Regional Seminar Series on

Developing and Implementing

Antistalking Codes

Monograph

U. S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Bureau of Justice Assistance

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC
Bureau of Justice Assistance

Regional Seminar Series on Implementing Antistalking Codes

Monograph

June 1996

NCJ 156836
The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the

Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

This document was prepared by the National Criminal Justice Association, under grant number

93–DD–CX–0025 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, and

grant number 94–VF–CX–K001 awarded by the Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Department of

Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this document are

those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.

Bureau of Justice Assistance

633 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20531

U.S. Department of Justice Response Center

800–421–6770

Bureau of Justice Assistance Clearinghouse

800–688–4252

Bureau of Justice Assistance Internet Address

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA
iii

Foreword

I am pleased to present this monograph on the regional seminar series “Developing and

Implementing Antistalking Codes.” The seminars were funded jointly by the Bureau of Justice

Assistance (BJA) and Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), both agencies of the U.S. Department

of Justice. 

The regional seminars were conducted to acquaint State policymakers with the model antistalking

code developed by the National Criminal Justice Association (NCJA) under contract to the

National Institute of Justice. The seminars also allowed policymakers to assess the strengths and

weaknesses of existing State laws and to review alternative approaches to enforcement.

The monograph includes an overview of the seminar proceedings and findings, a profile of

existing State antistalking statutes (current through the 1994 State legislative sessions), an

analysis of recent State appellate court decisions in stalking cases, and information on

developments in the area of civil protective order laws since publication of the model code. The

model code and commentary and the principal recommendations contained in the final report of

the model code project are included in appendixes.

The seminars provided participants with the opportunity to obtain valuable information from

practitioners on intervening in and prosecuting stalking cases. We hope that this information will

guide legislators, public policymakers, and criminal justice officials in making informed decisions

about antistalking laws and policies.

Nancy E. Gist

Director

Bureau of Justice Assistance
v

Acknowledgments

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) wishes to thank Gwen A. Holden, Executive Vice

President, National Criminal Justice Association (NCJA) for her outstanding work in 

supervising and coordinating the preparation of this document. BJA acknowledges the skill,

knowledge, and hard work of NCJA project staff, which included Paul E. Lawrence, Lisa 

Doyle Moran, Robert A. Kapler, Nadine M. Rapacioli, Carolyn J. Reid, Wanda A. 

Meredith, Jennifer A. Ferrante, and Doug B. Roberson. In addition, BJA would like to 

recognize the work of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) (under contract

with NCJA).

BJA also thanks the NCJA Advisory Council, whose members provided the NCJA project 

staff with the names of potential participants in the regional seminars, and the cohosts of the

regional seminars: the Florida Department of Law Enforcement; the Oregon Administrative

Services Division, Criminal Justice Services Section; the Illinois Criminal Justice Information

Authority; the Illinois Attorney General’s Office; and the Chicago (Illinois) Police 

Department. 

BJA and NCJA are especially appreciative of members of the project resource group, who are

introduced in the following paragraphs, for their dedication to this endeavor and willingness to

share their experiences with the project staff. 

 David Beatty is Director of Public Policy at the National Victim Center (NVC). In 

this capacity, he is responsible for all matters related to legislative and legal issues

regarding victims’ rights and interests. Mr. Beatty also serves as Director of the 

Center’s Crime Victim Litigation Project and the Coalition of Victims’ Attorneys and

Consultants. He currently serves on the Victim Committee of the American Bar

Association and is a member of the American Restitution Association and the National

Constitutional Amendment Network. Mr. Beatty holds a bachelor of arts degree in

political science from Colorado College and a Juris Doctor from University of Iowa

School of Law. 

 Joseph M. Claps is the Chief of Criminal Justice for the Illinois Attorney General’s

Office, where he has served in various capacities for 12 1/2 years. Previously, he 

served as an Assistant State’s Attorney for the Cook County (Illinois) State’s 

Attorney’s Office. Mr. Claps currently is an adjunct professor of law for trial practice 

at Loyola University Law School (Illinois) and a lecturer at John Marshall School of 

Law (Illinois). He also is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves as a judge

advocate general, currently serving as the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for the

commanding general. Mr. Claps received his undergraduate degree from Loyola

University and his Juris Doctor from IIT-Chicago Kent College of Law (Illinois).

 Michael T. Farmer currently serves as Manager of Corporate Security for the 

Exploration and Producing Division of the Mobil Oil Corporation. Prior to assuming 
vi

his current position, he was Manager of Corporate Security Planning; Manager of

Security, Exploration, and Producing; and Manager of Corporate Security Operations 

at Mobil. Before joining Mobil, Mr. Farmer served as Director of the Criminal 

Justice Center, John Jay College, City University of New York. He also served as

Director of Research and Field Operations for the Police Executive Research Forum

(PERF). Mr. Farmer served as Special Assistant to the Administrator of the U.S.

Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and as

Acting Director of the Office of Evaluation in the U.S. Department of Justice’s 

National Institute of Justice (NIJ). He began his career with the Kentucky Crime

Commission, where he served as the director of planning. Mr. Farmer holds a 

bachelor’s degree in sociology and psychology from University of Kentucky and a

master’s degree in regional planning from University of North Carolina at Chapel 

Hill. 

 Robert A. Fein is a forensic psychologist who currently is a Visiting Fellow at NIJ 

and a consultant psychologist with the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s U.S. Secret

Service. He codirects the Secret Service Exceptional Case Study Project, a multiyear

operational study of violence directed at public officials and public figures. 

Previously, Dr. Fein worked for 15 years as a clinical and forensic psychologist with

mentally disordered offenders in Massachusetts and with the mental health and

correctional systems that evaluate and care for them. He holds a bachelor’s degree in

American studies from Amherst College (Massachusetts) and a doctorate in clinical

psychology and public practice from Harvard University (Massachusetts).

 Jon R. Felde is General Counsel of NCSL and Director of NCSL’s Committee on 

Law and Justice. Prior to joining NCSL in 1986, he practiced law in Franklin, 

Kentucky, with the firm of Harlin, Parker & Rudloff. Mr. Felde holds a bachelor of 

arts degree from Harvard College (Massachusetts) and a law degree from University 

of Kentucky College of Law. 

 Susan W. Hillenbrand has worked for the American Bar Association (ABA) for more

than 20 years and currently is Director for Special Projects for ABA’s Section for

Criminal Justice. During her tenure, Ms. Hillenbrand has contributed to a variety of

victim assistance research projects and publications. She also has served as a 

consultant to the National College of the Judiciary and as a contractor for the U.S.

Department of Labor, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation, and

Research. Ms. Hillenbrand holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from 

Marymount College (New York) and a certificate from the Paralegal Institute in New

York (New York).

 Sally Hillsman is presently serving as Assistant Director of NIJ, under an interagency

personnel agreement between the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and NIJ.

Upon conclusion of this appointment, Dr. Hillsman will return to her position as Vice

President of research at NCSC. From 1979 to 1991, Dr. Hillsman served as Associate
vii

Director and Research Director of the Vera Institute of Justice (New York). She holds 

a bachelor of arts degree from Mount Holyoke College (Massachusetts), attended the

University of Edinburgh (Scotland), and holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia

University (New York).

 Donna Hunzeker is Criminal Justice Program Manager for NCSL in Denver, 

Colorado. She staffs NCSL’s Criminal Justice Committee. Prior to joining NCSL in 

1989, Ms. Hunzeker was a community action planner and spent 7 years with a justiceoriented nonprofit organization where she was editor of a corrections magazine. Ms.

Hunzeker holds a bachelor’s degree in sociology and has done graduate work in

journalism at University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

 Nolan E. Jones is the Group Director for the Human Resources Group of the National

Governors’ Association (NGA). He has served as Staff Director for NGA’s Task 

Force on Alcohol and Drug Abuse. Previously, Dr. Jones was assistant professor of

political science at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. Recently, Dr. Jones was

elected to the governing council of the American Political Science Association. He holds

an undergraduate degree from Texas Southern University and a doctoral degree in

political science from Washington University (Missouri).

 John C. Lane is a 22-year veteran of the Los Angeles (California) Police Department 

and serves as Officer in Charge of the department’s Threat Management Unit, which

focuses on abnormal, long-term threat and harassment cases. Lt. Lane is the founder 

and current President of the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals. Lt. 

Lane, who developed the unit, holds a bachelor’s degree in physical education from

California State University at Long Beach and a master’s degree in public administration

from University of Southern California. 

 Helen M. Lardner is Attorney-Advisor for the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 

Office of Enforcement. Previously, she practiced law at private firms. She holds a

bachelor’s degree in English from Xavier University (Ohio) and a Juris Doctor from

Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C.). 

 Victoria O’Brien currently serves as Attorney-Advisor in the Office of the General

Counsel, Office of Justice Programs (OJP), U.S. Department of Justice. Previously, 

she served as Acting Director of Operations for the Special Projects Division of the

Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), U.S. Department of Justice, which administers

training and technical assistance to victim service providers and criminal justice 

system professionals. She also has served as a legal advisor and grant monitor at the 

Legal Services Corporation and community organizer for the VISTA/Student 

Community Service Program in Denver, Colorado. She holds a bachelor of arts 

degree from Denison University (Ohio) and a Juris Doctor from Loyola University 

Law School (Illinois). 
viii

 Roxann M. Ryan currently serves as Assistant Attorney General of Iowa in the Criminal

Appeals Division. She has worked in the Iowa Attorney General’s Office since 1980,

previously serving as Deputy Attorney General, Division Head, and Staff Attorney in the

Criminal Appeals Division. Ms. Ryan is a full-time student in the criminal justice doctoral

program at University of Nebraska at Omaha. Ms. Ryan holds a bachelor’s degree in

economics and a Juris Doctor from Iowa State University.

 John R. Stedman is a Senior Researcher for PERF in Washington, D.C. Prior to assuming

that post, Mr. Stedman spent 16 years with the Alexandria (Virginia) Police Department,

serving as a patrol officer, police investigator, sergeant, and lieutenant. During his tenure,

he was commander of several divisions, including the Patrol and Special Investigations

Divisions. He also is the former Director of PERF’s Senior Management Institute for

Police. Currently he serves as Assistant Project Director of PERF’s Comprehensive Gang

Initiative Project and its Asset Forfeiture Training and Technical Assistance Project. Mr.

Stedman holds a bachelor of arts degree in sociology from Bowling Green State

University (Ohio) and a master’s degree in psychology from George Mason University

(Virginia).

 John H. Stein has been Deputy Director of the National Organization for Victim

Assistance (NOVA) since 1981. Previously, he served as Vice President of the NOVA

Board. Mr. Stein’s extensive experience in victim services has entailed helping to train an

experimental team of community service officers in the Dayton (Ohio) Police Department

and designing paralegal roles for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, D.C. He also

served as Deputy Director of the Criminal Justice and the Elderly Project at the National

Council of Senior Citizens, where he helped design service programs for elderly crime

victims and provided technical assistance to crime projects for the elderly across the

Nation. Mr. Stein holds a bachelor’s degree from Yale College (Connecticut) and a law

degree from George Washington University (Washington, D.C.). 

 Norma Mancini Stevens is a Senior Policy Analyst with the American Prosecutors

Research Institute (APRI). In this capacity, she is the project coordinator for two U.S.

Department of Justice-funded projects on domestic violence and stalking and violence

against women. Previously, she served as Chief of the Fiscal and Management Division,

Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), U.S. Department of Justice. As a Presidential

Management Intern for the Federal Government, she served in the U.S. Marshals Service,

on the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee staff, and in BJS. Ms. Stevens holds an

undergraduate degree from Lake Eric College (Ohio) and a master’s degree in public

administration from George Washington University (Washington, D.C.).

 Brian Vossekuil is a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s U.S. 

Secret Service. He currently serves as Assistant Special Agent in charge of the 
ix

Domestic Investigations Branch of the Office of Protective Research. Special Agent

Vossekuil codirects the Secret Service Exceptional Case Study Project, a multiyear

operational study of violence directed at public officials and public figures. During his 17-

year career with the Secret Service, Special Agent Vossekuil has served in the Detroit,

Michigan, field office; in the Presidential Protective Division; and in the Intelligence

Division.

 Michael Ward currently serves as Assistant U.S. Attorney in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He

has prosecuted stalking behavior using the Federal threatening letter statute and

participated in the drafting of the antistalking statute enacted by Minnesota. Previously,

Mr. Ward was an attorney with the firm of Chairman and Sterling in both New York,

New York, and San Francisco, California. He is a graduate of the National Law Center of

George Washington University (Washington, D.C.) and served a judicial clerkship with

the Honorable Oliver Seth of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Santa Fe, New Mexico.

Two resource group members, Mr. Claps and Dr. Fein, deserve special thanks for serving as

facilitator and panelist, respectively, for each seminar. BJA also would like to acknowledge the

contribution of the following individuals who provided presentations on the status of antistalking

legislation in their States at the regional seminars: Michael J. Niemand, Bureau Chief, Criminal

Division, Florida Office of the Attorney General; Oregon Senator Ron Cease (D); Oregon

Representative Kevin L. Mannix (D); Oregon Circuit Court Judge Hollie Pihl; and then-Illinois

Attorney General Roland W. Burris. In addition, the following individuals provided valuable

insight into the problem of stalking while serving as panelists at one of the regional seminars:

John F. Gorczyk, Commissioner, Corrections Department, Vermont Human Services Agency; Lt.

Lane; Laura Scott, Victims Advocate Coordinator, Pinellas County (Florida) Sheriff’s Office;

Vermont Senator Susan Sweetser (R); Mr. Stein; Mr. Beatty; Leslie Landis, Executive Director,

Life Span; and Ms. Ryan. 

Aileen Adams, Director, OVC, U.S. Department of Justice, and Nancy Gist, Director, BJA, U.S.

Department of Justice, provided support and guidance for this project. The project also benefitted

greatly from the contributions of Carolyn Hightower, Assistant Director, OVC; Lois Mock,

Program Manager, NIJ; Kenneth R. Thomas, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research

Service, U.S. Congress; Olga Trujillo, General Counsel, OJP; Charles M. Hollis, Law

Enforcement Program Manager, BJA; Jennifer Knobe, Grant Programs Specialist, BJA; and

Melanie Smith, Program Specialist, OVC. BJA also acknowledges the contributions of Charles A.

Lauer, former Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, OJP, and project monitor for

the model code project, who also provided valuable guidance in planning the regional seminars.

BJA would like to thank all of the seminar participants who generously shared their time and

experiences in dealing with stalking cases and who engaged in lively discussions during the

seminars.
xi

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Overview of Seminar Proceedings and Findings ....................... 1

Conducting the Seminars ......................................... 1

Issues Discussed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Stalkers’ Motivations and Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Evaluation and Treatment .................................. 5

Uncooperative Victims ..................................... 6

Other Observations and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapter 2. Profile of State Stalking Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Stalking Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Threat Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Intent Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Course of Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Sentencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Bail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Special Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Civil Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Mental Evaluation and Civil Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Related Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Chapter 3. Stalking Case Law: State Appellate Court Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

California Statute Upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Florida Statute Upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Georgia Statute Upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Oklahoma Statute Upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Virginia Statute Upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Massachusetts Overturns Conviction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Illinois’ Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Chapter 4. Using Civil Protective Orders in Stalking Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Eligibility for Civil Protective Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Enforcement of Protective Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Double Jeopardy Implications of Protective Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Sources for Further Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Appendix A. Model Antistalking Code and Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Appendix B. Principal Recommendations of the Final Report of the Project To 

Develop an Antistalking Model Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Appendix C. Participant Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
xii

Appendix D. Seminar Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Appendix E. Hypothetical Stalking Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Appendix F. Appellate Court Citations of Stalking Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

List of Tables

Table 1. Stalking Law Code Citations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Table 2. Proscribed Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Table 3. Comparison of Proscribed Acts Provisions Before and After Publication 

of the Model Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Table 4. Threat Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Table 5. Comparison of Threat Requirement Provisions Before and After Publication 

of the Model Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Table 6. Intent Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Table 7. Comparison of Intent Requirement Provisions Before and After Publication 

of the Model Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Table 8. Sentencing Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Table 9. Comparison of Sentencing Provisions Before and After Publication of 

the Model Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Table 10. Citations for Protective Order Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Table 11. Eligibility Provisions for Civil Protective Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
1. National Criminal Justice Association. Project to Develop a Model Anti-Stalking Code for States. Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. October 1993.

1

Chapter 1. Overview of Seminar Proceedings and Findings

Stalking captured widespread public attention in the wake of the 1989 murder of actress 

Rebecca Schaeffer and reports of a fan’s persistent harassment of talk-show host David

Letterman. California enacted the first State antistalking legislation in 1990. Since then, 48 

other States and the District of Columbia have enacted antistalking laws.

Stalking is a complex problem with three defining elements: the stalker’s relationship with 

the victim, the stalker’s motive in pursuing the victim, and the stalker’s behavior. Suspected

stalkers’ motives and intentions are uncertain, and their obsessive and unpredictable behavior

makes it difficult for criminal justice officials to determine with any certainty how great a 

threat they pose to their victims. Moreover, stalking is different from many other types of

criminal behavior because it involves a series of acts, each of which may be legal by itself, 

that become criminal when, taken collectively, they cause the victim to fear injury or death.

Conducting the Seminars

In 1994, the National Criminal Justice Association (NCJA) conducted a series of seminars on

“Developing and Implementing Anti-Stalking Codes” to assist States in establishing 

antistalking codes. Conducted under a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and 

the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), both agencies of the U.S. Department of Justice, the

seminars were developed to acquaint State policymakers and criminal justice practitioners 

with a model antistalking code and to assist policymakers in assessing existing State laws and

developing alternative approaches to enforcement. 

The seminars were a followup to the project funded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ),

U.S. Department of Justice, to develop a model antistalking code that would be both

constitutional and enforceable. NCJA managed the project under the direction and oversight 

of NIJ. The project was congressionally mandated under §109(b) of the U.S. Departments of

Commerce, Justice, and State; the Judiciary; and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 

Fiscal Year 1993 [P.L. 102–395). A project resource group established for the model code

project continued its work for the seminars series, providing guidance for the project. In 

drafting the model code, the project resource group analyzed issues relating to freedom of

expression, due process, freedom of movement, excessive punishment, and double jeopardy 

to ensure the code’s constitutionality. The model antistalking code and commentary, and the

principal recommendations contained in the project final report, are provided in Appendices 

A and B, respectively, of this monograph. The final report of the code development project

includes the text of the model code and commentary on issues that arose in drafting the 

code. In addition, the final report contains a profile of existing State stalking statutes; an 1

overview of police agencies’ current policies for managing stalking incidents; and discussion 
2

and recommendations for States’ consideration concerning bail and sentencing, code

implementation, and stalking-related research.

The grant from BJA and OVC supported five seminars of two types: two briefings on the 

model code for State legislators and staff, conducted by the National Conference of State

Legislatures (NCSL) under contract to NCJA, and three regional seminars geared toward

criminal justice practitioners, including law enforcement officers, victims advocates, 

prosecutors, and defense attorneys. 

The first briefing took place at NCSL’s Assembly on the Legislature, May 5–7, 1994, in

Washington, DC. Members of the NCSL Criminal Justice Committee were updated on 

emerging issues concerning State antistalking laws and learned how the model antistalking 

code could serve as a basis for constitutional and enforceable antistalking laws at the State 

level. A second briefing took place in conjunction with NCSL’s annual meeting in New 

Orleans, Louisiana, July 24–28, 1994. A joint session of NCSL’s Criminal Justice 

Committee and Children and Family Services Committee on “Stalking Laws and Critical 

Issues in Domestic Violence” focused on antistalking legislation as an important element of 

the response to the broader issue of domestic violence. Topics discussed included how State

legislation concerning domestic violence, civil protective orders, and training can help States

better address the broad issues of victimization.

In November 1994, NCSL mailed packets to legal and criminal justice legislative staff 

including an NCSL update on antistalking laws, an NCJA article on State appellate court

decisions in stalking cases, and copies of the model code. Subsequently, NCJA held 1 1/2-

day seminars in the following three geographical regions: 

 Eastern Region: Held March 31–April 1 in Tampa, Florida, in cooperation with the

Florida Department of Law Enforcement, this seminar included the States of 

Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland,

Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 

Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, the Virgin 

Islands, Virginia, and West Virginia. 

 Western Region: This seminar, which took place May 12–13 in Portland, Oregon, in

cooperation with the Oregon Administrative Services Division, Criminal Justice Services

Section, included the States of Alaska, American Samoa, Arizona, California, Colorado,

Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, the Northern Mariana Islands,

Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 

 Central Region: Held October 27–28 in Chicago, Illinois, in cooperation with the 

Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, the Illinois Attorney General’s Office, 

and the Chicago Police Department, this seminar included the States of Alabama,

Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
3

Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota,

Tennessee, and Wisconsin.

The participant lists from each seminar are provided in Appendix C. During the first day of 

each seminar, panelists provided a review of the methodology and collaborative process used 

to develop the model code and described antistalking statutes in the region. On the second 

day, using three hypothetical stalking case studies, participants discussed substantive issues

related to stalking. The agendas from each seminar are provided in Appendix D. The

hypothetical stalking cases used at the seminars are provided in Appendix E.

Speakers for the seminars included the following persons:

 Gwen A. Holden, NCJA Executive Vice President, discussed stalking and provided a

brief history of efforts to address the problem. Lisa Doyle Moran of NCJA provided an

overview of the model antistalking code for the States and a profile of the existing

antistalking statutes for the particular region. Robert Fein, a consulting psychologist for

the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and visiting fellow at NIJ,

discussed the most current information on the psychological profiles of stalkers.

 At the Eastern Region seminar, Michael J. Niemand, Bureau Chief of the Criminal

Division, Florida Office of the Attorney General, briefed participants on a recent 

Florida District Court of Appeals decision upholding the Florida antistalking statute. 

It was the first decision by a State appellate court to address the constitutionality of

antistalking laws. 

 At the Western Region seminar, Oregon Senator Ron Cease (D) and Representative

Kevin L. Mannix (D) discussed the development and enactment of the Oregon

antistalking statute. Circuit Court Judge Hollie Pihl, who had declared the Oregon statute

unconstitutional, discussed his decision. 

 In the Central Region seminar, Illinois Attorney General Roland W. Burris welcomed

participants.

The three hypothetical case studies, which include elements of actual stalking cases, were 

used to demonstrate potential practical implications of the model antistalking code; examine 

the experiences of States with existing statutes and practices for handling stalking cases; and

explore options for handling the complex and unique legal, social, and mental health issues 

raised by stalking cases. One of the hypothetical cases involves an estranged married couple,

another involves a supervisor and a former employee, and the third involves two individuals 

who do not know each other.

Ms. Holden and Joseph M. Claps, First Assistant Attorney General of the Illinois Office of 

the Attorney General, were facilitators for discussions of the hypothetical cases. After 
4

presenting a hypothetical case in its entirety, the facilitators broke the case down into various

stages of official action—prearrest, postarrest, prosecution, postconviction, and postrelease. 

The facilitators presented the facts and issues of a particular stage for discussion by panelists

from various disciplines. For example, a panelist with expertise in law enforcement may have

been asked how he or she would handle a particular series of events in the pre- and post-arrest

stages. Panelists reacted to each others’ responses, and audience participation was

encouraged.

 Panelists for the Eastern Region seminar were Mr. Claps; Mr. Fein; John F. Gorczyk,

Commissioner of the Corrections Department, Vermont Human Services Agency; Lt.

John Lane, Los Angeles (California) Police Department; Laura Scott, Victims

Advocate Coordinator, Pinellas County (Florida) Sheriff’s Office; and Vermont

Senator Susan W. Sweetser (R). 

 Panelists for the Western Region seminar were Mr. Claps; Mr. Fein; and John Stein,

Deputy Director of the National Organization for Victim Assistance. 

 Panelists for the Central Region seminar were David Beatty, who was then Acting

Executive Director of the National Victim Center; Mr. Fein; Leslie Landis, Executive

Director of Life Span; and Roxann M. Ryan, Deputy Attorney General, Iowa Attorney

General’s Office. 

Issues Discussed

The seminars addressed three principal issues: whether the stalker’s motivation should be

considered in prosecuting a case, the role of psychological evaluation and counseling in

handling and sentencing stalkers, and how to handle stalking cases in which the victim is

unwilling or unable to cooperate with the prosecution.

Stalkers’ Motivations and Behaviors

Stalkers may have many reasons for engaging in their conduct, including desire for contact

and control, obsessions, jealousy, anger, and revenge. Stalking behavior can vary from case to

case and from incident to incident within a single case. One stalker may be angry with the

victim for a real or perceived injury and may pursue the victim by sending threatening letters

and making threatening telephone calls. Another stalker may seek to win or maintain the

affection of the victim, making his interest known by sending flowers and other gifts.

However, the stalker may become violent if overtures are rejected.

During the development of the model code, the resource group agreed that the alleged

stalker’s behavior, not motives, should be the most significant factor in determining whether

to file charges. However, the project resource group pointed out that the stalker’s

relationship with and motive in pursuing the victim may have important implications for
5

selecting an a ppropriate, potentially effective strategy for intervening in the stalking

behavior. The group urged, therefore, that research be carried out on a wide range of matters

relating to stalkers—including behavior, motives, and relationships with victims—to provide

guidance for criminal justice and social services practitioners in developing intervention

strategies. Discussion at the regional seminars focused on the relationship between stalking

and domestic violence and on whether stalking behavior should be handled differently

depending on the stalker’s motives and the context in which the behavior occurs.

Although motives are relevant to the ultimate management and disposition of a case, the

resource group agreed that neither the stalker’s motives nor the context in which the stalking

occurred should be considered when the crime is charged. If the conduct in which the person

engages is seriously threatening, it should be charged as stalking, regardless of the defendant’s

motivations or relationship to the victim. In taking this approach, the resource group

reaffirmed the model code’s focus on behavior rather than motivation. 

Evaluation and Treatment

Although stalking cannot be considered normal or appropriate, a stalker may not necessarily

be diagnosed as mentally ill. However, some stalkers appear to suffer from psychiatric or

psychological disorders, and it is unlikely that simply punishing the convicted stalker will

resolve the problem. In fact, a stalker with a mental disorder who has been convicted and

incarcerated may be embittered and seek retribution for being kept from the victim, especially

if the illness was left untreated during incarceration. 

The report of the model code development project recommends that States consider requiring

mental evaluations and counseling as part of sentences imposed on convicted stalkers and as

part of conditions for pretrial release, probation, or parole. 

Including counseling in a stalker’s sentence may make it easier to intervene immediately if a

stalker resumes pursuit of the victim after release. If a probationer or parolee fails to comply

with the counseling conditions, the release could be revoked. In cases where the stalker does

not comply, or if treatment fails initially, the prosecutor may be more successful in obtaining a

jail sentence at a later court date. However, judges do not always know whether a defendant

complies with release conditions.

Some mental health professionals and others in the field contend that it is useless to require

counseling for individuals who do not believe they have a problem. In addition, the victim

may be lulled into a false sense of security because the offender is in treatment and may fail to

take steps to protect himself or herself once the treatment program ends. Finally, a judge may

be more apt to dispose of a case without sentencing, even in the case of a dangerous stalker, if

there is an option to release the individual on the condition that he or she participate in

counseling.
6

Prior to requiring counseling as a condition of probation, there should be a presentencing

mental health evaluation to determine what value counseling might have in the particular case.

The sentencing judge and mental health professionals who are assigned to the case should be

apprised fully of the results of the evaluation.

In addition, victims should be informed that treatment may not be successful and that they

should still take steps to protect themselves. While the defendant is undergoing treatment, the

victim may have an opportunity to relocate, commence separation proceedings, or make other

decisions with less fear. 

In cases of domestic abuse, victims are most at risk when attempting to leave an abusive

relationship. It may be helpful to keep the alleged abuser under court supervision during this

time. Many stalkers are released on unsupervised probation without conditions, or are

released from prison because of crowding. By making participation in counseling a

requirement for release, the court can retain control over the defendant without requiring a

prison sentence. If a defendant is committed to a mental institution as a result of an

evaluation, he or she may be institutionalized for a longer time than would have been the case

if the individual has been sentenced to prison, allowing the victim a longer period of respite. 

After careful consideration, the resource group reaffirmed its position that counseling should

be considered as a condition of pretrial release or probation in all cases. Although mental

health professionals cannot always predict whether a person will be helped by counseling,

some stalkers may benefit even though they are reluctant to recognize the problem initially.

The resource group recognized that treatment and counseling may be more useful in

obsessive, vengeful, or domestic situations than in less common stalking cases involving

organized crime, gang activity, or abortion protesters.

Uncooperative Victims

Although stalking victims may also be victims of domestic violence, the relationship between

the defendant and the victim in stalking cases is often very different from that in cases of

domestic violence. Stalking victims often cooperate more readily with law enforcement

officials and prosecutors than do victims of domestic violence because stalking victims are

more likely to have made a decision not to continue a relationship, if there was one, with the

stalker. 

In domestic cases involving stalking, if the victim has not ended the relationship with the

alleged stalker or is unwilling to testify against the stalker, problems of proof can arise, and

prosecutors may be unable to build a convincing case.

Although this problem was not addressed in the final report of the model code development

project, it was discussed at the regional seminars and by the resource group following the

regional seminars. 
7

The resource group agreed that victims and prosecutors must have information about the

consequences of their decisions. Many prosecutors have established no-drop policies in

stalking cases, which require a prosecutor to prosecute the case regardless of whether the

victim will cooperate. As a result, victims often are left out of the decision-making process or

discredited on the witness stand. A victim who is still married to a stalker may in some States

take advantage of the privilege not to testify against a spouse in a criminal case. Many States

have created exceptions to this privilege in cases of domestic violence, but the exceptions

may not extend to stalking.

Victims’ rights advocates have attempted to reconcile the sometimes conflicting goals of

pursuing and prosecuting offenders and, at the same time, empowering victims by allowing

them to regain a sense of control. Forcing victims to testify against their will can negate efforts

to make them feel in control. 

Many victims’ advocates believe that victims should have a voice, but not a veto, in the

prosecution of a stalker or an abuser. Often a victim’s refusal to testify may be a result of

direct or indirect coercion by the defendant. Victims’ advocates are in the best position to

provide advice concerning what course of action is in victims’ best interest. Advocates

attempt to empower victims and enable them to make their own decisions. However,

empowerment does not mean that victims should always have the final say about whether to

prosecute a case, some victims’ advocates emphasize. 

In some circumstances, victims have been so traumatized that they are incapable of deciding

what is in their best interests. Advocates must ensure that a victim’s decision is as fully

informed and independent as possible. 

Victims’ advocates should inform victims about the potential consequences of failing to

testify. If a victim’s decision not to pursue prosecution is based on a threat to the victim or a

family member or the fact that the defendant is the victim’s main source of economic support,

these issues should be discussed. 

Whenever possible, victims’ advocates should work to resolve external factors such as threats

or fear of economic deprivation that may hinder their decision to cooperate in the prosecution

of a stalker. In many States, police must provide victims with information about services that

are available to them when an incident is investigated.

It is important to make a distinction between victims who refuse to testify because they are

afraid and those who do not wish to testify because they have reconciled with their partners.

When provided with information and support, those who are afraid may realize that they have

other options and, therefore, may be more willing to testify than those who believe that they

have reconciled and that the abuse will not occur again. 

Although no-drop policies may help remove the onus from the victim and make the stalker

less likely to hold the victim responsible for the prosecution, the defendant may still hold the
8

victim responsible for reporting the incidents to the police. Moreover, stalkers often have

obsessive personalities and are likely to exaggerate the victims’ role in the prosecution.

The resource group agreed that mandatory no-drop policies are not feasible because they

remove discretion from prosecutors and fail to take into account other factors that may weigh

in favor of a dismissal, such as lack of evidence. The group agreed that there should be a

presumption against dropping a case but that the existence of certain factors could serve to

rebut that presumption. 

In stalking cases, it is particularly difficult to prove a victim’s fear without his or her

testimony. However, it is important for prosecutors to recognize that they can effectively

prosecute a case even if the victim is unable or unwilling to cooperate. Police should conduct

an independent investigation to learn whether probable cause exists. Furthermore, in States

that require evidence of “reasonable fear,” it may be sufficient to prove that a reasonable

person would be in fear. 

The National College of District Attorneys (NCDA) conducted a seminar on “Prosecuting

Domestic Violence Cases Without the Victim” in 1994 in San Diego, California. Many of the

following tactics recommended at that seminar could benefit prosecutors throughout the

country in stalking cases:

 Prosecutors should develop a trusting relationship with victims and their families as

early as possible. When victims trust the prosecutor, they are more likely follow

through with the case. 

 Keeping a defendant in custody may prevent witness intimidation and influence and

may expedite a guilty plea.

 Prosecutors should consider preparing a case from the beginning as if there will be no

victim cooperation, even if the victim appears cooperative at the outset. Prosecutors

can build a case through corroborating evidence such as tapes and printouts from a

911 emergency call; damaged property; weapons; employee records; telephone

records; letters from the defendant if the victim is willing to divulge them; photographs

of the defendant, if possible; and interviews with neighbors, children, and other

witnesses.

 Prosecutors should determine the number of hearsay exceptions available in the

evidence rules of their States. Excited utterances by the victim, admissions by the

defendant, former testimony, and declarations of state of mind may all be used to

admit statements that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay.

 If a defendant violates a protective order, the victim may not have to testify if there is

documentation of the violation. Even if a victim is unwilling to testify in person, the
9

victim may be willing to provide a victim impact statement that the prosecutor can

read to the court prior to sentencing.

Other Observations and Recommendations

Seminar participants offered these additional observations and recommendations:

 Early intervention and prosecution is crucial to prevent the behavior from escalating

to the level of criminal stalking. 

 Participants noted that law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and victims’

advocates should receive special training in handling stalking cases. Training on

stalking should be a two-tier process: the first tier to impart general information about

stalking and the second to provide information about specific steps that can be taken

and tools that can be used to manage stalking cases effectively. In addition, criminal

justice practitioners should receive some incentive to participate in the training

programs, which should be offered frequently because of high turnover rates in law

enforcement and prosecutors’ and public defenders’ offices.

 Several participants noted that violence is likely to escalate when a person is abusing

alcohol or drugs and suggested research into the relationship between stalking and

drug abuse.

 Because stalking statutes can often be more easily enforced than protective or

restraining orders, stalking statutes can be used instead of protective orders in States

that limit eligibility for protective orders.

 Participants recommended that even if there is insufficient evidence to arrest or

charge an individual with stalking, police should investigate the case and file a report

for future reference. Because stalking involves repetitive behavior, seminar

participants emphasized that police officers should refer to previous reports

concerning the same victim. If different police officers are called at different times to

incidents involving the same parties, each incident may be viewed as an isolated event

unless accurate and complete records are kept. Although maintaining a compilation of

all reports on a victim is difficult, participants agreed that this practice should be

encouraged so that police can recognize and quickly intervene in a pattern of abusive

or stalking behavior.

 Participants noted that law enforcement and prosecutors must be creative in their use

of stalking statutes. They stressed that prosecutors should use the numerous charges

available in prosecuting these cases, such as violation of protective orders, disorderly

conduct, harassment, terroristic threats, and trespass. For example, if children are

involved, the prosecutor may be able to charge a stalker with endangering the welfare

of a child. If several persons are working together to stalk or terrorize a victim,
10

prosecutors may be able to bring conspiracy charges. The stalking statutes of some

States may be used to prosecute abortion protesters. Gang members who conduct

questionable surveillance in public housing projects may be subject to stalking

charges.

 Participants addressed the disadvantages of plea bargaining in stalking cases. For

example, it was noted that corrections officials will devote fewer resources to an

individual who has pled guilty to trespassing than to one who has been convicted of

stalking. Moreover, in States that provide enhanced penalties for defendants who

have been convicted of more than one stalking offense, a defendant who is permitted

to plead to a lesser offense may not be subject to the enhanced penalty.

 Participants recommended that restitution be imposed in addition to, not as an

alternative to, other sentences or punishment. Rather, restitution should be construed

as paying a debt to the victim.

 Participants recommended that States agree to enforce protective orders from other

jurisdictions and that States develop cooperative data bases so that information on

incidents of stalking, domestic violence, and violation of protective orders in other

jurisdictions can be provided to the courts as part of criminal history records.

 Participants recommended that there be interaction between criminal and civil courts

in cases involving stalking in a domestic relationship. Communication between the

two court systems will enable a judge presiding over a divorce or custody case to take

into account previous charges and convictions for assault or stalking in making

rulings. 
2. The following States enacted stalking laws in 1992: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,

Kansas, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North

Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West

Virginia, and Wisconsin.

3. The following States enacted stalking laws in 1993: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,

Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and

Wyoming.

11

Chapter 2. Profile of State Stalking Statutes

As noted in Chapter 1, 49 States have enacted antistalking laws since 1990, when California

approved the Nation’s first State-level statute on stalking. The California law was enacted in

response to the unrelated murders of five women who had been stalking victims, including

the young television actress Rebecca Schaeffer. Thirty other States followed suit 2 years

later. California expanded and increased penalties under its stalking law in 1992. Eighteen 2

additional States and the District of Columbia approved antistalking legislation in 1993.3

Maine is the only State without a specific law to address stalking. However, the State uses a

terrorizing statute to address stalking and added provisions to the State’s protective order

statute in 1993 that allow such orders to be issued to enjoin stalking.

Seventeen States have amended their stalking laws since the model code was promulgated in

September 1993. Iowa, Virginia, and Utah amended their statutes to incorporate the language

recommended by the model code. Wisconsin amended its code to include provisions that are

similar to those in the model code, but does not incorporate the code’s language regarding

implicit threats. Other States that have approved amendments are Alabama, California,

Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South

Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia. A complete list of statutory citations

of State stalking statutes is provided in Table 1.

Stalking Defined

Although there is a common purpose underlying all State antistalking statutes, there is little

uniformity in how they define and address the problem. The statutes typically define stalking

as willful, malicious, and repeated following and harassing of another person. However, five

States do not enumerate specifically the types of conduct that are prohibited. Three States

proscribe lying in wait. Many stalking statutes prohibit nonconsensual communication. Seven

States include surveillance in the description of stalking behavior. 

Illinois considers a defendant who confines, restrains, or causes bodily harm to a victim guilty

of aggravated stalking. Many State statutes require a pattern of conduct by the alleged stalker

and specify that victims have a reasonable fear for their safety or of death or bodily injury.

Texas requires that the stalking behavior continue after the victim has reported the conduct

to law enforcement in order for a defendant to be charged under its stalking law. 
a. Information is for Maine’s terrorizing statute. 12

Table 1

Stalking Law Code Citations

State Citation

Alabama ALA. CODE §§13a-6-90 to 13a-6-94 (Supp. 1994)

Alaska ALASKA STAT. §11.41 260-270 (Supp. 1993)

Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-2921 (1992 & Supp. 1993)

Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. §5-71-229 (Michie 1993)

California CA PENAL §646.9 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994)

Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §18-9-111 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994)

Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. 53a-181c & d (Supp. 1993)

Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11. §1312A (Supp.1992)

District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. §22-504 (Supp. 1993)

Florida FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048 (Supp. 1993)

Georgia GA. CODE ANN. §16-5-90 - §16-5-93 (Supp. 1993)

Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. §711-1106-1106.5 (1988 & Supp. 1993)

Idaho IDAHO CODE §18-7905 (Supp. 1993)

Illinois 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3-7.4, 5/13-14-5 (1993 & Supp. 1994)

Indiana IND. CODE ANN. §§35-45-10-1 to 5 (Supp. 1993)

Iowa 1994 Iowa Legis Serv. S.F. 1093 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11)

Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-3438 (1994)

Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §508.130-.150 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993)

Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:40.2 (West Supp. 1995)

Maine ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A §210 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) a

Maryland MD. ANN. CODE ART. 27 §121B (Supp. 1993)

Massachusetts MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, Sect. 43 (Supp. 1993)

Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.411h-i (1993 & Supp. 1994)

Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.749 (Supp. 1994)

Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. §97-3-107 (Supp. 1993)

Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. §565.225 (Vernon Supp. 1994)

Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1993)
Table 1

Stalking Law Code Citations

State Citation

b. Information is for New York’s menacing statute.

13

Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. §28-311.02-.05 (Supp. 1992 & 1993)

Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. §200.575 (1993)

New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §633:3-a (Supp. 1993)

New Jersey N.J. REV. STAT. §2C:12-10 (Supp. 1993)

New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-3A3 (Michie Supp. 1993)

New York N.Y. PENAL LAW §§120.13 & 120.14 (McKinney Supp. 1994) b

North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-277.3 (1993 & Supp. 1994)

North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1993)

Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2903.211-215 (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1994)

Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1173 (West Supp. 1994)

Oregon OR. REV. STAT. §163.730 -.750 (1993)

Pennsylvania 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §2709 (Supp. 1993)

Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§11-59-1 - 11-59-3 (Supp. 1993)

South Carolina 1994 S.C. Acts 472 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 163-1070)

South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §22-19a-1-7 (Supp. 1994)

Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. §39-17-315 (Supp. 1993)

Texas TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §42.07 (West Supp. 1993); TEX. CRIM PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46 (West 1989)

Utah UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993)

Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§1061-1063 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993)

Virginia VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1993)

Washington WASH. REV. CODE 9A.46.110 (Supp. 1994)

West Virginia W.VA. CODE §61-2-9a (Supp. 1993)

Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. 940.32 (West Supp. 1993)

Wyoming WYO. STAT. §6-2-506 (Supp. 1993)
14

A list of acts prohibited in State stalking statutes appears in Table 2. A comparison of acts

prohibited by State laws before and after release of the model code appears in Table 3.

Threat Required

The two chief elements of most stalking statutes are threatening behavior and criminal intent

by the defendant. Fourteen States require that the perpetrator make a threat against the

victim in order to be charged under the stalking code. Colorado and New Mexico require that

the perpetrator make a threat and then engage in additional conduct in furtherance of the

threat. Forty States and the District of Columbia have provisions that encompass stalking

actions that would cause a reasonable person to feel threatened even if there has been no

verbal threat by the perpetrator. Eight States require that the defendant has the intent and/or

the apparent ability to carry out the threat. Some States allow threats made against members

of the victim’s immediate family to be presented as evidence of stalking. Four States require

that a threat be made to prove aggravated stalking, but not stalking. Statutes in Hawaii and

Texas prohibit threats in conjunction with intent to damage property and threats in

conjunction with intent to cause personal injury. A description of the threat provisions in

State stalking statutes appears in Table 4. A comparison of threat provisions included in State

statutes before and after publication of the model code is provided in Table 5. 

Intent Provisions

To convict a person of stalking in most States, it must be shown that the defendant

demonstrated criminal intent to cause fear in the victim. The course of conduct must be

willful, purposeful, intentional, or knowing. Seven States require that the prosecution prove

that the defendant intended to cause alarm or annoyance. Sixteen States do not require such

proof provided that the alleged stalker intended to do the act that resulted in fear. In these

States, if the victim has reasonable cause to feel frightened, the intent element of the crime

has been met. In Indiana and Missouri, if there is proof that the defendant intended to cause

fear, the crime is elevated to aggravated stalking. A description of the intent provisions of

State stalking statutes is provided in Table 6. A comparison of State intent provisions before

and after publication of the model code is provided in Table 7.

Course of Conduct

State stalking laws almost always require that the alleged stalker engage in a course of

conduct, not just a single act, to fall under their provisions. Typically, a course of conduct is

characterized as a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity

of purpose.

A few States specify how many acts must occur and during what period of time the conduct

must take place in order to constitute stalking. Illinois refers to “acts done on at least two

occasions. . .”; Michigan specifies a “series of two or more separate, noncontinuous acts”;
a. Some States proscribe some of the acts below in other statutes, for example, terroristic, threatening, or trespass statutes. They are not charted here.

Additionally, this chart uses the language of the specific statute to indicate what acts are proscribed. It should be noted that some statutes may use different

language to proscribe the same activities.

b. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s

harassment statute for the definition. In those instances, the proscribed acts from the harassment definition are included.

15

Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassingb

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

Vandalism

Bodily Harm

Table 2

Proscribed Actsa 

State

Alabama x xx

Alaska xxx x x

Arizona x xx x

Arkansas xx xx x

California x x

Colorado xx x

Connecticut x x

Delaware x x

District of Columbia x xx

Florida x x

Georgia xx xx x

Hawaii x x

Idaho x x

Illinois x x
a. Some States proscribe some of the acts below in other statutes, for example, terroristic, threatening, or trespass statutes. They are not charted here.

Additionally, this chart uses the language of the specific statute to indicate what acts are proscribed. It should be noted that some statutes may use different

language to proscribe the same activities.

b. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s

harassment statute for the definition. In those instances, the proscribed acts from the harassment definition are included.

c. The information is for Maine’s terrorizing statute.

16

Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassingb

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

Vandalism

Bodily Harm

Table 2

Proscribed Actsa 

State

Indiana x xx

Iowa x x

Kansas x

Kentucky No specific acts – no proscribed conduct is enumerated in the statute

Louisiana x x

Maine No specific acts – no proscribed conduct is enumerated in the statute c

Maryland x x

Massachusetts x x

Michigan xxx xxx

Minnesota xx x x

Mississippi x x

Missouri xx x

Montana x xxx
a. Some States proscribe some of the acts below in other statutes, for example, terroristic, threatening, or trespass statutes. They are not charted here.

Additionally, this chart uses the language of the specific statute to indicate what acts are proscribed. It should be noted that some statutes may use different

language to proscribe the same activities.

b. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s

harassment statute for the definition. In those instances, the proscribed acts from the harassment definition are included.

17

Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassingb

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

Vandalism

Bodily Harm

Table 2

Proscribed Actsa 

State

Nebraska No specific acts – no proscribed conduct is enumerated in the statute

Nevada No specific acts – no proscribed conduct is enumerated in the statute

New Hampshire xx x

New Jersey x

New Mexico xx x

New York x xx x

North Carolina xx x

North Dakota x

Ohio No specific acts – no proscribed conduct is enumerated in the statute

Oklahoma x x x x x x

Oregon x x x x x x

Pennsylvania x

Rhode Island x x

South Carolina x x
a. Some States proscribe some of the acts below in other statutes, for example, terroristic, threatening, or trespass statutes. They are not charted here.

Additionally, this chart uses the language of the specific statute to indicate what acts are proscribed. It should be noted that some statutes may use different

language to proscribe the same activities.

b. Some of the stalking statutes list harassing as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing with the stalking statute or refer to the State’s

harassment statute for the definition. In those instances, the proscribed acts from the harassment definition are included.

18

Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassingb

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

Vandalism

Bodily Harm

Table 2

Proscribed Actsa 

State

South Dakota x x

Tennessee x xx x

Texas x x

Utah x

Vermont x x xx x

Virginia x

Washington x x

West Virginia xx x

Wisconsin x

Wyoming xx x x
a. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s harassment statute for the defini

acts from the harassment defeinition are included.

Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassinga

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

Table 3 

Comparison of Proscribed Acts Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

StateAlabama ;; ;; ;Alaska ;;;;;; ; ; ;;Arizona ;; ; ;; ; ;;Arkansas ; ; ; ; ; ;; ; California ;; ;;Colorado ;; ;; Connecticut ;; ;;
Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassing

a

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

Table 3 

Comparison of Proscribed Acts Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

State

a. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s harassment statute for the definiacts from the harassment defeinition are included.

Delaware ;; ;;District of Columbia ; ; ; ;; ;Florida ;; ;;Georgia ; ; ; ; ; ;; ; ; ;Hawaii ;;;; ; ;Idaho ;; ;;Illinois ;;;;
Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassing

a

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

Table 3 

Comparison of Proscribed Acts Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

State

a. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s harassment statute for the definiacts from the harassment defeinition are included.

Indiana ; ; ;; ; ;Iowa ; ; ; ;;Kansas ;; ;Kentucky Louisiana ;; ;;Maine 
Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassing

a

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

Table 3 

Comparison of Proscribed Acts Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

State

a. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s harassment statute for the definiacts from the harassment defeinition are included.

Maryland ;;;; ;Massachusetts ;; ;;Michigan ; ; ;; ; ; ; ;; ; ;; ;Minnesota ;;;; ; ; ;;Mississippi ;; ;;Missouri ;; ; ;Montana ; ; ; ;; ; ; ;
Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassing

a

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

Table 3 

Comparison of Proscribed Acts Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

State

a. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s harassment statute for the definiacts from the harassment defeinition are included.

Nebraska ; ;; ; Nevada New Hampshire ;; ;; ; ;New Jersey ; ;New Mexico ;;;; ;;New York ;; ;; ;; North Carolina ;; ;; ; ;
Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassing

a

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

Table 3 

Comparison of Proscribed Acts Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

State

a. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s harassment statute for the definiacts from the harassment defeinition are included.

North Dakota ; ; ;;Ohio Oklahoma ; ; ;; ; ; ; ;; ; ;;Oregon ; ; ; ; ; ;; ; ;; ; Pennsylvania ; ;Rhode Island ;; ;;
Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassing

a

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

Confine/Restrain

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

Table 3 

Comparison of Proscribed Acts Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

State

a. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s harassment statute for the definiacts from the harassment defeinition are included.

South Carolina ;; ;;South Dakota ;; ;;Tennessee ; ; ;; Texas ;; ;; ;Utah ;; ;Vermont ; ; ; ; ; ;; ; 
Visual or Physical Proximity

Presence

Approaching

Pursuing or Following

Surveillance

Lying in Wait

Intimidating

Nonconsensual Communication

Harassing

a

Trespass

Possess or Show Weapon

Disregard Warning

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

1994

1993

Table 3 

Comparison of Proscribed Acts Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

State

a. Some of the stalking statutes list “harassing” as a prohibited activity. These statutes either define harassing within the stalking statute or refer to the State’s harassment statute for 

proscribed acts from the harassment defeinition are included.

Virginia X XWashington X X XWest Virginia X X X X X XWisconsin X Wyoming X X X X X X 

Totals 0 6 6 6 4 4 43 40 7 8 3 3 5 3 20 18 28 25 7 6 1 1 5 2 3 
TT 6 terroristic threat T 6 threat Aggrav 6 aggravated stalking

CT 6 credible threat I 6 implied threat sufficient AA 6 only requires apparent ability

a. Actions that would cause a reasonable person to be threatened, but which are not necessarily verbal threats by the perpetrator. The perpetrator may

make an explicit threat, but it is not required to satisfy an element of the crime.

b. Statutes that require the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat in addition to making the threat.

c. Statutes that require a threat and conduct to satisfy the elements of the crime of stalking.

1. Threat followed by additional conduct in furtherance of the threat is required. The treat can be implied.

2. On at least two occasions.

27

Table 4

Threat Requirements

State

Explicit or Explicit Threat Intent and Threat and

Implicit Threat Apparent Ability Conduct a b c

Alabama X I

Alaska X

Arizona X

Arkansas TT

California X X

Colorado X1

Connecticut X

Delaware X

District of Columbia X

Florida CT X 6 Aggrav

Georgia X

Hawaii X

Idaho X

Illinois X2

Indiana X

Iowa X
Table 4

Threat Requirements

State

Explicit or Explicit Threat Intent and Threat and

Implicit Threat Apparent Ability Conduct a b c

TT 6 terroristic threat T 6 threat Aggrav 6 aggravated stalking

CT 6 credible threat I 6 implied threat sufficient AA 6 only requires apparent ability

a. Actions that would cause a reasonable person to be threatened, but which are not necessarily verbal threats by the perpetrator. The perpetrator may

make an explicit threat, but it is not required to satisfy an element of the crime.

b. Statutes that require the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat in addition to making the threat.

c. Statutes that require a threat and conduct to satisfy the elements of the crime of stalking.

4. Threat followed by additional conduct in furtherance of threat is required.

28

Kansas X

Kentucky X

Louisiana X

Maine T 3 X

Maryland X

Massachusetts T

Michigan CT X 6 Aggrav

Minnesota X

Mississippi X

Missouri CT X 6 Aggrav

Montana X

Nebraska X

Nevada Aggrav X

New Hampshire X

New Jersey X X

New Mexico X X4
Table 4

Threat Requirements

State

Explicit or Explicit Threat Intent and Threat and

Implicit Threat Apparent Ability Conduct a b c

TT 6 terroristic threat T 6 threat Aggrav 6 aggravated stalking

CT 6 credible threat I 6 implied threat sufficient AA 6 only requires apparent ability

a. Actions that would cause a reasonable person to be threatened, but which are not necessarily verbal threats by the perpetrator. The perpetrator may

make an explicit threat, but it is not required to satisfy an element of the crime.

b. Statutes that require the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat in addition to making the threat.

c. Statutes that require a threat and conduct to satisfy the elements of the crime of stalking.

5. Conduct must occur after the person toward whom the conduct is specifically directed has reported to a law enforcement agency the conduct described.

29

New York X

North Carolina X

North Dakota X

Ohio X

Oklahoma X

Oregon X

Pennsylvania X

Rhode Island X CT

South Carolina X CT

South Dakota X

Tennessee X

Texas X5

Utah X

Vermont X

Virginia X

Washington X
Table 4

Threat Requirements

State

Explicit or Explicit Threat Intent and Threat and

Implicit Threat Apparent Ability Conduct a b c

TT 6 terroristic threat T 6 threat Aggrav 6 aggravated stalking

CT 6 credible threat I 6 implied threat sufficient AA 6 only requires apparent ability

a. Actions that would cause a reasonable person to be threatened, but which are not necessarily verbal threats by the perpetrator. The perpetrator may

make an explicit threat, but it is not required to satisfy an element of the crime.

b. Statutes that require the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat in addition to making the threat.

c. Statutes that require a threat and conduct to satisfy the elements of the crime of stalking.

5. Conduct must occur after the person toward whom the conduct is specifically directed has reported to a law enforcement agency the conduct described.

30

West Virginia AA CT

Wisconsin X

Wyoming X
a. Actions that would cause a reasonable person to be threatened, but which are not necessarily verbal threats by the perpetrator. The perpetrator may

make an explicit threat, but it is not required to satisfy an element of the crime.

b. Statutes that require the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat in addition to making the threat.

c. Statutes that require a threat and conduct to satisfy the elements of the crime of stalking.

d. Apparent ability only.

31

Table 5 

Comparison of Threat Requirement Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

Explicit or Explicit Threat Intent and Threat and

Implicit Threat Apparent Ability Conduct a b c

State 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994

Alabama XXX X

Alaska X X

Arizona X X

Arkansas X X

California X XXX

Colorado X X

Connecticut X X

Delaware X X

District of Columbia X X

Florida X X

Georgia X X

Hawaii X X

Idaho X X

Illinois X X

Indiana X X

Iowa X XX d
Table 5 

Comparison of Threat Requirement Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

Explicit or Explicit Threat Intent and Threat and

Implicit Threat Apparent Ability Conduct a b c

State 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994

a. Actions that would cause a reasonable person to be threatened, but which are not necessarily verbal threats by the perpetrator. The perpetrator may

make an explicit threat, but it is not required to satisfy an element of the crime.

b. Statutes that require the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat in addition to making the threat.

c. Statutes that require a threat and conduct to satisfy the elements of the crime of stalking.

d. Apparent ability only.

32

Kansas X X

Kentucky X X

Louisiana X XX d

Maine XXXX

Maryland X X

Massachusetts X X

Michigan X X

Minnesota X X

Mississippi X X

Missouri X X

Montana X X

Nebraska X X

Nevada X X

New Hampshire X X

New Jersey XX XX

New Mexico XXX X
Table 5 

Comparison of Threat Requirement Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

Explicit or Explicit Threat Intent and Threat and

Implicit Threat Apparent Ability Conduct a b c

State 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994

a. Actions that would cause a reasonable person to be threatened, but which are not necessarily verbal threats by the perpetrator. The perpetrator may

make an explicit threat, but it is not required to satisfy an element of the crime.

b. Statutes that require the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat in addition to making the threat.

c. Statutes that require a threat and conduct to satisfy the elements of the crime of stalking.

d. Apparent ability only.

33

New York X X

North Carolina X X

North Dakota X X

Ohio X X

Oklahoma X XX

Oregon X X

Pennsylvania X X

Rhode Island XXX X

South Carolina XXX X

South Dakota XX X

Tennessee XX Xd

Texas X X

Utah X X

Vermont X X

Virginia X X
Table 5 

Comparison of Threat Requirement Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

Explicit or Explicit Threat Intent and Threat and

Implicit Threat Apparent Ability Conduct a b c

State 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994

a. Actions that would cause a reasonable person to be threatened, but which are not necessarily verbal threats by the perpetrator. The perpetrator may

make an explicit threat, but it is not required to satisfy an element of the crime.

b. Statutes that require the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat in addition to making the threat.

c. Statutes that require a threat and conduct to satisfy the elements of the crime of stalking.

d. Apparent ability only.

34

Washington X X

West Virginia XX X X d d

Wisconsin X XX

Wyoming X X

Totals 32 41 1 1 13 8 19 9
a. These statutes require proof that the defendant intended to cause reasonable fear. The “actually causes” language is in some statutes, but for this chart, it is

assumed that if charges are brought, reasonable fear has resulted from the defendant’s actions.

b. This is a lesser standard than fear, and although some States have it in their stalking statutes, most reserve this language for their harassment statutes.

c. These statutes do not require proof of intent on the part of the defendant. As long as the victim is reasonably frightened by the defendant’s conduct, an

element of the crime has been met. The defendant need only have the intent to do the act that results in fear.

1. The defendant must act “willfully or maliciously.”

2. The defendant must act “intentionally and maliciously.”

35

Table 6

Intent Requirements

State

Intent to and Intent to and Actually Causes

Actually Causes Actually Causes Reasonable Fear

Reasonable Fear Alarm/Annoyance a b

c

Alabama X

Alaska X

Arizona X

Arkansas X

California X

Colorado X

Connecticut X

Delaware X

District of Columbia X

Florida 1st Degree Misdemeanor

3rd Degree Felony

Georgia X

Hawaii X

Idaho X1

Illinois X

Indiana Aggravated X

Iowa X

Kansas X2
Table 6

Intent Requirements

State

Intent to and Intent to and Actually Causes

Actually Causes Actually Causes Reasonable Fear

Reasonable Fear Alarm/Annoyance a b

c

a. These statutes require proof that the defendant intended to cause reasonable fear. The “actually causes” language is in some statutes, but for this chart, it is

assumed that if charges are brought, reasonable fear has resulted from the defendant’s actions.

b. This is a lesser standard than fear, and although some States have it in their stalking statutes, most reserve this language for their harassment statutes.

c. These statutes do not require proof of intent on the part of the defendant. As long as the victim is reasonably frightened by the defendant’s conduct, an

element of the crime has been met. The defendant need only have the intent to do the act that results in fear.

3. Information is for Maine’s terrorizing statute.

4. The defendant must act “purposely or knowingly.”

36

Kentucky X

Louisiana X

Maine3 X

Maryland X

Massachusetts X

Michigan X

Minnesota X

Mississippi X

Missouri Aggravated X

Montana X4

Nebraska X

Nevada Aggravated X

New Hampshire X

New Jersey X

New Mexico X

New York X

North Carolina X
Table 6

Intent Requirements

State

Intent to and Intent to and Actually Causes

Actually Causes Actually Causes Reasonable Fear

Reasonable Fear Alarm/Annoyance a b

c

a. These statutes require proof that the defendant intended to cause reasonable fear. The “actually causes” language is in some statutes, but for this chart, it is

assumed that if charges are brought, reasonable fear has resulted from the defendant’s actions.

b. This is a lesser standard than fear, and although some States have it in their stalking statutes, most reserve this language for their harassment statutes.

c. These statutes do not require proof of intent on the part of the defendant. As long as the victim is reasonably frightened by the defendant’s conduct, an

element of the crime has been met. The defendant need only have the intent to do the act that results in fear.

5. The defendant must act “willfully or maliciously.”

37

North Dakota X

Ohio X

Oklahoma X5

Oregon X

Pennsylvania X

Rhode Island X

South Carolina X

South Dakota X

Tennessee X

Texas X

Utah X

Vermont X

Virginia X

Washington X

West Virginia X

Wisconsin X

Wyoming X
a. These statutes require proof that the defendant intended to cause reasonable fear. The “actually causes” language is in some statutes, but for this chart, it is

assumed that if charges are brought, reasonable fear has resulted from the defendant’s actions.

b. This is a lesser standard than fear, and although some States have it in their stalking statutes, most reserve this language for their harassment statutes.

c. These statutes do not require proof of intent on the part of the defendant. As long as the victim is reasonably frightened by the defendant’s conduct, an

element of the crime has been met. The defendant need only have the intent to do the act that results in fear.

38

Table 7

Comparison of Intent Requirement Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

Intent to and Intent to and Actually Causes

Actually Causes Actually Causes Reasonable Fear

Reasonable Fear Alarm/Annoyance a b

c

State 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994

Alabama X X

Alaska X X

Arizona X X

Arkansas X X

California X X

Colorado X X

Connecticut X X

Delaware X X

District of Columbia X X

Florida X X

Georgia X X

Hawaii X X

Idaho X X

Illinois X X

Indiana X X

Iowa X X

Kansas XX X

Kentucky X X
Table 7

Comparison of Intent Requirement Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

Intent to and Intent to and Actually Causes

Actually Causes Actually Causes Reasonable Fear

Reasonable Fear Alarm/Annoyance a b

c

State 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994

a. These statutes require proof that the defendant intended to cause reasonable fear. The “actually causes” language is in some statutes, but for this chart, it is

assumed that if charges are brought, reasonable fear has resulted from the defendant’s actions.

b. This is a lesser standard than fear, and although some States have it in their stalking statutes, most reserve this language for their harassment statutes.

c. These statutes do not require proof of intent on the part of the defendant. As long as the victim is reasonably frightened by the defendant’s conduct, an

element of the crime has been met. The defendant need only have the intent to do the act that results in fear.

39

Louisiana X X

Maine X

Maryland X X

Massachusetts X X

Michigan X X

Minnesota X X

Mississippi X X

Missouri X X

Montana X X

Nebraska X X

Nevada X X

New Hampshire X X

New Jersey X X

New Mexico X X

New York X X

North Carolina X X

North Dakota X X

Ohio X X
Table 7

Comparison of Intent Requirement Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

Intent to and Intent to and Actually Causes

Actually Causes Actually Causes Reasonable Fear

Reasonable Fear Alarm/Annoyance a b

c

State 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994

a. These statutes require proof that the defendant intended to cause reasonable fear. The “actually causes” language is in some statutes, but for this chart, it is

assumed that if charges are brought, reasonable fear has resulted from the defendant’s actions.

b. This is a lesser standard than fear, and although some States have it in their stalking statutes, most reserve this language for their harassment statutes.

c. These statutes do not require proof of intent on the part of the defendant. As long as the victim is reasonably frightened by the defendant’s conduct, an

element of the crime has been met. The defendant need only have the intent to do the act that results in fear.

40

Oklahoma X X

Oregon X X

Pennsylvania X X

Rhode Island X X

South Carolina X X

South Dakota X X

Tennessee X X

Texas X X

Utah X X

Vermont X X

Virginia X X

Washington X X

West Virginia X X

Wisconsin X X

Wyoming X X

Totals 33 28 4 7 14 16
4. The Illinois Appellate Court, First District - Third Division reversed a decision by the Cook County Circuit Court to deny

bail based upon the no-bail provision of the Illinois statute. The appellate court did not, however, issue a written opinion in

the case. People v. Incandella, No. 1–92–3767, Dec. 10, 1992.

41

Oklahoma, “two or more separate acts”; and Colorado and North Carolina, “on more than

one occasion.”

Sentencing

Many States have both misdemeanor and felony stalking classifications. Typically, a stalker

convicted of a misdemeanor may receive a jail sentence of up to 1 year. Penalties of 3 to 5

years are typical for felony convictions. Some States allow 10- and 20-year sentences.

Enhanced penalties are available in most States if a stalker violates a protective order,

brandishes a weapon, directs his conduct toward a victim who is under age 16, or has

committed a prior stalking offense. In 14 States, the prior offense must have been against the

same victim. Nine States permit enhanced penalties for stalking if the defendant previously

has been convicted of another felony. A description of sentencing provisions of the State

stalking statutes is provided in Table 8. A comparison of sentencing provisions in State laws

before and after the model code is provided in Table 9.

Recently, several States have enacted legislation that mandates a life sentence in prison

without parole for those who have been convicted of a violent offense for the third time

(“three strikes, you’re out” laws). In States that classify stalking as a violent crime, such

provisions may become relevant in stalking cases.

Bail

Eleven States include bail or pretrial release provisions for stalking defendants in their

stalking laws or in related law. Arkansas, Maryland, Texas, and West Virginia require a nocontact order as a condition of pretrial release. Georgia, in addition to requiring a no-contact

order, provides that bail may be denied if evidence shows that the defendant previously

violated conditions of pretrial release, probation, or parole arising from a stalking offense.

In Illinois, bail may be denied after a hearing if the State proves that the defendant would

pose a threat to the stalking victim. The Ohio statute lists specific factors that a court must 4

consider in determining the amount and conditions of bail. In Montana, the defendant may

not be released without appearing before a judge, and the court must notify the victim of

pretrial release. In California, a hearing must be held before a person arrested for stalking or

domestic abuse is released on bail that is different from that specified in the bail schedule or

if the individual is released on his or her own recognizance. Vermont law considers stalking a

violent crime, and bail is determined according to State guidelines for violent crimes.

In a number of States, the constitutional right to bail does not apply to persons charged with

felony offenses if the alleged offense was committed while the accused was out on bail,
16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2nd: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

1. Court may require counseling as a condition of pretrial release.

2. Repeat offense within 10 years or under another State’s statutory provisions.

3. Same victim.

4. Court may recommend evaluation and counseling.

42

Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

Alabama 1610 years VO: 2620 years

Alaska Up to 1 year, $5,000 VO: Up to 5 years

16: Up to 5 years

W: Up to 5 years

PF: Up to 5 years

X1

Arizona 466 months AG: Up to 1 year

Arkansas 3610 years VO: 5620 years

W: 5620 years

2d : 5620 years 2

California Up to 1 year, $1,000 VO : 264 years 3

2d: 264 years

3d: 264 years

X4

Colorado 6624 months, VO: Consecutive sentences required

$5006$5,000 2d: Mandatory minimum 30 days

Connecticut 1 year VO: 165 years

2d: 165 years

16: 165 years
Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2d: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

5. Subsequent conviction within 7 years.

6. Second offense within 2 years.

7. If the stalker has the intent to cause fear, the crime of stalking is a felony offense.

8. Court may order a mental health evaluation and counseling as a condition of probation.

9. Court may order counseling.

10. Same victim.

11. Second or subsequent conviction within 7 years.

43

Delaware Up to 3 years VO: 6 months, $1,000

2d : 1 year, $1,000 5

District of Columbia Up to 1 year, $500 VO: 1 year, $500, and 1 year bond

2d : Up to 1.5 years, $750 6

3d: Up to 3 years, $1,500

Florida Mis: Up to 1 year VO: Up to 5 years, $5,000

Fel: Up to 5 years,

 $5,0007

Georgia Up to 12 months 2d: 165 years

VO: 165 years, $10,000

X8

Hawaii Up to 30 days, $1,000 Twice: Up to 1 year, $2,000 X9

Idaho Up to 1 year, $1,000 VO : 1 year, $1,000 10

2d : Up to 5 years, $10,000 11
Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2d: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

12. An order of counseling is one of the remedies that may be included in an order of protection.

13. Subsequent conviction within 7 years, same victim.

44

Illinois Up to 3 years, $10,000 2d: Up to 5 years, $10,000

BH: Up to 5 years, $10,000

CR: Up to 5 years, $10,000

VO: Up to 5 years, $10,000

2dAG: Up to 7 years, $10,000

X12

Indiana Up to 180 days, $1,000 T: Up to 1 year, $5,000

VO: Up to 1 year, $5,000

CC: Up to 1 year, $5,000

W: 1.5 years with not more than 

 1.5 years added for aggravated

 circumstances, and not more than 

 1 year subtracted for mitigating

 circumstances, $10,000

2d: same as W

Iowa Up to 2 years, VO: Up to 5 years, $500

$5006$5,000 W: Up to 5 years, $500

18: Up to 5 years, $500

2d: Up to 5 years, $500

3d: Up to 10 years, $5006$10,000

Kansas Up to 1 year, $100,000, VO: Up to 13 months jail, $100,000,

24 months probation 24 months probation

2d : Up to 17 months jail, $100,000, 13

 24 months probation
Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2d: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

14. Second offense within 5 years

15. A criminal complaint is currently pending with a court, law enforcement agency, or prosecutor by the same victim or victims and the defendant has been

given actual notice.

16. The defendant has been convicted or pleaded guilty within the previous 5 years to a felony or misdemeanor, other than another stalking violation, against

the same victim or victims.

17. Same victim.

18. Information is for Maine’s terrorizing statute.

45

Kentucky Up to 1 year VO: 165 years

2d : 165 years 14

W: 165 years

CC : 165 years 15

PF : 165 years 16

Louisiana Up to 6 months, $1,000 VO: 30 days to 1 year, $5,000

2d : 90 days to 2 years, $5,000 17

Maine Less than 1 year, $2,000 18

Maryland Up to 5 years, $5,000 Allows concurrent convictions of multiple

offenses

Massachusetts Up to 5 years, $1,000 VO: 165 years

2d: 2610 years
Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2d: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

19. Mental evaluation and counseling may be imposed as a condition of probation.

20. Second offense within 10 years.

21. If a person is convicted, the court is required to order an evaluation. The evaluation may be waived if an adequate assessment was conducted prior to

the conviction. If the assessment indicates that the offender is in need of treatment, the court shall include in the sentence a requirement that the offender

undergo treatment.

22. Second or subsequent conviction within 7 years.

23. Second or subsequent conviction within 7 years.

46

Michigan Up to 1 year, $1,000 T: Up to 5 years, $10,000; minimum

Probation for up to probation of 5 years

 5 years VO: Up to 5 years, $10,000; minimum

 probation of 5 years

2d: Up to 5 years, $10,000; minimum

 probation of 5 years

PF: Up to 5 years, $10,000; minimum

 probation of 5 years

X19

Minnesota Up to 1 year, $3,000 B: Up to 10 years, $20,000

FI: Up to 10 years, $20,000

18: Up to 10 years, $20,000

TJS: Up to 10 years, $20,000

2d : Up to 10 years, $20,000 20

W: Up to 10 years, $20,000

X21

Mississippi Up to 6 months, $1,000 VO: Up to 1 year, $1,000

2d: Up to 2 years, $2,000

T : Up to 2 years, $2,000 22

T : Up to 2 years, $2,000 23
Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2d: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

24. Second or subsequent offense within 5 years.

25. Defendant may be required to pay all medical, counseling, and other costs incurred by or on behalf of victim as a result of the offense.

