alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1227.111 Do existing delegation agreements remain in effect? This section explains your options if you have a delegation agreement in effect on the effective date of this regulation. ( a ) If you do not want to perform any royalty management functions in addition to those authorized under your existing agreement, you may continue your existing agreement until its expiration date. Before the agreement expires, if you wish to continue to perform one or more of the delegated functions you performed under the expired agreement, you must request a new delegation agreement meeting the requirements of this part and the applicable standards.
( b ) If you want to perform royalty management functions in addition to those authorized under your existing agreement, you must request a new delegation agreement under this part.
( c ) ONRR may extend any delegation agreement in effect on the effective date of this regulation for up to 3 years beyond the date it is due to expire.
[62 FR 43084, Aug. 12, 1997, as amended at 75 FR 61087, Oct. 4, 2010]
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk July 15, 2011

t0712 

# Order

July 15, 2011

142821

CHRISTOPHER TUCKER, by his Guardian, PAMELA WATSON, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 142821 COA: 294754 Oakland CC: 2008-095097-NO VINCENT PIPITONE a nd VINCENT PIPITONE, JR., d/b/a PRO BUILT CONSTRUCTION, PRO BUILT CUSTOM BUILDING CORPORATION, PRO BUILT CUSTOM BUILDING, INC., VINCE PRO BUILT, and IMPROVEMENTS UNLIMITED, INC., Defendants, and

RICHARD CARSON, d/b/a CARSON HOME MAINTENANCE, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal th e February 15, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals is cons idered, and it is DENIED. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Oakla nd Circuit Court’s deni al of the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s ne gligence claim against defe ndant Richard Carson on the

defendant’s stated basis that the plaintiff had failed to identify a legal duty that was separate and distinct from the defenda nt’s contractual duties pursuant to Fultz v UnionCommerce Assoc, 470 Mich 460, 467 (2004). The Cour t of Appeals correctly held that the plaintiff had alleged a separate and di stinct common law duty on the part of the defendant to use ordinary care in order to avoid physical ha rm to foreseeable persons in the execution of his undertakings. Loweke v Ann Arbor Ce iling & Partition Co, LLC

, 489 Mich 157 (2011).

H ATHAWAY , J., would deny leave to appeal w ithout the further statements found in the majority’s order.
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In re O.W. Loyd, II

No. 06-19-00077-CV

Appeal from the 402nd District Court of 

Wood County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 2019-

307). Memorandum Opinion delivered by 

Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Morriss and 

Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appeal should be dismissed 

for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

We further order that the appellant pay all costs of this appeal.

RENDERED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
Exhibit 99.2



                        Independent Accountant's Report


     Synthetic Fixed-Income Securities, Inc. (as Depositor)
     One Wachovia Center
     301 South College Street, DC-7
     Charlotte, NC 28288

     U.S. Bank Trust National Association (as Trustee)
     Corporate Trust Department
     100 Wall Street
     New York, NY 10005


     Re:   STRATS Trust For J.P.Morgan Chase & Co. Securities, Series 2004-9
           -----------------------------------------------------------------
           (the "Trust")
           -------------

     Ladies and Gentlemen:

     We have examined assertions of Synthetic Fixed-Income Securities, Inc.
     (the "Depositor") and U.S. Bank National Association, (the "Trustee" and
     Together with the Depositor, the "Management") that the Depositor and the
     Trustee have complied, in all material respects, with the provisions of
     the Base Trust Agreement dated as of September 26, 2003, as supplemented
     by a series supplement dated as of July 15, 2004 (together, the "Trust
     Agreement"), in respect of the STRATS Trust For J.P.Morgan Chase & Co.
     Securities, Series 2004-9 (the "Trust"), during the period covered by the
     annual report on Form 10-K filed by the Depositor on behalf of the Trust
     for the year ended December 31, 2005 (the "Annual Report"). Management is
     responsible for compliance with the Trust Agreement. Our responsibility
     is to express an opinion on Management's assertions based on our
     examination.

     Our examination was made in accordance with attestation standards
     established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
     and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the
     Depositor's and the Trustee's compliance with the Trust Agreement and
     performing such other procedures as considered necessary in the
     circumstances. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable
     basis for our opinion.

     In our opinion, the Depositor and the Trustee have complied, in all
     material respects, with the Trust Agreement during the period covered by
     the Annual Report and Management's assertions with respect to such
     compliance are fairly stated, in all material respects, for the year
     ended December 31, 2005.


     /s/ Aston Bell, CPA
     New York, New York
     March 16, 2006
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 05-629 

________________________________________________________________________ 

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 

Article 98 

 Agreement between the 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

and CAMBODIA 

Signed at Phnom Penh June 27, 2003 

 
 NOTE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

 Pursuant to Public Law 89—497, approved July 8, 1966 

(80 Stat. 271; 1 U.S.C. 113)—

“. . .the Treaties and Other International Acts Series issued 

under the authority of the Secretary of State shall be competent 

 evidence . . . of the treaties, international agreements other than 

treaties, and proclamations by the President of such treaties and 

international agreements other than treaties, as the case may be, 

therein contained, in all the courts of law and equity and of maritime 

jurisdiction, and in all the tribunals and public offices of the 

United States, and of the several States, without any further proof 

or authentication thereof.” 
CAMBODIA 

International Criminal Court: Article 98 

Agreement signed at Phnom Penh June 27, 2003; 

 Entered into force June 29, 2005.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMISI JERMAINE CALLOWAY,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

RANGEL, Sergeant; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 14-17245

D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00193-GSA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Gary S. Austin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding** 

Submitted December 9, 2015** 

Before: WALLACE, RAWLINSON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges. 

Jamisi Jermaine Calloway, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from

the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from a

FILED

DEC 16 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** Calloway consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(c).

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2003 alleged excessive force incident. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir.

2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382

F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal on the basis of a statute of limitations).

We affirm. 

The district court properly dismissed Calloway’s action because, even with

the benefit of statutory tolling due to incarceration, Calloway failed to file his

action within the applicable statute of limitations and failed to demonstrate he was

entitled to equitable tolling. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1 (two-year

statute of limitations for personal injury claims; two-year tolling period due to

incarceration); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2007)

(forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to

§ 1983 actions); see also Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1999)

(three-pronged test for equitable tolling in California; plaintiff was not entitled to

equitable tolling where “actions were not a reasonable and good faith effort to

pursue his claims in an alternate forum or case” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)); Thomas v. Gilliland, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520, 524 (Ct. App. 2002)

(“In the absence of a statute, a party cannot deduct from the period of the statute of

limitations applicable to his case the time consumed by the pendency of an action

2 14-17245
in which he sought to have the matter adjudicated, but which was dismissed

without prejudice to him.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

We reject Calloway’s contentions that his claims are not time-barred due to

his pro se status, or because of his alleged incapacitation after the statute of

limitations had already expired.

AFFIRMED.

3 14-17245
### §28302. Penalties

A person violating section 28301 of this title shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(Added Pub. L. 104–287, §5(56)(A), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3394.)

| Revised Section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 28302 | 45:66. | Sept. 3, 5, 1916, ch. 436, §4, 39 Stat. 722. |

Section

The words "shall be guilty of a misdemeanor" are omitted, and the words "shall be fined under title 18" are substituted for "shall be fined not less than $100 and not more than $1,000", for consistency with title 18. The words "upon conviction" are omitted as surplus.
Impurity and CAS Registry Number (a) Maximum percent

(b) Confidential CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI TS-E077KJ ( CBI ) 

### Attachment 3 Page 1/1
### §§321a to 325. Repealed. Pub. L. 86–70, §21(d)(6), (7), June 25, 1959, 73 Stat. 146

Section 321a, act June 30, 1932, ch. 320, §2, 47 Stat. 446, related to execution of laws pertaining to construction and maintenance of roads and trails by Secretary of the Interior.

Section 321b, act June 30, 1932, ch. 320, §3, 47 Stat. 446, related to distribution of duties and promulgation of rules and regulation.

Section 321c, act June 30, 1932, ch. 320, §4, 47 Stat. 446, related to submission of appropriations.

Section 321d, act June 30, 1932, ch. 320, §5, as added July 24, 1947, ch. 313, 61 Stat. 418, required a reservation of right-of-way for roads, roadways, highways, tramways, trails, bridges, and appurtenant structures in patents and deeds.

Section 322, acts Jan. 27, 1905, ch. 277, §2, 33 Stat. 616; May 14, 1906, ch. 2458, §2, 34 Stat. 192; June 30, 1932, ch. 320, §1, 47 Stat. 446; July 14, 1955, ch. 359, 69 Stat. 321, related to location, lay out, construction, and maintenance of roads, trails and bridges.

Section 323, acts Jan. 27, 1905, ch. 277, §2, 33 Stat. 616; May 14, 1906, ch. 2458, §2, 34 Stat. 192; June 30, 1932, ch. 320, §1, 47 Stat. 446, related to maps, plans and specifications for roads and trails and contracts for permanent contracts.

Section 324, acts Jan. 27, 1905, ch. 277, §2, 33 Stat. 616; May 14, 1906, ch. 2458, §2, 34 Stat. 192; June 30, 1932, ch. 320, §1, 47 Stat. 446, related to repair of roads and trails.

Section 325, acts Jan. 27, 1905, ch. 277, §2, 33 Stat. 616; May 14, 1906, ch. 2458, §2, 34 Stat. 192; June 30, 1932, ch. 320, §1, 47 Stat. 446, related to costs and expenses of laying out, constructing, and repairing roads and trails.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal of sections 321a to 325 effective July 1, 1959, see section 21(d) of Pub. L. 86–70 set out as an Effective Date of 1959 Amendment note under section 103 of Title 23, Highways.
#### Arlene Jette et al., Appellants, v Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Centre, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated June 3, 1977, which, *inter alia:*(1) vacated a prior order of the same court, which prior order directed a severance of the‘action and directed that there be an inquest as against the respondent; and (2) granted respondent leave to serve an answer, upon condition that its attorneys personally pay the sum of $250, as costs, to the attorney for the plaintiff. Order modified by increasing the amount of costs payable to plaintiffs’ attorney to the sum of $500. As so modified, order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements to appellants. On March 12, 1976 plaintiffs served their complaint upon the respondent hospital. They received no response and, in May, moved for a severance and an inquest based upon the hospital’s failure to answer. Respondent opposed the motion, claiming its default in answering was due to inadvertence. That motion was denied in June on condition that defendant serve an answer within 10 days. Respondent still did not serve an answer. Three months passed and plaintiff again moved for a severance and an inquest. Defense counsel again opposed the motion and attributed the default to inadvertent law office failures. No medical affidavits were submitted as part of the opposition papers to demonstrate that the hospital had a meritorious defense. Special Term granted the motion in December, 1976. In March, 1977, the hospital moved, *inter alia,*to vacate the December order, this time accompanying its papers with medical affidavits supporting its defense. Finally, on June 3, 1977, 15 months after the service of the complaint, respondent was relieved of its default and allowed to serve an answer, on condition that defense counsel personally pay $250 to plaintiff’s attorneys. CPLR 5015 (subd [a]) authorizes a court which rendered a judgment to relieve a party from its default "upon such terms as may be just”. In cases where a default was occasioned by "law office failure”, it has been our policy to visit the penalty for the neglect upon the responsible attorney personally, rather than upon his client *(Moran v Rynar,*39 AD2d 718). Under the circumstances of this case, including the lengthy delay and the numerous motions necessitated by the neglect of the attorneys for the respondent hospital, a fine of $500 should have been imposed. Martuscello, J. P., Damiani, Cohalan and Hawkins, JJ., concur.
§ 18.51 Electrical protection of circuits and equipment. ( a ) An automatic circuit-interrupting device(s) shall be used to protect each ungrounded conductor of a branch circuit at the junction with the main circuit when the branch-circuit conductor(s) has a current carrying capacity less than 50 percent of the main circuit conductor(s), unless the protective device(s) in the main circuit will also provide adequate protection for the branch circuit. The setting of each device shall be specified. For headlight and control circuits, each conductor shall be protected by a fuse or equivalent. Any circuit that is entirely contained in an explosion-proof enclosure shall be exempt from these requirements.
( b ) Each motor shall be protected by an automatic overcurrent device. One protective device will be acceptable when two motors of the same rating operate simultaneously and perform virtually the same duty. ( 1 ) If the overcurrent-protective device in a direct-current circuit does not open both lines, particular attention shall be given to marking the polarity at the terminals or otherwise preventing the possibility of reversing connections which would result in changing the circuit interrupter to the grounded line.
( 2 ) Three-phase alternating-current motors shall have an overcurrent-protective device in at least two phases such that actuation of a device in one phase will cause the opening of all three phases.
( c ) Circuit-interrupting devices shall be so designed that they can be reset without opening the compartment in which they are enclosed.
( d ) All magnetic circuit-interrupting devices shall be mounted in a manner to preclude the possibility of their closing by gravity.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 24 - 0300 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JAMIE LYNN STONE,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including August 28 , 202 4 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

July 22 2024

07/22/2024

Case Number: DA 24-0300
#### William R. Firnhaber, appellee, v. City of Chicago et al., appellants.

Gen. No. 28,608.

Mandamus for requisitions for ten captains of fire department of City of Chicago, to appoint petitioner to position of captain, or, alternatively, that he be paid salary of $2,700 per annum. Writ awarded as prayed. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph Sabath, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1923.

*612Reversed with a finding of facts.

Opinion filed November 27, 1923.

*Certiorari*denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).

Francis X. Busch, Corporation Counsel, for appellants; Gilbert Giles Ogden, Assistant Corporation Counsel, and Cora B. Hirtzel, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel. A. D. Gash, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.
1.
    
    The Borrowers desire to establish Shanghai Chongzhi Information Technology Co.
Ltd.(the Company) whose registered capital will be RMB1,000,000, and Borrower A and
Borrower B will respectively hold 55% and 45% of the equity interest in the Company.2.
    
    The Borrowers desire to borrow a loan (the Loan) from the Lender to invest in the
Company.3.
    
    The Lender agrees to provide the Loan to Borrowers.




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### §11102. Use of terminal facilities

(a) The Board may require terminal facilities, including main-line tracks for a reasonable distance outside of a terminal, owned by a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part, to be used by another rail carrier if the Board finds that use to be practicable and in the public interest without substantially impairing the ability of the rail carrier owning the facilities or entitled to use the facilities to handle its own business. The rail carriers are responsible for establishing the conditions and compensation for use of the facilities. However, if the rail carriers cannot agree, the Board may establish conditions and compensation for use of the facilities under the principle controlling compensation in condemnation proceedings. The compensation shall be paid or adequately secured before a rail carrier may begin to use the facilities of another rail carrier under this section.

(b) A rail carrier whose terminal facilities are required to be used by another rail carrier under this section is entitled to recover damages from the other rail carrier for injuries sustained as the result of compliance with the requirement or for compensation for the use, or both as appropriate, in a civil action, if it is not satisfied with the conditions for use of the facilities or if the amount of the compensation is not paid promptly.

(c)(1) The Board may require rail carriers to enter into reciprocal switching agreements, where it finds such agreements to be practicable and in the public interest, or where such agreements are necessary to provide competitive rail service. The rail carriers entering into such an agreement shall establish the conditions and compensation applicable to such agreement, but, if the rail carriers cannot agree upon such conditions and compensation within a reasonable period of time, the Board may establish such conditions and compensation.

(2) The Board may require reciprocal switching agreements entered into by rail carriers pursuant to this subsection to contain provisions for the protection of the interests of employees affected thereby.

(d) The Board shall complete any proceeding under subsection (a) or (b) within 180 days after the filing of the request for relief.

(Added Pub. L. 104–88, title I, §102(a), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 831.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 11103 of this title prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, §102(a).

A prior section 11102, Pub. L. 95–473, Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1419, related to classification of carriers, prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, §102(a).

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Jan. 1, 1996, except as otherwise provided in Pub. L. 104–88, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as a note under section 1301 of this title.
### §536. Repealed. Pub. L. 86–3, §14(e), Mar. 18, 1959, 73 Stat. 10

Section, acts Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, §92, 31 Stat. 159; May 27, 1910, ch. 258, §8, 36 Stat. 448; July 9, 1921, ch. 42, §314, 42 Stat. 120; Oct. 15, 1949, ch. 695, §5(a), 63 Stat. 680, prescribed salary of governor and secretary of Territory of Hawaii, and specified incidental expenses of governor.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Trevor Thomas, Appellant.

Judgment of conviction, Supreme Court, New York County, unanimously reversed, on the law, the motion to suppress granted, and the indictment dismissed. Police officers, from the vantage point of a fifth floor window, observed defendant-appellant, through binoculars, below on the steps of a building across the street. When another person sat beside him, defendant pulled a paper bag from his waistband, and extracted something, first characterized as a glassine envelope containing a white powder, and then, finally refined by cross-examination to "a white object,” and gave it to the other person. This evidence was insufficient to justify the arrest. "Even in the case of glassine envelope it has never been held that the mere passing of such an envelope establishes probable cause.” *(People v Corrado,*22 NY2d 308, 313; also see *People v Oden,*36 NY2d 382; *People v Maldonado,*59 AD2d 692.) Concur—Birns, J. P., Evans, Lane, Markewich and Sandler, JJ.