasser accepted an American-brokered compromise with the British 

on the Canal, but never received either the modern weaponry or the economic 
36

JSOU Report 11-3

assistance that he believed was promised.84 In 1955, Nasser’s frustrations 

pushed him toward the nonaligned movement and resulted in his turning to 

the Soviet Union for arms. 

In 1956, Washington withdrew support for the Aswan Dam, and Nasser 

reacted by nationalizing the Suez Canal. In the Suez War, the Israelis, the 

British, and the French invaded Egypt and attempted to topple the regime. 

Both the Soviet Union and the United States demanded their withdrawal, and 

Nasser survived. He became the hero 

of the Arab world. Nasser’s anti-British 

stance was particularly appealing in 

Yemen. Ahmad wanted to annex Aden 

and the protectorate. The British were the obstacle, and Nasser looked like the 

perfect ally. The Egyptians were also a source for advisors and modern Soviet 

weapons. Ahmed had to have known risks of Nasser’s appeal as illustrated by 

an encounter between two sons of a local sayyid when they met a commoner 

student on the street. The commoner kissed the young sayyids’ hands but later 

commented, “We kiss their hands now but just wait until tomorrow.” He was 

a Nasserist.

85 Nasser’s 1953 manifesto called for destroying imperialism and 

its “stooges,” ending feudalism, ending monopoly and capitalist domination 

over the government, bringing social justice to the masses, creating a strong 

national army, and creating a “sound democratic life.” 86 In 1953, his philosophy of revolution focused on the “permanent revolutionary struggle” and the 

“eradication of feudalism.” 87 Ahmed’s new friend in Cairo did not have the 

imamate’s best interests at heart. 

In Aden and the protectorate, Nasserism also had an impact. The British 

administrators viewed tribal leaders and ruling clans as “selfish and oppressive 

clogs on the wheels of progress.” In 1954 the British proposed the federation 

of the states of the protectorate, including the Executive Council and the 

Legislative Council to advise the governor. The British hoped that this would 

eventually allow them to pick progressive new leaders and evolve the federation into a democratic government with a constitution. Like today in Iraq or 

Afghanistan, where the American wish was to create a stable, progressive, 

and democratic leadership that would lead to democracy across the region, 

so the British hoped to see an independent, moderate South Yemen. 

South Yemen did not turn out well. An old English proverb about wishes, 

horses, and beggars has some applicability. Some British colonial officials 

Nasser’s anti-British stance was 

particularly appealing in Yemen.
37

Barrett: Yemen

believed the independent, moderate focus was not only possible but an obligation. The British referred to it as the “dual mandate.” 88

South Yemen and the Nasserist Era 

Significant changes in Aden and the protectorate occurred in 1954; the changes 

affected both South Yemen and the imamate. In 1951, the progressives formed 

the South Arabian League (SLA) and called for the unification of the two 

Hadramuti sultanates. The SLA wanted independence, while traditional leaders resisted because they understood that independence would compromise 

their own power. Nevertheless, neither wanted their political goals thwarted 

by a federation essentially run by the British governor-general. In addition, 

new ideas broadcast via the Sawt al-Arab from Cairo preached a nationalistic and anti-British message that resonated with the British opposition. The 

British attempted to counter the broadcasts, but as reported:

Even with the best equipment, the British administration had little 

hope of competing with Egypt in the field of propaganda. It had no 

ideas to offer which could compare with Cairo’s resounding appeals 

to Arab brotherhood and denunciations of colonialism.89

The British experience is a cautionary tale for foreigners who try to outpropagandize indigenous peoples that share a common culture, religion, and 

sense of injustice. Public diplomacy sounds good, but as the British learned, 

is often a waste of resources. 

Far more potent were policies that encouraged natural centrifugal forces; 

these polices made any sort of real cooperation difficult in fractured factional 

and tribal-based societies.90 The British signed the sultans of Awlaki, Awdhali, 

and Lahj to new treaties; however, the imam in Sana’a exploited ancient tribal 

and family rivalries to undermine effective implementation.91 Opposition 

stopped the forward policy and then forced a retrenchment. The British 

administration rode out the storm, but security in the protectorate suffered. 

“The events of 1954–1955 effectively destroyed the long-term credibility of the 

British regime in the minds of acute observers,” and the imam and rulers in the 

protectorate made it clear to colonial officials that they did not think British 

rule would last.92 Instead of the forward policy being a vehicle to assure the 

rule of progressive pro-British leaders in an increasingly democratic political 

environment, meddling with half-baked Western ideas from a foreign power 

accelerated the British downhill slide.
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JSOU Report 11-3

The Yemens — Contrasts in Culture, Politics, and Development

In 1955, the imamate continued to be a Zaydi-dominated state. Zaydi imams 

had created an elaborate theological and cultural justification for Zaydi rule 

over the Shafais. Zaydi leaders felt the superiority and self-satisfaction of a 

largely “inward looking mountain” people who had “little opportunity or 

inclination to compare” themselves to anything outside their isolated world. 

Shafais were often businessmen and traders situated in Taiz, Hudaydah, and 

the Tihama and therefore more exposed to the modern world and receptive 

to new ideas. The “Africanized Shafais” of the Tihama were a third group “at 

the bottom of the social order. It is not going too far to say that Zaydis looked 

down on Shafais, and both groups looked down on Tihaman and foreign-born 

Shafais.” 93 Little had changed in the relationship between north and south 

or mountain and shore. 

Internal divisions also existed. In Zaydi areas, the Hashid and Bakil fought 

figuratively and literally for influence. Various sayyids resisted Imams Yahya 

and Ahmed’s imposition of a family dynasty. The Zaydis primarily identified themselves in tribal terms; 

the Shafais, while aware of their 

tribal links, tended to identify 

themselves more in terms of 

location—that is, village and 

town. In South Yemen, a Shafai 

society and commercial center 

were emerging as the political 

power. The British had created 

an atmosphere in which the 

Shafais had become the focal 

point of political activity. They 

wanted to end colonial rule but 

Figure 9. Market Day in the

Old City of Sana’a — shopping malls may exist but

more traditional settings for

commerce still predominate

given the growing poverty.
39

Barrett: Yemen

certainly did not want jabili Zaydi domination.94 Why trade one form of 

colonialism for another? 

The tendency among historians is to lump the Hamid al-Din imams 

together as a single historical period. This practice is convenient but misleading. Dresch states that the writing of history argues tribal history (which 

comprises most of Yemen history) “is something antithetical to unified 

narrative and thus to what we expect of states.” It is easier to create false 

but “processual [sic] forms such as state formation.” The more sophisticated 

granular approach requires a level of knowledge about historical processes, 

objectivity, and experience that only rarely exists. Focusing on dynasties, 

revolutions, and invasions simplifies the process of explanation. As a result, 

otherwise intelligent analysts come up with a flawed understanding and 

policies doomed to fail because they are pegged to false assumptions about 

historical context.95

This issue is particularly key with Yemen, where the granularity of the 

tribal and factional element is so fine yet so important and the society is so 

different from the American experience. Lumping Imam Ahmed together 

with his father is an example: he was not as reactionary, but he could find a 

path to reform and remain in power—a situation not unlike Yemen today. 

The focus is skewed because the understanding is superficial; the question 

is certainly not about Yemen as a nation-state—something that has existed 

largely in the imaginations of outside analysts. It is less about the survival of 

Ali Abdullah Saleh than it is the survival of the political nexus that created 

and supported him for 32 years.

Hamid al-Din Reform

Imam Ahmed learned from the coup in 1948 that the policies of his father 

were simply untenable in the post-war era. The isolation of Zaydi Yemen 

from the rest of the world was not an option. His brother Hasan criticized 

him for “letting in foreigners.” He tried to innovate but survival required a 

continuation of personal rule.96 In March 1955, Imam Ahmed’s brother Saif 

al-Din Abdullah led an attempted coup in league with Colonel Ahmed Yahya 

al-Thalaya. They convinced old Free Yemenis—now free from the “University of Hajja,” their old prison—to participate. A reluctant Nu’man and more 

enthusiastic Iryani supported the coup against Ahmed.97 In the botched plan, 

Colonel al-Thalaya—the commander of the Taiz military district—ordered 
40

JSOU Report 11-3

Muhammad al-Huthi—the commander of the Taiz garrison—to besiege the 

imam in his Taiz palace fortress.98

Like his father before him, Ahmed’s son Badr fled to the Hamid al-Din 

stronghold of Hajja and rallied tribal support for the besieged imam. The 

coup collapsed for the following reasons: 

a. The plotters underestimated both Imam Ahmed and Badr.

b. Misinterpreting the perceived mistake of 1948, they did not assassinate 

Ahmed.

c. The plotters had no coordinated plan, and what plan existed was botched.

d. The coup itself merely wanted to replace Imam Ahmed with another 

imam more accepting of political reform. 

Again, the tribes provided the tipping point in countering the coup. However, the coup did have consequences. Thalaya, Abdullah, and another of the 

imam’s brothers—Abbas—were captured, interrogated, and beheaded. Prime 

Minister Saif al-Din Hasan, although in Cairo, was stripped of this position. 

Badr’s performance during the coup brought his immediate promotion to 

Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, Commander in Chief of the 

Armies, and Minister of Defense.99

Political foment increased in the aftermath of the coup, prompting Imam 

Ahmed to undertake a program of modernization that would prove to be the 

undoing of the Hamid al-Din rule. Badr, now in a position of considerable 

influence, was an ardent admirer of Nasser; he admired Nasser’s ideas on 

Arab nationalism and particularly the anti-British rhetoric. Badr pushed for 

cooperation with Egypt in targeting the British. The imam now endorsed a 

program in which Yemen, allied with and aided by Egypt and the Soviet Union, 

attempted to drive the British from Aden. This decision introduced Egyptian 

and Soviet military advisors into Yemen to train, support, and modernize the 

Yemeni Army. Reform-minded Yemenis supported this move despite their 

opposition to the imamate. They argued that any kind of modernization 

would open the eyes of the population to their situation and introduce new 

ideas that would undermine the Hamid al-Din. They were right. 

In 1958, Imam Ahmed, with Badr’s full support, entered into the ill-fated, 

pan-Arab experiment with Egypt and Syria, the United Arab States. Imam 

Ahmad authorized Soviet construction of the deep water port at Hudaydah 

and two new highways linking Taiz, Sana’a, and Hudaydah built by the 
41

Barrett: Yemen

Americans and the Chinese.100 These improvements did not mollify many in 

the growing opposition to the imam. Frustrated by the lack of real reform, 

Zubayri attacked the imamate, claiming it was responsible for the divisions in 

Yemen and the existence of two Yemens. “According to Zubayri’s interpretation 

then the imamate, in its contemporary form, pitched Shafai against Zaydi, 

Zaydi against sayyid, and finally sayyid against the house of the imam—the 

Hamid al-Din.” He also attacked the Qahtani versus Adnani interpretation 

of “divine right” to rule as the means by which the imam had co-opted the 

sayyids.

101 An additional effect was the token liberalization of 1947. It dramatically increased the exposure of Yemenis to new ideas, increasing pressure 

on the regime. Yahya had authorized the so-called Famous 40 to go abroad 

for their educations. Many of the Famous 40 as well as growing numbers of 

Yemenis in Aden, the protectorate, and the diaspora joined Yemeni branches 

of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ba’th Party, various stripes of Nasserism, and 

even Arab communist parties.102

The declining health of the imam and the open contempt for Badr did 

not bode well for the future. In April 1959, Imam Ahmed went to Italy for 

Figure 10. The Chinese engineered and built the Sana’a-Hudaydah highway with its spectacular views and terrifying traffic mishaps. It cut a

2-day journey to 5 hours.
42

JSOU Report 11-3

medical treatment, which included an addiction to morphine. In charge, 

Badr immediately ordered changes, including new political organizations 

and increased numbers of Egyptian military and security advisors. Unrest 

in the army grew, prompting Badr to promise a pay increase to the army for 

which he did not have funds. Unrest in the military again forced Badr to call 

on the Hashid and Bakil tribal confederations for support. After a substantial subsidy, they sent 50,000 tribal irregulars to Sana’a to cow the army. On 

learning of the trouble, Imam Ahmed returned from his medical treatments 

in Italy and laid the blame on the Egyptians. He demanded the removal of 

the Egyptians, then attempted to recover the subsidy paid to the tribes. This 

action placed the tribes, the Free Yemenis, and the army at least temporarily 

on the same side.

The tribes, particularly the Hashid, had been the key support of the 

Hamid al-Din dynasty and the imam’s control; however, at this point, even 

in Zaydi areas, support was slipping. Many Zaydis who had found work in 

Saudi oil fields were disillusioned by the situation at home. The Hashid and 

the paramount sheikh Husayn al-Ahmar had received the lion’s share of 

Badr’s subsidy; he had the most to lose if Ahmad recouped the payments. 

After attempts by the imam to impose control over the Hashid, al-Ahmar 

declared the Hashid goal as the removal of the Hamid al-Din dynasty. In a 

secret meeting with the Free Yemenis and army, al-Ahmar hatched a plan 

to assassinate the imam and replace the imamate with rule by al-Ahmar as 

something other than imam because he was not a sayyid. In January 1960, 

the revolt was underway and making significant progress when al-Ahmar in 

a “rare lapse of judgment” accepted Imam Ahmed’s invitation to talks based 

on a promise of safe conduct. Ahmed arrested and executed al-Ahmar and his 

son Hamid at Hajja. The coup collapsed and the other conspirators, including 

the Bakil paramount sheikh Sinan Abu Luhum, fled to Aden. 

The collapse of the 1959 to 1960 coup was important for two reasons: 

a. It severed the historical tie of support between the tribes and the 

Hamid al-Din.

b. Egyptian support shifted from political organizations like the Free 

Yemenis to the army.103 Anti-imamate activities increased. 
43

Barrett: Yemen

Summary

The Hamid al-Din experience of 1953 to 1962 provides a clear lesson for Yemeni 

rulers or would-be dynasties. Attempts to reform, no matter how limited or 

controlled in the beginning, can spin completely out of control. The Famous 

40 produced more political foment instead of relieving the political pressure. Modernizing the army to confront the British created a set of Nasserist 

and East Bloc influenced officers and the military instrument necessary to 

destroy the Hamid al-Din. When Ahmed lost the support of the tribal leaders, particularly the al-Ahmars and the Hashid, he removed the traditional 

trump card of the imamate in any internal power struggle—tribal support. 

With the threat of the tribes removed, he was at the mercy of the military. 

For Yemen’s rulers, attempts to restructure the political, social, or economic 

environment are quite often incompatible with survival. 

The outsiders’ view of Yemen is also instructive. The Egyptians armed with 

the tenets of Arab socialism believed that they would be welcomed with opened 

arms. If not, they believed that their large well-equipped modern army and 

air force would make short work of any opposition. They presumed that they 

knew Yemen and what it needed better than the Yemenis, thereby alienating 

everyone. By transforming it into an Egyptian war, they made themselves 

a target for multiple groups who could only agree on killing Egyptians and 

their Yemeni collaborators. It was a lengthy and costly mistake, but a good 

lesson that others might consider.

45

Barrett: Yemen

5. The Yemens’ Post-Imamate 1962 to 1979

In 1958, Imam Ahmed — disenchanted with the United Arab Republic (UAR) — wrote a poem severely criticizing Nasser, causing him to end the 

confederation with Yemen.104 Th e poem appeared in an Adeni newspaper and 

brought a concerted eff ort from Cairo to undermine the imam.105 In October 

1961 an assassination attempt severely injured Imam Ahmed, and Crown 

Prince Badr became regent. In December 1961, Nasser labeled the imam along 

with Jordan’s King Hussein and King Saud of Saudi Arabia “reactionaries” 

and “lackeys of imperialism.” 106 Yemen was a part of a much broader problem 

for Nasser. His Syrian union collapsed in 1961, bringing a more revolutionary 

approach. Replacing the imamate with an Egyptian-sponsored republic and 

threatening Saudi Arabia seemed just the project to restore Nasser’s lost prestige. Yemen became a pawn in a much larger game involving pan-Arab ideals 

wedded to Egyptian ambitions. For the Saudis, a Nasserist regime entrenched 

in Yemen was a direct threat.107 Th en, on 19 September 1962, Imam Ahmed 

died; 1 week later tanks rolled 

into Sana’a, ending 1,000 years 

of Zaydi imamate.

Civil War and Egyptian 

Intervention

In the Middle East, things that 

look simple on the surface oft en 

turn out to be very complicated. 

Yemen’s new leader Colonel 

Abdullah al-Sallal declared a 

republic and announced the 

death of Imam Badr. In reality, the imam had escaped to 

Saudi Arabia. Th e Saudis initially provided safe haven and 

nominal support. Nasser poured 

thousands of Egypt’s best troops 

into Yemen to support the new 

regime. The British in Aden 

knew too well Nasser’s ultimate 

Figure 11. This Soviet-built and -supplied 

SU-100 fi red the fi rst shot of the Yemen 

revolution of 26 September 1962, initiating almost a decade of civil war. 
46

JSOU Report 11-3

intentions vis-à-vis the crown colony and supported the royalists as did France, 

Jordan, and Iran.108 Over strenuous objections of almost all of its allies, the 

United States recognized the YAR.

109 John Badeau, the new U.S. ambassador 

in Cairo, argued that the imamate was a “paragon of anachronism” and the 

U.S. needed to identify with progressive forces as strategy to limit future Soviet 

influence.110 Badeau accepted at face value the assurances of the YAR’s first 

Foreign Minister Mushin Ahmad Al-Ayni and Anwar Sadat, the President of 

the National Assembly and Nasser’s “watchdog” for Yemen, Saudi Arabia and 

political organizations—that is, that neither the YAR nor UAR intended to 

destabilize Saudi Arabia.111 Understanding that the only substantive issue for 

the U.S. related to Yemen was Saudi security, Badeau suggested that the U.S.

trade YAR recognition for a UAR guarantee for Saudi stability. The Egyptians 

refused, arguing that the border situation was a Saudi-Yemeni issue.112

The royalists mounted an insurgency from the mountains, ambushing 

convoys and patrols and constantly harassing Egyptian troops. Later a historian of the struggle would compare it to “the Soviets in Afghanistan.” 113 Nasser 

came to refer to Yemen as Egypt’s Vietnam. Tanks, artillery, and fighterbombers availed little against the mountain guerillas. As a pro-republican 

Yemen official remarked, “It was obvious that chaos, offhandedness, recklessness, ambitions, competition, and the rush to jostle for positions and power 

were dominating the new political arena in Yemen.” 114 On 1 October 1962, 

YAR Deputy Prime Minister Abd-al-Rahman al-Baydani, Anwar Sadat’s 

brother-in-law, threatened Saudi Arabia over aid to the royalists. Nasser began 

to actively support Prince Talal ibn Abd-al-Aziz and other princes who called 

for a constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia. In early October, four Saudi 

air crews transporting arms to the loyalists defected and flew their aircraft 

to Egypt, forcing the grounding of the entire Saudi Air Force. At this point, 

Crown Prince Feisal, with support from the Sudayri Seven—which included 

Princes Fahd bin Abd-al-Aziz, Sultan bin Abd-al-Aziz, and Naïf bin Abd-alAziz—took control of the Saudi government from King Saud.115 Washington 

began having second thoughts about where U.S. interests lay—with Nasser 

or with Saudi Arabia whose oil was critical to the economies of the West. 

Alarmed, Washington warned the YAR government and Nasser that the 

“USG [U.S. Government] is morally committed to support [the] maintenance 

of integrity of reformist Feisal regime and cannot stand idly by in the face 

of such attacks.” 116
47

Barrett: Yemen

Feisal’s intent was to challenge Nasser by proxy and avoid a direct confrontation if at all possible.117 The Saudis were very cautious. Afraid of confronting Nasser alone, they waited until April 1963, which was six months after 

the first bombing of Najran, before fully committing to arm and finance the 

royalists. By that time, fly-bys of U.S. fighters based in Dhahran had assured 

Riyadh of U.S. support. Also basically on their own, the royalists had managed 

to push the Egyptians almost back to Sana’a, forcing Nasser to reinforce his 

expeditionary force. Given Nasser’s threats against Aden, the British also 

supported Feisal.118

The Civil War reaffirmed the preeminent position of the Zaydi tribes in 

Yemen affairs. Whatever influence the tribes had lost to the Hamid al-Din 

imams was quickly regained as the tribes switched sides based on the highest bidder. Sheikhs like Naji bin Ali al-Gadr went from being a minor Bakil 

leader to a paramount sheikh with thousands of fighters.119 Sheikh Abdullah 

al-Ahmar faired even better. Solidly republican in the beginning due to the 

execution of his father and brother by Imam Ahmed, al-Ahmar eventually 

turned on the Egyptians and al-Sallal in 1965 and was forced into exile.120 By 

1964, unhappiness with the Egyptians and Sallal resulted in a “third force” 

group; they argued that the Civil War was not a Yemeni issue but a product 

of Nasserist and Saudi competition. Ahmad Nu’man, Muhammad al-Zubayri, 

and Abd-al-Rahman al-Iryani resigned from the YAR government, declaring 

it “corrupt, impotent, and bankrupt.” 121 Observers at the time stated that it 

had been “the only independent-minded government Yemen had had since 

the 1962 revolution.” 122 Nasser may have curtailed third force activities but 

by 1965, he was looking for a face-saving way out. Disagreements in both the 

revolutionary government and the royalist camp ended hopes for an early 

settlement. In an effort to win on the ground or force a compromise, the 

Egyptians, who had reduced their forces, initiated a surge and raised troop 

levels back to 60,000 and again began bombing Najran.123 It would take outside 

events to convince Nasser that his involvement in Yemen was folly.

The Withdrawal of the Egyptians and the YAR’s Survival

In June 1967, Israeli-armored columns in the Sinai rearranged Nasser’s priorities. The debacle forced Egypt to withdraw. As in the past, the tribes came 

down from the mountains and laid siege to Sana’a from November 1967 to 

February 1968. Residents remembered well the sacking of Sana’a of 1948 and 
48

JSOU Report 11-3

banded together with the local, secular, and leftist officers, many of whom 

were Shafai, to lift the siege. The siege ended, but the tribes were the ultimate 

winners of the Civil War. One observer aptly referred to the resulting YAR

government as “tribalist republicans.” 124 To say that the tribes regained their 

influence was to some degree misleading; in fact, they never lost it. The imams 

depended on tribal support for survival. Once tribal support was lost, the 

Hamid al-Din dynasty collapsed. The Egyptian withdrawal and the stalemate 

at Sana’a in 1968 restored the equilibrium between central authority and the 

Zaydi highland tribes. 

