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i 

98–959 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–92] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING 

ON

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 2017 

BUDGET REQUEST AND READINESS 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 12, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Vice Chair 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARGARET DEAN, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Goldfein, Gen David L., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; accompanied by Lt Gen John W. Raymond, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations, and Lt Gen John Cooper, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection .................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Goldfein, Gen David L. ..................................................................................... 32 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J. .................................................................................. 31 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Courtney ..................................................................................................... 59 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 59 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 64 

Mr. Gibson ......................................................................................................... 67 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 63 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 2017 BUDGET 

REQUEST AND READINESS POSTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Friday, February 12, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. WITTMAN. Good morning. I want to call to order the Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Armed Services Committee. 

I want to welcome everybody this morning. I thank our witnesses 

for joining us. 

Before we begin, I would like to recognize a number of our great 

young airmen that are here from Langley Air Force Base. I want 

to welcome you here to Washington. We appreciate all the Langley 

Air Force Association does. We have got a great working relationship there, as well as the Langley Civic Association. 

Taylor, thanks so much for your leadership there, and we appreciate that. 

I know that I have to compete with Ms. Bordallo, so Ms. 

Bordallo, is there anybody here from Andersen Air Force Base? 

Ms. BORDALLO. Is there? 

Mr. WITTMAN. We have had a little competition going. Wherever 

we go, there is always somebody there from Guam, so I want to 

make sure that we had the opportunity to recognize them here this 

morning, but—yes, yes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Would you kindly stand up, please? 

Mr. WITTMAN. I knew it. I knew it. I knew it. She always does. 

She always does. 

Well, good morning. I want to thank all of you for being here for 

our Readiness hearing on the ‘‘Department of the Air Force 2017 

Budget Request and Readiness Posture.’’ This is the first of four 

hearings on the services’ budget request and readiness postures. 

And, in December and January, the services testified on increased 

readiness risks due to reduced installation investments. And, 

today, I look forward to hearing how the Air Force budget request 

enables a readiness recovery plan in where we continue to take 

risk. 

I would like to welcome all of our members and distinguished 

panel of Air Force experts. This morning, we have with us General 
2 

David Goldfein, U.S. Air Force, Vice Chief of Staff; Lieutenant General John Raymond, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; Lieutenant General John Cooper, U.S. Air Force, Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection. 

Thank you all for testifying today, and we look forward to your 

thoughts and insights on these important issues. And the purpose 

of this hearing is for the committee to receive clarification on Air 

Force choices for its budget request; to address funding priorities 

and mitigation strategies; and to gather more detail on the current 

and future impacts of these decisions on operations and training. 

Once again, I want to thank our witnesses for participating in 

our hearing this morning. I look forward to discussing these important topics. And now I would like to turn to our ranking member, 

Madeleine Bordallo, for any remarks that she may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, first, I would like to thank the witnesses. 

General Goldfein, nice to see you again. 

General Raymond and General Cooper and, of course, all the airmen that are here and committee people, good morning. 

I have no doubt that your testimony before our subcommittee 

this morning will prove insightful, and I thank all of you for your 

service to our Nation. The Air Force has been engaged in constant 

combat operations overseas for a quarter of a century while conducting global transport and mobile operations, and we know—we 

do know—that this has taken a toll on both our airmen and their 

equipment. 

You are accomplishing this feat today with a force that has considerably fewer personnel and aircraft than it did 25 years ago. 

Our forces continue to be deployed throughout the world, countering threats ranging from terrorist organizations to near-peer adversaries. The requirements placed upon the Air Force and our 

military as a whole can never be understated. 

Because of unreliable and unpredictable funding resulting from 

sequestration and numerous continuing resolutions over the past 

several years, you have had to maintain a delicate balance between 

readiness and modernization. At times, this balance has cost readiness, and the further we get behind this curve, the harder it will 

be for our force to recover to full-spectrum readiness. 

Through our discussion today, I hope that we can gain a better 

understanding of the Air Force’s plan to maintain readiness 

through personnel, training, and infrastructure improvement. So, 

again, thank you all for your service, and I look forward to your 

hearing. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you so much. 

I am going to go now to General Goldfein. I understand that you 

will be providing the statement for the panel. 
3 

I just want to remind our panel members, too, that all of your 

statements will be entered into the record, so we will have that, 

and if you would like to add anything, we can do that through the 

questioning period. 

So General Goldfein. 

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, USAF, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED BY LT GEN JOHN 

W. RAYMOND, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, AND LT GEN JOHN COOPER, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, ENGINEERING, AND FORCE PROTECTION 

General GOLDFEIN. Thank you, Chairman Wittman, Ranking 

Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

On behalf of our Air Force Secretary, and Chief of Staff, it is an 

honor to be with you today and a privilege to sit beside these two 

great airmen and in front of these incredible airmen. Together, we 

are honored to represent the 660,000 total force airmen serving 

today, and we request that our written statement be placed in the 

record. 

A little over 25 years ago, then Captain Dave Goldfein piloted an 

F–16 fighter on my first sortie in the opening hours of Operation 

Desert Storm. During the 100-hour ground war that followed the 

air campaign, the Air Force, along with our fellow joint and coalition partners, provided the same blanket of airpower that had 

shielded U.S. forces since April of 1953, the last time an American 

service member was killed by enemy aircraft. 

In addition to providing top cover, America’s airmen defended the 

base perimeter, refueled and maintained aircraft, controlled air 

traffic, managed supply lines, tended to our wounded, air dropped 

humanitarian aid, and supported the joint team with global vigilance, reach, and power. To many Americans and to others across 

the globe, Operation Desert Storm set the standard for American 

airpower, and it is what they remember. 

In the quarter century since Desert Storm, your Air Force has remained engaged in combat operations without respite. As we sit 

here today, airmen are standing watch over our nuclear enterprise, 

and they are conducting the lion’s share of strike, air refueling, and 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sorties over Iraq and 

Syria. 

However, 25 years of continuous combat operations, coupled with 

budget instability and lower than planned top lines, have made the 

Air Force one of the smallest, oldest, and least ready forces in its 

history. To put our relative size, age, and readiness in perspective, 

in 1991, we deployed 33 of our 134 combat-coded Active, Guard, 

and Reserve fighter squadrons in support of Operation Desert 

Storm. We were 946,000 airmen strong. The average age of our aircraft was 17 years, and 80 percent of the fighter force was ready 

for full-spectrum conflict. 

In contrast, today, we have just 55 total force fighter squadrons 

and approximately 660,000 total force airmen. The average age of 

our aircraft is 27 years, and less than 50 percent of our combat Air 

Force is ready for full-spectrum conflict. Couple this significant 

readiness reduction with a rising China; Russian aggression in 
4 

Eastern Europe and Syria; Iranian malign influence in the Middle 

East; North Korean nuclear and space ambitions; and our ongoing 

fight to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant], and you have an Air Force that is too small, too 

old, and less ready for what the Nation requires. 

Simply put, if we are to remain the most lethal and effective air, 

space, and cyberspace force on the planet, we must take steps to 

rebuild our readiness now. In order to accomplish this goal, the fiscal year 2017 budget aims to build, train, and equip an Air Force 

capable of responding to today’s and tomorrow’s threats. It balances capability, capacity, and readiness in support of our five core 

missions: air and space superiority; intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance [ISR]; rapid global mobility; global strike; and command and control. 

Our number one priority is our nuclear mission, and our budget 

reflects this importance, including investments in ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]; command, control, and communications; as well as B–2 and B–52 bomber modifications. The F–35, 

KC–46, and LRS–B will change the calculus of any potential adversary and will be critical to success in any future high-end fight. 

For an Air Force, failing to push the technological edge equals 

failure, and when the Air Force fails, the joint team fails. Our fiscal year 2017 budget request includes the funding required to recover the manpower needed to ensure the health of our nuclear 

forces, aircraft maintenance teams, battlefield airmen, and other 

critically undermanned and overtasked career fields. This budget 

marks the return of a committed investment to global vigilance, 

global reach, and global power for America. 

A return to BCA [Budget Control Act] level funding in fiscal year 

2018 will further decimate our readiness and modernization and 

will place the Nation at unacceptable risk. 

Mr. Chairman, decisive air, space, and cyberspace power and the 

ability to command and control these forces have become the oxygen the joint force breathes and are fundamental to American security and joint operations. 

The fiscal year 2017 President’s budget and the flexibility to execute it, as we have recommended, is an investment in the Air Force 

our Nation needs. America expects it, commanders—combatant 

commanders require it, and with your support, our airmen will deliver it. 

On behalf of our Secretary, our Chief of Staff, and the 660,000 

Active, Guard, and Reserve airmen who give our service life, thank 

you for your tireless support, and we look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Goldfein can be found in the 

Appendix on page 32.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Goldfein, thank you so much. Thanks for 

your testimony, and thanks for your commitment, as well as all the 

other airmen in getting our Air Force back to where it needs to be. 

I want to ask, in that context, where we are in restoring readiness. We know that the rebuilding point for readiness is set for the 

Air Force essentially at fiscal year 2020. So if you can give us some 

perspective on, staying on that glide path and based on what the 

budget request is this year and the resetting, beginning as a bench-
5 

mark in 2020, how far are we going to be able to go in restoring 

Air Force readiness? And give us some ideas of the timeframes. 

And, along the way, obviously, you are going to have to make 

some tough decisions about risk. Tell us what core functions you 

will have to make some tough decisions about where risk will be 

placed in this readiness recovery effort. 

General GOLDFEIN. Thank you, sir. So we have stated previously 

that our readiness recovery plan is dependent on a couple of key 

variables. The most important is a reduction in deploy-to-dwell 

time, which actually allows us to have the time to do the training 

that we need for high-end conflict. That is something, quite frankly, that we really can’t control, given the global situation. And 

while we are incredibly proud of the fact that airpower is a requirement in all of the contingencies that we face, both current and potentially in the future, it has resulted in a demand signal that has 

reduced our ability to do the high-end training we need. 

