In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 10, 2021

S21A0780. ELLIS v. THE STATE.

 ELLINGTON, Justice.

A Walker County jury found Robert William Ellis guilty of 

malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting 

death of Jeremy Little.1 Ellis contends the trial court erred by

 1 The shooting occurred on March 8, 2017. A Walker County grand jury 

indicted Ellis on October 3, 2017, for malice murder, felony murder, two counts 

of aggravated assault (as to Little and Julie Woody), first degree criminal 

damage to property, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, 

two counts of criminal trespass, and possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon. Ellis’s trial commenced on June 4, 2018. The jury found him guilty on all 

counts except the aggravated assault of Woody. Instead, the jury found Ellis 

guilty of the lesser offense of pointing a gun at Woody. The trial court sentenced 

Ellis to life in prison without parole for malice murder. The court imposed 

concurrent 12-month sentences for pointing a gun at another and both counts 

of criminal trespass. The court also imposed the following sentences to run 

consecutive to the murder sentence: criminal damage to property (10 years), 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (five years), and 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (five years). The court purportedly 

merged the remaining convictions, though the felony murder count was

actually vacated by operation of law. See Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 53 (2) (766 

SE2d 1) (2014). Ellis filed a motion for new trial on June 21, 2018, which he 

subsequently amended. Following a hearing held on July 19, 2019, the trial 
2

admitting into evidence his custodial statement, arguing that his 

statement was made while he was too intoxicated to waive his 

Miranda2 rights. Ellis also contends that his trial counsel was 

ineffective because she did not object when a State’s witness testified 

about what a surveillance video allegedly showed, which Ellis 

argues invaded the province of the jury. For the following reasons, 

we discern no error and affirm the judgment of conviction.

The evidence presented at trial showed that, on March 8, 2017,

Ellis shot and killed Little after Little had allegedly damaged Ellis’s 

1966 Mustang. The shooting was captured on home surveillance 

video. Ellis did not deny shooting Little; rather, his defense at trial 

was that he struck Little with a gun when Little lunged at him with 

a knife, and that the gun went off accidentally, resulting in Little’s 

death. The shooting was preceded by a series of events that angered 

both Ellis and Little.

 

court denied Ellis’s motion for a new trial. Ellis filed a notice of appeal on 

August 12, 2019, and this case was docketed to the April 2021 term and 

submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
3

Amanda Jenkins testified that, on the afternoon before the 

shooting, she encountered Ellis sitting in his white pick-up truck 

near the home of a mutual friend. Jenkins asked Ellis to give her a 

ride to her father’s home, and he agreed. During the drive, Ellis 

showed Jenkins two different guns, and he complained that his 

drugs were missing and that whoever took them “was going to lose 

their life.” Ellis briefly stopped at a store to let Jenkins buy some 

cigarettes. While in the store, Jenkins saw her friend, Julie Woody, 

who was engaged to Little. When Ellis repeatedly called Jenkins on 

her cell phone, Jenkins left the store. When Woody finished 

shopping and walked out to the parking lot, she saw Jenkins sitting 

in the passenger seat of a white truck. When Woody walked toward 

the truck, Ellis, who was bent over outside of the truck, turned 

around abruptly and pointed a large handgun at her. Ellis told

Woody not to walk up on him like that. 

Afraid, Woody asked Jenkins if she would ride home with her 

in her truck, and Jenkins agreed. When the women arrived at 

Woody’s home, Little was there. Jenkins told Little that Ellis had 
4

pointed a gun at Woody. Upon hearing Jenkins’s account of what 

had happened, Little got very upset and angry. He told Woody not 

to call the police, that he would “handle it.” Little gave Jenkins a 

ride home at about 6:40 p.m.

Around 7:30 p.m., Ellis called the police to report that someone 

had damaged his 1966 Ford Mustang. That evening, Ellis posted a 

status on Facebook that read, “Jeremy Little[,] I want you to know 

that [damaging my] ’66 Mustang’s windshield and cutting all four 

tires and running away was your biggest mistake in your life. I’m 

coming.” Then, in the comments section of the post, Ellis wrote that 

he was “pissed” and that Little was “stupid.” 

Woody’s landlord, who lived next door to Woody, had 

surveillance cameras set up that pointed toward the front and back 

doors of Woody’s home. At 7:54 a.m. on March 8, the surveillance 

system recorded Ellis parking his white truck in front of Woody’s 

home. The video showed Ellis get out of his truck, repeatedly swing 

something at Little’s truck, throw something through the back 

window of the house, fire a gun into the back door, and then leave. 
5

Woody woke when she heard gunshots and loud noises that sounded 

as if the “house was falling in.” Woody testified that, while she ran 

to check on her mother and brother, who slept in the front rooms of 

the house, Little ran outside. When he came back inside, he was 

angry, cursing, and saying that Ellis had just shot up the house and 

his truck. 

After the morning’s events, Ellis posted on Facebook: “Hey 

[Little,] who must’ve been the stupidest fool ever lived knowing 

police [and] road blocks ain’t going stop me[.] . . . [C]ome back here 

you fool so I can have life instead of death by injection knowing you 

ain’t going to be [there] to see it.” He also wrote that he was “going 

to give [the emergency] room its next patient.” 

At 1:16 p.m., while Woody and Little were resting in bed, Ellis 

returned to Woody’s home. He was armed with a handgun that he 

had purchased that morning. Woody noticed someone walk by 

outside her bedroom window, and Little went outside through the 

back door to investigate. The surveillance video showed Little 

emerging from his back door. Little stood motionless as Ellis 
6

approached him and struck him in the head with a handgun and 

shot him in the face. Woody testified that, as she rose to follow Little 

outside, she heard a gunshot. Woody ran to the back door, where she 

found Little lying on the ground with a gunshot wound to his jaw.

Ellis stood nearby with a gun in his hand. Ellis told Woody that he 

did not want to kill Little, then fled. Woody saw Little’s pocketknife 

lying open on his abdomen. She handed the knife to her mother, who 

had also come outside, and then Woody held Little until the 

paramedics arrived. Little died as a result of the gunshot wound.

An officer with the Rossville Police Department responded to 

Woody’s house. When he arrived, he found Woody, who was 

distraught, just outside the back door, holding Little. The officer

secured the house for a detective, who arrived shortly thereafter. 

The detective observed that Woody’s house and Little’s truck had 

been damaged. Woody told the detective that Ellis shot Little. While 

the detective investigated the crime scene, the officer went to Ellis’s 

house, but Ellis wasn’t there. The officer observed that Ellis’s 

Mustang, which had been loaded onto a wrecker, had a broken 
7

windshield and flat tires. After the officer photographed the 

Mustang, he drove to a nearby mobile home park, where Ellis had 

been seen, and arrested him. 

After Ellis was arrested, the police took him to the Rossville 

Police Department, where he was read his Miranda rights and 

interviewed. The lead detective and an agent with the Georgia 

Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”) conducted the interview. During the 

video-recorded interview, Ellis admitted that he had purchased a

handgun that morning, and that he intended to carry that handgun 

when he confronted Little for damaging his Mustang. He also 

admitted that he had damaged Little’s truck with a baseball bat, 

damaged the windows of Woody’s home, and kicked the back door. 

Ellis said that he encountered Little outside Woody’s home, and that 

Little swung a knife at him. Ellis said he reacted by hitting Little in 

the head with the gun, which he said accidentally discharged. 

A GBI crime scene investigator testified that he processed the 

scene of the shooting. He recovered three spent .45-caliber shell 

casings from the front of the house, and two from the back. He saw 
8

a footprint on Woody’s back door and noted that the door appeared 

to have cracked from a forceful kick. He also saw a small circular 

defect below the knob on the door that appeared to be a bullet hole. 

The investigator found a bullet behind the door. He also noted 

extensive damage to Little’s truck, and he found a baseball bat in

the truck’s bed. 

Ellis’s .45-caliber Hi-Point pistol was seized from his 

impounded truck and submitted to the GBI for ballistics testing, 

along with the shell casings recovered from the scene of the shooting. 

A GBI firearms examiner determined that the five shell casings

collected from the scene were fired from Ellis’s pistol. The firearms 

examiner testified that the pistol had four separate safety 

mechanisms. His forensic tests revealed that the pistol would not 

fire without pressure being applied to the trigger, and that the pistol 

and its safety mechanisms were functioning properly. 

On March 9, the day after the shooting, a detention deputy 

with the Walker County Sheriff’s Office walked by Ellis’s cell. The 

deputy testified that Ellis told him that he “didn’t have a choice, he 
9

had to kill” Little because Little had a knife. 

A GBI medical examiner testified that Little had multiple 

injuries to his head. He had a laceration and patterned abrasions on 

his forehead that the examiner opined would have required “pretty 

significant force to split the skin and leave those marginal abrasions 

like a pattern.” Little also had a gunshot wound to his cheek with 

gunpowder residue and stippling around it, indicating that the 

weapon had been fired “within a few inches” of Little’s face.

1. Ellis contends that, because he was under the influence of 

drugs when the detective explained his Miranda rights at the 

beginning of his custodial interview, his purported waiver of those 

rights was not voluntary. Therefore, he argues, the trial court erred 

by admitting the video-recording of the interview and the detective’s

testimony concerning statements Ellis made during the interview.3

As explained below, this claim of error is without merit.

 3 Ellis does not challenge the admission of his statement on the ground 

that it was involuntary under the constitutional due process standard, and so 

we do not address that issue. See Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29, 36 (4) (c) (829 

SE2d 131) (2019).
10

“To use a defendant’s custodial statements in its case-in-chief, 

the State must show that the defendant was advised of his Miranda

rights and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived 

them.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hinkson v. State, 310 

Ga. 388, 400 (5) (b) (850 SE2d 41) (2020). A trial court, in assessing 

whether a defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent, “must consider the totality of the 

circumstances to determine whether the defendant’s waiver was 

free of intimidation and coercion and whether the waiver was made 

with a full awareness of both the nature of the rights being 

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon them.” 

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wells v. State, 307 Ga. 773, 776 

(2) (838 SE2d 242) (2020). An appellate court generally reviews a 

trial court’s factual findings and determinations of credibility for 

clear error; however, “where controlling facts are not in dispute, 

such as those facts discernible from a videotape, our review is de 

novo.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. Additionally, 

the intoxication of the accused does not automatically 
11

invalidate his or her waiver of Miranda rights.

Intoxication, standing alone, does not render a statement 

inadmissible. If the evidence is sufficient to establish that 

the defendant’s statement was the product of rational 

intellect and free will, it may be admitted even if the 

defendant was intoxicated when he made the statement.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. 59,

64 (2) (829 SE2d 81) (2019).

Before trial, the trial court held a Jackson-Denno4 hearing. The 

lead detective testified during the hearing, and the State provided 

the court with a transcript of the detective’s custodial interview with 

Ellis. The detective testified that he advised Ellis of his Miranda

rights prior to interviewing him, and the video-recording of the 

interview shows the detective reading those rights to Ellis from a 

pre-printed form. The detective asked Ellis several times whether 

he understood the rights that he was waiving, and Ellis nodded and 

answered “yeah.” The detective also asked Ellis if he had any 

questions, and Ellis answered “no.” Ellis said that he wanted to 

explain what happened. He initialed each of the individual rights on 

 4 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
12

the form read to him, and he signed it at the bottom, indicating that 

he understood the rights he was waiving. The detective asked Ellis 

if he was using any drugs, and Ellis responded that he had “smoked 

a little pot and hit a bowl of meth” about an hour before his arrest.

Ellis admitted that he smoked meth daily and used marijuana

frequently. 

The video-recording of the interview shows that Ellis was able 

to walk, stand, sit, speak, and answer questions without any 

apparent problem. He did not appear to be under the influence to 

the extent that he could not comprehend his rights or understand 

the consequences of their waiver. The detective testified that, based 

on his experience dealing with people who are under the influence 

of drugs, he was not concerned that Ellis’s drug use had impaired

his decision to freely and voluntarily give a statement. During the 

interview, the detective sat just a few feet from Ellis and was able 

to observe him closely. Although Ellis was upset, agitated, and 

displayed a few indicia of intoxication (like dilated pupils), the 

detective said that he and Ellis were able to communicate with each 
13

other without any problem. The detective testified that Ellis gave 

answers that were coherent and responsive to his questions, and 

nothing on the video-recording contradicts the detective’s testimony. 

During the hour-long interview, Ellis recounted his side of the story. 

He told the detective that he retaliated against Little for damaging 

his car, that he bought a pistol that morning because he was afraid 

of what Little and unnamed others might do to him, and that he 

believed he was protecting himself from people who might “burn his 

house down.” The detective testified that many of the details of 

Ellis’s account were consistent with what his investigation had so 

far revealed. When the detective pressed Ellis on whether he had 

planned to shoot Little, Ellis became upset, stopped the interview, 

and demanded a lawyer. Ellis accused the detective of trying to 

make him angry so that he would say something incriminating. Ellis

stood, faced the wall, and put his hands behind his back, inviting the 

detective to handcuff him. The detective ended the interview. 

Although the evidence supports that Ellis was impaired to 

some degree, “the [detective’s] testimony and the recorded interview 
14

indicate that . . . [Ellis’s] mind was nevertheless clear enough to 

make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and to speak to 

the [detective] without an attorney.” Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. at 64 

(2). Under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision to admit 

Ellis’s custodial statements was not clearly erroneous. See id. 

2. Ellis also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object when the detective testified about what the 

surveillance video allegedly showed, which Ellis argues invaded the 

province of the jury. Specifically, Ellis contends that his trial counsel 

should have objected when the detective narrated the surveillance 

video, identifying Ellis and giving a “play-by-play” of what the video 

purportedly showed Ellis and Little doing. As explained below, this 

claim of error is without merit.

To succeed on this claim, Ellis must demonstrate both that his 

trial counsel performed in a constitutionally deficient manner and 

that, absent counsel’s deficient performance, a reasonable 

probability exists that the outcome at trial would have been 

different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-695 (III) 
15

(104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If he fails to satisfy either part 

of this test, we need not consider the other. See Richards v. State, 

306 Ga. 779, 781 (2) (833 SE2d 96) (2019). To prove deficient 

performance, Ellis must show that trial counsel performed “in an 

objectively unreasonable way, considering all of the circumstances 

and in light of prevailing professional norms.” (Citation and 

punctuation omitted.) Reyes v. State, 309 Ga. 660, 669 (3) (847 SE2d 

194) (2020). “A strong presumption exists that counsel’s conduct 

falls within the broad range of professional conduct.” (Citation and 

punctuation omitted.) Id. “Thus, deficiency cannot be demonstrated 

by merely arguing that there is another, or even a better, way for 

counsel to have performed.” Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 144 (3) (829 

SE2d 321) (2019). Further, “[t]rial tactics and strategy . . . are almost 

never adequate grounds for finding trial counsel ineffective unless 

they are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would 

have chosen them.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McNair v. 

State, 296 Ga. 181, 184 (2) (b) (766 SE2d 45) (2014). For example, it 

may be “a sound defense strategy to minimize objections in an effort 
16

to show the jury that the defense had nothing to hide.” Hartsfield v. 

State, 294 Ga. 883, 889 (3) (b) (757 SE2d 90) (2014).

During the hearing on Ellis’s motion for a new trial, his trial 

counsel testified that, given the overwhelming evidence against 

Ellis, including the video and eyewitness testimony as well as Ellis’s 

own admissions, her theory of defense was that Ellis did not intend 

to shoot Little. She hoped to secure a conviction for involuntary 

manslaughter based on Ellis’s contention that the gun discharged 

when he struck Little with it during their confrontation.5 Counsel 

believed she had a strong chance of successfully attacking the intent 

element of malice murder by focusing on that portion of the 

surveillance video where Ellis appeared surprised when his gun 

went off as well as those portions of his custodial statement where 

he said that he did not plan to shoot Little; rather, he only wanted 

to “smack” him with the gun “to scare him.”

Counsel also testified that she chose not to object to the 

 5 Defense counsel requested, and the trial court gave, jury instructions 

on involuntary manslaughter and battery. Counsel did not ask for, and the 

court did not give, a jury instruction on self-defense.
17

detective’s narration of the video because it did not hurt the defense

theory and because it was largely consistent with Ellis’s account of 

events. Counsel believed that the video showed not only Ellis’s 

surprise, but also his immediate remorse and fear. Counsel believed

that any attempt to limit the detective’s testimony might make the 

jury think the defense was hiding something. It would also prevent 

her from eliciting during cross-examination similar narration from 

the detective that favored Ellis. The trial transcript shows that 

counsel indeed went through the surveillance video with the 

detective on cross-examination, highlighting those moments where 

Little is holding a knife and, given the quality of the recording, it is 

impossible to see Little’s facial expression, which Ellis had described 

during his custodial interview as menacing. Counsel also asked the 

detective leading questions that served to narrate the video, such as: 

“And what we could see there Mr. Ellis was doing was grabbing his 

head in astonishment about what happened, right?” 

In ruling on Ellis’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 

trial court found that identification was not a disputed issue in the 
18

case. The court also concluded that counsel was not ineffective, and 

that it was a reasonable strategy for trial counsel not to object to the 

detective’s narration under the circumstances. We discern no error 

in the court’s ruling, and, based on the foregoing, the record shows 

that trial counsel’s decision not to object to the detective’s narration 

of the surveillance video was a matter of reasonable trial strategy.

See Starks v. State, 283 Ga. 164, 167-168 (6) (b) (656 SE2d 518) 

(2008). Because Ellis cannot show that his trial counsel acted 

deficiently, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See 

Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870 (2) (734 SE2d 876) (2012).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., 

not participating.