26. Subsequent offense within 7 years against same victim.

27. Multiple penalties may be imposed for other criminal offenses arising from the same conduct.

28. Without suspension, deferral, or other advisement.

47

Missouri 6 months to 1 year T: Up to 5 years

2d : Up to 5 years 24

2dAG: Up to 7 years

Montana Up to 1 year, $1,000 VO: Up to 5 years, $10,000 25

2d: Up to 5 years, $10,000

Nebraska Up to 1 year, $1,000 2d : Up to 5 years, $10,000 26

Nevada 6 months, $1,000 VO: 1 year, $2,000 27

2d: 1 year, $2,000

CT: 166 years, $5,000

New Hampshire Up to 1 year, $2,000 2d: 2.567 years, $4,000

New Jersey Up to 18 months 2d: 365 years

VO: 365 years

New Mexico Up to 1 year, $1,000 2d : Mandatory minimum 72 hours 28

3d: 18 months, $5,000
Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2d: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

29. For physical “menacing,” placing victim in fear.

30. Repeated harassment or following or displaying a firearm to place in fear.

31. Within 10 years, only for stalking or displaying weapon.

32. Within 5 years.

33. In North Dakota or another State involving same victim.

34. Same victim.

35. Same victim.

36. Court may order an evaluation.

48

New York Up to 90 days, $500 2d : Up to 4 years, $5,000 29

or up to 1 year, $1,00030

31

North Carolina Up to 6 months, $1,000 VO: Up to 2 years, $2,000

2d : Up to 5 years 32

North Dakota 1 year, $1,000 VO: Up to 5 years, $5,000

2d: Up to 5 years, $5,000

PF : Up to 5 years, $5,000 33

Ohio Up to 6 months, $1,000 2d : Up to 5 years, $2,500 34

SF : Up to 5 years, $2,500 35

X36
Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2d: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

37. Second offense within 10 years.

38. Within 10 years.

39. Includes one previous conviction for stalking with violation of a protective order.

40. Second or subsequent offense.

41. Previous crime of violence against same victim.

42. Same victim within 7 years.

43. Within 7 years, same victim.

49

Oklahoma Up to 1 year, $1,000 VO: Up to 5 years, $2,500

2d : Up to 5 years, $2,500 37

PF : Up to 5 years, $2,500 38

3d : Up to 10 years, $2,5006$10,000 39

Oregon Up to 1 year, $2,500 2d: Up to 5 years, $100,000

VO: Up to 5 years, $100,000

Pennsylvania Up to 5 years 2d : Up to 7 years 40

PF : Up to 7 years 41

VO: Up to 7 years

Rhode Island Up to 1 year, $3,000 VO: Up to 2 years, $6,000

2d : Up to 5 years, $10,000 42

South Carolina Up to 1 year, $1,000 VO: Up to 3 years, $5,000

2d : Up to 5 years, $10,000 43
Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2d: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

44. Second or subsequent conviction within 7 years.

45. Second or subsequent conviction within 7 years.

46. Repeat offense toward same person.

47. In Utah or another jurisdiction against same victim.

48. In another jurisdiction for a crime substantially similar to stalking.

49. In Utah or for a substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction.

50. In Utah or another jurisdiction against same victim.

50

South Dakota 1 year, $1,000 VO: 2 years, $2,000

2d : Up to 5 years, $5,000 44

Tennessee Up to 1 year, $2,500 VO: 166 years, $3,000

2d : 166 years, $3,000 45

Texas Up to 1 year, $3,000 2d : 2610 years, or 1 year community 46

correctional facility, $10,000

Utah Up to 6 months 2d: Up to 1 year

PF : Up to 1 year 47

PC : Up to 1 year 48

3d : Up to 5 years 49

3F : Up to 5 years 50

W: Up to an additional 5 years to run

 consecutively
Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2d: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

51. Same victim.

52. Second offense within 5 years.

53. Third offense within 5 years.

54 Prior conviction for any crime of harassment against the same victim or the victim’s family or other person named in a no-contact or

 no-harassment order.

51

Vermont Up to 2 years, $5,000 VO: Up to 5 years, $25,000

2d: Up to 5 years, $25,000

PF : Up to 5 years, $25,000 51

16: Up to 5 years, $25,000

Virginia Up to 6 months, $500 VO: Up to 1 year, $1,000

2d : Up to 1 year, $1,000 52

3d : 165 years, $1,000 53

Washington Up to 1 year, $5,000 VO: Up to 5 years, $10,000

2d: Up to 5 years, $10,000

PC : Up to 5 years, $10,000 54
Table 8

Sentencing Provisions

State Penalty Enhancement Counseling

Evaluation/

16: Victim under 16 years of age CT: Credible threat

18: Victim under 18 years of age FI: Committing the crime by false impersonation

2d: Second stalking offense PC: Prior conviction

2dAG: Second conviction for aggravated stalking PF: Prior felony

3d: Third stalking offense and each subsequent T: Threat

offense TJS: Committing the crime to tamper with the judicial

3F: Third felony system or officials in connection with judicial 

AG: Aggravated proceedings

B: Bias motivated Twice: Stalking occurs on more than one occasion

BH: Bodily harm to victim VO: Violate court order—includes protection orders,

CC: Criminal complaint pending probation, conditions of release, etc.

CR: Confining or restraining the victim W: Weapon

55. Court has discretion to impose home confinement with electronic monitoring as alternative sentence.

56. Second offense within 5 years.

57. Third or subsequent conviction within 5 years.

58. Any convicted person shall have as a condition of probation or suspension that he or she participate in counseling or medical treatment.

59. Second offense within 7 years, same victim.

60. In State, or under similar law of another jurisdiction.

61. Within 5 years in State, or under similar law of another jurisdiction.

52

West Virginia Up to 6 months, $1,000 VO: 90 days to 1 year, $2,0006$5,000 55

2d : 90 days to 1 year, $2,0006$5,000 56

3d : 165 years penitentiary, 57

 $3,0006$10,000

2d and VO: 6 months to 1 year,

 $2,0006$5,000

X58

Wisconsin Up to 9 months, $10,000 2d : Up to 2 years, $10,000 59

BH: Up to 2 years, $10,000

Wyoming Up to 6 months, $750 VO : Up to 10 years 60

PF: Up to 10 years

2d : Up to 10 years 61

BH: Up to 10 years
53

Table 9 

Comparison of Sentencing Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

Stalking Enhanced Penalties

Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum

Sentence Up to Sentence 1 Year Sentence Up to Sentence 1 Year

1 Year or More 1 Year or More

State 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994

Alabama XX XX

Alaska XX XX

Arizona XX XX

Arkansas XX X X

California XX X X

Colorado XXX X

Connecticut XX X X

Delaware XX X X

District of Columbia XX X X

Florida XX X X

Georgia XX X X

Hawaii XX XX

Idaho XX X X

Illinois XX X X

Indiana XX X X

Iowa XXX X

Kansas XX X X

Kentucky XX X X

Louisiana XX X X

Maine XX XX X
Table 9 

Comparison of Sentencing Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

Stalking Enhanced Penalties

Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum

Sentence Up to Sentence 1 Year Sentence Up to Sentence 1 Year

1 Year or More 1 Year or More

State 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994

54

Maryland XX XX

Massachusetts XX XX

Michigan XX XX

Minnesota XX XX

Mississippi XX XX

Missouri XX XX

Montana XX XX

Nebraska XX XX

Nevada XX XX

New Hampshire XX XX

New Jersey XX XX

New Mexico XX XX

New York XX XX

North Carolina XX XX

North Dakota XX XX

Ohio XX XX

Oklahoma XX XX

Oregon XX XX

Pennsylvania XX XX

Rhode Island XX XX

South Carolina XX XX
Table 9 

Comparison of Sentencing Provisions Before

and After Publication of the Model Code

Stalking Enhanced Penalties

Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum

Sentence Up to Sentence 1 Year Sentence Up to Sentence 1 Year

1 Year or More 1 Year or More

State 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994

55

South Dakota XX XX

Tennessee XX XX

Texas XX XX

Utah XX X X

Vermont XX XX

Virginia XX XX

Washington XX XX

West Virginia XX XX

Wisconsin XX XX

Wyoming XX XX

Totals 38 36 13 15 4 3 47 48
56

probation, or parole for another offense or if the accused previously has been convicted of a

felony. In those States, a charge of felony stalking may allow the court to determine that the

defendant is ineligible for bail.

Special Provisions

In 1994, some States amended their statutes to include fear of sexual assault as part of the

fear element. The West Virginia statute specifies that the stalker has a relationship, had a

relationship, or is seeking to establish a relationship with the victim through his or her

conduct.

Several States permit police to arrest stalking suspects without a warrant, provided there is

probable cause. Many States allow a warrantless arrest if there has been a violation of a

protective order. Implicit in such statutes is the provision that the officer need not see the

violation. Pennsylvania’s law makes such a provision explicit.

In Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Washington, it is presumed that the

defendant acted with intent to harass if the defendant has been warned that the victim does

not wish to be contacted.

In Michigan and Oklahoma, evidence that the defendant continued to engage in a course of

conduct, after having been requested to discontinue contact, gives rise to a rebuttable

presumption that the conduct caused the victim to feel frightened.

New Hampshire enforces protective orders issued by other States if the order is in effect in

the issuing State.

Some States require training for law enforcement, prosecutors, and the judiciary in handling

stalking cases.

Some States may require electronic monitoring of the defendant as a condition of pretrial

release or probation, or as an alternative to jail. In California, the electronic monitoring

program is dependent on the defendant’s consent. Other States allow a court to order

monitoring.

Montana provides that a person convicted of stalking may be required to pay all medical,

counseling, and other costs incurred by or on behalf of the victim as a result of the offense.

In Maryland, a sentence under the State’s antistalking law may be imposed separately from

and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any other offense.

In California, an incarcerated person who makes a threat against another person can be

prosecuted under the State antistalking law.
57

In Florida, a juvenile may be transferred to adult criminal court if charged with aggravated

stalking.

Arizona, Minnesota, Montana, and Wisconsin allow stalking victims to keep their addresses

confidential under certain circumstances.

In California, State employees are prohibited from releasing the registration or driver’s

license records of individuals who verify to the Department of Motor Vehicles that they have

reasonable cause to believe that they are being stalked or to fear death or great bodily injury.

Wyoming requires law enforcement agencies to provide emergency assistance to victims,

including making recommendations regarding available services. However, the statute makes

law enforcement immune from civil liability for failure to provide these services.

Some States require that victims be notified if the an alleged stalker is released before trial.

Some also require that the victim be notified when a stalker is released after conviction.

Victim-notification provisions are included in the antistalking laws of California, Georgia,

Indiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Texas, and Washington.

Since July 1, 1994, a person convicted of stalking in North Carolina has been required to

provide a DNA sample.

Civil Remedies

Stalking laws appear to provide a stronger link between civil protection orders and criminal

law. Some States have amended their domestic abuse and/or protective order statutes to

make it possible to issue protective orders in stalking cases. Other States have included

provisions in their antistalking laws designed to strengthen the enforcement of civil protection

orders.

In Oregon, California, and Wyoming, a victim can bring a civil action against a stalker to

recover damages incurred as a result of the stalking behavior. In Wyoming, the civil cause of

action is permissible even if an alleged stalker has not been charged or convicted of stalking,

and a civil suit does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution, regardless of the outcome of the

civil case.

At the Federal level, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 creates civil liability for

crimes of violence motivated by gender bias. The statute, codified at 42 U.S.C. §13981,

states, “A person . . . who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender . . . shall be

liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive

damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem

appropriate.” As defined in the law, a crime of violence includes an act that would constitute

a felony against the person. 
58

This statute and similar ones may prompt States to explore further the possibility of making

civil remedies available to stalking victims.

Mental Evaluation and Civil Commitment

None of the State stalking laws specifically address civil commitment, although several

States provide guidance to courts regarding mental health evaluations, treatment, or

counseling. In many States, courts may order an evaluation or counseling before trial or may

order counseling as a condition of probation. Minnesota and West Virginia require courts to

order evaluation and counseling for all stalking defendants. Laws that recommend mental

health treatment for convicted stalkers allow medical professionals to determine the

treatment to be provided. 

State statutes regarding the civil commitment of mentally disordered persons do not apply to

individuals who commit domestic violence. Sex offenses are the only violent crimes for

which States have enacted or are considering civil commitment measures. Some States are

considering broadening the criteria for civil commitment to include the inability to take care

of oneself and substance abuse.

Related Laws

Prior to enactment of antistalking legislation, law enforcement agencies handled stalking

through laws regarding criminal trespass, terroristic threat, and harassment. Stalking laws are

unique in the elements they require, their application to a variety of intimidating and

threatening situations, their ties to civil protection, and their penalty structures. However, the

types of behavior could constitute trespass, harassment, or stalking. 

Some State antistalking laws operate in conjunction with related laws to suggest gradations

of behavior and punishment. States that pair stalking with harassment or trespass are

Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,

Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 

The 46 States that have criminal trespass laws generally describe the offense as knowingly

and unlawfully entering or remaining in a dwelling, a building, or upon real property if notice

against trespass is given. A person also may commit criminal trespass if he remains in any

place in defiance of a lawful order to leave.

Twenty-eight States have harassment statutes. These usually prohibit intentionally annoying

or alarming another person by subjecting him to offensive physical contact, public insults, or

false reports about the victim. Some harassment laws contain provisions for handling threats

or violations of restraining orders.

Nineteen States have laws against terrorizing or making terroristic threats. Terrorizing

usually means threatening to commit a crime of violence or unlawfully causing the
59

evacuation of a building or facility. Terroristic threat is generally described as threatening to

kill another with the purpose of putting that person in fear of imminent death and under

circumstances that would reasonably cause the victim to believe that the threat will be

carried out.
5. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).

61

Chapter 3. Stalking Case Law: State Appellate Court Decisions

When the model antistalking code was released, there were no appellate court decisions on

stalking statutes. Since then, several State appellate courts have decided stalking cases.

Although legal challenges and court interpretations of antistalking laws vary widely, all

appellate courts that have addressed the issue of constitutionality have upheld the laws. 

Courts in California, Florida, Georgia, Oklahoma, and Virginia have found State stalking

statutes to be constitutional, rejecting arguments that the laws are so vague or overly broad

that they deny defendants their First Amendment right to free speech.

Other courts, although not addressing constitutional issues, have clarified statutory language.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts overturned a stalking conviction, ruling that the

lower court’s interpretation of the stalking statute was incorrect. The Appellate Court of

Illinois, based on its interpretations of the legislative intent, clarified the language of the State

stalking statute.

The following sections discuss selected State appellate cases. A complete list of citations for

State appellate court decisions is provided in Appendix F.

California Statute Upheld

In People v. Heilman, for example, the California Court of Appeal rejected a vagueness 5

challenge and found that the State’s stalking statute was constitutional under the State

constitution. The case stemmed from the 1992 shooting death of Janice Davis in the building

where she worked. Police charged her ex-boyfriend, John Heilman, with first-degree murder,

alleging that he had gone to her place of employment, followed her into the elevator, and shot

her. According to court records, Davis’ assailant ripped the emergency phone out of the

elevator wall to prevent her from calling for help and fled.

Heilman was convicted of the murder charge as well as charges of aggravated stalking and

violating a restraining order that Davis had obtained against him. In appealing his conviction,

the defendant focused on the wording of the California statute that defines the crime of

stalking: “Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another

person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place the person in reasonable fear

of death or bodily injury is guilty of the crime of stalking.” Heilman argued that the term

“repeatedly” is vague. When a statute is held invalid for vagueness, it either does not inform a

person of the conduct that is proscribed, or it creates the danger of arbitrary law enforcement.
6. 636 So. 2d 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

62

The court interpreted the statute as proscribing two different courses of conduct: willful and

malicious harassment, and the repeated following of a victim. The court held that the term

“repeatedly” modifies the word “follows,” not the word “harasses,” because harassment

already implies a series of acts, and to require repeated harassment would not comport with

the intent of the statute. Therefore, a key issue in deciding the case was to determine whether

Heilman’s actions constituted harassment, repeated following, or both.

Heilman and Davis had dated intermittently for 3 or 4 years. After the relationship ended,

Heilman called Davis on numerous occasions. He left angry, profane messages on her

answering machine at home and called her at work. Heilman often went to Davis’ car while

she was at work and left threatening notes. He also left a beer bottle covered with a condom

and ketchup on the hood of her car and damaged her car by placing super glue on the gas cap

and door locks. Davis told security officers at her office that she was afraid, and they

distributed reports containing Heilman’s picture to building management and security

personnel.

Because Heilman engaged in conduct that constituted willful and malicious harassment, the

section of the statute that prohibits repeated following did not apply to him, the court found.

The court continued, however, that even if the section proscribing repeated following did

apply to the defendant, the statute still would survive a constitutional attack. The court held

that the word “repeatedly” has a common meaning—more than one time—so that it

adequately informs a person of what is prohibited. The court also held that the law does not

create the danger of discriminatory enforcement because perpetrators have to follow their

victims more than once and communicate a credible threat before police can arrest them.

Florida Statute Upheld

A Florida District Court of Appeal held that the Florida stalking law is constitutional under 

the U.S. Constitution. Several other appellate courts in the State have cited this case in

upholding the statute.

In Pallas v. State, John Pallas was charged with aggravated stalking after harassing his wife, 6

Edie Pallas, from whom he was separated. He pleaded no contest to the charge, reserving the

right to appeal. 

The arrest was based on threatening calls that John Pallas allegedly made to his estranged 

wife, Edie, while she was staying with her parents, the Raglands, during divorce 

proceedings. The prosecution said that one Sunday during January 1993, the defendant began

calling the Raglands’ residence at 7:00 a.m. He called continually throughout the day, 

forcing Edie’s parents to take the telephone off the hook several times. When he did get 
7. 449 S.E. 2d 94 (Ga. 1994).

63

through, he cursed and threatened the Raglands. Testimony at trial also revealed that during 

the marriage, the defendant beat Edie and broke her jaw. 

Pallas argued that the aggravated stalking statute under which he was charged is

unconstitutional because it is vague and overly broad. Under the Florida law, “Any person

who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person, and makes a

credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily

injury, commits the offense of aggravated stalking. . . .” The definition of “harasses” is “to

engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional

distress. . . .” Pallas argued that the phrase “substantial emotional distress” in the definition of

“harasses” creates an entirely subjective standard, so that an unreasonably sensitive victim

could arbitrarily place a defendant in jeopardy of prosecution. Pallas also contended that the

statute is overly broad in that it encompasses constitutionally protected expression in its

prohibitions. 

The court found that Pallas harassed and threatened his estranged wife but did not follow her.

Unlike the California court, the court in Pallas held that the word “repeatedly” modifies both

“follows” and “harasses” and held that the defendant’s actions met the requirements for the

elements of the crime. 

The court held that the “substantial emotional distress” language creates a reasonable person

standard. Only if a reasonable person would be disturbed by the defendant’s action could the

conduct be considered criminal.

Although some protected expression may be encompassed, the statute was not broad enough

to invalidate the statute, the court found. The perpetrator’s conduct must be “willful,

malicious, and repeated,” indicating that the person must have malevolent intent before his

speech can be curtailed by the statute. Furthermore, the prohibition requires that speech be

combined with some conduct, and the standard for protecting speech mixed with conduct is

lower than for protecting speech alone.

Georgia Statute Upheld

The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled in Johnson v. State, that the Georgia stalking statute is 7

constitutional under the State constitution. The defendant was charged with misdemeanor

stalking and burglary. In Georgia, an element of burglary is the intent to commit a felony, and

court records indicated that the defendant intended to commit aggravated stalking as an

element of the burglary. After a jury convicted the defendant on both counts, he sought to

overturn the convictions by arguing that the stalking statute was vague and overly broad.
8. 886 P. 2d 496 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).

64

The defendant challenged a section of the stalking statute that prohibits “[contacting]

another person . . . without the consent of the other person . . . ,” arguing that the statutory

language could outlaw much constitutionally protected conduct, and therefore was overly

broad. The court rejected the argument, stating that a person who engages in nonconsensual

contact must do so with “the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.” The

specification that there be an intent to harass on the part of the defendant and the element

requiring that the victim be in “reasonable fear of death or bodily harm to himself or herself

or to a member of his or her immediate family” saves the statute from criminalizing

protected conduct. It is clear that the defendant must be engaging in conduct that does not

have a legal purpose to fall under the coverage of the statute, the court said.

The defendant also argued that the stalking statute is vague because it does not require an

explicit threat of bodily injury or death, nor does it require that the defendant’s conduct

actually cause substantial emotional distress. The court disagreed, holding that because the

statute requires that the victim be “in reasonable fear of death or bodily harm to himself or

herself or to a member of his or her immediate family,” the language is sufficiently clear to

ordinary people to protect the statute from a vagueness challenge.

Oklahoma Statute Upheld

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma unanimously upheld the Oklahoma statute in

State v. Saunders and found the statute constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of 8

the U.S. Constitution. Saunders, who was charged with stalking in 1993, filed a motion to

dismiss the charges before trial, alleging that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and

overly broad. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, and the State appealed.

Under Oklahoma’s stalking statute, “Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly

follows or harasses another person in a manner that: (1) would cause a reasonable person or

a member of the immediate family of that person . . . to feel frightened, intimidated,

threatened, harassed, or molested; and (2) actually causes the person being followed or

harassed to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested . . .

shall be guilty of the crime of stalking.”

The court stated that the basic rule of statutory interpretation requires a court to indulge the

intent of the legislature in favor of constitutionality whenever possible. It found that the

statute is not vague because it gives fair notice of the prohibited. The court wrote, “Stalking

statutes must be defined as broadly as possible to maximize victim protection, but narrowly

enough to prevent serious abuse.” The Oklahoma statute’s use of the words “willfully,

maliciously, and repeatedly” indicate a specific intent element. Statutes that require specific

intent have been found constitutional because the defendant must know that the conduct is
9. 47 S.E. 2d 530 (Va. App. 1994).

65

wrong in order to create the intent. The court also relied upon cases in other jurisdictions,

such as Pallas v. State and People v. Heilman, to support its holding. 

The defendant also challenged a part of the statute that gives rise to a rebuttable

presumption that the victim felt terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or

molested if the victim has asked the defendant to cease the conduct, and the defendant

disregards the warning and continues the course of conduct.

A rebuttable presumption is void if there is no rational connection between the facts proved

and the presumption, the court said. In this case, the court found that there was a rational

connection between the facts proved—the warning by the victim and the defendant’s

continued conduct—and the presumption that the victim was fearful. “Clearly the victim

would not have requested the perpetrator to stop the conduct if the conduct was not causing

a problem . . . . The continuation of such conduct would naturally lead the victim to feel

terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested,” the court said.

Therefore, it denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on this ground.

Virginia Statute Upheld

In Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld the constitutionality 9

of the Virginia statute under the State and U.S. constitutions. The statute has since been

amended to reflect the language of the model code. 

Anderson Woolfolk was arrested and charged with stalking after maintaining surveillance

over his estranged wife’s house for 4 consecutive days. Woolfolk told police that he was

monitoring his children’s environment, but a jury convicted him of stalking.

The statute under which Woolfolk was convicted read in part: “Any person who on more

than one occasion engages in conduct with the intent to cause emotional distress to another

person by placing that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury shall be guilty of a

Class 2 misdemeanor.”

The case stemmed from activities that began in 1987 when Woolfolk and his wife, Jane,

were separated. Anderson Woolfolk allegedly began following his estranged wife and

watching her home. In 1991, the couple was divorced after 15 years of marriage. 

Court records show that in 1992, when Jane began dating another man, her ex-husband’s

surveillance activities increased. He frequently drove up and down the street where his exwife lived and parked near the house. He watched the house for hours at a time, day and

night, and even followed her out of town to a wedding.
10. 637 N.E. 2d 854 (Mass. 1994).

66

After Jane Woolfolk’s tires were deflated in her driveway, Anderson Woolfolk was served

with a “no trespass” warning. He continued to drive past the home and park near there.

One morning, her new boyfriend received a telephone call from a man who threatened, “If

you don’t stop seeing her, I’m going to shoot [both of you].” The boyfriend recognized the

voice as that of Anderson Woolfolk. 

On appeal, Woolfolk argued that the statutory phrase “intent to cause emotional distress” is

unconstitutionally vague and that the statute was overly broad. 

