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S. HRG. 111–961 

SECURING THE NATION’S RAIL AND OTHER 

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 21, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

BRUCE H. ANDREWS, General Counsel 

ANN BEGEMAN, Republican Staff Director 

BRIAN M. HENDRICKS, Republican General Counsel 

NICK ROSSI, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 21, 2010 .............................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Hutchison ............................................................................ 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 29 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

Statement of Senator Warner ................................................................................. 30 

Statement of Senator Udall .................................................................................... 33 

WITNESSES

Hon. David Heyman, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Carlton I. Mann, Assistant Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

John O’Connor, Vice President and Chief of Police, Amtrak Police Department, National Railroad Passenger Corporation ............................................... 36 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38 

Howard R. ‘‘Skip’’ Elliott, Vice President—Public Safety and Environment, 

CSX Transportation, Inc. ..................................................................................... 44 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

Joseph Kelly, Acting Chief of Police, NJ TRANSIT .............................................. 53 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 54 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. David Heyman by: 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV ............................................................................ 61 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 63 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 64 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 66 

Letter, dated June 3, 2010 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and Hon. Frank 

R. Lautenberg from Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and 

Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................... 67 

Response to written questions submitted to Carlton I. Mann by: 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV ............................................................................ 70 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 71 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 71 

Howard R. ‘‘Skip’’ Elliott, Vice President—Public Safety and Environment, 

CSX Transportation, Inc., supplemental prepared statement .......................... 71 

(1) 

SECURING THE NATION’S RAIL AND OTHER 

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, 

presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We’ll call the meeting to order, now that 

I’ve broken the equipment, here. 

I want to thank each of you, all of you, for being here today and 

showing your interest in transportation security. 

Last month, during the morning rush hour, two huge explosions 

erupted in Moscow’s subway system, killing 40 people. They were 

killed on platforms, onboard trains. In recent years, we’ve seen 

similar bombing attacks in other train systems, including incidents 

in London, Madrid, Mumbai. We show here, on a chart, what has 

happened with terror attacks on mass transit and passenger rail 

service. Going back to 2004, in Spain, 191 people killed; in London, 

2005, 52 people killed; Mumbai, 2006, 209 people killed; and the 

last one, in Moscow, in November of 2009, 27 people were killed 

then; and again a repeated attack in Moscow last month. 

And make no mistake, although these attacks were far from our 

shores, our rail systems here are also targets. In February, an al 

Qaeda operative pled guilty to planning a stunning terrorist attack 

in which bombs would be strapped to suicide bombers and detonated in New York City’s subway system. Attorney General, Eric 

Holder, called this plot one of the most serious threats to the 

United States since 9/11. 

The evidence is clear, we’ve got to do everything possible to keep 

our Nation’s transportation system safe; and, unfortunately, it’s not 

clear that we’re meeting the obligation to keep our passenger rail 

system, our freight networks, and other surface transportation networks protected. And that’s why we’re here today. 

For years, I’ve been sounding the alarm that our attention has 

been too one-sided, that we can’t focus on aviation security alone, 

that we need also to concentrate on safeguarding our surface transportation network. The 9/11 Commission echoed this concern when 

it characterized the Federal emphasis on aviation security, and 

here I quote, ‘‘as fighting the last war,’’ and noted that, ‘‘opportuniVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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ties to do harm are as great or greater in maritime and in surface 

transportation.’’ That’s why we’ve worked so diligently to provide 

the Department of Homeland Security and TSA what they needed 

to secure our Nation against attacks and fulfill their responsibilities under the 9/11 Commission Act. 

Still, DHS and the TSA have been far too slow to meet these responsibilities, especially when it comes to addressing rail security. 

In fact, the 9/11 Act required TSA to complete, by 2008, a comprehensive risk assessment and a national security strategy for the 

rail sector. They still have not completed either one of these. It’s 

no wonder, then, that the White House released a report earlier 

this month in which the National Security Council called TSA to 

task for its failure to lead in protecting our surface transportation 

systems. 

Imagine what it might mean if a terrorist managed to carry out 

an attack on any one of these systems. We’ve got 140,000 miles of 

freight rail track, ushering coal, chemicals, and other materials. 

Liquid and national gas that fuel our Nation flow through more 

than one-and-a-half million miles of pipeline. More than 70,000 

people board Amtrak trains every day. And 35 million Americans 

rely on public transportation every day. The bottom line is that we 

cannot afford to be anything less than vigilant, and that’s why 

we’re going to keep working to do what it takes to make sure our 

families, the traveling public, and all Americans are safe. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses about what we 

need to do to ensure we deter any potential terrorist attack. 

I’m pleased to have Senator Hutchison here with me today, and 

would ask her now if she would like to make her opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, I want to thank you, Senator Lautenberg, for chairing today’s hearing. 

And thank all of you for being here. 

I will not be able to stay for the whole hearing, but I certainly 

will look at the information produced here. And, Senator Lautenberg, you have been an ongoing and committed champion of surface 

transportation, and certainly that includes security, so I think this 

is a timely hearing. 

It has been 8 and a half years since 9/11, and since that time 

there have been over 700 attacks on rail and bus systems around 

the world, killing more than 2500 and injuring 10,000. Fortunately, 

there have not been any successful attacks in America, but, as the 

Chairman mentioned, there was a plot that was overturned that 

would have done terrible damage to the New York subway system. 

I think that it is time for an open and frank discussion about 

how we can all take action to close the gaps in addressing surface 

transportation security. I do believe our transit, rail, and pipeline 

systems are safer today, due to the actions of TSA, DOT’s modal 

agencies, Amtrak, the commuter authorities, and private-sector 

rail, truck, bus, and pipeline companies. 

But, despite that fact, the Act, which created TSA, states unequivocally that TSA shall be responsible for security in all modes 

3 

of transportation. All indications are that TSA really has more of 

a supporting role with respect to transit and passenger rail security. TSA mostly encourages security improvements by the freight, 

rail, motor, and bus carrier, and pipeline sectors, since they are 

owned and operated in the private sector. 

Recent reports by the GAO are cause for concern. GAO has concluded that TSA has still not completed an overall risk assessment 

of mass transit, the passenger rail system, or the commercial vehicle sector. Its preliminary conclusions, in an ongoing assessment of 

pipeline security, suggest that TSA is not following up with pipeline operators to make sure that they are making the security improvements included in their security plans. 

I’m especially troubled that TSA has so strongly resisted the recommendation of the DHS IG to have TSA inspectors focused on 

surface transportation security report to an official with surface responsibilities, rather than to supervisors in the aviation arena. I’m 

concerned that over two-thirds of the recently hired surface transportation inspectors had no surface transportation experience. 

The White House apparently is not satisfied either in this area, 

since it conducted its own independent assessment of surface transportation security. And that was released on April 2, conducted by 

reaching out to government and private-sector stakeholders, and 

found that there is a significant overlap in Federal programs and 

agencies, and a need for more coordination between government 

agencies with the private sector. 

It is critical that TSA, the expert agency on security, step up to 

the plate and exercise more leadership, while continuing to operate 

in a collaborative way with surface transportation interests. The 

first step is the appointment of a TSA administrator, a position 

that has been vacant for more than a year. I hope the Administration will be sending up a nominee soon who can be confirmed. 

The Committee intends to mark up legislation to reauthorize 

TSA later this year, and we need TSA’s recommendations. We want 

to make informed decisions about transportation security, with 

input from all the stakeholders. 

Now, we know this is a huge area. And we know that there are 

budget constraints on something that is so vast, but we’ve got to 

use our resources wisely, and I think there is evidence that we are 

not doing as well as we could, even with the resources that we 

have. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing, and I will 

stay as long as I can, and then I know Senator Thune is on his 

way. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

Thank you for chairing today’s hearing, Senator Lautenberg, and thank you to all 

of the witnesses for being here today. I think this hearing is so important. The security of the Nation’s surface transportation systems, although long overshadowed by 

aviation security, is one of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)’s central missions and must be one of this committee’s highest priorities. 

It has been eight and one-half years since the terrorist attacks of September 11 

and, during that time, there have been over 700 attacks on rail and bus systems 

around the world, killing more than 2,500 and injuring 10,000. Fortunately, there 

has not been a successful attack in the United States. But the recent ‘‘Zazi’’ plot 

4 

to detonate explosives on the New York City subway system demonstrates the seriousness of the threats to our surface transportation systems. 

I have long expressed concern that enough effort and resources are not being committed to secure our transit, passenger and freight rail, highway, motorcoach, and 

pipeline networks. Currently, the budget for surface transportation security is just 

$110 million, a little over 2 percent of TSA’s total budget, a level of funding far from 

commensurate with the level of risk. And while another $360 million has been appropriated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for security 

grants, we clearly are not doing enough in this area. I hope today we can have a 

frank discussion about what has, and has not, been accomplished since 9–11, and 

how this committee, together with the Administration, can take action to close gaps 

in addressing and funding surface transportation security. 

I do believe our transit, rail, and pipeline systems are safer today due to the actions of TSA, DOT’s modal agencies, Amtrak, the commuter authorities, and private 

sector rail, truck, bus, and pipeline companies. But despite the fact that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created TSA, states unequivocally that 

TSA ‘‘shall be responsible for security in all modes of transportation,’’ all indications 

are that TSA sees itself as only having a supporting role with respect to transit and 

passenger rail security. TSA also seems reluctant, except at the specific direction 

of Congress, to do more than simply encourage security improvements by the freight 

rail, motor and bus carrier, and pipeline sectors, since they are owned and operated 

by the private sector. 

Recent reports by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the DHS 

Inspector General are cause for concern. GAO has concluded that TSA has still not 

completed an overall risk assessment of mass transit, the passenger rail system, or 

the commercial vehicle sector. Its preliminary conclusions in an ongoing assessment 

of pipeline security suggest that TSA is not following up with pipeline operators to 

make sure they are making the security improvements included in their security 

plans. 

I am especially troubled that TSA has so strongly resisted the recommendation 

of the DHS IG to have TSA inspectors focused on surface transportation security 

report to an official with surface responsibilities, rather than to supervisors in the 

aviation arena. And I am concerned that over two-thirds of the recently hired surface transportation inspectors had no surface transportation experience. 

The White House apparently is not satisfied with TSA’s performance either, since 

it conducted its own independent assessment of surface transportation security. 

That assessment was conducted by reaching out to government and private sector 

stakeholders, and it found that there is significant overlap in Federal programs and 

agencies. Clearly, there is a strong need for more coordination between government 

agencies and with the private sector. 

It is critical that TSA, as the expert agency on all security matters, step up to 

the plate and exercise more leadership, while continuing to operate in a collaborative way with surface transportation interests. The first step, as we all realize, 

is the appointment of a TSA Administrator, a position that has been vacant for 

more than a year. I think I speak for the entire Committee when I say that I hope 

the Administration will be sending up a new nominee—and one who we can confirm—as soon as possible. 

The Committee intends to mark up legislation to reauthorize TSA later this year, 

and we need TSA to come forward with its recommendations. We want to make informed decisions about surface transportation security, with input from all of the 

stakeholders, and a good understanding of the resources needed to address the risks 

terrorism poses to our surface transportation network. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, and 

discussing these important issues with them. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you for being with us, Senator 

Hutchison. Everybody’s got lots of things to do. And—— 

Senator HUTCHISON. Yes. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But, you show your respect for the importance of this hearing and the job that we have to do here, so thank 

you. 

I want to welcome our first panel of witnesses: Mr. David 

Heyman, the Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Department of 

Homeland Security; Mr. Stephen Lord, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability OfVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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fice; and Mr. Carlton Mann, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections at the Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General. 

Thank you all for being here. 

Mr. Heyman, if you would, you have 5 minutes to give your 

statement. And if you need more time, I would ask that you submit 

your full statement for the record, but meanwhile—please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID HEYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg, Senator Hutchison. 

I’m pleased to appear before you today to discuss safeguarding 

our Nation’s surface transportation systems and the Department of 

Homeland Security’s collective efforts with Federal, state, and local 

partners to improve the security of these systems. 

Safeguarding our Nation’s mass transit and passenger rail networks is of critical importance. The Nation’s surface transportation 

infrastructure is a vast, open system of interconnected networks of 

commuter rail trains, subways, and buses that move millions of our 

citizens every day, and are vital to our economy and our way of life. 

The scope of these networks is impressive. Consider, for example, 

the New York City subway network has 468 stations, with over 

31,000 turnstiles allowing direct access to the subway, and average 

weekday ridership of over 5 million passengers. Similarly, Amtrak’s 

operations are nationwide, with stations in close proximity to, or 

collocated with, mass transit stations. The huge benefits of these 

networks to our Nation include the inherent vastness and openness 

of the systems, but that, unfortunately, makes them targets for terrorists. As we have sadly learned from attacks in London, Mumbai, 

Madrid, and Moscow, as well as the New York City subway plot, 

mentioned by you, Senator Lautenberg. 

For the past decade, the Nation’s transportation network has 

been at an elevated risk of attack. The failed and foiled terrorist 

plots in the past year against mass transit and aviation are powerful reminders that terrorists will go to great lengths to defeat the 

security measures that have been put in place since September 11. 

The Administration is determined to thwart terrorist plots and 

disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks by employing and 

enhancing the multiple layers of defense that work in concert with 

one another to secure our country. 

A significant way that DHS contributes to enhanced security on 

all modes of surface transportation is through the award of grants. 

In Fiscal Year 2009, the Department directed more than $500 million to mass transit passenger rail agencies through its Transit Security Grant Program; $78 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding went to approximately 240 new law enforcement officers at 15 transit systems across the country; and $72 million in Recovery funds went to capital projects, such as improvements to high density tunnels, stations, and bridges. 

The Department has three principal tools in which we address 

surface security: intelligence, operational deterrence, and infrastructure protection. Through each of these, and through our grant 

program, our efforts are to secure the Nation’s surface transporVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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tation system. But, we do this through what—through the notion 

of a homeland security enterprise, a collective effort of shared responsibilities of Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners. 

This enterprise connotes a broad base of community of common 

interest in safety and security. It is a partnership. Indeed, strong 

working partnerships with state and local government, law enforcement, and emergency response officials, and hundreds of transit 

system operators, private sector and individuals, are critical to the 

success of surface transportation security programs. The Federal 

Government has a role to play, and it is also in great partnership 

with all of these participants. 

While there has been significant progress over the last several 

years in improving surface transportation security, there is still 

much work to be done. Our mission remains clear: providing the 

traveling public with confidence that these vital arteries that support our daily lives are secure. 

I look forward to working with you and this committee to achieve 

this goal. I would like to submit my full statement for the record. 

And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID HEYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and distinguished members of the Committee. I am pleased to appear today to discuss safeguarding our Nation’s open surface transportation systems and the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) collective efforts with Federal, state and local partners 

to improve the security of these systems. I appreciate the Committee’s efforts in 

support of this vital mission. 

The Nation’s surface transportation infrastructure is a vast, open system of interdependent networks that continually moves millions of passengers and millions of 

tons of commodities. The network and its four subsectors—Mass Transit, Highways, 

Freight Rail, and Pipelines—are critical to our economic well-being and our way of 

life. The security of this system is a shared responsibility among many governmental and private sector entities, including DHS. 

For the past decade, the Nation’s transportation network has been at an elevated 

risk of attack. The failed and foiled terrorist plots in the past year against mass 

transit and aviation are powerful reminders that terrorists will go to great lengths 

to defeat the security measures that have been put in place since September 11, 

2001. This Administration is determined to thwart terrorist plots and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks by employing and enhancing the multiple layers of defense that work in concert with one another to secure our country. 

President Obama has articulated the need to do more to safeguard surface transportation by building on existing security efforts. The President’s guiding principles 

for homeland security, including working with key stakeholders, investing in the 

most pressing short- and long-term infrastructure needs, and safeguarding the 

transportation systems that Americans use every day, will lead to a more resilient 

surface transportation system that improves public safety and enables efficient commerce. 

The Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment 

This Administration recognized that the Nation’s surface transportation system is 

an open and sprawling network and therefore we must look to the capabilities of 

Federal, state, local and private sector entities to secure the system and address 

threats through intelligence and the application of a risk-based approach. To this 

end, the White House led an interagency effort under the aegis of the National Security Staff to assess the security of the surface transportation system and determine what additional measures and initiatives could be undertaken to improve the 

security of the system. 

The result of this effort is the Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment, released April 2, which represents an important step toward further proVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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tecting the traveling public from acts of terrorism. The Assessment presents a thorough review of security efforts in all modes of surface transportation by the Obama 

Administration during its first year, including mass transit, commuter and long-distance passenger rail, freight rail, commercial vehicles and pipelines. It examines existing surface transportation security priorities, identifies interagency priorities for 

the next 4 years, provides recommendations on how to address existing policy gaps 

in surface transportation security efforts, and directs designated agencies to develop 

implementation plans to accomplish the report’s recommendations. 

The Administration engaged stakeholders from Federal, state, local and tribal 

government and the private sector using DHS’ National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan (NIPP) partnership model to furnish input into the comprehensive framework 

of recommendations set forth in the Assessment. In conducting the Assessment, common themes and recommendations included the need to enhance security through 

increased intelligence sharing, vetting, security planning, training, and exercises, 

improve efficiency and effectiveness, strengthen stakeholder partnerships, and employ a systems management approach to assessing risk. DHS served an active role 

in the Assessment supporting interagency efforts by assigning staff to support and 

coordinate the drafting of the assessment as well as preparation of the final report. 

The Assessment’s 20 recommendations are the building blocks for advancing our 

Nation’s surface transportation security initiatives. These recommendations are consistent with recommendations received from the DHS Office of Inspector General 

and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on how best to provide security in 

all modes of transportation. Among other things, the recommendations include the 

following: 

• Implement an integrated Federal approach that consolidates capabilities in a 

unified effort for security assessments, audits and inspections to produce more 

thorough evaluations and effective follow-up actions to reduce risk, enhance security, and reduce burdens on assessed surface transportation entities. 

• Implement a multi-year, multi-phase grants program based on a long-term 

strategy for surface transportation security. 

• Establish an interagency process to inventory education and training (E&T) requirements and programs, identify gaps and redundancies in surface transportation owner/operator E&T, and ensure that Federal training requirements support counterterrorism and infrastructure protection. 

These and other recommendations in the Assessment reflect the Administration’s 

commitment to goals that are critical to surface transportation security, such as 

teaming with all government partners and the private sector to identify and reduce 

risk; improving the efficiency and effectiveness of Federal missions, organizations 

and programs; strengthening interactive stakeholder partnerships; and application 

of a systems management approach to surface transportation security. 

The Administration remains committed to implementing the recommendations 

contained in the Assessment. Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, John Brennan released 

a memo to Departments and Agencies on April 14, 2010 directing the development 

of implementation plans for the 20 recommendations contained in the assessment. 

The implementation plans will: 

1. Define actionable and measurable next steps; 

2. Identify implementation metrics; 

3. Determine a timeline for completion; and 

4. Identify stakeholders for engagement in the development of the implementation plans. 

DHS was designated in the Assessment as the lead Department for implementing 

19 of the 20 recommendations. The Department looks forward to continued engagement with Congress on implementation of actions. 

Security in All Modes of Surface Transportation 

DHS plays a key role in the Administration’s efforts to ensure the security of our 

Nation’s surface transportation system. Employing an intelligence-driven and riskbased approach to assessing threats to the system, DHS and its partners have made 

substantial progress in the past few years in improving surface transportation security in this country. Our efforts to secure the Nation’s surface transportation system 

are a clear illustration of the concept of the homeland security enterprise established by the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. This concept refers to the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, 

and private-sector partners—as well as individuals, families, and communities—to 

8 

maintain critical homeland security capabilities. It connotes a broad-based community with a common interest in the safety and well being of America and American 

society. 

Indeed, strong working partnerships with state and local government, law enforcement, emergency response officials, hundreds of transit system operators, private sector groups, and individual citizens around the country are critical to the success of surface transportation security programs. By communicating with one another, sharing intelligence, and planning collaboratively, these stakeholders have 

created a foundation for both building surface transportation security initiatives and 

reducing risk. Through national standards, sharing best practices, guidance and regulation, they are putting those initiatives into operation. And by conducting assessments and using metrics to measure our progress, DHS constantly is examining 

ways to improve security and reduce risk throughout the surface transportation system. 

As a result of our risk-based and intelligence-driven approach, DHS has made real 

progress; some tangible accomplishments include the following: 

• DHS’ Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has assessed the top 100 

U.S. pipeline systems—which transport 84 percent of the energy products in the 

U.S., such as oil and natural gas—to ensure security standards are being met. 

Over the past 18 months, TSA has inspected 200 critical facilities related to 

those pipeline systems, including pumping stations, bridge spans, and control 

centers. 

• With respect to highway security, DHS’ U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) secures our northern and southern borders against dangerous passengers 

and cargo. For traffic within our borders, TSA has issued security guidelines for 

high hazard material transporters, provided security training for intercity bus 

and school bus operators, and is assessing key infrastructure vulnerabilities. 

Through TSA’s Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) vetting program, all 

individuals who seek a hazardous materials endorsement to their state-issued 

commercial driver’s license must go through a rigorous vetting program. This 

program covers approximately three million drivers authorized to transport hazardous materials. Additionally, as this committee is very much aware, TSA has 

conducted a full security threat assessment of, and issued a Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to, 1.6 million workers requiring 

unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities. 

• In freight rail, CBP secures our borders via inbound and outbound inspections, 

while TSA has reduced the toxic inhalation chemical risk in high threat urban 

areas by 80 percent since 2006, assessed security at 30 of the 50 key bridges 

throughout the nation, and issued a rail security rule on toxic inhalants to require a secure chain of custody from shippers to receivers. These impressive 

risk reduction results are a product of regulatory and voluntary efforts with the 

rail industry that are a model for the benefits of collaborative, data driven risk 

reduction. 

A significant way that DHS contributes to the enhanced security of all modes of 

surface transportation is through the award of grants. In FY 2009, DHS directed 

more than $500 million to mass transit and passenger rail agencies through the 

Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP), which focuses specifically on surface transportation; $78 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funding 

for approximately 240 new law enforcement officers at 15 transit systems across the 

country—including approximately $36 million for 128 new officers at the New York 

Police Department—to enhance the Nation’s ability to guard against acts of terrorism; $72 million in ARRA funding for capital projects, such as improvements to 

high-density tunnels, stations and bridges; and $388 million in Transit Security 

Grant Program and Freight Rail Security Grant Program funding for projects such 

as training, operational deterrence, hardening of tunnels, high-density stations and 

bridges. This funding also enhanced security efforts for Amtrak, which received almost $100 million through the Transit Security Grant Program for operational deterrence, infrastructure hardening, training and other initiatives. 

Additionally, TSA’s Mass Transit Security Training Program targets grant funds 

for recurring training of law enforcement officers and frontline employees in core 

areas of security awareness, behavior recognition, and immediate response to a 

threat or incident. DHS also conducts training, workshops, table top exercises, and 

‘‘lessons learned’’ sessions that integrate mass transit and passenger rail agencies 

with regional law enforcement and emergency response partners to expand and enhance coordinated deterrent, threat and incident management capabilities. ParVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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ticular emphasis is placed on prevention, specifically broadening capabilities for collaborative activities for deterrence. 

In the area of freight rail, TSA earlier this month provided the full Committee, 

and others in Congress, its study on the feasibility and appropriateness of requiring 

a non-Federal match for grants awarded to freight railroad carriers—the study was 

mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007. The particular grants being examined are funded through the DHS Freight 

Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP), managed jointly by TSA and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The purpose of FRSGP is to raise the security baseline in freight rail by funding vulnerability assessments and security 

plans, providing security training to frontline personnel, and installing Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking on railroad cars within the freight rail industry. Of 

note, the study recommended that a non-Federal match under FRSGP should not 

be required for certain high-priority projects, such as developing vulnerability assessments and security plans, and providing security training for frontline employees. 

The Obama Administration recognizes the critical importance of safeguarding our 

Nation’s mass transit and passenger rail networks. These open access, interconnected networks of commuter rail trains, subways, and buses move millions of 

our citizens every day and are vital to our economy and our way of life. The scope 

of these networks is impressive. Consider, for example, that the New York City subway network has 468 stations with over 31,000 turnstiles allowing direct access to 

the subway, and an average weekday ridership of over 5 million passengers. Amtrak’s operations are nationwide, and many Amtrak stations are in close proximity 

to, or co-located with, mass transit stations. 

The huge benefits of these networks to our nation, including the inherent vastness 

and openness of the systems, unfortunately, makes them prime targets for terrorists, as we have sadly learned from attacks in London, Mumbai, Madrid and Moscow, as well as the New York City subway plot uncovered last year. As an example 

of the Obama Administration’s efforts to meet this threat, in October 2009, Amtrak 

and TSA partnered to conduct random passenger and baggage screening at multiple 

locations across the Northeast Corridor. This effort is ongoing and is expected to expand nationwide. Such random screening teams are among DHS’ most effective deterrence and detection tools for countering terrorist threats. 

Tools for Protecting Surface Transportation 

As I have testified in the past, securing our modes of travel is one of the most 

powerful weapons we have to counter the ability of terrorists to attack us. The tools 

at our disposal fall into three primary categories: 

• Intelligence drives our efforts and helps prioritize how we allocate our resources. 

Our Federal Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), composed of DHS and other 

Federal and state personnel operating under FBI leadership, coordinate Federal 

and local investigations and information gathering operations and share that information among law enforcement and security partners, both public and private. 

• Operational deterrence focuses on using Federal, state, and local government 

personnel and resources in collaboration with private sector partners to prevent, 

deter, and detect threats from terrorists and criminal organizations. Activities 

currently employed for this purpose, including explosive detection canine teams 

and random, unpredictable transportation passenger screening by Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams, are highly effective operational 

tools for deterring and detecting terrorist threats. The funding in the FY 2010 

DHS appropriation to expand the number of dedicated VIPR teams from 10 to 

25 has been welcome news for TSA and surface transit alike. Congress overwhelmingly approved this funding increase, and we are grateful for your support. 