The area still had outstanding issues. “The sectarian and tribal cleavages 

present in North Yemeni society were strengthened by the experience of civil 

war.” With notable exceptions, it is fair to say that most of the republican 

support came from the Shafais and most of the royalist from the Zaydi. The 

role of foreign patrons, Saudi and Egyptian, merely increased the divide 

because it provided independent access to money and guns.125 “Sana’a was 

an island of revolutionary enthusiasm surrounded by a rising tide of strident 

traditionalism. A fight and its outcome were never in doubt.” 126 Zaydi tribal 

traditionalist influence triumphed.

Moves to reassert Zaydi influence in the military resulted in the Sana’a 

Mutiny of 1968. Shafai officers revolted and were put down by Zaydi commanders in the army with the support of Zaydi tribal irregulars. Conservatives 

spent months purging the army. They banned trade unions and leftist parties. 

The Thermodorian move against left-wing influence also confirmed Zaydi 

dominance. The new President Abd-al-Rahman al-Iryani allegedly told a 

gathering of Zaydi principal sheikhs, “If ever you want me out, you won’t 

have to do anything to me. Just tell me to go and I’ll go. There’ll be no need to 

kill me.” The tribal and traditional triumph also gained Saudi cooperation in 

finally ending the civil war.127 It did not end direct Saudi involvement with the 

tribes and in Yemen politics. Yemen was simply too unstable and too strategic 

to Saudi Arabia’s security interests for Riyadh to forego involvement. The 

northern tribal areas constituted an extended security zone, a buffer against 

instability and periodic chaos. 

Progressivism, Socialism, and the Shafai South

In Aden, the British created a climate in which the refugees from the imamate thrived. It became the conduit into Yemen for new ideas and ideologies. 
49

Barrett: Yemen

The Adeni Association, founded by Arab and Indian merchants, was the 

first political party in Arabia. Students and teachers from abroad returned 

with Nasserist, socialist, communist, and Ba’thist ideas. The port and British 

Petroleum refinery created an urban proletariat that by 1963 included more 

than 20,000 workers; these unions became the vehicle for political ferment. 

The Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC) stressed economic and political 

grievances and formed its own political unit, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). 

The PSP called for an end to colonial rule and Yemeni unity. In the 1950s, the 

linkage between Nasser and the imamate brought a request from traditional 

southern leaders that the British revive the federation concept. Both the Aden 

Association and the PSP opposed it, but by 1963, the Federation of South 

Arabia encompassed all of South Yemen. “The end result of direct British 

involvement in the politics of the hinterland was to ossify a previously fluid 

political structure and to weaken the tenuous ties that had bound ruler to 

ruled.” Lenient British rule, rather than the historical rulers, allowed political unrest to gain momentum that coupled with Egyptian subversion from 

the YAR brought revolution.128

Despite the Nasserist threat, some tribal leaders resented federation control. 

A revolt of the Qutaybi tribe was put down by the British. After the death of 

the sheikh, resistance was taken over by the National Front for the Liberation 

of South Yemen, otherwise known as the National Front (NF). The NF became 

the Yemeni branch of the Arab National Movement (ANM) sponsored by 

Nasser. One of the founders—Salim Rubayyaa Ali—would become the first 

president of the Peoples’ Republic of Yemen (the predeccesor to the PDRY), 

and another—Abd-al-Fattah Ismail—would succeed him. The NF spent as 

much energy attacking its radical rivals as it did the British. In 1965, the NF

forced Abdullah al-Asnaj—the founder of the PSP—to step down as leader 

of the Trades Union. 

Nasser wanted the NF and PSP to merge and form the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY). Nasser’s backing boosted Asnaj and NF military 

units, shifting support to him. In a preview of things to come, the NF and 

FLOSY could not meet in July 1966 in Taiz for fear of bloodshed between the 

groups. Against this backdrop, the British announced that they would withdraw from Aden by early 1968 and terminate their treaties with local rulers 

and the Federation of South Yemen. The prospect of South Arabia “falling in 

his lap” spurred Nasser to ratchet up the pressure on the NF to merge with 
50

JSOU Report 11-3

FLOSY. Egyptian threats and arrests resulted in Ismail and others agreeing 

to merge under Asnaj and FLOSY. NF ideological purists strongly resisted 

association with what they viewed as bourgeois elements under Asnaj.129

Until Nasser’s retreat from Yemen in 1967, FLOSY had the upper hand. 

The NF reemerged as the leader when both the labor and military wings of 

FLOSY joined the NF. In 1967, after a mutiny resulting from tribal frictions, 

the Federation of South Arabia army merged with the NF as the British evacuated. Support for FLOSY collapsed. At the same time, the NF announced 

the formation of the Peoples’ Republic of South Yemen (PRSY). Unlike the 

north, the NF eliminated tribal control and established a one party state. 

Now a tightly organized political party of 25,000 members, the NF gave the 

political structure in South Yemen a degree of control never witnessed in the 

north. Political struggles and conflicts occurred, but they were for control of 

the party apparatus. Internal alliances initially followed tribal lines: however, 

after a series of revolts, the NF leadership systematically eliminated tribal and 

Islamic challenges to the state.130

These developments left Riyadh in a quandary. In March 1970, the Saudis 

met with republicans, royalists, third force elements, and tribal leaders 

to attempt a political compromise, ending the civil war in the north. In a 

controversial move, Muhsin al-Ayni agreed to include royalists in the Sana’a 

government. More importantly, royalist areas were to be administered by 

royalist YAR officials. In effect, the YAR agreed to the continuation of the 

de facto Saudi influence in the tribal areas and political partition with the 

tribes. The YAR also agreed to turn a blind eye to Saudi efforts based in the 

YAR aimed at the overthrow of the regime in South Yemen.131

From this agreement emerged the political and diplomatic balancing act 

that would dominate YAR and PDRY internal politics and their relations with 

Saudi Arabia for two decades:

a. The YAR agreed to virtual autonomy for the northern tribal area and 

acquiesced to an extended Saudi-influenced, if not controlled, security 

zone inside the YAR. 

b. The only YAR defense against Saudi influence were threats like Al-Ayni’s 

to ally with South Yemen or turn to the Soviet Union for support.

c. The PDRY with its Shafai population, radical ideology, and cohesive 

government menaced the Zaydi-dominated YAR and, from a Saudi 

point of view, the Kingdom itself. 
51

Barrett: Yemen

d. At the same time, the PDRY threat within the context of the Cold War 

provided a means for the YAR to extract aid from both the Kingdom 

and the West.

e. The agreement assured that the YAR could not control its tribes or its 

territory. The tribes with independent support from Riyadh retained 

the ability to destabilize the YAR. 

In Sana’a, government ministers were at the mercy of tribal and military 

leaders leading to a series of unstable, short-lived governments. In 1972, Saudi 

Arabia’s efforts to undermine the PDRY from YAR territory ignited a border 

war. The anti-PDRY insurgents collapsed and the YAR army—starved of 

ammunition, training, and equipment—fared even worse.132 The military 

result was predictable; the political result was not. In October, the two Yemenis 

suddenly agreed to establish joint working committees with the ultimate 

aim of uniting the country. “Saudi Arabia could hardly contemplate a worse 

outcome and utilized all the levers of influence it possessed in the North to 

deflect Sana’a from pursuing unity.” 133

The YAR and the Triumph of Zaydi Military Rule

To say that the idea of a united Yemen did not appeal to Riyadh is an understatement. Opposition to unification became an obsession. Given the history 

and the relationship of the YAR and the PDRY with the East Bloc, their concern was justified. The Saudis reacted by using the tribes and other clients to 

pressure the Iryani government. On 13 July 1974 after a bloodless coup, Iryani 

resigned and left for exile in Damascus. He was the only civilian president 

that the YAR or Republic of Yemen (ROY) ever had.134 The Military Command Council emerged with Colonel Ibrahim Muhammad al-Hamdi as its 

president, and the constitution and Consultative Council were suspended. 

To gain Saudi and tribal support, Hamdi argued that he acted to prevent a 

takeover by Ba’thists and other leftists.135 The son of a respected qadi (judge), 

Hamdi sought to end corruption and restore economic stability and political order. Sinan Abu Luhum of the Bakil, Abdullah Husayn al-Ahmar of the 

Hashid, and the Saudis supported the coup—believing that in Hamdi they 

had a figurehead leader they could control. 

Hamdi had other ideas. He immediately installed Muhsin al-Ayni as 

Prime Minister, who attempted to form “an Assembly which would not be 

dominated by the tribal leaders, and yet not alienate them and also to fairer 
52

JSOU Report 11-3

reorientation to the Shafais and the town-dwellers.” Al-Ayni failed to solve 

the problem, upsetting al-Ahmar and the Saudis in the process. A double 

liability, Hamdi dismissed him and made Abd-al-Aziz Abd-al-Ghani the 

new Prime Minister.136 He relied heavily on his brother Abdullah al-Hamdi, 

the YAR chief of staff Ahmad Husayn al-Ghashmi, and the highest ranking 

Shafai in the YAR military Abdullah Abd-al-Alim—the commander of the 

paratroop brigade. During 1975, Hamdi used a divide-and-conquer approach 

by gaining al-Ahmar’s support in undermining Sinan Abu Luhum, forcing the 

resignation of his relatives in the government and military. He used the same 

tactic on other tribal leaders and then on al-Ahmar himself. The struggle with 

al-Ahmar was protracted and both sought Saudi support. Hamdi eventually 

isolated al-Ahmar and ignored him, avoiding a fight that might have united 

tribal opposition.137

In addition to economic development and rationalization of the government operations and planning, Hamdi reformed and reorganized the security 

services under Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad al-Khamis. The officer had 

close relations with the Saudis, and his appointment was seen as an effort 

to reassure Riyadh.138 Hamdi also signed a military assistance pact with the 

United States and Saudi Arabia and began a reorganization of the military. 

Hamdi’s goal was to tip the balance of power in the YAR away from the 

tribes, specifically towards the central government and the army. All of these 

efforts were linked to a broader effort to alter the YAR political construct. 

The aim was to undermine the tribalists and the conservatives who opposed 

modernization and to curtail Saudi Arabia’s pervasive influence. The rising 

educated elites credited Hamdi with trying to abolish the sectarian model 

and to create a national model of rule that transcended the historic sectarian 

politics. In the diplomatic and security areas, Hamdi’s good relations with his 

counterpart in Aden—Salim Rubayyaa Ali—and talk of unification plans 

provided him leverage in his relationship with the West and Saudi Arabia, 

as did his push for collective Red Sea security in conjunction with the PDRY. 

In 1977, Hamdi pressed the Saudis to channel aid for the tribes through 

the government in Sana’a. Such an arrangement ran directly counter to the 

Saudi interests and their desire to have direct influence over their erstwhile 

tribal allies. Hamdi also wanted al-Ahmar removed to a comfortable exile 

in the Kingdom. Then Riyadh began to drag its feet on weapons deliveries 

related to the trilateral U.S. arms deal of 1976. Agreements not withstanding, 

the Saudis were balking at providing modern arms to the YAR military for 
53

Barrett: Yemen

fear that they would be used to reduce the tribal Saudi clients in the north 

and perhaps at some point against the Kingdom as well. “A joke circulating in Sana’a at the time had the Saudis agreeing to the sale of tanks to the 

YAR only upon invention of a tank that could drive and shoot south but not 

north.” 139 Hamdi’s reduction of tribal power, his threat to Saudi influence, 

his increasingly cordial relations with the PDRY, and his general insistence 

in increasing policy independence for Yemen and for political independence 

for himself created powerful enemies. 

On 11 October 1977, Hamdi and his brother along with two unidentified 

foreign women were found shot dead in a house on the outskirts of Sana’a. The 

consensus was that army officers, led by Chief of Staff Ahmad al-Ghashmi with 

Riyadh’s blessing, decided Hamdi threatened the status quo in YAR and their 

security and personal interests.140 Viewed in the cold light of national interests, 

there is little doubt that had Hamdi’s programs succeeded they would have 

undermined Saudi security interests and the independence of the northern 

tribes. Hamdi’s independent foreign policy initiatives—including direct 

dealings with the U.S., the continuation of relations with the Soviet Union, 

and new openings to Iran and France—were also worrisome.141 A modern 

Yemeni army might threaten the Kingdom to say nothing of unification with 

the PDRY. The Saudis were not willing to take a chance. In addition, Hamdi’s 

military reforms threatened the status quo and positions of Hamdi’s closest 

military allies. Just as assassination had been a time-honored way to remove 

imams, it also worked on the presidents of the YAR.

The PDRY: Ideological Hardliners Confront the YAR and 

Saudi Arabia

Simultaneously with these developments in North Yemen, the political situation in the PDRY was going through a state of flux. The competition between 

PDRY President Rubayya Ali and NF Chairman Abd-al-Fattah Ismail was 

personal, political, and ideological. Ali supported a pragmatic relationship 

with Saudi Arabia while Ismail wanted an ideological confrontation. Ali 

talked of forming a Leninist vanguard party composed of multiple leftist elements to broaden regime support, and Ismail opposed it. Ismail and Prime 

Minister Ali Nasir Muhammad openly accused Saudi Arabia of engineering 

the assassination of Hamdi and thwarted attempts to end the Dhofar conflict 

with Oman. They supported expanded ties with the Soviet Union. In October 1977, they forced Ali to accept Ali al-Antar, a NF loyalist, as Minister of 
54

JSOU Report 11-3

Defense. Rather than supporting Rubayya’ Ali, Saudi Arabia interpreted the 

al-Antar appointment as Ali’s responsibility and withheld PDRY aid, a move 

that totally undermined him in his struggle with the NF.

142

By June 1978, PDRY support for the National Democratic Front (NDF) 

insurgency in North Yemen increased, as did friction within the PDRY

government between Rubayya’ Ali and the NF leadership. Ali opposed overt 

support for the NDF and attempted to maintain ties with YAR President 

Ahmed al-Ghashmi and Saudi Arabia. On 24 June 1978, a PDRY courier with a 

secret communication allegedly from Rubayya’ Ali to YAR President Ghashmi 

opened his briefcase in Ghashmi’s office; a bomb killed both men.143 Ghashmi’s 

assassination set off a power struggle in Aden that ended with the arrest and 

execution of President Rubayya’ Ali and his replacement by Abd-al-Fattah 

Ismail, the NF party chairman. Given the sequence of events, it is certain 

that supporters of Ismail, probably with Soviet help, substituted the original 

briefcase for one that included a bomb and then blamed the incident on Ali.144

In the YAR, the loss of a second president in 8 months fueled instability. 

A four-man Presidential Council was formed and Lieutenant Colonel Ali 

Abdullah Saleh—a strong Ghashmi supporter, a member of the group that 

eliminated Hamdi, and the garrison commander in Taiz—emerged as the 

president of the YAR and the commander in chief of the armed forces. For the 

Saudis and tribalists, like Hamdi, Saleh appeared to be the safest option. He 

was from a small Hashid tribe that could hardly serve as an independent power 

base. He also appointed Abdullah al-Ahmar of the Hashid Confederation 

and a son of Sinan Abu Luhum from the Bakil to the Constituent Assembly. 

The assembly was back in the hands of the tribalists.145 To everyone involved, 

Saleh appeared to be a manageable commodity. Handling Saleh would turn 

out to be more difficult than anyone could imagine. 

Given the Saleh tribal heritage and accommodation with the paramount 

sheikh from the Hashid confederation Abdullah al-Ahmar, Bakil confederation tribes became concerned about bias. The Shafais viewed Saleh as a return 

to Zaydi domination after the evenhandedness of Hamdi. The PDRY and NDF

fomented further unrest to destabilize the new regime. Almost immediately, 

several army officers mounted a serious coup assassination attempt.146 According to Burrowes in the fall of 1978, a joke circulated in Sana’a that Ghashmi 

had arrived in Heaven only to be castigated by Hamdi for not bringing qat (a 

mildly narcotic plant chewed by Yemenis) to which Ghashmi replied, “Presi-
55

Barrett: Yemen

dent Saleh has promised to take care of the qat—and he should be joining 

us any time now.” 147

The triangular situation between the Yemens and Saudi Arabia worsened. 

Many of Rubayya’ Ali’s supporters had fled to Saudi Arabia and the YAR. 

Riyadh and Sana’a again began to support opposition to the NF, now called the 

Yemen Socialist Party (YSP). Unfortunately, the YSP was better prepared than 

the Saudis or the YAR to play the destabilization game. On 24 February 1979, 

the PDRY army crossed into the YAR, quickly capturing border towns and 

threatening to sever the Taiz-Sana’a road. The YAR army virtually collapsed 

and had to be quickly supported by tribal levies from the north. Defections 

from both northern tribal levies and from the YAR army to the NDF further 

complicated the security situation. Cautious, the Saudis did not order its forces 

into Yemen and refused Sana’a’s requests for air support.148 Lack of help in the 

border war infuriated Saleh and pushed him toward a greater accommodation with the Soviet Union, leading eventually to a suspension of Saudi aid.149

In one of those pure Yemeni political twists, the fighting abruptly ended in 

early March and by late March, at a peace conference in Kuwait, the Saleh 

government and the Ismail government were calling for an end to hostilities 

and for unification of the two Yemens.150

Summary

In the aftermath of 1979, the Saleh regime faced critical legitimacy problems. 

The Hamdi period was the standard by which Ghashmi and Saleh were 

measured and found lacking. Ghashmi may have organized the overthrow 

of Hamdi but many believed that Saleh was directly involved in his elimination. Both were believed to have acted as the cat’s paw of Zaydi tribal leaders 

and Riyadh. With Ghashmi dead, Saleh became a focus of derision for his 

lack of education, his tribal origins, and his inexperience. In effect, Saleh 

had inherited the extra-constitutional system created by Hamdi that lacked 

legitimacy; in addition, his lack of stature contributed to the view that he 

was at best a military dictator and not a legitimate ruler.151 To survive, Saleh’ 

had to stake a more independent course for himself and the YAR. In the 

PDRY, survival was no less an issue for Abd-al-Fattah Ismail, Ali Antar, and 

Ali Nasir Muhammad. PDRY and NDF activities to foment trouble in the 

Shafai south and east met with considerable success. In addition, the PDRY

was the only Arabian client of the Soviet Union. While providing a powerful 
56

JSOU Report 11-3

and somewhat problematic patron, Soviet support also provided powerful 

enemies, most notably the United States. As a result, in 1979, President Carter 

declared the Carter Doctrine against Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf.152

He also authorized a covert action campaign against the PDRY designed to 

destabilize the regime.153

For Saudi Arabia, refusal to come to terms with the republican government 

in 1970 had resulted in the rise of Hasan al-Amri, whose relationship with the 

Soviets pushed the Saudis and tribes to a compromise peace. In 1972, Saudi 

support for PDRY exiles provoked a war between the Yemens, damaging YAR

and Saudi credibility. The Saudis faced a difficult dilemma: Was their greater 

fear a stable YAR or communist subversion from the PDRY? For that matter:

Was a stable Yemen even possible? What challenged and threatened Riyadh 

was the rise of Hamdi and his policies:

a. Breaking the tribal power in the military

b. Dismissing the consultative assembly

c. Removing Abdullah al-Ahmar and ending direct Saudi aid to the tribes

d. Seeking direct relations with the U.S., Iran, France, and the Soviet Union

e. Playing the Yemeni unification card to pressure Riyadh into compromise. 

His removal solved nothing. In fact, the deaths of PDRY President Rubayya’ 

Ali and YAR President Ghashmi in 1979 upended Riyadh’s Yemen policies. 

Riyadh’s unwillingness to become directly involved in the border war of 1979 

was less timidity than a well-advised conservatism. The defensive posture 

assumed by the Saudis at the time of the 1979 border war was the prudent 

course of action. What Riyadh could not know was that the new President 

Ali Abdullah Saleh, despite his apparent weaknesses, proved to be more adept 

than any of his predecessors at gaming the Kingdom and the West and in 

surviving the labyrinth of Yemeni politics. 

For the United States, Yemen policy now had a secondary as well as primary 

thrust. The security and stability of Saudi Arabia remained the primary interest. In the 1950s, the British had sought U.S. help to blunt the influence of the 

Egyptians and the Soviets and to relieve pressure on Aden and the federation. 

London told Washington, “Another success for Nasser in this area would have 

serious consequences for Western prestige throughout the Middle East. All 

of this increases the need for coordinated action by Britain and America.” 154

The U.S. refused to be drawn into any Yemen conflict. Secondarily in the Cold 

War struggle, the U.S. could ill-afford a PDRY victory. Some viewed the U.S.
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Barrett: Yemen

reaction to the 1979 border war and the YAR instability as an over reaction; 

if so, it was done to reassure Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states of the 

U.S. commitment to maintain their security in the face of Soviet proxies.155

Viewed within the context of the crisis of 1979—the fall of Pahlavi Iran, the 

siege in Mecca, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and 

anti-U.S. riots in Pakistan—Washington had to respond.

For the Soviets, the PDRY relations had become increasingly important 

because of port facilities, but the PDRY also represented the only pro-Soviet, 

socialist state on the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, the close relationship with 

the PDRY coupled with a continuing relationship with the government in 

Sana’a offered the possibility that Moscow could become a source of mediation 

between the north and south, thus a player in Arabian politics. The efforts 

of Yevgeny Primakov—as chairman of the Institute of Oriental Studies and 

the Soviet Peace Committee, a KGB front organization during the 1970s and 

1980s—testify to the seriousness with which Moscow viewed their Yemen 

opportunity.156

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Barrett: Yemen

6. The Saleh Regime, Survival and Self-Interest

At this point, the realization that Saleh displayed a shrewd and ruthless grasp of not only Yemen politics but also regional and global dynamics 

was becoming apparent. Saleh would prove to be a pragmatic risk taker who 

understood how to operate in a fluid, unstable environment—an important 

attribute when your next decision could be your last. When Saleh came to 

power, Yemeni politicians and Riyadh felt they had helped to promote a safe

candidate to the presidency, one who could be easily removed if deemed 

necessary. The 1979 border war seemed to confirm this view. The tribalists 

were once again in the government. Various factors seemed to bode well for 

even greater Saudi influence over the new regime and a solidified patron-client 

relationship; examples follow: 

a. Saudi aid to the northern tribes

b. Renewed prominence of traditionalist leaders

c. Strategic position held by Muhammad al-Khamis as head of the National 

Security Organization (NSO) and Foreign Minister Abdullah al-Asnaj, 

both viewed as pro-Western Saudi allies.157

Figure 12. East of Marib, the site of a clash in the no-man’s land

between YAR and PDRY forces during the 1979 Border War — now a

region of antigovernment activity.
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JSOU Report 11-3

Saleh Charts an Independent Course

Everyone underestimated Saleh, who had concluded the following:

a. U.S. relations with the YAR would always be predicated on Saudi interests. 

b. The Saudis would use aid, military or economic, and the tribes and 

purchase political influence as levers of control. 

Hamdi’s fate served as a strong incentive for Saleh to insulate his regime from 

Riyadh. Saleh gambled and opened a diplomatic initiative with the PDRY

aimed at blunting PDRY support for the NDF. He then turned to the Soviet 

Union for arms and advisors. He was a credit to the best Yemeni leaders of 

the past. Saleh chose to assert his regime’s independence by initiating a highwire act between region players and the Cold War adversaries. Saleh hoped 

that closer ties with the Soviet Union would bring leverage on the PDRY and 

through Aden on the NDF. Closer ties with the Soviet Union also raised U.S.

concerns and brought U.S. pressure on Riyadh to be more forthcoming. The 

U.S. and Saudis failed to appreciate Saleh’s political acumen. Riyadh had 

“treated the YAR as a virtual dependency” and now Saleh demonstrated that 

he had options. This treatment proved popular with advisors and nationalists in the officer corps.158

Saleh and Hamdi shared many of the same goals, but the former was 

more focused on personal survival and less on reform. To this end, Saleh 

moved to surround himself with loyalists dependent on him for their political 

survival. He reshuffled his government, removing Asnaj as Foreign Minister 

and shifting Muhammad al-Khamis from the NSO to Minister of Interior. 

Criticisms of “unnamed Arab countries” that were attempting to buy control 

of the YAR increased. To make a point, Asnaj was arrested and charged with 

treason for being on another Arab country’s payroll, and still more dramatic, 

Muhammad al-Khamis died in a still unsolved assassination case. In a series 

of military shakeups, Saleh placed loyal family members and members of his 

own tribe in key positions. He also rehabilitated a number of officers who had 

fallen into disfavor because of their nationalist views during the period of 

Saudi ascendancy.159 He bolstered his position with a second tier of supporters 

including Shafai technocrats who were dependent on him for their positions.160

The new regime now turned to the pressing problem of the NDF insurgency. The NDF was heterogeneous; many of its political groups had little in 

common. In fact, the NDF’s origins date to the aftermath of the siege of Sana’a 
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1968 when the quid pro quo for a compromise with the tribes resulted in the 

Sana’a Mutiny and the elimination of leftist elements from the government. 

These elements found refuge in the south and developed substantial influence 

within the PDRY government.161 Eventually, the NDF came to include Ba’thists, 

Nasserists, political progressives, and other disaffected groups including large 

numbers of Shafais. 

The common denominator in NDF politics was disaffection with the 

tribalist Zaydi domination in the north. Politics and power continued to be 

dictated by a group of military officers and security officials that had emerged 

from Sahih’s Zaydi Hashid confederation tribe. That group ruled through 

cooption of the two paramount sheikhs, Abdullah al-Ahmar of the Hashid 

and Sinan Abu Luhum of the Bakil. The tribalists maintained their influence 

by balancing their political posture between the government in Sana’a and 

Saudi Arabia, who subsidized their quasi-independent status. Zaydi rulers 

had traded sayyid robes and turbans for uniforms.162

Any Zaydi imam would have immediately understood the new regime’s 

problems. The more cosmopolitan PDRY posed a progressive threat to the 

YAR just as British Aden had proven to be problem for the imams. Traditional tribalists in the north were intent on preserving their prerogatives, 

and Saudi Arabia saw this focus as essential to its broader regional security 

interests—thus willing to support it. The Hamid al-Din had also wanted 

to see their rule extended over all the territories that they considered to be 

Yemen, and they wanted to be independent of outside influence—exactly 

the strategic policies of the Saleh regime. Internal groups—in the army, the 

bureaucracy, Zaydi traditionalists, Shafai groups, and tribal leaders—believed 

they had as much or more right to rule Yemen as Saleh. Like all Yemeni leaders, Saleh attempted to maintain internal control while dealing with outside 

interference from the Ottomans, the Portuguese, the British, the Saudis, the 

Americans, and the Soviets. Pick your period and the political dynamics are 

surprisingly similar. 

Saleh’s approach to rule in this unstable political milieu was as traditionally Yemeni as that of any ruler before him: 

a. Personal and political survival comes first.

b. Surround yourself with family and tribal loyalists.

c. Create a political following through patronage.

d. Maintain firm control of key military units—tribal or army.
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e. Practice divide-and-rule tactics internally.

f. Intimidate or eliminate those that cannot be co-opted.

g. Play foreign powers off (against) each other.

h. Get what you can from foreigners but keep them at arms length.

i. Control what territory you can in Yemen but do not overreach.

j. Play the role of Yemeni nationalist even when compromise is necessary.

This approach is the time-tested way to rule Yemen, but like the imam’s 

approach, it is a form of personal rule and therefore inherently unstable. The 

only real institution is the military and even that is suspect because positions 

are so closely linked to personal, family, and tribal ties.

The YAR, the PDRY, and the National Democratic Front

Saleh wanted the PDRY to end support for the NDF. The PDRY wanted the 

NDF to be incorporated into the YAR government. Evidence of real powersharing would include anti-tribalist, anti-Saudi, anti-imperialist—that is, 

anti-Western policies. Obviously, since the survival of the YAR government 

was based in large part on tribalism and aid from the Kingdom and the 

United States, Saleh was disinclined to agree to those terms. No matter what 

the real inclinations of the Saleh regime or the leadership in the PDRY, even 

the possibility of compromise generated strong pressure on both regimes to 

confront the other. The Saudis and Yemeni tribalists adamantly opposed any 

compromise on the part of Sana’a, while various Arab regimes like Libya and 

Syria—backed by the Soviet Union—objected to any solution that might 

undermine the south’s commitment to progressive reform in Yemen.163

In 1980, the backdrop was a plot against Saleh’s government in the YAR

by Saudi-backed army officers, conservatives, and tribalists. It also contained 

struggles in the PDRY between pragmatists and ideologues. President Saleh 

and PDRY Prime Minister Ali Nasser Muhammad met, announced agreements and issued communiqués regarding cooperation, and ultimately saw 

unification of the two Yemens. Alarmed, the tribalists and conservatives in 

the north—with Saudi support and tacit U.S. approval—formed the Islamic 

Front against the Communists. The Saudis cut off military and economic 

assistance amidst reports of Saudi-YAR clashes on the border. At first, Saleh 

defied Riyadh but eventually, in return for additional aid and accelerated 

arms shipments, he agreed not to compromise with the PDRY. However, he 

refused to expel Soviet military advisors.164 The NDF with the support of the 
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anti-compromise elements in the PDRY government escalated attacks along 

the YAR border and in the central regions as well. 

In late 1981, YAR regular army and tribal forces attempted to subdue the 

NDF and failed. The rebellion spread to areas northeast of Sana’a, and the 

NDF began to set up rudimentary administrations in the mountainous areas 

southeast of the capital. In the PDRY, Saleh Muslih al-Qasim—a staunch NDF

supporter—emerged as Minister of Defense, and the insurgency intensified.165 The first half of 1982 saw a major expansion of the conflict. Initially, 

NDF forces captured YAR border towns and downed two YAR Sukhoi-22 

aircraft. The Russian advisors in Sana’a had been reluctant to support YAR

military operations against their indirect clients, the NDF; however, under 

significant pressure, Saleh finally ordered them into the fray. The situation 

became increasingly critical for the YAR government. It was at this point that 

President Saleh turned to the northern tribes to support the YAR military. As 

many as 30,000 tribal irregulars descended on the central and border provinces south of Sana’a. The prospect of an extended stay by rampaging Zaydi 

tribesmen of the Islamic Front in the predominantly Shafai south quickly 

dried up local support for the insurgency.166 In comparison, dealing with the 

government in Sana’a now seemed like a far more attractive option. Saleh also 

compromised, offering conditional amnesty to NDF members and allowing 

them to participate as individuals in YAR politics.167

What ensued was a period of relative calm in southern Arabia that 

included closer Saudi ties with the YAR and PDRY. Despite setbacks, Saudi 

Arabia had achieved its primary 

goal — namely, preventing the 

unification of the Yemens and 

defeating the NDF. The PDRY

under Prime Minister Muhammad had moderated its activities 

in the region; and the Soviets, anxious to prevent the moderate Arabs of the 

Gulf from adopting an anti-Soviet stance as a result of Afghanistan, had 

strengthened Muhammad’s political hand. The PDRY, while still unacceptable politically, had become at least tolerable to Riyadh. Then in January 1986, 

Ali Nasser Muhammad attempted to eliminate his rivals in the YSP. After 

2 weeks of fighting, Ali Nasser and his supporters fled to the YAR. A new 

group of civilian Hadramis—Ali Salim Al-Bid, Haydar Abu Bakr al-Attas, 

and Yasin Said Nu’man—took control of the party and state. More clashes 

Despite setbacks, Saudi Arabia had 

achieved its primary goal—namely, 

preventing the unification of the 

Yemens and defeating the NDF. 
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JSOU Report 11-3

occurred between the YAR and PDRY near the new oil exploration sites in 

the Wadi Jawf near Marib in 1988. 

On the eve of unification, the YAR government appeared more chaotic than 

the party-dominated system in the south, but under the surface, the political 

and legal systems had similar key attributes. “The two legal systems shared a 

common trait: the presence of extra judicial military and security courts that 

needed no charge, warrant, or hearing to detain, imprison, or even execute 

dissidents.” Both security apparatuses were trained by the East Germans and 

the Iraqis and accounted for over half of state spending.168

For the YAR government, the discovery of oil in the Wadi Jawf and its 

development by Hunt Oil promised the possibility of a new era of prosperity 

and development.169 This newfound source of economic stability, coupled 

with the weakened state of the PDRY, created an environment in which the 

YAR government was no longer dependent on Saudi largess. It was just this 

independence that the Saudis had struggled long and hard to prevent. Longsimmering resentment of Saudi pressure and trips to Riyadh, hat in hand 

to ask for aid, did little to reduce underlying resentment. In 1985, the YAR

moved troops into the Jawf to suppress the tribes threatening the oil supplies, 

and the Saudis moved troops to a location near the Jawf historically viewed 

as Yemeni territory. 

Figure 12. The tribes in the Wadi Jawf have historically resisted

control from Sana’a. When asked about Yemen, one stated, “This

isn’t Yemen. Yemen is over the mountain pointing toward Sana’a.”
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Barrett: Yemen

The oil wealth provided Sana’a with the independence to support itself 

without the Saudis and the funds to expand its patronage in areas where 

Saudi payments had traditionally dominated.170 It also provided a flash point 

as the Saudis staked claims to areas in the Hadramawt, the PDRY oil region in 

Shabwa, and a part of the YAR.

171 In the late 1980s, the YAR embraced a call by 

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq for Arab unity and a realignment of the wealth of the 

Arab world. In February 1989, the Arab Cooperation Council—comprised 

of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and the YAR — was formed. “The Saudis...were 

appalled.” 172 The Saleh regime began talks with Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt that 

a just distribution of oil was a potential nightmare.

The Emergence of the ROY

The most blatant example of this new found independence came in the form 

of unification. The very process that the Saudis had thwarted for two decades 

resulted from the unanticipated collapse of the Soviet Union. In November 

1989, the other shoe fell. In Aden, they saw the new direction that Gorbachev 

had in mind for the Soviet Union; the YSP General Secretary Ali Salim al-AlBid unilaterally announced that the draft unity agreement of 1981 between the 

PDRY and YAR would be the subject of a national referendum. The pending 

loss of Soviet support drove Al-Bid to move toward unity while he still had 

cards to play. A surprised Saleh quickly accepted. The upshot was the creation 

of the ROY in May 1990 with Saleh as president and Al-Bid as vice president. 

The new constitution called for free elections and a multiparty system. 

Underscoring how divided Yemen actually was, more than 40 parties 

participated. There were three major parties: 

a. General Peoples’ Party (GPC) belonging to Saleh

b. YSP under al-Bid (basically the ruling party in the PDRY)

c. Hizb al-Islah (Reform Party) basically composed of Islamists and tribalists headed by Hashid Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar with substantial 

Saudi backing.

The significantly smaller secular parties were the Ba’th and the Nasserists. 

The result was predictable; the GPC with Islah as a partner won in the 

north and west, and the YSP won in the south and east. The YSP with its 

Soviet era heritage did not do as well as expected in the Shafai areas of the 

YAR. The Shafais living in the YAR were either traditional tribalists that 

opposed the social PDRY government for ideological and religious reasons or 
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JSOU Report 11-3

business leaders that opposed for ideological and economic reasons. Although 

something of an over simplification, two Yemens emerged—one southern, 

secular, and Shafai and one northern, traditional, and Zaydi. “Neither of the 

two leading parties had thus managed to attract a substantial constituency 

in the previous geographic domain of the other.” 173 Government positions 

were divided between the major groups, and the unity government was far 

from united. 

Just as the new unified state emerged, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Because 

Saleh had close ties to Saddam Hussein, including a palace for personal use 

in Iraq, he could not bring himself to 

denounce Saddam. As one U.S. official 

put it, “Saleh appeared to be enamored, 

perhaps enthralled would be a better 

term, with Saddam’s ability to control 

Iraq and his attitudes toward other Arab 

states particularly Saudi Arabia.” 174 It 

did not help when Yemen television redrew its weather maps to include large 

areas of Saudi Arabia including Asir and Najran.175 As a result, the new ROY

found it was ostracized by the Gulf states, and most of its foreign workers 

were expelled. Palestinians paid a similar price because of Yasir Arafat’s stand. 

The arrival of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis and loss of the remittances 

created an economic crisis that even the oil revenues could not offset. The riyal 

dropped from 30 to almost 160 to the dollar. “Saudi Arabia, already discontented if not alarmed by unification before the war, turned more fiercely than 

any against Yemen’s government, and the dislike of Saudi rulers for Yemen’s 

president gained the coloring of feud.” 176 Saudi support for Yemen and the 

Palestinians had not bought their appreciation and loyalty; rather the war 

brought out “their true feelings.” As Yemenis departed Saudi Arabia, they 

told their employers, “When we come back, we’ll be occupying your houses.” 

In Lacey’s view, “It was the revolt of the have-nots who had long resented the 

Saudi blend of windfall wealth and self-righteousness.” 177

External problems aside, unification offered a real opportunity to reform 

the YAR government particularly in the areas of finance and development. 

While blame lay with the former officials of both states, most of the problem 

lay with President Saleh and his tribal Zaydi supporters. They did not intend 

to give up the levers of powers either financial or police and military because 

their rule had been built and preserved by controlling them. In addition, the 

Just as the new unified state 

emerged, Iraq invaded Kuwait. 

Because Saleh had close ties

...he could not bring himself 

to denounce Saddam.
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Barrett: Yemen

inhabitants of Aden were not happy with North Yemen. They realized that the 

new oil finds in the south would constitute more than 40 percent of Yemen’s 

reserves and would have supported South Yemen’s smaller population well 

if not taken by the north. Growing disaffection in the south with the Zaydidominated north, coupled with the YSP disappointing showing in the April 

1993 elections, created additional animosity. In 1994, the frictions resulted in 

an open revolt and secession movement led by al-Bid.178

Seeing an opportunity to undermine Saleh, Saudi Arabia backed the 

Aden secession; they supported it with an estimated billion dollars in arms 

and aid. The U.S., mistakenly believing that unity meant stability, backed 

the YAR government. The YAR campaign pounded Aden into submission. 

Observers stated that the YAR military, former PDRY exiles loyal to Ali Nasser 

Muhammad, and Islamist militias treated the inhabitants of Aden so harshly 

that the seeds of future discord were permanently embedded into the fabric 

of society.179 In reality, the seeds had taken root centuries before. One senior 

Arab diplomat stated, “Rather than treating the Adenis with generosity in 

defeat and building a new unified state, the Sana’a government acted as a 

conquering army full of triumphalism.” 180 “Many drew parallels between 

the 1948 sack of Sana’a and that of Aden in 1994.” 181 Nevertheless, Saleh had 

thwarted southern secession and once again, Saudi opposition to a unified 

Yemen. The obvious casualty of the war was the remote hope of integrating 

the two Yemens into a democratic state.182

Summary

Unification and the Civil War of 1994 are often seen as the triumph of modernism and Yemeni nationalism. It was in fact the triumph of republican tribalism

based on the historical Zaydi exceptionalism of the north. Particularly by some 

in the U.S., it was viewed as political progress that could lead to the emergence 

of a modern Yemen state with democratic institutions. Subsequent events 

would show the naiveté of this progressive view. In the south, it was viewed 

first with trepidation and then in many circles as little more than a disastrous 

return to tribalism. Adenis complained, “Through 130 years of British rule 

and 30 years of socialist rule, we learned the forms of a developed state. We 

can’t accept going back to tribal rule.” What the Adenis complained about 

was not traditional tribal rule but rather the tribal, clan, and client relations 

within the neopatriarchy of rule from Sana’a. The key levers of power belong 

to a historical Zaydi model. Power is based on family, clan, tribal ties, and 
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JSOU Report 11-3

finally patronage that focus on a broader circle of prominent Zaydi tribal and 

government leaders and only then extends to other individuals and groups.183

Underlying the secessionist movement of 1994 is the fundamental proposition that no civil nationalist identity exists in Yemen. Multiple Yemens 

are fundamentally in conflict. At its simplest, coastal and upland Yemen is 

fundamentally different from highland Yemen. Ali Abdullah Saleh faces the 

same dilemma as other rulers in the region. He can rule through family, clan, 

and tribe or he can go the way of Hamdi. Power now centers on the Zaydi 

military and security establishment focused around the family and Sanhan 

tribe of President Saleh. Next the tribalists of the Hashid and Bakil confederations—particularly leaders like the former paramount sheikh of the Hashid, 

Abdullah al-Ahmar—were co-opted or neutralized through patronage. 

Finally, the Zaydi tribal power centers have for one reason or another been 

largely excluded from the patron-client arrangement exemplified by their 

conflict with the Saleh regime. These groups include the Huthis of the Sa’da 

region who see themselves as Zaydis of the old sayyid class—descendants of 

the Prophet. These competing, conflicting centers of power are the reality of 

post-1994 Yemen—a Yemen that any of the rulers of the past would instantly 

recognize, a Yemen in which central authority often merely competes for 

influence and some degree of control. 
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Barrett: Yemen

7. Yemen, a Nation-State?

An examination of contemporary Yemen underscores the continuity of  the political and societal paradigm that has driven three millennia of 

Yemeni history. The term nation-state is an absolute misnomer. A nationstate as defined by Weber has never existed in southern Arabia.184 By any 

definition, Yemen today resembles those Yemens of the past far more than it 

does a nation-state with a civic national identity. The Yemeni governments 

or central authority have always shared that authority and territorial control 

to a high degree with tribal elements, direct internal foreign influence, and 

at times other competing political groups. In fact, the only historical entities 

that approached the status of a nation-state were the southern Yemen Rasulids 

of the 13th century and the PDRY with its system of single party rule under 

the NF; however, even in these two cases, the argument is problematic. The 

fractured nature of Yemeni society and politics makes it impossible to control 

by either Yemenis or certainly by foreigners; therefore, the history of southern Arabia, like that of Afghanistan, is littered with the bones and treasure 

of those trying to change or control it. Political rule in Yemen is personal, 

and survival is the only measure of success. Successful Yemen rulers, those 

who survive, are experts at playing internal and external groups against one 

another to extract political support, funding, or arms; they are on no one’s 

side but their own. By these criteria, Ali Abdullah Saleh ranks with the greatest rulers of Yemen.

The Nature of Rule and Prosperity: ROY, 1994 to the Present

Ali Abdullah Saleh’s survival, although surprising, did not reorder the Yemeni 

political landscape. The unification of 1994 did not create a nation-state; 

1994 was an occupation. The ROY is still unstable and fractured. Whatever 

prosperity that exists is distributed through a patronage system focused on 

family, clan, and tribe first and political alliances second. This statement is 

not an indictment of the Saleh regime. President Saleh’s actions reflect the 

way one stays in power in Yemen; it was a matter of political survival. The 

south became a conquered prize to be divvied up among supporters and 

family members. Political patronage as practiced by Saleh fits almost exactly 

Hisham Sharabi’s description of neopatriarchy:
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Despite all ideological appearances, the individual’s basic affiliation 

in “modernized,” neopatriarchal society is to the family, the clan, the 

ethnic or religious group. For the common person in this society the 

concept of society or fatherland is an abstraction, which has meaning only when reduced to the primordial significations of kinship 

and religion....This practice strengthens both personal loyalty and 

dependence, cultivated early within the family, and bolsters them 

within the larger social whole in a system of patronage and the distribution of favor and protection.185

This system of patronage has to some degree blurred the social lines 

between historically distinct groups—merchant, sheikh, the military, and 

“modernists.” However, the lines still lead back to the basic power centers 

that have dominated Yemen for centuries. In addition, they include many 

of the most influential members of the Yemeni opposition. For example, 

in 1997, President Saleh—the military officer—became a partner in “Hayl 

Sa’id Enterprises, the best known of Yemen’s industrial and commercial 

companies.” Members of the president’s family and his allies have prospered 

through other commercial and economic opportunities that include pharmaceuticals, tobacco, the national airline, and other enterprises. As a result, 

“Ordinary Yemenis, with their fields and their little shops, simply do not have 

access to much of the national wealth.” In fairness to Saleh, the same system 

persists throughout the region, but when the economic pie to be divided is 

much smaller as in Yemen, the impact is much more noticeable. In the arena 

of financial investment, investment security depended not on rule of law but 

on the relationship to the president’s entourage of family and supporters or 

to someone who needs to be bought off.186

Political power and patronage tended to work in parallel. The president’s 

sons and daughters are intermarried within the family, clan, and tribal 

leadership with an eye to strengthening the core of regime support. In 1999, 

the president made his son Ahmad Ali Abdullah commander of the Special 

Forces. Brigadier Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a relative of the president, opposed 

Ahmad’s growing influence and was ordered out of the capital and given the 

difficult task of suppressing the Huthi revolt. Palace watching—guessing 

who was in and who was out and who would be the likely successor to the 

president—has become as pronounced as it was under Imam Ahmad. There 

were also other comparisons. For example, Imam Ahmad was believed to have 
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secreted chests of gold and silver in his fortress palaces; today’s speculation 

centers on the belief that members of the Saleh regime are storing the mass 

wealth in foreign bank accounts.187

A striking similarity between the Hamid al-Din imamate and the Saleh 

regime has been the issue of succession. Saleh gave all appearances of grooming his son Ahmad bin Ali Saleh, the commander of the Special Forces. The 

republican monarchy is a new phenomenon in the Middle East. It was tried 

in Iraq, Egypt, and Libya; it worked in Syria; and all indications were that 

Saleh intended to install his son in Yemen. In November 2009, Sheikh Hamid 

Abdullah al-Ahmar publicly accused the Ahmad bin Ali Saleh of using his 

republican guards to support Zaydi tribal rebels against troops under the 

command of Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar, who is not a close relative of the Hashid 

al-Ahmars but a political ally. Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar opposed Ahmad Saleh’s 

rise to power ostensibly because he believes that Ahmad is not capable of 

holding the country together but more likely because ambition and personal 

reasons. Hamid al-Ahmar, the brother of Sadiq al-Ahmar—paramount sheikh 

of the Hashid confederation, told Al-Jazeera, “The state no longer exists except 

in the Presidential Palace and in the capital.” 188 He accused the president, 

saying: “If Saleh wants the people of Yemen to be on his side against monarchy 

and defend national unity, he himself must quit pursuing monarchy.” He also 

called upon Saleh to leave office and not try to enthrone his son.189

Many Yemenis, including some supporters of the regime, do not want to see 

a perpetuation of “pervasive corruption that favors Mr. Saleh’s own clan.” 190

President Saleh’s attempt to pass the presidency on to his son became a rallying 

point for opposition to the regime. During the first half of the 20th century, 

establishing hereditary rule had undermined tribal and societal support 

for the Hamid Al Din monarchy and became a flashpoint for opposition to 

the imamate. It ran counter to Zaydi traditions, which in many respects the 

post-1962 republican traditions continued to reflect. As shared in Chapter 3, 

the most capable sayyid was to be the next imamate. It did not have to be a 

family member. In Yemen, a certain equalitarianism exists, which is not to 

be confused with democratic principles; the equalitarianism was violated by 

the succession policies of the Hamid Al Din and those that Saleh intended. 

Corruption, economic stagnation, social ossification, and the succession 

issue alienated the Zaydi sayyid families, created political and tribal unrest, 

and provided the catalyst that ended the monarchy. Today the Zaydi cultural 

prejudice against hereditary rule at the top when coupled with more liberal 
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democratic and secular ideas and Shafai opposition is a potent political 

mixture. Saleh’s attempt to anoint his son was viewed as a blatant attempt 

to preserve the increasingly corrupt regime. It became a politically explosive 

issue that united many military, tribal political leaders, and the more politically liberal opposition groups against the regime. 

The Saleh Regime and the Future

For Saleh, the issue became succession—not the war in the north, secession 

in the south, or the battle against Al Qaeda. This focus may prove to have 

been his undoing. Saleh concluded (or perhaps competing Yemeni leaders 

concluded) that the only way to perpetuate the regime he created was to hand 

power to his son Ahmad. The real issue for Yemen is not the person of Ali 

Abdullah Saleh but rather the future of his regime. It became an extension 

of his personal struggle to survive, no mean feat in itself. As one of his most 

vociferous critics—Hamid al-Ahmar—stated, “This man, Saleh, he never 

had any sort of strategic thinking or vision—his strategy from Day 1 was to 

remain in power.” 191 Obviously, al-Ahmar is too young to remember Yemen 

in the 1970s and what real instability was like. Saleh is the exception—few 

rulers have survived a decade in Yemen much less three. The regime includes 

many of his current detractors. The al-Ahmar family and the Hashid Confederation are enormous beneficiaries of the regime as are co-opted Shafai 

politicians—Abdul Majid al-Zindani, the radical Sunni cleric; military commanders; and Saleh’s relatives (e.g., Ali Mushin al-Ahmar and Ahmad Saleh). 

The regime is pervasive. It does not end with a change at the top, and it does 

not see an existential threat from any of these elements.192

The conflict with the Huthis in the north is most important because the 

inability to deal with an internal Zaydi issue constitutes more a political black 

eye than the issue of Al Qaeda. It will not disappear. Perhaps more important 

than anything else is the favoritism shown to the Hashid Confederation. It is 

not about control in the far north per se; the government in Sana’a has never 

controlled the Sada’a. The Huthi revolt represents a fracturing of the Zaydi 

community’s support for the Saleh regime now further complicated by the 

opposition of the al-Ahmars paramount Hashid Confederation leaders. In 

addition, General Ali Mushin al-Ahmar has moved to the opposition as well. 

Being a split in the army, it reflects to one degree or another tribal and clan 

loyalties within the military—a tribes or factions with uniforms phenomenon. 
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ROY officials simply do not believe Al Qaeda can threaten the regime 

and the idea that the regime can reap millions in aid in return for capturing 

radicalized Shafai Yemenis and Yemeni-Americans who oppose the regime 

for any number of other reasons. Al Qaeda provides a solid piece of leverage 

for getting U.S. aid and support. As for the separatist movement in the south, 

the ability of the military to maintain control—particularly in oil-producing 

regions of the old PDRY—is important; however, here too the sparse population in most of the critical areas has led ROY officials to conclude that the 

problem is manageable. One official stated, “We are not going to collapse and 

talk of a Somalia-like collapse; that is nonsense, but we do like all of the attention because it means that we get a better hearing when we ask for aid.” 193 So 

what does this mean? The Yemenis seem less concerned than Saudi Arabia, 

the U.S., and others in the region about their situation but are enormously 

keen to increase military and economic aid, although to what end?

The regional situation further complicated Saleh’s position. Events in 

Tunisia and Egypt have fueled calls for change in Yemen. On 3 February 

2011, in a move to preempt anticipated 

opposition, Saleh publicly announced that 

he will not seek reelection or attempt to 

place his son in the president’s office. He 

then moved to recoup his position with the 

Zaydi tribal leaders and gain more Saudi 

support. Imams Yahya and Ahmad would 

have absolutely agreed with his strategy. Assuming that Saleh does leave, it 

will be the fracturing of his alliance with the Zaydi tribes—not the influence 

of erstwhile opposition—that drives him from power. The next president will 

almost certainly be from the Zaydi tribal, military, and security entourage 

that he has created or be a puppet with those elements remaining the real 

power behind the scenes. The next president will also require the support of 

the Hashid and Bakil confederation tribes as well as additional support from 

Saudi Arabia. It will in large part be composed of elements of the Saleh regime 

without Saleh. In Yemen, the more things change, the more they stay the same. 

The protesters quoted in news reports were from the Islah party.194 Islah’s 

founder and former head was Abdullah al-Ahmar, the paramount sheikh 

of the Hashid confederation and erstwhile ally of President Saleh; thus one 

interpretation would hold that the Hashid are using recent events to reassert 

On 3 February 2011...Saleh 

publicly announced that he 

will not seek reelection or 

attempt to place his son in 

the president’s office. 
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tribal influence, which has waned to some degree in Sana’a since Abdullah 

al-Ahmar’s death in 2004. The chances for a fundamental revolution are 

virtually nonexistent. Yemen’s next rulers, either overt or from behind the 

scenes, will have the following elements:

a. Be from the military or security service or have their backing

b. Be Zaydi with republican credentials

c. Be Hashid or possibly (but unlikely) from Bakil tribe or a sayyid family

d. Have Hashid and to a lesser extent Bakil backing

e. Be ultimately opposed by southern Shafai separatists, disaffected Zaydi 

tribal elements, and radical Sunni jihadists

f. Have at least the tacit support of Riyadh. 

If a non-Zaydi or civilian becomes a compromise or interim president, which 

is a remote possibility, it will be relatively short-lived and only with the backing of the stated elements of political community.

The one new wrinkle in Sana’a could be the relationship with the United 

States. In an interview on CBS’s 60 Minutes, General Yahya Saleh, commander 

of Yemeni Central Security Forces and nephew of President Saleh, made it 

clear that the ROY government saw no role for U.S. forces on the ground. In 

response to an interviewer’s question about the unpopularity of the U.S. in 

Yemen, he responded, “The U.S. is unpopular in the region and Yemen is a part 

of the region.” In the same program, ROY Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi 

underscored the view that direct U.S. involvement was unacceptable—that 

is, the involvement created more problems. Al-Qirbi also stated there was “no 

evidence” to support U.S. allegations that Abdul Majid al-Zindani, the most 

powerful Sunni cleric in Yemen, is a key supporter of terrorism.195

Many in the region, including Saudi Arabia, question the efficacy of U.S.

direct involvement and particularly drone strikes, arguing that they provide 

a recruiting tool and create significantly more radicals than they kill. Any 

Yemeni government must calculate the benefits of U.S. aid, particularly in the 

form of training and equipment, to the forces under the command of close 

family members—who are the ultimate insurance for the regime—and the 

liability associated with his current Washington relationship. It may well be 

that the debit column is quickly outpacing the benefits. There is a tipping point 

at which a new Yemeni government could decide that the U.S. relationship in 

its current form is politically too expensive. Assuming Saleh’s departure, there 

will even be those who argue that his close relationship with Washington was 
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his undoing. Al Qaeda is only important in Sana’a if it threatens the established 

order, and many do not see it as a serious threat when compared to southern 

secession or the Huthi revolt. United States security problems and priorities 

are by definition not the same as those of the ROY.

The reading of Yemeni policy, along with its implications for the future, 

requires a hard look back. For roughly three millennia, Yemeni leaders—particularly the successful ones, survivors—managed a balancing act. 

Saleh was absolutely correct when he compared it to “dancing on the heads 

of snakes.” Yemeni rulers lived in a fluctuating political environment caught 

between external pressures and internal conflicts. The survivors utilized 

family, clan, tribal, and patronage circles of support that protected them to 

one degree or another from any number of forces that could unseat them. 

President Saleh has merely been another of the more competent survivors in 

this tradition. The central issue was always his personal and family survival 

above all else whether in Yemen or exile. Saleh has shown political acumen that 

is astounding. His entire patronage network 

has an interest in seeing his regime, if not 

his actual rule, perpetuated. Even many of 

his opponents want to see the survival of the 

current system, just under different leadership. 

The al-Ahmars benefited enormously in the 

Saleh regime. Hamid al-Ahmar’s wealth to a 

significant degree resulted from business transactions blessed by Saleh; the 

people in the opposition with wealth and power are not really talking about 

“revolution” but rather realignment largely within the current elites.

In the case of Al Qaeda, the regime’s handling of the USS Cole bombing—including the commuted sentences, the eventual escape from a maximum security prison in 2006, and then the house parole of recaptured 

perpetrators—provides a strong indication of the Yemeni government’s 

real views on Al Qaeda. In the immediate aftermath of the Cole bombing, a 

debate occurred within the inner circles of the ROY government concerning 

the depth to which it should become involved with anti-Al Qaeda operations 

and cooperation with the United States. Ghalib al-Qamish, the head of the 

Political Security Organization and Saleh’s long-time associate for national 

security, opposed becoming enmeshed too deeply in U.S. efforts against Al 

Qaeda, arguing that it was an American problem; they should not make it a 

Yemeni one.196 According to Clark, “Helping to explain why the jihadi threat 

Even many of his 

[Saleh’s] opponents want 

to see the survival of the 

current system, just under different leadership.
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JSOU Report 11-3

was very far from the top of any Yemeni agenda was the fact that Yemen’s security service, the Political Security Office, was itself a bastion of anti-Western, 

tending to pro-jihadist feelings.” It was staffed by Afghan war veterans who 

had transferred their hatred of the Soviets to the West and by Iraqi trained 

officers who hated the West because of the humiliation of the first Gulf 

War.197 As others have pointed out, “Yemen began releasing terrorists under 

presidential pardons and through a questionable rehabilitation program.” 198

No matter how aggravating or reprehensible the U.S. may view this attitude, 

it is nothing if not practical.

From a Yemeni perspective, Al Qaeda’s real threat to the Sana’a regime 

comes not from its potential to topple the Zaydi-dominated government 

but rather from its ability to damage the economic condition—that is, oil 

infrastructure—and perhaps to gain support among the disaffected Sunni 

Shafais in the south. Thus as pressure periodically builds for the ROY to do 

something about Al Qaeda, the ROY asks for more security assistance and aid. 

It then launches operations that never gain control of the problem because 

given the environment, controlling the problem is impossible. Southern Shafai 

resentment toward northern Zaydi domination and the remote areas of the 

old PDRY offer an almost perfect refuge for small Al Qaeda cells. Starved 

of government funds and economic opportunity by what they view as the 

Zaydi occupation—backed by what radicals labeled as the Zionist-supporting 

Americans and their clients the Saudis—Al Qaeda payments for protection 

are no doubt difficult to refuse particularly in the more remote areas. It takes 

no particular talent to make this sale.

The southern movement for independence could complicate matters. If 

it turns violent, tenuous government control will be further eroded in the 

south and east and more ungoverned territory will be created. Recently, 

the southern leaders ended their calls for independence opting instead to 

join the cacophony of calls for Saleh’s ouster. Their problems have not been 

addressed. The calculation is simple; with Saleh gone, their options multiply 

and their goal of independence from northern control comes closer. As noted 

in previous chapters, the PDRY, while ruled by a monolithic party, constituted 

a sea of competing factions just below the surface. In 1994, the Saleh regime 

added to that mix Islamists of varying stripes, exiles with scores to settle, and 

northern military officers seeking rewards for conquest. Continued lack of 

success in establishing anything approaching civil society is virtually guar-
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Barrett: Yemen

anteed. Reports state that police in many southern areas will not wear their 

uniforms for fear of assassination.199

The government explanation for this fear is that control takes different 

forms in Yemen. The control is often not direct but rather regularly exercised 

indirectly through tribes and other forms. “It does not have to be direct.” 200

The anticipation is that at some point deals will have to be struck with tribal 

and other groups in an effort to protect the oil-producing areas. This situation 

will only become more complicated in the future. It is unlikely that any government in Sana’a will be able to satisfy southern demands, which revolve around 

issues like land and oil that the Zaydi north has expropriated. Giving up either 

would undermine any ROY regime; while a period of national solidarity and 

self-congratulation will follow Saleh’s departure, the conflicts that face the 

ROY today will resume. There are fundamental conflicts between political, 

regional, and sectarian groups and a lack of resources to address them.

Saleh could not change Yemen, nor can anyone else. Assuming that he 

disappears, a new set of Zaydi military leaders would emerge, initially with 

a compromise military or even possibly a figurehead civilian as president. 

After a period of internal political intrigue and instability, but not collapse, 

the Zaydi establishment—represented by elements of the military, the tribes, 

and other groups—would either continue to dominate through a merry-goround of military presidents or more unlikely spawn another Saleh:

a. While government control would almost certainly contract, the core 

Zaydi-dominated military control would remain. 

b. Shafais resentment in the south and east would remain. 

c. Yemen’s inability to control its territory would remain. 

d. The struggles within the Zaydi tribal structure, exemplified by the 

Huthi issue, would remain. 

e. The autonomy of the tribal structure would continue to provide an 

alternative authority. As one author put it, “the appeal of tribalism 

and religion are not only ideological, for each is also a system of law 

capable of functioning in the absence of a state.” 201

f. The problem of providing security for the petroleum infrastructure 

would remain. 

g. The problem of rapidly decreasing water resources would remain. 

h. Saudi influence in Yemen political affairs would remain. 

i. Yemen as a staging area for radical Sunni jihadists would remain. 
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Lines and shading on a map do not constitute a state. There have always been 

multiple Yemens with fundamental social, cultural, and sectarian differences; to view it in any other way sets a considerable stumbling block in the 

way of creating, much less executing, a coherent strategy or policy. A senior 

Egyptian military officer—commenting on the ability of any outsider to 

influence or significantly alter the political, economic, or social conditions 

in Yemen—stated that given Egypt’s experience in Yemen, “Nasser learned 

the hard way. We have no illusions about changing the place; Yemen is what 

it is and we accept that. There is no alternative.” 202

The Yemeni Opposition

The fundamental problem with change, much less revolutionary change, in 

Yemen is the intrinsic political, social, and economic structure of the country. 

The opposition is an absolute reflection of the conflicts residual to this structure. As Saleh’s grip on power has slipped, this situation has only worsened 

with new opposition groups emerging that in fact represent elements of the 

regime jumping ship in an effort to preserve their influence. The opposition 

is now represented by what has been described as the formal opposition, the 

opposition within the military, and what can only be termed the internal 

regime opposition. 

The formal opposition, or Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), is composed of six 

loosely aligned parties whose interests are so diverse as to almost preclude 

any real long-term cooperation in a post-Saleh era: 

a. The largest party al-Islah is closely associated with the al-Ahmar family 

and the Zaydi tribalists. It is an Islamist party with Salafist rhetoric 

but lacks a coherent ideological stance. In short, religion provides the 

terminology but a coherent ideological base is lacking. In fact, the 

only reason that al-Islah is in the opposition is because of a falling out 

between the al-Ahmars and Saleh and the deterioration of its place 

in the state-sponsored patronage system.203 For example, Hamid alAhmar—the third son of Abdullah al-Ahmar, the former paramount 

sheikh of the Hashid confederation, and during his lifetime the second 

most powerful man in Yemen—owns a highly successful mobile phone 

network that has made him a billionaire. This wealth and that of his 

family is due in no small part to the Saleh regime and its patronage 

system.204 Thus, assuming Saleh departs, this very powerful family that 
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also enjoys Saudi support and is a former integral part of the regime 

will hardly seek a revolutionary change in the Yemeni political system. 

b. Al-Islah is aligned with the Yemen Socialist Party, the former partner 

of the Saleh regime from 1990 to 1994 with its secular largely South 

Yemen-based support headed by Yassin Numan, whose family opposed 

both Imams Yahya and Ahmed. The group also includes the Arab 

nationalist parties, the Nasserites and the Ba’th Party, both of which 

have a history of opposition to tribal-based power and influence.205

c. The last two parties are al-Hizb al-Haqq and the Union of Popular 

Forces Party. The Hizb al-Haqq is the party of the Zaydi sayyids and 

has expanded its influence to include the Ministry of Religious Endowments. It is based in the Zaydi strongholds of Hajja and the Huthi north 

around Sada’a. The influence of this party has grown as the situation 

between Saleh and the al-Ahmars and thus al-Islah worsened. In addition, the Sada’a and thus Huthi connection does not bode well for future 

relationships with the non-sayyid al-Ahmars. The last group, the Union 

of Popular Forces, is an almost entirely foreign-based Zaydi party with 

only limited presence in Yemen. Most of its members reside either in 

the United States or Saudi Arabia.206 The alliance of these parties had 

largely a single goal—that is, to prevent Saleh from playing one against 

the other. In a Yemen without Saleh, their interests diverge significantly 

and they share almost nothing in common ideologically. The implications are obvious—cooperation will likely be very short-lived.

There has been much talk about the military opposition to the Saleh 

regime. Almost all of it has centered on the person of Brigadier Ali Mushin 

al-Ahmar. While al-Ahmar is not one of the Hashid confederation shiekh 

al-Ahmars, he has been closely aligned with them, particularly as a result of 

the Huthi rebellion in the north. Brigadier al-Ahmar has had responsibility 

for war in the north. The feud between the Huthi and the al-Ahmar sheikhs 

has been the prominent feature of that conflict, placing the brigadier and the 

shiekhs on the same side politically. In addition, they were avowed opponents 

of Ahmad Saleh’s succession to the presidency. Brigadier al-Ahmar saw Saleh’s 

continuation in office as promoting a political and a military rival. Like the 

Hashid shiekh al-Ahmars, the brigadier was very much a part and beneficiary 

of the Saleh regime. His opposition to Saleh was personal. He is not a revolutionary who wants to see fundamental change in the Saleh system and in 
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a post-Saleh world, he will likely be the most influential commander in the 

military. Conflicts reflecting tribal and personal loyalties will likely emerge in 

the military as they have in the past; it is fundamental to the Yemeni system. 

It was exactly the same type of conflicts that brought the turmoil of the 1970s 

and the rise of Saleh. The military has a key position in the Yemeni political 

framework since the revolution of 1962, and no one should expect them to 

relinquish that role now—Saleh or no Saleh.

Now, with Saleh’s apparent coming departure, another political grouping 

has emerged, the Justice and Development Bloc. The new party is headed by 

Muhammad Abu Lahum. Sinan Abu Lahum was the long-time paramount 

sheikh of the Bakil tribal confederation, the second most powerful tribal 

group in Yemen. The new group represents officials and tribal elements tied 

to the regime who have gone over to the opposition. It includes a number of 

parliamentarians and former and current ministers.207 Whether or not this 

sudden conversion to the opposition represents an attack of conscience or 

perhaps more likely a pragmatic, self-serving (or perhaps self-preserving) 

maneuver, some of these figures represent powerful Zaydi tribal interests that 

will also have a role in defining any post-Saleh future. Like the al-Ahmars 

and the military, it is unlikely that they envision a true revolution in which 

the limited largess that the state has to bestow is divided at their expense. 

Yemen also has the separatist or revolting groups:

a. The southern separatists have announced their support for the opposition and that they have for the time being dropped the demand 

for southern independence. This show of unity is almost certainly a 

political calculation with no intention of foregoing long-term demands 

for independence. Without Saleh, the conqueror of the south in 1994, 

the separatists no doubt believe that their goal is more attainable. The 

likely weakness of the central government following a Saleh departure 

would also contribute to the program. The separatist move to support 

the opposition will evaporate once Saleh is gone. In the north, Saleh’s 

departure will have little if any effect on their situation. The hated alAhmars and the Hashid will still have a powerful role in the government. Brigadier Ali Mushin al-Ahmar will likely have a more powerful 

position in the military, and the Hizb al-Haqq could lose its position 

and influence in a new government. It is difficult to see a situation in 
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which the Huthis would be more likely to cooperate with a post-Saleh 

regime that they would likely view as worse. 

b. If Zindani acquires a more influential position within a new government and the government reinstates the truce that Brigadier al-Ahmar 

maintained with them during the middle of the last decade, Al Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its Sunni tribal supporters might 

lessen their activities directed against a new government. That would 

be very bad news for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and their efforts to 

control AQAP’s attempts to destabilize the region.

Given this situation, the question is not so much can the opposition mount 

a revolution but rather will they choose to mount one. The answer is almost 

certainly no. The most influential elements that will constitute a new government have been in fact part and parcel of the Saleh regime. While changes 

will occur, they will be superficial and most 

likely temporary. The al-Ahmars and the 

Hashid will not relinquish their power or 

tribal prerogatives and will move to recover 

any influence lost during their estrangement 

from Saleh. Despite divisions, the army will protect the privileged position that 

it has held for the past 50 years. This protection does not mean that faction or 

conflict will not occur within the military as in the past. Whatever military 

leadership emerges will jealously guard its power and eventually reclaim the 

presidency in the event that a nonmilitary president emerges. 

The large demonstrations in the cities of the non-Zaydi coastal plain 

are hardly surprising. From a cultural, sectarian, and even ethnic point of 

view, these areas comprise a different Yemen that is neither Zaydi nor a key 

player in the military-security elite. In one form or another, they are largely 

Sunni Shafaii and have viewed themselves as little more than occupied by 

tribal-dominated Zaydi Yemen. These demonstrations —no matter how 

large—represent just another in the long line of contractions of central political control in Yemen driven by political and economic marginalization by the 

government in Sana’a. Saleh—like other Yemeni leaders before him—has 

survived these types of contractions before, only to reassert control or influence at a later date. What makes the current situation different is that Saleh 

has lost the support of important elements in the Zaydi-dominated military 

and among the Zaydi tribes of the Hashid Confederation and their leadership 

While changes will occur, 

they will be superficial and 

most likely temporary. 
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the al-Ahmars. These elements have traditionally been the core of Zaydidominated rule in central Yemen. It is the fragmentation or defection of the 

Zaydi and military core that threatens the regime, not the size of the street 

demonstrations. The unrest could be managed to one degree or another but 

not without military and Zaydi tribal solidarity. 

Other political elements in Yemen will also maintain their influence. The 

Bakil tribes must be included in any power-sharing. The key Shafai political and tribal leaders must also have a share. With some deletions and some 

additions, the post-Saleh political system will very closely resemble the Saleh 

regime. Even a free election will not change that reality. After the euphoria 

of a Saleh departure, the reality of Yemen’s limited economic resources and 

fractured society will bring the country back to the reality of its stunted and 

fractured political, economic, and cultural structure. Many Yemenis will likely 

actually look back on the Saleh era with all its problems and conflicts as a 

period of unrivaled stability and prosperity. What they have to look forward 

to is the Saleh regime without Saleh to balance the interests. 

Saudi Arabia’s Interests and Future of the Yemens’ East

On his deathbed, Ibn Saud is purported to have warned his sons Saud and 

Feisal, two future kings, that nothing but trouble would come from Yemen. 

For Saudi Arabia, the Yemens are an ongoing critical strategic consideration; 

ignoring Yemen is not an option. Yemen is primarily a Saudi issue. There is 

a history of border disputes, including relatively recent Saudi claims to the 

Hadramawt and petroleum-producing regions. In the south and east, many of 

the separatists are Salafist Hanbali and Shafai Islamists who have long enjoyed 

Riyadh’s support. But for the British, Saudi Arabia would have conquered the 

Hadramawt, Tihama, and perhaps Aden in the 1930s. Currently, the Kingdom 

expresses strong support for the unity of Yemen—that is, the ROY regime 

under Saleh.208 What unity means exactly is somewhat ambiguous. A unified 

Yemen, particularly in any post-Saleh period, might in fact be a federalized 

Yemen with significant local and regional—that is, southern autonomy. Saleh 

would have never agreed to it but a fractured, weakened post-Saleh regime 

might. If central government control contracts significantly—a distinct possibility of which the Saudis are well aware, then it is difficult to believe that 

they do not have a series of potential contingencies for the Hadramawt and 

eastern provinces in mind. If they do not, they should. Saudi largess in taming 

the region would likely be more influential than Sana’a’s coercion.
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These disputes are often overshadowed by what Yemeni officials sometimes 

refer to as “the special situation”—namely, the Kingdom’s maintenance of 

a security zone deep into ROY territory through payments to tribal sheikhs 

and at times to key Yemeni officials.209 It is an open secret that Saudi Arabia, 

through payments to tribal leaders, often has greater influence in the northern and eastern tribal areas than the government in Sana’a.210 An ongoing 

debate concerns how much loyalty the Saudis actually buy. As one former 

U.S. official wryly put it; “the Saudis only have influence on the day that they 

pay the tribes.” While Saudi payments do not buy absolute loyalty, in the 

Yemens—where funds were historically lacking—the payments buy useful, if 

not critical, influence.211 Some have criticized Riyadh for meddling in Yemen’s 

internal affairs, but such criticism ignores the reality of the alternative: it is 

not ROY government control but rather the totally uncontrolled tribal areas 

that pose a threat to regional security. The Saudi intelligence services demonstrated the usefulness of their involvement in Yemen in the fall of 2010; their 

warning foiled multiple attacks on airlines where bombs hidden in printers 

were mailed from Sana’a. It appears that without Saudi involvement, there 

would have been no warning.

Riyadh has been the bête noir for modernists, secularists, the imams, 

tribalists, and Yemeni governments, including that of Saleh; however, those 

who complain ignore the fact that Saudi Arabia has also been the source of 

critical aid and support for the YAR and now the ROY. In addition, Saudi 

aid to the tribes has often protected Saudi and Western interests. It has been 

a two-way street. The Yemenis have used the Saudis to gain influence and 

survive politically, and the Saudis have used Yemenis to enhance the Kingdom’s security. Have their policies always created the best result either for the 

Kingdom or for Yemen? No, but to assume that without Riyadh’s meddling 

the ROY would evolve into an open democratic state with liberal institutions 

and a stable economy is simply nonsense. At this point, the fact that Saleh 

has turned to the Saudis for support—given the history of political and 

even personal animosity with the Kingdom—is an indication of the stress 

within the regime. Make no mistake—while complaining about meddling, 

his successors will be asking for Riyadh’s help. Ahmad al-Ahmar’s accusation that the Saleh government only controls Sana’a because it has circled the 

city with 60,000 troops is no doubt an exaggeration, but only just.212 Given 

this environment and the proximity to Saudi Arabia, it would be foolish on 
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the part of Riyadh not to create a security buffer and extend its influence as 

deeply into Yemen as possible. 

Influence and alliances with the northern tribes — particularly the 

new leader of the Hashid Confederation, the son of Abdullah bin Hussein 

al-Ahmar, Sheikh Sadeq Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar—are particularly 

important. The elder al-Ahmar’s alleged estrangement during his later years 

from the Saleh regime has been viewed as an indication of growing unhappiness in traditional tribal circles with the Saleh regime. The elder al-Ahmar’s 

ability to take stances independent of the government in Sana’a was directly 

related to his personal stature and his ties with Riyadh.213 Tribal structure 

looks different today, but power and influence among the tribes and in Sana’a 

are functions of family and patronage. As the situation worsens, the political, 

social, and economic stability of the north and east will depend on ties to the 

Saudi security apparatus and economy. It could very likely be the difference 

in the maintenance of relative stability in the tribal areas of the north and 

east over chaos.

This discussion leads to the issue of the Huthi revolt or insurrection in 

the north. The Sana’a government pejoratively described the revolt as Huthi

to discredit its leadership. The leaders come from the al-Huthi sayyid family 

that has dominated the region for centuries. The Huthis have used their claim 

to a sayyid heritage as a mark of legitimacy in arguing that the Saleh regime 

has not only economically neglected the Sada’a region but also allied itself 

with Sunni Wahhabi and Salafist elements sponsored by Saudi Arabia in an 

attempt to destroy Yemen’s legitimate Zaydi Shi’a heritage. 

The Huthis are divided into four primary entities:

a. A small ideologically motivated group that is anti-Western and embraces 

Iran

b. Those defending the Hashemite/Zaydi identity

c. Armed tribal elements with financial motivations

d. Tribesmen defending their land and families against state-sponsored 

encroachment by rival tribes, most notably the Hashid.214

They argue that not only has the government attempted to award local land to 

its Wahhabi and Hashid supporters but also dispatched Brigadier Ali Muhsin 

al-Ahmar, a Wahhabi sympathizer, to conduct literally “Operation Scorched 

Earth.” Military operations have been unsuccessful and have managed only 
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to alienate a much larger swath of the population against the government in 

Sana’a.215 This lack of success has hit the ROY government at a critical time. 

Falling government resources and the southern movement have constricted 

Sana’a’s ability to spread its patronage. The inability of the government and 

its allies to quell the revolt has created a perception of weakness. 

As the situation deteriorated and the Yemeni army failed to gain control, 

the government resorted to mediation. The normal internal Yemeni process 

failed, in part undermined by the death of Abdullah al-Ahmar. Hashid 

encroachments may have been part of the problem, but Sheikh Abdullah was 

a master at intertribal negotiations. At this point, the Qataris offered their 

good offices and mediators. The Qataris negotiated a settlement not only for 

the Huthi situation but also to provide economic and investment support. 

This solution brought an immediate Saudi response. The Saudis were already 

traumatized by the U.S. destruction of Sunni Iraq and the Iranian-backed Shi’a 

gains there as well as in Lebanon, with Sunni Hamas and agitation in the Gulf. 

With Saleh’s encouragement, Riyadh concluded that the Huthi problem was 

an Iranian-backed effort to undermine Saudi Arabia by providing weapons and 

financial support.216 The optimism of the accord, signed between the government and the Huthis in Doha on 1 February 2008, quickly vanished as heavy 

fighting resumed.217 Recently the Saudis have been arguing that there are ties 

between Al Qaeda and the Huthis; some believe it is an attempt to gain more 

U.S. support for what the Saudis view as their priority issue, Iranian support 

for the Huthi rebellion.218 U.S. officials bluntly state that they see no indication 

of Iranian support for the Huthis and for what it is worth, Washington has 

prohibited the Yemeni government from using U.S.-supplied arms against the 

Huthis.219 A new ceasefire is in place; however, no one knows for how long.

No matter what the merits of the Iranian argument, to a certain extent it 

is a replication of Saleh’s Cold War tactics. Fear of the Soviets extracted aid 

and concessions from Riyadh and Washington. In addition, the ROY regime 

might well have used the possibility of a Qatari-brokered peace to leverage the 

Kingdom.220 The Saudis want absolutely nothing to do with any compromise 

that might leave an Iranian-sponsored group on their border with Yemen. 

Given the Yemeni view of partnering—“How big is your checkbook? What are 

you doing for me?”—the Saleh regime walked away with billions in aid and 

copious amounts of military assistance and direct assistance in fighting the 

Huthis.221 This situation occurred in spite of the fact that U.S. officials viewed 
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Saudi concerns about Iranian infiltration as alarmist and not supported by 

the facts on the ground. The U.S. concluded as follows:

a. Arms from Iran were totally unnecessary because the ROY army and 

tribal levies were more than willing to provide them directly to the 

Huthis.

b. Funding is likely occurring. The ROY, its tribal allies, and the Saudis 

blockaded the Huthis, who are unlikely to be particular about the 

source of funding.222

This U.S. assessment would lead to a significant U.S.-Saudi disconnect 

over Yemen policy. In late 2009, after the deaths of two Saudi border guards, 

Riyadh launched a bombing and special operations campaign against the 

Huthis. The incursion came as a surprise to the U.S. because of a failure to 

understand the degree of Saudi concern about the Huthi issue.223 The Saudis 

attempted to establish a rebel-free zone on the Yemen side of the border and 

failed, leaving more than 100 Saudi soldiers and border security personnel 

dead.224The Saudis insisted they want a compromise solution that will bring 

peace to the northern border areas and any involvement with the Iranians 

must cease. 

For Saudi Arabia, the fundamental security issue is that the northern tribes 

provide a critical security buffer against both threats and the potential for 

humanitarian chaos emanating from Yemen. The death of Abdullah al-Ahmar 

and the strife between rival Zaydi tribal factions threatened to undo that 

system. Coupled with the belief that Tehran is involved, it becomes an immediate, high priority problem. Another indication of the level of this concern 

is the willingness to commit its own forces—despite their relative inexperience at these types of operations—to the fray.225 In addition, the Saudis are 

in the process of improving not only border control but also command and 

control for both police and military units along the entire Yemen border.226

Some observers call the Yemen government increasingly inefficient, not 

well governed, and with a widespread reputation for corruption and incompetence and 

view Riyadh’s support as problematic.227 While the Saudis are 

concerned about the problem 

of Al Qaeda in Yemen, they believe the Kingdom has the problem more or 

While the Saudis are concerned about 

the problem of Al Qaeda in Yemen...

they are far more concerned about 

Iranian influence in the region
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less under control. Presently, they are far more concerned about Iranian 

influence in the region and are sure the Iranians are behind the Huthi revolt. 

The aid to Sana’a buys them a free hand in dealing with the Huthi problem. 

From a Saudi perspective, if the revolt is allowed to fester, it not only creates 

a potential Iranian proxy on the Saudi border but also encourages other proIranian groups to attempt to undermine the Saudi state.228

The Saudis believe that the less overt U.S. involvement in Yemen, the better. 

They view independent U.S. action against Al Qaeda bases as risky and more 

likely to complicate security issues, by creating more recruits for the radical jihadists rather than contributing to their elimination. They argue that 

people who really know Yemen and their tribal allies or the government in 

Sana’a, all of whom have assets on the ground and good intelligence, are in a 

far better position to be effective.229 The Saudis have three primary concerns:

a. U.S. actions might go awry as they have in the past. 

b. Successful U.S. operations also create more recruits for the jihadis.

c. Unilateral U.S. operations would complicate their own efforts to garner 

support and cooperation in the Hadramawt and other tribal areas. 

In short, the lack of control from Sana’a has created a zone in which the jihadists of all stripes survive and train and is unlikely to improve any time soon. 

Saudi influence and involvement, particularly in the south and east, might 

actually contribute to greater stability. 

Saudi Arabia, like the United States, has invested considerably in the Saleh 

regime and in the person of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Both Riyadh and Washington believed that Saleh was the best hope for the maintenance of any type 

of centralized control in Yemen. The U.S. now believes that Saleh must go 

and the Saudis are looking for a way to at least have a say in the process. As 

a result, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have hosted a series of 

meetings under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that appear to have led 

to an agreement between Saleh and the opposition, facilitating his near-term 

departure. 

Summary

The primary issue that Yemen represents for Saudi Arabia is that of security. 

Historically, Yemen’s perpetual instability and the periods of hostility toward 

the Kingdom have made it an intractable problem. Events in Yemen have 

had an enormous impact on Saudi regional and security policy. The threat 
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posed by Nasser and the new Yemen Arab Republic brought a confrontation that required risk taking and dogged opposition to the consolidation 

of an Egyptian puppet state on the Arabian Peninsula. In the process, Saudi 

Arabia built a formidable relationship with the northern tribes that preserved 

its influence in Sana’a. Riyadh opposed any unification of Yemen because it 

feared the threat that a united Yemen might pose. Now, just as the rule of 

the sons of Abd-al-Aziz ibn Saud nears its end and the internal Saudi political paradigm is changing, so too are the security issues. The destruction of 

Sunni Iraq in 2003 removed a security buffer against a resurgent Iran. The 

Saudis believe that Washington has repeatedly ignored security concerns and 

advice on issues ranging from Iraq to Iran to Afghanistan.230 Now, Riyadh is 

faced with the prospect of preserving or adjusting the security paradigm with 

regard to Yemen that has served it well. No matter how problematic it may 

be for those focused on the territorial and political integrity of the Yemens, 

historically Saudi involvement and influence in the Yemeni political milieu 

has constituted a net plus for the Kingdom’s security and for the security of 

the global oil supply. 

The security requirement had not changed. Yemen tribal politics are more 

fractured than ever, and providing support for the tribes has become more 

difficult. The Saleh regime is as unreliable with regard to Saudi interests as 

it has ever been, but they continue to work with him. The Huthi threat is 

an internal Zaydi dispute that the Saudis, with a little more Machiavellian 

pragmatism, might well turn to their advantage. A little less paranoia about 

the Iranians and a little more largess toward the rebels from Sada’a might 

boost Saudi influence enormously. Increasing Saudi influence in the Hadramawt and eastern provinces maintains some degree of outside influence if 

not stability in the event that government control entirely collapses. It also 

provides a security buffer against Sunni jihadists. And finally, the Kingdom 

is constructing a border security system and command-and-control structure 

capable of supporting security forces in sealing off the border if necessary. 

These policies are nuanced, layered and should be flexible enough to adjust 

to any situation including, if necessary, providing a buffer to insulate the 

Kingdom from a humanitarian catastrophe or the unlikely total collapse of 

the government in Sana’a. 
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8. Conclusion, U.S. Interests and the Yemens

The political context of the Yemens is much more than the last 30 years under Ali Abdullah Saleh, the 50 years since 1962, or the political history 

of government of the YAR or ROY. Yemen history has consistent themes that 

date back almost three millennia and tell a surprisingly consistent story. 

Central authority in Yemen was less about controlling territory than it was 

about the personal political survival of a given ruler and about protecting the 

economic interests of a regime. The Sabaeans, the Himyarites, the Rasulids, 

the Zaydi imams, the YAR (North Yemen), and finally the Saleh regime since 

1994 have understood the limitations that the peculiar structure of Yemen 

society places on central authority. Rule has been based on patronage, and 

patronage has to be funded.

Organization Focus

Sabaeans and Himyarites Trade routes

Rasulids Trade and the ports

Zaydi imams Taxation and trade

YAR Control of foreign aid and oil revenues

Current regime in Sana’a Monopolizing development projects, oil 

revenues, and the distribution of foreign aid

Rule based on family, clan, and tribe has been the norm. Talk about ending 

the patronage system in Yemen and evolving Yemen into a civil society based 

on rule of law and civil governance flies in the face of the most basic logic. No 

government in Yemen has ever constituted a nation-state. Central authority 

has always existed in equilibrium with other tribal, sectarian, and political 

groups whose independent power base curbed the political options available 

to any central authority. All of these groups functioned and continue to function on the basis of patronage. In any historical period, political power ebbed 

and flowed between central and decentralized local and regional authority.

The political structures were remarkably similar:

a. At the core of political life, the ruling family’s primary focus was 

self-perpetuation and survival through giving “trusted” relatives key 

positions in the military, the government, and the economy. 
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b. Next close allies, clan and tribal, were followed by co-opted groups 

rewarded for their loyalty through patronage. 

c. The maintenance of sufficient tribal support provided a buffer against 

disloyalty in the inner circle or other tribes hostile to the region. 

d. Those in opposition to the regime who were the ruling elite were either 

unable or unwilling to co-opt and merely attempted to intimidate others 

into acquiescence or subservience. 

Rule, either by the state or an individual, has never been absolute. The Hamid 

al-Dins, particularly Yahya—who was credited with pacifying the tribes—created an intimidating mass hostage system. Still, he faced revolts. Saleh surrounded himself with family and then spread his largess among the military, 

political, tribal leaders, and potential political adversaries to tie them to the 

regime. He still has difficulty in controlling much of the territory claimed 

by the ROY. Civil authority is lacking and where patronage either does not 

work or the price is too high, the regime in Sana’a, just like the rulers in the 

past, applies extra judicial means of attempting to suppress or eliminate its 

opposition. 

From earliest times, the Yemens also existed in a broader regional and 

even global equilibrium. It is geography that has made Yemen important, not 

indigenous resources. As a result, just as rulers have had to balance internal 

political forces that could threaten the regime they have had to manipulate 

external powers and their ambitions and interests as well. Relative to its 

neighbors, trading partners and imperial overlords, the Yemens have always 

been relatively weak. The Queen of Sheba negotiated with the Israelite King 

Solomon in Jerusalem to stabilize the spice trade through Yemen and the 

Hejaz. The Himyarites balanced warring Byzantines and Sassanians who 

were both critical to their prosperity and apparently converted to Judaism to 

enhance Himyarite neutrality. The Hamid al-Din imams fought the Saudis 

for control of Asir and Najran and embraced Nasser to undermine the British. Then the imams embraced the Saudis to undermine Nasser and the YAR. 

Rule in Yemen is a three-dimensional juggling act.

Saleh embraced the Saudis and their Yemeni clients in his rise to power. 

He then promptly eliminated the key Saudi supporters in his regime and 

embraced the very policy, accommodation with the PDRY that had brought 

Saudi ire and the elimination of President Hamdi. He then called on Saudi 

and U.S. support in the border war with the PDRY. Disenchanted, for cause, 
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with that arrangement, he flip-flopped again with a Soviet arms deal. He then 

again called on tribes, erstwhile clients of the Saudis, to crush the NDF who 

were clients of the pro-Soviet faction in the PDRY. Immediately after gaining 

the upper hand in 1982, he again moved to normalize relations with the PDRY. 

Later he sided with Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq in the call for the pan-Arab sharing of Arab wealth and refused to condemn Saddam Hussein’s invasion of 

Kuwait despite the support that the Kuwaitis had given him, thus alienating 

the Gulf Arabs. Between 1990 and 1994, he again defied Saudi Arabia and 

finally unified the YAR and PDRY in addition to challenging Saudi influence 

and claims in the Hadramawt. Now, once again, he has re-embraced Saudi 

Arabia in return for economic support, military assistance, and their influence in controlling factions within Yemen that want to undermine his regime. 

