DNN Sentinel

in this issue:

Vol. I, No. 3

 defense by other means

u.s. department of energy (doe)

national nuclear security administration (nnsa)

defense nuclear nonproliferation (dnn) National Nuclear Security Administration 

3 Jamaica SLOWPOKE 

Reactor Conversion 

4 Integrating Cyber 

Analysis and Nuclear 

Security

5 Radiation Detection 

System Commissioned 

in Romania

6 Administrator Leads 

NNSA Team at CTBT 

SnT15 Conference

7 Innovation: Developing a 

New Fuel 

8 LANL Scientist 

Recognized for 

Innovations

9 U.S., China, IAEA 

Advance International 

HEU Minimization 

10 DNN Expert Profile: 

Meet the NGFP Class 

of 2015

12 Field Test of Automated 

System

13 Y-12 Hosts Japanese 

Delegation

14 Country Profile: Vietnam

16 FAQs: 123 Agreements 

for Peaceful Cooperation

ENERGY

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

South China Sea

THAILAND

LAOS

CAMBODIA

CHINA

VIETNAM

From the Deputy 

Administrator

As the last issue of the Sentinel went to press, the 

P5+1 and the Islamic Republic of Iran had just signed 

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Since then, we have 

marked Adoption Day, which occurred on October 18th, and are now 

focused on the actions necessary to be able to reach Implementation 

Day. As Secretary Moniz noted, “Adoption Day marks an important 

milestone in ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful in 

nature.” (http://energy.gov/articles/statement-secretary-moniz-adoptionday-joint-comprehensive-plan-action) 

The Department of Energy’s nuclear experts at our national labs and 

beyond will lead the U.S. effort to work with our P5+1 partners and Iran 

to modernize the Arak reactor, eliminating a potential source of weaponsgrade material. This is a key nonproliferation component of the agreement, which requires that Iran remove the current reactor core and fill it 

with concrete so it can never be used again in its current configuration. 

The redesign specified in the JCPOA will allow effective peaceful uses but 

not rapid accumulation of plutonium suitable for weapons and requires 

that the plutonium-bearing spent fuel be sent outside Iran, greatly complicating any Iranian attempts to make nuclear weapons from plutonium. 

The United States has substantial technical expertise and experience 

with reactor conversion, which we have used to reduce the use of highly 

enriched uranium in research reactors worldwide. As such, we expect 

to work closely with China and Iran on modernizing the reactor. (Joint 

statement of intent: http://energy.gov/articles/joint-statement-intentconcerning-arak-heavy-water-reactor-research-reactor-modernization)

Implementation Day is the next milestone on the JCPOA horizon and 

could come within the next 6 months if Iran fulfills all of its requirements 

and the IAEA is able to put the necessary transparency measures into 
2

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

DNN SENTINEL: 

DEFENSE BY OTHER MEANS

VOL. I, NO. 3

http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/

ourprograms/nonproliferation-0

Editor-in-Chief

Anne Harrington

Editorial Board

Sid Bartlett

Andrew Brown

Jaci Dickerson

Thomas Gray

Erika Hunsicker

Michelle Livingston

Sarah Norris

John Wengle

Meghan Wool

Editorial Advisors

Corey Hinderstein

Andrew Hood

Editor

Elaine Specht

Graphics 

Mike Crew

Sarah Kaukeinen

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Follow the links below to learn more about recent NNSA and DNN activities.

Press Releases

NNSA Recovers Radiological Material from Mexico

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/mexico-rad-recovery

United States and the Republic of Korea Sign Agreement for Civil Nuclear 

Cooperation 

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/rok-123

Blogs

NNSA Releases 2015 Enterprise Strategic Vision

http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa-releases-2015-enterprise-strategic-vision 

DOE/NNSA Visits Mumbai in Support of India’s Global Center for Nuclear 

Energy Partnership

http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/doennsa-visits-mumbai-supportindia%E2%80%99s-global-center-nuclear-energy-partnership

NNSA Contributions to Nonproliferation and Arms Control Highlighted at 

Generation Prague 2015 Conference

http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa-contributions-nonproliferation-and-armscontrol-highlighted-generation-prague-2015

 National Nuclear Security Administration 

DNN Welcomes You to Our New Home

DNN celebrated the opening of our new location with a ribbon cutting ceremony on 

July 29, 2015. Pictured from left are DNN Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator 

David Huizenga, DOE Under Secretary for 

Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator 

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Frank Klotz, DNN Deputy 

Administrator Anne Harrington, and NNSA 

Principal Deputy Administrator Madelyn 

Creedon. The DNN offices are located at 

Portals III, 1201 Maryland Ave., 7th floor, S.W., 

Washington, DC 20024.

Ken Shipp/DOE Photo

place. We will keep you updated as we further define DOE’s role in the implementation 

of the JCPOA. 

Anne Harrington

Deputy Administrator

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Letter from the Deputy Administrator – Continued
3

Jamaica SLOWPOKE Reactor Conversion and 

HEU Removal

By Jessica Jagmin Brookins

F

ollowing several years of international 

cooperation, Jamaica’s “Safe Low-Power 

Kritical Experiment” (SLOWPOKE) research 

reactor has been successfully converted from 

using highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low 

enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and the HEU has 

been returned to the United States. This makes 

the Caribbean region now completely free of 

HEU. 

In 1984, the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), Canada, Jamaica, and the 

United States arranged to provide nearly 1 

kilogram of U.S.-origin HEU to fuel a newly built, 

Canadian designed, SLOWPOKE reactor at 

the International Center for Environmental and 

Nuclear Sciences (ICENS) at the University of 

West Indies in Kingston, Jamaica. The 32-year-old research 

reactor is used for neutron activation analysis, a method for 

determining which chemical elements comprise a material 

by bombarding the material with neutrons. This research 

has informed environmental, agricultural, and health related 

studies, as well as mineral exploration, and has contributed 

to increased food safety, food security, and water and air 

quality in Jamaica. 

To ensure that this important research continues while 

minimizing the security risk posed by the presence of 

weapon-grade HEU, DNN’s Office of Material Management 

and Minimization (M3) Conversion and Removal programs 

worked in tandem to convert the reactor to operate on 

LEU fuel and return the HEU core to the United States in 

September 2015. 

Although the Conversion and Removal programs frequently 

collaborate at the same facilities, it is rare for a conversion 

and removal to occur so close in time. Due to the radioactivity of the used fuel, it is often necessary to allow the material 

to “cool” so that it can be safely handled and transported. 

However, due to the SLOWPOKE HEU’s limited radioactivity, 

the fuel was transported shortly after its removal from the 

reactor.

The École Polytechnique SLOWPOKE reactor in Montreal, 

which completed its conversion to LEU fuel in 1997, served 

as a model for the project. Canada Nuclear Laboratories 

(formerly Atomic Energy of Canada Limited) fabricated the 

LEU fuel under a contract with the Y-12 National Security 

Complex and also granted a one-time-use license for the 

intellectual property rights to replicate the unique tools 

needed to safely remove the HEU and insert the LEU core. 

Conversion of the core to LEU not only will maintain the 

same capabilities as the HEU core, but also will allow for 

longer full-power operation cycles and will have an overall 

longer lifetime than the HEU core. The core conversion is 

expected to permit reactor operations for another 30 to 40 

years. 

The conversion of the ICENS SLOWPOKE reactor marks 

the 94th conversion or shutdown as part of M3’s Conversion 

program. To date, M3 has removed or confirmed the disposition of 5,366 kilograms of HEU, permanently eliminating the 

threat of this material being used in a weapon. 

Read the NNSA press release to learn more about the 

SLOWPOKE reactor conversion and HEU removal from 

Jamaica: http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/

nnsa-removes-u.s.-origin-heu-jamaica-makes-caribbean-heu-free.

Jessica Jagmin Brookins is a Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow in M3

currently supporting HEU and plutonium removal projects in Asia. 

Ms. Jagmin Brookins holds a Master of Science in Foreign Service 

degree from Georgetown University.

Jamaica’s SLOWPOKE reactor achieved first criticality with the LEU fuel on 

September 30, 2015.
4

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Integrating Cyber Analysis and Nuclear Security

By Charles Nickerson

I

n the late 1990s, the city government of Lodz, Poland, 

initiated upgrades to its public tram system by installing 

a digital-based automatic control system. Each tram 

vehicle was outfitted with an infrared transmitter that 

communicated with control boxes located throughout the 

public transportation system. Ten years later, a 14-year-old 

train enthusiast noticed similarities between the operational 

parameters of the tram’s infrared network and his 

television universal remote controller. After a few months 

of study and tweaking, he had developed a device that 

could match the amplitude and frequency of the emitters 

onboard the tram and establish a connection into the tram 

network. He successfully turned the city’s rail lines into his 

personal train set, resulting in four derailments. Fortunately, 

there were no major injuries. 

Digital technologies have greatly improved workforce 

productivity, accuracy, and reduced costs in every industrial 

sector—including the nuclear industry. Governments, 

companies, and individuals have adopted and deployed 

complex software and hardware solutions to maximize 

these digital benefits. However, these same solutions have 

spawned new vulnerabilities to the very systems that were 

designed to increase workforce efficiency and prevent 

proliferation. Cyberspace is a contested environment and 

the threat trend line is sloping ever higher toward more 

frequent and sophisticated attacks that attempt to inflict 

damage to our operations. 

NNSA actively works with domestic and international 

partners to ensure that cyber considerations and 

cyber protection measures are a part of a robust and 

comprehensive nuclear security regime. In June 2015, a 

team of federal and laboratory staff from NNSA led by DNN 

Deputy Administrator Anne Harrington were key contributors 

and participants in a conference hosted by the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): “Computer Security in a 

Nuclear World: Expert Discussion and Exchange.” The 

conference focused on current challenges that Member 

States and individual facilities have in protecting assets from 

cyber-enabled adversaries. 

Demonstrating the timeliness of this issue, the conference 

was attended by more than 800 participants and nearly 100 

individual member states. The conference was opened by 

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano, who stressed that 

industries outside the nuclear world are experiencing a 

shift in adversarial tactics that combine traditional theft and 

sabotage methods with cyber capabilities. 

The consistent message from all Member States during 

the conference was that the cyber threat is an emerging 

capability within the existing design basis threat and that the 

instances of cyber attacks that produce a physical event in 

the nuclear industry will increase. Ms. Harrington concluded 

her plenary session remarks by stating, “The nuclear industry 

must respond to this security challenge by increasing 

resources and analysis to integrate the cyber discipline 

into our traditional nuclear security and nonproliferation 

programs.” Following the plenary session opening remarks, 

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano highlighted that “great 

strides in establishing improved designs and security measures to 

protect nuclear and radiological assets have been made. However, 

the adversary is adapting tactics and we must respond.”
5

an international 

team led by NNSA 

personnel initiated 

the conference’s 

technical 

discussions by 

demonstrating how 

an adversary could 

negatively impact 

nuclear power plant 

operations through 

cyber vulnerabilities. 

The demonstration 

scenario showed an 

adversary inserting 

code to manipulate 

the data used in a 

physical protection 

system and enable 

access to critical infrastructure areas. The demonstration 

served as the foundation from which technical experts 

discussed vulnerabilities and mitigation techniques for the 

remainder of the week. 

Member States gave their unanimous support to the key 

conference finding that nuclear security must include cyber 

considerations; they are interconnected. Successful nuclear 

security programs and regimes are holistic in approach by 

analyzing material control, physical protection, safeguards, 

and other disciplines as an array within a single system. To 

be successful against today’s adversary, the cyber discipline 

must be seamlessly integrated into the overall security 

program.

Charles Nickerson currently is overseeing the technical aspects 

of the Cyber Support Team, which works to enhance the security 

surrounding the critical digital assets that support DNN’s nuclear 

nonproliferation efforts. He has developed security solutions and 

risk mitigation measures for nuclear and other supervisory control 

and data acquisition (SCADA) national security targets since 2003. 

