SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT

TO CONGRESS

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

SAFETY BOARD

MARCH 1996

John T. Cnnw3Y, Cllairman

A,J. Eggenberger. Vice Chairman

Jnhn W. Crawford. Jr.

Jo~ph J. DIN'mno

Ikrbflrt John Cecil KouLS

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

SAFETY BOARD

625 Indimlil Avenue. NW. Suite 700, W':lshington. D.C. 20004

(202) 208·6400

March 25, 1996

To the Congress ofthe United States:

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is pleased to submit to the Congress its

sixth annual report for calendar year 1995. The Board is an independent executive branch

establishment responsible for providing advice and recommendations to the President and the

Secretary ofEnergy regarding public health and safety issues at Department ofEnergy (DOE) defense

nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and

safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and

decommissioning ofDOE defense nuclear facilities.

As required by statute, the Board's report summarizes activities during calendar year 1995,

assesses improvements in the safety ofDOE defense nuclear facilities, and identifies remaining safety

problems.

Since our last report, the Secretary of Energy has received the report of a committee

appointed by her to provide advice concerning the feasibility of external regulation ofDOE's nuclear

safety program. Inasmuch as the Board is identified in the committee's report as a possible base for

external regulation of this portion of DOE's activities, the Board's report also responds to the

committee's recommendations, in addition to the information required by the Board's enabling

statute.

~~wvy JOhnT~y tf'

Chairman

pn:;.;..... ~' ~~/

/'John W. Crawford, Jr. /'

Member

L/1ft O.1Ji)~ tJ10seph J. Difiunno -u;J

Member

R.o'P'''qqbm.:it::;;te~d~'::1-"'W'~'>eIz.

AJ. Eggenberger

Vice-Chairman

Herbert 1.C. Kouts

Member

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BOARD ACTIVITIES

RELATED TO HEALTH AND SAFETY DURING 1995

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION I

A. BA KGROUND I

B. REPRESENTATIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1995 ARISING FROM

BOARD ACTIONS 4

II. MAJOR TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE BOARD DURING 1995 6

A. HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR

FACILITIES· COMPLEX-WIDE ISSUES 6

Review of DOE Proposed Safety Rules and Revised Orders and Standards .. 6

Board Guidance Concerning Standards-Based Safety Management II

Continuing Efforts to Raise the Technical Competence and

Expertise of DOE 15

Efforts to Improve the Definition of Safety Responsibilities Among

Headquarters and Field Organizations 18

Safety Management of Laboratory Research and Development (R&D) 19

Readiness of Facilities to Operate 20

Department-wide Radiological Protection Program 22

B. ASPECTS OF INTERNAL BOARD OPERATIONS 24

Current Board Authority as a Means to Influence DOE Actions 24

Formal Recommendations 24

Reporting Requirements 27

Public Hearings and Public Meetings 28

Participation in the Work of the Advisory Committee on External Regulation

of Department of Energy Nuclear Safety 29

New/Rotated Site Representatives 30

C. SAFETY ASPECTS OF DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSE

NUCL AR FACILITIES 30

Defense Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site 30

In-Tank Precipitation Facility at the Savannah River Site 31
Structural Adequacy of Plutonium Storage Facility at the Rocky Flats

Environmental Technology Site 32

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Design Process for the Chemistry

and Mctallurgy Research (CMR) Building 32

Preparations for Major Upgrades at LANL CMR Building ...•......... 33

Guidance for Conducting Readiness Rcviews at the

Nevada Test Site (NTS) 33

Device Assembly Facility (OAF) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) 33

Systems Engineering at the I-Ianford Site 34

D. SAFELY MANAGING SURPLUS NUCLEAR

MATERIAL AND WASTE 34

Stabilization of Fissionable Residucs at the Rocky Flats Environmental

Technology Site 34

Nuclear Material Stabilization at the Savannah River Site 35

Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Savannah River Site 35

Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in the K-8asins at the Hanford Site 36

Integrity ofCesium and Strontium Capsules at the Hanford Site' 36

Adcquaey of Nuclear Material Storage Conditions at the Oak Ridge Y-12

Plant 37

Cylinders Containing Depleted Uranium at the Gaseous Diffusion Plants .. 37

High-Level Waste Storage Tanks at the

Hanford Site - Ferrocyanide Hazards 37

High-Level Waste Storagc Tanks at the I-Janford Site - Characterization of

Tank Contcnts 38

Neutralization of Rcsidual Production Materials at the Fernald Environmental

Managemcnt Project 38

Implementation of Rccommendation 94-2 - Improving DOE's Low-Lcvel

Waste Program 39

E. SAFETY ASPECTS 01' NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE

STEWARDSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 40

Oversight of Stockpile Stcwardship and Managcment Activities at the Nevada

Test Site _. _ _. _ 40

Disparity in Applicability of Orders _ 40

Implementation of Rccommcndation 93-IINESS CAP _. _40

Implementation of Recommendation 93-6 41

Improvements at the Pantcx Plant 43

Reduced Risk due to Aircraft Overflights 43

Improved Technical Staffing in the Amarillo Area Office _ 43

Readiness to Begin Wcapons AssemblylDisassembly Operations .. 44

Improved Conduct of Operations and Use of Standards 44

New and Upgradcd Safety Analyses 45

11
Design and Safety Basis for the Ncw Special Nuclear Matcrial Staging

Facility 45

Conduct of Operations and Criticality Safety at the

Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge 45

Project Sapphire - Receipt and Handling of Highly Enriched Uranium from

the former Soviet Union , 46

Control of the Authorization Basis for a Nuelcar Research and Development

Facility , , .. , 47

Reservoir Unloading at the Mound Laboratory, . , , . , 47

F. SAFETY ASPECTS OF DECOMMISSIONING DEFENSE NUCLEAR

FACILITIES _ , 47

Decommissioning Memorandum of Agreement Concerning the Rocky Flats

Environmental Technology Site _ , 48

Deactivating the UO) Facility at the I-Ianford Site _.•............ 48

Dcactivating the PUREX Facility at thc Hanford Site 49

Dccommissioning ofC-Rcactor at thc Hanford Site 49

Deactivation and Decommissioning of the Rocky Flats Environmental

Technology Site " __ . _ , 50

III. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS, , 51

A. PER ONNEL RECRUiTMENT ,. _.. , , , 51

B. OFFICIAL SITE VISITS BY BOARD MEMBERS AND BY STAFF .... 51

C. PUBLIC INTERACTION WITH THE BOARD 52

D. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (NPR) STREAMLINING

OBJECTIVES _ 53

Starting Without Encumbrances .. __ 53

Reducing Regulatory Burdcn . _ 53

"Excepted Scrvicc" and Pay for Performance . _................•..... 53

"No frills" Approach to Operations _. _. _. _ 54

Effective Organization Structurc .. _ 54

Management Continuity 54

Experienced Leadership __ . _ 54

Information Technology 55

Accountability vs. Excessive Controls __ .....•..................... 55

Customer Service 55

IV. PLANNED FOCUS OF BOARD ACTIVITIES DURING 1996 57

Operational Formality - A Complcx-Wide Issue 57

III
APPENDICES ................................................•..... 61

1995 Board Recommendations 61

IV
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BOARD ACTIVITIES

RELATED TO HEALTH AND SAFETY DURING 1995

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Beginning in the early days of World War II and continuing to the present, the

Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor agencies, the Atomic Energy Commission and

the Energy Research and Development Administration, produced special nuclear materials and

designed, manufactured, tested, and maintained the weapons in the nation's nuclear arsenal.

During most ofthat period, the defense nuclear weapons complex operated without independent

external oversight. In the late 1980's, however, increasing awareness ofthe accumulating public

health and safety issues involving many of the aging defense nuclear facilities led Congress to

pass a law in 1988 to create the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board,

which came into existence in 1989, a year later, is an independent teclmical oversight

organization within the Executive Branch, chartered to provide advice and recommendations to

the Secretary of Energy to ensure adequate protection of public and worker health and safety at

DOE's defense nuclear facilities.

The Board is responsible for independent oversight of all activities relating to nuclear

safety within DOE's nuclcar weapons complex. Many ofthese activities are now associated with

cleanup of extensive radioactive contamination resulting from decades of production operation.

DO is actively engagcd in the ongoing process of disassembling nuclear weapons, maintaining

the remaining weapons in the stockpile in a safe and reliable condition, and conducting research

focused on ensuring the continued stewardship of the stockpile. In addition, considerable

attention is cun'ently being devoted to safe storage of fissionable material removed from

disassembled weapons and of material remaining in the system following the abrupt cessation

of many production activities more than seven years ago.

By law, the Board is required to review and analyze facility and system design,

operations, practices, and events, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Energy that are

necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. The Board must consider

the tcchnical and economic fcasibility of implementing the recommended measures, and the

Secretary must report to the President and Congress ifimplementation of a recommendation is

impracticable because of budgetary considerations. If the Board dctermines that an imminent

or severe threat to public health or safety exists, the Board is required to transmit its

recommendations to the President, as well as to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense.
The enabling statute, 42 U.S.c. § 2286 el seq" requires the Board to review and evaluate

the content and implementation of health and safety standards, including DOE's orders, rules,

and other safety requirements pertaining to the design, construction, operation, and

decommissioning of DOE's defense nuclear facilities, The Board must then recommend to the

Secretary of Energy any specific measures, such as changes in the content and implementation

ofthose standards that the Board believes should be adopted to ensure that the public health and

safety are adequately protected. The Board also is required to review the design of new defense

nuclear facilities before their construction begins, as well as modifications to older facilities, and

to recommend neccssary changes. Review and advisory responsibilities ofthe Board continue

throughout the full life cycle of facilities, including shutdown and decommissioning phases.

The Board may conduct investigations, issue subpoenas, hold public hearings, gather

information, conduct studies, establish reporting requirements for DOE, and take other actions

in furtherance ofits review. These ancillary functions ofthe Board relate to the accomplishment

ofthe Board's primary function, which is to assist DOE in identifying and correcting health and

safety problems at defense nuclear facilities. The Department of Energy and its contractors at

defense nuclear facilities are required to cooperate fully with the Board.

The terms ofthe statute setting up the Board gave clear guidance of what Congress had

in mind for the Board to do, and the way it was to operate. Oversight with action-forcing powers

was chosen instead of making the Board a regulator, Congress expected the Board's oversight

to have many of the same positive results as regulation; that is, assure that DOE was

implementing a program for the safe management ofthe production and use of defense nuclear

materials, a program that provides reasonable assurance of no undue risk to the workers and the

public, and protects the envirorunent. Congress was well aware that DOE had issued safety

policies and standards of good practices, However, Congress was also aware that they needed

upgrading and that DOE and contractor operations in the past had left a residual of much

contamination in buildings and the surrounding enviromnent. DOE's problem appeared to be

more one of failure by DOE to establish clear expectations of its contractors and to build safety

compliance into the fabric of work planning and execution.

The Board's efforts in the past six years have been focused upon the exanlination ofthe

standards identified by DOE as codes of good practices, the manner in which DOE defines for

its contractors what is expected ofthem in the performance of DOE's mission, and how such

expectations once established as requircments are enforced. These elements are basic to any

safety management program whether internally or externally driven. The most significant

deficiencies noted by the Board in these basic elements have been communicated to DOE via

the recommendation process set fOlth in our authorizing legislation. These recommendations

not only describe the perceived deficiency, but also provide guidance as to what the Board

believes is advisable for a solution. Details of plans for addressing the issues identified through

the recommendation process are then submitted by the Secretary for Board approval. The Board

follows the progress ofthe required action program until the planned action has been completed.

2
To date the Board has issued 33 sets of recommendations containing 147 specific

recommendations. These will be discussed in more detail later.

Not all Board action-forcing activities lead to formal recommendations. The Board's

assigned functions also include the review of dcsign, construction, operation, and

decommissioning of defensc nuclear facilities. For such activities the Board's charter allows it

to satisfy a real need for DOE to get on with its work with a mipimum of delay due to external

oversight. The Board, through assignment ofits staff to monitor and review work, whether it

is design, construction or rcadiness preparations for operations, has been able to keep its reviews

synchronized with DOE activities. Technical concerns that arise are frequently resolved by the

technical staffs of DOE, the Board, and contractors without the need for action-forcing measutes

by the Board. (fthe Board dctermines there are unresolved safety issues that require resolution

before proceeding, the Board can dcfinc the issue for the Secretary and recommend resolution

before proceeding. In the case of opcrations at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site,

Congrcss specifically required thc Board to certify safety of rcadiness before resumption of

operations could begin.

In addition to its reviews of the basic elements and structure of DOE's safety

management progranl, the Board has given priority attention to facilities and activities believed

to represent the greatest safcty risks -- mainly those that now comprise the residual ofthe nuclear

weapons complex devoted to stewardship, maintenancc and surveillance ofnuclear weapons, the

storage ofstrategic and highly radioactive materials and the stabilization of hazardous residuals

ofweapons production. For those facilities and operations representing significant hazards (e.g.,

those classi lied as hazard classes I and 2), the Board is pressing DOE to dcvelop safety

management programs that result in clearly defined systems and components important to safety,

the technical specifications that define limiting conditions for operation, and thc infrastructute

needed to support maintenance and safety in operation. This has already been done in a number

of cases. The extension of this effort to all high-risk facilities is the thrust of thc Board's

Recommendation 95-2. Thc cnd goal is to have safety management programs that are well

defined but tailored to thc diverse operations that make up the DOE complex, the hazardsspecific nature of the activities involved and the aged nature of the facilities in which such

operations must be conductcd.

With respect to decommissioning of defense nuclear facilities, the Board has tended to

focus its activities on those facilities in transition to cleanup or environmental restoration under

the Comprehensive Enviromnental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and

the Resoutcc Conservation and Recovery Act (RCM). A substantial nwnber ofsuch facilities

require considerable effort to remove radioactive matcrials, or otherwise deactivate them, before

they can be considered safe for non-time critical' remedial action. CERCLA and RCM statutes

, Non-time critical remedial action is action which can be deferred temporarily, but which should be

completed at the first reasonable opportunity.

3
are administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the States. The Board is

working cooperatively with EPA and the States to by DOE effect this transition smoothly. The

Board has recently signed a cooperative agreement with the State ofColorado, EPA, and DOE

with respect to activities at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS).

The Board is required by statute to report to Congress each year concerning its oversight

activities, its reconmlendations to the Secretary of Energy, and improvements in safety achieved

at defense nuclear facilities as a result of its activities. This report addresses that requirement.

B. REPRESENTATIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1995 ARISING FROM BOARD

ACTIONS

During 1995, a number of Board initiatives, some undertaken in previous years, were

completed or advanced significantly. A representative sample of these accomplislmlents is

summarized below. nIese, as well as others, are discussed further in later sections ofthis report.

• The Board issued a landmark recommendation urging DOE to improve the

process used in development, review, and approval ofdocumentation for methods

to be used in ensuring safety (Authorization Bases) for facility operation or

conduct of potentially hazardous activities, based on two technical reports

prepared by the Board (Recommendation 95-2).

• Based on the guidance contained in the technical reports2 supporting

Recommendation 95-2, the Board had its staff complete assessments of

authorization bases for a representative sample of high priority defense nuclear

facilities and activities, demonstrating the soundness and adaptability of the

concepts included in the reports and setting the groundwork for future reviews

of authorization bases prepared by DOE and its contractors.

• In response to Recommendation 94-1, plutonium residues remaining from metal

casting at the RFETS were successfully stabilized during the summer of 1995,

and by mid-November 1995, all plutonium in contact with plastic had been

repackaged.

• Also in response to Recommendation 94-1 and a Board technical report, DOE

changed its previous plans for dry storage of deteriorating reactor fuel in storage

basins at the Savannah River Site and is now planning to stabilize the fuel by

processing it in F-Canyon.

2 Fundamentalsfar Understanding Standards-Based Safety Management afDepartment ofEnergy

Defense Nuclear Facilitie.r, DNFSBrrECH-5; and Safety Management and Conduct ofOperations at the

Department ofEnergy's Defense Nuclear Facilities, DNFSBrrECH·6.

4
• Largely as a result of the Board's attention to the problems associated with

deteriorating fucl at the Hanford Site, the K Basins now have in place most of

the elements of an adequate authorization basis), including an updated Safety

Analysis Report, revised Operational Safety Requirements, a corresponding

Safety Evaluation Report prepared by DOE, a Standards/Requirements

Identification Document (S/RID), and revised facility procedures.

• As a result ofBoard emphasis on the need for comprehensive readiness reviews,

substantial improvements were made in systems and practices at the F-Canyon

and FB-Line at the Savannah River Site, leading to the timely availability of

these facilities for stabilization of plutonium solutions.

• In early 1995, the Board issued Recommendation 95-1 after its staff found that

many cylinders containing depleted uranium hexafluoride in outdoor storage at

the three gaseous diffusion plants were handled and stored under conditions that

could lead to high deterioration ratcs. As a result, DOE initiated a program for

repairing the affected cylinders and for improving storage conditions.

• Spurred by Recommendation 90-7, DOE produced credible evidence during 1995

that the previously suspected accumulation of potentially explosive

concentrations offerrocyanidc compounds in waste tanks at the Hanford Site had

been mitigated by degradation of any such compounds to the point that they are

now present in relatively harmless concentrations.

• Due in large part to the Board's intensive review, agreements between DOE and

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have been reached that will

eventually eliminate most aircraft flights over the Pantex Plant, where nuclear

weapons are dismantled, thereby significantly reducing the risk of an airplane

crash into the Plant.

• Board attention to technical staffing of DOE's Amarillo Area Office and the Y12 Site Office at Oak Ridge led to the hiring of technically competent

engineering professionals in Amarillo and new technical staffmembers in the Y12 Site Office, yielding substantial improvements in operations at both locations.

• In response to Recommendation 94-4, DOE took immediatc steps to correct

safety deficiencies at the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge and then validated the

corrections through a formal restart process.

) DOE Order 5480.21 defines "authorization basis" as: "Those aspects of facility design basis and

operational requirements relied upon by DOE to authorize operation."

5
• The Board's staff played a substantial role in helping prepare a needed standard

for storing highly cnriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. None had

existed prior to the summer of 1995.

• In response to an earlier Recommendation (92-6), which called for improved

guidance for timing, staffing and content of operational readiness reviews, DOE

had developed a new order and a new DOE standard. Both were revised in 1995

to respond to a number of Board comments suggesting improvements in both

documents.

II. MAJOR TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE BOARD DURING 1995

A. HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR

FACILITIES - COMPLEX-WIDE ISSUES

Review of DOE Proposed Safety Rules and Revised Orders and Standards

In its enabling statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2286 el seq., the Board is assigned responsibility for

review and evaluation of" ... the content and implementation ofthe standards relating to the

design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of defense nuclear facilities of the

Department of Energy (including all applicable Department of Energy orders, regulations, and

requirements) at each Department of Energy dcfense nuclear facility." In addition to those

imposed by statute, DOE scts requirements for its employees and contractors through one or

more ofthe following vehicles:

• Rules incorporated in the Code of Federal Regulations;

• DOE Safety orders or SIRID's' for specilic subject areas, incorporating specific

requirements, such as standards; or

• Standards established by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), by

other recognized standards-writing bodies (such as technical or professional

societies or associations), or by DOE, when incorporated into contracts or into

the Code of Federal Regulations.

DOE's rules, orders, and regulations can be supplemented by "guidance documents" that

present acceptable methods for meeting requirements established in one of the above forms.

4 DOE safety orders or S/RIns, in themselves, do not impose enforceable requirements on DOE

contractors, but become enforceable when they are invoked by specific contract provisions, which are legally

binding (See Fundamentalsfor Understanding Standards·Based Safety Management ofDepartment ofEnergy

Defense Nuclear Facilities. DNFSBrrECH-5).

6
This guidance may include a recognized industry standard, an accepted industry practice, or an

internal DOE standard.

This compcndium can be viewed as depicting a hierarchy of established good practices

that exist in three tiers. The first tier contains the statutes, rules and other regulations that can

be viewed as non-discretionary. The second tier contains DOE safety orders and standards that

can be seen as discretionary until their applicability is establishcd by contract. The third tier of

the hierarchy contains the DOE "how-to" safety and implementation guides.

