U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis, Director

continued...

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

June 1999

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Brief: The

National Evaluation of Operation

Weed and Seed, a strategy to control violent crime, drug trafficking,

and drug-related crime in targeted

areas and to provide a safe environment for residents to live, work, and

raise their families. From the initial

three grant sites in 1991, Weed and

Seed has grown to include 200 sites

nationwide. The Weed and Seed

programs in eight sites—Hartford,

Connecticut; Manatee and Sarasota

Counties, Florida; Shreveport,

Louisiana; Las Vegas, Nevada; Akron, Ohio; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;

Salt Lake City, Utah; and Seattle,

Washington—were selected for the

national evaluation of their implementation and measurable effects

on crime and public safety.

Key issues: Weed and Seed strategically links concentrated and enhanced law enforcement efforts to

identify, arrest, and prosecute violent offenders, drug traffickers, and

other criminals operating in the

target areas (weeding) and community policing with human services—

including afterschool, weekend,

and summer youth activities;

adult literacy classes; and parental

counseling—and neighborhood

revitalization efforts to prevent and

deter further crime (seeding). The

eight evaluation sites were selected

because they provide examples

of different aspects of Weed and

Seed in application. In each site,

the evaluation focused on one or

two Weed and Seed target areas.

Although each site had its own

distinctive crime problems, they all

shared high rates of violent crime

related to drug trafficking and drug

use. Most sites had serious gangrelated crime problems.

National Evaluation of

Weed and Seed

by Terence Dunworth and Gregory Mills

Operation Weed and Seed represents an

ambitious Federal, State, and local effort

to improve the quality of life in targeted

high crime areas of America’s cities. First

launched by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1991, the program attempts

to control violent crime, drug trafficking,

and drug-related crime and to provide a

safe environment for residents to live,

work, and raise their families.

These are, by themselves, conventional

law enforcement goals. What makes the

Weed and Seed concept distinctive and

innovative is the means by which these

goals are achieved: Community-focused

human services programs and neighborhood improvement initiatives are

strategically linked with intensified,

geographically targeted law enforcement

efforts by police and prosecutors. Weed

and Seed is essentially a coordination

strategy; funding is only one tool among

many to achieve the program’s objectives.

(See “What is Weed and Seed?”)

Weed and Seed is administered by the

Executive Office for Weed and Seed

within DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs.

As exhibit 1 shows, from the initial three

grant sites—Kansas City, Missouri; Trenton, New Jersey; and Omaha, Nebraska—

in 1991, Weed and Seed has grown to

include 200 sites nationwide. Until

recently, cities were funded either as

demonstration sites, which generally received between $500,000 and $750,000

annually over 4 consecutive years, or officially recognized sites, which received

much smaller amounts ($35,000 in some

cases). Most sites currently (1999) receive about $225,000 annually.

The Weed and Seed programs in eight

sites were selected for the national evaluation of their implementation and measurable outcomes related to crime and

public safety: Hartford, Connecticut;

Manatee and Sarasota Counties, Florida;

Shreveport, Louisiana; Las Vegas,

Nevada; Akron, Ohio; Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania; Salt Lake City, Utah; and

Seattle, Washington. These sites were

selected by DOJ as examples of different

aspects of Weed and Seed. In each of

them, the evaluation focused on one or

two Weed and Seed target areas. (See exhibit 2.) Although each site had its own

distinctive crime problems, they all

shared high rates of violent crime related

to drug trafficking and drug use. Most

sites had serious gang-related crime

problems.

The effectiveness of weeding and seeding

activities varied across the eight sites.
2

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Issues and Findings

continued...

Key findings: The effectiveness of

weeding and seeding activities

varied across the eight sites. The

evaluation found:

● Preexisting community features

may make Weed and Seed easier

or more difficult to operate effectively. Important factors included

the strength of the social and

institutional infrastructure (an

established network of communitybased organizations and community leaders), the severity of crime

problems, geographical advantages

favoring economic development,

and transiency of the community

population.

● The mix of weeding and seeding

activities and the sequencing of

these components appear to be

important factors in gaining community support for the program.

Important positive factors included

early seeding, sustained weeding,

high-level task forces combined

with community policing, and an

active prosecutorial role.

● Sites appeared to have greater

success if they concentrated their

program resources on smaller

population groups, especially if

they could similarly channel other

public funds and also leverage

private funds.

● A less tangible ingredient that

seemed to characterize the more

successful programs was the active

and constructive leadership of key

individuals.

● The most effective implementation strategies were those that

relied on bottom-up, participatory

decisionmaking approaches, especially when combined with efforts

to build capacity and partnership

among local organizations.

The full cross site analysis and

the eight case studies are also

available.

Target audience: Congressional

representatives and legislative staff;

Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials; State and

local government officials; and

criminal justice practitioners and

researchers.

The evaluation found significant favorable

effects of Weed and Seed on key outcome

measures for some sites and time periods.

The evidence is modest in terms of its

statistical significance, but the indicators

consistently point in favorable directions.

