NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JOSLIN G., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, T.R., N.D., O.D., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0138

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD21968

The Honorable Joan Sinclair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll, Esq., Scottsdale

By Denise L. Carroll

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael F. Valenzuela

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
JOSLIN G. V. DCS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

K E S S L E R, Judge:

¶1 Joslin G. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her children, arguing the court lacked 

jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Joslin G. is the mother of T.R., born in 2007, N.D., born in 2008,

and O.D., born in 2010 (collectively “the children”). Joshua D. is the father 

of N.D. and O.D. Travis R. is the father of T.R.1 

¶3 In May 2012, the Arizona Department of Child Safety 

(“DCS”)

2 received a report that Mother and Joshua D. were abusing 

substances and neglecting the children. DCS went to the family’s home and 

found the children very dirty, one child with an untreated eye infection,

and another inappropriately clothed for the weather. 

¶4 During the initial assessment, Mother reported she and the 

children lived most of their lives in Washington, but had moved every few 

months since September 2011.3 Mother admitted that she and Joshua D.

had used methamphetamine before moving to Arizona, but claimed they 

had not used drugs in quite some time. Joshua D., however, passed out 

during the initial assessment and needed to be transported to the hospital. 

 

1 The fathers are not parties to this appeal.

2 Pursuant to S.B. 1001, Section 157, 51st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) 

(enacted), the Arizona Department of Child Safety (DCS) is substituted for 

the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) in this matter. See

ARCAP 27. All references to ADES will be changed to reflect the change.

3 Mother reported living in Alabama for two months, Georgia for three 

months, and Alabama for a month immediately preceding their move to 

Arizona in March of 2012, two months prior to the removal of the children 

by DCS.
JOSLIN G. V. DCS

Decision of the Court

3

The responding crisis team determined Joshua D. was under the influence 

of an unknown narcotic. Mother also was hospitalized for being a 

perceived danger to herself. DCS placed the children with Joshua D.’s 

parents (“the paternal grandparents”) and granted the paternal 

grandparents temporary custody of the children.4 Mother and Joshua D.

moved back to Washington in June 2012. Mother, however, returned to 

Arizona in July of 2013. 

¶5 Upon removal of the children in May 2012, DCS filed a 

dependency petition and petition for paternity and/or child support. The 

court ordered the children temporary wards of the state and to remain with 

the paternal grandparents. Mother moved to dismiss the petition for lack 

of jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement 

Act (“UCCJEA”). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 25-1001 (2007). Mother 

conceded Arizona likely had temporary emergency jurisdiction because the 

children were present in Arizona without a parent, a legal guardian, or 

anyone with proper legal authority over them, but argued that Washington 

retained ongoing jurisdiction. Mother asked the court to dismiss the action 

or, alternatively, to communicate with Washington courts to resolve the 

jurisdictional question. 

¶6 DCS opposed Mother’s motion to dismiss, arguing the 

children did not have a home state under the UCCJEA because of the 

family’s frequent relocations dating back to September 2011.

5 As such, DCS 

argued Arizona had jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2).6 Further, 

 

4 The paternal grandparents were identified as having a significant 

relationship with all three children, including T.R., who is not their 

biological grandchild. 

5 For the purposes of this decision, the term “home state” is defined as the 

state in which a child has lived with a parent or person acting as a parent 

for at least six consecutive months prior to the commencement of a child 

custody proceeding. A.R.S. § 25-1002(7)(a). 

6 A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2) confers jurisdiction to make an initial child custody 

determination to an Arizona juvenile court if no court in any other state has 

jurisdiction to do so as the home state of the child or a court of the home 

state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that Arizona is the 

more appropriate forum. Further, A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2)(a)–(b) confer

jurisdiction if the child and at least one parent have a significant connection 

with Arizona, beyond mere physical presence, and substantial evidence is 

available in Arizona regarding the child’s care, protection, training, and 

personal relationships.
JOSLIN G. V. DCS

Decision of the Court

4

DCS maintained that Arizona had temporary emergency jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. § 25-1034(A) and there were no orders entitled to enforcement nor 

custody proceedings in any other state at the time of removal. 

¶7 In reply, Mother argued Washington was the children’s home 

state because Washington courts had issued several orders between 2007 

and 2011 dealing with the best interests of the children.7 She contended

because Washington had issued these orders based on the best interests of 

the children and had acknowledged Washington as the children’s home 

state at the time those orders were issued, Washington was the children’s 

home state. 

¶8 After a pretrial conference in September 2012, during which 

the juvenile court designated the case plan to be family reunification 

concurrent with severance and adoption, the court issued a minute entry 

informing the parties that it had spoken to a juvenile court judge in 

Washington concerning the case. The judges agreed it was sensible to 

return the children to Washington, given the children’s parents were 

located, or were soon to be located, in Washington. The Arizona juvenile 

court ordered DCS and the Arizona Attorney General’s Office to coordinate 

with their counterparts in Washington to transfer the children to 

Washington, but indicated it would not dismiss the case until receipt of 

written verification, from the Washington counterpart of DCS, that the 

children were in Washington’s custody. 

¶9 However, at the time of a report and review hearing in 

November 2012, the children continued to reside in Arizona. Although 

counsel for DCS had contacted her counterpart in Washington, she was 

informed the Washington Attorney General’s Office would not file or move 

forward until they heard from the Washington counterpart of DCS. DCS 

requested the Arizona juvenile court to contact a Washington judicial 

 

7 The orders presented by Mother included: (1) a 2007 judgment and 

sentencing order entered against Travis R., T.R.’s father, for misdemeanor 

domestic violence against Mother, requiring Travis R. to have no contact 

with Mother; (2) a 2008 judgment and order determining the parentage of 

T.R.; (3) a 2008 order granting summary judgment with regards to paternity 

of T.R. and child support; (4) a 2011 order of child support for the benefit of 

T.R.; (5) an order of contempt against Travis R.; (6) a 2009 temporary order 

of protection against Travis R., granting Mother temporary custody of T.R.; 

and (7) a 2009 order of protection against Travis R., granting Mother 

temporary custody of T.R. and N.D., declaring Washington the home state 

of the children.
JOSLIN G. V. DCS

Decision of the Court

5

officer and request that a DCS case be opened in Washington and that DCS

in Washington take custody of the children. The juvenile court agreed to 

continue to attempt to contact the Washington juvenile court, noting it had 

tried to contact the Washington court several times about the case but had 

received no response. 

¶10 At the report and review hearing in April 2013, the juvenile 

court stated it had made additional efforts to work with its counterpart in 

Washington, including having sent a letter stating an intent to set a formal 

UCCJEA hearing, but had not received a reply from the Washington court. 

Because the Washington court had failed to reply to the numerous attempts 

at contact, the juvenile court ruled it would retain jurisdiction in the matter. 

¶11 In August 2013, the juvenile court changed the case plan to 

severance and adoption. DCS petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights based on the children being in an out-of-home placement for longer 

than fifteen months; on Mother not being able to remedy the circumstances 

which resulted in removal; and on the substantial likelihood that Mother 

would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and 

control in the near future.

8 See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

¶12 The juvenile court held a severance hearing in April 2014. 

Mother did not appear except by counsel, and the court proceeded by 

default because mother had waived her rights by failing to appear. 

Mother’s counsel continued to object to the severance based on lack of 

jurisdiction, but the court found it had jurisdiction because the children 

were in Maricopa County at the time the proceedings were commenced. 

See A.R.S. § 8-532(A) (2014). The court found termination of mother’s 

parental rights to the children was appropriate by clear and convincing 

evidence and that severance would be in the best interest and welfare of the 

children by a preponderance of the evidence. 

¶13 Mother filed a timely appeal, within fifteen days of the 

severance order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A)(2007), 

 

8 DCS also petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Travis R., based on 

his abandonment of T.R., see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1); and of Joshua D., based 

on N.D. and O.D.’s being in an out-of-home placement for longer than 

fifteen months; on Joshua D.’s inability to remedy the circumstances which 

resulted in removal; and on the substantial likelihood that Joshua D. would 

not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control 

in the near future, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The parental rights of both 

Travis R. and Joshua D. were terminated on December 17, 2013. 
JOSLIN G. V. DCS

Decision of the Court

6

12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 12-2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2013) and Juv. Ct. Rules of 

Proc., Rule 104(A). 

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14 Mother argues on appeal the juvenile court did not properly 

consider whether it had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, given the 

“possibility of a custody order in Washington.” At trial, DCS argued the 

juvenile court had jurisdiction to make an initial child custody 

determination under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2) because there was no home 

state when DCS filed the dependency petition or within six months prior to 

the filing, the children and parents had a significant connection with 

Arizona, and there was substantial evidence regarding the children’s 

welfare in Arizona. On appeal DCS argues the juvenile court had 

jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2) or, in the alternative, A.R.S. § 25-

1031(A)(4). Further, DCS argues that the Arizona juvenile court had 

jurisdiction to modify Washington’s initial child custody determination as 

to T.R. under A.R.S. § 25-1033.

¶15 Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited. 

State v. Chacon, 221 Ariz. 523, 526, ¶ 5, 212 P.3d 861, 864 (App. 2009). An 

order entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void. Id. We

review issues of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Angel B. v. Vanessa J., 

234 Ariz. 69, 71, ¶ 6, 316 P.3d 1257, 1259 (App. 2014); Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. 

v. Grant, 232 Ariz. 576, 579, ¶ 5, 307 P.3d 1003, 1006 (App. 2013) (holding 

jurisdiction over severance is a question of law and is reviewed de novo). 

We review any evidence presented to the juvenile court in the light most 

favorable to affirming the court’s decision. Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 449, ¶ 12, 153 P.3d 1074, 1079 (App. 2007); see also Jesus 

M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 13, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 

2002). We assume the trial court considered any admissible evidence 

presented to it before making its decision, Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 

55–56, ¶ 18, 97 P.3d 876, 880–81 (App. 2004) and will affirm the court on any 

basis supported by the record. Adage Towing and Recovery, Inc. v. City of 

Tucson, 187 Ariz. 396, 398, 930 P.2d 473, 475 (App. 1996). 

DISCUSSION

¶16 We summarily reject Mother’s argument that the trial court 

did not consider the possibility of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. In her 

motion to dismiss, Mother presented the court with evidence Washington 

might have been the children’s home state for UCCJEA purposes. We 

presume the court considered any evidence and arguments presented to it. 
JOSLIN G. V. DCS

Decision of the Court

7

Fuentes, 209 Ariz. at 55–56, ¶ 18, 97 P.3d at 880–81 (App. 2004). The court 

also repeatedly contacted Washington to determine which court should 

have jurisdiction, indicating that it was considering whether it had 

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. 

¶17 To the extent Mother argues the evidence she presented 

showed the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, we 

disagree. 

I. The Arizona juvenile court had jurisdiction to issue an initial custody 

determination with respect to N.D. and O.D. under A.R.S. § 25-

1031(A)(2).

¶18 Jurisdiction to issue an initial child custody determination is 

conferred on the superior court by A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2) if another state 

does not have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(1),

9 the child and at 

least one parent have a significant connection to Arizona, other than mere 

physical presence, and there is substantial evidence in Arizona concerning 

the child’s care. 

¶19 In this case, no court in any other state had jurisdiction to 

make an initial child custody determination under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(1). 

Washington could not be considered the children’s home state pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(1), because, at the time of removal and the 

commencement of these proceedings, the children had not been in 

Washington for more than six months. Further, the children were present 

in Arizona with one of their parents at the time DCS placed the children 

with the paternal grandparents. The presence of the paternal grandparents 

in Arizona, as well as the investigation by DCS, demonstrates not only there 

was substantial evidence in Arizona concerning the children’s care, 

protection, training and personal relationships, but also the children and at

least one of the children’s parents had a connection with Arizona, more 

significant than mere physical presence at the time of removal.

 

9 A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(1) confers jurisdiction on Arizona to make an initial 

custody determination if Arizona is the “home state of the child on the date 

of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child 

within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the 

child is absent from [Arizona] but a parent or person acting as a parent 

continues to live in [Arizona].”
JOSLIN G. V. DCS

Decision of the Court

8

¶20 Moreover, the Arizona juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter 

initial custody orders because none of the Washington orders proffered by 

Mother can be considered initial custody orders as to N.D. and O.D. The 

2007 judgment and sentence of T.R.’s father for misdemeanor domestic 

violence did not confer custody of any child to either parent.10 The 2008 

determination of parentage of T.R., and the order granting summary 

judgment on the same issue, also did not confer custody of N.D. and O.D. 

to Mother or Joshua D. Further, an order for child support is not a child 

custody determination. See A.R.S. § 25-1002(3)(b). Thus, neither order for 

child support was a determination of custody for any of the children. The 

order of contempt against Travis R. also failed to confer custody of any of 

the children in any way to either parent. Finally, while the orders of 

protection issued in 2009 did provide that Washington was the home state

of the children and that Mother had temporary custody of T.R. and N.D., 

those orders expired long before the current proceedings began. Under 

Washington law, the orders of protection do not extend jurisdiction under 

the UCCJEA beyond the term of the order. In re Parentage, Parenting, and 

Support of A.R.K.-K. v. Kelly, 174 P.3d 160, 164, ¶ 16 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).

Therefore, the Arizona juvenile court had jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-

1031(A)(2).

II. The Arizona juvenile court had jurisdiction to make an initial child 

custody determination with respect to N.D. and O.D. under A.R.S. § 

25-1031(A)(4).

¶21 Alternatively, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to make an 

initial child custody determination with respect to N.D. and O.D. under 

A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(4) because no court of any other state had jurisdiction 

under the criteria specified in A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(1)–(3).

11 No other state 

could be considered the home state of any of the children under A.R.S. § 25-

1031(A)(1) for the reasons stated above concerning length of time the 

children were in any particular state. Further, neither the children nor

evidence concerning their care, protection, training, and personal 

relationships were present in any other state as required by section 25-

1031(A)(2). Finally, since Washington did not have jurisdiction under 

(A)(1) or (A)(2), subsection (A)(3) does not apply because it requires a state 

 

10 RCW 26.27.021 states a child custody determination is a “judgment, 

decree, parenting plan, or other order of a court providing for the legal 

custody . . . with respect to a child.” It parallels A.R.S. § 25-1002(3)(a).

11 A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(4) confers jurisdiction to Arizona where no other state 

has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(1)–(3). 
JOSLIN G. V. DCS

Decision of the Court

9

which has jurisdiction under the first two subsections to exercise such 

jurisdiction to allow Arizona to determine custody.12 Therefore, the 

Arizona juvenile court had jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(4).

III. The Arizona juvenile court had jurisdiction to make an initial child 

custody determination with respect to N.D. and O.D. under A.R.S. § 

25-1034(B).

¶22 We also conclude the juvenile court had jurisdiction to make 

an initial child custody determination with respect to N.D. and O.D. under 

A.R.S. § 25-1034(B).13 Section 1034(A) provides that an Arizona court has 

temporary emergency jurisdiction to act when a child is present in Arizona 

and there is an emergency situation requiring that child to be protected

from mistreatment or abuse. Pursuant to section 25-1034(B), if there is no 

previous child custody determination “entitled to be enforced” and a child 

custody proceeding has not been commenced in another state having 

jurisdiction, a temporary custody determination made under A.R.S. § 25-

1034 becomes a final determination if it so provides and Arizona becomes 

the home state. 

¶23 Here, the children were subject to abuse or mistreatment and

there was no custody determination entitled to be enforced as to N.D. or 

O.D. in Washington, or any other state, because the orders of protection had 

expired. See Kelly, 174 P.3d at 164, ¶ 16 (jurisdiction conferred via

temporary order expires when that order expires). As discussed above, 

none of the other orders Mother presented to the juvenile court qualified as 

a child custody determination as to N.D. and O.D. and there was no 

evidence any custody proceeding had been commenced in another state. 

To construe expired proceedings in another state as depriving Arizona of 

jurisdiction to protect children present in Arizona would have left these 

children in limbo. 

 

12 A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(3) confers jurisdiction on Arizona where another 

court having jurisdiction declines to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds 

that Arizona is the more appropriate forum. 

13 The State argued below that jurisdiction existed under section 25-1034(B). 

While the State does not make that argument on appeal, we can affirm on 

any ground raised below and supported by the record. Adage Towing & 

Recovery, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 187 Ariz. 396, 398, 930 P.2d 473, 475 (App. 

1996). 
JOSLIN G. V. DCS

Decision of the Court

10

IV. The Arizona juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify Washington’s 

2008 child custody determination with respect to T.R. under A.R.S. § 

25-1033.

¶24 The UCCJEA defines a child custody determination as “any 

judgment, decree, or other order of a court, including a permanent, 

temporary, initial and modification order, for legal custody, physical 

custody or visitation with respect to a child.” A.R.S. § 25-1002(3)(a). As 

such, the 2008 judgment and order determining the parentage of T.R. and 

the 2008 order granting summary judgment regarding the paternity of T.R., 

both entered by the Washington court and proffered by Mother below to 

demonstrate Washington had jurisdiction over the matter, constitute an 

initial child custody determination with regards to T.R. 

¶25 The UCCJEA, however, allows for the court of one state to 

modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state 

under certain circumstances. For an Arizona juvenile court to have 

jurisdiction to modify a Washington child custody determination, the 

Arizona juvenile court must have jurisdiction to make an initial 

determination under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(1) or (2). See A.R.S. § 25-1033. In 

addition, one of the following conditions must exist: (1) the Washington 

court determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, (2) the 

Washington court determines that Arizona would be a more convenient 

forum, or (3) an Arizona court determines that the child, the child’s parents, 

and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in Washington. 

Id. Here, as previously discussed, the Arizona juvenile court had

jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination, with regards to 

all three children, under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2).14 Further, the record 

supports a finding that T.R., Mother, and the paternal grandparents were 

residing in Arizona, not in Washington, at the time of removal, at the time

DCS filed the dependency petition, at the time DCS filed the severance 

petition, and at the time of the severance hearing. “We will infer the 

necessary findings to affirm” the juvenile court’s order, so long as those 

“implied findings do not conflict with the court’s express findings.” State 

v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63, 67, ¶ 7, 282 P.3d 528, 532 (App. 2009) (citations 

omitted). Therefore, we infer that the Arizona juvenile court determined 

T.R., Mother, and the paternal grandparents were not residing in 

Washington at any pivotal point during the dependency or severance 

actions. As such, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify 

 

14 See supra Section I, ¶ 19.
JOSLIN G. V. DCS

Decision of the Court

11

Washington’s 2008 child custody determination with respect to T.R. under 

A.R.S. § 25-1033.

CONCLUSION

¶26 For the reasons stated above, we conclude the juvenile court 

had jurisdiction to issue the severance order. Accordingly, we affirm the 

juvenile court’s order.