alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of May Bolhower, Petitioner, v Stephen Berger, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents.

Determination of Commisioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, dated July 25, 1975, affirming decision of the New York City Department of Social Services (agency) requiring petitioner to pay one fourth of a hospital bill, to wit, $1,070, unanimously annulled, on the law, without costs and without disbursements, and the matter remanded to the agency to recalculate petitioner’s eligibility in accordance with the views expressed herein. On petitioner’s admission to New York Hospital for emergency brain surgery on August 15, 1974, from which institution she was discharged on September 7, 1974, she applied to the agency for medical assistance to cover the cost of her hospital stay. On December 12, 1974, the agency issued an eligibility determination requiring petitioner to pay one fourth of the bill, to wit, $1,070, based on her net income in 1973 of $4,282. In April, 1975, the agency adhered to this determination in response to the petitioner’s request for an adjustment based upon her net income in 1974 of only $1,500. Petitioner requested a fair hearing to appeal this decision. At the hearing, petitioner, not assisted by counsel or a lay representative, offered her income tax return for 1974 disclosing a net income of only $1,500, together with supplementary evidence. The hearing officer declined to accept into evidence the income tax return apparently on a general doubt, not supported by any concrete facts, that petitioner could have in fact lived on such an income. Apparently the hearing officer gave no consideraconsiderato the obvious fact that petitioner’s illness and hospitalization for an extended period in 1974 inevitably would have resulted in a sharply reduced income. It is clear that petitioner’s income during the year of the hospitalihospitaliin issue is decisive (see Social Services Law, § 366, subd 2, par [b]) and that the income reported on her income tax return for that year would exempt her from the requirement of a contribution. (Social Services Law, § 366, subd 2, par [a], cl [8].) The failure of the hearing officer to accept into evidence and give appropriate weight to the 1974 income tax return was arbitrary. Nor do we find the summary way in which the hearing was conducted with regard to a woman unassisted by counsel on a matter of large importance to her to be consistent with the requirements of a fair hearing. The determination challenged is accordingly nullified and the agency is directed to recalculate petitioner’s eligibility in accordance with the views here set forth. Concur—Silverman, J. P., Evans, Lynch, Sandler and Sullivan, JJ.
Exhibit 23


CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM


We have issued our report dated June 27, 2019, with respect to the financial statements and supplemental information included in the Annual Report of Navistar, Inc. Retirement Accumulation Plan on Form 11-K for the year ended December 31, 2018. We consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the Registration Statement of Navistar International Corporation on Form S-8 (File No. 333-162266).


/s/ Grant Thornton LLP


Chicago, Illinois


June 27, 2019
EXHIBIT 12.1

Medical Device Manufacturing, Inc.  Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges  (in thousands)

|                      |                                        | Twelve Months Ended December 31,
|--------------------- | -------------------------------------- | --------------------------------
|
|
|Pre-tax loss (income) |                                        | $                               
|                      | Interest Expense                       |                                 
|                      | Amortization of capitalized interest   |                                 
|                      | Distributed income of equity investees |                                 
|                      | Interest portion of rent               |                                 
|                      |                                        |                                 
|                      | (Loss) earnings                        |                                 
|                      | Fixed charges                          |                                 
|                      |                                        | Ratio                           
|                      |                                        | Deficiency                      

---



QuickLinks
§ 964.335 Grant agreement. ( a ) *General.* HUD will enter into a grant agreement with the recipients of a Family Investment Centers grant which defines the legal framework for the relationship between HUD and a HA.
( b ) *Term of grant agreement.* A grant will be for a term of three to five years depending upon the tasks undertaken, as defined under this subpart.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John Archie Miles, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the County Court, Suffolk County, dated July 18, 1956, denying, after a hearing, his *coram nobis*application to vacate a judgment of said court rendered December 30, 1940, convicting him, on his plea of guilty, of burglary in the third degree, and sentencing him as a second felony offender. Order affirmed. (See *People*v. *Page,*12 A D 2d 984.) Defendant also appeals from an order of the same court, dated August 5, 1958, denying without a hearing his second *coram nobis*application. Appeal from said order dismissed. No such order appears to have been entered and no such order is in the record. We have, however, examined the merits of the defendant’s second *coram nobis*application and would affirm the order if one had been made. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed May 19, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D20-403 Lower Tribunal No. 11-5566

________________ 

### Alejandro Cantero , Appellant,

vs. 

