i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 48 3- CV SEPCO TUBULARS , I nc. and Padr e Tubular , I nc.,

Ap pe lla nts
v . J esse ORTEGA and Collinsworth W ell Treating, Inc.,

Appellee s Fr om the 79th J udicial District Court, Br ooks County , Texas

Tr ia l Co ur

t N o. 05 -1 0- 13 09 2- CV Honora ble Richard C. Ter

rell, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: October 28, 2009 AFF I RMED I n eig ht issues on appea l, Sepco Tubulars, Inc. an d Padre Tubula r, Inc. cha lleng e the tria l court’s a mended judg ment enter ed in favor of Jesse Orteg a. We af firm the amended judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt
.04
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- 2- B R IEF B ACKG ROUND J esse Or teg a, a H alliburton Energ y Service s well hand, wa s injured when a burst pipe ca used
an o il w e ll b low ou t. Or

te g a su e d U nit e d Re so ur c e s, L .P. , th e we ll o pe ra tor , a nd Col lin sw or

th We ll Treating, Inc., the c ompany responsible for

p re s s u re testing the well. Collinsworth and United named a s a re sponsible third party the manufa ct u re r of the pipe, N izhnedneprosky Tube Rolling Plant ( “ NT RP” ), wh os e op e ratio ns are loc a te d in the Uk ra ine , a nd fi le d th ir d p art

y a c tio ns a g a ins t Sepco Tubular s, I nc. and Padre Tubulars, I nc., the sellers/distributors of NTRP’s pipe in the United States. Or t ega s ubsequently amende d his petition t o name Sepc o and Padre as def endants. The de fe nd ants c ro ss- c la ime d a g a ins t on e ano the r f or c on tr ibuti on and

a lso name d H a lli burt on

a s a
r e s p o n s i b l e t h i r d

p art y. Th e da y of tr ia l, O rt e g a

no n- su ite d Co lli ns wo rt

h. Col lin sw or

th r e ma ine d in the su it d

ue to
cross-c laims alleg ed ag ainst it by its co-def

endants. Dur ing the s i x -day jury trial, Orteg a blamed Sepco and Padr e for

selling substanda

rd pipe, whic h cause d the blowout. Sepco and Padr e did not call any witnesses at trial. B efor e the jury returne d its verdict, United settled with Orte g a. The jury found Sepco, Padre, and NTRP liable, and assessed r esponsibility betwee n Sepco and Padr e to be 7 5 % a n d 2 5 %, re s p ec t i v el y . Or t egawa s aw ar d edd am age s fo r p as tan d fu tu re p ai n an d

s u ff er i n g, past and futur e lost ear

nings, pa st and future phy sical impairment, and pas t an d fu t ure me dical expenses. The jury ’s ver dict totaled $4 million. Sepco and Padr e (he reina fter, c ollectively ref err ed to as “Sepc o”) f

iled a motion for JNOV; the trial c o u rt e n te r e d ju d g me n t o n th e v e r d ic t. Se p c o th e n f il e d a mo ti o n f

o r n e w tr ia l an d for
re mit tit ur . T he tr ia l c ourt g ra

nte d the mot ion

fo r r e mit tit

ur in p art and e nte re d a n ame nd e d ju dg me nt,
awa rding approximately

$2.6 milli on to Orteg a. A se cond motion for new trial and a m o t i on for fu rt he r r e mit tit

ur we re a lso fi le d, bu t den ie d. Se pc o now a pp e a ls fr om the fi na l ame nd e d ju dg me nt.04
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- 3- A N A L Y SIS On appe al, Sepco c halleng es the trial c ourt’s judg ment on the following g rounds: (1) c ounsel for Collinsworth made incurably harmful jury

argument; (2) additional incur able jury argument was made with re peate d violations of a motion in li mine; (3) Collinswo rt h i m permissibly skewe d the prese ntation of the trial by alig ning itself with the plaintiff; (4) the jur y ’s neg lige nce f

indings a re not supported by

leg ally or fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence ; (5) the damag es finding s and aw ards a re not supported by

leg ally or fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence ; (6) Sepco did not re ceive a spoliation instruction to whic h it wa s entitled; (7) judg ment was e rrone ously enter ed ag ainst Sepco and Padr e as manufa cture rs and se llers; and (8) the trial cour t abused its discretion in re fusing to gr ant Sepco’ s mot ion s f or ne w tri a l. 1. Inc ura ble

Jur y Arg ument Sepco first a

rgu es t h at this case must be re verse d and re manded due to incurable jury argument. Tor Vatne, the pre sident of Sepco at the time of the blowout, testified that the e x clusive mission of S epco w as to import and sell pipe fr o m NT R P , a Uk rainian c ompany . Vatne w as qu e sti on e d r e g ard ingthe re je c tio n r a te of

NT RP pi pe . Pip e is “ re

je c te d” if it d oe s n ot m e e t c e rt a in industry specific ations. Vatne w as not awa re of a third-pa

rty inspection repor

t stating that the pipe at issue had a

reje ction rate of 39 per cent. Vatne estimated that an ave rag e re jection rate “f

rom third world produc ers” is up to te n perc ent. Duringclosing argument, counsel for Colli nsworth ar g ued t o t h e j u r y: My c lie nt ha s no way of kn ow ingwh a t it is, e ve n w he re that pi pe c a me fr om. I t was a c omplete surprise to us that the pipe is from the Ukra ine. . . .
* * *04
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- 4- Th ir ty -n ine tim e s o ut o f 1 00 , I ’m g oin g to m a ke a

se ri ou s mi sta

ke that c ou ld hurt or kill somebody
. And t hen y ou pass t hat off as t he manufacture r of a piec e of pipe and you say : ‘Well, pipe fails all the time.’ This is Third World pipe! * * * Do y ou

re me mbe r M r. Vatne ? Re me mbe r w hat he sa id a bo ut that? Th is i s his own pipe that he sells and he called it “T hird World,” “Third World pipe.” * * * So, think about that when y ou think about what a r esponsible manufa cture r or seller of a piece of pi pe shoul d do. I f 39 per cent is the be st y ou can do, you need to wrap up the plant an d ca l l it quit s - - be cause we de serve better tha n that in the United States. We deser

ve better than that. . . . * * *
We don’t have a

ny direc t proof. We don’t have any body from the Ukr aine over he re w ith t h ei r l ittle Russ ian coats and hats telling us w hat it was that the y did . We do n’ t e ve n h a ve any do c ume nts wh e the r or

no t th e y pr op e rl y te ste d th is pipe. . . . * * * Th e y

[Sep c o/P a dr e ] wil l no t a c c e pt any res po ns ibi lity fo r t hat pi pe and

it become s y our re sponsibili ty as citizens of Br ooks County to say : ‘You know, we re sp e c tf ull y dis a g re e wi th you g uy s, Se pc o/P a dr e , wh oe ve r y ou a ll are , be c a us e it i s y our p ipe and

it i s b a d p ipe and

it i s p ip e th at sh ou ld not be ru n in the we ll. ’ A ll rig ht? To d o an y

thing e lse - - a

nd Idon’t think that y ou will - - but to do any thing else, I sug g est, is contrar

y to the evidenc e. No objection wa s lodge d to the above- quoted ar g ument. Stan dard of Revie w and A pplicable Cases Gene rally , to obtain reve rsal on the basis of i mproper jury argument, an appe llant must prove “(1) an er ror ( 2) that wa s not invit ed or provoked, (3) that wa s prese rved by the prope r trial pre dicate, such as a n objection, a moti o n t o i n s t ru ct, or a motion for mistrial, and (4) wa s not curable by an instruction, a prompt withdrawa l of the statement, or a re primand by

the judg e.” Sta nd

ar d F ireIn s.04
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- 5- Co. v . R e ese , 5 84 S.W. 2d 83 5, 83 9 ( Te x. 19 79 ); see also T EX . R. A PP . P. 33 .1
. I n r are ins tanc e s, retra ction of the a

rg ument or instruction from the c ourt will not cure a ny probable harm or prejudice ; in that case , the ar g ument is incurable a nd complaint may

be made even though objection was not timely made. Li ving C enters of Tex., I nc. v. P eñalve r , 256 S.W .3d 678, 680 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). To deter

mine whether

the har m emanatingfrom an imprope r ar g ument is incurable, the Te xas S up re me Court ha s instru c te d tha t w e mus t e xami ne , “ wh e the r t he argume nt, c on sid e re d in its pr op e r s e tti ng , wa s re a so na bly c a lc ulate d to c a

us e su c h p re

jud ic e to t

he op po sin g lit ig ant t

hat a withdrawa l by counsel or an ins truction by the cour t, or both, could not eliminate the proba bility that it resulted in an improper

verdic t.” Peñalve r , 2 5 6 S
. W
. 3 d at 6 8 1 (c i t i n g Tex. Employ ers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Hay wood, 153 Tex. 242, 266 S.W .2d 856, 858 (1954)) . The c ourt continued to explain that “jury argument that strikes at the a ppear ance of and the actua l impartiality , equality , and fa irness of justice rende red by

courts is incura

bly harmful not only

beca use of its harm t o t h e l i tiga nts involved, but also bec ause of

its capac ity

to damage t h e j u dicial sy stem. Such argument is not subject to the g ener al har

mless error

analy sis.” Peñalve r , 256 S.W .3d at 681. I n Peñalve r , th e Te xas S up re me Court c on sid e re d w he the r a

jur y argume nt m a de in a

c a se involving the wr ong ful death of a ninety y ear -old nursing home re sident wa s incura ble. The jury argument in q u est ion compare d defe nse counse l to perpetrators of Ge rmany ’s World W ar I IT-4 Project i n which elderly

and infirm per sons were used for medical e x perimentation. Id. at 679-82. The c ourt held that “[t] he argument struck at the integ rity of the c ourts by

utiliz ing a

n argument that was im proper , unsupported, and uninvited.” Id. a t 68 2. Th e c ourt no te d th a t th e fa ilure to a dd re ss such ar g ument would cause the “e ntire judicial sy stem” to suffe r. Id. Th e Te xas S up re me Court ha s a lso e xami ned

wh e the r a

tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in admitting a me mo containing the phra se “illiterate Mexi cans.” Coa sta l O il &Ga s Co rp . v . G ar za04
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- 6- En e rg yTru st, 268 S.W .3d 1, 21-26 (Tex. 2008)
. Noting that the all-Hispanic jury was inflame d by the phra se—as e vidence d by its ex cessive ve rdict—and that the memo was not re levant to the issues in the trial, the cour

t held that admission of the memo amo u n t ed to harmful error requiringa new trial. Id. at 26. Most rece ntly , the Texas Supreme Court consider ed whe ther the f oll o wi n g ar gument in a
wr on g fu l death ac tio n ag a ins t a phy sic ian amou nte d to inc ur a

ble jur y argume nt: “ F or

y e ars , in thi s
ve ry con ser

vativ e c omm

un ity , ju ri e s h a ve be e n v e ry

lib e ra l w iththe do c tor s, ve ry lib e ra l. Wh a t I
mean is: The ir verdic ts didn’t send much of a messag e at all.” Ph ill ips v . B ra ml e tt , 288 S.W .3d 876, 882 (Tex. 2009). Def

ense counsel i mmediately objected and t he trial court overruled the objection. Id. at 8 8 2 -8 3
. C o u n s el co n t i n u edt o ar gu e w i t h o u to b j ec t i o nt h at t h e j u ry

n ee d ed t o s en d a m es s age to the doctors of L

ubbock. Id. at 883. On a p p ea l, the court he ld that counsel’s plea to send a messag e to the doctor s was not an unsubstantiated a ttack on the inte grity

or ver acity

of a pa rty or counsel, nor did it appea l to rac ial prejudice or t he li ke; considering the entire recor d, the cour t stated the arg ument was not so extreme as t o be incapable of cure
. Id. The court emphasized that “[t] he party claiming incura

ble har m must persuade the court that, ba sed on the re co rd as a w hole, the offe nsive argument was so extreme that a ‘juror of ordinary intelligenc e could have been per suaded by that argument to ag ree to a verdic t c ontrary to that to which he would have a g ree d but for such argument.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Goforth v. Alvey , 153 Tex. 449, 271 S .W.2d 404, 404 (1954)). This court has a lso ex amined the issue of incura ble jury arg ument. I n 1939, we r ever sed the trial court’s judgme nt in a case wher e counsel stressed that the plaintiff was not an Am er ican citizen—unlike the defe ndant who was a “fe llow citiz en” w ho “pay [s] his tax es to the United States Gover nment and obey [s] the laws of the United States Gover nment”— and f

urther stated, “I

don’t kn owwh e the r he wa de d tha t riv e r or sw a m. B ut . . . whe n y ou g e ntl e me n b ri ngin t

he ve rd ic t he wi ll04
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1 ... W e no t ed t hat our d eci si o n did no t res t o n t he act ual et hni c heri t age o f t he jur o rs , but o n t he f act t hat t he a tto rn e y w h o m a d e the inte n tio n a l eth n ic a p p e a l t h o u g h t i t wo u ld ha v e a n im p a c t o n the ju ry. Id

. a t 8 6 7 n.9
.

- 7- swim that river ag ain because. .
. I think he is all wet in this law suit.” Basanez v. U nion Bus Lines , 132 S.W .2d 432, 432-33 (Tex . Civ. App.—San Antonio 1939, no writ). The cour t held that the argument was c lear ly

inflammatory

and pre judicial beca

use i t soug ht a verdict upon the pre mise that the appe llant was not a citizen of the United States, a s were the jury and the a ppellee. Id. at 433. “I t tended to cr eate a ra cial pre judice in the minds of the jury as b etwee n alien appe llants and citizens, appellee a

nd the jury .” Id. More r ece ntly , this court examined the issue of incura ble jury argument in Te

x . E mp loy e rs’ Ins. Ass’n v. G uerrero, 800 S.W .2d 859 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1990, w rit denied). I n that case , a Hispanic man s ued for

injuries sustained in the cour se of his employ ment. Plaintiff’s counsel, who
was a lso Hispanic, arg ued to the m ostly Hispanic jury that “[r]i g ht now i s a ti me t o be unit ed” a nd “ther e come s a time wh en we have g ot to sti ck tog ether as a c ommunity .” 1 Id. at 862. This court held that t he arg ument was an impermissible appea l to ethnic sol idarity and remanded the cause for
a new trial. Id. at 862-63, 868. In so doing, the court de clar ed that “inc urable reve rsible er ror oc curs wh e ne ve r a

ny a tto rn e y su g g e sts , e ith e r op e nly or wi th su btl e ty and fi ne sse , that a

jur y fe e l so lid ari ty with or animus toward a

litigant or a witness beca use of r ace or ethnicity .” Id. at 866. The c ourt str e sse d, ho we ve r, that it s h old ingdid no t e nc omp a ss inc ide nta l ref ere nces to the ra ce of

the par ties and witnesses. Id. at 867 (e mphasis added)
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2 ... B ot h C ol l i ns wort h and O r t ega ar gu e t hat t he Tr acht enbe r g o p inio n sh o u ld no t b e re lied up o n to d e c id e this ca s e bec au s e pr ec ede n t s t h at a r os e pr i or t o 1941 h ol di n g t h at j u r y ar g u men t was pr ej u di ci al a r e u n r el i abl e du e t o t h e 1941 a d o p tio n o f t h e ha rm le ss e rr o r ru le
. S ee S t a n d a rd F i re In s. C o . v. R ee se , 5 8 4 S .W .2 d 8 3 5 , 8 4 0 (T e x . 1 9 7 9 ).

- 8- Two Texas ca ses spec ifically addre ss jury arg ument involving Russians. I n Tra c hte nb e rg
v . Ca sti llo , 257 S.W .657 (Tex. Civ. App.—El P aso 1923, writ dism’d w. o . j.), 2 appellee ’s counse l ref e rre d to the appellants a s “these sw eet- scente d apple blossoms from Russia” and “ these birds fr om Russia.” Id . at 660. The c ourt held that the re marks we re obje ctionable and invoked race pr ejudice. Id. Ba sed on its dispositi on of ot her issues, the court reve rsed the case and re ndere d judgme nt for the appe llants. Id. I n United St ates v. Sae nz , 747 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1984), the prose cutor likene d the def ense’ s attempt to blame the prose cution of abusi n g t h e s y s tem to the Russians’ attempt to blame the Americ ans for the 1983 attack of a Korean airliner. Id. at 942-43

. The F ifth Circuit noted that the
rema rks wer e improper

and that the “u n fortunate compar ison cannot be c ondoned. . . .” Id. Ho we ve r, a ft e r w e ig hin g the de g re e to wh ic h the argume nt may have a ff e c te d th e su

bs tanti a l r ig hts of the de fenda

nts, the court h el d t h at the rhe toric did not rea ch the leve l of reve rsible er ror whe n taken in conte x t. Id. Discussion Sepco contends that the re marks by Colli nsworth’s counse l were an appe al to prejudice on nationality

g rounds and that no objec tion was requir ed bec ause a n instruction w ould not have cur ed the har m resulting f

rom the prejudicial rema

rks. Sepco further arg ues t hat t hey wer e harmed by the argument beca

use, despite overwhe lming evidence that other par ties were responsible for

Orteg a’s inj ur ie s and

Or te g a ’s ow n r e qu e st that th e jur y fi nd Un ite d 33 1/3 % re sp on sib le , th e jur y fo un d o nly NTRP, Sepco, and Padre liable. The jury then found that only Sepco and Padre should pay the $404
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- 9- milli on verdic t to Orteg a, a 29 y ear -old man who continued to wor k 90 hours a we ek af

ter sustaining a bac k injury . Sepco ar g ues that bec ause the evidenc e does not support these finding s, an “outside
cause ,” i.e. , the “hig hly

prejudicia l jury

argument,” must be re sponsible. I n response , Colli nsworth maintains that it did not overstep the bounds of prope r advoc acy b y a s s e rt i n g t h a tj u r o r s s h o u l d a p p l y a d o m e s t i c r a t h e r

t h ana f o r e i g ns t an d ar d

o f c ar e . A d d i t i o n a l l y, all the par

ties throug hout the trial, i n cl u d i n g Sepco, re fer red to the pipe as being“Ukr ainian” or “fr om the Ukra ine.” Fur t h er, the argument was invited g iven that Sepco e ng ag ed in questioning
a b o u tw h a t t h e t e c h n i c i an s a tN T R P m i g h th a v e d o n e i nt e s t i n g an d c e rt i f yi n g t h e p i p e . F i n a l l y, Colli nsworth aver s that the “Russian coats and hats” statement was a stray rema rk whi ch wa s not repe ated dur ing Collinsworth’s closing argument afte r a six-day trial. Thus, the argument was not so harmful that it was incur able, a nd any improprieties were waived by Sepco’s f ailure to objec t at trial. Orteg a also disag ree s that the argument was improper . Given that the U k ra inian orig in of the pip e wa s me nti on e d n ume rous ti mes thr ou g ho ut t he tr ia l and

that V a tne de sc ri be d N TRP a s a “third world” produce r, Orteg a contends the ar g ument was prope r bec ause it wa s based dire ctly on the evidenc e. Additionally , Orteg a ar g ues that “w e deser ve better than that in the United States” w as appropr iate bec ause it asked the j ury to “send a messag e” to the de fenda

nts that this conduct will not be tol e rate d b y

the c omm

un ity . O rt e g a

no te s th a t an a

pp e a l to loc a l pr e

jud ic e or un ity is u su a lly considere d a cur able improprie ty for whic h an objec tion is required. See 8 W I L L I AM V. D ORS ANEO III , T EX A S L I TI GATI ON G UI DE § 120C.04[ 3][ i] [i v] (2009). Acc ording ly , Orteg a asse rts the ar g ument was prope r, but eve n if improper, a ny harm would have bee n cure d by an instruction. Orteg a categ orizes the “Russian hats and c oats” c omment as ac cepta ble “hy perbole ” and fu rt h e r c o n t e n d s t h a t t h i s c o m m e n t w a s s a i d o n l y o n c e an d w a s u n l i k e l y t o p e r s u a d e t h e j u r o rs to04
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- 10- vote the wa

y they did solely beca

use of the comment. Orteg a is confide nt that the comment had no prejudicia l impact beca

use the jury

unanimously

answe red “ 0%” to the ques t i o n as k ing the perc entag e of O rteg a’s injuries c aused by NTRP. Turning to the j u ry

argument itself, we a g ree that some of counse l’s rema rks wer e objectionable. A lthough the r efe renc es to “Ukr aine” and “Third World pipe” wer e based on e licited trial testimony

and would not, standing alone, be improper, those r efe renc es bec ome more troublesome whe n combined with later rema rks such a s “little Russi an coats and h at s” and “ we de se rv e be tte r t

ha n th a t in the Un ite d St a te s. ” Cle arly , ou r cou rt s h a ve he ld t hat it is i mpr op e r t o appea l to racia l or ethnic pre judice. Se e, e .g ., Coa sta l O il &Ga s Co rp ., 286 S.W .3d at 26 ; Peñalv er , 25 6 S. W.3 d at 68 1; H

a y wood, 2 6 6 S
. W
. 2 d at 858; Gu e rre ro , 8 00 S.W. 2d a t 86 8; Basanez , 132 S.W .2d at 433. Her e, howe ver, taking the argument as a w hole, we c annot say the cr itical rema

rks
wer e either

unsupported by

the evidenc e or more t han incidental ref ere nces to the nationality

of the pipe manufa cture r. Nor can we ag ree with Sepc o’s contention that the only explanation for the jury ’s finding s and dama g e aw ards is an “outside ca use,” i.e ., the jury

argument. Although the ref ere nce to “little Russ ian coats and hats” was objectionable, we cannot conclude that based on the rec ord as a whole, the argument here was so extreme that a “juror of ordinary inte l l i gen ce c ould have be en persua ded by

that argument to ag ree to a ver dict contra ry to that to which he w ould have a g ree d but for suc h argument.” See Phillips , 288 S.W .3d at 883. Acc ording ly , Sepco’s first issue is overrule d. 2. Li mine V iol ations Sepco next argues t hat Collinsworth’s counsel re peate dly violated the trial c ourt’s ruling on a pre trial motion in l imine which p re cl u d ed “[a]ny mention of or re fer ence to Defe ndant’s fa ilure to call any

witness equally

available to any

other pa rty ” unless “suc h witness is w ithin the e x clusive control of . . . the De fe n d an t . . . .” Despite this, counse l for Collinsworth informed the jury of04
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- 11- Sepco’s failure to c all its e x pert witness, Dr. Wooley : “B ut w e did not hear from o n e i m p o rt ant person. Where was Dr . Wooley ? ” Sepco timely objected, stating that Colli nsworth had W ooley ’s vid e ota pe d d e po sit ion

and c ou ld h a ve pla

y e d it , a nd that th e state me nts vio la te d “ the Mo tio n in L imine.” Collinsworth replied t hat W ooley was a reta ined ex pert under Sepco’ s control. The tria l court ove rruled the objection. Collinsworth co n t i nued to make se vera l more re fer ence s to the “my sterious Dr. Wooley .” Af ter the conclusion of arguments and after the jury was given the char g e, Sepco moved f

or a mistrial based on the vi olations of t he mot ion in lim ine. The tria l court denie d the motion. Orteg a and Colli nsworth i nitially respond that Sepco failed to preser ve this issue for a

ppeal beca use: (1) the trial court never signe d an orde r or ve rbally ruled on the limine issues Sepco now complains of; (2) Sepc o’s complaints at trial do not comport with i ts complaints on appeal; and ( 3) Sepco’s c o m p l aint at trial wa s not specific e noug h to advise the trial c ourt of the a lleg ed er ror. Assuming Sepc o did preser ve er ror, the motion in limine did not prevent C o l l i n s worth fr om
c omm e nti ngon

the fa c t th a t Se pc o f

a ile d to c a ll D r. Woo le y , a wi tne ss w ith in i ts exc lus ive c on tr ol. C o u n s e l m ay c o m m e n t o n t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e o p p o s i n g p art y t o c a l l a w i t n e s s e mp l o ye d

b y s a i d p art y. First Interstate Bank of Bedford v. Bland, 810 S.W .2d 277, 289 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1991, no
wr i t ) ( ci t i n g Tex-J

ersey Oil Corp. v. Beck

, 157 Tex. 541, 548, 305 S
. W
. 2 d 162, 167 (1957),

ov e rru led on ot her

gr ou nd s, Sa nc he z v . S c hin dle r, 65 1 S. W.2 d 2 49 (T e x. 19 83 )) . “ Th e ri g ht t o
c omm e nt o n th e fa ilure to c a ll a nd us e an emp loy e e -w itn e ss doe s not g ro w o ut o f t he un a va ila

bil ity of t he witness but out of his relationship wit h the opposite party .” Tex-J ersey Oil Corp., 305 S.W .2d at 167. Acc ording ly , the trial cour t corre ctly

overr uled the objec tion on this basis. Sepco’s se cond issue is overrule d.04
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3 ... “A M a ry C a rte r a g re e m e n t ex ists w h e n th e s e tt li n g d e fe n d a n t re ta ins a fi n a n c ia l stak e in the p la intiff ’s re c o v e ry and r emai ns a par t y at t he t r i al of t he cas e. ” E lb a o r, 8 4 5 S .W .2 d a t 2 4 9
.

- 12- 3. Skewed Presentation of Trial I n its thi rd issue, Sepco a rg ues t hat ac tions taken by Colli nsworth during trial mandate a
reve rsal and a remand for a new trial as a matter of law. Accordingto Sepco, Collinsworth, who was
no n- su ite d b y

Ortega on the fi rs t da

y of tr ia l, u ne xpe c te dly

and un fa ir ly dis tor te d th e tr ia l pr oc e ss by alig ning itself with Orteg a to “a rg ue for high da mag es.” Sepc o maintains Colli nsworth’s position at trial wa s illogica l for a c ontribution defe ndant and, as evidence, points t o sever al instance s in the
re c or d whe re Col lin sw or

th (1 ) ac kn ow le dg e d or sup po rt e d Or te g a ’s c la ims of inj ur

y , (2) did no t jo in in the motion for direc ted ver dict against Orteg a, and ( 3) soug ht a sepa rate line submissi on on Orteg a’s c laim for future economic damag es. Arguing that the public policy principles discussed in Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W .2d 240 (Tex. 1992), should apply here , Sepco maintains Collinsworth’s unexpected ac tions skewed the a lignment of the par ties, confuse d the jury , thw ar t ed S epco’ s due proce ss rig hts to a fair trial , an d cause d the re ndition of an improper ve rdict. See id. at 249 (i nv a lid a tin g “ Mary

Cart e r” a g re e me nts 3 as void as ag ainst public policy). Assuming wi t h o ut deciding that Sepco prope rly prese rved this issue for a ppeal, Sepc o’s argument fails as unpe rsuasive fo r several re asons. Fir st, Coll insworth’s trial strate g y is neither
un e xpe c te d n or

pr oh ibi te d. B e c a

us e Or te g a no n- su ite d Co lli ns wo rt

h on th e day

of tr ia l, t he on ly parties a dverse to Coll insworth during trial wer e Sepco a nd Padre w ho we re se eking contribution fr om C oll ins wo rt

h in the e ve nt the jur

y he ld t he m li a ble fo r O rt e g a ’s inj ur ie s. Th e re fo re , it is h ard ly unexpected that Collinsworth would distance itself fr om Sepco and Padre. Nor is it surprising that Colli nsworth might seek to a lign itself with Or teg a, an injure d worke r and f amily man, portra

y ing him as someone injured throug h no fault of his ow n and “a g ood man” who did the “ rig ht thing” by04
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- 13- dropping claims ag ainst Colli nsworth af ter re alizing that Collinsworth was not at fault for the
acc ident. As noted by

J ustice He cht, “The re is nothing wrongwith one def endant siding with the plaintiff ag ainst another de fenda nt; the one def

endant may

believe the other t o b e li able.” See Mallios v. Bake r, 11 S.W .3d 157, 160 (Tex. 2000) (He cht, J ., concur ring ). Second, Sepco as k s us to apply the same public policy

principles discussed in Elbaor v. Smith and used to justify reve rsal in the M ary Carter settlement context. See E lbaor, 845 S.W .2d
a t 249 (M ary

Cart e r a g re e me nts pr e ssu re “ se ttl ing ” de fe nd ant t o a lte r t he c ha ra c te r o f t he su it i n fa vo r of the pla int if

f and thu s dis tor

t the c a se pr e se nt ed t o t he j ury ); see also Scurloc k Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 72 4 S. W.2 d 1 , 8 (T e x. 19 86 ) ( “ Ma ry Cart e r a g re e me nts sh ou ld b e pr oh ibi te d b e c a us e they are in im ic a l t o th e a d v e r s ar y s y s te m, an d

th e y d o n o t p r o mo te s e tt le me n t— th e ir p r im ary jus tif ic a tio n. ” ). He re , ho we ve r, the re is n o e vid e nc e a Mary Cart e r a g re e me nt e xiste d. Col lin sw or th was non-suited by

Orteg a and ha d no financ ial stake in the outcome of O rteg a’s suit ag ainst Sepco. No r d o w e a g re e wi th S e pc o’ s argume nt t hat th e same po lic y

pr inc ipl e s u se d to jus tif

y re versal in a Mar y Carter settlement contex t s h o u l d apply when, a s here , the def

endant is non-suited by

the plaintiff and then c hooses a tria l strateg y that alig ns itself with the plaintiff. Sepco re lies on St. Paul S u r plus Li nes Ins. Co., Inc . v. Dal-W orth Tank Co., Inc., 9 1 7 S. W. 2 d 2 9 , 4 1
- 4 2 ( T e x. Ap p . —Amarillo 1995), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 974 S.W .2d 51 (Tex. 1998). S t
. Pa ul is
rea dily distinguishable, howe ver, be caus e it in v o lv e d a s e tt le me nt a g ree ment that allowed the se ttling party to r ecoup a portion of its settlement if the plaintiff was succe ssful ag ain s t t h e n o n-settling defe ndants. Id. There fore , in both Elba or and St. Pa ul there exis ted a c lear financ ial incentive f

or the def endant to alig n itself with t h e p l ai n t i ff that is simpl y not present he re. A s noted by J ustice Hec ht in Mallios : “[Mary

Carter ] agr eeme nts contrave ne public policy beca use t hey provide ulterior fi na nc ia l in c e nti ve s f

or pa rt ie s to take po sit ion s th e y wou ld no t ot he rw ise take and thu s unf a ir ly04
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- 14- distort lit igation.” Mallios, 11 S.W .3d at 160 (He cht, J ., concur ring ). “ Th e re is nothin g wr on g wi th one def endant siding with the plaintiff ag ainst another de fenda nt; the one defe ndant m ay believe the other to be liable . The vice is not in t he unusual a lignmen t o f t h e parties, but in the fina ncial incentives that encour ag e the a lignment.” Id. Ba sed on the record before us, Colli nsworth di d not have a financ ial interest in the outcome of Or t ega ’s s u it ag ainst Sepco and Padr e, and the ref ore, neither the holdings nor r ationale of Mary Carter decisions apply
. Finally , even where a Mary Carter ag ree ment exis ts, a complaining party must establish that the claim ed er ro r “w as re asonably calc ulated to ca

use and pr obably

did cause the re ndition of an improper judg ment.” Elbaor, 845 S.W .2d at 251 n.23 (c iting for mer T EX . R. A PP . P
. 8 1(b) & 18 4( b) ); see als o S t
. P a u l S urplus Li nes Ins. Co., 917 S.W .2d at 44 (a ny err or in introducing exis tence of Mar

y Carter ag ree ment was ha

rmless wher e settl ing defe ndant did not argue for highe r damag es, pre sent witnes ses, or other wise vig orously

point finge r of liability at non-settling de fe nd ant) ; Tex. C

apital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W .3d 760, 770 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (same) . Although Sepc o argues that Collinsworth confused the jur y and ca used the re ndition of an improper ve rdict, the re cord doe s not refle ct that the jury was mi s l ed. Ac c or din g ly , w e ov e rr

ule thi s is su e on

a pp e a l. 4. Legal and Factual S ufficiency of the Evidence to Support Fi ndin g of Ne gligence I n its fourth issue, Sepco conte nds that there i s n o e v id e n c e , or fa ctually insufficient e vidence , to suppo rt t he jury ’s finding that NTRP, Sepco, and Padre wer e the only neg lige nt parties. When consideringa lega l sufficie ncy challeng e, we revie w the evide nce in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t giving“cr edit [t o] favorable evidenc e if re asonable jurors could, a nd disreg ard[ing] contra

ry evidenc e unless re asonable jurors could not.” City of Keller v. W ilson, 1 6 8 S. W. 3 d 8 0 2 , 8 2 7 ( T e x. 2005). We must determine “ whether the evidence at trial would ena ble re asonable and fa ir-minded04
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- 15- peo p l e t o reach the ve rdict under revie w.” Id. Evidence is leg ally insufficient whe n the re cord discloses: (1) a

complete a

bsence of evide nce of

a vital fac t; ( 2) the court is ba rre d by rules of la

w or of e vidence from g iving weig ht to the only evidenc e offe red to pr ove a vital fac t; (3) the evide nce offe red to prove a vital fa ct is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the e vidence establishes conclusively

the opposite of a vital f

act. Id. at 810. When revie wing a fac tual sufficie ncy challeng e,
we c onsider all t h e ev i d en ce i n the re cord a nd reve rse only

if the ver dict is so contrary to the
overw helming w eig ht of the evidenc e as to be clea rly wrongand unjust. Maritime Ove rseas Corp.

v . E lli s , 97 1 S.W. 2d 40 2, 40 6- 07 (T e x. 19 98 ); Cai n v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). I n applying the se standar ds, we must b e m i n d fu l t hat the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ c redibility

and the we i ght to give the ir testimony
. City of Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 819. J urors ma y choose to be lieve one w itness and disbelieve a nother. Id. a t 81 9- 20 . M os t c re dib ili ty questions are implicit rathe r t han ex plicit in a jury ’s ver dict. Id. a t 81 9. Thus , re vie wi ngc ourt s mu st assume jurors de cided all of t hem i n favor of the ve rdict if re asonable human being s could do so. Id. Juro rs ma y dis re g ard e ve n un c on tr a dic te d a

nd un imp e a c he d te sti mony

fr om d isi nte re ste d w itn e sse s. Id. a t 82 0; see a lso Barrajas v. VIA Me tropolit an Transit Auth., 9 4 5 S. W. 2 d

2 0 7 , 2 0 9 ( T e x. Ap p . — Sa n A n to n io 1 9 9 7 , n o w r it ) ( ju r y ma y d is b e li e v e w it

n e s s e v e n th o u g h h is te s ti mo n y is not contra dicted). Evidence at Trial O n M a y 3 , 2 0 0 5 , U n i t e d w a s t h e w e l l o p e r a t o r

o f G ar c i a N o . 1 W e l l i nZ a

p a t a C o u n t y. Un ite d r e ta ine d Co lli ns wo rt h to c on du c t pr e ssu

re te sti ngon the we ll. L a

ur o Silva s, a

Col lin sw or

th employ ee, w as responsible for testing the well at a level of 9,500 pounds per square inch (psi). As04
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4 ... H a lli b u rto n w a s re ta ine d b y U n ited to p e rfo ra te the w e ll.

- 16- Silvas pre pare d to te st the well, Orteg a, a H alliburton 4 well hand, drove a company truck onto the well site. Orteg a was told to move away from the we ll and drove the Halliburton truck a bout 125 fee t from the we ll. Suddenly , there was a blowout, or explosi on, cause d by a burst in a section of the pipe nea r the surf ace . The c ontents of t

h e w e ll—a combination of dehydrate d or par tially -dehydrate d dr ill i n g f l u i d s an d m u d , o i l , b r i n e w a t e r , f

r e s h w a t e r , an d

s an d

— s h o to u to f

t h e v a l v e a t9 , 5 0 0 p si and hit Orteg a. He was blown fr om the back to the f ront of his truck, whic h is 40 feet long
. Orteg a, complaining that he hurt a ll over, wa s taken to the ne are st clinic in Za pata. F rom there , he wa s rushed to the hospital in L are do. He wa s diag nosed with lower lumbar and ce rvica l spine strains, multiple contusions, and a conc ussion. Throug hout the summer of 2005, Or teg a had pain in his back a

nd both pain and numbness in his leg , and suffere d from heacha ches so intense he
wo u l d v o m i t
. Dr
. Al ej an dro L o p ez , t h e H al l i b u rt o nd o ct o r, re fe rr edOr t egat o an o rt h o p ed i c surge on, Dr
. J o h nM as ci al e. Ba s edu p o na p h y s i ca l ex am i n at i o nan d an M R I , M as ci al e c o n cl u d edt h at Or t ega sustained a disc he rniation compre ssing the ne rve ro ot at the L -4 spinal re g ion. Masciale tr eate d Orteg a with a c onservative approa ch, p re s cr ibing pa in medications, corticoste roid injections, and phy sical thera

py . I n September 2005, Orteg a returne d to w ork at Ha lliburton after Ma sciale r elea sed him fo r l ig ht d

uty . O rt e g a

e xpla ine d th a t he wa s c on tin ua lly in p a in, bu t ha d to g o to wo rk be c a us e he made a promise to support his family . Masciale did discuss with Orteg a the option of c hang ing to a le ss p hy sic a lly

str e nu ou s o c c up a tio n, bu t Or te g a did no t have any oth e r sk ill se ts h e c ou ld u se to ear n a living. About a y ear

later, O rteg a under we n t s pinal surg ery afte r re alizing that the conse rvative treatment approa ch wa s n o t all eviating his pain, which wa s only g etting w orse. Dur ing the04
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- 17- operation, Masciale visually confirme d that Orteg a had a her niated disc imping ing on the nerve root
a t th e L -4
. Af

te r the surg e ry , Or

te g a ’s pa in i nit ia lly

wo rs e ne d, and

the n le sse ne d, bu t is sti ll p re se nt. Or te g a c on tin ue s to re qu ir e pa in me dic a tio ns to wo rk and to sle e p. Or te g a sta te d th a t he is n ot a

ble to enjoy time with his family like he used to be cause of the pe rsistent pain. Orteg a re turned to work in Janu ary

20 07 in a

le ss s tr e nu ou s p os iti on

bu t st ill wo rk s lo ngho ur s. Mascial e te sti fi e d th a t if O rt e g a c o n t i n u e s t o w o r

k i n m an u a l l a

b o r , h e w i l l r e qu i r e a f

u tu r e s u r g e r

y f o r r e c u r r e nc e of dis c herniation. Also discussed at trial was the cause of the blowout. Afte r the blowout, United pulled the pipe and f

ound a split in the tenth joint down-hole. U nited order ed API (Amer ican Petrole um I nstitut e) P-110 c ertified pipe from Padre , which Padre order ed fr om Sepco. Metallurg ical testing of the fa ile d p ipe c on du c te d a ft e r t he blo wo ut, ho we ve r, e sta bli sh e d th a t th e pip e did

no t me e t th e se require ments. United’s expert conc luded that the “r oot c ause [of the blowout] was that the pipe wa s far below industry

standards f

or the p i p e that had bee n order ed.” I n addition, the pipe was not subjected to the te sting re quired by the industry
. A mill test repor t from NTRP did not indi cate that any hy drostatic testing

—a test t o ensure that pipe will hold a specific amount of pre ssure—wa s perf ormed.
On a pp e a l, S e pc o a

rgue s th a t be c a

us e Un ite d, Col lin sw or

th, and Ha lli burt on we re a ll at f a ult for a llowing Or

teg a to be within the “zone of dang er” at the time of the blowout, the e vidence does
no t supp or tt h e j u r

y ’ s f i n d i n g s t h a tt h e s e p art i e s b o r e n o r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r O rt e g a ’ s i n

j u r i e s. Ad dit ion a lly , O rt e g a

him se lf , a s an e xperi enced we ll h and , s ho uld have kn ow n to pla c e him se lf outside the zone of dang er. Sepc o urg es us to reve rse this jud gm en t o n t h e basis of fa ctual ins uf fi c ie nc y a s w e did

inBay, Inc . v. Ramos , 13 9 S.W. 3d 32 2, 33 0- 31 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio04
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- 18- 2004, pet. denied) (holding evidenc e was fac tually insufficient to support jury ’s finding that mother bore zero r esponsibility

for e igh t ee n -month-old child’s injuries ca used by deploy ment of air ba g wh e re mot

he r, de sp ite he r kn ow le dg e that ba c ks e a t wa s sa fe st p la c e fo r a y oungc hil d, pla c e d c hil d in front passeng er se at). We find Bay distinguishable f rom t h e i n s t an t fa cts . Her e, ther e wa s not uncontrove rted e vidence that Orteg a was contributorily neg lige nt. Conversely , the jury had bef ore it evidence that Orteg a wa s located a rea sonable distance awa

y from the we llhead at the time of the blowout. Michael Smith, president of an oil and gas consulting firm, testified that a minimum of 100 fee t from the we ll is considere d safe in the industry . There was testimony that Orteg a wa s standing betwee n 120 and 125 fe et fr o m the well. F urther, the re w as no evide nce, a s Sepco ar g ues, that Orteg a knew

he wa s standing dir ectly

in the path of the out-f

low valve whe n the pi pe failed. Severa l witnesses testified that the e ntire 360-de g ree radius of the well i s a dang er zone duringpressure testing be cause of t he var ious things that ca n g o wrong . As such, ther e wa s no completely safe place to stand during the test. This evidenc e wa s sufficient to suppor t t h e jury ’s finding s that Orteg a, Un ite d, Col lin sw or

th, and Ha lli burt on

we re no t ne g lig e nt o r

t h a t t h e i r n e g l i g e n c e did

no t pr oximate ly
cause the ac cident. Sepco’ s fourth issue is overr uled. 5. Sufficiency of

the Evidence to Support Dam ages Findin gs and Dam age Awards I n its fifth issue, Sepco argues that the damag es finding s and judg ment are contra ry to the
e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l f or fi ve re a so ns . B e fo re a dd re ssi nge a c h d a ma g e awa

rd in tur n, we no te that the jury

g ener ally has broad discretion to a war d damag es within the rang e of e vidence prese nted at trial. Vela v. W

agner &Brown, Lt d. , 203 S.W .3d 37, 49 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (c i t i n g Gu lf S

tat es Uti ls. Co . v . Lo w, 79 S.W. 3d 56 1, 56 6 ( Te x. 20 02 )) . Ajur y is e nti tle d to dis be lie ve or

dis c ount a

ny pa rt of an expe rt ’s te sti mony , ev e n thou g h the ba sis of the jur y ’s sp e c if ic04
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- 19- calc ulation cannot be deter mined from the r ecor d. Se e Am e ric a’ s F av or iteChi c k

e n Co . v . S

am aras , 92 9 S.W .2d 617, 629 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) ( upholding jury ’s damag es verdic t where jury

did not unquestioningl y ac ce p t testimony of plaintiff’s e x pert, but re duced the amount of dama g es pre sumably based on c halleng es made by defe n dant’s expert to plaintiff’s dama g e s mo de l) ; se e als o Sta te Fa rm Fi re & Cas . Co . v . R od rigue z, 8 8 S. W. 3 d