The uninitiated outside observer might conclude that President Saleh had a 

history of being unpredictable, unreliable, and ungrateful for aid and support. 

In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. He was absolutely consistent 

and predictable. Every political move and policy reversal was predicated on his 

evaluation of what was required for his survival and that of his family, clan, 

close associates, and regime. Despite mistakes, Saleh has understood Yemen 

and his times as well as any leader in the modern Middle East has understood 

his own political milieu and, with fewer resources, he has performed better 

than most of them. Saleh understood that tribalism, despite urban growth 

and modernization, is fundamental to Yemen’s political structure. In 1986 in 

an interview with al-Mujalla, Saleh was asked, “To what extent has Yemen 

succeeded in moving away from the stage of tribalism to the state stage? And 

can it be transformed from multiple tribes to one tribe?” He responded, 

The state is part of the tribes and our Yemeni people are a collection 

of tribes. Our towns and countryside are all tribes. All the official 

and popular apparatuses of the state are formed from the tribes.231

Tribalism, factionalism, and patronage are facts of political survival in 

Yemen. The labels and the exact political configurations shift from time to 

time but the fundamentals do not. From a U.S. perspective, he is not nor will 

he be a reliable ally because cooperation requires that his interests intersect 

with those of Washington. 
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The War on Terror and U.S. Policy in Yemen

From the Yemen perspective, the U.S. has not exactly been the most reliable 

ally either. Since the 1970s, U.S. deference to Saudi Arabia’s interest vis-à-vis 

Yemen has been particularly galling even when it came to bilateral aid arrangements.232 The inconsistency of U.S. strategies and policies has been another 

aggravation. Washington wants cooperation on the issue de jour without 

taking into consideration what the longer-term implications of cooperation 

might be for the regime in Sana’a. Policies toward radical Islamists are a prime 

example. There is a certain memory lapse in Washington about the origins of 

the Islamic Front and the radical jihadists that now plague U.S. global interests. With U.S. blessings and support, they were trained and armed during the 

Cold War for use against the Soviets in Afghanistan or the Soviet-supported 

regime in the PDRY and the NDF. No one objected when they were used in 

the 1994 conquest of the southern secession movement because those behind 

it were viewed as Soviet-era socialists. 

Suddenly, the attacks on the embassies in Africa, the attack on the USS Cole, 

and the attacks on 9/11 converted these former U.S. allies into terrorists, and 

now the U.S. demands the ROY cooperation in their eradication. The Yemen 

government had incorporated many of them in its system of control. These 

Islamist elements are useful against the southern secessionist led by al-Bid or 

against the Huthis in the north. In the recent past, Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, 

who the U.S. classifies as a terrorist, offered to recruit thousands of militants 

for the war in the north against the Huthis. 233 In effect, some Al Qaeda 

elements or at least radical Sunni jihadists have been the allies of the regime 

in Sana’a. Yemen’s political and security requirements had not changed, but 

U.S. requirements did. Saleh understandably was reluctant to sacrifice 

himself on George W. Bush’s altar 

of the global war on terror without 

something of considerable value in 

return. As a result, Saleh resorted 

to the “live and let live policies” of 

2004 to 2007 with the jihadists engineered by Brigadier Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar 

as an example.234 Saleh’s close relationship with the U.S. may in fact have 

contributed to his current predicament and possible downfall. Whether true or 

Saleh understandably was reluctant to sacrifice himself on George 

W. Bush’s altar of the global war 

on terror without something of 

considerable value in return. 
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not, it will likely be seen in that light. In addition, cooperation on key security 

issues in a post-Saleh era will be more difficult to obtain.

Even the current level of cooperation does not reflect real concern in 

Sana’a that Al Qaeda is a threat to the regime. Yemeni government officials, 

including Saleh, believe that the U.S. has shown far too little appreciation for 

what he has done since 9/11 and that for U.S. domestic political gain he has 

been often double-crossed and embarrassed by disclosures of his cooperation. 

Case in point, in 2002, a U.S. drone attack killed Al Qaeda’s top man, Abu 

Ali al-Harithi.235 ROY cooperation was revealed when the Bush administration insisted on taking public credit. Then there is the more fundamental 

issue. No matter what his rhetoric, the Yemeni government “does not believe 

AQAP poses a grave threat to his regime’s stability but rather is a Saudi and 

American problem.” 236 Senior Yemeni officials share his view.237 Given the 

existing problems with the south, a vigorous campaign there could provoke 

a wider civil conflict and further undermine the regime.238

Accusations are already surfacing that the ROY campaign against Al 

Qaeda has been in reality a campaign against regime opponents in the south 

and will serve as an anti-U.S. recruiting point for Al Qaeda.239 This possibility 

must be factored into the policy calculation. The U.S. has no way to control 

Yemeni operations or in some cases to accurately assess information passed 

by the ROY. This lack of control fits similar patterns of behavior where the 

labeling of political or tribal opponents as terrorists is used to settle scores 

that have nothing to do with counterterrorism.240 Even when the intended 

target is eliminated, it often serves as a recruiting tool for more jihadists.241 In 

addition, the training and equipment provided to Yemeni Special Forces under 

the command of Ahmad Saleh were undoubtedly being used against political 

opponents and demonstrators—not the best endorsement for cooperation 

with the U.S., particularly if Saleh steps down as it now appears that he will do.

Historically, the most westernized element of society has been the Sunni 

population. It is this population that is most estranged from the government 

and most vulnerable to radical Salafi and Al Qaeda overtures and recruiting. 

The Sunnis also represent the largest group in the Yemeni diaspora and particularly in the United States. Anwar al-Alwaki—the American born, radical 

jihadist sought in connection with inspiring the Fort Hood shooting spree by 

Major Nidal Hasan—is considered extremely dangerous because he understands exactly how to present jihadist ideas to American and Western-born 
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Muslims.242 Ironically, by supporting the Zaydi military government in Sana’a, 

the U.S. is fueling grievances of the southern and eastern Sunnis, the very 

societal groups in Yemen that can produce the radical jihadis who are potentially most dangerous to U.S. interests. The radicals are becoming increasingly 

effective in linking Western threats to Yemen with the unjust distribution 

of oil wealth found on southern tribal lands, some of which are also known 

sanctuaries for Al Qaeda.243 Any perceived ROY government excesses or U.S.-

targeting errors have the potential for unintended consequences.

The last big lesson about the Yemens is the level of institutionalized 

hostility. Internally, tribes are hostile to one another. Northerners are hostile 

to southerners, Zaydis to Shafais, sayyid Zaydis to non-sayyids, old NLF to 

FLOSY, modernists to tribalists, Hashid against Bakil, and so on. The society is 

fractured from top to bottom, thus making it virtually impervious to attempts 

at centralized control. The only thing that Yemenis really agree on is that they 

generally despise foreigners who intervene in their affairs. Whether Ethiopian, Portuguese, British, Ottoman, Egyptian, Russian, or Saudi, foreigners 

have always come to grief in the Yemen having wasted money, lives, or both 

pursuing their own plan for Yemen and failing. After all the effort and blood, 

Yemen—with adjustments for time and technology—is still very much the 

Yemen of the past. There is also perhaps a broader lesson here. In describing 

Yemen, Burrowes stated, “North Yemen and Afghanistan maintain that each 

of these late-developing countries is more like the other than like any other 

country in the world.” 244 Countries with a penchant for state building like the 

United States and a short memory about adventures past and present—the 

Philippines, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan—need to ask what a given place 

will really look like 20 years after a large U.S. presence on the ground. In this 

case, Yemen would eventually look just like Yemen. 

U.S.-Saudi Relations and U.S. Policy in Yemen 

Once again no matter the temptation, any involvement would acquire a selfgenerating momentum and rationalization of its own, the only truly U.S.

strategic interest in Yemen is the security of Saudi Arabia and the oil supplies of the West. The Sunni jihadists in Yemen and their collaboration with 

others in the region are a tactical not a strategic threat to the West. The real 

issue is the seriousness of the threat that they represent to Saudi Arabia. No 

one would care about a dispute between Zaydi Huthis and Zaydi-dominated 
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government in Sana’a if not for Saudi Arabia. The coming water shortage in 

Yemen and its accompanying humanitarian crisis would have little or no 

impact, as in Ethiopian and Sudan, on U.S. strategic interests in the region 

if not for the proximity of the Kingdom. Pirates in the Arabian Sea are an 

aggravation but not a strategic threat. Many Saudis are convinced that any 

unilateral U.S. involvement in Yemen—given Iraq, Afghanistan, and support for Israel—has more of a detrimental than a beneficial effect on the 

Kingdom’s security. The Middle East has a decided no-confidence vote in 

the U.S. ability to be a positive independent player; they also have the strong 

feeling the U.S. is fixated on what is now the lesser threat of Al Qaeda when 

the real threat is Iran.245

If the U.S. is to be effective in southern Arabia, it must pursue focused 

policies in which the stability and survival of the Kingdom are paramount. 

This focus does not mean that Saudis dictate all the priorities; to the contrary 

as Prince Turki bin Feisal bin Abd-al-Aziz once said when talking about Saudi 

criticism of the U.S. in Iraq, “Real friends sometimes have to say things that 

their friends do not want to hear.” 246 In addition, sometimes friends have to 

take actions that other friends do not approve of; however, in Yemen disconnects in Saudi-U.S. policy are a very serious matter. Independent action 

should only be taken after very careful consideration of the consequences 

and potential collateral damage to other more strategic interests. 

In addition to the training role for U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), 

the U.S. should retain its capability to act independently with precision to 

eliminate threats with or without the agreement of others. At the same time, 

Washington should not forget that the Saudis have managed over the years 

to have considerable influence within the Yemeni political milieu without 

a highly visible direct involvement on the ground. In the past, some Saudi 

policies have failed, but those failures have been tactical; the strategic goal 

of maintaining influence and the strategic security buffer has remained in 

place. The Kingdom and the United States need to see that continue. Saudi 

policy has been consistent and conservative; it is also focused on the use of 

proxies. U.S. policy should encourage this approach.

The U.S. should also take to heart the fact that well-meaning, progressive 

ideas about transforming other societies into democratic open civil societies 

are usually naïve and can lead to calamitous misadventures. Those who argue 
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that Yemen will become Somalia or U.S. action can prevent it or change the 

climate of chronic political instability are wrong on at least two counts: 

a. Yemen has never been a nation-state in any conventional sense of the 

words. The Yemens are fundamentally different with interests that 

conflict. 

b. It is unlikely that Yemen will become a Somalia. 

In classic Western terms, Yemen may be a failed state, but it is not a failed 

society. In other words, contractions in state authority and control such as the 

one now being experienced have never brought societal collapse. In addition, 

top priority U.S. problems associated with Yemen are not necessarily those 

of the Yemeni leadership. Yemen cannot be transformed: “It is what it is.” 247

An antiterrorism campaign in Yemen cannot be won by chasing a handful of 

Sunni jihadists with tens of thousands of troops; besides it is not cost effective 

and would undoubtedly transform the U.S. into just another invader. 

In late 2010, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin gave a litany of the aid promised to Yemen in 2010 and 2011. It amounted to approximately $300 million 

dollars. The official explained that the assistance and training had “only been 

marginally effective because the environment was not conducive to government control.” A former senior U.S. official posed the following question, 

“With the U.S. approaching [a] budgetary cliff, did it really make sense to 

spend $300 million annually to chase 200 to 300 Al Qaeda terrorists with 

‘marginal success’—that is more than $1 million per head annually.” The 

ambassador agreed that $300 million in aid was a drop in the bucket when 

compared to Yemen’s overall problems and categorically stated that the U.S.

had no intention of putting combat troops on the ground in Yemen.248 This 

begs the question, What is next?

A humanitarian crisis is a real possibility, perhaps even a probability. 

Previous famines and unrest have in large part created the Yemeni diaspora 

that stretches from Dar es-Salaam to Kuala Lumpur to Detroit. If such a 

crisis occurs, the U.S. will not be able to stop it. The U.S. national security 

objective (as opposed to humanitarian objectives) should be to assist the 

Saudis in preventing the crisis from spilling over the border into the Kingdom. Strengthened border security and command and control are obvious 

requirements as well as better operational integration of assets. Why then is 

the U.S. sending $300 million in aid to the Sana’a regime? It could be argued 
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that the U.S. security concerns regarding Yemen are as much about internal 

U.S. political considerations as any other issue. 

Achievable Goals

The 24 December 2009 attempted bombing of the Northwest Airlines flight 

by a Yemeni-trained jihadist brought calls to do something about Yemen. 

Forgetting for a moment that the individual involved should never have been 

allowed on the flight, the problem has no solution. For three millennia, no 

internal or external political or military power has been able to control Yemen; 

that is a fact. The economic problems are so enormous that the U.S. and even 

Gulf Arab aid has had only a marginal impact. The struggle between politically, socially, and culturally diverse factions and tribes over the dwindling 

economic pie will only intensify. Given the nature of Yemen society, political, economic, and social strife will find increasing expression in cultural 

and religious terms. The Zaydi Huthi rebellion and the inroads that jihadists 

have made in the Sunni population are examples. Problems that cannot be 

solved can only be contained.

A lesson from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that the lack of clear 

achievable goals tied to a concrete exit strategy is a recipe for the expenditure 

of blood and treasure with little or nothing to show for it. The U.S. has been in 

the business of nation building for more than a century, and the track record 

is less than stellar—it is in fact dismal in developing countries. If fundamental 

change is unattainable, then goals by necessity have to be realistically modest. 

The more limited the goals, the more likely the chances of success. Hand in 

hand with the realistic goals should be a realistic deeper contextual view 

of what Yemen is and what it is not. Some 

analysts have called Yemen a pivot point. 

Yemen lacks the cohesion to be called a pivot 

point. Historically, only the coastal areas 

have been viewed as strategically important 

and then only when one empire’s expansion 

threatened another’s interests in the area. Yemen is strategically important 

because of its geographic proximity to Saudi Arabia. 

There are issues of tactical importance. Coastal Yemen is important 

because of the aggravation posed by buccaneering in the Indian Ocean and 

Arabian Sea. Another issue is the uncontrolled movement of people and arms 

by sea between Africa and the Subcontinent (India)—an unstoppable and 

Some analysts have called 

Yemen a pivot point. 

Yemen lacks the cohesion 

to be called a pivot point. 
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uncontrollable phenomenon that has spanned millennia. Yemen’s disaffected 

Sunni areas are also tactically important because several hundred jihadists 

are training a handful of terrorists to strike at Western targets in general and 

the United States in particular. These problems cannot be solved nor can they 

be totally controlled; they can only be imperfectly contained.

It is as a part of this imperfect containment that SOF will be most heavily 

involved in Yemen. As CBS 60 Minutes pointed out (in its 16 January 2011 

broadcast), there is already significant involvement in training ROY counterterrorism forces. As both Arab and U.S. officials have noted, the ROY government—for all its issues to this point—has been “the only game in town.” 249

Even as government control shrinks, the government in Sana’a—if it can 

reconcile itself with the Zaydi tribal elements, including the Huthi rebels in 

the north—represents the current best vehicle for maintaining societal cohesion. This desired cohesion is among the Zaydi tribal interests. The old YAR

political factions, which have coalesced over the years around the patronage 

system, existed before Saleh but he perfected them. This SOF support for the 

government will not enable it to regain control of Yemen but rather to better 

control areas where the government in Sana’a has traditionally held sway. 

The support programs are necessary; however, the Saleh opposition appears 

to place the U.S. on the same side as their political enemies and oppressors. 

U.S. support programs have in effect become an element in the recruiting 

program of Sunni jihadists, including AQAP and other potential opposition 

groups (e.g., the Huthis and the southern separatists). Saleh leaving will not 

solve that problem because the regime’s military and security apparatus will 

no doubt remain largely intact.

SOF training and support for Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense and Aviation and Ministry of Interior and their border and cross-border capabilities 

may in the long term be the best strategic investment that U.S. containment 

efforts can make. In the end, Riyadh’s policies regarding Yemen will have a far 

greater impact there than anything that the U.S. does unilaterally. Differences 

over the nature of the Huthi rebellion notwithstanding, close cooperation in 

all areas—but particularly in joint operational training and exercises—will 

be absolutely critical should ROY central government control continue to 

erode. In the scheme of things, the Yemenis know the most about the key 

relationships between and among political factions, including the radical 

Sunni elements, but Saudi knowledge runs a close second. Riyadh knows more 

about Yemen at a tactical level than the U.S. government will ever know; the 
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issue is combining their knowledge and capabilities with U.S. capabilities in 

containing future eventualities. As Ambassador Benjamin stated, “Anything 

that affects the security of Saudi Arabia is significant to global stability.” 250

The U.S. needs to have the capability to act unilaterally in isolated, high 

priority cases. For now, it is the most effective approach to support Yemeni 

efforts to contain terrorist cells. As imperfect and frustrating as it may be, it is 

likely the most effective approach to containment at the present time. Although 

a further contraction of Sana’a’s control or an individual high value target 

might necessitate limited unilateral U.S. action at some unforeseen future 

date, the word limited is key. The May 2011 bin Laden raid is an example, but 

the political risks have to be rigorously and dispassionately evaluated against 

the potential political and operational gain. In the case of bin Laden, even if 

the mission had failed, the risk was worth it given the potential gain. In the 

case of most of the Yemeni jihadists, that will likely be a more difficult call. 

In Yemen, the chance for strategic success rather than limited tactical gains, 

emanating from unilateral U.S. military action, is virtually nil. 

In addition, the U.S. is currently linked to a regime in Sana’a that has been 

historically opposed by the Sunni elements, jihadist, or otherwise in the south 

and east of what is now called the ROY. The Zaydis have always been the tribal, 

economic, and religious competitors of the groups that are supporting AQAP

and other Sunni jihadists. The government in Sana’a is unlikely to win any 

hearts-and-minds campaign; the Saudis have a much better chance and more 

resources to exert influence in the Sunni areas. Washington now appears to 

be adopting an approach to aid for Yemen that conforms more closely to the 

Saudi model by attempting to bypass the central government—that is, provide 

aid directly to the local level, a recognition that the ROY central administration simply does not function.251 This situation has strategic implications for 

any future U.S. military involvement in Yemen’s eastern and southern Sunni 

regions—those most affected by the groups that Washington sees as potential 

threats or sources of instability—tribal and AQAP jihadists, and even radical 

African elements. Close coordination with Saudis will be strategically critical 

if the U.S. contemplates even limited direct action in Yemen.

Lastly, a cautionary note is in order. This study has attempted to show 

that Yemen, or rather Yemens, today are no more or no less potentially 

fragmented than they have ever been. Authority and governance viewed 

in light of nation-state standards is an illusion. The idea in the media and 

other places that unification, the election of 1990, and Saleh’s victory in the 
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1994 civil war represented the formation of a real modern state were simply 

false—an illusion. The last 20 years represent a blip on three millennia of 

a fractured political paradigm. However, the misconception — this lack 

of perspective—has created the myth that Yemen was unified and is now 

crumbling into a failed state. Yemen is what it has always been—a politically, 

economically, socially, and culturally diverse corner of the Arabian Peninsula 

where factionalism, sectarianism, and tribalism hold sway. The media and 

to some degree government officials have fed an overreaction to what is now 

occurring in Arabia Felix. 

A recent article in the Washington Post stated, 

For the first time since the September 11, 2001 attacks, CIA analysts see 

one of Al Qaeda’s offshoots—rather than the core group now based 

in Pakistan—as the most urgent threat of U.S. security, officials said.

The article went on to say that “Yemen has emerged as a more potent threat.” 252

On 8 September 2010, Ambassador Benjamin stated, 

The Washington Post is misleading. First, there is no threat ranking 

system and second, while Yemen is obviously a concern to say that 

it is more of a problem than Pakistan or some other place is simply 

wrong.253

A better understanding of Yemen’s paradigm and how the U.S. and its 

allies fit into that paradigm would facilitate two desired outcomes: a) a more 

judicious and accurate appraisal of the situation and where it is likely to go 

over the coming decade and b) clarification of the real interests of the United 

States. Yemen politicians and tribal leaders argue as follows:

The danger is a myth propagated by Washington to impose its control 

over the country or by the Sana’a government to give it an excuse to 

strike its domestic enemies.254

The argument about U.S. control demonstrates the deep suspicion with which 

any direct U.S. involvement is viewed. The second point underscores the fractured political landscape and the suspicion with which much of the country 

views Saleh or for that matter, any government in Sana’a. The bottom line is 

that the odds for success, in an environment where fundamental motives are 

questioned and the ability of the government in Sana’a to deliver is questionable, are significantly less than optimal.
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The bottom line raises another series of questions:

a. Given budget deficits and the absolute opposition to new taxes, can 

the U.S. afford its current approach of throwing money at problems 

through marginally effective or totally ineffective allies? The situation 

promises to worsen.

b. Are 200 to 300 jihadists—the vast majority of whom have little chance 

of reaching a U.S. target—a strategic threat? 

c. Is the real threat that which is potentially posed to the security and 

stability of Saudi Arabia? 

d. Is there an alternate approach that has more promise of containing 

(if not eliminating) the threat and the U.S. can afford, both politically 

and economically? 

Since the Yemen Revolution of 1962, the consistent answer has been that the 

U.S. strategic interest in Yemen is the security and stability of Saudi Arabia. 

One might conclude that the answer to the formulation of a flexible, cohesive 

strategy involving Yemen is most likely to be found in close coordination with 

Riyadh rather than in Sana’a. 

In the end, countries are not transformed. In the case of Yemen, if the U.S.

seriously looks into the past and examines the present, a series of snapshots 

about the future emerge. These pictures represent the possible scenarios for 

the Yemen of 2030 that would undoubtedly have most if not all the following 

attributes:

a. Central political authority will continue to be weak with significant 

areas of the country beyond the control of Sana’a.

b. The leader or leadership will rule surrounded by family, clan, and tribal 

loyalists supported by other clients through a system of political and 

economic patronage. If the ruler does not possess the gifts of charisma, 

guile, and ruthlessness, he will not survive.

c. The ruling elite will take the lion’s share of the economic benefits from 

the areas controlled by the central government and will distribute the 

remainder in an effort to maintain the loyalty of its client supporters.

d. Large areas of the country will be excluded from sharing in the wealth 

or political power, and this situation will cause periodic, widespread 

unrest.
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e. The Zaydi tribes of the north will provide a social underpinning for 

the highland population and their loyalties will be split, based on the 

generosity of the government in Sana’a and the willingness of the 

Saudis to subsidize them. Severe weakness in Sana’a would result in 

the virtual incorporation of the north into the Saudi economic and 

security structure.

f. The Shafai and southern resentment of the north and Zaydi rule will 

result in a more federal arrangement, total independence, or less likely 

the total subjugation and occupation of the south. The latter possibility 

guarantees growing problems for Sana’a.

g. If a great water crisis or other natural disaster occurs, the Yemeni 

government will invite United Nations (UN) support. The UN will 

provide camps and food, and the principal supporters of the regime 

and the army will be sheltered from the privations affecting the general 

population.

h. Pockets of radical jihadist groups and individuals will continue plotting 

terrorist acts against the United States and by-and-large their families 

and tribal ties will protect them.

No matter what the United States does or how much it invests, it will be a 

drop in the bucket compared to the problem, and Yemen will still function 

as a fundamentally fragmented political landscape of weak central government, competing power centers, and chronic revolts. Yemen will continue 

to be Yemen.

As a result, careful consideration needs to be given to the costs before 

anyone even thinks about deeper involvement. In an article on the role of the 

military, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made 

comments about Afghanistan that are readily applicable to Yemen; “In this 

type of war, when the objective is not the enemy’s defeat but the people’s 

success, less really is more.” 255 Mullen was discussing the role of the military 

and operations, but in the case of Yemen that statement applies to U.S. direct 

involvement. The U.S. embassy and military simply do not have the resources, 

staff, or experience in Yemen to run an effective smart power program. “The 

problems in Yemen will not be solved simply by throwing American money 

at them.” 256

The U.S. role in Yemen requires a very low profile with an ability to act 

independently in exceptional circumstances. The rejection by the Obama 
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administration of putting combat troops on the ground represents a two-fold 

recognition:

a. Both the ROY and the Saudis oppose the direct involvement of U.S.

ground troops in Yemen.

b. Unilateral U.S. intervention would be severely handicapped by a lack 

of information and intelligence without ROY or Saudi support. 

Conversely, the greater the diplomatic, military, and development support 

for any regime in Sana’a, the more its actions will be laid at the American 

doorstep. This reality is exactly what many in Washington fear and why aid 

has continued despite the situation on the ground and the protests against 

the regime. The U.S. continues the military aid in hopes that it will be used 

against Al Qaeda, as opposed to political opponents, and fears that change 

could bring a new government that more reflects the strong anti-American 

sentiment in Yemen and curtail or even end cooperation on terrorism issues. 

As Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said, “Obviously the situation right 

now is a difficult one. The longer it festers, the more difficult it becomes. That 

is why this government has been urging a negotiated transition as quickly as 

possible.” He then went on to comment that Saleh continued to be in control 

of Yemen’s military forces and military aid was continuing.257 That may no 

longer be the case.

As one U.S. military officer stated, “If Saleh goes, the two likeliest outcomes 

are anarchy or a government that is not as friendly.” 258 A recent survey in 

Yemen conducted by Glevum Associates tends to bear out this concern. Only 

1 percent of the population feels that the U.S. should “address” in dealing with 

the violent protest; most support an Arab League solution. Eighty eight percent 

are either very or somewhat unfavorable toward the U.S.-led war on terror 

and policies toward the Islamic world. The study also concludes, “There is a 

notable level of popular support for the radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and 

for the actions and agenda of the terrorist group Al Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula.” At the same time, almost half want to see U.S. military assistance 

continue.259

One might argue that the position on aid is traditionally Yemeni—give 

us aid and stay out of our politics. Glevum allows for a margin of error of 

3 percent; however, even assuming a much larger margin of error, the U.S. is 

deeply unpopular in Yemen. A key reminder for anyone involved in Yemen 

follows: 
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When any Yemeni leader’s evaluation of the situation requires a 

change in policy concerning the U.S. relationship, interests, or 

involvement, it will happen. 

Given the sentiments outlined above, it could very well happen. Saleh’s alleged 

quote—“the Americans are hot-blooded and hasty when you need us [but] 

cold-blooded and British when we need you”—certainly reflects Saleh’s and 

Yemen’s experience with the U.S. since the 1950s. The Yemenis know that the 

U.S. interest in Yemen is tangential to other political and strategic interests. 

When evaluating the present and planning the future in Yemen, glance back 

frequently at the deeper context and track record and factor that into the 

equation. Saleh’s 32 years reflected Yemen’s cultural, political, economic, and 

social reality—not the converse. As Saleh contemplates his next move and 

his opponents contemplate theirs, it bears remembering that political power 

in Yemen is about survival first and perhaps some limited vision of a political 

and economic future that is highly circumscribed by Yemen’s reality. Write any 

name into the blank space left for the chief executive—Saleh, Hamdi, Iryani, 

Imam Ahmed, Imam Yahya; as this monograph has outlined, the differences 

are only marginal. Understanding the overall context and flow of Yemen’s 

historical reality refracted through the prism of time on the present is what 

is important. Whether Saleh comes or goes as appears likely or whether his 

successor lasts 10 years or 10 days, Yemen will still be Yemen. There “the past 

is not dead; it’s not even past.” 260
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Endnotes

Foreword

1. Jeffrey D. Feltman (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. DoS), 

“Yemen on the Brink: implications for U.S. Policy,” Remarks to House Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., 3 February 2010; available at www.state.

gov/p/nea/rls/rm/136499.htm, accessed May 2011. 

2. Daniel Benjamin (Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 

Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Washington, D.C.), “Remarks at Jamestown Yemen 

Conference,” 15 April 2010; available at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/140327.

htm, accessed May 2011. 

3. Ibid. 

Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context

1. See Neil MacFarquhar, “Tahseen Bashir, Urbane Egyptian Diplomat, Dies at 77,” The 

New York Times, 14 June 2002. Tahseen served Nasser and Sadat and thoroughly 

harassed Mubarak. Urbane, well-educated and well-read, was famous for memorable political phrases. Two of the more memorable were “the mummification of 

the Egyptian cabinet” and “Egypt is the only nation state in the Arab world, the rest 

are just tribes with flags.” When asked in the 1990s why Mubarak failed to make 

sweeping changes in a new cabinet, he remarked, “Because their tombs weren’t 

ready.”

2. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso Books, 2006), 160. 

Anderson’s work is a challenging look at modern nationalism and its effect on global 

communities. He views it as selling a myth unity to communities whose interests 

are fundamentally different—the creation of imagined communities and argues 

that the real surprising issue is not that adherents to these imagined communities 

are willing to kill for a myth but that millions have been willing to die for one. 

This book is a challenging work but a most interesting look at nationalism. It also 

provides some thoughts for practitioners of nation building. In fact, one might 

argue the advent of the professional army as opposed to the citizen army in the 

United States reflects the breakdown of what Anderson calls the nationalist myth

in that most of the citizens support a system in which they are actually unwilling 

to die for their country or unwilling even to pay through taxes for the wars that it 

fights.

3. “In quite a state: Defining what makes a country,” The Economist, 10 April 2010, 

62-63.

4. There are those within the Special Operations community who argue, and rightly 

so, that SOF needs to create cadres of experts on the environments within which 

they operate. Often the term used is to create “T. E. Lawrences” who have an 

understanding of all aspects of a given society so that they have a better chance of 

operating successfully in that environment. If that is to be the model, then the first 
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lessons is to understand that Lawrence was an archeologist whose understanding of 

the Middle East was constructed on a grasp of the earliest fundamentals of Middle 

Eastern cultural development. In the Middle East, heritage, ethnology, history, and 

culture are supremely important in placing individuals and groups within a deeper 

cultural context because it is the context that motivates, explains, and to a certain 

degree makes actions predictable. With the “Lawrence goal” in mind, this study 

includes an introduction to ancient Yemen as the necessary foundational building 

block to an understanding of the contemporary situation.

5. Richard H. Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), 

239. 

See also Wendell Phillips, Qatabah and Sheba (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 

Company, 1955), 89-119. This book contains an interesting description of archaeological teams in Yemen working on the ruins of the city. The description of a meeting 

with Imam Ahmad also underscores the nature of personal rule and the imam’s 

intimate knowledge of the foreigner’s activities in Yemen.

6. Sally Ann Baynard, Laraine Newhouse Carter, Beryl Lieff Benderly, and Laurie 

Krieger, “Historical Setting,” The Yemens (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 

Army, 1986), 11.

7. Ibid., 8.

8. J.J. Saunders, A History of Medieval Islam (London: Routledge Press, 1965), 7.

9. Baynard, The Yemens, 13.

10. Jacob Adler, “The Jewish Kingdom of Himyar: Its Rise and Fall,” Midstream, May/

June 2000 (Volume 46), 28.

11. It was in fact a Kharajite who murdered the Caliph Ali and not an Umayyad Sunni. 

Today, the largest concentration of Kharijites is the Ibadis in Oman. They reject 

both the Kharijites and Ibadi labels, arguing that they are the true Muslims and thus 

should be called simply Muslims. The Ibadi imam was called imam al-muslimin

(imam of the Muslims).

12. Philip K. Hitti, Makers of Arab History (Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 47 and 

61-64.

13. Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 

1985), 50.

14. John L. Esposito, The Oxford History of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1999), 44.

15. Baynard, The Yemens, 24.

16. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (London: Cambridge University Press, 

1988), 669.

17. Momen, Shi’i Islam, 51. See also Dilip Hiro, Dictionary of the Middle East (New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 349.

18. Manfred W. Wenner, Modern Yemen 1918-1966 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 30. See also Encyclopedia Britannica Online.
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19. Lapidus, Islamic Societies, 669.

20. R.J. Gavin, Aden under British Rule (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1996), 11.

21. Patricia Risso, Merchants and Faith: Muslim Commerce and Culture in the Indian 

Ocean (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 45-47.

22. Gavin, Aden, 12.

23. Baynard, The Yemens, 35.

24. A senior Arabian official knowledgeable about Yemen and Saudi Arabian affairs.

25. Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume I 

Empire of Gazis and the Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808 (London: 

Cambridge University Press, 1977), 84.

26. Ibid., 100.

27. Eric Macro, Yemen and the Western World (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 

37.

28. Shaw, Ottoman Empire, 176.

29. Baynard, The Yemens, 36.

30. Ibid., 39.

31. Tom Pocock, Battle for Empire: The Very First World War 1756-1763 (London: 

Michael O’Mara Books Limited, 1998), 13.

32. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism on the Dark Continent (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1961), 1-26.

33. Gavin, Aden, 22.

34. Christopher Bayly, Imperial Meridians: The British Empire and the World 1780-1830

(London: Longman Limited, 1994), 35-74.

35. Gavin, Aden, 24.

36. Ibid., 37.

37. James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the 

British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 21.

38. Although nominally under Ottoman control, Mehmet Ali (or Muhammad Ali)—an 

Albanian military officer—had emerged in the early 19th century as the independent viceroy over whom the Ottoman’s had little or no control. His dynasty would 

rule Egypt until 1952 and the Nasserist revolution.

39. Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 2002), 17.

40. Marco, Yemen and the Western World, 21.

41. John Marlowe, History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1956

(Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1956), 37.

42. Gavin, Aden, 27.
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43. Paul Dresch, “Imams and Tribes: The Writing and Acting of History in Upper 

Yemen,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East , editors Philip S. Khoury 

and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1990), 273.

44. Wenner, Modern Yemen, 45. 

45. Ibid., 47.

46. Dresch, Imams and Tribes, 273. 

47. Baynard, TheYemens, 13.

48. Jamal Al-Atasi, Al-Thawra li Jamal Abd-al-Nasser wa ala Fikrihi al-Istratiji wa 

al-Tarikhi, (Beirut: Mahad Al-Agmaln Al-Arabi), 7. 

49. Dresch, Imam and Tribes, 275.

50. Ibid. See also, Phillips, Qataban and Sheba, 205. Phillips recounts a meeting with 

Imam Ahmad in the early 1950s in which the imam questioned them about the 

details of their journey, including why they provided an old man in Shabwa a gazelle 

that they had killed. Phillips commented, “The King seemed satisfied with the reply, 

while I was lost in admiration of his intelligence system, wishing that Washington 

might have one like it.”

51. Wenner, Modern Yemen, 62.

52. There is an old Yemeni proverb that states, “Ruling Yemen is like trying to dance 

on the head of a snake.” See a paper presented at the U.S. Naval Academy by Major 

Stephanie Kelley, U.S. Air Force. The proverb differs slightly from the title of Victoria Clark’s recent book, which was taken from a comment by ROY President Ali 

Abdullah Saleh, “Ruling Yemen is like dancing on the heads of snakes.” Saleh no 

doubt made the statement plural to more accurately reflect his own position and 

challenges.

53. William Shakespeare, Henry IV (Act III, Scene I, Line 33).

54. Dresch, Imams and Tribes, 275.

55. Ibid., 273.

56. Wenner, Modern Yemen, 80.

57. Gunther Pawelke, Der Jemen – Das verbotene Land (Dusseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1959), 

75.

58. Wenner, Modern Yemen, 59.

59. Baynard, The Yemens, 46.

60. Wenner, Modern Yemen, 76.

61. Dresch, Imams and Tribes, 273.

62. Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

2000), 21 and 31.

63. F. Gregory Gause III, Saudi-Yemen Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign 

Influence (New York: Columbia Press, 1990), 58.

64. “Arabia: Fall of Yemen,” Time, 14 May 1934 (online article), 2.
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65. Wenner, Modern Yemen, 164. The British “forward policy” was to create a federation and use it to get the tribal areas under control and to institute progressive 

reforms. The British hoped to create a new class of rulers who were enlightened 

and pro-British. All this required a much more aggressive policy in the hinterland 

to provide security and stability for the institutional development.

66. The British were reluctant because they understood that in tribal societies, the 

people that you train and arm today are more likely than not the people that you 

will have to fight tomorrow. Or as the case may be, the people who sell the arms 

give them to the very people that you want to fight. The object lesson for training 

and arming groups, as an example, is that many of the Afghan jihadists of 1979 are 

now the Afghan jihadists of 2009.

67. Dresch, A History, 32-34.

68. Gause, Saudi-Yemen Relations, 58.

69. J. Leigh Douglas, The Free Yemeni Movement 1935-1962 (Beirut: The American 

University of Beirut Press, 1987), 15.

70. Gause, Saudi-Yemen Relations, 58.

71. “Telegram from the Governor of Aden Sir John Hall to the Secretary of State for 

the Colonies,” Public Records Office (FO 371/45182, 20 March 1945). Also see 

description of FYP travails in Aden from 1944 to1945 in Douglas, Free Yemeni, 

76-85.

72. Ibid., 110-115.

73. Gause, Yemeni-Saudi, 58.

74. Douglas, Free Yemeni, 140-142.

75. Wenner, Modern Yemen, 105.

76. Ibid., 150.

77. Ibid., 131.

78. Ibid., 150.

79. Ibid., 161.

80. Gavin, Aden, 320-325.

81. Ibid.

82. The term “wave of the future” became synonymous with Nasser and widely used. 

In 2003 interviews—with Phillips Talbot, General Andrew Goodpaster, William 

“Bill” Lakeland, and Walt Rostow—each used the term to describe the U.S. evaluation of Nasser and the Nasserist wave that seemed to be sweeping the Arab Middle 

East. Sultan bin Abd-al-Aziz also used it in an interview in describing Nasser and 

scoffing at the U.S. view of the 1950s that Nasserism would triumph. 

See also Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations, The Amorality of Power Politics (New 

York: Simon & Schuster, 1969), 214-218. Copeland’s account of various reactions to 

the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 is one of the more entertaining. First, he quoted 

a member of the U.S. Middle East Policy Planning Committee asking the CIA, 
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“Would you fellows like to send someone along on the mission that’s going out to 

explain it to the Arab chiefs of state? We can’t afford to associate ourselves with every 

lunatic scheme that comes along.” He quotes Nasser as saying, “The genius of you 

Americans is that you never make clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid 

moves, which make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something to 

them we are missing.” Complicated or not, Copeland points out Nasser understood 

that the Eisenhower Doctrine did not bode well for his view of Arab unity or his 

ascendancy in the region. 

83. “Eisenhower to the Acting Secretary of State, 23 April 1953,” Dwight David Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman Files, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 1, p. 3.

84. Interview with William C. Lakeland, Berkeley, California, 23-24 September 2003. 

Lakeland was the former political officer in Cairo at the U.S. Embassy and served 

as the conduit between the British and the Egyptians in the Canal negotiations.

85. Adeed Dawihsa, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to 

Despair (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 173.

86. Tareq Y. Ismael, The Arab Left (Syracuse, N.Y.: The Syracuse University Press, 1976), 

78-79. 

See also:

a. Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (Oxford: The Oxford 

University Press, 1993), 105-164. 

b. Abdel Moghny Said, Arab Socialism (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 

1972), 73-79. This book is a theoretical discussion of Arab socialism and how 

it differs from both capitalism and Marxist-Leninism. It explains in theory 

the justification for alternative approach to modernization and the Nasserist 

“command economy.”

87. Jamal Al-Atasi, Al-Thawra li Jamal Abd-al-Nasser wa ala Fikrihi al-Istratiji wa 

al-Tarikhi (Beirut: Mahad Al-Agmaln Al-Arabi), 7. 

88. Gavin, Aden, 332. 

See also Frederick D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: 

William Blackwood & Sons, 1922). Gail M. Gerhardt, Foreign Affairs, SeptemberOctober 1997, 643 provides this review:

The definitive defense of British colonial rule in Africa by its most eminent 

practitioner, this work catalogued the vast variety of administrative and 

development issues in the heyday of empire: systems of land tenure, 

direct and indirect administration through indigenous authorities, taxation, agricultural and mineral exploitation, education, transport, trade, 

legal development, and the eradication of indigenous forms of slavery. 

Lugard conceded that British methods had not produced ideal results 

everywhere and that the time was not yet foreseeable when complete 

independence would be feasible for African colonies, but he argued with 

assurance, contrary to the skepticism expressed by the British Labour 

Party, that Britain’s rule was fundamentally benign. Pure philanthropy, 
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he wrote, could of course never be the motive of empire, yet the welfare 

and advancement of African peoples was a strong guiding principle of 

British rule, part of its ‘dual mandate’ of reciprocal benefit. Where native 

races were becoming restive, he declared, it was precisely because of their 

exposure to British values of liberty: ‘Their very discontent is a measure 

of their progress.

This argument in many respects reflects U.S. attitudes about nation building that 

come from the American progressive traditions of the 19th century. The idea is that 

somehow we can make others think and act like us and that the resulting spread 

of western style liberal democracy will create global peace and prosperity. It also 

touches on what has been described as Salvationist discourse. This western idea 

of superiority and thus greater responsibility to teach, to cajole, and if necessary 

to compel others to develop liberal democratic institutions because it is for their 

own good is virtually always a motivating element in U.S. approaches to nation 

building. It was an abiding theme in the Philippines, Cuba, Vietnam, and now Iraq 

and Afghanistan.

89. Gavin, Aden, 333. The problems with counter propaganda are illustrated by the 

following humorous but instructive report from Aden on suggested propaganda 

strategies:

 “Letter from the Political Office, Middle East Command, Aden (J. C. W. Bushell) to Arabian Department FO (A. R. Walmsley), 27 December 1962,” PRO, 

FO371/168625, 1. 

This particular letter contained a request from Aden that London mount a diplomatic campaign to counteract Egyptian propaganda against the British in Oman and 

Aden. The Egyptians claimed that the Royal Air Force (RAF) was bombarding the 

peaceful population in both places. Bushell wanted the various British missions to 

point out that the RAF had “never dropped napalm on defenseless villagers as the 

Egyptians do” or “explosive cigarettes.” In the attached minute (commentary), B. R. 

Pridham in London commented, “I wonder if Mr. Bushell is serious in making the 

point in para 2 around which his letter is built. We can scarcely reply to propaganda 

by saying that we kill Arabs in a much more genteel manner than the Egyptians.”

90. There is a lesson here for the United States. The Internet has caused a second round 

in this communications revolution. When comparing return on investment, the 

Islamic militants have gotten far more bang for the buck than all the elements of the 

U.S. Government combined. The real successes that are now occurring are in large 

part the result of indigenous factionalism and rivalries. An American organization 

making an appeal or argument in the Middle East is at best viewed as suspect and at 

worst usually ignored. To encourage the natural tendency toward internal factional 

conflict has always proven more effective.

91. Wenner, Modern Yemen, 176.

92. Gavin, Aden, 338.

93. Robert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development 1962-

1986 (Boulder, Colorado: The Westview Press, 1987), 9-12.
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94. The term jabili often pronounced gabili comes from the Arabic word jabal that 

means mountain. Hence a jabili is a person from the mountains and is often used 

in the pejorative by urban dwellers or in the case of the Yemens by urban dwellers 

and Shafais referring to their Zaydi overlords. It is a proper term but can be used in 

a way that directly parallels someone calling a person from Appalachia a “hillbilly” 

with all that it implies.

95. Dresch, Imams and Tribes, 275.

96. Lakeland interview. In the mid-1950s, William Lakeland—a U.S. Foreign Service 

officer—accredited in Yemen recalls a November visit from Aden, first to Sana’a 

where he learned that the imam was in Hudaydah and then the bone-jarring trip 

down the mountains and through the wadis to present his credentials. At the audience, the imam sat on a dais taking petitions from his subject written on small strips 

of papers. He would remove his conical head dress and place ones of particular 

importance in the liner, which apparently served as a portable royal filing cabinet. 

His departure from Yemen required the imam’s personal authorization, which the 

imam refused to give until after Lakeland had taken a 3-week tour of the imamate 

that the imam viewed as more important than a family Thanksgiving celebration 

in Aden.

97. Douglas, Free Yemenis, 184-188.

98. Ibid., 188.

99. Wenner, Modern Yemen, 115-120. 

See also Colin Reid of the London Daily Telegraph who compiled a list of Imam 

Yahya’s 14 sons that survived childbirth. The list was reprinted in “And then there 

were only . . .,” Newsweek, 18 February 1958, 39. It is instructive on the nature of 

Yemeni internal politics and is ordered from the oldest Ahmad to the youngest 

Abd-al-Rahman:

a. Ahmad became the imam.

b. Muhammad drowned (not easy in Yemen, without assistance).

c. Hassan was exiled.

d. Husayn was murdered.

e. Ali moved to Coventry (no doubt motivated by self-preservation).

f. Abdullah was beheaded.

g. Qasim exiled.

h. Mutahir died in Cairo.

i. Ibrahim disappeared.

j. Ismail went “abroad” and apparently stayed there.

k. Abbas was beheaded.

l. Yahya disappeared.

m. Muhsin was assassinated.

n. Abd-al-Rahman continued to live in Yemen. 

100. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 20. 
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See also Robert Lacey The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud (New York: 

Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, Inc., 1981), 310-371. “Colonel Nasser’s New Way” 

gives an overview of the impact of Nasserism on the Saudis and southern Arabia. 

The book makes two particularly important points:

a. It briefly discusses the role of Egyptian teachers in Saudi Arabia and the grassroots influence that they exerted on the Kingdom. Because of the cadres of 

Egyptian teachers in the imamate and the large numbers of Yemenis from the 

north in the protectorate and Aden, this influence was also true for Yemen.

b. Lacey discusses the impact of Nasser’s July 1956 visit to Dhahran and Riyadh 

and humiliation of the Saudi royal family, “There could be no face-saving 

rationalizations of the hysteria that swamped the Egyptian leader when he 

arrived. ... Riyadh had never seen anything like it. No member of the house 

of Saud had ever inspired such spontaneous displays of passion.” 

101. Muhammad M. Zubayri, Al-Khud’a al-Kubra fi’l-Siyasiyya al-’Arabiyya (Cairo: 

[pamphlet]), 86. 

102. Robert Burrowes, “Yemen’s First-Generation Modernists and Educational 

Emigrants,” Middle East Journal (Winter 2005), 81-97.

See also Burrowes, Historical Dictionary of Yemen, Historical Dictionaries of 

Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East, No. 17 (London: the Scarecrow Press, Inc.), 

145. Imam Yahya, with some (as it would turn out) justifiable trepidation about 

the potential impact of foreign ideas, authorized the first large group of young 

Yemeni men to go outside Yemen for their education. Three-fourths were Zaydi, 

and virtually all them came from “humble backgrounds.” The group first went to 

Beirut in 1947 and then later to Egypt. Approximately one-third were ultimately 

educated in Western Europe and the United States. That group included several of 

the soldiers that would participate in the Revolution of 1962. Virtually all of the 

students supported the revolution and returned to Yemen to serve the Republic. 

“For these boys, the move from Yemen to Cairo and beyond amounted to going 

from the 16th century to the 20th century.” 

103. Douglas, Free Yemeni, 238.

104. Saeed M. Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), 3.

105. Steven C. Caton, Peaks of Yemen I Summon (Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 1990), 216. Caton states that even in the 1960s poetry, particularly tribal 

offerings were an important means of expressing political positions and criticisms. 

Apparently, when the coup plotters of 26 September 1962 took over the Sana’a radio 

station, they broadcast the declaration of the new republic in the form of a poem. 

All of this writing underscores that this is an ancient society in which modalities 

of behavior have a momentum of their own and cannot be easily altered.

106. Douglas, Free Yemeni, 232.

107. Badeeb, Saudi-Egyptian Conflict, 49.
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108. Victoria Clark, Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 2010), 91.

109. Oral history. John S. Badeau, Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, John F. 

Kennedy Library, interviewed by Dennis O’Brien in New York City on 25 February 

1969, 24-25. The new Kennedy administration had appointed John Badeau, the 

former president of the American University in Cairo, as ambassador to the UAR. 

Badeau believed that U.S. support for monarchies “played into the Russian hands 

as they ... depict (the U.S.) to the Middle East as the supporters of the vanishing 

order” while they support revolution. He then added that “the traditional order is 

doomed” and “radical change” was probably the “wave of the future.”

110. “Telegram from U.S. Embassy Cairo (Badeau) to WDC, 12 October 1962,” NACPM, 

GRDOS-59, NEA, CDF 1960-1963, 786h.02/10-1262, 1.

111. “Telegram from U.S. Permanent Mission to UN (Stevenson) to WDC on Meeting 

with YAR foreign minister, 18 October 1962,” NACPM, GRDOS-59, NEA, CDF 

1960-1963, 786h.00/10-1862, 1. 

“Telegram from Badeau, Cairo, to Washington, 18 October 1962,” NACPM, GRDOS59, NEA, CDF 1960-1963, 786h.00/10-1862, 1. 

Sadat became Minister of State in 1954, Secretary to the National Union in 1959, 

President of the National Assembly from 1960 to 1968, and Vice President and 

member of the Presidential Council in 1964. He was serving as Vice President 

when Nasser unexpectedly died of a heart attack in 1970. Because he was viewed as 

easy to manipulate, he became the consensus replacement for Nasser. He adroitly 

outmaneuvered his political opponents and emerged as a powerful independent 

ruler within 2 years. As Anthony Nutting points out in Nasser (New York: E.P. 

Dutton & Company, 1972), 123-124, Nasser’s distrust of the Foreign Ministry and 

his lack of knowledge about his fellow Arabs caused him to give foreign policy 

responsibilities to his former military colleagues. Sadat received the Saudi Arabian 

and Yemen portfolios. 

By the time of the Yemen Revolution, Sadat—now President of the National Assembly—had increased his portfolio to that of “presidential watchdog” for political 

organizations as well as for Yemen and Saudi Arabia. It was in this capacity that 

he bluntly warned U.S. Ambassador John Badeau not to succumb to Saudi pressure to support the royalists in the Yemen Civil War. See “Telegram from Cairo 

(Badeau) to Washington, 27 September 1962,” National Archives—College Park, 

Maryland, 786h.00/9-2762. 

See Burrowes, Historical Dictionary of Yemen, 69-70, in which the author describes 

al-Ayni as Yemen’s “best-known civilian modernist politician from the early 1960s 

to the mid-1970s.” He was the first foreign minister and would later serve four 

stints as both prime minister and foreign minister in the governments of President 

Abd-al-Rahman al-Iryani (1967–1974). He was at times viewed as al-Iryani’s likely 

successor. He also served as prime minister under President Ibrahim Muhammad 

al-Hamdi who demoted him in a power play in 1975 against the paramount sheikh 

of the Bakil Confederation, Sinan Abu Luhum, who was al-Ayni’s brother-in-law. 
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112. Telegram from U.S. Embassy Cairo (Badeau) to WDC, 22 October 1962,” NACPM, 

GRDOS-59, NEA, CDF 1960-1963, 786h.02/10-2262, 1-2.

113. Badeeb, Saudi-Egyptian Conflict, 40-41.

114. Ibid., 93-97. Several sources place the number of Egyptian troops at 75,000 to 

80,000. 

See also Clark, Yemen. Clark quoted Dr. Abdul Karim al-Iryani, a former minister 

as saying, “Even if Nasser got fed up with him, Sallal was completely Egypt’s man. 

Without showing any respect for our national identity or pride, the Egyptians came 

in here and practiced ‘direct rule’ just like (L. Paul) Bremer in Iraq.”

115. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 60-61.

116. “Telegram from WDC to U.S. Consulate General Taiz, 9 November 1962,” National 

Archives, College Park, Maryland, GRDOS-59, NEA, CDF 1960-1963, 686B.86H/11-

762, (M-1855, 59/250/3/27/4), 1. 

117. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 61.

118. Badeeb, Saudi-Egyptian Conflict, 55-57.

119. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 23.

120. Clark, Yemen, 99.

121. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 65-67. See also Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 26-27.

122. Dana Adams Schmidt, Yemen: The Unknown War (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 

Winston, 1968), 220.

123. Edgar O’Ballance, The War in Yemen (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1971), 

152 and 165-168.

124. Clark, Yemen, 101.

125. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 23.

126. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 30-31.

127. Clark, Yemen, 101.

128. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 40.

129. Ibid., 46.

130. Ibid., 51.

131. Ibid., 82.

132. Ibid., 98.

133. Ibid., 93.

134. Clark, Yemen, 105.

135. John F. Devlin, The Ba’th Party: A History from its Origins to 1966 (Stanford: Hoover 

Institute Press, 1976), 325.

136. Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens (Boulder: Longman Westview Press, 1983), 173.

137. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 65.
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JSOU Report 11-3

138. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 110. Khamis’ close relationship with Riyadh would later cost 

him his life.

139. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 72-85.

140. Ibid., 87. See also Clarke, Yemen, 108. 

141. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 128. Gause points out that the Iran opening in Yemen was 

particularly vexing to Riyadh. Always concerned about Iranian and Shi’a influence 

in Arabia, the Saudis were attempting to pressure the Sultan of Oman to remove the 

Iranian troops sent by the Shah to support his regime during the Dhofar rebellion. 

With Iranian troops in Oman, the idea that Zaydi Shi’a Yemen might also have 

close relations or even an alliance with Riyadh ignited Saudi paranoia on multiple 

fronts—ideological, ethnic, sectarian, and regional geopolitics. In the context of 

the times, Pahlavi Iran was a focus of suspicion and competition. 

142. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 123-125.

143. Ibid., 123.

144. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 92.

145. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 127.

146. Ibid., 130.

147. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 92.

148. Ibid., 96.

149. Bidwell, Two Yemens, 331.

150. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 96.

151. Ibid., 97.

152. James E. Carter, Jr. “The Defense of the Gulf,” Air Force Magazine, April 2010, 72.

153. Washington Post, 4 December 1986, 1 and 44.

154. “Memorandum from Eastern Department FO (Riches) to Hayter, 30 April 1958,” 

PRO, FO371/132968.

155. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 134.

156. Primakov served as the troubleshooter and a lead Soviet official with regard to 

Middle East affairs during the 1970s and 1980s. His importance and stature would 

later become apparent when he emerged as Russian prime minister under Boris 

Yeltsin in 1998. He was an ardent opponent of American unilateralism in the postSoviet era and the architect of the Russian challenge to U.S. and NATO policies 

with regard to Kosovo in the late 1990s.

157. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 105.

158. Ibid., 98.

159. Ibid., 106. See also Dresch, A History, 152. Dresch explains that Khamis was assassinated by internal security units. “The organizer of the operation later spoke too 

freely and was lucky to escape with a transfer to the criminal investigation branch.”

160. Dresch, A History, 149.
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161. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 99.

162. Dresch, A History, 164.

163. Ibid., 101.

164. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 139.

165. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 101-104.

166. A former western diplomat that serving in Yemen.

167. Gause, Saudi-Yemeni, 147.

168. Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen: The political economy of activism in modern 

Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 39.

169. Ibid., 151-154.

170. Dresch, A History, 162.

171. Clark, Yemen, 133.

172. Dresch, A History, 180.

173. Nazih N. Ayubi , Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East

(London: IB Tauris, 1995), 437.

174. A former senior U.S. Ambassador knowledgeable about Yemeni-Saudi security 

affairs.

175. Robert Lacey, Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the 

Struggle for Saudi Arabia (London: Viking Press, 2009), 129.

176. Ibid., 186.

177. Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 130.

178. Clark, Yemen, 143.

179. Ibid., 144.

180. Senior Gulf Arab diplomat familiar with the politics familiar with internal Yemen 

affairs.

181. Dresch, A History, 197.

182. Ayubi, Overstating, 437.

183. Dresch, A History, 197.

184. Fuad I. Khuri, Imams and Emirs: State, Religion, and Sects in Islam (London: Saqi 

Books, 1990), 57. Khuri explains the difference between Max Weber’s definition of 

a state with a “political personality” and a “jurist personality.” The latter is a modern 

western style state; it can sue and be sued and the latter, he argues, is represented 

by the Ibadi imamate in Oman and the Zaydi imamate in Yemen both creating a 

“unique political personality” that has existed since the 9th century. Khuri points 

out that the concept of state in the Arab world tend to refer to governments or 

regimes that resembled the concepts found in Ibn Khaldun’s medieval works on 

society and government. His states lacked the attributes of and were in fact not 

nation-states. 
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See also:

a. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). Although Khaldun (1332 to 1406) lived his entire 

life in Islamic Spain and North Africa, his family was Hadramawti in what is 

now Yemen. 

b. Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry (New York: St. Martin’s 

Press, 1990). Khaldun’s thoughts on asabiyya (the bond between tribal groups) 

provides the cohesion necessary to gain political power and as it wanes, the 

group disintegrates. The parallels are obvious with the cyclical nature of the 

historical Yemeni political paradigm.

185. Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society

(London: Oxford University Press, 1988), 45-48. 

See also Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab Nationalism: A History (London: Blackwell 

Publishers, 2000), 173. Choueiri argues that all Arab states, whether monarchies 

or republics, shared a “common patronage system.” “Hence family ties, regional 

identifications, as well as ethnic, tribal and sectarian grievances, were either reconstructed or reactivated. ... Jobs, loans access to education, legal rights, and even 

marriages were supposed to become available or be withdrawn according to the 

rules of patronage.” Yemen’s core system of patronage shifted from one group to 

another but never changed.

186. Dresch, A History, 202-203. 

See also:

a. Steven Erlanger, “In Yemen, U.S. Faces a Leader Who Puts Family First,” New 

York Times, 5 January 2010. The author quotes analysts as saying that Saleh 

spent “less time in the past 2 years managing the complicated tribal and regional 

demands of fragile Yemen than trying to consolidate the power of his family.” 

b. Nasser Qahtan, “A Republic or a Kingdom?” Aden Press Web version, 10 

February 2010. The author provides his list of the Saleh family members that 

hold key positions in Yemen.

187. Ibid. (Dresch).

188. “Ahmar Says President Saleh Seeking to Get Rid of General Ali Mohsen,” Yemen 

Herald, 7 November 2009. 

See also Jane Novak, “Hamid al-Ahmar, the Strong man of Yemen,” Yemen Times, 

28 December 2007.

189. Steve Erlanger, “In Yemen, U.S. Faces Leader Who Puts Family First,” New York 

Times, 5 January 2010 Web article, 3.

190. “Strife in Yemen - The World’s Next Failed State,” The Economist, 12 September 

2009, 49.

191. Dexter Filkins, “Letter from Yemen: After the Uprising” New Yorker, 11 April 2011, 

46.

192. A senior Arabian official knowledgeable about Yemen and Saudi Arabian affairs.
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Barrett: Yemen

193. Ibid.

194. Ahmed al-Haj, “Yemenis trying to oust leader protest for 5th day,” Associated Press, 

15 February 2011.

195. Interviews by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes, CBS, 16 January 2011.

196. A former senior western diplomat knowledgeable about Yemeni affairs.

197. Clark, Yemen, 170.

198. Ali H. Soufan, “Closing the Case on the Cole,” New York Times, 12 October 2010.

199. Robert F. Worth, “Separatists put Yemen at risk of self-destruction,” New York Times 

Global Edition, 1 March 2010, 6.

200. A senior Arabian official knowledgeable about Yemen and Saudi Arabian affairs.

201. Carapico, Civil Society, 203.

202. A senior Egyptian military officer knowledgeable about Yemeni and Saudi affairs.

203. Sarah Phillips, Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State, 

Developmental Leadership Program, February 2011 research paper.

204. Filkins, “After the Uprising,” 46.

205. Phillips, Yemen: Developmental Dysfuncton.

206. Ibid.

207. Mohammed Ghobaari and Mohamed Sudam, “Yemen ruling party members from 

pro-protest bloc,” Reuters, 18 April 2011; available from www.reuters.com/assets/

print?aid=USTRE73H1EU20110418.

208. Lynn Carter, Yemen Desktop Interagency Conflict Assessment (U.S. Agency for 

International Development, Management Systems International), 17 September 

2009, v.

209. A senior Arabian official knowledgeable about Yemen and Saudi Arabian affairs.

210. A mid-level Middle Eastern security officer knowledgeable about Yemen security 

affairs.

211. A former senior U.S. Ambassador knowledgeable about Yemeni-Saudi security 

affairs. 

212. “Ahmar Says,” Yemen Herald, 7 November 2009.

213. Adel Ameen, “What it means: The Demise of Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar,” Yemen 

Times, 8 December 2009 and Sadam Al-Ashmori, “Hashid Tribe Expresses Allegiance to Sadeq Al-Ahmar as New Leader,” Yemen Times, 26 January 2010.

214. “Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb,” International Crisi Group - Middle East 

Report No. 86, 27 May 2009, 5.

215. Carter, Yemen Desktop, 14-15.

216. Senior Middle East military officer knowledgeable about Arabian Peninsula affairs 

and Iran.

217. “Saada Time Bomb,” Crisis Group, 21-22.

218. “Saudi claims Yemeni rebels linked to Al Qaeda,” Reuters, 23 January 2010, 1.
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219. “Presentation and discussion at the U.S. Institute for Peace – Daniel Benjamin, 

Ambassador At-Large for Counter-Terrorism,” 8 September 2010, Washington, 

D.C.

220. Senior Qatari official knowledgeable about the Yemen negotiations and development 

aid. The Qataris are Wahhabi but of a much more relaxed strain than Saudi Arabia. 

In addition, al-Jazeera, the Qatari cable network, consistently tweaks Riyadh on 

a number of embarrassing issues. One could also make the argument that Qatar 

has better relations, thought strained at times, with Iran than any other Gulf Arab 

state. Thus the idea of Qatar mediating a dispute between Zaydi Shi’a groups on the 

Saudi border, where the Iranians were believed to be supplying the rebels as well 

as increasing its influence in Yemen through large amounts of aid, was a scenario 

that Riyadh could hardly be expected to welcome. 

221. Greg Bruno, “Interview with Christopher Boucek Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” Council on Foreign Relations, 29 December 2009, 3.

222. A U.S. official knowledgeable about Saudi-Yemeni affairs.

223. Roby C. Barrett, “Gulf Security: Policies without Context,” MEI Bulletin, December 

2009, 2-3.

224. Caryle Murphy, “Yemen: Why it’s a bigger problem for Saudi than U.S.,” Christian 

Science Monitor, 21 January 2010, 3.

225. A mid-level foreign military officer knowledgeable about Saudi military capabilities.

226. A senior Middle Eastern security official knowledgeable about border security 

issues.

227. Murphy, “Yemen,” 2.

228. Senior Middle Eastern military officer knowledgeable about Arabian Peninsula 

affairs and Iran.

229. Ibid.

230. A senior Middle Eastern security official knowledgeable about border security 

issues.

231. Dresch, Imams and Tribes, 280.

232. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 107.

233. Kevin Peraino, “The Reeducation of Abu Janda: Can Jihadis really be Reformed?” 

Newsweek, 8 June 2009, 42.

234. Clark, Yemen, 282.

235. Charles Levinson and Margaret Coker, “Al Qaeda’s Deep Tribal Ties Make Yemen 

a Terror Hub,” The Wall Street Journal, 22 January 2010.

236. Barak Barfi, “Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of Al Qaeda in Yemen,” New 

American Foundation-Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, January 

2010, 1.

237. A senior Arabian official knowledgeable about Yemen and Saudi Arabian affairs.

238. “A growing worry for the West,” The Economist, 2 January 2010, 35.
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239. Christopher Boucek, “Question presented by Ahmed Saleh described as a South 

Yemeni,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Al-Qaeda in Yemen, 7 July 

2009.

240. A relatively new area of study on colonial regimes is called informant theory for 

lack of a better term; it looks at police and security operations and how they were 

colored by who the informant supplying the information fit into the society. For 

example, having a Christian Lebanese report on Hezbollah or a Jaish al-Mahdi

member report on the Sons of Iraq (SOI) invites problems of intentional and cultural 

prejudice that distort the information. 

See an excellent study by Christopher A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence 

gathering and social communication in India, 1780-1870 (London: Cambridge 

University Press, 1999). It examines the complexities evaluating information and 

sourcing in a culturally diverse environment.

241. Senior Gulf military officer knowledgeable about tribal issues and U.S. policy.

242. “Growing Worry,” The Economist, 35.

243. Levinson, “Deep Tribal Ties.” The Wall Street Journal.

244. Burrowes, Yemen Arab Republic, 8.

245. A senior Middle Eastern military officer knowledgeable about Arabian Peninsula 

affairs and Iran.

246. Prince Turki bin Feisal bin Abd-al-Aziz, speech at the Middle East Institute Conference, Washington D.C., November 2006.

247. “Presentation – Daniel Benjamin,” 8 September 2010.

248. Ibid. Another person suggested that the U.S. might consider paying the jihadis 

$100,000 each to stay at home because it would be “more cost effective.”

249. “Presentation – Daniel Benjamin,” 8 September 2010.

250. Ibid.

251. Jim Michaels, “U.S. takes new approach to Yemen aid program,” USA Today, 16 

November 2010, 5A.

252. Greg Miller, “CIA sees increased threat in Yemen,” The Washington Post, 25 August 

2010, A1.

253. “Presentation – Daniel Benjamin,” 8 September 2010.

254. “U.S. terror war in Yemen frustrated by politics,” AOL News; available at www.

aolnews.com/story/us-terror-war-in-yemen-frustrated-by/1335869 (accessed April 

2011). 

255. Mike Mullen, “The Proper Use of the Military,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 22 March 2010, 66.

256. Frederick W. Kagan and Christopher Harnisch, “Yemen: How to Apply ‘Smart Power’ 

in Yemen,” Wall Street Journal, 14 January 2010, 2. This article is absolutely correct 

about the capabilities of the U.S. Government in Yemen, but the solution of creating 

a capability in Washington to address problems in Yemen is utter nonsense. The 
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authors are under the impression that the government in Sana’a is a nation-state 

and must be supported as the only alternative to the Huthi rebellion and southern 

secession. The problem is far more complicated.

257. Phil Stewart, “U.S. urges Yemen transition, no aid cut-off Pentagon,” Reuters, 9 April 

2011; available at http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid+UKTRE7346V720110405 

(accessed April 2011).

258. Filkins, “Letter from Yemen,” 40.

259. 2011 Yemen Stability Study—Glevum Stability Assessment, March 2011; available 

at www.fpri.org/pubs/2011/glevum.yemen2011stabilitysurveyvi.pdf (accessed April 

2011), 11.

260. William Faulkner, “Requiem for a Nun,” 1951.