### HSBC Bank USA, N.A. , Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice Butchko, Judge. Pomeranz & Associates, P.A., and Mark L. Pomeranz (Hallandale), for appellant. Liebler Gonzalez & Portuondo, and Mary J. Walter, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM.2

Affirmed. See Stacknik v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Tr., MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgs. Tr. 2007-3 Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3, 283 So. 3d 981, 983–84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (affirming final judgment of foreclosure finding that evidence of the default notice, the mailing log and customer service notes indicating that the default notice had been mailed was sufficient to establish compliance with paragraph 22 of the mortgage); CitiBank, N.A. for WAMU Series 2007-HE2 Tr. v. Manning, 221 So. 3d 677, 681–82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding that evidence of the breach letter and testimony that the letter “went out” by a witness with personal knowledge as to the Bank’s regular business practice of mailing breach letters was sufficient to raise a presumption that the breach letter was indeed mailed to Borrower via first class mail in compliance with the mortgage’s notice requirements).
### §31323. Disclosing and incurring obligations before executing preferred mortgages

(a) On request of the mortgagee and before executing a preferred mortgage, the mortgagor shall disclose in writing to the mortgagee the existence of any obligation known to the mortgagor on the vessel to be mortgaged.

(b) After executing a preferred mortgage and before the mortgagee has had a reasonable time to file the mortgage, the mortgagor may not incur, without the consent of the mortgagee, any contractual obligation establishing a lien on the vessel except a lien for—

(1) wages of a stevedore when employed directly by a person listed in section 31341 of this title;

(2) wages for the crew of the vessel;

(3) general average; or

(4) salvage, including contract salvage.

(c) On conviction of a mortgagor under section 31330(a)(1)(A) or (B) of this title for violating this section, the mortgage indebtedness, at the option of the mortgagee, is payable immediately.

(Pub. L. 100–710, title I, §102(c), Nov. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 4744.)

| Revised section | Source section (U.S. Code) |
| --- | --- |
| 31323(a) | 46:924(1) |
| 31323(b) | 46:924(2) |
| 31323(c) | 46:941(b) (last sentence) |

Section 31323(a) requires the mortgagor to disclose any obligations on the vessel before executing a preferred mortgage. This subsection makes no substantive change to law.

Section 31323(b) provides that, after executing a preferred mortgage, the mortgagor may not incur, without consent of the mortgagee, any contractual obligations establishing a lien on the vessel—except a lien for stevedore wages, crew wages, general average, and salvage. The only substantive change to law made by this subsection is that the reasonable time to record a mortgage is changed to a reasonable time to file the mortgage, and the elimination of the reference to endorsements. These changes are in keeping with the changes made in section 31322.

Section 31323(c) provides that if a mortgagor is convicted of a violation of this section, then the mortgage indebtedness, at the option of the mortgagee, is payable immediately. This subsection makes no substantive change to law.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Jan. 1, 1989, with certain exceptions and qualifications, see section 107 of Pub. L. 100–710, set out as a note under section 31301 of this title.
### §§1341 to 1344. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Sections 1341 to 1344 were omitted as not of general application, and as covered by the Canal Zone Code. The Canal Zone Code was subsequently redesignated the Panama Canal Code by Pub. L. 96–70, §3303(b), and repealed by Pub. L. 104–201, §3549.

Section 1341, acts Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 390, §7, 37 Stat. 564; Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 370, §2, 42 Stat. 1004; Feb. 16, 1933, ch. 91, §1, 47 Stat. 814, related to determination of towns in Canal Zone.

Section 1342, acts Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 390, §7, 37 Stat. 564; Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 370, §1, 42 Stat. 1004; Feb. 16, 1933, ch. 91, §1, 47 Stat. 814, related to magistrate courts.

Section 1343, acts Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 390, §7, 37 Stat. 564; Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 370, §1, 42 Stat. 1004; Feb. 16, 1933, ch. 91, §1, 47 Stat. 814, related to appeals from magistrate courts.