Radiation Detection System Commissioned in Romania

The radiation detection system at the Henri Coanda 

International Airport near Bucharest was commissioned in 

a ceremony July 22, 2015, led by U.S. Embassy Chargé 

d’Affaires Duane Butcher, Romanian Minister of Internal 

Affairs Gabriel Oprea, and other senior officials. The system 

is the latest result of the partnership of DOE/NNSA and the 

Romanian government to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear 

and other radioactive material in Romania. DNN’s Nuclear 

Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program has worked 

together with Romania’s General Inspectorate of Border 

Police to deploy multiple radiation detection systems that 

have scanned more than ten million vehicles, pedestrians, 

and shipping containers since 2010. Cooperation also has 

included joint trainings, practical exercises, and sustainability 

initiatives. 

Read the NNSA press release to learn more about the 

radiation detection system installed near Bucharest: 

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/

nnsa-romania-launch-radiation-detection-system. 

Deputy Administrator Anne Harrington 

stated, “Costly, high profile security 

breaches against major energy and 

corporate infrastructures, such as the 

2012 attack against Saudi Aramco that 

deleted data from three-quarters of 

the company’s computers or the more 

recent attack against Korea Hydro and 

Nuclear Power, have demonstrated 

the seriousness and pervasiveness 

of the threat to everyone from facility 

operators to heads of State.”

Integrating Cyber Analysis and Nuclear Security – Continued

An international team led by NNSA personnel demonstrated how a 

cyber-enabled adversary could carry out traditional sabotage and 

theft scenarios.
6

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Administrator Leads NNSA Team at CTBT 

Science & Technology Conference

By Tim Evans 

DOE Under Secretary for 

Nuclear Security and NNSA 

Administrator Lt. Gen. (Ret.) 

Frank Klotz was a featured speaker on 

June 22, 2015, in Vienna, Austria at the 

fifth Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban 

Treaty (CTBT) Science & Technology 

Conference (SnT15), during which 

over 1100 participants met to further 

enhance the strong relationship 

between the scientific and technological 

community and the Preparatory 

Commission for the CTBT Organization 

(CTBTO). Lt. Gen. Klotz’s remarks 

focused on multilateral collaboration on 

nuclear explosion test monitoring and 

NNSA’s extensive collaboration with 

the CTBTO Preparatory Commission 

in all aspects of the international 

monitoring and verification regime. Over 

40 NNSA experts from 6 DOE National 

Laboratories (Los Alamos, Lawrence 

Livermore, Sandia, Pacific Northwest, 

Oak Ridge, and Idaho) and NNSA 

Headquarters attended SnT15 and 

presented on a wide range of topics, 

showing the depth of NNSA support for 

the CTBT effort.

While in Vienna, Lt. Gen. Klotz also 

met with CTBTO Executive Secretary 

Lassina Zerbo and the Directors for the 

International Monitoring System (IMS), 

International Data Centre (IDC), and OnSite Inspection (OSI) Divisions; toured 

the IDC; and viewed radionuclide 

equipment at the Vienna International 

Centre. NNSA will continue to support 

the CTBT and contribute to the improvement of the CTBTO’s 

nuclear explosion monitoring and verification capabilities. 

Tim Evans is the Nuclear Testing Limitations Program Manager 

in DNN’s Office of Nuclear Verification within the Office of 

Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC). He has been with DOE 

for 24 years, with the past six in NPAC, managing NNSA’s support 

for CTBT activities.

DOE Under Secretary and NNSA 

Administrator Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Frank 

Klotz addressing a session at SnT15, 

discussing NNSA’s support for multilateral 

collaboration on nuclear explosive test 

monitoring and verification. His remarks 

included the offer to “facilitate making 

[NNSA’s] Nevada National Security Site 

available to future classes of OSI inspectors 

in order to enrich their training and 

experience.”

Walt Dekin of Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory (left, with IDC Director Randy 

Bell, formerly of NNSA) won the Best Oral 

Presentation Award for “Understanding the 

Challenges of OSI Drilling to Safely Recover 

Relevant Radiological Samples from an 

Underground Nuclear Explosion.” Mr. 

Dekin has extensive underground nuclear 

explosion monitoring experience and was 

a key Inspection Team leader at the 2014 

large-scale OSI Integrated Field Exercise. 

DOE Under Secretary and NNSA Administrator Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Frank Klotz and Assistant 

Secretary of State Frank Rose hear about capabilities of the CTBTO International 

Monitoring System at the International Data Centre in Vienna, Austria. Photo by Wolfgang Picot, UNVIE Photo provided by CTBTO Photo provided by CTBTO

See related Tweets at 

https://twitter.com/FrankKlotzNNSA/status/613374744021323778

https://twitter.com/ctbto_alerts/status/613242059634380805
7

innovation: Developing a New Fuel to Enable 

Research Reactor Conversion 

By Michael Itamura and Kristen Peters

T

he conversion of research reactors from highly 

enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium 

(LEU) fuel is a cornerstone of the United States’ HEU 

minimization policy. Conversion achieves permanent threat 

reduction by decreasing the demand for HEU in civilian 

applications. The Reactor Conversion Program in DNN’s 

Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) has 

successfully converted or verified the shutdown of 94 civilian 

HEU facilities worldwide. These facilities, most of which 

are standard research and test reactors, converted using 

existing LEU fuels developed in the 1980s and prior. 

Many of the remaining HEU reactors around the world, 

however, require first-of-their-kind high density LEU fuels 

to be able to perform their scientific missions. In the United 

States, there are six so-called “high-performance research 

reactors” remaining, and the M3 Reactor Conversion 

Program is working to develop a special high-density LEU 

fuel and associated commercial fabrication capability to 

convert these six reactors so they will be able to perform at 

a level equivalent to their current HEU performance without 

changing the geometry of the reactor core. The Europeans 

and Russians also are developing and testing new highdensity fuels that will allow for the conversion of their HEU 

high performance research reactors. 

