THE WASHINGTON METRO SYSTEM: SAFETY,

SERVICE, AND STABILITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 21, 2010

Serial No. 111–105

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

THE WASHINGTON METRO SYSTEM: SAFETY, SERVICE, AND STABILITY

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THE WASHINGTON METRO SYSTEM: SAFETY,

SERVICE, AND STABILITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 21, 2010

Serial No. 111–105

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

JUDY CHU, California

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 21, 2010 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Rogoff, Peter, Administrator, U.S. Federal Transit Administration ............ 16

Sarles, Richard, Metro interim general manager, WMATA; Peter Benjamin, chairman Metro Board of Directors, WMATA; Matt Bassett,

chair, Tri-State Oversight Committee; Jackie Jeter, president, Amalgamated Transit Union Local 689; and David Alpert, vice-chair, Metro

Rider Advisory Counsel ................................................................................ 54

Alpert, David ............................................................................................. 103

Bassett, Matt ............................................................................................. 91

Benjamin, Peter ......................................................................................... 78

Jeter, Jackie ............................................................................................... 97

Sarles, Richard .......................................................................................... 54

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Alpert, David, vice-chair, Metro Rider Advisory Counsel, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 105

Bassett, Matt, chair, Tri-State Oversight Committee, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 93

Benjamin, Peter, chairman Metro Board of Directors, WMATA, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 81

Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Virginia, prepared statement of .............................................................. 134

Issa, Hon. Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from the State of

California, prepared statement of ................................................................ 9

Jeter, Jackie, president, Amalgamated Transit Union Local 689, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 99

Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Florida, minority staff analysis ................................................................... 35

Quigley, Hon. Mike, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Illinois, prepared statement of ..................................................................... 133

Rogoff, Peter, Administrator, U.S. Federal Transit Administration, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 18

Sarles, Richard, Metro interim general manager, WMATA, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 57

Towns, Chairman Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 3

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THE WASHINGTON METRO SYSTEM: SAFETY,

SERVICE, AND STABILITY

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edolphus Towns (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Towns, Maloney, Cummings, Kucinich,

Clay, Watson, Lynch, Connolly, Norton, Van Hollen, Cuellar, Issa,

Mica, and Bilbray.

Staff present: John Arlington, chief counsel—investigations;

Kwane Drabo, investigator; Brian Eiler, investigative counsel;

Aaron Ellias, staff assistant; Adam Hodge, deputy press secretary;

Carla Hultberg, chief clerk; Marc Johnson and Ophelia Rivas, assistant clerks; Chris Knauer, senior investigator/professional staff

member; Phyllis Love, Ryshelle McCadney, and Christopher Sanders, professional staff members; Jenny Rosenberg, director of communications; Leneal Scott, IT specialist; Mark Stephenson, senior

policy advisor; Ron Stroman, staff director; Lawrence Brady, minority staff director; Frederick Hill, minority director of communications; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member liaison; Kurt

Bardella, minority press secretary; Stephanie Genco, minority

press secretary and communication liaison; Howard Denis, minority senior counsel; and Mitchell Kominsky and Jonathan Skladany,

minority counsels.

Chairman TOWNS. The committee will come to order.

Good morning, and thank you for being here.

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority operates

the second-largest rail transit system in the country, second only

to New York’s subway system. It also runs the fifth largest bus system. For a long time now, it has been a clean, reliable, and safe

system, but there are indications that the system is deteriorating.

On June 22, 2009, a Metro rail train slammed into another train

near Fort Totten Station. Nine people were killed and 80 were injured. It was the worst accident in Metro’s history. In January of

this year two maintenance workers were killed as they worked on

the tracks. In total, 15 people have lost their lives on the Metro rail

system over the past year. Something clearly is wrong.

Earlier this year, Senator Mikulski asked the Federal Transit

Administration to audit its safety system. The Tri-State Oversight

Committee [TOC], the FTA found serious shortcomings in the safety culture. To me, the most surprising thing was this: even though

2

the TOC has the responsibility to oversee safety on the Metro system, the TOC has no full-time staff. It has no inspectors, no auditors. It has no enforcement power.

The FTA has no enforcement power over Metro, either. In other

words, the Metro rail is pretty much on the honor system when it

comes to safety. That is why it is extremely important for Metro

to have top-notch management.

I think the safety problems we are seeing now at Metro are

symptomatic of a larger problem, particularly on the rail system.

Years of deferred maintenance and management problems are taking their toll.

In February, some board members asked a well-respected former

Metro general manager, David Gunn, to conduct a review of the entire Metro operation. Mr. Gunn spent 2 weeks performing a broad

review of the rail and bus system. He spoke to managers and line

employees and rode the entire rail system. Unfortunately, Mr.

Gunn is retired and living in Canada and couldn’t be here today,

but we were able to obtain a copy of the presentation he made to

a closed-door meeting of the board of directors last month.

Mr. Gunn told the board that the bus system is in pretty good

shape, but the rail system is in serious decline. According to Mr.

Gunn, Metro rail has major organization and managerial problems.

For example, he found that there was so much bad blood between

the maintenance and the engineering departments that they literally would not even speak to each other. That does not improve

the safety conditions.

Deferred maintenance has reached a crisis stage. Gunn said that

in the 2-weeks he rode the rail system there were two derailments,

one of which he witnessed. He also found a broken rail on the main

line. In addition, seven station platforms, which are made of reinforced concrete, were being shored up by wood.

Mr. Gunn concluded and he told the board that Metro rail has

downhill momentum which will be difficult to stop.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Edolphus Towns follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. At this time I yield 5 minutes to the ranking

member, Congressman Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding

this hearing.

Clearly we have jurisdiction over the District of Columbia and

surrounding areas’ Metro system on this committee. I am proud

that we have the ranking member of the Transportation Committee

also on this committee, since the problem that we are going to explore today of our Metro system in the D.C., Maryland, and Virginia area is, in fact, not unique.

On a virtual daily basis around the country people discover that

the operators of trains are texting, reading, and sometimes sleeping

while an extremely heavy piece of equipment hurls down the road

without any supervision. The use of automation today and over the

last several decades has become the preferred system to rely on,

but, as we discovered last year, there is no substitute for human

beings involved in the process—human beings involved in the

maintenance, the engineering, and the operation. Any failure there

cannot be made up for by a system that 99.9 percent of the time

provides safety.

The U.S. Government provides 30 percent of the subsidy for

every rail fare and as much as 70 percent of the subsidy for bus

fares. Additionally, tens of thousands of Federal workers receive a

tax-free transit benefit that effectively amounts to an indirect subsidy to our Metro system. Nevertheless, Metro cannot reach its financial obligations and is facing $189 million budget shortfall for

fiscal year 2010.

Let us be very clear: it is not because Washington, DC, and

northern Virginia are not booming. Employment is up. Home prices

are virtually stable. And, in fact, times are good in the District of

Columbia. Fares are rising, but ridership is falling. A system which

was innovative in its day is now potentially going to be outdated.

This shifts more and more traffic onto our roads, ones that, in

the case of the District of Columbia, were not able to be expanded,

cannot be upgraded because of the—I won’t say clutter, but the

large amount of Federal buildings. We in the District of Columbia

cannot simply tear down the White House in order to form a more

innovative track system. We cannot move the Capitol.

Due to this, the failure of the Red Line and the killing of 9 people and the injuring of 80 others is more than just an accident to

be investigated. We have a system in the District of Columbia and

surrounding areas that must work. It must be able to carry more

passengers and do so safely.

So as we hear today about the failures, let us understand that

the day of saying that in the District of Columbia the Metro is good

to use is behind us. The Metro is essential to use. We cannot,

through buses or cars, meet the requirements of a growing Federal

Government.

I, for one, would like to see the Federal Government not grow,

but I have been here 10 years and not having good, freed-up systems of transportation has never worked in the past, it will not

work in the future. So I join with the chairman in wanting to investigate this and hope that we will continue to monitor on a

broader basis to find out where the flaws are coming in a system

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that we took to be safe when, in fact, it appears it is not safe and

crumbling.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much.

Let me just say that we have agreed that we would have two

opening statements on each side. The ranking member of the subcommittee that has jurisdiction, we will allow them to make an

opening statement, of course, and the gentlewoman from Washington, DC, who actually represents the District of Columbia, and, of

course, Mr. Mica, who is the ranking member on Transportation.

So we will go in that order, with the gentlewoman from D.C. first.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I certainly

want to associate myself with your remarks and with the remarks

of the ranking member.

I asked for this hearing several months ago at the subcommittee

level. I regret that it has been delayed, but I will accept that delay

inasmuch as it has been put at the full committee level, on the

hope that putting this hearing at the full committee level will get

some greater attention to the issues that were raised now almost

a year ago and where I see no progress.

And, if I may say so, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned nine people

from this region were killed just short of a year ago, seven of them

from the District of Columbia, but the larger number of people who

ride the Metro come from all over the region. Where are we almost

a year later? What action has been taken?

Well, the President has appointed the two Federal members that were necessary to get the first $150 million of the $1.5 billion over

10 years we are promised. We got that $150 million only after nine

people were killed, and finally during the appropriation process,

out of committee, on another committee, and the ranking member,

Mr. Mica, of that committee is here. We have sent to the floor—

not yet heard—a bill that will regulate Metro systems across the

country, but what has happened in this region, Mr. Chairman?

Just in this morning’s paper we read that the executives of the

three jurisdictions involved just got together yesterday and publicized a plan—I hope we will hear more of it—to strengthen the

so-called TOC, the safety mechanism that was toothless and brainless before this accident. A full year, and we are just getting a

mechanism and we are just learning about it.

I don’t know what it takes to shock action, but I would have

thought that immediately after nine people were sacrificed that

would be enough.

In addition, after that we see the Metro trains slowed every day,

which makes people think something must be wrong, no real explanation as to what is happening and why and how long it will take.

Mr. Chairman, I compare this once sterling system to the system

you know so well in New York, to systems in Chicago. Those systems are very much older than the system here, and yet those systems do not show anything like this accident rate, either among

personnel or among its riders.

Mr. Chairman, I am, if anything, frustrated, have nothing good

to say about the progress that has been made, despite the oversight

of the subcommittee, and believe that if we do not see some explanation at this hearing and some immediate action on what has

been a melt-down of our major transit system, we will see what is

already apparent: the loss of confidence in the only system most

people have to take.

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So we are done with oversight. It is time now to demand from

witnesses action that we can see, certainly by the anniversary of

June 22nd, when nine people lost their lives on this system.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. I thank the gentlewoman from Washington,

DC.

I now yield to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you so much, Mr. Towns, for both conducting

this hearing, your responsiveness in conducting appropriate oversight. I am the Republican ranking member, the Republican leader

of the Transportation Committee. I think it is great to have this

committee, with its independence, also take a look where we need

to and conduct oversight where we need to on important issues

even in the transportation realm.

Certainly it is incumbent upon this committee, given our jurisdiction also over the District of Columbia, that we do due diligence in

addressing the problems that we have here.

First of all, let me say that safety has to be our absolute top priority when it comes to transportation. I think everybody is committed to it—the administration, Members of Congress. And I think

we have to see what we can do to make certain that we improve

not only the District transportation system operations but also to

address the country’s infrastructure and transportation safety

issues there.

Now, given that, you know, every time you have problems with

a system everybody runs for a solution. I would have to beg to differ with the administration for the solution that they have come

forward with, and I think we are presented with some choices. The

administration is coming forward and saying we need to expand

Federal authority over local and State transit systems and operations. I can tell you, ladies and gentlemen, that the last persons

that we need or entity that we need are Federal bureaucrats or another Federal responsibility in this area.

If we just look at the transit responsibility we have for safety

right now, transportation safety responsibility—where’s our little

chart, I will put it up there—you look at the record, you have to

go by the record of how people perform. The Federal Government

FRA has authority over commuter rail right now and also over Amtrak, our two star areas that FRA oversees. The deaths with commuter rail are one per five billion passengers. This is the 2008 fatality rate. The death for Amtrak, excluding suicides, is one for

every 241,000. I guess that is extrapolated out. But, by the same

token, if you look at rail transit under local and State authority,

we are looking at 1 in 65 million. So local and State, for the most

part, are doing very well, and they also have a huge number of passengers, far surpassing anything. In 1 day the transit systems locally exceed what Amtrak does in an entire year.

So we don’t want to spread the butter any thinner and the

money any thinner. What you need is you need resources, and applying the resources for millions of dollars and more bureaucrats

to walk the tracks or have some new title is not the answer.

It is also the slowest answer. You could ask Ms. Norton how

she’s coming on getting voting rights for the District of Columbia.

This Federal process is a slow process.

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I was pleased to see that the two Governors and Mayor Fenty

have acted, and I think that is the best action, and it can be taken,

not that we don’t need to tighten up some Federal regulations. We

don’t need to impose mandates, but we can have some better safety

standards for them without the bureaucracy.

What they need—and Ms. Norton put her finger on it—is money.

And the money did not come until people were killed, and that is

not the way to run a transit system. So we need to make the investment in technology and equipment that will give us the safest

possible systems not only in the District of Columbia but across the

United States of America.

So I am glad you are conducting this. I want to keep our eye on

the ball and the problem and a solution that will make us truly

safe.

Thank you.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much, and thank you for your

statement.

At this time I yield to the chairman of the subcommittee that has

jurisdiction, Congressman Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening today’s important hearing.

As chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, we have had multiple hearings on the various

challenges currently facing the Washington Metro. The Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority [WMATA], as some have referred to it, is the Nation’s Capital’s primary transportation agency, and it provides services to a population of over 31⁄2 million people, with a 1,500 square mile area. Considering the estimated 40

percent of the Federal employees who utilize the Washington Metro

on a daily basis and the hundreds of thousands of D.C. area residents and tourists who rely on the system to navigate the Nation’s

Capital, it is critical that the D.C. Metro system be transformed

into a pinnacle of dependability and safety.

Unfortunately, as others have pointed out, the Washington Metro

is currently facing serious safety and budgetary challenges. The

D.C. Metro is confronting a $189 million budget gap which concerns me as far as the potential impact of those who utilize Metro

rail, Metro bus, and Metro access. The WMATA Metro is also in

the midst of addressing a series of accidents, including the June 22,

2009, Red Line collision, which the subcommittee held a hearing on

in July 2009, and five subsequent accidents which resulted in four

workers deaths and three non-fatal injuries.

At the subcommittee’s hearing on the June 22nd collision and in

subsequent reports, serious questions were raised regarding deficiencies in the Washington Metro safety culture. In light of these

concerns, I am particularly interested in the steps that have been

taken and that plan to be taken to ensure that the highest standards of safety exist for Metro riders and employees, alike.

Specifically, I look forward to discussing the efforts that WMATA

and the three jurisdictions that are affected have taken to

strengthen would Metro’s safety oversight agency, the Tri-State

Oversight Committee. I also hope we will be able to touch upon the

legislative proposals that have been put forth to enhance the overVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63139.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
14

sight and regulatory authority of the Federal Transit Administration over transit agencies and operations.

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority is navigating a complex transition period right now, and I hope to learn more

today about what is being done by Metro and its various stakeholders to ensure the safety and security of hundreds of thousands of

people who rely on the system on a daily basis.

Additionally, I would like to note that the Federal Government

has a role to play in promoting the safety and service of WMATA.

I welcome the opportunity to hear about what we in Congress can

do to help Metro at this time.

Again, I would like to thank Chairman Towns and the gentlelady

from the district, Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton, for their willingness

to push this issue forward and to convene this hearing today.

I welcome our witnesses and I yield back the remainder of our

time.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.

The chairman had to leave. We will continue the hearing.

I want to thank the chairman and Ranking Member Issa, also,

for convening the hearing. As a member of the Washington area

delegation, this has been a pressing issue for all of us. I want to

thank Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton for her long-time

leadership on this issue. Of course, Mr. Connolly from Virginia has

been a big advocate for WMATA in his early capacity as a local official, head of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, and, of

course, has remained very focused on this issue as a Member of

Congress. And my colleagues from Maryland and Virginia, Mr.

Cummings—Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia, of

course, contribute in terms of resources and manpower and expertise to this important system.

I see Mr. Connolly. I think we will have an opportunity, Mr.

Connolly—we are going to be very flexible during the question period. I think that we will have as many rounds as people want to

cover points.

I think without further ado we will just get right to it.

Mr. Rogoff, thank you for being here today to give your testimony. As has been referenced, you did an earlier report. I believe

this is the first time that WMATA will have an opportunity in this

kind of public setting, anyway, to respond to your report, so thank

you for being here today.

It is the tradition of this committee to swear in the witnesses,

so if you could please stand and raise your right hand as I administer the oath.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Let the record reflect that the witness has answered in the affirmative.

You may now be seated and please proceed to deliver your oral

statement. You have 5 minutes. You will see the yellow light go on

there when you have 1 minute left, and the red light, as it says,

is when you can try and wrap up your comments.

Thank you for being here, and please proceed.

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STATEMENT OF PETER ROGOFF, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION

Mr. ROGOFF. Thank you, Mr. Van Hollen, Ranking Member Mica,

Ms. Norton, and other members of the committee. I appreciate the

opportunity to appear before you today.

Washington Metro provides essential public transit and paratransit services to millions of citizens of the capital region every

day, and through Secretary LaHood’s leadership the Obama administration has remained focused on the challenge of improving Metro’s troubling safety record. In the wake of the tragic Fort Totten

accident last June, Secretary LaHood, acting through his newly established Safety Council, provided technical assistance to the Metro

leadership to help immediately address their safety deficiencies. In

addition, secretary LaHood ordered the Federal Transit Administration, along with Senator Mikulski, to initiate an audit of the TriState Oversight Committee, as well as Metro’s safety program.

Our audit resulted in 21 findings and recommendations. Before

I present them, however, I do want to make three over-arching

points.

First, the individual findings in our audit are merely symptoms

of a larger problem. Addressing each of our recommendations piecemeal, one-by-one, will not solve the whole safety problem at Metro.

The over-arching safety problem will only be solved through a topto-bottom change in the safety culture and focus at Metro.

Second, I want to emphasize that under current law FTA does

not have the legal authority to compel WMATA to take specific corrective action to address any of our recommendations. As I have

testified before, FTA is currently prohibited by law from issuing

national safety regulations for transit systems. And with few exceptions, State safety organizations like the TOC similarly have no

legal authority to compel transit agencies like Washington Metro

to respond to their safety findings. They don’t have to respond to

them in a timely way. In fact, they don’t have to respond to them

at all.

This is precisely the reason why Secretary LaHood, on behalf of

President Obama, formally transmitted a safety reform bill to the

Congress back in December 2009. Just weeks later, President

Obama transmitted a budget request to Congress that includes the

funding necessary to implement the bill.

The Metro crash last summer certainly accelerated our efforts to

develop our transit safety bill, but it is important to note that we

were already focused on accidents and safety lapses that concerned

us at the Chicago Transit Authority, the Muni system in San Francisco, the T up in Boston, and elsewhere.

While we believe the situation at Washington Metro is particularly troubling, some of the deficiencies and vulnerabilities that we

identified in our audit are similar to problems that exist at transit

agencies and State safety organizations around the country. That

is why we need Congress to move forward with our transit safety

reform bill now. The U.S. DOT cannot move forward to address

these problems in any meaningful way while we are still prohibited

in law from issuing safety regulations or conducting direct safety

oversight.

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Just a few weeks ago, for example, Secretary LaHood used his

authority to prohibit texting while driving nationwide for commercial truck and bus drivers, but even a simple, common-sense safety

measure like that cannot automatically apply to employees operating trains on systems like Metro until Congress changes the law.

So on behalf of the President and Secretary LaHood, I must ask

you collectively to do all you can to move this legislation to the

President’s desk.

The third over-arching point I want to make—and it echoes

something that Mr. Mica said—is that rail transit safety has challenges. We see important factors on the horizon that cause us concern. We have statistics that I am sure I will bring into the record

that concern us that gave rise to our moving forward with our legislation. But it is important to point out that any proposal that, in

the interest of curing the problems of Washington Metro, lowers

the capacity of Washington Metro, and in so doing pushes people

from Metro onto the city streets is a degradation of safety. It is still

far safer by any measure to use rail transit than to drive.

With those points made, I want to summarize our 21 findings.

I am going to summarize them in the interest of time. I am going

to ask that our full audit be made part of the hearing record so all

Members will have access to it. But really our findings surround

four major observations, both at the TOC and in WMATA.

First and foremost, inadequate communication. Also, in terms of

the authorities of the TOC, inadequate authority, inadequate management of resources, and inadequate expertise.

Regarding WMATA, we believe there are serious organizational

failures that must be addressed immediately. Our audit found that

there is no internal process for communicating safety-related information across all WMATA departments. Worse still, there is no internal process for the chief safety officer to communicate safety priorities to the general manager.

In fact, safety department representatives indicated that they

were learning for the first time during our audit that information

of a safety nature was being documented by other operating departments.

Put simply, Metro’s safety department has been isolated both

from top management and from other Metro departments. In fact,

the safety department has had their access and authority questioned by other operating departments.

The safety department was, in effect, completely marginalized at

Metro, and this dynamic has seriously undermined the safety department’s ability to conduct its safety responsibilities.

Two facts that give us great concern: the safety department,

itself, had been reorganized six times since 2005. Since 2007, there

have been four different individuals in charge of the safety office.

Given this record, no one should be surprised that Metro’s safety

department has been dysfunctional and ineffective.

Further, the lack of effective communication challenges within

WMATA also impacts the communication between Metro and the

Tri-St Oversight authority. Put simply, the multi-State agency that

is charged with overseeing safety at Metro hasn’t, until recently,

had a way to communicate with Metro’s senior management.

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Finally but importantly, WMATA must finalize its right-of-way

protection rules and develop consistent and comprehensive training

as part of implementing these rules before employees get access to

the right-of-way. Supervisors and operators told FTA that communications from right-of-way workers do not specify their exact location on the alignment. Specifically, operators stated that in some

cases they do not know that workers are on the track until they

have visual contact, and when this occurs, especially in so-called

blind spots, operators have limited ability to slow the train. This

is a grotesque violation of all common-sense safety principles.

Given these practices, we should be disgusted but not surprised

that Metro’s employees have faced disproportionate risk of fatality

and injury as they work to keep the Metro system safe for the rest

of us.

No fewer than eight Metro right-of-way workers have been killed

on the job since 2005. It is an inexcusable record.

Regarding the Tri-State Oversight authority—I see my time has

elapsed. I am going to try and move through this quickly—we have

a number of recommendations that really apply to getting the necessary authority, staying on top of open corrective action plans.

TOC was tracking over 200 open corrective action plans designed

to prevent the recurrence of accidents at one time. Some of those

corrective action plans date back to 2004.

Now, I noted with interest the announcement that Governor

McDonnell, Governor O’Malley and Mayor Fenty issued just yesterday on these matters. I should say the TOC has until May 4th to

formally respond to the specific findings of our audit. The white

paper that they released yesterday responds to some of our audit

findings but not all of them. I believe yesterday’s announcement

granting greater authority to the TOC chairman and implementing

efforts to streamline the TOC’s procedures are an important step

in the right direction. More needs to be done, and, as is always the

case, the proof will be in the agency’s performance.

The same can be said for Metro’s new-found responsiveness to

the TOC’s safety concerns. I have known Rich Sarles for a number

of years, going back to his service both at Amtrak and at New Jersey Transit. I believe he is a skilled and committed no-nonsense

transit professional. But, as Rich Sarles knows better than anyone,

the proof that change has really come to Washington Metro will be

in Metro’s performance.

Now, I was going to take some time and explain how our transit

safety proposal addresses some of the very issues that we found at

Metro and the TOC. I think I will seek that through Q and A since

I have expired my time.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogoff follows:]

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Rogoff. Thank you for that testimony.

Let me just pick up on the issue you raised near the end of your

testimony with respect to TOC’s proposal that was made to the

Governors and the mayor of the District of Columbia yesterday. I

gather from your comments you have had some opportunity to review that.

Mr. ROGOFF. We got it last night.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. And you mentioned it made some progress toward some of the recommendations you have raised but still has

some room to go. If you could please elaborate, both on the parts

that you think address some of the issues that you have raised, but

also on what you see as missing and what will have to be filled in

by the May deadline that you mentioned.

Mr. ROGOFF. Probably the most important change that was made

has to do with the actual authority of the individuals that are appointed by the three jurisdictions. Up until this point, really the

TOC was—Ms. Norton referred to it as toothless. I think it is fair

to say that their authority and their ability to command any attention out of Metro is undermined by the law, but it is also undermined that whenever they sought to elevate an issue they each had

to go back to their own jurisdiction and consult with the District

leadership, the Maryland leadership, the Virginia leadership, and

get a go-ahead to elevate these issues.

From what I could review, just having reviewed their document

last night, they are attempting to take on that issue by appointing

a full-time chairman—as I pointed out, right now up until recently

they had no full-time employees—to give the TOC greater authority

to act independently without having to run everything up the flagpole in all three jurisdictions.

But, like I said, how much credibility and how much authority

the TOC can have to address some of the core issues is undermined

by the statutes, both in terms of the authority that was granted to

TOC and the absence of Federal standards.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Well, on that issue, you mentioned in your testimony that only a few States have developed comprehensive,

State-level regulations and granted their State safety organizations

the authority to enforce those regulations. Could you talk about

what those States have with respect to the enforcement provisions,

and then talk a little bit about modeling TOC after that and what

changes would be required specifically to the legal framework to accomplish that?

Mr. ROGOFF. Well, under the legislation we have submitted, our

goal is to develop a system where the State safety organizations

are very much our partners. We want to strengthen the State safety organizations just like Mr. Mica does. We want them to be our

partners in this endeavor. But in order to do that, they need to

have the authority to command the attention of the agencies they

oversee, and some of those authorities that some of the States have

implemented piecemeal have been things like the ability to fine,

the ability in a worst-case scenario to dictate an operating practice.

Those aren’t the common situations that you want. You certainly

don’t want, first and foremost, transit agencies have transportation

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to deliver during rush hour, and they need to get people in and out,

and it needs to be done in a seamless fashion.

But I think importantly right now we have 27 State safety organizations, all of them I would describe as weak in their authority,

but, more importantly, since we have no Federal standards we

have 27 different definitions of rail safety out there, and that is one

of the reasons why we felt that it was critically important that

there be an opportunity for the Federal Government to establish

minimum safety standards, so as we strengthen the State safety

organizations they have a standard to oversee and enforcement

rather than 27 agencies defining safety in their own way.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. WMATA, as you probably know, has also come

up with a kind of work plan to respond to the issues that you

raised in your report. Can you comment on whether that plan, in

your opinion, gets us to where you think we need to go to meet the

safety concerns that you raised?

Mr. ROGOFF. Well, we haven’t had transmitted to us a comprehensive plan yet. Like I said, they have until the 4th to specifically respond to the findings of our audit. We have obviously seen

measures taken by Metro, some of which we find very encouraging.

They have now brought in a new chief safety officer, Jim Dougherty, who is an industry professional who came from California to

join the WMATA team. We have obviously seen hiring now. We

were very concerned about the number of vacancies in the safety

office.

I think one of the things that is very, very hard to determine

from the outside is whether this whole issue of communication has

yet been solved, is whether all of the assorted stovepipes in

WMATA are working together, are talking to each other, and pooling resources around common safety goals. There I think the proof,

as I said, is going to be in the performance.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, one of the things we try to do here is ask different

questions to make the record complete, and I am going to ask you

a line of questioning that is almost counter to the Secretary’s proposal or portions of it, but not because I want to be counter to it.

His proposal and the committee of jurisdiction may be exactly

right, but I will leave that to the Transportation Committee. But

let me ask you a couple of questions.

First of all, what if you set up a standard and didn’t have the

authority to enforcement it, but you set up a standard and published it? What if you had the funds to publish a central standard

and you had the transparency to review whether or not they were

compliant with what would ultimately be a voluntary standard?

Wouldn’t that, first of all, set something from which these committees—and the Metro system appears to be a committee of committees of committees, and that is part of their problem.

But ultimately the committee would have to answer the question:

are we compliant or not, the same as every audit firm looks at—

and I sit on the board of a public company—we look. The one thing

we don’t want is we don’t want our review to say we have material

failures of our audit in any aspect, so we work very hard to meet

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that standard. We don’t always meet it, but ultimately you can

have material failures every single time as a public company and

yet the last thing you want to do is have the stakeholders, particularly in a public company, see that.

What is wrong with the Federal Government beefing up its

transparency and its ability to develop that standard as an interim

step?

Mr. ROGOFF. Well, there are some voluntary standards in place

now. They are not issued by the FTA. I will say that we have participated in funding this effort through the American Public Transit Association, but they are just that: they are voluntary standards.

Mr. ISSA. Does the Metro system meet that standard?

Mr. ROGOFF. I can’t speak to each individual voluntary standard

and where Metro may be compliant with some and not with others.

I think——

Mr. ISSA. But doesn’t that beg the question of, if you have helped

in the process of creating multiple standards with your own funding, in a sense aren’t you complicit, if you will, in this failure by

not using the Federal Government’s dollars, not just the ones we

give to the various Metros, but the Federal Government’s dollars

to have a single point of what is right or wrong in a given situation

that could be studied and hopefully complied with by people who

don’t want to be sued, who don’t want to look terrible in their safety record and other parts, when in some cases some of these boards

and commissions are either truly voluntary or de minimis in their

pay. I mean, people who sit on these boards, the last thing they

want is to ruin a reputation that caused them to be appointed by

a mayor or a Governor to them.

Mr. ROGOFF. I think to the degree that we are complicit in

wrongdoing in that is—and this started, obviously, before our participation, but that is that we engaged in at least helping the transit industry develop voluntary standards. As a Federal agency, I

feel that it is our obligation to identify what the safe practice is,

and that is why the only way we can ensure that we are going to

see those safe practices is by having mandatory standards.

Now, having said that——

Mr. ISSA. Let me be the devil’s advocate a little further. You

haven’t developed a single standard. You haven’t had the

ability——

Mr. ROGOFF. Sir, I am prohibited by law from establishing a

standard.

Mr. ISSA. No, no. I understand. I understand, but I am trying to

walk you through the difference between federalism and, in fact, a

single government. We don’t have a single government. San Diego

has a pitiful, slow system of Metro, for the most part. Most of our

trains and trolleys and so on—and, for that matter, the San Francisco cable cars I think should flunk any safety standard, and yet

please let’s not tell San Francisco that they have to get rid of their

cable cars.

So back to the basic point: you haven’t developed a single standard, for whatever reason, call it a self-inflicted wound by Congress,

you haven’t developed a single standard, you don’t have a statutory

transparency, even though we provide more than 30 percent of the

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funding to the Metro system, and you, if you will, you have sort

of been an observer.

If we are looking at fixing the system and respecting States and

other—in this case, two States and the District—organization, respecting their ability to do the best they can with the specifics of

what they have, why wouldn’t we take the interim step of giving

you the authority to analyze, the money to analyze, the ability to

have transparency on these organizations that we fund with Federal taxpayer dollars, but at the same time recognize that until you

produce that standard that you would like to produce and it has

a little bit of testing, why would we immediately go to mandating

it when it might be in some cases that your standard, if mandated,

would not necessarily improve the safety for every Metro around

the country? After all, you do have authority over the interstate

train system and it is not without its flaws, is it?

Mr. ROGOFF. No, it certainly isn’t.

Let me make three points. The interstate train system is overseen by the Federal Railroad Administration and it is very pertinent to some of the data that Mr. Mica put up, and that is that

we have a very voluminous Federal book of standards issued by the

Federal Railroad Administration that pertains to about one-eighth

of the rail transit riders in the form of commuter rail. Eight times

that number of transit riders are currently covered by no Federal

standards.

Now, I think it is important to point out you are talking about

a specific standard to a specific technology. We have said over and

over again that it is our goal to not recreate the very voluminous

FRA rule book for rail transit systems. Not only would it be overwhelmingly burdensome, it wouldn’t really be appropriate for rail

transit because these systems use different technologies. You can’t

just write a standard that would necessarily apply to all of them.

I mean, certainly you could pull off some low-hanging fruit, like

prohibiting texting while driving a rail vehicle.

Mr. ISSA. Or sleeping.

Mr. ROGOFF. Or sleeping. That is a no-brainer. Or, you know,

medical examinations for rail transit vehicle operators. But our

real goal is to require a system, to get the transit operators to get

a system of safety management in place. Right now, across the universe of rail transit safety, performance by our transit agencies, we

have huge diversity. In the area of asset management and do they

really know the condition of their assets, I have transit agencies

that do a very, very good job and know where all their assets are

and know their condition. I also have transit agencies who couldn’t

even tell you where all their assets are at this moment, and everything in between.

What we are trying to do is not necessarily regulate in the tensile strength of every segment of rail, but really get at the issue

of requiring a safety management system that addresses the

unique safety challenges of each transit system, and the safety

challenges of those transit systems are going to be different system

to system.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

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Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yes, the safety standards are going to be different system to system. That is very important. Most of these systems don’t run across

State lines the way ours do. But it is important to note, because

Mr. Mica indicated that there might be local systems that are

doing well. As I understand the administration’s proposal, the preference is for the local system. If it is not doing well, somebody has

to do it, and as long as it is done under some Federal regulations

that we all would agree upon, who would, in fact, be doing it would

be the local jurisdictions.

Isn’t that the case, that rather than have mandates imposed, because San Francisco differs from the District of Columbia, the mandates wouldn’t be imposed locally, so you would look only at the

mandates to see if they are consistent with safety standards, recognizing that there might be very different mandates and that the

Federal Government shouldn’t be imposing some national mandate?

Mr. ROGOFF. Our goal is really—I’m not going to say at the

10,000 foot level, but to establish standards at the 5,000 foot level,

like I said, that addresses safety management systems rather than

individual components, agency by agency.

I think, importantly, another part of our proposal that is critical

to it, and that is to strengthen these State agencies. Right now, up

until this year when the number just ticked above one, right now

the average staffing strength for these State safety organizations,

when you remove California, is less than one person per year.

Ms. NORTON. The average what?

Mr. ROGOFF. The staffing strength, the number of people who actually work in these State safety organizations. Right now, based

on our most recent data, because the TOC has boosted his staff a

little bit and because California has a very different regime, but

when you look at all of the other 25 State agencies, there is less

than one full-time person working at them all year.

Ms. NORTON. This really gets to my next question, because I

wanted a comparison of TOC with safety organizations across the

United States. We know how to compare WMATA with New York

and Chicago, but are you telling me the vast systems in Chicago,

for example, in Illinois, that those systems, like WMATA, would

only have this toothless notion? Or let me ask further, would such

systems at least have some authority, even if they were not well

staffed, in other jurisdictions?

Mr. ROGOFF. Our goal under our legislation is to——

Ms. NORTON. No, I am asking what it is.

Mr. ROGOFF. What it is now?

Ms. NORTON. I am trying to get some perspective on whether or

not TOC is different from other jurisdictions.

Mr. ROGOFF. Well, I think we have——

Ms. NORTON. In terms of its authority relative to the local transit

system.

Mr. ROGOFF. We have State agencies that are stronger and State

agencies that are weaker. We have 27 models out there, which is

part of the problem, which is why we want to establish——

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Ms. NORTON. But if they have one person on average, can you

possibly have some that are strong with one personnel?

Mr. ROGOFF. The only one that I would identify as being considerably stronger is California. It is handled by the California Public

Utility Commission. They have staffing of upwards of 18 people to

bring to bear on this issue.

Ms. NORTON. Well, do you think that one full-time chairman—

now, I am told this chairman would be full time, this proposal that

apparently came forward because this committee was holding a

hearing, it appears. Would this full-time chairman be a full-time

paid chairman at the executive level, as you understand it or see

it?

Mr. ROGOFF. I am really just going off of the material we got last

night.

Ms. NORTON. And it does not say?

Mr. ROGOFF. The chairman of the TOC is testifying on the next

panel. It might be an appropriate question for him. What we have

said is these are some steps in the right direction, but clearly more

needs to be done.

Ms. NORTON. Let me ask you about your role. How many other

transit systems in the United States cross State lines like this?

Here we cross three State lines. Is that unusual?

Mr. ROGOFF. Well, it is unusual in some cases, but off the top

of my head we certainly have, up in the New York/New Jersey/Connecticut region we have it. We are going to have rail

transportation——

Ms. NORTON. Well, you have the authority——

Mr. ROGOFF [continuing]. Between Rhode Island and Massachusetts.

Ms. NORTON. I know New York and New Jersey, but typically

they are within State boundaries.

Mr. ROGOFF. Typically.

Ms. NORTON. Now, in New York and—you did an audit. what

gave you the authority to do the audit at all if you have so little

authority over State systems?

Mr. ROGOFF. We had the authority to audit the State safety organization, because they are the—that is, currently implementing the

rather weak Federal regime. That is the decision that was made

in ISTEA in 1991, that rather than have Federal authority that we

would have these State safety organizations.

Ms. NORTON. How many audits have been done?

Mr. ROGOFF. Very few. Well, let me rephrase that. We audit

every 3 years the condition of each of the State safety organizations, but it is fair to say that this audit had considerably more attention and more resources put on it.

Ms. NORTON. Are you prepared, as I understand it and you are

correct, we will learn more about what is proposed, and you do not

have the response to the audit yet. Is the Federal Government considering that three States are involved and the Nation’s Capital is

involved? Is your office prepared to retain some kind of audit oversight until we get a TOC in place that will assure the public that

safety concerns are being enforced? Or how will we know if there

isn’t somebody to inform us on a regular basis that what happened

in June will not happen here or elsewhere?

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Mr. ROGOFF. Well, I think, put simply, we can stay on top of the

TOC to implement the audit findings we have, but our entire reason for putting forward a new legislative statutory regime was precisely because we don’t think the current law allows the kind of

comprehensive oversight by which we could guarantee the safety of

the system.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one last question?

Does the proposal put forward by the executives propose to change

their laws? What about their laws would have to be changed for

us to get an independent TOC?

Mr. ROGOFF. Well, you raised a very important issue, and that

is independence. That is one of our concerns about the inadequacy

of the current regime. We currently have a situation where some

of these State safety oversight organizations have been allowed to

be funded by the very transit agencies they are supposed to oversee. It is a——

Ms. NORTON. Well, how else are they going to get some money?

Mr. ROGOFF. That is probably——

Ms. NORTON. The legislature?

Mr. ROGOFF. That is probably how this situation emerged, but

the reality is we don’t allow regulated parties to fund their regulators in any other area of transit safety oversight.

Ms. NORTON. So among the things the State legislatures do,

would have them funding from the legislature and essentially to

strengthen their independence?

Mr. ROGOFF. Strengthen their independence and their enforcement authority.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Well, I think we are all searching for a solution to sum up with

the safest possible system. Our minority side did a report December 2009 with some conclusions for reform.

My concern, Mr. Rogoff, is that, first, while you are asking for

$29.6 million and 260 new full-time, permanent positions, and I am

wondering how that money would best be spent. If we look at some

of the problems, first you have some aging infrastructure. I just got

back yesterday with Mr. Oberstar. We were out in Chicago.

Mr. ROGOFF. Right.

Mr. MICA. The L was built in 1888, the L line. We have a system

here that is 34 years old. We look at the problems that we have

seen. First of all, we had—well, we do have some special authority

and responsibility over the District, which is unique, and we need

to see that things are in place there.

As far as the country, if you look at the Federal Government and

what it has done where it has authority—and, you know, you are

FTA, but FRA has a horrible record of safety oversight, not that

you will be a failure, and we don’t want you to be a failure. We

want you to be a success. But you had a failure of an agency to

organize. When you don’t have personnel assigned to safety, when

you don’t have a phone number or Web site or specific responsibilities defined in something we have oversight of, and our committee

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does over the District and over this system, there is something

wrong, so that needs to be changed.

If other State agencies don’t do that—and our recommendation

was to reform existing State oversight program to ensure that

State agencies are properly staffed and have necessary authority to

oversee safety of local and State systems. Rather than having

money to create a Federal bureaucracy, give them the resources.

You just got through saying it is a conflict for the agency to use

their resources to do the regulation, so I would rather go in the direction, if we are going to set some standards—and we don’t know

what they will be. The standards are going to be dramatically different. The L in Chicago is different than San Francisco, which you

mentioned, which has cable car. We have BARTA system, different

technologies. So one size fits all is not the answer to our problem.

Right?

Mr. ROGOFF. We agree.

Mr. MICA. OK.

Mr. ROGOFF. Absolutely.

Mr. MICA. So, again, I don’t mind spending the resources on safety, so I think we have to—you are well intended. You said the mandates would be limited to safety management systems. Did I misquote you?

Mr. ROGOFF. Well, I don’t want to say exclusively. That is our

focus. Something like, as I said——

Mr. MICA. Well, again, we make certain that something is in

place and somebody is doing something, whether it is the two

States and the District of Columbia here or——

Mr. ROGOFF. Something that is appropriate for the unique circumstances.

Mr. MICA [continuing]. Illinois or regional system. Now we are

getting into regional systems. So I just don’t want to spend a lot

of money creating another Federal bureaucracy with a lot of mandates.

And then the other thing, too, is we said provide additional funding to local transit systems to upgrade safety equipment. That was

our second recommendation back in November. So take some of the

money, like Ms. Norton said, or these aging systems. They are all

aging systems, and they need the money. And pinpoint that toward

safety equipment that can make a difference in true safety.

So I am with you in the intent, but I think that we could, if we

work together, we could refine this and address the problems and

then have a solution that will do the job.

Mr. ROGOFF. Mr. Mica, I think we may disagree less than it appears, and here is why: you don’t want to spend a lot of money on

a large new bureaucracy. That is, in part, what we are saying

when we say we don’t want to completely recreate the FRA. And

that is not to denigrate the FRA, but they grew out of a very different tradition over not decades but almost a century of trying to

regulate—well, it started as rail operations run by private railroads.

You know, we have put forward money for additional people, not

only so we could do regulations but also to do the very issues like

fund strengthening of State oversight organizations to give them

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the training and the expertise so we can certify that they are safe

and they are fully empowered to do a good job.

Our budget proposal for this, which is funded in the President’s

2011 budget, is still well less than 1 percent of my agency’s entire

budget, and I don’t foresee our overall budget, even in its fully

built-out form, exceeding 1 percent of our agency’s total budget.

And I would also point out, on the issue of the aging infrastructure, we are totally in agreement. We did a report, as you know,

that identified some $50 billion in deferred maintenance at the

seven largest rail transit systems. In our 2011 budget, a transit

budget that only grows by 1 percent for the whole FTA, we found

a way of funding the new safety responsibilities, and we provided

an 8 percent for our state of good repair initiative for these rail systems, so we are putting our money where our mouth is on looking

out for safety and trying to do as well as we can on state of good

repair.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Maybe we can get an agreement here.

Mr. MICA. Well, we do thank him and look forward to working

with him.

I would ask unanimous consent that both a copy of our recommendations, the minority, that were prepared in December be

made part of the record, and also the chart that I referred to on

the safety record of the various agencies that was displayed before

the committee be made part of the record.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. ROGOFF. Could I just add one thing? This is not to create dissonance where there may be some harmony, but there are some

data points. I think it is important, in considering the context of

Mr. Mica’s statistics, it is important to point out, thankfully, there

are few enough fatal accidents in either of these modes that one

accident skews the data rather dramatically, so that data did not

take in the Metro accident. There are all kinds of ways on cutting

this data, on whether you include right-of-way accidents or not.

We have some data that concerns us greatly, like a 65 percent

increase in derailments.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I want you to be able to make that point, if

you could make it——

Mr. ROGOFF. I will summarize it for the record.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. That would be very helpful, just because we

have other Members.

Mr. ROGOFF. Absolutely.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

your earlier kind remarks.

Thank you, Mr. Rogoff, for your testimony and for this very

thoughtful audit, which I think is presented in direct language,

easy to follow.

But let me just say that Metro is unique in the United States.

It isn’t like the other 26 transit systems around the country. It, as

Ms. Norton pointed out, is governed by three jurisdictions, and it

is funded essentially, operationally, in two ways: fare box recovery

by users, the highest in the United States, so they are already paying more than their fair share; and, second, by subsidies by the

local jurisdictions. My taxpayers in Fairfax County, Congressman

Van Hollen’s taxpayers in Montgomery County, and Eleanor

Holmes Norton’s taxpayers in D.C. Not a dime of Federal subsidies

for operational purposes.

So if we are going to have expanded Federal oversight of safety

or any other aspect of Metro, then the Federal Government has to

be at the table with operational dollars. Mr. Mica is right. Otherwise, we have an unfunded mandate. We have the Federal Government setting new standards and putting on new burdens and new

requirements, all of which may be good ideas, but not funding

them.

Therein lies the problem with Metro, because for a long time,

long before Mr. Rogoff got the job, the Federal Government has

been retreating from its responsibilities with respect to transit in

America, and especially with respect to this Metro.

We move 40 percent of the Federal work force every day. No

other transit system in America does that. We bear the burden of

12 to 14 million American and other tourists coming to visit the

Nation’s Capital because we are the seat of the Federal Government. No other transit system in the United States does that. And

local governments are expected to subsidize that through their subsidy programs. And so one of the things missing at the table is the

Federal Government with operational dollars.

We finally made progress for the Federal Government providing

capital dollars in a matching program, and that is great. That is

real progress. But I feel very strongly that the Federal Government

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can’t have it both ways. If we are going to set new standards, if

we are going to put new burdens, all of which may be justified, on

Metro, then the Federal Government has to provide operating dollars, and I think it ought to anyhow because of the unique relationship with Metro.

I know that some might say we already provide operating subsidies in the form of smart subsidizing fares for Federal workers

who use it. That is a subsidy for our work force. That is not a subsidy, that is not an operating subsidy for Metro, itself, because actually it serves our interests as the Federal Government to have

those people using Metro every day, and we saw the importance of

that relationship in the recent blizzard. When Metro could not

function above ground, we had to shut down the Federal Government for 41⁄2 days. So the relationship is vital, essential. There is

no turning back, and we might as well recognize that relationship.

Mr. Rogoff, let me ask you, if I can, three questions. One, 21

thoughtful recommendations. What would it cost to implement

those recommendations? Do you have a cost estimate?

Mr. ROGOFF. We would not, but I am glad you raised that issue,

because I have to say that when you look deep down in some of

those recommendations, issues like communication and parts of

WMATA working at cross purposes, I do not believe that all of

those recommendations are about money. I do not believe all of

those solutions bear a cost. I think it is about focus. It is about how

serious the safety challenge is taken by all lines of business and

how Metro is organized.

Mr. CONNOLLY. But you have no cost estimate? I mean, certainly

it is going to cost something.

Mr. ROGOFF. Some of the things may cost something in terms of,

you know, we have asked the TOC to strengthen its personnel at

the tri-state oversight. Obviously, that bears some salary costs for

those additional personnel. But, again, I think a lot of the more immediate audit findings of what has troubled us on the safety performance at Metro are not cost issues, they are performance, organization, and focus issues.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. I agree with some of that, but, I mean, I

think it also involves dollars. Metro is starving for dollars in terms

of operating costs and bumping up against limits in both subsidies

and fare box recovery.

Let me ask you, if it is possible, to ask the agency to go back and

look at this issue of——

Mr. ROGOFF. We are happy to look and see where we identify a

specific cost for the response.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good.

Second, governance structure. I have read with great interest

some interesting editorials in a local newspaper about how parochial the governing structure is, the notion that Maryland, D.C.,

and Virginia have this odd and quixotic notion that elected officials

from those jurisdictions are appointed, officials from those jurisdictions ought to actually have some say over how their local tax dollars are being used to subsidize Metro. Have you looked at the governance structure, and are there recommendations for how it might

be improved, streamlined, or made more efficient?

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Mr. ROGOFF. We did not as part of our audit specifically take on

the issue of the governance structure. However, I will say this: we

do have some concerns as it relates to the governance structure of

the TOC, and the TOC sort of mirrors what is going on with the

WMATA board, and that is that you have a rotating chairman that

changes every year, and all three jurisdictions have to agree on everything.

I would say this: we do have concerns over what has sometimes

been described as the mutually assured destruction single jurisdiction veto of the Metro board. It makes it very hard to make very

difficult funding decisions.

You had mentioned in your opening remarks that Metro has very

high fare box recovery. That is true on the rail side. It is not necessarily true on the bus side. And if we are going to address the

overall budget on the whole, everything needs to be looked at.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know my time is up. I want to echo

what Mr. Rogoff suggested. I also think we have to look at uniform

strengthening of rail safety standards so that we are all working

from the same book; that we can’t have 27 different standards for

27 different systems. No wonder we have a problem.

I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Mr. Bilbray.

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Administrator, in all fairness to the Metro system, as a former transit operator, myself, the bus systems have

never had fare box recovery that rail does.

Mr. ROGOFF. Absolutely.

Mr. BILBRAY. OK. We just want to clarify that.

Let me just say that I am going to dig into one little aspect, and

I think it is more important to talk about this one aspect and see

how the system is responding to that. How many systems do we

have in this country right now that are automated operation with

manual override?

Mr. ROGOFF. It is relatively few, and most of those are shorter

segments that aren’t city-wide systems. They are sometimes point

to point. I would have to get you that for the record.

Mr. BILBRAY. When I came here in 1995, this sent up a red flag

for me as a former operator, because in 1981, when we implemented our rail system, we were specifically told by experts that

the system that was automatic with the manual override was

worse than having no automation at all; that it was a warning that

it was a system designed by an engineer sitting in an office, not

designed by an operator who had actually had real-life experience.

We specifically went to manual operated with an automated override, much like what you are proposing with the positive train operation.

My concern is: if we knew about it in 1980 that this problem

came in—and, my colleagues, just think about this. You spend 8

hours a day doing nothing but waiting for something to happen,

and you do that for years on end. When something happens, there

is no way your response time is going to be quick enough to stop

the situation.

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When we talk about people texting, when we talk about them

being on the phone, they are not doing anything because you have

designed a system that was designed to design the operator out of

the process, and then you want the operator to be in the process

at a split second at a certain time. It is totally counter-intuitive to

human nature. But we continue to operate systems like this.

Mr. ROGOFF. I would agree with you, sir, that the whole issue of

operator engagement, fatigue, sleep apnea, and how we keep the

operator engaged in their task is a very important area for not only

research but a real, hard look by some of these agencies. It is a

concern. And the NTSB has spoken to it also.

Mr. BILBRAY. Well, Mr. Administrator, you don’t have to go very

far. You go right down with the tram between here and the Capitol. You have an individual working a switch with an automated

override in case they don’t back that switch off. But at least when

something is wrong the attention is there, the focus is there, and

if there is a problem they will know very quickly.

I have just got to say that what worries me is where has the entire safety oversight in this country been since 1980 when those of

us in the system knew that this whole assumption that some expert engineer who probably never drove a train in their life designed this perfect system that was designed to eliminate the operator, and then include the operator there for a false security that

really doesn’t work. How have we allowed that to happen over the

last 20, 30 years?

Mr. ROGOFF. Well, I think you have correctly identified that, in

the interest of trying to develop fail safe systems, they have tried

to eliminate the risk posed by the human factor, and sometimes

when you eliminate that human factor you also eliminate the attentiveness of that human. And this is an area that I know in our

research and innovation office within DOT they are looking at on

a mode-wide basis, and maybe we can have that administrator,

Peter Ropell, come up and talk to you about what we are trying

to find out there.

Mr. BILBRAY. OK. I think that what we did is we saw the human

factor as being the weak link in the process and that technology

was the answer all the time. But instead of taking the positives of

both we took the negatives of both; that when an automated system fails there is no way for the operator to respond where, in fact,

if we had put the operator at control with a backup of automation,

that automation does not get fatigued, does not get in a pattern.

Automation can respond in time.

We have literally allowed some nerd in a back room, because he

has a Ph.D., to design a system that doesn’t work in the real world.

I worry about that, that in the Federal system our safety system

didn’t work in the real world because we didn’t nip this and say

up front to everybody what I was told as a young designer of a

transit system: don’t follow these guys down this road. This is a

system that is not based in reality and it will kill people.

So I have to say, Mr. Chairman, when I saw the accidents here

right on my first reaction was this is exactly, the system was designed to do this. These accidents were designed into the system,

but somewhere down the way our process did not re-engineer the

process and make them change to the positive.

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Thank you. I appreciate it.

Mr. ROGOFF. I would just add I believe Jackie Jeter is testifying

on the next panel. She represents the rail operators, and I think

she would probably have more real life information to share with

you on that than I can.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

This is a dysfunctional system, isn’t it?

Mr. ROGOFF. It needs work urgently.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You know, as I listened to your testimony, it

seems to me it is a wonder if we are able to get the kind of results

we need at all, because it seems like the right hand doesn’t know

what the head or the left hand is doing. Is that a fair description?

Mr. ROGOFF. I would make this observation: when I had a sitdown, we have a great deal of concern about our audit specifically

focuses on the lack of communication between the safety department and other departments. In conversations with Metro leadership, that communication problem is not limited to the safety department.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes.

Mr. ROGOFF. There are other right hands and left hands that

aren’t talking, and that is a very big problem, especially given the

intensity of service that this system has to turn out every day.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what do you think that is all about? You

heard Mr. Mica, and I sit on the Transportation Committee also,

and you heard Mr. Mica’s opposition to the bill. Let us assume for

the moment that the bill is not going to get through any time soon,

although I would like to think otherwise, but I also want to be realistic. I am trying to figure out, of the 21 recommendations, you said

that not all of them cost money, which I agree. I mean, I am just

trying to figure out how do we get to where you have to go, where

you are trying to get us. Let us assume the legislation doesn’t pass.

How do we get there?

Mr. ROGOFF. Well, I think, importantly and sadly, you have a lot

more focus on this problem after an accident than obviously you

did beforehand, so I would like to, because I want to be an optimist

on these things, represent that the local jurisdictions and the TriState Oversight Committee, even with its extraordinary limited authority, will be able to turn things around, as I think Peter Benjamin and Rich Sarles have committed publicly to doing.

As I said, as a daily rider of this system, the thing that spooks

me most are these communication issues, these stovepipe issues,

and something that isn’t in our audit but I have now heard from

enough people that I feel comfortable voicing it here, and that is

that there is some real bad blood and hostility between some operating departments. That is a very, very dangerous environment in

which to be running a rail and bus operation.

So I think an important focus of what needs to get us where we

are going is new Metro management needs to identify that for what

it is, pierce through it, and if people all up and down the chain still

want to voice hostility and not work together as a team, then

maybe they should go find their new team somewhere else and

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bring in people that are prepared to work as a team to focus on

the problem.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you realize what a sad commentary you just

made? Do you realize how sad that is?

Mr. ROGOFF. I do, sir, but the audit speaks for itself. These are

not light-hearted findings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. It is chilling. So basically what we are talking

about are, aside from all the things that you have dealt with in

your audit, you are also talking about probably a morale issue?

Mr. ROGOFF. Clearly.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And something in a leadership issue. And I am

not saying present leadership, because I know it is new and all

that, but—and it is so sad that we would—you know, you can have

all the rules and the regulations you want, but if you don’t have

people who are committed to the mission, because I think when you

are committed to the mission, a lot of that small stuff——

Mr. ROGOFF. Falls away.

Mr. CUMMINGS [continuing]. And sweating it goes away. It is sad.

It is really sad.

So you are saying you almost have to start from scratch?

Mr. ROGOFF. I think you need to start from the top, the bottom,

and the middle. Let me just give you an example. I think you put

your—you kind of hit the nail on the head when you talk about morale and what is it that the workers see when they report a safety

concern up the chain. Does anything ever come back?

When we talk about establishing safety management systems,

not just at WMATA but in every rail transit system through our

legislation, it is about having an environment where every set of

eyes and ears at the transit agency is focused on safety and is reporting issues up, and there are people who are analyzing that information and finding out where the safety vulnerabilities are and

addressing them first.

But if you have been working on the right-of-way for a dozen

years, and in the last 3 years every concern you raised doesn’t get

an answer—in some cases it is even worse, because in some cases

the transit agency addresses their problem but doesn’t tell you that

they have addressed the problem, so you don’t even know that they

have addressed it, and it turns into a real morale buster in terms

of, if middle management and senior management isn’t caring

about safety, why should I.

Mr. CUMMINGS. This last thing, Mr. Chairman. And then it becomes like a cancer.

Mr. ROGOFF. Absolutely.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Because new people come in and say, Why are

you working so hard.

Mr. ROGOFF. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so you have a problem, and the people suffer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Mr. Rogoff, I just think, in response to Mr. Cummings, you referred to bad blood between some of the different groups at

WMATA, and before we bring up the last panel, I think it is in the

interest of the public record that you elaborate just briefly. I think

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we would all benefit. And I think WMATA would benefit, because

this is a very important issue that was brought up. So if you could

just briefly elaborate so that the witnesses——

Mr. ROGOFF. I will elaborate a little bit, but out of fairness I

need to say that these observations that have been made to me

have been anecdotal, and that is, especially when it comes to these

issues of right-of-way safety, you have different workers working in

different crafts.

Really, a common rule of thumb when you have people working

on the right-of-way with moving trains is everyone has to get a

comprehensive safety briefing and know where everyone is at all

times. And the observation has been made to me—again,

anecdotally—that folks are not making that extra effort. It really

shouldn’t be an extra effort; it should be a fundamental effort. And

that is for lack of caring between departments as to who is on the

right-of-way crew versus who the operators are. It is a concern that

is the most critical safety example, but I think that there are other

examples.

Let me give you one that was in our audit. When the safety department has come around to other operating departments and

said, we need to audit your safety department, they have had their

own authority questioned. Why do we need the safety audit? What

do you know about it? That is a kind of form of dysfunctionality

that can’t be allowed to persist.

Mr. BILBRAY. If I can just interject, there is another aspect here

we don’t even talk about, and that is getting the policymakers before construction to be looking at the safety. The policymakers,

when you are talking about doing alignment—a good example is

alignment. Let’s talk about the Metro when it goes over through

Alexandria. How many times when a policymaker on the board decides to go with an engineering that is an elevated platform are

they informed and sensitized to the fact of the increased risk of

maintenance on elevated platforms as opposed to ground-level or

underground?

That kind of thing needs to be interjected not just when you are

doing operation, but when you are designing the program, when

you are deciding right-of-ways. All of this needs to be front-loaded

so you are not trying to make do afterwards.

Mr. ROGOFF. Mr. Bilbray, we completely agree. And, indeed, our

current regulations ask the States to set up, where you are introducing a rail transit system in a State for the first time, we ask

the States to establish their State safety office so they can be in

conversation with the designers of the system, rather than just

come in on the first day of operation.

I will tell you, because of our limited authority, we have sometimes had to really pull some teeth to get the Governors to stand

up to that responsibility.

Mr. BILBRAY. And I want to point out it is even to the point of

alignments, because sometimes alignments require certain type of

construction that is not as safe as others, so it needs to be a consideration right from the get-go, before you even decide where the line

is going to go.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony, Mr.

Rogoff.

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Mr. ROGOFF. Thank you, sir.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Now we are going to bring up the next panel:

Mr. Sarles, Mr. Benjamin, Mr. Bassett, Ms. Jeter, and Mr. Alpert.

I want to welcome all of our witnesses on our second panel. On

this panel we have Mr. Richard Sarles, who is the interim General

Manager of Metro, who was appointed by the Board of Directors

and began his duties March 29th of this year.

Welcome, Mr. Sarles.

We have Mr. Peter Benjamin, who is the chairman of the Metro

Board of Directors and a member of that board since 2007.

Welcome, Mr. Benjamin.

Mr. Matt Bassett, who is the chairman of the Tri-State Oversight

Committee of Metro [TOC].

Ms. Jeter, Ms. Jackie Jeter, who is the president of the Amalgamated Transit Union Local 689. Welcome.

And Mr. David Alpert, who is the vice chairman of the Metro

Rider Advisory Council.

Thank you all for appearing before the committee today. As you

heard from the first panel, it is the custom of this committee to

swear in the witnesses. If you could please all stand and raise your

right hands as I administer the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative.

At this time, each of you will have 5 minutes to deliver your oral

statement. As you heard, the yellow light means you have 1 minute

remaining. The red light means stop.

Mr. Sarles, as you begin your testimony, let me just congratulate

you on your new assignment. Obviously, you are coming into a

very, very tough situation, but we are all, I think, looking forward

to working with you to make sure that the Washington Metro system is as safe and as reliable and as efficient as possible.

With that, if you could please begin.

STATEMENTS OF RICHARD SARLES, METRO INTERIM GENERAL MANAGER, WMATA; PETER BENJAMIN, CHAIRMAN

METRO BOARD OF DIRECTORS, WMATA; MATT BASSETT,

CHAIR, TRI-STATE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE; JACKIE JETER,

PRESIDENT, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL 689;

AND DAVID ALPERT, VICE-CHAIR, METRO RIDER ADVISORY

COUNSEL

STATEMENT OF RICHARD SARLES

Mr. SARLES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking

Member Bilbray, and members of the committee. Thank you for the

opportunity to testify today.

I am Richard Sarles, general manager of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority [WMATA or Metro]. I became Metro’s

general manager less than a month ago. In my first few weeks here

I have met with employees, customers, and other stakeholders, and

have reviewed the findings of oversight agencies.

Based upon those meetings and findings, we have drafted a 6-

month action plan to move Metro forward, addressing our greatest

challenges, which I see as safety, service reliability, and budget.

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Let me begin with safety. We have taken a number of actions in

recent months to improve safety, including, for example, hiring a

new chief safety officer and adding 12 new positions to our safety

department. We now have safety officers assigned to each bus and

rail division to improve communications between safety and operational personnel. And we are working hard to improve the safety

of our track workers. We established a working group which includes several Metro departments, as well as union representatives

and others. That group is creating a new roadway worker protection manual and developing a new roadway worker training plan.

While we have made progress with regard to safety, we still have

work to do. We have established the following six safety-related

priorities for the next 6 months: One is to fill the remaining safety

department vacancies and increase training.

Two, continue to accelerate close-out of open safety-related audit

findings. Let me say here that I am particularly focused on responding to the recommendations in the FTA audit. Our action

plan is attached to my written testimony.

Three, develop an incident tracking and safety management reporting system.

Four, encourage near-miss reporting, including publicizing our

anonymous employee safety hotline and strengthening whistleblower protection.

Five, complete a new right-of-way worker protection manual and

revisions to the Metro rail safety rules and procedures handbook.

Six, complete a self-assessment of safety-related internal controls

and initiate a thorough assessment of safety culture.

Turning to the reliability of our service, I think it is fair to say

that the quality our customers experience is the key to the continued success of our system. We are taking steps to improve the ontime performance of all our modes, as well as the availability of our

elevators and escalators. Still, we can do better.

We have established the following six priorities for improving

service reliability over the next 6 months: One, increased training

for front-line employees and supervisors.

Two, create transparent performance tracking and reporting systems.

Three, revise inspection and maintenance procedures to reflect

changes in operations.

Four, compile a new schedule adjustment on the Red Line. This

new schedule will allow for more time for customers to board trains

at our busiest stations and will involve more A-car trains running

to the ends of the line.

Five, initiate an external assessment of elevator/escalator maintenance and repair programs.

Six, continually re-emphasize safety and state of repairs top priorities. Maintenance of vehicles, tracks, structures, signals, and

other infrastructure in a good state of repair has a direct impact

on the safety and reliability of the Metro operation.

The most effective action we can take to improve reliability is to

improve the physical condition of our system. This leads me to a

topic which has a direct effect on our ability to improve service reliability, Metro’s budget.

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Fiscal year 2011 is likely the most difficult year financially

speaking that Metro has ever had to face. The economic slow-down

means that ridership and revenue are down, while costs have continued to rise. This imbalance created a $189 million gap in our fiscal year 2011 operating budget.

Tomorrow the Metro board will begin considering how to close

the budget gap. Without knowing what they will decide, it is fair

to say that balancing Metro’s budget will require hard choices. The

economic downturn has affected everyone in this Nation, and, unfortunately, Metro is not immune.

National economic conditions will have an impact on our capital

budget, as well. Funding constraints require Metro to limit our capital program for the next 6 years to only the most critical, mustdo projects such as replacement of our oldest rail cars and buses.

We will not be able to make other improvements to our service,

such as running additional A-car trains.

Over the next 6 months, we intend to accomplish the following

objectives related to Metro’s budget: One, educate policymakers,

customers, and members of the public about their role in funding

Metro.

Two, implement the board-approved 2011 budget.

Three, manage the transition of our next 6-year capital program

currently being developed, including responding to any recommendations in the final NTSB report on the June accident.

Four, initiate a discussion with regional and Federal stakeholders on Metro’s long-term fiscal outlook to identify both challenges

and solutions.

The basic challenge is this: the Metro system must be brought

into a state of good repair. Unless there is renewed commitment to

this goal, the system will continue to degrade.

Mr. Chairman, 6 months from now I intend to deliver an interim

performance assessment report to Metro’s board, but we do not

have to wait until then to track our progress. We are developing

products that will allow the public to see how we are doing. We expect to launch the first of those monthly vital signs reports shortly.

We are committed to improving transparency and communication

with our customers and other stakeholders, including Congress.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be glad to

answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sarles follows:]

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Sarles.

Mr. Benjamin.

STATEMENT OF PETER BENJAMIN

Mr. BENJAMIN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bilbray, and

members of the committee, I have worked for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority for 25 years, a system to which

I am very dedicated, and I am pleased to appear before you today

as the chairman of the Board of Directors to speak with you about

one of my favorite subjects.

Metro’s job is not to run buses and trains; it is to move people,

to connect origins and destinations, to create transportation alternatives for the region, and to support the operations of the Federal

Government. It is to get people to work, to school, to the Rayburn

Building, and to the zoo. Most of the people who ride Metro bus

or Metro rail are not dependent upon transit. They own cars. They

will ride Metro only if it is safe, clean, reliable, comfortable, and

at a reasonable price.

Our challenge is to provide that safe, clean, reliable, affordable

service. At the same time, we need to improve our communication

with our riders so that they have a better understanding of Metro’s

limitations. We have a 34-year-old rail system, which is not like it

used to be when it was new. It has old rail cars, track bed, power

equipment, and communication systems. More than half of our bus

garages are over 50 years old, and some buses are 15 years old.

As the equipment and facilities age, they become less reliable,

break down more often, and need more maintenance. We will have

more service disruptions and delays than when the system was

new—planned ones to rehabilitate the infrastructure and unplanned ones because of reduced equipment reliability. And we

need to ensure that our customers are informed and prepared for

that reality.

Above everything else, we must provide safe and reliable service,

and in the past year we have had accidents which have shocked

and saddened all of us.

We need to focus on three goals: we need to build a new safety

culture throughout the organization, from the board and the general manager to the bus and rail operators, mechanics, and track

walkers; we need to invest in the equipment, facilities, and personnel needed to enhance safety; and we need to create the policies

and procedures that enhance system safety. In doing so effectively,

we will restore public confidence in the safety and quality of our

service and we will rebuild trust among policymakers, legislators,

and other stakeholders.

I know that these goals will not be achieved overnight, but we

are determined to accomplish them.

Metro faces the same financial issues which practically every

other major transit system in the United States does. In this period

of economic decline, many of our revenue sources, such as advertising and fares, have decreased, and the funds available for our subsidies have declined. Transit systems throughout the country with

dedicated sources of subsidies such as sales taxes have seen those

funds decline and have had to cut staff, reduce service, and inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63139.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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crease fares, as well as defer capital projects in order to use those

funds to fill operating gaps.

Those transit systems which look to local governments to provide

subsidies, as we do at Metro, find those governments dealing with

lower tax revenues and the need to cut governmental services.

Transit becomes one of a number of vital services that must be

funded with fewer resources available.

We are exceptionally pleased that our State and local funding

partners have demonstrated a long history of strong financial support for this system. That strong support is continuing even in

these tough economic times, as our jurisdictional partners are proposing to provide over a half billion dollars to support Metro operations in fiscal year 2011.

At a time when the Maryland transportation trust fund is woefully short of revenue and the State is reducing its highway expenditures drastically, that State, which I represent on the Metro

board, will be increasing its operating contribution to Metro in

2011.

Metro’s capital needs inventory identifies investments totaling $11.4 billion over the next 10 years. This committee led the effort

to obtain additional Metro funding for capital rehabilitation and replacement, the first installment of which was appropriated last

year. That funding will go a long way toward helping us to meet

our capital needs; however, our projected funding over the foreseeable future does not bring us to where we need to be.

Again, this is not unique to Metro. A recent study referred to by

Administrator Rogoff by the Federal Transit Administration found

that the seven largest transit systems in the United States, including Metro, currently have a backlog of state of good repair needs

totaling $50 billion. Going forward, the study concluded that these

systems would need an additional $5.9 billion per year so as not

to fall further behind.

We have been fortunate in that our State and local funding partners have demonstrated strong support on the capital side, just as

they have done on the operating side. Over the last 6 years, they

have provided Metro with $525 million more in capital contributions than what was needed just to match Federal funds. The key,

however, rests with you and your colleagues and the administration. Increased support for the state of good repair needs of older

systems is essential in the next surface transportation authorization if we and other systems throughout the Nation are to continue

to be able to provide safe and reliability service.

Metro’s board is extremely pleased that it was able to convince

a leader of Richard Sarles’ experience and capability to delay his

retirement and help us address our challenges while the board

seeks a new permanent general manager for the agency. In his

first few weeks here, Mr. Sarles has demonstrated a deep understanding of the issues facing Metro, and he is moving forward aggressively in a number of areas, as he has covered in his testimony.

The Metro board is on the verge of selecting a search firm which

will conduct a national and international search for the next permanent general manager. Understanding that we wish to move forward as quickly as possible, we intend to take the time needed to

conduct a comprehensive recruitment process so that we can idenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63139.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tify the best candidate for what I can honestly say, having seen it

close up, is one of the toughest jobs in the transit industry.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I simply want to say Metro’s mission is to move people safely, reliably, and comfortably. We are

committed to carrying out our mission.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Benjamin follows:]

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Benjamin.

Mr. Bassett.

STATEMENT OF MATT BASSETT

Mr. BASSETT. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bilbray, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the important topic of the Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s rail safety challenges and

initiatives. Today’s hearing is of great importance to the rail transit

industry, the citizens of the Washington area, and our Nation’s

transit riders and workers as a whole.

The Tri-State Oversight Committee [TOC], is a joint effort between Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia to oversee

WMATA’s rail safety and security efforts. We review their accident

investigations, approve key safety documents, evaluate corrective

actions, and periodically audit their safety procedures and programs.

Dating back even before the tragic Red Line collision of June 22,

2009, the TOC noted significant shortfalls in Metro’s safety efforts.

Accident investigations were not always completed. Safety hazards

sometimes went reported, while others were reported to no avail.

WMATA’s responses to the TOC’s information requests were often

delayed or inadequate. Audit findings went unaddressed, and, as

our committee found in a recent assessment, significant gaps existed between operating rules and actual practice.

The rail agency’s significant funding challenges only compounded

the inherent hazards of an aging rail system. However, I am here

today to inform the committee and the Congress that in the last

10 months WMATA has made significant and commendable

progress in changing its agency culture, in addressing backlogged

action items, in improving their responsiveness to our committee,

and in bolstering safety communication across departments. Initiatives such as their cross-discipline, multi-agency right-of-way worker protection task force and inter-departmental efforts to resolve

open corrective actions have charted a way forward.

Our policy leadership and committee have also taken crucial

steps to strengthen and improve our oversight of the Metro rail

system’s safety. Yesterday morning, Governor Robert McDonnell of

Virginia, Governor Martin O’Malley of Maryland, and Mayor Adrian Fenty of the District of Columbia jointly committed to an interim program to augment the TOC’s accountability, independence,

and authority. These measures coordinate with policymakers, improve public access to our reports and information, provide the

TOC Chair with additional authority, and start to evaluate longterm plans for Metro safety oversight.

Along with committee monthly meetings with the WMATA interim general manager and quarterly public interaction with the

WMATA board, most recently on April 10th, the TOC is entering

a new phase in our relationship with Metro, as well as with the

riding public. WMATA still faces major hurdles in improving the

system’s safety, especially those related to improving safety communication, addressing backlogged action items, and resolving open

investigations. It is essential that the transit agency maintain the

momentum it has worked hard to generate in recent months.

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The recent Federal Transit Administration audit provided a valuable assessment for WMATA and the TOC, and we are working

diligently to respond to these findings prior to the deadline early

next month.

The TOC looks forward to working with WMATA, the FTA, the

National Transportation Safety Board, and the Congress to sustain

this progress and to ensure that it translates into real and lasting

change.

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bassett follows:]

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Ms. Jeter.

STATEMENT OF JACKIE JETER

Ms. JETER. Good morning to the committee. Thank you for your

invitation to appear before you today to share our insights, concerns, and suggestions on improving safety and service within the

Metro rail system.

My statement details issues that you are well acquainted with,

so I will focus on items that you may not be familiar with.

WMATA’s apparent inability to initiate effective internal investigations based upon the evidence to institute effective safety

changes continues to inhibit their ability to move toward a safer

system. Unfortunately, we meet and talk a lot, but action is needed. Failure to implement needed procedural changes and the lack

of oversight to do it quickly continues to compromise safety and

service delivery.

I would note that there is a tendency to blame individual employees instead of looking for underlying systemic causes of safety-related incidents.

Local 689’s experience concerning the investigations lead us to

belief that WMATA has not implemented several key measures

that would make the Metro rail system safer. Urgency and rapidity

will be the hallmark of suggested changes we are offering below.

WMATA must consider instituting the following without delay:

multiple layers and redundancy of safety protections, codification of

standards for track worker safety similar to the Federal Railroad

Administration track worker safety standards, clear and concise

communication between workers and controllers, clear notification

and designation of work areas and zones on the right-of-way, effective worker safety training and retraining, supervisory enforcement

of safety standards, a contractual process for WMATA employees to

appeal the standards they believe to be incorrect or unsafe, such

as a safety appeals board, meaningful whistleblower protection to

ensure that employees are not fearful of reporting precise safety

problems, effective labor/management safety committees, WMATA’s

commitment to rapid development and implementation of procedures and standards that are calculated to improve safety immediately and in the long term.

Short- and long-term solutions likely to address budget shortfalls

currently confronting WMATA must be seen in the context of the

impact insufficient funding has on workers, riders, businesses, and

overall development in the three jurisdictions hosting the system.

Public transportation will never be profitable. It is an expensive

public service. The critical nature of funding and the lack thereof

has a major impact on the riding public and WMATA employees

who are our members. We have struggled with wage and benefit

issues for the last 3 years and have been victimized by WMATA’s

failure to adequately plan for expected labor cost increases.

Beyond the impact of wages and benefits is the impact of the

public as service cuts are becoming standard practice to help close

the budget gaps. I will emphasize the need for flexibility in capital

budget allocation in order to allow for capital funds to cover operating costs.

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The Union has suggested the following alternative approaches to

job and service cuts WMATA believes necessary because the budget

shortfalls it is experiencing.

Review carefully the formula grant that is used as a basis of Federal funding to consider adjusting the percentage allocated to

Metro. Look at reducing [sic] the number of parking spaces at

Metro stations to induce greater use of the system. Lobby to establish a dedicated funding source from the jurisdictions. Consider recapturing tax incentives given to businesses that surround Metro

stations. They should bear a greater share of the cost because they

gain a greater benefit as a result of their location.

The Federal transit benefit should be indexed to both increase

use and inflation. It would get an annual increase automatically to

reflect the real cost of providing increased service and any increased costs resulting from inflation.

Consider supporting the development of the outer spokes of the

system to increase ridership and revenue from business development likely to occur around the stations.

Local 689 supports the selection of a permanent general manager

for WMATA who is a seasoned, transit top-level manager with vision, knowledge anchored by the political savvy most likely to garner, private, and government support that will nurture the critical

system in our Nation’s Capital.

We believe the general manager should be a person capable of

forming alliances, fostering tri-State cooperation, encouraging legislative affinity for addressing the needs of mass transit, while possessing the background that comes from long-term involvement in

managing and developing a sizable system. But without true overhaul of the Metro board, any general manager selected will have

serious pressure because of the micro-management style.

I will be pleased to address any questions you might have in regard to my testimony, and I thank you on behalf of my members

and the riding public.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jeter follows:]

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Ms. Jeter.

Mr. Alpert.

STATEMENT OF DAVID ALPERT

Mr. ALPERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member

Bilbray, and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me

to testify today. My name is David Alpert, and I am the District

of Columbia vice chair of the WMATA Riders Advisory Council. I

also report on and advocate for transit and better urban design

through my Web site, greatergreaterwashington.org.

The Riders Advisory Council has 21 members appointed by the

WMATA board from the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. Members use Metro bus, Metro rail, and Metro access, and

represent a diverse mix of ages, backgrounds, and ways in which

they use Metro.

Metro experienced its worst year in history in 2009 and suffered

a substantial loss of public confidence. The June 2009 crash on the

Red Line and subsequent track worker fatalities catalyzed that

change and accelerated awareness of the larger problem, the growing disrepair of the Metro infrastructure.

Failing to keep the system in a state of good repair seriously

threatens safety. While certainly not as dramatic as the past year’s

incidents, crowded platforms following service disruptions, crumbling platform tiles, and out-of-service elevators and escalators are

significant recurring safety concerns. Renewing the local Metro

matters funding agreement, which is currently under negotiation,

is essential.

The Council appreciates Congress’ support for the $150 million

annual Federal capital funding for WMATA last year and hopes

Congress will continue to provide these funds. Unfortunately, even

continuing that appropriation annually and renewing the Metro

matters agreement leaves WMATA about $3.4 billion short of its

identified capital needs over the next 10 years.

In addition, WMATA must secure support for its operating budget. Closing the currently projected $190 million operating budget

gap for fiscal year 2011 will likely require both significant fare increases and substantial service cuts.

Riders are not the only ones who benefit from good transit. The

entire region benefits economically. The Federal Government benefits from greater productivity. And drives benefit from reduced congestion on roadways. For that reason, the Riders Advisory Council

and transit advocates have asked local jurisdictions to increase

their contributions enough to forestall severe service cuts.

The northern Virginia counties have taken the greatest steps in

this area, explicitly making room in their budgets for greater support for transit. Some representatives, including many Maryland

State delegates and county council members, have expressed their

support; however, that has not yet translated into meaningful action, and there remains a great deal of uncertainty about the

amount the funding jurisdictions can or will ultimately provide.

Safety must top the list of Metro’s core values. Effective oversight is also critical to maintaining safety and customer confidence

in transit. Still, safety cannot exist in a vacuum. Statistics show

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ing. Mandates that improve safety while maintaining service quality can greatly enhance transit. Mandates that impair service in

the long run in the name of safety will only drive commuters to

other more dangerous modes of travel.

We are pleased that Congress is taking a strong interest in the

safety and success of the Washington area transit system. At the

same time, safety for commuters does not start and end with Metro

rail. A USDA employee was killed after the recent snow storm

walking to the Branch Avenue Metro Rail Station in Prince

George’s County, MD, where the sidewalks had not been cleared.

A military truck driver closing roads for the recent nuclear security

summit killed a bicyclist last week right in downtown D.C.

WMATA safety issues have received considerable press recently,

but the degree of press attention has been so great specifically because Metro rail fatalities are so rare, while fatalities on roadways

are common to the point that we have become inured to these tragedies.

This Congress should not ignore these larger safety concerns and

could draw needed attention to them by also conducting oversight

into the ways in which our roadway designs, snow removal policies,

and traffic law enforcement succeed or fail at maximizing the safety of commuters on all modes.

A safe, reliable, well-maintained, and adequately funded Metro

system will enrich the entire region notably, including the Federal

Government.

I thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony and would

be happy to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Alpert follows:]

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Alpert. I must say your Web

site that you reference is a very useful resource for all of us.

Mr. ALPERT. Thank you.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. And I join you in calling upon our local jurisdictions to do what they can now to help ease the difficult choices

that Metro is going to have to make that you pointed out.

Let me start out by asking some questions of Mr. Sarles and Mr.

Benjamin.

We heard from Mr. Rogoff in his testimony, and obviously you

have familiarized yourself with the FTA report. There was also the

report that was commissioned by WMATA by the former general

manager, Mr. David Gunn, and I assume you are familiar with

that report; is that right?

Mr. SARLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENJAMIN. Yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. You have no objection, WMATA has no objection to those recommendations being made public, do you?

Mr. BENJAMIN. The recommendations by Mr. Gunn?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Gunn, yes.

Mr. BENJAMIN. This was a confidential report that was given to

our board, and we have summarized the recommendations that he

made, and that has been provided to the press. We would appreciate it if the report, itself, were left as a confidential report.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I would encourage you and will work with you

to try and make sure that all the recommendations that were made

to WMATA are made available to the public. It seems to me

WMATA is a public agency. This was done with the purpose of trying to strengthen the safety of the system, and I think I would

strongly encourage you to work with us to make sure that those

findings and conclusions are made available.

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire here?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Yes. I think that we will pursue this between

now and the end of the hearing, because we feel strongly that this

information—that the public has a right to know this information.

Mr. BENJAMIN. We will be happy to work with you on that.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I don’t know if—well, let me move on, because

I am going to ask you some questions about the Gunn report,

which are also relevant to this hearing.

Mr. Sarles, have you had a chance to familiarize yourself with

the Gunn report?

Mr. SARLES. Yes, I have.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. So my question to the two of you is: we

have now heard from Mr. Rogoff. You have heard his testimony,

which said we need a top-to-bottom change in the safety culture at

WMATA. He said safety concerns were marginalized. He has gone

on to issue his report with specific recommendations, and Mr.

Gunn has also issued a report with recommendations. My question

to the two of you, one as interim general manager the other as

chairman of the board: do you agree with the recommendations

that were made by the administrator? To the extent you do not

agree, please elaborate. And do you agree or disagree with the recommendations that were made by Mr. Gunn? That is why it is

going to be important that we make this information available to

the public.

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Mr. SARLES. Simple and clear answer is yes, I agree with the

FTA recommendations, and yes, I agree with Mr. Gunn’s report,

based on my own experience in the industry.

Let me talk to the FTA recommendations first. They hit on communications, they hit on hazard analysis, they hit on roadway

worker protection. That is the basic areas when you look at the details.

My first impressions—only 3 weeks here—is certainly there is

need for significant improvement in communications within

WMATA. And this doesn’t extend to just safety, but it is the nature

of the current nature of the operation. I think that is just reflective

of what has happened over the last few years in terms of funding,

changes in administration, reorganization, changes in leadership,

safety officer being one case, general manager being another case.

So there is a tendency to go into silos. That has to be changed, and

I have already started working on that.

With regard to hazards analysis, to me one of the important

things is that you anticipate problems before they become accidents. Doing hazard analysis, getting near-miss reports, getting

good upward and downward communication helps you identify

those problems before they become major problems and address

them and avoid those accidents, so that is extremely important.

The whole issue of roadway worker protection is extremely important. When I worked at Amtrak, I personally got trained in that

because I was out in the right-of-way. I understand how important

that is. So there has been a very active effort underway, started

certainly before I got here, involving the staff that work there, the

unions, in a very collaborative approach, including representatives

from the TOC, to develop a very robust worker protection program.

That is well underway. It is expected that the actual manual be

issued by the end of the year.

One of the most important things that goes with all of this is

training. People have to be trained to understand what is right,

how things should operate, and then that should be reinforced.

That has to be done, and that is some of the points that Mr. Gunn

made. I agree with him that the fact that there has not been sufficient investment in state of good repair, which is not unusual for

this particular Metro rail—it is the same thing in other parts of the

Nation—does affect the level of reliability operation, certainly over

time could affect the safety of the operation, but safety has to remain No. 1 priority. And you have to have the leadership in place,

a stable leadership in place that continually focuses on safety and

state of good repair. If you continue to change the leadership, it impacts the ability to do that.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Mr. Benjamin.

Mr. BENJAMIN. Mr. Chairman, let me first of all associate myself

with Mr. Sarles’ remarks. I agree with what he said, and I fully

support all of the positions relative to the FTA report. I think it

has brought up some significant issues, all of which we have to do

substantial work on, and I am very pleased that Mr. Sarles has

started on that process, and we have every intention of completing

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ticular, those associated with the safety culture and communications.

One of the communications issues which Mr. Gunn also raised

was the concern about what he called kill the messenger. That is,

where a staff person tries to report information up the line and, instead, is criticized for it as opposed to supported for it and told that

if you have identified a safety issue it is a great concern. Those

kinds of things need to be changed, and we are going to have to

make a major effort to improve our communications and change

the overall culture of the system from the bottom to the top.

There are areas in Mr. Gunn’s report where he has made recommendations that reflect his personal bias as an individual or his

personal history. As you know, he was with this Authority for a

limited period of time as a general manager, and, in fact, during

that time he was the person who appointed me the chief financial

officer of Metro, and so I am a strong advocate of Mr. Gunn, and

I was one of the people who strongly wanted him to come in. But

he is one voice among many, and all of his opinions are not necessarily those that we on the board would fully agree with.

What we did is we asked him to come in, knowing that he had

that type of experience and tendency to make reports, so that he

could be one of many voices that we could hear in making decisions.

That having been said, I am not sure I agree with his suggestions for organizational structure, would tend to move toward traditional rail organizations, inner city rail organizations and how they

would structure, as opposed to transit rail organizations, but that

is something that I think I would rather leave to the general manager, the interim general manager, and the permanent general

manager when they are selected.

And I think his positions on governance reflect an experience

that he had many years ago, and not necessarily the way that the

board and the senior staff at Metro work at the present time.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Right.

Let me just be clear. I want to commend the board for bringing

him in, No. 1, and recommendations. I think that those recommendations are all in your binders. As a committee, we believe

the public has a right to know. We intend to release the report. I

think it is important that it be done with your testimony, because

I think no one is suggesting that it is going to be adopted, it has

been adopted by WMATA. They are recommendations he made.

You may agree with some of them, you may disagree with some of

them. Within that context, I think it is important to make it available, because it is part of the public discourse. You, as stewards of

WMATA, are obviously critical to that oversight process, and it

should be part of the dialog.

I appreciate the fact that you indicated where you may have

some disagreements with his recommendations going forward.

Let me turn it over to Mr. Bilbray.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you very much.

First of all, I think, Mr. Benjamin, I think I should give you a

chance to respond to my diatribe about the system’s preemption of

use of technology and the way we stacked it up. I mean, do you

have any defense or counter to my statement about the fact that

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we are actually using technology in a way that was assumed to be

the cutting edge for the future in the 1960’s and the early 1970’s,

but by 1980 we knew that—at least a lot of people were claiming

that was a wrong assumption?

I think in all fairness we ought to remember that a lot of these

systems back in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s were designed

with the assumption there would not be an operator in the cab, and

later that was stuck in.

Your comments on that, as somebody who has been on the

board?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Congressman Bilbray, let me first note that one

of the observations that you made is really important, and it applies very strongly to Washington Metro. When the Metro system

was originally put together, when our compact was passed, the direction was for Metro to build but not operate a rail system, and

it was not to run a bus system. So the people who originally designed and built Metro were not operators and were not trying to

deal with operators. It was only after the system was already

under construction and most of the policy issues which you have

discussed had already been decided by those people that, in fact,

the Congress came back to Metro and said, well, why don’t you run

it also, and while you are doing that why don’t you run the bus systems in the Washington area.

So the original concept of Metro was not the integrated build and

operate, and so that did cause a number of issues throughout the

design of the system that we probably today would not have done

the same way knowing what we know. I suspect that is true about

every rail system.

Specifically on automation, I would say that is a really difficult

issue. Certainly if you are building a light rail system, I would

agree completely with the concept that you have put forward that

you don’t want to have full automation, because there are too many

potential ways that there can be incursion onto the right-of-way. In

a heavy rail system, there is a balance here, and I am not sure

where that balance is. Certainly, you are absolutely right if you

take all functions away from the operator you have reduced the attentiveness of that operator and the ability to respond. Now, that

having been said, we have multiple cases where operators have, in

fact, respected very effectively in overriding the automatic system.

Mr. BILBRAY. Let me interject here. I understand that, and I understand that the assumption is that automation allows you to basically get more ridership, more trains, that the safety boundary

there is better with automation than hand operated. That is the

theory. But, again, it comes back down to the fact of that response

time of somebody who is not in operation. The theory doesn’t seem

to pencil out when you come down to real-life facts that people,

after year after year of not responding, has a very slow response

time, right?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Congressman Bilbray, one of the things that we

have discovered is that people tend to pay less attention, as you

might imagine, if they are in an automated system.

That having been said, one of the things you can do is to increase

the number of tasks that they do have to carry out while they are

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tem, keep in mind that we don’t even have to do station announcements with our operators opening and closing doors and several

other functions. Those functions have been deliberately turned over

to the operators to cause them to keep their attention.

That having been said, Congressman, I don’t know where that

line is, I must admit. That is certainly worthy of substantial additional research.

Mr. BILBRAY. OK. And let me just say, as somebody who has had

to put together the governance board, I totally understand why the

unanimous issue was brought up. You have three sovereign States

that do not want two basically dictating to the other. I understand

that. The issue of rotation of Chairs, though, may seem symbolic,

but operationally it is a very, very important issue because if you

rotate that makes the general manager really the front line of governance, and the fact is that the rotational really does not give you

somebody on the board who has hands-on, long-term responsibility

on this issue.

Has there been any discussion at all about modifying that, or is

that locked into this tri-State agreement?

Mr. BENJAMIN. No, Mr. Congressman. It is not locked into the

agreement, it is a practice of the board, as opposed to any legal requirement.

Mr. BILBRAY. I appreciate that courtesy.

The operational issue from the Union’s point of view?

Ms. JETER. I agree with you wholeheartedly. As an operator—I

operated a train from 1987 to 1997, when I became an interlocking

operator—operators have complained about the automation of the

system, and they did then, even though now they are operating in

manual, because it took away all of your skills. Unless you worked

a yard operation—and you have a two-man team in 9 yards, and

out of 400-some operators you can tell how many people actually

get the opportunity to do that. That is what hones your skills. And

there was a constant, I think, behavior of taking away the duties

of the operator. Making a station announcement is one aspect of it,

but if your train broke down you didn’t even get the opportunity

to go back and troubleshoot it to repair it. Someone else did that.

So you eroded your skills on a regular basis.

Then we went into the process where we used to have kind of

like a pre-certification day where you would more or less go into

a training mode and you re-train and you kind of hone your skills

a little bit and then you would certify. That was taken away.

So I think where safety is concerned there has been a process

where the operator has really become very redundant. And then all

of the sudden, when we start having system failures, one that is

not talked about on a regular basis was when the operators went

to total door opening, because there is a problem with that, that

is not talked about. The operators now open and close the doors in

manual, and even through that process they are thrust back into

this manual operation and they are expected to perform the same

way that the train would when it is operating in automatic with

the scheduling and all of that, and it does not work that way.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

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Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. First of all, I want to say how much I have appreciated this testimony. I always judge testimony by whether I learn

something. Particularly from your, Mr. Sarles, did I learn that

some measures have been taken to improve safety. That was a very

important goal and objective of this hearing.

Could I ask all of you whether you would support legislation to

create an independent TOC funded by the respective State legislatures? Could I just ask all of you for a yes or no answer?

Mr. Sarles.

Mr. SARLES. I think it is important that the oversight agency be

independent and that it be well funded and well resourced to be

effective.

Ms. NORTON. Well, of course you have heard testimony of Mr.

Rogoff beforehand that it is unprofessional to fund by those being

examined, shall we say, so it is a two-part question. Do you favor

it? And do you favor the independence that would come from direct

funding from the legislatures of the respective jurisdictions?

Mr. SARLES. And I favor them being independently funded, and

that they should be independent.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. Mr. Benjamin.

Mr. BENJAMIN. I agree with the statements that Mr. Sarles

made. I would add to that and point out that at the present time

they are independently funded. They are not funded by Metro, they

are funded by——

Ms. NORTON. Well that is important for the record. They are not

funded——

Mr. BENJAMIN. They are not funded by Metro. They are funded

by the States and the District.

Ms. NORTON. What is the present level of funding, Mr. Benjamin?

Mr. BENJAMIN. The source of the funding is different, I believe,

in each one of the areas.

Ms. NORTON. Well, each of the three jurisdictions. Mr. Bassett,

first of all, do you favor an independent TOC? And if you are independently funded, what is your funding and do all three jurisdictions contribute, and in what proportions?

Mr. BASSETT. I will try to answer each one of those questions individually.

In response to your first question, it has always been the position

of the TOC that we support any initiative that overall improves the

situation of rail safety in the Washington area and the Nation. We

do not take specific positions on individual legislative proposals.

Regarding where our funding comes from, we are funded by the

three individual State agencies that——

Ms. NORTON. At what level, please?

Mr. BASSETT. Each jurisdiction contributes its own level of personnel in terms of——

Ms. NORTON. I am asking for the budget. What is it?

Mr. BASSETT. I don’t have those numbers.

Ms. NORTON. You don’t know what the budget is?

Mr. BASSETT. I could not specifically tell you how much each jurisdiction spends in salaries and benefits.

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Ms. NORTON. Could you tell me what the total budget is for the

TOC?

Mr. BASSETT. I can tell you how much we spend on an annual

basis for consultant support.

Ms. NORTON. Do you have a budget, Mr. Bassett?

Mr. BASSETT. Yes, ma’am, we do.

Ms. NORTON. What is the budget?

Mr. BASSETT. We receive——

Ms. NORTON. You are the chairman. What is the budget, sir?

Mr. BASSETT. Each year each jurisdiction contributes $150,000 to

the TOC through our administrative——

Ms. NORTON. That is $150,000 each?

Mr. BASSETT. Yes, but that does not include salaries, benefits, or

any of the other support that we receive for training or certification.

Ms. NORTON. Where do the salaries and benefits and support,

where does that funding come from?

Mr. BASSETT. That comes from the governments of the State of

Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of Columbia.

Ms. NORTON. So, Mr. Benjamin, they are not independently funded? They get their salaries—well, I don’t know. They get their

budget from the legislatures. They get their salaries somehow, not

from the legislatures but from the county and the city governments? Maybe that is it. Maybe that is the independent funding.

Mr. BASSETT. We are employees of State agencies and our funding comes from those individual State agencies.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Alpert, did you have a contribution to make on

that score?

Mr. ALPERT. I was just trying to clear up the confusion, which

I think was that my understanding is that they are not employed

by a separate organization, the TOC, but rather by the Departments of Transportation, so you were sort of asking the

question——

Ms. NORTON. Well, that is a very important answer. So the TOC

is not an entity that has employees, including yourself, Mr. Bassett?

Mr. BASSETT. No, ma’am. The TOC is a creation of a memorandum of understanding between the three jurisdictions. It is more

of a joint task force between three government agencies.

Ms. NORTON. I can understand. That is very important to know.

We don’t have an organization; we have a task force as a safety

oversight mechanism.

Ms. Jeter, do you support an independent TOC funded independently by the respective jurisdictions?

Ms. JETER. Yes, I do. And I believe that the reason why it needs

to be independent, you know, there is this, for lack of a better

term, there seems to be a relationship that is there between TOC

and the Authority, and I believe that, although, yes, they have to

work together to get information, I think that the TOC does need

to be more independent so that it does make the kind of recommendations and actually see them through to its completion to

make the safety with WMATA more effective.

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Ms. NORTON. Mr. Sarles, I was almost heartened by your testimony. I would think your testimony was, alone, an important reason to have this hearing, because I am not sure the public knows

or knew before this hearing the specifics of what you say are now

in place as some improvements in safety mechanisms.

Could I ask you whether the TOC was a source of any of these

improvements or whether they were internally generated, whether

they came from the Gunn report? Could you tell us the source of

these improvements?

Mr. SARLES. They came from all those sources. We took into account we heard from TOC, from the FTA, from Mr. Gunn, and,

frankly, from our own employees.

Ms. NORTON. I would like to ask Mr. Bassett to clear up some

confusion at least I have from his testimony about this new plan

that has gone into effect. You refer to it in your testimony and you

say the two Governors and the mayor considered both the possibility that FTA might directly take over the safety oversight mission

for WMATA and that their jurisdictions might establish a Metro

safety commission in place of the TOC. Now, what exactly does this

new proposal establish?

Mr. BASSETT. The proposal is broken into two individual phases.

The first, which is the interim phase one, creates a TOC policy

committee which provides direct access from the TOC to policymakers of the three jurisdictions. It increases the administrative

and executive authority available to the TOC chair to respond

quickly and effectively to Metro’s developing safety situations, and

it provides for a more stringent schedule of reporting of safety concerns, both to our own policymakers and to leadership at Metro, including in public forums such as at the Metro board meeting.

That is the interim plan that is going to go into effect in very

short order, as soon as the memorandum of understanding which

establishes the TOC can be revised.

The longer plans that you noted in your question are an evaluation of the fact that the three jurisdictions who established the

TOC want to look beyond the immediate time period for a sustainable and strong long-term model of oversight at Metro. Obviously,

this will depend very heavily on legislation that comes from the

Congress regarding the FTA’s proposal.

Ms. NORTON. Well, could I say to all who assemble here, don’t

wait on the Congress please. It is very difficult to get something

through the House and the Senate. We passed this out of committee some months ago, a couple of months ago. It is not even to the

floor yet. That is why I am concerned and want to know more

about this Metro safety commission.

Do any of you see any reason why the local jurisdictions can’t establish a Metro safety commission now?

Ms. JETER. If I can, there is no reason why.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Can you hold for 1 second? I am going to have

to leave and I want to turn the Chair over to Mr. Connolly, who

obviously has been focused on Metro for a very long time.

As I leave, I just want to share in the comments Ms. Norton is

making and I am going to ask Mr. Connolly also to followup on the

white paper, because I think we all have serious questions about

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when this is going to actually be implemented and meaningful, as

opposed to in more concept form.

I really appreciate those questions.

Without further ado, let me turn it over to Mr. Connolly and

thank the witnesses.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr.

Chairman.

The reason I expressed some concern is I would have expected—

and I know, Mr. Bassett, you are not the one to propose this, but

this is a hearing where we have to lay out where the responsibilities are. I would have expected something like this kind of improved task force to come forward literally within the month after

nine people lost their lives. Now we have almost a year, and we

have the same kind of a task force, only better reporting, better

communication, as I see it, no new powers, not even a proposal for

the legislature to consider powers, not even a proposal for a commission, even if we are not ready yet for what it would take to establish a commission.

That is why I must ask you, given the timeframe, and with the

certainty that you shouldn’t be waiting for the Congress, whether

or not these local jurisdictions on their own should be now establishing a Metro safety commission, whether you see any reason,

any impediments to such a commission being established.

Mr. CONNOLLY [presiding]. If the respondents could be concise,

because the time of the gentlelady has expired.

Ms. JETER. Ms. Norton, if I may, that is one of the problems that

has been occurring and continues to keep occurring. We have commissions upon commissions. We have committees upon committees.

Ms. NORTON. This is not a study commission. This would replace

the TOC.

Ms. JETER. Even to replace the TOC, I mean, replacing the TOC

is only one aspect of it. There needs to be and there should be concise procedures and standards in place now, if no other time. We

have had—you know, we talk about the nine deaths in the public,

but prior to that we had deaths of employees, and nobody did anything. There has been no study, there has been no group, there has

been nobody coming together to talk about what needs to be done.

And now all we do is continue.

Mr. Gunn did not have to come here to tell WMATA what it

needed to do, and it will not listen to those individuals that are inside, that are here, that are doing the work, that continue to say

we need to start doing thus. They have that already.

Ms. NORTON. Ms. Jeter——

Mr. CONNOLLY. The time of the gentlelady has long expired. We

may have an opportunity to have another round.

Mr. Clay of Missouri.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, and let me thank you

for holding this hearing.

You know, thousands of residents utilize the Metro system daily,

and many of these riders are our very own Federal workers who

make our jobs possible, and so to ensure the safety of them and

others I am looking forward to finding solutions to existing problems and addressing some ongoing concerns.

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With that, let me start with Mr. Benjamin. I am interested in

the progress of the Dulles rail extension project. I am aware that

this is a joint venture between WMATA and several other authorities in that initial funds are being raised through toll increases and

commercial taxes. However, looking further down the line, will

WMATA’s current financial troubles affect future phases of the extension?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Mr. Clay, that extension is fully funded by the

State of Virginia and is being carried out by the Airports Authority,

so all funding issues are Virginia issues as opposed to Washington

Metro issues.

Mr. CLAY. How about the projected ridership? How does that

compare to other lines that are in existence today?

Mr. BENJAMIN. Mr. Clay, I am not really extremely familiar with

that project because it is not a project which the board has been

intimately involved in because it is a Virginia project. I don’t know

if Mr. Sarles knows that any better than I.

Mr. CLAY. But you will maintain it once it is up and running?

Mr. BENJAMIN. At some point the built system will be turned

over to Metro, and Metro will operate it and maintain it.

Mr. CLAY. Mr. Sarles, can you inject anything into that?

Mr. SARLES. I can’t help you out much with the ridership. That

hasn’t been my focus in the first few weeks. It has really been on

safety and state of repair.

I will add one thing, though. While the funding is from Virginia,

and I guess the Airports Authority for the construction, ultimately

with WMATA taking over the operations and maintenance, we all

have to keep in mind that there will have to be more funds made

available for operations and maintenance so that it is maintained

in a state of good repair from the very get-go and not left to deteriorate.

Mr. CLAY. Let me also ask about another concern, the perceived

ability to keep up with safety issues. We cannot add ridership on

this new line without being able to ensure their safety. How can

we be sure that the current backlog of maintenance needs affecting

the Metro system will not affect the Dulles extension?

Mr. Sarles, do you want to take a stab at it? Or maybe I should

hear from Ms. Jeter. She may have something to say about it.

Mr. SARLES. The existing system has to be brought back up the

a state of good repair and the money has to be made available to

do that. If you ultimately don’t bring the existing system up to a

state of good repair, it is going to affect any new construction.

Mr. CLAY. Ms. Jeter, anything to add about a new line coming

on and being able to maintain it and make it safe?

Ms. JETER. I think with a new line you have probably less worries than you do with old lines. With a new line coming on, you

know, the equipment is new, it works like it is supposed to, and

everything is done according to plan. It is only when the lines become aged and older that you have more problems.

I honestly, from the operators and knowing them, I don’t believe

that if WMATA—if WMATA takes steps immediately, that should

not be a concern, Mr. Clay. It should not be a concern on whether

or not the lines are going to act effectively or whether WMATA can

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effectively run new lines. I know they can do that, but they do have

to make some changes quickly.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you.

Mr. Sarles, although you have had only a short time in your current role as interim general manager for the system, your testimony states that you have worked in public transit for 40 years.

From your perspective, do you believe that the agency’s general

managers have enough authority and enforcement power?

Mr. SARLES. Yes.

Mr. CLAY. Yes, you do. OK. Do you believe that the general managers are armed with enough information on a daily basis to make

informed decisions?

Mr. SARLES. I believe that the information systems at WMATA

have to be improved significantly. Safety is an example, where the

incident reporting is not systematically kept. There are efforts underway, and we hope this summer to have a system in place that

can systematically record all that incident information. So the answer to your question is there is work to be done in that area.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you so much for the panel s response.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the gentleman.

By the way, with respect to the gentleman’s question on rails to Dulles, it is a $5.5 billion project. It is proceeding smartly. It is

under construction as we speak. It is important to note that the

original Metro system was built with 80/20 Federal money. Of the

construction, 80 percent was financed by the Federal Government.

When rail to Dulles is completed, 16 percent of the cost will be

borne by the Federal Government. If you want to see a dramatic

retreat in terms of Federal funding for transit in the construction

area, rail to Dulles is a great example.

The first time we ever talked about rail to Dulles in a Federal

document was 1962. Forty-seven years later we signed the full

funding grant agreement, which I guess is warp speed in the Federal context.

Mr. CLAY. And, Mr. Chairman, that really highlights the point

that the Federal Government depends——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

Mr. CLAY [continuing]. Quite a bit on this system, and they

should also have a share——

Mr. CONNOLLY. To the premier airport in the Nation’s Capital,

essentially the Federal Government has said, You think it is a good

idea, local government, you pay for it. And it is entirely borne by

Virginia entities, including the Airports Authority, who have to figure out how to pay for this.

Mr. CLAY. Perhaps we can find something to share with the gentleman.

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I think it is important, the point Mr. Sarles

and Mr. Benjamin made. Once the Metro system accepts the fully

constructed line, then again the local jurisdictions—Ms. Norton’s,

mine, Mr. Van Hollen’s—we bear the full subsidy cost of bringing

that into the system. The Federal Government bears zero responsibility, which is the problem I have with the current system.

Let me ask Mr. Sarles and Mr. Benjamin, it has been suggested

that the real problem with Metro is mismanagement and organizaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63139.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tion and communication; it really isn’t a matter of resources. Mr.

Sarles, welcome. I know you are new, but I would welcome your

and Mr. Benjamin’s take on that. Is that true that really it is not

the whole question of safety and performance, really isn’t a question of resources?

Mr. SARLES. First impressions, 3 weeks——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

Mr. SARLES [continuing]. Is that it is a combination of the two.

I think that when you have an organization that maybe has not

had the full amount of resources available to it to spend on state

of good repair it begins to have an effect on the employees and the

management in terms of the ability to really do what they believe

is necessary.

Then you add on top of that the fact that there have been a number of changes in leadership, you are losing people who have 30

years experience getting ready to retire, not necessarily replaced,

one of the first things I am doing is trying to just fill the holes in

the organization where we have lost that experience, we have lost

that leadership, to create a foundation again to build it back into

the organization it should be.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Benjamin.

Mr. BENJAMIN. I would echo Mr. Sarles’ comment that it isn’t one

or the other, it is really both. Clearly, if we have not made the investments that we need to make in replacing our infrastructure

and our equipment, that is going to have an effect on safety. On

the other hand, we also have a clear problem with our safety culture. We do not live safety from the general manager all the way

down to the last track worker and operator. It is something that

needs to be improved. Clearly, also our communication needs to be

improved.

So we have to be working in both areas, and neither one by itself

will be sufficient.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can I ask you each briefly: is it a fair proposition, though, to say what is missing at the table in terms of subsidies, operating subsidies on a day-to-day basis, is Federal dollars?

Mr. BENJAMIN. I certainly agree that additional sources of funding would be very, very good, and having the Federal Government

participate by adding funding would tend to make some of the decisions, such as the ones we have right now, an awful lot easier.

Mr. SARLES. I agree with that.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. I think we have to recognize the uniqueness

of the relationship. This is not Wyoming or—I mean, this is the

Nation’s Capital.

Ms. Jeter, would you say that personnel cuts might have some

impact over time on safety and efficiency and operational issues,

and that those personnel cuts are all about saving money?

Ms. JETER. Yes. Yes, I would. I think that any time you make

not only personnel cuts but severe service cuts you are weakening

your system.

Mr. CONNOLLY. And would you say that all of that is related to

the issue of resources?

Ms. JETER. Yes. And I do agree that there needs to be operating

money.

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Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Bassett, one of the critiques in the past, especially in a series of Washington Post stories, was that your organization sort of lacks teeth, doesn’t really have any binding powers

over the safety operations of Metro, and that almost consistently

Metro has denied you and your colleagues and entities controlled

by you access to the system in a timely fashion whereby you could

detect or report on or make recommendations about potential safety violations. What is your take on that critique?

Mr. BASSETT. I think the FTA administrator did an excellent job

outlining the regulatory framework under which we operate earlier

today and the limitations we face in being able to regulate a rail

transit system, which are very similar to the regulatory limitations

that most other State safety oversight agencies face, so I don’t believe we are unique in that regard.

In regards to WMATA not permitting access to the Tri-State

Oversight Committee’s auditors, that was really an issue that revolved around our ability to access the live right-of-way. We were

attempting to conduct an audit on whether or not the Authority

was complying with its track worker safety protection rules, and

while it was covered in the media, I am happy to note that,

through increased coordination with both the Board of Directors

and WMATA leadership, that issue has been satisfactorily resolved,

and we were, in fact, able to go out, complete the audit, and the

audit was released on our Web page in December noting a number

of issues and deficiencies in terms of gaps between operating practices and what was written in the rule book.

So while I believe it is a very significant concern, I think coordination between our groups has addressed that, and the proof is in

the proverbial pudding of the audit we were able to generate.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you. My time is up.

The gentlelady from the District of Columbia is again recognized

for 5 minutes.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to join you in the notion of operating subsidies, and I want to also note what it took for you to get the rail

line to Dulles. I don’t want anybody to leave the table with raised

expectations. It took us 7 years even to get the thing authorized

over here. We didn’t get the first $150 million, and I am convinced

we wouldn’t have gotten it out if the people hadn’t been killed. So

as much as it is fair, particularly given the utter dependence of the

Federal Government and the way in which Metro is running out

of money, I don’t want anybody to leave this table, go back to their

jurisdictions, and say even the Congress thinks we ought to have

operating subsidies.

I can tell you this, that the entire region does, but most of the

Congress didn’t even think that we should be paying for capital

spending, even after we grounded year after year into their heads

that we were talking about Federal employees.

Look, you have all testified that there should be an independent

TOC. My question was a followup, simply said would that mean—

I am calling it by another name, the Metro safety commission.

Mr. Benjamin, you see the problem is I am dealing with the people who would be regulated. We don’t have anybody at the table

who is truly independent. And in order for there to be a commisVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00137 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63139.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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sion, somebody would have to put in a proposal at the next session

of the legislatures for a commission. And I can tell you one thing:

when we told them to put in a proposal for the States to get their

share to match our $150 million, it even took them some time to

do that. D.C. did it right away. It took Maryland and Virginia 2

or 3 years to do it. And already we have been waiting a full year

after people were killed and, Ms. Jeter is right, after employees

have been killed for 10 years before that.

So I would like to see a Metro commission if we are going to have

one, an independent TOC, call it what you want to, come through

the respective State legislatures this coming legislative season.

Does anyone see any reason why that should not occur? Let me

put it that way, without asking you to have someone regulate you.

Any of you see any reason why that should not occur?

[No response.]

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask you, Mr. Sarles, the lives were lost in

1970’s vintage cars. You only get $150 million per year from the

government. Is all of that money being used to replace those cars

that went up like an accordion, whereas the somewhat later cars

that was behind it, no one was killed? And does that mean that the

entire $150 million per year is going to cars, or when will the cars,

those 1970’s cars, be gone?

Mr. SARLES. First, to answer your question about will the $150

million every year go solely to the cars, the answer to that is no.

In addition to paying for the replacement of the 1,000 series cars,

it will also go to basic state of good repair, tracks, signals, that sort

of thing.

The time it takes—and we are about ready to recommend to the

board very shortly that we award the contract—it takes 3 to 31⁄2

years to get the first cars. That is just the nature of the industry,

because they have to be designed, the pilot cars have to come out,

they have to be thoroughly tested, and then manufacturing starts.

Ms. NORTON. So the cars haven’t even been manufactured that

we are going to buy?

Mr. SARLES. No, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. They are not sitting on the line waiting to come

and we have another 3-year wait on cars that should have been out

of service decades ago.

I do want to say, Ms. Jeter, how much I appreciate what the

Union did. It is the Union that made a common-sense suggestion,

but it is a suggestion that came out of the Union’s experience that

at least those 1970’s cars not be made the caboose and the front

end. And when I asked the NTSB at hearings we had earlier why

they hadn’t made that common-sense suggestion, they replied that,

you know, we try to make suggestions for what is the perfect solution.

The committee that is designing the legislation that is now,

frankly, waiting to go to the floor for Metro system safety throughout the United States has taken what happened with respect to

Metro and we now are requiring the NTSB not to give us, as they

did for 10 years, the most costly suggestions, knowing full well that

WMATA did not have the money, rather than using their expertise

also to give interim suggestions that might have saved lives.

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That is why I respect, Ms. Jeter, the testimony of the Union, because you do know, from everyday experience, what this system

needs. You seem to believe that the WMATA board is a central

part of the problem, but if we were not to have this WMATA board

with all these jurisdictions having a say have you thought about

what kind of system we would replace it with, since after all they

are all putting a lot of money into this system each year?

Ms. JETER. Let me say this: I know that the board, the WMATA

board, is necessary because of the three jurisdictional type of governance that we have. I understand that they are necessary. I

question their role, and the reason why I question their role is simple: we have had probably, what, six or seven general managers

since the deaths began, and it has not stopped. I don’t see a line

item in the budget anywhere that talks to safety or specifically

says that this is for safety. We don’t have any budget line items

there.

And I am frustrated, because where individuals sit and they

come in front of you and they talk about what they want to do and

all the good things that are supposed to happen, when we go back

and we watch it every day it does not happen. I think that board

has a direct responsibility to make sure that occurs, and it has not

happened.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is there anyone else who wishes to address that

question, because the time of the gentlelady has expired.

Mr. SARLES. I would just like to say, with regard to what Jackie

just mentioned, that when we discuss with the board tomorrow the

revised budget, I specifically am putting money in there for safetyrelated issues, both on the operating and capital side.

Mr. ALPERT. Could I also——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Alpert.

Mr. ALPERT. If I may, the Riders Advisory Council doesn’t have

a position about the board governance specifically. My personal

opinion is that I think that, while changes might be useful, I think

that is not really going to get at the heart of the issues. When we

look at, for example, the safety, and speaking to the TOC questions

from earlier that Ms. Norton was making, the board was very surprised to find out that Metro had not permitted the TOC access to

the tracks, and they immediately jumped in and took strong action

to ask the TOC to bring to them any issues that might come up

where Metro would deny them access to something in the future.

I think that sort of reveals two things that troubled me. One is

the sort of general lack of transparency from the Authority in the

past about what is going on within it as far as these issues. Second,

I am a little bit baffled that the TOC sort of went for several

months being stymied and didn’t actually tell the board members

or tell the public, and it wasn’t really until the Washington Post

sort of found it out through FOIA requests that anything happened. I know there may be legal restrictions on what they can do

and that sort of thing, but it would seem that we need the TOC

to at least feel free, if they are feeling like something is really

wrong, to jump up and down and tell the board, the press, their

friends, whatever, you know, there is something wrong here.

Likewise, you know, it was good to hear that Mr. Sarles was

promising to have some metrics that would be revealed to the ridVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 Mar 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\63139.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ers. I think that, from the point of view of the riding public, we still

don’t really know what steps Metro is going to take to fix things.

There is a lot of information that people don’t have about what is

going wrong, and I think that may be why there is some frustration that I perceive from you, as well, that what exactly do we need

to do to fix this, what is the problem here.

I think we need that transparency into information, and I don’t

think the board is necessarily restricting it, except maybe with the

Gunn report issue, which I would like to see public as well, but

generally some board members tell me that they don’t have a lot

of this information either. Sometimes they are frustrated that they

can’t get it.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you.

Mr. Bassett, were you——

Mr. BASSETT. If I could just briefly address the transparency aspect of Mr. Alpert’s comments, it is a significant priority for our executive leadership to ensure that the TOC going forward is transparent and accountable. After the July hearing of last year and Ms.

Norton’s comments, we were able to secure Web site space on the

D.C. DOT Web page. We are now working on establishing an independent Web page that is solely for the TOC so that you won’t have

to go through an agency Web page.

I think it has been a significant improvement over the last few

months that we have been able to coordinate so closely both with

our executive leadership at our home agencies, as well as with the

board and the WMATA executive team.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. And I thank the gentlelady.

I want to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses.

Without objection, the record shall be left open for 7 days so that

Members may submit information for the record.

Without objection, I will enter this binder of hearing documents

into the committee record.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statements of Hon. Mike Quigley and Hon. Gerald

E. Connolly, and additional information submitted for the hearing

record follow:]

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