UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ 

 ) 

MULUGETA HAILU et al., ) 

 ) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) Case No. 22-cv-00020 (APM)

UNIQUE N. MORRIS-HUGHES et al., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

_________________________________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I.

This action involves claims brought by Plaintiffs Mulugeta Hailu, William Perry, 

Yohannes Woube, and Mizan Werede for alleged procedural due process and statutory violations 

in the District of Columbia’s administration of their applications for unemployment benefits. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants District of Columbia, Mayor Muriel Bowser, and the Director of 

the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (“DOES”), Unique N. MorrisHughes, violated their constitutional and statutory rights by denying, terminating, and seizing 

unemployment benefits without providing adequate notice and an opportunity to challenge those 

actions. Specifically, they allege that Defendants (1) failed to provide written notice of adverse 

unemployment benefits determinations and (2) improperly refused to review on appeal adverse 

unemployment benefits determinations that lacked written findings.

On April 14, 2022, this court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding 

that they had failed to establish “a likelihood of standing for purposes of obtaining either their 

requested prospective or retrospective relief.” Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 27, at 2. Two 

months later, Plaintiffs Hailu and Werede voluntarily dismissed their claims without prejudice. 
2 

Notice of Dismissal by Pls. Mulugeta Hailu and Mizan Werede, ECF No. 32 [hereinafter Notice 

of Dismissal]. The remaining plaintiffs, Mr. Perry and Mr. Woube, then withdrew “their claims 

for prospective declaratory and injunctive remedies based on future injury.” Notice by Pls. 

Yohannes Woube and William Perry Withdrawing Their Claims for Pros. Decl. & Inj. Rem., ECF 

No. 33 [hereinafter Notice Withdrawing Claims]. 

What remains of the case are claims by Mr. Perry and Mr. Woube seeking retrospective 

declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and nominal damages. Defendants again move to 

dismiss for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Compl., ECF No. 29 [hereinafter Defs.’ MTD], Mem. of P. & A. in 

Supp. of Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 29-1 [hereinafter Defs.’ Mot.]. For the reasons that follow, 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. 

II. 

The court first addresses Plaintiffs’ sole claim against Defendants Bowser and MorrisHughes in their official capacities. In Count One, Plaintiffs assert a “private right of action” under 

the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause for failure to provide adequate notice before depriving 

Plaintiffs of their constitutionally protected property rights. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 35–45. As to 

that claim, Plaintiffs seek: (1) prospective injunctive relief that prohibits Defendants from denying, 

terminating, or reducing benefits without a written decision, and (2) a declaration that Defendants’ 

failure to provide notice and an opportunity to challenge decisions denying, terminating, or 

reducing benefits through offset violates the Due Process Clause. Compl. ¶ 45, 30–31 (identifying 

as the relief requested the “equitable remedies set forth in paragraphs A.1 through A.4,” which 

seek a form of prospective injunctive relief, and “B.1 and B.2 of the Prayer for Relief,” which seek 

declaratory relief only as to offset practices). 
3 

As stated above, Plaintiffs no longer seek prospective injunctive relief. See Notice 

Withdrawing Claims. And the only Plaintiffs who alleged that Defendants had offset their benefits 

without adequate notice and opportunity to challenge—Hailu and Werede—have voluntarily 

dismissed their claims. Notice of Dismissal; see Compl. ¶¶ 28–34. Because the remaining 

plaintiffs no longer seek prospective injunctive relief, and no plaintiff remains who suffered injury 

arising from the challenged offset practices, Count One must be dismissed.1 

III.

Five counts remain against the District. Plaintiffs bring three counts under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the District has a policy, custom, or practice of: (1) failing to 

provide adequate notice of the reasons for denying or terminating benefits, and (2) providing 

insufficient process for individuals to contest denials or terminations, each in violation of the 

Due Process Clause (Count II) and 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (Count III), id. ¶¶ 46–54, 66–76; and 

(3) not making timely determinations and payments of employment benefits in violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (Count IV), id. ¶¶ 88–100. Plaintiffs’ remaining two claims are for failing

to follow mandatory notice and hearing procedures (Count V) and failing to make timely benefits 

determinations (Count VI) in violation of the D.C. Code and D.C. Municipal Regulations. Id.

