DHS Lacks Oversight of 

Component Use of Force 

(Redacted) 

January 12, 2017 

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
 

DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force 

January 12, 2017 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

We conducted this audit to 

determine whether the 

Department of Homeland 

Security and its components 

have controls in place to 

minimize the risk of imprope

use of force by law 

enforcement officers. 

What We 

Recommend 

We recommend that DHS 

establish a department-level 

entity to actively oversee and

assist with component use of

force activities, update 

policies, and improve 

training. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 254-4100, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

r 

What We Found 

DHS employs approximately 80,000 Federal law 

enforcement officers whose positions allow for the 

use of force as they perform their duties. Every 

day law enforcement officers face danger when 

performing their duties. These officers have very 

little time to assess the situation and determine 

the proper response when dealing with a 

dangerous or unpredictable situation. The officers 

must react to the threat or potential threat and 

respond with the appropriate tactics — possibly 

including some level of force. DHS has not done 

enough to minimize the risk of improper use of 

force by law enforcement officers. Specifically, the 

Department does not: 

• have an office responsible for managing 

and overseeing component use of force 

activities; 

• ensure the collection and validation of 

component data needed to assess use of 

force activities, minimize risks, and take 

 corrective actions; 

• ensure use of force policies have been 

updated to reflect current operations and 

lessons learned; or 

• establish consistent requirements for lesslethal recurrent training and ensure 

training was completed as required. 

Additionally, each component varies on their use 

of force activities. Without improvements in the 

management and oversight of use of force 

activities, the Department may increase its risk of 

improper use of force by law enforcement officers. 

DHS Response 

The Department concurred with both 

recommendations. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dh s.gov 

January 12, 2017 

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Dr. Brodi J . Kotila 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Office of Policy 

FROM: John Roth ~"'---"\(oh. Inspector General 

SUBJECT: DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force -

Sensitive Security Information 

Attached for your information is our final report, DHS Lacks Oversight of 

Component Use of Force - Sensitive Security Information. We incorporated the 

formal comments from the Department in the final report. 

The report contains two recommendations aimed at enhancing the 

Department's efforts to actively oversee and assist with component use of force 

activities, update policies, and improve training. Your office concurred with 

both recommendations. Based on information provided in your response to the 

draft report, we consider recommendations 1 and 2 open and resolved. Once 

your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal 

closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. 

The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreedupon corrective actions. Please send your response or closure request to 

OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will 

provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will 

post the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact 

Donald Bumgardner, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at 

(202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 

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Table of Contents 

Background .................................................................................................... 1 

Results of Audit .............................................................................................. 5 

DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force Activities ................... 6 

Use of Force Policies Do Not Reflect Current Operations or Lessons 

Learned ............................................................................................... 10 

Recurrent Training for Use of Force Can Improve ................................. 12 

Recommendations......................................................................................... 16 

Management Comments and Analysis ........................................................... 17 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................. 18 

Appendix B: DHS Comments to the Draft Report ................................. 21 

Appendix C: DHS Law Enforcement Components Reviewed ................ 24 

Appendix D: FY 2015 DHS Use of Force-related Data ........................... 25 

Appendix E: Summary of Recent Reports on Use of Force .................... 26 

Appendix F: Use of Force Incident Tracking Processes ......................... 27 

Appendix G: FY 2014 Training Requirements and Analysis .................. 28 

Appendix H: Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report ........... 31 

Appendix I: Report Distribution.......................................................... 32 

Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CEW Conducted Electrical Weapons 

CRCL Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

CRSO Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FPS Federal Protective Service 

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

OC Oleoresin Capsicum 

OCSO Office of the Chief Security Officer 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 consolidated all or part of 22 different 

Federal departments and agencies into one single Department of Homeland 

Security. The Department’s mission and goals involve enforcing a wide range of 

laws, including preventing terrorism, protecting governmental leaders and 

facilities, securing transportation, and enforcing border security and 

immigration laws. The following 10 DHS components1 employ law enforcement 

officers and agents authorized to make arrests and carry firearms: 

x U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

x U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

x United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) 

x United States Secret Service (Secret Service) 

x Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

x National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Federal Protective Service 

(FPS) 

x Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

x Office of the Under Secretary for Management’s Office of the Chief 

Security Officer (OCSO) 

x Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) 

x Office of Inspector General (OIG)2 

Within the components, DHS employs approximately 80,000 Federal law 

enforcement officers whose positions allow for the use of force as they perform 

their duties. According to the Department of Justice, law enforcement officers 

face danger every day. These officers have very little time to assess the 

situation and determine the proper response when dealing with a dangerous or 

unpredictable situation. The officers must react to the threat or potential threat 

and respond with the appropriate tactics — possibly including some level of 

force. DHS law enforcement officers and agents are permitted to use an amount 

of physical force reasonably necessary to ensure compliance with lawful 

commands and overcome all resistance. 

 1 Appendix C provides details about the DHS components with law enforcement officers and 

agents as well as their mission and operating environments.

2 We excluded OIG in our scope to meet the generally accepted government auditing standards 

conceptual framework approach to independence. We also refer to FPS and OCSO as DHS 

components in this report.

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Department of Homeland Security 

Allegations of excessive or improper use of force by law enforcement officers 

continue to receive significant media and public interest. In response, the 

public has called for greater accountability when law enforcement officers use 

excessive or improper force. Various law enforcement agencies, such as the 

New York City and Baltimore Police Departments, have conducted reviews of 

their use of force policies and practices, subsequently making improvements. 

For example, the New York City Police Department’s review recommended 

improving its data tracking and training. Additionally, the Baltimore Police 

Department conducted a review and now plans to implement a new policy 

stressing de-escalation and requiring officers to intervene when other law 

enforcement officers are using excessive or improper force. Recognizing the 

importance of collecting information on law enforcement use of force to develop 

trust and promote transparency, the Department of Justice recently 

announced plans to collect data on the use of force by local, state, and Federal 

law enforcement agencies. 

Levels of Force 

Use of force may include: 

x	 Force that is deadly is likely to cause serious physical injury or death. 

Lethal force is also referred to as deadly force. Examples of lethal force 

include, but are not limited to, any discharge of firearms against 

persons, use of impact weapons to strike the neck or head, any 

strangulation technique, any strikes to the throat, and the use of edged 

weapons. 

x	 Less-lethal force is not likely to cause serious physical injury or death. 

Examples of less-lethal force include, but are not limited to, the use of 

less-lethal devices and techniques such as batons, chemical irritants, 

electronic control weapons, compressed air launchers, and specialty 

impact munitions. Components use terms like “intermediate force 

devices” when referring to less-lethal devices. Figure 1 shows examples of 

less-lethal devices and techniques DHS components use, such as the use 

of Conducted Electrical Weapons (CEW), batons, and Oleoresin 

Capsicum (OC)3 spray. 

