www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 7 1 

The Interoperability Challenge

I

nteroperability is as much or more about human teamwork than it is 

about compatible machines and processes. The North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) operational deployments, without respite since 

1992,1 have spawned a nascent culture of multinational planning and operational teamwork among a host of militaries. This coalition culture is emerging in the same way as the joint operations culture has grown across the U.S. 

military since the watershed Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986.

A generation of military leaders has become knowledgeable, comfortable, 

and successful (though often under great stress) in multinational operations. 

By 2014, when NATO anticipates turning over its operations in Afghanistan 

to national responsibility, allied militaries will have been deployed together in 

combat and postconflict land, maritime, and air operations for more than 20 

years. Junior through senior leaders will have experience in planning operations 

and commanding forces in life and death situations. A substantial percentage of 

these will have experienced multiple deployments alongside the U.S. military. 

Arguably, the Alliance has reached a high water mark in interoperability.

All this experience has generated a wealth of allied forces capable of 

working with the United States across a broad range of missions. Many Allies 

have made at least their most capable forces interoperable with counterparts in 

the U.S. military. There is now a multinational reservoir of military leaders skilled 

at planning and commanding in NATO- and U.S.-led operations. U.S. leaders 

and forces have likewise gotten much better at operating with other nations. 

Even U.S. special operations forces (SOF) now operate with allied SOF units. In 

Building Future Transatlantic 

Interoperability Around a 

Robust NATO Response Force

by Charles Barry

Transatlantic Current

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Charles Barry is a Distinguished 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

Transatlantic Security Studies, Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University.

Key Points

◆ The centerpiece of U.S. military 

doctrine is joint coalition operations undergird by a high level of 

interoperability with other militaries. Sustained interoperability with 

friendly nations is a vital force 

multiplier that must be nurtured, 

protected, and advanced. NATO’s 

28 members and 41 partners (7 in 

Asia) are the enduring core of these 

potential partners.

◆ After ISAF draws to a close, a revitalized NATO Response Force (NRF) 

will be the anchor of the Alliance’s 

enduring interoperability exercise 

and training strategy.

◆ The United States should approve 

steps to optimize its NRF commitment to sustain transatlantic interoperability in an era of reduced 

operations.

◆ The most salient immediate steps 

are to take a robust approach to 

U.S. participation in the NRF; designate U.S. European Command as 

global executive agent for interoperability; give major interoperability requirements a special budget 

line, outside Service budgets; 

revamp USEUCOM force posture to 

optimize multinational training, exercises, and crisis response; and tie 

the staffs of USEUCOM and each of 

its components close to the NATO 

Command Structure.

October 2012

Center for Transat

lantic Security Studies
2 Transatlantic Current No 7 www.ndu.edu/inss

short, multinational skills have reached an all time high, 

though there is more road ahead than already traveled.

However, this accrued wealth of interoperable capability may be at its apogee, soon to decline as the result of 

two looming events. First, Alliance leaders took the decision in 2011 to shed approximately 4,200 multinational 

billets from the NATO Command Structure (NCS) by 

2014. Second, drawdown of the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF), and subordinate commands, will 

close out approximately 2,000 additional multinational 

billets in Afghanistan also by 2014. In short, 2 years from 

now, NATO will have 6,500 or so fewer positions—some 

40 to 50 percent of the current command structure—in 

which to immerse the next generation of officers in the 

multinational command and control culture the Alliance 

now enjoys. The drawdown of ISAF (and to a lesser extent, the Kosovo Force [KFOR]) will also mean the end 

of deployments, bringing to a close most interoperability 

opportunities for forces as well as commands.

Once these impending events come to pass, how 

will the United States maintain the ability of its forces to 

work with Allies and vice versa? Time is short to stand 

up an affordable training and exercise regime to preserve 

and sustain this multinational culture and expertise in 

coalition planning, command, and operational skills. On 

the cusp of future crises, it will be too late to rebuild the 

expert knowledge that will soon begin to fade.

Almost any U.S. Servicemember will say it is far 

more difficult to work with Allies than to go it alone with 

a U.S.-only force. Allies, more often than not, have less 

experience, less developed military skills, and less capable 

equipment than U.S. forces. Many Allies are not a onefor-one replacement for U.S. forces, and most require support—some of it substantial. Yet operating with Allies is 

an overwhelming advantage over going it alone. Many 

operations would be far more difficult without the cultural 

knowledge and language skills that some partners bring 

with them. As many as 40,000 personnel from almost 50 

Ally and partner nations have served in ISAF alongside 

U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Allies have participated in 

generating the required forces, in the risks, and in the casualties. That has meant fewer U.S. troops deployed and a 

reduced pace of operations. The political, diplomatic, and 

financial advantages of having Allies deploy, fight, and 

invest alongside the United States are beyond refuting. 

There is also a powerful military advantage, notwithstanding the caveats Allies often append to their participation 

mainly due to domestic political pressures.

Interoperability with Allies in coalition warfare is 

at the core of U.S. defense policy and military doctrine. 

These are enduring fundamentals of the way we conduct 

operations. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, 

the most recent top-level Department of Defense (DOD) 

strategy document, emphasizes the importance of Allies 

and partners 60 times in its brief eight pages. The latest 

version of the military’s capstone doctrinal publication refers to interoperability 87 times in just 200 pages.2

NATO is the undisputed epicenter of interoperability between American forces and other militaries—and its reach has only expanded since the Cold 

War. NATO membership has expanded from 16 to 

28 countries, and 41 formal partners have been added 

from across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. All 

these militaries conduct operations, to a greater or 

lesser extent, “the NATO way”—that is, following 

many standardization agreements, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in the conduct of operations, sharing information, participating 

in networks, and adhering to lessons learned. To be 

sure, much of what the Alliance has set out is far from 

universal among participants. However, what is operationally shared by members and partners is far greater 

than any other multinational regime and is consistent 

with U.S. doctrine.

The United States should be building on NATO 

practices as it broadens and deepens cooperation across 

NATO is the undisputed epicenter of 

interoperability between American 

forces and other militaries
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 7 3 

Asia and other regions. It would be counterproductive 

to develop TTPs and standards inconsistent or divorced 

from the NATO way. Stated differently, if South Korea 

and Australia want their militaries to operate together, 

these formal NATO partners would follow procedures 

mainly determined in Brussels by the United States and 

its Allies. In short, NATO is the driving force behind a 

wealth of common operating systems used by the United States as well as a host of other militaries.

Revitalizing the NRF

The NATO Response Force should be perhaps the

central platform for sustaining transatlantic interoperability. For the reasons cited above, the United States has 

to get the most return from its deeper commitment to 

the NRF. Engagement cannot be viewed as an isolated 

commitment; it should be seen as the means to preserve 

and grow the capacity of NATO members and partners 

for future operations.

The NRF faces two main issues at the close of 2012, 

one for the United States to decide and one for Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to recommend to the Military Committee. First, the United 

States must adopt a plan to fulfill its commitment to 

support the NRF with a U.S.-based Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT) on an enduring basis. Second, the Supreme 

Allied Commander Europe must propose a way to link 

the NRF to the future NCS by means of an operationally 

effective joint chain of command.

Defining the Future U.S. 

Commitment to the NRF

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced at 

the 2012 Munich Security Conference that a U.S.-

based BCT will contribute to the NRF. He also declared that a U.S. battalion would rotate to Germany 

in order to take part in exercises and training as part 

of the U.S. commitment to sustaining land force interoperability. These unprecedented commitments 

were accompanied by news of the pending withdrawal 

of the last heavy BCT from Europe. DOD spokesmen 

explained that the remaining heavy BCTs had spent 

much of their time in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, they noted that because the new NRF force 

would deploy and train with Allies in Europe, the net 

effect would be greater transatlantic engagement.

In practical terms, the United States will designate 

a portion of a BCT (a battalion task force with enabling 

elements) to deploy to Europe for annual NRF training 

and exercise regimens. This force will train for Article 5 

missions and for non–Article 5 contingency operations. 

Over time, the planning, training, and exercises will 

help keep transatlantic interoperability strong and foster 

transformation among allied militaries. At the same time 

it will give NATO an operational force should the North 

Atlantic Council chose to act.

A U.S. commitment to the NRF should have two 

enduring objectives: demonstrate U.S. leadership in 

maintaining strong transatlantic military ties via multinational engagements and preparedness in a post-ISAF 

environment; and revitalize the NRF as a tool to improve 

transatlantic interoperability—the building of allied and 

partner capacity to work with the United States in ever 

better ways post-ISAF.

There are some immediate tasks.

Design a Policy That Will Keep the U.S. NRF Commitment Strong over the Long Term. The first and most 

critical step is to meet the full intent of the U.S. commitment to NATO. This should include a regime of 

training and exercise participation that is met without 

fail, year in and year out, and over the long haul. The 

plan should make clear, with reasonable flexibility, the 

size and nature of the force that will join the NRF. A 

reasonable commitment would be a battalion task force 

the United States should be building 

on NATO practices as it broadens 

and deepens cooperation across Asia 

and other regions
4 Transatlantic Current No 7 www.ndu.edu/inss

NATO Response Force Highlights

◆ Origin: November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague.

◆ Two missions: To deploy rapidly for combat and crisis response and to serve as a catalyst 

for transforming national forces from static defense to deployable and sustainable response forces.

◆ Initial concept: 25,000-member multinational joint force.

◆ Initial operational capability: October 2004.

◆ Full operational capability: November 2006.

◆ Revised concept (2008–2010): Immediate Response Force (IRF) of 13,000, plus a Response 

Force Pool (RFP) of indeterminate size.

◆ NRF component commands come from nations (NATO Force Structure) and are organized 

under either a lead nation or one of the multinational commands:

◆ Nine land component commands include seven High Readiness Corps (EuroCorps, FR, 

GE/NL, IT, SP, TK, UK/ARRC) and two corps at lower readiness (GR and Multinational 

Corps Northeast)

◆ Five high readiness maritime forces (FR, IT, SP, UK and STRIKFORNATO)

◆ Four Joint Force Air Component Commands (JFACC)–FR, GE, IT, and UK

◆ In addition to these, the Danish Rapid Reaction Division and 3rd UK Division have 

been certified as land component commands for an NRF rotation.

◆ Under the new NATO Command Structure, a deployed NRF is expected to most often be 

under the command of either JFHQ Naples or JFHQ Brunssum.

◆ In January 2012, NRF rotations went from being 6 months to a full calendar year. This 

means a given national corps headquarters will only participate in the NRF once every 9 

or 10 years. Participation would involve months of prior preparation as well as the 1 year 

in NRF ready status, followed currently by disbandment of the NRF rotation force.

◆ The primary NRF utility to date has been as a catalyst for force transformation by improving 

the deployability, usability, and readiness of participating forces. The NRF has not deployed 

substantially as it was envisaged, that is, as a combat-capable crisis response force. Only 

select supporting forces have been deployed, mainly for humanitarian missions.

◆ The IRF is a joint force comprised of a brigade-size land force plus air, maritime, and special operations forces components. It also can include a chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear defense task force. The size and composition of the RFP is dependent on 

what nations are willing to offer.
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 7 5 

from a BCT offered to each NRF rotation. This should 

be a heavy battalion force whenever possible to offset 

the light and medium forces already in theater. For the 

most part, the battalion should be committed to the 

Response Force Pool to allow Allies more opportunities 

to participate in the Immediate Response Force (IRF) 

itself. However, the United States should have the flexibility to participate as one of the three IRF battalions. 

The United States should also hold out the possibility 

of providing IRF deployable brigade headquarters or 

even overall command of a land heavy operation with 

a U.S.-based corps. These levels of participation should 

be integrated into future NRF rotations over time.

Begin U.S. Engagement in Activities of the NRF in 

2012. The United States should not wait until 2014 to 

begin participating in the NRF. Engagement in planning, coordination, observation at command post and 

logistics exercises, and other actions should be considered. A first event should be planned soon before the last 

of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Heavy 

Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) is withdrawn.

Designate USEUCOM as Principal for U.S. participation in the NRF and as Global Coordinator for Interoperability. NRF joint force planning should become 

a primary portfolio for USEUCOM across all components—including SOF. Special attention should be given at U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) to the new U.S. 

commitment in land forces to NRF preparation and 

standby exercises. USEUCOM should ensure NATO 

standards are common to all U.S. partners worldwide.

Make U.S. Maritime, Air, SOF, and Enabling 

Support to the NRF Better Known. The United States 

has provided these assets to the NRF on an informal 

case-by-case basis rather than regular commitments. 

This policy need not change, yet USEUCOM should 

seek maximum interoperability value when any U.S. 

assets are exercising with the NRF, whether in a live 

operation, planning exercises, or a simple tabletop 

map exercise.

Rotate Army and Marine Units to Europe for 

Training Outside of the NRF. There are many excellent training facilities in Europe that could be used by 

Active and Reserve U.S. units to hone deployment and 

interoperability skills—in Germany, Norway, Poland, 

Romania, and Spain to name but a few. As operations 

draw down, training deployments should be able to 

ramp up. These areas will complement sites in the continental United States.

Preposition BCT Equipment Set in Europe. The 

cost of deploying a BCT headquarters or a battalion 

task force and enabling forces to Europe for either multinational training or NRF rotation exercises could be 

reduced by prepositioning equipment in theater. The 

Marine Corps recently revised its prepositioned equipment plan in Norway,3

 and the Army has the Cold War 

example of POMCUS (Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets4

) stocks to draw on. The 

cost advantages of investing in a prepositioned “flex” 

set of brigade equipment—stored and maintained in 

climate-controlled readiness versus repetitive equipment deployments by varying types of units—must be 

determined by thorough analysis. A heavy equipment 

set should be the basic prepositioning model. However, 

additional equipment modules would provide the flexibility for NRF participation by other types of BCTs. 

Both light and medium U.S.-based units could also 

take advantage of training areas in Europe and association with Allies. Prepositioned equipment, locally 

maintained and regularly exercised, is also a visible testimony to Allies and potential adversaries of enduring 

transatlantic bonds in the wake of troop withdrawals. A 

final advantage is the hedge prepositioned equipment 

provides against factors that might reduce or cancel 

U.S. NRF training, factors such as the availability of 

shipping assets, cost of fuel, international tensions, and 

regular training of European forces 

in North America should become a 

robust long-term program
6 Transatlantic Current No 7 www.ndu.edu/inss

Persistent NRF Shortcomings

The NRF is one of NATO’s most successful initiatives. Yet as it enters its ninth year in 2013, the 

project suffers from two challenges that have persisted since its inception. These are continuing 

force generation shortfalls and the inability to employ the NRF as intended for high-level crisis 

response. To these shortcomings might be added a third: the rapid dissipation of the high level of 

interoperability that units achieve as a result of NRF experience. Instead of maintaining some level 

of cooperation, the NRF task force dissolves and units return to long periods of lower readiness.

Force Generation Shortfalls. Problems in force generation have dogged the NRF almost 

since it was first declared to have reached full operational capability in 2006. European nations 

in particular, in the throes of declining budgets, slow-evolving force transformation, and competing real world requirements, have had difficulty providing the units and funds to generate 

the full 25,000-member force, even while maintaining active forces of over 2 million personnel 

(2011). In 2008 and 2010, NATO revamped the NRF program to require a much smaller Immediate Response Forces of 13,000 backed by a Response Force Pool of indeterminate size. This has 

eased the force-generation challenge. NRF force generation pressures should ease as nations 

begin to draw down operational commitments in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Kosovo 

and other missions. If returning forces are kept together in varying levels of readiness, more 

forces should be available to response sooner in a crisis.

Operational Mission Obstacles. The NRF was created to give NATO a high intensity combat 

force, including employment in forced entry scenarios. The reasons underlying the reluctance 

to use the NRF more often operationally are political and financial. These are not easy to resolve; however, common funding for at least some aspects of NRF operations, such as deployment and redeployment costs, would go a long way in doing so. Another difficulty is that the 

NRF is designed for rapid response to small, short-duration missions, while NATO has agreed 

only to large, slowly evolving missions such as IFOR, KFOR, and ISAF. In addition, the NRF 

mission profile is for a maximum of 120 days. Few if any missions last 120 days or less, hence 

a follow-on force would have to be almost immediately available. NATO has not considered 

deploying the NRF for any major crisis response or combat mission. Small elements of the NRF 

have been deployed to monitor the 2004 Olympic Games in Greece and to provide humanitarian assistance in the United States (Hurricane Katrina in 2005) and in Pakistan (2005–2006 

earthquake response). It is unlikely there will be more interest in committing the NRF in the 

future, though, in a crisis, common funding would remove one obstacle. Whether used operationally or not, the NRF provides substantial added value to NATO and nations and must be 

preserved as the centerpiece of interoperability generation.

NRF Interoperability Dissipated. Nations gain substantial benefit from an NRF rotation in 

a transformational sense—experience in deployment and crisis response that can enrich an 

entire national military force over time. The beginnings of multinational teamwork take root. 

However, “the NRF boost” quickly recedes because the present practice is to train, perform the 
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 7 7 

other issues that could make full equipment movement 

unwise or impossible.

Invite More Allied Use of Training Areas/Facilities 

in the United States and Canada. The limited practice 

of allied units training in North America could be enhanced as a technique to increase exposure to U.S. forces 

after announced draw downs are complete. As with U.S. 

units heading to Europe to train, European forces will 

gain crisis response experience and hone their skills in 

contingency deployments for operations involving U.S. 

and Canadian forces. Given the payoff, regular training 

of European forces in North America should become a 

robust long-term program.

There are also some longer term tasks.

Establish a Unique DOD Budget Line under 

USEUCOM for NRF/Interoperability. Resource requirements for multinational interoperability must be 

protected from competing Service demands. One way 

to do this is to give USEUCOM responsibility for a 

special DOD-level budget line for all interoperability. This line would be similar to the budget authority 

of U.S. Special Operations Command but discreet in 

purpose, designed to insulate robust interoperability 

engagement from tough budget choices often faced 

by the Services. Existing policy is to levy requirements 

such as NRF participation on the Services, who then 

face tough programmatic choices that invariably lead 

to reduced participation or longer gaps between deployments. The present “out of hide” approach invites 

selective compliance that weakens implementation of 

political decisions such as NRF participation. Establishing a single purpose budget line will fence off funds 

for building partner capacity to work with U.S. forces. 

These funds should support training in NATO TTPs, 

doctrine, operating concepts, and standards. Specific 

programs covered by an interoperability budget line 

might include all NRF participation as well as other 

rotational deployments to training with NATO Allies 

and partners anywhere.

Station a Cadre BCT in USAREUR. Cadre5

 BCT 

units are being proposed informally within some U.S. 

Army circles, similar to U.S. cadre divisions prior to 

World War II. Those divisions were quickly brought 

up to strength in time of crisis. Cadre BCTs could 

provide low-cost U.S. participation in planning, training, and simulations for map and command post exercises—which account for a substantial portion of 

partner exercise activity. Cadre units could be dualhatted to take on theater security cooperation or allied 

mentoring missions to expand the footprint of transatlantic engagement at reasonable cost. If the Army 

elected to organize cadre BCTs, it would be wise to 

consider stationing one in Europe, and it is reasonable to suggest a Europe-based cadre BCT should be 

a HBCT because Active Stryker and infantry BCTs 

are already in theater. A cadre BCT with Reserve augmentees could enhance the U.S. commitment to the 

NRF or command multinational forces in exercises. 

The views of the USAREUR commander should be 

fully explored in developing this proposal.

Fund Joint Multinational Training Center in 

Grafenwöhr, Germany, in Part by NATO Common 

Funding. JMTC has been called the “crown jewel” of 

USAREUR for its multifaceted, high-tech training 

Persistent NRF Shortcomings (cont.)

NRF rotation, and then disband permanently. As NATO’s multinational operational requirements lessen, a training solution centered on the NRF should provide continuing opportunities for multinational experience. One possibility is to create habitual multinational training 

relationships among units.
8 Transatlantic Current No 7 www.ndu.edu/inss

infrastructure. This includes the Joint Multinational 

Simulation Center at Grafenwöhr, Joint Multinational 

Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Combined Arms Training Center at Vilseck, and Training Support Activity 

Europe at Grafenwöhr. These modern facilities have 

trained U.S. and allied forces (the latter often at U.S. 

Army expense) for deployment to the Balkans, Iraq, 

and Afghanistan. With those operations winding down 

and U.S. Army combat brigades in theater reduced to 

just two, the cost of maintaining these extensive facilities will come under close scrutiny by the Army. What 

is needed is to realign funding of JMTC so that it can 

be usable for the needs of all Allies and, where agreed, 

partners. The goal should be to fund JMTC as a NATO 

common infrastructure facility. User fees should be required but based on ability to pay, perhaps reflecting the 

proportionality of the NATO Security Investment Program budget itself. JMTC should be integrated with 

and digitally connected to other NATO training and 

simulation centers at Stavanger, Norway, and Bydgoszcz, Poland, as well as major national training centers 

such as the bilateral U.S.-Romanian Joint Task Force–

East at Kogalniceanu Airbase Romania.

Stand up a U.S. Corps Forward Element in Europe.

As V Corps is withdrawn and deactivated, the United 

States should consider standing up a corps forward command post in Europe as it has done in Japan with I Corps 

(Forward). A corps forward element in Europe could 

readily respond to both USEUCOM and U.S. Africa 

Command requirements. It could be operational at low 

cost if collocated at JMTC or Wiesbaden, Germany, perhaps with a dual-hatted JMTC or deputy USAREUR 

one- or two-star commander. A corps forward element 

in Europe would facilitate interoperability and provide 

another critical symbol of U.S. commitment. In addition, 

U.S. corps expertise will be essential to bringing European corps up to joint command and control criteria for 

command of land-heavy, small joint operations as called 

for by the new command structure. These certifications 

will be a long process. The United States is the only Ally 

with joint-capable corps headquarters. A U.S. corps is 

the logical mentor for the nine European corps that must 

achieve this status through additional equipment, personnel, training, and ultimate certification. Locating the 

forward element of a U.S. corps in theater provides both 

a proximate advisor and model. A U.S. corps forward 

would also be available to participate in the NRF rotation, demonstrating U.S. leadership in meeting NATO’s 

requirement for nations to command land-heavy small 

operations under the new NCS. Finally, NATO expects 

to rely on the United States to provide operational command over larger major joint operations, defined as more 

than one deployed corps. Since the U.S. Army reorganized in 2010, the corps is the highest command level 

in its structure. A challenge for NATO and the United 

States is to test how a U.S. corps might oversee two or 

more allied corps in the field.

Determining the Optimum Link 

Between NCS and NRF

SHAPE must determine how the NRF will be linked 

to the smaller NCS that will come into being in 2014–2015. 

Will every NRF operation require a deployable command 

element of the NCS in addition to the NRF headquarters? 

Will some operations require only a NATO Force Structure 

(NFS) joint command and control headquarters? Should 

every deployed joint command, either the NRF command 

or a NFS deployed headquarters, be overseen by one of the 

two joint force headquarters (JFHQ), by one of the three 

NATO component commands (land, maritime, or air), or 

by Allied Command Operations (ACO) itself? Reporting to one of the component commands could complicate 

command and control if the operation grows in size, requiring a JFHQ to deploy and assume command. Reporting 

the United States should consider 

standing up a corps forward 

command post in Europe as it has 

done in Japan
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 7 9 

directly to ACO may be equally complicated. ACO, like 

component commands, is nondeployable. Often the course 

of small operations proves unpredictable.

For the near term, the two JFHQ are the only 

deployable joint command and control assets available 

in the NCS. Under the new NATO structure each 

JFHQ will be capable of deploying to command one 

operation at a time, for up to 1 year. A single deployment 

is expected to require 500 of the JFHQ 850 staff 

complement, leaving only 350 available to oversee other 

operations and essential non-operational tasks, such as 

building partner capacity. A staff of 500 deployed may 

be a low estimate for a deployed four-star command. 

By comparison, the latest revised U.S. Army corps 

headquarters design includes more than 750 personnel, 

and these are commands at a lower echelon with fewer 

overall responsibilities than JFHQs. It is reasonable to 

conclude that the JFHQ, while fixed in size today, may 

not be ideal and could be quickly over taxed.

NATO Level of Ambition and NRF. Maintaining 

the forces and capabilities to conduct a specific number 

of major and smaller joint operations, in close time proximity, is called NATO’s Level of Ambition.6

 The NRF 

should expect to be deployed as the initial element of 

any major or smaller joint operation. It may constitute 

the only required deploying force; however, it is expected 

often to be the lead force even for smaller operations. As 

such, and because the NRF (including its joint command 

element) is constituted from national forces, NATO will 

have to design and exercise how a deployed NRF links 

to the NCS.

The NRF calls for a deployable joint command from 

among national capabilities. Joint capable national commands have not been an area of strong emphasis in the 

past when NATO anticipated providing most all deployable joint command from within the NCS. NATO now 

intends to rely far more on national joint commands for 

operations. These will most often be land corps or maritime task group headquarters, and these will have to be 

transformed from component commands to legitimate 

joint commands. Plans for transformation have not been 

announced by NATO or nations. With few exceptions, 

the primary source of joint commands at the national 

level today is the United States, with three land corps 

and two comparable Marine Expeditionary Forces for 

worldwide contingencies. The United Kingdom and 

France also maintain single joint commands.

A new joint command is Germany’s multinational 

joint headquarters in Ulm called the Response Force 

Operations Command (RFOC). The RFOC, with a staff 

of about 760, is being offered as a permanent joint deployable headquarters for the NRF. It is already a joint 

command for European Union (EU) battle groups. The 

RFOC role within NATO still has to be agreed on; however, the fact that it is an available joint capable command asset means it is a likely future NRF headquarters.

A legitimate question might be to ask: what are 

the roles of the NCS JFHQs in addition to oversight 

of NRF deployments? They have three broad operational tasks. First, they are the designated deploying 

commands for major operations, including Article 5 

operations. Collective defense operations are regarded 

as remote possibilities for now, yet deterrence requires 

they be exercised regularly. Second, JFHQs must manage (from their home stations) the host of ongoing 

joint missions of any size that extend over long periods 

of time, such as ISAF, KFOR, and the planning and 

execution of exercises. Third, they must be prepared to 

deploy and take direct command of any smaller operation that grows into a major operation. JFHQs are also 

expected to develop regional and cultural expertise as 

part of operational preparedness.

It may not be wise to deploy a higher headquarters 

in the initial stages of even a large operation. In smaller 

operations, the NRF may suffice such that no higher 

the RFOC, with a staff of about 760, 

is being offered as a permanent joint 

deployable headquarters for the NRF
10 Transatlantic Current No 7 www.ndu.edu/inss

level command need deploy at all, similar to EU-controlled operations in Congo (2003) and Chad (2008). In 

a developing crisis, it will often be wise to wait until the 

situation under control before deploying a higher command echelon that must be supported and secured. The 

NRF can initially report to an NCS command outside 

the operational area. In situations where there is risk of 

a spreading crisis such that a higher headquarters might 

eventually be required, a JFHQ will be the right choice. 

Therefore, in high risk scenarios, having the NRF report 

to a JFHQ from the beginning ensures continuity of 

command and will be the wisest option.

Recommendation. NATO’s JFHQs are the most 

pragmatic link in the NCS for land-heavy NRF operations. For small NRF operations, however, there should 

not be an automatic or urgent requirement to deploy 

a JFHQ command element. The main purpose of the 

JFHQ will be to provide resources and deflect external 

distractions (that is, requirements of NATO, other agencies, or the host nation) from the deployed joint commander so he can focus entirely on operational success. 

The JFHQ should be prepared to deploy if the operation 

endures or grows in scale into a major operation—it is 

this possibility that make the JFHQ the right link from 

the NRF to the NCS. The JFHQ also has many other 

tasks that will become low priority or go unattended 

when it must deploy, hence it should not be overly anxious to do so.

If the JFHQ is too committed, the land component 

command should be prepared to assume the link to the 

NCS for land-heavy operations, and provide oversight 

of the NRF for ACO. The land component will have the 

closest ties to and greatest knowledge of all deployable 

NFS land commands. This will come from overseeing 

the continuing transformation of the land force commands of the NRF and their transition to joint capable 

commands. The land component command also has the 

responsibilities of land force operational planner and 

land force employment advisor for ACO. As all component commands, it is also responsible to ACO and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) for multinational 

training. This role includes primary responsibility for 

managing component interoperability and integration of 

capabilities into effective joint and combined forces. The 

component commands need not be deployable in order 

to be the reported-to command link of the NCS.

Interoperability Initiatives to Complement the NRF.

For the United States to sustain interoperability as a truly strategic operational resource, it has to do much more 

than revitalize the NRF. NATO should become the interoperability incubator for U.S. forces worldwide. Any 

nation has only one military, and it can follow but one set 

of operational procedures. NATO-agreed standards and 

doctrine continue to be tested and updated, promulgated 

beyond NATO, and invested in by more and more nations. The United States cannot afford a new set of standards and different doctrine to grow out of its outreach 

to partners in the Pacific or other regions. We should 

endeavor to spread the NATO way as far as possible beyond the present 69 NATO members and partners.

The procedures deeply ingrained from NATO institutions and longstanding agreements should be the 

basis for Pacific-based partner activity. However, NATO 

interoperability and standardization processes have to 

be agile, not dogmatic. NATO has to be open to global 

feedback, take on best of breed operating practices, and 

strive for rapid, vibrant refinement of what works best.

Where there is common equipment, common standards, procedures, and doctrine often follow. Common systems make interoperability easier. Much U.S. and European equipment is being acquired by partners. There are also 

NATO members looking to the seven Pacific NATO partners to make future capital investments in defense. The new 

U.S. Littoral Combat Ship and Joint High Speed Vessel are 

having the NRF report to a JFHQ 

from the beginning ensures 

continuity of command and will be 

the wisest option
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 7 11 

being built by the U.S. subsidiary of Australian shipbuilder 

Austal. The United Kingdom has just ordered Royal Navy 

tankers from South Korean shipbuilder Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering. These are but two examples.

Proposals

What follows is a list of specific proposals for U.S. 

policymakers to consider that will preserve and advance interoperability in tandem with the U.S. commitment to the NRF. The United States should propose to 

NATO as soon as possible a comprehensive strategy for 

sustaining future interoperability among members and 

partners in a period of reduced operations. A key element of the strategy should be a vigorous transatlantic 

interoperability track that signals enduring U.S. interest 

and leadership.

Strengthen the Capacity of the USAREUR Digital 

Liaison Detachment. The U.S. Army force structure includes Digital Liaison Detachments (DLDs) assigned at 

the theater army and component command levels to provide liaison teams capable of digital information-sharing 

with allied corps and divisions. USAREUR’s 209th DLD 

is a Reserve unit comprised of 30 personnel capable of 

liaising with allied forces at brigade through corps levels or with a multinational joint commander. It has been 

noted the value of the 209th in reaching out to Allies is 

limited but could be enhanced if funding were available 

for additional Active duty days for Reservists, or if the 

209th were reorganized as an Active Army unit in theater.

Convert USAREUR Single Function Military Police (MP) Brigade HQ with a Multifunctional Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) HQ. USAREUR’s 

eventual MP Brigade HQ (with a single MP battalion) 

should be reorganized as a multifunctional MEB HQ 

that could fill more roles for NATO and USEUCOM. 

An MEB HQ can exercise mission command over a 

wider assortment of either in-theater or U.S.-based 

forces, including chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear, MP, explosive ordnance disposal, civil affairs, and 

engineer units. MEBs can also employ a battalion-sized 

tactical combat force. An MEB is a better organizational 

fit to the NRF due to its multifunctional staff designed 

for planning and conducting stability operations, disaster 

relief, humanitarian assistance, and other wide area security functions. Having this asset in USAREUR would 

provide significantly greater flexibility than a single function MP Brigade HQ.

Embed More U.S. Officers on Senior Allied Staffs.

Interoperability can be enhanced by developing a 

well-structured program of embedding U.S. military 

officers in defense ministries, national military 

headquarters, and other key military entities of select 

Allies and partners.7

 Unlike liaison officers or tactical 

level exchange officers at corps and below, senior level 

“embeds” are posted inside ministries and top military 

staffs, side-by-side with host country colleagues, 

and often within the host’s chain of command. 

Embedding can bring substantial benefits to both the 

United States and its Allies and partners, including 

bringing planning and operational expertise to bear 

as host staffs determine national strategies, policies, 

and requirements; exchanging information at senior 

working levels; developing appreciation for different 

problem-solving cultures; and building networks for 

future collaboration. Embedding enhances intellectual 

interoperability upstream in national defense structures, 

which facilitates practical cooperation downstream, 

either within NATO or in any coalition operations.

Increase U.S. and Allied Exchange Students at 

National and NATO military schools. Austerity measures 

may eventually affect the investment in personnel 

attending NATO and allied military education programs. 

The opposite is what is required to offset the drawdown 

the United States should propose a 

comprehensive strategy for sustaining 

future interoperability among 

members and partners in a period of 

reduced operations
12 Transatlantic Current No 7 www.ndu.edu/inss

in experience with international, interagency, and civilmilitary operations expected after 2014. The lessons from 

these operations are precisely the ones that a 21st-century 

force requires for success. NATO should track full 

attendance at its schools and invite nations to share data 

on the number of allied exchange students they support 

via bilateral arrangements. The goal should be to wring 

maximum advantage from all programs.

Study the Creation of a USEUCOM Theater Security Cooperation Group. In pursuit of USEUCOM’s 

major mission of security cooperation, a Joint Security Cooperation Group ( JSCG) should be organized 

within the headquarters staff with contact elements at 

each component command. The main work of a JSCG 

would be to integrate partnership outreach programs 

across USEUCOM to realize optimum allied engagement from limited resources. An effective JSCG could 

be comprised of an estimated 100 or less midgrade 

officers and senior noncommissioned officers with recent operational experience. Principal activities would 

include advising allied exercise planning, doctrine 

development, adoption of NATO standards, and efficient use of resources. The goal of the JSCG should 

be to assist allied ministries of defense and the top 

echelons of national militaries in performance of multinational contingency operations.

Align Each NFS Corps with a Core of Habitually Affiliated Forces. Each corps in the NRF rotation should 

maintain a core of habitual unit affiliations that remain 

constant beyond a given NRF rotation. Longer term 

relationships provide closer mission planning and training relationship among NRF units. Anticipated NRF 

joint component relationships should also be identified, 

creating a permanent core of members and some nonpermanent members and partners. These “in being” relationships will further interoperability at low cost. Liaison 

and training relationship should be established within 

each command to maintain connectivity among subunits 

and enablers on a continuing basis. When not training 

for or in an NRF rotation, regular information-sharing, 

periodic planning meetings, individual exchanges, and 

selected training are reasonable activities to nurture familiarity with multinational operations.

Expand the NRF Commitment for Land Commands 

Up to 3 Years. With 9 corps (10 with the U.S. corps 

proposed above) participating,8

 each national corps 

across NATO would come into an NRF rotation only 

once every 9 or 10 years. Such a system has merit, but 

it means the NRF will be invisible most of the time to 

most NATO corps commands. The value of the NRF 

experience, and getting a greater return on investment 

in terms of commands able to meet unexpected crisis, 

suggest that the NRF window should be extended 

from 2 years (a year of preparation and a year on NRF 

standby) to 3 by adding a third, post-NRF year at a 

lower readiness level to act as an NRF “surge force.” The 

new flow scenario would roughly be as follows: The year 

prior to an NRF rotation, anticipated missions would be 

prioritized from Article 5 collective defense missions to 

various crisis response scenarios, and a base force package 

would be identified as the NRF Immediate Response 

Force. Other enabling forces would be identified from 

within the wider Response Force Pool for lower priority 

missions (for example, peace operations or humanitarian 

assistance/disaster relief ). The year prior to the NRF 

rotation, the joint force trains for its primary mission, 

with less time devoted to other mission types, and to be 

capable of reconfiguring as required. At the end of the 

train-up year, the force is certified and begins its NRF 

1-year rotation. All this is the current NRF procedure. 

However, at the end of the NRF year, the force would 

then return to lower readiness and remain available as a 

surge NRF force on lower readiness, able to respond to 

a second rapid response operation if needed. This surge 

each corps in the NRF rotation 

should maintain a core of habitual 

affiliations that remain constant 

beyond a given rotation
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 7 13 

status could last less than a year, or until the follow-on 

corps, in train-up to assume the NRF mission, surpasses 

the surge corps’s readiness9

Reconnect USAREUR to NATO as Soon as Possible. USAREUR is unique among U.S. commands in 

theater in having fully decoupled from the NCS since 

the Cold War. Given the centrality of interoperability in 

U.S. doctrine, this is a major flaw within USEUCOM. 

USAREUR needs to become the driving force in standing up NATO’s new land component command in Izmir, 

Turkey. That is the only way transatlantic land interoperability will remain strong and deepen as the Alliance 

comes to depend on collective training rather than continuous operations for excellence in multinational missions. The land component command in Izmir should 

rapidly assume oversight of land force transformation 

across NATO—a current deficit in the NCS. It should 

have close ties to national land force chiefs and expert 

knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of all NFS 

deployable commands. This will come from overseeing 

the transformation of land forces in general and the land 

component commands of the NRF in particular, especially their transition to joint capable corps commands. 

The land component command must also become the 

land force planner, concept developer, and multinational 

land force trainer for ACO. It will have primary responsibility for integrating the land components of every Ally 

and partner into joint and combined operations, similar 

to its maritime and air counterparts. Because of the many 

responsibilities of the land command at Izmir, it should 

have a U.S. commander and be tied to USEUCOM as 

other NATO component commands are, dual-hatted as 

either the USAREUR commander or his deputy.10

Strengthen the Role of ACT as the Primary Engine of 

Interoperability. Although ACT is well established on interoperability, it must be underscored that ACT is the agent 

responsible for all Alliance interoperability, including across 

the Atlantic. A U.S. initiative to give interoperability strategic stature as a military asset and force multiplier has to 

define how it sees ACT working in harmony with all other 

proposals. ACT should have a close and special relationship 

to the Pentagon. In the future, interoperability must be built 

on vigorous training rather than operational experience—

a clear shift in emphasis from ACO toward ACT, though 

both are central to training as well as operations. ACT must 

also get the maximum effect from every resource invested in 

interoperability. This is conceptualized in the complement 

to Smart Defense that the Secretary General has christened 

Connected Forces Initiative (CFI).11 CFI may well prove 

to be the more effective and successful of the two. Yet ACT 

is the engine behind both and will need close cooperation 

with and from USEUCOM in the absence of the former 

U.S. Joint Forces Command if NATO is to succeed in replacing operational experience with training. ACT must be 

manned and resourced appropriately, including with top 

U.S. personnel. One task ACT should have in its sights is 

how to spread more of NATO TTPs, doctrine, concepts, 

and standards to more partners. It should actively track the 

degree to which members and partners invest in NATO 

compliant systems and methods.

The NATO Response Force is the essential core 

of future interoperability. However, it is just the core. A 

far broader vision and implementing strategy have to be 

internalized by Alliance members, especially the United 

States. Many related initiatives can be instituted in the 

near term at low cost. Other steps will take a while to be 

realized, but Allies should see them through. Our ability to operate together will be the foundation on which 

transatlanticism will flourish in the 21st century.

Notes 1 The NATO Operation Maritime Guard, conducted under 

United Nations Resolution 787 authorizing the use of force to stop 

arms shipments to Yugoslavia, commenced in the Adriatic in October 

Acknowledgments

Advice and support for this paper was provided by Dr. John Bonin; 

Mr. Steve Covington; Colonel Bill Harmon, USA; Major Timothy 

Wolfe, USA; Mr. Scott Anhalt; Mr. Leo Michel; Mr. Diego RuizPalmer; Colonel Greg Payne, USA; Dr. Nicholas Rostow; and Mr. 

Tim Touzinsky. The support of these experts is gratefully acknowledged; however, any errors of fact, misinterpretation, or omission 

are the author’s sole responsibility.
14 Transatlantic Current No 7 www.ndu.edu/inss

1992. The Alliance has been engaged in deadly force crisis response 

land, sea, and air operations ever since.

2 See Joint Publication 3.0, Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint 

Staff, August 11, 2011). This publication is regarded as the capstone 

manual from which an extensive host of doctrine is further elaborated.

3 The Marine Corps Pre-positioning Program–Norway, in existence since the early 1980s, is actively used. In July 2012, it completed 

modification from a Marine Expeditionary Brigade equipment set 

to a smaller and more flexible Special Purpose Marine Air Ground 

Task Force available globally and configured for either operational 

contingencies or security cooperation missions.

4 Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets. Several 

heavy divisions’ worth of this equipment, held in climatically controlled 

warehouses across Europe, were maintained in ready-to-use status by 

local civilian technicians. U.S.-based units could leave their equipment 

behind and arrive much more quickly in theater, ready to fight.

5 Cadre is a brigade or division organization manned only by its 

key personnel and lacking any full subordinate units or major equipment. The unit is able to participate in limited planning and training 

and can be quickly filled with a full complement of personnel and 

equipment to be ready for training and operations. Because all key 

personnel are well known to each other, the unit avoids many of the 

startup problems typical of new organizations.

6 For details of the Level of Ambition, see Part 3, NATO Political Guidance Annex 1 to C-M (2011) 0022, March 14, 2011 (NATO 

Restricted).

7 This “embed proposal” reflects an initiative described by Leo 

Michel, “For a Smarter U.S. Footprint in Europe, Think Small,” 

Defense News, June 7, 2010, available at <www.defensenews.com/

article/20100607/DEFFEAT05/6070323/For-a-Smarter-U-S-Footprint-in-Europe-Think-Small>.

8 It is reasonable that NATO review with nations whether it 

needs 9 or 10 national and multinational corps. One impact of economic austerity is that many of these headquarters are undermanned 

at present. In addition, under the new NATO Command Structure, 

each of these land commands is to invest in becoming a deployable 

joint force command for smaller NATO operations. What the requirement will be to meet Allied Command Operations (ACO) certification as a “joint command” is not yet identified. However, it will 

involve some investment in additional personnel, communications, 

and other “kit.” It will also require exercises and ACO certification.

9 This readiness regimen is analogous to U.S. aircraft carrier 

deployment schemes for the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.

10 A sound argument can be made that the U.S. Army Europe 

(USAREUR) commander should be located in Izmir rather than 

Wiesbaden. The principal activity of USAREUR is now building 

partnership capacity, that is, the preparation of multinational land 

forces to operate together. There will be few U.S. combat forces 

in theater to warrant an extensive operational focus. Hence, the 

main land force mission focus for the U.S. Army is team-building 

with potential partners in Izmir. In Wiesbaden, a deputy commander could be located along with much of the USAREUR staff 

to manage theater Army forces and missions, including planning 

and conducting limited U.S.-only operations (for example, bilateral 

assistance and noncombatant evacuation operations). A USAREUR 

commander, dual-hatted as commander NATO Land Command 

Izmir and located there, provides command arrangements between 

NATO and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) that are compatible and synchronous. However, having a dual-hatted commander 

is not enough; the two headquarters staffs must also coordinate 

closely together. That is necessary to correct the full disconnect 

between USAREUR and NATO’s land commands today, an unsatisfactory situation that will persist if the U.S. flag officer at Izmir is 

not aligned with USEUCOM. Dual-hatting the USAREUR commander is also preferable to the difficulties that might emerge if he 

were to report to the USEUCOM commander while a USAREUR 

deputy reported to SACEUR as the NATO land commander at 

Izmir. The United States should seriously reconsider the rank of 

its USEUCOM component commands in light of their mission 

of overseeing the successful transformation of so many allied and 

partner militaries into capable partners to U.S. forces. An additional 

star in this case is low-cost high return. Notably, Senator Daniel 

Inouye (D-HI) has declared the position of commander, U.S. Army 

Pacific, should be redesignated a four-star position, justified by the 

vast number of foreign militaries with which he must engage.

11 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, remarks 

at the February 2012 Munich Security Conference.

The Center for Transatlantic Security Studies within the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies provides research 

and policy advice to senior Department of Defense and 

other U.S. Government leaders through studies, research 

projects, and outreach and education programs. CTSS 

draws on its unique interface with U.S. and international 

governments and research institutions to provide timely 

and relevant policy recommendations.

The Transatlantic Current series presents original research by members of the CTSS resident scholars as 

well as nonresident subject matter experts. The opinions, 

conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense Department or 

any other agency of the Federal Government. Visit NDU 

Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Ambassador Robert Hunter

Director

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

COL Timothy A. Vuono, USA 

Director, INSS

Director of Research
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 7 15 

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The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, 

and Capabilities 

Edited by Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force has undergone a rapid transformation since the 1990s 

into a formidable, modern air force that could present major challenges to Taiwanese and U.S. 

forces in a potential conflict. To examine the present state and future prospects of China’s air force, 

a distinguished group of scholars and experts on Chinese airpower and military affairs gathered in 

Taipei, Taiwan, in October 2010. This volume is a compilation of the edited papers presented at 

the conference, rooted in Chinese sources and reflecting comments and additions stimulated by the 

dialogue and discussions among the participants. Contributing authors include Kenneth W. Allen, 

Roger Cliff, David Frelinger, His-hua Cheng, Richard P. Hallion, Jessica Hart, Kevin Lanzit, Forrest 

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Murray Scot Tanner, Joshua K. Wiseman, Xiaoming Zhang, and You Ji.

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By David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders

The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon 

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characteristics of these three domains—nuclear, space, and cyber—can provide the underpinnings 

of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. David Gompert 

and Phillip Saunders assess the prospect of U.S.-Chinese competition in these domains and recommend that the United States should propose a comprehensive approach based on mutual restraint 

whereby it and China can mitigate their growing strategic vulnerabilities. This mutual restraint 

regime may not take the form of binding treaties, but patterns of understanding and restraint may 

be enough to maintain stability.
16 Transatlantic Current No 7 www.ndu.edu/inss

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Cross-currents in French Defense 

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