Section 1344, acts Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 390, §8, 37 Stat. 565; Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 370, §2, 42 Stat. 1005; Feb. 16, 1933, ch. 91, §2, 47 Stat. 815, related to district courts generally.
#### § 972.100 Purpose.

The purpose of this subpart is to implement section 33 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437z-5), which requires PHAs to annually review their public housing inventory and identify developments, or parts of developments, which must be removed from its stock of public housing operated under an Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) with HUD.

This subpart provides the procedures a PHA must follow to develop and carry out a conversion plan to remove the units from the public housing inventory, including how to provide for the transition for residents of these developments to other affordable housing.
#### § 15.1 Purpose and effective dates.

This part sets forth the requirements for approval of explosives and sheathed explosive units to be used in underground coal mines and certain underground metal and nonmetal gassy mines and is effective January 17, 1989. Those manufacturers proceeding under the provisions of the previous regulation may file requests for approval or extension of approval of explosives under that regulation until January 17, 1990. After January 17, 1990, all requests for approval or extension of approval of explosives or sheathed explosive units shall be made in accordance with Subpart A and the applicable subpart of this part. Explosives issued an approval under regulations in place prior to January 17, 1989, and in compliance with those regulations, may continue to be manufactured and marked as approved as long as no change to the explosive is made.

[53 FR 46761, Nov. 18, 1988; 54 FR 351, Jan. 5, 1989]
### §1755. Compensation, privileges, and immunities

Until the Rules of the House of Representatives are amended to provide otherwise, the Delegate from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands shall receive the same compensation, allowances, and benefits as a Member of the House of Representatives, and shall be entitled to whatever privileges and immunities are, or hereinafter may be, granted to any other nonvoting Delegate to the House of Representatives.

(Pub. L. 110–229, title VII, §715, May 8, 2008, 122 Stat. 869.)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Frank Lugo, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered January 6, 1977, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interests of justice, and new trial ordered. The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment because of the 18-month delay between the alleged drug sale and the arrest. However, other errors require a reversal and a new trial. Defense counsel, in a demand for a bill of particulars, requested the prosecution to inform him of any statements that might have been made by the defendant and whether any tape recording of the alleged sale of cocaine had been made. The prosecutor denied the existence of either of such items. It was only during the hearing held on the defendant’s *Townsend*motion (see *People v Townsend,*38 AD2d 569) that defense counsel learned of the existence of a tape recording of conversations between the undercover officer and the codefendant prior to the sale, and of statements allegedly made by defendant during the drug transaction. The denial of the existence of such information, which was known to the prosecutor is improper (see *People v Testa,*48 AD2d 691, affd 40 NY2d 1018). Furthermore, the conduct of counsel for both sides is not to be commended. Counsel often made improper, irrelevant and inflammatory remarks. Moreover, the trial court should have granted defendant’s request for a *Wade*hearing with respect to his identification by the undercover officer. Although there appears to be evidence suggesting that the officer had a sufficient independent basis to support his identification of defendant, identification was a crucial issue with regard to the alibi defense and the circumstances revealed in this record indicate that a hearing should have been held. In view of the fact that the evidence of guilt presented was not overwhelming, we cannot say that the foregoing errors were harmless (cf. *People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230). Latham, J. P., Gulotta, Margett and Hawkins, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Bradley J. Bell, Principal Executive Officer of Nalco Finance Holdings LLC (‘‘Nalco’’) and Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Nalco, in conjunction with the filing of Nalco’s 10-K financial report (the ‘‘Report’’) with the Securities and Exchange Commission, covering the period ending December 31, 2007, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as follows:

| |    |                                                                                                                      
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | a. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

| |    |                                                                                                                                     
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | b. | The information in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Nalco.

/S/ Bradley J. Bell
Bradley J. Bell
Principal Executive Officer and Executive
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Date: February 28, 2008


A signed original of this written statement required by §906 has been provided to Nalco Finance Holdings LLC and will be retained by Nalco Finance Holdings LLC and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
§ 1210.206 Will I need to submit additional documents or evidence to ONRR? ( a ) Federal and Indian lease terms allow us to request detailed statements, documents, or other evidence necessary to verify compliance with lease terms and conditions and applicable rules.
( b ) We will request this additional information as we need it, not as a regular submission.
[66 FR 45771, Aug. 30, 2001. Redesignated at 73 FR 15897, Mar. 26, 2008]
EXHIBIT 99.1
                                  ------------





                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT BY
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the quarterly report of Commodore Separation
Technologies, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended September
30, 2002, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of
his knowledge:

         (1)  The quarterly report fully complies with the requirements of
              section 13 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)  The information contained in the quarterly report fairly presents,
              in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
              operations of the Company.


Date: November 11, 2002              /s/ Bentley Blum
                                     -----------------------
                                     Bentley Blum
                                     Chief Executive Officer
#### Howard Hale et al., Respondents, v City of Utica et al., Appellants.

Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs. Memorandum: Appellant property owners appeal from a judgment declaring void an ordinance of the City of Utica which rezoned their 11-acre parcel of land from residential to Planned Development-Extraordinary (PD-E). Appellant intends to construct "a regional scale chain discount store” (K-Mart). The property is located in an essentially residential area. The proposed amendment was not approved by the county planning department and the city planning board failed to state the reasons for its approval as required by the ordinance. In an effort to comply with the statutory requirement that it state its reasons for adopting the amendment although the county planning board failed to approve the proposal (see General Municipal Law, § 239-m), the common council passed a resolution after this litigation was commenced stating primarily economic reasons general to the community as a whole for rezoning the property. It cited the value of the new construction, the number of new jobs, the increase in employment and the increase in the city’s tax base, matters which the council did not relate to sound planning principles. Since the amendment was not supported by any evidence that it accorded with the city’s existing or evolving plans for development of the area, the ordinance is void (see *Udell v Haas,*21 NY2d 463, 469; *Walus v Millington,*49 Misc 2d 104, affd 31 AD2d 777). We have not passed upon the several procedural issues raised by the briefs. (Appeal from judgment of Oneida Supreme Court—declaratory judgment.) Present—Moule, J. P., Simons, Dillon, Hancock, Jr., and Denman, JJ.
#### Jason Pomerantz, Appellant, v In-Stride, Inc., Respondent, et al., Defendant.

[835 NYS2d 589]

*523In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dollard, J.), entered March 14, 2006, as, upon granting that branch of the motion of the defendant In-Stride, Inc., which was for leave to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of a discharge in bankruptcy, granted that branch of the motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant In-Stride, Inc., on the ground of discharge in bankruptcy.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant In-Stride, Inc., on the ground of discharge in bankruptcy is denied.

In September 2001 the infant plaintiff allegedly was injured while wearing sneakers manufactured and/or distributed by the defendant In-Stride, Inc. (hereinafter In-Stride). The infant plaintiff, by his mother, subsequently commenced this action against In-Stride and the defendant Journeys, the alleged distributor and/or seller of the sneakers. Answers were served by both defendants. During the course of the action, In-Stride declared bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and eventually was discharged by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas.

Subsequent thereto, In-Stride moved, inter alia, for leave to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of a discharge in bankruptcy and, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground of discharge in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court granted that relief. We reverse the order insofar as appealed from.

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, even though In-Stride’s debts were discharged in bankruptcy, the complaint in this action, insofar as it was asserted against In-Stride, should not have been dismissed. It is clear from both the plaintiffs opposition papers and his brief that the plaintiff is seeking to pursue this action solely for the purpose of obtaining a judgment or settlement so as to be able to proceed directly against In-Stride’s liability insurer under Insurance Law § 3420. Such an action is permitted even after a discharge in bankruptcy *(see Lang v Hanover Ins. Co.,*3 NY3d 350, 355, 356 [2004]; *Roman v*
      *524
      *Hudson Tel. Assoc.,*11 AD3d 346, 347 [2004]; *Presutti v Suss,*254 AD2d 785 [1998]; *Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v Morse Shoe Co.,*218 AD2d 624, 625 [1995]; *see also Green v Welsh,*956 F2d 30, 33-34 [1992]; *cf. Resolution Trust Corp. v Independent Church of Realization of Word of God,*259 AD2d 683 [1999]). Accordingly, the complaint should not have been dismissed insofar as asserted against In-Stride. Rivera, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.