Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Iroquois Warriors 

in Iraq

Steven E. Clay
Cover: Iraqi Major Ali, a company commander with 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 

3d Iraqi Army Division, shares a successful moment with US Army MAJ Mark 

Brooks, a senior advisor to the battalion. Photograph from the cover of The 

Advisor, 16 July 2005, credited to US Army SGT Lorie Jewell.
Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Iroquois Warriors 

in Iraq

Steven E. Clay
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Clay, Steven E., 1957-

 Iroquois warriors in Iraq / Steven E. Clay.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 1. Iraq War, 2003- 2. United States. Dept. of the Army. Division (Training), 

98th. I. Title. 

 DS79.76.C587 2007

 956.7044’3420973--dc22

 2007016154

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. 

The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of 

the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the 

Army or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press 

publications, many of them available for downloading, can be 

found at http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources.csi/csi.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use the CSI official seal on 

any republication of this material without the expressed written permission of 

the Director of CSI.

This is the Official US Government edition of this 

publication and is herein identified to certify its 

authenticity. Use of the 0-16-078425-5 ISBN prefix 

is for US Government Printing Office Official 

Editions only. The Superintendent of Documents of 

the US Government Printing Office requests that any reprinted edition clearly 

be labeled as a copy of the authentic work with a new ISBN.

F ro as le t yb eh S epu ri tn e edn tn fo D co mu e tn S.U ,s G . evo r emn tn P ri itn O gn ffice

I tn er en t: tskoob ro e P vog.opg. enoh : lot l f ree ( )668 -215 ;0081 D C a re ( a )202 -215 0081

Fa :x ( )202 -215 aM 4012 il: I potS DCC W , ihsa tgn no D , C -20402 1000

ISBN 978-0-16-078425-5
iii

Foreword

The role of the Organized Reserves in the history of the US Army has 

taken many twists and turns since the nation’s founding. The organization 

and missions of the Army’s reserves, both the National Guard and the Army 

Reserve, are once again undergoing fundamental change to meet the needs 

of the 21st century. In Iroquois Warriors in Iraq, Mr. Steve Clay analyzes 

the role played by the “Iroquois Warriors” of the US Army Reserve’s 98th 

Division (Institutional Training). In an unprecedented move, the soldiers 

of the 98th were called on in mid-2004 to deploy to Iraq and to fulfill a 

critical role in the building, training, and advising of the new Iraqi Army.

Prior to 2004, a US Army Reserve institutional training division had 

never deployed overseas to a theater of operations, nor were they designed 

to function as unit trainers and combat advisors. The author highlights the 

challenges faced by the 98th Division as it trained for and deployed to 

Iraq for this unusual mission. Among those challenges were how to train 

and prepare for the mission, who to send, how to integrate reservists into 

the new Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), 

and whether to deploy the 98th as a unit or as a collection of individual 

soldiers.

Throughout the turbulent period of 2004 and 2005 in Iraq, the soldiers 

of the 98th Division added to the proud legacy of the US Army Reserve. 

Iroquois Warriors in Iraq tells the story of the history of the 98th Division 

(IT), it is a compelling narrative of the earliest phases of the Army’s efforts 

to build the Iraqi armed forces, and it offers a number of key insights for 

the Army as it conducts the Long War. CSI is pleased to recommend this 

study for your professional reading. CSI—The Past is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Acknowledgments

This book was a pleasure to write because it gave me an opportunity 

to relate a part of a story that is often overlooked in American military 

history—the story of the US Army Reserve. Since World War I, the combat 

history of the Regular Army and the National Guard has been fairly well 

documented, while that of the Army Reserve has been spotty at best. I 

hope this monograph helps make up for that shortfall in some small way.

I wish to acknowledge the help and contributions of all the Iroquois 

Warriors and other soldiers associated with the 98th Division’s deployment to Iraq who made this book possible. They cooperated in this effort 

by participating in numerous interviews, telephone calls, and e-mails. 

They also sent me many documents that provided much of the framework 

and context of what happened. Without their assistance, this book would 

have been impossible to write.

In particular, I would like to thank LTC Jim DiRisio for providing me 

copies of numerous briefings, orders, rosters, e-mails, and memorandums 

he had collected throughout his period of active duty at Rochester and for 

the time he was in Iraq. Jim has a historian’s eye and made a pointed effort 

to preserve those documents for future use. Those documents certainly 

came in handy for this project. Jim also patiently answered my countless e-mails pestering him for information on a host of topics relating to 

various aspects of the mission. As a member of the tactical operations 

center (TOC) and then as the executive officer to the Coalition Military 

Assistance Transition Team (CMATT), he was particularly well positioned 

to observe many key events and actions and thus able to provide excellent 

commentary on most of the subjects.

Other soldiers also provided superb information and documents and 

patiently fielded my many queries as well. These included MAJ Matthew 

Jones, COL Gus Stafford, COL Jody Daniels, MAJ John Vernick, MAJ 

Scott McConnell, and LTC John Curwen. In addition, Matt Jones went to 

great lengths to set up numerous sessions with most of the people interviewed for this project, and COL Stafford spent a great deal of his time 

on phone calls and e-mails detailing the negotiations and complex issues 

surrounding the development of the redeployment training plan and its 

subsequent execution at Camp Atterbury.

Finally, I would like to thank those here at CSI for their help, advice, 

and support. In particular, I would like to express my appreciation to 

COL Timothy Reese and Dr. William G. Robertson for assigning me this 

project and for their invaluable input to the final product. Their advice 
vi

and recommendations on the analysis chapter were particularly welcome 

and appropriate. I also wish to thank Ms. Betty Weigand, my editor, for 

her patience and superb editing skills. She performed yeoman work on 

the manuscript and made it eminently superior to the initial draft. Any 

mistakes or omissions, however, are my own.
vii

Contents

Page

Foreword ................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgments ................................................................................... v

Figures ..................................................................................................viii

Introduction ............................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1. The 98th Division and the Foreign Army-Training 

Assistance Command .............................................................................. 3

History of the 98th Division ............................................................. 4

Foreign Army-Training Assistance Command ................................. 7

Chapter 2. Alert and Preparation ........................................................... 13

The Tactical Operations Center ...................................................... 13

Rumor, Confusion, and Concern .................................................... 16

Attempting to Bring Order to Chaos .............................................. 18

Premobilization Planning ............................................................... 22

Opposition to the Mission ............................................................... 25

Chapter 3. The Survey Team ................................................................. 31

Chapter 4. Mobilization and Training ................................................... 41

Manning the Battle Rosters ............................................................ 42

The Battle Over Predeployment Training ...................................... 45

Mobilization ....................................................................................51

Camp Atterbury ...............................................................................52

Boots on the Ground—Kuwait ........................................................66

Chapter 5. Staff and Training Team Operations .....................................81

The Mission .....................................................................................81

The Staffs .........................................................................................82

Base Support ....................................................................................91

The “Training Package” ..................................................................95

Chapter 6. The Advisor Mission ..........................................................115

The Command and Control (C2) Cell ...........................................115

The Advisor Support Teams ..........................................................117

The Advisor Experience—The 5th Iraqi Division ........................127

The Advisor Experience—The 3d Iraqi Division ..........................159

The Advisor Experience—The 1st Iraqi Division .........................176

The Iraqi Advisor Group and the Phoenix Academy ....................186

Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority with the 80th Division .......189

Chapter 7. Redeployment and Summary .............................................201
viii

Page

Chapter 8. Analysis and Conclusions ...................................................207

General Issues ................................................................................208

Advisor Specific Issues .................................................................212

Reserve Component Specific Issues ..............................................214

Assessing the Performance of the 98th Division ...........................224

About the Author ..................................................................................229

Glossary ...............................................................................................231

Bibliography ........................................................................................237

Appendix A. Chronology .....................................................................249

Appendix B. 98th Division Key Personnel, 2004–2005 ......................253

Appendix C. Redesignation of Iraqi Army Units, April 2005 .............255

Index ....................................................................................................257

Figures

1. 7 July mission analysis brief ............................................................19

2. MG Bruce E. Robinson, commanding general of the 98th 

Division ...........................................................................................20

3. 9 July course of action brief ............................................................21

4. Task areas identified by the advanced party ....................................32

5. COL Cipolla’s observations relayed to division headquarters ........32

6. BG Richard Sherlock, Assistant Division Commander, 98th 

Division, and later CG, Iraqi Advisor Group ..................................33

7. Advisor selection criteria .................................................................43

8. 98th Division’s predeployment training plan ..................................47

9. First Army’s predeployment training plan .......................................49

10. Division mobilization groups ..........................................................52

11. Iroquois Warriors practice clearing a house at Camp Atterbury ......61

12. Members of the 98th Division (IT) undergo AK-47 

familiarization training in Kuwait before deploying to Taji, 

Iraq, in October 2004 .......................................................................67

13. 98th Division key locations .............................................................82

14. LTG David H. Petraeus, commanding general of the MNSTC-I ....86

15. BG James Schwitters, commanding general of the CMATT ...........89
ix

Page

16. CPT Joe Burkhart demonstrates operation and assembly 

procedures to Iraqi soldiers .............................................................95

17. LTC George Crowell conducts logistics training with two Iraqi 

officers as part of the “Co-Op” program .......................................109

18. Elements of the 2d and 4th Companies, 6th Iraqi Battalion, 

clear a route north of Fallujah headed toward Al Karmah in 

Decemer 2004 ................................................................................133

19. LTC Dan Christian (center), advisor to the 3d Brigade, 5th 

Division, provides recommendations to the brigade commander, 

Colonel Rhaman (right), on the deployment of troops during 

Operation COBWEB......................................................................147

20. Medical evacuation operation for the four 3d Brigade advisors 

wounded by an IED just after the conclusion of Operation 

FISHNET, 8 July 2005 ..................................................................150

21. SSG Christopher Dill and Emad, a unit interpreter, at a 

checkpoint north of Fallujah in December 2004. Dill was 

killed in action 4 months later near Balad Ruz .............................154

22. CPT Ari Moskowitz, staff advisor to Headquarters, 3d 

Division, Iraqi Army, provides 9mm pistol familiarization 

training to members of the 3d Division staff at Al Kasik 

Military Training Base, Iraq, in December 2004 ...........................159

23. CSM Robert Riti, senior enlisted advisor to the 3d Iraqi 

Division, and his Iraqi counterpart inspect election banners 

and election equipment prior to distribution by Iraqi Army 

forces before the 30 January 2005 Iraqi National Elections .........165

24. Advisors and soldiers of the 3d Iraqi Division detain 

suspected insurgents following roadside ambush near Rabiah 

in January 2005 .............................................................................167

25. LTC Terrence Crowe .....................................................................172

26. A typical haul of ammunition confiscated during one of 

the Iroquois Warriors’ many search missions conducted in 

conjunction with their Iraqi Army units ........................................181

27. Just prior to his departure from Iraq, MAJ John Bovina 

receives the Iraqi General Service Medal from Brigadier 

General Abdullah for his services as an advisor to the Iraqi 

4th Division ...................................................................................202



Introduction

In August 2004, the 98th Division (Institutional Training) was formally 

assigned the mission of deploying approximately 750 soldiers to Iraq to 

reinforce the newly formed Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq (MNSTC-I), commanded by Lieutenant General (LTG) David H. 

Petraeus. The MNSTC-I mission was to enable the Iraqi armed forces to 

take over the mission of fighting and defeating the insurgency that had 

developed in Iraq since the summer of 2003. Major General (MG) Paul 

Eaton who commanded the under-resourced Coalition Military Assistance 

Transition Team (CMATT), an agency owned by the Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA), had undertaken the initial effort in 2003–2004. When 

MNSTC-I was organized as a separate command under the Multi-National 

Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) in June 2004, CMATT was subsumed by the new 

headquarters. Nevertheless, MNSTC-I, like CMATT before it, was not 

sufficiently manned to conduct the mission adequately. The challenge was 

to find units and personnel to reinforce the command to enable it to satisfy 

its mission requirements. Ultimately, the solution was found in assigning 

the mission to the US Army Reserve’s 98th Division.

In the summer of 2004, virtually all of the US Army’s active and 

National Guard combat brigades were in Iraq or Afghanistan, had just 

returned from an overseas mission, or were currently slated for an overseas assignment. Additionally, the various Special Forces (SF) groups in 

the same two components were equally committed. There seemed to be 

no good option for reinforcing the MNSTC-I. However, a concept that 

had its genesis in the desire to reorganize the US Army Reserve (USAR) 

training divisions to be capable of supporting current world realities rather 

than those of the Cold War paradigm was coalescing at the same time the 

planners in the Pentagon were grappling with how to support Petraeus’ 

new command. That idea, termed the Foreign Army-Training Assistance 

Command (FA-TRAC), was the brainchild of LTG James R. Helmly, the 

Chief of the Army Reserve and the commanding general of the United 

States Army Reserve Command (USARC).

This monograph is the story of how that concept evolved and how it 

came to form a nexus with MNSTC-I that resulted in the use of a USAR 

training division for an overseas combat mission for the first time in US 

Army history. The monograph presents issues connected with the mobilization, deployment, training, and integration of Reserve Component (RC) 

units and personnel in general; the use of units to perform tasks not part 

of their mission essential task list (METL); and issues associated with the 

major task assigned to the 98th Division—training and advising a foreign 
army. It finishes with an analysis of the overall mission and provides conclusions and recommendations for consideration. The intent of this monograph is to expose leaders and soldiers to the issues described above, so 

in future conflicts, and perhaps even for the current conflict, they might 

gain insights that will enable them to develop solutions should similar 

problems arise.


Chapter 1

The 98th Division and the Foreign ArmyTraining Assistance Command

Go do it.

LTG Richard Cody

The story of how the 98th Division, or more properly how soldiers

from the 98th Division, a table of distribution and allowances (TDA) 

organization designed to train and educate leaders and soldiers on basic 

and advanced individual skills at Army training centers, was selected 

and deployed to support the efforts of the MNSTC-I to train and advise 

the Iraqi Army in collective combat tasks seems unusual at first blush. 

However, when one views Army history, one will find numerous examples 

of Army units and soldiers assigned missions for which they were not 

originally organized, equipped, and trained. It has often occurred in past 

wars and is certainly true in the current conflict. Moreover, it will likely 

occur again in the future.

When the 98th Division received its mission in August 2004 to go 

to Iraq and support the MNSTC-I, the priority of requirements as designated by LTG Petraeus were: first, to fill numerous staff vacancies in 

the command; second, to provide various training capabilities to establish 

and develop institutional training for the Iraqi Army (officer and noncommissioned officer academies, Military Occupational Specialty schools, 

etc.); and third, to advise and support Iraqi Army units on “operations 

and training management issues.”1 The operative words in the last priority 

are “advise” and “operations.” Within these two words lie the reality of 

the mission conducted by the soldiers who performed the division’s most 

controversial task—advising the Iraqi Army.

It is useful at this point to explain the difference between training 

and advising. Training units and individuals in the sense that the 98th 

Division was designed to do entails the instruction of specific individual 

and collective (e.g., squad, platoon, company, etc.) tasks using the various 

tasks, conditions, and standards defined and detailed in the US Army’s 

various training manuals. Most 98th Division advisors believed they were 

going to Iraq to train the units of the Iraqi Army in a garrison environment. 

Advising a foreign army, however, is not the same as training it. Although 

advising can include training, it primarily consists of the effort to establish 

trusting relationships with the unit leaders and advise them on the best 

ways to perform missions. As an advisor, one coaches his counterpart 
and recommends options or courses of action before and during combat 

operations. Advising usually involves exposure to potentially lethal 

situations. This scenario is closer to what the advisors of the 98th Division 

would actually experience.

Before reviewing what the division’s soldiers did in Iraq, it is helpful 

and important to understand the history of the division and how it became 

involved in the mission.

History of the 98th Division

The 98th Division is nicknamed the “Iroquois Division” for its shoulder insignia, which depicts an Iroquois warrior with five feathers that symbolize the five civilized tribes of that nation. The blue and orange colors 

of the patch represent the House of Nassau for the Dutch settlers who 

originally settled the upstate New York area where the division has been 

historically located.

The 98th has the dubious distinction of being the only division still 

on the rolls of the Army that has no official combat experience. It began 

its existence as a National Army division mobilized at Camp McClellan, 

Alabama, beginning on 1 October 1918. The division was one of a number that were being organized and trained to participate in the great Allied 

offensives envisioned to take place in the spring of 1919. Colonel (COL) 

Jennings B. Wilson was assigned as the division’s chief of staff and took 

command of the personnel assembling at Camp McClellan pending the 

assignment of a commanding general. As things turned out, other than the 

division headquarters, the 26th Trench Mortar Battery at Del Rio, Texas, 

was the only unit assigned to the division to be organized during the war.2

The division’s initial connection to the northeast United States was 

loosely established that fall when two New York National Guard regiments, 

the 52d Pioneer Infantry (12th New York) and the 53d Pioneer Infantry 

(47th New York), both already in France, were slated to be reorganized 

and redesignated respectively as the 389th and 390th Infantry Regiments 

and assigned to the division as part of the 195th Infantry Brigade. This 

action never transpired as the War Department ordered the demobilization 

of the division on 30 November 1918, and the division’s first chance to 

show what it could accomplish in combat faded to nothing.3

The division was reconstituted in June 1921 as an element of the 

Army’s newest component, the Organized Reserves. The division headquarters was established on 18 August 1921 at Syracuse, New York, thus 

formally establishing its ties to the northeast in general and to the state of 

New York in particular. The various infantry, artillery, and service units of 
the division were organized throughout the upstate area. During the interwar years, division units were composed mostly of Reserve officers and a 

few enlisted reservists. By law, the Organized Reserves could only enroll 

up to 33 percent of an organization’s authorized enlisted strength. This 

political constraint was imposed through congressional action secured 

by powerful National Guard lobbies to ensure the new federal component would not compete with the nation’s second-string team of ground 

forces.

Regardless of the problems encountered with manning, the leaders 

of the division busied themselves by attending various drills, classes, and 

schools during the inactive training period. An interesting point to note 

here is that unlike their counterparts in the National Guard, reservists were 

not paid for their attendance at training events during the inactive training 

period that generally ran from September to June. The only time reservists 

were paid was when they attended active duty training, which typically 

consisted of a 2-week training camp held at a Regular Army installation.

The 98th Division’s units attended camps at various locations depending on the branch of the unit. For example, the infantry regiments went to 

Fort Niagara, Fort Porter, or Plattsburg Barracks in New York, or Camp 

Dix in New Jersey. The artillerymen went to Pine Camp (now Fort Drum). 

The quartermasters attended camp at Fort Hancock and the signaleers 

went to Fort Monmouth, both in New Jersey. Since there were few enlisted 

men in the division, officers of the various units gained practical knowledge in leading soldiers by running the annual Citizen’s Military Training 

Camps at various posts and for some years by taking command of a unit of 

Regulars on minor maneuvers. Junior officers would later receive invaluable experience by participating in the running of Civilian Conservation 

Corps (CCC) companies during 6-month stints on active duty at various 

CCC camps. These training cycles went on year after year with only a 

few exceptions, most notably the participation of many of the division’s 

personnel in the large First Army maneuvers in 1935, 1939, and 1940 as 

umpires and fillers for Regular Army and National Guard units.

As World War II approached, training vastly increased for members of 

the division as did opportunities for tours on active duty with the Regular 

Army. As more Regular Army units were activated, individual reservists, 

including many from the 98th, were called to the colors. As a result, personnel assigned to the 98th Division were not mobilized as part of the 

division when it was finally activated in 1942—there were too few reservists left in the 98th to mobilize as units. The division, in essence, had been 

“cherry-picked” to the point that it made more sense to start from scratch 
rather than try to build it around a cadre of a few junior officers not yet 

called to duty and World War I-era senior officers who would likely be 

relieved for age.

When the division was activated at Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky, in 

September 1942, it was composed of personnel from all over the country, 

but it still did not lose its northeastern flavor as many of the assigned draftees were from New York and New England. After undergoing its postmobilization training and “D” series tests, the Iroquois Division was sent 

to Hawaii in April 1944 to further prepare for combat in the Pacific. As 

in World War I, the 98th was slated to participate in one of the last great 

offensives of the war—Operation OLYMPIC. For OLYMPIC, the division 

was to land on the island of Kyushu and help reduce the remaining armed 

resistance in Japan. Just as in the previous war, the fighting ended before 

the “Iroquois Warriors” got their chance to prove their mettle. The division 

did participate in the demilitarization of Japanese forces and occupation 

activities in the areas around Osaka. In February 1946, the colors were 

once again cased and returned to the United States.

The following December saw the unfurling of the colors at Syracuse 

when the division was again organized in the Reserves. Members of the 

unit spent the next 12 years attending drills and annual training (AT) at 

Fort Dix and Camp Drum and otherwise preparing for mobilization as 

an infantry division. In May 1959, however, the 98th Division received a 

change of mission that would be the focus of its attention for the next 48 

years. It was reorganized and redesignated as a training division.

Under this new guise, the 98th Division was responsible for taking 

over a replacement training center and assuming responsibility for 

conducting basic combat training (BCT), advanced individual training 

(AIT), and common specialist training (CST). The Iroquois Division’s 

wartime mission was to assume control and operate Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri, as an infantry training center. That focus remained static until 

1968 when the division’s AIT mission was changed to engineer-specific 

training and the regiments were reorganized as brigades. In 1994, under 

a major transition of Army Reserve training divisions, the 98th was 

reorganized as an institutional training division or DIVIT. Under this 

concept, the division, which retained its engineer BCT and AIT missions, 

picked up a wider array of training and education missions that were once 

the responsibility of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) schools. 

These included the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), 

noncommissioned officer (NCO) basic and advanced courses, officer basic 

and advanced courses, the Command and General Staff Officer Course 
(CGSOC), nursing courses, civil affairs courses, and a number of others. 

Because of this reorganization, the division assumed command of units all 

over the northeastern United States as some elements of the inactivated 

76th Division and a number of the USAR schools were integrated into its 

structure. The 98th Division was in this configuration when it was being 

considered for a new mission—the Foreign Army-Training Assistance 

Command (FA-TRAC).

Foreign Army-Training Assistance Command

In the autumn of 2003, LTG James R. Helmly, Chief, Army Reserve 

(CAR) and CG, USARC was convinced (unlike some in the Pentagon who 

were already talking about demobilizing the National Guard and Army 

Reserve) the situation in Iraq would be a long-term obligation for large 

numbers of US troops to perform nation-building and security duties. He 

believed the active force was too small to fill all the requirements and the 

only way to meet the need was with the assistance of RC units. Helmly 

also knew that his own component, the USAR, was too inflexible to meet 

modern warfare demands because much of it, especially the 11 Reserve 

training divisions, was still structured for a Cold War type scenario. Thus, 

he began to look for ways to transform the USAR, or at least parts of 

it, to “generate greater capability within existing resources.” One of his 

concepts was what he termed the FA-TRAC.4

In the FA-TRAC, Helmly envisioned a standing headquarters 

commanded by a major general (Regular Army or Reserve) that possessed 

a robust planning staff consisting of both regulars and reservists. This 

headquarters would deploy to a failed, failing, or defeated nation to 

coordinate the planning and execution of rebuilding all or parts of that 

nation’s armed forces. With the assistance of the USAR’s DIVITs and/or 

Training Support Divisions (TSDs) coming into country on a rotational 

basis, the FA-TRAC would establish what was essentially a mini-version 

of the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and 

its training base. The established training base would be parts of BCT, 

AIT, CST, the Officer Education System (OES), the Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System (NCOES), the Command and General Staff 

College (CGSC), the War College, lane training, and other special training 

capabilities to meet the needs of that nation’s army. Only those parts of 

the DIVITs or TSDs called for by the FA-TRAC would rotate to conduct 

the mission. As the assisted nation stood up its own training institutions 

capable of assuming the mission, the FA-TRAC would eliminate those 

requirements from the rotation schedule. On completion of the mission, 

the command would return stateside and prepare for the next deployment. 
In essence, the FA-TRAC concept envisioned a purely training role for 

any USAR elements attached to it.5

Sometime that fall, Helmly went to see LTG Richard Cody, Army 

G3, to discuss the idea of the FA-TRAC. Cody evidently liked what he 

heard because he asked Helmly to further develop the concept and brief 

him on the results. After some frustrating work with his staff (the young 

staff officers struggled to understand what was needed for the concept), 

Helmly provided the results in a brief to Cody on 28 April. There had been 

one minor change to the original concept that was included in the new 

brief. Because no new force structure or manpower spaces were going to 

be forthcoming anytime soon, the concept was changed to have a DIVIT 

headquarters function as the FA-TRAC headquarters instead of an entirely 

new command.6

Cody approved the concept brief. In this concept, Helmly concluded, 

Cody saw a means to relieve the Army combat units of some of the burden 

in Iraq with which they had been saddled after the end of major combat 

operations. Cody (and others) apparently perceived that the Army’s brigade 

combat teams and combat arms brigades (including those of the National 

Guard) would quickly become stretched thin in terms of scheduled 

rotations to Iraq to perform just the basic security missions, not including 

the training of the new Iraqi Army.7

Since its inception, the FA-TRAC concept was discussed and debated 

in the halls of the Pentagon, at USARC headquarters, and within the USAR 

at large, but the pace of implementation of the idea was slow. Helmly’s 

idea filtered its way to the Army’s force provider, US Army Forces 

Command (FORSCOM), which opposed the concept because it wanted to 

use National Guard units to train the Iraqi Army. Helmly recalled:

At the time, the Guard had already assumed the mission of 

helping to train up the Afghan National Army and they’ve 

done an exemplary job of that, but they used the asset 

of task organizing TOE-deployable Guard brigades. . . . 

when I first proposed [FA-TRAC], FORSCOM seemed to 

oppose my concept, saying that they would just use Guard 

brigades. I kept arguing, though, that that was ridiculous 

because you’re going to end up needing those Guard 

brigades to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan or elsewhere. . . . 

Here again we were victimized all the way down to Army 

FORSCOM; general officers were believing what the DOD 

was saying—that we would be down to five brigades in Iraq 

and one in Afghanistan 6 months from now or whenever.8
The pace of progress began to change in late May 2004 when Cody 

asked Petraeus, who had been recently ordered to take command of the 

newly formed MNSTC-I, to sit in on a briefing at the Pentagon before 

he went to Iraq. The briefing, conducted on 1 June by Brigadier General 

(BG) Gary M. Profit, Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve, covered the FATRAC concept. Also in attendance were Cody; Helmly; MG Bruce E. 

Robinson, the commanding general of the 98th Division; and BG Richard 

Sherlock, the division’s assistant division commander (ADC). Petraeus 

recalled the brief was “essentially a proposal whereby one of the institutional training divisions of the US Army Reserve could take on the same 

mission that MNSTC-I was about to embark on” and it presented the idea 

that this division “could take on substantial portions of the mission.”9 The 

brief also recommended that a USAR training division take on that mission, which included helping the MNSTC-I headquarters become operational and providing training teams to train three Iraqi divisions. Sherlock 

recalled that Petraeus’ response to the FA-TRAC idea was “Let’s do it.” 

Petraeus wanted a survey team to come to Iraq to conduct a requirements 

and “troops to task” assessment.10 Cody assigned the survey team mission 

to Robinson’s 98th Division.

Once in Iraq, the new MNSTC-I commander wasted no time in issuing the appropriate instructions for the survey team. On 3 June, the day 

after his arrival in Baghdad, Petraeus’ headquarters issued MNSTC-I 

Fragmentary Order #15 that outlined the visit of the team to Iraq. It called 

for a three-person advanced party to arrive on, or about, 3 July, followed 

by the rest of the team of 10 personnel to arrive on, or about, 20 July. The 

order included the names of the 98th Division personnel who would make 

up the team and, in general, the team’s activities and the locations it would 

visit.11 The stage was set on the Iraqi side of the water to begin gathering 

information for a decision.

After the 1 June brief, Helmly directed Sherlock to conduct a mission 

analysis for the survey and brief it to Cody. Sherlock and a small team put 

together the brief and presented it to Helmly on 15 June. Helmly recollected that the plan was “very solid and I was very pleased with it.” He 

approved the conclusions and gave Sherlock his blessing to present the 

brief to Cody on 18 June.12

The 18 June briefing was attended by Cody; Helmly; Robinson; and 

COL Frank Cipolla, commander of the division’s 2d Brigade, a OneStation Unit Training (OSUT) brigade headquartered in Buffalo, New 

York. Sherlock’s brief depicted a three-phased operation: deploy a survey 

team to Iraq to conduct the assessment, develop the FA-TRAC’s tables of 
10

organization and equipment (TOE) to meet MNSTC-I’s mission requirements, and stand up the FA-TRAC and subordinate elements in Iraq to 

assume the mission no later than 15 October. The brief also provided two 

courses of action regarding the organization of the FA-TRAC headquarters. Both courses envisioned a robust headquarters of 240 to 319 personnel commanded by an Army Reserve major general and detailed the 

capabilities of each option. It concluded with a series of questions, the 

command’s critical information requirements, which needed answered to 

complete the planning for the mission.13

What was known was that MNSTC-I needed a lot of reinforcements 

to be able to address the myriad responsibilities of the new command. 

The major unknown was what the FA-TRAC’s actual mission requirements were in terms of the mission tasks and the numbers of personnel and 

kinds of skill sets needed to satisfy the demands of those tasks. The survey 

team’s mission was to go to Iraq and find out those details and report back 

to the Army Staff and other agencies for a decision on deploying all or 

parts of a training division to form the FA-TRAC to support MNSTC-I.

On conclusion of the brief, Cody asked a few questions, and then said, 

“Okay, the mission is approved. Go do it.”14 Cipolla, who had already 

been identified as one of the potential survey team members, recalled that 

Helmly turned to him and said, “I envy you,” and then asked, “Are you 

ready to go?”15 Of course, Cipolla replied that he was. Now all that was 

required was to get the survey team to Iraq and start the research.
11

Notes

1. Headquarters, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

Support Unit, “Requirements Assessment,” 3 August 2004, 5–6.

2. Center of Military History, Order of Battle of the United States Land 

Forces in the World War, CMH Pub 23-4 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1988), Vol 3 Pt 2, 666–67.

3. Ibid.

4. MG James R. Helmly, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 December 2006, 1. MG Helmly was appointed 

as a lieutenant general during his tenure as the Chief, Army Reserve. When he left 

that office, he returned to his permanent rank of major general and was serving as 

such at the time of this interview.

5. Ibid., 4.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 5.

9. LTG David H. Petraeus, interview by author, Headquarters, Combined 

Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 December 2006, 4.

10. BG Richard Sherlock, interview by author, Office, Chief of the Army 

Reserve, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 16 November 2006, 1, 10; “Requirements 

Assessment,” 2.

11. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Fragmentary Order 

#15, Subject: Training Support Division Training Assessment, Baghdad, Iraq, 

Date/Time Group: 032100D June 2004. Apparently the names had been provided 

by the division to Petraeus before his departure to Iraq.

12. Sherlock interview, 16 November 2006, 1.

13. Headquarters, 98th Division, PowerPoint Brief, “The Foreign ArmyTraining Command, Proposed Timeline and Operational Concepts,” 18 June 

2004.

14. Ibid., 1, 4.

15. BG Frank Cipolla, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 November 2006, 2.

13

Chapter 2

Alert and Preparation

How can you do that?

98th Division Soldiers to LTG Helmly

USA Today, 16 September 2004

After LTG Cody approved the mission, Robinson and Sherlock began 

preparations to send a survey team to Iraq and to mobilize the division. 

This was not as straightforward as it may seem as the division had to continue its routine operations and, at the same time, plan for an impending 

mobilization without adequate information. The potential for mobilization 

created a host of questions that needed answers before any realistic planning could be conducted. Yet, Robinson could not afford to have his staff 

sit on their hands and wait for those answers before starting to get the division ready should it be mobilized. Robinson and Sherlock also had to concurrently sell the concept of deploying a DIVIT to Iraq to the generals at 

FORSCOM and USARC, all of whom (except Helmly of course) seemed 

to be against the idea and who would have a say in the final decision. Both 

of these situations caused a great deal of uncertainty and confusion among 

the Iroquois Warriors throughout the summer.

The Tactical Operations Center

On his return, Robinson directed Mr. Todd Arnold, the division’s command executive officer (CXO), to activate a planning cell at the Reserve 

Center headquarters in Rochester. On 21 June, Arnold activated the cell 

under the division’s G3, COL Bradford Parsons.1 The cell, which came to 

be referred to unofficially as the TOC (tactical operations center), was to 

coordinate and plan the alert, home station premobilization training, mobilization, and deployment of division elements (including the survey team) 

to Iraq. Once the survey team deployed to Iraq, the TOC was to operate on 

a 24-hour basis to provide the team with a ready communications conduit 

and response center.2

To assist him in executing the TOC mission, Parsons appointed 

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Christopher Semler as the officer in charge 

(OIC). Semler had one full-time military technician and nine drilling reservists who were brought on active duty initially under 30-day 

Additional Duty Training orders, and later on short-term Contingency 

Operation Temporary Tour of Active Duty (COTTAD) orders. Among the 

latter was Major (MAJ) James DiRisio, who recently transferred to the 

98th from the 84th Army Reserve Readiness Training Command.3
14

DiRisio felt honored at having been asked to come on active duty to 

help plan for this major event in lieu of others, but the division’s new chief 

of staff soon dispelled this feeling. The Department of the Army (DA) 

had recently directed the American flag patch be sewn on the right sleeve 

of soldiers’ battle dress uniforms (BDUs), and DiRisio had not yet gotten 

around to having it attached to his uniforms. One drill weekend, soon after 

reporting to work with the planning cell, the chief of staff called together 

all the officers to discuss with them the importance of being aware of the 

realities of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In front of those officers, he then pointed out DiRisio as an example of someone slow to grasp 

that reality because he had not sewn the flag on his uniform. 4

Though responsible for establishing the TOC, as the CXO Arnold was 

primarily in charge of the 98th’s active duty staff that took care of the dayto-day operations of the division. While the TOC prepared the division for 

the deployment mission, Arnold continued to coordinate, plan, and execute the division’s normal missions dealing with the Total Army School 

System (TASS), Initial Entry Training (IET), Professional Development 

(PD) training, and other missions that had not been removed from the 

division’s plate. To some degree, this situation caused friction between the 

members of the TOC and the division staff. DiRisio recalled, “Initially, the 

majority of the full-time support staff looked at what the TOC was doing 

with varying levels of disinterest or contempt. Many simply could not 

be bothered by the thought that we were engaged in something that was 

completely beyond the high levels of competency they had developed in 

executing the division’s traditional missions.”5

Arnold, however, was not one to let that condition fester. DiRisio went 

on to say:

LTC Arnold was the person through whom the TOC interacted with the 98th’s full-time staff, and in this capacity, 

he gradually became more involved and interested in the 

work the TOC was doing. . . . LTC Arnold was extremely 

adept at making the linkages between our needs and the 

full-timers’ abilities to make things happen. He met often 

with COL Parsons and [MAJ Matthew] Jones, and most 

often took the lead in communicating the effects of our 

planning to the rest of the division.6

Parsons and his small team had other challenges to overcome besides 

the division staff. The immediate problem was one of gathering information. This was extremely problematic, as Sherlock had forbidden the 

TOC to coordinate with higher headquarters (USARC and FORSCOM) 
15

except under specific circumstances. Sherlock was concerned that these 

two headquarters, which had staff personnel strongly opposed to the idea 

of using a DIVIT to reinforce MNSTC-I, would attempt to kill the effort. 

Also, the TOC was not allowed to contact other Reserve divisions that had 

already sent people to support the Iraqi Army training effort.7 Additionally, 

Parsons had been cautioned on the kinds of information he could share 

with subordinate units. Thus, the members of the TOC were often dependent on the division’s full-time staff to surreptitiously acquire answers to 

questions in which they themselves were largely disinterested.

Nevertheless, the TOC team went to work trying to get answers 

through other means. COL Robert Catalanotti, commander of the division’s 1st Brigade in Providence, Rhode Island, remembered that Parsons 

was “intensely trying to pull that information in from outside sources. . . . 

He was doing everything he could to try and understand the mission and 

how the mission was to be filled with personnel, equipment, and logistics.”8

 Without the advantage of having members of the 98th already in 

Iraq providing the division with answers to the key questions and with 

the communications constraints imposed, such a task was proving next to 

impossible. “We started gathering as much open source information as we 

could,” DiRisio remembered, and “started making contacts over there [in 

Iraq] and got onto the SIPRNET [secure internet protocol router network] 

and did a little bit of exchanges of classified information.”9 Still, the information flow was a trickle and certainly not adequate for serious planning 

efforts. Some help was on the way, however.

On 23 June, just 2 days after the TOC stood up, Cipolla and two other soldiers that made up the survey team’s advanced party arrived at the division 

headquarters. The other members were LTC Phillip McGrath, commander 

of the 1st Battalion, 304th Regiment, an IET unit out of Londonderry, New 

Hampshire, and Captain (CPT) Ramin Dilfanian. Dilfanian was assigned 

to the 6th Battalion (Military Intelligence), 98th Regiment at Fort Devens, 

Massachusetts, and had been born in Lebanon. He was an Arab linguist 

and would function as the team’s interpreter. The three soldiers conducted 

their Soldier Readiness Program (SRP) at the Reserve Center and departed 

for the Continental United States Replacement Center (CRC) at Fort Bliss, 

Texas, on 26 June.10

On 6 July, BG Sherlock and the other 10 members of the survey team 

gathered at division headquarters. The team included COL William Clegg, 

assistant division commander for support; LTC Jody Daniels, deputy chief 

of staff; LTC Anthony Morales, assistant G3; and LTC Lawrence J. Kelly, 

commander of the 13th Battalion, 98th Regiment; among others. Also 
16

included in the lineup was LTC Sean Ryan, a staff officer on loan from 

the Office of the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 

Guard and Reserve Affairs, who had worked with Sherlock on a previous 

assignment. Ryan, whose background in the Reserves had been in Special 

Operations and then later in mobilization, went along as the G5 Plans officer. The team was organized somewhat along the lines of typical staff 

functional areas (S1 through 4), but also included personnel who would 

analyze collective training, security, medical, and TASS requirements.11

After completing the SRP at the division headquarters, the team departed 

for Fort Bliss on 10 July. With the departure of the survey team, Parsons 

and his TOC staff would soon start receiving some of the answers they 

needed.

Rumor, Confusion, and Concern

After getting the survey team on its way to Fort Bliss, Arnold and 

Parsons continued preparations to, as they initially understood it, “mobilize the entire division.”12 They were not alone in their belief that the whole 

division was to participate in the mission. It was a common perception in 

the early stages of the mission among most of the division’s leadership. 

Indeed, on the day before the survey team left for Fort Bliss, the New York 

Times ran a widely printed Associated Press article that led with the statement, “As many as 3,600 soldiers from the 98th Division could be headed 

to Iraq . . .,” which certainly helped to reinforce the idea in the minds of the 

rank and file.13 This impression was to hold sway among most members of 

the division for some time before the survey team would quash it with its 

findings later in the summer.

As the G3, and thus a member of the division staff as well as the 

TOC, Parsons had the responsibility to communicate information on the 

plans for the possible mobilization to subordinate commanders and staffs. 

Though he had to be very careful what he provided, he tried to keep the 

brigade commanders informed. This contact was critical in trying to minimize the rumor mill that begins grinding when units get word of a potential mission. When it first started operations, the TOC went to great lengths 

to conceal what it was doing. No one outside the command group and only 

a few people on the division staff even knew of the cell’s existence and 

mission. But, few things stay secret for long. According to DiRisio, “As 

soon as people heard there was a TOC set up, the word began to get out 

that things were going to happen—that we were probably going to Iraq 

or Afghanistan. The word also got out about training a foreign army.”14

Parsons attempted to control the inevitable rumors by providing information to brigade commanders as soon as possible when he received answers 
17

he was allowed to pass on. As the G3, he held a weekly conference call 

with brigade commanders to relay the latest facts, particularly those bits of 

information that began to trickle in from the advanced party. “Step-by-step 

along the way we had counseled all our brigade commanders and our division staff as well as our commanding general,” Parsons remembered, “of 

the serious nature of the mission and the risk we had in going forward.”15

On 12 July, the division initiated “Stop Loss” to prevent a rapid loss 

of personnel from the division through transfers, separations, and retirements. This action reinforced the idea that the division was about to be 

assigned a mission. The speed of the rumor mill increased after 16 July 

when a formal alert notice was received by the division headquarters from 

the Department of the Army. The order listed the division headquarters and 

40 subordinate units, including the band.16 This event combined with the 

recent news articles about the possible mobilization and deployment of the 

division to Iraq shook even the most dubious of the division’s soldiers.

Rumor now appeared to be reality, and not all members of the division were happy about it. Many were shocked that what was normally a 

nondeployable TDA (that is, a noncombat administrative) unit was apparently getting ready to be mobilized to go to a combat zone. Reservists who 

felt they were safe from having to deploy now faced the real possibility 

that they might have to soldier in the heat, flies, and bullets of the Middle 

East rather than the relative comforts of Fort Leonard Wood or Fort Dix. 

The thought prompted protests from a few of the reservists and from some 

family members.

Even the most senior Army reservist in the country was not immune to 

receiving complaints. In a USA Today article, Helmly described the reaction he received after the 98th Division was alerted. “I’ve gotten cards, 

letters, and e-mails [saying], ‘How can you do that?’” He also heard from 

reservists who said, “I didn’t think it would happen to us.”17

Helmly recalled that at the beginning of the GWOT, the Army Reserve, 

as an institution, 

 . . . had been lulled into believing that they probably 

wouldn’t be mobilized and, if they were, it wouldn’t be 

for long. . . . The problem . . . was that everybody wanted 

their damn security blanket. Well, my intent was to take 

that security blanket away. I want you to understand that 

the world is not amenable to a security blanket. It’s different. It’s changed. So I was doing everything I could to 

change the organization to accommodate the demands of 

war.18
18

He had told many of his subordinate leaders that this was a different 

kind of war and the Army Reserve had to change to accommodate it. 

Unfortunately, many reservists either did not hear their chief’s warnings 

or chose to ignore them, believing things would go on as usual. Now, 

at least for reservists in the Iroquois Division, reality was setting in, and 

some could not or would not adapt.

Those who had no intention of going to Iraq, providing the division 

actually received the mission which was by no means certain at this point, 

could either desert (none did), transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve 

(IRR), or if they were eligible could request retirement. A number of senior 

officers and NCOs chose one of these options, some as early as mid-June. 

One of those quick to transfer to the IRR was the division’s new chief of 

staff—the very same man who had recently chided Jim DiRisio for being 

slow to grasp the gravity of the GWOT by not having the American flag 

sewn on his BDUs. Another soldier, a brigade sergeant major, who after 

being provided a sanitized brief of the potential division mission, went 

straight to the G1’s office to prepare his retirement packet.19 In a flurry of 

paperwork, several other seasoned leaders submitted retirement packets 

and, with the approval of the division commander, these soldiers ended 

their association with the Army Reserve, which left vacancies in the division’s various staffs and units.20

Although there were those who chose to leave when the going was 

getting serious, there were more Iroquois Warriors who had a desire to 

actually do this mission. When asked later about what went right with the 

division’s experience in Iraq, Arnold reflected, “What went right was the 

98th Division soldiers’ reaction to the deployment. We had individuals 

who were slated to retire and they postponed their retirements. We had 

individuals who were going to PCS [permanent change of station] or end 

their tour of service and they postponed them. There were a lot of people 

who wanted to participate in this mission.”21

Attempting to Bring Order to Chaos

While the staff dealt with the reaction to the news that the division 

might go to Iraq, the TOC team continued to gather information and 

develop plans from what they acquired. In the second week of July, Parsons 

had them develop two briefs with the information they had gleaned thus 

far. The purpose of these briefs was to update division leaders and higher 

headquarters staffs on what the division might do in Iraq. Though ultimately 

not reflective of what the division actually did, and keeping in mind that 

the survey team had not yet arrived in Iraq, these briefs provide a glimpse 

into what the impressions were among division leaders at that point.
19

The first was a mission analysis brief dated 7 July and prepared 

ostensibly to update MG Robinson on what the mission was thought to be. 

It began by providing the mission statements for MNSTC-I and CMATT 

sent back by the advanced party. Figure 1 provides the highlights of the 

briefing.

The briefing ended with the following restated mission and intent for 

the division:

Mission: On order, TF 98, 98th DIV (IT) (-), deploys to 

Iraq and trains the new Iraqi National Army to support the 

national sovereignty of Iraq.

Figure 1. 7 July mission analysis brief.

 Facts:

• The Office of Security Transition owns eight bases22

• The 98th Division will be the headquarters for 

command and control of Iraqi Army training

• The Army G3 had directed attachment of additional 

assets to the 98th Division

 Assumption: FA-TRAC will be a 98th Division mission

 Essential Tasks:

• Develop a training force and the FA-TRAC command 

and control structure

• Deploy

• Execute mission

 Constraints/limitations:

• Must retain structure to execute the division’s Training 

Year (TY) 04 and 05 TASS, IET, and PD missions

• 3,110 potentially deployable personnel

 Timeline:

• 7 August Main CP deploys

• 28 August Mobilization groups begin deployment

• 30 September Assume mission
20

Intent: We will deploy TF 98 to Iraq to train the new 

Iraqi National Army (INA) to rebuild their capability to 

provide their own National Security capability and reduce 

Coalition presence in Iraq. Success will be defined by the 

completion of the training of 3 divisions consisting of 3 

brigades of 3 battalions per brigade, and the successful 

redeployment of TF 98 to home station.23

At this point, it is clear the division still planned to deploy the 

headquarters to provide command and control of the division’s efforts 

in Iraq. It is interesting to note that the focus was on training and not 

advising. It is also apparent the division was still planning to execute all, 

or at least some, of its normal training support requirements as it had not 

been relieved of those taskings. The 30 September date for assuming the 

mission was based on what was believed to be a mobilization order that 

would arrive at any moment.

The second brief (figure 3), prepared on 9 July, listed the same basic 

facts and assumptions, and addressed three courses of action (COAs) for 

each of three issues.

Figure 2. MG Bruce E. Robinson, commanding general of 

the 98th Division.

Timothy J. Hanson
21

This brief also illustrated that the planners assumed the predeployment 

training would occur at Fort Bliss, Texas, or Fort Dix, New Jersey, or a 

combination of the two. If the latter option was selected, personnel going 

to staff positions would go through a short train up and processing at Bliss. 

The remainder of the division personnel, that is the trainers and mentors 

working with the Iraqi Army, would go through a more extensive train 

up at Fort Dix. The task organization for the training teams envisioned a 

training component similar to a DIVIT’s typical capabilities as a major 

part of the division’s mission. The SME/mentor COAs also show that the 

planners at this point did understand there was a requirement for what 

were being referred to in Iraq as Advisor Support Teams (ASTs). Still, it 

Mobilization sites (for predeployment training):

• COA 1: Fort Bliss

• COA 2: Fort Dix 

• COA 3: A combination of Forts Bliss and Dix

Task Organization for “Training Teams” (for conducting 

OES, NCOES, BCT, etc., in Iraq):

• COA 1: Two brigade headquarters, each with four battalion 

headquarters, each with three BCT companies

• COA 2: Three brigade headquarters, each with three battalion 

headquarters, each with three Advanced Skills Training 

companies

• COA 3: Two brigade headquarters, each with three battalion 

headquarters, each with three BCT companies; one additional 

battalion headquarters with six BCT companies for surge 

capability

Subject Matter Expert (SME)/Mentor Integration (for 

“mentoring” Iraqi Army units):

• COA 1: SME/Mentor Detachment at brigade headquarters 

only (28 personnel)

• COA 2: “Robust” SME/Mentor Detachment at battalion 

headquarters (20 personnel each)

• COA 3: “Modest” SME/Mentor Detachment at battalion 

headquarters (12 personnel each)

Figure 3. 9 July course of action brief.
22

is interesting to note that the word “advisor” had not yet entered the 98th 

Division’s deployment lexicon.

Premobilization Planning

While the TOC struggled with finding and providing answers, the 

subordinate units of the division were not idle. Brigade and battalion 

commanders and their staffs began to prepare their troops for this possible 

deployment by identifying who was and was not deployable and planning 

time during drill schedules for processing the soldiers through the standard 

SRP, conducting limited predeployment training, and holding Family 

Readiness Group (FRG) meetings.

The first step in deciding who of the roughly 3,300 soldiers of the 

division would go on the mission was determining who was deployable. 

Soldiers with retirement orders, PCS orders, or certain types of permanent physical defects were all exempt from the deployable list. MAJ John 

Vernick, the division’s assistant G1 mobilization officer in charge of identifying the pool of deployable personnel, soon discovered that security 

clearances were an issue. Feedback from the theater of operations was that 

everybody had to have a current clearance, and not everyone in the division met that requirement. Mr. Jose Santiago, the division’s security manager, suddenly found himself deep in paperwork for initiating new security 

investigations. There were also instances where certain individuals could 

not be granted clearances for financial difficulties or for prior criminal 

records and thus became ineligible for deployment. Then there were the 

provisions of the Lautenberg Amendment. This law, which amended 

the Gun Control Act of 1968, prohibited anyone convicted of domestic 

violence from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving firearms 

or ammunition, including military personnel on official business. Thus, 

Vernick was required to verify all convictions of soldiers in that category, 

and if found to be accurate, those soldiers were eliminated from the list. 

Fortunately, only about 10 soldiers met that particular condition.24

Due to the lack of hard answers on what the division’s actual 

personnel requirements were for the mission, two assumptions were made 

for the purposes of developing the initial deployment list or battle roster. 

First, the division would not be relieved of any of its routine training 

requirements. Thus, some personnel would have to stay behind to satisfy 

those requirements and to run the division’s rear command post (rear 

CP). The latter organization would keep the division’s headquarters in 

Rochester open, command the stay-behind detachment, address family 

readiness and support issues, and provide a communications node with the 
23

division headquarters in Iraq. The second assumption was that everybody 

not needed in the rear CP or for TASS, IET, and PD requirements, or who 

were not otherwise disqualified, would deploy.25

As the mobilization officer, Vernick suspected that once the mobilization order arrived there would be pressure to get an initial mobilization 

group to Iraq as quickly as possible. By law, the Army had to give RC 

soldiers 30 days after notification of mobilization to take care of personal 

issues before they were brought on active duty. Typically, these issues 

included notifying their employers of the mobilization, taking care of outstanding bills, preparing their spouses and children for their absence, and 

completing any pending legal requirements. The law also allowed soldiers 

to waive that right, and so the word went out to the division asking for 

volunteers to waive their rights to the 30-day delay. Significantly, about 

200 volunteers responded to the request. For these troops, the biggest concern was not so much the idea of soldiering in Iraq, but the fear that their 

employers would find out they volunteered to go early.26

At the regular monthly home station drills, units began processing 

soldiers tentatively identified as deployable through the SRP. This 

included verification, preparation, or revision of personal documents such 

as wills, emergency data sheets, allotments, applications for Servicemen’s 

Group Life Insurance, and Family Care Plans (FCP). The process required 

soldiers to undergo physical or dental examinations if the previous exams 

were out of date and it allowed the unit administration personnel to help 

soldiers update their personnel records. Typically, this process would take 

a soldier about 2 hours of drill time to complete, unless one or both of the 

medical exams were required. The results of the SRP conducted in midJuly for the 2d Battalion, 390th Regiment were probably typical. During 

that drill, 35 soldiers went through the SRP. On average, about 46 percent 

of the documents in each of the files needed some form of revision. This 

was normal given many of the revisions were things such as updating 

phone numbers or addresses. Only five of those soldiers had unsatisfactory 

or incomplete FCPs. Additionally, the soldiers’ mobilization files were 

collectively rated as “Good,” although several were missing at least one 

required document.27

In addition to the SRP, units also conducted training on many of the 

“40 plus 9” tasks. These consisted of 40 common task tests (CTTs) and 9 

battle drills required by TRADOC and FORSCOM for premobilization 

training and testing. Among the events were things such as putting on and 

wearing the protective mask, first aid, and a number of individual weapons tasks. Some thought this training, or at least part of it, was a waste 
24

of time on at least two levels. In the case of the protective mask tasks, 

people believed that Iraqi insurgents would not use chemical or biological 

weapons in their own country. Second, all of the tasks were those that drill 

sergeants routinely taught. It seemed odd that those considered the experts 

at teaching such tasks were now required to prove their own proficiency 

performing them.

The soldiers’ families were also brought into the premobilization 

activities. At numerous Reserve Centers throughout the northeast, division 

units set up Family Readiness Group briefings for soldiers and their loved 

ones. At these meetings, family members were briefed on a host of issues 

that dealt with mobilization: how to get ready for the absence of their 

soldier, Army benefits for active duty reservist families, and the various 

agencies available that provided support to families of service personnel. 

MAJ Paul Loncle, who would deploy to Iraq as a member of OES Mobile 

Team 4, described his impressions of the FRG efforts:

The family readiness group (FRG) brought [the family 

members] in and had a series of subject matter experts 

speak, starting with Mr. John Knope, our FRG director. He 

had all these various organization representatives come 

and explain benefits, what they could and couldn’t do . . . 

all [of the agencies were] represented. The Red Cross was 

there to tell how to get Red Cross notification messages 

to your soldiers. They explained what [conditions] would 

really permit emergency leave—that whole process—and 

I thought they did a very thorough job. They had a lot of 

handouts. It was very well run and organized and I thought 

they did a really good job providing as much information 

to the families as possible.28

In addition to the group that Knope assembled to inform the family 

members, MG Robinson also attended many of these meetings to talk personally with the spouses and children of his troops:

General Robinson was on the road probably 5 days out of 

every week for several months. He was going to different locations meeting with families—and anybody who 

wanted to meet with him, he would make himself available. He would start in Maine and work his way south to 

New Jersey and western New York. There were a couple 

times when he would show up at a location with only 

a few people there. But in his eyes, as long as he met 

with one person who understood what was happening, he 
25

considered that a success. There were a lot of questions. 

Some of ours were, ‘Why is my father/brother/son, who is 

not an infantryman, mobilized for infantry duties? What 

is their mission once they get over there? What is their 

mission once they come back?’ There were standard questions, plus additional ones. The biggest thing was, ‘This 

is something new—what can you tell us [about what] 

they’re going to be doing over there? Yes, you’re taking 

them into harm’s way, but what exactly are they going to 

be doing?’29

Though many family members were not thrilled with the prospect of having their soldier deployed to Iraq, these meetings, and Robinson’s personal 

efforts, went a long way toward making them feel they were indeed part of 

the Army family and were not going to be alone in this adventure.

Opposition to the Mission

As all the division’s premobilization preparations were proceeding, 

the staffs at USARC and FORSCOM were clearly aware that Robinson, 

Sherlock, and the 98th Division were all leaning forward in the saddle 

with the intent to participate in this mission. Members of the division, 

most notably Sherlock and Robinson, had been keen from the beginning 

to get the Iroquois Division involved in the FA-TRAC business. The division’s direct involvement in the series of June briefings in Washington 

and the deployment of a survey team to support MNSTC-I reinforced the 

impression. Many of the key staff officers in the USARC and FORSCOM 

were against the 98th Division, or any Reserve division for that matter, 

being involved in such a venture. Throughout the summer, while the survey team was in Iraq developing the requirements assessment, staff officers at USARC and FORSCOM brought up reason after reason to the 98th 

Division staff, to the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, and to the 

Pentagon, why the division should not do the mission.

The USARC opposition developed across a wide spectrum of real and 

perceived issues: DIVIT soldiers were not trained for a combat mission, 

the FA-TRAC mission would conflict with training missions in the continental United States (CONUS), other units were better qualified or had 

more available personnel, and this was a pseudo-advisor mission and many 

DIVIT soldiers were not combat arms and those that were combat arms 

were out of practice. The USARC staff also stated that other DIVITs were 

complaining that if the 98th Division was tagged with the mission, they 

might have to pick up the 98th’s TASS requirements. Opposition from the 

FORSCOM staff appeared to be based on two main points: first, DIVIT 
26

soldiers did not possess the right skill sets for what was shaping up to be an 

advisor-type mission; and second, the division might not meet its TASS, 

IET, and PD training missions for FY 2005 due to its reduced drill sergeant 

and instructor pool.30 The key point of contention for both appeared to be 

focused on the advisor aspect of the mission.

In some respects, it was rather odd these two headquarters were so 

opposed to this idea. The very theater that the division was to support was 

positively disposed toward the idea. Reflecting on the issue, BG Sherlock 

related:

I’d have to say there was much more significant resistance . . . in CONUS than there was overseas. From the 

moment I arrived in Kuwait, Lieutenant General David 

McKiernan, before he left, and then Lieutenant General 

R. Steven Whitcomb after he arrived—because General 

McKiernan was leaving very shortly after I arrived—

General Petraeus, Major General Gary Speer, the deputy CG at CFLCC [Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command], they all said, ‘How can we make you successful? What do you need?’ There was a lot more trepidation 

back . . . at FORSCOM, at United States Army Reserve 

Command (USARC), and at the Department of the Army 

(DA)-level where there was a feeling of, ‘How can you 

think of using institutional training division soldiers? 

All you get with those are drill sergeants and platform 

instructors who have no collective training experience.’ 

I think there was also a certain amount of ‘not invented 

here’ resistance.31

LTG Helmly confirmed the resistance:

Because we were doing something different that had 

never been done before, it got to be very difficult. I can’t 

remember the number of people who kept telling me we 

couldn’t do certain things; that [the 98th Division] was 

only a TDA organization and wasn’t meant to do what 

we were proposing. One of the reasons I was voted Mr. 

Congeniality in the Pentagon was that I said, ‘Screw you! 

I’ve got my orders and we’re going to do it, goddamn it.’ 

And we did it. It was hard but that’s what you get paid for. 

By the way, the people who actually did the ‘Lord’s work’ 

here—General Sherlock and the entire 98th—I never had 

one problem with them. They were all for it. They wanted 
27

to do it. It was all the institutional pieces like the USARC 

staff . . . , it was all these other people.32

Despite the opposition, neither of the division’s two higher headquarters ever seem to have proposed an alternative option to using a DIVIT 

to support MNSTC-I. The staffs were against it for a host of reasons, but 

largely because they perceived that the 98th’s reservists did not have the 

right skill sets to be advisors—and that opposition was extant despite the 

fact that in excess of 50 percent of the personnel already performing as 

ASTs were Army reservists.33 Whether or not Sherlock could overcome 

the combined opposition of the USARC and FORSCOM staffs would be 

contingent on what the survey team developed in the MNSTC-I requirements assessment and how well that assessment fit what the 98th Division 

could provide.
28

Notes

1. COL Bradford Parsons, telephone interview by author, Headquarters, 

98th Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 1. Parsons had been asked 

to come to the division headquarters in Rochester to be part of the planning cell. 

He arrived on 18 June, the day of the Cody brief, and stood up the TOC 3 days 

later.

2. LTC James DiRisio, e-mail to author, Subject: 98th Division in Iraq, 

9 January 2007.

3. Ibid.

4. LTC James DiRisio, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 January 2007.

5. Ibid. Todd Arnold also explained that some of the foot dragging on the 

part of the full-time staff was because their counterpart at the USARC was telling them the 98th Division would never get the mission and that BG Sherlock 

was wasting everybody’s time. The full-time staffers apparently believed this and 

thus were reluctant to spend much time working on issues associated with the 

mission.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. COL Robert Catalanotti, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th 

Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 2.

9. LTC James DiRisio, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 2.

10. Ibid.

11. COL Sean Ryan, interview by author, Joint Center for International 

Security Force Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 December 2006, 3; MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq, Fragmentary Order #15, Subject: 

Training Support Division Training Assessment, Baghdad, Iraq, Date/Time 

Group: 032100D June 2004.

12. COL Todd Arnold, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 1.

13. New York Times, 9 July 2004, “Rochester: 3,600 Face Prospect of Iraq 

Duty,” 6.

14. DiRisio interview, 3 November 2006, 3.

15. Parsons interview, 3 November 2006, 3.

16. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Alert Order, Subject: DA Alert 

Order #549-04, DAMO-ODM, Washington, DC, Date/Time Group: 161816Z 

July 2004.

17. USA Today, “Army Reserve chief says force was not well-prepared for 

terror war,” 16 September 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/

washington/2004-09-16-army-reserve_x.htm; accessed 3 November 2006.

18. MG James R. Helmly, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 December 2006, 10.

19. DiRisio, telephone interview, 9 January 2007.
29

20. Ryan interview, 21 December 2006, 8. Some soldiers in the 98th Division 

were critical of Robinson’s actions in this regard, but the argument can be made 

that these officers and NCOs were not likely to be assets to the division and may 

not have been positive contributors to the mission.

21. Arnold interview, 4 November 2006, 6.

22. The Office of Security Transition was essentially the forerunner to 

MNSTC-I.

23. Headquarters, 98th Division (IT), PowerPoint Brief, “OPLAN 04-XX 

(FA-TRAC), Mission Analysis Brief” (Draft), 7 July 2004.

24. MAJ John Vernick, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 5 November 2006, 4.

25. MAJ John Vernick, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 January 2007.

26. Vernick interview, 5 November 2006, 2.

27. Headquarters, 77th Regional Readiness Command, PowerPoint Brief, 

“Task Force Liberty Soldier Readiness Program After Action Report for 2d 

Battalion, 390th Regiment, 2d Brigade, 98th Division,” 10–12 July 2004.

28. MAJ Paul Loncle, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division (IT), 

Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 1–2.

29. Arnold interview, 4 November 2006, 7.

30. COL Todd Arnold, e-mail to author, Subject: RE: 98th Division in Iraq, 

8 January 2007.

31. BG Richard Sherlock, interview by author, Office, Chief of the Army 

Reserve, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 16 November 2006, 10.

32. Helmly telephone interview, 2 December 2006, 6.

33. Sherlock interview, 16 November 2006, 11.

31

Chapter 3

The Survey Team

This is the right answer—for this snapshot in time.

LTC Sean Ryan

COL Cipolla and the advanced party arrived at Baghdad International 

Airport (BIAP) on 4 July. The work of the advanced party and the followon survey team would determine the future of the FA-TRAC, and to a 

lesser degree, the future of the 98th Division’s association with the effort 

to reinforce MNSTC-I in its mission to rebuild the Iraqi Army.

The mission of the advanced party was to acquire initial survey guidance from Petraeus and prepare for the arrival of the survey team in terms 

of lodging, vehicles, phones, computers, and visit schedules. The party 

met with Petraeus on 5 July. In that meeting Cipolla recalled that Petraeus’ 

main emphasis was on the creation of 39 Advisor Support Teams (AST) 

to replace those already deployed with the first three divisions of the new 

Iraqi Army.1 The task seemed straightforward enough, though it would 

prove to be the most difficult task the division had to accomplish.

The following day, Cipolla went to meet with BG James Schwitters, 

the commanding general of CMATT to get his assessment. Cipolla recollected that Schwitters asked a number of questions regarding the differences between a DIVIT, a TSD, and a Reserve Readiness Command. 

Schwitters then proceeded to reinforce to Cipolla what the survey team 

needed to do while in Iraq. At this point it was becoming clear to Cipolla 

this was not just a training mission. He remembered Schwitters told him the 

ASTs were not really trainers, but that their jobs were “teaching, coaching, 

and mentoring. . . . General Schwitters always stressed those three things.” 

The party’s next stop was a command and control cell at Taji Military Base 

northwest of Baghdad. There, the officer in charge explained the cell’s 

mission in supporting the ASTs, who and what the ASTs really were, and 

how the cell performed its job. It turned out to be the very job Cipolla 

would hold after the 98th deployed.2

As the advanced party gathered information on the situation in Iraq and 

the evolving requirements from MNSTC-I, Cipolla began sending reports 

back to the division headquarters at Rochester. First, Cipolla had been 

presented with five task areas that related to the MNSTC-I and CMATT 

missions that he relayed back to Sherlock. Figure 4 identifies the five task 

areas.
32

Additionally, he sent back the observations that significantly changed 

the original planning assumptions (see figure 5).

Task Area 1: Identify and institute professional development 

training with a timeline of events (2005 through 2008).

Task Area 2: Advise and support Joint Iraqi Forces for operations and training—staff exercises, mission essential task list 

(METL) development, yearly training guidance development, 

and yearly training calendar development.

Task Area 3: Integrate the Iraqi National Guard into the Iraqi 

Army—similar to a “One Army Concept.”

Task Area 4: Develop senior-level Army staff capabilities—

Combined Staff (Operations) and Joint Staff (Administration 

and Logistics).

Task Area 5: Provide Advisory Support Teams for the Iraqi 

Army.

Figure 4. Task areas identified by the advanced party.

1. Command and control requirements were smaller than 

anticipated due to theater structure in place (i.e., CMATT 

HQ).

2. Basic training requirements needed to support the Iraqi 

Army were smaller than anticipated.

3. The complexities of training a national army in the 

multi-ethnic and multi-tribal Iraqi culture had been 

underestimated.

4. The complexities of training through interpreters had been 

underestimated.

5. The structure of the Iraqi Army was still being refined, thus 

their training requirements and priorities would continue to 

shift to match the emerging requirements of the theater of 

operations.3

Figure 5. COL Cipolla’s observations relayed to division headquarters.
33

In short, the original concept of an FA-TRAC headed by the 98th Division 

was fast becoming irrelevant—CMATT already occupied that position; 

the training aspect of the mission was about to be deemphasized; and the 

advisory aspect of the mission was about to become much more apparent 

as an emerging requirement.

Meanwhile, the survey team arrived in Iraq on 24 July after a 2-day 

stopover in Kuwait. On his arrival in Baghdad, Sherlock had an idea of 

what he (and many other Iroquois Warriors as well) thought the 98th 

Division’s main task would be if it was to get the go ahead for the mission. He recalled, “We believed it would take a structure for an organization to flesh out the FA-TRAC concept, because the original mission we 

were given by Generals Cody and Helmly was to look at going over and 

performing all the training for the regular army, essentially consuming 

what was then the CMATT mission [emphasis added].”4 After a very short 

time in country, Sherlock and the survey team confirmed Cipolla’s initial 

reports. Seeing the command and control infrastructure that MNSTC-I 

already had in place, his original idea was now radically changed. As he 

later reflected on the situation, Sherlock stated: “. . . because you had a 

Figure 6. BG Richard Sherlock, Assistant Division 

Commander, 98th Division, and later CG, Iraqi 

Advisor Group.

DA Photo
34

CMATT, a CPATT [Coalition Police Assistance Training Team], a joint 

headquarters AST, and a MNSTC-I staff already with a skeletal structure, 

instead of trying to supplant one of those organizations with a plug-in 

structure, we found it [would be] most efficient if we were to augment the 

existing structure and see where we could draw from our skill sets to flush 

out the rest of the organization.”5

The FA-TRAC, at least as originally conceived, was now essentially 

dead (though the term would be used intermittently until well into the 

division’s tour in Iraq). Nevertheless, there was still the task to determine 

what MNSTC-I and its subordinate commands needed, and Sherlock and 

his team set out to do just that. Tony Morales recalled that Sherlock:

. . . broke down the survey team into two to three groups 

of individuals to go out to various camps and to interview 

Marines and Army advisors who were already in that 

role and learn their mission . . . we didn’t have a script, 

we didn’t have any questions written down. We put that 

together after being with General Sherlock and him asking what do we need to do.6

Over the next 8 days, the group interviewed Petraeus and Schwitters and 

their principal staffs; BG William J. Troy, Chief of Staff of the MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I); MG Peter Chiarelli, CG of the 1st Cavalry 

Division; and 37 advisors from 18 different ASTs.7

From Petraeus, the survey team received, among other things, one 

piece of pointed guidance—there was no need for the 98th Division headquarters to come to Iraq. CMATT was already in place; therefore, there 

was no need for the division commander or the flag to deploy.8 Petraeus 

also indicated that his priority was to get his staff vacancies filled with 

people possessing the right skill sets. The MNSTC-I staff was operating at 

about 30-percent strength and he needed people as quickly as possible to 

fill positions and get the headquarters functioning properly.9

From Schwitters, who was in the position the CG of the FA-TRAC 

would have filled, the team received additional guidance. Regarding his 

interview with the team, Schwitters stated he emphasized the need to have 

ASTs that were cohesive and “familiar with each other.” He believed teamwork was critical to the success of advisor teams. He also made the remark 

that only about one-third of the current AST members were effective in 

working with their Iraqi units. Ryan recalled asking the general about what 

had been done to prepare them for their duties as ASTs. “Nothing” was 

Schwitters’ response.10 Ryan further explained:
35

[Schwitters] was very frustrated with the inability of 

the advisor support teams, or military transition teams 

(MiTTs) as they were later called, because only about a 

third of those teams were effective. The truth of the matter was that [nothing had been done] to prepare them to 

be effective—and [Schwitters] agreed with that. That led 

to an outgrowth of [the survey team] role, which was to 

develop an initial training package that would prepare 

them to be effective.11

Thus, one of the additional tasks the team had to tackle was to develop 

a training plan that, should the 98th Division get the mission to deploy, 

would better prepare those soldiers slated for advisor duties. As will be 

seen, the result of this effort was to later cause much friction between the 

98th Division staff and the First Army G3.

The survey team also visited Chiarelli and ASTs that were working 

for the 1st Cavalry Division training the Iraqi National Guard (ING) to 

get a feel for what training and logistical support those personnel believed 

was needed for the advisor mission. The ASTs informed the survey team 

they were critically short of almost everything advisors needed in the 

way of equipment and supplies. From this discussion, the team began to 

develop a standardized set of equipment for ASTs that included two uparmored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and 

two vehicle-mounted crew-served weapons (M2 .50-caliber machine gun, 

Mark-19 grenade launcher, or M240 machine gun) per team, M4 assault 

rifles with scopes, and AN/PVS-14 night vision devices.12

Additionally, the advisors told the team that incoming AST personnel needed specific training before they assumed the advisor mission. The 

recommended training included live-fire exercises in convoy training and 

forced-entry into buildings, communications training on the new generation of Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) 

radios, and cultural awareness training.13 If it had been murky before, it 

was now crystal clear to Sherlock and his team (though it would not be to 

those to be assigned as advisors) that those soldiers assigned as advisors 

would not be training the Iraqi Army, but would be directly involved in 

working with Iraqi units in combat situations.

The team spent the better part of 2 weeks accumulating data with 

which they would build the requirements assessment. Once Sherlock 

and his team had gathered their findings, they met with COL Peter A. 

Henry, the MNSTC-I chief of staff, who provided them with the various 

manning documents and personnel requests that had been developed to 
36

support MNSTC-I. Henry also authorized LTC Craig Vest, the MNSTC-I 

J1 and his deputy, Lt. Col. Brian Kelly, US Air Force, to assist the team in 

developing the consolidated personnel requirements for the command. The 

team analyzed MNSTC-I’s two existing Joint Manning Documents (JMDs) 

and three or four different requests for forces (RFF). Each document was 

thoroughly scrutinized to eliminate duplicate or unnecessary positions. The 

survey team also added a number of other requirements not yet thought 

of or requested by the MNSTC-I staff. Among the latter were positions 

to support an officer and NCO education effort for the Iraqi Army and a 

modest training capability for selected military occupational specialties 

(MOS). The existing AST Command and Control (C2) Cell at Taji was 

recommended to be increased to 21 people, and a convoy escort platoon 

that the J3 wanted to provide convoys with a security force was to be 

increased to two platoons.14

Using the information collected, the survey team then developed a list 

that incorporated all known personnel, logistics, and training requirements. 

All this information was integrated into a single comprehensive document 

entitled the Requirements Assessment that Sherlock and his team briefed 

to Petraeus on 6 August.15 The assessment, among other things, called for 

about 730 soldiers to meet MNSTC-I’s personnel requirements. About 310 

of these soldiers were to be assigned as advisors.

Petraeus approved the assessment and authorized Sherlock to begin 

coordination with USARC, FORSCOM, and the Army G3 for approval. 

The first step was to inform the Army’s force provider, FORSCOM, what 

MNSTC-I’s requirements were. Previously, Sherlock and his team had 

conducted several video-teleconference (VTC) briefings with FORSCOM 

and USARC to let them know what was transpiring with the survey. 

However, MG Charles Wilson, the USARC Deputy CG and gatekeeper 

between the Army Reserve and FORSCOM, did not want to be briefed via 

VTC. He wanted to be briefed in person, as did MG Julian H. Burns, Jr., 

the FORSCOM G3. Thus, Sherlock and Ryan boarded a plane at BIAP on 

7 August and headed for Georgia.

Arriving in Atlanta the following day, Sherlock and Ryan joined MG 

Robinson, COL Parsons, and LTC Arnold at USARC headquarters at 

Fort McPherson. About 15 minutes into Sherlock and Ryan’s presentation to Wilson and members of the USARC staff, a soldier entered the 

room and said, “Sir, it’s time.” At that point, Wilson, his CXO, and his 

sergeant major departed to promote a soldier and left the brief to two of 

his staff officers, COL David Lowry, the USARC G3, and COL William 

Hamilton, the USARC G7. Near the end of the brief, Wilson returned and 
37

merely reiterated the litany of concerns the USARC staff had expressed 

all summer. One-by-one the leaders of the 98th Division addressed each 

point with answers designed to counter the arguments and reinforce the 

idea that a DIVIT could meet MNSTC-I’s requirements. Still dubious and 

without providing any positive word of support, Wilson gave his approval 

for the brief to be presented to FORSCOM. As a parting shot, Wilson told 

Robinson and his party that the FA-TRAC mission was only an additional 

duty—the division would still have to meet the requirements of its FY 

2005 TASS, IET, and PD missions.16

The party of Iroquois Warriors next traveled across the post to 

FORSCOM headquarters where they briefed MG Burns. Ryan remembered that Burns was also doubtful of the idea of using a training division 

to reinforce MNSTC-I; however, he was primarily interested in the bottom 

line of what it was going to take to meet MNSTC-I’s needs. “I just want 

somebody to tell me what the right answer is,” Burns said before the brief. 

Ryan responded, “Sir, here’s our recommendation” and proceeded along 

with Sherlock to brief the assessment. Once again, the two countered each 

of the concerns brought up by the FORSCOM G3. In contrast to Wilson, 

Burns’ reaction to the arguments was one of growing encouragement. Brad 

Parsons recollected that initially, Burns,

. . . was very aligned with what [Wilson] was thinking. 

But as the briefing and mission got articulated and he felt 

more comfortable with the plan . . . his big stumbling 

block was how much training would be required of the 

Reserve Component to get validated to be shipped to go 

overseas. That was his big concern—and to make certain 

we had enough training to prepare every soldier to be able 

to handle the mission over there.17

On conclusion of the briefing, Ryan recommended to Burns, “Sir, this 

is the right answer for this snapshot in time. Give us the authority to do it.” 

Burns responded with words to the effect of, “Okay. I like it. Go with it,” 

and gave his approval for the idea.18 Sherlock and Ryan were soon on their 

way to Washington to convince the final decision makers there.

The following day, Sherlock and Ryan briefed LTG Helmly and Ms. 

Kathryn Condon, the Army’s Deputy G3 in the Pentagon. Both gave their 

blessing to the assessment and to the idea of a training division supplying 

MNSTC-I’s needs for personnel. The only question now was which division would support the mission. There had never been a formal decision 

on which unit would go, and there were people in the USARC who specifically did not want the 98th Division to get the mission.19 In reality of 
38

course, that choice had already been made. The staff of the 98th Division 

in Rochester had been scrambling to develop various courses of action, 

plans, and battle rosters; identify deploying personnel; and acquire the 

necessary information needed from numerous sources to fill the holes in 

each. The final decision was pro forma.

When reflecting on the selection of which unit would go, Helmly 

recalled, “The most capable force at the time was the 98th Division. It 

was more ready. It was, frankly, just sharper. [When] we got the warning 

orders from DA and FORSCOM . . . I nominated the 98th.”20 Now, after 

86 years, the 98th Division, or at least pieces of it, was about to get its first 

taste of combat.
39

Notes

1. BG Frank Cipolla, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 November 2006, 2–3.

2. Ibid., 3.

3. Headquarters, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

Support Unit, “Requirements Assessment,” 3 August 2004, 3.

4. BG Richard Sherlock, interview by author, Office, Chief of the Army 

Reserve, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 16 November 2006, 2.

5. Ibid.

6. LTC Antonio Morales, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 January 2007, 1.

7. “Requirements Assessment,” 3–4.

8. Sherlock interview, 16 November 2006, 5.

9. COL Sean Ryan, interview by author, Joint Center for International 

Security Force Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 December 2006, 4.

10. MG James Schwitters, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 December 2006, 1; Ryan interview, 21 

December 2006, 4.

11. Ryan interview, 21 December 2006, 4.

12. LTC Jody Daniels, interview by author, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 20 December 2006, 4.

13. Morales telephone interview, 16 January 2007, 1.

14. Daniels interview, 20 December 2006, 2–3.

15. “Requirements Assessment,” 3.

16. COL Bradford Parsons, telephone interview by author, Headquarters, 

98th Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 17 January 2007, 10.

17. Ibid., 9.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid. According to COL Ryan, Ms. Condon was present for purely 

informational purposes.

20. MG James R. Helmly, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 December 2006, 2.

41

Chapter 4

Mobilization and Training

They were doing the best they could.

COL Robert Catalanotti

The final decision to use the 98th Division to support MNSTC-I immediately made its way to the division headquarters in Rochester. Everybody 

expected the mobilization (mob) order from DA to arrive at any minute 

for time was believed to be of the essence. The training of the Iraqi Army 

was a priority mission in Iraq. The Bush administration wanted to get the 

Iraqi Army trained so it could provide security for the new democracy, 

therefore allowing Central Command to start drawing down American 

forces in the theater. Thus, the MNSTC-I mission was arguably the most 

important game in town. However, MNSTC-I and its subordinate headquarters were all severely undermanned and handicapped in effectively 

progressing toward meeting their mission objectives. Additionally, the 

rotation date for many of the initial advisors brought over by CMATT was 

quickly approaching, which would further deplete many of the already 

understrength ASTs.

Before the Iroquois Warriors could assume their missions in Iraq, most 

of them had to go through the mobilization process, complete a postmobilization training package at a CONUS mobilization site, complete 

an advanced training package in Kuwait, and process through the Taji 

Military Training Base (TMTB). None of this could start until a mobilization order was issued. Nevertheless, despite the stated importance of the 

mission, it would take almost another month before DA issued the order.

The delay was a mixed blessing. While MNSTC-I desired to have 

the Iroquois Warriors in Iraq as soon as possible, various agencies stateside (USARC and FORSCOM), apparently still reluctant to support the 

decision to send the 98th, appeared to drag their feet. This delay gave 

other agencies that were unprepared to support the mobilization of the 

division (including the First United States Army, the agency responsible 

to train and validate the deployment of the Iroquois Warriors) time to finalize solutions to problems that had arisen earlier in the summer. From the 

First Army standpoint, the primary issues revolved around postmobilization training; specifically, where it would happen, what would be trained, 

and how long it would take to conduct the training. In addition, the 98th 

Division’s own TOC and staff had only recently received the approved 

Requirements Assessment and still had to finalize assigning “faces to 
42

spaces” and getting enough qualified personnel to meet all of MNSTC-I’s 

personnel requirements. Though the G1 staff had wrestled with battle rosters all summer trying to identify who would go, the delay would give 

them time to address final manning problems.

Manning the Battle Rosters

The primary task now confronting MAJ Vernick, the mobilization 

officer, was finding enough deployable and qualified personnel to fill all 

the slots on the consolidated MNSTC-I manning requirements provided 

by the survey team.1 On the surface, it seemed rather easy—the division 

had over 3,000 soldiers from which Vernick could choose to fill about 730 

slots. However, the task was not that simple. A number of variables came 

into play that rapidly reduced the pool of soldiers from which to select. 

First, as a training division, the 98th Division possessed a much higher 

percentage of officers, and especially field grade officers, when compared 

to the number of enlisted personnel in a comparable TOE-type organization. The requirements for enlisted personnel on the JMD were a higher 

percentage than the division possessed. Therefore, although the division 

had many officers, most were not needed because they could not be slotted 

against enlisted positions.

Another issue was that while the division had a number of drill sergeants, most of whom were MOS 11B (infantryman), the need in the 

enlisted positions was for noncombat arms MOSs. A training division has 

a relatively low number of enlisted personnel in logistics, administration, 

signal, maintenance, and other noncombat arms MOSs. Further, given the 

potential combat nature of the mission, females were barred from serving as advisors and a few other select positions. These constraints created 

further shortfalls. Thus, the division was forced to send requests to the 

USARC to find about 200 soldiers in the Reserve system, either from other 

Reserve units or from the IRR, to man slots in the 98th’s battle roster that 

could not be filled from within.

In addition, the division G1 staff had to select personnel to fill the advisor slots. Given what was now understood to be a combat role, Sherlock 

had sent back specific instructions on how to select people for those positions based on what the survey team had learned from advisors in Iraq. 

MG Robinson consolidated and promulgated the criteria in a memorandum and issued it on 19 August (see figure 7). Furthermore, each potential advisor had to volunteer and submit a packet with a recent photo (in 

BDU), a medical fitness certification, a recent APFT scorecard, a biography, a security clearance, and a memorandum from the soldier’s brigade 
43

commander endorsed by the first general officer in the chain of command 

recommending the person for the AST mission.2

The process laid out by Robinson seemed to be thorough. COL Parsons 

recalled, 

We screened the soldiers we took on the AST mission. 

We really looked at their Army physical fitness test scores 

to judge their overall physical conditioning and see who 

would possibly struggle in that type of environment. 

We were very cognizant of the health conditions of our 

soldiers, their background and experience, and we did 

a really good job choosing who would get into the AST 

mission.3

● Personal Traits:

—Commitment to successful mission accomplishment 

—Experience

—Physical toughness

—Coolness under pressure

● Competencies:

—“Train the Trainer” mentality (train yourself out of a job)

—Ability to discern “ground truth” 

—Communications

—Ability to establish rapport and maintain relationships

—Sound grasp of planning and training management

—Sound grasp of the diplomatic and political context

—Ability to train using a translator

● Other Requirements:

—Cultural sensitivity and awareness of current events in 

CENTCOM area of operations

—Ability to adapt, improvise, overcome

—Ability to work within a small group operating in an austere 

base of operations 

—Minimum APFT score of 220 

—Ability to be diplomatic under extreme stress

—Ability to operate in a tactical environment while maintaining 

excellent situational awareness

Figure 7. Advisor selection criteria.
44

However, there was, perhaps, a flaw in the process. MAJ Matthew Jones, 

a former Marine and a full-time staff operations and training officer with 

the division headquarters, had recently served a stint as an advisor to the 

Afghanistan Army. He believed the process skimmed over a key criterion:

The one critical element that was really missing from the 

process was that, if you don’t want to be there [in Iraq], 

don’t be there as an advisor. Be there as a staff person or 

something else. So much of what you do as an advisor can 

easily be road-blocked by the reality of being in Iraq and 

you can easily get frustrated if you don’t want to be there. 

It shows so transparently to the Iraqis. They know if you 

don’t want to be there. In a heartbeat, they know if you 

don’t believe in the mission. They also know if you’re 

going to get easily sidetracked and road-blocked. And if 

you are, you’re not much use as an advisor.4

He went on to explain that although many soldiers did volunteer to be 

advisors, it was largely due to the misunderstanding that the mission was 

training in nature and not advisory. When people began to realize they 

would actually be accompanying Iraqi units on combat missions, among 

some volunteers the desire to “be there” waned dramatically.5

As August wore on, the TOC staff identified advisors and filled the 

battle rosters with what appeared to be the best-qualified personnel. As 

the rosters solidified, Vernick coordinated with the USARC to get that 

headquarters to develop Derivative Unit Identification Codes (DUIC) so 

personnel could be assigned against them and mobilization orders could 

be prepared. Typically, Army personnel deploy as part of a unit under a 

Unit Identification Code (UIC). Vernick’s preferred method was to transfer all personnel out of several of the division’s subordinate units and reassign deploying personnel to those units based on the mission they were to 

perform in Iraq. However, the USARC G7, one of the key opponents to 

using a DIVIT for the MNSTC-I mission, barred this course of action and 

directed the 98th Division to deploy its personnel under DUICs, a kind of 

subunit UIC. Failing to get permission from the USARC to deploy using 

several UICs, Vernick pushed for establishing only seven DUICs based on 

the soldiers’ latest arrival date (LAD) as requested by MNSTC-I, to simplify management and tracking of deploying personnel. When the USARC 

provided the DUICs, they did so based on the UICs to which the deploying 

soldiers were actually assigned. Therefore, when Vernick received the list 

from the USARC, it contained about 125 DUICs. Some had only one soldier assigned and many had less than five. This made for an administrative 
45

nightmare that would plague division personnel managers at Rochester as 

well as those in Iraq throughout the entire deployment.6

The DUIC issue was only one of several areas where it seemed the 

USARC was making life difficult for the division. Todd Arnold had a number of dealings with that headquarters during this period. He later stated:

The thing that didn’t go so well was coordination with 

USARC. There was a lot of resistance to the 98th Division 

or just to the plan itself for whatever reason. Perhaps 

because it was something out of the norm or it took too 

many people out of the regular mobilization feeder track 

for other missions. I think we could have coordinated that 

better. And quite frankly, I don’t think it was our mission. 

I think it was USARC that should have stood up and supported us in being mobilized. Once they got on board, 

reluctantly in some areas, they were great in supporting 

us. But there was that lag of 2 months where it was very 

difficult to get a lot of USARC assistance.7

To help Arnold resolve premobilization issues and manage the 

deployment, the rear CP cell was nominally activated on 7 August to 

assume the responsibilities of the TOC. COL Parsons, LTC Semler, MAJ 

DiRisio, and other members of the TOC had volunteered or had been 

selected to fill deployment positions and had to start getting ready to go; 

therefore, there was a need to replace the TOC with a permanent control 

cell that would remain behind.

LTC Richard F. Monczynski, the division’s deputy G3, was put in 

charge of the rear CP. Monczynski and about 10 other personnel were 

brought on active duty to operate the cell. These soldiers were sent to 

Camp Atterbury, Indiana, for 2 weeks in early September to go through 

the mobilization process, and were then brought back to the division headquarters in Rochester. Monczynski’s team officially took the reins from 

the TOC on 18 September.8

The Battle Over Predeployment Training 

Another fortunate aspect of the mobilization delay was it provided 

time to address a major challenge that encompassed virtually every command involved in this venture—the battle over the predeployment training 

plan. The disagreements between the division and the First Army actually 

began earlier in the summer. The main issues centered on where the training would take place, what would be trained, and how long the training 

would take. The first point of friction was solved somewhat by default.
46

The 98th Division desired to conduct its predeployment training at 

Fort Dix, New Jersey. The division’s personnel were familiar with that 

post due to its basic training, TASS, and RC training functions. Besides, 

it was close to home. Fort Dix, however, was currently being used by the 

units of the 42d Division that were also to deploy to Iraq. The focus of the 

First Army training team there was to get the 42d Division headquarters 

ready to go.9

The division’s alternate choice was Camp Shelby, Mississippi, but that 

installation was occupied. The 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment from the 

Tennessee National Guard was there undergoing its predeployment training. The focus of the First Army training team there was to get the 278th 

ready to go. That unit was stretching Camp Shelby’s resources to the limit. 

There was no room there for the 98th.10

First Army wanted the division to undergo its training at Camp 

Atterbury. Some considered the post’s training resources to be rather limited, but it only had to accommodate approximately 450 Iroquois Warriors 

for about 3 months and not all at one time. Moreover, it was available. 

The other issues were concerned with training content and time. In 

mid-July, as Parsons and the TOC were going through their mission analysis, they assumed the training required to satisfy the emerging advisor 

requirement would be met by the same training plan used to prepare the 

advisors embedded with the Afghanistan National Army (ANA). Matt 

Jones was aware of that training due to his previous experience as an advisor in Afghanistan. “I knew the folks who replaced us in Afghanistan had 

built a training package, so I contacted the guys who were over there so 

they could send us that package . . . and that’s what we proposed to use in 

preparation for Iraq,” he explained.11

That plan called for 36 training days at the mobilization training site. 

To address MNSTC-I’s desired LAD for the advisor teams and Sherlock’s 

directive to try and cull the training to get troops to Iraq in the shortest 

possible time without sacrificing readiness, LTC Ryan developed a training plan that estimated the ASTs needed only 28 days of training at the 

Atterbury mob site.12 (See figure 8.) Even with the proposed shorter timeline, it was going to take 70 days from mobilization until the first advisor 

arrived in Kuwait, much less arrived at his assigned Iraqi unit.

COL Al Jones, the First Army G3, on the other hand, wanted the 

Iroquois Warriors to go through the First Army’s standard security force 

Program of Instruction (POI)—the same POI used to train the artillery 

units serving as military police units in Iraq. In addition, he took the position that the 98th Division troops would be trained on all the training 
47

AST/Foreign Trainer Training

Training Phases

Pre MOB Training

• SRP• Doctrine Review• MDMP Overview• Training Management

7

Days

Pre MOB Training

• SRP• Doctrine Review• MDMP Overview• Training Management

7

Days

AST/Foreign Trainer TNG--BLOCK III(RSOI)

• Operational Overview• TTP for Advisors• Radio Procedures, Call for Fire/CAS• Convoy Training/Battle Drills• Tactical TTP Review

4

Days

AST/Foreign Trainer TNG--BLOCK III(RSOI)

• Operational Overview• TTP for Advisors• Radio Procedures, Call for Fire/CAS• Convoy Training/Battle Drills• Tactical TTP Review

4

Days

Individual MOB Admin--BLOCK Ia

• Accountability, SRP, OCIE & Equip

issue, PCI, PTSR & Equip shortfalls

Individual MOB TNG--BLOCK Ib

• CTT, UXO, IEF, FORSCOM• Mandatory Training, Weapons Qualification• Close Quarters Marksmanship

6

Days

Individual MOB Admin--BLOCK Ia

•

Individual MOB TNG--BLOCK Ib

• CTT, UXO, IEF, FORSCOM• Mandatory Training, Weapons Qualification• Close Quarters Marksmanship

6

Days

Home Station Mob Station RSOI – Kuwait

IDT/AT M-Day Deployment TOA

Home Station MOB Training

• SRP• CTT• Squad Battle Drill Review

3

Days

Home Station MOB Training

• SRP• CTT• Squad Battle Drill Review

3

Days

AST/Foreign Trainer TNG—BLOCK IIa

• Environmental Awareness• Basic Arabic Familiarization• Working w/Interpreters• Foreign Weapons Training• Situational Training Exercises

--

•

28

Days

AST/Foreign Trainer TNG--BLOCK IIa

• Environmental Awareness• Basic Arabic Familiarization• Working w/Interpreters• Foreign Weapons Training• Situational Training Exercises

AST For AST/Foreign Trainer TNG

--

BLOCK IIb

• Radio Procedures, Call for Fire/CAS• Combat Life Saver• Convoy Training/Battle Drills• Squad Battle Drills / LFX• Platoon Battle Drills

28

Days

Pre-Deployment Post-Deployment

--

Figure 8. 98th Division’s predeployment training plan.
48

tasks required by DA and CENTCOM for units deploying to Iraq. These 

included the “40 plus 9” tasks and drills directed by DA, the standard 

Army driver’s training course, 40 hours of language training, and the full 

range of instruction for weapons qualification.13

CENTCOM also required the Iroquois Warriors to go through the standard Theater Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT), the Theater 

Specific Leader Training, a defensive live fire exercise (LFX), a convoy 

situational training exercise (STX), and a convoy LFX required of all units 

deploying into theater. In addition, a change to FORSCOM’s basic training guidance for all units deploying to Iraq after 20 September directed 

several additional tasks to include training on battle command systems, 

code of conduct, and cultural awareness.14 Thus, these requirements were 

not based on COL Jones’ training whims. The requirements were directed 

by various headquarters whose authority in the matters was beyond First 

Army’s ability to change, even if that command wanted to do so.

In contrast to the division plan, the myriad additional tasks First Army 

had to address in preparing the soldiers of the 98th Division for employment in Iraq resulted in a solution requiring 44 training days. That plan 

extended the earliest arrival time for ASTs in Kuwait to 86 days, which 

amounted to almost one-quarter of the year that each AST soldier was 

expected to serve on active duty. The First Army training plan would delay 

the advisor team linkup with its assigned Iraqi unit by another 2 weeks. 

(See figure 9.)

The battle between First Army and the 98th Division lasted all summer. 

In numerous phone conferences, VTCs, and face-to-face meetings at 

the USARC and elsewhere, each side made its arguments to support its 

position. Matt Jones, who had been working closely with Parsons during 

this period, recalled that the division and First Army “fought over [these 

issues] for about 40 days. . . . We were just wasting time.”15

About mid-August, LTC Morales, with the survey team in Iraq, entered 

the debate by providing new information via SIPRNET on training that 

could be provided in Kuwait. Once back in Baghdad after the briefings in 

Atlanta and Washington, Sherlock had pulled the survey team together to 

tell them about what had transpired and to let them know the mission was 

on. He also gave them additional guidance on actions needed to prepare 

for the reception of the division’s soldiers.16 There was pressure to get the 

division’s soldiers to Iraq as soon as possible so Sherlock had been thinking 

of various ways to shorten the time it would take to get boots on the ground. 

One way was to shorten the postmobilization training period in CONUS.
49

FA-TRAC MOBILIZATION/DEPLOYMENTMODEL

HS

3 1 13 14 5

EQUIP PREP/

LOAD

3

SRP IND TNG

BLOCK 1

COLLECTIVE TNG

BLOCK 3

MDMP PE

5

56 DAYS REQUIRED

TVL MOB ALERT

30 12

MSN TNGBLOCK 2

CTTCLSLAND NAVWPNS QUALNBCCOMMOADV DVR TNGTSIRTTSLTCULT AWARLANG FAM

BTL DRILLSOC/TWPNS FAMTCP OPNSTNG PLANSCONDUCT AAR’sCONDUCT REHC2 OPNSCNVY STXCNVY LFX

OFF OPNSDEF OPNSSTAB OPNSM/CM/S OPNSCORDON & SEARCHEST LNOCMOCOORD FS, CASSECURE CIVEMPLOY OPSEC

• 44 TRAINING DAYS REQ• 56 TOTAL DAYS AFTER MOB• 600 +/- SOLDIERS TO TRAIN• ANA TRAINING MODEL 62 DAYS

FOR SECFOR (670 PAX)

• ANA ETT 36 DAYS TO TRAIN

(225 PAX)

DEPLOY

SRPCIFRFI

DOC REVMDMP REVMDMP PE

RECOVERYPCILOAD

RFIs:• WHAT ARE REQUIRED TRAINING

TASK FOR VALIDATION

• WHAT EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED

FOR DIV TO DEPLOY

• WHEN IS MOBSAD/RLD(P)/LAD

Figure 9. First Army’s predeployment training plan.
50

Sherlock had discovered training opportunities in Kuwait that might 

be used to validate the troops on required tasks rather than completing the 

training stateside. The training could also make up some training shortfalls 

identified by the existing ASTs during the survey. Morales recalled that 

after the meeting Sherlock said, “Tony, come on over here. After talking 

with Sean Ryan, I need you to go to Kuwait because we’ve got this mission. 

Go down to Kuwait and start to assess what’s there in terms of training, 

training areas, and support.” In particular, Sherlock specified he wanted 

realistic convoy training, communications training, and cultural awareness 

training if it could be coordinated. Soon after his meeting with Sherlock, 

Morales and Master Sergeant (MSG) John Compitello, G4 maintenance 

NCO, were on their way to Kuwait to find out what additional training 

might be available there. They were told to coordinate with CFLCC to 

determine reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) 

requirements for bringing the division’s elements into theater.17

In Kuwait, Morales met with COL Mike Milano, the CFLCC C3. 

Milano provided Morales with the basic details he needed to develop the 

division RSOI plan. Milano informed Morales that a US contractor in 

Kuwait had the capability to put the Iroquois Warriors through each of 

the training requirements that Sherlock had specified except for cultural 

awareness. In addition to those tasks, Morales coordinated for weapons 

training on ranges, live-fire forced entry into buildings, and training on the 

Blue Force Tracker (BFT) system, which few if any members of the 98th 

Division had ever seen much less trained on.18 All of these findings were 

sent back to Parsons at Rochester for inclusion in the division’s version of 

the predeployment training plan.

The information provided by Morales on the training available in 

Kuwait only added fuel to the fire. Furthermore, MNSTC-I (through the 

MNF-I) supported the 98th Division’s position saying the training provided in Kuwait would preclude the necessity of many training events 

being insisted on by First Army for deployment validation. The implication was that the division’s ASTs and other elements could be validated on 

those tasks in Kuwait.19

Little of this seemed to move First Army, primarily because its hands 

were tied. The G3 insisted the 98th Division was going to go through the 

entire training package required for deploying units. The only progress the 

98th Division seemed to make was getting the First Army to shorten the 

timeline by 2 days for a total of 42 training days. Finally, about 18 August, 

the issues of location, content, and length of training were presented to 

LTG Russell Honoré, the First Army CG, for a decision. Honoré decided 
51

in favor of his staff on all counts.20 The Iroquois Warriors failed in their 

efforts to shorten the deployment timeline, but the delay in the decision 

was to have repercussions on the training conducted at Camp Atterbury.

Mobilization

On 3 September, the mobilization order finally arrived at the division 

headquarters. Monczynski at the rear CP received the order and notified 

MG Robinson and other key members of the staff. By this time, Vernick 

had organized deploying personnel into eight mobilization groups (later 

expanded by three small groups in December 2004 and March 2005) based 

on the two mobilization training sites and when the groups would attend 

training. In general, those personnel going to the MNSTC-I, CMATT, 

and CPATT staffs and those going to support the C2 Cell were sent to 

Fort Bliss. Those troops slotted as ASTs and trainers on the BCT, OES, 

NCOES, and MOS training teams were sent to Camp Atterbury. Oddly, 

the convoy security team was sent to Fort Bliss. Jim DiRisio explained, 

“because of expediency we assumed some risk and sent them through the 

CRC instead” to get them to Iraq sooner.21

After many days and sometimes nights, the battle rosters Vernick had 

scrubbed, rescrubbed, and scrubbed again took final form. In his communications with the USARC staff while struggling to finalize the deployment lists, Vernick had been told to expect that upwards of 30 percent 

of the division’s soldiers identified for deployment would fall out of the 

process for various reasons—physical problems, financial problems, security issues—based on the average for Reserve units since the USARC had 

been tracking activations after 9-11. When the dust settled and the figures 

came in, the 98th Division experienced a less than 10 percent fallout rate. 

“I think that shocked USARC,” Vernick happily recalled.22

One of the issues to plague the 98th Division was that it was not going 

to mobilize and deploy as a unit, but as individual soldiers that would act 

as fillers in relatively small teams or as individuals based on MNSTC-I’s 

requirements. Moreover, the urgency of MNSTC-I’s situation demanded 

that certain fillers, such as those slated for the headquarters, get there as 

quickly as possible. Therefore, mobilization of the division’s soldiers in 

one big package was not feasible. Sean Ryan explained:

. . . to get the 98th alerted, mobilized, trained, and 

deployed we needed 2 months or more. Well, that 

wasn’t acceptable so we broke the 98th into packages. 

We had the staff sections that were going straight into 

the MNSTC-I, CMATT, and CPATT staffs go through the 
52

CRC and they were expedited. Then, the ones who would 

be more in harm’s way—who would be conducting training and operations with the Iraqis—would go through the 

full training package, which ultimately was done at Camp 

Atterbury, Indiana. We piecemealed the 98th in because of 

the urgency of getting MNSTC-I filled, which led to the 

mindset that they were individual augmentees as opposed 

to a unit solution.23

To meet MNSTC-I’s requirements and the 98th’s own unique circumstances, Vernick had developed a total of eight mobilization groups and 

determined their departure dates for Fort Bliss and Camp Atterbury based 

on the mobilization order (figure 10).

Of course, in the first two mobilization groups were most of the initial 

200 or so volunteers who had waived their right to the 30-day delay. 

Those going to Fort Bliss would complete the standard processing and 

training most individual replacements experienced before going to Iraq 

or Afghanistan. The training primarily consisted of CTT and the nine 

required premobilization battle drills. In short, the CRC process at Fort 

Bliss was mature, efficient, and relatively smooth. Few Iroquois Warriors 

experienced any problems at Fort Bliss. The training at Camp Atterbury, as 

it turned out, was to possess few of these traits, at least from the perspective 

of those who received the training. 

Camp Atterbury

Camp Atterbury, located just outside Edinburg in southern Indiana, 

had been established in 1942 as a training cantonment for an infantry 

Mob Group Location Departure Date No. of Personnel

CRC-1 Fort Bliss 11 September 64

Mob-1 Camp Atterbury 11 September 123

CRC-1.5 Fort Bliss 25 September 18

Mob-1.5 Camp Atterbury 25 September 5

CRC-2 Fort Bliss 10 October 131

Mob-2 Camp Atterbury 6 October 174

CRC-3 Fort Bliss 16 October 62

Mob-3 Camp Atterbury 20 October 13924

Figure 10. Division mobilization groups.
53

division. It had also served as a prisoner of war camp for German and 

Italian soldiers, and later as a demobilization center at the end of the war. 

It had not seen much use since then except to support the summer training 

of the Indiana National Guard. It was reopened in February 2003 primarily 

to support the mobilization of RC units and soldiers participating in the 

GWOT.25

As mentioned, Camp Atterbury was not the division’s first choice. Nor 

was it the choice of LTG Helmly:

I didn’t feel Camp Atterbury was equipped or organized 

to do [what was needed for the 98th Division]. . . . Camp 

Atterbury simply needed a lot of capabilities that I didn’t 

feel were resident, but that decision was made and we sent 

the 98th there. I argued against it, but it was done anyway. 

It wasn’t one of those things, though, that we couldn’t 

make work regardless of the shortcomings.26

COL Charles “Gus” Stafford, the commander of the 3d Brigade, 85th 

Division (TS), and the man who would eventually get the mission to train 

the troops of the 98th Division at Camp Atterbury, disagreed with that 

assessment. His opinion was:

The 98th Division and its initial role in going over as ASTs 

was focused on the basic combat training piece of the mission with new recruits to the Iraqi Army. With that in mind, 

their principal tasks were focused on soldierization skills, 

weapons qualification and the initial forming of units as 

individuals and squads—no higher than platoon level. 

Camp Atterbury, being a platform to train units up to the 

battalion level, had sufficient assets to do that training.27

Interestingly, Stafford’s belief that the 98th Division was “focused on 

the basic combat training piece of the mission with new recruits to the Iraqi 

Army” reveals a fundamental misinterpretation of the mission common to 

many people before the 98th Division’s advisors arrived in theater. This 

impression was also common to his trainers who, in turn, reinforced it to 

the advisors. Many of the advisors were already of the mistaken belief that 

they were still going to be in a training role, not an advisory one, while 

in Iraq. The idea that the division’s soldiers were going over to train the 

Iraqi Army helps explain some of the training conducted for the Iroquois 

Warriors while they were in Indiana.

Whether Atterbury was or was not the best option, the late decision in 

choosing the location and the content of the training had a negative impact 
54

on the experience for the Iroquois Warriors. Stafford acknowledged that his 

brigade was not assigned the mission until about 20 August, only 3 weeks 

before the first mobilization group arrived from Rochester. In that period, 

he had to design and coordinate a viable training package that met the First 

Army requirements and have his trainers ready to start operations shortly 

after the troops’ arrival. The concern, and perhaps frustration, registered 

by Stafford with the late notice is palpable in a message he sent to the 85th 

Division G3 on 24 August. He wrote, “98th Division Train-up: When? By 

who? With what resources? I know we aren’t deploying folks to the war 

zone inside a 5-week lock-in, are we? Having said that, if it’s ours, then 

tell us when it needs to be done, and we’ll make it happen. . . .”28

Making it happen was no mean feat. The 98th Division contingent 

was an add-on to the 3d Brigade’s already crowded training schedule. 

Although Camp Atterbury was relatively empty when the first mobilization group arrived in September, the 3d Brigade had numerous other units 

scheduled for training soon after. Within the next month, the population 

of the post would swell to over 4,000 soldiers in training from four Army 

Reserve and National Guard engineer battalions and several other smaller 

units. All of these units would be competing for ranges and resources with 

the 98th Division, especially mobs 2 and 3, which arrived in October.

29

Committed to providing a good training package to the soldiers of the 

98th, Stafford and his staff went to work designing the plan and squeezing 

it into the existing schedule. To his advantage, Stafford’s 3d Brigade was 

well acquainted with Camp Atterbury. The post had been the brigade’s 

primary training site since well before 9-11. The 3d Brigade’s primary 

mission was to develop, conduct, and evaluate lane training for Guard 

and Reserve units throughout Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan. Its primary 

customers, however, had been units of the Indiana National Guard’s 38th 

Infantry Division and the division’s 76th Infantry Brigade. The 3d Brigade 

had been mobilized after 9-11 to help reactivate Atterbury as a mobilization 

training site for RC units deploying to support the GWOT, and so Stafford 

and his troops had a good idea of what it took to get units through the 

validation process for deployment.30 Still, with such short notice, it would 

take a great deal of effort to ensure his people were ready to begin training 

when the Iroquois Warriors began to arrive on 11 September 2004.

COL Catalanotti was already at Camp Atterbury. MG Robinson had 

contacted him in August and asked him to go to Indiana and assume the 

position of Commander of Troops for the 98th Division contingent going 

through training there. Catalanotti arrived on Labor Day, 6 September, and 

immediately began coordination with Stafford on the training program. 
55

He recalled that from the beginning, the relationship between his staff and 

those on the installation was solid:

There were really three chains of command. There was 

the 98th internal chain of command, which all the soldiers and their layers of leadership were accountable to, 

namely to me. There was the Camp Atterbury garrison 

structure, which had the billets, food, transportation, and 

all the equipment. And then there was the 85th Division 

(Training Support) that provided the training and the ultimate certification. The good news was that we three colonels [Catalanotti, Stafford, and the garrison commander] 

came together very nicely with our staffs. As a result, we 

were able to get four-plus increments through Atterbury 

swiftly with certification in 39 to 45 days, with all the 

equipment resources and all the personnel issues, from 

medical to operational readiness, taken care of.31

Though Catalanotti’s opinion that the Camp Atterbury experience was 

good for him and his staff, for the Iroquois Warriors who began to arrive 

shortly thereafter, the impressions went downhill. The subsequent disgruntlement of the trainees would focus on four main areas: their treatment, the 

experience and knowledge of the trainers, the quality and content of the 

training, and the inefficient use of time.

There’s an old Army saying that “Soldiers aren’t happy unless they’re 

complaining.” There is truth in that statement, and anyone who has been 

a leader in the Army knows that that statement can be as true for officers 

and NCOs as it is for private soldiers. Given the nature of the missions 

they had been assigned to perform, the majority of the 98th Division personnel sent to Indiana were officers and senior NCOs. The genesis of their 

unhappiness may have been the fact that they were at Camp Atterbury. 

According to Gus Stafford,

One of the problems in this entire mobilization process 

that we’ve been going through has been the desire on the 

part of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard to 

follow a model that says, ‘We will train. We will mobilize. 

We will deploy.’ That’s an endstate we’re seeking as we 

move toward the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) 

model. However, in the experience of the 98th Division, 

that was not the case. With the 98th Division, we mobilized them, we trained them, and we deployed. Because 

of their desire to quickly mobilize and get to theater, it 
56

was a constant battle to explain to them that they had 

to go through certain training before they could get into 

theater.32

He went on to explain, 

There are insufficient days in the current model for the 

Army Reserve and National Guard to bring a unit up to the 

level of proficiency required at the collective level simply 

using . . . 39 days [annually]. . . . In spite of the fact that 

we were doing the right thing by providing the training 

opportunity that they otherwise couldn’t have gotten during their normal drill weekends and annual training periods, there was still a feeling on the part of the Reserve and 

Guard folks going through the mobilization process that 

somehow the active force was looking down on them, that 

they were less prepared, and that’s why we were doing 

what we were doing. And that, by being less prepared, we 

were somehow challenging their professionalism. I would 

say, though, that nothing could be further from the truth. 

We were simply focused on giving them the training they 

needed to best prepare them for combat in Iraq.33

In retrospect, few, if any, of the Iroquois Warriors who went through 

the training at Atterbury would deny the training was necessary, and 

most would chalk up any griping as fulfilling the old saw about soldiers’ 

complaints. What they would argue with, perhaps, was the way some 

of the administrative aspects of the training were conducted. For example, a number of them resented being treated like privates. MAJ Scott 

McConnell, a staff officer in the division G3 section and slated to be on an 

AST, related:

The whole experience there from start to finish was taking 

master sergeants, captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels 

and putting them into the private-going-through-basictraining mindset. They put us in formation and accounted 

for every minute of our days. We slept in barracks. We 

were locked down, couldn’t leave post. We were put 

through a training program and weren’t utilized as anything but students going lockstep through this training.34

MAJ Paul Loncle, division budget officer and assigned to work on 

the OES team, agreed. “I was kidding with my friends. I said, ‘I’m an 

E3/O4—I’m treated like a private first class and I’m paid as a major,’” 

he recalled. “You look at who’s going [through the training]. In the OES 
57

we’re talking majors and lieutenant colonels. You have a lot of people here 

who know how to lead and we’ve proven it through our military careers.”35

The implication was that these senior soldiers did not need to be marched 

around like privates in basic training.

However elementary the environment, there were reasons for such 

actions. COL Stafford explained:

From the Training Support Brigade side, we put huge 

emphasis on forming cohesive teams. We tried to billet, 

train, and eat in [AST] team organization so they would 

get to know each other’s strengths and weaknesses. We 

fought against letting folks ‘do their own thing’ since 

many of these teams formed at the mobilization station. 

We encouraged them to form internal chains of command 

and to define roles and missions within their teams. The 

98th Division leadership fought hard to keep this same 

rigor in maintaining accountability and validation records 

management. No one went anywhere by themselves. [In 

addition,] Camp Atterbury has long had a requirement 

for squad-sized elements to move in formation due to the 

congested road networks and number of units mobilizing 

at any time . . . we could have over 4,000 soldiers in over 

30 different units training at one time on everything from 

infantry tactics to heavy engineer equipment to heavy 

equipment transports. Marching was a safety issue, not 

a haze.36

Still, for those soldiers in the group who were drill sergeants, to be 

treated like basic trainees must have been particularly galling. Despite the 

perceived basic training atmosphere, however aggravating it may have 

been, the majority of those leaders going through the Atterbury experience 

basically accepted it as the price of being there and focused on what they 

needed to learn from those who had been selected to train them. 

The majority of the trainers at Camp Atterbury were soldiers of 

Stafford’s own 3d Brigade. The 85th Division was a multicomponent 

training support division, meaning that its brigades and battalions were a 

mixture of Regular Army and Army Reserve soldiers. Most of the reservists were assigned to the division’s multiple battalions. The 3d Brigade 

consisted of seven training support battalions and a contractor cell. The 

contractor cell provided training on the Arabic language and culture, 

Combat Life Saver (CLS) training, and role players for various simulated 

exercises. Stafford’s trainers had developed various training scenarios that 
58

used these role players (many of whom were Iraqi ex-patriots) as Iraqi 

civilians, soldiers, and insurgents to put units in as realistic situations as 

possible.

The rest of the brigade consisted of one logistics support, one engineer, two infantry, and three combat service support training support battalions. These battalions typically consisted of a number of lane training 

teams. These teams could be composed of branch-specific trainers, such as 

infantry, engineer, or transportation, or they could be multifunctional. For 

example, a logistics lane team possessed quartermaster, transportation, and 

medical personnel to train and grade multifunctional units such as division 

support battalions. Likewise, these lane training teams could function as 

observer/controllers (O/C) for external evaluations of units during AT.

What the lane grading teams were not designed to do was to conduct 

weapons training and qualification. To assist the 3d Brigade with those 

tasks, Stafford acquired a number of soldiers from the Indiana National 

Guard’s 76th Infantry Brigade, who would be responsible for training and 

validating the 98th Division’s troops on individual weapons qualification 

and with training on, and familiarity with, crew-served weapons.37

The problem with the trainers, from the standpoint of the Iroquois 

Warriors, was that the situation seemed to be the “blind leading the blind.” 

Many of the trainers were reservists too. Additionally, from the beginning 

it seemed to the trainees that their trainers were ill-prepared to execute the 

training due to their short preparation time and unfamiliarity of some of 

the tasks. “Since we weren’t programmed into the deployment, we were 

kind of thrown onto the TSDs,” Matt Jones recalled. “They were overwhelmed. They didn’t know we were coming until about 15 to 20 days 

before we arrived, so they were scrambling. I don’t think there was a really 

good understanding of what the mission was going to be and there was no 

training plan that was really focused on the mission.”38

The lack of preparation time and the perceived lack of combat experience led to negative impressions of the trainers themselves. Loncle felt that 

“the trainers we had at Atterbury weren’t necessarily the best ones.” LTC 

Douglas Shipman, S3 for the 98th Division’s 1st Brigade in Providence 

and soon to be the deputy senior advisor to the Iraqi 3d Division AST 

team, explained that the trainers “gave it the old college try, but these were 

people who had never been to Iraq teaching us about improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and things like that. It was very difficult for them to 

be credible.” Staff Sergeant (SSG) Brian Charnock, a drill sergeant with 

the 1st Battalion, 390th Regiment, a basic training unit from Buffalo, New 

York, agreed. “A lot of them had no experience in country. They were 
59

basically drill sergeants like us who did the same jobs we do. . . . There 

were a few who gave us a lot of insight, those who had actually gone 

to Iraq or Afghanistan, and they were obviously the more valuable trainers. Otherwise, though, it was just one Reserve soldier teaching another 

Reserve soldier. . . .” Perhaps the most charitable in his view was COL 

Catalanotti: “Your best trainers are the ones who’ve experienced Iraq. 

Well, we were the first division to go through there, so there wasn’t a 

whole lot of experience with their trainers. They were doing the best they 

could.”39

The professionalism of the trainers was questioned as well. The soldiers of the 98th Division were trainers and instructors themselves, so any 

flaw in the presentation, whether it was technique or, more importantly, 

facts, was quickly detected. It also added to any friction existing between 

trainers and trainees. Looking back at the situation, Loncle recollected:

. . . a lot of the [trainers], we know, just got the info wrong 

and we learned real early that it just wasn’t worth bringing it up to them. They just got way too defensive. So later 

on we would get everybody back together and say, ‘Okay, 

this is what they put out, but let me tell you—this is how 

it really is, just so you don’t get any false ideas.’ We just 

tried not to step on any toes and cause any trouble. It was 

more like, ‘Hey, those of you who know that what they’re 

putting out is wrong, don’t call them on the carpet. If you 

have a problem with them, take it up the chain outside and 

don’t bring it up here in front of the whole class.’40

The late mission assignment also affected the 3d Brigade’s ability to 

issue training schedules in a timely manner so troops could plan to fill any 

holes in the schedule with supplementary training. The Army standard is 

to publish training schedules 6 weeks out. In theory, the training schedules 

for all 6 weeks should have been available on arrival. But as MAJ Roger 

Swartwood, slated to be on the AST for the Iraqi 1st Division, recalled, 

“the information flow became discouraging at times, trying to find out 

what we were doing 2 or 3 days in advance so we could maybe plan for 

some of the training we were trying to do as a team.” He added, “We 

would have liked to have had at least a week out training schedule, but 

we had only a 2-day type thing. We knew what we were going to do today 

and then they gave us an idea of what we would be doing the next day, but 

that was it.”41

Compounding the frustration of the Iroquois Warriors was the content 

and quality of the training. One of the early events on the training schedule 
60

was a 40-hour block of training on cultural awareness. Jody Daniels 

remembered that the survey team’s guidance on this block of instruction had 

been very specific. She stated, “We specifically requested that the language 

training not be done as a 40-hour week but as 2 hours a day every day for 

4 weeks or whatever. We wanted it spread out over time so they actually 

had a better chance of learning a few things about the language, rather than 

trying to get immersed in it in 5 days. We knew that just wasn’t going to 

take.”42 Matt Jones explained, “We had 5 [straight] days of Arabic, and they 

even tried to teach us how to write Arabic. . . . They put us in the officer’s 

club where there was no air conditioning. . . . It was ridiculous.” Moreover, 

the Civil Affairs officer assigned to give the country study briefing had 

never been to Iraq, which further strained credibility.43

Following that less than effective experience, the Iroquois Warriors 

then entered individual skills training. For many, this was as demoralizing as trying to learn Arabic in 5 days. Scott McConnell, who like many 

Iroquois Warriors, had completed most of the “40 plus 9” tasks at his 

Reserve Center during the summer now had to do them all over again. 

Sergeant First Class (SFC) Dennis Ewing, another drill sergeant with the 

1st Battalion, 390th Regiment, remarked that the trainers “were spending 

a lot of time on common tasks that we do every year. We’re different from 

other units that may not do common tasks as often as we do. We do them 

every weekend so it was a waste of time for us.”44

The CTT training was followed by weapons training that Ewing 

described as minimal. For example, there was no training on any of the 

common foreign weapons that advisors might encounter in Iraq such as the 

AK-47 with which Iraqi Army units were equipped. Additionally, Ewing 

felt that more time should have been spent on crew-served weapons, and 

everybody should have had the opportunity to get the training. During 

that block, “Only two people on each team were sent to [the training on]

each crew-served weapon,” Ewing said. COL Parsons, when reviewing 

the training at Atterbury agreed. He believed the major flaw in the training 

plan was there had not been more training on crew-served weapons.45

The training on the newer, high-tech pieces of equipment the Iroquois 

Warriors would be working with in Iraq was equally lacking. Similar to the 

crew-served weapons training, only one person per advisor team was sent 

to gain experience with the new Blue Force Tracker (BFT) system. No 

practical exercises were conducted; the training was no more than a brief 

familiarity session with the piece of equipment. Each of the soldiers sent to 

the training was then expected to train his team on the BFT once they were 

issued the item in Iraq. Training on SINCGARS radios was conducted 

with older versions of the system that were not widely used in Iraq and 
61

was limited to just a small number of people. As a result, Ewing recalled 

that when the advisors arrived in country “there were senior NCOs and 

officers who didn’t know how to operate a radio. That’s the wrong time to 

have to figure that out.”46

One block of training at Camp Atterbury that was almost universally 

praised was the CLS training. McConnell believe that the CLS training 

“was the most effective of all the things there.”47 Perhaps the real 

possibility of casualties in Iraq made the training seem to be all that much 

more important.

On conclusion of the individual-level tasks, the training shifted to collective tasks. These blocks included offensive and defensive tasks such 

as cordon and search missions; planning, coordinating, and conducting 

fire support and close-air support; civil-military operations; and convoy 

security operations. These events received higher praise from the Iroquois 

Warriors, but even they came in for some criticism. In a postdeployment 

series of interviews with members of the division, it was the convoy training that seemed to be the most memorable part of the Atterbury experience, and therefore garnered the most comments. Catalanotti explained 

the basic problem with the convoy block.

They [the 3d Brigade trainers] tried very hard academically [to conduct the training] by the training doctrine. 

Training doctrine can only go so far, though. You can study 

Figure 11. Iroquois Warriors practice clearing a house at Camp Atterbury.

Encounter with History, 
62

the driver’s education booklet and take your driver’s test, 

but to understand how to drive you need to get out there 

on the road. Early on, those running convoy exercises did 

not [reflect the] Iraq experience; they were running them 

from a training doctrine standpoint.48

The 3d Brigade trainers were teaching a purely doctrinal approach 

to conducting convoy security operations and not techniques that were 

reflective of the situation in Iraq. COL Stafford explained, “. . . the tactics, 

techniques and procedures (TTPs) were a hedgehog principle. Every 

soldier in the vehicle would point his weapon out of the vehicle to show an 

aggressive presence and be able to return fire, because the primary threat 

was insurgents with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).” 

This technique was being used because in the summer and fall of 2004, 

according to Stafford, the insurgents were still primarily using ambush 

as a means to intercept, destroy, or delay convoys rather than IEDs. LTC 

Shipman, however, countered this with the comment that the convoy 

scenario trained at Atterbury “was not consistent with the current threat 

situation [that existed] when we got into country.”49

The HMMWVs that were used for training at Atterbury were the 

soft-skinned version and the technique of having weapons pointed out the 

window so one could immediately return fire was the proper one if the 

threat was a traditional ambush against such vehicles. The ASTs deploying to Iraq were to be equipped with the up-armored HMMWV and the 

emerging threat was from IEDs. In such a scenario, the best technique was 

to keep the shrapnel-proof glass rolled up and drive through an ambush. 

Moreover, having the windows up in the event of an IED explosion would 

further protect the soldier from death or injury. Though the correct equipment might not have been available at Atterbury, conceptually the technique could have been trained. Despite any shortcomings revealed in the 

training, in a posttraining after action report (AAR) prepared by personnel 

of the division, the convoy live-fire exercise conducted by the 3d Brigade 

was rated as “excellent.”50

For those soldiers at Camp Atterbury assigned to ASTs, the training they 

expected to teach them “how” to be advisors was a further disappointment. 

When asked about the advisor-specific training he received during his 

stay at Camp Atterbury, Roger Swartwood responded, “I can’t remember 

getting any.” Shipman generally supported that assessment. He said, “We 

strongly recommended that we get more training on being an advisor . . . 

but I don’t think the training was set up to accommodate that.”51 In short, 

advisor-specific training was not provided. But there was a potential, albeit 

only partial, remedy to the problem.
63

The approximately 42 days spent at Camp Atterbury by the various 

mobilization groups of the 98th Division were not overly busy. In fact, 

Shipman described the experience as having “2 weeks of training crammed 

into 5.”52 Thus, there was sufficient time to undertake hip-pocket training if 

one knew when time would be available. Along with conducting additional 

training, there was time to conduct further research on the advisor mission 

if one was so inclined. Some members of the 98th Division attempted to 

perform these actions in their spare time. Scott McConnell remembered 

that Matt Jones used his spare time to train his team: “Matt Jones had been 

in Afghanistan in this role and so he really knew what was going to be 

expected of him. He went the extra mile and did training above and beyond 

the official curriculum, after hours, and they were doing different tactics 

and techniques that he thought were going to be appropriate for a battalion 

AST—and he had almost the entire team together there with him.”53

Others used their spare time wisely as well. MAJ Jeffrey Tennyson, 

assigned to an AST for the 3d Iraqi Division, also conducted training after 

duty hours with his team. “What my team ended up training on were things 

we felt were the highest risks—things like room clearing and first aid,” 

Tennyson explained. “We all went through Combat Life Saver and, as a 

follow-up, we just kept practicing what we learned. We made a huge list 

of tasks, broke them down, and then prioritized what we wanted to train 

on first. I also brought a little bit of stuff on IEDs from my work at Fort 

Leonard Wood.”54

In an effort that is truly reflective of the times, Swartwood conducted a 

great deal of research on-line looking for information on ASTs. “I got a lot 

of it from the Internet,” he recalled.55 Shipman confirms that the Internet 

was probably the best means of determining what an advisor was and what 

one did:

. . . a couple weeks out from mobilization, we found a 

website about advisor support teams that someone had 

set up. One of our noncommissioned officers found it 

accidentally through a Google search and e-mailed it to 

us—and you know, there was more information on that 

website than we had received from anybody up to that 

point. It was kind of humorous that the Army’s official 

system hadn’t really provided the information that we 

needed.56

COL Edward P. Castle, the division G6, was slotted on the battle rosters to be the commandant of the OES/MOS school. He and most of his 

personnel were in the division’s second mobilization group (Mob-2) to 
64

go through Camp Atterbury. During their spare time he pulled his team 

together to do some brainstorming on how the team would perform its 

mission. His team also “concentrated on getting documentation around 

the particular branch [we] were going to train in, just to have some kind 

of information when we went over there—field manuals, training manuals 

or any kind of a document; lesson plans from different schoolhouses,” he 

recalled. “We did a lot of e-mailing and a lot of burning CDs to get documentation. That’s what we did to get ready as a team.”57

The major portion of the division’s troops accomplished very little 

with their spare time, however. McConnell later revealed, “There were 

maybe two or three out of the eight or so [advisor support] teams that actually took it upon themselves to do that extracurricular training. The rest of 

the brigade, division, and some of the battalion teams just went through 

the curriculum and that was all.”58

Overall, the training experience at Camp Atterbury drew mixed reviews 

from members of the 98th Division. One officer described it as “. . . horrible . . . a complete waste. . . .” Another said it was “marginal.” SFC 

Ewing reflected that the training “wasn’t even close to what we needed.”59

Others gave a more positive assessment and were probably closer to reality. They tended to characterize the quality of the training as varied. Castle 

may have expressed it best when he said,

Some of it was good and some, unfortunately, wasn’t. I 

think the biggest disappointment with Atterbury’s training 

was that a lot of it was left up to us. There were portions 

of the day where they said, ‘Well, this is mission-specific 

or up to the team you’re with to decide.’ But since we 

knew very little about our mission, it was kind of hard to 

develop what it was that we wanted to train on.60

Tennyson further addressed the challenge of that task, at least as it 

related to those slotted for the AST mission: “It was like we were trying to 

train for a mission in a black box. We were shaking it, holding it up, and 

trying to guess what was in that black box.”61

Unfortunately, some of the members of the 98th Division were not 

even attempting to do that. In all fairness to the 3d Brigade trainers, if the 

training experience was considered inadequate by some Iroquois Warriors 

and did not prepare them as well as they thought it should have, the fault 

in part may be due to their own failure to take advantage of the time and 

opportunities they did have to build on their level of readiness. It is clear 

that at least some of them did, but others did not.
65

Ever the optimist, Catalanotti gave the 3d Brigade trainers the 

highest marks. “For the resources they had, they did a good job,” 

he remarked. “Some of the more common skills [tasks] . . . they did 

very well on. . . . Medical readiness and Combat Life Saving, the 

whole biological and chemical piece, they did well on too.”62

Gus Stafford acknowledged that the training might not have been as 

good as it should have been, but his reasons for why differed from the 

Iroquois Warriors. He believed the major shortfall was the inability of the 

training package to develop a sense of teamwork. He thought the number 

of days available in the plan to conduct the training was too short, and the 

number of tasks that had to be trained and validated precluded adequate 

time to develop teamwork among the 98th Division elements, especially 

the ASTs. “We did not build enough of an employment exercise with training vignettes and lanes to hammer home their ability to operate as teams,” 

he reflected.63

Stafford understood the frustration expressed by many of the 98th’s 

soldiers who went through the training at Camp Atterbury. Regarding the 

basic marksmanship and CTT training, for example, he wrote, “Since the 

98th Division (IT) was manned with individual training experts, there is 

little wonder that they felt we were wasting their time as we trained, practiced, and tested them on the very tasks they said they already knew.”64

Most of the training was conducted, not because there was any belief that 

the Iroquois Warriors were not trained, but simply because the training 

was required by a higher authority. 

Stafford did take issue regarding the level of experience of his trainers, however. He explained, for example, that the unit that conducted the 

convoy training for the 98th Division, the 1st Battalion, 335th Regiment, 

was composed almost exclusively of combat veterans who had served in 

either Iraq or Afghanistan.65 They were indeed soldiers who could, and 

did, impart their knowledge and experience in combat operations in the 

GWOT. Charnock acknowledged as much in comments regarding those 

who had been in Iraq or Afghanistan, and their value as trainers.

Arguably the most glaring shortfall of the Atterbury experience was 

the lack of training that focused on actual advisor duties and responsibilities. This was not the fault of the 3d Brigade, but perhaps the fault of the 

Army as an institution. Sean Ryan recalled that during one of the many 

meetings between the 98th Division and First Army to discuss the training 

plan, COL Jones, the G3, “gave a great soliloquy on the fact that this was 

really a Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense mission and the institutional Army didn’t have the ability to train advisors . . . [and] he was 
66

absolutely correct.”66 The reality, however, was that Special Forces (SF) 

units were already stretched thin with multiple missions, recovering from 

recent missions, or preparing to go on other missions, and that included 

the SF groups in the National Guard. There were no SF units available for 

training the Iraqi Special Forces (ISF) and the Army had to look elsewhere 

to satisfy the advisor requirements, as it had often done in past conflicts. 

Additionally, because the conventional Army has not performed advisor 

missions on a routine basis, it has never developed a basis for training 

advisors, nor has it even adopted a basic doctrine for advisor missions 

for conventional forces. Thus, there were no (and to date are no) tasks, 

conditions, and standards available with which the 3d Brigade could have 

trained the ASTs of the 98th Division on advisor-specific responsibilities.

Boots on the Ground—Kuwait

At about the mid-point of Mob-1’s training at Camp Atterbury, CRC-1 

from Fort Bliss arrived at the BIAP just west of the city on 22 September. 

Just 2 weeks after the receipt of the mobilization order, the 98th Division 

had boots on the ground ready to go to work for MNSTC-I. Consisting of 

just over 60 soldiers, the majority of CRC-1 was assigned to MNSTC‐I’s 

J‐Staff. After processing through BIAP, these soldiers arrived at their 

various places of duty, mostly at the MNSTC-I or CMATT headquarters in 

Baghdad where they would spend 10 to 11 months of their active duty tour. 

This group would be followed by four more groups about every 2 weeks 

until all troops slated on the JMD for the command’s various staffs were in 

country.

At about the same time the third Atterbury mobilization group began 

assembling at home stations in mid-October to travel to Indiana, the first 

mobilization group at Camp Atterbury was preparing to depart for Kuwait. 

On 17 October, Mob-1 took off from Indianapolis and headed for Rhein 

Main Air Base near Frankfurt, Germany. After a stop there, the plane flew 

to Kuwait where it landed at the Kuwait City International Airport. There 

to greet them were Sean Ryan and Tony Morales. Once the troops were off 

the plane, the two colonels took turns briefing them on the plan for their 

stay in Kuwait and various aspects of the local environment, to include 

security and the potential for heat casualties. Ryan explained, “One of the 

things we briefed them on was heat. They just left Rochester, New York, 

and they’re now in Kuwait. It’s 116 degrees, so we told them the importance of drinking water all the time and not skipping meals. We told them 

about slowing the tempo down to where they could sustain and get through 

the training.” After the briefs, the troops were loaded into buses and taken 

to a tent cantonment at Camp Virginia for their next phase of training.67
67

Camp Virginia was located in the desert about 50 kilometers due west 

of Kuwait City. LTC Daniel Christian, slated to be the brigade advisor for 

the 3d Brigade, 5th Iraqi Division, generously described the camp and 

its surrounding environment as austere. He noted, “There was certainly a 

heightened situational awareness [among us] as we were getting ready to 

go north at that point.”68

Unlike Camp Atterbury, the training that the Iroquois Warriors were 

to receive in Kuwait was almost universally praised. The package at Camp 

Virginia consisted of training in close quarters combat using the “glass 

house” technique, training on AK-47s (to include field stripping and firing 

the weapon), training on crew-served weapons—on which everybody had 

the chance to train, and a realistic live-fire convoy training exercise.

In contrast to Camp Atterbury, contractors employed by Military 

Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) conducted the training in 

Kuwait. All were ex-military, and many were former SF soldiers. Paul 

Loncle’s assessment of these teams was, “They were really good.”69

Most of the training in Kuwait was conducted at the Udairi Ranges 

about 40 kilometers north of Camp Virginia and most of it revolved 

around combat operations and substantive live-fire exercises. “It opened 

my eyes,” Charnock recalled. “The training in Kuwait was to the standard 

I would have expected going into country. It was pretty good.”70

Figure 12. Members of the 98th Division (IT) undergo AK-47 familiarization 

training in Kuwait before deploying to Taji, Iraq, in October 2004.

COL Douglas Shipman
68

As in Indiana, the convoy training seemed to be the highlight of the 

training experience in Kuwait. One of the key factors in the quality of the 

experience was, for the first time, the Iroquois Warriors were trained in 

up-armored HMMWVs. These heavy vehicles provided a different driving 

experience than the canvas-top models at Camp Atterbury, especially in 

the sandy terrain of the Middle East. In addition, some were equipped with 

the M2 .50-caliber heavy machine gun in a ring mount on the top, as well 

as the BFT system that proved to be so rare in Indiana. In some cases, the 

HMMWVs mounted no crew-served weapon. In those instances, a soldier 

was posted in the hatch and used his rifle to simulate the missing weapon. 

The training was conducted over a 3-day period at Udairi and concluded 

with a live-fire convoy exercise.71

While considered a major improvement over the Atterbury experience, 

the training at Camp Virginia was not without flaw. The convoy technique 

taught by the MPRI instructors was more or less the same as what had 

been taught at Camp Atterbury—the “hedgehog” principle with windows 

down and weapons pointed outward. Scott McConnell recalled:

Some of those tactics we didn’t end up using in theater 

anyway, things like marking IEDs with stuff you throw 

out of the vehicle. Mostly the tactics were pretty consistent and the only drawback was that it was all based on 

us having our own convoy. [When] we’re going to run a 

convoy of 25 vehicles [in Iraq] . . . they’re all going to be 

Americans. In reality, if it was an all-American convoy, 

it was maybe three or four vehicles with small teams. If 

it was any bigger than that, it was because we were part 

of running an Iraqi convoy. When we got there, we had 

to train Iraqis, communicate with Iraqis, and do all that 

as part of their convoy—and we never touched on any of 

that during our training.72

McConnell’s last comment highlights the fact that there was no 

AST-specific training provided at Camp Virginia either. Swartwood and 

other AST leaders continued to send requests up through their chains of 

command to provide training, or at least information, on AST duties and 

responsibilities, but to no avail.73

One of the challenges anticipated by the division’s planners was that 

their troops would need time to acclimatize on arrival in Kuwait. Daniels 

explained that the survey team had deliberately planned to make acclimatization a part of the Kuwait experience:
69

When you’re in a training environment in the United 

States, you are very typically on e-mail, on cell phones, 

and very connected to your family and friends and your 

normal lifestyle. We figured if we could pause in Kuwait, 

do some training and get immersed in what it was like to 

be in 110-degree days with body armor, not attached to a 

cell phone and not having all those lifelines before they 

actually went up into a more combat-like environment, it 

would be very helpful. . . . It was very conscious. We needed 

to stop and do more training in the desert environment, in 

the vehicles, and Kuwait was a good place do that.74

Despite the planning and despite his initial warnings to the troops on 

their arrival, Ryan recalled that “not 2 days [went] by and we had the first 

heat casualty. Then we had two more heat casualties. The first one was a 

female colonel who had skipped three meals.”75

Another problem facing the Iroquois Warriors that had been anticipated by the survey team, but was not yet apparent to the troops, was that 

some of them would end up changing jobs once they arrived in theater. 

Christian encountered this situation soon after his arrival: “. . . my original 

mission requirement was to be the officer in charge of an engineer schoolhouse and I would have had three majors working for me. When I arrived 

in Kuwait, though, within 24 hours we were notified that that mission was 

really up in the air and no one was sure if it was going to occur.”76 It did 

not. This kind of situation was to become more prevalent once the troops 

arrived in Iraq.

About 29 October, Mob-1 boarded C-130s at Kuwait International 

Airport and flew into BIAP. (The rest of the mob groups transited through 

the training in Kuwait between mid-October to mid-December.) The following day, the troops were transported by bus to the Taji Military Training 

Base (TMTB), located about 20 kilometers northwest of Baghdad. Before 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, Taji had been the headquarters of the Republican Guard’s Al-Medina Armored Division and possessed extensive tank repair facilities. Therefore, the camp was a lucrative 

target and had been heavily damaged in Operation Desert Fox in 1997 

and again during OIF. A few new facilities had been built and much of the 

damage had been repaired by the CPA before the Iroquois Warriors arrived, 

though the damage to many areas was still very much in evidence.77

The TMTB was divided into two sections: the US side, which housed 

the aviation brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, and the Iraqi side, where 

various Iraqi Army units and training facilities as well as the C2 Cell for 
70

CMATT’s ASTs were located. At Taji, the Iroquois Warriors were billeted 

in “The Green Hotel,” a two-story, metal and corrugated tin building that 

had originally been painted green. McConnell described the experience 

of a stay there: “I think [it had] corrugated tin floors as well. Every time 

somebody walked down between the bunks, it echoed through the building, one end to the other. They crammed us all into these buildings with 

just enough room for you to stick your legs between the bunks. It was 

pretty tight quarters and pretty friendly, so to speak, for the time we were 

there.”78

The primary activities for the Iroquois Warriors at Taji were theater 

in-processing, familiarization with the Iraqi culture, and preparing for 

movement to their place of duty. The in-processing was accomplished by 

98th Division personnel from the J-Staff at MNSTC-I and by the AST C2 

Cell for those troops being assigned as advisors. As part of the reception, 

BG Schwitters typically talked to each arriving group and related the 

expectations of them as part of the MNSTC-I and CMATT team.79 The 

in-processing was followed by cultural awareness training.

The cultural awareness training consisted of almost 2 days of briefings 

on the Iraqi culture, the Arab mindset, the history of Iraq, and “why things 

work the way they do in Iraq.”80 The training, perhaps better described as 

indoctrination, was provided by Dr. Chin, a man who seemed to be a character out of a James Bond movie. When asked about Dr. Chin’s first name 

in an interview, Matt Jones responded:

He didn’t officially have one. He was a scary guy. He was 

Delta Force’s psychiatrist/psychologist or Jedi mind master or something like that. Anyway, that was the best training we received the entire time. Dr. Chin gave a 3-hour 

breakdown of the history of Iraq so you could understand 

some of these cultural issues and the implications of some 

of the decisions that had been made. I wish we had had 

that on day one. He was such a clear presenter. He made it 

easy to understand why certain things were going on and 

it was very helpful.81

Dr. Chin’s presentation was widely regarded by the Iroquois Warriors 

as one of the best, if not the best, block of instruction in their whole training experience prior to assuming their missions. Chin’s presentation was 

Schwitters’ idea. Schwitters had worked with Chin on previous occasions 

in the Special Operations community. The general had recognized that 

Chin was uniquely capable of performing this kind of training and had him 

contracted to come to Taji to do it.82
71

The training at Taji completed the process to prepare the advisors, 

and any other 98th Division soldiers slated to work directly with the ISF 

to perform their mission. Now it was a matter of moving to their assigned 

places of duty and going to work—or so it seemed.

Even while the troops were at Camp Atterbury, mounting evidence 

indicated there would be turbulence in assignments and duties when they 

finally arrived in Iraq. Soldiers designated to be advisors had been slotted 

against specific ASTs going to specific Iraqi units. On his arrival at Camp 

Atterbury, Swartwood learned he was assigned as the team leader for the 

1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division. “When I put my stuff 

down on my bunk, they had my name over my bunk with ‘1st Battalion 

Team Leader’ written on it,” he recalled.83 Unfortunately, for many, those 

assignments were about to change. 

LTC Daniels, who had been sent over on the survey team to function as the operations liaison officer, had actually been functioning as 

the personnel officer. She had sent numerous messages back to both the 

TOC at Rochester and to Camp Atterbury attempting to explain that there 

was no way to ensure the ASTs currently designated for a given Iraqi unit 

would actually end up going to that unit. Therefore, the AST designations 

assigned at Atterbury really meant nothing, but apparently that word had 

not filtered down to the advisors.84

The problem lay in the AST situation the survey team found when 

they conducted their assessment during the summer. Daniels explained 

that due to the rapid expansion of the AST requirement in the winter and 

spring of 2004 and the lack of adequate staffing at CMATT, nobody knew 

exactly where the ASTs were, how many there were, and what their rotation dates were:

Part of what I was doing, while the plan was being 

approved, was spending a significant number of hours 

with a warrant officer in the J1. He and I kept turning over 

rocks and finding ASTs. We came up with who was really 

in country and where they were. We found ASTs that had 

been reassigned to other missions. We also found people 

who had come in on other missions that had terminated 

and later became ASTs. We found records of people who 

never made it into country but were reported to be there. 

One guy had broken his leg at Fort Benning and never 

got on the plane, but he was being reported as physically 

being in Iraq. It was a nightmare trying to find out who 

was actually there, when they showed up and what their 
72

365 [i.e., rotation date] was. We had to find out what their 

orders said, how long they could stay, and whether we 

needed to get them an extension. We basically had to sort 

out where all these people were.85

To compound the problem, the existing advisors were from numerous different CONUS and United States Army Europe (USAREUR) commands and were assigned on orders for varying lengths of time. Some 

were in Iraq on as short as 60-day orders, others as long as 1 year and 

many in-between, and all were due to rotate at different times. “That’s 

why,” Shipman recalled, “if I was signed up as a 3d Division [advisor] but 

the current 3d Division [advisor] didn’t leave for another 2 months, they 

could put me in 5th Division. That made sense once you got on the ground, 

but nobody understood that back home so we were a little irate.”86

Additionally, some advisors had different rotation dates than others 

on the same team, thereby creating vacancies that had to be filled by individuals rather than by an entire cohesive team. Thus, the battle handoff 

between the 98th Division ASTs and the existing teams was not going to 

be a clean, one-for-one swap on a given date. 

The upshot was that some 98th Division ASTs were no longer going 

to be assigned to their originally designated Iraqi units. Others would have 

to be broken up to fill individual slots on short-handed ASTs. The resulting 

reshuffling of team assignments to Iraqi units and the breaking up and 

rebuilding of others caused a great deal of frustration among the troops. “ . . . 

there were a few touchy days there,” Matt Jones recalled. “There were a lot of 

very upset people because it made absolutely no sense in the world to do that. 

All these teams had worked together all through training and now they were 

just going to blow them apart and send them to different units.”87

Both Schwitters and Sherlock were directly involved in many of these 

changes, which at first seems a bit odd when one considers Schwitters’ 

own desire to build well-trained, cohesive ASTs. His belief was that to 

be most effective, CMATT needed “to have teams that know themselves 

well, that have been functioning together as a team for some time, and that 

are well functioning small groups.”88 But Schwitters understood that given 

the situation with the original ASTs, it just was not possible to smoothly 

transition to the 98th Division’s replacement teams.

In reality, it made sense to make such changes, although to many of 

the incoming advisors it did not seem so at the time. What seemed to be 

arbitrary reassignments to some were for the most part rational and calculated, especially now that the advisor situation was becoming clearer. 

Shipman explained:
73

Our senior leader, who was COL Sanford Holman, had 

input into the decision-making process, as did COL 

Bradford Parsons who was the 5th Division [AST] leader. 

It wasn’t done in a vacuum entirely. We had a couple people 

pulled off our division team and put in other assignments. 

Those were good decisions, actually. We had a major who 

was going to be the S3 advisor but ended up being the 

senior battalion advisor—and that was the right place for 

him. He was a former enlisted Ranger Battalion guy. He 

needed to be out there helping the Iraqis shoot bad guys, 

not pushing papers and answering e-mails at division.89

Valid or not, the changes added to the frustration and uncertainty felt by 

many of the advisors. 

Another jolt to the advisors was that on the day the first teams arrived 

at Taji two of the battalion ASTs headed to the Iraqi 5th Division were 

informed they would immediately be convoyed out to their Iraqi units to 

begin the transition with the existing ASTs. Word spread that these two 

battalions were soon to enter combat operations at Fallujah (with the 6th 

Battalion) and Samarra (with the 7th Battalion). As McConnell described 

it, “That was a huge shock to all of us . . . at that time [we] still thought 

the whole Iraqi Army was in a garrison training mode. So it really opened 

our eyes.”90

While those two teams were made aware of their assignments and the 

status of their Iraqi units, other teams were, perhaps unavoidably, kept 

in the dark. Tennyson, who would be one of the lucky ones whose team 

was untouched by the advisor shuffling, stated he and the others on his 

team “knew we’d be going to Al Kasik but we didn’t know what battalion we’d be assigned to or what they were doing. We didn’t know if they 

were going to be in training, fully operational, or just forming up.” As it 

turned out, they would not get the answers until they physically arrived at 

Al Kasik.91

The frustration and uncertainty caused by assignment changes and 

lack of concrete mission information was by no means limited to the 

ASTs. Others experienced similar problems. COL Castle’s OES/MOS 

school began to fall apart as his people were pulled for other assignments. 

Christian, a part of the cell responsible for developing the engineer OES 

recalled, “The original cadre was supposed to be three majors, but it ended 

up being another major and myself. But [even] that folded and it ended up 

just being me.”92

Jim DiRisio, who had been slated to be an operations officer in the 
74

division’s AST C2 Cell at Taji, had been delayed in Kuwait by a severe 

foot infection. When he finally arrived at Phoenix Base, he was informed 

that Sherlock had recommended him and three other officers to interview 

for a job as BG Schwitters’ executive officer (XO). The JMD called for an 

active duty combat arms officer in that position, but such an animal had 

apparently not made it through the replacement pipeline to CMATT yet, 

so the 98th was asked to offer up a few possible candidates. DiRisio ended 

up with the job, but at the expense of the C2 Cell.93

Once it was definite that a given advisor team or staff replacement 

assignment was finalized, the next hurtle was getting there. For those 

assigned to jobs on the MNSTC-I or CMATT staffs in Baghdad, it was 

relatively simple, though potentially dangerous. Those soldiers had to ride 

in armored “Rhino” buses along the IED-infested Highway 1 out of Taji 

and into the International Zone (IZ) or “Green Zone” in the city. Though 

dangerous, the process of getting troops to the Green Zone was easy when 

compared to those who were going to places like Al Kasik, Numaniyah, 

and Kirkush. 

Between mid-September and mid-December, the mobilization groups 

from Fort Bliss and Camp Atterbury filtered into BIAP and Taji, inprocessed, and made their way to their duty locations in Iraq. Throughout 

the fall of 2004, the MNSTC-I, CMATT, and CPATT staffs grew and 

became more functional as each wave of Iroquois Warriors arrived to 

go to work. The AST C2 Cell in Taji became exclusively 98th Division 

soldiers. The ASTs transitioned with the outgoing teams. These, however, 

were not the only missions for which the Iroquois Warriors would assume 

responsibility for in Iraq. There were numerous others. How well they 

would perform those missions over the next 9 to 10 months though, 

remained to be seen.
75

Notes

1. According to COL Sean Ryan, the JMD represented only one portion of 

the overall requirement. To get support from the Joint Staff and HQDA, MNSTC‐I 

had to gain approval to waive the formal RFF and JMD processes to consolidate 

the requirement. 

2. Headquarters, 98th Division, Memorandum, AFRC-TNY-CMD, Subject: 

Identification and Selection of Advisor Support Teams (ASTs) in Support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom for Soldiers Outside of the 98th Division, 19 August 

2004.

3. COL Bradford Parsons, telephone interview by author, Headquarters, 

98th Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 3.

4. MAJ Matthew Jones, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 5.

5. Ibid., MAJ Matthew Jones, e-mail to author, 21 March 2007, Subject: 

RE: Question About Advisors.

6. MAJ John Vernick, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 5 November 2006, 2–3. To make matters worse, as people 

arrived at Fort Bliss the 98th Division received word that MNSTC-I wanted those 

individuals to go through training at Camp Atterbury based on the jobs they were 

to do in Iraq. Headquarters, First Army cut new orders for them that “split” their 

DUICs creating sub-DUICs that had to be tracked as well. The only person with 

that detailed information was Vernick, who became more a focal point for management of the 98th Division’s personnel than even the gaining command as he 

had the most accurate data.

7. COL Todd Arnold, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY 4 November 2006, 6.

8. LTC Richard F. Monczynski, telephone interview by author, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 January 2007, 2.

9. COL Charles A. “Gus” Stafford, telephone interview by author, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 8 December 2006, 2.

10. Ibid.

11. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 4.

12. Headquarters, 98th Division, PowerPoint Brief, “The Foreign Army 

Training Command Proposed Timeline and Operational Concepts,” 8 July 2004; 

Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 4.

13. COL Charles A. “Gus” Stafford, e-mail to author, Subject: Training 

Requirements, 6:38 p.m., 30 March 2007. Stafford recalled the marksmanship 

blocks were Pre-Marksmanship Instruction, Maintenance, Zero, Day, Night, and 

NBC qualification tables. “All soldiers went through M-9 and M-16 qualification. 

A smaller number followed the process on the M60, M2, and M249. This 

process took 3 to 4 days and nights based on refires and range scheduling. We 

also provided opportunity ranges to give more of the soldiers familiarization on 

automatic weapons,” he recalled.

14. Headquarters, US Army FORSCOM, Message, XX Sep 04, Subject: 
76

Change 4 to Training Guidance for Follow-on Forces Deploying ISO Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM.

15. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 3–4.

16. LTC Antonio Morales, interview by author, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 January 2007, 6.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Stafford telephone interview, 8 December 2006, 3.

20. Briefing, “The Foreign Army Training Command Proposed Timeline 

and Operational Concepts,” 8 July 2004; Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 4.

21. LTC James DiRisio, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 4. LTC Jody Daniels, one of the people working the JMD requirements for the survey team, later explained that the 

MNSTC-I J4 office actually developed the requirement for the convoy security 

team and had included it in the request for logistics personnel who would perform 

base support functions. It was not initially clear to the survey team that the convoy 

team was essentially a security unit rolled into the logistics request. The survey 

team eventually figured that out, and the fact that the convoy team was really a J3 

asset, not a J4 asset. By the time that was realized, the convoy team had already 

been slated to go to Fort Bliss and it was too late to change the mobilization flow.

22. Vernick interview, 5 November 2006, 9.

23. COL Sean Ryan, interview by author, Joint Center for International 

Security Force Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 December 2006, 6.

24. Headquarters, 98th Division, PowerPoint Brief, “Information Brief, 98th 

Division (IT) FA-TRAC and TY04/TY05 Missions,” 2 October 2004, 7. Three 

additional small mob groups would be mobilized and sent over in December 2004 

and March 2005. These soldiers were either additional troops mobilized to replace 

others who were KIA, WIA, sick or sent home on emergency leave or other reasons, or were to fill additional requirements identified later by MNSTC-I.

25. Timothy J. Hansen and Jocene D. Preston, ed. An Encounter with History: 

The 98th Division and the Global War on Terrorism: 2001–2005 (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 67.

26. MG James R. Helmly, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 December 2006, 8.

27. Stafford telephone interview, 8 December 2006, 2.

28. COL Charles A. “Gus” Stafford, e-mail to author, Subject: 98th Division 

(IT) Documents 5, Attachment: Subject: FW: New Guy Stuff, 19 January 2007. 

This e-mail contained a string of e-mails that were between Stafford and COL 

William J. Mushrush, the 85th Division G3. The difficult planning environment 

facing Stafford and his brigade is evident in the messages.

29. Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 85th Division (TS), Master Training Schedule, 

September–December 2004.

30. Stafford telephone interview, 8 December 2006, 1.

31. COL Robert Catalanotti, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th 

Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 2–3.
77

32. Stafford telephone interview, 8 December 2006, 3.

33. Ibid., 5. 

34. MAJ Scott McConnell, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 December 2006, 2.

35. MAJ Paul Loncle, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division (IT), 

Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 2.

36. COL Charles A. “Gus” Stafford, e-mail to author, Subject: RE: 98th 

Division (IT) 3d Brigade Organization (Unclassified), 23 January 2007. 

37. Ibid.

38. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 4.

39. Loncle interview, 4 November 2006, 2; COL Douglas Shipman, interview 

by author, Headquarters, 98th Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 3; 

SSG Brian D. Charnock, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division (IT), 

Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 2; Catalanotti interview, 3 November 2006, 3.

40. Loncle interview, 4 November 2006, 2.

41. MAJ Roger Swartwood, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 3.

42. COL Jody Daniels, interview by author, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 20 December 2006, 5. Stafford explained that the division’s 

request for spreading out the training was not simply ignored. The problem was a 

contracting issue over which he had no influence. The contract provided for three 

instructors to conduct the training over a 5-day period.

43. Daniels interview, 20 December 2006, 5; Jones interview, 4 November 

2006, 4.

44. SFC Dennis Ewing, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 2.

45. Ewing interview, 4 November 2006, 2; Parsons telephone interview, 3 

November 2006, 3.

46. Ewing interview, 4 November 2006, 2.

47. McConnell interview, 12 December 2006, 3.

48. Catalanotti interview, 3 November 2006, 4.

49. Stafford telephone interview, 8 December 2006, 4; Shipman interview, 3 

November 2006, 3.

50. SFC Andrew T. Brown, After Action Report, Subject: 98th Division AST 

Mobilization at Atterbury, IN, undated, 3.

51. Swartwood interview, 3 November 2006, 4; Shipman interview, 3 

November 2006, 3.

52. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 3.

53. McConnell interview, 12 December 2006, 3.

54. MAJ Jeffrey E. Tennyson, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th 

Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 3.

55. Swartwood interview, 3 November 2006, 2.

56. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 1.

57. COL Edward P. Castle, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 5 November 2006, 3.
78

58. McConnell interview, 12 December 2006, 3.

59. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 4; McConnell interview, 12 December 

2006, 3; Ewing interview, 4 November 2006, 2.

60. Castle interview, 5 November 2006, 2.

61. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 3.

62. Catalanotti interview, 3 November 2006, 4.

63. Stafford telephone interview, 8 December 2006, 8. Stafford was not 

satisfied with the training plan used to validate the 98th Division. Contrary to 

the news reports in 2006 that implied there was no effort to improve training at 

Camp Atterbury after the 98th Division’s stay there, Stafford made great efforts 

to improve the training plan for the 80th Division, which would take over the 

advisor mission from the 98th in 2005. He and that division’s assistant division 

commander, BG John P. McLaren, Jr., traveled to Iraq in May 2005 to see first 

hand what the conditions were on the ground. That experience enabled Stafford to 

significantly revamp the training package at Atterbury to address the needs of the 

80th Division’s advisors.

64. Stafford e-mail, Subject: Training Requirements, 6:38 p.m., 30 March 

2007.

65. COL Charles A. “Gus” Stafford, telephone interview by author, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 March 2007.

66. Ryan interview, 21 December 2006, 9.

67. Ibid., 5.

68. LTC Daniel Christian, interview by author, 98th Division Headquarters, 

Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 2. Christian arrived in Kuwait with Mob-2.

69. Loncle interview, 4 November 2006, 3. 

70. Charnock interview, 4 November 2006, 2.

71. McConnell interview, 12 December 2006, 4; Jones interview, 4 November 

2006, 5.

72. McConnell interview, 12 December 2006, 4.

73. Swartwood interview, 3 November 2006, 5. In a 29 March 2007 e-mail, 

Swartwood stated he was referring to the 98th Division’s command element at 

Camp Atterbury. “More than once we were told that the situation (as to where 

and even what we would be doing) was fluid and to ‘be flexible.’ I do not know 

if the requests went any higher than my immediate commander or above the 98th 

Div.”

74. Daniels interview, 20 December 2006, 5.

75. Ryan interview, 21 December 2006, 11.

76. Christian interview, 3 November 2006, 1.

77. Global Security, “Al Taji Army Airfield/Al Taji Camp,” available 

at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ iraq/ al-taji.htm, accessed 3 

November 2006.

78. McConnell interview, 12 December 2006, 5.

79. BG Frank Cipolla, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 November 2006, 3.

80. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 4.
79

81. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 6.

82. BG James Schwitters, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 December 2006, 2.

83. Swartwood interview, 3 November 2006, 4.

84. Daniels interview, 20 December 2006, 8.

85. Ibid., 7.

86. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 4.

87. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 6.

88. Schwitters interview, 13 December 2006, 6.

89. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 4.

90. McConnell interview, 12 December 2006, 5.

91. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 5.

92. Christian interview, 3 November 2006, 3.

93. DiRisio interview, 3 November 2006, 5.

81

Chapter 5

Staff and Training Team Operations

Then we were operating as an “Army of One.”

COL Cipolla

If one were to ask an Iroquois Warrior who participated in the mission 

in 2004–2005, “What did the 98th Division do while it was over there?”, 

he or she would likely give an answer along the lines of “A lot of things,” 

and then provide a litany of missions that members of the division performed. If there is one word that describes the breadth of missions that 

soldiers of the 98th Division performed in Iraq it is “diverse,” not only in 

terms of what missions they undertook, but also where they did them and 

with whom they did them.

Of course, the original question would be flawed, because technically 

the “division” did not go to Iraq. The division commander did not deploy, 

the flag stayed in Rochester, and the soldiers were sent over on orders 

bearing DUICs, not UICs. Indeed, the attitude on the part of the MNSTC-I 

and CMATT soldiers already in theater was not that the 98th Division was 

coming over to help; their view was, “Well he’s just another filler from 

the Army Reserve,” and technically they would be right. But that was not 

the view of the Iroquois Warriors. “. . . our intent was to be viewed as the 

98th Division,” John Vernick later said. “[If it were me,] I’d say, ‘The 98th 

Division was deployed.’”1 To some degree, that divergence of attitudes 

on the status of the division would color the relationships between the 

Regulars (whether they were Army, Marine, Air Force, or otherwise) and 

the reservists of the 98th Division for at least the initial period of the mission, and for some, the entire period.

The Mission 

Regardless of the different views on the status of the division, few 

could argue with the diversity of the mission, especially when one considers the mission was only remotely related to those the division was 

doctrinally supposed to perform in wartime. In addition to manning the 

staffs at MNSTC-I, the training teams, the C2 Cell, and the advisor teams, 

members of the 98th Division would create or assume the responsibility 

for organizations and institutions that were not originally on the JMD. 

These would include ASTs for ING divisions, several Combat Service 

Support (CSS) unit ASTs, the Phoenix Academy, the Iraq Advisor Group 

(IAG), and some installation command and staff positions at various bases 
82

in Iraq. The Iroquois Warriors would perform these missions at locations 

from Tall Afar in the north to Basra in the south and numerous places in 

between (see figure 13), and they would perform them with Sunnis, Shi’as, 

Kurds, Marines, Airmen, Sailors, Australians, Brits, Poles, Salvadorans, 

and a host of American soldiers from a vast array of units from all three 

components. 

The Staffs

One of the largest groups of Iroquois Warriors deployed to Iraq was 

designated to fill various positions on the MNSTC-I, CMATT, and CPATT 

staffs. No less than 164 division soldiers were assigned to supplement these 

three headquarters.2 The 98th’s “fillers” brought those staffs from around 

30-percent strength to something approaching 90 percent in a relatively 

R Baghdad amadi

Fallujah

Taji MTB

Samarra

Numaniyah

Basra

IRAN

TURKEY

SAUDI ARABIA

Kirkuk

Irbil

Mosul Tall Afar

Euphrates River

Tigris River

Kilometers

0 100 200 300 400

98th Division Key Locations

Balad Ruz

Kirkush MTB

JORDAN

Camp Virginia

Kuwait City

KUWAIT

Al Kasik MTB

Figure 13. 98th Division key locations.
83

short period of time.3 Most of these soldiers’ place of duty was in the Green 

Zone, though others were located at posts in Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan. On 

the same compound as the MNSTC-I staff was the American Embassy and 

the headquarters for the MNF-I, both located in Saddam Hussein’s former 

presidential palace. The compound was walled and secured by contract 

security guards, concertina wire, and other security measures. The area 

was considered relatively secure, although occasionally an insurgent 

would attempt to lob in a mortar shell from across the Euphrates River.

4

The MNSTC-I and CMATT headquarters where the staffs actually 

worked was designated “Phoenix Base.” It was a one-story former schoolhouse located near the Assassin’s Gate about a mile from the presidential 

palace. The CMATT headquarters had originally been located in the palace, 

but as that command grew, it needed more room and so it too was moved 

to the school. When CMATT moved over from the palace, MNSTC-I allocated it one cramped classroom. As Jim DiRisio described it: 

We were literally in there elbow to elbow with our laptop computers. Any spare flat space we could put a laptop 

computer on we did. It was very close quarters, but it was 

air conditioned and we had generators, electricity. . . . We 

would have like 20 people crammed into this little classroom, yet there was a classroom next door to us the same 

size that had the [MNSTC-I] J7 staff, the engineers from 

MNSTC-I, and they only had like 5 guys in there.5

Those soldiers assigned to the CPATT staff were not colocated with 

the MNSTC-I as was the CMATT. The CPATT headquarters was located 

with the offices of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) at Adnan Palace, 

which was in the Green Zone about a 5- to 10-minute drive from Phoenix 

Base. The working conditions for the soldiers in CPATT were comparable 

to the MNSTC-I and CMATT headquarters with two major differences. 

Established more recently than CMATT, the CPATT headquarters was not 

as far along in its organization, planning, and establishment of internal 

procedures as its military counterpart. Additionally, it was staffed with 

a very large percentage of civilian employees, which made the working 

environment at the same time more difficult and easier than at CMATT. 

Being on a newer staff, the CPATT soldiers ended up spending more of 

their time planning and developing procedures than implementing and 

adjusting existing plans.6

While the physical work environment at these headquarters was better 

than what most 98th Division soldiers experienced while they were in Iraq, 

the initial relations between the reservists and the active duty members of 
84

the various headquarters staffs were uncomfortable. Concerning the 98th 

Division soldiers sent to reinforce his command, Petraeus recalled, “We 

were happy to have them. We were just glad to get somebody over there 

to help us out—and the sooner the better.”7 Unfortunately, the CG’s attitude did not seem to filter down to many on the staff. As Lawrence Kelly 

remembered it:

We were not well received when we got there. . . . We had 

to deal with those prejudices, I’ll say. It got so bad one 

time that I had a Marine Corps colonel tell me that when 

this was all done he was going to write a book and title it 

Blame It on the 98th. . . . I told him, ‘When we got here, 

you had people all over this country. You didn’t have any 

idea how much time they had boots on the ground and 

you didn’t have any idea when people were leaving, what 

they were doing or anything else. We brought you 700 

soldiers that you didn’t have prior to us getting here. We 

filled the joint manning document, we filled CMATT, we 

did the police side of the house, we loaded people on the 

MNSTC-I staff, we did MOS training, the ASTs, and we 

did logistics support.’ They could not have done without 

the 98th Division or another Reserve unit coming in and 

bringing that many bodies.8

The Marine colonel would later apologize for his remarks.

Chaplain (COL) J. Paul Womack, the 98th Division’s command 

chaplain, recalled his introduction to CMATT in Baghdad shortly after 

his arrival in September. The chaplain was having breakfast in Saddam’s 

palace when BG Sherlock walked up. Sherlock apparently wanted to warn 

Womack of the atmosphere in the CMATT headquarters and related to 

Womack an incident that transpired between him and a senior colonel on 

the staff. The general told Womack that at some point during his conversation with the colonel, this officer made an impassioned outburst to the 

effect of “Your division was told not to being any (expletive deleted) chaplains over here!” Womack explained that CMATT apparently had concerns 

that “military chaplains and chaplain assistants and their religious support 

responsibilities would translate into efforts to proselytize Iraqi military 

personnel.” He then added, “Nothing, of course, could have been further 

from my mind. . . .”9 Still, it was clearly an unnecessary and unprofessional remark on the part of a senior leader in that headquarters and would 

have been an extremely unlikely occurrence had Sherlock been a Regular 

Army general officer.
85

Frank Cipolla recalled that his initial reception was mixed at best:

General Petraeus was great. Most of the colonels and 

below, though, wouldn’t even talk to us because we were a 

Reserve unit—that is, until they found out what we could 

do; about a month later, they were much more receptive. 

But initially they didn’t want to have anything to do with 

us. My first impression was, ‘I thought we were an “Army 

of One” here.’ Yet there were active component colonels 

who wouldn’t even look at us.10

He further reflected that there was, at least initially, a perceived attitude 

that if anything went wrong, “it was the Reserves’ fault.”11

The initial “anti-RC bias” was detrimental to the efficiency of the staffs 

for a number of reasons, to include dampening the reservists’ enthusiasm 

for shouldering the load. COL Daniels believed this led to an unwillingness of the regulars to trust the reservists with important staff actions. The 

obvious lack of trust for the reservists caused some regulars to take on “a 

greater load than they [could] handle, because they [would] not share or 

delegate responsibilities.” She went on to remark that such actions could 

potentially lead to rapid exhaustion in a stressful combat environment.12

The apparent “we–they” attitude may have been exacerbated because 

the soldiers of the 98th Division felt they had deployed as a unit and 

desired to maintain that identity. A soldier who is worth his salt and who 

serves in a good outfit wants people to know he is a member of that unit. 

It is a point of pride. Esprit d’ corps is one of those intangibles vital to a 

good unit, and the troops of the 98th Division had it. Thus, many desired to 

continue wearing their Iroquois Warrior patch, and the issue soon became 

a command-interest item. It was enough of a problem that Vernick, back in 

the TOC at Rochester, heard about it: “A lot of our soldiers would not take 

off the 98th Division patch. It was a real issue. A lot of those commands 

wanted them to take off that patch because they did not view them as 98th 

Division soldiers.”13

Schwitters directed DiRisio, already working as the XO at CMATT, to 

prepare an information paper that described the regulatory requirements 

and proper wear of shoulder sleeve insignia. The paper, issued 20 October 

2004, emphasized that “Soldiers in CMATT are not assigned to MNSTC-I 

as units, but rather as individuals” and went on to state that “Soldiers who 

are cross-leveled, assigned, attached, or augmenting deployed units . . . 

according to AR 670-1, ‘Will wear the same SSI–FWTS worn by members 

of the deployed unit(s) to which attached or OPCON.’” Technically, the 
86

proper patch for the 98th Division soldiers was actually the CENTCOM 

patch, and so off came the Iroquois Warrior patch. “A lot of people out of 

protest still wore the 98th patch, though,” DiRisio reflected, “and a lot of 

our people were in places that were so far from the flagpole that it didn’t 

really matter what patch they were wearing.”14 Still, the incident did little 

to establish better relations on either side.

It appears that most of the prejudices and frustrations between regulars and reservists, perceived or otherwise, were relatively short-lived. As 

they settled in and began to work together, much of the mutual mistrust 

in capabilities and intents seemed to fade away. Cipolla recalled that after 

a month or two the relationships began to improve: “Their initial skepticism was eventually replaced by an attitude of care and concern. They 

witnessed what we were doing and realized that we were accomplishing 

the mission. It was at that point that things got a lot better. Then we were 

operating as an ‘Army of One.’”15 Even so, some 98th Division soldiers 

maintained that, in their environment anyway, the prejudices remained for 

the rest of the rotation.

The reception of the Iroquois Warriors by MNSTC-I’s commanding 

general was generally regarded by the reservists as very positive. Petraeus 

had commanded the 

101st Airborne Division 

during the march on 

Baghdad in March—

April 2003. It was a 

command of which he 

was clearly proud and 

in which he had great 

confidence. In an interview in 2006, Petraeus 

expressed the idea that 

it would have been nice 

to have had the division 

headquarters come over 

to help him stand up the 

MNSTC-I operation. 

He knew that would not 

have been possible and 

the situation was such 

that he was going to 

have to make do with an 

ad hoc organization. As Figure 14. LTG David H. Petraeus, commanding 

general of the MNSTC-I.

LTC James DiRisio
87

for the incoming reservists, he was indeed delighted to receive their help. 

His attitude toward the members of the division was apparent and was 

reciprocated by them. In postdeployment interviews, the Iroquois Warriors 

were unanimous in their praise of his leadership.

Of the 164 soldiers assigned to the three major headquarters, about 112 

were assigned to the joint staff sections of Petraeus’ MNSTC-I headquarters. Of this number, only four 98th Division soldiers were assigned to the 

J1. This seems to be a small contribution until one considers that there were 

only seven Army slots for the section on the JMD. The senior Iroquois in 

the section was MAJ Ann Pellien, who not only managed MNSTC-I’s JMD 

personnel requirements and personnel support, but played a major role in 

tracking and managing the division’s personnel in theater. This section 

would later assume the responsibility for acquiring additional personnel 

for MNSTC-I’s ever-increasing requirements for ASTs as new Iraqi units 

were stood up and for the new Special Police Transition Teams (SPTT). 

It also mentored the Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) personnel directorate 

and assisted it in developing policies on key personnel actions such as pay, 

promotion, and accountability.16

Like the J1, the J2 section possessed four 98th Division soldiers for 

the seven Army slots allocated. Initially run by a Reserve colonel (who 

was not from the 98th Division), its leadership would be turned over to 

Daniels in February 2005. The Iroquois Warriors in this section helped to 

develop the daily intelligence estimates for Petraeus, operated the Secure 

Compartmented Intelligence Facility (SCIF), and conducted the route 

analysis for the movement of Iraqi Army units into the Fallujah area for 

the major operations conducted there in November 2004. After Daniels 

took over, the J2 became deeply involved in developing intelligence training support to the Iraqi Army, in part by establishing an intelligence school 

at Taji.17

The J3 section was considered the “Coordination Hub” of the MNSTC‐I 

headquarters. Of the 33 Army positions (from about 40 total) in the J3 on 

the JMD, 20 were filled by 98th Divisions soldiers. This section’s mission 

was the “development, justification, prioritization, and implementation of 

projects to train, equip, and mentor” the ISF. As such, it coordinated the 

rest of the MNSTC-I staff to meet the command’s mission requirements. 

Among other missions, it coordinated the development of the SPTTs and 

the operational transition between the 98th and its successors in the 80th 

Division.18

Not included in the J3 numbers but working directly for it was the 

J3’s Convoy Security Team, commonly referred to as the “Rough Riders.” 
88

Consisting of about 40 soldiers, mostly from the 98th Division but including troops from other Reserve divisions and even a few Marines and a 

sailor or two, this outfit was essentially a small company consisting of 

two platoons. The division soldiers were a conglomerate of troops. “ . . . 

they wanted combat-oriented infantrymen over [on the Convoy Security 

Team],” remarked Vernick, “but it ended up being a variety of MOSs.”19

Provided up-armored HMMWVs armed with crew-served weapons, the 

team’s mission was to provide security to military convoys all over central 

Iraq. During its tour in country, elements of the Rough Riders conducted 

over 2,000 security missions. Elements of the team experienced a number 

of ambushes and IEDs from which they sustained a number of casualties, 

but it suffered no KIAs.20

MNSTC-I was authorized 128 personnel in the command’s J4 section. 

Of this number, Iroquois Warriors filled 51 positions. This was clearly the 

largest group of division soldiers in the MNSTC-I headquarters. Arguably, 

the J4 section had the most complex and far-reaching mission. The J4 not 

only coordinated and managed the logistics operations for MNSTC-I and 

its subordinate commands, it also coordinated logistics support to the Iraqi 

MOD. During the year the division troops functioned in the section, the 

J4 was responsible for the delivery of 50,000 tons of supplies to the Iraqi 

Army and police units. It coordinated the shipment of 80,000 weapons 

and over 30 million rounds of ammunition. It acquired and issued all the 

equipment needed for the ASTs to include 550 up-armored HMMWVs, 

SINCGARS radios, BFTs, night vision goggles (NVGs), and a host of 

other items.21

The survey team operation in Kuwait under LTC Morales and MSG 

Compitello transitioned into positions on the J4 staff and became the J4’s 

liaison team to CFLCC in addition to the RSOI functions (reinforced by 

four more Iroquois Warriors at Camp Virginia), which they maintained 

until all 98th Division troops were in country. As that operation closed 

down, another J4 RSOI cell opened operations at Camp Buehring to handle 

RSOI operations for new ASTs coming into country when MNSTC-I’s 

mission expanded to cover the former ING divisions as well as the three 

initial Regular Army divisions. Additionally, the Iroquois Warriors in the 

J4 operated the Central Issue Facilities to support ASTs and Iraqi Army 

units at Taji, Al Kasik, Kirkush, and Numaniyah.22

The 98th Division filled five slots in the J6 section, which handled 

communications and automation systems for MNSTC-I. Like the other 

sections, it not only performed its mission for MNSTC-I, but accomplished 

tasks for the Iraqi MOD and MOI by “designing solutions to requirements, 

purchasing, and implementing radio and computer-based systems” for 
89

those agencies. This section coordinated the transfer of tens of thousands 

of radios and thousands of computers to the ISF, MOD, and MOI. Like the 

other sections, it mentored and developed its counterpart sections in the 

MOD and MOI.23

The 98th Division contributed 28 soldiers to the CPATT staff, to 

include COL Michael R. “Mike” Smith, who was assigned as the chief of 

staff and, as such, was the senior Iroquois Warrior in that command. His 

tour in Iraq would last for 18 months, extending through both the 98th and 

80th Divisions’ rotations and into that of the 108th Division in 2006. As 

mentioned before, the demand to fully organize this headquarters was not 

as great as it was for CMATT, thus the division reinforcements for CPATT 

arrived with the later mobilization groups.24

The majority of Iroquois Warriors, by far, were assigned to the CMATT 

headquarters and its subordinate elements. These included a number of 

diverse missions that included reinforcing (and in some instances commanding) base support commands; establishing and operating various 

OES, NCOES, and MOS training activities; and of course, the major 

effort, the manning of no less than 31 of the 39 ASTs in CMATT. In all, 

about 476 division soldiers were assigned to CMATT.

The commanding 

general of CMATT, BG 

Schwitters, was a former commander of the 

Delta Force, an organization with which he 

had a long-time affiliation. He had served 

in, or with, Delta for 

at least 11 of his over 

25 years of service. 

One Iroquois Warrior 

described Schwitters 

as a “Southern gentleman,” and indeed, he 

had been educated 

at the evangelical 

Christian school of 

LeTourneau University 

in Longview, Texas. 

While he was not as 

popular with many of 

Figure 15. BG James Schwitters, commanding 

general of the CMATT.

LTC James DiRisio
90

the Iroquois Warriors as Petraeus, they considered him a dedicated, nononsense commander.25

For his part, Schwitters was not as happy, perhaps, to have the 98th 

Division soldiers on his staff as his boss, but it had nothing to do with the 

fact that they were reservists. “My initial impressions were mixed but did 

not revolve around any issues of it being a Reserve organization; rather, 

it was simply an issue of having the right folks in the right quantities with 

the right skills to do the mission,” he recalled. “I just wanted people who 

could do the job.”26 Like many others, Schwitters was not convinced the 

incoming reservists possessed the requisite skill sets for the mission.

Twenty-four Iroquois Warriors were assigned to Schwitters’ staff and 

headquarters. With only 58 people assigned to the headquarters, every staff 

section in CMATT had representatives from the division. Being colocated 

with the MNSTC-I headquarters, working at CMATT came with all the 

attendant advantages and disadvantages. While communication with the 

higher headquarters was extremely easy, being the subordinate headquarters at Phoenix Base ensured that priority for space and communications 

capabilities went to the MNSTC-I staff.

CMATT was a joint and combined command that, along with its basic 

mission, made it an interesting, though challenging, work environment. 

DiRisio explained:

Everything you learned at CGSC about how a joint staff 

operates was pretty much thrown out the window at 

CMATT. Maybe I’m being a little facetious. There were 

certain things I learned at CGSC that were helpful. But 

where we were, the mission was so ambiguous and so 

evolving that we were very much a seat-of-the-pants type 

of organization—and that isn’t a knock on the professionalism of anybody in CMATT. General Schwitters had 

been the commander of Delta Force before he came to this 

position. The chief of staff of CMATT was an active duty 

colonel—Fred Kienle—and he had been at Norfolk at 

Joint Forces Command when he was selected to go over. 

He was no schlep by any means as far as planning. We had 

competent people but the mission was very ambiguous, 

so we basically developed standard operating procedures 

for ourselves and evolved those over time. We also had 

four Australians [working] there. In fact, the main planner of the organization was an Australian engineer officer. 

We had active duty Air Force and Navy; we truly were 
91

joint. If you looked at any given time in our little building, 

you’d see any number of different uniforms and people 

coming from different perspectives all trying to dig in and 

do the same thing.27

Much of the CMATT staff’s efforts went to supporting the AST mission, especially the administration and logistics requirements, and the Iraqi 

Army. In a nutshell, the CMATT mission was to man, train, and equip the 

new Iraqi armed forces, which included air force and navy requirements 

though the latter were very small. That mission included recruiting Iraqi 

service personnel; however, none of the Iroquois Warriors were directly 

involved in the recruiting effort.

Base Support

One of the missions vital to the overall CMATT effort, but only peripherally associated with it, was the requirement to staff the installation commands of a number of military training bases important to the command’s 

mission. One of the largest of these was the TMTB commanded by COL 

Catalanotti.

On completion of the training of mobilization groups going through 

Camp Atterbury, Catalanotti was notified he would deploy to Iraq to backfill Frank Cipolla, who was designated to return to Rochester as the OIC 

for the C2 Cell at Taji. Arriving at Baghdad in December, Catalanotti 

had been there only a few days when COL Henry approached him about 

becoming the base commander for Taji. “Absolutely,” was Catalanotti’s 

response. He then met with Schwitters to confirm the decision and was 

soon off to Taji to take command.28

Catalanotti took over command of TMTB from the temporary commander, a Marine major by the name of Gallagher, who had been attempting to keep it under control while operating with an almost nonexistent 

staff. The command at Taji included providing housing and life support 

for 15,000 Iraqi and 500 Coalition soldiers, and promised to get bigger. 

“They wanted to formally make Taji one of the largest military training 

bases,” Catalanotti recollected. Thus he quickly began building an installation staff, developing a command structure, and formulating policies and 

procedures for the post. A few of the people he acquired for his staff were 

98th Division personnel. As he described them, “. . . I had to take from 

here and there. I had an Air Force officer. I had a Navy corpsman for my 

medical staff. I had a couple individuals from the 75th Division (Training 

Support).”29 His installation sergeant major, however, was Command 

Sergeant Major (CSM) Milton Newsome, who had been the CSM for the 

6th Brigade back in Mattydale, New York.
92

In Catalanotti’s opinion, the greatest challenge he faced was providing force protection and security for the post. The installation was 

surrounded by a series of guard towers. The first thing he went to work 

on was getting the Iraqi security force trained to man them. “I needed 

those guard towers . . . to be manned by soldiers who knew what to 

do, who knew the rules of engagement and how to fire a weapon,” he 

recalled. Some of the other priority tasks that his new command trained 

for included force protection, reaction to incoming mortars and rockets, 

and triage procedures for wounded Iraqi soldiers and civilians.30

One of the key security problems Catalanotti and his staff faced was 

the East Gate. Newsome described that location:

When I first got over there, we called the East Gate 

‘Dodge City’ because you could drive down the highway 

and mortars would be lobbed at you. As people came into 

the base to work during the day, they were lined up like a 

shooting gallery and it was very bad. We closed the East 

Gate down and built the South Gate, which ran parallel to 

the American gate. That helped alleviate a lot of the tension and helped us protect the Iraqis.31

But even with the new South Gate, there were problems. “Taji had 

the largest entry control point in all of Iraq, and the volume of vehicles, 

soldiers, pedestrians, and workers coming into that base was enormous,” 

Catalanotti said. “. . . the [South Gate] opened off Highway 1 and that was 

one of the most dangerous roads. I needed Iraqi security, contractors, and 

the American advisors at the gate, because you needed multiple echelons 

of people checking each other, and the ultimate group was the Americans 

checking everyone else. It was the only way it could be done.”32

The control measures at the gate were indeed stringent. Corruption by 

the Iraqi guards was always a problem, and not necessarily because they 

were allowing the terrorists in. Most often it was because they wanted to 

take care of a friend, a fellow tribesman, or perhaps they had accepted a 

bribe. Catalanotti described some of the many other problems:

Who was letting what in? Who was only being somewhat 

checked versus someone not getting checked at all? It 

was as silly as the ice cream man trying to get ice cream 

onto the base and yet his vehicle could only go so long in 

130-degree weather. He would spend 4 hours sitting outside the gate before he could come through, and he would 

wind up bringing in melted ice cream. From issues like 
93

that to severe issues like an Iraqi general who said we’re 

not going to check him. Well, how did I know that someone wasn’t holding that Iraqi general’s wife hostage at his 

house until he came on the base and killed me? No matter 

how much that Iraqi general respected me, he would’ve 

had to make a decision: ‘Do the insurgents kill my wife 

or do I kill you as the American colonel?’ Needless to say, 

he got checked.33

The second major challenge for Catalanotti and Newsome was life 

support requirements. “How to get food into the base and keep the Iraqis 

fed, how to run the dining facilities, how to run the barracks, how to keep 

law and order among the different tribes that were in the force, [and] how 

to deal with hygiene and cleanliness. Trying to get 15,000 Iraqis fed in 

a reasonable way is very difficult,” Catalanotti recalled. Part of providing life support for the post was building new support infrastructure or 

rebuilding that which had been previously destroyed or damaged. “Taji 

had been hit very hard . . . and there wasn’t much left when we moved 

in,” Catalanotti said. “Trying to put a training base in there required all 

the buildings to be restructured and refurbished. All the contractors, the 

security of the contractors, who was legit to come into the base—all that 

came under my responsibility.”34

The third primary area of responsibility for Catalanotti was to support 

the training functions of the post. Taji was the headquarters for the Iraqi 

1st Division, and home base for most of its subordinate units. As such, 

the installation had to provide the life and logistics support to that command and to the Iraqi Army NCO Academy located there. Late in February 

2005, when the so-called “Phoenix Academy” was stood up to provide the 

final training for advisors coming into Iraq, Catalanotti assumed responsibility for supporting that school as well.35 Newsome recalled that the Taji 

training functions were even more diverse: “We actually trained the Iraqi 

police department there too. In addition, we trained medical and supply 

there as well. We also had the transportation corps and the air corps. We 

had a lot of different training going on at Taji all at the same time. Plus, 

Taji was the largest logistical base in Iraq. . . .”36

In retrospect, Catalanotti was proud of what was accomplished at Taji. 

He had worked wonders at Taji, but did not do it without assistance. He 

commented, “I had a great relationship with General Schwitters. He gave 

me a lot of support. We were able to take a base from nothing to something 

very potent in 10 months. His support, MNSTC-I’s support, and the support of my staff were all very important [to the end result].”37
94

There were at least six other bases that MNSTC-I controlled. One of 

the smaller ones was Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shield in Baghdad. 

This small compound was located near the MOI and the Baghdad police 

academy, and it housed the Transition and Assistance Support Center along 

with a mixture of corps-level support units. The post was the responsibility 

of MAJ Shauna Hauser of the 98th Division. 

Hauser had originally deployed as a planner in the MNSTC-I J5 section. Her primary focus had been researching requirements and developing 

plans for CPATT and their efforts to train the various Iraqi police forces. 

About the end of January 2005, she was selected to be the base commander 

for FOB Shield, but as she described the job, “I was what you might call a 

‘base management officer.’ Some people say ‘base commander’ but I had 

no authority over really anybody on the base. . . .”38

To assist in her mission, Hauser had one deputy, a Marine warrant officer, who functioned as her “staff.” She controlled a contract security force 

that consisted of a dozen former British Special Air Service (SAS) soldiers 

who provided the leadership for the Fijian security guards that protected 

the compound. Beyond that, her control on the base was practically nil. 

“Because I didn’t have direct control over one unit, it really came down to, 

‘Hey would you do this? Would you do that?’ [in] trying to get the units to 

work as a team toward the betterment of the base,” she remembered.39

The biggest headache Hauser faced was the ownership of the post. It 

was initially under MNC-I, but that command wanted to give it up and 

turn it over to the Iraqis. MNSTC-I, however, wanted the base due to its 

location near the MOI and the police academy and decided to retain it. 

The problem was that the post was dependent on MNC-I for support but, 

as Hauser explained, 

MNSTC-I wasn’t set up to really support itself. It could 

support Iraqis, but could not support itself. So on some of 

the issues, like water for instance—that KBR [Kellogg, 

Brown, and Root] didn’t provide—MNSTC-I would provide water for an interim period, but then the corps was 

like, ‘Well, this isn’t my base. Even though I have 60 percent of the soldiers living on it fall under me, it’s not my 

base.’ And so those were some of the issues that day to 

day, we had to work out, to make sure we had water, we 

had support, we just had stuff that sometimes we take for 

granted.40

Although not originally planned as part of the support package for the 

mission, the experiences of Catalanotti and Hauser illustrate some of the 
95

ways troops of the 98th Division were able to adapt to meet the challenges 

faced by the MNSTC-I. They also point out the range of responsibilities 

the Iroquois Warriors were asked to accomplish for which they were not 

specifically trained. However, one area the soldiers of the division were 

particularly suited to address was that of institutional training.

The “Training Package”

The Iroquois Warriors played a major role in the effort to establish 

various training institutions for the Iraqi Army. That mission came under 

the purview of the so-called “Training Package” organization that was to 

be established at the TMTB. Not so much an organization per se as it was 

a group of related and loosely organized training and education teams, 

this element performed, at least in part, what was probably the closest 

thing to the 98th Division’s original mission. Unlike the other elements 

sent to support MNSTC-I, the Training Package included no USAR filler 

personnel from outside the 98th Division. It consisted of 136 soldiers who 

were divided into four smaller elements: the MOS trainers (25 personnel), 

NCOES trainers (34 personnel), OES trainers (47 personnel), and the ING 

BCT team (30 personnel).41

Figure 16. CPT Joe Burkhart demonstrates operation and assembly 

procedures to Iraqi soldiers.

The Advisor
96

The MOS training team, of which COL Castle was designated the 

commandant (as well as for the entire Training Package), was probably the most diverse organization in the group. It consisted of one large 

generic combat arms training team and six smaller MOS-specific teams 

that included engineer, signal, ordnance, medical, quartermaster, and 

maintenance instructors, almost all of whom were majors and lieutenant 

colonels.42 These elements were not positions that MNSTC-I originally 

envisioned, but were believed by the survey team to be needed for training 

the Iraqi Army. Unfortunately, most of the personnel on these teams would 

be pulled away for other missions due to the exigencies of CMATT’s everevolving situation. None of these teams would ultimately perform the 

actual missions they were sent to Iraq to perform. Castle described how it 

happened:

When we first got to Taji, we still thought that [we were 

going to do the MOS training mission]. We were separated from the ASTs who were getting assigned out to 

units around the country. We stayed in Taji and just started 

working on developing POIs because that’s what we 

thought we were going to be doing . . . folks would come 

to me and say, ‘Hey, we need two people for this AST 

mission,’ or ‘We need two people for this staff position,’ 

or ‘We need somebody to go over here.’ Little by little, 

folks were taken from my organization to a point where I 

think we just had a few engineer officers there who were 

working on the engineer POI.43

Castle’s two deputies, LTC Lawrence Kelly and LTC Sean Sullivan, 

were OICs of the NCOES and OES teams, respectively. These two officers, however, were sent to Baghdad to work on the J-Staff soon after 

Mob-2 and 3’s arrival in Iraq. Both officers, at least nominally, remained 

in charge of their respective teams, though these teams too, would suffer 

losses from personnel being pulled away for other missions.44

Though the instructors from these teams did not ultimately perform 

their intended missions, that does not mean they were idle or were malemployed. Most still went on to achieve training successes with the Iraqi 

Army. The engineer MOS instruction team is a good example.

The engineer MOS team consisted of LTC Daniel Christian, MAJ 

Brian Miller, and MAJ Kevin Myers. These three went to work preparing a POI for the engineer MOS training. The problem was that no one 

at CMATT seemed to have any interest in the engineer MOS training (or 

for the whole MOS school mission for that matter) and it began to appear 
97

to Christian that they were wasting their time. “For the first 3 months, the 

three of us really tried to get interest, support, and funding for the school,” 

Christian remembered. “It was a really difficult thing to do at that time, 

just to get the concept off the ground.” Not one to be idle, Christian found 

other things to fill his time and skills as an engineer officer:

While I was in Taji I took it as an opportunity to do force 

protection. We were on the Iraqi side and the footprint of 

the base was that it backed up against the forward refueling point for the 1st Cavalry Division. That perimeter was 

riddled with holes in the fence and things of that nature, 

so I assumed the responsibility as the engineer to do force 

protection for Taji and just started to move that down the 

road. I begged and borrowed for resources. I got some 

concertina wire and we really shored up that area pretty 

well before I left.45

For several weeks, Christian and Miller worked for Castle in laying the foundation for the establishment of an engineer school but it was 

apparently a frustrating experience. However, Christian ultimately found 

what he considered more useful employment. “I went to Phoenix Base in 

Baghdad, met up with COL Parsons and the other folks who were running 

the 5th Division, and pleaded my case,” he explained. “I was going crazy 

with that mission in Taji and needed to do something else.” Soon after this 

meeting he received orders to report to Numaniyah Military Training Base 

(NMTB) where he was assigned to replace an existing brigade advisor 

from the 91st Division (TS) whom Christian later described as “very much 

mentally on his way out.”46

Meanwhile, Castle and Miller received a new mission—that of helping to develop the Iraqi Army’s engineer force. It was a CMATT mission, like many others, that was created “on the fly.” Before Christian had 

departed for Numaniyah, Castle had noted the disintegration of his school 

and decided to address the issue with CMATT:

About 1 month into this I noticed that things were getting 

peeled away. I actually contacted BG Richard Sherlock 

and said, ‘Sir, I’m not doing anything here. Is there something else I can do?’ He called me down to Baghdad where 

I talked both to him and BG James Schwitters. Probably 

about a week into the trip to Baghdad, General Schwitters 

either saw or was told about a need to develop the Iraqi 

Army engineer force because they just didn’t have anything; and since I was an engineer officer, it kind of fit. He 
98

interviewed me for the job and that’s when I got started. 

It didn’t appear to me that it was a planned position, more 

of an opportunity that had come up.47

Castle returned to Taji, grabbed Christian and Miller and went to work, 

though he lost Christian soon after this effort started. The mission for the 

engineers now was not to develop an MOS course, but to help stand up 

and train a 200-man engineer battalion that would form the basis for the 

support troops of the Iraqi Army’s engineer training center. In essence, 

Castle and Miller would be a two-man AST. As such, Castle worked with 

Brigadier General Marza, the engineer branch representative in the MOD 

responsible for engineer force development. These two officers worked 

hand-in-glove on organizational design, equipment quantities and specifications, and like issues in developing the vision for the future Iraqi Army 

engineer force. Meanwhile, MAJ Miller worked with Colonel Ali, the 

commander of the 1st Engineer Regiment (equivalent to a US battalion), 

in organizing, equipping, and training the first engineer unit.48

In working with Marza, Castle recalled that he sometimes had to advise 

“pretty hard.” The engineers of the old Iraqi Army were largely trained as 

bridge units or mine laying units and a fair number of the officers and men 

from these old units were now in the new army. As is human nature, they 

desired to work on tasks with which they were familiar. “Well, what am I 

going to do if we don’t do bridges?” he recalled some of them saying. With 

plenty of old Soviet-style bridging equipment sitting around, Marza was in 

agreement with their desires. However, Castle disagreed. There were more 

pressing needs for these engineer units, and Castle pushed hard to make 

him see the soundness of his position:

We had a lot of discussions with General Marza and the 

engineers too, because General Marza wanted to have 

bridge companies and mine laying companies. I told him 

we needed to think about what will be the most important 

things about our mission, and it was really more around 

survivability and construction as to what they were looking for. We worked on the training to prepare those areas, 

so we didn’t really talk about mine laying or bridges at 

all, even though they had some bridges still left over there 

that we could’ve used to do some training on: using the 

excavators that were there and then just basic masonry—

we had equipment in for that; pipefitting and some other 

things they could use to refurbish some of their buildings 

so they could use them to either live in or work in. In a 

lot of the areas we went into to stand up these companies, 
99

the buildings were there but everything else had been 

stripped out—wires, pipes—everything had been taken to 

use somewhere else.49

Ultimately, Castle’s view won out.

Following through on Castle’s vision, Miller worked with Colonel Ali 

to develop training on immediately useful engineer-specific tasks. In addition to the more routine training events such as marksmanship and drill, 

they included basic tasks in masonry, piping, and electrical wiring, as well 

as identification and reduction of IEDs and mines. They likewise arranged 

training on more advanced skills with engineer equipment. Castle was able 

to arrange for the transfer of excavators from the MOI to the Iraqi Army. 

At Taji, there were 28 new civilian versions of these power shovels sitting 

idle. He convinced the MOI they would be better utilized by the army and 

so they went to the 1st Engineers for use at the training center, and later 

two were issued to each division.50

Castle’s work with Marza caused him to work closely with the 

MNSTC-I J5 section. In doing so he discovered several months into the 

effort that the MNSTC-I plan was to create an engineer regiment in each of 

the Iraqi divisions (which by now included the former ING divisions and 

two completely new divisions that were forming) for a total of eight new 

units. The 1st Engineer Regiment, which had just completed organizing 

and going through its basic and advanced training, would have to support 

this new initiative. Working with the MOD, Castle and Miller arranged 

to send 80 of the 1st Regiment’s engineers to the United Arab Emirates 

(UAE) on C-130s to be trained by the German Army on additional engineer skills. On return from the UAE, these troops formed the core of the 

Iraqi Army’s basic training unit that would help populate the new divisions 

with trained engineer troops.51

The engineer basic training unit at Taji would eventually go on to 

train one engineer company (which would eventually expand to form a 

regiment) for each of the existing Iraqi divisions that had not yet acquired 

one. Interestingly, the three ING divisions each possessed an explosive 

ordnance disposal (EOD) company, since that mission (the Iraqis had no 

Ordnance Corps at the time) was of higher priority than other missions for 

those units. The basic training unit ran the EOD companies through engineer training and eventually qualified them to perform basic engineer tasks. 

Significantly, it was an early success story of Iraqis training Iraqis.52

While the engineer team was at least employed in working with the 

Iraqi Army in its branch skills, such was not true for other members of the 

MOS training teams. The two officers on the ordnance team, for example, 
100

were sent to other duties that were not directly related to their branch. 

MAJ Theresa Baginski was pulled out of the MOS training team about 

mid-November and reassigned to be on the AST for the 1st Transportation 

Regiment headed by LTC McGrath (who himself had been originally slotted as an intelligence officer on the CMATT staff).53

Having been assigned to the MOS training team, Baginski had not 

received the same training at Camp Atterbury as had the other AST 

members. “We were all in the same situation—none of us were slotted to 

be [on an AST],” she explained. “There were times in Camp Atterbury, 

Indiana, when they divided us up and [the AST] people got this training 

[e.g., combat-related training] while the [MOS, NCOES, and OES] people 

tracked a different way or maybe skipped something.”54

Though reassignment to do a job for which she had little preparatory 

training was disconcerting, Baginski felt that being the first AST assigned 

to the regiment was a distinct advantage. She believed the team was very 

lucky “because we were there from the very beginning. Because of that, 

we didn’t have to overcome a lot of, ‘Well, the Americans before did it this 

way.’ The Iraqis didn’t have a lot of experience to go off or didn’t have 

expectations of how it would be because we were the first Americans with 

whom they had worked.”55

In spite of the fact that being on the first AST had its advantages, it did 

not mean the team was free from problems. When they arrived at the unit, 

there were only 50 soldiers and 30 old Russian-made trucks. The assigned 

regimental commander had not yet arrived, and the acting commander was 

busy creating new problems. Baginski explained:

We had issues because the Iraqis weren’t prepared to 

address some of the soldiers’ basic needs, like getting 

them paid. The soldiers wanted to go home and wanted to 

take their pay home with them. At one point early on the 

Iraqi soldiers decided they were going to go home no matter what, they mobbed together and demanded to go on 

leave . . . they just got that attitude and said, ‘You’re not 

going to pay me? I don’t have to stay here. I’m allowed 

to go home on leave.’ The acting commander, the Iraqi 

colonel, just got very angry because he wasn’t used to 

an army where soldiers even dared to speak out. So he 

told them they were all lazy and undisciplined. His insults 

were what really provoked that situation. Soon after that, 

the Ministry of Defense provided us with a colonel who 

would be the regimental commander.56
101

The new commander, Colonel Ea’ad, turned out to be a fine commander and things began to run much smoother. He had 24 years of service 

in the old army and was experienced and skillful at leading and training 

men. His interaction with his American advisors minimized many of the 

problems they and the unit faced. One of the issues that was potentially a 

significant problem was that Baginski, and CPT Stacy O’Keefe, another 

advisor on the team, were female. 

This issue had raised its head originally when assigning the first 

groups of Iroquois Warriors to the ASTs—no women were assigned 

to those teams due to the perception that Iraqi soldiers, steeped in the 

traditions of a male-dominated Arab culture, would refuse to listen to 

female advisors. The acting commander, to his credit, quashed any notion 

in his troops that they would be allowed to cause trouble for Baginski and 

O’Keefe. Baginski remembered that the acting commander had “pulled 

all the soldiers into a room and told them there would be absolutely no 

disrespect shown to American females, that they would treat us with the 

respect that’s due a Muslim woman and that was that.” It was a sentiment 

the permanent commander reinforced, and the two women experienced 

no problems with the Iraqi troops. Baginski’s recollection was that it was 

quite the opposite: “In fact, I think they sometimes turned to us more than 

the men because they knew we were going to follow through and take care 

of them. They didn’t have clothing; they didn’t have anything. At the very 

beginning, I was the one carrying around the box with all the medicine in 

it. We did everything for them.” That positive relationship even extended 

to the rest of the AST: “They became very loyal to the Americans from the 

beginning because we took care of them. The soldiers had more faith and 

trust in the Americans that we were going to protect them than they did 

in their chain of command, originally. That was something we had to get 

around later.”57

Another aspect of this unit that made the advisor-unit relationship go 

smoother was the nature of the soldiers themselves. Baginski described them 

and why their mission may have been a breeze compared to many others:

Our soldiers were primarily Shi’a and they were much 

older than the typical infantry battalion soldier. Many of 

our soldiers had previous transportation experience in 

the Iraqi Army. . . . They knew how to drive and maintain vehicles. We still had to do a lot of training, but our 

training focused more on convoy operations and convoy 

defense. We started off initially putting together our training schedules, thinking we were going to have to do the 
102

training, but then within a week we realized that that was 

not going to work. The Iraqis needed to train the Iraqis. 

So we started the train-the-trainer concept very early on, 

which took away the language barrier issues. We put the 

people who had the expertise up front right away and that 

just made things move along quicker.58

Around the end of January, McGrath was ordered to move to 

Numaniyah to stand up a new AST for the 2d Transportation Regiment. 

Leadership of the AST for the 1st Regiment was passed to Baginski. She 

did not miss a stride and continued to develop the training plan for the 

regiment. There was no specific template for CMATT’s ASTs to take their 

units through a collective training cycle. Each AST was free to develop 

its own methods, tasks, and schedule. Baginski described how her AST 

conducted its business:

We went through stages. Everything that we were doing, 

I worked directly with Colonel Ea’ad on. We met and 

talked daily. We worked daily moving the regiment further 

along toward independency. I found myself advising him 

on all facets of the operation and constantly reminding 

him that the officers needed to take care of their soldiers 

and develop NCO/officer relations. So, on a daily basis, I 

asked him if he went out and checked training, if he made 

sure he knew what his people were doing. I asked him, 

‘Do you know how your soldiers are living? Have you 

talked to your soldiers?’ We worked to empower the first 

sergeants, which was something that had not happened. 

We established training meetings—initially daily meetings 

where they brought in their staff and the company 

commanders—to hold the commanders responsible for 

knowing their people and knowing what was going on. 

We would demonstrate to them the importance of planning 

in advance. The Iraqis didn’t want to plan anything out. 

They didn’t seem to have the concept of planning so we 

worked really heavily on that. We started out initially 

doing the training and getting the companies trained up. 

We started at that level. We had an advisor for each of 

the Iraqi company commanders who worked directly with 

them in planning, training, and executing training. That 

ultimately led to us running convoy missions, and that 

company advisor would go through all phases of planning 
103

the convoy operation. Initially the US advisor planned it 

more than the Iraqis. Eventually, though, it transitioned 

over to where the advisors were just supervising and out 

there being mentors and guides to the Iraqis, because we 

wanted the Iraqi company-level officers to execute on their 

own. We started out doing everything at the company level 

because they didn’t have any staff. It was the commander, 

an executive officer, and the company commanders.59

The fact that there was no staff was another challenge Baginski had to 

overcome. She remembered that she and Ea’ad had to fight with the MOD 

directly to get the officers they needed. “The commander and I went to the 

MOD on a couple different occasions to talk to the Iraqi leadership and 

tell them we needed more officers. We couldn’t build a battalion without a 

staff, so he and I took two or three trips to Baghdad to do that.” Eventually 

the staff officers began to dribble in, which increased the capabilities and 

efficiency of the regiment. “Our focus initially was mainly on the command side of the house, both at the company and battalion level,” she 

explained. “But as we progressed and started running missions and started 

filtering in more officers, then we shifted responsibilities so we were training up more of the staff side of the house.”60

By this time the unit was actually running convoy missions for the 

Iraqi Army, but they were limited in distance, scope, and complexity. 

To increase the skill-level and value of the unit to the overall war effort, 

Baginski and Ea’ad opened communications with the 1st Corps Support 

Command (COSCOM) in late February to coordinate missions. Three 

months later, in May, control of the regiment was formally transferred 

to the COSCOM for assignment of missions. The COSCOM wanted the 

Iraqi unit validated before assigning it primary missions and so directed 

that the 46th Corps Support Group send over a team to train and certify the 

regiment. Baginski recalled that the 46th Group “came in and developed a 

program of instruction and brought in a team of about 30 NCOs who were 

assigned to train each of the companies to conduct convoy operations. 

They went through a very intensive train up. . . . The training ended with 

a convoy live-fire operation . . . and upon completion of the exercise they 

started to run missions.”61

The job of Baginski’s team was not over, however. Her team was now 

nine strong with the addition of advisors from a different USAR training division in February. It was now equipped with four up-armored 

HMMWVs, each with a crew-served weapon mounted on the top. 

Therefore, she insisted that each convoy from the regiment be escorted by 
104

two of the team’s vehicles as additional security and to provide the commander with feedback on how the operation went. These missions were 

not without risk, of course, as Baginski described:

 . . . we had a few incidents. One of our missions was 

going to Ramadi and an improvised explosive device 

(IED) went off right after Captain O’Keefe’s Humvee 

went by. She was the convoy commander of that mission. 

One of her convoys also took gunfire and an Iraqi passenger was shot in the leg. We were transporting troops that 

day and we had to pull into Abu Ghraib to get him medical support. On another occasion, I was on a mission and 

we were going into Baghdad. We were coming around 

one of the traffic circles and started taking fire from the 

left, but the Iraqis took care of that one. 

She went on to add that, “We never lost an Iraqi, though, and none of 

the Iraqi soldiers or our American team members were ever shot. We had 

absolutely no combat injuries on any of our missions.”62 Looking back 

on the experience of her time in Iraq, Baginski was clearly proud of the 

efforts of her team and that of her advised unit. She said:

I’m very, very positive about how the 1st Motor 

Transportation Regiment went from literally nothing to 

the point where they were effectively running missions 

when I left there. There were some fights along the way 

on how independent the Iraqis needed to be. But we got 

to that phase where they were planning the missions; they 

had the staff piece in place and were actually executing 

the missions. We were not quite at the point where they 

could go out on their own without our help, but a lot of 

that was due to limitations within country. They didn’t 

have a system in place where they could call for support 

if they were being attacked and they didn’t have a system 

for medical evacuations in place either. They didn’t have 

long-range radios yet. When I left, we were still working 

on that. We were trying out a couple different things. But 

when we left, they were more than capable.63

The MOS training team was not the only organization to see a significant shift in its organization and the missions that its assigned personnel 

actually performed. Another was the OES team. MAJ Loncle described 

the team’s mission as more or less “running the Iraqi West Point. We each 

would have been assigned as professors or instructors in certain areas. We 
105

would have all gone to one or two military academy type places and then 

students would have come to us.” The plan was to run modified courses 

that included a Platoon Leaders Course, Company Commanders Course, an 

Operations and Training Course, and an Administration/Logistics Course, 

among others. However, the team members discovered soon after their 

arrival that the mission was scrubbed. Loncle remembered that instead of 

running schools the team was “ . . . going to be broken into mobile training 

teams and they would be farming us out to each of the area commands to 

support them.”64

Part of the reason this change transpired was that several countries in 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had volunteered to take 

over officer training for the Iraqi Army. Once that mission was taken, the 

OES team had no function. “What are we going to do with these people?” 

was CMATT’s response, Loncle recalled. It was left up to the 47 members 

of the team to figure it out. Loncle continued, “We had to work out who we 

were and what we could do. . . . We were given very general limitations. 

They didn’t want us to all become ASTs and go running out playing battle. 

We had to still stay in that realm.” That “realm” was the business of officer development and education. What was decided was to build about 9 

five-man OES mobile training teams (MTT). Loncle described the team’s 

parameters:

Each team had to be able to teach skills from basic, 

advanced, Command and General Staff College (CGSC), 

all the way up the line depending on where our students 

were. We basically did collective staff training. . . . We 

were doing more formal classes. As you go through the 

officer education, if they needed to start down at the basic 

level, we had to be able to step in there. As our students 

progressed, we would ramp it up toward Combined Arms 

and Services Staff School (CAS3)/Intermediate Level 

Education (ILE)-level training as necessary.65

The MTTs were sent to teach at numerous locations to include the 

Kurdish Military Academy, the Iraqi Military Academy, and the various 

military training bases. The experience of each team was varied, but 

Loncle’s team OES MTT #4 gives one a good idea of what these teams 

accomplished. 

LTC Mark Truhan was the OIC of MTT #4, and reported to his 

nominal chief, Sean Sullivan at CMATT. In addition to Loncle, there were 

three other officers on the team. The team’s first mission was to work with 

ING units at FOB War Horse in Ba’qubah. The team was transported to 
106

War Horse and dumped off with their baggage in the middle of the post, 

then their escorts departed, “because they wanted to get home before it got 

dark,” Loncle recalled. No one on the post knew the team was coming. 

Having no vehicles, the two lieutenant colonels on the team sought the TOC 

of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), the owners of the 

installation, and informed the command of their presence. Thus, this team 

rapidly learned a lesson that many other Iroquois Warriors would come to 

understand about working for CMATT in Iraq—CMATT personnel were 

largely at the mercy of the American operational units of MNC-I when it 

came to life support. Sometimes it was good, and sometimes it was not. 

For MTT #4, things happened to turn out well. Loncle described the 

reception: “Hats off to the first sergeant of Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company (HHC) of the 3d Brigade, 1st ID who adopted us. He came with 

a truck, picked up all our gear and put us into a transient tent for one night. 

By the next night, then, we had containerized housing units to live in, so 

they reacted very quickly and took care of us.”66

Not only was the housing relatively decent for the team, the post 

boasted other luxuries. War Horse had a large Army and Air Force 

Exchange Service (AAFES)-run Post Exchange (PX) where they could 

buy just about anything they needed for maintaining something close to a 

US lifestyle. It also possessed a large dining facility that was considered 

quite good for the quality of its meals.67

One drawback to War Horse, at least in the way of convenience for 

the team, was that, like Taji, it was split into two areas—the US side and 

the Iraqi side—and the team was billeted on the US side. This was problematic for a team with no transportation. “ . . . the students came to us as 

opposed to us going to see them. That was difficult,” Loncle recollected. 

It was difficult because the students had to be searched and processed 

through the security entrance each time they attended training on the US 

side of the compound.68

The team coordinated with the four-man AST provided by the 3d 

Brigade to work with the four ING battalions located near the post. “Hey, 

this is what we can do,” Loncle recalled telling them. “I have to say that the 

3d Brigade really did a great job supporting us. They were quite receptive 

and happy to get us. We hooked up with their team and integrated in.”69

The Iraqi units—the 204th, 205th, and 206th ING Battalions—were 

all part of the newly formed 32d Brigade, 5th Iraqi Division.70 Each 

was in varying states of training, experience, and readiness. The team 

went to work training the battalion staffs. Each staff received an initial 

overview training package of staff roles, responsibilities, and procedures. 
107

The presentations were a challenge because they all had to be conducted 

through interpreters. Loncle explained the process:

The hardest working people in Iraq are the interpreters, 

and we were blessed with having two very, very good 

interpreters who worked with us when we were at FOB 

War Horse. We’d write our lesson plans in English and 

submit them to the translator team they had there. We did 

everything on PowerPoint but it was all dual language, 

so half the slide was in English and the other half was in 

Arabic. As such, whoever was looking at it could follow 

in whatever language they were comfortable in. We practiced our classes with the interpreters to make sure they 

were comfortable with the material. It was slow but you 

learned how to do it. Even though you don’t understand 

their language, you learned how to read body language. 

You could tell if the students were picking up the lesson or 

if they weren’t quite sure what you were going over. You 

almost had to do it by body language. You could tell what 

parts they understood by their questions, because they 

would start asking really intelligent, pointed questions. 

It’s almost an art but with practice you got more comfortable. We were just blessed with really good interpreters.

Loncle also emphasized, “Initially it was tough, though.”71

Soon after the team began their work with the 32d Brigade, the pace of 

the effort slowed, then stopped due to the upcoming January elections. The 

ING units were needed to provide polling place guards and other security. 

Additionally, the 1st Division had been extended on its tour in country to 

cover the elections, then almost immediately after began leaving as the 

3d ID came in to replace it. It was at about that time the team’s focus 

shifted. “We were on the back burner until 3d ID landed and got up to 

speed,” Loncle explained. “Somewhere during the 3d ID’s mobilization 

process, they were informed that they would have to form these military 

transition teams [MiTT—ASTs were redesignated as MiTTs in January 

2005] to work with the Iraqi Army and that it was going to be one of the 

highest priority missions while they were there.”72 The notification to the 

3d ID that they would have to provide MiTTs for the ING came very late 

in the division’s mobilization. The staff had no time to form and train the 

teams before deployment, so the teams were organized once they arrived 

in country. Thus, the MTT #4 switched its efforts, for the time being, to 

training the new MiTTs for the 3d ID.73
108

Initially, the team provided a 3-day orientation and train-up to the 

MiTTs during which it provided the new advisors with CDs and DVDs 

full of lesson plans and other training aids. This was followed by another 

3 weeks of more practical work. Loncle recalled that the most valuable 

service to the 3d ID MiTTs was probably orienting them to their ING 

charges: “ . . .we had already established rapport with the Iraqi staffs. They 

knew us, so we could help the 3d ID assess them and tell them, ‘All right, 

this is where your battalion is at; this is what they’re strong at and this is 

what they’re weak at.’”74

In early April, MTT #4 was transferred to the Kirkush Military Training 

Base (KMTB) to work with the 5th Iraqi Division staff and the staff of 

its 3d Brigade. At KMTB, the team was billeted on the Iraqi side, which 

eliminated the security hassles. “It was way better for us because now we 

lived on the Iraqi side of the post with the ASTs and every day I could go 

see my students,” Loncle remembered. “I didn’t have to bring them on 

the American FOB or arrange for a convoy in support to get me to them. 

Now we were with them.” Additionally, the team was able to acquire the 

use of several vehicles for transportation. Futhermore, the US side, FOB 

Caldwell, still possessed most of the comforts that the team had come to 

enjoy at War Horse.75

At KMTB, MTT #4 worked closely with COL Parsons, the senior 

advisor to the 5th Division. In fact, Parsons was in large part responsible 

for the transfer of the team to Kirkush. He discovered that his NCO advisors had limited experience at brigade and division level staff work and 

needed someone to help with that effort. MTT #4 filled that bill perfectly. 

For the next several months, the team continued to work for Parsons and 

helped bring that division to higher levels of capability. In reflecting on his 

time there, Loncle explained his definition of success when working with 

the Iraqis: “Was it hard? Yeah. I lived for what I called ‘the days the light 

bulbs went on.’ We’d be up teaching something and I’d know they weren’t 

getting it, and then finally the light bulbs would come on—they had gotten 

it and you could see it.”76

Unlike the MOS and OES teams, the NCOES and ING BCT teams 

actually performed the tasks they were sent over to do. Like the OES team, 

the NCOES team was to set up and operate a sort of NCO academy and 

run courses that included a Squad Leaders Course, a Platoon Sergeants 

Course, an Advanced Platoon Sergeants Course, a First Sergeants Course, 

and a Supply/Maintenance Course.77 This team actually ran these courses 

at the Kirkush NCO Academy.

The ING BCT team, consisting of 30 drill sergeants, was developed 
109

to assist the MOD in expanding the Iraqi National Guard to six divisions. 

Initially, Coalition maneuver units were responsible for running the basic 

training for the Iraqi National Guard at six different regional training 

centers located at Mosul, Tikrit, Habbaniyah, Taji, Al Kut, and Talil. The 

ING BCT team was brought in to assist Iraqi drill sergeants develop the 

skills needed to assume the mission, to put an Iraqi face on the training, 

and eventually to release the Coalition units for other missions. Teams of 

Iroquois Warrior drill sergeants were sent to each of the regional training centers where they taught their newly minted Iraqi drill sergeants in a 

train-the-trainer fashion.78

The 98th Division soldiers who served on the MNSTC-I, CMATT, 

and CPATT staffs helped bring a level of efficiency and accomplishment 

to those headquarters that would have been much later in realization had 

the Iroquois Warriors not shown up when they did. They filled those staffs 

Figure 17. LTC George Crowell conducts logistics training with 

two Iraqi officers as part of the “Co-Op” program.

The Advisor, SGT Matt Murphy
110

with officers and NCOs who, on arrival, went to work helping to create 

and establish operating procedures for a new headquarters that possessed 

what was arguably the most important mission in Iraq. The soldiers on the 

many training teams also contributed by assisting the Iraqi Army establish 

viable training and logistics support institutions of its own and by helping 

to create or improve specialized combat support and combat service support organizations.

While the missions assigned to the Iroquois Warriors who worked on 

the various staffs and training teams were diverse, that of the ASTs was 

singular: teach, coach, and mentor the Iraqi Army to enable it to take the 

lead in combat operations. Nevertheless, it was a varied mission in terms 

of location, activities, level of readiness, and number of Iraqi units the 

soldiers advised. Those varieties made the AST mission the largest single 

effort of the division in Iraq—and the most dangerous.
111

Notes

1. MAJ John Vernick, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 5 November 2006, 3.

2. Headquarters, 98th Division, PowerPoint Brief, “Information Brief, 98th 

Division (IT) FA-TRAC and TY04/TY05 Missions,” 2 October 2004, 7. All numbers provided in this chapter regarding the personnel strength contributed to each 

section of MNSTC-I, CMAAT, and CPATT are derived from this briefing. The 

numbers reflect all 98th Division personnel contributions including those from 

other commands who deployed as part of the division’s mobilization groups. 

3. BG Richard Sherlock, interview by author, Office, Chief of the Army 

Reserve, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 16 November 2006, 5.

4. LTC James DiRisio, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 10.

5. Ibid.

6. LTC James DiRisio, e-mail to author, Subject: CPATT, 26 January 

2007.

7. LTG David H. Petraeus, interview by author, Headquarters, Combined 

Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 December 2006, 6.

8. COL Lawrence Kelly, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 December 2006, 7.

9. Chaplain (COL) J. Paul Womack, written response to author’s queries, 

31 January 2007, 2.

10. BG Frank Cipolla, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 November 2006, 4.

11. Ibid.

12. COL Jody Daniels, e-mail to author, Subject: RE: Your Interview 

Transcript, 16 March 2007, 4:33 p.m.

13. Vernick interview, 5 November 2006, 3.

14. Headquarters, Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, Information 

Paper, “Subject: Authorization and Wear of Shoulder Sleeve Insignia (SSI) for US 

Army Personnel Belonging to the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team 

(CMATT),” 20 October 2004, 2. The information paper was also sent to the rear 

CP at Rochester to ensure that deploying soldiers understood they would have to 

remove their division patches once they arrived in country; DiRisio interview, 3 

November 2006.

15. Cipolla telephone interview, 20 November 2006, 4.

16. Timothy J. Hansen and Jocene D. Preston, ed. An Encounter with History: 

The 98th Division and the Global War on Terrorism: 2001–2005 (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 98–99.

17. Ibid., 100–01.

18. Ibid., 103–04.

19. Vernick interview, 5 November 2006, 8.

20. Hansen and Preston, Encounter with History, 105–06.
112

21. Ibid., 86.

22. Ibid., 87–89.

23. Ibid., 107–09.

24. DiRisio interview, 3 November 2006, 11.

25. Army Knowledge On-line, General Officer Management Office website, 

BG James Schwitters; COL Jody Daniels described BG Schwitters as such in a 

telephone conversation with the author in December 2006.

26. BG James Schwitters, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 December 2006, 1–2.

27. DiRisio interview, 3 November 2006, 5–6.

28. COL Robert Catalanotti, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th 

Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 5.

29. Ibid.; LTC James DiRisio, e-mail to author, Subject: RE: Taji BSU 

Commander Before Catalanotti, 29 March 2007, 1:50 p.m.

30. Catalanotti interview, 3 November 2006, 5.

31. CSM Milton Newsome, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 3.

32. Catalanotti interview, 3 November 2006, 8.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., 6.

35. Ibid., 6–7.

36. Newsome interview, 3 November 2006, 3.

37. Catalanotti interview, 3 November 2006, 6.

38. MAJ Shauna Hauser, interview by John McCool, Operational Leadership 

Experience Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 November 

2005, 2.

39. Ibid., 10.

40. Ibid., 12.

41. Headquarters, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

Support Unit, “Requirements Assessment,” Enclosure 4, “Army Support to 

MNSTC-I Requirement,” 3 August 2004, 10–13.

42. Ibid.

43. COL Edward P. Castle, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 5 November 2005, 3.

44. Kelly and Sullivan had both been on the survey team and so were already 

in Iraq when the mobilization groups with their teams arrived.

45. LTC Daniel Christian, interview by author, 98th Division Headquarters, 

Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 2, 4.

46. Ibid., 3–4.

47. Castle interview, 5 November 2005, 4.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., 6.

50. Ibid., 5.

51. Ibid.
113

52. Ibid., 5–7. Incidentally, LTC Sean Sullivan was the action officer at 

CMATT who arranged the contract for the ING EOD companies to receive EOD 

training near Basra.

53. LTC Theresa Baginski, telephone interview by author, Headquarters, 

98th Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 5 November 2005, 1.

54. Ibid, 2.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., 3.

58. Ibid., 2–3.

59. Ibid., 3.

60. Ibid., 3–4.

61. Ibid., 4.

62. Ibid., 6–7.

63. Ibid., 6.

64. MAJ Paul Loncle, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 3; “Information Brief, 98th DIV (IT) FATRAC and TY04/TY05 Missions,” 2 October 2004, 13.

65. Loncle interview, 4 November 2006, 4.

66. Ibid., 7.

67. Ibid., 8.

68. Ibid., 4.

69. Ibid.

70. Designations of Iraqi units referred to in this work use those assigned 

at the time the 98th Division ASTs took over the mission. The Iraqi Army units 

underwent several major reorganizations and redesignations between January and 

May 2005. See appendix C for a conversion chart that details the before and after 

designations.

71. Loncle interview, 4 November 2006, 4–5.

72. Ibid., 5.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid., 4, 8. The team lost LTC Truhan at this point. He was transferred to 

Rustamiyah to work with the Iraqi Military Academy.

76. Ibid., 8.

77. “Information Brief, 98th DIV (IT) FA-TRAC and TY04/TY05 Missions,” 

2 October 2004, 13.

78. Ibid., 16; Headquarters, Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team, 

PowerPoint Brief, “CMATT JMD Staff Brief,” undated, 5.

115

Chapter 6

The Advisor Mission

. . . we were pretty happy with the turnaround.

SFC Ewing

The largest, and arguably most important, mission the Iroquois Warriors 

performed in Iraq was that of advising Iraqi Army units. Approximately 

335 of the soldiers who deployed as part of the 98th Division’s package 

to support the MNSTC-I (which included the C2 Cell) were assigned to 

perform this mission. The number of soldiers who participated as advisors 

is actually somewhat larger when one considers there were at least 20 or 

more soldiers mobilized and deployed as fillers to replace advisors who 

were killed, wounded, or for some other reason left one of the ASTs. There 

were still others, as previously stated, who were later reassigned as advisors to unplanned ASTs once they were in Iraq.

The primary components of the 98th Division’s AST mission in Iraq 

consisted of the C2 Cell (which underwent several mission changes) and 

over 30 advisor teams who worked primarily with the 1st, 3d, and 5th Iraqi 

Divisions, although as described, a few worked with Iraqi Army engineer 

and logistics units too. Though these troops had a single focus to their mission, their experiences were easily more diverse—and hazardous—than 

any other team of Iroquois Warriors sent to Iraq.

The Command and Control (C2) Cell

In the original planning for this mission, the AST C2 Cell was intended 

to function as the Headquarters, 98th Division (Forward). As such, it 

would have been MG Robinson’s headquarters element that controlled the 

RSOI of division elements coming into theater, and then the FA-TRAC 

headquarters to provide the planning, administration, and logistics support 

to those elements for the duration of the mission. Once it was discovered 

that CMATT existed, the C2 Cell’s mission rapidly evolved into something 

less than originally envisioned, although the responsibilities remained 

substantial.

Officially, the cell’s mission statement was “Coordinate all administrative, logistical, reporting, and liaison functions for Advisor Support 

Teams (AST) and CG CMATT, CJTF-7.” Functionally, it was a little more 

involved than the statement leads one to believe. The cell’s RSOI function came to include the reception of those non-98th Division advisors 
116

identified to deploy and support the expansion of the Iraqi Army, which 

occurred in January 2005 when the ING was integrated into the Regular 

Army and two additional divisions were created. This task included the 

operation of the Green Hotel, the issue of AST supplies and equipment at 

Taji, the coordination of transportation of the advisors to the location of 

their respective Iraqi units, the coordination of the transfer of team equipment between incoming and outgoing teams, and the retrograde of the old 

teams to Taji. Part of the cell was located in Kuwait to help in these tasks. 

In addition, the C2 Cell was the node to which all ASTs sent their monthly 

Unit Personnel Reports, daily Personnel Status Reports, AARs, and other 

data. In turn, the cell would forward this information to the CMATT operations section.1

COL Cipolla, OIC of the C2 Cell at Taji, assumed responsibility 

for that mission in September. LTC Joseph Friedman was assigned as 

Cipolla’s operations officer, but due to the immediate supply and deployment requirements after his arrival at Taji, he ended up doing much of the 

logistics work in the cell. Initially his primary task was to go to the BIAP 

to meet the mobilization groups. “Every week I was in BIAP meeting and 

greeting a new group coming in and escorting them by Chinook to Taji, 

getting them in the Green Hotel, getting them bedded down with meals in 

their bellies and pots to piss in,” he recalled.2

Friedman discovered the cell had inherited a lot of supplies and equipment waiting to be issued to the ASTs:

Almost nothing had been distributed to the ASTs. They 

had team boxes which contained all the stuff they would 

need to work as an AST—not TA-50 or weaponry, but 

just stuff . . . whatever they felt they wanted in a team 

box—and those hadn’t even been distributed; they were 

still in Taji. A lot of these ASTs were already in their field 

environments and thus had to convoy back to Taji to pick 

up their team boxes. We had tons of stuff in a warehouse 

on the other side of Taji that hadn’t been distributed and 

there wasn’t any plan as to who was going to get what. It 

was just, ‘Here’s a whole bunch of stuff for your ASTs.’ 

There were night vision goggles (NVG), but they were 

old and worthless—5Cs maybe. They gave us a bunch of 

batteries, but you’d need a whole lot of batteries to equip 

these guys. There was also soap, field vests, and all this 

stuff was in this big barn-like warehouse on Taji.3
117

Fortunately for the deploying 98th Division ASTs, they would have 

the opportunity to acquire most of their supplies before they deployed to 

their duty locations; however, many of the up-armored HMMWVs would 

not arrive until around the beginning of January 2005.

The Advisor Support Teams

As described, there was confusion among the advisors as to what the 

teams were really going to be doing. Most advisors had concluded, at least 

initially, that they would train their assigned Iraqi unit in basic tasks on a 

safe compound. Few had the idea they would be advising their units on 

combat missions.

The actual mission of the ASTs was to teach, coach, and mentor their 

Iraqi units. In theory, these units were to have completed basic training 

at about the time the ASTs arrived, so there would be minimal training 

requirements. On completion of the basic training, the assigned leaders 

of the battalion (Iraqi officers and NCOs) would consolidate with their 

trainees and soon after be declared operational. The 98th’s ASTs, once 

they relieved the existing advisors, were to merely coach and mentor the 

leaders of those units as they prepared for and conducted actual operations. 

Of course by the US Army’s standards, these Iraqi battalions would be no 

where near ready for combat operations, but the pressing need to “put an 

Iraqi face” on the security efforts in Iraq, especially before the upcoming 

January elections, ensured that these units would be employed in such 

operations well before they were truly prepared.

By the MNSTC-I JMD, organizationally the ASTs were to consist of 

the following personnel:

• Division AST (10 Advisors):

Position	 Rank	 Branch/MOS

Team Leader COL Combat Arms

Staff Advisor LTC Combat Arms

Staff Advisor MAJ Branch Immaterial

Staff Advisor CPT Branch Immaterial

Staff Advisor CPT Branch Immaterial

Advisor/Team NCOIC SGM MOS Immaterial

NCO Staff Advisor SSG-MSG Combat Arms

NCO Staff Advisor SSG-MSG Combat Arms

NCO Staff Advisor SSG-MSG MOS Immaterial

NCO Staff Advisor SSG-MSG MOS Immaterial
118

• Brigade AST (10 Advisors):

Position	 Rank	 Branch/MOS

Team Leader LTC Combat Arms

Staff Advisor MAJ Combat Arms

Staff Advisor MAJ Branch Immaterial

Staff Advisor CPT Combat Arms

Staff Advisor CPT Branch Immaterial

Advisor/Team NCOIC SFC-MSG Combat Arms

NCO Staff Advisor SSG-SFC Combat Arms

NCO Staff Advisor SSG-SFC Combat Arms

NCO Staff Advisor SSG-SFC MOS Immaterial

NCO Staff Advisor SSG-SFC MOS Immaterial

• Battalion AST (10 Advisors):

Position	 Rank	 Branch/MOS

Team Leader MAJ Combat Arms

Advisor CPT Combat Arms

Advisor CPT Branch Immaterial

Advisor/Team NCOIC SFC-MSG Combat Arms

NCO Advisor SSG Combat Arms

NCO Advisor SSG Combat Arms

NCO Advisor SSG Combat Arms

NCO Advisor SSG Combat Arms

NCO Advisor SSG MOS Immaterial

NCO Advisor SSG MOS Immaterial4

Within the teams, each was organized by its OIC in ways that seemed 

to best suit the needs of the Iraqi unit advised. Depending on what level the 

unit was at in terms of training often determined where the focus was for 

the advisors. In some cases, advisors were habitually assigned down to the 

companies to work on small unit tactics. In others, the OIC kept his team 

at battalion level to train the staff and sent advisors out with companies as 

needed.

The 98th Division’s teams were fully manned to meet the requirements of the JMD. Each team was to be equipped with two up-armored 

HMMWVs, each with a mounted crew-served weapon (M2 .50-caliber 

heavy machine gun, M240 7.62-mm machine gun, or a Mark 19 grenade 

launcher), one or two SINCGARS radios, and a BFT system per vehicle. 

In addition, the team was to be issued a basic load of ammunition and the 

materials and supplies issued as part of the team box. What these soldiers 
119

soon discovered, however, was the manning and equipping documents 

that specified the ideal package for an AST did not match the existing 

conditions on the ground.

The units the ASTs were originally deployed to advise were the three 

Iraqi Regular Army divisions—the 1st, 3d, and 5th—consisting of 3 division headquarters, 9 brigade headquarters, and 27 battalions. Therefore, 

this mission required 39 ASTs. Of these, Marines were responsible for 

advising one division headquarters, two brigade headquarters, and five battalions, all in the 1st Division. Additionally, the Australian Army retained 

responsibility for two brigade headquarters and six battalions, all in the 

3d Division.5 Thus, the 98th Division was originally responsible for the 

remaining 23 ASTs, which included 13 ASTs in the 5th Division, 5 ASTs 

in the 1st Division, and 5 ASTs in the 3d Division.

That number increased to 31 teams by October, when the Australians 

dropped out of the mission. The Australian government’s rules of engagement (ROE) for its troops in Iraq stated they would not participate in combat operations; therefore, once the Iraqi units they were advising finished 

their basic training, the Australians considered their mission completed. 

They would not go with the Iraqis beyond the garrison fence. That left the 

98th Division to fill the void and caused further turmoil over mission and 

team changes when the division’s personnel arrived at Taji.6

The Iraqi 1st Division headquarters was located at Taji, as were its 

subordinate brigades. The 1st Division was originally designated as the 

Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF) and trained counterinsurgency operations. 

Originally, the MOD intended this force to be employed anywhere it was 

needed throughout Iraq, though ultimately it would be employed as a standard infantry unit. The 3d Division, less two battalions, was located at the 

Al Kasik Military Training Base (AKMTB) about 50 miles northwest of 

Mosul. Its initial mission was to be the security force for northern areas of 

Iraq and guard the Syria-Iraq border. The 5th Division, less the 3d and 9th 

Brigades, was located at the Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB) east of 

Baghdad and was responsible for the southern part of Iraq. The 3d Brigade 

was located at Numaniyah, and the 9th Brigade existed on paper only.

The existing ASTs working with these divisions were a conglomerate 

of personnel from the US and Australian Armed Forces. Though many 

of the American advisors were Marines, most were from one of the three 

US Army components, and primarily from the Army Reserve. There was 

a smattering of people from the National Guard and Regular Army, but 

most seem to have been from the USAR’s 75th, 91st, and 95th Training 

Divisions. One team was made up entirely from Regular Army observer/
120

controllers (O/C) from the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at 

Hohenfels, Germany. Many felt O/Cs were the best example of a perfect 

fit for the advisor job.7 Most ASTs, on the other hand, were entirely ad hoc 

organizations composed of personnel who showed up in Iraq, were pooled 

together at the last minute, and sent off to advise an Iraqi unit. Some had 

received at least minimal levels of training to prepare them for the mission; others had received only the individual skills refresher training such 

as that at Fort Bliss. Some wanted to be there, others did not; therefore, 

their success with training the Iraqi units was just as mixed as their overall 

composition. Thus, the advisors the Iroquois Warriors were replacing were 

a curious mixture of military personnel with varying levels of training, 

experience, competence, and ability to perform the AST mission. In fact, 

Schwitters had earlier estimated that only about a third of the ASTs then 

assigned were effective in their duties.8

The next task for the ASTs was to link up with their respective Iraqi 

units. The plan was for the teams to load all their ammunition, supplies, 

and equipment in their HMMWVs and convoy to their respective duty 

locations. However, none of the crew-served weapons were yet available 

and, with the exception of the ASTs in Fallujah, neither were the vehicles. 

Friedman remembered that the existing ASTs “were out there in Toyota 

pickups with M16s and that was all they had. It was a while before uparmored Humvees, Blue Force Trackers, M4s and other weaponry came 

[in].”9 All the items were on order, but most had yet to make their way 

through the supply system to Taji. As a result, the C2 Cell had to find 

another way to get the teams to their field locations.

For a few of the ASTs, members of the teams they were replacing, who 

were anxious to be replaced, showed up at Taji to pick up their replacements and get them to their new home. For most, however, that option 

was not feasible. Most AST duty stations were too far from Taji to make 

it convenient for the old advisors to drive over and pick up their replacements, especially for those up north at Al Kasik. Therefore, the best option 

was to fly. 

Fortunately, the aviation brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division was 

nearby and amenable to help, for which Cipolla was grateful: “We did a lot 

of wheeling and dealing when it came to requesting Blackhawks because 

we were not really on the top of the priority list. If it wasn’t for the 1st 

Cavalry Division, we would have had problems. They did me a lot of 

favors when it came to getting the troops out into the field.”10

Once at their respective places of duty, the advisors were to link up 

with the existing team and conduct a “right seat ride,” or officially, the 
121

Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIPTOA) process. Ideally, this 

event consisted of an orientation by the existing team members with their 

individual replacements to teach them how to do the job, show them where 

various facilities and training areas were, and, most importantly, introduce 

them to the Iraqi leaders from the unit they were to advise, coach, and 

mentor. The new team members would watch the old advisors perform 

their tasks for a week followed by a week where the new advisors took 

charge while the old advisors mentored them. Trying to coordinate this 

event was problematic for a variety of reasons. Sherlock explained one of 

them:

. . . in many cases, our ASTs in the September/October 

2004 timeframe were being met at the aircraft by their 

outgoing counterparts who were simultaneously throwing their bags on the aircraft saying, ‘See ya. Your barracks are over there, have a good time. Oh by the way, the 

name of your counterpart is . . .,’ whatever. In some cases, 

we had to go back and get them from the airfield, take 

them back into their quarters and do a very rudimentary 

RIPTOA with the teams we replaced.11

The “right seat ride” experience encountered by the Iroquois 

Warriors varied between poor to excellent, depending on the dedication of the outgoing team. Doug Shipman recalled that the outgoing AST for the Iraqi 3d Division headquarters was not helpful.

I don’t think the incoming people felt like the outgoing 

people had much to contribute. It was like, ‘Here are your 

computers, here are your desks, here are the people, here 

are your interpreters, and this is the state of the training so 

far. See you later. . . .’ It was only a matter of 2 or 3 days.12

Scott McConnell’s team replaced the division staff AST for the 5th 

Division. His experience was better, but still not great. “I spent the first 

5 days following him [the outgoing advisor] around and he did all the 

introductions,” he remembered. “I got hooked up with e-mail and points 

of contact in Baghdad. The next 5 days he followed me around with less 

and less interest in what we were doing and more interest in packing bags 

and getting out of Dodge.”13

In some cases, the outgoing ASTs were very good about preparing 

their replacements to assume the mission. Matt Jones recollected, “The 

guys we replaced did a phenomenal job. They did everything they possibly 

could to set us up for success. . . . Logistically they did everything they 
122

could for us. When we got there, they knew what we were going to need 

and they had already gotten it for us. We were very appreciative.”14

SSG Charnock, assigned to the 1st Division, related how important 

the outgoing AST was to the integration process with the Iraqi unit as well. 

He explained that the RIPTOA process—

. . . really helped establish trust to have the Iraqis see us 

with the guys they’d been working with for the last 8 

months. They realized that we weren’t just new faces but 

could be trusted as well. I think my American counterpart, 

whom I was replacing, gave the Iraqis some assurances 

about me and that helped a lot. Instead of starting from 

zero, maybe I started at two out of ten with the Iraqis.15

At the same time the Iroquois Warrior ASTs were conducting their 

right seat rides, they were also discovering just how Spartan the living 

conditions were for advisors. Though part of MNSTC-I’s charter was 

to provide logistics support to the Iraqi Army—it was not set up to support the ASTs assigned to it. Thus, there was a tacit agreement between 

MNSTC-I and MNC-I that the Coalition Major Subordinate Commands 

(MSC) would provide life support to the advisors. In theory, this was a 

workable solution; in practice, often it was not. 

First, there was not always a Coalition unit colocated at posts with the 

ASTs. For example, there were no Coalition units at Numaniyah where 

the ASTs for the 9th Brigade, 5th Division were stationed. Christian, the 

engineer who had successfully wrangled an AST assignment to leave Taji 

and the OES team, described the life support situation there:

Numaniyah is 125 kilometers southeast of Baghdad and 

borders the Al Kut-Baghdad Road. The forward operating 

base is 9 square miles. There are about 40 ASTs with 10 

to 12 people each and at various times as many as 15,000 

Iraqis. It was all Iraqi run. There were no other Americans 

or American support. In fact, our higher headquarters was 

the Poles and they were located in Diwaniyah, about 180 

klicks [kilometers] south of us. Needless to say, it was 

really a different world. All they served was Iraqi food 

and it was a very austere environment. Power was up and 

down every day. Internet didn’t exist. TV didn’t exist. We 

really had no idea what was going on in the outside world. 

For all intents and purposes, we were in the middle of 

Iraq on our own, doing what we needed to do. It was a 

big shock for me. While I was in Taji, we had everything. 
123

There was a Burger King and a Cinnabon. We went from 

that to pretty much having nothing.16

In the case of Numaniyah, CMATT had arranged to support those 

ASTs through contracts. “We had life support contract arrangements set 

up that supported both the Iraqi Army and the advisors embedded there. 

When they needed things that only the Coalition could provide, we either 

had it delivered or they developed their own convoys and went up to Taji 

to get that stuff,” Schwitters explained.17

Another problem arose with the Coalition units themselves. The ASTs 

with the 5th Division at KMTB were reliant on the New York National 

Guard’s 42d “Rainbow” Division as their Coalition support unit. Parsons, 

the senior division advisor, recalled, “We would have to constantly plead 

our case to get support from the 42d. It was made available to us, but 

it was not without a great deal of wailing and gnashing of teeth to get 

things going. This was true not only for our support, but also to get support for the Iraqi forces.”18 In other words, the level of support provided 

to the ASTs (and the Iraqis) was directly proportional to the willingness 

of the supporting unit to provide it, and that was usually directly related 

to the commanding officer’s view of that responsibility. If the local commander was not particularly interested in helping, the ASTs would often 

go without. Some commanders took that responsibility seriously and supported the ASTs in their area of operations (AO) as well as they could. Life 

support for those advisors tended to be significantly better than for those 

whose US counterpart unit commander did not view that responsibility 

with importance.

Availability of food and water seems to have been rarely, if ever, a 

problem for the ASTs, although the quality of the food was sometimes a 

matter of comment. At Kirkush, Charnock recalled that his Iraqis had hot 

food delivered to them and the advisors often ate with their charges:

They were happy to have us. In fact, they wanted us to 

eat their food. You would only eat so much of it, though, 

because of the way they served it and the cleanliness of it. 

They would just give it to you with their hands and you 

didn’t know where those hands had been. But after awhile 

I stopped thinking about it and just ate the food anyway. 

If we really wanted to, we could have driven back to the 

Marine camp any time and gotten a hot meal. But it was 

like, ‘Do I really want a meal that badly that I would risk 

taking a convoy out through the city?’ Maybe not.19

Christian gave another perspective:
124

We ate Iraqi food about every day. . . . Could you live on 

it if you had to? Yes. Did you lose weight? Absolutely. 

When I was there I lost 42 pounds. You survive. I don’t 

want to paint this grave picture, but you just did what 

you had to do to get by. In terms of food, there were tons 

of care packages from home. We lived on soup and we 

cooked in our rooms a lot. We were lucky—one of our 

guys was a chef. He was very creative with some of the 

stuff he came up with. We started to run the unit like an 

SF unit. We had team rooms and food and we just made 

do with what we had.20

Water was rarely an issue, and the ASTs could get all the bottled 

water they needed from both US and Iraqi sources. Tennyson, with a 3d 

Division battalion that later deployed to Tall Afar, stated, “There was lots 

of bottled water . . .” but then added, “Water to wash with was a problem, 

though. . . . When we were in Tall Afar at our outpost, we didn’t have any 

running water until we managed to get a pump down to the spring next to 

the [outpost] and pumped in wash water.”21

Ammunition was another commodity in great supply, but most of the 

advisors did not take it for granted. Charnock was one of them. He remembered that in Kuwait, he and the members of his team were concerned there 

would not be enough of a resupply in Iraq so they decided not to shoot up 

their ammunition while on the live-fire ranges. “We’d just stand up there, 

go through the motions, and then keep all our rounds,” he explained. He 

later came to believe it had been a good decision. When one of the teams 

that had been identified to depart early from Taji to join its unit was getting 

ready to leave, it had only a small basic load to take along. Charnock was 

able to provide those advisors with more from his own stash. He probably 

need not have worried though, because ammunition was one class of supply of which there was plenty in Iraq. Charnock added that when he got to 

Kirkush, “. . . the Marines actually were very helpful. They had [an ammo] 

bunker set up with everything imaginable and they let me go in there and 

take what I needed.”22

Equipment, on the other hand, was a major concern. Instead of the 

HMMWVs and crew-served weapons they expected to receive, some 

ASTs received little or nothing in the way of proper equipment, at least 

initially. Some teams had Toyota pickup trucks for team vehicles. Few 

had the up-armored HMMWVs, crew-served weapons, SINCGARS, and 

BFTs they had anticipated. Charnock was on a team that was one of the 

exceptions. “When I got there I signed for everything we were supposed 
125

to get and that’s what we got. We got two Humvees, a .50 cal and a M249 

squad automatic weapon (SAW). That was it.” On the other hand, some of 

the equipment brought over from the states was cause for concern:

It was bad equipment. . . . We brought over PVS-5s [night 

vision goggles], which are crap. . . . They’re very hard 

to work with. The active duty guys were walking around 

with PVS-14s. I would have been happy with a pair of 

PVS-7s, but the 5s were what we took over there and 

carried with us the whole time in their big green boxes. 

We ended up getting 14s, though, from the Marines, but I 

can’t say everyone got that kind of stuff. I feel lucky that 

we fell under the Marines because they had everything 

they needed and they took good care of us.23

Maintenance was another issue. It is one thing to have the equipment 

on hand, it is still another to keep that equipment operational. In the case 

of Dan Christian’s ASTs at Namuniyah, they relied on Iraqi soldiers to 

perform some basic repairs on their HMMWVs. They also established an 

informal relationship with a support unit from the 56th Brigade, Texas 

National Guard, located 30 kilometers away at Camp Scania, for acquisition of parts, oil changes, and other minor work on their vehicles. “We did 

everything we could to beg, borrow, steal, leverage American ingenuity, 

and establish relationships to get done what we needed to get done,” he 

recalled.24

BG Schwitters was acutely aware of the conditions under which the 

advisors were living. Jim DiRisio recollected that the general was out 

often checking on the teams:

General Schwitters did a lot of traveling. At any given 

week, we were probably out of the office 4 or 5 days. 

We were visiting the ASTs, giving them support, letting 

them know we were there, trying to find out what they 

needed. That was always difficult, though, because some 

of them lived in pretty Spartan conditions and there was 

a lot of frustration on their parts about what they didn’t 

have. They didn’t have access to the American PXs and 

sometimes they didn’t even have access to decent food 

or water because they were embedded with Iraqi units. It 

was hard to go out and sit down and ask them how they 

were doing and what they needed because we would just 

get bombarded with complaints about mail, food, water, 

being able to take showers, and needing translators. There 
126

was no shortage of problems to be solved. We tried to 

solve them as best we could.25

Schwitters agreed with that assessment:

Every day we wrestled with the question of how to improve 

what we were doing. In hindsight, if we’d been able to 

predict the future better, we certainly would have set up a 

much more robust and resourced effort for both logistics 

and life support. Life support was the one area that was a 

continual struggle—providing our ASTs a safe and secure 

source of life support, whether that’s food, water, or what 

I’ll call ‘quality of life’ issues. We didn’t want them bathing in pond water or worse, for instance. We wanted them 

to have the means to keep themselves sustained.26

While he was aware of the problems facing his advisors, as a career 

Special Operations officer, Schwitters also knew there was a point of 

diminishing returns. He explained that living a lifestyle that approximates 

what one could expect in America, 

. . . runs exactly contrary to the principle of embedding 

yourself and living like they do. T.E. Lawrence certainly 

talks eloquently about the need to become one of them. So 

we had a cultural clash between what you or I as a leader 

would want for our soldiers and the compromises someone in that position would find makes them most effective. If you want to live over in your own little walled 

compound with good food, showers, TVs, weight rooms, 

a morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) sustainment 

package once a week or month and Internet access, well, 

that runs square against developing the relationships upon 

which effectiveness hinged.27

Many of the Iroquois Warrior advisors either understood this principle 

when they arrived or came to learn it while they were there, but predictably there were also some who never understood it. Unfortunately, those 

were the few individuals who complained the most and likely understood 

the mission the least. The effectiveness of those advisors to their Iraqi 

units was questionable at best.

The experiences of the 98th Division advisor teams in Iraq during 

2004 and 2005 were as varied as the locations at which they served. Each 

team encountered a unique set of circumstances, events, units, and personnel with which they had to contend and interact with as they worked 
127

to improve the Iraqi Army. On arrival at their respective duty stations, 

each team found their Iraqi unit at a different level of organization and 

readiness than those of their brother ASTs. Each Iraqi division, brigade, 

and battalion had been organized at different times. Indeed, some battalions had not yet been organized. Compounding the differences between 

units was the quality and dedication of their previous ASTs. Thus, the Iraqi 

units and their leaders were all at differing levels of knowledge, experience, and training, all of which presented a unique set of advantages and 

disadvantages for their new advisors. To provide a clearer, and hopefully 

more cohesive, explanation of what the 98th Division ASTs accomplished 

during their year’s tour, it is necessary to provide a description of the collective ASTs experiences by division. 

The Advisor Experience—The 5th Iraqi Division

The Iraqi 5th Division, also known as the “Hadeed Division,” was 

organized in April 2004 at KMTB. It was commanded by MAJ General 

Ahmad Hlaybos. On the arrival of the 98th Division ASTs, the 5th Division 

consisted of the 3d, 7th, and 9th Brigades. The 3d Brigade had completed 

its basic training some time before and had already been engaged in a 

few minor operations. The 7th Brigade was just completing basic training 

and preparing to go “operational.” The 9th Brigade, with the exception 

of its officers, was nonexistent. It would begin basic training in early 

December.28

In April 2005, the division would undergo a major reorganization as 

part of an overall plan developed by the MOD that did away with distinctly designated units and gave all divisional subordinate units a uniform 

set of designations. In this reorganization, 3d and 9th Brigades were redesignated as the 1st Brigade, 5th Division, and 3d Brigade, 5th Division, 

respectively. The brigades’ subordinate battalions were redesignated the 

1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions. Concurrently, the 7th Brigade was transferred 

to the 1st Division as that division’s 4th Brigade, and replaced by the 32d 

Brigade, Iraqi National Guard which was redesignated as the 5th Division’s 

new 2d Brigade.29 (See appendix C for a more detailed explanation of this 

reorganization.)

The senior advisor for the 5th Division was COL Parsons. Parsons had 

originally been assigned to the C2 Cell in Taji; however, while he was at 

Fort Bliss in early September 2004, Parsons learned in a phone call from 

MG Robinson that the 5th Division’s senior advisor slot had come open. 

Robinson asked him if he wanted the position, to which he responded that 

he did. Parsons soon was on his way to go through the training at Camp 
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Atterbury and ended up in the first Atterbury mobilization group to arrive 

in country.30

When he arrived at Taji in late October, Parsons learned that the 5th 

Division already had units preparing to go to Fallujah (the entire 1st Division 

was already there). The 3d Brigade had been ordered to move two battalions there to support the 1st Marine Division’s assault on the city, and an 

additional brigade, the 7th, soon was to follow. The 3d Brigade had to have 

its units in place to support the Marines before the 7 November start date. 

The division headquarters was to move to Fallujah on 10 November, and 

the 7th Brigade would follow after that. Therefore, the 5th Division ASTs 

were ordered to link up with their units at KMTB as soon as possible.31

The teams for the 3d Brigade and its subordinate battalions flew out 

on 1st Cavalry Division Blackhawks. They were accompanied by part of 

Parsons’ division team. Because Mob-1 was made up of the volunteers 

who had waived their right to a 30-day delay, Parsons’ divisional AST 

only had 5 of its authorized 10 men present at Taji. The remainder would 

follow in Mob-2, about 3 weeks later. Even with only five of his troops 

present, there was difficulty in getting them all to the KMTB in a timely 

fashion due to the space available on the choppers. Parsons and one other 

member made it out to the KMTB on time. The other three, including 

Scott McConnell the G3 advisor for the division, were delayed for 2 days 

by severe weather.32

Parsons’ team backfilled an AST from the 95th Division (IT). That 

team had been there about 6 months and had taken the division staff 

through the basic training period.33 All was not well with that team, however. McConnell’s counterpart, who had only been thinking about “getting 

out of Dodge,” was not only the G3 advisor but also the OIC of the team. 

Apparently the lieutenant colonel who had been the OIC had, some time 

earlier, “fallen out of favor with the [rest of his AST] and scooted back to 

Baghdad” and the major was required to take charge.34

Of course, the 5th Division AST was not perfectly prepared to assume 

the mission either. In addition to missing half of its members, there had 

been no decision on who would assume each of the specific duties on 

the team, except that Parsons would be the advisor to the division CG. 

McConnell recalled the team had to hold “huddles” away from the Iraqis 

to find out “who was good at what and who wanted to do what as far as the 

staff positions” after they arrived in Kirkush.35

The integration with the Iraqi staff, on the other hand, went well despite 

the organizational difficulties of the AST. Parsons gave his impressions of 

their reception and the division commander:
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They welcomed us. They were excited to have the 

American presence and support and so we had a very good 

working relationship. The guy I was working with was 

not an individual who had been vetted through General 

Petraeus and MNSTC-I, but he turned out to be a pretty 

solid guy. He probably wasn’t the best military commander you could have had as a commanding general of 

an Iraqi division; but while we didn’t need to make them 

as capable as the United States Army, we had to make 

them mission capable to fight the insurgency. To me, his 

prior military experience and his caring for soldiers made 

it easy for us to link up and gain synergy early on. His 

staff was welcoming of our efforts and we aligned very 

quickly with them.36

In theory, the 5th Division was fortunate to have Major General Ahmad 

and his key subordinates. Ahmad, the deputy division commander, and 

the chief of staff had all been members of the old Iraqi Army. They were 

also veterans of the Iran—Iraq War and so possessed knowledge of and 

experience in combat operations. In reality, that experience did not seem 

to translate into ability, at least not immediately. “They were not capable 

of planning, developing a plan from intelligence, nor could they perform a 

mission on their own,” Parsons recollected. “. . . I don’t believe any one of 

them—even with their wealth of experience in actual combat operations—

could develop a mission plan and move forward.”37

This lack of ability was compounded by the mindset of the division’s 

staff officers. McConnell described them as “a bit disjointed and fairly 

disengaged.” He went on to explain that after the team took over from the 

previous AST, “. . . the whole flavor of where the division staff was seemed 

to be primarily focused on garrison training and garrison operations. The 

emphasis [should have been] on how you keep in touch with units that are 

in combat. There was one whole brigade deployed forward and they had 

no mechanisms to get in touch with them, other than by courier, which to 

us seemed absolutely ludicrous and very ineffective.”38

This situation was apparently due in part to the fact that most of the 

officers and NCOs on the staff had been recruited at their hometown of 

Numaniyah and desired (and schemed) to get the headquarters transferred 

back there. “That’s where most of these officers and NCOs were recruited 

from and that was where they all lived around,” McConnell recalled. 

“They all wanted to be based within 45 minutes of their homes so they 

could go home at night or on the weekends. They were preoccupied with 
130

that whole thing and basically in denial that they had a brigade that was 

actually fighting the fight.”39

To complicate matters, the AST had to rely on only two interpreters. 

The five members of the team had to share them and so the time each 

member could spend with his Iraqi counterpart was limited. “It was really 

slow going at the start,” McConnell recalled. The lack of interpreters left 

time for the advisors to work on their responsibilities to the US side of 

operations, such as the various reports that had to be rendered to CMATT. 

But even that had a downside, as McConnell explained:

My experience (and a lot of other people’s experience) 

was that it was easier to stay involved with the American 

side of the piece. Doing the American reports, doing the 

American coordination, working with the Coalition force 

that was there at Kirkush and trying to get in touch with 

the people in Baghdad. It was almost like, ‘I can do this. 

Let me take care of this stuff.’ Getting in with and building relationships with the Iraqis took second fiddle.40

Fortunately, Parsons and Ahmad hit it off well in their relationship. 

Soon after the transition, both men departed Kirkush and spent the next 

month in Fallujah and Tikrit observing what the 3d Brigade units were 

doing to help the Marines. The excursion did a get deal to cement the bond 

of trust between the two soldiers, but the absence of the two leaders was 

a strain on both the division staff and the AST. Neither man was there to 

provide the guidance and set policy and direction for their respective units. 

Therefore, little progress was made in developing the division staff and the 

division as a whole. This situation was remedied shortly after their return 

in early December. McConnell described what happened:

. . . Colonel Parsons and General Ahmad came up with a 

plan that they would send a slice of the 5th Division AST 

and the 5th Division headquarters forward to Fallujah to 

work with the Marine regiment there, to be in charge of 

the two Iraqi Army brigades and the battalions that were 

working in Fallujah. That did a couple positive things. It 

got us embedded, living and breathing 24/7 with the Iraqi 

Army staff. It also showed them what actually went on 

forward in combat and how the Coalition works—how 

we get in, move around and communicate. I’d say it was 

very tenuous and uncomfortable the whole time we did it 

and maybe it wasn’t as effective as a division staff leading the fight; but as far as a training tool and us showing 
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them firsthand what the 5th Division should be doing, it 

was effective. Talk about indoctrination by fire—that was 

definitely it. It was either stupid and lucky or absolute 

brilliance, depending on how you wanted to look at it.41

At the brigade and battalion level, Iroquois Warrior advisors encountered many of the same and many different experiences as those at division 

level. In the case of MAJ John C. Curwen, OIC of the AST for the 6th 

Battalion, 3d Brigade, it was decidedly different. On one of the two initial 

ASTs that were rushed out of Taji to link up with their units, Curwen and 

his men arrived at the KMTB about the end of October. There, they discovered the 6th Battalion, less one of its companies, had already deployed 

to Fallujah. One member of the outgoing AST, SFC Michael Kingsbury, 

was there with the company, but was not deploying forward. Curwen and 

the others peppered Kingsbury with questions about the unit, the mission, 

and the area. The team also met their interpreter, Muhammed, and was 

able to get a sense for the unit and the KMTB before they left, not knowing 

whether the battalion would ever return there.42

Riding in a 5-ton truck with jury-rigged armor, the team accompanied 

the last company of the 6th Battalion on its journey to Fallujah. The convoy 

passed uneventfully through Baquba and Baghdad. West of Baghdad, the 

convoy was hit by an IED that went off about 75 meters behind the 5-ton 

that Curwen was riding in. The IED, which was apparently hidden under 

the body of a dead dog, caused only superficial damage to one of the 12 

Hyundai trucks that served as personnel carriers for the Iraqi soldiers. 

No troops were injured in the blast. The convoy continued to move and 

approaching Abu Ghraib, it was struck by a second IED. The second one 

went off about 300 meters behind Curwen, this time very close to one of the 

Hyundai trucks. The line of trucks continued to move out of the blast area, 

then stopped to allow leaders to check on their troops. Two Iraqi soldiers 

had been injured and were evacuated to a field hospital.43 After a rather 

harrowing introduction to convoy operations in Iraq for the 6th Battalion 

AST, the convoy finally pulled into East Fallujah Camp that evening.

Curwen and his AST were met at Camp Fallujah by MAJ Peter Fedak, 

the outgoing AST OIC. Fedak’s team was known as the “Timberwolves” 

and was actually an O/C team from the CMTC at Hohenfels. From Fedak, 

Curwen learned the 6th Battalion was down to about 230 soldiers. Like 

a number of other Iraqi battalions, there had many desertions in the 6th 

after a recent incident where 49 soldiers from the 7th Brigade had been 

captured and executed while going home on leave. Even more 6th Battalion 

troops deserted after being told they would be sent to Fallujah to conduct 
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operations.44 Fortunately, the battalion’s leadership was essentially intact 

and had suffered no desertions. 

Despite the weakened state of the 6th Battalion, Curwen noticed that 

Fedak and his men had done a credible job working with the unit. He was 

impressed with the way Fedak and his team worked with the staff and 

saw that the Iraqi soldiers conducted their operations at least like moderately trained soldiers. Curwen remembered “. . . watching the soldiers, 

watching how they moved, and how they reacted to different situations, it 

was clear that they had a lot of the basic soldier skills like moving spread 

out—although there were times when they would bunch up. There were 

times when you had to remind them of certain things, but generally their 

tactical movements and planning were good.”45

When Curwen’s AST arrived, the 6th Battalion and Fedak’s team were 

preparing to participate in Operation AL FAJR, the reduction of the insurgent stronghold of Fallujah, which was to start on 7 November 2004. The 

battalion formed part of the security perimeter holding the insurgents in 

while other units attacked south through the city to destroy or capture as 

many of them as possible. Though the RIPTOA began when Curwen’s 

team arrived, Fedak held the reins of control through the assault. Curwen 

recalled that the transition was not very smooth or complete:

It was a little bit more chaotic than I think either they 

or we would have liked given the nature of the fact that 

we were literally hours—a day to 2 days—prior to the 

start of the offensive. And so a lot of pieces had to be put 

together quickly and they were probably concentrating as 

much on the tactical mission that they were advising the 

6th Battalion on as they were transitioning with us.46

Curwen’s team completed the transition about 11 November while 

operations were still ongoing. That day, Curwen escorted Fedak to a local 

landing zone, put him on a chopper, and assumed responsibility for the 6th 

Battalion.

For the next month, the 6th Battalion conducted foot patrols and 

coordinated searches or manned traffic control points in the suburbs of 

Fallujah and virtually all of the towns surrounding it. About the beginning 

of December, the battalion received notice it would deploy back to the 

KMTB in two segments. The first started back on 3 December and was 

followed by the remainder on 6 December. At Kirkush, Curwen began the 

long process of retraining the battalion as it began to receive new recruits 

to replace those lost before the deployment.47
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In contrast to Curwen’s experience, Matt Jones, the OIC for the 18th 

Battalion, 7th Brigade, found a different set of circumstances when his 

team arrived at Kirkush in early November. “The team we were replacing 

didn’t even know we were coming and there was already a major on the 

ground who thought he was staying for another 4 months. They only had 

five guys,” he recalled. The members of the outgoing AST were from a 

USAR training division, probably the 95th Division, and were in Iraq on 

120-day or 180-day orders. The team had never left the compound because 

the 18th Battalion had been in basic training and was not yet operational. 

In fact, when Matt Jones and his team arrived, the battalion was on its 

post-basic training leave so no soldiers were present.48

An incident occurred just prior to Matt Jones’ arrival that reinforced to 

all the Iroquois Warrior ASTs just how dangerous the advisor mission was 

going to be. On 24 October, three battalions of the 7th Brigade completed 

their basic training. Immediately following the graduation parade, the 

troops were loaded on trucks, buses, and minivans to transport them back 

to their hometowns for several weeks of leave. A group of 3 minivans, 

carrying 49 soldiers of the 17th Battalion, was ambushed at a fake police 

checkpoint near the Iranian border about 95 miles northeast of Baghdad. 

The soldiers were forced out of the vans, ordered to lie face down in the 

sand, and each summarily executed with a bullet to the back of the head.49

This incident, and the brigade’s pending orders to go to Fallujah, had a 

Figure 18. Elements of the 2d and 4th Companies, 6th Iraqi Battalion, clear 

a route north of Fallujah headed toward Al Karmah in December 2004.

MAJ John Curwen
134

significantly detrimental impact on the morale of the brigade and on many 

units of the Iraqi Army.

For the first 20 days that Jones and his team were at the KMTB, there 

were no soldiers, just some of the battalion cadre. Jones used that time 

to have his team work with the Iraqi officers and concurrently attempt to 

secure the necessary equipment they would need to operate in the upcoming mission to Fallujah. 

Like Curwen, Matt Jones’ AST inherited two up-armored HMMWVs. 

Unfortunately, these vehicles did not possess any turret armor for the crewserved weapons. The vehicles also did not have radio mounts. Additionally, 

the team’s radios, brought with them from the United States, were older 

SINCGARS models. “They were just crap,” Jones explained. “We had 

radio problems all the time.” Jones, therefore, decided to fix the problem. 

The team first went over to the local US unit, the 30th Infantry Brigade 

from the North Carolina National Guard, to try and get newer radios and 

other equipment. Failing there, they traveled down to Numaniyah and met 

with limited success in getting some support there, but still no new radios. 

The team would have to do with what it had.50

The Iraqi leave period passed quickly and soon it was time for the 

soldiers to return. Jones and his team were detailed to go out to the various 

pick-up points and escort the soldiers back to the KMTB. This had two 

purposes: first, to provide the soldiers some security on their return trip to 

prevent a repeat of what had happened to the soldiers of the 17th Battalion; 

and second, to facilitate the actual return of the soldiers. Jones explained, 

“If we didn’t go and pick them up, nobody would return.” As it was, only 

about 400 of the battalion’s 750 soldiers actually returned from leave.51

On returning from this escort mission, Matt Jones learned of the 

Ahmad–Parsons plan to move the 7th Brigade to Fallujah to reinforce the 

3d Brigade. The orders went out to the brigade on 1 December that directed 

it to move on 7 December (although the brigade did not actually depart 

until the 14th for sundry reasons). The very day they received the movement order to Fallujah, an additional 200 soldiers, all of whom refused 

to serve outside of what they considered their home area, walked out the 

front gate. Incredibly, one of the deserters was the battalion commander. 

“He stole his pistol, his staff car—a Chevy Lumina—and an AK‐47. We 

never saw him again. That wasn’t exactly a good day for morale,” Jones 

remembered.52

The good news was that the battalion XO, Major Karasul Amir 

Karasul, was a dedicated and professional soldier. Karasul happened to 
135

be a Kurd whom the soldiers respected and trusted. He had served in the 

Peshmerga before the war and possessed a great deal of combat experience 

and knowledge of how to lead men. This officer was to provide his unit 

a quality of leadership in the ensuing months that was apparently uncommon for most Iraqi battalions. 

Despite the mass departures (it was not technically desertion because 

the Iraqi soldiers were there voluntarily and not yet bound by law to 

remain), Jones knew that his team and the battalion’s leaders had to get 

ready for what they would face in Fallujah and there was no time to spare. 

But cultural differences were going to be a part of the challenge:

We’d set up these training schedules that went from 0500 

physical training all the way until 2200 at night, and it just 

didn’t happen. It’s hard to get the Iraqis to train for more 

than 4 hours a day. If we could get 6 hours of training in a 

day, that was a good day. We would do round robin training where we’d do reflexive firing, some very basic closequarters marksmanship, to include a live-fire battle drill 

with some shoot houses we put up. We did convoy operations and we did patrolling. We had from 1 December 

until the 15th, and if we got 8 training days in all of that 

I would be surprised. They had holidays and other things 

going on. What we had to do was focus everything on getting them there alive.53

At about the same time that Matt Jones was getting his troops ready 

to move to Fallujah, the division’s 9th Brigade was beginning its basic 

training. SFC Dennis Ewing, a drill sergeant from the 1st Battalion, 390th 

Regiment in Buffalo, New York, had been assigned to the AST for the 

9th Brigade’s 26th Battalion. Like most of the other ASTs for the 5th 

Division, Ewing’s team linked up with its battalion at the KMTB, although 

in Ewing’s case the battalion at this point consisted only of an officer and 

NCO cadre. Thus, the team spent the first several weeks working with the 

battalion’s leaders, at least those that were present. Ramadan was in full 

swing, so many were on leave for the holiday. 

Ewing recalled that much of his effort during this period was focused 

on NCO team building. The battalion’s NCOs were a mixture of priorservice soldiers and a number who had gone through a short NCO training course. Collectively, Ewing felt that these men had about as much 

leadership and training experience as a US soldier might have when 

he completed basic training. “We concentrated on the NCOs becoming 
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leaders,” he remembered. “We went to the range, did individual fighting 

movements. We figured if we could train them up to a semi-standard, they 

would be better off when they were actually showing their privates how to 

go through things.” Having this time to work with the unit’s NCOs was a 

bonus. According to Ewing, “. . . a lot of [ASTs] didn’t have that luxury. 

They already had teams that were up and running and had missions. Then 

they had to more or less train their NCOs and officers at the same time they 

were training the privates.”54

Once all the officers and NCOs returned, the team departed with the 

cadre and traveled to Numaniyah where the 9th Brigade’s soldiers would 

go through basic training beginning the first week of December. Once at 

the NMTB, the team helped their unit leaders get the thousands of Iraqi 

recruits in-processed, through the medical exams, and assigned to their 

new platoons, companies, and battalions. They then started the troops 

through 8 weeks of basic training. When asked about the AST’s and brigade’s most significant accomplishment during this period, Ewing blandly 

stated, “There were no casualties. . . . I don’t think there was anything 

really bad. I think uniformly the standards were just not there. There was 

no desire to learn.”55

In January, about half way through the brigade’s basic training, 

Christian arrived at the NMTB to take over from the mentally questionable brigade AST OIC. As he engaged in the transition process with his 

US counterpart, he quickly came to realize that he faced two major problems. The first was the garrison commander, and the second was his own 

team.56

From his counterpart, Christian learned that the garrison commander, 

a US Army colonel, was for some reason hostile to the ASTs and was 

resistant to providing them any support. “So right off the bat I have this 

built-in contentiousness going on just between the Americans, which is 

really something you just don’t want to have to deal with. There’s enough 

fighting going on outside the gate.”57 The second issue was the more serious of the two. 

The 9th Brigade AST was one of three in the 5th Division that was 

not exclusively manned by 98th Division soldiers (although all three had 

division personnel assigned and were led by Iroquois Warrior OICs). This 

team had USAR personnel from Oklahoma, Kentucky, and the East Coast. 

Christian explained, “Some of the soldiers who were there, quite frankly, 

were really not cut out to be on [an AST]. They didn’t want it. They were 

only doing it because they were ordered to do it, not because they elected 

to do it or thought they could do it.” This posed problems in a number 
137

of ways, not the least of which was that the Iraqi leaders could sense it. 

Christian had to act quickly and make changes to remedy the situation:

I met with various key leaders throughout the organization whom I felt I could trust and whom I thought had 

the ability to assess soldiers’ capabilities as to what the 

mission requirements were. That’s what it was really all 

about. Then I just moved people around and put them 

where I felt appropriate to get the job done, where I had 

confidence they could do a good job and no one was going 

to get hurt. Those who couldn’t do the job, I found different jobs for. Although these other jobs were equally as 

important, they weren’t necessarily on the front lines. It 

was really a chess game to make sure everyone was in the 

right place; and at the end of the day, it seemed to work 

out pretty well.58

While the 9th Brigade started basic training, the 7th Brigade, in accordance with the Ahmad–Parsons plan, moved to reinforce the 3d Brigade 

at Fallujah. Matt Jones remembered that in his AST’s efforts to “get them 

there alive,” the team spent the last 3 days at the NMTB on convoy operations and then departed on 15 December. “We convoyed down on the 15th 

with 52 vehicles,” he explained. “They were driving Nissan pickup trucks 

and Hyundai cargo trucks. We got steel to reinforce the doors of the cargo 

trucks and the beds and welded PKM machine gun mounts on the personnel trucks. They had three or four machine guns mounted on them apiece. 

There were no plates underneath, though, still a wood floor.”59

The convoy departed at about 0900 with what the Iraqi leadership 

counted as 251 soldiers and drove west to Taji escorted by a security team 

from the 30th Brigade. En route, one soldier decided it was time to leave. 

“He just jumped off a truck north of Baghdad and took off. He didn’t take 

his rifle; he just ran away,” Jones recalled. At Taji, the convoy picked up 

a team from the 1st Cavalry Division and started southwest to Fallujah on 

what was described as “a bad road.” Just out of Taji, the convoy was struck 

by an ambush. The AST was quickly involved in the fight:

It was a complex attack with multiple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small arms fire. The Iraqis 

stopped in the kill zone and one Iraqi was hit in the throat. 

Two of my guys on the AST had to get out of the vehicle 

they were driving. They were traveling with RPKs. They 

engaged the enemy and then kicked the Iraqis back onto 

their vehicles, threw the body in the back so we could treat 
138

him. The 1st CAV escort team was doing their best to suppress the enemy, and it was a pretty raging firefight back 

and forth for awhile. So we got out of the kill zone and 

treated the kid. We were fortunate to have an outstanding Navy corpsman attached to us as well. We medically 

evacuated the kid via helicopter but he died anyway.60

As the convoy approached Fallujah, a Marine escort team took over 

and led it into the East Fallujah Camp. The Iraqi leaders immediately 

began sorting out the unit. “The Iraqis did a pretty good job reorganizing 

and getting their guys straight and settled,” Jones remembered, but there 

was one glitch:

We [asked] the Iraqis how many soldiers they have and 

they say 256. ‘How is that possible? We lost two!’ But 

they were adamant about it. Numbers in Iraq are always 

iffy. The Marines asked how many soldiers we had and 

we said, ‘About 200-ish.’ They were angry. ‘What does 

that mean? You don’t know how many soldiers you 

have?’ ‘Nope. We don’t. We can’t speak Arabic and we 

can’t count them all, and if they can’t do it, oh well.’61

At this point, with all the departures, the companies in the 18th Battalion 

were down to about 45 men each. 

Over the next 2 days, the 18th Battalion went through a training exercise with its assigned counterpart unit, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. After 

the training, the 18th Battalion conducted a relief in place with one of the 

3d Brigade battalions that had been sent to Fallujah before the assault. 

Matt Jones’ battalion took over a number of outposts on 18 December. He 

remembered that the city was still live with insurgents who had not been 

killed or wounded in the battle or who had not fled to other cities such as 

Samarra:

[Our outposts were] all pure Iraqi positions, no joint positions, and none of the positions were fortified. They were 

just houses that had been taken in the fight. The city was 

still very active. The Marines were still losing people. 

Current operations were ongoing. One of the Marine battalions had cleared some buildings in the center of the city 

that they thought were suspicious, and apparently they’d 

missed a lot of people. The city was a free-fire zone at the 

time. It was a lot of fun. You could shoot anything that 

moved at night. They were chasing down a lot of insurgents, catching them on thermals, and then the Marines 
139

and the Iraqis would chase them through the city and try 

to get them.62

On 19 December, the battalion began active patrols with the Marines 

in the city. Initially the patrols consisted of four Iraqi soldiers with each 

Marine squad. Each patrol would go out three or four times each day. 

Those troops not on patrol would remain at their outposts pulling local 

security and fortifying their positions. The work with the Marines was 

invaluable to the new Iraqi soldiers. Jones recalled that the Marines treated 

the Iraqis as soldiers and their leaders as leaders—they did not denigrate 

them. Thus, through mutual trust, the Marines were able to significantly 

increase the capabilities of the Iraqis, at least at the soldier level. “The 

individual soldiers really jumped ahead that first month. The Marines 

taught them proper urban patrolling and room clearing techniques. They 

taught them the things they do best and so the soldiers were getting a lot 

better.”63 They needed to be better because there was an important mission 

on the horizon—the Iraqi national elections.

The immediate objective for the Marines and the Iraqis was to produce 

a secure environment by January to allow the elections to go forward. 

As with other Iraqi units, the 18th Battalion provided security at polling 

sites to provide a clear Iraqi presence while the Marines secured other key 

locations such as intersections and main thoroughfares to provide ease 

of access for voters. According to Jones, the elections went “flawlessly,” 

although there were actually few voters left in the city. The only incident 

of note was that the insurgents attempted to rocket a polling place just 

after the polls closed at 1630. “. . . it landed like 50 meters past the tent,” 

Jones said. “We were all just standing there watching the rockets come in 

and laughing. We were like, ‘Come on, man. Can’t you do any better than 

that?’”64

Parsons agreed that the elections in Fallujah went well, given the 

recent events there. The Coalition units surrounding the city were vigilant 

about who was let back in after the fighting. That, combined with the overall security effort in the city and at the polls, produced a positive outcome. 

Parsons remembered:

All our Iraqi soldiers who were there in the city were able 

to rotate through and vote as well. I thought it was a great 

accomplishment. It gave them a feeling of success, where 

they could build toward the objective of the election and 

ultimately get people in to vote. Even though people were 

afraid, they were coming out of their homes and voting. It 

was really a confidence builder.65
140

The 5th Division Headquarters (Forward) had arrived at Fallujah 

at about the same time as the 7th Brigade. The intent of bringing the 

headquarters slice and two of the 5th Division’s brigade headquarters to 

Fallujah was to allow the 1st Marine Division to gradually start letting those 

headquarters take over operations in the area. The forward headquarters was 

attached to the 1st Marine Regiment, commanded by Col. Michael Shupp. 

Like Jones, McConnell remembered that working with the Marines was 

largely a positive experience. “The regiment was great as far as supporting 

the whole concept,” he said. “They gave us logistics support, equipment, 

beans and bullets, the whole nine yards. They bent over backwards to 

support the Iraqis, helping them set up a base of operations and learning 

logistics and whatnot.” However, the relationship was not perfect. “The 

piece that kind of fell apart was the Marine regimental command using 

the 5th Division headquarters staff to run the Iraqis. They actually had 

communications and links from the Marine regiment all the way down to 

the Iraqi battalions, which cut off the Iraqi division and brigade leadership 

of any responsibility for running battles.”66

One could argue that the Marine effort to consistently control the 

subordinate unit operations was self-defeating in terms of allowing the Iraqis 

to take over control of operations in Fallujah. In reality, the 5th Division’s 

forward headquarters was not really a functional organization. The level 

of training of the headquarters staff did not enable it to assume control 

as originally envisioned by the Marines, and the division’s subordinate 

units were likewise not ready to take responsibility for patrol sectors. As 

a result, in January the I Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters made 

an assessment of the situation. “ . . . they realized that the 5th Division 

wasn’t doing anything but occupying terrain and buildings that needed to 

be given to somebody else,” McConnell recollected. “So, if they weren’t 

going to bring anything to the fight, then they were going to go back to 

base.” The problem was that CMATT resisted sending the division back 

to the KMTB. “We knew we needed to go but we couldn’t. We were 

caught between a rock and a hard place,” McConnell explained. Finally in 

February, CMATT relented and the division forward headquarters returned 

to Kirkush later that month.67

As for the rest of the 5th Division units in Fallujah, the 7th Brigade 

remained there to continue operations with the Marines. The 3d Brigade 

headquarters and the 6th Battalion were returned to the KMTB, which 

was now filled to the brim with the recruits of the 9th Brigade as well. The 

5th Battalion was sent to Taji because there was not enough billeting for 

that battalion at Kirkush. There the battalion performed perimeter security 

duties for the next several months. 
141

The 5th Division scheduled both of these battalions for rebuilding 

and retraining, since they had lost so many troops to desertion before 

the fighting in Fallujah. The battalions were to be refilled with so many 

recruits that they would essentially be untrained units and would require 

retraining. 

The 3d Brigade’s other battalion, the 7th, had been sent to Samarra 

when the others departed for Fallujah. The team XO for the 7th Battalion’s 

AST was MAJ Lawrence “Larry” Bradley. Bradley had been commissioned 

in the Regular Army in the early 1990s and had served with John Curwen 

in the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry at Schweinfurt, Germany. Bradley had 

left active duty about 10 years before, but retained his commission in the 

IRR. Though he had been promoted through the ranks to major over the 

ensuing years, he had not participated in drills with a Reserve unit. “I 

hadn’t worn a uniform regularly for 10 years,” he explained. Therefore, 

it came as a surprise for him to receive orders for active duty and service in Iraq in August 2004. Dutifully answering his orders, he completed 

the weeklong refresher training at the Fort Benning CRC and was sent 

to Camp Atterbury as a filler for the 98th Division. By coincidence, the 

first person Bradley met when reporting into the division’s command post 

building at Atterbury was Curwen. As an outsider to the division, Bradley 

was happy to see a familiar face. He had not been told anything about 

the mission and was not informed as to what role he would be assigned. 

Curwen, however, “tried to poop me up on what was going on as best he 

could,” Bradley recalled.68

After completing the training at Atterbury and in Kuwait, Bradley 

arrived in Taji around 23 November. Even though he had been with the 

98th Division mobilization group for 2 months at this point, he still did 

not know what his job was going to be. That soon changed. About his 

third day there, he was finally notified that he was going to be an advisor 

for the 7th Battalion, 3d Brigade. He was to replace an officer who either 

refused or failed to perform his duties with that unit. By the beginning of 

December, Bradley was on a chopper headed for Samarra.69

The chopper landed at FOB 7, a small compound located about 21⁄2 

miles from the city. As the chopper approached the compound to land, 

Bradley remembered that seeing the voluminous amounts of paper and 

garbage blowing through the post and all the trash caught in the concertina 

wire surrounding the camp caused him to believe that the 7th Battalion 

must be a very ill-disciplined unit.70

At FOB 7, Bradley linked up with the OIC of the AST, MAJ Peter 

Mucciarone, an Infantry officer assigned to the 98th Division’s 7th Brigade. 
142

The team had been with the 7th Battalion only about 2 weeks before 

Bradley arrived and was now at full strength with his arrival. Though it 

was among the first ASTs to deploy into a combat zone, Mucciarone’s 

team possessed only one up-armored HMMWV. The other HMMWV was 

a standard “rag top.”71

As the XO, Bradley was responsible for developing supply and logistics support for the team. In this he was lucky that the local US unit was 

the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry from the 1st Infantry Division. Though the 

battalion was not liable to provide any support if it chose not to, Bradley 

discovered that the various supply and maintenance NCOs and officers 

from the unit were amenable to help the AST when they could.72

The 7th Battalion, including the battalion’s leaders, was a mixture of 

Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurds. “We never had any problems between soldiers 

in our battalion due to tribal differences, though,” he explained. The main 

problem was that the battalion would lose 50 to 60 troops a month to 

desertion. These were replaced about once a month with 50 to 60 more. 

“They’d just show up at the gate on trucks,” Bradley remembered.73

The constant turnover of personnel required a continual process of 

training the new soldiers, both at the individual level and at the more 

practical collective level. Compounding the problem was that the troops 

were required to have 1 week’s leave per month (which was standard for 

all units of the Iraqi Army). They would depart on a Friday morning and 

return the next Friday evening—if they returned at all. Additionally, the 

battalion had the mission of securing its own compound and conducting 

various missions, such as cordon and search missions and manning tactical control points (TCP) in and near the city.

The solution to this problem was that Mucciarone and the battalion 

commander developed a schedule where each of the battalion’s four companies was assigned to a specific task for a period of 1 week:

1 Company—Patrolling, TCPs, cordon and search

1 Company—FOB defense

1 Company—On leave

1 Company—In training

Over a month-long period, each company was able to rotate through all the 

tasks and ensure the battalion met its basic obligations.

As Bradley got to know the leaders and soldiers of the 7th Battalion, 

he came to realize the battalion was not as undisciplined as he initially 

believed. “Their ways are not our ways,” he explained. “Once I lived with 

the Iraqi soldiers for a while, and came to understand what they were 
143

about, I realized that they were committed and dedicated to the mission. 

They would do the job.”74

In January 2005, MNSTC-I began to implement a series of fundamental changes to the advisor effort in Iraq. The first change, which took 

place that month, was the redesignation of AST to MiTT. The intent of 

this change was to provide psychological reinforcement to the Iraqis, and 

Coalition soldiers too perhaps, that the teams’ mission was to transition 

the responsibility of the fighting to the Iraqi Army. Another change was 

the decision to integrate the ING into the Iraqi Army. This change had 

little immediate impact, but it would lay the groundwork for providing 

those units a formal MiTT later. Though these steps were predominantly 

psychological, there were more substantive changes in the works, but they 

would not take place until later that spring.

The 5th Division MiTTs began to settle into a routine that allowed 

them to work on coaching, mentoring, and advising their units. After 

the January elections, the location and activities of the division’s units 

would remain relatively constant. This was particularly true of the division 

headquarters.

Back at the KMTB, Brad Parsons and Scott McConnell began working on making their division staff capable of planning and conducting at 

least minor operations at the brigade and division level. It was a great challenge given the language and cultural barriers and the limited number of 

interpreters. Much of the effort to move the division headquarters toward 

competence began with Parsons and the division commander:

I spent a lot of time speaking to General Ahmad about what 

it meant to be the commander of an Iraqi division of over 

5,000 soldiers. We talked about what his responsibilities 

and roles were, how important it was for him to get 

clear guidance from higher headquarters (that being the 

Minister of Defense and the Iraqi ground forces command 

later on). He had to be in sync with them operationally. 

That was a very challenging effort because, culturally, 

they are always swayed to do personal agreements with 

their senior leadership. For example, we would go to 

Baghdad to meet with the Minister of Defense and the 

ground forces commander and get agreement (in their 

terms) to support efforts that the [division commander] 

felt were important. That kind of obviated what we were 

trying to do and I explained at length how we operated in 

the US Army, how we take our guidance from higher as 
144

far as missions are concerned, and that [guidance] would 

come down from corps to division, from division to us 

at the 5th Division Iraqi Army. It was all synched and 

coordinated from the highest headquarters down to the 

lowest. Although they understood what we were trying to 

tell them, they just weren’t going to follow that plan.75

Though cultural differences impeded some progress, Parsons recalled 

that the team was successful in other areas:

We did a lot of battle staff exercises with them in 

order to teach them to work as a staff. We presented 

challenges to them and watched them react to changes 

in the environment as if it was a real combat operation. 

We put them through scenarios that had [the division] 

losing troops and equipment and had them perform 

resupply efforts. We presented medical evacuation issues. 

There were logistics, fuel and water supply rationing, 

ammunition [problems], you name it. We challenged them 

on different scenarios in order to get them to react and 

battle track and work as a staff to provide information up 

to their higher headquarters, as well as provide guidance 

down to the subordinate unit commanders so they could 

take appropriate actions.76

As the G3 advisor, McConnell remembered the staff presented 

significant challenges in spite of the fact that many had prior military 

experience:

We had to teach them simple things like just how to use 

grid coordinates. Their army wasn’t used to using grid 

coordinates. They would just estimate where things were. 

For example, they would say, ‘Here it is, just southwest 

of that town on this road outside this village.’ They 

really had no idea where exactly they were headed. They 

couldn’t track engagements with any kind of accuracy or 

consistency. It just didn’t exist prior to us working with 

them.77

As the division AST worked toward creating a functioning staff, the 

9th Brigade ran its units through basic training and prepared them for 

active combat operations. The brigade completed its basic training at the 

end of January 2005 and the troops departed on 2 weeks of block leave 

around the beginning of February. Meanwhile, once he was able to get his 
145

inherited brigade AST in order, Christian began preparing for the next step 

in the brigade’s evolution into an operational unit. 

Christian went to work talking with the headquarters that owned his AO, 

the Multi-National Division Central-South (MND-CS). The Polish Army 

manned the MND-CS headquarters, but the division also included Ukrainian, 

Romanian, Salvadoran, and Bulgarian soldiers. Christian’s brigade had no 

defined mission, so in negotiating with the Poles he attempted to acquire 

one. However, the Poles had no territory or even small, finite missions they 

were willing to give to the 9th Brigade. Christian then went to talk to the 

nearest US unit and came up with the same answer. Therefore, just as at 

Taji (where he found useful work in repairing and improving the concertina 

wire), Christian again took the initiative and created his own mission.78

Working with the brigade staff and coordinating with the local ING unit 

(actually a former ING unit by this time), he divided the Wasit province 

into operational sectors. Once the 9th Brigade’s troops returned from leave 

and the subordinate units were run through a series of validation training 

events, the brigade was ready to take a few baby steps on actual missions. 

Ewing recalled that his battalion’s first operation was a “split mission” that 

included multiple tasks:

We started doing patrols with our battalion and we had 

set up checkpoints in the vicinity of Numaniyah. We also 

did a direct recruiting mission which was a supplement 

to the basic training. Units would send new potential soldiers down (we had ASTs training them) and then they 

were being shipped out throughout the whole country to 

fill shortages within the units. We had some of our ASTs 

on that while the others were with the battalion doing missions. . . . [the operations were] just basic, touchy-feely 

missions—setting up checkpoints, walking through local 

villages, weapons caches, and stuff like that.79

Through March and April 2005, the 9th Brigade, now nicknamed the 

“Al Karrar,” or Warrior Brigade, and its subordinate battalions ran missions like those described by Ewing. The brigade’s significant events log 

for April provides an idea of the kinds of operations that 9th Brigade units 

were performing and the results of those efforts:

Date:	 Location:	 Event:

3 Apr 05 AO Sword 1st Bn found dead body floating in the 

canal. HN [host nation] victim had throat 

slashed. No further info.
146

9 Apr 05 MB 771503 While conducting convoy security from

TCP #2 NMTB to MND-CS border, 3d Bn and 

US escort observed a firefight ongoing 

between US forces and insurgents. 

Unknown US forces advised the convoy 

to turn around.

16 Apr 05 ANMTB 3d Bn soldier died of self-inflicted gunshot wound in his barracks.

21 Apr 05 AO Sword IP [Iraqi Police] advised IA of ordnance

NB105103 cache. Located, secured, and transported 

to the NMTB range for disposal. Cordon 

and searches conducted on local homes. 

Nothing else found, no arrests (2d Bn).

23 Apr 05 AO Sword 2d Bn stopped HN vehicle containing

Shumali 5 AK-47 rifles at the TCP.

Bridge

23 Apr 05 AO Sword 2d Bn on patrol located ammo cache.

NA 133997 Destroyed 49 57mm AA rounds, 6 rockets, 117 mortar rounds, and 4 artillery 

rounds.

24 Apr 05 AO Sword 2d Bn found dead body floating in the

Shumali canal. Appeared to be HN civilian with

Bridge gunshot wound to the head.

26 Apr 05 AO Sword 2d Bn detained 10 Afghan civilians who

Shumali were traveling through Iraq from Iran.

Bridge They had only photocopies of their passports. They were handed over to the IP.80

In May, the 9th Brigade began to conduct larger operations. The first 

of these was a brigade-level mission called Operation COBWEB conducted 6 through 10 May 2005 in the area north of Suwayrah, Azizyah, 

and Zubaydiyah. The brigade’s mission was to “locate, eliminate, and prevent the establishment of insurgent sanctuaries in northern areas of Iraq’s 

Wasit province.” It was a mission designed to be relatively low-key and 

simple to teach these units basic techniques in tactical movement, communications, and cooperation with higher headquarters and adjacent units. 

The mission was conducted in coordination with the 1st Polish Brigade 

Combat Team and elements of the Iraqi 8th Division. 

The 4-day sweep was quite successful with Ewing’s 2d Battalion 

(formerly the 26th Battalion) producing the greatest results. During the 
147

mission, the 2d Battalion uncovered a number of caches that included 

AK-47s, RPG-7s, IEDs, electrical wire, and a number of the distinctive 

black uniforms of Saddam’s former Fedayeen forces. The unit also captured 

a number of DVDs that contained anti-Iraq government propaganda and 

video clips of the execution of several MOI officials. The most significant 

haul, however, was 29 suspected insurgent fighters that were captured and 

taken off the streets.81

In talking with a reporter from The Advisor, MNSTC-I’s newsletter for 

advisors, Christian told him, “Cordon and search missions such as these 

not only allow the Al Karrar brigade to have a substantial impact on the 

insurgency’s ability to operate, but also enable the brigade to improve on 

its tactics and techniques for future operations.” The brigade commander, 

Colonel Rahman Jerry Chalib, explained through an interpreter, “We hope 

to use the extensive intelligence information that we gathered from this 

discovery to assist the planning of additional missions in the future.”82

That future mission was not long in coming.

Ten days after the conclusion of COBWEB, the brigade conducted 

a larger cordon and search mission appropriately dubbed Operation 

PENINSULA. This operation, which had the same objectives as the earlier 

mission, was conducted by sealing off the base of what was a peninsula 

formed by the Tigris River. It was roughly a 5-kilometer square area that 

had been considered by intelligence personnel to be rather tame in terms of 

Figure 19. LTC Dan Christian (center), advisor to the 3d Brigade, 5th 

Division, provides recommendations to the brigade commander, Colonel 

Rhaman (right), on the deployment of troops during Operation COBWEB.

LTC Dan Christian 
148

insurgent activity. Thus, it was also considered to be another good training 

mission for a relatively new brigade. 

The operation began in the morning with one battalion conducting 

the seal, and the other two moving through their assigned sectors conducting the search. Much to everyone’s surprise, the haul on this mission 

was greater than on COBWEB. After several small firefights, the brigade 

ended up detaining 187 suspected insurgents, of which 67 were made official prisoners after military intelligence personnel questioned them. The 

amount of captured materiel was much larger too. Christian explained, 

“We filled five or six dump trucks worth of weapons, anything from 

AK-47s to rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), dynamite, C4—all kinds 

of stuff.” As it turned out, the brigade conducted three more raids of that 

area before the 98th Division left in the fall of 2005 and turned up quite a 

few more caches. Christian later recalled rather dryly that the results were 

“really interesting for an area that was considered dormant, and not really 

critical, to be such an active area for insurgents.”83

Though these missions were quite successful, Christian and the other 

MiTT members felt that their greatest success came with Operation FISH 

NET II held on 8 July. Since the MiTT mission was to prepare their Iraqi 

units to be ready to operate on their own, they developed a concept for 

a cordon and search mission north of Numaniyah that would be entirely 

Iraqi planned and run. Christian recalled the results:

It was very successful and brought in more insurgents and 

more caches. They received the mission, they planned the 

mission, they conducted the mission, and they did retrograde operations back to the Numaniyah Training Base 

with no US support. We sat back and just watched. We 

pointed out opportunities for improvement, pointed out 

things they needed to consider in terms of mission planning or mission execution, but they did the whole thing—

and at the end of the day, that was what we were there to 

do.84

Though Christian and his advisors had brought their brigade to a 

higher level of capability, that did not mean their job was done nor was 

it any less dangerous. Operation FISH NET II concluded just after noon 

that day and the Iraqi troops loaded their vehicles to convoy back to the 

NMTB. Christian’s two brigade HMMWVs, accompanied by two 5th 

Division MiTT HMMWVs and two Polish “Scorpion” vehicles from the 

MND-CS, were along to provide escort support. The convoy departed a 

little after 1300 and moved south-southeast on Route BISMARCK headed 
149

for Numaniyah. About 30 minutes later, the last vehicle in the convoy, 

an M1114 (up-armored HMMWV) manned by members of the brigade 

MiTT, was hit by an IED. 

In the HMMWV were five advisors: LTC David P. Wait, the brigade 

XO advisor, was the vehicle commander; CPT Paul Bollenbacher was the 

driver; SSG Jose Rodriguez was the gunner; CPT Peter Mollineaux and 

Chief Petty Officer Hyde, a Navy corpsman, rode in the rear seats. The blast 

threw shrapnel into the right side of the vehicle and smashed the ballistic 

glass at the right rear seat where Mollineaux was sitting. Fragments of the 

IED, or perhaps spall from the inside of the truck, lashed at Mollineaux, 

Hyde, and Rodriguez. Wait and Bollenbacher escaped injury, other than 

being rattled by the blast and perhaps sustaining some hearing loss. 

Christian, located in his M1114 two vehicles to the front, heard and 

felt the blast. The gunner, First Sergeant (1SG) Joseph B. Joie, turned to 

see the smoke and debris from the explosion. Christian ordered his driver, 

MAJ Micheal L. Eller, to turn around and go to the assistance of the other 

vehicle. By the time they got there, Bollenbacher had managed to drive his 

HMMWV about 100 meters farther down the road and stopped. There Joie 

and Bollenbacher provided first aid to the wounded soldiers while Wait 

and Christian pulled security.

The two vehicles began receiving small arms fire from the vicinity of a water treatment plant to the northeast of their position. Within 

the next 20 minutes, Eller called for a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) 

and four additional M1114s arrived (two division MiTT HMMWVs and 

two Marine HMMWVs) to help with security. With the arrival of those 

vehicles, some equipped with .50-caliber M2 machine guns, the fire from 

the treatment plant became sporadic. That, in turn, allowed the landing of 

the MEDEVAC helicopter directly on the road at about 1425. The three 

wounded men were loaded on the chopper and were taken to Camp Echo 

for treatment. 

As testimony to the rugged durability of the M1114 issued to the 

advisor teams, in addition to saving the lives of those three soldiers, the 

vehicle required only three new tires (which were changed on the spot) to 

be driven away. Christian and the six HMMWVs arrived at the NMTB at 

about 1730 that afternoon.85

At about the time the 9th Brigade was starting its post-basic training 

operations, the 3d Brigade was coming out of its rebuilding efforts and 

was ready to start active operations again. John Curwen’s 6th Battalion 

had been manning eight guard towers on the perimeter fence at the KMTB 

since its return in December. Between December and April, the battalion 
150

went through the process of rebuilding and retraining. It was a difficult 

experience, Curwen recalled. “It was painful because we didn’t get all the 

soldiers at once. We got them like 100 here, 150 there. And as each new 

group of brand new green recruits came in, it was back to basic training or 

taking the seasoned soldiers and helping to train them on how to do some 

of the basic soldier tasks.”86 The team also worked with getting the unit’s 

sergeants to understand the duties and responsibilities of NCOs, but that 

too was problematic.

Adding to the difficulties was that the 30th Infantry Brigade had been 

replaced at the KMTB by the Tennessee National Guard’s 1st Squadron, 

278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). Unlike the 30th Brigade, the 1st 

Squadron had no desire to help Curwen and his team, nor was it enamored 

of the Iraqi soldiers of the 6th Battalion. Curwen remembered that the 

Guardsmen’s view was essentially, “We’re large and in charge, and we 

really don’t care what you do with your Iraqi soldiers. Just keep them out 

of our way.”87

The attitude of the Tennessee Guardsmen was not lost on the Iraqi 

soldiers. Curwen explained:

You know, they tolerated us, but parts of the regiment 

were always convinced that certain elements within the 

Iraqi units were going to attack them late one night, to 

the point where they put up an interior guard—Camp 

Caldwell [where the 278th was billeted] occupied a corner 

Figure 20. Medical evacuation operation for the four 3d Brigade advisors 

wounded by an IED just after the conclusion of Operation FISHNET, 

8 July 2005.

LTC Daniel Christian
151

of the Kirkush Military Training Base. There were towers 

around the entire perimeter of KMTB. When 278th came 

in, they put in jersey barriers and guard towers on the interior lines. . . . When [the Iraqis saw], you know, posts on 

the inside of the base and it wasn’t always manned, but 

when it was manned and you’d see the American soldier 

whose weapon is pointing not outwards but is pointing 

inwards, the language doesn’t matter.88

Fortunately, the prevalent attitudes of the 278th ACR did not last long 

due to a transformation in its relationship with the 6th Battalion. Another 

fundamental change to advisor operations occurred in the first couple of 

weeks in May. Over that period, the command and control of the MiTTs 

was transitioned from the CMATT to a new headquarters designated the 

Iraq Advisor Group (IAG), which was commanded by BG Sherlock.89 In 

keeping with the new policy of transitioning the burden of the conflict to 

the Iraqi Army, this command worked directly for the CG, MNC-I, LTG 

Thomas F. Metz, rather than for Petraeus. The MiTTs were now required to 

report to the IAG and were MNC-I assets rather than MNSTC-I’s responsibility. Concurrently, MNC-I assigned each Iraqi division to one of the 

corps’ MSCs and provided each battalion and brigade a Coalition counterpart unit that was responsible for assisting the training of its Iraqi unit 

and the administrative and logistical support of its MiTTs. Some Coalition 

units had to create more MiTTs “out-of-hide” to advise the many former 

ING units that were integrated into the Iraqi Army as the 2d, 4th, and 6th 

Divisions, as well as for the new 8th Division and 9th Mechanized Brigade. 

The Coalition units also had responsibility for employment of the Iraqi 

unit on missions in the Coalition unit’s area of responsibility (AOR). 

In theory, this arrangement provided better command and control of 

the MiTTs and the Iraqi units for actual operations, better logistics support 

to and security for the MiTTs, and more resources (air support, artillery, 

intelligence, etc.) to support the higher collective training requirements of 

the Iraqi brigades and divisions. In practice, it often fell short of meeting 

the goals.

Under this new program, the initial counterpart units for the 5th 

Division were as follows:

Division headquarters Headquarters, 42d ID

1st Brigade 1st Squadron, 278th ACR

2d Brigade 3d Brigade, 3d ID

3d Brigade None
152

Though Parsons provided his reports to the IAG on administrative and 

logistical matters, his boss for day-to-day operations was now MG Joseph 

J. Taluto, CG of the 42d Division. As part of the transition to MNC-I, 

Parsons had to develop an assessment of where the 5th Division and its 

subordinate units were in terms of readiness and capabilities, and that 

assessment went to Taluto for review. The report was part of a process to 

develop standards in terms of readiness for Iraqi units and a timeline to 

meet certain levels of operational capability.90 Apparently, at least some 

of the burden was placed on the US counterpart units to ensure their Iraqi 

units met the timeline. McConnell stated that the 42d Division developed 

a plan, without any input from the 5th Division MiTTs, on how they were 

going to meet the readiness and time requirements: 

When we got their briefing, they looked at us and said, 

‘Oh, you’re a division-level team. We’re not going to be 

at division-level operations until 2006. You just stay here. 

Do CPXs [command post exercise], do garrison training 

and somebody will pick you up when the time comes. In 

the meantime, we’re going to go back down to company 

level and revalidate all their training from company level, 

to battalion, then to brigade.’91

In other words, the 42d Division was going to start retraining the 5th 

Division units at the company level without any consideration of whether 

the units needed it or not. It was a “one-size fits all” approach to working 

with the Iraqi units. No one had apparently bothered to read Parsons’ 

assessment, nor had the 42d Division attempted to find out from the people 

who had fought, ate, and slept with the very units they were assigned to 

train, where those soldiers thought the unit was in terms of capability. 

McConnell explained with some frustration: “They basically invalidated 

everything that had been done and disregarded all that experience, not 

only of the [MiTTs] but of the Iraqi staffs as well. They were taking them 

back down to ground zero, reassessing them, and then retraining them 

according to their standards.”92

Parsons’ 5th Division MiTT spent the rest of their time in Iraq basically working with the division staff on planning and training skills, routine staff work, and occasionally a CPX, but there was to be no practical 

experience in planning and controlling actual unit operations. As a result, 

Parsons recalled: “We never took them into an operation, nor did we ever 

take them to where we could sign off on territory completely where they 

were in control.”93

In theory, logistics support to the MiTTs by the US counterpart should 
153

have improved when they switched over to MNC-I, and in some instances 

it did. The difference, however, was entirely dependent on the attitude 

of the US counterpart unit commander and his view of MiTTs and the 

mission to transition the fight to the Iraqi Army. Some unit commanders 

understood the big picture and went to great lengths to support the advisory effort. Others gave it as little attention as possible. Most were somewhere in between. Parsons described his perception of the problem:

When we were under MNSTC-I and CMATT, their effort 

was to make the Iraqi forces the top priority. When we got 

transitioned from MNSTC-I and CMATT and fell under 

the MSCs, they were already in the AO as the warfighters—and so they saw it as a threat to drawing down on 

resources they had, because the mission was changing on 

them. Now, they not only had to play the combatant role 

but they also had to be the support arm for the advisor 

teams. I believe that transition stuck in the craw of a lot 

of MSCs. I don’t think it was well received by a lot of the 

MSC commanders, quite frankly.94

Surprisingly, Curwen found that once the 278th ACR became the official counterpart unit of his brigade, its attitude toward the MiTT mission 

reversed course 180 degrees:

Again, to their credit, the 1st Squadron completely 

reorganized their troops to support the training mission, 

and although they, by mission, didn’t have to give me 

many soldiers to plus up my AST team—I think it went 

from . . . I had 10 and I think they had to bring me up to 

15 or 16 on their own through task analysis and working 

with me—they determined or decided that it was better to 

give me more soldiers so that not only the battalion had an 

advisory team, but each of the companies had . . . either a 

six- or seven-man team. The battalion had enough people 

where you could actually work with the staff. We could 

work with the S1, the S4, each of those sections, and 

give them the attention that they really needed. We could 

work with the companies to help them finish rebuilding 

and training the soldiers up to the standards where they 

needed to be.95

Two days after the 278th provided men to function as advisors with 

Curwen’s team in early April, they were out on their first mission with 

the 6th Battalion. Two days later, the battalion was ordered to send two 
154

companies to an area south of Balad Ruz, near a town that American 

soldiers nicknamed “Turkey Village.” The area was predominantly Sunni 

and a known trouble spot. There was a wide open field there about 2 

kilometers square that, during Saddam’s day, was rumored to have been 

a place for local farmers to hide crops to prevent their confiscation by the 

state. Intelligence gained from an informant by a Special Forces A-Team, 

or Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA), indicated insurgents might now 

be using the area to hide weapons and ammunition. The 6th Battalion was 

ordered to go there and conduct a search.

For the search, the battalion commander selected the 1st and 4th 

Companies. SSG Christopher Dill, a drill sergeant from the 2d Battalion, 

390th Regiment in Webster, New York, was assigned as an advisor to the 

3d Company. Dill, who had served with a combat engineer battalion with 

the 24th Infantry Division in the first Gulf War, had already seen combat 

in this conflict. The previous November, when the 6th Battalion was in 

Fallujah, Dill had dismounted from the safety of his armored HMMWV 

to help his Iraqi soldiers clear a building defended by insurgents. He 

was awarded the Bronze Star for Valor for his actions that day.96 Now 

he volunteered to go along on the mission to Balad Ruz, even though his 

company was not going to be involved. Since it was the battalion’s first 

Figure 21. SSG Christopher Dill and Emad, a unit interpreter, at a checkpoint 

north of Fallujah in December 2004. Dill was killed in action 4 months later 

near Balad Ruz.

MAJ John Curwen
155

two-company operation and the first mission conducted with an ODA, he 

wanted to see how such operations would be conducted.97

The detachment of the 6th Battalion arrived in the search area about 

0900 on 4 April 2005 and began the search. The effort continued in the 

designated zone uneventfully until about 1330. At that point, the search 

had covered about 70 percent of the required area, so the ODA team 

decided to take their informant farther south to another location. It was an 

area determined to be suspicious based on aerial photographs. The ODA, 

mounted in two M1114s and escorted by Dill in another HMMWV and 

two Iraqi gun trucks, drove down to take a look. About 45 minutes later, 

Curwen got a call from one of the vehicles saying the element had come 

under fire. Curwen immediately decided to send most of his MiTT (which 

now included the 278th advisors) to the rescue, because they were at hand 

and he could quickly get them there to reinforce. He felt it would take 

the Iraqi soldiers too long to assemble, load their trucks, and get there in 

time. Curwen did order the Iraqi commanders to start the vehicle loading 

process and follow later.

Curwen and most of his advisors took off to the south. En route he 

was trying to make radio contact with the advisors who had gone forward 

because the situation was unclear:

They knew they were taking fire from the south or from 

the southeast. But it was sporadic. They’re in contact, 

then they’re not, then they are. We ended up following 

them down the same road that they took to that area. I 

had, when I went down there, my 1114 plus, I want to say, 

two others that traveled down there, and ended up setting 

up on either side of the ODA trucks and my other M1114 

that was down there with them. The situation that developed was a combination of rifle fire and machine gun fire, 

RPG-4s, and sporadic mortar fire.98

Curwen recalled, “. . . the people who were down there had significant 

stocks of RPGs and other munitions. It wasn’t just stuff that they happened 

to be carrying.” Whether the insurgents happened to be training in the 

area and were surprised, or they knew the 6th Battalion was coming and 

were preparing an ambush, is not clear. Whatever it was the ODA had run 

into, it was at least an organized body of insurgents who were clearly well 

equipped and willing to fight.99

Once Curwen’s vehicles arrived, the weight of the fire from the crewserved weapons on the M1114s caused the insurgents to change tactics. 

They now began to break contact and retreat south, only to resume the 
156

fighting once the advisor vehicles were on the move. Eventually, the MiTT 

and ODA came to an area criss-crossed with irrigation canals and berms 

that forced the vehicles to stay on the road. The insurgents continued to 

fire at them, but because of the terrain it was difficult for the advisors to 

pinpoint where the fire was coming from. Finally, the ODA was able to 

coordinate for air support and soon two AH-64 Apache helicopters arrived 

in the area. Although the choppers were unable to do much damage to the 

dismounted insurgents who were using the ditches for cover and concealment, they did detect several vehicles behind a tree line to the south of 

the enemy positions and called in two jets. Within minutes, the jets were 

on station and released a 500-pound bomb at the trucks behind the trees. 

Curwen remembered that the strike “took care of the trucks and vehicles. 

The battle damage assessment wasn’t tough. We saw pieces of what they 

had go flying into the air.”100

Just after the air strike, the 1st and 4th Companies finally arrived, 

dismounted, and began to sweep toward the last known enemy positions. 

Dill and three advisors from the 278th pushed out with the Iraqis to clear 

the ditches to their front. The line had advanced only a short distance when 

suddenly the enemy opened up with heavy automatic weapons fire from 

a trench line about 150 yards away. It was accurate and heavy. “It was 

hitting right around the soldiers and they [weren’t] making any headway,” 

Curwen recalled. Several Iraqi soldiers were wounded or killed in quick 

order. The troops seemed to be caught in a planned kill zone and became 

pinned down. Dill, 2LT Christopher Rule, SSG Stephen Kennedy, SGT 

Robert W. Betterton, and two members of the ODA dismounted from their 

vehicles to move down and render assistance. These men, too, were quickly 

pinned down. Within minutes, all four advisors had been hit. Rule’s and 

Betterton’s wounds were not too serious, but Dill’s and Kennedy’s were. 

Kennedy was hit in the side where the round just missed striking the Small 

Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plate in his Kevlar vest that would have 

probably stopped it and let him off with a severe bruise. Dill was struck in 

the neck, just above the vest. Soon after Dill and Kennedy were hit, other 

advisors quickly dragged them out of the kill zone and moved them to the 

1114s for protection. In the meantime, someone had called for MEDEVAC 

choppers.101

When the MEDEVAC arrived at about 1600, the fighting was at a lull. 

“We had a sense when they were MEDEVAC’d—Sergeant Kennedy and 

Sergeant Dill—neither of them were doing too well,” Curwen explained. 

In fact, both soldiers died later that day. In addition to Kennedy, Dill, Rule, 

and Betterton, the MEDEVAC choppers evacuated at least two dead and 

eight wounded Iraqi soldiers, but the fighting was not yet over.102
157

The two Iraqi companies now pushed forward again. Curwen was 

with the 4th Company on the right; the 1st Company was on the left. About 

two-thirds of the way across a field that was bordered by a bushy tree line 

to the south, the 6th Battalion came under fire again, this time from the 

tree line now only 80 yards away. The insurgents threw grenades at the 

1st Company, which began to pull back. Curwen, however, led the 4th 

Company all the way to the tree line. The bad guys were now to his left 

and the 1st Company had retreated back to the jump-off line across the 

field. Moreover, the M1114s were now parked at the far end of the tree 

line.103

Curwen was clearly in a dilemma. He could not fire down the tree 

line at the insurgents for fear of hitting his vehicles; the vehicles could 

not fire at the insurgents for fear of hitting the troops of the 4th Company; 

and the 4th Company could not advance along the tree line for fear of 

being mistaken for insurgents by the 1st Company, now in positions back 

across the field. Curwen motioned over his interpreter and asked him if he 

thought the company would be embarrassed if it was pulled back before 

finishing the insurgents off. They had gotten this far and Curwen did not 

want to crush their morale, especially after the casualties the battalion had 

sustained. “I’ll be honest, I was in no big hurry to run down the bush line 

to find these insurgents,” he remembered. “We pulled back.”104

It turned out to be a good call. Just as the unit was moving back away 

from the tree line, the remaining insurgents attempted to sprint across the 

road south toward safety. But the gunners on the M1114s were ready. The 

insurgents were cut down in a hail of fire from the vehicles. Soon after, a 

muffled blast came from the tree line. “. . . I saw something fly up in the 

air and it wasn’t parts of bushes,” Curwen said. Apparently, one of the 

insurgents had committed suicide with an explosive. That event ended the 

fighting; it was now dusk.105

The 6th Battalion completed the search and collected the enemy dead, 

weapons, and ammunition. The battalion had killed 13 insurgents and probably more. There were a number of enemy wounded too, as evidenced by 

the various blood trails found. But the cost to the battalion was also high. 

The unit sustained 2 Iraqi soldiers killed in action and 13 wounded, in addition to the 2 dead and 2 wounded Americans. The battalion reconstituted 

and reorganized that night, protected by a C-130 gunship and mounted 

elements of the 278th ACR that had been sent down as reinforcements.106

It appears the fighting south of Balad Ruz must have broken the insurgent threat in that area, at least for a time. For the rest of his time in Iraq, 

Curwen and the 6th Battalion conducted patrolling operations in the area 
158

west of that city, while the 7th Battalion, back from Samarra, patrolled the 

areas to the east. No tactically significant actions occurred in those areas 

during the remainder of the tour.

When reviewing the efforts of the various 98th Division ASTs/MiTTs 

that worked with the 5th Division, the advisors that served on those teams 

draw a picture that reflected mixed results. On the one hand, the advisors 

were not able to bring the units as far as they might have wished. Parsons 

lamented that his team never got the division headquarters far enough 

along to plan and conduct actual operations. Scott McConnell estimated 

that “on a scale of 1 to 10, we took them from a 1 up to a 5 or 6 level. There 

was certainly still a lot of room for improvement.”107

On average, however, the 5th Division advisors were very proud of 

what they accomplished with their Iraqi units. At the division level, while 

the headquarters did not ever conduct a real operation, Parsons believed 

the staff was at least “capable of developing and preparing to execute a 

mission.”108 McConnell agreed: “By the time we handed it off to the 80th, 

though, they were a moderately competent division staff that could work 

together through serious issues. They could actually do battle tracking, 

communications, and they could come up with some kind of plan and 

guidance for their subordinate units.”109

At the brigade level, Dan Christian was very satisfied with what his 

team was able to achieve. He believed that when he handed the old 9th 

Brigade off to the succeeding MiTT, the brigade could plan a mission, 

conduct it, and return to the FOB, “and they could do it all on their own.”110

Dennis Ewing was satisfied with his team’s results as well. He recalled 

that the old 26th Battalion was “pretty close to being a working asset by 

themselves, without American support, so we were pretty happy with the 

turnaround.”111

By the fall of 2005, it was clear the Iroquois Warriors had not brought 

the 5th Division to the point that it could plan and conduct even the simplest of division operations. That would be a difficult goal to achieve even 

for an active duty MiTT drawn from a US Army division staff. Parsons 

and his advisors were able to bring the staff to the point were it was ready 

to at least begin attempting such a task. At least one of its brigades, the 

9th, was conducting brigade-level operations on a recurring basis, and one 

other, the old 3d Brigade, was probably capable of such an effort. The 

battalions of those brigades were planning and conducting basic missions 

at the battalion level as well. At the very least, it can be said that the 5th 

Division advisors built a good foundation for the 80th Division MiTTs to 

build on and take the 5th Division to the next level. 
159

The Advisor Experience—The 3d Iraqi Division

The headquarters of the Iraqi 3d Division began organizing about June 

2004 at the Al Kasik Military Training Base. Major General Khursheed 

Saleem Hassan Al Dosekey, a highly respected Kurd soldier with a lot of 

combat experience, commanded the division. Khursheed was also apparently serving part-time as the deputy commander of a large Peshmerga 

force. Verbally, the general supported the Iraqi government and its policies, but it was never clear where his true loyalties lay though, as one 

officer intimated, one may surmise they were with the Peshmerga if push 

ever came to shove. Shipman recalled:

He told us many times that he really felt we needed a new 

Iraqi Army and he supported an integrated army with 

Arabs and Kurds serving together. His frustration was that 

the southern soldiers, who were mostly Arab, would go 

away and not come back again because they didn’t want 

to be in Kurdistan or close to Kurdistan, which is where 

our base was. Even though he wanted to have a diverse 

unit, it was difficult to maintain that. Consequently, the 

Figure 22. CPT Ari Moskowitz, staff advisor to Headquarters, 3d Division, 

Iraqi Army, provides 9mm pistol familiarization training to members of the 3d 

Division staff at Al Kasik Military Training Base, Iraq, in December 2004.

COL Douglas Shipman
160

people they recruited to come in on this direct recruit program were mostly Kurdish soldiers. The balance tipped 

much more heavily on the Kurd side.112

Unlike the 1st and 5th Divisions, the 3d Division’s organization 

remained constant, with the exception of one battalion, during the 98th 

Division’s tour in Iraq. It consisted of the 4th, 5th, and 8th Brigades, which 

would later be redesignated as part of the Iraqi Army reorganization in 

April—May 2005 as the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades, respectively. When the 

ASTs began to conduct their link-ups in November and December 2004, 

most of the division was at Al Kasik. The 4th Brigade had completed its 

basic training in October, and was ready to begin operations. The 8th 

Brigade was still in basic training and would finish in mid-January. The 

last brigade, the 5th, did not exist except for the cadre, which was located 

at Fort Tall Afar.113

The senior advisor for the 3d Division was COL Sanford Holman, 

later the commander of the 80th Division’s 1st Brigade at Fort Meade, 

Maryland. Holman had just been reassigned from the 80th Division to the 

headquarters of the 98th Division as the G4 in the summer of 2004 and 

soon after accepted a position on the battle roster to serve as a division 

senior advisor for the deployment.

Holman’s deputy was LTC Shipman. Shipman was one of the advisors 

who kept the same assignment from the time his name was placed on the 

battle roster in June until he arrived at the 3d Division in November. That 

would change about April 2005 when he was promoted to colonel and 

reassigned as the senior advisor to the Iraqi 2d Division.114

The 3d Division’s ASTs were made up entirely of personnel who had 

deployed with the 98th Division, although a number were fillers from 

other USAR divisions. The teams were deployed from Taji to the AKMTB 

over several weeks due to the existing AST’s rotation dates and the various 

levels of training of each of the brigades. Thus, the ASTs for the division 

headquarters and the 4th Brigade were the first to travel to Al Kasik during 

the beginning of November. The majority of the advisors were flown into 

the AKMTB, but Shipman was placed in charge of the ground convoy to 

transport the teams’ brand new up-armored HMMWVs to the base.115

The convoy departed Taji about 7 November and took Highway 1 

north toward Turkey. Shipman guided his serial of vehicles to tag along 

with other convoys so that there was strength in numbers in the event of 

an attack. En route, the convoy stopped a number of times at FOBs to 

remain overnight, refuel, and link up with another convoy that happened 

to be going its way. What should have been a long 1-day trip, or perhaps a 
161

trip consisting of 2 short days, turned into a 5-day trip. “We didn’t really 

know where we were going and many of the units we were tagging along 

with were new to the theater too,” Shipman reflected. Luckily, the group 

latched on to a 25th Division Stryker company headed to Mosul. Shipman 

recalled that the unit, as new to Iraq as his own, “was outstanding. The 

company commander even had his people call ahead and make reservations for us at lodging so we could stay at the FOB in their area when we 

got there, because it was going to be about 2200 at night when we pulled 

in. They took great care of us.”116

On 9 December, Shipman’s cluster of vehicles, still guided by the 

Stryker unit, reached FOB Marez, just south of Mosul near the airport. 

Shipman and his convoy remained there for 2 days waiting on another 

convoy that was heading west to Al Kasik. It happened that a Stryker company was heading there on the morning of the 11th. 

Departing FOB Marez in the morning, the convoy reached city center about 0900. As they passed through the city Shipman recalled, “Our 

pucker factor was very high because we sensed something was wrong.”117

He further explained, “There were places where people were running 

away from the roads or moving away from us as we were coming through, 

but we didn’t have any enemy contact.” The convoy kept moving and 

turned left onto the road that would take it to Al Kasik, 30 miles to the 

west. Shipman’s detachment arrived at the AKMTB to find out from the 

evening’s television news that almost the entire 1,800-man Iraqi brigade 

stationed there and the city’s police had walked off the job. The city had 

been left to the insurgents before the convoy passed through.118

At the AKMTB Shipman learned the 3d Division was headquartered 

in a temporary location while the permanent headquarters building was 

being renovated. The renovation was necessary because that building and 

one of the mess halls on the base had been heavily damaged by truck 

bombs the previous August. “By the time we got there, they had really 

beefed up security and cracked down so things like that wouldn’t happen 

again,” he remembered.119 That may have been true at the AKMTB, but the 

3d Division ASTs would soon find out it was not true everywhere.

By the time Shipman had arrived with the HMMWVs, Holman’s division team had completed its RIPTOA with the previous AST. The outgoing advisors spent only 2 days with Holman and his people. Shipman 

recollected, “I don’t think our team really felt that the outgoing team had 

a lot to contribute.”120 The transition for the battalion and brigade teams 

apparently took a little longer and was at least more satisfying in terms of 

information the outgoing teams had to offer.
162

In the case of the 8th Brigade, its ASTs were particularly lucky as 

those battalions were still in basic training. Shipman recalled,

. . . our advisors overlapped with the Australian training 

unit that was there doing the training with them. That was 

a pretty successful handover. It took longer. The Aussies 

didn’t just dump it on our guys. They probably took 5 to 

7 days—and the Aussies were there for quite some time 

after that before they pulled out. They were there to assist 

as needed.121

For Tennyson, assigned to the 12th Battalion, 4th Brigade AST, the 

RIPTOA experience was enlightening, to say the least. He was finally about 

to find out what was in that black box he had been pondering over since his 

arrival at Camp Atterbury. The team that Tennyson’s AST was replacing 

consisted of only four individuals—a major, a captain, and two sergeants. 

These soldiers had been part of another AST, but had been pulled away to 

take the 12th Battalion through its basic training. As the battle handover 

proceeded, Tennyson discovered the black box held something different 

than he had imagined. “The whole time leading up to us getting [to the 

AKMTB], we had been thinking we were going to be doing some training with these guys,” Tennyson explained. “Instead, [we learned the 12th 

Battalion was] the only operational Iraqi battalion in Al Kasik—in that 

whole northern territory.”122

This state of affairs caused Tennyson concern. First, his assessment 

was that the battalion was not really trained and, therefore, not ready for 

active operations. “They only knew the basics,” he explained. His second 

concern was the battalion’s leaders. He remembered that some were 

“total slugs. We . . . had other officers who were pretty lazy and not well 

respected. They didn’t treat their soldiers well.” On the other hand, there 

were also those who were good leaders and some with combat experience. 

Tennyson described one particularly good officer: “We had one company 

commander who was former Peshmerga and a very strong leader. The 

soldiers respected him and he really cared about his soldiers. They would 

follow him anywhere. He was always in the lead.”123

Another division-wide problem was desertion. When the ASTs began 

to arrive at Al Kasik, many of the division’s soldiers were at home for the 

Ramadan holiday. As with the 5th Division, the soldiers were being targeted by the insurgents as they were going home and when they returned 

from leave. Shipman recalled:

Some were beheaded and their bodies were strewn along 

the roads in Mosul and west toward Al Kasik. It was a very 
163

difficult time for the division. . . . The Kurdish soldiers had 

an easier time coming back because we were way up north 

and it was a shorter distance they had to travel. The soldiers 

from the south, though, really had trouble coming back 

because of the distance and the insurgent threat. There was 

a certain amount of attrition. It’s hard for me to put a percentage on it but it could go as high as 40 to 50 percent.124

Another source of attrition was payday. Tennyson explained that the 

battalion “would get new soldiers in, they’d get a paycheck, go on leave, 

and then they would not come back. Every month there were new soldiers 

or else the soldiers we had just trained weren’t there anymore.”125

After the transition of authority with the outgoing teams, the incoming ASTs settled in to begin work with their units. Shipman described his 

AST’s relations and its work with the 3d Division leadership and staff:

General Khursheed was always very receptive. He was 

extremely cordial and his staff was cordial and appreciative 

in the normal style. There was all the usual drinking of chai 

(tea). We met with him every day for 1 to 2 hours in the 

morning and the rest of the day we didn’t interfere with his 

internal operations. We did the same with the staff. Because 

of our senior advisors’ approach to how we would do this, 

we did not colocate with them in their building or living 

quarters. We had a Coalition block over on one side of the 

base, and a mile and a half away was the Iraqi compound 

where their division headquarters was. We’d go over, work 

with them, and then go back to our side of the base.126

For Tennyson, the process of settling in was a little more exciting than 

for those advisors at the division headquarters. His team was immediately 

going into active operations with the 12th Battalion. The first mission was 

a relatively simple one and it took place only 2 days after Tennyson’s team 

took over.

Like the rest of the 4th Brigade, the vast majority of the soldiers of 

the 12th Battalion were on leave for the Ramadan holiday when the team 

arrived. Many of the soldiers were Kurdish and so were not very far from 

home. The routine for the 3d Division was to drive its Kurdish soldiers to a 

secure drop off point in Kurdistan about 45 minutes north of Al Kasik and 

let them off there to start their leave. At the appointed time about a week 

later, trucks would return to that point and pick up the soldiers to bring 

them back to base. The AST’s first mission was to escort the convoy up 

to Kurdistan and return. At this point, however, Shipman had not arrived 
164

with the teams’ HMMWVs, so the advisors rode in the civilian vehicles 

the previous team had been using.

Just north of Al Kasik, the convoy was hit by IEDs. Tennyson described 

the incident:

We were going through a narrow area through some 

mountains and there was a daisy-chain of five mortar rounds. 

They were pretty small, though, and nobody was seriously 

injured. The fins on them were 6 inches. They were 120s, I 

guess. Luckily they were right on the edge of the road and 

our guys were driving in the center of the road. The way 

they were emplaced, each of them made a crater that was 

about 3 feet in diameter and a couple feet deep.

Fortunately, because of the amateurish emplacement of the mortar rounds, 

the blast effect went straight up instead of into the vehicles. Tennyson continued: “They just didn’t have them directed correctly. We had one soldier 

who received some shrapnel in his head but it was nothing serious. The van 

he was in was fine. . . . When this happened, we were rolling out in our team 

Yaz Jeeps and the outgoing AST team brought their Durango out afterwards. It all happened about 10 minutes outside of Al Kasik.”127 In short, it 

was another startling introduction to the realities of advising in Iraq.

The hazards of serving in Iraq were driven home more deeply the 

following month. In late November, the first operational brigade in the 

division, the 4th Brigade, received the mission to send two battalions to 

begin expanding the cleared areas around Al Kasik. The 10th Battalion 

was sent to Tall Afar to begin operations there, and the 11th Battalion was 

sent to FOB Marez in Mosul to operate in that locality.

In Mosul, the 11th Battalion was responsible for manning an outpost across the city from the main FOB. Each company spent about a 

week at a time there manning the post and conducting visibility patrols 

in that part of the city. SFC Paul D. Karpowich, a drill sergeant in the 1st 

Battalion, 417th Regiment at Pennsauken, New Jersey, and now on the 

AST for the 11th Battalion, was at the outpost from about the 7th through 

the 21st of December. Previously a paratrooper with the 82d Airborne 

Division, Karpowich had left the Regular Army but remained in the Army 

Reserve.

On 21 December, Karpowich’s unit returned to FOB Marez in Mosul, 

and he was looking forward to his first prepared meal in 2 weeks. He and 

the team medic, Petty Officer Second Class Isidoro Dacquel, went over to 

the mess hall and enjoyed a hot dinner. Near the end of the meal, Dacquel 
165

told Karpowich to relax and he would go gather up the Iraqi soldiers as 

they came out to form up and return to their billets. Dacquel was outside 

and had just ordered one of the soldiers to put out a cigarette when an 

explosion ripped through the mess hall. As soon as the debris stopped falling, Dacquel charged back into the facility to begin treating the wounded, 

but it was too late for Karpowich. A suicide bomber, disguised as an Iraqi 

National Guardsman, had set off an explosive device that killed Karpowich 

and 22 other soldiers and wounded another 60. Karpowich, the 30-year old 

Freeland, Pennsylvania, native, was the first of five Iroquois Warriors to 

give their lives for their country during the deployment.128

Part of the purpose in deploying units to Mosul and Tall Afar was 

to prepare for the January elections. As in the 5th Division area, the 3d 

Division units were employed to increase security in various areas to facilitate the conduct of the elections. The 12th Battalion was sent to a small 

town of about 4,000 people north of Al Kasik. Tennyson recalled that the 

battalion set up a cordon around the town and sealed it off and then began 

gathering intelligence from the local populace: 

Figure 23. CSM Robert Riti, senior enlisted advisor to the 3d Iraqi Division, 

and his Iraqi counterpart inspect election banners and election equipment 

prior to distribution by Iraqi Army forces before the 30 January 2005 Iraqi 

National Elections.

COL Douglas Shipman
166

You would always have somebody come up to you and 

say something like, ‘Hey, that guy has weapons and he 

also has some pictures of Saddam. He’s talked about 

shooting helicopters.’ So they’d go in and maybe find one 

little picture of Saddam and an AK [-47]. Well, what are 

we supposed to do with him now? There wasn’t a whole 

lot there to arrest him on, but they would hold people like 

that and release them later on. We had a lot of that.129

Through the intelligence gathering effort, the battalion was able to 

round up about 30 suspects and, perhaps as a result, the elections went off 

without a hitch. After the elections, the Iraqi battalion commander decided 

to take the suspects back to Al Kasik for further questioning. “The . . . 

commander had reason to believe these guys knew things so he detained 

them for the weekend and wouldn’t accept any risk with the suspects. In 

the end, most of them were released, though.” It turned out the reason why 

so many were released, apparently, was that the informants and most of the 

arrested men were from families that were feuding with one another.130

Following the elections, the division went into a recruiting drive to 

replace the men who had deserted. The battalions were each down to about 

400 men and needed to be brought back up to something closer to full 

strength. The effort was apparently focused on prior service soldiers who 

could be directly recruited into battalions and trained there to shorten the 

lag time from enlistment to employment in actual operations. But there 

were problems with the process as Shipman explained:

We were allowed to do this direct recruit program. It was 

a bit complicated and I’m not sure we ever did it exactly 

right, but basically commanders could direct a recruit—

former military soldiers—into their unit and train them 

through a structured training program. What ended up 

happening was probably less structured than that. A lot 

of them came up from Numaniyah where they were inprocessed. Some of them got a little training down there 

but most got none. They were brought up on buses to Al 

Kasik over the next several months and then brought into 

our unit, integrated into the units. They were supposed to 

be kept separate in a training platoon/company/battalion 

to go through the basic training again, a refresher, and 

then put into the units. What actually happened, though, 

was that a lot of them got integrated right into the units 

because they were former soldiers. People just assumed 

they knew what they were doing.131
167

After the elections, the 12th Battalion began stepping up its operations 

in and around Al Kasik. It conducted raids, cordon and search missions, 

and “cordon and knock” missions, in addition to the routine security and 

TCP missions it was already performing. Tennyson recollected, “Those 

were the first real infantry type missions they were doing, other than just 

driving down the road and securing it so they could move back and forth 

to go on leave, or setting up a checkpoint. They started gaining proficiency 

in those kinds of skills.”132

But apparently each company was not improving at the same rate. The 

battalion commander kept using the company of the former Peshmerga 

commander to do the hard missions, and the captain would, in turn, rely 

on about 20 or so reliable soldiers who were themselves former Peshmerga 

fighters or members of his family. Tennyson explained, “We relied a lot 

on the Iraqi leadership to handpick their guys for the main efforts on missions, which had the effect of hiding the lack of training for the rest of the 

battalion.”133

Despite the disparity in unit selection for missions, the 12th Battalion 

ASTs, by now redesignated as MiTTs, attempted to equally train and 

advise every unit in the battalion. The advisors helped the companies put 

Figure 24. Advisors and soldiers of the 3d Iraqi Division detain suspected 

insurgents following roadside ambush near Rabiah in January 2005.

COL Douglas Shipman
168

together “shoot houses” for training on entering and securing buildings. 

They assisted the battalion staff with convoy training and other operations. The advisors tried to explain the correct methods and techniques 

for conducting a wide range of collective tasks, but the efforts did not 

always bear fruit. “It was always frustrating because I’d sit down with the 

Iraqi S3 and go through some planning factors on a battalion movement 

and it seemed like he got it,” Tennyson remembered. “When they went to 

execute, though, if I wasn’t right there he would just go back to the old 

way of doing things.”134

In April the 12th Battalion was transferred to Tall Afar to replace the 

10th Battalion. Tall Afar is located about 30 miles west of Mosul. Pre-war, 

the city boasted a population of about 250,000 people, mainly of Turkish 

descent. However, because of the insurgency the population may have 

been as low as 150,000 by the time the 12th Battalion arrived.

In the center of the city on a slight rise sat an old Ottoman-era fortress 

or castle that had been used by the British during their stay in the area 

after World War I. Both the ING and the local government, including the 

police headquarters, were using it when the 12th Battalion arrived in April 

to garrison the position. The battalion also manned another combat outpost 

large enough to accommodate one company at a location on the northeast 

outskirts of the city.

The local US unit, the 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry, was part of the 

Stryker brigade from the 25th Infantry Division. The 12th Battalion began 

conducting operations with that unit soon after its arrival. “We were actually working closely with one of the infantry companies, going on missions and doing cordon and searches and raids,” Tennyson recalled. The 

missions were sent out from the two outposts into various areas of the city. 

Tennyson described the procedure:

From there [the outposts], we were doing presence patrols 

out into the neighborhoods, just short ones where we’d 

go out for 45 minutes or an hour and then come back in. 

They were doing pretty good. We would take them into 

the friendly areas just for practice. On a few occasions, 

they ended up in firefights. They were still making mistakes but it didn’t cost them any lives on those operations. 

They were still having problems maintaining accountability of their people while on foot patrol. The company 

commander would get up front and he’d just go, while 

our [MiTT] would be splayed out throughout the battalion 

trying to keep track of everything.135
169

Though the patrols eventually began going into worse areas of the city, 

the battalion suffered few casualties from these forays. Most deaths and 

injuries came from IEDs. Another source of casualties came from what 

might be described as sightseeing from the fortress walls. “. . . you could 

see the whole city from this thing,” Tennyson remembered. “It had the old 

parapets with the arrow slits and everything. There was lots of cover. Guys 

would stand up on the wall and look out, and we had a few guys get shot 

doing that.”136

Around April and May 2005, the 3d Division began to experience a 

number of changes that affected how it and its subordinate units operated. 

The most important of these was the command changeover from CMATT 

to the IAG. Another was the arrival of the 3d ACR commanded by COL 

H.R. McMaster. The assumption of responsibility for the Mosul—Al 

Kasik—Tall Afar AOR by the 3d ACR instantly changed how the 3d 

Division operated. McMaster dictated everything that was going to happen with the Iraqi units in his AOR. He went so far as to coordinate SF 

ODAs to work with the Iraqi units on operations rather than their own 

MiTTs. “The challenge became that, just when the 3d Division felt like 

they were beginning to gain some autonomy, in came the 3d ACR and the 

ODA teams,” Shipman explained. He further described the shift:

The ODAs took over a lot of the tactical operations [with 

the Iraqi units] and 3d ACR took over the battlespace management and major combat operations, including clearing 

out Tall Afar of insurgents. The MiTTs thus took a secondary role and [they were] largely [relegated to] working 

with the battalion, brigade, and division staffs and doing 

mostly logistics and personnel advising, not the operational advising—which was being done by the ODAs.137

Under the 3d ACR’s management, MiTTs became extraneous because 

between the ODAs and the cavalry regiment’s advisors, the actual MiTTs 

were considered strap hangers on actual missions. “The ODAs or the 3d 

ACR advisors would tell the unit MiTTs ‘we got it’ and tell them to stay 

back on the post during the missions,” Shipman recalled. “The MiTTs 

were not welcome to go along.”138

The 3d Division also began to deploy more units farther out and away 

from Al Kasik in June, mostly near the Syrian border to help interdict 

illegal border crossings along that line. The 8th Brigade sent one of its battalions to Rabiah, another to Sinjar, and a third to Al Biaj, to support the 

border security effort. However, as these battalions deployed, the division 

lost control over them. Shipman explained:
170

So [these battalions] were being pushed out and asked 

to be more operational, but they were also losing their 

autonomy because they were getting way more oversight 

from the 3d ACR and others than they had been getting 

before. From supporting a counterinsurgency operation 

and working with a national army [standpoint], it was 

a difficult situation. The Iraqi division commander was 

really no longer the division commander. He was now 

taking very direct orders from an Army colonel in the 

American Army.139

Soon after the 3d ACR settled in to Al Kasik, the 3d Division MiTT 

was trying to hurry the process of getting Major General Khursheed and 

his staff to move into the newly renovated headquarters. There were a 

number of reasons why Shipman (the acting senior advisor since Holman 

had returned to the United States on mid-tour leave) was pushing for the 

move. First, the division MiTT was working out of offices on the US side 

of the base. Shipman knew that to have the best impact on the division 

staff, he and the MiTT needed to be working in the same building on a 

daily basis. Second, he had plans to set up a model TOC in a room he had 

picked out for the Iraqi staff to see and use so they could learn how to operate a tactical headquarters. Third, Shipman had picked out a room in the 

headquarters that was considered secure enough for setting up a SIPRNET 

site so the team could operate its terminal and do routine business there 

rather than at its old offices on the US side. Most of these plans went to 

naught however, because the 3d ACR had demanded space in the headquarters so it could maintain a presence there for liaison and coordination 

purposes. The regiment took over the SIPRNET room leaving only the 

model TOC room for the MiTT. No wonder Shipman later described the 

relationship between the 3d ACR and the MiTTs as “tense.”140

The impact of the 3d ACR’s mode of operations was clearly felt at the 

battalion level as well. Tennyson described his impressions:

. . . it was like the reigns got pulled way back and the 

Iraqis were told to stay in the outpost. I think they [the 

3d ACR] were afraid of a bloodbath, but I don’t really 

know. I never had an opportunity to talk to the squadron commander. When they came in, they wanted to try 

the diplomatic route again so all the operations that were 

ongoing—the cordon and searches, the presence patrols, 

the occasional firefight—that all stopped. The 3d ACR 

wanted to meet with the mayor and the police chief. There 

were a whole lot of meetings with the elders and such.141
171

There was another downside to these changes from the advisor point 

of view: “I think the Iraqis lost some proficiency, though. They had just 

started to get decent with the presence patrols on a small level,” Tennyson 

recalled.142 The implication was that the longer the Iraqi troops remained 

in garrison, the more their operational skills eroded.

Though the initial methods of operation by McMaster and the 3d ACR 

seemed a little heavy-handed (at least toward the MiTTs and their Iraqi 

units), the relationships did improve with time. The longer the commanders of the ACR worked with the MiTTs of the 3d Division, the more they 

came to rely on them. Tennyson explained, “I think once they realized 

what kind of asset we were, any time they wanted to get Iraqi soldiers they 

knew they just had to call us.”143

In May 2005, as part of the major Iraqi Army reorganization, the 

MOD decided to transfer the 11th Battalion at FOB Marez to the new 2d 

Division, because the battalion had been there so long and was in that division’s AO. To replace the 11th Battalion, the 109th ING Battalion, located 

in Tall Afar, was assigned to the 3d Division. The 109th was assigned 

to the 4th Brigade and soon after was redesignated as the 2d Battalion, 

1st Brigade, 3d Division (the old 4th Brigade was redesignated as the 3d 

Division’s 1st Brigade). 

Since it had been an ING unit, the 2d Battalion had never had an 

AST or MiTT. At the time of the transfer, Holman was still on leave so 

Shipman, as the acting senior advisor, approached LTC Joel Armstrong, 

XO for the 3d ACR, and requested the ACR provide a MiTT for the battalion. Armstrong agreed the regiment should provide the team, but the 

personnel for it never materialized. In May, Shipman decided to create a 

MiTT out of hide and selected newly promoted LTC Terrence K. Crowe, 

formerly of the old 21st Battalion in the 8th Brigade, to head the new team. 

Because the team was ad hoc, Shipman could only provide an additional 

captain and three NCOs to help man it.144

While serving in his former battalion, Crowe had gained a reputation 

for leading from the front. MAJ Michael T. Ansay, a MiTT OIC from a 

sister battalion, said:

LTC Crowe is largely responsible for the success that our 

brigade had in the north of Iraq. LTC Crowe’s team led 

the way with captured insurgents, recovered weapons and 

explosives, and the collection of intelligence information. In fact, my team and my Iraqi battalion are heading 

into an area where LTC Crowe previously worked. I was 

amazed at all the intelligence his team handed off to me 
172

and all the great work they completed there. I have been 

blessed to move into an area that LTC Crowe has largely 

cleaned out.145

In early June, Crowe’s battalion received a routine mission to conduct patrols in and around Tall Afar. The battalion had been performing 

these operations for some time, but had only recently been operating with 

units of the 3d ACR. The mission was to sweep part of the city in coordination with the tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV) from the 

regiment. On 7 June, parts of the 2d Battalion, with Crowe and his team 

going along, moved into the city on trucks, escorted by the 3d ACR. At 

the designated point, the Iraqi soldiers jumped off their trucks and began 

dismounted patrols in the targeted area. Ansay described Crowe’s actions 

on such missions:

Foot patrols inside the cities are by far the most dangerous missions. Your only level of protection is your body 

armor. Not surprisingly, soldiers are very reluctant to lead 

Figure 25. LTC Terrence Crowe.

Encounter with History
173

off on such patrols. Being the great leader he was, LTC 

Crowe would not ask his Iraqis or his team members to do 

anything he would not do himself. Therefore, he repeatedly led off on such patrols. He would continue to do so 

until the Iraqis and his team members gained their own 

confidence.146

Leading his battalion through the dangerous, dirty streets of Tall Afar, 

Crowe skillfully advised the commander on maneuvering his units to 

maintain the advantage over any insurgents that might decide to oppose the 

movement. In fact, the enemy had decided to do just that. The 2d Battalion 

soon ran into a pocket of enemy fighters who opened fire with automatic 

weapons and rocket propelled grenades. From the top of a two-story building, an insurgent found Crowe in his sights and pulled the trigger. Within 

a second or two, Crowe was hit twice—once in the leg and once in the 

groin. Though wounded, Crowe was able to crawl to cover. Part of the 

2d Battalion was now pinned down and the call went out to bring up the 

vehicles of the 3d ACR. The intent was to secure the area and get Crowe 

out as quickly as possible for medical treatment.

While they waited for the cavalry to come to the rescue, the men 

of the 2d Battalion hunkered down and fought back. Amazingly, Crowe 

continued to fire, but he was seriously wounded. Hit in the femoral artery, 

he was quickly bleeding to death. In fact, before the mounted element 

arrived, Crowe had died.147

Soon after this incident, Shipman was reassigned from the 3d Division 

to be the senior advisor to an Iraqi division that was formerly an ING unit. 

Unlike the units of the 1st, 3d, and 5th Divisions, the battalions of the 

ING had been stood up by various Coalition units using men largely from 

a given tribe from a specific geographical area. Also unlike the original 

three Iraqi Army (IA) divisions, the ING units were not intended to be 

used outside their home area. The only advisors made available to these 

units initially were those soldiers that Coalition units could spare. Thus, 

in terms of useful training and advising by a professional team of soldiers, 

the coverage for ING units was very uneven and dependent on whether the 

commander of the counterpart Coalition unit saw the mission as important 

or useful. When the ING was integrated into the Iraqi Army in early 2005, 

MNC-I and MNSTC-I began to put greater emphasis on advising those 

organizations. That is, in part, how Shipman and Crowe ended up advising 

these former ING units.

Shipman, along with an ad hoc six-man MiTT, was reassigned as the 

senior advisor for the 2d Division which was headquartered at Al Kindi, a 
174

suburb of Mosul. The counterpart unit helping to advise and train the 2d 

Division was the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, a Stryker outfit. In 

contrast to the 3d ACR, Shipman recalled, “The Stryker Brigade treated 

us fabulously and gave us a great deal of support.”148 The units of the 2d 

Division had been doing actual missions almost from the day they were 

organized. They had not gone through any kind of basic training, but had 

learned their skills on the job. When Shipman and his MiTT arrived, the 

division had been pulled back into garrison and was starting the process 

of going through a more formal training program that would, in theory, 

bring its units up to the proficiency levels of the first three regular army 

divisions.

Shipman began working with the Stryker brigade to provide organized 

MiTTs to the division’s subordinate units. Despite the lack of an initial formal training program, and although there had been no MiTTs at brigade or 

battalion level to advise the units, Shipman explained that “the 2d Division 

was much more integrated with the 1/25 Stryker Brigade [than had been 

the case with the counterpart units with the 3d Division]. [The 2d Division 

was doing] operations jointly and had been since the fall. A lot of those 

battalions had already married up with companies and battalions from the 

Stryker Brigade and were doing operations.”149

Shipman’s time with the 2d Division was short-lived. In June 2005, 

a formal MiTT under COL Michael Cloy arrived in country to take over 

from Shipman’s team. Shipman was then reassigned to advise the Iraqi 

police chief for the Nineveh province, a job he held for the rest of his 

tour.150

Back in the 3d Division, Tennyson’s battalion was also in the process 

of trying to refit and retrain, but his team, and the ODA now assigned to 

help train the unit, was running into a familiar problem. The revised training plan was to run a schedule similar to that described by Mucciarone’s 

battalion in the 5th Division: two companies on missions in Tall Afar, one 

company in training, and one company on leave. The problem was that 

instead of the troops of the company on leave taking only 1 week, many 

soldiers would come back 5 or even 10 days late. As a result, the company 

designated to be in training rarely achieved any significant training results 

before it had to rotate into the actual mission cycle. Having a truly volunteer army clearly had its disadvantages, but there were also extenuating 

circumstances as Tennyson described:

It was bad. It doesn’t take 2 weeks to take your money 

home and hand it to mama. They wanted to go home and 

relax for a couple weeks. Granted, some of these guys had 
175

real problems at home. We often had guys come back who 

had lost two or three of their family members while they 

had been gone, because someone came and shot them. 

They had major issues at home and if I was in the same 

situation I don’t know if I’d stay with the army. I might be 

at home defending my house as well. 

As a caveat, Tennyson went on to say, “There were also guys, though, who 

took advantage of it and would take as much leave as you’d let them.”151

In August the 3d Division lost its third advisor. SFC Robert V. Derenda, 

a drill sergeant from Ledbetter, Kentucky, was assigned to the 3d Battalion, 

398th Regiment of the 100th Division. He was a filler, but in fact, he had 

formerly been a member of the 98th Division when he lived in New York. 

Assigned to a MiTT in the 8th Brigade, Derenda and SFC Brett E. Walden 

of the 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, were traveling together 

in a HMMWV escorting a convoy near Rabiah on 5 August. The Iraqi 

driver of a civilian fuel vehicle apparently lost control as he was passing 

the convoy. The truck swerved into the oncoming lane and into Derenda’s 

HMMWV. Both soldiers were killed in the accident.152

Within the next month, many of the 3d Division advisors were rotating 

home. In reflecting on their experiences, the Iroquois Warriors that served 

with the 3d Division provided a varied assessment of how well their mission was executed in Iraq. Shipman provided a rather balanced appraisal:

This was not a mission for which we were trained or are 

habitually established to do. We have great drill sergeants 

and great instructors whose jobs are to do individual training in an administrative classroom environment or in a 

very controlled basic training environment. Very few of 

them, though, had any tactical or operational experience 

going into this mission, so it was quite a steep learning 

curve. Many of us have come back and said, ‘We really 

learned a lot.’ We learned a lot working with tactical forces 

like the Stryker Brigade, 3d ACR and doing operations. 

Some of the things we learned, though, were by mistakes 

that we made. We weren’t necessarily the right unit for 

the job, but I think we acquitted ourselves as well as we 

could have.153

Tennyson was perhaps more pointed in his evaluation. “I think there 

was a lot of bad stuff and we were lucky things didn’t go a lot worse than 

they did for a lot of our teams,” he said. He then added, 
176

The 98th Division has a lot of capable leaders. If you 

give them a mission, they can train for it. But the black 

box mission we got—of just being told we were going to 

advise and support a foreign army—is not good enough. 

I think knowing exactly what we were going to do would 

have alleviated a lot of issues and given us a chance up 

front to correct a lot of things we had to struggle through 

once we were in country.154

The Iroquois Warrior advisors in the 3d Division were, perhaps, not 

as far along as those of the 5th Division in bringing their division and 

brigades to a level where those headquarters were capable of planning, 

conducting, and controlling tactical operations. Part of the reason is that, 

as a whole, the 3d Division was behind the 5th in terms of dates of organization, dates of basic training completion, and arguably, in the level of 

experience with actual combat operations. One wonders also about the 

impact of the 3d ACR’s efforts when it arrived in the area to sideline the 

MiTTs and assert direct control over the 3d Division units. Of course 

from the Iraqi perspective, one would have to ask that question of the unit 

leaders. At the very least, it must have been a bit confusing, and perhaps 

even alarming, for the Iraqis to have the teams with which they had been 

working on missions now be told by another American unit to stay away 

from operational missions. Still, all considered, it seems that the Iroquois 

Warrior advisors of the 3d Division also laid a good foundation for followon MiTTs to build on.

The Advisor Experience—The 1st Iraqi Division

The advisor experience for the Iroquois Warriors in the Iraqi 1st 

Division was largely different than that of the 3d and 5th Divisions. The 

differences were primarily centered on two things. First, the majority of 

the ASTs/MiTTs in the 1st Division were manned by Marines. The ASTs 

for the division headquarters, two brigade headquarters, and five of the 

nine battalions were exclusively Marines. The 98th Division provided 

only four battalion teams to the 1st Division and a few soldiers to the 1st 

Brigade AST.

The other difference was that by the time the 98th Division ASTs fell 

in on their respective battalions in November, those units had already 

been organized and in combat. Some battalions had already worked 

with several groups of advisors prior to the 98th Division’s arrival. The 

Iroquois Warriors coming into the 1st Division would find no green units 

to advise—they were already veterans.
177

The 1st Division had been organized in May 2004 at Taji from battalions and brigades that were formed as part of the IIF. The IIF was a 

division-size, elite force that was intended to be trained specifically in 

counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and employed wherever it was 

needed in Iraq. Once the decision was made later that year to train all Iraqi 

units in COIN, the unit’s distinction as the IIF was lost, but its pride in 

being designated as the 1st Division and in being the first division to be 

formed in the new Iraqi Army carried on. 

Initially composed of just two brigades, the 1st and 6th, the division 

received its third brigade about December 2004 when the 2d Brigade was 

reassigned from the 5th Division. It gained a fourth brigade in April 2004 

when the 7th Brigade was transferred in, again from the 5th Division. As 

part of its mission, the 1st Division was responsible for operations in Anbar 

province and thus became involved with Operation Al Fajr in Fallujah 

in November 2004 where five of its battalions were involved. 

Fallujah is where MAJ Swartwood’s battalion was located when a 

Marine officer showed up at the Green Hotel at Taji looking for him the 

day after Thanksgiving. The officer, Col. Ronald Baczkowski, was the 

senior advisor to the Iraqi 1st Division. Baczkowski told Swartwood that 

his AST would fly out of Taji that night to Fallujah where they would 

link up with their Iraqi unit, the 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade. Accordingly, 

Swartwood assembled his team, moved to the airfield, and flew out about 

2300. The choppers landed on the US side of Camp Fallujah in the wee 

hours of the next morning.

There, Swartwood and his men met LTC Marcus DeOliveira, the 

senior advisor for the 1st Brigade AST. DeOliveira recalled that the team 

landed at Camp Fallujah and, “. . . because their aircraft got there late, I 

did not have as much time as I wanted with them. I think I had a bit less 

than an hour and then they were passed off to the teams they would transition with to go into Fallujah to start the transition process. It was not the 

best case scenario—a relief in place in Fallujah while operations were 

on-going.”155

In the meeting, DeOliveira laid out his expectations of the team and 

just what it was they were going to be doing. DeOliveira remembered telling them “they had to execute operations alongside those they advised so 

as to . . . understand what the unit they advised was capable of doing.” He 

also stressed that “being an advisor was not about teaching but building 

relationships and trust. . . .”156 Swartwood later recalled that DeOliveira’s 

pitch was the first information on what exactly he was going to be doing as 

an advisor in Iraq, other than what he had gleaned from the Internet.157
178

For his part, DeOliveira was somewhat taken aback by some of the 

advisors he received on the three teams that came to his brigade. “I am not 

sure what they were told before they got to me or how much they heard 

what was told them,” he explained. “There was much talking about being 

told they were only going to be teachers and not have to go out. That was 

not my idea of being an advisor. I fully expected they go out and fight 

alongside their units.”158

The unrealistic impressions of the advisors’ mission, formed before 

mobilization and fostered through Camp Atterbury, Camp Virginia, and 

Taji, were now cleared away, and the stark reality of what their actual 

duties entailed was driven home. The expectations for advisors to participate in combat operations and live in the same Spartan conditions as their 

Iraqi counterparts immediately caused a few of them to balk and protest. 

“I was a bit disappointed with some complaining,” DeOliveira recalled. 

“This was the kind of complaining I would expect of much more junior 

personnel than those on the teams.” He was also concerned by the quality 

of some of the soldiers he was provided:

I think of the three teams that came to me (one brigade and 

two battalions) there were 28 or 29 individuals. Of these, 

one I sent away his first day in Fallujah. He was extremely 

overweight and not able to operate in a combat zone. Two 

officers were moved to better positions than initially suited 

them. One NCO deliberately shot himself. One NCO was 

caught trying to send a pistol back to the US. Two other 

NCOs were sent away for medical reasons.159

DeOliveira was also concerned about the soldiers’ level of ability given 

the previous combat experience of the battalions in his brigade. “I needed 

real infantrymen, artillerymen, and logisticians,” he said. “The skill sets I 

needed were not all there and I had to move some people around and have 

some do things other than originally intended in order to get at people’s 

strengths. Overall we got things done but there was more friction than 

needed.”160

After meeting with DeOliveira, Swartwood’s team next met with the 

outgoing AST. MAJ Hunter Floyd led the team. Floyd’s team was composed of reservists from the Fort Lewis brigade of the 91st TSD. They had 

all volunteered for the mission and had been there for about 6 months. 

Significantly, they were all O/Cs from the same lanes training battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington, and as such, had made a cohesive team. 

Though they may have been particularly suited for the mission, just like 
179

their CMTC counterparts, the Powder River boys were ready to go home. 

Swartwood described the transition:

MAJ Floyd did a pretty good job. He gave me a lot of 

information and my team said they received a lot of 

information from the people they replaced as well. The 

problem was that it was only 2 days and we could have 

gotten a lot more information if we had had more time. 

It would have been nice to have gotten more information 

from them. . . . They’d been there for six months and said, 

‘Six months is too long to be with these Iraqis. We want 

to leave.’ My team was pretty gung-ho and we could tell 

the other guys wanted to leave so we simply said, ‘We’re 

ready to take over.’161

In retrospect, of course, Swartwood realized that his team was not 

ready to take over and the combat veterans of the elite 1st Battalion knew 

an opportunity when they saw one. Swartwood’s men were the fourth 

ASTs to work with them and the Iraqis knew their new advisors were 

green. He explained,

. . . for a period of time, they took advantage of the fact 

that we were the new guys and did some stuff that circumvented the rules that were in place. For example, at 

that point we were working with the 1st Marine Division 

and they were giving us supplies. They would come out to 

the field once a week and give us supplies, in addition to 

stuff we’d get through the Iraqi chain. However, the Iraqi 

supply chain didn’t work very well so we would get most 

of our supplies from the 1st Marine Division. At first, my 

AST didn’t have a good grasp on that procedure so the 

Iraqis would take stuff that we were supposed to get.

Swartwood chalked that up to the short transition. He later allowed that 

Floyd “may have given me that information but I just may not have grasped 

it all in that short period of time.”162

The 1st Battalion was considered the best unit in the Iraqi Army. It was 

not only first in name, but also first in fact. The 1st Battalion was the original infantry battalion to be formed and was organized at Kirkuk in August 

2003. Relatively well trained, it was the only Iraqi unit to be given its own 

sector of operations during the battle of Fallujah in November 2004. When 

Swartwood’s AST arrived, the battalion was still securing that area of the 

city. “There was a lot of pride among the Iraqis at being the 1st Battalion, 
180

1st Brigade, 1st Division, as being the first unit stood up. They saw themselves (and other Iraqis saw them) as the Americanized Iraqi battalion,” 

Swartwood recalled.163

The lack of experience of their new advisors was also a concern in 

the initial integration. Swartwood stated, “They had been through combat 

already and we were coming out there as pretty green. None of my team 

had seen combat. As a result, we thought the Iraqi soldiers would initially 

look at us as being perhaps not quite worthy or at least not quite as good 

as the advisors we’d replaced.” Swartwood later determined that he should 

not have been concerned. “It ultimately didn’t end up that way because the 

Iraqis view the Americans as superior forces,” he said.164

Though the 1st Battalion possessed a lot of pride, it did not mean 

that everything was well within the unit as Swartwood soon discovered. 

One of the things that Floyd failed to mention was that the 1st Battalion 

Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Jabbar, had been accused of embezzling. Since there was no banking system to speak of in Iraq, there was 

no such thing as automatic deposits either. Each month, the Iraqi soldiers 

were paid in cash. Ali had received an entire month’s payroll while the battalion was in Fallujah and it soon disappeared. Ali then had the temerity to 

ask his soldiers to help him make it up by donating money left over from 

their previous payroll that they had not been able to take home because 

they had been in Fallujah for so long. Swartwood, now aware of the situation, understood from DeOliveira that Ali would be relieved before leaving Fallujah to return to its base at Rustamiyah.165

About 3 weeks after it arrived in Fallujah, the 1st Battalion was relieved 

of its mission by a battalion of the 8th Brigade. Swartwood’s AST accompanied the 1st Battalion back to Rustamiyah. The problem was that Ali had 

not been relieved. As a result, the battalion XO, the S3, and two company 

commanders left in disgust when they arrived at Rustamiyah. Swartwood 

explained, “They thought [Ali] was dishonest and not a good officer. They 

transferred out of 1st Battalion because they felt Colonel Ali should have 

been relieved and he wasn’t. They couldn’t work for him. They were very 

good officers too; it really was a shame.”166

The plan at Rustamiyah was for the battalion to go on about 2 weeks’ 

leave, and then begin a retraining cycle. When the troops returned, the battalion went to the ranges and the advisors took their units through various 

training exercises for the next month, then it deployed to Mosul to prepare 

for the elections.

At Mosul, the 1st Battalion entered the AO of the 1st Brigade, 25th 

Division. The battalion was given a sector covering the southeast portion 
181

of the city. There they set up in a number of abandoned buildings and 

began visibility patrols. As in most of the other areas where the Iraqi Army 

was on patrol during the elections, everything went relatively smoothly. 

The battalion returned to Rustamiyah and from there conducted operations 

with units of the 10th Mountain Division and the 3d Infantry Division in 

the spring. Later in the summer it deployed out to Ramadi and conducted 

missions there with the 2d Marine Division.167

At about the time the 1st Battalion was performing its missions with 

the 3d Infantry Division, the 7th Brigade was reassigned from the 5th 

Division and became the 4th Brigade of the 1st Division. Along with that 

brigade came Matt Jones and Brian Charnock. Both had been serving with 

their battalions in Fallujah until that time.

After the January elections, Jones recalled that Fallujah became 

relatively quiet. There was time for the advisors to work with their units 

on squad-level training and conducting presence patrols. Then in April, at 

about the same time the brigade was transferred to the 1st Division, the 

enemy began to stir once again. “We started to have more activity on the 

peninsula,” Jones explained. “Fallujah sits on the river and the peninsula 

region is in between Fallujah and Ramadi. . . . There was more activity out 

there and we lost a kid to an IED attack. From that point on, the city started 

Figure 26. A typical haul of ammunition confiscated during one of the Iroquois 

Warriors’ many search missions conducted in conjunction with their Iraqi 

Army units.

Encounter with History
182

to turn [ugly] and the IEDs in our area became rampant. There was one 

IED a day, and that was just in our battlespace.”168

Matt Jones’ battalion (officially redesignated as the 3d Battalion, 4th 

Brigade, but unofficially continued using the 18th Battalion designation) 

rapidly shifted focus from presence patrols to anti-IED operations. The task 

became almost impossible. Jones remembered, “we were very unsuccessful 

in keeping them out of the city. There were so many armaments lying 

around. You could dig in almost every yard and find buried 155-millimeter 

artillery shells. We found a cache with 220 120-millimeter rounds all 

buried in this guy’s yard. It took four trucks to haul them all away.”169

In April the 18th Battalion was also assigned a new counterpart unit, 

the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. Jones worked with that unit to integrate his 

Iraqi troops into the battalion’s operations. In doing so, he also wanted the 

Iraqi battalion to move to the next higher level of operations. He explained 

how he accomplished it:

 . . . we developed a plan with them [the 3d Battalion, 4th 

Marines] to do an operation every 10 days. It would be a 

company operation but we’d call it a battalion operation 

so the battalion staff could do the planning. That way, 

the Iraqi staff could do the planning and issue the order. 

The Marines did a great job of integrating the battalion 

and company staffs of the Iraqis into the planning and 

execution. The Iraqi battalion commander, the S3, the 

translator, and I would go to the Marine base and we’d sit 

through the op order brief. They’d always issue it verbally. 

We’d sit through the rock walk and any other briefs that 

needed to be done.170

Once through the information gathering with the Marines, the advisors 

guided the staff through the development of the operations order and 

then had them issue the order to the company or companies going on the 

mission. The company would then conduct the mission with the Marines.

By late spring, the units of the 18th Battalion were conducting some 

fairly sophisticated operations. Jones explained:

We started doing company operations where companies 

would have their own search lanes. They’d do a cordon 

and search with the Marines, doing joint operations. Then 

we developed battalion battle drills. We had a battalion 

IED battle drill and, within that, we had a MEDEVAC 

drill. We had one company who had a Republican Guard 
183

officer and he started doing his own activities. By May, 

they were doing about one joint patrol a day. If a company 

sent out three or four patrols, two of them might be with 

MiTTs and the other two were all Iraqis.171

Though his Iraqis were making progress, there were still problems. 

One of the issues concerned the conduct of the Quick Reaction Force 

(QRF) missions:

We had a lot of fights over the QRF. Every company was 

supposed to have a QRF, plus they were supposed to have 

a standing battalion QRF—and that QRF went out two or 

three times a day. They were lackadaisical on it and one 

time we really lost it. We were very upset because they 

weren’t using it properly. They were endangering lives 

because they weren’t doing what they were supposed to 

and weren’t moving like they were supposed to move.172

By late summer, the 18th Battalion was conducting true battalionlevel operations. Jones recalled that it conducted at least two battalion 

cordon and search missions before his MiTT left Iraq. For one mission, 

the 3/4th Marines even attached an engineer squad and a psychological 

operations team to the battalion. The willingness of the commander of the 

3d Battalion, 4th Marines to work with and respect the 18th Battalion is 

much of the reason why the Iraqi battalion advanced so far while he was 

there. According to Jones:

I give the Marines a lot of credit because they treated the 

Iraqi battalion commander like a battalion commander. 

The biggest problem we had over there was the attitude 

of, ‘Oh, it’s only a f------ Iraqi.’ Well, if that Iraqi is a battalion or brigade commander and you want him to operate at a certain level, you have to treat him at that level. 

If you’re going to treat him like a private, he’s going to 

act like a private. If you treat him like a battalion commander and his battalion fails to follow through on a 

mission, you need to call him on the carpet and ask him, 

‘Battalion commander, where were your soldiers?’ Then 

he’ll answer to you. But if you just go grab his soldiers, he 

won’t answer to you.173

Though it was in the same brigade as the 18th Battalion, Charnock’s 

16th Battalion did not seem to have progressed as far, but it too continued 

to make progress after being reassigned to the 1st Division in April. At 
184

that time the battalion was still in Fallujah, but soon after was moved to Al 

Kharma, a town about 7 miles away. 

At Al Kharma, the Marines had set up four platoon-size observation 

posts (OP) from which to watch the city and conduct presence patrols. 

Intelligence indicated some of the insurgents that had escaped Fallujah 

had gone there. The commander of the 16th Battalion’s Marine counterpart unit felt the Iraqi unit was trained well enough to take over the positions in Al Kharma and clear the town. In turn, that would release a Marine 

company for operations elsewhere. Charnock described the operation:

[The 16th Battalion] took over the city and did a whole 

clearing of the city when they first got there. It was an 

Iraqi-led mission. We were just there for support. . . . They 

did that and then set up at the OPs the Marines had. The 

Marines cut their men in half and kept about a squad or 

two at each OP. We put one member from the AST at each 

OP as well. We were responsible for patrols for so many 

hours during the day and were to respond to anything. 

Once the city was cleared, the 16th Battalion settled in to routine patrolling. “We were mostly a reactive force at that point,” Charnock recalled.174

After securing Al Kharma, the 16th Battalion continued minor operations 

until it moved to Taji later that summer. There it would conduct its RIPTOA 

with the incoming 80th Division MiTT in September.

On balance, the Iroquois Warrior advisors and their Iraqi brigades and 

battalions assigned to the 1st Division seem to have benefited from their 

association with their counterpart Marine units. It appears that Marine 

commanders were somewhat more positively disposed to both their Iraqi 

units and the advisors that were assigned to them. They were more willing to integrate the Iraqis into combat operations and support them with 

resources, both logistical and operational, when they needed it. 

The fact that the 1st Division units were already combat veterans did 

not seem to have a long-term impact on their relationship with the 98th 

Division’s “green” advisors. From the evidence, it seems the MiTTs, along 

with help from both Army and Marine counterpart units were able to significantly increase the operational capabilities of the Iraqi units to which 

they were assigned.

Of course, as in the case of the teams with other divisions, the overall 

progress was good in some areas, minimal in some areas, and at best, flat 

in others. Success was not achieved in all areas with all units. Some of the 

failure to progress can be laid at the feet of the Iraqi leaders and soldiers 
185

and some of it can be attributed to the advisors. For example, Charnock 

initially developed a slightly negative perspective toward the Iraqi soldiers 

and their leaders based on his own military experience: “When we got 

them I was skeptical of what they could and couldn’t do. . . . These guys 

[didn’t] have a lot of upper leadership. Their NCOs were pretty much just 

their best privates.” Matt Jones reinforced this view by stating, “The Iraqis 

will never operate at the level the Americans operate at. We’re head and 

shoulders above them.”175

On the other hand, the advisors, or at least the process used to select 

them, were not entirely blameless. Jones made the argument:

An advisor in combat is not someone who sits back with 

a clipboard and goes through the Army Training and 

Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and says, ‘Yes, you did this 

right. Yes, you did that right.’ Instead, you are actively 

engaged in combat operations. You’re side-by-side with 

your Iraqi counterpart. There are times when you’re more 

directive than other times and times when you, as the advisor, have to tell them exactly what to do because of the 

urgency of the situation. There are other times, though, 

when you’re going to be accepting a greater amount of 

risk than with regular Coalition forces because you need 

to sit back and let them learn. You need to go into the mission with an open mind and with a good understanding of 

how to operate in a combat zone. The problem we had was 

that we had way too many officers and NCOs who went 

over there who had never been operational in their life 

and didn’t have a clue how a battalion operates in combat. 

If you don’t know how a battalion operates in combat, 

you certainly can’t know how a brigade is supposed to 

operate in combat—not at Combined Arms and Services 

Staff School (CAS3), not on a staff somewhere, not teaching a class, but how a battalion really operates.

176

Obviously, many of the personnel from the 98th Division selected to 

be advisors did not have the skills and experiences, at least initially, that 

Jones describes. Many of them did learn the skills on the job and, if they 

were one of those who were positively disposed toward the mission and 

their Iraqi soldiers, were likely to be very effective in helping to bring their 

assigned unit to a higher level of capability. 

If the advisory efforts in the 1st Division were not entirely successful, it seems many advisors who served with the division feel they were, 
186

at least, largely successful. Though skeptical initially, Charnock proudly 

related that the 16th Battalion made good progress:

These guys came a long way. By the end, we would send 

them out on patrols by themselves. They would go out 

and they would be responsible for patrols all on their own. 

They would find stuff and bring people back, get intel. 

They did a lot of things. Of course, they still made a lot 

of mistakes and we had to help them, but I would expect 

that from an American unit as well. . . . I definitely trusted 

them a lot more toward the end and I didn’t have any 

trouble going out with them by myself if need be. Many 

times, it would be me and maybe one other American. 

We’d go out into the city, do a patrol, and I felt almost as 

safe as I would with an American force.177

Matt Jones believed the 18th Battalion was likewise a better unit, with 

some caveats, than the one that existed before his team arrived:

By the end, they were doing some battalion operations 

within their lanes and they were getting fairly successful 

with some counterinsurgency missions. They were very 

good at raids and at exploiting intel that they gathered 

through their own sources. They were somewhat 

constrained in the detention process, though, which was 

kind of crappy. The system for detention wasn’t working 

very well. They have a different view of the Constitution 

than we do and they operate in their own ways certain 

times, but they were very successful at exploiting human 

intelligence. For example, say we grab the triggerman of 

an IED. That same night, we’d probably hit two or three 

houses.178

In short, many of the Iroquois Warriors who served on the ASTs/MiTTs 

would concur with the way Swartwood summed up the advisor experience: “I’m very proud of what I did and what my team accomplished over 

there.” DeOliveira would also agree. Despite, the rough start with a few 

of his Iroquois Warrior advisors, he later commented, “Overall I am very 

proud of every one of them for putting their lives on the line and working 

at improving the units they advised.”179

The Iraqi Advisor Group and the Phoenix Academy

It is important to note two additional significant aspects of the advisory effort in Iraq developed by soldiers of the 98th Division—the Iraq 
187

Advisor Group (IAG) and the Phoenix Academy. Though the academy 

would eventually become part of the IAG, the two had distinctly different 

geneses.

In December 2004, General George W. Casey, CG of the MNF-I, 

decided he wanted to formalize the AST concept for all Iraqi Army divisions, including those of the ING (soon be integrated into the Iraqi Army). 

Up to that point, the advisor effort for ING units had been left up to the discretion of the Coalition counterpart unit commander. Some units provided 

their ING battalion with a lot of advisor support, and others provided nothing. Casey directed that beginning in January the Coalition counterpart 

units would provide enough personnel and equipment for a standard MiTT 

for ING battalions, brigades, and divisions, and for some of the new Iraqi 

Army units that were scheduled to be organized.180

As various changes to the advisory effort began in January 2005 (ASTs 

changed to MiTT, ING integration into the IA, designation of Coalition 

counterpart units to work with the units of the regular IA, etc.), the MNC-I 

staff realized a need for a headquarters between MNC-I and the MiTTs 

to supervise those teams and ensure some level of standardization of the 

counterpart-provided MiTTs. Petraeus had two brigadier generals assigned 

to the CMATT headquarters where only one was needed (a situation which 

apparently possessed all the friction one might expect). The MNSTC-I CG 

thus volunteered Sherlock to MNC-I to start up and command the IAG. 

The offer was accepted and Sherlock began the effort to establish the IAG 

in January 2005, largely with personnel from the 98th Division.181

The charter of the IAG was not to command the MiTTs. Effective 

about 1 April, the MiTTs were to become answerable to the MNC-I Major 

Subordinate Commands to which they were attached for tactical control 

(TACON). Sherlock and his new headquarters were to be responsible for 

receiving and compiling the reports of the MiTTs, ensuring their administrative and logistical support (which was to be provided predominantly 

by the counterpart unit), ensuring standardization of MiTT organization 

and functions across all the teams, and developing a standardized training 

program for incoming advisors. The IAG was additionally responsible for 

the RSOI of new advisors coming into country that were generated as a 

result of RFFs for MiTTs to be assigned to the new IA divisions (the 7th 

through 10th Divisions) being organized that year.

On 1 April 2005, the IAG officially took over responsibility for 

operational MiTTs (those of the 1st through 6th Divisions). Newly 

arrived MiTTs remained under CMATT control until such time that their 

IA unit was declared operational and assigned a counterpart unit. At that 
188

point, the MiTT was transferred to the TACON of its counterpart unit 

and the administrative control of the IAG. Eventually, the IAG would be 

responsible for about 80 MiTTs based throughout Iraq.182

The genesis of the Phoenix Academy was the idea of BG Schwitters 

and COL Kienle, the CMATT Chief of Staff. Schwitters later described the 

rationale for the school:

We recognized around the November/December 2004 

timeframe that the training of the [advisors] coming in—

regardless of what service or unit they were from—needed 

to be finished off, and it could only be done by guys who 

had been doing the advisory support mission and doing it 

successfully. So we made that part of the force flow. The 

idea was to continue to use the training at Camp Atterbury 

as the initial platform, and then they would come into 

Kuwait and get collective training in the environment. . . . 

From an operational and mission perspective, we needed 

to finish that training off in the [actual] environment, led 

by successful AST leaders as well as cultural experts, and 

also give them the opportunity to go out and do [representative missions] in the local area. We wanted them to go 

out and actually be able to train on entry control points 

and take some low-risk convoys out. We wanted them to 

have a chance to go out and do these things before they 

were out on their own and training the Iraqis to do them. 

That was the reason for Phoenix Academy.183

As part of his responsibilities as the CG, IAG, Sherlock was directed 

to develop a comprehensive training program for MiTTs that began with 

the training at Camp Atterbury. The IAG developed a three-tiered effort 

(Atterbury, Kuwait, and Taji) based on an improved version of what the 

98th Division experienced for its deployment. The third tier evolved from 

the 2 days of Iraqi history and culture classes into a 10-day program that 

became the curriculum of the Phoenix Academy.

The ideas for what was needed for this curriculum came from an advisor conference held by Schwitters at Taji in January. At the conference, the 

advisors were canvassed for what they thought was needed by incoming 

advisors to adequately prepare them for the MiTT mission. The information gathered from this conference was provided to Sherlock who then 

turned to the 98th Division C2 Cell to function as a curriculum development team. LTC Robert Lawless (who became the cell OIC when Cipolla 

left), Joe Friedman, and five others sat down in March to develop the 
189

schedule and write the lesson plans. Friedman recalled that the team tried 

to put realism into the training:

Some classes were an hour; some were half a day. Most of 

it was classroom but there were a few hands-on practical 

exercise types of blocks [such as] ‘How do you work with 

Iraqis through an interpreter?’ So the [class object] was to 

set up a traffic point. We had the new ASTs in country get 

with interpreters and some MPs (who were Iraqi soldiers 

already stationed there). They would instruct the MPs on 

how to set up a traffic point through the interpreter. That 

was a block called ‘Working with Interpreters.’184

The planning team’s concept also brought in serving advisors to function as instructors and to talk to the students about the realities of advising 

in Iraq. Additionally, the team wanted to bring in Iraqi soldiers and leaders 

to talk to the students and answer questions about serving with Iraqi units, 

Iraqi culture, customs of specific locations, etc. The planning effort was a 

lot of work, but it eventually paid off and was conducted more or less as 

planned. “I was personally very proud of what we did there because, in 6 

weeks, this went from concept to having the first large group of students 

walk in the door,” Friedman remembered.185

The first class of advisors to attend the Phoenix Academy was actually 

advisors for SPTTs, which included some Polish and El Salvadoran advisors. By the time the C2 Cell turned permanent ownership of the academy 

over to the IAG in June, 700 students had completed the course.186

The IAG and the Phoenix Academy were successful 98th Division 

projects that brought greater capabilities, order, and professionalism to the 

advisory effort in Iraq and helped MNSTC-I get beyond the ad hoc operations it inherited in June 2004. Both the IAG and the Phoenix Academy 

were just beyond their formative stages when they were handed over to the 

80th Division, which began arriving in country in June 2005.

Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority with the 80th Division

The RIPTOA with 80th Division elements that were deploying to 

replace the 98th Division began in July 2005, starting with the handoff of 

the IAG between Sherlock and Brigadier General John P. McLaren, Jr., 

the ADC of the 80th Division (Institutional Training). To prevent what 

had happened to their soldiers when they arrived, Sherlock and the IAG 

developed a formal, in-depth, 2-week RIPTOA process that was conducted 

between the MiTTs of the 98th Division and those of the 80th Division. 

The intent was for the 98th Division MiTTs to take their replacements 
190

through a specific series of events (such as an introduction meeting with 

their interpreters and the Iraqi unit, a guided tour of the base, inventory of 

team equipment, instruction on operations peculiar to the AO, introductions to the Coalition counterpart unit, etc.). The handoff also consisted of 

a more formalized “left-seat, right-seat ride.” The concept of this process 

was that for the first week or so, the outgoing team would be in charge 

of advisor operations on missions. The outgoing team would drive the 

vehicles, operate the radios, and provide actual advice to the Iraqi units. 

The incoming team members would simply observe and ask questions. 

For the second week, the roles would be reversed and the outgoing team 

would provide a critique. Once the RIPTOA was complete, the new team 

was in charge and the outgoing team would travel to the Green Hotel at 

Taji to await transportation to Kuwait.

The quality of the battle-handoff between the 98th and 80th Division 

advisor teams perhaps lay in the eyes of the beholder. McLaren felt that the 

98th Division teams were not always committed to the plan:

There was a specific checklist that was developed to 

make sure you covered all these topics and there was a 

reporting requirement that came back as to what had to be 

done to have an effective turnover or transition between 

the teams. It was very dependent upon the personality of 

the actors involved. We tried to make the most efficient 

transition happen possible but, again, when you have that 

diverse of an area, I would say some went well and some 

didn’t. Some of the problems were guys who just wanted 

to get out of Dodge as fast as they could. It was specifically me and Brigadier General Richard Sherlock calling 

folks and saying, ‘If you’re not happy with the transition, 

the guy doesn’t leave.’ We took that attitude with every 

single team. If the arriving team was not satisfied that 

everything had been covered sufficiently for them to feel 

like they could take over, then we weren’t going to let the 

other team go.187

On the other hand, the 98th Division advisors were not always 

impressed with their replacements either, as Charnock related in his 

experience:

The 80th Division guys came in to replace us with a 10-

man team. They weren’t happy. I think they believed the 

same things we did initially about simply being trainers 

when they got there. We had to tell them that the Iraqis 
191

didn’t need any more training; they were doing the real 

stuff every day. I think they were told that they weren’t 

going to be leaving the wire too much. Then they found 

out where they were going to be living, there was no wire. 

They pretty much lived in a house in the city with neighbors who were Iraqis. They didn’t really want to go out on 

many missions. We had some trouble right in the beginning where Marine generals had to step in and tell them 

to do things because they were saying they wouldn’t do 

certain things. The handoff didn’t go well. They didn’t 

like us because we were telling them they had to do these 

things, like going on missions with the Iraqis. They kept 

saying no, that that’s not what they were told they were 

going to be doing. They had a bad taste in their mouths 

for us.188

Tennyson’s team had some trouble with its replacements as well, but 

some things turn out for the best:

We did spend a lot of time with them, though, a lot of 

time with our Iraqis, and we tried to build up the relationship between them and the 80th guys. Before we left, they 

were on one of their first missions with the Iraqis, into Tall 

Afar, and they got hit with an IED. Nobody got hurt, but it 

was a good wake up call for them because we were having some trouble conveying to them certain details about 

things. We were getting down to the nitty-gritty details 

about where they should put each Humvee. I think that 

incident got their attention. When they got back in, they 

wanted to know everything. It was the one good IED.189

In the case of the 5th Division team, Parsons and McConnell may have 

gone too far, but as they had learned, better too much than too little:

They showed up in the middle of the night on these 

Chinooks. We piled them into trucks and bed them down 

for the night. The next day, we had a big welcome for 

them. The Iraqi Army, Colonel Ahmad and his whole 

staff, put on a big meal to welcome them in. They got 

indoctrinated to Iraqi food and culture. We did a couple 

briefings with them. From then on, it was just a daily 

update brief with a deliberate list of tasks that had to be 

completed. We had a huge binder with a wealth of information concerning the whole story, from when we first 
192

picked the unit up to pictures of things that were done in 

Samarra, Kirkush, and Numaniyah. We gave them CDs, 

binders, operations orders, and schools plans. I think we 

overwhelmed them, having them drink from the fire hose, 

but I honestly believe that when we left they had a good 

handle on where they needed to go next, what to do and 

how to do it.190

While it is likely that not every 98th team did their handoff as well as 

they might have, the Iroquois Warriors that were replaced by LTC Paul 

Ciesinski’s 80th Division MiTT certainly did, as Ciesinski himself attests 

to both their transition efforts and the job they did with their Iraqi unit:

That was . . . LTC [Stephen T.] Udovich’s team. It took 

about 10 to 14 days and they took it seriously. They 

were well under TOE strength; they were about 60 to 

70 percent strength. . . . They took us all throughout 

the area of operations (AO) and they did their honest 

best to get us to learn our AO and the challenges we 

would face . . . the 3d Brigade was becoming more 

and more confident due to Udovich’s team, to the 3d 

ACR working with them, and due to an SF officer who 

was working with them. . . . When [Udovich] took 

over, they couldn’t even get out the gate in a convoy. 

They couldn’t feed themselves. They couldn’t fuel. 

They couldn’t arm. They couldn’t pay their soldiers, 

and that was having major repercussions on retention. 

But, Udovich’s team and 3d ACR worked hard on these 

things while the ODA worked strong on squad and platoon level combat skills: raids, cordon and searches, 

and those types of things.191

One thing seems to be evident about the 98th Division’s RIPTOA 

efforts with the 80th Division—the transition experience for the 80th 

Division personnel coming into Iraq was clearly more organized and 

thorough than that received by the Iroquois Warriors. It is possible that 

some of the 80th Division’s advisors possessed the same “we know it all” 

attitude that plagued the MiTT that Tennyson’s team had to deal with, 

and therefore, missed some of the details their outgoing teams were 

attempting to convey. As Swartwood admitted, there may have also been 

details that were passed on to them that they did not absorb due to a short 

transition as in Swartwood’s case in the transition with MAJ Floyd. The 

detailed checklist and reporting procedures dictated by the 98th Division’s 
193

RIPTOA process, if followed correctly, should have given the incoming 

teams ample opportunity to listen, observe, and learn before the Iroquois 

Warriors departed. By all reckoning, after their transition the 80th Division 

MiTTs should have been the beneficiaries of a solid foundation of advisory 

experience and of Iraqi units that were ready to proceed to the next level.

Although it is arguable whether the advisor mission was more important to the overall MNSTC-I operation than the other tasks performed by 

the Iroquois Warriors, it was clearly the mission that garnered the most controversy concerning the decision to employ a DIVIT to meet MNSTC-I’s 

needs. The question of whether or not these institutional training soldiers 

had the skill sets to do the mission was answered. Moreover, the answer 

was, predictably, yes and no, which would have been true of almost any 

group of soldiers that could have been sent over. The Iroquois Warriors did 

possess the basic training and small unit collective training skills needed 

for most battalions of the 1st, 3d, and 5th Divisions. With the exception 

of two battalions of the 1st Division, the other battalions that the 98th 

Division advisors worked with were just out of or still in basic training 

and others were still not yet formed. The tactical and technical skills that 

these DIVIT soldiers brought to the mix were probably about right. The 

purely advisory skills they needed were, just like those soldiers before 

them, learned on the job, and for the most part they learned them well. 

As the various ASTs completed their left-seat, right-seat rides with 

their 80th Division counterparts, and as those Iroquois Warriors on the 

staffs and training teams transitioned with their replacements, they all prepared to move to Taji for outprocessing and the trip home. Compared to 

their movement to the theater and their subsequent experiences in Iraq, the 

movements to Taji and Kuwait were anticlimactic. It was difficult at times 

to get the soldiers back to Taji due to transportation problems, but all 98th 

Division soldiers got back to the Green Hotel in time to catch their flights 

to Kuwait. At that point, to most Iroquois Warriors the delays and holdovers they would experience did not matter. They were going home.
194

Notes

1. Headquarters, Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team, PowerPoint 

Brief, “Coalition Military Training Assistance Team Command and Control (C2) 

Cell, Headquarters CMATT, undated, passim.

2. LTC Joseph Friedman, interview by author, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 November 2006, 5.

3. Ibid., 4.

4. Headquarters, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

Support Unit, “Requirements Assessment,” Enclosure 4, “Army Support to 

MNSTC-I Requirement,” 3 August 2004, 7–8.

5. Headquarters, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

Support Unit, PowerPoint Brief, “Assessment,” 3 August 2004, 2.

6. LTC James DiRisio, e-mail to author, Subject: Number of ASTs, 1 

February 2007. 

7. Both BG Schwitters and LTC DiRisio commented on the excellent 

performance of these soldiers.

8. COL Sean Ryan, interview by author, Joint Center for International 

Security Force Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 December 2006, 4.

9. Friedman interview, 5 November 2006, 5.

10. BG Frank Cipolla, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 November 2006, 3.

11. BG Richard Sherlock, interview by author, Office, Chief of the Army 

Reserve, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 16 November 2006, 11.

12. COL Douglas Shipman, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 5.

13. MAJ Scott McConnell, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 December 2006, 7.

14. MAJ Matthew Jones, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 7.

15. SSG Brian D. Charnock, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th 

Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 3–4.

16. LTC Daniel Christian, interview by author, 98th Division Headquarters, 

Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 4.

17. BG James Schwitters, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 December 2006, 4.

18. COL Bradford Parsons, telephone interview by author, Headquarters, 

98th Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 7.

19. Charnock interview, 4 November 2006, 9.

20. Christian interview, 3 November 2006, 11.

21. MAJ Jeffrey E. Tennyson, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th 

Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 10.

22. Charnock interview, 4 November 2006, 8.

23. Ibid.

24. Christian interview, 3 November 2006, 11.
195

25. LTC James DiRisio, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 7.

26. Schwitters telephone interview, 13 December 2006, 4.

27. Ibid.

28. McConnell telephone interview, 12 December 2006, 7.

29. Headquarters, Coalition Military Transition Team, PowerPoint Brief, 

“10 Division Proposed MOD Forces Organization Chart, Version 3,” 8 March 

2005.

30. Parsons telephone interview, 3 November 2006, 4.

31. Ibid.

32. McConnell telephone interview, 12 December 2006, 6.

33. Parsons telephone interview, 3 November 2006, 5.

34. McConnell telephone interview, 12 December 2006, 7.

35. Ibid., 6.

36. Parsons telephone interview, 3 November 2006, 4–5.

37. Ibid., 5.

38. McConnell telephone interview, 12 December 2006, 7.

39. Ibid., 8.

40. Ibid., 9.

41. Ibid.

42. LTC John C. Curwen, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 8 February 2007, 2–3.

43. Ibid., 4–5.

44. Ibid., 3–4.

45. Ibid., 6.

46. Ibid., 7.

47. Ibid., 9–10.

48. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 6–7.

49. The Middle Ground web log, available at http://themiddleground.

blogspot.com/2004/10/patriots-and-soldiers-iraq-fallen-49.html, accessed 3 

November 2006; Edward Wong, “Ambush Kills 50 Iraq Soldiers Execution 

Style,” The New York Times, 25 October 2004.

50. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 7.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., 7–8.

54. SFC Dennis Ewing, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 3.

55. Ibid., 4.

56. Christian interview, 3 November 2006, 4–5.

57. Ibid., 5.

58. Ibid.

59. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 8.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.
196

62. Ibid., 9.

63. Ibid., 10.

64. Ibid.

65. Parsons telephone interview, 3 November 2006, 5.

66. McConnell telephone interview, 12 December 2006, 10.

67. Ibid., 11.

68. MAJ Lawrence Bradley, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 2007.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Parsons telephone interview, 3 November 2006, 6.

76. Ibid. 

77. McConnell telephone interview, 12 December 2006, 9.

78. Christian interview, 3 November 2006, 6.

79. Ewing interview, 4 November 2006, 4.

80. 3d Brigade, 5th Division, “Significant Events Log, 1 Dec 04–25 Aug 

05.”

81. CPT Paul Molineaux, Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq, “Iraqi Soldiers Wrap Up ‘Operation COBWEB,’” The Advisor, 14 May 

2005, 7.

82. Ibid.

83. “Significant Events Log”; Christian interview, 3 November 2006, 7.

84. Christian interview, 3 November 2006, 7.

85. MAJ Michael L. Eller, “Consolidated Report: IED Ambush Attack of 3d 

Brigade, 5th Division (Iraqi Army),” 8 July 2005.

86. Curwen interview, 8 February 2007, 10.

87. Ibid., 11.

88. Ibid.

89. Sherlock functioned as the deputy CG of CMATT until he took over as 

the CG of the IAG.

90. Parsons telephone interview, 3 November 2006, 6.

91. McConnell telephone interview, 12 December 2006, 11.

92. Ibid., 12.

93. Parsons telephone interview, 3 November 2006, 6.

94. Ibid., 8.

95. Curwen interview, 8 February 2007, 11–12.

96. Timothy J. Hansen and Jocene D. Preston, ed. An Encounter with History:

The 98th Division and the Global War on Terrorism: 2001–2005 (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 258–59.

97. Curwen interview, 8 February 2007, 12.

98. Ibid., 14.
197

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., 15

101. Ibid., 15–16.

102. Ibid., 16.

103. Ibid., 17.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., 17–18.

106. Ibid., 18.

107. Parsons telephone interview, 3 November 2006; McConnell telephone 

interview, 12 December 2006, 9.

108. Parsons telephone interview, 3 November 2006, 5.

109. McConnell telephone interview, 12 December 2006, 9.

110. Christian interview, 3 November 2006, 7. 

111. Ewing interview, 4 November 2006, 6.

112. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 6.

113. Ibid., 6.

114. Ibid., 1–2.

115. Ibid., 4.

116. Ibid.

117. COL Douglas Shipman, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 February 2007.

118. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 5.

119. Ibid., 2.

120. Ibid., 5.

121. Ibid., 6.

122. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 4.

123. Ibid., 6.

124. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 6. 

125. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 6.

126. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 7.

127. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 5.

128. Stars and Stripes, “Coming to Grips with a Close Call at Mosul,” 

available at http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=33002&ar

chive=true, accessed 11 October 2006; Fallen Heroes Memorial, “Fallen Heroes 

of Operation Iraqi Freedom: Lt. Col. Terrence K. Crowe,” available at http://

www.fallenheroesmemorial.com/oif/profiles/croweterrencek.html, accessed 3 

November 2006.

129. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 7.

130. Ibid, 7.

131. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 6.

132. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 7.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.
198

137. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 8.

138. Shipman, telephone interview, 14 February 2007.

139. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 8.

140. Ibid., 7–8; Shipman, telephone interview, 14 February 2007.

141. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 8.

142. Ibid., 8.

143. Ibid., 11.

144. Shipman, telephone interview, 14 February 2007.

145. “Fallen Heroes of Operation Iraqi Freedom: Lt. Col. Terrence K. 

Crowe.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid.

148. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 10.

149. Ibid., 9.

150. Ibid., 9; COL Douglas Shipman, e-mail to author, Subject: RE: Your 

Interview Transcript, 24 January 2007.

151. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 8.

152. Hansen and Preston, Encounter with History, 262–63.

153. Shipman interview, 3 November 2006, 10. 

154. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 11.

155. COL Marcus DeOliveira, e-mail to author, Subject: Iraqi 1st Brigade, 4 

March 2007.

156. Ibid.

157. MAJ Roger Swartwood, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th 

Division (IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 7.

158. DeOliveira e-mail, 4 March 2007.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.

161. Swartwood interview, 3 November 2006, 7–8.

162. Ibid., 8.

163. Ibid., 9.

164. Ibid., 8.

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid., 9.

167. Ibid.

168. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 11.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid., 11–12.

172. Ibid., 11.

173. Ibid., 12.

174. Charnock interview, 4 November 2006, 5.

175. Ibid., 6; Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 13.

176. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 12–13.

177. Charnock interview, 4 November 2006, 6.
199

178. Jones interview, 4 November 2006, 12.

179. Swartwood interview, 3 November 2006, 10; DeOliveira e-mail, 4 

March 2007. 

180. Sherlock interview, 16 November 2006, 8. The ING was established 

3 September 2003 as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). The ICDC was 

designed to be raised and advised by Coalition units and used to complement 

Coalition operations. It was redesignated as the ING in July 2004 and integrated 

in the Iraqi Army about April 2005.

181. LTG David H. Petraeus, interview by author, Headquarters, Combined 

Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 December 2006, 8.

182. MG John P. McLaren, Jr., telephone interview by author, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 November 2006, 3. Actual control of 

some MiTTs was delayed by as much as 2 weeks due to operational activities.

183. Schwitters telephone interview, 13 December 2006, 6–7.

184. Friedman interview, 5 November 2005, 8.

185. Ibid.; The C2 Cell was integrated fully into the IAG in May 2005, but 

continued to perform the RSOI function for incoming MiTTs until its RIPTOA 

with the 80th Division.

186. Sherlock interview, 16 November 2006, 11; Friedman interview, 5 

November 2006, 12.

187. McLaren interview, 14 November 2006, 5.

188. Charnock interview, 4 November 2006, 6.

189. Tennyson interview, 3 November 2006, 9.

190. McConnell telephone interview, 12 December 2006, 12.

191. LTC Paul Ciesinski, interview by Dr. Christopher Ives, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 October 2006, 9–10.

201

Chapter 7

Redeployment and Summary

If they are to succeed, they must do so on their own.

SGT With

As the RIPTOA process between the 98th and 80th Divisions progressed through the summer and fall, Lawless, in charge of what had 

become the IAG C2 Cell, managed the movement of staff personnel at 

MNSTC-I, CMATT, CPATT, the advisors teams, and other Iroquois 

Warrior individuals and elements from their respective duty stations back 

to the Green Hotel at Taji. From there, the cell would arrange for transportation to the BIAP and for space on flights to Kuwait.

The procedure seemed simple, but as with many military operations, 

there were variables that could not be controlled. The biggest problem was 

the date and time for departure flights from the BIAP to Kuwait were not 

known until at best 48 hours beforehand, and to ensure a given mobilization group was boarded on its assigned flight was a zero-defects operation. 

All levels applied pressure to ensure nobody missed their scheduled flight. 

If a MiTT was at Tall Afar, it had to complete its RIPTOA before it could 

go to Taji for outprocessing. If the incoming team was late, that immediately posed a problem. Once the handoff was complete, transportation had 

to be arranged to get the team to Taji and choppers were not always available. Once at Taji, the outprocessing checklist had to be completed, which 

included all officer efficiency reports, noncommissioned officer efficiency 

reports, and awards.1

Friedman explained that to ensure people did not miss their flights, 

Lawless would “move these ASTs to Taji and they’d be there for a couple 

days, not knowing when they were going to leave because we didn’t know 

when the flights were. We didn’t want to send them anywhere because 

we might not get them to all the steps in time. Colonel Lawless had to 

‘swag’ in getting people to Taji, and sometimes they sat for a while. Some 

people understood and some didn’t.”2 Once at Taji, however, everything 

else seemed to go relatively smoothly for the remainder of the journey 

home, at least in terms of transportation arrangements. Additionally, the 

C2 Cell at Taji was in frequent contact with the rear CP at Rochester letting Rick Monczynski and the rear CP know when personnel were flown 

out to Kuwait.

After Friedman’s stint as a curriculum developer with the Phoenix 

Academy, Lawless sent him to Camp Arifjan in Kuwait to manage the 
202

C2 Cell’s efforts to receive Iroquois Warriors coming in from the BIAP, 

organize them into their original mobilization groups, and coordinate 

their movement from Kuwait to their CONUS mobilization training post. 

Friedman also let Monczynski know when flights left Kuwait.3

Back in the states, the rear CP was able to track each group of soldiers 

as to their arrival dates and times at Indianapolis and El Paso. MG 

Robinson had directed a colonel or above from the division be on hand to 

welcome each flight home, and he personally attended a number of these 

arrivals (as well as the “Welcome Home Warrior Citizen” ceremonies 

conducted at various home station locations after demobilization). Once 

the mobilization groups went through the process of turning in weapons 

Figure 27. Just prior to his departure from Iraq, MAJ 

John Bovina receives the Iraqi General Service Medal 

from Brigadier General Abdullah for his services as an 

advisor to the Iraqi 4th Division.

The Advisor
203

and equipment, filling out appropriate demobilization paperwork, and 

going through a medical exam (all of which took several days), the troops 

were flown home to start a well-deserved 30-day demobilization leave. By 

December, almost all of the division’s soldiers were home.

Though the 98th Division did not deploy as a division to Iraq, the 

deployment, mission, and redeployment was clearly a division effort. 

Although approximately 600 soldiers from the 98th deployed overseas, 

the remainder of the Iroquois Warriors still had to perform all the basic 

training, MOS, OES, and NCOES missions the division had been assigned 

for FY 2005, just as MG Wilson had directed. The division successfully 

accomplished those missions and still supported the MNSTC-I mission.

As far as the Army was concerned, when the 98th’s soldiers went to 

Iraq they went as individual fillers. As such, their parent unit could have 

washed their hands of them; however, Robinson established the rear CP 

cell for the duration of the mission. The rear CP kept track of what was 

going on with his soldiers in Iraq, provided those soldiers with what support he could from this side of the Atlantic, and tried to anticipate the 

return of those troops who came back early (some wounded or worse) so 

their families could be notified. He also insisted on leadership presence on 

the troops’ return and sent administrative teams to Fort Bliss and Camp 

Atterbury to help those installations put the Iroquois Warriors through the 

demobilization process quickly and efficiently.

In Iraq, there was no division headquarters yet the C2 Cell, and officers such as Jody Daniels and Ann Pellien, expended a great deal of effort 

to track where the division’s soldiers were, what they were doing, and 

what their status was, particularly those wounded. Their efforts were not 

always successful, but logically, there need not have been any effort at 

all other than that provided by MNSTC-I—that is unless there was some 

sense of unity, an esprit, which existed to bring these individuals together 

as a team before the deployment. And indeed there was.

Although the Iroquois Warriors went to Iraq as individuals, they 

maintained their unit identity, if only psychologically, and often called 

on each other in ways that other members of the MNSTC-I would not. 

When Sherlock needed to organize the IAG, for example, he turned to 

the division C2 Cell to help form the new command. When he needed the 

Phoenix Academy created, he turned to the same group. When Shipman 

needed to create the MiTT that the 3d ACR failed to provide, he turned to 

other Iroquois Warriors to meet the need. When Parsons needed someone 

to help train the 5th Division staff on various staff skills, he turned to a 

98th Division MTT. There was clearly a unit spirit maintained among the 
204

Iroquois Warriors in Iraq that transcended the patch they wore on their left 

sleeve.

The part of the division that went to Iraq performed a wide array of 

missions for MNSTC-I and performed them, by all accounts, successfully. 

Almost overnight, the division was able to rapidly increase the staff 

capabilities of the MNSTC-I, CMATT, and CPATT. What was originally 

billed as a training mission, morphed into an advisory mission by the time 

the survey team developed its requirements assessment for LTG Petraeus. 

By March 2005, the division was manning over 30 MiTTs and had 

personnel serving on a number of others. In various other assignments, 

the 98th Division had soldiers serving in every province of Iraq, Kuwait, 

and Jordan.

Most Iroquois Warriors who served in Iraq agreed they were glad 

to get home, but also, they were proud of what they, and the “division,” 

accomplished. Most also agreed the mission was a worthwhile experience. 

Many said they would be willing to do it again. They also believed what 

they accomplished contributed to the long-term success of a long-suffering 

country. Perhaps SGT Julian With from Schenectady, New York, packing 

to leave to go home in July 2005, said it best:

This place is a learning experience to say the least. I have 

made several new friends and I have changed my opinion 

of the Iraqi culture. The people I have worked with have 

told me that because of me and the other Americans they 

come in contact with on a daily basis, that they have seen 

a different side to the Americans than what Saddam had 

taught them. They have been there to see us laugh and to 

see us cry when we lost some dear friends. It is weird—I 

can’t wait to get home but at the same time I feel bad 

for leaving because I have made some very good Iraqi 

friends, but I understand that if they are to succeed they 

must do so on their own. It is kind of like raising a child 

and watching them take their first steps and hoping they 

don’t fall flat on their face.4

In June 2006, the mission of training advisors for the Iraqi Army was 

transferred to the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas. 

At about the same time, the 108th Division (IT) began taking over the 

MNSTC-I mission from the 80th Division. By 2007, a fourth USAR training division was identified to assume the mission that summer. From June 

2004 on, the MNSTC-I evolved from an ad hoc group of individuals to 

an efficient command capable of training, advising, and supporting the 
205

Iraqi Army. The advisory effort also evolved from a collection of soldiers 

who learned their new duties on the job to trained advisor teams with 

an understanding of their mission and who possessed effective advising 

methodologies.

The trends have been in the right direction, but the future still holds 

the answer to whether the Iroquois Warriors, along with the string of other 

Army Reservists who followed them, fully succeeded in helping MNSTC-I 

and the Iraqi Army keep from falling on their face. The answer will be 

revealed when, and if, the Iraqi Army finally assumes the lead in active 

combat operations in their own country and consistently wins.
206

Notes

1. LTC Joseph Friedman, interview by author, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 November 2006, 10. By several accounts from 98th 

Division personnel, the administrative procedures to outprocess the division’s 

soldiers at Taji were broken. At the time of this writing, several officers and NCOs 

have not received their efficiency reports or end-of-tour awards.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 11.

4. SGT Julian With, Times Union Blog, “Returning Home, 25 July 2005, 

available at http://blogs.timesunion.com/wartime/?p=42, accessed November 

2006.
207

Chapter 8

Analysis and Conclusions

They should be justly proud of what they did.

LTG Petraeus

The activities of RC units in recent years have provided numerous 

revelations about the state of the Regular Army and the Reserves in the 

early 21st century. Most revelations, it is safe to say, have been in the 

positive column of the ledger. For the first time since the Korean War, 

the Army conducted a large-scale activation and deployment of RC units 

into war zones and did so in a relatively quick, smooth, and efficient manner. Moreover, the Army Reserve and National Guard units sent to Iraq 

and Afghanistan have been given meaningful and challenging missions 

that have enabled them to positively contribute to the war effort. This is 

especially true for the National Guard combat arms brigades sent to those 

theaters.

Unlike World Wars I and II, there has been no wholesale relief of 

RC general officers from their commands (and subsequent replacement by 

Regular Army officers) before their units deployed. Every RC command 

has deployed into theater under its assigned general officer commander, 

and the vast majority have remained in those commands throughout their 

combat tours. This is both a testament to the increase in executive ability 

and professionalism of the RC general officer ranks and to the trust and 

confidence placed in those abilities by the Regular Army.

Additionally, the US Army has seen an ever-increasing willingness 

to deploy National Guard division headquarters to places like Bosnia and 

Kosovo, as well as to Iraq, to command both active and RC brigades and 

battalions to conduct myriad and complex missions.

However, on the “improve” side of the ledger there are a few issues 

concerning the employment of RC units that this monograph has attempted 

to illustrate and that bear further analysis. Some of those are the use of 

Reserve units to perform non-METL missions, the use of Reserve units 

to provide individual fillers versus unit solutions to mission requirements, 

and the complications of AC/RC integration under the historical biases 

held by members of both components. There are also issues of a more 

general nature that are worth reviewing. These include the selection, training, and support of advisors and the issues associated with establishing 

ad hoc organizations. A further discussion of these issues is provided 
208

to educate Army leaders from all components, and all levels, for future 

consideration.

General Issues

Ad Hoc Organizations

MNSTC-I, an ad hoc organization, was assigned a crucial mission that 

needed to be performed even as it was being created. To be efficient and 

effective, it had to transition beyond ad hoc methods and procedures. To 

succeed, it had to function like a permanent organization with standardized routines and methods of operations. That capability, in large part, is 

what the 98th Division was able to contribute to the success of MNSTC-I’s 

early efforts.

British military historian Sir Michael Howard once remarked, “I am 

tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the armed 

forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted 

to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does 

matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.”1

His quote is, at least, partially applicable for the US Army’s situation 

immediately following the end of major combat operations in Iraq in 2003. 

The US Armed Forces were not prepared to rebuild the Iraqi Security 

Forces after the collapse of the Saddam regime. The US Army did not 

even have doctrine regarding rebuilding the armed forces of a defeated 

nation to get wrong.

What is applicable is that once the deed was done, the United States 

needed to begin rebuilding Iraqi military forces quickly and get it right. 

Whether it was done quickly is not within the purview of this work as the 

mission is still ongoing as this is written. More relevant is the question 

of whether we got it right. The definitive answer to that question will 

have to wait for history to unfold, but perhaps a preliminary attempt is 

appropriate.

MG Eaton received his mission to build three new Iraqi divisions in 

June 2003. Typically, SF units would be brought in to perform such a mission and some were; however, SF units, including the two National Guard 

groups, were already stretched thin with other missions in the GWOT. 

Thus, Eaton had to build an ad hoc training and advisory organization 

from the ground up. He did so by submitting various RFFs to fill the 330 

plus trainer/advisor positions envisioned to support the initial three divisions. The personnel to fill these positions were acquired through the process of having Human Resources Command assign the requirements to 
209

commands throughout the Army. What Eaton ended up with was an array 

of soldiers who ran the gamut from Regular Army combat arms O/C teams 

from the Combat Training Centers and Marines (many of whom possessed 

actual combat experience) to noncombat arms soldiers from the RC and 

a sprinkling of Navy corpsmen. All were on orders for varying lengths of 

time, which caused a replacement nightmare.

The quality of advisor personnel that CMATT was receiving from its 

beginning in 2003 to September 2004 appears to have been as varied as 

their sources. Of course, quality is a relative term. Doubtless, nearly all 

were good soldiers, but some were not suited to the role of being a unit 

advisor by temperament and training. Most of the ASTs were collections 

of individuals who did not jell into functional teams until sometime into 

their deployment, if ever. As related earlier, BG Schwitters estimated that 

only about a third of those teams were effective in performing their duties 

with their Iraqi units.

When the 98th Division mobilization groups arrived in Iraq, what the 

CMATT received with the new ASTs was not far removed in terms of 

quality from the original teams. While none of the 98th teams were made 

up entirely of O/Cs or combat veterans, most (though not all) had been 

working together for at least 2 months and many of the individuals were 

familiar with each other because they often came from the same hometown units. Some were temperamentally suited to be advisors; some were 

not. The major difference was that the package CMATT received from the 

98th at least possessed a uniform standard of training and all were in Iraq 

for a minimum of 9 to 10 months. The same was true for the personnel 

going to work on the various staffs and base support operations within 

MNSTC-I. What the 98th provided MNSTC-I, in addition to the work its 

soldiers performed, was some breathing space for transitioning from what 

was clearly an ad hoc seat-of-the-pants effort by CMATT under the CPA 

to what became a relatively well-structured organization (MNSTC-I) that 

had established an orderly process for integrating and rotating the followon units (i.e., the 80th and 108th Divisions). While the whole operation 

was not perfect, by the time the Iroquois Warriors left the record shows 

that at the very least they helped MNSTC-I to be well on its way to getting 

it right.

Adoption of LTG Helmly’s concept for a permanent FA-TRAC would 

preclude many of the problems faced by Eaton and Petraeus when standing 

up an ad hoc effort like MNSTC-I. The command could focus on preparing for this mission during peacetime. When the next conflict materializes where rebuilding or retraining a foreign army becomes necessary, the 
210

FA-TRAC could be reinforced with the needed parts of a training division 

and deployed to perform the mission for which they had been trained.

The FA-TRAC concept may require training divisions to assume 

another mission—that of advising foreign army units in addition to training an army. This, of course, would complement the mission provided by 

SF units, but would also require coordination with that community. The 

addition of that mission, in turn, requires the Army to create a doctrine for 

advising foreign forces so training divisions can develop viable and standardized training programs to meet requirements of an advisor mission.

Militating against such a plan is that in a period of limited budgets will 

the Army see value in maintaining such a specialized organization in the 

force structure? One senses that the answer, for now, might be yes given 

our experience in Iraq.

Non-METL Missions

Much of the argument over the decision to send a DIVIT to reinforce 

MNSTC-I centered on the skill sets needed for advisor duties versus the 

skill sets of the 98th Division soldiers. This facet of the debate is largely 

moot. The reality was that outside the Special Operations community, few, 

if any, soldiers or Marines are trained or educated in the skill sets peculiar 

to an advisor. As mentioned, SF soldiers were in high demand for other 

duties and thus not available. Logically, the next best-qualified soldiers 

to perform this job were probably O/Cs from the Army’s various Combat 

Training Centers (CTCs), but they too were needed at their places of duty 

to support the war effort. Even so, some were sent over to be advisors 

under Eaton.

Some people have suggested there may have been better options than 

DIVITs. DiRisio thought so. “I think a training support division, which runs 

lanes training, would have been a much better fit. . . .” Those soldiers are, 

in essence, O/Cs. They help train and evaluate units on collective training 

tasks and therefore might have made better advisors than DIVIT soldiers. 

The argument against TSDs is that the large majority of their battalions 

perform their missions with combat support and combat service support 

units. There are some TSD training battalions that work with National 

Guard Combat Arms units and those might have been the next best option 

after the CTC O/Cs. However, just like COL Stafford’s 3d Brigade at Camp 

Atterbury, many of those units were already engaged in training National 

Guard units for duty in Iraq or Afghanistan. Their availability was limited 

as well. As DiRisio added after his comment above, “. . . it’s not always 

about fit. Sometimes it’s about availability and we were available.”2
211

Even though advising a foreign army was not in a DIVIT’s METL, 

the Iroquois Warriors certainly possessed some of the skills needed for the 

advisor duties to which they were assigned. Several IA units actually went 

through basic training with their 98th Division advisors. Many others had 

just completed basic training and were still in the crawl mode when their 

advisors arrived. Very few IA battalions had actually experienced combat before their new advisors showed up. As MAJ Swartwood discovered, 

even for the few units that had been in combat, there were still things the 

Iroquois Warriors could teach them. Those advisors who had been CAS3 

and CGSC instructors had a great deal to offer the staffs of the units to 

which they were assigned.

Perhaps a more pertinent question here is not whether the 98th Division 

possessed the right skill sets for the initial rotation to Iraqi, but whether 

the 80th and 108th Divisions possessed the skill sets needed when they 

arrived. When the 80th Division arrived, the Iraqi units would have been 

a year older in age and experience. The skill sets and tactical and technical knowledge needed to advise them would have been more advanced. 

Instead of basic tactical knowledge at the platoon and company level, the 

advisors might need to advise and teach about integrating air support in 

battalion offensive operations. As each rotation takes place, the follow-on 

advisors would have to be ever more capable and knowledgeable about 

ground force operations at the appropriate levels (company, battalion, brigade, and division).

Of course, training skills were not the key requirement for success in 

an advisor mission. Schwitters explained the essence of what was required: 

“We needed people who were temperamentally and experientially trained 

to go in, put their arms around a bunch of folks, and develop relationships 

from which they could then influence action and behavior and develop 

capabilities.” By that standard, few units, other than SF, would meet the 

need. One will search in vain for such a task on any conventional unit 

METL. Yet the need was there, so the Army did what it often does by taking units that are not trained to perform a certain mission or task and gives 

it to them anyway. That is the situation the Army has found itself in many 

times in the past, is finding itself in now, and will find itself in again in the 

future. The important thing, as Michael Howard said, is for units that get 

non-METL missions to get it right as quickly as possible.

MG James A. Kelly, now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Reserve Affairs, recently described the old training model for RC units 

as “mobilize, train, deploy.”3 In other words, the idea was that the critical collective training required to make the unit actually deployable into 
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a given theater would take place after the unit was mobilized and before 

it deployed. The model that USARC wants to move to is “train, mobilize, deploy,” which means the unit would master its wartime METL tasks 

before it was mobilized. That approach is laudable and perhaps in many 

cases achievable. Unless the Army creates the FA-TRAC or similar command, it is a model that will not work for cases like the 98th Division 

in Iraq. As long as units are assigned to non-METL missions, there will 

always be a need for an extensive training period (approximately 45 to 

90 days) to enable that unit to perform the mission to at least an adequate 

level. This is true of any unit, Active Component or Reserve Component.

Advisor Specific Issues

Training for the Advisor Mission

Despite the unfavorable evaluation that many 98th Division soldiers, 

and others, have expressed about the training at Camp Atterbury, the reality is that the training they received there was, at the very least, a solid 

foundation for many of the tactical and technical skills they needed in Iraq. 

That is not to say that the time allotted was always adequately used or that 

the classes were perfect, but the evidence indicates the training conducted 

was a good refresher for many reservists who had not touched a rifle, put 

on a protective mask, or conducted preventive maintenance checks and 

services on a military vehicle for years. The collective training was also a 

good springboard for the realistic training conducted in Kuwait. The training at Camp Virginia constituted what was in essence a mini-CTC event 

before the troops moved into the actual area of operations. The Camp 

Atterbury experience helped the Iroquois Warriors get through the “walk” 

level of those tasks, so they could maximize their training experience in 

Kuwait. They were far enough along in experience at Camp Virginia that 

they were not trying to play “catch up” on unfamiliar tasks taught in a very 

compressed and comprehensive way.

Unfortunately, the 98th Division ASTs did not get the benefit of the 

Phoenix Academy experience since it was established well after their 

arrival in Iraq. It seems odd that someone did not realize much earlier 

that education like that provided by the Phoenix Academy was needed. 

Nevertheless, once that shortfall was recognized, Schwitters and Sherlock 

moved quickly to make the academy a reality. It is impossible to surmise 

exactly what difference it would have made had the Iroquois Warriors gone 

through such a course, but it would have at least made them more familiar 

with the realities and responsibilities of the advisor mission before they 

arrived at their IA unit.
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In planning for future advisor operations, perhaps even as part of a 

future FA-TRAC, the Army should plan for a Phoenix Academy-type 

course from the beginning of an operation to provide at least a minimal 

understanding of the complex nature of the advisor mission. The required 

education should include experiential events. The “building relationship” 

skills that Schwitters said were critical for advisors cannot be trained. 

They do not lend themselves well to the “task, condition, and standards” 

model. They are part of the art of war, not the science of war. Thus, they 

must be part of an education process, not a training event. This means 

that the subjects primarily require intellectual exercise, such as reading 

assignments and courses that provide an understanding of the country’s 

culture, customs, and mores. Ideally, frequent and detailed interaction with 

seasoned advisors and a cross section of members of the target country 

would be best for helping the future advisor to understand how to build 

relationships with citizens and soldiers of that country.

Further, given information-age realities, an on-line advisor course that 

provides exposure to advisory experiences and responsibilities universal 

in nature would help soldiers in the future acquire knowledge earlier in 

the preparation process. Such a course would be especially valuable to RC 

soldiers.

Finally, the Army should consider developing doctrine that can be 

used by conventional forces on those occasions when they are assigned 

to an advisory-type mission. The doctrine can then form the foundation 

for developing training and education such as that provided at Camp 

Atterbury, Camp Virginia, and the Phoenix Academy.

Advisor Selection

In discussing the kinds of people needed to fill the job of an advisor, 

one hears most frequently two requirements: “They have to want to be an 

advisor,” and “they have to be from among the best soldiers.” If the mission 

is relatively small, those two requirements might be met through requesting 

volunteers and then screening the records of and interviewing those who 

volunteer. If the mission generally requires many soldiers, establishing a 

procedure to find out who wants to be there and defining whether a soldier 

is among the best is probably too cumbersome and slow. Also militating 

against such an approach is that such duties are not considered “plum” 

jobs and therefore not career enhancing. Few will actually volunteer and 

most of those will probably not be among the best—depending on the 

definition of “best.”

When the 98th Division received the mission, the division staff did try 

to work those two requirements into their selection process. Most soldiers 
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eventually assigned to the advisor teams were volunteers for the job. Some 

volunteers were actually screened out due to physical fitness scores, medical records, and other issues. The records for all advisors, including those 

few who did not volunteer, were screened to ensure the best possible mix 

of soldiers was being assigned to the teams. Of course, this process still 

did not ensure that everyone assigned to the ASTs wanted to be there, or 

were the “best,” but it likely minimized or eliminated problems that would 

have arisen from a purely objective selection process that considered only 

soldiers’ personnel files.

Advisor Logistics Support

Many of the 98th Division’s advisors say that the logistics support to 

their team was inadequate at best and terrible at worst. Among their chief 

complaints was the lack of luxuries and distractions that normally grace 

any US installation. There was no Burger King or pizzeria. There was no 

movie theater or television. There was no post exchange at which to buy 

the niceties to which US soldiers have become accustomed. On the other 

hand, the necessities—food, water, and ammunition—were rarely, if ever, 

a problem. In fact, as a number of advisors related, they often ate with their 

Iraqi soldiers and their meals, ready to eat (MREs) piled up so there was 

always plenty of food. Actually, the lack of such facilities was arguably 

a good thing for an advisory effort. As Schwitters explained, setting up 

business in a “Little America” when advising foreign troops was not good 

practice because it runs contrary to the idea that the advisor should share 

the same deprivations as those he advises.

Soldiers selected for advisor duties need to understand that they will 

likely be operating in an environment that is Spartan in terms of creature 

comforts. The expectations of advisors should be that they will be sustained in more or less the same fashion and to the same level of comfort 

as those they are advising. Living beyond that level to any great degree 

begins to erode credibility with their advisees by creating envy and perhaps the impression that the advisor is too good to live as the locals do.

Reserve Component Specific Issues

Preparedness of Reserve Component Soldiers

The Reserve Components have made tremendous strides toward 

higher standards of professionalism over the past 30 years. Unlike their 

counterparts from the Vietnam and immediate Post-Vietnam era, National 

Guard and Army Reserve soldiers of today are largely indistinguishable 

from their active duty counterparts. Like the senior leaders of the Regular 

Army in the 1980s and 1990s, senior RC leaders of the same period strove 
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to improve standards of readiness, conduct, appearance, and fitness in their 

commands, and they have succeeded. Granted, the reservist is sometimes 

not as well rounded in purely military experience as active duty soldiers 

and, collectively, reservists tend to be slightly older than regulars holding 

similar positions. But such is the nature of the Reserve Components and 

therefore is not likely to change.

There is a mindset among some reservists that being in the Reserves 

shields a soldier from overseas deployments, especially to combat zones. 

Since Desert Storm, this mindset has been gradually dying away, 

especially among National Guard and USAR TOE units. The reality is that 

the US Army, as currently structured, cannot conduct any sizable operation without RC units. The Army has become too small in the post-Cold 

War era to operate without the Reserves, and it will likely remain so for the 

foreseeable future. Indeed, since 2003 the Army has assigned Guard and 

Reserve units to the Iraq and Afghanistan long-term rotation schedules and 

will continue to do so. Thus for TOE units, an active duty stint has become 

a fact for which RC soldiers must plan.

There are many TDA-type organizations, like the USAR training divisions, that historically have not deployed. The mobilization of the 98th 

Division, and of those divisions that followed it, illustrates that all reservists are now a possible source of manpower to help the war effort. The 

Reserve Components are truly an operational reserve and, unlike previous 

eras, will likely be used as such from now on.

Regular Army—Reserve Component Biases Analysis

Historically, tension between Regulars and part-time soldiers has 

existed virtually since the beginning of the Republic. Unfortunately, it 

remains today, despite the obvious advancements in professionalism and 

readiness made by the Reserve Components in the last 30 years. Primarily, 

Regular Army soldiers who often see Army Reservists and National 

Guardsmen as less disciplined, less prepared, less dedicated, and less competent generate most of the tension.

RC soldiers contribute to the tension as well. They are convinced the 

regulars do not value the contributions and capabilities they bring to the 

table that might be (and sometimes are) superior to what a Regular unit 

can provide. Thus, when they are activated and assigned to a Regular 

Army headquarters, they often arrive convinced they will be treated as 

second-class soldiers regardless of how well they perform.

Contributing to this historical tension is the experience of National 

Guard and Army Reserve units in previous conflicts. In World War I, many 
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National Guard units were broken up and consolidated with other units 

to meet the table of organization requirements of the newly adopted divisional structure. This action led to the loss of commands by a number of 

Guard regimental and brigade commanders when their units were made 

a part of others, causing animosity among both leaders and men. Later 

in the war, many other National Guard leaders, especially brigade commanders, were relieved for incompetence and replaced by Regular Army 

officers, which often caused further frustration for the Guardsmen whether 

the relieves were justified or not.

During the mobilization for World War II, once again many old National 

Guard units were organized out of existence. By the end of 1942, almost 

all of the original commanding generals of the 18 National Guard divisions and numerous brigade and regimental commanders were relieved for 

age and incompetence. Regardless of the propriety, those actions contributed to the National Guard’s distrust of the Regular Army. In the case of 

the Army Reserve, none of its hundreds of units were activated for service 

under the officers who had served in them before the war. Reservists were 

brought on active duty only as individuals and rarely given commands of 

any significance. There were some but very few, especially if one considers that the vast majority of officers serving in the Army during World War 

II were reservists, yet few commands at regiment and above were held by 

Reserve officers.4

If one fast forwards to the first Gulf War and examines the experiences 

of the 48th and 256th Infantry Brigades, one sees fodder for both sides of 

the issue. A few units of the 256th Brigade demonstrated some serious 

leadership deficits and disciplinary problems. The 48th Brigade failed to 

measure up to the standards of the National Training Center (NTC). The 

NTC’s Regular Army O/Cs gave the brigade low marks on most of its missions and the Guardsmen were quick to claim the regulars were just out to 

get them—to make the Guard look bad.

In some respects, the situation faced by the troops of the 98th Division 

does not seem too far removed from earlier times; for example, the decision not to deploy Robinson and the division headquarters to Iraq. In this 

case, however, the decision was probably a good one. There was no need 

for duplication of leadership and structure that already existed in CMATT. 

Also, sending those soldiers headed for the headquarters staffs and several 

other positions as individual fillers rather than as part of a unit deployment 

was also the best method to support the mission.

The reception of the division soldiers who arrived to supplement the 

MNSTC-I and CMATT headquarters was, for some, abrasive and cold. 
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They believed, and with some justification, that there was little effort to 

integrate the Iroquois Warriors into the headquarters in such a way to make 

them feel part of the team. This reinforced the natural tendency to try and 

maintain their identity as 98th Division soldiers. The desire to retain their 

identity may in turn have exacerbated the problem and caused at least one 

senior officer on the CMATT staff to accuse the Reserve personnel in that 

headquarters of setting up a parallel 98th Division communications system to pass division-specific information, which in fact was true.

The biases between regulars and reservists in the advisor teams appear 

to have been less pronounced, perhaps because of the proximity and 

sharing of danger; however, it did exist to some extent. MAJ Swartwood 

remembered there was some dissension between the regulars at brigade and 

his team simply because “we were reservists and they were Regular Army 

guys.”5 Some of the friction may have been justified as several Iroquois 

Warriors admitted that some team members probably complained about 

their situation more than they should have. Others indicated that some 

troops just did not want to be there and were not suitable to be advisors. 

That too, could have caused some ill will between the soldiers of the two 

components.

In fairness to the regulars, not all interaction between the two components was bad. Division soldiers, for example, were complimentary of 

the way LTG Petraeus seemed to interact with them. They truly believed 

he was glad they were there (and he admitted as much). Petraeus was 

able to get BG Sherlock assigned to a position of importance when he 

was assigned as the first CG of IAG (incidentally, a position also held by 

the ADC of each follow-on Reserve division). Additionally, regardless of 

their first impressions, many regulars warmed up to the reservists once 

they saw that the Iroquois Warriors were rolling up their sleeves and going 

to work trying to contribute to the war effort just like everybody else. 

The shame is that those impressions were not there initially, thus avoiding 

much antagonism and perhaps misunderstanding.

To help reduce this friction, the Army should look for ways to increase 

AC/RC interaction on a more formal basis during peacetime. After 

Vietnam, the US Army began to shift its focus back to fighting a Soviet 

invasion of Europe and a North Korean invasion of South Korea. The 

Reserve Components made up a major portion of the troops identified to 

be mobilized and deployed to either location to fight the war. As a result, a 

program called “Capstone” identified various RC units that would fall under 

Regular Army corps and divisions for mobilization purposes. Headquarters 

and subordinate units affiliated with Capstone RC units became involved 
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in supporting those units’ training, advising the units at training events, 

and conducting the external evaluation of the units during annual training 

(AT). As a result, Regular Army leaders at the brigade level and down had 

relatively frequent contact with RC personnel and organizations.

After the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet threat died, the 

Capstone program also died. Though there was, for a time, an affiliation program, primarily for National Guard enhanced brigades, contact 

between regulars and reservists became less frequent. The primary contact 

between Reserve units and Regular Army units since 2001 (and perhaps 

even before) has been when an RC unit has shown up in theater to conduct 

actual operations under a Regular Amy headquarters (and sometimes viceversa). As a result, few Regular Army personnel, outside those serving in 

TSDs, have an appreciation for the true nature and actual capabilities of 

RC units.

Exacerbating this problem has been that, historically, relatively few 

Regular Army officers ever serve a tour of duty with an RC unit. For 

Regulars, duty with the RC is not seen as career enhancing and few seek 

such an opportunity. In the case of many current senior Army leaders, their 

experience with and opinions about the Reserves were formed when most 

were lieutenants and captains in the immediate post-Vietnam era when the 

Capstone program was in effect. For many, and perhaps most, of them, 

that is the last time they have had any meaningful contact with an RC unit. 

Thus, their opinions were formed 25 to 35 years ago when many National 

Guard and Reserve units possessed the image of rolling to the field with 

ice chests full of soda and barbeque grills in the bustle racks—an image 

that is no longer valid. Many of those leaders have little or no first-hand 

understanding of the various problems that face an RC unit in terms of 

training, recruiting, retention, and readiness. Thus, a common prejudice 

against the Reserves is based on an inability to fully understand the true 

nature of RC units and their personnel, and the issues that militate against 

full readiness.6

Because of their lack of direct experience with Reserve units, Regular 

Army leaders also fail to understand that reservists will often come to them 

with valuable individual skills that are not readily apparent. For example, 

a group of reservists that are predominantly engineers may arrive for 

assignment to the command, but what is badly needed is a comptroller. It 

just may be that one of those engineers is a Wall-Street banking executive 

in his professional life and far more qualified for the position than any 

Regular Army finance officer. However, because the personnel manager 

only tries to fit round pegs in round holes, he fails to learn that one of those 
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engineers is just the soldier he is looking for to fill the comptroller slot. 

Thus, the slot goes unfilled and the engineer officer, who may not have 

worked in his branch for years, now goes to the engineer staff.

Integration of RC units and personnel into a Regular Army command 

(and vice-versa incidentally) is a leadership issue. Any leader who recalls 

having his platoon or company cross-attached to another command vividly recalls how his unit, and he, was treated. If the gaining commander 

pulled in that platoon, fed it, armed it, and maintained it, that commander 

typically received a significantly increased capability to his command and 

a set of leaders and soldiers who were ready, willing, and able to be part 

of the team. If those troops were the last to be fed, could not get fuel, 

and were always given the worst missions, trust in the gaining unit would 

rapidly decline along with the willingness to do any more than what was 

specifically ordered. 

Regular Army commanders and leaders should also be knowledgeable 

of what they are getting when an RC unit arrives and what they can truly 

expect in terms of capabilities. In the past, they could not expect a unit 

that has worked together for more than 38 or 39 days a year and that had 

gone through more than what was likely a minimally adequate mobilization training cycle somewhere before deployment. With the new Army 

Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model of training, this may not be the 

challenge it has been in the past.

Under ARFORGEN, each RC unit will enter a 6-year cycle that consists of three distinct phases or pools. The first phase consists of units in the 

Reset/Train pool. These units are in the process of recruiting and training 

at the individual level for about 31⁄2 years. The units then enter the Ready 

Force pool where they are given additional resources that may include:

• Increases in specialty training, schools, and active duty positions 

for Active Guard-Reserve personnel.

• Increases in Active Component advisors.

• Increases in training days per year.

• Increases in training days per AT period.

• Increases in assigned equipment for training on collective tasks.

• Priority for school slots.

• Priority for mobile training teams.

These units will experience a higher operational tempo and more training 

at the higher levels of collective training tasks. At the end of this 11⁄2-year 

period, the units enter the 1-year Available Force pool and are eligible for 

mobilization and deployment.7
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Even with these additional resources, an RC unit will still not be 

at the same readiness level as their Active Component counterparts. 

Commanders must plan to give these units missions they can handle and 

give them greater responsibility as they grow in experience and capability. 

Most importantly, commanders and leaders must work to integrate these 

units and individuals into their commands as smoothly and efficiently as 

possible knowing that they might show up with the expectation of being 

treated differently than those units of soldiers habitually assigned to the 

commander’s own organization. That expectation can be quickly quashed 

by accepting those RC units on an equal basis and making their leaders 

feel that way too. That sense of belonging will quickly communicate to 

the unit’s subordinates and the integration will be as smooth as can be 

expected.

The attitude and conduct of RC unit leaders is equally important. 

Arriving with a defensive or protective attitude can cause the Regulars to 

feed any prejudices that might exist and can infect the unit’s subordinate 

soldiers. Additionally, RC leaders should realize that they will likely have 

to integrate outsiders into their own ranks. Several reservists who were 

fillers to the 98th, for example, perceived some indifference toward them 

when it came to their integration into the various division teams. Some felt 

largely ignored or kept in the dark as to what their assignments would be 

until they arrived at Taji. Given the nature of Reserve mobilization requirements, it is likely there will always be some number of fillers needed to 

bring the unit up to strength. For the purposes of efficiency and the unit 

mission, IRR soldiers should be integrated just as if they had always been 

part of the organization. 

Finally, it is interesting to note how much emphasis in the past 20 years 

has been put on the need for jointness in the US military. The idea is for 

senior leaders of each branch to come to know the capabilities, attitudes, 

obstacles, needs, and even the culture of the other services. This, in turn, 

should increase the capabilities of joint force operations and planning. Very 

little emphasis has been paid to the need of the Army’s three components 

to really understand each other’s capabilities, issues, attitudes, obstacles, 

and culture. That shortfall is particularly true for the Regular Army for 

several reasons. First, many reservists and Guardsmen have served in the 

Regular Army. They generally begin learning about the Active Component 

by living the experience. The same, of course, is not true for Regulars. 

Second, more positions are offered to reservists in an active duty environment than to Regulars to serve with Troop Program Unit (TPU) soldiers 

who are the bulk of RC personnel. Thus, Reserve leaders are far more 

exposed to the Regular Army than is the opposite case. Finally, the careers 
221

of Regular Army leaders who show promise are carefully managed and 

few end up serving with the Reserves. (General of the Army George C. 

Marshall, who served with the Illinois National Guard before World War 

II, was a notable exception.) Thus, most of them never have any meaningful experience with (and therefore an inadequate understanding of) the RC 

program and its units. Since these officers are required by law to serve in 

joint assignments before they can advance to the general officer ranks, the 

Army ends up with senior leaders who potentially understand more about 

the Air Force or Navy than they do about two-thirds of their own service.

Perhaps the Army should consider making a tour at the National Guard 

Bureau, in the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, at the US Army 

Reserve Command, and a few other select headquarters a requirement for 

promotion to brigadier general. Such assignments would be considered 

career-enhancing and thus expose some of those officers who will eventually rise to high commands (almost all of which will include RC units) to 

the realities of Reserve Component programs. One would surmise that it 

might also help decrease the historical tension between the components, 

thus making for a more efficient and capable Total Army.

Derivative Unit Identification Codes versus Unit Identification 

Codes Analysis

The 98th Division deployed about 750 troops (about 600 of which were 

originally assigned to the division) to Iraq on 125 DUICs. Some DUICs 

had only one person assigned to them. At least one DUIC was created for 

every subordinate unit in the division and some units had several DUICs. 

Additionally, the First Army created split DUICs when some division 

personnel who were sent to Fort Bliss were later required to go through 

the training at Camp Atterbury. New orders were cut creating sub-DUICs 

for those troops. What resulted was a personnel management nightmare 

for the division and the J-staff at MNSTC-I, because each soldier had to 

be tracked by the DUIC.

The 98th’s G1 wanted to send the division’s personnel over on five 

UICs. The plan was to transfer into those units all deploying personnel 

and transfer out nondeploying personnel to stay-behind units. This option 

allowed the division to send over personnel in recognized unit packages, 

making personnel management easier, and it would give those units combat credit for the deployment. Barring that, they wanted to create five 

DUICs, which would still make the personnel management of the deployment more efficient. USARC denied that too.

The net result of this, besides the management problems, was that 

neither the 98th Division nor any of its subordinate units deployed to Iraq. 
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In actuality 750 individual filler personnel, who just happened to be from 

the same command, were sent over for the mission. Only those units, if 

any, which contributed at least 65 percent of their assigned personnel to 

a DUIC that deployed to Iraq will receive campaign credit for what the 

troops accomplished, despite the fact that over 300 division soldiers served 

in combat, 5 of them were killed, and another 15 were wounded in action 

or suffered injuries.8

Collectively, division personnel are very proud of their service in Iraq 

and what they accomplished while there. Unit pride—esprit-de-corps—

can be a combat multiplier. Ask any soldier who has served with the Big 

Red One or the Screaming Eagles. Soldiers are very proud of their units 

and especially their part in creating the legacy of that unit. That is as true 

for Army Reserve and National Guard units as it is for any Regular Army 

outfit. It certainly was (and is) true of the Iroquois Warriors. If anyone 

doubts that, one just needs to point to the efforts by division soldiers to 

be recognized as such by surreptitiously wearing the division patch even 

after orders were issued to remove them. While one cannot condone such 

actions, one can still respect the spirit behind it. 

There were other problems associated with the use of DUICs as well. 

Sherlock described them in a 2006 interview:

I think the worst thing we ever did was to get good at 

DUICs, but there’s a larger problem than that. The way 

the Army deployed in 2002 and 2003 is that we ended up 

taking a lot of pieces and parts of units—Active, Guard 

and Reserve—as opposed to taking complete units. We 

also took a lot of capacity early, which burns some parts 

of the mobilization clock on soldiers. So as you had to go 

back and then get another military police or engineer unit, 

you ended up not having whole units to take. As such, 

you ended up taking individuals and filling out another 

derivative. And once you start into that process, you end 

up spending the rest of the time chasing your tail. Instead 

of taking the entire requirement for 750 soldiers, transferring all of them into an AAUIC like the 2d Brigade of the 

98th and deploying a brigade so you have a structure—a 

unit you can then still individually task organize to support whatever MNSTC-I needed to do, because obviously 

you’re going to meet the requirements on the ground—

instead of that, we went in 125 derivatives of two, three, 

and four soldiers each, and then we also went with about 

300 individual-based sets of orders. So instead of taking 
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what was envisioned as a unit-based solution, we became 

a unit pool for the solution.9

Sherlock went on to add,

. . . it was hard on the soldiers because, in many cases, it 

brought on what I thought was the worst of both worlds. 

We were treated as a unit when it was convenient for us 

to be treated as a unit and we were treated as individuals 

when it was convenient for us to be treated as individuals. 

For example, when I went in and said, ‘I need to look at 

equipping this’ or ‘I need this kind of support,’ in some 

cases I would hear, ‘Well, that’s a 98th Division problem, 

deal with it.’ And then when I would go in and say, ‘Wait 

a minute, why are we taking this group of soldiers and 

re-missioning them and sending them somewhere else?’ 

I was sometimes told, ‘Well, you guys didn’t come as a 

unit, you guys came as individuals, so we’re going to use 

you as individuals.’10

Of course, there was no way to avoid entirely using DUICs in the situation faced by the 98th Division. Many of those requirements were clearly 

and simply individual-based and a DUIC was the best way to handle them. 

However, it would have been logical and relatively easy to identify several 

subordinate UICs and task organize the ASTs so that units were deployed 

vice individuals, thus allowing a unit command structure for management 

purposes and ensure that some of the division’s subordinate units receive 

earned combat credit. As it stands now, most, if not all, campaign credit 

earned by the 98th’s soldiers will disappear with MNSTC-I when it is disbanded on the conclusion of the Army’s participation in the conflict.

The reason for the inability to credit properly the 98th Division units 

and soldiers for what they accomplished can be largely laid on the use of 

DUICs for deploying troops. The Army should seek ways to deploy units 

rather that individuals where possible, especially if a unit is contributing 

a large number of soldiers to the deployment. If that requires taking an 

existing organization like the 98th Division and task organizing it for the 

mission by reassigning personnel to a few subordinate units, where it can 

be done it should be done. For the sake of unit integrity and esprit-de-corps, 

the Army should strive to make a unit’s contributions mean something 

more than a passing mention in the history books. To its credit, the Army 

has recognized the division’s efforts with the Army Superior Unit Award, 

but no campaign streamer for Iraq will grace the division colors and may 

not for any of its subordinate units.
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Assessing the Performance of the 98th Division

In various interviews and other discussions with soldiers associated 

with the 98th Division’s mission to Iraq, it was apparent that the division’s 

leaders, MG Robinson and BG Sherlock, were pushing hard to participate 

in LTG Helmly’s concept of a FA-TRAC. Some people felt that the generals’ intent in trying to get the division involved was driven by a desire to 

“save” the 98th Division. At the time, the DA and the USARC were considering (and are currently implementing) a series of changes that would 

considerably alter the configuration of the institutional and training support divisions in the USAR. Some divisions were to be downsized; others 

could be eliminated from the force structure. The belief among some people then, was that the two generals were trying to ensure the 98th Division 

was not eliminated as part of the restructuring plan—another illustration 

of the unit esprit in the division. Others intimated that the generals were 

simply trying to make the 98th a relevant part of the GWOT or perhaps 

they were just trying to support Helmly’s efforts to get the Army Reserve 

out of its Cold War paradigm by taking on a nontraditional mission that 

seemed to generally fit the organization’s METL. Still others just saw it as 

personal ambition.

Whatever the reason for their effort, the two generals were successful 

both in saving the division (although it appears now that it will be reduced 

to a one-star command and placed under a larger Army Reserve training 

command) and in getting the Iroquois Warriors more directly involved in 

the war effort. In retrospect, their efforts were timely from the standpoint 

that MNSTC-I needed to rapidly increase its capabilities in numerous 

areas at a critical time and the 98th Division was able to adequately fill 

many of those requirements. Whether the effort to get involved in the first 

place was a good idea or a bad one is arguable.

From the beginning, at least as far as Helmly and the division leaders 

were concerned, the USARC and FORSCOM headquarters were against 

the idea of using a USAR training division for reinforcing MNSTC-I. The 

arguments, as related before, were focused on the skill sets needed for the 

mission versus what the division could provide, the combat related aspects 

of the mission, and the need for the division to perform its TASS missions, 

among others. Not everybody in the MNSTC-I and subordinate headquarters was convinced it was a good idea either. Schwitters assessed the use 

of a DIVIT for the mission this way:

. . . they were largely comprised of Total Army School 

System guys who taught Army schools within the 

Reserve Component, and we had drill sergeants—NCOs 
225

and units—that were prepared to mobilize and take over 

the institutional training operations for the Army. Those 

aren’t the skill sets that are uniquely suited to go into 

another culture, influence organizations and develop them 

in the manner that this mission required. They were, by 

experience and training, designed to give instruction or be 

drill sergeants, which weren’t the skills we needed.

However, the general soberly added, “ . . . while it wasn’t a perfect solution, there wasn’t a better one we could execute given the very clear and 

compelling timelines we had to operate against.”11

Of course, there were those in the 98th Division itself who would 

agree with all or some of the foregoing arguments. Some of them chose 

to retire early and at least one refused to obey his mobilization orders. 

The vast majority of Iroquois Warrior soldiers, even those that might have 

disagreed with the idea of sending a training division to Iraq, patriotically 

answered their call and did their duty. 

In spite of all the resistance to the idea from USARC, FORSCOM, 

and others, the gaining commander for whom the division’s troops would 

work in Iraq clearly stood on the “good idea” side of the debate. Like 

Schwitters, Petraeus realized the DIVIT option was not the ideal solution 

to his needs. Still, he said of the Iroquois Warriors under his command, 

“We were happy to have them. We were just glad to get somebody over 

there to help us out—and the sooner the better.” The general went on to 

say that, in retrospect, the division did a good job in Iraq:

I think they should be justly proud of what they did. In 

some cases they did missions for which they were completely suited; in other cases, just like everybody else in 

Iraq, they did missions that were not familiar to them and 

they responded admirably in each case. . . . To say we 

couldn’t have done it without . . . the 98th would be a 

huge understatement, so they ought to look on this episode in their history with pride.12

Interviews conducted for this project with the members of the 98th 

Division reveal that those Iroquois Warriors who participated in the mission 

are indeed proud of their accomplishments and stand on the positive side 

too. Sherlock was particularly pleased with how quickly the division was 

able to deploy over there and pitch in:

On 18 June [LTG Cody] said, ‘Okay, the mission is 

approved. Go do it.’ Then less than a week later, we 
226

launched the first three of our 13-member survey teams to 

CRC, to Iraq less than 3 weeks later, and followed with the 

rest of the survey team about 2 weeks after that. So from 

being given mission approval to having people in Iraq was 

less than 3 weeks. From getting mission approval to having the survey completed in Iraq was about 7 weeks. And 

from getting mission approval to having the first soldiers 

on the ground in Iraq to start performing that mission was 

essentially 4 months. By mid-September we had soldiers 

arriving, which was a very fast flash-to-bang time had 

that been an Active Army unit. But it was also a very fast 

flash-to-bang time for what had been a generating force 

institutional training division that had not been heretofore 

thought of as an overseas deployment asset.13

The division was able to accomplish its assigned missions despite the 

lack of adequate information about the true nature of the mission and the 

relative inexperience of the soldiers selected to perform it. The overall 

experience was often likened by Robinson, Sherlock, and others, to building an aircraft as it was rolling down the runway on take-off. Still, when all 

was said and done, the soldiers of the 98th Division believed they had successfully accomplished everything that was asked of them. MAJ Loncle 

expressed his satisfaction this way:

I think it was really successful given the limitations I saw. 

Could it have been better? Yes. There was a big disconnect between what we were told we were going to be 

doing and what actually happened. But when people hit 

the ground and figured out which direction was up, if you 

will, they all marched forward and did what they could 

do to various levels of success, no doubt. With the units I 

worked with, I know I saw improvement over the course 

of time we spent with them. I left them better than I found 

them, so I’ll count that as success.14

MAJ McConnell was more emphatic. He said, “I really think the 98th 

Division made a huge impact and [provided] a great [example] as far as 

what can be done with American soldiers and institutional training divisions. I was very proud of that.”15

When examining the results of the 98th Division’s deployment to Iraq 

from 2004 to 2005, one notes that, while not everything went perfectly 

in each of the division’s areas of endeavor, each mission was performed 

well enough to be deemed a success. This may seem to be damning with 
227

faint praise, but such is not the case. When one considers the obstacles 

facing the division in securing the mission; training for the mission; and 

deploying for, integrating into, and conducting the mission, it seems a 

wonder that its soldiers performed their myriad assignments as well as 

they did. The 98th Division’s performance is a testament to the everincreasing professionalism of the Army’s Reserve Component soldiers 

and their leaders. The Iroquois Warriors should indeed be justly proud of 

what they accomplished.
228

Notes

1. Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” Journal of the 

Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 119 (March 1974) : 4.

2. LTC James DiRisio, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 12.

3. MG James A. Kelly, interview by Laurence Lessard, Operational 

Leadership Experience Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

8 February 2007.

4. For an analysis of the relief of National Guard senior leaders in World 

Wars I and II from the National Guard perspective, see The Minute Man in Peace 

and War: A History of the National Guard by Jim Dan Hill, Stackpole Books, 

1964. For another perspective on World War II, see Mark S. Watson, United States 

Army in World War II, The War Department, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and 

Preparations, Historical Division, US Army, 1950.

5. MAJ Roger Swartwood, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division 

(IT), Rochester, NY, 3 November 2006, 10.

6. To gain an appreciation of the lack of direct and prolonged experience 

senior Army leaders have with RC units, one only has to review the assignments 

listed on their official biographies. While these documents are not comprehensive 

in terms of an officer’s actual contact with RC units and personnel, they are 

accurate in terms of which assignments the officer has had with an RC unit or 

headquarters whereby direct and prolonged contact is ensured.

7. Mr. Nathan Godwin, Headquarters, US Army Forces Command, 

telephone interview with the author, 3 April 2007.

8. Ms. Denise Harris, Policy Section, Military Awards Branch, US Army 

Human Resources Command, e-mail to author, Subject: Campaign Credit for the 

98th Division, 19 March 2007; Headquarters, 98th Division, Excel Spreadsheet, 

“Active Casualty/Injury Report,” 18 August 2006.

9. BG Richard Sherlock, interview by author, Office, Chief of the Army 

Reserve, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 16 November 2006, 12.

10. Ibid.

11. BG James Schwitters, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 December 2006, 2.

12. LTG David H. Petraeus, interview by author, Headquarters, Combined 

Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 December 2006, 13–14.

13. Sherlock interview, 16 November 2006, 4.

14. MAJ Paul Loncle, interview by author, Headquarters, 98th Division (IT), 

Rochester, NY, 4 November 2006, 8.

15. MAJ Scott McConnell, telephone interview by author, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 December 2006, 13.
229

About the Author

Steven E. Clay, LTC (USA Retired), spent his 27-year Army career 

in mechanized infantry units (including two tours with the Big Red One) 

and in educating and training soldiers and leaders. From 1997 to 2006, 

he worked at the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

in the following positions: executive officer; Chief, Staff Ride Team; and 

Chief, Research and Publications Team. He currently works for CSI as a 

contracted research historian. Mr. Clay’s published works include Blood 

and Sacrifice: A History of the 16th Infantry from the Civil War to the 

Gulf War and is co-author of CSI’s Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland 

Campaign: A Study in Operational-Level Command.

231

Glossary

1SG first sergeant

2LT second lieutenant

AAFES Army and Air Force Exchange Service 

AAR after action report

ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment

ADC assistant division commander

ADVON advanced party

AIT advanced individual training

AKMTB Al Kasik Military Training Base

ANA Afghanistan National Army

AO area of operations

AOR area of responsibility

APFT Army Physical Fitness Test

AR Army regulation

ARFORGEN Army Force Generation

ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program

AST Advisor Support Team

AT annual training

BCT basic combat training

BDU battle dress uniform

BFT Blue Force Tracker

BFV Bradley Fighting Vehicle

BG brigadier general

BIAP Baghdad International Airport

Bn battalion

C2 command and control

C3 command, control, communications

CAR Chief, Army Reserve

CAS Close Air Support

CAS3 Combined Arms and Services Staff School

CAV Cavalry

CCC Civilian Conservation Corps

CD compact disc

CENTCOM US Army Central Command

CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component Command

CG commanding general

CGSC Command and General Staff College

CGSOC Command and General Staff Officer Course

CIF Central Issue Facility

CJTF-7 Combined Joint Task Force-7

CLS Combat Life Saver

CMATT Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team

CMO Civil Military Operations
232

CMTC Combat Maneuver Training Center (Hohenfels, Germany)

COA course of action

COIN counterinsurgency

COL colonel

Col. colonel (Air Force and Marines)

CONUS continental United States

COSCOM Corps Support Command 

COTTAD Contingency Operation Temporary Tour of Active Duty

CP command post

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CPATT Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

CPT captain

CPX command post exercise

CRC Continental United States Replacement Center

CSM command sergeant major

CSS combat service support

CST common specialist training

C-Staff Combined Staff 

C1 = Personnel and Administration Section

C2 = Intelligence Section

C3 = Operations and Training Section

C4 = Logistics Section

CTC Combat Training Center

CTT common task test

CXO command executive officer

DA Department of the Army

DEF Defense

Div Division

DIVIT Division (Institutional Training)

DOD Department of Defense

DUIC Derivative Unit Identification Code

DVD digital video disc

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

e.g. for example

etc. and so forth

FA-TRAC Foreign Army-Training Assistance Command

FCP Family Care Plan

FOB Forward Operating Base

FORSCOM Forces Command

FRG family readiness group

FY fiscal year

GEN general

G-Staff General Staff

G1 = Personnel and Administration Section

G2 = Intelligence Section
233

G3 = Operations and Training Section

G4 = Logistics Section

G5 = Civil Affairs Section

G6 = Communications Section

G7 = Strategic Plans Section

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company 

HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

HN host nation

HQ headquarters

HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army

HS home station

IA Iraqi Army

IAG Iraq Advisor Group

ICDC Iraqi Civilian Defense Corps

ID infantry division 

IDT inactive duty training

i.e. that is

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IET Initial Entry Training

IIF Iraqi Intervention Force

ILE Intermediate Level Education

IN Indiana

INA Iraqi National Army

ING Iraqi National Guard

IP Iraqi Police

IRR Individual Ready Reserve

ISF Iraqi Security Forces

ISO in support of

IT Institutional Training

IZ International Zone

J-Staff Joint Staff at MNSTC-I HQ: 

J1 = Personnel Directorate

J2 = Intelligence Directorate

J3 = Operations Directorate

J4 = Logistics Directorate

J5 = Plans Directorate

J6 = Communications Directorate

J7 = Force Development, Doctrine, and Training Directorate

JMD Joint Manning Document

KBR Kellogg, Brown and Root

KIA killed in action

KMTB Krikush Military Training Base

LAD latest arrival date

LFX live fire exercise
234

Lt. Col. lieutenant colonel (Air Force and Marines)

LTC lieutenant colonel (Army)

LTG lieutenant general

MAJ major

M/CM/S mobility/countermobility/survivability

M-Day mobilization day

MDMP military decision making process

MEDEVAC medical evacuation

METL mission essential task list

MG major general 

MiTT military transition team

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq

MND-CS Multi-National Division Central-South

MNF-I Multi-National Forces-Iraq

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Mob mobilization

MOD Ministry of Defense

MOI Ministry of the Interior

MOS military occupational specialty

MP military police

MPRI Military Professional Resources Incorporated

MRE meal, ready to eat

MSC Major Subordinate Command

MSG master sergeant

MSN mission

MTT mobile training team

MWR morale, welfare, and recreation

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAV navigation

NBC nuclear, biological, chemical

NCO noncommissioned officer

NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge

NCOER noncommissioned officer evaluation report

NCOES Noncommissioned Officer Education System

NMTB Numaniyah Military Training Base

NTC National Training Center

NVG night vision goggles

NY New York

O/C observer/controller

OCIE organizational clothing and equipment

ODA Operational Detachment-Alpha

OER officer evaluation report

OES Officer Education System

OIC officer in charge

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
235

OP observation post

OPCON operational control

OPSEC operational security

OSUT one station unit training

PCI pre-combat inspection

PCS permanent change of station

PD professional development

PDSS predeployment site survey

PE practical exercise

PLDC Primary Leadership Development Course

PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services

POI Program of Instruction

POW prisoner of war

PTSR post-mobilization training and support requirements

PX Post Exchange

QRF quick reaction force

RC Reserve Component

rear CP rear command post

RFF request for forces

RFI request for information

RIPTOA Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority 

ROE rules of engagement

RPG rocket-propelled grenade

RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

S1 personnel staff officer

S2 intelligence staff officer

S3 operations staff officer

S4 logistics staff officer

SAPI Small Arms Protective Insert

SAS Special Air Service

SAW squad automatic weapon

SCIF Secure Compartmented Intelligence Facility

SF Special Forces

SFC sergeant first class

SGT sergeant

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

SIPRNET secure internet protocol router network

SME subject matter expert

SPTT Special Police Transition Team

SRP Soldier Readiness Program

SSG staff sergeant

SSI-FWTS shoulder-sleeve insignia-former wartime service

STX situational training exercise

TACON tactical control

TASS Total Army School System
236

TCP tactical control point

TDA table of distribution and allowances

TF task force

TMTB Taji Military Training Base

TNG training

TOC tactical operations center

TOE table of organization and equipment

TPU Troop Program Unit

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TS Training Support

TSD Training Support Division

TSIRT Theater Specific Individual Readiness Training

TSLT Theater Specific Leadership Training

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

TV television

TY training year

UAE United Arab Emirates

UIC Unit Identification Code 

US United States

USAF United States Air Force

USAR United States Army Reserve

USARC United States Army Reserve Command

UXO unexploded ordnance

USAREUR United States Army Europe

VA Virginia

VTC video teleconference

WIA wounded in action

XO executive officer
237

Bibliography

Copies of all sources used in the research for this project (with the exception 

of those denoted by an asterisk [*]) are located in the Iroquois Warriors in Iraq

file located in the Combined Arms Research Library archives, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.

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238

________. E-mail to author, 7 February 2007, 11:00 a.m. Subject: RE: Questions 

About Your Brigade. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

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(IT) TOC. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Attachment: 

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2004, 5:56 a.m. Subject: RE: 98th Division (IT) TOC.

________. E-mail to author, 9 January 2007, 1:39 p.m. Subject: RE: Draft 

PowerPoint Presentation. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS. Attachment: E-mail from MAJ James M. DiRisio to LTC Jody 

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Presentation.

________. E-mail to author, 9 January 2007, 1:47 p.m. Subject: FW: Command 

Emphasis-Volunteer Statements SUSPENSE: 311200 AUG 04. Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Attachment: E-mail from MAJ 
239

James M. DiRisio to COL Robert Catalanotti, 30 August 2004, 7:59 p.m. 

Subject: FW: Command Emphasis-Volunteer Statements SUSPENSE: 

311200 AUG 04.

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2004, 12:04 a.m. Subject: FW: DIV (IT) Contact.

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Training. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

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Smith. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

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ASTs. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

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to the AST/MiTT Mission. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS. Attachments: Personnel Readiness Working Group (PRWG); Terms 

of Reference; PRWG Minutes 5 February 2005; English Version, MOD 

Unit Numbering Plan; 10 Division Proposed MOD Forces Organization 

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to the AST/MiTT Mission. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.

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BSU Commander Before Catalanotti. Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

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Ewing, SFC Dennis. Interview by author, 4 November 2006. Transcript. 

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Friedman, LTC Joseph. Interview by author, 5 November 2006. Transcript. 

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Campaign Credit for the 98th Division. Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.
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Hauser, MAJ Shauna. Interview by John McCool, 29 November 2006. Transcript. 

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Jones, MAJ Matthew. Interview by author, 4 November 2006. Transcript. 

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Organization. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

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into Kuwait. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

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Brigade. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. E-mail to author, 21 March 2007. Subject: Question About Advisors. 

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Kelly, MG James A. Interview by Laurence Lessard, 8 February 2007. Transcript. 

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Loncle, MAJ Paul. Interview by author, 4 November 2006. Transcript. 

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McConnell, MAJ Scott. Telephone interview by author, 12 December 2006. 

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________. E-mail to author, 8 February 2007, 8:12 a.m. Subject: Questions About 

the 5th Division. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Attachment: Command Brief, 5th Division IAF Update, 3 March 2005.

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241

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Morales, LTC Antonio. Telephone interview by author, 16 January 2007. Synopsis 

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Newsome, CSM Milton. Interview by author, 3 November 2006. Transcript. 

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________. Telephone interview by author, 17 January 2007. Transcript. 

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Petraeus, LTG David H. Interview by author, 11 December 2006. Transcript. 

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Ryan, COL Sean. Interview by author, 21 December 2006. Transcript. 

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Schwitters, BG James. Telephone interview by author, 13 December 2006. 

Transcript. Operational Leadership Experience Project, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/

carl/contentdm/home.htm (as of 1 March 2007).

Semler, LTC Christopher. E-mail to author, 12 February 2007, 2:13 p.m. Subject: 

RE: Questions. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Sherlock, BG Richard. Interview by author, 16 November 2006. Transcript. 

Operational Leadership Experience Project, Combat Studies Institute, 
242

Fort Leavenworth, KS. Available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/

contentdm/home.htm (as of 1 March 2007).

Shipman, COL Douglas. Interview by author, 3 November 2006. Transcript. 

Operational Leadership Experience Project, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS. Available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/

contentdm/home.htm (as of 1 March 2007).

________. Telephone interview by author, 14 February 2007. Synopsis transcript 

of interview. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. E-mail to author, 24 January 2007, 8:43 a.m. Subject: RE: Your 

Interview Transcript. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. E-mail to author, 24 January 2007, 9:04 a.m. Subject: RE: Comparison 

of 2d and 3d Divisions. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Stafford, COL Charles A. Telephone interview by author, 8 December 2006. 

Transcript. Operational Leadership Experience Project, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/

carl/contentdm/home.htm (as of 1 March 2007).

________. E-mail to author, 17 January 2007, 2:18 p.m. Subject: 98th Division 

(IT) Documents 1. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Attachment: 98th Division, Briefing, “The Foreign Army Training 

Command, Proposed Timeline and Operational Concepts,” 8 July 2004.

________. E-mail to author, 17 January 2007, 2:35 p.m. Subject: 98th Division 

(IT) Documents 2. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS. Attachment: 98th Division AST 35-Day Training Plan Matrix, 

Version 1.

________. E-mail to author, 17 January 2007, 2:43 p.m. Subject: 98th Division 

(IT) Documents 3. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Attachment: First Army, Briefing, “FA-TRAC Mobilization/Deployment 

Model,” undated.

________. E-mail to author, 17 January 2007, 2:45 p.m. Subject: 98th Division 

(IT) Documents 4. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Attachment: Memorandum, Headquarters, 98th Division (Institutional 

Training), AFRC-TNY-CMD, Subject: Identification and Selection of 

Advisor Support Teams (AST) in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 

for Soldiers Outside the 98th Division, 19 August 2004.

________. E-mail to author, 17 January 2007, 3:30 p.m. Subject: 98th Division 

(IT) Documents 5. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Attachment: 98th Division, Briefing, “Foreign Army Training Command 

in Support of MNSTC-I/CMATT,” 25 August 2004.

________. E-mail to author, 17 January 2007, 3:36 p.m. Subject: 98th Division 

(IT) Documents 6. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Attachment: Memorandum, Headquarters, 98th Division (Institutional 

Training), AFRC-TNY-CMD, Subject: 98th DIV (IT) Support to 

MNSTC-I (Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq), 21 

August 2004.

________. E-mail to author, 19 January 2007, 10:14 p.m. Subject: 98th Division 
243

(IT) Documents 5. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Attachment: E-mail, COL Charles Stafford to LTC Keith Sharples, 

Subject: New Guy Stuff, 25 August 2004.

________. E-mail to author, 19 January 2007, 10:22 p.m. Subject: 35 Day Training 

Plan. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Attachment: 

E‐mail, LTC Steven G. Sorrell to 85th Div (TS), Subject: 35 Day Training 

Plan, 24 August 2004.

________. E-mail to author, 23 January 2007, 10:25 a.m. Subject: 98th 

Division (IT)-3d Brigade Organization. Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS. Attachment: 3d Brigade, 85th Divsion (TS), Briefing, 

“98th Division (IT) Mobilization,” undated.

________. E-mail to author, 23 January 2007, 12:27 p.m. Subject: 98th 

Division (IT)-3d Brigade Organization. Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

________. Telephone interview by author, 28 March 2007. Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. E-mail to author, 30 March 2007, 6:38 p.m. Subject: Training 

Requirements. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Swartwood, MAJ Roger. Interview by author, 3 November 2006. Transcript. 

Operational Leadership Experience Project, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS. Available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/

contentdm/home.htm (as of 1 March 2007).

________. E-mail to author, 29 March 2007, 10:39 a.m. Subject: Question About 

AST Training. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Tennyson, MAJ Jeffrey. Interview by author, 3 November 2006. Transcript. 

Operational Leadership Experience Project, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS. Available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/

contentdm/home.htm (as of 1 March 2007).

Vernick, MAJ John. Interview by author, 5 November 2006. Transcript. 

Operational Leadership Experience Project, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS. Available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/

contentdm/home.htm (as of 1 March 2007).

________. Telephone interview by author, 10 January 2007. Synopsis transcript 

of interview. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. E-mail to author, 19 January 2007, 2:03 p.m. Subject: Questions. 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Womack, Chaplain (COL) J. Paul. Written response to the author’s queries, 

31 January 2007.

Documents

Brown, SFC Andrew T. After Action Report, Subject: 98th Division AST 

Mobilization at Atterbury, IN, undated.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. DA Alert Order #549-04, Subject: Alert 

Order #549-04, DAMO-ODM, Washington, DC. Date/Time Group: 

161816Z July 2004.
244

DiRisio, LTC James. “Summer 2004 Chronology, 98th Division,” no date. See 

e-mail from LTC James DiRisio to author, 8 January 2007, 9:19 p.m. 

Subject: RE: 98th Division in Iraq. Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

Eller, MAJ Michael L. “Consolidated Report, IED Ambush Attack of 3rd Brigade, 

5th Division (Iraqi Army),” 8 July 2005. See e-mail from LTC Daniel 

Christian to author, 7 February 2007, 11:00 a.m. Subject: RE: Questions 

About Your Brigade. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Headquarters, Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team. PowerPoint Brief, 

“10 Division Proposed MOD Forces Organization Chart, Version 3,” 

8 March 2005. See e-mail from LTC James DiRisio to author, 13 

February 2007, 1:56 p.m. Subject: RE: Changes to the AST/MiTT 

Mission. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. PowerPoint Brief, “Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team 

Command and Control Cell,” undated.

________. Information Paper, “Subject: Authorization and Wear of Shoulder 

Sleeve Insignia (SSI) for U.S. Army Personnel Belonging to the Coalition 

Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT),” 20 October 2004.

________. PowerPoint Brief, “CMATT JMD Staff Brief,” undated.

________. PowerPoint Brief, “C2 Cell Mission Brief,” undated.

Headquarters, First Army. PowerPoint Brief, “FA-TRAC Mobilization/Deployment 

Model,” undated. See e-mail from COL Charles A. Stafford to author, 

17 January 2007, 2:43 p.m. Subject: 98th Division (IT) Documents 3. 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Headquarters, US Army Forces Command. Message, Subject: Change 4 to 

Training Guidance for Follow-on Forces Deploying ISO Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM. XX Sep 04. See e-mail from COL Charles A. Stafford 

to author, 30 March 2007, 6:38 p.m. Subject: Training Requirements. 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Headquarters, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. MOD Office 

Call Summary 2 January 2005. See e-mail from LTC James DiRisio to 

author, 13 February 2007, 1:56 p.m. Subject: RE: Changes to the AST/

MiTT Mission. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. Fragmentary Order #15, Subject: Training Support Division Training 

Assessment, Baghdad, Iraq, Date/Time Group: 032100D June 2004.

________. MOD Office Call 9 January 2005. See e-mail from LTC James DiRisio 

to author, 13 February 2007, 1:56 p.m. Subject: RE: Changes to the AST/

MiTT Mission. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. Terms of Reference, Personnel Readiness Working Group, undated. 

See e-mail from LTC James DiRisio to author, 13 February 2007, 1:56 

p.m. Subject: RE: Changes to the AST/MiTT Mission. Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. PowerPoint Brief. “Grand Scheme, 4.3.”

Headquarters, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Support Unit. 

PowerPoint Brief, “Assessment,” 3 August 2004.
245

________. MS Word Document, “Requirements Assessment,” 3 August 2004.

________. Excel Spread Sheet, “Army Support to MNSTC-I Requirements,” 

undated.

Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 85th Division (Training Support). Briefing, “98th 

Division (IT) Mobilization,” undated. See e-mail from COL Charles 

A. Stafford to author, 23 January 2007, 10:25 a.m. Subject: 98th 

Division (IT)-3d Brigade Organization. Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS. Attachment: 3d Brigade, 85th Division (TS), Master 

Training Schedule, September—December 2004.

Headquarters, 5th Iraqi Division. PowerPoint Brief, “Command Brief, 5th Division 

IAF Update,” 3 March 2005. See e-mail from MAJ Scott McConnell to 

author, 8 February 2007, 8:12 a.m. Subject: Questions About the 5th 

Division. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. Briefing, “5th Division Grand Scheme, Modified.” See e-mail from MAJ 

Scott McConnell to author, 8 February 2007, 8:18 a.m. Subject: One More 

File That May Help. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Headquarters, 77th Regional Readiness Command. PowerPoint Brief, “Task Force 

Liberty, Soldier Readiness Program After Action Report, 2d Battalion, 

390th Regiment, 2d Brigade, 98th Division,” 10–12 July 2004.

Headquarters, 98th Division (Institutional Training). Annex A (Battle Roster) to 

Operations Plan 02-2004.

________. MS Word Document. FA-TRAC, Foreign Army Training Assistance 

Command Lessons Learned, November 2004.

________. Excel Spreadsheet, “98th Division AST 35-Day Training Plan 

Matrix,Version 1.” See e-mail from COL Charles A. Stafford to author, 

17 January 2007, 2:35 p.m. Subject: 98th Division (IT) Documents 2. 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. Excel Spreadsheet, “Active Casualty/Injury Report,” 18 August 2006.

________. Memorandum, AFRC-TNY-CMD, Subject: Identification and Selection of Advisor Support Teams (AST) in Support of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom for Soldiers Outside the 98th Division, 19 August 2004. See 

e-mail from COL Charles A. Stafford to author, 17 January 2004, 2:45 

p.m. Subject: 98th Division (IT) Documents 4. Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. Memorandum, AFRC-TNY-CMD, Subject: 98th DIV (IT) Support 

to MNSTC-I (Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq), 

21 August 2004. See e-mail from COL Charles A. Stafford to author, 

17 January 2004, 3:36 p.m. Subject: 98th Division (IT) Documents 6. 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. Operations Order 05-24 (98th Division (IT) Redeployment Plan), 

Rochester, NY, 231700 July 2005.

________. PowerPoint Brief, “Information Brief, 98th Division (IT) FA-TRAC 

and TY04/TY05 Missions,” 14 September 2004.

________. PowerPoint Brief, “Information Brief, 98th Division (IT) FA-TRAC 

and TY04/TY05 Missions,” 2 October 2004.
246

________. PowerPoint Brief, “98th Division (IT) Organization Charts,” 16 October 

2003. See e-mail from MAJ Matthew Jones to author, 25 January 2007, 

8:27 a.m. Subject: RE: Division Organization. Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS.

________. PowerPoint Brief, “The Foreign Army Training Assistance Command, 

Proposed Timeline and Operational Concepts,” 18 June 2004. 

________. PowerPoint Brief, “The Foreign Army Training Assistance Command, 

Proposed Timeline and Operational Concepts,” 8 July 2004. See e-mail 

from COL Charles A. Stafford to author, 17 January 2007, 2:18 p.m. 

Subject: 98th Division (IT) Documents 1. Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

________. PowerPoint Brief, “Foreign Army Training Assistance Command 

in Support of MNSTC-I/CMATT,” 25 August 2004. See e-mail from 

COL Charles A. Stafford to author, 17 January 2004, 3:30 p.m. Subject: 

98th Division (IT) Documents 5. Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

________. PowerPoint Brief, “Foreign Army-Training Assistance Command 

(FA‐TRAC) Review,” undated.

________. PowerPoint Brief, “OPLAN 04-XX (FA-TRAC) Mission Analysis 

Brief (Draft),” 07 July 2004.

________. PowerPoint Brief, “OPLAN 04-XX (FA-TRAC) Course of Action 

Development Brief,” 09 July 2004.

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, Personnel Readiness Working Group 

(PRWG). Memorandum, Subject: Minutes from 6 February 2005 

Meeting, 6 February 2005. See e-mail from LTC James DiRisio to author, 

13 February 2007, 1:56 p.m. Subject: RE: Changes to the AST/MiTT 

Mission. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Iraq Ministry of Defense. Excel Spreadsheet, MOD Unit Numbering Plan, English 

Version. See e-mail from LTC James DiRisio to author, 13 February 

2007, 1:56 p.m. Subject: RE: Changes to the AST/MiTT Mission. 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Pinkela, MAJ Ken. PowerPoint Brief, “Foreign Army Training Assistance 

Command (FA-TRAC) Decision Brief to FDD Review Board,” Office 

of the Chief, Army Reserve, 12 May 2004.

PowerPoint Chart, “AST Tool,” 9 March 2005.

3d Brigade, 5th Division, “Significant Events Log, 1 Dec 04–25 Aug 05.”

Secondary Sources

Books and Articles

*Army Knowledge On-line, General Officer Management Office website, BG 

James Schwitters.

*Center of Military History. Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces 

in the World War. Vol. 3, Pt. 2. Center of Military History Publication 

Number 23-4. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988.
247

Fallen Heroes Memorial. “Fallen Heroes of Operation Iraqi Freedom: Army Lt. 

Col. Terrence K. Crowe.” http://www.fallenheroesmemorial.com/oif/

profiles/croweterrencek.html.

*Feasel, MAJ Laurence W. Professionals on Review: An Historic Profile of the 

98th “Iroquois” Division. Rochester, NY: Headquarters, 98th Division, 

1980.

Global Security, “Al Taji Army Airfield/Al Taji Camp.” http://www.globalsecurity.

org/military/world/iraq/al-taji.htm.

*Hansen, Timothy J. and Jocene D. Preston, ed. An Encounter with History: The 

98th Division and the Global War on Terrorism, 2001–2005. Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 2006.

Helmly, LTG James R. “Profound Change While Fighting the War.” Army. 

October 2004, 103–14.

*Howard, Michael. “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” Journal of the Royal 

United Services Institute for Defence Studies. As reprinted in C600 

Book of Readings, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas.

The Middle Ground. Web log. http://themiddleground.blogspot.com/2004/10/ 

patriots-and-soldiers-iraq-fallen-49.html.

Molineaux, CPT Peter. “Iraqi Soldiers Wrap Up ‘Operation COBWEB.’” The 

Advisor, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 14 May 

2005.

New York Times, 9 July 2004, “Rochester: 3,600 Face Prospect of Iraq Duty,” 6.

Stars and Stripes. “Coming to Grips with a Close Call at Mosul.” 11 October 

2006. http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=33002 

&archive=true.

MilitaryCity.com. “Honor the Fallen: Army Sergeant First Class Paul D. 

Karpowich.” http://www.militarycity.com/valor/573046.html.

USA Today, “Army Reserve chief says force was not well-prepared 

for terror war,” 16 September 2004. http://www.usatoday.

com/news/washington/2004-09-16-army-reserve_x.htm.

With, SGT Julian. “Returning Home.” Times Union.com Blogs, 25 July 2005. 

http://blogs.timesunion.com/wartime/?p=42.

Wong, Edward. “Ambush Kills 50 Iraq Soldiers Execution Style.” New York 

Times, 25 October 2004.

249

Appendix A

Chronology

2003

Fall	 LTG Helmly, CAR, developed FA-TRAC concept and

discussed it with LTG Cody, ARSTAFF G3

2004

April	 Draft FA-TRAC concept briefed at USAR conference,

Fort Eustis, VA

28 April	 OCAR FA-TRAC concept briefed to LTG Cody;

Cody approves FA-TRAC concept; directs further

development

12 May	 FA-TRAC decision brief to OCAR Force Development

Directorate

15 May	 MNSTC-I headquarters activated in Baghdad

1 June FA-TRAC concept briefing by BG Profit to LTG Petraeus 

(Cody, Helmly, Robinson, Sherlock present); Petraeus 

asks DA to send survey team to Iraq

3 June	 HQ, MNSTC-I Fragmentary Order #15 issued

6 June LTG Petraeus assumes command of MNSTC-I

15 June	 98th Division survey team concept brief to LTG Helmly

18 June	 98th Division survey team concept brief to LTG Cody;

98th directed to conductsurvey of mission requirements

in Iraq

21 June	 Division TOC activated at Division HQ, Rochester, NY

23 June	 Division ADVON Team mobilizes at Division HQ

26 June	 Division ADVON Team moves to CRC Bliss

4 July	 Division ADVON Team arrives in Iraq

6 July	 Survey Team mobilizes at Division HQ

10 July	 Survey Team moves to CRC Bliss

12 July	 Stop-loss initiated

16 July	 DA Alert Order #549-04 alerts 98th Division of possible

activation

21 July	 Survey Team arrives in Kuwait
250

24 July	 Survey Team arrives in Iraq

29 July	 First 98th Division coordination meeting with USARC

and FORSCOM

3 August	 Survey Team completes survey and Requirements

Assessment

4 August 	 VTC between BG Sherlock (Iraq) and MG Robinson

(Rochester)

5 August	 Second 98th Division coordination meeting with USARC

and FORSCOM

6 August LTG Petraeus approves revised Requirements 

Assessment

7 August Division Rear CP activated at Rochester

8–10 August	 BG Sherlock and LTC Ryan present Requirements

Assessment to USARC, FORSCOM, OCAR, and Army

G3; 98th Division given go-ahead to conduct mission

9 August Division notified by MG Wilson it would retain FY 05 

TASS missions

@ 18 August Postmobilization training plan approved by LTG Honoré; 

Camp Atterbury, IN, confirmed as mobilization training 

site

20 August	 3d Brigade, 85th Division (TS) assigned mobilization

training mission for the 98th Division

3 September	 2300—98th Division receives DA mobilization order

8 September	 CRC 1 initial mobilization at home stations (HS); begins

HS training

Mob 1 initial mobilization at HS; begins HS training

11 September	 CRC 1 travels to Bliss

Mob 1 travels to Camp Atterbury

18 September Division Rear CP assumes mission from TOC

3 October	 CRC 2 mobilizes at HS; begins HS training

Mob 2 mobilizes at HS; begins HS training

6 October	 CRC 2 travels to Bliss

Mob 2 travels to Camp Atterbury

15 October	 CRC 3 mobilizes at HS; begins HS training
251

18 October	 Mob 3 mobilizes at HS; begins HS training

CRC 3 travels to Bliss

CRC 2 arrives in Kuwait

19 October	 Mob 1 and Mob 2 arrive in Kuwait

20 October	 Mob 3 travels to Camp Atterbury

23 October	 CRC 1 arrives in Kuwait

30 October	 CRC 3 arrives in Kuwait

@ 31 October	 First 98th Division AST deploys to link up with Iraqi

counterpart unit

5 November	 Mob 4 and 4.5 mobilize at HS; begins HS training

7 November	 Second Battle of Fallujah begins

8 November	 Mob 4 and 4.5 travel to Camp Atterbury

28 November	 Mob 3 arrives in Kuwait

16 December	 Mob 4 and 4.5 arrive in Kuwait

December 	 GEN Casey directs formalization and standardization of

AST concept across the Iraqi Army

2005

January	 HQ, IAG begins to form

30 January	 Iraqi Elections

@ 21 February	 MiTT Leadership Conference

1 March ASTs officially redesignated as MiTTs

4 March	 Mob 4.6 mobilizes at HS; begins HS training

5 March	 Mob 4.6 travels to Fort Hood

27 March	 Mob 4.6 arrives in Kuwait

@ 30 March Phoenix Academy starts classes

@ 1 April	 MiTTS transferred from CMATT to MNC-I

HQ, IAG established under MNSTC-I

@ 30 May	 HQ, IAG transferred to MNC-I

23 July 98th Division issues OPORD 5-24, Redeployment Plan

August	 Redeployment begins

October Redeployment officially complete

253

Appendix B

98th Division Key Personnel, 2004–2005

Name	 Division Position	 Deployment Position(s)

MG Bruce E. Robinson	 CG, 98th Div (IT)	 Same

BG Richard Sherlock 	 ADC, 98th Div (IT)	 Deputy CG, CMATT

CG, IAG

COL Bradford Parsons Div G3 OIC, 5th Div AST

COL Robert Catalanotti	 CO, 1st Bde, 	 Mobilization CO,

98th Div (IT)	 Camp Atterbury

Base Commander,

TMTB

COL Frank Cipolla	 CO, 2d Bde, 	 OIC, ADVON Team

98th Div (IT)	 OIC, C2 Cell

COL Edward P. Castle Div G6 OIC, MOS/OES 

Training Teams

COL Sanford E. Holman	 Div G4	 OIC, 3d Div AST

LTC Todd Arnold Civilian Executive Same

 Officer

LTC Jody Daniels	 Div Deputy 	 Survey Team Ops

 Chief of Staff Liaison Officer

LTC Antonio Morales	 Div Assistant G3	 OIC, C2 Cell—Kuwait

CFLCC Liaison

LTC Douglas Shipman	 S3, 1st Bde, 	 XO, 3d Div AST

98th Div (IT)	 OIC, 2d Div AST

LTC Richard Monczynski Div Deputy G3 OIC, D-Rear CP

MAJ James DiRisio G3 Plans Officer XO to CG, CMATT

MAJ Matthew Jones	 Assistant S3, 2d Bde, 	 OIC, 18th Bn AST

98th Div (IT)

CSM Milton Newsome	 CSM, 6th Bde, 	 CSM, TMTB

98th Div (IT)

255

Appendix C

Redesignation of Iraqi Army Units, April 2005

The Iraqi Army underwent a major reorganization in April 2005 for

the purposes of integrating the units of the Iraqi National Guard into the

regular army. A uniform numbering system was implemented for the 10

existing divisions, and except for the divisions the unique designations 

were eliminated. The following information details the changes to the

Iraqi Army units advised by soldiers of the 98th Division.

Original Designation New Designation

1st Division Same

1st Brigade	 	 1st Brigade, 1st Division

1st Battalion	 	 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Division

2d Battalion	 	 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Division

4th Battalion	 	 3d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Division

2d Brigade	 	 2d Brigade, 1st Division

3d Battalion	 	 1st Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division

8th Battalion	 	 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division

9th Battalion	 	 3d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division

6th Brigade	 	 3d Brigade, 1st Division

22d Battalion	 	 1st Battalion, 3d Brigade, 1st Division

23d Battalion	 	 2d Battalion, 3d Brigade, 1st Division

24th Battalion	 	 3d Battalion, 3d Brigade, 1st Division

7th Brigade*	 	 4th Brigade, 1st Division

16th Battalion	 	 1st Battalion, 4th Brigade, 1st Division

17th Battalion	 2d Battalion, 4th Brigade, 1st Division

18th Battalion	 3d Battalion, 4th Brigade, 1st Division

3d Division Same

4th Brigade	 1st Brigade, 3d Division

10th Battalion	 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3d Division

109th Battalion**	 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3d Division

12th Battalion	 3d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3d Division

*Formerly assigned to the 5th Division. Transferred to the 1st Division about

1 April 2005.

**Formerly an Iraqi National Guard battalion. Replaced the 11th Battalion

about April 2004.
256

5th Brigade	 2d Brigade, 3d Division

13th Battalion	 1st Battalion, 2d Brigade, 3d Division

14th Battalion	 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 3d Division

15th Battalion	 3d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 3d Division

8th Brigade	 3d Brigade, 3d Division

19th Battalion	 1st Battalion, 3d Brigade, 3d Division

20th Battalion	 2d Battalion, 3d Brigade, 3d Division

21st Battalion	 3d Battalion, 3d Brigade, 3d Division

5th Division Same

3d Brigade	 1st Brigade, 5th Division

5th Battalion	 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 5th Division

6th Battalion	 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 5th Division

7th Battalion	 3d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 5th Division

32d Brigade***	 2d Brigade, 5th Division

204th Battalion	 1st Battalion, 2d Brigade, 5th Division

205th Battalion	 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 5th Division

206th Battalion	 3d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 5th Division

9th Brigade	 3d Brigade, 5th Division

25th Battalion	 1st Battalion, 3d Brigade, 5th Division

26th Battalion	 2d Battalion, 3d Brigade, 5th Division

27th Battalion	 3d Battalion, 3d Brigade, 5th Division

***Formerly an Iraqi National Guard brigade. Replaced the 7th Brigade

when it was transferred to the 1st Division in April 2004.
257

Index

Abu Ghraib, Iraq, 104, 131

Acclimatization, 66, 68

Adnan Palace, 83

Advanced Party, viii, 9, 15, 17, 19, 31, 32, 231

Advisor, iii, vii–ix, 3–4, 21–22, 25–27, 34–36, 41–42, 44, 46, 53, 58, 63, 65–67, 

70–73, 75, 78, 81, 92, 97, 101, 103, 108, 115–117, 119–121, 126–128, 

130–131, 141, 147, 149, 150, 153–156, 159–163, 165, 167–171, 173, 

175–182, 184–188, 190, 192–193, 202, 205, 211–214, 217, 240, 242

training of, 35, 46–49, 60–62, 64–66, 71, 93, 108, 187–190, 204, 207, 211–212

selection of, viii, 34–35, 42–44, 66, 75, 101, 207–208, 213–214

qualities of, 3–4, 27, 34, 44, 63, 120, 177–178, 185, 209–211, 217

Advisor Support Team (AST), vii, 21, 31–32, 34–35, 43, 46, 48, 50–51, 53, 56–

59, 63–64, 66, 68, 70–75, 77, 81, 84, 96, 100–102, 105–106, 110, 113, 

115, 117–122, 128, 130–131, 133, 135–137, 141–142, 144–145, 153, 

158, 160–164, 167, 171, 176–177, 179–180, 184, 186–189, 193–194, 

201, 209, 212, 214, 217, 231, 239, 242–246, 251, 253

equipment for, 35, 62, 88, 115–116, 119–120, 124–125, 134, 142, 149, 156, 

160, 164

Iraqi counterparts, 81, 101–102, 108, 127, 129, 144, 147–148, 163, 167, 179, 

181–182, 184

life support to/logistics for, 91, 115–117, 122–126, 153, 201, 214

mission statement/requirements, 35, 43, 64, 87–88, 102–103, 110, 115, 117–

118, 120, 133, 147, 151, 163, 178, 204, 210

number of, 27, 31, 34, 36, 41, 89, 115, 119, 122

organization of, 65, 96, 98, 101–102, 117–118, 120, 128, 160, 162, 176, 178, 223

redesignation to MiTT, 35, 107, 143, 151, 187

Afghanistan, 1, 8, 16, 44, 46, 52, 59, 63, 65, 207, 210, 215, 231

Afghanistan National Army (ANA), 46, 231

Ahmad Hlaybos, 127, 129, 130, 134, 137, 143, 191

Ahmad-Parsons plan, 130, 134, 137

Ali, Colonel, 98–99, 180

Al Kharma, Iraq, 184

Al Kut, Iraq, 109, 122

American Embassy, 83

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, 55, 219, 231

Army Superior Unit Award, 223

Arnold, Todd, 13, 28–29, 75, 237, 253

activation of TOC, 13–14, 45

responsibilities as CXO, 13–14

on mobilization, 16, 18

at USARC HQ, 36

on interaction with USARC, 28, 45

Azizyah, Iraq, 146
258

Baghdad, 9, 11, 28, 31, 33, 48, 66, 69, 74, 84, 86, 91, 94, 96–97, 103–104, 119, 

121–122, 128, 130–131, 133, 137, 143, 231, 244, 249

Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), 31, 36, 66, 69, 74, 116, 201–202, 231

Baghdad Police Academy, 94

Baginski, Theresa R., 100–104, 113, 237

Balad Ruz, Iraq, ix, 154, 157

Ba’qubah, Iraq, 105

Battle rosters, vii, 22, 38, 42, 44, 51, 63, 160, 245

Betterton, Robert W., 156

Blue Force Tracker (BFT) system, 50, 60, 68, 88, 118, 120, 124, 231

Bollenbacher, Paul, 149

Bosnia, 207

Bradley, Lawrence, 141–142, 196, 237

Briefings, 

28 April 2004, FA-TRAC concept brief to Cody, 8, 249

1 June 2004, FA-TRAC concept brief to Petraeus, 9

18 June 2004, Survey Team brief to Cody, 9–11

7 July 2004, 98th Division Mission Analysis brief, viii, 18–19, 29

9 July 2004, 98th Division Course of Action brief, viii, 18, 20–21, 29

6 August 2004, Requirements Assessment brief to Petraeus, 36–37

8 August 2004, Requirements Assessment brief to Wilson and Burns, 36–37

9 August 2004, Requirements Assessment brief to Helmly and Condon, 37

Buffalo, NY, 9, 58, 135

Burns, Julian H., Jr., 36–37

“Capstone” program, 217–218

Casey, George W., 187, 251

Castle, Edward P. 77–78, 112, 237, 253

at Camp Atterbury, 63–64

on training at Camp Atterbury, 64

as MOS/OES school commandant, 63, 73, 96–97

work with Iraqi Army engineers and engineer school, 96–99

Catalanotti, Robert, 15, 28, 41, 76–78, 94, 112, 237, 239, 253

at Camp Atterbury, 54–55, 91

on training at Camp Atterbury, 55, 59, 61, 65

as Taji base commander, 91–93

Central Issue Facility (CIF), 88, 231

Charnock, Brian D., 67, 77–78, 124, 181, 185, 194, 198–199, 237

at Camp Atterbury, 58–59

on training at Camp Atterbury, 58, 65

RIPTOA with early advisors, 122

interaction with the 16th Battalion, 184–185

and AST logistics, 123

improvement of the 16th Battalion, 183, 186

at Al Kharma, 184

RIPTOA with 80th Division, 190–191
259

Chiarelli, Peter, 34–35

Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), 7, 11, 231, 246

Chin, Dr., 70

Christian, Daniel J., ix, 67, 69, 73, 78–79, 96–98, 112, 122–123, 125, 136–137, 

145, 147–150, 158, 194–197, 237, 244

Ciesinski, Paul, 192, 199, 238

Cipolla, Frank, viii, 11, 31, 33, 39, 78, 81, 111, 120, 194, 238

at 18 June 2004, Survey Team concept brief, 9–10

as OIC of the Advance Party, 15, 31–32, 253

on relations with MNSTC-I and CMATT staffs, 31, 85–86

as OIC of the C2 Cell, 31, 91, 116, 188, 253

Citizen’s Military Training Camp, 5, 60

Civil Affairs, 7, 233

Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), 5, 231

Clegg, William, 15

Coalition Allies, Troops, and Units,

Australian, 82, 90, 119, 162

British, 82, 94

Bulgarian, 145

German, 99

Polish, 145, 189

Romanian, 145

Salvadoran, 82, 145, 189

Ukrainian, 145

Units:

Multi-National Division Central-South (MND-CS), 145–146, 148, 234

1st Polish Brigade Combat Team, 146

Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team (CMATT), v, viii, 1, 19, 31–34, 41, 

51, 66, 70–72, 74, 81–85, 89–91, 96–97, 100, 102, 105–106, 109, 111, 

113, 115–116, 123, 130, 140, 151, 153, 169, 187–188, 194, 196, 201, 

204, 209, 216–217, 231, 242, 244, 246, 251, 253

Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), 34, 51, 74, 82–83, 89, 94, 

109, 111, 201, 204, 232, 239

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 1, 69, 209, 232 

Cody, Richard, 3, 8–10, 13, 28, 33, 225, 249

Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), 120, 131, 179, 232

Command and Control Cell (C2 Cell), vii, 36, 51, 69–70, 74, 81, 91, 115–116, 

120, 127, 188–189, 194, 199, 201–203, 231, 239, 244, 253

Compitello, John, 50, 88

Condon, Kathryn, 37, 39

Contingency Operation Temporary Tour of Active Duty (COTTAD) orders, 13, 232

Contractor, 50, 57, 67, 92–93

CONUS Replacement Center (CRC), 15, 51–52, 66, 141, 226, 232, 249–251

Convoy, 103, 108, 116, 120, 123, 131, 135, 137–138, 146, 148, 160–161, 163, 175

attacks on, 101, 104, 131, 137, 149, 164, 188
260

training, 35, 48, 50, 61–62, 65, 67–68, 101–103, 137, 168, 192, 239

security team, 36, 51, 61–62, 76, 87–88

Cordon and search/Cordon and knock, 61, 142, 146–148, 165, 167–168, 170, 180, 

183, 192

Crowe, Terrence, ix, 171–173, 197–198, 247

Curwen, John C., v, 133–134, 141, 149–150, 153, 195–196, 238

at Kirkush, 131–132

on RIPTOA with early advisors, 132

convoy to Fallujah, 131

on status of the 6th Battalion, 131–132

on performance of the early advisors, 150

at Fallujah, 131–132

on relationship with US counterpart unit, 132, 150, 153

on combat action south of Balad Ruz, 155, 156–157

Dacquel, Isidoro, 164–165

Dilfanian, Ramin, 15

Daniels, Jody J., v, 39, 77, 85, 111–112, 203, 238, 253

as member of the Survey Team, 15, 71, 76, 253

on cultural awareness training, 60

on acclimatization in Kuwait, 68

on AST reassignments, 71

as MNSTC-I J2, 87

Del Rio, TX, 4

Demobilization, 4, 53, 202–203

DeOliveira, Marcus, 177–178, 180, 186, 198–199

Department of the Army (DA), 14, 17, 26, 28, 33, 38, 41, 48, 224, 232–233, 243, 

249, 250

Department of Defense (DOD), 232

Derenda, Robert, 175

Derivative Unit Identification Code (DUIC), 44–45, 75, 81, 221–223, 232

Dill, Christopher W., ix, 154–156

DiRisio, James, v, 28, 51, 76, 79, 111–112, 194–195, 228, 238–239, 244, 246

work with TOC, 13–16, 45

BDU flag incident, 14, 18

on division staff’s attitudes, 14

on the Convoy Security Team, 51

as Schwitters’ XO, 73–74, 85, 253

on working conditions at CMATT, 83, 90

on 98th Division patch incident, 85–86

on Schwitters, 125

on use of institutional training divisions for the advisor mission, 210

Diwaniyah, Iraq, 122

Drill sergeant, 24, 26, 42, 57–60, 108–109, 135, 154, 164, 175, 224–225

Ea’ad, Colonel, 101–103
261

East Gate (at Taji), 92

Eaton, Paul, 1, 208–210, 239

Edinburg, IN, 52

Elections (in Iraq), ix, 107, 117, 139, 143, 165–167, 180–181, 251

Eller, Michael L., 149, 196, 244

Ewing, Dennis P., 60–61, 64, 77–78, 115, 135–136, 145–146, 158, 195–197, 239

Fallujah, ix, 73, 120, 131, 133–134, 138, 154, 177–178, 180–181, 184, 251

Operation AL FAJR, 132, 177

Iraqi elections at, 139, 181

Camp Fallujah, 131, 138, 177

other operations in/near, 87, 132, 134–135, 140–141, 179

and 5th Division (Forward), 128, 130, 137, 140

Family care plan (FCP), 23, 232

Family Readiness Group (FRG), 22, 24, 232

Fedak, Peter, 131–132

Fedayeen, 147

Foreign Army-Training Assistance Command (FA-TRAC), vii, 7–8, 10, 19, 29, 

31, 34, 76, 111, 113, 210, 212–213, 232, 242, 244–246, 249 

Helmly’s original concept of, 1, 249

genesis of, 7–8

28 April 2004 concept brief to Cody, 8, 249

1 June 2004 concept brief to Petraeus, 9, 249

FORSCOM resistance to, 8

USARC resistance to, 8–9, 25

18 June 2004 concept brief, 9–10

Robinson’s involvement in, 25, 115

increasing irrelevance and end of, 33–34

as additional duty to 98th Division, 7, 19, 37

Fragmentary Order #15, 9, 11, 28, 244, 249

Frankfurt, Germany, 66

Friedman, Joseph D., 120, 189, 194, 199, 201, 206, 239

and C2 Cell, 116, 188–189, 202

and the Phoenix Academy, 201

Freeland, Pennsylvania, 165

Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 14, 17–18, 53–54, 65, 76, 111, 196, 208, 224, 

233, 247

Green Zone, 74, 83

Green Hotel (see also Taji Military Training Base), 70, 116, 177, 190, 193, 201

Gun Control Act of 1968, 22

Habbaniyah, Iraq, 109

Hamilton, William, 36

Hauser, Shauna, 94, 112, 240

Hawaii, 6
262

Helmly, James R. (see also US Army Reserve Command, Office of Chief, Army 

Reserve), 7, 9, 11, 13, 28–29, 33, 39, 76, 209, 240, 247, 249

his original concept of FA-TRAC, 1, 7, 224, 249

on the Iraq War and the GWOT, 7, 17

on readiness of USAR, 7

and FA-TRAC briefs to Cody, 8

on FORSCOM and USARC resistance to FA-TRAC, 8, 13, 25–26, 224

directs 98th Division to develop survey team concept brief, 9

at 9 August 2004 Requirements Assessment brief at the Pentagon, 37

on the 98th Division, 9, 17, 38, 224

on Camp Atterbury, 53

efforts to reorganize the USAR, 224

HMMWV (M1114), 35, 62, 68, 88, 103, 117–118, 120, 124–125, 134, 142, 148–

149, 154–155, 157, 160–161, 164, 175, 233

Henry, Peter A., 35–36, 91

Highway 1, 74, 92, 160

Hohenfels, Germany, 120, 131, 232

Holman, Sanford, 73, 160–161, 170–171, 253

Honoré, Russell, 50, 250

Howard, Michael, 208, 211, 228, 247

Hussein, Saddam, 83–84, 147, 154, 166, 204, 208

Improvised Explosive Device (IED), ix, 58, 62–63, 68, 74, 88, 99, 104, 131, 137, 

147, 149–150, 164, 169, 181–182, 186, 191, 196, 233, 237, 244

Indianapolis, IN, 66, 202

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), 18, 42, 141, 220, 233

Installations (US and Iraqi),

Barracks

Plattsburg Barracks, NY, 5

Bases

Al Kasik Military Training Base (AKMTB), Iraq, ix, 119, 159–162, 231

Forward Operating Base (FOB), general, 141–142, 158, 160–161, 164, 232

FOB Caldwell, Iraq, 108, 150

FOB Marez, Iraq, 161, 164, 171

FOB Shield, Iraq, 94

FOB War Horse, Iraq, 105–108

Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB), Iraq, 108, 119, 123, 127–128, 

131–132, 134–135, 140, 143, 149–151, 233

Numaniyah Military Training Base (NMTB), Iraq, 97, 122, 136–137, 

146, 148–149, 234

Taji Military Training Base (TMTB), Iraq, 41, 69, 91, 95, 236, 253

Camps

Camp Atterbury, IN, v, vii–viii, 45–46, 51–58, 60–68, 71, 74–75, 77–78, 

91, 100, 127–128, 141, 162, 178, 188, 203, 210, 212–213, 221, 

243, 250–251, 253

Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, 201
263

Camp Breckinridge, KY, 6

Camp Buehring, Kuwait, 88

Camp Dix, NJ, 5

Camp Drum, NY, 6

Camp Echo, Iraq, 149

Camp Fallujah/East Fallujah Camp, Iraq, 131, 138, 177

Camp McClellan, AL, 4

Pine Camp, NY, 5

Camp Shelby, MS, 46

Camp Virginia, Kuwait, 66–68, 88, 178, 212–213

Forts

Fort Benning, GA, 71, 141

Fort Bliss, TX, 15–16, 21, 51–52, 66, 74–76, 120, 127, 203, 221, 249–251

Fort Devens, MA, 15

Fort Dix, NJ, 6, 17, 21, 46

Fort Hancock, NJ, 5

Fort Leonard Wood, MO, 6, 17, 63

Fort McPherson, GA, 36

Fort Meade, MD, 160

Fort Monmouth, NJ, 5

Fort Niagara, NY, 5

Fort Porter, NY, 5

Fort Riley, KS, 204

Fort Tall Afar, Iraq, 160

Ottoman Fort, Tall Afar, Iraq, 168

Internet, 63, 122, 126, 177

Interpreter, ix, 15, 32, 107, 121, 130–131, 143, 147, 154, 157, 189–190

Iraq, iii, v, viii, ix, 1, 3, 7–10, 13, 15–17, 19–21, 23–25, 28, 31, 33–34, 41, 44–46, 

48, 51–52, 58–62, 70, 72, 78, 81–82, 89, 91, 96, 107, 112, 115, 119, 122, 

124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 138, 141, 146–147, 152, 161, 164, 186, 189, 

192, 195, 203–204, 207–210, 215, 221–223, 225–226, 237, 246–247

Iraq Advisor Group (IAG), vii, 33, 81, 151, 186–187, 199, 201, 203, 233, 251

genesis of, 81, 87

and Sherlock, 33, 151, 189, 196, 203, 217, 253

and command relationships, 151, 169, 187, 189

mission of, 151

and development of MiTT training, 108, 187–188

and the Phoenix Academy, 81, 187–189

and McLaren, 189–190

and RIPTOA process, 189–190, 201

Iraqi Army (IA) (see also Iraqi Army units), iii, viii–ix, 3, 8, 15, 19, 21, 31–32, 

35–36, 41, 53, 60, 73, 87–88, 91, 93, 95–99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 110, 

115–116, 122–123, 127, 129–130, 134, 142–143, 146, 151, 153, 159–

160, 165, 171, 173, 177, 181, 187, 191, 199, 204–205, 211–212, 233, 

237, 244, 251, 255
264

Engineer Training Center, 98

NCO Academy, 93, 108

Iraqi Military Academy, 105, 113

Kirkush NCO Academy, 108 

Kurdish Military Academy, 105

Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF), 119, 233, 177

Iraqi Army units (see also Appendix C), 3, 21, 69, 88, 113, 115, 142, 173, 181, 

187, 212, 255

Battalions: 

1st Battalion, 71, 175, 177, 179–181

5th Battalion, 140, 256

6th Battalion, 73, 131–132, 140, 149–151, 153–155, 157, 256

7th Battalion, 73, 141–142, 158, 256

10th Battalion, 164, 168, 255

11th Battalion, 164, 171, 255

12th Battalion, 162–163, 165, 167–168, 255

16th Battalion, 183–184, 186, 255

17th Battalion, 133–134, 255

18th Battalion, 133, 138–139, 182–183, 186, 255

26th Battalion, 135, 146, 158, 256

204th ING Battalion, 106, 256

205th ING Battalion, 106, 256

206th ING Battalion, 106, 256

Brigades:

1st Brigade, 71, 151, 160, 176–177, 180, 198, 238, 255

1st Brigade, 1st Division, 180, 255

1st Brigade, 3d Division, 171, 255

1st Brigade, 5th Division, 127, 256

2d Brigade, 127, 151, 160, 177, 222, 255

2d Brigade, 1st Division, 255

2d Brigade, 3d Division, 256

2d Brigade, 5th Division, 106, 256

3d Brigade, ix, 106, 108, 119, 127–128, 130–131, 134, 137–138, 140–

141, 149, 150–151, 158, 160, 192, 255

3d Brigade, 1st Division, 255

3d Brigade, 3d Division, 256

3d Brigade, 5th Division, ix, 67, 127, 147, 196, 237, 244, 246, 256

4th Brigade, 127, 160, 162–164, 171, 181–182, 255

5th Brigade, 256

6th Brigade, 255

7th Brigade, 127–128, 131, 133–134, 137, 140–141, 177, 181, 240, 

255–256

8th Brigade, 160, 162, 169, 171, 175, 180, 256

9th Brigade (“Al Karrar Brigade”), 119, 122, 127,135–137, 140, 144–

147, 149, 158, 256
265

9th Mechanized Brigade, 151

32d Brigade, 106–107, 127, 256

Divisions: 

Al-Medina Armored Division, 69

1st Division, 59, 93, 107, 119, 122, 127–128, 160, 176–177, 180–181, 

183–184, 185, 193, 255–256

2d Division, 151, 160, 171, 173–174

3d Division, ix, 58, 72, 119, 121, 124, 159–161, 163, 165, 169–171, 

173–176, 242, 255–256

4th Division, ix, 151, 202

5th Division (“Hadeed Division”), ix, 72–73, 97, 119, 121–123, 127–

131, 135–136, 140–141, 143–144, 148, 151–152, 158, 162, 

165, 173–174, 176–177, 181, 191, 193, 196, 203, 237, 240–

241, 244–246, 256

6th Division, 151, 187

8th Division, 146, 151

Regiments:

1st Engineer Regiment, 98–99

1st Transportation Regiment, 100

2d Transportation Regiment, 102

Other:

Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF), 119, 233, 177

Iraqi National Guard (ING) (see also Iraqi Army units), 32, 35, 81, 88, 95, 99, 

105–109, 113, 116, 127, 143, 145, 151, 165, 168, 171, 173, 187, 195, 

233, 255–256

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) (see also Iraqi Army units), 66, 71, 87, 89, 208, 233

Japan, occupation of, 6

Joie, Joseph B., 149

Joint Manning Document (JMD), 36, 42, 66, 74–76, 81, 84, 87, 113, 117–118, 

233, 244

Jones, Al, 46

Jones, Matthew T., v, 48, 75–79, 181, 194–195, 198–199, 240, 246, 253

work with TOC, 14

on advisor duties, responsibilities, and selection process, 44, 46, 185

at Camp Atterbury, 63

on training at Camp Atterbury, 58, 60

on Dr. Chin, 70

at Taji, 72, 137

RIPTOA with early advisors, 121

at Kirkush, 133–134

integration with the 18th Battalion, 134

convoy to Fallujah, 135, 137

at Fallujah, 138–140, 181

Iraqi election, 139

improvement of the 18th Battalion, 182–183, 186
266

Jordan, 83, 204

Karasul Amir Karasul, 134

Karpowich, Paul D., 164

Kienle, Frederick, 90, 188

Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) (see also Contractors), 94, 233

Kelly, Brian, 36

Kelly, James A., 211, 228, 240

Kelly, Lawrence J., 15, 84, 96, 111–112, 240

Kennedy, Stephen, 156

Khursheed Saleem Hassan Al Dosekey, 156, 163, 170

Kingsbury, Michael, 131

Knope, John, 24

Kosovo, 207

Kurdistan, 159, 163

Kurds, 82, 142, 159

Kuwait, vii–viii, 26, 33, 41, 46, 48, 50, 66–69, 74, 78, 83, 88, 116, 124, 141, 188, 

190, 193, 201–202, 204, 212, 240, 249, 251, 253

Kuwait City International Airport, 66

Kyushu, Japan, 6

Lautenberg Amendment, 22

Lawrence, T.E., 126

Lawless, Robert J., Jr., 188, 201

LeTourneau University, 89

Londonderry, NH, 15

Longview, TX, 89

Loncle, Paul A., 24, 29, 56, 58–59, 67, 77–78, 104–108, 113, 226, 228, 240

Lowry, David, 36

Major Commands,

Central Command (CENTCOM), 41, 43, 48, 86, 231

Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), 26, 50, 88, 231, 253

First US Army, viii, 5, 35, 41, 45–46, 48–50, 54, 65, 75, 221, 242, 244

Foreign Army-Training Assistance Command (FA-TRAC) (see separate entry) 

Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), 34, 94, 106, 122, 151, 153, 173, 187, 

234, 251

Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), 1, 50, 83, 187, 234

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), iii, viii, 1, 3, 

9–11, 15, 19, 25, 27–29, 31, 33–37, 39, 41–42, 44, 46, 50–52, 66, 

70, 74–76, 81–88, 90, 93–96, 99, 109, 111–112, 115, 117, 122, 129, 

143, 147, 151, 153, 173, 187, 189, 193–194, 196, 201, 203–204, 

208–210, 216, 221–224, 233–234, 242, 244–247, 249, 251

United States Army Europe (USAREUR), 72, 236

United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), 8, 13–14, 23, 25–27, 

36–38, 41, 48, 75, 224–225, 228, 232, 239, 244, 250
267

United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), 1, 7–8, 13–14, 25–28, 

36–37, 41–42, 44–45, 48, 51, 212, 221, 224–225, 236, 250

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 7, 23, 236

Marshall, George C., 221

Marza, Brigadier General, 98–99

Mattydale, NY, 91

McConnell, Scott P., v, 77–79, 128, 130, 194–197, 199, 226, 228, 240, 245

on training at Camp Atterbury, 56, 60–61, 63–64, 68

on the “Green Hotel,” 70

on the true nature of the advisor mission, 73

on the RIPTOA with early advisors, 121, 128

on the staff of the 5th Division, 128–129

on the “Ahmed-Parsons” plan, 130–131

on working with the Marines, 140

on working with the 5th Division, 143–144, 158, 191

on the 42d Infantry Division, 152

McKiernan, David D., 26

McGrath, Philip S., 15, 100, 102

McLaren, John P., Jr., 78, 189–190, 199, 241

McMaster, H.R. (see also 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment), 169, 171

MEDEVAC operations, 149, 156, 182, 234

Metz, Thomas F., 151

Milano, Mike, 50

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), 3, 36, 42, 51, 63, 73, 84, 88–89, 95–96, 

98–100, 104, 108, 117–118, 203, 234, 253

Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) (see also Contractors), 

67–68, 234

Military Transition Team (MiTT), 35, 108, 143, 148–149, 151–153, 155–156, 

158, 168–171, 173–176, 183–184, 186–189, 192–193, 199, 201, 203, 

234, 239, 244, 246, 251

Equipment for, 148–149

Life support to/logistics for, 151–153, 169

Number of, 151, 153, 204

Organization of, 35, 107, 187

Redesignation from AST, 35, 107, 143, 167, 187

Miller, Brian, 96–99

Ministry of Defense (MOD), 87–89, 98–100, 103, 109, 119, 127, 171, 195, 234, 

239, 244, 246

Ministry of the Interior (MOI), 83, 88–89, 94, 99, 147, 234

Mission Essential Task List (METL), 1, 32, 207, 210–212, 224, 234

Mission statement/requirements, 10, 25, 48, 50, 54, 69, 75–76, 93, 116, 151, 207–

208, 210, 249

98th Division, 19, 25, 37, 118

Advisor Support Teams, 21, 32–33, 35, 46, 66, 71, 87, 91, 117, 137
268

C2 Cell, 115

MNSTC-I, 1, 3, 10, 19, 27, 31, 36–37, 42, 46, 51–52, 87, 94, 204

Mobilization, vii–viii, 1, 6, 13, 16–17, 20–24, 41–42, 44–46, 51–57, 63, 66, 76–77, 

107, 178, 202, 215–217, 219–220, 222, 225, 234, 242–245, 250, 253

Mobilization (Mob) groups, 19, 51–52, 54, 63, 66, 74, 89, 91, 111–112, 116, 128, 

141, 201–202, 209, 234

Mollineaux, Peter, 149

Monczynski, Richard F., 45, 51, 75, 201–202, 241, 253

Morales, Antonio L. “Tony,” 15, 39, 76, 241, 253

as member of the Survey Team, 34, 48, 50, 88

on the postmobilization training plan, 34

on training in Kuwait, 50, 48

as CFLCC LNO, 50, 66, 88

as C2 Cell representative in Kuwait, 66

Mosul, Iraq, 109, 119, 161–162, 164–165, 168–169, 174, 180, 197, 247

Mucciarone, Peter, 141–142, 174

Myers, Kevin, 96

Nassau, House of, 4

National Guard (see also US Army units), iii, v, 1, 4–5, 7–8, 46, 53–56, 58, 66, 

119, 123, 125, 134, 150, 207–208, 210, 214–216, 218, 221–222, 228

National Guard Bureau, 221

Newsome, Milton, 91–93, 112, 241, 253

New York Times, 16, 28, 195, 247

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 105, 234

Observer/controllers (O/C), 58, 119–120, 131, 209, 234

Office of the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Guard and 

Reserve Affairs, 16

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), 246, 249–250

Office of Security Transition (OST), 19, 29

O’Keefe, Stacy, 101, 104

Organized Reserves, 4–5, 111

Operations,

AL FAJR, 132, 177

Desert Fox, 69

COBWEB, ix, 146–148, 196, 247

Desert Storm, 215

FISH NET II, 148

Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 69, 75–76, 197–198, 234, 242, 244–245, 247

OLYMPIC, 6

PENINSULA, 147

Patch (shoulder sleeve insignia), 4, 14, 204, 222

controversy over wear of, 85–86, 111

Parsons, Bradford, 28, 39, 50, 73, 75, 77, 97, 128, 134, 137, 194–197, 241, 253

work with TOC, 13–17, 45–46
269

development of briefings, 18

at 8 August 2004 Requirements Assessment briefing, 36

on Burns’ view of the Requirements Assessment, 37

on advisor selection process, 43

on training at Camp Atterbury, 48, 60

as OIC for the C2 Cell, 203

as senior advisor to the 5th Division, 108, 123, 127–128

on the 42d Infantry Division, 152

integration with the 5th Division, 128–129

on capabilities of the division commander and staff, 129

and MG Ahmad Hlaybos, 130–131

on the Iraqi elections in Fallujah, 139

on training and advising the 5th Division, 143, 191

on relations with counterpart units, 144, 153

on progress of the 5th Division, 152, 158

RIPTOA with the 80th Division, 158, 191

Pellien, Ann, 87, 203

Pennsauken, NJ, 164

Pentagon, 1, 7–9, 11, 25–26, 29, 37, 39, 111, 194, 228

Peshmerga, 135, 159, 162, 167

Petraeus, David H., viii, 1, 11, 26, 34, 36, 86–87, 111, 129, 199, 204, 207, 209, 

225, 228, 241, 249–250

priority of 98th Division requirements, 3

at 1 June 2004, FA-TRAC concept brief, 9

guidance to survey team, 9, 31, 34

and 6 August Requirements Assessment brief, 36

on and relations with the 98th Division, 84–85, 90, 217

and the Iraq Advisor Group, 151, 187

Phoenix Academy, vii, 81, 93, 186–189, 201, 203, 212–213, 251

Phoenix Base, 74, 83, 90, 97

Presidential palace, 83–84

Profit, Gary M., 9, 249

Providence, RI, 15, 58

Rahman Jerry Chalib, 147

Ramadi, Iraq, 104, 181

Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), 50, 88, 115, 187, 

199, 235

Rear command post (rear CP), 22–23, 45, 51, 111, 201–203, 235, 250

Redeployment operations, v, vii, 20, 201, 203, 245, 251

Regular Army, v, 5, 7, 33, 57, 84, 88, 119, 141, 164, 207, 209, 214, 222

Bias and prejudice toward Reserve Components, 84, 207, 215–221

Request for Forces (RFF), 36, 75, 187, 208, 235

Requirements Assessment, 11, 25, 27, 35–36, 39, 41, 112, 194, 204, 245, 250

Reserve Readiness Command, 31

Retirement, 17–18, 22
270

Rhein Main Air Base, Germany, 66

Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIPTOA), vii, 121–122, 177, 235

between early advisors and 98th Division, 121, 132, 138, 161–162, 177

between 98th Division and 80th Division, 184, 189–190, 192–193, 199, 201

Robinson, Bruce E., viii, 20, 29, 54, 115, 127, 203, 216, 226, 250, 253

at 1 June 2004, FA-TRAC concept brief, 9, 249

at 18 June 2004, Survey Team concept brief, 9

directive to establish the TOC, 13

at 7 July 2004, Mission Analysis brief, 19

predeployment briefings to families, 24–25

involvement in FA-TRAC, 25, 37, 224

at 8 August 2004, Requirements Assessment brief, 36

and advisor selection, 42–43

and mobilization order, 51

and “Welcome Home Warrior Citizen” ceremonies, 202

Rochester, NY, v, 13, 22, 28–29, 31, 38–39, 41, 45, 50, 54, 66, 71, 75–78, 81, 85, 

91, 111–113, 194–195, 198, 201, 228, 237, 245, 247, 249–250

Rustamiyah, Iraq, 113, 180–181

Ryan, Sean, 28–29, 31, 36, 39, 75–76, 78, 194, 241, 250

as member of the Survey Team, 16

on Schwitters’ view of early advisor teams and advisor training, 34–35

at 8 August 2004, Requirements Assessment brief, 36–37

at 9 August 2004, Requirements Assessment brief, 37

and postdeployment training plan, 41, 50, 65

on mobilization of the 98th Division, 51

on acclimatization in Kuwait, 66, 69

Samarra, Iraq, 73, 138, 141, 158, 192

Santiago, Jose, 22

Scania, Iraq, 125

Schenectady, NY, 204

Schweinfurt, Germany, 141

Schwitters, James, 34, 39, 70, 72, 74, 79, 85, 90–91, 93, 97, 112, 194–195, 199, 

228, 241, 246

as CG, CMATT, viii, 31, 89

view of advisor duties and capabilities, 31, 34

frustration with advisor training and preparation, 34–35, 72, 120, 209, 211, 

213

background of, 89–90

98th Division’s view of, 89

on use of Reserves for advisor mission, 90, 224–225

on logistics support to advisors, 123, 125–126, 214

and the Phoenix Academy, 188, 212

Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), 15, 48, 170, 235

Security Clearance, 22, 42

Semler, Christopher, 13, 45, 241
271

Sherlock, Richard, viii, 11, 28–29, 33–35, 39, 74, 97, 111, 194, 196, 199, 203, 

225–226, 228, 241, 250, 253

at 1 June 2004, FA-TRAC concept brief, 9, 249

and 8 June 2004, Survey Team concept brief, 9, 13

and guidance to TOC, 14, 15

as OIC of the Survey Team, 15–16, 33–34

involvement with FA-TRAC, 9, 25, 224

on resistance of USARC and FORSCOM to FA-TRAC, 13, 15, 26–27

view of the original FA-TRAC mission to Iraq, 25, 31, 33

and 6 August 2004, Requirements Assessment brief to Petraeus, 36

and 8 August 2004, Requirements Assessment brief to USARC/FORSCOM, 

36–37, 250

and 9 August 2004, Requirements Assessment brief to Helmly, 37

and selection of advisors, 42

and postmobilization training plan, 46, 48, 50

and interaction with the CMATT chief of staff, 72, 84

on RIPTOA with early advisors, 121

assignment to IAG, 151, 187, 217

and development of MiTT training, 187–188

and the Phoenix Academy, 188, 203, 212

and McLaren, 189

and RIPTOA process, 189–190

on problems with DUICs, 222–223

Shi’a, 82, 101, 142

Shipman, Douglas R., 77–79, 159–160, 174, 194, 197–198, 203, 242, 253

on the training at Camp Atterbury, 58, 62–63

on advisor assignment turbulence, 72–73

on RIPTOA with early advisors, 121, 161–162

and convoy to Al Kasik, 160–161

on desertion of Iraqi soldiers, 162–163

on integration and relations with the 3d Division leadership, 163, 170

on the Iraqi Army “direct recruiting” program, 166

on relationships with the 3d ACR, 169–171

on selection of LTC Crowe, 171–172

as senior advisor to the 2d Division, 173–174

on relationships with the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 174

on the performance of the 98th Division in Iraq, 175

Shumali Bridge, 146

Shupp, Michael, 140

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), 35, 60, 88, 

118, 124, 134, 235

Soldier Readiness Program (SRP), 15–16, 22–23, 29, 235, 245

South Gate (at Taji), 92

Smith, Michael R. “Mike,” 89

Special Air Service (SAS), 94, 235
272

Special Forces (SF), 1, 65–67, 124, 154, 169, 175, 192, 208, 210, 211, 235

Special Police Transition Team (SPTT), 87, 189, 235

Special Operations, 16, 70, 126, 210

Speer, Gary D., 26

Stafford, Charles A. “Gus,” v, 75–78, 210, 242–246

on the 98th Division’s mission, 53

on training Reserve Component units, 54–55, 57–58

on convoy training techniques, 62

on postdeployment training plan inadequacies, 57, 65

on experience level of 3d Brigade trainers, 65

Stop Loss, 17

Stryker, 161, 168, 174–175

Sullivan, Sean, 96, 105, 112–113

Sunni, 82, 142, 154

Survey Team (see also Sherlock, Richard), vii, 9, 13, 16, 18, 25, 35, 42, 48, 60, 69, 

71, 76, 88, 112, 226, 249–250, 253

composition of, 13, 15–16, 34

mission of, 9–10

development of requirements assessment, 25, 27, 31, 33–36, 71, 204

development of Kuwait training, 68, 96

Suwayrah, Iraq, 146

Swartwood, Roger, 71, 77–79, 177, 186, 192, 198–199, 211, 217, 228, 243

on the training at Camp Atterbury, 59, 62–63, 68

on RIPTOA with early advisors, 177–179, 192

on status of the 1st Battalion, 179–180

on operations at Fallujah, 180

Syracuse, NY, 4, 6

Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA), 3, 17, 26, 215, 236

Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), 8–10, 42, 192, 215, 236

Tactical Operations Center (TOC), v, vii, 13, 15–16, 18, 22, 28, 41, 44, 46, 71, 85, 

106, 170, 236, 238, 249–250

establishment of, 13–14, 249

mission of, 13–15, 45

Talil, Iraq, 109

Tall Afar, Iraq, 82, 124, 160, 164–165, 168–169, 171–174, 191, 201

Taluto, Joseph J., 152

Tennyson, Jeffrey E., 63, 77–79, 162, 174, 191–192, 194, 197–199, 243

on the training at Camp Atterbury, 63

on advisor assignment turbulence, 64, 73

on advisor logistics, 124

on RIPTOA with early advisors, 162

on status of the 12th Battalion, 162–163

on IED incident north of Al Kasik, 164

on Iraqi elections at Al Kasik, 165

on operations with the 12th Battalion, 167
273

on relationships with the 3d ACR, 170–171

on problems in the Iraqi Army, 168–169, 171, 174–175

on the 98th Division’s performance in Iraq, 175

on progress of the 12th Battalion, 162, 167–169

Tikrit, Iraq, 109, 130

Total Army School System (TASS), 14, 16, 19, 23, 25–26, 37, 46, 224, 235, 250

Trainers, iii, 21, 31, 51, 53–55, 57–62, 64–65, 95, 190

Training, iii, v, vii–ix, 1, 3, 5–11, 15–16, 19–20, 23, 25–26, 28, 31–37, 41–42, 44, 

48, 51–73, 75–78, 81, 84, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95–96, 98–103, 105–111, 113, 

117–121, 127–130, 132–133, 135–138, 140–142, 144–145, 148–153, 

155, 159–160, 162, 166–168, 173–176, 178, 180–181, 187–189, 191, 

193–194, 202–204, 207–213, 215, 218–219, 221, 224–227

availability in Kuwait, 41, 48, 50, 69

battle with First Army, 48–51

postmobilization, 6, 41, 48

premobilization, 13, 21–22, 45–47, 50

Training Package, vii, 35, 41, 46, 50, 52, 54, 65, 65, 78, 95–96, 106

MOS team, 51, 95–96, 99–100, 104, 108

NCOES team, 21, 51, 95–96, 108

OES team, 21, 24, 51, 56, 95–96, 104–105, 108, 122

ING BCT team, 51, 95, 108–109

Training, Schools, and Courses,

Advanced Individual Training (AIT), 6–7, 231

Army War College, 7

Basic Combat Training (BCT), 6, 21, 51, 53, 95, 108–109, 231

Combat Life Saver (CLS), 57, 61, 63, 231

Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), 105, 185, 211, 231

Common Specialist Training (CST), 6–7, 232

Common Task Tests (CTT), 23, 52, 60, 65, 232

Command and General Staff College (CGSC), 7, 105, 231, 247

Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC), 6, 231

Convoy Training, 35, 50, 61, 65, 67–68, 168, 239

Cultural Awareness Training, 35, 48, 50, 60, 70

Driver’s Training, 48, 62

Initial Entry Training (IET), 14–15, 19, 23, 26, 37, 233

Intermediate Level Education (ILE), 105, 233

Marksmanship Training, 65, 75, 99, 135

Noncommissioned Officer Academy, 93, 108

Noncommissioned Officer Advanced Course, 6

Noncommissioned Officer Basic Course, 6

Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), 7, 21, 51, 234

Officer Advanced Course, 6

Officer Basic Course, 6

Officer Education System (OES), 21, 24, 51, 234

One-Station Unit Training (OSUT), 9, 235
274

Professional Development (PD), 14, 19, 23, 26, 32, 37, 235

“40 plus 9,” 23, 48, 60

Troy, William J., 34

Truhan, Mark, 105, 113

Turkey Village, 154

Unit Identification Code (UIC), 44, 221, 236

US Army Reserve (see also US Army units), iii, v, 1, 9, 221

US Army,

Numbered units:

Battalions: 

1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 142

1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 134

1st Battalion, 335th Regiment, 65

1st Battalion, 390th Regiment, 58, 60, 135

2d Battalion, 390th Regiment, 23, 29, 154, 245

1st Battalion, 417th Regiment, 164

6th Battalion, 98th Regiment, 15

13th Battalion, 98th Regiment, 15

Brigades:

1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, 204

1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 174

1st Brigade, 80th Division (IT), 160

1st Brigade, 98th Division (IT), 15, 58, 253

2d Brigade, 98th Division (IT), 9, 29, 222, 245, 253

3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, 106

3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, 151

3d Brigade, 85th Division (TS), 53–54, 57–59, 61–62, 64–66, 76–77, 

210, 245, 250

30th Infantry Brigade, 134, 150

56th Brigade, 36th Division, 125

48th Infantry Brigade, 216

76th Infantry Brigade, 54, 58

195th Infantry Brigade, 4

256th Infantry Brigade, 216

Aviation Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 69, 120

Divisions:

1st Cavalry Division, 34–35, 69, 97, 120, 128, 137–138

1st Infantry Division, 106, 142, 204

3d Infantry Division, 107–108, 151, 181

10th Mountain Division, 181, 187

24th Infantry Division, 154,

25th Infantry Division, 161, 168, 174, 180

38th Infantry Division, 54

42d Infantry Division, 46, 123, 151–152

75th Division (Training Support), 91, 119
275

76th Division (Training), 7, 54, 58

80th Division (Institutional Training), viii, 78, 87, 89, 158, 160, 184, 

189–190, 192–193, 199, 201, 204, 211

82d Airborne Division, 164

85th Division (Training Support), 53–54, 57, 76, 243, 245, 250

91st Division (Training Support), 97, 119, 178

95th Division (Institutional Training), 119, 128, 133

98th Division (Institutional Training), iii, v, vii–viii, 1, 3–7, 9, 11, 13, 

16–20, 22, 25–29, 31, 33–35, 37–39, 41–42, 44–48, 50–51, 

53–55, 57–59, 63–67, 70–72, 74–78, 81–91, 94–95, 109, 111–

113, 115, 117–119, 126–127, 136, 141, 148, 158, 160, 175–176, 

184–190, 192–196, 203–204, 206, 208–217, 221, 223–228, 

237–240, 242–247, 249–251, 253, 255

101st Airborne Division, 86

108th Division (Institutional Training), 89, 204, 209, 211

Regiments:

3d Armored Cavalry (ACR), 169–176, 192, 203

12th New York Infantry, 4

47th New York Infantry, 4

52d Pioneer Infantry, 4

53d Pioneer Infantry, 4

278th Armored Cavalry, 46, 150–151, 153, 155–157

389th Infantry, 4

390th Infantry, 4, 23, 29, 58, 60, 135, 154, 245

Miscellaneous units:

1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM), 103

Mobile Training Team #4, 105–108

26th Trench Mortar Battery, 4

46th Corps Support Group, 103

Convoy Security Team (a.k.a. “Rough Riders”), 87–88

US Marine Corps, 34, 84, 88, 91, 94, 119, 123, 128, 130, 138–140, 149, 176–177, 

179, 181–184, 209–210, 232, 234

advisor opinions working with, 84, 124–125, 130, 138–139, 182–183, 191

at Fallujah, 130, 138–141

Numbered units:

I Marine Expeditionary Force, 140

1st Marine Division, 128, 140, 179

2d Marine Division, 181

1st Marine Regiment, 140

3d Battalion, 1st Marines,138 

3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 182–183

Udairi Ranges, 67–68

Udovich, Stephen T., 192

United Arab Emirates (UAE), 99, 236

USA Today, 13, 17, 28, 247
276

Vernick, John G., v, 22, 29, 51, 75–76, 85, 111, 243

as G1 mobilization officer, 22–23, 42, 81

and security clearances, 22

and DUICs, 44

and mobilization groups, 23, 51–52

and battle rosters, 22, 44, 51, 88

Vest, Craig, 36

Wasit province, Iraq, 145–146

Wait, David P., 149

Webster, NY, 154

“Welcome Home Warrior Citizen” ceremonies, 202

Wilson, Charles, 36–37, 203, 250

Wilson, Jennings B., 4

With, Julian, 201, 204, 206, 247

Womack, J. Paul, 111, 243

on Sherlock’s interaction with the CMATT chief of staff, 84

Zubaydiyah, Iraq, 146
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