Opinion filed August 1, 2013

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-13-00036-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.L. AND M.N.L., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 358th District Court

Ector County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. D-3106-PC

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the mother 

and father of J.A.L. and M.N.L. Both parents filed a notice of appeal. We affirm.

In a single issue on appeal, the children’s father challenges the legal and 

factual sufficiency of the evidence to show endangerment, abandonment,

noncompliance with a court order, and best interest. The mother presents two 

issues in which she asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to 

support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best 

interest of the children. Although not presented as an “issue,” the mother also 
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challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial 

court’s findings regarding endangering conditions, endangering conduct, and 

compliance with a court order. 

The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2012). To 

determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we 

review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine 

whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its 

finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if 

the evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and 

determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm 

belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 

89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). To terminate parental rights, it must be shown 

by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts 

listed in Section 161.001(1)(A)–(T) and that termination is in the best interest of 

the child. Section 161.001. 

With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. 

denied). But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their 

analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, 

but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical 

needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to 

the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking 

custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best 

interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the 

agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, 

(8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-
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child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions 

of the parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds 

for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the 

child’s best interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. 

In this case, the trial court found that the father had committed four of the 

acts listed in Section 161.001(1): those found in subsections (D), (E), (N), and (O). 

The trial court found that the mother had committed three of the acts listed in 

Section 161.001(1): those found in subsections (D), (E), and (O). Specifically, the 

trial court found that both parents had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the 

children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the physical or 

emotional well-being of the children; that the parents had engaged in conduct or 

knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that 

endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; that the father had 

constructively abandoned the children, who had been in the permanent or 

temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective 

Services or an authorized agency for not less than six months and (1) the 

Department or authorized agency had made reasonable efforts to return the 

children to the father, (2) the father had not regularly visited or maintained 

significant contact with the children, and (3) the father had demonstrated an 

inability to provide the children with a safe environment; and that both parents had 

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established 

the actions necessary for them to obtain the return of the children, who had been in 

the managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a 

result of the children’s removal from the parents for abuse or neglect. The trial 

court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(2), that termination of each parent’s 

parental rights would be in the best interest of the children. 
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The record shows that J.A.L. and M.N.L. were removed from their parents 

on October 12, 2011, when J.A.L. was four years old and M.N.L. was two years 

old. The Department removed the children due to physical abuse to both children;

the parents had severely disciplined the children. At the time of removal, M.N.L. 

had a big bruise on her lower back that was fading, and J.A.L. had bruising on his 

upper thighs and legs, around his genital area, and on his penis. J.A.L.’s injuries 

were caused by the father beating J.A.L. with a belt. The record indicates that this 

type of beating occurred more than once.

The evidence shows that the father beat the children with a belt. The father 

stated that the mother also used excessive discipline with the children, including 

spankings with a belt that left bruises on them. During counseling with Teresa 

Volaro, a licensed professional counselor, the mother denied physically abusing the 

children; she only admitted to calling them stupid and yelling at them. The mother 

did tell the counselor that she did not intervene when the father was hitting the 

children with the belt “because her mother always hit her with a belt and she was 

afraid she would get hit with the belt, too.” J.A.L. screamed when he saw the belt.

Volaro testified that marital problems between the parents were ongoing at 

the time of the final hearing. The parents were not able to handle stressors in an 

appropriate manner, and evidence was presented showing that domestic violence 

had occurred between the parents and in the presence of the children. Two weeks 

before the hearing, the parents got into a loud argument while they were in Volaro’s 

office for a counseling session. The father had told Volaro throughout the 

counseling sessions that “it would be a big mistake to bring the children home right 

now because of the situation with him and [the mother].” In a session two weeks 

before the final hearing in this case, the father admitted that “there has not been a 

change.” Volaro could not recommend that the children go back to live with the 
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parents in that environment of hostility. She would fear for the physical and 

emotional safety of the children if they were returned to their parents.

Jenna Clark, a licensed professional counselor, conducted a psychosocial 

assessment of the parents. She testified that domestic violence or abuse that occurs 

between parents in the presence of small children is dangerous to those children 

and “terribly detrimental to the children’s emotional growth.” Clark also testified 

that hitting children in the face or spanking young children to the point of having 

bruises on their legs and buttocks is excessive and abusive. The attachment issue 

caused by a parent’s physical abuse is a deep issue that affects all relationships 

with significant adults in the children’s lives.

The Department’s conservatorship worker, Michelle Franco, testified that the 

mother had performed some of the required services but that she had not complied 

with the service plan because she failed to complete Project ADAM as ordered. 

Franco also testified that the father completed some of the required services but 

that he failed to comply with the service plan; he did not attend all of the therapy 

that was required, did not obtain financial counseling, and did not maintain stable 

employment. The father had nine different jobs during the time period from 

removal to the final hearing.

According to Franco, the children were disruptive after their visits with the 

mother. Over the course of the case, J.A.L. wet himself, had temper tantrums, and 

was very bossy after the parents visited. The children changed in a positive manner 

when the parents missed their visits. Overall the children are happy and content 

and behaving well in their current situation. They have a safe home. The 

Department recommended that the parental rights of the mother and father be 

terminated and that the children be adopted by their foster parents. According to 

Franco, the foster parents would like to adopt J.A.L. and M.N.L. Franco testified 

that she thought it would be in the best interest of the children to terminate the 
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parents’ rights. She stated that the parents “have not shown any kind of 

improvement since the beginning of the case.” Franco was concerned that the 

physical abuse would recur because the parents had not changed despite the 

services offered to them.

The father testified that he was a changed person and asked the court to 

return the children to him and the mother. At trial, the mother testified that, on two 

occasions, she spanked the children with a belt but did not leave marks or bruises. 

The mother admitted to screaming at the children and agreed that she allowed the 

father to spank the children and to regularly deny the children of anything to drink. 

She also stated that the domestic violence between her and the father often resulted 

in the father getting mad and taking it out on the children. The mother testified 

that she and the father had learned in counseling how to properly deal with 

stressors.

We hold that there was clear and convincing evidence from which the trial 

court could reasonably have formed a firm belief that both parents engaged in 

conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct 

that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. In addition 

to the severe physical abuse of J.A.L., there was evidence of domestic violence 

between the parents. Both constitute conduct that endangered the children. To

support termination under Section 161.001(1)(E), the offending conduct does not 

need to be directed at the child, nor does the child actually have to suffer an injury. 

In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). Domestic violence may constitute 

evidence of endangerment. Id.; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 265. The evidence is legally 

sufficient to support the trial court’s finding as to each parent under 

Section 161.001(1)(E). Because a finding that a parent committed one of the acts 

listed in Section 161.001(1)(A)–(T) is all that is required under that statute, we 

need not address the parents’ remaining arguments regarding the sufficiency of the 
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evidence to support the trial court’s other findings under Section 161.001(1). See

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 

We also hold that, based on the evidence presented at trial and the Holley

factors, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction 

that termination of both the father’s and the mother’s parental rights would be in 

the best interest of J.A.L. and M.N.L. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. We 

cannot hold that the findings as to best interest are not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. The evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to 

support the findings that termination of the father’s and the mother’s parental rights 

is in the best interest of the children. The father’s sole issue and both of the 

mother’s issues are overruled. 

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination. 

JIM R. WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE

August 1, 2013

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Willson, J.