The court held that “emotional distress” is a common and well-recognized legal term.

Emotional distress is “suffering or mental anguish that arises from being placed in reasonable

fear of death or bodily injury and is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected

to endure it.” The court held that the statute creates a reasonable person standard, not a

subjective standard, so that the proscribed conduct does not depend on the sensitivity of the

victim.

The court rejected the assertion that the statute is overly broad, holding that the only

proscribed actions are those that have no legitimate purpose and that are intended to cause

fear in the victim. Therefore, very little, if any, constitutionally protected expression is

encompassed by the statute. 

Massachusetts Overturns Conviction

In Massachusetts, the State supreme court overturned a stalking conviction, ruling that the

lower court misinterpreted the stalking statute. In doing so, the supreme court provided

guidance on the proper interpretation of the statute. 

The case, Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, stemmed from an incident in which James 10

Kwiatkowski visited his estranged wife’s home in violation of a restraining order and

threatened her when she called the police. Kwiatkowski was arrested and eventually

convicted of stalking and of violating a restraining order.

In 1991, Mary Kwiatkowski filed for divorce after 7 years of marriage. James Kwiatkowski

was served with a restraining order that prohibited him from abusing Mary, visiting her

home, or telephoning her. The prohibition on telephone calls was added to the order after

James Kwiatkowski made more than 150 threatening calls in 1 week.

On appeal, Kwiatkowski argued that the statute is invalid because it is unconstitutionally

vague. Under the statute, a person is guilty of stalking if he or she “willfully, maliciously, 
67

and repeatedly follows or harasses another person, and makes a threat with the intent to place

that person in imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury.”

In rendering its decision, the Massachusetts supreme court weighed the facts of the case

against the meaning of the statutory language. One weekend, while the couple’s children

were visiting James Kwiatkowski, he called his estranged wife at 2:45 a.m. and said that one

of the children had a nightmare. When she asked to speak with the child, he said the child

was asleep. He told his estranged wife that he wanted to work things out with her but when

he asked her if there were men at her apartment, she hung up. Immediately, the phone rang

again. Mary Kwiatkowski hung up again, and left the telephone off the hook for the rest of

the night.

When Kwiatkowski showed up at his ex-wife’s home with the children about 2 hours later, she

called the police. Kwiatkowski threatened her and was arrested when the police arrived. 

The court agreed with the defendant that the statute was vague because it prohibited

someone from repeatedly harassing, although the crime of harassment already denotes a

series of acts over time. Under the lower court interpretation, repetition of an act is required

to meet the elements of the crime of stalking. 

The court held that the intent of the legislature was likely to criminalize one pattern of

conduct, not several, but that this intent was not sufficiently clear in the way the statute was

drafted. “The result is that the portion of the stalking statute concerning harassing conduct

lacks any reasonably discernible unambiguous application, and the defendant may properly

assert a facial challenge to it.”

The court wrote that from the date of its opinion, the crime of stalking would be committed

if a person “willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing pattern of conduct or series of

acts over a period of time directed at a specific person which seriously alarms or annoys that

person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and . . .

also makes a threat with the intent to place that person in imminent fear of death or bodily

injury.”

Repeated conduct is not an element of the crime, but the legislature’s intent is included in the

phrases “pattern of conduct” and “series of acts” because both require more than one incident of

stalking behavior.
11. 634 N.E. 2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).

68

Illinois’ Interpretation

In People v. Krawiec, the Appellate Court of Illinois sought to clarify an Illinois stalking law by 11

holding that the law allows an act to be considered threatening even if the act does not result 

in violence.

After threatening his estranged wife and placing her under surveillance, Thomas Krawiec was

convicted of stalking and sentenced to 30 months of probation with conditional discharge. 

The prosecution alleged that Krawiec had made threatening telephone calls to his estranged

wife and had taken his 11-year-old son to his wife’s home to show him that she was having

sex with another man. Krawiec videotaped his estranged wife and another man in the

bedroom and pushed her when she tried to stop him. Krawiec also allegedly knocked two

television sets to the floor and told his wife that he was going to play the video for their

daughter. The tape was later admitted into evidence against the defendant.

Under the Illinois statute: “A person commits stalking when he or she transmits to another

person a threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable apprehension of death,

bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint, and in furtherance of the threat

knowingly does any one or more of the following acts on at least two separate occasions: (1)

follows the person, other than within the residence of the defendant; (2) places the person

under surveillance by remaining present outside his or her school, place of employment,

vehicle, other place occupied by the person, or residence other than the residence of the

defendant.”

On appeal, the defendant questioned the meaning of the phrases “in furtherance of the threat,”

and “places the person under surveillance.”

The court held that an act may be threatening even if the perpetrator did not intend for the

act to be threatening and the act does not result in violence. The court held that an act is

threatening if the threat is reinforced by further conduct. In this case, the broken television

sets and the fact that the defendant pushed Marilyn Krawiec were sufficient to meet the

element of “in furtherance of the threat.”

The court also clarified the meaning of placing a person under surveillance. “It is the act of

remaining in the vicinity of the would-be victim’s house, with the requisite intent to further a

threat that is prohibited,” the court wrote. The court noted that it is irrelevant whether the

victim is at home or is aware that the stalker is watching.
69

Chapter 4. Using Civil Protective Orders in Stalking Cases

The final report of the model antistalking code contained a chapter on the use of protective

orders in stalking cases. However, since publication of that report, there have been several

developments in the area of protective order law, which are outlined in this chapter. A number of

States have expanded the eligibility provisions of their statutes to make protective orders

available to all stalking victims. In addition, a number of State appellate courts have decided

cases involving the constitutionality of bringing criminal charges based upon conduct for which

the defendant already has faced criminal contempt charges for violating a protective order.

One characteristic of stalking is the element of escalation. Behavior that initially may be

bothersome and annoying, but legal, escalates to the level of obsessive, dangerous, violent, and

even fatal acts. Stalking victims, therefore, need appropriate means to protect themselves against

potential acts of violence.

Protective orders can serve as the first formal intervention in the stalker’s behavior. The

protective order puts the suspected stalker on notice that this behavior is unwanted and that any

further similar behavior will be regarded as criminal and will result in more severe intervention

by the criminal justice system. In addition, protective orders provide a means for protecting a

victim by allowing law enforcement officials to take defendants into custody immediately if they

violate the order.

However, two factors may limit the applicability and effectiveness of protective orders in

stalking cases. Statutory provisions limiting the category of individuals eligible to apply for

protective orders may prohibit certain stalking victims from obtaining protective orders.

Furthermore, recent studies suggest a need to reexamine and improve the enforcement of civil

protection orders.

Eligibility for Civil Protective Orders

Most States have statutes authorizing civil orders of protection in domestic abuse cases. States

should consider reviewing their protective order statutes to determine whether protective orders

would be available to all stalking victims. A list of statutory citations of State protective order

provisions is provided in Table 10.

All protective order statutes establish some eligibility limits, but the limits vary among 

States. Thirteen States offer broad eligibility, permitting victims of harassment to obtain

protective orders. In 1994, California enacted legislation that permits an employer to obtain a

protective order on behalf of an employee. In most States, protective orders are available to

individuals who have been married; persons who live with, or who once lived with, another

individual; individuals who have a child in common; and persons related by blood or 

marriage. Some States have stricter eligibility limitations. Some States, for example, require 
70

Table 10

Citations for Protective Order Provisions

State Citation

Alabama ALA. CODE §§30-5A-1-7 (Supp. 1993).

Alaska ALASKA STAT. §§18.65.520 (1991), 12.30.025, 25.35.010-.050, 25.35.200 (1991 & Supp. 1993).

Arizona ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. §§12-1809, 13-3601 to 3602 (1989 & Supp. 1993)

Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. §§9-15-101 to 211 (Michie 1993).

California CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§543-553 (1972 & Supp. 1994), 527.6; CAL FAM. CODE §§6211, 6250 (Supp. 1994).

Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. §§14-4-101-105, 18-1-1001 (1987 & Supp. 1993)

Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. §46b-15, 46b-38a to -38d,-38f (1986 & Supp. 1993).

Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§921-923, 943, 945-952 (1975 & Supp. 1993).

District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. §§16-1001 to -1006 (1989 & Supp. 1993).

Florida FLA. STAT. ch. 741.30 -.31. (Supp. 1993).

Georgia GA. CODE ANN. §§17-4-20.1, 17-5-7, 19-13-1 to -6, 19-13-20 to -22, 19-13-30 to -31 (1991 & Supp. 1993). 

Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. §§586-1-11 (1988 & Supp. 1993)

Idaho IDAHO CODE, Ch. 63, tit. 39-6301-6317 (1993)

Illinois 725 ILCS 5/111-8, 5/112A-A31 (Supp. 1994)

Indiana IND. CODE ANN. §§34-4-5.1-1 to 1-2, 1-4 to 1-6 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1994)

Iowa IOWA CODE §§236.1-.18 (1993)

Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. §§60-3101-3111 (1993)

Kentucky KY REV. STAT. ANN. §§403.715-.785 (Baldwin 1993)

Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§46:2131-2142 (West Supp. 1994)

Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§4654-4655, 4659 to 4660-A (West 1989 & Supp. 1993) tit. 19, §§761-A to 762, 765-766,

769-770 (West 1981 & Supp. 1993) tit. 22 §4032 (West 1992).

Maryland MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§4-501, -504 to -510, -513, -515 (1991 & Supp. 1993).

MD. ANN. CODE, Article 27 §594B (1992 & Supp. 1993).

Massachusetts MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch.209A, §1-10, ch.209C, §15 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1993).

Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§552.14, 600.2950a (West 1988)

Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. §518B.01 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994)

Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. §§93-21-1 to 29 (1972 & Supp. 1993)

Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. §§455.010-.085 (Vernon Supp. 1994)

Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§40-4-121-125 (1993)

Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. §§42-901-927 (1978)
Table 10

Citations for Protective Order Provisions

State Citation

71

Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§33.017-.100, 200.591 (1986 & Supp. 1993)

New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §173-B:1 to :11-b (Supp. 1993).

New Jersey N.J. REV. STAT. §§2C:25-17 to -33 (Supp. 1993).

New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-1-7 (1984 & Supp. 1993), 40-13-2 (Supp. 1993)

New York N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §530.11-.12 (McKinney, 1984 & Supp. 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §252 (McKinney, 1986 &

Supp. 1994); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§153-b to 158, 812-813, 821-828, 846-847 (McKinney, 1983 & Supp. 1994).

North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. §§50B-1 to -9 (1989 & Supp. 1993).

North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE §§14-07.1-.01 to .18 (1991 & Supp. 1993)

Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§3113.31 et seq. (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1993)

Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§60-60.7 (1992 & Supp. 1994)

Oregon OR. REV. STAT §§107.700-.750, §163.735-163.747 (Supp. 1993); OR. LEGIS. SERV. 643 (1993)

Pennsylvania 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §6101-6117 (1991).

Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§15-15-1 to -7 (1988 & Supp. 1993).

South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. §§20-4-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1993).

South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§25-10-1-33 (1992 & Supp. 1994)

Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. §§36-3-601-615 (1991 & Supp. 1993), §§40-7-103 (1993).

Texas TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§71.01-.19 (1986 & Supp. 1994); TEX. PENAL CODE §25.08 (1989 & Supp. 1994)

Utah UTAH CODE ANN. §§30-6-1--10 (1989 & Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE CRIM. PROC. §§77-3-1-12 (1990 & Supp. 1993)

Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§1101-1109 (1989 & Supp. 1993).

Virginia VA. CODE ANN. §§16.1-253 to -253.2, -253.4, -279.1 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1993).

Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§10.99.020 (1990 & Supp. 1994), 26.50.010-.902 (1990 & Supp. 1993)

West Virginia W. VA. CODE §48-2A-1 to -10 (1992 & Supp. 1993).

Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. §§813.12 (West Supp. 1993)

Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. §§7-3-507-509, 35-21-101-107 (Supp. 1993)

Virgin Islands V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§90-99b (Supp. 1993).

Puerto Rico P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, §§601-602, 621-628, 631-641 (Supp. 1990).
12. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).

72

that the applicant live or have lived in the same residence as the person against whom the

protective order is sought. 

To provide for early intervention in stalking cases, States should consider amending their statutes

to ensure that all stalking victims, regardless of their relationship with the alleged stalker, can

obtain protective orders. Eligibility provisions are provided in Table 11.

Enforcement of Protective Orders

For protective orders to be enforced effectively, all parties, including the victim, the defendant,

the judge, and probation and parole officer must be aware that an order is in effect and its

specific terms. States should review their protective order notification procedures to ensure that

adequate instructions are given for notifying all parties of the existence and specific terms of an

order. For example, States should consider implementing procedures to ensure that defendants

receive a copy of a protective order issued against them and an explanation of the possible

consequences of a violation. 

In most States, law enforcement officers can arrest a person without a warrant if they have

probable cause to believe that the person has violated a protective order. In many States,

violating a protective order is a misdemeanor. In many jurisdictions, violation of a protective

order results in civil or criminal charges. In some States, courts can enforce protective orders

issued by another jurisdiction.

Seminar participants indicated a need to reexamine and improve the enforcement of civil

protection orders. Victims need to be better informed of their rights once they have obtained a

protection order and of the process for reporting violations. Similarly, defendants need to be

better informed about what constitutes a violation of a protective order.

Police need to be better informed about how to respond to violations of protective orders. Judges

and prosecutors need a better understanding of the sanctions available when protective orders

are violated. Many States now require that judges and prosecutors have domestic violence

awareness training.

Double Jeopardy Implications of Protective Orders

Although civil protection orders can provide early intervention in stalking cases, there are

questions about whether they violate the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution, which

prohibits trying a defendant twice for the same offense. In June 1993, in United States v.

Dixon, the U.S. Supreme Court, ruled that law enforcement officials can enforce protective 12

orders through criminal contempt proceedings in addition to bringing subsequent criminal charges

based on the same conduct. 
1. Or grandchild.

2. Or grandparent.3. As a condition of pretrial release.4. Or woman is pregnant.5. In the second degree.6. Must be of the opposite sex.7. Blood only.8. In the second degree.* Irrelevant whether parents have lived together or have been married.

73

Table 11

Eligibility Provisions for Civil Protective Orders

State Spouse Ex-Spouse Child Minor Parent Child in Related by Related by Currently or Currently Currently or Currently or 

common* blood or blood or formerly living living with formerly formerly 

marriage and marriage with offender offender living with living with 

living with offender as a offender as a 

offender spouse sexual

partner

AL X XX X XAK X XX X X X 

1 2 

AZ X XX X X X X 

45 6

AR X XX X X X 7CA X XX X X X 

8
Table 11

Eligibility Provisions for Civil Protective Orders

State Spouse Ex-Spouse Child Minor Parent Child in Related by Related by Currently or Currently Currently or Currently or 

common* blood or blood or formerly living living with formerly formerly 

marriage and marriage with offender offender living with living with 

living with offender as a offender as a 

offender spouse sexual

partner

9. Includes stepchildren and foster children.10. Defined as current or former relation.11. Against any person charged with a crime.12. Must be of the opposite sex.13. By blood or legal custody.14. Includes stepchildren and foster children.15. Includes stepparent and foster parent.* Irrelevant whether parents have lived together or have been married.

74

CO X XX X X X 

9 10 

CT X XX X XDE X XX X X X12DC X XX X X X 13FL XX XGA X XX XX X 14 15
Table 11

Eligibility Provisions for Civil Protective Orders

State Spouse Ex-Spouse Child Minor Parent Child in Related by Related by Currently or Currently Currently or Currently or 

common* blood or blood or formerly living living with formerly formerly 

marriage and marriage with offender offender living with living with 

living with offender as a offender as a 

offender spouse sexual

partner

16. Includes stepchildren.17. Includes stepparents.18. Who have lived together within the past year.19. Within the last year.20. Includes stepchildren.* Irrelevant whether parents have lived together or have been married.

75

HI X XX X X XID XX X X XIL X XX X X X X 

16 17

IN Any person who suffers or is threatened with bodily injury or damage to property may apply for a protective order on behalf of himself/hersIA X XX X X X X X X 18 19KS XKY X XX X X X 20
Table 11

Eligibility Provisions for Civil Protective Orders

State Spouse Ex-Spouse Child Minor Parent Child in Related by Related by Currently or Currently Currently or Currently or 

common* blood or blood or formerly living living with formerly formerly 

marriage and marriage with offender offender living with living with 

living with offender as a offender as a 

offender spouse sexual

partner

21. Includes stepchildren and foster children.22. Includes stepparent who resides or resided with the offender or the victim for at least 90 days within 1 year before the filing of the petition.23. Living as a spouse and there are minor children who also live in the household.24. Must be adults.25. Holding oneself out as a spouse is unnecessary to constitute living as a spouse.26. Includes stepchildren who reside or resided with the offender or the victim for at least 90 days within 1 year before the filing of the petition.27. Includes stepparents who reside or resided with the offender or the victim for at least 90 days within 1 year before the filing of the petition.28. Or who has lived with the offender for at least 90 days before the filing of the petition.29. Person who has had a sexual relationship with the offender and resided with the offender for 90 days within 1 year before the filing of the petition.30. The relationship will be adjudged by courts, considering the length of time of the relationship.* Irrelevant whether parents have lived together or have been married.

76

LA X XX X X 21 22 23ME XX X X X X 24 25MD X XX X X X X 26 27 28 29MA XX X 
Table 11

Eligibility Provisions for Civil Protective Orders

State Spouse Ex-Spouse Child Minor Parent Child in Related by Related by Currently or Currently Currently or Currently or 

common* blood or blood or formerly living living with formerly formerly 

marriage and marriage with offender offender living with living with 

living with offender as a offender as a 

offender spouse sexual

partner

31. Blood only.32. Must be of the opposite sex.33. Includes stepchildren, foster children, and adopted children.34. Includes stepparents, foster parents, and adoptive parents.35. Blood only.36. Must be of the opposite sex.* Irrelevant whether parents have lived together or have been married.

77

MI X X MN X XX X X X X X 31MS X XX X X XMO X X XX32MT X XX X X X X 

33 34 35 

NE XX X X XNV XX X X X 
Table 11

Eligibility Provisions for Civil Protective Orders

State Spouse Ex-Spouse Child Minor Parent Child in Related by Related by Currently or Currently Currently or Currently or 

common* blood or blood or formerly living living with formerly formerly 

marriage and marriage with offender offender living with living with 

living with offender as a offender as a 

offender spouse sexual

partner

37. A guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent the interests of the children of either or both parties.38. Cohabitation is unnecessary for all categories.39. Defined as a “continuing personal relationship.”40. Must be of the opposite sex.41. In a current dating relationship.42. Within 1 year.* Irrelevant whether parents have lived together or have been married.

78

NH X XX X X 

37

NJ XX XNM38 X XX X X X NY X XX X X XNC X X XX X40ND X XX X X X X OH X XX X X X42
Table 11

Eligibility Provisions for Civil Protective Orders

State Spouse Ex-Spouse Child Minor Parent Child in Related by Related by Currently or Currently Currently or Currently or 

common* blood or blood or formerly living living with formerly formerly 

marriage and marriage with offender offender living with living with 

living with offender as a offender as a 

offender spouse sexual

partner

43. All categories include elderly and handicapped persons.44. Includes present spouses of ex-spouses.45. Adult persons.46. Within 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the petition.47. A minor who is not related to the adult offender and with whom the offender is living or has lived in the past 3 years.48. Includes current pregnancies.49. As a spouse.* Irrelevant whether parents have lived together or have been married.

79

OK XXX X X X 

43 44

OR XX X X X 

45 

PA X X XX X X X RI X X XX47SC X X XX XSD X X XXTN X XXX 48 49
Table 11

Eligibility Provisions for Civil Protective Orders

State Spouse Ex-Spouse Child Minor Parent Child in Related by Related by Currently or Currently Currently or Currently or 

common* blood or blood or formerly living living with formerly formerly 

marriage and marriage with offender offender living with living with 

living with offender as a offender as a 

offender spouse sexual

partner

50. Includes foster children.51. Includes foster parents.52. As a condition of pretrial release.53. Must be of the opposite sex.54. Adult persons.55. Includes stepchildren.56. Includes stepchild.* Irrelevant whether parents have lived together or have been married.

80

TX X XX X X X X 

50 51 

UT XX X X X XVT X XX X53VA X XXWA XX X X X 

54

WV X XX XX X X 

55 56
Table 11

Eligibility Provisions for Civil Protective Orders

State Spouse Ex-Spouse Child Minor Parent Child in Related by Related by Currently or Currently Currently or Currently or 

common* blood or blood or formerly living living with formerly formerly 

marriage and marriage with offender offender living with living with 

living with offender as a offender as a 

offender spouse sexual

partner

57. Blood only.58. Adult children only.* Irrelevant whether parents have lived together or have been married.

81

WI X XX X X X 57WY X XX X X 

58
13. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).

14. People v. Allen, 868 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1994); People v. Correa, 623 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 1993); Buie v. State 633 N.E.2d 250

(Ind. 1994); Eldred v. Commonwealth, 1994 WL 587834 (Ky., Oct. 27, 1994); State v. Fairfield, 644 A.2d 1052 (Me.

1994); State v. Burns, 877 S.W. 2d 111 (Mo. 1994); State v. Barker, 858 P.2d 360 (Mont. 1993); People v. Latham, 609

N.Y.S. 2d 141 (N.Y. 1994); State v. Mertz, 514 N.W.2d 662 (N.D. 1994); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W. 2d 530 (Tenn.

1994); State v. Kurzawa, 509 N.W. 2d 712 (Wisc. 1994).

15. Hawaii v. Lessary, 865 P.2d 150 (Haw. 1994).

82

A lower court had cited a 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Grady v. Corbin, in which 13

the court ruled that a subsequent prosecution is barred under the double jeopardy provision 

if, in 22order to establish an essential element of the crime, the government had to prove 

conduct that constituted an offense for which the defendant already had been prosecuted. 

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Dixon, overruled the Grady decision. Three

justices dissented from the portion of the opinion overruling Grady.

The Court reestablished the “same-elements” test used prior to Grady to determine whether a

subsequent prosecution violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The test requires a court

to analyze whether each offense contains an element not present in the other. If the charged

offenses have some different elements, the offenses are not barred from prosecution by double

jeopardy. If all elements of the crime already have been litigated in the first proceeding, the

double jeopardy clause applies and the second prosecution is barred. 

By violating a protective order, a defendant also may be committing an act which, if 

combined with other conduct, constitutes stalking. A critical element of any stalking 

conviction is evidence that the defendant repeatedly engaged in the stalking behavior. 

Therefore, in order to obtain a stalking conviction, the State would have to prove the element 

of repeated behavior. 

However, to find a defendant in criminal contempt for violating a protective order, the State 

must prove that the defendant knew about the protective order and engaged in the prohibited

behavior on one occasion. Since the elements needed to prove each offense differ, it appears

that, under the majority decision in Dixon, the State would not be barred from prosecuting 

the defendant for stalking, even if he or she has been found in criminal contempt. 

Policymakers, legislators, and law enforcement officials should be aware that the law in this 

area is somewhat unsettled, as evidenced by the reversal of the Grady test, which was

established only in 1990. At least 11 State supreme courts have adopted the Dixon “sameelements” test. Since the Dixon decision, at least one State supreme court has rejected the 14

“same-elements” test, ruling that the State constitution’s double jeopardy provision provides

greater protection than does the provision in the U.S. Constitution. The reestablished 15

standard has been the basis of much litigation in State courts, and many States have cases

pending in the intermediate appellate courts.
16. State v. Johnson, 644 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

17. State v. Miranda, 644 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

83

Two Florida courts have reached opposite decisions in considering whether a subsequent

prosecution for aggravated stalking after a conviction for criminal contempt based on 

violation of a protective order would violate the double jeopardy clause.

In State v. Johnson, Robert Johnson was charged with criminal contempt for violating an 16

injunction against domestic violence when he broke into the house of Andrea Green.

Simultaneously, the State charged him with “aggravated stalking by violating a prior injunction.”

In Florida, an element of aggravated stalking is violation of an injunction against violence.

Johnson pleaded no contest to the criminal contempt charge and moved to have the aggravated

stalking charge dismissed. 

The State appellate court dismissed the aggravated stalking charge, holding that according to the

test articulated in Dixon, prosecuting Johnson for aggravated stalking based on violating an

injunction was forbidden under the double jeopardy clause because each element of the

aggravated stalking charge was subsumed in the violation of the injunction charge. The court

wrote, “There is no conceivable way in which [Johnson] could have committed aggravated

stalking against the victim without also violating the terms of the injunction, a crime for which he

had already been convicted.”

A separate appellate court in State v. Miranda came to the opposite conclusion. Humberto 17

Miranda was charged with criminal contempt for violating a domestic violence injunction and

aggravated stalking. Miranda pleaded guilty to the criminal contempt charge and moved to

dismiss the aggravated stalking charge on the grounds that it violated the double jeopardy clause.

The court found that the defendant was charged with aggravated stalking for conduct he engaged

in after the conduct for which the violation of the injunction was based. 

The court, using the test articulated in Dixon, examined the elements of the criminal contempt

charge and the aggravated stalking statute. The court noted that Dixon required that in order to

prosecute for both offenses, each offense must contain at least one element that the other does

not. Both the aggravated stalking statute and the contempt charge required that the State prove

that an injunction for protection had been issued. 

In continuing its analysis, the court found that in order to prove aggravated stalking, the

prosecution had to prove that the defendant “knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and 

repeatedly follow[ed] or harass[ed] another person” and “engage[d] in a course of conduct

directed at a specific person that cause[d] substantial emotional distress.” These 

requirements, however, were not elements of the charge of violating the conditions of the

injunction.
84

The court also found that the contempt charge included an element that was not part of the

aggravated stalking charge—that the defendant had entered on or about the victim’s place of

employment. Because each offense contained at least one element that the other did not,

prosecution for both offenses was constitutionally permissible.

Protective orders and domestic violence were the focus of much State legislative activity in the

past year. For example, the provisions listed below were approved during the 1994 State

legislative sessions.

 Arizona: The address of a person seeking a court order of protection from harassment or

domestic violence may not be listed on the petition and cannot be disclosed to anyone

except by court order, unless it was the common residence of the plaintiff and defendant

during the past 5 years. A protection order expires if it is not served within 1 year from

the date it is signed. (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-1809 (1994 and Supp. 1994)).

 California:

4 A person subject to a protective order is prohibited from owning or possessing a

firearm. (Cal. Fam. Code §6389 (West Supp. 1995)).

4 Each county is required to increase enforcement procedures for protective orders

among jurisdictions. (Cal. Fam. Code §6385 (West 1994)).

4 A mandatory minimum sentence is imposed for second and subsequent convictions of

spousal battery within 7 years. (Cal. Penal Code §273.6 (West 1988 and Supp.

1995)).

4 An employer is authorized to obtain a temporary restraining order on behalf of an

employee. (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §527.8 (West Supp. 1995)).

4 A prosecutor may recharge a misdemeanor crime based on domestic violence

within 6 months if the reason the case was originally dismissed was because the

complaining witness refused to testify after being served with a subpoena. (Cal.

Penal Code §1387 (1982 and Supp. 1995)).

4 A person convicted of battery may be required to pay up to $5,000 to a battered

women’s shelter, and a court may order the individual to participate in a batterer’s

program as a condition of probation. (Cal. Penal Code §243 (1988 and Supp.

1995)).

 Colorado: The definition of domestic violence includes the invasion or threat of 

invasion of home or property. (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-6-800.3 (West 1990 and 

Supp. 1995)).
85

 Hawaii: A person subject to a protective order may not possess a firearm or ammunition.

(Haw. Rev. Stat. §134-7 (1988 and Supp. 1995)).

 Indiana: The protective order laws were amended to require increased enforcement

among jurisdictions and to allow protective orders to remain in effect for 1 year. (Ind.

Code Ann. §§5-2-9-6, 31-1-11.5-7, 31-11-5-8.2, 34-4-5.1-2 (West Supp. 1995)).

 Louisiana: The duration of protective orders is increased from 3 months to 6 months. (La.

Rev. Stat. Ann. §46:2136 (West Supp. 1995)).

 New Hampshire:

4 Previous reconciliation can no longer be grounds for denial of a protective order.

(1994 N.H. Laws 259) (to be codified at N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §173-B:4).

4 A minor can seek relief from domestic violence without being accompanied by a

parent or guardian. The court is authorized to require counseling for the abuser.

(1994 N.H. Laws 259) (to be codified at N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §173-B:3).

 Rhode Island: The definition of domestic assault now includes persons who are in a

substantive dating or engagement relationship. (R.I. Gen. Laws §8-8.1-1 (1985 & Supp.

1994)).

 South Dakota: Law enforcement officers and prosecutors are required to attend training

on domestic abuse, and law enforcement agencies are required to develop policies

pertaining to domestic abuse. (S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§23-3-39.4, -39.7, -42.1 (Supp.

1994)).

 West Virginia: Several laws relating to domestic violence are amended. (W. Va. Code

§§48-2A-6, -10, -14, 61-2-28 (1994)).

 Wisconsin: The laws relating to restraining orders are amended. (Wis. Stat. Ann. §§46.95,

813.12, 968.075 (West Supp. 1995)).

87

Sources for Further Information

For more information about this document on implementing antistalking codes or other

documents on stalking, contact the following:

BJA Contact

Jennifer Knobe

Program Manager

Adjudication Branch

Discretionary Grants Program Division

633 Indiana Avenue NW.

Washington, DC 20531

202–616–3212

NCJA Contact

Lisa Doyle Moran

Assistant Director for Legal Affairs

444 North Capitol Street NW.

Suite 608

Washington, DC 20001

202–347–4900

Bureau of Justice Assistance Clearinghouse

Box 6000

Rockville, MD 20849-6000

800–688–4252

89

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Appendix A

Model Antistalking Code and Commentary

95

Model Antistalking Code for the States

The model antistalking code development project has sought to formulate a constitutional and

enforceable legal framework for addressing the problem of stalking.

The model code encourages legislators to make stalking a felony offense; to establish penalties

for stalking that reflect and are commensurate with the seriousness of the crime; and to provide

criminal justice officials with the authority and legal tools to arrest, prosecute, and sentence

stalkers.

The Model Antistalking Code for the States

Section 1. For purposes of this code:

(a) “Course of conduct” means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a

person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by conduct or

a combination thereof directed at or toward a person;

(b) “Repeatedly” means on two or more occasions;

(c) “Immediate family” means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or “any other person who

regularly resides in the household or who, within the prior 6 months, regularly resided in

the household.”

Section 2. Any person is guilty of stalking who:

(a) purposefully engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would

cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to himself or herself or a member of his or

her immediate family or to fear the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her

immediate family; and

(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person will be placed in

reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or herself or a member of his or her 

immediate family or will be placed in reasonable fear of the death of himself or herself 

or a member of his or her immediate family; and

(c) whose acts induce fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or herself 

or a member of his or her immediate family or induce fear in the specific person of 

the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family.
96

Analysis and Commentary on Code Language

Prohibited Acts

Unlike many State stalking statutes, the model code does not list specific types of actions that

could be construed as stalking. Examples of specific acts frequently proscribed in existing

stalking statutes include following, nonconsensual communication, harassing, and trespassing.

Some courts have ruled that if a statute includes a specific list, the list is exclusive. The model

code, therefore, does not list specifically proscribed acts because ingenuity on the part of an

alleged stalker should not permit the stalker to skirt the law. Instead, the model code prohibits

defendants from engaging in “a course of conduct” that would cause a reasonable person fear. 

Credible Threat

In contrast to many State stalking statutes, the model code does not use the phrase “credible

threat.” Stalking defendants often do not threaten their victims verbally or in writing but instead

engage in conduct which, taken in context, would cause a reasonable person to fear. The model

code is intended to apply to such “threats implied by conduct.” Therefore the “credible threat”

language, which might be construed as requiring an actual verbal or written threat, was not used

in the model code.

“Immediate Family”

A stalking defendant may, in addition to threatening the primary victim, threaten to harm

members of the primary victim’s family. Under the provisions of the model code, such a threat to

harm an immediate family member could be used as evidence of stalking in the prosecution for

stalking of the primary victim.

The model code uses a definition of “immediate family” similar to one currently pending in the

California legislature. This definition is broader than the traditional nuclear family, encompassing

“any other person who regularly resides in the household or who within the prior six months

regularly resided in the household.”

States that are considering further expanding the definition of “immediate family” should be

aware that broadening it too much may lead to challenges that the statute is overly broad.

Classification as a Felony

States should consider creating a stalking felony to address serious, persistent, and

obsessive behavior that causes a victim to fear bodily injury or death. The felony statute could

be used to handle the most egregious cases of stalking behavior. Less egregious cases could be 
1. This idea is further explained in a Georgetown Law Journal comment: “Aside from statutorily defined components of

stalking, a generally recognized notion of ’stalking’ is evolving. Not only do anti-stalking statutes indicate recognition of

stalking, public and judicial perceptions indicate that stalking is a discretely identifiable behavior. Although this public

perception of stalking does not obviate the need for concise definitions in anti-stalking statutes, it does provide guidance as to

the types of activity society is trying to limit through these statutes.” Silvija A. Strikis, Note, Stopping Stalking, Geo L.J.

81(2771). 1993. 

2. Ibid.

97

handled under existing harassment or intimidation statutes. As an alternative, States may wish to

consider adopting both misdemeanor and felony stalking statutes.

Since stalking defendants’ behavior often is characterized by a series of increasingly serious 

acts, States should consider establishing a continuum of charges that could be used by law

enforcement officials to intervene at various stages. Initially, defendants may engage in 

behavior that causes a victim emotional distress but does not cause the victim to fear bodily 

injury or death. For example, a defendant may make frequent but nonthreatening telephone 

calls. Existing harassment or intimidation statutes could be used to address this type of 

behavior. States also may want to consider enacting aggravated harassment or intimidation 

statutes that could be used in situations in which a defendant persistently engages in annoying

behavior. The enactment of a felony stalking statute would allow law enforcement officials to

intervene in situations that may pose an imminent and serious danger to a potential victim.

Classification as a felony would assist in the development of the public’s understanding of 

stalking as a specific crime, as well as permit the imposition of penalties that would punish 1

appropriately the defendant and provide protection for the victim. 

Of utmost importance is a State’s decision to require the criminal justice system and related

disciplines to take stalking incidents seriously. The decision about how to classify stalking and 2

how to establish a continuum of charges is of less importance. 

“Conduct Directed at a Specific Person”

Under the model code’s language, the stalking conduct must be directed at a “specific person.”

Threatening behavior not aimed at a specific individual would not be punishable under a statute

similar to the model code. For example, a teenager who regularly drives at high speed through a

neighborhood, scaring the residents, could not be charged under a stalking statute based upon the

model code.

 

Fear of Sexual Assault

It is likely that victims who fear that a defendant may sexually assault them are also likely 

to fear that the defendant would physically injure them if they resisted. Furthermore,

because the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes acquired immunodeficiency

syndrome (AIDS), could be contracted through a sexual assault, a victim is more likely to 
98

fear bodily injury or death, as well as psychological injury. Nevertheless, States may wish to

consider expanding the language of felony stalking statutes to include behavior that would 

cause a reasonable person to fear sexual assault in addition to behavior that would cause a

reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death.

Intent Element

Under the provisions of the model antistalking code, a defendant must engage purposefully in

activity that would cause a reasonable person to fear and have or should have knowledge that the

person toward whom the conduct is directed will be placed in fear. In other words, if a defendant

consciously engages in conduct that he knows or should know would cause fear in the person at

whom the conduct is directed, the intent element of the model code is satisfied.

Suspected stalkers often suffer under a delusion that their victims actually are in love with them

or that, if properly pursued, the victims will begin to love them. Therefore, a stalking defendant

may not intend to cause fear but instead may intend to establish a relationship with the victim.

Nevertheless, the suspected stalker’s actions cause fear in the victim. 

As long as stalking defendants know or should know that their actions cause fear, they can be

prosecuted for stalking. Protection orders can serve as notice to alleged stalkers that their

behavior is unwanted and that it is causing the victim to fear.

Fear Element

Since stalking statutes criminalize behavior that might otherwise be legitimate conduct because

the behavior induces fear, the level of fear induced in a stalking victim is a crucial element of the

stalking offense. The model code, which treats stalking as a felony, requires a high level of

fear—fear of bodily injury or death. Acts that induce annoyance or emotional distress would be

punishable under statutes such as harassment or trespassing, which do not rise to the felony level

and carry less severe penalties.

In some instances, a defendant may be aware through a past relationship with the victim of 

an unusual phobia of the victim’s and use this knowledge to cause fear in the victim. In order for

such a defendant to be charged under provisions similar to those in the model code, the victim

actually must fear bodily injury or death as a result of the defendant’s behavior and a jury must

determine that the victim’s fear was reasonable under the circumstances.
Appendix B

Principal Recommendations of the Final Report

of the Project To Develop an Antistalking Model Code

101

Principal Recommendations of the Final Report of the Project To

Develop an Antistalking Model Code

A Model Antistalking Code for the States

 Because stalking often is characterized by a series of increasingly serious acts, States

should consider establishing a continuum of charges that law enforcement agencies can

use to intervene at various stages in a stalking case.

 States should consider creating a felony charge of stalking to address serious, persistent,

and obsessive behavior that causes a victim to fear bodily injury or death.

Sentencing Convicted Stalkers

 States should consider establishing a sentencing policy for stalking that makes

incarceration an option for all stalking convictions.

 If a State decides not to treat stalking as a felony, it should consider incorporating

aggravating factors into its sentencing policy for stalking so that a particular incident can

be elevated from a misdemeanor to a felony if an aggravating factor(s) is present.

 States should consider the same penalty enhancements for stalking convictions that they

generally apply to aggravating circumstances such as violation of a protective order, a

minor victim, or use of a weapon during commission of the crime. States should consider

making severe enhancements available in instances in which the defendant has committed

a previous felony or stalking offense. In such instances, States should consider requiring

mandatory prison sentences.

 As an alternative to penalty enhancements, States may wish to establish a separate crime

category—for example, aggravated stalking—to deal with convicted stalkers who have

committed previous felonies or stalking offenses.

 States’ stalking sentencing policies should incorporate release options and conditions that

increase in restrictiveness commensurate with the risk the stalker poses to the victim. At a

minimum, States should consider no-contact orders as a condition of release for convicted

stalkers who are about to be placed on probation or parole. States also may want to

consider monitoring convicted stalkers released on probation or parole through electronic

monitoring or house arrest.

 States may wish to consider requiring convicted stalkers, as part of their sentences, to 

pay restitution to their victims. Alternatively, States may wish to consider permitting

victims to recover damages from convicted stalkers through civil causes of action.
102

 States should consider requiring evaluation and offering counseling as part of any

sentence imposed on a convicted stalker. States also should consider requiring counseling

as a condition of release for convicted stalkers placed on probation or parole.

Pretrial Release: Supervising Accused Stalkers 

 States should consider developing appropriate pretrial release conditions for accused

stalkers. At a minimum, they should consider making it a condition of release that the

accused refrain from deliberately contacting the victim and, if appropriate, members of

the victim’s immediate family.

 States should consider including provisions in pretrial release or bail laws that require

authorities to make reasonable efforts to provide victims with copies of relevant pretrial

release orders, together with information about how and to whom they report alleged

violations, and the sanctions for violations.

Strategies for Implementing Stalking Statutes and Protocols

 States should consider developing a multidisciplinary approach emphasizing early

intervention in suspected stalking. This approach should involve the law enforcement

community, the judicial system, correctional and social services agencies, victims’

services, advocacy groups, and community organizations in the characteristics and

behavior of stalkers. 

 Criminal justice officials should receive training in the characteristics and behaviors of

stalkers. In cases in which two or more criminal justice disciplines have shared,

compatible training needs, States should consider developing interdisciplinary training

resources.

 Police officials should receive training in four principal areas: stalking law provisions and

evidentiary requirements; identifying and monitoring stalking incidents; assessing the

potential danger posed by a suspected stalker; and assisting stalking victims. Training for

police officials should be incorporated into police recruit and roll call and in-service

specialized training curricula.

 States should consider reviewing their protective order statutes to determine whether,

under present conditions, protective orders would be available to all stalking victims.

 States may wish to consider adopting legislation and complementary procedures that

allow protective orders to be issued on an emergency basis after court hours.
103

 Judges should consider incorporating recommendations for substance abuse 

monitoring and treatment and mental health counseling into restraining orders, when 

the existence of these conditions can be documented.

 States should consider reviewing the notification procedures in their protective order

statutes to ensure that they provide adequate notification to all parties that a protective

order has been issued and notify them of the terms of the order.

 States should consider enacting legislation that would allow the courts to enforce

protective orders issued by another jurisdiction.

 Law enforcement agency administrators should establish formal department policies and

procedures for handling stalking cases.

 States should consider enacting legislation and establishing procedures that encourage

judges to use defendants’ criminal history record information when making decisions

about pretrial release conditions, sentencing, and issuing protective orders in stalking

cases. Similarly, States should consider developing procedures to ensure that judicial

authorities making decisions about pretrial release and civil protection orders in stalking

cases, have timely access to information about civil protection orders applied for, or

issued in, any court in the State.

 States should examine their privacy and freedom of information statutes to determine

whether amendments are needed to prevent information contained in public records from

being used for illegal purposes.

 States should review their statutory and regulatory victim notification provisions, as well

as the protocols of their victims’ agencies, to determine whether they are adequate to

meet the unique needs of stalking victims. 

A National Research Agenda on Stalking

 Research should be undertaken on stalkers’ behavioral histories to respond to the

following questions:

4 What information is available about stalkers and their behavioral histories?

4 Is stalking a new behavior? Have allegations of stalking behavior increased during

the past 3 years? How prevalent was stalking 20 years ago?

4 Do stalkers as a group exhibit any common characteristics or patterns of

behavior?
104

4 How many stalkers have records of prior felony arrests and convictions unrelated

to the stalking incident?

4 What behaviors do stalkers exhibit immediately before committing a violent 

act?

4 Are there any mental disorders associated with stalking behavior?

 Research should be undertaken on handling stalking cases to answer the following

questions:

4 How many persons are arrested each year for stalking?

4 How many of these arrests for stalking were made under stalking statutes? What

charges were filed in stalking cases in which arrests were made under nonstalking

statutes?

4 How many individuals arrested for stalking were convicted?

4 How many individuals arrested for stalking were convicted under stalking

statutes?

4 How many individuals were convicted for stalking-like behavior under

nonstalking statutes?

4 What sentences did stalkers receive in cases adjudicated under stalking statutes?

4 What sentences did stalkers receive in cases adjudicated under nonstalking

statutes?

4 How many stalkers are under the jurisdiction of a civil or criminal court? 

4 Is information on stalkers and their behaviors being used to guide law

enforcement and other criminal justice officials in handling stalking cases?

 Research should be undertaken on protective orders to answer the following questions:

4 How well do defendants understand the terms of civil protection orders issued

against them?

4 How well do individuals who obtain civil protection orders understand their rights

and the process by which violations should be reported?
105

4 How well do law enforcement officials and judges understand the enforcement

process for civil protection orders?

 Research should be undertaken on how private corporations are handling alleged

incidents in which an employee is a victim of stalking or an employee is using corporate

resources to engage in stalking behavior.

 Regional seminars should be conducted to help the criminal justice community explore

legislative and programmatic approaches to addressing the problem of stalking. 

Appendix C

Participant Lists

109

Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes

Eastern Region Seminar

March 31–April 1, 1994

Tampa, Florida

Participants

Mr. Stanley E. Adelman Mr. Lindsay G. Dorrier, Jr.

General Counsel Director

Executive Office of Public Safety Virginia Department

1 Ashburton Place, Room 2133 of Criminal Justice Services

Boston, MA 02108 805 East Broad Street

Sgt. Philip A. Amabile

Broward Sheriff’s Office Ms. Deborah Downing

P.O. Box 9507 Victims Services Analyst

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33310–9507 Department of Criminal Justice

Ms. R. Maria Brady 805 East Broad Street

Director, Victim Witness Services Richmond, VA 23219 

Law Enforcement Planning Commission

8172 Sub Base, Suite 3 Ms. Lisa Doyle Moran

Charlotte Amalie Assistant Director for Legal Affairs

St. Thomas, VI 00802–5803 National Criminal Justice Association

The Honorable Paul E. Caron Washington, DC 20001 

Massachusetts State House of

 Representatives Mr. Joseph P. Dugdale

Co-Chair, Joint Committee on Assistant Attorney General

 Public Safety Crime Control Section

Room 473B, State House P.O. Box 27687

Boston, MA 02133–1053 Raleigh, NC 27611–7687

Mr. Joseph M. Claps Mr. William Duryea

First Assistant Attorney General Staff Writer

Office of the Attorney General St. Petersburg Times

100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor 1000 North Ashley Drive, Suite 700

Chicago, IL 60601 Tampa, FL 33602 

Richmond, VA 23219 

 Services

444 North Capitol Street NW., #618
110

Ms. Lynn J. Falkenthal Ms. Robin S. Hassler

Executive Director Executive Director

Victim Advocate Program Governor’s Task Force on

630 Estate Frydenhoj 41–6–1 Domestic Violence

Suite 25 Executive Office of the Governor

St. Thomas, VI 00802–1411 Room 210, The Capitol

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.

Consultant Psychologist Sheriff Cal Henderson

U.S. Secret Service Hillsborough County Sheriff’s

Visiting Fellow Office

National Institute of Justice 2008 Eighth Avenue

39 Linnaen Street Tampa, FL 33605 

Cambridge, MA 02138 

Ms. Lisa A. Frisch Executive Vice President

Director of Public Safety National Criminal Justice Association

New York State Office for the 444 North Capitol Street NW., #618

 Prevention of Domestic Violence Washington, DC 20001 

Capitol View Office Park

52 Washington Street, 3rd Floor Mr. Charles M. (Bud) Hollis

Renssealaer, NY 12144 Chief, Adjudication Programs Branch

Mr. Ted Gest U.S. Department of Justice

Senior Editor 633 Indiana Avenue NW., Room 602

U.S. News & World Report Washington, DC 20531 

2400 N Street, NW.

Washington, DC 20037 Mr. Henry W. Jaeger

The Honorable Judy M. Gomez Union County, New Jersey

Senator One Elizabeth Plaza

Legislature of the Virgin Islands Administration Building

P.O. Box 1690 Elizabeth, NJ 07207 

St. Thomas, VI 00801 

Mr. John F. Gorczyk Massachusetts State Senator

Commissioner Third Essex District

Department of Corrections Co-Chair, Joint Committee on

103 South Main Street Public Safety

Waterbury, VT 05671 Room 217, State House

Tallahassee, FL 32399–0001

Ms. Gwen A. Holden

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Assistant Prosecutor

The Honorable James P. Jajuga

Boston, MA 02133–1053
111

Dr. Nolan E. Jones Ms. Penny Morrill

Director Executive Director

Justice and Public Safety Domestic Violence Program

National Governors’ Association Sunrise of Pasco County, Inc.

444 North Capitol Street NW., #267 P.O. Box 928

Washington, DC 20001 Dade City, FL 33526 

Lt. John Lane Mr. Michael J. Neimand

Los Angeles Police Department Bureau Chief

150 North Los Angeles Street Criminal Division

Los Angeles, CA 90012 Office of the Attorney General

Mr. Charles A. Lauer Suite N921

Special Assistant to the P.O. Box 01341

 Assistant Attorney General Miami, FL 33101 

Office of Justice Programs

U.S. Department of Justice Mr. David O’Neil

633 Indiana Avenue NW., Room 942 President

Washington, DC 20531 Juris Monitor Project

Mr. Paul E. Lawrence Boulder, CO 80301 

Director of Administration and

 Information Systems Ira K. Packer, Ph.D.

National Criminal Justice Association Assistant Commissioner

444 North Capitol Street NW., #618 Massachusetts Department of

Washington, DC 20001 Mental Health

Ms. Melissa Lazarich Boston, MA 02114 

Deputy Attorney General

State of Delaware Department of The Honorable Mary Ann Pickard

 Justice Senator

820 North French Street Virgin Islands Legislature

Wilmington, DE 19801 P.O. Box 1051

Maj. Connie Locke St. Croix, VI 00821 

Volusia County Sheriff’s Office

P.O. Box 569 Ms. Sheryl Powell

DeLand, FL 32721–0569 Victim-Witness Assistance

Capt. Denny Martin Metropolitan Atlanta Crime

Orange County Sheriff’s Office Commission

2430 West 33rd Street 170 Garnett Street SW.

Orlando, FL 32839 Atlanta, GA 30335 

401 Northwest Second Avenue

5757 Central Avenue, Suite 200

25 Staniford Street

Christainsted

 Program Advocate
112

Mr. Philip G. Ramer Chief L. Jerome Spates

Special Agent in Charge Duval County Sheriff’s Office

Florida Department of 501 East Bay Street

 Law Enforcement Jacksonville, FL 32202 

4211 North Lois Avenue

Tampa, FL 33614 Ms. Lynn Gittens Spencer

Ms. Nadine M. Rapacioli Task Force on Domestic Violence

Legal Researcher P.O. Box 8300

National Criminal Justice Association Sunny Isle, VI 00823–8300

444 North Capitol Street NW., #618

Washington, DC 20001 Mr. Gaylord A. Sprauve

The Honorable Maurice H. Richardson Law Enforcement Planning Commission

First Justice 8172 Sub Base, Suite 3

Dedham District Court St. Thomas, VI 00802–5803

631 High Street

Dedham, MA 02026 The Honorable Susan Sweetser

Ms. Elsie V. Roberts State House

Deputy Commissioner Montpelier, VT 05602 

Virgin Islands Police Department

Enighed #18–37, Cruz Bay The Honorable Lynn Tepper

St. John, VI 00831–0057 Circuit Judge

Mr. Andrew K. Ruotolo, Jr. Dade City, FL 33525 

Prosecutor

Union County, New Jersey Heidi Urich, Esq.

One Elizabeth Plaza Executive Director

Administration Building Massachusetts Office for

Elizabeth, NJ 07207 Victim Assistance

Lt. Richard S. Scheff Boston, MA 02202

Broward Sheriff’s Office

P.O. Box 9507 Mr. George E. Wattendorf

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33310–9507 Prosecuting Attorney

Ms. Laura Scott 46 Locust Street

Victim Advocate Coordinator Dover, NH 03820 

Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office

P.O. Box 2500

Largo, FL 34649–2500

Co-Chair

Drug Policy Advisor to the Governor

Senate Chambers

38053 Liveoak Avenue

100 Cambridge Street, Room 1104

City of Dover Police
113

Mr. S. Elwood York, Jr.

Principal Assistant Attorney General

Department of Justice

48B–50C Kronprindsens Gade

GERS Building, 2nd Floor

Charlotte Amalie

St. Thomas, VI 00802 

115

Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes

Western Region Seminar

May 12–13, 1994

Portland, Oregon

Participants

Mr. Joe Albo Ms. Claudia Black

Executive Assistant Legislative Assistant

Office of the Governor State Senate

1700 West Washington 2625 Northeast Hancock

Phoenix, AZ 85007 Portland, OR 97212 

The Honorable Annelle C. Amaral Mr. Greg Boles

State Representative Detective III, Supervisor 

Hawaii State Legislature Threat Management Unit

235 South Beretania, Room 806 Los Angeles Police Department

Honolulu, HI 96813 150 North Los Angeles Street

Ms. Ellen Archibald

Administrative Assistant and Mr. Alfred S. Bask

 Director of the Victims of Crime Resident Agent-in-Charge

 Assistance Program U.S. Secret Service

Davis County Attorney’s Office 121 Southwest Salmon, Suite 1330

P.O. Box 618 Portland, OR 97204 

Farmington, UT 84025 

Ms. Janet Arenz General Counsel

Director of Education Oklahoma Department of Mental Health

ACLU—Oregon and Substance Abuse Services

310 Southwest Fourth, #705 1200 Northeast 13th

Portland, OR 97204 P.O. Box 53277

Mr. Alan L. Baker

Special Agent The Honorable Ron Cease

U.S. Secret Service Senator

121 Southwest Salmon, Suite 1330 State Senate

Portland, OR 97204 2625 Northeast Hancock

Los Angeles, CA 90012 

Mr. Timothy A. Brauer

Oklahoma City, OK 73152–3277

Portland, OR 97212
116

Mr. Joseph M. Claps Ms. Robin Estes

First Assistant Attorney General Special Agent

Office of the Attorney General Oklahoma State Bureau of

100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor Investigation

Chicago, IL 60601 P.O. Box 11497

Joseph J. Cocozza, Ph.D.

Vice President Ms. Star Euthene

Policy Research Associates, Inc. Vice President of Domestic Violence

262 Delaware Avenue Idaho Coalition Against Sexual and

Delmar, NY 12054 Domestic Violence

Sgt. Gary Cox Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814 

Administrative Sergeant

West Jordan Department of Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.

 Public Safety Consultant Psychologist

8000 South Redwood Road U.S. Secret Service

West Jordan, UT 84088 Visiting Fellow

Sgt. Randy Day 39 Linnaen Street

Portland Police Bureau Cambridge, MA 02138 

1111 Southwest Second Avenue

Room 1326 Ms. Susan Evans Grabe

Portland, OR 79204 Law Improvement Coordinator

Ms. Letha DeCaires 5200 Southwest Meadows Road

Detective P.O. Box 1689

Criminal Investigation Division Lake Oswego, OR 97035

Honolulu Police Department

801 South Beretania Street The Honorable Jeannette Hamby

Honolulu, HI 96813 Senator

Mr. Patrick F. Donaldson 952 Jackson School Road

Executive Committee Member Hillsboro, OR 97124 

Citizens Crime Commission—Portland

610 Southwest Broadway, #302 Lt. Mariane Heisler

Portland, OR 97205 Portland Police Bureau

Ms. Lisa Doyle Moran Portland, OR 97204

Assistant Director for Legal Affairs

National Criminal Justice Association

444 North Capitol Street NW., #618

Washington, DC 20001 

Oklahoma City, OK 73136

2201 North Government Way, Suite E

National Institute of Justice

Oregon State Bar

Oregon Legislature

1111 Southwest Second Avenue
117

Ms. Gwen A. Holden Charles B. Maclean, Ph.D.

Executive Vice President Principal

National Criminal Justice Association Health Promotion and Business

444 North Capitol Street NW., #618 Consultants

Washington, DC 20001 P.O. Box 14914

Mr. Roy A. Holt

Director Honorable Kevin L. Mannix

Statistical Analysis Center Representative

Arizona Criminal Justice Commission Oregon House of Representatives

1501 West Washington, Suite 207 2003 State Street

Phoenix, AZ 85007 Salem, OR 97301 

Mr. Allen Horne Ms. Jessica Mindlin

Legislative Aide Attorney

Texas State Senator Mike Marcrief Oregon Coalition Against Domestic and

P.O. Box 12068 Sexual Violence

Austin, TX 78711 2336 Southeast Belmont Street

Ms. Paula J. Houston

Senior Prosecutor Ms. Lois Mock

West Valley City Attorney’s Office Program Manager

3600 Constitution Boulevard National Institute of Justice

West Valley City, UT 84119 U.S. Department of Justice

Capt. Gary Jeffs Washington, DC 20531 

West Jordan Department of

 Public Safety Chief Monty Montague

8000 South Redwood Road Idaho Falls Police Department

West Jordan, UT 84088 605 North Capital

Mr. Keith M. Kaneshiro

Prosecuting Attorney Mr. Thomas D. Moots

City and County of Honolulu Supervisor

State of Hawaii Nevada Division of Investigation

1060 Richards Street, 10th Floor 555 Wright Way

Honolulu, HI 96813 Carson City, NV 89711–0100

Mr. R. Monte MacConnell Ms. Alicia Philpot

Deputy Director Legislative Assistant

Idaho Department of Law Enforcement State Senate

P.O. Box 700 2625 Northeast Hancock

Meridian, ID 83680–0700 Portland, OR 97212 

Portland, OR 97214 

Portland, OR 97214

633 Indiana Avenue NW.

Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
118

The Honorable Hollie Pihl Mr. John H. Stein

Circuit Court Judge Deputy Director

State Judicial Department National Organization for Victim

Courthouse Assistance

Hillsboro, OR 97124 1757 Park Road NW.

Ms. Nadine M. Rapacioli

Legal Researcher Mr. Bill Taylor

National Criminal Justice Association Counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee

444 North Capitol Street NW., #618 Oregon Legislative Assembly

Washington, DC 20001 332 State Capitol

Ms. Martha Ross

Administrative Coordinator Ms. Lynda Whitlock

Sex Abuse Treatment Center Director

1415 Kalakaua Avenue, Suite 201 New Horizons Crisis Center, Inc.

Honolulu, HI 96826 146 North Main, Suite 10

Ms. Rhonda Saunders

Deputy District Attorney Ms. Laurie Wimmer

Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office Executive Director

210 West Temple Street Oregon Commission for Women

Los Angeles, CA 90012 P.O. Box 751

Washington, DC 20010 

Salem, OR 97310 

Richfield, UT 84701 

Portland, OR 97207 
119

Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes

Central Region Seminar

October 27–28, 1994

Chicago, Illinois

Participants

Ms. Carolen F. Bailey Ms. Debra Burton

Assistant Commissioner Court Advocate

Minnesota Department of Rainbow House

 Public Safety 2313 South Millard

Suite 1000 NCL Tower Chicago, IL 60623

4454 Minnesota Street

St. Paul, MN 55101 Mr. Joseph M. Claps

Mr. Thomas F. Baker Office of the Attorney General

Executive Director 100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor

Illinois Criminal Justice Chicago, IL 60601

 Information Authority

120 South Riverside Plaza Mr. Robert L. Crites

10th Floor Assistant Deputy Director

Chicago, IL 60606 Illinois State Police

Mr. Grace Barreras P.O. Box 19461

Law Enforcement Instructor Springfield, IL 62794–9461

New Mexico Law Enforcement Academy

4491 Cirrillos Road Ms. Patricia Ann Davenport

Santa Fe, NM 87505 Victim Service Director

Mr. David Beatty Booth Center

Director of Public Affairs P.O. Box 1144

The National Victim Center Greenville, MS 38701

2111 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 300

Arlington, VA 22201 Ms. Rosemary Davis

Mr. Robert P. Boehmer Rainbow House

General Counsel 2313 South Millard

Illinois Criminal Justice Chicago, IL 60623

 Information Authority

120 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 1016

Chicago, IL 60606

First Assistant Attorney General

100 Armory Building

The Salvation Army Catherine

Court Advocate
120

Ms. Maureen DeMatoff Ms. Clare Pfoten Hauer

Associate Director Trooper

Illinois Criminal Justice Illinois State Police

 Information Authority 8330 S. King Drive

120 South Riverside Plaza Chicago, IL 60619

10th Floor

Chicago, IL 60606 Ms. Gwen A. Holden

The Honorable Loretta O. Douglas National Criminal Justice Association

Circuit Court Judge 444 North Capitol Street NW., #618

Circuit Court Cook County Washington, DC 20001

10270 South 76th Avenue

Bridgeview, IL 60455 Ms. Lynda Jones

Ms. Lisa Doyle Moran On Our Own/Hear Our Cries, Inc.

Assistant Director for Legal Affairs 1229 South Michigan Avenue

National Criminal Justice Association Chicago, IL 60605

444 North Capitol Street NW., #618

Washington, DC 20001 Ms. Becky Kinnamon

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D. Story County Attorney’s Office

Consultant Psychologist 900 Sixth Street, Courthouse

U.S. Secret Service Nevada, IA 50201

Visiting Fellow

National Institute of Justice Ms. Leslie Landis

39 Linnaen Street Executive Director

Cambridge, MA 02138 Life Span

Mr. Theodore A. Gottfried P.O. Box 445

State Appellate Defender Des Plaines, IL 60016

Office of the State

 Appellate Defender Ms. Susan Laurence

P.O. Box 5780 Program Specialist

Springfield, IL 62705–5780 Office for Victims of Crime

The Honorable James E. Graves, Jr. U.S. Department of Justice

Circuit Court Judge 633 Indiana Avenue NW.

Hinds County Circuit Court of Hinds and Washington, DC 20531

Yazoo Counties

P.O. Box 327

Jackson, MS 39205

Executive Vice President

Executive Director

Victim/Witness Administrator

Center for Legal Services and Advocacy

Office of Justice Programs
121

Mr. Gregory W. O’Reilly Ms. Mary E. Richards

Legislative Liaison Story County Attorney

Cook County Public Defender Story County Attorney’s Office

200 West Adams Street, 9th Floor 900 Sixth Street, Courthouse

Chicago, IL 60606 Nevada, IA 50201

Mr. Ronald W. Pavlock The Honorable Jennie Robak

President Senator

Illinois Association of Nebraska Legislature

 Chiefs of Police 1018 State Capitol

112 East Northwest Highway Lincoln, NE 68509

Mount Prospect, IL 60056

Ms. Jane M. Philo Legislative Consultant

Executive Director 550 Warren Avenue

Gulf Coast Women’s Center Zumbrota, MN 55992–1164

P.O. Box 333

Biloxi, MS 39533 Ms. Roxann M. Ryan

Mr. Roger Przybylski Iowa Attorney General’s Office

Associate Director Hoover Building

Illinois Criminal Justice Second Floor

 Information Authority Des Moines, IA 50319

120 South Riverside Plaza

Chicago, IL 60606 Ms. Christina M. Schneider

Mr. Paul Radzicki Women’s Advocacy

Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Illinois Attorney General’s Office

Chicago Field Office 100 West Randolph

U.S. Secret Service Chicago, IL 60601

Gateway IV Building

300 South Riverside Plaza Ms. Melanie Smith

Suite 1200 North Program Specialist

Chicago, IL 60606 Office for Victims of Crime

Ms. Nadine M. Rapacioli U.S. Department of Justice

Legal Researcher 633 Indiana Avenue NW.

National Criminal Justice Association Washington, DC 20531

444 North Capitol Street NW., #618

Washington, DC 20001

Ms. Sue L. Rockne

Deputy Attorney General

Assistant Division Chief

Office of Justice Programs
122

Ms. Vickie M. Smith Mr. Brian M. Vossekuil

Executive Director Assistant Special Agent in Charge

Illinois Coalition Against Intelligence Division

 Domestic Violence Office of Protective Research

730 East Vine, Room 109 U.S. Secret Service

Springfield, IL 62702 1800 G Street NW.

Mr. Ezzard Charles Stamps

Program Manager Mr. Michael Ward

Department of Public Safety Assistant U.S. Attorney

401 North West Street 234 U.S. Courthouse

Eighth Floor 110 South Fourth Street

Jackson, MS 39225 Minneapolis, MN 55401

Ms. Taya D. Sun Mr. Mark Warnsing

Director of Preventive Programs Senate Legal Counsel

Chicago Housing Authority Senate President’s Staff

3833 South Langley Stratton Building, A Section

Chicago, IL 60653 Springfield, IL 62706

Ms. Ann Tarjan Mr. Phil Weber

Assistant Director Research Director

On Our Own, Inc. Senate President’s Staff

1229 South Michigan Avenue, #102 Stratton Building, A Section

Chicago, IL 60605 Springfield, IL 62706

Ms. Barbara L. Thrasher Ms. Nancy D. Whittemore

Program Manager of Victim Division Director

 Assistance Department Tennessee Department of Finance

Chicago Housing Authority and Administration

3833 South Langley 500 Deaderick Street, Suite 1400

Chicago, IL 60653 Nashville, TN 37243–1700

Ms. Laura A. Tucker Ms. Marsha Willis

Chief, Women’s Advocacy Division Director, Office of Program

Illinois Attorney General Assessment and Support

100 West Randolph Tennessee Department of Finance

Chicago, IL 60660 and Administration

Washington, DC 20223

1400 Andrew Jackson Building

Nashville, TN 47243–1700
Appendix D

Seminar Agenda

125

Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes

Eastern Region Seminar

hosted by the

National Criminal Justice Association

and

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance

in cooperation with the

Florida Department of Law Enforcement

March 31 and April 1, 1994

Wyndham Harbour Island Hotel

725 South Harbour Island Boulevard

Tampa, Florida

Agenda

A principal feature of the 2-day regional seminar will be an examination of three hypothetical

stalking cases, based on common elements of actual stalking cases, as the basis for

demonstrating the possible practical implications for policymakers, legislators, and criminal

justice officials of the model antistalking code provisions. The hypothetical cases will serve as

vehicles for examining the experiences of the States with existing stalking statutes and current

policies and practices for handling stalking cases. Finally, the hypothetical cases will provide

the means and opportunity to explore possible options for handling the complex and unique

legal, social, and mental health issues raised by stalking cases.

Thursday, March 31

Convene 1 p.m.

Welcome and Opening Remarks

Description of the stalking problem; history of efforts to address the problem

Charles A. Lauer, Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs and 

Project Director for the regional seminars project

Gwen A. Holden, Executive Vice President

National Criminal Justice Association 
126

Overview of the Model Antistalking Code for the States

Review of the methodology and collaborative process used to develop the model code

and explanation of the arguments for and against various options that were considered in

formulating code provisions

• Principles that guided statutory construction.

• Uses and limitations of the model antistalking code.

• Model antistalking code provisions and related commentary.

Mr. Lauer

Profile of Antistalking Statutes of Eastern Region States

Lisa Doyle Moran, Assistant Director for Legal Affairs

National Criminal Justice Association

Recess 5 p.m.

Friday, April 1

Reconvene 9 a.m.

Introduction of Stalking Case Studies

• Explanation of interactive process to be used by panelists in discussing case

studies with seminar participants.

• Overview of hypothetical stalking cases. 

• Overview of critical issues identified by the model antistalking code project’s

resource group, including implementing stalking and related legislation; the use of

protective orders in stalking cases; and dealing with alleged and convicted stalkers

in light of limited financial and treatment resources.

Ms. Holden 

Practical Exercise: Three Hypothetical Stalking Cases

Facilitator

Ms. Holden

Panelists

Joseph A. Claps, First Assistant Attorney General

Illinois Office of the Attorney General
127

Robert Fein, Consulting Psychologist

U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Secret Service and

Visiting Fellow, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice

John F. Gorczyk, Commissioner

Corrections Department

Vermont Human Services Agency

Lt. John Lane

Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department

Laura Scott, Victims Advocate Coordinator

Pinellas County (Fla.) Sheriff’s Office

The Honorable Susan Sweetser 

Vermont State Senator 

Adjourn 3 p.m.

129

Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes

Western Region Seminar

hosted by the

National Criminal Justice Association

and

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance

in cooperation with the

Criminal Justice Services Division of the

Oregon Administrative Services Department

May 12–13, 1994

The Governor Hotel

Southwest 10th at Alder

Portland, Oregon

Agenda

A principal feature of the 2-day regional seminar will be an examination of three case studies,

using hypothetical stalking fact patterns, as the basis for demonstrating the possible practical

implications for policymakers, legislators, and criminal justice officials of the model

antistalking code provisions. The case studies will serve as vehicles for examining the

experiences of the States with existing stalking statutes and current policies and practices for

handling stalking cases. Finally, the case studies will provide the means and opportunity to

explore possible options for handling the complex and unique legal, social, and mental health

issues raised by stalking cases.

Thursday, May 12 

Convene 1 p.m.

Welcome and Opening Remarks

Description of the stalking problem; history of efforts to address the problem

Gwen A. Holden, Executive Vice President

National Criminal Justice Association

Overview of the Model Antistalking Code for the States

Review of the methodology and collaborative process used to develop the model code

and explanation of the arguments for and against various options that were considered in

formulating code provisions

• Principles that guided statutory construction.
130

• Uses and limitations of the model antistalking code.

• Model antistalking code provisions and related commentary.

Ms. Holden

Lisa Doyle Moran, Assistant Director for Legal Affairs 

National Criminal Justice Association

Stalker Profiles

Robert Fein, Consulting Psychologist 

U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Secret Service and 

Visiting Fellow, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice

Profile of Antistalking Statutes of Western Region States

Ms. Doyle Moran

Discussion of Recent Constitutional Challenges to the Oregon Antistalking Statute

The Honorable Ron Cease

Oregon State Senator 

Recess 5 p.m.

Friday, May 13 

Reconvene 9 a.m.

Introduction of Stalking Case Studies

• Explanation of interactive process to be used by presenters in discussing case

studies with seminar participants.

• Overview of stalking case studies.

• Overview of critical issues identified by the model antistalking code project’s

resource group, including implementing stalking and related legislation; using

protective orders in stalking cases; and dealing with alleged and convicted stalkers

in light of limited financial and treatment resources.

Ms. Holden
131

Practical Exercise: Three Stalking Case Studies

Facilitators

Ms. Holden

Joseph M. Claps, First Assistant Attorney General 

Office of the Illinois Attorney General

Panelists

Mr. Claps

Mr. Fein

John Stein, Deputy Director

National Organization for Victim Assistance

Adjourn 3 p.m.

133

Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes

Central Region Seminar

hosted by the

National Criminal Justice Association

and

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance

in cooperation with the

Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority,

the Illinois Attorney General’s Office, and 

the Chicago Police Department

October 27–28, 1994

The Westin Hotel/O’Hare

6100 River Road

Rosemont, Illinois

Agenda

A principal feature of the 2-day regional seminar will be an examination of three hypothetical

cases, based on common elements of actual stalking cases, as the basis for demonstrating the

possible practical implications for policymakers, legislators, and criminal justice officials of

the model antistalking code provisions. The hypothetical cases will serve as vehicles for

examining the experiences of the States with existing stalking statutes and current policies and

practices for handling stalking cases. Finally, the hypothetical cases will provide the means

and opportunity to explore possible options for handling the complex and unique legal, social,

and mental health issues raised by stalking cases.

Thursday, October 27 

Convene 1 p.m.

Welcome and Opening Remarks 

Description of the stalking problem; history of efforts to address the problem

Gwen A. Holden, Executive Vice President

National Criminal Justice Association
134

Overview of the Model Antistalking Code for the States

Review of the methodology and collaborative process used to develop the model code

and explanation of the arguments for and against various options that were considered in

formulating code provisions

• Principles that guided statutory construction.

• Uses and limitations of the model antistalking code.

• Model antistalking code provisions and related commentary.

Ms. Holden

Lisa Doyle Moran, Assistant Director for Legal Affairs

National Criminal Justice Association

Stalkers: What Do We Know?

Robert Fein, Consulting Psychologist

U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Secret Service

Visiting Fellow, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice

Profile of Antistalking Statutes of Central Region States

Ms. Doyle Moran

Recess 5 p.m.

Friday, October 28 

Reconvene 9 a.m.

Introduction of Stalking Case Studies

• Explanation of interactive process to be used by presenters in discussing case

studies with seminar participants.

• Overview of hypothetical stalking cases.

Practical Exercise: Three Hypothetical Stalking Cases

Facilitators

Ms. Holden

Joseph M. Claps, First Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Illinois Attorney General
135

Panelists

David Beatty, Director of Public Affairs

National Victim Center

Mr. Fein

Leslie Landis, Executive Director

Life Span

Michael Ward, Assistant U.S. Attorney

Minneapolis, Minn.

Adjourn 3 p.m.

Appendix E

Hypothetical Stalking Cases

139

Hypothetical Case No. 1

The branch manager/victim and the teller/stalker, both males, are coworkers in a suburban

branch of a major national bank.

The bank branch is located in a stand-alone building in a suburban shopping mall that also houses

a carry-out restaurant next to the bank and several offices. There is no full-time security guard

posted in the branch. 

The branch manager has been employed by the bank for 15 years and has served as manager of

the branch in which he and the teller currently work for 5 years.

The teller has worked for the bank for 2 years and has spent that entire time employed as a teller

under the branch manager’s supervision. During the teller’s employment with the bank, the

branch manager has identified, documented, and placed in the teller’s personnel file several

reports of problems with the teller’s performance. These problems have escalated during the 2

years of his employment with the bank and include unexcused absences, suspected alcohol use

during working hours, and conflicts with and aggressive behavior directed toward coworkers and

customers. 

In the teller’s most recent personnel evaluation, the branch manager rated the teller’s

performance unsatisfactory. Continuing performance problems culminate in the branch manager

firing the teller. The firing is triggered by three occurrences of significant shortages in the teller’s

daily cash settlement over a period of 1 month and the suspicion that the missing funds are being

taken by the teller. The teller is notified of his dismissal and advised of the reasons for his

dismissal in a meeting held during regular banking hours, involving only the branch manager and

the teller. 

The meeting becomes confrontational. Notwithstanding the branch manager’s review of the

variety of performance problems that contributed to the teller’s firing, the teller tells the branch

manager that he believes that he is being fired unjustly because of false allegations of theft. The

teller leaves the meeting in an extremely agitated state, verbalizing his outrage with the branch

manager as he moves from the branch manager’s office into the bank itself and past bank

personnel and customers, toward the bank’s exit.

One week after the teller was fired, the teller contacts the branch manager’s direct supervisor,

the consumer banking manager, by telephone and accuses the branch manager of unjustly firing

him. The teller alleges that the false accusation was made to deflect blame from the branch

manager who, the teller says, actually took the missing money. The consumer banking manager,

who is familiar with the teller’s performance history and aware of his dismissal by the branch

manager, concludes that the teller’s behavior is an irrational response to his dismissal and that his

accusations against the branch manager are without merit. The consumer banking manager

contacts the branch manager to report the teller’s call and the content of the call and then

summarily dismisses the matter. 
140

After contacting the consumer banking manager, the teller begins to appear every morning at the

carry-out restaurant located next to the bank, where the branch manager routinely stops for his

morning cup of coffee. He makes no direct contact with the branch manager. A week later, the

teller enters the bank, approaches a former coworker, and loudly complains about the bank’s

handling of his personal account. After the teller returns to the bank a second time to continue

his complaints, the branch manager instructs all bank employees to refer any further contacts

with the teller, either by telephone or in person, directly to him. The branch manager informs the

consumer banking manager of the teller’s behavior and asks for a security guard to be assigned

inside the branch during banking hours. 

The teller begins to make frequent telephone calls to the branch manager, at his office and his

home, in which he accuses the branch manager of ruining his life with false accusations that he

stole the missing bank money. The branch manager notifies the consumer banking manager of the

teller’s telephone calls and requests an unlisted telephone number from the telephone company. 

One evening the branch manager, returning home from work, observes the teller driving past his

home. The teller drives past the branch manager’s home several times that evening.

A week after the teller is observed in the branch manager’s neighborhood, the branch manager’s

wife and two young children return home to find a note from the teller attached to the front door

of their home. The note reiterates that the branch manager has ruined his life and states that he

plans to ruin the branch manager’s life in return. He informs the branch manager in the note that

he owns a knife, but he makes no specific threat to use it. 

The branch manager notifies the consumer banking manager and the police of the teller’s actions

and threat.

Case Assumptions

1. The stalking victim and the stalker are coworkers. 

2. The stalking victim does not specifically ask the stalker to cease the stalking activity but

attempts to deal with initial stalking incidents by seeking the bank’s intervention. 

3. The stalking incidents persisted after the bank hires the security guard.

4. The stalking victim’s first contact with law enforcement authorities concerning the

stalking was made after a series of stalking incidents occurred. 

5. In the stalking victim’s State of residence, an individual applying for a protective order

must live with the individual against whom the order is sought.
141

Discussion Questions

1. Did the victim report the stalking activity to the police at the earliest possible time?

2. (a) Are there other individuals or agencies from whom the victim could have sought

assistance? If so, at what point should the victim have contacted these individuals or

agencies?

(b) How can police officials go about determining the credibility of the bank manager

when he reports the stalking behavior?

— What questions do police officials ask the bank manager?

— What conditions and circumstances, should police officials look for? 

(c) Should police officials contact the teller after the report is made of the stalking 

activity? If so, should the first contact with the teller be a warning, a warning that 

results in the filing of a report, or a formal contact that produces a report?

3. (a) What are the stalking events in this fact pattern?

(b) Looking back over the events listed in response to question 3(a), would the police

have been able to intervene at an earlier stage?

(c) What events listed in response to question 3(a) could be used by the prosecution to

build a stalking case? How will the defense respond?

4. Assuming the bank manager would be ineligible to petition for a protective order, what

advice should law enforcement officials give to him if the teller is not charged or remains

free on bail?

5. What types of conditions should be included in any pretrial release or probation orders

resulting from this case? How should violations of conditions be dealt with?

6. Were the actions taken by the bank appropriate? Should the bank have taken any additional

actions? Could the bank incur any liability based upon its actions or failure to take action? 

Hypothetical Case No. 1: Supplemental Facts

 Several days after placing the note on the front door of the branch manager’s door, the

teller slashes the tires of the branch manager’s personal car while the vehicle is parked

in the bank’s parking facilities. The branch manager/victim’s supervisor and the police

are contacted. No one observed the tires being slashed. Although it is strongly

suspected that the damage was inflicted by the teller, it cannot be proved.
142

The police take and file a formal report of the incident. The bank’s consumer banking

manager makes arrangements for the security guard assigned to the bank’s premises to

make periodic tours of the branch parking facilities. 

 The teller arrives at a local bar for the regular Friday night postwork gathering of bank

employees. The branch manager also is at the gathering. The teller makes a loud and

animated scene in which he again states that the branch manager falsely accused him of

theft and asserts that he took the missing money himself. He announces to the bar patrons

that he has obtained a handgun and plans to use it, but provides no specific information

on how and when. The police are contacted by the proprietor of the bar.

 The teller shoots out several windows of the branch manager’s home. He has conducted

an informal surveillance of the branch manager/victim’s home and carries out the

shooting at a time of day when the family generally is away from the home. No one is

injured in the shooting. 

 The teller is arrested by police and charged with stalking (a felony) and with malicious

destruction of property and trespass (misdemeanors). The teller agrees to plead guilty to

the lesser charges in return for the prosecutor dropping the stalking felony charge. The

teller is sentenced to 2 years of probation. As a condition of probation, the teller is

required to undergo a mental health evaluation and counseling. He is ordered to have no

further contact with the branch manager or his family and to stay away from the branch

offices. He also is ordered to pay restitution.

Discussion Questions

1. Were there other charges that reasonably could have been brought against the teller?

2. Would a stalking prosecution of the teller have been successful?

3. Would dropping the stalking charge have any effect on prosecuting and sentencing if the

teller engages in further stalking behavior? 
143

Hypothetical Case No. 2

A husband/stalker and his wife/victim own their own home in a moderate middle-class

neighborhood. The husband is a certified public accountant with a small accounting firm. The

wife left a 4-year college after 2 years to marry her husband and currently stays home to care for

the couple’s two children, ages 2 and 4. She has no work experience and no professional skills.

Two years ago, the wife decided to return to college in the evenings to complete her bachelor of

arts degree. Despite a lack of enthusiasm for his wife’s return to school, the husband agreed to

make funds available to support this endeavor and to babysit the children on the evenings that

she attends classes. A year later she began classes in the community college’s evening division. 

The relationship between the woman and her husband of 6 years has become increasingly

strained and stressful during the past 9 months, ending almost a year of relative calm in a

relationship that suffered a stormy beginning. Career uncertainties, a young child, money

problems, and the death of the husband’s father in the first 2 years of the marriage combined to

create a volatile home environment. The husband began to criticize the victim’s performance as a

wife and mother. Twice in those early years, police were called by neighbors to intervene in

fights between the woman and her husband. On one occasion, the husband pushed and shoved

his wife, who received a sprained wrist and several bruises in the incident. 

These incidents precipitated a 9-month separation during which the wife and the couple’s

children lived with her parents. During that separation, the wife sought and received a protective

order prohibiting the husband from telephoning, writing, and following her. The husband

continued his pursuit, and on two occasions the wife reported the husband’s behavior to the

police. On the first occasion, the husband was arrested by the police, spent a night in jail, and

was released the next day when the woman refused to press charges for the violation of the

protective order. On the second occasion, the wife refused to press charges when the police

arrived at her home to take the complaint.

A promotion for the husband and a resulting improvement in the family’s financial status

apparently alleviated many of the husband’s worries. The husband and the wife were reunited, a

second child was born, and the couple’s relationship improved markedly. 

Now completing her second semester of classes, the wife is enrolled in two evening 

seminars, each meeting once a week for 3 hours. The husband’s initial lack of enthusiasm for his

wife’s return to college now has been replaced by growing anger over the impact of the wife’s

educational pursuits on his personal schedule. The husband resents the 2 nights a week that he

must stay home to care for the children while his wife attends classes, and he resents the

disruption in the family routine caused by his wife’s absence. The husband’s anger and

resentment are heightened further by the wife’s enthusiastic accounts of her classes and

classmates. Moreover, the husband recently has become suspicious of his wife’s relationship 

with one of the men in her seminar with whom she has been working on a seminar project. 
144

Completion of that project has involved the wife in several additional hours of class-related 

work and has exacerbated the husband’s frustration over his wife’s preoccupation with 

school. A Saturday meeting between the wife and her male project associate, from which the

wife returns nearly 2 hours later than planned, preempts the husband’s plans to attend a 

sporting event that afternoon. The husband becomes so enraged when the wife returns home that

he tells her of his suspicions about her relationship with her male associate. The husband accuses

his wife of abandoning her family, failing in her responsibilities as a wife and mother, and

betraying him by entering into a relationship with her classmate while he stays at home taking

care of a sick child. The wife vehemently denies any such relationship with her associate. 

On several occasions, the husband follows his wife as she shops for groceries and carries out

other household errands. After observing a conversation between his wife and a male 

pharmacist, the husband accuses his wife of flirtatious behavior. Several weeks later, when 

the wife returns home late after celebrating the end of classes with a drink with her seminar

colleagues, the husband becomes verbally and physically abusive. He again accuses the wife of

being unfaithful to him and of abandoning her family. He says that he and the couple’s 

children have been following her to her classes and that they have observed her in the 

company of the male classmate. An episode of pushing and shoving concludes with injuries 

to the wife and a neighbor’s telephone call to the police. The police arrest the husband and 

take him to the city lockup. The next morning, the wife appears at the police station and 

refuses to press charges despite the urging of neighbors and other friends to do so. The husband 

is released.

The wife and her children leave the home and move into the home of her parents. In a note, the

wife informs the husband that she believes that they need time apart to consider their

relationship. The wife says that she does not plan to seek a legal separation but that she does not

want to speak with or hear from the husband during the separation. Notwithstanding this request

for no contact, the husband continues daily attempts to reach the victim by telephone at her

parent’s home and is observed driving by the home each morning and evening. Despite the wife’s

objections, the mother contacts the police. 

Case Assumptions

1. The stalking victim and the stalker are husband and wife.

2. The stalking victim and the stalker have a history of domestic problems. The stalking

behavior is one element of those domestic problems.

3. The stalking victim attempts to deal with the initial stalking incidents as well as the other

aspects of their domestic troubles first by reasoning with the stalker and second by

separating from him.

4. Despite the stalking victim’s attempts, the stalking persists.
145

5. In the stalking victim’s State of residence, protective orders are available to spouses and

former spouses.

Discussion Questions

1. Was the stalking activity reported at the earliest possible time?

2. (a) Are there other individuals or agencies from whom assistance could have been

sought? If so, at what point should these individuals or agencies have been contacted?

(b) Should police officials contact the husband after the report is made of the stalking

activity? If so, should the first contact with the husband be a warning, a warning that 

results in the filing of a report, or a formal contact that produces a report?

3. What charges, if any, could be filed against the husband after the wife’s mother 

contacts the police? Would the fact that the husband had engaged in stalking activities

during the couple’s first separation play a role in determining what charges should be

filed? 

4. (a) What are the stalking events in this fact pattern?

(b) Looking back over the events listed in response to question 3(a), would the police

have been able to intervene at an earlier stage?

(c) What events listed in response to question 3(a) could be used by the prosecution to 

build a stalking case? How will the defense respond?

(d) Could the wife’s mother file stalking charges against the husband?

5. (a) How can law enforcement officials deal with a victim who is reluctant or refuses to

take the actions they suggest, such as filing for a protective order?

(b) Should law enforcement officials push reluctant victims to file stalking complaints? 

(c) What courses of action are available to law enforcement officials when a victim 

refuses to file a complaint?

(d) If a victim refuses to file a complaint and testify, to what extent can prosecutors rely

on third parties in trying a stalking case? What problems does this present for the

prosecution?

6. Assume that the wife had agreed to petition for, and obtained, a protective order and 

that the husband violated the order. Assume further that at a subsequent contempt
146

hearing the wife had expressed reluctance to testify against her husband. How should a

judge handle this situation in light of the following possibilities:

— The court’s primary concern is family preservation.

— The husband is threatening the wife with violence if she testifies against 

 him. 

— The judge has access to evidence suggesting that the wife may be in danger. 

7. What types of evidence could a judge rely on to assess whether a stalking defendant

poses a danger, and how should the judge weigh such evidence?

8. What types of conditions should be included in any protection order, pretrial release, or

probation order resulting from this case? How should violations be dealt with?

Hypothetical Case No. 2: Supplemental Facts

 The husband continues contact with the wife by sending several letters to her parents’

home in which he at first implores her to return home and then threatens to take the

children from her if she does not come home. On one occasion, the husband confronts the

wife in a shopping mall parking lot and again threatens to take the children from her if she

does not return home. A passerby alerts mall security of the altercation. As security

approach the site, the husband returns to his car and leaves the mall area.

 On returning to her parents’ home after the altercation at the mall, the wife tells her

mother about the incident. The police are notified and arrive at the wife’s parents’ home

to take a report on the mall parking lot incident and other recent incidents associated with

the couple’s problems. The police advise the wife to secure a protective order. The wife

says she does not wish to do so. The following day, a friend of the wife’s observes the

husband in his car outside the school his children attend and notifies the wife of this. 
147

Hypothetical Case No. 3

A local male sportswriter/victim stops each morning at a convenience store located in a small

strip mall to pick up a cup of coffee and several newspapers that the convenience store clerk 

set aside for him. 

The assistant manager/stalker of a dry cleaning business located next to the convenience store in

the strip mall has seen the sportswriter enter and leave the convenience store every day for

several months and has become infatuated with him. She also has seen him occasionally at the

public recreation center where she regularly participates in aerobics classes. The assistant

manager has hoped for a casual encounter with the sportswriter on one of his trips to the

convenience store and has imagined a long-term romantic relationship. She casually has asked

her friend, the convenience store clerk, for information about the sportswriter and has learned

that he is a sportswriter with the local paper. To date no encounter has occurred between the

assistant manager and the sportswriter. 

The assistant manager decides to initiate contact with the sportswriter. For 2 consecutive 

days, the assistant manager arranges to be in the convenience store chatting with the store 

clerk when the sportswriter arrives to pick up his coffee and newspapers. On the first 

encounter, the assistant manager says good morning to the sportswriter and comments on the

weather. The sportswriter returns the greeting but pursues no further conversation with the

assistant manager and leaves the store. On the second day, the assistant manager again says 

good morning to the sportswriter and comments on the number of newspapers he buys. The

sportswriter returns the greeting and acknowledges with a smile the assistant manager’s

comments about the newspapers, but he again leaves the store without pursuing any further

conversation or contact with the assistant manager. 

The assistant manager is frustrated by the failure of her first two attempts to initiate contact with

the sportswriter, but is encouraged that the sportswriter smiled at her. She has interpreted that

smile as signaling his interest in her and she decides to pursue more aggressively further contact

with him.

The following day, the assistant manager again arranges to be in the convenience store when

the sportswriter arrives. She greets the sportswriter and accompanies him out of the store to

his car. The sportswriter is polite but unresponsive to the assistant manager’s efforts to

initiate a conversation with him. The assistant manager returns to the convenience store and

laments to the convenience store clerk her failure to engage the sportswriter in a

conversation. The clerk suggests to the assistant manager that she is being too obvious about

her interest in the sportswriter and probably has scared him away. The clerk advises her

friend to tone down her pursuit of him. The assistant manager is visibly angered by the

clerk’s remarks. In a loud, hostile voice, which is overheard by the handful of customers in

the convenience store, the assistant manager tells the convenience store clerk that her

“relationship” with the sportswriter is none of her friend’s business and suggests that the
148

clerk is jealous of that relationship. The assistant manager leaves the convenience store,

threatening to end her friendship with the convenience store clerk. 

A few days later, the assistant manager encounters the sportswriter at the public recreational

facility where he has been playing basketball with a few of his colleagues. The assistant manager

greets the sportswriter and comments upon the frequency with which their paths appear to be

crossing. She invites the sportswriter to join her for a drink. The sportswriter politely declines the

assistant manager’s invitation. The sportswriter rejoins his companions on the basketball court

and the assistant manager overhears the sportswriter and his colleagues laughing. The assistant

manager assumes that the sportswriter and his colleagues are laughing at her. She leaves the

public recreational facility. 

Hurt, angry, and embarrassed by the sportswriter’s most recent rejection of her, the assistant

manager anonymously mails him a copy of William Congreve’s poem “The Mourning Bride,”

which contains the oft-quoted line, “Heaven has no rage like love to hatred turned, nor hell a

fury like a woman scorned.”

The sportswriter receives the poem in the mail at his home 2 days later. He doesn’t know why

the poem has been sent or who has sent it. The following night, he and his wife return home to

find several telephone hangups recorded on their answering machine. Later that evening, the

sportswriter’s wife answers a telephone call. The caller is the assistant manager. Without

identifying herself to the sportswriter’s wife, the assistant manager asks to speak to the

sportswriter. When he comes to the telephone, the assistant manager asks him if he received the

poem she sent him and if he is sorry for hurting and embarrassing her in the company of his

colleagues at the public recreation facility. The sportswriter asks the caller her identity and

asserts that he does not know what she is talking about. The assistant manager replies angrily that

he is lying and that she does not plan to tolerate his behavior toward her any longer. The

sportswriter asserts that the caller is “some kind of nut,” demands that she not call again, and

hangs up. 

The assistant manager is startled to learn that the sportswriter is married and is angered that 

he has further rejected her and called her a nut. She confronts him at the convenience store 

the next day. In a hostile, irrational diatribe, she accuses him of infidelity and enticing her 

into a romantic relationship only to reject her cruelly. She asserts that in payment for his

unkindness to her she will ruin his reputation and career and says that she plans to report his

infidelity to the editor of the newspaper that employs the sportswriter. The sportswriter notifies

the police. 

Case Assumptions

1. The stalking victim has no relationship, acquaintance, or association with the stalker (the

stalker is a stranger).
149

2. The stalking victim’s first contact with law enforcement authorities was made after a

series of stalking incidents occurred. 

3. In the stalking victim’s State of residence, an individual applying for a protective order

must live with the individual against whom the order is sought.

Discussion Questions

1. Did the victim(s) report the stalking activity to the police at the earliest possible time?

2. (a) Are there other individuals or agencies from whom the victim(s) could have sought

assistance? If so, at what point should the victim(s) have contacted these individuals or

agencies? 

(b) How can police officials go about determining the credibility of the victim(s) reporting

the stalking behavior?

— What questions should police officials ask the victim(s)? 

— What conditions and circumstances should police officials look for? 

3. (a) What are the stalking events in this fact pattern?

(b) Looking back over the events listed in response to question 3(a), would the police

have been able to intervene at an earlier stage?

(c) What events listed in response to question 3(a) could be used by the prosecution to

build a stalking case? How will the defense respond?

4. Assuming the sportswriter would be ineligible to petition for a protective order, what

advice should law enforcement officials give to him if the assistant manager is not

charged or remains free on bail?

5. What types of conditions should be included in any pretrial release or probation orders

resulting from this case? How should violations of conditions be dealt with?

Hypothetical Case No. 3: Supplemental Facts

 The assistant manager shows up at the newspaper where the sportswriter works

demanding to see him. The security officer at the newspaper, having been advised of the

situation, refuses to admit her to the newspaper’s office. The assistant manager leaves a

message for the sportswriter with the security officer in which she tells the sportswriter

that he will be sorry if he continues to refuse to see her. 
150

 During the next few days, the assistant manager, unobserved by the sportswriter,

monitors the movements of the sportswriter and his wife at home and at work. A week

after the assistant manager’s angry confrontation with the sportswriter at the convenience

store, the assistant manager follows the sportswriter’s wife to her place of business. The

assistant manager intercepts and verbally and physically assaults the sportswriter’s wife

outside the wife’s office building, accusing the wife of turning the sportswriter against her

and stealing his affections. The police are summoned.

 The assistant manager is charged by the police with assault. She pleads no contest to the

charge; a no-contact order is issued by the judge and the manager is released without

supervision.

Discussion Questions

1. Could the assault on the sportswriter’s wife be used as evidence to prove stalking charges

brought by the sportswriter? 

— If not, would there be enough evidence to prosecute stalking charges brought

by the sportswriter? What would the prosecution’s strategy be, assuming the

assault on the sportswriter’s wife would not be admissible evidence to prove

stalking charges brought by the sportswriter? How would the defense respond?

— If the assault on the sportswriter’s wife were admissible to prove stalking

charges, would the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy bar a

separate assault charge?
Appendix F

Appellate Court Citations of Stalking Cases

153

Appellate Court Citations of Stalking Cases

Alabama

Morton v. State, 1994 WL 529354 (Ala. Cr. App. September 30, 1994).

California

People v. Heilman, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).

Florida

Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Folsom v. State, 638 So. 2d 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Gilbert v. Florida, 639 So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Huffine v. State, 648 So. 2d 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Perez v. State, 648 So. 2d 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Rosen v. State, 644 So. 2d 531 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Salatino v. State, 644 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Barron, 637 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Baugher, 637 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Johnson, 644 So. 2d 1028 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Kahles, 644 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Miranda, 644 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Tremmel, 644 So. 2d 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Varney v. State, 638 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Georgia

Johnson v. State, 449 S.E. 2d 94 (Ga. 1994).

Illinois

People v. Krawiec, 634 N.E. 2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).

Massachusetts

Commonwealth v. Kwiatowski, 637 N.E. 2d 854 (Mass. 1994).

Minnesota

In Matter of Christensen, 1994 WL 233616 (Minn. App. May 31, 1994).

State v. Nash, 1994 WL 705355 (Minn. App. December 29, 1994).
154

Montana

State v. David, 880 P. 2d 1308 (Mont. 1994).

Ohio

Cleveland v. Walters, 1994 WL 734829 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. October 13, 1994).

State v. Benner, 644 N.E. 2d 1130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Wasmire, 1994 WL 476462 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. August 6, 1994).

State v. Wegman, 1994 WL 159517 (Ohio App. 6 Dist. April 29, 1994).

State v. Wilcox, 1994 WL 590407 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. October 14, 1994).

State v. Woodgeard, 1994 WL 167928 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. April 29, 1994).

Oklahoma

State v. Saunders, 886 P. 2d 496 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).

Virginia

Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 47 S.E. 2d 530 (Va. App. 1994).

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