FILED

May 1, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE, WESTERN SECTION

AT JACKSON

_______________________________________________________

)

CHARLES R. BROWDER and ) Shelby County Circuit Court

TERESA NOLAND BROWDER, ) No. 63317 T.D.

)

 Plaintiffs/Appellants. )

)

VS. ) C. A. NO. 02A01-9602-CV-00039

)

JERRY C. MORRIS and )

CHRIS CASTLEBERRY, ET AL )

)

 Defendant/Appellees. )

)

______________________________________________________________________________

From the Circuit Court of Shelby County at Memphis.

Honorable Wyeth Chandler, Judge 

Randall J. Fishman,

Mark A. Mesler,

BALLIN, BALLIN & FISHMAN, P.C., Memphis, Tennessee

Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants.

J. Cecil McWhirter,

McWHIRTER & WYATT, Memphis, Tennessee

Attorney for Defendants/Appellees Jerry C. Morris and Chris Castleberry.

James W. Cook,

CARD, COOK & HOLT, Memphis, Tennessee

Attorney for Defendant/Appellee General Accident Group.

Robert L. Moore, 

THOMAS, HENDRIX, HARVEY, JOHNSON & MITCHELL, Memphis, Tennessee

Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Paul Davis Systems, Inc.

OPINION FILED:

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

FARMER, J.

CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S. : (Concurs)

HIGHERS, J. : (Concurs)
1Mrs. Browder’s claim was for loss of consortium.

This is an interlocutory appeal by appellants, Charles R. and Teresa Noland Browder,

from the trial court’s denial of a motion seeking to amend their complaint to name an additional

party defendant pursuant to T.C.A. § 20-1-119. The statute was enacted in response to the supreme

court’s decision in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), which abolished the

doctrine of contributory negligence in Tennessee and adopted principles of comparative fault. The

statute allots a plaintiff in cases of comparative fault additional time beyond the normal running of

the statute of limitations within which to join a previously unnamed defendant by either amendment

of the complaint or institution of a separate action. The issue presented here is whether the statute

as enacted contemplates the joinder of a third party defendant whose liability, if any, is vicarious

only.

The following facts are before us: On July 25, 1994, the appellants filed suit against

Jerry C. Morris and Chris Castleberry for injuries Mr. Browder allegedly sustained in an automobile

accident with Morris on July 26, 1993.1 The complaint alleges that at the time of the accident,

Morris was operating a vehicle owned by Castleberry “with the consent, permission, authority, and

about the business of Mr. Castleberry.” The named defendants as well as the appellants’ liability

insurer, General Accident Insurance Company, filed answers to the complaint. General Accident’s

answer was filed on September 19, 1994. Upon motion, the trial court allowed General Accident

to amend its answer, to conform with certain facts made known during discovery, and assert that at

the time of the accident Morris was operating an automobile owned by Castleberry, but was on or

about the business of his employer, Paul Davis Systems, and that Paul Davis Systems was an

unnamed defendant. General Accident’s first amended answer was filed October 19, 1995. On

November 2, 1995, the appellants moved to amend their complaint to specifically name Paul Davis

Systems as an additional defendant. As noted, the motion was denied with this appeal resulting.

The issue on appeal as framed by Appellants is as follows:

Whether the trial court erred by denying the Plaintiffs’ motion

to seek leave of court to file an Amended Complaint against Paul

Davis Systems, Inc., where the Defendant, General Accident

Insurance Company, filed an Amended Answer, naming Paul Davis
2Appellees Morris, Castleberry and General Accident have adopted the arguments of

Appellants for purposes of this appeal.

Systems as an unnamed defendant, and where the Plaintiffs then

sought to name this party as a defendant pursuant to Tennessee Code

Annotated Section 20-1-119?

