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i

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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

THE EFFECTIVE USE OF RESERVE PERSONNEL 

IN THE U.S. MILITARY:

LESSONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

RESERVE MODEL

Shima D. Keene

January 2015

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public release; distribution is unlimited.

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Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
iv

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Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

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ISBN 1-58487-659-X
v

FOREWORD

The U.S. Army and the British Army are undergoing similar processes of rebalancing between regular 

and reserve personnel. The British armed forces are 

currently at a more advanced stage of this change than 

the United States, and consequently there are useful 

lessons to be drawn from their experience to date. This 

is particularly the case in a time of growing defense 

austerity; in addition to their smaller scale, the United 

Kingdom’s (UK) armed forces have great familiarity 

with undertaking missions and maintaining close to 

full-spectrum capability while subject to severe and 

apparently insurmountable resource constraints. 

Studying how this is made possible may also provide 

valuable pointers for a U.S. defense force in an era of 

sequestration and budget cuts. 

This monograph presents research by Dr. Shima 

Keene, a defense analyst with extensive experience of 

working both with and within the UK’s Reserve Forces. Dr. Keene identifies areas where the U.S. Army 

and other services can potentially benefit from examining the UK’s comparable program of reserve reform. 

Equally important, she identifies key areas where aspects of this reform have been entirely counterproductive, and points to specific and expensive recent British mistakes which it is essential for the U.S. military 

to avoid. 

The Strategic Studies Institute considers that this 

monograph provides a useful view of prior experi-
vi

ence in organizing and integrating reserve forces, and 

is a valuable addition to the debate on how to plan the 

future shape of the U.S. Army.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

SHIMA D. KEENE is a Director of the Conflict Studies 

Research Centre, Oxford, the United Kingdom (UK), as 

well as Director of the Security Economics Programme 

at the Institute for Statecraft, London. She is also a 

Deployable Civilian Expert (DCE)1

 and a member of 

the UK Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG)2 specializing in Intelligence and Security Sector Reform. She is 

a former Senior Research Fellow and Advisor at the 

Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence 

Academy of the UK, and Special Advisor to the UK 

Ministry of Defence (MoD), where she had responsibility for assessment and recommendations for the development of financial counterinsurgency strategies 

in Afghanistan. Dr. Keene advises and works closely 

with a number of British and international organizations on a number of topics relating to national and 

international security including the MoD, various UK 

government departments and law enforcement agencies, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 

Europe, the Council of Europe, Global Futures Forum, 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. 

Government departments and law enforcement agencies, and various global private sector organizations. 

Dr. Shima has 25 years of practitioner experience in 

a number of industries to include finance, defense, 

security, and telecommunications in both the public 

and private sectors, with government departments, 

law enforcement, telecommunications, and finance. 

She is also a former British Army reservist soldier 

with 7 years military service, most of which was spent 

serving as the Company Medic and Physical Training 

Instructor for the 4th Battalion, the Parachute Regiment. Dr. Keene has published numerous internal/
viii

external MoD and NATO reports as well as awardwinning academic journal articles, and is the author 

of Threat Finance: Disconnecting the Lifeline of Organized 

Crime and Terrorism. Dr. Shima holds an M.Phil. in defence and security studies and graduated with honors in Business Studies, and a Ph.D. in international 

criminal law. 
ix

SUMMARY

In the current age of economic austerity, there is increasing pressure for the military in the United States 

and the United Kingdom (UK) to be streamlined, so as 

to be able to deliver more for less cost. This requires 

a whole new approach to warfare supported by additional skill sets, many of which are not currently 

readily or widely available within the military. These 

skills have become even more vital in the current security environment of networked global insecurities. 

As such, there is a need for the military not only to 

re-establish lost skills, but to develop new skills to enhance its ability to tackle the emerging security threats 

of the 21st century.

One way in which such skills shortages can be addressed is by accessing existing skill sets within the 

civilian workforce, which can be achieved through 

the recruitment of reservists. Reservists have been utilized not only by the U.S. Army, but also by numerous 

armies around the world, including the UK, where the 

reliance on Reservists has increased significantly in 

recent years. However, recent reviews carried out by 

the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) identified a range 

of deficiencies highlighting the need for UK Reserve 

Forces to be modernized so that they can be utilized in 

a manner that is efficient, cost effective, and sustainable. Consequently, this monograph explores the various types of reservist roles and deployment options, 

as well as factors that are both detrimental and beneficial to the recruitment, retention, and use of Reservists, highlighting areas where the UK experience is of 

potential relevance to the U.S. Army’s future options. 

It is recognized that U.S. Reserve Forces are bigger, 

better funded, and more integrated with the Regular 
x

Army compared to the UK. However, there are also 

many similarities between the two forces, such that 

the cross-fertilization of experiences can be of mutual 

benefit. For example, both the United States and the 

UK have suffered the effects of the economic downturn, one side effect has been the need to cut defense 

spending. As a result, each has recently made a decision to reduce the size of its Regular Army, compensating for the reduction by a greater reliance on the use 

of Reserve Forces. This decision has met with criticism 

in both the United States and the UK, with many questioning the extent to which reservists can be used to 

“replace” regular forces. Some have expressed serious 

concern regarding over-reliance on Reserve Forces, 

viewing this as potentially weakening and endangering defense capabilities as a whole. 

On the other hand, others have argued that such 

concerns are not based on evidential data, but instead 

on prejudice, and that it is the culture of the Regular 

Army that needs to be addressed. This debate has encouraged further research and analysis into numerous 

aspects of Reserve Forces so that an assessment can 

be made as to the validity of the concerns expressed. 

In order to contribute to this assessment, the aim of 

this monograph is to highlight the lessons learned 

by the UK Reserve Forces, both in terms of successes 

and challenges, as well as to explore the feasibility 

of achieving the proposals set out by Future Reserves 

2020. This may be useful for the United States moving 

forward as the need to cut defense spending further is 

likely, and the UK may serve as a good model of how 

to operate with a smaller budget. The assessments are 

intended to assist the United States to consider the 

successful elements of the UK model and its reform 

program, while avoiding the errors and unintended 

detrimental consequences identified. 
xi

One case study, with a focus on the use of reservists 

with specialist skills, examines the use of medical professionals such as doctors. Another examines the use 

of subject matter experts through the recently established Specialist Group Military Intelligence (SGMI) 

unit, whose principal strength is its ability to utilize 

the breadth of Reservist capability to provide a depth 

of expertise to the Field Army, defense, and the wider 

government that would be both uneconomical and 

untimely to develop within a regular unit; and prohibitively expensive to contract from the private sector. 

In addition, negative outcomes of reform processes in 

the UK are highlighted, in particular the disastrous effect on recruitment and retention of outsourcing key 

programs to the private sector. The analysis provided 

leads to recommendations to enhance the overall capability and utility of the U.S. Armed Forces; better 

harness the talents and the volunteer ethos of the U.S. 

population; provide the U.S. Army with better integration with, and understanding by, the society from 

which its manpower is drawn; and improve the costeffectiveness of defense.

ENDNOTES

1. In the UK system, DCEs are nongovernment civilians who 

are available for deployment, often at short notice, for assignments in countries affected by or at risk of violent conflict. They 

are part of the CSG, which is a pool of skilled individuals who are 

deployed to fragile and conflict-affected countries to assist the UK 

Government in addressing instability.

2. The Stabilisation Unit is an interdepartmental agency of 

the UK government, jointly owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development, 

and the MoD.

1

THE EFFECTIVE USE OF RESERVE PERSONNEL 

IN THE U.S. MILITARY:

LESSONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

RESERVE MODEL

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, the U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) militaries possessed robust expertise on 

the culture and decisionmaking processes of potential 

adversaries, in the form of numerous linguists and 

foreign area officers whose purpose was, in part, to 

study foreign countries and to prepare for possible 

deployments to various continents. However, due to 

the past 10 years of constant operational deployments, 

this critical capability has been diminished. In the existing security environment, such international relations capability is essential not only in understanding 

the developing threat environment, but to serve as an 

early warning system and means of identifying issues 

and problems before any potential need for military 

intervention arises.

In addition, there is a need for the military to develop and sustain a new range of skill sets in order 

to better understand and tackle today’s highly technical, globalized, and complex security threat environment. To keep up to speed and attempt to stay ahead 

of emerging threats, the deployment of a new breed 

of soldier who is a specialist/subject matter expert 

(SME) in a range of necessary disciplines is vital. As 

such, there is an immediate need for both the U.S. and 

British Army to address existing skills shortages, both 

in terms of the re-establishment of “foreign relations” 

skills which have diminished over the last decade, as 

well as developing new additional skills essential for 

the battlefield of the 21st century. 
2

One solution is for the military to better access 

and utilize existing relevant civilian skills through 

the recruitment of Reservists who have developed the 

necessary skill sets outside the military environment. 

Reservists are able to provide additional capacity as 

well as to make available specialist expertise which 

would not be practical or cost effective to maintain as 

a regular capability. In recognition of these challenges, 

the UK Reserve Forces are in the process of undergoing a radical change in an attempt to professionalize 

and make better use of their Reservists. 

UK VERSUS U.S. RESERVE FORCES

U.S. Reserve Forces are larger, better funded, and 

represent a larger ratio of the whole force compared 

to the UK Reserve Forces. For example, the U.S. Army 

Reserves and the U.S. Army National Guard form 20 

percent1

 and 32 percent,2 respectively, of total Army 

Personnel, representing a combined total of just over 

half of the U.S. Army, compared to the proposed 27 

percent3 which the UK is hoping to achieve. The U.S. 

Reserve Forces are also better integrated with their 

regular counterpart, in that the “Total Force” concept4

was adopted shortly after the end of large-scale U.S. 

military involvement in Vietnam in 1973,5 whereas the 

concept is only just in the process of being established 

in the UK. Nevertheless, there are numerous similarities, especially in terms of challenges that both countries face. For example, both have suffered the effects 

of the economic downturn resulting in the need to cut 

defense spending. As a result, both the United States 

and the UK have recently decided to reduce the size of 

their Regular Army. 
3

U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno announced in June 2013 that the Regular Army would 

downsize the number of Brigade Combat Teams from 

45 to 33, reducing the number of Soldiers from 570,000 

to 490,000 by 2017.6

 In addition, U.S. Defense Secretary 

Chuck Hagel has recommended shrinking forces even 

further, to between 440,000 and 450,000, making the 

total cut in personnel between 120,000 and 130,000.7

Similarly in the UK, British forces are undergoing a 

20 percent reduction in Regular Army numbers from 

102,000 to 82,000, to be implemented between 2010 and 

2018.8 However, this cut has been compensated by the 

proposed increase and better use of Reserve Forces. In 

addition, the UK’s Territorial Army was rebranded as 

the “Army Reserve” in an attempt to move away from 

its previous ambiguous reputation as part-time soldiers or “weekend warriors,” and adopt a more professional image to reflect its actual role and function.

In the United States, although the budget for its 

Reserve Forces has been reduced, the Department of 

Defense’s (DoD) 2012 strategic guidance stated that 

the impact of the defense cuts on Reserve Forces and 

the National Guard would be minimal. Furthermore, 

General Odierno confirmed in January 2012 that the 

decision to cut the active force by 80,000 Soldiers 

would place even greater reliance on the National 

Guard and Reserves than ever before.9

There are four key arguments supporting the use 

of Reserves. 
4

Rationale for the Use of Reserves.

Skill Set: 

The world today faces a diverse range of security 

risks resulting in strategic uncertainties. These challenges can only be countered by an agile military organization with appropriate skill sets to meet these 

challenges. In addition, the fast evolving nature of the 

threat environment is such that it is unrealistic that 

all of the necessary skills could be available on a fulltime basis. As such, it makes sense to utilize civilian 

talent and skills if and when required through the use 

of Reservists. 

Deployability: 

Reserve Forces are deployable. This is particularly 

relevant in the context of specialist knowledge (See 

“Specialists” section on succeeding pages. Case study 

on Specialist Group Military Intelligence) where an 

SME is required. Such expertise can often be found 

within civilian government employees, but these are 

not a deployable resource. 

Cost: 

Affordability is often a dominant argument put 

forward in relation to the use of Reserve Forces. There 

are considerable cost implications to developing additional specialist skill sets required in-house. In addition to the cost of training days payable to the Soldier, 

the cost of hiring specialist teaching staff, as well as 

providing facilities such as classrooms, training materials, travel, accommodation, and subsistence needs 
5

to be considered. On the other hand, as “specialist/

expert” Reservists have already developed the necessary skills, all that is required is the provision of remedial training to enable skills to be transferred for use 

in the military environment. This not only results in 

considerable savings but also presents excellent value 

in terms of continued use of that expertise.

For example, in the UK, a clinical toxicologist takes 

over 10 years to train and would usually bill at a daily 

rate of £1,200 ($2,000),10 reflecting the availability of 

approximately 20 suitably qualified individuals nationally. The same individual recruited as a Reservist 

at the rank of staff officer (SO2), usually an O-4 equivalent, would instead be paid a daily rate of £91.81 

($155),11 representing a considerable cost advantage 

compared to the full rate the military would have to 

pay if the individual were employed as an outside 

consultant.

In terms of running costs of the unit as a whole, 

the cost of Reserve Forces is considerably lower compared with Regular Forces. For example, in the UK, a 

Reserve unit of comparable size to its regular counterpart costs approximately 20 percent of the latter’s 

manpower bill when not mobilized. When mobilized, 

a Reserve unit costs 10-15 percent less than its mobilized regular counterpart.12

Political: 

Popular opinion continues to play a key role in warfare. “All warfare requires the political support and 

consensus of the people in whose name it is waged.”13

As such, societal buy-in is key. Reserve Forces can be 

seen as a gateway for the military to engage with many 

different elements of society, including businesses 
6

who may be the employers of Reservists, as well as 

their family and friends. Supporting and championing Reservists enables society to become more engaged with matters relating to defense. This is a view 

shared by the United States, which forms the basis of 

the Total Force Concept. General Creighton Abrams 

intertwined the structure of the three components of 

the Army in such a way as to make extended operations impossible, without the involvement of both the 

Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. One 

interpretation of General Abrams’ intent in doing so 

was to ensure that no U.S. President should be able to 

take the United States (and more specifically the U.S. 

Army) to war without the support of the American 

people.14

UK RESERVE FORCES

Thirty years ago, the UK’s Armed Forces were designed to fight a conventional war of national survival. 

The principal role of the Reserve Forces was to provide 

mass reinforcements to help counter the Soviet threat, 

and there was little political appetite for their use in 

any other contingency, such as the Falklands Conflict 

in 1982.15 However, the end of the Cold War led to 

the reduction in size of the Regular Forces, which in 

turn led to an increase in the use of Reserve Forces 

in operations such as the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and Libya.16 Since April 1, 2003, 26,219 UK Reservists 

(army, navy, and air force) have deployed globally, as 

well as within the UK, in a variety of roles ranging 

from infantryman to intelligence analyst. 

Recent examples include Operation HERRICK in 

Afghanistan, Operation TELIC in Iraq, and the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games,17 where 
7

Reservists made up approximately 15 percent of Defense’s contribution to safety and security.18 At their 

peak in 2004, Reservists made up 20 percent of UK 

forces in Iraq and 12 percent in Afghanistan.19 The 

UK Army Reserve (formerly known as the Territorial 

Army [TA]), produced almost one in 10 soldiers who 

served in Afghanistan, a large proportion of which 

were medical staff. A number of Reservists have been 

decorated, and at least 27 have lost their lives.20 As 

a result, the image of the TA as somewhere people 

go to “play” soldier has begun to diminish in recent 

years. However, the stigma attached to being “parttime” soldiers remains and needs to be addressed, as 

rebranding alone is unlikely to achieve the necessary 

shift in perception.

UK RESERVIST CATEGORIES

In recognition of differing circumstances and skill 

sets, several categories of Reservists exist within the 

UK. There are two principal categories of Reservists, 

the Volunteer Reserves and the Ex-Regular Reserves.

Volunteer Reserves. 

Volunteer Reserves are members of society who accept an annual training commitment and a liability to 

be mobilized to deploy on operations. They comprise 

the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Marines Reserve, 

the Army Reserve, and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. 

Reservists typically attend training on a part-time basis throughout the year, including an Annual Camp 

which runs for approximately 2 weeks.21 Volunteer 

Reserves are paid at the same rates as regular personnel and become eligible for an annual tax exempt 
8

bounty payment on completion of a specified amount 

of training per year.22

As Volunteer Reserves are at a known level of 

readiness, they are usually the first Reservists called 

on for operations.23 In addition, a Volunteer Reservist 

can sign a contract to undertake a full-time role for a 

set period of time (Full-Time Reserve Service), a parttime or intermittent additional role (Additional Duties Commitment or an increased liability for call-out 

when they have skills which may be needed at short 

notice (High Readiness Reserves [HRR]). 

Ex-Regular Reservists.

Ex-regular Reservists are former members of the 

Regular Forces who retain a liability to be called up 

for service. On completion of the period of liability for 

recall, all become members of the Long-Term Reserve 

up to the age of 55, or on completion of 18 years in the 

Regular Reserve. The Long-Term Reserve may only be 

recalled for national danger, great emergency, or attack on the UK. In general, ex-regular Reservists have 

only been called upon to support routine operations if 

they have volunteered or when volunteer Reservists 

have not been available.24

High Readiness Reserves.

HRR were introduced in the Reserve Forces Act 

1996 (RFA 96) and are drawn from both Ex-Regular 

Reserves and Volunteer Reserves. They comprise individuals who may be trained to a higher standard 

and are available for military service at an agreed 

minimum notice, for which they receive an annual 

payment. The agreement of the employer is required 

before an individual can be accepted as an HRR.25
9

Sponsored Reserves. 

Sponsored Reserves (SRs) were created by RFA 96 

in order to allow certain support tasks to be carried 

out by trained professionals. They are members of a 

civilian workforce who are required to join the volunteer or ex-regular Reserves as a condition of a contract, 

which their civilian employer has entered into with 

the MoD to provide a capability under normal conditions as well as on operations. Generally the MoD uses 

SRs to fill capability gaps which they wish to control. 

Among others, a number of discrete contracts have 

been awarded for Heavy Equipment Tank Transportation, STUFT shipping,26 and the UK Meteorological 

Office.27 Over 2,000 personnel hold SR status across a 

range of military capabilities as diverse as fulfilling 

the UK’s strategic sealift28 requirement,29 provision of 

aviation weather services to the Royal Air Force (RAF) 

and Army Air Corps, advising on environmental factors affecting operations,30 and meeting the Army’s 

need for the transportation of heavy equipment. 

CURRENT STATUS OF THE UK 

RESERVE FORCES 

In November 2012, the Independent Commission 

to Review the UK’s Reserve Forces published its findings in a Green Paper31 having reached four main 

conclusions. The first was that the UK Reserve Forces 

were in decline; second, that the role of the Reservist needed to be modernized; third, that the potential 

of Reserve Forces had not been fully harnessed; and 

fourth, that they were not used in a cost-effective 

manner.32 A public consultation followed, prompting 
10

over 3,000 responses, which in turn led to the publication of a UK Government white paper33 setting out the 

future relationships MoD seeks with Reservists, their 

employers, and society.34 The paper also introduced 

the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Programme as part 

of the wider Transforming Defence campaign that 

aims to transform the UK Armed Forces and deliver 

Future Force 2020.35

FR 2020 PROGRAMME

FR20 stipulates that by 2020, a greater proportion 

of the overall Defense effort will be contributed by 

the Reserves. In recognition of the decline in morale 

among existing Reservists, coupled with the declining trend in recruitment, FR20 proposes to “revitalize” the role of Reservists through better training and 

improved clarity of purpose, coupled with better integration with Regular Forces. In addition, the introduction of new legislation to better enable mobilization 

was proposed, and the TA was renamed the “Army 

Reserve,” to reflect the major changes to its role and 

its integral place as part of the Whole Force concept.36

Furthermore, the importance of the relationship between the Reservist and their families and employers, 

as well as society as a whole, in terms of both recruitment and retention, was recognized. As a result, the 

program aims to further develop these relationships 

with the aim of achieving further buy-in and support 

through the introduction of the following measures. 

Family. 

Recent studies have shown that families play a 

key role in the recruitment and retention of Reservist 
11

personnel and that family support is the biggest predictor of retention and readiness of Reservists.37 Reservist pay, although not a primary incentive for Reservists themselves, has been identified as playing an 

important role in “sweetening” family relationships, 

as it was frequently used as a negotiation tool to allow the Reservist to continue his or her service. For 

example, Reservist pay was often presented as “extra 

income” which could be used to pay for family holidays and home improvements, benefitting the family 

as a whole.38 This is of particular relevance in the UK’s 

high taxation, low disposable income societal environment, but similar factors could be expected to affect 

U.S. Reservists from lower income brackets. 

In recognition of the importance of pay as an incentive for both enrollment and continued service, 

the total pay package for UK Reservists was recently 

made more attractive. For example, the annual leave 

entitlement was introduced in April 2013, amounting 

to approximately 1 day’s paid leave for every 10 training days completed. This is paid in addition to the current annual leave awarded for time on deployment, 

as well as the annual tax-free bounty.39 The program 

rewards Reservists with high attendance, providing an incentive to continue their commitment year 

after year. 

In addition, in an attempt to encourage retention 

of Reserve personnel on a long-term basis, pensions 

for Reservists were introduced for the first time. As of 

April 2015, when the new Armed Forces pension program comes into play, Reservists will accrue pension 

entitlements for time spent training as well as when 

mobilized. Other new financial incentives include the 

Reservist Award which, in some circumstances, provides for payments to make up the difference between 
12

civilian earnings and military salary when a Reservist 

is mobilized to ensure that the Reservist is not financially disadvantaged by mobilization.40

Employers.

The white paper also recognized the contribution 

made by employers of Reservists, resulting in the 

proposed introduction of a financial incentive of an 

additional monthly payment of £500 for small- and 

medium-sized enterprises when an employee is mobilized.41 In addition, FR20 recommended the use of 

nonfinancial incentives such as a “kitemark-type”42

award for supportive employers,43 to provide appropriate recognition of the contribution those employers 

make.44

However, these changes do not adequately address concerns expressed by employers in relation to 

employee absence, which has been compared to maternity leave. In the UK, statutory maternity leave is 

52 weeks,45 accompanied by statutory maternity pay,

which is paid up to 39 weeks.46 In addition, paternity 

pay and leave is also available by law, albeit for a 

shorter duration of time.47 One difference between absence due to maternity leave and military deployment 

is the notice period given to employers. Maternity 

leave typically starts with 4 to 6 months’ notice, whereas military deployment can take place with a typical 1 

to 3 months of advance warning. Consultation with 

employers highlighted that this shorter timescale was 

problematic as it makes it more difficult to make arrangements to provide cover during the employee’s 

absence. A further difference is in relation to risk, as 

the possibility of the employee not returning at the 

expected time due to medical reasons, or not at all, is 
13

considerably higher. The loss of a member of staff for 

such long periods of time (temporary or permanent) is 

even harder for small- and medium-sized enterprises 

to accommodate, particularly if the employee concerned is highly skilled and hard to replace.48

At the same time, the consultations also revealed 

that many employers acknowledged the potential 

value that Reservists bring to their organization, in 

terms of additional skills developed in the form of 

leadership, people management, and initiative skills, 

which benefit the civilian employer.This was felt to be 

particularly relevant in the modern workplace, where 

academic qualifications alone are no longer deemed 

adequate, with employers increasingly seeking individuals with proven workplace skills such as team 

working, leadership, and effective communications.49 

Furthermore, a recent study conducted for MoD and 

endorsed by the UK’s Chartered Management Institute, found that during a typical year, a Reservist 

gained skills from military training that would cost 

£8,327 ($14,156) for their civilian employers to buy.50

However, the majority of Reservists consulted reported that their role as a Reservist was at best tolerated by their employers, with the potential to damage 

career progression, especially if there was a high probability that they would be mobilized. As a result, most 

had downplayed their role as a Reservist or had avoided mentioning the subject at all to their employers or 

colleagues. This was particularly true of individuals 

in positions of seniority who were expected to have 

a high commitment to their role, and were often required to work long, demanding hours. Furthermore, 

many employers were likely to regard the Reservist’s 

military commitments as being in direct conflict with 

their ability to contribute fully to their civilian role. 
As such, more work is needed to resolve these issues, 

especially if the army is to utilize resources from the 

high skilled end of the market.

SKEPTICISM OVER FR20

Although proposals put forward by FR20 have 

been well received by many Reservists, considerable 

skepticism also exists as to whether they are achievable. The UK’s National Audit Office, a government 

oversight body, concluded in a highly critical report 

entitled Army 2020 that there was no evidence that 

“the feasibility of increasing the number of trained 

Reserves within the planned timescale, needed to 

provide the required capability, was robustly tested.” 

The report also warned that the proposed changes in 

the new Army structure come with significant further 

risks, which if not mitigated “could significantly affect 

value for money and the Army’s ability to achieve its 

objectives.”51

The report found that “The Department [MoD] did 

not test whether increasing the trained strength of the 

Army Reserve to 30,000 was feasible” and that “the 

Department’s recruitment targets for Reserves are not 

underpinned by robust planning data.”52 Indeed, as 

noted by Professor Vince Connelly of Oxford Brookes 

University,53 any feasibility study may have been 

irrelevant: 

the final figure of 30K was actually imposed on the 

Army by the FR20 Independent Commission and...

there was no choice about that figure at all. The Army 

was given the figure of 30k once [the UK Government] 

accepted the FR20 report.54

14
15

Although the main purpose of the restructuring is 

to reduce cost, the findings warn that “reducing the 

size of the Army will not alone deliver the financial 

savings required,” and that “greater reliance on Reserves will help the Department make savings but 

may lead to increased costs for HM Treasury,” an apparent paradox explained by the UK’s system where 

the MoD pays for soldiers in peacetime, but Treasury—central Government finance—pays for “wartime costs,” including the mobilization of Reserves. In 

particular, “the Department did not fully assess the 

value for money of its decision to reduce the size of 

the Army.”55

What is of additional concern is that the Regular 

Army is ahead of its target to reduce its uniformed personnel to 82,500 by 2018 and deliver the staffing savings required by its reduced budget, but at the same 

time, the trained strength of the Army Reserve, which 

is intended to compensate for this, has not increased 

since April 2012 and the “recruitment of Reserve and 

regular soldiers is behind the requirement set by the 

Army for 2013-14.”56 The report also highlights that 

“The Department failed to provide Information and 

Communication Technology (ICT), infrastructure 

critical to the success of the Army’s Recruiting Partnering Project with [outsourcing contractor] Capita,” 

and consequently that “the Department’s failure to 

enable the setting up of new recruitment software 

has impacted on recruitment activities and increased 

costs.”57

These concerns over the ability to recruit and retain the additional number of Reservists stipulated are 

widespread, especially among currently serving Reservist personnel.58 Furthermore, even if the proposed 

numbers are achieved, many also question whether 

future Reserve Forces will be able to sufficiently bol-
ster the reduced Regular Force, not only in terms of 

numbers, but capability.59

RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

Many believe that it is unrealistic to achieve

the proposed growth from a trained strength of approximately 20,00060 to 30,000 by 2018.61 The concern 

is widespread and valid, given the declining trend in 

recruitment reported in recent years. For example, 

the number of volunteer Reserves (both trained and 

untrained, to include officers and other ranks) was 

34,730 in 2003. This figure fell to 30,220 in 2009 and 

has steadily declined year after year to reach 26,500 

in 2013.62 Some UK media reporting, considered misleading by MoD insiders, has highlighted that the 

Army Reserves/TA are in “serious decline in terms 

of numbers, capability and morale” and that “current 

forecasts see the TA ageing and reducing to potentially unsustainable levels by 2015.”63

However, Professor Connelly is optimistic that it 

would be possible to increase recruitment and points 

out that the decline can be attributed to ongoing manning challenges resulting from decisions made during 

the previous decade of sustained underfunding. 

Lots of TA units [have] actually shrunk in terms of the 

numbers they could recruit. . . . This reduction in posts 

primarily fell on the top end of the rank pyramid so 

that SNCO’s and officers were squeezed out of orbats 

and so left. The number of TA staff posts also diminished over this period in certain areas. There seems to 

be a collective forgetting of these various measures 

over the years.64

An additional critical factor is that many Reservists 

believe the recent increase of mandatory training days 

16
17

(MTDs) from 27 to 40 is not only unrealistic, given the 

demands of their career and personal commitments, 

but will result in serving members leaving, as well 

as make the recruitment of new Reservists more difficult.65 In addition, the “one-size-fits-all” approach of 

setting a standard number of MTDs was heavily criticized. Some felt that while the increase to 40 MTDs 

would be welcomed by units such as the Officer Training Corps (OTC), others were already struggling to 

meet the 27-day requirement. The OTC consists of 

university students in full-time education, with long 

holiday periods where they are actively looking for 

paid work. As such, they not only have the time to 

attend training days, but are likely to try to maximize 

time spent with the OTC, as their pay as a Reservist is likely to be an important or even sole source 

of income.

In comparison, Reservists who are doctors or senior managers of an organization are highly paid but 

typically work demanding hours and already often 

struggle to meet the former 27-MTD requirement. 

Here, time is more valuable than pay, and as a result 

many forego their tax free annual bounty.66 However, 

the inability to attend training days does not mean that 

they are less capable. This is especially true of medical 

practitioners such as doctors, who are practicing their 

trade in their civilian career on a daily basis. 

RESERVE VERSUS REGULAR DEBATE

A further concern relates to whether Reservists, 

even when they are able to meet the training requirements, are capable of replacing Regular soldiers. A 

succession of planning decisions in the UK which 

called for reducing its regular troop numbers from 
18

102,000 to 82,000, and attempting to replace the 20,000 

regular troops with 30,000 Reservists has been met 

with criticism.67 Despite planned investment of £1.8 

billion (B) (U.S.$3.06B) over 10 years to enhance the 

capability and strength of Reserve Forces and better 

integrate them with the Regular Army,68 many critics 

remain concerned about the impact of replacing a fulltime soldier with a part-time Reservist.69 According to 

one former soldier who served in the Regular Army: 

“We now have far too few people to do the role. We’re 

relying too heavily on the TA or Reservists, as they’ve 

tried to rebrand them. And it’s not working.”70

This is a view that is shared by many. Similar concerns with respect to the ability of Reserves to perform 

to the necessary standards have also been raised in the 

United States. For example, Colonel Ted Spain, deployed to Iraq as the commander of the 18th Military 

Police Brigade in 2003, believes that the decision to 

deploy Army Reserve Officer Brigadier General Janis 

Karpinski to command the military police unit at the 

Abu Ghraib Prison was one of the key U.S. mistakes 

made during the Iraq war.71

In addition, Army Quadrennial Defense Review director Major General John Rossi has also recently 

questioned aspects of the National Guard’s combat 

performance since September 11, 2001 (9/11).72 These 

views were shared by retired U.S. Army Reserves Colonel Patrick Allen73 who observed during his 21 years 

of service that: “. . . Regular soldiers are almost always 

better qualified than the National Guard or Reservists, 

due to the differences in the number of training hours 

as well as resources such as training ammunition.”74

At the same time, Colonel Allen also highlighted 

that Reservists with specialist skill sets, who perform 

similar or identical roles in their civilian occupation, 
19

often perform better in that role compared to their 

Regular military counterpart. This is predominantly 

because these individuals benefit from military training as well as, not instead of, civilian training. In addition, they have developed their knowledge and trade 

through practical/operational experience both in and 

out of uniform. 

Giving the examples of the use of fuel truck operators and cyber experts, Allen argues that one advantage of the Reserves and the National Guard is that 

when specialists are required, the existence of already 

trained personnel means that the Army does not need 

to invest in training from scratch. In other words, remedial training can be provided to get the Reserve 

and Guard Units to the desired level of training much 

more quickly than starting from no unit at all. 

The same situation applies in the UK where Reserve personnel undergo intensive mobilization training prior to deployment. According to former infantry 

officer Major (Ret.) Anthony Ball, this is adequate to 

enable soldiers to reach the necessary level of proficiency equal to that of their Regular counterparts. Ball, 

who has 20 years of service in both the Regular Army 

and the Reserves, argues that although there may be 

some Reservists who fail to come up to scratch, this is 

equally true of soldiers in the Regular Army. 

Overall, recent operational tours have shown that 

the performance of Reservists has not been an issue, 

and that they have worked well alongside the Regular Army once they have had an opportunity to prove 

their professionalism and capabilities in the field. 

However, despite evidence of the ability of Reserve 

Forces to perform satisfactorily in operations, there 

continues to be a belief that Reservists do not possess 

the same level of professionalism and skills. The subject deserves closer examination to determine wheth-
20

er this is a justifiable concern, or mere prejudice that 

needs to be overcome. 

PERCEPTION OF THE PART-TIME 

PROFESSIONAL

There is a perception among the Regular Army 

that Reserve Forces cannot be regarded as fellow professionals. This arises because the full time element 

of the Army defines who is a professional by judgment against full-time norms. For example, an Army 

professional is someone who demonstrates a strong 

commitment and 24/7 availability to the organization. Thus, individuals who do not show they work 

full-time hours and are not available 24/7 (i.e., who 

are part-time) will be seen as not wholly committed 

and so will be perceived as less professional in their 

status, no matter how well they may perform in their 

roles.75 However, this view is not unique to the armed 

forces.76 Full-time employees in other professions such 

as the police also struggle to view their part-time colleagues as true professionals.77 This is also reported to 

be the case with respect to professions where the initial training or education has been equivalent. Examples include doctors, nurses and accountants, where 

the employee have reduced their hours from full-time 

to part-time.78

Peter Quinn, Research Fellow in Military Sciences 

at British defense and security think-tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),79 goes as far as to dismiss 

the fundamental principles behind the Whole Force 

Concept, arguing that the implication of the “integrated” and “single force” command slogans, that Reservists are equivalent to their regular counterparts, is a 

myth. Quinn believes that regular capabilities cannot 
21

be replicated on a part-time basis, and compares the 

Reservists 40-MTDs to the regulars’ 223 annual working days. He further argues that “. . . those who claim 

otherwise discredit the professionalism of regulars 

and place unrealistic expectations on Reservists.”80

There is clearly a valid argument that, if an individual has received less training than another in an 

equivalent position, that the ability of that individual 

to perform will be less than his or her better trained 

counterpart. The argument becomes stronger if the 

training provided is inferior. However, although this 

may be the case in some Reservist roles, this is not true 

in all cases. Furthermore, one “Reserve” training day 

does not necessarily equate to one “Regular” working 

day. For example, the Reserve training day is generally more intense, and, unlike regular soldiers, many 

Reservists are required to complete various tasks 

such as personal administration relating to the military, physical fitness training, and coursework preparation on their own unpaid time, outside reported 

“training” hours. 

At the same time, the key differential between the 

Army Reserve and Regular Army is that for most Reservists, the army is not his or her sole career. In fact, 

many do not view their role as a Reservist as a career. 

Although there is considerable evidence to illustrate 

that Reservists are capable of performing well, and are 

able to contribute significantly to the overall Defense 

effort, it must also be recognized that the Reservist’s 

main priority is likely to be his or her day job. It is 

perhaps this fact that will always differentiate Reserve 

Forces from the Regular Military. Nevertheless, the 

following case studies illustrate the valuable contribution that Reserve Forces currently make and will continue to make for the foreseeable future, which needs 

to be recognized.
22

CASE STUDIES

Case Study 1: The Medical Corps.

In the British Army, core health and medical services are provided by the Royal Army Medical Corps 

(RAMC). The majority of RAMC Reservists ordinarily 

work for the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK. 

Currently there are over 2,000 NHS staff serving as 

Reservists.81 The NHS as an employer is a supporter of 

Reserve Forces, making the recruitment and retention 

of Reservists less challenging. Furthermore, as their 

“day” job is to work in the medical services, typically 

as doctors or nurses, the argument that they are less 

professional or experienced compared to their regular 

counterpart cannot hold true. Despite this, Medical 

Corps Reservists deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan 

reported receiving considerable skepticism from their 

Regular counterparts. 

The view that field hospitals run by Reservists 

were somehow inferior to those run by regulars came 

not only from regular RAMC personnel, but also from 

the injured soldiers who were admitted into those 

hospitals.82 But despite their initial apprehension on 

learning that the Reservists were mostly NHS staff in 

their “day” jobs, the injured soldiers soon reported 

that they felt that they were in even better hands. This 

was because many viewed NHS care to be better than 

that of the military. This resulted partly from the general positive image of the NHS in British society, but 

also from the soldiers’ belief that by receiving both civilian and military training and education, the Reservists benefited from superior training and experience 

and a wider breadth of knowledge. 
23

In this situation, while the doctors and nurses may 

only be part-time in terms of their military commitments, they are full-time medical professionals, and 

so the argument that they are somehow less professional than their regular counterparts clearly does not 

apply. Furthermore, even when the Reservist’s main 

career was not in medicine, it is questionable as to 

whether he or she was less skilled than a regular Medic/Combat Medical Technician (CMT). For example, 

some Reservists who serve as Medics in a noncommissioned role often hold highly skilled jobs in their 

civilian life. Some are senior managers in their own 

professions, who are not only well-qualified academically, but have a broad range of practical management 

skills which can be used effectively in their role as an 

Army Medic. 

Specialists.

The medical profession is not the only field where 

specialist civilian skills can be utilized by the military. Military Intelligence is another example where 

specialists play a key role. At the heart of intelligence is analysis.83 The importance for the analyst to 

not only possess general analytical capabilities, but 

also in-depth specialist knowledge, was acknowledged in the UK Government’s Butler Report84

in 2004: 

Analysis can be conducted only by people expert in 

the subject matter—a severe limitation when the topic 

is as specialised as biological warfare or uranium enrichment, or the internal dynamics of terrorist cells or 

networks85
24

The Butler report further cautioned that a “special 

danger here can be the failure to recognise just what 

particular expertise is required.”86 In other words, it 

requires an individual with specialist knowledge to 

understand the problem in order to be able to recommend additional expertise required. This observation 

highlights the importance of involving specialists in 

the operational role of the headquarters element to ensure that any force generated has the correct experts. 

Against this background, the UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review recognized both the importance of “understanding” and the cost-benefits that 

could be realized through the use of Reservists.87

Reserve Forces have the flexibility to be mobilized 

and deployed, unlike their civilian counterparts in 

government service. This has resulted in the birth of 

the concept of the SGMI, a deployable cadre of deep 

specialists that can provide technical expertise across 

a wide spectrum of disciplines in support of both 

national and operational objectives.88

Case Study 2: Specialist Group Military 

Intelligence. 

In recognition that “Analysis can be conducted 

only by people expert in the subject matter,”89 the formation of the Specialist Group Military Intelligence 

(SGMI) was announced in a UK Ministerial Statement 

on Reserves in 2013. The Group’s remit is to extend 

the capability available to defense forecasting, intelligence, and understanding through cost-effective access to the breadth and depth of specialist intelligence, 

scientific, and technical expertise available through 

the Army Reserve. Its work falls under the banner of 

technical intelligence (TECHINT) which is defined as: 
25

intelligence concerning foreign [or nonstate actor] 

technological developments, and the performance and 

operational capabilities of foreign [or nonstate actor] 

materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes.90

Although such a capability was developed during 

World War II, this had lapsed, and in recent times until the formation of SGMI, the British Army had no 

central repository of specialist intelligence personnel. 

SGMI is an independent Army Reserve unit under 

the operational command and administrative control 

of 1 Military Intelligence Brigade, but is expected to 

migrate to the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade when this formation is stood up. The 

Unit will eventually consist of three pillars: Technical 

Intelligence Specialists Organisation (TISO); Human 

Domain Intelligence Specialists (HDIS), and Regional 

and Thematic Intelligence Specialists (RTIS). A headquarters element will also be established to provide 

the command and staff elements to enable tasking and 

force generation. 

Technical Intelligence Staff Organisation: The Technical Intelligence Staff Organisation (TISO) will evolve 

directly from the existing Technical Intelligence Staff 

Officers pool. The brand name TISO will endure, although Officer will be changed to Organisation to reflect the inclusion of warrant officers for the first time. 

The new sections retain the traditional specialism 

of the former pool: materiel and personnel exploitation; weapons, ordnance, munitions and explosives 

(WOME); military systems and chemical, biological, 

radiation and nuclear. In addition, an infrastructure 

and environment section will be included to provide 

understanding of critical infrastructure. The new TISO 
26

will triple the size of the former pool with the distribution of manpower reflecting Defense priorities. As 

such, WOME, is likely to be the largest at present. In 

addition, the HDIS and RTIS pillars will enhance the 

capabilities of SGMI to provide expert coverage of disciplines not traditionally associated with TISO.

Human Domain Intelligence Specialists: The Human Domain Intelligence Specialists (HDIS) areas of 

expertise will include technical networks; social networks; governance (political “science” and economics) and human science (including ergonomics and 

psychology). 

Regional and Thematic Intelligence Specialists: Regional and Thematic Intelligence Specialists (RTIS), 

the third pillar, is to have two regional sections to foreign area specialists. A thematic section will provide 

expertise in areas such as criminology, finance, narcotics, and terrorism. The composition of this section 

is likely to be highly flexible to reflect strategic and 

operational priorities. 

The proposed composition of SGMI reflects an 

appreciation of the likely character of future conflict 

and the role that understanding will play in it.91 Current UK doctrine notes that understanding, the foresight that arises from the application of judgment to 

situational analysis, in future conflict will be achieved 

through a deep appreciation of the human domain 

framework.92 It is clear that specialist intelligence is 

a key enabler in delivering timely understanding of 

the future battle space and the new Reservist SGMI is 

well placed to provide this capability in a cost-effective and timely manner that would be unlikely to be 

provided through the regular Army or private sector. 

At the same time, it must be recognized that SGMI is 

currently in its early stages of development and faces 
27

a number of challenges which it must overcome if it is 

to fully realize its potential. 

CHALLENGES

The future success of any of the specialist units in 

the Reserves depends upon their ability to identify 

and recruit suitably qualified personnel. Furthermore, 

they must do so without compromising on the quality 

of their specialist personnel, as so doing will result in 

a loss of credibility. As such, the following challenges 

need to be recognized and addressed.

Challenge 1: How Do You Find the Right Person?

The reputation of these units relies heavily on the 

credibility of the expert in the eye of the customer. 

This usually requires professional recognition at a national or international level. However, it is not always 

easy to determine the reputation of an expert if expertise does not already exist, making the assessment of 

the suitability of a candidate difficult. A starting point 

is to recruit individuals with a relevant higher degree 

from a reputable university, coupled with fellowship 

or chartered membership of a relevant professional 

body or a suitable employment record. The majority 

of serving officers in these roles already meet these 

criteria, and are either employed in a consultancy role 

outside the military, or in the case of medical specialists, usually within the NHS. 

Challenge 2: How Do You Successfully Recruit 

that Individual?

Even when a suitable candidate is located, the next 

challenge is how to recruit that individual who is un-
28

likely to be looking for additional work, especially if 

he or she is successful in their own career. As noted 

earlier, pay is not the primary motivator for Reservists. At the same time, all Reservists consulted stated 

that they would not serve without financial compensation. Furthermore, although the motivation for Reservists to join Reserve Forces varied from individual 

to individual, most agreed that they would not have 

joined if they felt that serving as a Reservist would 

damage their main career. This is even more relevant 

for potential recruits into units such as SGMI where 

there is a close overlap between the role and function 

of their main career and their work as a Reservist. 

For example, if a business manager in civilian life 

is an infantryman, the two careers are quite separate. 

Apart from time needed for training and deployment 

on operations, the Reservist is likely to develop additional skills such as leadership, which he or she 

will bring back. As such, this is a positive relationship. However, if you have a SME in Terrorism, for 

example, their work as a Reservist has the potential of 

having a direct impact on their main career due to the 

similarity of the work.

One potential concern relates to professional status, which in turn is closely related to pay. As an SME, 

the daily rate is important, not so much in terms of the 

actual amount paid, but more as a reflection of your 

worth. In other words, the pay rate is an indicator of 

status used to demonstrate the level of professional 

recognition. For example, the résumé of an SME may 

indicate qualifications equivalent to the rank of Colonel in a civil service role. However, if that individual 

is recruited as a far lower rank, such as a Captain, the 

implication is that the individual is not a true expert. 

Another concern is in relation to travel. If the SME 

is internationally recognized, it is likely that their work 
29

will require international travel, often at short notice. 

Existing military bureaucracy requires individuals to 

request and be granted authorization prior to international travel. This is not a realistic expectation as such 

a restriction will damage the SME’s ability to carry out 

his or her main job, and as such, could well deter that 

individual from joining as a Reservist.

Challenge 3: Security Clearance.

A challenge relating to the recruitment of specialists is security clearance in those areas where higher 

level clearances may be required. Traditionally, recruitment of specialists was restricted to experienced 

staff officers with a specialist qualification who at the 

same time held developed vetting clearance (an approximate UK equivalent of top secret/sensitive compartmented information [TS/SCI] clearance). However, this becomes a real challenge if the specialism 

required is a Pashto93 speaker with the Waneci94 dialect who has an in-depth understanding of not only 

the language but the local culture, which must be current. As the individual will be working with sensitive 

material, he or she must be capable of obtaining the 

necessary security clearances. The first requirement 

for obtaining such security clearances is that the individual must be a British national. 

However, the challenge is in finding an individual 

who has been born and bred in the UK with the necessary local knowledge and skills, who not only has 

the ability to translate, but the ability to fully appreciate the nuances of the language. There may be fluent 

speakers of Pashto trained by the military. However, 

the limitations of an individual with 1 year of training 

in Pashto and a short course on Afghan culture at the 
30

Defence Centre for Languages and Culture must be 

understood. These individuals are typically used in 

operations as translators and are trained to be able to 

hold basic conversations with the local populace without offending them too much. However, what will be 

required from a specialist is an individual with a far 

more sophisticated knowledge of the language and 

culture. In other words, you need someone who is a 

native. This is not currently possible given the restrictions relating to security clearance, which the army 

needs to consider how to address. 

Challenge 4: How Do You Retain the Expertise?

Even when a suitable candidate has been successfully recruited, the next potential challenge is retention. Recent studies and consultations have highlighted that wastage is at its highest between the period of 

enrollment and initial training. According to Professor Connelly, who conducted research into wastage 

of Reserve personnel, the patterns are similar to gym 

memberships. The initial period shortly after joining 

is important as this is where the new member is “trying out” the gym to access suitability. Any negative 

experiences during this period are likely to deter that 

individual from continuing his or her membership. 

The same situation applies to Reservists, in that the 

impression of the army given at the initial stage, to 

include administrative procedures such as medicals, 

issuing of uniforms, and basic training, will have a 

profound impact on whether that recruit continues 

the training. Interviews conducted not only with staff 

from specialist National Reserve units, but also with 

infantry regiments and Medical Corps personnel, all 

indicated that this initial stage was a real problem, 
31

where they were struggling to maintain recruits. The 

reason provided by all consulted was administrative 

blunders and the poor quality of training, which had 

been outsourced in an effort to cut costs. Crucially, this 

is also reported to be the case for the Regular Army.95

As such, the cost benefit of outsourcing needs to be 

assessed with extreme caution. 

Dangers of Outsourcing.

The benefit of outsourcing as a means of controlling and minimizing cost is well established. There are 

examples (see section on Sponsored Reserves) where 

outsourcing has worked well. At the same time, the 

outsourcing of recruitment has been a disaster for the 

UK armed forces, to include the Regular Army. For 

example, the main objective of the UK’s 10-year, £440 

million (M) (U.S.$748M) deal to privatize recruitment 

was to enable a saving of £300 million (U.S.$510M). 

However, this has resulted in a sharp drop in the 

number of recruits. In October 2013, the Defense Correspondent for the UK’s influential Daily Telegraph

newspaper reported that: “. . . the Army is facing a 

recruitment crisis after a cost-cutting outsourcing 

deal resulted in the number of people joining up falling by more than a third.”96 Figures obtained by the 

newspaper showed that the number of people attending Army interviews and selection tests to be regular 

soldiers had fallen by 35 percent since Capita, a contracting and services corporation, had taken over recruitment. According to one senior infantry regiment 

source, “What this has done is completely erode an effective system. Although it delivers savings, it doesn’t 

deliver a result.”97
32

Just as in the Regular Army, within the Army Reserves numerous problems have arisen over the administration of new recruits as well as basic training, 

which has also been outsourced to a private contractor. According to one Staff Officer at 256 Field Hospital, “Outsourcing has been a nightmare and a total disaster. We’ve lost a lot of recruits who just had enough 

and decided not to proceed with their enrollment and 

basic training.”98

Examples provided include a series of administrative blunders such as a new recruit turning up on a 

specified date and time to be issued his or her uniform, only to find that the relevant person in charge of 

issuing uniforms (from the outsourced company) was 

unavailable that day. Typically, the individual would 

be told to return on another day, which was problematic as appointments have to be made during normal 

working hours, requiring the recruit to take further 

time off work. While a recruit may be prepared to take 

one day off, repeated blunders eating into limited 

vacation time form an early impression that the organization they are in the process of joining lacks basic 

competence—enough in some cases for the recruit to 

withdraw their application altogether.99

Another commonly reported problem was difficulty in completing medical examinations, a prerequisite 

of the recruit being allowed to begin basic training. 

The process was reported to have become so cumbersome and time-consuming as a result of outsourcing, that many recruits were reported to have given 

up and decided not to continue with their service in 

the Reserves. 

The same complaints were voiced by Reservists in 

all branches, whether in combat arms such as infantry or technical corps such as the RAMC, Intelligence, 

and so on. This highlights the need when considering 
33

outsourcing to focus on value for money as opposed 

to cost reduction alone.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the on-going climate of economic austerity, 

the pressure to cut defense spending and achieve more 

for less cost is likely to continue into the foreseeable 

future. As a result, the use and reliance on Reserve 

Forces is likely to increase. The argument for the use 

of Reserve Forces is not only their affordability compared to Regular Forces, but also the ability to access 

relevant specialist skills which are currently either not 

widely available or entirely unavailable within the 

Regular Army. An added advantage is that Reservists 

serve as a gateway to wider society, enabling political 

buy-in for matters relating to defense through family, 

friends and employers of Reservists.

Cost Cutting Initiatives. 

With on-going pressure to reduce defense spending, new cost reduction initiatives are likely to be of 

interest to the United States. Here, the UK may serve 

as a valid case study, as it has been able to carry out 

operations at a fraction of the U.S. budget. As such, the 

United States may look to the UK for other models, as 

well as to see how these initiatives have worked, in 

order to be able to make an assessment of the likelihood for success if similar measures are adopted 

in the United States. Outsourcing is a case in point 

where the United States may wish to explore why 

some measures have worked, while others have been 

counterproductive. 
34

The U.S. defense budget is considerably bigger 

than the UK defense budget. As a result, the United 

States can afford a degree of personnel specialization 

which the UK simply cannot. This is exemplified at 

both unit and individual level, and is typified in the 

much broader range of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) in the U.S. military, reflecting a narrower 

skill range within each MOS.100 To take just one example, the U.S. Army’s Career Management Field 94 

“Electronic Maintenance and Calibrations” includes 

a multiplicity of MOS,101 some specializing in single 

weapons systems. In the British Army, by contrast, 

these all come under the single multi-skilled “trade” 

of Electronics Artificer, which requires a higher education degree before progression to the rank of Staff 

Sergeant (E-7 equivalent). In short, a vastly smaller 

budget has resulted in soldiers being required to be 

far more omni-competent in the UK. The British skill 

and specialty distribution model may therefore provide a useful case study if continuing financial pressure forces the U.S. Army to examine new areas where 

costs can be reduced.

At the same time, the need to re-establish specialist human domain skills to address new security challenges applies to both the UK and the United States. 

As such, a re-establishment is a long-term process best 

achieved in the short term through the use of high 

level, internationally recognized SMEs recruited as 

Reservists. Here the SGMI model, which is still in its 

infancy, may prove useful. The United States is also 

better placed to effectively establish such a unit, as 

the U.S. budget is much less restrictive than that of 

the UK.

Nevertheless the limitations of the use of Reserve 

Forces must also be understood. Various challenges 
35

have been identified in this monograph in relation 

to the recruitment and retention of Reservists in the 

UK. In order to establish and maintain Reserve Forces 

that are fit for purpose to tackle the asymmetric threat 

environment of the 21st century, the UK needs to understand and tackle effectively the following specific 

challenges, which can also be translated to the U.S. 

planning environment: 

Cultural Change.

The perception that Reserve Forces are inferior to 

the Regular Army is unlikely to change in the immediate future. In some cases, the perception is justified, 

as the training provided to some Reservists is inferior 

in terms of quality as well as quantity. However, this 

does not apply to specialists, where the perception is 

based on prejudice and lack of knowledge as to what 

the specialists are capable of and how they contribute 

to the defense effort. 

Recommendations: In the case of Reservists with 

specialist skills, prejudice can be overcome by first 

establishing effective and fully operational specialist 

units; and second, by educating the Regular Army as 

to their purpose and function. Over time, these units 

could be seen as distinctive and valuable entities that 

bring value added to military operations. To achieve 

this, the recruitment of the right caliber of specialists is 

key. Counterintuitively, specialists should continue to 

be viewed as being different to the Regular Army, and 

their purpose being to fill a gap in skill sets as opposed 

to being part-time soldiers trying to fill a Regular Soldier’s job. In relation to nonspecialists, prejudice can 

best be minimized through better training and integration with the Regular Army. 
36

Training.

Although there are numerous examples to illustrate that Reserve Forces are capable of achieving the 

necessary standards of skills and professionalism, 

this can only be achieved when sufficient high quality 

training is provided. 

Recommendation: Integrate training with Regular 

Forces where possible. This is best achieved when a 

Reserve Unit is structured so that it is directly in support of a parent Regular Unit. Currently, Regular Soldiers do not work evenings or weekends for training 

purposes, which is when the majority of the Reservists’ training takes place. However, it is possible to 

integrate annual training camps and elements of trade 

courses to enable Reservists to appreciate what the 

required standard is in the Regular Army. 

Furthermore, consideration should be given as to 

whether the Regular Army would be able to be more 

flexible with respect to their working hours. If Regular 

soldiers expected to work with Reservists were able 

to work 1 weekend every other month and therefore 

synchronize training elements with those Reservists, 

this would dramatically enhance the effort to integrate 

training. Existing negativity and prejudice on the 

part of the Regular Army toward the Reserve Forces 

at the present moment in time would make this difficult to achieve. However, efforts need to be made to 

overcome this.

Specialists.

The need for training does not apply to the same 

extent for specialists, such as doctors and SMEs. Here 

too, however, the ongoing stigma attached to being a 
37

Reservist needs to be overcome. There are also numerous challenges relating to the service contracts of specialist personnel, such as rank, travel restrictions and 

security clearance, which need to be addressed.

Recommendation: Better integration with the Regular Army is necessary to enable the value of specialists 

to be better recognized. Standard Operating Procedures relating to security clearance, authorization for 

travel, and rank need to be re-examined to ensure that 

the flexibility is available to enable the highest caliber 

of personnel to be recruited and retained, and to ensure that the SME’s career does not suffer as a result of 

his or her Reserve service. 

Motivation—Incentives versus Disincentives.

With the exception of Reservists serving on a fulltime basis, the Reservist is not economically reliant on 

the Army as they will have their own career outside 

the military. As such, the balance between incentives 

and disincentives plays a crucial role in the recruitment and retention of Reservists. 

Recommendation: Efforts must be made to understand what the real incentives and disincentives are 

and to ensure that the former outweigh the latter. In 

other words, the motivation of Reservists, their families and employers needs to be better understood. In 

addition, a flexible approach is necessary to accommodate the needs of widely varying Reservists and 

the very different posts which they are intended to 

fill, and a one-size-fits-all approach to training must 

be avoided.
38

Dangers of Outsourcing.

In an attempt to control and cut costs, outsourcing 

to the private sector is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. However, lessons from the UK have 

shown that while some outsourcing programs have 

been successful, others have been nothing short of 

disastrous. 

Recommendation: Based on the UK’s experience, the 

single most important recommendation of this monograph is that cost must no longer be the only criterion 

for determining value. Instead, further consideration 

of the quality of output is essential. In addition, in each 

case, a feasibility study should be conducted to assess 

the likely outcome of outsourcing with reference to 

the individuals on the ground who will be impacted 

by the change and to senior military personnel, as well 

as the administrators and budget personnel currently 

consulted.

ENDNOTES 

1. “For only 6 percent of the Army budget, the Army Reserve 

provides almost 20 percent of the Total Force.” See America’s 

Army Reserve: A Life-saving and life-sustaining force for the Nation: 

2013 Posture Statement, Ft. Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Reserve, 2013, 

available from www.usar.army.mil/resources/Media/ARPS_2013_6-

6-13%20%282%29.pdf, accessed May 10, 2014.

2. 2012 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement: A great Value for 

America, Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, available from 

www.nationalguard.mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements

/2012%20National%20Guard%20Bureau%20Posture%20Statement.

pdf, accessed May 10, 2014.

3. Army 2020 envisages that the future UK army will be 

112,000 by 2020, consisting of 82,000 Regular personnel and 

30,000 Reservists. See Library Standard Note Army 2020, SN06396, 

London, UK, July 26, 2012.
39

4. The Whole Force concept involves treating the three components of the Army—the Regular Army, the Army National 

Guard, and the Army Reserve as a single force.

5. Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States 

and the Modern Historical Experience, New York: Pantheon Books, 

1985, pp. 457-461.

6. Paul D. Shrinkman, “Army to Cut 80,000 Soldiers,” US 

News, June 23, 2013, available from www.usnews.com/news/

articles/2013/06/25/army-to-cut-80000-soldiers-from-its-ranks-chiefsays, accessed May 13, 2014.

7. Andrew Feickert, “Army Drawdown and Restructuring: 

Background and Issues for Congress,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS), February 28, 2014, available from 

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42493.pdf, accessed May 13, 2014.

8. Caroline Wyatt, “Has Britain’s Defence Budget Been Cut 

Too Much?” BBC Defence Correspondent, BBC News, February 

24, 2014, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26271018, accessed 

May 13, 2014. 

9. Lolita C. Baldor, “Army Chief Sees Greater Role for Guard 

and Reserves,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 27, 2012. Taken 

from Feickert.

10. U.S. Dollar equivalent values use an exchange rate of £1 = 

$1.70, current as of July 1, 2014. 

11. Joint Service Publication 754, Tri-Service Regulations for 

Pay and Charges, London, UK: Ministry of Defence, Ed. 18, April 

1, 2013. 

12. The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, Commission’s Vision for the Reserve Forces in 

2020, London, UK: Ministry of Defence, July 2011, p. 11.

13. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) Publication: Future Character of Conflict: Strategic Trends Programme, London, UK: Ministry of Defence, February 1, 2010, p. 9, available from 

www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/courses/RND/supporting-documents/
40

20100201Future_Character_of_ConflictUDCDC_Strat_Trends_

4.pdf/view, accessed May 7, 2014.

14. James Carafano: “Total Force Policy and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future,” No. 869, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, April 18, 2005.

15. Chris Parry, Down South: A Falklands War Diary, London, 

UK: Viking Books, 2012.

16. The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, p. 8.

17. Use of Reservists during the Olympics, London, UK: SaBRE 

publication, January 29, 2012, available from www.sabre.mod.uk/

News/Olympics-2012#.U3SQMCjaNKU, accessed May 15, 2014.

18. Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, London, UK: Ministry of Defence, White paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her 

Majesty, July 2013, p. 67.

19. The Independent Commission to Review the United 

Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, p. 11.

20. Thomas Harding, “TA Troops ‘Too Poorly Trained to 

Make Up for Army Cuts’ The Reservists Who Replace Soldiers 

Made Redundant as Part of the Army Cuts Lack Commitment 

and Proper Training, Senior Military Figures Fear,” The Telegraph, 

May 26, 2012, available from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/

defence/9291338/TA-troops-too-poorly-trained-to-make-up-forArmy-cuts.html, accessed May 7, 2014. 

21. TSP7—UK Reserve Forces and Cadets April 1, 2013, London, 

UK: Ministry of Defence, Defence Statistics (Tri Service), November 28, 2013, available from https://www.gov.uk/government/

uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/280401/2013.pdf, accessed May 9, 2014. 

22. A bounty is an annual tax free payment starting at £428, 

but rising with each year of qualifying service. Currently, the annual bounty after 5 years of service is £1,691. See Territorial Army 
41

Rates of Pay, Bounties and Expenses, London, UK: MoD, April 2013, 

available from www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Rates_of_Pay_

TA.pdf, accessed May 9, 2014.

23. Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, p. 16.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., pp. 66-67.

26. STUFT (ship taken up from trade) is a civilian ship requisitioned for government use.

27. The RAF’s Mobile Meteorological Unit (MMU) has been 

staffed since October 2000 by SRs of the Royal Auxiliary Air 

Force, who are otherwise civil service employees of the Met 

Office. The engineering support delivered by SERCO to the BAe 

125 aircraft of the RAF’s 32 (The Royal) Squadron came under an 

April 2001 agreement. See “Sponsored Reserves,” the UK Defence 

Forum, FS56, available from www.ukdf.org.uk/assets/downloads/FS56

SponsoredReserves.pdf, accessed May 8, 2014.

28. The use of cargo ships for the deployment of military assets, such as weaponry, vehicles, military personnel, and supplies.

29. The Royal Navy’s Strategic Sealift Capability, of six new 

two roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) vessels (Beachy Head, Longstone, 

Hartland Point, Anvil Point, Hurst Point, and Eddystone), has 

proven invaluable in supporting Operation TELIC and ongoing operations in Iraq. These ships are operated by a commercial 

shipping consortium, AWSR Shipping Ltd. Under the terms of its 

agreement with the MoD, AWSR typically commits four of the 

ships to MoD tasking requirements, leaving a further two ro-ro 

vessels in the commercial market, to be called-out in time of crisis. 

These are crewed by 180 Sponsored Reserves, provided by AWSR 

but serving with the RN Reserve. See “Sponsored Reserves.” 

30. Supporting Operations, Met Office Website, available 

from www.metoffice.gov.uk/defence/mmu, accessed May 20, 2014.

31. A green paper is a tentative government report and consultation document of policy proposals for debate and discussion, 
42

without any commitment to action; the first step in changing the 

law. Green papers may result in the production of a white paper.

32. The Independent Commission to Review the United 

Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, p. 6.

33. A white paper is an authoritative report or guide helping 

readers understand an issue, solve a problem, or make a decision.

34. Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, p. 8.

35. The Chief of Defence Personnel, is the Senior Responsible Owner for FR20 and is accountable to the Reserves Executive 

Committee, chaired by the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, and 

ultimately to the Secretary of State for Defence for the delivery of 

the future Reserve Forces.

36. Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, 

pp. 10-15.

37. Zoe Morrison, Wendy Loretto, and Sarah CunninghamBurley, Future Reserves 2020: Understanding the Factors that Affect 

Support for Reserve Service—a preliminary study prepared for the 

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Edinburgh, Scotland: University of Edinburgh, Centre for Families and Relationships, March 

2013, p. 13.

38. Ibid., p. 3. 

39. Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, p. 31.

40. Ibid., p. 32.

41. Louisa Brooke-Holland, “Future Reserves 2020,” SN06733, 

London, UK: House of Commons, International Affairs and 

Defence Section, October 3, 2013, p. 4.

42. The Kitemark is a symbol of trust, integrity, and quality recognized worldwide and described as a ‘Business Superbrand’. It is a registered certification mark owned and awarded 

by the British Standards Institution (BSI), originally developed 

by the BSI. Kitemark website available from www.kitemark.com/

about-kitemark/, accessed May 18, 2014.
43

43. Consultation Launched on the Future of Britain’s Reserve Forces, London, UK: Ministry of Defence, November 8, 2012, available 

from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/consultation-launched-onthe-future-of-britains-Reserve-forces, accessed May 10, 2014.

44. Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, p. 8.

45. Two weeks leave after the birth is mandatory by law.

46. Statutory Maternity Pay consists of 90 percent of average 

earnings (before tax) for the first 6 weeks followed by £138.18 or 

90 percent of average weekly earnings for the following 33 weeks. 

See Maternity Pay and Leave, UK Government website, available 

from https://www.gov.uk/maternity-pay-leave/leave, accessed May 

18, 2014.

47. The entitlement for Paternity pay and leave is available 

when your partner is having a baby or a child is adopted. This 

typically consists of between 1 and 2 weeks paid Ordinary Paternity Leave, as well as up to 26 week’s Additional Paternity Leave, 

if the mother/co-adopter returns to work. See UK Government 

Website, available from https://www.gov.uk/paternity-pay-leave, accessed May 18, 2014.

48. Philippa Tucker, Response to Ministry of Defence consultation on “Future Reserves 2020: Delivering the Nation’s Security 

Together,” Corby and London, UK: Chartered Management Institute, January 2013, available from www.managers.org.uk/sites/

default/files/Future%20Reserves%202020%20-%20consultation%20

response.pdf, accessed May 8, 2014.

49. Ibid.

50. Richard Tyler, “Employers Benefit from Afghan Tours,” 

Daily Telegraph, July 13, 2014.

51. Army 2020, HC 263, Session 2014-15, London, UK: Ministry of Defence, National Audit Office, June 11, 2014, pp. 7-8.

52. Ibid.
44

53. Professor Connelly is also an officer in the British Army 

Reserve, currently serving as SO1 G1 Policy and Plans, HQ Support Command.

54. E-mail correspondence with author, July 2014.

55. Army 2020, HC 263, Session 2014-15.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Interviews conducted with UK Army Reservists between 

April and June 2014.

59. Peter Quentin, RUSI Journal, Vol. 33, No 2, March 13, 2014, 

pp. 5-7, available from https://www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/

ref:A514077C33D4E6/#.U2t3_1d7Jps, accessed May 8, 2014.

60. Harding. 

61. As of April 2012. TSP7—UK Reserve Forces and Cadets: April 

2013, Defence Statistics (Tri Service) London, UK: Ministry of Defence, November 28, 2013.

62. TSP7.

63. Harding. 

64. E-mail correspondence with author, July 2014. 

65. Interviews conducted with serving members of the Reserve Forces in the Army Reserve conducted between March 2014 

and May 2014.

66. Interviews conducted with members of 256 Field Hospital, May 1, 2014.

67. Harding. 

68. Ibid.
45

69. Winnie Agbonlahor, “’Playing with Fire,” Civil Service 

World, October 14, 2013, available from www.civilserviceworld.com/

playing-with-fire-2, accessed April 28, 2014.

70. Caroline Wyatt, “Has Britain’s Defence Budget Been Cut 

Too Much?” BBC News, February 24, 2014, available from www.

bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26271018, accessed May 13, 2014.

71. Colonel Ted Spain U.S. Army (Ret.) and Terry Turchie, 

Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Breaking Iraq: The Ten Mistakes That Broke Iraq, New York: History Publishing Company, 2013.

72. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “National Guard Commanders Rise in Revolt Amongst Active Army; MG Rossi Questions 

Guard Combat Role” Breaking Defence, March 11, 2014, available 

from breakingdefense.com/2014/03/national-guard-commanders-risein-revolt-against-active-army-mg-ross-questions-guard-combat-role/, 

accessed April 29, 2014.

73. Dr. Patrick Allen, PMP, Johns Hopkins University, retired 

as a full colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves in 2002. He has 21 

years of service, 4 of which were active service, with the remainder in the U.S. Army Reserves involved with correspondence and 

2-week tours at various locations around the United States and in 

Germany.

74. Interview with Dr. Patrick Allen, April 13, 2014.

75. Vince Connelly, “Cultural Differences between the Regular Army and the TA as Barriers to Integration,” Unpublished paper prepared for UK Ministry of Defense, Directorate of Personnel Capability, January 2013, p. 11.

76. Penny Dick and Rosie Hyde, Consent as Resistance, Resistance as Consent: Re-Reading Part-Time Professionals’ Acceptance 

of Their Marginal Positions, Gender, Work & Organization, Vol. 13, 

Issue 6, November 2006, pp. 543–564.

77. Shima D. Keene, “Bullfinch Review: The Use of Financial 

and Criminal Intelligence in the context of tackling Child Sexual Exploitation” Unpublished report (restricted) produced for 

Thames Valley Police, UK, March 2014.
46

78. Connelly, “Cultural Differences between the Regular 

Army and the TA as Barriers to Integration,” p. 19.

79. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is an independent think tank engaged in defense and security research, founded in 1831 by the Duke of Wellington.

80. Peter Quentin, RUSI Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, March 13, 

pp. 5-7, available from https://www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/

ref:A514077C33D4E6/#.U2t3_1d7Jps, accessed May 8, 2014.

81. “Become a Reservist,” Lafayette Hill, PA: NHS Services, 

available from www.nhscareers.nhs.uk/working-in-the-nhs/developing-your-career/become-a-Reservist/, accessed May 16, 2014.

82. Interviews held with Medical Corps staff from 256 Field 

Hospital, London, UK. See Appendix A for further details.

83. The most common mistake is to consider “intelligence” as 

synonymous with “information.” Information is not intelligence. 

Information plus analysis equals intelligence. So without analysis, 

there is no intelligence. In other words, Intelligence is not what is 

collected; it is what is produced after collected data is evaluated 

and analyzed. As such, analysis requires thoughtful contemplation that results in conclusions and recommendations. Computers 

may assist with analysis by compiling large amounts of data into 

an easily accessible format, but this is still only collated data; it is 

not analyzed data or information, and it falls far short of being 

intelligence.

84. The Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, widely known as the Butler Review after its chairman Lord 

Robin Butler of Brockwell, published by the British government 

on July 4, 2004. The Review examined the intelligence on Iraq’s 

weapons of mass destruction which played a key part in the Government’s decision to invade Iraq (as part of the U.S.-led coalition) 

in 2003. 

85. Lord Robin Butler et al., “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” London, UK: House of Commons 

Publication, July 14, 2004.
47

86. Ibid.

87. “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty,” The Strategic Defence and Security Review, HM Government Cm 7948, 

October 2010.

88. “Exercise Agile Warrior and Future Development of UK 

Land Forces,” RUSI Occasional Paper, London, UK, May 2011.

89. Strategic Trends Program, Future Character of Conflict, London, UK: Ministry of Defence, Developments, Concepts and 

Doctrine Centre, February 2, 2010.

90. Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6: NATO Glossary 

of Terms and Definitions, Brussels, Belgium, August 7, 2000, available from https://wss.apan.org/432/Files/Events/TE-03/Supporting%

20Documents/NATO%20Terms%20%20and%20 Definitions.pdf, accessed May 15, 2014.

91. This conceptual framework consists of four environments: 

cultural, institutional (including political and military), technological, and physical.

92. Joint Doctrine Publication 04: Understanding, London, UK: 

Ministry of Defence, Developments, Concepts and Doctrine 

Centre, December 2010.

93. Pashto (alternatively spelled Pukhto, Pakhto or Pushto), 

also known historically as Afghani and Pathani, is the native language of the Pashtun people of South-Central Asia. Pashto is one 

of the two official languages of Afghanistan (the other being Dari 

[Farsi]), and is also spoken as a regional language in western and 

northwestern Pakistan and among the Pashtun diaspora around 

the world.

94. Wanetsi, or Waneci, is a Pashto dialect which is spoken by 

a small population of Tareen tribes in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 

primarily in Harnai and Sinjawi area east of Quetta, northern 

Balochistan, Pakistan.

95. Ben Farmer, “Army Struggling to Find Recruits since 

System Was Overhauled to Cut Costs,” Defence Correspondent, 
48

The Telegraph (London), October 7, 2013, available from www.

telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10359743/Army-struggling-tofind-recruits-since-system-was-overhauled-to-cut-costs.html, accessed 

May 20, 2014.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Interview with serving Warrant Officer, 256 Field Hospital, May 1, 2014. 

99. Interviews conducted with members of the Reserve forces 

carried out between January and July 2014.

100. 36th Air Refueling Squadron (336 ARS) is a United 

States Air Force Reserve squadron assigned to the 452d Operations Group stationed at March Joint Air Reserve Base, CA. The 

squadron is a corollary unit of the active duty 92d Air Refueling 

Squadron, 92d Air Refueling Wing (92 ARW), Fairchild Air Force 

Base, WA. 

101. “US Army Human Resource Command (HRC) Enlisted EMF History Chart,” available from https:// pamxxi.armyg1.

army.mil/Select/SelectMosUnclas.aspx.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Shima D. Keene

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil