1

Africa Security Brief

Optimizing Africa’s Security 

Force Structures

By Helmoed Heitman

A Public ation of the Afric a C enter for Str ategic Studie s

◆ African security forces must be able to counter and defeat experienced, highly mobile, and well-armed 

irregular forces that are often tightly embedded with local communities.

◆ Security forces must be demonstrably competent and professional if they are to be accepted by local 

populations, whose support is indispensible to defeating irregular forces.

◆ Small units of balanced general purpose forces capable of conducting operations over dispersed territory 

without support are key to effective force design when facing irregular forces.

Hig h lig h t s

No. 13 / may 2011

Nigeria’s total oil production. Moreover, illegal fishing costs the continent $1 billion annually. Illegal 

logging and mining, arms trafficking, and general 

smuggling further add to the dimension and complexity of these threats.

Irregular forces include guerrillas fighting perceived disenfranchisement (Darfur) or injustice 

(Niger Delta), for secession (Cabinda, Angola, and 

Casamance, Senegal), or for other causes. They also 

comprise militias protecting territory and resources 

(the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]), 

private armies hired by illegal miners, loggers, and 

smugglers, and groups with no rational cause (the 

Lord’s Resistance Army). There is also a growing 

problem of terrorism, including groups such as al 

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al 

Shabaab in Somalia, and efforts by international 

There is much happening in Africa that is positive—economically, socially, and politically. But a 

large share of the continent remains fragile, putting 

those gains at risk. The most pressing challenges facing many African states are paramilitary threats—

threats that are beyond the ability of most police 

forces and frequently transcend national borders. 

Organized crime, rural banditry, piracy, local warlords, guerrillas, ethnic and religious violence, and 

extremist Islamist groups are just a few of an array of 

such threats.

These paramilitary threats are growing in size 

and scope. Organized crime is increasingly linked to 

narcotics trafficking from South America through 

West Africa and from Asia through East Africa—a 

trade now running in the tens of billions of dollars. 

Oil theft (“bunkering”) amounts to 10 percent of 
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Islamist terrorist groups to establish themselves elsewhere in Africa.

Many of these irregular forces—whether criminal or guerrilla—are dangerous opponents. They are highly experienced in bush war 

and are well armed with assault rifles, RPG–7s, 

and heavy machineguns. Moreover, they are 

highly mobile in four-wheel-drive vehicles and 

well equipped with global positioning systems, 

night vision goggles, and satellite telephones. 

A few may have man-portable antiaircraft missiles. In 2002, terrorists fired two SA–7s at an 

Israeli airliner in Mombasa, and in 1996, cattle 

rustlers used one to shoot down a Kenyan police 

helicopter, killing all on board. Some are supported 

by neighboring countries, enabling access to even 

better equipment. General Laurent Nkunda’s forces 

in the eastern DRC had T–55 tanks and field artillery. Guerrillas in the Central African Republic 

(CAR), Chad, and Uganda have been supplied and 

even deployed by air. Some smugglers are using air 

transport extensively.

There also seems to be a trend toward collaboration. The operations of AQIM, Tuareg rebels, 

and smugglers in Mali and Niger are increasingly 

intertwined. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta has developed symbiotic 

relationships with bunkering gangs in Nigeria and 

guerrillas in Cameroon’s Bakassi Peninsula. Al 

Shabaab derives some of its funding from piracy 

off the coast of Somalia.

Most of the states in the region lack forces able 

to counter these threats, mainly because they cannot afford them. Compounding this issue is the fact 

that the equipment of their armed forces is often 

not suited to the type of operations they confront. 

Nor are these problems sufficiently addressed by security assistance initiatives or typical security sector 

reform programs, which tend to focus on downsizing 

rather than optimizing security forces. New force 

structures are needed to confront these challenges. 

Africa must develop security forces that are context appropriate, adequate to deal with current and 

likely threats, and affordable.

Geographic, Demograph i c , 

Cultural, and Economic Challenges

The obvious geographic challenge is the size of 

most African countries. Côte d’Ivoire is larger than 

Italy, Sudan’s Darfur region is the size of Spain, the 

CAR and Somalia are each the size of France, Chad 

is twice the size of France, and the DRC is twice the 

size of France and Spain combined. Difficult terrain 

and climate, poor transport infrastructure, and low rural population density often compound the problem.

A key demographic challenge is rapid urbanization, resulting in concentrations of unemployed 

youth in cities and towns, presenting a pool of potential recruits to criminal and guerrilla groups. 

It also spawns growing informal settlements that 

present tactical challenges: difficult navigation, 

roads easily blocked by ditches, civilians who cannot escape fighting, homes vulnerable to penetration by most munitions, and the risk of fire among 

flimsy structures. 

Cultural challenges include ethnic, linguistic, 

religious, and tribal differences. Moreover, security forces must typically overcome disconnects 

between rural villagers and a predominantly urban 

officer class.

Most African countries are also extremely 

poor, finding it difficult to meet the legitimate 

aspirations of their people. The resulting discontent is easily exploited by criminals, warlords, and 

some politicians, with obvious security implications. Poverty also makes it difficult to fund adequate forces. CAR, with a population of 4.5 million, spent only $18 million for defense in 2007. 

Chad, with 10.3 million people, committed only 

$70 million. Even relatively prosperous Kenya, 

with 39 million people, expended a modest $681 

Helmoed Heitman is a Defense Consultant, Correspondent 

for Jane’s Defence Weekly, and a member of the Vision 

2020 Project Team of the South African Army, from which 

he retired as a major in 1996.

“most of the states in the region 

lack forces able to counter these 

(paramilitary) threats”
3

million. The result is security forces far too small 

and ill equipped for their responsibilities.

Appr opr iate, Adequate, an d 

Affordable Forces

The fundamental requirement for security forces 

is to prevent security threats from arising at all, by 

deterrence or preemption, and to respond effectively

to such threats that do materialize. In Africa, this 

must be achieved within tight funding constraints, 

expansive geographic areas, and poor transportation 

infrastructure. That will demand some unconventional thinking.

African countries face highly diverse security 

threats and have quite different security requirements. 

There is no “one size fits all” or even “one style suits 

all” solution. Nevertheless, given the nature of many 

of these threats, most operations will be constabulary 

or counterinsurgency in nature. Some fundamental 

requirements can be identified on that basis.

Acceptance and trust by the people, without 

which effective operations against groups moving and 

operating among the people are not possible. Security forces must be thoroughly embedded and engaged

with the local population, willing and able to assist 

in times of need. The people must see themselves reflected in the security forces and see them as a friend 

and helper. This requires focused recruiting, training 

to enable troops to assist the people, and ensuring 

that troops are aware of local customs and can converse in local dialects. Reservists living in an area can 

be immensely valuable in this respect.

Security forces must also be demonstrably competent if they are to be accepted by local communities. That demands a focus on professionalism, 

particularly for officers and noncommissioned officers. Security forces must also be visibly honest. 

This demands careful selection, education, rigorous monitoring, competitive salaries and service 

conditions, and reliable administration to make 

petty corruption unnecessary. Finally, they must 

be politically neutral, which demands great care to 

ensure that senior appointments are clearly based 

on professional considerations.

Sustained presence, without which security 

forces will not be able to protect and support the 

population, discourage organized crime and formation of irregular forces, and develop popular support. 

This is fundamental to policing and should be equally 

so to constabulary or stability operations. Forces of 

appropriate strength that are properly tasked, trained, 

and equipped can provide effective protection against 

bandits and guerrillas, develop intelligence, defuse 

dissatisfaction by assisting the people, and keep government authorities apprised of critical needs. A 

well-considered basing strategy that permits quick 

access to the population but does not impede its daily 

activity must, therefore, be part of any force design.

Current, comprehensive intelligence, without 

which small security forces cannot be effective. Security forces must fully understand their opponents 

and the social environment within which they must 

operate. That requires continuously updated intelligence to enable security forces to monitor trends, 

highlight relevant developments, predict potential 

threats, and develop situational assessments.

Security forces must also have current operational and tactical intelligence to be effective against 

elusive and wary opponents. This requires effective 

collection, collation, and distribution, and an information-intelligence-action cycle run at the lowest 

possible unit level. A typical bureaucratic intelligence system that provides intelligence long after it 

might have been useful will not suffice.

Designing Balanced General 

Purpose Forces

Against this background, it is possible to develop some concepts that can be widely applicable as a 

starting point for a tailored force design (see table).

This will be complemented by specialized force elements including airpower and, depending on the 

particular country, maritime elements.

The reality faced by most African security sectors 

is that small force elements must be able to conduct 

operations without support. Dispersed deployment will 

be essential for presence and to develop and main-

“security forces must be 

thoroughly embedded and engaged 

with the local population”
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tain a usable intelligence picture. Meanwhile, quick 

reinforcement will be difficult at best. Poor roads will 

in many cases make it difficult to deploy and sustain 

large forces. All force elements must, therefore, have 

balanced general purpose combat capabilities and protected mobility. Fire support will require long range 

(to support dispersed forces deployed or patrolling far 

from base), lightweight ammunition (to offset supply 

problems), and precision (for efficient use of munitions 

and to avoid collateral casualties and damage). 

Several South African examples exemplify 

this approach.

The Modular Battalion. An infantry battalion 

whose number of companies, armored cars, mounted 

or motorcycle troops, engineers, and other attached 

elements varied depending on its area of responsibility (AOR). Each company in turn was also modular 

in structure, often with five infantry platoons and one 

of armored cars as well as some Armored Personnel 

Carriers (APCs) for mobile patrols. Such modularity 

allowed each battalion and company to be tailored 

precisely to its AOR—size, terrain, roads, population 

density—and to conduct a range of operations with 

its own resources.

The Battalion Group. A mechanized or motorized infantry battalion with an integral armored car 

company, artillery battery, and engineers. Even light 

infantry units were organized as battalion groups 

with an armored car company, an artillery battery, 

and some APCs for mobility when not engaged in 

foot operations. This versatile yet light structure 

took cognizance of the fact that battalion level units 

would often have to operate far from other units or 

supporting arms and gave them the inherent internal flexibility to do so effectively. This also virtually 

eliminated common problems that came with temporarily attaching elements of different arms to a unit.

Another example is Cameroon’s Rapid Intervention Battalion, formed specifically to counter rural 

banditry and having its own air component with light 

aircraft and helicopters. It has proven successful in large 

part because of its specific doctrinal and organizational 

focus on combating paramilitary opponents rather than 

conventional military operations. It also has a range of 

in-house capabilities that enable it to respond quickly 

and flexibly as a situation develops without having to 

request support attachments and wait for their arrival.

At a higher organizational level is the French 

army example of the “demi-brigade,” and at a lower 

level many armies use “half-battalions,” “company 

groups,” and “half-companies” to good effect. The 

key is a balance of capabilities that match an array of 

likely tactical requirements.

In addition to balanced capabilities, force design 

must at all levels provide for:

◆◆ operational, tactical, and logistical mobility and agility, to allow prompt and quick 

focusing of combat power to seize fleeting 

opportunities to engage elusive opponents

◆◆ rapid and sustained dominance in an AOR, 

including the elasticity (strength and logistics) and flexibility (balanced capabilities) 

to extend deployments in time or area and 

to adapt deployments as a situation develops

◆◆ precision firepower, to enable small, dispersed forces to overmatch and quickly

overwhelm opponents and minimize collateral casualties and damage

◆◆ assured communications, using aerial relay 

when conditions require it

◆◆ assured logistic support that takes into account the difficulties of movement over 

poor roads and the very real risk of ambush 

or interruption of logistic routes. 

In most African countries, optimal force design 

will comprise a mix of permanently deployed force 

elements with responsibility for assigned sectors and 

mobile force elements that can be shifted to adapt 

force density or serve as reaction forces when needed.

“the reality faced by most African 

security sectors is that small force 

elements must be able to conduct 

operations without support”
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Africa’s Paramilitary Threats and Counterforce Requirements

Operational Challenges Force Design Implications

Many irregular groups present a significant military 

threat, at least at a tactical level. 

Counter and defeat opponents at a military level, which 

require sufficient capacity and assets to overmatch 

opponents. There is no excuse for sending government 

forces to a “fair fight.” 

Irregular forces are often more criminal than military, 

requiring an appropriate mindset to counter them.

Understand and counter irregular forces’ criminal intent 

and activities.

Most irregular forces are well embedded within the 

population, voluntarily or through intimidation, and have 

good local knowledge.

Engage destabilizing forces in populated areas without 

undue collateral casualties or damage. 

Security forces must be broadly representative, aware 

of cultural issues, and able to communicate in local 

dialects.

Personnel must be educated and trained to high 

standards to enable small, dispersed force elements to 

be effective against varied threats.

Many irregular forces are very mobile, on foot in forests 

or mountainous terrain or in four-wheel-drive vehicles. 

Enhanced mobility—on foot, by vehicle, and by air—is a 

key force multiplier.

Most irregular forces have adequate communications 

for command and control.

Deployed force elements must have balanced 

capabilities (infantry, armor, engineers, communications, 

and so forth) to handle immediate tasks, avoid timeconsuming attachments or reinforcements, and offset 

inadequate overall strength, dispersed deployment, and 

mobility constraints.

Distances can render radio communications tenuous, 

requiring special measures. 

Difficult terrain and weather will hamper operations. 

Moreover, informal settlements present a particularly 

important and complex challenge.

Specialized force elements for certain terrain types 

(forest, mountain, river, informal settlements) 

are needed.

Good intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are 

difficult to provide, particularly in rural and border areas. Intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capability 

are required at all levels. Basing and deployment Operational, tactical, and logistical maneuverability is decisions must offset mobility constraints. difficult and slow.

States have insufficient force densities and elements to 

counter multiple threats. 

Equipment that balances capability, supportability, and 

affordability is required. 

The permanently deployed force elements will 

in most cases best be modular battalions with company and perhaps half-company bases in key parts 

of their AOR. They can be supported by a mobile 

element that would conduct pseudo-random patrols throughout the battalion area to confuse opponents, vary force density within selected zones, 

and serve as a reaction force. Reinforced platoons 

may suffice for some outposts, although there always should be two commissioned officers, one to 

lead patrols while the other ensures command and 

control. Effective village protection can even be 

provided by reinforced infantry sections. In each 

case, however, such small force elements must be 

assured of prompt support—for their own protection and to ensure their credibility.

Whether the mobile elements of the modular 

battalions are mechanized or motorized will depend 

on the terrain, nature of the opponent, and available funding. The aim should be to overmatch likely 

opponents in mobility and firepower, while also ensuring force protection. In most cases, simple, easily 

maintained, and affordable mine-protected APCs 

should suffice. Full-scale Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected–type vehicles will be required only where 

forces cannot conveniently move off road, and thus 

become vulnerable to improvised explosive device 

attacks. In particularly difficult terrain, these force 

elements may best comprise light infantry deployed 

and supported by vehicle or helicopter.

The main mobile operations forces will in most 

cases best be battalion groups or company groups that 
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employ high-mobility operations concepts and tactics. The key to their effectiveness will lie in mobile 

thinking and then translating that into doctrine and 

detailed organization.

Wherever possible, all mobile force elements 

should exploit their asymmetric edge over light opposing forces. There is nothing quite as asymmetric 

as an armored combat vehicle engaging a guerrilla 

on foot. The South African “mechanized followup” concept provides one example. It was based on 

combining a short intelligence cycle at platoon level, 

tracking skills, and the mobility, firepower, and protection of mine-protected APCs. This was supported 

by helicopters for reconnaissance, command and 

control, and fire support. Such a combination was 

extremely difficult for guerrillas to counter.

Specialized Force Elements. In some situations, 

it will be worth developing specialized units to complement conventional forces. Each situation will demand its own solution, but among the concepts that 

have proven tactically effective and cost-efficient in 

multiple conflicts are the deployment of special forces 

teams to live with remote rural communities, assisting and protecting them while also developing an 

intelligence picture; the deployment of detachments 

to live in and protect rural villages; and the development of local self-protection forces. 

Theaters with long lines of communication will 

require careful thought to adequately protect logistic 

movements. Convoys and checkpoints alone will not 

suffice against competent opponents. There will also 

need to be mobile force elements conducting pseudorandom patrols of the areas through which those lines 

of communication run. 

Airpower. With the continent’s large theaters, 

low force densities, and poor road links, airpower can 

be a critical factor and provide an asymmetric edge in 

Africa. Given the cost of airpower, however, the focus 

should be on a combination of low-cost turboprop 

aircraft and affordable high-tech systems to provide 

essential capabilities such as:

◆◆ reconnaissance, surveillance, and communications intelligence, using single- or twinengine utility aircraft with optronic turrets 

and basic communications intelligence systems. Unmanned aerial vehicles are an option but often not as inexpensive or simple 

as they appear. 

◆◆ transport, to deploy and support force elements, including light vehicles. It is not 

helpful to fly in and then have to move 100 

kilometers or more on foot while the opponent departs or even to maneuver using 

four-wheel-drive vehicles. 

◆◆ tactical helicopter mobility, preferably for at 

least two platoons in a single lift to ensure an 

effective element on the ground, and, when 

possible, with support by armed helicopters 

◆◆ combat air support, using armed turboprop trainers and light fixed-wing gunships with low-cost precision weapons for 

an optimal mix of persistence, firepower, 

and affordability

◆◆ airspace control, using a mix of observation 

posts, transportable stealthy radars, and 

low-cost turboprop interceptor aircraft to 

prevent irregular forces making use of air 

transport. 

Maritime Elements. Most African countries depend on seaborne trade, fishing, and other offshore 

industries but lack effective navies or coast guards. 

This applies equally to countries with long lake borders or major riverine transport systems. Even small 

rivers can be used as smuggling routes by light craft 

and must be secured. As with airpower, low-cost 

systems that give the required minimum capability 

should be prioritized. Maritime security capabilities 

“much of what African 

security forces will have to 

do over the medium term 

will be either constabulary or 

counterinsurgency in nature and 

will not require a 

full-scale military”
7

will have to be developed in phases as funding allows 

and operational experience makes practicable: 

◆◆ security around ports and inshore fishing 

grounds, using light inshore patrol craft 

with only very basic systems and light 

weapons but capable of night operations 

to deter smuggling

◆◆ prevention of over-the-beach smuggling, 

which will require seacraft of some endurance, 

ideally with support by light surveillance aircraft (even single-engine types will suffice)

◆◆ protection of offshore assets, which will 

require larger vessels, 45 to 90 meters depending on the typical sea condition and

distance to those assets. Protection will 

best be performed by a combination of patrol vessels and surveillance aircraft, which 

can be light twin turboprops. This might be 

handled in collaboration with fishing and 

oil companies or funded directly by a tax on 

their activities. 

◆◆ protection of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 

which can essentially be an extension of the 

protection of offshore assets. 

Military or Paramilitary?

Much of what African security forces will have 

to do over the medium term will be either constabulary or counterinsurgency in nature and will not require a full-scale military. In fact, a force that starts 

out with a policing mindset might well be better than 

a conventional military. A military will inevitably 

run the risk of comparing itself to and benchmarking itself against the armed forces of larger countries, 

which face entirely different challenges.

African countries should, therefore, consider 

whether they might not do better with a constabulary or gendarmerie that incorporates civil police, 

paramilitary units, coast guard, air patrol, and transport elements rather than separate police and armed 

forces. A paramilitary force of this type would also 

amalgamate a full range of capabilities within a single 

organization, eliminating the inevitable duplications 

of having both police and military. 

This approach might, of course, simply not be 

practicable politically. That still leaves the option of 

the European example: a paramilitary gendarmerie 

that is part of the military but has a policing focus 

and reports to the interior ministry in times of peace. 

During conflict or war, that type of force provides 

security and rear area protection, and its specialist 

antiterrorist elements complement military special 

forces. This approach will be more expensive than a 

single force but would bring the best of both worlds.

Conclusion

African security forces will face varied challenges over the medium term, few of them of a kind

to be found in most manuals. They will need to apply imaginative thinking and to FOCUS: Focus on 

their mission, Optimize their force structure, Control 

operations tightly, Understand what is actually happening (not what they might like to be happening), 

and Seize tactical and operational opportunities as 

they arise.
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Africa Center for 

Strategic Studies

Director: Ambassador William 

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 21

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Web site: www.africacenter.org

Africa Center 

Regional Office 

in Dakar

Regional Manager: 

Elisabeth Feleke

Phone: 221 33 869 61 00

Email: FelekeE@ndu.edu

Africa Center 

Regional Office 

in Addis Ababa

Regional Manager:

Brad Anderson 

Phone: 251 11 517 4000 

Email: AndersonBG@state.gov

Africa Security Briefs

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808

Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal

Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at

http://www.africacenter.org.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the 

development of U.S. strategic policy toward Africa by providing highquality academic programs, undertaking policy-relevant research and

analysis, and fostering awareness of and open dialogue on U.S. strategic 

priorities and African security issues. Toward these aims, the ACSS 

is committed to building networks of African, American, European, 

and international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

http://www.africacenter.org

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

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