¶¶ 101–18. 

A.

The District asks the court to hold, as it did when denying the motion for preliminary 

injunction, that no plaintiff has standing as to any claim. Defs.’ Mot. at 13–17. The court’s present 

1 In Counts II, III, and V, Plaintiffs also seek relief with respect to Defendants’ offset practices. See Compl. ¶¶ 64, 86, 

id. at 31 (seeking compensatory damages for “benefit amounts offset by Defendant without adequate notice” (A.6)), 

id. (seeking declaratory judgments that Defendants’ offset practices violated federal and District of Columbia law

(B.3, B.4, B.6, B.7)). To the extent Counts II, III, and V seek this relief, they too are dismissed because neither Mr. 

Perry nor Mr. Woube have standing to challenge the offset practices. 
4 

inquiry is different, however. First, this matter is at the motion to dismiss stage, which requires 

Plaintiffs only to make a plausible showing of standing. See Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Vilsack, 

797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Second, Plaintiffs have now dropped their demand for prospective 

relief, meaning that their failure to establish future injury is no longer dispositive. They now seek 

only retrospective relief. Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 31 [hereinafter Pls.’ Opp’n], at 6. 

1. 

In addressing standing, the court begins with general principles of law and then evaluates 

whether any plaintiff has standing as to “each claim” and “form of relief sought.” DaimlerChrysler 

Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“The judicial Power” of the federal courts extends only to “Cases” and “Controversies,” 

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, “and there is no justiciable case or controversy unless the plaintiff has 

standing,” West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “To establish standing, [a]

plaintiff must show (1) [he] has suffered a concrete and particularized injury (2) that is fairly 

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a 

favorable decision[] . . . .” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election 

Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 376–77 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs 

bear the burden of establishing standing, and “[e]ach element must be supported in the same way 

as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and 

degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Susan B. Anthony List v. 

Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to 

dismiss for lack of standing, a complaint must state a plausible claim that the plaintiff has suffered 

an injury in fact fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant that is likely to be redressed by a 

favorable decision on the merits.” Humane Soc’y, 797 F.3d at 8. 
5 

Courts must “accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable 

inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 

(D.C. Cir. 2015). However, courts “do not assume the truth of legal conclusions, nor do [they] 

‘accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.’” Id. (quoting Islamic 

Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted)). In 

determining standing, courts “may consider materials outside of the complaint.” Food & Water 

Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In a case with multiple plaintiffs, “the 

court need only find one plaintiff who has standing” to proceed. Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 

1010 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

2. 

The court first assesses whether either remaining Plaintiff has standing with respect to the 

claims asserted. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Perry has properly pleaded injury in fact for two time 

periods: (1) from June 6, 2020 to February 28, 2021, when Mr. Perry “filed a claim,” “was entitled 

to benefits,” and “DOES failed to pay, or notify him of any decision regarding[] the claim,” and 

(2) after February 28, 2021, when “DOES sent him a notice denying his claim” and “failed to pay, 

or notify him of any decision regarding[] the request for a redetermination of benefits previously 

denied.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 7. Further, they argue that “Defendants injured Mr. Woube by denying 

his benefits claim without any notice or opportunity to be heard,” id. at 3, and by failing to notify 

him of his benefits determination in a timely manner, see Compl. ¶ 33. Because the court 

concludes that Mr. Woube has standing as to each claim, it does not evaluate Mr. Perry’s case for 

standing. 

Mr. Woube first applied for unemployment benefits in April 2020 and did not receive a 

determination until mid-October 2020. Id. He received no opportunity to dispute the denied 
6 

benefits, and the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) refused to hear 

his appeal because Mr. Woube “could not provide a written DOES decision explaining the basis 

for” the benefits determination. Id. ¶ 34. Taking these allegations as true, the court finds that 

Mr. Woube’s injury (denial of benefits without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard)

2

is “fairly traceable” to the District’s failure to provide adequate notice of his benefits 

determination; accordingly, Mr. Woube has standing to bring Counts II, III, and V. Furthermore,

the record shows that Mr. Woube did not receive a benefits determination for six months after he 

first filed a claim. Id. ¶ 33. Therefore, he also has standing with respect to Counts IV and VI, 

which allege violations of law resulting from the District’s untimely decision-making. 