 3 Also known as pepper spray, OC is a chemical compound that irritates the eyes to cause 

tears, pain, and temporary blindness used in policing.

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x

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Figure 1: DHS Less-lethal Devices and Techniques 

Conducted Electrical Weapons Baton Training OC Spray Training

Source: FLETC 

In addition to lethal and less-lethal uses of force, other levels of force 

include officer presence, verbal commands, and empty hand techniques. 

Based on individual records from each component, in fiscal year 2015 DHS 

apprehended and/or arrested4 nearly 600,000 people.5 Components reported 

using lethal force 34 times and less-lethal force 838 times. Nine of these 

instances resulted in death. 

Variations in Operational Environment and Use of Force 

Each component’s mission and operations influence its law enforcement 

officers’ interaction with the public. Accordingly, the use of force varies by and 

within each component based on officers’ assigned duties. For example: 

x Border Patrol officers may encounter frequent and dangerous attacks as 

they detect and deter the unlawful entry of people and goods along the 

border. However, CBP Office of Field Operations officers at a port of entry 

operate in mostly controlled environments, in which they work in close 

proximity to other officers with back-up readily available. 

x ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations officers target and conduct 

raids to capture foreign nationals with prior criminal convictions 

considered serious or violent offenses. ICE Homeland Security 

 4 An apprehension is the seizure, taking, or arrest of a person. An arrest is to take a person in 

custody. 

5 Within the Coast Guard, only the Coast Guard Investigative Service tracks the total number 

of arrests and assaults; see appendix D for DHS component use of force data and how Coast 

Guard arrests and apprehension data were calculated. 

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Investigations officers investigate immigration and customs violations — 

including narcotics, weapons, and contraband smuggling; cybercrimes; 

human trafficking; and identity and benefit fraud — as well as national 

security investigations. 

x	 TSA’s Federal Air Marshals travel on U.S. aircraft and conduct operations 

in airports and other transportation systems. On the other hand, TSA’s 

Office of Inspection officers’ duties include covert testing of TSA 

screening operations and investigations of employee misconduct and 

program fraud. 

x	 Secret Service agents on protective details normally operate in 

environments in which back-up is readily available. Agents conducting 

investigations have some control of the time and circumstances of 

arrests. 

Figure 2 shows DHS officers and agents engaged in various operations. 

Figure 2: DHS Components’ Operations 

Clockwise: 1) CBP checkpoint, 2) Coast Guard drug seizure, 3) ICE arrest, 4) Secret Service 

arrest. Source: Clockwise: CBP, Coast Guard, ICE, Secret Service 

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Differences in officers’ environments and encounters influence officers’ 

responses — including the amount of force used. Appendix D shows the FY 

2015 reported number of DHS component law enforcement personnel, arrests 

and/or apprehensions, assaults on law enforcement officers, and instances 

when force was used. 

Each component has its own distinct law enforcement mission, oversight, 

policies, and training. DHS’ July 2004 Use of Deadly Force Policy provides 

guidance on the use of deadly force and permits components to adopt more 

detailed operational guidance that reflects their different law enforcement 

missions. 

Improper Use of Force 

Allegations of excessive or improper use of force by law enforcement officers 

continue to receive significant media and public interest. For example, in 

recent years several reports by internal and external entities made 

recommendations to improve CBP use of force activities, including policies and 

training. Appendix E provides a summary of the reports we identified. For the 

purposes of this report, use of force activities could include policies, training, 

and the collection and validation of use of force data. We conducted this audit 

to determine whether DHS and its components have controls in place to 

minimize risk of improper use of force by law enforcement officers. 

Results of Audit 

DHS employs approximately 80,000 Federal law enforcement officers whose 

positions allow for the use of force as they perform their duties. Law 

enforcement officers may face danger when performing their duties. These 

officers have very little time to assess the situation and determine the proper 

response when dealing with a dangerous or unpredictable situation. The 

officers must react to the threat or potential threat and respond with the 

appropriate tactics — possibly including some level of force. DHS could do 

more to minimize the risk of improper use of force by law enforcement officers. 

Specifically, the Department does not: 

x have an office responsible for managing and overseeing component use of 

force activities;

x ensure the collection and validation of component data needed to assess 

use of force activities, minimize risks, and take corrective actions;

x ensure use of force policies have been updated to reflect current 

operations and lessons learned; or

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x establish consistent requirements for less-lethal recurrent training and 

ensure training was completed as required. 

Additionally, each component varies on their use of force activities. For 

example, not all components have: 

x policies that emphasize the respect for human life when using force; 

x established reporting requirements for less-lethal use of force; 

x annual training that focuses on less-lethal techniques, tactics, and 

devices. 

Without improvements in the management and oversight of use of force 

activities, the Department may increase its risk of improper use of force by law 

enforcement officers. 

DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force Activities 

DHS does not have a sufficient mechanism to oversee its use of force activities. 

Specifically, no department-level office is responsible for managing and 

overseeing component use of force activities. The Department also does not 

ensure it is collecting and validating data necessary to assess such activities, 

minimize risk, and take corrective actions. 

Decentralized Management and Oversight 

DHS does not have an office responsible for managing and overseeing 

component use of force activities. Instead, management and oversight is 

decentralized. The Department has offices responsible for use of force-related 

policy and some oversight functions, but none of them have overarching 

supervision of use of force activities within DHS. Table 1 lists the DHS offices 

with a role in component use of force activities and their overall 

responsibilities. 

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Table 1: DHS Offices with Use of Force Oversight Roles 

Department-level 

Office 

Roles and Responsibilities 

Office of Law Coordinates with the components and interagency 

Enforcement Policy stakeholders to resolve law enforcement program issues 

concerning policy, operational, legal, legislative, budgetary, 

privacy, public, and international affairs. 

Office for Civil Rights 

and Civil Liberties 

(CRCL) 

Assists and advises DHS leadership by reviewing issues that 

have an impact on civil rights and civil liberties and 

investigating specific complaints, to include allegations of 

improper use of force. Investigates complaints filed by the 

public regarding Department policies or activities, or actions 

taken by Department personnel. 

Office of the Chief Facilitates integration teams to achieve cross-component 

Readiness Support collaboration and reinvest in mission-critical priorities. The 

Officer (CRSO) office looks to increase coordination between components in 

areas such as real and personal property, which includes 

force-related resources. 

Source: DHS OIG analysis 

None of the previously mentioned department-level offices are responsible for 

centralized oversight of use of force allegations, trends, training, facilities, and 

resource challenges faced by field personnel. For instance — 

x	 CRCL can recommend use of force-related policy changes but does not 

play a comprehensive, centralized oversight role for the Department. 