At the same time, the evaluation has

pointed out a number of weak links in the

chain, most noticeably the limited and

tenuous role that many local prosecutors

played in the weeding process. A number

of local prosecutors reported they simply

lack the funding and personnel to conduct

enhanced prosecution of the target area

caseloads generated by more aggressive

policing activities. Although difficult to

measure with precision, the effect of this

constraint almost certainly has been to limit

the removal of offenders from target areas.

Setting up Weed and Seed at

the local level

The eight sites differed substantially in

how they organized their Weed and Seed

programs, due, in large part, to the unique

law enforcement and social needs and

existing organizational infrastructure and

resources available in each site. (See

“Study Methodology.”) In general, the sites

were organized along these lines:

Grantee organization. The grantees

included mayors’ offices, local police

departments, and local nonprofit

501(c)(3) organizations. The staff assigned to the Weed and Seed effort and

their ability/authority to operate cohesively in conjunction with community

representatives were among the most

important factors in successful program

implementation at the eight evaluation

sites. In general, an adequate supply of

dedicated staff resources, from both

grantees and other participating agencies,

produced positive results in program

implementation, oversight, and cohesion.

In most sites, the role actually played by

the grantee was dynamic, as key participants changed, programs and roles

evolved, and community and interagency

relationships developed.

The U.S. Attorney’s role. The U.S.

Attorney is asked to play a central role in

organizing the steering committee and

Exhibit 1. Number of Weed and Seed sites and annual funding

Fiscal Year Number of Funded Sites Total Program Funding (millions)

1991 3 $0.5

1992 20 $11.5

1993 21 $13.5

1994* 36 $31.5

1995* 36 $32.5

1996* 88 $37.5

1997* 118 $37.5

1998* 176 $42.5

1999* 200 $49.0

* Since 1994, in addition to appropriated funds, the U.S. Department of Justice has allocated $9 million annually in Asset Forfeiture Funds for Weed and Seed-related task forces administered through the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other DOJ law enforcement agencies.
3

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

W eed and Seed is a strategy to

mobilize and coordinate resources in the

targeted communities rather than simply

a program or mechanism to fund local

activities that share no collective aim.

Weed and Seed is an “incubator for social

change” to stabilize the conditions in

high crime communities and to promote

community restoration.a

 The key components of this strategy are as follows:

● Enhanced coordination—Coordinated analysis and planning of local problems and strategies to address them.

● Weeding—Concentrated and

enhanced law enforcement efforts to

identify, arrest, and prosecute violent

offenders, drug traffickers, and other

criminals operating in the target areas.

The objective is to remove criminals from

the target areas.

● Community policing—Proactive

police/community engagement and problem solving in which police officers are assigned to specified geographic locations.

By gaining the growing trust and support

of the community, police and prosecutors

engage residents and businesses as problem-solving partners in the law enforcement effort. This effort is the bridge

between weeding and seeding.b

● Seeding—Human services—including

afterschool, weekend, and summer youth

activities; adult literacy classes; and parental counseling—and neighborhood revitalization efforts to prevent and deter

further crime.

The Federal oversight responsibility for

each participating site rests with the U.S.

Attorney’s Office for the corresponding district. This decentralized arrangement was intended to reinforce local participation while

at the same time providing a more hands-on

Federal role—in particular, to enable Federal

prosecutorial action to be more responsive

to local law enforcement initiatives. Other

components of each local organization’s

structure generally include:

● The Weed and Seed steering committee,

which establishes operational goals, designs

and develops programs, guides implementation, and assesses program achievements.

● The weeding committee, which plans and

monitors the law enforcement efforts,

including interdiction and prosecution.

● The seeding committee, which plans and

monitors the prevention, intervention, treatment, and neighborhood restoration efforts.

● The Weed and Seed program staff,

who operate and maintain daily program

activities.

Each site is required to create at least one

“safe haven,” a highly visible and accessible

multiservice center where youths and adults

can receive needed services, develop relationships, enhance personal skills, and

find opportunities to be productive and

successful.c

 Special effort is made to keep

these safe havens secure from drug trafficking and other criminal activities.

The full National Evaluation Research Report is available in print and online. The

eight case studies are available online.

Notes

a. Executive Office for Weed and Seed, Operation Weed and Seed, Implementation Manual,

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of Justice Programs, Executive Office for

Weed and Seed: 1–3 and 1–4.

b. The Executive Office for Weed and Seed

regards community policing as “increasing

police visibility and developing cooperative

relationships between the police and citizenry

in target areas.” The associated techniques

include foot patrols, police ministations, nuisance abatement, victim referrals to support

services, and community relations activities, in

which the community is encouraged to undertake such initiatives as neighborhood watches,

citizen marches and rallies, drug-free zones,

and graffiti removal. See Executive Office for

Weed and Seed, Operation Weed and Seed,

Implementation Manual: 9–6.

c. Executive Office for Weed and Seed, Weed

and Seed Fiscal Year 1998 Program Guide and

Application Kit for New Sites, Attachment 2,

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of Justice Programs, Executive Office for

Weed and Seed, 1998: 2–1. In its literature,

the Executive Office for Weed and Seed describes safe havens as an integral part of a

“risk factor and protective factor” approach to

crime prevention. This is viewed as the counterpart to comprehensive community-based

disease prevention programs, which have operated effectively in the public health arena. In

the Weed and Seed context, risk factors, those

that make an individual susceptible to criminal

behavior, must be identified and addressed.

At the same time, protective factors, those

that serve to counter or neutralize risks, must

be enhanced.

What Is Weed and Seed?
4

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

bringing together community organizations and other Weed and Seed participants. A basic Weed and Seed premise

is that the U.S. Attorney’s Office provides Federal oversight and coordinates

Federal, State, and local law enforcement and prosecutorial activities, as

well as general DOJ oversight of the

Weed and Seed strategy. Through such

coordination, some sites effectively

used Federal law in weeding strategies

and mobilized resources for seeding

programs from a variety of Federal

agencies. In other sites, however, Weed

and Seed was managed and operated by

a city agency (e.g., a police department), and the role played by the U.S.

Attorney was much more limited.

Police and prosecutors. Additional

law enforcement resources are brought

to bear on targeted areas. Police and

prosecutors concentrate their efforts to

identify, arrest, and prosecute criminals, especially those engaging in drug

trafficking and violent crime. By providing more effective crime detection and

response, speedier investigations and

trials, and the stricter sentences available through Federal prosecution, police and prosecutors seek to get drug

dealers and other criminals off the

street. The goal of these activities is to

build trust and support with the residential and business communities.

Police and prosecutors can then engage

area residents and business people as

problem-solving partners, who, through

their cooperation, will promote further

arrests and prosecutions.

Steering committee. The role and

composition of steering committees varied among sites, with some dominated

by public-sector representatives and

others more heavily represented and

guided by community residents.

In general, the committees established

goals and objectives, provided guidance and oversight on key program design and implementation issues, and

integrated weeding and seeding at the

policy level. In most sites, the steering

committee played a critical role in

coordinating efforts across agencies,

sectors, and jurisdictions. For several

sites, the steering committee or Weed

and Seed community organizations

provided a critical means of resident

participation in program decisionmaking. Across all eight sites, steering

committee members included key public agency representatives and local

government officials and various social

service providers, community-based

organizations, and residents.

Interorganizational linkages.

Increased interagency collaboration

was a central component of most weeding strategies. Such efforts included

monthly meetings between Weed and

Exhibit 2. Target area characteristics

Site/Target Area(s) W/S Start Funding Part I Area in

Date Crime Rate* Square Miles Population

Akron: West Side October 1995 $158,172 69.5 3.5 23,930

Hartford: Stowe Village January 1995 $2,448,424 199.2 0.001 1,300

Las Vegas: $2,168,066

Meadows Village October 1994 206.3 0.05 4,819

West Las Vegas October 1994 118.0 1.6 10,103

Manatee/Sarasota: $2,515,000

North Manatee October 1994 73.9 1.1 3,327

South Manatee October 1994 85.3 1.2 8,620

Pittsburgh: Hill District April 1992 $3,275,000 246.6 0.5 4,244

Salt Lake City: West Side March 1995 $550,000 55.1 6.3 22,000

Seattle: Central District January 1993 $3,125,000 172.6 1.2 13,812

Shreveport: Highland/Stoner Hill February 1995 $2,250,000 211.6 4.6 12,668

*Per 1,000 residents in the year preceding implementation of Weed and Seed.
5

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

T fewer questions than the 1995 survey. The

decision to proceed in 1997 with telephone

interviewing and a shorter questionnaire was

based on the difficulties experienced in 1995

in completing the targeted number of interviews per site.

To analyze arrest and crime patterns in the

10 Weed and Seed target areas, the research team requested computerized incident-level data from law enforcement

agencies, including basic facts about each

arrest, crime (e.g., when and where the

crime was committed), and associated criminal charges. Because the primary interest

was in arrests that were made and crimes

that occurred in the target areas, procedures

were developed to identify those arrests and

crimes from data files provided by each jurisdiction. In most cases, the procedures involved geocoding the address where the

arrest was made or where the crime was

committed.

The focus has also been on the seven Part I

crimes—homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto

theft. Although these crimes account for

only one segment of the overall crime problem (ignoring, for example, order maintenance and other crimes closely associated

with quality-of-life issues), there are standard

definitions of these crimes that all law enforcement agencies follow, thus allowing for

site-to-site comparisons. Given that controlling drug trafficking and drug-related crime

is one of the key Weed and Seed objectives,

the researchers also focused on drug arrests.

Onsite observation of programs. Interviews were conducted with seeding program

participants in each site (excluding Akron,

Ohio) to gain their perspectives. Evaluation

staff visited 4 to 6 programs in each of

the sites and conducted interviews with

groups of 7 to 10 people. These interviews

were not intended to measure outcomes

of the programs that were visited; rather,

they were designed to learn the perceived

benefits and drawbacks of the programs

from the individuals who participated in

them. Long-term effects of these programs on the lives of the program participants cannot be deduced from the

interviews conducted.