So while we testified previously that we believed that we would 

be able to achieve full-spectrum readiness on a given date, it is actually a rolling timeframe, and as our Chief and Secretary have 

testified, it is about an 8- to 10-year timeframe when we actually 

get the conditions set to be able to rebuild that readiness. 

So we—and the last time we testified and we said 2025 was 

about what we were targeting, that was based on some assumptions that haven’t panned out. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Right. 

General GOLDFEIN. Some of those assumptions were that we 

wouldn’t be increasing our activity in the Pacific, that we wouldn’t 

be increasing our activity in Europe, and that we wouldn’t be increasing the activity that we are now seeing in Iraq and Syria. 

So as long as that activity continues and that demand signal is 

there, what you will see from us is a continual rolling 8- to 10-year 

cycle to get to full-spectrum readiness. 

Our prediction right now is that for the next 2 to 3 years, we will 

probably just be able to hold our own in terms of our current state 

of readiness, and as the Chief and Secretary have testified, where 

we currently sit and where I mention in my opening statement is 

we are approximately 50 percent ready across the total force for 

full-spectrum conflict. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Does your 2017 budget request, does that reflect 

maintaining the necessary effort in core functions going forward? 

And, secondly, does 2017 budget, does that help you in setting the 

conditions for restoring readiness? And if not, where are the shortfalls or the things that we need to consider as we develop the policy 

to lay the framework for appropriations? 

General GOLDFEIN. Thank you, sir. So when we submitted this 

budget, we worked to get the best balance we could, given the top 

line we received, between capability, capacity, and readiness. And 

so what you will see in the readiness accounts is that we actually 

funded our readiness accounts to the capacity that we can generate. 

And so that, with the addition of OCO [overseas contingency operations] funding on top, we are actually able to fly to the capacity 

that we can generate. You had asked before about the core functions or about, you know, where we are taking the greatest risk. 
6 

The two core functions of our five where I believe we have the 

greatest risk are in air and space superiority and global strike. And 

the reason for that is that is where we have to train to the highend fight against a peer adversary, and that is where we are just 

not getting the down time to be able to train to that level. 

So when we talk about the combat Air Forces and we talk about 

gaining and maintaining air superiority, that requires training at 

a very high level against sophisticated adversaries and their capabilities, and that is where we are struggling to be able to find the 

time to do that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, General Goldfein. 

I am going to go now to Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General, the Air Force is facing a modernization bubble with several major projects competing for budget space as evidenced by the 

F–35 procurement decrease this year and over the coming years. 

What is the one thing that Congress can do to improve Air Force 

readiness while addressing the modernization changes? 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am. So, first, let me tell you that you 

will hear a consistent answer from me in terms of what Congress 

can do, and that is, repeal BCA, because when we go back and take 

a look at what happened to your United States Air Force in 2013, 

when we were sequestered, it devastated our readiness, and quite 

frankly, we are still recovering. 

So now I want to take a look at the budget that we have submitted. We did have to make some strategic trades between modernization and readiness, and like I said, first of all, we funded to 

our capacity, our current capacity in the readiness accounts, but to 

do that, we had to take some risk in modernization that we did not 

want to do. Deferring F–35 procurement, deferring C–130 procurement, pushing to the right, you know, modernization of our fourthgeneration aircraft—all required for that high-end fight—are all 

risk trades that we had to make to be able to keep our readiness 

accounts at capacity. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Another question I have. The Air 

Force has been a leader in advocating the total force concept, integrating the Active and the Reserve Components. 

General, what opportunities do you see in this and future years 

for leveraging the cost-saving nature of the National Guard to contribute to increase readiness, and where can Congress play a role 

in facilitating these engagements? 

General GOLDFEIN. Thanks, ma’am, for an opportunity to showcase our Guard and Reserve. You know, we are one force, one Air 

Force, and all three components are actively participating. As the 

former Air Component Commander for Central Command, I travelled around the region, as you might imagine. And it never ceased 

to amaze when I would go up in the cockpit of a C–17 and one of 

the questions I would ask is: Okay, which one of you is Active? 

Which one of you is Guard? And which one of you is Reserve? And 

I would often have all three in the same cockpit performing that 

mission. That just gives you one vignette of just how closely integrated we are across the force. 
7 

So where we continue to look for opportunity is where we can leverage, very often, the higher experience level and the stability in 

the Guard force, in our Reserve force as we look to continue to associate in ways that can bring more and more capability to the 

fight. 

The Secretary, in her testimony previously this week, made a 

comment that one of the activities we are looking at is how do we 

take the large number of Active Duty service codes that are out 

there and start combining them to make it easier for folks to come 

into the Guard, Active, Reserve and be able to transition between 

those components so that we can actually leverage the most that 

we can from the individual components. 

I will just give you one quick vignette. So our Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force came back from a visit to Lewis-McChord 

up in Washington, and he noticed a young senior airman driving 

to work in a Tesla, and so he pulled the airman over aside and 

said, ‘‘Okay, you know, talk to me, how is this?’’ 

And he said, ‘‘Well, sir, I’m actually in the Air National Guard, 

but when I am not in the Air National Guard, I am the director 

of security for a Fortune 500 Silicon Valley tech company, but I 

also want to serve. And so when I’m not working security for this 

particular company, I am a senior airman, and I am doing cyber 

business for the United States Air Force.’’ 

We want to make that easier, and so anything that Congress can 

do to help us to be able to make that continuum easier would be 

extremely helpful, and that is what we want to leverage. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. And I have another one, 

final question for you, General, and I will also say that we, as 

Members of Congress, whenever we travel on our CODELs [congressional delegations], when it is a MILAIR [military airlift] operation, the Guard is there for us and doing a great job. 

The budget request indicates that the Air Force will continue to 

take risk in facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization 

[FSRM]. What impacts will reduced FSRM spending have on our 

airmen’s day-to-day quality of life and activities? 

General Cooper. 

General COOPER. Congresswoman Bordallo, I would like to field 

that. The simple truth is: there is not enough money to go around. 

So we did—this budget request does take risk in our installations. 

That is really where we take the risk, at the expense of modernization and readiness. So the—what you will see as you dive into the 

budget is that we have constructed our installations around military construction and around FSRM, facility, sustainment, restoration, and modernization. 

Based on the pause in 2013, we have to get at construction, so 

we focused—we put more money into our military construction, and 

we put less money into our restoration and modernization. We kept 

the same amount, roughly the same amount in sustainment because we have got to keep the buildings moving. 

That does push us into a strategy of worst first. We have a backlog of like $12 billion in facility restoration and modernization 

projects, so we are addressing the worst first. The worst first focuses around the mission, so, unfortunately, quality of life is com-
8 

peting against mission requirements, and we are opting for our 

mission requirements. 

So, internally, we are working processes on those core services to 

make sure our airmen can get the best we can give them, things 

like child development centers, things like gymnasiums and fitness 

centers and dining facilities. We are using transformational efforts 

to make sure that we can expand hours, provide those services so 

the airmen can conduct the mission. 

But at the funding level we are at, we have to focus on modernization and readiness. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you, gentlemen, and thank you for 

your candid answers to our questions. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

We will know go to Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service, and 

I just wonder, is that plane still flying? What were you flying 25 

years ago, and is that one still in the air? 

General GOLDFEIN. I am being told it is now being used for an 

unmanned drone. I am hoping not. 

Mr. SCOTT. But it probably still is in the air. It is something 

most people don’t recognize is that while we had that many decades edge 25 years ago, the fact that we haven’t recapitalized has 

given our adversaries an opportunity to maybe not catch us but get 

a lot closer to us. 

I want to talk to you about the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Targeting and Attack Radar System], which is an ISR platform that 

flies out of Warner Robins. Obviously, there is some money in the 

budget this year for it. There was more money last year for it. I 

am concerned about the reduction in that, but the recapitalization 

of the JSTARS fleet has continued to push a year here, a year 

there, and when I look at the charts that show what is going to 

happen with our current planes that are flying, when they go in 

for depot maintenance, we are going to end up with a capability 

gap that is going to force us to either keep very, very old planes, 

much older than the ones that you were flying 25 years ago, in the 

air or not be able to provide that—the moving target indicator and 

the battle management platform to the forces that need it on the 

ground. 

The other aspect that I see is that the new system would save 

a tremendous amount of money on an annual basis. It is a new 

plane, much more efficient, can gather more data at one time, and 

I just don’t understand why a program that uses existing mature 

technology that is relatively inexpensive compared to the other 

platforms that we talked about with regard to the recapitalization, 

has taken so long to deliver, and my question is, what are the 

plans for the capability gap that is going to exist when the current 

planes, which are many, many decades old, go in for depot maintenance if the new planes are not ready to go? And what plans would 

you have for accelerating the timeline to make sure that we don’t 

have those capability gaps? 

General GOLDFEIN. Thank you, sir. So when we went—when we 

were in—as we have been in discussions about JSTARS, part of the 
9 

discussion has been, do we shift to an unmanned versus a 

manned—large aircraft manned platform. We went out to the combatant commanders. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force went out 

to every combatant commander to revalidate individually the requirement for airborne battle management as a critical component 

of their war plans, and that was validated across all of the combatant commanders. 

That is important because very often when we talk JSTARS, we 

start talking about the sensor, but I would argue that the most important thing that JSTARS brings is airborne battle management. 

As the Air Component Commander for Central Command, I will 

tell you that I use that platform in a number of ways, in addition 

to what is traditionally considered, you know, airborne battle management of the air-to-ground fight. I used it on the naval—in the 

maritime domain covering the Strait of Hormuz. 

So, first and foremost, we have validated that airborne battle 

management is a critical requirement for the combatant commanders, and we need to move out on that. Now the challenge becomes a technology discussion, which is, at what point do we transition and can we transition this to an unmanned platform of the 

future versus a manned platform? And the reality is, is the technology that we would need to put on an unmanned platform doesn’t 

currently exist to get the same capability that we provide to combatant commanders today. It is just not miniaturized enough. It 

just can’t give the same level of fidelity of the ground moving target indicator that the JSTARS does today. 

So the Air Force’s position, for two reasons. One, we don’t have 

the technology to put it on a manned platform, and two, airborne 

battle management is the critical requirement. We need to push 

forward with a manned airborne platform. We have the funding in 

this budget to do that. 

But that dialogue has slowed us down. And then I will turn to 

General Cooper to talk about covering the gap in the middle. 

General COOPER. Yes, sir. I mean, the JSTARS got its—it is an 

old airplane, 47-years-old, and we are having structural issues. And 

as you know, 50 percent of the airplanes are in depot, and the 

depot takes longer to keep them going, but that is emblematic of 

really our larger fleets, right, is we have to recapitalize our fleets. 

We have a number of fleets that are almost as old as JSTARS, 

and we just have to keep on recapitalizing our fleets. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, thank you for that. The JSTARS fleet is a relatively small fleet, though, and the total cost for recapitalization is 

significantly less than it is for most of these other fleets, and it is— 

it seems to me that if we could push forward with an aggressive 

rapid acquisition process, that we could get newer planes, better 

technology that are going to save us money on an annual basis. 

And instead of spending so much money on depot maintenance for 

planes that we know we are going to pull out as soon as we have 

a new platform, why not push this thing up? 

I mean, we are talking about—we are talking multibillions for a 

lot of platforms, hundreds of billions, and this is not one that costs 

anywhere close to what most of the platforms cost. And, as you 

said, it can’t be done with any other platform, the battle management aspect of it, so thank you for your service and—— 
10 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

We will now go to Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the panel for being here this morning. 

General, last year’s NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], 

we came up with a pretty good arrangement for the C–130 modernization with the new AMP 1 [Avionics Modernization Program] 

approach that hopefully is going to short-circuit some of the problems that existed before. 

On page 14 of your testimony, you mention the C–130 modernization. I just wonder if you could just sort of talk about what 

is in the budget. I mean, it seems like a relatively small number 

for 2017, and 2020, as you know, is coming up fast for the global 

navigation requirements, so I was wondering if you could elaborate. 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. So we have broken up 

the AMP program into, as you know, two increments. So Increment 

1, which actually makes us—makes the C–130 capable of flying in 

all the international airspace and meets FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] requirements. The previous budget, we actually had 

that completing in 2022. We were able to, in this budget, actually 

accelerate that to 2020, which allows us to actually be in line with 

the expectations for the FAA on being AMP 1 compliant by the 

timeframe they have given us. So that is first. 

We have also been able to fully fund Increment 2, which actually 

does the physical upgrades to the C–130, and that will now complete in 2028. So we feel pretty good about the AMP program right 

now. We have actually—Chief of Staff has led an effort through our 

total force to talk to all of the States that have C–130s. All of the 

adjutant generals are part of this plan. When we work through the 

C–130 issues, we actually have that dialogue with them so they are 

part of the process. So, right now, going into this budget, we feel 

pretty good about the program. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And, again, I am sure, you know, later in the 

process, we are going to have more conversations about this with 

you and your team. It is just—so is there any space or, you know, 

possibility that Congress can help in terms of accelerating it more 

or, you know, flexibility in the 2017 budget to help, again, push 

this along? 

General GOLDFEIN. Sir, we will take that one to see if there is 

any kind [of] help we would require from Congress. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

General GOLDFEIN. Right now, we feel like the program is pretty 

well funded for what industry can support. I will tell you where we 

could use your help, though, and that is, you know, we had to take 

some decisions—make some decisions to delay critical modernization to be able to pay readiness and get the balance in this budget. 

One of the decisions we made was to defer some C–130J procurement, and so any help we could get to bring those back would be 

very much appreciated. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you very much, General, and again, to all 

the witnesses for your service. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 
11 

We will now go to Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the panel, and thank you for your service. 

For General Goldfein. General, in procurement line 22 of the aircraft procurement account for F–16 AESA [Active Electronically 

Scanned Array] radars, the Air Force requests and states an expedited delivery schedule. It is imperative to operationally field the 

AESA radar in support of homeland defense against evolving 

threats. 

Can you please update the subcommittee on how the research, 

design, test, and evaluation as appropriated in last year’s omnibus 

is progressing? What phase are you currently in? And how will this 

be completed? And when do you foresee an award coming? 

General GOLDFEIN. Thank you, sir. As you know, we, the Department, originally pursued a joint urgent operational need, a JUON, 

from the supporting combatant commander, NORTHCOM command [U.S. Northern Command] in this case, to be able to procure 

the AESA radars for those F–16s that we use to do defense of the 

National Capital Region [NCR]. 

What a JUON does for us is allows us to actually go sole source, 

which speeds up the acquisition process. That JUON was not supported, so, therefore, we are now in a competition for those radars. 

The Air Force fully funded 24 of those sets to be able to take care 

of those aircraft that are part of the NCR. But now what we will 

need to do and what we are pursuing is an acquisition strategy 

that allows competition for those 24, and the money has been laid 

in for that. 

The remainder of the fleet will also be able to go into a full and 

open competition so that we can continue to modernize the remainder of the F–16 fleet with AESA radars, but we do have a strategy 

to get up to 24, although we are not able to go sole source at this 

time. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. So you are attempting to expedite or—— 

General GOLDFEIN. Attempting to expedite, but we have to follow 

the acquisition rules for competition, but the money has been laid 

in for those 24. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I recently received word that the Ops 5 and 6 for 

the F–35 Air National Guard basing decision criteria, has been 

pushed back to later in the spring of 2016. Can you update the subcommittee on how that is progressing? 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. So, as you know, we build our basing 

process so that we can be, you know, fully open and transparent 

with all of Congress to ensure that not only do you see the criteria 

but that you see how each base scores out in that criteria. 

So what we are looking at right now with the F–35 Ops 5 and 

6 is: What criteria now do we need to make sure that we have 

ready to go? As soon as that criteria is ready, we will then put that 

out, and then we will start the process that goes through not only 

setting the criteria but then actually then scoring a certain number 

of bases against that criteria, sharing with Congress how that scoring occurred, and then making the final decision that the Secretary 

makes in terms of what that basing will be. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Do you have any idea of timeline on that of when 

we are going to get to see any of that? 
12 

General GOLDFEIN. Let me see if we have all that. Sir, can we 

take that one, and we will get it back to you? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Sure. I, obviously, have a great interest in that. 

I like to think that I represent, if not the, one of the premier homeland security bases in the country because of our strategic location 

to New York and to Washington, and we think fair, objective, and 

transparent, we would score really well in that. 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. 

General GOLDFEIN. And we will try to get that answer to you, I 

think, even before this hearing ends, if we can. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. LoBiondo. 

We will now go to Mr. Peters. 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I wanted you to expand on training a little bit in two respects. One is, I would like 

you to explain why it is that a delay in the annual budget for— 

or diminishment in the annual budget for training lasts beyond the 

year. I think people don’t often understand that there is a permanent effect to underfunding training year to year. I also wanted you 

to address sort of your sense of how—what—any additional challenges for the training budget are posed by the addition of new airframes like the F–35. 

General GOLDFEIN. Thank you, sir. So, first, on the delay and the 

lag effect that goes into training. So the way we do our flying hour 

program is we budget in 2-year cycles, as you know, sir. And so we 

project in the future how much we think we are going to fly in contingency flying, and given the capacity of any weapons system— 

take the F–16 and Block 50 as an example, that is designed for 

suppression of enemy air defenses, so very high-end fight-centered 

focused community. So we look at all of the capabilities in that way 

to—in our weapons system to produce flying hours, and that is a 

fixed capacity. And then we project how much of that we think in 

that weapons system will be flown down range, and that becomes 

part of what we call the OCO. 

And so what—you can’t go up because that is the fixed capacity 

of the weapons system, so the only thing that can happen with that 

is that you project—what you project doesn’t pan out and the assumptions change. And what we found year after year is that we 

actually fly more down range activity than we have left for home 

station training. 

So what that means in the Block 50 F–16, for instance, is that 

air crew that are supposedly—that are trained and designed to do 

high-end peer-to-peer conflict in a contested environment are actually focusing more and more of their training on the lower end 

close air support violence extremist fight. So they lose their skills 

over time, and you can’t build those back immediately because you 

have got to build them back so that they can be in a—that community, they have to be wingmen. They have to be flight leads. They 

have to be instructors. They have to be certified for all of those. 
13 

The less amount you have to train to that high-end fight, the less 

readiness that you have, so it actually takes you more and more 

time to actually build that back. 

When it comes to bringing the F–35 and other weapons systems, 

the challenge for us and both the challenge and the asymmetric opportunity is that we approach joint warfare from a networked perspective. And the vignette I would share with you is, you know, I 

flew the F–117 as the last pilot, and when I took off and flew the 

F–117—first-generation, low-observable [LO]—it was a very closed 

system approach to using LO. I mean, I actually had a switch that 

would turn everything off, you know, all of the sensors would stow, 

and I would, you know, lower my seat and go to work. 

In the F–35, when you power up the aircraft, it starts doing machine-to-machine collaboration and discussion on the initial power 

up, and it starts comparing amongst it, in the network, and it is 

talking through air, space, cyber. It is doing the full-spectrum look, 

and it is doing a human-machine collaboration that actually places 

symbology on the visor of that aircraft. 

And so it is a very networked approach. So when we bring the 

F–35, the F–22 on, it is about the networked approach to warfare, 

and that makes it its own training challenge because we have got 

to be able to simulate that entire network and go to training as opposed to a single aircraft going out and training on a range. 

Mr. PETERS. Just sort of—I know quantitatively, just how short 

are we, given that we have been lagging a little bit already? 

General GOLDFEIN. So, as I testified earlier, we are at 50 percent 

or less in overall full-spectrum readiness across the Air Force, and 

that vignette I share with you in terms of the fact that we are not 

training at this level, that is exactly what that means, meaning 

that we are not able to train to the suppression of enemy air defenses mission because we are using that weapon so much in the 

fight against ISIL. 