According to a CRCL official, CRCL has authority outside of an 

investigation. This may occur when a new policy or initiative may impact 

civil rights or civil liberties; however CRCL faces less component 

resistance when their involvement is grounded in investigations of 

complaints. Additionally, CRCL can encourage nationwide improvements 

or implementation of recommendations, but they have no authority to 

enforce recommendations. Components must formally concur or nonconcur with CRCL’s recommendations. Should the components nonconcur, the matter may be elevated to higher-level Headquarters review. 

However, during fieldwork, this process had not been approved by the 

Department. 

x	 Although CRSO does not oversee component use of force activities, it has 

made progress to combine resources as part of the DHS Unity of Effort 

initiative. The purpose of the initiative is to unify DHS components’ 

processes. To fulfill this goal, CRSO reviews how DHS components within 

geographic locations can share training resources, such as shooting 

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ranges, training facilities, and instructors to increase operational and 

monetary efficiency. 

DHS has not established a mechanism — such as a review board or other 

entity — to assist the components in addressing challenges, mitigating risks, 

and sharing lessons learned associated with use of force. For example, CBP 

studied the feasibility of including body-worn camera technology in its law 

enforcement operations. CBP concluded the technology may offer benefits in 

support of the CBP mission by reducing allegations and lowering the likelihood 

of use of force incidents. The cameras could offer insights into law enforcement 

encounters that have traditionally been 

unavailable and enhance training capabilities by 

using footage as a learning tool. A CBP official 

CBP established the said that CBP provides regular updates to the National Use of Force DHS Office of Law Enforcement Policy and CRCL Review Board based on the on the status of the body camera efforts. Federal Bureau of 

However, as CBP’s efforts are ongoing, DHS is not Investigations’ model. It 

yet coordinating a body-worn camera working includes members from the 

Department of Justice, ICE, group across the Department to apply lessons and non-voting members learned. According to a DHS Law Enforcement from DHS CRCL and the Policy official, the office was not coordinating any Office of Inspector General.

department-wide efforts related to use of force 

because of its other priorities, which at the time 

of fieldwork did not include use of force. 

CBP is the only component with a high-level use of force review board that 

includes members outside of CBP and the Department. The board reviews use 

of force incidents by CBP officers and makes recommendations concerning the 

application of deadly force, training, and tactics policy issues. 

Each component, except FEMA,6 has its own use of force review board, but not 

all use their review boards to perform internal analyses of incidents that may 

improve their use of force policies, procedures, and training. For example, an 

FPS official acknowledged FPS does not track or report activities and trends 

through its Use of Force Incident Review Committee. 

Additionally, DHS does not oversee component incident tracking processes to 

ensure processes and policies are standardized and data collection takes place 

to better improve data accuracy or reliability. As such, the Department does 

not know how many incidents are unreported or not internally reviewed. For 

example, the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Internal Affairs 

 6 FEMA does not have its own use of force review committee. However, FEMA policy refers to 

OCSO’s Firearms and Use of Force Incident Review Committee. 

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Division investigates allegations of misconduct, including excessive use of 

force, committed by FPS officers. As part of testing to determine whether 

components oversee and monitor excessive use of force allegations, we 

requested case details for a judgmental sample of FPS cases. The Division was 

unable to provide any documentation regarding two incident details we 

requested. The office was unable to locate the information for these cases. 

DHS also does not use the data in component incident tracking processes to 

conduct trend analyses to mitigate risk associated with use of force incidents. 

Appendix F summarizes the use of force incident tracking processes 

maintained by each component. Similar to the incident tracking processes, 

components also have different mechanisms to investigate allegations of 

excessive force. 

No Comprehensive Use of Force Data Available 

DHS does not collect and report component data needed to assess use of force 

activities, minimize risks, and take corrective actions. Because departmentlevel use of force data was not readily available, we requested it from the 

components, and in some cases, from their subcomponents. For example, to 

obtain ICE use of force-related data, four ICE subcomponents provided arrest 

data separately for FY 2015. We collected use of force data from the 

components, including numbers for arrests and apprehensions, incidents, and 

assaults, as well as the number of law enforcement personnel within DHS. 

DHS does not have minimal requirements for use of force incident data or a 

process to collect and report the accurate number of incidents. For example, 

the Coast Guard tracks use of force incidents by each level of force. Conversely, 

the Secret Service does not collect less-lethal use of force data. The 

components have established reporting requirements for lethal use of force, 

and six of eight components7 have established specific reporting requirements 

for less-lethal use of force incidents. CBP is the only component that publishes 

its use of force data to ensure transparency. Without collection of consistent 

data, DHS management cannot fully review and analyze overall use of force 

trends, revise policy based on this analysis, and ensure transparency by 

making use of force data available. 

Even though components are collecting use of force data, DHS does not have 

quality assurance procedures to ensure the components’ data is complete and 

accurate. For example, in 2 of 10 incidents we tested, ICE officers did not 

properly report use of force. In the past, ICE has recognized significant 

 7 CBP, ICE, FPS, the Coast Guard, TSA, and FEMA have established reporting requirements for 

less-lethal use of force.

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discrepancies in its reporting systems — specifically, the need to report 

incidents in a timely and accurate manner.8 Additionally, FPS relies on its 

regions to properly report use of force but does not review incident reporting 

forms to assess effectiveness of reporting. As a result, we could not validate the 

use of force statistics. 

Department-level coordinated management and oversight of component use of 

force activities does not fully satisfy the intent of the Department’s Unity of 

Effort initiative. Without a formal mechanism for managing and overseeing 

component use of force activities, DHS cannot coordinate similar functions and 

combine analytic efforts to support effective department-wide decision making. 

Use of Force Policies Do Not Reflect Current Operations or 

Lessons Learned 

Although DHS and components developed use of force policies and procedures, 

the policies are outdated and have not been updated to reflect current 

operations. 

Outdated Policies 

DHS’ and ICE’s use of force policies have not been updated since 2004 — more 

than 12 years ago. Government standards highlight the importance of 

reviewing policies and procedures for continued relevance and effectiveness in 

addressing potential risks.9 DHS policy mentions ICE’s use of marine warning 

shots, even though ICE has not conducted marine operations since 2004. The 

2004 Interim ICE Use of Force Policy also has a section on marine 

operations that provides guidance on when it is appropriate to fire warning 

shots. 

Policies Do Not Reflect Lessons Learned 

DHS and components have not incorporated recommendations or lessons 

learned from recent reviews into their use of force policies. A 2011 Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) report10 identified sharing performance trends and 

best practices as examples for improving efficiency efforts across the Federal 

Government. The report found that using a department-level office to 

standardize guidance, training, and lessons learned is a key practice. 

 8 To resolve the reporting issues, ICE implemented an electronic reporting system. See 

Appendix F for more information on the incident tracking process.