The seeding programs that were visited

fall under four general categories: youth

recreation and education, community

building, employment and training, and

violence prevention. Programs visited

included Police Activities (or Athletic)

Leagues, Boys and Girls Club Athletic Programs, Safe Haven After-School Programs,

and Youth Enrichment Programs. Based

on the comments of the participants interviewed, the seeding programs appeared to

provide services that would otherwise not

have been available in the target areas.

Most of the interviewees also indicated

participation in the seeding programs has

been a positive experience that helped

them feel more secure emotionally, physically, or both. The general themes that

emerged focused on providing additional

structure and discipline in the lives of

target area youths and providing opportunities and assistance for adults to work

toward personal and professional growth.

he National Evaluation of operation Weed and Seed was designed to

gain the perspective of target area residents in eight sites, to assess the trends in

arrests and crime in those areas, and to

draw from the personal experiences of

participants in the seeding programs. The

evaluation included a wide variety of activities at each site as follows:

● A review of funding applications and

other significant program documents.

● Individual interviews with key program

administrators, senior law enforcement

staff, managers of seeding organizations

and activities, service providers (both current and former), and community leaders.

● Analysis of automated, incident-level

crime and arrest records provided by the

local police departments.

● Group interviews with seeding program participants.

● Resident surveys in target areas, conducted in June 1995 by the Institute for

Social Analysis and in December 1997 by

Abt Associates Inc.

Resident surveys. To a large extent,

both surveys focused on the same issues—resident perceptions of crime,

public safety, police performance and

activities, quality of life, and awareness

of the Weed and Seed program. There

were, however, some differences in the

methods used in the two surveys. The

1995 survey consisted of 1,531 in-person

interviews, while the 1,995 interviews in

1997 were conducted by telephone. In

addition, the 1997 survey consisted of

Study Methodology
6

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Seed officers and probation/parole

officers to catch parole violators, frequent joint Federal and local special

narcotics operations, and the creation

of formal interagency Weed and Seed

law enforcement task forces, such as

in Las Vegas, Manatee/Sarasota Counties, and Pittsburgh. In Salt Lake City,

Weed and Seed worked closely with

the existing Metro Narcotics Task

Force, which focused on high-level

drug dealers.

The eight Weed and Seed sites tried to

build their seeding programs around

existing resources, in addition to creating new partnerships. For example,

Hartford Weed and Seed integrated

seeding efforts with the existing U.S.

Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) Family Investment Center, and the Salt Lake City

Weed and Seed program built on the

Comprehensive Communities Program.

Extensive partnerships and collaborations were created through Weed and

Seed in the public and private sectors,

with most of the private-sector partnerships with nonprofit and communitybased organizations. In Shreveport, for

example, Weed and Seed arranged for

existing services to come to the target

area, including free immunizations for

children provided by the State Department of Public Health, a library bookmobile, and free computer training

from a local university. In Seattle, the

Washington Insurance Council joined

Weed and Seed to establish the Seattle

Neighborhood Action Program as a

public/private partnership to help revitalize a Weed and Seed neighborhood.

Seeding program partners and providers who were interviewed emphasized

how Weed and Seed increased coordination and communication links

among neighborhood groups and other

agencies. Almost all respondents said

they felt more connected to the community and service providers. A director of a youth service organization in

Shreveport said:

Establishing partnerships is the key

to Weed and Seed—cooperation on

projects and working together to

bring the community together.

[You] can touch more people as a

group of organizations than as a

single entity.

Building trust and

community capacity

Several of the evaluation sites encountered early community resistance to

Weed and Seed because residents

were concerned about an exclusive

focus on enforcement or the potential

for targeted harassment. The clear

lesson from these experiences was the

importance of involving residents early

in Weed and Seed planning, providing

residents with substantial program

authority, and nurturing higher levels

of interaction and trust between public-sector representatives and those

they serve. The seeding component

and community policing were typically

the intended means for building community trust and encouraging participation. In the initial concept, it was

assumed these elements would follow

intensified enforcement. In practice,

it became apparent to many Weed

and Seed organizers that the target

areas had to become involved at the

outset and a comprehensive strategic

plan was needed to bring this about.

Even when target areas had strong

preexisting community organizational

infrastructures, considerable resources

were needed to effectively catalyze

resident participation and increase the

organizations’ scope of operations and

outreach. Weed and Seed sites that

employed a bottom-up, grassroots

approach tended to build trust among

residents and community-based leaders and enhanced community capacity

for crime prevention and reduction

and social development.

Weed and Seed also provided a forum

for leadership development among

residents. In Salt Lake City, for example, a resident took the lead in the

initial Weed and Seed grant application and played an instrumental role

in early program implementation. In

the North and South Manatee target

areas, charismatic individual leaders

emerged who essentially ran the safe

havens as volunteers and directed a

variety of community activities. For all

sites, it remained a central organizational challenge to continuously

develop and broaden leadership to

implement and sustain the Weed and

Seed strategy.

Approach to law enforcement

Most sites developed and implemented

coherent law enforcement strategies

that responded to local conditions and

incorporated stronger patrols at the

street level with some degree of higher

level interagency cooperation. Law enforcement approaches across the target

areas typically included increased

police presence through additional

staffing and overtime, with the majority of sites assigning officers dedicated

to the target area, and increased special operations for targeted law enforcement, especially for drug-related

and violent crime.

Multiagency task forces. The sites

developed varying degrees of increased

local, State, and Federal coordination,

whether in targeting offenders, narcotics operations, prosecution, or probation/parole. Local responses ranged
7

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

from increasing communication through

monthly meetings to creating formal interagency and multijurisdictional task

force operations housed at the same facility. Although multiagency task forces

concentrated on the target area, they

pursued drug cases across jurisdictional lines. Consequently, the benefits

of these efforts extended beyond the

target areas, particularly when the focus was on high-level drug dealers who

controlled large operations. Task force

missions varied primarily according to

the nature of crime in the target areas

and preexisting law enforcement operations, so the Weed and Seed task forces

complemented existing efforts.

The community policing bridge.

The implementation of Weed and

Seed enabled most sites to expand or

strengthen community policing efforts

or institute new programs; better concentrate, coordinate, and integrate

efforts within police departments; and

increase integration of law enforcement with seeding type activities.

Community policing initiatives such

as nuisance abatement, landlord programs, graffiti eradication, code enforcement, and neighborhood cleanups

helped improve property maintenance

and neighborhood environments.

Officers participated in a wide range

of youth recreation and education

programs in the target areas. Such

activities engaged local youths in

constructive activity, provided positive

role models for the youths, and built

community relations.

The assignment of dedicated officers

to the Weed and Seed target areas was

important in building relationships

with residents and in aiding enforcement through better knowledge of

the neighborhood, better intelligence,

and the ability to operate proactively.

In Shreveport, for example, many

residents knew the four dedicated

“bumble bees”—the bicycle patrol

officers in their yellow shirts and black

shorts—and, in Pittsburgh, residents

lobbied to keep one of their Weed and

Seed officers from being reassigned to

another district. One police lieutenant

in Las Vegas would find jobs for gang

members, and, occasionally, he would

drive them to their jobs or check with

their supervisors to see how the youths

were doing on the job. Although weeding has typically involved less resident

participation than has seeding, communication between residents and the

police seems to have increased across

sites.

In addition to enhancing community

policing efforts, Weed and Seed

provided a vehicle for mobilizing residents to participate in crime prevention and, in some cases, for creating

effective structures for community

authority and leadership. Responses

ranged from increasing neighborhood

watches, to community meetings, to a

citizens’ advisory committee that provided guidance on law enforcement

priorities.

The U.S. Attorney’s role. At the

Federal level, the U.S. Attorney’s two

potential roles were to serve as:

● A coordinator or “people mover”

for Weed and Seed operations. For

example, when the U.S. Attorney

chaired steering committee meetings and used resources of the

Office of the Attorney General in

the process, this served as a stimulus to other partners.

● A key player in multijurisdictional

task forces when the focus was on

high-level drug distribution and

sales. This helped to integrate,

coordinate, and focus local and

Federal enforcement efforts.

In Las Vegas, for example, the U.S.

Attorney’s Office played both roles

during the early stages of program

implementation. The role played by

the U.S. Attorney in each area might

be strong or weak, depending on the

personalities and motivations of the

partners involved.

Prosecution. Overall, prosecution

has been a relatively weak link in

Weed and Seed due to various institutional, political, and judicial issues.

In the majority of sites, there was no

special Federal or local prosecution

or tracking of Weed and Seed cases

except for efforts conducted by joint

Federal/State/local task forces. In general, district attorneys operate with

limited resources and in politicized

environments that act as barriers to the

provision of the additional resources

needed for local prosecution of Weed

and Seed cases. Some local prosecutors said although weeding activities

generated more criminal complaints,

their office budget was not increased

to hire new prosecutors or to cover the

operating costs that would be added

by enhanced prosecution of Part II or

quality-of-life offenses.

At the local level, police departments

and prosecutors often work through

different political systems. Most

police departments are city based and

receive their local and Federal funding

through their city council. That process is fairly well defined in most cities. Prosecutors, on the other hand,

often are county based and receive

their funding from the county. This

funding process often encompasses

multiple municipal priorities and

other competing political considerations. The role of Federal prosecution

also varied from no or few Federal

prosecutions to substantially increased

Federal, State, and local cooperation.
8

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Approach to seeding

One of the greatest challenges for the

sites was to develop an appropriate

seeding strategy with community

members that targeted Weed and Seed

resources most effectively and leveraged existing public and private

resources. Simply selecting and successfully implementing seeding programs, such as safe havens, in itself

was more difficult for most sites than

implementing their weeding programs,

with some sites initially stumbling at

this level of program execution.

Seeding was inherently a broader and

more complex task, both in development of goals and strategies and from

a practical organizational standpoint.

Seeding efforts involved engaging participation and commitment from public- and private-sector organizations,

whereas weeding had a relatively

clearer mission, operating within more

established hierarchical structures of

law enforcement and criminal justice

organizations. Due to the broader and

less defined nature of seeding, relatively more time was needed for

planning, relationship building, and

gaining consensus and commitment

from the wide range of participants

who shaped this domain. Seeding, by

its nature, is resistant to short-term

fixes designed to produce observable,

overnight results.

