alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 250
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 250 appear at 77 FR 50891, Aug. 22, 2012.

§ 250.620 Wireline operations. The lessee shall comply with the following requirements during routine, as defined in § 250.601 of this part, and nonroutine wireline workover operations: ( a ) Wireline operations shall be conducted so as to minimize leakage of well fluids. Any leakage that does occur shall be contained to prevent pollution.
( b ) All wireline perforating operations and all other wireline operations where communication exists between the completed hydrocarbon-bearing zone(s) and the wellbore shall use a lubricator assembly containing at least one wireline valve.
( c ) When the lubricator is initially installed on the well, it shall be successfully pressure tested to the expected shut-in surface pressure.
[76 FR 64462, Oct. 18, 2011. Redesignated at 77 FR 50895, Aug. 22, 2012]
### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN NO. 03-0 8 -00 223 -CV The St r om bac k Liv ing Tr ustand G ust avM . St r om bac k and V ivaM . St r om bac k, Ind ividu ally and as trustee s for the Strom back Li ving T rust , Appellan ts v. P alo P etr oleum , Inc. and Ind igo Com pany , Appellees F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-06- 0041 16 , HO NORAB LE GUS J. STRAUSS JR. , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E MO R

A N D UM O P I N I O N Appellants’ brief was due in this Court on November 5, 2008 and is ove rdue. I f an appellant f

ails to file a brie f, this Court may dismiss the appea l for wa nt of prosec ution unless the appellant r easona

bly explains t he fa ilure and a

ppellee is not sig nificantly injured by that failure . See Tex. R. App. P . 38.8(a) (1). On D ece mber 11, 2008, we se nt notice to appellants that their brief wa s ov e rd ue and tha t the a pp e a l may

be dis mis se d if

a pp e lla nts did no t su bmi t a pr op e r m oti on

to t his Court on or befor e De cembe r 22, 2008. To date , no brief or motion for extension of tim e has be en filed. Ac cording ly , we dismiss the appea l for wa nt of prosec ution. SeeTex. R. App. P . 42.3(b).2 __________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Dismissed for Want of Prosecution Filed: January

27, 2009
#### Public Service Mutual Insurance Company, Appellant, v Kalb, Rosenfeld & Essig, P. C., et al., Respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on August 8, 1977, unanimously affirmed for the reasons stated by Ascione, J., at Special Term. The respondents shall recover of the appellant one bill of $60 costs and disbursements of this appeal. Concur—Lupiano, J. P., Birns, Evans and Markewich, JJ.
#### DAY, Respondent, v. BARRETT, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

March 8, 1905.)

Action by Henry C. Day against Charles Barrett. No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.
#### § 256.70 Extension of lease by drilling or well reworking operations.

The term of a lease shall be extended beyond the primary term so long as drilling or well reworking operations are approved by the Secretary according to the conditions set forth in 30 CFR 250.180.
(March 13, 1978)

#### Sad ye Ackerman, Appellant, v City of Long Beach, Defendant, and Gerard Solferino et al., Respondents.

Judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered September 8, 1976, affirmed, without costs or disbursements (see *Rooney v City of Long Beach,*42 AD2d 34, mot to dismiss app granted 33 NY2d 897). Shapiro, J. P., Cohalan, Margett and O’Connor, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jerome Williams, Appellant.

[834 NYS2d 819]

Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Mark H. Fandrich, J.), rendered December 17, 2002. The case was held by this Court by order entered June 10, 2005, decision was reserved and the matter was remitted to Cayuga County Court for a reconstruction hearing (19 AD3d 1121 [2005]). The reconstruction hearing was held and completed before Peter E. Corning, J.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of three counts of aggravated harassment of an employee by an inmate (Penal Law § 240.32). We previously held this case, reserved decision and remitted the matter to County Court for a reconstruction hearing to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial at the time of his trial *(People v Williams, 19*AD3d 1121 [2005]). Contrary to defendant’s contention, “[t]he record supports the court’s determination following the reconstruction hearing that the People sustained their burden of demonstrating by a fair preponderance of the evidence defendant’s competence to stand trial” *(People v Marasa,*284 AD2d 971, 971 [2001], *lv denied*96 NY2d 940 [2001]). Defendant’s further contention that the prosecutor improperly sought a sealed indictment is unpreserved for our review and, in any event, is lacking in merit *(see People v Burkett,*12 AD3d 1196 [2004], *lv denied*4 NY3d 762 [2005]). Finally, consecutive sentences were authorized because the three offenses were committed through separate and distinct acts *(see*
      *1276
      *People v Bryant,*92 NY2d 216, 230-231 [1998]; *cf. People v Mack,*273 AD2d 939 [2000], *lv denied*95 NY2d 966 [2000]), and the imposition of consecutive terms did not render the sentence unduly harsh or severe. Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Gorski, Green and Pine, JJ.
UNITED STATES NAVY-MARINE CORPS 

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Before

J.A. FISCHER, K.M. MCDONALD, D.J. SMITH

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

SHAWN M. BACKOWSKI

SERGEANT (E-5), U.S. MARINE CORPS

NMCCA 201400319

SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL

Sentence Adjudged: 7 July 2014.

Military Judge: Maj N.A. Martz, USMC.

Convening Authority: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 10th 

Marine Regiment, 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejuene, NC.

Staff Judge Advocate's Recommendation: LtCol K.S. Woodard, 

USMC.

For Appellant: LCDR John Zelinka, JAGC, USN.

For Appellee: Mr. Brian Keller, Esq.

18 December 2014

---------------------------------------------------

OPINION OF THE COURT 

---------------------------------------------------

 After careful consideration of the record, submitted 

without assignment of error, we affirm the findings and sentence 

as approved by the convening authority. Art. 66(c), Uniform 

Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).

 

For the Court

 

 

 

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

HUMBERTO R. CASTILLO, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D16-5281

)

BAYSIDE ENGINEERING, INC., )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed February 2, 2018.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Hillsborough County; Elizabeth G. Rice, 

Judge.

Humberto R. Castillo, pro se.

No appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

CRENSHAW, MORRIS, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
#### William R. Nash et al., Appellants, v State of New York, Respondent.

(Claim No. 55210.)

Appeal from a judgment, entered October 31, 1975, upon a decision of the Court of Claims. Claimants were the owners of an irregularly shaped parcel of land located on the southerly side of State Highway Route 7, known as the Troy-Schenectady Road, and improved with a ranch-type frame residence and a one-car attached garage when, on October 18, 1971, the State appropriated approximately 8,146 square feet of the property for highway purposes. The residence and the garage were situated on the property taken, and claimants were left with only about 1,406 square feet of landlocked realty with a nominal after value. At trial it was established that, while the subject parcel was commercially zoned, it was also a part of Colonie Estates, a filed subdivision containing 23 other residences, all of which were subject to a deed restriction limiting the property to residential use. With this background, claimants’ appraiser testified that the subject property had a highest and best use for a drive-in commercial enterprise and fixed damages at $65,300. The State’s expert, however, premised his report upon the assumption that the deed restriction limited the highest and best use to residential purposes, and he calculated claimants’ damages to be $27,000. Adopting this latter figure, the trial court awarded claimants the sum of $27,000 with interest. On this appeal, claimants initially argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the deed restriction was the sole factor in determining a residential highest and best use for the parcel prior to the appropriation. We cannot agree. In this State, the valuation of land subject to a deed restriction is predicated upon the restricted use value (cf. *Maretski v State of New York,*40 AD2d 891), and claimants have a heavy burden to show that a restrictive covenant is unenforceable due to changed conditions *(Normus Realty Corp. v Disque,*50 AD2d 277, affd 16 NY2d 912). Where, as here, the residential character of a subdivision is retained and commercialism has only infiltrated an adjacent area, the situation does not justify the extinguishing of a restrictive covenant covering the subdivision *(Hayes v Leonard,*30 AD2d 745). Claimants’ remaining contentions are likewise without merit. Section 345 of the Real Property Law is inapplicable in this instance and does not serve to invalidate the deed restriction because paragraph (a) of subdivision 9 of that statute expressly states that it shall not affect "the power of any person * * * to enforce the same restriction by action for damages or for an injunction to the extent that it is also imposed by covenant”. Similarly, the testimony of the State’s appraiser was properly admitted into evidence. That he was a State employee clearly did not render his testimony incompetent, and his experience or lack thereof would affect on the weight to be accorded his testimony and not its admissibility. Judgment affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Main, Mikoll and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 28, 2009

d0921 

# Order

September 28, 2009

138452

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 138452 COA: 288344 Wayne CC: 91-010567-FC MICHAEL E. VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 4, 2009 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).
Editorial Note on Part 250
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 250 appear at 77 FR 50891, Aug. 22, 2012.

