Page 1 GAO-17-265R DEA Confidential Informants

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 30, 2016

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz

Chairman

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings

Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

Confidential Informants: Status of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s Efforts to 

Address a GAO Recommendation

Law enforcement agencies rely on the use of confidential informants as one of many 

investigative tools at the agencies’ disposal.

1 Because of some informants’ past involvement in 

criminal activities or organizations, the informants often have access to, or status in, such 

organizations and are uniquely situated to provide useful and credible information to law 

enforcement agencies regarding criminal activities. The information the informant provides may 

be critical to an investigation, but problems can occur if an agency fails to exercise appropriate 

oversight over the informant and the informant’s activities. To help ensure appropriate oversight 

of informants, The Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants

(Guidelines) sets forth detailed procedures and review mechanisms to ensure that law 

enforcement agencies exercise their authorities appropriately and with adequate oversight.

In September 2015, as part of a review of several agencies’ use of confidential informants, we 

reported on the extent to which (1) the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) informant 

policy included procedures outlined in the Guidelines for effectively vetting informants and 

overseeing informants’ illegal activities, and (2) DEA had monitoring processes to ensure 

compliance with the provisions in the Guidelines for vetting informants and overseeing 

informants’ illegal activities.2 Our report contained one recommendation to the Administrator of 

DEA, with assistance and oversight from the Department of Justice (DOJ) Criminal Division, to 

update its policy and corresponding monitoring processes to explicitly address the Guidelines’ 

provisions on oversight of informants’ illegal activities.3 You asked us to report on the actions 

DEA has taken to address this recommendation. This report provides our assessment of DEA’s 

actions taken in response to our recommendation.

 1

The Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants defines a confidential informant as 

any individual who provides useful and credible information to a law enforcement agency regarding felonious criminal 

activities, and from whom the law enforcement agency expects or intends to obtain additional useful and credible 

information regarding such activities in the future.

2

See GAO, Confidential Informants: Updates to Policy and Additional Guidance Would Improve Oversight by DOJ 

and DHS Agencies, GAO-15-807 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2015). DEA was among eight component agencies 

within the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security that GAO evaluated in the report.

3

We found that DEA’s policy generally addressed the factors outlined in the Guidelines for vetting a confidential 

informant. 
Page 2 GAO-17-265R DEA Confidential Informants

To complete our September 2015 report, we assessed DEA’s informant policy against 

provisions in the Guidelines regarding vetting informants and overseeing informants’ illegal 

activities. Our assessment determined whether DEA’s and the other agencies’ policies met the 

minimum criteria established in the Guidelines. We also interviewed DEA officials responsible 

for overseeing the agency’s informant programs and reviewed guidance from and interviewed 

representatives of DOJ headquarters offices (Office of the Deputy Attorney General and 

Criminal Division). Additionally, we analyzed monitoring processes by comparing agencies’ 

internal review mechanisms and processes against Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government.

4 We also analyzed documentation such as examples of inspection checklists and 

inspection reports. Our published work provides more detail on our scope and methodology.5 As 

part of our annual fiscal year 2016 recommendation follow up, we requested DEA’s updated 

confidential informant policy and internal inspection checklists. We continued to receive updated 

information through October 2016. We reviewed the updated policy and inspection checklists 

and met with DEA officials to assess the extent to which DEA’s actions were consistent with our 

recommendation. 

We conducted this performance audit in November 2016 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief

DEA has updated its policy and monitoring processes to address the Guidelines’ provisions on 

oversight of informants’ illegal activities. These actions are consistent with the recommendation 

we made in our September 2015 report, and we consider the recommendation to be closed and 

implemented. 

Background

The Guidelines require each DOJ law enforcement agency to develop agency-specific policies 

regarding the use of informants, and the DOJ Criminal Division is tasked with reviewing these 

agency-specific policies to ensure that they comply with the Guidelines. The Guidelines also 

provide that whenever an agency believes that an exception to any provision in the Guidelines 

is justified, the agency is to seek an exception from DOJ’s Criminal Division, and the agency is 

required to maintain documentation of any exceptions granted.

Our September 2015 report focused on two areas within the Guidelines:

• Requirements for Vetting Informants: The Guidelines require that, prior to utilizing a 

person as an informant, agencies vet informants to assess their suitability for the work. 

For example, law enforcement agents who oversee the use of informants (case agents 

or control agents) must complete and sign a written initial suitability report and 

recommendation that addresses factors about the proposed informant such as 

biographical information, personal information (e.g., relationship to the target of the 

investigation), motivation for becoming an informant, and criminal history.

 4

GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

5

GAO-15-807.
Page 3 GAO-17-265R DEA Confidential Informants

• Requirements for Overseeing Informants’ Illegal Activities: Since 1980, the 

Guidelines have permitted agencies to authorize informants to engage in activities that 

would otherwise constitute crimes under federal, state, or local law if someone without 

such authorization engaged in these same activities. For example, in the appropriate 

circumstance, an agency could authorize an informant to purchase illegal drugs from 

someone who is the target of a drug-trafficking investigation. Such conduct is termed 

“otherwise illegal activity.” The Guidelines include certain requirements when authorizing 

otherwise illegal activity and restrictions on the types of activities an agency can 

authorize. In particular, the Guidelines prohibit agencies from authorizing an informant to 

participate in an act of violence, obstruction of justice, and other enumerated unlawful

activities.

DEA Has Addressed Our Recommendation to Update Its Confidential Informant Policy 

and Corresponding Monitoring Processes 

In September 2015, we reported that DEA’s policy generally addressed the factors outlined in 

the Guidelines for vetting a confidential informant. We also reported that DEA’s policy was either 

partially consistent with or did not address some provisions in the Guidelines regarding 

oversight of informants’ illegal activities. As a result, the policy did not explicitly inform DEA 

agents of all the activities and safeguards that the Guidelines outline for minimizing the risks 

involved with using informants. We found that DEA had processes in place, such as ongoing 

monitoring activities and separate evaluations, to help ensure compliance with its informant 

policy. However, DEA’s monitoring processes—including periodic internal inspections of DEA 

field offices—generally did not address compliance with illegal activity provisions, in part 

because these provisions were not explicitly addressed in DEA’s informant policy. To help 

ensure that DEA’s policy and oversight were fully consistent with the Guidelines, we 

recommended that the Administrator of DEA, with assistance and oversight from the DOJ 

Criminal Division, update DEA’s policy and corresponding monitoring processes to explicitly 

address the Guidelines’ provisions on oversight of informants’ illegal activities.

In response to our recommendation, DEA updated its policy and provided it to the DOJ Criminal 

Division for review. In April 2016, the DOJ Criminal Division signed a memorandum stating that 

the updated policy is consistent with the Guidelines. We reviewed a copy of the policy in 

September 2016, once the policy provisions had been fully incorporated into DEA’s agents 

manual, and confirmed that the policy is consistent with the Guidelines provisions regarding 

overseeing informants’ illegal activities. Additionally, in October 2016, DEA provided us with 

updated internal inspection checklists that include questions to help ensure compliance with the 

updated policy, including provisions added to the policy to address our recommendation. 

DEA’s updated policy and monitoring processes are consistent with our recommendation. Thus, 

we consider the recommendation closed and implemented.

Agency Comments

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Justice. In its written 

comments, reproduced in enclosure I, DEA stated it was pleased with our determination that 

DEA has implemented the recommendation.
Page 4 GAO-17-265R DEA Confidential Informants

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the 

Attorney General of the United States. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the 

GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about our September 2015 report or the actions that DEA 

took to close the recommendation, please contact me at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are Kristy Love, 

Assistant Director, and Alana Finley.

Diana Maurer

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Enclosure - 1
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Enclosure I

(101258)
Page 6 GAO-17-265R DEA Confidential Informants

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