alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §§811 to 820. Repealed. July 3, 1950, ch. 446, §5(2), 64 Stat. 320

Section 811, acts Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §25, 39 Stat. 958; May 17, 1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158, vested all local legislative powers in Puerto Rico, with certain exceptions, in "Legislature of Puerto Rico", consisting of a "senate" and a "house of representatives".

Section 812, acts Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §26, 39 Stat. 958; May 17, 1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158, related to Senate of Puerto Rico, its members, election and powers.

Section 813, acts Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §27, 39 Stat. 959; May 17, 1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158, related to House of Representatives and its members and their election.

Section 814, acts Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §28, 39 Stat. 959; May 17, 1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158, provided for division of Puerto Rico into thirty-five representative and seven senatorial districts.

Section 814a, acts Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §35, 39 Stat. 963; May 17, 1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158, related to qualification of electors.

Section 815, acts Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §29, 39 Stat. 959; May 17, 1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158, provided for time of holding elections and revision of boundaries of senatorial and representative districts and municipalities.

Section 816, act Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §32, 39 Stat. 960, related to powers of senate and house of representatives, including determination of election and qualifications of members.

Section 817, acts Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §33, 39 Stat. 960; Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 503, §5, 44 Stat. 1420, provided for holding of annual sessions of legislature and time for convening.

Section 818, acts Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §33, 39 Stat. 960; Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 503, §5, 44 Stat. 1420, authorized governor to call special sessions of legislature or senate.

Section 819, acts Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §30, 39 Stat. 959; May 17, 1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158; June 1, 1938, ch. 308, 52 Stat. 595, related to term of office of senators and representatives, filling of vacancies, and limitations upon appointment to other offices of those legislative members.

Section 820, acts Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, §31, 39 Stat. 960; Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 503, §4, 44 Stat. 1420; May 17, 1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158; June 24, 1948, ch. 610, §4, 62 Stat. 580, related to compensation and mileage of members of senate and house of representatives.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal of sections 811 to 820 effective July 25, 1952, see note set out under section 732 of this title.
### §2126. Treatment of actions arising from chapter

#### (a) Jurisdiction

Except as provided in section 2124(f)(2) of this title (relating to the issuance of an order enforcing a subpoena), and subchapter III (relating to adjustments of debts), any action against the Oversight Board, and any action otherwise arising out of this chapter, in whole or in part, shall be brought in a United States district court for the covered territory or, for any covered territory that does not have a district court, in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.

#### (b) Appeal

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any order of a United States district court that is issued pursuant to an action brought under subsection (a) shall be subject to review only pursuant to a notice of appeal to the applicable United States Court of Appeals.

#### (c) Timing of relief

Except with respect to any orders entered to remedy constitutional violations, no order of any court granting declaratory or injunctive relief against the Oversight Board, including relief permitting or requiring the obligation, borrowing, or expenditure of funds, shall take effect during the pendency of the action before such court, during the time appeal may be taken, or (if appeal is taken) during the period before the court has entered its final order disposing of such action.

#### (d) Expedited consideration

It shall be the duty of the applicable United States District Court, the applicable United States Court of Appeals, and, as applicable, the Supreme Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under this chapter.

#### (e) Review of Oversight Board certifications

There shall be no jurisdiction in any United States district court to review challenges to the Oversight Board's certification determinations under this chapter.

(Pub. L. 114–187, title I, §106, June 30, 2016, 130 Stat. 562.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This chapter, referred to in subsecs. (a), (d), and (e), was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 114–187, June 30, 2016, 130 Stat. 549, known as the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act and also as PROMESA, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2101 of this title and Tables.
EX-10.1




 Exhibit 10.1 

Performance Options 

INTEL CORPORATION 
 2021
INDUCEMENT PLAN 
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO 

OPTION AGREEMENT 

(for Time- and Performance-Vesting Options) 

This First Amendment (this “Amendment”) to the Option Agreement by and between Patrick Gelsinger
(“you”) and Intel Corporation (the “Corporation”), effective as of February 15, 2021 (the “Award Agreement”), is made by and between you and the Corporation, effective as of November 18,
2022 (the “Amendment Effective Date”). Capitalized terms contained herein but not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the 2021 Inducement Plan or Award Agreement, as the case may be. 

WHEREAS, you were granted an Option pursuant to the terms of the Award Agreement; and 

WHEREAS, you and the Corporation have agreed to amend and modify certain terms of the Award Agreement as provided
herein, with the understanding that all other provisions of the Award Agreement shall remain unchanged. 
 NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises contained herein and for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto, each intending to be legally bound hereby, agree to amend
the Award Agreement, effective as of the Amendment Effective Date, as follows: 

1.         Increase of Performance Vesting Hurdle. 

 

	 	(a)	 Section 4(b) of the Award Agreement is hereby amended by replacing “thirty percent (30%)”
with “fifty percent (50%)”. 



2.         Increase to Stock Price Performance Hurdle Measurement Period.

  

	 	(a)	 Section 4(b) of the Award Agreement is hereby amended by replacing all references to “thirty
(30) consecutive trading days” with “ninety (90) consecutive calendar days”. 


  

	 	(b)	 Section 10 of the Award Agreement is hereby amended by replacing the reference to “thirty
(30) consecutive trading days” with “ninety (90) consecutive calendar days”. 



3.         Miscellaneous. The Award Agreement shall remain unchanged and
in full force and effect other than as provided in this Amendment. This Amendment shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware (without regard to conflicts of law). 











 Performance Options 

4.         Counterparts. This Amendment may be executed in counterparts,
each one of which shall be deemed an original and all of which together shall constitute one and the same Amendment. 
 [Signature Page
Follows] 











 Performance Options 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be duly executed and effective as of the Amendment
Effective Date. 
  

	
	 INTEL CORPORATION
	
	  /s/ Dion Weisler

	By:   Dion Weisler
	   Chair, Compensation Committee



  

	
	 Acknowledged and Agreed to by:
	
	  /s/ Patrick Gelsinger

	 Patrick Gelsinger
	
	  November 18, 2022

	 Date
§ 9.154 Occupancy of accessible dwelling units. ( a ) The agency shall adopt suitable means to assure that information regarding the availability of accessible units in PDP housing facilities reaches eligible individuals with disabilities, and shall take reasonable nondiscriminatory steps to maximize the utilization of such units by eligible individuals whose disability requires the accessibility features of the particular unit. To this end, when an accessible unit becomes vacant, the agency (or its management agent) before offering such units to an applicant without disabilities shall offer such unit: ( 1 ) First, to a current occupant of another unit of the same project, or comparable projects under common control, having disabilities requiring the accessibility features of the vacant unit and occupying a unit not having such features, or, if no such occupant exists, then
( 2 ) Second, to an eligible qualified applicant on the waiting list having a disability requiring the accessibility features of the vacant unit.
( b ) When offering an accessible unit to an applicant not having disabilities requiring the accessibility features of the unit, the agency may require the applicant to agree (and may incorporate this agreement in the lease) to move to a non-accessible unit when available.
(No. 93-CC-0101

#### DRF Realty, Inc., Claimant, *v.*The State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Order filed April 6, 1993.*

DRF Realty, Inc., *pro se,*for Claimant.

Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Sebastian Danziger, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

*363ORDER

Rurke, J.

Claimant DRF Realty, Incorporated (DRF) brought these claims seeking money due pursuant to a tax escalation clause in a rental agreement for property utilized by the Respondent’s Department of Employment Security (DES). In its standard lapsed appropriation form complaints, DRF alleged that it made demands for payment but the demands were refused on the grounds that the funds appropriated for such payments had lapsed. The Respondent filed stipulations agreeing to entry of awards in the full amount sought. The stipulations are now before us for approval.

The Court of Claims is not bound by such stipulations. In these cases we are unable to approve all of the stipulations for the following reason.

In *La Salle National Bank v. State*(1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 266, we held that payments due pursuant to tax escalation clauses in leases were current obligations of the fiscal year in which they became due. Neither party filed a copy of the lease agreement in this case so we do not know exactly when payments were due. We do know from the copies of the tax bills attached to the complaints that the bills were not payable in the fiscal years for which the Respondent provided data in its departmental reports, *e.g.,*in 93-CC-0099, the tax bills indicate that payment was to be made in the first installment during fiscal year 1990 and the second installment was due in fiscal year 1991, but the report contains information relating to fiscal year 1989.

We are, however, able to approve the stipulation in 93-CC-0101. The bills in that case were payable by the *364Claimant in fiscal years 1988 and 1989 and the Respondent would have owed pursuant to the tax escalation clause during one or both of those years. From the reports in 93-CC-0099 and 0100 we see that sufficient funds lapsed to cover the obligation.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded $629.26 in claim No. 93-CC-0101; it is further ordered that the Respondent review the lease agreement to determine in which fiscal year the obligation to pay arose in 93-CC-0099 and 93-CC-0100 and file amended reports in those cases. The parties are advised that payment of any awards made in these claims will require legislative approval, so Respondent is to provide the information at the earliest possible date.
### §§220 to 224. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Sections 220 to 224, relating to Territory of Alaska, were omitted in view of admission of Alaska into the Union.

Section 220, act Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552, §7, 32 Stat. 828, vested control over the fur seal, salmon and other fisheries of Alaska in Department of the Interior.

Section 221, acts June 6, 1924, ch. 272, §1, 43 Stat. 464; June 18, 1926, ch. 621, 44 Stat. 752, empowered Secretary to set aside fishing areas, prescribed closed seasons, and to place limitations on catch.

Section 222, acts June 6, 1924, ch. 272, §1, 43 Stat. 464; June 18, 1926, ch. 621, 44 Stat. 752, declared that fishing in certain areas was unlawful, prohibited granting of exclusive rights, and provided that citizens shall not be denied fishing rights.

Section 222a, acts June 6, 1924, ch. 272, §1, 43 Stat. 464; Aug. 14, 1937, ch. 622, 50 Stat. 639; Apr. 7, 1938, ch. 110, 52 Stat. 208, prohibited commercial salmon fishing by nonresidents.

Section 223, acts June 6, 1924, ch. 272, §1, 43 Stat. 464; June 18, 1926, ch. 621, 44 Stat. 752, related to prohibited areas in creeks, streams, rivers, etc.

Section 223a, acts June 6, 1924, ch. 272, §1, 43 Stat. 464; June 18, 1926, ch. 621, 44 Stat. 752, authorized Secretary to permit taking of fish or shellfish for bait purposes.

Section 223b, acts June 6, 1924, ch. 272, §1, 43 Stat. 464; Aug. 2, 1937, ch. 556, 50 Stat. 557, authorized Secretary to lease bottoms for oyster cultivation.

Section 224, acts June 6, 1924, ch. 272, §1, 43 Stat. 464; June 18, 1926, ch. 621, 44 Stat. 752, prohibited importation of salmon during closed seasons.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification of CEO Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tumbleweed
Communications Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Jeffrey C. Smith, as Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: November 14, 2003



|/s/    JEFFREY C. SMITH             
|------------------------------------
|Jeffrey C. Smith                    
|Chairman and Chief Executive Officer



This certification
accompanies the Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended.
#### Donald E. Bryant, Jr. *v.*Helen V. Bryant

*Donald E. Bryant,*pro se, in support of the petition.

*Theodore Freedman,*in opposition.

Decided October 13, 1992

The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 27 Conn. App. 910, is granted, limited to the following questions:

“1. Was the Appellate Court correct in rejecting the plaintiffs claim that the trial court, under General Statutes § 46b-8, improperly refused to consider the plaintiff’s motion for modification simultaneously with the defendant’s motion for contempt?

*“2.*Was the Appellate Court correct in rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court’s finding of contempt was not based on sufficient evidence?”
EXHIBIT
31.1





Certification
of Chief Executive Officer


Pursuant
to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002








I, Bruce J. Wood,
certify that:





1.  I have reviewed
this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Schiff Nutrition International,
Inc.;





2.  Based on my
knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report;





3.  Based on my
knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the
periods presented in this report;





4.  The registrant's
other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:





(a)  Designed such
disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this report is being prepared;





(b)  Evaluated the
effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and





(c)  Disclosed in this
report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting
that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and





5.  The registrant's
other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or
persons performing the equivalent functions):





(a)  All significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and





(b)  Any fraud,
whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting.








Date: April
      3, 2008
            By:
            /s/ Bruce J.
      WoodBruce J.
      WoodChief
      Executive Officer
#### City of Winona *vs.*James Burke.

December 15, 1876.

Evidence — City Ordinances. — In a prosecution under an ordinance of a city, the ordinance should be pleaded and proved. Courts do not take judicial notice of them.

The defendant was tried before a justice of the peace in and for Wiuona city and county, on a complaint charging him with maintaining a nuisance in the said city, i( contrary to the provisions of an ordinance of this city, entitled an ordinance to prevent and abate nuisances.” This was the only mention of the ordinance in the complaint, nor was any proof of it made at the trial. The defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that no offence was charged in the complaint, and for want of proof of the violation of any ordinance of the city, no ordinance of the city having-been offered in evidence. The motion was overruled, and an exception taken. The justice found the defendant guilty, and imposed a fine of $15 and costs ; whereupon the defendant caused the action to be removed to this court by *certiorari.*

*255
      *J. E. Robinson*and *J. W. JDychson,*for defendant.

*O. B. Gould,*for plaintiff,

argued that the objection to the complaint should have been made before going to trial, citing *City of Rochester*v. *Upman,*19 Minn. 108 ; *State*v. *Reckards,*21 Minn. 47 ; that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the ordinances of the city are printed in book form, and, therefore, need not be proved, and that city ordinances are judicially noticed by courts of the municipality having exclusive jurisdiction of violations thereof, citing Laws 1873, c. 68 ; *Napman*v. *People,*19 Mich. 352 ; *Conboy*v. *Iowa City,*2 Iowa, 90.

Gtlkilean, C. J.

The defendant was convicted in the court below for the alleged violation of a city ordinance. On the trial no proof of the ordinance was made, and the defendant moved to dismiss the prosecution on that ground, which motion was denied. It is claimed on behalf of the city that, because of Laws 1873, c. 68 — which provides that, when the “by-laws, ordinances, etc., of any city * * * have been or shall hereafter be printed and published by authority of the corporation, the same shall be received in evidence in all courts and places without further proof” —the court will take judicial notice of the existence of the ordinance, without proof. Such was not the intention of the act, as is clear from its language, and does not aifect the necessity of proving the ordinance. Courts do not take judicial notice of city ordinances. *Garvin*v. *Wells,*8 Iowa, 286 ; *Goodrich*v. *Brown,*30 Iowa, 291. Such ordinances should be pleaded and proved.

Judgment reversed.
## NO. 12

- 1 1

- 00 220

- C V

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

JACKIE LAMAR MILES, § APPEAL FROM THE THIRD

APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

MICHAEL UNIT INFIRMARY (TDCJ),

APPELLEE § ANDERSON C OUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

This appeal is being dismissed for want of jurisdiction pursuant to Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 42.3(a). The trial court’s judgment was signed on May 27, 2011. Under the

rules of appellate pr ocedure, the notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the

judgment is signed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.1. Appellant did not file a motion for new trial. See

T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.1(a) (providing that notice of appeal must be filed within ninet y days after

judgment signed if any party timely files motion for new trial). Therefore, Appellant’s notice of

appeal was due to have been filed no later than June 27, 2011. Appellant did not file his notice

of appeal until July 11, 2011. Because Appell ant’s notice of appeal was not filed on or before

June 27, 2011, it was untimely, and this court has no jurisdiction of the appeal.

On July 19, 2011, this court notified Appellant, pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure 37.1 and 42.3, that his not ice of appeal was untimely and there was no timely motion

for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal. Appellant was further informed that

pursuant to the holding of the Texas Supreme Court in Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615

(Tex. 1997), this court would imply a motion to extend time for filing the notice of appeal.

Appellant was warned, however, that the appeal would be dismissed unless, on or before July 29,

2011, he provided this court with a written explanation of facts that reasonably ex plained his2

need for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal. See id . at 615. The July 29, 2011

deadline has now passed, and we have not received the required written explanation from

Appellant.

Because this court is not authorized to extend t he time for perfecting an appeal except as

provided by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 26.3, the appeal is dismissed for want

of jurisdiction

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.3(a).

Opinion delivered August 3, 2011.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Gr iffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)