So, at 50 percent readiness, the challenge is, if you look at what 

our Secretary of Defense has laid out as the major strategic challenges that we face, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and a condition of violent extremism that we will likely have to deal with in 

the next decade, that covers the spectrum of the potential conflict 

that we may face. So if we, as an Air Force, are 50 percent ready, 

what we are saying is we are 50 percent ready against the higher 

end threats. 

Mr. PETERS. And, General, I just want you to know that is something that has been on my mind since I have been on this subcommittee, and it is something that is not easily observed, and so 

I wanted to take a little time to draw it out. I appreciate the emphasis on it, and I hope we can be responsive. Thank you again for 

your testimony and your service. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Peters. 

We will now go to Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

General, I appreciate the opportunity of being here. 

Mr. Wittman, I appreciate you having a hearing at 8 a.m. in the 

morning. I realize you think there are no other issues that conflict 
14 

with that. There is one. It is called my mattress. I wish you would 

get one that is comfortable for you so we wouldn’t be doing this. 

And, General, can I also just—before I ask a question, just say 

one thing. Your complaints about the BCA are spot-on accurate, 

but it is too narrow. There were four other cuts in addition to that, 

as well as the 25 years of constant combat flights you had to do. 

You add all those things together. So when you have the criticisms, 

don’t just narrow it to that one aspect. There are other things that 

have screwed you up in addition to that, much broader than that. 

Can I ask you a question, though? You did mention in the written testimony about Hill, which is important to me for obvious reasons. I do have some concern over the transition that is going forward, especially as we look in what is going in the future. 

Is there any concern—because the 388th is a combined unit—is 

there any concern you have with the Reserve unit there? Are they 

going to be tasked more or less in the future? 

General. 

General RAYMOND. Thank you. 

Congressman Bishop, thanks for the question. The Reserve Component at Hill, like all of our Reserve Components, is critical to our 

force and great, great partners. We do have a transition plan. 

Those F–16s will be transitioning in the 2018 timeframe, and what 

we have done in the—to fund that transition is to put some funding 

in to make sure that those aircraft can be flown while we are waiting for the transition. 

Mr. BISHOP. But the maintainers are still going to be a problem 

that has to be dealt with. 

General. 

General COOPER. If I can field that, Congressman Bishop. 

Yes, maintainers are a problem in our Air Force. We have taken 

great steps to make sure that we are going to transition well to 

IOC [initial operating capability] for F–35, but I am concerned on 

any F–35 beddowns after IOC. We are 4,000 maintainers short in 

our Air Force. We are focusing on Hill right now to make sure that 

we can get the maintainers for IOC, so, right now, at Hill specific, 

we moved—as you know, the 4th Fighter Squadron came back recently. We moved those maintainers over to begin training for F– 

35, and we received—we have six airplanes there. I will be out 

there next week making sure we get IOC right. 

And then we are—the Reserves are taking care of the F–16s. 

When the 421st Squadron comes back, the same will occur. Those 

maintainers will move over to F–35, and then the Reserves will 

manage the F–16s. 

Mr. BISHOP. That still seems to indicate there is going to be a 

greater emphasis put on the Reserves taking more capacity. 

General COOPER. Yes. The Reserves will—we are going to let the 

Reserves work on the—use those aircraft at Hill Air Force Base 

until transitions in the following years. 

Mr. BISHOP. Can I transition just slightly and see if you can do 

this because I do have a concern about hiring practices? I wonder 

if the Air Force is going into that. I mean, some of them are taking 

up to 160 days just to hire people. 

Is the Air Force looking at trying to devolve some of that authority, because once again, I think OPM’s [Office of Personnel Man-
15 

agement’s] goal is like 80 days, which seems to be an outrageous 

goal, and if, indeed, you cannot hire those people, I understand you 

have to augment them with contractors which may—on the work 

lines—which may not necessarily be a cheaper way of doing it. So 

is the Air Force moving in something to try and deal with civilian 

hiring practices? 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, our Secretary of 

the Air Force is leading that effort herself. She has tasked the— 

our A1, our Director of Personnel, to look at all of our policies 

across the Air Force relative to civilian personnel to see how we 

can speed up the process of hiring when we need to hire, especially 

for critical skill sets. She is also having us take a look at the continuum of service between the three components and allowing civilians to be able to come into the Air Force, especially where we need 

critical skills. 

The challenge we have, Congressman, as you know, is that most 

of the rules associated with civilian actually don’t reside within the 

service. Most of those are above the service. 

So while we are looking at everything we can and why we are 

brushing all of our individual policies, it is really above us, and 

that is where we can probably use your help. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Well, we will try and do that as best we can, help out. I appreciate your comments about fourth-generation modifications have 

been delayed. You were very clear on how the readiness capacity 

or capabilities are being lost. I also have a—that is not even a 

question. I am just saying it once again. 

I also have a concern of how it is affecting contracts, depot workloads, everything else. I have only got 20 seconds, so you don’t need 

to respond to that, but thank you for your presence here. And, in 

an hour, I think I will be awake so I can understand what you actually said. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. We will make sure that 

when we have an opportunity, we convene at a later time. 

Mr. BISHOP. And then we will talk Indian bills after that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes, we will. Yes, we will. 

We will now go to Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask, General, about the nuclear cruise missile part 

of this budget, and I will tell you my limited understanding and 

some of my concerns, which should take no more than a minute, 

and then offer you the remainder to answer. 

My understanding is that this is a $30 billion price tag for a 

weapon that will be carried on the aging B–52 platform. I want to 

know: What would happen should we not pursue this strategy? 

What is the risk to the United States? And, two, what are your 

thoughts on the British decision a few years back not to pursue 

this as a strategy because of their concern that it would produce 

miscalculation and unintended consequences? And it kind of departs from traditional nuclear deterrence, where each side has a 

good understanding of the other’s capabilities and their conditions 

for using them. 
16 

And so if you would take the remaining 4 minutes to answer 

those concerns and tell us what would happen if we didn’t do this 

and where we could apply those $30 billion if we didn’t. 

General GOLDFEIN. Thank you, sir. Just to talk about just the 

funding part of it right now, just to be clear. So the long-range 

standoff weapon that will replace our air-launched cruise missile is 

currently scheduled to be integrated not only on the B–52 but also 

on the B–2. 

So, for us, the way we look at this is it has to do with, you know, 

21st century strategic deterrence and what the nuclear aspect of 

that is, and we, as an Air Force, we like to joke that we are responsible for three of the four legs, because if you add nuclear command 

and control, which we are responsible for, it is actually almost a 

leg in and of itself to ensure that we have assured communications. 

So, for us, it is about: How do we ensure that we have a reliable, 

assured, secure nuclear deterrent to be able to hold targets at risk 

so that we can show that we have that capacity and capability? 

And so there are a number of ways you do that. 

You do that through the bomber force. You do that through the, 

of course, the ground-based force, our Minuteman III, and then 

transition into ground—GBSD [Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence], and we also do that with the Navy, with our submarine 

force. 

And so, for us, when you take a look at the long-range standoff 

missile, it is about being able to have the right standoff to be able 

to actually go in to be able to service targets that the Commander 

in Chief may ask us to service. 

And so, when we look at it, we need to have both that capability, 

which is standoff, plus we need to have gravity capability, plus we 

need to have penetrating capability with gravity, which is why we 

are putting money into the B–61 as well, and we have to modernize 

the nuclear missile fields. And so that is why you see an increase 

of $4.3 billion in this budget to be able to modernize the nuclear. 

So what we would tell you is that we believe that is a critical 

component of the three legs of the triad. 

In terms of, you know, risk that we would have, in terms of employment, you know, modernization of a particular weapons system 

does not actually indicate that you would have—you would be more 

susceptible to use. That is a—purely a Commander in Chief decision. So we would say, as the employers of the nuclear enterprise, 

that we don’t think it increases risk. 

So one of the areas that we are going to need help from Congress 

on is that if you take a look at the nuclear enterprise, most of it 

was billed in the 1940s and 1950s, and it is aging significantly, and 

we have some bills that are going to come due after this FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], in the 2022 timeframe, that are significant. 

So we are working within the Department to look at all aspects 

of the nuclear enterprise to ensure that we are putting the best 

dollar forward to ensure that we have a safe, secure, reliable, nuclear deterrent for the 21st century that has all three legs plus the 

command and control intact. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. So you do not share the British concern or the 

concern of former Defense Secretary Perry about the risk of mis-
17 

calculation or unintended consequences. You think this is the 

wisest use of that $30 billion. 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. And if, for whatever reason, Congress were not 

to support that request, where would that—and still allow for that 

$30 billion to be used within the Air Force, where would that 

money go? 

General GOLDFEIN. Sir, you know, to be honest with you, what 

we would do is we would take a look first at our stewardship of 

the nuclear enterprise, and so the first place we would look is, 

where do we need to place that within the nuclear enterprise as 

our number one priority for our service. 

After that, we would look at it like we look at everything else, 

which is we would look at a planning choice, you know, and we 

would look at the trades that we have to make between capability, 

capacity, and readiness, but I can assure you the first place we 

would look, it would be within the nuclear enterprise. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. O’Rourke. 

We will now go to Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panelists. 

Thank you for your service and your sacrifices and those of your 

family. My question has to do with joint interoperability, training, 

and readiness, and specifically with regard to the budget, if you 

could lay out where the commitments are in terms of Joint Forcible 

Entry exercise, how many commitments—how many rotations do 

you see this budget year, and then also commitments to the National Training Center [NTC] and the scope of that, and any other 

modeling and simulation for the year, if you can lay out where the 

budget is. 

General GOLDFEIN. Thank you, sir. So, you know, 15 years of 

continuous combat has actually produced the most joint force in 

our history, and I can say that also personally, having been the 

Combined Forces Air Component Commander deployed for two of 

those years. 

So what we found is that our forces—soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

marine—who are down range are not only training but executing 

jointly every day, and then when we come back at all of our major 

training venues, if you go out and take a look at Red Flag at Nellis, 

Green Flag at Nellis, Cyber Flag, NTC rotations, air warrior rotations, you will have a joint element of every one of our exercises, 

and the service chiefs and the ‘‘3s,’’ the Directors of Operation, 

work that hard every day. 

You know, we are very proud of the fact that when it comes to 

training of the United States Army and their Joint Forcible Entry 

capability, when it comes to especially airborne, that we provide 

the lift that they require to do that mission. And so, working with, 

you know, General Abrams in Forces Command and working with 

not only our Army but also our Marine Corps and Special Forces, 

what we ensure is that we understand the requirement for a number of jumps that we have to support, and then we look across our 

enterprise at the global mobility to ensure we have the C–17s and 

the C–130s and the H–60s that are required to be able to support 

those jumps. 
18 

Mr. GIBSON. You know, I appreciate that. And, as you know, and 

I thank you so much for the incredible career you have had, you 

know, the whole piece of it comes together with electronic warfare, 

with fighters, bombers, and command and control. So, specifically, 

the question is: How many Joint Forcible Entry exercises are in the 

budget for this year? 

General RAYMOND. We have really focused on putting resources 

to the training effort. In this program, the budget that was just 

submitted, we have over $398 million going to CAF [Comprehensive Airman Fitness] readiness training, which are those exercises 

which you talked about. We invested over $235 million into our 

training ranges to make sure that those ranges are high-end capable, fifth-generation capable, to get the most out of those training 

events. 

We have also spent about $345 million on live, virtual, and constructive training, looking at, how do you do that better in the simulator to, again, to maximize those—maximize those training 

events? 

Mr. GIBSON. So thank you. It sort of—and it may very well be 

my failing in not framing the question right, but I will sort of lay 

out a few points. 

You know, over the years, as we, you know, are working to sustain the joint piece of this, the forcible entry piece of this, we could 

have anywhere from 8, in some years 10, Joint Forcible Entry exercises. And, last I looked at it, I think we are down to about four 

a year. And I understand, I mean, the war has played a big role 

in that in terms of where the resources need to go, understandably. 

But, you know, this is among the reasons why, gentlemen, I 

would say, I am concerned about the decision the Air Force has 

taken with regard to the 440th [Airlift Wing at Pope Field], and 

the reason is, is we are all managing risk. Up here, we are managing risk. The Air Force is certainly managing risk. All the joint 

forces are managing risk, but among the things that the 440th 

could do is really allow for smaller units in the XVIII Airborne 

Corps to sustain. As was mentioned, you have a—you take—justifiably you are proud of the fact that you do help the joint forces 

maintain their readiness. But it is especially difficult today, at the 

company and battalion level, to keep up on the eaches when it 

comes to their requirement knowing that the four major packages 

that we have, the Joint Forcible Entry exercise is important for exercising higher level staffs for integration, but it is getting tougher 

to, you know, the one-offs, the people who go to school and come 

back, and that was managed by the 440th actually being at Fort 

Bragg. 

General GOLDFEIN. Sir, if I could just, very quickly, you know, 

our objective—and we are working this with the commander there, 

General Townsend, you know, we met with him regularly. Our objective is that when a soldier walks out to the flight line to get on 

a C–130 for a jump, he doesn’t know that the 440th is gone, because what we have done is we put an aircraft there, and he gets 

the training he needs. That is the objective. 

And so we do that for a number of bases around the world that 

do airborne and do training, and so we do that in Vicenza, in Italy, 

we do that across, so we think we have a good template for that. 
19 

The Army leadership agrees, and so if we get this right, it will be 

transparent to your soldiers. 

Mr. GIBSON. My time is expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gibson. 

We will now got to Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning. You spoke a little bit earlier in your comments 

about the investment and the necessity of increasing cyber capabilities, and I am wondering if you can talk in a little bit more detail about two things, recruiting and retention. When we look at 

the talent that exists and the innovation and how quickly evolving 

this world is in the private sector, you know, what kind of creative 

efforts are you taking to be able to bring those folks in, to be able 

to work with us, as well as to retain them once they are there? 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. So we are working, 

quite frankly, very hard with an effort that the Secretary of Defense is leading called ‘‘Force of the Future,’’ and one of the elements of that is permeability and allowing easier access to the ingenuity and innovation that is in the private sector and the public 

sector to come into the military when we need it and vice versa, 

right, also sharing what talent and expertise and capability we 

have with the private sector. So we continue to look at those capabilities. And, right now, as an Air Force, our contribution to the 

cyber force is 39 teams. It represents about 30 percent, as you 

might imagine. It is about right for our contribution, 39 teams. So 

CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] has laid out three key mission 

areas they are responsible for: defend the Nation, defend the networks, support the combatant commanders. We have 13 teams that 

we are building to support each of those requirements in each of 

those mission areas, so 13 times 3 equals 39, so that is where we 

get to. Right now, we sit at about 26 teams, and we are on track 

to complete our build of 39 by 2018. So we feel pretty good about 

where we are, where we are going. I will tell you that you can 

never stop looking at managing this talent because we have got to 

have the incentives in place for not only them to want to join us, 

out of more than just patriotism, but because we are a good place 

for them to reside because of how we take care of them and the 

value of their service, so those total force continuum measures that 

we are working on are going to be incredibly important. 

General RAYMOND. Another thing, if I could add, we have done 

a review of the retention across the cyber force, and we are not seeing retention issues with the cyber force. The retention levels mirror the rest of the Air Force. They are about equal. As General 

Goldfein mentioned earlier about with the vignette of the airman 

driving the Tesla, I think people join the Air Force for a reason. 

They want to serve their country, protect their Nation, and right 

now, we are not seeing those readiness challenges. 

Ms. GABBARD. That is great. Somewhat connected with that but 

really on the overall broader scale is, as you talk about the total 

force integrating the Guard and Reserves, how are you integrating 

those elements in your deployment-to-dwell ratio in a way that is 

sustainable for the future? 
20 

General RAYMOND. Thank you for the question. We are a completely integrated force. As General Goldfein mentioned earlier, you 

go look in a cockpit, and you won’t be able to tell the difference. 

There will be Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty all blended together, and that is that way across our service. When you look at 

the readiness levels across the service, we mirror each other because we operate together. If you look at the deployed as well, the 

same concerns are there with the total force as it is with the Active 

Duty force. We about mirror each other in readiness levels, and we 

watch that very closely, but we are the most integrated service 

with our Guard and Reserve, and they are critical partners to us. 

Ms. GABBARD. What is the deploy-to-dwell ratio now? 

General RAYMOND. Across the board, on average, it is about 

1:2.5. 

Ms. GABBARD. Okay. 

General GOLDFEIN. Ma’am, could I also offer that at some point 

you do get to a capacity stop. So, regardless of how integrated we 

are, we still only have 55 squadrons to do the Nation’s work. So, 

at that point, you actually can’t get any more out of what you have 

already got. So that is why I go back to the point that we are actually too small and you are seeing us trying to build back up the 

force size and our capacity to do what we believe the Nation needs. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Gabbard. 

General Goldfein, in your testimony, when you spoke about the 

shortage on maintainers, I would like to get your perspective and 

a little more of a drill down as to the nature of that. And you talk 

about needing to use contract maintainers for your A–10s, F–16s, 

C–130s, in order to get people transferred over to spin up to maintain the F–35s. There seems to be another aspect to it, though, 

when you look at the nature of the shortage, and that is many of 

the shortages are occurring with your senior NCOs [noncommissioned officers] that are, indeed, your trainers for airmen coming 

in. Tell me: How do you address that, because that is a long-term 

issue? The short-term issue is contract maintainers, but the longterm issue is, as you bring new Air Force personnel in, how do you 

get them to stay in the Air Force so they can become that senior 

NCO that is a master maintainer but also the trainer for the new 

airmen that are coming into the Air Force? Tell me how you address that, because that wasn’t related in your testimony. 

General COOPER. Chairman, I would like to answer that. So we 

are 4,000 maintainers short across the Air Force, and the issue is 

we are bringing two F–35s in a month, and each F–35 requires 20 

maintainers, so we add to that deficit every single month as we go 

forward. And, next year, it will be three F–35s. So we are addressing it fully on how can we grow our fleet. So what we have done 

to date is we balanced as much as we can safely do with our legacy 

fleets, even with our large airplanes, moving to fighters because it 

is most acute in the fighting Air Force, in our fighters. So we have 

moved like crew chiefs from C–130s, to F–35s. Congress authorized 

us to transfer up to 18 A–10s—36 A–10s to BIA [back-up inventory 

aircraft] status. We used 18 because we needed the capacity for the 

fighting force as well as the maintainers. We split the difference. 
21 

Moved the maintainers to F–35s, so we have done as best we can 

there. 

We have offered numerous retention incentives to our older 

maintainers, our tech sergeants, and our master sergeants, our 7- 

levels, so they will stay in and retain that training expertise. And 

we have seen some growth there. Up to a thousand maintainers 

have taken the retention bonus and have stayed in, which is good. 

But we are digging a continual hole as we go forward because we 

have the force structure that we are not able to divest, and we are 

growing F–35s. 

Internally, since 2013, we under-assessed our maintainers, so our new airmen coming in, it was a challenge. We had an $8 billion 

challenge after sequestration going 2014 into 2015 on how to close 

that gap, and the first place that we went to, the easiest place to 

go to get dollars that quick that soon is the personnel account. So, 

unfortunately, we under-assessed in the maintenance. We are reversing that trend. We did it in 2015 at the expense of other critical AFSCs [Air Force specialty codes] and career fields in the Air 

Force. We are doing it in 2016 up to a thousand in fiscal year 2016 

at the expense of critical career fields, not maintenance, in the Air 

Force, and this budget asks for a growth of maintainers in the 2017 

budget. And part of that, an overall growth for the Air Force, a 

large part of that is maintenance. 

The initiative we just started was looking at the contract maintenance in areas across the Air Force where there are not combatcoded units. They are mostly training units. They don’t have a deployment requirement. And we feel that we can contract, if the 

market is right, we can contract in those locations, take those 

maintainers and move them to F–35s. But that is a challenge, that 

is just a short-term challenge, and we need to continue to grow, 

and really that only gets us about 2 years, and we will have the 

same problem in 2 years. 

Mr. WITTMAN. It just seems like a cascading effect, especially 

across the MOSes [military occupational specialties] for your maintainers at every level of experience there. 

General COOPER. It is. We are challenged in our, especially in 

our fighter fleets. We have six career fields that are below 1:2 

dwell, meaning they are slightly at home slightly longer than they 

are deployed today on legacy. 

General RAYMOND. I would just add that when we look at readiness and the impact of that, we have critical skills availability as 

a key piece of that readiness, and it is not just the numbers of people, but it is the right level of people, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. That is why it takes some time to grow that readiness. We 

have made that initial investment, and we bring new airmen into 

the Air Force, but it will take 5 years or so to grow those to a level 

where we have the senior leadership that we need to build that 

readiness back up. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I just want to make sure that we reflect the proper policy so you can continue to grow both the capacity and the capability. It has to be grown on both levels. Let me ask a quick 

question about a comment that you made in your testimony about 

infrastructure and capacity and excess capacity. As you know, we 

look at that, there was a requirement from last year’s NDAA for 
22 

each of the service branches to provide a report back to Congress 

concerning capacity issues, overcapacity, excess inventory, those 

kinds of things, as well as what we had hearings on earlier, and 

that is: What are we doing to support the existing critical infrastructure and facilities support, which is one of the elements of 

what we use to generate readiness? 

One of the concerns I have going forward is to make sure that 

we don’t get too shortsighted, because everything we have done recently has been very shortsighted. What do we do to make it to the 

next budget year? What do we do to move money around? And I 

understand the immediate need to try to generate some dollars and 

the dollars that come out for older facilities. And I think that there 

is a logical way and a risk way to do that. My concern is this: on 

the other side, too, the Air Force with its assets is going to continue to grow. We are going to have new fighter aircraft coming on 

board and new Long-Range Strategic Bomber, a new tanker fleet, 

that lift capacity that is there, even a few more C–17s, modernized 

C–130s. So there is a need for infrastructure to support that. So 

my concern going forward is saying: Well, let’s reduce base structure or that infrastructure. We know we need that to generate 

readiness in the support aircraft as it comes on. I want to make 

sure that those two curves don’t cross each other, and then we 

come back and say: Guess what, now we have more aircraft than 

we have facilities necessary to keep the aircraft and maintain 

them. So, in my idea, how do you find the right balance in saying 

we need a BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] in light of saying 

we have got to be building more aircraft? 

General GOLDFEIN. Sir, thanks. I will start, and then I am going 

to turn over to General Cooper to give you a little bit more detail 

on where we are with our infrastructure. A couple key points here. 

First, it will be no surprise to you that, as airmen, we project airpower from our bases, so they are actually part of our fighting platform. So when we actually talk about infrastructure, we are talking 

about part of how we fight, so it shouldn’t be surprising that we 

are going to put a significant amount of resources against our infrastructure. In this budget, we made a strategic trade and a decision to emphasize combatant commander requirements and new 

mission beddown, KC–46, F–35, because as you stated, as you 

bring on new weapons systems, there are unique capabilities that 

you have to build to be able to bed those down. So you will see 

those two priorities. 

As we have testified previously, you have also seen that we have 

taken risks in our facilities, restoration, modernization accounts to 

do that. So, as I transition to General Cooper, what I will tell you 

is that, right now, we are about 30 percent over in terms of the infrastructure versus our capacity. And so, right now, today, we 

would tell you that we are keeping a number of facilities on these 

large bases up and running because we are not going to tear them 

down, and we don’t have the force structure to require us to use 

them, so we could use at least a reorganization to be able to get 

more rightsized. But we also look at that through the lens of where 

we are going to be in the future when we get these new missions 

on. Right? So when you take a look at the tanker trade, as you will 

see, we will actually build up to about 479 tankers before we actu-
23 

ally start coming back down and sort of keep it balanced. So we 

think that 30 percent over capacity that we have now will actually 

continue to exist as we make the trades of the future. So let me 

turn it over to General Cooper. 

General COOPER. Thank you, General. 

Too much, too old, too expensive. I am on the business side of 

the Air Force, and I am responsible for trying to—and the readiness side, so we are trying to make sure that we have the appropriate readiness so we can give General Raymond and the three 

and the operations the most the Air Force can give America. Our 

infrastructure is too big. We know that. So, I mean, I have a litany 

of testimonials here. I mean, at Keesler Air Force Base where we 

train our pilots, we have a 50-plus-year-old drainage system which 

just gets rid of the water off the flight line that can’t handle large 

rains. So about three times a year, it floods, and we can’t conduct 

pilot training. So, last year, we lost 370 sorties because it rained. 

That facility project is still competing for funds because there are 

other more critical facility projects. We avoid $2.9 billion in expenses because of previous BRACs 

every year. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Goldfein, General Cooper. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I just have a couple of questions I would like to ask. The first 

is: To what extent are weapon shortages affecting prepositioned 

munition inventories and, consequently, readiness to address other 

potential conflicts around the globe? 

General GOLDFEIN. Thanks ma’am. So, in this budget, what you 

will see is that we are actually funding munitions to the capacity 

that industry can produce. The challenge we face is that while we 

have the munitions we require for the current fight, it takes us upwards of 4 years to actually replenish the munition that we drop, 

just based on how we do a budget cycle and the timeframe it takes. 

As we drop more and more munitions, then what happens is—and 

by the way, as we have more and more allies and partners that join 

the coalition, who are also looking at the same preferred munitions, 

primarily Small Diameter Bomb, Hellfire, and JDAM [Joint Direct 

Attack Munition], are the three that we tend to be using in this 

fight, precision-guided all of them. What we do then to be able to 

keep the stocks we need for the current fight, is we do take the others around the globe down to a certain extent. Now, we have a plan 

to continue to replenish them, but there is a lag factor because of 

that 4-year period. So part of that readiness for contingencies in 

the high-end fight, if you were to have the PACOM [U.S. Pacific 

Command] commander here or the EUCOM [U.S. European Command] commander here, they would probably both tell you they are 

not satisfied with their current stock levels that we have had to deplete and towards to have what we need for the current fight. 

In addition, when our allies and partners come to us and say, 

‘‘Listen, we are part of this coalition, and we need your support 

with the munitions,’’ and ‘‘oh, by the way, here is what we would 

really like to have, Hellfires, JDAMs, Small Diameter Bomb,’’ that 

further exacerbates the challenge we have. So what we are working 

to do is to be able to work to project future expenditures based on 
24 

historical averages. We have been in this for 15 years. We think 

we can probably project about what we are going to drop 2 to 3 

years from now, and then be able to shorten the cycle time to be 

able to replenish those munitions so we can keep our stocks high. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, General. I 

guess now is the $64,000 question. If the current operational tempo 

were to increase, say budget constraints, sequestration, whatever 

else you have out there, what would be the real effect on the total 

Air Force and, of course, readiness, most importantly? I mean, I am 

talking like 2020, or whatever the case might be, if you could answer that, General. 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am. It will—as I said before, the one 

element that we can’t control is demand and demand of the things 

that we look at to generate and sustain readiness levers, if you 

will. It is the demand signal that is actually keeping us from doing 

the high-end training. If that demand goes up with the capacity 

that we currently have, if we don’t get bigger, if we don’t bring 

these maintainers on, if we don’t bring our capacity up, we will be 

less and less ready over time for the high-end fight. It goes to, 

again, if I can fly this many sorties, and that is all that I can generate, and I need this many sorties here to be able to generate fullspectrum readiness, and the reality is the Nation calls on me to do 

this, I am going to have less to do high-end training, and I am 

going to be less ready. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

We will now go to Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief about this. 

I do want to go back to one of last points Ms. Bordallo made, and 

the munitions—that is hard for us south Georgia boys to say; we 

call it ‘‘ammo.’’ It doesn’t matter what size it is; it is ammo. But 

our private sector partners that provide a lot of those things for us, 

when we are not able to give them consistency in their production, 

that creates a tremendous amount of turmoil on them, and in many 

cases, we have lost our partners in the private sector and ended up 

with sole source or in some cases having to go to other countries 

that, quite honestly, aren’t friendly with us to do certain things. 

I do want to encourage you to do one thing. The people on the 

committee, the Armed Services Committee, I think will support you 

regardless of what party they are in. If you look, historically, we 

have been able to work together on these issues. But I would ask 

that you expand and meet with Members that are not on the 

Armed Services Committee. This patch, if you will, that is going to 

temporarily stop the reduction in readiness from 50 percent on 

down, this is a patch, and that is all it is. And I think that Members who are not on the Armed Services Committee, who are not 

on Armed Services Appropriations, probably don’t understand the 

current situation. And some of them are very anxious to cut spending no matter where those cuts come from. And my concern is not 

with any of the Members here or on this committee. My concern 

is with Members who have not had the opportunity to listen to people who we respect as much as we respect the three of you, so I 
25 

would encourage you to speak with all of the Members as well, and 

take somebody from their State. 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

I think that completes our questioning. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us. I want to thank 

not only you but all of your colleagues there, our airmen that have 

joined us today. A great opportunity to see how the process works. 

We appreciate your perspective. It is very important as we develop 

the policy this year, the National Defense Authorization Act, to 

make sure that we get it right, restore as much readiness as we 

can within this particular window. 

So, gentlemen, thanks again for your service. We appreciate the 

sacrifice, too, of your families. 

And our subcommittee is now hereby adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 9:19 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 12, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 12, 2016 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 12, 2016 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY 

General GOLDFEIN. C–130H AMP Increments 1 and 2 are both fully funded in the 

FY17 PB. In accordance with Congressional guidance, AMP Increment 1 has been 

accelerated to complete in December 2019, prior to the January 2020 FAA mandate. 

AMP Increment 2 is accelerated by 14 years to modernize the fleet by 2028. C–130H 

AMP Increment 2 now modifies at a rate of 22 aircraft per year; this rate was determined by considering expected aircraft downtime during modification and impact on 

current operations. No further assistance is requested at this time. [See page 10.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

General GOLDFEIN. We expect the SecAF will approve the enterprise and criteria 

for the F–35A OPS 5, 6, and 7 early this spring. [See page 12.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 12, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. In July 2015, the Marine Corps declared that the F–35 had 

achieved initial operational capability (IOC) even though it had not met all of the 

requirements outlined in the Marine Corps IOC requirements letter. As the Air 

Force prepares to declare initial operational capability for the F–35A in August 

2016, what steps are being taken to ensure that the Air Force meets all of the IOC 

requirements outlined in its IOC requirements letter? 

General GOLDFEIN. In his January 30, 2015 IOC requirements letter, the Commander of Air Combat Command (COMACC), Gen Carlisle, stated, ‘‘USAF F–35A 

IOC shall be declared when USAF Airmen are trained, manned and equipped to 

conduct basic Close Air Support (CAS), interdiction, and limited Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD/DEAD) operations in a contested environment. The F–35A shall have the ability to conduct operational missions utilizing 

System Development and Demonstration (SDD) program of record weapons and mission systems. The war fighter shall be supported with verified tactics detailing core 

mission fundamentals. The first USAF F–35A operational squadron shall have 12– 

24 primary aircraft and shall be capable of deploying and performing its assigned 

mission(s). In-place logistics elements shall include personnel, support equipment, 

spares, munitions, verified technical manuals, and training programs. In-place operational elements shall include pilots, maintenance personnel, operations support 

personnel, verified technical manuals, mission qualification training programs, and 

training devices. USAF IOC is capability-based and will be declared when the above 

requirements are met.’’ Consistent with the Integrated Master Schedule, the program is on track for IOC within the window of August 1, 2016 (objective) and December 31, 2016 (threshold). 

COMACC reviews program schedule and performance monthly to consider status 

and progress toward IOC. He is closely monitoring three areas: software/radar stability, Autonomic Logistics Information System software delivery, and Mission Data 

File delivery. With this increased attention we are confident we will achieve IOC 

requirements within the August to December 2016 window. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Live-fly training, particularly for 5th generation aircraft, can be 

limited due to range restrictions, airspace and threat replicator limitations, environmental factors, and other issues. The Air Force has identified the integration of live, 

virtual, and constructive (LVC) training as critical to its vision of how best to train 

aircrews in complex environments. 

Is the current range and air space infrastructure sufficient to meet the training 

needs of the Air Force? If not, what aircraft are most affected by range and air 

space limitations? 

General GOLDFEIN. No. We are currently limited in our ability to provide relevant 

and realistic training to 4th Generation and 5th Generation aircrews; because our 

live environment cannot fully replicate the conditions they may encounter in future 

conflicts. Our limiting factors include a lack of realistic threat density, limitations 

on spectrum use, and the increasing footprints required for new weapons and weapon systems. We are investing across the FYDP to upgrade our threat replication capability and develop better synthetic training capabilities. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Are any additional training resources, such as adversary air for 

training purposes, required to support 5th generation or legacy aircraft? 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes. Live adversaries using realistic threat tactics with appropriately sized threat presentations and realistic ground-based threats, range infrastructure, and target sets capable of emulating potential adversary defenses are required to provide relevant and realistic high end training for 4th Generation and 

5th Generation aircrews. Additionally, systems capable of emulating adversary 

jammers would further enhance live training. 

Mr. WITTMAN. What plans, if any, does the Air Force have to make investments 

in training resources before additional 5th generation squadrons reach initial operational capability status? 

General GOLDFEIN. The Air Force has significant plans to invest in live, virtual, 

and constructive training environments; live capabilities such as ranges, threats, adversary air, and electronic attack; simulation capabilities to include a timely fielding 
64 

of F–35 Full Mission Simulators; and a robust investment in Distributed Mission 

Training capability. Our plans for constructive capabilities include technology demonstrators such as the Joint Synthetic Environment (JSE); a synthetic training environment that will enhance future 5th generation training, and Secure Live Virtual 

Constructive Advanced Training Environment (SLATE); which is a live training environment with synthetic input that will integrate LVC training environments. 

Mr. WITTMAN. To what extent has the Air Force identified specific live-fly training 

challenges that will be overcome by training in a simulated environment? 

General GOLDFEIN. The AF has carefully identified, assessed, and understands 

the growing challenges to live-fly training. In response to these challenges, the Air 

force will increasingly leverage virtual simulators to raise the level of overall training effectiveness, especially in the highly contested environment. Fifth (5th) generation weapon systems offer a unique challenge in that their capabilities cannot be 

fully exercised in the live environment, and will benefit greatly using high fidelity 

synthetic training. 

Mr. WITTMAN. To what extent has the Air Force developed an investment strategy 

to ensure it will have the resources needed to carry out its LVC vision? 

General GOLDFEIN. Currently, the AF is developing an over-arching investment 

strategy at the enterprise level. Air Force Major Commands (MAJCOMs) have developed Core Function Master Plans/LVC investment strategies leading to the President’s Budget input. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Discuss the linkage between decreased aircraft inventory, airframe 

age and flight hours, manpower and readiness. 

General GOLDFEIN. Twenty-five years of continuous combat operations, coupled 

with budget instability and lower than planned top lines, have made the Air Force 

one of the smallest, oldest and least ready forces in its history. 

To put our relative size, age, and readiness in perspective, in 1991 we deployed 

33 of our 134 combat-coded Active, Guard, and Reserve fighter squadrons in support 

of Operation Desert Storm. We were 946,000 airmen strong. The average age of our 

aircraft was 17 years, and 80 percent of the fighter force was ready for full-spectrum 

conflict. In contrast, today we have just 55 total force fighter squadrons, and approximately 660,000 total force airmen. The average age of our aircraft is 27 years, 

and less than 50 percent of our combat Air Force is ready for full-spectrum conflict. 

If we are to remain the most lethal and effective air, space, and cyberspace force 

on the planet, we must take steps to rebuild our readiness now. In order to accomplish this goal, the fiscal year 2017 budget aims to build, train and equip an Air 

Force capable of responding to today’s and tomorrow’s threats. 

The F–35, KC–46 and LRSB will change the calculus of any potential adversary 

and will be critical to success in any future high-end fight. For an Air Force, failing 

to push the technological edge equals failure, and when the Air Force fails, the joint 

team fails. Our Fiscal Year 2017 budget request includes the funding required to 

recover the manpower needed to ensure the health of our nuclear forces, aircraft 

maintenance teams, battlefield airmen, and other critically under-manned and overtasked capabilities. A return to BCA-level funding in Fiscal Year 2018 will further 

decimate our readiness and modernization, and will place the nation at an unacceptable risk. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. What percentage of readiness could the Air Force reasonably attain and by what time frame? How much of the Air Force’s capacity is consumed 

by day-to-day, steady-state operations? What is the Air Force’s capacity to provide 

additional ‘‘surge’’ forces to respond to a major contingency? How would you characterize the Air Force’s readiness for full-spectrum combat operations? 

General GOLDFEIN. a. Our Nation needs its Air Force to be at least 80% full spectrum ready. It will take eight to ten years to achieve that level of readiness if we 

actually get the conditions set to be able to rebuild readiness. The one variable we 

don’t control is the operations tempo, and at current capacity, the current tempo 

creates a rolling timeframe for readiness recovery. 

b. Current readiness capacity is being consumed faster than we can rebuild it. 

The Air Force has approximately 20,000 Airmen deployed worldwide and another 

71,000 permanently stationed at overseas bases. In particular, 2/3 of our fighter 

squadrons are engaged on a day-to-day basis. That’s why in this year’s budget we 

valued capacity and readiness over modernization. 

c. If required, the AF is postured to provide nearly 100% of its combat force in 

response to a major contingency, however surging to that contingency may involve 
65 

disengaging from existing steady-state operations. Because over 50% of our forces 

are not sufficiently ready for a high-end, full spectrum fight, it could take longer 

to get to the fight, if could take longer to win, and potentially cost more lives. 

d. Twenty-five years of continuous combat operations and difficult decisions in the 

face of austere budgets has shaved our capacity to the point where our strategic reserve is now operationalized to support rotational demand, and the Total Force is 

required to surge in response to a major contingency. As of now, less than 50% of 

Air Force units are full spectrum ready. 

Ms. BORDALLO. How would you assess ‘‘high-end’’ combat skills, such as those that 

would be employed against a near-peer competitor? What do you believe are the biggest obstacles in the Air Force’s readiness recovery? Are there areas that cannot recover even if provided additional resources in the future? What is the one thing Congress can do to improve USAF readiness? 

General GOLDFEIN. The capability gap is closing. Today’s focus on counter-insurgency in a permissive environment limits our opportunity to train against a high 

end threat, and our adversaries are not standing still. They continue to invest in 

high end capability and they are catching up. 

The biggest obstacle in the Air Force’s readiness recovery is the Budget Control 

Act (BCA) and sequestration. The Air Force’s readiness recovery depends on the 

steadfast commitment to time and resources to achieve our readiness recovery goals. 

All areas can recover if provided sufficient resources and opportunities to train 

across the entire range of military operations. 

BCA and sequestration have resulted in tens of billions of dollars of lost buying 

power as the Air Force has been forced to make extremely difficult decisions to balance today’s readiness against tomorrows capability. We need repeal of the BCA. 

Ms. BORDALLO. If near-term readiness is a priority, what actions or resources are 

being applied to near-term readiness recovery efforts? 

General GOLDFEIN. Readiness growth cannot be accelerated substantially with resources alone while ongoing rotational deployments continue to consume readiness. 