The eight Weed and Seed sites tried to

build their programs around existing

resources, in addition to creating new

partnerships. Seeding program partners and providers who were interviewed emphasized how Weed and

Seed increased coordination and communication links across neighborhood

groups and other agencies. Weed and

Seed sites reflected different emphases

in funding local seeding programs—

with varying degrees of program

breadth, depth, and duration. In several sites, providing communities with

a voice in the seeding grant award process was critical to gaining community

participation and trust.

Seeding initiatives undertaken by the

evaluation sites can be clustered as

follows, in order of predominance:

● Prevention and intervention programs for youths that included

afterschool programs, safe

havens, recreation and sports

programs, skills and employment

training, job development, and

health and substance abuse-related

programs.

● Neighborhood restoration, such as

neighborhood cleanups and code

enforcement.

● Community building and community development initiatives.

● Adult employment and economic

advancement programs, such as

computer, Internet, and educational

training.

● Family support services targeted to

adults.

● Community economic development.

Impact on crime trends

Across the evaluation sites, crime

patterns varied widely. As exhibits

3a and 3b show, in nine target areas

available data allowed a comparison of

the number of Part I crimes (homicide,

rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) in the

year prior to program implementation

to the second year of Weed and Seed.

Six of these areas showed declines:

Stowe Village in Hartford, 46 percent;

Crawford-Roberts (one neighborhood

within the Hill District) in Pittsburgh,

24 percent; North Manatee, 18 percent; the Shreveport target area, 11

percent; the Central District in Seattle,

10 percent; and West Las Vegas,

6 percent. Three target areas experienced increases in Part I crimes:

South Manatee, 2 percent; Meadows

Village in Las Vegas, 9 percent; and

Salt Lake City, 14 percent. A comparable estimate was not possible for the

Akron target area due to insufficient

data.

During this same time period, in seven

target areas—Hartford, Pittsburgh

(Crawford-Roberts), North Manatee,

South Manatee, Shreveport, West Las

Vegas, and Salt Lake City—Part I

crime rates declined more or increased

less than in the rest of the city or

county.

A relationship appears to exist between crime trends and the concentration of program resources in sites that

had the largest increases or decreases

in crime. Hartford, for example, has

the smallest target area in terms of

population and area, while Salt Lake

City has the largest single target area

in square miles and, along with Akron,

the smallest level of Federal Weed and

Seed funding. (See exhibit 2.)

Finally, changes in the drug arrest

rates appear to follow the same general

pattern as the changes in the Part I

crime rate. For example, among those

six target areas for which there are

arrest data, the four with decreases

in Part I crime from the year prior to

Weed and Seed through the second

year of implementation (i.e., Hartford,

Pittsburgh, North Manatee, and

Shreveport) all experienced initial

high rates of drug arrests—suggesting

an initial period of intense weeding

activities—followed by declining

drug arrest rates. Assuming the level
9

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Exhibit 3a. Percent change in Part I crime from the year preceding Weed &

Seed to year 1 and to year 2: target areas

* Year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City are based on 5-month periods only. Weed and Seed

started in August 1995, and data are available only back to March 1995.

Exhibit 3b. Percent change in Part I crime from the year preceding Weed &

Seed to year 1 and to year 2: comparison areas

* Year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City are based on 5-month periods only. Weed and Seed

started in August 1995, and data are available only back to March 1995.

of enforcement as measured by police

presence has remained somewhat constant, this trend reflects success in reducing drug activity. However, the Salt

Lake City target area and South Manatee both experienced large increases

in the number of drug arrests in 1997

compared with 1996, suggesting perhaps these sites had not yet succeeded

in reducing the level of drug activity

in the target areas. In the case of Salt

Lake City, an influx of gang activity is

an important contextual factor, raising

the question of whether the crime rate

would have been even higher there

without Weed and Seed.

Assessing the Weed and

Seed strategy

The evaluation investigated two major

questions: What factors appeared to

help or inhibit successful implementation of Weed and Seed; and did detectable changes in outcome measures

take place as a consequence of Weed

and Seed?1

Effects on crime and public

perceptions

Regarding the specific survey-reported

pattern of residents’ perceptions of

crime, public safety, and police performance, the target areas cluster into

three groups:

● North Manatee and Pittsburgh

exhibited substantial evidence of

changes in residents’ perceptions

across multiple outcome measures,

including the severity of crime and

police effectiveness in controlling

crime.

● Akron, Hartford, and Seattle exhibited some evidence of changes in

residents’ perceptions on selected

crime dimensions, either drugrelated crime (Akron and Seattle)

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

year 1 year 2

Highland/

Stoner Hill

(Shreveport)

Central District

(Seattle)

West Side

(Salt Lake City)*

Crawford-Roberts

(Pittsburgh)

South

Manatee

North

Manatee

West 

Las Vegas

Meadows

Village

(Las Vegas)

Stowe Village

(Hartford)

West Side

(Akron)

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

year 1 year 2

Shreveport

Seattle

Salt Lake City*

Pittsburgh

Manatee County

Las Vegas

Hartford

Akron
10

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

or violent and gang-related crime

(Hartford).