3. 

The court next addresses whether Mr. Woube has standing for the specific relief he seeks. 

Defendants argue that, because “Mr. Woube was ultimately paid $15,677 for his claims in 2020 

and 2021,” his request for benefits payments is “moot because he is no longer injured by the lack 

of such payments.” Defs.’ Mot. at 15. Plaintiffs respond that “Defendants’ mootness defense is 

baseless [because] Mr. Woube seeks other remedies in addition to the payment of back benefits.” 

Pls.’ Opp’n at 4. Specifically, Mr. Woube seeks compensatory damages for mental and emotional 

distress resulting from the lack of notice, nominal damages for his Due Process claim, and a 

“retrospective declaratory judgment that Defendants violated his notice and hearing rights under 

federal and D.C. law.” Id. at 6. 

2 Mr. Woube’s injury is procedural in nature. “A procedural injury claim . . . must be tethered to some concrete interest 

adversely affected by the procedural deprivation.” See WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 305 (D.C. Cir. 

2013). Here, Mr. Woube’s concrete interest that is adversely affected by the procedural deprivation is the nonpayment 

of benefits. See, e.g., Young v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 17-cv-2428 (JDB), 2020 WL 1557170, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 

2020) (holding that “procedural injury in the adjudication of plaintiffs’ [ ] compensation claim satisfies the injury-infact requirement”). 
7 

Compensatory Damages. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Woube is entitled to seek compensatory 

relief for his § 1983 claims because—“as a result of the withholding of benefits”—Mr. Woube 

“suffered financial, mental and emotional distress,” “was at times unable to pay for food,” and was 

forced to “leave his home of more than a decade” because he “was unable to pay for rent.” Compl. 

¶ 33. Defendants do not dispute that compensatory damages are recoverable for mental and 

emotional distress under § 1983, but respond that Mr. Woube is not entitled to compensatory 

damages because “[a]ny ‘distress’ manifesting from [his] inability to afford necessities, is not 

fairly traceable to the delay in benefits payments because [Mr. Woube has] not plausibly alleged 

[that he was] eligible for benefits in the first place.” Defs.’ Reply in Further Supp. of Defs.’ Mot., 

ECF No. 36 [hereinafter Defs.’ Reply], at 2 (quoting Pls.’ Opp’n at 4). 

The court need not decide at this juncture whether Mr. Woube was in fact eligible for 

benefits to recover damages for emotional distress because, on this record, it is plausible that he 

was. The District insists that “Mr. Woube was monetarily ineligible for regular unemployment 

compensation on April 16, 2020, July 31, 2020, October 15, 2020, and April 19, 2021.” Defs.’ 

Mot. at 10 (citing Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 20 [hereinafter Defs.’ PI 

Opp’n], Ex. M, ECF No. 20-13. Yet, on March 1, 2022, “DOES issued Mr. Woube payments 

totaling $15,677 for unemployment claims filed between May 23, 2020 and February 13, 2021,” 

including for two of the weeks Defendants contend Mr. Woube was ineligible. Defs.’ Mot. at 11; 

compare id. at 10 (“Mr. Woube was monetarily ineligible for regular unemployment compensation 

on . . . July 31, 2020 [and] October 15, 2020.”) with Defs.’ MTD, Ex. A, ECF No. 29-2, at 2–3 

(showing Mr. Woube received benefits payments for each week in July 2020 and October 2020). 

It is not clear to the court why DOES would issue benefits payments to Mr. Woube if he was “not 
8 

entitled to benefits in the first place.” Defs.’ Reply at 3. The District makes no effort to explain 

this apparent inconsistency. 

To make matters more confusing, at times Defendants imply that Mr. Woube was entitled 

to benefits. See id. at 1 (“Mr. Woube has been fully compensated for his claimed benefits, while 

Mr. Perry was ineligible for them.”). Due to the lack of clarity in the record, and taking all factual 

inferences in Mr. Woube’s favor, the court finds that there is a “plausible claim that [Mr. Woube] 

has suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant that is likely to be 

redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.” Humane Soc’y, 797 F.3d at 8. In other words, 

the court finds it plausible that Mr. Woube was entitled to benefits and the District’s failure to 

notify him about his eligibility caused him actual injury in the form of mental and emotional 

distress, lost housing, and food insecurity. Accordingly, Mr. Woube has standing to seek 

compensatory damages. 

Nominal Damages. Plaintiffs concede that Mr. Woube has standing to seek “nominal 

damages for his Due Process claim” only if “he did not demonstrate the actual injury required to 

recover compensatory damages.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 5. Because Mr. Woube’s assertion of actual 

injury is plausible, at this stage, he does not have standing to seek nominal damages. 

See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 800 (2021) (“Nominal damages are . . . the 

damages awarded by default until the plaintiff establishes entitlement to some other form of 

damages, such as compensatory or statutory damages.”); see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248

(1978) (“[I]n the absence of proof of actual injury, [Plaintiffs] are entitled to recover only nominal 

damages.”).

Retrospective Declaratory Relief. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Woube has standing to seek “a 

retrospective declaratory judgment that Defendants violated his notice and hearing rights under 
9 

federal and D.C. law.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 6. They argue that “a retrospective declaratory judgment 

(premised only on past harm) is an available remedy when intertwined with a claim for 

damages.” Id. The District agrees that a claim for retrospective declaratory relief in the absence 

of injunctive relief can be sustained (1) if “constitutional adjudication is required” and (2) “as a 

predicate to a damages award.” Defs.’ Reply at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because 

Mr. Woube has standing to seek compensatory damages, and resolving his claims may require this 

court to declare whether the District violated his constitutional rights, Mr. Woube is entitled to 

seek declaratory judgments determining that the District acted unlawfully. Coleman through Bunn 

v. District of Columbia, 306 F.R.D. 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2015) (recognizing that a retrospective 

declaratory judgment is available when the claim is “intertwined with a claim for monetary 

damages that requires [the Court] to declare whether a past constitutional violation occurred”).

IV.

Having found that at least one Plaintiff has standing, the court turns to the merits. In Counts 

II, III, and IV of their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to hold the District municipally liable under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional and federal statutory violations allegedly committed by 

District employees. Compl. ¶¶ 66–100. “Under Monell [v. Department of Social Services of City 

of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)], municipalities are liable for their agents’ constitutional torts 

[and violations of federal law] only if the agents acted pursuant to municipal policy or custom.” 

Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan 

Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (“[A] plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a 

municipality under § 1983 [must] identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the 

plaintiff’s injury.”). 
10 

There are four ways to show that an unconstitutional policy or custom exists: (1) “the 

municipality adopts a policy that itself violates the Constitution,” (2) “the unconstitutional action 

was taken by a ‘policy maker’ within the government,” (3) “the employees’ unconstitutional 

actions ‘are so consistent that they have become [a] ‘custom’’ of the municipality of which the 

supervising policymaker must have been aware,” or (4) “the municipality knew or should have 

known of a risk of constitutional violations, but showed ‘deliberate indifference’ to that risk by 

failing to act.” Hurd v. District of Columbia, 997 F.3d 332, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Baker 

v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). “A showing under any of these 

four theories suffices to sustain a claim of Monell liability against a municipality.” Goodwin v. 

District of Columbia, 579 F. Supp. 3d 159, 168 (D.D.C. 2022). 

In this case, Plaintiffs advance the first and fourth theories of municipal liability. They 

argue that: (1) the District adopted an explicit policy that itself violates the law, and (2) the District 

knew or should have known of a risk of violations and showed “deliberate indifference” by failing 

to act. Pls.’ Opp’n at 9–13. Plaintiffs do not, however, successfully plead either ground for 

municipal liability. 

A. 

Plaintiffs’ sole contention as to the adoption of a policy is “that they were injured by an 

explicit OAH procedure refusing to hear appeals of unemployment benefits determinations unless 

DOES issues a written decision explaining the determination.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 12;3 see Compl. 

¶ 60. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Mr. Woube tried to appeal to OAH but OAH would not 

hear the case because he could not provide a written DOES decision explaining the basis for failing 

to pay benefits.” Compl. ¶ 34. 

3 Plaintiffs also reference an alleged “offset-seizure” policy, Pls.’ Opp’n at 12, but no remaining plaintiff has standing 

to challenge that purported policy. 
11 

But the problem with Plaintiffs’ pleading is that they cite no actual OAH policy. Plaintiffs 

insist that they were injured by an “explicit” OAH policy that “refus[es] to hear appeals of 

unemployment benefits determinations unless DOES issues a written decision explaining the 

determination,” Pls.’ Opp’n at 12, and as support they point to paragraphs 60 and 82 of their 

Complaint, see id. But those paragraphs only allude to the existence of a “policy” without ever 

identifying one. See Compl. ¶¶ 60, 82. A conclusory assertion that fails to state “some factual 

basis for the allegation of a municipal policy” does not plausibly state a claim for municipal 

liability based on an adopted policy. See Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 422 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996); cf. id. at 422–423 (holding that a plaintiff pleading municipal liability based on 

inadequate training can survive a motion to dismiss by alleging “both a failure to train and an 

unusually serious instance of misconduct that, on its face, raises doubts about a municipality’s 

training policies”). 

B. 

Plaintiffs’ pleading of “deliberate indifference” fares no better. A “city’s 

inaction . . . constitutes a ‘policy or custom’ under Monell when it can be said that the failure [to 

act] amounts to ‘‘deliberate indifference’ towards the constitutional rights of persons in its 

domain.’” Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting City of 

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 & n.7 (1989)). “Deliberate indifference is determined 

objectively, ‘by analyzing whether the municipality knew or should have known of the risk of 

constitutional violations,’ and yet failed to respond as necessary.” Robinson v. District of 

Columbia, 403 F. Supp. 2d 39, 53 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Baker, 326 F.3d at 1307). Deliberate 

indifference “involves more than mere negligence,” and it “does not require the city to take 

reasonable care to discover and prevent constitutional violations. It simply means that, faced with 
12 

actual or constructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate constitutional rights, the city 

may not adopt a policy of inaction.” Warren, 353 F.3d at 39. Actual or constructive knowledge 

may be shown by demonstrating “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations[.]’” Hurd, 997 

F.3d at 339 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). 

Plaintiffs here contend that the District “knew or should have known that” DOES 

employees (1) “repeatedly den[ied], terminat[ed], and/or seiz[ed] beneficiaries’ unemployment 

benefits without adequate notice or opportunity to be heard,” and (2) “failed to make timely 

[benefits] determinations and timely [benefits] payments,” and thus acted with “deliberate 

indifference” to the risk of violating Plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process Clause and the Social 

Security Act. Pls.’ Opp’n at 9–11. But Plaintiffs have alleged no facts to support those assertions. 

At most, they rely on their own circumstances to plead deliberate indifference. Two isolated 

examples do not, however, constitute a “pattern of similar constitutional violations” necessary to 

establish actual or constructive notice. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. They also do not “allege any 

actual or constructive knowledge by a policymaker.” Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 602 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Harvey v. District of Columbia, 798 F.3d 1042, 1053 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015) (finding deliberate indifference where the evidence showed “a longstanding practice of 

deliberate disregard of the medical needs of involuntarily committed mental patients”); Aubin v. 

District of Columbia, 107 F. Supp. 3d 169, 172 (D.D.C. 2015) (dismissing § 1983 municipal 

liability claim where “plaintiff merely relies upon the one incident of his own arrest in his 

allegations”); DuBerry v. District of Columbia, 582 F. Supp. 2d 27, 39 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing 

case where the plaintiff had “not produced any evidence that the Department’s alleged 

discriminatory employment practices impacted a single employee or prospective employee other 

than himself”). 
13 

For these reasons, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead that the 

District acted with “deliberate indifference” to the risk of violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional and 

statutory rights. 

V.

Plaintiffs bring Counts V and VI against the District under various provisions of the 

D.C. Code and D.C. Municipal Regulations. See Compl. ¶¶ 101–18. The court has supplemental 

jurisdiction over these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over a claim if “the 

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367; 

see Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“A district court may choose to 

retain jurisdiction over, or dismiss, pendent state law claims after federal claims are dismissed.”). 

Because the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” the court 

declines to consider the remaining state law claims. Shekoyan, 409 F.3d at 423. 

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 29, is granted. A final, 

appealable order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

 

Dated: February 23, 2023 Amit P. Mehta

 United States District Court Judge