3 1 3 , 3 2 1 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) , abrogated on other grounds by Don’s Bldg. Supply, Inc . v. OneBe acon Ins. Co. , 267 S.W .3d 20, 27 (Tex. 2008) (jury is free to blend the evidenc e and be lieve all, some, or none of

a witness’s testimony

); Ba rra jas , 945 S.W .2d at 209 (jury may disbelieve a

n expert witness conce rning damag es eve n though his testimony is not contradicted)
. A. Due to Ortega’s pre-e xistin g inju ries and condition s, there is no evide nce that any act or omiss ion on Se

pc o’ s p art c aus e d O rte

ga ’s all e ge d d amage s. Sepco ar g ues that all t he damag es findings should be reverse d beca use Dr. Masciale ba sed his c onclusion that the blowout c aused Orteg a’s injuries on his a ssumption that Ortega was sy mpt om- fr e e pr ior to the a c c ide nt; Se pc o c on te nd s Ma sc ia le ’s a ssumpt ion wa s e rr on e ou s b e c a

us e Orteg a sustained a

back injury in 1997 and never reported it t o Masciale . The 1997 injury , howeve r,
wa s a n e vu lsi on

fr a c tur e of

the L -5 . A s a

re su lt of the b low ou t a t is su e , O rt e g a su sta ine d a

dis c herniation at the L -4; Mascia le per formed spina l surg ery at the L -4. Orte g a stated he did not complain about or seek treatment for ba ck pain be tween 1998 a nd the date of

the blowout in 2005. Sepco also a lleg es Orte g a suffere d from a c ong enital condition and ar thritis. Masciale testified Orteg a has a

transitional seg ment at t he L -5, not the L -4. The f inding of arthritis was a lso discovere d aft e r the a c c ide nt at the L -5
. Thus , Sep c o cann ot de mon str ate that a pre vio us inj ur y or c on dit ion is to b lame fo r O rt e g a ’s dama g e s.04
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- 20- B. Fu ture lost earn ing capacity. The jury found Orte g a should be awarde d $577,950 for loss of future ea rning capa city ; the trial court r educe d the fig ure to $300,000. L oss of future ear ning c apac ity

is the plaint i ff ’s d i m i n i s h ed capa city

to ear n a living a fter the trial. Tagle v. Galvan, 1 5 5 S
. W
. 3 d 5 1 0 , 5 1 9 ( T e x. App.—San Antoni o 2004, no pet.). The jury has consider able discr etion in determining the amount of this awar d. Id. To support an award of damag es for loss of future ear ning capa city , the plaintiff
c an in tr od uc e e vid e nc e of pa st ea

rn ing s; the pla int if

f’ s sta min a , ef

fi c ie nc y , an d ab ili ty to wo rk wi th p a i n ; t h e w e a kn e s s e s an d

d e g e n e r a t i v e c h an g e s t h a tw i l l n a tu r a l l y r e s u l tf r o m t h e p l a i n t i f

f ’ s i n j u r y; and the plaintiff’ s work-life expectancy
. Id. Sepco maintains the evidenc e is insufficient to support any awa rd beca use Orteg a returne d to his same job a few months after the acc ident and eve n rec eived a pay raise. A lthough Or

teg a wa s working at the time of trial, the jury was e ntitled to consider the fac t that his earningcapa city may be diminished in the future due to another injury or surg ery . See id. Orteg a was 29 y ear s-old at the time of trial, a nd Dr. Stephen H orner , an ec onomist, t estified that if Orteg a we re not a

ble to work at all in the future, his lost ear ning c apac ity

would total $1.2 mill ion. Ba sed on this testimony , the j ury was free to determine w hat portion of Or teg a’s f uture wa g e ea

rning
c a p a c i t y w o u l d

b e l o s td u e t o a f u tu r e s u r g e r

y o r p e r i o d s o f

c o n v a l e s c e n c e . G i v e nt h i s t e s t i m o n y,
we c ann ot c on c lud e the awa rd of $3 00 ,0 00 wa s c le arl y

wr on g or manif e stl y un jus t. C. P as t an d f utur ephy sic al i mpair ment. The jury f o u n d O rte g a s h o u ld b e aw ar d e d

$ 5 7 7 , 9 5 0 f

o r b o th p a s t a n d f u tu r e p h y s ical impairment; the trial cour t reduc ed t he aw ards to $250,000 and $500,000, r espec tively . Phy sical impairment is defined a s the loss of a per son’s former lifesty le, extending be y ond pain, mental
an g u is h , an d

e ar n in g c a p a c ity
. See Casas v. Parade z , 267 S.W .3d 170, 188 (Tex. App.—San04
- 08
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- 21- Ant o n i o 2008, pet. denied) . Sepco conte nds Orteg a has not suff ere d an injury

distinct from and bey ond pain, mental anguish, and diminis hed ea rning capa city , nor will he suffe r the same in the future. Orteg a testified that a lthough he still g oes campingand take s trips with his family , it is not the same a s i t was be fore the ac cident. B eca use he is consta

ntly in pain, he is ea sily

irritated. He is n owg rumpi e r, so me tim e s le ss f un to b e wi th, and

le ss p lay fu l w ithhis c hil dr e n. Th e inj ur y a lso int e rf e re d w ithhis ro manti c re la tio ns hip wi th h is w if e . Ph y sic a l imp a ir

me nt c an inc lud e dif

fi c ult y communicating with others, inability to sle ep due to pa in, a nd inability

to play with children . See Pa tly e k v . B rit tai n , 1 49 S.W. 3d 78 1, 78 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 04, p e t. d e nie d) . T hu s, thi s evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the r emitted awa rds.
D. Pa st a nd f

utur ephy sic al p ain and

menta l an

gui sh. The jury found Orte g a should be a war ded $1,155,900 for past pain and mental a ng uish and $963,250.00 for f

uture pa in and ment al an g uish; the trial court re duced both f igur es to $750,000. The jury is give n broad discr etion in awa rding amounts for pa in and mental anguish beca use there
are no objective guidelines by wh i ch we m easur e the moneta ry equivalent of

pain and suff

ering resulting from phy sical injury
. Casas , 267 S.W .3d at 185. With respect to pa in and suffe ring , there
was e vidence that Orteg a wa s knocked to the ground after being hit by debris-f illed liquid propelled by a pre ssure of 9,500 psi. He hurt all over, a nd suffe red a

concuss i o n an d a d isc herniation. There afte r, Orte g a experienc ed hea dache s so intense he ofte n vomited. He also suff ere d from seve re ba c k a nd le g pa in a

nd numbn e ss in his le g . H e wa s c on sta ntl y on pr e sc ri pti on

pa id m e dic a tio n s o that he could f

unction and sleep. Masciale descr ibed Orteg a’s pain as “ chronic ,” mea ning he was
ne v e r p a i n - f

r e e . D u e t o t h e w o r s e n i n g p a i n , O rt e g a u n d e r w e n t s p i n a l s u r g e r

y . A l t h o u g h t h e pa in04
- 08
- 00 48 3- CV

- 22- was lesse ned by

the surg ery , it is st ill present. I f Orte g a continues to wor k, which he stated he plans to do in order to support his family , he will require another spinal surg ery

in the future. T here fore , the re cord c ontains sufficient e vidence of pain a nd suffe ring
. Withre sp e c t to me nta l anguis h, Or e tg a pr e se nte d e vid e nc e of a su bs tanti a l di sr

up tio n in his daily routine. Se e Pa rk

way Co. v . W

oo dr uff , 901 S.W .2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995). Even thoug h he
c o n t i n u e d t o w o r k an d e n g a g e i na c t i v i t i e s w i t h h i s f am i l y, a s S e p c o p o i n t s o u t , h e d i d n o t“ a c t i v e l y” eng ag e in the same activities. He was worrie d about providing for his family , he wa s easily irritated du e to t he c on sta nt s ta te of pa in h e liv e d in , a nd he wa s a lw ay s w on de ri ngwh e the r a c e rt a in a c tiv ity would h u rt h i s b ack. There fore , the post-re mitted awar d is supported by sufficie nt evidence that Orteg a suff

ere d, and would suff

er in the f uture, menta l ang uish.
E. F utur emedic al e

xp e nse s. F ina lly , the jur

y fo un d tha t Ort e g a sh ou ld be awa rd e d $50 ,0 00 fo r f

utu re me dic a l e xpe ns e s. Th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t r e mit thi s amou

nt. Dr . M a sc ia le te sti fi e d th a t O rt e g a ’s futur e me dic a l c os ts could exceed $100,000. H e ca lculated $300- $500 per y ear for of fice visits; a couple thousand dollars per

y ear for presc ription medications; $5,000 per injec tion treatment; $1,000 per MRI ; and over $10,000 f

or a fusion operation which Orteg a will “more likely than not” nee d if he c ontinues to w or k a s a manu a l la

bo re r. Or te g a te sti fi e d he wi ll c on tin

ue to w or k at H a lli burt on

to s up po rt

his family
. Sepco ma in ta in s th a t M a s c ia le ’ s te s ti mo n y th a t O rte g a ma y n e e d a f u tu r e o p e r a ti o nis too speculative to support the awa rd of $50,000 for f

uture medic al expenses. See B ill Mill er Bar-B- Q En te rs. , Lt

d. v . G on za le

s, No. 04-04-00747- CV, 2005 WL 2176079, at *3 n.4 (Te x . App.—San Antonio Aug . 24, 2005, pet. denied) (re ducing awa rd for future medical ex penses where there was04
- 08
- 00 48 3- CV