● Las Vegas, Salt Lake City, and

Shreveport exhibited little evidence

of changes in residents’ perceptions

of general public safety or the

severity of specific types of crime

in the neighborhood.

Based on the pattern of findings on

the rate of Part I crimes as well as

responses to crime-related survey

questions, the target areas fall into

four categories, first according to the

evidence of reduced Part I crimes and

then (within each category) according

to the evidence of improved public

perceptions:

● Pittsburgh and Hartford showed

strong evidence of reduced Part I

crimes and improved public perceptions on crime-related measures

(e.g., reduction of fear of crime,

public safety).

● Manatee/Sarasota (North Manatee)

and Shreveport showed substantial

evidence of reduced Part I crimes.

(North Manatee also showed improved public perceptions on multiple crime-related measures.)

● Seattle, Akron, Las Vegas (West

Las Vegas), and Manatee/Sarasota

(South Manatee) showed some evidence of reduced Part I crimes.

(Akron and Seattle also showed

improved public perceptions.)

● Salt Lake City and Las Vegas

(Meadows Village) showed no evidence of reduced Part I crimes.

Factors favoring successful

implementation of Weed

and Seed

Of course, these findings must be interpreted in terms of local circumstances and program approaches.

What factors appear to have promoted

successful implementation of the

program and thus have promoted the

achievement of the program’s intended

results? To address this question, the

evaluation considered site characteristics and program features.

Community setting. Preexisting

community features may make Weed

and Seed easier or more difficult to

operate effectively. Important factors

included the strength of the social and

institutional infrastructure (an established network of community-based

organizations and community leaders),

the severity of crime problems, geographical advantages favoring economic development, and transiency of

the community population. The last

factor is particularly important. Rapid

turnover, as in the case of Meadows

Village in Las Vegas, undermines the

crime-fighting effect of community

policing and makes it difficult, if not

impossible, to generate the ongoing

community involvement that is a key

element in the Weed and Seed

concept.

Program design. The mix of weeding

and seeding activities and the sequencing of these components appear to be

important factors in gaining community

support for the program. Important

positive factors included early seeding,

sustained weeding, high-level task

forces combined with community policing, and an active prosecutorial role.

Concentration of funds. As is to

be expected, sites appeared to have

greater impact on crime rates if they

concentrated their program resources

on smaller population groups, especially if they could similarly channel

other public funds and also leverage

private funds. The important factors

included funding “intensity” (applying

funding to a narrowly targeted group of

residents in a small geographical area)

and channeling and leveraging other

funds.

Leadership and partnership. A less

tangible ingredient that characterized

the more successful programs was the

active and constructive leadership of

key individuals. By its very nature,

Weed and Seed places a great premium on effective coordination of

groups with different organizational

missions, responding to different

constituencies. To establish effective

working relationships among these organizations required personal energy

and initiative and an organizational

structure that facilitated interaction.

For example, those sites that based

weeding and seeding staff in the same

facility tended to develop better cooperation and coordination between the

two program components.

The most effective implementation

strategies were those that relied on

bottom-up, participatory decisionmaking approaches, especially when

combined with efforts to build capacity

and partnership among local organizations. This required a long-term perspective about the program and its

potential to bring about community

change. Such sites, including some

that achieved substantial crime reductions within the time period analyzed,

have established a stronger foundation

and more sustainable basis for further

community-targeted initiatives.

Policy implications

In charting the future direction of

Weed and Seed, policymakers have a

number of strategic choices to make.

These include designating sites for

continued funding, selecting sites

for new awards, and allocating funds
11

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Where Is Weed and Seed Going?

Funds, Asset Forfeiture Funds, COPS hiring

awards) as well as other Federal, State,

local, and private resources. The longrange objective is for recipient sites to use

the Weed and Seed funds to develop successful, self-sustaining community-based

interventions.

Consistent with the program’s emphasis

on flexibility and customer orientation,

sites are given considerable latitude to develop programs with the Executive Office

for Weed and Seed grant funds and to

request training and technical assistance.

Increasingly, experienced sites are asked to

provide peer-to-peer training to show new

and developing sites what to do and what

to avoid to develop successful local programs. Sites are encouraged to organize

regional training sessions to facilitate these

exchanges and coordinate with other

Federal agency partners.

In addition to providing funding directly

to sites, Weed and Seed supports many

multisite activities. For example, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy Drug Demand

Reduction Task Force and other military

partners, Weed and Seed supports the

implementation of the Drug Education for

Youth (DEFY) program in Weed and Seed

communities. Weed and Seed DEFY sites

increased from 3 in 1996 to 60 in 1999.

among participating sites over time.

(See “Where is Weed and Seed going?”) The key policy question is how

to use program funds most effectively

in ways that make the greatest longterm contributions to controlling crime

and promoting a safe living environment for residents. Other nonfunding

considerations include improved coordination among Federal, State, and

local public and private partners.

The experience of the eight sites

evaluated suggests Weed and Seed has

affected the target areas through either

(or both) of two avenues. The first,

program effectiveness, relates to the

specific initiatives that focus on law

enforcement and crime prevention.

These activities, both on the weeding

and seeding sides, appeared to have

varying degrees of success in reducing

crime and improving perceptions of

public safety. The second, community

mobilization, is the process in which

Weed and Seed provides a catalyst for

greater involvement of neighborhood

residents and community-based organizations. As mentioned earlier, some

sites were more predisposed than others to participatory problem-solving

arrangements by virtue of their preexisting infrastructure and active leadership by respected individuals and

established organizations.

These two mechanisms of change are

clearly interrelated. The experience of

the sites studied here showed:

● The Weed and Seed program has

been a strong stimulant to community

coalition building. Public and private

organizations came together, for the

first time in a number of sites, to develop interventions that would have a

broad base of support. It seems clear

these developments would not have

occurred in the absence of Weed and

Seed influence. To maximize impact

on crime rates, Weed and Seed

should seek the highest feasible concentration of funds in the program

sites. Given the annual funding constraint of the congressional appropriations process, this implies a more

selective process in choosing sites to

receive new awards and/or limiting

the number of years that ongoing

sites receive program funding. Having a concentrated and focused strategic effort is also an important

means of increasing the intensity of

the intervention. Increasing coordination with other Federal funding

sources is another key element. Furthermore, the evaluation finds that

Weed and Seed funding has acted

as a significant catalyst for general

community revitalization efforts and

that most target area communities

have undertaken programs and

created beneficial community

eginning in 1996, the Weed and

Seed program altered its paradigm and

approach to site longevity and funding

levels. After funding 36 sites as part of a

3-year demonstration at approximately

$750,000 per site, funding was extended

to additional sites at a lower level. By

1997, Weed and Seed funding was

offered to almost 120 sites, typically at

$250,000 per year. At this new, lower

annual funding level per site, Weed and

Seed appropriated funds to 176 sites in

1998. In 1999 the program grew to approximately 200 sites, despite a drop in

total national funding.

In fiscal year 2000, new policies will require the original 36 sites to submit comprehensive reapplications to be eligible

for funding. Subsequently, every site

must reapply after 5 years of continuous

funding. This new approach is consistent

with the basic Weed and Seed strategy of

pursuing effectiveness through coordination and leveraging of additional public

and private resources (in many cases, several times the amount of Weed and Seed

funding).

Additional resources sites are urged to

investigate include other U.S. Department

of Justice funding streams (e.g., Local

Law Enforcement Block Grants, Byrne

Formula Grants, Juvenile Justice Formula

B
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

Washington, DC 20531

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

PRESORTED STANDARD

POSTAGE & FEES PAID

DOJ/NIJ

PERMIT NO. G–91

Findings and conclusions of the research

reported here are those of the author(s) and do

not necessarily reflect the official position or

policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Terence Dunworth, Ph.D., is managing vice president and project

director at Abt Associates Inc.

Gregory Mills, Ph.D., is a senior

associate at Abt Associates Inc.

NCJ 175685

The National Institute of Justice is a

component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau

of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice

Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for

Victims of Crime.

This document, the full cross site analysis, the eight case studies, and other NIJ

publications can be found at and downloaded from the NIJ Web site (http://

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij).

The research for this study was supported under grant number 95–DD–

BX–0134 by the National Institute of

Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

U.S. Department of Justice.

organizations that likely would not

have come into existence without

Weed and Seed.

● In selecting sites for new program

funding, Weed and Seed should

place its funding priority on sites

with geographically small target

areas and with favorable community settings and program designs.

This is more likely to produce demonstrable successes. In turn, this

should increase potential spinoffs

from the Weed and Seed target area

to other areas in the site.

● The Executive Office for Weed and

Seed should expand its provision of

technical assistance to the funded

sites. The lessons learned from the

more successful sites—and the less

successful ones—on these issues

are, to a large degree, widely applicable. New sites should receive

the benefit of this experience. This

seems especially important in promoting the partnership arrangements that have characterized the

more successful programs examined

in this research.

Note

1. The most rigorous means of establishing

the counterfactual is an experimental design in

which the intervention, in this case Operation

Weed and Seed, is not implemented among a

randomly selected set of subjects, in this case

the sites. Such a design was infeasible in this

context. Another approach would have been to

match each evaluation site with a comparison

site of similar baseline characteristics. At an

earlier stage of this evaluation, the National

Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Institute for

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Social Analysis identified such comparison

sites and included them in the 1995 survey of

community residents and other baseline data

collection efforts. Soon thereafter, however, NIJ

and Abt Associates concluded the comparison

sites were not sufficiently comparable to their

corresponding target areas in demographic

characteristics and crime trends. The matched

site approach was not pursued further. See

Terence Dunworth, et al., Overview of Institute

for Social Analysis National Evaluation

Baseline Data and Implications of the Data for

the Weed and Seed Impact Evaluation, Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., January 1996.