Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about 

Joint Special Operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and 

recommendations of national security professionals and Special Operations Forces’ students and leaders for consideration by the SOF 

community and defense leadership. 

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the US Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The mission of 

the Joint Special Operations University is to educate SOF executive, senior 

and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international 

security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, 

outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. 

JSOU provides education to the men and women of Special Operations 

Forces and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department 

where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and these operational 

priorities: 

• Preempting global terrorist and CBRNE threats

• Enhancing homeland security

• Performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conven-

 tional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries

• Conducting proactive stability operations

• Executing small-scale contingencies

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency and US military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsou.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem

President

Editorial Advisory Board

John Alexander

Ph.D., Education

The Apollinaire Group and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

JSOU Senior Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Retired

JSOU Institutional 

Integration Division Chief

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution Stanford 

Univ. and JSOU Senior Fellow

George Emile Irani

Ph.D., International Relations

Toledo International Center for 

Peace and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel U.S. Air Force

USAFSOS Commandant

Brian A. Maher

Ed.D., Education

JSOU Vice President

Michael C. McMahon

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

JSOU Strategic Studies Department Director

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

JSOU Senior Fellow

¡lvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, 

Brazilian Army, Retired

JSOU Associate Fellow 

Kenneth H. Poole

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Retired

JSOU Senior Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Director of Homeland Security

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Labs

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General,

U.S. Army, Retired

Alutiiq, LLC

Joseph A. Stuart

Ph.D., Educational Leadership

JSOU Dean of Academics

J.P de B. Taillon

Ph.D., International Affairs

Royal Military College of Canada

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History

Courage Services, LLC and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group

William S. Wildrick

Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired

JSOU Senior Fellow
JSOU Report 06-2

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2006

Civil-Military

Operations

and

Professional Military

Education

James F. Powers, Jr.
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the U.S. 

Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or the Joint Special 

Operations University. 

*******

Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. 

Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-

2763; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.

af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-01-6
iii

Contents

Foreword ............................................................................. v

About the Author .................................................................vi

1. Introduction ..................................................................... 1

2. Historical Context of Civil-Military Operations ................. 3

3. Current Guidance .......................................................... 17

4. Views from the Field ...................................................... 27

5. Conclusions and Recommendations ............................... 35

Endnotes ............................................................................. 37

Bibliography ...................................................................... 49
Previous Publications of the JSOU Press

2004–2005 JSOU/NDIA Essays, April 2005

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, June 2005

Russian Special Forces, August 2005

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

The Evolving Requirements of the 

Canadian Special Operations Forces, September 2005

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Operationalizing COIN, September 2005

Joseph D. Celeski

Theoretical Perspectives of 

Terrorist Enemies as Networks, October 2005

Robert G. Spulak and Jessica Glicken Turnley

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005

Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005

James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006

Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro
v

Foreword

The chaotic situations leading to the rich history, vignettes, and 

importance of civil-military operations (CMO) encompass missions requiring diplomatic, informational, military, and economic prowess on every level. From infantry squad to Army Group, 

from hamlet to country, and from assisting local tribal leaders to replacing entire political regimes with their ideologies and institutions, 

the examples are endless. From the Mexican War of 1846 through 

both theaters of war in World War II to present-day operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, the fact remains that armies of all types must 

plan for and execute CMO as part of the overall political-military 

campaign. 

Ironically though, CMO has yet to be included as a core foundational learning area of officer Professional Military Education (PME). 

Although some aspects are addressed at various levels, CMO has yet 

to assume a position of relevance commensurate with the historical 

number of missions conducted and resources expended throughout 

the history of the US Armed Forces. 

Time is a daunting enemy facing both the commandants of the 

service PME institutions and commanders of special operations forces (SOF) when preparing for operations. It may be understandable 

then why units spend the majority of available time on the combat-related, life-threatening skills. Only when a situation affording 

extra time occurs can unit commanders look beyond the combat-related, kinetic skills to the secondary skills required to fully win the 

peace—transitioning from their primary role to something other than 

primary—something required in that phase of the campaign following combat.

In this monograph, the author addresses the historical, legal, 

doctrinal, and operational reasons CMO should be included in core 

PME. He discusses the impacts of this omission on the SOF assigned 

to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and 

suggests that the time to correct the oversight is now. 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon

Director, Strategic Studies Department

Joint Special Operations University 
vi

About the Author

James F. Powers, Jr. is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University under contract with Science Applications International Corporation. 

Since his retirement from the military in 2001, he has served as 

a special operations consultant supporting the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (C3I) and a program manager for the Dean, US Army 

War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Before his retirement from active duty as a US Army Special Forces Colonel, he 

served as the Director, Special Operations and Faculty Instructor at 

the US Army War College. Other military duties have included command of the US Army’s only active duty Civil Affairs battalion, and 

various command and staff assignments in the United States, Korea, 

and Germany.

Powers is a graduate of the University of Alabama, the US Army 

Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College. 

He earned a Master’s Degree in Public Administration at Shippensburg University (Pennsylvania).

He is the coauthor of Civil Affairs: A Function of Command, Military Review (1995) and the author of National Assistance and CivilMilitary Operations: The Gap in Professional Military Education, US 

Army War College (1996). As a Faculty Instructor at the US Army 

War College, he authored three core lessons and five electives: Special Operations, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Civil-Military 

Operations, and Special Operations Case Studies. 
1

Powers: CMO and PME 

1. Introduction

On 2–3 June 1999, the National Defense University (NDU) 

hosted a symposium entitled: “Beyond Jointness: Civil-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance.” LTG Richard A. Chilcoat, then President of NDU, set the 

tone for the symposium in his opening remarks.

Military leaders have historically been ill-prepared to deal with 

the ambiguities of civil-military operations or to integrate their 

efforts effectively with the increasingly diverse array of civilian 

partners involved. Civil-military responsibilities may be necessary to secure victory, but military leaders have never eagerly 

welcomed them. In the midst of the American Civil War, William 

T. Sherman acknowledged the demanding nature of civil-military missions when he complained that ironically, “success was 

crippling our armies in the field by detachments to guard and 

protect the interests of a hostile population.” Charles Magoon’s 

1903 report on the Caribbean territories identified inadequacies similar to those we find today: in military training for civil 

tasks and in the cooperation between US military and civilian 

agencies. Irwin Hunt’s report after World War I found American 

training and organization inadequate to the task of post-conflict operations.1

The story of CMO during WWII ranges from assisting villages to 

replacing Fascist and Nazi ideology and institutions. The impact of 

these activities is evident in General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s letter to 

General George C. Marshall a few weeks after Germany’s surrender 

in 1945.

The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside 

the military’s scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I 

live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in 

political and economic matters.2

Since WWII these same type activities have become no less important. The experiences of one officer further emphasize the historical lessons.

Anyone who is strictly a combat-arms soldier and doesn’t see 

or feel the need for CMO or how CMO can help is unbelievably 

mistaken. Even those not convinced of the mantra of “winning 

the hearts and minds” must appreciate the most effective use 

of CMO: intelligence gathering.3
2

 JSOU Report 06-2

This monograph addresses the background and reasons CMO 

should be incorporated as core Professional Military Education (PME) 

and the impacts on the SOF assigned to the United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM). The reasons for this omission 

are much less important than correcting the omission.

During the establishment of USSOCOM the rationale for leveraging the existing Service PME institutions for SOF PME was wise. 

Exposing special operations officers to service and joint doctrines/

concepts develops a synergy not otherwise attained.

Nevertheless, this exposure to Service and joint doctrine has 

slowly caused gaps in the continuing PME of special operations officers.4 The gaps were unperceivable and caused only minor perturbations in officer professional development. It appeared as if on-the-job 

training was actually a synonym for SOF Continuing Education. 

This monograph identifies factors that will lead towards enhancing Joint Professional Military Education for SOF. The objectives 

are:

1. Identify historical examples of CMO as they relate to PME.

2. Identify the legal basis for CMO in PME.

3. Identify the directive and doctrinal basis for CMO in PME.

4. Identify essential CMO skills and planning factors required 

for post-conflict operations.

5. Provide recommendations for narrowing the gap in CMO PME 

for SOF.

To accomplish these objectives this monograph identified four 

areas directly affecting core PME for SOF:

The Historical Context of CMO is provided in Section 2. 

Current Guidance: The Law and DoD Directives are discussed in 

Section 3. 

Views from the Field are provided in Section 4. 

The author’s Conclusions and Recommendations are provided in 

Section 5. 

•

•

•

•
3

Powers: CMO and PME 

2. Historical Context of 

 Civil-Military Operations

This chapter provides a frame of reference for understanding 

CMO and why senior leaders at every level must be educated. 

Presented fi rst is the current doctrinal overview of CMO. A discussion and analysis of historical examples of CMO follow.

Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the melding of responsibilities and obligations facing commanders when their operations 

encounter civilians within the area of operations. 

The following defi nition provides the conceptual framework. Reality, however, provides the actual defi nitive examples. 

Civil-military operations (CMO) encompass the activities that 

joint force commanders (JFCs) take to establish and maintain 

positive relations between their forces, the civil authorities, and 

the general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, 

neutral, or hostile areas where their forces are employed in 

order to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and 

achieve US objectives.5

The types of CMO are further described:

Foreign humanitarian assistance is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions.

Populace and resource control assists host nation governments 

or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population 

centers and resources to preclude complicating problems that 

may hinder accomplishment of the JFC’s mission.

Figure 1. CMO results when civil society and military operations overlap.
4

 JSOU Report 06-2

Nation assistance operations involve civil or military assistance 

rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on 

agreements mutually concluded between the United States and 

that nation.

Military civic action involves activities intended to win support 

of the local population for the foreign nation and its military. 

Military civic actions are predominantly conducted by indigenous military personnel, while US forces provide advice, supervision, or technical support.

Emergency services are all those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: minimize the effects upon the civilian population which would be caused by a disaster; deal with 

the immediate emergency conditions which would be created 

by any such disaster; and effect emergency repairs to, or the 

emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed 

or damaged by any such disaster.

Civil administration is a unique action undertaken by US commanders only when directed or approved by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Civil administration support consists 

of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities 

that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US 

and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory.

Domestic support operations usually occur after a Presidential 

declaration of a major disaster and are designed to supplement 

the efforts and resources of state and local governments and 

voluntary organizations. The US military normally responds to 

domestic emergencies in support of another agency.6

US military doctrine has used a linear 

approach to planning and conducting operations: desired events can be envisioned and sequenced chronologically to occur in stages or 

phases. This facilitates transition of not only 

thought, but manpower, resources, and transfer of authority/handoff. Phases refer to overall 

efforts and not the actions of particular elements within the force, i.e. 

every unit in an operation may not be active within the same phase 

as other units. For example, bulk fuel handlers, cooks, engineers, 

and nurses perform their skills without regard for any phase designation. To assure uniformity within the conceptual process DoD has 

US military doctrine 

has used a linear 

approach to planning and conducting operations ...
5

Powers: CMO and PME 

directed that future publications will require plans to be structured 

in six phases:

 Phase 0: Shape

 Phase I: Deter

 Phase II: Seize the Initiative

 Phase III: Dominate

 Phase IV: Stabilize

 Phase V: Enable Civil Authority.7

The lessons derived from military operations further supported 

this linear approach. During the Vietnam War, however, US military 

planners began to see the beginnings of friction between this linear 

approach and the emerging irregular/unconventional type warfare. 

Military units were no longer moving across the battlespace freeing 

the populace, establishing lasting security systems, and resurrecting infrastructure. Civil infrastructure and societal systems were not 

rebuilt, reinstated, and then transitioned to a host nation authority 

in the aftermath of conflict. The US military doctrinal approach was 

being challenged, but too few saw it as anything of concern. This was 

irregular warfare, an aberration. Don’t overreact and rethink existing 

doctrine. What worked in the WWII will work anywhere under similar 

conditions, thought some planners.

As military planners and civilian strategists would later realize, 

operations occur both simultaneously and nonsequentially and not 

always chronologically and sequentially.8 In the following sections, 

we’ll explore historical examples of CMO occurring wherever and 

whenever required, and without any regard for whether it was preplanned or not.

The Early Military Strategists. Although the term CMO was not used 

by any of the early military strategists, some PME institution faculty members believe that Clausewitz’s concept of Operational Art

did address and provide for what is known today as post-conflict 

operations. Considering the campaign nature of these operations, 

where the armed forces are required to execute noncombat tasks 

and activities in support of strategic objectives, they asserted that his 

principles and tenets remain valid. The majority of their colleagues, 

however, did not share this view. Early armies, they argue, were not 

concerned with cleaning up the aftermath and rebuilding infrastructure. Differing opinions thus exist on how CMO might be addressed 

when studying the writings of these early strategists.
6

 JSOU Report 06-2

Mexico, 1846–1848. In 1848, during the US Army’s Vera Cruz occupation, BG William Worth derived a model for administering the civilian sector charged to him following hostilities. Without any existing 

doctrine, he envisioned a strategy separating the civil functions into 

six (6) areas: fiscal affairs, public works, public health, public safety, 

legal affairs and education.

Philippines, 1889–1903. Of the US military examples of operations requiring major CMO to influence overall campaign success, perhaps 

the US Army’s experience in the Philippines provides the most varied 

examples. After linear, European-style operations had appeared to 

quiet the insurrection, a new phase emerged: guerrilla insurgency. 

At the time, the prevailing doctrine was Euro-centric, i.e., based on 

a conventional opponent using similar tactics. Following the conventional combat phase and imposition of martial law, Major General 

Elwell S. Otis was appointed the Military Governor. Realizing that 

local dynamic situations and conditions required tailored solutions, 

Major General Otis encouraged and permitted creative civil affairs 

operations suited for each locality. The degree to which his focus 

changed while conducting CMO is summarized here:

At the close of his 1st year as Military Governor, GEN Otis wearily noted that his Civil Affairs/Military Government responsibilities consumed more of his resources than did the actual 

fighting. ... The experience of the past year has conclusively 

demonstrated that the labor demanded to organize, supply, 

command, and exchange an Army actively engaged in hostilities are small in comparison to those which are required to 

supervise the business, social and political interests and the 

individual rights of several million of people.9

WWI, 1914–1919. Following the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 

1919 ending World War I in Germany, US Armed Forces found themselves in occupation duty, in charge of millions of civilians.

The US Army and government had not really accepted the administration of civil government in occupied enemy territory 

as a legitimate military function after the Mexican War, Civil 

War, or Spanish-American War, and the officer in charge of civil 

affairs for the US military government in the Rhineland after 

World War I lamented that the American army of occupation 

“lacked both training and organization” to perform its duties.10

Just as expected, clarity and vision did appear following the war 

when the US Army War College (USAWC) included civil affairs as 
7

Powers: CMO and PME 

a subject area within the G-1 (Personnel) and War Plans Division 

Course in 1919. Civil Affairs remained in the curriculum until the 

US entered WWII. In 1925, the USAWC reinstituted civil affairs as a 

curriculum component of the G-1 section.

The Army, now aware from its Rhineland Military Government 

experience that there was a need for Civil Affairs sections in 

its war plans, made such planning a part of the War Plans 

Course.11

WWII, 1941–1945. The inter-war period provided military planners 

and strategists the time to ponder civil issues requiring military support and vice versa. The lessons of WWI and the Philippines provided an excellent foundation for understanding CMO required during post-conflict operations. This research and analysis served as an 

epiphany to some; doctrine had finally emerged.

As WWII approached, Army War College committees went back 

to the WWI reports and developed formal doctrine for military 

government. In the spring of 1942, a School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia, and thinking began about postwar reconstructions of Germany, Japan, 

and Italy.12

As Operation OVERLORD unfolded across the beaches of Normandy, the supporting operations concerned with restoring civil 

infrastructure, societal institutions, and rule of law in the wake of 

death and destruction were just beginning. These tasks and activities were referred to at the time as either Civil Affairs or Military 

Government,

13 depending on the particular activity under discussion. 

Both are now doctrinally considered supporting missions of CMO. 

Using Operation OVERLORD as an example, allied military forces 

might have easily won the war but lost the ensuing peace without 

CMO. Military Government also applies to civilians, but specifically 

to the implementation of the rule of law at every level by an occupying martial authority. This is martial law and the point where the 

Army term stability and support operations enters the picture to describe the overall ground-related activities normally occurring postconflict. For a more detailed explanation, see US Army Field Manual 

3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations.14

But skepticism was still looming among key cabinet advisors 

regarding the involvement of other agencies of the US Government 

(USG). President Franklin D. Roosevelt even studied the issue and 
8

 JSOU Report 06-2

believed CA/MG were civilian matters and therefore should be under 

the Department of State (DoS). His Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, however, did not agree.

Stimson tried to point out that no one could tell how long hostilities or any post-hostilities period of unrest might continue 

and that it would take soldiers to deal with these conditions 

over the long run.15

Korea, 1951–1953. Using the civil affairs tenets and principles derived 

from its WWII occupation, the US Army in Korea again validated the 

need for addressing and preparing for civil affairs.

Analysis of the missions of civil affairs indicated: 

• The need to negotiate civil affairs agreements during the early 

stages of conflict, providing those controls over the internal 

affairs of the combat areas that are necessary to attain the 

military and political objectives

• The inseparability of military command and civil affairs responsibilities, and the importance of both a single focus of 

responsibility within the Army for all civil affairs functions, 

and a single point of contact within the Army for relationships with governments of the operational areas

• The need for officers qualified in civil affairs functions, including officers skilled in the language of the area

• The need to alert commanders and other military personnel 

to the importance of civil affairs in attaining military and political objectives16

Vietnam, 1962–1974. From the previous examples and vignettes, and 

from ad hoc guidance to newly formulated principles and doctrine, 

the uniqueness of CMO across the battlefield was tested in Vietnam. 

The functions of the DoD and the DoS, both focusing on specific civilian aspects of the campaign were on a collision course. This collision of thought precipitated a new shape and function. The necessity 

to link two separate and distinct programs (one military, one civilian) 

produced the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Program, a military program actually residing within 

the DoS.17 This innovative and successful program produced not 

only an active, engaging, and meaningful CMO program supporting 

the Vietnamese populace but also served to support the overall campaign plans of the USG and that of the Republic of Vietnam. Initially 

viewed as two unrelated programs, it took President Lyndon John-
9

Powers: CMO and PME 

son’s direction to make it work. The unique aspect of this program 

was that DoS and DoD were linked and focused on the same task. 

Instead of having two separate elements, the CORDS Program used 

a combined civil-military organization to focus on the holistic, synergistic effort required. The CORDS Program, initially run by former 

Ambassador Robert Komer, resided structurally within the MACV 

but reported directly to President Johnson. As conditions and situations surfaced requiring military resources and security, the MACV 

commander provided them.18

Panama, 1989. Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY provided special operations planners with a chance to prove how advanced planning for 

CMO across all phases can insure mission success. 

In the face of extensive looting and violence in downtown Panama City, [GEN Maxwell R.] Thurman predicted a complete 

breakdown in law, order, and public safety unless he took immediate actions. As soon as the Endara [Guillermo Endara 

Galimany] government could provide Panamanian personnel, 

they would be integrated into the operation. ... Regular combat 

with PDF elements wound down during the next four days, but 

the need to deal with remnants of the PDF19 and to conduct 

civil-military operations increased. ... GEN Thurman created a 

CMOTF20 combining some of his own troops [USSOUTHCOM] 

and those of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion ... and 300 reservists who would follow over the next three weeks. ... The first 

stage of Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY concentrated on public 

safety, health, and population control measures. Later, the US 

country team and the new Panamanian government took responsibility for population control, rebuilding commerce, winning the support of the people for reforms, and restructuring 

the PDF into separate police, customs, and defense organizations. ... From 26 Dec to 3 Jan, Civil Affairs and Special Forces 

troops helped distribute 1,600 tons of food ... and 218 tons of 

medical supplies. They also organized a camp at Balboa for 

nearly 5000 persons displaced by the fighting.21

Kuwait, 1991. Operation DESERT STORM provided a unique example 

of how a vision for CMO can support a campaign. This one, however, 

did not commence with a commander’s vision.

A combined and interagency task force called the Kuwait Task 

Force ... did provide the needed direction and assistance for the 

reconstruction of Kuwait City. However, such a task force was 

not conceived by CENTCOM or the military. It was an initiative 

by Colonel Randall Elliott, who happened to hold a position in 
10

 JSOU Report 06-2

two separate organizations. ... senior analyst in the Near East 

Division of the Department of State and also the operations 

officer of the 352d Civil Affairs Command. Therefore he understood the interagency and multinational requirements for 

termination and the post-conflict situation. ... the Kuwait Task 

Force did prove successful, in large part because of the experience of the key individuals and the funding made available by 

the Kuwaiti government in exile.22

Southern Turkey/Northern Iraq, 1991–1992. In the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, Saddam Hussein launched retaliatory attacks 

against his long-time enemies, the Kurds. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, a joint/combined security and CMO to render life-saving humanitarian assistance/safe passage to the fleeing Kurds, began with 

a conventional airdrop of water and food by US European Command 

(USEUCOM) USAF aircraft. When it became apparent that supplies 

alone would not resolve the situation, President George Bush made 

the decision to place troops on the ground to render life-saving emergency aid and provide security. The key aspects of this operation 

were the time-sensitive nature of the deployment, the simple and unambiguous guidance, the conditions for end-state (Kurds returned 

to Iraq and a seclusion zone established to guarantee their security), 

and the transition and handoff to a nonmilitary entity (UN). This was 

straightforward combined/joint military-led humanitarian assistance operation conducted within a security umbrella. The inherent 

skills of the participating military units accounted for the majority 

of skills required for success. What surfaced as a major lesson was 

the need to understand and work with the many IO and NGO that 

arrived to conduct their operations when/where they desired.23

Somalia, 1993. By the time US military forces entered Somalia with 

the sole mission to provide security for convoys providing humanitarian relief supplies, military planners knew enough about CMO 

to ask for their respective WARTRACE24 civil affairs units. The 352 

Civil Affairs Command and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion deployed 

assets to provide the nucleus for the JTF civil-military operations 

center (CMOC) and six (6) Humanitarian Operations Centers to be 

located throughout the area of operations. Coordinating their actions 

through the CMOC, Marine and Army CA units provided security and 

coordinated humanitarian assistance supplies while also superbly,

“... gathering information on issues that included refugee health, the 
11

Powers: CMO and PME 

development of tribal consuls and the effects of food distribution on 

the local economy.”25

After Action Reports and personal vignettes from soldiers assigned to the 96th CA Battalion indicated that with the few exceptions 

of force protection constraints, civil affairs teams and unit CMO Staff 

Officers were able to effect coordination and orchestrate the efforts of 

most of the international and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) 

with a synergy otherwise unattainable.26

The Balkans, 1993–1999. As US Armed Forces entered the Balkans, 

commanders came face-to-face with CMO and the reality that all 

units, regardless of type, have inherent skills in supporting and 

conducting limited CMO. But force protection measures severely 

hindered many units from effecting the coordination required to 

execute even the simplest of CMO. Civil Affairs units, attached to 

conventional units and task forces, found themselves bound by the 

supported unit’s force protection measures. These measures required that any element leaving the garrison or camp had to be accompanied by security vehicles both front and rear. Many of these 

supported units failed to understand the implications of command 

relationships, in this case, attachment. Since the CA units were attached to the supported units, the supported unit had the responsibility for providing all support, including organic security. Thus, 

many planned CMO missions were never realized and executed due 

to the lack of knowledge of the supported units. This was another 

example of commanders not understanding that CMO is a command 

responsibility, not a specific unit responsibility, e.g., CA.

In 1999, the United States Institute of Peace conducted a conference with senior commanders after their deployment in the 

Balkans to determine how prepared they were to face a stability 

operation. The conclusion was that the Institutional Education 

System [PME] had failed to prepare them.27

Haiti, 1994–1995. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, in terms of innovative approaches for CMO, was as rich as Bosnia-Herzegovina but 

less dangerous. But the same force protection mind set crippled the 

JTF Commander, MG David Meade, from acting proactively with his 

10th Mountain Division (Light). BG Richard W. Potter, Jr., Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) subordinate to the 

JTF realized that the initiative had to be seized in restoring security in 

Port-au-Prince and then spread countrywide. BG Potter moved from 
12

 JSOU Report 06-2

a static presence in Port-au-Prince to returning and restoring civil 

infrastructure systems throughout the major cities, power nodes, 

and opening lines of communication. Attaching civil affairs teams to 

his Special Forces teams and then deploying them to 27 cities was 

the first step in reading the pulse of the populace and determining 

what was needed, where was it needed, who had it, and what assets 

were available to move it there. 

One notable example was Operation Light Switch, the restoration 

of limited electricity to several major population centers. His CMO 

Staff Officer, MAJ Mike Czaja and later MAJ Steve Meddaugh, both 

from the 96th CA Battalion, coordinated CMO tasks and activities 

with the J3-CMO of the JTF, MAJ Robin Friedman. 

The successes of BG Potter’s JSOTF have been captured in numerous lessons learned, after action reports, and monographs. The 

creative CMO approaches of the JSOTF opened the eyes of the JTF 

commander and staff and that of the US Atlantic Command to commence even more CMO.28

Afghanistan, 2001. In the aftermath of the combat raids on Taliban 

and Al Qaeda terrorist training sites, US military forces began to 

reassemble the necessary infrastructure previously destroyed by the 

Taliban leadership. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM continues to 

provide vignettes highlighting CMO planning and its impact on the 

overall campaign. The following examples are testimony to the effects 

of CMO on the campaign. 

– Central Command established a Humanitarian Assistance 

Working Group at its headquarters in Tampa to integrate the 

efforts of the coalition partners with the UN and NGOs. A liaison cell composed of representatives from the NGO InterAction, 

the UN Office of Humanitarian Assistance, and the UN Joint 

Logistics Center worked in close coordination with the J5 ... 

and the Deputy Commander of Central Command to present 

the positions of those agencies and reach mutually acceptable 

solutions to problems. In the operational area, a Combined 

Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force with subordinate 

CMOCs was formed.29

– These principles of find-fix-and-finish are what helped us defeat the Al Qaeda and the anticoalition militants in the Bermel 

Valley, but what won on the larger and long-term level was 

getting out and engaging the local population. This was done 

through our CMOs and local projects completed by the members of the Coalition Joint Civil Military Task Force and other 
13

Powers: CMO and PME 

government agencies ... as well as with the support of some 

nongovernment organizations. You only truly know your AO 

when you get out and engage the population; they only come to 

trust you when you do so.30

– All of our PRT [provisional reconstruction teams] were task 

organized to suit the particular situation in a particular city, 

village, and district. My PRT comprised civil affairs, security, 

agriculture, a host nation rep, USAID, multinational elements, 

a CMOC, a Department of State rep, a rep from the Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior, interpreters, maintenance, military police, communications, medical, contracting, and corps 

of engineers.31

The demand for civil affairs, military police, medical, logistics, 

transportation, contracting, and engineer assets will continue until 

mission completion. This continual drain, assuming troop force levels remain constant, will eventually impact on other military units. 

This in turn, may affect their specified mission.32 The following vignette highlights the need to forecast CMO assets during the planning stage. It also presents a trend seen more and more—contracting for local services (material, services and/or labor). Whether more 

appropriate for education or training, the requirement still exists. 

In some cases, expertise is needed down to platoon/company level; 

hence the reason for the PRT to include contracting expertise. Waiting for the higher headquarters CMOC or CA teams to coordinate 

such support hinders the local, on-the-scene commander in the execution of his CMO.

Innovative ways of supplying nonstandard items must be developed. There are key downsides to using local transportation. In 

OEF, the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force 

(CJCMOTF) contracted local trucks to supply the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Centers (CHLC) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Many times 30–50% of the supplies on 

these trucks were pilfered. Because of the light footprint, CJTF 

180 did not have the assets to secure these convoys. The Afghan 

authorities did not have the capability to do anything about this 

situation either. Thus a cost of doing business was incurred. 

These types of situations must be anticipated. That includes 

better ways of obtaining civilian equipment and supplies.33

Iraq, 2003. Examples of CMO in Iraq, as Afghanistan, are numerous 

and continue to surface in the news as the campaign progresses. The 

innovativeness and creativity of those officers and noncommissioned 
14

 JSOU Report 06-2

officers (NCO) having to learn about CMO the hard way, i.e., without 

the benefit of prior PME are exemplary. But situations are sometimes 

too dynamic/complex to derive innovative solutions on the spot. The 

following vignette from the Georgia Army National Guard Newsletter, 

Profiles, is but one example.

A detachment from the 265th Engineer Group, its Engineer 

Civil-Military Operations cell is assigned to the active Army’s 

82nd Airborne Division to help rebuild Iraq. Soldiers with the 

detachment work the western sector of Iraq that covers more 

than 58,000 miles and has an estimated 1.5 million inhabitants ... These Georgia Guardsman work in the most dangerous part of Iraq, the Sunni triangle, and manage more than 

3,000 construction projects totaling an estimated $1.4 billion 

dollars of seized funds. ... The work ranges from small renovation projects, such as upgrading a local health clinic, to 

major new construction that includes a six-lane, concrete expressway bridge across the Euphrates River. Every day has its 

challenges, whether it’s dealing with the local population or a 

project that’s being undertaken by the CMO. When it comes to 

staying on top of things the soldiers of the Civil-Military Operations Cell don’t wait for those challenges to come to them, they 

go out and interact with the populace, meet with local Iraqi 

government ministers and continually check the progress—on 

site—of the work being done. ... The frequent meetings with 

the government ministers and the recurring visits to the work 

sites happens not just because the unit needs to make sure a 

particular project continues to move forward, but because the 

unit is responsible for the money—an average of more than $1 

million dollars-a-week in project costs.34

Emerging Concerns. Many interviewees having Afghanistan and/or Iraq 

experience observed that generally, conventional officers did not fully 

understand CMO and its synergistic effect on the overall campaign. 

They believed the US Armed Forces are not doing as much CMO as 

it should because of two things: security and manpower—specifically, civil affairs forces. Perceptions are that many commanders are 

relying on CA to do the actual work because it’s their specialty. Most 

seem unaware that CMO is a function of command and therefore 

should be planned and executed by the unit having responsibility for 

the sector in which it operates, unless of course, it calls for specialized teams at the local or provincial governmental level, and because 

they usually have the most resources. CMO Staff Officers are con-
15

Powers: CMO and PME 

stantly asking for unit support, but there seems to be a shortage of 

assets. 

The main hindrance to effective CMO in Iraq is simply security. 

Until that obstacle is eliminated or at the least controlled to a manageable level, all CMO will be limited in scope. Security in Iraq is 

such an issue that knowledge of what to do and how to do it may 

sometimes be masked by security concerns.

There are, of course, many legal constraints worth mentioning that 

hinder CMO and use of military assets. As seen below, some fiscal and 

resource tools are simply outdated. But these subject areas still must 

be covered either during PME or pre-deployment of SOF. And it is better suited for education than on-the-job training. It will be far better to 

provide PME up front than legal counsel after the fact. One emerging 

example is the Commander’s Emergency Response Program.

The fiscal and resource tools that the commanders have available are based on decisions made in the 1980s and do not 

match the current operational requirements. The well-meaning 

Funded Transportation ... and the Denton Transportation Authority (Space Available) ... are examples.35

The Funded Transportation program allows donors to petition 

the US Department of Defense for the transport of humanitarian goods and equipment to countries in need. It is a commodities transportation program ... [that] provides the Department 

of Defense the authority to conduct humanitarian assistance 

operations worldwide and to transport DoD nonlethal excess 

property and humanitarian assistance materials donated by 

NGO, IO, and PVO for humanitarian relief.36

The Denton Program allows donors to use space available on 

US military cargo aircraft to transport humanitarian goods and 

equipment to countries in need. The Denton Program is a commodities transportation program ... jointly administered by the 

US Agency for International Development, the DoS, and the 

DoD. The Denton Amendment provides the authority for DoD 

to use extra space on US military cargo aircraft to transport 

humanitarian assistance materials donated by NGO, IO, and 

PVO for humanitarian relief.37

Historical Trends: Looking into the Crystal Ball. During interviews, historians provided what may be the most relevant perspective of how 

and why the US Armed Forces came to overlook CMO as a major set 

of tasks. Researching and analyzing events and contexts, and then 

developing findings and conclusions are in their nature. Foreseeing 
16

 JSOU Report 06-2

common threads and trends running through situations is also a 

developed skill that military planners and political strategists seem 

to overlook. It may be due to the short-term nature of their assignments. They don’t appear to be assigned to positions long enough to 

appreciate the plights of those before them. The macro focus of historians enables deeper study, research and analysis of what transpired, the context in which it occurred, and the 2nd and 3rd order 

effects of events over time.

Generally, historians interviewed for this project concluded that 

overall, the US Armed Forces tend to think they can separate these 

type operations from their combat/warfighting role and give it to the 

Reserve Component Civil Affairs (CA) forces. But it’s not a pure CA 

job—it’s every commander’s job.

A few military historians also suggested that modern Western 

armies generally hold one of Moltke’s views—politicians get you into 

the fight, militaries do the fighting, and the politicians then get you 

out.38 Someone else, other than the military, does the cleanup. It 

would appear that in many ways, military planners still have this 

mindset. But there may be a mitigating factor in all this reluctance 

to adequately plan for CMO. Wars today tend to be much shorter. 

Whether they began as deliberate plans or a developing contingency 

may also be a factor. Longer planning cycles would enable unit planners to learn as they worked, taking their time, doing research, and 

reading/studying lessons learned.

These preceding vignettes provide clear proof that CMO have 

been a part of US military operations, whether envisioned or not. 

CMO are not on the verge of disappearing; history will repeat itself. 

To ignore history will be doing an injustice to those US Armed Forces 

preparing for the next contingency.

In Chapter 3, we’ll look at what, if anything, Congressional legislation, DoD Directives, and Joint and Service doctrine has to say 

regarding PME, CMO, and post-conflict operations.
17

Powers: CMO and PME 

3. Current Guidance

 The Law, DoD Directives & Joint/Service Doctrine

I

n this chapter, we’ll explore directives and guidance, specifically 

Congressional Law, DoD Directives, and Joint and Service doctrine. The US Armed Forces derive core and collateral tasks and 

activities from the general and permanent laws codified by the US 

Congress in Title 10 (Armed Forces) United States Code (USC)39, 

hereafter designated as Title 10 USC. This particular Title provides 

direction and guidance to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and 

Services regarding US Armed Forces.

Title 10 USC 

The US Code of Laws is a consolidation and codification by subject 

matter of the general and permanent laws of the USA; the Code does 

not include regulations issued by executive branch agencies, decisions of the Federal courts, treaties, or laws enacted by State or local 

governments. Title 10 USC has been enacted into positive law based 

on Supplement III of the 2000 edition.40 It directs the following responsibility related to PME.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Responsibilities. Regarding PME, 

the CJCS is responsible for:

Developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed 

forces ... and formulating policies for coordinating the military 

education ... of members of the armed forces.41

CJCS direction and guidance, developed and coordinated by the 

Joint Staff, fulfilling this Congressional requirement is referred to 

as the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP).42 Its 

purpose is to,

... distribute the policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for officer professional military education (PME) and 

joint officer professional military education (JPME) ... from precommissioning through G/FO levels43 ... . PME conveys general 

bodies of knowledge and develops habits of mind ... education 

fosters breadth of view, diverse perspectives and critical analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty and innovative thinking, particularly with respect to complex, nonlinear problems... Training focuses on the instruction 
18

 JSOU Report 06-2

of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific functions and tasks.44

While it is clear that training and education are not mutually 

exclusive, it should be obvious that how to approach CMO is more 

a function of mental agility and conceptual thought than it is procedural, i.e., checklist or procedure-driven.

To the CMO Staff Officer, war is a finite concept having a fixed 

and tangible adversary. The terms of a surrender/truce are codified, 

where rule of law and normalcy are generally returned to a duly designated or elected authority. Worst case is non-war that pushes the 

military into unfamiliar territory and uncertainty. This unfamiliar 

territory/uncertainty is where additional emphasis within PME curricula needs to occur, for in the words of the OPMEP, “Joint education prepares leaders ... to think their way through uncertainty.” 45

The OPMEP

The OPMEP provides directions and guidance to the Service PME 

institutions in the form of Learning Areas and Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE). Additionally it establishes a council of senior level representatives having responsibility to synthesize Service requirements 

across all officer ranks and develop the basis for PME at each of the 

levels; this council is referred to as the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC). The MECC is composed of the MECC principals and a supporting MECC Working Group.46 The Commander, 

USSOCOM is not considered a MECC principal, however, he may 

send a rep to the MECC Working Group.

How might CMO enter the OPMEP? The OPMEP provides for PME updates in two ways: Policy Review (conducted every 5 years, involving 

the Joint Staff, the Services, combatant commands, PME institutions and other affected agencies),47 and Curricula Review (regularly 

reviewed by each Service and joint college/school to remain current, 

effective, and in compliance with policy guidance).48

Based on the historical examples provided in Chapter 1 and 

emerging post-conflict operations concepts/doctrine from contemporary contingencies, one would think that there would be an outcry, if 

not a demand, for inclusion of CMO in the OPMEP. The overwhelming 

majority of PME institution faculty members interviewed indicated 

that with increasing frequency, students are arriving for PME having 

more and more exposure to CMO. Yet the curricula have not changed 

to keep pace with their experiences.49 Some faculty members even 
19

Powers: CMO and PME 

indicated an uneasiness about addressing these CMO tasks and activities due to their own lack of personal experience and because it 

was not required by the curriculum of their PME institution.

A review of each of the Learning Areas found at the five levels of 

PME mentioned earlier produced two salient conclusions:

• The major focus continues to be on strategic level systems 

and processes, campaigning, and the Service systems and 

capabilities. 

• The focus, where applicable, on stability, support, reconstruction, and transition tasks and activities is disproportionate to 

combat-related tasks and activities. 

This focus is changing, however, and should be noted. Each of 

the PME institutions is currently revising its curriculum to accommodate more post-conflict operations; these may or may not include 

CMO as an integral part of post-conflict operations. 

The OPMEP, in fulfilling the 10 USC 153 requirements, appears to 

provide for a holistic PME system capable of synthesizing current and 

emerging educational requirements and translating them into Learning Areas used in curriculum development by the PME institutions. 

However, overlooking the lessons of history is one thing, omitting them 

while in the midst of a protracted campaign is inexcusable. 

In summary, there is no reference to CMO or any of the type 

activities comprising CMO in the OPMEP. There is, however, sufficient broad language to permit PME institutions to include education on what is referred to as Phase IV, Stabilize (Post-Conflict Operations), which would include stability and support, reconstruction 

and transition, and thus CMO depending on interpretation. Regardless, implicit in the stability and support, reconstruction and transition phases is the requirement to conduct supporting CMO at every 

level.50

Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces

In 10 USC 167, the Congress directs the establishment of USSOCOM.51

Its principal function is to prepare SOF to carry out assigned missions. Implicit in that function is the task of educating and training. 

Insofar as education was concerned, the original drafters of this section realized it would be better and cheaper to leverage the existing 

Joint and Service PME institutions for general education and use the 

component operated, special operations-specific, qualification courses and schools to develop the hard/technical skills required of SOF. 
20

 JSOU Report 06-2

At the time, it appeared that all aspects of PME would thus be covered by such an approach. However, as the requirement to conduct 

CMO, stability, support, and transition emerged in the aftermath 

of Operation DESERT STORM in April 1991, it became apparent to 

some interviewees that the PME institutions had not adequately prepared the conventional armed forces for such nontraditional roles.52

Monitoring PME: Is that enough? Title 10 USC 167 also directs the Commander, USSOCOM to monitor PME of SOF. But is monitoring really 

enough? Does the OPMEP/MECC system permit changes when the 

Commander, USSOCOM, determines there is a gap/deficiency in education required of his officers? What are the options available to the 

Commander, USSOCOM when a determination is made that a lack 

of core PME in a specific area is impacting adversely on his SOF? 

Without his own PME institution, the Commander, USSOCOM, has 

only two options:

• Address the issue directly with the commandants of the PME 

institutions in hopes of addressing the deficiency.

• Develop and operate a USSOCOM PME course specifically 

addressing the areas deemed critical and affecting readiness 

but which have not been sufficiently addressed by the OPMEP and/or specific PME institutions or fellowships.53

The OPMEP, shaped by input from the MECC discussed previously, is a consensus-based document. Although USSOCOM is a player 

at the working group level, it still has only one vote. And one vote in 

the overall scheme of the process, regardless of the importance and 

implications on SOF, may not have much bearing on swaying the 

other voting members to present it to the MECC.

National Defense Strategy (NDS) 

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the USG 

was riveted to the reality that an overall defense strategy, not just 

military, was required. Associations with the word defense quickly 

changed from the US Armed Forces to all the agencies and organizations capable of defending the USA from foreign and domestic aggression. The intent of this strategy is provided below.

This strategy is intended to provide the President a broad range 

of options. These include ... stability operations that could 

range from peacekeeping to substantial combat action.54
21

Powers: CMO and PME 

Addressing stability operations specifically, the NDS provides a 

focus for the military:

We’ll need to train units for sustained stability operations. This 

will include developing ways to strengthen their language and 

civil-military affairs capabilities as required for specific deployments.55

This direct reference to strengthening civil-military affairs capabilities implies, at a minimum, education in the form of PME. The 

SECDEF’s intent is clear; how it is to be strengthened is not.

National Military Strategy (NMS) 

The NMS supports the National Security Strategy and implements 

the 2004 NDS. In the NMS, the CJCS provides his vision for the 

armed forces in achieving the military objectives supporting the NDS 

and NSS. The references to stability operations, restoration, postconflict activities, improving existing conditions, etc., indicate linkage to CMO.

Preventing conflict requires the capability to perform stability 

operations to maintain or re-establish order, promote peace 

and security or improve existing conditions. ... A campaign to 

win decisively will ... require capabilities for ... unconventional 

warfare, ... security, stability and post-conflict operations. ... 

Winning decisively will require synchronizing and integrating 

... stability operations and significant post-conflict interagency 

operations to establish conditions of stability and security. ... 

The Joint Force must be able to transition from major combat operations to stability operations and to conduct those 

operations simultaneously. At the operational level, military 

post-conflict operations will integrate conflict termination objectives with diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, law 

enforcement and information efforts. Joint forces will, where 

appropriate, synchronize and coordinate their operations and 

activities with international partners and nongovernmental organizations. These missions render other instruments of national power more effective and set the conditions for long-term 

regional stability and sustainable development.56

The mental acumen required to continuously synthesize the 

stimuli affecting post-conflict operations is enormous. That acumen 

must be derived over time through a system, not on-the-job-training. 

Implicit in the NMS is the need to establish an interface with the civilian populace and civil authorities to conduct activities that set the 
22

 JSOU Report 06-2

conditions for the eventual transfer of authority to either a duly appointed host nation authority or UN representatives. Core CMO PME 

and exercises would provide the basis for such knowledge, but like 

the NDS, there is no mention of stability operations or civil-military 

affairs in the OPMEP.

Transitioning from the strategic level, let’s shift our focus to those 

DoD Directives which may influence the crafting of OPMEP Learning 

Areas.

DoD Directives (DoDD)

A DoD Directive is a broad policy document containing what is 

required by legislation, the President, or the Secretary of Defense to initiate, govern, or regulate actions or conduct by the 

DoD Components within their specific areas of responsibilities. 

DoDD establish or describe policy, ... define missions ... provide authority; and assign responsibilities. One-time tasking 

and assignments are not appropriate in DoD Directives.57

Currently only two DoDDs directly relate to CMO, post-conflict 

operations, stability and support operations, reconstruction and 

transition/handoff, even though these terms are directly stated in 

the directive. DoDD 2000.13, Civil Affairs,58 provides for maintaining 

civil affairs forces to conduct the broad range of activities required 

to support civil affairs missions. Regarding PME, the directive tasks 

Commander, USSOCOM to educate and train selected personnel in 

civil affairs. This task, provided below, is underway and on-track as 

directed.

Conduct specialized civil affairs education and individual training for assigned officers and noncommissioned officers and 

nonassigned DoD and non-DoD personnel.59

The second is DoDD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.60 Without 

directly mentioning the term CMO or its associated doctrinal tasks 

and activities, there is nonetheless clear linkage throughout the document. In summary, the vast majority of the tasks and activities 

depicted in this new DoDD, regardless of how worded, have been 

within the CMO and Civil Affairs / Military Government doctrine for 

years. There is nothing new in this DoDD that practitioners of Civil 

Affairs / Military Government in post WWII Germany and Japan, 

previously mentioned, did not experience during the implementation 
23

Powers: CMO and PME 

of the Marshall Plan and the occupation of Japan. Perhaps it is a sad 

commentary on the crafters of this DoDD, attempting to categorize 

tasks and activities within a certain linear phase, than it is on military doctrine writers and practitioners of CMO who fully realize that 

it must occur without regard for phases or any other man-made metric. Had the writers of this DoDD received core CMO PME it would 

have been the perfect opportunity to state that CMO are a vital part 

of stability operations but occur throughout all phases. 

But there is positive side to this DoDD. It provides Commander, 

USSOCOM the opportunity to finally address many of the special 

operations-related PME deficiencies that existed before. In the tasks 

section of the DoDD, the Chairman, JCS is tasked to develop curricula at joint military education and individual training venues for 

the conduct and support of stability operations, in coordination with 

the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, 

USSOCOM. Further, Commander, USSOCOM is tasked to appoint a 

senior officer to lead stability operations initiatives; develop stability operations capabilities; ensure curricula in individual and unit 

training programs and service schools prepare personnel for stability operations; ensure CA and PSYOP programs develop the quantity and quality of personnel needed for stability operations; support 

stability operations joint concept development, experimentation, and 

capability development; ensure research, development, and acquisition programs address stability operations capabilities and are integrated, in coordination with the USD(AT&L); support interagency 

requests for personnel and assistance to bolster the capabilities of 

US Departments and Agencies to prepare for and conduct stability 

operations as appropriate, in coordination with the USD(P); and develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving 

the goals of subparagraphs 5.11.1 through 5.11.8, in coordination 

with the USD(P). 

Joint Doctrine 

Within the DoD, the Joint Staff orchestrates and de-conflicts emerging Service concepts into joint doctrine reflecting the Congress’ and 

SECDEF’s guidance and direction.61

Although joint doctrine currently exists for civil-military operations (Joint Publication 3-57, discussed below) and civil affairs (Joint 

Publication 3-57.1, discussed below), and a Service manual (Army 

Field Manual 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations),
24

 JSOU Report 06-2

Neither Joint nor Army doctrine contains any principles for conducting civil-military operations ... the civil-military operations 

center (CMOC) is discussed in the staff responsibility section of 

the G-5 but CMO is not addressed in the body of the document. 

CMO is not identified as a commander’s responsibility and part 

of the integral fabric of full spectrum operations.62

Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, Joint Pub 3-57. The definition, scope, and types of CMO provided previously in Chapter 1 provide the best overview of CMO: Who directs them, What they encompass, When they can be legally conducted, Where they will occur, 

and Why they should occur. They should not to be confused with 

emerging doctrine relating to stability and support operations, reconstruction, and/or transition. These refer generally to the overall planning phases as previously mentioned. CMO, on the other hand, may 

occur across all phases simultaneously.63

Joint Operations Concepts (JOC). In the JOC, the SECDEF articulates 

the concept for future joint military operations. The concepts and 

definition of stability operations found therein clearly link CMO to 

operations across the spectrum:

Stability operations are military operations in concert with the 

other elements of national power and multinational partners, 

to maintain or re-establish order and promote stability.64

Directly relating to CMO and establishing infrastructure is JOC 

3.A.4., “Rapidly deploy selected portions of the Joint Force that can 

immediately transition to execution, even in the absence of developed 

infrastructure. Expeditionary capabilities ... shape the battlespace, 

set initial conditions to achieve strategic objectives, provide assured 

access, and establish the required infrastructure.” 65

Service Doctrine: US Army 

The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Combined 

Arms Center (CAC), Ft Leavenworth, KS, is now the proponent for 

CMO and will develop doctrine accordingly. The US Army John F. 

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is to remain the proponent for Civil Affairs. Until CAC fulfils its responsibility and provides 

a CMO Staff Officer’s Course, however, CA officers will continue to 

be assigned as unit CMO Staff Officers having only their CA Officer’s 

Qualification Course as PME. Although many of the skills are similar, 

the scope of the CMO Staff Officer, as defined in Army Field Manual 
25

Powers: CMO and PME 

101-5, is much broader. Comments from current and previous CMO 

Staff Officers indicate that in order for the CA Officer’s Qualification 

Course to also fulfill requirements for CMO Staff Officers, especially 

at the combatant command level, approximately four weeks of instruction would have to be added.66

US Army Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS). US Army Field Manual 

100-5, “Operations,” dated 14 June 1993, refers to the major functions performed by the force on the battlefield as BOS. BOS include 

maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility and survivability, and combat service support. Since 

1994 USSOCOM has tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to convince the 

Army to incorporate CMO as an equally viable system. Now that stability operations have returned to the doctrinal lexicon, CMO-associated tasks and activities may eventually emerge as critical to the 

overall mission. The US Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (USAPKSOI) has concluded from its study of stability 

operations that,

The Army has focused its training and development on ... Maneuver, Command and Control, Fire Support, Intelligence, Air 

Defense, Mobility Counter-Mobility Survivability, and Combat 

Service Support. Two of the key “systems” for Stability Operations that do not have a home are information operations and 

Civil-Military Operations.67

US Army Field Manual (FM) No. 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.