- 23- no evidenc e cla imant would, in reasona ble proba bility , require surg ery

). Even puttin g as i d e the $10,000 surg ery

cost, howeve r, there was suff icient evidenc e to support t he award for future medica l expenses based on Ma sciale’ s testimony that the cost of future office visits, t reatments, MRI s, and medication would excee d $100,000.
I nco n cl u s i o n , th e e v i d e n ce b ef o re t h e j u ry

wa s s u ff i ci en tt o s u

p p o rt t h e d am age s fi n d i n gs and dama g e aw ards. Ac cording ly , Sepco’s f ifth issue is overruled. 6. Jud

gment Cann ot b eEnte re d Ag

ain st Se pc o a nd P

ad re as Ma nuf

ac ture rs o r Se lle rs Orteg a alleg ed Sepco a

nd Padre w ere strictly

liable under

a manuf actur er/seller

theory pursuant to sec tion 82.003(a)( 5)(C) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, whic h provides that a seller

that did not manufac ture a product is not liable for ha rm ca used to the cla imant by

that product unless the claimant proves that the claimant r elied on the r epre sentation in obtaining or using the produc t. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 82.003(a) (5)( C) (Ve rnon 2005). Sec tion 82.003(a) (5)( C) does not apply , howeve r, to the instant situation because the par ties stipulated that NTRP is not subje ct to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts. See id. § 82.003(a) (7)( B) (“se ller that did no t ma nu fa c tur e a

pr od uc t is no t li a

ble fo r h arm

c a us e d to the c la ima

nt b y that pr od uc t un le ss the claimant pr oves . . . that the manuf actur er of the product is
. . . not subject to the jurisdiction of the cour t”). Ac cording ly , we ove rrule Sepc o’s six th issue. 7. Spoliat

ion In struction Sepco’s se venth issue raises spoliation of evidenc e. Spoliation is t he improper destruction of evidenc e, proof

of which ma

y g ive rise to a pr esumption that the m i s s i n g ev idence would be unfavor able to the spoliator. W a lk e r v . Th o m a s s o n Lu m ber Co. , 20 3 S. W. 3 d 4 7 0 , 4 7 7 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2006, no pet.). To r aise the s p o l i at i o n issue, the par ty seekingthe04
- 08
- 00 48 3- CV

- 24- presumption bear s the burden of establishing that the alleged spoliator had a duty to preser ve the evidenc e in question. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Johnson , 1 06 S.W. 3d 71 8, 72 2 ( Te x. 20 03 ). Th is du ty to pr e se rv e e vid e nc e ari se s whe n a pa rt y kn ow s o r r e a so na

bly sh ou ld k no w that ( 1) the re is a substantial chanc e th at a claim will be filed and (2) evidenc e in its possession or control will be materia l and re levant t o t hat claim. Id. We reviewa ruling on a spoliation instruction under an abuse of discretion standa

rd. Crescendo Invs., Inc . v. Brice , 61 S.W .3d 465, 479 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied)
. Af te r t he blo wo ut, Un ite d p ull e d th e pip e fr om the we ll an d sen t it fo r m e ta llurg ic a l ana ly sis ; Se pc o a lle g e s th e pip e was su bs e qu e ntl y de str oy e d w hil e in U nit e d’ s p os se ssi on and /or c on tr ol. Acc ording ly , Sepco maintains it was entitled to a spoli ation instruction beca use t he pipe wa s cruc ial to t he c a se , a nd it w a s una

ble to pres ent its thi rd -p art y c la ims a g a ins t U nit e d a

nd its de fe ns e s to Or te g a ’s c la ims . F ur

the r, Se pc o c on te nd s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s re fu sa l to inc lud e the ins tr uc tio n p ro ba

bly
re su lte d in

the re nd iti on

of an im pr op e r v e rd ic t. Orteg a and Collinsworth reply that the t ri al co u rt was unde r no duty to give a spoliation instruction beca

use the pipe at issue was not destroy ed; in fac t, it was available f or inspection and testing f or over two y ea rs before tria l, but Sepco never asked to see it. Col linsworth adds that
a lth ou g h a sma ll por

tio n of the pip e wa s des tr oy e d dur ing te sti ng —a nd that me ta llurg ic a l te sti ngis inh e re ntl y de str uc tiv e —Se pc o d oe s n ot a tte mpt to sh ow ho w it wa s pr e jud ic e d by

no t be inga

ble to examine or test those particula r portions of t he pipe. We ag ree there was no e vidence that United de str oy e d th e pip e wi th f

ra ud ule nt p ur po se or int e nt. See J

ohnson , 1 06 S.W. 3d

a t 72 2; Crescendo , 61 S.W .3d at 479. Acc ording ly , the t rial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the proposed instruction.04
- 08
- 00 48 3- CV

- 25- 8. Motion s for New Trial Finally , Sepco conte nds the trial court abused its discr etion in de ny ing Sepco’s motions for new tria l beca

use the many

serious er rors that oc curr ed during trial prejudice d and harmed S epco a nd resulted in the rendition of an improper ve rdict and judg ment. See Norton v. M artinez , 935 S.W .2d 898, 901 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ) (de nial of motion for newtrial is review ed for abuse of discretion). In particula

r, Sepco stre sses that the improper “Russians in the ir littl e coa ts and hats” a rg ument resulted in a ve rdict ag ainst “the Russians” only , despi t e Or t eg a’s r equest that the jury fi n d Un ited 33 1/3% responsible. In addition, Sepco alleg es it was entitled to a ne w trial beca use the jury

requ ired a

calc ulator to arr ive at its awa rd which “ mag ically ” adde d up to $4 milli on. Sepco maintains the re mitted awar d is also unjust. Al th o u g h t h i s c o u rt h a s r e c o g n i z e d t h e “ c u m u l a t i v e - e r r o r d o c t r i n e , ” i t d o e s n o ta pp ly in this case be ca u s e t h ere was no e rror by the trial cour

t with respec t to the previous issues
asser ted by Sepco. S

a enz v. Martinez , N o . 0 4
- 0 7
- 0 0 3 3 9
- CV , 2 0 0 8 WL 4 8 0 9 2 1 7 , a t * 1 0 ( T e x. A p p . — S anA n t o n i o N o v . 5 , 2 0 0 8 , n o pe t.) ; s ee C ortez ex re l. Estate of Puentes v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 131 S.W .3d 113, 124 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004), aff’d, 1 5 9 S. W. 3 d 8 7 ( T e x. 2005). Ac cording ly , we ove rrule this last issue. C ONCL US I ON The trial c ourt’s ame nded judg ment is affirme d.
Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice