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S. HRG. 114–540 

INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY 

OPERATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 10, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

DECEMBER 10, 2015

Page 

INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ........................................ 1 

Schwartz, General Norton A., USAF, Retired, President and CEO, Business 

Executives for National Security, and Former Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force ...................................................................................................................... 4 

Stavridis, Admiral James G., USN, Retired, Dean of the Fletcher School 

of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and Former Commander of U.S. 

European Command and U.S. Southern Command .......................................... 8 

Lamb, Dr. Christopher J., Deputy Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University ....................................................... 12 

(III) 

(1) 

INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY 

OPERATIONS 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Wicker, Ayotte, 

Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, 

Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Kaine, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, good morning. 

The committee meets today to continue our series of hearings on 

defense reform. We have reviewed the effects of the GoldwaterNichols reforms on our defense acquisition, management, and personnel system, and our past few hearings have considered what 

most view as the essence of Goldwater-Nichols, the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, and service chiefs, and 

the combatant commanders. 

This morning, we seek to understand how Goldwater-Nichols has 

impacted the effectiveness of U.S. military operations and what reforms may be necessary. 

We are pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses 

who will offer insights from their many years of experience and distinguished service. General Norton Schwartz, former Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force and President and CEO [Chief Executive Officer] 

of Business Executives for National Security; Admiral James 

Stavridis, former Commander, U.S. European Command and U.S. 

Southern Command, and currently the Dean of the Fletcher School 

of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and frequent appearance 

on various liberal media outlets; Dr. Christopher Lamb, Deputy Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. 

More than anything else, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a result 

of escalating concern in the Congress and in the country about the 

effectiveness of U.S. military operations. The Vietnam War, the 

failure of the hostage rescue mission in Iran, and the flawed invasion of Grenada all pointed to deep systemic problems in our defense enterprise that needed to be addressed for the sake of both 

our warfighters and our national security. 

2 

In particular, Goldwater-Nichols focused on ensuring the unity of 

command and improving the ability of our forces to operate jointly. 

As we have explored in previous hearings, many questions remain 

about the balance our military is striking between core military 

competitiveness, competencies, and joint experience. But as it relates to combat effectiveness, there is no doubt, as one former 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it, no other nation can 

match our ability to combine forces on the battlefield and fight 

jointly. 

The subject of today’s hearing relates directly to the many steps 

Goldwater-Nichols took to improve the unity of command. The law 

made unified commanders explicitly responsible to the President 

and the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions and 

preparedness of their commands. It also removed the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff from the operational chain of command and prevented the 

services from moving forces in and out of regional commands without approval. Geographic combatant commanders were given the 

ability to issue authoritative direction on all aspects of operations, 

joint training and logistics, internal chains of command, and personnel within their assigned areas of responsibility. These steps 

were effective in establishing clear lines of command authority and 

responsibilities that translated to a more effective fighting force 

than we had in the 1980s. 

However, 30 years later, we have to take a hard look at this command structure in light of current threats and how our model of 

warfighting has evolved. The United States confronts the most diverse and complex array of crises since the end of World War II, 

from rising competitors like China, revanchist powers like Russia, 

the growing asymmetric capabilities of nations ranging from Iran 

to North Korea, the persistence of radical Islamic extremism, and 

the emergence of new domains of warfare such as space and cyberspace. These threats cut across our regional operational structures 

embodied by geographic combatant commands. 

So we must ask whether the current combatant command structure best enables us to succeed in the strategic environment of the 

21st century. Should we consider alternative structures that are organized less around geography and transregional and functional 

missions. 

At the same time, as numerous witnesses have observed, while 

combatant commands were originally envisioned as the warfighting 

arm of the military, the Department of Defense, that function has 

largely migrated to joint task forces, especially on an ad hoc basis 

in response to emerging contingencies. This suggests that people 

have identified a shortcoming in the current design and have 

adopted measures to work around the system as we see quite often. 

This should inform our efforts to reevaluate and re-imagine the 

combatant commands. 

At the same time, combatant commands have come to play very 

important peacetime diplomatic functions. Do these developments 

argue for changes in the structure of combatant commands? At a 

minimum, it would call into question the top-heavy and bloated 

staff structures that we see in the combatant commands. Time and 

again during these hearings, we have heard how dramatic increases in civilian and military staffs have persisted even as reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
3 

sources available for warfighting functions are increasingly 

strained. 

As former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele 

Flournoy pointed out earlier this week, combatant command staffs 

have grown to 38,000 people. That is nearly three divisions? worth 

of staff in just the combatant commands alone. We have to ask if 

this is truly necessary and whether it is improving our warfighting 

capabilities. 

At the same time, we have to examine whether there are duplicative functions in the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and subordinate commands that can be streamlined. That includes the question of whether we really need all of the current combatant commands. For example, do we really need a NORTHCOM [Northern 

Command] and a SOUTHCOM [Southern Command]? Do we really 

need a separate AFRICOM [Africa Command] headquartered in 

Germany when the vast majority of its forces reside within 

EUCOM [European Command]? 

As we have to revisit the role of the Chairman and the members 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the 

Joint Staff and operational commanders at the expense of the services. Has that gone too far or not far enough? Former Secretary of 

Defense Robert Gates raised this issue when he testified before this 

committee because of his frustration with the military services? 

lack of responsiveness to current operational requirements. 

Many of our witnesses have discussed whether the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff has sufficient statutory authority to perform the strategic integration that the Department of Defense all 

too often seems to do poorly, integrating priorities, efforts, and resources across regions, across domains of military activity, and 

across time, balancing short-term and long-term requirements. The 

question has been raised whether the Chairman should be placed 

in the chain of command with the service chiefs and combatant 

commanders reporting to him. We have heard testimony in favor 

and against. I look forward to exploring this further today. 

These are critical questions about our defense organization that 

have direct bearing on the effectiveness of U.S. military operations 

and, as a consequence, on the wellbeing of our warfighters. We owe 

it to them to look at this seriously, ask the tough questions, challenge old assumptions, and embrace new solutions if and when it 

is needed. 

I thank our witnesses again and look forward to their testimony. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 

me join you in welcoming the witnesses. I have had the privilege 

really of working with General Schwartz as Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force, Admiral Stavridis as EUCOM Commander, and Dr. Lamb, 

your service in the Defense Department, now as an analyst and 

academic. I deeply appreciate it. Thank you very much, gentlemen, 

for joining us today. 

As the chairman has said, we have undertaken a very rigorous, 

under his direction, review of Goldwater-Nichols. And we heard 

just a few days ago from former Under Secretary of Defense 

4 

Michele Flournoy about one of the issues, and that was in her 

words,‘‘over the years, the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] has 

become a routinized, bottom-up staff exercise that includes hundreds of participants and consumes many thousands of man-hours 

rather than a top-down leadership exercise that sets clear priorities, makes hard choices and allocates risk.’’ 

So one of the things I would hope that the witnesses would talk 

about with this whole planning process, the formal process, the informal process, and how we can improve that—that is just one of 

the items. There is a long and I think important list of topics that 

we could discuss: the role and authorities assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including whether the Chairman 

should be placed in the chain of for military operations; improving 

the employment and synchronization of military capabilities 

through possible structural reforms to our combatant commands, 

defense agencies, and field activities; and the potential benefits of 

adopting organizational changes, including consolidation of staff 

elements and creation of cross-functional teams, to achieve efficiencies and provide senior civilian and military leaders with more 

impactful and timely recommendations. 

And finally, in previous hearings, several of our witnesses have 

rightly observed that enhancing the effectiveness of our military 

operations and better capitalizing upon the gains achieved through 

those improvements may require significant changes to our interagency national security structure and processes as well. And this 

point was made by Jim Locher, who was the godfather, if you will, 

of the Goldwater-Nichols. In his words, ‘‘No matter how well you 

transform the Department of Defense, it is still going to be troubled 

by an interagency system that is quite broken and the problems 

that confront this Nation and national security require an interagency response. The days of the Department of Defense being able 

to execute a national security mission by itself are long gone, and 

we do not have the ability to integrate the expertise and capacity 

of all of the government agencies that are necessary.’’ I think it is 

important to keep that in mind. 

And chairman—again, let me commend him for beginning this 

process with this committee and the Department of Defense, and 

I hope it is a catalyst under his leadership for serious review by 

other committees and other agencies about how together we can 

improve the security of the United States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Welcome, General Schwartz. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, RETIRED, PRESIDENT AND CEO, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY, AND FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF 

THE AIR FORCE 

General SCHWARTZ. Thanks, Chairman McCain and Ranking 

Member Reed for your and the committee’s commitment to improving DOD’s internal governance and defense organization shaped by 

the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. It is an unexpected privilege to return to this hearing room and to offer a few related ideas on how 

to improve performance in the Department of Defense, and it is a 

5 

special pleasure to sit beside the finest flag officer of my generation, Jim Stavridis. 

While there are many issues that warrant attention, command 

arrangements, resource allocation, acquisition processes, overhead 

reduction, joint credentialing of military personnel, and the potential for consolidation, among others, I wish to focus this morning 

on the three that I am persuaded hold the greatest promise for particularly positive outcomes. They are the role and authority of the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, right-sizing the combatant 

commands, and establishing standing joint task forces for execution 

of COCOM [combatant commands] operational missions. I am certainly prepared to address the other matters you mentioned at your 

discretion. 

In my experience as a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and the Joint Staff, a functional combatant commander, and a chief 

of service, I have come to the conclusion that the Chairman’s informal role in supervising the combatant commanders and the JCS 

[Joint Chiefs of Staff] is insufficient for the demands of our times. 

While it is true that delegated authority from the Secretary of Defense is an alternative, there should be no doubt in the armed 

forces about the directive authority of the Chairman, subject to the 

close and continuing scrutiny and oversight of the Secretary of Defense. 

Strategic guidance for force employment, force allocation tradeoffs between combatant commands and establishing strategic priorities for the armed forces should not be the result of bureaucratic 

negotiation or the exquisite application of personal persuasion, but 

rather the product of strategic leadership. This capacity is constrained by the Chairman’s inability to exercise executive authority 

on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, and the remedy I suggest is 

to place the Chairman in the line of supervision between the Secretary and his or her combatant commanders. 

The nine combatant commands are complex entities, none of 

which are alike, some with regional responsibilities and some with 

functional roles. The commands strive to serve both peacetime, crisis response, and warfighting obligations. The composition of the 

combatant command staffs clearly reflect the inherent tension in 

this excessively broad mission array: peacetime administration, deterrence, training, and partner engagement versus maintaining the 

capacity to conduct complex contingency operations in peace and 

war. 

The proliferation of resource directorates, J–8’s; joint intelligence 

centers, J–2’s; security assistance program offices, typically J–4’s; 

partner engagement entities, typically J–9’s; and operations and 

training staff, J–3’s, is the result of this expansive assigned mission set. And over time, the warfighting role of the combatant commands has evolved to the almost exclusive use, some would suggest 

excessive use, of joint task forces up to and including four-star-led 

joint task forces to execute assigned missions. The simple question 

in my mind is, can the combatant command, no matter how well 

tailored, perform each and every associated task with equal competence? I do not think so and the attempt to infuse greater interagency heft into the combatant commands has, in my experience, 

6 

detracted from the core operational focus in either peacetime or in 

conflict. 

How have we squared the tension between combatant commands? peacetime and wartime roles? I would argue by again extensive use of joint task force organizations to execute operational 

missions. It is my conviction that the efficacy of the task force employment model is beyond dispute. The National Counterterrorism 

Joint Task Force demonstrates conclusively in my mind the enduring value of standing, mature, well-trained, and equipped joint task 

forces. It may well be that high performance parallels exist for national joint task forces in the surface, maritime, and air domains 

as well. What we should continue, however—or what, I should say, 

we should discontinue is the proliferation of joint task forces in 

each combatant command with the attendant service components 

and headquarters staffs. Task Force 510 in the Pacific Command 

might qualify, however, as an exception to the rule. 

In short, Mr. Chairman, we need to have within the armed forces 

a strategic leader who can exercise executive authority. We need to 

aggressively tailor combatant command headquarters composition 

to its core mission or missions and refrain from creating subordinate joint task forces out of service headquarters. And finally, we 

need to drive toward employment of long-term, highly proficient 

national joint task forces for combatant command employment. 

Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and 

members of the committee for your attention this morning. I trust 

my presentation will assist in advancing the noble cause of Goldwater-Nichols reform. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Schwartz follows:] 

STATEMENT BY GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF (RET.) 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, thank you 

for your commitment to improving internal governance and defense organization 

shaped by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. My remarks are based on my experience 

in uniform as the 19th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force and a former 

Commander of the US Transportation Command. It is an unexpected privilege to 

return to this hearing room and to offer a few related ideas on how best to improve 

performance in the Department of Defense. 

I now serve as the President and CEO of Business Executives for National Security, a non-partisan organization of business executives with genuine concern for national security. As part of your defense reform review I would be pleased to offer 

to you, at some future date, my organization’s views on the pressing need to make 

more efficient use of defense resources and improve Defense Department management—also objectives of the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation. 

As requested, my remarks today are confined to the topic of increasing the effectiveness of military operations. The views are my own. 

THE RATIONALE FOR REFORM

First, let me commend the Senate and this Congress for restoring acquisition responsibilities to the Service Chiefs in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act 

legislation. Not only does it put accountability where it belongs in the Service acquisition structure, it identifies the acquisition career field as central to respective service identities, which is important for promoting viable military career paths. 

The need to reconsider the roles of other senior military leaders in the structure 

of the Department stems, I believe, from two transformational factors that have 

evolved since implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. The first is the concept of 

jointness, which has been inculcated over a period of nearly thirty years into the 

daily cadence of military operations. I cannot foresee us ever going to war in the 

future with a concept of operations that is not joint. Because of this irreversible development, we should perhaps look at adapting the current joint duty requirements 

7 

for officer promotion by emphasizing joint experience at the operational level of command instead. 

The second factor is related to the first and involves changing the way we identify 

and resolve conflict today as opposed to more traditional warfare designs of the past. 

The evolving threat is political, economic and demographic. In the Middle East the 

adversary is ideological, made up of proto-state, non-state, and sub-state entities. 

Think ISIS/ISIL, Hezbollah, Hamas. Internationally, China and Russia seek ascendancy. Across the developing world, nearly 40 percent of the population is under the 

age of 15 creating a huge demand on future resources and governing institutions. 

Climate change suggests complex consequences with security implications. Clearly, 

maintaining national security in this environment requires DoD to plan for a wide 

range of contingencies. The model we have adopted more often than not as the preferred military response is to task organize for the specific contingency. 

Goldwater-Nichols arose in an era of more sharply defined politico-military circumstances. Those boundaries no longer exist. It is therefore appropriate and necessary to evaluate the need to adapt our military operational structure for the new 

threat environment. 

THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING MILITARY OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE

While there are many issues that warrant attention: command arrangements, resource allocation, acquisition processes, overhead reduction, joint credentialing for 

military personnel and the potential for consolidation among others, I wish to focus 

on the three I am persuaded hold the greatest promise for particularly positive outcomes. They are: the role and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

right-sizing the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), and establishing standing Joint 

Task Forces for execution of COCOM operational missions. 

1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational chain of supervision 

In my experience as a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint 

Staff, I have come to the conclusion that the Chairman’s informal role in supervising the Combatant Commanders and the JCS is insufficient for the demands of 

our times. While it is true that delegated authority from the Secretary of Defense 

is an alternative and is routinely implied, there should be no doubt in the Armed 

Forces of the United States about the directive authority of the Chairman, subject 

to close and continuing scrutiny and oversight by the Secretary of Defense. 

Developing strategic guidance for force employment, deciding force allocation 

tradeoffs between Combatant Commands and establishing strategic priorities for the 

Armed Forces should not be the result of bureaucratic negotiation or the exquisite 

application of personal suasion but, rather, the product of strategic leadership. That 

capacity is constrained by the Chairman’s inability to exercise executive authority 

on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. The remedy, I suggest, is to place the Chairman in the line of supervision between the Secretary and the Combatant Commanders. 

2. Right-sizing the Combatant Commanders for peacetime deterrence and engagement roles 

The nine Combatant Commands are complex entities, none alike, some with regional responsibilities and others with functional roles. The commands strive to 

serve both peacetime, crisis response and warfighting obligations. The composition 

of the Combatant Command staffs clearly reflects the inherent tension in this excessively broad mission array: peacetime administration, deterrence and partner engagement versus maintaining the capacity to conduct complex contingency operations in peace and war. 

The proliferation of organizational elements such as resource directorates (J–8s), 

Joint Intelligence Centers (J–2s), security assistance program offices (typically J– 

4s), partner engagement entities (typically J–9s) and operations and training staffs 

(J–3s) is the result of the expansive assigned mission set. What we see over time 

is that the warfighting role of the Combatant Commands has evolved to the almost 

exclusive use of subordinate Joint Task Forces (JTFs).up to and including four-star 

led JTFs.to execute assigned operational missions. Further, the infusion of greater 

Federal interagency heft into the Combatant Commands has, in my experience, detracted from core operational focus, in both crisis and conflict. This evolution in organizational complexity raises a simple question: can a Combatant Command, however well-tailored, perform each and every associated task with equal competence? 

I don’t think so, and I believe it is necessary to refocus the Combatant Commanders 

on their core mission: strategic engagement, relationship building, joint training, 

combat support, and contingency planning; and, adjust their headquarters staffs accordingly. 

8 

3. Standing Joint Task Force for land, maritime and air 

The proliferation of COCOM organizational elements that I have just described 

brings up a fundamental question of task and purpose. The COCOMs are supported 

by separate component commands in land, sea and air. Yet, their components role 

is largely administrative not operational. Instead, we have we squared the tension 

between Combatant Command peacetime and wartime roles by extensive (some 

would argue excessive) use of Joint Task Force organizations to execute operational 

missions. By and large this has been successful. 

It is my conviction that the efficacy of the Task Force employment model is beyond dispute. The National Counterterrorism Joint Task Force demonstrates conclusively, in my mind, the enduring value of standing, mature, well-trained and wellequipped Joint Task Forces. It may well be that high performance parallels exist 

for National Joint Task Forces in the surface, maritime and air domains as well. 

We need to consider creating highly efficient National Joint Task Forces for global 

employment when and where needed. What we should discontinue, however, is the 

proliferation of Joint Task Forces in each Combatant Command, with attendant 

service components and headquarters staffs (Task Force 510 in the US Pacific Command, PACOM, might qualify as an exception to the rule). 