The statute provides, as here pertinent:

Comparative fault -- Joinder of third party defendants. -- (a) In

civil actions where comparative fault is or becomes an issue, if a

defendant named in an original complaint initiating a suit filed within

the applicable statute of limitations, or named in an amended

complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations, alleges in

an answer or amended answer to the original or amended complaint

that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury

or damage for which the plaintiff seeks recovery, and if the plaintiff’s

cause or causes of action against such person would be barred by any

applicable statute of limitations but for the operation of this section,

the plaintiff may, within ninety (90) days of the filing of the first

answer or first amended answer alleging such person’s fault, either:

(1) Amend the complaint to add such person as a defendant

pursuant to Rule 15 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and

cause process to be issued for that person; or

(2) Institute a separate action against that person by filing a

summons and complaint. . . .

(b) A cause of action brought within ninety (90) days pursuant

to subsection (a) shall not be barred by any statute of limitations.

This section shall not extend any applicable statute of repose, . . . .

(c) This section shall neither shorten nor lengthen the

applicable statute of limitations for any cause of action, other than as

provided in subsection (a).

. . . .

(e) This section shall not limit the right of any defendant to

allege in an answer or amended answer that a person not a party to the

suit caused or contributed to the injury for which the plaintiff seeks

recovery.

It is agreed that resolution of the issue requires a proper interpretation of the language

“caused or contributed to” as utilized within the statute. Appellants assert2 that the statute should

not be so narrowly construed as to prohibit the joining of those defendants who, it is alleged, share

only financial responsibility for a plaintiff ’s alleged injuries. Appellants rely upon the legislative

history of the statute as supporting their position. To the contrary, Paul Davis Systems, on whose

behalf a brief has been filed with this Court, argues that the statute was not intended to apply to those

who share only vicarious responsibility as that person or entity “has done nothing to contribute to

the circumstances giving rise to the injury suffered by the plaintiff. . . .” 
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the legislative intent, with

all rules of construction being but aides to that end. Locust v. State, 912 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tenn.

App. 1995). We must initially look to the language of the statute itself in determining the intent of

the legislature. Courts are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the

legislature within the four corners of the statute, unless an ambiguity requires resort elsewhere to

ascertain legislative intent. Austin v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 655 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tenn. 1983). A

statute is ambiguous if it is capable of conveying more than one meaning. In re Conservatorship

of Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tenn. App. 1995). We must consider the language employed in

context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction which would extend or limit

its meaning. Weaver v. Woods, 594 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tenn. 1980); Wilson v. Johnson County, 879

S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tenn. 1994). We are to assume that the legislature used each word in the statute

purposely and that the use of these words conveys some intent and has a meaning and purpose.

Locust, 912 S.W.2d at 718. Where words of the statute are clear and plain and fully express the

legislature’s intent, there is no room to resort to auxiliary rules of construction, Roberson v.

University of Tennessee, 912 S.W.2d 746, 747 (Tenn. App. 1995), and we need only enforce the

statute as written. Clayton, 914 S.W.2d at 90. 

With these basic rules of statutory construction in mind, we hold the statute before

us is amenable to but one interpretation and, thus, unambiguous. It is assumed that the legislature

carefully chose and purposely used the words “caused or contributed to.” These words must be

construed to mean what they say. Roberson, 912 S.W.2d at 747. Under their plain meaning, the

statute limits a plaintiff to additionally name only those defendants who allegedly “caused or

contributed to” the plaintiff’s injuries. By definition, one who is “vicariously” liable is not one who

has “caused or contributed to” another’s injuries. We find no other language in the four corners of

the statute to suggest an alternative or expansive meaning. As we have determined the statute

unambiguous in this respect, it is unnecessary and, indeed, improper to refer to the legislative history

offered for explanation by Appellants. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978);

D. Canale & Co. v. Celauro, 765 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn. 1989).

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was correct in denying the appellants’

motion to amend their complaint to join Paul Davis Systems as an additional defendant as the parties
agree that its liability, if any, is vicarious only. Paul Davis Systems neither caused nor contributed

to Plaintiffs’ injuries or damages. We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings

herewith consistent. Costs are assessed against Charles R. and Teresa Noland Browder, for which

execution may issue if necessary.

___________________________________

FARMER, J.

______________________________

CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S. (Concurs)

______________________________

HIGHERS, J. (Concurs)