§ 250.282 Do I have to conduct post-approval monitoring? The Regional Supervisor may direct you to conduct monitoring programs. You must retain copies of all monitoring data obtained or derived from your monitoring programs and make them available to BSEE upon request. The Regional Supervisor may require you to: ( a ) *Monitoring plans.* Submit monitoring plans for approval before you begin work; and
( b ) *Monitoring reports.* Prepare and submit reports that summarize and analyze data and information obtained or derived from your monitoring programs. The Regional Supervisor will specify requirements for preparing and submitting these reports.
#### Shanique Lee, Appellant, v Boro Realty, LLC, et al., Respondents.

[832 NYS2d 453]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the *716plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated December 7, 2005, which granted those branches of the defendants’ separate motions which were to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the action was barred by a general release.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action was barred by a general release. “A release is a contract, and its construction is governed by contract law” *(Kaminsky v Gamache,*298 AD2d 361, 361 [2002]). *“A*release will not be treated lightly, and will be set aside by a court only for duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake” *(Shklovskiy v Khan,*273 AD2d 371, 372 [2000]).

Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff executed a release whereby she agreed to “released and discharged [the defendants] . . . from ... all actions, causes of action, suits, . . . controversies, . . . damages, claims, and demands whatsoever, in law, ... or equity.” Such language is unambiguous, and the plaintiff’s conclusory and unsubstantiated claim that she intended the release to only apply to her medical expenses, rather than to any claim for personal injuries, was insufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss *(see Barry v Hildreth,*9 AD3d 341 [2004]; *Koster v Ketchum Communications,*204 AD2d 280 [1994]; *Touloumis v Chalem,*156 AD2d 230, 232 [1989]).

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or are without merit. Schmidt, J.P., Spolzino, Florio and Skelos, JJ., concur.
###### Editorial Note on Part 250

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 250 appear at 77 FR 50891, Aug. 22, 2012.

#### § 250.1476 Can BSEE reduce my penalty once it is assessed?

Under 30 U.S.C. 1719(g), the Director or his or her delegate may compromise or reduce civil penalties assessed under this part.
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 19-3706

___________________________ Estate of Marjory Gail Thomas Osborn-Vincent lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant Lesa Benacquisto; Daniel Benacquisto; Richard Thoresen; Elizabeth Thoresen; Arnold Mork; Isabella Mork; Ronald Melchert; Susan Melchert, on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly situated lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff

s
v. American Express Financial Corporation; American Express Financial Advisors, Inc.; American Centurion Life Assurance Company; American Enterprise Life Insurance Company; American Partners Life Insurance Company; IDS Life Insurance Company; IDS Life Insurance Company of New York

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota

____________ Submitted: December 17, 2020 Filed: February 4, 2021 [Unpublished]

____________ Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________PER CURIAM.

Marjory Gail Thomas Osborn-Vincent was a member of a class certified in the District of Minnesota. The action involved alleged misrepresentations made by defendants while marketing, selling, administering, and servicing various life insurance and annuity products. A settlement agreement approved by the court in 2001 contained a release which applied to, in relevant part, “all Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, [and] successors” and covered conduct that included “any and all past or present” claims that “are based upon, related to, or connected with, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part,” the facts and allegations underlying the lawsuit. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. After Osborn-Vincent died in 2016, her Estate brought suit in Oregon asserting various fraud claims against defendants based on Osborn-Vincent’s purchase of a life insurance policy. Defendants moved the district court in Minnesota to enforce the settlement agreement and enjoin the Estate of Osborn-Vincent from pursuing its claims in Oregon on the ground that Osborn-Vincent waived the claims as part of the settlement agreement. The district court agreed and entered an order enjoining the Estate of Osborn-Vincent. Osborn-Vincent appeals. For a federal court to have personal jurisdiction over a party, the party must be properly served under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. Adams v. AlliedSignal Gen. Aviation Avionics, 74 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding the district court lacked jurisdiction over an improperly served party regardless of whether or not the party had notice of the lawsuit). Here, defendants never effected service under Rule 4 against the party that they sought to enjoin: the personal representative of the Estate of Osborn-Vincent. In addition, although permissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25, the defendants never moved to substitute the personal representative of Osborn-Vincent’s estate as a party. -2-We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

______________________________

-3-
NASA LogoNTRSNTRS - NASA Technical Reports ServerSearchmore_vertCollectionsAboutNewsHelpLogin Back to ResultsEngine Icing Modeling and Simulation (Part 2): Performance Simulation of Engine Rollback PhenomenaIce buildup in the compressor section of a commercial aircraft gas turbine engine can cause a number of engine failures. One of these failure modes is known as engine rollback: an uncommanded decrease in thrust accompanied by a decrease in fan speed and an increase in turbine temperature. This paper describes the development of a model which simulates the system level impact of engine icing using the Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation 40k (C-MAPSS40k). When an ice blockage is added to C-MAPSS40k, the control system responds in a manner similar to that of an actual engine, and, in cases with severe blockage, an engine rollback is observed. Using this capability to simulate engine rollback, a proof-of-concept detection scheme is developed and tested using only typical engine sensors. This paper concludes that the engine control system s limit protection is the proximate cause of iced engine rollback and that the controller can detect the buildup of ice particles in the compressor section. This work serves as a feasibility study for continued research into the detection and mitigation of engine rollback using the propulsion control system.Document ID20120001791Acquisition SourceGlenn Research CenterDocument TypeTechnical Memorandum (TM)AuthorsMay, Ryan D.*(ASRC Aerospace Corp. Cleveland, OH, United States)*Guo, Ten-Huei*(NASA Glenn Research Center Cleveland, OH, United States)*Veres, Joseph P.*(NASA Glenn Research Center Cleveland, OH, United States)*Jorgenson, Philip C. E.*(NASA Glenn Research Center Cleveland, OH, United States)*Date AcquiredAugust 25, 2013Publication DateDecember 1, 2011Subject CategoryAircraft Propulsion And PowerReport/Patent NumberNASA/TM-2011-217200E-1788511ICE-0081/2011-38-0026Meeting InformationMeeting: International Conference on Aircraft and Engine Icing and Ground DeicingLocation: Chicago, ILCountry: United StatesStart Date: June 13, 2011End Date: June 17, 2011Sponsors:Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc.Funding Number(s)WBS: WBS 284848.02.06.03.02Distribution LimitsPublicCopyrightPublic Use Permitted.Available DownloadsNameType20120001791.pdfSTIcloud_downloadcontent_copyvisibilityRelated RecordsThere are no records associated with this record.visibility_offNo Preview Available
 No Fear Act | Freedom of Information Act | Office of the Inspector General | Agency Financial ReportsNASA Web Privacy Policy and Important Notices | NASA Guidelines for Quality of InformationDisclaimers, Copyright, Terms of Use | Accessibility | NASA OCIO | USA.gov | NASA.govContact Us | Site MapSTI LogoNASA Official: JoAnne R. Calhoun Site Curator: STI Compliance and Distribution Services Last Modified: September 12, 2024
#### § 1218.301 Method of payment.

The payor shall tender all payments in accordance with § 1218.51.

[52 FR 23815, June 25, 1987]
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9 MOS.
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          78,971
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  215,468<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0<F1>
<INVENTORY>                                          0     
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F2>
<PP&E>                                      11,493,293
<DEPRECIATION>                                 634,277
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,860,215
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F2>
<BONDS>                                      7,744,926
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  1,057,178
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,460,286
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,860,450
<SALES>                                     12,860,215
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               932,619
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  504,801
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,599
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             281,747
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                141,273
<INCOME-TAX>                                   141,273
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            141,273
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  7,002
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   148,275
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.71
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.71
<FN>                                                  
<F1>RECEIVABLES ARE STATED NET OF ALLOWANCES.
<F2>THE OPERATING PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT REPORT USING A CLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>