CONCLUSION

A major purpose of Goldwater-Nichols was to strengthen the Joint Staff and the 

Combatant Commanders. Your comprehensive review needs to balance that objective with the Service’s authorities to organize, train and equip. The roles are complementary: operations and support. However, we need to reinforce the chain of supervision and, in turn, accountability. You have done this with the reconstitution 

of the Service Chiefs’ acquisition role. On the Joint Chiefs’ side, we need to have 

within the armed forces a strategic leader who can exercise executive authority. We 

need to aggressively align Combatant Command headquarters composition to its 

core mission(s) and refrain from creating subordinate Joint Task Forces from Service headquarters. And, finally, we need to drive toward employment of long-term, 

highly proficient National Joint Task Forces for Combatant Command employment. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Admiral Stavridis? 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, RETIRED, DEAN OF THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER COMMANDER 

OF U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

other distinguished members, a pleasure to be back with you and 

to be here with General Schwartz, who was not only a service chief 

but a combatant commander, as well as being Director of the Joint 

Staff. There is no one who can talk more coherently to these issues 

than him. And as well, my good friend, Dr. Chris Lamb, who I 

think an best address the questions of planning and strategy that 

Senator Reed raised a moment ago. 

I spent 37 years in uniform. I spent probably a decade of that 

in the Pentagon. I wish I had been at sea during those years, but 

in that time, I managed to serve on the staff of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, 

and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So I have sort of 

seen inside the building. And as Senator McCain mentioned, I was 

twice a combatant commander, once in Europe and once in Southern Command, Latin America and the Caribbean. 

So I am going to simply walk into four or five ideas that I think 

might be interesting for this committee to discuss and debate. None 

of these are fully firmed ideas, but I think they relate to the objective of what the committee I think very correctly seeks to do as we 

9 

sit here kind of 3 decades after Goldwater-Nichols. And they all relate in one way or another to how the Department is organized. 

So I am going to start with one that I think is controversial but 

ought to be considered, and that is do we need a cyber force for the 

United States. I would invite you to think about where we were 

100 years ago. We had an Army, a Navy, and a Marine Corps. Did 

we have an Air Force? Of course, not. We barely flew airplanes 100 

years ago. I would argue today it feels like that moment a few 

years after the beach at Kitty Hawk, and my thought is clearly we 

need a Cyber Command, and I think we are moving in that direction. But I think it is time to think about whether we want to accelerate that process because our vulnerabilities in the cyber domain, in my view, are extraordinary, and we are ill-prepared for 

them. And therefore, some part of our response will have to be 

done by the Department of Defense, and the sooner we have not 

only a Cyber Command, but in my view a cyber force, small, capable, I think we would be well served. I think we should have that 

discussion. 

Secondly, to the question of the interagency and the power of 

how to bring those parts of the government together, I think an interesting organizational change to consider would be at each of the 

regional combatant commands to have a deputy who is a U.S. ambassador or perhaps some other senior diplomat. I think you would 

need to continue to have a military deputy in order to conduct military operations, but a great deal of what combatant commands do 

is diplomatic in nature. And I think having a senior representative 

from the interagency present would be salutary. This has been 

tried at SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, and AFRICOM at one time or another, and I think it would be an effective and interesting idea to 

consider as you look at the combatant commands. 

Thirdly—and the chairman mentioned this—in my view geographically we have too many combatant commands. We have six 

today. I think we should seriously consider merging NORTHCOM 

and SOUTHCOM and merging EUCOM and AFRICOM. I think 

there are obvious efficiencies in doing so. I think there are operational additional benefits that derive. And I think finally it is a 

way to begin reducing what has correctly been identified as the 

bloat in the operational combatant command staffs. 

Fourth, I would associate myself with General Schwartz and a 

number of others who have testified with the idea that we should 

consider an independent general staff and strengthening the role of 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Frankly, in practice, as 

a combatant commander I would very typically call the Chairman, 

check signals with the Chairman. I would not undertake a radical 

departure without talking to the Chairman. I think putting the 

Chairman in the chain of command, as General Schwartz has outlined and a number of other witnesses have mentioned, is efficient, 

sensible, and frankly codifies what is in effect today in many ways. 

In addition, I think that Chairman would be well served with 

what some have termed a general staff. This is the idea of taking 

mid-grade military officers of extraordinary promise and pulling 

them from their services and more or less permanently assigning 

them to this general staff. This model has been used in other 

points by other nations in history. I think it is a powerful way to 

10 

create efficiencies and avoid duplication because by doing so, you 

can reduce a great deal of what happens in the combatant commands today. So in addition to strengthening the position of the 

Chairman, I think it would be worth considering whether a general 

staff model would make sense. 

Fifth and finally, I think that we talk a great deal, appropriately, 

about joint operations. It is important to remember that joint education is extraordinarily important in both ultimately the conduct 

of operations, the creation of strategy, the intellectual content of 

our services. So I would advocate considering whether we should 

integrate our joint educational institutions, probably by taking the 

National Defense University, putting it back to three-star rank, 

and giving that officer directive authority over the Nation’s war colleges. This would also create a reservoir of intellectual capability, 

which I think could match up well with the idea of a general staff. 

All five of those ideas are controversial, but I think they should 

be part of the conversation that this committee is unpackaging, 

which is one that is deeply important for the Nation’s security. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADMIRAL JAMES STAVRIDIS, USN (RET) 

Chairman McCain, Rank Member Reed, other distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for asking me to come and discuss ideas for reform of the Department of Defense. 

In the course of my 37 years of active service after passing out of Annapolis in 

1976, I served about half of my career in staff assignments in the Pentagon—on the 

staffs of the Secretary of Defense as his Senior Military Assistant; Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs focused on the Unified Command Plan; Secretary of the Navy as his 

Executive Assistant and Special Assistant; and Chief of Naval Operations with focus 

on long range and strategic planning. 

I also served twice in command as a Combatant Commander at US Southern 

Command for three years; and as US European Commander for four years, concurrently with serving as Supreme Allied Commander at NATO. 

While I did not enjoy staff duty as much as being at sea (true I suspect for most 

military officers), I learned a great deal and formed some opinions that I am happy 

to share today based on my years of active duty. 

Additionally, since leaving active duty two years, I have served as the 12th Dean 

of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and as a Senior 

Fellow at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. In both capacities, I continue 

to study and comment on these issues. 

All of these remarks, however, are my personal opinions and do not represent the 

views of any other individual or organization. 

I would like to begin by pointing out that I believe that overall that the US Department of Defense is the best functioning entity in the US government, and that 

it does an enormous amount of good in the world today. And that the vast majority 

of civilians and military assigned to the Department on staff duty are dedicated, 

hard-working, and very focused on their jobs in professional and commendable ways. 

Having said that, I also believe it is time to take a look at several aspects of the 

way the Department does business, and the work of this committee is therefore 

timely and sensible. It is over three decades since Goldwater-Nichols reshaped much 

of the day-to-day conduct of DoD business, and its effects have been overwhelmingly 

good. But three decades is a long time, and it makes a great deal of sense to look 

at new ways to think about how this enormous, $600 billion per year enterprise is 

run. 

All the thoughts that I offer today should quite obviously be regarded merely as 

starting points for further discussion, as the issues are so significant and complex 

that they demand much study, collaboration, consideration of second order effects, 

and caution as we go forward. 

As 2016 rolls around, it will be thirty years since the Goldwater-Nichols Act fundamentally reshaped the broad organization and specifically the chain of command 

of the military. It solidified the Joint requirements for education and promotion, creVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
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ated the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and vested the power 

to conduct military operations solely in the Combatant Commanders, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. After thirty largely successful 

years under Goldwater-Nichols, now is a good time to take a fundamental look at 

what we are doing in the massive Department of Defense and consider some new 

potential ideas. 

Here are five admittedly controversial ideas to think about: 

Create a Cyber Force. It is a foregone conclusion that we need a military Cyber 

Command, i.e. an independent, 4-star commander focused on cyber operations. The 

real question is: do we need a cyber force as well? If we look back a hundred years 

ago, we didn’t have an Air Force—quite obviously because we didn’t fly planes in 

any number. It took us over 50 years to figure out that we needed a separate branch 

of the military to focus on aviation. 

Today we cannot conceive of a world in which we would not have trained, capable 

Airmen ready to defend their nation in the skies. Seems high time we considered 

a separate service to do the same in the cyber world, a place where we are increasingly under attack and in which many other nations have already militarized. And 

while we are at it, we should likewise think about whether this model works for 

Special Operations as well—i.e. creating a fully formed separate Service to perform 

all elements of Special Operations. 

Give Each Regional Combatant Command a Civilian Deputy. As we look at 

a 21st century in which we need to exercise national security through not only the 

military instrument but also via diplomacy and development, having a senior civilian as a Deputy at each COCOM makes sense. The best choice would be a senior 

State Department official, preferably someone who had served as an Ambassador in 

the region for the Geographical Commanders. He or she should be detailed at the 

level of Minister-Counselor (1/2 star) with authority through the command. 

This has already been successfully implemented at SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, and 

AFRICOM; and standardizing it makes sense to increase the interagency reach of 

the COCOMS. We should also give each of the Combatant Command staff a capable 

J–9 staff element to do interagency coordination and a very small group J–10 to do 

private public cooperation. 

In terms of the Functional Combatant Commands, there may likewise be arguments for including a civilian deputy above the level of the current ‘‘Politcal Advisors POLAD’’ provided by State Department, although it is a less clear cut case. 

These commands should be examined on a case-by-case basis to see if this model 

is equally effective as it is for the Geographic Combatant Commanders. 

Reduce the number of Geographic Combatant Commands, rationalizing 

them to four in number. This should be done in parallel with reducing the overall 

size of the staffs, which are too large given that much of the operational activity 

of the Department is conducted by Joint Task Forces anyway. 

—Merge SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM into a single Americas Command. The 

artificial division of Mexico from SOUTHCOM hurts our unified purpose throughout 

Latin America and the Caribbean; and our Canadian allies are very involved in the 

world to the south as well. Making this one command—probably headquartered in 

Miami, with a sub-unified command in Colorado Springs retaining NORAD and air 

defense—would be efficient, save resources, and improve focus on the Americas. 

—Merge EUCOM and AFRICOM, reconstructing the earlier model, now terming 

it Euro-Africa Command. The staffs remain collocated in Germany anyway, and 

there are savings to be had in terms of size much as is the case between the two 

commands focused on the Americas. 

Stand up a truly independent General Staff with Operational Authority, atop 

the military chain of command. In today’s world, the officers assigned to the Joint 

Staff in the Pentagon essentially function in this role. The problem is that they 

know they will return to their parent services for promotion and advancement to 

the next rung on the career ladder. 

An independent General Staff would be manned by the brilliant few, selected from 

their service at the level of 0–4/0–5, and permanently assigned to the General Staff. 

Additionally, some number of 0–6 and Flag / General officers could likewise be laterally assigned after their Captain / Colonel and Flag command assignments. But 

the key would be that they would no longer return to their parent services once they 

were assigned to the General Staff—only to Joint commands and / or back to the 

Pentagon General Staff. 

It is also time to consider simply making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

the senior operational commander, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. 

The Combatant Commanders should report to the Chairman, not to the Secretary 

of Defense. Frankly, this is how the system largely works in practice anyway; and 

it would merely codify the existing custom into a sensible, linear chain of command. 

12 

The Service Chiefs should continue to focus on train, equip, and organize functions, 

with additional responsibility for acquisition, reporting to the Service Secretaries. 

Finally in this regard, it is worth looking at the entire system of ‘‘Joint Credit’’ 

for promotion, and potentially shifting the requirement for ‘‘Joint Credit’’ up to the 

0–8 or even the 0–9 level. This would also permit dropping a significant number 

of ‘‘joint billets’’ which are needed to keep access to joint credit available to everyone. All of this would potentially permit reducing the total size of the officer corps. 

Unify Joint Professional Military Education (i.e. all of the War Colleges) 

Under one 3-star officer, who would also be the President of the National 

Defense University. 

Given the need for a coherent, unified curriculum under Joint aegis, having a single chain of command (as opposed to each of the Services) controlling Joint Education at the highest levels might make sense. This officer could then report to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, functioning somewhat like a Combatant Commander 

for intellectual, research, and joint educational matters. 

The cultural, educational, and organizational power of unifying the various War 

Colleges may make sense and, by the way, serve as a central point of effort to organize the study required to consider the other changes discussed herein. This command would then be essentially the intellectual arm of the General Staff described 

above. 

All of these ideas are highly controversial, bordering on heretical. And I freely 

admit they may not be the exact right next moves. But I offer them as an examples 

of the kind of thinking we need to undertake on the upcoming 30-year anniversary 

of Goldwater-Nichols, which shook us up but may not have taken us far enough 

down the road to truly Joint, Interagency, and International / Coalition operations— 

which collectively represent the future of security in this turbulent 21st century. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

Dr. Lamb? 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Dr. LAMB. Senator McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to share my views on improving the effectiveness of military operations this morning. Your 

invitation to testify is a great honor and especially so considering 

the distinguished service of your other witnesses today, General 

Schwartz and Admiral Stavridis. It is the high point of my career 

to be sitting with them today and in front of you, and I am really, 

truly humbled by the opportunity. 

I also want to acknowledge the presence of my wife who, in light 

of the unconventional things I am about to say, decided I needed 

moral support, and I agree with her. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We will hold her in no way responsible. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. LAMB. She will appreciate that I know. 

In my written statement, I argued for three sets of organizational changes to increase the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. 

First, to correct a persistent lack of preparedness for irregular 

threats, I argue that we should give USSOCOM [U.S. Southern 

Command] the lead for small unit irregular conflict and the Marine 

Corps the lead for larger irregular conflicts. 

Second, to make the best possible investments in military capabilities and maintain our advantages in major combat operations, 

I believe we should encourage the use of horizontal teams in the 

Department of Defense and support their work with collaborative 

management or joint scenarios, operating concepts, data, methods 

of analysis, risk metrics, and institutional knowledge. And I comVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
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pletely agree with General Schwartz that we need to reinvigorate 

our approach to joint headquarters so that we have standing task 

forces ready to experiment with and test new joint concepts. 

And then, finally, to better integrate military operations with 

other instruments of national power, I believe we need legislation 

that allows the President to empower leaders to run interagency 

teams. 

None of these recommendations are unique to me, and they have 

all been made before by various groups and individuals. But I hope 

now is an opportune time for the Senate and the leadership in the 

Department of Defense to reconsider their merits. 

In the brief time remaining, I would like to address some likely 

questions about these recommendations, particularly with respect 

to horizontal or sometimes referred to as cross-functional teams because I know that members of the committee have expressed some 

interest in that. And so I want to raise a number of questions that 

are likely to come up in this area. 

First of all, it is often asked whether all national security problems are not inherently complex and therefore require cross-functional teams. My response to that would be no. Clausewitz famously argued the most important judgment a statesman and commander have to make is determining, quote, the kind of war in 

which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for nor trying to 

turn it into something that is alien to its nature. 

I think the same thing holds true for national security problems 

more generally. We need to determine the kind of problem being 

addressed. Not all military tasks are intrinsically joint. Not all national security missions are intrinsically interagency. If we say otherwise, we greatly increase the risks of failing to bring the right 

type of expertise to bear on the problem at hand. 

Another question that frequently arises is whether all groups 

with representatives from functional organizations are, in effect, 

cross-functional teams. No. There is a huge difference between a 

committee and a team in the executive branch. The members of the 

committee, to use some shorthand, typically give priority to protecting their parent organization’s equities, and the members of a 

cross-functional team give priority to the team mission. 

So why do some groups work like teams and some groups work 

like committees? For example, why do all executive branch crossfunctional groups not work as well as, say, an Army battalion 

headquarters, which also has to integrate functional expertise from 

the artillery, the infantry, armor, et cetera? Well, I think the answer is that the difference is the degree of autonomy exercised by 

the functional organizations and the degree of oversight exercised 

by their common authority. In a battalion headquarters, all the 

participants share a cross-cutting culture, have the obligation to 

follow legal orders, and receive direct and ongoing supervision from 

the battalion commander. Most interagency groups consist of members from organizations with quite different cultures, different legal 

authorities and obligations, and no supervision from the only person in the system with the authority to direct their behavior, the 

President. 

Another question often raised is whether we do not already have 

in effect good interagency teams with empowered leaders, for exVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
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ample, the State Department’s country teams. Ambassadors, after 

all, have been given chief of mission authority by the President. 

Well, first of all, there are notable exceptions to that authority 

to the ambassador, particularly with respect to military and covert 

operations. But in any case, the ambassador’s authority is not sufficient. Many ambassadors are perceived as representing State’s interests rather than national interests. Hence, the country team 

members often feel justified in working around the ambassador, 

and the direct supervision of the President is so far removed that 

many of the people on the country teams feel that they can do that 

and actually be rewarded by their parent organizations for doing 

so. 

I will stop there, but I want to close by anticipating one final reaction to the proposals for horizontal teams. Some will invariably 

complain that this is all rather complicated and that at the end of 

the day, we are better off just finding and appointing good leaders. 

This is an understandable but dangerous simplification. 

First, as Jim Locher likes to say, there is no need to choose between good leaders and good organizations. We need both. Horizontal teams cannot be employed to good effect without supportive 

and attentive senior leaders, but neither can senior leaders of functional organizations solve complex problems without organizations 

that are engineered to support cross-cutting teams. 

Second, in the current environment, titular leaders simply lack 

the time to supervise every or even the most important cross-cutting problems. Neither is it sufficient to simply insist that their 

subordinates, quote, get along. The heads of functional organizations have an obligation to represent their organization’s perspectives and expertise. This obligation, reinforced by bureaucratic 

norms and human nature, ensures that group members with diverse expertise will clash. Conflicting views are healthy, but they 

must be productively resolved in a way that gives priority to mission success and not less noble factors. 

Finally, I would dare to say that the intense focus on leadership, 

particularly in this town, has always struck me as rather un-American. Our Founding Fathers realized the American people needed 

more than good leadership. They paid great attention to organizing 

the government so that it would work well or work well enough, 

even if it is not always led by saints and savants. We should do 

the same with respect to the Department of Defense and the national security system. Right now, I do not believe the men and 

women who go in harm’s way for our collective security are backed 

up by the best possible policy, strategy, planning, and decisionmaking system. That can and should change, and I am glad the 

committee is looking into this matter. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to share some results of our 

research at National Defense University. I look forward to answering any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lamb follows:] 

15 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB* 

Senator McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the Committee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to share some of my research and views on defense reform. 

The invitation to testify to the Senate Armed Service Committee is a great honor, 

especially considering the stature of your other witnesses today and their records 

of service to our country. It is humbling to be sitting next to them and in front of 

you today. I understand the Committee is interested in organizational changes that 

could increase the effectiveness of U.S. military operations and whether current 

combatant command and Service structures provide the necessary strategic planning and military readiness to ensure operational excellence. I hope to provide some 

useful insights for your consideration on those topics. 

My testimony identifies three major impediments to high performance in military 

operations that can be corrected. Most of my recommendations involve the Department of Defense, but I also argue that interagency teams could be structured and 

incentivized to improve performance for some types of military operations. Fielding 

interagency team would require some changes in the way we structure and run the 

larger national security system. 

My views on these topics are shaped by my experience as a Foreign Service officer 

and mid-grade executive serving in both the Pentagon and Department of State over 

the past 20 years, and by research this past decade at National Defense University, 

including organizational performance studies in support of the 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review and for the Project on National Security Reform. I am on record 

as a strong proponent of defense and national security organizational reform, and 

this testimony draws heavily upon previous research. Where appropriate I cite such 

research in support of my recommendations. 

WHY REFORM?

Not everyone will agree there is a defense performance problem worthy of the 

Senate’s attention. However, I believe that reforms in several areas could improve 

the effectiveness of military operations. A brief overview of major trends helps explain why. At the outset of World War II we were not as well prepared for war as 

our enemies, but we prevailed by learning, adapting and out-producing our foes. At 

war’s end the United States accounted for just under forty percent of global gross 

domestic product. The resource preeminence of the United States put us in a good 

position to ensure permanent readiness against the global Soviet threat. During the 

Cold War we built new institutions to safeguard our freedoms, and we out-lasted 

the enemy. After Vietnam we instituted an all-volunteer military, executed a revolution in military training techniques, leveraged technology successfully with increasingly realistic testing (compared to our World War II performance), and finally fixed 

our most egregious operational command and control problems with the GoldwaterNichols legislative reforms. The result was stable nuclear deterrence and unparalleled world-leading conventional military forces. Our one glaring weakness throughout this period was poor performance against irregular threats. 

The terror attacks on September 11, 2001 highlighted this weak spot and also its 

strategic import. 9/11 drove home the reality that terrorists are willing to and capable of launching mass-casualty attacks against us and our allies. In responding to 

9/11 the national security system performed well in some areas. Success was usually 

a function of departments and agencies conducting their core missions extremely 

well, or leaders pioneering ways to generate new levels of interdepartmental cooperation on nontraditional missions. However, the system performed poorly on the 

whole, demonstrating our historic inability to counter irregular threats well. The 

United States spent prodigious sums, organized world-wide coalitions, swept large 

enemy formations from the field, and targeted terrorists and insurgent leaders on 

an industrial scale, but exercised little influence over eventual outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq. We squandered resources, lost public support, and arguably generated as many terrorists as were eliminated. 

Despite fifteen years of war, the threat of catastrophic terrorist attacks remains. 

Distracted, if not exhausted by fifteen years of conflict, we have seen our notable 

advantages in major combat capabilities diminish relative to some nations that are 

exploiting the global explosion in information technologies. Areas that used to constitute an unhindered, unilateral advantage for U.S. forces are now subject to challenge. The credibility of our aging deterrent forces against weapons of mass destruction is also growing suspect. With our share of global gross domestic product roughly half of what it was following World War II and projected to decline in relative 

————— 

* The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position 

of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

16 

terms, peer competitors are likely to emerge much earlier than we anticipated following the collapse of the Soviet Union and prior to 9/11. 

This broad overview of defense performance prompts several observations about 

the need for defense reform. First, we are long past due for correcting our persistent 

difficulties in dealing with irregular threats. Second, if resource overmatch was ever 

a good strategy, it has lost its luster and is no longer affordable. To maintain our 

current advantages in major combat operations we need to improve our ability to 

make good decisions on investments in military capabilities going forward. Third, 

effective military operations alone are insufficient. They must be integrated effectively with other instruments of power, something we currently do quite poorly. It 

is imperative that we improve our ability to collaborate across departments and 

agencies. In particular, the time has come to give the President the authority to delegate his authority for integrating department and agency efforts to manage or resolve complex, high-priority national security problems. In sum, we need a Pentagon 

that can manage the full range of security challenges; rationally allocate resources 

to priority missions; and collaborate well with other departments, agencies and allies. Consequently it is important to identify major impediments to these performance aspirations and understand how they might be overcome. 

REFORMING IRREGULAR CONFLICT CAPABILITIES

Although irregular conflict is the subject of endless debate and terminological controversies, we understand its distinguishing features and why they require different 

military capabilities. In large-scale, force-on-force combat operations the primary 

operational objective is destruction of enemy capabilities, which sets the conditions 

for subsequent political relationships. In major combat operations military necessity 

take precedence over all other concerns except the purpose for which the war is 

being fought. All other objectives remain in doubt until the adversary’s ability to 

resist is overcome. In contrast, military objectives are subordinate to, and constantly 

informed by, numerous political considerations in irregular conflict. In irregular conflict the immediate objective is not to take terrain and destroy forces, but to alter 

political relationships and, by extension, adversary behavior. Military operations are 

constantly tailored to and constrained by political considerations even down to the 

tactical level, which these kinds of military operations different and demanding. 

Irregular conflicts take much longer, so patience and perseverance are necessary, 

and taxing. Protracted engagements make it imperative that costs—human, material, and political—be kept low. Popular political support (host country, U.S. domestic and international) determines which side will be able to best inform and sustain 

their operations, and our partners know and understand local populations far better 

than we do. When one of the protagonists can no longer count on the passive or active support of key population groups, they must reduce their presence, withdraw, 

or otherwise abandon their efforts. Thus, both to reduce costs and be effective, it 

is often advisable for the United States to work well with third parties, which is 

not easy to do. 

For all these reasons, prevailing in irregular conflict requires military forces with 

some new or modified capabilities, or increased quantities of existing capabilities in 

the following areas: 

• Force protection to keep casualties proportionate to the perceived US interests 

at stake; without it U.S. public support dwindles over time. In irregular conflict 

force protection is more demanding because it is difficult to identify the enemy, 

which means ambushes, surprise attacks, and acts of terror are the norm. 

• Discriminate and proportionate force to keep the enemy on the defensive without provoking popular discontent, and over time to make the population feel secure enough to resist enemy coercion or better, to assist U.S. and allied forces. 

In major combat operations the U.S. military wants to avoid harm to non-combatants or exerting more force than necessary to achieve military objectives. 

However, these objectives are subordinate to the success of their military missions. In irregular conflicts the opposite is true; proportionate and highly discriminate use of force is a prerequisite for success. 

• Special intelligence in irregular conflict is complex and more critical. In largescale combat operations the intelligence community can focus on a standard set 

of primary indicators and warnings for enemy disposition, composition, and 

movement. Our most likely combat opponents and their order of battle are usually known well in advance of hostilities. In irregular conflict intelligence is required on short notice and for a broad set of social, political and military subjects, often cannot be collected by traditional technical means, and is more difficult to interpret once collected. 

17 

1 Christopher Lamb with Megan Franco, ‘‘National-Level Coordination and Implementation: 

How System Attributes Trumped Leadership,’’ in Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, 

Hooker and Joseph Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War, National 

Defense University Press, 2015. 

• Persuasive communications to influence foreign audiences with messages supportive of U.S. policy are more important in irregular conflict for the simple reason that it is difficult for terrorists to survive without popular support and impossible for insurgents. Hence, every effort must be made to convince the population that even passive support of the enemy is not in its interests. Persuasive 

communications are always difficult because they require a deep understanding 

of target audiences, but in irregular conflicts they also need to be immediately 

responsive to tactical developments to be effective. • Modified command and control to ensure unified effort across diverse government departments and agencies and with allies. The requirement to apply all 

instruments of national power instead of relying primarily on military force 

means that irregular conflict is an intensely interagency effort. Moreover, policy 

and strategy in irregular conflicts are more fluid and must repeatedly be translated into realistic operational requirements. In turn operational plans must be 

carefully tailored to support policy objectives and repeatedly updated. 

This list could be expanded, and the nomenclature, relative importance, situational impact, role of technology and many other aspects of irregular conflict could 

be debated, but these broad requirements are well-known and well-represented in 

all the classic literature on the topic, including our own U.S. Marine Corps Small 

Wars Manual. So it is significant that the Department of Defense did a poor job of 

fielding capabilities for irregular conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

This past year researchers at National Defense University completed a comprehensive review of lessons from the past decade and a half of war. 1 After reviewing 23 senior leader accounts from both the Bush and Obama administration, as 

well as more than one hundred insider accounts, influential articles, blue-ribbon 

commissions, think tank and inspector general reports, it is clear there is a broad 

consensus that we performed poorly on strategic communications, specialized intelligence and equipment, and in providing civil-military administrative capacity for 

better governance. 

There were bright spots to be sure. We achieved unprecedented integration of allsource intelligence in support of high-value targeting, and ground forces received 

equipment previously available only to Special Operations Forces (SOF): body 

armor, latest generation night vision goggles, intra-squad communications gear, tactical satellite radios, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, etc. We went from having 

8 unmanned aerial vehicles in Iraq in 2003 to 1,700 by 2008, and within 18 months 

we deployed thousands of mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles to theater—an accomplishment some have described as an industrial feat not seen since 

World War II. To get these kinds of capabilities to the troops the Pentagon created 

new organizations and streamlined procedures and Congress supported these efforts 

by making copious amounts of funding available. Even so, and despite urgent requests from commanders in the field, much of this type of capability was late to 

need, and arrived only after senior leaders mounted extraordinary efforts to squeeze 

them out of a reluctant bureaucracy. Worse, much of this new-found capacity is now 

being abandoned. 

For example, it took the Department a long time to realize that defeating insurgents, partnering with host-nation officials, and winning popular support are hardly 

possible without a profound understanding of local social and political relationships 

at all levels. The need for socio-cultural understanding has been cited as one of the 

‘‘top 5’’ lessons learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a view echoed by 

many senior leaders in the Department of Defense. Yet the U.S. military’s traditional pattern of behavior on sociocultural knowledge is reemerging. After we develop sociocultural expertise at greater-than-necessary expense and too late to ensure success, we then abandon the hard-won capability as part of post-conflict budget reductions or out of deference to prevailing American strategic culture, which favors technology, small-unit combat skills, and large-scale military maneuver training rather than a deep understanding of our adversaries and their societies. Much 

of the organizational architecture developed to provide sociocultural knowledge to 

U.S. forces is being dismantled. The Army’s Irregular Warfare Center and Human 

Terrain Team programs have been shut down, and officers participating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program are not being promoted at rates comparable to 

the rest of the Army. 

We also were slow to recognize irregular threats that arose in the aftermath of 

our regime-change operations. It took years to produce leadership, concepts, and viaVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
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2T.X. Hammes, ‘‘Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,’’ in Lessons 

Encountered. 3 Christopher J. Lamb, Matthew Schmidt and Berit Fitzsimmons ‘‘MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, 

and Pentagon Reform,’’ Occasional Paper, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2009. 

ble plans for countering insurgents. When some of our more capable and innovative 

field commanders combined traditionally effective counterinsurgency techniques 

with an astute appreciation of local political realities, they were uncommonly successful. In a healthy, high performing organization these extraordinary successes 

would have been rapidly recognized, rewarded, and replicated. Our record in this 

regard is spotty. Anecdotally, it appears extremely successful field commanders were 

passed over for promotion or promoted only after intervention by senior civilian 

leaders. 

The replication of these successful examples was even more limited. The U.S. 

military adopted proven counterinsurgency techniques slowly and unevenly. In part 

this was because the methods used to achieve tactical successes challenged prevailing policy and strategy. Tactical partnering with local forces could fuel sectarian 

sentiments and undermine formal Iraqi governmental structures the United States 

was committed to supporting; it also often involved working with local leaders with 

checkered pasts or who were judged to be marginal players; and it ran counter to 

our policy of transferring responsibility for security to Iraqi military forces as quickly as possible, which was based on the assumption that the mere presence of U.S. 

forces was an irritant to be minimized as a matter of priority. For all these and 

other reasons the tactical successes of Marine and Army field commanders in late 

2004 and 2005 failed to prompt a rapid reassessment of these policy and strategy 

assumptions. 

Our desire to pass responsibility for security to host-nation forces also was handicapped by lack of preparedness for irregular conflict. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, 

the United States had no plans for establishing local security forces and proceeded 

on an ad hoc basis. Once the efforts were under way we developed security forces 

modeled on U.S. institutions even though the local political, economic, and social 

conditions ‘‘made U.S. approaches problematic and unsustainable without a significant U.S. presence.’’ 2 We also encouraged short tours and optimistic reporting, 

which made it difficult to evaluate actual progress. In turn, the longer it took commanders to recognize gaps between desired and actual performance, the longer it 

takes to adapt more effective methods. 

In short, our performance in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced awareness that we 

are poorly prepared for irregular conflict. This was true before 9/11 and, with the 

exception of hunting high-value targets, largely remains the case today. Innumerable studies and Pentagon directives over the past decades have identified this problem and attempted to fix it by encouraging the Services to take the mission more 

seriously. On at least three occasions since World War II national leaders spent 

major political capital trying to force a solution. The Soviet Union’s support for 

‘‘wars of national liberation’’ led President John F. Kennedy to embrace Special 

Forces and unconventional warfare, even replacing an Army Chief of Staff who he 

believed was unsympathetic to his plans. In 1986, after years of poor responses to 

terrorism and other political-military problems, Congress mandated new special operations and low-intensity conflict organizations over the objections of the Pentagon. 

More recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates launched his own personal effort 

to get the Pentagon to better balance conventional and irregular capabilities. These 

efforts failed, and it is not hard to see why. 

We keep asking organizations that are raised, trained and equipped to conduct 

large-scale force-on-force combat operations to also conduct irregular conflict as a 

lesser-included mission. They invariably give priority to what they consider their 

more important core missions, and are slow to comprehend, much less invest in irregular conflict concepts and capabilities. They argue irregular conflict is not sufficiently different from conventional war to justify separate capabilities. They insist 

SOF have the mission covered, and that allies and other U.S. departments and 

agencies should do more. If forced to invest in irregular capabilities, the Services 

pursue less costly non-material initiatives like education and training that can be 

more easily reversed. They argue their future capabilities will be equally effective 

in all types of conflicts, so there is no need to buy equipment for irregular conflict 

now. If they must buy such equipment they typically abandon it as quickly as possible to avoid maintenance costs. 3 If assigned an irregular conflict campaign, our 

field commanders learn on the fly. 

Besides Service cultures focused on major combat operations, there are other factors handicapping readiness for irregular conflicts. Asking all the Services to be 

19 

4The case for improving USSOCOM’s indirect capabilities is made in ‘‘The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,’’ a prepared statement of Christopher J. Lamb before the Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, July 11, 2012. 

equally responsible for the mission just makes it easier for everyone to ignore the 

responsibility and harder for anyone to be held accountable for results. Also, irregular conflicts require a flexible approach to requirements and acquisition but the 

Pentagon usually does not do business this way. General requirements for irregular 

conflict are well-known but the amount and specific types of equipment needed are 

highly situation-dependent, transitory and difficult to establish in advance. What we 

need is a solid research and development base and some programs of record that 

can be rapidly expanded depending on emergent needs. This is precisely what Secretary Gates wanted to do when he called for the institutionalize procurement of 

[irregular] warfare capabilities.’’ But with the exception of USSCOM, which was 

granted unusual acquisition authorities by Congress, this sort of approach to irregular conflict programs is difficult in today’s Pentagon. Finally, without a clear mission-lead the largest rather than the best-suited military organizations dominate 

command and control of deployed forces in irregular conflict (again SOF sometimes 

being an exception). As a result we often operate with less effectiveness early on, 

make the situation worse and inadvertently raise costs. 

In my opinion we now have overwhelming evidence that the United States will 

not have a standing and ready irregular conflict capability until it clearly assigns 

that mission to specific organizations that are culturally capable of executing it and 

rewarded for doing so. USSOCOM promulgates four SOF ‘‘truths:’’ that in special 

operations humans are more important than hardware; SOF cannot be massed produced; quality is better than quantity; and competent SOF cannot be created after 

emergencies occur. These same truths largely apply to irregular conflict. We did not 

get world-class SOF without a powerful organization assigned to organize, train, 

equip and employ these forces, and the same has proven true for irregular conflict 

more broadly. Conventional forces can ‘‘learn’’ and prepare for irregular conflict 

after the fact, but the costs of doing so are high and the results are poor. 

Different ways of ensuring irregular conflict capabilities have been proposed, including the creation of large new organizations, but the most sensible and politically 

feasible option would be to leverage the parts of the Department of Defense that 

are historically most proficient in irregular conflict: Special Operations Forces and 

the U.S. Marine Corps. In effect, we need to adjust military roles and missions to 

assign a clear division of labor for irregular conflict in a tiered approach. USSOCOM 

should be, and to some extent already is, the preferred option for small unit direct 

and indirect irregular conflict, but it needs to be upgraded to conduct indirect missions better. 4 The U.S. Marine Corps has comparative advantages at the lower-end 

of the conflict spectrum compared to the Army, and with some increases in authorities, force structure and equipment could take the lead role successfully for largerscale irregular conflicts. 

USSOCOM already is assigned the lead for many irregular conflict missions that 

can be conducted by small units, but its indirect capabilities need to be upgraded. 

By indirect, I do not mean ‘‘non-lethal,’’ as is often supposed. I mean working by, 

with and through foreign forces and populations with both lethal and non-lethal capabilities. Our preferred approach to irregular conflict should be working with hostnation forces, both to be more effective and to reduce the resource and political commitments of the United States. Indirect missions require greater specialization in 

what some call SOF’s ‘‘warrior-diplomat’’ or ‘‘cross-cultural’’ skill sets, including a 

deeper understanding of indigenous forces and populations. Direct SOF missions require more emphasis on technical skills, particularly those highly specialized capabilities involved in direct action behind enemy lines. For SOF to be equally well prepared for indirect and direct missions some units must weight their training and 

equipment toward warrior-diplomat skills while others concentrate on what some 

refer to as the SOF ‘‘commando’’ skills. 

If USSOCOM is going to excel not only at special operations but also at irregular 

conflict more generally, it must put much greater emphasis on its ability to conduct 

missions indirectly. SOF indirect approaches and capabilities are as valuable and 

challenging to build, maintain and employ as SOF direct action capabilities. Somewhat counter-intuitively, SOF indirect capabilities have actually atrophied this past 

decade; arguably when they could have been most useful. Successful indirect efforts 

in places like the Philippines were overshadowed by SOF direct action missions in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. Even SOF units that traditionally demonstrate greater appreciation for indirect approaches often paid more attention to direct action against terVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
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5 ‘‘The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,’’ Prepared Statement of Christopher J. Lamb 

before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 

U.S. House of Representatives, July 11, 2012. 25 pages. 6 A case for this is made in David Tucker and Christopher Lamb, U.S. Special Operations 

Forces, Columbia University Press, 2007. 

rorists and insurgent leaders in those countries. 5 Army Special Forces in particular 

have sacrificed area orientation, language proficiency, and cultural appreciation 

within their assigned regions since 9/11. The operational demands of the Iraq and 

Afghan theaters led to a substantial degradation of SOF indirect skills. 

Reconstituting these critical capabilities requires significant investment and leadership. USSOCOM leaders are aware of the problem and have been trying to upgrade SOF indirect capabilities. How well they are doing is a matter of great import. 

USSOCOM needs better socio-cultural knowledge; better persuasive information capabilities; more robust and quicker access to civil affairs skills; adjustments to the 

SOF selection process; a Washington presence for its indirect leadership and some 

indirect programs; new approaches to interagency collaboration on indirect approaches to irregular conflict; new authorities to oversee security assistance programs on a multi-year basis; and perhaps separate budget lines for direct and indirect capabilities. If the Committee looks into it and concludes USSOCOM is failing 

to provide these kinds of improvements, it may want to investigate new sub-unified 

commands for USSOCOM that cooperate but concentrate on the direct and indirect 

approaches, respectively. 6

For irregular conflict problems that cannot be contained and well-managed by 

small SOF teams, we would call upon the U.S. Marine Corps. The Marines would 

be assigned the lead role for large-scale, direct interventions against irregular opponents. The Marines would partner with USSOCOM, concentrate on the least secure 

areas that demand the most direct attention, and in more secure areas use their 

infrastructure to assist USSOCOM’s small-unit, indirect operations with host-nation 

forces. Of course the Army, Navy and Air Force would lend support for joint operations as necessary, but in terms of training and equipping their forces, they would 

be free to concentrate on major combat operations. Any irregular conflict mission requiring more than the combined forces of USSOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps 

should probably be reconsidered, but in extremis other forces could be assigned to 

operate under their direction as necessary. 

The U.S. Marine Corps would require additional resources to be well prepared for 

its new, priority irregular conflict responsibilities. It would need new authorities for 

command of irregular conflict missions and fielding of irregular conflict equipment 

similar to the authorities Congress granted USSOCOM. Similarly, and again like 

USSOCOM, the Marines should be granted special irregular conflict acquisition authorities so that they could rapidly integrate and field relevant technology and 

equipment tailored for irregular conflicts. In addition, it would be necessary to increase Marine force structure and transfer some existing capabilities for irregular 

conflict from the Services; the types of irregular conflict capabilities the other Services have long refused to purchase and maintain. This would include slower fixedwing aircraft for reconnaissance and close fire support; brown- and green-water vessels for inland waterways and coastal patrol boats; up-armored vehicles; etc. The 

Marines would maintain a prudent technology base for irregular conflict capabilities 

that could be modified and expanded as circumstances warrant, much as they have 

tried to do with non-lethal weapons. It should be relatively easy for the Marines to 

integrate these kinds of irregular conflict capabilities since they already have air, 

naval, amphibious, ground and support capabilities that are integrated down to the 

tactical level. 

With USSOCOM taking the lead on small unit irregular conflict missions like the 

raid on Bin Laden’s hideaway and the advisory mission to the Philippines, and the 

Marines taking responsibility for larger direct interventions against irregular opponents such as we faced in Afghanistan and Iraq, the nation would be much better 

prepared for irregular conflicts. And the Services would not be distracted from their 

focus on major combat operations. Instead of spending valuable senior leader time 

and scarce training resources on difficult programs like regionally-aligned brigades, 

the Army, Navy and Air Force could concentrate on reestablishing our diminishing 

lead in major combat operations. 

This division of labor would be more efficient in the short and long-term. Shortterm savings would come from abandoning universal requirements like language 

training, irregular forces at major combat training centers, efforts to improve training of foreign forces throughout our force structure, etc. Critical irregular conflict 

requirements such as force protection (e.g. up-armored vehicles), discriminate force 

(e.g. non-lethal weapons, Military Police); intelligence (e.g. persistent counter-insurVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
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7 It has been argued that the ‘‘every marine is a rifleman’’ ethos ‘‘allows a high degree of 

adaptability’’ for irregular warfare missions. Michael R Melillo, ‘‘Outfitting a Big-War Military 

with Small-War Capabilities,’’ Parameters. Carlisle Barracks: Autumn 2006.Vol.36, Issue 3. 8Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2006: pp. 65ff. 

gent ISR, Human Terrain Teams, Foreign Area Officers and programs), persuasion 

(e.g. psychological operations), and command and control (e.g. multi-level shared 

communications architectures) and other niche capabilities (e.g. countering-IEDs) 

could be transferred and consolidated under USSOCOM and the Marine Corps. 

The Department of Defense already expends considerable resources to maintain 

a high state of readiness for SOF and the Marines, particularly in training, air and 

sea-lift, and amphibious capabilities. These organizations are already postured for 

global, expeditionary operations with minimum overseas infrastructure. It is inherently more efficient to ask them to serve as the first, second and preferred proponents for irregular conflict than to ask all the Services to maintain readiness for 

the same. For example, the Marines already have the expeditionary infrastructure 

to manage brown- and green-water operations more efficiently than the Navy, and 

provide responsive close air support in irregular conflict operations more readily 

than the Air Force. 

Over the long-term the Department of Defense could expect better performance 

and additional savings from operational efficiencies. Assigning the irregular conflict 

mission to USSOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps would increase the chances that 

such operations could be conducted with a small footprint and expert command and 

control. Irregular conflict requires inherently ‘‘joint,’’ interagency and multinational 

operations. Both USSOCOM and the Marines are intrinsically joint and capable of 

working with interagency partners as demonstrated historically and in recent operations. SOF are particularly well adapted to work through third parties with small 

numbers of advisors. If an irregular conflict problem exceeded SOCOM’s capacity 

the Marines could draw upon those historical, cultural and structural attributes 

that make them a more efficient irregular conflict mission partner than the larger 

Services, including a higher tooth-to-tail ratio. 7 If, in extreme circumstances, the 

other Services were needed they would support the Marines and SOF. Inverting the 

general rule that the largest forces have the top command slots would help ensure 

tactical irregular operations are controlled by appropriate expertise from the beginning. 

This new division of labor makes particular sense in a time of declining resources 

when organizations naturally focus on what they consider to be their ‘‘core competencies.’’ A better division of labor takes advantage of this natural tendency to 

focus on core missions by reducing duplication and increasing specialization (i.e. 

competence). Currently Army efficiency is undermined by the view that it should be 

a ‘‘full-spectrum’’ rather than a decisive land force. For example, a proper activereserve balance would be easier to achieve if the Army focused just on decisive land 

battle. Similarly, Marine Corps efficiency would improve if the Marines’ strategic 

concept unequivocally included irregular conflict. The Department of Defense already absorbs the cost of amphibious expeditionary units that have air, sea and land 

elements in an organization that has historically conducted irregular conflict well. 

It is more efficient to ask that organization to expand its existing elements to include capabilities for irregular conflict. In an emergency, the Marines—supported by 

Air Force and other naval forces—would still pack enough punch to stop most conventional aggressors until the Army arrived on the scene. 

REFORMING PENTAGON DECISION MAKING

Limited Pentagon decision-making capacity also constrains the effectiveness of 

military operations. A decade ago the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report put 

major emphasis on improving decision-making capacity. It said ‘‘the complex strategic environment demands that our structure and processes be streamlined and integrated to better support the President and joint warfighter;’’ and ‘‘recent operational experiences demonstrated the need to bring further agility, flexibility and 

horizontal integration to the defense support infrastructure.’’ The report asserted 

the Department had ‘‘moved steadily toward a more integrated and transparent senior decision-making culture and process for both operational and investment matters;’’ that it had ‘‘made substantial strides in . . . the creation of new organizations 

and processes that cut across traditional stovepipes;’’ and ‘‘most importantly, the Department has made notable progress toward an outcome-oriented, capabilities-based 

planning approach that provides the joint warfighter with the capabilities needed 

to address a wider range of asymmetric challenges.’’ 8

22 

9The bureaucratic factors shaping these processes are further described in Christopher Lamb, 

‘‘Pentagon Strategies,’’ in David Ochmanek and Michael Sulmeyer, eds., Challenges in U.S. National Security Policy: A Festschrift Volume Honoring Edward L. (Ted) Warner, (Arlington, VA: 

RAND, 2014); and in ‘‘Acquisition Reform: The Case of MRAPs.’’ Prepared Statement of Christopher J. Lamb before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 

June 24, 2014. 

The report was correct about the need to improve Pentagon decision-making capacity, but overly optimistic about the amount of progress in that direction. Like 

many organizations the Pentagon is divided into hierarchical structures that represent different bodies of expertise: e.g. policy, intelligence, personnel, program analysis, acquisition, and budgeting. Within these bodies are subdivisions that further 

specialize in more narrowly defined subjects. These stove piped divisions each build 

and nurture expertise in a relatively narrow body of knowledge. There are advantages to such organizations but typically they are incapable of rapid, integrated decision making, which the 2006 report acknowledged the Pentagon needed to keep pace 

with the evolving security environment. That conclusion is even more valid today. 

The Pentagon has elaborate processes and laborious coordination procedures to integrate diverse expertise across its functional organizations. Generally speaking, 

however, these attempts at integration produce compromises that paper over critical 

assumptions, distinctions, and differences of opinion that need to be resolved. Separate organizations in in the Office of the Secretary of Defense lead various stages 

of these decision-making processes. Each office leading a component part of the 

strategy process depends on other parties in the process to do their work well and 

protect the integrity of the decision process. Each organizational boundary crossed 

opens up an opportunity for the dilution of strategic logic. 

The overall process values compromise more than clear choices among competing 

alternatives. All organizations’ equities are protected to the extent possible, which 

results in long lists of desired objectives. Offices managing the process further down 

the logic chain use those wide-ranging priorities as justification for picking and 

choosing their own areas to emphasize, which loosens the strategy logic, sometimes 

beyond recognition. The same types of compromises affect the Joint Staff’s efforts 

to create meaningful joint operational concepts. Because the Department cannot 

make trades at these broader levels in the analytic chain of reasoning—strategy, 

planning and operational concepts—the rest of the downstream processes—requirements, programs and budgets—is managed without the benefit of broader context. 9

Each link in the chain of reasoning tends to operate semi-autonomously. Thus the 

process is not truly ‘‘strategy driven,’’ which is a major reason the Department is 

unable to rationally allocate resources to produce the most valuable capabilities for 

the most important missions. 

When diverse groups do meet to cooperate there are disincentives for information 

sharing and collaboration. Involving other parties slows and waters down the resultant products. One Joint Staff assessment in support of the 2006 QDR effort identified over 860 cross-cutting groups that Joint Staff personnel attended. All but a 

handful of these groups were information-sharing and not decision-making bodies. 

Even so, they shared information incompletely because extant organizational incentives militate against transparency. When measured by what they produce, these 

groups absorb large amounts of staff time and energy without producing what the 

Chairman and Secretary need most, which is truly integrated assessments of problems, their causes and preferred solutions. 

The bureaucracy’s penchant for producing consensus products encourages talented 

and highly motivated officials to get their positions directly to senior decision-makers by circumventing the formal coordination process. If the issue is simply a narrow 

functional concern, then a quick decision this way can be made without much risk. 

But the most important issues are increasingly multidisciplinary or cross-functional, 

and proposals presented by one functional entity invariably reflect a limited perspective that does not benefit from all relevant information. The narrow, functional 

proposals presented to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary often contradict one another, and with the limited information provided, it is difficult for these senior officials to determine which position is the more compelling and why. Thus it is difficult for senior leaders to make well-reasoned tradeoffs among competing alternatives. 

In essence, Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries have to serve as their own integrators of functional expertise, diving deeply into the issues that matter most to them 

to investigate the ‘‘stove piped’’ or ‘‘least common denominator’’ products they receive and root out critical issues. This is what Secretary Gates did to ensure the 

delivery of needed armor and theater intelligence and surveillance assets to Iraq. 

Yet this is a difficult task for Secretaries of Defense and an inefficient use of their 

23 

limited time. Pentagon organizations husband their information carefully. Data is 

safeguarded; analysis is not collaborative, methods, metrics and lexicon are not common or agreed upon; and institutional knowledge is not easily retained or retrieved 

for the benefit of all components. So it takes a great deal of time for the Secretary 

and Deputy Secretary to assess the competing positions presented to them. Moreover, they are constrained by the political liabilities of overriding powerful personalities and institutional interests. Hence, decisions tend to be made slowly if at all, 

or if in response to a crisis, made without the benefit of requisite information and 

supporting analysis. 

Not surprisingly, these circumstances frustrate Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, who feel poorly supported by their staff. They often conclude, incorrectly, that 

it is the sheer size of the staff that prevents better decision support. In reality, it 

is the inability of their functional leaders to collaborate and produce integrated 

problem assessments and solution proposals. Staffs could be cut in half and the Secretary would receive 50 percent less paperwork, but he would not receive one smidgen more of the better integrated products he needs. In reality, Pentagon middle 

managers and action officers are working extremely hard; just not to good effect. 

The Pentagon’s large staff ends up working marginal resource allocation issues, and 

consumes too much time and energy for too little effect. In essence, large amounts 

of the Secretary’s most important and expensive commodity—human talent—is 

wasted. 

Improving decision-making capacity in the Department of Defense requires holistic organizational reform. However, several fundamental changes are especially important. The Secretary cannot be the first point of integration for the Department’s 

most important cross-functional endeavors. He needs horizontal organizations empowered to generate cross-cutting problem assessments and solution alternatives. 

Such teams could manage cross-cutting functions for the Secretary but also oversee 

real-world missions that require the rapid integration of diverse functional specialties. They would examine problems ‘‘end-to-end’’ and be the designated strategic integration point across all bodies of expertise, freeing up senior leaders to focus on 

key strategic decisions. The teams would intervene selectively to eliminate friction 

and sub-optimal efforts where component parts of the Department are not collaborating to maximum effect. The presumption is that the Secretary will back up their 

authority to intervene and obtain the results he wants. Leaders of functional organizations would be free to focus on problems resident within their domains. 

For the horizontal organizations to succeed, they must be constituted correctly 

and their leaders empowered appropriately. They must be given proper resources, 

to include office space, administrative support, and members committed for specific 

periods of duration and levels of effort. The groups also must be given clear objectives; preferably a clear, written mandate that identifies what is to be accomplished 

and why. The groups must be allowed to decide how to accomplish their objectives, 

identify their metrics for evaluation and feedback, and what expertise they need. 

Group members that represent bodies of functional expertise must be given incentives to collaborate with the other members of the group and not simply represent 

their parent organization’s interests. This means the group leader must be able to 

return the expert in question to his parent organization and must have a say on 

their evaluations. If these horizontal organizations are not empowered, the reorganization efforts will fail. They will simply become another layer of advisory groups 

that further confuse the rest of the Pentagon entities about their respective roles 

and responsibilities. 

These cross-cutting teams would encounter less resistance from functional organizations if the Department could do a better job of determining which problems are 

actually cross-functional rather than primarily the responsibility of a single functional domain. In this regard the Department’s tendency to label all operating concepts ‘‘joint’’ complicates a proper division of labor between the Services and joint 

entities. Our broadest operating concepts are invariably joint but many subordinate 

operating concepts like anti-submarine warfare should be considered ‘‘Service-centric’’ and left to the Services to formulate and update. There may be an element of 

joint command and control or information sharing involved in Service-centric military concepts of operation but the vast bulk of the requisite expertise is resident 

in a single Service. Distinguishing between operating concepts that are intrinsically 

joint, like theater air and missile defense, and concepts that are largely the preserve 

of one Service, would make a meaningful division of labor between the Services and 

joint entities much easier. 

To better support decision making by senior officials and their cross-cutting 

teams, the Pentagon also needs a reformed decision support culture. In the training 

revolutions of the 1970s the Services transformed their combat capabilities by introducing objective, empirical feedback into training exercises with the aid of new simVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
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10 Christopher Lamb and Irving Lachow, ‘‘Reforming Pentagon Decisionmaking with a Decision Support Cell,’’ Strategic Forum No. 221, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National 

Defense University, July 2006. 11 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014): 206. 

ulation technologies and after-action reports to improve learning and future 

battlespace decision making. The new training approaches instilled respect for collaboration, information sharing, and empirical objectivity. A similar transformation 

of Pentagon decision support capabilities is needed, and it would require sustained 

attention from the Secretary. 

To begin with, the Secretary would have to make a point of insisting on collaboration from senior leaders. He can do this through his personal example and key hiring decisions. The Secretary also would need a small technical support staff that I 

have referred to elsewhere as a Decision Support Cell, 10 to oversee the new approach to information sharing in support of analysis. The cell would ensure that decision support is transparent, based upon clear assumptions about security challenges and options to meet those challenges. In particular, it would be responsible 

for ensuring all organizations have equal access to the same joint scenarios (to 

bound the assumptions about priority problem sets); authoritative joint operating 

concepts (testable preferred ways to solve operational problems); joint data (common 

assumptions about forces, performance, terrain, etc.); joint methods of analysis 

(transparent means of assessing risk); joint operational risk metrics (standards for 

measuring value and risk); and repositories of institutional knowledge (the means 

to retrieve and build upon knowledge). Currently no single entity has the authority 

to produce these necessary precursors for good analysis of alternatives. 

Finally, the Department needs some selective investments in greater jointness 

that would allow it to empirically test and exercise innovative improvements in 

operational military capabilities. Even though Joint Forces Command was disbanded and widely assessed as inefficient, we still need the ability to generate 

standing joint task force headquarters that can conduct realistic experimentation in 

and testing of innovative joint operating concepts. The Services have the technical 

capacity and resources to fully explore Service-centric operating concepts, but we 

lack commensurate capability to test new joint concepts with joint headquarters. 

In fact, the ability to optimize joint headquarters and operations has largely eluded us. It is stunning to realize that we were not even able to achieve unified command of all military forces in Afghanistan until 10 years of war had passed. Secretary Gates is forthright in acknowledging command relationships in Afghanistan 

were a ‘‘jerry-rigged arrangement [that] violated every principle of the unity of command.’’ 11 SOF and conventional forces had trouble coordinating their operations, 

and even within the SOF community, which ostensibly shares a common chain of 

command and considers unified effort a core organizational value, we could not 

achieve unified effort. Despite broad agreement among national security leaders, 

USSOCOM leaders and many individual SOF commanders that the indirect approach to counterinsurgency should take precedence over kill/capture operations, the 

opposite occurred. SOF units pursuing counterterrorism took precedence and often 

failed to sufficiently coordinate their efforts with other SOF units conducting counterinsurgency. It is apparent we need a much more aggressive effort to field truly 

joint task force headquarters and experiment with the same during peacetime. 

ENABLING UNIFIED EFFORT IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

The national security system’s inability to routinely integrate the efforts of diverse 

departments and agencies has long been recognized, but the impact of this limitation on successful military operations is less appreciated. For example, it is widely 

assumed that senior leaders are uniquely responsible for the unsatisfactory outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq. When things go wrong it is natural to blame leaders, reasoning that things would have gone better if they had made better decisions. 

It also is understandable that poor outcomes are often linked to common decisionmaking errors such as flawed assumptions, improper analogies, tunnel vision, and 

cognitive dissonance. Almost by definition when things go badly, these types of limitations are in play to some extent. However, it is also important to acknowledge 

that leaders are not in complete control of outcomes and that they are constrained 

to make their decisions within an organizational and political system with behaviors 

they do not fully control. For these reasons, good outcomes are not always the result 

of great decision making, and bad outcomes are not always the result of flawed decision making. The war in Iraq is a case in point. 

A close examination of the historical record demonstrates that disunity of effort 

provides a better explanation for what went wrong in Iraq than the belief that senVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
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12 Condoleezza Rice, ‘‘Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,’’ Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000. 

ior leaders based their decisions on optimistic assumptions, made them without examining a sufficient range of options, or failed to adjust their decisions as circumstances changed. For example, many believe U.S. leaders made the ‘‘heroic’’ assumption that Iraqis would welcome U.S. forces with open arms and there would 

be no civil unrest in response to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. U.S. 

leaders were not so naive. They thought the majority Shiite population would welcome Saddam’s ouster but the Sunnis much less so, and that in any case whatever 

welcome U.S. forces received would not last. Intelligence on Iraq predicted a ‘‘short 

honeymoon period’’ after deposing Saddam, and almost all decision-makers in Defense, State, and the White House worried that an extended American occupation 

would be costly and irritate the local population. Most senior leaders preferred a 

‘‘light footprint’’ approach in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As many commentators 

have noted, there were multiple planning efforts prior to the war by State, Defense, 

and other national security institutions that underscored how difficult the occupation might be. These insights found a ready audience in the Bush administration, 

which came to office disdaining extended nation-building missions and warning that 

the U.S. military was ‘‘most certainly not designed to build a civilian society.’’ 12

Yet there were deep disagreements among senior leaders about how best and how 

fast to pass authority to the Iraqis while reducing U.S. presence. The Department 

of Defense preference was a short transition period for military forces with a quick 

turnover of authority to Iraqi expatriates. The Department of State, including Secretary Colin Powell (and later Ambassador Bremer), did not want an extended occupation of Iraq either. However, State believed it would be difficult to find others 

willing to take responsibility for the future of Iraq and that the United States would 

have to do so since it had engineered the war. State wanted the speed and scale 

of U.S. postwar activities commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake. It thought 

the quickest way out of Iraq was to make the maximum effort to stabilize it following the termination of large-scale fighting, which meant a large ground force for 

security, plenty of development assistance, and as much international support as 

could be mustered. 

The White House explicitly considered the U.S. obligation to Iraq after deposing 

Saddam Hussein. The President decided to give Iraqis a chance at democracy because he thought it was the right thing to do, albeit not a vital security interest 

for the United States. This decision meant State and DOD could not ignore the postwar mission but left plenty of wiggle room for disagreements about how the mission 

should be conducted. The two departments obliged. They disagreed over the importance of ensuring good governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, over the appropriate 

level of U.S. commitment to this mission, over how it should be carried out, and over 

which department would do what to execute postwar tasks. These disagreements 

should not have been a surprise; they had been a longstanding bone of contention 

between the two departments. 

Consistent with previous experience, President Bush did not resolve the differences. The President gave the lead for postwar planning to DOD to preserve ‘‘unified effort.’’ But he also promised Ambassador Bremer that he would have the authority and time he needed to stabilize Iraq (that is, to take the Department of 

State approach). As the situation deteriorated, State was increasingly adamant 

about security and DOD was increasingly adamant about early departure for U.S. 

forces. State increased its appeals for more troops, while Rumsfeld’s generals told 

him counterinsurgency was an intelligence-dependent mission and that more troops 

would be counterproductive. When Ambassador Bremer worried the Department of 

Defense was setting him up to take responsibility for failure by pushing an accelerated schedule for turning over authority to the Iraqis, President Bush reiterated his 

promise to support more time and resources for Iraq. The NSC staff refereed the 

debates between State and DOD, looking for ways to effect compromises. The views 

of the two departments were not reconciled and the success of the postwar mission 

was compromised—not because of optimistic assumptions about Iraqi sentiments, 

but because differences between strong departments were not managed well. 

I believe our greatest, most persistent, most deleterious implementation problem 

in Afghanistan and Iraq was our inability to integrate the vast capabilities resident 

in the national system for best effect. Many blue-ribbon commissions and senior Department of Defense leaders agree. General Wayne Downing, a former four-star 

commander of the nation’s special operations forces, argued after 9/11 that, ‘‘the 

interagency system has become so lethargic and dysfunctional that it materially inhibits the ability to apply the vast power of the U.S. government on problems,’’ a 

26 

13Shanker, Thom, ‘‘Study Is Said to Find Overlap in U.S. Counterterror Effort,’’ New York 

Times, March 18, 2006. 14 2nd Annual C4ISR Summit, August 20, 2003, Danvers, Massachusetts, Selected Speeches, 

Testimony, Articles, October 2001–September 2005, page 225. 15 ‘‘Pace Calls for Better Interagency Work,’’ UPI, August 9, 2007. 16 Naler, Christopher L. Unity of Effort: An Interagency Combatant Command. Ft. Belvoir: 

Defense Technical Information Center, 2005, 4. <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA509122>. 

17 United States. ‘‘Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Robert M. Gates.’’ Posed by the Senate 

Armed Services Committee. 5 December 2006. <http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/ 

documents/Gates—Responses—Nov2006.pdf> 18 Robert M. Gates. ‘‘Landon Lecture’’ (speech, Kansas State University, November 26, 2007), 

Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199. 19 Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (Washington, DC), Saturday, January 26, 2008. 20 Robert M. Gates. Remarks at The Nixon Center, February 24, 2010, available at 

www.nixoncenter.org/index.cfm?action=showpage&page=2009–Robert-Gates-Transcript. 

21Garamone, Jim. ‘‘Flournoy Calls for Better Interagency Cooperation.’’ American Forces Press 

Service. 11 June 2010. <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=59601>. 22The author is on record as a proponent of interagency teams. See ‘‘Overcoming Interagency 

Problems.’’ Prepared Statement of Christopher J. Lamb before the Terrorism, Unconventional 

Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on Implementing the Global War on Terror, U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, March 15, 2006. Others 

fact made evident by ‘‘our operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan’’ and elsewhere. 13

Several Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also are on record lamenting insufficient interagency cooperation, including General Richard Meyers 14 and General 

Peter Pace. General Pace, after years of managing the military portion of the effort 

against Al-Qaeda, argued the enemy could not be defeated without better interagency cooperation. He bluntly concluded, ‘‘We do not have a mechanism right now 

to make that happen.’’ 15 Pace and other senior military officers argued for legislation to force interagency cooperation much as the Goldwater Nichols legislation at 

the end of the 1980s forced joint cooperation among the military services. 16

Recent Secretaries of Defense are also on record complaining that interagency 

mechanisms do not work well. Secretary Cohen called the interagency policymaking 

process in the late 1990s ‘‘dysfunctional,’’ and Secretary Rumsfeld made the same 

point, saying the endless and fruitless interagency meetings he participated in 

‘‘sucked the life’’ out of senior officials. He told the 9/11 Commission that a legislative fix was needed. When Secretary Robert Gates replaced Secretary Rumsfeld he 

told Congress that: 

Nearly nine years under four Presidents on the National Security Council 

staff taught me well about the importance of interagency collaboration and 

cooperation. The U.S. clearly needs a government-wide approach to the 

challenges we face today and will face in the future. If confirmed, this type 

of interagency collaboration and cooperation will be one of my priorities. 17

Not long into his tenure as Secretary of Defense, however, Secretary Gates concluded wholesale reform of the national security system was needed to improve 

cross-organizational collaboration. 18 He noted: ‘‘The U.S. government has tried, incrementally, to modernize our posture and processes in order to improve interagency 

planning and cooperation mostly through a series of new directives, offices, coordinators, tsars, and various initiatives,’’ and he concluded these half-measures were 

insufficient. 19 Two years later he was even more emphatic, arguing that: ‘‘America’s 

interagency toolkit is a hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by a 

dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and 

unwieldy processes.’’ 20 Michelle Flournoy, Secretary Gates’ Under Secretary of Defense for policy matters later added an exclamation point to his concerns: 

To put it bluntly, we’re trying to face 21st century threats with national 

security processes and tools that were designed for the Cold War—and with 

a bureaucracy that sometimes seems to have been designed for the Byzantine Empire, which, you will recall, didn’t end well . . . .We’re still too often 

rigid when we need to be flexible, clumsy when we need to be agile, slow 

when we need to be fast, focused on individual agency equities when we 

need to be focused on the broader whole of government mission. 21

In other words, we have long recognized that insufficient unity of effort in the national security system is a major handicap for successful military operations, but we 

have been at a loss for how to correct this liability. My hope is that recent research 

from National Defense University can help point the way forward. 

Various senior leaders and studies increasingly argue for interagency groups that 

operate as teams (sometimes labeled as fusion cells, task forces, etc.). 22 One probVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
27 

have made the same recommendation. For example, see Project Horizon Progress Report, Washington D.C., Summer 2006. 23The cases studies are: ‘‘Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One 

Interagency Group Made a Major Difference’’; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/ 

stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-11.pdf; ‘‘Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The 

Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success’’; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-5.pdf; ‘‘The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power’’; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/ 

Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-15.pdf; Post 2001: ‘‘9/11, 

Counterterrorism, and the Senior Interagency Strategy Team: Interagency Small Group Performance in Strategy Formulation and Implementation’’; http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/IAS-003-APRIL14.pdf; and ‘‘Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as 

an Organizational Innovation’’; http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/ 

stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-4.pdf. 

lem with such recommendations is that they are short on details that explain how 

these constructs would differ from current interagency groups. For example, when 

the Project on National Security Reform recommended ‘‘empowered’’ interagency 

teams, it was able to cite only a few positive examples of such phenomena that were 

revealed by mass media or personal accounts from practitioners. To rectify this 

shortcoming, researchers at National Defense University made a point several years 

ago of producing in-depth studies of four rare but highly successful interagency 

teams: 23

• the Active Measures Working Group, which countered Soviet disinformation 

successfully for most of the 1980s and sent shock waves to the top of the Soviet 

political apparatus at virtually no cost to the United States; • the Bosnia Train and Equip task force, which stabilized the military balance 

in Bosnia and helped secure the peace in the aftermath of vicious inter-ethnic 

fighting; • the leadership group at Joint Interagency Task Force South, which runs an organization that accounts for more than 80 percent of all federal, state and local 

government disruption of cocaine shipments; • and the interagency High Value Targeting teams used by Special Operations 

Forces to put terrorists and insurgents on the defensive and set the stage in 

2007 for the dramatic reversal of the security situation in Iraq. 

A careful comparison of the case studies reveals several prerequisites for success. 

Many interagency groups fail to perform well because representatives attending initial meetings begin to doubt that senior leaders care whether the effort succeeds or 

not. Evidence that senior leaders strongly support the group’s mission is therefore 

a critical first prerequisite. The nature of the support senior leaders provide varied 

in the cases studied, but was sufficient to strongly suggest that both Congress and 

the Executive Branch leaders considered the missions assigned to the groups national priorities and wanted them pursued on an interagency basis. These preferences were communicated formally through directives and mandates, and informally through attention paid to the groups and their issues. Otherwise, the senior 

leaders generally allowed the groups great latitude, and did not provide a lot of 

overt intervention to smooth the way to success. 

After senior leader support, agreement on purpose seems to be the next most important precondition for success. The case studies suggest it is possible to start with 

a broad idea of the group’s mission and then forge a more specific concept for execution as the group better understands the problems it is tackling. All four groups also 

benefited from access to required resources, although they were managed differently 

by each group. When senior leaders make a point of providing special resources for 

a group it reinforces and communicates their support. Not all missions require the 

same types or amounts of resources, however. For example, in the case of the group 

charged with countering Soviet disinformation, the primary resource required was 

information resident in multiple departments and agencies about Soviet activities 

and techniques. In the case of the U.S. program to arm and train Bosnian Federation forces, substantial amounts of cash and equipment were required. 

The next most important prerequisite for success was team leadership. Successful 

team leaders exhibited a propensity for taking charge, taking risk, and assuming 

responsibility for outcomes. They put mission success ahead of parent organization’s 

preferences, which was risky bureaucratic behavior. Successful interagency team 

leaders all delegated substantial authority, trusted their subordinates and encouraged initiative. Interestingly, teams were able to produce great results with a mix 

of high performing and mainstream personnel from diverse departments and agencies and without an extraordinary reward system in place. Some enduring teams 

shifted from more mainstream membership to higher performers as time went by 

and recruiting new team members became easier. However, the ability of these 

28 

teams to perform at a high level with the members initially assigned to them is 

noteworthy. 

It also is interesting that team members proved highly productive without tangible incentives. The vast majority of members on all the teams had no expectations 

of personal recognition or monetary rewards, either before or during their service. 

On the contrary, many assumed their careers would be put on hold or retarded by 

assignment to the teams. It was actually more important for team leaders to provide 

positive feedback to the departments and agencies providing the personnel than to 

the personnel themselves. This was true for all four teams, although some team 

leaders made of point of making their team members feel appreciated. What team 

members in all four cases did receive, however, were huge psychological dividends 

when it became clear they were making a difference on important missions. As a 

result, most members were devoted to their teams and motivated to work long 

hours—around the clock and seven days a week when circumstances demanded it. 

In addition, successful teams also required some unique structure. In particular, 

they greatly benefited from colocation and full-time focus on their missions. Small 

size was another common structural attribute. All the groups were between seven 

and fifteen persons (in the case of Joint Interagency Task Force South, the organization’s leadership team was this size). However, all four teams aggressively pursued 

support from outside the team by engaging senior leaders, negotiating partnerships 

with other organizations, and monitoring entities conducting work on behalf of the 

teams. Even more important for high productivity, all four groups were structured 

for end-to-end mission management. This meant that within the scope of their mission they took responsibility for the entire sequence of functions required to achieve 

desired outcomes. If the group operated at the national level, as was true for the 

Reagan-era Active Measures Working Group and the Clinton-era Bosnia Train and 

Equip task force, end-to-end mission management meant taking responsibility for 

policy, strategy, plans, operations, assessments and adjustments to all components 

of the mission effort to ensure desired outcomes. 

The willingness to take responsibility for all activities necessary to produce results was critically dependent upon each group’s leadership. Typically an interagency group conceives its mission in limited terms. At the national level, the strong 

inclination is to limit an interagency group to just a policy or planning exercise. At 

lower levels there is a tendency to limit a group’s mission to whatever the lead or 

most powerful participant prefers to do. However, in the four success cases we studied, the team leaders accepted a broader ‘‘end-to-end’’ mission concept that increased 

responsibility for actual results but also increased the risks of failure. In some cases, 

like the Bosnia Train and Equip task force, the need to produce results in the field 

was essentially part of the original mission statement. Even so, the task force embraced the intensely operational responsibility for results when they could have 

avoided doing so. In other cases, like the Active Measures Working Group and Joint 

Interagency Task Force South, the leaders dared to take responsibility for ‘‘end-toend’’ mission performance when it was much less necessary. 

The ‘‘end-to-end’’ conceptualization of all four missions was critical for productivity. It encouraged responsibility and accountability. Once the groups established 

their lead role for all components of the mission, there were no acceptable excuses 

for poor performance. There were no other actors working a portion of the process 

that could be held responsible for failures. In such circumstances, only the inherent 

difficulty of the mission or inadequate group performance were likely explanations 

for poor results. In all four cases, the interagency groups rose to the challenge and 

held themselves accountable for demonstrable progress toward group objectives. 

The ‘‘end-to-end’’ approach adopted by the four groups did not mean they operated 

independently or that they did everything themselves. The groups received guidance. The groups had to work within the parameters established by higher authorities. Sometimes the scope of the group’s activities was clear; other times it had to 

be discerned or explored. For example, the Active Measures Working Group determined that it had to concentrate on countering Soviet disinformation rather than 

taking on more aggressive active measures against the Soviet Union. This was a 

point of dispute in the group, but the leaders knew the more aggressive measures 

would collapse support for the group and decided to leave those efforts to a classified 

group working out of the National Security Council staff. 

The research identified other group attributes correlated with success, including 

the need to preserve good to great levels of trust and the ability to learn from experience, which includes leader support for innovation and a willingness to delegate 

responsibilities. However, the main point to be made here is that stellar interagency 

performance is possible even in our current system; it’s just exceedingly uncommon. 

The reason for this is that the groups require special empowerment and must work 

around strong system impediments and disincentives. We would be much better 

29 

24 Bradley L. Kirkman and Benson Rosen, ‘‘Antecedents and Consequences of Team Empowerment,’’ The Academy of Management Journal 42 no. 1 (Feb., 1999), 58–74. 25Seidman notes ‘‘many believe that [interagency committees] are fatally flawed because there 

is no provision for a central directive authority’’ that could compel involuntary cooperation. 

Seidman, Harold. Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization. New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1980: 219, 224. 26Seidman argues ‘‘standing interagency committees with responsibility to coordinate in general (emphasis in original)’’ perform much less well than ‘‘ad hoc interagency groups organized 

to study and report on specific problems.’’ Harold Seidman, ‘‘Coordination: The Search for the 

Philosopher’s Stone,’’ in Harold Seidman and Robert S. Gilmour. Politics, Position, and Power: 

The Dynamics of Federal Organization, 5th ed., (Oxford University Press: New York, 1980): 217. 

served by a national security system that supports rather than thwarts such interagency collaboration. 

At first the prerequisites for success identified by our research might seem mundane. Most people would assume that a team requires adequate authority and resources to perform its mission well, 24 and that having senior leaders assign a small 

group a clear mission, a capable leader and necessary resources meet those requirements. However, it is important to note that the groups did not have the directive 

authority that some observers believe is essential for high-performing interagency 

groups. 25 They were able to use the senior leader support they received to encourage collaboration across departments and agencies, and once they had a collaborative effort under way, the legal authorities resident in multiple departments and 

agencies were sufficient to accomplish their missions. Having directive authority 

would make it easier to field and sustain high performing interagency teams, but 

the case studies suggest it is not a necessary precondition for success when other 

support is in place. 

In addition, we need to recognize how rare it is for interagency groups to have 

a clear purpose and adequate resources to accomplish their missions in the current 

national security system. Most interagency small groups are assigned broad missions without a clear focus. It has long been argued that it is much more difficult 

for standing interagency committees with general responsibilities for coordination to 

perform effectively, in contrast to interagency groups that are organized to pursue 

a more limited objective and that ‘‘go out of business once their assigned task if accomplished.’’ 26 Joint Interagency Task Force South, which manages the counternarcotics mission on a continuing basis, belies the notion that standing interagency 

groups cannot perform well. However, it does seem from the four cases researched 

that a well-defined mission and group consensus on what is being accomplished are 

critically important to team performance. 

Normally interagency groups also lack the resources necessary to accomplish their 

missions. Because of the way government is structured and resourced, it is common 

to approve interagency strategies without providing the resources essential for success. The participating departments and agencies are expected to provide the resources voluntarily. In the national security system, other departments and agencies 

frequently look to the large Department of Defense to pick up the tab for new initiatives, and it typically resists. The tendency to assign missions without identifying 

commensurate resources for the group means many interagency small group efforts 

are doomed to fruitless bickering over which organization will pay, or to a loose coordination effort since every organization naturally demands control over any resources it contributes. 

It is even rarer for interagency small groups in the national security system to 

own an entire mission area as opposed to being assigned just one segment of the 

enterprise; for example, establishing policy; making plans; and executing some portion of the required operations. Rarely does an interagency group manage its mission ‘‘end-to-end’’ as was true for the four cases studied. Members of the four successful groups believed mission focus and comprehensive responsibility for the mission were keys to success. Groups with a more diverse set of responsibilities that 

dilute the group’s focus, and groups that are responsible for only one segment of a 

mission chain find it much more difficult to achieve success. 

In the current system most small groups operate without directive authority. Instead, they are based on the voluntary cooperation of the departments and agencies 

that staff them. In cases where simple information sharing is all that is necessary 

or desired, interagency small groups can succeed. If active cooperation or a high performing team is necessary, then interagency groups needs assistance to escape the 

centrifugal forces that pull them apart and incline their members to protect their 

parent organizations’ equities rather than give priority to the group’s mission. Assuming our case studies are a good representation of system tendencies, senior leaders who want an interagency small group to succeed need to set it up for success 

by: 

30 

27This is a lesson from a case study of the Senior Interagency Strategy Team at the National 

Counterterrorism Center, which turned out to have some major performance problems. Christopher Lamb and Lt Col Erin Staine-Pyne, ‘‘9/11, Counterterrorism, and the Senior Interagency 

Strategy Team: Interagency Small Group Performance in Strategy Formulation and Implementation,’’ Col. Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, Ft. Leavenworth, March 2014. 28Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: Harper, 2008): p. 316. 

1) Communicating the group’s mission clearly, the priority they attach to it and 

the fact that it can only be undertaken on an interagency basis; 

2) Providing the group resources as required by the mission; 

3) Finding a leader committed to the mission who is willing to buck his own parent organization’s predilections; 

4) Permitting the group to collocate and work the problem full-time if the mission’s level of difficulty demands it; and 

5) Allowing the leader and his or her team the latitude to manage their problem 

‘‘end-to-end,’’ or from strategy to its execution and assessment, so that the 

group effectively controls all aspects of the solution chain. 

It helps if Congress supports the Executive Branch on the first two points. In taking these steps it also helps if senior leaders provide tangible evidence of the importance they attach to the interagency group’s mission. Implicit in these conditions is 

the recognition by all parties (senior leadership, parent organizations and the team 

leader and members) that mission success takes priority over protecting department 

and agency preferences. If the group is established with the opposite expectation it 

will not be able to solve a complex problem 27 and the wisdom of allocating scarce 

resources (human and materiel) to the effort probably needs to be reevaluated. 

High-level political support cleared the way for the four groups we investigated 

to function, but did not guarantee their success. The team’s leader and members 

must exploit the opportunity they have been given by forging a consensus on how 

to accomplish their assigned purpose. They need to: 

1) Define the group’s purpose with an ‘‘end-to-end’’ conceptualization of the problem and solution, taking responsibility for all activities necessary to achieve results; 

2) Pursue an open if not collaborative decision making process; 

3) Partner aggressively with other entities to manage each segment of the endto-end solution chain; 

4) Establish and maintain trust among group members; and 

5) Learn from experience and adjust accordingly to manage the assigned problem 

well. 

Although our case studies demonstrate that interagency collaboration is possible 

in the current system, they also suggest why it is an uncommon and fragile commodity. Successful interagency groups require national leaders, group leaders and 

teams that are willing to challenge the structure, decision-making norms, culture 

and incentives of the current national security system. This is seldom the case, 

which is why high performing interagency small groups are rare, and even when 

they do occur, are prone to breakdown and atrophy. 

Ironically, the President will need more help from Congress to generate these 

kinds of interagency teams than the Secretary of Defense would need for producing 

cross-functional teams in the Department of Defense. One reason for this is that the 

authorities of the President’s cabinet members are well-established in law and not 

easily overridden except by direct personal intervention by the President. This point 

was illustrated by the Department of Defense shortly after 9/11. The Department 

cited current law on the chain of command for our armed forces to argue Defense 

had to be put in charge of everything involving Iraq. ‘‘No one else could take charge 

of security, because no one else had the legal authority to command our armed 

forces.’’ Thus, Defense argued, if the President wanted ‘‘unity of leadership’’ and 

‘‘unity of effort’’ he would have to put the Secretary of Defense in charge of everything involving Iraq. 28 Defense thought this argument was conclusive and it apparently convinced the President. However, the actual result of making Defense the 

lead agency for Iraq was less unified effort. 

Legislation allowing the president to appoint leaders, or what some call ‘‘mission 

managers,’’ to run interagency teams is also probably a legal requirement. Gordon 

Lederman, the former leader of the Project on National Security Reform’s Legal 

Working Group, argues that, ‘‘Any individual in the interagency space who exercises 

meaningful authority to compel departments to act’’ would have to be an ‘‘officer of 

the United States,’’ and officers of the United States must have their positions established by statute as required by the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. 

31 

29Gordon Lederman, ‘‘National Security Reform for the Twenty-first Century: A New National 

Security Act and Reflections on Legislation’s Role in Organizational Change,’’ Journal of National Security Law and Policy, vol. 3 (2009), 363ff. See also Christopher Lamb and Edward 

Marks, ‘‘Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration,’’ Strategic Perspectives, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, December 2010, 

p. 10. 30The bureaucratic and political pressures that militate against strategy are discussed at 

length in ‘‘Pentagon Strategies,’’ and ‘‘National-Level Coordination and Implementation,’’ op. cit. 31Forging a New Shield. Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, Project on 

National Security Reform, 2008; available at: http://0183896.netsolhost.com/site/wp-content/ 

uploads/2011/12/pnsr—forging—a—new—shield—report.pdf. 

Codifying mission manager authorities in statute would also help secure resources 

for the President’s priority interagency missions: ‘‘The President may create structures and processes and fund them temporarily by transferring resources, but ultimately it is Congress that provides resources on a sustained basis. Without 

Congress’s input and resources, a presidentially-imposed solution to interagency integration may wither for lack of funding.’’ 29 Thus, the legislation allowing the president to delegate his integration authorities should also include a mechanism for 

funding interagency team activities and provide for associated congressional oversight. 

In addition to legislation, it would be important to structure and lead the teams 

well. The Project on National Security Reform has proposed some baseline standards for such groups that would be a good place to begin. If such teams were empowered and structured to emulate the attributes of teams that have performed well 

in the past, the President would find them useful. Empowered teams would produce 

better strategy because they would be less susceptible to the bureaucratic and political pressures that militate against strategy formulation. 30 They also would execute 

strategy with much greater unity of effort. Hence they would be more effective, and 

the President would be inclined to use them more frequently. Their use would then 

proliferate, which would create the need for some complementary reforms in the National Security Council staff. 

As the use of interagency teams increases, the need to de-conflict their efforts will 

grow. Such teams tend to pursue their objectives with great determination and 

without regard for work in adjacent or overlapping strategic challenges. The good 

news is that the National Security Council staff, freed from intense issue management, could then pay more attention to system management and better de-conflict 

the work of the interagency teams. It also would be important to ensure such teams 

were not assigned inappropriate problems to solve; i.e. ones that are not inherently 

cross-functional. If the teams encroached on issue areas that are predominantly the 

responsibility of one department or agency, there would be much greater substantive and political resistance to their use. 

Ultimately, these developments would move us in the direction of a new model 

for the National Security Advisor and staff. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the 

choice is not merely between an ‘‘honest broker,’’ and ‘‘a commanding intellect,’’ or 

some combination thereof. What the President needs is a ‘‘system manager’’ with 

responsibility for making the national security system better serve presidential intent. The Project on National Security Reform has made a detailed case for how 

such a revised national security staff should work. 31

CONCLUSION

In my estimation our historic unpreparedness for irregular conflict, our inability 

to rationally allocate defense resources to priority military capabilities and missions, 

and the lack of unified effort among our departments and agencies are major impediments to improving military effectiveness. Fixing these problems will be as difficult as it is necessary. Not fixing them means we will continue to be vulnerable 

to irregular threat in an age where small groups have the intent and increasingly 

the capability to execute catastrophic terrorist attacks; that potential adversaries 

will be much more likely to close the gap on our advantages in major combat operations; and that future national security missions will experience the same frustrating lack of unified purpose and effort that has handicapped and in some cases 

crippled us in the past. 

For all these reasons I am encouraged and appreciative of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s decision to thoroughly investigate Pentagon performance issues. 

Congress has intervened to improve military capabilities in the past, and done so 

to very good effect when it has developed a deep understanding of the underlying 

causes of performance problems. The Committee’s thorough, bipartisan approach to 

identifying the root causes of behaviors that limit military performance is altogether 

32 

laudatory and a great encouragement to those of us who work on defense matters. 

I wish you every success and would like to again express my appreciation for the 

opportunity to share my thoughts on this vital subject.Christopher Lamb with 

Megan Franco, ‘‘National-Level Coordination and Implementation: How System Attributes Trumped Leadership,’’ in Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, 

Hooker and Joseph Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long 

War, National Defense University Press, 2015. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

Let us start out with a fairly easy one. Is there a reason why we 

should have a NORTHCOM and a SOUTHCOM? And is there a 

reason for us to have an AFRICOM that is based in Germany right 

next to your old command, Admiral Stavridis? And let me add onto 

that question. Is there not now a need, as much as we are trying 

to reduce and streamline—is there not now a need for a Cyber 

Command, given the nature of that threat? I will begin with you, 

General. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the original thinking on NORTHCOM 

was concern about having assigned forces to a senior officer with 

responsibility for the U.S., the domestic circumstances. That notion 

foreclosed at the time the possibility of having a joint command for 

both North and South America. It is time now with the passage of 

time to consolidate both of those organizations, as Admiral 

Stavridis suggested. 

The rationale for AFRICOM was somewhat different. As you will 

recall, there was actually an effort to place AFRICOM on the African continent. 

Chairman MCCAIN. That did not turn out too well. 

General SCHWARTZ. It did not. But you can appreciate how that 

thought process sort of preempted other considerations at the time. 

But again, with the passage of time, that is an act of consolidation 

that certainly makes sense to me. 

And with respect to CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command], yes. 

Once they have assigned forces, it is time to establish CYBERCOM 

as an independent COCOM. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Admiral? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I think we absolutely should merge 

NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, not only for the efficiencies, but I 

think there are cultural connections that are important to get Canada and Mexico, two of the largest economies in the Americas, into 

the flow with our work and our world to the south. Predictably, 

there will be some objections based on NORAD [North American 

Aerospace Defense Command]. I think that can be easily handled 

with a subunified command in some way. 

AFRICOM was a good experiment, but I think it is time to admit 

merging it back together. The forces, as you said, are all in Europe. 

And I think those connections between Europe and Africa actually 

would be very positive and in some sense well received in the African world. 

And then Cyber Command I have already addressed. I think it 

is absolutely time to do it. The real question we should be considering, do we want to go one step further to a cyber force? 

Chairman MCCAIN. That is really important. Thank you. 

Doctor? 

Dr. LAMB. I would not have strong feelings on the span of control 

we assign to the combatant commands, but I would make the folVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
33 

lowing observation. I think that decision is probably best linked to 

other recommendations that have been made here today, including 

whether we increase and beef up our ability to field joint task 

forces, standing joint task forces, whether we have a general staff, 

or we have the Chairman in the chain of command. I think that 

would impact a lot the effective span of control the combatant commanders could exercise. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

And this whole issue of the joint task forces I think is one of the 

most important aspects of it, obviously, since there is now a gap 

between the organizations in being and the appointment in every 

crisis of a joint task force, whether it comes from that command or 

from others. It is obvious that is where the operations are. 

Finally, in a more philosophical plane here, one of the much criticized but yet pretty successful staff structure has been the German 

general staff, names like Schlieffen and Ludendorff and others, as 

well as Keitel and others. And every time we start talking about 

centralizing authority in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

that issue is raised. The German general staff system is not something that we want to emulate, and yet, there are others who say 

that it was not because of the staff system that they lost, it was 

for other reasons. 

So give me more of a fundamental view. Do you want to centralize this much power in the hands of one individual or authority 

in the hands of this one individual? General? 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, I would not create a general 

staff. I actually believe that there is risk of having the brilliant few 

become self-serving. However, it is not necessary that a Chairman 

in the chain of command connect to a general staff. By retaining 

a similar arrangement as we have now, where the Joint Staff is a 

creature of the Joint Chiefs, you minimize concern about a rogue 

individual. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would at least have a robust discussion 

about the pros and cons of a general staff, in addition to placing 

the Chairman atop it operationally. 

In terms of the concerns raised about the German general staff, 

you know, that rattles old ghosts in our memories, but at the end 

of the day, it was political leadership and economic collapse in Germany that led to the rise of fascism. The German general staff was 

perhaps a tool of that. 

I think here in the United States, the culture in the military is 

so strongly one of subservience to civilian leadership that I would 

not believe that to be a significant concern when weighed against 

the efficiencies that could be derived from such a structure. 

Dr. LAMB. I would just second what Admiral Stavridis said about 

there not being a threat to civilian control of the military from a 

general staff. But I do think it is worthwhile for the committee to 

ask or take up an issue that Michele Flournoy raised earlier in the 

week about the tyranny of consensus. Even compared to OSD, the 

Joint Staff is well known for its extensive coordination to ensure 

consensus on positions that are forwarded to the Chairman. And I 

think it would be very interesting to hear from former Chairmen 

or the current Chairman what they think of their staff’s performance in that regard and for the committee to get to the heart of 

34 

why consensus tends to rule in the way the Joint Staff operates 

and runs. I think it has not served us particularly well or the 

Chairman particularly well to date. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I just would finally make a comment, 

and that is that being a student of World War II, they did not have 

any of all this stuff. There were just some very brilliant guys 

named Marshall and Leahy and King and others that won the most 

seminal war probably of modern times. So I do not know how we 

look at that aspect of it, but it certainly was the major factor in 

winning World War II. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your very, very thoughtful testimony. 

Two issues are emerging, among many. One is putting the Chairman in the chain of command, and two, creating a general staff. 

And there are pros and cons, as Admiral Stavridis pointed out. And 

since you gentlemen are some of the most intellectually honest people I know, it helps us—we get the pros a lot. What is the con? 

What do you worry about, General Schwartz? If we had a Chairman in the chain of command—if we did it, we would have to create sort of a buffer against those downsides. So both you and Admiral Stavridis, please, and Dr. Lamb. 

General SCHWARTZ. The traditional thinking of having the Chairman in the chain of command is potentials for abuse, for excessive 

exercise of one’s authority, and undermining, as Chris Lamb mentioned, the fundamental principle of civilian authority. That is the 

downside. 

But I believe that—and given my experience—the Chairman and 

the Secretary operate so closely in today’s environment that there 

is a level of supervision which mitigates that possibility. But that 

is a legitimate consideration. 

Senator REED. Let me follow up with a question. Even in your 

concept of putting the Chairman in the chain, he would be still 

subordinate to the Secretary of the Defense. 

General SCHWARTZ. Of course, exactly. Correct. 

Senator REED. The practical effect would be injecting him between the service chiefs and service secretaries? What is the practical effect? 

General SCHWARTZ. The practical effect is that there is an authoritative referee in uniform. At the moment, that authoritative 

referee is either the Deputy Secretary or the Secretary. And it 

seems to me that having someone in uniform with executive authority, properly supervised contributes to effective activity. 

Senator REED. Admiral Stavridis, your points on both these 

issues, the general staff, standalone general staff, and the Chairman in the chain. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, let me take the Chairman position first. 

We have identified and already correctly identified one of the cons. 

I will give you another one. It is having put that much power and 

authority into one person, what if you get an extremely mediocre 

Chairman, someone who is not smart, not effective? We have a 

very good up and out system. We are probably going to get a very 

good Chairman. But that level of power and authority—you need 

35 

to worry not only about abuse of power but lack of capability in it 

as well. 

In terms of the general staff, I think a con would be that a general staff, because the officers would have been plucked out of their 

services at the 04/05 level in their late 30’s, they would not have 

the robust level of operational experience that we see on the Joint 

Staff today. That would be a con. Again, my intuition is that in 

both cases the pros would outweigh the cons, but that would be 

part of the conversation, looking at both sides. 

Senator REED. Dr. Lamb, your comments. 

Dr. LAMB. First, with respect to the Chairman in the chain of 

command, I think I would agree with General Schwartz that in the 

past the relationship between the Chairman and the Secretary has 

been extremely tight. And so I am not sure what the value added 

in inserting someone formally into the chain of command is. There 

are issues there. Some Chairman and Secretary teams have worked 

very closely, and the Secretary’s interests and decisions have been 

passed through the Chairman. And in other cases, you can think 

of Secretaries who have dealt directly with the combatant commanders at length. So I think I would be kind of agnostic on that, 

but I am generally inclined to believe there is not a lot of value 

added to that. 

The more important decisions that I think the Chairman needs 

to work on are future force development. This is where we really 

have to work hard to preserve the qualitative advantages that we 

currently enjoy and which I think most people agree are diminishing. And there, to get to the issue of the general staff, I think 

he needs really dedicated, deep expertise on his staff, and currently 

we tend not to have that. We bring people directly in from operational commands who have never worked those broad issues before. We throw them at a problem for a couple years, then rotate 

them out. My view would be that more stability like a general staff 

would bring to the Chairman would probably be a good thing on 

the whole. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for 

your service and for your testimony. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. It is nice to have you 

here. Some interesting comments. 

Admiral and Dr. Lamb, if you would please. In 2009, in relation 

to the DOD, former DOD Secretary Bob Gates said this is a Department that principally plans for war. It is not organized to wage 

war, and that is what I am trying to fix. Again, that was from Bob 

Gates. 

And from both of you, please, do you believe that it can be fixed 

within the Department? And if so, if you could share your thoughts 

on that. Yes, please. General, go ahead. 

General SCHWARTZ. I agree that the model for employment—once 

again, I would try to reemphasize my earlier point, that we have 

migrated perhaps more by chance than by design, but the joint 

task forces are the way we operate today. And it seems to me that 

professionalizing those entities in the same way that we have 

36 

grown the special operations national joint task force is the model 

for the future in the other operating domains. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree with General Schwartz as a general 

position. I think we should make the point that the Department of 

Defense today operates very effectively in a number of venues, but 

we could be better and more efficient if we had a model like General Schwartz is suggesting in my view. 

Dr. LAMB. I really appreciate the question. I am personally fascinated by Secretary Gates and his tenure as Secretary of Defense. 

I think he is a remarkable man, and he has been very candid in 

his memoirs about the experience he had leading the Department 

of Defense at a time of war. And I have looked at what he had to 

say very carefully, and I think it is interesting. 

And what really seemed to frustrate him was that even though 

we had troops on the battlefield in contact with the enemy, the 

service chiefs were called to their statutory obligation to raise, 

train, and equip the force of the future, and he could not get 

enough capability in the field for the problem we were currently 

trying to master. And this was a source of great frustration to the 

Secretary, and I think it underlies the comment that you just 

quoted him on. 

But for me, the problem there was in part our lack of preparedness for irregular warfare. The services, whether we are talking 

about preparing for future irregular conflicts or we are engaged in 

them currently, have always given priority to what they consider 

their core responsibility of fighting and winning the Nation’s largescale force-on-force conflicts. We have never been very good at 

being prepared for irregular war, and I think that is true over the 

last 60 years. 

So I think we do need some changes there. But for me, the solution there is to put someone definitively in charge of being prepared for irregular conflict. That is something we have not done. 

We always turn to all the services and say you are all equally responsible for being prepared for irregular conflict, and they invariably consider a lesser included case. So we do not go to those conflicts thinking about them, planning for them, prepared for them 

with the niche capabilities, et cetera. I think that is what frustrated the Secretary, and I think it can and should be fixed. 

Senator ERNST. Yes, and there were a lot of very provocative 

comments that the Secretary has made, and that is good because 

now we are spending the time talking about some of those reforms 

and thoughts that he had in regards to irregular warfare, asymmetrical warfare. We really did not start talking—at least I was 

not so much aware of it until about 15 years ago or so when we 

really started taking a look at our force. 

But how can we empower those combatant commanders to take 

that prudent risk and make those decisions on their own? Do we 

empower them to do that, or how can we empower them to do that? 

Any thoughts? Or does it need to be a top-down approach? Why can 

it not be a more bottom-up approach in taking some of those risks? 

General? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think thoughtful combatant commanders 

like Jim Stavridis did exactly that. However, it is important to asVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
37 

sign missions and to distinguished what the priorities are. That is 

a function of the Pentagon in this town. And we have not been terribly good at that. 

Senator ERNST. We have not. Thank you, General. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for your service. 

And I am going to direct these to General Schwartz and Admiral 

Stavridis. 

I am so appreciative of you all coming and so candid with us and 

tell us exactly what you have seen and what your experience. The 

hard thing I am having a hard time with, why either you cannot 

make these changes when you are in that command, when you are 

on the front line, when you are in charge. Is the system bogged 

down to where we are throwing so much stuff at you from here to 

the intermediators that is coming to us? But also, how do we keep 

the separation of the civilian oversight, as we do, which is unbelievable, and I am glad we do. And that is the concern we might 

have, the balance. 

But you know, when you have—the 2010 report by McKinsey and 

Company found that less than 25 percent, or one-quarter, of active 

duty troops were in combat roles, with the majority instead performing overhead activities. And if you look at it from the standpoint of all the pay increases, we are giving the same pay increases 

to 75 percent of the people who do not see any action. I think we 

need to know from you now in your role, not being constrained in 

your remarks, how do we get to where you are able to make the 

decision when you are in charge and in power. They are saying 

they cannot be made. The military cannot change. Under the Goldwater Act that we had way back when, that only we can force it 

from here. But yet, we have thrown so many regulations and so 

many oversights, that it makes it impossible to govern. Where is 

the intermediate? Who makes that decision? Is there a commission 

that should be in place? 

And for those who are concerned about giving total power to the 

Joint Chiefs and the Chairman, still having the civilians in the 

control in an advisory capacity—I do not know how to circumnavigate this. 

And the final question you all two can answer. I know that we 

are talking about NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. I would ask the 

same question about National Guard and Reserves. I as a Governor, former Governor. I was over my Guard. And I would have 

gladly shared with the President, and if the only reason we have 

the Reserves doing what they are doing and the Guard doing what 

they are doing is because of separation of oversight, it does not 

make any sense to me. We could save a tremendous amount and 

use our Guard and Reserves in a much more, I think, effective role 

and much more cost-effective. But I do not see that happening either. 

So whoever wants to chime in, please do. 

General SCHWARTZ. Thank you. 

I actually believe that giving the Chairman, hopefully a very capable individual, directive authority, executive authority would 

change the dynamic in what you are saying. 

38 

Senator MANCHIN. And right now, you are saying that that person does not have that. 

General SCHWARTZ. At the moment, he does not have that. He 

can encourage. He can persuade, but he cannot compel. And that 

is not a business-like approach to the problem. 

Secondly, with regard to the Guard and Reserve, it is at least in 

part a function of the statutory authority, as you are aware being 

a former Governor and others here on the dais. The Reserve is a 

Title 10 entity which is responsive to the service leadership, and 

the Guard, of course, is Title 32 and a little more complex arrangement. And I think it is safe to say that at least the Army and the 

Air Force have a preference for maintaining both of those entities 

because access to the Reserve is cleaner and more expeditious in 

most cases than it is in some cases with the Guard. 

Senator MANCHIN. Admiral? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. A couple of thoughts, sir. You do touch on, 

I think, an important aspect of all this, which is reforming pay, 

benefits. I think those authorities derive from all of you here on 

Capitol Hill based on proposals that can come, and I think you are 

spot-on to look at why do we pay an 03 essentially exactly the same 

amount of money. 

Senator MANCHIN. Right. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It really is in my view ripe for a new look. 

You could drive it from here, but I think in the building, they have 

the authority to build that into proposals and move it forward. And 

I hope you spur them to do it. 

In terms of authorities to really make changes, I think providing 

the SecDef more authority to go into government and move civilians that have been there, simple authorities over the GS system 

I think would be helpful in creating efficiencies. 

In terms of the Guard and Reserve, to the degree the committee 

wants to really lick your finger, reach up, and touch the third rail, 

you could look at an alternative model in the maritime world. We 

have an Air Guard and a land Guard, if you will, but we have a 

Coast Guard. The Coast Guard resides, as you all well know, in the 

Department of Homeland Security. It is a very different model. If 

you want to look at efficiencies and structures, that might be an 

interesting model to look at as to whether it pertains in the air and 

on the land, as it seems to work quite effectively in my view at sea. 

So these are huge questions. In terms of do you need a commission, I would say what this committee is doing right now is the 

basis of driving these thoughts forward, and I hope you continue 

at this. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer? 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, recently a friend and I have been having discussions 

on a 1984 speech by Caspar Weinberger, which of course became 

known as the Weinberger Doctrine. And the third rule that he laid 

out would be that military forces should only be committed after 

the military and political objectives have been clearly defined. 

There has been criticism lately because of recent campaigns that 

we have seen in Afghanistan and Syria, criticisms that perhaps we 

have not seen that end result, that end state really clearly defined. 

39 

I think in future conflicts, especially when we look at the cyber 

area, it is going to be difficult. It is going to be a challenge there 

to be able to define what is ahead. 

I guess I would like to hear from all of you, if you believe these 

evolving trends are going to change, how we look at laying out 

those objectives in the future, and are we going to be able to look 

at a comprehensive strategy and comprehensive plan for the future? Or are we going to have to look at it more incrementally as 

we move forward, and what are the risks that would be involved 

with that? If I could start with you, General. 

General SCHWARTZ. As I see it, ma?am, the role of civilian leadership is to decide the why and the where, and the role of the uniforms is to offer advice on the how. Both are essential ingredients 

of success. And the desire for clarity in the why and the where is 

important to those who serve in uniform, without a doubt. 

I think the clear thing here is that there is a need for understanding that these are complex circumstances, but it is important 

for there to be support for the mission. 

And if I may offer an unsolicited piece of advice, the absence of 

an authorization for use of military force in the current setting is 

less than ideal. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree with General Schwartz. Clearly, 

ideally the ideal structure, Senator, would be crisp, clear direction 

from the political level, a coherent strategy that has been explained 

to the American people and has a reasonable level of support in our 

democracy. Then the military conducts the detailed planning, 

which really is the precision piece of this going forward. How to 

make that link more effective—I think a lot of what we are discussing today would be helpful in that regard. And the degree to 

which that our military can be given that kind of strategic clarity 

will be the degree to which we are successful in our engagements 

overseas. 

Senator FISCHER. So would you both say that that is a rule that 

we as Members of the Senate should continue to require to limit 

risk even into a future where the nature of warfare may change? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes. 

Senator FISCHER. And, Dr. Lamb, if you had comments, please. 

Dr. LAMB. Yes. One of the jobs I had in the Pentagon was helping prepare the contingency planning guidance and the defense 

planning guidance and overseeing the Nation’s war plans for the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. And one of my observations 

was that the operational plans were crystal clear compared to the 

strategic guidance that we often are able to promulgate. And I 

know that some of your previous witnesses have talked about strategy from the point of view of the need for more gray matter, greater strategists, better strategists, et cetera. 

My view is a little bit different. I think there are political and 

bureaucratic forces at work that tend to militate against strategy. 

You ask why do we not have a clear end state. Why do we not have 

a clear center of gravity? Why do we not marshal our resources 

against that center of gravity, et cetera? I think the answer is twofold. 

First of all, in formulating a strategy with that kind of clarity, 

right now there are great political and even bureaucratic disincenVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
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tives for that kind of clarity. So if you say there are three ways to 

attack this problem and we are going to choose door B, so to speak, 

someone will always criticize you for not having taken option A or 

option C. So the safer thing to do is to say we are going to do all 

those things. So in the war on terrorism, we are going to emphasize 

strategic communications and we are going to go after the terrorists themselves and we are going to dissuade state sponsors, and 

on and on and on. So if you look at all of our public strategy documents, they are just long laundry lists of objectives, and you do not 

have that clarity. 

And then when it comes to implementing the strategy, you similarly have bureaucratic forces at play. I am firmly convinced, after 

a year of study, that a lot of popular opinion about what went 

wrong in Iraq is in fact wrong. Because of the point we just made 

about formulating strategy, if you have real strategy, it really exists not on paper but in the minds of the key decision-makers because they cannot promulgate the strategy for the reasons I just 

mentioned. So it is in their minds. So if you are going to get a 

clear, cohesive implementation of the strategy, everybody has to be 

working together and have a mind-meld, if you will. 

That did not happen in Iraq, and we could go into detail on why 

that did not happen. But the point is we had people in one part 

of our national security system working very hard to go in one direction and people on the ground in Baghdad supported by other 

people trying to go in a different direction. And the results were 

not good. 

So when it comes to strategy, I think we have political and bureaucratic problems. And it is one reason I favor these cross-functional teams. I think they can put the strategy together and have 

a better chance of implementing it in a cohesive and a unified way. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And I appreciate Senator Fischer bringing up the Weinberger 

Doctrine and, General Schwartz, your comment about the authorization. I think there are many reasons why an authorization is 

really important. One is just the legal requirements of Article I and 

Article II. The second is the sign of resolve that you show to adversaries, allies, and especially your troops. But the third is sort of the 

one that the Weinberger Doctrine gets at, which is it helps you 

clash out at the beginning what is the mission and goal. So traditionally the President would present an authorization, but then 

Congress usually does not just accept it verbatim. President Bush 

presented an authorization right after the attack on 9/11. Congress 

rejected the originally presented version and batted it around and 

came up with something different. 

The war against ISIL is one that we started on August 8th, 

2014—the President to protect Yazidis on Mount Sinjar and to protect the American consulate in Irbil. But within a couple of weeks, 

it was, okay, now we have to go on offense, but we did not have 

the discussion. We did not have the administration’s presentation 

of the rationale and then the withering cross examination that that 

deserves. I fault the President for not sending an authorization to 

Congress for, I mean, essentially 6 months after the beginning of 

41 

the war, and now it has been 10 months since the President sent 

an authorization. We still really have not had the discussion that 

you ought to have at the front end if you are going to ask people 

to risk their lives. So I think the Weinberger Doctrine is a good 

way to look at it. 

A couple questions just to clarify. You have all offered some interesting ideas. So, Admiral Stavridis, the cyber force. Just walk 

through, if you are looking 15 years ahead, how does that look. 

There is a force. There is a command. Is there a cyber academy? 

Most of us have just done our service academy nominations. Is 

there a cyber academy? Talk to us about what that would look like. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I can. I think it is small. It is probably numbered in thousands of members, so quite small, less than 10,000 

probably. 

I think what you have today is each of the service academies is 

building inside itself a small cyber academy, and this is kind of the 

inefficiency of it that I think we need to overcome. 

So, yes, I think there would be an educational pipeline. I think 

there would be a career path. I think you would have to get away 

from some of the, if you will, traditional go to boot camp, shave 

your head, crawl your way up a hierarchical organization. I am not 

sure that is going to attract the kind of people we need in a cyber 

force. So it probably has somewhat different paid benefits back to 

Senator Manchin’s question a moment ago about are we paying the 

right people the right amount. So this may be a highly paid cadre. 

I think probably the closest analog to what we have, quite obviously, is special forces, and that is roughly what it would look like. 

I do believe it is time we get after this because I think our 

vulnerabilities are significant in this area. 

Senator KAINE. A second question to another idea you had. I 

thought it was intriguing, the idea of an ambassadorial level sort 

of civilian deputy within the COCOMs. And I gather there is sort 

of an unstated assumption that is kind of about the nature of the 

American military mission now that so much of it is diplomacy, you 

know, the nations that want us to send the special purpose 

MAGTFs throughout Africa to train their militaries. I mean, so 

much of it is kind of on the border between diplomacy and military 

or working out with the Japanese the Okinawan situation. That is 

diplomatic as much as it is military. Is that sort of your thinking 

behind the recommendation? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is. The structure, as it was in effect when 

I was at Southern Command and while I was at U.S. European 

Command, I had a military deputy, and I think you need to continue to have a military deputy for the conduct—— 

Senator KAINE. Operations. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS.—of operations. 

But we also had, instead of a POLAD, a political advisor from 

the State Department—we had a senior ambassador who was our 

civilian deputy, and he or she was capable of doing that kind of engagement, diplomatic work, working with host nations, helped resolve innumerable individual challenges in, if you will, the smart 

power side of the equation. It is low cost, and it also is a strong 

signal to the interagency about how we want to work together to 

address problems that I think is salutary. 

42 

Senator KAINE. It sounds like a Fletcher School dean idea. 

And then, Dr. Lamb, one last question for you. The idea that you 

advocate in your opening testimony about having some primary responsibility for irregular war, if it is small or if it is large, rather 

than everybody feeling like the irregular wars are sort of a lesser 

responsibility, which means we are not really preparing for regular 

wars. Talk a little bit about that. Elaborate on that if you would. 

Dr. LAMB. Yes. I mean, I think that we have a parallel with regard to special operations forces in general. All the services, before 

we combined them under SOCOM [Southern Command], had special operations forces. They knew what they wanted to use them 

for, et cetera. But they were not a priority for the services. So Congress in its wisdom—and I think rightly so—created USSOCOM, 

and we now have world-class special operations forces particularly 

for the high value target mission. So the direct action, go there, go 

to a site, get what you need done, and come back. We have unparalleled capabilities. And those have only improved over the last 10 

or 15 years. 

But when it comes to working by, with, or through host nation 

forces, we are not quite as sharp. And there is a number of complex 

reasons for that which have been discussed by many individuals. 

But I think the committee needs to take that issue up with 

SOCOM. SOCOM leadership has repeatedly told Congress that 

they think the indirect mission is in fact more important and they 

intend to improve their indirect capabilities. But whether or not 

that is happening I think is a matter of great import. 

With regard to the Marine Corps, not every problem, unfortunately, not every low end of the conflict spectrum problem could be 

handled with a small special operations team. So the question is 

who in the Department of Defense, amongst all our forces, is really 

responsible for being prepared for that mission. Time and time 

again, we go on these missions, whether it is Panama, Somalia, 

Bosnia. We go on these missions not really prepared for them, kind 

of learning on the job, seeing what the situation demands, not having the equipment, as Secretary Gates found, not only not having 

the equipment, but not being able to generate it quickly in response even to urgent requests from forces in the field. 

I think we can do better than that. The Marine Corps, from my 

point of view, would work well in that regard for a number of reasons. It has a history of greater involvement in these. It is already 

kind of a joint force with amphibious, air, land capabilities that are 

well integrated. So there is a lot of advantages there. 

I think we have come to a point where we cannot afford all the 

duplication we have without some clarification of roles in the Department. So this is something that made sense to me. 

Senator KAINE. I thank all of you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for being here today. 

Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to ask you about your prior position 

as Commander of SOUTHCOM. And we had testimony this spring 

from General John Kelly, the Commander of SOUTHCOM, about 

how the networks are working over our southern border, the soVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:13 Jan 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\23575.TXT WILDA
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phisticated smuggling networks that I can assure you now, unfortunately, are being used to devastate my State with how heroin is 

coming into my State, but also the issue that he raised as well was 

that he believed that adherents to ISIS have called for infiltration 

of our southern border. 

So I wanted to ask you about your thoughts on that in terms of 

the use of those networks not only on things like drugs, but also 

as we look at this terrorism challenge. Is this something we should 

be worried about? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It absolutely is something we should be worried about, Senator. And I have called this before convergence, and 

it is the convergence of these drug routes, which are extremely efficient, with the possibility of using them to move terrorists or, at 

the really dark end of the spectrum, weapons of mass destruction, 

along with the narcotics. So when those drug routes and those 

higher-level threats converge—convergence—I think we are at 

great risk. 

What we should do about it is exactly what we are talking about 

here is think holistically about how you create a network to combat 

a network. This is a very sophisticated, private-public, if you will, 

collaboration with international abilities ranging from moving submarines with 10 tons of cocaine to aircraft, et cetera, et cetera. So 

you need to bring the interagency to bear. You need to bring special operations to bear. And I think this also argues for merging 

NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM because it creates one sphere 

through which these routes are coming at us. So there is a quick 

basket of ideas. 

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate it. I do not know if anyone else 

wants to comment on that. Thank you. 

I also wanted to, not to pick on you today, Admiral, but given 

your prior position as certainly the Commander of NATO, what we 

have seen recently with Iran—on October 10th, Iran conducted a 

ballistic missile test, a medium-range missile, and then also recently we have learned that they have tested a missile on November 21st. And as I look at these, first of all, a clear violation of U.N. 

resolutions. Also from what we understand, the reports suggest 

that the missile tested last month has a range of approximately 

1,200 miles. So that would give Iran a capability, of course, of hitting eastern Europe and places that we are concerned about in the 

NATO context. 

So I have been asking why are we not responding to this, and 

what do you think our response should be? Should there be some 

response? It strikes me as a very important issue because it is already, in light of the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]—they are violating existing U.N. resolutions. And it seems to 

me if there is not some response from us, that they are going to 

continue. Not only this does not bode well for the JCPOA, but also 

to continue to develop ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] capability, as you know, that could go even further to hit the United 

States. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As I have said often, Senator, we ought to be 

concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, but it is a much bigger 

problem than that. Iran views itself as an imperial power dating 

back two and a half millennia. They currently are in control of five 

44 

capitals in this region. The JCPOA I think is going to shower resources upon them. And so they are a highly dangerous opponent 

and will be going forward. 

So what should we do? 

First, we should hold Iran to the commitments they have made 

in the JCPOA, and if that means that agreement is broken and we, 

therefore, return to a sanctions regime, we need to face that. 

Secondly, we need to use all of our clandestine, our intelligence 

capability to truly understand what is going on in Iran. 

Thirdly, we need to stand with our Sunni allies in the region 

and, of course, with Israel, who are going to be the bulwark against 

this kind of expansion. 

Fourthly, in Europe, as you well know, Senator—I took you 

around there—we looked at the missile defense system. We should 

continue to move in that direction. That is kind of a beginning, but 

I think Iran will continue to be a geopolitical threat to the United 

States. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you all. 

Senator REED [presiding].Thank you, Senator. 

On behalf of Senator McCain, Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you all very much both for your service and for being here 

today. 

Dr. Lamb, you talk about flattening the structure of the military 

to set up special teams that have a commitment to mission as opposed to what often interagency groups bring to task. It seems to 

me that I really like that idea. I think that one of the things—if 

we look at the private sector, one of the things they figured out is 

that the top-down approach, a hierarchical approach, is not as good 

for decision-making for what they are trying to accomplish as a 

team approach. 

But what are the challenges—and I guess maybe I ought to ask 

both General Schwartz and Admiral Stavridis what you think the 

challenges are of trying to move from what has been such a traditional hierarchical structure to one that allows that team approach 

to really address the challenges that we are facing? And, General 

Schwartz, do you want to start? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sure. You know, I do not know, ma?am, if 

the committee has had Stan McChrystal before you, but here is an 

example, maybe the best recent example, of how the team approach 

produces extraordinary results with his organization. And he has 

written two books and what have you. But the bottom line is that 

Chris Lamb’s model does work. There is evidence of that. And 

there is a new generation of military leadership that gets it I think, 

and we should support that, encourage it, and through your oversight, mandate it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Admiral Stavridis? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. A core question going forward. And what 

mitigates against it, what makes it difficult, Senator—and you 

know this—is the built-in structure of the military. This is an organization where a million people get up in the morning and put on 

the same outfit. I mean, this is why we call it ‘‘uniforms.’’ And you 

have got to start cracking that mentality. We will—I think General 

Schwartz is spot-on—because there is a generational shift. 

45 

The question here is this is not an on and off switch between a 

highly chaotic, Silicon Valley-like entity or a Prussian-style military. It is a rheostat. We need to dial that rheostat more toward 

team approaches, interagency, international cooperation, strategic 

communication, all of those smart power things without losing our 

ability to deliver lethal combat power. I think we can do that. We 

need to think of it as a rheostat that is turning in the direction you 

identified. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And, Dr. Lamb, you talked about the Coast 

Guard having a different model. One of the things I remember 

after the BP oil spill, when they were talking about the response 

to rescuing people—no. I am sorry. Not the oil spill. Hurricane 

Katrina—was that the Coast Guard was very effective in responding I think both there and on the BP oil spill because they were 

able to make decisions on the spot without having to check with 

anybody. 

So what is different about the Coast Guard model, and how do 

you transfer what is effective about that? Or should we be looking 

at transferring what is effective about that to address some of the 

other challenges of building that teamwork capacity? 

Dr. LAMB. Well, when I was involved in the project, national security reform, we spent some time looking at the Coast Guard 

model. And the Coast Guard I think would say—and Admiral 

Stavridis could speak to this, I think, more directly. But I think 

they would say their leadership model and their training and education model is different than some of the other services. Because 

of their very nature, they are used to thinking about problems in 

a cross-functional way. They both serve the Department of Defense 

in war and law enforcement in peacetime. And so they have some 

natural advantages in that respect. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So can you explain? When you say their leadership model is different, their training is different, what is different that gives them that different ability to focus? Admiral 

Stavridis? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. They begin their lives at the Coast Guard 

Academy with an appreciation of the fact that they are but one entity within the Department of Homeland Security, which has 19 

different entities within it. They know they straddle that border between Title 10 combat operations, in which they participated heroically many, many times, as well as law enforcement, as well as 

rescue at sea, as well as environmental. So their mission, their 

ethos, their mentality is simply one of cooperation, working together. It is hard to find a better integrated organization than the 

Coast Guard. I think we could learn a lot from that. 

General SCHWARTZ. And they have much greater experience with 

State and local leadership than typically do the active duty forces. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all very much. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Sullivan, please. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and your years 

of service, decades of service to our country. 

I wanted to focus a little bit, Admiral, on your recommendation 

perhaps with regard to NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM merging 

46 

with a bit of a focus on the Arctic. General Schwartz, I know that 

you have spent a lot of time in Alaska and so have a sense of that. 

We have had a lot of discussions here. Senator King and I and the 

chairman and a lot of others are interested very much in what is 

going on in the Arctic. Actually in this NDAA, there is a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to put together an Arctic operations plan for the first time, which we think is progress. 

But just given your background—actually any of the panelists. 

You know, one of the many challenges that we have up there is 

that when you look at the Arctic, it is the classic scenes of different 

combatant commands where its forces are OPCOM [Coast Guard 

Operations Command] to PACOM [Pacific Command]. Its advocate 

is NORTHCOM, and its threat is primarily in EUCOM. 

So you, I am sure, all noticed the very massive Russian buildup. 

Actually just yesterday there was another article about a new missile defense system that they are putting in the Arctic, four new 

combat brigades, 11 new airfields, on and on and on, huge exercises. And we are looking at actually getting rid of the only airborne BCT in the entire Asia-Pacific and in the Arctic. And as you 

know, General Schwartz, that takes a lot of training to have your 

forces up there well trained to be able to operate in 30 below zero. 

So I would just really appreciate your views on the Arctic, but 

also how that NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM merger idea would either 

enhance or merger idea would either enhance or diminish—we do 

not think it should be much more diminished. We think there 

should be more attention on the Arctic given all that is going on 

up there right now. Any panelist, I would welcome your thoughts 

on it. 

General SCHWARTZ. I think it is important that the Arctic be assigned as a mission to one of the combatant commands. That has 

yet to happen. It should transpire. That is point one. 

Point two is a more pedestrian concern, but we only have one operating icebreaker, Senator Sullivan. This is unthinkable for the 

United States of America. And clearly, that Coast Guard platform—we need more of that, and we need the other kinds of wherewithal that allow us to assert our sovereignty in the Arctic. 

Senator SULLIVAN. We have one and the Russians have 40 I believe. 

General SCHWARTZ. Understood, sir. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. You are absolutely correct. Russia has 38 

plus two icebreakers. The Chinese, who are not an Arctic power, 

to say the least, have 16 icebreakers, et cetera. The Danes, a nation of 5 million, have eight icebreakers. So this is actually beyond 

a pedestrian point. It is a very good one. 

I agree with assigning it to U.S. Northern Command in its entirety. I think that it would not be diminished by the merger between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. When you look at the level 

of activity to the south and what NORTHCOM is doing, I think 

that could easily be folded into a unified command responsibility, 

and I think it would be valuable because it would further solidify 

our integration with Canada, with whom we ought to be partnering 

in a very significant way, as you know better than anybody, in the 

north. 

47 

Lastly, we should be working with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization] to ensure that NATO perceives this is a NATO frontier. This is a NATO border. Canada and the United States are 

NATO nations. We need to think of that border as importantly as 

we do as the borders of the Alliance in eastern Europe and to the 

south on the Mediterranean. 

Senator SULLIVAN. General Schwartz, could you talk to just the 

strategic location of those forces up there? Because, you know, Admiral, when you talk about having it completely with regard to unified under NORTHCOM, do you think that the operational forces 

should also be under NORTHCOM, given that they are very oriented towards the Asia-Pacific? And as General Schwartz—and I 

know you know, sir, the strategic location of Alaska is such that 

those forces, those air forces, those Army forces, can really be anywhere in the northern hemisphere within 7–8 hours whether it is 

Korea or the Baltics. Would you mind just talking on that for a bit, 

sir? 

General SCHWARTZ. Quickly, if the constraint of assigned forces 

to the domestic four-star can be overcome, that makes sense. To assign those assets in Alaska that have the opportunity both to reinforce America’s claims in the Arctic, as well as be deployable for 

other missions that might be assigned is certainly the right approach. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would only add we talk a lot about the unified command plan, which kind of divides the world among the 

combatant commanders. The other important document, Senator, is 

called the ‘‘Forces For’’ document, which actually apportions and 

assigns those forces. It is renegotiated typically every two years. I 

think as General Schwartz indicates, that would be a very important new way to think about force assignment. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple of quick points. Amen on the icebreakers. It is preposterous that we do not have more significant icebreaker capacity, 

particularly given what is happening in the Arctic in terms of the 

opening up of the ice. 

Secondly, would all of you agree that it would be advantageous 

to the U.S. to accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Because I am an Admiral, I get to go first. 

Senator KING. Yes, sir. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

General, do you agree? 

General SCHWARTZ. And airmen agree with that. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Dr. Lamb? 

Dr. LAMB. Agnostic, sir. 

Senator KING. Agnostic on the treaty? All right. Two to one. We 

will take those odds. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Could I ask why agnostic? 

Dr. LAMB. I really have not studied it at length, but I am concerned about our willingness to protect freedom of navigation 

48 

around the world and the way other nations are interpreting their 

littoral areas and their control over them. I am not quite sure of 

the impact of the Law of the Sea Treaty on those kinds of issues. 

Senator KING. My concern is that other nations are going 

through that process, making claims, and we are standing on the 

sidelines. Your gestures will not show up in the record. Could 

you—— 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree with your assessment. We are much 

better inside that treaty than outside it in terms of protecting our 

rights. We could have a long hearing on the Law of the Sea, and 

I am sure such has been done. But call me back up on that one 

anytime. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

I want to associate myself with the comments of Senator Ayotte 

on this Iran ballistic missile test. It is hard to interpret exactly 

what they are doing. There is some thinking that maybe this is the 

struggle of the hardliners and they are trying to torpedo the agreement. On the other hand, it seems to me it would be very dangerous for us to establish the precedent of blinking at violations. 

I am a great believer that implementation is as important as vision. I voted for the JCPOA but it was based upon an understanding and expectation that it would be scrupulously enforced. 

And I think this could be interpreted as an early test of our resolve. And, General, I take it you agree. 

General SCHWARTZ. I certainly do. And if it is a violation of U.N. 

resolutions, we should call that out without hesitation. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree with General Schwartz. I agree with 

your comment as well. 

I have been hopeful of this agreement, but I am increasingly 

skeptical that it will be the right step for U.S. national security. 

This certainly gives weight to the negative side of that equation. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Dr. Lamb, in your prepared remarks, you talked about how we 

need to be thinking about unconventional warfare and suggested 

several areas, one that I want to emphasize. You talk about persuasive communication. In my view, there are two fronts to the war 

with ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. One is military. 

The other is ideas. And we are badly losing the war of ideas. And 

it strikes me that that is a huge gap in our national strategy. I 

know we are doing some things, but my sense is it does not have 

the priority that it should. Would you agree with that? 

Dr. LAMB. Yes, I absolutely would. I think there are two issues 

here, one substantive and one organizational. Organizationally we 

are not well organized to treat the issues of communications. We 

get public affairs, public diplomacy, and then what used to be 

called psychological operations. 

Senator KING. And USIA was abolished 15 years ago. 

Dr. LAMB. Yes, yes. We do not have a dedicated organization to 

deal with this anymore, and we are confused about the difference 

between these different—Americans are very sensitive about government control or use of information. And we are losing this 

game. I would actually concur. 

49 

On the substantive front, we are having some real political problems with deciding the best way to deal with the issue, as General 

Dempsey once said, with the fact that some terrorists happen to 

also be Muslim and Islamic. And we want to emphasize that the 

Islamic religion is peaceful and tolerant and so on and so forth, but 

we do have this strain within that religion that sees the world differently. And our ability to deal with that in a forthright way has 

really been handicapped. 

And actually I am surprised by the number of senior leaders who 

have said in their memoirs from their tours of duty during the past 

15 years that this is an Achilles heel for us and that we still have 

not effectively identified the enemy we are up against and how best 

to deal with that, how to turn that issue back into something that 

the Islamic world debates itself about what it is going to do about 

this virulent strain within it. 

So I think substantively and organizationally we are really on 

our heels in this regard. I could not agree more. 

Senator KING. And ultimately that is where this battle will be 

won or lost in my view because there are now—pick a number— 

100,000, 200,000 jihadists. There are 1.6 billion Muslims. That is 

the battlefield. And it can only be won within the Muslim community, but we have to lead it, it seems to me, or we at least need 

to work with the worldwide non-jihadist Muslim community. 

General? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, I just would close by saying we need 

to give voice to those who have escaped ISIL-occupied areas. 

Senator KING. It seems to me a natural. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Just one last thought, if I could. It is a battlefield, but it is also a marketplace. And we have to compete. We 

have to recognize that. That is a very important aspect of how we 

communicate. We are pretty good at dominating markets. We 

should bring some of those skills to bear. 

Senator KING. It is ironic in the extreme that we are the people 

that invented Facebook and Twitter and all of those things, and we 

are losing on that front. 

Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. I have a lot of other 

questions about the organization, but we will get to those later. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. If you would like to ask an additional question—— 

Senator KING. One additional question on—and maybe this is for 

the record. We are talking about combining several of the combatant commands, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM and 

Europe. Are there any savings to be had? And if so, we would like 

to quantify them because in fiscal year 2017 we are going to face 

about a $15 billion shortfall from where we would like to be. And 

that is real money, and we are going to have to find some places 

where it can be saved in staff, personnel, noncombatant kind of 

areas. So perhaps you have an immediate response or for the 

record. 

General SCHWARTZ. In the business world, we call those 

synergies. And I cannot offer a number, but certainly there are 

50 

those in the Department who could answer that question for you 

and I would recommend you press for that. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes. There are savings. And I would recommend not only pressing the Department but getting somebody 

on the outside to take a good look at that. 

Senator KING. Thank you very much. I appreciate your testimony. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I appreciate the comments about the hearts 

and minds, but first you have got to kill them. And as long as the 

perception is out there that they are winning, then they will also 

win in other areas as well. I believe that one of the reasons why 

these young men are most attracted is that they think they are 

joining a winning cause, and events such as at San Bernardino and 

Paris are one of the greatest recruitment tools they have. And until 

we beat them on the battlefield, I think that our messaging efforts 

will be severely hindered, but I also agree that it is just going to 

be a long fight on using the most advanced technologies. 

And I would also point out that we still have a big problem with 

the ability now of ISIS to be contacted and direct a young man or 

young woman to a secure site. That is just not right. That is not 

right. And I see heads nodding. As Senator King mentioned, that 

is not recorded. 

Senator KING. I agree with the chairman on both fronts. Thank 

you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Admiral? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree completely. And I think that this also 

gets into the cyber piece of this. There are ways that we can track, 

control, eradicate in the cyber world. 

I also particularly agree the leading edge of this has to be hard 

power. In the long game, it is a mix of hard power, smart power. 

But at the moment, dealing with the forces that are arrayed 

against us from the Islamic State, we have to go hard now. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Doctor, did you have any comment? 

Dr. LAMB. For myself, I think this is just a good example of what 

I was referring to on the indirect approach in special operations, 

the military information support forces in SOCOM. If you look at 

how they are raised, trained, and equipped, it is not to the same 

levels of proficiency that the other aspects of SOCOM are. So I 

think there is room for improvement there. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I thank you. 

And the Doctor is a graduate of the institution in which you are 

presently employed when it had the correct name. I want to thank 

you for your continued good work. 

And I thank the Admiral and General for your many years of 

service. 

This will probably be the conclusion of a series of hearings that 

we are having as we try to address this whole issue of reform, ability to get into the challenge, to meet the challenges of the 21st century. I believe that Goldwater-Nichols could never have come from 

within the Pentagon. I think everybody agrees with that. And we 

intend, on a bipartisan basis, to work with the Pentagon and Secretary Carter as closely as we possibly can, but I think it is pretty 

well known that we have to lead. And it is not to the exclusion of 

the Pentagon, but it certainly is a responsibility that I think that 

51 

we have. And I am proud of the modest measures that we have 

taken in this year, but I think next year is really where we can 

really make a significant impact. And the series of hearings that 

we are now concluding with I think gives us an excellent basis for 

the kinds of reforms that need to be made. 

It just is disappointing to our constituents when I go back to Ari- zona and somebody asks me about a $2 billion cost overrun of one 

weapon system. It is hard to defend, hard to justify. And then 

when we see the combat capabilities going down in organizations 

and yet the staffs and support going up and we are still unable to 

conduct an audit successfully of the Department of Defense and no 

one can tell this committee how many contract personnel are employed, there is a pretty large task ahead of us. But if we pursue 

the principles that you have recommended to us today, some of 

those other aspects of this challenge will follow. 

So you have been very helpful. 

And, Admiral, I asked the panel yesterday if you all would prepare notes of condolences to be delivered to Senator Reed on Saturday afternoon, it would be much appreciated. 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Con gusto. 

Senator REED. Go Army. 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Go Navy. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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