alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ABDELKAKER MORCELI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

W. MEYERS, Lieutenant,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-15187

D.C. No. 1:11-cv-00685-AWIBAM

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 25, 2016**

Before: LEAVY, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Abdelkaker Morceli appeals pro se from the district 

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a violation of 

his First Amendment free exercise rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo, Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 4 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 15-15187 

2015), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Morceli 

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant was 

responsible for the challenged headwear policy’s creation and enforcement. See id.

at 1031-32 (setting forth elements of a § 1983 free exercise claim); Starr v. Baca, 

652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements for supervisory 

liability under § 1983). Contrary to Morceli’s contentions, the district court 

applied the proper standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in granting 

summary judgment where Morceli’s contentions were not supported by facts. See 

Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“[C]onclusory allegations unsupported by factual data are insufficient to defeat [a 

defendant’s] summary judgment motion.”).

AFFIRMED.
NASA LogoNTRSNTRS - NASA Technical Reports ServerSearchmore_vertCollectionsAboutNewsHelpLogin Back to ResultsBig Data Analytics and Machine Intelligence Capability Development at NASA Langley Research Center: Strategy, Roadmap, and ProgressIn 2014, a team of researchers, engineers and information technology specialists at NASA Langley Research Center developed a Big Data Analytics and Machine Intelligence Strategy and Roadmap as part of Langley's Comprehensive Digital Transformation Initiative, with the goal of identifying the goals, objectives, initiatives, and recommendations need to develop near-, mid- and long-term capabilities for data analytics and machine intelligence in aerospace domains. Since that time, significant progress has been made in developing pilots and projects in several research, engineering, and scientific domains by following the original strategy of collaboration between mission support organizations, mission organizations, and external partners from universities and industry. This report summarizes the work to date in Data Intensive Scientific Discovery, Deep Content Analytics, and Deep Q&A projects, as well as the progress made in collaboration, outreach, and education. Recommendations for continuing this success into future phases of the initiative are also made.Document ID20170000676Acquisition SourceLangley Research CenterDocument TypeTechnical Memorandum (TM)AuthorsAmbur, Manjula Y.*(NASA Langley Research Center Hampton, VA, United States)*Yagle, Jeremy J.*(NASA Langley Research Center Hampton, VA, United States)*Reith, William*(Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Inc. Hampton, VA, United States)*McLarney, Edward*(NASA Langley Research Center Hampton, VA, United States)*Date AcquiredJanuary 20, 2017Publication DateDecember 1, 2016Subject CategoryDocumentation And Information ScienceReport/Patent NumberL-20775NF1676L-26218NASA/TM-2016-219361Funding Number(s)WBS: WBS 736466.07.08.07.02Distribution LimitsPublicCopyrightPublic Use Permitted.Available DownloadsNameType20170000676.pdfSTIcloud_downloadcontent_copyvisibilityRelated RecordsThere are no records associated with this record.visibility_offNo Preview Available
 No Fear Act | Freedom of Information Act | Office of the Inspector General | Agency Financial ReportsNASA Web Privacy Policy and Important Notices | NASA Guidelines for Quality of InformationDisclaimers, Copyright, Terms of Use | Accessibility | NASA OCIO | USA.gov | NASA.govContact Us | Site MapSTI LogoNASA Official: JoAnne R. Calhoun Site Curator: STI Compliance and Distribution Services Last Modified: September 12, 2024
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report of PetroHunter Energy Corporation (the
“Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ending September 30, 2009, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
Martin B. Oring, President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive
Officer) of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.








Date:
      January 13, 2010
            /s/
      Martin B. OringMartin
      B. Oring, President and Chief Executive OfficerPrincipal
      Executive Officer
Editorial Note on Part 982
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 982 appear at 64 FR 26640, May 14, 1999, and at 89 FR 38293, May 7, 2024.

§ 982.351 Overview. This subpart describes what kind of housing is eligible for leasing, and the areas where a family can live with tenant-based assistance. The subpart covers: ( a ) Assistance for a family that rents a dwelling unit in the jurisdiction of the PHA that originally selected the family for tenant-based assistance.
( b ) “Portability” assistance for a family PHA rents a unit outside the jurisdiction of the initial PHA.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3456 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3456

   To amend title 28, United States Code, to provide for individuals 
 serving as Federal jurors to continue to receive their normal average 
                  wage or salary during such service.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 27, 2005

 Mr. Andrews introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 28, United States Code, to provide for individuals 
 serving as Federal jurors to continue to receive their normal average 
                  wage or salary during such service.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CONTINUATION OF WAGES OR SALARY FOR INDIVIDUALS SERVING AS 
              FEDERAL JURORS.

    (a) Continuation of Wages or Salary.--Section 1877 of title 28, 
United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
        subsection:
    ``(b)(1) The employer of a Federal grand or petit juror shall pay 
to that juror, for each day during which that juror performs duty as a 
juror, a wage not less than the differential compensation specified in 
paragraph (2) less the aggregate amount, paid to the juror for that 
day, of any fees and allowances under section 1871.
            ``(2) The differential compensation referred to in 
        paragraph (1) means--
                    ``(A) if that juror has a regular employment 
                schedule with that employer, the wage or salary that 
                the juror would have been paid for that day under that 
                schedule but for that juror's performance of duty as a 
                juror; or
                    ``(B) if that juror does not have a regular 
                employment schedule with that employer, the average 
                daily wage or salary of the juror during the 7-day 
                period ending on the day before the juror first 
                performed duty as a juror.
            ``(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term `employer' 
        includes any public or private employer.''.
    (b) Significant Hardship to Employer.--Paragraph (1) of section 
1866(c) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``or 
upon a showing by the employer of the person that payment of 
differential compensation under section 1877(b) would result in 
significant hardship to the employer,'' after ``inconvenience,''.
                                 <all>
```
NO. 07-03-0408-CV

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL E

	JANUARY 11, 2006 

	______________________________

	MILES E. and IRENE BALDWIN, 

										Appellants

	v.

	ROBERT E. GARNER, individually, and TEMPLETON & GARNER,

										Appellees

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

	NO. 75,051-E; HON. VANN CULP, PRESIDING

	________________________________

	Memorandum Opinion

	________________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., REAVIS, J. and BOYD, S.J.1

	Because I conclude the trial court erred in holding that the July 1, 1982 fee agreement was revocable in whole or in part, I respectfully dissent to that determination.

	 In Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1964) (citing Story, Equity Jurisprudence, 7th ed. 1857, s 311), after noting the relationship between an attorney and client is highly fiduciary and that their dealings are subject to scrutiny as a transaction between a trustee and beneficiary, the Court held as follows:

	[t]he burden of establishing its perfect fairness, adequacy, and equity, is thrown upon the attorney, upon the general rule, that he who bargains in a matter of advantage with a person, placing a confidence in him, is bound to show that a reasonable use has been made of that confidence; a rule applying equally to all persons standing in confidential relations with each other.		

Later, in Levine v. Bayne, Snell & Krause, Ltd., 40 S.W.3d 92, 95-96 (Tex. 2001), the Court adopted the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 18, and held that because a lawyer is more familiar with the intricacies of legal representation and with the law and drafting of fee agreements, the burden falls on the lawyer to express the terms of the payment of the fee.  

	According to the agreement printed on the law firm letterhead, Baldwin sought Garner’s services to represent him in Texas to assist in retaking unidentified property and to “potentially” (1) file a suit to set aside a foreclosure and (2) sue Baldwin’s former attorney for neglect and the maker of various notes.  The July 1, 1982 fee agreement did not address a refund of the $20,000 payment or any part thereof if Garner withdrew from representing Baldwin.  However, the agreement did provide that if Baldwin desired to terminate Garner’s services at any time, counsel would return the $20,000 less amounts advanced for payment of costs, expenses, and fees earned at $125 per hour, upon request.  Because the agreement did not provide the request for a refund could not be implied, and was silent as to an accounting for repayment if Garner withdrew from representation, applying the principles announced in Archer and Levine, I conclude the trial court erred in construing that the $20,000 payment was not refundable, in whole or in part.  

							Don H. Reavis

							     Justice
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Dean Witter
Cornerstone Fund IV and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial instruments.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                     104,927,961
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  364,747
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             105,362,851<F1>
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               105,362,851<F2>
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            31,756,524<F3>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             7,560,205
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             24,196,319
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         24,196,319
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                24,196,319
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>In addition to cash and receivables, total assets include net unrealized
gain on open contracts of $70,143.
<F2>Liabilities include redemptions payable of $1,044,804, accrued management
fees of $349,039 and common administrative expenses payable of $267,788.
<F3>Total revenue includes realized trading revenue of $27,041,974 net change
in unrealized of ($198,148) and interest income of $4,912,698.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
§ 18.36 Cables between machine components. ( a ) Cables between machine components shall have: ( 1 ) Adequate current-carrying capacity for the loads involved,
( 2 ) short-circuit protection,
( 3 ) insulation compatible with the impressed voltage, and
( 4 ) flame-resistant properties unless totally enclosed within a flame-resistant hose conduit or other flame-resistant material.
( b ) Cables between machine components shall be: ( 1 ) Clamped in place to prevent undue movement,
( 2 ) protected from mechanical damage by position, flame-resistant hose conduit, metal tubing, or troughs (flexible or threaded rigid metal conduit will not be acceptable),
( 3 ) isolated from hydraulic lines, and
( 4 ) protected from abrasion by removing all sharp edges which they might contact.
( c ) Cables (cords) for remote-control circuits extending from permissible equipment will be exempted from the requirements of conduit enclosure provided the total electrical energy carried is intrinsically safe or that the cables are constructed with heavy jackets, the sizes of which are stated in Table 6 of Appendix I. Cables (cords) provided with hose-conduit protection shall have a tensile strength not less than No. 16 (AWG) three-conductor, type SO cord. (Reference: 7.7.7 IPCEA Pub. No. S-19-81, Fourth Edition.) Cables (cords) constructed with heavy jackets shall consist of conductors not smaller than No. 14 (AWG) regardless of the number of conductors.
#### In the Matter of William J. Fitzgerald, an Attorney, Respondent. Denis M. Hurley, Petitioner.

Motion by respondent for reargument of petitioner’s motion to confirm the Special Referee’s report and to vacate the order of this court dated October 24, 1960, disbarring respondent, referred to the court that rendered the decision. Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Kleinfeld, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur. Motion denied. Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Ughetta, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur.
### SUBCHAPTER II—JUDICIAL MATTERS
On Friday, December 28, 2012 at 1:30 PM EST, Secretary Ray LaHood had a conversation via telephone with the Governor

- Elect of Puerto Rico, Alejandro García

- Padilla, regarding the privatization of the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport (SJU).

Governor

- Elect García

- Padilla indicated that he is aware of SJU’s application to participate in the FAA’s Airport Pr ivatization Pilot Program, and expressed the following three concerns that he believes must be addressed in any final privatization contract:

• No employees of SJU should be fired as a result of privatization;

• Nearby ai rports must retain the right to expand; and

• Airport rates at SJU must not increase.

As the FAA is currently reviewing the SJU application, Secretary LaHood explained to the Governor

- Elect that he would forward these comments for inclusion in the officia l docket for this matter.
### §20165. Limitations on non-Federal alcohol and drug testing

(a) Testing Requirements.—Any non-Federal alcohol and drug testing program of a railroad carrier must provide that all post-employment tests of the specimens of employees who are subject to both the program and chapter 211 of this title be conducted using a scientifically recognized method of testing capable of determining the presence of the specific analyte at a level above the cut-off level established by the carrier.