This is the Army’s capstone manual for staff organization and operations of major tactical and major tactical support commands at corps 

level and below. It establishes responsibilities, defines the tasks 

within staff sections, and provides direction on developing plans and 

orders to execute decisions. The CMO Staff Officer is designated as 

a primary staff officer. However, the Army does not authorize a CMO 

Staff Officer below division headquarters (UEx) level. In addressing 

this lack of authorization, FM 101-5 states that in units having no 

authorization for a CMO Staff Officer the commander will appoint an 

officer such responsibility for civil-military operations (CMO) functions as an additional duty.

It is hard to imagine, in the face of the Army’s rich history of conducting CMO, how the very units doing the most CMO historically 

(battalions and below) are authorized no CMO planners. Could this 

be an indication by those doctrine writers having no foundation in 

or historical knowledge of CMO that such a position can actually be 

performed as an additional duty? This may also be the genesis, from 
26

 JSOU Report 06-2

a PME perspective, why many officers fail to learn about CMO and 

its relationship to the overall campaign. Reviewing the duties of the 

CMO Staff Officer reveals the obvious weakness in attempting to address this staff function as an additional duty.68

Service Doctrine: US Marine Corps 

In MCWP 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations, the Marine Corps provides clear and succinct guidance as 

to why CMO will be conducted.69 It is also the only publication providing a set of CMO planning principles. Not only are these worth 

mentioning, but also worthy of inclusion in core PME.70 Although the 

USMC has such a doctrinal manual, it neither includes CMO as a 

Learning Area in core PME nor operates a CMO course. 
27

Powers: CMO and PME 

4. Views from the Field

Independent Studies

A number of independent studies focusing on various aspects of 

post-conflict operations either have been concluded or are still underway. Most address education and training in general terms, but 

nothing specifically CMO in nature. The following studies, however, 

directly relate to PME, and to CMO specifically.

Defense Science Board (DSB) 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and 

from Hostilities. The DSB is a federal advisory committee established 

to provide independent advice to the SECDEF; its statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations do not represent the official 

position of DoD.71 This study produced several findings relating directly to CMO and civil affairs operations:72

Stabilization and reconstruction should become a core competency ... through ... leader development, doctrine development, 

and other tools DOD applies to serious missions. The service 

secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff should integrate stabilization and reconstruction operations into the services’ professional military education programs.73

Reconstruction [and nation-building75] calls for a myriad of 

competencies: humanitarian assistance, public health, infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, civil administration, and media.76

Stability forces need to be able to attend to humanitarian concerns and make initial infrastructure repairs and deal with civil 

emergencies and related government issues.76

S&R planning can require expertise in Infrastructure, Public 

Health, Civil Administration, Governance, Economic development, Humanitarian assistance, and Media.77

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New 

Strategic Era. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N), a three-phased effort 

to explore the next era of defense reform, has as its primary goal the 

development of an integrated set of practical and actionable recommended reforms for organizing both the US military and national 

security apparatus to meet 21st century challenges.78
28

 JSOU Report 06-2

The Phase 1 Final Report, released in March 2004, contained this 

conclusion:79

... the Iraq war has served to remind us that post-conflict reconstruction operations are an inherent part of warfare. However “decisive” the combat phase of a war, it will invariably stop 

short of achieving our broader strategic objectives. ... decisive 

military operations may be necessary to achieve our objectives, 

but they are rarely if ever sufficient. To get to the final goal, one 

needs follow-on civil-military operations to win the peace.80

The Phase 2 Final Report, released 28 July 2005, identified two 

specific trends requiring correction by PME reform:

1. Lack of activity Integration. “... there is no standard approach 

to fully integrating the activities of military forces and civilian agencies on the ground. To the contrary, an examination 

of the coordination mechanisms used in operations ranging 

from Haiti and Bosnia during the Clinton administration to 

Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush administration suggests that US civilian and military leaders tend to develop 

new approaches in each operation. These ad hoc, often personality-driven approaches too often ignore the experience 

gleaned from previous operations.” 81

2. Military neither trained nor equipped for post-conflict operations. “With the exception of civil affairs units that are specifically trained for reconstruction work, the US military is not 

adequately trained or equipped to build civil administrations, 

act as mayors of villages, establish national financial systems, rebuild health and sanitation infrastructures, instigate 

judicial reform, hold elections, and so on.” 82

Summarizing all previous PME-related observations, findings, 

conclusions and recommendations, the Phase 2 Final Report provided a conclusion relating to the very heart of this monograph and 

what should be the essence of PME:

Education that does not equip personnel to operate in a world 

of multinational and interagency operations ... does not provide 

a useful service to its students or the nation.83

US Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute Report, “Stabilization 

Operations: Where We Are And The Road Ahead.” This study followed a 

December 2004 symposium on stability operations sponsored by the 

US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (USAPKSOI), DoS’ Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and 
29

Powers: CMO and PME 

the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). It focused on PME, civilian education and training development, operational lessons learned 

with emphasis on improving civil-military planning and execution, 

and identifying civilian and military capability gaps.84

Central to the study’s theme was the challenges confronting the 

USG in stability operations.85 Panel discussions and presentations 

posited further evidence that curricula in the PME institutions could 

be improved in the area of stability operations.

Among the responses offered were making more relevant the 

curriculum in the military education system ... .86

Interviews: Rants & Raves

With historical examples of CMO, Title 10 USC responsibilities, 

DoDD, joint and Service doctrine, and independent study findings/

recommendations providing the basis for PME reform, we’ll now transition to candid comments and observations from the field—those 

officers and civilians studying, teaching, researching, analyzing and 

executing CMO. What do they think about the lack of CMO in core 

PME curricula? What do those senior officials charged with planning, orchestrating support for, and directing stability and support 

operations and their inherent CMO think about PME? Are the PME 

institutions able to adapt to the realization that the tasks and activities normally associated with CMO and occurring across stability, 

support, reconstruction, and transition are as key as the kinetic, 

combat tasks found in Phase II—Dominate?

Participating respondents were asked many questions related 

to post-conflict operations, CMO, stability and support, curriculum 

design, the OPMEP, feedback from PME institution students and 

graduates, lessons learned, personal experience, etc. As expected, 

responses spanned the spectrum of awareness, ranging from What’s 

CMO? to Completely Aware (former CMO Staff Officers).87

The interviews produced data which can generally be grouped 

into the following categories: Leader Mindset, PME Institution Atmosphere, the OPMEP Process, Student and Graduate Experience, 

Critical Expertise Required for CMO, the Information Gathering: The 

Collateral Benefits of CMO, and finally a Grassroots Success Story.

Leader Mindset: Emphasis on Kinetic versus Nonkinetic Tasks. The lack of 

core CMO knowledge appears to go well beyond the US Armed Forces. In respondents’ opinions, there is still no acceptance by some 
30

 JSOU Report 06-2

senior, civilian officials that the post-conflict phase is as important 

as previous phases. Many senior officials exhibit the attitude that 

someone else takes over after the warriors. This ignorance of what 

military and nonmilitary organizations and agencies can do was surprising. And if this ignorance exists at the highest levels of DoD, is it 

not understandable why CMO has been omitted from core PME?

Consensus among respondents indicates that CMO occurring 

during the post-conflict phases require a different thought process, 

more of the How to think previously described as opposed to What 

to think/What to do. Interviewees knew that CMO provide countless 

opportunities for creativity and innovative approaches. It is the unit 

commander’s vision of end-state, however, that is important; the entire chain of command will see it if he can see it. But commanders 

must instill in their subordinates that the post-conflict phases are as 

important as the Dominate phase.

Conventional militaries understand Operational Art as postulated by Clausewitz,88 but that ends at the conclusion of Phase III—

Dominate, say some interviewees. Commanders are sometimes risk 

averse and aren’t inclined to undertake CMO because they are not 

specifically stated in plans/orders from higher. Some respondents 

witnessed an unwillingness and lack of knowledge to fill any vacuum 

caused by a lack of guidance from higher headquarters. Thy posited 

that this lack of guidance from higher emanates directly from a lack 

of PME, particularly in CMO. 

Other respondents preferred to summarize this same perception 

in a different manner. If our leaders, both military and civilian, believe it is not important, then we probably will not do it. How we plan 

to fight is a function of the assumptions we make up front based on 

guidance. We can plan for anything, as long as we know up front 

what our masters want. However, when senior leadership cannot determine the extent of military participation and provide a vision for 

campaign conclusion, then a void develops. 

Some blame this perceived reluctance to undertaking CMO or 

post-conflict operations, non-warrior-like tasks on the military’s warrior ethos, i.e., warriors do warrior-like tasks; non-warriors do nonwarrior tasks. Some believe the PME institutions focus so much on 

the warfighting aspects that one cannot help but feel anything else 

is unimportant. 

PME Institution Restrictions. Current and former PME institution faculty members indicated their curriculum were tight, i.e., any new 

and improved idea would become a wedge. And when inserted, some 

other core subject would either be pushed aside or the institution 
31

Powers: CMO and PME 

would have to accommodate it either by extending the school day or 

the curriculum length/school year; extending both are very sensitive 

issues. Paraphrasing these faculty members, it would appear there is 

something sacred about PME course length, which mandates that no 

matter what is required by whatever body of thinkers, it shall not exceed a specified length. Why isn’t it the other way around? Shouldn’t 

the requirements drive course length?

Adapting PME Curriculum at Glacial Speed. Most faculty members are 

aware that the OPMEP is the driving force behind PME curricula 

development; each PME institution commandant has the authority 

and responsibility to adjust the curriculum depending on his assessment of what is being taught, what should be taught, and how this 

knowledge is being assessed and exercised. The process of developing the OPMEP through consensus may not be the best method, but 

it appears to be the only viable method of collating input from the 

participating representatives discussed earlier. But this process is 

too slow to respond, regardless of the reasons. 

Historians and faculty members were asked whether they believed the OPMEP process hindered adding emerging topics deemed 

critical by the commandant and curriculum committee. Several interviewees were very quick to point out that by looking at current 

curricula, you would not know we are a nation at war! Not surprisingly, the respondents adamantly favoring the addition of CMO to 

core PME tended to be those having recent operational experience. 

Particularly at the MEL-4 level, it was not uncommon to hear that the 

PME institution is behind the times. Said some, this school moves at 

glacial speed when directed to add or amend something; and it’s always a knee-jerk reaction and sudden change—not very well thought 

out. We have become a procedures school, e.g., Standing Operating 

Procedures, formats, checklists, templates, etc. A lot of the how to 

think has been deleted in lieu of actual training. We should reduce 

the repetitive task training, e.g., writing annexes, and use that time 

more wisely studying concepts, history, and principles. We have very 

smart faculty members, but we are slow to change in order to meet 

the intellectual needs of these students, particularly the ones having 

just returned from Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. It’s business as usual.

Don’t Forget the Nonresident Students! To this point we have addressed 

core PME in general terms, i.e., the reader probably concludes that 

PME is PME, whether it refers to resident or nonresident students. 
32

 JSOU Report 06-2

But there is a clear distinction between resident PME curricula and 

nonresident. Those students selected for nonresident PME are faced 

with two different kinds of challenges altogether. First, resident PME 

facilitates full-time focus, i.e., students attend on a full-time basis. 

Nonresident students, however, must maintain their full-time positions while attempting to dedicate as much time as possible to the 

nonresident PME program. Most students would probably conclude 

that both curricula are the same since it is from the same PME institution. Were CMO to be addressed in the core curriculum, then nonresident students would receive it in nonresident curriculum. This is 

not the case, however, for each of the PME institutions. At the SSC 

level, for example, nonresident curricula may or may not coincide 

with the resident curricula due to various rationale; most nonresident faculty members say the differences are due to how the courses 

are administered, i.e., via the internet. Lessons could not exceed a 

specified size and function when delivered from a server. Band-width 

also prohibited many taped lectures and video clips used by the resident courses. 

Student & Graduate Experience. Most faculty members indicated that 

whether or not the curriculum included CMO and post-conflict operations, the student body as a whole was being exposed to it during seminar discussions/presentations. These discussions resulted 

not so much from faculty instructor-driven, Socratic-based Learning 

Areas or Points To Consider, but from the discussions of student experiences in Panama, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Kosovo, Albania, 

Montenegro, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Although a component of seminar learning is sharing experiences, the degree of experience differs 

from seminar to seminar based on the composition of that particular 

seminar. Thus, they believed, there must be a standardized CMO 

Learning Area incorporated into the curricula.

Critical Expertise required for CMO. When asked about the particular 

skills critical to planning and conducting effective CMO, most respondents listed cultural awareness, cross-cultural communications 

skills, negotiations, and knowledge of the local language; planning, 

orchestrating, and de-conflicting CMO seemed dependent on such 

expertise. When asked whether they believed these same type skills 

might be duplicated by conventional forces as opposed to SOF, many 

stated that although the concept sounded logical, it would probably 

require too many years and too much money to make it happen. 

Most respondents understood the perishable nature of foreign lan-
33

Powers: CMO and PME 

guage skills and that regional orientation and cultural awareness 

were not as perishable. It should not be surprising to the reader that 

the majority of the respondents believed the best forces for effecting 

any interface with the local populace and leaders were SOF. One 

NGO executive emphasized how well SOF can provide that presence 

so desperately needed at the local neighborhood level; not the job for 

conventional forces. They don’t seem to be comfortable doing it and it 

shows. We [NGO] notice it and all the locals notice it as well.89

Information Gathering: The Collateral Benefits of CMO. One of the benefits of interacting with the local populace during CMO is the ability 

to passively gather information; such information may or may not 

eventually be processed into intelligence; each interview produced 

this observation. The very nature of CMO opens avenues to information that might otherwise be closed. The following vignette is indicative of the many ways military forces gain access during the normal 

course of conducting CMO.

The way ahead is simple: focus some of our doctrine and training to prepare young company commanders to lead combinedarms warfare, to conduct CMO, and to develop and exploit their 

own intelligence. ... We met with elders from every village in the 

Bermel Valley, drank chai ... and discussed village problems 

and how to arrive at joint solutions. We provided humanitarian 

assistance and di-minimus [sic] health care (defined as smallscale medical assistance operations using available excess 

medical supplies) to the population. We laid the groundwork 

to build wells, hospitals and schools—including the first ever 

girls’ school in the region. We met routinely with the Pakistani 

Border Commander ... to discuss cross-border issues and cooperation. ... And the unified effort of engaging the population 

in CMOs led directly to most of the intelligence we collected—

intelligence that saved my life and my soldiers’ lives. ... none of 

my formal military training focused on such scenarios.”90

Unencumbered by the OPMEP: A Grassroots Success Story. By far the 

most comprehensive CMO education in PME is currently found in 

the US Army Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSC) 

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It is incorporated as part of the general SOF strategic and operational overviews presented in the core 

curriculum. It also resides within a separate SOF track developed 

and coordinated by the Special Operations Faculty Instructors comprising the Special Operations Element of the Department of Joint 

and Multinational Operations. At the heart of this SOF-track is a 
34

 JSOU Report 06-2

focus on special operations PME for Army special operations officers: Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Special Operations Aviation, and Rangers. These officers, in addition to 

attending and completing the regular core CGSC curriculum and 

requirements, must also undertake special operations subjects tailored for their specific specialty. In regards to CMO, the CA students 

receive CMO in their Advanced Civil Affairs track and other selected 

lessons (about 26 more hours than do the SF and PSYOP students 

who also receive some). Some students are writing papers on CMO, 

some on CA. The SOF track core curriculum also covers key Service 

capabilities to support CMO, e.g., USAF Prime Beef, Harvest Falcon, 

Harvest Eagle, Rapid Runway Repair, and Red Horse units; US Navy 

construction battalions and medical ships; and US Marine Corps 

construction battalions. The linkage between SOF skills involving coordination w/civilians is very important and emphasized throughout 

the curriculum.

What is so remarkable about this unique continuing Special Operations PME is that it was not produced as a result of any Title 10 

USC, DoDD, Joint or Service directive. It began as a grassroots vision by the Special Operations Faculty Instructors within the Special 

Operations Element of the Department of Joint and Multinational 

Operations. 
35

Powers: CMO and PME 

5. Conclusions 

 and Recommendations

Conclusion #1: SOF are not receiving CMO education in core PME. 

Commander, USSOCOM, has both the authority and responsibility 

to provide SOF PME.

Recommendation: For Resident PME (all ranks), develop a mandatory CMO Course in the spirit of CGSC ILE. For Nonresident 

PME (officer and NCO), develop a web-based CMO Course. Grant 

access to all SOF for continuing PME.

Conclusion #2: The skills and functions required of CMO Staff Officers 

are not sufficiently included the CA Officer’s Qualification Course.

Recommendation: Include the critical skills and functions required of the CMO Staff Officer in the CA Officer’s Qualification 

Course.

Conclusion #3: The lack of CMO education impacts on USSOCOM 

(specifically SF, CA, and PSYOP) who are continually requested to 

deploy to plan, orchestrate, conduct and support CMO due to their 

inherent specialty skills (area and cultural orientation, language proficiency, and cross-cultural communications).

Recommendation: Seek inclusion of CMO as core PME subject 

in order to educate conventional forces that CMO is a command 

function. This will lessen the requirement to provide SOF to 

plan and execute CMO for many units.

Consider the impact/value of SOF in post-conflict operations as 

mentioned in the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on 

Transition to and from Hostilities.

The J-5 of one combatant command put it to us very succinctly: “For each of my high-priority countries, I need a 

good foreign area officer, a civilian staff member who has 

been working the country for years, and an experienced 

special operator.” Few combatant command staffs have 

that depth of expertise.91
36

 JSOU Report 06-2
37

Powers: CMO and PME 

Endnotes

 1. National Defense University, “Beyond Jointness: Civil-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance,” symposium 

report (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, January 2000), 1.

 2. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become 

Governors (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 

1992), 3.

 3. David L. Buffaloe, “Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 

82d Airborne in Firebase Shkin,” The Institute of Land Warfare (October 2004): 18.

 4. These include officers serving in the following operational career 

paths/specialties/ratings: Army civil affairs, psychological operations, 

special forces, rangers, and special operations aviation; Naval special 

warfare ratings; and Air Force special operations specialty designations.

 5. US Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, 

Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 February 2001), vii.

 6. US Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, 

viii-ix.

 7. US Department of Defense, Joint Operation Planning, Revision Third 

Draft (3), Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 10 August 2005), IV-31.

 8. Without exception, every historian interviewed stated this should have 

been evident all along. But at the time military planners were still adhering to the European-influenced warfare doctrine and readings.

 9. Stanley Sandler, Glad To See Them Come and Sorry To See Them Go: A 

History of US Army Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991, (Fort 

Bragg, N.C.: United States Army Special Operations Command, 1998), 

116.

 10. Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, 

Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario

(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003), 13.

 11. Sandler, 167.

 12. Crane and Terrill, 15.

 13. Civil Affairs refers to those affairs of a civilian populace which must be 

addressed by military commanders in an operation that require attention and support in order the further the goals of the overall campaign 

plan. Military Government refers to the administration of civilian infrastructure and societal-related support systems until a duly-elected 

or appointed authority assumes control.

 14. “Stability operations and support operations are not new to the Army. 

From the start of American history, the government has called on its 

armed forces to pursue US strategy. The Army, as an instrument of national power, promoted and protected national interests, and relieved 
38

 JSOU Report 06-2

human suffering. The Army helped open the West...conducted explorations, governed territories, guarded national parks, made maps, and 

built roads and canals ... provided disaster relief, quieted domestic 

disturbances, and supported American foreign policy (for example, 

conducting stability operations in the Philippines from 1899–1904 and 

Haiti from 1915–1934). While many of these operations occurred during peacetime, what the Army now calls stability operations and support operations emerged during the 20th century as a major contributor to the overall success of combat operations. During World War II, 

for example, US forces assisted the local governments and populace 

in reconstructing the civil infrastructures of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. They fed starving civilians, rebuilt bridges 

and roads, and de-mined extensive tracts of farmland while full-scale 

combat operations continued to take place against conventional enemies. During the Vietnam conflict, Army units conducted pacification, which involved civil-military operations such as assistance to civil 

authorities for security and administration. The Army has repeatedly 

been called to respond to the nation’s requirements, both at home and 

overseas.” US Department of the Army, Stability Operations and Support Operations, Field Manual 3-07 (FM 100-20) (Washington, D.C.: US 

Department of the Army, 20 February 2003), 3. 

 15. Sandler, 172.

 16. Darwin C. Stolzenbach and Henry A. Kissinger, Civil Affairs in Korea 

1950-1951, Working Paper (Chevy Chase, Md.: Johns Hopkins University, August 1952), p. 67.

 17. The CORDS Program was the MACV advisory effort to the government 

of Viet Nam’s pacification program. It was essentially the CMO aspect 

of the Viet Nam conflict. In today’s doctrinal terms, the CORDS Program was joint with all Service components represented. CORDS also 

had a large civilian component.

 18. In January 1970, the word “Revolutionary” was changed to “Rural.”

 19. Panama Defense Forces

 20. civil-military operations task force

 21. Ronald H. Cole, “Joint Campaign Planning” (Washington, D.C.: Joint 

History Office of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

VIII, February 2005), 13-15.

 22. William J. Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict 

Success,” Parameters XXXIII, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 110.

 23. And of course they were entirely correct. At the time of US Armed 

Forces deployment, the UN had not officially sanctioned and designated the operation for support. The UN neither requested nor selected 

the US to enter the conflict. It began as a unilateral US operation 

and eventually evolved into a multinational operation incorporating 

the assets and expertise of participating nations also there on their 

own under the leadership and advice of the US Once security was established and emergency medical aid administered, the UN was able 

to energize its systems and agencies and assume the role of sponsorship. The lessons derived from this CMO were not the validated use 
39

Powers: CMO and PME 

of medical, communications, logistics, SOF, and other military assets 

but the growing need to understand and work with the many IO and 

NGO. This friction and fog remains today one of the hardest aspects of 

CMO. The author, serving as the Deputy J3, Joint Task Force Alpha, 

witnessed many members of these organizations say, Who put you in 

charge, America? This is not your land. We’re here to help also. We’ll 

go where we want, when we want, and do what we want within our 

charters—we work for our benefactors, not for any military force.

 24. In accordance with US Army Regulation 30-1, The Army WARTRACE 

Program, RC units are to be apportioned to AC units in support of 

Warplans. This apportionment insured that RC units knew of their 

wartime tasks and facilitated training relationships with the wartime 

supported units.

 25, Adam B. Siegel, “45 Intelligence Challenges of Civil-Military Operations,” Military Review, September–October 2001 [journal on-line]; 

available from http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/English/

SepOct01/siegle.htm; Internet; accessed 13 September 2005.

 26. The author, serving as the Battalion Commander, 96th CA Battalion 

(Airborne), received Situation Reports, phone calls and conducted interviews and debriefs from returning forces soldiers during the period 

May-December 1993.

 27. William J. Flavin, “Key Issues Impacting Stability Operations” (point 

paper, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, 30 May 2005), 4.

 28. This operation was unique in a number of aspects. First, it was initially planned as a combat assault. The extent of post-conflict CMO 

activities authorized, as stated by ADM Paul David Miller, Commander 

in Chief, USACOM, was “to restore the country to D-1 standards. US 

Armed Forces would not, under any circumstances, conduct nationbuilding.” Secondly, when the operation changed to become an unopposed landing, stability and support became the primary missions. 

Upon deployment, there was no enemy force, no shots fired, and no 

collateral damaged due to combat. So, what began initially as Only do 

enough CMO to restore the country to D-1 standards later became We’re 

not sure what we want you to do, but don’t screw it up!

 29. Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” 

106.

 30. Buffaloe, 4.

 31. LTC Charles L. Westover, US Army Reserve, interview by author, 21 

April 2005, Seattle, WA.

 32. It is interesting to note that during research for this project interviewees often used the term drain when referring to using their organic 

assets to support CMO. Perhaps this is the best indicator of all that 

PME is needed to emphasize proper CMO planning so required assets 

are apportioned to support CMO and thus not dual-tasked.

 33. Flavin, “Key Issues Impacting Stability Operations,” 17.
40

 JSOU Report 06-2

 34. Profiles, the Georgia National Guard Home Page; available from http://

www.dod.state.ga.us/profiles/265th_Eng_Grp-b-feb_13_%2004.

html; Internet; accessed 13 September 2005.

 35. Flavin, “Key Issues Impacting Stability Operations,” 9.

 36. This authority provides for the actual cost of commercial transportation and the payment of any associated DoD administrative costs 

incurred. The DoD administers the Funded Transportation Program. 

Guidelines: While the statutory authority permits transportation via 

any mode and for any cargo that could be defined as humanitarian 

assistance materials, the DoD and the Department of State (DOS) 

have established policies that impose limits on the program due to 

the austere level of funding made available. These policies are: Transport is limited only to surface modes -- funded airlift is reserved only 

for emergency (declared disaster) situations. Cargo is limited only to 

that which addresses basic humanitarian needs (e.g., medical, food, 

shelter, and clothing). Minimum cargo restrictions -- to use this program, the minimum cargo size is one 20 - foot shipping container (or 

1100 cubic feet equivalent). Before gathering supplies, donors should 

first contact the DoD Funded Transportation Program Manager to determine whether the program is possible in the specific country. US 

Department of Defense, About the Funded Transportation Program, 

available at http://www.dentonfunded.com/AboutFT.htm, internet; 

accessed 13 September 2005.

 37. Since the Denton Program is a space available program, it is impossible to predict when transportation will be provided; therefore, no 

guarantees can be made regarding completion of a shipment. Guidelines: The Denton program offers free transportation only on a Space 

Available basis. It cannot be undertaken at any cost to the USG other 

than the cost of the transportation itself. USAID Home Page, Overview 

of the Denton Application Process, available at http://www.usaid.gov/

our_work/cross-cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/

dentonguidelines.html; Internet; accessed 13 September 2005.

 38. Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke (October 26, 1800 - April 24, 

1891), who became Helmuth, Graf von Moltke in 1870, was a famous 

German Field Marshal. Influenced by Clausewitz, his main thesis was 

that military strategy had to be understood as a system of options 

since only the beginning of a military operation was plannable. As a 

result, he considered the main task of military leaders to consist in 

the extensive preparation of all possible outcomes. His thesis can be 

summed up by two statements, one famous and one less so, translated into English as “No battle plan survives contact with the enemy,” 

and “War is a matter of expedients.”” Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, 

available from http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Helmuth_

von_Moltke_the_Elder; Internet; accessed 15 September 2005.

 39. The Code of Laws of the United States of America, Latest edition: 2000, 

Supplement 1, 22 January 2002.

 40. 19 January 2004

 41. Armed Forces, US Code, vol. 10, sec. 153 (2002).
41

Powers: CMO and PME 

 42. US Department of Defense, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01B 

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 August 2004).

 43. military Service academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps units, and 

Federal and State Officer Candidate Schools and Officer Training 

Schools; abbreviation for General/Flag Officer

 44. US Department of Defense, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, A-1 thru A-2.

 45. Ibid., A-A-2.

 46. The MECC Principals include the Deputy Director, Joint Staff for Military Education; the presidents, commandants and directors of the 

joint and Service universities and colleges; and the heads of any other 

JPME-certified or accredited institutions; and the USJFCOM J-7. The 

MECC Working Group comprises Dean’s-level/O-6 representatives 

of the MECC principals. Service chiefs and combatant commanders 

are invited to send participants to all MECC Working Group meetings to provide feedback to improve the educational process. From US 

Department of Defense, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01B 

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 August 2004), C-1.

 47. Ibid., C-2.

 48. Ibid., C-3.

 49. PME institution faculty instructors and historians, interviews by author, December 2004 through July 2005, multiple locations.

 50. The Primary level of PME has no Learning Area covering tasks and 

activities beyond combat, yet the majority of stability and support, reconstruction and transition/CMO tasks and activities are conducted 

by the smallest units on the ground—squads, platoons and companies. Success or failure of these village-level CMO are largely dependent on the abilities of these young officers to assess the situation and 

derive conclusions about what will work, what can be supported, and 

what the desired outcome is to be. But this requires an understanding 

of CMO and how they fit into the overall campaign.

 51. Armed Forces, US Code, vol. 10, sec. 167 (2002).

 52. “SOF’s diverse talents made it a natural choice to support humanitarian assistance efforts. Perhaps the best example of SOF’s capabilities 

to deal with a large scale disaster was Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. 

At the end of DESERT STORM, in February 1991, Iraqi Kurds revolted against Saddam Hussein, but his forces quickly crushed the 

rebellion. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled to the mountains in 

northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. In April 1991, USEUCOM initiated Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to stop further Iraqi attacks 

and to establish a safe haven for the Kurds. On short notice, MC130Es led in other aircraft to drop emergency supplies to the Kurdish 

refugees in the mountains of Iraq and Turkey. Next, Special Forces 

personnel, supported by MH-53J helicopters, located suitable sites 

for refugee camps and worked with refugee leaders to organize and 

distribute supplies to the populace. Civil Affairs units developed plans 
42

 JSOU Report 06-2

for medical assistance, food distribution, and daily camp operations, 

and then managed their implementation. Joint SOF medical teams 

provided medical assistance and training, such as camp sanitation, 

and were instrumental in dramatically reducing the death rate. SEAL 

and Special Boat Unit personnel provided medical support and security in camps. Psychological Operations forces supported efforts to 

end chaotic conditions by producing millions of leaflets and by loudspeaker presentations. Their efforts also helped to convince the Kurds 

to return to their homes. SOF were credited with saving thousands of 

lives by providing skilled personnel to rebuild the civil infrastructure, 

establish supply networks, and furnish medical assistance and training.” US Special Operations Command, “United States Special Operations Command History 15th Anniversary,” available from http://www.

socom.mil/Docs/15th_aniversary_history.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 

September 2005.

 53. The majority of respondents felt that forcing a change in the current 

curricula of their PME institution, regardless of the technique and 

intent, would prove fruitless. Suggestions such as this one appeared 

more times than not as the best and actually only way to fix any perceived gaps/deficiencies in what the OPMEP and PME institutions 

provided and what Commander, USSOCOM, required.

 54. US Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Secretary of Defense, March 

2005), 8.

 55. Ibid., 15.

 56. US Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United 

States of America (Washington, D.C.: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

2004), 13-14.

 57. The Washington Headquarters Services Executive Services Directorate 

Directives and Records Division Home Page, available from http://

www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/general.html; Internet; accessed 25 

September 2005.

 58. US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, 

Civil Affairs (Washington, D.C.: ASD (SO/LIC), 27 June 1994).

 59. Ibid., 6.

 60. DoDD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, 

and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, November 28, 2005. Noteworthy in this new DoDD is the policy that “Stability operations are a core 

US military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared 

to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to 

combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across 

all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.” 

 61. The Joint Doctrine Branch is responsible for promoting joint doctrine 

awareness and managing the development of joint doctrine to improve 

joint, interagency, and multinational Interoperability and to enhance 

regional combatant command warfighting capabilities. The Joint Edu-
43

Powers: CMO and PME 

cation Branch is responsible for policy, programs, quality management and analysis of military education matters prescribed as CJCS 

responsibilities or implemented by CJCS Directive, with particular 

emphasis on Joint Professional Military Educating (JPME).

 62. Flavin, “Key Issues Impacting Stability Operations,” 2.

 63. From Operation OVERLORD through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 

CMO have occurred when and where commanders felt it necessary. 

As Allied combat units swept through Normandy liberating cities, forces designated prior to the invasion had the responsibility to conduct 

what was known then as civil affairs operations to assist the French 

in restoring, as much as legally and physically possible, civil infrastructure institutions. In Viet Nam, the Civil Operations and Rural 

Development Support (CORDS) Program provided an integrated civilian-military organization to work at the grass-roots level of society in 

hopes of restoring hope in the minds of the populace as to the overall 

military effort. From Grenada, through Panama, Kuwait, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro, Haiti, and to Afghanistan and 

Iraq, CMO have provided the civil-military interface required to support, complement, and assist attainment of strategic objectives.

 64. US Department of Defense, Joint Operations Concepts (Washington, 

D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 November 2003), 18.

 65. Ibid., 12.

 66. Directly affected by this is USSOCOM, which continues to educate 

Functional Area 38/39, Civil Affairs officer to fill the G9/J9/CJ9 billets 

throughout DoD. Without proper PME this FA 38/39 will be unable 

to meet the full-spectrum requirements of the position, particularly at 

the unified combatant command, Joint Staff, Service department, and 

Interagency task force levels.

 67. Flavin, “Key Issues Impacting Stability Operations,” 16.

 68. These include, but are not limited to: advising the commander of the 

civilian impact on military operations, advising the commander on his 

legal and moral obligations concerning the impact of military operations on the local populace (economic, environmental, and health) for 

both the short and long term, minimizing civilian interference with 

combat operations, to include dislocated civilian operations, curfews, and movement restrictions, advising the commander on the 

employment of other military units that can perform CMO missions, 

establishing and operating a civil-military operations center (CMOC) 

to maintain liaison with and coordinate the operations of other US 

government agencies; host nation civil and military authorities; and 

nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations 

in the area of operations, planning positive and continuous community relations programs to gain and maintain public understanding 

and good will, and to support military operations, coordinating with 

the SJA concerning advice to the commander on rules of engagement 

for dealing with civilians in the area of operations, providing recommended CMO-related IR and EEFI to the G2, coordinating with the G3 

(FSCOORD) on protected targets, providing the G2 operational infor-
44

 JSOU Report 06-2

mation gained from civilians in the area of operations, coordinating 

with the G3 (PSYOP) on trends in public opinion, coordinating with 

the G1 (surgeon) on the military use of civilian medical facilities, materials, and supplies, assisting the G1 with coordination for local labor 

resources, coordinating with the PAO and the G3 (PSYOP) to ensure 

disseminated information is not contradictory, coordinating with the 

PAO on supervising public information media under civil control, providing instruction to units or officials (friendly, or host nation civil or 

military) and the population in identifying, planning, and implementing programs to support the civilian populations and strengthen the 

host nation internal defense and development, identifying and assisting the G6 with coordination for military use of local communications 

systems, providing technical advice and assistance in the reorientation of enemy defectors, EPWs, and civilian internees or detainees, 

participating in targeting meetings, coordinating with the G3 (PM) the 

planning of the control of civilian traffic in the area of operations, assisting the G3 with information operations, identifying and assisting 

the G4 with coordination for facilities, supplies, and other material resources available from the local civil sector to support military operations, coordinating with the G1 and SJA in establishing off-limits areas and establishments, coordinating with the SJA on civilian claims 

against the US government, exercise Staff planning and supervision

over: attached civil affairs (CA) units, military support to civil defense 

and civic action projects, protection of culturally significant sites, humanitarian civil assistance and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), emergency food, shelter, clothing, and fuel for 

local civilians, and public order and safety as it applies to military 

operations.

 69. US Department of the Navy, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations, MCWP 3-33.1 (Washington, D.C.: US Marine Corps, 7 

April 2003).

 70. For a complete description and discussion of these principles, see US 

Department of the Navy, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military 

Operations, MCWP 3-33.1 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 7 April 2003). 3-8 thru 3-10.

 71. Secretary Rumsfeld asked the DSB to consider the tasks and activities 

associated with transition to and from hostilities in order to define the 

necessary capabilities (skills and systems) required for success. The 

DSB was to consider capabilities across this spectrum of activities from 

peacetime through stabilization and reconstruction. The DSB framed 

the guidance even further by considering, “activities that should be 

undertaken in peacetime with the objective of avoiding large-scale hostilities by better orchestrating all the instruments of US power. And, 

failing in that aim, what activities should be undertaken in peacetime 

to be more successful in the stabilization and reconstruction operations that commonly follow large-scale hostilities—operations critical 

for achieving US political goals, not just military goals. The DSB considered the period ranging from peacetime, through large-scale hostili-
45

Powers: CMO and PME 

ties, through stabilization and then reconstruction as a continuum, 

with none of these activities having a clear beginning or end. From US 

Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, 2004 Summer Study 

on Transition to and from Hostilities (Washington, D.C.: Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

December 2004), iii.

 72. The DSB’s recommendations were reviewed by the SECDEF and the 

results promulgated in DoD Directive 3000.cc, “Defense Capabilities 

to Transition to and from Hostilities (DRAFT),” dated September 17, 

2004. During the approval process, DoDD 3000.cc was transformed 

into DoDD 3000.ccE, highlighted previously in Chapter 2. This DoDD 

is currently in Final Review.

 73. US Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, 2004 Summer 

Study on Transition to and from Hostilities (Washington, D.C.: Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, December 2004), vii.

 74. The DSB also concluded that the certain tasks need to be performed 

in any nation-building operation. In priority, these are: security (demobilizing former combatants, rebuilding police, and establishing a 

justice system), basic governance (public administration, and public 

services (waste and sewage removal, water purification and distribution, public educations, power), macroeconomic and regulatory functions (establishment of a stable currency, resumption of commerce), 

political reform (free press, civil society, political parties, and elections), and traditional economic development.

 75. US Department of Defense, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study 

on Transition to and from Hostilities, 43.

 76. Ibid., 44.

 77. Ibid., 59.

 78. “As part of its outreach to build the case for necessary reforms, the 

BG-N study team serves as an honest broker among the various 

stakeholders, including between and among the Defense Department 

(DoD), the State Department, the White House, and the Congress, as 

well as among the various parties in DoD. In support of the project, 

the BG-N study team regularly convenes a wide and diverse body of 

largely former, deeply experienced military, defense and non-defense 

officials to seek their judgment on a wide range of pressing issues.” 

The Center for Strategic and International Studies, International Security Program Home Page, available from http://www.csis.org/isp/

bgn/; Internet; accessed 20 September 2005.

 79. “The Phase 1 recommendations were widely briefed to the most senior-level civilian and military officials, who reacted very positively. 

However, to date, few, if any, actions have been taken to implement 

the BG-N Phase 1 change agenda. In part, of course, this reflects the 

crowded policy agenda of national leaders when the country is at war 

during what was an election year. But it also reflects how hard it is to 

change a massive bureaucracy like DoD.” From the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Gov-
46

 JSOU Report 06-2

ernment and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report 

(Washington, D.C.: CSIS, July 2005), 15.

 80. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond GoldwaterNichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, 

Phase 1 Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 67.

 81. Ibid., 44.

 82. Ibid., 56.

 83. Ibid., 117.

 84. The United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the United States Department of State and the United States 

Institute of Peace, “Stability Operations: Where We Are and the Road 

Ahead,” symposium report (Carlisle, PA: USAPKSOI, 13-14 December 

2004), 3.

 85. This symposium provided an opportunity for both military and civilian 

agencies and organizations involved in stability operations to share 

their collective experiences and lessons learned, and to inform other 

conference participants of their respective organizations’ capabilities 

and current and planned activities. PME was one of the focus areas 

deliberated. From The United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute, the United States Department of State and the 

United States Institute of Peace, Stability Operations: Where We Are 

and the Road Ahead, symposium report (Carlisle, PA: USAPKSOI, 13-

14 December 2004), 3.

 86. The United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the United States Department of State and the United States 

Institute of Peace, “Stability Operations: Where We Are and the Road 

Ahead,” 15.

 87. From the author’s perspective, it would be easy to conclude that no 

matter what curricula changes occur, it will not be sufficient because 

the Services are not likely to increase PME course length regardless of 

how many more Learning Areas are prescribed and by what authority.

 88. Operational Art, as posited by Karl von Clausewitz, is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, 

integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, 

and battles. Strategists argue whether his original thoughts ever envisioned the state of war as it is today. At the time of writings, armies 

focused on the defeat of an opposing army and not on infrastructure 

building in order to facilitate any transition to a legal authority. The 

term CMO would not have been a concept in his day since armies had 

no reason to focus on such operations. Other strategists argue that 

Clausewitz’s theory of Operational Art was so brilliant that it would 

serve to provide a time-enduring framework for any type of future operation conducted by any army. 

 89. The International Crisis Group is an independent, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization, with over 110 staff members on five conti-
47

Powers: CMO and PME 

nents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy 

to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

 90. Buffaloe, 1.

 91. US Department of Defense, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study 

on Transition to and from Hostilities, 114.
48

 JSOU Report 06-2
49

Powers: CMO and PME 

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Buffaloe, David L. “Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 82d 

Airborne in Firebase Shkin,” AUSA Landpower Essay, (Arlington: 

AUSA Institute of Land Warfare), October 2004.

Coles, Harry L. and Albert K. Weinberg. Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors. Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1992.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. “The National Military Strategy of the United 

States of America,” Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01B, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy,” Washington: Government Printing 

Office, 30 August 2004.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Operations Concepts,” Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 3 November 2003.

Joint Publication 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations,” Washington: Government Printing Office, 8 February 2001.

Jumper, General John P. “Letter to The Honorable Ike Skelton, Ranking 

Democrat, House Armed Services Committee, Subject: Views of JPME,” 

Washington: US Department of the Air Force, 18 January 2005.

Bush, George H. W. “National Security Presidential Directive 24, Post-War 

Iraq Reconstruction,” Washington: The White House, 20 January 

2003.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. “Memorandum For Secretaries of the Military Departments et al, Subject: Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from 

Hostilities,” Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8 October 

2004.

Skelton, Ike, “Letter to General John P. Jumper, CSAF, Subject: Views on 

JPME (Joint Professional Military Education,” Washington: House of 

Representatives of the United States Congress, 19 November 2004.

The White House. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America,” Washington: The White House, 17 September 2002.

US Congress, “Title 10 USC, Supplement 1”, Washington: Government Printing Office, 22 January 2002.

US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.ccE, “Department of Defense Capabilities for Stability Operations,” Washington: Government Printing Office, 28 February 2005.

US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, “Civil 

Affairs,” Washington: Government Printing Office, 27 June 1994.

US Department of Defense, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force 

Development, Joint Staff J-7 “Joint Operations Concepts” Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2003.
50

 JSOU Report 06-2

US Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, “The National Defense 

Strategy of the United States of America,” Washington: Government 

Printing Office, March 2005.

US Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College. “Joint 

Campaign Planning,” Volume 8, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, February 2005.

US Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 36-2301, “Professional 

Military Education,” Washington: Chief of Staff, US Air Force, 27 June 

2002.

US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07 (FM 100-20), “Stability Operations and Support Operations,” Washington: US Department of the 

Army, 20 February 2003.

US Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 101-5, “Staff Organization 

and Operations,” Washington: US Department of the Army, 31 May 

1997.

Secondary Sources

Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. “Executive Summary: Educational Requirements 

Analysis for Academic Years 2005-2010.” McLean: Booz Allen Hamilton, 8 June 2005.

Center for Strategic and International Studies-AUSA, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Joint Project of the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA),” 

Washington: CSIS, May 2002.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: 

DoD and USG Reform for a New Strategic Era.” Washington: CSIS, 26 

February 2005.

Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973. Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1988.

Crane, Conrad C. and W. Andrew Terrill. “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, 

Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario,” Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003.

Embrey, James H. “Reorienting Pacification: The Accelerated Pacification 

Campaign of 1968.” (Ph.D. diss., University of Kentucky, 1997).

Flavin, William J., “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” Parameters (Autumn 2003).

National Defense University, “Beyond Jointness: Civil-Military Dimensions 

of Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance,” symposium report (Washington: National Defense University, January 2000).

Sandler, Stanley. Glad To See Them Come and Sorry To See Them Go: A History of US Army Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991. Fort 

Bragg: United States Army Special Operations Command, 1998.
51

Powers: CMO and PME 

Scoville, Thomas W. Reorganizing for Pacification Support. Washington: US 

Army Center of Military History, 1982.

de B. Taillon, J. Paul, “The Evolving Requirements of the Canadian Special 

Operations Forces: A Future Concept Paper,” 8 May 2005.

US Department of the Army, The United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the United States Department of State and 

the United States Institute of Peace. “Stability Operations: Where We 

Are and the Road Ahead.” Symposium Report. Carlisle: USAPKSOI, 14 

December 2004.

US Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command. “Army Training and Leader Development Study.” Fort Monroe: TRADOC, December 2001.

Yates, Lawrence A. “Power Pack: US Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 

1965-1966,” Leavenworth Papers 15 (July 1988).

Interviews

The author would like to thank the following individuals and 

those whose names do not appear at their request for participating in the research for this project. Without your experience-based perspectives, candor, and sincere desire to provide 

better CMO education for the US Armed Forces, this project 

could not have been possible.

General Carl Stiner, US Army (Retired), interview by author, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 13 April 2005.

Colonel James H. Embrey, US Army, interview by author, Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania, 26 May 2005.

Colonel James T. LaRue, US Army (Retired), interview by author, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 3 December 2004.

Colonel Thomas P. Baltazar, US Army, interview by author, Washington, 

D.C., various dates between February-June 2005.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Herndon, US Army, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 1 February 2005.

Brigadier General Jack Kern, US Army, interview by author, Washington, 

D.C., 3 February 2005.

Colonel Michael G. Rose, US Army, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 

3 February 2005.

Colonel John R. Martin, US Army (Retired), interview by author, Washington, D.C., 1 February 2005.

Dr. Carol Kessler, Pacific Northwest Center, interview by author, University 

of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 21 April 2005.

Captain Cathy Osman, US Navy, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 1 

February 2005.
52

 JSOU Report 06-2

Major Patricia M. Ross, US Air Force, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 

1 February 2005.

Dr. Jerre W. Wilson, interview by author, Marine Corps University, Quantico, 

Virginia, personal interview, 31 January 2005.

Colonel Jeff Fleming, US Marine Corps, interview by author, Marine Corps 

University, Quantico, Virginia, 31 January 2005.

Dr. Wray R. Johnson, interview by author, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, 31 January 2005.

Lieutenant Colonel Curt Ames, US Marine Corps, interview by author, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, 31 January 2005.

Mr. Anthony Fields, US Army (Retired), interview by author, Washington, 

D.C., 31 January 2005.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas D. Huizenga, US Air Force, interview by author, 

Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1 March 2005.

Colonel William Hartig, US Marine Corps, interview by author, Naval War 

College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1 March 2005.

Professor Patrick C. Sweeney, US Army (Retired), interview by author, Naval 

War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 28 February 2005.

Lieutenant Colonel James L. McKnight, US Army, interview by author, Fort 

Campbell, Kentucky, 7 December 2004.

Major John M. Freeburg, US Army, interview by author, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 7 December 2004.

Dr. Glenn L. Spivey, interview by author, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 

9 February 2005.

Colonel Mike Stanley, US Air Force, interview by author, Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama, 9 February 2005.

Budd Jones, interview by author, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, personal interview, 10 February 2005.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Westover, US Army, interview by author, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 21 April 2005.

Ms. Kathy Ward, International Crisis Group, interview by author, University 

of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 21 April 2005.

Jim White, Mercy Corps, interview by author, Portland State University, 

Portland, Oregon, 26 April 2005.

Dr. Susan P. Hocevar, interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, 29 

April 2005.

Dr. Hy Rothstein, interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 April 

2005

Dr. David Tucker, interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 April 

2005.

Colonel Joe E. Tyner, US Air Force, interview by author, Naval Postgraduate 

School, 27 April 2005.

Dr. John Arquilla, interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, 29 April 

2005.

Colonel Pete Gustaitis, US Army (Retired), interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, 29 April 2005.
53

Powers: CMO and PME 

Dr. Thomas Durrel-Young, interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, 

28 April 2005.

Matthew Vaccaro, interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 April 

2005.

Colonel Frank Ryan, US Marine Corps, interview by author, 26 May 2005.

Dr. Conrad C. Crane, interview by author, Military History Institute, Carlisle, 

PA, 24 May 2005.

Colonel John W. Prior, II, US Air Force, interview by author, Fort Walton 

Beach Florida, 12 May 2005

Dr. J. Paul de B. Taillon, interview by author, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, 

12 May 2005.

Dr. William Glenn Robertson, Deputy Director, Combat Studies Institute, 

interview by author, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 19 May 2005.

Lieutenant Colonel Walter Davis, US Army, interview by author, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 19 May 2005.

Lieutenant Colonel John Henshaw, US Army (Retired), interview by author, 

Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 19 May 2005.

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, interview by author, Ft Leavenworth, 19 May 2005.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven G. Meddaugh, US Army, interview by author, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, 18 May 2005.

Dr. Joseph R. Fischer, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 18 

May 2005.

Colonel Kevin Benson, US Army, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, 18 May 05.

Colonel Cliff Dickman, US Army (Retired), phone interview by author, Birmingham, Alabama, 5 July 2005.

Lieutenant Colonel Hector Acosta, US Army (Retired), interview by author, 

26 June 2005.

Major Gilbert E. Doan, US Army (Retired), interview by author, various times 

December 2004-July 2005.
54

 JSOU Report 06-2