The M3 Reactor Conversion Program is leading a team of 

nine national laboratories and plants as well as industry 

participants to develop the new high-density fuel, establish 

a commercial-scale fabrication capability, and perform all 

the analyses needed to successfully convert the reactors 

using the new fuel. In order to meet reactor performance 

requirements, the new fuel needs to have upwards of 50 

times the amount of uranium-238, compared to the current 

HEU fuel, to reduce the overall enrichment to 19.75%. 

As a result, the overall uranium density in the fuel needs 

to increase by a factor of five. One of the main technical 

challenges in developing this type of high-density fuel is 

fitting all of the additional uranium into the same volume 

and shape of the existing fuel elements. This fuel design 

also requires a new fabrication technology because it is 

manufactured using a single piece of enriched uranium metal 

(known as monolithic fuel meat) versus existing processes 

that use a powder compact. 

Because highperformance research 

reactors use much 

more HEU on an 

annual basis than 

standard research 

reactors, the HEU 

minimization benefits 

of converting 

reactors using new 

high-density fuels will 

be even greater than 

in the previous conversions. In fact, the conversion of the 

remaining high performance research reactors around the 

world will reduce the HEU in global civilian use and transit 

by almost 1⁄2 a metric ton annually—a huge threat reduction 

impact. 

The M3 Reactor Conversion Program has concluded over 

a dozen irradiation tests of this new high-density fuel and 

has confirmed that the fuel can operate safely in a variety 

of conditions. The next step of the program, currently 

underway, is to manufacture mini-plates that will undergo 

irradiation testing at the Advanced Test Reactor at the Idaho 

National Laboratory between 2017 and 2019 to evaluate 

multiple fuel fabrication concepts for the new high-density 

LEU fuel while also gathering additional irradiation data for 

the fuel qualification report that will be submitted to the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Once the mini-plate tests 

and post-irradiation examination are completed, the M3

Reactor Conversion Program will select a final fuel fabrication 

method. Using the selected fabrication method, several 

full-sized plate, element, tests, and demonstration tests will 

take place before the first U.S. high-performance research 

reactor is converted in 2025.

Michael Itamura is a contractor at Sandia National Laboratories 

currently assigned to M3. He has supported the radiological security 

and reactor conversion programs of DNN since 2007. Dr. Itamura 

holds a B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in Mechanical Engineering 

from the University of California, Berkeley.

Kristen Peters is a former National Graduate Fellowship Program 

participant assigned to the M3 Reactor Conversion Program. She 

holds her B.A. from Barnard College, Columbia University in Political 

Science and her Masters in Emergency and Disaster Management 

from Georgetown University.

Example of a high-density LEU fuel 

being rolled.
8

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

By Meghan Wool

Dr. Eric Dors from Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL) was one of nine recent recipients of the 

2014 E.O. Lawrence Award for his work in national 

security and nonproliferation, research that was funded 

through DNN’s Office of Research and Development. The 

award recognized Dr. Dors for his technical leadership of the 

Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System (SABRS), 

the next generation in satellite-based nuclear explosion 

sensing and detection. The system plays an essential role 

in fulfilling DOE’s nonproliferation mission to monitor global 

nuclear detonations in support of the Limited Test Ban Treaty 

(LTBT). In order to improve upon previous generations of 

similar technology, the LANL team under Dr. Dors’ direction 

reduced the weight, size, and complexity of the system, 

simplifying integration of SABRS onto host satellites. Their 

novel approach involved rethinking the entire layout and 

configuration of the system. 

Dr. Dors acknowledges a number of factors that contributed 

to his personal success. While attending graduate school 

on a fellowship from NASA, he learned about preparing 

research proposals and project management. Then, early 

in his career, he was given a lot of responsibility, which 

provided him the opportunity to learn, make decisions, 

and grow. Dors expressed concern over the trend toward 

students more narrowly specializing in their fields while 

foregoing the type of “big picture” training that has helped 

his career. He feels graduate students should be in more 

holistic programs that develop their program management 

skills. “We need to find a way to give students a wider and 

larger perspective on how R&D is done and what it takes to 

pull all the different pieces together,” he explains. 

Dr. Dors has a deep commitment to developing the next 

generation of scientists and technical team members 

through training, coaching, and mentoring. As he explained, 

it takes years to “get people trained to do the things you 

need them to do. It’s also very important for continuity of 

knowledge that there is no gap between the younger and 

the older generations so that the knowledge is passed 

along.” Dr. Dors himself is part of that “continuity of knowledge” having had the opportunity to meet his predecessors 

who worked on legacy systems starting in the 1960s. He 

has great respect for the scientists who came before him, 

marveling at what they were able to accomplish without the 

advanced computing powers of today.

Looking to the future, Dr. Dors predicts a variety of 

challenges—the presence of more objects in space, new 

enemies, cyber threats, and budget constraints—will impact 

the development of new satellite detection and monitoring 

systems. Despite the challenges, however, the need to 

miniaturize and field these technologies will continue to grow.

Learn about all the exceptional U.S. scientists and 

engineers presented with an E.O. Lawrence Award awarded 

in May 2015: http://science.energy.gov/lawrence/

award-laureates/2010s/2014-ceremony/. 

Meghan Wool is a Leidos contractor supporting DNN’s Office of 

Research & Development.

Energy Secretary Dr. Ernest Moniz presented the E.O. Lawrence 

Award to Dr. Eric Dors at a ceremony held at DOE Headquarters in 

May 2015.

LANL Scientist Recognized for Innovations in 

Sensing Nuclear Explosions from Space

The E.O. Lawrence Award was established in 1959 

to honor the memory of Dr. Ernest Orlando Lawrence, 

a 1939 Nobel Laureate in physics. Dr. Lawrence 

played a leading role in establishing the U.S. system of 

national laboratories. The award recognizes midcareer scientists and engineers in the United States 

who have advanced new research and scientific 

discovery. Learn more about E.O. Lawrence—the 

man and the award—at http://science.energy.gov/

lawrence/. 
9

U.S., China, and IAEA 

Advance International 

HEU Minimization Efforts 

By Brian Waud

I

n December 2015, a new low enriched uranium (LEU) 

core will be inserted into the Chinese Miniature Neutron 

Source Reactor (MNSR) at the Chinese Institute of Atomic 

Energy (CIAE), the final step in converting the reactor to LEU 

fuel. The conversion follows the discharge of the reactor’s 

93% highly enriched uranium (HEU) core and the receipt of 

an LEU operating license in September 2015. This MNSR 

will be the first converted through a joint effort of the United 

States, China, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA).

A number of Chinese designed MNSRs have been built 

around the world, including four in China (although only two 

in China are still operating) and one each in Ghana, Iran, 

Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria. They are low-power (~30 kW) 

neutron source research reactors used primarily for neutron 

activation analysis (an analytical technique used for both 

qualitative and quantitative analysis of major, minor, trace, 

and rare elements), as well as for education and training. 

These reactors have cores consisting of less than 1 kilogram 

of HEU, enriched to 90% uranium-235 or greater.

Since 1978, various national and international activities have 

been underway to convert research and test reactors from 

the use of HEU fuel to LEU fuel. The MNSR community 

joined this international effort by establishing an IAEA 

Coordinated Research Project (CRP) in 2005 to harmonize 

various activities related to the conversion of MNSRs to LEU 

fuel. This first conversion in China serves as a test case for 

the remaining reactors; the MNSRs in Ghana, Nigeria, and 

Syria are already in various stages of conversion planning.

Through Argonne National Laboratory, the United States 

participated in the CRP by providing input to a generic 

conversion analysis, which will serve as the safety basis for 

future MNSR conversions. The CRP participants established 

that China, or other fuel fabricators, will be able to produce 

LEU cores for the MNSR reactors and that conversion of 

the MNSRs is feasible. The IAEA expects to publish the 

findings of the CRP in 2015 as a Technical Report entitled 

“Best Practice Analyses Supporting Conversion of Research 

Reactors from Highly Enriched Uranium Fuel to Low 

Enriched Uranium Fuel: The Case of Miniature Neutron 

Source Reactors.” 

In 2008, CIAE, DOE/NNSA, and the IAEA agreed to build a 

zero power test facility (ZPTF) at CIAE to demonstrate the 

technology for implementing MNSR conversions. Testing 

the LEU fuel in the ZPTF successfully demonstrated that 

the fabricated LEU fuel meets the reactivity requirements 

of the MNSR facility without loss of performance capability. 

In fact, the LEU fuel may even provide some performance 

enhancements. 

In addition to participating in the IAEA’s CRP and supporting construction of the ZPTF, DNN’s Office of Material 

Management and Minimization (M3) provided technical and 

financial support to China to assist with the conversion of the 

CIAE prototype MNSR. M3 helped by validating calculations 

and analysis used in the request for an operating license 

from the regulatory body, procuring the LEU core and 

testing it in the ZPTF, and procuring equipment necessary to 

remove HEU and insert LEU fuel. 

The first successful MNSR conversion provides a baseline 

for the conversion of the remaining MNSRs. The LEU cores 

will be tested by China using the ZPTF to ensure that the 

design parameters and requirements are satisfactorily met. 

The next MNSR conversion, in Ghana, is planned to occur 

in 2016 and work is underway for additional MNSR conversions beyond that. 

Brian Waud is the Project Manager for International Reactor 

Conversions in M3. He has worked in varying nonproliferation roles 

at DOE since 2002, including serving five years at the IAEA as a 

Nuclear Security Officer. 

Testing of the LEU core in the ZPTF at 

the CIAE.

LEU core inserted 

into the Chinese 

MNSR at the CIAE.
10

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

DNN Expert Profile: Meet the NGFP Class of 2015

By Cornelia Brim and Maren Disney

After their first month on the job, several Fellows of 

the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) 

assigned to DNN met with us to share their stories. 

Why nonproliferation?

When asked what attracted them to nonproliferation work, 

Fellows cited a range of interests, from intellectual and 

science challenges to philosophical questions.

Tom Gray, who works in DNN’s Front Office, spent 7 years 

in the U.S. Navy, some aboard a ballistic missile submarine, 

before coming to NGFP. “When I left the Navy, I wanted to 

experience the ‘other’ side of the issue [of nonproliferation] 

and I earned a master’s degree in nonproliferation and 

terrorism studies,” he said.

Kaitlin Oujo told us, “In contrast to work in other fields I’ve 

worked in (conflict resolution), nonproliferation takes a long 

view, staff members think about issues over the long-term. 

Where do we want to be in the next 10, 20, or 50 years? In 

other [U.S. Government-related] work I’ve done in the Middle 

East, staff members were responding to crises—elections in 

Egypt and ISIS gaining prominence—versus strategizing for 

the long-term.” Oujo is assigned to DNN’s Office of Global 

Material Security (GMS) in the Nuclear Smuggling Detection 

and Deterrence Program.

As an undergraduate student studying medical physics, 

Jessica Paul (now a PhD) was not aware of nonproliferation 

until she took a class that piqued her interest in nuclear 

engineering. She said, “Nonproliferation presents an 

opportunity to do important, impactful work.” She thanks her 

insightful professors at the University of Florida and Georgia 

Tech for steering her into this field. Paul is assigned to DNN’s 

Office of Research and Development (DNN R&D).

Some Fellows came into the field with first-hand experience 

with the challenges countries face in controlling their borders 

and maintaining a stable government.

“I’ve previously looked at nonproliferation through a China 

lens. When I worked for the U.S. Department of Energy 

(NNSA and the Office of Nuclear Energy) within the U.S. 

Embassy in Beijing, a mentor suggested I apply for the 

NGFP Fellowship,” Jason Portner recalls. Portner is assigned 

to the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC).

The NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program is a full-time, 

salaried fellowship program that places graduate-level 

students interested in nuclear security careers in 

offices across NNSA. In June 2015, 15 Fellows joined 

DNN for one year. Read more about the program in 

the DNN Sentinel, Volume I, No. 2, page 10. 

Of the NGFP Fellows currently assigned to DNN programs, 4 hold PhDs, and 11 hold masters degrees. 

Their expertise spans disciplines from science and 

engineering to nonproliferation, foreign policy, and 

international economics—and many have a “hybrid” 

background, meaning a mix of both technical and 

policy education. The Fellows are also world travelers, 

many of them having spent time studying or working 

in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, China, and Asia. 

Collectively, they are proficient in several foreign 

languages, including Arabic, Mandarin Chinese, 

French, German, Japanese, Russian, and Spanish.

Part of the NGFP orientation at Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory is a course in Social Styles, where participants explore 

how one’s style—Driver, Expressive, Amiable, Analytic—can affect 

professional working relationships. (Clockwise) Andrew Cartas 

(upper left), Bonnie Canion, Chris McGuire, Ty Otto, Temica Stewart, 

and Dana Jesperson discuss style preferences and expectations.
11

DNN Expert Profile – Continued

For others, nonproliferation was a natural complement to 

academic studies in physics and nuclear engineering—and 

it was simply interesting. As Robert (Ty) Otto quipped, 

“What could be cooler than taking on the threat of 

nuclear destruction?” He is assigned to NPAC’s Office of 

International Nuclear Safeguards.

What did you do during your first month at DNN?

While every Fellow’s assignment is different, all agree 

that their first month was spent learning the lay of the 

nonproliferation landscape through reading and research, 

attending meetings, and becoming acquainted with 

coworkers. 

Andrew Cartas, PhD, joked about receiving his “body 

weight in material to read.” During his first month on 

the job, Cartas completed the “Issues in Missiles and 

Nuclear Nonproliferation” course at the James Martin 

Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Speakers included 

Tom Countryman, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for 

International Security and Nonproliferation, who had just 

come back from Vienna and discussed negotiations with 

Iran for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. “It was nice 

to have a behind-the-scenes perspective,” Cartas said. He 

is assigned to DNN’s Office of Materials Management and 

Minimization.

Bonnie Canion, who works for DNN R&D, said, “I had 

the opportunity to attend the conference, ‘Generation 

Prague 2015: Bridging Divides, Defining the Future,’ which 

happened to start right after the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action in mid-July. Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of 

State for Political Affairs and [lead U.S.] negotiator of the Iran 

deal, spoke to us and got a standing ovation.”

Within GMS, Sarah Norris is helping with preparations for 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General 

Conference in September and for the Nuclear Security 

Summit in 2016. 

Lance Garrison, PhD, supporting DNN R&D, is reviewing 

the entire portfolio and writing concise summaries of the 

research and development projects being performed. 

Garrison also attended the Generation Prague conference 

and is now acting as the “eyes and ears” of his office at a 

number of other conferences and meetings.

Tracey-Ann Wellington, PhD, who is assigned to NPAC’s 

Office of Nuclear Export Controls said, “I’ve been working 

on understanding export licensing with a focus on missile 

technology.” Wellington explained that her assignments have 

helped expose her to what the different DNN offices do and 

how they are engaged with each other. 

Ben Briese, who is working in the GMS Nuclear Smuggling 

Detection and Deterrence Program, said, “I’m splitting my 

time between the implementation side and the sustainability 

side. For implementation, I’ve been working with country 

manager, Jared Carter (former NGFP Fellow, class of 2012). 

I support him on his work in Belarus, Moldova, and Croatia. 

I’ll be traveling with him to Belarus supporting stakeholder 

meetings where we’re reviewing the designs for a new set of 

radiation portal monitors we’ll be installing there.”

Most interesting task (so far) at DNN?

Only a month into their year-long assignments, Fellows had 

already begun their hands-on work, calling up their existing 

talents and strengths while acquiring new knowledge and 

experiencing nonproliferation work from a new perspective.

Elizabeth Lostracco, who works in the GMS Radiological 

Security Program, shared, “I did not know anything about 

isotopes, so learning about [isotopes and] non-isotopic 

alternate technologies is really fascinating. I love the mental 

challenge.” 

Cartas was asked to give his technical opinion on a highly 

debated paper on the validity of Russian means of plutonium 

disposal—with a 24-hour turnaround. Cartas said, “I was 

exposed to some of the elements in my background but 

I was forced to look at other research to make sure I was 

accurate. I could not speak off-the-cuff.” Cartas delivered 

on the assignment and noted that it was an interesting 

opportunity to explore other points of view. 

Cornelia Brim and Maren Disney are communications specialists at 

PNNL.

Read More

To see the full list of Fellows assigned to DNN and 

answers to more questions, read the DNN Sentinel, 

Vol. I, No. 3, Addendum online at http://nnsa.energy.

gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation-0. 
12

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

UCVS field prototype in action at the Westinghouse fuel 

fabrication facility in South Carolina.

Why Automate Cylinder Measurements?

The ability of gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants 

(GCEPs) to change the isotopic concentration of 

uranium (i.e., enrichment levels) is a sensitive process 

and creates a proliferation concern. In recent years, 

the IAEA has pursued innovative techniques and an 

integrated suite of measures to verify that nuclear 

material at GCEPs is safeguarded at all stages in the 

process, including the cylinders used to store and 

transport uranium hexafluoride. 

The IAEA’s current methods for verifying the contents 

of these cylinders are time-consuming and laborintensive. Since human and financial resources 

preclude continuous inspector presence at GCEPs, 

one set of improvements being explored is employing permanently installed, unattended instruments 

capable of performing routine and repetitive measurements that were previously performed by inspectors. 

By automating safeguards data collection, IAEA 

inspectors could focus scarce time and resources on 

detecting indications of undeclared activity.

Field Test of Automated System for the Verification 

of Uranium Cylinders

By Anagha Iyengar

DNN’s Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control 

(NPAC) has joined forces with several national 

laboratories, the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA), and Westinghouse to develop and evaluate a 

prototype system intended to improve nuclear safeguards 

at the front end of the fuel cycle. An Unattended Cylinder 

Verification Station (UCVS) would provide automated, 

independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 

uranium-235 mass, and total uranium mass in cylinders 

used to store and transport uranium hexafluoride within 

and between nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment 

plants and fuel fabrication plants. 