Whereas selected practices contained within the first two tiers become requirements by

law or contract, the guidance contained within the third tier is viewed by DOE to be "optional"

and is briefly describcd below.

The DOE safcty and implementation guides describe acceptable methods that the

contractor may implcment in order to meet specific requiremcnts. DOE has stated that the

contractor is not required to use these methods and may propose alternative implementation

methods for DOE's approval, as long as there is technical justification that an adequate level of

safety, commensurate with the hazard, is achieved. In tillS context, the methods described in the

DOE salety and implementation guides are termed "optional."

It is from this fabric ofrecognized good practices that safety management programs are

tailored to lit the specifics of the work to be done.

During the past several years, DOE has revised, improved, and upgraded some

requirements in response to many factors, including not only Board Recorrunendations, but also

DOE and contractor initiatives and a general recognition ofthe importance ofsafety standards

and requirements in establishing an effective safety managcment program.

During 1995, DOE initiated a major "Ordcr/Rcquirement Reduction and Streamlining"

effort to overhaul the requirements it had developed and used for years, motivated by a number

ofinfluences, both internal and external. The scope ofthis effort includes substantial revisions

of requirements covering administrative, procurement and technical aspects of how the

Department does its business. These are set forth in a small number of rules and in hundreds of

DOE orders pertaining to the broad spectrum ofDOE's responsibilities. TillS DOE undertaking

involved large commitments of the Department's technical, administrative, and lcgal staff

resources. Ofthe many hundreds of orders, fifty-one (51) are related to nuclear safety matters

for which the Board has oversight responsibilities.

From its inception, DOE's Order/Requirement revision effort has been closely monitored

by the Board, as that effort applicd to the 51 orders of interest to the Board. After reviewing

initial drafts of order changes and proposed rules under this effort, the Board observed that

extensive deletions of many good practices now captured as safety requirements were being

considered by DOE. That possibility led the Board to have its staff and its outside experts

7
review in detail the 51 safety-related orders and DOE's implementation of those orders in the

field. Based on that review etlCn1, thc Board determined that much of the requirements and

guidance in most ofthe 51 safety-related orders should be rctained. The Board also found that

substantial improvement was needed in some of the existing orderss

. On the other hand, it

appeared that DOE 5480.18B, Nuclear Facility Training Accreditation Program, might be

UlUlecessary for low hazard facilities, provided DOE 5480.20A, Personnel Seleclion, Training

and Qualificalion Requiremenlsfor DOE Nuclear Facilities, was rigorously implemented.

By year's end, the Board and its staff were extensively engaged in rcviewing DOE's

Order/Requirement Reduction Effort, providing detailcd technical comments and requesting

DOE to provide justification for changes to nuclear safety requirements being contemplated in

the "new" series of orders and proposed rules. The Board and its staff called to DOE's attention

inadequacies in the new orders/rules and in the technical justifications developed to support these

requirement changes. The Board observed that in carrying out this effort, DOE has set aside or

is making discretionary or optional many well-established safety practices, thus rendering the

affected orders deficient.

Numerous technical mcetings with DOE's staff have been held during the past year to

review and discuss the technical merits of the proposed changes. In July 1995, after a fourmonth review period, the Board held a public meeting on DOE's "new" order/rule process, and

in September, a second public meeting on the subject was held to examine some ofthe issues

remaining at that time. During these meetings, the Board's staff testified that the requirements

in some of the proposed rules or draft orders, when analyzed together with their associated

guidance, do not represent, in total, an adequate set ofrequirements and guidance for establishing

the Department's safety management program for protection ofthe health and safety ofworkers,

the public, and the environment. Based in part on that testimony, the Board concluded that DOE

needed to cxamine more closely the total set ofrcquirements and guidance encompassing nuclear

safety instead of embarking on piecemeal changes. As part of this proposed examination, the

Board requested that DOE prepare a "mapping" or "cross-walk" showing the tracking of

requircmcnts from the existing set of 51 safety-related orders to the "new" orders and rules.

DOE officials have stated that the cross-walk would be completed prior to the issuancc of new

orders and incorporation into contracts. Despite these assurances, DOE has not complcted its

own analysis to assure that important safcty requirements have not been lost 01' inadvcrtcntly

dropped.

5 These included DOE 4700.1, Project Management; DOE 6430.1 A, Generat Design Criteria; and

DOE 5820.2A, Radioactive Waste Management.

8
The Board has informed DOE that only six6 oftwelve' new or amended safety orders

that DOE had issued by the end of 1995 provided safety management frameworks with safety

levels comparable to those incorporated in their predecessors.

During 1995, DOE also embarked on a parallel process of replacing portions of the

existing set ofDOE safety orders with rules to be incorporated in Title 10 ofthe Code of Federal

Regulations. Reviews by the Board and its staff in this arena raised issues identical to those

encountered in the Order/Requirement Reduction Effort. Major deficiencies in several ofDOE's

proposed rules have been pointed out to DOE. The Board also has taken issue with DOE for

failing to establish a single organization within DOE with technically competent individuals as

the focal point responsible for the rule and order development effort. At present, there is no

single organization within DOE responsible for carrying out this key assignment.

The Board recognized in 1994 that DOE's program to revamp its requirements system

of rules, orders, standards, and guides was not being done as an integrated effort nor being

directed at a common goal. Accordingly, the Board issued Recommendation 94-5 that stressed

the need for the Department to establish clearly for its contractors and staff the relationship and

expected manner of implementation ofboth the non-discretionary and discretionary components

ofits good practices governing defense nuclear facilities. The Secretary of Energy accepted this

recommendation and submitted a plan for its implementation. Some progress has been made,

but the issue has not yet been brought to closure. In part, this is because ofthe close connection

ofthe 94-5 issues and those subsequently raised in the Board's Recommendation 95-2, dealing

with standards-based safety management.

Notwithstanding the Department's good intentions, the results to date, in the Board's

view, leave much to be desired. Of particular concern is the move toward generalization and

minimization of discretionary guidance and non-discretional)' requirements. In effect, this will

give greater leeway to contractors to interpret how the requirements are to be met. In this regard,

DOE is preparing many safety and implementation guides which identify acceptable methods

for meeting specific requirements. Alternative methods for meeting the requirements may be

proposed by the contractor. However, it is the Board's position that any implementation method

selected must be justified to ensure that an acceptable level ofsafety, commensurate with the

identified hazard, is achieved.

6 These six new orders covered Emergency Management (151.1), Safety and Health Reporting

Reqllirements (231.1), Startlip and Restart ofNllclear Facilities (425.1), Life Cycle Asset Management (430.1),

Departmental Materials Tramportation and Packaging Management (460.2), and Accident Investigations

(225.1 ).

7 Six other new orders had been provided to the Board as oCtile end oCtile year: Performance

Indicators and Analysis ofOperational Information ( 210.1); Occllrrence Reporting (232.1); Facility Safety

(420.1); Worker Safety and Health Program ( 440.1); Packaging and Transportation Safety (460.1); and

Directives System (251.1).

9
Of particular concern to the Board about this restructuring is the effect it may have on

the development ofstandards-based safety management programs. When safety requirements

are more general and less specific, enormous demands ,are placed on the technical expertise of

those charged with evaluating safety management programs based on these types of

requirements. The Board has repeatedly urged the Department to increase the number of highly

qualified staff assigned safety management functions (see Recommendation 93-3). It may be

necessary for the Department to form special task teams using non-government employees with

requisite expertise, such as has been done for Operational Readiness Reviews, to evaluate and

approve safety management programs proposed by contractors for highly hazardous facilities and

activities (see more detailed discu sion ofthis issue in later sections ofthis report).

In attempting to resolve these problems, the Board issued Recommendation 94-5 which

proposed that DOE take a systems engineering approach to establishing safety management

programs and tailoring standards for such programs to the hazards of individual facilities and

operations being conducted. Although the Secretary ofEnergy accepted Recommendation 94-5

on February 2L 1995, the implementation plan subsequently submitted to the Board was

deficient in many respects, and the Board so informed the Secretary on September 15, 1995.

Many ofthe key points in the recommendation that should have led to features in the plan were

not included. An acceptable plan has not yet been issued. In the meantime, the Board has

directed its staff to continue to work in parallel with DOE in overseeing the revision of

individual safety orders, rules, and standards, and the Board has strengthened its call for

integrated safety management programs by issuing Recommendation 95-2. The Board noted in

its letter ofNovember 2, 1995, that cooperation and progress had stalled on staff efforts to revise

individual orders, rules, and guidance due to DOE's premature issuance of inadequate revised

safety orders, policy statements, and guidance, and the Department's failure to provide the

promised "cross-walk" which was to map the fate of all safety requirements contained in

previous ordcrs.

The Board has repeatcdly urged DOE to review thc adequacy of its safety requirements

to create a solid base for the Department's safety management program. While strongly

Suppo11ive ofsuch efforts, the Board is, however, concerncd that DOE, in its zeal to reduce and

simplify rcquirements, has set aside or made optional well-established safety practices. The

Board intends to continue its critical and constructive oversight of the "new" orders and

proposed rules to ensure that the underpinning ofsafety management is not compromised.

DOE's Orders/Requirements Reduction Effort is continuing, as is the Board's continuing

oversight of it. The dialogue between the Board and senior DOE officials remains candid and

open regarding deficiencies identified by the Board and its staff, but a clear path forward to their

resolution has yet to be developed.

In its Fifth Annual Report, dated February 1995, the Board considered the desirability

ofrequesting legislative authority for the Board to establish safety standards to be used by DOE

or alternatively to request legislative authority to approve standards developed by DOE. At that

10
time, the Board concluded that such enhanced authority was unwarranted. The Board's

experience in the past year is causing it to rcassess that position (See later discussion on external

regulation, beginning on page 29).

Board Guidance Concerning Standards-Based Safety Management

In keeping with Congressional intent as embodied in the Board's enabling statute, the

Board has committed a considerable amount of its resources to oversight of how standards are

used by DOE and its contractors in establishing and performing safety management of DOE's

diverse defense nuclear activitics. The focus ofthe Board's attention has been on the safety bases

upon which DOE authorizcs contractor performance of its more hazardous operations and the

conditions it imposes on such opcrations in the interest of protecting public and worker safety

and the environment. In this regard, the Board has observed considerable variability across sites

and among facilities. Both the Board and the Department have been active in attempts to address

this matter generically, as well as for specific facilities.

I\s one ofits earliest formal interactions with DOE, the Board urged the Department, in

Recommendation 90-2, to identify, assess the adequacy of, and determine compliance with the

applicable safety standards at each of its defense nuclear facilities. The Board's continued

attention to this matter is reflected in four additional formal Board Recommendations (91-1, 92-

3, 93-1, and 94-5) that directly or indirectly involve applicable DOE safety standards. These

recommcndations and associated actions have been discussed extensively in previous annual

rcports. Neither the Board's efforts nor DOE's responses to date have brought standards-based

safety management programs ofthe Department to the desired end state.

In a further effort to assist DOE to understand and apply safety standards, the Board

issued a seminal tec1l1lical report, Fundamentals for Understanding Standards-Based Safety

Management of Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities (DNFSB/TECH-5). The

report describes a generic process that begins with hazards analysis and leads to definition of

ways to: (I) prevent radiological exposure; (2) preserve and properly use safety features; (3)

prepare for emergencies and mitigate effects of unanticipated events; and (4) manage the

authorized activities safely. Such a process, when completed thoroughly and comprehensively,

can result in the definition of an adequate safety management plan (tailored to the specifics of

the facilities or activities) that the Board deems an essential part ofthe overall management plan

for the contractor's conduct ofspecified work.

To further clarify and reemphasize the importance of establishing a standards-based set

ofsafety requirements for operation of defense nuclear facilities, the Board also held a public

meeting in late May, 1995 on Standards-Based Safety Management. During that meeting, the

DNFSB/TECH-5 report was reviewed in detail to give DOE and the public an opportunity to

fully understand the essential ingredients ofsafety management.

I I
Concurrently with its development of a formal recommendation on this subject, the

Board prepared a second report, Safety Management and Conduct of Opera/ions at the

Department ofEnergy's Defense Nue/ear Facilities (DNFSBfrECH-6). This report elaborates

on the concepts ofsafety management and conduct ofoperations as outlined in DNFSBfrECH-5

and addresses appropriate bases for authorizing operation of facilities or conduct of specific

activities. Such a program delineates all those attitudes, processes, and precautions taken in the

interest of safety, comparable in content and parallel to an Operating License issued by the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

One ofthe initiatives undertaken by DOE in connection with its program for revising and

promulgating standards has been an attempt to define a process for tailoring its generally

applicable requirements to those needed for its diverse facilities and activities. The DOE

objective is to impose upon anyone operation or activity only those requirements that are

"necessary and sufficient" to provide reasonable assurance of the safety of workers and the

public, and the protection ofthe environment. In comparing this initiative with what the Board

is advancing for defining adequate safety management programs, the Board observes some

differences, but also much that is common.

In the interest of bringing the Board and DOE initiatives into synchronization, the Board

issued8 Recommendation 95-2 on October 11, 1995, recommending that DOE improve the focus

of its entire standards effort and urging that the Department follow the guidance in

DNFSB/TECH-5 and 6. On January 17, 1996, the Secretary accepted parts of the Board's

recommendation and expressed the Department's willingness to continue the dialogue on subparts of the recommendation that DOE was not yet ready to accept.

In a pilot program initiated late in the year, the Board's staff used the guidance in

DNFSBrrECH-5 and -6 for preliminary trial reviews of authorization bases for a representative

sample" of 33 DOE facilities and activities identified as having the highest priority for Board

attention 10. The selection of facilities to be reviewed considered such factors as the severity of

hazards, operational intensity, and expected lifetime of the operation involved. The sample

included processing facilities, laboratory research and development facilities, and deactivation

and decommissioning. Findings disclosed in the pilot program have been briefed to the Board,

and will be provided to DOE as part ofthe Board's ongoing attention to this matter.

8 Copies of fonnal Board recommendations issued during 1995 appear in Appendix B.

9 Facilities in the sample included Buildings 371 and 771 at the Rocky Flats Environmental

Technology Site; TA-55 and CMR at LANL; the K-EaSI Basin and the Tank Fanns at the Hanford Sile; and the

DWPF and both canyons at the Savannah River Site. Specific activities included implementation of

Recommendalion 94-1 at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site; assembly and disassembly

operations at the Pantex Plant; and decommissioning work at the Hanford Site.

10 The priority facilities and activities are presented in tabular fonn in Appendix A.

12
The scoping effort has been beneficial for two reasons. It demonstrates thc soundness

and adaptability ofthc TECH-5 and TECH-6 concepts for use in both identifYing and evaluating

the required c1cmcnts of acceptable authorization bases, and demonstrates that the conccpts in

TECII-5 and -6 have general applicability, rcgardlcss of differences among processing facilitics,

weapons facilities, national laboratorics, or activities. The review also identified significant

deficicncies in the performancc of hazards analysis and identification of prevcntive and

mitigativc systems, and in the establishment of approvcd authorization bases for opcration of

facilities or conduct ofspecific activities. In addition, the exercise provided a number of broad

insights rcgarding the condition of existing facility authorization bases. In general:

• Gaps exist in the set of safety elements required for establishing authorization

bases for several facilities. Exceptions were found in areas where the Board had

previously called specific deficiencies to DOE's attention and where DOE had

subsequently taken corrective action.

• In many cases. DOE's development ofsafety management plans does not address

the entire spectrum of hazards that should be considered, analyzed, and mitigated.

It appears likely that this occurs in many cases because cxisting DOE directives

do not require in-depth analyses of scenarios involving accidents that are less

scvere than the design basis, or bounding accident.

• Authorization bases arc consistcntly dcficient in addrcssing worker safety. The

Board emphasizcd this issue as a condition of rcadiness for long-term opcration

of any facility.

In contrast to these general inadequacies in authorization bases, there are sevcral

examples ofsuccessful efforts by DOE and its contractors, brought about inlargc mcasure by

the Board's intervention and scmtiny ofsafcty issues at the Savannah River and Hanford Sites.

Application of the process describcd in DNFSBrrECH-5 and -6 to facilities at these sitcs has

resultcd in major improvemcnts to safety management programs. Many identified vulncrabilities

were subsequently eliminatcd, thereby providing reasonable assurance that the safety of the

public, the workers, and the environment is adcquately addrcsscd, as demonstratcd in the

following examples:

The original hazard/accident analyses for the Defensc Waste Processing Facility

at the Savannah River Site did not adequately assurc confincment of potential hazards.

As a result ofthe Board's attention, a more extensive, deterministic design basis analysis

was conducted to evaluate potential cffects on the public from postulated accident

scenarios. An additional study was pcrformcd to evaluatc the protection of co-located

workers and workers assigned to thc facility. These studics rcsulted in the establislunent

ofadditional systems to provide redundancy, the upgrading of certain systems to "safety13
related" status" to provide greater assurancc of operation during and after an accidcnt,

and thc establi hment of additional administrative controls.

In early 1994, DOE plmmed to address the problems associated with deteriorating

fuel in the K-Basins at the Hanford Site by encapsulating the fuel and sludge for

continued underwater storage. Extensive Board attention has been applied to these

basins, through Recommendation 94-1, staff assessments of facility operations, and,

more recently, stafIreview ofthe authorization basis for the K-Basins. This involvement

has helped focus attention on a more plausible path forward as well as a better defined

authorization basis. Currently, the K-Basins staff has put in place most of the elements

needed for an adequate authorization basis. An updated Safety Analysis Report and

revised Operational Safety Rcquircments have recently bccn approved. A corresponding

Safety Evaluation rcport has been preparcd by DOE. In addition, a

Standards/Requirements Identification Documcnt has been approved by DOE and

implemented into facility procedures. These activities provide not only a basis for

authorization to operatc the basins, but also a sound basis for review of new activities

associated with removing the fuel from the basins.

The guidance in DNFSBrmCH-5 and -6 provides a descriptive, rather than prescriptive,

methodology for an adequate certification-type process for either operation of a new defense

nuclear facility or initiation of a significant new activity. In this regard, the process described

in Recommendation 95-2 compares favorably with that currcntly being followed by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission in its consideration ofsafety ofthe gaseous diffusion plants.

The issuance of DNFSBffECH -5 and -6 and the associated Recommendation 95-2

represents a proactivc role in the Board's ongoing efforts to assist DOE in the development and

implementation ofadcquate nuclear safety requirements and guidance. By setting forth its vicws

on the essential clemcnts of an adequate standards-based safety management plan that is fully

compatible with industry practices throughout the domestic and international nuclcar

community, the Board has laid out a constructive path forward for DOE to rcvamp and

modernize its safety management program.

Notwithstanding the Secretary of Energy's rcserved acceptance ofReconunendation 95-

2, the Board is encouraged by growing evidence that some DOE Operations Offices and

operating contractors have accepted, and are moving forward with, the development ofsafety

management programs consistent with concepts advocated in the recommendation. Notable

examples are the Savannah River Site, for the DWPF and the F-Canyon; the Hanford Site, for

the K-East Basin Project; the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, for Building 332; the

II Safety-related systems are subject to more stringent requirements regarding quality assurance,

surveillance, and redundancy in order to improve reliability ofthe syStem function.

14
Los Alamos National Laboratory, for Building TA-55; and the Rocky Flats Environmental

Technology Site, for Buildings 371,707, and 771.

Continuing Efforts to Raise the Technical Competence and Expertise of OOE

The report of the Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 1085, that accompanied

legislation establishing the Board includes the mandate: "The. Board is expected to raise the

technical expertise ofthe Department substantially ... " The technical qualifications of DOE

personnel who are assigned safety-related responsibilities have become increasingly important

since the Board's establishment, not only because ofthe diminution ofthe extensive background

and experience formerly residing in contractor organizations, but also because the lessprescriptive approach to safety management advocated by DOE will require greater reliance on

judgments of highly experienced staffs. Examples ofthis increasing importance include:

• The Secretary of Energy's response to formal Board inquiries concerning the

assignment of safety responsibilities [in DOE's Manual of Functions,

Assignments, and Re5ponsibilitiesfor Nuclear Safety (FAR Manual); see next

section] states that "competence commensurate with responsibilities" will be one

of the five principles constituting the basis of DOE's Safety Management

Program.

• In revising DOE rules and orders, representatives ofthe Office of Environment,

Safety and Health (EH) have indicated that reviews of contractors' plans for

implementing revised rules and orders will be feasible only if both Headquarters

and Field Office employees' technical qualifications are improved.

• Under either the Safety/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) closure

process recommended by the Board in Recommendation 95-2, or the "necessary

and sufficient" closure process advocated by DOE, the important safety

determination of adequacy of facility authorization bases will hinge on review

and approval by highly qualified DOE technical personnel.

In each ofits previous annual reports, the Board has addressed DOE technical expertise,

emphasizing repeatedly that the most important and far-reaching problem affecting the safety

of DOE defense nuclear facilities is the lack of adequate numbers of qualified technical

personnel in organizations responsible for safety at defense nuclear facilities. It remains the

most critical problem today, despite significant efforts on the part ofthe Board.

From its inception, the Board has continually engaged DOE senior management in

discussions addressing the importance that DOE must attach to obtaining and retaining

technically qualified DOE personnel, both at headquarters and in the field. Numerous letters,

as well as reports generated by the Board's technical staff, have been specifically directed to this

subject; in the last three years alone, more than two dozen letters contained explicit observations

15
of negative impacts on nuclear safety due in part to the limited technical competence of DOE

personnel. Twelve of the 33 sets of formal recommendations the Board has made to DOE

include specific comments on the need to strengthen the technical capabilities ofDOE personnel.

In particular, in Recommendation 93-3, Improving DOE Technical Capability in Defense

Nuclear Facilities Programs, thc Board urged DOE to make a direct assault on this problem.

The Board pointed out that, at that time, DOE had 200 excepted service positions authorized

under the Department ofEnergy Act (42 U.S.C. § 723 I(d)] which were not being used. As noted

by the Board, cxcepted service personnel authority provides a proven means by which Federal

agencies can attract highly qualified scientific and teclUlical talent. Furthermore, the Board's

testimony before Congress was instrumental in helping DOE obtain, in November 1994,

excepted service personnel authority for 200 additional positions. In mid-1994, and throughout

1995, DOE was in the midst of filling approximately 1200 general schedule positions within the

defense nuclear complex, providing a unique opportunity to dramatically raise the technical

expertise in the Department.

Despitc DOE's recruiting efforts during the 1994-95 period, the number of highly

qualified technical personnel added to the Department remains minimal. The Board initiated a

public airing ofthis issue at a public hearing held in Washington, D.C. on January 30, 1996, at

which members ofthe Board's staffwho studied this matter reported the following observations.

• Although DOE has added a significant number of new hires to its

technical staff"l2, most of these were not the senior, highly experienced

individuals required for technical leadership roles. In fact, DOE hired !lQ

excepted servicc personnel in 1994; by the end of 1995, only 33 ofthe

400 (that is, less than ten percent) available excepted service positions

had been filled.

• DOE elected to base its hiring efforts almost exclusively under the more

constrained lUles ofthe civil service system, rather than enrich the talent

pool through outside recruitment under the excepted service provisions

authorized by Congress. Analysis by the Board's staff ofthe collective

technical capabilities ofthe 1994 and 1995 technical hires revealed that

DOE general schedule hiring practices did not result in hiring a

significant number of highly qualified technical personnel. Further, the

technical applicant hiring process used by DOE tended toward selection

of marginally qualified candidates. Selection of highly qualified

candidates occurred with no greater frequency than that expected through

a random process.

12 Personnel records show that DOE filled more than 900 technical billets in the defense nuclear

complex during the 1994-95 period.

16
The Board notes that nearly half of the positions advertised by DOE were filled by

individuals drawn from the existing DOE technical pool, a population considered by several

prominent review groups (e.g. the National Research Council, the Advisory Committee on

Nuclear Facility Safety, the Office ofTechnology Assessment, and the Galvin and Poston Task

Forces) as lacking in scientific and technical excellence. At least half ofthese internal "hires"

involved promotions. At thc more senior levels (e.g., OS-14 and above), internal selection

accounted for more than 80 percent of the positions filled.

Judging by these results, both the failure to use excepted service personnel authority and

the marginal quality of the general schedule hirings, the Board concludes that DOE has not

targeted recruitment ofthe exceptionally talented as Congress and the Board had advocated. As

described in two cases below, if DOE desires to improvc the technical capabilities of a particular

unit, it can be done.

At the DOE Amarillo Area Office at the Pantex Plant and the DOE Y-12 Site Office at

Oak Ridge, DOE managers have responded to Board prompting by augmenting their staffs,

hiring 20 new, technically qualified personnel. The Y-12 Site Office, in particular, conducted

a nationwide search for highly competent candidates. The effects of these newly hired

individuals have been noted by the Board in such subject areas as improvements in the analysis,

documentation, and control of the safety envelope; improved personnel training and

qualification; and more formal control of nuclear weapons dismantlement processes. Each of

these improvements can be directly attributed to the increases in the technical ability of the

staffs. The Y-12 Plant and Pantex Plant experience shows the very positive results that can occur

with DOE management's determination to make such improvements and willingness to use all

ofthe tools at their disposal. The key to this effort was the Secretary of Energy's commitment

to conduct a nationwide search for qualified candidates to fill the vacant safety related technical

positions.

In contrast to efforts to bring new technical talent into the DOE system, a major portion

of DOE's effort to "raise the technical expertise ofthe Department" has centered on the training

and qualification ofincumbent personnel under a program developed as an outgrowth of DOE's

implementation plan for Recommendation 93-3. This program was to have been implemented

by December 31,1995. With respect to this Technical Qualification Program, the Board has

observed that:

• reviews of assignments of personnel to functional areas at various Operations

Offices and Headquarters reveal a lack of sufficient senior level management

planning ofthe assignment process;

• although Department-wide standards for technical qualification in specific

functional areas have been developed, reviews by the Board have identified

17
several as inadequate, others as marginal, and most as requiring specific

improvements;

• approved training activities and acceptable equivalencies to meet competencies

identified in technical qualification standards have not yet been identified,

developed, or promulgated; and

• differences between the qualifications required for specific DOE technical

positions and the competencies possessed by incumbents will be determined by

the individual employees' supervisors; yet the technical expertise of many ofthe

supervisors themselves is less than adequate.

The Board is aware ofthe difficult task it has asked DOE to accomplish in the face of

substantial mandated reductions in total manning levels. As a result of such downsizing

activities, however, the need to improve the Department's pool of unique technical expertise

becomes all the more imperative. With the dictum of "Do more with less" in force, and with its

heavy responsibilities for public health and safety, DOE must respond by obtaining and retaining

the best technical talent.

However, the clear message from DOE's poor record in this area is that senior DOE

officials have not placed enough emphasis on the solution to this problem. One important

element in finding a solution to this vexing problem is for DOE to reinvigorate its middle to

senior level managers with a greater sense of purpose and for DOE to pursue more aggressively

methods for reassigning or removing poor performers. Given the importance ofhigWy qualified

DOE technical leadership to achieving safety objectives, the Board intends to continue its

pressure on DOE to upgrade its technical capabilities.

The Board intends to resume its public airing ofthis issue by requesting DOE officials

to explain the Department's 1994-95 recruitment efforts and its plans for accomplishing the

upgrades committed in the implementation plan for Recommendation 93-3. The Board may also

consider the advisability ofseeking authority to establish or approve technical qualifications for

selected safety positions within DOE.

Efforts to Improve the Definition of Safety Responsibilities Among Headquarters

and Field Organizations

The Department continues to experience change in programs and organization.

Throughout the past year, the Board has placed substantial emphasis on the need for the

Department to establish a clear definition ofroles and responsibilities for nuclear safety within

the Department. This emphasis is an extension of a Board request in 1994 for the Department

to define more clearly the nuclear safety responsibilities and organizational arrangements for all

organizations with cognizance over defense nuclear facilities.

18
An important element of ongoing changes within DOE is the delegation of broad

operational responsibilities to field organizations. This emphasis, along with proposed

elimination from DOE orders ofthe assignment ofresponsibilities to Federal employees, places

increased importance on the content of DOE's Manual of Functions, Assignments, and

RC!Jponsibilitiesfor Nuclear Safety (FAR Manual).

In response to the Board's 1994 request, the Secretary issued Revision I to the FAR

Manual. The manual, already in its second revision, consisted cntirely of extracts of DOE order

requirements assigned to Federal employees, most notably Cognizant Secretarial Officers and

Heads of Field Elements. Although the FAR Manual was a step in the right direction, its

emphasis on assignment ofresponsibilities at only the highest levels did not support achievable

and prompt implementation and thus it quickly became out-of-date.

The Board has continued to: (I) emphasize the importance it attaches to keeping the FAR

Manual updatcd, and (2) ensure that DOE line management clearly understands its

responsibilities. DOE does not appear to share the same sense of importance.

DOE has committed to updating the FAR Manual early in 1996, but, in the Board's view,

without sufficient capable effort and active direction by top management, that schedule appears

to be overly optimistic. Representatives ofthe Department have also stated their intent to reflect,

in revisions of the FAR Manual, the results of the response and implementation plan for

Recommendation 95-2, regarding Safety Management Programs for DOE defense nuclear

facilities. While the Board agrees that the FAR Manual will eventually need to reflect thc results

of 95-2 implementation, an update of the FAR Manual should not be delayed awaiting the

completion ofthe 95-2 Implementation Plan.

Safety Management of Laboratory Research and Develonment (R&D)

In late 1994, and throughout 1995, the Board held a series of discussions with DOE and

representatives ofthe three nuclear weapons laboratories, focused on the integrated management

ofsafety at DOE's weapons research and development facilities. Associated activities included:

eight trips by the Board and its staff to the national laboratory sites; issuance of a formal

reporting requirement to DOE; a meeting in Albuquerque with senior DOE and laboratory

representatives; two public meetings; two status meetings in the Board's Washington offices;

and other activities by the Board and its staff.

Nuclear R&D requires an environment that encourages creativIty and fosters a

management approach that is flexible enough to permit the safe execution and control of a wide

variety of activities. The weapons laboratories had expressed concern that DOE's current safety

management approach did not permit the required flexibility and was not improving R&D

operational safety. During 1995, the Board engaged DOE and the laboratories in frank

discussions on the perceived problems and potential solutions.

19
In late April, pursuant to its authority under 42 U.S.C. §,2286b(d), the Board requested

that DOE provide a report that addressed:

• whether there is adequate DOE guidance on the subject of integrated safety

management of R&D activities;

• how DOE plans to ensure the availability of adequate technical talent,

mechanisms, acceptance criteria, and an exception approval process to address

laboratory-proposed integrated safety management systems; and

• what DOE needs to do to coordinate line management and independent oversight

safety audits at the weapons laboratories.

On May 25, the Board met with senior DOE management and the heads of the three

weapons laboratories to discuss the basis for the Board's reporting requirement. During that

meeting, the manager of the Albuquerque Operations Office assumed the responsibility for

coordinating DOE's response. DOE representatives at this meeting stated that the Board's

reporting requirement provided an opportunity that is broader than the obligation to address the

specific issues that the letter contained, Later correspondence between the Albuquerque

Operations Office Manager and DOE Headquarters reemphasize this, by stating:

"The development of this report is extremely important to continuing the

missions ofthe laboratories while efficiently ensuring the safety ofthe workers,

public and the environment. I believe this report provides DOE and the

laboratories with the unique opportunity to create model Management Systems

that integrate Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) at each laboratory. These

laboratory management models will meet laboratory management requirements

while meeting DOE responsibilities and DNFSB expectations."

An interim response to the Board's reporting requirement was formally submitted on

September IS, including DOE's commitment to work cooperatively with the laboratories, and

with the Board, to develop and implement integrated safety management systems at the weapons

laboratories. DOE and the weapons laboratories have stated their commitment to additional

effort in 1996, and potentially into 1997, on the development ofthe principles, implementation

strategies, and actual implementation of integrated safety management ofR&D activities. The

Board will continue to exercise oversight ofthis important effort.

Readiness of Facilities to Operate

Since the Board's inception, the Board and its staff have closely scrutinized the

preparations for starting or restarting activities at defense nuclear facilities and the conduct of

associated readiness reviews. Confirmation of readiness to proceed is a major element of an

acceptable safety management program as outlined in Recommendation 95-2. The Board made

20
a number ofrecommendations that addressed standards for performance of operational readiness

reviews, including Recommendations 90-4, 91-3, 91-4, 92-3, 92·5, and 92-6.

In Recommendation 92-6, the Board urged DOE to develop uniform orders and guidance

to govern the readiness review process for startup or restart of activities. In response, DOE

developed a new order, DOE 5480.31, Startup and Restart 0/Nuclear Facilities and a new DOE

standard, 00E-STD-3006-93, Planning and Conduct a/Operational Readiness Reviews, both

ofwhich apply to all operations at defense nuclear facilities except nuclear explosive operations.

In 1995, the DOE Nevada and Albuquerque Operations Offices completed development of

separate interim guidance to govern readiness reviews for nuclear testing and weapons assembly

and disassembly operations. This interim guidance is intended for use until implementation of

Recommendation 93-1 is completed.

Both the order (now designated as DOE 425. I) and the standard were revised in 1995,

to respond to Board comments and to provide clarification in some areas, based on readiness

review experience across the complex. With these developmental efforts completed, DOE's

commitments under Recommendation 92-6 were met and the recommendation was closed by the

Board in October 1995.

The Board and its staff continue to monitor readiness preparations for startuplrestart and

conduct of readiness reviews throughout the complex. In general, the Board has observed

continued improvement in line management preparations for startup or restart of operations and

the conduct of readiness reviews. In the past year, the Board closely followed the readiness

preparations and conduct ofreadiness reviews involving:

• the Defense Waste Processing Facility and the In-Tank Precipitation Facility at

the Savannah River Site;

• the F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities at the Savalmal1 River Site;

• weapons disassembly activities at the Pantex Plant;

• stabilization of plutonium solutions in Building 771 at the Rocky Flats

Environmental Technology Site;

• plutonium operations in Building 332 at Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory;

• receipt, shipment and storage of highly enriched uranium at the Oak Ridge Y-12

Plant, including reviews leading up to Project Sapphire;

• the special unload project for tritium reservoirs at Mound Laboratory; and

21
• the uranyl nitrate hexahydrate stabilization project at the Fernald Environmental

Management Project.

These activities are discussed in more detail in other sections orthis report. The Board

will continue to monitor line management preparations for the stmtup Or restmt ofan activity and

the conduct of readiness reviews in accordance with the requirements of DOE Order 425.1.

Department-wide Radiological Protection Program

Early in its history, the Board conducted extensive reviews and assessments of

radiological protection programs at a number of facilities. This review effort disclosed a number

of significant weaknesses in the Department's radiological protection program. As a result of

the identified weaknesses, the Board issued Recommendation 91-6 in December 1991,

emphasizing a need for incrcased DOE attention in five major areas: (I) DOE management and

leadership in radiological protection programs; (2) radiological protection standards and

practices at defense nuclear facilities; (3) training and competence of health physics technicians

and supervisors; (4) analysis of reported occurrences and correction of radiological protection

program deficiencies; and (5) understanding and attention to radiological protection issues by

individuals and contractor organizations.

During the ensuing five years, a major Board effort has been devoted to tracking and

evaluating DOE's implementation of Recommendation 91-6. In response to Rccommendation

91-6, DOE has moved to strengthen various aspects oftheir radiological protection programs,

including:

• issuance of IOCFR835, Occupational Radiation Protection;

• upgrading of occupational radiation training and certification or workers;

• development and promulgation of a Radiological Control Manual, a guide to

good

radiation practices; and

• authorizing the Department's M&O contractors to add additional stan'to their

radiological protection programs.

Although DOE has made progress in addressing some ofthe improvements needed, many

commitments have been unnecessarily delayed. As a result, in late July 1995, the Board wrote

to DOE criticizing the delays and observing that they were traceable to DOE's failure to

designate specific DOE personnel responsible for commitments made in the 91-6 DOE

Implementation Plan. Since then, DOE has initiated efforts to update the implementation of

Recommendation 91-6 to reflect current realities, changed DOE approaches, and continuing

Board interest.

22
During 1995, the Board conducted assessments of radiological protection programs at

the Savarmah River Site, the Hanford Site, the Rocky rIats Environmental Technology Site, the

Mound Laboratory, and the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. Those assessments disclosed that worker

exposures generally have been kept within established bounds. However, judged in terms ofthe

need for radiological engineering and work planning to keep routine exposures low and the

chance of accidental exposures small, implementation of good practices requires some

improvement, especially at the I-Ianford Site. In particular, the need at Hanford to acquire

sufficient numbers of competent persolUlel with the requisite technical expertise has been

identified as essential to establishing and maintaining a radiation protection program in which

radiation exposures are as low as reasonably achievable. The Board has concluded that this will

be especially important as deactivating and decommissioning facilities require greater fractions

of the total work effort and the associated hazards of moving, handling, and processing

radioactive material increase.

In general, the radiological control program throughout the DOE complex has been

improving. However, the quality of the program is inconsistent from site-to-site and from

facility-to-facility on a site. In 1992, DOE issued its Radiological Control Manual and guidance

documents to provide the framework of a radiological protection program that contractors could

use in achieving radiation protection objectives. During 1995, the Board and its staff were

deeply involved in reviewing the new DOE approach to standards in the radiological protection

areas, including the newly published 10 CFR 835, Occupational Radiation.

23
B. ASPECTS OF INTERNAL BOARD OPERATIONS

Current Board Authority as a Means to Influence DOE Actions

Formal Recommendations

The Board's cnabling statute is, in the words ofthe D.C. Circuit Court ofAppeals, "action

forcing." For example, the power in the Board's authority to issue recommendations is

substantial. It rests on two foundations. The first is the Board's ability to articulate technically

sound and persuasive support for actions it advocates, in a way that convinces the Department

of the merits of those recommended actions. Secondly, the requirement for the Secretary to

justify rejection of a recommendation in formal reports to cognizant Congressional Committees

has been acknowledgcd by DOE to be a very powerful forcing action.

In Part 2 ofits Fifth Annual Report, the Board provided a comprehensive analysis ofthe

recommendation process. Since that analysis was completed, the Board has issued two

additional sets ofrecommendations, including eight individual specific recommcndations. Thus,

in total, 33 formal Board recommendations, consisting of 147 individual recommendations, have

been made to the Secretary of Energy concerning actions necessary to protect public health and

safety. The first 32 recommendations have been accepted by the Secretary.

The Board's most recent Reconuncndation, 95-2, "Safety Management, " was submitted

to DOE on October 11,1995. On January 17, 1996, the Sccretary accepted parts of the Board's

recommendation and expressed the Department's willingness to continue the dialogue on subparts of the recommendation that DOE was not yet ready to accept. The Board is currently

exploring with DOE those provisions of this recommendation that the Secretary did not fully

accept, for further rcsolution.

Also during the ensuing pcriod, an additional six sets of rccommendations have bccn

Cully closed or subsumed by latcr recommendations. The rcmaining 17 are in various stages of

implementation. Updated versions ofthe tabular data concerning elapsed times presented in the

Fifth Allliual Report appear hcre as Tables I and 2.

The Board has reexamincd its last year's analysis and found it to be confirmed by its

experience in the past year. When a Board recommendation is precise in its language, with

clearly stated, achievable deliverables and associated milestones for their completion and is

compatible with DOE's missions and schedules, DOE is more likely to understand and respond

favorably. When the problcm addressed by a Board recommendation is generic, involving the

entire defense nuclear complex or a combination of facilities and sites, or when the subject

appears to be at odds with DOE's current prioritics and schedules, the reaction is more likely to

be resistant and to lead to considerable delay in its implementation..

24
3/25196 Elapsed Times to Key Events Associated with Board Recommendations

Rec SUbject Issue SOE IP Bd Closure SOE [ncrem Increm Increm Elapsed Total

No Date Accept Rev a Accept Dale Increm to Dell 10 to Time to Elapsed

Date Date IPDale to Plan Revise Close Closure Time to

Accept Date

90-1 Reactor Operator TrainingfQualifications. 2122190 4110/90 7/13190 2rt191 10/27/92 47 94 209 628 978

90-2 Identify slds; assess adequacy; determine implemenlation. 318/90 6112/90 9/17190 11/1195 11/1195 96 97 1871 0 2064

9ll-3 Monitoring and Corrective Actions for selected tanks. 3127/90 5116190 8/13190 10/12190 5/1192 50 89 60 567 766

90-4 Conduct and conlent of ORR's for Rocky Flats buildings. 5/4/90 6120/90 11/30/90 2115191 2116195 47 163 77 1462 1749

90-5 Systematic Evaluation Program for Rocky Flats activities. 5/18/90 6/13/90 10/19190 514/94 11/1195 26 128 1293 546 1993

90'<; Develop program for removal of Plutonium in ducls. 6/5/90 7124190 11130190 8117/92 11/1195 49 129 626 1171 1975

90-7 Expansion of Recommendation 90-3 to cover ferrocyanide tanks. 10/12190 12/3190 317191 516194 52 94 1156 1991

91-1 Improvement needed in DOE standards development program. 3rt191 5/13191 8116191 10127192 10/27192 67 95 438 0 600

91-2 ROMP dosure packages and practices. 3127191 5/14/91 817/91 10/27192 10127192 48 85 447 0 580

91-3 WIPP Readiness Review. 4125/91 615191 817191 10/27192 10127192 41 63 447 0 551

91-4 Expansion/clarification of R 90-4 on Bldg 559 ORR 9130/91 1116/91 1118191 2/3192 5/1/92 37 2 87 88 214

91-5 Savannah River K Reactor Power limits. 12119/91 217192 217192 8127/92 417193 50 0 202 223 475

91-6 Need for improved departmen!-wide guidance on rad protection. 12119191 1131192 6/17192 7/2193 43 138 380 1558

92-1 Need for ORR on HB Line. 5/22192 10120192 10/20192 10127192 10127192 151 0 7 0 158

92-2 Need for improvement in DOE Facility Representative Program. 5128192 7120192 11/5192 53 108 1397

92-3 Expansion on R 92·1; inadequacy of previous ORR's on HB line. 5/29192 9/15192 9121192 10116192 213193 109 6 25 110 250

92-4 Improve Project Management and Design Contlot at Hanford MWTF. 7/6192 8/28/92 215/93 53 161 1358

92-5 Discipline of Operation durirlQ period of cJ1anges in mission. 8/17192 12116192 12121/92 1/8193 118/93 121 5 18 0 144 1316

92'<; Need for DOE guidance on content, timing and staffing for ORR's. 8/26192 10/19192 1119193 4/29194 11/1195 54 92 465 551 1162 1307

92-7 Need for broad improvement in DOE TrainingJQualification Programs 9122192 1119193 11/4193 11/4/93 11/4193 119 289 0 0 408

93-1 Need for consistency between Orders for weapons/production facils 1121193 4127/93 7119193 7/30/93 96 83 11 1159

93-2 Need for continued general purpose Department criticality program 3123/93 5/12/93 8110193 9/30193 50 90 51 1098

93-3 Implement step change in DOE technical staff qualifications 611193 6123193 11/4/93 11/5/93 22 134 I 1028

93-4 Need for improved tech mgt and oversight of ERMC's. 6116193 816193 11/8193 11/18193 51 94 10 1013

93-5 Accelerate waste characterization program. 7119193 8/31193 1125/94 3125/94 43 147 59 980

93.<; Need to retain access to capabililylknowledge of weapons experts 12/10193 212194 7/5/94 812194 54 153 28 836

94-1 Expedite remediation of SNM storage/stabilization/disposition 5126194 8131194 1215/94 5/5195 97 95 151 669

94-2 Comprehensive review of low-level waste program 9/14/94 10128194 4110195 6/15195 44 164 66 558

94-3 Apply Sys Eng to dev plog for protection against nal.phenomena 9126194 11/18194 6130195 1013/95 53 224 95 546

94-4 Raise Conduct of Ops to acceptable level 9127194 11118194 2124195 3128195 52 98 32 545

94-5 Integrate DOE Safety Orders. Rules and other Requirements 12129194 2121195 7119195 54 148 452

95-1 Need to improve safety of depleted UF6 cylinders 5/5/95 6129195 10/16195 11/1195 55 109 16 325

95-2 Need to improve focus of standards effort 10/11195 166

Table 1
03125196 Elapsed Time to Key Events for Complex-Wide Board Recommendations

Rec Subject Issue SOE IP Date SO Closure SOE lncrem Inere lnoem Elapsed Elapsed

Time to

No Date Accept Rev 0 Accepts Date InClem to Dev mlo to Time to Date

Date Date IP to Plan Revis Close Closure

Accept e

91>-2 Identify stds; assess adequacy; determine implementalion. 3/8/90 6112190 9/17190 1111195 1111/95 96 97 1871 0 2064

91-1 Improvemenl needed in DOE standards delJelopment program. 317191 5113/91 8/16191 10127192 10127/92 67 95 438 0 600

91"; Need for improved department-wide guidance on rad protection. 12119/91 1131192 6117192 712/93 43 138 380 1558

92-2 Need for improvement in DOE Facility Representative Program. 5128/92 7120192 11/5/92 53 108 1397

92-5 Discipline of Operation during period of changes in mis,sian. 8/17/92 12116/92 12121/92 1/8193 1/8/93 121 5 18 0 144

92-6 Need for DOE guidance on content, timing and staffing for ORR's. 8/26192 10119/92 1119/93 4/29194 11/1/95 54 92 465 551 1162

92-7 Need (or broad improvement in DOE Training/Qualification Programs 9/22192 1119/93 1114/93 t 1/4193 11/4/93 119 289 0 0 408

93-1 Need for consistency belween Orders for weapons/production facils 1/21193 4127/93 7119193 7130193 96 83 1I 1159

93-2 Need for continued general purpose Department criticalily program 3/23/93 5112193 8110/93 9130193 50 90 51 1098

93-3 Implement slep change in DOE ledmical staff qualifications 6/1/93 6/23/93 11/4/93 t 115193 22 134 1 1028

93-4 Need for improved tech mgt and oversight of ERMC's. 6/16193 8/6193 11/8193 11/18/93 51 94 10 1013

94-2 Comprenensive review of low·level waste program 9/14194 10/28194 4/10195 6115195 44 154 66 558

94-5 Integrate DOE Safety Orders, Rules and other Requirements 12/29194 2/21/95 7/19195 54 148 452

95-2 Need to improve focus of slandards effort 10/11195 166

Table 2
After DOE acceptance and implementation of Board recommendations, safety

improvements have been madc in such fundamental areas as operational readiness reviews;

compliance with safety standards, orders and requiremcnts at ccrtain facilities; technical training

at DOE sites; discipline of operations; the safe handling of nuclcar materials; and radiation

protection. However, the pace of progress has been slow, especially in increasing the number

of qualified technical DOE persolmel and in dcvelopment of a sound, standards-based, complexwide safety managcmcnt program.

The Sccrctary of Energy has tcstified that the Board's actions, primarily in its formal

reconm1endations, had assisted the Department in identifying and correcting public health and

safety deficiencies at defense nuclear facilities. Key areas for which the Secretary was most

appreciative of thc Board's oversight included compliance with DOE safety requirements

including orders; hiring, retention, education, and training of DOE's technically-qualified

personnel; readying facilities to operate safely, and conduct of operations.

Both the Board and DOE have learncd much about smoothing thc rccommendation

process during the past six years. Establishment ofjoint working groups early in the process

contributes to satisfactory resolution of disagreements, and DOE's designation of a responsible

senior manager to lcad its development and completion of an acceptable implementation plan

has greatly improved the earlier record. Not all the previous disagreements have been resolved,

but some progress has been made, and the Board is confident that it can be sustained. The

cooperation evidcnt in the development of meaningful implementation plans for the most recent

Board recommendations is a good omen, and with each such achievement, the climate improves

further. Though some problems in actually completing implementation plans remain, these are,

for the most part, amenable to correction by sustained attention of senior managers in both

organizations. The Board reiterates its earlier conclusions regarding the effectiveness of thc

recommendation process, and refers the reader to Part 2 ofits Fifth Annual Report for a thorough

review ofthc subject.

Reporting Requirements

The Board's authority to establish binding reporting requirements, 42 V.S.c. § 2286b(d),

is likewise a strong forcing function which has been effective in causing DOE to take actions to

generate the information the Board seeks. This is particularly effective when the Board

determines it to be likely that activities needed to generate a mandated rcport will provide

irrefutable evidence ofa problem, and will likely do so in a manner that points thc way to DOE's

resolution ofthe issue of interest to the Board. Several examples ofthe Board's exercise ofthis

authority are presented in other sections ofthis report, as well as in earlier armual reports.

27
Public Hearings and Public Meetings

Finally, the statute also authorizes the Board to hold hearings on safety matters of

concern, under 42 U.S.C. § 2286b(a). The Board has learncd that conducting public hearings,

or less formal public meetings in which the public may observe the Board as it reviews particular

subjects with its own staff or with DOE representatives, is a particularly useful tool for helping

to determine the causes for DOE delays in implementing Board recommendations aimed at

achieving safety improvements. During the past year, the Board has used these tools more

frequently, and has found them valuable, not only to improve public access to the Board's

activities but also to obtain meaningful commitments from DOE officials.

In this connection, the Board has found that questioning key DOE and contractor

witnesses in a public forum focuses the witnesses on the need for obtaining tcchnically

supportable and reliable answers. The Board's authority to obtain information in a hearing and

under oath, if necessary, is quite compelling. For example, it is possible that holding such

hearings could have pinned down more effectively and expeditiously the nature oftechnical and

administrative problems, identit1ed areas of disagreement between the Board and DOE and

contractor personnel, and ultimately prompted DOE to complete some safety improvements

more quickly in implementing such fundamental Board recommendations as 90-2 (development

and implementation ofsafety requirements), 91-6 (radiation protection), 93-3 (improving DOE

technical competence), and 93-5 (waste characterization).

Questioning in public forums creates an atmosphere of accountability--an atmosphere

that conveys the Board's intent to use every available vehicle to achieve safety progress. It also

provides leverage through public and peer pressure to meet commitments contained in

implementation plans for Board recommendations accepted by DOE, and serves notice that

unjustifiable dclays will not be tolerated by the Board. The Board has used such hearings to

good effect regarding, for example, the need to take prompt and vigorous steps to stabilize

t1ssionable material in process lines and vessels, spcnt nuclear fuel, and waste materials;

characterization ofwaste stored in the Hanford Tank Farms; and needed improvements in DOE's

program for development, promulgation, and implementation ofsafety standards.

Response to public meetings and hearings such as these has been very positive. For

example, representatives oflabor organizations, the Texas State Senate, the City of Amarillo,

local businesses, citizens' groups, and many individuals from the vicinity ofthe Pantex Plant

respondcd to a public hearing by writing letters to the Board to applaud its openness, to express

their views that the Board and its staff have performed admirably, and to endorse the Board's

continuing oversight role. Similar responses have been received from neighbors ofthe Rocky

Flats Environmental Technology Site and the Savannah River Site.

28
Participation in the Work of the Advisory Committee on External Regulation of

Department of Energy Nuclear Safety

On January 25, 1995, with the support of the White House Council 011 Environmental

Quality (CEQ), the Secretary of Energy created an Advisory Committee on External Regulation

of the Department of Energy's nuclear activities. Some, but not all of these activities are

regulatcd under provisions of laws pertaining to environmental protection. In 1988, Congress

providcd for oversight of the nuclear safety aspects of DOE's defense nuclear facilities by

establishing the Board.

The Secretary's action in setting up the Advisory Committee was stimulated in part by

a Congressional Subcommittee's interest in the idea of external regulation rather than oversight

and a Department perception that the public acceptability and credibility of the Department's

future activities could be enhanced through external regulation of nuclear activities. The Board

was requested by CEQ and the Sccretary of Energy to participate in the Advisory Committee's

study. In the spirit of cooperation. the Board contributed to this matter through the active

participation ofBoard Member Joseph J. DiNunno. This proved to be no small chore on his part.

The Committee's report, "Improving Regulation o/Sa/ety at DOE Nuclear Facilities, "

dated December 1995, which advocates external regulation, was released to the public on

JanualY 19, 1996. Both the Board and the Nuclear Regulatoly Commission were identified as

candidatc agencies around which such a regulatoly program might be structured. Although the

report purports to represent views of the Committee as a whole, there was in reality strong

consensus on only a few ofthe conclusions and considerable diversity of views on others. Mr.

DiNunno issued a statemCnl of separate views which is appended to the Committee's final

report. In his statement, Mr. DiNulillo supported a number of the concepts and ideas in the

Committce's report and explained in brief his objections to a number of specific

recommendations.

The Board's initial reaction is that any regulatmy model that embodies all the concepts

recommended in the Comminee's report will exacerbate the Department's problems, not solve

them. Modest expansion of Ihe Board's statutolY authority would go a long way toward

achieving many ofthe perceived benefits of external regulation, and at much lower cost. Such

an expanded role for the Board might include, for example, greater powers involving: (1)

standards setting; (2) approval by the Board of authorization bases for operating high hazard

facilities; and (3) approval of qualification requirements for selected safety positions. This

concept of an incremental increase in the Board's functions was presented to the Committee

during its deliberations. It was never considered seriously.

The matter of external regulation of defense nuclear facilities is particularly sensitive

since national security issues are involved. The Board is sensitive to not only this aspect of

increased regulatory oversight ofDOE defense nuclear activities, but also the cost implications

29
oflegalistic, formal regulatory proccdures. NRC estimated an additional cost of $\00 to $300

million per year and an additional 1100 to 2000 full-time employees if it were to assume

regulatory responsibility similar to the certification process used for the gaseous diffusion plants;

licensing of new DOE facilities was not included in NRC's estimate. In addition, if the

Committce's recommendation were to bc implemented in full, it would provide greater

opportunity for citizen lawsuits in defense nuclear activities than currently exists in the

commercial nuclear regulatory arena.

New/Rotated Site Representatives

During 1995, the Board continued to increase its on-site oversight of defense nuclear

facilities by assigning two experienced staff members to full-time duty at the Rocky Flats

Environmcntal Technology Site (RFETS). Technical taffmembers already had been stationed

at two other DOE sites; two individuals who are assigned to the Pantex Plant, and one who is

assigned to thc Hanford Site. During the past year, the Board also completed the first rotation

of staff mcmbers assigned as site representatives at the Pantex Plant, thus highlighting an

additional potential career path for the Board's technical staff. A second site representative was

assigned to the Hanford Site in March 1996 and the Board expects to have a full-time staff

member at the Savannah River Site by mid-year.

The Site Representatives Program has greatly expanded the Board's ability to closely

monitor DOE activities. Site representatives have facilitated prompt identification of health and

safety concerns and in conducting daily assessments ofnuclear safety management at the priority

sites to which they have been assigned. Site representatives regularly interact with the public,

union members. Congressional staff members, and public officials from federal, state, and local

agencies. The Board has received numerous unsolicitcd comments from members of these

groups reflecting favorably on the performance ofthe assigned site representatives.

C. SAFETY ASPECTS OF DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSE

NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Defense Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is a large, new vitrification plant

designed to convert highly radioactive waste into a stable borosilicate glass f01111. Constmction

began in 1983, before the facility was completely designed. Detailed design proceeded

concurrently with construction through the late 1980's. Since then, additional facility design

improvements determined to be either desirable or necessary have been identified and

implemented. The chemical processes involved are extremely complex. They are significantly

complicated by the presence of high-level waste (HLW) and the resulting need for remote

handling ofthe material.

30
During the past several years, the Board and its staff have emphasized to DOE the

importance of providing defense-in-depth in both the design and the operation ofthe plant. This

emphasis has led to improvements in designs and operational modes, including: upgrading of

selected critical plant systems to safcty class; installing backup nitrogen inerting systems on

process vessels; improving training and qualification programs; and reducing the potential

number ofsimultaneous safcty-critical alarms in the control room.

At year-end, DWPF prcoperational testing was nearing completion, and DOE had

scheduled a comprehensive Operational Readiness Review (ORR) in anticipation of an early

1996 startup. The Board's staffwill observe the readiness rcview and assess the results.

In-Tank Precipitation Facility at the Savannah River Site

At thc In-Tank Precipitation (lTP) facility, sodium tetraphenylborate (TPB) is used to

concentrate and remove radioactive cesium from the waste stream in preparation for processing

at the Defcnsc Waste Processing Facility. During the process, chemical and radiolytic

decomposition ofthe TPB occurs, liberating substantial quantities of highly flammable benzene.

This situation creates the potential for a tank deflagration accident that could release large

amounts ofradioactive material. Safeguarding against this potential situation has been a major

focal point of Board scrutiny.

Another focus of the Board's attention at this facility was an assumption in the ITP

safety analysis that benzene vapor in the tank head spacc would be well mixed. Benzene vapor

is significantly denser than air or nitrogen and thus there is a distinct possibility that flammable

pockets of benzene vapor could develop near the liquid surface of the waste. Based on an

analytical study ofthis issue by its staff, the Board has prodded DOE to perform a detailed fluid

dynamics analysis to dctermine whether this assumption of a well-mixed vapor in the tank head

space is indeed valid. The Board also established the need for an on-line sampling system to

measure temperature and vapor concentrations throughout the tank. This system has proven

valuable in helping to analyze recent unexpected conditions.

Although several tests and experiments have been performed during the last 13 years, the

exact processes which result in the production and liberation of benzene are not well understood.

Unexpectedly, the release of benzene is significantly increased by forced mixing resulting from

operation ofthe slurry pumps. The resultant concentration of benzene in the vapor space would

likely exceed Operational Safety Requirement (OSR) limits during multiple slurry pump

operation. This anomalous behavior is being examined assiduously by both the Board and DOE

as part of pre-operational preparations.

An Operational Readiness Review performed by the Westinghouse Savannah River

Company (WSRC) in October 1994 determined that training and qualification of operating and

support personnel were still at a very early stage. Furthermore, high quality procedures needed

by operators were not sufficiently in place. The Board insisted that the ORR be redone when

31
ITP was better prepared to stmi up and operate. A supplemental ORR, performed by WSRC in

the April-May 1995 period. was much more effectivc at confirming facility readiness. The

subsequent ORR performed by DOE supported this by identi fying only a limited number of

additional deficiencies requiring correction.

The Board will continue to review upcoming ITP activities, including Unreviewed Safety

Question Determinations associated with postulated benzene production and release

mechanisms, testing evolutions, plant modifications, and research.

Structural Adequacy of Plutonium Storage Facility at the Rocky Flats

Environmental TeehnQlogy Site

In 1993, DOE formulated plans to consolidate storage of large amounts of plutonium in

Building 371 at the Rocky Flats Envirorunental Technology Site (RFETS). The building was

not originally designed for this mission. The Board reviewed the design of the building,

including the building's capacity to withstand external forces from natural phenomena (e.g.,

earthquakes). Based on its review, the Board concluded that activities to prepare Building 371

for an extended storage role were neither logically structured nor sufficiently broad in scope to

establish structural adequacy under loadings from unusual natural phenomena.

In September 1994, the Board issued Recommendation 94-3, Seismic andSafetySyslems,

addressing this matter. During DOE's preparation of an implementation plan, the Board spurred

DOE to take a systems cngineering approach in the development of an integrated plan that

addresses the civil-structural-seismic and systems safety issues and evaluations involved. In

October 1995, DOE completed an analysis which determined that the building could be made

structurally adequate provided several structural upgrades were accomplished. DOE is currently

planning to make these upgrades. Based on further efforts to systematically assess the plans for

Building 371, DOE is now evaluating whether there are better options for storing special nuclear

material at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site.

Los Alamos National Laboratory {LANLl Design Process for the Chemistry

and Metallurgy Research {CMRl Building

[n late 1994, the Board, its staff, and its outside experts reviewed preparations for a

testing program designed to study reactions ofmolten plutonium with other materials within fullsized components from dismantled nuclear weapons. For this program, LANL had already

begun upgrading the structural capability of a portion ofits Chemistry and Metallurgy Research

Building and had been constructing an experimental apparatus.

The Board's reviews disclosed that even though the contract for the building upgrade had

been placed and an experimental apparatus was being fabricated, potential hazards did not appear

to have been fully identified, and no clear analytical process for identifying them was apparent.

32
Based on these disclosures, the Board rcquested thut DOE provide a report identifying

the formal processes LANL follows in design, construction and preparation for operation of new

and upgraded facilities. As a rcsult, LANL has begun to clarify and implement an improved

systcm for technical management ofsuch projects.

Prepm'ations for Majo"lJpl:mdes at LANL CMR Building

LANL is planning upgrades of the CMR Building totaling more than $100 million,

including major changes in the electrical systems. Bascd on a review by the Board's staff, it

appears that a proper idcntification of hazards for the probable mission ofCMR would lead to

the necessity of providing emergency/standby power. LANL stated that while

emergency/standby power will be considered for thc upgrades, it is possible that ncither

emergency nor standby power would be implemented. This matter was brought to the attention

of DOE line management.

Configuration Management was also reviewed at CMR. The fundamental objectivc of

configuration managemcnt is to establish and maintain consistency among the facility dcsign

basis, physical configuration, and facility documentation for safety-related structures, systems

and components. It appears that configuration managcment activities need to be considerably

strengthened prior to significant additional work on thc CMR upgrades.

Guidance for Conducting Readiness Reviews at the Nevada Test Site fNTS)

In June 1995, the Board received revised interim DOE guidance for the conduct of

readiness reviews for testing of nuclear devices, termed "Testing Readincss Assessments." This

guidance was originally developed in response to Recommendation 92-6, Operational Readiness

Reviews, and was subsequently reviscd to address Board commcnts regarding when such

assessments arc rcquired. The Board accepted the Testing Readincss Assessment guidance as

meeting the intent of Recommendation 92-6 for the conduct of readincss reviews of tests of

nuclear devices at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), should such operations be rcsumed in the future.

DOE has committed to use the process until additional guidunce, to bc dcveloped as part of

Recommendation 93-1 implementation, becomes available.

Device Assembly Facility lOAF) at the Nevada Test Site fNTS)

The Device Assembly Facility (DAr) at NTS is a new, modcrate hazard facility for

nuclear explosive operations, that was originally intended for assembling one-of-a-kind nuclear

test devices. However, a broader range of operations, such as disasscmbly, modification,

staging, maintenance, repair, retrofit, and surveillance of nuclear weapons, could be

accommodated within thc DAF mission with only modest changes. The Board and its staff

reviewed the OAF safety basis and the design of selected systems, in anticipation of its

upcoming ORR. Specific deficiencies in the electrical distribution and fire protcction systems

identificd by the reviews were provided to DOE; these were addressed by coordination studies

33
applicable to protective dcvices, anticipated clectrical system upgrades. and a consolidated fire

hazards analysis.

Systems EngineCl'ing at the I·lallford Site

III Recommendation 92-4, the Board pressed DOE to commit to systematic management

ofthe Hanford Multi-function Waste Tank Facility (MWTF) project because of indications that

the Department was proceeding with thc project without adequately addressing all health and

safety design criteria for the fulllifc cyclc of the facility. In response, DOE committed to take

a systems enginecring approach to the design ofthe MWTF, and to perform independent design

reviews, starting with an overall System Requirements Review (SRR) for the Tank Waste

Remediation Systcm (TWRS).

This SRR, performed by an independent group and led by reprcsentatives from DOE

Headquarters, idcntified significant risks and uncertainties associated with the project. As the

Board had independcntly determincd. the SRR team found that health and safety requiremcnts

including those related to end state criteria and final waste form had not been adequately dcfined

even though a project baseline had been assumed. Selections of alternatives had been made

without adequate justification from performance and safety perspectives. As a result ofthe SRR,

DOE-RL and its contractors are working toward more systematically identifying the systcms

functions and requirements, including those requirements related to health and safety.

D. SAFELY MANAGING SURPLUS NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND WASTE

Stabilization of Fissionahle Residues at the Roeky Flats Environmental Technology

Site

In Recommendation 94-1, the Board recommended that DOE expedite its efforts to

characterize and stabilize a wide variety of production residues remaining in process lines and

storage containers which were continuing to degrade. creating an increasing hazard. Although

the problem exists at several facilities in the defense nuclear complex, it is especially acute at

the Rocky Flats Evironmental Technology Site (RFETS).

During the summer of 1995, impure material remaining from metal casting, which

constituted one of the highest risk sources of plutonium-bearing residues at RFETS, was

successfully stabilized. In addition, by mid-November 1995, plutonium metal in contact with

plastic at RFETS had been repackaged in accordance with DOE's implementation plan.

Moreover, processing and safe interim storage of other plutonium residues and oxides are

proceeding, albeit not on the schedule set forth in DOE's implementation plan.

34
Nuclear Materil\! Stabilization nt the Savannah River Site

At the SavalUlah River Site, Recommendation 94-1 applies to stabilization of solutions

containing plutonium and trans-plutonium elements in F-Canyon, plutonium metal in storage,

and irradiated fuel and target assemblies in basins. In accordance with its implementation plan,

DOE has expedited processing of plutonium solutions in F-Canyon and FB-Line, in addition to

reassessing its earlier plans for deteriorating fuel and target material.

As part ofthe material stabilization effort, the Board has insisted that each facility to be

used for stabilization undergo a thorough Operational Readiness Review, including reviews of

operator training and procedures, verification of equipment operability, and definition and

control ofthe facility's authorization basis. This process has resulted in: (I) augmented steps

to protect against radioactive material release, including the isolation of an F-Canyon tank that

contains highly radioactive americium and curium; (2) modifications to the FB-Line ventilation

system to provide exhaust filtration through a sand filter; (3) additional controls in F-Canyon and

H-Canyon to prevent an explosion similar to the accident at the Tomsk facility in the former

USSR; and (4) reductions in the size and number of contaminated areas in both F-Canyon and

the FB-line.

Spent Nuclear Fue! at the Savannah River Site

In Recommendation 94-1, the Board urged DOE to expedite processing of deteriorating

reactor fuel stored in basins at the Savannah River Site. In its implementation plan, DOE

committed to begin stabilizing this aluminum-clad highly-enriched fuel by November 1996.

Subsequently, DOE announced plans to continue to store the material in water basins and to

conduct additional studics ofthe feasibility of dry storage.

The Board and its staff identificd problems with pursuing dry storage plans for

aluminum-clad highly-enriched uranium fuel, and pointed out certain rapidly corroding

nondefense fuel that had been previously predicted by DOE to remain stable for another ten

years. In a subsequent tcchnical report, DNFSBrrECH-7, Stabilization ofDeteriorating Mark

16 and Mark 22 Aluminum-Alloy Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Savannah River Site. the Board

established the technical basis for concluding that stabilization of this fuel by chemical

separation is the better alternative.

The Board's attention to this matter caused DOE to refocus its previous dry storage plans,

and, as a consequence, DOE now is examining means to expedite convcrsion of the fuel into

more manageable components (i.e., feed for the Defense Waste Processing Facility and lowenriched uranium).

In addition, had the Board not alerted DOE to the rapidly corroding but incorrectly

categorized fuel, it is likely that DOE would have continued wet storage, based on its assumption

ofstability for at least the next decade. In response to the Board's findings, DOE rapidly made

35
plans to remove this fuel from wet storage and to stabilize it by chemical processing. Only

weeks after these revised plans were initiated, this fuel demonstrated its lack ofstability under

the prevailing conditions of accelerated chemical attack and corrosion in wet storage by having

one of its storage containers rupture.

Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in the K-Sasin' at the Hanford Site

At the beginning of 1994, DOE pursued a vaguely defined course of action to resolve

recognized safety issues with severely deteriorated spent fuel stored in leaking basins located

next to the Columbia River. A Tri-Party Agreement involving DOE, the Environnlental

Protection Agency, and thc State of Washington had been reached to remove the fuel from the

basins by the end of the year 2002. DOE·HQ expressed reservations about the feasibility of

meeting the agreed-upon completion date. Meanwhile, the contractor expendcd considerable

resources, but made little progress, on an interim effort to encapsulate (in the basin water) all of

the fuel in the K-East Basin.

[n early 1994, the Board pointed out the lack of a teclmical basis for DOE's planned

course of action and urged DOE to identify engineering alternatives, the criteria for selecting an

alternative, and the anticipated radiological consequences of proposed actions. In May 1994, the

Board issued Recommendation 94-1, specifically recommending that the program be accelerated

to place the deteriorating reactor fuel in a stable configuration for interim storage until an option

for ultimate disposition is chosen.

As a result of intense interactions between DOE and the Board and its teclmical staff,

DOE's implementation plan committed to begin fuel removal by the end of 1997, and to

complete fuel removal by December 1999. In addition. this implementation plan reflected

results of recently performed engineering studies identifying stabilized dry storage as the best

interim storage for the type of fuel stored in the K-Basin.

The Board's involvement with these issues resulted in a technically sound path forward

and an expedited schedule for resolving the safety and environmental vulnerabilities associated

with the leaking fuel. The Board was instrumental in steering both the contractor and DOE

toward a system where all activities associated with the stabilization ofthe fuel in the K-Basins

were conducted on a separate project basis. The Board has since continued to apply pressure to

ensure timely implementation ofthis path forward.

Integrity of Cesium "nd Strontinm Capsules at the Hanford Site

The B-PlantlWaste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) at the Hanford Site

contains about 1900 metal capsules containing radioactive cesium and strontium which are

stored undelwater. The material, which was extracted from high level waste and sealed in the

double-encapsulated metal containers between 1974 and 1985, contains about 73 million curies -

about one-third ofthe total inventory ofradioactive material at the Hanford Site.

36
The capsules m'e currently intact, but confinement must be maintained until the capsules

are removed from thc facility, and final disposition may not occur for another twenty ycars.

During the coming ycar, the Board and its staff will continue to review the long-term integrity

of thc capsules, the integrity of the storage pools, and the capability to detect and handle a

leaking container. Through its staff, the Board is also reviewing the authorization basis of the

facility. These reviews are expected to continue into FY 1997, and bcyond.

Adequacy of Nuclear Material Storage Conditions at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

At the Y-12 Plant, the nation's repository for Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), DOE

plans to consolidate much ofthe HEU from other sites in the complex. This will involve receipt,

proccssing, and storage of uranium in many different forms. Historically, no standard existed

for uranium storage. This past summer, DOE approved a standard for storing HEU at the Y-12

Plant. The Board and its tcchnical staff played a key role in the creation ofthis standard through

on-sitc reviews and dctailed technical comments on the initial drafts.

Cylinders Containing Depleted Uranium at the Gaseous Diffusion Plants

Approximately 50,000 cylinders containing more than 500,000 metric tons of depleted

uranium hexal1uoride (UF.) remaining from the production ofenriched uranium for both defense

and civilian purposes are in outdoor storage at the three gaseous diffusion plants in Oak Ridge,

Tennessee; Portsmouth, Ohio; and Paducah, Kentucky. In early 1995, the Board and its staff

reviewed the safety of these cylinders, following up on information indicating that poor

maintenance and storage conditions had led to severe corrosion and breaching of several

cylinders. The Board found that thc corrosion-resistant coatings ofthe cylinders had not been

maintained and that many cylinders were handled and stored under conditions that could lead

to high deterioration rates.

To protect against further cylinder breaches and the resulting potential for dispersion to

the environment oflarge amounts of UF6, the Board issued Recommendation 95-1 in May 1995,

urging DOE to address the problem promptly. The Secretary of Energy acceptcd thc Board's

Recommendation and submitted an acceptable implementation plan in October 1995. DOE

committed to: (I) address severely degraded cylinders expeditiously; (2) start a program to renew

protective coatings on cylinders; (3) investigate other measures to protect cylinders; and (4)

complete a full evaluation of cylinder storage hazards. The Board will continue to closely

monitor these efforts during 1996.

High-Level Waste Storage Tanks at the Hanford Site - Ferroeyanidc Hazards

During the first year ofits existence, the Board identified the storage tanks for high level

radioactive waste at the Hanford site as one ofthe most serious hazards in the defense nuclear

complex, mId gave the tank farms its immediate closc anention. One ofthe hazards of particular

37
concern was the suspected accumulation of potentially explosive concentrations of ferrocyanide

compounds in the tanks.

Late in 1990, the Board issued Recommendation 90-7, urging DOE to improve

significantly the monitoring, modeling, characterization, and emergency preparedness for those

high-level waste tanks believed to contain fcrroeyanide compounds. In its implementation plan,

DOE committed to upgrade instrumentation in the tanks, greatly accelerate efforts to characterize

the tank wastes and vapors, and conduct a focused investigation into the properties ofsimulated

wastes.

Spurred by the Board's recommendation, DOE and its contractors at Hanford researched

and investigated this issue and produced substantial evidence that during the decades of highlevel waste storage, the ferroeyanides have degraded to the point that they are now present in

relatively harmless concentrations, thus relieving a major safety issue. DOE is expected to

complete the work needed to close this issue permanently in the coming year.

High-Level Waste Storage Tanks at the Hanford Site - Characterization of Tank

Contents

In Recommendation 93-5, the Board exhorted DOE to substantially improve and

accelerate characterization of high-level waste in tanks at the Hanford Site. In response, DOE

committed to improve its management and conduct ofthe characterization program, to greatly

accelerate the sampling rate, and to ensure the timely completion of sampling and associated

analyses needed by the tank safety and waste disposal programs.

DOE and its contractors have struggled with the tank sampling and characterization

program. The result is that the characterization effort has not progressed at the planned rate.

However. a number ofsignificant improvements have resulted from DOE's efforts to implement

the Board's recommendation. The needs of the safety program have been identified, and

laboratory analyses critical to safety are evaluated and reported more rapidly than they had been

before the Board emphasized the seriousness of the issues. In addition, efforts to define

information needs have led to an improved understanding ofthe tank safety issues. In addition,

these efforts have led to a recognition that substantial uncertainties remain about waste tank

safety. DOE has responded by expanding safety-related controls on tank farm operations, a

precaution intended to reduce the likelihood of a tank accident.

Neutralization of Residual Production Materials at the Fernald Enyironmental

Management Project

In Recommendation 93-4, the Board recommended that DOE develop and implement a

plan for technical management of the contractor for the Fernald Environmental Management

Project, and to develop a clear plan and authorization basis for the neutralization of 200,000

gallons of uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH). In accordance with its implementation plan, DOE

38
developed a technical management plan identifying the responsibilities of DOE personnel

involved in management of the contractor. As a result, the UNH program was substantially

improved. Modifications to the process were made, disciplined conduct of operations principles

were implementcd, and detailed formalized procedures were developed. With these

improvements, the entire UNH inventory and a smaller amount ofthorium nitrate solution were

safely neutralizcd.

Implementation of Recommendation 94-2 - ImproYing DOE's Low-Level Waste

Program

Recommendation 94-2, issued in September 1994, called for a complex-wide review of

DOE's low-level radioactive waste (LLW) program to establish the dimensions of the LLW

problem and identify suitable corrective actions. DOE's implementation plan organized efforts

into six areas: (I) systems engineering, (2) a complex wide vulnerabilities assessment, (3) a

study of DOE LLW regulatory structure and process, (4) LLW performance assessments, (5)

LLW projections, and (6) research and development associated with LLW disposal.

Originally, the implementation plan called for work to be completed by August 1997,

with most activitics completed by latel996. DOE has made little progress, however, toward

achievement ofthis schedule. Instead, DOE has directed its efforts toward reassessing existing

commitments and formulating a new strategy that is more consistent with available funds and

technical resources.

Key technical issues remaining to be resolved include:

• bounding DOE's low-level waste program in a manner that is consistent with

DOE's needs;

• development of a sound technical strategy for reflecting composite radionuclide

source terms in LLW performance assessments;

• revision of DOE Order 5820.2A, Radioactive Waste Management, to inelude the

commitments in DOE's implementation plan; and

• delays in formulating a LLW policy consistent with low-level waste projections

and capacity in terms of both volume and radionuclide loading.

Overall, DOE misjudged the technical complexity ofimplementing this recommendation

and is in the process of determining what resources and strategies are necessary to resolve

fundamental issues. The Board is following these efforts with keen interest, to ensure that

DOE's selection of alternatives is consistent with the Board's intent.

39
E. SAFETY ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

AND MANAGEMENT

Oversight of Stockpile Stewardship and Management Activities at the Nevada Test

Site

During 1995, DOE conducted several test rcadiness exercises and activities at tlie Nevada

Test Sitc (NTS). The Board oversaw the first high-explosive experiment conducted in a new

underground facility and other experiments that exercised safety-critical skills needed for nuclear

testing operations. In addition, the Board Members traveled to NTS in November 1995, where

they obtained firsthand information on a variety of experimental activities being conducted in

support of DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program; the status of the new

Device Assembly Facility; and the archiving efforts related to Recommcndation 93-6 being

performed by the Nevada Operations Office/Joint Test Organization. The Board also examined

the LYNER underground experimental facility.

Disparity in Applicahjlity of Orders

The Board issued Recommendation 93-1, Standards Utilization in Defense Nuclear

Facilities, in early 1993, recommending that DOE address the differences between the safety

requirements applicable to nuclear explosives facilities and those applicable to other defense

nuclear facilities. In 1994, DOE completed its analysis and developed a plan to improve the set

ofDOE orders applicable to nuclear explosives facilities, and to take corrective actions in sixteen

functional areas. The Department plarmed to "adopt by reference" nine previously excluded

DOE orders as the cornerstone ofits corrective actions. Additionally, DOE had agreed to review

standards currently applicable to nuclear explosives facilities and to develop additional

standards, as needed.

The Board is encouraged by DOE's commitment to extend the applicability of nuclear

safety orders and to increase the set of DOE safety standards applicable to nuclear explosive

operations.

Implementation of Recommendation 93-lINESS CAP

In its implementation plan for Recommendation 93-1, Standards Utilization in Defense

Nuclear Facilities, and the associated Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Corrective Action Plan

(NESS CAP), DOE made commitments to complete five major actions. Three ofthe five actions

have been completed and subsequently accepted by the Board.

The Board currently is having its technical staff evaluate one of the remaining tasks

concerning the revision of orders applicable to facilities involved in assembly, disassembly, and

testing of nuclear explosives. The current drafts of the new orders represent quantum

improvements over the existing orders; however, some significant issues remain. For example,

40
the revised orders do not include the previous requirement to conduct a quantitative risk

assessment of plutonium dispersal during Nuclear Explosive Safcty Studies. In addition, several

ofthe previously-excluded nuclear safety orders DOE has committed to "adopt by reference" are

only partially invoked in the rcvised orders. At the end of the year, the Board's staff was

continuing to work with its DOE counterparts to address thcsc issues.

DOE's Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE-AL) is re,viewing all ofits Supplemental

Directives (AL-SDs), with the aim of eliminating as many as possible. These directives provide

detailed guidance for safety of nuclear explosive activities conducted at the Pantcx Plant. The

Board intends to follow this activity closely to ensure that safety of nuclear explosive operations

at the Pantex Plant is not compromised.

In response to Recommendation 93-I, DOE has been working to expedite and upgrade

Order Compliance Self-Asscssments (OCSA) at the following five sites: the Pantex Plant, the

Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Oak Ridge

Y-I2 Plant, and the Nevada Test Site. This effort has significantly enhanced the use ofstandards

that affect nuclear explosive safety. During the thirty months since the Board accepted DOE's

implementation plan for Recommendation 93-1, other initiatives to define, control, and

implement safety requirements have also been underway. A summary of each site's work

completed or planned is included below:

• The Pantex Plant is expected to complete a revised site-level OCSA in the first

quarter of 1996. Development of an "Essential Standards Program" that will

include SRlDs and compliance assessments has been initiated by the

management and operating contractor.

• At Oak Ridge, revised OCSAs have been completed for site-level and Buildings

9212 and 9720-5 SRlDs at the Y-12 Plant.

• The three nuclear design laboratories are working together to develop integrated

safety management programs for research and development activities.

• DOE committed to verify order compliance prior to conducting its operational

readiness review (ORR) for the Device Assembly Facility at NTS.

Implementation of Recommendatjon 93-6

In its implementation plan for Recommendation 93-6, "Maintaining Access to Nuclear

Weapons Expertise in the Defense Nuclear Facilities Complex," DOE committed to retain access

to and capture the unique, and as yet undocumented knowledge of individuals who had been

engaged for many years in the assembly, disassembly, and testing of nuclear weapons.

4\
DOE's execution ofthe approved implementation plan was problematic from the start.

Some efforts were made in ccrtain areas, but little progress in completing several key

commitments was evident by the spring of 1995. The commitment to establish an ongoing

program to identify and capture skills and knowledge was several months overdue, due to the

lack of integrated technical guidance and coordination. Efforts to remove administrative

obstacles to gaining needed access to retirees for archiving purposes were stalled. The

commitment to establish processes for developmcnt of safe dismantlement and modification

proccdures for the Pantcx Plant, originally due in October 1994, had not been completed six

months after that datc. DOE's assertion that the existing stockpile surveillance program

addressed the Board's concerns on hazards from the degradation of remaining weapons and the

potcntial impact on weapon operations was not supported by the description of this program

provided as a deliverable under the implementation plan.

On April 5, 1995, the Board wrote to the Secretary of Energy expressing these concerns

about Recommendation 93-6 implementation. The letter stated the Board's position that:

" ... the delay in completing these and other important commitments has

jeopardized the overall schedule and effectiveness ofthe DOE's implementation

of Board Recommendation 93-6. These delays continue to indicate that the

necessary level ofmanagement attention at DOE Headquarters, field offices, and

contractors organizations is not being applied in meeting the commitments to the

Board."

The Board asked to be infom1ed ofadditional actions DOE planned to take to address the

identified implementation deficiencies and to minimize further adverse impact to the ovcrall

implementation ofRecommendation 93-6.

The Board received the Department's response to the April 5 letter on July 7. This

response committed to develop a reviscd Implementation Plan for Recommendation 93-6.

However, this response, which came three months after the Board's letter, only committed to

having the Defense Program organization draft an Implementation Plan revision by thc time

anothcr month had passed. As of thc end of 1995, DOE had failed to provide a revised

Implementation Plan for Recommendation 93-6 for Board consideration and acceptance. The

Department's performance in this important form offormal interaction with the Board has been

poor. However, despite the problems discussed above, DOE field and contractor efforts to

implement the intent ofBoard Recommendation 93-6 made significant progress in 1995.

While revision ofthe Implementation Plan was in progress, the Nevada Operations Office

(NVOO) effectively completed all commitments under both the old Implementation Plan and

the revised Plan under considcration. This included completion ofJob Task Analyses (ITAs)

for all key positions involved with the critical safety activities, functions, and operations for

nuclear testing. An evaluation was completed on the reliance on traditional administrative

controls for nuclear explosive safety in testing operations. A knowledge, skill, and experience

42
archiving program has been developed and is being actively implemented. NVOO has formally

institutionalized an annual adequacy assessment of critical functional areas, key positions, JTAs,

and personnel. NVOO personnel involved in Reconmlendation 93-6 implementation should be

commended for thcir high degrce of independent initiative.

A "Knowledge Preservation Progranl" involving both the Y-12 Plant and the DOE Oak

Ridge Operations Office was developed and was being implemented at year-end, in anticipation

of completion ofthe revised implementation plan.

Progress was less evident for those clements of the Recommendation involving

operations at the Pantex Plant, which come under the cognizance ofthe Albuquerque Operations

Office. A Board briefing on the status ofthe weapons laboratories' archiving programs in late

May showed little evidence of progress in capturing the undocumented safety-related skills and

knowledge of departing weapons progranl personnel. In response to the Board's expressed

concerns, DOE issucd additional explicit instructions to the laboratories; by year-end there was

evidence of more activity, on both the DOE side and at the laboratories.

Improvements at the Pantex Plant

The Board's activities have initiated or provided significant contributions to a number

of achievements at the Pantex Plant during the last year:

Reduced Risk due to Aircraft Overllights

Due in large part to the Board's intensive review of the aircraft crash analysis for the

Pantex Plant, an Overflight Working Group, chaired by DOE and including representatives from

the City of Amarillo, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the United States Air

Force (USAF), was chartered to assess the feasibility ofmoving air traffic away from the plant.

Based on the recommendations of this working group, DOE has funded the FAA to upgrade

navigational aids at the Amarillo International Airport. The FAA has completed engineering

design studies and expects to complete in late 1996 the construction of a precision approach to

Runway 22. Eventually, most flights over the Pantex Plant will be eliminated, thereby reducing

significantly the risk of an aircraft crash at the site. Additionally, DOE has discussed the safety

implications of aircraft overflights of the Pantex Plant with representatives from neighboring

USAF bases whose aircraft use the Amarillo runway for pilot training. The Air Force

commanders have issued safety bulletins to their aircraft squadrons that will help reduce the

number of overflights ofthe Pantex Plant.

Improved Technical Staffing in the AmarillO Area Office

On July 20, 1994, the Board wrote to DOE concerning the paucity of technically

competent personnel on the DOE Amarillo Area Office (AAO) staff. This deficiency had

resulted in delays in implementing nuclear safety requirements, as well as a general inability to

43
ensure the contractor's readiness to proceed with new nuclear weapons activities. The Board

mged DOE to place the highest priority on upgrading the staffing of AAO with the correct mix

and quantity of technically qualified personnel. Because of the Board's efforts, technically

competent engineering professionals were hired, many with strong nuclear industry experience.

This enhancement of technical competence of the AAO staff has yielded substantial

improvements in operations at the Pantex Plant in the areas of analysis, documentation and

control ofthe safety envelope; personnel training and qualification; and control ofthe nuclear

weapon dismantlement process.

Readiness to Begin Weapons Assembly/Disassembly Operations

The Board and its staff have been reviewing implementation of the DOE process used

to confirm readiness to conduct nuclear weapons assembly, disassembly, and smveillance

operations at the Pantex Plant. This process was developed partially in response to

Recommendation 92-6, Operational Readiness Reviews. The Board is encouraged by the

increased involvement of personnel from the National Laboratories in the review of readiness

to begin operations. However, the Board's review of DOE's efforts to start operations on a

number of weapon systems revealed deficiencies with implementation of the process. For

example, reviews were being utilized more as a teclmical assistance visit by the Laboratories,

than as a final independent assessment of operational readiness. In January 1995, the Board

asked DOE to address certain issues and identify actions to improve the readiness process and

its implementation. In response to the reporting requirement, and at DOE's direction, the Pantex

Plant has improved its line management ability to assure readiness and is incorporating improved

guidance for the independent review processes.

Improved Conduct of Opcnltions and Use of Standards

During the past year, in response to Board Recommendations on standards and reporting

requirements concerning conduct of operations, DOE and the Pantex Plant management and

operating contractor have improved the use of procedures, thereby greatly improving the

formality of operations at the plant. AAO has developed a set of operating procedures to

standardize area office functions. These procedures capture requirements from DOE orders and

other guidance to ensure the AAO staff fulfills all its responsibilities. The contractor also has

improved its use ofstandards during the last year to control operations more formally. Examples

ofthese improvements include a standardized process for writing Nuclear Explosive Operating

Procedures, standardized review criteria, methods for self-assessments, and improved

maintenance surveillance procedures. DOE-AL directives require verbatim compliance with

approved procedures; however, the Board continues to identify numerous cases in which

procedures are not followed or calmot be followed as written. This matter will receive close

attention from the Board's site representatives and other staff members during 1996.

44
New and Upgraded Safety Analyses

The Board has had a significant impact on the efforts to upgrade safety analyses at the

Pantex Plant. Its reviews have ensured consistency between the safety analyses being performed

for the site-wide Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and the facility Safety Analysis Reports

(SARs). The Board has also closely reviewed the technical adequacy ofthe Basis for Interim

Operations and the rigor ofthe bounding accident analysis. This focused review by the Board

has helped ensure that the safety analyses being developed are complete and technically sound.

A draft site-wide EIS and SAR's for the Assembly/Disassembly Bay and Cell are expected to

be completed in 1996. These efforts to upgrade safety analyses have led to the identification of

several Unreviewed Safety Questions at the Pantex Plant. For example, additional analysis and

controls were required to improve the safety of tritium storage and of eell operations so as to

assure that an explosion would not cause radioactive material to be released from the building.

Design and Safcty Basis for the New Spccial Nuclcar Material Staging Facility

The Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Component Staging Facility at the Pantex Plant

(Building 12-116) was designed in 1988; construction was completed in 1993. However, the

facility has never been operated, primarily because ofshifting mission requirements and the need

to correct design and construction discrepancies. The facility, which is expected to have new

equipment backfitted during the next two years and to become opcrational in 1998, will be used

to consolidate staging, inspection, and packaging operations for strategic reserve components.

During the latter half of 1995, the Board initiated a systematic review of this facility,

focusing particularly on design characteristics that establish the nuclear safety envelope. These

characteristics are expected to form a significant part ofthe authorization basis for the facility.

The ongoing review by the Board is to identify hazards and appropriate accident scenarios for

the facility, and to detennine whcther safety-related Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs)

provide thc requisite defense-in-depth. In addition, the review will examine standards, tests,

analyses, and independent design reviews used in the design ofthe SSCs. The review, which

is scheduled for completion by mid1996, is designed to provide early identification of potential

facility safety problems and to allow DOE up to six months to resolve any problems prior to the

anticipated start of backfit construction.

Conduct of Operations and Criticality Safety at the Y-U Plant. Oak Ridge

In September 1994, in response to numerous violations of criticality safety and

weaknesses in disciplined operations identified by its staff, the Board issued Recommendation

94-4, Deficiencies in Criticality Safety at the Oak Ridge Y-] 2 Plant. This recommendation

discussed observed wcaknesses in operator discipline and in criticality safety programs, as well

as in the adequacy of DOE and contractor cxperience, training, and performance. Based on the

Board's observations, DOE suspended operations at the Y-12 plant, pending development of an

implementation plan. Both DOE and its contractor have since undertaken a number ofinitiatives

45
to prepare the Y·12 facilities for resumption of operations, in accordance with DOE's

implementation plan.

DOE's course of action for resumption of operations was to take immediate steps to

correct safety deficiencies and then validate them through a (ermal restart process in accordance

with DOE 5480.31, Startup and Restart 01Nuclear Facilities. Three mission areas have been

restarted successfully. Disassembly and assembly operations are projected to be restattcd in the

spring of 1996 and enriched uranium operations are scheduled to resume in 1997. In addition,

within months ofthe Board's issuance ofRecommendation 94-4, the DOE Y·12 Site Office was

able to add eight new, tcchnically competent personnel. These individuals have technical

degrees and extensive nuclear backgrounds.

Several other independent DOE functional area assessments (training, conduct of

operations, and criticality safety) have been performed in accordance with commitments in

DOE's 94-4 Implementation Plan. Each ofthese assessments found that, in general, significant

progress had been made in the past year as a direct result of activities associated with

Recommendation 94·4. The training area assessment made note ofthe technical competence of

key DOE personnel at the Y·12 Plant, stating, "The base level of Federal personnel technical

expertise and competency at the Y-12 Plant site has significantly increased since the September

1994 event." The evaluators also noted that continued progress is still required in those areas

that have been restarted, and that significant work is needed in other areas where restart has not

occurred.

Project Sapphire· Receipt and Handling of Highly Enriched Uranium from the

former Soviet Union

During the period November 1994 through October 1995, the Board providcd safety

oversight of activities involving "Project Sapphire" materials at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. In

November 1994. Project Sapphire personnel transported approximately 600 kilograms of Highly

Enriched Uranium (HEU) from a nuclear facility in the Former Soviet Union State of

Kazakhstan to Dover Air Force Base, in Delaware. After arrival at Dover, the material was

shipped to the Y-12 Plant, where it was received and placed into interim storage by the Y-12

personnel. DOE next began negotiating with private vendors for the sale ofthe material, for the

purpose ofeventual blending the material down for commercial reactor fuel. The final shipment

of Project Sapphire material was made from the Y-12 Plant in October 1995.

The Project Sapphire material was received, stored, and reshipped from the Y-12 Plant

in a safe manner. However, Board oversight did identify areas for improvement that should be

considered for similar initiatives, should any become necessary. During Board staff reviews

conducted prior to shipment to the Y-12 Plant, it appeared that the Project Sapphire material had

not been sufficiently characterized to conclude that it complied with Y-12 standards for storage

ofHEU. In addition, adequate hazards analysis and unreviewed safety question screening were

not accomplished prior to receipt of the material to determine if the special operation was

46
actually within the safety authorization basis for the facility. Although DOE eventually

developed an adequate sampling plan, the necessary additional sampling and charactcrization

were never accomplishcd. DOE decided to allow the charactcrization and subsequent processing

to be accomplished aftcr shipment to the vendor's facility.

Control of the Authol'ization Basis for a Nuclear Research and Development

Facility

Thc primary mission of the Plutonium Facility at the Lawrencc Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL) involves the conduct of plutonium research and development activities

associated with the DOE Stockpile Stewardship and Management program. During a 1994

review ofthe facility, the Board's staff noted the absence of facility operating limits on which

the newly approved final Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is to be based. LLNL had failed to meet

surveillance requirements established by the SAR to ensure operability ofsafety systems, such

as emergency power, fire protection, and ventilation. After the Board identified these

deficiencies to both DOE and laboratory personncl, LLNL placed the facility in administrative

standby and normal nuclear operations were curtailed.

Before resuming operations in late 1995, LLNL required approximately six months to

rewrite many of the Technical Safety Requirements. After additional analysis, training, and

procedurc writing efforts, the newly implemented safety improvcments were validated through

a suCCCSSfl11 formal restart proccss in accordance with DOE Ordcr 5480.31, Startup cmd Restart

ofNuclear Facilities.

Reservoir Unloading at the Mound Lahoratory

Thc Mound Laboratory is currently involved in the safc shutdown and decommissioning

of facilitics formerly used for the production, repackaging and offsite shipment of nuclear

matcrials, and the cleanup of nuclear waste. The Board has followed closely DOE's project for

unloading more than 500 special tritium reservoir units at the Mound Laboratory. Review ofthe

projcct disclosed that DOE had not completed appropriate readiness reviews for the proposed

operations. Subsequent rcadiness reviews by DOE and thc contractor for Mound Laboratory

contractor confirmed deficiencies in radiation protection, training, and surveillance requirements.

Action plans were developed to correct these deficiencies, and the unloading of the reservoirs

began in late 1995.

F. SAFETY ASPECTS OF DECOMMISSIONING DEFENSE NUCLEAR

FACILITIES

At the prescnt time, as required by its statutory charter, the Board is following

deactivation and dccommissioning activitics at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

(RFETS) and thc Hanford Site -- two locations DOE has selected for priority attention. At

RFETS, work is underway to develop new methods for deactivation and decommissioning of

47
facilities and to streamline processes that would permit the site to be decommissioned much

more rapidly than the ten-year span that had previously been projected. At the Hanford Site,

DOE has identified the U03 facility and the PUREX Deactivation Projects as models for the

development of common dcactivation practices. In addition, DOE has identified C-Reactor at

the Hanford Site as the centerpiece of a large-scale demonstration project for development of

new decommissioning technologies, including placement of the reactor in a cocoon').

Decommissioning Memorandum of Agreement Concerning the Rocky Flats

Enyironmental Technology Site

The Board's statutory assignment includes the responsibility to review the adequacy of

DOE's safety standards and their implementation in the design, construction, operation and

decommissioning of defense nuclear facilities. Decommissioning ofsuch facilities commences

in earnest when DOE determines they are no longer needed for support ofthe weapons program

and they are scheduled for decontamination and eventual dismantlement.

On thc basis of understandings with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and

associated State authorities, DOE is proceeding to decontan1inate excess facilities to the extent

required to maintain and monitor them safely until they can be dismantled, and environmental

restoration can be accomplished under provisions ofthe Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act (RCM) or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

(CERCLA), as may be appropriate. Provisions of those statutes bring such actions under the

oversight of EPA and/or the affected states.

The Board has becn working with DOE, EPA, and the State of Colorado to fashion an

agreemcnt on how best to bring their respective oversight and regulatory authorities to bear on

cleanup ofRFETS, to facilitate DOE's cleanup effort. This effort has been progressing well and

the principals hope to have a coopcrative agreement in place in early 1996. The Board plans

similar dialogues with Federal and State authorities having jurisdiction over decommissioning

activities at other DOE sites.

Deactivating the UO, Facility at the Hanford Site

The UO, facility was fonnerly used to convert uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) solution

from the PUREX Plant into solid UO) powder. The facility's last operating campaign was

completed in June 1993, after which deactivation began immediately.

13This involves extending all reactor shield walls to the same height, and adding a new concrete roof

over the reactor; modifying the reactor building to seal all penetrations and most other building access points;

removing all ancillary buildings and structures; and allowing only infrequent and limited access to the facility

for periodic inspection.

48
The purpose ofthe UO, facility deactivation project was to establish a passively safe and

environmentally secure configuration and to preserve that configuration for up to 10 years. DOE

considers the project to be completed. Currently, the plant is unoccupied and devoid of portable

equipment and furniture. In its stabilized condition, nearly all the radioactive or hazardous

materials have been removed. Only minimal effort is required for Surveillance and Maintenance

(S&M) activities. All process equipment, instrumentation, and systems for heating, ventilation

and ail' conditioning are shut down. The building doors and gates in the perimeter fence are

locked to limit access. The facility is entered only for quarterly surveillance visits or to correct

deficiencies identified during previous surveillance entries.

Deactivating the PlJREX Facility at the Hanford Site

The PUREX facility processed irradiated fuel from the Hanford production reactors for

the recovery of plutonium and uranium between 1956 and 1972. It was restarted in 1983, and

continued to operate until 1990. DOE intends that the PUREX facility follows a deactivation

process similar to that used at the U03 plant.

The Board's primary focus at both the U03 and PUREX facilities will be to ensure that

DOE's deactivation and decommissioning methods provide adequate protection ofthe health

and safety of workers and the public, and the protection ofthe environment. Board attention is

currently focused on DOE's planning for transition from deactivation to decommissioning to

ensure that later stages also provide adequate protection.

Decommjssioning of C-Reactor at the Hanford Site

The C-Reactor is a surplus production reactor that was originally scheduled to be the first

of eight to be dismantled at the Hanford Site. In lieu of dismantling, DOE now intends to place

the C-Reactor in a cocoon for an extended period of up to 75 years before dismantlement is

completed. DOE expects lhat this approach will constitute a safe storage mode during this long

waiting period and reduce risks and costs of prolonged maintenance. In addition, DOE believes

lhat the use of a cocoon for the C-Reactor could provide technology improvements to reduce

cost, improve safety, and lessen environmental liabilities within the DOE complex.

Technologies developed at the C-Reactor could be transferred quickly to other Hanford facilities,

where seven other similar reactors and dozens of other large facilities require action, as well as

to facilities elsewhere in the defense complex.

The Board intends to continue to focus its attention on ensuring that the technologies

developed for the long-term storage of the C-Reactor are adequate for maintaining the safety

ofthe facility throughout the storage period.

49
Deactivation and Decommissioning ofthe Roeky Flats Enyironmental Technology

.s.ik.

The Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, constructed in the early 1950s, had

as its primary mission the production of nuclear weapon components. This mission included

manufacture ofspecific weapon components and chemical recovery ofplutonium from residues

and scrap. In early 1993, DOE canceled all plans for production of nuclear weapon components

at RFETS and changed the primary mission ofRFETS to one involving area cleanup, elimination

ofresidues that had accumulated, interim storage of materials until they can be shipped to their

final location, and removal of excess facilities. In order to accomplish these activities, the

integrating contractor at RFETS is exploring alternatives to the previously identified sequencing

of plant decommissioning.

The Board is following closely the development of deactivation and decommissioning

plans to ensure the safety of workers and the public, and the protection ofthe environment.

50
III. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

A. PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT

As of December 31, 1995, the Board had a staff of 98 full-time employees, including

two full-time Site Representatives at the Departmcnt of Energy's Pantex Plant, near Amarillo,

Texas; one Site Representative at the Hanford Site, in Richland, Washington; and two site

representatives at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, near Denver, Colorado.

The highly technical mission of the Board requires staff of the highest scientific and

technical caliber with demonstrated competencies in all major phases of nuclear safety. The

Board's technical staffincludes individuals with extensive backgrounds in nuclear, mechanical,

electrical, chemical, structural, and metallurgical engineering; and physics. As an indication of

the Board's technical talent, 20 percent ofthe technical staff hold degrees at the Ph.D. level and

an additional 64 perccnt have Masters degrees. Moreover, almost all technical staff members,

except interns, possess practical nuclear experience gained fTom duty in the U.S. Navy's nuclear

propulsion program, the nuclear weapon field, or the civilian reactor industry. Five other senior

members of the Board's staff have law degrees (JD), in addition to degrees in a technical

specialty. Both the Board and its staff include persons experienced in environmcntal impact

assessments and regulatory processes.

This staff expertise is supplemented on occasions when special technical expertise is

needed by outside experts with extensive experience with plutonium processing and weapons

assembly and disassembly, and other nuclear operations. Since the limited staffsize precludes

its ability to cover all scientific mattcrs by means ofin-house specialists, the Board contracts for

specialized technical expertise as needed. Guiding the work of its technical staff and outside

experts and utilizing their individual specialized knowledge and capabilities has enabled the

Board to make its own technical judgements forming the basis of its recommendations and

relatcd actions.

Through its technical intern program, the Board has continued to recruit and develop a

select group of the Nation's top engineering graduates. Currently, six interns are in various

phases of a three-year training program encompassing formal graduate school education and onthe-job training. The recruitment and selection methods used have proven very effective, based

on the outstanding academic and on-the-job performance of the five staff members that have

already completed the intern program. Board staffing projections include the recruitment offive

technical interns in 1996.

B. OFFICIAL SITE VISITS BY BOARD MEMBERS AND BY STAFF

From the establislunent of the Board in October 1989, through December 31, 1995,

Members ofthe Board, its staff, and its contractor experts had collectively made 870 site visits

to DOE's defense nuclear facilities. In 1995 alone, 173 site visits were made to DOE's defense

51
nuclear facilities by Board Members, staff, and outside experts. These visits focused primarily

on selected facilities that both the Board and DOE consider to be most pressing in light of DOE's

mission. Where appropriate. the results ofstaffvisits were conveyed formally to DOE managers

as trip reports.

During its visits, the Board reviewed firsthand the health and safety issues at each of

these sites. The Board also gathered information relevant to its recommendations to the

Secretary of Energy and observed their implementation.

C. PUBLIC INTERACTION WITH THE BOARD

The Board continues to be sensitive to the need for public involvement and awareness

of defense nuclear safety issues, and has found public meetings to be very effective tools in

encouraging responsiveness on the part of Department representatives, and in exchanging

information with state and local officials, labor leaders, DOE facility workers, public interest

groups, and area residents. During 1995, the Board conducted five public meetings, hearings,

and briefings at or near the following DOE defense nuclear sites:

• Savannah River Site

• Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

• Hanford Site -- two meetings

• Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

During 1995, the Board also held five public meetings at its Washington, D.C. offices

where, among other topics, the Board, its technical staff, and outside experts discussed the status

of work in the standards area, as well as health and safety reviews at DOE defense nuclear

facilities. In addition to these public meetings, members of the Board's staff have provided

information briefings to local officials and public interest groups in the vicinity ofthe Pantex

Plant, and the Savannah River, I-lanford, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Sites, and

the Fernald Environmental Management Project.

Notices of such public Board meetings are published in the Federal Regjster and are

mailed to 386 organizations and individuals who have requested to be on the Board's mailing list.

In addition, each notice is published three times in several local newspapers serving the

communities near the DOE facility involved.

In July 1995, the Board expanded the information available to the public via its Home

Page on the World Wide Web 14• The Home Page includes links to, among other things, the

entire text of all Board recommendations, the Board's most recent Annual Report, biweekly

updates of the log of all correspondence/documents sent or received by the Board, and other

'4 hnp:llwww.dnfsb.gov

52
background information on the Board's hcalth and safety review activities. Tltis service has been

heavily utilized, with more than 22,000 inquiries registered during the month of December 1995

alone.

D. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (NPR) STREAMLINING OBJECTIVES

The Board believes that as a new agency, not encumbered by years of bureaucratic rules,

regulations, and practices, has already accomplished many ofthe streamlining objectives ofthe

NPR. At its inception, the Board's executive leadcrship recognized the importance of carefully

structuring an organization to avoid layering, to promote empowerment, and encourage timely

action. Using this philosophy, the Board focuscd its early attention to the following key

organizational elements:

Starting Without Encumhl'3nccs

As a new agency, the Board did not inherit any staff, organizational structure, or internal

regulations governing the conduct of business. Therefore, the Board was free to create a lean

organization tailored to its specialized scientific and technical mission, without the

encumbrances often associated with traditional government operations such as, vertical layering,

excessive administrative support, and duplication of function. The simple structure of the

teclmical staff enables the Board to use technical staffmembers in an optimum way to deal with

each new topic the Board takes up.

Reducing Regulatory Burden

The Board's policy on regulations is fully consistent with the President's memorandum

on streamlining the bureaucracy. To date, the Board has promulgated only those regulations

necessary to maintain orderly operations -- Freedom of Information Act, Privacy Act,

Government in the Sunshine Act, and Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interests.

Moreover, in promulgating these regulations, the Board has written the rules in ways that acltieve

the statutory purposes without burdening the Board with inflexibility, or overly-prescriptive

requirements that attempt to substitute detailed paperwork for sound judgment.

"Exccpted Service" and Pay for Performancc

The Board successfully argued for, and subsequently received through legislation and

administrative delegations, the means to overcome many oCthe administrative road blocks that

have traditionally frustrated change in government organizations. Most prominent in this list of

specific statutory authorities sought by the Board and ultimately granted by the Congress is the

"Excepted Servicc" persolmel authority.

The pay banding and pay for performance concepts recommended in the NPR have been

operational at the Board for more than four years and have received favorable review by the

53
General Accounting Officc and the Officc of Personnel Management. These concepts have

proven to be very effective in hiring technical talent, holding employees accountable for their

performance, and rewarding outstanding performance on thc job.

"No frjlls" Approach to Operations

From the first day o[ operation, the Board Members have set the standard for having a

"no frills" approach to conducting Board business. Administrative expenses are carefully

reviewed for absolute necessity before expenditures are allowed. For example, the Board does

not employ chauffers and has no Government automobiles. It carefully enforces the Federal

Travel Regulations. These internal policies have been in place since its inception with no

adverse impact on operations. Internal directivcs were written to give practical guidancc in the

most simplified manner.

Effectiye Organization Structure

The Board maintains focus on its mission rcspecting the adequate protection of public

and worker health and safety at DOE defense nuclear facilities. Using a matrix form of

organization, the Board gained management flexibility and avoided the need to establish layers

of middle management that divert limited staff resources from performing health and safety

reviews.

Adopting the "economies of scale" philosophy for obtaining needed administrative

support services, the Board negotiated Interagency Agreements with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, the National Science Foundation, Ihe Public Health Service and the General

Services Administration 10 obtain immediate support for accounting, procurement, personnel,

and payroll serviccs. Resourccs that normally are diverted to these administrative functions

remain dedicated to the health and safety mission.

Management Continuity

Under the Board's enabling legislation, the five Members are appointed to staggered fiveyear terms on a full-time basis. Thus, the Board has enjoycd management continuity and has not

been subjcctcd to the disruption resulting from frequent changes in leadership cxperienced by

many government agencies. From the first day of operation, the Board has had precise and

consistent direction of the conduct of its technical mission and major policy issues.

Experienced Leadership

Building an organization from its statutory foundation offers a special management

challenge requiring individuals with good planning skills, organization skills, and detailed

knowledge of a wide range of Federal government policies and practices. The Board

54
successfully recruitcd a small senior management staff with demonstrated management

experience and proven accomplishments.

Using their collective knowledge of government operations, the Board and its senior

management staff plmmed and implemented an organizational structure that maximizes the

effectivcness of the scientific and tcchnical resources available and that avoids ulmecessary

layers of management.

Information Technology

The Board has encouraged the full use of today's advanced computer capabilities by

investing in state-of-the-alt hardware and software. Staff members use their desk top computers

to obtain the latest information on cvents at defense nuclear sites; review a data base of more

than 1.2 million pages of teclmical documents received by the Board on defense nuclear

facilities; access Federal Register notices and legal decisions; and electronically send draft

repons to colleagues for review. Expert consultants, engineers on travel, and site representativcs

send and receive electronic communications through remote access to the Board's local arca

network.

Accountability ys. Excessive Controls

Small organizations such as this Board cannot afford to waste scarce resources

cstablishing layers ofinternal management. The Board belicves that the foundation for a strong,

cffective program to prcvcnt fraud, waste, and abusc of government property and funds begins

with the line managers rcsponsible for overall program administration.

An independent rcview of the organization structure and management of the Board

conducted by the Institute of Public Administration recognized the significant progrcss and

accomplishments made by the Board in establishing a strcamlined structure with a minimal

commitment of resources. Also, a recent independcnt audit of the Board's administrative

opcration conducted by Gardiner, Kamya & Associates, a private accounting finn, in November

1995, confirmed that a reliable and workable system of management controls operates as an

integral part ofthe Board's administrative systems.

Customer Service

In the Board's public health and safety reviews, contacts with the public are primarily

through open hearings and access to the Board's public rcading room. Since 1990. the Board has

held 48 public hearings at sites across the nation and in Washington, D.C. The public reading

room is open to the public every working day and the staff has received numerous

complimentary letters from private citizens, public interest groups, corporations. and other

government agcncies.

55
To assist the public in requesting information, the Board published a Customer Service

Standard in July 1995. This publication catalogs the various public information services offered

by the Board. This document was mailed to all groups and individuals on the Board's mailing

list and placed in a new customer service category in our World Widc Web Home Page.

56
IV. PLANNED FOCUS OF HOARD ACTIVITIES DURING 1996

Opcl'ation»1 Formality - A Complcx-Widc Issuc

As described broadly in Recommendation 95-2 and in DNFSB/TECH-6, operational

fomlality is a structured and systematic way of planning and performing work while ensuring

that a sound authorization basis for the facility or activity is preserved. It encompasses the set

of practices used to ensure safety in a facility, and in the operations conducted therein, cxtending

to the systematic coverage implicd by the teml "safety culture."

Operational formality is not simply a group of unrelated functional areas, but an

integrated approach to pcrfomling esscntial elements ofoperations such as: ensuring that facility

activities, including any cnvironmental discharges, are conducted within the authorization basis;

fOmlal conlOlUnications during evolutions; independent safety reviews ofsignificant procedure

and plant changes; continuing review of operating experience and implementation of lessons

learned; and preparing, reviewing, approving and using operating proccdures. Though details

may vary from facility to facility, the need for a structured approach, appropriately tailored,

remains constant and will be a major focus of the Board in 1996.

--------_....._---------

During thc coming months, extending through and beyond 1996, the Board anticipates

that the ongoing transition ofthe mission of DOE's weapons complex will continue to evolve.

At the same timc the weapons stockpile programs demand continuing attention, the legacies of

aging facilities, widespread contamination, and huge inventories of highly toxic and radioactive

waste products and residues from half a century of nuclcar weapons production must be dealt

with. In the face of these challenges, and as DOE rcaligns itself to accommodate mandated

downsizing, the role of competent, independent, extcrnal oversight will bccomc cven more

demanding. Based on its experience during thc past five years, the Board bclieves that its

oversight function is an indispcnsable element of the overall national effOlt to cope with the

myriad safety issues at defensc nuclear facilities.

Within this broad context, the Board plans to continue much the same cmphasis it

established a year ago. The Board will continue to place a high priority focus on complex-wide

safety issues, such as the need to:

• oversee the continuation of dismantlement and storage of weapons and weapons

components - to help ensure protection ofthe health and safety of the public and

the workers involved, and ofthe environment;

57
• evaluate proposed upgrades to facilities and processes vital to the stockpile

stewardship and management programs - to ensure their design adequacy and

their safe operation;

• closely monitor DOE's upgrading of its technical capabilitics and expertise and

those of its contractors - to verify thc effectiveness of DOE's program for

improving staff qualifications at the same time it seeks to meet demands placed

on a dwindling staff;

• ensure that DOE expedites the processing, packaging and safe long-teml storage

of plutonium-bcaring materials - to reduce the risk of unwarranted exposures to

these ha7..ards;

• review in detail authorization bases prepared by DOE for priority facilities and

activities - to verify conformance with established principles, including recent

guidance prepared by the Board and its staff;

• monitor the integration ofsafety management of both defense nuclear research

and development activities and weapon assembly, disassembly, and testing

operations - to ensure that both can be accomplished effectively and safely;

• continue its close attention to DOE's program for resolving safety issues

associated with existing inventories of corroding spent fuel in storage pools at

several facilities and with byproduct material from historical defense enrichment

operations - to assist DOE gain control ofthese potential and actual sources of

significant contamination and radiological exposure;

• encourage DOE to continue to improve its radiation protection program - to

reduce thc risk of unnecessary worker exposures, as well as to reducc potential

public exposures;

• monitor closely DOE's planning for work in hazardous and radiological

environments, criteria for rclease ofmaterials after cleanup, and development and

evaluation ofradiological protection performance indicators applicable to unique

cleanup situations - to ensure adherence to the principles of the "As Low As

Reasonably Achievable" concept

• cvaluate DOE's ongoing expedited revision of its program for development and

promulgation of requirements, including orders, rules, standards, guides and

contract provisions, as well as reviewing DOE's programs for verification of

adherence to those requirements - to ensure that DOE appropriately integrates

these processes; and

58
• insist that DOE adopt sound systems engineering practices in all its safety-related

projects and programs - to foster DOE's overall management of its safety

program.

Technical issues at DOE continue to evolve. The combination of well-recognized and

longstanding threats to public health and safety, accompanied by potentially hazardous new

activities. presents different and potentially serious challenges. These include, for example, the

need to:

• operate facilities for short periods to remove and stabilize radioactive or

hazardous materials held up in processing lines and vessels;

• establish improved storage conditions to minimize corrosion of spent nuclear

fuel stored in basins that were not designed for long-term use;

• gain control ofthe existing inventories ofchemical and radioactive wastes, which

continue to grow and are bound to become even larger when decontamination

and decommissioning get underway in earnest;

• surmount technical problems associated with existing high-level radioactive

waste storage tanks;

• ensure the safe startup and operation of high-level radioactive waste processing

facilities;

• ensure that dismantlement of more than 2,000 warheads each year is conducted

safely;

• design, construct, and operate facilities to store nuclear materials from dismantled

nuclear weapons;

• consolidate weapons stockpile stewardship and management functions at a

reduced number of sites, including in upgraded facilities that were previously

used predominantly for research and development.

• process and replenish tritium in nuclear weapons retained in service; and

• determine possible roles of existing research and development facilities for

limited production missions, and institute the significant modifications to

traditional laboratory operating practices that will be required to fulfill those

roles.

59
The Board is concerned that these teclmical challenges, and others not yet identified, may

be at least as large in number and just as severe as those encountered during production

operations.

60
APPENDICES

A Table of Priority facilities and Activities

B 1995 Board Recommendations

61

Appendix A

Appendix A

Priority Facilities and Activities

Facility Status Hazards Key

(Note 1) (Note 2) . Regulatory!

Oversight Bodies

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE FACILITIES

F-CanyonIFB-Line/FA-Line Operational HIGH DNFSB

H-Canyon/HB-Line/HA-Line (£M) Plutonium, Uranium, Transuranics,

HLW

DWrFIITP/ESP Operational HIGH DNFSB

HLW Tanks (EM) Fission Products

RBOF. L-Basin. K-Basin and Operational MODERATE DNFSB

P-Oasin (EM) Plutonium, Uranium, Fission Products

Tritium Facilities Operational HIGH DNFSB

(Dr) Tritium

HANFORD FACILITIES

High Level Waste Tank Fal'lllS Operational HIGH ON FSB, State, EPA

(EM) Fission Producls

K-Reactor Area Fuel Storage Operalional MODERATE DNFSB, Slate, EPA

Basins (EM) Spent Nuclear, Fuel and Sludge

Plutonium Finishing Plant Operational MODERATE DNFSB, State, EPA

(EM) Plutonium

Waste Encapsulation and Operalional MODERATE DNFSB, Slale, EPA

Storage Facility (EM) Cesium & Strontium
Priority Facilities and Activities (Continued)

Faeility Status HazardS Key

(Note 1) (Note 2) Regulatory/

Ovel'Slght Bodies

ROCKY FLATS FACILITIES

Solulion processing and SNM Shutdown MODERATE DN FSB.Slale and

Storage Building 771 Plutonium solution, SNM, and waste EPA

Solulion processing and SNM Shutdown HIGH DNFSB.SlaLe and

consolidated slorage Plutonium solution. SNM, and waste EPA

Building 371

Residue Processing and SNM Shutdown MODERATE DNFSB.State and

Storage Building 776. Bldg 776 could be HIGH based on EPA

Building 779. Building 707 contamination. Plutonium residue

SNM, and waste

Highly Enriched Uranyl Nilrate Shutdown MODERATE DNFS8.State and

Processing Building 886 Highly Enriched Uraniulll Solution EPA

SNM, and waste

INEL FACILITIES

Advanced Test Reactor ~erational HIGH DNfSB

E) fission Products, Uranium-235

CPP-603 °ERerational MODERATE DNFSB

Underwater fuel Storage ( -M) fission Products, Uranium,

Plutonium
Priority Facilities and Activities (Continued)

Facility Status Hazards Key (Note 1) (Note 2) Regulatory/

Oversight

Bodies

REPRESENTATIVE PANTEX FACILITIES

Nuclear Weapon Operational HIGH DNFSB

AssemblylDisassembly cells (DP) High Explosives, Plutonium,

Uranium,Tritium

Nuclear Weapon Operational HIGH DNI'SB

AssemblylDisassembly Bays (DP) High Explosives. Plutonium, Uranium}

Tritium

Building 12-116, SNM Staging New Facility - MODERATE (at present) DNI'SB

Facility (New nuclear facility) Startup in FY 97 Plutonium, Uranium, Tritium

(DP)

Building 12-1 04A, Special New Facility- MODERATE DNFSB

Purpose Bays (New nuclear Startup in FY95 Weapons ha,,.,rds Radiation Generating

facility) (DP) Device (Linac)

REPRESENTATIVE LANL NUCLEAR FACILITIES

TA-55, Plutonium Facility, Operational. HIGH. DNFSB

LANL's main facility for R&D (DP) Plutonium. (New Mexico

and processing of plutonium, Chemical hazards, Nuclear criticality, Enviromncntal

Department

(NMED)

TA-3, Chemistry and Operational. HIGH, DNFSB

Metallurgy Research Building, (DP) Plutoniulll, Uranium. Chem ical hazards. (NMED)

an R&D

TA-18, Los Alamos Critical Operational. HIGH, DNFSB

Experiments Facility (DP) Nuclear criticality,

TA-16, Weapons Engineering Operational. MODERATE, DNFSB

Tritium Facility (DP) Tritium

TA-15, Dual Axis Partially HIGH. DNFSB

Radiographic Hydrotest constructed, Radiation generating device, Explosions,

(DARHT) Facility (DP) Depleted Uranium, Chemical Hazards,
Priority Facilities and Activities (Continued)

Facility Status Hazar'ds Key

(Note I) (Note 2) Regulatory/

Oversight

Bodies

REPRESENTATIVE OAK RIDGE FACILITIES

Y- I2: Highly Enriched Operational. MODERATE, DNFSB

Uranium Processing. (DP) HEU

Hazardous, toxic. and radioactive materials

Y-12: Component Assembly, Operational. MODERATE, DNFSB

Disassembly, and Evaluation (DP) HEU, Lithium Hazardous, toxic, and

radioactive materials

Y-12 and ORNL: Material Operational. MODERATE DNFSB

Storage (DP) HEU, mU. Hazardous, toxic, and radioactive

materials.

K·25 Highly Enriched Transition MODERATE. DNFSB

Uranium Remediation and (EM) HEU,DU,HF

Depicted Uranium Tailings

Storage

REPRESENTATIVE LIVERMORE FACILITY

Building 332, Plutonium Operation;,)1 MODERATE DNFSB

Facility (DP) Plutonium. Uranium

NOlES.

I. DP = DOE Defense Programs; EM· Environmental Management.

2. These are not DOE rankings. Rankings are tentative, currently under Board review.

SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES FACILITIES

Technical Area V: Operational MODERATE DNFSB . Annular Core Research (DP) Highly enriched uranium fueled reactors. Reactor (ACRR) - Sandia Pulse Reactor Facility

REPRESENTATIVE NTS FACILITIES

Abel Site, Area 27 (to be Operational HIGH DNFSB

replaced by the Device (DP) High Explosives

Assembly Facility, Area 6) Plutonium, Uranium, Tritium

Radioactive Waste Operational MODERATE DNFSB

Management sites in Area 5, (DP) Plutonium, Uranium

Area 3 and the TRU Pad ..-
Appendix B

Federal Register I Vol. 60. No. 93 I Monday, May 15, 1995 I Notices 25893

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACIUTIES

SAFETY BOARD

(Recommendation 95-1]

Improved Safety of Cylinders

Containing Depleted Uranium

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board

ACTION: Notica; recommondation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board has mad. a

recommendation to tha Secretary of

Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a

concerning improved safety of cylinders

containing depIcted uranium. The

Board requests public comments 00 this

recommendation.

OATES: Comments, data, viows. or

vguments con.cerning this

recommendation arc due on or befooo

lune 14. 1995.

ADDRESSES: Send comments. data.

views, or arguments concerning this

recommendation to: Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board. 625 Indiana

Avenue. NW.• Suite 700. Washington.

DC 20004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CCNTACT:

Kenneth M. Pusateri or Carol C. Morgan

at the address above or telephone (202)

20_400.

John T. Conway.

Chainnall.

Th. three large gaseous diffusion

plants that were operated by the

Department of Energy (DOE) and Hs

predecessors produced enriched

uranium, some for defense usc and

some for incorporation into nuclear fuel

for civilian reactors in the UnHed Slates

and other coUntries. In the course of

isotope separation. most of the uranium

ended up as the pan depleted in U-235,

designated as "tails" or "tailings",

Enrichod uranium at all desired assays

was simultaneously extracted from tho
25894 Federal Register I Vol. 60. No. 93 I Monday. May 15. 1995 I Notices

plants, for all purposes. and so no provido within one year D. uranium

amount of tails can be identified as inventory study that would includo

related to enricluncnt solely for ~ithcr among other matters recommendations

defense or civilian purposes. Most of all for the future USe and disposition of

uranium ever mined in the United inventories of all Govemment·owned

States or imported into tho United uranium or uranium equivalents,

Stales remains in tails at the gaseous including depleted tailings. The

diffusion plants. These tails are stored Department has not yet complied with

onsite at Ule t.hree plants in large steel tills requircmont. presumably at least in

containers. nonnally tenned part because the matters addressed by

"cylinders", as the chemical compound Congressional action arc very

UF6. comprehensive and n:quire extensive

Members of the staff of the Defense decisions on future courses of action.

Nuclear Facilities Safety Board recently It Is clear to the Boaro that directions

had an opportunily to visit the gaseous developed in response to section 1016

diffusion plants. to follow up on of Public Law 102-486 wiUarrect the

infonnation that had been obtained on long.term fulure of the vasrinventory of

safety of storage of the tails. A short depleted uranlwn tails. However. tho

report documenting the results of their very size or that invontory means that

review is attached. It was found that no matter what actions may be taken.

DOE has approximately 50.000 they will require a long time 10

cylinders in outdoor storage at the three consumate. with deterioration of the

diffusion plants. containing more than cylindars continuing all the while.

500.000 metric Ions ofUF•. Poor To protect against the dispersal of

maintenance and storage conditions. large amounts of uranium to soil and

combined with mechanical damage ground water in years to Come. an early

suffered during handling. have led to start to remedial action should be

corrosion and subsequenl breacWng of planned and then insUluted. The

several of these carbon steel cylinders. alternative could be 8 massiye problem

Cylinders have surface cootings . with extraordinary financial costs.

(paint) of varying quality and integrity. Therefore. the Board recommands

wWch in a large number of cases is that:

severely degraded. Cylinders are kept 1. An ea.rly program be started to

outdoors. some stacked on pads and renew the protective coating of

some directly on the ground. Some cylinders containing tho talls from the

older cylinders have boen in.storage in historic production of enriched

excess of forty years. Although general uranium.

external corrosion seems to increase 2. The possibility of additional

with time. handling damage and measures be explored. to protect these

localized corrosion altributable to cylinders from the damaging effects of

electrolytic attack appear to be more exposure to the clements. as well 8S any important factors in deterioration. th be call d The corrosion-resistant coatings have additional handling at may . e

not been maintained. leaving the vast for.

majority of cylinders vulnerable to J. A sludy be in~tituted to d?lermine

localized corrosion. Visual inspections whether a more swtnble chemIcal fonn

have shown abundant pitting and crevic should be selected f~r long-tenn storage

corrosion of ti,e cylinders. as well as . - of tile depleted U!a.ruum.

galvanic attack near bronze valves and The ao~rd d~sl~natod Mr. Steven

plugs. Since neither localized corrosion Krahn ~s Its pnnClpal s~aff member for

rates nor the extent of existing defects diSCUSSions ,:"Uh those 10 DOE.whom

in the cylinders are well known or well you may deSignate to act on tlus

understood. it is uncertain how many re~ommenda~on.and J]1atters·that may

cylinders may be expected to fail in the ansa concemmg It.

near futuro. DOE and MMES (Martin- John T. Conway.

Marietta Energy Systems) arc attempting Chairman.

to evaluate the extent of the erosion fFR Doc. 95-11870 Filed 5-12-..95: 8:45 ami

ratos and their consequences; results nrc OILUHQ COOE 3el0-0l~

very preliminary. but they indicate that

more than 1.000 cylinders have a

potential to breach before the year 2020

of no remedial actions arc taken. with

the result that their components of more

than 10.000 tons of uranium could

become accessible to release to the

environment.

In sectlon 1016 of Public Law 102-

486 (October 24. 1992). Congress

direcled tho Dopartment of Energy 10
Federal Register I Vol. 60, No. zoz I Thursday, Oclobor 19, 1995 I Notices 54065

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

SAFETY BOARD

[RocommondaUon 9s-.2]

Safoty Management

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board.

ACllON: Notice; recommendation.

SUMMARY: Tbe Defense.Nuclear

Facilities Safoly Board (Board) bas made

a recommondation to the Secretary of

Energy pUJ'Sunnt to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(.)(5)

concerning Safety Management. The

Board requests public comments on this

recommendation.

OATES: Commonts. data. views or

arguments con""raing this '

recommendation are due on or before

November 20, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Send comments. data. views

or arguments concerning this

rec01nrncndation to: Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safoty Board, 625 Indiana

Avonue NW.. Suite 700, Washington.

DC 20004.
54066 Federal Register I Vol. 60, No. 202 I Thursday, October 19, 1995 I Nolices

FOR FURTliER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Konneth M. Pusateri or Carolo J.

Morgan. at tho addres. above or

telephone (202) 203-6400.

Doted: October 16.1995.

John T. Conway,

Chainnan.

[Recommendation 95-2]

Sefety Management

Dated: October 11, 1995.

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safoty

Bo8rd lI!oard) ha. issued and thn

Secrotary of Enorgy ha. accopted threo

sots ofrocouunendations (90-2, 92-5.

and 04-5) concomlng the use of

standards by contractors at the

Departmont of Energy's (DOE) defense

nuclear facilities, and the level of

conduct of operations to be malntJlined

at theso facilities. These

recommendations Intersoct in many of

tholr implications. Tho Board now

wishes to combine and modify these

recommendations Into a fonn that (1)

roflects what it has leomed from DOE's

responso to the recommendations, (2)

more sharply focuses continued acUvity

on the obje.cUves DOE and the Board

seek to achieve. and (3) Is more clearly

consonant with the scUons which DOE

hos under way to modify DOE's system

of Orders.

On March 8, 1990, the Board

forwarded to the Secretary of Energy

Recommendation 00-2. Briefly

paraphrased, It recommended that (1)

DOE idontify the particular standards

that it considered should apply to

certain dc·signaled defenso nuclear

facilities of DOE, (2) DOE provide its

views of the adequacy of these

standards, and (3) DOE establish the

extent to which the standards were

being applied to the facilities. The

Secrotary accepted this

Recommendation on June 11, 1990, and

provided the Beard with an acceptable

Implementation Plan on November 9.

1994.

The.prlncipal product of

implementation was to be Q sel of

facility.specific decuments that set forth

the applicable standards and

requirements for a solected set of DOE's

dofense nucloar facilities. These were

termed Standards/Requiremonts

Implementation Documents (S/RIDs).

Tho S/RID was to contain those

requiremonts considered necessary and

sufficient for ensuring safety in the

particular application. These were to be

principally extracted from DOE Orders,

appropriate standards. NRC guides. and

similar sources. The S/RID was

envisioned as the basis upon which

work controls would be developed and

Implemented.

This concept has b..n maturing In the

course of its application to several DOE

defense nuclear facilities. Subsequently,

in connection with its Internal plans to

restructuro ils system of Orders, DOE

hos devoloped the concept of the

"necessary and sufficient" set of

requirements at a site or 8. facility or for

an activity. As applied to safety

requiremonts, we recognize the

"necessary and sufficient" and S/RID

concepts to be identical. In the

following, the identity of the two will be

implicitly understood, although we

shall continue to use SIRID as the

proferred term for tha documonted set of

applicable standards and requlrements

in agreements between DOE and its

defense contracts. This is the

nomonclaturo found in implementation

plans suhmitted by DOE to the Boat'd.

To avoid confusion, we suggest that

DOE continue uniform use of the term

SIRID in this connecUon.

DOE is to determine the extent to

which standards are implemented

through a.process ofOrder Compliance

Self-Assessment. This has generally

been accomplished through review of

detailed compliance with the DOE.

safety Orders of Interostto the Board.

The practice is to be followed until.sl

RIDs are In placo. after which time. the

issue becomes compliance with

requirements In S/RIDS.

Tho Board has viewed the Order

Compliance Sell-Assessment Program of

DOE as an initial activity in the

formulation of the SIR1Ds. As part of

this complianco seU·assessment. DOE

required the contractors to justify in

documel,lted form the rationale for

judging requirements to be nonapplicable. This procedural requirement

has been.ropOtled to have caused the ~~pendituro of more effort than merited

to achieve the end re;ult the Board

sought, which was the establishment of

the particular subset of requlrements

upon which the safety management

programs at a site would be struet~~d.

In the recommendations below, the

Board seeks to streamline the process of

arriving at an Authorization Basis and

Authorization Agreements with respect

to DOE's safety management of its sites,

facUities. and activities. The review and

acceptance by DOE of (1) the· hazards

assessment of the work contracted, (2)

the standards/requirements idontified as

appropriate, and (3) safety management

controls committed by the contractor for

the work would in effect constitute, in

the view of the Board. a DOE .

detennination of adequacy relative to

sufficiency of the requirements basco

In anollier aclion. on August 17.1992.

the Board forwarded its

Recommendation 91-5. wbich called for

establishing certain safety policies at

defense nuclear faciUties faced with

missions that were changing In ,,",sponse

to the shifting world situation. The

principal features of Recouunendation

92-5 can be paraphrased os follows: (1)

that facilities to be used In the longer

term in nuclear defense missions or in

cleanup from previous nuclear defense

activities should be operated according

to a superior level of conduct of

operations, (2) that certJlin safoty

practices be fonowed at nuclear defense

facilities being restarted altor e long

period of idleness, and (3) that defense

nuclear facilities deSignated for various

other kinds of use (such as standby)

should be subject to a greded appreach

ofsafety criteria and requirements to he

developed. The Board requested that it

be Informed on a timely basis of changes

in the intended use of DOE's defense

nuclear facilitios.

Implicit in the RccommendoUon was

a broader view of conduct of operations

than adheronce to written procedures

and related activities dlroctly In ,upport

of operations. it encompassed the entire

set of practices used to enswe safely in

a faclllty, and in the operations

conductod therein, extending to

coverage implied by tho tann "saCaty

culture. " On December 16, 1992, the Secretary

of Energy accepted Recommendation

92-5, and forwarded to the Board an

Implementation Plan which the Boord

accepted on January 8, 1993.

Circumstances affecting DOE's

defense programs have continued to

ovolve since then. and the view of the

future of the dofense nuclear

establishment is now different from that

in late 1992. Many facilities then

scheduled for restart or standby ore now

slated for deactivation and

decommissioning. Though the future

Conn of tho establislunent continues to

be uncertain. the Board believes that the

extent of the changes and other

intervening events makes it necessary t.o

bring major featUres of Its

Recommendation 92-5 up to date and in

line with the updating of

Recommendation 90--2.

Another important development bas

been the elahoration of the S/RID

concept into a system view of a

standards·bosed safety management

system.' This has shed further ligbt en

such important matters as pennissible

variability of safety management-at

facilities of different kinds and different

levels of risk. and the formal means

who~eby an Authori1.ation Agreement

1 Fundamontals fOf Understanding Standards·

Basod Safety Managemc:nt, Joseph I. DiNunno.

I)NFSDITECli-S.
Federal Register I Vol. 60, No. 202 I Thursday, October 19, 1995 I Notices 54067

related to envirownent. safoty and

health objectivos is incorporated into

contractual torms.

Principles that should guide the

structwe and use of safety management,

tho framework Cor conduct of operations

eppropriate to different cases, the basis

for grading of safety menegement and

conduct of operations, end the

application to the important defense

nuclear laboratorios of the Department

of Energy, oro outlined in enother

document In the DNFSBrrECIi

sequenco.2 The points laid out in

DNFSBrrECIi-6 are consistent with

those In DNFSBrrECIi-5. Although the

concepts and processes discussed in

theso documents are couched in terms

of radiological hazards, they are more

genoral. and apply as well to hazards of

other kinds, In addition, they offor en

appropriate match to requiremonts

establishod elsewhere for safoty in

decommissioning of facilities, and

would servo as a bridge to such

operations.

The Boord ogrees with tho view

adopted by DOE In certain pilot tests

prosently underway. that tho contractor

for a site, facility. or activity should

originate the drafttng of the Safety

Management Plan and tho S/RID with

assistance and Input os appropriate by

DOE. DOE has the responsibility for

determtntng that the proeosed S/RID

wili onswe an edequate evel ofsafety,

""d finally approving it when it is

found to be satisfectory. In the Board's

view, an SIRID should be ti'e central

component ofthe Authorization

Agreement which should have

contractual status es part of the

agreement with tho contractor relevant

to performance of the work authorized

for the sito, facility, or activity.

In accordance with its statutory

direclivo to review DOE's safety

standards and their implementation. the

Doord plans to track selected S/RlDs and

the associated Safety Management

Programs as·they oro developed. Tbe

Board will formally review tl,em after

their completion and will provide its

comments to DOE tn letters to the

Secretary or In the statutory fonn of

recommendations. The Board would

normally oxpect DOE to have performed

its own review with documentation of

the results before being formally

provided with the Boord's comments.

We recognize that the various DOE

organizational units which may be

delegated review and app.rovnl authority

for S/RIDs and associated Safety

Management Progmms may not have

1 Safoty Mnnogomsnt and Conduct of Operalions

It tbe Departmont of Enc"8)"$ Dorenss Nuclear

"~Gcilitie5, DNFsnlTECH-6.

enough il'~dividuals ~l~ qU81ifi~tions

in the technical speCIalties rcqUlred to

carry out effectivoly the streamlined

process being recommended. This

means that technicol assistance may

noed to be retained from elsewhore to

compensate for such personnol

deficiencies where they exist. It also

means that DOE !)lay need to augment

its own technical expertise so as not to

be obliged to continue indefinitely to

rely on technical assistance from

outside DOE.

The Boord renews its requost that it be

informed on a tlmely basis of changes In

planned use of dofense nucloar

facilities, In addition, the Board DOW

wishes to replace Recommondatipns 90-

2 and 92-5. The schedule agrood(o by

DOE and the Boord for S/RID

development and implementation

pursuant to Recommendation 9(}-2 will

be revised and carried forward as a port

of Recommendation 94-5. which Is not

baing otherwise modified at this time.

Therefore, tho Board recommends.

that DOE:

1. Institutionalizo the procoss of

Incorporating Into the plan.nlng and

execution of every major defenso

nuclear activity involving hazardous

materials those controls necessary to

ensure that environment, safoty and

health objectives arc achieved.

2, Require the conduct of all

operations and activities within tho

defense nuclear complex or the former

dofense nuclear complex that involve

radioactive and other substantially

bazardous materials to be subject to

Safety Management Plans that oro

graded accordtng to the risk·associated

with the activity. The Safety

Management Plans and tho operations

should be structured on the lines

discussed in the roferenced documents

DNfSBrrECIi-5 and DNfSBrrECIi-6.

3. Establish a new list of facilities and

activities prioritized on lines ofhaza:rd

and importance to defense 9lld cleanup

programs. to focus the transition.from

implementation programs related to 90--

2 and 92-5 to this revised development

of S/RlDs and associated Safety

Management Plans, following the

process of Section I of DNFSD/TECIi--{;.

4. Promulgate requirements and

associated instructions (Orders!

standards) which provide direction and

guidance for this process including

responsibilities for carrying it out. The

manner of establishing responsibilities

and authorities as currently set forth in

DOE Order 5480.31 (425.1) for

Operational Readiness Reviews should

servo as a model for preparing,

revic\,,ring. and approving lhe Safety

Management Programs. The requirement

for conformance should be made 8

contract tenn.

5. Take such measures as are required

to ensure that DOE itself hos or acquires

the technical expertise to effectively

implement the streamlined process

recommendod.

John T. Conway,

Chaimum.

October 11, 1995

The Houo",bl. Hazel R. O'leary.

Secretory 0/Energy. Woshington, DC 20585

llear Sacrotary O'Leary: On Octeber 11,

1995. the Dofenso Nucloar Facilities Safety

Board, in acx:ordaDco with 42 U.S,c.

S228aa(a)(5). unanimously Ipprovad

Recommendation 95-2 which is &IIIDclosed for

your considoration. Reeommood.llUon 05-2

deals with Safety Managoml!tnl

42 U,S.c. S2288d(a) rcqulret the Board,

after receipt by you, to promptly make this

recommondation available to the public in

th. Depanment ofEoargy'. regional public

reading rooms. Tho Board belleves the

recommendation contains no lnfonnatlon

which is classified or otherwise restricted. To

the extent this recommendation does not

include infQrmaUOn restricted by DOE under

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.c.

§§ 2161-66. as amend~d, please arrange to

havo this recommondation promptly placed

on file an your ~ion81 publlc reading rooms.

The Board wUl publish this

recommendation in the Federal R.egister.

Sincerely.

John T. Conway,

Chainnon.

Enclosure

c: Mark Whitaker. £H-9

(fR Doc. 95-2594f>filed 10-18--95: a:45 "1"1

IULUNG COOE 3&70-0,,,",,,