• Infrastructure protection initiatives, such as the effective administration of Federal grants for physical security improvements and training, focus on hardening 

the Nation’s critical transportation infrastructures, including underwater tunnels, subway stations, and bridges, as well as educating our fellow citizens to 

become partners in security. TSA’s Transportation Security Inspectors work 

with state and local officials to assess security vulnerabilities and recommend 

how to use limited resources to get the most security bang for the buck. 

Conclusion 

The Obama Administration is dedicated to ensuring the security of our Nation’s 

surface transportation system. As evidenced by the creative and collaborative effort 

10 

of the Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment, security for our Nation’s 

surface transportation system is a responsibility shared among key Federal, state, 

local and private sector partners. DHS, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Energy, and others are working collaboratively with our state and local 

partners and the private sector, and are making significant strides in improving security. 

While the Administration and DHS have made significant progress over the last 

several years in improving surface transportation security, much work remains to 

be done. With the additional resources from Congress, expanding collaboration with 

surface transportation partners and local law enforcement and emergency response 

officials, and a focus on uncovering and addressing deficiencies in a cost-effective 

manner, there is a strong foundation and clear path toward meeting our security 

goals for the Nation’s surface transportation systems. Our mission remains clear: 

providing the traveling public with confidence that these vital economic arteries are 

secure. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to address surface transportation security. 

I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Appreciate that. 

Mr. Lord, please. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. LORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Hutchison, for 

inviting me to testify at today’s hearing. 

As you noted in your opening remarks, the recent terrorist attacks in Moscow, London, and Madrid highlight the vulnerability 

of these systems to terrorist attacks. 

Before I begin, it’s, first, worth noting that about 2 percent of 

TSA’s 2011 budget request is designated for surface transportation 

issues, while 80 percent of the budget is designated for aviation security, including the Federal Air Marshal Service. 

Today, I would like to discuss the three key issues: first, TSA’s 

use of risk management principles to identify security priorities; 

second, TSA’s efforts to coordinate with other industry stakeholders; third, TSA’s efforts to measure the impact of its security 

improvement initiatives. 

Regarding risk management the large body of work we completed 

in this area has shown that TSA has taken some actions to better 

manage these risks, but still needs to improve its overall risk assessment process. This will help them identify security gaps and 

inform the allocation of resources across all transportation modes. 

For example, our 2009 Risk Management Report found that TSA 

had not conducted comprehensive risk assessments across the 

major modes of transportation that would help them identify priorities and judge whether the current levels of investment are appropriate. 

In addition, we reported that TSA needs to improve their risk 

management efforts within each particular mode to help focus their 

efforts and identify potential security gaps. For example, our April 

2009 Freight Rail Report found that TSA’s security strategy had focused almost exclusively on rail shipments of toxic inhalation hazards, such as chlorine, which can be fatal if inhaled. And while reported—while we reported that TSA’s initial focus was a good first 

step, we recommended that TSA consider other threats, such as 

sabotage to bridges and tunnels. The good news is, TSA agreed 

11 

1The six major transportation modes defined in the Transportation Security Administration’s 

(TSA) Transportation Security Sector Specific Plan (TS–SSP) are: aviation; maritime; mass tranContinued 

with our recommendation and developed a risk tool to help identify 

vulnerabilities to bridges and tunnels. 

We also assessed TSA’s risk management efforts in our ongoing 

review of pipeline security. And although the findings are preliminary, we found a weak statistical correlation between a pipeline 

system risk rating and the time taken to schedule the very important corporate security reviews of a facility’s security plans. Specifically, among the 15 highest risk-rated pipeline systems, the time 

between a first and second review ranged from 1 to 6 years. And 

two of these high-risk systems had not had a second review in 

more than 6 years, even though they were deemed high risk. TSA 

officials agreed with our observations, but noted that other factors, 

such as geographical proximity and other related inspection activities, influenced the timing of such reviews. 

In terms of coordination, TSA has developed several initiatives to 

improve coordination with Federal, state, and private-sector partners. However, our recent reports found that these coordination efforts could be improved in many areas. For example, our Freight 

Rail Report found that TSA was not requesting data on deficiencies 

and security plans and training, even though the FRA was collecting this information during their inspection process. We believe 

this information could be useful to TSA. And I’m encouraged that 

the Administration’s Interagency Policy Committee Report on Surface Transportation, that you mentioned in your opening remarks, 

also highlights the needs for Federal entities to better coordinate 

their various activities. 

Finally, I would like to briefly discuss how TSA measures its 

progress in improving security. As you may know, TSA has developed national strategies, called ‘‘modal annexes,’’ for each surface 

transportation mode. However, our body of work, collectively, 

shows that TSA needs to strengthen its efforts to measure whether 

the goals listed in each of these modal annexes are being achieved. 

For example, in June 2009, we reported that TSA’s modal annex 

for mass transit and passenger rail lacked outcome-oriented measures and targets to help assess progress over time. The good news 

is that TSA agreed with our recommendation to improve the measures, and now more accurately reports results. 

In sum, our collective body of work has identified several important steps that TSA could take to improve risk management, coordination with other entities, and the way it measures what all 

these activities result in, at the end of the day. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND

JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss key surface transportation security issues. Surface transportation modes include mass transit, freight rail, pipeline, and highway systems.1 Terrorist attacks on surface transVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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sit (including transit buses, subway and light rail, and passenger rail—both commuter rail and 

long-distance); highway; freight rail; and pipeline. 2Subway attacks occurred in Moscow March 29, 2010, in Mumbai on July 11, 2006, in London 

on July 7, 2005, and in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Each attack caused dozens of deaths and 

injuries. 3 Additional funding is requested for accounts such as transportation security support, which 

supports both aviation and surface transportation security programs. Some of the Federal Air 

Marshal Service funding support nonaviation activities. 4GAO, Transportation Security: Key Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Mass Transit and 

Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs, GAO 09 678 (Washington, D.C.: June 2009); Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates 

Grants Based on Risk, but Its Risk Methodology, Management Controls and Grant Oversight 

Can Be Strengthened, GAO 09 491 (Washington, D.C.: June 2009); Freight Rail Security: Actions 

Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored, GAO 09 243 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2009); Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform 

TSA Resource Allocation, GAO 09 492 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009); Commercial Vehicle Security: Risk-Based Approach Needed to Secure the Commercial Vehicle Sector, GAO 09 85 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2009); Highway Infrastructure: Federal Efforts to Strengthen Security Should 

Be Better Coordinated and Targeted on the Nation’s Most Critical Highway Infrastructure, GAO 

09 57 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2009). 5 Corporate Security Reviews are on-site security reviews that TSA’s Pipeline Security Division conducts with pipeline operators to develop a firsthand knowledge of operators’ security 

plans and implementation, establish working relationships with key pipeline security personnel, 

and identify and share good security practices. 

portation systems in Moscow, Mumbai, London, and Madrid that caused significant 

loss of life and disruption have highlighted the vulnerability of transportation facilities to terrorist attacks worldwide.2 While there have been no successful terrorist 

attacks against U.S. surface transportation systems to date, securing these systems 

is a significant undertaking. In the United States, the surface transportation system 

includes more than 100,000 miles of rail, 600,000 bridges, more than 300 tunnels, 

and 2 million miles of pipeline. Securing these systems is further complicated by the 

number of private and public stakeholders involved in operating and protecting the 

system and the need to balance security with the expeditious flow of people and 

goods. Further, surface transportation systems generally rely on an open architecture that is difficult to monitor and secure due to its multiple access points, hubs 

serving multiple carriers, and, in some cases, lack of access barriers. An attack on 

these systems could potentially lead to significant casualties due to, for example, the 

high number of daily passengers, especially during peak commuting hours. In the 

2011 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA), $137.6 million of the $8.2 billion total request 

is for surface transportation security, while $6.5 billion is requested for aviation security, including the Federal Air Marshal Service.3

My testimony today focuses on the extent to which: (1) DHS has used a risk management framework to guide efforts to strengthen the security of the surface transportation sector, (2) TSA has coordinated its strategy and efforts for securing the 

surface transportation sector with other Federal entities, states, and private-sector 

stakeholders, (3) TSA has measured the effectiveness of its surface transportation 

security-improvement actions, and (4) TSA has made progress in deploying surface 

transportation security inspectors, and what challenges, if any, it faces in these efforts. 

This statement is based on related public GAO reports issued from January 2009 

through June 2009.4 All of this work was conducted in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards, and our previously published products 

contain additional details on the scope and methodology for those reviews. In addition, this statement includes preliminary observations based on ongoing work assessing the security of the Nation’s pipeline systems for this committee. This ongoing work, which will be completed later this year, is assessing, among other things, 

TSA’s risk assessment efforts and performance measures for this area of surface 

transportation. For our ongoing review of pipeline security, we reviewed relevant 

laws and program management and planning documents, including pipeline performance measures, and interviewed TSA Pipeline Security Division officials to discuss, among other things, their identification of the most critical pipeline systems 

and their development and use of the pipeline risk assessment model and performance measures. We also analyzed TSA’s pipeline risk assessment model by measuring the strength of the relationship between the frequency of Corporate Security 

Reviews for each pipeline system and that system’s ranking based on risk.5 We determined that the data we analyzed were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

this statement. Specifically, we reviewed related documentation, interviewed knowledgeable agency officials, and tested those data to identify missing information or 

13 

6 A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing risk through a series 

of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives. 7The TS–SSP includes modal annexes for Aviation, Maritime, Mass Transit, Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier, Freight Rail, and Pipeline. 8TSA VIPR teams, which TSA has reported using since late 2005, work with local security 

and law enforcement officials to secure any mode of transportation. 9STSIs conduct their work by building collaborative working relationships with freight rail 

carriers, the mass transit and passenger rail industry, and applicable local, state, and Federal 

authorities. 10Pub. L. No. 110–53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007). 

outliers. Our ongoing work related to pipeline security is being conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In addition, this statement contains selected updates conducted from September 2009 through April 2010 

on TSA’s efforts to implement our previous recommendations regarding surface 

transportation security. In conducting these updates, we obtained new information 

from TSA regarding the agency’s efforts to enhance its surface transportation inspections and meet legislative requirements, among other things. We conducted 

these updates in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides 

a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. 

Background 

TSA is the primary Federal agency responsible for overseeing the security of surface transportation systems, including developing a national strategy and implementing security programs. However, several other agencies, including DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), also play a role in helping to fund and secure these systems. Since 

it is not practical or feasible to protect all assets and systems against every possible 

terrorist threat, DHS has called for using risk-informed approaches to prioritize its 

security-related investments and for developing plans and allocating resources in a 

way that balances security and commerce.6

In June 2006, DHS issued the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 

which established a six-step risk management framework to establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources protection so that Federal funding and resources are applied in the most effective manner to deter threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and minimize the consequences of attacks and other incidents. The NIPP, updated in 2009, defines risk as a function 

of three elements: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Threat is an indication of 

the likelihood that a specific type of attack will be initiated against a specific target 

or class of targets. Vulnerability is the probability that a particular attempted attack will succeed against a particular target or class of targets. Consequence is the 

effect of a successful attack. In May 2007, TSA issued the Transportation Systems 

Sector-Specific Plan (TS–SSP), which documents the risk management process to be 

used in carrying out the strategic priorities outlined in the NIPP. As required by 

Executive Order 13416, the TS–SSP also includes modal implementation plans or 

modal annexes that detail how TSA intends to achieve the sector’s goals and objectives for each of the six transportation modes using the systems-based risk management approach.7

To address the objectives and goals laid out in the TS–SSP, TSA uses various programs to secure transportation systems throughout the country, including Visible 

Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams and Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI). VIPR teams employ a variety of tactics to deter terrorism, 

including random high-visibility patrols at mass transit and passenger rail stations 

using, among other things, behavior-detection officers, canine detection teams, and 

explosive-detection technologies.8 STSIs, among other things, conduct on-site inspections of U.S. rail systems—including mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail 

systems—to identify best security practices, evaluate security system performance, 

and discover and correct deficiencies and vulnerabilities in the rail industry’s security systems.9

In August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

(9/11 Commission Act) was signed into law, which included provisions that task 

DHS and other public and private stakeholders with security actions related to surface transportation security.10 Among other things, these provisions include manVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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11GAO–09–492. The four major surface transportation modes are mass transit and passenger 

rail, freight rail, highway, and pipeline. A comprehensive risk assessment approach would assess threat, vulnerability, and consequence to inform the allocation of resources, as called for 

by the NIPP and the TS–SSP. 12Through this effort, TSA intended to estimate the threat, vulnerability, and consequence of 

a range of hypothetical attack scenarios and integrate these estimates to produce risk scores 

for each scenario that could be compared among each of the modes of transportation. However, 

officials stated that TSA discontinued this work due to difficulties in estimating the likelihood 

of terrorist threats. 13GAO–09–678. Although all levels of government are involved in mass transit and passenger 

rail security, the primary responsibility for securing the systems rests with the mass transit and 

passenger rail operators. We have reported that most mass transit and passenger rail systems 

have made operational enhancements to their security programs, such as adding security personnel or transit police. Some of the largest systems have also implemented varying types of 

random passenger or baggage inspection screening programs. Additionally, mass transit agencies have invested in capital improvements, including upgrading closed-circuit television systems 

and installing explosives-detection equipment and silent alarms. 14The White House Transborder Security Interagency Policy Committee Surface Transportation Subcommittee, Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment (March 2010). In 

making its recommendations, the subcommittee gathered input from surface-transportation 

owners and operators, DHS and DOT, as well as state and local government representatives. 15GAO–09–243. 

dates for developing and issuing reports on TSA’s strategy for securing public transportation, conducting and updating comprehensive security assessments for public 

transportation agencies, and ensuring that transportation modal security plans include threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences for transportation infrastructure assets including mass transit, railroads, highways, and pipelines. 

TSA Has Taken Some Actions to Implement a Risk Management Approach 

but Could Do More to Inform the Allocation of Resources across the 

Surface Transportation Sector 

In March 2009, we reported that TSA has taken some actions called for by the 

NIPP’s risk management process, but has not conducted comprehensive risk assessments across aviation and four major surface transportation modes.11 In 2007, TSA 

initiated but later discontinued an effort to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment for the entire transportation sector, known as the National Transportation 

Sector Risk Analysis.12 Consequently, we recommended that TSA conduct comprehensive risk assessments for the transportation sector to produce a comparative 

analysis of risk across the entire transportation sector, which the agency could use 

to guide current and future investment decisions. DHS and TSA concurred with our 

recommendation, and in April 2010 TSA identified planned actions, including integrating the results of risk assessments into a comparative risk analysis across the 

transportation sector. TSA officials stated in April 2010 that the agency has revised 

its risk management framework, TS–SSP, and modal annexes. They added that 

these documents are undergoing final agency review. 

In addition, we have previously reported that while TSA has collected information 

related to threat, vulnerability, and consequence within the surface transportation 

modes, it has not conducted risk assessments that integrate these three components 

for individual modes. For example, we reported in June 2009 that TSA had not conducted its own risk assessment of mass transit and passenger rail systems that combined all three risk elements, as called for by the NIPP.13 Thus, we recommended 

that TSA conduct a comprehensive risk assessment that combines threat, vulnerability, and consequence. DHS concurred with this recommendation, and in February 2010, DHS officials said that TSA had undertaken a Transportation Systems 

Sector Risk Assessment that would incorporate all three elements of risk. In April 

2010, TSA stated that this risk assessment is under review. Similarly, the Administration’s Transborder Security Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) Surface Transportation Subcommittee’s recently issued Surface Transportation Security Priority 

Assessment recognized that assessing transportation assets and infrastructure and 

ranking their criticality would help target the use of limited resources.14 Consequently, this subcommittee recommended that TSA identify appropriate methodologies to evaluate and rank surface transportation systems and critical infrastructure. 

We have also identified other opportunities to improve TSA’s risk management efforts for surface transportation. For example, in April 2009, we reported that TSA’s 

efforts to assess security threats to freight rail could be strengthened.15 Specifically, 

we noted that while TSA had developed a freight rail security strategy, the agency 

had focused almost exclusively on rail shipments of toxic inhalation hazards (TIH), 

such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, which can be fatal if inhaled, despite 

15 

16Shipments of TIH, especially chlorine, frequently move through densely populated areas to 

reach, for example, water treatment facilities that use these products. We reported that TSA 

focused on securing TIH materials for several reasons, including limited resources and a decision in 2004 to prioritize TIH as a key risk requiring Federal attention. Other Federal and industry freight rail stakeholders agreed that focusing on TIH was a sound initial strategy because it is a key potential rail security threat and an overall transportation safety concern. 17We have previously reported that certain bridges, such as those over large rivers, play a 

key role in the national railroad system because capacity constraints limit options to reroute 

trains. As a result, incidents limiting or preventing their use could negatively affect the economy 

by severely delaying rail traffic for significant periods of time and causing transportation system 

delays and disruption. 18See GAO–09–491. DHS awards TSGP grant funding to owners and operators of mass transit and passenger rail systems that have used these funds for a variety of security purposes, 

including developing security plans, purchasing or upgrading security equipment, and providing 

security training to transit employees. 19 Industry entities have also reported undertaking independent efforts to assess security risks 

to their systems and operations. These effects include: (1) a 2008 rail industry security assessment conducted by the American Association of Railroads, which resulted in the identification 

and prioritization of over 1,000 rail assets, including bridges, tunnels, and control centers; and 

(2) comprehensive risk assessments that incorporate and combine all three risk elements, which 

have been conducted by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) and some individual transit systems. 20We calculated a simple correlation coefficient to measure the strength and direction of the 

linear relationship between systems’ risk rankings and the time elapsed between TSA’s first and 

subsequent Corporate Security Reviews for pipeline systems. The magnitude of the correlation 

coefficient determines the strength of the correlation. Our preliminary analysis resulted in a 

weak correlation coefficient score. 

other Federal and industry assessments having identified additional potential security threats, such as risks to bridges, tunnels, and control centers.16 We reported 

that although TSA’s focus on TIH has been a reasonable initial approach given the 

serious public harm these materials potentially pose to the public, there are other 

security threats for TSA to consider and evaluate as its freight rail strategy matures, including potential sabotage to critical infrastructure. We recommended that 

TSA expand its efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail security strategy. DHS concurred with this recommendation and has since reported that TSA has 

developed a Critical Infrastructure Risk Tool to measure the criticality and vulnerability of freight railroad bridges. As of April 2010, the agency has used this tool 

to assess 39 bridges, some of which transverse either the Mississippi or Missouri 

Rivers, and intends to assess 22 additional bridges by the end of Fiscal Year 2010.17

Further, we reported in June 2009 that the Transit Security Grant Program 

(TSGP) risk model includes all three elements of risk, but can be strengthened by 

measuring variations in vulnerability.18 DHS has held vulnerability constant, which 

limits the model’s overall ability to assess risk and more precisely allocate funds to 

transit agencies. We also found that although TSA allocated about 90 percent of 

funding to the highest-risk agencies, lower-risk agency awards were based on other 

factors in addition to risk, such as project quality. For example, a lower-risk agency 

with a high-quality project was more likely to receive funding than a higher-risk 

agency with a low-quality project. We recommended that DHS strengthen its methodology for determining risk by developing a cost-effective method for incorporating 

vulnerability information in its TSGP risk model. DHS concurred with the recommendation, and in April 2010 the agency stated that it is reevaluating the risk 

model for the Fiscal Year 2011 grant cycle. Further, TSA is evaluating the feasibility of incorporating an analysis of the current state of an asset, including its vulnerability, in determining Fiscal Year 2011 grant funding.19

Additionally, we are currently conducting an assessment of TSA’s efforts to help 

ensure pipeline security; the resulting report will include an evaluation of the extent 

to which TSA uses a risk management approach to help strengthen pipeline security. Our preliminary observations found that TSA has identified the 100 most-critical pipeline systems in the United States and produced a pipeline risk assessment 

model, consistent with the NIPP. Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission Act requires 

that risk assessment methodologies be used to prioritize actions to the highest-risk 

pipeline assets, and we found that TSA’s stated policy is to consider risk when 

scheduling Corporate Security Reviews—assessments of pipeline operators’ security 

plans. However, we found a weak statistical correlation between a pipeline system’s 

risk rank and the time elapsed between a first and subsequent review.20 In addition, we found that among the 15 highest risk-ranked pipeline systems, the time between a first and second Corporate Security Review ranged from 1 to 6 years for 

those systems that had undergone a second review. Further, as of April 2010, 2 systems among the top 15 had not undergone a second review despite more than 6 

years passing since their first review. TSA officials told us that although a pipeline 

16 

21The Pipeline Security Division began inspections under the Critical Facility Inspection Program in November 2008. The program involves on-site physical security inspections of each critical facility of the 100 most-critical pipeline systems. 22Some rail industry stakeholders have independently implemented other types of operational 

and procedural changes to secure their hazardous rail shipments, such as making modifications 

to procedures for how rail companies manage and schedule trains and railcars. Rail industry 

organizations also play a role in disseminating pertinent information, such as threat communications from DHS and DOT, to their members. 23See GAO–09–243. 24DHS’s Office of Infrastructure Protection is an organizational entity within the National 

Protection and Programs Directorate, whose mission includes leading the coordinated national 

effort to reduce the risk to critical infrastructure and key resources posed by acts of terrorism. 25GAO–09–57. The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency responsible for the security 

of the Nation’s ports and waterways, which may include highway assets that have a maritime 

nexus, such as bridges. 26 In addition to Federal efforts, highway-sector stakeholders have taken a variety of voluntary actions intended to enhance the security of highway infrastructure. Key efforts include 

developing security publications, sponsoring infrastructure security workshops, conducting research and development activities, and implementing specific protective measures intended to 

deter an attack or reduce potential consequences, such as security patrols, electronic detection 

systems, and physical barriers. 

system’s relative risk ranking is the primary factor driving the agency’s decision of 

when to schedule a subsequent Corporate Security Review, it is not the only factor 

influencing this decision. They explained they also consider the geographical proximity of Corporate Security Review locations to each other in order to reduce travel 

time and costs, as well as the extent to which they have worked with pipeline operators through other efforts, such as their Critical Facility Inspection Program.21 Better prioritizing its reviews based on risk could help TSA ensure its resources are 

more efficiently allocated toward the highest-risk pipeline systems. We expect to 

issue this report by the end of this year. 

TSA Has Generally Improved Coordination with Key Stakeholders but 

Additional Actions Could Enhance Current Efforts to Improve Surface 

Transportation Security 

TSA has developed several initiatives to improve coordination with its Federal, 

state, and private sector stakeholders. However, we have previously reported that 

TSA’s coordination efforts could be improved. For example, we reported in April 

2009 that Federal and industry stakeholders have taken a number of steps to coordinate their freight rail security efforts, such as implementing agreements to clarify roles and responsibilities and participating in various information-sharing mechanisms.22 However, Federal coordination could be enhanced by more fully leveraging 

the resources of all relevant Federal agencies, such as TSA and FRA.23 For example, 

we reported that TSA was not requesting data on deficiencies in security plans and 

training activities collected by FRA, which could be useful to TSA in developing regulations requiring high-risk rail carriers to develop and implement security plans. 

To improve coordination, we recommended that DHS work with Federal partners 

such as FRA to ensure that all relevant information, including threat assessments, 

is shared. DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that it planned to 

better define stakeholder roles and responsibilities to facilitate information sharing. 

Since we issued our report, DHS reported that TSA continues to share information 

with security partners, including meeting with FRA and the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection to discuss coordination and develop strategies for sharing relevant assessment information and avoiding duplication.24

In addition, we reported in January 2009 that although several Federal entities, 

including TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard, have efforts underway to assess the risk 

to highway infrastructure, these assessments have not been systematically coordinated among key Federal partners.25 We further reported that enhanced coordination with Federal partners could better enable TSA to determine the extent to which 

specific critical assets had been assessed and whether potential adjustments in its 

methodology were necessary to target remaining critical infrastructure assets. We 

recommended that to enhance collaboration among entities involved in securing 

highway infrastructure and to better leverage Federal resources, DHS establish a 

mechanism to systematically coordinate risk assessment activities and share the results of these activities among the Federal partners. DHS concurred with the recommendation. In February 2010, TSA officials indicated that the agency had met 

with other Federal agencies that conduct security reviews of highway structures to 

identify existing data resources, establish a data-sharing system among key agencies, and discuss standards for future assessments.26 The Administration’s Surface 

Transportation Security Priority Assessment also highlighted the need for Federal 

17 

27GAO–09–85. The term ‘‘commercial vehicles’’ refers to vehicles used in the commercial 

trucking industry (e.g., for-hire and private trucks moving freight, rental trucks, and trucks carrying hazardous materials) and the commercial motor coach industry (i.e., intercity, tour, and 

charter buses). For the purposes of this statement, we are including them in the highway infrastructure mode. 28 Although all levels of government are involved in the security of commercial vehicles, primary responsibility for securing these vehicles rests with the individual commercial vehicle companies themselves. Truck and bus companies have responsibility for the security of day-to-day 

operations. As part of these operations, they ensure that company personnel, vehicles, and terminals—as well as all of the material and passengers they transport-—are secured. 29Strengthening Surface Transportation Security, Exec. Order No. 13416, 71 Fed. Reg. 71033 

(Dec. 5, 2006). The primary purpose of Executive Order 13416 is to strengthen the security of 

surface transportation. The executive order requires DHS to assess the security of each surface 

transportation mode, and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of current transportation security initiatives, among other things. 30GAO–09–57. 

entities to coordinate their assessment efforts. That report included a recommendation to establish an integrated Federal approach that consolidates capabilities in a 

unified effort for security assessments, audits, and inspections to produce more thorough evaluations and effective follow-up actions for reducing risk, enhancing security, and minimizing burdens on assessed surface transportation entities. 

We also reported in February 2009 that TSA, which has the primary Federal responsibility for ensuring the security of the commercial vehicle sector, had taken actions to improve coordination with Federal, state, and industry stakeholders with 

respect to commercial vehicle security.27 These actions included signing joint agreements with DOT and supporting the establishment of intergovernmental and industry councils. However, we also reported that additional opportunities exist to enhance security by more clearly defining stakeholder roles and responsibilities. For 

example, some state transportation officials stated that DHS and TSA had not clarified states’ roles and responsibilities in securing the transportation sector or communicated to them TSA’s strategy to secure commercial vehicles, which in some cases 

has caused delays in implementing state transportation security initiatives. Industry stakeholders also expressed concerns with respect to TSA communicating its 

strategy, roles, and responsibilities; leveraging industry expertise; and collaborating 

with industry representatives.28 As a result, we recommended that TSA establish 

a process to strengthen coordination with the commercial vehicle industry, including 

ensuring that the roles and responsibilities of industry and government are fully defined and clearly communicated, and assess its coordination efforts. DHS concurred 

with this recommendation and in April 2010 reported that its TS–SSP Highway 

Modal Annex is under review and is expected to delineate methods to enhance communications and coordination with stakeholders. 

Using Targeted, Outcome-Oriented Performance Measures Could Help TSA 

Better Monitor Strategy and Program Effectiveness 

In accordance with Executive Order 13416 and requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act, DHS, through TSA, has developed national strategies for each surface 

transportation mode.29 However, we have previously reported the need for TSA to 

strengthen its evaluation of the results of its efforts through the use of targeted, 

measurable, and outcome-based performance measures. Our prior work has shown 

that long-term, action-oriented goals and a timeline with milestones can help track 

an organization’s progress toward its goals. The NIPP also provides that DHS 

should work with its security partners, including other Federal agencies, state and 

local government representatives, and the private sector, to develop sector-specific 

metrics. 

Using performance measures and an evaluation of the effectiveness of surface 

transportation security initiatives can help provide TSA with more meaningful information from which to determine whether its strategies are achieving their intended results, and to target any needed improvements. For example, in January 

2009, we reported that TSA’s completion of a Highway Security Modal Annex was 

an important first step in guiding national efforts to protect highway infrastructure, 

but it did not include performance goals and measures with which to assess the program’s overall progress toward securing highway infrastructure.30 As a result, we 

recommended that TSA establish a time-frame for developing performance goals and 

measures for monitoring the implementation of the annex’s goals, objectives, and activities. Similarly, in June 2009, we reported that TSA’s Mass Transit Modal Annex 

identified sectorwide goals that apply to all modes of transportation as well as subordinate objectives specific to mass transit and passenger rail systems, but did not 

contain measures or targets on the effectiveness of operations of the security proVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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31GAO–09–678. 32GAO–09–243. The transportation-sector goals identified in the Freight Rail Model Annex include: (1) prevent and deter acts of terrorism against the transportation system, (2) enhance resiliency of the U.S. transportation system, and (3) improve the cost-effective use of resources 

for transportation security. 33GAO–09–491. The purpose of the TSGP is to provide funds to protect critical surface transportation infrastructure and the traveling public. 34 In Fiscal Year 2008, FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate became responsible for administering TSGP grants. 35GAO–09–678. 

grams identified in the annex.31 As a result, we recommended that TSA should, to 

the extent feasible, incorporate performance measures in future annex updates. 

DHS concurred with both of these recommendations. In February 2010, TSA indicated that the updated annex would incorporate performance measures among other 

characteristics we recommended, and as of April 2010, the annex is under review. 

We will continue to monitor TSA’s progress in addressing these recommendations. 

We also reported in April 2009 that three of the four performance measures in 

TSA’s Freight Rail Modal Annex to the TS–SSP did not identify specific targets to 

gauge the effectiveness of Federal and industry programs in achieving the measures 

or the transportation-sector security goals outlined in the annex.32 We also reported 

that TSA was limited in its ability to measure the effect of Federal and industry 

efforts on achieving the agency’s key performance measure for the freight rail program, which is to reduce the risk associated with the transportation of TIH in major 

cities identified as high-threat urban areas. This was because the agency was unable to obtain critical data necessary to consistently measure results. We reported 

that TSA was unable to obtain critical data necessary to consistently calculate cumulative results for this measure over the time period for which it calculated 

them—from 2005 to 2008. In particular, some baseline data needed to cumulatively 

calculate results for this measure were historical and could not be collected. As a 

result, the agency used a method for estimating risk for its baseline year that was 

different than what it used for calculating results for subsequent years. 

Consequently, to help ensure the strategic goals of the modal annex are met and 

that TSA is consistently and accurately measuring agency and industry performance 

in reducing the risk associated with TIH rail shipments in major cities, we recommended that TSA ensure that future updates: (1) contain performance measures 

with defined targets that are linked to fulfilling goals and objectives; and (2) more 

systematically address specific milestones for completing activities and measuring 

progress toward meeting identified goals. We further recommended that TSA take 

steps to revise the baseline year associated with its TIH risk reduction performance 

measure to enable the agency to more accurately report results for this measure. 

DHS concurred with these recommendations and has indicated that it will incorporate them into future updates of its Freight Rail Modal Annex, which will be designed to more specifically address goal-oriented milestones and performance measures. In April 2010, TSA stated that the agency has revised its risk management 

framework, TS–SSP, and modal annexes and that these documents are undergoing 

final agency review. 

In addition to developing performance measures to assess the success of its security strategies, we have also identified the need for TSA to develop or enhance its 

performance measures for specific programs such as the TSGP, VIPR Program, and 

pipeline security programs. Specifically, in June 2009, we reported that the TSGP 

lacked a plan and milestones for developing measures to track progress of achieving 

program goals.33 While FEMA—which administers the grants—reported that it was 

beginning to develop measures to better manage its portfolio of grants, TSA and 

FEMA had not collaborated to produce performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of TSGP-funded projects, such as how funding is used to help protect 

critical infrastructure and the traveling public from possible acts of terrorism.34 We 

recommended that TSA and FEMA collaborate in developing a plan and milestones 

for measuring the effectiveness of the TSGP and its administration. DHS concurred 

with our recommendation, and in November 2009, FEMA stated that it will take 

steps to develop a plan with milestones in coordination with TSA. Likewise, the administration’s Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment discussed the importance of establishing a measurable evaluation system to determine the effectiveness of surface transportation security grants and recommended that TSA coordinate with other Federal agencies, including FEMA, to do so. 

In June 2009, we reported that TSA had measured the progress of its VIPR program in terms of the number of VIPR operations conducted, but had not yet developed measures or targets to report on the effectiveness of the operations themselves.35 TSA program officials reported, however, that they were planning to introVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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36 According to TSA, the four measures introduced in Fiscal Year 2010 for the VIPR program 

include: (1) total VIPR asset deployments; (2) completion percentage at high risk locations; (3) 

percentage of national special security event; and (4) percentage of primary stakeholders with 

repeat deployments. 37TSA has not issued pipeline security regulations, but works with the pipeline industry to 

implement suggested security measures to make pipeline systems more secure. Private companies who own and operate pipeline systems are responsible for assessing their own specific security needs and incur the costs associated with implementing security measures. 38TSA intends to hire an additional 179 surface inspectors in Fiscal Year 2010. According to 

TSA, the April 2010 data includes headquarters staff. 39See, for example, Pub. L. No. 110–53, §§ 1512, 1517, 121 Stat. 266, 429–33, 439–41 (2007). 40GAO–09–678. 

duce additional performance measures no later than the first quarter of Fiscal Year 

2010. They added that these measures would gather information on, among other 

things, (1) interagency collaboration by collecting performance feedback from Federal, state, and local security, law enforcement, and transportation officials prior to 

and during VIPR deployments; and (2) stakeholder views on the effectiveness and 

value of VIPR deployment. In April 2010, TSA reported that the VIPR program introduced four performance measures for Fiscal Year 2010; these measures will be 

reported quarterly.36 TSA has also stated that it has identified performance targets 

for these measures, which it will revisit when baseline program data is available. 

As part of our ongoing review of TSA’s efforts to help ensure pipeline security, 

we are assessing the extent to which TSA has measured efforts to strengthen pipeline security.37 While our work has not been completed, our preliminary observations have identified that TSA has taken actions to measure progress as called for 

by the NIPP, but could better measure pipeline security improvements. More specifically, our preliminary observations have identified that effective performance measurement data could better inform decisionmakers of the extent to which pipeline security programs and activities have been able to reduce risk and better enable them 

to determine funding priorities within and across agencies. Also, developing additional performance measures—particularly outcome-based measures—that assess 

the effects of TSA’s efforts in strengthening pipeline security and are aligned with 

transportation-sector goals and pipeline security objectives could better enable TSA 

to evaluate security improvements in the pipeline industry. Our upcoming report 

that will be issued later this year will provide additional details. 

TSA Has More Than Doubled Its Surface Transportation Inspector 

Workforce but Faces Challenges in Balancing Priorities and Directing 

Current and Future Workforce Needs 

Over the past 2 years, TSA has reported having more than doubled the size of 

its Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program, expanding the program 

from 93 inspectors in June 2008 to 201 inspectors in April 2010.38 Inspectors have 

conducted baseline security reviews that assess, among other things, the overall security posture of mass transit and passenger rail agencies and the implementation 

of security plans, programs, and measures, and best practices. However, TSA had 

not completed a workforce plan to direct current and future inspection program 

needs as the program assumes new responsibilities associated with the implementation of certain provisions of the 9/11 Commission Act by passenger and freight rail 

systems.39

Since establishing the inspection program in 2005 to identify and reduce 

vulnerabilities to passenger rail and ensure compliance with passenger rail security 

directives, TSA has expanded the roles and responsibilities of surface inspectors to 

include additional surface transportation modes—including mass transit bus and 

freight rail—and participation in VIPR operations. For example, as of April 2010, 

TSA’s surface inspectors had, among other things, conducted security assessments 

of 142 mass transit and passenger rail agencies, including Amtrak, and over 1,350 

site visits to mass transit and passenger rail stations to complete station profiles, 

which gather detailed information on a station’s physical security elements, geography, and emergency points of contact. However, we also reported that TSA faced 

challenges in the following areas: 40

• Balancing aviation and surface transportation priorities: We reported in June 

2009 that TSA has reorganized its field unit and reporting structure since establishing the inspection program, and surface inspectors raised concerns about 

its effect. These reorganizations placed TSA’s surface inspectors under the command of Federal Security Directors and Assistant Federal Security Directors for 

Inspections—aviation-focused positions that historically have not had an active 

20 

41Federal Security Directors are the highest-level TSA officials at an airport and provide operational leadership for transportation security responsibilities within an airport. 

role in conducting surface transportation inspection duties.41 According to TSA, 

these changes were designed to support its pursuit of a multimodal workforce 

and ensure a more cohesive and streamlined approach to inspections. However, 

we noted that surface inspectors raised concerns that these changes had resulted in the surface transportation mission being diluted by TSA’s aviation 

mission. Among these concerns is that the surface inspectors were being assigned airport-related duties, while aviation inspectors had been assigned surface responsibilities that had affected performance in conducting follow-up inspections to determine progress mass transit and passenger rail systems had 

made in addressing previously-identified weaknesses. TSA officials reported 

that they had selected their current command structure because Federal Security Directors were best equipped to make full use of the security network in 

their geographical location because they frequently interacted with state and 

local law enforcement and mass transit operators, and were aware of 

vulnerabilities in these systems. 

• Workforce Planning: At the time of our June 2009 report, TSA did not have a 

human capital or other workforce plan for its Surface Transportation Security 

Inspection Program, but the agency had plans to conduct a staffing study to 

identify the optimal workforce size to address its current and future program 

needs. TSA reported that it had initiated a study in January 2009, which, if 

completed, could provide TSA with a more reasonable basis for determining the 

surface inspector workforce needed to achieve its current and future workload 

needs. However, in March 2010, TSA officials told us that while they were continuing to work on the staffing study, TSA did not have a firm date for completion. 

Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement. I look forward to answering any 

questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at this time. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Lord. 

And now, Mr. Carlton Mann, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of 

the Inspector General. 

Mr. Mann, please. 

STATEMENT OF CARLTON I. MANN, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MANN. Good afternoon, Chairman Lautenberg and Ranking 

Member Hutchison. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the 

challenges within the surface transportation mode confronting 

Transportation Security Administration. 

Mr. Chairman, as you noted in your remarks, the terrorist incidents abroad have underscored the need to focus more on mass 

transit, highways, pipelines, and freight rail. Within the last 2 

years, we’ve issued several reports related to surface transportation 

issues, including the Surface Transportation Security Inspector 

Program. In total, we made 14 recommendations to TSA to promote 

more efficient, effective, and economical operations. I’d like to highlight, briefly, the results of those reviews. 

In June 2008, we issued an inspection report, TSA’s Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs. This report addressed the strengths and weaknesses of TSA’s oversight 

and assistance programs for mass transit rail. Our goal was to 

evaluate how well TSA managed these programs and how well the 

programs met the security needs of the major mass transit rail systems. 

We identified important challenges to improve transit rail security. For example, we observed unclear chains of command, insuffiVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
21 

cient guidance, inadequate communication, and TSA’s need to be 

more consistent in its interaction with its mass transit rail stakeholders. In that report, we recommended that TSA place surface inspectors under the direct authority of a TSA headquarters official 

responsible for surface transportation. 

And, Ranking Member, as you noted, TSA did not concur with 

that recommendation. 

As mandated in the 2011 Commission Act, we conducted a follow-up review of surface inspection—of the Surface Inspection Program. In February 2009, we issued a report: The Effectiveness of 

TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors. We determined 

that TSA needed to look critically at how it is deploying resources 

and assess how planned exercises could use inspectors better. The 

program appeared to be understaffed for the long term, and aviation-focused command structure had reduced the quality and morale of the workforce. TSA concurred with our recommendation to 

examine how many inspectors it needed to perform necessary functions by assessing current and anticipated duties. 

We also recommended, again, that TSA place the surface inspectors under the direct authority of a TSA headquarters official. And 

once again, TSA did not concur. TSA stated its belief that the current surface command structure did not inhibit its inspectors’ effectiveness. 

In August 2009, TSA informed us that it was conducting a staffing study of its entire inspection work force. In September 2009, we 

learned that TSA began to implement a multi-phased restructuring 

of its surface resources. The restructuring plan appeared to affect 

numerous senior staff within the surface inspector program. TSA 

has not formally communicated how the reorganization will 

strengthen the surface inspection program, or whether the plan 

will enable surface inspectors to operate adequately and independently of TSA’s aviation security mission. 

In March 2010, we issued a report: TSA’s Preparedness for Mass 

Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies. In that report, we evaluated TSA’s effectiveness in assisting passenger rail and mass transit stakeholders with preparing for and responding to emergencies. 

We noted that TSA could support passenger rail agencies better by 

improving its assessments of emergency preparedness and response 

capabilities. TSA can also ensure that drills and exercises are more 

realistic. We believe that will help strengthen response capabilities. 

TSA has focused primarily on security and terrorism prevention 

efforts, while providing limited staff and resources to emergency 

preparedness and response. As a result, passenger rail agencies 

and the first responders they rely upon, may not be prepared to 

handle all emergencies. TSA concurred with that report’s four recommendations. 

While most of my statement summarizes weaknesses in TSA’s 

Surface Transportation Security Programs, it is important to point 

out that we generally found that TSA’s surface inspector assessments and domain initiatives are helpful and have been effective. 

We certainly look forward to working with the Department to 

identify ways to strengthen its surface transportation security. 

Sir, that concludes my statement. I’d be glad to answer any questions that you may have. 

22 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mann follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARLTON I. MANN, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Good afternoon Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on 

challenges within the surface transportation mode confronting the Transportation 

Security Administration. When discussing transportation security, people usually 

think of aviation security first. However, terrorist incidents abroad have underscored the need to focus more on surface transportation modes—mass transit, highway, maritime, pipelines, and freight rail. 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 gave the Transportation Security Administration authority and responsibility for securing all modes of transportation. Congress further clarified TSA’s oversight role with the 9/11 Commission 

Act. Beginning in 2004, TSA increased its efforts to mitigate the vulnerability of 

mass transit rail systems across the United States. This was accomplished by introducing mass transit stakeholder security forums; developing guidance, memorandums and directives; using its Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program 

(STSI) to provide voluntary vulnerability assessments; and providing support 

through grants and direct operational assistance. 

Within the last 2 years, we have issued several reports related to surface transportation issues, including the STSI Program. I would like to highlight the results 

of those reviews. Most of my statement focuses on our findings and recommendations. However, it is important to point out that we also reported that TSA’s surface 

inspector assessment and domain initiatives have been effective, and have helped 

the program achieve many of its goals. 

In June 2008, we issued an inspection report, TSA’s Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs. This report addressed the strengths and 

weaknesses of TSA’s oversight and assistance programs for mass transit rail, including the Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program, the Transit Security 

Grant Program, the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Program, 

and the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program. Later that year, we 

conducted a follow-up inspection and in February 2009 issued another report, Effectiveness of TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors. This report addressed 

the strengths and weaknesses of TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors. 

Most recently, in March 2010, the OIG issued a report, TSA’s Preparedness for Mass 

Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies. It addressed TSA’s effectiveness in supporting mass transit and passenger rail stakeholders with preparing for and responding to emergencies. In total, we made 14 recommendations to TSA to promote 

more efficient, effective, and economical operations. 

In our mass transit report, we identified important challenges to improve transit 

rail security, meet the needs of mass transit authorities, and comply with legislation, which expanded TSA’s statutory authority and responsibility. In our review of 

the Surface Transportation Security Inspector program, we concluded that TSA 

needed to look critically at how it is deploying resources. The central issue in both 

reports was the mission, organization, and command structure of its surface inspectors. In particular, its command structure appeared to be aviation-focused. 

This year, we evaluated TSA’s effectiveness in supporting mass transit and passenger rail agencies in preparing for and responding to emergency incidents. That 

evaluation overlapped our previous reports in one respect. In our earlier reports, we 

discussed TSA’s use of the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement Program 

and pointed out that they have led to security improvements in the mass transit 

systems reviewed, but did not analyze the BASE program or processes. In our most 

recent report, we identified weaknesses in the BASE program’s ability to assess passenger rail stakeholders’ emergency preparedness and response capabilities. 

Following is a more detailed summary of each report. 

TSA’s Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs 

(OIG–08–66) 

The purpose of our review was to evaluate TSA’s four largest oversight and assistance programs for mass transit rail: the Surface Transportation Security Inspection 

Program, the Transit Security Grant Program, the Visible Intermodal Prevention 

and Response program, and the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program. Our goal was to evaluate how well TSA managed these programs and how 

well the programs met the security needs of the major mass transit rail systems. 

The 9/11 Commission Act, which was enacted shortly after we began this review, 

introduced new mass transit rail standards and responsibilities for TSA. Where we 

23 

obtained information on the status of TSA compliance with standards introduced by 

the 9/11 Commission Act, we included it in our report. The review did not encompass TSA’s responsibilities for freight rail and for intercity passenger rail, or for 

other forms of mass transit, such as buses. We conducted our fieldwork from June 

2007 to October 2007. 

We reported that TSA could improve certain aspects of each of these mass transit 

security programs. We observed unclear or unduly complex chains of command; an 

unclear mission, insufficient guidance; and insufficient communication. TSA needed 

more consistency in its interactions with mass transit rail stakeholders—who were 

at odds over the best approach for allocating funds and prioritizing projects for the 

Transit Security Grant Program—although it acknowledged and attempted to address some early missteps that strained stakeholder relationships. Nonetheless, we 

noted TSA should further integrate stakeholder expertise to implement more effectively its oversight and assistance programs and fulfill its responsibility for mass 

transit security. We reported considerable satisfaction among mass transit agencies 

using the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program. 

The report contained seven recommendations aimed at improving the TSA’s oversight and assistance programs for mass transit rail. TSA concurred, or concurred 

in part, with recommendations to direct its Transportation Security Network Management office to provide Transportation Security Inspectors information and updates on the rail-related programs. TSA also agreed to develop procedures for incorporating asset-specific risk and vulnerability assessments, including information 

provided by Transportation Security Inspectors, into the grant decision-making process and grant guidance; include in its annual report to Congress how it used grants 

to implement its transportation security goals; and each grant recipient’s assessment of the grant application and award process. In addition, TSA acknowledged 

the need to seek Memorandums of Agreement with all relevant transit authorities 

regarding VIPR deployments; and revise grant program eligibility criteria to allow 

start-up funds for mass transit systems that do not already have a canine explosive 

detection unit. 

TSA did not concur with our recommendations to place the Transportation Security Inspectors—Surface under the direct authority of a TSA headquarters official 

responsible for surface transportation, and to develop specific, feasible security 

standards for mass transit systems. 

A few of the report’s recommendations are not yet resolved, pending additional 

information from TSA and the resolution of recommendations in the follow up STSI 

report. 

Effectiveness of TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (OIG–09–24) 

The 9/11 Commission Act directed that we evaluate the performance and effectiveness of TSA’s Transportation Security Inspectors-Surface and whether there is a 

need for additional inspectors. The act stated, ‘‘Not later than September 30, 2008, 

the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General shall transmit a report to 

the appropriate congressional committees on the performance and effectiveness of 

surface transportation security inspectors, whether there is a need for additional inspectors, and other recommendations.’’ We conducted our fieldwork from February 

to July 2008. 

We determined that TSA needed to look critically at how it is deploying resources, 

and assess how planned exercises could better use the inspectors and their activities. The program appeared understaffed for the long term and an aviation-focused 

command structure had reduced the quality and morale of the workforce. 

TSA agreed that Transportation Security Inspectors and their unique expertise in 

mass transit and rail should be integrated into VIPR planning and deployment. TSA 

stated that it has addressed the potential role of Transportation Security Inspectors 

in its VIPR Team Capabilities and Operational Deployment guide. TSA did not 

agree that Transportation Security Inspectors’ comprehensive inspection activities, 

such as BASE and Security Action Item reviews, should be integrated into VIPR operations. 

TSA concurred with our recommendation to examine how many inspectors it 

needed to perform necessary functions by assessing current and anticipated future 

duties, and then expand the Transportation Security Inspector workforce to ensure 

that each field office has sufficient staffing. However, at the time of our report we 

did not agree with the approach TSA proposed to carry out this recommendation. 

TSA did not concur with our earlier recommendation, which we repeated in this 

report, to place the Transportation Security Inspectors-Surface under the direct authority of a TSA headquarters official who is responsible for surface transportation. 

TSA did not agree that the Transportation Security Inspector command structure 

inhibited the inspectors’ effectiveness and we were unsuccessful in persuading TSA 

24 

to implement this recommendation. Ultimately, in the absence of a commitment 

from TSA management to modify its command structure, we retracted our original 

recommendation and instead recommended that TSA eliminate practices that undermined efforts to establish a more transparent chain of command. In its last update, TSA indicated that it was taking steps to strengthen communication between 

the STSI program and Federal Security Directors and their staffs in the field. 

TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies (OIG–10–68) 

The purpose of this audit was to evaluate TSA’s effectiveness in assisting passenger rail and mass transit stakeholders with preparing for and responding to 

emergencies. We conducted this performance audit between April and August 2009, 

and the OIG issued its final report in March 2010. 

We determined that TSA could better support passenger rail agencies by improving its assessments of emergency preparedness and response capabilities. TSA can 

also improve its efforts to train passenger rail agencies and first responders, and 

ensure that drills and exercises are live and more realistic to help strengthen response capabilities. TSA has focused primarily on security and terrorism prevention 

efforts, while providing limited staff and resources to emergency preparedness and 

response. As a result, passenger rail agencies and the first responders that rely 

upon may not be adequately prepared to handle all emergencies or mitigate their 

consequences. 

The report made four recommendations. TSA concurred with, and took corrective 

actions for, all four recommendations. 

Evolution of the Surface Transportation Security Inspector Program 

The STSI program’s organization and chain of command continues to evolve, but 

in a manner which is not consistent with our recommendations. As discussed above, 

we reported our concerns twice about the organization and authority for the program and in both reports recommended that TSA place the responsibility for the 

STSI program with an official at TSA headquarters. After considering TSA’s comments on the STSI report, we revised our recommendation to TSA to eliminate practices that undermined efforts to establish a more transparent chain of command. 

In December 2006, TSA shifted from a system where Transportation Security Inspectors reported to surface-focused supervisors to a system where they reported to 

aviation-focused supervisors. TSA reorganized the program to match the field command model for aviation and cargo inspectors. Supervisory Transportation Security 

Inspectors became Assistant Federal Security Directors-Surface (AFSDs-Surface) 

who reported to the local FSD. The FSD was the administrative manager, but the 

STSIP headquarters office still set the priorities and provided the budget resources 

for the inspectors in the field. AFSDs-Surface, therefore, effectively had two chains 

of command. 

In May 2008, TSA made further changes. In primary field offices that have an 

AFSD-Surface, Transportation Security Inspectors were reporting to that individual. 

In satellite field offices without an AFSD-Surface, inspectors were reporting to the 

local Assistant Federal Security Director—Inspections (AFSD-Inspections). However, 

the AFSD-Surface at the nearby primary field office still mentored and advised all 

surface inspectors within that area, even when they were not under his or her direct 

command. Under this structure (at the time of our report), 55 (37 percent) of Transportation Security Inspectors were reporting to an AFSD-Surface, and the remaining 95 (63 percent) were reporting to an aviation focused AFSD-Inspections. 

At the time, we also observed several problems regarding FSDs’ involvement with 

the STSIP that were leading to tension and confusion over the program’s chain of 

command. In response to our STSI report, TSA stated that it chose this command 

structure because FSDs are better able to use the security network in the area. TSA 

noted that FSDs frequently interact with state and local law enforcement and mass 

transit operators. TSA believes that FSDs understand the vulnerabilities and challenges of the mass transit modes ‘‘in their backyard.’’ In our final report, we maintained that the program continued to operate differently than that outlined in a 

management directive that TSA cited. 

In August 2009, TSA informed us that it was in the process of conducting a formal independent comprehensive staffing study of the entire inspection workforce, to 

include surface, with the results due in the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. TSA 

has not communicated the results of its study. 

In September 2009, we learned that TSA began to implement a multi-phased restructuring of its Office of Security Operations, Office of Compliance, Surface Inspection and Oversight to meet mission demands and to utilize resources better. 

TSA planned to abolish positions, establish new positions, realign some functions 

among positions, and reallocate resources among field offices throughout the counVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
25 

try. The restructuring plan appeared to affect numerous senior staff within the surface inspector program. To our knowledge, TSA has not formally communicated how 

the reorganization will strengthen the STSI program and resolve the primary issue 

raised in our reports. On a broader level, we remain concerned whether this plan 

will better enable surface resources to operate adequately and independently of 

TSA’s aviation security mission. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these matters. We look forward to continuing our work with the department to identify ways to strengthen surface transportation security. I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you all very much for your testimony. 