In April 2015, a UCVS prototype designed to preliminary 

requirements provided by the IAEA was installed at the 

Westinghouse nuclear fuel fabrication facility in Columbia, 

South Carolina. The UCVS prototype operates in an unattended fashion with operator involvement limited to placing 

a cylinder and waiting for the scan timer to elapse. The 

installation marked the beginning of long-term field testing of 

the integrated system that will include the assay of several 

hundred cylinders and a series of special scan sequences 

designed to address specific technical questions posed by 

the IAEA and others. Central to the field trial is a comparative 

evaluation of two candidate nondestructive assay methods, 

both of which were developed under NPAC and could 

improve the IAEA’s ability to more fully and accurately 

measure the material in the cylinders.

NPAC’s Office of International Nuclear Safeguards sponsored development of the UCVS field prototype in response 

to a request from the IAEA to the U.S. Support Program to 

IAEA Safeguards and the European Commission Support 

Program. The U.S. project team includes Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory (PNNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and 

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL).

In June 2015, representatives from DOE/NNSA, the IAEA, 

Euratom, several National Laboratories, and Westinghouse 

gathered at the fuel fabrication facility to assess the status of 

the field trial and accompanying analysis. For representatives 

from the IAEA and Euratom, the meeting provided the first 

opportunity to see the UCVS prototype in action and to 

hear feedback about the instrument from a facility operator. 

Analysis of the data is being performed offline by experts 

from PNNL, LANL, and ORNL. Preliminary findings were 

reported to the IAEA and Euratom in late September, and 

feedback from stakeholders will guide the final stage of the 

field trial and data analysis, expected to culminate in early 

2016.
Y-12 Hosts Japanese Delegation

The Y-12 National Security Complex recently hosted members of a U.S.–Japanese bilateral Nuclear Security Working 

Group (NSWG), which was established at the 2010 Nuclear 

Security Summit. The NSWG meets regularly at nuclear 

sites in Japan and the United States to share technology 

and methodologies that help secure our facilities, our nation, 

and the world. Y-12 offers its expertise in areas ranging from 

securing highly enriched uranium to training on safeguarding 

nuclear materials. The goal is to improve nuclear security 

practices worldwide. 

Members of the Japanese delegation, led by Takashi Hatori (center), receive a briefing at 

the Alarm Response Training (ART) facility. ART courses prepare emergency responders for 

nuclear and radiological incidents.

At the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, Hatori is shown how to operate a uranium 

canister handling system.

Laura Holgate, leader of the U.S. delegation 

and National Security Council Senior 

Director for Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Terrorism and Threat Reduction, visits 

Y-12. “I’ve been well aware of the 

nonproliferation contributions by Y-12, but 

to see it in person is a real benefit to me,” 

she said. 

DOE Under Secretary for Nuclear 

Security and NNSA Administrator Lt. 

Gen. (Ret.) Frank Klotz tours Y-12’s 

new ART facility in Oak Ridge and 

greets staff. See DNN Sentinel, Vol. I, 

No. 1, to learn about the opening of 

the new ART facility. 

13
14

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Removing Materials from 

the Past and Preparing for a 

Secure Future

DNN has long been active throughout Southeast Asia, developing 

strong partnerships with regional actors to strengthen their 

indigenous nuclear security, safeguards, and nonproliferation 

practices. In Vietnam, DNN has established relationships with the Vietnam 

Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS) and the Vietnam Atomic 

Energy Institute (VINATOM), the two main agencies under the Ministry of 

Science and Technology that are responsible for nuclear safety and security 

as well as the Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission.

Vietnam’s nuclear history stretches back to the 1960s, when it began 

operating a Training Research Isotope General Atomics (TRIGA) research 

reactor on U.S.-origin enriched fuel. The United States removed the fuel on 

March 31, 1975, due to the unstable situation in the country. After the end of 

the Vietnam War, Vietnam restarted the reactor using Russian-origin highly 

enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. 

In 2007, the reactor was partially converted to the use of LEU and all fresh 

HEU was returned to Russia. In 2011, the reactor was fully converted to LEU 

and the spent HEU was returned to Russia in 2013 after it had sufficiently 

cooled and could be transported safely. DNN assisted with both the reactor 

conversion and fuel returns. This trilateral effort with Vietnam and Russia 

made Vietnam the 11th location from which all HEU was removed as part of 

President Obama’s effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the 

world in four years. 

Looking to the future, Vietnam is pursuing the development of a civilian 

nuclear power program. Current plans are to construct eight nuclear power 

reactors by 2030, with the first four to be built and financed by Russia and 

Japan. 

The United States and Vietnam have had a legally binding, governmentto-government Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement in place since 

October 2014. Known as a 123 Agreement, it allows licensing of U.S. 

exports of nuclear reactor and research information, material, technology, 

and equipment to Vietnam; however, no transfers have yet occurred under 

the agreement. DNN provided technical and policy support throughout the 

negotiations for the 123 Agreement and is in the process of negotiating an 

Administrative Arrangement (AA) to the Agreement. The AA is a non-legally 

binding document that will provide a framework for material tracking and 

accountancy. (See the FAQ article on page 16 to learn more about 123 

Agreements.)

country profile: vietnam

Research reactor at 

Dalat Nuclear Research 

Center began operating 

Joined the Treaty on 

the Non-Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons 

(NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

Comprehensive 

Safeguards Agreement 

with the International 

Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) entered into force

Concluded and 

ratified IAEA 

Additional Protocol

123 Agreement 

between the United 

States and Vietnam 

went into effect

1963

1982

1990

2012

2014

Vietnam’s 

Nuclear 

History 

in Brief

South China Sea

THAILAND

LAOS

CAMBODIA

CHINA

VIETNAM

Signed the 

Comprehensive 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty (CTBT)

1996

Ratified the CTBT as 

an Annex-2 country

2006

Approved plan to 

construct seven 

2011 nuclear reactors
15

DNN’s support of U.S.-Vietnam nuclear collaboration 

and cooperation covers many other areas in addition to 

conversions, removal, and policy negotiations.

Nuclear Security

DNN has supported physical protection and security of 

nuclear materials and facilities training events for Vietnamese 

participants since 2013. The training is presented in 

Vietnam and also at the regional Center of Excellence in 

Japan. Previous topics covered include INFCIRC 225/Rev. 

5 implementation and foundations of physical protection. 

The most recent workshop, held in July 2015, covered 

contingency plan development. 

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence

To enhance Vietnam’s ability to counter nuclear and 

radiological smuggling, DNN supported installation of a 

radiation detection system (RDS) at the Port of Cai Mep. 

In May 2014, Vietnam Customs began official operations 

of the RDS, and Vietnam is on track to assume long-term 

responsibility for operating and maintaining the system in 

2016. An additional RDS installation is in the design stage 

for the Port of Cat Lai, with construction planned to start in 

2016. 

Radiological Security

DNN has cooperated with Vietnam in the area of radiological 

security for more than a decade. Current activities include 

providing security upgrades at sites that use or store high 

activity radiological sources, delivering training courses and 

workshops, and improving security at the Dalat Research 

Reactor. In all, DNN has provided security enhancements 

at 28 buildings in Vietnam and has worked with Vietnam on 

regulations development and training of inspectors. In May 

2015, NNSA conducted a refresher training course that 

covered how to search for, recover, and secure orphaned 

radiological sources. Also in 2015, NNSA initiated a new 

project to help Vietnam develop a national response plan to 

a malicious incident involving radioactive materials.

Nuclear Safeguards

DNN initiated 

safeguards 

engagement 

with Vietnam in 

2007 to build its 

indigenous capacity 

to implement 

international 

safeguards. 

Cooperation 

primarily focused 

on assistance in 

the implementation 

of the Additional 

Protocol (AP), 

which Vietnam 

ratified in 2012, 

and consultation on safeguards-related legislation and 

regulations. In FY 2015, DNN expanded technical assistance 

to include the joint development and deployment of an 

information management system for nuclear material 

accounting and reporting in Vietnam. Future cooperation 

will include assistance in establishing a new safeguards 

laboratory, developing a strong national safeguards 

inspections capability, and creating a quality assurance/

quality control program, as well as outreach to academic 

and other public stakeholders about Vietnam’s safeguards 

reporting requirements under the AP. 

Export Controls

DNN is collaborating with the General Department of 

Vietnam Customs to develop a Vietnamese version of DNN’s 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commodity Identification 

Training (WMD CIT). This effort will allow Vietnam Customs 

to train officials to recognize WMD-related commodities 

that may be transiting or transshipping through Vietnam. 

The expertise developed through this training will help 

Vietnamese Customs officers detect suspect shipments 

that could support an illicit WMD program. The Department 

of State provides funding for DNN’s work in Vietnam, with 

technical expertise and training material provided by DNN.

Country Profile: Vietnam – Continued

DNN subject matter experts conducting 

an equipment inventory check for 

handheld gamma-ray instruments 

at a Nuclear Safeguards Laboratory 

Development course for the Vietnam 

Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety 

(VARANS), held April 2015 in Hanoi.
16

FAQs: 123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation

U.S. firms cannot export nuclear material and 

equipment to just anyone. Before another country 

can receive exports of certain nuclear-related items 

from the United States, an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear 

Cooperation or a “123 Agreement” must be in place with 

that country. The term “123” refers to Section 123 of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The agreement 

acts in conjunction with other nonproliferation tools, 

particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to establish 

the legal framework for significant nuclear cooperation 

between the United States and another country.

What types of exports require a 123 Agreement to be 

in place?

Nuclear material, equipment, and major components 

controlled by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

as outlined in Part 110 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, including but not limited to, source material, 

special nuclear material, byproduct material, nuclear reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and specially designed or prepared 

equipment or components for such facilities. 

Through what process does a 123 Agreement come to 

be in place?

Once the decision has been made to enter into negotiations 

on a new or renewed 123 Agreement, the Department 

of State has the lead for negotiating the agreement, with 

technical assistance from DOE and support from the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. Upon completion of negotiations, 

the Secretaries of State and Energy together must submit 

the proposed 123 Agreement and statutorily required 

supporting documentation to the President for review. The 

President then submits the package to Congress for a 

90-day review period. 

What is DNN’s role in the process of negotiating and 

implementing 123 Agreements?

DNN is the office within DOE that provides statutorily 

required technical assistance to the Department of State 

in the negotiation of all 123 Agreements. DNN ensures 

that the proposed 123 Agreement complies with the terms 

of the Atomic Energy Act and aligns with the goals of the 

Secretary of Energy and Administration. DNN participates in 

all interagency 

meetings and 

Congressional 

briefings 

on any 123 

Agreements in 

negotiation or 

under review 

and assists with 

all supporting 

documentation. 

Following entry 

into force, DNN 

leads the interagency on negotiating and implementing 

Administrative Arrangements to the 123 Agreements, which 

provide a framework for material accountancy and tracking 

for exchanges done pursuant to the agreement. 

Does having a 123 Agreement in place with a specific 

country commit the United States to export certain 

items to that country?

No. The proposed agreement establishes the legal 

framework for nuclear cooperation to take place between 

U.S. entities and partner counties and companies. Each 

application to transfer nuclear materials, equipment, and 

technology is reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the U.S. 

Government and requires separate regulatory approval from 

the appropriate agency. 

Besides opening the door to allow granting approval 

to export nuclear equipment and material to another 

country, what other functions are served by having a 

123 Agreement? 

A 123 Agreement allows for cooperation in technical 

exchanges, scientific research, and safeguards discussions. 

A 123 Agreement also can provide the basis for addressing 

any questions or disputes that could arise from the potential 

misuse or diversion of a licensed nuclear commodity.

Learn more and see the complete list of the States or groups of 

States with which the United States currently has entered into a 

123 Agreement at: http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/

nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforpeacefulc

ooperation.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, signed into 

law by President Eisenhower, sets forth the 

conditions that are legally required to be in 

any 123 Agreement.