9 GAO-14-704G, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, September 2014.

10 GAO-11-908, Streamlining Government, Key Practices from Select Efficiency Initiatives Should 

Be Shared Governmentwide, September 2011.

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Several organizations11 have 

conducted reviews of CBP's use of force 

policy and recommended improvements. “A respect for human life and the For instance, one review recommended communities we serve shall guide 

that CBP include a statement that clearly all employees in the performance of 

sets the limits on use of force, emphasizes their duties. Authorized Officers 

and Agents should employ respect for human life, and reiterates the enforcement tactics and techniques agency’s role in protecting the public. that effectively bring an incident Subsequently, CBP revised its use of force under control, while minimizing the 

policy — including a statement from the risk for injury or property damage. 

CBP Commissioner on respect for human The use of excessive force by CBP 

law enforcement personnel is life. 

strictly prohibited.” 

CBP incorporated additional - CBP’s Commissioner’s 

recommendations into its policy that are Statement in Use of Force 

not included in other components’ use of Policy, Guidelines and 

Procedures Handbook force policies. For example, as a result of 

one review, CBP added a reference to the 

constitutional standards and a key 

Supreme Court decision12 that are the 

criteria used for determining reasonableness of force. Citing this reference 

provides officers a clear understanding of what is appropriate when using force. 

Additionally, CBP added a subsection concerning the limitations of CEW (or 

Electronic Control Device usage). FPS has not made changes to address the 

use of such devices. Specifically, FPS policy does not include prescriptive 

guidance when using CEWs. Components revising their policy to include use of 

CEWs should incorporate the same lessons learned.

From December 2011 to September 2013, CRCL issued memoranda to CBP 

that included recommendations for the proper use of CEWs and 

implementation of use of force policies. However, due to scope limitations, 

CRCL did not share the recommendations on the use of CEWs, which may help 

other components develop or improve their CEW policies and training. 

 11 See Appendix E for brief summaries of reports published by these organizations, including 

the Police Executive Research Forum, the Homeland Security Advisory Council, and the 

American Civil Liberties Union. 

12 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). According to the court decision, the basis of 

reasonableness must recognize that officers are often forced to make split-second judgments 

about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. 

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The Department may miss opportunities to minimize the risk of improper use 

of force when policies are outdated, do not reflect current missions, and do not 

incorporate lessons learned. 

Recurrent Training for Use of Force Can Improve 

DHS and components have not established consistent requirements for lesslethal recurrent training. DHS’ Use of Deadly Force Policy directs components 

to provide less-lethal training. The policy also indicates that DHS components 

may establish policies for weaponless control techniques and less-lethal 

weapons based on each component’s unique law enforcement mission, 

training, and equipment. For example: 

x	 CBP, the Coast Guard, and TSA Federal Air Marshal Service require 

annual training in less-lethal techniques, tactics, and devices. However, 

the Secret Service and OCSO currently do not require annual less-lethal 

training. 

x	 FPS and FEMA have clear training requirements on less-lethal devices. 

However, ICE has unclear recurrent training requirements. Additionally, 

ICE and FPS allow officers 8 hours per quarter for use of force training 

and to demonstrate firearms proficiency. ICE and FPS instructors 

provide courses in different use of force techniques that officers can use. 

Additionally, FEMA law enforcement personnel must complete periodic 

refresher training. However, with a few exceptions, policies do not 

address specific use of force courses and their frequency of instruction. 

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Table 2 summarizes components’ less-lethal recurrent training requirements. 

Table 2: Components’ Less-lethal Recurrent Training Requirements 

Clear 

Requirements 

Unclear 

Requirements 

No Requirements 

CBP 9

ICE* 9

FPS 9

Secret Service 9

TSA** 9

Coast Guard 9

OCSO*** 9

FEMA 9

* During fieldwork, ICE provided a draft Firearms and Use of Force Handbook, which outlines 

clear less-lethal training requirements. However, this draft policy was not finalized at the time 

of our fieldwork. 

** Although TSA policy outlines clear less-lethal training requirements for the Federal Air 

Marshal Service, there are no similar requirements for Office of Inspection law enforcement 

personnel. 

***Although OCSO policy had clear less-lethal requirements regarding batons, OC spray, and 

control tactics, OCSO officials said that use of force training has involved only an annual 

review of OCSO Use of Force policy and written acknowledgement of review. Additionally, law 

enforcement personnel were not authorized less-lethal force options, such as OC spray or a 

baton, at the time of our fieldwork. 

Source: DHS OIG analysis 

Officers and agents surveyed said they could benefit from more training in lesslethal use of force, which provides an alternative to control an individual and 

minimizes the risk of escalating situations to serious and lethal injury. 

According to FLETC officials, although annual training on less-lethal use of 

force is not required, it is recommended. A FLETC report on stress and decision 

making noted that officers are more likely to receive calls to respond to nonlethal than lethal situations. 

Previous reports highlighted the importance of training on less-lethal use of 

force. For instance, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing stated 

that law enforcement agency use of force training policies should include, at a 

minimum, annual training in the use of less-lethal technologies. The report 

also mentioned that use of force training should emphasize de-escalation. 

FLETC instructors also conveyed the importance of providing decision-making 

skills training through realistic scenarios. According to the instructors, 

scenario-based training involves role players and instructors who examine 

officers’ responses and reinforce the legal foundation for using force and 

determining reasonableness of force when making decisions. 

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Incomplete Required Recurrent Training 

Agents and officers do not always complete recurrent training on less-lethal 

use of force and firearms qualifications. Additionally, training instructors do 

not always record or document completion of training. 

We obtained FY 2014 use of force and firearms proficiency training records for 

OCSO, FPS, CBP, ICE, the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, and TSA. Of the 

sample of 1,888 DHS law enforcement officers selected, we found that 687 (36 

percent) officers tested could not provide evidence or documentation of training 

completion. 

Of officers with less-lethal training requirements, 292 of 1,078 (27 percent) 

could not provide documentation of completion. Additionally, of officers who 

had recertification of less-lethal device or techniques requirements, 395 of 

1,078 (37 percent) could not provide documentation of completion. Lastly, of 

officers who had firearms requalification requirements, 267 of 1,888 (14 

percent) could not provide documentation of completion. We did not include 

FEMA in our recurrent training analysis because officers are assigned to one 

location and had no use of force incidents reported in our scope. Appendix G 

contains additional information on testing analysis and components’ specific 

requirements. 

Components do not always ensure officers meet training requirements and 

data entered into systems of records are complete and accurate. For example, 

CBP did not enter training records for 50 officers sampled in their system of 

record. Although components conduct limited oversight through self-inspection 

and review programs, the current activities do not ensure all agents and 

officers complete training. 

A more proactive, centralized approach to monitoring training completion — 

such as the TSA Federal Air Marshal Service’s approach — provides improved 

oversight. Specifically, the TSA Federal Air Marshal Service continuously 

monitors training completion for all officers at the headquarters level. However, 

CBP, ICE, FPS, and the Secret Service delegate oversight to the local field 

offices and sectors. Without consistent oversight, components cannot provide 

reasonable assurance that officers are receiving required use of force training. 

Component management we interviewed reported facing challenges with 

providing training to law enforcement officers. They cited limited availability of 

shooting ranges, training facilities, and instructors. Some field office locations 

must reserve time at training facilities from local law enforcement agencies or 

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private sector sources. These restrictions limit management’s ability to shift 

training based on operational needs and officer schedules. For example: 

x Officers at one CBP field office must rent range time, when available, 

from a local college. Also, because it is an indoor range, officers cannot 

conduct certain training tactics and maneuvers. 

x Officers at one ICE field office said they rely on state and Federal 

partners to access range time, but access is dependent upon availability. 

Federal laws and regulations require agencies to establish training programs 

that support their mission and evaluate the results of such programs and 

plans.13 Government standards emphasize that agencies establish controls that 

include the right training, tools, and structure to ensure the workforce has the 

right skills to meet agency goals. Without establishing consistent requirements 

for less-lethal recurrent training and ensuring training was completed as 

required, DHS cannot be assured its officers have the right skills or tools to 

carry out mission operations most effectively. As a result, DHS may miss 

opportunities to minimize its risk of improper use of force. 

Conclusion 

Given the large number of personnel with law enforcement responsibilities 

within DHS, the Department should be more proactive in tracking use of force 

incidents, conducting trend analysis, and collecting use of force data from the 

components. DHS has an opportunity to improve transparency and 

accountability of use of force and further minimize the risks associated with 

use of force incidents. Those risks include force that would impact the public, 

law enforcement personnel, and the Department’s reputation with respect to its 

mission. 

According to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, law 

enforcement agencies should establish a culture of transparency and 

accountability in order to build public trust and legitimacy. In response to 

allegations of excessive or improper use of force by law enforcement officers, 

the public has called for greater accountability. Various law enforcement 

agencies, such as the New York City and Baltimore Police Departments, have 

conducted reviews of their use of force policies and practices, subsequently 

making improvements. 

 13 5 U.S. Code, Chapter 41 § 4103(a) and 5 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 410 § 410.202 

and § 410.203 

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To better assist the officers, the Department must provide strong oversight, 

ensure components update policies and incorporate lessons learned, establish 

consistent training requirements, and ensure required training is completed. 

Without such oversight and action, DHS cannot be assured it is tracking and 

using the right data; giving officers the right tools; or ensuring transparency 

and accountability necessary for public trust — all critical factors to minimize 

its risk of improper use of force. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Deputy Secretary, Department of 

Homeland Security establish a formal entity at the Department level to oversee 

component use of force activities. Once established, the responsible personnel 

at the Department level should work with the components to: 

a.	 establish minimal requirements for what each component should report 

as a use of force incident and develop a process to collect and report the 

accurate number of incidents; 

b. develop a formal mechanism by which components can share lessons 

learned regarding use of force policies, training, and oversight; 

c.	 collaborate with the components and conduct a review or study to 

identify minimum standards or requirements for less-lethal use of force 

training, and require the components to implement the training; 

d. ensure each component has and uses a system of record to actively 

monitor completion of required recurring training; and 

e.	 continuously improve monitoring of training requirements, address 

training challenges related to resource availability, optimize regional 

efficiencies, and identify opportunities for cooperation to meet training 

related goals. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Deputy Secretary, Department of 

Homeland Security direct the Office of Policy, Law Enforcement Policy to: 

a.	 update DHS’ 2004 Use of Deadly Force Policy and 

b. ensure components’ use of force policies include lessons learned 

resulting from any reviews or shared information. 

DHS Comments 

The Department provided its official response and concurred with both 

recommendations. DHS and the components also provided technical comments 

separately. When appropriate, we made those minor changes throughout the 

report. DHS described its efforts to implement policies, reexamine procedures, 

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and explore new and innovative technologies to improve oversight of use of 

force activities. A summary of the Department’s response and our analysis 

follows. 

OIG Analysis of DHS Comments 

Recommendation 1: Concur. The Department recognized the need for 

improved headquarter oversight and collaboration for use of force activities. The 

Deputy Secretary will establish a Use of Force Steering Committee chaired by 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement Policy and comprise key 

leaders from pertinent DHS operational and headquarters components, to 

develop and implement recommendations of this report, as well as address 

additional key use of force-related issues as appropriate. The committee will be 

established by February 28, 2017 and coordinate across DHS to implement the 

recommendations with an expected completion date of December 31, 2017. 

OIG Analysis: We consider this recommendation resolved and open. The 

Department’s planned corrective actions to establish a Steering Committee as 

the formal entity and coordinate with the components to address the report’s 

issues should improve the use of force activities. We will close the 

recommendation once the Department demonstrates the effectiveness of the 

Steering committee to address the issues identified in the report. 

Recommendation 2: Concur. The DHS Office of Policy has begun to develop a 

Department-wide use of force policy by initiating a comprehensive review of all 

existing DHS and component use of force and other applicable policies. The 

Office of Law Enforcement Policy will continue to work with relevant 

components and other stakeholders until they issue the final policy. This will 

include ensuring best practices and recommendations set forth by the new 

Steering Committee are considered and incorporated into the policy. The 

expected completion date is December 31, 2017. 

OIG Analysis: We consider this recommendation resolved and open. The 

Department’s planned corrective actions to develop a Department-wide use of 

force policy should improve the use of force activities. We will close the 

recommendation once the Department issues the final policy. 

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Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

DHS Office of Inspector General was established by the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 

1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared 

as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and 

effectiveness within the Department. 

We conducted this audit to determine whether DHS and its components have 

controls to minimize risk of improper use of force by law enforcement officers. 

We examined eight DHS components with law enforcement personnel — CBP, 

ICE, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, TSA, FPS, FEMA, and OCSO. We 

excluded FLETC because we did not learn it has law enforcement officers until 

after we completed fieldwork. We also excluded OIG to meet the generally 

accepted government auditing standards conceptual framework approach to 

independence. We met with officials from the DHS Office of Policy who were 

identified as our point of contact for the audit recommendations. 

To answer our objective, we interviewed DHS headquarters officials in CRCL; 

OCSO; CRSO; and Office of Policy, Office of Law Enforcement Policy, as well as 

component officials from the FLETC, FPS, CBP, ICE, the Coast Guard, the 

Secret Service, TSA, and FEMA. We interviewed Department of Justice officials 

to identify the Department’s approach to use of force. 