Mr. Heyman, the 9/11 Act set a number of deadlines for securing 

our surface transportation system, but TSA has missed many of 

these deadlines. One of the deadlines was a comprehensive risk assessment and national security strategy for our Nation’s rail system. This was due last year, and I’m asking you, I hope for the last 

time, when the Department will complete this long overdue risk assessment. What do you say to that? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Senator, the risk assessment is in interagency review right now. It should be coming to Congress after that review 

is complete. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. After what? 

Mr. HEYMAN. After that review is complete. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. When will that be? 

Mr. HEYMAN. These—the interagency review process is one 

which you have comments from agencies, and it goes through the 

OMB process, and they have to be adjudicated by TSA. So, depending upon the comments that are—get back—matters of weeks, 

probably. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Heyman, that doesn’t sound very good. 

I reminded you, in my question, that the report was due last year. 

And to be told now that, ‘‘Well, they’ll get it done when the comment period is over,’’ that is outrageous. 

I used to run a corporation, I can tell you that we wouldn’t have 

permitted that kind of thing to take place. And I don’t understand 

the delay, with the risk that we’ve got, just in New Jersey, 150,000 

people ride the train every day. The area that I live in abuts the 

area that is declared by the FBI to be the most appealing target 

for a terrorist attack in the country. The two-mile stretch between 

Newark Airport and the Harbor is filled with chemical companies 

and all kinds of threats to human safety. We’re walking around, 

with a bureaucratic delay. It’s not fair to the people who we serve, 

you and I and Senator Hutchison and all of us, to say, ‘‘Well, it’s 

work in process.’’ I hope that something better can come out of this. 

The National Security Council recently released a report, finding 

that TSA has failed to take the lead on coordinating surface transportation security efforts. What specific actions does TSA plan to 

take in order to address the NSC’s recommendation? How long is 

that going to take? 

Mr. HEYMAN. First, Senator, I share your concern about the 

delays on the risk assessment. As somebody who was sworn in last 

summer and have taken a look at some of the recommendations 

that have yet to be implemented, let me assure you that it is a priority to move quickly as we can through these types of recommendations that have not been completed. The—if there is a silVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
26 

ver lining on this, about 90 percent of the 9/11 recommendations 

have already been put in place. But, the risk assessment needs to 

be completed, and I share that with you. 

Even so, during the grant processes, which is one of the most effective tools that we have for putting in place security at these 

places, the—they are—the investments are based on risk. They are 

done, looking at threat, looking at vulnerability. Those risk assessments have been completed, and, as you say, rightly, New York is 

not only—and the New Jersey corridor—not only of greatest risk, 

but has also received perhaps the greatest amount of funds, as a 

result of that. And that’s a reflection of the risk assessments that 

have been done to promote the grant programs. 

As it pertains to the White House Report, the TSA played a leadership role in supporting that effort. It was an interagency report 

that was completed with the contributions of the Department of 

Transportation and the Department of Energy and the Department 

of Homeland Security. And a—I met, yesterday, with the President’s advisor at Homeland Security. He is very much interested 

in putting forward an implementation plan which will be delivered 

to the White House at the end of next month. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I’m told that 36 of 77 recommendations for 

surface security have not yet been completed. I can tell you, Mr. 

Heyman—nothing personal here, but I’m not comforted by the response that you gave. The fact that you’re a relatively recent arrival, you’re called in as the next management group, and it’s not 

very heartwarming to hear the fact that we’re going to still be delayed on one part of this, and—we’re talking about something that 

was begun a long time ago. 

So, I would say to you, take the message back to the Secretary 

of DHS that we’re going to look further into this. I am absolutely 

dissatisfied with the response given. 

Excuse me, Senator Hutchison, for running it a little longer, I 

want to hear from you, please. 

Senator HUTCHISON. No, I appreciate your line of questioning. 

Let me talk about the area of the inspectors. In the February 

2009 report to Congress on the effectiveness of TSA’s surface transportation inspectors, the DHS inspector general noted that TSA 

has its surface-focused inspectors report to aviation-focused supervisors, rather than surface-focused supervisors. Two-thirds of the 

inspectors hired after the reorganization had no rail or mass transit experience. 

The IG concluded that, the current TSI command structure inhibits TSI effectiveness, and recommended, three times, that TSA 

place surface inspectors under the authority of a TSA official that 

is surface-transportation-oriented. TSA rejected the recommendation each time, and the IG’s office ultimately backed off the proposal. 

Mr. Heyman, your policy of having surface-focused inspectors report to aviation-focused supervisors, and the hiring of surface inspectors with no surface experience, doesn’t seem like a good way 

for TSA to address the issues that we are concerned about, the security issues in surface transportation. Could you explain how you 

are trying to achieve this with this kind of IG report? 

27 

Mr. HEYMAN. Senator, thank you. I have looked at that IG report, and I know those at TSA who I’ve spoken with have looked 

at it. And I believe that there is an interest—an additional recommendation in the report about the command-and-control structures, in terms of how those inspectors are implemented and deployed into the field. I know that TSA has said that there is a 

broader interest in reorganizing that to more effectively deploy inspectors. And I believe that they will be doing so. I suppose that 

part of the challenge, of course, is that, even though there has been 

a change in administration, there has not, at this point, been a 

TSA Administrator. And, of course, those kinds of reorganizations 

or changes are usually left for the incoming team. But, I think 

the—that the report was, as you said, well received by TSA. And 

I think they are looking to implement that with new leadership on 

board. 

Senator HUTCHISON. OK. So, you are saying, today, that you 

think the inspectors hired will, going forward, have surface experience, and also that there would be a surface person as the supervisor? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I’m not quite sure how the—how it will be organized, but I know that they will look into that. And I’m happy to 

give you additional information after the hearing. 

Senator HUTCHISON. I would—well, I’d like to have the information when there is a policy that is set, if it, in fact, is going to 

change, because I certainly would have questions, going forward, 

and probably of the nominee for TSA—— 

Mr. HEYMAN. Sure. 

Senator HUTCHISON.—when that appointment is made. 

TSA’s current policy only requires the surface transportation inspectors for the top 50 transit systems to visit the property once 

every 3 years. Does that seem like enough supervision if the transit 

agencies know that, once an inspection is done, that they won’t be 

inspected for 3 years? And is that still the policy? 

Mr. HEYMAN. That is the policy, as far as I know. The inspections are in sync with the granting cycle, and so, it is meant to synchronize funding and assessments. There are about 5,000 transit 

sites across the country, and with—given the limited inspectors, 

that’s the tempo of operations, I think, that can be sustained at 

this point. 

Senator HUTCHISON. I’d like to ask Mr. Lord and Mr. Mann, 

number one, Do you think that it is a good policy to indicate to an 

agency that they will have an inspection once every 3 years? Number two, Do you think surface inspectors should still report to aviation supervisors? 

Mr. Mann, you have recommended that the surface-focused inspectors report to surface transportation people. 

And, Mr. Lord, you have indicated, in your reports, that they 

should have surface transportation experience. 

So, would you speak to this and let’s see if—— 

Mr. LORD. Sure. I’d be glad to. 

Senator HUTCHISON.—we can generate some—— 

Mr. LORD. The—in regard to your first question, I’m a little concerned about locking the inspectors into a rigid schedule, primarily 

because if you fully embrace a risk-based approach, I would argue, 

28 

you should focus your management time and resources on the highest-risk facilities. So, they may want to revisit that policy. You 

can’t—it’s not one-size-fits-all, obviously. If you have higher-risk facilities and you are—and you haven’t embraced risk management 

principles, I would argue you should focus where the risks are 

greatest first, then use scarce resources to look elsewhere. 

In terms of this issue of reporting to the aviation-side of the 

house, obviously those are where the biggest programs are. That’s 

the most visible component, in some respects, of the agency’s operations. This has been a longstanding problem. I don’t think there 

is a simple solution. I know we have met with the inspectors. They 

believe the function needs to be elevated, organizationally. 

And I was encouraged by the fact that H.R. 2200, the TSA Reauthorization Act, which passed the House last year, it would elevate 

the surface inspector function within the agency. And perhaps 

that’s one mechanism you could use to, you know, ensure more attention is focused on it, if you have higher-level officials leading the 

effort within the agency. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Mann? 

Mr. MANN. Infrequent inspections does pose some risk. But, I 

also agree with my colleague, Mr. Lord, that where the risk seems 

to be greatest is perhaps where we should not be locked into a rigid 

schedule of every 3 years and perhaps do something more frequently or more unannounced. 

Regarding the—we’ve made it clear that we’ve recommended that 

TSA should have its surface transportation inspectors report directly to a person in TSA, for a variety of reasons. First of all, the 

Federal security directors are aviation-focused, and generally do 

not have the surface transportation expertise. The chain of command is somewhat convoluted, simply because direction comes from 

headquarters, it comes from the Federal security directors. And 

we’ve got those inspectors, who are out on the ground, getting conflicting—sometimes conflicting messages, and certainly getting 

messages from several different sources. And we stand by our recommendation that TSA should have a central person at TSA headquarters in charge of the surface transportation program. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you. 

My time is up. And we now have other Senators to ask questions. 

I would just say that I hope that you, Mr. Lord and Mr. Mann, 

both of you, will continue to make these recommendations. There’s 

no reason to back down. I know that this is a big area, and I know 

that there’s no TSA Administrator. Those are certainly legitimate 

concerns. But, I think we do need to have much better use of our 

taxpayer dollars. And I think we can do better. And I hope that the 

next leader that is appointed for this agency is of the same mind 

and will take some of the advice from the GAO and the IG. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Senator Hutchison. 

Senator Thune, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, we 

are pleased to have you with us. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Please. 

29 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. 

I want to thank our panelists today for being here and sharing 

their perspectives on an issue that’s very important to this country 

and to our economy. Transportation infrastructure is critical, and 

all of the different modes are, at some point or another, vulnerable 

or susceptible to attacks. We want to make sure that we are taking 

all the steps that are necessary to protect that infrastructure. 

Let me ask a question, if I might, Mr. Heyman. What do you see 

as the biggest threat to surface transportation security? And which 

surface modes, if you can discuss this in an open session, are most 

vulnerable to a terrorist attack? And how prepared are we to prevent that sort of an attack? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Senator. Welcome. 

Let me just say, generally speaking, we are still concerned about 

aviation threats and surface threats, as it pertains to mass transit. 

The discussion that we’ve had here, the recent events that we’ve 

seen over the last year, and the recognition of this being a largely 

open networks of—network of networks creates great challenges 

and, obviously, opportunities for those who seek to do harm. We 

are, as noted, trying to take a risk-based approach to buy down the 

risk at the highest value and highest concerns. We do that across 

all modes of transportation. This past year, we are completing our 

multimodal risk assessment, for the purposes of assessing where 

the next investments go. But, this is an area that we do need to 

be concerned about. And I can give you more details in a classified 

briefing. 

Senator THUNE. OK, thanks. 

And I would, I guess, direct this to Mr. Lord. We’ve got 2 million 

miles of pipeline across this country, including over 6,000 miles in 

my home State of South Dakota pipelines that carry oil, natural 

gas, and other products. Given that a threat to our Nation’s pipelines could have some grave economic consequences, how should 

TSA use risk management to calibrate its attention to critical 

threats to the Nation’s pipeline and, consequently, our energy supply? 

Mr. LORD. Well, they’ve taken the first step. They’ve ranked— 

they developed a list of the 100 critical pipeline facilities, based on 

risk. And even though our observations are preliminary, our upcoming report is going to suggest, and use that risk information as 

part of your inspection process. Use it to help guide you on where 

the—you conduct your corporate security reviews, how frequently 

you get out there to make inspections. And also, once you do identify a problem, we think it’s very important to have a follow up 

mechanism to ensure any deficiency and planning you identify is 

implemented. 

So, it’s—they’re at the first step, and our report’s going to highlight the need to carry forward what they’re doing. You know, have 

a more frequent inspection process at the higher risk facilities. And 

third, follow up on any deficiency, to close the loop, so to speak. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Mann, there is a DHS IG report on the effectiveness of TSA’s surface transportation security inspectors, and 

30 

in that report, TSA rejected the IG’s recommendation to have surface inspectors report to fellow surface transportation experts; instead, they are reporting to TSA airport personnel. My question is, 

Are TSA’s surface inspectors expected to be multipurpose field inspectors, jacks-of-all-trade instead of masters of a particular field? 

Mr. MANN. It is our understanding that they are not. In fact, one 

of the assistant Federal security directors, in fact, told us that 

these inspectors, who are aviation- oriented, are incapable of doing 

most of the duties that the surface inspectors are required to do. 

Senator THUNE. The FRA has about 400 safety inspectors across 

the country. Is it possible for those inspectors to be trained to handle security responsibilities to improve efficiency and lower the cost 

of inspections to the taxpayers? 

Mr. MANN. I think it is possible. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Thune follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important hearing. I 

also want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today. 

While aviation security gets most of the public’s attention, the security of our Nation’s surface transportation system—our railroads, highways, and pipelines—must 

also be a national priority and a priority for this committee. The past few years 

have seen attacks on rail transit systems in major cities throughout the world including London, Madrid, and Moscow, as well as an unsuccessful plot to detonate 

explosives on the New York City subway system. 

In addition to keeping passengers secure, we must also work to keep our Nation’s 

freight network secure. Many rural states, including my state of South Dakota, depend on surface transportation to ship their products within the United States, and 

around the world. An attack on our Nation’s surface transportation system could 

disrupt the timely delivery of goods and significantly weaken our Nation’s economy. 

The private sector, and the railroads in particular, should be commended for their 

leadership following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in putting in place their own security 

plans, and installing cameras, fencing and other security equipment to ‘‘harden’’ facilities. The Transportation Security Administration (ISA) seems to have taken a 

collaborative approach in working with the private sector transportation companies, 

a good approach I believe, because initiatives to guard against terrorism must be 

balanced with the need to not place undue burdens on commerce. 

I do find the conclusions of the recently released White House assessment on surface transportation security rather troublesome. At a time of record Federal deficits, 

the last thing we need are duplicative security programs and overlapping responsibilities among Federal agencies. I hope our witnesses will have recommendations 

for how DHS, and if necessary, Congress, can more clearly delineate roles and responsibilities for surface transportation security. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Warner? 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. I’ve just got couple of quick questions. 

One is—and obviously recognizing that some of this could fall in 

the classified area—as a Senator from the Commonwealth, I am 

very concerned about the safety of Metro. Recognizing some incidents in both Moscow in Madrid over the last year and a half, I’d 

31 

love for you to tell us about what we should do more here in the 

Nation’s capital, in terms of safety and security around Metro. And 

whether this area poses any unique challenges. When you think 

about how Metro intersects with the challenges of three different 

jurisdictions—you’ve got a Metro system, you’ve got a VRE system, 

you’ve got a separate Maryland rail system, you’ve got CSX, you’ve 

got this configuration of all these different systems coming together 

within the national capital area to move people around. And I 

would love to hear—again, respecting the confidentiality of some of 

these aspects, any comments you might have, particularly Secretary Heyman and Mr. Mann or Mr. Lord. Any one of you. 

Mr. LORD. I’ll go first. I don’t mind. The—without divulging anything classified—and I’ll defer to Mr. Heyman on the threat information—I think, obviously, the arrest of Mr. Zazi, up in New York, 

shows terrorists are determined to attack our systems. And as the 

DHS IG recently pointed out, we perhaps need to spend more time 

dealing with the emergency response. You know, what happen— 

what do we do if something happens, and how to actual—respond 

to an actual emergency, give more training to front-line staff, have 

more joint exercises with all the emergency responders. I thought 

the IG did a nice job of laying that out in their March 2010 report. 

So, obviously you have to be concerned about threats, but you also 

have to focus on, ‘‘Well, what do we do if something happens?’’ And 

this is all public-level information. 

Mr. MANN. Sure. I think—I thank goodness our intelligence enterprise is what it is, first of all. To have perhaps shortcut any 

planned attacks against our systems, as well as the total Federal 

response, with regard to security, as well as heightened awareness, 

even regular citizens. I mean, we’re all—all of us who ride the 

Metro are certainly more aware of items being left unattended. I 

mean—so, overall, the heightened awareness, I think, is a very 

good thing. 

But, I think four things really come to mind, with regard to what 

do we really need to do—or what does TSA need to do: more people, 

more resources, more training, better systems. 

Senator WARNER. Well, let me follow up that. It’s recognizing 

that so much—and particularly of our surface transportation system—is in private hands. Beyond simply more personnel, are there 

efficient but lower-cost ways to partner more with our private-sector partners in the surface transportation—— 

Mr. MANN. I think they are. One of the things that we have— 

we commented on in our reports is that TSA needs to do a better 

job of interacting with our transit stakeholders. There’s a lot of expertise there that we’re not certain that TSA has actually taken 

advantage of. So, we’d like to see a closer collaboration, take advantage of that knowledge that the individuals on the ground who are 

doing this all day, every day, bring to the table, to be able to provide us with a more efficient, and just a better—a safer environment for our public travelers. 

Senator WARNER. Let me move to one other subject matter. I recognize that I’m joined by Senator Udall, and he’ll want to ask some 

questions, as well. This is an area of concern beyond just the TSA 

realm, which is how we do a better job of measurements and 

metrics in all of our government performance. I noticed that one of 

32 

the TSA’s deficiencies in GAO’s risk management was that TSA 

had not developed performance measures for all surface activities. 

I think this is a challenge, not just for surface, but clearly across 

the whole way. 

How do we get milestones and metrics that we can use to measure your performance, other than the avoidance of a catastrophic 

event? From an oversight standpoint, what should the public expect, in terms of truly measurable milestones that we should look 

to, to measure the performance, staying focused on the surface 

transportation area? Recognizing if you don’t have that whole, 

‘‘Here are the 47 points we ought to be looking at as our checklist,’’ 

how do we get to that checklist so that we can do our job and work 

with you in evaluating your performance? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So, on the—let me just say that the approach to 

performance metrics is a challenge across most areas, as you said. 

And in surface transportation, or transportation, broadly speaking, 

what we have started to do and to look at is the first level of analysis, which is, Have they done the training program that you required of them? Have they taken the preparedness steps that they 

should, whether it’s emergency response, whether it’s on law enforcement, behavioral-detection training? Have they put in place 

the capital investments for infrastructure hardening? Those steps 

are measurable. And while not on the level of—you suggest risk 

avoidance, so to speak, you can start measuring the buydown of 

risk. And we are starting to look at it that way. 

Let me just also add, on your previous question—in fact, the 

Washington metropolitan area has in some sense an advantage, the 

challenges that other private-sector entities face or—in terms of receiving funding, because it’s a regional entity, it can apply for 

grants, based—it has some benefit for applying for grants on a regional basis, in terms of either UASI grants, in addition to the normal transit grants, and that can be applied to Metro, if so needed. 

And I would also add that one of the challenges we face—and 

this was actually in the White House report, but also the Department has made this recommendation, as well—and that’s the 

multiyear capital investments. And what we want to be able to do 

is to say, over a period of time, ‘‘These are the capital investments 

we’re going to do.’’ We need to be able to design it and build it, and 

that takes time. And so, we need to put our grant programs in that 

order, as well, and have the funding linked to that. So, those are 

both an opportunity and a challenge. 

Senator WARNER. As somebody who’s grappled with these regional issues as Governor and now Senator, to actually see there’s 

an advantage of this three-part jurisdiction sometimes is harder to 

see. I would love to come back and revisit with you, at some point, 

how we work through this, and recognizing it’s an enormous challenge, other metrics we can measure, in terms of performance. Because, again, your challenge is—your success will be—the less we 

know about what you’re doing is perhaps the best evidence of success, but we’ve got to also have some other milestones. And I do 

think your training is a good example. And, kind of, putting some 

procedures in place, but there probably needs to be additional—— 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes, we’re happy to do that. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

33 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Senator Udall. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much, Chairman Lautenberg. 

The area I wanted to focus on, but I also wanted to follow up on 

what Senator Warner was asking about—the first area is, these 

other countries where they’ve had attacks, you know the Moscow 

subway, what went on in Madrid and London—are those countries 

using the approach that we have? Or are they applying the model 

that we have with TSA with government people? What approach 

are they taking? And is there anything to learn from that? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We work closely, have a good relationship with our 

British colleagues, and have learned from them, and also shared 

best practices, looking at ways of detecting or disrupting plots in 

advance, as well as engaging in what we call ‘‘operational deterrence.’’ 

The three pillars to the—to our approach to transit security: intelligence, operational deterrence, and infrastructure protection. 

The centerpiece there on operational deterrence has to do with, 

‘‘How do you prevent something from happening to—before it 

does?’’ That involves gaining the support and the involvement of 

the public, bringing your private-sector partners into having a 

greater understanding of the threat, and putting in place teams, 

like we’ve just started today, our VIPR teams in New York, for supporting local law enforcement in detection of explosives, and surge 

capacity, in terms of presence, when you have intelligence to address. 

Senator UDALL. In the British example, are they partnering—or 

do they actually have TSA-type people onsite doing security with 

the rails? How is the British model specifically done? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So—transport—the Ministry of Transport oversees 

the rail and transit security. And they work both with local law enforcement, as well as their own officers. And I’m happy to give you 

more details—— 

Senator UDALL. OK. 

Mr. HEYMAN. All right. 

Senator UDALL. OK. Tell me how the passenger rail and bus 

companies and others in the United States—how they’re doing on 

Senator Warner’s metrics and milestones? When you talk about 

training programs, about putting in place the capital investments, 

things like that. Where are they? And how far do they have to go? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So, on training, the—there’s a challenge of getting 

the information, to know where they—where we are. We’ve done 

some surveys to assess the level of training. I think where we— 

what we’ve determined is, about two-thirds of the folks in the agencies have received training. And each year, we try to do more. 

One of the things that we’ve done in the last year or so, for 

grants, is to add funding for—first of all, to prioritize rail, above 

all else, because of congressional interest, and, as well, it’s a national interest, but—the Congress has made that clear, as well— 

but also to provide funding for backfill. So, for—in order for someVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
34 

body to get training, they have to take time off of their job, and 

you have to backfill that individual. And the challenge that we 

saw, over a number of years, was that people would not be able to 

go take training, because we—there was no funding for the timeand-a-half overtime for the backfill. So, there’s now funding available for that, to help improve that. We’ll get beyond the 63 percent 

or so. 

Senator UDALL. Great. Thank you very much. 

And, Senator Lautenberg, I would thank you for holding this 

hearing and having such an interest in this and showing your leadership. Thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Senator Udall. 

One of the things that I think is quite apparent here is that 

we’re late on lots of things. Almost, I’m going to say, delinquent. 

When we think about the fact that 2 million people each day get 

in an airplane, on average, and 35 million get into transit—2 million, aviation; 35 million daily, in transit. And there are so many 

susceptibilities out there. 

And I would say this—and I’m directing this aside to Mr. 

Heyman and the Department—and that is, ‘‘Get on the stick, here. 

Get going.’’ This is an outrage, that it has taken so long. This is 

like the traffic cop, standing on the sidewalk and watching the traffic go by, and think about when he ought to interrupt the flow to 

keep the cars from crashing into one another. It’s not acceptable, 

Mr. Heyman. 

After the Moscow subway attack that killed 40 people, injured 

dozens more, a number of transit agencies across our country visibly increased their security presence. But, we’ve heard very little 

from TSA. When, heaven forbid, there’s something to be aware of 

in aviation, we hear about it. But, after a major terrorist attack on 

a mass transit agency, though off our shores, shouldn’t the agency 

responsible for our Nation’s transportation system take a lead in 

communicating with the public, letting people know whether or not 

they’re at unusual risk? 

I remember the days of the color classification of threat. And I 

thought it was one of the worst things that I’d ever seen, because 

they would say ‘‘purple’’ and not tell you what to do. It didn’t say 

stay away from the bridges, so all it did is make everybody nervous, but not more protected. 

So, don’t you think that TSA ought to be out there, talking to the 

people across the country, and giving them some assurances, some 

advice? 

There’s so much conversation about it, we have nice officers here 

from Amtrak, senior officers here. And I use Amtrak a lot, and I 

see them, and there is a presence. I think, in many of the large systems, that the presence is largely that of the local agency that runs 

security, and it’s disheartening. 

I want to ask either Mr. Lord or Mr. Mann, are DHS and TSA 

prepared to respond, if necessary, to an attack like the ones that 

occurred in Moscow or other passenger rail and mass transit systems throughout the world? What do you think? 

Mr. MANN. Sure. In our March report, we questioned that very 

premise. The TSA’s focus is terrorism and prevention. We’re not so 

certain that it is as capable to respond and mitigate. 

35 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Any comments, Mr. Lord? 

Mr. LORD. The—I think one activity they have ramped up in response to the recent attacks are the so-called VIPR deployments. 

These are visible intermodal protection and response teams. 

They’re—they—they’re aimed at deterring possible attacks on passenger rail and mass transit. But, these are more episodic, they— 

they’re short-term. Over the longer term, I think it’s important to 

reach out to the transit agencies and passenger rail companies 

themselves, because, as Senator Hutchison noted in her opening remarks, TSA’s role is more supportive and indirect. It’s different— 

fundamentally different from the aviation sector, where they Federalized that function. They control your access to the airport. So, 

they have to work hand in hand with other agencies and providers 

to provide that. So, they have a less visible role, based on how it’s 

currently organized. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Therefore, in order to best protect our people who travel in transit, shouldn’t they be more clear in their communications about what needs to be done, and, do the risk assessment plan, and at least give guidelines out there? The surface 

transportation lays down conditions that have to be met in order 

for communities to get grants. But, I don’t know that TSA has provided any direction at all. And its, as I said, disheartening. 

So, Mr. Heyman, you’ve heard from people today, and listened to 

your colleagues at the table. And I would hope that it’s understood, 

at TSA. We heard talk about VIPR recently. Does TSA do anything 

to evaluate, for instance, the performance of these VIPR teams? 

And if GAO suggested some weaknesses, or at least asked for 

measures to determine the effectiveness of VIPR—where is TSA on 

these things? 

Mr. HEYMAN. On the VIPR teams—first, I want to thank you and 

Congress for supporting additional funding for expanding of the 

VIPR teams. We have done red-teaming to address the effectiveness, and we’ve compared VIPR teams as a deterrent to action, 

versus other type of surge, such as additional local transit officers 

on the beat. And it has—is—it has consistently shown to be more 

effective as a deterrent for adversaries than other means. And so, 

we are red-teaming it. We are looking at continuing to perfect the 

deployment of the VIPR teams. And, as I think I noted, we have, 

just following up on the Moscow concern, deployed, for the first 

time, in New York City, today, VIPR teams in support of law enforcement for explosive detection. And we will continue to look at 

doing that. We’ve been doing that for the last year on the Northeast Corridor on Amtrak. And we’ll continue to expand that program. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We’ll keep the record open. Thank you. 

Do you have something you wanted to add, Mr. Lord? 

Mr. LORD. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I—in my prior response, I 

would like to add, on a very important point, we’re currently evaluating TSA’s efforts to disseminate information—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Mr. LORD.—down to the local level. And we’ll be formally reporting on that toward the end of the year. We’re looking at the various 

mechanisms they have to help push information out to the transit 

agencies and passenger rail. 

36 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We’d like to hear from you as quickly as 

it can be developed. 

Mr. LORD. Sure. Thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Mann, did you—— 

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. I’d just like to follow up what Mr. Lord said. 

This is not necessarily a TSA initiative, but the Department of 

Homeland Security is ramping up its Fusion Center concept, where 

intelligence on emerging threats, if it happens to be against a transit system, can, in fact, be pushed down to the effective system. 

And that’s a very robust endeavor. It’s improving. And we expect 

to have a national Fusion Center concept, where information can 

be shared online—when I’m saying ‘‘we,’’ the Department—soon. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We await with interest. 

Thank you, each. And we’ll keep the record open for a while and 

ask you to respond to any inquiries sent to you promptly, please. 

Thank you very much. 

And I would call the second panel to the table: Mr. John O’Connor, Chief of Police, Acting Vice President of the Office of Security 

and Special Operations at Amtrak; Joseph Kelly, who is the Acting 

Chief of Police of New Jersey Transit; and Mr. Skip Elliot, the Vice 

President for Public Safety and the Environment for CSX. 

[Pause.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, all. 

And I would now ask Mr. O’Connor to give us your testimony. 

Try to keep it to 5 minutes. We won’t be too tough on the clock, 

but we do have to move along. 

So, sir, welcome. Please, let’s hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN O’CONNOR, VICE PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF OF POLICE, AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION 

Mr. O’CONNOR. I’ll do my best, Senator. 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and thanks very much for the opportunity to testify. 

My name is John O’Connor. I am currently the Chief of Police 

of the Amtrak Police Department. I have over 37 years’ experience 

as a sworn police officer in the rail and mass transit environment, 

as both the Chief of Police for Amtrak, as well as for Long Island 

Railroad in my first career. 

I’m here today to discuss policing on surface transportation systems and the critical task we are facing in combating terrorism. 

The Administration has been studying this matter and has just released its Surface Transportation Priority Assessment Report. We 

are in broad agreement with many of the recommendations it contains, such as the allocation of resources to address likely threats, 

information sharing, and the need to fund a multiyear security 

grant programs. 

The need for focus, though, is critical, because, while terrorists 

can employ many tactics, attacks on surface transportation usually 

take three forms: the use of an improvised explosive device, or IED, 

on a train; the use of an IED in a station; or the new emerging 

threat of an active shooter scenario. Those are the three threats 

that I think we need to focus on in surface transportation. 

37 

The pattern is unmistakable. IEDs were used to attack trains in 

Madrid in 2004; London, 2005; Mumbai, 2006; Moscow on several 

occasions, including last month, to name a few. Active shooters also 

attacked a station in Mumbai in 2008. And according to the Mineta 

Transportation Institute, since January of 2007, there have been 

284 attacks against surface transportation; of those, 130 were 

against rail. 

There’s obviously a range of threats, and our approach to them 

can range from ‘‘do nothing and hope for the best’’ to ‘‘spread your 

resources and attempt to respond to every possible threat, at the 

risk of underpreparing for the most probable threats.’’ 

We must identify the most likely threats, assess the likelihood 

and consequences, and focus our efforts on defending against those 

identified threats. We are working closely with countries around 

the world to share information and experience. 

I recently traveled to Mumbai as part of a State Department initiative to exchange information and collaborate on strategy with Indian rail officials. Amtrak has become the first American rail police 

department to become an associate member of RAILPOL, a European organization of rail and transit police agencies cooperating to 

share intelligence, coordinate activities, and improve counterterror 

capabilities. These experiences have helped us understand the need 

for closer collaboration on all levels of government and among surface transportation agencies. 

Today, the Amtrak Police Department is reorganizing to address 

these concerns. We have undertaken a number of initiatives to address these likely attacks. First and foremost is the expansion of 

our canine program. We have a poster here that depicts that. We 

have expanded our program from 20 canines to more than 45 

teams, 10 of which have the capability of detecting suicide bombers. We’ve instituted random baggage screening, started in 2008, 

fashioned after the program started by the New York Police Department. We’ve had great collaboration with the TSA, including 

the deployment of VIPRs since the year 2007. And this year, as 

mentioned by a previous panel, we began joint screenings with TSA 

agents on Amtrak. 

We are also heavily involved in DHS and ARRA grants, in our 

corporate security division, protecting our infrastructure. One of 

our biggest efforts is to form law enforcement partners. And the 

poster, there, depicts one of our operation alerts, where we have organized more than 150 police agencies, between Virginia and 

Maine, to deploy on a single day. 

Earlier there was a question, ‘‘Can we respond in the event of an 

attack?’’ These types of exercises allow us to very quickly deploy 

not only our assets, but assets up and down a major area of the 

country. 

Two more items are employee training and public outreach— 

we’ve invested heavily in that; and intelligence coordination. We 

have several members assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

around the country. 

I’ll be happy to elaborate on these initiatives during the questionand-answer period. 

As Amtrak has more than 500 stations in 46 States, we face 

great challenges, with limited resources. Consequently, we are enVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
38 

thusiastic about programs that help us to bring more people, technology, and animals to bear on the task of keeping our systems secure. We are also working to improve cooperation with transit and 

commuter agencies, many of which share our facilities, to close the 

gaps that we see in coverage where systems meet. While we are 

definitely concerned about the whole spectrum of threats, we will 

continue to devote the bulk of our efforts to defending against the 

most likely and dangerous forms of attack. In future budgets, we 

will submit funding requests that will detail our needs, in that regard. 

The security of our system is our top priority, and Amtrak looks 

forward to working with the Committee in the coming months to 

make sure that we have the resources, the people, and the intelligence to keep our system safe and secure. 

Thank you once again for the opportunity to be here today, and 

I will be glad to answer any questions the Committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Connor follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN O’CONNOR, VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF POLICE, AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT, NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thanks very much for the opportunity to testify. My name is John O’Connor, and I am currently Vice President and Chief of 

the Amtrak Police Department; we have a total of 416 sworn officers. I have over 

thirty-seven years experience as a sworn police officer in the rail and mass transit 

environment. I joined Amtrak in 1998 after 25 years with the Long Island Rail 

Road, where I rose from Patrolman to Chief of Police. 

I’m here today to discuss policing and security on surface transportation systems 

and the critical task we are facing in combating terrorism. The Administration has 

been studying this matter and has just released its ‘‘Surface Transportation Priority 

Assessment Report.’’ We at Amtrak are in broad agreement with many of the overarching recommendations it contains, particularly those that deal with the allocation of resources to address likely threats, information sharing, and the need to fund 

a multi-year, multi-phase transportation security grant program. These are some of 

the major issues we have been dealing with as we work to identify likely threats 

and direct resources to meet them. While terrorists can employ many tactics, overwhelming historical evidence indicates that terrorist attacks on surface transportation will likely occur in three (3) forms: 

• Use of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on a train 

• Use of an IED in a station 

• Emerging threat of an active shooter 

The reasons are simple and clear. Surface transportation systems are open and 

densely packed with people. These systems are a big part of people’s daily routine. 

The whole point of terror is shock, and nothing produces shock like unexpected and 

horrifying attacks. The pattern is unmistakable. IEDs were used to attack trains in 

Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, Mumbai in 2006, and Moscow on several occasions, 

including last month, to name a few. Active shooters attacked a station in Mumbai 

in 2008, in each case with tremendous loss of life. And these are just the attacks 

that made the front page—there are an astonishing number of attacks on rail transit systems going on around the world. The Mineta Transportation Institute, which 

tracks attacks on public transportation worldwide, states it added 88 attacks per 

month to its database between November 2009 and February 2010. Obviously, some 

attacks are failures, such as the fizzled July 21, 2005 bombing attempt on the London Underground, and the numbers may also be slightly inflated by delays in reporting. But they are nevertheless an illustration of how attractive a target public 

transportation has become. Explosives are clearly the preferred tactic. Of the total 

attacks on public surface transport, 74 percent were either explosive or incendiary 

in nature; when passenger rail was the target, the number jumps to 83 percent. 

There’s a wide range of possible threats, obviously, ranging from cyber attacks up 

to the ultimate and scarcely imaginable possibility of nuclear terrorism. Our approach to these can range from ‘‘do nothing and hope for the best’’ to ‘‘spread your 

resources in an attempt to respond to every possible threat, at the risk of underpreVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
39 

paring for the most probable threats.’’ Amtrak’s position is that we must identify 

the most likely threats, assess the likelihood and possible consequences of an attack, 

and focus our efforts on defeating or deterring the most dangerous and likely terror 

tactics. We are working closely with countries around the world in the hopes that 

we can share information and learn from their experiences. I recently traveled to 

Mumbai as part of a State Department initiative to exchange information with Indian Rail Officials and to collaborate on mutually beneficial counter-terror strategies 

and efforts. Amtrak has become the first American rail police department to become 

an associate member of RAILPOL, a European organization of rail and transit security agencies cooperating to share intelligence, coordinate activities and improve 

counter-terror capabilities. Structured like INTERPOL, this group embodies the 

type of multi-national surface transportation efforts needed to address the terrorist 

threat globally. These experiences have helped us to better understand the role and 

needs of surface transportation police and security and the need for more collaboration at all levels of government. 

Today, the Amtrak Police Department is reorganizing to address these concerns. 

We have undertaken a number of measures designed to eliminate redundancy within the police and security functions and ensure our security needs are well represented at the top level of Amtrak. We have merged the two groups that were formerly responsible for security to eliminate some duplication of functions and allow 

better use of manpower and assets. Those two groups were OSSSO and APD, now 

simply APD. The Department has shifted its primary mission of customer-oriented 

policing to a blend of customer-oriented policing and robust counter-terrorism efforts. We have taken several steps to align our force to our new strategy, keeping 

in mind that we are operating in 46 states on a system that is very open. These 

steps fall into four specific categories of effort that we are now undertaking. 

1. Growth of the Explosive Canine Detection Program 

I am proud to say that Amtrak has more than doubled the size of bomb-detecting 

canine teams in the last few years. Canine assets are still one of the most accurate 

and useful tools for detecting and deterring explosive devices before they can be introduced on surface transportation systems. In 2005, the Department had about 20 

canine teams, many of which were not trained to detect explosives. Today, there are 

45 canine teams that are single-purpose dogs whose mission is bomb detection. Several of these teams are also ‘‘vapor wake’’ trained and can actually detect the presence of fumes left after someone passes through with an explosive device. Amtrak 

has moved to the forefront of the field with use of this canine application and continues to work to build this counter-terror capability. 

2. Security Inspection Program 

In 2008, Amtrak began a random baggage screening program similar to one pioneered by the NYPD. Using technology, screening teams deploy in an unpredictable 

fashion designed to make it harder for a terrorist to predict the level of security. 

To date, Amtrak has conducted hundreds of passenger screening operations during 

which thousand of trains were screened, resulting in tens of thousands of passengers being randomly selected for screening. Though an American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act/Transportation Security Grant program (ARRA/TSGP) grant, Amtrak is expanding this screening program by adding three additional screening 

teams in the NEC and Intercity areas. 

3. Collaboration with TSA 

To address the chief terrorist threats, Amtrak has improved its working relationship with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Beginning in December, 2007, Amtrak and TSA started joint deployments with TSA’s ‘‘Visible Intermodal Protection and Response’’ (VIPR) team program, which was developed to augment the integral security operations of various transportation modes, such as the 

Amtrak Police or transit security. These provide a visible uniformed presence and 

can help dedicated law enforcement to deter or detect suspicious activity, and they 

provide the traveling public with a reassuring police presence. VIPR teams can include various useful capabilities, including air marshals, officers specially trained in 

behavior detection, and explosive detection. Included in the latter category are 

bomb-sniffing dogs, which are an important component of the overall security effort. 

Our first VIPR exercise was held with the TSA at the Amtrak station in El Paso, 

Texas. These operations have basically involved the unannounced ‘‘surge’’ of TSA 

personnel onto Amtrak trains and stations at various points, and are designed to 

test the ability of TSA to flex support to surface transportation. A total of 328 VIPR 

operations have been held at various locations on the 21,100 mile Amtrak system, 

approximately 42 percent of them at stations off the Northeast Corridor. 

40 

In October, 2009, Amtrak requested that TSA expand the VIPR program to include a joint screening program with TSA, using additional TSA assets, including 

Bomb Appraisal Officers, Behavior Screening Officers and Surface Transportation 

Security Inspectors to augment our screening forces. We are very interested in expanding our partnerships and joint activities with other transit and Federal law enforcement agencies, and we are hopeful that we will be able to obtain the resources 

we need to build the effective partnerships we will need to reduce gaps in our security coverage. 

4. Corporate Security 

Amtrak has leveraged the Transit Security Grant and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) grant programs to improve protection for passengers, employees, and critical infrastructure. We will never stop assessing Amtrak’s 

vulnerabilities. These build upon an earlier risk assessment performed for Amtrak 

and will be closely focused on addressing these individual vulnerabilities. Use of 

ARRA funds to install fences, close circuit TV and other security improvements is 

directly tied to Amtrak’s commitment to let our risk assessments drive security investment. The majority of our ARRA funding efforts are being used to protect infrastructure we have identified as critical through vulnerability assessments designed 

to identify and implement risk reduction strategies. The security program is managed in part by Station Action Team personnel. They work closely with the Operations Department to ensure Amtrak security and emergency response policies are 

followed and coordinated as part of a larger risk reduction strategy that incorporates recovery and continuity of operations processes. 

Amtrak employees and passengers will continue to be a key piece of our security 

strategy. They are very valuable sources of information that can ‘‘cue’’ the law enforcement system. Amtrak also benefits from the services and operational knowledge of upwards of 19,000 people who work on the railroad, and the hundreds of 

millions of passengers who pass through our stations and over our tracks are also 

capable of noticing when something’s not right, and reporting it to us so we can investigate it. We have seen plenty of examples where the vigilance and courage of 

citizens have helped prevent or thwart an incident in recent years, and we are doing 

everything we can to make sure they know who to contact if they see something 

suspicious—and that those employees know what to do once the matter has been 

brought to their attention. Over the past few years, the Station Action Teams and 

Regional Security Coordinating Committees have involved our station staffs in the 

security planning process. This integration has improved coordination and raised 

employee awareness of potential security threats. We have trained and continue to 

train our police officers in Behavior Assessment Security Screening (BASS) to teach 

them to recognize the behaviors that might signal an imminent attack, and frontline employees have been provided with a non-law enforcement version, to improve 

their awareness and maximize their value as intelligence resources. 

As Amtrak has more than 500 stations, we are always resource-constrained. Consequently, we are enthusiastic about programs that help us to bring more people, 

technology, and animals to bear on the task of keeping our stations and trains secure. We are also working to extend and improve our cooperation with transit and 

commuter agencies, many of which share our facilities, to get rid of the gaps in coverage where systems meet. This is another crucial area because intermodal systems 

can create gaps for potential points of entry—and once you’re on a rail or transit 

system, it tends by its very nature to carry an attacker to a point where people are 

most concentrated and vulnerability is at its highest. TSA is aware of the need for 

cooperation and coordination among all rail and transit stakeholders but this is an 

area where continued improvement is the paramount need, because our opponents 

know how to exploit gaps—and they only need to get lucky once. 

We are devoting our efforts to making it harder and harder for terrorists to use 

their preferred strategies to attack our stations, trains, and passengers. We will continue to devote the bulk of our efforts to defending against and deterring the most 

likely and dangerous forms of attack, which will continue to be IEDs and active 

shooters. We are, however, definitely concerned about the whole spectrum of cyber, 

chemical, biological and radiological threats, and we will continue to work with the 

Federal Government to defend against them. We hope to obtain additional funding 

to expand aggressively our efforts to defend our system against the most probable 

and devastating methods of attack, and we will work with DHS, TSA and the Committee to identify other potential funding sources. In future budgets, we will submit 

funding requests that will detail our needs; we expect to fund the necessary programs out of our FY 2011 budget. The security of our system is our top priority, 

and I look forward to working with the Committee in the coming months to make 

41 

sure that we have the resources, the people, and the intelligence we need to keep 

our system safe and secure. 


421OCON1.eps 421OCON2.eps
42 


421OCON3.eps
43 


421OCON4.eps
44 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

And Mr. Elliott? 

STATEMENT OF HOWARD R. ‘‘SKIP’’ ELLIOTT, 

VICE PRESIDENT—PUBLIC SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT, 

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Good afternoon, Senator Lautenberg. 

My name is Skip Elliott. I have been a railroader for 33 years, 

and currently I serve as Vice President of Public Safety and Environment for CSX Transportation. 

In my role at CSX, I am responsible for the environment, hazard 

material transportation safety, our railroad police, homeland security, and industrial hygiene programs. I am pleased to be here before the Committee today, testifying on behalf of CSX and the Association of American Railroads, on the freight rail industry’s effort 

to enhance rail security. 


421OCON5.eps
45 

I have submitted my full statement to the Committee, and I 

would like to make a few brief comments. 

CSX and the rail industry remain deeply committed to rail security. We recognize that the security environment in this country 

has changed dramatically in recent years. There are new threats 

that demand new ways of thinking about our freight and passenger 

rail security and safety. 

Immediately after September 11, 2001, and well before the focus 

on rail security by TSA, our industry moved rapidly to address the 

new threat environment. The significant and proactive measures 

CSX and the industry undertook immediately after 9/11, is welldocumented and we have responded to the new security paradigm 

in a post-9/11 world. 

CSX recognizes the role of TSA and the actions the Federal Government has taken to enhance freight rail security. Within the Federal Government, DHS and DOT share responsibility for securing 

the freight rail system. With great thanks to this committee’s leadership, the Federal Government has enacted comprehensive legislation and extensive formal regulations aimed at strengthening 

freight rail security. CSX fully supports the goals of these regulations and is committed to full compliance. 

In the last 7 years, there have been no less than nine sets of regulations and guidelines that the freight railroads have been required to implement to enhance security. Beginning in 2003, DOT 

issued regulations requiring employee training and security plans. 

This was followed soon after by standards issued by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol to enhance security at railroad international border crossings and a U.S. Coast Guard security regulation at locations where we have port operations. Not long after, two 

sets of security action items for railroads were issued by TSA, as 

were additional U.S. Coast Guard rules requiring transportation 

worker identification credentials for those railroad employees who 

work in regulated maritime facilities. 

This was followed next by TSA regulations requiring robust 

chain-of-custody measures for toxic inhalation hazards and a separate DOT rulemaking requiring that railroads conduct a comprehensive route analysis for toxic inhalation hazards, using 27 

safety and security factors. 

Finally, DOT introduced a regulation last year providing standards for tank cars used to transport toxic inhalation hazards, to 

help improve their survivability due to an accidental or nonaccidental event. We also anticipate receiving several new regulations 

currently being written by TSA and DOT, such as one that will 

provide further guidance for employee security training. 

It is important to underscore the significance of these regulations 

and that the freight rail industry is fully complying with them. 

However, what we are most proud of is that they were built on a 

foundation of the immediate, comprehensive, proactive, and voluntary security measures taken by the railroads after the attacks 

of September 11. 

But, we don’t believe what we did proactively after September 

11, or that complying with current and future regulations, is necessarily enough. 

46 

At CSX, we maintain a steadfast commitment to the safety and 

security of our operations and the communities in which we operate. CSX’s security challenge extends to 21,000 miles of track in 23 

states and the District of Columbia. The network crosses 700 counties and 13,000 local jurisdictions. CSX believes that partnerships 

and close coordination of security concerns is essential to enhancing public safety and benefits the communities we serve, our employees, and our operations. 

The cornerstone of CSX’s public/private partnership is our highly 

specialized, secure network operation workstation, called 

SecureNOW, which we share with Federal and state homeland security officials. Developed by CSX, the SecureNOW system allows 

security officials to promptly identify the location and status of 

CSX trains and railcars on our 23-state network. SecureNOW’s— 

allow public agency officials to independently track the location of 

CSX trains, and to identify the contents of railcars in those trains, 

in a nearly real-time environment. Both the USDOT Crisis Management Center, located just a short distance from here, and the 

TSA Freedom Center have and are using this CSX-provided technology. We have similar partnerships at a number of State Homeland Security Fusion Centers. One in particular, in your state, New 

Jersey, has proven to be a very good example of what a long-term 

productive public/private partnership should be. 

In conclusion, CSX and the freight rail industry recognize the 

complexity of challenges faced by both the government and American business in ensuring the safe and secure movement of people 

and products in a post-9/11 world. We also recognize that government responsibility, first and foremost, is to protect the public. Yet 

it is also important that DHS react to the new security environment with sound regulatory policies that do not impede the free 

flow of commerce. 

To help achieve that outcome, we recommend meaningful coordination among regulators; improved communications between railroads and regulators, especially in areas such as intelligence sharing; and stronger collaboration, maximizing government use of railroad expertise. These are consistent with the 20 recommendations 

made recently by the Administration in its surface transportation 

security priority assessment. 

CSX recognizes that the freight rail and national security environment in which it operates is continually changing. As such, 

safety and security are, and will remain, our top priority. CSX and 

the industry look forward to working with DHS to develop sound 

security policy and practices that are coordinated, flexible, and that 

ensure the continued efficient and effective flow of goods. We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on this important 

topic. We also greatly appreciate the good work and guidance of 

this committee, and your role in improving freight rail security. 

Thank you, Senator. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Elliott follows:] 

47 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HOWARD R. ‘‘SKIP’’ ELLIOTT, VICE PRESIDENT—PUBLIC

SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT, CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. 

Introduction 

On behalf of CSX Transportation, Inc. (‘‘CSXT’’) and the Association of American 

Railroads (‘‘AAR’’), thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Freight Rail Industry’s (the ‘‘Industry’’) efforts to enhance rail security. 

CSXT and the Industry are deeply committed to rail security. We recognize that 

the security environment in this country has changed dramatically in recent years— 

there are new threats that demand new security considerations, and a new way of 

thinking about freight rail safety and security. Immediately after September 11, 

2001, and well before the creation of TSA, the Industry moved rapidly to address 

the new threat environment. It is well documented what actions CSXT and the Industry have voluntarily taken and how we have taken the initiative to respond to 

the new security paradigm in a post-9/11 world. And much has been done since the 

initial rail efforts after September 11 in 2001. Industry security plans, a Surface 

Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center, an AAR Operations Center feeding information to an industry Rail Alert Network, annual desktop exercises, 

and the E-Rail Safe contractor credentialing program—all are voluntary industry 

initiatives that have enhanced the security of the Nation’s rail network. 

Compliance with Government Regulations and Action Items 

CSXT recognizes the Transportation Security Administration’s (‘‘TSA’’) role and 

the actions the Federal Government has taken to enhance freight rail security since 

2001. Within the Federal Government, DHS and DOT share responsibility for securing the freight rail system. Prior to September 11, 2001, the Department of Transportation (‘‘DOT’’) was the primary Federal agency responsible for regulating freight 

rail transportation. With the creation of TSA in November 2001 and TSA’s Freight 

Rail Security Program in 2003, the DOT, Department of Homeland Security 

(‘‘DHS’’), and TSA have worked diligently to identify freight rail security needs and 

coordinate various efforts to enhance freight rail security. Specifically, DOT, DHS, 

and TSA have enacted extensive formal regulations aimed at strengthening freight 

rail security. CSXT fully supports the goals of these regulations and is committed 

to full compliance. 

Formal Federal agency reaction to freight rail security risks inherent in the post9/11 world began as a cooperative and collaborative effort between the government 

and the Industry. Immediately after September 11, 2001, and before the creation 

of TSA, the Industry, in consultation with security experts and Federal agencies, 

implemented a rail security plan which included network-wide risk assessments and 

asset specific countermeasures, with each railroad implementing over 50 countermeasures, based on people, process, and technology. This concept of escalating alert 

levels, borrowed from U.S. Military Defense Condition (DefCon) protocols, is also 

used by TSA today. 

Experience with the voluntary plans of the largest railroads led to adoption of formal requirements for all railroads. In September 2003, the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

(‘‘PHMSA’’) issued rules requiring any railroad that handles hazardous materials to 

adopt a security plan and engage in training of its hazardous material employees. 

PHMSA’s security planning rules require railroads to develop and implement security plans that address security risks and vulnerabilities related to the transportation of hazardous materials. 

PHMSA’s security planning rules require railroads to develop and implement a 

security plan based on an assessment of possible transportation security risks. The 

plan must address personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security. 

The security plan must be based on an assessment of possible transportation security risks and must include at a minimum, an assessment of possible transportation 

security risks and appropriate measures identified by risk assessments. All security 

plans are required to be in writing, updated as necessary to reflect changing circumstances and must be retained for as long as the plan remains in effect. 

PHMSA also issued rules that require security awareness training for hazardous 

materials employees. Railroads must provide ‘‘in-depth’’ security training and ‘‘security awareness’’ training to employees. In-depth security training must include security objectives, specific security procedures, employee responsibilities, actions to take 

in the event of a security breach, and the organizational security structure. Security 

awareness training requires that each employee receive training that provides an 

awareness of security risks associated with the transportation of hazardous materials and methods designed to enhance transportation security, including how to recognize and respond to possible security threats. 

48 

For CSXT, compliance with these rules was relatively straightforward. With a 

comprehensive security plan that had been in place for several years, we reviewed 

our existing plan in light of the regulations and made some modifications as needed 

to ensure that it met the new regulatory requirements. 

Also in 2003, CSXT began participating in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s voluntary C–TPAT (Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism) program. 

C–TPAT is a voluntary government-private sector partnership to strengthen and improve U.S. border security and the security of the international supply chain. C– 

TPAT increases security measures, practices and procedures throughout all sectors 

of the international supply chain. 

As a participating member of C–TPAT, this supply chain security program for 

international cargo is in place at CSXT’s U.S.-Canadian border crossing points. It 

requires adherence to a variety of security-related performance measures in order 

to achieve certification in the program. 

In 2003, CSXT also began working on compliance with United States Coast 

Guard’s regulations under the Maritime Security Act of 2002. These extensive rules 

require comprehensive port threat and vulnerability assessments, security plans 

and security measures. CSXT has facilities in Maryland, Ohio, and Florida that fall 

under these regulations, and that undergo regular inspection and evaluation by the 

U.S. Coast Guard to ensure compliance. 

In 2006, TSA and DOT began to give heightened attention to the transportation 

of certain ultra-hazardous commodities such as toxic inhalation hazard (‘‘TIH’’) materials. They began by developing twenty-four voluntary security action items in a 

series of consultative meetings between the rail industry, TSA and other interested 

Federal agencies. These voluntary security action items, adopted in June 2006, were 

to be followed as recommended best practices of rail carriers handling these particularly sensitive products. 

CSXT was a strong proponent of the cooperative process that led to the original 

set of guidelines, and continues to support voluntary cooperation. This original set 

of voluntary action items generally focused on three main areas: (i) system security, 

(ii) access control, and (iii) en-route security. 

On November 21, 2006, TSA issued further voluntary ‘‘action items’’ for the handling of TIH. TSA Supplemental Security Action Item Number 1 concerns the transportation of TIH and generally focuses on: (i) enhancing access control and security 

awareness for rail facilities in federally designated High-Threat Urban Areas 

(‘‘HTUAs’’), (ii) monitoring the movement of TIH cars in HTUAs to substantially reduce dwell and transit time, and (iii) eliminating unattended TIH cars in HTUAs. 

Unlike the first set of action items, these were adopted by TSA unilaterally and 

without further dialogue with the rail Industry. 

In January 2007, the USCG and TSA issued new regulations requiring that workers who enter regulated maritime facilities must obtain a Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential (‘‘TWIC’’). The TWIC requirement applies to railroad employees who enter and work for CSXT at any regulated maritime facility in the 

United States. Train and Engine crews, Mechanical and Maintenance of Way personnel, Railroad managers, Special Agents and any other railroad employee entering 

these covered maritime facilities must have a TWIC. 

On February 12, 2007, TSA again unilaterally issued further voluntary ‘‘action 

items’’ for the handling of TIH. TSA Supplemental Security Action Item Number 2 

provides further guidance on the recommended scope and procedures for voluntarily 

conducted background checks. 

Over time, TSA saw a need to move to a more formal interaction with the Industry over the transportation of certain ultra hazardous commodities such as TIH materials. These voluntary guidelines were gradually supplanted by progressively more 

active formal regulations. 

In November 2008, the TSA issued final regulations imposing new ‘‘chain of custody’’ obligations regarding the handling of TIH cars in interchanges, i.e., where one 

railroad transfers a TIH car to another railroad. The regulation required railroads 

to modify their routing operations to ensure that only attended interchanges are 

used for transporting TIH. This regulation also imposed similar requirements for 

the transfer of custody from shipper to railroad and from railroad to certain receivers at destination. 

When TSA issued its final Chain of Custody rules in November 2008, it initially 

gave the rail industry just 30 days to implement new interchange practices and to 

train tens of thousands of employees on the new requirements. CSXT as well as the 

Industry persuaded TSA to extend the compliance date to April 1, 2009, thus enabling the Industry to adapt its operations without conflict with the new regulations. 

CSXT and the Industry greatly appreciate TSA’s willingness to meet with us, disVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
49 

cuss the practical implementation challenges we faced, and to give the Industry 

time it needed to do the job properly. 

Additionally, TSA’s final rule required railroads to designate a rail security coordinator (‘‘RSC’’) and at least one alternate RSC to be available on a 24-hour, 7 days 

per week basis to serve as the primary contact for receipt of intelligence information 

and other security-related activities from TSA. The final rule also required Class I 

railroads to provide location and shipping information to TSA within 5 minutes of 

an inquiry if the request concerns only one car and within thirty minutes if the request concerns two or more rail cars. 

Also in November 2008, the DOT issued final rules requiring railroads to perform 

a safety and security risk analysis for routes used to transport certain hazardous 

materials and to select the safest and most secure routes, using a provided list of 

27 risk factors. Congress, through the good work and guidance of this committee, 

mandated this approach in 2007 in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/ 

11 Commission Act. 

The DOT routing regulation (adopted by PHMSA and enforced by FRA) represents a commendable effort to address the public’s routing concerns regarding the 

transportation of certain highly hazardous materials. DOT’s routing rule requires 

railroads to compile annual data on certain shipments of explosive, TIH, and radioactive materials for use in making routing decisions. Railroads must use this data 

to analyze safety and security risks along routes used to transport these materials, 

assess alternative routing options, and make routing decisions based upon those assessments. 

For the initial analysis, the government gave railroads the option of completing 

the initial route analysis by September 1, 2009, based on 6 months of data (from 

July to December 2008), or March 31, 2020, based on 12 months of data (full year 

2008). CSXT was one of the first railroads to complete the initial route analysis, on 

September 1, 2009, using the Rail Corridor Risk Management (‘‘RCRMS’’) tool, a 

Government-funded routing model. RCRMS is a statistical routing model that railroads may use to assist with compliance with the rule. The RCRMS model was developed by expert consultants with periodic reviews by a government executive oversight panel—officials from TSA, DOT, FRA, and PHMSA. Railroads are not required 

to use RCRMS and may choose other routing models for use in preparing their risk 

analyses. 

We recognize the importance of this regulation, but nonetheless, the route analysis requirement was a complicated and burdensome process. It imposed significant 

demands on CSXT management time and resources. While this is important and 

necessary work, we must keep in mind at all times that the traffic subject to the 

routing rule represents about one-half of one percent of CSXT’s total traffic base, 

and that these efforts are consuming—and will continue to consume—a disproportionate share of management resources. 

In January 2009, the DOT issued interim tank car standards that mandate commodity-specific improvements in the safety features and design standards for tank 

cars transporting TIH materials. These interim standards were adopted to improve 

the accident survivability of TIH tank cars. At the same time, the DOT imposed 

speed restrictions on trains carrying even a single carload of TIH materials. 

Voluntary Actions 

CSXT appreciates the freight rail security guidance in the form of regulations 

from DHS, but we are still an Industry (and a railroad) that does act proactively 

and voluntarily to improve the safety and security of the rail network. 

At CSXT, ‘‘Safety is a Way of Life’’ and we maintain a steadfast commitment to 

the safety and security of our operations and the communities in which we operate. 

CSXT’s security challenge extends to 21,000 miles of track in 23 states and the District of Columbia. This network crosses 700 counties and 13,000 local jurisdictions. 

CSXT believes that partnerships and close coordination of security concerns is essential to enhancing public safety and benefits the communities we serve, our employees, and our operations. We work closely with the Industry and with Federal, 

state and local officials, on improving the safety and security of rail transportation 

to help keep our employees, our communities, and our customers’ employees safe. 

As part of this effort, CSXT has established public-private partnerships to provide 

Federal and state homeland security officials valuable, current information they can 

use to protect the communities they serve. Formalized partnerships allow CSXT, 

state officials and first responders to effectively and seamlessly share information 

and work side-by-side protecting the communities we serve and our employees. 

At CSXT, we believe that public-private partnerships offer the best route to improving not only freight rail security but also national security. The cornerstone of 

CSXT’s public-private partnerships is sharing our highly-specialized secure Network 

50 

Operations Workstation (‘‘SecureNOW’’) with Federal and state homeland security 

officials. The SecureNOW system is a proprietary, secure online computer tool used 

to monitor, identify and respond to rail-security and emergency issues throughout 

the CSXT network. This system, developed by CSXT, provides CSXT employees and 

trained state homeland security and public agency officials with a tool to promptly 

identify the location and status of CSXT trains and rail cars on our network. 

SecureNOW allows trained security and public agency officials in several states to 

independently track the location of CSXT trains and the contents of the rail cars 

in those trains in a nearly real-time environment. Before, officials needed to telephone CSXT to access this information. 

CSXT’s SecureNOW system and our approach to information sharing helps homeland security officials prepare for and—if needed—respond to emergency situations. 

Access to SecureNOW also provides state and Federal officials with additional information about what is carried on our rails, and state officials can more efficiently 

allocate law enforcement resources, coordinate with CSXT security officials, and integrate rail security into on-going law enforcement operations. 

In fact, CSXT has entered into partnerships with two Federal entities—the TSA 

Freedom Center (TSOC) and the DOT Crisis Management Center. This allows 

trained Federal homeland security officials to have nearly real time information regarding the location of CSXT trains and the contents of the rail cars transported 

on our lines. In addition to these Federal partnerships, CSXT also has partnerships 

for access to SecureNOW with New York, New Jersey, Kentucky, Maryland, Indiana, Ohio, Georgia, and Florida. These partnerships formalize and enhance CSXT’s 

ongoing commitment to these states and Federal agencies to share information, resources and strategies in order to better protect the communities in which CSXT 

operates. 

As part of CSXT’s ongoing commitment to enhancing rail security, CSXT is collaborating with the National Alliance for Public Safety GIS, in the development of 

a GIS tool for sharing data to enhance decision support for the prevention, mitigation, and response to emergencies. The GIS tool includes CSXT’s comprehensive rail 

yard emergency response schematics, and detailed mapping of the rail lines connecting our yards. This project, when completed, will be directly accessible by emergency responders and will provide the location of known hazards in CSXT rail yards 

as well as identify access points onto CSXT property. 

Additionally, CSXT is dedicated to educating communities and first responders 

about rail emergency response programs. We provide communities and emergency 

responders with the information and training necessary to address a rail-related 

emergency. Each year we conduct a tremendous amount of training and coordination with local first responders and security officials. We regularly provide first responders hazardous material incident-response training by our hazardous materials 

team. The training consists of classroom training, table top exercises, and handson training using the CSXT safety train. These training sessions familiarize first responders with the commodities moved by rail, the containers used, how to locate 

contact information and carry out appropriate response procedures. This training 

has been very well received by first responder agencies and we continue to build 

on this collaborative effort. 

One outstanding example of the Industry’s effort to enhance training for emergency responders is witnessed by the AAR’s Transportation Technology Center located in Pueblo, Colorado, receiving Congressional authorization to become a member of The National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (‘‘NDCP’’). The NDCP includes eight other nationally recognized organizations that address the counter-terrorism preparedness and training needs of our Nation’s emergency responders. At 

TTCI, emergency first responders receive comprehensive and realistic training on 

surface transportation security and emergency response. 

CSXT, like all the Class I railroads, regularly provides first response agencies in 

every jurisdiction where we operate with a Community Awareness Emergency Planning Guide, which, for training and planning purposes, provides a list of the top 25 

hazardous commodities shipped by rail in North America as well as a list of the top 

25 shipped by CSXT. Upon request, we provide local first responders with a density 

study that details the top hazardous commodities for a specific community, and provides responders with the necessary information to plan for a commodity-specific 

and community-specific response. 

CSXT also works cooperatively with local first responders to familiarize them with 

CSXT facilities and our operations. CSXT has a long standing practice of inviting 

local responders into rail yards and facilities so they may become familiar with onsite safety considerations. The benefit of this open door policy is two fold. First, responders are better equipped to safely and effectively aid CSXT in the event of a 

rail-related incident or other emergency on rail property. Second, this practice alVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
51 

lows local law enforcement officers to become familiar with rail property so that 

CSXT’s police force and local law enforcement officials can coordinate on issues like 

rail crime, sabotage, and trespasser mitigation efforts. 

CSXT is proud to offer industry-leading training programs to local first responders 

and emergency personnel in the communities we serve. But CSXT’s training efforts 

do not stop here. CSXT also provides rail safety training to Short Lines. Our goal 

is to expand the sophistication of Short Line managers on important rail transportation safety issues. CSXT’s safety training includes environmental regulations and 

compliance, waste management, hazmat awareness and response, security planning 

and train accident prevention. CSXT provides annual updates and makes CSXT 

project managers and the CSXT Public Safety Coordination Center hotline (1–800– 

232–0144) available to Short Lines to help them with issues on an ongoing basis. 

Employee communication is central to CSXT’s philosophy. We continue to have 

dialogue with labor union representatives on security training and employee perspectives on rail security issues. CSXT and the Industry are taking the initiative 

to engage labor on several different fronts. As recently as last week, CSXT and 

other Industry representatives met with the Teamsters Rail Conference on overall 

railroad security. 

However, our actions cannot be solely focused on freight rail security. Given the 

information we have received from Federal intelligence sources, we believe that the 

greatest terrorist threat to CSXT comes from the approximately 8 million passenger 

and commuter train miles each year that operate on CSXT-owned rail lines. To that 

end, we work closely with the agencies entrusted to carry passengers on our lines 

to protect the 19 million riders on those trains. In 2007, CSXT developed a series 

of 149 safe havens for Amtrak trains operating on CSXT-owned rail lines. These 

safe havens allow for pre-identified and coordinated locations, approximately 25 to 

30 miles apart, where during a time of increased terrorist concern or an actual attack, we can safely bring Amtrak trains to a stop in order to evacuate or tend to 

passengers needs. In 2009, we added safe havens for our commuter partners—VRE, 

MARC, Tri Rail, and MBTA. Emergency responders at all safe haven location received information and training to assist in their important role should we have to 

activate our safe haven plan. 

CSXT also recognizes the vital role that freight railroad police play in enhancing 

freight rail and national security. CSXT, like all Class I railroads, has its own police 

force with commissioned railroad police officers to maintain the safety and security 

of the public and the freight entrusted to the railroad. However, the CSXT police 

department is the only U.S. based freight railroad police department to be nationally accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies 

(‘‘CALEA’’). CSXT is proud of this accomplishment, as only approximately 10 percent of the police departments in the country have met the more than 450 required 

best practice standards to be awarded CALEA accreditation. 

Additionally, in 2004, CSXT’s police department developed and implemented a 

Rapid Response Team (‘‘RRT’’) that consists of a group of highly-skilled CSXT Police 

special agents specifically trained to respond to security incidents. The RRT is an 

interdisciplinary team that is composed of CSXT Police special agents. Among them 

are explosive-detection K–9 teams, counter-surveillance specialists, and tactical response specialists, Hazmat managers with paramedic and engineer qualifications, 

and a medical support element. 

The CSXT RRT is responsible for rail counter-terrorism to ensure that rail infrastructure does not become a target of domestic or foreign terrorists. RRT team members are positioned and equipped for a rapid response anywhere on the CSXT system. They are highly trained according to national and international guidelines, 

which makes the team the premier rail counter-terrorist experts in the industry. In 

fact, the RRT provides rail-specific anti-terrorism training to public agencies to support their mission and aid in response to railroad incidents and/or threats. 

In fact, since its inception in 2004, our CSX RRT has trained over 90 local, county, state, Federal and military law enforcement agencies and nearly 900 tactical police officers on how to respond to a terrorist attack to a railroad—both passenger 

and freight using a one-of-a-kind tactical training train (T3) that allows for realistic 

force-on-force training. 

Recommendations: Coordination, Collaboration, and Communication 

1. Coordination among regulators 

2. Communication between railroads and regulators (i.e., intelligence sharing) 

3. Collaboration (maximizing government use of railroad expertise) 

CSXT and the Industry recognize the complexity of challenges faced by both the 

government and American business in ensuring the safe and secure movement of 

people and products in a post-9/11 World. We also recognize that government reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
52 

sponsibility, first and foremost, is to protect the public. Yet, it is also important that 

DHS react to the new security environment with sound regulatory policies that do 

not impede the free flow of commerce. Open dialogue and collaboration with Industry stakeholders, including extensive and constructive discussions at the earliest 

stages, will ensure positive results with minimal impacts on our industrial economy. 

Grant programs are an important component of government-industry collaboration. Federal money to support private security efforts is an effective means by 

which government can leverage resources. In this regard, it is important to remember that the rail security grant program, as originally conceived, was intended to 

enhance freight rail security. As implemented, however, most of the available funding has gone to projects other than freight security infrastructure. The Class I railroads would urge the Committee to direct future grant programs precisely to freight 

rail infrastructure security projects. 

CSXT does not disagree with the importance of mandatory security regulations, 

but regulatory controls should be adopted only after meaningful coordination and 

collaboration. Most industries are more complicated than first meets the eye, and 

the rail industry is particularly so. By working with the Industry and fully understanding the implications of possible approaches to Federal policy, DHS would best 

be able to ensure that it minimizes the unintended consequences of new regulations 

and policies. Genuine, open communication between stakeholders and the government can not only lead to practical solutions; it can open the door to solutions that 

might not otherwise have been apparent. 

We urge DHS to make early, frequent consultation with all affected industries a 

hallmark of its security policymaking. Establishing a formal collaborative rulemaking process will give stakeholders the opportunity to be directly involved in improving rail transportation security and to develop mutually satisfactory rail security regulations and practices. It will ensure that final rules are well-conceived, consistent, and effective for Industry. This kind of coordination and consultation before 

decisions have been finalized, before agency direction has been determined, and before a notice of proposed rulemaking is published, can only improve the final product. True collaboration will ensure that we are taking maximum advantage of the 

best thinking in government and industry. 

Specifically, CSXT recommends that DHS adopt a process that gives all stakeholders the opportunity to have an open dialogue with TSA on rail security issues 

similar to the FRA’s Rail Safety Advisory Committees (‘‘RSAC’’). As the Committee 

may know, the RSAC is a formal advisory committee that provides advice and recommendations to the FRA on development of new safety regulations, revision of existing regulations, and non-regulatory options for improving railroad safety. The 

RSAC members consist of railroads, labor organizations, state associations, government agencies, and other key rail safety stakeholders. The RSAC gives stakeholders 

an opportunity to have an open dialogue on rail safety best practices, a forum to 

advise FRA on rail safety issues, and a process to identify reasonable solutions and 

regulatory options for enhancing rail safety. This process has proven effective in 

reaching consensus and limiting areas of disagreement. Importantly, the agency retains full responsibility and authority over the actual final rule adopted. The stakeholders contribute; the agency decides. 

Establishing an RSAC-like process would not impede DHS from issuing proposed 

rulemakings in a timely manner. Rather, CSXT believes that a formal process like 

this would: (1) expedite adoption of future final rules, (2) facilitate more effective 

compliance, and (3) provide Industry stakeholders with a better understanding of 

the agency’s expectations and its views on the scope of new rules. 

Conclusion 

CSXT recognizes that the freight rail and national security environment in which 

it operates is continually changing. As such, safety and security are, and will remain, our top priority. CSXT and the Industry look forward to working with DHS 

to develop sound security policy and practices that are coordinated, flexible, and 

that ensure the continued efficient and effective flow of goods. CSXT appreciates the 

opportunity to provide comments on this important topic. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

And now like to hear from Joseph Kelly, who’s the Acting Chief 

of New Jersey Transit Police. 

Mr. Kelly, welcome. 

53 

STATEMENT JOSEPH KELLY, ACTING CHIEF OF POLICE, 

NJ TRANSIT 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, and good afternoon, Senator Lautenberg. 

My name is Joseph Kelly, and I am the Acting Chief of Police 

for New Jersey Transit. 

New Jersey Transit is the Nation’s largest statewide public 

transportation system, operating in 3 states and providing nearly 

900,000 weekday trips on buses, light rail, and commuter rail. My 

police department is authorized for 244 officers, including 39 positions full-time to counter terrorism. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the other distinguished 

members of this committee for providing me the opportunity to testify today on the criticality of protecting our Nation’s passenger rail 

system. 

Let me first describe some of the counterterrorism strategies we 

have put in place since September 11, 2001. And then I will outline 

some of the challenges we face at New Jersey Transit, going forward. 

We acknowledge we cannot place a police officer on every corner. 

However, force multiplication is desperately needed to protect our 

passengers. To that end, we have focused our efforts on technology 

advancements, coordination, force augmentation, and education. 

New Jersey Transit has been active in installing surveillance 

cameras and deploying radiological and explosive detection systems. We’ve also added a variety of other equipment aimed at prevention, detection, and recovery of all hazards. Thanks to grant 

funding from the Transit Security Grant Program, the Urban Area 

Security Initiative, and State Homeland Security Grants, we have 

recently been able to add a continuity-of-operations vehicle capable 

of emergency response and sustained redundancy, satellite communications, interoperable communications, a variety of hazardous 

material response equipment, rescue and extrication equipment, 

radiological pagers and isotope identifiers, explosives trace detection machines. 

With respect to coordination, New Jersey Transit has created a 

crime analysis and intelligence unit. Our officers are assigned to 

the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force and the New Jersey State Police Fusion Center. Additionally, the department exchanges information with the Regional Transit Security Working Group and the 

Northeast Corridor Coalition. 

Our department also relies heavily on force augmentation. We 

are assisted with patrols of our stations and facilities by local law 

enforcement agencies. In addition, we run regular counterterror exercises with the New Jersey State Police, the New Jersey Office of 

Homeland Security and Preparedness, and our regional transportation partners, including the NYPD, as well as some of New Jersey’s rapid deployment teams. 

In terms of education, our transit employees have been trained 

in terrorism awareness, dating back to 2002. Our front-line employees have also received related courses and are targeted to receive 

behavioral assessment training through a Regional Transit Security Grant. Some employees are also receiving advanced training 

through our Citizens Police Academy. Our police officers receive 

counterterrorism training now as part of their basic police officer 

54 

training, and have also been trained in behavioral assessment. Police officers assigned to the counterterrorism function have also attended a variety of specialized courses, such as federally funded 

courses including the incident response to terrorist bombing and 

the strategic counterterrorism training for transit managers. 

We train our commuters through some nonconventional means, 

using uniformed police officers. Commuters and citizens alike are 

given information contain TIPS phone number, the type of information to report, and awareness of precursor terrorist activity. This 

information is distributed on counterterror deployments, such as 

our community outreach details. 

New Jersey Transit is in constant communication with our Federal partners. The two principal Federal repositories for counterterrorism-related information are the FBI, JTTF, and the Transit Security Operations Center, known as TSOC, operated by the TSA. 

The required reporting of both these entities sometimes can be 

problematic and duplicative. A preferable approach may be to rely 

on the Joint Terrorism Task Force to communicate with the TSOC 

after the JTTF makes a determination as how it wants to proceed 

on any given piece of information. 

Let me briefly touch on our budgetary challenges. As you know, 

the national economic downturn has had a dramatic effect on state 

and local revenue. A survey recently completed by the American 

Public Transportation Association found that 60 percent of APTA 

systems have already cut service or raised fares, and that 84 percent of public transportation systems will do so by the end of the 

year. 

New Jersey Transit recently approved a 22-percent increase to close a projected $300-million Fiscal Year 11 budget gap. In addition, we instituted a hiring freeze and are eliminating more than 

200 positions. With these local funding challenges, Federal operating support for security efforts has become even more critical. 

Since Fiscal Year 2007, New Jersey Transit has received much 

needed operating support for security efforts. The officers funded 

by these grants will be completely dedicated to counterterror, and 

will be a critical component to our prevention efforts. I urge the 

Committee to continue this support. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. And I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH KELLY, ACTING CHIEF OF POLICE, NJ TRANSIT 

Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Hutchinson and distinguished members 

of the Committee—my name is Joseph Kelly and I am the Acting Chief of Police 

of NJ TRANSIT. NJ TRANSIT is the Nation’s largest statewide public transportation system, operating in three states providing nearly 900,000 weekday trips on 

2000 buses, three light rail lines and 12 commuter rail lines. My department is authorized for 244 police officers, including 39 police positions full-time to counter-terrorism. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the other distinguished members of this 

committee for providing me the opportunity to testify today on the criticality of protecting our Nation’s passenger rail system. 

Let me first describe some of the counter-terrorism strategies we have put in 

place since September 11, including our close partnerships with Federal authorities. 

I will then outline some of the challenges we face at NJ TRANSIT going forward. 

We know that we cannot place a police officer on every corner of our system. However, force multipliers are desperately needed to protect our passengers. To that 

55 

end, we have focused our efforts on technology advancement, coordination, force 

augmentation and education. 

NJ TRANSIT has been very active installing security surveillance cameras and 

deploying radiological and explosives detection and protection systems. We have also 

added a variety of other equipment aimed at prevention, detection and recovery of 

all hazards. Thanks to grant funding from the Transit Security Grant Program, 

Urban Area Security Initiative Grants funding and State Homeland Security 

Grants, we have recently added: 

• A Continuity of Operation Vehicles capable of emergency response and sustained operational redundancy. 

• Satellite Communications (fixed and mobile). 

• Interoperable communications equipment including ICRI and MACOM gateway 

switch. The ‘‘ICRI’’ is a small, portable ‘‘switch’’ used to interconnect municipal 

public safety radios, state and Federal radios and telephone. 

• A variety of Hazardous Material response and investigative equipment. 

• Rescue and extrication equipment. 

• Radiological pagers and handheld isotope identifiers. 

• Explosive Trace Detection Machines capable of detecting both nitrate and peroxide based explosives. 

With respect to coordination, NJ TRANSIT has created a crime analysis and intelligence unit and we have implemented COMPSTAT aimed at information sharing 

and thorough investigation. NJ Transit Police officers are assigned to the FBI Joint 

Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the NJ State Police Regional Operations Intelligence Center. Additionally the department exchanges information with the Regional Transit Security Working Group and the Northeast Corridor Coalition. 

Through these partnerships, the NJ TRANSIT Police Department exchanges real 

time intelligence across the region and the Nation in a timely and efficient manner. 

Our Department also relies heavy on force augmentation. We are assisted with 

park, walk and talk patrols of our stations and facilities by municipal, county and 

state law enforcement agencies. In addition, we run regular counter terror exercises 

with the New Jersey State Police, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and 

Preparedness and our regional transportation partners (including the NYPD) and 

some of New Jersey’s county rapid deployment teams. 

In terms of education, we have offered counter-terrorism related training in three 

groups; transit employees, police officers, and the commuters and public. 

Our transit employees have been trained in terrorism awareness dating back to 

2002. Our front line employees have also received related courses and are all targeted to receive behavioral assessment training through a 2008 Regional Transit Security grant. Some employees also receive advanced training through our citizens 

police academy program. 

Our police officers receive counter-terror training now as part of their basic police 

training and have also been trained in behavioral assessment. Police officers assigned to counter-terror full time also attend a variety of specialized courses such 

as the federally funded Incident response to a terrorist bombing and the strategic 

counterterrorism training program for transit managers. 

We train our commuters through some non-conventional means using uniformed 

police officers in the field. Commuters and citizens alike are given information containing our TIPS telephone number, the type of information to report and the precursors of terror related activity. This information is distributed on counter-terror 

deployments such as community outreach details. 

As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, NJ TRANSIT is in constant communication with our Federal partners. The two principal Federal repositories for counterterrorism related information are the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and 

the Transit Security Operations Center, known as TSOC, operated by the TSA. The 

required reporting to both of these entities can be problematic and duplicative at 

times. For instance, a lead provided to the JTTF by NJ TRANSIT has the potential 

to be compromised by virtue of the reporting process of the Transit Security Operations Center, which shares this information via e-mail when suspicious activity is 

reported. A preferable approach may be to rely on the Joint Terrorism Task Force 

to communicate with the Transit Security Operations Center after the JTTF makes 

a determination as to how it wants to proceed on a given piece of information. 

Let me briefly touch on NJ TRANSIT’s budgetary challenges. As you know, the 

national economic downturn has had a dramatic effect on State and local revenue. 

A survey recently completed by the American Public Transportation Association 

(APTA) found that 60 percent of APTA systems have already cut service or raised 

56 

fares and that 84 percent of public transportation systems will do so by the end of 

the year. 

NJ TRANSIT recently approved a 22 percent fare increase to close a projected 

$300 million FY11 budget gap. In addition, we have instituted a hiring freeze and 

are eliminating more than 200 positions. With these local funding challenges, Federal operating support for security efforts has become even more critical. 

Since FY07, NJ TRANSIT has received much needed operating support for security efforts. The police officers funded by these grants will be completely dedicated 

to counter-terror and will be a critical component to out prevention efforts. I urge 

the Committee to continue this support. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to answering 

any questions you may have. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank each of you for your valuable testimony. 

I want to just get an idea of what communications you get from 

the Department of Homeland Security—after the recent subway attacks, for instance. 

And, Mr. Elliott, we include you in the rail discussion, even 

though we don’t say ‘‘freight.’’ But, the fact is, it’s a very important 

element of our total economic system. 

And so, the attack was there. Other attacks on passenger rail, 

mass transit systems throughout the world. What kind of actions 

did the Department of Homeland Security take to help you increase 

your level of security? 

Mr. O’CONNOR. Senator the day of the last attack, in Moscow, we 

did get a call from TSA. I and, actually, Chief Kelly are part of a 

group; it’s called a Peer Advisory Group. It’s about a dozen police 

chiefs from around the country that conference once a month to 

discuss security issues. But, that call came about 12 or 1 o’clock 

that day. Obviously, the attacks had occurred almost 12 hours earlier, and many of us had already gone through what we thought 

we had to, in terms of reassuring the public. 

So, while the—while it was commendable, on the TSA’s part, to 

get the group together and kind of share information on what we’re 

doing, I think it would have been more helpful if they were out a 

little bit quicker so that we could have had a common response to 

reassure the public. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Chief Kelly? 

Mr. KELLY. Senator, thank you for the question. I echo Chief 

O’Connor’s remarks, in that we do get information from the TSA, 

but normally it’s not as timely as it could be. I—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. How about the kind of communications 

you get, as well as the timing. 

Mr. KELLY. We receive briefings, generally—in addition to the 

phone call, briefings via e-mail on a daily basis. However, when it 

comes to attacks, such as Moscow or Mumbai or Madrid, we’re receiving in-depth briefings from our law enforcement partners in the 

region. And usually—I don’t want to speak for Chief O’Connor, but 

I get in-depth briefings from my detective assigned to the Joint 

Terrorism Task Force, in a very timely manner, telling us what 

we’re facing and what we need to do. 

Mr. O’CONNOR. Just to follow up on that, in the Zazi investigation I got a call directly from the head of the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force when those warrants were being executed that 

night. So, we knew, before it went public, you know, what was hapVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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pening and what the public might be alarmed about, and that gave 

us advance notice to prepare for that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. Mr. Elliott, do you have any comment 

to make on this connection? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes. I would, Senator. With over 8 million train 

miles of passenger and commuter operations on our private freight 

lines every year, we cannot disassociate ourself from the very real 

concern—security concern to passenger operations. I will tell you 

that, even though, from a freight railroad perspective, the relationship that we have with our passenger and commuter partners is 

admirable, including a longstanding relationship with Chief O’Connor, especially, in the Amtrak Police Department. I would like to 

echo his sentiment. I think the information we receive is adequate, 

but I don’t think it’s timely enough. I think one of the great things 

about the U.S. rail industry today is our ability to quickly respond 

to good intelligence. And if we don’t get that good intelligence in 

a timely basis, then we are not able to take the steps that we need 

to provide both freight rail infrastructure, as well as the passengers that might be riding on that portion of the rail. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Does TSA give any of you advice on new 

technological discoveries, new equipment, new ideas on protecting 

your responsibilities? I’m not just trying to get TSA in a vise here, 

but I’m interested in what each of you does, each and every day. 

You have enormous responsibility of life and limb, the economy, the 

functioning of our society. Is TSA a significant source for data and 

information on what you can do to improve your operation, without 

simply suggesting you get more resources, which I think also—— 

Mr. O’CONNOR. Through the years, Senator, we have partnered 

with TSA to experiment or run pilot programs on different technology, whether it be millimeter wave technology that they’re trying detect someone carrying a suicide vest on their body, radiological detectors, explosive trace detection. That’s one of the areas 

where DHS and TSA has been particularly helpful. I think they 

need to do more, you know, and I think that they have to, kind of, 

speed up getting some technology to us, in terms of cameras and 

face recognition and, you know, the ability to detect people who 

may be leaving things behind on trains and in stations. But, that’s 

one area where TSA has been helpful to Amtrak. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. There have been, thank goodness, no terrorist attacks on rail systems in our country. Attacks around the 

world have resulted in significant loss of life and system disruptions. The TSA only allocates about two percent of its budget for 

surface transportation security. How does—this structure, this 

prioritization by the Department affect you and your ability to 

meet your security needs? 

Mr. KELLY. Senator, while—it wouldn’t be fair to compare aviation to surface security. As I mentioned in my testimony, it’s 

never—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. You said—— 

Mr. KELLY.—been more—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG.—900,000 people board your trains every 

day? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. But, it’s an open system, as compared to a 

sterile environment. It has never been more critical than it is now, 

58 

with the budget constraints, I believe, that are pressing against 

most transit properties. We—we’ve received about $59 million in 

support through Federal grants since 2003. And it’s critical that 

that continues so that we can continue to provide the level of security that we do. 

Mr. O’CONNOR. Senator, several of the panelists previously testified that decisions like this should really be based upon risk. And 

clearly, I think the risk to surface transportation has become greater over the years. So, that, to me, would suggest that TSA and 

DHS should take a step back and see if their formula that they 

thought was the right one several years back is still the right one 

today. You know, it would appear to me, as you said earlier, with 

2 million to 35 million passengers at risk, the formula needs to be 

revisited. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But, also there are 45,000 people, thank 

goodness, inspecting baggage and passengers to make sure, as 

much as possible, that bad people don’t get on the airplane. On a 

comparative basis, however, because of the widespread use of that 

surface transportation, it’s—I’m not sure that there can be any 

comparison to that which is spent—87 percent of the budget is 

spent on aviation. And the question is, have we done enough—are 

we doing enough? 

Chief Kelly, I hear what you’re saying. I mean, we know that 

there are significant budget cuts in—New Jersey Transit and other 

facilities in the state, unfortunately. But, the question is, At what 

point do we impair our ability to provide the kind of security— 

that’s a rhetorical question, you don’t have to answer, because I 

know what your thoughts might be, even what your words might 

be different from—the fact of the matter is that these things could 

have consequences—that are unthinkable. 

I was a Commissioner of the Port Authority before I came to the 

Senate. And one of the first things I did was to go down in the Port 

Authority tube tunnel. I wanted to see what it was like. And I 

found things in unacceptable condition, fire doors locked and a electrical system that was so antiquated—one system is one series, another is a different kind of system. So, one system, if you lose a 

bulb, half of the system goes out, things of that nature. It was 

shocking. And they got on it in a hurry, but the inspection for these 

things is essential. I mean, security is not simply, as all of you 

know, a terrorist taking action against our citizens, but there are 

also other security measures—fire, et cetera, and the terrible thing 

we saw on 9/11 that—— 

So, what I’m trying to do is to make sure that there is an awareness by TSA that response time has to be far better than that 

which—and I’m not asking for your opinion, I want to spare you 

that, but I’m giving you mine, based on what we heard here at the 

table today. And the thing that we have to do is step up to our full 

responsibility. 

And I’m pleased to have you here with us. I appreciate the time 

that you’ve given. 

We will keep the record open, to see if any other questions occur 

that we might want to talk to you about. 

I want to ask Mr. Elliott a question. In 2007 CSX provided New 

Jersey’s regional operations, intelligence center with access to onVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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line systems that allow the center to track the location and contents of CSX trains in real time. You mentioned this. How has this 

partnership, do you think, improved rail security? And might it be 

replicated throughout the country? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, thank you, Senator Lautenberg, for the question. As you asked me the question, I think the example of the 

partnership that we have with the New Jersey State Department 

of Homeland Security is, again, an admirable one. Much is to the 

credit of then-Director of Homeland Security, Dick Canas. He is no 

longer in that position, but I give much of the credit for the success 

of that public-private partnership to his candor, his vision, and his 

frankness in wanting freight rail transportation to be an equal 

partner in helping to ensure the safety and security within the 

state. 

And what we did, through the technology that we provided, was 

actually provide transparency to the state homeland security group 

within New Jersey. That allowed them transparency. This is something that then-Director Canas was very interested in having, so 

he could go to the leadership in New Jersey, and he could honestly 

say—and you talked about that corridor, the chemical coast up in 

North Jersey. Senator, so he could honestly say that he knew 

where every train was on CSX, and where every hazardous-material car might be in that train. We provided him with that transparency. 

I think, in return, the Department of Homeland Security in New 

Jersey did some very positive things, unlike we have seen in any 

other state, in that they utilized some of their hard-to-get Federal 

DHS dollars and put that toward infrastructure protection of 

freight rail assets. And that is not something else that we have 

seen a model of. 

As you know, while we receive some Federal dollars, it is solely 

for training. We get no Federal funds to enhance any of our security assets. But, in the case of New Jersey, they found a way to 

work closely with their freight rail partner, CSX, to come up with 

a win-win scenario. And, again, this is something—both the technology and the transparency—that we try to provide and we have 

in place in eight states. And we are actually working with approximately four other states to provide the same technology. And you 

heard me mention that both the TSA Freedom Center, in Herndon, 

and the DOT Crisis Center, here in Washington, both have that 

technology. 

But, do I think it could be replicated? Yes. I think there is a need 

for—in the right hands, in the right secure hands—for security analysts and security officials to be able to have a better understanding where the Nation’s freight railroads are operating. And 

give them better information so they, in turn, can do their part to 

help protect us. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Do you talk to others in the freight business about security measures? Is there an interchange of information? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes. Through our trade association, the Association 

of American Railroads, there is a standing security committee. And 

there is regular interaction, regular dialogue on what we are doing 

throughout the industry to enhance security. 

60 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, each of you has a responsibility that 

overlaps with your neighbor across the table. And the exchange of 

information is critical, information about things that might be happening, but also about improving your communications, timing and 

efficiency. And I would ask you, please—you know how to get a 

hold of my office, and if you have any commentary that goes beyond the questions that we may submit for the record, we’d invite 

you to volunteer your views on any of the ideas that come your way 

as a result of your people being in the field. 

I wanted to check one thing with you, Mr. Kelly, before we finish. 

And I promise, this is the last, and I’ll let you go, and I’ll go. And 

that is, you talked about the complement that you have in your police department; 244—— 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG.—positions. And did you have to take some 

cuts in that now? 

Mr. KELLY. The police department lost no sworn positions, sir. 

We did—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. All right—— 

Mr. KELLY.—we did lose some positions in the police department, 

but none of them were police officers. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you all very much for being here. 

[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(61) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO HON. DAVID HEYMAN

Question 1. Can you please provide a status update, timeline, and plan of action 

for when each of the rules mandated in the Implementing the Recommendations of 

the 9/11 Commission Act related to comprehensive security training for rail, transit, 

and bus workers will be issued? 

Answer. TSA has combined three requirements in the ‘‘Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007’’ (9/11 Act) for security training 

rules into a single regulation. Sections 1408, 1517, and 1534 of the 9/11 Act require 

the Secretary to develop and issue regulations for training frontline employees of 

public transportation, railroad, and over-the-road-bus operators, respectively. The 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) is being developed, as required by the 9/ 

11 Act, in consultation with representatives of government and law enforcement experts, emergency responders, private sector operators, and labor organizations. TSA 

anticipates that the NPRM would be available for public comment in early calendar 

year 2011. 

Question 2. To what extent is each surface transportation mode applying, or 

adapting, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s threat, vulnerability, and 

consequence construct to their respective modes to produce comprehensive risk assessments and to rank assets or systems accordingly? Which modes have made the 

most progress in this effort? 

Answer. As described in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is a co-Sector Specific Agency (SSA) 

for the Transportation Sector along with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and TSA 

is responsible for developing and carrying out the provisions of the Sector Specific 

Plan (SSP) for Transportation Systems—including the modal annexes for the surface transportation modes. The USCG is a co-SSA for the Transportation Sector for 

the maritime mode of transportation. The Transportation Systems SSP addresses 

the applicability of the NIPP’s risk management framework construct to the Transportation Sector-Specific programs and how the sector has responded to the request 

to rank assets or systems accordingly. 

Specifically, several risk assessment tools have been developed and implemented 

in support of the sector risk management framework, to identify and address measures required to build resilience in all the modes of transportation. The sector developed a comprehensive methodology for conducting annual assessments of terrorismrelated risks across the sector. The Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment 

(TSSRA) was designed to provide data for modal and cross-modal risk analyses and 

enable the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop a baseline understanding of the risk landscape facing the sector. Similar methodologies such as the 

USCG’s Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM), and the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement in the mass transit mode have a more finite scope 

than TSSRA, but share the goal of helping to determine the individual mode’s most 

important risk considerations. 

The Highway and Motor Carrier Security Division in TSA has developed a risk 

based methodology to determine the most critical highway infrastructures and has 

begun conducting in-depth risk assessments of these structures. TSA provided the 

individual states with the methodology to determine that these structures and this 

information were forwarded by each state to TSA. Although results were not received from all states, TSA, working with the Army Corps of Engineers, has begun 

conducting assessments on the top 58 and anticipates completing approximately 25– 

30 by the end of 2010. At the National level, the Office of Infrastructure Protection, 

Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) is engaged in 

a systematic building of capability of transportation networks, system interdependencies, and consequence assessments through the National Infrastructure SimulaVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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tion and Analysis Center (NISAC) to assist with both risk assessment and consequence management during real world events. 

Additionally, the Highway and Motor Carrier Security Division in TSA has completed industry risk assessments on the school transportation industry and the 

trucking industry as required by the 9/11 Act. TSA is also completing industry risk 

assessments on the over-the-road bus industry, an overview of the states’ Departments of Transportation structures, and an overall assessment of the entire highway mode. 

Question 3. Given that the Surface Transportation Security Program is under supervision of the aviation-focused Federal Security Directors, what steps does TSA 

take to ensure that surface transportation security gets the appropriate level of priority? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration provides program oversight 

from headquarters to ensure work products at each location meet the frequency and 

quality mandated in the regulatory activities plan. In addition to oversight reports, 

six Regional Security Inspectors-Surface with extensive surface expertise are assigned to regions and conduct regular site visits to ensure standardization. Surface 

security training for all FSDs and AFSD-Is is ongoing to ensure they have the proper foundation to lead and manage the surface transportation security within their 

respective Area of Responsibility (AOR). 

Question 4. How does TSA ensure that those responsible for surface transportation security have the necessary level of expertise? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration has established experience 

requirements for transportation security inspectors. Those in lead or supervisory positions are required to have surface experience to provide stability to the surface 

program. Inspectors are assessed against these requirements throughout the interview, hiring, and promotion processes. 

Question 5. What is the status of TSA’s efforts to develop a national bridge strategy to supplement the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Annex to assist 

the stakeholder community in assessing both the criticality and the security 

vulnerabilities of its assets? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is moving ahead to: 

identify critical structures; conduct vulnerability assessments on those structures; 

identify and share with stakeholders appropriate structural and operational vulnerability mitigation steps and tools; identify and recommend contemporary technological mitigation products; and promote appropriate security elements in planning 

and funding stages of new or significantly modified critical highway structures. 

A National Strategy for Highway Bridge Security was developed in a multi-agency 

work group chaired by TSA and signed into policy by then-TSA Administrator Kip 

Hawley in 2008. It is currently under biennial review and possible update by the 

same work group. Participants in that group included TSA, the DHS Offices of Policy, Infrastructure Protection (IP) and Science and Technology (S&T), as well as the 

USDOT’s Federal Highway Administration. Since the Strategy’s approval, the principles agreed upon have guided TSA’s initial selection and inspection of highway 

structures in a cooperative campaign with its fellow Federal agencies. 

Using Strategy principles, TSA identified a list of 58 critical infrastructures to be 

assessed over the next 2 years, including 45 bridges and 13 tunnels. TSA has engaged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) through an Interagency Agreement to complete the assessments. Since February 2010, the USACE has completed 

eight bridge assessments. It is anticipated that the USACE will complete 20 to 30 

assessments by the end of calendar year 2010. TSA will share the findings of these 

assessments with appropriate stakeholder communities. 

IP conducts specialized field assessments to identify vulnerabilities of nationally 

significant critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). These vulnerability assessments provide the foundation of the risk-based implementation of protective programs designed to prevent, deter, and mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack while 

enabling timely, efficient response and restoration in an all-hazards post-event situation. IP has conducted 274 vulnerability assessments on CIKR Transportation Sector assets, including 102 assessments of surface transportation assets, on the Level 

1/Level 2 List since 2004. 

These assessments are conducted on a strictly voluntary basis. IP has no regulatory authority on transportation sector assets to conduct assessments and relies 

on the cooperation of its private sector partners. The final assessment report is classified Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII), and is limited in distribution. 

63 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

HON. DAVID HEYMAN

Question 1. Please provide the Committee with your training program for surface 

transportation inspectors and VIPR teams. 

Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Surface Inspectors receive 

5 weeks of initial training that covers: Department of Homeland Security and TSA 

missions, core values, roles and responsibilities; the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

of 2007, and other guiding legislation or documents; ethics and other legal issues; 

49 CFR Part 1580 Rail Transportation Security; and TSA compliance and enforcement strategies. In addition, Surface Inspectors attend a one-week Railroad Operations Safety and Security training course that covers: safety; industry terminology; 

railroad and transit system organizational structure; rail and transit system operations; infrastructure; hazmat; emergency response; and railroad/rail mass transit 

security initiatives. 

Follow-on training consists of various courses conducted by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Transit Safety Institute, the New Mexico Tech Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 

The TSA Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service has established 

an Intermodal Training Branch (ITB) at its training center in Atlantic City, New 

Jersey. The goal of the ITB is to develop Surface mode specific training curricula 

and tactics for Federal Air Marshals to utilize while conducting Visible Intermodal 

Prevention and Response (VIPR) operations. Training courses have been developed 

and are being implemented at the field level. 

TSA VIPR assets at the management and field levels attend a Railroad Operations, Safety and Security Training class in Pueblo, Colorado, in an effort to familiarize them with the surface transportation domain. TSA also continues to leverage 

its transportation stakeholder/partners by attending training sponsored by transportation entities regarding operational safety and tactics in the surface transportation 

domain. 

Locally, the TSA coordinates with the transit agency to train inspectors as well 

as other VIPR team members to operate within their system. The training usually 

includes work and track safety and an overview of the station to include emergency 

exits. The Inspectors have also been trained to conduct station profiles, which are 

also part of pre-operational planning for VIPR. 

Question 2. For several years TSA has partnered with the private freight railroads 

and the Department of Transportation to develop the Rail Corridor Risk Management System to measure the risk of transporting hazardous materials by rail. How 

will the Department continue to support this important Rail Corridor Risk Management System? 

Answer. Since its inception in 2005, the Freight Rail Security Grant Program 

(FRSGP) has allocated funding for the development of a Rail Corridor Risk Management System (RCRMS) to assist railroads with the analysis of routes used to transport certain hazardous materials. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

believes that the RCRMS is now in an operations and maintenance phase and that 

future funding should be provided by the regulated parties that use RCRMS to assist them in complying with the provisions of 49 CFR 172.820. However, TSA will 

continue to work with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to evaluate new 

funding needs for new capabilities, as/if they arise. TSA will also continue to work 

with FRA in reviewing the routing analyses submitted by the railroads by providing 

relevant threat and vulnerability intelligence to inform the RCRMS. 

Question 3. As part of your rail risk assessment, have you considered whether encouragement of the chemicals industry to develop alternative products or manufacturing processes would have an effect on security risks? 

Answer. The freight railroad risk assessment prepared by the Transportation Security Administration does not directly address the issue of product substitution or 

inherently safer technologies to replace toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials in 

rail transportation. The primary objective of the railroad risk assessment was to 

identify the risk to and from freight rail transportation in its current state. 

Question 4. When will TSA develop performance measures to evaluate grants provided under its various transportation security grants? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is currently working 

with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop performance 

measures for grant programs that can be objectively measured and incorporated into 

ongoing and regular site monitoring visits. TSA is also working to identify current 

64 

mitigation actions for high-risk critical infrastructure assets, including how/when 

they will be fully remediated. These actions will provide tangible results on the effectiveness of grant funding for implementation in the Fiscal Year 2011 grants cycle. 

Question 5. When will TSA have measures in place to determine the effectiveness 

of its VIPR teams, as recommended by GAO? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues to work on 

enhancing and refining the current Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response 

(VIPR) performance metrics as improvements are made to data collection and analytical capabilities. 

To continue to address the opportunities cited by the Government Accountability 

Office, the VIPR program is incorporating additional functionality into a new information system being implemented during calendar year 2010. This system will be 

readily available to all VIPR team members for documenting, planning, deploying, 

and follow-up of the VIPR program activities. Analysis of performance data over 

time at both the local and national levels will increase understanding of VIPR program effectiveness. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

HON. DAVID HEYMAN

Question 1. As you know, ferry transportation is a critical component of Washington State’s transportation system. I know that DHS has been very concerned 

about the vulnerability of ferries to terrorist attack. I appreciate how well you have 

worked with the Washington State Ferry System on security issues. How does the 

department evaluate the current safety and security regimes across the various 

ferry systems operating in the U.S.? 

Answer. The United States Coast Guard’s (USCG) Ports, Waterways, and Coastal 

Security (PWCS) strategy views security as a shared responsibility, requiring collaboration and cooperation at all levels of government, with the private sector, and 

international partners. All passenger vessels (including ferries) of over 100 gross 

tons that are capable of carrying more than 150 passengers in domestic service, or 

that are capable of carrying more than 12 passengers on an international voyage, 

are required to comply with the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 

2002, and its regulatory provisions found in 33 CFR Parts 101–105. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) supports the USCG in ensuring compliance by applicable maritime facilities and vessels (including ferries) with 

33 CFR parts 101–105 by leveraging its core competencies of passenger screening, 

explosives detection, Transportation Worker Identification Credentialing (TWIC) 

management, and intermodal transportation security. 

Question 2. Are there aspects of ferry security that are of special concern to the 

Department? 

Answer. The United States Coast Guard (USCG), in conjunction with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other Federal, State and local officials, has 

been interested in reducing the security risk posed by ferry vessels. Under the 

USCG’s Operation Neptune Shield, Sector Commanders are directed to escort a percentage of high capacity passenger vessels, including ferries, to deter and protect 

them against small vessel attacks. 

Question 3. Are we investing adequately in ferry safety and security in light of 

the number of passengers and vehicles ferries transport? 

Answer. Maritime security is achieved through the combined and coordinated efforts of international, private, and governmental maritime security community 

members. A layered strategy is used to create a security regime that reduces risk 

and shares cost. For example, the FEMA administered Port Security Grant Program 

(PSGP) has made over $1 billion available to eligible maritime stakeholders, including ferry systems, since the inception of the program in 2002. To reduce or eliminate 

vulnerabilities, certain high risk ferry systems, for a number of years, had access 

to their own separate allotment of PSGP money for which only they could apply. 

Though there is no longer a separate ferry allotment, eligible ferry systems can still 

apply for money from the general PSGP fund. 

Question 4. Can you assure us that container cargo coming into the Port of Prince 

Rupert, British Columbia, and across the U.S.-Canada land border is subject to the 

same security scrutiny as import containers entering through U.S. ports? 

Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) exercises level of security 

scrutiny for container cargo coming into the Port of Prince Rupert, British Columbia 

as it does for import containers entering through other U.S. ports absent specific 

threat streams. Conveyances arriving in the United States from Canada through 

65 

land border ports of entry by truck or rail are arriving from foreign origins, and are 

thus subject to the same level of security scrutiny as containers being imported directly through U.S. ports. 

Regardless of the mode of transportation, CBP concentrates its efforts on its primary mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the 

United States, while at the same time facilitating legitimate trade and travel. CBP 

must secure America’s borders while doing it in a way that does not stifle the flow 

of legitimate trade and travel through our borders. 

We are accomplishing these equally important goals through the use of advance 

information, risk-management targeting systems, detection technologies and extended border strategies. CBP employs a layered enforcement approach to safeguarding U.S. borders from threat by land, air, and sea. 

CBP recognizes that no single strategy or risk assessment is 100 percent effective 

and accurate, thus CBP focuses on layering multiple initiatives together to accomplish its mission. CBP works aggressively with trade and government partners to 

legislate improvements regarding data timeliness and quality, which augment the 

abilities of highly trained personnel to using cutting edge technology for targeting, 

detecting and securing terrorists, or implements of terrorism, destined to the United 

States. 

The strategies and technologies used within our agency to help combat terrorism 

and prevent instruments of terror from entering the United States include: 

• The National Targeting Center (NTC)—A single location for coordinating critical 

intelligence within CBP and with the Intelligence Community to rapidly implement targeting responses for passengers and cargo; 

• The Automated Targeting System (ATS)—A decision support system that enables CBP to utilize automated risk-scoring algorithms to vet relative levels of 

risk for cargo shipments and passengers and focus inspection efforts. ATS is a 

highly adaptive system that allows CBP to fuse data from enforcement and 

commercial sources to assess risks. For cargo, ATS integrates entry declaration, 

carrier manifest data and enforcement data, and utilizes extensive and comprehensive historical data to identify unusual and high-risk shipments. The industry data that feeds ATS is substantial, and the Trade Act regulations requires detailed and accurate cargo information in advance of arrival to facilitate 

risk evaluation; 

• Regulatory Changes for Reporting Requirements—CBP actively works with the 

trade community to evaluate new and refined reporting requirements that can 

enhance supply chain transparency and security. Recent and significant examples include the 24-Hour Rule and the Trade Act. These regulatory changes give 

CBP the authority and mechanisms needed to receive detailed electronic cargo 

information on all U.S.-bound sea cargo before it leaves a foreign seaport; allows 

receipt of cargo information for air, rail and truck shipments, and permits targeting decisions to be made before the arrival of conveyances; 

• The Container Security Initiative (CSI)—CBP is targeting—and with our foreign 

counterparts—screening targeted containers; that may be used to conceal terrorist weapons before they are loaded on ships destined for the United States; 

• The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT)—Through C– 

TPAT, CBP has partnered with the private sector to implement security standards and best practices that better protect the entire supply chain against exploitation by terrorists—from foreign loading docks to U.S. ports of entry; 

• Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) and Radiation Detection Technologies—Another 

facet of our layered defense that enables CBP to screen a larger portion of the 

stream of commercial traffic in less time while facilitating legitimate trade and 

travel. These tools provide CBP with a significant capability to detect and interdict terrorist weapons and other contraband at U.S. ports; 

• Air Cargo Interagency Collaborations—Efforts between CBP and other agencies 

have been established to strengthen air cargo security; 

• And, the implementation of ‘‘Smart Border’’ agreements that involve a number 

of actions to improve information exchange and adopt benchmarked security 

measures that will reduce the terrorist threat at our borders, such as the sharing of significant seizure information that would enhance future targeting efforts. 

These layers are interdependent and deployed simultaneously, to substantially increase the likelihood that contraband, including terrorists and weapons of terror will 

be detected. No single strategy could provide the level of security that CBP has 

worked to achieve and maintain since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. 

66 

Question 5. DNDO hasn’t yet come up with a radiation screening solution for ondock container transfers from ship to rail, so containers at Port of Tacoma have to 

be unloaded, scanned and then loaded on trains. Prince Rupert has on-dock intermodal rail facilities like Tacoma. Are they going to the same lengths to screen containers for radiation? 

Answer. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) concept of operations 

(CONOPS) for scanning ship-to-rail containers at Prince Rupert is similar to the 

CONOPS used at most of the terminals at Port of Tacoma (POT). The CONOPS 

used at Prince Rupert and most of the terminals at POT involves yard-haulers (i.e., 

tractor and trailer with container) driving through ‘‘standard’’ 4-panel radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at multiple locations on each terminal. The Pierce County Terminal at the POT, however, has a much more challenging issue. They use straddlecarriers to move containers from the ship to the stacks and/or the train and have 

no physical space or infrastructure to add RPMs or tractor/trailer equipment. A 

straddle-carrier is much too large (size and shielding) to be scanned with a ‘standard’ RPM, which is driving the proof-of-concepts in the On-Dock Rail Program. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

HON. DAVID HEYMAN

Question 1. As a former prosecutor, I am always concerned that state and local 

law enforcement entities play an informed and active role in security initiatives. 

Can you explain in more detail how TSA is working to incorporate state and local 

law enforcement into mass transit security? What are some of your suggestions as 

to how we can better improve on that partnership? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) augments the efforts 

of Federal, state and local resources to deter potential terrorist and criminal activity 

across various modes of transportation by effective deployment of Visible Intermodal 

Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams. 

VIPR teams work alongside stakeholders, including law enforcement, utilizing a 

variety of security tactics that are accomplished through coordination with stakeholders to deploy Federal, state and local resources, as well as integrated TSA assets, to conduct random high visibility patrols, passenger and baggage screening operations, and deployment of explosive detection canine teams, and technology. 

TSA takes a proactive approach to initiating, building and maintaining stakeholder relationships by conducting face-to-face meetings, and conducting stakeholder 

teleconferences. TSA also meets bi-annually with the major rail and mass transit 

police chiefs at the Safety and Security Roundtable co-sponsored by the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security, and maintains liaison with rail 

and mass transit police chiefs at the annual International Association of Chiefs of 

Police conference. 

National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) has partnered 

and entered into Cooperative Agreements with 19 law enforcement agencies in the 

Mass Transit/Maritime arena. TSA also partially funds over 100 state and local explosives detection canine teams in mass transit/maritime, to offset operating costs 

experienced by municipalities. 

Additionally, the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) is a DHS-administered, 

$50 million targeted infrastructure protection grant program for local law enforcement focused on identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities at the highest-risk critical infrastructure sites and providing funding to local law enforcement for equipment acquisition and planning activities to address gaps and enhance security capabilities. The BZPP is designed to increase first responder capabilities and preparedness by bringing together private sector security personnel and first responders in 

a collaborative security planning process that enhances the buffer zone—the area 

outside a facility that can be used by an adversary to conduct surveillance or launch 

an attack, around individual assets. 

Since FY 2004, IP has conducted 165 BZPP assessments on Level 1/Level 2 assets 

throughout the Transportation Sector, and distributed $25 million in grant funding. 

As a subset, 19 BZPP assessments have been conducted in the mass transit subsector, providing a total of approximately $4.5 million in grant funding. 

Question 2. In your testimony, you mentioned that in October 2009, Amtrak and 

TSA partnered to conduct random passenger and baggage screening at multiple locations across the Northeast Corridor. I understand you intend to expand this initiative nationwide. You cite this program as among DHS’ most effective deterrence and 

detection tools for countering terrorist threats. Can you elaborate on it? 

Answer. The 2009 initiative referenced above was an Amtrak-led, Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) supported, simultaneous security operation that ocVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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1GAO, Surface Transportation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Manage Risk, Improve Coordination, and Measure Performance, but Additional Actions Would Enhance Its Efforts, GAO– 

10–650T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2010). 

curred during the morning and evening rush hours throughout the Northeast Corridor from New England to Northern Virginia. Amtrak Police, TSA Transportation 

Security Inspectors, and more than 100 police departments across 13 states mobilized for this coordinated operation that included random passenger and baggage 

screening at multiple locations among the 150 railway stations involved in the 

event. 

The joint operation demonstrated the capability to implement random, unpredictable security enhancements, quickly and on short notice, at multiple passenger rail 

locations. Similar to previous operations held over the last 2 years, these continuing 

operations, through their emphasis on mutual cooperation, set the stage for future 

quick, short notice use of this capability. In addition to random passenger and baggage screening, other security enhancements implemented during the initiative that 

contributed to its success included the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response 

(VIPR) operations and canine teams. The readiness of Amtrak; state, local and transit law enforcement partners; and TSA to act jointly and simultaneously was part 

of the continuous effort to advance a collaborative security strategy for the Northeast Corridor. 

Question 3. In your testimony, you mentioned that in October 2009, Amtrak and 

TSA partnered to conduct random passenger and baggage screening at multiple locations across the Northeast Corridor. I understand you intend to expand this initiative nationwide. What evidence do you have to show that randomized screening has 

lowered the threat level to trains running on the Northeast Corridor? 

Answer. There are significant indicators that suggest that the pro-active security 

program encouraged and fostered by TSA and its security partners, and consisting 

of numerous individual security programs and efforts, have served to lessen the 

overall risk to trains operating in the Northeast Corridor. These include: greater 

public awareness of increased, security measures based on visibility and media coverage underlining rail passenger vigilance; better communications with local law enforcement agencies, the transit police, and security forces as evidenced through the 

success of joint operations; and more efficient and timely sharing of information between law enforcement agencies. 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Washington, DC, June 3, 2010 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

Chairman, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

U.S. Senate. 

Hon. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, 

Safety, and Security, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

U.S. Senate. 

Subject: Surface Transportation Security: GAO Responses to Post-hearing Questions 

for the Record 

On April 21, 2010, I testified before your committee at a hearing on Surface 

Transportation Security.1 This letter responds to the four questions for the record 

you posed. Your questions and my responses follow. 

Question 1. What measures can TSA or DHS put into place to determine if homeland security funds are effectively reducing risks to the Nation’s surface transportation security networks? 

Answer. In recent years, the President and Congress have provided that Federal 

agencies with homeland security responsibilities should apply risk management 

principles to inform their decisionmaking regarding allocating limited resources and 

prioritizing security activities. DHS’s risk management principles include using 

metrics and other evaluation procedures to measure progress and assess the effectiveness of protection programs. However, we have previously reported that TSA 

has not established a mechanism to monitor how effectively the agency has implemented its risk management framework and used these results to improve its perVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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2GAO, Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource Allocation, GAO–09–492 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

2009) 3See GAO–09–492; Commercial Vehicle Security: Risk -Based Approach Needed to Secure the 

Commercial Vehicle Sector, GAO–09–85 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2009); Highway Infrastructure: 

Federal Efforts to Strengthen Security Should Be Better Coordinated and Targeted on the Nation’s Most Critical Highway Infrastructure, GAO–09–57 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2009); Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO–07–225T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2007); and Transportation Security: Systematic 

Planning Needed to Optimize Resources, GAO–05–357T (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2005). 4GAO–09–492. 

5GAO, Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based on Risk, but Its Risk 

Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant Oversight Can Be Strengthened, GAO–09–491 

(Washington, D.C.: June 2009). 6DHS has held vulnerability constant because it lacked data on the differences in vulnerability among transit agencies. 7GAO–09–57. 

formance.2 We recommended that TSA establish a system to monitor and improve 

how effectively DHS’s risk management framework is being implemented. DHS concurred with our recommendation and in August 2009 stated that TSA has established an Executive Risk Steering Committee that will, among other activities, oversee TSA’s risk management strategy and provide a structure to support standing 

and ad-hoc risk management working groups. 

We have also reported that TSA has not always taken necessary steps to inform 

its resource allocation or fully assessed alternatives that could be pursued to achieve 

efficiencies and potentially enhance security.3 In March 2009, we recommended that 

TSA take several actions to promote the effective use of risk management, including 

adopting security goals that define specific outcomes, conditions, end points, and 

performance targets; conducting comprehensive risk assessments that combine individual assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence; and analyzing these 

risk assessments to produce a comparative analysis of risk across the entire transportation sector to guide current and future investment decisions.4 DHS concurred 

with our recommendation and in April 2010, TSA officials stated that the agency 

had revised its risk management framework, along with its Transportation Security 

Sector-Specific Plan and accompanying modal annexes. They added that these documents are undergoing final agency review. Until TSA completes risk assessments 

for each individual transportation mode and analyzes these assessments to produce 

a comparative risk analysis across all modes, the agency is limited in its ability to 

ensure that it is allocating its resources to those areas with the highest priority 

risks. 

We have also reviewed DHS’s Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP), which the 

agency uses to provide funds to owners and operators of mass transit and passenger 

rail systems to protect critical surface transportation infrastructure. In June 2009, 

we reported that the TSGP incorporated a risk model that included all three risk 

elements (threat, vulnerability, and consequence) and was intended to allocate grant 

funding to the highest-risk regions and transit agencies.5 However, we further reported that the TSGP risk model could be strengthened by measuring variations in 

vulnerability—which is considered a generally accepted practice in assessing terrorism risk—and recommended that DHS develop a cost-effective method for incorporating vulnerability information into future iterations of the TSGP risk model.6

DHS agreed with our recommendation and in April 2010, DHS stated that it has 

not yet taken action to vary vulnerability in its risk model, but is reevaluating the 

model for the Fiscal Year 2011 cycle. Further, DHS stated that TSA is evaluating 

the feasibility of incorporating an analysis of the current state of an asset in determining grant funding for the Fiscal Year 2011 cycle, which the agency believes 

would address our recommendation. Until DHS considers possible variations in vulnerability in the TSGP risk model, the agency will be limited in its ability to assess 

risk and more precisely allocate transit security grants. 

Question 2. To what extent have Federal entities coordinated their efforts to assess the risks to the Nation’s highway infrastructure? 

Answer. In January 2009, we reported that although several Federal entities, including TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), had efforts underway to assess the 

risk to highway infrastructure, these assessments had not been systematically coordinated among key Federal partners.7 Specifically, we found that DHS agencies 

and offices, including TSA, DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and USCG, 

each had efforts underway to assess the threats posed to highway infrastructure, 

including the most likely tactics that terrorists may use and potential targets. We 

also reported that Federal agencies were assessing the security vulnerabilities of, 

69 

8GAO–09–85. 

and consequences of an attack on highway assets to some degree, although the scope 

and purpose of these individual efforts varied considerably. For example, TSA’s 

Highway Motor Carrier (HMC) division had chosen to identify highway infrastructure vulnerabilities by working primarily with state departments of transportation 

to identify the extent to which common security practices are employed given staffing limitations and the substantial number of highway infrastructure assets under 

their jurisdiction. However, we reported that more comprehensive, asset-specific vulnerability analyses were being conducted by both DHS’s Office of Infrastructure Protection and the USCG, although the scope and purpose of the resulting products 

varied considerably. In addition, we reported that TSA conducts reviews of security 

practices at the state level through its Corporate Security Review (CSR) program 

to develop a baseline assessment of security nationwide. While TSA’s CSR assessments have a wide scope, other Federal agencies operate programs that assess the 

security vulnerabilities of specific highway assets. However, we found that the various assessments conducted to date were not well coordinated among these key Federal partners, and the results have not been routinely shared. We noted that enhanced coordination with Federal partners could better enable TSA to determine the 

extent to which specific critical assets had been assessed and whether potential adjustments in its CSR methodology were necessary to target remaining critical infrastructure assets. We recommended that to enhance collaboration among entities involved in securing highway infrastructure and to better leverage Federal resources, 

DHS establish a mechanism to systematically coordinate risk assessment activities 

and share the results of these activities among the Federal partners. DHS concurred 

with the recommendation and in February 2010, TSA officials indicated that its 

HMC division had initiated an interagency agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers to conduct on-site risk assessments. The agency also reported that it has 

met with other Federal agencies that conduct security reviews of highway structures 

to identify existing data resources, establish a data-sharing system among key agencies, and discuss standards for future assessments. 

Question 3. To what extent has TSA assessed the security risk for the commercial 

vehicle sector and used its lessons learned to implement a security strategy? 

Answer. In February 2009, we reported that TSA had taken actions to assess the 

security risks associated with the commercial vehicle sector, including assessing 

threats and initiating vulnerability assessments, but more work remained to fully 

assess the security risks of commercial trucks and buses, and to ensure that this 

information is used to inform TSA’s security strategy.8 Specifically, we reported that 

although TSA had completed a variety of threat assessments and was in the process 

of developing several threat scenarios with likelihood estimates, its key annual 

threat assessments did not include information about the likelihood of a terrorist 

attack method on a particular asset, system, or network, as required by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). We also found that although TSA cosponsored a large number of vulnerability assessments through a pilot initiative in 

the State of Missouri, the agency had made limited progress and had not established a plan or time frame for conducting a vulnerability assessment of this sector 

nationwide. Moreover, we reported that TSA had not determined how it will address 

recommendations from an evaluation of the Missouri pilot initiative regarding the 

ways in which future vulnerability assessments can be strengthened. In addition, 

we reported that TSA had not conducted assessments of consequences of a terrorist 

attack on the commercial vehicle sector, or developed a plan to conduct sectorwide 

consequence assessments. As a result, we found that TSA had not completed a 

sectorwide risk assessment of the commercial vehicle sector or determined the extent to which additional risk assessment efforts are needed, nor had it developed 

a plan or a time frame for doing so, including an assessment of the resources required to support these efforts. In addition, TSA had not fully used available information from its ongoing risk assessments to develop and implement its security 

strategy. 

We recommended that TSA establish a plan and a time frame for completing risk 

assessments of the commercial vehicle sector, and use this information to support 

future updates to the Transportation Sector Strategic Plan, to include conducting: 

(1) to the extent feasible, threat assessments that include information about the 

likelihood of a terrorist attack method on a particular asset, system, or network as 

required by the NIPP; (2) a vulnerability assessment of the commercial vehicle sector; and (3) consequence assessments of this sector. DHS concurred with this recommendation and in August 2009 stated that TSA is conducting comprehensive security assessments that will determine the risks associated with a terrorist attack 

70 

9See GAO, Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored, GAO–09–243 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2009). 10GAO–09–491. 

upon the Nation’s general trucking population, and specifically, the hazardous materials trucking system; and the Nation’s school bus transportation system. 

Question 4. The GAO and the National Security Council have identified the need 

for performance measures to determine the effectiveness of grants provided under 

the TSGP. What performance measures should TSA have in place to determine if 

homeland security funds are effectively reducing risk? 

Answer. We reported in April 2009 that TSA’s performance measures for surface 

transportation security initiatives should be targeted, measurable, outcome-based, 

and reasonably free of significant bias and subjectivity that would distort the accurate measure of performance.9 We also reported that performance measures should 

provide a reliable way to assess progress such that the same results would be 

achieved if applied repeatedly to the same situation. Moreover, since implementing 

the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) is a joint responsibility between TSA 

and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), we reported in June 2009 

on the importance of agency collaboration in developing performance measures for 

this program.10 For example, we identified that FEMA was taking some steps to develop their performance monitoring efforts; however, the agency had not collaborated with TSA to produce performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of 

TSGP-funded projects, such as how funding is used to help protect critical infrastructure and the traveling public from possible acts of terrorism. We further reported that FEMA did not yet have performance measures in place for its administrative duties, such as measuring the time taken to complete reviews of financial 

and administrative requirements. FEMA officials reported that while they were in 

the process of establishing baselines and targets for measures, additional work was 

needed to develop meaningful measures. We noted that until TSA and FEMA collaborate to develop a plan with related milestones, it will be difficult for the agencies to provide reasonable assurance that measures are being developed to ensure 

that the program is achieving its stated purpose of protecting critical surface transportation infrastructure. We recommended that TSA and FEMA collaborate to develop a plan and milestones for measuring the effectiveness of the TSGP and its administration. DHS concurred with our recommendation and in November 2009, 

FEMA officials stated that they agreed to develop a collaborative written plan with 

milestones as part of a formal agreement between TSA and FEMA on their roles 

and responsibilities with respect to managing the TSGP. 

STEPHEN M. LORD, 

Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO CARLTON I. MANN

Question 1. Does TSA effectively use risk in determining its resource allocations 

between its aviation security and surface transportation security missions? 

Answer. That is a larger question that we did not address in the three reports 

that provided the basis of our testimony. We did raise concerns in both the mass 

transit report and the surface inspector report that the surface inspection program’s 

chain of command was unclear due to an aviation-focused command structure. We 

are not certain that TSA’s staffing plan for its surface resources will enable surface 

inspectors to operate adequately and independently of TSA’s aviation security mission. 

Question 2. To what extent have Federal entities coordinated their efforts to assess the risks to the Nation’s highway infrastructure? 

Answer. We have not specifically reviewed the department’s risk assessment activities for the Nation’s highway infrastructure. We did gain some insight into related activities while conducting our review, Effectiveness of the Federal Trucking 

Industry Security Grant Program (OIG–08–100, September 2008). We became familiar with the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Modal Annex to the Transportation Sector-Specific Plan, which describes how Federal, state, local, and private 

sector entities will work together to protect the highway transportation system. We 

observed interaction between certain stakeholders, including how the Highway Information Sharing and Analysis Center meets highway and highway-transport-reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 May 06, 2011 Jkt 066169 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66169.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
71 

lated security needs and issues. We recommended that DHS retain the Highway 

Watch program, but also concluded that DHS needed to look for ways to improve 

the effectiveness of the program. 

Question 3. To what extent has TSA assessed the security risk for the commercial 

vehicle sector and used its lessons learned to implement a security strategy? 

Answer. We have not performed sufficient work related to security risks for the 

commercial vehicle sector to answer this question. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

CARLTON I. MANN

Question. How should TSA be monitoring whether security deficiencies found by 

security inspectors during BASE reviews, Corporate Security Reviews, and other inspections are remedied? 

Answer. BASE Assessments are voluntary. To validate passenger rail stakeholder 

responses to BASE Assessments, TSA’s surface inspectors review documents, meet 

with and question personnel, and observe security measures within the transit system. In freight rail, TSA conducts Security Action Item reviews and like BASE Assessments, compliance is voluntary. During our reviews, TSA reported that information it gathered from these inspection activities would drive the formulation of regulations. To the extent that these efforts lead to security standards and promulgation 

of regulations, TSA’s ability to effect improvements or address noncompliance, 

would increase. TSA may also indirectly monitor how stakeholders address security 

deficiencies by incorporating how well they implement TSA’s recommendations into 

eligibility criteria for relevant grant programs, such as the Transit Security Grant 

Program. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

CARLTON I. MANN

Question 1. Assistant Inspector General Mann, in your testimony, you indicated 

that TSA needs better consistency in its interaction with mass transit rail stakeholders—again, a public-private partnership issue like we saw after the Christmas 

bombing attempt. Is TSA working effectively with private sector partners in implementing security programs and sharing guidance and information? 

Answer. In general, TSA’s communication with mass transit stakeholders has improved since the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005 established the Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP), and TSA 

has taken steps to streamline its programs and information sharing. Part of my 

comment about TSA’s consistency related to TSA’s evolving administration of its 

Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response program. 

We remain concerned whether recent changes to the organizational structure of 

the STSIP will enhance TSA’s relationships and communication with its surface 

transportation partners. The presence of dedicated Assistant Federal Security Directors—Surface afforded TSA recognizable liaisons to transit systems and enabled information sharing. 

Question 2. In your view, what else must TSA do to integrate stakeholder expertise into its oversight and assistance programs? 

Answer. Integrating stakeholder expertise into its oversight and assistance programs is important. Regional Working Groups have provided a forum for stakeholders to provide input on TSA’s programs. Despite having regional working 

groups, TSA and transit systems have not always agreed on transit systems’ greatest risks and threats or the best approaches to addressing them. Surface Transportation Security Inspectors’ presence in the field has benefited TSA’s mission considerably due to their relationships with transit systems. We are uncertain how organization changes within the STSIP might affect those relationships or the program’s 

ability to integrate information it collects from stakeholders. The STSIP must remain distinct from aviation-related security programs, or TSA risks alienating transit security stakeholders. 

SUPPLEMENTAL PREPARED STATEMENT OF HOWARD R. ‘‘SKIP’’ ELLIOTT, 

VICE PRESIDENT—PUBLIC SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT, CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. 

CSX Transportation, Inc. (‘‘CSXT’’) thanks the Committee for the opportunity to 

submit these supplemental comments in response to Senator Lautenberg’s invitation 

72 

at the close of the hearing on Securing the Nation’s Rail and Other Surface Transportation Networks (the ‘‘hearing’’) on April 21, 2010. 

These separate comments by CSXT are intended to first, address Senator 

Hutchinson’s observations regarding the limited experience of many Transportation 

Security Administration (‘‘TSA’’) surface transportation inspectors, and second, to 

address Senator Lautenberg’s comments regarding the need for more coordination 

between TSA and the private sector on surface transportation security issues. 

As indicated in our oral statement and more fully in our written statement submitted to the Committee at the hearing on April 21, 2010, CSXT maintains a steadfast commitment to the safety and security of our operations and the communities 

where we operate. We recognize that Government and Industry cooperation and collaboration are essential components of rail transportation security. At CSXT, we 

truly believe that partnerships and close coordination of security measures is essential to enhancing public safety and national security. 

As part of CSXT’s ongoing commitment to, and relentless focus on, safety and security, CSXT continues to reach out to, and work with, Government and Industry 

officials to find solutions for rail security issues. At the hearing, we highlighted 

some of CSXT’s public-private partnerships and initiatives to improve rail safety 

and security. We would like to take this opportunity to discuss a newly developed 

CSXT training program for TSA surface transportation security inspectors (‘‘TSA Inspectors’’) along our network. 

CSXT developed this training program to familiarize TSA Inspectors with the 

many ways in which CSXT is complying the Department of Homeland Security 

(‘‘DHS’’) regulations. This program will also give TSA Inspectors a detailed overview 

of CSXT’s approach to rail security. CSXT’s training program will also provide TSA 

Inspectors with a greater understanding of CSXT’s network, operations, resources, 

and roles of employees at all levels to enhance rail transportation security. Although 

CSXT recognizes that TSA Inspectors may receive some type of general railroad familiarization training, each railroad has unique operating characteristics that underscore the importance of this carrier specific training. 

CSXT coordinated with TSA in the development of this training program. And, 

TSA has agreed to work with CSXT to implement this training program. We believe 

that this joint training partnership—the first of its kind in the rail industry—will 

enhance TSA Inspectors’ knowledge and awareness of CSXT rail security initiatives. 

CSXT is proud of the cooperative and collaborative working relationship that we 

have developed with TSA, and we hope to continue this relationship in the future. 

Æ