The Air Force requires sufficient and predictable funding, along with increased 

manpower in critical skills areas, and improved deploy-to-dwell time to improve 

readiness. Today, we are working closely with the Combatant Commanders to maintain deployment levels at or below readiness recovery rates. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The latest projections for rebuilding readiness are based on setting the conditions for readiness recovery in FY 2020. What tangible measures can 

you point to that suggest conditions will be set in 2020, particularly in terms of 

operational tempos? 

General GOLDFEIN. The Air Force’s plan provides the resource foundation from 

which to begin growth in FY20 if deployment conditions improve. We will regularly 

analyze actual conditions and adjust the resource plan accordingly, but the readiness enterprise depends on consistent, predictable funding. The Air Force will fulfill 

Combatant Commander requirements, recognizing that a high deploy-to-dwell rate 

consumes full-spectrum readiness. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What, if any, mitigation plan does the Air Force have to meet 

combatant commander requirements if the conditions for readiness recovery (decreased deployments/operational tempo and predictable funding) are not set in 

2020? 

General GOLDFEIN. The Air Force will continue to meet Combatant Commander 

requirements to the best of our ability. Senior Department of Defense leaders have 

made restoring joint readiness a top priority; and we continue to work closely with 

them to ensure readiness is restored as quickly as possible. Global Force Management reforms implemented within the past year include consideration for force element readiness, and they appear to be a promising initiative in assisting with our 

readiness recovery. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are there particular service core function areas that are more at 

risk than others, in terms of their readiness recovery efforts? 

General GOLDFEIN. The core functions at greatest risk are those under the greatest demand relative to capacity of equipment or personnel (supply-demand mismatch). This dynamic prevents growth due to constant loss of readiness during rotational deployment (Example: Command and Control (C2)). Similarly, core functions 

with complex training requirements or very long-lead resourcing requirements are 

also at risk due to the long timelines associated with the development of proficiency 

in complex tasks or acquisition of materials (Example: Personnel Recovery (PR)). 

Ms. BORDALLO. There are several communities within in the Air Force that have 

deploy-to-dwell rates below the Secretary of Defense’s goal of 1:2, and some stressed 

career fields have rates of 1:1. How does the Air Force intend to increase dwell time 
66 

for personnel in its stressed career fields while still meeting combatant commander 

demands? 

General GOLDFEIN. The Air Force has several unique capabilities that are low in 

supply yet very high in demand (Personnel Recovery, Intelligence, Air Battle Managers, etc.). We comply with SecDef policy established in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) to maintain an active component deploy-to-dwell goal 

of 1:2 with a threshold of 1:1. As a result, 90% of the Active component met 1:2 

or better deploy-to-dwell in FY15. The FY17 Baseline Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) sources all force elements within readiness recovery thresholds to meet Combatant Commanders’ most important requirements. 

But we remain concerned. Without predictable budgets at levels that allow us the 

flexibility to balance capability, capacity, and readiness, we cannot recover full spectrum readiness. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What is the plan to get the current deploy-to-dwell ratio to a 

maintainable level? Is there a total force solution to this? 

General GOLDFEIN. The Air Force’s plan is to fill Combatant Commander requirements at a regain readiness rate in compliance with SecDef policy established in 

the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). The FY17 Baseline Global 

Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) will source all force elements within 

readiness recovery thresholds. Exceptions to this policy are only granted in rare 

cases and at the 3-star level or above. 

Yes. The Air Force fully integrates the Reserve Component into sourcing global 

combatant command requirements. Lack of access to the RC, either in activation authority or funding, will severely impact USAF’s ability to meet Combatant Commander demands while still maintaining regain readiness thresholds. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent is the Air Force’s flying hour program properly 

sized to support completion of training requirements? 

General GOLDFEIN. The FY17 Presidents Budget capped the Air Force’s peacetime 

Flying Hour Program (FHP) to 92% of the minimum required flight hours. The Air 

Force is currently unable to execute the minimum required flight training to sustain 

readiness due to limits in capacity in several key areas. These areas include: the 

lack of the proper number and skill level of Airmen in critical areas (i.e. aircraft 

maintenance, aircrew); continued high OPSTEMPO; and consistent high demand to 

deploy forces. These factors, levied against a reduced force structure, limit our opportunities to train and build readiness. 

To build readiness, the FHP will need to be expanded. But before the FHP can 

be successfully expanded, several limiting factors must be rectified. These factors include: improving manning in critical skill areas (i.e. aircraft maintenance, aircrew); 

better management of OPSTEMPO; and limitations to the demand to deploy forces. 

Incremental improvements in these areas plus adequate sustainment and training 

resources will eventually allow the AF to expand the FHP to the minimum requirement (100%) and beyond to build and sustain a ready force. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In instances where the Air Force has been unable to execute its 

flying hour program, what factors contributed to under-execution of the program? 

General GOLDFEIN. Two key factors contribute to the Air Force inability to execute 

the full FHP requirement: 1) ongoing rotational deployments in support of ongoing 

combatant command requirements reduce opportunity to execute home station flying hours; and 2) manpower shortfalls in key areas of the maintenance enterprise 

impede the Air Force’s ability to generate training sorties at the levels necessary 

to execute a full flying hour program. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Is the current range and air space infrastructure sufficient to 

meet the training needs of the Air Force? If not, what aircraft are most affected by 

range and air space limitations? 

General GOLDFEIN. No. We are currently limited in our ability to provide relevant 

and realistic training to 4th Generation and 5th Generation aircrews; because our 

live environment cannot fully replicate the conditions they may encounter in future 

conflicts. Our limiting factors include a lack of realistic threat density, limitations 

on spectrum use, and the increasing footprints required for new weapons and weapon systems. We are investing across the FYDP to upgrade our threat replication capability and develop better synthetic training capabilities. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are any additional training resources, such as adversary air for 

training purposes, required to support fifth generation or legacy aircraft? 

General GOLDFEIN. Yes. Live adversaries using realistic threat tactics with appropriately sized threat presentations and realistic ground-based threats, range infrastructure, and target sets capable of emulating potential adversary defenses are required to provide relevant and realistic high end training for 4th Generation and 
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5th Generation aircrews. Additionally, systems capable of emulating adversary 

jammers would further enhance live training. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What plans, if any, does the Air Force have to make investments 

in training resources before additional 5th generation squadrons reach initial operational capability status? 

General GOLDFEIN. The Air Force has significant plans to invest in live, virtual, 

and constructive training environments; live capabilities such as ranges, threats, adversary air, and electronic attack; simulation capabilities to include a timely fielding 

of F–35 Full Mission Simulators; and a robust investment in Distributed Mission 

Training capability. Air Force plans for constructive capabilities include technology 

demonstrators such as the Joint Synthetic Environment (JSE); a synthetic training 

environment that will enhance future 5th generation training, and Secure Live Virtual Constructive Advanced Training Environment (SLATE); which is a live training 

environment with synthetic input that will integrate Live, Virtual, and Constructive 

training environments. 

Ms. BORDALLO. If the current operational tempo were to increase, what would be 

the effect on readiness? 

General GOLDFEIN. If operational tempo increases, we would expect a further reduction in full spectrum readiness. High operations tempo substantially reduces our 

units’ opportunity to train for its FULL mission set. A higher ops tempo would further reduce our opportunities to train. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent are weapons shortages affecting prepositioned munitions inventories, and consequently readiness to address other potential conflicts 

around the globe? 

General GOLDFEIN. The increased expenditures of certain munitions, along with 

known budgetary constraints since the August 2014 start of Operation INHERENT 

RESOLVE (OIR) have resulted in reallocation of some munitions stocks from preand forward-positioned locations to the point of need. Replenishment of those stocks 

will occur through existing Air Force munitions prioritization and positioning 

governances. Inventory levels for Precision Guided Munitions will continue to decline until new production increases. 

Ms. BORDALLO. How, specifically, is your current budget request balancing the 

short-term requirement to repair or rebuild equipment with longer-term efforts to 

replace that same equipment with next-generation equipment? 

General GOLDFEIN. This year’s budget prioritized capacity and readiness over 

modernization. We sacrificed investments in next-generation capability (F–35, 

C130Js) to fund readiness, grow capacity in manpower, and to keep force structure. 

For example, we are growing end strength to 317,000 on a path to 321,000. Also, 

F–16C/D models will undergo multiple offensive and defensive upgrades to ensure 

capability and survivability in the current and future threat environments, as the 

F–35 comes into the field in greater numbers. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Do you have a strategy that ensures you do not unnecessarily 

reset equipment you plan to replace? If so, does that strategy present any risks to 

readiness? Please explain why or why not. 

General GOLDFEIN. We have a very robust reset and refurbish plan for our equipment. All of our major end items like aircraft and engines have structured lifecycle 

management plans to ensure we get the best value when deciding whether to overhaul, modernize, or purchase new. For our aircraft we use an economic service life 

analysis to determine whether to overhaul, extend the life, or retire and buy new. 

We apply similar methods for other equipment where we properly balance decisions between refreshing equipment, redistributing between units, and buying new 

equipment. This approach ensures the maximum service life of our equipment, and 

prevents a large reset bill. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent are reset efforts and schedules aligned with unit 

training plans and supporting, or hindering, the achievement of overall unit readiness? 

General GOLDFEIN. High operations tempo (deploy-to-dwell ratios below 1:4) 

hinders our ability to effectively synchronize and schedule training events to achieve 

full spectrum readiness. The current ops tempo has compressed training timelines 

across most Air Force communities; forcing units to focus on their next deployment 

and assigned missions, versus completing the training curriculum for all of their designed operational capability tasks. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON 

Mr. GIBSON. How many Joint Forcible Entry Exercises are in the FY17 AF budget? 
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General GOLDFEIN. The Joint Forcible Entry Exercise (JFEX) is now known as the 

Joint Operational Access Exercise (JOAX). While the JOAX is not a specific line 

item in the FY17 President’s Budget, Air Mobility Command uses Operations & 

Maintenance funding to support four JOAX. 

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