We judgmentally selected DHS law enforcement field personnel based on those 

officers available the day of our site visit. We obtained the officers’ perspectives 

on recurring training and other areas of concern pertaining to use of force. We 

visited the following locations: Boston, MA; San Diego, CA; Philadelphia, PA; 

Washington, DC; El Paso and Dallas, TX; Jacksonville, FL; and Mount Weather, 

VA. We developed a survey instrument that included recurrent training and 

equipment needs, and we ended the surveys with an open-ended question on 

areas of concern regarding use of force. 

To determine whether DHS and components are overseeing and monitoring use 

of force, we selected a judgmental sample of 46 cases from FPS, CBP, ICE, TSA, 

the Secret Service, and the Coast Guard. We reviewed the cases to determine 

whether the components followed processes for reporting and investigating the 

complaint and to determine the outcome resulting from such investigation or 

complaint. There were no use of force complaints identified within our scope for 

OSCO and FEMA. We did not rely on component allegation data to support 

conclusions or findings and therefore did not test the completeness of 

allegations of excessive use of force provided by components. 

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We obtained use of force incident data from DHS OIG Integrity and Quality 

Oversight, which manages the OIG hotline in which Federal employees and the 

public can report allegations of civil rights abuses to include use of force 

concerns, to determine the number of use of force allegations submitted to the 

OIG. For a limited number of cases referred to the components, we determined 

whether the allegation was investigated. We also obtained use of force incident 

data from CRCL to determine the total number of complaints submitted to 

CRCL by component. 

We also obtained component use of force incident data for FY 2015. We relied 

on the data reported by each component and did not test the data presented in 

this table. The reporting of data varies by component and is dependent on law 

enforcement personnel correctly reporting the use of force per agency 

guidelines. Additionally, the type and quantity of data collected is not consistent 

across the Department. We did not use the data to support our findings and 

conclusions. 

To determine whether DHS and components created and implemented use of 

force policies and procedures, we obtained use of force-related policies and 

procedures, guidance, directives, training manuals, and handbooks from OCSO, 

FPS, CBP, ICE, the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, TSA, and FEMA. We 

assessed each document to determine to what extent it addresses elements of 

use of force, including physical use of force, use of deadly force, use of lesslethal devices, training and proficiency requirements, reporting requirements, 

investigation requirements, disciplinary and corrective actions, and other 

operating environments (i.e., air or water). Additionally, we reviewed prior 

reports related to the use of force to understand previous findings and lessons 

learned. 

To determine to what extent law enforcement officers and agents are being 

trained on use of force, we obtained FY 2014 use of force and firearms 

proficiency training records for OCSO, FPS, CBP, ICE, the Secret Service, the 

Coast Guard, and TSA and selected 1,888 DHS law enforcement officers for 

testing. Specifically, we selected a statistical sample of 1,855 law enforcement 

officers from OCSO, ICE, FPS, CBP, the Secret Service, and TSA for testing 

based on a 95 percent confidence level, 50 percent population proportion, and 5 

percent sampling error. In addition, we selected a judgmental sample of only 33 

Coast Guard law enforcement officers for testing due to limitations in extracting 

Coast Guard training records. We compared the selected law enforcement 

official’s annual training records to component use of force training 

requirements. We performed a limited review of FEMA and did not analyze 

training records because we identified late in fieldwork that FEMA has law 

enforcement officers; these officers are assigned to one location and had no 

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incidents reported for our scope. We also observed training at FLETC in Glynco, 

GA; the Secret Service’s Rowley Training Center in Laurel, MD; and CBP’s Use 

of Force Center for Excellence in Harpers Ferry, WV. 

DHS components use different systems and processes to record and maintain 

training and firearms proficiency completion. For the components in which we 

relied on a statistical sample, we reviewed system controls and determined that 

training records entered into the systems were sufficiently reliable. We 

performed a limited assessment of these systems to determine the integrity and 

reliability of their data. When the systems did not show a record of training, we 

requested components provide source documentation, if available, to verify 

training completion. 

We conducted this performance audit between June 2015 and July 2016 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

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Appendix B 

DHS Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

DHS Law Enforcement Components Reviewed 

Component Mission and Operating Environment 

CBP To safeguard America's borders; thereby protecting the public from dangerous 

people and materials while enhancing the Nation's global economic 

competitiveness by enabling legitimate trade and travel. CBP’s subcomponents 

include Office of Border Patrol, Office of Field Operations, Air and Marine 

Operations, and the Office of Internal Affairs. CBP agents operate along the 

southeast coastal, southwest, and northern borders. 

ICE To enforce Federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and 

immigration to promote homeland security and public safety. ICE’s 

subcomponents include Enforcement and Removal Operations, Homeland 

Security Investigations, and the Office of Professional Responsibility. 

Coast Guard To protect the maritime economy and the environment, defend our maritime 

borders, and save those in peril. The Coast Guard performs 11 missions, of 

which the following are maritime security and law enforcement related: port 

and waterway security, drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and other law 

enforcement. The Coast Guard’s subcomponents include Office of Law 

Enforcement, Office of Aviation Forces including the Helicopter Interdiction 

Tactical Squadron, and Coast Guard Investigative Service. The Coast Guard 

operates in almost every facet of the U.S. maritime environment. 

Secret Service To investigate financial crimes, covering missions such as prevention and 

investigation of counterfeit U.S. currency, U.S. treasury securities, and 

investigation of major fraud. The Secret Service also ensures the safety of 

current and former national leaders and their families, such as the President, 

past Presidents, Vice Presidents, presidential candidates, and visiting heads of 

state. Subcomponents include Uniformed Division, Presidential Protective 

Division, and Office of Professional Responsibility. 

TSA To protect the Nation’s transportation systems ensuring freedom of movement 

for people and commerce. TSA’s subcomponents include Office of Law 

Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service and the Office of Inspection. Federal 

Air Marshals are deployed on U.S. flagged aircraft throughout the world, 365 

days a year. Federal Air Marshals in the aviation sector operate at 30,000 feet, 

in tight quarters, remain vigilant, and are prepared to react to a wide spectrum 

of criminal and terrorist activities. Office of Inspection operates in airports 

identifying vulnerabilities in security systems through operational testing, and 

ensures the integrity of TSA's workforce through special investigations. 

FPS FPS is a subcomponent of National Protection and Programs Directorate. FPS 

is responsible for protecting Federal facilities and those who occupy them. 

Internal Affairs Division is another unit of this Directorate, under the Office of 

Compliance and Security. This Division investigates allegations of misconduct 

committed by NPPD employees. 

OCSO Subcomponent of Office of the Under Secretary for Management responsible for 

safeguarding DHS’s people, property, and information security programs. 

FEMA Mount Weather Police Department is a unit of FEMA. Officers are responsible 

for the protection of property owned or occupied by the Federal Government 

and persons on the property, including duty in areas outside the property to 

the extent necessary to protect the property and persons on the property. 

