### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 321 -CV

Wil lia m Al e xa nde r Ro pe r , J r . , A ppe lla nt

v. Reagan, Burrus, Dierkson, Lamon & Bluntzer P LLC , Appellee

FROM THE COUN TY C OURT OF LA W N O. 2 OF COMAL C OUNT Y, NO. 2005 P C0102 , HO NORAB LE CHARLES A. STEP HENS II , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Wil liam Alexander Roper, Jr., has filed a notice of appea l f rom a May 10, 2007 order of the trial c ourt compelling the depe ndent administrator of the Estate of Micha el G. Roper to pa y
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s awa

rd e d in a pr e vio us or de r. I n th e pr ior or de r, date d Mar c h 1, 200 6, the tr ia l c ourt , on application by

Reag an, B urrus, Die rkson, L amon & Bluntzer PL L C (“Reagan Burrus”) , had order ed the de pendent a dminist ra t o r t o p ay approximately

$6,200 in attorney ’s fe es and e x penses incurre d thr o u g h Re a g anB u r

r u s ’ s p r o v is io no f

le g a l s e r v ic e s in c o n n e c ti o nw it

h th e d e p e n d e nt administrator’s a

ppointment. Reag an B urrus ha s filed a motion to dismi ss Rope r’s appea l for wa nt of su bje c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n. Ha vin g re vie we d th e juri sd ic tio na l arg ume nts in R op e r’ s r e sp on se to the motion to di s m i s s and his brief on a ppeal—we conclude that we lac k subject-matter jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

he a pp e a l and we g ra nt t he mot ion

and dis mis s.2 Under the probate code, the under ly ing Ma rch 1, 2006 or der a

war ding Re ag an B urrus fe e s and e xpe ns e s wa s fi na l and a pp e a la ble . Re a g an B ur

ru s’ s a pp lic a tio n f

or pa y me nt w a s a

c la im
a g a ins t th e Es tate . Se c tio n 3 12 (e ) o f t he pr ob a te c od e pr ov ide s:
Whe re a c la ima nt o r a ny oth e r p e rs on

int e re ste d in an e state sh a ll b e dis satis fi e d w ith the a c tio n of the c ourt

up on a c la im, the c la ima

nt o r p e rs on

may a pp e a l th e re fr om t o the c ourt s o f a

pp e a ls, a s fr om oth e r j ud g me nts of the c ounty

c ourt in p ro bate matte rs . Te x. Pr ob
. Cod e Ann. § 3 12 (e ) ( Wes t 20 03 ); see also id. § 3 12 (d ) ( Wes t 20 03 ) ( or de rs of pr ob a te court on c laims “shall hav e t h e fo rc e and e ffe ct of fina l judgments” ). Section 312(e ) “ha s been interpre ted to me an that if an order rende red under section 312 is not a ppeale d, it becomes fina l and is not subject to collatera l attack.” In re Estate of Figueroa- Gomez , 76 S
. W
. 3d 533, 535-36 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).

Ap pe lla nt f ile d h is pro se no tic e of a pp e a l on J un e 1, 20 07 , longa ft e r a ny po ssi bly applicable deadline to a

ppeal the Ma

rch 1, 2006 o rd er ha d lapsed. Ge nera lly , an appe llant has 30 day s to file his notice of appe al from a judgme nt or order, unless he timely filed a motion for ne w trial or motion to modify the judgme nt, in which case he has 90 day s to f ile his notice of appe al. See Tex. R. App. P . 26.1(a) . In this case, a ppellant filed, on June 1, 2006, in the same ca use, what he sty led a “ bill of review” and moti on to set aside the Ma rch 1 or der. A

ppellant’s instrument challeng ed the Ma

rch 1 ord er b o t h o n t h e merits and on the basis that appellant wa s an intere sted party who had not bee n proper ly serve d with a copy of R eag an Burrus’ s application. No hearingon this filing was se t or held, and the trial court did not take a ny action on it. Reag an B urrus urg es that appellant’ s “bill of re v i ew ” i s actua lly a mis-sty led motion for new tr ial that was ove rruled by3

operation of law 75 day s after fili n g, in Aug ust 2006. See Caldwell v. Barnes , 154 S.W .3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (explaining that bill of re view is an e quitable proc eedingbroug ht by a par ty seeking to set aside a pr ior judg ment that is no long er subjec t to challeng e by new tria l motion or appeal);

c f. T ay lor v . H ill , No. 03-07-00285- C V,

_ _ S
. W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. App.—Austi n, Fe b. 15, 2008, no pet. h.) (“ We first observe that Taylor filed his ‘ Motion to Dec lare J udg ment Void Due to L ack of Sub je c t- Matte r Jur isd ic tio n’ in the same un de rl yingpr oc e e din g , a nd it amou nts to a n unti me ly motion to set aside the J une 2003 judgme nt.”). We ag ree . I n any event, appellant’s “bill of review” to challeng e the Ma

rch 1, 2006 or der, e ven if pe nding, w ould n o t co nfer on us subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the orde r appe llant attempts to challeng e her e.

On Fe bruar

y 13, 2007, Reag an B urrus filed a m o t i o n to compel pay ment of the attorney ’s fe es that the trial c ourt had pre viously awa rded in its Marc h 1, 2006 order . On May 10 , th e tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d th e mot ion . I t is fr om t his or de r t

hat a pp e lla nt p ur po rt s to a pp e a l. Our a ppellate jurisdiction is limi ted to final judg ments and those limited classes
o f i n t erloc utory

order s over whic h the leg islature has g iven us jurisdiction. Ma je sk i v . E sta te of Majeski , 1 6 3 S
. W
. 3 d

1 0 2 , 1 0 5 ( T e x . A p p . —

Au s t i n2 0 0 5 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Sta ry v . D e Bo rd , 967 S.W .2d 352, 352-53 (Te x . 1998)). As Roper acknow ledg es in his docketing statement, the May 10, 2007 order

compelling pay

ment of attorne y ’s fe es is i n t er l o cu t ory . See W agner v. W arnasch , 295 S.W .2d 890, 8 9 3 (Tex. 1956) (“[A]n order or decr ee, ma de for

the purpose of
car rying a judgme nt o r d ec ree alre ady enter ed into eff

ect, is not a fina l judgment or decr ee, and ca nnot be appe aled f

rom as such.” ). S t at u t es authorizing a ppeals fr om interlocutory order s
ar e s t ri ct l y

construed. Art Inst. of Chi cago v. I ntegral Hedging, L.P. , 129 S.W .3d 564, 5704

(T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 3, no pe t.) . In p ro bate pr oc e e din g s, se c tio n 5 1. 01 4( a ) a uth or ize s a

pp e a ls from an inter lo cu t o ry o rd er t hat appoints a re ceive r or trustee or over rules a motion to vacate an order th a t a p p o in ts a r e c e iv e r o r tr

u s te e . T e x. Ci v . Pr a c . & Re m. Co d e A n n . § 5 1
. 0 1 4 ( a ) ( 1 ) , (2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2007). Sec tion 51.014(a) does not a uthorize an appe al from a n interlocutory order compelling pay

ment of pre viously

awa rded attorney ’s fe es. See I n te gr a l H e d g in g , L.P. , 129 S.W .3d at 573.

I n summary , Roper d i d n o t t i mely perf ect a n appea l from the trial c ourt’s Mar ch 1, 2006 order

and we do not have jurisdiction to consider Rope r’s a ppeal f rom the trial cour

t’s May 10, 2007 interlocutory

order . Acc o rd i n gl y , we dismiss this appeal for w ant of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P . 42.3(a)
.

________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: Mar ch 18, 2008