(b) Redress Process.—Each railroad carrier that has a non-Federal alcohol and drug testing program must provide a redress process to its employees who are subject to both the alcohol and drug testing program and chapter 211 of this title for such an employee to petition for and receive a carrier hearing to review his or her specimen test results that were determined to be in violation of the program. A dispute or grievance raised by a railroad carrier or its employee, except a probationary employee, in connection with the carrier's alcohol and drug testing program and the application of this section is subject to resolution under section 3 of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 153).

(Added Pub. L. 110–432, div. A, title IV, §409(a), Oct. 16, 2008, 122 Stat. 4887.)
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3240 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on methoxyfenozide. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 12, 2005 

Mr. BUYER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 

methoxyfenozide. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. METHOXYFENOZIDE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.32.93 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 methoxyfenozide) is amended— 

7 (1) by striking ‘‘Free’’ and inserting ‘‘1.0%’’; 

8 and 

9 (2) striking ‘‘12/31/2006’’ and inserting ‘‘12/ 

10 31/2008’’. 
2 

•HR 3240 IH 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

2 subsection (a) apply to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

May 15, 2003

Before

Hon. Joel M. Flaum, Chief Judge

Hon. Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judge

Hon. Daniel A. Manion, Circuit Judge

No. 01-3648

John Doe and Jane Doe, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Carla Heck, et al,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District

of Wisconsin

No. 99 C 907

J. P. Stadtmueller, Judge.

O R D E R

The opinion of this court issued on April 16, 2003 is amended as follows:

Replace the text of fn. 13 with the following:

To the extent the plaintiffs’ suit against the defendants in their official capacities with the

Bureau seeks retrospective monetary damages, this action constitutes a suit against the

state that is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588,

592 (7th Cir. 2001). This aspect of the plaintiffs’ suit is, therefore, dismissed. See Higgins

v. Mississippi, 217 F.3d 951, 954 (7th Cir. 2000) (though this court need not raise

Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte, since it does not implicate subject matter

jurisdiction, it may do so).

On April 30, 2003 the appellees filed a petition for rehearing. All of the judges on the

original panel voted to deny the petition. The petition is therefore DENIED.
### §10703. Authority for rail carriers to establish through routes

Rail carriers providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part shall establish through routes (including physical connections) with each other and with water carriers providing transportation subject to chapter 137, shall establish rates and classifications applicable to those routes, and shall establish rules for their operation and provide—

(1) reasonable facilities for operating the through route; and

(2) reasonable compensation to persons entitled to compensation for services related to the through route.

(Added Pub. L. 104–88, title I, §102(a), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 810.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 10703, Pub. L. 95–473, Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1372; Pub. L. 96–296, §22(a), (h), July 1, 1980, 94 Stat. 812, 814; Pub. L. 97–449, §5(g)(5), Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2443; Pub. L. 98–216, §2(11), Feb. 14, 1984, 98 Stat. 5; Pub. L. 99–521, §7(a), Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2994; Pub. L. 103–272, §5(m)(21), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1377, related to authority for carriers to establish through routes, prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, §102(a). See sections 10703 and 13705 of this title.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Jan. 1, 1996, except as otherwise provided in Pub. L. 104–88, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as a note under section 1301 of this title.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1380 

CA 15-00503 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, VALENTINO, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V ORDER

JOSEPH MARRA AND SUSAN MARRA, 

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

LEWIS & LEWIS, P.C., BUFFALO (EMILY F. JANICZ OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

WALSH, ROBERTS & GRACE, BUFFALO (KEITH N. BOND OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Cattaraugus County

(Paula L. Feroleto, J.), entered December 8, 2014. The order, among

other things, granted defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment

dismissing the complaint in its entirety. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in the decision

at Supreme Court.

Entered: December 23, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court