Source: DHS OIG analysis 

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Appendix D 

FY 2015 Component Use of Force-related Data 

Component Law 

Enforcement 

Personnel 

Arrests/ 

Apprehensions 

Assaults 

on Officer Lethal 

Use of Fo

LessLethal 

rce 

Warning & 

Disabling* 

Total 

Use of 

Force 

CBP 345,236 390 28 728 11 767 

ICE 176,919 20 6 89 N/A 95 

Secret 

Service 

3,008 24 0 Not 

tracked** 

N/A 0 

TSA 34 7 0 1 N/A 1 

FPS 1,673 18 0 10 N/A 10 

OCSO 3 0 0 0 N/A 0 

Coast 

Guard*** 

70,786 2 0 10 61 71 

FEMA 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 

Total 597,659 461 34 838 72 944 * CBP’s Office of Air and Marine Operations and the Coast Guard do not consider warning shots and 

disabling fire to be lethal force. 

** The Secret Service does not track less-lethal use of force. Therefore, the total use of force number 

only reflects lethal use of force instances by the Secret Service in FY 2015. 

*** We excluded the number of Coast Guard Investigative Service law enforcement personnel because 

they were not able to provide FY 2015 data and only provided FY 2016 data. In FY 2016, the Coast 

Guard Investigative Service reported 390 law enforcement officers. In September 2015, the Coast 

Guard updated its tracking system to capture arrest data. Therefore, the number of arrests and 

assaults for FY 2015 was not available. The Coast Guard Investigative Service tracks its own arrest 

data. The Coast Guard’s Maritime Law Enforcement unit tracks vessel boardings, which we included 

in the arrest/apprehension column for this table. We combined the Coast Guard Investigative 

Service arrests with the Maritime Law Enforcement’s boarding numbers to obtain the total 

arrest/apprehensions. 

Source: DHS OIG analysis 

Differences in the Data and Qualifications of the Data: 

We relied on the data reported by each component and did not test the data presented in this 

table. The data are estimated because of the lack of standardized reporting by components. The 

components provided data for law enforcement officers from different dates within FY 2015. 

Because this data are from various points in time in FY 2015 and in some cases from FY 2016, 

the table is not representative of personnel as of September 30, 2015. Therefore, the 

components provided incomplete data that does not reflect cumulative totals of law 

enforcement officers for FY 2015. For example, Coast Guard Investigative Service provided FY 

2016 law enforcement personnel data because the FY 2015 report was not readily available. 

Also, FEMA’s personnel data is based on the roster of law enforcement officers at the time of 

our site visit in the spring of FY 2016. Similarly the Coast Guard Helicopter Interdiction 

Tactical Squadron personnel data is based on the squadron’s roster as of December 14, 2015. 

We also noted that CBP data on incidents of lethal and less-lethal use of force for FY 2015 that 

was publicly available slightly differed from the data provided to OIG in February 2016. In 

addition, ICE provided FY 2015 arrests data from three different offices within the component. 

We also noted that ICE did not have reporting requirements for soft techniques, while USCG 

had a reporting requirement for these techniques. 

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Appendix E 

Summary of Recent Reports on Use of Force 

Date Title Summary 

March 2012 CBP FY 2011 Use of 

Force Report conducted 

by the CBP Office of 

Training and 

Development 

Provides qualitative and quantitative 

review of uses of force of CBP officers 

and agents during FY 2011. Improves 

visibility of use of force applications 

and provides data to enhance and 

improve training and equipment. 

February 2013 U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection Use of Force 

Review: Cases and 

Policies conducted by the 

Police Executive 

Research Forum 

Reviews use of force by CBP officers 

and agents. Analyzes use of force 

policies and specific cases of deadly 

force. Recommends improvement in 

initial reporting, investigation, incident 

review, weapons, personal protective 

gear, and changes to policy. 

April 2013 U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection Use of Force 

Review Report conducted 

by the CBP Use of Force 

Policy Division 

Reviews shooting incidents and 

identifies use of force trends. 

Recommends changes to CBP’s use of 

force policies, equipment, tactics, 

training, and operational posture. 

September 2013 CBP Use of Force 

Training and Actions To 

Address Use of Force 

Incidents (OIG-13-114) 

Reviews allegations of CBP employees’ 

use of excessive force and determines 

what reforms CBP has implemented. 

Recommends improvements to 

training and use of force case 

management. 

February 2014 American Civil Liberties 

Union Recommendations 

Regarding Use of Force 

by U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection Officers 

Makes recommendations to CBP to 

help reduce the incidence of 

unreasonable use of force and 

strengthen oversight and 

accountability. 

May 2015 The President's Task 

Force on 21st Century 

Policing 

Identifies best practices and offers 

recommendations on how policing 

practices can build public trust. 

Includes use of force discussions from 

the point of view of both research and 

policy, and internal and external 

oversight. 

June 2015 Homeland Security 

Advisory Council, Interim 

Report of the CBP 

Integrity Advisory Panel 

Evaluates CBP’s efforts to deter and 

prevent corruption, the use of 

excessive force, and its efforts to 

restore public confidence. Provides 

recommendations based on law 

enforcement best practice for integrity, 

use of force, and transparency. 

Source: DHS OIG analysis 

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Appendix F 

Use of Force Incident Tracking Processes 

Component Incident Tracking Process 

OCSO OCSO provides use of force memoranda to the Office of the General 

Counsel, which is maintained by the Inspections and Program Review 

Unit.

CBP The CBP Office of Training and Development’s Use of Force Center of 

Excellence maintains records of reportable incidents in the electronic 

CBP Use of Force Reporting System. 

ICE The ICE Office of Firearms and Tactics Programs tracked incidents 

manually but implemented an electronic process called Use of Force, 

Assaults and Discharge Reporting System in 2015. 

TSA TSA’s Inspection and Investigation Division uses the electronic Access 

Integrated Database to maintain all use of force-related information. 

FPS According to an Internal Affairs Division official, investigation cases are 

housed in a Microsoft Access database and hard copies. The FPS 

Incident Review Committee must rely on the regions to provide 

documentation on incidents. 

Secret Service The Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility Inspections 

Division maintains allegations in an electronic database called the 

Inspection Tracking System. 

Coast Guard The Coast Guard tracks incident data at the local level and reports it to 

central command, which maintains an electronic database. 

FEMA FEMA has an electronic tracking database for storing incident tracking 

reports. 

Source: DHS OIG analysis 

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Appendix G 

FY 2014 Training Requirements and Analysis 

Recurring Firearms Requalification Requirements and Completion 

Firearms 

Requalification 

Missing Record of 

Requalification 

Percent not in 

Compliance 

OCSO Quarterly 2 of 29 6.9% 

CBP Quarterly* 25 of 381 6.6% 

ICE Quarterly 60 of 420 14.3% 

TSA Quarterly 1 of 400 0.3% 

FPS Quarterly 59 of 270 21.9% 

Secret 

Service Quarterly** 120 of 355 33.8% 

Coast 

Guard Semi-Annual 0 of 33*** 0% 

Total 267 of 1888 14.1% * CBP’s Office of Field Operations changed to a semiannual requalification requirement as of 

FY 2015.
 ** Various factors why an employee would not have a recorded score include operational travel, 

staffing, medical conditions, and extended leave such as for military or administrative reasons. 

*** We selected a statistical sample of 1,855 law enforcement officers from OCSO, ICE, FPS, 

CBP, the Secret Service, and TSA for testing. In addition, we selected a judgmental sample of 

only 33 Coast Guard officers for testing due to limitations in extracting training records. 

Recurring Less-Lethal Use of Force Training 

Requirements and Incomplete Training 

DHS Total Incomplete Training 

Use of Force 

Policy Review 

Less-Lethal 

Training Hour 

Requirement 

Less-Lethal Device 

Recertification (i.e., 

Baton, CEW, OC Spray) 

Less-Lethal Technique 

Training (i.e., Defensive 

Tactics, Control & Arrest 

Techniques) 

8 of 808 (1.0%) 273 of 651 (41.9%) 170 of 697 (24.4%) 227 of 408 (55.6%) 

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CBP Total Incomplete Training 

Use of Force 

Policy Review 

(Annual) 

Less-Lethal 

Training Hour 

Requirement 

(4 Hours / 

Quarter) 

Less-Lethal Device 

Recertification (i.e., 

Baton, CEW, OC Spray) 

(Annual) 

Less-Lethal Technique 

Training (i.e., Defensive 

Tactics, Control & Arrest 

Techniques) 

(Annual) 

3 of 381 (0.8%) 88 of 381 (23.1%) n/a 225 of 381 (59.1%) 

Annual recertification of issued less-lethal devices is required by policy. Less lethal devices 

issued to officers varies dependent upon job duties and program office. As such, we did not test 

recertification. All CBP officers are required to be recertified in defensive tactics, edge weapon 

defense, and arrest and control techniques annually. If any of the three courses listed were not 

complete, the officer is shown as not in compliance. 

NOTE: Recurrent training requirements and testing are based on the 2010 CBP Use of Force 

Policy Handbook, which was effective in FY 2014. For FY 2015, CBP requirements included one 

annual firearms-based use of force scenario. 

FPS Total Incomplete Training 

Use of Force 

Policy Review 

(Quarterly) 

Less-Lethal 

Training Hour 

Requirement 

(8 Hours / 

Quarter) 

Less-Lethal Device 

Recertification (i.e., 

Baton, CEW, OC 

Spray) 

(Annual) 

Less-Lethal Technique 

Training (i.e., Defensive 

Tactics, Control & Arrest 

Techniques) 

(Unclear Requirement) 

n/a 199 of 270 (73.7%) 162 of 270 (60.0%) n/a 

FPS officers must complete 8 hours of training per quarter that includes a review of FPS and 

DHS policies on use of force. FPS policy does not identify specific less lethal technique training 

course requirements. 

TSA Total Incomplete Training 

Use of Force 

Policy Review 

(Annual) 

Less-Lethal 

Training Hour 

Requirement 

Federal Air Marshal 

Service Minimum 

64 Hours/Year 

Office of Inspection 

– No Requirement) 

Less-Lethal Device 

Recertification (i.e., 

Baton, CEW, OC 

Spray) 

(Federal Air Marshal 

Service Annual 

Office of Inspection 

No Requirement) 

Less-Lethal Technique 

Training (i.e., Defensive 

Tactics, Control & Arrest 

Techniques) 

(Office of Inspection - No 

Requirement) 

5 of 400 (1.3%) n/a 6 of 400 (1.5%) n/a 

TSA Federal Air Marshal Service policy requires a minimum of 64 hours of training per year for 

all officers. Certain Federal Air Marshal Service positions are subject to a 160 hours annual 

requirement. Core curriculum training disciplines include defensive measures, firearms, 

intermodal, and legal/investigative.

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
 

 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Coast Guard Total Incomplete Training 

Use of Force 

Policy Review 

(Semi-Annual) 

Less-Lethal 

Training Hour 

Requirement 

(No Hour 

Requirement) 

Less-Lethal Device 

Recertification (i.e., 

Baton, CEW, OC 

Spray) 

(Annual) 

Less-Lethal Technique 

Training (i.e., Defensive 

Tactics, Control & Arrest 

Techniques) 

(Annual) 

0 of 27 (0%) n/a 2 of 27 (7.4%) 2 of 27 (7.4%) 

For the Maritime Law Enforcement and Coast Guard Investigative Service, the recurring 

training for Control Techniques, Aggressive Response Techniques, and intermediate weapons 

(less-lethal) training are on a recurring annual basis. The Helicopter Interdiction Tactical 

Squadron does not have recurring intermediate training due to the nature of its role as an 

aviation unit.

ICE 

According to ICE policy, officers must complete 8 hours of training per quarter, 

which includes firearms requalification. ICE’s training tracking system is 

unable to track training by hours; therefore, less-lethal training requirements 

could not be tested. 

Secret Service 

Secret Service policy does not specify less-lethal use of force recurrent training 

requirements. According to Secret Service officials, the Secret Service is 

developing a regional in-service training curriculum based on its operational 

needs. 

OCSO 

OCSO does not require less-lethal use of force training. 

FEMA 

Late in our fieldwork, we learned that FEMA has law enforcement officers. We 

recognized that these officers are confined to one location and had no incidents 

reported for our scope. As such, we conducted a limited review of FEMA and 

did not test FEMA officers’ training completion. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 30 OIG-17-22 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
 SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix H 

Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report 

Patrick O'Malley, Director 

Robert Greene, Audit Manager 

Kristine Odiña, Analyst-in-Charge 

David DeHaven, Senior Auditor 

Jeanne Garcia, Senior Program Analyst 

Elizabeth Kelleher, Senior Program Analyst 

Paul DeLuca, Auditor 

Kendra Starkus, Program Analyst 

Barry Bruner, Senior Auditor 

John Jadick, Program Analyst 

Muhammad Faizul Islam, Statistician 

Kevin Dolloson, Communications Analyst 

Elizabeth Argeris, Communications Analyst 

Jeff Mun, Independent Referencer 

Jeffrey Wilson, Independent Referencer 

www.oig.dhs.gov 31 OIG-17-22 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
 

 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix I 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Chief Security Officer 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

www.oig.dhs.gov 32 OIG-17-22 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General Public Affairs 

at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click on the red 

"Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at (800) 323-8603, fax our 

hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 

Attention: Hotline 

245 Murray Drive, SW 

Washington, DC 20528-0305