[Cite as State v. Lucas, 2024-Ohio-4496.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 113861

v. :

FRANK LUCAS, SR., :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: VACATED; REVERSED AND REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 12, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-23-683686-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Margaret Graham, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

The Law Office of Schlachet and Levy and Eric M. Levy, 

for appellant. 

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

Defendant-appellant Frank Lucas, Sr. (“Lucas”), appeals from his 

conviction and sentence for felonious assault following a guilty plea. Pursuant to 

Loc.App.R. 16(B), the State of Ohio concedes this error. After a thorough review of 
the record and law, this court reverses and vacates Lucas’s guilty plea and sentence 

and remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On August 15, 2023, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Lucas 

on Count 1, attempted murder in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.02(A); Count 

2, felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); Count 3, felonious assault in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); Count 4, violating a protection order in violation of 

R.C. 2919.27(A)(2); and Count 5, violating a protection order in violation of R.C. 

2919.27(A)(1). The attempted murder and felonious assault counts each contained 

three repeat violent offender specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A) and three 

notice of prior conviction specifications pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(6). Both 

counts of violating a protection order contained furthermore clauses. These charges 

arose from a July 2023 incident in which Lucas stabbed the victim in her back, neck, 

and forearm, causing significant and lasting injuries.

On March 4, 2024, the court held a group plea hearing for Lucas and 

two unrelated defendants. The assistant prosecuting attorney placed the terms of 

Lucas’s plea agreement on the record as follows:

The State would move to dismiss count 1 in its entirety. He will plea to 

count 2 as charged in the indictment, felonious assault, a felony of the 

second degree in violation of Revised Code Section 2923.11(A)(1)(a). 

That has with it two repeat violent offender specifications under 

Revised Code Section 2941.149(A) and two notice of prior conviction 

specifications under 2929.13(F)(6).

They would merge for — the two NPCs would merge for the purpose of 

the sentences as would the two RVOs.
The state would move to dismiss counts 3, 4, and 5 in their entirety.

(Tr. 21.) Lucas’s counsel confirmed that this was his understanding of the plea 

agreement.

During the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, the court outlined the potential 

penalties for Lucas as follows:

Mr. Lucas, I believe it is your intention to plead guilty to the amended

— no, I’m sorry. To count 2. There is [sic] no amendments there. That 

is a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2923.11(A). That 

carries a possible penalty from two to eight years in prison and a fine of 

up to $15,000.

Pursuant to Reagan Tokes, there is an additional possible term of up to 

four years that could be placed upon you if when you get to the prison 

you violate some of their rules and they then can hold you after a 

hearing of up to an additional four years. So instead of your term being 

two to eight, it is — it could be as much as two to 12 years.

(Tr. 34.)

The trial court accepted Lucas’s guilty plea to Count 2, felonious 

assault, and Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 were nolled. No additional reference to any 

specifications or their corresponding potential penalties was made at the plea 

hearing. The corresponding journal entry stated that Lucas pleaded guilty to 

Count 2, with three attendant notice of prior conviction specifications and three 

attendant repeat violent offender specifications, as charged in the indictment.

The court held a sentencing hearing on April 1, 2024. The court 

outlined Lucas’s prior guilty plea as follows:

Previously on March 4th of 2024, the defendant pled guilty to Count 2, 

felonious assault. That is a felony of the second degree, in violation of 

R.C. 2903.11(A) with notice of prior conviction and repeat violent 

offender specification.
I’m sorry, two notice of prior convictions and two repeat violent 

offender specifications attached.

I’m sorry, three notice of prior convictions and three repeat violent 

offender specifications attached.

(Tr. 41.)

Ultimately, the court sentenced Lucas to eight years in prison for 

felonious assault and five years in prison on the repeat violent offender specification, 

to be served consecutively, for a total of 13 years in prison. Pursuant to the Reagan 

Tokes Law, Lucas’s maximum sentence is 17 years.

On April 25, 2024, Lucas filed a timely notice of appeal. He presents 

two assignments of error for our review:

I. Appellant’s plea must be vacated where it was entered in violation of 

Crim.R. 11 as not being knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made 

where he was not advised of the maximum potential penalty which 

could be imposed and the mandatory nature that a sentence on the 

repeat violent offender specification would be required to be imposed 

consecutively.

II. Appellant’s sentence is not supported by the record or is otherwise 

contrary to law and must be vacated.

On July 26, 2024, in lieu of filing a brief, the State of Ohio filed a 

notice of conceded error pursuant to Loc.App.R. 16(B).

II. Legal Analysis

In his first assignment of error, Lucas argues that his plea was not 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered where the trial court failed to advise 

him of the maximum potential penalty he faced. Specifically, Lucas argues that the 

trial court did not advise him of any additional prison sentence that could be 
imposed on the repeat violent offender specification, nor was he advised that any 

additional prison sentence was required to run consecutively to the underlying 

prison sentence. The State concedes this error. After a thorough review of the 

record, we agree.

A defendant’s decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary because a guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional rights. State 

v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 10, citing Parker v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 

(1992); State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 25. Enforcement of the plea is 

unconstitutional where the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily. Id.

Crim.R. 11(C) sets forth certain constitutional and procedural 

requirements, which a trial court must comply with prior to accepting a guilty plea. 

Under Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court shall not accept a guilty plea in a felony case 

without personally addressing the defendant and doing all of the following:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 

penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible 

for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at 

the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty. . ., and that the court, upon 

acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury 

trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory 

process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require 

the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a 
trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against 

himself or herself.

The Ohio Supreme Court has summarized appellate review of 

compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) as follows: 

Properly understood, the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has 

the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if 

the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure 

of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating 

prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the 

defendant met that burden?

Dangler at ¶ 17. 

Lucas pleaded guilty to repeat violent offender specifications 

pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A). Sentences imposed for repeat violent offender 

specifications can be either discretionary, governed by R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a), or 

mandatory, governed by R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(b). Because the criteria in R.C.

2929.14(B)(2)(b)(i) through (iii) apply, the sentence was mandatory and the trial 

court was required to sentence Lucas on the repeat violent offender specification. 

Further, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(d), any sentence imposed on a repeat 

violent offender specification is required to be served consecutively to the 

underlying prison sentence.

Because the court failed to advise Lucas of the maximum potential 

penalty he faced as a result of his plea agreement, the court did not comply with 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). State v. Hindman, 2023-Ohio-1974 (8th Dist.). Pursuant to 

the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Dangler, a “‘trial court’s total failure to inform 

a defendant of a distinct component of the maximum penalty during a plea colloquy
constitutes a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), thereby requiring 

the vacation of the defendant’s guilty or no contest plea.’” State v. Rogers, 2020-

Ohio-4102, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Fabian, 2020-Ohio-3926, ¶ 20 (12th 

Dist.).

Because Lucas’s plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

made, we sustain Lucas’s first assignment of error and, reverse his conviction and 

sentence, and vacate his plea.

Because Lucas’s first assignment of error is dispositive of the appeal, 

we decline to address his second assignment of error challenging his sentence 

because it is moot. Loc.App.R. 16(A). For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Lucas’s 

plea, reverse his conviction and sentence, and remand this matter to the trial court 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR