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22–351 2016

INTERVIEWS OF WITNESSES

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

THE EVENTS SURROUNDING

THE 2012 TERRORIST

ATTACK IN BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, 2012–2016

VOLUME 7 OF 11

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the

2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi

(

Available on the Internet:

www.fdsys.gov
(II)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman

LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PETER ROSKAM, Illinois

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama

SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland

Ranking Minority Member

ADAM SMITH, Washington

ADAM SCHIFF, California

LINDA SA ́ NCHEZ, California

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director
CONTENTS

Page

Interview of Speechwriter #1 .................................................................................. 1

Interview of Speechwriter #2 .................................................................................. 111

Interview of Huma Abedin ...................................................................................... 213

Interview of Director, Office of Terrorism Analysis .............................................. 435

Interview of Senior Libyan Desk Officer, Office of Maghreb Affairs ................... 437

Interview of Chief of Base ....................................................................................... 549

Interview of Jeffrey David Feltman ....................................................................... 551

Interview of Chief of Operations for the Near East Division ............................... 731

Interview of Thomas Nides ..................................................................................... 733

Interview of Bernadette Meehan ............................................................................ 865

Interview of Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs ..................................... 1011

(III)

INTERVIEW OF SPEECHWRITER #1

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, OCTOBER 9, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

FOR SPEECHWRITER #1

JONATHAN SU, Esq.

Latham & Watkins LLP

555 11th Street, Suite 1000

Washington, D.C. 20004

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

* * *, Attorney-Adviser

ERIC SNYDER

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Ms. , this is the transcribed interview being conducted by

the House Select Committee on Benghazi. It is being conducted, as I

understand it, voluntarily, that you're appearing voluntarily as

opposed to pursuant to a subpoena, as part of the committee's

investigation into the attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in

Benghazi, Libya and related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567

of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Could we begin by having you state and spell your name for the

record?

Ms. . Yes. It's , .

Mr. Missakian. First, let me thank you for appearing here today.

We know you traveled a bit of a distance, so the committee appreciates

your cooperation in the investigation.

My name is Craig Missakian, I'm one of the lawyers from the

majority staff, and at this point, it's traditional for everybody in

the room to introduce themselves to you, so why don't I start with Mr.

Grider over there in the corner.

Mr. Grider. Hi, I'm Mark Grider.

Mr. Missakian. And then, Mr. Su, why don't you state your name

and relationship to the witness, for the record.

Mr. Su. Sure. Jonathan Su, Latham & Watkins on behalf of Ms.

. And Craig, when you have a minute, I'd like to make a brief

opening remark whenever you have a chance.

Mr. Missakian. Absolutely. ?

Ms. . , attorney advisor for the U.S.

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Department of State.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with minority staff.

Mr. Missakian. All right. Have you ever had your deposition

taken before?

Ms. . No.

Mr. Missakian. Have you ever been interviewed by Congress?

Ms. . Nope.

Mr. Missakian. Okay. So this will be new to you. There are

some procedural and ground rules. I'll just kind of go over those now,

and then we'll let your attorney make the statement that he just

referred to.

Off the record for a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Missakian. Let's go back on the record.

Generally speaking, the way questioning proceeds during these

interviews is that a member of the majority staff will ask questions

for up to an hour, and then the minority will have an opportunity to

ask you questions for an equal amount of time.

Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee or

designated staff member. We then rotate back and forth, 1 hour per side

until we are out of questions, and at that point, the interview will

conclude

Unlike testimony or a deposition in a Federal court proceeding,

the committee format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness

or your counsel may raise objections for privilege, and those would be

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subject to review by the chairman of the committee, Mr. Gowdy.

If the objections cannot be resolved during the interview, you may

be required to return for an additional -- additional session or for

a hearing or for a deposition. Members and staff of the committee are

not permitted to raise objections when the other side is asking

questions.

With regard to classified information, this session is going to

be treated as unclassified. If any question calls for a classified

answer, please let us know and we will reserve its answer until we move

into a classified setting if we decide to do that. I don't expect that

will happen today, but at any rate, just let us know if your answer

requires the disclosure of classified information

You are welcome to confer with your attorney at any time during

the interview, but if something needs to be clarified, then we simply

ask you to let me know. If you don't understand one of my questions,

just let me know, and I'm happy to rephrase it. If you need to discuss

anything with your counsel off the record and outside the presence of

the other members of the staff, just let me know, and we'll take a break.

Beyond that, if you want to take a break for any other reason, just let

me know.

With regard to the court reporter who you see seated here next to

you, there will be -- she's an official court reporter and is taking

down everything we say. So recognizing that, we just ask that your

responses be verbal as opposed to a nod of the head, for example.

Occasionally, the witness and the questioner, sometimes have a tendency

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to talk over each other. It makes it difficult for the court reporter,

so I will do my best not to talk over you, and I would just ask the same,

that you allow me to finish my questions and then we'll allow you to

answer.

Ms. , you are required to answer questions posed to you from

Congress truthfully. Do you understand that?

Ms. . I do.

Mr. Missakian. This also applies to questions that are posed to

you by congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand that?

Ms. . Yes.

Mr. Missakian. Do you also understand that witnesses that

knowingly provide false testimony could be subject to criminal

prosecution for perjury or for making false statements?

Ms. . I do.

Mr. Missakian. Is there any reason why you're not able to give

your best truthful testimony during this interview today?

Ms. . No.

Mr. Missakian. Peter, do you have anything to add?

Mr. Kenny. I would just like to thank the witness, thank you, Ms.

, for appearing here today. I look forward very much to hearing

your statement.

Mr. Missakian. All right. Mr. Su, at this point, if I want to

make a statement, please do

Mr. Su. Sure. So thank you for the opportunity to talk with you

all today. Ms. is here, as you noted, voluntarily, you know,

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to answer the committee's questions. She has expressed an intent to,

you know, cooperate with the committee, and that's why she's here.

As you know Craig, you and I, and Dana, Dana Chipman, had some brief

correspondence earlier in the month regarding the scope of these

proceedings, and we understood, and Dana confirmed that the relevant

period of inquiry would be the 2012 attacks in Benghazi, Libya and the

immediate days thereafter. That the committee's interest related

solely to this witness' government service, and that, you know, the

committee would advise me if there are any other specific matters of

interest, and I have not heard any other than what's been described here.

And further, that the committee's questions would not delve into any

classified issues.

So that's kind of the bounds from which we, you know, prepared and

are prepared to answer questions, but you know, with that, we'll let

you proceed, and we'll go from there, if that makes sense

Mr. Missakian. Okay. Great. Thank you. That's my

understanding as well with regard to the scope of the interview. Should

something come up in one of your other answers that requires us to follow

up on areas that may ordinarily fall outside that scope, we'll do our

best to deal with that at the time, but I don't expect that I will have

them, but if it does, we'll deal with it.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Okay. First, let's start with the basics. When did you

begin work at the State Department?

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A I started work in March of 2009.

Q Where did you work prior to that?

A Immediately prior to that, I was at a firm here in town,

a speech writing firm called West Wing Writers for a few months.

Previous to that, I had been the speech writer for Michelle Obama, on

the 2008 Obama for America campaign, and before that I was at this firm,

West Wing Writers for about 5 years, if that makes sense.

So I stayed with this firm the whole time, except for a brief

period when I left to -- moved to Chicago and write for Mrs. Obama.

Q When you say you were working for Obama for America, was

it?

A Yes.

Q Is that the same as the Obama presidential campaign, or is

that something different?

A Yes. No, no, no, the campaign.

Q How long did you work on the campaign?

A From August 2008 through election day.

Q Okay. When did you leave the State Department?

A In February 2013.

Q That was when Secretary Clinton left?

A Shortly after, yeah.

Q Was there any discussion of you staying after she left the

State Department?

A Not really.

Q Was that typical for people in her speech writing department

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to leave with her?

A I don't know actually how long everyone else stayed. I

left.

Q Was it expected that people would leave when she left?

A I don't know actually. I know I had made up my mind to leave

then, and so that kind of foreclosed the issue for me. And I didn't

really talk seriously with anyone about staying, so I didn't -- I don't

know. That was sort of the beginning of the end of the conversation

in my own head.

Q Okay. Now, from March 2009 to February 2013, when you

left, what was your title or titles during that time?

A Yeah. I was her speech writer. I think eventually I

became her senior speech writer. Also, as a speech writer, I was also

a member of the policy planning staff at the State Department speech

writers -- their home is within policy planning.

Q Tell me a little bit more about the structure. So you have

the -- who was the head of the policy planning staff at that time?

A When I started, it was a woman named Ann Marie Slaughter.

She was director of policy planning for 2 years, so that's, I guess,

roughly the calendar years of 2009, 2010. Having said that, I'm

actually not positive about the dates of her service, but they're

publicly available. So she was my first boss as the head of policy

planning, and then she was replaced by Jake Sullivan for the last

2 years or so of the Clinton time.

Q Just so I understand, there's the policy planning staff,

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and the speech writing department is under that, so --

A Right.

Q -- essentially your boss was first Ann Marie Slaughter and

then Jake Sullivan?

A Yes. Although, as perhaps a slightly complicating

circumstance.

Q Please.

A There's also a director of speech writing. So as a speech

writer, I answer to both, I guess.

Q Who is that director?

A Well, at first it was a woman named who hired

me.

Q Could you spell that?

A Yes, her first name is , , and her last name

is , .

Q Okay.

A So she hired me and she served as director for about 2 years,

and then when she left, she was replaced by a man named .

Q When did leave, to your knowledge?

A That's a good question. I don't -- around when I left, I

think. I'm not sure.

Q Describe for us the relationship between the director of

speech writing and Jake Sullivan, for example, the head of the policy

planning staff?

A What do you mean by describe the relationship?

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Q Well, tell us a little bit about the process of how Jake

Sullivan fit into the process of approving the work product that came

out of the speech writing department?

A Uh-huh. Well, he certainly read everything that we

produced. He was an editor, or he weighed in on the drafts that we

wrote, some more than others. He offered edits. Often we would meet

with him before drafting to get his thoughts for what ought to be in

a speech. We also did that with other high-level officials across the

building, especially depending on what the content of the speech was.

For example, if it were a speech about China, we would speak with the

head of the East Asia Bureau or maybe whoever was the head of the China

desk, so we do a lot of preliminary meetings, especially on big speeches

with people around the department, including Jake, and he would

generally be on the list of people who would vet speeches, who would

read speeches, who would read drafts. Yeah.

Q Okay. And how would that work physically? Would somebody

in your department do a Word document, for example, and then email it

around?

A Exactly.

Q Okay. And physically, where was your department located

in relationship to Jake Sullivan's policy planning staff?

A So the policy planning staff occupies several suites in like

a general area that -- depending on how big we are, you know, I believe

we sort of commandeered some rooms here and there in order to make sure

everyone has a seat.

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So there is one main suite of offices, it's relatively small, on

the 7th floor of the State Department. That's where the policy

planning director has his office, it's where his chief of staff is,

it's where his deputy director is, and then there are like eight offices

in that suite. Mine was one of them, and the director of speech writing

also had one of them.

Q One thing we've learned in some of the other interviews is

that various bureaus, for example, the one that we're most interested

in here is the NEA bureau. Within that bureau and others, there are

people that specialize in communications.

A Yeah.

Q What was your -- what was the relationship generally,

between the speech writing department and those communications

departments within the individual bureaus?

A It was small. I can't think now of who those people were

in any -- I do know that there are -- you're right, that there are

communication staff sort of scattered around the department.

Q Uh-huh.

A There are also other speech writers. Some people have

speech writers. I don't even know who -- I don't know who they are.

Q So to the extent that you mentioned earlier that with regard

to certain speeches you might talk to the folks in that particular area,

I think you used China as an example, when you met with the people in

that area of the world, were you talking to the communications people

or more the, I don't know, policy, subject matter experts within that

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department?

A Policy. I can't remember ever meeting with a communication

staffer. It was almost always like the assistant secretary or the

deputy assistant secretary, so it was the front office staff. Now,

having said that, I certainly attended meetings in which there were

like a bunch of people from that bureau, and I wouldn't know necessarily

who all of them where. We might meet around a table like this and very

quickly introduce ourselves, and then I would say, what do you all

think?

Q Do you recall any instances where the people from the

communications departments within those other bureaus were involved

in the editing process of any speech that your shop had drafted?

A I don't remember many examples of that. There was a woman

in the EURB, the European and Eurasian bureau who was a talented writer,

and I think, I think wrote speeches for the assistant secretary, and

he had, I think, at one point cc'd her to ask her to weigh in on edits.

I remember this because they were very good, and there aren't a lot

of woman speech writers, so I noticed this.

Apart from that, I have no memory of a communication staffer

editing.

Q Okay. So it sounds like that was an exception rather than

the normal process?

A I believe so, yes.

Q Let's talk a little bit about the relationship between

speech writing -- before I get to that, just for the record, Heather

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Sawyer from the minority staff has joined us.

Let's talk about the relationship between the speech writing

department and the State Department's press office, which at the time,

I believe, was headed up by Victoria Nuland. Is that correct?

A Uh-huh. She was our spokeswoman. I'm so bad with titles.

I have no idea if she ran the office, but I trust that you know.

Q Let's not assume that.

A I know she was behind the podium every day.

Q Okay. So --

Mr. Su. Well, let's define time period, how about that? Is

that --

Ms. . Oh, that's a good point. When are you talking

about?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q All these questions just relate to the time period you were

at the State Department.

A Okay. Well, there were several people during that time who

were spokesperson.

Q Okay. Let's start with the structure of that department

and identify the --

A Yeah.

Q -- positions first. We've identified the spokesperson,

Victoria Nuland held that at some point in time.

A Right.

Q Who else was in that department?

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A Boy, you're really exposing my ignorance here. I genuinely

don't know a lot of -- I can't think of a lot of people that I knew

in that department.

Q Would you know them by title or position?

A Maybe. No, I mean, I --

Q Okay.

A -- truly -- my mind is blank thinking of anyone in public

relations, except Victoria.

Q Okay. Why don't you describe in general the interaction

between State -- I mean, the speech writing shop and Victoria

Nuland's --

A Right.

Q -- department?

A Well, Victoria herself was on a lot of the -- often was on

the distribution list for speeches. She is a very beautiful writer

herself, so she would often offer edits, and I often really admired

them and took them, so she's someone that I knew well and worked with

often. She also traveled with us.

Apart from her, I can't think of anybody in the public relations

or public affairs bureau that I worked with.

Q Would it have been typical for Victoria Nuland to sit down

with your group in one of these pre-meetings that you talked about?

A No.

Q So it sounds like she would have come into the process, if

at all, after something had been drafted and then it was being

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circulated for comment and edit?

A That's right. That is the process that I recall, yeah,

generally.

Q Tell us more about who is in your department. We know about

and --

A .

Q -- , thank you. Who else was in the department

during that period from March 2009 to February 2013?

A Well, there were a number of people. This is speech writing

specifically that you're talking about?

Q Speech writing department, yes.

A People came in and out, as you can imagine, during that time,

so how would you like me to --

Q Let's talk start with how many permanent slots are there

in that department?

A That's a good question. I think -- well, there was a

director who at one point was and one point was . There was

me, there was another permanent spot, which was filled for a time by

a guy named .

Mr. Su. You are going to want to spell that for her.

A is his first name, which is , and his

last name is . Then there is another permanent spot,

which is somebody who writes both for the secretary and for the deputy

secretaries, so that person has a multiple roles. We had a staff

assistant, and then there were few other people who wrote with us who

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I believe technically were seated -- belong to different bureaus but

who were sort of on loan to us. There was one woman who had a

presidential management fellowship.

Q Hold that thought.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q All right. Do you remember where you were?

A Yeah. We were talking about the people that work with us.

So I think there were about four permanent speech slots. We had a staff

assistant as well that might have also been a fifth slot.

Then there were a few other people who wrote with us who I think

technically belong to different bureaus who I don't think actually

occupies our slots but who were effectively on our staff who wrote,

who attended our meetings.

Q Do you recall anybody from the NEA bureau being in one of

those slots?

A No.

Q How were those bureaus identified; do you recall?

A Well, in the case of one person, she was a presidential

management fellow who was in a bureau where she wasn't really -- she

didn't have that much to do, and she had an interest in speech writing,

so she sort of helped out from time to time, and then it was clear that

she was very talented, so her bureau was willing to lend her to us,

so it really was the person, not the bureau, if that makes sense.

Q It does.

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A That's the one person that I could think of actually.

Q At one point I think you mentioned that some people write

speeches for the secretary, some people write speeches for the

assistant secretary. Were there clear lines of demarcation or were

assignments done more on an ad hoc basis?

A Well, for that one person who wrote for the deputy, the

secretary and the two deputy secretaries of State, he was the only

person who had that responsibility and no one else wrote for the

deputies.

The rest of us all worked for the Secretary, and it was pretty

ad hoc. It was basically who is next available got the next speech.

Q Now, one thing we've seen is on occasion, Jake Sullivan

would put pen to paper and draft a statement that the Secretary would

give or maybe even a speech. How were those decisions made? And by

that I mean, the decision to have somebody in the speech writing

department write the speech versus having somebody outside that

department, like Jake Sullivan, weigh in and do something?

A That's a good question. I don't remember incidents of that

happening, although it makes sense that they would, but I can't, I don't

remember that happening, so I don't know how to answer that question.

Q Okay. That's fair. I have in mind one statement that

we'll get to later on, we know that Jake Sullivan wrote or at least

took part in writing. It was a short, not what I would describe as

a speech. I mean, is it fair to say that the speech department wrote

all the speeches and Jake Sullivan or others may have come in to write

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statements, or did the speech writing department write statements as

well? I mean, were the lines that clear or am I just reading too much

into it?

A The lines were not that clear. Over the course of 4 years,

an enormous amount of writing was produced in the form of speeches or

occasionally written statements. We usually, for the most part,

usually didn't write written statements. It was usually produced

elsewhere. Sometimes we would give them a read or an edit or a polish.

But it's hard to state authoritatively exactly where every product

originated, if that makes sense.

So over the course of those 4 years, there was just so much that

I'm sure that if I said this is how it always worked, there would be

a counterexample.

Q Okay. So it sounds like the speech writing department did

focus on speeches, and statements, not so much. Do you know why that

is or was?

A Well, it's a volume issue. She gave a lot of speeches. She

gave a lot of speeches. Every Secretary of State gives a lot of

speeches, but she gave more than most or than previous secretaries had

given, so we had a lot of work to do.

Q Okay. With regard to the statements that were prepared,

were those sent to your department for vetting or were those vetted

outside the speech department? By vetting I mean reviewed, edited,

that kind of thing?

A That's another good question that I don't really know the

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answer to that.

Q What do you recall personally? Do you ever recall seeing

a statement come to you that you were asked to review and edit?

A I'm sure that happened, probably several times. I don't

remember off the top of my head a specific statement, but I'm positive

they exist. I don't know how speeches that I wasn't cc'd on or asked

to review -- I mean, pardon me, statements. I don't know how those

statements were vetted. You know, I would only know if they -- if I

were on the email chain, I would be a part of that moment, but otherwise,

I don't know how they were handled, if that makes sense.

Q Uh-huh.

A So I'd say as a -- I don't know if this is a hypothetical.

I don't know if that's the right word, but like a general matter, if

occasionally there was a statement that, you know, perhaps it borrowed

language from a speech I had recently written, perhaps it was on an

issue area where I had written a number of speeches on that area, I

might be asked to take a quick look at this before we send it out, and

I would.

Q All right. One thing that we've noticed is, on occasion,

something being drafted, the State Department will be sent to somebody

in the White House for review. For example, we've seen that with Ben

Rhodes getting involved in the process. Can you shed any light on the

relationship between, you know, the written product coming out of the

State Department and the White House's review of that?

A I can remember off the top of my head one example of that.

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I wrote a speech about energy diplomacy, energy security, and then at

some point I sent it to Ben to have him take a look at it knowing that

it was one of the first times she'd ever spoken on this topic. It was

a fairly new bureau. We had created it. It was the first time

that -- it was the first major policy statement about this issue area,

and Ben wrote back to say something like looks good.

Q Okay.

A So it was a very light touch.

Q Okay. How did you know to send it to Ben Rhodes?

A Jake Sullivan asked me to send it to Ben Rhodes.

Q Did he give you an explanation for why Ben Rhodes was coming

into the process?

A I don't believe he did so, no. I don't remember exactly,

but no, I don't think so.

Q And going forward, did you have an understanding what if

any role Ben Rhodes would play in reviewing speeches that you were

drafting, for example?

A I don't know that I had an -- I don't really know how to

describe it. There wasn't like a set of rules where it was like if

you write a speech like this --

Q Uh-huh.

A -- please send it to Ben. That did not exist. It was more

that in this one scenario, this one case that I do remember, it was

that Jake said can you send it to Ben to make sure he sees this, or

something like that, and I did, and that was kind of it. So you know,

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that's how that incident worked. That's how that worked that time.

Q Do you recall how many discussions with your colleagues in

the speech writing department about either Ben Rhodes reviewing their

work or anybody else in the White House reviewing their work?

A I don't remember a conversation like that, no.

Q All right. Let's move to the night of the attack,

September 11. Obviously, we are going to focus a little bit on that.

Let's start out with the basics. Were you at the office that day?

A I was.

Q And at any point during that day, did you become aware of

the protests that were going on in Cairo?

A I did. I did, at some point, come to know that, yeah.

Q Do you recall how you became aware of it?

A I do not.

Q So it could have been you were following a twitter feed,

it could have been a conversation with one of your colleagues, at this

point you don't know one way or the other?

A I just don't remember.

Q That's fine. We know it was awhile ago. What if anything

do you recall about Cairo when you first heard about it?

A I remember being upset. I had gone to Cairo not that long

before then, I think. Gosh, I should have that answer for you, I'm

sorry. But at some point in the months preceding that, I had taken

a trip to Cairo with the Secretary, so I remember thinking I know exactly

where this is happening. I've been to that embassy. And at some point

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I believe during that, those protests -- I mean, I think they crossed

the -- the protestors got over a wall. I think they pulled down our

flag. That was extremely distressing.

Q Do you remember how you were getting any of the information

you had regarding Cairo?

A Well, I don't remember exactly if I had. I mean, what I

would -- almost certainly I was glued to the television. I would have

had, you know, the various newspaper and TV sites up on my computer.

We also, likely, because it was a -- again, this is -- I'm sorry that

I don't remember this exactly, but we usually get, when there

is -- certainly when there is like an attack on an American facility,

I think we would likely to have gotten an alert from the Op Center at

the State Department, so I would have been hearing from them, too,

probably.

Q We have seen some emails that come from Ops Alert at maybe

State.gov, I don't remember. What's your understanding of who

receives those Ops Alerts?

A I don't know the answer to that. I never signed up for them

or anything like that, but I receive them, so I don't know if that means

that everyone at the State Department gets them or if certain staffs

do. I don't know, but I know that I did.

Q What was your understanding of where they were coming from?

A Well, there is an Ops Center, it's an office not far from

our offices at the State Department, and I've seen in them once. It's

like a 24-hour center that's pretty high-tech, and they follow events

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around the world at all times, so I think they all come from that office.

Q At this point in time, September 11, 2012, was

the head of the speech writing department?

A He was.

Q He had taken over at that point. All right. Did you have

any conversations within the speech writing department

about -- professional conversations about how the speech writing

department would fit into any messaging about what was going on in

Cairo?

A I don't remember a conversation like that.

Q Do you recall any meetings with your colleagues about what

was going on in Cairo?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall what time you left the office that night?

A I don't know that either. I'm sorry.

Q That's okay.

A So it's going to be -- sadly, that's going to be my answer

for a lot, for what happened that day. I just don't remember a lot

of what happened that day.

Q Can you say whether or not it was a normal day, you left

at 6:00, 7:00, or whether you stayed later?

A It probably was a normal day. You know, I will say that

as a speech writer, there are times when I'm up writing many days in

a row, and then if it's -- if I don't have an active assignment, we'll

leave early, or I might be staying late in order to get -- my hours

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25

were extremely erratic, so it's hard to -- when you say like a normal

day, there are actually -- there kind of weren't a lot of normal days

for me in terms of hours at the office.

Q All right. So let's move ahead a little bit in the day.

At some point at around 3:40 Easterntime, that's when the attacks in

Benghazi occurred. Do you recall hearing about those attacks?

A I know that I did at some point hear that something terrible

is happening in Benghazi. I don't remember when. 3:40, that's

interesting. I wouldn't have been able to name that time.

Q Do you remember how you learned of the attacks?

A Again, I do not.

Q Do you recall what you learned about the attacks?

A No. I know that -- I mean, I know at some point I learned

that something was happening, and I don't remember how it was described.

I don't know.

Q What's your best recollection of what you heard, first off,

about what was happening in Benghazi?

A Right. Well, I really don't know. I don't know. I don't

know how it was originally described, or I don't know where I heard

about it. I don't know. I think that if I had to make my best

recollection, is that the phrase?

Q That's all we want is your best recollection.

A It's probably that I heard that it was a protest just like

what was -- similar to what was happening that day in Cairo, but I'm

sorry, I don't have a real recollection of this.

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26

Q Okay. So if your best recollection is that you heard it

was a protest, I mean, what's your best recollection of where you got

that information?

A Well, probably a combination of an Ops Alert, which I'm

just -- again, I don't remember receiving an Ops Alert about Benghazi,

but that is what they do. That's exactly what they do. They send out

alerts when something like Benghazi happens, so I probably was getting

alerts from them.

And then if I recall, there was a great deal of press reporting

about what was happening in Egypt that day, and in time ago, what was

happening in Benghazi that day, so probably a combination of that.

Q Okay. So a combination of information from the Ops Alerts

and then possibly what was being reported in the open media?

A Right.

Q Okay. With regard to what was being reported in the open

media, I mean, would you have taken that as gospel, or how would you

have treated that information?

A No, certainly not. I wouldn't take any press report as

gospel, you know, ever.

Q As you sit here today, do you recall participating in any

briefings that night about what was occurring in Benghazi?

A No, I did not.

Q There's some evidence that there was a SVTCS, a secure video

teleconference, that night at 7:30 p.m. Did you take part in that?

A I did not.

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27

Q Were you aware of it?

A I was not.

Q Until now?

A Until hearing about it now.

Q Is that something that Mr. would have taken part in,

to your knowledge?

A I don't know. I don't know.

Q Have you spoken to Mr. about anything that occurred

that night since you left the State Department?

A I have not.

Q Have you spoken to anybody about what occurred that night,

other than your attorney?

A That's a good question. I can't think of an example with

me talking to anybody about what happened that night. I talked to my

family, but that was a really terrible night for a lot of us, and it's

really -- it was certainly the worst day I ever had at the State

Department. So though I can't remember a specific conversation about

it, I don't want to foreclose the possibility that I've spoken about

it with friends or colleagues.

Q Why don't you walk us through the events that night as best

you can remember them. Why don't we start with, you know, around 3:40,

which is when the attack occurred in Benghazi, and just as best you

can, take us through what you did that night?

A Well, where my memory really kicks in is quite a bit later

in the day, which is after I was home, it was in the evening, I was

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28

ready to start winding down, and I got a call from my colleague

who said that -- something like it looks like our facility

in Benghazi has been attacked, some Americans might be dead, we're

afraid that the Ambassador, that Chris might be dead, and we are going

to have to put our heads together and write something for the Secretary

because she's going to want to talk about this in the morning.

Q Did you get a sense that Mr. was coming up with

this idea on his own, or was this coming from Mr. ?

A No, I did not. I don't think he was coming up with this

on his own. I actually don't know who would have been the person to

give him the heads up that this was happening. I don't know.

Q So what did you say to him, as best you can recall, in that

conversation?

A Well, we came up with a plan for how to get this done.

. I lived in Adams Morgan. I had been to his house

quite a bit. We're friends. He has a comfortable home, so we agreed

that I would grab my computer and I would come up to his house and we

would sit together and try to write something good under tough

circumstances.

Q How long was the phone call?

A Short. Basically as long as what just happened here.

Q Okay. So you hung up the phone, you packed up your stuff,

and you went to his house.

A I did.

Q Shortly after the call.

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29

A That's right.

Q Can you remember anything about what type of night that was?

A Just a straight up guess, an uninformed guess, 10:00, 10:30,

in the evening. It was not early. It was late, at a point where I

would normally be trying to get to sleep.

Q How late were you at Mr. house that night?

A So soon after that, so --

Mr. Su. I think he's asking you -- I think Craig is asking you

when you left, right?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Yes. How late were you there?

A Well, that's a good question. I've seen an email that I

wrote that had a time stamp like 3:30 in the morning, so certainly until

then, maybe a little bit after that, 3:30, 4:00, something like that.

Q Was anybody else there besides you and Mr. ?

A Yes, one of our other colleagues, a guy named .

Q Could you spell that for us, please.

A Yes, it's . Everyone's named in my life, , ,

. His last name is , .

Q ?

A , like , exactly, and he -- I called him after

called me, and he came and picked me up, and the two of us

drove up to .

Q And who is he, Mr. ?

A He is another speech writer with us, so the three of us were

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30

colleagues.

Q At that point, I think you said you took your laptop. Did

Mr. and Mr. both have their laptops as well?

A That's a good question. I think did, it was

his home, so I think his laptop was there. I don't know if

brought his laptop.

Q Did you have anything that gave you access to your work

email?

A Yes. We had fobs that we used to sign into our work email

from when we were not on from outside the building.

Q Do you recall doing that that night?

A I do not.

Q So we've got three people in the room, probably three

laptops, at least one. What other information did you collect before

you went over to Mr. house?

A I don't remember collecting any.

Q What information did he have about the attacks when you got

there, if any?

A I don't remember specifics. I do remember that we didn't

know a lot.

Q Let's just take it step by step. You three got there. Did

you have a kind of a conversation to get your bearings and decide who

was going to do what at the outset? How did the evening begin?

A That's another great question that I don't have a great

answer to, I'm sorry. You know, there's not like a set of steps that

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31

you follow when you sit down to write a speech, no matter what, but

certainly in a situation that just wasn't that --

Q Let me give you an example of what I'm thinking about.

A Please.

Q Potential one way to divvy up the labor is they could have

said, , you're going to be writing the speech, Mr. , you're

going to be collecting the information that goes into it, and Mr.

, you're going to be ordering the pizza, whatever it turns out

to be. I mean, did you have that kind of conversation where you're

dividing up the labor at the outset, and what do you recall about that

conversation?

A I don't think we did do that. I think we definitely -- part

of the conversation that started then but really did last the whole

time was, you know, what can we actually give her, what should she say.

Q Did you have any direction on what the -- first of all, were

you just writing a speech in the abstract, or was this a speech that

was intended for a specific event or a specific purpose?

A Right. Well, you know, so this now, at this point was like

3-and-a-half years into our time together writing for her, and then

of three of us, several of us had been writing together. I mean, we

now all had a few years, at least, under our belts.

So I'd say that we all knew, because of our previous months or

years of experience, never quite in this situation but in similar sort

of, you know, you got to write something quickly because of the

fast-moving events somewhere in the world and she needs to say something

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32

about it.

We knew basically a few things that we wanted to accomplish. If

indeed some people had died, we knew that we wanted to give her some

material that she could say about them, so she could say gracious things

about them, which we knew she would have wanted to do. We knew that

we would want to give her some sort of a -- something that she could

say that would summarize what had happened, anticipating that, you

know, if Americans were waking up and turning on their TV in the morning

and their Secretary of State was standing there, that they would -- one

of the questions on their mind would be what, what happened. We wanted

to be able to give her some language that would at least begin to answer

that.

And then, you know, we knew that, as we often do in response to

a violent, you know, distressing worldly appalling moment, we knew that

she would want to say something that reiterated our values, our purpose,

our, you know, continuing on our mission, how we won't be swayed by

this. So there were sort of, I guess, units, if that makes sense, of

what we knew this document, this speech would need to cover.

We had a loose idea of how it would be delivered, which is that

we knew that some time in the morning, so not too late in the day, she

would want to go on camera, probably in the blue room at the State

Department which is where she often does statements. And we knew it

should be pretty short. I don't know if that's helpful, but that's

sort of --

Q No, no, it's very helpful. Thank you. So you knew

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33

that -- did you know she planned to go on camera the next morning, or

was that just something that you expect that she would do?

A I don't know the answer to that. I'm not sure if we knew

that for sure or if we assumed that she would want to.

Q Where was Mr. in this process that night?

A He really wasn't a part of this process that night. I'm

not -- I don't know if he knew that we were gathering like that. He

may have. I wasn't in contact with him that day -- that night.

Q With regard to the, to use your term, the unit of the speech

that explained to the American people what had happened in Benghazi.

How did you all go about collecting the information to answer that

question?

A That is such a great question because so many of the facts

of the matter were like -- were very foggy at that moment. Often, in

a circumstance like that, we would be getting the information from our

people on the ground, but obviously, in this circumstance, it was

impossible to get information from them because they were under attack.

So we wanted to write something that was, you know, safe, that

we could have confidence in without going too far into any details that

would turn out to be -- perhaps that would turn out to be wrong. We

didn't want, as ever, never want to give her something that's wrong.

So I looked at the final text since then, and I think, if I recall,

it's pretty -- it's actually fairly generic, which is just what happens

in a circumstance like this. There's just not a lot that we could

assert with total certainty. So we stuck with what we felt like we

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34

could safely assert, that our compound was attacked by, I think we

described them as heavily armed militants, which I believe -- I mean,

that is like a fairly safe phrase, you know.

They were clearly armed, and they were -- anyone who attacks an

American facility is a militant, so that was sort of how we settled

on that. Just what can we have confidence in.

Q And we'll get into that statement in more detail later. So

is it fair to say that you were not relying on anything that was being

reported in the open source media?

A Well, I would say relying -- I don't think -- no. We were

not relying on anything reported in the open source media, by which

I mean we wouldn't see something reported in CNN or New York Times and

say great, and cut and paste and put it in a document for her, absolutely

not. Having said that, we were certainly following what was being

reported in the open source media.

Q Sorry. Did you finish your answer?

A No, because --

Q Go on.

A Because you know, that was helpful.

Q Okay. Did you speak to anybody in the Ops Center that night

about what was going on, because my understanding is that there were

communications going back and forth between the United States and

Benghazi, United States and Tripoli?

A Yeah.

Q Did you speak to anybody either in the DS command center

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35

to the Ops Center that night?

A No.

Q Did you speak to anybody -- and this is again about what

happened in Benghazi. Did you speak to anybody in the NEA bureau about

what had happened in the attacks?

A I don't recall speaking to anyone in the NEA bureau.

Q Is that something you would have done? I mean, you talked

earlier about the process. If you're writing a speech about China,

you go to --

A Right.

Q -- the China experts and ask them. I mean, did that happen

that night with regard to Libya?

A No, I don't think so. I don't recall any conversation with

anyone from -- no.

Q All right. So let's just try to circumscribe the sources

of information you three had that night. Obviously you had access to

your State Department email?

A Right.

Q So whatever was in those emails is, you know, that was in

those emails. We talked about the open source reporting. Were there

any individuals that you spoke to either within the State Department

or outside the State Department about what had occurred?

A So just putting it -- to add one thing. In terms of State

Department emails, I don't recall what emails I received that night.

Hopefully there is a record of them. But my guess is that we probably

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36

were getting some information from people who were just sending us

things, either us specifically, the speech writers, or that perhaps

we were on a distribution list, I don't know. But I wouldn't be

surprised if it turned out that, you know, in addition to an Ops Alert,

perhaps we got some sort of an update maybe from NEA, maybe from -- I

don't know. I don't know who else.

Q I mean, at this point --

A I don't want to foreclose the possibility that there was

more information coming at us.

Q Right.

A If that makes sense.

Q The record of what emails you received is the record,

whatever that is?

A Right.

Q Just sitting here today, you can't recall any specifics?

A Not a one.

Q With regard to speaking to anybody, do you recall speaking

to anybody that night?

A Jake Sullivan is probably -- that's the only person I can

think of, outside of that room.

Q When you had your conversation -- or let me ask you. Was

it one conversation or multiple?

A Well, he joined us. I don't know if we spoke on the phone

before he joined us.

Q He joined you in person?

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37

A Yes. He came to office -- apartment.

Q Apartment. At what point in the evening did Mr. Sullivan

show up; do you recall?

A It was sometime after we got there, so my guess it was after

midnight.

Q Was he alone?

A Yes.

Q What if anything did he bring with him?

A I don't think he brought anything.

Q No laptop, no briefcase, no files, no nothing?

A No. His Blackberry.

Q How long was he there, if you recall?

A He stayed with us until we were finished, so we all left

together, whenever that was.

Q And prior to him showing up, I assume you knew he was coming?

A I probably did know that he was coming. I don't remember

being surprised when he showed up.

Q All right. So I'm just trying to understand. If Mr.

, the head of that department wasn't -- seems that maybe he wasn't

involved, maybe he didn't even know about it, the three of you got

together and decided to meet. Was that at Mr. Sullivan's suggestion

or did you reach out to him and invite him to the --

A Right.

Q -- working group?

A So I don't remember the exact chain of events here. You

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38

know, I don't remember exactly how that happened. I don't know

why -- who called originally and said something's

happening, we think it could be very bad, we think Chris could be dead,

you guys should write something.

I'm not sure who made that call to him. I'm not sure when -- if

I told Jake at some point separately, hey, I'm on my way to .

I may have. Jake was our boss. We had worked together very, very

closely for many years, for several years at this point, so it would

have certainly been natural to say we're working on this, let us know

if you need anything, or whatever, just to keep him in the loop as to

the fact that someone was taking care of this, you know, certainly

compared to everything else that was happening that night, this

comparatively very small piece of what was happening, but you know,

something that needed to get done. Having said all that, I don't

remember for sure.

Mr. Su. So I am going to give you this advice, which is what Craig

wants to know is what your recollection is.

Ms. . Right.

Mr. Su. He understands that you are not -- by saying that you

do not recall a specific event, that you're not necessarily foreclosing

other possibilities, so --

Ms. . Right.

Mr. Su. So I'll deign to speak for Craig. He's just asking for

your recollection. So don't feel like, if you cannot recall a

particular event, that what he's going to take from that, well, then

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39

is foreclosing any other possibility.

Ms. . Right.

Mr. Su. I don't think he's taking that position. He just wants

to know what you specifically recall.

Mr. Missakian. I couldn't have said it better myself. That's

fair.

Ms. . Thank you. Thank you.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Okay. So let's go back to Mr. Sullivan a little bit and

finish off with him. Now, my understanding is that the State

Department issued a statement at around 10 o'clock the night of the

attacks, and I'm sure you're aware of that statement as you sit here

today, but what I'm asking you is the night of the 11th when you were

at Mr. apartment, were you aware that that statement had

gone out?

A I don't remember.

Q Do you recall, when Mr. Sullivan got there, he had a copy

of that statement? In other words, I mean, think of it in this context.

He walks in, this is what we put out, let's get to work on the longer

piece. Do you remember anything like that?

A I don't.

Q Okay. Well, as best you can recall, just take us through

the evening before Mr. Sullivan got there, and then we'll go into after

he got there?

A Well, there's not that much of a difference between before

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40

and after. I mean, part of my answer is that, you know, writing a

speech, I mean, I'm like pulling back the curtain on how to write a

speech. It's like a very haphazard situation. There's no clear

process.

We all started thinking out loud, you know, this would be a nice

phrase, maybe she should say this. I can write a little bit about

Chris. Let's find out a little bit more about the other guys if we

can. Do we know who they are. Has it been confirmed. So it's just

like a narrative conversational process.

I don't think that changed much once Jake got there. He certainly

would have known more than we did about what was happening just by the

nature of his work, but we just kind of kept that process going until

there is a page-and-a-half written.

Q I'm sure you're aware that one of the possible motivations

of what had occurred in Cairo was the video that was put out on YouTube.

Now, prior to going to Mr. apartment, do you recall being

aware of that video?

A Yes.

Q How did you become aware of it?

A I don't remember.

Q What do you recall about the video? Again, this is back

then.

A Right.

Q Not now.

A Well, I remember that the Egyptian television, I believe,

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41

played it or played segments of it on the national Egyptian TV. I

believe that was before the protest. I believe that is what triggered

the protest. I haven't seen the video. My understanding of what it

contains is some pretty ugly depictions of the Prophet Muhammad in

pretty ugly situations.

Q Do you recall having any information that connected the

video to what occurred in Benghazi prior to getting to Mr.

apartment?

A I do not.

Q Now, was there a draft of the speech that would be done prior

to Mr. Sullivan getting there that night?

A No. Well, actually I don't really remember but almost

certainly not because I think it took as long as it took. I think it

took awhile.

Q Sorry.

A No, of course.

Q I've got to try harder. Do you remember who physically

typed the speech that you three were working on, you four were working

on eventually?

A I think we shared that duty. I know I certainly typed for

awhile. I recall, for example, at one point saying maybe

we should say something about, you know, our strength in the face of

situations like this. He was sort of musing out loud, and I remember

being like write it, don't just narrate it.

Q What I'm trying to get at, and I probably didn't ask it in

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42

the best way, is would there be a way for us as investigators to go

back and kind of piece together the chronology of drafts that were done

that night by you four?

A I don't know. I think that would be hard. I think it was

just one document that we just worked on exclusively. I'm not really

sure how one kind of forensically takes that kind of a draft apart,

so I'm not really sure what you could do with that.

Q So your best recollection is there was one laptop and maybe

you all traded off typing on it?

A That is my best recollection, yeah.

Q As you sit here today, is there anything about the process

that you recall that night involving anything specific that was being

said about what occurred in Benghazi, anything that stands out in your

mind now?

A I don't remember if it happened while we were there or

afterward, but I do remember there was a video taken by someone in the

crowd that night that showed the Ambassador's body being taken to the

hospital. It was incredibly upsetting, so I will never forget that.

I think we saw that while we were all still together. It may have

been --

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43

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q On the news?

A No. It was someone had -- I mean, someone in the crowd had

taken it and put it up, I think, on Twitter. Maybe I saw it on Facebook.

It was on social media, and it was heartbreaking.

Q And do you recall any discussions on the video and how to

treat that video in the speech that you were preparing?

A We definitely discussed it. I don't remember specifically

what we said. I think whatever -- I'm sorry that I can't recite or

don't quite remember exactly how we treated it in that first draft.

But that -- how we treated it in that first draft would have been,

obviously, the result of whatever conversation we had about it.

Q Right. As you sit here today, do you recall anything

generally about the conversation specific to the video that night?

A No. Only that we thought it belonged in the statement.

Q Do you recall why you thought it belonged in the statement?

A Well --

Q When I say you, I don't mean you necessary. I mean you,

the group?

A That's a good clarification because I was just about to say

I can only tell you why I remember thinking, yeah, that should be in

the statement.

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44

Q Okay.

A Which is that I believed that it played a role in sparking

the events of that night. And that any sort of conversation about what

had happened, and what has to happen now would have to be taken into

account in some way.

Q Okay, just so I understand, it was your view that night that

the video should be referred to in the statement because in your mind,

the video had played some role in the attack in Benghazi?

A Yeah, in sparking them or triggering them or motivating some

of the people that night. Yeah, yes.

Q And so you were kind of going back to your point about one

of the goals for this speech was to explain to the American people what

had happened. For that reason you wanted to refer to the video. Is

that fair?

A Yeah. I would say that's fair.

Q And as best you can, could you just tell us what you based

that conclusion on, or that opinion that the video somehow sparked what

occurred in Benghazi?

A Well, at the time it seems like the commonsense conclusion.

You know, there was this incident happening in the same -- not far from

Benghazi, just a few countries to the -- well, shoot, one country to

the east. God, I'm failing on the geography -- a nearby country,

Cairo, Egypt, on the same day there was this protest that seemed -- that

was similarly targeting an American facility, that similarly had our

facility breached in this alarming way. And that seemed to be very

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45

clearly connected to this video since, again, I believe that not long

before that protest broke out, the video had been broadcast on Egyptian

news. So, you know, I was learning about what was happening in Egypt,

and oh, look, the same day, something is happening at an American

facility not far from there.

So I drew the conclusion that it was probably for the same reason.

And I don't know if it was September 11, or September 10, or

September 13. I'm not sure, but that week saw protests, incidents at

American facilities in a lot of places, in Hong Kong, in Australia,

in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, Dhaka, and just in tons of places, and

in Europe -- American schools in Europe, there was a Tunisian school

that was bombed, an American school in Tunis.

And many of those protests, were reported for what that's worth,

were reported as being connected to the video, so I guess like the

gestalt of these incidents seemed to involve the video. So I drew the

conclusion, I guess, that what had happened in Benghazi was like that,

was like those events.

Q Yeah, I understand. I understand, but what I really want

to focus on, again, the circumscribing information you had had that

night. Some of the protests you just referred to occurred after

September 11 --

A That's right.

Q -- as you said. So at that point you have got the protest

in Cairo, and nothing else, no other protest. So were there any other

facts, other than the Benghazi attack followed the protest in Cairo,

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46

that led you to that conclusion that the video sparked the Benghazi

attacks that night?

A I don't recall anything else. I don't recall any other.

Q That's fine. That's fine.

A Yeah.

Q Do you recall anything that anybody else said in the room

about the connection between the video and the Benghazi attacks that

night?

A I do not.

Q Can you recall anything that anyone else said on the subject

of the video, generally, that night?

A Well, I recall when we got to the section of the remarks

where we wanted to reference and do, you know, deal with and quickly

do away with the video, in the course of the remarks when she said

that -- I don't remember exactly how it went, but she refers to them

in the context of decrying people killing in the name of religion.

Q We will get to that. You don't have to guess about the --

A Great.

Q We will get to that.

A I remember when we got to that part and we thought we should

say something about this. You know, we talked about -- I wouldn't be

able to -- I don't remember exactly how that conversation went, but

that's a tricky topic to try to handle in a few sentences, so --

Q Why do you consider it a tricky topic?

A Well, it's a complicated -- you know, religion, violence

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motivated by religion, gosh, that's hard. So figuring out a way to

have her talk about it in two or three sentences, is -- that's tough.

Q And do you recall that night being aware that a group called

Ansar al-Sharia had taken responsibility for the attacks?

A I do not recall that.

Q Do you recall hearing anything at that point about the fact

that the attacks began at the State Department facility and then

continued at the classified CIA annex? Did ou know that fact?

A I did not.

Q When did you learn that?

A I don't know, but it was after that night. I know because

I remember being -- I remember learning that and going ah, okay, now

I see that. I get it. It wasn't that night. It took a little time

before that became clear to me at least.

Q Do you recall Mr. Sullivan telling the group anything about

what he knew relating to the nature of the attacks, why they occurred,

anything like that that night?

A I don't remember exactly what he said.

Q You are never going to remember exactly.

A Yeah, that I'm not sure.

Q If you remember generally.

A The one thing that I believe we were confident of by the

time that we were asked was that Chris was dead, and that one other

person was dead and we knew who that person was; this guy named Sean

Smith. I'm pretty sure that came from Jake. I don't know where else

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we would have learned that.

Q Okay, all right. I think my first hour is up, so -- see.

We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Missakian. Okay, let's go back on the record. Peter, can

you just confirm on the record that you decided to forego your hour,

and that you are going to reserve questions for the end?

Mr. Kenny. Yes, out of respect for the witness' time and the fact

that we have additional witnesses this afternoon, we will be reserving

our time for a second round.

Mr. Missakian. Okay, thank you.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Ms. , we have talked about the one speech that you

participated in drafting on the night of September 11 going into the

morning of September 12. Were there any other speeches, statements

that you participated in drafting that week.

Mr. Su. Prior or after?

Ms. . Yeah, that's a great question. Prior or after the

attacks?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Oh, okay.

A Prior to the attacks, I'm sure there were.

Q Yes, I'm sure there were. Let's focus on after that one.

A So at some point, I don't know if it was the next day or

the day after, it might have been the next day, President Obama came

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to the State Department to lend his support to everybody. It was,

obviously, a really tough time. And I put together some talking points

for her to use while the two of them were going to be standing together

in the courtyard of the State Department, kind of impromptu talking

to everybody. And as I remember because as I was working on them, I

could hear her already talking, and I realized that some signals got

crossed and I was working on something that was never going to be used

because the event was starting. So that was one thing. And then --

Q You know, before you continue, I think I'm going to make

this a little easier on you. I'm going to mark this document as an

exhibit.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

MY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q It is a compilation of what we believe to be the statements

the Secretary made on the subject of Benghazi --

A Great.

Q -- in the days and weeks after the attack. So it might be

easier for you to look at this specific statement and tell us whether

you participated or not.

A Perfect.

Q So I will mark this document as exhibit 1 to the transcribed

interview of .

Mr. Su. And Craig, would you mind just -- is exhibit 1 a

compilation that you all put together?

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Mr. Missakian. No.

Mr. Su. Okay.

Ms. . Thank you.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q For the record, what we have marked as exhibit 1, is a

multi-paged document. The first page is an email from Jacob Sullivan,

to H dated September 24, 2012. Below that is another email from

, to Jake Sullivan also September 24, 2012. The document

identification number on the first page is SCB0045474 through

SCB0045498.

Mr. Su. So what Mr. Missakian is asking you to do is to review

the statement, and then tell him of days which you recall working on.

Fair?

Mr. Missakian. We will go through them one by one;.

Ms. . Okay.

Mr. Missakian. Make it a little bit easier for you.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q So flip to the first page, sorry, the second page. The

document control number at the bottom is 45475. At the top, there is

a heading: "Statement on the Attack in Benghazi, September 11, 2012."

Okay, if you could just read that and let me know when you're done.

A Okay.

Q Do you recognize that statement?

A I do not really. I'm sure that -- I don't remember reading

this before, but --

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Q And do you recall participating in the drafting of the

statement at the top of the page?

A No.

Q Do you recall discussing the content of that statement with

anybody?

A I do not.

Q All right, let's drop down to the next one on the page the

heading is: "Statement on the Death of American Personnel in Benghazi,

Libya." Below that is the date September 12, 2012. And it goes on

to the next page, the top of the next page. So if you could just read

that, and I will ask you a couple of questions.

A Okay.

Q Do you believe that you participated in drafting this

statement?

A I do not think so.

Q Do you have an understanding of who drafted it?

A I do not.

Q Have you seen this statement before today?

A I don't remember seeing this statement before today.

Q Okay. Let's flip to the next page which has document

control number 45476, beginning about a third of the way down the page

the heading is, "Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in

Benghazi, Libya." And below that the date appears September 12, 2012.

When you have had a chance to review that statement which goes

on for two -- roughly two pages, let me know.

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Go off the record for a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Back on the record.

A Okay.

Q Is this a statement that you took part in drafting with Jake

Sullivan and the other two individuals you have identified?

A It is.

Q And let's focus specifically on paragraph 5 on the second

page, the fifth full paragraph on the second page. The paragraph

begins, "There will be more time later to reflect."

And having read that paragraph, does that jog your memory at all

as to any discussions you had that night between the four of you about

the video?

A Actually, what I'm noticing is that this language tracks

with the language from the statement the day before. Actually, almost

looks like we just cut and pasted and then added a few sentences at

the end of the graph. So I'm concluding from that that we said, let's

use the language that was in the statement earlier when we got to this

section.

Q As your attorney explained, I don't want you to guess about

that.

A Right. Right.

Q There may be a logical inference from what you're seeing, --

A Exactly.

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Q -- but what I really want to know is if just reading that

now and seeing it on paper jogs your memory about any specific or general

discussions you had that night with the other three individuals?

A It really doesn't. No.

Q Now, if, in fact, what happened is what you described, that

it was cut and pasted from the earlier statement, mechanically how would

that have occurred? In other words, would Mr. Sullivan have brought,

you know, a thumb drive that had the statement on it, cut and paste

possibly. How do you think that happened?

Mr. Su. Well, I think the problem with her answering that

question is, as we noted, that was --

Ms. . Yeah.

Mr. Su. You don't have a recollection of that, right?

Mr. Missakian. And if you don't know, that's a fine answer.

Ms. . I don't know.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q So as you sit here today, you have read both statements and

they appear to be the same or similar, but you can't say one way or

another whether or not they were cut and paste -- cut and pasted, I

should say?

A I can't say with certainty, no.

Q Would it be fair to say that if they were, in fact, cut and

pasted, that this is something that Mr. Sullivan would have brought

to the attention of the group because you were not aware of that

statement previously?

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A Right. I don't remember this statement. I don't know if

that day I knew the statement had been put out a few hours earlier.

I don't know. I don't know what Mr. Sullivan would have had to tell

us by way of the put-out statement or if I knew that there had been

a statement. I just don't remember.

Q You can't recall any discussion about a prior statement and

how to use it in this longer speech, anything like that?

A I really don't. I will say that if this had been put out

already, then it was on the -- right.

Mr. Su. Wait for his question.

Ms. . Fair enough.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q I assume you were going to say if this had been put out

already it would have been on the State Department's Web site?

A Exactly.

Q Is that something you would have ordinarily checked on your

own without being prompted by Mr. Sullivan or somebody else to do that?

A Not -- I don't have a regular habit of checking in on the

State Department Web site, but so maybe. Maybe not. I don't know.

Q Anything else in the statement to refresh your memory about

what was discussed that night? And by that night, I mean September 11,

your meeting with the other three individuals?

A Uh-huh. No. Not really. No.

Q Have you had any discussions with anybody since the day of

this speech about its contents, aside from your attorney?

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A Again, I don't remember any conversation I have ever -- I

have had since then about this. This was a really sad and upsetting

night, so I definitely talked to my mom about it. I definitely talked

to my dad about it. But I don't remember any other conversation with

anyone about that evening. And I don't remember any conversation with

anyone about this text, no.

Q Right. We will get to the next statement in a moment, but

flip to the first page again. I just want to ask you a couple of

questions about that. The very first page. The first email from

-- and I don't know how to spell the person's last

name -- pronounce the person's last name.

A .

Q to Jake Sullivan. The subject line is just:

"Benghazi/Protest Statements Attached." And then Mr. Sullivan

appears to be forwarding this compilation to Secretary Clinton a short

time after it was received.

Do you recall being involved in any process by which the

Secretary's statements about Benghazi were collected?

A I do not. I don't remember being a part of that, no.

Q You don't recall ever being approached by Jacob Sullivan

asking you to give us the statements that were put out on Benghazi?

A I don't recall.

Q Do you recall any discussion of that being done and if so,

why?

A I do not.

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Q All right. Let's go back to the statements now. We are

at the page marked at the bottom 45478. About a third of the way down,

the heading is, "Statement on the Deaths of Tyrone S. Woods and Glen

A. Doherty in Benghazi, Libya." The date is September 13, 2012.

Do you recall participating in the drafting of this speech?

Mr. Kenny. And just to clarify, I don't think -- you just

characterized this as a speech.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Well, I was just going to ask you. How would you

characterize this? Is this a speech or a statement? What's the

difference?

A Well, it's titled "statement," so I'm guessing it's a

statement and not a speech. And that actually does have meaning.

Statement is usually written. And a speech is usually delivered

orally.

Q Oh, I see. Okay, fair enough.

A Remarks would also be delivered orally. So, yeah. I do

not think I worked on -- was that your question?

Q Yes, do you recall participating in the drafting of this

statement?

A I do not recall that, no.

Q Having read through it, does anything jog your memory about

anything that may have been discussed about the Benghazi attacks?

A Not really.

Q Do you recall, we know that you took part in the remarks

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on September 12.

A Yes.

Q Do you recall taking part in the drafting of anything else

for the Secretary that week?

A Well, again, I did work on something for when the President

was coming to the State Department.

Q Right. You testified to that.

A That may not have ended up being used.

Q Anything else that you recall?

A She spoke when the coffins were brought back to Andrews Air

Force Base. I was not the principal author on those remarks. That

was . I would have been cc'd on them, and I would have

read them, but I didn't write them.

Q All right. Okay, if we go to the statement on the one that

we just referred to, no recollection of participating in that one?

A No.

Q All right. Let's flip to the next page. The number is

45479. About a third of the way down, and the heading is: "Remarks

at the Opening Plenary of the U.S. Morocco Strategic Dialogue." Dated

September 13, 2012. When you have had a chance to read that, let me

know.

A Okay.

Q Okay. Having read it, do you recall taking part in drafting

it?

A No, I will tell you, I do not know who wrote this. It might

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58

have been me. I don't know. Usually I can tell, but I can't tell if

I wrote this one.

Q Okay. Let's take a look at paragraph 4. It's the

paragraph that begins, "To us, to me personally, this video is

disgusting and reprehensible."

Reading over that paragraph, does that jog your memory with regard

to anything that was said or discussed about the video, why it should

be included in remarks, statements, or speeches, anything like that?

A No.

Q Do you recall having any, just generally speaking, any

discussion about the video with any of your colleagues in the Speech

Writing Department?

Mr. Su. In the week after the attacks?

Mr. Missakian. At any point in time.

Ms. . No.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Let's keep working our way through. Next one appears at

page marked 45482, towards the bottom. The heading is: "Remarks at

Reception Marking Eid ul-Fitr." I don't know if I'm pronouncing that

right?

A I think it is Eid.

Q Eid. Thank you. The date is September 13, 2012.

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. Do you recall participating in drafting of that

statement?

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59

A I do not.

Q Or those remarks, I should say?

A I do not, thanks, though.

Q You can take credit for it if you want.

Now, keep going on the next page, there is a portion that's been

redacted. These are statements by Embassador Aujali. Do you know why

that would be redacted?

A I don't.

Q Now, then Secretary Clinton's name appears, and can you tell

whether these are prepared remarks, or whether or not she is just

speaking? Is it possible to tell? I assume they are prepared remarks,

but I just want to confirm.

A I actually don't think you should assume that.

Q Okay.

A Well, the fact that it's long, perhaps it's prepared. It's

hard to tell. You know, the fact that she speaks and that she passes

it to someone else and then speaks again, makes -- I think it's possible

this was extemporaneous, but I don't know.

Q But you do know you did not participate in drafting it if

they were prepared remarks, or you can't recall?

A I don't believe -- yeah, I don't recall working on them.

Q All right. Let's keep going. Now we are at the page marked

45485. In the middle, the heading appears: "Remarks at the Transfer

of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those Lost in Attacks in Benghazi, Libya."

The date is now September 13, 2012. After you have had a chance to

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review those remarks, let me know.

A Okay.

Q Having read through it, do you believe you took part in

drafting these remarks?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall having any discussions with anybody about the

remarks that Secretary Clinton gave at the return of the remains?

A I remember admiring the line that, "The people of Egypt,

Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia did not trade the tyranny of a dictator for

the tyranny of a mob." I thought that was a good encapsulation of the

situation in the region, and I remember telling that I liked it.

That's basically it.

Q Okay. And now we are on page marked 45487. Towards the

middle of the page the heading is, "Remarks with Mexican Secretary of

Foreign Relations Patricia Espinosa After Their Meeting." The date

is now September 18, 2012. Let me know after you have had a chance

to review those. They go on for a few pages.

A Okay.

Q Do you recall having taken part in drafting any of these

remarks?

A I do not recall.

Q Flip ahead to the page marked 45490. Towards the bottom

two-thirds of the page the heading is, "Remarks with Indonesian Foreign

Minister Raden Mohammad Marty Muliana Natalegawa --" I'm not even

going to try that last one -- "After Their Meeting." The date now is

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September 20, 2012.

A Okay.

Q Okay. Do you recall taking part in drafting any of these

remarks?

A I do not recall.

Q Please flip ahead to page marked at the bottom 45495. At

the top third of the page, the heading is, "Remarks with Pakistani

Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar Before Their Meeting." The date

now is September 21, 2012. If you could read that over and let me know

when you are done.

A Okay.

Q Do you recall taking part in drafting any portion of these

remarks?

A I do not.

Q If you would take a look at paragraph one, two, three, four,

five, it's the paragraph that begins, "Yesterday afternoon when I

briefed the Congress --" do you see that?

A Uh-huh.

Q The second sentence reads as follows: "What happened in

Benghazi was a terrorist attack and we will not rest until we have

tracked down and brought to justice the terrorists who murdered four

Americans."

Now, I have read through the other statements that we went through

and to my reading, this is the first time we see the word "terrorist"

being used in the statements that are part of this compilation, at any

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rate.

Do you recall any discussion about the use of that term in any

statement that the Secretary was making, whether it be remarks, or a

statement, or anything about what occurred in Benghazi?

A I do not.

Q So as you sit here today, you don't recall any discussion

of whether to use that term or not?

A I don't.

Q And the last statement begins on the page marked 45497.

This one, again, beginning about a third down the page, the title is,

"Remarks With Tunisian Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalem Before Their

Meeting." The date now is September 21, 2012. And I'm happy to give

you the spelling of all of these names, obviously.

A Okay.

Q Do you recall taking part in the drafting in any portion

of these remarks?

A I do not.

Q I would like to jump ahead from September 11 to

September 16. This is the Sunday when then Ambassador Rice appeared

on the Sunday talk shows, and I'm sure you are aware of the controversy

that followed in the wake of that.

One, did you see her appearance on any of those talk shows?

A I did not.

Q Have you since read a transcript of any of those

appearances?

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A I don't recall doing that. I don't remember doing that.

Q Okay, do you recall having any discussion with anybody at

any time about Ambassador Rice's appearance on those talk shows and

what she said?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall it being a topic of discussion within the

Speech Writing Department in any way, shape, or form?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall, putting aside her appearance there on the

talk shows, do you recall there being a discussion about what the State

Department was saying about the attacks in Benghazi versus what she

had said on the talk shows?

A Do I recall there being a conversation about any

discrepancy?

Q Well, not necessarily a discrepancy, just comparing the two

in any way?

A I don't recall.

Q So as you sit here today, you can't recall any discussions

about Susan Rice's appearance on the talk show in any way, shape, or

form?

A No.

Q Do you recall having any discussions with anybody about,

you know, the controversy that surrounded the statements she made on

those talk shows?

A I really don't.

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Q Do you recall ever coming to the point in time where your

views about what occurred in Benghazi and the attack changed from what

you -- it sounds like you initially believed?

Mr. Su. In terms of the video?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Sure. We can say tie it to the video. It sounds like you

initially believed that the video sparked what occurred in Benghazi.

Did that opinion ever change?

A It really didn't.

Q So to this day, you are still of the mind the video sparked

what occurred in Benghazi. Is it fair to say?

A Yes, I would say that I continued to believe that the video

played a role in sparking those events.

Q Okay, and you earlier on testified and gave us the basis

for that conclusion. Have you added any additional facts to your

analysis since, you know, September 11 essentially?

A Well, there has been at least one comprehensive review done

by the New York Times about a year after Benghazi about whether the

video played a role and it concluded that it did. So upon reading that,

my initial conclusion seemed to hold.

Q Okay, anything other than what you read in the New York

Times?

A No.

Q Okay. Thank you, I don't have any other questions. So you

guys want to take over?

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Mr. Kenny. Let's just take a quick 5-minute break.

[Recess.]

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So we will go back on the record. The time is now 12:37.

Ms. , on behalf of Ranking Member Cummings, all of the Democratic

Members, I would just like to thank you for appearing here today; take

a just a quick moment to introduce myself. I'm Peter Kenny. I'm

counsel with the committee minority staff. I am joined by our staff

director Susanne Sachsman Grooms. And we just wanted to reiterate at

the outset here how much we appreciate your willingness to come, and

look forward to concluding this as quickly and as comfortable for you

as possible.

I just want to make this process easy, comfortable for you. If

at any point in time you are not clear as to a question that I'm asking

you, please feel free to stop me. I'm happy to either rephrase it so

that you better understand it.

We ended the last round walking through a series of the

Secretary's statements that were made, and I think what would be

helpful, at least from our perspective, would be to take a step back

and talk a little bit about the context in which some of these

statements, some of the remarks were being prepared. We spent a bit

of time speaking specifically about one drafting session, I believe

in Mr. either house or apartment. But I would like to just

maybe ask for your -- ask for you to step back and just kind of describe

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66

for us generally what this period was like for you, how challenging

the circumstances were under which you and some of the other

speechwriters were operating. If you could maybe just start with that

for us.

A You mean when you say "this period," do you mean like this

week, or --

Q Well, start with the days immediately following the attack,

including the night of when you first found the first drafting session

and through just the days into that next week.

A Well, it was an unusual time. I can't think of a period

of time that was like it during my years at the State Department. As

those statements reflect, there was a lot of other business being done

still during that time. And yet, in all of those statements and

remarks, even if they were about a different country, whether it was

with the foreign -- not minister, but the foreign -- the equivalent

of the Foreign Minister of Mexico, or Morocco, or wherever, the events

of Benghazi still clearly loomed large and found their way into those

remarks.

I don't remember a great deal about -- as I have explained earlier,

comments I don't remember a lot about writing any specific remarks

during that time. But there really was just this one thing that I was

thinking about a lot, which, you know, this one -- this one night, this

one incident. That was -- yeah, the very front of mind.

Q And to the extent that you can't remember whether you

participated in an editing session or a drafting session with respect

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67

to a specific statement or a speech, it has been over 3 years since

the attacks and I would just like to ask for your perspective on how

or whether the passage of time has had some sort of effect on your

ability to recall some of those specific instances or moments?

A Yes, certainly. Thank you for asking that, yes,

definitely. I remember actually very little about any specific day,

or week, or set of remarks from that period, or, yeah, from a lot of

my time at the State Department. I don't remember quite -- I don't

remember a lot in terms of specifics or details.

Q And you recall it may have been at the beginning of the last

hour I had written in my notes, you referred to a volume of work that

you and the other speech writers would have prepared for the Secretary,

and as we all know, the Secretary operates in a very public role, so

she would issue, deliver statements or remarks fairly frequently, is

that correct?

A Yes, often multiple times a day.

Q And over the course of your tenure, do you recall about how

many statements, or drafts of remarks or statements you would have

prepared for the Secretary?

A We did an accounting once after just the first year of her

public statements, whether they were short or long, versus Secretary

Rice, and Secretary Powell, who were the two preceding Secretaries of

State, and she was almost double their volume. So at that point,

I -- I'm sorry that I don't remember the numbers, but it was quite large.

So over the 4 years that I was there, I certainly -- I wrote hundreds

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68

of things. I may have crossed over into a thousand or more. I wrote

a lot.

Q And sitting here today, if I were to show you a final version

of one of those remarks, or those statements, would you be able to recall

for us specific edits that perhaps you may have made to those?

A Almost certainly not. I will go further and say that if

my name weren't on the top of the draft, for most of them I wouldn't

know if I had been the one to actually write the first draft.

Q There was a discussion in the last hour about your belief

of whether the video had played a role in the unrest in the region,

to include the attacks in Benghazi. I would just like to ask, you know,

there was quite a bit of focus on the video. I'd like to also ask your

belief at the time to the best you can recall about whether you

understood there had been a protest that took place at the Special

Mission before the attacks commenced?

A That is my understanding. I'm not able to tell you where

I got that understanding, but that is my understanding of what happened

there, yes.

Q Okay. Were you aware of the initial assessment that the

intelligence community had made regarding what had happened in

Benghazi; that there had, in fact, been a protest before the attacks?

A I'm now aware of that. I don't know where I learned that.

I don't know if I knew that at the time.

Q Okay. And if somebody had told you that the intelligence

community had assessed that, would it have been appropriate for you

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to second guess an assessment by the intelligence community?

A No.

Q Okay. Give me a moment as I review my notes here.

Returning to our discussion of the drafting session that took

place at Mr. house, and I believe we established that that

was with respect to remarks that the Secretary issued in the treaty

room on September 12?

A Yes.

Q Okay. You were asked some detailed questions about what

information you had available to you at that time, what you recall

knowing or learning at that time. And I would just like to ask if you

have any recollection about whether you had an insufficient amount of

information at that time on which to draft the statement that you

ultimately wrote, or that you ultimately participated in drafting?

A Well, "insufficient" is an interesting word choice. I

mean, we had to write something. She was -- we knew that she was going

to do this. We had a task which was to write something. So, you know,

we didn't have such insufficient knowledge that we were unable to do

our task. Does that make sense?

Q Uh-huh.

A We definitely did not know a lot of what happened. We knew

very few specifics about what was actually going on on the ground. So

we used what we actually did have to write what we wrote.

Q And in terms of tasking, I believe you were asked about

whether you recall receiving direction. But as someone who had worked

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in the Speech Writers Office and had a few years, at least at this point,

of experience drafting, was it your sense once you leaned that these

attacks occurred that you would have to draft some sort of statement

for the Secretary or participate in a drafting session for her?

A My memory of what happened that night is that I, you know,

learned in the same call from my colleague that what had happened in

Benghazi had really spiralled far out of control, and perhaps people

had died. That was the same call in which I learned that -- I don't

know if it is fair to call it tasking so much as she is probably going

to want to say something.

Q So I guess that's maybe what I'm trying to get at. I'm not

being as clear as I should. You have a lot of experience as a speech

writer. When something like this happens --

A Right.

Q -- can you anticipate that there would be this need to

develop public remarks the Secretary to make?

A Certainly. Having said that before that call, I don't

remember knowing that things had gone as poor -- that things had gone

so catastrophically south as they had in Benghazi at that point. So

I wasn't, you know, scribbling notes or coming up with ideas for

something that she was going to say.

It was upon learning that -- I learned in the same conversation

that things had gone very badly in Benghazi, and that we were asked

to write something. So you're right that generally, if something bad

goes wrong, or some breaking event happens, good or bad, you're right

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that I can anticipate that probably something will have to be written.

Q When I used the term "insufficient information" before, I

guess what I was trying to get at is your recollection, obviously,

appeared to be limited from that evening. And if there were remarks

that were prepared in a drafting session you participated in, and you

felt that there wasn't a sufficient evidentiary basis for making those

statements, is that something you would have remembered?

A Certainly, the idea of giving her something to read that

we are not confident, is true. That's not an acceptable thing to do.

You don't --

Q Accuracy is important in speech writing?

A Of course, yeah. So if you don't know that something is

true -- if I didn't know that something was true, I wouldn't put it

in text for a person to read.

Q Okay. And is there like a process that the speech writers

would use in order to ensure the accuracy of speeches? You were asked

a little bit about this earlier, but were there subject-matter experts,

for instance, that you could reach out to either in the Office of Policy

Planning or elsewhere in the State Department to review a speech to

ensure its accuracy?

A Certainly. I don't know -- certainly, on this night, and

almost always, in fact, perhaps always, something that I wrote would

go through a vetting process before it reached the Secretary. I can't

recall a time that I ever wrote something and just handed it to her

and she walked out and delivered it. That's just not the way it works.

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So that night, as with every set of remarks, a team of people would

read it and weigh in on it and vet it.

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BY MR. KENNY:

Q And would that team vary depending on either the urgency,

the timing of when a statement needed to be released, or the actual

content --

A Yes.

Q -- of that speech?

A Yes.

Q So there was no fixed formal process for who the recipients

would be in the vetting process?

A That's right.

Q And to the best of your recollection, did the statement,

the remarks that you helped prepare on September 11th, did they undergo

that vetting process?

A They did.

Q And you know that because?

A I know that because, for one, I believe I was the one that

circulated the draft to a team of people, senior staff members to vet

it. And secondly, I guess I'm extrapolating, but she delivered the

remarks. So -- I don't know, you know, who saw them beyond the group

that I circulated it to. I don't know if anyone else in the State

Department was included on --

Q So there would be emails to reflect that, though?

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A Yes.

Q That both the draft of whatever speech or remarks or

statement, as well as the traffic relating to the vetting of that

speech?

A Yes.

Q Or remarks?

A I believe almost all of it would be done over email. It's,

of course, possible that someone would have handed someone a draft and

said read this, but it almost always would have happened over email.

Q And you mentioned that it would be helpful to your -- or

would have been helpful to you that you can recognize a particular draft

as yours because your name would appear in that draft. Is that right?

A Generally, yes. We have it like a heading that you

would -- one would usually -- I would usually include on my drafts.

Q Okay. You were asked a little bit in the last round about

some controversy surrounding Ambassador Rice's statements on the five

Sunday talk shows of September 16th. There has also been some public

criticism of some of the statements made by Secretary Clinton. I would

just like to ask if you have any sort of response to when you hear or

see that criticism, that statements she may have been about Benghazi,

statements you may have helped draft or write, that those are either

inaccurate, or worse, that they may have been intentionally inaccurate?

A Well, I can say with certainty that anything that I worked

on was never intentionally inaccurate and that I don't have any

knowledge of anyone that I worked with intentionally being inaccurate.

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Certainly not. Absolutely not.

Q Okay.

A I don't have really much to say beyond that, I don't think.

Q Uh-huh. It's been alleged that the administration had

created a false narrative related to the YouTube videos specifically,

that that had somehow played a role in the attack, and I'd just like

to ask what your response is to that allegation that the administration

created a false narrative?

A I don't believe that's true.

Q And can you give us a sense of what your basis for that belief

is?

A Well, I participated in drafting at least one set of her

remarks about this, and we never heard or saw, or I don't -- nothing

that I saw in that process suggested to me that anyone was doing anything

other than trying to put together a set of remarks that was accurate

and appropriate for this really difficult moment and that reflected

American policy, American values, and that did right by these men who

had died.

So just at no point in any of the work that I did on this, on these

remarks or just generally during that entire period of time, I saw

absolutely nothing that suggested anything other than like total

integrity about my colleagues.

Q So at this point we'd like to move on, and I'll preface this

next section just by remarking that this is now the eighth congressional

investigation into the Benghazi attacks, and it's our duty to help

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ensure that it's the last.

We've been asking every witness about a series of public

allegations that have been made since the attack, and it's our

understanding that even where they've been answered by other

investigations, our colleagues in the majority may still be pursuing

these allegations, and that's why we're continuing to ask about them.

While anyone can speculate about the Benghazi attacks, plenty of

people have, only a limited population or universe of people actually

have actual knowledge or evidence of what happened either before,

during, or after the attacks, and I'm going to ask you about a series

of allegations, and what we're asking for here is not speculation or

opinion but just whether you have any firsthand information. And if

you don't, simply move on to the next allegation, and there's about

a dozen of these, so just please I'd just ask and appreciate your

patience and bear with me.

First, it has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta

to stand down, and this resulted in the defense department not sending

more assets to help in Benghazi. Do you have any evidence that

Secretary of State Clinton ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to

stand down on the night of the attacks?

A I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

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of the attacks?

A I do not.

Q Next. It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton

personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The

Washington Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it Four

Pinocchios, its highest award for false claims. Do you have any

evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable

denying security resources to Libya?

A I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A I do not.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011. Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton

misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi

to his own people in order to garner support for military operations

in Libya in spring 2011?

A I do not.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not collecting and

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shipping arms from Libya to Syria," close quote, and that they found,

quote, "no support for this allegation," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that CIA was not shipping arms

from Libya to Syria?

A I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that U.S. facilities in Benghazi

were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria

or any other foreign country?

A I do not.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound on the

night of the attack, and there have been a number of allegations about

the cause and the appropriateness of that delay. The House

Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report concluding that the

team was not ordered to, quote, "stand down," close quote, but instead

there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to

depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand down order

to CIA personnel?

A I do not.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think that it was the right decision,

do you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper

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decision -- reason, behind the temporary delay of the CIA security

personnel who departed the Annex to assist the Special Mission

Compound?

A I do not.

Q Concern has been raised by one individual that in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board, damaging

documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed

or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were provided

to the ARB?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed to anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub

damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A I don't.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents provided to

Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A I do not.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political respects and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA faithfully performed our duties in

accordance with the high standards of objectivity and nonpartisanship.

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Do you have any evidence the CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A I do not.

Q Do you any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell altered

the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A I don't.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks. Do you have any evidence that Ambassador

Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on

the Sunday talk shows?

A I don't.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, on

the night of the attack, and that he was, quote, missing in action,

close quote. Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that

the President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in

action on the night of the attacks?

A I do not.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks were considering flying

on second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors to stand

down, meaning cease all operations. Military officials have stated

that those four individuals were ordered to, quote, "remain in place,"

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close quote, in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in

their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," close quote. Do you have any evidence to contradict the

conclusion of House Armed Services Committee that there was, quote,

"no stand down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who

sought to join the fight in Benghazi," close quote?

A I do not.

Q Almost there.

A Okay.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, former chairman

of the House Armed Services Committee conducted a review of the attacks

after which he stated, quote, "given where the troops were, how quickly

the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we probably

couldn't have done more than we did" close quote.

Do you any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to

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deploy?

A I don't.

Q And with that, we'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Missakian. Let's go back on the record.

I'm going to mark a second copy of exhibit 1 as exhibit 2.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Missakian. And Ms. , I'd simply like you to flip to

the statement that you helped draft on September 11 and September 12

with the other individuals you identified and just put your initials

next to that statement so the record is clear about which statement

we were referring to and which statement you were referring to.

Ms. . Of course. Thank you.

Mr. Su. And just so I understand the purpose of this exercise.

By Ms. placing her initials next to the statement, it is

basically and only a confirmation that this is the statement that we

have been talking about that she worked on on the night of September

11th and then, or early morning of September 12th; is that fair?

Mr. Missakian. Yes.

Mr. Su. Okay.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Just so the record is accurate. That statement

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begins on the page marked 45476 and continues to page 45478.

Ms. , I thought I heard you say that you had circulated a

draft of that statement on the evening of September 11, morning of

September 12th. Now, you recall doing that?

A I do, yes.

Q Okay. You did that by email?

A I did.

Q I don't recall having seen that email, maybe I just missed

it, but do you recall who you sent it to?

A I don't. Specifically, I don't, no.

Q What's your best estimate of who you would have sent it to

that night knowing that Mr. Sullivan was in the room with you when it

was drafted?

A I would say the kind of core senior staff, so that would

be Jake, Cheryl Mills. Probably Victoria Nuland as our spokeswoman.

It would have been smart to include Beth Jones, who I think was the

NEA assistant secretary at the time, and maybe Phillipe Reines, who

is also a senior staff member. This is my best guess. Not a big group.

Q I understand. Do you recall receiving any comments about

the draft?

A I don't.

Q Do you recall having any phone calls with any of the

individuals you just named about the draft?

A I don't.

Q Do you recall becoming aware of any conversations, maybe

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you didn't participate in them, but conversations between Jake

Sullivan, for example, and any of those individuals about the draft?

A The one thing that I remember is going to work that morning,

so that would be a few hours after leaving office, I

went home --

Q A few hours after leaving --

A Apartment. So that was quite late that night. I went

home, I took a shower, I went to the office, and I remember being in

Jake Sullivan's office that morning. I remember Toria Nuland sitting

at his desk with the document, the draft up, and I think she was reading

it. I don't know if she was editing it. And I remember Secretary

Clinton walking in and thanking me, basically, saying thank you for

working on this last night, I think it's very good.

Q So at that point she had seen it?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall her making any other comments beyond thanking

you?

A I do not.

Q All right. Thank you.

I don't have any further questions?

Mr. Kenny. And just so the record is clear, we believe that we

have received that draft.

Mr. Missakian. Great.

Mr. Kenny. So we're happy to discuss --

Mr. Missakian. You mean the email circulating the draft?

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Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Yes.

Mr. Missakian. Okay. Great. Very good. Thank you, thank

you, appreciate it. Off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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EXHIBIT 1

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INTERVIEW OF SPEECHWRITER #2

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, OCTOBER 9, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

FOR SPEECHWRITER #2

JONATHAN SU, Esq.

Latham & Watkins LLP

555 11th Street, Suite 1000

Washington, D.C. 20004

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

***

ERIC SNYDER

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Mr. Missakian. Let's go on the record then. We are now

beginning the transcribed interview of conducted by

the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being

conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into

the attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and

related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress

and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Mr. , would you please state and spell your name for the

record.

Mr. . It's , ,

.

Mr. Missakian. First off, on behalf of the committee, both the

majority and minority staff, thank you for being here voluntarily. The

committee appreciates your cooperation in our investigation. My name

is Craig Missakian. I'm one of the attorneys on the majority staff

side. At this point, we traditionally go around the room and have

everyone introduce themselves just so you know who's here. So I'll

start with Dana Chipman.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with the committee staff.

Mr. Su. Jonathan Su from Latham & Watkins on behalf of Mr.

.

Ms. . . I'm an attorney-adviser with the

U.S. Department of State.

Mr. Snyder. Eric Snyder, Department of State.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

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Mr. Missakian. Before we begin questioning Mr. , I'd

like to go over some of the ground rules that apply to the interview

here today. Generally, the way the questioning proceeds is that a

member of the majority staff will ask you questions for up to an hour,

and then once I am done, I will hand it over to an attorney for the

minority staff, and then we will go back and forth an hour at a time

until we finish.

Have you ever had your deposition taken or testified before

Congress before?

Mr. . No, I have not.

Mr. Missakian. This procedure is slightly different than a

deposition in that we don't follow the rules of evidence that might

apply in a Federal District Court proceeding, for example. In that

sense, the witness or your counsel may raise objections for privilege

only, subject to review by the chairman of the committee, Congressman

Gowdy. If the objections cannot be resolved in this interview, you

may be required to return for a deposition or a hearing once those issues

have been resolved.

Members of the staff committee are not permitted to raise

objections when the other side is asking questions. This session is

to begin as unclassified. If we get into any area where you would be

required to disclose classified information, please let me know. We

are not prepared to do that today, so we will have to make other

arrangements if we decide we want to go there. You are welcome to

confer with your counsel at any time during the interview; and if for

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any reason, if I ask you a question that you don't understand, just

tell me I don't understand and I'll do my best to rephrase it for you.

If you'd like to take a break at any point in time, talk to your

counsel or for any other reason, just let us know and we'll be happy

to accommodate that. As you can see, there is an official court

reporter in the room taking down what you say and I say and what

everybody else has said during the course of the interview, so the one

thing we ask is that to the extent you answer a question, do so verbally

rather than a nod of the head, for example, and we do our best not to

step on each other's -- me on your answers and you on my questions,

just for the sake of the court reporter and the clarity of the record.

You'll understand this as we go along. If there's a question I

ask you you don't know the answer to or can't recall, that's fine. Just

say you don't know or you don't understand. We don't want you guessing

here. To the extent you have a best estimate or something that you've

put together based on facts you do know, that's fine. But we just don't

want any guesses.

Now, do you understand, Mr. , that you are required to

answer questions posed to you by Congress truthfully?

Mr. . Yes.

Mr. Missakian. Do you also understand that that obligation

extends to questions I may ask you as a member of the staff of a

congressional committee?

Mr. . Yes.

Mr. Missakian. Do you also understand that a witness that

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knowingly provides false testimony could be subject to criminal

prosecution for perjury or for making false statements?

Mr. . Yes.

Mr. Missakian. Is there any reason why your interview should not

go forward today? Are you prepared to give your best answers to the

questions?

Mr. . I am.

Mr. Missakian. That's the extent of our preamble. Mr. Kenny,

do you have anything you'd like to add?

Mr. Kenny. Yes, I'd just like to take the opportunity to thank

Mr. for coming in. I'm looking forward to hearing what you

have to say today.

Mr. . Thank you.

Mr. Missakian. Jonathan, would you like to add anything at this

point?

Mr. Su. Sure. For the record, Craig, I'll say that Mr.

is here, as you know, appearing voluntarily before the committee. You

and I have corresponded before about the scope of the interview, and

it relates to the 2012 attacks in Benghazi, Libya, and the immediate

days thereafter. You've confirmed that the committee's interest

relates solely to this witness's government service and that the

committee would advise me if there are any other specific matters of

interest; and I've not understood there to be any other matters of

interest. We are not getting into any classified information today.

But, you know, with those caveats, we're certainly prepared to proceed

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if that works for you.

Mr. Missakian. Yes, that does. That is my understanding of the

scope of the interview, Mr. . It may come to pass that an

answer you give may open up other areas beyond the scope that your

attorney just described. I may ask you questions there. I don't

anticipate it, but it may happen. We'll see how it goes.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q When did you begin work at the State Department?

A In early 2009.

Q Do you remember a month?

A I think February 2009.

Q And what were you doing immediately before the State

Department?

A I worked for then-Senator Clinton in her Senate office in

Washington.

Q Doing what?

A I was her deputy press secretary.

Q How long did you hold that position?

A I was deputy press secretary for all of -- for a

year-and-a-half, and was in that office for about 3 years.

Q What did you do for Senator Clinton prior to becoming the

deputy press secretary?

A I was the assistant to her chief of staff.

Q So you came to the State Department when Secretary Clinton

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came to the State Department?

A Correct.

Q How long did you stay at the State Department?

A For 4 years.

Q Do you recall what month you left?

A I believe it was February of 2013.

Q What have you done since?

A I have continued to work for Secretary Clinton.

Q And what do you do for her?

A I'm her chief speech writer.

Q When did that employment begin?

A Immediately following the State Department, so February of

2013.

Q And what is the entity that employs you, if you know?

A Hillary for America, her presidential campaign.

Q So Hillary for America, I assume that's a corporation?

A That is, well, whatever kind of entity a political

presidential campaign is, that is who employs me now.

Q Okay, but you began work for that entity, whatever form that

may be in February 2013?

A No, the campaign did not exist then. In February 2013, I

went to work for her in her personal office, Secretary Clinton's

personal office, and then when the campaign began, which was in this

year, I went to work for the campaign.

Q Again, what is your formal title with the campaign?

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A Director of speech writing.

Q Do you know the name of the entity that employed you between

the time you left the State Department and going to work for the

Secretary's presidential campaign?

A I believe it was -- well, it was Secretary Clinton's

personal office, and I believe the technical name was something like

ZFS Holdings, or something like that.

Q During the time you were at the State Department, what was

your job title?

A Speech writer.

Q And where did that position fit in the hierarchy of

positions within the speech writing department?

A There was a director of speech writing, and then there were

several speech writers. And then there was one or two junior, like

a staff assistant, and that was it.

Q Let me ask you, who was the director of speech writing at

that point when you first started with the State Department?

A Well, was when I first started with the

State Department.

Q And then it eventually became ?

A Yes.

Q Who were the other speech writers there with you at the time?

A Over the whole 4 years?

Q Over the whole 4 years, yes.

A I might forget somebody, but for a period of

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time, , , for a period of time ,

, myself, , . For a very brief

period, a gentleman named , I can't remember his last name. The

core team that was consistent, was there the whole time with me

and was there the whole time. He was the staff assistant, and

then the rest of the team shifted around a little bit.

Q Have you had any conversations with any of those individuals

that you just named about the Benghazi investigation?

A The fact of it, yes. The details of it, no.

Q Okay, who did you have that conversation with, the fact of

it?

Mr. Kenny. Can you be specific? Which investigation?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q That's fair. Any of the investigations that were stood up

in the wake of the Benghazi attacks.

A Well, in my capacity as a speech writer, I wrote about the

ARB report, and I helped prepare testimony the Secretary gave before

the committee. Before which committee, it was the House and Senate

Foreign Affairs Committees in 2012. So that was a collaborative

process, and so, of course, much discussed.

Q So when you say you wrote material for Secretary Clinton's

appearance before Congress, is that when she testified in January 2013?

A Correct. She gave an opening statement which I helped

prepare.

Q Who else worked on that opening statement? Do you recall?

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A I worked closely with Jake Sullivan, but I don't

recall -- and it was a collaborative process, but I don't recall. I

couldn't give you a list -- conditional list. I don't recall.

Q Did you take part in any prep sessions with the Secretary?

A I did not.

Q Who did?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know if those even occurred?

A I don't know about that.

Q Other than the conversation you had with Mr. Sullivan in

connection with that statement, were there any other conversations you

had with anybody about the congressional investigations that were stood

up after the attacks?

A Are you referring to this committee?

Q Yes, this committee included.

A Well, I've discussed with my lawyer in preparation for this

session.

Mr. Su. He doesn't want -- I'll speak again for Craig when I say

he understands that, you know, you and I may have spoken, but he is

not -- you know, you can assume he is phrasing his questions other than

with your attorney.

Mr. . I don't recall any conversations like that.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Okay, and that's from, you know, the time it happened up

until today, other than your attorney?

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A The fact of the committee being in existence has been much

in the news, of course, you know, so -- but in terms of the details

of it or what we would discuss here, no.

Q And who did you have those conversations with?

A About the fact that it exists?

Q Yes.

A I don't feel I could give you an exhaustive list, but I feel

like, you know, sort of a comment, anyone you would discuss current

events with, so any colleagues, coworkers, family members, but no one

in particular that I could recall.

Q Okay, do you recall any conversations with Secretary

Clinton about the investigation?

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A No.

Q How about with Jake Sullivan?

A Insofar as Secretary Clinton, we have to prepare for

Secretary Clinton's hearing, and I will once again probably help her

prepare for that, but otherwise, no.

Q When you say Secretary Clinton's hearing, you're talking

about helping her prepare for the upcoming appearance before this

Benghazi committee on the 22nd?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Let's go back in time to September 11, 2012. I just

want to ask you a few questions about that. Let's start with the

protests in Cairo. Well, let me take you even a step back. Were you

at the office that day?

A I was.

Q And do you recall when you left the office that day?

A The early evening.

Q Do you recall hearing about the protests in Cairo at any

point during the day?

A I do, but I don't recall the details of how or when I heard.

Q What do you recall about how you heard and what you heard

and when you heard?

A Yeah, I don't recall when or how I heard.

Q Do you recall generally anything about what you heard about

Cairo?

A I recall that there was -- hearing that there was a protest

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in Cairo, but I couldn't tell you when or how I heard that.

Q And do you recall how you heard about the attacks in Benghazi

later that night?

A Jake Sullivan called me in the evening and told me about

it.

Q Do you recall what time?

A I was at dinner, I imagine, so around dinner time.

Q Do you recall that being the first time you heard about the

attacks?

A To the best of my recollection.

Q From what we have seen, the attacks began about 3:40 p.m.

eastern time, so this would have been before you left the office. Did

you hear anything about it before, or if I understood you --

A All these years later, I don't recall hearing about it

before that phone call.

Q All right. Let's talk about the phone call again. Mr.

Sullivan called you?

A Correct.

Q And how long did that phone conversation last?

A Maybe 5 or 10 minutes.

Q What do you recall being said by you and him during that

call?

A He said that I should start working on remarks that the

Secretary could give about an incident in our diplomatic post in

Benghazi, that we had lost at least one colleague, that we didn't know

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15

yet the status of the Ambassador, that it was a fluid situation, but

I should start thinking about, you know, and working on what the

Secretary could say.

Q Do you recall him giving you any details about what had

occurred?

A Beyond what I just said, I don't recall any others.

Q Was there a plan discussed about how the process would

unfold that night?

A In that first conversation, I don't think so.

Q So I gather there was another conversation after the first

one?

A I spoke to him several times that evening.

Q By phone or in person?

A Both. We spoke a few more times by phone throughout the

evening, and eventually, he came to my apartment in northwest

Washington.

Q Let's focus on the phone calls first to begin. Do you

recall anything that was said in any of the subsequent calls?

A You know, all these years later, I really can't distinguish

now or remember now what was said in which call.

Q All right. That's fair. Let's just talk about what you

remember without identifying it with any particular call. So just tell

me what was said by each of you in all the calls.

A Well, as I said, he told me that we had lost one of our

colleagues and that we didn't know the status of the Ambassador. Later

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16

in the evening, he told me that the Ambassador was dead, but I can't

recall whether that was in person or on the phone. And we discussed

on the phone and in person, we discussed the tone that the Secretary's

remarks should take; the goals that we would have to, in effect,

eulogize the colleagues that we had lost; that we would have to

demonstrate American resolve; that we would have to speak to a global

audience and try to lower the temperature because, of course, it was

a period of unrest, not just in Libya, but around the region and the

world, and demonstrate, sort of, upholding American values. So we

talked about that sort of tone.

Q Were there any other goals for the statement you were

working on that you discussed?

A As I said, sort of honoring the colleagues that we lost,

determination. I think I would add to the list sort of helping

Americans make sense of a dangerous and difficult time, and sending

a message to the world about American values, and lowering the

temperature in a period of upheaval.

Q When you said helping Americans make sense, what did you

mean by that?

A Well, we had lost a department personnel; and the world,

there was all this upheaval across the region, and one of the goals

of having a Secretary of State talk is so that Americans can understand

America's role in the world and what are we doing there and what's the

way forward. So any time the Secretary addresses a topic, that's part

of it, and this would be no exception.

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17

Q Was there any discussion of telling the American people who

was responsible for the attacks in Benghazi and what their motives were?

A In fact, the opposite. What she said was that there would

be time, that we were still learning about the motivations and methods

of those who did this, and that there would be time for more reflection

in the days ahead; so that was not a big focus of the remarks.

Mr. Su. Just so the record is clear, when you say she said that?

Mr. . In her remarks, the Secretary --

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Maybe my question wasn't clear. Were still talking about

conversations you had with Jake Sullivan the night of. Is there any

discussion in any of those conversations about telling the American

people who was responsible and what their motives were?

A No. And the opposite. We discussed, and we did write for

her that sentiment, that we are still learning about the motivations

and methods, and that there would be time to get into all that later.

Q I understand that's what was written. But my question was

a different one. Hold on. We have to trade off here. I know it was

written, but my question is, was it discussed? It sounds like you're

saying it wasn't discussed, but then it was. Is there something

reflected about it in the statements? I'm just not understanding.

A What I mean by that is insofar as we discussed that it would

be appropriate to write that we were still learning, that was discussed,

and then we wrote that. Beyond that, no.

Q So again, was there any discussion about telling the

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18

American people who was responsible and what their motives were?

A Beyond that, we were still learning, no.

Q So that was the discussion. You two discussed we don't know

what happened, so let's reflect that in the statement?

A I didn't say we don't know. I said we're still learning,

but that was reflected.

Q Okay. Then if you were still learning, that suggests that

you knew something at the time. What did you know at the time about

who was responsible and their motives?

A I can only speak for myself.

Q That's all I'm asking about.

A And, you know, based on the information I had, had a group

of heavily-armed militants had attacked our compound, and that's what

I understood, and that's what we wrote.

Q Did you have any information beyond that in terms of motive

or the identity of the individual attackers?

A No.

Q Where did you get that information?

A I got my information that evening primarily from Jake

Sullivan. I was also part of -- I was on various internal State

Department email chains, and I brought to it also the sort of context

of what had been happening in the world over that day and previous days

and weeks.

Q That night, and again, we're just focused on September 11,

did you rely on any of the information you read in any newspaper reports

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19

about the incident?

A Can you explain what you mean by "rely"?

Q Well, did any of the information you saw in media reports

get reflected in the statement that you prepared?

A I think that, you know, media provided color and context

for what was going on in the world, but beyond that, no.

Q I'm sorry. I don't understand what that means.

A I couldn't point to a specific newspaper article that I read

that said, that I took facts from, no.

Q Thank you. That's what I meant. You talked about speaking

to a global audience. What did you mean by that?

A I mean any time the Secretary of State speaks, the world

is listening. We had -- it was a period of unrest across the Middle

East, North Africa, and beyond; specifically, in the Muslim world,

which was a source of concern; and how to lower that temperature and

speak to that situation was an important issue.

Q Was that focused on the video?

A The video was the source of that unrest across the world

in that period. And so, you know, lowering the temperature of that

situation was one of our goals.

Q Again, focus just on the night of September 11. What

information did you have that suggested that the video was, in any way,

connected to what occurred in Benghazi?

A I don't recall any specific information.

Q Okay. What general information do you recall?

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20

A I recall that it was the context with which we entered that

night was protests across the Muslim world, specifically that day

protests in Cairo that had turned violent at our embassy. That was

the context with which we approached the situation, and then I couldn't

recall for you that night a specific piece of information or not.

Q Just to be clear, my understanding is there was one protest

in Cairo and that was it on September 11. Are you aware of others?

A What I'm aware of, this removed, these years later, is that

throughout that period there were protects across the Muslim world.

I couldn't tell you a chronology of which country and protest happened

when, but I recall that we were concerned about it in the days before.

We had seen, there was a history of inflammatory, provocative incidents

leading to protests and violence, including the burning of a Koran,

various incidents in Afghanistan, Danish cartoons. There is a long

history there, and one that the State Department had to take seriously

and be concerned about, and I could not recall the chronology of which

protests happened when, but I recall the general sense that in that

period, there was a lot of unrest.

Q You just said that you -- you, the State Department -- were

concerned about the video, I gather, in the days before the September

11 attack. Did I hear that correctly?

A My recollection, again, I can't remember the whole

chronology of when the protests were happening, but in general, I would

say that is my recollection.

Q Do you recall being aware that protests were planned for

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21

the Cairo Embassy prior to them occurring?

A That's nothing I know about.

Q I'm sorry?

A No, I don't recall anything like that.

Q So when you said that you were concerned about the protests,

what do you mean?

A Well, there was a protest in Cairo at the Embassy, and that

was concerning.

Q Right. I realize that, but you said you had been concerned

days before that.

A I think, as I said, I can't reconstruct the entire

chronology, but what I remember is in that period being concerned that

there was a provocation that could lead to unrest and violence as we

had seen in previous incidents.

Q So as you sit here today, you have no recollection of being

concerned about protests prior to the protests in Cairo. Is that fair?

A What I can't recall now is whether the chronology of whether

there were any or half dozen protests in the days before or whether

they were all in the days after. I can't remember now.

Q Okay. So when you said you were concerned days before the

Cairo protests, you just were misremembering at that point?

A I'm saying what I remember is that period, being concerned

about it.

Q Okay. And I'm asking you, you stated, this is what you

said, that you were concerned days before the protest in Cairo.

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22

Ms. Sawyer. Craig, he's verified to you --

Mr. Missakian. Heather, please. We don't do this to you.

Ms. Sawyer. And I rarely do it to you, but you've asked the same

question four times.

Mr. Missakian. I know, but I'm entitled to an answer to the

question.

Ms. Sawyer. I think he has answered that. Sitting here today,

he does not recall whether it was the days preceding or the days

following. He just recalls it was generally around that time.

Mr. Missakian. I heard the same testimony you did. I just don't

believe he answered my question.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q You said that you were concerned days before the Cairo

protests about those protests?

Mr. Kenny. I'm actually not sure -- I mean, we can go back to

the tapes. I heard "provocative event."

Mr. Su. Shall we just start over and maybe let him answer the

question?

Mr. Missakian. That would be fine.

Mr. . Do you want to reask the question?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Right. If I misheard what you testified to earlier, that's

fine, just tell me. But I thought I heard you say there were concerns

about the protests before they occurred?

A I think, at this removed, I can't remember the chronology

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23

of when -- I do not remember when I first learned of the videos

existence, and I do not remember when I first learned of resulting

unrest in the Muslim world, and I do not remember when the first protests

began across the region. I do remember that in that period around

September 11 of 2012, that it was a source of concern for me and for

the Department as a whole that there was unrest in the Muslim world

relating to this video.

Q So other than the existence of the Cairo protest, were you

aware of any other information -- I'm talking again about the night

of September 11 -- that connected the video to what occurred in

Benghazi?

A I don't recall any specific piece of information.

Q Okay. What do you recall discussing about the video with

Jake Sullivan that night, if anything?

A I really don't recall a specific conversation, the details

of any specific conversation in that regard.

Q Do you recall generally how you were going to treat the video

and any statements that were made about the attack?

A As I said earlier, I think one of our goals was to lower

the temperature in the world, in the region, and speak to widespread

unrest, but beyond that, I don't recall any specific conversation.

Q It's our understanding, and at some point that night, and

I think you said this, that Jake Sullivan came to your apartment?

A That's correct.

Q And there were others there as well?

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A Correct.

Q For the record, could you identify those others?

A Yes. and , my speech-writing

colleagues.

Q Were you aware that night that the State Department had put

out a statement about the attacks in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q How did you become aware of that statement?

A How did I become aware that it existed?

Q Yes.

A I don't recall.

Q Do you recall if Mr. Sullivan brought a copy of it with him?

A He did not bring a copy with him.

Q Why do you remember that?

A I don't remember him bringing a copy with him.

Q All right. Tell us about what occurred that evening in your

apartment?

A So I invited and over. Jake had told me we had

to start working on remarks for the Secretary, as we have discussed.

and came over, and we started brainstorming what those remarks

could include. We brainstormed and discussed for a period of hours.

Jake then joined us. And we sort of collectively sort of began drafting

and revising and drafting the statement until, you know, sort of the

middle of the night.

Q Other than Mr. Sullivan and the information he gave you,

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25

what other sources of information did you have about what had occurred

in Benghazi?

A Right. So Jake was the primary source of information that

night. I think there were other internal State Department emails that

provided additional information. For example, we had to eulogize our

colleagues that we lost, and we needed to gather information about their

professional history, but I could not otherwise give you details about

what those emails were or anything like that, but Jake was the primary

source of information.

Q Were you on the ops alert distribution list?

A Yes.

Q To the extent ops alerts were sent out that night, you would

have had access to them?

A As far as I know. I don't know whether ops sent out alerts

that I didn't get. I frequently got ops alerts, and I believe I got

them that night.

Q In the course of your work on the Secretary's remarks, did

you speak to anybody in the NEA Bureau?

A I didn't speak to anyone other than, in NEA or on the phone

or anything like that. I think that we -- I really can't remember.

Q Did you speak to anybody that night about what had occurred

in Benghazi other than Jake Sullivan and the folks that were in the

room with you?

A I don't think so. I don't recall having any other

conversation.

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26

Q At any point in the evening, was the talk of the video

discussed?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What do you recall about those discussions?

A I don't recall details of what we discussed, but I do recall,

as I said, that it was in the context that we were approaching the night

was there was this, there was unrest across the region and caused by

the video, and that was the backdrop to which we were -- that was the

context in which we were operating. So that would have been on my mind.

Q What do you mean by that was the context in which you were

operating?

A I mean, I don't want to go back over everything I've said

before, but --

Q I understand the facts that you were aware of. I understand

that there was a protest in Cairo. What I don't understand is what

you mean by "this was the context in which we were operating."

A So one of the goals of the Secretary's remarks, in addition

to honoring those we lost, would be to try to express American

determination in our values and to lower the temperature across the

region, because of the -- and the reason we needed to lower the

temperature was there was unrest across the region that was a potential

threat to American interests.

Q I think I understand. So when you say "context," you didn't

mean to suggest that you were attempting to link what had occurred in

Cairo with what had occurred in Benghazi?

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27

Mr. Su. Do you understand the question?

Mr. . I'm not sure I understand the question.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Well, you can make a statement in the context of what was

happening in the region, or you could make a statement that suggests

that there was a cause-and-effect relationship between what occurred

in Cairo, and what occurred in Benghazi.

A Oh, I don't recall any conversation like that.

Mr. Su. Try to ask it this way: Do you recall any conversation

that night in which there was an effort to link the issues in Cairo

with the issues in Benghazi. Is that a fair --

Mr. Missakian. It's not actually what I'm asking. If you don't

understand --

Mr. . Do you want to clarify?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q I'm just asking, trying to get clarification on the term

"context" and how it's being used here. So do you recall any

conversations in which it was discussed that what had occurred in Cairo

was somehow linked to what had occurred in Benghazi?

A I don't recall a specific conversation like that.

Q Do you recall having -- generally, that that was a topic

of discussion?

A I recall that that was the climate, the context, you know,

of the day, but I don't recall a specific conversation, certainly not

a specific conversation about cause or linkage, is what you asked. I

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28

don't recall a conversation like that.

Q Let me ask you this then. Did you personally believe that

what had occurred in Cairo that day was somehow connected to what had

occurred in Benghazi?

A I'm trying to remember. I think that what I recall

believing is, based on the information I had at the time, was that both

events were playing out against the same backdrop of unrest across the

region, and that is as far as my recollection goes of what I believed

at the time.

Q Did you understand there to be protests outside the State

Department facility in Benghazi prior to the facility attack that

night?

A As I recall -- yes. Well, we should clarify that. It was

hours after the attack. You know, I was learning information as the

night went on, but at some point, I think that was my impression. I

couldn't recall for you any details about that.

Q Okay. At some point that was your impression. At some

point that night, or at some point in the days and weeks after?

A That night.

Q So was that your impression prior to finishing work on the

statement?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall what that impression was based upon?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall if anybody else in the room shared that

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29

impression?

A I wouldn't want to speak for anyone else. I couldn't speak

for anyone else.

Q But you don't recall any discussions about it among the

group?

A I don't recall any discussion.

Q All right. Tell us about the process of drafting the

statement. For example, where did Jake Sullivan come into the process?

Did you have an initial draft ready and then he came in and took part

in editing? What was the chronology there, if you recall?

A As I said, and and I were there first. We were

brainstorming. As part of the brainstorming process, we drafted

sentences, paragraphs, moved things around. I don't recall when we

had a rough draft, but it was largely a brainstorming process, and I

couldn't tell you when Jake arrived or what the status of the draft,

if any, was.

Q Do you recall that Mr. Sullivan had suggested mentioning

the video in the statement prior to him arriving?

A I don't recall. I'm sorry.

Q Do you recall anything he said on the subject once he got

to your apartment?

A I just don't.

Q Do you recall anything anyone else said on the subject of

the video during the evening?

A No. All these years later, I don't.

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30

Q And in your mind, and I know you've talked about this, but

just for the record -- well, let me do it this way: What I'd like to

do is mark as exhibit 1 to this transcribed interview a multi-page

document. This is the same document that was marked previously. I've

got fewer copies now. We can share.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Mr. , this is a multi-page document. The first

page is an email at the top from Jake Sullivan to what we believe to

be Hillary Clinton, September 24, 2012. The pages after the first

email appear to be a compilation of statements made by the Secretary

that involve some reference to the attacks in Benghazi. If you could

just flip through this and identify if it's here, the statement that

you worked on with the group on the evening of September 11 and into

the morning of September 12?

A Yes. I don't see page numbers, so this, at the bottom

corner is says State SEB0045476, remarks on the deaths of American

personnel in Benghazi, Libya, September 12, 2012.

Q If you could, just take your attorney's pen and mark your

initials next to the statement so the record is clear that that's the

statement we're referring to.

Mr. Su. So for the record, he's marked that statement on that

particular Bates number for the sole purpose of identifying the remarks

that he participated in developing the night of September 11.

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31

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Is that accurate?

A It is.

Q So let's flip to the second page in that series, fifth

paragraph down, the paragraph that begins "There will be more time later

to reflect." That paragraph. Do you see it?

A I do.

Q And the third sentence says, "We are working to determine

the precise motivations and methods of those who carried out this

assault." And then it continues, "Some have sought to justify this

vicious behavior along with protests that took place at our Embassy

in Cairo yesterday as a response to inflammatory material posted on

the Internet." Do you see that sentence?

A I do.

Q Okay. What was the purpose for including that sentence in

this statement?

A You read two sentences. Which one are you asking me about?

Q Thank you. What was the purpose for including the two

sentences in the statement?

Mr. Su. And he is, of course, asking from your point of view,

if you recall.

Mr. . Right. You know, as I said earlier, the goals of

our statement were to honor those who fell, to address the unrest in

the region, to express American determination and adherence to our

values. So these sentences were included to advance those goals, but

141
32

I couldn't tell you more about those specific sentences.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q So at some point that evening, a draft of the statement was

completed; and I understand that it was then circulated for review.

Did you take part in that process of circulating the statement to others

for review?

A Could you clarify what you mean by "taking part"?

Q For example, if previously stated that she took

the draft statement and sent it by email to others to review -- she

couldn't remember who, but she recalled sending that -- possibly some

of those individuals who received it may have sent comments back, and

there may have been a back and forth about changes to the draft you

all had prepared. So that's what I mean. Did you take part in the

process of reviewing the statement that was prepared?

A Got it. In the morning I went over our draft with Jake

again, and made edits in the morning.

Q And were the edits that were made based on conversations

with anybody, or was it you woke up and looked at it and thought it

could be said better?

A I did not have any other conversations with others. My

understanding is that Jake did, but I don't know the details of those

conversations.

Q Okay. Did he discuss those conversations with you?

A He said, you know, we have to keep making edits. He didn't

tell me the substance of the conversations he had had, just that there

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33

were more edits to make.

Q Okay. What kind of edits?

A I can't, you know, all these years later, tell you which

sentences we changed, but the only thing that I remember is, I think

the formulation "heavily-armed militants" we added that morning in his

office. But I could not beyond that give you chapter and verse about

what we changed.

Q So specifically, what line and paragraph are you referring

to with that change? Do you recall?

A The second sentence of the statement.

Q So again, just so the record is clear, if you could borrow

your attorney's pen and put brackets around the language that you recall

being added the next morning.

A I have done so.

Q Thank you. Do you recall how that sentence read the night

before?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall why that change was made?

A I do not.

Q What, if anything, did Mr. Sullivan say about why that

change should be made?

A I don't recall. I don't recall the conversation. That's

the only phrase that stuck in my memory as having been added that

morning, but I don't recall why or how.

Q Why is it, do you think, you recall that particular change?

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34

A I couldn't say.

Q Is that a term that you had used before, the term

"heavily-armed militants"?

A That I had used before?

Q Yeah.

A I don't recall.

Q Is that language you believe that he suggested?

A Yes.

Q Did you have the sense that this change was a result of

conversations he had had with other people within the State Department?

A We would have to ask him. He said, Here are the edits I

want to make, and we made them.

Q And beyond that one, you can't recall any others?

A No.

Q Do you recall about what time that change was made?

Obviously, it was before the remarks were given.

A Right. I think around 8 a.m., but I can't be sure.

Q Now if you could, flip to the second page. This is a page

marked 45475 at the bottom.

A Yes.

Q There's a statement at the top, the title is "Statement on

the Attack in Benghazi." The date is September 11, 2012. My

understanding is this statement was issued by the State Department at

10 p.m. on September 11.

A Okay.

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35

Q Prior to today, have you seen this statement?

A Yes.

Q When did you see it?

A I saw it when it came out, so around 10 o'clock.

Q So at 10 o'clock that night. I gather at that point you

were at your apartment working on the statement?

A Yes.

Q Did you have any part in drafting the statement?

A You know, I really don't remember.

Q Do you recall this statement being discussed in the context

of what would be written in the statement you did work on?

A What I recall about this is that it says we have confirmed

that one of our State Department officers was killed. What I recall

is we didn't know what had happened to Chris Stevens. And I recall

knowing that the statement, this paper statement, would address the

one person lost because we didn't know about what was the status of

the second person. That's what I recall about it.

Q Okay. But as far as you sit here today, you had no part

in the drafting or discussion about content?

A I'm not saying I didn't. I just don't recall.

Q Back to the review process of the statement that you did

participate in. Do you recall anything about that other than your

discussions with Mr. Sullivan the next morning?

A That's all I recall.

Q All right. What I'd now like to do is go through the other

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36

statements in this compilation and ask you if you had any part in

drafting them. So I think we can just go page by page here. We have

already obviously done the two on the second page. I take that back.

Let's go to the second one on the second page, "Statement on the Death

of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya." Did you take part in

drafting that statement?

A I believe I did.

Q Okay. Let's skip ahead to the page marked 45478. Do you

recall taking part in drafting that statement?

A Yes, I did.

Q Do you recall having any conversations with anybody about

the content of this statement?

A Yes. I recall doing some research, I could not tell you

with whom or where, to get the biographical information. And I recall

asking for the appropriate way to refer to the employment status of

these two men.

Q Let's flip to the next one. This is now the Remarks of the

Opening Plenary of the U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue, dated

September 13, 2012. Did you take part in drafting any portion of this

statement?

A I don't believe that I worked on this one.

Q Just generally, at any point during the week, that week,

meaning September 11, all the way to the weekend, do you recall

receiving any information about the identity of the attackers in

Benghazi or their motivations?

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Mr. . You say receive information?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Yeah.

A No. I don't recall. I don't recall receiving

information.

Q Do you recall receiving any classified briefings or

classified intelligence reports during that week?

A No.

Q Is that something you normally would have received and

reviewed?

A No.

Q All right. Let's keep going. Now we're at page 45482.

The "Remarks at Reception Marking," if you can help me pronounce it.

A "Eid ul-Fitr."

Q Also dated September 13, 2012. Did you have any part in

drafting any of the Secretary's remarks that are reflected here?

A I don't believe I had the pen on this one.

Q Okay. Let's flip forward then to page marked 45485. The

title here, "Remarks at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those

Lost in Attacks in Benghazi, Libya," now dated September 14, 2012.

What role, if any, did you play --

A I did here. I did write these ones.

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Q Did you have any discussions with anybody on the topic of

how the identity of the attackers or their motive should be reflected

in these remarks or were not reflected?

A I don't recall -- I don't recall any conversation like that.

Q Do you know one way or another whether or not Secretary

Clinton herself reviewed the statement that you prepared on the night

of September 11 before delivering it?

A Yes, she read it.

Q Okay. And how do you know that? Were you present?

A Yes.

Q Tell us about that. What happened?

A It was when we had a final draft, we printed it, handed it

to her, she read it quietly, took a moment, and then walked out and

delivered it.

Q All right. Do you know if she had had any input prior to

that reading?

A I did not have any conversations with her. I don't know

beyond that.

Q Do you know if Cheryl Mills had any input?

A I didn't have any conversations with her, and I don't know

beyond that.

Q Please flip to page marked 45490. These are "Remarks With

Indonesian Foreign Minister," dated September 20, 2012. Did you have

any role in drafting any portion of these remarks?

A I honestly don't remember.

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Q Okay. Let's flip to, now page 45495. These are "Remarks

With Pakistani Foreign Minister," now dated September 21, 2012.

A I don't recall whether I wrote them or not.

Q Now, with regard to these remarks, in paragraph 5, we now

see the word "terrorist attack" used and the word "terrorist." I

read --

A I see it.

Q I read the other statements, and to my reading, those terms

were not used prior to this statement on the 21st. I'm just going based

on what's in this compilation.

Do you recall any discussions with regard to whether or not to

use the word "terrorist" in connection with the Benghazi attacks at

any point in time?

A I remember the President using the phrase "It was an act

of terror" on the 12th, but I don't remember any internal conversation

about the phrasing that we would use in those days.

Q Is that what you recall about the President's remarks, that

he called it -- called it an act of terror?

A That's what I recall.

Q Okay. Have you read those statements recently?

A No.

Q So with regard to the use by the Secretary, are you

suggesting that the word now appears in here because of the President's

remarks?

A I'm not --

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Q Why were you connecting it?

A I'm not suggesting that. I'm simply suggesting that I

remember -- I remember him using that phrase. I do not remember -- I

guess, I mention that because you asked about the word "terrorist."

I do not remember any internal conversation about that word.

Q Do you remember any internal conversations about the use

of that word divorced from what occurred in Benghazi just in general?

A You mean in other situations?

Q Sure, just in general in the State Department. Is there

a word that could be used only in certain context, anything like that?

A No, it was used pretty interchangeably with "violent

extremist" or other similar phrasing, so no, I don't remember it being,

you know, not any particular conversation like that.

Q Okay. Could we go off the record for a second?

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Let's go back on the record.

Mr. , now going beyond December 11 up to that following

Sunday when Ambassador Rice appeared on the talk shows. Do you

recall -- what do you recall, if anything, about discussing the role

of the video in the attacks in Benghazi, whether there was a protest

in Benghazi prior to the attack? Do you recall anything on those

topics?

A In relation to Susan Rice?

Q No, not in relation to Susan Rice. I just use that as an

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end point in the discussion. Just that week.

A Would you ask it again then?

Q Sure.

A I got distracted by the Susan Rice part.

Q Right. In the period between the morning of September 12th

and Sunday, September 16th, do you recall taking part in any

discussions where the topic of discussion was, in whole or in part,

whether the video was connected to the attacks in Benghazi or whether

there was a protest in Benghazi prior to the attacks?

A I really don't. I really do not remember a conversation

like that.

Q Do you recall ever discussing what had occurred in Benghazi

with anybody in the NEA bureau?

A In that time period?

Q Yes.

A I do not recall discussing -- if your question is -- I think

how you put it was -- will you just say again whether was the motivations

or what was the question?

Q Sure. Whether the video had any connection to what

occurred in Benghazi or whether there was a protest in Benghazi prior

to the attacks.

A I did not discuss with anyone in any -- I don't remember

discussing with anyone in NEA those questions.

Q Now, at some point, did you come to learn that there was

not, in fact, a protest that preceded the attacks in Benghazi?

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A No, I never came to learn that, as far as I recall.

Q Okay. So my telling you that here today is the first time

you are hearing that or learning that?

A I am aware of the controversy, and I'm aware -- I certainly

recall hearing that topic hotly debated. I myself don't have

independent knowledge and not sure. You know, at this point, I

couldn't tell you anything beyond what's, you know, in the public

record.

Q Okay. So just so I understand, at no point while you were

employed at the State Department did you come to learn that there was

no protest?

A Oh, no, no. Not that I recall.

Q Do you recall watching Ambassador Rice make her appearances

on the Sunday talk shows?

A I don't believe I did watch that.

Q Afterwards, did you read any transcripts of her statements?

A I don't believe I read a -- ever read a full transcript of

the interview. As a consumer of news, I was aware, you know, especially

when it became a controversy, I was aware of that, and I, you know,

certainly recall now I knew that she spoke to it.

Q So you do recall becoming aware of the controversy --

A Yes.

Q -- surrounding her remarks?

A Yes.

Q Again, just for the sake of the court reporter, one at a

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time.

How did you become aware of that controversy?

A As I said, I'm a consumer of news and a follower of current

events. Beyond that, I couldn't recall specifically where I read or

learned about that controversy.

Q Do you recall having any discussions about it with your

State Department colleagues?

A No, I do not.

Q What do you recall of the nature of the controversy to be?

A Well, from this removed, I recall there being public

controversy over the word "spontaneous," and the -- I guess the word

"protest," and I honestly don't remember the full extent of what she

said beyond that, but I remember there being a controversy.

Q Okay. Was that a subject that was covered in preparing

Secretary Clinton to appear before Congress in January 2013?

A I can only speak to my role, which was in helping with the

opening statement, and I don't -- I have not gone back to review that,

and I do not recall her -- it being in the opening statement, and I

don't recall discussing it. But again, I haven't reviewed it, so I

can't be sure.

Q Do you recall any discussions concerning the video,

concerning the protest, concerning the motive of the attackers,

anything like that in the context of preparing that statement for

Congress?

A No, I don't recall that aspect of it.

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Q Do you recall at all the administration's version of events

changing over time?

Mr. Su. So that's a bit of a broad question. I'm not sure how

he -- I mean --

Mr. Missakian. Why don't we give him a chance.

Mr. Su. Okay.

Mr. . Do I recall the administration's version of the

events changing over time, that's the question?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Yes.

A I mean, I can really only speak for, you know -- well, I

guess are you asking me like a consumer of news or as, like, in my role

at the State Department?

Q We're just talking about you. I can get to how, you know,

you learned of it later, but I'm just asking you, if you became aware

of it?

Mr. Su. Well, Craig, I mean, I don't know how he answers that

question, and I'll just say it again, I mean, is he aware of the -- in

what capacity, do you have a specific point of reference? I'm just

not sure how he -- and that assumes a fact that I'm not sure he's agreed

to, which is that the administration did change positions, so, you know,

if you ask a question, he'll answer it.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q That's one way to answer it. You can say, "Mr. Missakian,

I'm not aware of any change in the administration's version of what

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occurred in Benghazi." Is that your testimony here today?

A No. I mean, I'm -- you know, as I recall -- I mean, the

Secretary said on the 12th, we are learning about the motivations and

methods of what -- of the attackers here, and I believe that to be true

and that, you know, I didn't -- I was not involved in this, but I believe

the senior officials to have -- continue to do their best to fill in

the information with the picture of the information they had, but I

only say that as a consumer of news, and from years later trying to

remember, you know, what was said when in public, but I can't really

say much more than that.

Q Okay. So I just want to understand. Are you aware that

the administration's version of events changed over time? And that's

a simple yes-or-no question. If you're not aware of it, please say

it, and we'll move on.

A I am aware that the administration -- you know, that more

was learned over time, but that's -- beyond that, I really -- I'm not

aware of who learned what when. I just don't know.

Q Do you recall having any conversations with anybody about

anything Susan Rice said on the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q Do you recall having any conversations with anybody about

how to -- I'll withdraw that question. Did Susan Rice's comments

factor in at all in the statements the Secretary was making about the

Benghazi attacks?

A Not that I worked on, not that I know of.

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Q Thank you. I don't have any further questions.

A Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. I think, if you'd just give us a sec to switch seats,

we can do it, and make sure everyone has water and what else they need,

and I don't know that we need a lengthy break or anything, unless you

are going to --

Mr. Su. We are ready.

Ms. Sawyer. Good.

Mr. Kenny. Mr. , you all set?

Mr. . I am.

Mr. Kenny. You guys good? We'll go back on the record. The

time now reads 3:13. This will begin the majority's portion of the

questioning, and --

Mr. Chipman. Minority's.

Mr. Kenny. I'm sorry. For one, I could strike that. The

minority's questioning. Thank you for the clarification.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Mr. , just on behalf of Ranking Member Cummings and

all the Democrat members, we would like to take the opportunity to thank

you for appearing here today, and extend the remarks that were issued

to you earlier. We know that the attacks have taken a toll on many

in the Department and those who view the Department as a family, and

so obviously, we want to try to be as respectful as possible, while

at the same time, gathering information the committee deems is

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necessary in order to conclude its investigation.

Just take a quick moment to reintroduce myself. My name is Peter

Kenny. I'm with the minority staff. I'm joined here by chief counsel,

Heather Sawyer. And again, we just appreciate your willingness to be

here today. Thank you.

A Thank you.

Q I'd like to pick up where we left in the last round, where

we were walking through a series of statements that the Secretary had

issued. They're either statements, public remarks, speeches. This

is exhibit 1. You were asked to comment or describe your participation

in a series of -- the succession of these. And for a number of these,

I had in my notes that you couldn't recall whether you participated,

or you couldn't recall the extent to which you may have made specific

edits and specific line edits to the speeches, to the remarks.

And I was hoping just to get your sense, you know, we are 3 years

removed now from the events in question, and I was just wondering

whether -- the passage of time, whether you could just provide for us,

generally, your sense of your recollection of those specific edits and

of the night in general, just based on the passage of time?

A Are you asking about the edits to the statement on the

morning of September 12th?

Q So for any of these where you've identified that you did

participate, and you were asked about specific edits you may have had,

I thought I recall you indicating that you didn't have specific

recollection about some of those, and so my question to you is just,

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I thought I'd heard that you referenced back that this has now been

3 years, and so my question to you is whether the passage of time, how

that's affected your ability to recollect, with specificity, these

edits you've been asked about?

A Oh, yes. Well, it has been 3 years. I wrote a lot of words

in this job. These are some of them. And I cannot now, you

know -- there are certain phrases that I remember having worked on,

but I can't, you know, all these years later, you know, really go through

and say, well, this edit happened for this reason or not. It's just

beyond my memory.

Q No, thank you. That's helpful. You know, as we understand

it, the Secretary operates in a very public role as the face for the

administration and implementer of our foreign policy. And so our

understanding is also that she or he would also issue a number of

statements or remarks frequently. Is that accurate?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. And then over the course of your tenure, you said

you were at the State Department for 4 years, I believe?

A Correct.

Q And a speech writer for that entire period?

A Yes. I spent 2 years in the Office of Strategic

Communications in the Bureau of Public Affairs, and 2 years in the

speech writing office of Policy Planning, but my responsibilities all

4 years were as a speech writer to the Secretary.

Q Okay. And during your 4 years as a speech writer, whether

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serving in one office or the other, do you have any recollection of

how many speeches or statements you may have worked on, you may have

prepared yourself?

A Gosh, a lot. I couldn't give you a number, but you are

correct. She -- the Secretary spoke frequently, issued many paper

statements also, and I had a hand in many of them, and so I couldn't

begin to count, actually, but a lot.

Q Would you say dozens?

A Hundreds. Several each week.

Q And sitting here today, if I were to show you the final

version of either a statement or a prepared speech, do you think you'd

be able to share with us what specific edits or what that editing process

was like for that speech, just as a general matter?

A Some are more memorable than others, but it's been so many

years that it's very difficult to go back and reconstruct how, you know,

specifically step by step how a speech gets edited, especially when

you've written so many and it's been so many years.

Q When you say some may be more memorable than others, would

you count these types of statements or speeches in that regard?

A I would say that the remarks of September 12th were

memorable, important, but what I also said it was, which is it has been

3 years, and I don't remember all the specifics of which edit, of each

edit.

Q Okay. Thank you. Just roughly, briefly, before we move

on, and I know that there was a question about the word "context" in

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the last hour.

A Yeah.

Q Context is something that we generally find to be helpful

in understanding the events and circumstances surrounding the events

of the attacks, as well as the administration's response. And I was

hoping whether you could help us understand what sorts or types of

challenges you, in the speech writing office, and your colleagues in

the speech writing office, were facing during this period, and by this

period, I mean from when you learned of the attacks through the last

of the remarks or speeches that you were shown in exhibit 1?

A Well, you know, as I said earlier, you know, one of

the -- part of the context here was unrest across the Middle East, North

Africa, and beyond, protests in many countries sparked by an

inflammatory video. There was a scary situation in Tunisia at our

embassy. There was a scary situation in Sudan. There were protests

in many countries.

Q Uh-huh.

A Part of my job as a speech writer in that period was to help

craft remarks for the Secretary that would address that instability,

lower the temperature, deny oxygen to -- or limit the oxygen to these

issues, not inflame the situation more, and as I said, to express

American determination and our values.

Q You used a phrase just a moment ago about not giving oxygen,

or denying oxygen to these events. Could you just elaborate on what

you mean by that?

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A I just mean you have to decide, when you're speaking to a

global audience, and for me, as a speech writer, as I'm helping prepare

remarks for a global audience, the tone that you're going to take, which

issues you're going to address and with which prominence, and sometimes

it is helpful to talk about -- to take on a problem and sort of work

your way through it, and sometimes doing that and talking a lot about

an issue that's causing, say, unrest will just draw more attention to

it and cause more unrest, and so you have to try to calibrate and balance

in your public remarks, in your public presentation, the right way to

do that to advance U.S. interests and values around the world, and so

that's what I mean by oxygen.

Sometimes, you know, the job of the speech writer and

communications, in general, you know, in that global setting, is to

strike that right balance on sort of behalf of American interests.

Q Thank you. That's helpful. In the last round, you had

also indicated, or you had referenced the burning of a Koran before,

and what specifically were you referring to?

A I recall an incident in -- there was a pastor in Florida

who threatened to burn a Koran and drew worldwide notice, and then I

think eventually did. And also, through worldwide notice, these were

issues, you know, of concern, for me at least.

Q And was that something that you had specifically dealt with

in your capacity as a speech writer at the Department?

A I don't recall now in this room whether I ever wrote

something about that, but I remember being aware and concerned about

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it.

Q You were asked about your general awareness of when a

YouTube video may have begun circulated, or first been posted onto

YouTube as well as the effect that that may have on the region. I would

just like to ask, were you aware -- I just want to drill down a little

bit -- that the video had been posted on YouTube that summer? Was that

something that you're aware of?

A You know, as I said earlier, I can't remember now the

chronology of when I became aware of the video's existence, when I

became aware that it was causing unrest in the region, and when various

protests started across the region. I am -- what I recall now is that

in that period, there -- that it was causing significant unrest around

the world. That's what I remember.

Q I would like to shift to your recollection of the drafting

process on the night of the 11th and the morning -- into the early

morning of the 12th. You described a drafting session that occurred,

took place at your residence, and I recall you were being asked a

specific question about press reporting that night, and I wanted to

reconcile that, because I thought I later heard you say that you were

a consumer of the press. And I believe I had my notes that you didn't

have a specific recollection of a specific news report from that night,

but do you remember generally being aware of press reporting on the

night of the attacks?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what's the basis for that recollection? Do you

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recall there perhaps being a television on in the background that news

alerts would have been coming into somebody's inbox?

A I do not recall a television being on, but -- and I do not

recall a specific news story that I would have -- that I read that night,

but I do recall being on the Internet, you know, reading -- I don't

recall any specifics, but I do recall sort of there is an event

unfolding, I was interested to know what the -- what was in the public

domain, what are people saying about it. That is, of course, if you're

a speech writer, that's important context to know, what is the climate

in which you're writing.

Q So if I understand you correctly, it sounds like in order

to do your job effectively, you need to be reading for this.

A Yes, yes.

Q Okay. And so your understanding is you would have then been

reading the news; you just don't have a specific recollection?

A I do not have a specific recollection of I read this story,

I read that story.

Q If you could take a look at -- referring back to exhibit 1.

So these are the remarks, and I just -- just so the record is completely

clear, these are the remarks that I believe you indicated that you had

participated in the drafting of at your residence, and these are the

same remarks that the Secretary then delivered on camera?

A The ones marked, "Remarks on the Death of American Personnel

in Benghazi, Libya, September 12th, 2012."

Q Okay. And to the extent that there are two statements that

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preceded here in this chronology, which was prepared by ,

it appears, was your understanding that there had been two public

statements that had been issued prior to the delivery of these remarks?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A These are paper statements. The first -- the remarks on

the 12th are the ones that she delivered in person.

Q And in the last round, you described what you viewed as the

purpose of the goals that these remarks -- that these remarks would

serve. I guess, well, let me ask my question this way: Was one of

the purposes to deliver a definitive accounting of the attacks that

took place that night?

A No.

Q To provide every single detail about the attacks?

A No.

Q Okay. And to the extent that you would include factual

information about the attacks, how did you decide which information

you should include?

A It's a good question. I think it is definitely true, as

just discussed, that the goal was not to provide a definitive accounting

of the facts, and, you know, as she said, we were still -- there would

be time to reflect later and that we were still learning about the

motivations and methods.

So, I think we were -- that was our -- that was our guide.

We -- and I can't recall conversations about specifically put this fact

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in, don't put this fact in, but I do recall that sentiment, that we

didn't need to provide a definitive accounting of the facts, and that

that was not the goal of this statement, and that we -- there would

be time to reflect later and that we were still learning about

motivations and methods.

So we said all that, and beyond that, I can't recall, you know,

the specific in-and-out discussion.

Q And in a statement like this, you know, you were directed

to the fifth paragraph on the second page. It appears to be towards

the bottom of the speech. As a speech writer, would you generally tend

to, when you wrote a speech for the Secretary to deliver, put the most

important information up front for the Secretary to deliver? In other

words, is there some meaning to how information is presented in a speech

in the order in which it's presented?

A I wouldn't want to draw too broad a generalization about

that. As a -- different speeches have different structure.

Q What about here? And the reason I'm asking, the very first

paragraph, the first two sentences indicate that there was an attack,

and then that second sentence, which you were asked about in the

previous round reads, quote, "Heavily armed militants assaulted the

compound and set fires to our buildings," close quote. And you know,

to us, our reading, that appears to be a fairly strong statement that's

up front, and I just was trying to get your sense, or your reaction,

to why language like that would be inserted not only in the speech,

but at the beginning, very beginning of the speech?

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A So, I think the balance that as a speech writer, I would

try to strike in this situation is between what we just said, which

is the goal of this speech is not -- or these remarks are not to provide

a definitive factual record.

The goals are, as I said earlier, to honor those who fell, to

express American determination and values, to lower the temperature

around the world, and speak to a global audience, balanced against the

need that the audience needs to know what she's talking about. So the

audience was waking up in the morning, and the Secretary is giving

remarks. The first two sentences reflect, you don't know what we're

talking about, we're telling you what we're talking about, but beyond

that, I think, you know, that's the balance to strike.

Q Okay. And -- so I would like to direct your attention now

to the language that you referred to in the last hour, the sentence

reads, quote, "Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior along

with the protest that took place at our embassy in Cairo yesterday as

a response to inflammatory material posted on the Internet," close

quote.

And you've been asked your opinions, your beliefs about a protest,

about a video, about whether -- the use of the word "terrorism," your

recollection of that. And my question to you is, this sentence here,

which is substantially similar to the sentence that appears in the very

first public statement, did you view that as in competition with the

first or second sentence of the remarks?

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Mr. . Not at all.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. So it was accurate, or did you believe it to be

accurate both that this first, I'm sorry, the second sentence,

"Heavily-armed militants assaulted the compound and set fire to our

buildings, and some have sought to justify this vicious behavior as

a response to inflammatory materials on the Internet." You viewed both

of those as accurate at the time?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Did you view them in any way as mutually exclusive?

Mr. . No. I didn't then and I don't now. I think that,

you know, what I believed then is what the Secretary said, which is

we were still learning about the motivations and methods. And I don't

today, sitting here, claim to have any, you know, perfect knowledge

about motivations of every person who participated in that attack. But

there doesn't seem to me today to be any contradiction between some

people -- some people being motivated having multiple motivations, or

some being motivated by one thing and another by another thing. I don't

see any contradiction between -- and certainly not between the fact

that some have sought to justify the suspicious behavior with the idea

that there were heavily-armed militants there.

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BY MR. KENNY:

Q So you've been asked a little bit about specific underlying

information to support or undergird your beliefs. And I'd just like

to ask, at the time, do you recall having some sort of evidentiary basis

in order to confirm that those statements were accurate?

A I relied primarily for information on Jake Sullivan. And

was guided by the best information I had at the time.

Q And would that have been inappropriate in these

circumstances? Can you just describe for us, for instance, the

relationship between the speech writing team and Jake Sullivan, who

I understand was the deputy chief of staff and later became also the

director for policy planning.

A And by this point was director of policy planning.

He was our boss. The speech writing staff was housed in the

Office of Policy Planning. Jake was the director of policy planning.

He was very hands-on in the speech writing process. He was our primary

conduit for guidance on policy and what was the Secretary's -- what

the Secretary wanted to say at any given day. And so it was both

appropriate and not unusual that I would rely on a him as my primary

source of information.

Q And with specific respect to these remarks which were

delivered in the treaty room on September 12, do you recall anyone

either in your original drafting session or later raising concerns that

any of the information here or any proposed edits were inaccurate?

A No. I do not recall anything like that.

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Q Okay. And just to close out, this speech we had talked

about some of the goals that you believed were your guiding principles

for drafting this speech. And I'd just like to ask: Was it your

opinion at the time that you felt that these remarks fulfilled those

goals?

A Yes.

Q And just to follow up a little bit with that, and you may

have already answered this question, but the specific line "some have

sought to justify," if you've already explained it, I apologize. But

explain to us how that line fit in with the overall goals that you

described earlier?

A One of the goals that I mentioned for these remarks was to

address a global audience and lower the temperature in a period of

unrest across North Africa, the Middle East, and the Muslim world.

That unrest was related to the inflammatory video. And so this

sentence related to that goal.

I also mentioned the goal of being -- reaffirming American values

in the world. And I think that this part of the speech was about that

as well.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So in terms of you said sometimes there's a balance between

fighting, not with specific regard to this speech, but overall, when

to mention something in order to lower the temperature, and when not

to mention in order to deny -- I think the phrase you used was deny

oxygen to the issue?

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A Right.

Q I don't know if there was concrete -- I'm not asking you

necessarily whether you recall the concrete discussions about that

balance here, but was there a sense that it was more important to mention

it than to deny it, oxygen at this point in time, by refusing to mention

it?

A I think that -- and, again, I don't recall the specific

conversations that night about this. But I think where we ended up

reflected our best judgment about that balance.

Q And that could have been a decision that changed over time,

that balance and whether it was -- as the days progressed --

A Absolutely.

Q -- as to whether --

A We were dealing with -- over the course of the following

days and weeks, we were dealing with an unfolding situation. As I said,

there were incidents at other embassies in other countries, in Tunisia

and Sudan and elsewhere. It was an ongoing global crisis. And as I

worked on remarks throughout the following days and weeks, that was

an ongoing discussion about how best to address that situation.

Q So a decision as to whether or not to mention, for example,

the issues around the video in a particular speech versus deciding not

to mention it, from your perspective, was driven by the factors that

you've articulated here?

A Absolutely.

Q Were they ever driven by a desire to downplay the potential

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role of extremists or terrorists with particular regard to Benghazi,

because that's the one that the accusation has been made -- the calculus

as to when to talk about the video and when not, were they ever driven

by a desire to downplay the role of terrorists?

A No.

Q To deny that there might have been terrorists involved in

the attack?

A No. I was never part of a conversation like that. I

certainly don't recall any, that being something that was discussed.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I'd like to move forward. And I'll direct your attention

to -- it's Bates number SCB -- or document number SCB0045485. This

is the September 14 ramp ceremony remarks.

A Yes.

Q And I believe you indicated that you had drafted this

speech. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And could you just describe for us what the goals

of this speech were. You mentioned that previously with the treaty

room remarks, could you just describe generally what this speech was

to accomplish?

A Sure. The goals were similar. But in this case,

overwhelmingly, the goal was to honor those we had lost. Secondarily,

as with the previous remarks, we were still speaking to a global

audience. We were speaking in the middle of an ongoing crisis, a period

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of instability. So the primary goal was to honor those we lost.

Secondary goal was to address that global audience and the ongoing

events in the region and beyond.

Q And to your knowledge, do you recall whether it was

important for the Secretary to attend this event?

A Yes. I mean, you know, it depends based on whose judgement.

I guess if you are asking my judgment, I thought it was --

Q Please.

A -- important that she go. We had lost colleagues, and it

was -- I went, and it was -- and a lot of other people did too. And

it was an important moment.

Q I'd like to direct your attention on the second page about

four paragraphs in. And this paragraph, the last sentence reads,

quote, "The president of the Palestinian Authority who worked closely

with Chris when he served in Jerusalem sent me a letter remembering

his energy and integrity, and deploring, and I quote, 'an act of ugly

terror,' close quote. Many others from across the Middle East and

North America have offered similar sentiments," closed quote.

A North Africa.

Q North Africa. I apologize. "Have offered similar

sentiments," close quote. It appears here that the Secretary,

although not in her direct voice, refers to an act of ugly terror. Is

that your understanding as well?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall whether that specific phrase was included

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in the first draft of the speech that you prepared?

A Gosh. I can't remember the draft, how many -- whether this

went through multiple -- I mean, I don't remember the first draft, so

I couldn't say.

Q Do you remember any concern being raised about including

that specific phrase?

A No. I do not recall any concern about that.

Q In the last round you were asked about the use of the term

"terrorist," and you had mentioned, or indicated that you viewed that

term somewhat interchangeably, I believe, with "extremists." Is

that --

A Violent extremists.

Q -- is that right? Violent extremists.

A It was a common phrase in our lexicon.

Q Okay. Thank you. So you were asked about your awareness

of the controversy surrounding what Ambassador Rice had said on the

five Sunday talk shows September 16. There also has been some public

controversy over some of the Secretary's remarks. And I would just

would like to begin by asking how you feel when you see or read those

criticisms. And they may be particular statements or remarks that you

had drafted. How do you feel when you see criticisms that they may

be inaccurate or that were said they were intentionally inaccurate?

A How I feel now today?

Q Sure.

A Are you -- well, I think as I said earlier, I don't see any

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contradiction between what was -- you know, what we wrote in those

remarks and what she said that this was an ugly act of terror, that

there were heavily-armed militants, that there were some who sought

to justify events because of an inflammatory video. I don't see any

contradiction there. I feel proud of the remarks we wrote and the

Secretary's leadership during a difficult time. Feel proud of my

colleagues who pulled together, you know, after they lost friends and

colleagues. And, you know, that's the -- that's -- when I look back,

that's what I remember.

Q So sitting here today, you're proud of the work that you

accomplished?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. It's further been alleged the administration

created a false narrative with respect to the YouTube video that caused

so much unrest, and insinuating that it played a direct role in the

attack. And, again, I'd just like to ask for your response to that

allegation and your thought on whether the administration created a

false narrative?

A I never heard anyone talk about anything like that. I never

heard anyone talk about this in the context of politics. I never heard

anyone say let's do anything other than be guided by the best

information we have, and serve the American people the best we can.

And so, no, I think that's way off base.

Q And just to follow up on that, anyone else you worked with

on this speech, any speech or any statement that was related to the

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Benghazi attacks, are you aware of anybody made any changes that were

known at that time to be false?

A Never. I am not aware of any -- I mean, I can only speak

for myself. But I certainly didn't do that. And I'm not aware of

anyone else doing that either.

Q Okay. And so no one ever pressured you to make changes to

any statement or speech about the Benghazi attacks that you believe

to be false?

A Absolutely not.

Q And no one told you that they had been pressured to make

changes that they knew were false?

A Absolutely not.

Q Okay. So at this point, we're going to shift gears a little

bit, and in moving to this next section, I'll just preface by saying

that this is the eighth Congressional investigation into the Benghazi

attacks. And we feel certainly that it's our duty to ensure that it's

the last. And in order to do that, we've been asking every witness

about a series of public allegations that have been made since the

attacks. It's our understanding that even where they have been

answered by other investigations, our colleagues in the majority are

pursuing them. And that's why we continue to ask about them. While

anyone can speculate about the Benghazi attacks, and plenty of people

have, only a limited universe of people have actual knowledge or

evidence of what happened before, during, and after the attacks.

What I'm going to ask you for is not your opinion or speculation,

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but just whether you have any firsthand information. If you don't,

we'll simply move to the next allegation. And there's about a dozen

of these. So please bear with me.

First, it's been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

Congressman has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon

Panetta to 'stand down,'" closed quote, and this resulted in the Defense

Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No. I don't.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated the claim and gave it Four Pinocchios, its

highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources at Benghazi?

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A No, I don't.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

the spring of 2011?

A No, I don't. And I hadn't heard that one.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syrian," close quote, and that they found,

quote, "no support for this allegation," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No. I don't.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

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from departing the annex to assist the Special Mission Compound on the

night of the attacks. And there have been a number of allegations about

the cause of and appropriateness of that delay.

The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report

concluding the team was not ordered to stand down, but that there were

tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A I do not.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision, or you feel it was right, do you have any evidence that there

was a bad or improper reason behind the temporary delay of the CIA

security personnel who departed the Annex to assist the Special Mission

Compound?

A No, I don't.

Q Concern has been raised by one individual that in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board, damaging

documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials or provided

to the ARB?

A No. I don't.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed to anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub

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damaging document from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask you questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q And it has been alleged that the CIA Deputy Director Mike

Morell altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks

for political reasons, and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress and the CIA that the CIA "faithfully performed our

duties in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship."

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional representation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

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shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as commander in chief," close quote, on

the night of the attacks, and that he was, quote, "missing in action,"

close quote.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks were considering flying

on a second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors to, quote,

"stand down," close quote, meaning to cease all operations. Military

officials have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered

to, quote, "remain in place," closed quote, in Tripoli to provide

security and medical assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand-down order issued to

the U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight

in Benghazi," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that, quote, "There was no stand-down order

issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the

fight in Benghazi," closed quote?

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A No.

Q Last one. It has been alleged that the military failed to

deploy assets on the night of the attacks that would have saved lives.

However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the

former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a

review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the

troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it

dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," closed

quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No. I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives, but the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to

deploy?

A No.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I think we're just about done. We appreciate your time.

I don't know if our colleagues have some follow-up. But in terms

of -- you've, I think, done a nice job giving us a generalized sense

of kind of the factors that would go into what was included in any

particular speech and explaining that those might have evolved over

time.

Today, you were shown only final versions of speeches. And that

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was my understanding as well with Ms. . You weren't shown any

drafts. You know, it's my understanding that the committee does have,

at least in some instances, drafts. With regard to those, we've

reviewed them. We did not -- we thought they were mostly

self-explanatory. But had the committee had a question about any

particular draft on a document in our possession, would you have been

willing and able to try to explain to us with regard to things like

seeking to achieve these goals, learn the temperature versus denying

an issue oxygen, seeking not to inflame the situation anymore,

displaying American resolve, to the best of your recollection, based

on an actual document, what factored into it?

A You know, based on my best recollection, I would try to be

as helpful as I could. But, you know, as I said, it's hard 3 years

later to reconstruct edit by edit. But I would be -- you know, so

within my recollection, I would answer as best I could.

Q And just in the more general sense, without having a

particular edit, these were the standards that you feel governed the

speech writing at the time?

A Yes.

Q And I know it sounds like a strange question. It is a little

strange. But I ask it in part, and I do want this on the record because

we have, over the course of this investigation, asked for and received

a number of documents from the State Department. We continue to press

for more, and I'm sure we will continue to get more. But I do want

the record to reflect that you were here, you were willing, you're

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available to talk --

A Yes.

Q -- about any document in our possession that we had

questions about?

A Yes.

Mr. Kenny. I think that concludes our round. And with that, we

can go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Missakian. Back on the record.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Mr. , I should have asked you this before. On the

evening of September 11, there was a secure video teleconference at

the State Department that began at 7:30 that we understand. Did you

participate in that?

A No.

Q Did anyone discuss with you anything that was discussed

during that call?

A No.

Q Are you aware that it even occurred?

A Not that I'm aware of.

I am, in retrospect -- sitting here, I'm aware of it. I was not

then.

Q Now, you were asked some questions in response to which you

said something to the effect that the statement we've been looking at,

which is focused on in Exhibit 1, which is a statement that was prepared

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on the evening of September 11, and then given the next morning on

September 12, that your goal was not to give a definitive accounting

of what had occurred during the attacks. Do you recall giving that

answer?

A I believe I recall that exchange. I think I said that it

wasn't the goal to provide a definitive accounting of all the facts

or something like that. We can look at the transcript.

Q Right. I may have not gotten it exactly right.

Why was that not a goal?

A The goal of the statement -- the goals of the statement

were, as I said, you know, to honor those who we lost, to express

American determination and values, to address the global audience and

period of instability, lower the temperature. And, you know, my role

was, as a speech writer, was to help achieve those goals. The

Secretary, you know, her role as the representative of the United States

to the rest of world, those were her -- you know, as I understood them,

those were her goals. So it was not -- you know, so those were the

goals, and I don't think the other one was. It would be left to others.

Q So if I understand your testimony, the goal as you

understood for that statement came directly from the Secretary?

A Well, they came from Jake. And Jake was my primary source

of information and sort of what -- of information and of sort of

guidance of what would be appropriate to provide for the Secretary.

Q I understand that. But you described them as her goals,

meaning Secretary Clinton's. Were they Secretary Clinton's goals or

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were they Jake Sullivan's goals?

A They were the goals that Jake communicated to me would be

appropriate for the Secretary -- you know, for the remarks. So I did

not have any independent conversation with the Secretary.

Q Do you have any basis for believing that Mr. Sullivan

discussed the goals for the speech with the Secretary before

communicating them to you?

A I don't know. I really couldn't say whether he talked to

her or not. I don't know.

Q All right. So it wasn't that you all had a discussion and

made a decision not to include an accounting of what had occurred, that

was just not included in the set of goals that were communicated to

you by Mr. Sullivan?

A That's generally right. I don't recall a specific

conversation like that. What I do recall is, as I think I said earlier,

is that, you know, we discussed, you know, striking the right balance

in his remarks of advancing those goals. And being, you know, being

guided by the best information we had, and -- and it's -- so, right.

Exactly. I don't remember a specific conversation, in answer to your

question.

Q On the night of the attack, were you aware that there was

a separate CIA facility that had come under attack?

A I don't recall being aware of that that night. I'm aware

of it now, but I don't recall being aware of it then.

Q Okay. I think you were asked some questions about whether

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or not you were aware of the news reports that night. We know that

you're a consumer of news. It's part of your job. Did you use anything

you read in any of those news reports in any of the remarks that you

drafted?

A I don't -- I don't remember any specific -- I don't remember

drawing any kind of specific insight from any news reports that would

have been reflected in the draft.

Mr. Missakian. That's it. Thank you.

Mr. . Thank you.

Mr. Kenny. Off the record.

[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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INTERVIEW OF HUMA ABEDIN

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, OCTOBER 16, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Liaison and Counsel

PHIL KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

KRISTA BOYD, Minority General Counsel

FOR HUMA ABEDIN

MIGUEL E. RODRIGUEZ,

Bryan Cave LLP

KAREN DUNN,

MARTHA L. GOODMAN,

Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP

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Ms. Jackson. This is a transcribed interview of Huma Abedin

conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi.

This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the

committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic

facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant to House

Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th

Congress.

Could we have the witness state her name, please?

Ms. Abedin. Huma Abedin.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. We appreciate your appearance today. We

understand, as I just said, that it's voluntary, and we appreciate,

again, you coming in and sharing the information that you have.

Again, good morning. I am Sharon Jackson. I am one of the

counsel from the majority staff. And for the reporter to make an

official record of this proceeding, I'm going to have everyone go around

and introduce themselves, and I'll start with Mr. Pompeo to my right.

Mr. Pompeo. I'm Congressman Mike Pompeo from the 4th District

of Kansas.

Mr. Westmoreland. Lynn Westmoreland from Georgia.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And we'll go to your counsel then.

Ms. Goodman. Martha Goodman, counsel for Ms. Abedin.

Mr. Rodriguez. Miguel Rodriguez, counsel for Ms. Abedin.

Ms. Dunn. Karen Dunn, counsel for Ms. Abedin.

Ms. Jackson. How about back to the minority staff in the back

row.

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Ms. Boyd. Krista Boyd with the select committee minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke, majority staff.

Mr. Kiko. Phil Kiko with the committee.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Mr. Davis. Carlton Davis, counsel for Mr. Gowdy.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with the committee.

Ms. Barrineau. Sara Barrineau with the majority staff.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

With that, I understand that both the witness and her counsel have

something to say, so we'll allow you to add to the record at this point.

Ms. Dunn. Thank you, Sharon. Thanks for the opportunity to be

here.

So the first thing we just want to say is Ms. Abedin will be

testifying today to the best of her recollection. She has not had the

benefit of review of all documents that are at the State Department

or even all documents that have been produced to this committee by the

State Department.

So we have agreed with committee staff that if there is a document

that you want to show Ms. Abedin that she has not seen before -- some

documents, we understand, were produced yesterday; we obviously have

not seen those -- that we would take a break and allow for her to review

the document.

The other concern we shared with majority staff is about leaking.

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We received some assurances in this regard, and we just want to make

sure everyone is sensitive to that.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Ms. Abedin. Ms. Jackson, I just want to say very briefly that

I'm glad to have the opportunity to answer your questions today. You

know, I've spent most of my adult life in government service, including

in this complex for many years, and I want to do everything I can to

be helpful to your committee. And I will do the best that I can to

answer your questions as best as I can remember.

And the last thing I'll say: If it's not already painfully

obvious, I've never testified before a congressional committee before,

and I'm extremely nervous. And so I appreciate your bearing with me.

Ms. Jackson. All right.

As with anything, we have some ground rules that we follow, some

procedures that we have in place that govern a transcribed interview

like this. So I'd just like to take a couple minutes and go over those

with you.

Ms. Abedin. Of course.

Ms. Jackson. Generally, the way that questioning proceeds is

that a Member of Congress or a member of the staff, of the majority

staff, will ask questions for up to an hour.

Ms. Abedin. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. And then you'll stay there, we'll switch seats and

allow the minority staff or minority members of the committee to have

the next hour of questioning. And we rotate back and forth in that

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manner until each side has exhausted the questions that they have. And

then, once we're out of questions, the interview will conclude for

today.

Ms. Abedin. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. I realize that you've not testified before, but

unlike testimony in a Federal court or a State court or a deposition

in litigation, the committee format is not bound by rules of evidence.

You and your counsel may raise objections for privilege subject to,

then, review by the chairman of the committee. If those objections

cannot be resolved in the interview, we can require you to return to

answer those questions in a deposition or a hearing.

Members or their staff, however, are not permitted to raise

objections to the questions that are posed when either side is asking

questions. This has not been an issue that we've had, but it is one

of our processes that we observe.

The setting that we're in today is an unclassified setting, so

if any question that we pose to you you believe calls for a classified

answer, please just let us know. We have a classified setting reserved

for this afternoon, and we can move to that, or we can hold the question

or withdraw the question until we're in a classified setting.

Ms. Abedin. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. So, again, just to the best of your ability, alert

us if you think an answer might go into classified information, and

we'll reserve it for the appropriate setting.

I believe your counsel has told you this, but I just wanted to

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reiterate it. You are very welcome to confer with your counsel

whenever you wish to do so. And you can do that throughout the

interview before you answer any question and, obviously, during the

breaks that we will take.

But if it's a simple matter of you need something clarified or

repeated, just ask us to do so. I have a habit of asking complex

questions, and sometimes they need to be broken down. So if there's

too many parts to it, just let me know. I'll be happy to restate it

or rephrase it in a way that enables you to answer it to the best of

your ability.

But, again, if you want to discuss anything with your counsel,

just let us know. We'll, you know, stop the clock, take a break, allow

you a private area to confer with your counsel and give you as much

time as you need to do that.

Ms. Abedin. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. We will also take a break whenever is convenient

for you. We typically do this at the end of every hour of questioning,

so we take a break every hour. But if you need a break in between,

if you need another cup of coffee or if you need water or anything like

that, please just let us know. We're going to try and make you as

comfortable as possible, given the circumstances that we're all in

today.

As you can see, we have an official reporter taking down

everything that is asked and your responses today. So one of the things

that is important is that you give verbal responses to the questions

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that are posed. We have a habit in conversation of nodding and shaking

our head, but the reporter needs to take everything down. And so I

give the reporter permission, if we get into that habit of not answering

verbally, that the reporter can interject and say, "I need a verbal

answer."

Along those same lines, sometimes people talk over each other,

start giving an answer, or I might start a question before you've

finished your answer. I will try my best not to do that. Again, I

give the reporter full rein to interject and say "one at a time" or

"slow down" or things like that.

I have been told, when I used to appear in Federal court, that

I can talk really fast. Anytime a judge would say to me, "You have

5 minutes left in your closing," and I had 15 minutes of words yet to

speak, I could talk really fast. And I will try not to do that today.

We don't want to keep you here any longer than possible, but we

do want to make sure we get a good record of everything that's said

and that you feel that you understand the questions that are posed to

you to give us your best recollection.

And, again, that is what we're asking for today. We know that

there has been a passage of time since these events that we're going

to ask you about. And we realize that everyone's memory is not as

crystal-clear as it was, say, yesterday, although I will admit that

my short-term memory is the worst these days. My long-term memory is

a little better.

But we are asking that you give us the most complete answer that

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you can to our questions and to the best of your recollection. If you

can honestly not remember something, please just say so. That's all

we ask.

If it's a matter of you don't know the information but you know

someone else does, we would ask that you give us that information. So,

again, as I've often said, we weren't there at the time, we were not

in the room, and so we can only get the information from the people

who were there at the time. And that's why you're here today.

So I think that's pretty much it, except for the last part, but

it's a very important part. Do you understand that you are required

to answer questions from Congress truthfully?

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Do you understand that this also applies to

questions asked by staff members of a congressional committee?

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Do you understand that witnesses that

knowingly provide false testimony could be subject to criminal

prosecution for perjury or making false statements?

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Is there any reason that you would be unable

to provide truthful answers to today's questions?

Ms. Abedin. No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

That is the end of my preamble. I am going to ask the minority

staff if they have anything that they would like to add.

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Ms. Sawyer. We'd just like to welcome you here. We appreciate

you being here. The ranking member, Mr. Cummings from Maryland, will

be joining us shortly, and I'm sure that he will also express his

appreciation for you joining us today.

Ms. Abedin. Thank you, Heather. Appreciate it.

Ms. Jackson. Ms. Abedin or your counsel, do you have anything

else that you would like to add before we start the first round of

questioning?

Ms. Dunn. No.

Ms. Abedin. No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

And, with that, we will start the first round of questioning.

I'll say it's 10:19, sort of in between that, but we will start the

first round of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Ms. Abedin, we understand that you worked at the State

Department between the years of 2009 and 2013. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Could you describe for us your duties, responsibilities,

and positions at the State Department?

A I was Secretary Clinton's Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations. And, in that capacity, I was responsible for the

day-to-day operations of her office as it related to her schedule, her

daily schedule, her long-term schedule. So it was everything from

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12

planning, coordinating, and implementing her travel, whether it was

in the building, domestically, or on foreign trips.

Q And you said your role was limited to her office and her

schedule. Is that correct? You were not in charge of operations for

the State Department writ large?

A That is correct.

Q Okay.

And can you give us the -- were you there during her entire tenure?

A I was.

Q Okay. Did you stay after her tenure?

A I did not.

Q Okay.

Ms. Abedin, how did you first learn that the U.S. diplomatic

facility in Benghazi had been attacked or was being attacked?

A I remember receiving an alert on my BlackBerry. It was

either a news alert or an alert from our operations center that there

had been an attack.

Q Where were you at the time?

A I was in New York.

Q Okay. So you were not at State Department buildings here

in Washington, D.C.

A I was not.

Q Okay.

What, if anything, did you do when you received that alert?

A I called one of the assistants in the Secretary's office

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13

to check in.

Q Okay. And do you recall who that was?

A It was either or , one of her

two personal assistants there.

Q Could I get the first name again, please?

A or .

Q Okay. And what, if anything, did you want to do or inquire

about, or what was the purpose of your call?

A I just wanted to check in. I'd heard about this -- I'd heard

about the attack and just wanted to check in to the office and see what

was happening.

Q Do you recall approximately when that was?

A You know, I honestly don't remember the time, but I was out

to dinner with friends in New York, so it was sometime in the early

evening.

Q Would you say it was after 6 p.m. and before 8 p.m. or was

it earlier than that?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay.

You said that one of the ways that you might have been alerted

was through an alert from the operations center?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

[Abedin Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

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14

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I'm going to hand you what I've marked as Deposition Exhibit

No. 1 or exhibit No. 1, which is a series of updates from the operations

center at the State Department. It bears -- oh, man, the copying is

bad -- bears document number 58670, and it is a multipage document.

But I would ask that you take a look at this exhibit, and then

I'm going to ask you a few questions from it.

A Okay.

Q Okay. Are you ready?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Is this the nature of an ops alert that you described

as being the type of information that you might have received? Or would

an ops alert come to you in a different format?

A Looking at this, the document that you're showing me, I'm

not sure I would have received these particular messages. Often, the

special assistants -- , for example, is noted up here -- would

forward alerts that they got, that the special assistants got, that

they then forwarded to some of the members of the Secretary's staff.

I don't recall receiving updates to this detail that evening.

But, yes, an ops alert typically would give you an update on a situation

around the world at one of our facilities.

Q And when information would be forwarded to you, would it

be forwarded in the form that the special assistants received it?

A I can't speak specifically, but this would not be atypical,

for the special assistant to then forward it to some members of the

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15

Secretary's staff, as is reflected in this particular document.

Q So I want to understand how the information flow would go.

So if it wouldn't come in this form, how would it come to --

A No, it would. It would've been forwarded -- I mean, this

is not atypical is what I'm saying.

Q Oh, not atypical.

A This is not atypical --

Q Okay.

A -- for the special assistant to have forwarded something

to members of the Secretary's staff.

Q Okay.

Going back to, sort of, the end of this document, when the first

alert came out, which would be, sort of, the bottom of the

second-to-last page into the last page, it is sent Tuesday,

September 11, 2012, at 4:05 p.m. And it lists a variety of what I would

call distribution lists.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is that how you would describe who it is sent to?

A I'm not sure I can speak to who, you know, the ops alert

would send emails to. But, yes, it was a selection of people throughout

the Department. Yes.

Q Were you part of any of these email addresses here? For

example, in the "to" line, I see, S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov.

A Correct.

Q Correct. Would you be a recipient of that, or would that

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have been someone else who then would have perhaps forwarded the

information to you?

A I would not have been a recipient of that. That would go

to the S_SpecialAssistants.

Q Okay.

As you look through this list of email addresses, do you see any

email address that you would have been a part of?

A There isn't an email address here that I recognize as part

of a distribution group I would have been on.

Q In the middle of that distribution list, I see an email

address that is called "BenghaziUpdate@state.gov." Do you recognize

that email address?

A It does not sound familiar to me.

Q Okay. So you don't know who would have been a part of that

email address.

A I am not certain.

Q Okay.

Throughout this document, exhibit 1, there are periodic updates

that have come in, which culminates on the first page with what is in

the subject line, "Update 8: Second Evacuee Flight is Wheels-Down in

Tripoli."

Do you recall whether you received these updates periodically

through this evening and into the next day, September 12?

A I do not recall.

Q Did you receive periodic updates that night from any other

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source?

A You know, Ms. Jackson, the best that I remember, I received

a notice on my BlackBerry. I'm not certain if it was an ops alert or

if it was, you know, a CNN breaking news story. I was out to dinner

with my husband and with some friends. I looked at it with some alarm.

I got up. I remember I was in a noisy restaurant. I called the

office. "What's happening?" And it was clear they had a lot going

on and said, yes, the Secretary is here, senior staff is here, and a

lot's happening. And, basically, I can't -- I don't remember it being

more than a few-minute phone call. I certainly don't think I

appreciated how serious the situation was in that moment, because, you

know, I just went back to what I was doing.

And so I do not recall having received -- and now that I've read

this document -- you know, some obviously very serious updates that

were being sent. I don't recall seeing those.

Q Did you have any further communications with anyone back

at what I will describe as "Main State" either that evening or the next

morning?

A I went to bed not, you know, having much, frankly, of an

update. I don't recall hearing from any of my colleagues that evening.

And then I woke to a department-wide email informing us that we'd lost

Chris Stevens.

Q Okay. Do you recall if you had talked to the Secretary that

evening?

A I didn't talk to her.

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18

Q Okay. Did you talk to her the next morning?

A I did.

Q Okay. And we'll come back to that in a moment.

One last question about exhibit No. 1. At the very top of this

document, on Tuesday, October 23, 2012, this document is being sent

to Philippe Reines, Cheryl Mills, and Jake Sullivan and then to an

address called "Coordination@state.gov."

Do you know what the Coordination@state.gov represented?

A I don't.

Q Is it an email address that you recall ever using?

A I never heard of it before.

Q Okay.

Was there any type of coordination group that was put together

in response to the Benghazi incident?

A If there was, I'm not aware of the specifics.

Q Okay. All right.

A Shall I return this to you, ma'am?

Q We'll just set them over there for the reporter.

A Okay.

Q Set them to the side.

You stated that you talked to the Secretary the next morning?

A I did.

Q Okay. And do you recall approximately when that was?

A I do not.

Q Before noon? Or before 10?

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A I think it may have been in the afternoon.

Q Okay. And did she relate to you what she knew about the

attacks in Benghazi?

A Honestly, in that moment, I think everyone was just in shock

and immediately trying to figure out how we brought the bodies home.

And, you know, for me, for my purposes, the purpose of our

communication that day would have been how we addressed her existing

schedule, which was quite full, and how we accommodated the schedule

to have an appropriate service to honor, you know, those that we lost,

and, you know, how that affected her schedule, and what do we cancel,

what do we keep, who are we calling, and just, you know, coordinating

that.

I mean, it was pretty -- we had moved pretty quickly into how do

we operationalize, what are we supposed to be doing. I just remember

everyone, you know, being in a little bit of -- our building was in

mourning.

Q Uh-huh.

Do you recall any conversation with the Secretary regarding the

details of the attack as part of that conversation?

A Oh, absolutely not. Those were -- no.

Q Okay.

Did you have conversations, telephone conversations, with any of

the other senior leaders from the State Department that day?

A I did.

Q Okay. And who did you speak with?

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A I couldn't tell you specifically, but I probably spoke to

a lot of them. I was in the building the next day. I returned to

Washington; I was in the building the next day. I saw many of my

colleagues.

Q Okay. That was going to be my next question. Were you

doing this from New York or Washington?

A I was in Washington.

Q So you returned that morning of the 12th?

A I returned, if I remember correctly, late morning -- I

returned late morning. It was after the President had visited the

Department.

Q Okay.

And so, then, once you returned, you were handling the Secretary's

schedule and rearranging things and --

A You know, honestly, at that point, I was more serving in

an advisory capacity -- how can I help, you know, what needed to be

done. You know, many of my colleagues in the Department knew Chris

quite well. And so it was just, you know -- part of it was, you know,

we were just wondering around, you know, we were hugging people and

checking in on them. But, yes, I did reengage.

Q Okay.

When did you first get any details regarding the attack, or

attacks?

A I don't recall anything specific. There was

obviously -- there were news reports coming out immediately. If there

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21

were reports about the attack that were coming up in the Department,

those were not meetings I would have typically been in.

Q Was it discussed, though?

A I --

Q And by that, I mean in your presence.

A I don't remember conversations. I was more in -- it wasn't

my purview to be, sort of, listening to those conversations or being

part of those conversations. I don't recall anything specific, aside

from just talking about the loss of life.

Q Okay.

Do you know if the Secretary had reached out to either any of the

survivors of the attack or the employees in Tripoli or other Americans

that were in Libya?

A Could you be more specific into what time? When?

Q Either the night of the attack or the 12th.

A I know that -- I think it's public record that she spoke

with the embassy that evening. And beyond that, I wasn't privy to the

conversations or meetings that she had that evening.

Q Okay. And when you say "the embassy," you're talking about

Tripoli as opposed to Benghazi?

A Yes. That's my recollection.

Q Okay.

There is an interagency group known as the FEST, which is the

Foreign Emergency Support Team. Are you aware of the FEST?

A I'm not, really. I've read about them in news reports, but

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no.

Q At the time.

A No.

Q At the time of the --

A At the time, I would not.

Q Okay.

Ms. Dunn. Sharon, I think also it would help, just to clarify,

because I think there are some things that Ms. Abedin will know because

she saw the news, and there are things that she will know because they're

her firsthand knowledge.

Ms. Jackson. Right.

Ms. Dunn. And I suppose what you're interested in is what she

actually remembers based on her firsthand knowledge.

Ms. Jackson. That is correct.

Ms. Dunn. But it's sometimes very difficult because, sitting

here today, she probably knows what she read in the news. So I think --

Ms. Jackson. I will try and preface my questions with "at the

time." But that is what -- you know, at the time these events unfolded,

you know, did any number of things happen. And I have a list of things

that I want to go down.

Ms. Abedin. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. So, regardless of whether you subsequently learned

about things, I want to focus on what you knew at the time, what was

discussed at the time, the information flow within --

Ms. Abedin. Okay.

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Ms. Jackson. -- the senior leadership of the Department.

And I understand that it's very likely you don't know a variety

of things, but I want to explore that too, okay?

Ms. Abedin. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. All right.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So, as to the FEST, at the time of the attacks in September

of 2012, you did not know of that resource of the State Department?

A I did not.

Q Okay. Did it come up in any conversations that you were

privy to in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, like, the 12th,

13th, 14th, that week?

A None that I recall.

Q Okay.

Subsequent to that time and notwithstanding anything that you may

have read in the media or learned, but did you ever learn in your

official capacity at the State Department that there was a decision

not to employ the FEST that evening?

A No. I'm not aware.

Q Okay.

Moving ahead a couple of days, or in the immediate aftermath of

the attacks, so the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, was the Secretary asked

to appear on any news shows?

A I recall conversations about potentially appearing on the

Sunday shows.

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Q Okay. And when do you recall that you first learned about

that?

A I have no memory. It was within -- you know, it was within

that span of days, but I couldn't tell you.

Q Would it have been before Friday?

A It's possible it wasn't. I don't know. I really don't

know.

Q Okay. Do you recall that you had the return-of-remains

ceremony on Friday afternoon?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. Would it have been -- I'm just trying to focus on

the time period as best we can.

A Okay.

Q Would it have -- you returned on Wednesday?

A Wednesday.

Q And you had the return of remains on Friday. Where did the

Secretary go after the return of remains? Did she go to New York?

A She was in Washington, as I recollect.

Q That weekend?

A Not the entire weekend. She returned to New York that

weekend.

Q Okay. Would it have been before she returned to New York

that these conversations about the Sunday talk shows would have come

up?

A I would be speculating, but likely -- I would be

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speculating. I mean, I don't -- I honestly don't remember.

Q Okay. And that's why we have documents.

A Oh, thank you. Good.

Q I'm going to mark this document as exhibit No. 2.

[Abedin Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q It's document 45306.

A Okay.

Q There's a front and back, double-sided, but there's very

little on the back.

A Okay.

Q Have you had enough time to review this document?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. This document, which has been marked 45306 and

45307, has a subject line of "Mini for Today -- Friday, September 14,

2012."

Can you explain to us what a "mini for today" is?

A Yes. So her assistants would typically print her schedule,

shrink it down on an index card so that it was convenient for her to

travel with, and we called it the mini.

Q Okay.

This was an email exchange sent by . Who was he?

A He was one of her assistants in the office. He did all of

her correspondence and printed documents for her.

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Q Okay. So he worked on the seventh floor at the State

Department?

A He did.

Q And he would have access to her calendar and schedule and

things like that?

A He typically would -- he would've been sent this to format

it, but the schedulers are the ones who accessed and maintained the

schedule.

Q Okay.

And I notice that this was sent at 7:29 a.m. to you and others.

is a name that you --

A Yes.

Q -- previously mentioned. , I believe, is also

a name you mentioned. And then there is one other name, and who is

that person?

A was her director of scheduling.

Q Okay.

So were all of these people, you yourself included, involved in

setting up her schedule for that day?

A It would have been who set up her schedule, and most

of us would have been cc'd for our awareness, but yes.

Q Okay.

And I noticed that down at the bottom there are some TBDs, which

I assume means "to be determined," but please correct me if I'm wrong.

A That is correct.

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Q Okay. And it appears that there was some consideration

that the Secretary would leave after the return-of-remains ceremony

and go to New York. Was that under consideration at the time?

A It must have been, as is noted on the schedule, yes.

Q Okay. Do you have a recollection as to whether that

occurred?

A I don't. I'm not sure. You know, I'm not sure that she

would have left that night.

Q Okay. If she didn't leave Friday night, when did she leave?

A She either left Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. I just would

have to check --

Q Okay.

A -- the records.

Q And what type of records would have that information?

A Her schedule. Her schedule for that day.

Q And the State Department should still have a record of that?

A You'd have to check with them.

Q Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. Sharon, can I just get her to clarify?

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. What kind of scheduling did you do for Mrs.

Clinton?

Ms. Abedin. Well, I oversaw the scheduling operation. So it

would be, sort of, long-term planning, where she goes, you know, when

we're traveling overseas. I worked very closely with we worked

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28

hand-in-hand, but she actually typed out the schedule. She would be

the one who then called the host organization and said, "The Secretary

will be coming," and then worked out all the logistical details. But

I oversaw

Mr. Westmoreland. So you oversaw all the scheduling, but there

was people that worked under you that scheduled different things?

Ms. Abedin. They would schedule those things, sir. They did the

actual logistics. They called. They, you know, talked about what her

arrival point would be, where would she depart from, what would the

order of the program be. So they reported -- she reported to me.

Mr. Westmoreland. So you would say, "She is going to New York,"

and they would do all the other stuff, whether it's getting a flight

or whatever. If you said, "She's going to New York Friday

afternoon" --

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- then it would be up to them to --

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. would --

Mr. Westmoreland. -- coordinate that?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. But you don't remember if you told them that

she was going to New York that afternoon or not?

Ms. Abedin. When she was in -- I don't. There was some

conversation about her leaving that evening, as is reflected in this

document. I'm not certain she did, sir. She went back --

Mr. Westmoreland. But you had her scheduled to go back to New

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29

York.

Ms. Abedin. We had put it as a tentative option for her to go,

but she -- it's possible she left later in the weekend. But I don't -- I

didn't travel back with her, so I don't have on the top of my head when

her wheels-up time was.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. Just a couple other things on her schedule that day.

I see at 9:30 a.m. she had a weekly meeting with U.N. Ambassador

Susan Rice. Do you see that on the schedule, on exhibit 2?

A I do see that, yes.

Q Do you know if that meeting occurred that day? Do you

recall?

A I don't specifically recall for Friday. They did have a

standing Friday meeting, so it was, you know -- typically, Ambassador

Rice was there. As to that particular Friday, I don't remember if I

saw her or not.

Q Okay. And one of the reasons I was just wondering is if

Ambassador Rice then stayed and traveled with the Secretary to the

ceremony in the afternoon or if you have a recollection of seeing her

on this particular day.

A The senior officials I remember seeing that day were at

Andrews Air Force Base. I just -- I don't remember if Ambassador Rice

was there. I don't -- I really -- I'm sorry. I'm sorry I can't be

more helpful.

Q Okay. Well, let me ask it this way. Once the Secretary

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concluded her meetings for a day, was there a document that was written

up that would summarize what actually happened on her schedule? Is

there another document that may be out there that would confirm what

she did or did not do?

A There typically was, yes, maintained at the State

Department by , who was her executive assistant and did

the final -- you know, updated what actually ended up happening.

Q Okay. And do you know where that final schedule was kept?

A Somewhere in the Department.

Q Okay. But was the person who was

responsible for that at the time?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A When she was in the office, it was , yes.

Q Okay.

Moving up to the schedule, I see at 8:45 a.m. there's a daily

senior staff meeting in the Secretary's conference room. Do you recall

if that meeting occurred?

A It's a meeting that took place every day when she was in

Washington. I'd be speculating, but I would imagine it happened. I

have no reason to believe it wouldn't happen.

Q Okay. And who would attend the daily senior staff meeting?

A It was leadership -- it was leadership from --

Ms. Jackson. Oh, let me just interrupt for a second. We've been

joined -- interrupt you to say we've been joined by Representative

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Cummings.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I believe the question was, who would attend the daily

senior staff meeting?

A It was leadership from throughout the Department, the

deputy secretaries and then the heads of various departments throughout

the building.

Q So the under secretaries?

A No, not the under secretaries, specifically. It was the

deputy secretaries of state and then representatives from -- you know,

the executive secretary, for example, would be there, the executive

assistant would be there, the head of H&L, and our counselor and chief

of staff would be there. It was a smaller group.

Q Okay. And would you typically attend those when they were

held at the State Department?

A Sometimes I did, but not always.

Q Okay.

And when the Secretary was traveling, did she have an alternative

to this meeting? Was there a daily conference call as opposed to a

meeting in her conference room? Did she maintain a daily briefing with

her senior staff when she was out of the office?

A She received a PDB on a daily basis.

Q And would that be the Presidential Daily Brief?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

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A But on travel, there wasn't typically a standing meeting

or phone call that took place with the Department. But, you know, we

were all regularly talking on the road, and several members of people

traveling would be in communication with the State Department,

including the Secretary.

Q Okay.

And at this daily senior staff meeting, for the ones that you

attended, what were the topics of conversation, just generally? What

type of things were being discussed?

A It was any news and updates that each individual department

wanted to say that they are working on. The Legal Advisor would, for

example, tell the Secretary what they were working on. The people

representing H would tell her what was happening on the Hill. The

executive secretary would give an update about what was happening at

embassies around the world. It was sort of a, you know, daily update,

daily report.

Q Okay.

A And then she would share anything that she wanted to.

Q Okay.

And did she have other standing meetings throughout the week with

other either departments or sections of the Department?

A She did. Every Monday morning, we had a senior leadership

meeting, which was very large, that did include the under secretaries,

and it included the assistant secretaries from just about every bureau

in the building. And all the envoys were included. So that was a

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standing meeting that was every Monday.

She also had a standing meeting with the regional assistant

secretaries. So the assistant secretaries that reported to the Under

Secretary for Political Affairs, they would update her on the

activities of their bureau.

Q Okay. That would include the Under Secretary for Near

Eastern Affairs, the regional bureau?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q And when you say "regional bureaus," just help me understand

the hierarchy in the State Department. Was that a level below the

assistant secretary? Were they people different than the assistant

secretaries, or was it the assistant secretaries?

A It was either the assistant secretary or, you know, the

principal deputy assistant secretary in the office. It was whoever

the assistant secretary for that particular bureau, you know, deemed

appropriate to attend. They either came themselves; often, if they

were traveling, it wasn't atypical for a deputy to show up.

Q Okay. And how often were these meetings held?

A The regionals were once a week or once every other week.

But, again, it depended on her travel schedule. We tried to do it once

a week. And I think it was every Thursday.

Q Okay. And how many people would be attending this

particular meeting? How voluminous was the attendees?

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A For the regional?

Q Let's start there, yeah.

A It would be just the number of assistant secretaries as

there were for regional bureaus. So 10, 11? I'm guessing.

Q Okay.

A It was -- you know, it would fill this table.

Q I just want to make -- let's take Near East Affairs. Do

you know how many regional bureaus were within the Near East Affairs --

A Well, that was a --

Q -- region?

A That was a regional bureau.

Q Okay.

A That was one.

Q Okay. So they'd have one person there.

A Correct.

Q Oh, okay.

A Yes.

Q I understand now.

A Yes.

Q And the other meeting that you described that was the larger

meeting, how many people would be at that?

A That was quite large. That could have been, you know,

anywhere from 30 to 40 people. Again, I'm guessing, but that was a

very broad cross-section of leadership throughout the Department was

included.

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Q Okay.

Now, you said the special envoys attended that meeting?

A If they were not traveling, yes.

Q Okay. So were there any telecommunications capabilities?

I mean, did people remote in? Was it is a SVTCS or a VTC or anything

like that? Or would it be an in-person meeting?

A That was an in-person meeting.

Q Okay. So if you had an envoy that was in the Middle East

or some other country, that person would not be participating?

A I don't recall that ever happening.

Q Okay.

I veered off a little bit. We had been talking about the

Secretary was asked to appear on the Sunday talk shows following the

attacks in Benghazi. And I believe you stated that she had been

requested to do them. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you recall who requested?

A Actually, I just want to clarify something, Ms. Jackson.

There was conversation about her going on the Sunday shows that was

raised with me, but -- yes, there was conversation.

Q And did you have those conversations with the Secretary?

A If I'm recalling, yes.

Q Okay. And who else participated in those conversations?

A Our press secretary, Philippe Reines.

Q Okay. Anyone else?

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A I'm sure our deputy chief of staff, Jake Sullivan, and our

chief of staff, Cheryl Mills.

Q Okay. Did Victoria Nuland participate in the

conversations, if you recall?

A I'm sure she did. Philippe reported to Victoria, so I'm

sure she did.

Q Okay. Anyone else that you recall being a part of that?

A No.

Q Okay.

What do you recall about how the topic came to be? Had the news

organizations reached out to the Secretary or to Philippe Reines or

Victoria Nuland requesting her? Was she asked by the White House? Was

it something that she volunteered to do? What can you tell us about

the origin of that?

A And you're asking me what I knew at the time --

Q Yes.

A -- not what I know now.

What I remember -- I don't remember being on any email exchanges

about this. I remember getting a call. And it wouldn't have been

atypical for Philippe, our press secretary, to call me and say, hey,

what do you think about the idea of -- you know, can we have the

Secretary -- or should we talk about the Secretary being on the Sunday

shows? And we had a discussion about it. It might have been a

conference call with some of these, you know, other individuals I

mentioned. It might have just been me and Philippe. But it was pretty

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quickly determined that she would not.

Q Okay. And tell us about how that decision was reached.

What was discussed? Who discussed it? What were the pros and cons

being discussed?

A Well, I can tell you from my perspective, because that's

what I remember, which was we had a pretty full set of particularly

phone calls that we needed and that the Secretary wanted to -- both

responsive and proactive phone calls that she needed to make throughout

the weekend. And we were much more focused -- I was much more focused

on just getting done what she needed to have done. And if I remember

correctly, she was on the phone pretty much all weekend, certainly all

day Saturday and maybe some part of Sunday too.

But it seemed to me, as somebody who had to determine what to,

you know, put on her schedule, that we had other priorities, other

things that she needed to be doing. I did also anticipate that she

was going to go back to New York that weekend. And, lastly, it was

a pretty rare occurrence that she would have done Sunday shows. I mean,

it wasn't anything that was ever seen, really, as a priority by any

of us, frankly.

Q Was there any part of this discussion that centered on the

fact that when she had in the rare instances done Sunday talk shows

before it had been about Libya?

A Are you telling me that?

Q Well, let me ask you that. Did you know that she had

previously done the Sunday talk show circuit, if you will, regarding

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Libya? Do you recall?

A You know, we had done the Sunday shows that year, I know

that, and maybe one or two, but I don't remember the topic. I do

remember that we went, yes, earlier in the year.

Q Do you recall that she did the Sunday talk shows right around

the time of the U.N. resolution and when the President was going to

make an address to the Nation regarding Libya?

A It could have been.

Q Could have been?

A Yeah. Yeah.

Q Okay.

Do you recall whether there was any -- back to September --

A Yeah.

Q -- of 2012. Do you recall there being any part of the

discussion of whether she should do the shows being the fact that she

had done Sunday talk shows regarding Libya before? Do you remember

that being discussed as a factor?

A Not at all.

Q Okay.

And, again, do you recall when the decision was made that she was

not going to do them?

A I don't recall specifically when. But I do know that when

it was raised with me, from my perspective, I immediately said, this

will be very challenging to do, given everything else we're trying to

do, in terms of these priority calls that needed to be done.

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Q Do you know when the decision was made to have Ambassador

Rice do the Sunday talk shows? Were you part of any of those

discussions?

A I was not. And I typically wouldn't have been.

Q Okay.

In the days following that, did you learn anything -- so in the

rest of the month of September into October, did you learn anything

about how the decision was made to have Ambassador Rice go on the talk

shows?

A I don't recall any conversations.

Q Okay. None at all?

A No. And, I mean, those typically wouldn't be conversations

I would have been involved in. But I specifically. I don't

specifically.

Q Do you know if anyone else was involved in those

conversations, regardless of the specifics of the conversation?

A I can't speak to what other people were involved with. I

don't know. I honestly don't know.

Q Did the Secretary weigh in as to whether she wanted to do

the Sunday talk shows?

A I remember discussing it -- you know, we discussing it with

her very briefly, and the answer was "no" almost immediately, from my

memory.

Q Okay.

Now, you've stated that the Secretary made a variety of calls that

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weekend. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what were the nature of those calls? I mean,

to whom? What were -- yeah.

A Wow, you're really -- you're really, like, testing my

memory here.

Q I'm looking for more generally.

A You know, there would have been regional calls to other

leaders in the Middle East. She may have called -- in fact, I'm sure

she called the Libyan leadership and other, sort of, regional Arab

leaders.

I recall there being some conversations with African leaders, as

well. There was something going on in the region, and those calls

needed to be addressed. And that, I think, might have even been prior

to knowing about the attack, but it was.

I remember, that weekend, there just being so many calls that she

had to make. I think she called the King of Morocco, for example, as

a specific, I mean, just something that sticks out in my head. But

those are the ones that I can recall.

Ms. Dunn. Do you have a document or something?

Ms. Jackson. Yeah.

Ms. Dunn. Okay. Given that, you know --

Ms. Jackson. We may circle back around to that.

Ms. Dunn. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

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Q I know you answered this, but let me ask it again because --

A Yeah.

Q -- I'm not exactly sure I remembered your answer. Did you

stay in Washington that weekend, or did you travel -- I know you said

you didn't travel back with the Secretary.

A Yes.

Q But did you travel back to New York?

A I did.

Q You did?

A I did.

Q Okay. Did you work with her at her New York residence that

weekend on these calls?

A I don't think I was with her that -- I wasn't always with

her. So I don't think I was there that weekend, no.

Q Okay.

I want to switch gears here for a moment because I have a few more

questions. Or --

Mr. Pompeo. You keep going. You keep going.

Ms. Jackson. Are you sure?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, of course.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Ms. Dunn. I'm also just wondering, do you do breaks on the hour,

or do you them on the 19s, when we started?

Ms. Jackson. I usually go for a full 60 minutes, but if you would

like a break, we'll be happy to take one now.

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Ms. Abedin. Oh, no, I'm fine.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Then I will go to, like, 19 after, and then

I'd be done with my hour, and we would take a break and switch.

Ms. Dunn. Got it. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Is that fine?

Ms. Dunn. Yeah, no, that's fine.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I want to step back to much earlier, in February and March

of 2011, when the Arab Spring erupted --

A Okay.

Q -- and ask you what you recall about the discussions of the

U.S. intervention in Libya.

A Well, anything related to the policy elements, I would not

be able to be helpful in providing because I wasn't involved in those

conversations. But in terms of her travel and her schedule, I can tell

you what I remember. Is that what you're asking me?

Q We wanted to know what you knew and what you didn't know

and then -- yes. And now we want to go into what you do know. Okay?

A Okay.

Q I just wanted to make clear what you would have been involved

in and not involved in.

A Yes. In that time period or, frankly, any time period, any

meetings as it related to policy would not have been my purview and

would not have been what I was included in. But I certainly was

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included in conversations about where she would go. I was part of those

discussions about her travel.

Q And as to policy and as to Libya, in particular, who would

have been the person that she discussed Libyan policy with?

A That would have been our -- well, it would have been a

combination of leadership of the Department. It would have been our

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Jeff Feltman, and, you

know, our Deputy Secretary of State, Bill Burns, and Jake Sullivan,

who was my co-Deputy Chief of Staff, and he did policy. I was

operations, and he was policy.

Q Okay.

Now, the Department had a second Deputy Secretary; I believe at

that time it was Thomas Nides. Or, at least, he changed --

A Was it Jack Lew or Tom? I think it would have been Tom,

yes.

Q Okay. Regardless of who was in the position, did they have

a policy role?

A I'm not sure how to answer that question. I mean, they

certainly -- I mean, I experienced the person in that role as much more

of a management deputy. Like, I certainly saw, you know, Bill Burns

or Jim Steinberg as the Deputy Secretary of State who did policy, and

the other was more of a management capacity.

Q Okay. And not to say that they didn't delve into policy --

A Yeah, no, yes. I just -- yeah, I'm not -- I'm not sure

that -- I'm not sure that I saw that.

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Q In the spring of 2011 and throughout 2011, we see a lot of

documents where you are forwarding to Secretary Clinton information

regarding Libya and what's happening in Libya, both in general news

articles and in more specific substance from within the State

Department. Do you recall that?

A Yes. Absolutely.

Q Okay. Tell us how you chose or you knew to forward things

to the Secretary. Were you given direction to do so? Did you just

know what was going on and did it of your own volition? We're just

trying to understand why the information flowed in the way it did.

A You're talking about electronic?

Q Yes.

A Okay. So when she was in the office and when she was on

the road, you know, most information that she got was on paper that

was, you know, handed to her and that she handed back. And the same

thing happened on the road. We had our line officers, whose

responsibility was to create the paper, print it, and give it to her.

In instances where she might be at home for the evening or it was

the weekend, I often did send her news alerts or just updates through

the Department. She generally wanted to know what was going on, and

it was my attempt to help keep her informed.

Q Okay. Would she communicate to you what areas of the world

she was concerned about or wanted updates on?

A No. You know, I generally erred on sending her more rather

than less. It wasn't specific. You know, for example, if it was a

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news update, I would send it to her, regardless of the region in the

world.

Q Okay. And how did you know to send her information on

Libya? What was your thought process in deciding to send her

information on Libya?

A I would have send her, if it was information on Somalia or

London or the U.K., I mean, anywhere, I would have forwarded -- I would

have likely forwarded it to her.

Q Okay.

Do you have any sense or recall as to whether the volume of

information you sent her regarding Libya stayed constant, whether it

ebbed and flowed? Was there a time where it tapered off? And,

specifically, I'm looking at the period of 2011 and 2012.

A I remember -- I recall receiving just throughout her tenure

lots of, you know, email updates about the status of, you know,

countries around the world, and I sent them to her.

Certainly, in 2011, I mean, we were very heavily engaged in all

aspects of what was happening in Libya. I mean, I can speak from my

own perspective. The amount of time she spent at these international

conferences and with the contact groups -- I mean, I think we had, I

don't know, eight or nine trips in 2011 alone that were somehow related

to Libya, I mean, starting in February, I think, of that year when she

went to the U.N. Human Rights Council in Switzerland.

So, between that and then going to Paris and then going to London

and then going back to Paris and then being in Istanbul and Rome and

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the Emirates and then finally back in Paris and then ending up in Tripoli

in October of that year, yes, I mean, it was a constant, you know,

physical presence that she had in these meetings. And there was a lot

of work done, you know, around that remotely. And so, sure, was I

sending her updates on Libya? Absolutely.

As to the number and the volume, I couldn't guess, but it was

probably -- I would speculate that there was probably a lot of updates

that were coming in that I would be sending.

Q Okay.

And all of those cities that you just talked about, Paris three

times and Rome --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- and Istanbul, were those all Libya-related meetings --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- that she attended?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

In February-March of 2011, were you aware that Chris Stevens was

going to be selected to be the Envoy to -- and be sent to Benghazi and

Envoy to Libya?

A I was not.

Q Okay. When did you first learn that?

A When I met him -- and if I'm remembering correctly, I think

that was the first time I actually met Chris. When he attended a

meeting with Mahmoud Jibril in Paris was the first time that the

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Secretary was meeting with the opposition leader. And this would have

been probably mid-March of 2011, and it's the first time I met Chris.

Q Okay. And that was before he went into Benghazi as the

Envoy?

A I don't know at that point what his formal title was. But,

at that point, it was, at least to me, clear -- that's why he was in

the meeting -- that he was our representative to the TNC.

Q Okay.

Do you recall whether Ambassador Cretz was at that meeting?

A I think he was. I think he was, yes.

Q Okay.

And tell us what you know of why Chris Stevens was selected to

go and be the representative to the rebels or the revolutionaries.

A I have absolutely no idea.

Q Okay. Do you know who made that decision?

A I would be speculating.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. I see that I only have about 5 or 6 minutes left,

and I believe Mr. Westmoreland has a couple of question. So he may

want to jump back a little bit.

Mr. Westmoreland. I just want to go back to the scheduling for

a minute.

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. You talked to the Secretary, I guess, late in

the afternoon of the 12th?

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Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did she give you any scheduling request of

what she felt like she needed to do for you to put on the calendar?

Ms. Abedin. From my recollection, sir, that first meeting that

we had was to address what to do about the next few days in the immediate.

For example, we had the Foreign Minister of Morocco who had come

in with an entire delegation, and we were doing a strategic dialogue

meeting. And this had been a long-planned summit, if you will, that

was taking place actually the next day, that Thursday, the 13th.

And we also had had a long-scheduled and delayed Eid reception,

which was, you know, the end of the month of Ramadan, sort of,

celebration.

And that purpose of that first meeting was what should we do about

the next few days. And, you know, again, from my recollection, we

pretty quickly decided that --

Mr. Westmoreland. Let me just --

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. But would not the attack on a mission and the

killing of the Ambassador and three other Americans, would not that

have been a priority over -- I mean, this had just happened the day

before.

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. And if something like that had happened, you

know, in my district, you know, I would have called scheduling and said,

hey, look, I want to talk to the county commissioner where this

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happened, I want to talk to the city council members, I'd like to make

a phone call to the governor. I mean, you know, there are just --

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- those things that I would think that she

would have relayed to you, but she just basically wanted to continue

with the schedule?

Ms. Abedin. Oh, no, sir. By the time I saw her, she had already

done many of those things.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Ms. Abedin. Earlier in the day, she --

Mr. Westmoreland. So she'd have made all these high-priority

contacts?

Ms. Abedin. She'd already made a -- she'd already made phone

calls, as I understand. She had gone to the White House, met with the

President. You know, they had a meeting about what was happening. The

President returned to the State Department with her and spoke to State

Department employees.

I apologize if I was mischaracterizing what her priority was.

When the attack happened, I was not there. She consulted with the staff

that was immediately in her presence, and they were the ones who

executed -- I do not hold up executing anything, sir, as it related --

Mr. Westmoreland. No, I wasn't inferring that.

Ms. Abedin. No, no, I meant, like, as a matter of practice. You

know, if it was --

Mr. Westmoreland. So when called you, she did give you -- or,

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at some point, late afternoon --

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- did she talk to you about rearranging

anything on the schedule or prioritizing anything or --

Ms. Abedin. Well, Friday changed dramatically. I mean, really,

you know, the -- she had spent the morning -- she had also spoken with

family members that morning.

So it really was -- and, also, if I'm remembering correctly, you

know, shortly after we met with her, she met to talk about the ceremony

at Andrews, because our chief of protocol had to take the lead on

organizing that, you know, amongst the other agencies. So, in the

moment, it was: how do we properly honor; you know, reach out to the

families; spoke at the Department.

But, yes, sir, there was this question: What should I do? We

had obviously canceled whatever else she'd had on Friday. There were,

as you can see, a few things that we kept. We did decide to move forward

the next day with the meeting with the Moroccans and with the Eid

reception, but --

Mr. Westmoreland. Did -- go ahead.

Ms. Abedin. No, that's okay. That's okay. I'll take your

questioning.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, You know, if I'm trying to get in touch

with Mike --

Ms. Abedin. Yeah.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- and sometimes it's hard getting contact

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Member to Member, I'll call my scheduler and say, can you call Mike's

scheduler and set up a time where we can talk?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. And I can't imagine trying to get in touch with

another ambassador or the President of a country or opposition leaders

or whoever it is without, you know, scheduling a phone call.

Did you schedule any phone calls to these people that she was going

to call either at the end of that week or over the weekend?

Ms. Abedin. So I would be overseeing -- typically, what I had

done in the past was I was overseeing that operation. So, if I wasn't

there, she would have just had the scheduler do that who was sitting

in the building in addition to, you know, our deputy chief of staff,

our chief of staff, all the staff that was with her, and said, you know,

I need to call the family members, I need to call the leadership of

Libya, which, you know, I think I --

Mr. Westmoreland. So she didn't call you and say you need to

contact somebody. She was contacting other --

Ms. Abedin. Oh, no, sir. No, sir. Yeah, if she was in the

office -- and I've mentioned a few times -- she would

pick up the phone -- it didn't matter if I was in the office or not.

She would pick up the phone, and she would say, I would like to call,

you know --

Mr. Westmoreland. But would you have been the one to say she's

going home and I'm going to schedule phone -- you know, on Saturday

and Sunday, we're scheduling phone calls?

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Ms. Abedin. Ultimately, when she was going home, she would

direct us. So, if I was with her, she'd tell me. If somebody else

was with her, she'd tell them. I happened, in that particular time

period, not to be there, so none of these directives were directed to

me.

Ms. Abedin. So the press secretary got the request -- because

I know, you know, if we say something or, you know, something happens,

you know, we have all the press people that calls our press girl, and,

you know, she talks to my scheduler and to me about what's, you know,

going on.

So they call this press person. And did he call and ask you, hey,

does she have time to do these things?

Ms. Jackson. And you're talking about the Sunday talk shows?

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes, I'm talking about the -- I'm sorry. I'm

talking about the Sunday talk shows.

Did he say, does she have time to do this? Or was it, do you want

to talk to some of the policy people about her doing this? Would you

have been his first phone call once he got those press things?

Ms. Abedin. Probably not.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Ms. Abedin. No. He would've probably consulted -- typically,

he would've consulted with the policy team first.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, how did you get in the loop, then?

Ms. Abedin. He'd probably call to say, we want to schedule, you

know, what do you think, what else is happening.

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Mr. Westmoreland. I know, but after he talked to the policy

people, it seems pretty evident that the answer was, no, we're not going

to do that.

Ms. Abedin. Yeah, we could have -- and it's possible that we were

all on the same call. I just -- it wasn't something we spent a lot

of time talking about. So, you know, could I have been on that same

call with Jake? That wouldn't have been atypical, sir. It wouldn't

have been atypical for the chief of staff, the deputy chief, and myself,

for all to be on one phone call.

Mr. Westmoreland. So, just to be perfectly straight, in your

opinion --

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- these phone calls that weekend --

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- that she had already made these priority

calls, you said, you know, that night and the next morning, she had

been on the phone talking to these different people. So the priority

phone calls that she made on Saturday and Sunday were a lower priority

than what the first calls were, I'm assuming, or either she couldn't

get in touch with them.

And so did you all say, hey, this needs to be our priority rather

than informing the American people of what happened in Benghazi that

killed four Americans? And I guess that's my question to you. How

did that -- you know, you said that these other phone calls were

prioritized over doing the Sunday talk shows, right?

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Ms. Abedin. That is correct, sir. But I also -- I think the

Secretary has been pretty public about saying that she did not see the

Sunday shows, as a matter of practice, to be a priority. But she had

taken the opportunity --

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, seeing them, I can see them not be a

priority. They're not a priority -- I don't get up on Sundays to go

on a talk show.

Ms. Dunn. We should also clarify, because your initial

testimony, just to be clear, was about your perception.

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Ms. Dunn. And so I think, if you're -- if you want to clarify --

Ms. Abedin. Yeah, no. I mean, yes, I can only speak to what I

knew. And, you know -- and I think the only thing that I was going

to add is she had made several public statements prior to Sunday on

a number of occasions, the day after the attack, including on Friday

at Andrews Air Force Base. And I think she communicated to the American

people on a number of occasions.

And, again, I'm saying this from my perspective. I don't know

that the Sunday shows are the only place where you can communicate to

the American people. But I say that very respectfully, and that's

just -- that's my opinion, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you.

Ms. Abedin. Thank you, sir.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. I see that our first hour is up.

Ms. Dunn. Great.

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Ms. Jackson. And so we will go off the record and take a break.

Ms. Dunn. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. And we'll resume in hopefully -- let's shoot for

10 minutes.

[Recess.]

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. We'll go back on the record.

Good morning, Ms. Abedin. Again, I'm Heather Sawyer. I'm with

the Democratic members of the select committee. We, again, appreciate

your willingness to be here, your willingness to be here voluntarily,

and all of your efforts to make sure that this committee has information

from you, including your documents, that will help our investigation.

The ranking member, Mr. Cummings, is here with us. I know he has

some questions for you and wanted to also welcome you, so I'm going to

turn it over to him.

Ms. Abedin. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings. Good morning.

Ms. Abedin. Good morning, sir.

Mr. Cummings. Ms. Abedin, I came here out of respect for you. I

am going to be here for a while, and hopefully I'll get a chance to come

back. I've got to run back to Baltimore and do some things in our

district and prepare for next Thursday. But I do thank you for being

here. And we appreciate your continued cooperation with the committee

and your willingness to appear voluntarily to answer our questions.

And I want to be clear. We have voiced our objections to the

chairman for calling you in based on our firm belief that you are being

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targeted because of your relationship with Secretary Clinton, not

because you can provide information about the Benghazi attacks, the

subject that this committee is supposed to be investigating.

Our concerns are based on our understanding from previous

witnesses brought before the committee and our review of the documents,

that you are not a policy advisor on Libya or Benghazi and did not have

a role in security for overseas posts, including the temporary mission

facility in Benghazi.

I wanted to confirm that understanding and make sure the record

is clear on your possible role, if any, with respect to legitimate

questions that fall within the scope of the committee's jurisdiction.

Your title, Ms. Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, might

lead some to believe that you did have an operational role in overseeing

security for overseas posts. Was that the case?

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Ms. Abedin. That is not the case, sir.

Mr. Cummings. So you had no role with regard to operations?

Ms. Abedin. None at all.

Mr. Cummings. So you were never personally reviewing or

responsible for assessing and managing security needs and assets for

the temporary mission facility in Benghazi?

Ms. Abedin. That's correct, sir.

Mr. Cummings. Which division within the State Department is

responsible for security at diplomatic posts?

Ms. Abedin. It was our Under Secretary for Management, along with

the head of the DS bureau.

Mr. Cummings. So it is personnel with the diplomatic security who

serve as the experts, I take it, for assessing and managing security

needs and resources for the Department as opposed to the rest.

Ms. Abedin. That's correct, sir.

Mr. Cummings. I wanted also to ask you some questions about your

involvement, if any, in policy decisions with regard to the State

Department's presence in Benghazi.

In December 2011, a recommendation was sent to the Under Secretary

for Management, Patrick Kennedy, to Main State Department presence in

Benghazi. Did you participate in drafting that recommendation?

Ms. Abedin. I did not, sir.

Mr. Cummings. Were you someone who needed to sign off on the

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recommendation before it went to the Under Secretary?

Ms. Abedin. No, I did not.

Mr. Cummings. Did you take part in his decision to approve that

recommendation?

Ms. Abedin. I did not.

Mr. Cummings. The Accountability Review Board that investigated

the attacks in Benghazi found that there were several troubling security

incidents in Benghazi in the months before the September 11, 2012,

attacks, including incidents at the temporary mission facility.

Emergency action committees were convened to assess the security

environment and make recommendations.

We understand that the emergency action committees are the main

tool used by post to review the security environment and make necessary

adjustments to security posture. In our investigation, we have not seen

any recommendation to depart from Benghazi. Are you aware of any

emergency action committee recommendation that personnel in Benghazi

should depart post?

Ms. Abedin. In that time, sir?

Mr. Cummings. Yes.

Ms. Abedin. I don't believe I was. It didn't mean that there

wasn't a memo that may have crossed my desk or an email that I may have

received, but those were not action items for me, so I would not have

done anything about it.

Mr. Cummings. Some members have questioned why Ambassador

Stevens was visiting Benghazi from Tripoli during the anniversary of

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9/11, 2001, and the terrorist -- of the terrorist attacks. Do you know

why Ambassador Stevens was there at that time? Do you know?

Ms. Abedin. I do not, sir.

Mr. Cummings. Do you have any reason to believe that Secretary

Clinton sent him there at that time? Would you have knowledge of that?

Ms. Abedin. I wouldn't have knowledge. You'd have to ask her.

Mr. Cummings. Do you have any reason to believe that before she

learned of the attacks, Secretary Clinton even knew that he was there?

Ms. Abedin. I wouldn't know how to answer that question, sir.

Mr. Cummings. So you -- why do you say that? I'm sorry.

Ms. Abedin. I don't -- I don't even -- or could you repeat the

question, sir?

Mr. Cummings. Yeah. I said, do you have any reason to believe

that before she learned of the attacks, and if you can't answer this,

that's fine, just -- do you have any reason to believe that before she

learned of the attacks, Secretary Clinton even knew that Ambassador

Stevens was there?

Ms. Abedin. I don't know what she would have known and what she

wouldn't have known.

Mr. Cummings. All right. Now, you were not with the Secretary

on the night of the attacks, I understand, but you spoke with her the

next morning. Is that correct?

Ms. Abedin. I spoke to her some time the next day, that is correct,

yes, sir.

Mr. Cummings. One thing that is often overlooked is the fact that

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Secretary Clinton, like others in the Department, lost members of her

team, individuals who were a part of the State Department family, and

I understand it's a very close family. Can you share with us on a

personal level what that meant to her and what it meant to you and others?

Ms. Abedin. Well, I think, you know, I -- I'm not even sure I

mentioned this yesterday -- earlier, rather, but I wasn't even aware

that we'd lost Chris Stevens until I got the Department-wide email when

I woke up to it the next morning. And I was stunned. I'd never

experienced anything like that in all of my years in government service,

and I just never had -- I never dealt with anything like that before,

and, you know -- I'm really sorry.

Mr. Cummings. Take your time.

Ms. Jackson. Take your time.

Ms. Abedin. And when I came to the Department the next day, I

think -- the general feeling, as I had mentioned earlier to Ms. Jackson,

was I think everybody was just in shock, you know, , who

I was very close to, I sat right next to her and had known, of course,

for a very long time, and it was just hard to -- it was just hard to

believe. These are people you're in meetings with every day, and you

don't actually have --

Mr. Cummings. And --

Ms. Abedin. I'm sorry. I'm sorry.

Mr. Cummings. Let me ask you this: You had a chance to talk to

Secretary Clinton. Is that right?

Ms. Abedin. I did.

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Mr. Cummings. And what can you share about what you got from her?

Did you have an impression of her feelings --

Ms. Abedin. As I --

Mr. Cummings. -- with regard to this tragedy?

Ms. Abedin. As I mentioned -- as I mentioned, I mean, I think we

were all just trying to come to terms with what had happened. It was

clear that the President's visit to the Department meant a lot to people

there and people were talking about that. I know she was just -- I mean,

I remember seeing people who were upset or crying. I think it had been

a long time since, I think, even people in the building had remembered

losing -- actually losing an Ambassador, but she was very -- she was

very -- you know, she was upset and she was moved, but she was also very

determined to find out what happened, and really, it was bringing the

bodies home and doing it appropriately.

And I remember, and I was saying to Congressman Westmoreland, when

we had a meeting after the scheduling meeting with our chief of protocol,

or at least Pat Kennedy, I don't remember who, but it was how do we do

the ceremony appropriately, how is it done in the best way, how do we

take care of the families. It was -- that was our primary focus, was

that ceremony, that was the single, you know, thing that I remember

driving my mind, but she was -- I remember her being extremely affected,

and I'm sure -- you know, I don't want to speak for her, but it was -- you

know, this was one of her ambassadors. And so, it was a -- it was a

hard few days where you were trying to reconcile what had happened and

also just, you know, the Department, things were happening, things that

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needed to get done.

Mr. Cummings. Did you believe that her feelings were genuine?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. Cummings. And sincere?

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Mr. Cummings. Secretary Clinton is sometimes accused of caring

only about her public image, of doing things only to make herself look

good to the American people. Did you feel that was true with how she

responded to the attacks in Benghazi? And you know her. You've been

with her a long time.

Ms. Abedin. From what I know about my boss, absolutely not. In

fact, I feel it's the opposite with her. She focuses more on just

getting the job done and making the choices that need to be made, and

less about how it reflects on her. That is how I've experienced it in

all the years I've worked for her.

Mr. Cummings. Now, Ms. Abedin, it's my understanding that the

press was informed that you were being interviewed by the committee and

given the time and the place of this interview.

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Cummings. I had previously expressed my concern to the

chairman that the select committee is unfairly targeting witnesses with

ties to Secretary Clinton for negative publicity and selective release

of information. I raised similar concerns with regard to the chairman's

treatment of Mr. Blumenthal, who was served with a unilateral subpoena

despite being willing to appear voluntarily. There were numerous leaks

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about his interview to the press, which resulted in inaccurate reporting

by the press. The same thing happened again when Cheryl Mills was

brought before the committee.

I suspect that you may share in that -- and I wasn't here when we

opened up today. I suspect that you and your counsel may share some

of these concerns, and I wanted to give you an opportunity to comment

on that, particularly as you shared with us already that you were nervous

about even being here.

Ms. Abedin. I --

Mr. Cummings. Let me ask it another way: Do you have any concern

that following this interview, your testimony will be portrayed

accurately by members of the committee, and that it will be fair?

Ms. Abedin. I can only hope that it will be. And as I said when

I first arrived, I really do -- I really do want to be helpful if I can

be, and if there are questions that I can answer, I want to be helpful

to the committee, but -- and I do hope that it is represented accurately

after I leave today.

Mr. Cummings. You had expressed --

Ms. Dunn. Yes. So --

Mr. Cummings. -- early on -- and I'm sorry I wasn't here.

Ms. Dunn. No. That's okay. So I had expressed concern about

leaks of the testimony today. I conveyed these concerns yesterday to

majority staff counsel, to Mr. Chipman. He gave me assurances in this

regard. And I think I also speak for Mr. Rodriguez when I say that it

is our fervent hope that there are no leaks of Ms. Abedin's testimony

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today. It is -- she has made very clear, and I think is very obvious

from her testimony thus far, how much she wants to be as helpful as

possible, and I think it would undermine her effort were there to be

selective leaks, or leaks at all about her testimony today.

Mr. Cummings. Very well.

Again, I want to thank you for being here. And I -- like I said,

I came here out of respect for you. And as I said, I hope to get back.

If I don't, thank you again for being here.

Ms. Abedin. Thank you, sir. I'm honored by your presence.

Ms. Sawyer. So why don't we go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Sawyer. We're back on the record.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I just wanted to pick up with some of the conversation you

had in the prior round. I couldn't recall. I think you've already

told us, but what day -- you were in New York. And then did you return

physically to D.C. during that week?

A I did. I -- the next day.

Q Okay. You know, and a lot of the conversation thus far has

focused pretty exclusively on Benghazi and kind of the attack in

Benghazi, but do you have a recollection, do you recall hearing about

protests elsewhere in the region?

A Yes, I did.

Q And to the best that you can recall, what did you hear, when

did you hear it?

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A I don't -- I don't remember the specific time, but it was

in the days prior, we had heard about a trailer for a movie that was

an anti-Muhammad movie that, I believe, had actually aired in Egypt,

I think the trailer had aired in Egypt and the movie was -- was going

to be coming out shortly thereafter, and that there had been a protest,

some protests, but at least a specific protest in our embassy in Cairo,

and that some of the perpetrators of that protest had said they were

there because they were, you know, outraged, offended by the potential

content of the movie based on the trailer that they'd seen.

So, yes, it -- and there may have been protests in other parts

of the region. I remember Cairo specifically because that's where we

had our embassy protest. And that was -- in the days around that time

was prior to the attack, for sure.

Q Do you recall whether or not -- well, you said that some

of the individuals at Cairo had indicated they were there

over -- because of anger over the film.

A Yes.

Q Was that something that this government, the U.S.

Government, had seen before, had experience with when something was

deemed to be insulting to the Prophet Muhammad, that there would be

unrest in other places in the world?

A Yes, yes. There were the -- there were the cartoon

depictions, I can't remember where in Europe. I believe -- again, I

don't want to make it up, because I don't remember, some were elsewhere

in Europe, and that had caused some unrest. So, yes, it had been heard

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of before.

Q And did you have an awareness at any point in time? You

said that you knew about the protests in Cairo. Were you aware, at

any point in time, that protesters there had also breached the wall

of the embassy in Cairo?

A I obviously know now, or remember, you know. A lot of this

I read afterwards. In the moment, I may have actual -- I may have,

Heather, it may have been something that was an update that was

presented at a morning meeting. It's possible I did, yes.

Q And, again, I under --

A I think, in fact, I remember that it was on the front page

of The New York Times or something, or The Washington Post the next

day, and it was this very arresting photo of the wall being breached

or something like that. That's my memory.

Q So certainly for you, one of the ways you would hear about

information was through just reading news reports?

A Oh, absolutely, and our news clips. We got a very robust

set of press clips early every morning, which I would read, yes.

Q And certainly, while you would read them and you would see

them, it was not your responsibility on behalf of the Secretary to be

tracking those reports or collecting those reports. Is that accurate?

A That is accurate.

Q And that would be accurate about the news reports. I think

my sense from even the ops alerts was it certainly wasn't -- it doesn't

sound like you were necessarily on an initial distribution list, and

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it certainly was not your responsibility, and in your role for the

Secretary to be tracking ops alerts and making sure she was seeing the

ops alerts?

A That's correct.

Q And the same would be true of intelligence briefings. It

wouldn't be your responsibility to make sure that she was seeing all

of the intelligence briefings, or even discussing the contents of the

intelligence briefings with her. Is that accurate?

A That's 100 percent accurate.

Q But you certainly sometimes, it sounds like, would be

certainly seeing, reading, tracking, and would have an understanding

of the general context as to what was going on in the office?

A Exactly.

Ms. Dunn. Can we just take a brief pause for one second before

you do --

Ms. Sawyer. Sure.

Ms. Dunn. I just wanted to mention something to Huma. If we can

off the record, that would be great.

Ms. Sawyer. Yes. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Dunn. Back on the record. I think Huma had one thing that

we wanted to make sure we mentioned before --

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah, sure. Please.

Ms. Abedin. Yes, Ms. Sawyer, I wanted to go back and note

something Ms. Jackson asked me about earlier about the schedules in

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the aftermath of the attack and suggest, you know, I do believe that

they are probably available at the State Department. You know, I don't

know how or where, but that it might be a resource or a place that you

could go to find out, find the actual schedules.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. Thank you.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So in terms of you mentioned there would be a compilation

of news clips, you were shown kind of ops alerts. And I just want to

go back for a moment to exhibit 1 just -- I think you might have a copy

of it there.

A Oh, yes.

Q You were shown exhibit 1, which looked like operational

alerts, which are providing an update as to what's happening. I just

wanted to make sure it was clear for the record that there is a list,

two lists there, you are not on that list. Is that -- at the top of

this, the top line is dated October 23, 2012.

A Yes.

Q It's not apparently contemporaneous with the attacks, and

it's sent to a group of folks that does not include you, correct?

A That's correct.

Q And so this piece that was -- I just assume you wouldn't

know if this was a compilation of alerts, that it -- it doesn't appear

to me that it's possible that as of the night of 9/11, this came out,

given the date, but you wouldn't have been aware -- involved in any

way of compiling these ops alerts or any involvement in compiling this

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email?

A It would not be something in my purview, that's correct.

Q And then in addition to sending out kind of these types of

reports from the operational center, we've also seen ops news tickers.

Is that another function that the operations center provides, that they

also send out news alerts through the operations center?

A Yes, that's correct.

Q And so it's possible that at the same time that they're

sending out situational alerts, they're also sending out, you know,

op ticker news alerts? Would that be accurate?

A That is accurate.

Q So we were talking about certainly some awareness of

protests in Cairo. And you had said that was not, you know, the first

time that the U.S. Government certainly had experience with unrest

following activity that was deemed to offend the Prophet Muhammad or

be offensive. Was the -- do you recall just there being generalized

concerns about what might happen in the region?

A I don't recall any general concerns, aside from my own

perspective, receiving or hearing about the news, but I think those

conversations would have happened outside of my presence.

Q And from your perspective, were there concerns? Were there

concerns that there might be unrest that happened in the region,

certainly once you had heard about Cairo?

A I mean, in the moment, it may have -- I can't speak to what

other people were concerned about, but it may have been top of mind,

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particularly, as I mentioned to Ms. Jackson, with the Eid reception

on Friday, Fridays typically being Friday prayer, so it's possible

there was. I can't -- I just -- I don't remember, like, in the moment

what we were thinking.

Q I'm going to show you what I'm going to mark as exhibit 3

for identification purposes.

A Okay.

[Abedin Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I'm going to give you a moment to take a look at it.

A Okay.

Q And I'll just -- while you're looking at it, I'm just going

to identify it for the record. It's a document that has a number down

in the right-hand corner that just reads SCB0045311. It's a three-page

document. It's an -- at the top it's an email that is from you,

Ms. Abedin, it's addressed to H. It's dated September 14th, 2012 at

9:21 in the morning, and it -- and we'll talk about the contents. I

want to give you a chance to take a look.

A Okay.

Q Okay? You set?

A Yes.

Q So at the very top, there's just an email from you, and we'll

talk about the contents of that, but down below it appears,

it's -- again, there's a line and then it says from ops alert, subject,

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situation report, and then it has a number. And I assume that you

were -- I mean, can you -- I guess you could explain for us, but my

assumption was you were forwarding to the Secretary that ops alert.

A Yes, correct.

Q And then there's a brief comment from you at the top, and

again, I'll have you explain that, but I did want to -- what was your

sense of kind of what -- it's a situation report - the role that a

situation report served?

A You're asking me what the role -- what role the situation

report --

Q Just in general, before we -- we'll talk a little bit about

the contents, but --

A I'm not sure I ever focused on the title of the updates.

As you said, there were some that said ops alerts, some that said ops

news ticker, some clearly that said situation report, but they were

generally updates about things that were happening around the world.

It didn't -- I don't know that I processed them necessarily

differently, but this clearly was a report, as is reflected, of what

was happening in the world.

Q And then under the line situation report number one, there's

a Middle East protest monitoring group.

A Uh-huh.

Q Were you -- I assume you were not a part of that Middle East

protest monitoring group?

A No.

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Q So there's a number of -- down beneath it there's one,

two -- 10, it looks like, countries that are identified, and then

there's various updates.

A Yeah.

Q One is an update on Libya; one is an update on Egypt; there's

an update on Yemen; Kuwait; Pakistan; Indonesia; Malaysia; Sudan;

India; Iran. Some of those are reports of demonstrations and protests

where they indicate that the gatherings were peaceful. So, for

example, Malaysia, it talks about around 30 people gathered peacefully.

Do you see --

A Yes.

Q -- that one there?

A Yes.

Q And then underneath Sudan, references a peaceful mass

protest at the embassies in Khartoum. Some of them report the

deployment of riot police to consulate. That seems to have happened

in Pakistan. Do you see that reporting up at the top?

A Yes.

Q And then there's a note in the international reaction, which

is down at the bottom of page 2, and the second bullet says, "The Arab

League condemned the Benghazi attack and called on the U.S. Government

to take a serious position against the film producers." So there's

certainly some condemnation of what was a very violent attack, the

attack in Benghazi. So that's included as well, correct?

A Correct.

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Q So you forwarded this on to the Secretary, and you have a

short note at the top, and I'll just read it for the record, it says,

I'm giving you credit for inspiring the, quote, "peaceful," end quote,

protests.

Do you have a recollection of kind of what you meant by that and

why you said that?

A Yes, I do. I can -- I can speak to what I remembered at

the time. This was a day after the Eid reception that we had at the

State Department. And from a scheduling perspective, we weren't sure

if we were going to move forward with that particular event, the event

I was telling Ms. Jackson about earlier. And I know what was top of

mind for me is that the Secretary had already, on a number of occasions,

publicly said that there was -- you know, encouraged people to not

protest, but regardless, saying that there was no -- that there was,

you know, nothing that justified violence, just there was -- no matter

what the source or the cause was, nothing justified violence, and that

if people were to protest, and I'm not quoting her here, that's what

was in my head is the message that she was sending was that if there

are protests, they should be peaceful.

And in this particular instance, what I'm guessing is I was -- I

had read this particular report and had seen all the places in the world

where there were peaceful protests, and because she'd been calling for

them, I was giving her credit for that.

Q And so from your perspective, did it seem that one of the

goals in her public statements was certainly to lower the temperature

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throughout the region with regard to the anger over this film?

A That was my experience of it. I -- I recognize that she

was dealing with a whole host of issues, including that, but that

was -- yes, that was certainly how I experienced it.

Q And one of the other things you specifically mentioned was

the counterpart, that she certainly, from your perspective, was

expressing that, nonetheless, nothing does justify violence. And so

did -- was it your sense that was another part of an important goal

for the Secretary?

A That's how I -- that's how I experienced it, based on what

I had heard her -- heard her say in the several instances in the days

leading up to, you know, this particular email.

Q And her concern there, her concern for helping prevent

violence, further violence, did you feel that that was out of her

concern for her personnel and other people, non-Americans as well,

presumably, on the ground in these places?

A From what I know about my boss, that was one of her foremost

concerns, yes, the security of her personnel in -- overseas,

absolutely.

Q Did you ever get the sense that she actually was making those

statements because she wanted to minimize or portray what happened in

Benghazi as -- inaccurately?

A I can't speak to what she had in her mind or her intention,

but, again, knowing her, absolutely not.

Q And with regard to the focus, this is dated September 14th,

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that Friday.

A Yes.

Q We -- I think I counted them before, but there's a number

of places here. So statements she was making and steps she was taking

and things she was scheduling that week would not have only been focused

on Benghazi. Is that fair to say?

A From my recollection of what she was doing, yes, ma'am,

that's fair to say.

Q So I was going to just shift and show you another exhibit.

So I'm going to show you another exhibit, which I will mark as exhibit

4 for identification purposes. And this one I will, again, just

identify for the record while I give you guys an opportunity to take

a look.

[Abedin Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So while you're taking a look, down in the right-hand corner

are the -- is the number SCB0045332. This is a two-page document. It

is from to Secretary Clinton, and it is dated

September 15th, 2012, at 10:52 in the morning. You are not cc'd on

that top line message. You are included earlier, however, in the chain

earlier that day, 9:35 a.m.

So with regard to that top part, I understand you're not on it,

but I think you had mentioned Ms. before as someone you worked

closely with on scheduling?

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A Yes.

Q And that you would oversee some of the kind of longer term,

broader --

A Yes.

Q -- but she would often kind of get into the actual logistics

of setting up a daily, this is going to happen at 9:15 versus 9:30.

Is that accurate?

A Yes. -- yes. was her primary personal

assistant who traveled with her.

Q So at the top of this email is a message that goes from

to the -- I presume to the Secretary, it says to H, and I understand

that to be Secretary Clinton's email?

A I would -- that's a fair assumption, given the content of

the email.

Q Great. And that looks to me as if it blocks out -- in the

middle of it, it has a block of time that runs from 12:00 to 3:00,

starting at 12:00 with a U.K. FM Hague, and then it ends at 3:00 with

Somali President Mohamoud. And it looked to me a schedule of calls

that the Secretary was planning to do that day, Saturday,

September 15th. Is that accurate?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall -- this might help. It has been 3-1/2

years, so I was hoping this would just help refresh your recollection

as to whether these were the types of calls that were being scheduled,

what relation, if any, they had to what was going on throughout that

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region there. They indicate calls with the Libyan prime minister, the

Turkish foreign minister, the Somali former transitional president,

the Saudi foreign minister, the Israeli prime minister, the Egyptian

foreign minister. And does that refresh your recollection as to

whether or not these were related to what we saw in exhibit 3 about

what was going on throughout that region?

A I don't remember the -- I wouldn't have remembered the

content of the call sheets, but it is fair to suggest that, yeah, these

calls were connected to the aftermath of the attacks, and also what

was happening regionally.

Q So would it be fair to say that this is something -- this

is a Saturday, it's a weekend -- that actually wasn't low priority,

but seemed potentially high priority for her to be engaged in these

types of calls with high ranking officials from other countries?

A I -- I do remember -- my recollection was

actually -- doesn't entirely match this. I actually thought it was

throughout a longer period of time. And she typically didn't have

calls that short, but I -- that's just my recollection. I'm not going

to challenge what's in this document. But, yes, that that weekend was

focused on making phone calls to leaders around the world here.

Q And it indicates underneath one of the little ticklers

there, that there's also a call still pending. Do you have any

recollection of whether they were able to schedule it on Saturday,

whether that call had to go forward on Sunday?

A That is the one call, as I mentioned to Ms. Jackson, that

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I did remember potentially taking place that weekend. I -- my memory

is it did take place. I don't know if it took place on Saturday or

Sunday, but I do believe she did calls on both days, on both Saturday

and Sunday.

Q And then the bullet beneath it indicates that King Juan

Carlos of Spain called. There's then a note saying that there was a

call inquiring after the status of embassies in the Middle East. We

are working on a call sheet. So my impression from that would be that

there was an ongoing effort, that you are correct in saying it may not

have been -- this was not the sum total of the calls that the Secretary

was involved in, either that weekend or maybe through the week. Is

that a fair reading of what that says there?

A That is consistent with my memory. That's a fair reading,

yes.

Q Up above the schedule, there's a reference to a pouch, and

a few read items, and an action memo authorizing war powers resolution

for Tunisia. So in addition to -- you know, we talked a little bit,

and I think we'll talk a little bit more, just about the Secretary's

work style and how she received information.

A Okay.

Q But you had mentioned that one way when she was not

physically in the office would be that papers would be delivered to

her. Is this an example of papers being delivered to her?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And one of the things they mention is the war -- a potential

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war powers resolution. So to the extent sensitive information had to

come to the Secretary, was there a way to get her that sensitive

information when she was not physically in the office?

A Yes, ma'am. In the -- if she was in Washington at home,

a pouch was typically -- and actually, as is reflected in one of these

exchanges, there was a locked pouch that was delivered to her residence

by a courier from the operations center.

Q And that -- to the extent it included sensitive material,

to the extent it included classified material, that would be how she

would obtain and receive classified material while she was not in the

office. Is that accurate?

A Yes, unless it was going to be conveyed to her verbally.

And, in fact, this exchange notes will be at the residence with

the PDB. So that was also not atypical. So it was either in person,

verbally, or in the pouch with paper from the courier.

Q And when you said sometimes it could be verbally, did she

both have -- did she have a secure line? If she had to talk to someone,

if the person who had the information that they needed to convey was

not going to be face to face with her, did she have a secure line in

her home to be able to do secure phone calls?

A Yes, she did.

Q So to the -- you know, one of the calls on this list at 12:15

says it's a call with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr.

A Yes.

Q And then just turning your attention back to exhibit 3,

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there's a mention, the top line mention of the country that they discuss

first is Egypt, and then there's -- in the second bullet there, it says

there is a call for nationwide demonstrations.

And do you recall that even in Cairo you had said -- you know,

you had heard about the unrest there, that in Cairo there were continued

concerns about continuing protests throughout the week?

A Based on what I'm looking at, yes, that confirms what, and

I believe my general sense was, as I said earlier, yes.

Q And did you have any particular sense of, you know, kind

of where -- you know, this indicates nationwide demonstrations, but

supported symbolic demonstrations at Tahrir Square. Did you get any

sense of the scale of the problems in Egypt, in particular?

A In September of 2012, I -- you know, I -- to that specific

time frame, I -- I don't know what my awareness would have been. I

mean, the Arab Spring started a year and a half before, and so at any

given -- I don't know what my level of awareness would have been in

that moment.

Q And I wanted to just return to the conversation that was

in the last hour of decisions being made about scheduling and

certainly --

A Yes.

Q -- about whether the Ambass- -- whether the Secretary would

appear on the Sunday talk shows.

A Yes.

Q And you had indicated in talking about how to convey

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information to the American people that it certainly wasn't the only

way to speak to the American people, and she had done so through the

week. But in terms of figuring out priorities, would these concerns

and considerations about some of the stuff we've been talking about,

scheduling, would those have come into play in determining whether she

had the time to appear on the Sunday talk shows?

A I am not -- you know, I wouldn't -- I want to be thoughtful

about how I answer this, because it's not -- it's not that the only

reason we weren't doing the Sunday shows, from my perspective, was she

had other things to do. That was my primary concern. She has many

calls that she has to make around the world, many of these people

who -- I'm not certain, but I'm pretty sure she didn't reach most of

these people earlier in the week, I'm not sure, but separate from that,

in the brief conversation we at the staff level had about Sunday shows,

I don't know that it was a, "This is a priority over this." I think

the consideration of the shows was -- you know, was considered, not

considered necessary for her to do or a priority for us, and by the

way, we have all these other things to do.

From my perspective, this was the priority, was getting all these,

you know, calls on her schedule, and -- and the Sunday shows, as I

recollect, pretty quickly came up and went away.

Q So we -- we've talked a little bit about what was going on

in your role in that. And just to be -- to make it clear, I think it

has been clear, you know, there's -- in the investigations of the events

in Benghazi, there has been, you know, a focus both on kind of what

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was happening before in the run-up, and then what happened that night

and then how the attacks there were talked about. And we've already

talked, I think, and made perfectly clear kind of your limited role

on the policy and the security, and I just want to make clear for the

record. In terms of crafting statements, both drafting them, helping

the Secretary finalize her statements, you were not involved in that

as part of your work with the Secretary. Is that accurate?

A It wouldn't be unusual for draft statements of hers or

speeches to also be in my inbox, you know, as one of the members of

her senior staff in that office. It is likely I would have received

drafts, but it was more for my informational purposes. Sometimes I

read them, sometimes I didn't, but it, you know, really wasn't my job

to edit them or finalize them. It was, frankly, more for a practical

reason. So as the person who was with her the most, you know, her being

able to check in and say, what's the status of this speech, and I'll

say it's still in draft form. So I would have received them, but not

necessarily done anything about them.

Q Yeah. And I certainly don't mean to suggest that it would

be inappropriate if you read something and you thought, wow, that's

really beautifully written or stay far away from that, you wouldn't

comment, I presume you would feel free to comment if you saw something

even though it wasn't your primary. Is that fair?

A That's fair. And I've -- yes, that's fair. I probably

did.

Q And I just wanted to make clear that it was not really your

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primary responsibility, your job, your role to be the primary drafter

of statements, to be clearing on statements, to be coordinating with

the Secretary as to the in-depth content of her statements. Is that

fair?

A That's fair.

Q So shifting gears a little bit, just to get a sense of, based

on your experience working with the Secretary at the State Department,

if you could talk to us a little bit of how was it that she generally

received information? Some people are very reliant on technology,

emails, reading things on the computer, other people prefer paper.

Where does the Secretary fall in that spectrum?

A She received information through a variety of ways, both

on paper, verbally, and electronically. When she was in the office,

it was a combination of in-person briefings for meetings; simultaneous

to that, when she walked into the office every day, there was often

a stack of folders on her desk with action items for her, things for

her to sign, and those were hand in hand. She often had meetings

throughout the day. That's when she was in the office.

When we were traveling, the paper documents continued by the

executive assistant who was traveling with us, or the line officers,

they would have folders in her room every night. She still had verbal,

you know, in-person meetings with the staff traveling, and she often

called back to the Department to speak with the -- with the leadership

there, and she also, when she was traveling, would often receive

information on her email, on her BlackBerry.

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Q So she sounds like someone who's a pretty voracious reader

of information. Is that accurate?

A That would be fair -- that would be fair to say, yes, ma'am.

Q So that would be one way, certainly, reading materials,

either paper form, sometimes electronic form, that would be one way

she would obtain information?

A That's -- that's correct.

Q And you indicated another way would be through face-to-face

meetings, obviously often with staff, both when she's traveling and

in the office, I presume.

A Yes.

Q Is that accurate?

A Yes.

Q And that stuff you talked a fair amount, I think in the last

hour, about the range of meetings and the range of individuals certainly

within the Department that she had access to and would meet with, it

sounds like, both routinely. Is that fair and accurate to say?

A That's correct.

Q And certainly we talked some about some of those routine

meetings with regional bureaus, with some of her policy team. In

addition to kind of routine meetings, presumably, I mean, she's the

boss, she is the Secretary of State. She could, at any point, call

a meeting, convene a meeting around a particular issue that she wanted

to take a deeper dive or get more information on. Is that accurate?

A Absolutely.

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Q And you talked about travel and you talked -- because the

specific discussion was around travel, I think, in the spring,

including February in the spring.

A Of 20 --

Q 2011.

A Of 2011, yes.

Q And you said a lot of that travel was around meetings,

discussions about Libya. So presumably, that travel and those

meetings would be another source of both information and potential

conversation with foreign leaders and others. Is that the purpose of

those kinds of travel?

A Yes.

Q So all of those individuals would be sources of information

as well as potentially people who were giving her advice. Is that true?

A Yes.

Q Some lobbying her pretty strongly to take a position one

way or the other, or trying to advocate or negotiate in the normal course

of, you know, what the Secretary does in making policy decisions?

A I would -- I would imagine so, yes.

Q Now, again, you were not -- I just want to, you know, be

clear. I appreciate the operational insights you're giving us,

not -- and understanding that your role wasn't kind of in being in those

meetings or discussions for the deep dive on the policy. So we do

appreciate the kind of operational oversight.

How would you describe in that context the Secretary's use of

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email? We've seen some of her emails. Oftentimes she'll get an email

and she'll forward it and say, please print, giving me the impression

that oftentimes, even when she got something electronically, she

preferred to read it in paper. So could you give us a sense of how

she used email in the course of her doing business?

A I think it was mostly to -- so I just want to back up by

saying I didn't actually -- I never really was privy to the email

exchanges that she had, so as for my -- I can tell you about, you know,

my email exchanges with her. It's hard to talk, I think, generally

about how she used it, but my experience was she wasn't doing on a

day-to-day basis, when we were traveling, a heavy amount of work on

her email, because so much of it was verbal or on paper, but were

we -- were we sending -- you know, I experienced it as sort of the

day-to-day tasks, the, you know, what time am I starting tomorrow, just

like the -- almost like general housekeeping that one would conduct,

it's 2 o'clock in the morning, what time do I leave in the morning?

Do you know where this is? So it was usually sort of, you know, after

hours when we weren't physically -- physically with her. And then she

did have people who had emailed her documents as like -- as you had

suggested, and sometimes we'd print those so she could review those

in paper form.

Q So trying to kind of assess what the -- what any given day

was like for the Secretary or the information she actually looked at

in the course of that day and the meetings she might have had and who

she might have talked to, would I be able to get an accurate picture

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of that simply by reviewing her email usage over the course of a day?

A Not being privy to what her inbox was, and -- but from my

perspective, I would say not particularly when she was in Washington.

You know, she didn't have access to her email when we were in the

Department. Our office was a SCIF and so we didn't have our devices

with us. So unless you had a computer at your desk, you really

weren't -- and she did not -- you weren't emailing. So from my

perspective, it is unlikely.

Q So on those days, certainly her email might have been

sporadic, it wouldn't have been continuous, it wouldn't have been --

A Correct.

Q -- and it, in any event, might not reflect the volume of

information that we talked about that was coming to her in person or

through meetings, or in face-to-face conversations about particular

policy issues facing her. Is that accurate?

A That is accurate.

Ms. Sawyer. I know that I'm hitting up on my time and that you

guys deserve a break, so we should go off the record and we can talk

about some of the logistics about how much more and whatnot.

[Discussion off the record.]

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Let's go back on the record. I have 1:33, and we will start

our next hour of questioning.

Ms. Abedin, welcome back.

A Thank you.

Q I want to follow up on some things you were asked about in

the last hour, and also to follow up on some of the things we talked

about in my first hour.

A Okay.

Q You had stated earlier that you met Chris Stevens for the

first time in Paris. I believe that was in March of 2011. Is that

timeframe about right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did you come across him again in your travels

with the Secretary?

A I don't remember having seen Chris after that first

encounter in Paris.

Q Okay. Did you ever see him at Main State back here in

Washington, D.C.?

A He may have attended meetings, but I don't remember any

specific meetings.

Q Okay. So that would have been the one and only time that

you can recall meeting with him, or seeing him, meeting him?

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A Yes. I mean, I'd have to check the schedules to see if in

any of the, you know, the meetings we were having throughout, you know,

in different countries, the Libya contact group meetings, if it was

Chris Stevens or Ambassador Gene Cretz there. From my recollection,

it was the Ambassador, Ambassador Cretz, but I don't know that

definitively.

Q Okay. Did you ever email or have a phone conversation with

Chris Stevens?

A I don't believe so, no.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, did the Secretary email with him

or have phone conversations with him?

A Well, you'd have to ask her about whether he emailed her.

There were no instances that I recall where I would have seen an email

exchange. Phone conversations, I would imagine yes. But, you know,

again, I'd want to check our schedules to see when, et cetera, but I

don't remember.

Q Okay. Are those records kept by the State Department of

the Secretary's calls with ambassadors and others?

A I would presume so. Those were documents that were housed

at the State Department, yes.

Q Okay. And what type of documents would those be?

A You know, what I saw in my screen, you know, it was just

in the -- it was like an Outlook calendar, and her assistant in the

office would just update them on the computer.

Q Okay. And then if the call for whatever reason didn't go

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through, would it be taken off or noted in some way that the call didn't

go through?

A Yes. There was usually a revised schedule at the end of

the day, so there was, you know, the schedule as it was finalized the

night before. In some instances there were things that were left

tentative, as it was in one of those days that we discussed. And

job was to reflect what actually took place in the course of

the day.

Q Okay. It is my understanding that the Secretary traveled

to Libya in October of 2011?

A Correct.

Q Do you recall that trip?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Did you accompany the Secretary on that trip?

A Yes, I did.

Q Okay. Do you recall whether Chris Stevens was in Tripoli

during your visit there, your and the Secretary's visit there?

A I don't recall seeing Chris Stevens on that trip. I recall

Gene Cretz.

Q Because our Embassy in Tripoli had reopened by then?

A Yes. If I remember correctly, it was the -- yes, it was

the makeshift embassy that was the residence or the compound. But yes,

we visited it, yes.

Q Okay.

A I remember that.

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Q All right. And was that the only trip that the Secretary

took to Libya during her tenure?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were any other trips planned or discussed?

A Yes. We had talked about returning to Libya. As I had

mentioned earlier, one of the things that we did at the State Department

was have meetings with our senior leadership to talk about travel for

the year.

Usually we met, you know, once or twice a year to do long term,

what should we do this year, and the next 6 months, and certainly Libya

had been on the list of countries to potentially visit.

Q Okay. And do you recall approximately when that was going

to be, that second trip to Libya?

A It would have been in 2012.

Q Okay. Do you recall that the elections in Libya were in

July of 2012?

A I remember that they were in the first half of the year,

correct. Yes.

Q Okay. Was the trip to be before or after the elections?

A Oh, I, in fact, remember us talking about potentially going,

having the conversations probably that summer. So, and usually, as

I mentioned, we met twice a year to talk long term, so probably we would

have met in December or January to like focus on the next 6 months.

And then we probably regrouped in June, July, to talk about the rest

of the year.

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And, you know, from what I remember from my planning, I really

had Libya as a potential for the fall, when we were likely to go back

to the Middle East. We typically -- we'd been to the Middle East in

the fall the first few years she was there, if I remember correctly,

in 2009, and 2010, so it wouldn't have been atypical.

Q Okay. And do you recall what the purpose of the trip was,

why Libya was on the schedule of places to visit?

A Well, I think, you know, it was obvious that the United

States had, you know, played a very large role in trying to shepherd

this transition to democracy, which was the will of the Libyan people.

And the Secretary of State and the administration was quite involved.

And so, as we did in 2011, it was showing her support for the

transitional government at the time.

And, you know, from my perspective at that point the conversation

we would've had is they've just had a successful Democratic election,

we should go back and visit and, you know, check in, show our support

for the new government.

Q When you were traveling with the Secretary in October

of 2011 -- and I apologize for skipping back and forth between the

2 years -- were you in the meetings she had in Tripoli that day?

A No.

Q Okay. Would you typically attend the meetings when she

would be traveling internationally?

A Not typically. Sometimes I did, sometimes I didn't.

Q Okay. We talked in the first hour about a lot of different

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countries that she went to for the Libya contact group and other

meetings that she attended where Libya was either the topic of

conversation or one of many. Were you in those meetings typically with

her?

A In the contact group meetings with the other ministers?

Q Yes.

A No, I typically would not be.

Q What type of meetings would you attend?

A In the Department or when we were traveling overseas?

Q When you were traveling. And again, looking at 2011 and

2012, that timeframe.

A It honestly varied. Generally, you know, protocols called

for very often to match sides when you were in meetings with a foreign

government. So they would say, you know, we're coming to the meeting

and we're bringing nine people and your side should bring nine people.

And we'd often -- a lot of times it was for parity, and members of the

senior staff that were traveling on the plane were manifested in those

meetings.

Typically a deputy chief of staff to the Secretary would have been

manifested. That primarily was always -- was Jake Sullivan.

Sometimes it was me. There was no -- you know, I was not necessary

to the bilateral meeting, so I didn't necessarily sit in, but it didn't

mean that sometimes I did.

Q You didn't have a role as even a note taker or recorder of

due-outs or anything like that from the meetings?

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A Not at all.

Q Okay. Did you know any of the members of the new

Transitional National Council in Libya? Did you know any of the

leaders? Had you met them before the revolution?

A I'm sorry, did I know any of the Libyans?

Q Yes.

A No.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q Through schooling. You've lived overseas.

A Oh, oh, yes.

Q I didn't know if you had --

A No, I did not. I did not know any of the Libyans, no.

Q Okay. Some of them had been in the United States before.

I just wondered if your paths had ever crossed before.

A Oh, yes. No, ma'am. No, ma'am.

Q Okay. What about the Secretary? Did she know any of them,

to your knowledge?

A Not to my knowledge she did not.

Q Okay. If you could pick up -- I'll just do them in

order -- number four, which is the Saturday, September 15, 2012, I

would call it a call schedule. Is that a fair way to depict what this

email chain is about?

A Sure. Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. I just have a couple follow-up questions regarding

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this. You talked about a pouch being delivered. Would a pouch be

delivered to both her D.C. home and her New York home? Was there any

distinction between a pouch being delivered?

A You're referring to when emailed her?

Q Yes. At the top of the page it says, "A pouch with all of

your call sheets and the schedule is En route to you."

A Oh, I see. The note from to the Secretary?

Q Yes.

A Yes, it was typical when she was in Washington for a pouch

to be delivered to her residence. It was less frequent at her residence

in New York. Yes, it was less frequent.

Q Okay. I was just wondering if there was any way to tell

whether she was in Washington or New York on Saturday the 15th.

A Well, from this and, you know, my attorney and I, this is

when we looked at each other, it's very clear from this email that she

was indeed in Washington. It refers to her residence in Washington

on the second page.

Q So on the second page?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And who was ? It says --

A was the PDB briefer.

Q Presidential daily brief, briefer?

A Yes.

Q Was he a member of the national security staff, if you know?

I mean, was he a State Department official or --

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A I think he was -- you know, I don't know.

Q Okay.

A

Q Okay. What types of intelligence products did the

Secretary read or get briefed on other than the presidential daily

brief, if you know?

A I'm sorry. Can you ask me that question again?

Q What type of intelligence products, CIA cables, or finished

intel products, or things like that did the Secretary routinely look

at to know what was going on in the world from the intelligence

standpoint other than the presidential daily brief?

A She received, both when we were in Washington and when we

were traveling, regular folders and we always knew what the folders

were because they were red. But they went directly to her from our

executive assistant, who was both in the office -- and this is the

senior, you know, the senior member in our office. So he and I actually

shared a wall. And he would, throughout the day, frankly, take in the

red folder, had documents in there for her to review, and he would take

them back or she would bring them back to him. That's when we were

in the office.

When we were traveling, typically it would be similar, usually

at the beginning of the day and the end of the day. When she was in

a foreign country and between meetings, she wasn't really getting

documents like that. It was specific to when we were in a SCIF.

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Q And you may not know, but if you do, do you know what type

of intelligence products those were? Would they be from the agency?

Would they be from the Department of Defense? Were they only State

Department intelligence products, if you know?

A I was not privy to those documents. Those went directly

to her and from her. And it was regular practice for those not to go,

you know, through me or through any other staff member.

Q Even her senior policy adviser, like Mr. Sullivan?

A I don't know what documents Jake looked at. I would be

speculating. But, you know, I'm sure he saw documents related to

policy, but as to the specifics, I wouldn't know.

Q Okay. And if we could go back for a moment to exhibit

number 3, the situation report from, I believe it's the 14th, Friday

the 14th.

A Yes.

Q As I reviewed this document, I don't see any indication that

any of the protests occurred -- or any of the protests that are

described in here occurred prior to September 13. And perhaps I've

missed it. But did you -- we had talked earlier about protests around

the time of the attacks.

A Yes.

Q And the attacks were on the 11th. And I'm just trying to

figure out if, from your recollection, the protests followed the

Benghazi attack or predated it or preceded it.

A From my recollection, and I noted this when I was speaking

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with you and also with Ms. Sawyer, we were planning the Eid reception.

That was something that had been on the calendar prior to the attacks.

And there were going to be a lot of Muslim leaders from around the

country flying in to attend that.

So, you know, that's part of my, frankly, the trigger that I have

to remember that the protests, as far as I remember, and the movie

trailer, all of that occurred prior to the Benghazi attack. I don't

think it was a long period of time, but that is my recollection, that

we were aware of that. I was aware of the trailer. I had seen the

news about the protests, specifically in Cairo. That's my memory.

Q Was that a protest in Cairo or multiple days worth of

protests? To the best of your recollection, what do you recall?

A As I said to Ms. Sawyer, what stuck out in my mind was the

protest in Cairo, and that image in the paper is what I do remember.

Beyond that, you know, I don't -- you know, even that morning I couldn't

tell you the morning of the attack that I was necessarily aware of where

else there may have been a protest.

Q Okay. So you don't have any recollection that the first

Cairo protest was the day of the attack in Benghazi?

A Are you telling me it was?

Q I'm asking if you have any recollection of that being true?

A I don't know if it was that day, but I feel like it was before

the attack. That's the only thing I -- having had that knowledge.

Q Okay. We talked a little bit about the fact that the

Secretary was planning another trip to Libya in the fall of 2012. Who

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would you typically coordinate with for the Secretary to take a trip

overseas?

A The planning process always started with our Deputy

Secretary of State.

Q You had two. Which one?

A As I say, the you know, one for management and the other

for policy, so that would either be Bill Burns or Jim Steinberg prior

to Bill Burns. So we typically met with the Deputy Secretary of State,

the Under Secretary for Political Affairs was Bill Burns originally

and then thereafter it was Wendy Sherman. And then the leadership,

you know, within our office, our chief of staff, my co-deputy, Jake

Sullivan, the executive secretary, the executive assistant, and our

scheduler.

And we would map out priorities for the year and sort of have a

loose calendar which, you know, we would follow. But it was typical

that I would check in with them, I would either email them. I saw all

of them when we were in Washington. I saw them on a daily basis. So

check in, any changes, any issues, but that's how we implemented the

planning process.

Q Okay. From the documents that we've reviewed, we've seen

a lot of emails back and forth between you and the Secretary regarding

Libya in 2011. And then not so many in 2012. Is that your recollection

of how it was?

A I can't explain why there wouldn't be in 2012. What I

remember in 2011 is certainly we spent so much of our time traveling

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around the world on behalf of -- you know, to go to these Libya meetings.

So it wouldn't be atypical that I would have had a lot of emails. I

shared with her, as it related to Libya. I can't explain why there

wouldn't be any in -- or did you say there were any? There were very

few in 2012.

Q A lesser number.

A A lesser number.

Q Yeah, okay. What were the hot spots as you recall in 2012

around the world?

A Well, there were Syria meetings starting, I think, in the

first half of that year or first few months of that year, if I'm

remembering correctly. I think I was on maternity leave. But we

had -- I mean, Syria certainly comes to mind. And -- sorry, I'm really

just trying to like place my years in my head.

It was Myanmar, now Burma, her engagement there. You know, I

recall that. We were spending a lot of time -- she was spending a lot

of time working on that. We were coordinating with the White House

about a trip. I mean that's what comes to mind just off the top of

my head.

Q Okay. What awareness or involvement -- let me just say,

what awareness did you have about any discussions as to how long we

were going to keep the mission open in Benghazi, Libya?

A None.

Q Did you know that we still had a presence in Benghazi?

A I'm sorry, at what point?

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Q At the time of the attacks. Or was it a surprise to you

that there was an attack in Benghazi? Were you aware we still had

people there, given the reopening of the Embassy in Tripoli?

A You know, I'm sure I had a general awareness. You know,

as you've probably seen in the documents, there were often emails sent

to me with updates for the Secretary. You know, I had a top line focus

like in the time, you know, what I needed to prioritize and send to

her and -- but I didn't always read everything that was sent to me for

her.

In the time of the attacks, was I aware? I'm sure I had a general

awareness. I mean, we were talking about the trip. I'm sure I did.

I mean, if I had to put myself back in that time, I'm sure I did, yes.

Q Okay. You said you had a top line focus of what was going

on in the world to send things to the Secretary. Was that throughout

your entire tenure with her when she was Secretary of State?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. So things that were hot and bubbling up you made sure

she got the information on?

A If it was emailed to me, yes.

Q Yes. Okay. So you were sort of, I don't want to say -- not

the filter -- but you were sort of the funnel to make sure that the

top line information got to her?

A Only when she wasn't in the office or she wasn't on the road,

I mean, you know, after hours, weekends when she might be at home in

Washington or at home in New York. I would say it was a small number

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of what she actually got because, as we discussed earlier, I think the

vast majority of what she absorbed in terms of content and material

on any matter, including something like Libya, she would have absorbed

in the form of a printed document or a verbal briefing.

Q Okay. Were you personally aware of any of the security

incidents that occurred in Benghazi in the summer of 2012, for instance

when there was a hole blown in the wall of the compound there, or an

RPG attack against the British Ambassador who was in Benghazi? Were

you aware of those incidents as they occurred?

A I likely was. And, I mean, you're jogging my memory a

little bit about the British Ambassador. It's very likely that I was,

yes.

Q Okay. But as you sit here today you don't have a specific

recollection of learning that information or passing it on or doing

anything with that information?

A I don't have a specific recollection.

Q Okay. Was there anything that you would typically do with

information that pertained to a significant security event at one of

our embassies or posts around the world?

A No, ma'am. I mean, I think, you know, the daily life that

we had we were constantly getting updates about what was happening at

our embassy facilities frankly around the world, whether it was the

Middle East or it was Asia or it was Pakistan or India. I mean, on

a daily basis there were updates that were coming in.

It wasn't my responsibility or my purview to -- I didn't see those

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as action items for me. And as I mentioned, if we were off campus,

if she was, rather, off campus at home, I would ensure that she had

that information. But I don't believe that was her primary source of

information.

Q Okay. And what were her primary sources of information

regarding security incidents around the world against our people or

at our posts?

A You'd have to ask her that. I wasn't privy to a lot of what

she saw.

Q Okay. Did the operations center -- I mean, we talked about

the operations center alerts and things like that.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Was that a mechanism that was used to push out information

in urgent situations?

A To us as staff?

Q To the seventh floor principals of the organization.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Was there any other type of documents? Did the

Diplomatic Security put out a daily, weekly, or a monthly briefing of

any kind that you saw?

A I'm not aware of any regular document that the department

of security would have put out. I'd be speculating if I said they did.

Q Okay. Did the assistant secretary for Diplomatic Security

have regular meetings with the Secretary?

A They were present, yes, present at the weekly -- as I think

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I discussed with you or Ms. Sawyer earlier -- our weekly Monday meeting

with the senior leadership in the building, yes.

Q With the senior leaders or with the --

A And the Secretary was present, yes.

Q And that went down to the assistant secretary level?

A Yes.

Q We've talked about a couple of meetings. I want to make

sure --

A Yes, Deputy Secretaries, Under Secretaries, and Assistant

Secretaries, yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And so the assistant secretary for Diplomatic

Security was one of all the assistant secretaries that attended that

meeting?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Do you recall if the assistant secretary for

Diplomatic Security attended the regional meetings?

A I don't remember.

Q Would there be some record of who attended those meetings?

Were there agendas? Were there sign-in sheets? Were there --

A Yes, it is very likely on the Secretary's calendar. I don't

recall there being agendas. The purpose was really for every assistant

secretary to give the Secretary a verbal update on what was happening

in their region. I don't remember the assistant secretary of the

Diplomatic Security being in those meetings, but --

Q And those were also weekly meetings?

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A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Now, we know the Secretary was -- I think she still

is -- the most traveled Secretary of State. Given that, how often or

on average in a month how often would those weekly meetings occur, given

her travel schedule?

A How many times in a month?

Q Right. Would it be -- you know, did she make sure that she

made them every week or, you know, once a month? Every other week?

Do you have a sense of how often they actually occurred?

A If she was in Washington, it was a given that she was

present. If she was traveling -- I mean, we often traveled in sort

of in spurts. So she was gone for, you know -- it's one of the ways

we tried to create her schedule so that she had time in the building

to do the meetings that she needed to do. So it would be a week away

but then we were there a week and then 3 days here. I mean, a lot of

our trips were short trips and we came back. But, you know, they

happened on a fairly regular basis.

Q Were there days of the week that she tried to be in the office

as opposed to other days of the week? When you say she tried to --

A Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt you. I apologize. I'm

sorry.

We didn't entirely own her schedule in that a lot of the

responsibilities she had when she was traveling was preexisting

meetings. So if it was, you know, a regular meeting of ministers in

Asia, the APEC meeting, for example, these were fixed meetings in

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certain parts of the year. So we were really being reactive, and we

would build, you know, stops in other countries around those trips that

she had to be on.

But, you know, when she came into the building, one of the things

that she conveyed to those of us who were helping her manage her schedule

is she really wanted to be present as much as she possibly could be

at the Department. And so we would do, you know, heavy travel but then

also be in Washington for days at a time. And she was -- very often

she'd come in and be in a meeting starting at 8:30 and then just go

the entire day in meetings.

Q Did those standing meetings ever get pushed off to another

day or rescheduled, or did they just -- did they stay standing?

A Rarely. Yeah. I mean, they were almost a -- you know,

they were pretty regular.

And sorry, I'm just going to volunteer this, but I think they may

have also happened whether she was there or not, like the Monday

meeting, the big Monday meeting I was telling you about. I think the

Deputy Secretary of State would run it when we were on the road.

Q Okay. And again, approximately how many people would be

in that big Monday meeting?

A As I think I mentioned to Ms. Sawyer, I think there were

anywhere between 30 or 40 people.

Q And approximately how long would that meeting last?

A An hour.

Q There was a lot of paperwork that flowed through the

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department. Every Federal governmental agency has its own

bureaucracy. We have seen things called information memorandums to

the Secretary, and, in fact, I've got a copy of one. And I want to

ask you a few questions about -- I'm going to mark it as Exhibit 5.

It is a memo dated August 17th.

[Abedin Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And I will note that it has been marked now unclassified

and reproduced to this committee as redacted -- well, it says released

in full but it also says at the bottom "reproduced to the Benghazi Select

Committee redacted by State Department for public release by Congress."

So if you would take a look at this. I have some questions about what

some of the markings mean and the process.

I will also say for the record, this document bears document

number C05390124.

Have you had an opportunity to review that document?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Just generally, how would an information memo like

this come to the Secretary? What's the flow of paperwork within the

State Department for something to get to the Secretary?

A A document like this would -- if it was approved by -- let's

see, it was sent by Beth Jones, so it would've been sent likely to our

Deputy Secretary of State and then to the executive assistant in our

office, you know, who oversaw the special assistants. Again, this is

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the trio of people who managed all the paper.

Q And who was the executive secretary at the time?

A It was two people. It was Joe Macmanus and Alice Wells.

I mean, they shifted -- Joe started and then he left and then it was

Alice and then Joe came back.

Q Okay. So I won't ask you which one was in place on this

particular day.

A I wouldn't remember.

Q Okay. So it would then flow through the executive

assistant for the Secretary's review? Is that correct?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Now, I see on the top middle of the front page there's a

circle with the letters "HRC" in there. Does that signify anything

of importance? Is that a symbol to say that she's seen it and reviewed

it?

A You'd have to ask Joe or the specials. I'm not sure what

system they used. I mean, the information like this that went to her

wouldn't have passed through me, so I don't know what HRC stands for,

aside from it's my boss' initials.

Q Okay. Do you recall seeing that symbol on other documents

that pass over her desk?

A If I did, I don't know that I would have paid much attention

to it. So it's possible, yeah.

Q Was there another way that the Secretary indicated that she

had reviewed information?

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A Usually, you know, I'm used to documents, but I think for

me I was more familiar handling the action memos that came up requesting

that she do an event. And there was usually a cover sheet on top saying

"approve, disapprove," and you'd pick it.

Q Right. But for information that just came to her, was --

A That's not something that went through me. I didn't

oversee this, so I don't know.

Q And, again, Joe Macmanus or Alice Wells would be the people

that we would need to talk to regarding the flow of this type of

information?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. In the summer of 2012, were you aware of a declining

or deteriorating security situation in Libya?

A I think it was likely -- yes, it was part of my general

awareness. As we discussed earlier, we were talking about visiting

Libya later that year.

Q In your discussions with others regarding that trip, was

the security of Libya a concern?

A You know, from what I recall, in an instance like this, I

would have consulted with the senior leadership in the Department. And

they -- you know, it's unlikely they would say we're worried about

security. They would just say, you know, we're not sure yet or it's

too soon to tell whether we can plan the trip or we'll get back to you.

We're still talking about, you know, whether we do want to really

recommend that she do this. I mean, that's the kind of information

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I would probably -- you know, that's how I remember experiencing it.

Q And do you recall any of those types of conversations with

regard to Libya in the summer of 2012?

A Just that we talked about going but that we weren't -- you

know, we weren't sure. It was an evolving situation. This was a

country that was going through a fairly significant transition, and

we'd have to wait and see if we were going to confirm the trip in the

fall.

But it was still early. I mean, we were talking about this

probably in the middle of the summer, and we weren't talking about going

until, I don't know, later in the fall.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q So Libya was in the category of "wait and see"?

A Yes. It was a country listed as a potential to visit but

not one that I experienced as, you know, definitely we're going, but

we should consider going.

Q Okay. Do you recall whether the Secretary received

any -- in her normal course would receive requests for additional

security at embassies or posts overseas? Was that the type of

information that would come to her?

A I don't know. You'd have to ask her.

Q Okay. Those are not documents that you would see, action

memos or things like that?

A Not typically. I mean, the documents that were

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specifically sent to me were documents that said we want to go speak

in Morocco next week at the Forum for the Future, yes or no. I mean,

those were the kinds of documents that -- the paper that I received

for my action.

Q Okay. Did the Secretary review cables written by

ambassadors or sent in by ambassadors?

A I believe she did, yes.

Q Okay. All of them?

A I think she read what was given to her.

Q And who would make that choice as to what she should read?

A There was a whole process, a protocol at the Department.

There was a lot of paper. There was a lot of paper. Even what it did

come through, there was a lot of paper.

Q And that's my question.

A But, you know, I only know what was approved to go in there.

You know, I can't say this particular person said yes or no. I know

there was a chain of command at the Department, the Deputy Secretary,

other people who would weigh in on whether a cable should go into her

or not, you know, maybe the regional assistant secretary.

But by the time it reached us in the S office, I think the paper

that went into her was paper that had been cleared elsewhere.

Q Okay. But would it -- I guess what I'm looking at is you've

described a hierarchy, and I'd like to understand that hierarchy. Is

everything that went to the Secretary from an overseas post, did it

flow through a deputy secretary? And did it always flow through one

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or could it be either one, and did it have to come through an Under

Secretary? I'm just trying to understand to the best that you know

what all those levels of review would be before it reached the

Secretary.

A That wasn't a process that, certainly anybody in my position

was privy to. What came into our office was the cleared documents for

the Secretary to see. How many people and who they were that had to

say, "yes, this goes to her," I don't know.

Q Do you at least know who the last person would be to clear

it for the Secretary? Was it Deputy Secretary Burns, for instance?

A I think that would have happened before it came to our

office, so I'd be guessing if I said it was Deputy Secretary Burns.

I would imagine a lot of paper went to him, but I don't know if everything

went to him either.

Q Okay. I'm going to jump around a little bit. I have a

few -- well, I have one more topic and then I'm going to let you have

some.

Mr. Pompeo. That's fine.

Ms. Jackson. I shouldn't say this, but because I have to.

I'm actually going to show you two documents that I'm going to

mark exhibits 6 and 7.

[Abedin Exhibits Nos. 6 and 7

Were marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And as you're reviewing that, for the record, exhibit 6 is

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document number SCB0058547. It's an email chain at the top dated

Tuesday, October 30, 2012.

And Exhibit 7 is document number 0045765, and it's an email dated

Monday, October 29, 2012.

A Okay.

Q Have you had an opportunity?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Let me first go to Exhibit 7. Exhibit 7 dated Monday,

October 29, 2012, from you to H., which I assume is Secretary Clinton;

is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. And I would like to go to what I think is the third

paragraph, but I want to read it into the record. It says, "Had a long

visit with my friend who was in Benghazi. Will download in person but

think very important for you to call , the injured DS officer.

He is now well enough to talk."

First of all, was one of the agents who was on the ground

in Benghazi the night of the attack?

A Yes.

Q And he was significantly injured during the attack? Is

that correct?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. In fact, he spent over a year at Walter Reed

Hospital, if you know? Do you know?

A I know it was a significant period of time.

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Q Okay. It also says here, "Had a long visit with my friend

who was in Benghazi." Who was that?

A I had a friend from college who was in Benghazi that night.

Q On the night of the attack? The night of the attack?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And was that -- was your friend a witness in any way

to the attacks?

Ms. Abedin. I am not able to discuss that.

Ms. Dunn. Sharon, we should go off the record.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. We can.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Jackson. Let's go back on the record and pose --

Ms. Dunn. I'm sorry. Also -- I don't know if you do this -- do

you want to strike your last question or --

Ms. Jackson. We don't follow the rules of evidence that closely.

Ms. Dunn. Got it.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q The question that we're going to pose to you is, in this

email exchange, you're requesting or suggesting that the Secretary call

the agent who was injured; is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And to your knowledge, had the Secretary talked to

Agent up until this point?

A She had not.

Q She had not, okay.

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Had she talked to any of the surviving agents of the attack?

A Before this --

Q Before this time.

A I don't believe she had.

Q Okay. And then going to Exhibit 6, which is a series of

emails between -- starting on October 25 through October 30, it

essentially discusses the same thing, a call to Agent ; is that

correct?

A That's correct.

Q And so what is Exhibit 7, would have been your communication

to her in the middle of all of this other communication. Is that a

fair reading of these emails?

A That's a fair reading, yes.

Q Okay. Do you know when the Secretary talked to Agent ,

or did she?

A What I remember about the call to is that there

was an interest in calling him to see how he was doing, and the

information that we were getting from Assistant Secretary Boswell prior

to this date, was that he wasn't well enough to speak. And so it was

something that we, you know, some of my colleagues were staying in touch

with Assistant Secretary Boswell about to see when he was well enough

to actually take a call from her.

I'm pretty certain she talked to him shortly after this email

exchange. I don't remember the exact date, but I'm pretty certain she

did.

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Q Okay. And had she talked to the other agents by the end

of October?

A Any of the other injured agents?

Q Surviving agents.

A Surviving agents, I don't believe so. I don't believe so,

ma'am.

Q Okay. Did she talk to them, to your knowledge, at all

during 2012?

A Not to my knowledge.

Ms. Jackson. I have about 10 minutes left so I'm cutting you a

little short, but I will turn it over to you at this point because I'm

ready to turn to a different topic.

Mr. Pompeo. Okay. We can do that. Great. Thank you.

First, Mr. Cummings spoke and indicated he had no idea why you

were here. And I just want to assure you, we think there's a perfectly

appropriate reason for you to be here consistent with our mission. He

may or may not know, we have had a heck of a time getting documents

from the State Department for this committee, and we have had a heck

of a time identifying where all these documents are and who's got them

and what emails were used.

And you were very close to the Secretary, and you were very

involved in her daily life, both her official life and, as people are

who are close, involved in things personal. And so I just want

you -- we think you can help us identify how to complete this record

so that we have a full and complete understanding of what took place.

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So, Mr. Cummings is obviously entitled to his view, but I just

thought it was appropriate for you to know that I view your time here

as deeply appreciated but also necessary and highly relevant to what

it is we're seeking to accomplish on behalf of the American people.

Ms. Abedin. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Pompeo. Thank you. Thank you for being here today too.

The two email addresses -- and just coincidentally, in these two

last documents that you just had a chance to review, a personal one

the @clintonemail.com and then official State.Gov email. Were there

any other email addresses under which you conducted business that was

related to either Libya or Benghazi or the matters that we have

discussed so far today?

Ms. Abedin. During my time at the State Department in that

period?

Mr. Pompeo. Well, I guess more broadly. Any time.

Ms. Abedin. I had a personal Yahoo.com --

Mr. Pompeo. Let me stop. If it's an email that you used strictly

for personal business, for nothing that's related to this, I am

uninterested in that email address.

Ms. Abedin. You don't want my email? I'm offended, sir.

Mr. Pompeo. Duly noted.

Ms. Abedin. I did have, in addition to those two email addresses,

I did have a Yahoo.com address that I occasionally used to forward some

documents to print and also that I forwarded news clips to and those

could've included news clips regarding Libya, so yes, there was an

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additional one.

Mr. Pompeo. Okay. Great. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. May I ask one follow up?

Mr. Pompeo. Of course, yeah.

Ms. Jackson. And during your search of your personal records to

turn over to the State Department, did you search that account?

Ms. Abedin. I instructed my attorneys to go through all of my

email records and documents and to do as thorough a search as possible

for any potentially Federal records and to turn them over to the State

Department. And to my knowledge, they did that.

Ms. Jackson. And including that Yahoo account?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Pompeo. Did you have a security clearance while you were

working at the State Department?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Pompeo. And do you have that security clearance now?

Ms. Abedin. I do not.

Mr. Pompeo. You do not. Was it withdrawn at the time you

departed the State Department coincidental with that, or did you

continue it sometime after your continued service? Or do you know

exactly?

Ms. Abedin. I'm not sure when I ceased to have security

clearance. To the best of my recollection, it didn't end the day she

walked out but sometime thereafter.

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Mr. Pompeo. Sometime thereafter. And what was that security

clearance that you held? What level of security clearance? Was it

secret? Top secret? Do you recall?

Ms. Abedin. I am fairly certain it was top secret as was the

practice for anybody working within the S office because we worked in

a SCIF.

Mr. Pompeo. Great. Thanks. Makes sense to me.

Were you interviewed by the ARB?

Ms. Abedin. I was not, sir.

Mr. Pompeo. Have you, in the lead up to today, have you had

conversations with any of the other individuals that we have

interviewed where you discussed the matters that either they discussed

with us or you thought you might be discussing today?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, I have talked to some of my former colleagues

and current colleagues, and it was to acknowledge that they were coming

in or I was coming in. We wished each other good luck. But, you know,

particularly since Jake Sullivan and I continue to work together on

a daily basis, we determined early on that we would not discuss our

appearances here.

Mr. Pompeo. So any of the conversations that you had were pro

forma, good luck, not substantive with relative to their testimony or

the testimony that you were contemplating providing us with today?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Pompeo. And I guess the same question with respect to

Mr. Blumenthal. Have you had a conversation with Mr. Blumenthal about

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his testimony? Maybe you can tell us if you even know Mr. Blumenthal

or have ever had a conversation with him? Maybe give us a little

background.

Ms. Dunn. Before we enter Mr. Blumenthal, just because I think

the record is now like a tiny bit unclear. I think you helped her

address this a little bit, but your original question was have you

discussed any of the substance?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, of course.

Ms. Dunn. And you answered, "Yes, we talked to wish each other

good luck and didn't discuss the substance." But because Ms. Abedin

answered yes to your original question, I just want to make sure --

Mr. Pompeo. The correct answer would be no.

Ms. Dunn. -- that it's clear from her subsequent testimony that

what she really meant was no.

Mr. Pompeo. I'm going to run outside and tell them she said yes.

Ms. Dunn. I appreciate you assisting her with that subsequently.

Mr. Pompeo. No worries.

Ms. Dunn. Okay. Go ahead. Sorry.

Mr. Pompeo. So same question. Maybe you can talk about your

interactions with Mr. Blumenthal during your time at the State

Department and then maybe subsequent to that as well. Would you break

it down?

Ms. Abedin. I had really very few interactions. I've known Sid

for a long time. I worked for Secretary Clinton for 19 years now, and

I met Mr. Blumenthal at the White House when I was working there. He

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was at the Clinton White House and the Clinton administration at the

same time. So I've known him since then.

While I was at the State Department, in terms of physical

interaction, it was very minimal. I'm struggling to think of when I

actually physically saw him. I don't believe I had any phone

conversations with him in that period. It's possible that there were

periodic email exchanges, but from my recollection, those were mostly

in the form of emails from Sid being forwarded to me to print.

Mr. Pompeo. Were you aware of the -- I want to say this in a way

that doesn't -- Mr. Blumenthal wrote to the Secretary frequently.

We've now seen those documents during this relevant time period.

That's my characterization. I think there were a lot. They were

directly related to intelligence prospects in Libya.

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Pompeo. Were you aware that those communications were taking

place? Were you ever copied on them, or did you know that Secretary

Clinton was receiving that information from Mr. Blumenthal related to

Libya in particular?

Ms. Abedin. I don't recall being copied on them, but I certainly

do remember printing documents that were emails from Sid, yes.

Mr. Pompeo. In a similar way, were you aware of any

communications that occurred prior to the departure of Mr. Qadhafi from

power with respect to post-Qadhafi planning? That is, if we're

successful, tell me what next steps -- were you involved in that at

all? You might not have been in your role. But were you aware of

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post-regime change planning that was taking place prior to the time

that the regime was removed?

Ms. Abedin. I don't know. Certainly those were not

conversations that I would have been involved in, but it's possible

I had a top line awareness that there were some meetings going on. But

I don't know.

Mr. Pompeo. I think that's all that I have, Sharon. Thank you.

Ms. Abedin. Thank you, sir.

Ms. Jackson. Well, and I think we're essentially out of time.

We may have like 2 minutes, but it's not enough to start the next series

of questions that I have, which are going to focus on the completeness

of the record that we got from the State Department, which is a long

area but it is my last area.

Ms. Abedin. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. So with that, I think we'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Let's go back on the record. It's 2:45. The minority

staff have graciously conceded their next hour, so I'm going to continue

with my questioning and hopefully this will make the day shorter than

it could have been.

When Mr. Pompeo was here, he asked if you were interviewed by the

ARB that was impaneled following the Benghazi attacks, and you said

no. Did you provide any documents to the ARB?

A I was not asked to provide any, no.

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Q Okay. Was there a memo that went out to all staff from Under

Secretary Kennedy requesting that anybody who had information to

provide it to the ARB? Do you recall that?

A I don't. If there was one, I don't remember receiving it.

Q Do you recall if the Secretary provided any documents to

the ARB?

A I'm not aware of what she provided.

Q Okay. Who would have played a role in that if she were to

provide documents to the ARB?

A It would have been our chief of staff, Cheryl Mills.

Q Okay. During the time that you worked with the Secretary,

were you ever part of or privy to a conversation regarding complying

with FOIA requests that particularly involved the Secretary's records?

A No, I wasn't aware that had ever happened. No.

Q Okay. So you were unaware that there had ever been a FOIA

request regarding records of the Secretary individually?

A While we were at State or post State?

Q Let's start with while you were at the State Department.

A Not at all that I remember.

Q Okay. What about after you left the State Department?

A That was not something -- no, that wasn't something that

happened outside her attorneys.

Q Okay. During the time that you were at the State

Department, you were aware that the Secretary was using a personal email

address; is that correct?

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A I was, ma'am.

Q Were you aware that it was her exclusive means of electronic

mail communications?

A Yes, I was.

Q Okay. And were you aware that that personal email account

was maintained on a private server?

A I know it was an email address that was provided by the IT

person in President Clinton's office. I'm not certain that I was aware

of what server it was on or not on.

Q But it was not on a State Department server?

A That's correct.

Q So you were aware at least of that fact?

A Absolutely, yes.

Q Okay. I'm sorry, but I'm going to jump back just a minute.

In September of 2012, following the attacks, there was the first

congressional inquiry into documents relating to the Benghazi attack.

Were you aware of that letter from a subcommittee of the Oversight and

Government Reform Committee?

A No. And it wouldn't have likely gone to me anyway, so I

wasn't aware. You're reminding me of something I didn't remember.

Q Okay. So there were no discussions among the senior staff

regarding complying with congressional requests for information

regarding the Benghazi attacks?

A I want to be thoughtful about how I answer that. I

think -- I know mostly in the context of the ARB I remember both the

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Secretary and Cheryl saying that they wanted everybody to be very

responsive to the committee. But in regards to any other inquiry, I

have no specific recollections.

Q Okay. Do you have any generalized recollection that there

was discussion of congressional inquiries into the Benghazi attacks?

A Yes. Yes, I'm sure I was aware at the time. But I think

what was more top of mind for me was the ARB. I believe that that

inquiry started fairly quickly.

Q Okay. And in the ARB, was there any discussion of the

Secretary or others in senior leadership providing documents to the

ARB?

A Not any discussions that they included me in. And I

certainly -- I wasn't asked for any documents.

Q Okay. Have you subsequently been aware that there were

conversations ongoing at that time regarding producing documents to

the senior leadership to the ARB?

A I don't think it's something that we've talked about since

then. It doesn't jog anything in my memory even post her time at the

State Department related to a congressional inquiry.

Q Or the ARB?

A The ARB, yes. As I mentioned, I do remember there being

this encouragement from our chief of staff and the Secretary that they

wanted people who were asked to participate to be responsive and

cooperative.

Q And did that responsiveness include their own records?

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A I don't know.

Q Okay. Do you recall that in December of 2012, Chairman

Darrell Issa of the Oversight and Government Reform sent a letter to

the State Department requesting information as to whether the Secretary

used a personal email account? Do you recall the Department receiving

that inquiry?

A No.

Q Okay. Do you recall any discussions that were had within

the senior leadership of the State Department at that time of receipt

of that request?

A Definitely not.

Q Okay. Do you recall anything about that letter coming in?

A Reading about it in the press, some months or a year

thereafter.

Q Okay. But nothing at the time when you were still at the

State Department?

A Definitely not.

Q Okay. You were asked by our minority colleagues about the

Secretary's ability to conduct business at her residence. And I

believe you said that she had a secure telephone there; is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Did she have other equipment in one or both of residences?

A Yes, she did.

Q Okay. Let me just ask this, was the equipment the same in

both of the residences?

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A It was pretty similar, yes.

Q Okay. If you could just describe what did she have in her

D.C. residence and what did she have in her New York residence.

A Certainly. In both residences, they basically established

in the present offices, the existing offices in the residence.

So they took the door down and they replaced it with a door with a special

lock in both houses. They installed fax machines, secure fax machines.

If I recall, there were two phones; there was a white phone and then

a yellow Cisco phone that had the two different levels of security.

Q So one up to the secret level and one to the top secret level?

A Correct. Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

A And she had the same setup in her New York residence as well,

a secure fax machine as well as two different types of phones.

Q Okay. Did she have a safe?

A She did, yes.

Q At each residence?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you said they made it into Do you know

whether it was accredited to hold up to top secret information?

A I wouldn't know the accreditation level, but I do know that

they installed doors that had locks on them.

Q Were there windows in those rooms?

A Yes.

Q Did they do anything to the windows?

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A I don't recall.

Q And I'm assuming that the State Department underwrote the

cost for those upgrades for her?

A I don't know.

Q Do those rooms still exist today the way they did at the

time?

A No, ma'am. They brought her existing doors out of storage

and replaced them, and they took all the equipment.

Q Okay. Did she have a regular fax machine at one or both

of the residences?

A If I remember -- and I think they still exist -- she had

one unit that was a printer, copier, and fax machine in both residences.

Q Did she have a computer in either of those rooms?

A She did.

Q Okay. Did she have a computer capable of processing

classified information?

A She did not.

Q Okay. So it was a regular computer in there?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

A But I should clarify that these were computers that she did

not use. They existed before she became Secretary of State and they

for the most part were dormant and --

Q So they were her personal computers?

A They were her personal computers, yes.

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Q Okay.

A And, Ms. Jackson, I apologize, I forgot to mention, they

did install in her Washington residence the ability to do, you know,

VTC. I don't know how to --

Mr. Rodriguez. SVTCS, the secure video.

Ms. Abedin. Yes, the video. I don't know if it was secure, but

the video capability.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Video teleconferences?

A Yes. We didn't use it, but it did exist. It was there.

I forgot to mention that.

Q You have no knowledge as to whether that could go to the

classified level?

A I have no recollection of having used it, but it was there.

Q Okay. And in these rooms they sort of built out for her

use?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Did she use those pieces of equipment to receive

information, the secure phones, the secure faxes. You've told us about

not using the VTC, but were the other modes of communication used?

A She absolutely used the secure phones. You know, she was

often home in either residence over the weekends and she made calls

and received calls on those phones, yes. The secure fax was deployed

very little, mostly because we often had technical challenges receiving

the faxes. She sometimes struggled with the equipment and --

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Q I believe I've seen an email where you have said, "Don't

ever use the fax machine."

A Yes. It was so maddening to try and execute it without

there being some challenge, so, you know, secure faxes, we pretty

quickly gave up on. And when she was in Washington, it was very

convenient to have a pouch delivered. She often had a pouch delivered

anyway. She lived in very close proximity to the State Department so

we would just ask those documents to be included in the pouch.

Q Okay. And was there a way to deliver documents to her in

New York?

A Yes, there was a courier from the U.S./U.N. facility was

able to do it there, but sometimes we, you know, had to struggle with

the secure fax machine to get her document.

Q When she traveled, did a secure phone -- I assume that there

was a secure phone and fax and other things on the plane when she

traveled, but when she would be in hotels, were there secure

communications available to her?

A On most occasions that I remember, yes. It's very common

for there to be a phone installed, a black phone in the suite. And

then they would have secure equipment in our -- I apologize. I'm

losing the word -- in our staff office, you know, the control room as

well.

Q Did they have like a command center or something like that?

A Yes. Yes. We called it a control room.

Q Control room?

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A Yes.

Q Okay. Did she have a classified email account assigned to

her by the State Department?

A She did not.

Q At any level, secret or top secret?

A No.

Q Was there someone who had an account on her behalf on those

systems?

A Not that I'm aware of, no.

Q Okay. Did she have a secure Blackberry?

A She did not.

Q Did anyone carry one on her behalf?

A No.

Q Okay. Did she have a secure cell phone?

A Oh, interesting question. There may have been a secure

cell phone that -- yes, on occasion. Yes.

Q That would travel with her?

A That would be with whoever, you know, whatever special

assistant or, you know -- yes. Yes. I forgot about that.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And did that routinely travel with her?

A We didn't need to use it very often because she was always

within close enough proximity with an actual hard line secure phone,

but now that you've asked me, I actually do remember that on occasion

there was a secure cell phone. I travel -- it was a little box. A

couple of times I traveled with it or assistant traveled with it, yes.

Q So is it accurate to say or to summarize that it

probably -- that it generally travelled with her but it was not used

much?

A Yes.

Q Okay. I would assume that it was in the checklist of things

that got packed when you traveled overseas.

Okay. Let's go back to the personal email account and the

non-State Department server. When did you first learn that the

Secretary was going to use a personal email account as Secretary of

State?

A Well, we -- you know, she'd had an email account that she

used prior to arriving at the State Department, and obviously, I was

aware of that. I communicated with her on that device, and that

continued through her time at State.

Q So during the time that she was a Senator, she only used

a personal email account?

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A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. When did you first learn that it was going to change

from the prior personal account to the clintonemail.com account?

A So once the President asked Secretary Clinton to serve as

Secretary of State, it was at the conclusion of 2008, the presidential

campaign was over, and her Senate office was transitioning. So for

my purposes, I'm talking about my transition at this point, I reached

out to the IT, the person that did IT in President Clinton's office.

I'd always had an email account that was provided to me by the Clintons

and so I said I'm losing my hillaryclinton.com email, what can I use?

Q Let me just stop you right there. The hillaryclinton.com,

was that the one that you had been using?

A Yes, ma'am. That was prior to arriving at the State

Department. That was provided to me by the political entity associated

with the Secretary.

Q Okay. And how long had you had that email address?

A Since we left the White -- well, I probably had -- first

it was called @friendsofhillary.com, that transitioned -- that was

right when we left the White House, and then that transitioned to

hillaryclinton.com once she opened her presidential committee.

Q Okay. And the William Jefferson Clinton office maintained

that email address, that domain name, hillaryclinton.com, or did her

political campaign?

A Her political campaign, yes.

Q Okay.

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A Yeah.

Q So to your knowledge, there was a server associated with

her political campaign?

A I would have -- yes. I mean, I would have assumed so. It

wouldn't have been something I paid attention to, but yes, ma'am.

Q But when there was a problem, you didn't call the William

Jefferson Clinton office?

A I usually called Justin. He was our go-to guy. He always

was, you know, I'm having a problem, can you help me fix it, and he

always did, so that wasn't --

Q And who is Justin?

A Justin Cooper worked in President Clinton's office, and he

handled a lot of IT issues that would arise from time to time.

Q And you used him even when you had the political campaign

for Mrs. Clinton running for President?

A I was on the road a lot. I used -- you know, Justin was

an easy go-to call. I certainly called him when the then Senator was

having challenges with her email, yes. When in need, he was my point

of contact.

Q Okay. And just to be clear, she never had a senate.gov

account, email account when she was Senator?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. So moving forward to the end of 2008 to early 2009

when you were aware that she was going to become Secretary of State,

take us through those steps.

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A So as I was saying earlier, I reached out and said I'm losing

these two email addresses. You know, what can I use to continue doing

emails as it related to Clinton family matters, and he suggested that

I use that clintonemail.com address, and so that's what I did.

Q Was that something that Just -- and by he, you're talking

about Justin Cooper, right?

A I am referring to Justin, correct. That's my recollection,

but yes.

Q Was that something that he was setting up as something new,

or did it exist?

A I'm not certain if it existed or not, but around the same

time, that's when, you know, obviously, she went from her AT&T

Blackberry email to Clinton email. It all happened around the same

period of time.

Q Okay. Did Secretary Clinton have a email address under the

domain name hillaryclinton. -- it's hard to say

hillaryclinton@hillaryclinton.com, but do you understand what I mean?

A Yes, ma'am. She did not.

Q She did not. She just had her AT&T account?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So it was something@at&t.net, or something like that?

A Exactly.

Q And do you recall approximately when this was that you were

having these conversations with Justin Cooper and the setup or the

transfer to clintonemail.com?

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A I don't remember the exact timeframe, but it was once I knew

that I was about to lose two email addresses and trying to figure out

what I was going to do.

Q And I guess my question is, why were you going to lose them?

Could they not continue or who made the decision that they were not

going --

A Well, she was no longer -- sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt

you, Ms. Jackson. I apologize. But she was no longer going to be

Senator, so obviously our Senate email accounts were going to be

defunct, and her campaign committee was essentially shutting down. We

were all going to lose our hillaryclinton.com email addresses within

a short period of time.

Q So that leaves me to infer, but please correct me if I'm

wrong, that those email addresses, the hillaryclinton.com addresses

were not associated with their family foundation and business and

things like that?

A Well, the foundation was a whole separate -- and I, you know,

and I you know, I never had a foundation email account, but I used my

hillaryclinton.com account for anything as it related to the family,

in addition to anything related to the campaign at that time.

Q Okay. And did you say you had two accounts there?

A I'm sorry --

Q With her campaign?

A It was friendsofhillary that sort of morphed into

hillaryclinton.com.

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Q But they were not simultaneous?

A I think what happened is, when she went from being senator

with having a political action committee and then went to deciding she's

running for President, the friendsofhillary.com emails just sort

morphed into -- or I don't know how to really explain it, but I guess

they were -- anyone who emailed me at friendsofhillary.com I would get

on the hillaryclinton.com email address. Does that make sense?

Q Actually it does, but I don't know why.

Do you know who came up with the name of clintonemail.com?

A I do not recall, no.

Q Okay. Just came to you as that?

A Yes. I'm not the most tech savvy person, so yes, in my

recollection is I got a brand new Blackberry in the mail and it had

a working phone number and an email address, and I was very happy.

Q Did it come with a contact list?

A I don't know.

Q I'm asking if some of the other --

A I would suppose that the contacts they had in my

hillaryclinton.com Blackberry were transposed to the

clintonemail.com. That's a safe -- yeah, that's safe to assume. I

would have probably been frustrated if not.

Q And for those people who had an email address at

hillaryclinton.com, did they get new email addresses at

clintonemail.com? I think I said that right.

A No, no.

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Q They did not?

A No.

Q Do you know how many did? How many people did? Obviously

the Secretary did and you did.

A I think the only additional person was Chelsea.

Q What if any discussions did you have with the Secretary

regarding the use of this new email address as her exclusive means of

electronic communication as Secretary of State?

A I don't recall having many conversations. It was a natural

progression from what she was doing previously, and she continued to

do so.

Q And I just want to be precise here. You said you don't

remember many conversations. Were there any conversations?

A I don't remember any conversations. I think those of us

who were part of her senior leadership at the State Department all

regret that we didn't think about it more, but we really didn't.

Q When she went in as Secretary of State, had they set up a

state.gov account for her in anticipation of her arrival?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Did you or did anyone, to your knowledge, communicate with

the State Department that she would not be using -- did you or others

tell the IT department or the executive secretary or the executive

assistant that she did not want one?

A I don't remember anyone discussing it with us. You know,

we were coming into a bureaucracy. I don't know that they

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necessarily -- I don't know that they necessarily assumed or approached

us, assuming that the Secretary of State would have a state.gov email

address. I'm not sure that the former Secretary had a state.gov email

address. I don't know that it was the normal course of business for

the Department, but I'm supposing on their behalf. I don't think it

was automatic. I certainly don't remember anyone approaching me about

giving her a state.gov email.

Q Okay. At any time prior to her becoming Secretary of State,

did you have any conversation with her about using personal email versus

official email as First Lady or as Senator or at any time in your past

tenure with her?

A Certainly not as First Lady. You know, even as Senator,

I don't recall. It doesn't mean it's out of the realm of possibility,

but I don't recall any specific conversations with her.

Q Do you recall when she came in as Senator, whether they had

set up an email account for her at a senate.gov address?

A No.

Q No recollection, or no, they did not?

A No, they did not.

Q Okay. Were you involved at all in the server being

relocated to the New York -- well, first of all, let me ask you this.

Was a server relocated to the New York residence?

A I have subsequently learned that's the case, but I wasn't

aware at the time, no.

Q When did you learn?

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A I think in the last year or so or the last -- I don't want

to put a timeframe on it, but as all of this has become public,

learning -- it wasn't something that was discussed with me before it's

become public.

Q Okay. When problems arose during the time that she was

Secretary of State, and I can't imagine that there's an electronic

system out there that didn't have a problem or two, during this tenure,

who did you call?

A When problems arose for myself?

Q For yourself or on behalf of the Secretary with the

clintonemail.com account?

A If it was related to clintonemail.com, I would called

Justin.

Q Justin Cooper?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. If it wasn't related to clintonemail.com, under what

sort of problems would you encounter?

A If it was the state.gov email, it would just be that it

wasn't working, which happened from time to time that the state.gov

system was down.

Q Okay. Did you ever call anybody other than Justin Cooper

when problems arose?

A Outside of Clinton email?

Q Yeah.

A For state.gov, I would ask one of the assistants in the

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office, I would say my Blackberry isn't working, can you help me get

it fixed, and they would go to somebody in our IT department.

Q Good. And then back to the clintonemail.com address, did

you call anyone other than Justin when problems arose?

A I think there was a period, and it may have been -- my memory

is fuzzy on this, so I apologize, but at one point we -- I would call

Bryan Pagliano, but I don't remember if that was pre or post, but I

mean, Justin was my primary person.

Q Okay. And did Justin work at the State Department?

A He did not.

Q Okay. And where did he work?

A He worked in President Clinton's office.

Q In New York?

A In New York.

Q The Harlem office?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. So you had no involvement in the redirection of the

campaign server to the New York home?

A No.

Q Okay. Do you now understand that it was in the New York

home?

A Yes.

Q Okay. It wasn't in some other building. It was in their

residence in Chappaqua, New York?

A Yes.

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Q Okay. Have you subsequently learned who was involved in

the relocation of the server to the Chappaqua, New York residence?

A I actually don't know that I do.

Q Okay. Was it Bryan Pagliano?

A It may have been Bryan, but I would -- I'm guessing.

Q Okay. And why would he be in the realm of possible persons

to have done that? What was his role? How did you know him?

A I knew him previously from the campaign, the presidential

campaign. He worked on her 2008 presidential campaign, so I knew Bryan

from there.

Q And did he run the IT systems for that campaign?

A I don't know if he ran the IT systems, but he was one of

the people who worked on IT systems in 2008.

Q Was he like the head person, or where did he fall in the

hierarchy of IT folks?

A I don't know. We had a lot of people in 2008, and I was

never really at headquarters, so for me it was a name and email address,

and I would say I need help.

Q Okay. And he was in New York?

A That would have been -- he would have been in Washington,

actually. Our headquarters were in Virginia specifically in 2008.

Q Okay. Do you know how the personal email account and the

private server were funded?

A I don't.

Q No information on who paid the registration fees for the

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domain name or paid for the relocation of the server to the Chappaqua,

New York home?

A No.

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah, I certainly appreciate the witness'

willingness to answer every single question put before her, but I

am -- and I certainly will give you the latitude to finish, particularly

because both she and her counsel are obviously being cooperative, but

I just would caution you that we have gotten very far afield in

completing the record when we are talking about how it was financed.

Ms. Jackson. I understand that that's your position, and we have

a different one, and I will continue asking questions in my hour.

Ms. Sawyer. Could you at least give us some foundational sense

as how that's related to the investigation into the attacks in Benghazi?

Ms. Jackson. I will continue asking questions in my hour.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. And I just want the record to very clearly

reflect, since we did see a letter in the public domain indicating that

we have never objected in the context as to how the investigation is

being run, that I am clearly objecting, and I appreciate the willingness

to answer on behalf of Democratic Members to the questions that are

going far beyond determining whether or not we have a complete record

as to the documents that are in the -- Ms. Abedin's custody and control

related to Benghazi and the attacks in Benghazi.

And we also don't agree with the scope of how far back, but I

understand as was said in the last hour already that to the best of

her knowledge and ability, any documents that were in her custody or

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control related to Libya or Benghazi have been now turned over to the

State Department. I mean, can I just clarify if that is accurate?

Ms. Abedin. That is accurate, yes, ma'am.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. That's fine.

Ms. Jackson. And I would also note for the record, we had no

objection from the witness or the counsel to that, and those are the

only objections that are allowed in a transcribed interview, and we

have not objected to any question posed by minority counsel.

Ms. Sawyer. That's fine. And I just want to read from the letter

sent from the chairman to the ranking member the following sentence.

Ms. Jackson. Ms. Sawyer, you will have the opportunity to ask

questions during your hour.

Ms. Sawyer. That's fine. I appreciate that. Thank you.

Ms. Dunn. Since we have interruption in the questioning, in any

event, there's at least one thing that I think the witness should

probably make clear about her email use, so I don't know how much more

questioning we're going the do about that, but -- so Huma, if there's

anything that you want to make clear, you should do that.

Ms. Abedin. I think the only thing I wanted to clarify is I myself

did the vast majority, the vast, vast majority of my work as it related

to the State Department on my state.gov email, I think, and I think

my documents would reflect that work that was conducted on Clinton email

was minimal compared to the amount of work I did.

I just generally want to say, like I always try to do the right

thing, I always try to do things the way I was told I had to do them

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and listen to the instructions, so that's the only other point I wanted

to make about my email use.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q We've talked about a Yahoo account you had and the

clintonemail.com account. Were there any other domain names

maintained on that server, to your knowledge?

A I'm not sure my Yahoo account was maintained on any server.

Q I'm sorry. I didn't mean to imply that it was. I'm trying

to identify the scope of email accounts and then, as a corollary to

that, were they maintained on the server that the clintonemail.com was

maintained? It's kind of a two-part.

You know what, let me just withdraw it and start all over because

I think I just complicated it by putting two things together.

A Okay.

Q You've identified for us two personal email accounts, a

Yahoo account and a clintonemail.com account; is that correct?

A I had one personal account, which was my Yahoo account, and

I had a Clinton email account that was provided to me by the Clintons

that I used for their personal emails about their personal matters,

but that was the distinction.

Q Okay. Were you aware that the Secretary used -- well, let

me ask this. How many different email addresses are you aware of that

the Secretary used?

A I am aware of two, the one that she used when she first

arrived at the State Department and then after the subsequent incident

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where her email address was made public while she was Secretary of

State, that email address has changed.

Q Okay. The first one was hdr22@clintonemail.com?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q That was the one she used during the duration of being

Secretary of State?

A That's what she used until that was made public, and then

that was changed.

Q And how was that made public?

A I think somebody -- oh, gosh, I'm sorry. You're testing

my memory, but it was -- I believe it was somebody else's emails that

became public, and it had identified her email address, and her email

address was then made public.

Q Recognition is often better than recall, so do you recall

that it was Sid Blumental's email address that was hacked?

A Yes. Yes. Yes.

Q Okay. And at that time she changed to a different email

address?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Had there been any other email addresses used by the

Secretary from 2009 forward, to your knowledge?

A In that time period --

Q From 2009 forward.

A Yes, it was those two, yes.

Q And as of today, is she still using one of those two?

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Ms. Dunn. Can we go off the record?

Ms. Jackson. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q We've talked about the hdr22@clintonemail.com, and then

after the Sid Blumenthal hack, a different email address has been used.

From 2009 forward, have there been any other email addresses used by

the Secretary?

A While she was at State?

Q Well, let's start there, while she was at State?

A So there was those two at State, so she transitioned from

the AT&T Blackberry that happened around the same time as she started

at State. She had the hdr22, she used that, solely that address until

the hacking incident, and then we changed the address to another

@clintonemail.com, and --

Q And then, more recently, has there been yet another one?

Not what it is, just has there been?

Ms. Dunn. So I'd be more comfortable if we went off the record

and talked about this.

Ms. Jackson. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Jackson. All right. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Westmoreland. Can I ask a couple before you go on?

Ms. Jackson. Yes, you may.

Mr. Westmoreland. If I get out of bounds, somebody pull a flag.

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But you said the IT person -- and this is going back a little bit, and

I think you identified he was Justin, but was he from Mr. Clinton's

office? I mean, did he work for Mr. Clinton?

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. And you said the .

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. And I think you mentioned that that was

actually the President's office that they .

Ms. Abedin. No, sir. No, sir. Actually, the President had a

separate office in the New York -- actually, he had separate offices

in both residences. These were offices that were specific to the

Secretary at both residences --

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Ms. Abedin. And those were .

Mr. Westmoreland. So it was not his office. It was just a office

that was ?

Ms. Abedin. They were her offices, and they were her offices prior

to her becoming Secretary of State, but in both residences, they each

had their own --

Mr. Westmoreland. Sure.

Ms. Abedin. -- their own offices.

Mr. Westmoreland. But the server wasn't in , that you know

of?

Ms. Abedin. I don't -- I actually, sir, even till today, don't

know physically where that server was.

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Mr. Westmoreland. That's all.

Ms. Abedin. I don't know.

Mr. Westmoreland. Now, when you were talking about

, and you said you don't know who paid for it, if it was the

State Department or private or whatever?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. But the upgrades included a secure phone and

a secure fax and some of the other things that you mentioned.

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. But those would have had to have come from the

State Department, right?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, they did, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. And do you know if it was ever restored

back to the -- I mean, you said they took down a door, you know.

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. I'm sure they added some stuff.

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. But did the contractor or the State come in and

put it back to this original condition?

Ms. Abedin. They did, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. And you said that she had a personal email while

she was a Senator?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. And, was it on the same server that was used

when she got the clinton.com, or do you know?

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Ms. Abedin. I don't know. I don't know if that email address was

housed on that server already.

Mr. Westmoreland. So it could have been two different servers.

I mean, they wouldn't have wiped one clean and then say, okay, we got

all the Senate stuff out of the way and now we're going to use it for

this, but you --

Ms. Abedin. I really don't -- I really don't know.

Mr. Westmoreland. Now, the other thing is, you said when you got

your Blackberry, that it had a phone number and an email address, and

you think possibly, probably so, it had your contact list?

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. Was that the Blackberry that came from the

Clintons or was that the Blackberry that came from the State Department?

Ms. Abedin. It was the Blackberry that came from the Clinton

office. I had two. I operated on two Blackberries when I was at the

State Department.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yeah. So, but the one you're talking about

that already had the --

Ms. Abedin. Yes, yes, that would have been the personal one.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. And you said that Yahoo, clinton.com,

and .gov was the three emails that you had, your personal and the Clinton

one, and you said you used it for personal, right?

Ms. Abedin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Now, did you do personal work? I mean, if you

are only doing it for personal, were you doing personal work for Ms.

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Clinton while you were at the State Department, or was this just to say,

hey, how you doing or how's Chelsea and what did you all have dinner,

or let's get together or something like that? I mean, was it work

related or just -- I mean, kind of explain that.

Ms. Abedin. Of course. It was work related for me, but it was

more often than not personal for them, just given my job

responsibilities, you know, especially planning her schedule, knowing

when to coordinate, knowing, you know, where her husband was or her

daughter was. It wasn't atypical for them to say FYI, you know, is the

Secretary scheduled to be in Washington tomorrow because the President's

going to be there and will they be spending the night together. I mean,

they, you know, both traveled a lot. It was coordinating for those

purposes.

And absolutely, it would not have been atypical, sir, for somebody

from the President's office to email and say, you know, does her schedule

end in time tomorrow for her to have dinner with the President in New

York when she lands, so yes, it was related to coordinating all three

of their schedules.

Mr. Westmoreland. Now, the President didn't email, correct?

Ms. Abedin. That's correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. So who would have been emailing you for

the President to find out where you all were going -- when they were

going to have dinner? I mean, I'm confused, I guess.

Ms. Abedin. He had a staff, sir. He has a scheduler.

Mr. Westmoreland. Oh, so his so staff emailed.

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Ms. Abedin. Yes. Yes, yes, yes. I apologize if I wasn't clear.

I was not emailing --

Mr. Westmoreland. No, that's okay. But would his staff not have

had your State Department address or they didn't think it was appropriate

to ask you do what you were doing over at the State Department address?

Ms. Abedin. They absolutely did have my state.gov address, and

on occasion, I was emailed there as well. But I think for, frankly,

it seemed more appropriate to have those kinds of exchanges on the

systems that we'd always used, and like I said, it was primarily to

coordinate, and it was not communications with the President directly.

It was with his staff.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, I've got to leave, and it's certainly

nice to meet you. Thank you.

Ms. Abedin. Thank you. It was nice to meet you as well.

Ms. Dunn. Thank you.

Mr. Westmoreland. I appreciate it. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. Thank you, sir.

Ms. Dunn. Do you know when we started this?

Ms. Jackson. Quarter till.

Ms. Dunn. Great. Thank you.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q All right. Let's return to Mr. Pagliano. When did you

first meet him?

A Sometime probably -- sometime around the beginning of her

presidential campaign in 2007, 2008. I don't remember -- I don't

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remember the first time I met him.

Q Okay. Did Mr. Pagliano become an employee of the State

Department?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And where did he work and what did he do?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Did he do IT related services for the State

Department?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Did you have any involvement -- did you know he was

coming to the State Department?

A I'm not sure I did, but he was there. I do know he was there.

Q Okay. Did he also perform work for the Clintons during the

time that you were at the State Department?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Well, I guess I want to go back to you said you would

call Justin Cooper, or there was a period of time when you called Bryan

Pagliano. So can you explain to me what you called him about and what

was he to do?

A I'm not clear on the timing. It's very fuzzy in my head.

There was a period of time, that I would have called Bryan for the same

thing I would have called Justin for, it's not working, can you help

me, but I'm very fuzzy on what that time period is.

Q But obviously you were at the State Department because

before then he was working for the campaign. Is that correct?

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A Yes.

Q Okay. And at what --

A It's not necessarily -- actually, I want to revise that,

or at least clarify that. I'm not sure if it was when we were at State,

and I guess I really should probably think about it. Justin was my

main point of contact over the years. Bryan, at some point, was -- I

just am not fuzzy -- I'm just fuzzy on when.

Q Okay.

A I mean, it may have been after we left the State Department

when I say I'm fuzzy. It may have actually been after we left the State

Department.

Q And how would you communicate with him?

A Probably through , through her assistant, or I would

have emailed him.

Q Okay.

A If it was a problem with her email.

Q With the Secretary's email?

A Yes.

Q You would have emailed him to fix it?

A Possibly, yes.

Q Did he have an email -- clintonemail.com account?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. And what account did you have in your Blackberry,

your contacts for him?

A I don't remember. I don't remember.

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Q Do you still have those contacts?

A I probably do.

Q Is he still in your contacts?

A He may be. I haven't been in touch with him for a long time.

Q Okay. Would you be willing to provide that information to

the committee as to what email address is in your contacts for him?

A I am happy to provide whatever contact information I have,

yes.

Q Okay. Were there ever times when the system went down, the

clintonemail.com address went down and during the time you were at the

State Department?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall how often that occurred?

A Oh, I don't recall it happening often. In fact, I feel like

it was a big deal when it did happen. I specifically remember one

instance one summer, I don't remember which year specifically, when

it went down. There was a big storm.

Q Was that Hurricane Sandy?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. Does it refresh your recollection to know that that

happened in 2012?

A I'm sorry, what do you mean?

Q Well, when Hurricane Sandy occurred.

A Okay.

Q You said one summer.

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A Oh, okay.

Q In fact, if you would go back to exhibit 7 and take a look

at that and see if that refreshes your recollection.

A Yeah. Yes.

Q Okay. Is that when you're talking about that the system

went down?

A I'm not sure it was.

Q Okay. And when was the date in that again?

A This is October 29, 2012. I'm not sure it was. It was the

summer.

Q Okay. Do you recall the system going down at the time of

Hurricane Sandy?

A I don't.

Q You don't recall that Bryan Pagliano had to go out and do

some repairs to the system in New York?

A Are you telling me that?

Q I'm asking you if you recall that.

A I'm not aware that that happened.

Q Okay. At any time while you were at the State Department

and Secretary Clinton was the Secretary of State, do you recall any

intrusion or breach of data or the system otherwise going down and

having the loss of data on the system?

A In the state.gov system?

Q No, where the clintonemail.com account was housed.

A No, I'm not.

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Q Okay. Were you aware of any cyber threats to the system

that housed the clintonemail.com?

A I am not.

Q Do you know whether that system, the system that housed the

clintonemail.com, had encryption capabilities?

A I am not.

Q Did you ever encrypt information that would go onto that

system, encrypt a document that was attached to an email, or anything

like that?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Have you ever encrypted a document?

A I don't know what that means.

Q Like password protect it in some way or anything like that?

A No, not that -- no.

Q Okay. Do you know who provided the physical security for

the server and related equipment in the New York home?

A I don't.

Q Who, among the senior staff at the State Department, was

aware that former Secretary Clinton used a personal email address?

A It was pretty common knowledge amongst senior staff.

Q Okay. And when you say senior staff, how far down the

organizational chart are you going? Deputy secretaries?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Under secretaries?

A Yes.

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Q All of the under secretaries have her personal email

account?

A I am not sure if all of them did but certainly many did.

Q Okay. And can you recall which ones did?

A No.

Q Did Wendy Sherman?

A She would have, yes. That makes sense.

Q Did Patrick Kennedy?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Would the Under -- I can't remember them all. They

had letters. R, N.

A I still refer to them by their letters.

Q Okay. Was there an R, Under Secretary for R?

A Yes.

Q Was that like press, public affairs, public something like

that?

A Yes, that was Judith McHale.

Q Yes. Do you recall if she had the --

A I'm fairly certain she did.

Q Okay. What are some other letters that you recall? We can

back into this.

A Well, let's see. So the deputy secretary certainly would

have, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs would have likely had

it, pretty certain did. The Under Secretary for, you know, Public

Affairs is, as you relayed, did. I know some of the assistant

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secretaries had her email.

Q Which ones do you recall had her?

A You know, the ones I remember were the Under Secretary -- I'm

sorry, the assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Jeff Feltman,

but beyond that, maybe Phil Gordon did, you know, European Affairs

Assistant Secretary, but now I'm just guessing and assuming, but there

were certainly -- there were certainly leadership in our department

that had her email, and then obviously everyone within the Secretary's

office had her email.

Q Okay. Who, among the other heads of the executive branch,

had her personal email account, like Secretary Gates, then Secretary

Panetta, Director Petraeus, people from the White House, were there

other leaders in the executive branch that had her personal email

address?

A I know she communicated with leadership at the White House.

Q By email?

A By email, yes, ma'am. I really did not, you know, have the

capacity -- I didn't read who was sending her emails, but I do know

in some instances people asked for her email and we provided it. I

don't know about General Petraeus or Secretary Gates. I honestly

don't. She saw many of these people on a regular basis in meetings

at the White House, so I'm not sure that they actually emailed each

other.

Q Okay. Who, among the White House staff, requested her

email address?

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A From what I recollect, the chief of staff and --

Q And at what times, which chief of staff?

A Ron Emanuel, shortly after we arrived, and I know David

Axelrod communicated on -- or at least had requested, you know, had

asked for her email address.

Q And were those given -- was the email address given to those

two individuals?

A Yes, anyone who asked for her email address, for the most

part, received it.

Q Do you recall anyone who was denied it?

A No, I don't.

Q Okay. Were ambassadors given her email address?

A I don't know. I don't believe so. I think it was -- it

wouldn't probably have been protocol either for an ambassador to email

the Secretary of State directly. They typically went through, you

know, the chain of command and reported in to the relevant assistant

secretary.

Q Do you recall whether the general counsel or the legal

advisor to the State Department had her personal email account?

A Harold Koh, I suspect, did.

Q You don't recall precisely whether he did or not?

A I don't, but I -- I mean, I'm sure he did.

Q Do you know whether he was consulted by the Secretary before

she exclusively used her personal email account at the State

Department?

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A Do I know if he was consulted?

Q Uh-huh.

A I don't.

Q At any time, did he raise any concerns about her use of a

personal email account?

A Not to me, that I remember.

Q Of all of the people that we've talked about, the deputy

secretaries, the select under secretaries, a few assistant

secretaries, at any time did anyone raise any type of concern about

the Secretary exclusively use -- let me state that differently.

At any time did any of these individuals voice any type of concern

over the secretary's use of a personal email account?

A No.

Q Okay. Did any of these individuals know that the Secretary

was exclusively using a personal email account?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. Do you know whether the Secretary or anyone on her

behalf consulted with the National Archives and Record Administration

regarding the exclusive use of a personal email?

A I don't believe so.

Q Do you believe that did not happen?

A I certainly did not do it on her behalf.

Q Okay. Do you know whether she told officials at the White

House that it was going to be her exclusive means of electronic

communication?

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A I can't speak to what she told the White House.

Q Were you ever present when she denied or deflected any

inquiry in that regard?

A No.

Q Was the Secretary, what is known as an original

classification authority with respect to classified information?

A I don't know.

Q When did you first become aware that the Department was

requesting or notified Secretary Clinton that they were going to ask

for the return of her records or knew that they didn't have her universe

of records?

A You know, I've thought about this a lot because there has

been so much news about this recently, and I've tried to fix in my head

when I first became aware, I think, I had full awareness about what

the Department had requested and what the committee had requested

earlier this year when our campaign team was being, you know, informed

about what transpired in the last year. But prior to that, it was

something that was being handled by her attorneys, so I didn't really

have much awareness.

Q Okay. And specifically when you say her attorneys, who are

you referring to?

A David Kendall.

Q Okay. Were you talking with Cheryl Mills at all?

A Was I talking to Cheryl about?

Q The State Department's request for Secretary Clinton's --

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A No.

Q What about a Heather Samuelson?

A Of course I know Heather, but no.

Q Is she currently working on the campaign?

A No.

Q Okay. Do you know where she is currently?

A Physically?

Q Yes. I mean what city, what state?

A I think she's still in Washington.

Q Not New York?

A She's not in New York, no. She's not in New York.

Q Do you know if she played any role in the return of the

Secretary's records to the State Department?

A I'm not aware of what role Heather played.

Q To your knowledge?

A To my knowledge, yes.

Q Do you know what if any role Cheryl Mills played?

A I don't know specifically. I don't know what role Cheryl

would have played. I know Cheryl was one of the Secretary's attorneys.

Q Okay. I do want to try and nail down the timing of when

you knew that the Secretary's records were not with the State

Department. I know I'm running out of time, but it's also my last

topic.

Mr. Rodriguez. How much longer do you think you'll be?

Ms. Dunn. Do you want a break?

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Mr. Rodriguez. Do you know how much longer you'll be?

Ms. Jackson. 5 minutes maybe.

Mr. Rodriguez. You have about 5 minutes in you?

Ms. Abedin. No, I do, but I'm not sure I'm going to be able to

satisfy your answers here.

Ms. Jackson. You know what, let's go off the record. Let's take

a break and --

Ms. Dunn. Yeah.

[Recess.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. Let's go back on the record. It is 4 minutes after

4:00. I am going to continue with my questioning to wrap up this

session, then we're going to turn it over to my minority colleagues,

and then we're going to transfer down to a short, very, very short

classified setting for just a few questions.

So right when we broke, I was talking to you about the request

for the review and return of records of the Secretary to the State

Department, and I believe I was asking you as to when that was. Do

you have any idea of like what season it was, was it spring, was it

summer, was it fall, can you connect it to any other event and try and

give me a better sense of when you first learned?

A Yeah. I've really been trying to rack my brain about what

I knew in the time and what I've known subsequently, but in the period

where that request had gone to her, it had really been handled by her

attorneys.

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It wasn't something that was certainly discussed with me or shared

with me, and I wasn't involved in the process of retrieving anything,

so I'm not sure that I knew the full extent until earlier this year

when, you know, as part of the campaign staff we were being briefed

on what the attorneys were going to make public about what had

transpired in the last year.

Q Okay. So you first learned, for, sure earlier this year,

is that correct, so early --

A Definitely about what had happened and the period of time

when a letter was sent by the State Department and these FOIA requests,

like all these things that have now become very obvious --

Q Uh-huh.

A -- I don't think was on my radar until it really had to meet

for the purposes of the campaign really.

Q Okay. And was that then before or after the New York Times

ran the article? I'm just still trying to get a sense of when.

A Which -- I'm sorry, which article --

Q About her exclusive use of a personal email address during

her tenure as Secretary of State, which I recall being on March 2nd?

A Was that the first time it was reported?

Q That is my recollection, but --

Ms. Dunn. Do you have the article?

Ms. Jackson. Not with me.

Ms. Abedin. Well, obviously I knew that she had used only that

email account, so that wouldn't have been news to me. So are you asking

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me when I knew --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q About the request for the return of records, the review and

return of records, was it before or after it became public knowledge

that she had exclusively used her personal email account during her

tenure as Secretary of State?

A From my recollection, it was once -- and frankly, the only

reason that anybody from the campaign needed to know anything about

this is because there were press requests asking a whole series of

questions. I actually do not recall that it was the New York Times

that had written that first article, but I know there were news reports

earlier this year, and then subsequently there were questions being

asked. We were planning events for her as it related to the campaign,

and then all of a sudden we now had to deal with a new set of questions

from the press about what had transpired in the last year, and that's

why her lawyers were consulted.

They then relayed the relevant information to the communications

team at the campaign, and those were the talking points that -- then

the talking points were put together by our communications team, and

so at that point, yes, yes, ma'am, absolutely, I was aware it was listed

there when she got the request and what her lawyers did and that the

documents had been provided.

Q But I guess from your long history with the Secretary, I

see you in sort of a different role, and you had essentially the family

email account, the clintonemail.com?

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A Sure, yeah.

Q And so I understand that the campaign officials were told,

but weren't you told before then?

A Who would have told me?

Q The Secretary herself.

A Absolutely not.

Q Okay. Cheryl Mills?

A I don't ever recall Cheryl mentioning that to me.

Q Okay. Philippe Reines?

A I don't recall Philippe Reines mentioning it to me.

Q No one asked you about your own clintonemail.com account

in connection with the Secretary's return of records?

A No.

Q Okay. So the first time you knew that anybody knew you had

a clintonemail.com account was when they requested you to look at your

records, or did you know before then?

A I'm sorry, can you ask me that question again --

Q Yeah, it was a little complicated. At some point you were

asked to return your own records, to go through your own personal

records and return them to the State Department.

A That's correct, yes.

Q Okay. How did you get your clintonemail.com account

records? Were you able to still access that account?

A I didn't do it myself. I asked my attorneys. I gave them

my devices and my documents and I asked them to make the review and

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collect everything that I had and to turn over any potential Federal

records.

Q So that account was still active in the sense that it could

be accessed without going to a server or an Internet service provider?

A I'm not sure that the account was still active,

but -- because I had transitioned to a new email, but I certainly, you

know, clearly did have emails on my devices that were relevant, and

as I understand, they were all turned over, yes.

Q All right. Prior to you being contacted, did you know ahead

of time that you were going to be -- well, let me ask this. How did

you first become aware that you personally were going to be requested

to review your records?

A To review and return?

Q Yes.

A I read a news article.

Q Okay. That was before the letter arrived?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

A I read a news article that said that my records and other

members of the senior team identified by name, had been asked to review

and return their Federal records. I had not received any such request.

I contacted my lawyers and said there's a news article saying that I

have been asked to do this, but no one has actually asked me to do this.

They inquired on my behalf, and sure enough, it turns out that

a request had been sent in March of this year for the review and return

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of records in my personal possession.

It never made it to me because the requests were sent to an old

mailing address and to old email addresses, so my attorneys were able

to reach out to the Department, and I did officially receive the request

in May of this year.

Q Okay. Do you have any knowledge or awareness of the

methodology that was used by Secretary Clinton's representatives in

how they reviewed her records for return to the State Department?

A I don't. They did not consult with me. You'd have to ask

them.

Q Do you know how many people worked on that project?

A I have no idea.

Q There have been various media accounts about the server

being maintained by a company known as Platte River. Have you read

those accounts?

A Yes, I have.

Q Prior to reading those accounts, did you have any awareness

of Platte River as a company involved with the server maintaining those

emails?

A Yes, ma'am, I did.

Q Okay. Tell us what your involvement was and your awareness

was of that.

A I was informed, I believe it was, after we left State

Department or around that time, I don't remember a date specifically,

that Platte River Networks was going to take over responsibility for

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the IT needs of the family.

Q Okay. And who was it being transferred from to Platte

River?

A That's a good question. I would imagine from the system

that was, you know, an internal -- I guess an internal system that was

managed by the President's personal office to a company, an outside

company.

Q Did Bryan Pagliano have any involvement in that?

A He may have, yes, that's possible.

Q Okay. In maintaining the server prior to its being

transferred to Platte River?

A I don't remember the Bryan period. I want to check. I

mean, I feel like this is knowable. I just don't remember. I

apologize. I didn't prepare for that, so I don't know. I know Bryan.

I know there's a period where he was in and out of our universe. I

really wouldn't be doing service till I've given you accurate

information by saying yes.

Q Okay. And what records would you have available to you that

you could access? Would that be emails or telephone calls, call logs?

A I think I would call somebody and say, hey, when did Bryan

do this? I don't even know who. I'd probably call somebody in the

President's office. I don't -- you know.

Ms. Dunn. I think it's pretty clear it's not within her

recollection. Thank you.

BY MS. JACKSON:

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Q Who was involved in the selection of Platte River?

A I wasn't part of the process, so I was informed after they

had been selected.

Q Okay. And do you know who made that decision?

A I don't know who made the decision. I know I was informed

by the President's office and by Chelsea's office.

Q Do you know if there was any vetting done of the company

before it was chosen?

A You'd have to ask their offices.

Q Okay. Do you know who in their offices was involved in

that? Who was the person who informed you?

A It was the President's chief of staff and Chelsea's chief

of staff.

Q And who are those individuals?

A Tina Flournoy and Bari Lurie.

Q Do you know whether the server was physically shipped to

Platte River, or was the information electronically transmitted?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Do you know where the data is from that server today?

A I don't.

Q Okay. Do you know whether the Secretary has retained any

copies of -- either electronic or hard copy of the information that

was taken from the server?

A I think you'd have to ask David Kendall. I really don't

know.

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Q You don't know. You've not had any conversations with the

Secretary or anyone about that?

A I will tell you one thing for certain, Ms. Jackson, she does

not have these conversations with me.

Ms. Jackson. That's it. I think that might be all my questions,

and I will turn it over to the minority staff.

Ms. Abedin. Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. Go off the record just for a second while we shift.

[Recess.]

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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q We'll go back on the record. It's 4:20. And thank you for

your incredible patience with us today and all the answers to our many

questions.

You know, during the last round, and I just need to take just a

moment, you know, I had voiced a concern, an objection to the line of

questioning that you were being asked. You probably recall from very

early in the day, there was a preamble that indicated that we were not

deemed to be able to object. We've been very judicious in our

objections, not only in this interview, but certainly in other

interviews.

You know, nonetheless, with regard to this and to make sure that

the record is perfectly clear, and particularly in light of public

statements, and I'm just going to, in the record, read the letter sent

to the ranking member on October 8th, it's dated October 7th, we

received it the 8th, that says, quote -- from Chairman Gowdy, quote,

"And because your staff has participated fully in each transcribed

interview and deposition, you know we have done exactly that." The

"exactly that" is run the committee in a fair and bipartisan manner

and followed the facts wherever they may lead. "Not once in any of

these conversations have you ever questioned the motivations of the

committee's work or questioned our mission to uncover the facts

surrounding the Benghazi terrorist attacks."

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So I just need to make clear for the record, we lodged an

objection, certainly during the course of the questioning. We

understand fully and appreciate your desire to answer every single

question put before you. Thank you for that. That does not mean that

by being in the room, being here that we agree that that is within the

legitimate scope of this committee's jurisdiction. I feel like the

questions that you were asked during almost the entirety the last round

fell outside the scope of our legitimate jurisdiction. We do thank

you for answering them. We understand the desire to be able to say

you've answered every question that Congress has put to you, so thank

you for that. And I'll now just proceed to some --

A Thank you. Thank you so much.

Q I'll just proceed to just mostly following up on some of

the conversation you've already had today.

A Okay.

Q And I'll try to be efficient. We certainly, again, want

to be respectful of your time.

So during the last hour, there was some conversation about certain

outages that might have occurred on the email that the Secretary was

using during her time as Secretary of State, the personal email account.

You know, just taking a step back for a second, would you characterize

yourself as someone who is kind of tech savvy, technology

knowledgeable, or not?

A I would say very definitively not.

Q So overall and generally, and not getting into the technical

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details, did you feel that your ability to just communicate in terms

of the reliability was reasonably good on the account that the Secretary

was using on her personal email account?

A From -- you know, from my memory, it was -- it was fairly

reliable. There -- it was -- you know, there were instances where it

wasn't working for a period; there was a delay by a couple of hours

or something. I'm not saying there was never any technical issues at

all in the 4 years, but it felt like we had just as many, if not many

more instances, with State.gov going down for a period. So it wasn't

exclusive to one email or another.

Q Right. I mean, I recall you talking a little bit about a

particular problem and difficulty you had had with a fax machine --

A Yes.

Q -- and that --

A Yes.

Q -- seemed to me that that was a State Department fax setup,

because it sounded like it was the secure fax.

A That's correct.

Q It's not that the State system would have been perfect

either. Is that fair to say?

A That is fair to say, in my opinion, yes.

Q And in either case, if you encountered a problem, you were

not going to be the technology person to solve the problem. Is that

fair?

A That's fair.

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Q So you were also asked about a particular potential outage

of a server or of the account during Hurricane Sandy, and you said you

didn't -- I'm not sure -- I'm not sure if you said you didn't recall

if it happened or if you think it didn't happen, but is it possible

that there was an outage that you would not recall, either during that

instance or at some other time?

A It is possible. I was not aware until Ms. Jackson

mentioned what had happened in October of 2012. That was not top of

mind to me. I -- in my recollection, actually had been a summer and

I thought it was a year earlier. I wasn't aware of that one, or I didn't

remember that one.

Q When you say a summer or a year earlier, are you referring

to Hurricane Sandy or a problem with the server?

A Well, this was Hurricane Sandy, so there was an August,

either the year before or 2 years prior that -- and I -- it must have

been 2000 -- let me think about this for a second. So it would have

been 2011, by my recollection. The only instance that I remember that

we had an issue with Clinton email going down, I had thought was in

2011, in August 2011, for a period. I certainly didn't remember this,

and maybe --

Q And either way, Hurricane Sandy, I had to ask my colleague,

was fall of 2012. So that one itself was 3 years ago.

A Yeah.

Q And then the other one, to the extent you had a recollection,

would have been more than 4 --

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A Yes.

Q -- years ago?

A Yes.

Q So understandably, to the extent that you have done your

best throughout the day to recall specifics of 3, or potentially longer

ago, certainly you have done your best to answer our questions to the

best of your knowledge, I assume.

A As best as I can -- as best as I can remember, and as I said,

it's just -- it's very -- it's very fuzzy, and I'm not sure that it

was her BlackBerry that wasn't working or her Clinton email. I can't

even pinpoint it to that if it was a period in August her BlackBerry

wasn't working or that Clinton email wasn't working, if that makes

sense.

Q Now, shifting gears a little bit, there was some discussion

about the process for the Accountability Review Board.

A Yes.

Q Just to be clear, you weren't, in any formal way,

responsible for helping coordinate any kind of interaction with the

Accountability Review Board, were you?

A No, ma'am.

Q So to the extent there was a process for both seeking

documents broadly throughout the State Department and obtaining those

documents, you would not have been involved in that process?

A No, ma'am.

Q Just briefly returning to exhibit 5, which was a document

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that -- it's probably in your stack. Give me a moment. You spoke with

my colleague about that document. It's titled, "Information Memo for

the Secretary." Do you -- I have heard the term "information memo"

and also the term "action memo" used. I think you mentioned very

briefly, not in relation to anything substantive, but the word "action

memo" came up earlier in the day.

A Yes.

Q Can you explain for us what the difference would be between

an information memo and an action memo?

A From my recollection, the action memos actually required

a response from the Secretary or whoever that particular memo was

directed to, and there was usually a cover sheet that said action memo

for, you know, Huma Abedin, and then it would have a summary of what

the request was. In my case, it was very often -- almost always it

was signing off on an event or a request for a phone call, whatever

it was, and then there was a line that said "approve" and there was

a line that said "disapprove."

For the Secretary, I know there were definitely memos I saw that

were of a -- you know, a different level. She wasn't getting action

memos that related to, you know, scheduling events, but it was a

decision that a department needed, and would say "approve,"

"disapprove."

That's how I experienced action memos, it required a response from

whoever received it.

Information memos, you know, like the one I have in front of me

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often was to give an update about something happening from whoever the

email, in this case, the acting Assistant Secretary.

Q And so an information memo would not, in the same way that

an action memo would, require a response or action from the Secretary.

Is that fair, one fair distinction?

A Yes.

Q And certainly, the way you describe an action memo, if one

were seeking to get a response or action taken by the Secretary herself,

an action memo would certainly be one formal mechanism for doing that

and ensuring that happened. Is that fair?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So you were asked a few questions about Sidney Blumenthal.

Did -- in the course of -- did Mr. Blumenthal ever email you directly?

A Yes, yes. He had in the past; not recently, but certainly

in years prior to being at the State Department, he certainly did, yes.

Q Did he email you at all while you were at the State

Department, to the best of your recollection?

A I don't -- I don't recall, once we were at State, him

emailing me, but I think that's mostly because he was -- he had the

ability to email the Secretary directly. Whenever he emailed me in

the past, it was to pass a message to the Secretary.

Q Did the Secretary ever talk to you about the emails that

she was receiving from Mr. Blumenthal?

A No.

Q Did she ever indicate to you that she was asking him to send

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her information in particular?

A No, not that I recall.

Q Did she ever ask you to take any action on Mr. Blumenthal's

behalf?

A I've -- I'm --

Q And by asking that, I'm not -- like, if she said, can you

get Sid on the phone, I'm not talking about that. I mean, more, did

she ask you to reach out to anyone on his behalf and make a connection

for him? Did she ask you to schedule a meeting for him that was not

with her, that was with anyone within the State Department or anyone

outside the State Department?

A She did not.

Q Is there anything inherently wrong or inappropriate with

someone who is not inside the State Department sending the Secretary

or any other Department official information?

A In my opinion, not. And it was, you know, as I think has

been now publicly disclosed in the Secretary's email, she had -- he

wasn't the only person outside the State Department who was emailing

her.

Q Well, one person that I saw who did email her, at least

sometimes, was Anne-Marie Slaughter.

A Yes.

Q Do you know Anne-Marie Slaughter?

A Yes, I do.

Q Did your -- can you just briefly explain kind of who she

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is?

A Yes. She and I actually started at the State Department

at the same time. She was our director of policy planning for the

first -- I believe she was there for the first 2 years, maybe 2-1/2,

before Jake Sullivan replaced her, and so I saw her on a -- on a daily

basis. The policy planning director was very present in all of our

senior staff meetings.

Q Would there have been -- did she also sometimes email you

as well as the Secretary, or --

A She did. In fact, I -- as I recall, she cc'd me fairly often

when she emailed the Secretary.

Q And was there anything inappropriate when she would email

the Secretary about her emailing the Secretary?

A Certainly I didn't experience that. That wasn't my

experience either when she was at State or after she left State, but

I know she continued to email her after she left.

Q Did you have any sense, either from being included on

threads or talking or emailing with Ms. Slaughter yourself as to what

her purpose was in sending emails and information to the Secretary?

A You know, from the way I experienced it, it was just sending

information, thoughts, ideas. I'm -- you know, suspect Ms. Slaughter

knew the Secretary welcomed information, and so she thought it would

be helpful.

Q Did you ever get the sense, or do you have any reason to

believe that the Secretary was relying heavily on Ms. Slaughter's

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opinion above and beyond anyone else's when she was making particular

policy decisions?

A I have no specific reason to believe that.

Q Would you have -- do you have any evidence or reason to

believe that the Secretary was relying heavily on Mr. Blumenthal's

information or advice that he might send her?

A No, ma'am, I don't. I had no reason to believe that.

Q So I wanted to -- all right. In the same letter that I

referenced moments ago when I was making clear for the record our

concerns about some of the questions you had been asked, in that same

letter, Chairman Gowdy states the following, quote, "The fact that

former Secretary Clinton relied so heavily on an individual for the

Libyan intervention, her quintessential foreign policy initiative,

whom the White House explicitly prohibited from working at the State

Department is mind-boggling," end quote. The individual he is

referring to in that letter is Mr. Blumenthal.

So just as a starting place, is it, from your perspective,

accurate to claim that it was a fact that the Secretary relied heavily

on Mr. Blumenthal for the Libyan intervention?

A Not from my perspective, no, ma'am.

Q And that he relied -- we talked I think at great length in

several of the prior rounds about the number of people and the number

of meetings and the extensive travel meeting with people outside the

United States that the Secretary undertook with regard particularly

to Libya, I assume for other policy decisions as well. Do you have

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any reason to believe that she relied on him as a substitute, or to

the exclusion of all those other people she was meeting and talking

with?

A You know, Ms. Sawyer, I will just tell you, from my

perspective, what I saw, which is that she was physically very present

and engaged in meetings, both in the interagency process, both at State,

the interagency process, and abroad with her foreign counterparts on

all matters related to Libya. She received so much paper on a regular

basis that she consumed and returned both on the high side and the low

side, and I know that related to documents, you know, related to Libya.

In the time, honestly what Sid sent seemed to be, and I was not

on all those emails, it seemed to me, as one other person on the outside,

who was sending her updates. He certainly wasn't -- or suggestions

or ideas, or whatever was in the content of those emails. It didn't

appear to me that he was the only person doing that, and I certainly

didn't witness the Secretary in the time asking -- she certainly did

not ask me to act on anything that Sid had sent. Obviously, I have

learned since then that she had shared with other people in the

Department some parts of emails that he had sent.

Q In that same letter, there's the kind of further allegation

that the reason that Mr. Blumenthal was sending information with

particular regard to Libya and, quote, "pushing Secretary Clinton to

war in Libya," end quote, was because Mr. Blumenthal stood to benefit

personally from contracts with, quote, "a government that would exist

only after a successful U.S. intervention in Libya that deposed

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Qadhafi," end quote.

Did you see any evidence whatsoever that the Secretary took action

on Mr. Blumenthal's behalf in order to try to further -- and not taking

as a given the validity of the allegation about a business interest,

but to further business interests in Libya?

A So I'm not comfortable speaking on behalf of the Secretary,

but from what I know about her, she would absolutely not do that.

Q Just one final question on this. You know, Chairman Gowdy

has publicly said and publicly said after Mr. Blumenthal's deposition,

he raised the question and he stated it as, quote, "You have an

intelligence apparatus at your disposal. We have a CIA. Why would

you not rely on your own vetted sourced intelligence agency?" End

quote. The "you" there is the Secretary, in this instance, Secretary

Clinton.

Do you have any evidence or reason to believe that Secretary

Clinton did not actually rely on her vetted sourced intelligence that

was available to her?

A I have no reason to believe that. As somebody who was

familiar with her schedule and saw how much time she spent in meetings

at the White House and in high-level meetings at the State Department

and on these, you know, confidential phone calls, I have no reason not

to believe that.

Q You likely have seen reported in the news the issue -- one

issue that has come up is this, something I was not familiar with, which

is in the FOIA process, the potential retroactive upgrading of

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information in documents or emails to being classified that was not

previously handled or marked as classified. I just wanted to ask you

a couple of questions about that.

While you were at the State Department, and regardless of what

system you were using or whose email you were sending it to, to the

best of your knowledge, did you ever send on an unclassified network

materials that were clearly marked as classified?

A I did not do that.

Q Now, some time -- you know, through the course of the day,

you've explained that you would often forward on to the Secretary

information other people had asked you to forward, sometimes things

that you were collecting and tasked with forwarding, and that at times,

you did not read in depth the substance of what you were sending on.

Is that kind of a fair characterization of your role for the Secretary?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So in those instances, would you be relying -- if you were

certainly forwarding on something to someone else, would you be relying

on the sender to have determined and to have marked something as

classified if it was, indeed, classified?

A Yes. I always -- I did. I relied on them.

Q And to have used the classified system, if indeed it was

classified, material that they had deemed and judged at the time to

be classified?

A I didn't have the capability to forward those messages to

her, so that -- I'm sorry. Maybe I didn't understand your question.

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I'm sorry.

Q Well, that -- that is helpful, because I may not -- so to

the extent someone did need or want to send the Secretary something

that was clearly marked, designated at the time classified, that would

not have come to you. Is that accurate?

A It -- it could have come to me on the classified on the high

side, but I would have had no way to forward that to the Secretary,

because you couldn't forward on the high side to an unclassified email

account.

Q And so to the extent someone sent something to you to be

forwarded on the low side --

A Yes.

Q -- obviously it seems unlikely that they would have then

sent it if it was clearly marked classified. Is that just a fair --

A That's a --

Q -- presumption?

A Yes, that's fair.

Q And you did say you were relying on the sender --

A Yes.

Q -- to make the determination. And presumably, sometimes

those senders were people who did have classification authority, and

certainly, also people who had a fair amount of experience within the

State Department handling information that obviously must have dealt

with communications with foreign officials and other type of

information that the State Department routinely deals with. Is that

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fair?

A Yes, that is. I mean, it was one of the things that we were

really struck by when we joined the State Department, is that, you know,

it was a group of, you know, very dedicated professionals to ensuring

that sensitive information was treated and handled properly, which is

why I think, number one, we had so many people, but also that there

was a very clear line of authority about who was able to give her that

paper, and that it was returned to them and that they were responsible

for every document that went into her and that came out that was -- that

was on the high side.

So going back to your question about what I would have been emailed

on the high side, just to -- anybody in the Department would know that

if they were trying to communicate something on the high side to the

Secretary, it was likely being done on paper and going up through

the -- you know, the protocol channels of how she got paper on a regular

basis, not by email.

Q And you've certainly explained some of the process. Based

on your experience, interactions with her and the way she was handling

both receiving the information by paper and how she used her email,

did you feel that the Secretary herself took seriously her obligation

to safeguard classified information, information that was clearly

deemed, marked, and designated as classified when in her possession

or when she received it?

A From what I viewed of her practices, yes.

Q During -- when you were explaining to us a little bit of

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your own email practices and usage, you had indicated that you used

the account that the State Department had provided for you when you

were there.

A Yes.

Q And you said that, I think in just explaining to us, you

said, you know, I do try always to do the right thing. And I just wanted

to explore that with you a little bit, because I think that some could

read that as you having then said that you believed that at the time

she did it and made the decisions, that the Secretary wasn't trying

to do the right thing, and I just wanted to get a sense as to whether

or not that's what you were trying to convey.

A Oh, no. I mean, not at all. I was only speaking on -- I

was only speaking on my own behalf in terms of my own practices. I

think, you know, she has said it, you know, I will repeat it again,

I know other members of our senior team probably feel the same way,

we all regret that we didn't -- we weren't more conscious about her

email practices or the device or the account that she used when she

joined the State Department. It just wasn't anything that we gave much

thought to. She has publicly said she did it as a matter of

convenience. In hindsight, none of us would have made the same choice,

but it was -- you know, it was a mistake, she's clearly said it. And

I -- I wasn't comparing that to my own -- my own email practices.

Q And certainly, you were not conveying your belief that what

she did was in any way against the law or unlawful to have used personal

email for work-related purposes?

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A When we were at the State Department, it was not out of the

ordinary for people to be using their Gmail accounts. I certainly

understood that I was allowed to use personal email. I was not aware

of any rules that I was not allowed to. In fact, I recall times when

the State.gov email was not working and we would get emails saying you

need to use your -- you know, your personal email for this period of

time. But for my own work and -- you know, I'm not sure I have actually

mentioned this to you or Ms. Jackson. When we traveled, which was a

large percentage of the time, I really -- my primary device for work

was my State Department BlackBerry. I emailed on that, I did my calls

on that, I was on the go constantly, and so I did the vast majority

of my work on State.gov, but I certainly did not understand that I

couldn't use Clinton email, and people were absolutely emailing me at

that address.

Q And so to the extent that the Department might prefer or

encourage or ask employees to use the State.gov account when feasible,

when possible, and understanding there might be times when that just

wasn't --

A Right.

Q -- it certainly was not something that you were ever told

was completely prohibited and not allowed?

A That is correct.

Q You know, I think -- you know, the other thing that I think

your counselor mentioned at the outset about both the events in

Benghazi, which I think you've indicated is somewhat true also about

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how you were communicating with the Secretary over the time, the emails,

et cetera, in terms of figuring out exactly when you knew, what you

knew, contemporaneous versus what you've read in the press, you know,

I just want to give you the opportunity in the same way that I did to

have you assure us that, to the extent we have asked you to search your

memory without the benefit potentially of documents before you that

might refresh your recollection, to the extent you've received

something 3 years ago or 2 years ago or 1 year ago, from me a week ago,

that you might not recall, that you have certainly done your best to

be as accurate as you can with regard to your answers?

A Yes, ma'am. I have done the best I can to the best of my

recollection to answer your questions, particularly as it relates to

that period of time at the State Department.

Q Great. I'm going to shift gears a little bit.

A Okay.

Q I'm going to ask you some questions that -- you know, we're

now at least the eighth congressional investigation since the attacks.

You know, I think all members of the committee want to ensure that this

is the last investigation into the Benghazi attacks. And we,

therefore, are asking every witness a series of allegations that have

been made publicly since the attacks.

We have called before the committee a number of witnesses who have

firsthand information about some aspects of what happened in Benghazi,

so not all of these questions will fall within your purview. We are

asking everyone in part, because we want to make sure that we have left

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no stone unturned. We're also asking about these allegations because

we have asked for them to be put to rest and taken off the table. We

have talked with our majority colleagues. They have still indicated

they're investigating all of them and that none of them are off the

table.

So I will ask you a series of questions. To the extent you have

firsthand information, we'll explore that. So I'll just proceed. I

just ask you to bear with me a little bit. I don't want to read too

quickly for the court reporter, and I -- there's about a dozen of these

or so.

A Okay.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

Congressman has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon

Panetta to stand down, and this resulted in the Defense Department not

sending more assets to help in Benghazi."

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A Can you ask that question again? I'm sorry.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

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of the attacks?

A Not that I'm aware.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact-checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring of 2011?

A No, I do not.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

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Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and they found no support

for this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to, quote, "stand down," but that instead, there were tactical

disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A I do not.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

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the temporary delay of the CIA's security personnel who departed the

annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the Accountability Review Board?

A Absolutely not.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the Accountability

Review Board?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress.

A Okay.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A No, I do not.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

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political reasons, and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

non-partisanship."

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No, I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No, I do not.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made a,

quote, "intentional misrepresentation," end quote, when she spoke on

the Sunday talk shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented the facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No, I do not.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," end quote, on the

night of the attacks and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

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Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors,

to, quote, "stand down," meaning to cease all operations. Military

officials have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered,

quote, to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical

assistance in their current location. A Republican staff report

issued by the House Armed Services Committee found that, quote, "there

was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli

who sought to join the fight in Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi?

A No, I do not.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. Former

Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former chair of the

House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the attacks,

after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were, how quickly

the thing all happened and how quickly it dissipated, we probably

couldn't have done more than we did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

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assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

to deploy?

A No, I do not.

Q I think that concludes our questioning. Again, we do

appreciate your appearance here today, your willingness to answer all

the questions.

I also want to make perfectly clear, I think you had mentioned

at the outset your years of public service, I know that certainly I

think all of the Members truly appreciate that service in the name of

our country, and we thank you for that as well.

A Thank you, Ms. Sawyer.

Can I just say one -- is there -- is it possible for me to say

one quick thing to both of you -- to both of you before this ends? Is

that okay?

Ms. Jackson. Uh-huh.

Ms. Sawyer. Yes.

Ms. Abedin. I -- you know, I have worked for Secretary Clinton

for a long time, it's almost 20 years, and I -- I recognize that I was

asked a lot of questions about her today, about her practices and her

intentions and the work that she did. And as somebody who knows her

really well, the one thing I do feel really compelled to say is I really

do have a tremendous amount of respect, not just for her personally,

but professionally, for the -- for her work ethic, for the work that

she's done on behalf of this country, and with how proudly she served

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at the State Department and -- and really wanted to advance the

interests of this country in her capacity as Secretary of State. And

I was really proud to work for her and with all the other, you know,

foreign service officers and diplomats at the State Department.

And I really hope I was able to provide some assistance to you

today. And -- and thank you for -- thank you for taking the time that

you took with me today. Appreciate that.

Ms. Sawyer. You're welcome. We're off the record.

[Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q This is going to be the final session that we have. We have

moved to a classified setting. Everyone in this room is cleared up

to the TS level. And we just have a few questions for you that we

started earlier with regard to exhibit 7 that is now before you.

And, again, exhibit 7 bears document number 45765, it is an email

from you to Secretary Clinton in October of 2012, and about half to

two-thirds of the way down there, there's a sentence that says, "had

a long visit with one" -- oops. I wrote something. Could you just

read that sentence to us, had a long -- that starts with, had a long

visit?

A Had a long visit with .

Q Okay. And then I think you followed by saying, will

download in person?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was -- you had a friend

?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

?

A Yes.

Q Okay. ?

A

Q Yeah.

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5

A Yes.

Q .

A Yes.

Q Okay. And how long did you know this person?

A .

Q Okay. ?

A Oh, I don't know.

Q Okay. ?

A Yes, .

Q Okay. ?

A , so I would -- I would imagine so,

yes.

Q Okay. ?

A I have to answer that --

Ms. Dunn. Well, I --

Ms. Abedin. Yes.

Ms. Dunn. I think -- if we could go off the record for a second.

Ms. Jackson. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Back on the record.

?

A Yes. That's my understanding.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, has this friend been interviewed

by any congressional committee?

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A Not that I'm aware.

Q Was this friend of yours interviewed by the ARB?

A Not that I'm aware.

Ms. Jackson. I think that's all the questions I would have

regarding this issue.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Just a couple of questions.

A Yes.

Q In the context of this exhibit, and this is exhibit --

Ms. Jackson. 7.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q -- 7, it seems like the conversation you're talking about

is with regard to the Secretary potentially connecting with one of the

surviving DS agents who was injured. Is that fair?

A That's correct. .

Q And was -- when you said you had a long visit with your

friend, will download in person, what -- was the information that you

were downloading and sharing

A No, ma'am, it wasn't.

, and as I -- we had discussed in the unclassified setting,

there had been conversations about having -- the Secretary wanted to

call . We had been told by Assistant Secretary Boswell that

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7

he wasn't well enough to take a phone call.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A I'm sorry. I'm doing this again. I'm sorry.

Q You know, one of the things that's true in a transcribed

interview setting is that obviously emotion does not reflect on the

record. And we understand and appreciate that some of the things

you've talked about today hit -- come very close to home, and we

appreciate your -- as with your willingness to answer all of our

questions, your willingness to even answer the ones that are not easy,

personally not easy. So, again, we appreciate that.

I have nothing further. And, you know, with that, we thank you

for your time today and hope that you have a wonderful weekend.

A Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. The only thing that I would add just to clarify the

record is that we will handle this portion of the transcript at the

TS level pending review for classification matters.

And for that, again, we join in thanking you for today. You've

been very patient with us, you've been very gracious in --

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Ms. Abedin. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. -- answering our questions, and we appreciate your

being here today, so we echo. Have a good weekend. Put us out of mind.

Ms. Abedin. Thank you. And I appreciate all of your patience

with me today. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 1

416
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

417
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

418
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

419
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

420
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 2

421
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

422
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 3

423
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

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424
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

425
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 4

426
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

427
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 5

428
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

429
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

430
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 6

431
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

432
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 7

433

INTERVIEW OF DIRECTOR,

OFFICE OF TERRORISM ANALYSIS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, NOVEMBER 13, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

436
INTERVIEW OF

SENIOR LIBYAN DESK OFFICER

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, NOVEMBER 18, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

FOR SENIOR LIBYAN DESK OFFICER

RAEKA SAFAI

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

LAURA E. DECK, Attorney-Adviser

ERIC SNYDER

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3

Ms. Jackson. Ms. , I think we have everyone in the room. And

good evening to you. We appreciate your accommodating us in your evening

hours and in this forum.

How are you today?

Ms. I'm good. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. Good.

My name is Sharon Jackson. I am one of the counsels on the majority

staff. And what we're going to do is start with just a brief overview of the process

that we're going to follow today, do introductions of the people in the room, and

then we'll get started with the questioning.

Ms. Okay. Great.

Ms. Jackson. And it's my understanding that you've been previously

provided with some documents. Have you had the opportunity to review those

documents?

Ms. I have reviewed them but not in great detail. I do have them

printed out with me as well.

Ms. Jackson. And for the stuff that you got from the majority staff, do you

have the top sort of index of the documents?

Ms. I do, with the 21 unclassified and then a total of 26 total.

Ms. Jackson. Correct. Then we'll get started.

This is a transcribed interview of conducted by the House

Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as

part of the committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic

facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and matters related to it pursuant to House Resolution

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4

567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Ms. , could you give us your name for the record, please?

Ms. Sure. My name is

Ms. Jackson. We appreciate your appearance here today, and especially

given the long time change and your willingness to appear and provide information

to this committee.

Again, my name is Sharon Jackson. I am with the committee's majority

staff. We will go around the room. You're not going to be able to see everyone

in the room, but we would like a record of all who is present. And we'll start with

your counsel here today from AFSA.

Ms. Safai. Sure. Raeka Safai from AFSA.

Ms. Deck. Laura Deck, of the Legal Adviser, State Department.

Mr. Snyder. Eric Snyder, State Department, SES.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority.

Ms. Jackson. And then outside your purview to my left is.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clark with the majority.

Ms. Barrineau. Sara Barrineau with the majority.

Mr. Kiko. Phil Kiko with the committee.

Ms. Jackson. Before we begin, I'd like to just review the process that we're

going to follow today. Given the distance that you are from us and the fact that

we're doing this by videoconference, we have agreed that each side, the majority

and the minority, will have 90 minutes to ask you questions regarding the attacks

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5

in Benghazi and matters related to that. So what we're going to do is I, on behalf

of the majority, will ask questions for up to an hour. Then we'll switch and allow

the minority to ask questions for up to an hour, and then each side will have an

additional 30 minutes to ask additional questions or follow-up questions.

Ms. Deck. Sharon, I'm sorry to interject. I just want to make it clear that

the highest level of classification that can be discussed during this interview is

secret.

Ms. Jackson. And that was my next point I was going to make. We are

doing this by secure video teleconference and that is that this session will allow for

the discussion of classified information and as we have all agreed, that we are

going up to the secret level. If for any reason any question that is posed to you

makes you believe that you have to go higher than that, please just let us know,

and we'll have to reserve that for another time and place to get an answer to that

question.

Many of our questions are going to be in the unclassified realm, and so to

the best of our ability if we can highlight when we're going into classified

information, that will help the review of the transcript down the road, but there will

be a review of the transcript in this case.

You have counsel from AFSA here today. If at any time throughout the

interview you would like the opportunity to consult with your counsel, please just

let us know. We will all depart the room and allow you the opportunity to consult

with counsel before we continue with any answer or any question that is posed to

you.

As you may be able to see, we have an official reporter here that is taking

down everything so that we can have a written record of today's events. Also,

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6

given that it's a video teleconference, it's going to be important that you give verbal

answers to everything as opposed to nods of the head, shakes of the head, and

things like that. I'm going to ask the reporter to interrupt if for any reason she

does not get a verbal answer. We actually have two reporters here today. They

will be switching off during the proceedings.

Again, because we are trying to get a written record, and given the delay

that there is in this video teleconference, it's going to be important that we try and

not talk at the same time as each other, but given the delay, I don't think that's

going to be a problem.

We are asking that you give us the best recollection of events. We do

understand that these happened about 3 years ago. But if there are things that

you do not remember or can't remember, please just say so, and if you could,

inform us to the best of your ability who might be able to provide information for

our questions.

And then, do you understand that you are required to answer questions

from Congress truthfully?

Ms. I do.

Ms. Jackson. Do you understand that this also applies to questions that

are posed to you by a congressional committee and its staff?

Ms. I do.

Ms. Jackson. Do you understand that witnesses who knowingly provide

false testimony could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or making false

statements?

Ms. I do.

Ms. Jackson. Is there any reason that you are unable to provide truthful

442
7

answers to today's questions?

Ms. . No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Well, that is the end of my questions for the process and the procedures

that govern our interview today. I would ask if the minority has anything that they

would like to add at this time.

Ms. Sawyer. No, we don't. Thank you for making the time for us this

evening. We really do appreciate it. And we'll try to be as efficient as we can in

our questions.

Ms. Jackson. By my watch, it is 8:12 D.C. time, and I will begin the first

hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Ms. , how long have you been with the State Department?

A I joined in January 2005.

Q If we could just go back for the last 5 years, can you walk us through

the various assignments that you've had since 2010 forward?

A Sure. In 2010, I transferred from Embassy Caracas in Venezuela to

Washington, D.C. Then I spent 5 years in D.C. before moving here

this past summer. In D.C. I spent 1 year at the Operations Center. I

then joined the Libya desk and worked in the Office of Maghreb Affairs for 2 years.

I then served at the National Security Council for a year and then did a year of

language training at our Foreign Service Institute.

Q Ms. , one of the reasons that we have asked to interview you

today is because from the review of documents that we have received it appears

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that you had an integral role with respect to the reaction and response on the night

of the attacks and in the days after for both the State Department and the

interagency. And because you were there and we weren't, we need to talk to the

people who have that firsthand knowledge.

Can you just walk us through how you first became aware of the Benghazi

attacks on September 11th, 2012, what you did, how you got information, what

you did with that information, what you were directed to do? If you could just walk

us through that night.

A Sure. So in the late afternoon I was giving a briefing to a group of

people who were heading out to Libya, and someone interrupted the briefing.

This was in a separate building at the State Department across the street from the

main building. Someone interrupted the building to say that there was a news

ticker that there was some sort of attack or problem or fire -- I don't recollect the

details -- at our mission in Benghazi.

I then ran back over to my office. It was quickly clear that there was

something very serious going on. So my deputy director and I agreed that I would

go upstairs to the Operations Center on the seventh floor to see if I could be more

valuable up there. So I remember running through the halls of the State

Department to get up to the Operations Center, and I spent the rest of the evening

there until I went home.

In terms of what we were trying to do, we were trying to do everything we

possibly could. We were trying to get information from everywhere we possibly

could. We were trying to reach every resource we could think of. I was trying to

share every information I thought with whoever I thought might be able to help us.

And that was definitely the tone of everyone on the operations floor and also

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9

everyone that I worked with within the State Department.

Q Explain to us how the flow of information occurs in the Operations

Center. Who is in the Operations Center? Are people tasked with certain

agencies to reach out to or collection of information from either foreign partners,

from Libya? Just walk us through that and help us understand how that worked.

A The Operations Center has its own system for trying to gather

information. I wasn't trying to interfere within that. I was just trying to be

value-added because I would have the substantive knowledge related to Libya and

be right there on the floor with them so I could provide that really quickly.

Separately the assistant secretary for NEA was also gathering information

from her side. You know, we called people we thought might be able to provide

information. We tried to reach our people in Benghazi. We were in contact with

our people in Tripoli. And we shared it as quickly as we could.

Q Was Assistant Secretary Jones in the Operations Center with you?

A She was not. She was in her office.

Q Was there other individuals from NEA in the Operations Center?

A I don't think so. I think it was just me. But I, you know, I quickly

would relay any information I had from my NEA world and my NEA email to the

people on the floor. And similarly for the people within the Operations Center, if

they had any information that I felt anyone in NEA needed, I would immediately

transfer that.

Q Who were the people in the Operations Center?

A They were the people who were -- who were on -- the Operations

Center is staffed 24 hours a day, so they were the people who were on shift until

11. And then they swapped out, and I was there for a little bit of the next shift. I

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10

don't remember their names. I didn't know them personally.

Q Would any of the senior leadership come to the Operations Center to

monitor what was ongoing?

A Senior leadership sometimes would come to the Operations Center

as a way to thank people for the work they were doing, but it wasn't actually a

useful thing to us to have them on the floor with us because we were set up to

provide support for them in their offices or wherever they happened to be in fact.

Q So in the Operations Center is there a person who is tasked to

coordinate with the military and another person tasked to coordinate with the

intelligence community? I'm still not understanding exactly how it works.

A Sure. There are different roles within the -- within the -- I think it's

usually five people on shift. There's the watch officer, who is first on answering

phones and keeping a log of the phone calls coming in. There is an emergency

action officer who would be the person who would normally reach out to the

interagency, to reach out to DOD contacts.

During the working day there's also a separate DS agent who's part of

watch order, and that person worked there so she would be tapped into the DS

watch center as well. Then there is an operations specialist who helps

particularly with interagency documents, particularly the ones that are highly

classified, but also is helping on the phones, since primarily phones are a lot of the

work that's up there.

Then there's the person who writes the briefs, because there are briefs that

go out regularly, and so there is one person who is working on producing that brief

that goes to the seventh floor and the Secretary and other principals. And then

there's the senior watch officer who's really in charge of making sure everything is

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working well.

So, for instance, when there was a phone call, there was a phone call that

night, which means the Secretary and the President of Libya, you know, one

person was tasked with connecting that call. Somebody else was tasked with

making sure they were taking notes during the call. Because I was up there, I

also sat in on the call and took notes as a backup note taker.

But there's a standard process that happens there, and in situations like

September, that day in September, it can be helpful to have a substantive person

right there at the floor. Both I and my direct supervisor in the Office of Maghreb

Affairs, , had both worked in the Operations Center the year

before, so we were very familiar with what they could do and what value it would

be to have one of us up there during this time.

Q And so your deputy director, Ms. , and others in NEA, such

as Assistant Secretary Jones, where were they physically located? Where is

NEA in relation to the Ops Center?

A NEA is spread out in different offices in the Main State building of the

State Department. The Office of Maghreb Affairs at the time was on the first floor.

The assistant secretary's office was on the sixth floor. I believe that over the

course of the evening our director, , went up to Assistant Secretary

Jones' office and was there for some of the work that he was doing. Other people

from my office might have been doing that as well. I wasn't tracking their

movements that night.

Q Did you personally make any outreach to interagency partners, such

as the intelligence community or DOD, the National Security Council, National

Security staff? Did you undertake any of those actions yourself?

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A I'm sure I was sharing information with them and was in constant

communication with them. I don't have any particular memory of deciding at what

point I needed to contact them. As soon as there was this type of crisis, we all

were just focused on trying to get any help we could possibly get. So, yes, I was

in touch with them to see what we could do.

Q Okay. Do you recall who you contacted?

A So I would have been in regular touch with our -- the National

Security Council director for Libya, Ben Fishman. I also was in touch with

someone with -- I actually think that he contacted me, and it's in the documents

about someone ,

I had a counterpart at OSD Policy, and I would have been in regular touch

with him as well.

Q And I'm sorry, what was that office that you just mentioned?

A OSD Policy. So the Department of Defense, the Office of the

Secretary of Defense Policy.

Q And who was that individual?

A The names escape me, and they're blocked out in these documents,

so I apologize for not remembering. But he would we my counterpart, the desk

officer for Libya in OSD Policy.

Q And so it's whoever's name is redacted on those documents?

A Right.

Q You said you were in contact with Ben Fishman from the National

Security Staff. Did you have a prior professional relationship with Mr. Fishman on

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Libya issues?

A Certainly. There is a lot of work that we did within the interagency,

and Ben Fishman was involved with that, and I worked closely with him in

coordinating that.

Q And just taking a step back prior to the night of the attacks, can you

describe for us some of the issues that you would have worked directly with Mr.

Fishman on?

A It would have been the range of policy issues related to Libya. So

what were our policy priorities there, what were the preparations for the elections

that happened there, what happened during the transfer of power from the

Transitional National Council to the newly elected government. Really the range

of issues related to Libya. You know, we were in close coordination with many

different parts of the U.S. Government and therefore with the National Security

Council.

Q And did you personally play that role in the interagency process?

When you mentioned working with other interagency partners, did you personally

undertake working with, you know, DOD or members of the intelligence community

in developing the policy with regard to Libya?

A So the Office of Maghreb Affairs would host weekly meetings where

we invited people from around the interagency to both brief them and to hear from

them on the programs they had in place or they had planned or concerns they

had. So we were regularly coordinating with a wide range of people given the

complicated nature and changing nature of our work in Libya.

Q And those were meetings that you attended as part of the Office of

Maghreb Affairs.

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A So those are meetings, I'm thinking of the meetings that we actually

would host in the State Department, and I would attend them, and my office

director normally would chair them.

Q Okay. Are there other meetings that you participated in in the

interagency?

A There may have been other meetings from time to time on particular

issues. It would have been very low-level, working level if I were the person

participating in them. But we tried to communicate really well so that we could all

know what each other was doing and make sure we were doing things in a

coordinated way.

Q Returning to the night of the attacks, you've described your role as

being in the Operations Center to be fully aware of the information flow through the

Ops Center and be a subject matter resource to them. Who were you

communicating information to outside of the Ops Center, within the State

Department, who within NEA or senior leadership or Diplomatic Security? What

was your role with regard to pushing information out within the State Department?

A So within the State Department, I was primarily making sure that all

the information on the ops floor was available to my assistant secretary in NEA,

my office director in NEA, and my colleagues working on Libya within NEA. That

was my primary focus. But I believe I also was in touch with the task force

representative who was at the State Department that night, and I would have

probably been responding to other queries as they happened because people

knew that I would be working on this issue, so as they heard about it they were

contacting me.

Q Okay.

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A And then the Operations Center is sent up to then brief other parts of

the State Department that would need to know that kind of information.

Q And did they do that through primarily email communications?

A They could do it through email alerts. They could do it through

phone calls. So they could use either one, whichever one they felt was more

efficient.

Q You described that the Ops Center had contact with Embassy Tripoli.

Is that correct?

A That's right.

Q Would you describe for us those communications that the Ops

Center had with Tripoli?

A So I think as soon as it happened I would imagine -- and this would

have been before I got up to the ops floor but knowing the practice of the

Operations Center, and I think I saw this when I got up there -- usually what

happened, they would have reached out to the deputy chief of mission in Tripoli to

get the latest information to him. So they were doing that and getting updates

from him on what was happening, and at one point I believe the assistant

secretary from NEA said, I am going to start being the point of contact with him.

We can't keep having people who don't know enough, don't have the same kind of

background reaching out to him at this time. There are too many people reaching

out to him basically. So she made sure it then became a phone call that

originated from her to him. So then it shifted away from the ops reaching out to

her, reaching out, which is something that is pretty standard practice because

otherwise the people in the crisis are being hampered by the number of calls that

are going out to them.

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16

Q And were you a participant or listener/observer to those

conversations between Assistant Secretary Jones and the deputy chief of

mission?

A I don't recall. I might have been. But once it became something

that she was calling from her office, I would not have been because I was up in the

Operations Center.

Q Okay. And after her conversations with the deputy chief of mission,

did she memorialize those conversations and send out the information?

A I don't know. If there was something specific that he said that she

felt she needed to relay, I'm sure she did that, but I don't know that there was the

kind of note taking that we would have done on a, you know, on a call with a

foreign national that was where we were actually taking notes of everything that

they're saying.

Q You stated earlier that you attempted to reach the mission in

Benghazi. Did the Ops Center ever reach anyone at the mission that evening?

A I don't recall. I don't think so. We certainly, certainly by the time

that I got up there, we never reached Ambassador Stevens.

Q It's my understanding that the DS Command Center had

communication with the agents who were on the ground in Benghazi. Was there

ever a live feed of those communications into the Ops Center?

A What do you mean by live feed?

Q Where you -- where the people in Ops Center were -- like a

three-way call or some sort of way conferencing in so that people in the Ops

Center were listeners to the conversations between the agents and the DS

Command Center?

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17

A I don't think so. I don't recall that.

Q Would the DS Command Center send information to the Ops

Center?

A They certainly should, and there is communication between the DS

Command Center and the Operations Center, although they are not located in the

same building. I don't recall the exact mechanisms of that night.

Q Do you recall, was there any issues, problems, or concerns with the

flow of information between the Command Center and the Ops Center?

A No, I don't. I don't recall any issues or concerns about it.

Q Based on your understanding of the events that were occurring in

Benghazi that evening, can you describe for us what you understood was

occurring over there and had occurred, how the attack occurred?

A It's a little hard for me to think back to what I knew at the time since

it's been so long since then and so much more information has come out. But we

knew there had been a fire. We knew there were people there attacking. And

then we knew that Ambassador Stevens was missing. We knew that one body

had been found and that it wasn't Ambassador Stevens. We were at the time

trying to identify that person and then notify his next of kin. There was some

confusion about that.

There had been lots of information that Ambassador Stevens was okay,

that he was over in this place, that he had been sighted somewhere else. There

was a lot of information that clearly was wrong. But it was clear that something

very bad had happened. And, you know, I knew quickly that once Ambassador

Stevens had been missing, we never found him until it was quite clear that he had

been killed.

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18

Q In all of the information that came in that night, was there any

information that there had been a protest prior to the attack or crowds gathering to

protest anything prior to the attack?

A I have no information about that other than to say that there were

press reports -- I don't remember if it was that night or the next day -- that said

there were protests, but otherwise there was no information suggesting that there

was a protest.

Q So no information that came in from your Embassy in Tripoli or

through the Command Center said that there was a protest prior to the assault on

the compound?

A I at no time during that evening thought that there had been a protest

because I thought that if there had been a protest Ambassador Stevens would

have told us, and so we would have known that there was a protest. If there had

been something happening prior to the very significant thing that was clearly

leading to a very tragic and sad result, we would have known about it. So I at no

time during that evening thought there had been a protest.

Q So Ambassador Stevens was someone who was in regular

communication with you and others in NEA regarding what was happening within

Libya, whether it was Tripoli or Benghazi?

A He was in regular communication with us, yes.

Q At any time of the day of the attack or in the days preceding the

attack, did he or anyone else within Libya communicate to you or others that there

was any call for any type of protest in Benghazi, such as through social media, the

regular media, or just picking up the word on the street?

A No.

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19

Q Is that something that Ambassador Stevens would have

communicated to you and others in NEA had that been the state of events?

A The protests against the U.S. facilities would have been something

that was very rare, and if Ambassador Stevens had thought that was in the works,

I'm sure he would have shared it with us.

Q And would you have been a person who would have known that if it

had been shared with anyone in NEA?

A It would have depended on whether it was primarily a security issue

that was being flagged or if it was something that was a more general issue. So

probably I would have. If it was something that Ambassador Stevens thought was

important, I probably would have known about it. But there was a division in our

work between the kind of policy work and then the security work. So DS

channels, for instance, had their own information streams, and I wasn't aware of

those.

Q Did you, though, at times learn of security incidents that occurred

within Libya?

A Yes.

Q And how would you gather that information? How would you learn

that information?

A We would hear it from Embassy Tripoli.

Q Would you ever get any reporting from your counterpart in DS, the

individual who headed the Libya issues for DS here at Main State?

A No.

Q Were you aware of an individual by the name of ?

A Certainly.

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20

Q And what, if any, interaction did you have with him?

A So I was in email contact with him from time to time. The primary

reason was generally that a DS agent would need a visa, and so they would need

to come to the Libya desk to get that visa. That was our primary purpose for

communicating.

Q Returning to the night of the attack, were you aware that there was

an interagency SVTC about 7 p.m. that evening?

A I was not aware of that, to the best of my recollection.

Q So you did not participate or attend that SVTC?

A I did not.

Q At any time during the evening, did Assistant Secretary Jones or Mr.

or anybody else update you on what the interagency plans were for

responding to the attack in Benghazi?

A I don't recall an update like that.

Q Do you recall whether you learned of what, if any, military response

was being contemplated as a result of the attacks in Benghazi?

A So I knew that there was some use of resources for collecting

information that were in use, and I knew that there was support from the other

agency that was on the ground, or that they were trying to be that kind of support.

I knew that there was a plane that went to Benghazi to save them later, to

evacuate the people who were on the ground. But I was not part of the

conversations about any other sort of military response, to the best of my

recollection.

Q Were you aware of whether there was any discussion, either within

the Ops Center or within the larger State Department, about deploying the FEST?

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21

A I was unaware of the FEST discussion.

Q Do you know a Mark Thompson?

A I do know Mark Thompson. We worked on occasion together, and I

understood that he testified to Congress or spoke to Congress later where he

focused a lot on this FEST issue.

Q On the night of the attack or in the days following, did you ever have

a conversation with Mark Thompson about his feelings on whether or not the

FEST should have been deployed?

A I don't recall one, but there could have been one. It was a really

difficult, difficult time for all of us, and we had many people, many issues that we

were working on very intensely.

Q At some point the personnel, the State Department personnel, leave

the mission and they go to the Annex facility nearby. Do you recall approximately

when that was? Was that fairly early in the evening or was it later on?

A As I recall, it was later on in our evening, but I don't recall the exact

time line.

Q Okay. If I could, if you could go to what was No. 15 on the list of

documents that we sent you, the list of 21 unclassified. It is an --

Ms. Sawyer. I'm just going to interrupt for a second. We don't have

copies of those documents here in the room.

Ms. Jackson. Yes, you do.

Ms. Sawyer. Can we get copies?

Ms. Jackson. Yes, I have copies, just like we do with any others.

Ms. Sawyer. Well, great. Before we ask questions of the witness, I think

it would be helpful if the people in the room also get a chance to look at it.

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22

Ms. Jackson. Yes. I was just going to identify it so she could find it.

I'm going to mark it as exhibit 1, and it is document No. C05580494?

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Snyder. I'm sorry. Can you read that again? I have it. I apologize.

Ms. Jackson. It is an email from a to on

September 11 at 6:08 p.m.

Ms. . I have that document.

Ms. Jackson. And then I would also ask if you would pull out the document

that was item No. 16, which I'm going to mark as exhibit No. 2, which is another

email exchange to you and others.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Jackson. It's document No. C05580512, from a to you

and others on September 11 at 7:57.

And then I would also ask if you would pull the document at what was tab

17, or item No. 17, which I'm going to mark as exhibit 3, which is a document that

was produced to us by the White House.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Jackson. It bears document No. SCB 000029. It's an email from, at

the top, to Ben Fishman on September 11 at 10:32. I'm going

to ask you some questions about these three documents.

A Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

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23

Q I'm actually going to Exhibit 2 first, the September 11 email at 7:57

p.m. The subject line says, "RE: The (redacted) compound in Benghazi is under

fire." There is a redacted word in there. Did you take that to be the CIA Annex

facility? Did you understand that to mean that?

A When I wrote that, I believe that's right.

Q So at the bottom of the page, you started this email exchange from

you to -- it appears to be a distribution list and a Mr. Maxwell. And you

wrote -- and you meant at that time the Annex is under fire. Is that correct?

A That's right.

Q And you also wrote at the bottom, "That is where everyone is now."

And by everyone, what did you mean by that?

A I would have meant everyone that we -- everyone that was -- all the

survivors. I don't think at that moment we had confirmation that Ambassador

Stevens had been killed, but everyone that we were in touch with were there.

Q So the State Department personnel had relocated to the Annex

facility?

A So I'm looking at these emails now and remembering it back from

then, but based on this, that would be my understanding, yes, that everyone that

we were in touch with was over at that other compound.

Q You also write in this first email that this is through intel channels.

How is it that you acquired this information?

A So I would think that -- I don't recall, but my guess based on where I

was at the time was that that came through intel channels in the operations floor,

which does have access to people in INR Watch, who sit right off of the operations

floor and would have access to the intel channels.

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24

Q And then if you could go to exhibit 3, which is an email exchange

between Ben Fishman and . The top line of that email, or the

last exchange at 10:32 p.m., it says that -- they talk about you being in Ops and

that Jeff is on the phone with Beth to pass along some info that he has gleaned.

Is Jeff referring to Jeff Feltman?

A I would think so. I couldn't say for sure at this point, but I would

think so.

Q And did you have an opportunity to review this document before?

A I did look at it. I just got it today, so, you know, I reviewed it quickly.

Q I'd like to go to the exchange at the bottom of page 1 and the top of

page 2 where it's Ben Fishman to at 9:19 p.m., where Mr.

Fishman writes, "You don't have anything further on Chris, right? I was sitting in

that meeting for 2 hours. I don't know why Pat Kennedy is so concerned about

what extra security folks are wearing. Does that come from Greg? The time for

being overly sensitive to Libyan concerns about military appearances seems to be

over."

In your interactions that evening, can you glean anything from this

exchange between Mr. Fishman and Ms. about Mr. Kennedy being upset

over or concerned about military going in in uniform?

A I don't have any recollection about there being a huge concern about

military going in in uniform.

Q And then going to exhibit 1 that I asked you to look at, an email

exchange between and yourself at 6:08 p.m., you first write to her,

and the subject line is, "points per NEA that are being drafted now for Magariaf

and," then I think you go on to main points of the call. What are you trying to

460
25

accomplish in this -- what are you trying to communicate that you're doing in this

email -- by this email?

A So per the best of my recollection, and I certainly wouldn't remember

much of this if I didn't have the document to look at, my guess is that

, who is an operations specialist and was working on the floor, was assigned

to note take for the call between the Secretary and Magariaf. And in advance of

note taking for a call, it is standard practice that you would have the call sheet so

that you could review the information that was being proposed to the Secretary to

discuss because that would facilitate your ability to be able to quickly and

accurately take notes on the call.

So I was helping staff prepare for the phone call by letting her know what

the points were. In this case, of course, the call sheet would have come up right

before the call started if we even got it, because it was such an urgent situation.

So I was letting her know this is what we are going to ask the Secretary to discuss

with Magariaf.

Q Do you recall if there was a call sheet for that call that the Secretary

made, if one formally got pulled together?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. Now, you stated earlier, I believe -- correct me if I'm

wrong -- that you were a note taker on that call between the Secretary and

President Magariaf?

A So I wasn't an official note taker. There is an official

one -- official -- there is a primary note taker who is then responsible for writing up

the record of a call. This is true for all phone calls with foreign officials. And then

there is a secondary person who really acts as a backup. And then because I

461
26

was on the floor and because it was helpful for us in our work for me to know

immediately what was said, I sat in as a third note taker where I took notes of the

call and shared it with people on the floor and shared it with my colleagues in

NEA.

Q Okay. And how did you share that information? Did you email your

recollection of that call to others in NEA so that it could reach more than one

person at a time -- at the time?

A I believe I did. I don't recall. It would have been outside of

standard practice to do so. The Operations Center standard practice would not

be to have people emailing this kind of information around. They'd prefer that it

go through the standard formal review process where they can make sure

everything is accurate before any of it is shared. However, in these

circumstances, I expect that I decided that I would share it with everyone I thought

needed to see it if it in any way could help us help our people who were under

attack in Benghazi.

Q Okay. During that phone call between the Secretary and President

Magariaf, did the Secretary describe the events in Benghazi as an attack or as a

protest gone bad?

A I don't recall specifically. I believe it would have been our people

are under attack and we need help. That would have been, to the best of my

recollection, what she said.

Q Do you recall whether the Secretary talked to the Libyan President

about U.S. military going into Libya to assist in the evacuation or exfil of the

U.S. Government personnel on the ground in Libya?

A I don't recall. I believe the main point was we need your help to stop

462
27

this. And, unfortunately, the President didn't have the capabilities to help us.

Q Given the fact that Libya as the host nation didn't have the capacity

to assist, was there any, though, any conversation about other assets going into

Libya to assist outside of the U.S. military, such as FBI or agency or anything of

that nature?

A You know what, I really don't recall, but I -- in some ways I'm -- it's

difficult to answer because nobody thought that any outside -- or I certainly didn't

think that there were any outside resources that could help us. This was an

attack that was happening. Our Ambassador was already missing. We needed

something immediately, and there was nothing that could be immediately available

on the ground except for our colleagues at the agency. That was our only hope.

Q And I believe you described before that there were some from Tripoli

who then went to Benghazi?

A Yeah. I understand that there were. I know that people were

evacuated, and I know there was a plane that evacuated them. I don't know

exactly the mechanisms of how that happened.

Q Were you involved in the discussions or decisionmaking process on

the evacuation of personnel out of Benghazi?

A I don't recall. I don't recall that.

Q Other than the State Department personnel and the Annex

personnel, are you aware of whether there were any other American citizens that

were evacuated with the State Department and CIA personnel?

A I'm not aware of others.

Q Were you aware of whether any Libyans were evacuated from that

country, either the night of the attack or in the days following the attack?

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28

A I don't recall that being an issue.

Q Did you know of an individual by the name of ?

A

Q

A

Q

?

A

Q Were you still with NEA at the time?

A I don't recall.

Q After the DS agents were evacuated from Benghazi, were in Tripoli

and then went to Germany, were you given any additional information regarding

their version of the attacks? Were they debriefed in any way? Was that

information shared with you and others in NEA as to what happened that night?

Did you learn that in the days immediately following the attacks?

A So I think that the only way in which I heard a story that came from

them was that my deputy director, , and I spoke with the polycon

chief from Embassy Tripoli the following day or the next day after the attacks, and

he, based on his conversations with the DS agents, gave us a very detailed

account of what had happened.

Q And who was that individual? Was that Mr. ?

A That's right.

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29

Q And what did Mr. tell that you he had learned from the

agents?

A Well, this was actually very detailed about how the attacks started,

how there was a fire -- or how the DS agent brought the Ambassador and his

colleague to a safe haven place and then left, and then a fire broke out, and then

he wasn't able to get back in, and then the details of how that happened.

Q In any of the information that Mr. related to you and Ms.

, was there any mention of any type of demonstration or protest

preceding the attack?

A No.

Q In the days after the attack, what, if any, awareness did you have or

any role, any review role that you may have had, in what has become known as

the talking points? Did you play any role in the development of any talking

points?

Mr. Kenny. Please be clear as to which talking points you're referring to.

Ms. Jackson. I would just ask the witness if she knows of any talking

points, and then I'll ask her which talking points she's referring to.

Mr. Snyder. All right. So the question she has -- do you want to repeat

the question so it's clear?

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you plan a review or review of any type of talking points

regarding the attacks?

A I likely was part of efforts to produce many talking points related to

Libya during that period.

Q And who would you be interacting with on these talking points?

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30

Was it within NEA or was it within the larger interagency?

A So if I could just be specific, are we talking about the talking points

that were used on the Sunday after the attack, or are we talking about talking

points in general that I would be producing for a variety of reasons?

Q That's exactly what I'm trying to get at. You know, what were you

involved in? Were you involved at all in the talking points that were used by

Ambassador Rice or were you involved in different talking points or both?

A So I don't recall all the engagements that happened over the course

of that week, but I regularly was involved with developing talking points related to

things in Libya. For the specific talking points that Ambassador Rice used on

Sunday, I was not involved in the development of those talking points.

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31

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. You had not -- Mr. Fishman or no one else from the national

security staff had forwarded you a copy of those over the weekend?

A I had no information about those talking points.

Q Okay. If you could pull out the documents that were marked at tab

20 and 21, I'm going to mark them as exhibits 5 and 6. Number 5 --

[ Exhibit Nos. 4 and 5

Were marked for identification.]

Ms. Sawyer. And I'm just going to interrupt for a second because your time

is about -- you've got about 2 minutes in your first hour.

Ms. Jackson. Twelve after.

Ms. Sawyer. Oh, this is 5 minutes fast. I'm sorry. I'm looking at Peter's.

Ms. Jackson. If have like 7 minutes.

Ms. Sawyer. I understand. But if it goes over that, we're more than happy

to let you finish with these exhibits, but we would just then ask since we both have

90 minutes we just subtract it. That's all I'm saying. I didn't want to have to stop

you once you got started.

Ms. Jackson. Now, can I have an extra 30 seconds now?

Ms. Sawyer. You absolutely can have an extra 30 seconds.

Mr. Evers. Which one is number 5?

Ms. Jackson. Number 5 is an email exchange, it's document number

C05580617; and exhibit 6 is C05580618.

Number 5 is an email exchange that at the top of the page between

to , and . And actually, it

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32

appears that exhibit 6 is a continuation of that exchange, but it bears a different

document for whatever reason.

Ms. Betz. Just so I'm clear, this is what everybody has.

Ms. Jackson. The multiple-page one is exhibit 5 and the single page one

is exhibit 6.

Ms. Betz. We're trying to figure out where exhibit where exhibit 4 is. I

think we jumped.

Ms. Jackson. Oh, that would be -- then let's change the numbers. I

marked a 4 and evidently didn't use it. All right. We'll change these numbers to

4 and 5.

Ms. Betz. So your multipage document is exhibit 4, and your single-page

document is exhibit 5.

Ms. Jackson. And that's why you're here, keep me on the straight and

narrow.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Ms. , do you have those documents in front of you?

A I do have those documents.

Q Okay. And were you able to review them prior to talking with us

today?

A I did review them.

Q Okay.

A I have reviewed them.

Q Going to exhibit 4, you talked about you were involved in drafting

talking points, and at the back of this document, there appears to be -- it's entitled,

the very last page, "NEA Press Guidance, September 17," and then, "Key Points."

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33

Are these the type of talking points that you would have been involved in

review, editing, commenting, or drafting?

A So it's interesting nomenclature, I suppose. This would be, from my

perspective, press guidance, which in my world, would have been a little bit

different than talking points. But, yes, I regularly provided press guidance to our

press folks in advance of briefings with the press where they thought something

that I covered might come up in the press briefing and therefore wanted my input

on the guidance.

Q Okay. When you received these -- this press guidance, what was

your reaction when you saw them?

A So my concern with this guidance was that it made our definitive

declaration on the nature of the attack, and I felt that the information that we had at

that time wasn't sufficient to make that determination. And so I thought that they

should be -- you know, we shouldn't go on the record with saying something like

that because we just didn't have the information at the time to warrant it.

Q And what in particular concerns you? Was it the phrase that the

demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the

U.S. Embassy in Cairo and involved into a direct assault against the U.S. Mission?

Ms. Safai. Can you tell us what page you're on.

Ms. Jackson. It's the second page.

Ms. Sawyer. It's actually not. You had her on the last page. That's not

the same point.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q If we go to the second page under the 12:36 p.m. exchange, under

key points, the first bullet point.

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34

A Right. I didn't think there had been demonstrations in Benghazi,

and therefore, I thought we shouldn't say this to the press.

Q Okay.

A I think I might have known by that point, and I certainly found out in

the meeting on Tuesday, that the IC did think that there had been demonstrations

or parts of the IC did think that. I don't recollect exactly if I clearly knew that on

the Monday, the 17th of September.

Q Okay. But you did not receive that information until Tuesday the

18th?

A Well, I just have a very distinct memory on Tuesday the 18th of being

in an interagency meeting with the IC, that the IC arranged, where I said there

were no demonstrations, and someone in the IC said that he had information that

there were demonstrations, and we had an exchange where I, you know,

continued to disagree with him about that issue. So I knew that -- I know now that

at least, you know, as of the Tuesday following, there were still parts of the IC that

believed that there had been demonstrations.

Q And who was the person in the IC that you would --

A But I was quite certain that there had not been.

Q I'm sorry. I interrupted you.

A Sorry.

Q Could you repeat your last comment:

A Sorry. Just to complete the sentence, I was quite certain that there

had not been demonstrations, and so I was responding in this way to the press

guidance.

Q Okay. And who was the individual in the interagency that you were

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35

having this discussion or disagreement with on the 18th?

A You know, I honestly don't know his name and I wouldn't have even

known his name at that time.

Q Who else from the State Department participated in that meeting?

A I think I was probably the only person from NEA, but there would

have been people from our CT office that would have actually hosted and

arranged the meeting.

Q Okay. And would there be a record of your and other persons'

participation in that SVTC?

A I don't know that there would have been a written record of who

attended. There may well have been, but it wasn't something that I was involved

in putting together or tracking.

Q Is there at least a sign-in sheet for who's in the SVTC room?

A Not that I recall.

Q Okay. Going back --

A It was working level. It's not important -- not high-level people in the

meeting.

Q Okay. Going back to exhibit 4, at 2:16 p.m., you write to

, and and I quote, "I think Rice was off

the reservation on this one." Could you elaborate on that comment and why you

wrote that?

471
36

A So I was just continuing to say that I didn't think that this was right.

You know, my colleagues were responding that this had already been said, and so

I was going back by saying, it's still not right. So I still don't think we should say it.

Q Okay. Were there other aspects of Ambassador Rice's comments

on the Sunday talk shows that you disagreed with or that you thought did not fall

within your understanding of what had happened in Benghazi?

Ms. Sawyer. Can we establish whether she saw them first --

Ms. Safai. Right.

Ms. Sawyer. -- her comments.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Then let me ask you this, did you either watch any of the Sunday talk

shows or review transcripts of them afterwards?

A No.

Q Okay. Then on what basis did you make this comment that

Ambassador Rice was off the reservation?

A Because my colleague in the press shop told me that she said this

on five Sunday morning shows, and that's why I thought she was wrong about it.

Q Okay. And then if we could briefly go to what we marked as exhibit

5, which is the continuation of this email exchange where at 2:19 p.m.

responds to you and others, "WH" -- which we understand to be

White House -- "very worried about the politics. This was all their doing." Was

that your understanding?

A I had no information about that.

Q At any time after this exchange, did you ever have a conversation

with Ben Fishman or anyone else from the White House regarding what

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37

Ambassador Rice had said or the narrative that the Benghazi attacks were a result

of -- as a result of the Cairo protests?

A I don't recall any specific conversation about it. It wasn't something

that I was focused on because we had our colleagues in Stuttgart who had just

gone through a traumatic event. We had our colleagues in Tripoli who were

really, really going through a difficult time. They abandoned one of their

compounds. They were then moving into another compound. They had just lost

Ambassador Stevens. We had just lost Ambassador Stevens and our other

colleagues.

So this was not a big part of what I was spending my time on. But if

someone had asked me, I would have immediately said there was no protest.

And the real discussion that I remember about that was with the IC on the

Tuesday following the attacks.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And with that, I'm going to conclude my first hour. I

see that, by my watch, I went over by 3 minutes. So my next session will be

27 minutes instead of 30.

And would you like a short 2- to 5-minute break just to maybe stretch, get

some water, and then we can reconvene perhaps maybe --

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. I would just suggest maybe if we can do it, take

10 minutes, that would give you at least 5. And then if you wanted or needed to

talk to your lawyer, you could do so before we start up again.

Ms. Safai. Sure. And I have 9:17 as the time. So I have 5 minutes over.

Are you going off of this or that?

Ms. Jackson. No, I've been going after my watch that I started at 12 after

and then did a quarter after.

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Ms. Sawyer. So we'll start up again about 9:30.

Ms. Jackson. So on the hour. We'll resume on the hour.

Ms. Okay. Thank you.

[Recess.]

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So we'll go back on the record. The time is now 9:35 a.m., local

Eastern Standard Time now. We are on standard time.

And, Ms. , again, thank you. Welcome. On behalf of the select

committee minority staff, I want to thank you again for appearing today and thank

you as well for your service to our country. We appreciate your willingness to

speak with us, including during off duty hours in your location, so we hope to make

this process, again, just as simple and as straightforward for you as possible.

At the outset, I also did just want to mention that we do understand that you

lost -- you and your colleagues lost friends and fellow patriots on the night of the

attack, so we want to be respectful of that fact and both of you and your time as

well today. And again, just thank you for your service and being here.

I would hope to start by returning where we left off in the last round in the

discussion of emails related to NEA press guidance on September 17. And I'd

like to close out that discussion just while it's still fresh in everybody's mind. And

in order to do so, I'm actually going to mark a new exhibit. It's a similar, related

thread, and this will be exhibit number 6.

And this document, it has the Bates number C05580621. It's an email, the

top email is September 17, 2012. The timestamp is 1:52.

Ms. Safai. Is this part of the list that the -- or is this part of your document?

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BY MR. KENNY:

Q So this will be part of the minority staff documents that were

submitted to you in advance, I believe. Is that correct?

A I have it. I have it.

Q Okay. Great.

A I have it in front of me, yeah.

Q And please, just let me know when you're ready for --

A I'm ready.

Q And again for the record, this is document ID C05580621. And this

is a similar email thread to exhibits 4 and 5 that we were just discussing

previously. You'll note that the third email in, in the middle of the first page, is an

email that you were asked about in the last round where you wrote, quote, "I really

hope this was revised. I don't think we should go on record with this," closed

quote.

Do you see that?

A I do.

Q Okay. And you'll note that that is also the same email that appears

in exhibit 4 at the top of the second page.

A Yep.

Q And so just to be clear for the record, this email then appears to take

a different track from the other emails. The next two emails in this thread are new

emails, and those are the ones that I'd like to ask you about here. Just bear with

me one second.

And in the last round, the majority had asked about your concerns about

specific talking points that appeared throughout this thread. We'll get into that in a

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little bit. But what I just wanted to first start with is, and I'll read it into the record,

the email above the one I just referred you to is from at 1:47 p.m.

And who is Mr. ?

A So he and and all worked together in

the NEA press shop. So he is one of the people we would be in touch with about

press guidance.

Q Okay. Thank you. And it is Mr. . Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And at 1:47 p.m., Mr. wrote to you, "This is what I

think we should go with. There is an ongoing FBI investigation. We are looking

to that investigation to give us the definitive word as to what transpired."

And then above that, at 1:52 in the top parent email, you wrote back, "Yes!",

exclamation point, closed quote.

And the question I had for you, you had raised in the last round a concern

about being too definitive about specific information that was included in some of

the press guidance that you'd reviewed in this email thread. And I just want to

ask whether this is also a reflection of that concern.

A Yes. I feel that the two email threads were -- reflected a consistent

belief on my part.

Q Okay. And moving on. And just real briefly, again, to better

understand or help us better understand what your concern was at that time, when

you said that you had this concern about information being too definitive or

statements or press guidance being too definitive, was that because at that point

in time information was still being collected and analyses were still being

performed on that data set in order to make a determination about what had

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transpired?

A Absolutely, that was my concern.

Q Okay. And that applies even to this --

A We just didn't know what had happened.

Q No. Thank you. That's helpful.

And that applies even to this date, which is September 17, 6 days after the

attacks. Is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. Thank you.

I think we'll move on, or move back rather. So we'll refer you back to

exhibit 4.

A So my numbering is a little bit different. Is that --

Q Sure. So this is -- the top email is from to

. The timestamp is 2:17 p.m.

A Oh, okay. Sure. Sure.

Q I'm sorry. 2:18 p.m. Do you see that there?

A I do. I do. Thank you.

Q And the email I'd like to refer you to in this thread is at the bottom of

the page. It's, again, an email. The timestamp is 2:02 p.m.

And you had indicated to us in the last hour that at this point in time, to the

best of your recollection, you had not seen Ambassador Rice appear on the five

Sunday talk shows. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And at this point in time, had you seen transcripts? I believe

I had in my notes that you didn't review the transcripts at this particular point in

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time, but I just want to make sure that the record is clear on that.

A I have no recollection of reviewing the transcripts.

Q Okay.

A To the best of my recollection, I heard about these Sunday talk

shows during this email chain.

Q Okay. And so when you say the first you heard that she was on the

Sunday shows, would that have been at this 2:02 p.m. email from ?

A To the best of my recollection, yes.

Q Okay. And moving up two emails in that thread, and this was the

email you were asked about again in the last hour, where you write, quote, "I think

Rice was off the reservation on this one," that comment, you were asked about the

basis of what the reference was for that comment. And I guess what I was hoping

to understand is, well, first, there seems to be a little bit of confusion in the last

round as to which set of press guidance you were referring to when you made that

specific comment?

A Well, I mean, I would have objected to a declaration one way or

another about whether it was spontaneous or planned, because we didn't have

enough information to make that determination. I also didn't think there had been

demonstrations, and so I would have, again, objected to that characterization.

Q Okay. And just so that we can follow you with those comments, are

you referring to the NEA press guidance, the draft that appears at the back of this

exhibit, or are you referring to what's referred to as the, quote, "NSS language,"

unquote. Page two.

A So I'm right now referring to the email from at

12:36 p.m. that says, this is the most recent. "Just saw NSS language, which I

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used as the key points here. NEA press guidance." And then it lists these

points.

Q Okay. And I guess part of the reason for my confusion is I heard

you just a moment ago refer to planning or preplanning. And I'm not sure I see

information as to preplanning in those particular points, but I do see those in the

earlier press guidance, which is on the last page or page four.

Ms. Safai. Can you repeat your -- what's the question?

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So I'm just trying to isolate your concerns. So you said you think

that the concerns that you expressed in the last round were in reference to

email at 12:36, the key points email. But I thought I heard you

just a moment ago say that --

A That's right. I mean that -- I mean, I would -- I don't recall my exact

thought process on that day, but normally I would not go and read the whole chain.

If my press folks told me this is the most recent guidance, please review this, then

the most efficient thing for me to do would be to review that most recent guidance

and respond to that. So it was a very, very busy and intense day, and I'm sure

that I would have done, you know, what I needed to do to be accurate, but I doubt

that I would have gone through and read closely the long chain of press guidance

below that.

Q Okay. Well, that's helpful.

And I believe you were asked also in the last round whether press guidance

of this sort would be the sort of thing that you would be asked to weigh in on or

provide comment or feedback on. Just to help contextualize this for us, can you

recall in this time period some of the other activities you were undertaking within

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NEA-MAG, perhaps a support post or otherwise, other activities that you were

working on to support post.

A Sure. Sure. I mean, press guidance was often a daily action, but it

was never the thing that I spent most of my time on. During this period, we had

our colleagues who had been evacuated to Germany and they were going through

a very difficult time there.

We had our colleagues who were still in Tripoli, and they were dealing with

a lot of concerns there about whether there might be threats to them. They had to

abandon one of their compounds, and they had lost Ambassador Stevens, of

course, and so they were really dealing with very difficult circumstances.

Within NEA-MAG writ large, our Embassy in Tunis had been subject to an

attack the previous week as well, and the American school right next to the

embassy had been burned down, and so we had people who were evacuated from

Tunis as well. They were also with our colleagues in Germany at that point.

It was a very, very difficult time in NEA writ large, and certainly for those of

us who had worked very closely with Ambassador Stevens. It was also a time

when we were all grieving for him.

Q Thank you. I think that's helpful for us to understand some of the

other activities that you and your office were undertaking during this time period.

I think part of the other reason that I hope to ask that question is you had

defined your role as the Libyan desk officer within NEA-MAG, and I was hoping

that we could just take a step back and you could just explain for us what a desk

officer does on a day-to-day basis at the State Department?

A Sure. So on the desk, you're really the focal point where all of the

information related to the range in policies used with the post comes together

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45

within the Department. So we would try to support post in whatever they needed,

make sure that felt like their voice was part of meetings within Washington about

the policy issues.

We relayed information back from the range of offices within the

Department that would work on the small piece of our Libya policy, but it would be

at our desk that those pieces all came together.

So, you know, we also would support our colleagues from post, particularly

the ambassador, the deputy chief of mission, when they were back in Washington

for consultations. We would brief people who were going out to serve at post.

We were very involved in the confirmation process for Ambassador Stevens, so

helping him prepare for his hearing.

So we really were where all the different information and the many aspects

of our policy related to Libya would come together.

Q Okay. And was that a shared role? In other words, was there

another Libya desk officer or a person who could have stepped in to help support if

the portfolio became too much for one person to manage?

A So when I started on the desk, there was just one desk officer. We

then found some temporary support and were up to three desk officers by the end

of the first year and then we went down to two officers moving forward. I

understand it is bigger now.

But it was a very, very busy desk. It required long hours, and it was, I

think, one of those places where the workload had increased tremendously but our

staffing hadn't increased rapidly enough to accommodate that increase in

workload.

Q Sure. And you mentioned when you started, just as a bit of

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housekeeping, when did you serve -- when did you become the Libya desk officer,

and when did you move off that position?

A So I started in July 2011. I officially left the position in July of 2013.

Starting from January 2013 until about July 2013, I was also acting deputy director

for the Maghreb office when our office director went out to be charge d'affaires in

Tripoli and our deputy director became acting director.

Q Okay. And returning to the discussion we were just having about

how busy the portfolio was, can you just give us a sense of how that worked, I

guess, explain for us at the working level how that portfolio would be carved out or

how responsibilities would be shared among the various desk officers?

A So I don't really remember how we divvied up work between myself

and the other desk officer, but, you know, we generally had so much work that

whoever was not working on something urgent at a time would do the other task at

hand. So whether it was writing info memos to the Secretary, whether it was

preparing call sheets for people to engage with Libyan officials, whether we were,

you know, briefing people who were heading out to post, whatever it was that

needed to be done, we would find a way to do it.

Q Okay. That's helpful.

And you mentioned a few moments ago that -- some of the various folks or

actors you'd have contact with, I thought. And I just wondered if you had a

primary point of contact, either at Embassy Tripoli or the Special Mission?

A So I would have been in regular contact with the deputy chief of

mission, with the polycom chief. Those would have been my two primary points

of contact. I'd also been in very regular contact with Ambassador Stevens when

he was a Special Representative out in Benghazi and certainly through his

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confirmation process. But I tried to respect his role as ambassador and not email

him often but try to get the work done at the more working level where possible.

Q Okay. And you were asked a little earlier about your interaction with

in DS/IP/NEA, and I'd just like to ask if on a routine basis or regular

basis you would interact with other professionals in the Bureau of Diplomatic

Security, whether at post or back at Main State?

A So when overseas, in general, we interact with the regional security

officer very, very frequently, depending on the circumstances. On the Libya desk,

I did not interact with DS representatives often, and I think that was

the only -- my only regular contact in DS.

Q Okay. And how generally would you describe your working

relationship with him or with the bureau, writ large?

A My relationship with him was good, but it was very much very

specific questions that I would answer, specifically, as I mentioned earlier, about

visas. So when DS agents needed visas, they would contact me for that. It was

rare that we would work on other things, but it happened on occasion.

Q Okay. And how often did you work or interact with personnel in

NEA-EX, NEA-SCA/EX?

A I worked regularly with personnel --

Q Okay.

A Sure. I worked regularly with personnel in NEA-EX as they were in

charge of the resources and management operations.

Q Okay. And if we could just talk, because you have longevity in your

position and at your post, but during your time as the Libya desk officer, how

would you generally characterize the support that they provided to you?

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A So they wouldn't have been providing support to me. They would

be providing support to post. So we were -- you know, we were counterparts

where I covered policy issues and are they would cover resource issues for the

post. There would be areas where those would overlap, obviously, so we would

work -- we would try to work closely together on those areas.

Q Okay. No, I appreciate the distinction.

Perhaps I could ask it, did you have an assessment of the support that they

provided to post? How did you view the support that they provided to post?

A You know, I think that we were all working under very strange

circumstances in that it was a post that was in constant flux. And so I know they

worked very hard to provide the resources that were required, given that there

were changing circumstances on the ground.

Most of the State Department's staffing patterns and resource patterns are

all planned out far in advance of any particular date. So it really was very unusual

that they would be having to staff up a place that hadn't had anybody previously or

tried to send people back to reopen a mission.

And I would also note that NEA writ large was going through a time of a lot

of change with the Arab Spring and related turmoil across the region. So our

NEA-EX colleagues were really dealing with a whole range of very difficult issues

at the same time.

Q Okay. And just, as a general matter, what is your understanding of

NEA's role with respect to providing security resources at post?

A I would think that that was Diplomatic Security's role in providing

security resources at post.

Q Okay.

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A But it certainly wasn't something that I was directly involved with.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, does NEA have -- or at this time did they

have specialized knowledge or expertise on securing and protecting facilities and

personnel?

A NEA would not have had that expertise, no.

Q Okay. And where would that expertise have resided within the

Department?

A That would have been with Diplomatic Security, and so we would

rely on their expertise for those issues.

Q Okay. At this point, we're going to shift gears a little bit, and I'm

going to introduce into the record what I'll mark as exhibit 7.

[ Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And this is an email that's dated February 9, 2012, from you to

, and the document number is C05390170. Let me know if you

have any luck finding that. And, again, it's February 9, 2012.

A If you can provide the date again.

Mr. Snyder. It's February 9, 2012.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And we were just informed, it's also number six in, it looks like, the

index that the majority provided to you.

A Oh. Okay.

Q I apologize in advance that we didn't also provide an index, but --

A No, I have the email. Thank you.

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Q Okay. And I'll give you just a moment to review that. Let me know

when you're ready.

A Okay.

Q Okay. And I'll direct you to the first chain in the email, which is the

bottom of page one. This embedded email, it's also a February 9 email, in which

writes to , and she includes what appears to be a

draft email. There's a cover and then some hashmarks and it appears to be some

texts below that.

And I'd first just like to ask what your understanding of this email is?

A So, you know, as you can tell, this isn't my email. Reading through

it and, you know, per a very vague recollection, this would have been something

that was drafting for to send to our assistant secretary to use, to email

to our under secretary for management. Because we were having difficulty

getting the staffing levels up in some of our posts.

Q Okay. And our understanding, just based on our review of this

document, is that the hashmarks, what appears below there is that draft note. Is

that your understanding as well?

A That would be my understanding, yes.

Q Okay. So I'd like to just read into the record that first portion below

the hashmarks. And it reads, quote, "We determined early on that it was

important to us to maintain a presence in Benghazi to engage with the TNC and

keep an eye on political and security developments in the east.

"The Mission in Benghazi has also allowed PM and USAID to conduct

periodic TDYs in the east to further develop their contacts and monitor progress on

our MANPADs, elections, and civil society assistance programs. The simmering

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protests in Benghazi and the east against the TNC and local councils over the last

few weeks, (along with the violent unrest in Bani Wali in the west), have shaken

the interim government and illustrated the importance of maintaining a broad base

of contacts and visibility outside of Tripoli," closed quote.

And I'll just preface this next set of questions by saying that there have

been some lingering questions about the purpose of the U.S. Government's

presence in Benghazi. So I just wanted to at this point take a little bit of time and

walk through some of the reasons and the justifications that are listed here.

And I'd first just like to begin by asking if you could explain for us why it

would've been important to maintain engagement with the TNC in Benghazi?

A Well, we at the time thought that what was happening in Benghazi

was very important to what was happening in the country writ large, and so having

a presence there meant that we could maintain these contacts with the

Transitional National Council and with a variety of other actors there so that we

could better understand and also effect developments in the country writ large.

Q Okay. And we understand that at some point the TNC may have

moved its base of operations from Benghazi to Tripoli. Was it your understanding

that some of those TNC members would have still resided or come from Eastern

Libya?

A That's right. I mean, many of them would have moved as soon as

they could when Tripoli, you know -- when Qadhafi was ousted from Tripoli. But

some of them did reside in the east, and certainly our people in Libya thought that

it was important that we have a presence there.

Q Okay. And just moving down to a next reference in the paragraph

that I read to you, can you just explain for us why it would've been important to

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keep an eye on political and security developments in the east?

A Well, there are a lot of things that were changing, and we knew that

the government in Tripoli didn't have full control over the country such that the only

real way to know what was happening in the east would be to have somebody

there who could engage with the local communities, who could engage with

people from a broad range of civil society and politicians to understand how things

were developing there. And to be part of a process that, you know, led to support

for general nationwide elections, which occurred later that year.

Q Okay. And so when you referred to the nationwide elections, would

that have been one of the potential political developments that it would've been

important for the U.S. to monitor?

A That's right.

Q Okay. And moving down through the email, can you explain for us

why it may have been important for the State Department to monitor its Pol-Mil

operations in Eastern Libya?

A Yes. Pol-Mil was actually present very early on when we were able

to have a presence in Benghazi because they were very concerned about the

possibility that MANPADs, so this is shoulder-operated missiles that can take

down airplanes, which Qadhafi had very, very high stockpiles of, I think the highest

in the world for a country that didn't actually produce them.

They were very concerned that these stockpiles would become available on

the open and black market and available to people seeking to use them

against -- basically for terrorist purposes, including against the U.S. national

interests. So they had a program in place to try to identify stockpiles and disable

stockpiles of MANPADs from very early on in our presence in Benghazi, following

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the start of the uprising against Qadhafi. So they had a very active program.

Q Okay. And there's also a reference here to USAID programs. Can

you just explain for us why it was important for the State Department to monitor

those programs?

A Well, we felt those programs are very important in helping a society

that had had basically no free expression and no civil society and no free press

and no elections of any kind for decades, transition toward a more Democratic and

free place.

So we had -- you know, it happened almost immediately as Qadhafi would

be pushed out of an area -- or was forced to be pushed out of an area, these small

civil society groups would start and USAID was very active in helping them and

helping them understand what their role of civil society was, what the role of the

press would be in a democracy dealing with very, very basic questions from

people who had had literally no experience with that at all.

Q Okay. And just taking a step back from our discussion of some of

these specific pieces, we've seen some discussion about maintaining a physical

presence in Benghazi at one point in time versus what was referred to as a, quote,

"virtual presence," which we understand to mean no physical presence in

Benghazi but operating from Tripoli as a base of operations.

And in light of some of these specific programs that we discussed or

projects, can you explain for us how a physical presence would have helped

further those priorities?

A Well, with a visible presence you can maintain regular contact with a

range of people that you need to contact. You can then more easily support

visitors going into an environment because you have people on the ground who

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understand what's going on there.

I really deferred to my colleagues who were in Libya on these issues. So,

you know, we really took our direction from them, from Ambassador Stevens -- he

wasn't ambassador yet at this time but he, you know, had recently been the

Special Representative and had a lot of contacts in Benghazi -- and then also our

colleagues, Ambassador Cretz, and our other colleagues who were in Tripoli at the

time.

Q And do you recall what then-Special Envoy Stevens, later

Ambassador Stevens, what his views were about maintaining a U.S. presence in

Benghazi?

A Yes. Ambassador Stevens felt strongly that it was important to have

a U.S. presence in Benghazi.

Q And what about Ambassador Cretz?

A I believe he also supported maintaining a presence there.

Q And you mentioned a moment ago that you may have deferred on

some of the decisions, but I'd just like to ask whether you had a personal view on

the importance of having a presence in Benghazi?

A My personal view is that the more engagement we can do, the better

we're able to do to develop and implement good policy. So my personal view at

the time, although it was not asked really, because we were very clear from people

who had much more on the ground expertise was that it was a good idea to

maintain a presence in Benghazi.

Q And when you say it was clear from people with on-the-ground

expertise, can you just explain to us what you mean by that?

A I just mean Ambassador Stevens --

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Q Okay.

A -- saying to us that he thought it was a good idea to maintain a

presence there.

Q Sure. Okay.

We'd like to return just briefly to the draft email that we were discussing.

This is in exhibit 7, the top of page 2. I'll just read the next paragraph. It begins,

quote, "Unfortunately DS staffing is becoming a recurring problem in Benghazi.

At the current security threat level, Benghazi needs a minimum of four agents to

support moves out of town, three to accompany the principal officer, or TDY

officer, and one to remain on compound with the IRM management person.

"Post needs a minimum of three agents to facilitate one movement at a time

in town and one to remain on the compound. DS staffing has dropped to two

agents several times over the last few months between rotations, which has

prevented the PO from leaving the compound."

And I'd just first like to ask whether you agreed with this assessment that

the staffing of DS agents in Benghazi had become a, quote, "recurring problem,"

closed quote.

A I did agree that we had difficulty adequately staffing DS agents

based on what DS determined was required for security to support movements off

compound.

Q Okay. And there is a mention of that. It refers to what is a PO, is

the abbreviation. Is that principal officer?

A That's right.

Q Okay. And that person would have been the senior diplomat

present at the facility?

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A That's right. I believe at this time we would have just had two

people apart from the DS agents, so a senior -- a principal officer and then the

IRM management person.

Q And if Diplomatic Security wasn't able to support movements off

compound or around town, why was that a concern?

A Because that limited our ability to make use of our officer who was

out there serving as the diplomat. It limited our ability to engage with people

effectively.

Q Okay. You'll see in the next discussion, if you continue on, that

Ms. in the draft includes a discussion about the minimum number of DS

agents, or in what we just discussed. Did you have an understanding of where

that recommendation came -- would have come from? Would that have been

something that would have come from post, for instance?

A That would have come from Diplomatic Security. I don't know if it

would've been from the RSO at post or from Diplomatic Security in Washington,

but that would have been determined completely by DS security, as far as I know.

Q Okay. So you don't have any reason to believe that

, for instance, was generating the list of requirements of DS agents at the

special mission?

A I'm certain that she was not generating a list of requirements for the

DS agents.

Q Okay. And that's because that wouldn't have been the role of

NEA-MAG to assess and come up with security requirements for a post?

A That would not have been the role of NEA-MAG to determine those

requirements.

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Q Okay. The email continues in that third paragraph on the second

page, quote, "DS tells post it is unlikely they can fully staff Benghazi due to

broader staffing challenges across NEA and has suggested we adjust our

expectations about movements in outreach," closed quote.

We touched on it a little bit earlier, but what do you remember about these

discussions about security staffing challenges at this point in time?

A So I actually don't recall where this information would have come

from. It's also not something I wrote. It is consistent with my understanding that

it was very difficult to get DS agents -- sufficient numbers of DS agents to post.

They couldn't find -- you know, normally, in a normal mission,

, we have people who are permanently assigned for tours of 2

or 3 years, in some places 4 years. And because the Benghazi positions were all

unexpected within our staffing patterns, DS was finding 4-week TDYers to fulfill

those roles, which is why there would be gaps. She mentions that there are gaps

between the TDYers. So that made it very difficult to have continuity over time

with people there.

Q Okay. So was the issue a continuity issue, or was it one of never

actually attaining the minimum required number of DS agents at post, for

instance? The way I understand you is that --

A So from our perspective -- sure. From our perspective, it was that

the people on the ground weren't able to do the outreach they wanted to do

because the DS wasn't staffing the numbers that they had determined were

required for people to move off compound.

Q Okay. And was your understanding that that was due to some sort

of resource constraint on the part of DS?

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A That was my understanding, but I didn't have any real insight into

why that was or how, you know, Benghazi stacked up against other posts that had

important security needs as well.

Q Okay. If I could direct your attention back to the first page of exhibit

7. In the email above the hashmarks from to , she writes,

quote, " let me know if this works and whether you want to consult with or

EX before sending this to the FO," closed quote.

Does FO here refer to the NEA front office?

A That would be my understanding, yes.

Q Okay. And you mentioned earlier that that would have been the

acting assistant secretary? I don't know if she was -- if it was Ambassador Jones

at this point in time, or I believe it was still Jeff Feltman. Is that your recollection

as well?

A I believe, in February 2012, it would've been Assistant Secretary

Feltman.

Q Okay. Do you know whether this draft note was ever sent to

Assistant Secretary Feltman?

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[10:24 a.m.]

Ms. . I honestly don't know.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. Do you know if the NEA front office had discussions with the

M Bureau about the matters discussed here?

A I have no information about that.

Q Okay. Do you recall any other steps that were undertaken in this

timeframe to address some of the concerns in this email? For instance, whether

Deputy Chief of Mission may have had meetings, whether Chris

Stevens would have had meetings, or whether Ambassador Cretz would have had

meetings with anyone back at Main State?

A I'm sure that they had meetings, and I would imagine that they would

have raised this, but I don't recollect anything specific.

Q Okay. And just to close out this piece, and I apologize for jumping

around, but at the bottom of the second page there is a reference to -- the

second-to-last sentence in the last paragraph, bottom of page 2 -- about if there

being no recourse, some sort of reconsideration about whether they're keeping the

mission going. And do you recall whether that conversation took place?

A I have no recollection of a serious conversation about closing the

mission in Benghazi.

Q Okay. We'll stay in the same document, but shift a little bit and

move up to the email that you wrote at the top of page 1. You wrote to

, quote, "Also the Secretary asked last week if we still have a presence in

Benghazi -- I think she would be upset to hear that yes we do but because we

don't have enough security they are on lockdown," close quote.

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First, I'd just like to ask, in that first sentence you refer to a question that the

Secretary asked. Did you hear that directly from Secretary Clinton?

A I did not hear that directly from Secretary Clinton.

Q Okay. And how did you hear that she had asked this question?

A It was a secondhand or thirdhand comment forwarded or told to me,

and I at this point can't remember how I heard it.

Q Okay. And when you heard or learned that the Secretary had asked

if we have a, in your language here, "if we still have a presence in Benghazi," what

did you understand that to mean? What did you understand her question to

mean?

A There had been some discussion when we moved our -- many of our

operations to Tripoli whether we should maintain a presence in Benghazi. Some

of our international partners were moving everybody to Tripoli. Some were

maintaining a presence. So there had been some discussion. So I -- and, again,

I don't remember the details of how this was related to me. When I had heard

that that might have -- that the Secretary might have asked about it, I would have

thought that she was just confirming whether or not we had still maintained an

active presence in Benghazi.

Q And in the second part, when you said that the Secretary would be

upset to hear that due to inadequate security resources post was on lockdown,

just when you refer to lockdown is that a reference similar to what we were

discussing below about without the adequate number of DS agents that the

principal officer would not be able to make off-compound movements?

A The lockdown is shorthand for being required to stay on compound.

In most circumstances you would use it because of a security threat that made

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people determine that it was safer to be on the compound than off the compound.

In this case it was resulting from not having adequate DS agents on the ground

that DS had determined was adequate to allow for movements off compound.

Q So a little while ago I had asked you why it was important to have a

physical presence, why it was important for a principal officer to be able to report

and travel around town. I'd just like to ask, what did you mean when you said that

Secretary Clinton would be upset about this -- learning this particular fact?

A So I believe that Secretary Clinton thought that the work we were

doing in Libya was important and that she would have not been pleased to hear

that we didn't have the resources in place to do that work.

Q Okay. And when you say you thought that the Secretary thought

that the work that was being done in Libya was important, what gave you that

impression?

A I mean, she had been very active in Libya. She had visited there.

She had done a lot of work on the policy. And I believed her when she said it was

important for U.S. national interests.

Q Okay. But the reason I ask some of these questions is this email in

particular has become a little bit of political fodder. Secretary Clinton was asked

about it during the Select Committee's October 22 hearing as possible evidence

that she didn't care about Libya, and in particular Benghazi, after Qadhafi fell.

To your knowledge, was Secretary Clinton engaged on Libya matters?

And we'll start with the 2011 timeframe, from when you became the Libya desk

officer?

A Yes, Secretary Clinton was engaged on Libya.

Q Okay. And did that, your sense of her engagement, her level of

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engagement, did that continue through 2012?

A Yes. From my perspective she maintained engaged on the

developments in Libya.

Q Okay. So then in your view would you agree with the

characterization that Secretary Clinton checked out on Libya in 2012?

A I would not agree with that.

Q Did she turn a blind eye to Libya in 2012?

A I would not agree with that.

Q Okay. And did she turn a blind eye to Benghazi in 2012?

A I would not agree with that statement either.

Q Okay. And if you would, could you just explain to us the basis for

why you gave those responses?

A I felt it was clear that Libya had -- that Libya was a high-profile

portfolio, that there were people on the seventh floor that were actively watching it.

They were actively interested. They wanted to visit regularly. And I didn't see

any change in that level of interest over time.

Q Okay. Did the Secretary ever say or do anything to suggest to you

that she did not care about the Department's personnel in Libya?

A No.

Q Did she ever say or do anything that suggested she didn't care about

personnel who were assigned to Benghazi?

A No.

Q And to the extent that some may have pointed to this email as

evidence that Secretary Clinton did not know or did not care about Benghazi, at

least after Qadhafi fell, do you think that that is an accurate or fair reading of what

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you said or what you meant?

A I do not.

Ms. Sawyer. The pause is just us figuring out a couple more questions to

ask before we take our next break, so that's all that's going on over here.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q We just have a few more minutes, and we obviously want to try to be

as respectful of your time as possible.

If I could quickly redirect your attention to exhibit 1?

A Could you remind me what that was?

Q Yes, sure. It's No. 15 in the majority's index. It's ,

September 11, 2012.

A All right.

Q And the email that you write at 6:06 p.m., which we understand to be

about 12 o'clock local time in Libya, again these are some of the main points that

you were prepping for a call between the Secretary and the Libyan President-elect

or Libyan President Magariaf. And the second point of this call is that, quote, "We

need help in Benghazi -- Ambassador Stevens is still missing," close quote.

And I just would like to ask for your understanding, since you were in the

Operations Center on the night of the attacks, whether your sense was that

Benghazi was somehow not a priority; in other words, that the priority was Tripoli

and not Benghazi?

A My sense from working on this in the State Department during the

attacks was that everyone was trying to get whatever resources we could get to

help our people in Benghazi. It was absolutely a focus on Benghazi.

Q And just moving real briefly to exhibit 3, this is the email from

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to Ben Fishman, No. 17 in the exhibit list.

A Yes.

Q And what I'd just like to ask for your understanding, again being in

the Operations Center, and you had indicated earlier that you had some contact

with Ben Fishman, a country director, at the NSS, here in this email it appears that

Ben Fishman makes a recommendation for some outreach that could be done to

help expedite some help in Libya. Is that your understanding as well?

A So this is a conversation that was mostly -- you know, I had very little

recollection of this particular email when I reviewed it. But, yes, upon reviewing it

I believe that Ben Fishman was also trying to figure out who we could contact who

could get help as fast as possible to Benghazi. And so I believe that the idea

would have been that the Qataris could have had some connection to groups

within the Benghazi area that could have come to our assistance.

Q And so when you had mentioned earlier or characterized the

response within the Operations Center as everybody trying to do everything

possible, would that have extended as well to the partners in the interagency, to

include the White House national security staff?

A That would absolutely have extended to anybody that I had ever

worked with on Libya.

Q Okay.

A We had all worked really closely with Chris Stevens. You know, he

was both a really valued colleague and a valued friend just because of the way

that he interacted with anyone that he worked with. He made friends out of all of

his colleagues. And everyone was trying to do everything that we could do to get

help.

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Mr. Kenny. And I see with that our time is up, and so we'll go off the

record. Thank you.

[Recess.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay, Ms. , we are going to start with our next and final round

with you for the next 25 minutes or so. I want to return to exhibit 7 and ask you a

few more questions about that, and in particular the first line that you wrote where

you say, and I quote, "Also, the Secretary asked last week if we still had a

presence in Benghazi."

You said that you didn't have a specific recollection of who said that to you,

but can you tell us anything about the context in which you received that?

Because it's, quite frankly, a very declarative statement.

A I really don't recall who conveyed it to me.

Q Would it have been someone --

A I don't recall the context. But it was not conveyed to me in a sense

of surprise. It was very matter of fact -- very matter of fact question.

Q And it came from someone who you believe they were accurately

relaying information to you?

A I really apologize that I can't remember who told me it, but as far as I

can recall it was someone who I thought would be relaying something accurate.

Q Because obviously you wouldn't further report it if you didn't think it

was an accurate recitation of what the Secretary had said?

A I mean, we are always interested in what the boss' boss' boss' boss'

et cetera thinks about things. So information like this is not always accurate, but I

did believe it at the time when I wrote that.

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Q Okay. So you believed it accurate at the time that you wrote it?

A Yes.

Q You were asked a lot of questions in the last hour about your belief

that the Secretary maintained a high level of interest in Libya throughout 2012, but

you weren't asked the basis for that knowledge, and so I want to take a few

minutes and explore your personal basis for that assessment.

In the year 2012, how often would you personally be in a meeting with the

Secretary?

A I don't think I was ever in a meeting -- that's not true. I don't recall

exactly, but it would not have been very frequent.

Q Okay. And would that have been perhaps one, maybe two times

throughout that entire period of 2012? Or I'm just trying to gauge what you mean

by it would not be frequent.

A It's not frequent that desk officers are in meetings with the Secretary

in general at the State Department. I should also note that in 2012 I was on leave

from March 29 until late July, so I was not actually on the desk or working during

that time.

Q So during that time period you would have no way of assessing at all

the level of interest by the Secretary. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Can you describe your personal involvement in either attending

meetings or briefing the Secretary's senior staff regarding issues pertaining to

Libya in 2012?

A So, again, given the hierarchy and the operations in the State

Department, it would be rare that a desk officer would be in meetings like that.

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Usually it would be more senior people who would be doing those kinds of

briefings.

Q Okay. So you then don't have any firsthand personal knowledge of

the level of involvement of the Secretary's senior staff in the period of 2012.

Would that be a fair assessment?

A So I don't recall specific incidences that I can point to you easily, but

when you are working on an issue at the State Department you often have a pretty

good sense for whether it's something that someone cares about on the seventh

floor or not. And that's true in terms of what kinds of questions get down -- get

reported down to you, what kind of briefings are asked, whether they make trips,

whether they have senior -- other senior officials do trips.

There is a way to tell when the seventh floor is interested in an issue, and I

had always felt from the moment I started on the desk that there was a high-level

interest from senior people of the Department.

Q And who would you get that information from? Would that be

something that you would learn through or or

others?

A Questions? So there's also the SP staff, the Secretary's policy

planning staff. They would ask questions. The P staff, so our under secretary

for political affairs. Our deputy secretary's staff, they would ask questions. I

would get those directly to me. And then I would also hear questions that were

filtered through our assistant secretary, and they would be filtered down as well.

And occasionally we would have -- you know, we always had a weekly all-hands

meeting with the assistant secretary, and in those meetings it also seemed quite

clear that our assistant secretary was asked a lot of regular questions about what

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was happening in Libya and that there was a high level of interest.

Q Okay. Did you brief any of those, the under secretary for P or the

policy people in the Secretary's staff, did you brief any of those individuals?

A I was in very, very regular contact with their staff. So they would

have one person who would cover NEA, and I would be in very close contact with

that person.

Q And who was that person on the policy side?

A So, for instance, for our deputy secretary, that would have been

. People changed over time. There's one person in each school year, I

suppose would be the way to say it, but those people are all people that I worked

with very closely.

Q And one last sort of area to explore on the February 9th email is the

crux of that email is the problems with staffing on security measures in Benghazi.

And what we're really trying to understand is, if Libya was so important within the

State Department, why was security such a problem? And that's the crux of what

this committee is looking for, is that if, as you've described, Libya was different,

you know, why wasn't its security posture correspondingly different?

Mr. Kenny. And just to be clear, this email refers to Benghazi. And I think

your question --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Benghazi. Yeah.

A I guess I would have two responses to that question. The first is

that this was not about whether or not we had adequate security per se, but

whether we had adequate staffing per what the security professionals said was

necessary to do off-compound movements. So this was not a discussion about

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we don't have enough people to be safe there. It was a discussion about do we

have the security, the Diplomatic Security, that was required in order for us to do

off-compound movements which we think are important.

The second thing is, the problem with -- the staffing writ large is a really

complicated issue, and unfortunately the State Department is not very flexible

about how they move people around quickly. And this was a time of very high -- a

lot of dangerous places within NEA. So I think that was what was related to

having it be so difficult in getting the people that Diplomatic Security said was

needed in order for us to do these movements.

Q I want to just go back to something that -- to the first part of your

answer to that. Isn't having a sufficient number of Diplomatic Security agents to

move with a principal officer off compound part of the security? I mean, doesn't

security encompass both the physical security of the grounds and the personal

security of the people who are there?

A So I would respond by saying that in response to that level, the

people -- the personal security was provided by maintaining and by requiring those

people to be on the compound. This is not something that I'm an expert in in any

way, this is just what Diplomatic Security said was necessary. Which is to say

that this was not a conversation about us not having enough security. It was a

conversation about the Diplomatic Security saying that we shouldn't do the type of

off-compound movements that we wanted to do.

Q So how were you going to achieve the political reporting if you

couldn't move off compound?

A Well, that's certainly what we were saying in this or what

was proposing that say. That was a frustration from the policy side.

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Q I want to move to one last exhibit in my remaining minutes, and it's

item No. 14 in the stack that we sent. It's an August 17 information memo to the

Secretary. And we're going to mark this as exhibit 8.

[ Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And I would note that the version that we sent to you, although

marked confidential, has been reviewed by a classification authority, and it is now,

the version that we're going to talk about, is redacted and releasable for public

release. It bears document No. C05390124.

A Yes, I see it. I have it.

Q Okay. Let me first ask, Ms. , did you have any part in

drafting this memo?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would you describe your role in drafting this memo?

Who tasked you with doing it, what information you used to draft it, and what was

its purpose.

A I don't recall whether this was a memo where we were requested to

do an info memo or whether it was something that we in NEA decided to do. Both

would have been very, very possible in the circumstance.

So normally I would do the first draft. I would share it with some

colleagues within the State Department for their input. And then it would be

paired up through my chain of command to my deputy director, my office director,

our deputy assistant secretary, our principal assistant secretary, and then from

acting Assistant Secretary Beth Jones, to who it came from, it was sent from, to

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the Secretary.

Q Okay. And do you recall who within NEA tasked you with drafting

this memo?

A So I have a vague recollection, but I do recall discussing it with

our -- with my office director, .

Q Okay. And do you recall what information you used to talk about, to

write about the overall security situation and the uptick in violence? Were you

relying on cables from post? Were you in contact with people on the ground in

Benghazi? Where were you accumulating the information that you used as the

basis of this memo?

A So I would have used a range of sources normally, and I would

imagine with this as well. I would have used reporting from post, potentially

conversations from post, open source reporting, you know, whatever sources

there were in order to get the most accurate information into this memo.

Q And, again, I just want to clarify, what was the purpose of this

memo? Why was there a need to write a memo like this?

A So when there is something happening that seems significant that

we want to make sure our principals have a full picture of we would write an info

memo about those to get past sort of the things that they might see in other

smaller reports. So that would be the purpose, to provide information about a

changing -- a change or something that was happening within Libya.

Q Just circling back a minute, you said earlier that you were on leave

until July sometime of 2012. When was it in July that you returned?

A I believe it was the third week of July.

Q So you'd been back about 30 days at the time?

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A I don't have the exact date with me.

Q So you would have been back approximately 3 to 4 weeks at the

time you're drafting this memo and it goes up to the Secretary?

A That's right.

Q You've described before that it was your personal assessment that

the Secretary was involved in and maintained her level of involvement in Libya, so

it kind of begs the question as to why you would have to write a memo like this if

the Secretary has maintained a high level of visibility and engagement in Libya.

A I guess I would disagree with the premise of that question. I think it

is -- I think, in fact, it is when we think the Secretary is particularly interested in a

topic that we tend to write these kinds of memos.

So it was a complicated situation. What was causing the increase in the

violence? How important was it? Was it something that was going to lead to

anything in general or not? So it was a topic that warranted this kind of more

in-depth report than you might get if you're just looking at spot reports or one-off

reports on information.

Q Do you recall whether or not you reviewed a particular cable that had

been written on or about August 8 that was subtitled "The Guns of August"?

A I'm sure -- I do recall reviewing that cable.

Q And did you use the information in that cable in any way to form the

basis for the information that was in here?

A I don't recall my exact process, but I certainly would expect that, yes,

I did.

Q There was another cable, a Benghazi EAC, that was issued on

August 16th of that day. Do you remember if you saw that cable?

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A I don't remember if I saw that cable.

Q You recognize now the cable I'm referring to? You remember a

cable on August 16th?

A I believe I reviewed it. I believe I reviewed it in the preparation for

this meeting. I believe it was captioned HIPDA (phonetic), which might not have

been something that would have gone to me.

Q So today you don't have a recollection of whether or not you saw that

cable at the time it was issued?

A That's right. I don't think that I did, but I can't recall.

Q Was there any discussion within NEA in the drafting and issuing of

this information memo for the Secretary, was there any discussion regarding

closing or suspending operations in Benghazi?

A I don't recall any such discussion.

Q Were you aware of whether now Ambassador Stevens was

considering closing Benghazi because of the uptick in violence?

A No, I don't. In fact, to the contrary, I think Ambassador Stevens was

working with us to try to come up with a policy case for establishing a more

permanent presence in Benghazi.

Q Was that the purpose of his trip?

A I don't think so, but it may have been something he was thinking

about, but I don't recall that being stated as a reason for his trip there.

Q Were you aware that the Secretary was planning another trip to

Libya in the fall of 2012?

A I don't think that I was aware of that, but I'm not surprised or I

wouldn't have been surprised if she had been. I don't recall it specifically, though.

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Q You've described that you would have conversations with Envoy

Stevens and then later Ambassador Stevens. Did he ever express to you his

concerns over security, particularly in Benghazi?

A He did not.

Q At no time did he discuss security with you?

A I do not recall him discussing concerns about security in Benghazi

during this timeframe.

Q It seemed that you emphasized the word "concerns." Did he

discuss security generally with you or did I just misread your answer?

A Well, I thought you had shifted the question to include, you know,

general security. I mean, he may -- I don't recall during this time period a

conversation with him about security in Benghazi. He was in Benghazi the

previous year, and I don't have any specific recollection right now of something

that was specifically about security then, but there may well have been

discussions about various security issues.

Q Were you aware that Ambassador Stevens was going to travel to

Benghazi in September of 2012?

A Yes.

Q And what did you understand was the purpose of his trip?

A Partly it was because we had a gap in coverage in Benghazi

because we also were having difficulty getting permanent people there to cover

the principal officer role. I knew that he wanted to go back there. He had spent

a lot of time there in the previous year but hadn't been back since becoming

Ambassador, as I recall. And so he was interested in reconnecting with a number

of his contacts there as well. That's my understanding.

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Q Did you know or have any understanding that he wanted to keep his

trip low profile and not have it published or have publicity about it?

A That generally would have been something that the security

professionals would be -- would recommend. So I'm not surprised to hear that,

but I don't recall it being a particular issue that we discussed.

Q Is it your experience as a foreign service officer that when an

ambassador travels, that he or she will have a higher level of security protection

than, say, yourself as a foreign service officer or any other type of political econ

reporting officer?

A It really depends from place to place, but I would say generally that

would be more common than not certainly. So I would say more generally yes,

an ambassador would likely have more security than a working-level person.

Q And then returning to the information memo that was sent to the

Secretary, what happened after that? Were there any meetings convened? Was

security discussed among NEA and DS or at higher levels in the State

Department? What happened as a result of that memo?

A So we wrote this memo as a policy memo in the sense of we were

talking about security with regards to our policy work rather than talking about

security with regards to our specific missions there. I am not aware of

conversations or I don't recall conversations that resulted immediately following

this memo regarding security for our missions in Libya.

Q In my last minute or 2, can you describe when an information memo

like this goes up to the Secretary, does it go -- does it also get disseminated to

other members of her senior staff?

A I think so, but I don't know exactly as to how it's distributed.

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Ms. Jackson. I'm out of time, right? Yeah, okay.

Well, I am out of time with my questions, Ms. . Thank you very

much for your patience with us today and answering our questions today. And

hopefully we will have you out of here soon. And we'll go off the record for just a

minute as we change seats.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Sawyer. We're going to go back on the record. We're certainly

hopeful that we will not need our full half hour and that we can finish up with just

some few remaining questions and let you go home after a long day. But thank

you again for your patience.

Ms. . Could I make one more statement that's related to the last

discussion we just had?

Mr. Kenny. Please.

Ms. Safai. , do you want to --

Ms. . I'd just like to --

Ms. Safai. Go ahead.

Ms. That's okay. I'd just like to note that, you know, I had served

in Iraq from 2006 to 2007, and I had also served in Saudi Arabia in our consulate

in Dhahran soon after our consulate in Jeddah was attacked, where we had

several local staff killed. When I was in Iraq, we were under regular threat of

rocket fire. We slept in containers that didn't have hard cover, so we were really

vulnerable to the rocket fire that was happening regularly the year I was there.

Which is just to say that people working in the State Department, and

particularly in NEA at this time, just had a lot of experience with being in places

that were clearly not very safe places, but thinking that it was important for U.S.

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national interests and for our long-term security goals to do the work that we were

doing. So we had a level of familiarity with being in very risky situations. That's

all.

Mr. Kenny. Thank you. That is a helpful clarification.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Ms. , also returning to where the discussion left off in the last

hour, I'm going to refer to you exhibit 8, which is the August 17th information

memorandum. And you were asked just a few minutes ago about -- and I'll give

you a second. Do you have the document ready?

A I do.

Q Okay. You were asked whether you had reviewed certain

documents that had been disseminated in preparation of the drafting of this

product. In particular you were asked about an August 15th Emergency Action

Committee memorandum or cable. You were asked about a cable that was also

written entitled "The Guns of August."

For those types of products, would those have been cleared in any way

through post? So in other words, would Embassy Tripoli have had eyes on those

particular documents, the August 15th EAC, "The Guns of August" memo, before

they were reported back in?

A Yes, they would.

Q And I understand it's a bit circular question asking if Embassy Tripoli

is aware of the fact that Embassy Tripoli or the Special Mission wrote in, but the

reason I'm asking that question is we're trying to understand who at post would

have had familiarity with the types of issues that would have been contained in

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those documents. And I understand that you've reviewed some of those and we

hadn't prepared or put any of those documents directly in front of you here today,

but I did want to ask whether you recall that either of those two documents had

been viewed or cleared by either the deputy of chief of mission in Tripoli or the

Ambassador himself.

A I think that they certainly would have been reviewed by both the

deputy chief of mission and the Ambassador, but I don't have any particular

evidence that I'm thinking of. That would just be normal practice.

Q Okay. So to the extent that that applies in this situation, would your

understanding then be that the Ambassador and the DCM had an awareness of

the issues that were raised in those documents?

A Oh, yes, I would certainly think so.

Q Okay. And then moving to this particular document, it is an

information memo. The "from" is NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jones. Would

this document have also been run through Embassy Tripoli to your knowledge?

A I just don't -- I don't remember. In theory, and this is something

about the changing technology and how it affects our work, I think there's been a

shift where in the past something like this would not have gone to Tripoli -- to the

post, right. It would be a document produced in Washington for Washington.

But since now so many things are so easily shared, we may well have shared it

with post. And I would be -- I don't recall specifically, but I would expect that we

had discussed it with post since we really considered them the experts on all this

information.

Q Okay. And it's our understanding that the Emergency Action

Committee process, that recommendations can come out of that process for

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changes in the security posture at post or other types of security-related

recommendations. Would the information memo that you see here in exhibit 8,

would that also have been a similar vehicle whereby certain recommendations

would have also been included?

A If there had been recommendations included we would have made it

an action memo.

Q Okay. And perhaps you can help me understand.

A So as an information memo it only -- sorry.

Q No, please.

A As an information memo it would just be providing information. It is

quite distinct from an Emergency Action Committee meeting, which is very

deliberately about the security of the people in the mission and what steps need to

be taken related to that.

Q Okay. And when you mentioned at the end of the last round that

you viewed this document to be more of a policy document rather than a

security-focused document on security resources, is that because the EAC, that

cable, that process would have been the appropriate venue for those types of

discussions?

A I don't know that there's causality there, but this is a document about

the security issues -- or the security situation in the country rather than a

document that talks about the security needs of our mission in the country. And I

think of those as very distinct products, and I would be involved in the policy

document, and I would be much less, if at all, involved in the other type of

document.

Q And the reason I'm just trying to talk about those two pieces in

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context is a memo like this, where you described it as a policy memo, wouldn't

then mean that Main State was ignoring, for instance, security needs or security

requests that might flow from an EAC. Is that correct?

A They would be -- could you perhaps just say the question again?

Q Sure. Yeah. Sure. And I apologize if I'm being a little obtuse

here. What I'm trying to understand is you had characterized this document as a

policy document focused on policy, and for those of us outside of the State

Department, outside of the foreign service officer world, I'm just trying to

understand that there are different processes or vehicles for raising certain types

of concerns. And the policy dimension would have been appropriate for a

document like this, whereas a different type of set of recommendations or

discussions, especially if they emanated from post, would have been appropriate

for another process, such as the Emergency Action Committee, at this time. Is

that correct?

A Yes, I agree with that.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. And just to be clear, even setting aside that distinction, at

face what I heard you saying was that at any point in time had there be a

recommendation where you were seeking action at the Secretary's level, this

would not have been just an information memo, but an action memo. Is that an

accurate characterization?

Ms. That is accurate, yes.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And I guess just to -- maybe I'll try to summarize it a little bit better

this time -- but this document doesn't show that NEA-MAG was ignoring security

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concerns or security requests at the Special Mission. Is that a fair assessment?

A I'm sorry. I missed part of that sentence. Could you repeat it?

Q Sure. Again, I'm just trying, we have the EAC on the one hand,

where a post makes specific recommendations about security concerns, security

recommendations, and then we have a document such as this. And I'm just trying

to understand, this document or any -- let's step back and not focus on this

document. Let's just talk about NEA-MAG. NEA-MAG was not ignoring,

somehow ignoring security concerns at the Special Mission Compound, or were

they?

A We were not ignoring security concerns in Libya. If our colleagues

in Libya had said that they wanted something, we would have done whatever we

could to try to get it for them. And this memo is not -- was not trying to get -- the

intent of this memo was not to get more security resources for our mission in

Libya.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Just real briefly before we move on, you had mentioned -- you were asked

about Ambassador Stevens' views about continuing the Special Mission or a

mission in Benghazi in light of security incidents and the deteriorating security

environment in this August-September 2012 timeframe. And you referred to his

efforts perhaps to seek a more permanent status for the Benghazi mission. Could

you just elaborate on what your understanding of those efforts were at that point in

time?

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Ms. To the best of my recollection, it has been a few years. You

know, we were working with our embassy in Tripoli, and specifically with

Ambassador Stevens and DCM Hicks, on putting together the policy rationale for

having a more permanent presence in Benghazi.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. And so, do you recall, for instance, in the late August, early

September timeframe that Deputy Chief of Mission Hicks or Ambassador Stevens

may have sent back to NEA-MAG that proposal, a draft proposal?

A I believe that's right. I believe we then were, you know, working with

that draft to provide, you know, our input to that to give to NEA-EX, which would

be the place for that kind of resource request would most likely come from.

Q And was your sense that Ambassador Stevens was being instructed

to move that process along, or was that something that he himself supported and

took some initiative in moving himself?

A Oh, I understood it to be something that he believed was important.

Q Okay. And so it didn't surprise you then that he may have sent a

proposal back to Washington to have a permanent presence there even after

some of these products we were discussing earlier, the information memo, the

Emergency Action Committee meeting?

A No, it didn't surprise me.

Q Okay. And we didn't touch on this in our discussion in the previous

hour about the mission in Benghazi, but did you understand especially you had

mentioned a task force in an earlier round, did you understand there to be a

counterterrorism imperative or rationale for being in Benghazi?

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A I certainly thought there was a broad counterterrorism reason to be

there in the sense of there are a lot of -- I'm just trying to remember what I thought

at the time rather than what I've thought subsequent to that time. So, I guess, at

the time, as far as I can recall, I thought it was -- I understood that there was a

counterterrorism interest there, but I wasn't aware of the specifics of it.

Q Okay. And I'll just follow up, one of the reasons I ask that question

is, we have seen some reasons put forward or justifications on the

counterterrorism front and, again, not being within the State Department FSO

family, we're just trying to understand. It seems a little counterintuitive if you have

the threat of extremism in a place that you'd also want to be there in order to

address or counter that counterterrorism threat or the terrorism threat.

Is that something that you can help explain for us? If not, that's okay.

A I mean, I really think we find in the world that where we're able to

engage and where we're able to be present, we're better able to counter threats of

terrorism than when we aren't present and we aren't on the ground. So just as a

general principle, I think our national security interests are best served when we're

able to be where these kinds of groups are forming and operating so that we can

best counter them.

Q Okay. And at this point, I'd like to shift gears and this will be the

final portion of the minority's questions.

And at the outset here, we'll just let you know that this, ours, the select

committee is the eighth congressional investigation into the attacks, and it's our

hope that it will be the last and final investigation. And therefore, we've been

asking every single witness a series of public allegations that have been made

about the attacks.

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And while folks can speculate about the attacks, there's only a handful of

people who do have the actual knowledge of what happened, both before, during,

and after the attacks. And so what I'm going to ask you here is a series of

questions and not looking for your opinion or speculation, but really whether you

have firsthand knowledge. And if you don't, we can simply move on to the next

allegation. But there are a dozen, so please bear with me.

The first is, it has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman has

speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down, and this

resulted in the Defense Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton issued any

kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Next, it has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed an

April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington Post Fact Checker

evaluated this claim and gave it Four Pinocchio's, its highest award for false

claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed an

April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was personally

involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day security resources in

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Benghazi?

A No.

Q Next, it has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or

fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to

garner support for military operations in spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or

fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to

garner support for military operations in Libya in spring 2011?

A No.

Q Next, it has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi included

transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries. Bipartisan report

issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence found that,

quote, "The CIA was not collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria," closed

quote, and they found, quote, "no support for this allegation," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence Committee's

bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in Benghazi were

being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria or to any other

foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed from

departing the Annex on the night of the attacks to assist the Special Mission

Compound, and there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and

appropriateness of that delay. House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan

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report concluding that the team was not ordered to, quote, "stand down," closed

quote, but that instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how

quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you agree with the decision or think it may

have been the right decision, do you have any evidence that there was a bad or

improper reason behind the temporary delay of CIA security personnel who

departed the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q Next, a concern has been raised by one individual that in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board damaging documents

may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed or

scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were provided to

Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were provided

to Congress?

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A No.

Q Next, it has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for political reasons

and that he then misrepresented his actions when he told Congress that the CIA,

quote, "faithfully performed our duties in accordance with the highest standards of

objectivity and nonpartisanship," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave false

or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the Benghazi talking

points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell altered

the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q Next, it has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made a,

quote, "intentional misrepresentation," closed quote, when she spoke on the

Sunday talk shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the U.S. was, quote,

"virtually AWOL as commander in chief," closed quote, on the night of the attacks

and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the President was

virtually AWOL as commander in chief or missing in action on the night of the

attacks?

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A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four U.S. military personnel at

Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering flying on a

second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors to, quote, "stand down,"

closed quote, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials have stated that

those four individuals were instead ordered to, quote, "remain in place," closed

quote, in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their location.

Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services Committee

found that, quote, "There was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military

personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi," closed quote. Do

you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House Armed Services

Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in

Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi?

A No.

Q We are almost at the end. I know it's been a long day. This is

actually the last one.

It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets on the night of

the attack that would have saved lives. However, former Republican

Congressman Howard Buck McKeon, the former chairman of the House Armed

Services Committee, conducted a review of the attacks, after which he stated,

quote, "Given where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how

quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," closed

quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

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A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military assets

available to them on the night of the attacks that could have saved lives but that

the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to deploy?

A No.

Mr. Kenny. And with that, we'll just take a quick moment to thank you once

again.

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. Thank you very much for your patience. We know

it's late there, but I did want to just give you the opportunity now that you have

patiently sat through and answered all of our questions if there's really anything

you wanted to add before we go off the record.

Ms. No. I think I'm all done. Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. Great. Well, thank you again. Please be safe getting

home, and thank you so much for your past and continued service to the country.

Ms. Thank you.

Mr. Kenny. We'll go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the interview was concluded.]

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INTERVIEW OF

CHIEF OF BASE

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, NOVEMBER 19, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

550
INTERVIEW OF

JEFFREY DAVID FELTMAN

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, DECEMBER 8, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel

ERIN O’BRIEN, Minority Detailee

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ERIC SNYDER, Senior Counsel

LAURA E. DECK, Attorney-Adviser

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Ms. Jackson. This is a transcribed interview of Ambassador

Jeffrey Feltman conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi.

This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the

committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic

facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and matters related to it, pursuant to

House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of

the 114th Congress.

Ambassador Feltman, could you give us your name, please, for the

record.

Mr. Feltman. Jeffrey David Feltman.

Ms. Jackson. And, Ambassador Feltman, please accept our thanks

for being here today and your appearance before this interview.

I've introduced myself before but, again, I'm Sharon Jackson, and

I am with the committee's majority staff.

And then we'll have everyone go around the table and introduce

themselves for the record. You are accompanied here today by --

Mr. Snyder. Eric Snyder, State Department.

Ms. Deck. Laura Deck, State Department.

Ms. O'Brien. Erin O'Brien, minority staff.

Mr. Desai. Ronak Desai, minority staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm Susanne Sachsman Grooms with the

minority.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Ms. Jackson. Before we begin -- we'll see who's knocking on the

door. We just did the introductions, sir, could you introduce

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yourself?

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny, minority staff.

Ms. Jackson. Before we begin, I'd like to go over the ground

rules and explain how the interview will proceed. The way the

questioning proceeds is that a member from the majority will ask

questions for up to an hour, and then the minority staff will have an

opportunity to ask questions for an equal period of time if they choose.

We generally adhere to this 1-hour time limit to each side. We've made

some adjustments in the past, but we generally go back and forth an

hour at a time.

Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee or a

designated staff member. And, again, we will rotate back and forth

1 hour per side until we are out of questions and the interview will

be over.

Unlike a testimony or a deposition in Federal court, the committee

format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness or their

counsel may raise objections for privilege, which would be subject to

review by the chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot

be resolved in the interview, the witness can be required to return

for a deposition or a hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. This is

not an issue that we really encounter, but it is a rule that we are

governed by.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. It's not actually a rule. Procedure.

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Ms. Jackson. It's a procedure.

So this session is to begin as unclassified. So if any question

calls for a classified answer, please let us know and we can reserve

it until we move to a classified setting. And we have a classified

setting reserved for this afternoon.

You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time throughout the

interview, but if something just needs to be clarified, we ask that

you make this known. If you need to discuss anything with counsel who

has accompanied you today, we will go off the record and stop the clock

and provide you that opportunity.

We will take a break whenever it's convenient for you. This can

be -- we typically do this after every hour of questioning, but it can

be whenever you prefer. If you need anything, such as a glass of water

or the use of the facilities or to confer with counsel, please just

let us know and we'll go off the record, stop the clock, and allow you

to do that. We're trying to make this process as easy and as

comfortable as possible.

As you can see, we have an official reporter who is taking down

everything that you say and I say to make a written record, so we ask

that you give verbal responses to all questions as opposed to nods of

the head or shakes of the head. And I'm going to ask the reporter to

please feel free to jump in in case you respond nonverbally.

Similarly, we should try and not talk over each other so it's

easier to get a clear record. We want to make sure that your questions

are the most complete and truthful and that we get them down in order.

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6

So we'll take our time during this interview and repeat or clarify

questions if necessary. If for any reason you don't hear all of the

question or don't understand it or just need it clarified in some way,

please just make it known. We'll be happy to clarify or repeat our

questions.

We are trying to get the most complete and truthful answers to

the questions that we have today. So if you honestly don't know an

answer to a question or don't remember, it's best not to guess, but

we do ask that you give us your best recollection. And if there are

things that you do not know or can't remember, please, if you can, inform

us as to who might have that information and be able to provide a more

complete answer to the question.

And now, there are a few rules that do govern us. Do you

understand that you're required to answer questions from Congress

truthfully?

Mr. Feltman. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Do you also understand that this applies to

questions posed by congressional staff in an interview?

Mr. Feltman. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Do you understand that witnesses that knowingly

provide false testimony could be subject to criminal prosecution for

perjury or making false statements?

Mr. Feltman. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Is there any reason you'd be unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

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Mr. Feltman. No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Well, that's the end of the preamble.

Does the minority have anything that they would like to add at

this time?

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I think we just wanted to thank you for

coming in. I understand that you are at the U.N. now, not a

U.S. Government employee, and that you were only in country for a couple

of days, and so we've really taken a big chunk of that timeout of your

December, so I really appreciate your taking the time to come in.

Mr. Feltman. Thank you. Yes, I am traveling to Central Asia

tomorrow, and that's why I have a small suitcase. I start the trip

today.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. I see that the clock says 8:36, and so I will

begin the first hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Ambassador Feltman, you are currently at the U.N. What is

your position there?

A I'm Under Secretary General for Political Affairs.

Q And, generally, what does that entail?

A It would be akin to being sort of a foreign minister or

Secretary of State if the U.N. were a country. So I'm the chief foreign

policy adviser to the Secretary General. I oversee the diplomatic and

political work of the United Nations globally. That's different from,

say, development work or humanitarian work; it's the political and

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diplomatic work that I oversee.

Q And you've been in that position since early July of 2012?

A July 2, 2012.

Q Okay. And you had been with the State Department for

approximately 30 years before that?

A A little bit less, something like 27 years.

Q And what was your last position with the State Department?

A The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

Q And how long did you have that position?

A I had that position from -- confirmed in, I believe,

August 2009 up until my retirement from the State Department in

May 2012.

Q Okay. And what were your duties and responsibilities as

the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs?

A To oversee the U.S. diplomatic relationships or U.S.

political interests in the 19 countries that fell into that bureau's

responsibility. That's the area of the world starting from Morocco

stretching through Iran.

Q And that included Libya?

A And that included Libya.

Q Okay. Where had you been posted prior to becoming the -- or

what positions did you have prior to becoming the Assistant Secretary

of State for Near Eastern Affairs within the State Department?

A I was acting in that position from December 2008 until my

confirmation in August, so I was acting for several months. Before

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that, I was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, which is

the number two in the Near East Bureau. That was from February 2008

until December 2008 when I became acting Assistant Secretary. Before

that, I was the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Lebanon from 2004

to 2008. I've also served in Jerusalem; Tel Aviv; Baghdad; Amman,

Jordan; Tunis, Tunisia. Those were my postings in those

particular -- in that particular area.

Q Ambassador Feltman, I want to direct your attention to

September 11, 2012. Where were you on that night? Were you at the

U.N.? Were you in the United States, or were you traveling?

A I was in New York. I was at the United Nations during

office hours and then at home in my apartment after office hours.

Q Okay. And how did you learn about the attacks in Benghazi?

A I had called the State Department on some other business,

U.N. business, and I had talked to Liz Dibble, the Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State at the time, on -- I don't remember what

the issue was I called her about. And she said: By the way, there's

an attack going on at the U.S. Mission -- the U.S. office in Benghazi.

And that was how I first heard about it was from a former colleague

from the State Department.

Q And was that during business hours? Do you recall

approximately when that was?

A It was in the business hours. It was in the afternoon. I

don't remember what time it was, but it was some time in the afternoon.

Q Okay. But certainly before 5, 6 o'clock at night in the

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evening?

A It may have been -- the U.N.'s business hours are until

7 p.m., and I don't remember what time.

Q All right. And what did Liz Dibble tell you, if anything,

about her understanding of what was going on in Benghazi?

A She just said there's a big problem in Benghazi, and they're

worried, and that was about it. She said, you know, we're worried about

Chris, who's a friend of hers, a friend of mine, and that was all.

Q Did you know that the Ambassador -- that Ambassador Stevens

was missing at the time --

A No.

Q -- or unaccounted for?

A No.

Q Approximately how long did this conversation last?

A I have no idea. That part of the conversation was very

brief, but I simply don't remember the subject, why I called her.

Q Did you receive any further information the night of the

attack from the State Department or from U.N. officials or -- and then

I'll ask, my followup question is, what, if anything, did you do in

response to learning that there was an attack going on in Benghazi?

A Ambassador Shalgham, who is the Libyan Perm Rep to New York,

called me at several points throughout the evening with cell phone

numbers of people he said who knew where Chris was, who claimed that

Chris was alive. You know, so Ambassador Shalgham called me, which

was appropriate, I was a U.N. official. He was working at the U.N.

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11

He was the Representative to the U.N.

So I would try to call these cell phone numbers that Ambassador

Shalgham gave me, because I was concerned about my friend, and none

of them panned out. None of them led to anything.

I received a phone call from Libya sometime that evening. It was

after I was -- I think I was getting ready to go to bed. I think it

was like something, maybe 9, maybe 10 o'clock or something. And I

recognized the number as being a Libyan number, and so I, of course,

answered it. It was to my personal phone. I don't know how the person

got the number.

The person did not identify himself except to say he was a friend

of Chris Stevens and that he too had information that was sort of vague

about Chris being alive, and at that point, I called Beth Jones, who

was the Assistant Secretary of State, I think in an acting capacity,

you know, my successor, via the ops center to say I had gotten this

phone call, and, you know, here's the number if there's anything.

And I don't think it panned out because it simply wasn't true what

the information was that the person said. But yes -- so I did have

further conversations as just outlined.

Q Now, this the phone call that you received from a Libyan,

did that person identify themselves?

A No. And I asked, and he did not identify himself, refused,

and just said he was a friend of Ambassador Stevens.

Q And did he give any details as to where he was? Was he on

the compound? Was he at a hospital? Was he in transit?

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A It was vague. It was all in Arabic. I speak Arabic, but

my Libyan Arabic is not so great. It's a different accent. So I

questioned him several times, and he would say: He's at a hospital.

He's outside. He's at a friend's. It, frankly, didn't make sense.

And I don't think it was all just the linguistic issue, which is why

I thought, well, this -- you know, I'm concerned about Chris being a

friend of mine, but this is really an issue for the State Department,

not for the U.N., which is why I used the ops center to call Beth Jones.

Q Okay. And, again, you recognized it as a Libyan number,

but you did not recognize the incoming number?

A No.

Q Okay. But it came to your personal cell phone?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you, within the U.N., take any actions? For

example, did you have any U.N. officials or personnel in Benghazi,

Libya, at the time?

A I'm not sure I understand why this is relevant. But

certainly, we had -- you know, we had staff in -- U.N. staff in Libya.

And as would happen anywhere around the world, we had a -- you know,

we had a security assessment meeting to decide what sorts of actions,

if any, needed to be taken by the U.N. staff.

I, frankly, don't remember what we decided. We probably decided,

you know, to hunker down and not move off of our -- out of our offices

until there was more clarity. But I, frankly, don't remember. But,

yes, we did meet to talk about what our own security posture should

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be afterwards.

Q You've described for us phone calls with Liz Dibble and Beth

Jones and calls to the ops center. Did you have communications with

any other U.S. Government personnel regarding the Benghazi attacks

that night, such as anyone from the National Security staff, anybody

from the agency or DOD, any other U.S. Government personnel?

A No one like that, no one from the agency, no one from the

NSC, no one from DOD, not even from U.S. Mission of the U.N. I do

remember, and I maybe remember incorrectly, because it may have been

the following day, but I do remember having phone calls with Liz Dibble

but not official, just sort of like: This is terrible. You know, we

feel awful.

Liz is a friend. Liz is a friend of Chris. I'm a friend of Chris.

And so I had conversations with Liz about just how horrible this was,

but I don't remember if they were that night or the following day. They

were probably the following day because it wasn't clear to me until

the following morning what had happened.

Q Okay. And when you had those subsequent phone calls with

Liz Dibble, did she provide to you anymore clarity on what she

understood had happened?

A No. It was all solidarity calls with a close friend was

what it was.

Q Okay. So nothing about the nature of the attack --

A No.

Q -- how quickly it was, who they thought were the

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14

perpetrators of the attack?

A No, we were talking about things like what do we say to

Chris' family, you know, those sorts of things. We were talking about

things that friends were talking about. We weren't talking about

things that were official.

Q Okay. Do you recall if during any of these conversations

you learned about the subsequent attack at the CIA Annex?

A I don't know when I learned about the subsequent attack.

It may have been the news reportings the following day. I don't

remember.

Q Okay. You don't recall -- you recall not getting any calls

regarding --

A I got no calls regarding the attack.

Q Were you aware of the demonstration earlier in the day in

Cairo?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And how did you learn of that?

A Through the news.

Q Okay. At any time, did you have any conversations with

anyone regarding comparing and contrasting what happened in Cairo

versus what happened in Benghazi?

A No.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. You mean someone from the U.S. Government?

Ms. Jackson. Anyone.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Well, I'm sorry. And I say that only

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15

because at some point, my understanding was that you weren't going to

go into like internal U.N. deliberations, seeing as he's not a member

of the U.S. Government, and we're not asking the U.N.

Mr. Snyder. Also we haven't had a chance to talk to counsel at

U.N. because we weren't aware that he'd be talking about U.N. business.

It could be dicey for the witness and his current employment having

not, you know, sorted that through. So if you want to ask about

conversations -- and, by the way, there probably aren't any with U.N.

officials -- but if you want to ask about conversations with U.S.

personnel, that would be fair game. Otherwise, we're going to have

to break and go and just make sure that he's not running afoul of some

U.N. issue.

Ms. Jackson. Well, why don't we just ask the foundational

questions of did you have any, who were they with, and then we can make

the assessment.

Mr. Feltman. I really am not going to talk about any U.N. job

here, and this is already very awkward for me in terms of my U.N.

employment to be doing this. And I really do not want to speak about

the conversations I had in the U.N. I did not talk about this with

any U.S. Government official.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Fine.

Mr. Snyder. That's good.

Ms. Jackson. Just want to close the loop.

Mr. Snyder. Thank you.

BY MS. JACKSON:

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Q Did you have any conversations with Susan Rice regarding

the attacks?

A The following day, I went -- on September 12, there was a

Security Council session, I believe it was on the Middle East. I think

it was, you know, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where I had to brief

the Council. This was a public, you know, open -- they call it open

briefing in the Chamber, which means it's televised and all that. And

before that meeting started, Susan Rice came up to me and just gave

me a big hug and said, I'm sorry.

Q Okay. And did you brief on the Benghazi attack?

A I made a reference to it at the beginning.

Q So no briefing as to --

A No briefing. The Security Council did not ask me to brief

on Benghazi, but given the news, I thought it was important to

acknowledge that it had happened at the beginning of this briefing.

So I acknowledged it happened and then went on.

Q Did anyone brief on the Benghazi attack --

A No.

Q -- during that meeting? Okay.

Did you have any subsequent conversations with Ambassador Rice

regarding her appearing on the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q So you were not a part of any prep sessions with her or

consulted in any way regarding what she might say on those shows?

A No.

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Q Okay. Ambassador Feltman, I want to move back in time to

early 2011, when the Arab Spring occurred and the Embassy in Tripoli

had closed and there was a decision made to send in Chris Stevens as

the special representative or envoy. So I want to go back in time to

that.

What can you tell us about how the decision was made to send

someone -- that turned out to be Chris Stevens -- into Benghazi in the

spring of 2011?

A I think it's worth keeping in context the fact that the

U.S. Government's policy toward the uprising in Libya evolved over the

course -- very quickly evolved but evolved because of the changing

situation on the ground. As soon as Qadhafi very early on, in

mid-February, started cracking down with extreme violence against the

demonstrations, the U.S. position initially was to try to, you know,

pressure Qadhafi to stop that.

Qadhafi was impervious to pressure from any corridor to stop

cracking down on the demonstrations with violence. He was killing the

people who were protesting for, you know, for liberty. It quickly

evolved into trying to persuade Qadhafi it was time to step down. And

it was in that context that the U.S. started engaging with the

representatives of the uprising, you know, that later became known as

the Transitional National Council.

You know, Benghazi had been long neglected by Qadhafi, in fact,

oppressed by Qadhafi. It was a symbol to Qadhafi of the previous

regime. The Libyan monarchy had its roots in the east. And so

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18

Benghazi was basically ripe for this type of uprising, given the decades

of repression under Qadhafi that suffered, even compared to the rest

of Libya.

But in this attempt to try to convince Qadhafi that it was time

to leave, that it was better for him, for his family, for his country

to leave, you wanted to show the inevitability that he was going to

go anyway. So part of that was to increase the representation,

increase the engagement with the Transitional National Council as part

of the leverage against Qadhafi, to show Qadhafi it's time for you to

exit stage right.

And it was also important to show the people of Libya who were

courageously standing up to this terrible violence that the U.S. was

trying to be supportive of what their struggle stood for, you know,

human rights, you know, freedom and all that. So it was in that context

the decision was made to, first, start engaging more directly with the

TNC -- and Hillary Clinton met with TNC officials on her travels in

Europe -- and to send a representative to Benghazi.

Q Prior to her meetings with these people, can you describe

for us the interagency process that occurred, if there was one? Or

was this solely a State Department-driven initiative, or were there

other players that were participating in the decision to intervene in

Libya?

A You know, there were so many interagency discussions at the

time. Remember, the entire region, the entire region was in turmoil,

you know, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, the Syria revolution was starting,

568
19

Bahrain. The entire region was in some kind of turmoil. So we're

constantly having interagency meetings and interagency discussions.

What the interagency discussion was in February, in March of 2011 about

Libya per se, I simply don't remember.

Q Okay. Was the National Security staff involved?

A It's hard for me to imagine they weren't involved, but I

can't remember specific meetings that we may have had about this.

Q Okay. Were there conversations between the State

Department and the CIA about going into Libya?

A I did not have any conversation with the CIA about going

into Libya, but that doesn't mean that others didn't.

Q Were you aware of any other discussions, even though you

may not have personally participated in them?

A You know, a lot of this is -- was sort of the natural way

of doing business between the various agencies. So, I mean, I don't

remember specifically the conversations we may have had, and in terms

of more details, probably we should talk about in the other setting.

Q Okay. Let me ask if you can answer this, and if not, we'll

reserve it for the other setting:

Mr. Snyder. I would think that would definitely be for another

setting.

Mr. Feltman. I can't talk about that.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. We'll go into another setting on that.

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20

What was the Department of Defense participation in Libya in

February, March 2011, if they had any?

A I don't remember the February, March period having an active

DOD presence. Perhaps documentation that you've reviewed more recent

than I have would show that they have, but I don't remember.

Q Do you recall at this point when the NATO airstrikes

occurred?

A Well, they couldn't occur before mid-March because

mid-March was the adoption of Resolution 1973 by the Security Council.

And so the NATO -- the French had the first strikes just after the

Security Council resolution was passed, so the NATO airstrikes would

have begun soon after that March 20 resolution was adopted.

Q --

A

Q

Ms. Betz. We'll go into the other setting.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Actually, this part has been a little unclear. Who

actually appointed Chris Stevens to go into Benghazi? Was it a

Presidential appointment, or was it an appointment by the Secretary

of State?

A I believe it was by the Secretary of State.

Q Okay. Is there a difference between a special envoy and

a special representative in --

A You'll have to ask the lawyers. I don't know.

570
21

Q Okay. So -- all right. Did you know him to be the Special

Envoy or Special Representative, or were those terms used

interchangeably?

A I don't remember. I truly don't remember. And I'm not

sure what difference there is, but lawyers maybe know. He was not

accredited to the Transitional National Council. We didn't break our

diplomatic relations at this point. He was not accredited.

So -- because it was not a recognized government. But he was sort

of -- he was sort of a liaison presence.

Q And for those of us who come from outside the State

Department, can you elaborate on the significance of that, of what

accreditation means, not breaking diplomatic relations? Help us

understand that.

A Accreditation is the process by which a head of state will

appoint his or her representative to a foreign court or foreign country.

That person is usually known as an ambassador. The recipient

country -- recipient monarch or head of state -- has to provide

concurrence with the choice of the sending country.

So there's a diplomatic process by which -- in this country, of

course, it includes a Senate confirmation as an additional element.

But a head of state will send a letter of accreditation -- send a request

for agrement, it's called, to a foreign country.

The foreign country will, in most cases, in an overwhelming

majority of cases send a letter accepting the agrement, providing

agrement, in which case the ambassador then goes with letters of

571
22

accreditation to that country from the head of state. That's a typical

appointment of an ambassador. The practice is followed globally with

variations, depending on local circumstances, such as the Senate

confirmation process in the United States.

The Transitional National Council was not a government at that

time. So there was -- it would have been inappropriate for the United

States to send a request for agrement to Benghazi or for Chris Stevens

to be carrying letters of accreditation, nor, of course, was he at that

point confirmed.

But the TNC had asked in the meetings with Hillary Clinton for

representation to be able to work directly on a continuing basis with

the U.S. Government, which is why a decision was made to send a

representative to Benghazi.

Q Okay. And it's our understanding from a review of the

records that there were some meetings in early to mid-March in Paris

that Chris Stevens attended with the Secretary and Ambassador Cretz.

First of all, were you present at those meetings?

A No.

Q Okay. Were you involved in coordination of those meetings,

such as getting Chris Stevens there or preparing information for use

in those meetings?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would you describe what you did.

A Well, I, you know -- it was a variety of things. First,

whenever the Secretary of State travels and is going to have meetings

572
23

on issues in a particular bureau's area of expertise, that bureau is

responsible for doing the preparatory work in terms of the paperwork,

you know, the talking points, the briefing papers.

Now, did I, myself, write those briefings papers? Of course not.

I have staff that did that. But on a subject as important as Libya,

I would pay particular attention to what was said, so I may have edited

the papers that were prepared for her as they came to my office for

approval. I don't remember exactly. But that would be typical when

she was going to have meetings in Libya, in Paris, I would be signing

off on the paperwork that was in preparation for her.

I also would be the one proposing to her staff: Hey, it's a good

idea to have Chris Stevens there too since the decision has been made

to send him, so let's include Chris Stevens in the meetings.

So those are the sorts of things I would be involved in.

But I intentionally did not travel because, again, the entire

region was in an uproar. And for me to be going with the Secretary

when she already had Gene Cretz, who was the Ambassador to Libya, and

she was having Chris Stevens go, it would have been too many resources

on one issue when we also had to worry about Yemen and Bahrain and Egypt

and Tunisia and Syria.

Q Okay. If you could help us understand the decision to pick

Chris Stevens -- because we did have Ambassador Cretz who was back in

the U.S.; there was who was the deputy chief of

mission -- I mean, was there a reason not to pick someone who had been

evacuated from Tripoli? Was there a reason to pick someone who had

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not been currently assigned to Libya to go in and meet with TNC?

A Chris was perfect for this position. Chris had the Arabic

skills. He had the Libya exposure. He was a new face for a new

situation in Libya. He had the people skills. He was exactly the

right person. Gene Cretz and are extremely competent,

good professionals who played a very, very important role, before,

during, and after the uprising. But Chris Stevens was the right person

at the right time for that job.

Q Did Chris Stevens, in his expedition, have any type of

official status when they went into Libya?

A If you're asking, "did he have such things like a Libyan

entry visa," no, that would have been asking the Qadhafi Government

to give him a visa, which would have been quite odd, and we didn't want

to give Qadhafi a veto over how we were going to deal with the TNC.

But he certainly had the official backing of the, you know, of the

U.S. Government so he went in officially to manage our relationship

on a day-to-day basis with the TNC.

Ms. Betz. Well, and let me clarify because I think you hit

something that is of interest to the committee, is that you clarified

that we never broke official status with the official Libyan

Government, but yet there's sort of a parallel track, if you will, of

Stevens going in. And so that's -- you know, understanding the

resources that went into that, any interaction, you know, with an

official status, just understanding the background of sending him in

in sort of this unofficial status is helpful for us.

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25

Mr. Feltman. Again, the overall goal was to try to limit the need

for a military solution, to focus on a political solution, and convince

Qadhafi that his time was over. So you close down the Embassy in

Tripoli -- of course, we closed it down earlier for security

reasons -- but you have no representation in Tripoli, but suddenly you

have somebody in Benghazi.

You know, psychologically, did this have an impact on Qadhafi's

thinking to realize that the U.K., the U.S., France, Italy, whole lists

of countries no longer had representation in Tripoli, but they had

representation in Benghazi.

Now, the TNC, as I said, wasn't a government at the time. You

know, there's certain attributes that a government has that we didn't

think they had achieved those attributes yet. They very much wanted

to be recognized as the legitimate government of Libya, and I'm not

sure that any country actually recognized them within that period as

legitimate government. I don't think they did. But it was important

to show who -- which Libyans did the U.S. think were appropriate

interlocutors at the time.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Now, you've just described -- I'm going to use "process"

for lack of the appropriate word that I'm struggling to find right

now -- of the United States Government and other governments, other

foreign governments going into Benghazi to show Qadhafi that he should

leave power and to avoid military intervention. We've seen other

documents where you describe what was going on as the Libya experiment.

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Is that what you meant by the term "Libya experiment," that the

U.S. Government and other foreign countries were going into Benghazi

as a show of support to the rebels to avoid having military

intervention? Or does the term "Libya experiment" mean something

else?

A Well, first of all, if I said "to avoid military

intervention," I misspoke. We were hoping to limit or shorten military

intervention. Military intervention had already started.

Qadhafi started -- Qadhafi is the one who started using the

military in the first place, but then after the Security Council

resolution there were the civilian protection mandates being acted upon

by NATO countries. So we were hoping to be able to hasten the

transition away from Qadhafi and therefore limit the military use. It

wasn't a question of avoiding military at that point.

I'm not sure what I meant by -- I don't remember using that term,

but I'm sure you have documentation that shows I did. I don't know

what I meant. But there were very strong U.S. interests in Libya, but

I wouldn't say that they went so far as to be the sort of state-building

interests that term may suggest in hindsight.

You know, securing Libya's chemical weapons stocks and the

precursors to chemical weapons was a key U.S. interest. Trying to

limit the outflow or use of the MANPADs stocks was a key U.S. interest.

U.S. had long-term commercial interests in Libya. We had human rights

accountability interests in Libya. But there were others who had

stronger interests in Libya, you know, European countries. And so I'm

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not sure what I meant in hindsight about using the term "Libya

experiment."

Mr. Snyder. If you used it. Like, I don't know if there's a

document you want to show him. I don't have anything in front of us

now.

Mr. Feltman. I simply don't remember. That wasn't something

that I would have used so frequently that it sticks in my mind, if I

used it at all.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And that's helpful to us too, that it's not a term that you

recall at this time.

A No.

Q Can you describe for us, during the time of deciding to send

Chris Stevens in and when he first went into Benghazi, how the reporting

structure within the State Department occurred? How did -- I mean,

Stevens would report into the State Department. How would that

information flow? How would the information get to you? What would

you do with the information?

A Before he went?

Q Well, during the March, April timeframe because as we

understand it, he was -- it took a couple of weeks for him to get into

Benghazi because of conditions on the ground, because of weather,

because of the ferry. But he was either in Crete or Malta or someplace

waiting to go in.

A Yeah, this was all -- but this whole -- this was all a very

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quick evolution. You know, the Libyan uprising starts in

mid-February. The Security Council passes the resolution in mid-March

to the start of the NATO strikes. By early April, Chris is there. You

know, it's actually a fairly quick timeline.

And I don't remember -- I remember having discussions about how

we were going to get Chris in there. There was some reluctance on DOD's

part because of, you know, not wanting to have boots on the ground,

so we had to look at various options. But I don't remember it being

a terribly long period.

I do know that at some point -- and I don't remember when -- we

started a 7 a.m. phone call with Chris Stevens. It may have been after

he got to Benghazi, but it may have started before. I don't remember.

And it was in that 7 a.m. phone call, 7 a.m. Washington time, phone

call with Chris Stevens was extremely important because it was able

to allow us to convey the information he was getting on the ground to

the principals at the State Department and beyond at their morning

meetings.

I didn't participate in those 7 a.m. phone calls. My staff did.

But I was briefed at 8 o'clock every morning at what had transcribed

on those phone calls that was of significance that I should know, so

that I could then go to the meetings with Secretary Clinton that took

place afterwards and make sure that she knew.

So there was a communication, a regular communication in addition

to whatever was sent by email, in addition to whether cables came later,

but in addition to whatever was a written product and in addition to

578
29

my own phone calls with Chris. We wanted to make sure that every day

that we touched base with him.

Q Okay. And then would you describe for us your -- did you

have daily meetings with the principals of the State Department? Were

they weekly meetings? How often would you brief senior officials

within the State Department?

A I saw the Secretary of State in the formal meetings she had

with her senior staff three times a week. And in those

three-times-a-week meetings, she would often say to somebody, you know,

stop by my office, you know, let's keep talking afterwards. And often

that person was me because, again, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain,

Syria, Libya. So when she's asking someone to stay after to talk about

something after those formal meetings, it was likely me.

But far beyond that, we had constant meetings on various issues

dealing with what we call shorthand Arab Spring. And she may call a

meeting -- she may have called a meeting on, say, Egypt. But in that

meeting on Egypt, if there was something that she needed to know, wanted

to know, or I wanted to tell her on Libya, that would come up too.

So it's very hard for me to characterize how often I would have

seen her because I saw her on so many different subjects dealing with

the Arab Spring at that period and that it's hard to specify how many

times Libya might have come up versus any of these other issues we were

working on.

Q Okay. And given the nature of events that were occurring

and that things evolved, did those meetings also evolve and decrease

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in frequency, intensity over time, throughout 2011?

A I don't remember any let-up in the sort of feeling of

intention and focus until my retirement. I mean, it was -- I felt like

I was -- from the time the Tunisian uprising began in December of 2010

until my retirement in May of 2012, I felt like it was just a marathon

the whole time.

Q So taking a step outside of coordination within the State

Department, were there interagency meetings ongoing from the

time -- from the U.N. resolution, and let's just go through the first

3-month time period, so the rest of March, April, May, and into June

during that time. Were there regular, recurring interagency meetings

that you attended or that you that you were aware of others within the

State Department attended?

A There were constant interagency meetings.

Q And let me be specific, regarding Libya.

A On all of these topics. And they occurred at different

levels. There were interagency task forces -- I'm not sure what -- I

forget -- I'm using U.N. terminology because I've forgotten my U.S.

terminology. But they were principal's committee meetings on Libya

as well as other topics. There were deputy's committee meetings as

well as other topics. There were meetings at my level. There were

meetings at my staff level. The meeting schedule was pretty brutal

on Libya as well as other subjects.

Q Okay. And with regard to Libya, who were the other

interagency partners that were participating in these meetings? Just

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the agencies, not specifically what would have been said.

A They were what you would expect for a foreign policy

security issue. You know, DOD was there. The agency was there. You

know, NSC, State, those were there for all of them. And then you would

have others, depending on what the issues would be. You would have

representatives of various counterterrorism organs being there.

But it would depend on what the -- you know, there was an agenda

for meetings that was established and depending on what the agenda was.

But I can't think of a single meeting that wouldn't have included State,

DOD, agency, NSC.

Q Okay. And who were your counterparts within those

other -- the other members of the interagency? Who did you primarily

deal with from the national Security Council and from the agency, from

DOD, from --

A You know, I would deal with whoever I needed to deal with.

I would deal a lot with Denis McDonough on these issues. You know,

I would call my counterparts at DOD. I mean, there were constant

contacts and conversations among all of us working on these issues.

Q Okay. So you didn't have a primary point of contact in each

of these agencies?

A No, I would call who I needed to call. I was able to get

through to whoever I needed to get through to. I mean, obviously I

wasn't calling Secretaries, but below that level.

Q For example, did you work with Ben Fishman at the National

Security staff?

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A Ben Fishman would work with my staff.

Q So he would be a level below yours?

A Ben Fishman would work with my staff. He traveled with me

once to Benghazi in August 2011, but Ben Fishman worked with my staff.

Q Okay. And who on your staff would he primarily work with?

A I'm guessing the people who worked in the Office of Maghreb

Affairs is who I remembered; you know, , ,

, you know, those people.

Q Can you --

A And he would attend, you know, many of these meetings, but

if there was a meeting at my level or higher he would be along the wall.

Q And all of those names just triggered something. Can you

describe how NEA was structured and who within NEA was working on Libya

issues during this time of, say, the first half of 2011 or throughout

2011 if it was constant?

A We had an Office of Maghreb Affairs that was headed by

, I believe, to that whole period. I may not have the chronology

exact, who had a deputy and who had desk officers. And, you know, the

desk officers for, you know, say Morocco would help out with Libya

because Libya was obviously at that point a much higher priority.

But we also had the added benefit of officers from Embassy

Tripoli. Embassy Tripoli had been evacuated. And so for part of 2011,

we had sort of a surge capacity provided by the talent from Embassy

Tripoli. It was back in Washington.

At the beginning of all of this, in fact, throughout the spring

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and the summer, the Office of Maghreb Affairs reported up to Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State , who also covered the Arab

Gulf. This was traditionally NEA's organization because the Arab Gulf

and North Africa had traditionally been quiet. And so while they're

geographically removed, they're different from other parts of NEA,

which were always in some sort of chaos -- the other parts of the NEA

world, not NEA the bureau, but NEA the countries.

Q You mean, NEA was not in chaos?

A 2011 you could've asked me that question.

But, you know, you often had -- you know, you had things in Syria,

Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Egypt that would require a lot of

attention, so you had different structures. But the Arab Gulf, you

know, the six GCC countries, North Africa tended to be quiet. So they

reported to one DAS. This became untenable. You had the Arab Gulf

in uprisings, in Bahrain in the counterreactions of Bahrain, you had

very serious problems in Yemen, and you had Tunisia and Libya. You

couldn't have one DAS doing all this.

So sometime, I believe it was in the fall, we were able to get

approval for another DAS position, just so that we could split those

two portfolios and have one DAS concentrate on the Arab Gulf, one DAS

concentrate on North Africa, and then that DAS, of course, would report

to the PDAS, report to me.

Q When Libya was erupting and was the hot spot, did you

designate a particular person to focus more -- from your senior staff,

from your front office -- on Libya? For example, we see a lot of

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interaction with Liz Dibble who was your principal.

A Well, but Liz Dibble didn't come on board until that fall.

Ron Schlicher was still PDAS at the time the Libyan uprising began,

if I remember correctly. Isn't that right? I think that Liz

Dibble -- let me think. When did we move from Ron Schlicher to Liz

Dibble? I believe that Liz Dibble did not begin work until, for me,

until September 2011, and Ron Schlicher was the PDAS when all this

began.

And Ron and I basically had -- we never formalized a division of

labor on these crisis points, but Ron had served in Egypt and had very

close ties with Egypt. So when we needed to have a particular focus

on Egypt, for example, Ron was better equipped -- having local

knowledge -- than I was. If there was something with Syria, given my

time in Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon, I could focus on that. So we

didn't have a formal division of labor, but we tended, given the need

to manage all these crises at once, to look at where the comparative

advantage was for each of us to work.

Q And that makes perfect sense. Did you have this unofficial

division of labor with respect to Libya? Because, obviously, we're

interested in talking with the people who were focused on Libya.

A As I recall, Ron worked a lot on the management issues

regarding Libya: You know, how do we get Chris Stevens into Benghazi?

What sort of -- what do we need to be asking for in terms of

infrastructure support for Libya? And I worked more on the policy:

How are we engaging with the TNC? What should we in NEA propose as

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the U.S. priorities in those interactions? That sort of thing.

So that was more of a traditional role where the PDAS is working

on the management of the bureau and management of the post, and the

Assistant Secretary is working on the broader policy issues.

Q And did that sort of division continue when there was the

handoff to Liz Dibble as your PDAS?

A Yes.

Q I have about a little over 10 minutes left.

How many times did you travel to Libya after Embassy Tripoli

closed at the end of February of 2011? You talked about a trip in

August of 2011 that you took with Ben Fishman. Had you been in Libya

before that when -- and, in particular, to Benghazi to meet up with

Envoy Stevens?

A I believe I was in Libya five times in 2011. I went to

Benghazi in May of 2011. I went to Benghazi again in August of 2011.

I went to Tripoli in September of 2011. I accompanied Secretary

Clinton to Tripoli in October of 2011. I accompanied U.S. Permanent

Representative to the United Nations Susan Rice to Tripoli in

November 2011. So I believe I was in Libya five times in 2011.

Q Did Ambassador Rice also go to Benghazi in November?

A Oh, yes. Yes. Yes, you're correct. She went to Benghazi

in 2011.

Q Did she go to both Tripoli and Benghazi or just one or the

other? We understand it has been a while, and you do a lot of travel.

A She went to both.

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Q Both. In your trip to Benghazi in May, in late May of 2011,

can you -- did you go -- you went just to Benghazi at that time. Is

that correct?

A Yes.

Q In Libya. And met up with Chris Stevens?

A No. Chris Stevens was on a much deserved R&R at the time,

and I was there when was heading up the small office

we had.

Q She was the acting envoy at the time?

A Acting whatever the title was, yes.

Q She went in to relieve Chris Stevens at the time?

A Yes.

Q And what was the purpose of your visit?

A To basically reinforce the engagement that we had with the

TNC to make some policy points to the TNC in a way that can reinforce

what the local reps are doing. This is, again, part of diplomatic

practice. You know, if one of the local representative is always

saying to one's contacts, we suggest, you know, this or that or the

other or we would like to see this, that, or the other, it always helps

to have headquarters reinforce that point, you know, whether it's by

visits, by phone calls, or whatever.

So I was there to basically reinforce the policy points with the

TNC and, again, as part of this effort to show Qadhafi that people

weren't dealing with him anymore.

I also had the occasion to meet with a broad range of civil society

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37

representatives when I was there to show that the U.S. wanted to hear

from, engage with, a broad spectrum of Libyans, that it wasn't simply

that we were dealing with the head of the TNC, that we were trying to

understand the broader Libyan context.

Q And when you say "civil society," I just want to make sure

that I understand what you're talking about. Are you talking

universities and educators, healthcare professionals? What is within

your definition of "civil society"?

A In this case, we met with students. We met with women's

groups. We went to a hospital to meet with medical professionals. We

met with human rights activists. Benghazi had been, you know,

essentially closed for decades because of Qadhafi's repression, and

this was an important way to show sort of a reopening of the world with

a city that traditionally had been an internationally open city.

Q Either prior to this trip or during this trip, were there

discussions about how long to have the Benghazi expedition or the

Stevens expedition continue in Benghazi?

I guess, let's take a step back first. What was the initial plan

when he went in? Was he to be there for a day, a week, 30 days,

6 months, or was it more fluid than that?

A It was more fluid than that, but it was certainly the idea

was to be there more than a day or a week. The idea was to be there

for long enough that we would have the type of insights into TNC thinking

that you can't get from a single meeting, that we would have the type

of access to other decisionmakers in the TNC that you can't have when

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you only are meeting with one or two persons.

We needed somebody who could better understand what was

happening, what was motivating the leadership of the TNC, what were

they thinking. So the idea was not that this would necessarily be years

and years and years but certainly more than a few weeks.

Q Okay. And then when you -- either prior to your trip or

during your trip in May of 2011, were there discussions about

continuing the presence in Benghazi for an indefinite period of time,

maybe not years but at least the foreseeable future?

A Yes, there were. And the discussions were, what's the

appropriate -- when I was there, part of our discussions were, what's

the appropriate platform for maintaining a presence for that period

in Benghazi?

Q And by "platform," do you mean number of personnel?

A Number of personnel, communications, location. You know,

at the time we were in a hotel --

Q The Tibesti Hotel?

A The Tibesti Hotel. And so the discussion had already

started about what were the alternatives to being in a place like that.

Q Okay. And had there been some review of compounds and

villas at that time?

A Yes, it had started, and it was very difficult because there

were not that many places available or appropriate.

Q Okay.

A And we were, frankly, in competition with the British, the

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39

French, the Italians, everybody else.

Q Everybody always wanted the best place.

A Yeah.

Q For the least amount of money.

Had there been similar discussions back at Main State regarding

a continued presence in Benghazi prior to your going to the May trip?

A I'm sure there were, but I don't remember.

Q Okay. And do you recall approximately when it was that the

decision was made to have a longer-term presence in Benghazi? Was it

before your trip, during your trip in May, shortly after your trip,

or some other period of time?

A I don't remember.

Q Was it certainly before you had your August trip?

A During the August trip, Chris and I talked about, frankly,

our shared view that we needed to maintain a longer presence in Benghazi

than the fall of Tripoli might otherwise suggest. I was in Benghazi

when the battle for Tripoli began, and it was clear that this time,

it was inevitable that Qadhafi was leaving Tripoli even though he

wasn't, of course, found and killed until later.

And so Chris and I did talk in that August trip about the fact

that both of us believed that we needed to maintain some kind of presence

in Benghazi for the foreseeable future. We didn't talk about how long,

but given the history of Libya, given the history of the revolution,

given the need for Benghazi to remain supportive of whatever government

took form in Tripoli, we thought it was politically extremely important

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40

that we maintain some kind of presence in Benghazi beyond the fall of

Tripoli.

Q In the course of those discussions, were there any

benchmarks that you discussed that we need to be in Benghazi until this

happens, or we need to be in Benghazi until the following three things

happen, such as, you know, government being reestablished in Tripoli

or, you know, Qadhafi completely out of power?

A We were thinking beyond those. We were thinking things

like the elections that were to be scheduled, and in August 2011, we

didn't know when there would be elections. We knew eventually the TNC

or its successor would have to have some kind of elections to provide

legitimacy to the governing structures, and we thought that it was

important to maintain some kind of presence in Benghazi through

whatever the electoral calendar was, passed the initial elections, and

perhaps a little bit beyond to see things. So we were talking about

things like that.

Q And were there other factors in addition to or apart from

the elections that were important benchmarks to meet?

A Part of this was the historic realities of Libya. Libya

emerged as an independent country in 1951 through a U.N. resolution,

oddly enough. It's one of the few countries created by a U.N.

resolution. And it was created out of three separate parts, you know,

one part in the south, Fezzan, and then the part in the east, Cyrenaica,

and then Tripoli in the area in the west. And the east and the west

remain rivals.

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41

I mentioned Qadhafi repressing Benghazi for decades. And Libya,

if it's going to hang together as a unified state -- and we all hope

it will regain that unified state approach -- it's going to have

to -- Libya is going to have to transcend this division. And we thought

it was important to maintain a presence to help show the people of

Benghazi they were not reverting back to their neglected, oppressed

state of being under Qadhafi.

So there was -- part of this was just historic reality of how

you -- what you need to do to help keep Libya together as a unified

state post-Qadhafi.

Ms. Jackson. Well, I see I have about 2 minutes left, and before

I go to another topic, I think I will just stop.

Ms. Betz. Can I just ask one followup question?

Ms. Jackson. Oh, yes, Kim.

Ms. Betz. So, to that point, why not make the mission official?

Mr. Feltman. Because we knew we would never get the resources

from Congress that we needed to make it official. This is a time of

diplomatic retrenchment globally. We do not get the security

resources or the diplomatic resources or the positions from Congress

that we need.

So what we were trying to -- what Chris and I were trying to figure

out was, how could we make a compelling enough argument that in the

zero-sum game that we have in terms of our budget and our resources,

that we could find enough resources to keep Benghazi operating through

the critical transition period?

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We didn't think we had any hope of keeping it there permanently

because we would never get the type of budget support out of Congress

we would need. This is a time when the U.S. reduces diplomatic

presences, doesn't expand them.

Ms. Jackson. With that, we'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

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BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Let's go back on the record. I'll just reintroduce myself.

My name is Susanne Sachsman Grooms. I'm the Staff Director on the

Democratic side of the Select Committee. And again I want to thank

you for being here today. I think we have an incredibly distinguished

diplomat in front of us, so we will try not to embarrass ourselves with

our knowledge of the Mideast.

So I just want to start by covering a couple things that went over

in the last round just briefly to clarify a couple different points.

One of the things that you were talking about was a series of lots and

lots of constant communications, interagency meetings, discussions

with the Secretary, discussions within the Department, and with

external interagency, in the 2011 time period about the Arab Spring

for lack of a better term. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. It sounds like your memory doesn't particularly

distinguish between specific discussions about Libya during that time

period versus, you know, generalized lots of discussions about all of

these different topics where Libya would have been included when

relevant. Is that accurate?

A Yes, to an extent. It's hard to describe how different it

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was working in NEA in, say, February 2011, versus February 2010. At

the time in February 2010, I wouldn't have thought of NEA as being a

quiet area of the world, but in comparison to what hit us in February

of 2011, February 2010 was quiet. And it wasn't just NEA. It was the

entire U.S. Government was focused on what was happening in all of these

different countries. Everything was unfolding at once and going in

different directions.

The way that Yemen was evolving was certainly different than the

way that Tunisia was evolving, from Egypt involving, Syria, Libya, et

cetera. So often meetings would go from one topic to the other. Now

not necessarily at the NSC. The NSC would call my meetings on various

subjects, and you would stick to the agenda at the NSC.

But if I had a meeting with Hillary Clinton, as I said earlier

on Egypt, but I needed her to know something about Libya, the discussion

would easily evolve into a Libya discussion because that was my target

of opportunity because she was right in front of me, and I could tell

her something she needed to know about Libya. Or she could take the

opportunity to raise something she wanted to tell me on Libya. So while

the NSC meetings would be distinct based on agendas, often our

discussions at the State Department were more free form, looking at

this entire region.

Q And when you speak about it becoming sort of a marathon of

a job and a marathon throughout the region until the time period when

you retired, you're talking about the whole region?

A Yes. We joked to ourselves that NEA stood for never, ever

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45

again will I bid on this job.

Q And as part of the evolution, you were talking a little bit

about how the NEA Bureau itself had to establish a new Deputy Assistant

Secretary spot. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Is that the spot that Ray Maxwell ended up taking?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what did his DAS spot entail?

A The DASes in NEA were responsible for geographic subsets

of the region and/or functional areas, and his area was North Africa.

Q So that included Libya?

A That included Libya.

Q Okay. I think he, and I don't know if you've sort of seen

this before, but he came before a previous committee to Congress and

alleged that he had been sort of excluded from, and not involved in,

Libya matters. From your point of view at the time you were there,

was he still a reporting structure for Libya matters?

A He was still the reporting structure for Libya matters, and

he cared particularly about the staff who worked for him sort of in

the office of North African affairs. He was an advocate for making

sure that I understood the pressures they were under in terms of

producing papers, policy recommendations, et cetera. So he often

engaged with me on basically protecting our own staff from the workload.

Q You also talked in the previous round about some issues or

concerns that you had with obtaining congressional support for staying

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46

or setting up the post in Benghazi. At the time, and this would then

be in spring of 2011, there was bipartisan support for intervention

in Libya. Right?

A Yes.

Q And so was the concern more a financial one?

A Yes, but it wasn't a concern about the short term. We knew

we had support for engagement with the TNC. What this was, was

the -- let me start over. When we started to look at the U.S. presence

in Libya, what it would be like after the fall of Tripoli -- this was

when Chris Stevens and I were talking about this in August of 2011 -- our

working presumption was, it's impossible to open a new permanent

diplomatic presence in Benghazi because of the budget realities.

I'm not sure the State Department has ever gotten its full

requests funded by the U.S. Congress, so given the fact that it would

be untenable for us -- we would look out to lunch. We would look as

though we didn't understand the reality for us to propose having a

permanent presence here -- what do we really need now to help get

through the transition? That was the context. It wasn't complaining

one way or the other. It was just accepting certain realities of how

the State Department has to do business given the fiscal climate in

the United States right now.

Q And I think you talked previously about the importance of

going into Benghazi and the importance of engaging with the TNC to

ensure that there would be a unified government. Can you explain what

the importance of having a unified Libyan Democratic Government would

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be to the United States Government in terms of counterterrorism, and

chemical weapons, and MANPADs, and those sorts of things?

A If you permit me, I will go back a little bit historically.

You know, there were decades when the U.S. did not have a diplomatic

presence in Libya. You know, Qadhafi and his green revolution

overthrew the monarchy in 1969. In the early 1970s, the U.S. withdrew

its ambassador. By the late 1970s, U.S. Diplomatic Mission had been

closed after it had been attacked and burned.

During that period, from the time the U.S. had no diplomatic

presence, up until the settlement for the Pan Am 103 attack, you saw

many, many examples where Libyan behavior was contrary to U.S.

interests -- Pan Am 103 is the one that's most obvious -- but in terms

of what Libya did to support revolutions in Africa, what Libya did in

terms of supporting terrorist organizations. There's a whole list of

things that were of great concern to the United States.

After the settlement in 2003, and the return of U.S. diplomats

to Tripoli in 2004, the U.S. was engaging with the Qadhafi Government

to promote U.S. interests. To build on the renunciation of weapons

of mass destruction, the renunciation of terrorism in the Pan Am

settlement that Qadhafi had done, but it was never the type of collegial

relationship in which you could easily pursue U.S. interests.

So, of course, our aspiration was to see the type of government

in Tripoli that would be able to engage with the United States and others

on areas of mutual interest, and would be able to represent all of Libya,

would be able to project a unified front when it came to controlling

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counterterrorism, when it came to -- working on counterterrorism,

excuse me. When it came to the protection of the remaining chemical

weapons and things like that because there was always a risk that this

country would split apart. And many of our discussions with TNC

representatives were about that well-intentioned advice, but the need

for inclusion, the need to show in word, and act, and representation

that the TNC was capable of representing the interests of all of Libya,

not just the interests of Benghazi.

Q And just so we have a sense of this sort of immediate need,

when we went into Benghazi, especially following the fall of Qadhafi

and in that 2011 timeframe. Can you give us a sense, though, of what

the importance would be of the country not splitting apart, of having

a centralized control of the MANPADs, chemical weapons, the militia,

those sorts of things?

A Unfortunately I think we can see the risk of the country's

split when we look at Libya today. But you've asked me about 2011,

at which point the risks that we see manifested today were there but

hadn't yet come out. But, you know, look at the MANPADs. MANPADs are

a relatively easy to use weapon. They pose a risk to civil aviation.

Plus it's, I understand, relatively simple to take explosive material

out of MANPADs and use it for other purposes.

So there was a real danger, a real risk, to the smuggling of

MANPADs across Libya's long and porous borders to other countries. And

there were many concerns raised by the Egyptians about these things,

the risk of these flowing into Egypt. The Israelis were concerned

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about the explosives, the MANPADs themselves then going into Gaza

through the tunnels from the Sinai. The African countries to Libya's

south were concerned about the outflow of weapons. It was extremely

important that we had local authorities willing to work with us to

figure out how to try to control this risk. The U.S. was not going

to put boots on the ground. So we needed to have a proper authority

to be able to work with us on this. The chemical weapons were similar.

The Organization For the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW,

based in the Hague, has the responsibility for monitoring the

destruction of chemical weapons and chemical precursors when countries

sign on to the Chemical Weapons Convention, as Qadhafi did as part of

that 2003 settlement. And there was an ongoing program to destroy

Libya's chemical weapons that had been proceeding under the Qadhafi

Government, but it hadn't been completed yet, so there were still

chemical weapons and precursors at a facility called Waddan in southern

Libya, that needed protection. And we needed an authority that was

able to have the capacity, the legitimacy, to protect that. So those

are the sorts of things. Those are among the immediate concerns we

had.

Q And when you talk about the risks being, in 2011, the risks

being that Libya would become what it essentially is today, did you

and did Chris Stevens in your discussions with him, feel that engaged

diplomacy within Libya and specifically within Benghazi would help

prevent Libya from becoming the way it is essentially today?

A I don't think any of us had an exaggerated sense of what

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diplomatic efforts alone can achieve, but we certainly saw diplomatic

engagement as important tools to try to achieve these goals, not the

only tools, but the ones that were under our responsibility as State

Department foreign service officers.

Q There has been, I think, much made and probably more in the

election realm, but maybe not always in the election realm, about a

lack of a U.S. strategy to deal with the change of government in Libya

in the Arab Spring. From your perspective where you were sitting, was

there a U.S. strategy -- I mean I've seen strategy documents -- but

was there a U.S. strategy that you all were engaged in and trying to

develop and implement?

A Yes, but it even predates the Libyan uprising, or it

continues through the Libyan uprising. Because there was a policy to

pursue limited U.S. objectives in Libya that preceded Qadafi's fall.

It included some of the issues we have already talked about, which is

counterterrorism and protection of -- well, protection against

proliferation of weapons, promotion of certain commercial interests,

but it also included trying to encourage a more representative Libyan

Government. More respect for human rights that were sadly lacking

under the Qadhafi Government. So these basic policy objectives

remained throughout this period. Of course, the Libyan uprising

provided a new impetus to some of them and new opportunities and new

challenges in trying to pursue them.

Q I want to talk a little bit -- so I'll go back a little bit

to the last round where we left off because we were talking a little

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bit about, I think, late 2011 and your discussions with Chris Stevens

about extending the U.S. presence. Let me just start by talking for

a couple minutes about Chris Stevens himself. Did you consider Chris

Stevens to be an expert on Libya?

A Yes, as much as anyone is an expert on Libya.

Q From our discussions with a number of people within the

State Department and previous committees, a lot of people talked about

giving a fair amount of deference to Chris Stevens' policy views about

Libya because of his expertise. Do you agree?

A Yes. I do not like trying to second guess people who are

in the field, who are working on issues on the ground in ways that we

at headquarters can't possibly understand.

Q And so in the fall of 2011, when you would have been talking

to Chris Stevens, would you have given a lot of weight to his views

about the extension of U.S. presence in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q And you shared those views?

A Yes, largely.

Q And do you recall specifically what he -- and I understand

it's been a long time -- but what he did say were his views about why

it was important to stay at that time?

A We had sort of an on-and-off discussion about this when I

was there, particularly in August when we were there together, but we

had an on-and-off discussion about it over the phone or if we would

see each other elsewhere as well because we knew we had kind of an uphill

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climb on this.

The normal response would be once the government's in Tripoli,

we didn't have anything in Benghazi before that, then you close down

Benghazi. That would be sort of a normal response given the budget

climate, given all the other complications. And so Chris and I would

talk about did we really think this was essential. Why did we think

it was essential. And it had to do with, again, the fact that Libya

had been essentially a divided country before, where Benghazi had been

neglected, oppressed even by Qadhafi, but yet Benghazi was where this

uprising had begun. It was where the Libyan revolution had begun, so

it was important that Benghazi feel part of this process. We felt that

having a small diplomatic presence in Benghazi -- it would not be the

Embassy.

Clearly the Embassy would be accredited to the government in

Tripoli -- but that that would keep our presence as well as the presence

of others, because we were not the only ones looking at this, as well

as the presence of others, would keep Benghazi as part of the political

equation. Because if you didn't have Benghazi feeling invested in what

was happening in Tripoli, you had the risks of the country splitting

again, is what we clearly thought.

Q And were these sort of ongoing discussions sort of

throughout the fall, so you had your trip in August 2011? It looks

like you were back in Tripoli in September, October, and then November.

Were these sort of ongoing discussions with him during that time period?

A They were ongoing discussions, and of course they included

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others as well, because we needed to muster our arguments. We needed

to muster our rationale. We needed to feel confident ourselves that

this was the right thing to do before we would propose something that

was going to be, you know, financially difficult.

Q And it looks like, from the documents that we have seen,

and I think some people we've spoken to, that the actual decision didn't

get made to stay in Benghazi until December of 2011? Is that accurate?

A Yes, yes. And you're referring to the memo to Pat Kennedy.

Q Yes.

A Yes the decision was made in December, but of course there

were a lot of preliminary discussions before that memo was sent forward

to Pat Kennedy.

Q And preliminary discussions throughout the State

Department? Is that what you mean?

A Throughout the State Department, but this was also, I'm

sure, was also included in discussions at the NSC.

Q And do you recall what the NFC's views were?

A I don't recall any questions about it. I would remember

objections to this.

Q And how would that have been sort of phrased? Would that

have been sort of discussions and recommendations that started from

the field with Chris Stevens, and then were you joining with Chris

Stevens, and you would be then recommending that path forward to the

NSC?

A I mean, what I remember is that we proposed this to the State

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Department. The State Department had that responsibility. I don't

remember exactly how we discussed it with the NSC.

Q It would have been a State Department decision?

A It would have been a State Department decision.

Q And the memo was signed off by Under Secretary Kennedy.

Would it have been his decision within the State Department?

A Yes, it would have been Pat's decision, but I can't imagine

that Pat didn't also consult, inform others, including the Secretary

on something that was this significant.

Q On the issue of the large policy decision about staying in

Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Can you sort of describe the process for the memo itself,

how it gets worked?

A The memo is, you know, drafted below my level. It's

approved by me, and that's not just a nominal approval. On something

that important, I read, and thought about it, probably made edits. I

don't remember. But it's only written after there's been enough

consensus among various stakeholders in the State Department. So this

memo was only written after, you know, Diplomatic Security, other parts

of the State Department, would have been in concurrence that there was

a need to stay, so there was a lot of preliminary meetings before

somebody started typing out this memo.

Q And from what we can see, it looks like -- well, did Chris

Stevens to your knowledge have input into the memo?

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A I'm sure he did.

Q Were you aware that some of the language that's actually

in the memo appears to be sort of cut and pasted from one of Chris

Stevens' emails?

A No, I'm not aware, but I'm not surprised.

Q And you're not surprised because?

A Because Chris was on the ground. Chris would be making the

strongest arguments. Chris had a unique perspective that as smart as

we may think we are at headquarters, we lack. I'm actually happy if

my desk would be using arguments that Chris Stevens formulated because

I think he was in a better position than any of the rest of us to know.

Q Yeah. Great. So much has been made from the fact that the

memo is specific as to how many Diplomatic Security slots should be

in Benghazi and how many, you know, in the year moving forward. Do

you remember how that information got into the memo?

A It would have gotten into the memo by the discussions

between NEA and DS.

Q Now, you had talked about lots of preliminary discussions

on the policy decision of moving forward and keeping a diplomatic

presence in Benghazi throughout the Department, with the NSC.

Would the level of detail of how many particular Diplomatic

Security agents have been involved in those conversations, or is that

a decision that DS would have made and would have just sort of been

inputted into the memo?

A I don't know because by the time the memo came to me, those

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words were already there. I would not have signed this memo. Actually

I didn't sign the memo. I think I was travelling when the memo was

sent and somebody signed on my behalf. But I approved it remotely.

I wouldn't have approved this memo had DS not have cleared the memo.

This would not have been something that we would have done independent

of DS. So I assume that DS was comfortable with the numbers that were

in that memo.

Q And did you generally defer to Diplomatic Security on

diplomatic security matters?

A Yes.

Q Did you trust their judgment?

A Yes. I have served in some dangerous places throughout my

career, including places where I know that I was a target, and DS has

protected me extremely well throughout my career, including on my

travels as NEA Assistant Secretary in some really problematic places.

And so I have every reason to trust the professionalism of Diplomatic

Security.

Q And so when you received the memo, did you sort of stop and

question the DS presence, or was your view on it more of an overall

policy, should we stay in, kind of a view?

A It was the latter. It was more of the policy view. I

assumed that my staff and DS were in agreement on the DS requirements.

Had there been a problem with DS, my staff would have alerted me, and

they did not, so I did not focus on it.

Q And we have heard the term split memo or dissent memo.

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Could Diplomatic Security have issued one on this action memo?

A Diplomatic Security cleared this memo.

Q Yes. I mean like in theory could they have?

A Yes. In theory you could always have a split memo that says

NEA says this; DS says this, and you ask for a decision by the

principals, but DS joined this memo.

Q Yes. And in the memo, it talked about extending through,

it was obviously through the end of the calendar year of 2012. Why

until the end of the calendar year of 2012?

A We thought that that would get us past the critical elements

of transition, that there was supposed to be elections the following

summer. I think they actually took place in August, although the date

wasn't set when that memo went forward. And it would allow the

government to take off as it would be formed out of those elections.

So it would provide us the ability to have some understanding of the

leadership circles in Benghazi, hopefully some influence over what the

people in Benghazi were thinking through that election and transition

period.

Libya is a big country. If we only had a diplomatic presence in

Tripoli during those elections, I think we would have gotten a very

distorted view of -- I was already gone from the State Department at

this point, but I think it would have been a very distorted view if

you are only reporting what's happening in Tripoli during something

as critical as the first elections after Qadhafi's fall.

Q And do you recall whether there were sort of discussions

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at the time about reevaluating later, right, to see whether there would

be an extended U.S. presence or whether the plan was just to leave at

the end of 2012?

A The idea was to look at it again.

Q I want to switch gears and show you an exhibit. I'm going

to mark this as exhibit 1, and it's a letter that the committee has

received from, I believe, 33 former ambassadors, former career

ambassadors. I just want you to take some time to read it because I

assume you haven't seen it.

[Feltman Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. For the record, I think this is the first time that

the majority has seen this letter.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Oh, okay. It's my understanding that a

copy of the letter was sent to the majority and the minority.

Ms. Betz. It just may be us, so we'll double check, but just for

the record.

Mr. Feltman. It's also been widely published.

Mr. Snyder. If we can take a few minutes and read it.

Mr. Snyder. Okay.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Before you were the Assistant Secretary, you were the

Ambassador to Lebanon? Is that right? Well, not directly before.

A Not directly before but previously.

Q And you were the Ambassador to Lebanon during the 2004, 2008

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under the Bush administration?

A Yes.

Q So you also would have been a career ambassador. Is that

accurate?

A Yes.

Q A career Foreign Service?

A Yes.

Q And following the committee's hearing with Secretary

Clinton, the committee received a letter from these 33 former career

ambassadors. It identifies misunderstandings that they felt our

members had or some of the members had during the hearing that were

reflected during the questioning. Do you recall whether you had an

opportunity to watch the hearing with Secretary Clinton?

A I do not own a television.

Q Okay. Wonderful for you.

A Actually the answer should be then no. But that didn't

answer the question. The question is no. I certainly read the news

coverage afterwards, but I did not -- and I heard excerpts on the radio,

but I did not watch it.

Q The letters from 33 former career ambassadors, do you know

some of these individuals?

A Many of them, the majority.

Q And do you respect their viewpoints?

A Yes.

Q I just want to go through some of the points within the

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letter and ask you whether you agree with them because they said, and

I'm quoting here: "Our experience in how ambassadors function and how

they interact with the Department and with the Secretaries of State

they serve, was at variance with understandings expresses in some lines

of questions raised by the committee." And that's an important point,

I think, that if the committee has been misunderstanding things, that

we need to understand them better. And frankly you're our first

ambassador here since we received the letter, so I think it will be

helpful to walk through it, if you don't mind.

In the first page, that bottom paragraph, it reads: "Each of us

had ample access to the Secretaries we served. However, that access

more often than not, was conducted through a range of senior

professional colleagues across the Department, each of whom was

empowered to make decisions in the management and policy spheres. The

normal chain of command is through regional and functional assistant

secretaries, not directly to the secretaries. Skilled career Foreign

Service ambassadors understand the need to move questions to decision

at the right level and to work those decisions up the leadership chain

as needed. We believe this experience is in keeping with sound

organizational practice and compatible with what we have seen in the

private and nongovernmental spheres in which our activities currently

are focused."

Do you agree with that statement?

A Yes.

Q In your role as Assistant Secretary for NEA, were you part

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of that normal chain of command that's sort of referenced within there?

A Yes.

Q And why do you think that chain of command functions well?

A It enables an ambassador, chief of mission overseas, to have

immediate access to the part of the State Department that's most focused

on his or her portfolio. That Assistant Secretary has the

responsibility to make sure that other principals who need to know,

know what the issue is if it's appropriate to be going beyond that.

But often things that are of great concern at a particular post can

be solved by the regional bureau that's working full-time to backstop

that particular post. It would be untenable to expect the Secretary

of State to be able to respond to each request from every Ambassador

of, I think, the U.S. has diplomatic relations in over 190 countries.

Q Do you believe that when you personally raised up issues

to the Secretary of State, that she treated them with the appropriate

level of attention, thoughtfulness, and care?

A I was in senior leadership positions for the State

Department when I was in Beirut, earlier when I was in Jerusalem, and

then, of course, when I was in Washington. And I felt that whether

I was trying to get something to Condoleeza Rice in the case of Jerusalem

or Beirut, or trying to get something to Hillary Clinton in the case

of my Washington tours, that I had absolutely the attention I needed

from both of those Secretaries with whom I worked most closely.

Q And when you had a crisis and you needed attention, did you

feel that you could get their attention?

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A Absolutely.

Q What about when you raised issues with other management

within the State Department like Under Secretary Kennedy? When you

brought issues that needed to be addressed to his attention, do you

think he took you seriously, and he treated those issues appropriately?

A We often called Pat Kennedy the miracle worker at NEA

because he was the one who could often help us find the solution to

something that was vexing us. He's tough. He has the responsibility

for helping us find the resources we may need in a very tight budget

climate, or in making sure that we have thought through extraction

capabilities if there's something of risk. So he was a very tough

counterpart, but he more often than not would find a way to address

a problem that we could identify for him, so, yes, he was essential

to my ability as Assistant Secretary to support my overseas posts.

Q And you felt when you went to him that he was actively trying

to help solve the problems that you brought to him?

A Yes. If he thought something simply wasn't realistic that

we were proposing, he would be straight with that. But more often than

not, he almost seemed to relish seeing what seemed to be an intractable

problem and finding a way to overcome that challenge.

Q And you were there when the Embassy in Tripoli evacuated.

Right? Let me be more specific. You were in the NEA Bureau as the

Assistant Secretary when the Embassy in Tripoli evacuated?

A Yes.

Q And can you explain how that worked and whether that was

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sort of a good example of seeing Under Secretary Kennedy in a crisis

situation?

A It was very complicated for a number of reasons.

Securitywise, Libyan government, bureaucratic restrictions, exit

visas, permissions, things like that, as well as meteorological, the

weather. The weather didn't cooperate with us very well. This was

a joint effort by DS, NEA, with management, Pat Kennedy, being the key

person, to all of us playing very specific roles. I had to work with

Bill Burns, the then Deputy Secretary, to try to get the permission

of the Libyan government to let us leave because the Libyan government

didn't want us to leave. It was a diplomatic defeat for them to see

embassies departing. It showed that they weren't able to control the

security of their own capital, and I think that they could probably

play it back and realize that we weren't going to come back as long

as Qadhafi was there. So we had a real diplomatic political problem.

Then the logistical problem was how do you get people out given the

security and things? And it was Pat Kennedy who was able to find a

way to charter the boat from Malta that came in to the port in Tripoli

to physically move these people. Again, the weather didn't cooperate

with us. It wasn't the easiest thing. Pat looked at every detail of

the physical movement of the people, while we looked at the diplomatic

efforts of it, and security looked at the security aspects to make sure

it could happen. I don't think there was anyone that was more important

to that evacuation in Washington than Pat Kennedy. On the ground,

was essential, but in terms of Washington, it was Pat Kennedy

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who was essential.

Q Was that a, and maybe there is no typical, but was that

evacuation in your view sort of the typical process for how to work

through an evacuation?

A I don't think there is a typical evacuation. I hope there

never is.

Q At the time of the evacuation, I think we have seen some

documents reflecting that there was a delay in the decision announcing

U.S. policy against Qadhafi until after we could get the U.S. personnel

out of Tripoli. Is that what you recall?

A You know, Qadhafi was very unpredictable. He was under

threat, but he was certainly under pressure because of the uprising

that was taking place. Given the history of what Qadhafi had done

around the world, you had to take into account all contingencies. It

may have been very, very remote, but what if Qadhafi had taken our

diplomatic personnel as sort of human shields or hostages? You had

to take that into account. Again, it may have been remote, but we had

to play out all these contingencies; and so, yes, the decision was our

statements in the initial days of the uprisings had to take into account

the safety of our personnel and the safety of American citizens on the

ground.

Q And that was a decision made by the State Department. Do

you know who sort of made that decision, or was that just a consensus?

A I remember it was a consensus because it was such

commonsense.

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Q It was a consensus decision to take into account in U.S.

policy and put it at the forefront of the safety of our Embassy

personnel?

A The safety of our personnel has to take precedence in a

situation like that. You can develop lots of ways to get messaging

across to Qadhafi that what he was doing was unacceptable, and we did.

We were speaking to his aides and advisers directly. We were using

others who had influence on him to pass the message privately that what

was happening was absolutely unacceptable. But your public

messaging -- which is what governments typically react to because they

have to show a public response to a public message -- you have to take

into account the absolute essential responsibility of the

U.S. Government, the State Department, for protection of American

diplomats, other personnel, facilities, and American citizens.

Q And it goes without saying, but I'll ask it anyway, it was

a policy decision that you agreed with?

A Yes.

Q I'm just going to take you back to the letter. On the second

page where we had left off it reads: Ultimately if an Ambassador

believes an issue is sufficiently critical to merit the Secretary's

attention, the Ambassador has both the means and the responsibility

to make certain it does. In the event of an urgent need for direct

contact with the Secretary, however, none of us expected to use direct

email contact as there are more effective ways of communicating. For

example, the State Department Operations Center, which operates 24/7,

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provides better access to senior officials than does any direct cell

phone number and can track down department principals any time,

anywhere. Do you agree with that statement?

A Yes.

Q And can you explain the importance of using the ops center

when you're outside of the U.S., or outside of headquarters?

A Sometimes you can use the ops center in headquarters. The

ops center knows where the Secretary is at all times and what the

Secretary is doing at all times. So the ops center can reach -- I'll

say her, because it was -- I'll use the pronoun her because it was a

she -- at any time. And if the Secretary is like in a meeting with

the President, the ops center would be able to find someone to pull

the Secretary out if needed. If I had a direct cell phone and she had

turned it off, what good is that? I needed to reach her urgently. The

other thing is, the ops center, with permission of the callers, of the

people on the phone, can take notes to alert others of the information.

If you're having a one-on-one conversation with the Secretary, and you

need follow-up, if you're an Ambassador and you call the Secretary and

say, Madam Secretary, I need X,Y and Z, do you expect the Secretary

of State herself to drop her entire schedule and then call up Pat Kennedy

and say, Pat, we need this; call up Eric Boswell and say, Eric, we

need this. You would want someone else to be on the call as well to

make sure that the action items agreed upon are followed up, not because

the Secretary will neglect, but because that's not the best use of the

Secretary of State's time.

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So that's the reason why I think using the ops center -- those

are two reasons, the ability to reach the Secretary at all times and

to know what the Secretary is doing, whether it's appropriate to

interrupt or not, and to be able to make sure that action by other parts

of the State Department are followed up upon.

Q And you would use that maybe even if you were in the same

building as the Secretary?

A Yes. But there were a variety of things I could do and did

do. I often would simply stop by Jake Sullivan's office. If there

was something where I wanted the Secretary to know something, but I

didn't need to engage with her directly and she had a very busy schedule,

I would drop by Jake and say, Jake, can you make sure the boss knows

X, Y or Z. And then Jake would tell me later if she had any reaction

to X, Y or Z, or she perhaps would call me when she had a break and

say, hey, I got your message, and I agree with what our proposing or

whatever. So it wasn't always using the ops center. It was using

whatever means was most appropriate and most convenient at the time.

Q And is it fair to say that your standard practice was not

to email the Secretary's unclassified email account in order to get

matters to her attention?

A I responded to emails that she sent me. I do not believe

that there's a single email I initiated with her. I would have thought

it would be inappropriate, you know, email address notwithstanding,

whatever the email address is, I think it would have been inappropriate

for an Assistant Secretary to email her directly when there are so many

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other ways to get her information.

Q And so the lack of extensive email communication between

you and the Secretary in her unclassified email account, doesn't

reflect a lack of communications between the two of you or the lack

of information that was flowing up from you to the Secretary. Is that

accurate?

A That's accurate. I think it would be rare if we were both

in Washington that we didn't see each other on a daily basis.

Q In here, just further down in that paragraph, it says,

quote, "We did not expect the Secretary of State to read each of the

hundreds of thousands of cables sent annually to the Department. We

knew the Department cables sent under the Secretary's name were only

rarely approved by him or her." Is that accurate?

A Yes.

Q And this, I think this particular claim is probably a

reference to some allegations that we had seen before that the

Washington Post Fact Checker had sort of checked already. Is it fair

to say that lots and lots of department cables bear the Secretary of

State's name in the signature line, but that does not mean that she

approved the decision?

A Yes.

Q In the next paragraph it says, quote, "Ambassadors are given

wide latitude in how they operate in the field. We were expected to

use our good judgment paired with internal vetting processes in

deciding where to travel in country. The same was expected in deciding

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with whom Embassy staff should meet. Decisions all the more critical

in war zones and other crisis situations." Was this true for the

Ambassadors in the NEA Bureau when you were there and for you when you

were the Ambassador to Lebanon?

A Yes. The exceptions being that if there is a designated

terrorist entity, ambassadors would not be able to freely meet with

representatives of terrorist organizations, but in general, yes, this

is accurate.

Q And you had spoken previously about giving ambassadors sort

of a wide latitude as to how they operate in the field and to their

judgments about the field. Can you explain why that is better than

sort of micromanaging things from D.C.?

A I don't think the 6,000 mile screwdriver works very well.

It was important for me as Assistant Secretary to make sure that the

chiefs of mission in NEA countries understood the realities of

Washington. They needed to know if they had policy recommendations

that simply were not feasible, if they were proposing ideas that were

contrary to overall U.S. policies.

It was my job to steer them, to help them understand Washington

realities, but it was their job to make sure Washington understood the

realities that they were experiencing and they knew about on the ground.

And for me to second guess who they were seeing, how they were

interpreting interlocutors' views, interlocutors who I may not know

or may have only met in very formal settings but they knew quite well,

would have just been wrong and would have distorted the foreign policy

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process, would have distorted our ability collectively to understand

what was happening in any particular country.

Q And if they needed something from you in terms of resources,

would they reach out to you?

A Yes, but it wouldn't start that way. It would start at a

far lower level and perhaps be worked out without me ever knowing that

there was a resource request from a certain post, or perhaps I would

be told by my own management people, my own executive office, hey, we

need such and such for this embassy or this ambassador, and we have

figured out how to do it by shifting this around. Do you approve? And

I would approve it without ever having the conversation with the

Ambassador. If the Ambassador were not getting any satisfaction at

lower levels, at that point the Ambassador may reach me. And I traveled

quite frequently, and so ambassadors would often take the opportunity

of my travel and take that opportunity to talk to me about issues that

they had of concern about Washington support.

Q The next paragraph goes on to say, "In many countries rule

of law is rarely what it should be and security issues in some of these

countries can be dire. The Secretary has leadership responsibilities

for the security of all of those under his or her charge. However,

in carrying out that responsibility, any Secretary must rely heavily

on senior subordinates and on ambassadors, who have a designated and

specific authority in this regard, to flag when a security issue is

not being dealt with adequately.

Diplomacy carries inherent risks especially in high-threat

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posts. Ambassadors understand these risks and constantly make

decisions of how much risk to take and for what purpose. They know

that absolute security is not possible and that these decision rarely

will be clear-cut. However, they need the latitude to make difficult

day-to-day decisions, relying on advice from security professionals

and the expectation that they will receive appropriate support from

Washington."

Do you agree with those statements?

A Yes.

Q Now the NEA Bureau, especially during your time in that 2011

timeframe, was full of dangerous places. Can you speak to how to

balance the policy needs for being in those countries with the security

risks?

A It's something that one has to monitor constantly. This

is not, as we learned in 2011 in NEA, if we didn't know it already,

this is not a static region where you can make a decision today on how

one is going to operate in any one country and expect to just be able

to continue that procedure. You have to look at this constantly. It's

why all embassies are required and do develop tripwires. They develop

tripwires in several areas. They develop tripwires on when one might

need to draw down Embassy staff, and if you're in a dangerous place,

you have tripwires on what travel outside of an embassy compound, often

a very fortified embassy compound, what tripwires would close down

those sorts of travel requirements. I know this very well from, of

course, my time in Beirut. The tripwires are an essential tool because

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they're a reminder of what you all collectively agreed were warning

signs. Because if you're someplace and the situation is slowly

deteriorating, you may not recognize that deterioration, so your

tripwires remind you of what it was you said need to alert you.

Q Would that have been a top-down analysis or a sort of bottom

up where you gave deference to the ambassadors?

A In my experience, it tends to be a bottom-up where it's

developed between security staff, other parts of an Embassy, say, but

ultimately approved by the Emergency Action Committee of any post that

includes the input of all of the heads of all of the agencies represented

at that post.

Q And these ambassadors also talk about relying on the

security professionals. I think you also spoke to that. Why would

you rely on the security professionals on these sorts of decisions,

the security professionals in the field, on these sorts of decisions?

A They have the responsibility, they have the skills, they

have the knowledge of best practices. They are the ones who have, I

would argue, the proven track record, of fulfilling these

responsibilities.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I think my time is up. So I will say thank

you.

Ms. Jackson. Off the record.

[Recess.]

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I have 11:09, and we'll begin our next hour of questioning.

The minority covered several topics that's on our list, which

you'll be happy to know, because it will cut down the number of questions

that we overall have. But I do have some sort of follow-up, add-on

questions to what they covered.

But first, going back to my first round, we talked about your five

trips to Libya in 2011. And you talked about Ben Fishman traveled with

you in August of 2011. Did any other U.S. Government personnel, State

Department, or interagency personnel travel with you in August of 2011,

other than Mr. Fishman?

A My special assistant.

Q And that was?

A His name is .

Q What about your trip earlier in May of 2011?

A I'm sure I had a staff assistant with me because I tended

to travel with the staff assistant to make sure that I stayed connected

with Washington, but I don't remember who it was.

Q But no other interagency personnel accompanied you on that

trip in May of 2011?

A No.

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Q Okay. I believe your next trip was then to Tripoli in

September. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did anyone travel with you other than a staff

assistant?

A No.

Q And then there was the October trip that you went with the

Secretary. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And I assume she traveled with any number of people

on that trip. Did you actually travel with the Secretary, or did you

travel --

A I was on the road someplace else in the Middle East and North

Africa and I met her in Malta and flew in and out with her from Malta.

Q And that was a day trip into --

A Yes.

Q Was there any discussion that she would go to Benghazi?

A I don't believe so, but there had been talk in the spring

about a possible trip to Benghazi that never quite worked out for a

number of scheduling and other reasons. But I don't believe that

September trip included the possibility of Benghazi.

Q Okay. And when the Secretary was there, the embassy in

Tripoli had reopened. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did Chris Stevens come from Benghazi over to

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Tripoli?

A I don't believe so.

Q Okay. And was there a reason that he didn't come over to

meet with the Secretary?

A I don't believe so.

Q Okay. During the time that the Secretary was in Tripoli

that day, were there meetings or discussions about a continued presence

by the State Department in Benghazi?

A If there were, it was quite light and in passage. She had

a very, very busy schedule going to see a variety of Libyan officials,

meeting with representatives of Libyan civil society, delivering a

speech. It was a jam-packed day and it wasn't the type of quiet time

to have sort of policy discussions like that.

Q Okay. Do you recall any meeting with just the embassy staff

and the Secretary that day where discussions about embassy staff, or

the vision and future of our diplomatic presence in Libya was discussed

internally with State Department personnel?

A She typically met with embassy personnel on her travels more

to show support for them rather than have any type of sort of, you know,

you can't discuss policy in a town hall, in a town hall-type setting.

But I don't recall such a meeting in Tripoli. I either forgot that

there was one or perhaps for a number of reasons it didn't happen.

Q And then I believe you also traveled, I think it was, in

November of 2011. Is that when Ambassador Rice came to Libya?

A Yes.

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Q Did you travel with her?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And I don't remember. She went to Tripoli and

Benghazi or one or the other?

A She went to Benghazi and Tripoli, in that order.

Q Okay. And other than your staff assistant and perhaps a

staff assistant traveling with her, were there any other

representatives of other government agencies or any other U.N. people

that traveled in November?

A I wasn't U.N. then. I was State Department. I was still

State Department. She had her own staff from the U.S. Mission to the

United Nations. That's different from the U.N. Those are also

U.S. Government officials, work at the U.S. Mission of the U.N.

Samantha Power went from the White House and then there were, you know,

various others, but it was a State Department, U.S. Mission to the U.N.

with Samantha Power in trip.

Q And do you recall the purpose of Samantha Power being along

from the national security staff?

A I think it was natural for her to be included on one of these

trips. First of all, she was the one who was the person at the

White House who was watching international organizations, looking at

the U.S. role in the United Nations, and after all, the effort in Libya

was under the United Nations umbrella. So I think it was appropriate

for her to witness firsthand what this U.N. mandate had at that time

wrought.

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Q Going back to your trip in August of 2011, and I believe

that's the one that Mr. Fishman accompanied you on. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Was there discussions with Mr. Fishman about the overall

U.S. Government involvement in Benghazi during that trip? Or

actually, let me ask it this way: What was the purpose of Mr. Fishman

going to Benghazi in August of 2011?

A His responsibilities at the NSC included Libya. I don't

think they were limited to Libya, but he was the primary staff-level

person dealing with the Libya policy at the White House. I don't think

he had been to Libya. When he asked me if he could come with me, I

welcomed it as a way to help him understand the challenges and

opportunities that Libya presented by having a little bit of

on-the-ground awareness.

Q Okay. And do you recall if he made subsequent trips to

Libya after that?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. If you could just educate us a little bit on what

the NSC brings when we're in a place like Libya or we're intervening

in another country. I mean, from my reading, Libya was rather unique

in what was happening because there was an overthrow of a government

as opposed to what was happening in some of the other countries in North

Africa.

But explain to us, if you could, or educate us, please, about how

the NSC guides and directs what the U.S. Government's role is in a

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country such as Libya?

A The NSC plays an important coordinating role. As much as

the State Department professionals would like to think that we have

a monopoly on representing the U.S. in any country abroad, in fact,

that's not the case. And, you know, DOD had interests in Libya. Other

agencies we can talk about elsewhere have interests in Libya.

And the NSC basically disciplines us all to try to come up with

consensual approaches to things that affect all of our interests. Now

that I work at the -- I don't want to talk about the United Nations

that much but --

Q Right. And we'll steer clear.

A -- but the United Nations doesn't have such an organ. So

I see the value in hindsight of having one part of a bureaucracy that's

primary purpose is to make sure that the various other components of

the bureaucracy are working in as collaborative a fashion as possible.

Q So the NSC would be the coordinating agency that would

direct the State Department to say we want to do X, Y, and Z. We want

humanitarian relief. We want support for educational opportunities.

We want election monitoring people in Libya, for example. And you,

State Department, are in charge of ensuring that these types of

personnel get in. Would that be -- I'm just trying to understand how

the NSC would undertake its coordinating role?

A There's several roles that the NSC plays in situations such

as you described. First of all, there are -- and I'm going to talk

more generally than just Libya -- there are often policy directives

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that come out of the President, you know, presidential policy

directives. The NSC will make sure, to the best of its ability -- that

the rest of us are developing our own activities in accordance to those

policy directives that come from the White House.

So there is a certain discipline that the NSC is designed to impose

on the various components of this government. A second area also I

would put into the disciplinarian for coordination. Let's say that

the State Department had a certain proposal for an activity in any

country, could be Libya or elsewhere. The NSC, through its

coordination meetings can say, hey, these other agencies have an

interest in that activity or have some equities here. You need to make

sure that you're coordinating, you're not just going on your own.

The State Department is being the diplomatic arm of the

U.S. Government. The Secretary of State is representing the President

to foreign diplomats, can also use the NSC to make sure that other parts

of the system are recognizing or supporting that lead role that the

State Department does have. So I look at the NSC as being useful in

imposing sort of coherence onto the system.

Now, it doesn't also work. This is not a perfect system. And,

yes, there were times when we might be annoyed that the NSC is calling

another meeting when I felt I had other things to do. But the lack

of that coordinating role that I've seen elsewhere makes me appreciate

that much more the structures that are set up here.

Q And during your time, and especially focusing on 2011, did

the NSC have specific policy directives that they wanted accomplished

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in Libya?

A You know, yes, but these were derived collaboratively

through this interagency process that we touched on earlier.

Q Okay. Was there a presidential directive on the Middle

East overall as a region?

A There was one that was in development, but I don't believe

it was issued before I left. I may be wrong.

Q Okay.

Ms. Betz. Not one in 2011? That was issued in 2011?

Mr. Feltman. Maybe there -- I simply do not remember. But we

had -- again, I don't feel any lack of, or any shortage of, engagement

with the NSC to make sure that, from my own part, I was abiding by policy

directions that came from the White House. But in terms of an

overarching -- perhaps there was. I simply don't remember.

Ms. Betz. Would they play a role in logistics? Would they make

sure staffing was adequate? I mean, did they have a role in sort of

the logistics or resources within these policy directives?

Mr. Feltman. They would often ask us what we were doing to

implement them, but it wasn't the same as directing staffing, no.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q What was happening in North Africa, in the spring and summer

of 2011, in the political upheaval realm, was Libya different than other

countries such as Egypt and Tunisia? I mean, how was the -- was the

Arab Spring revolution the same in Libya or different than its

surrounding countries?

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A There were similarities and differences in all of these

countries. The similarities were the mobilization of youth. The sort

of collapse in the legitimacy of leaderships in all these

organization -- in all of these countries, you know, that the

legitimacy that Qadhafi had from his -- from the revolution had

completely eroded. The legitimacy that Mubarak had, had eroded. So

there were a lot of similarities between the phenomenons, the

uprisings.

But, of course, how they developed in each country were sui

generis based on a number of factors, not only that country's history

but how the leadership reacted to those uprisings. Mubarak stepped

down. Bashar al-Assad and Qadhafi tried to suppress through violence.

Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen ultimately negotiated a way out of office.

So how these revolutions -- if you call them revolutions -- how

these uprisings proceeded varied. But the fundamental feeling of

youth disenfranchisement, of lack of opportunities, of lack of

legitimacy by governments, these were similar. These were shared

across the region.

Q From a different perspective, can you compare and contrast

for us how the governments were able to evolve from these uprisings

and talk about -- what I'm wanting to focus on is the capability of

the new government to govern.

A Again, there's similarities and differences. But one of

the characteristics of the Arab states, that went through uprisings

in 2011 and after, one of the similarities from 2010 and before was

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that you had strong leaders with weak legitimacy. You know, Bashar

al-Assad, Qadhafi, Ben Ali in Tunis, Mubarak in Egypt, these were strong

leaders who controlled the levers of the state to benefit their ruler

and their supporters. They were strong leaders but they had weak

legitimacy.

What happened after these uprisings is you had governments

authorities that had strong legitimacy. They had overthrown the

dictators. They had removed the dictators, but they were weak leaders.

So you had the reverse which allowed, in the case of Egypt, for more

or less, a return to the -- you know, after -- you know, it took a couple

years but you had a return to the previous authoritarianism in Egypt.

In Tunisia you had a negotiation among the two political parties

that led to elections and power sharing that's actually a positive way

forward, although it's still weak. In the case of Libya, you've had,

unfortunately, that strong legitimacy shatter under the differences

between the various constituencies inside Libya. So you had

similarities at the large level and then individual developments at

the country level.

Q So why did Libya shatter?

A The institutions of Libya were not as strong as the

institutions in Egypt or in Tunisia, for example. Qadhafi had hollowed

out the institutions, including the armed forces of Libya over the

course of his rule in favor of using a policy of fear to have everything

revolve around him, meaning that the TNC and then the government that

moved back to Tripoli, you know, in, what, September, August, September

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of 2011, did not have the same institutional framework on which to

develop their own authorities that was present in Cairo or in Tunis.

There was a much greater challenge for the authorities in Libya.

And there were also far greater divisions in Libya than there were

in, say, Tunisia. Tunisia is a relatively homogeneous country with

a -- that's majority middle class, majority owning houses. It's a

country that has some strong social foundations -- social economic

challenges as well. I don't want to underestimate those.

But in Libya you had the historic divisions between east, west,

and south. You had very strong tribal loyalties. Some of the tribes

having supported Qadhafi and having benefitted from Qadhafi's rule that

were suspicious of the changes. You had an Islamist secular split in

Libya as well. You had -- some of these divisions were present in

Tunisia as well but not to the extent that there were in Libya. It

made the challenge in Libya much greater than the challenge of

governance in Tunis.

Q So looking back, what could've been done or what should've

been done by the U.S. Government to, if we could, prevent Libya from

shattering?

A I don't think that -- we all wish that Libya today looked

better than Libya does, without question. I don't think that the

United States or any other country can assume that we could have, quote,

saved Libya. Obviously, hindsight forces us to think again about

decisions that were taken throughout 2011 and 2012.

But let's face the facts: The Libyans did not want foreign

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intervention or foreign interference in their internal affairs. They

accepted the U.N. Security Council resolution, the civilian

protection mandate that NATO then implemented as a tool toward

overthrowing Qadhafi. They did not accept a role for NATO troops to

come in and secure Libya afterwards. The Libyans made a lot of

decisions themselves that have contributed to the sorry state of Libya

today.

But the knowledge that we all had that Libya could shatter, we

didn't think it was inevitable but that it could shatter, is what has

led to some of the things we're discussing today. Why it was that Chris

Stevens and I both believed we should maintain a presence for some time

in Benghazi, to from try to use our diplomatic interventions to

understand if the country was starting to split, if there was anything

that we could do to try to influence it. Because I really don't believe

that in a country as complicated as Libya that only having a presence

in Tripoli would have given us sufficient understanding.

Q So one of the things this committee is to do is to make

recommendations. So is a recommendation that if we go into a country

like Libya again under -- well, hopefully there are no more countries

like Libya, but if we were to go into a country that is facing a similar

situation, should we put more personnel in at the beginning? Should

there be more of a -- not -- a surge or more personnel from across the

spectrum in there? I mean, what would be a recommendation in hindsight

of what could have been done differently?

A Please remember that I did retire from the State Department

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in May 2012 so the discussions that took place between May and September

of 2012 in the U.S. Government I'm not privy to. So what options were

considered then I don't know.

You ask a very tough question because we do have the lesson of

Benghazi, you know, behind us. And one could argue that contradicts

my basic belief which is that we need to have diplomatic presences in

critical areas around the world, despite the risks.

And I'm very proud to have served in the Foreign Service where

people are willing to go out and serve in these sorts of places, despite

the grave personal risk that they face and the personal hardship they

often have, separation from families, et cetera. So I do believe that

we need to be in places that are dangerous, and we need to find a way

to mitigate the risks as best we can, but we're never going to eliminate

the risks.

The other thing I believe strongly is that we have to make sure

that even if the embassy walls are very high and very thick for obvious

security reasons, that we are not closing ourselves off from the

broadest spectrum possible of political opinion, of influence, of

access to influence makers in a particular country. And so that means

that we're going to have to find a way of developing and cultivating

a wide base of contacts in countries like Libya to give us insights,

influence, et cetera.

Libya is particularly challenging. As I said, there were no

diplomatic relations. There were no diplomats in Libya for decades.

The U.S. diplomats went back into Tripoli in 2004 and worked in very

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restrictive environments. You know, Qadhafi was paranoid about U.S.

engagements, so the embassy had faced lots of challenges.

And my salutes to Gene Cretz and and ,

and all the people that worked there for how creative there were in

making contacts with Libyan society despite the fact that the Libyan

Government didn't want them to meet with other Libyans. The Libyan

Government wanted to maintain a monopoly on contacts with the

U.S. Government.

But in most countries an embassy will develop over decades rich

contact base, credibility with a wide number of civil society

organizations, with universities, with students groups, with lawyers.

In Libya, none of that existed, and that was why it was almost heroic

what Gene and and and and Chris and all these people

did.

Ms. Jackson. Would you like to take a break? Let's go off the

record.

[Recess.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I want to turn now to the -- what we call the extension memo

from December of 2011 that went out under your signature to Under

Secretary Kennedy that we discussed or what you discussed in the last

hour. And you had described a process of a series of meetings and

discussions and essentially consensus before the memo goes up. Is that

correct?

A Consensus among those other parts of the State Department

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that had interests or whose support was essential, such as Diplomatic

Security, yes.

Q And was OBO another essential partner or stakeholder in the

memo, if you recall?

A I don't recall but there would have had to have been -- what

I can say for sure is if OBO wasn't part of the process, Pat Kennedy

would have made sure that once that memo got there that OBO was included.

If we had somehow neglected, I don't remember.

Q Okay. Because they were going to be dealing with the

physical security aspects of the villa compound that was going to be

leased. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. OBO?

Mr. Feltman. OBO and DS.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So I just want to makes sure I understand this clearance

and consensus process. Is that -- would it be fair to describe that

as a commitment from those components of the State Department that they

are going to support the expansion into Benghazi as written in that

document?

A I believe it reflects -- yes, I believe it would reflect

an understanding by all those that were involved in development of that

memo, what the responsibilities were that we were all undertaking, and

if this memo were approved.

Q Let me take a step away from that particular memo. Were

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there any other justification memos that had to go up? For example,

was there a policy memo that went to the under secretary for political

affairs -- and I don't remember if it was Wendy Sherman at the time,

but I think it was -- saying we have a policy political reason for being

in Benghazi through the end of 2012? Were there any other

corresponding memos that would be approved, or were you on the political

affairs sides the person that made that decision by being the author

of the memo?

A I do not know if there were other memos that would have been,

as you say, accompanying this one or not, you know, parallel,

complementary memos. But certainly, I had these discussions with my

bosses at the State Department about why Chris Stevens and I both

thought that we needed to maintain a presence in Benghazi.

Q Okay. And we're just trying to understand the

decision-making flow within the State Department. Would you typically

see those types of parallel policy type memos go up, or would you just

see more of the, what I would say is more the logistical type memos

go forward?

A I mean, there was an earlier -- I know that there was an

earlier policy memo that went forward, but it preceded this one, I

believe, where we talked about what are the U.S. interests in Libya,

what are the U.S. policy goals in Libya in the coming period, where

we would say explicitly we're not here for state building. We're here

for these specific things.

So I know that there was a memo that went forward so that there

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was -- to make sure that we had a general understanding and consensus

from our superiors what NEA was pursuing was, in fact, approved above

just the NEA level.

Q And would that have gone to your under secretary for

political affairs, or would it have gone to the deputy secretaries or

to the secretary?

A I'm guessing it went to the deputy secretary with clearance

from the under secretary of political affairs, but that's merely a

guess. I don't remember. That typically would have been what I would

have done and relied on Bill Burns to make sure if there was something

specific for the secretary to see that it would have happened.

But, again, I want to underscore, I had ready access to the

secretary. I don't think that anything that I would have put in any

of these memos would have surprised her just because of the sort of

ongoing discussion we had about the Arab Spring.

Q So at the time that the memo to Under Secretary Kennedy went

out under your signature, you were confident that it was going to be

approved because you had -- it had been massaged, if you will, through

all the people who needed to be aware of it and be the decisionmakers?

A I was confident that we had done our best to build the

consensus that would led to a yes. You're never sure when you sign

a memo to Pat Kennedy if you're going to get that yes no matter how

much homework you've done ahead of time, because Pat Kennedy is the

one that's going to be responsible for making sure that we can do what

we say we're going to do.

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He's the one that's going to be responsible for making sure that

the contingencies have properly been followed. He's looking at this

not in the NEA context only. He's looking at this in the global context

of what resources we have available in terms of financing, staffing,

security, et cetera.

So yes, I had a fairly good sense that we had addressed the

questions that Pat Kennedy was going to ask me, but I didn't know for

sure whether Pat Kennedy would say yes when I sent this memo forward.

I hoped he would and I thought he would.

Q Do you recall, did he have any questions or concerns that

came back to you after the memo went to him?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. If he did, who would have been in that process to

have known any concerns that he had?

A Had Pat felt strongly about something, Pat would have picked

up the phone and called me or Pat would have said, Jeff, come to my

office. Pat picked up the phone regularly when he felt the need to.

And then his -- I don't know what her title was at the time -- but

his -- who worked for him was in direct

contact constantly with my executive director, .

Because, again, we had management issues, I mean, across the

region. Embassy Sana'a was the -- was breached by a mob the day after

Chris Stevens was -- no, Embassy Sana'a was breached -- because I was

still assistant secretary at one point. Anyway, there were all sorts

of management security issues that we had because of the reactions of

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the Arab Spring that we had to be working directly with Pat Kennedy's

office all the time. And so that was usually and

.

Q And, granted, it's a few years down the road, but just so

that I'm clear, you don't recall Pat Kennedy communicating any

objections to any component of the December 2011 extension memo prior

to his approval of it?

A I don't recall, but perhaps you have documentation he did.

But I don't recall.

Q Okay. Actually, we don't have any documentation to that.

We're just trying to confirm that the lack of documentation -- that

we're interpreting the lack of documentation correctly.

Mr. Kenny. But, Sharon, just to be precise on that point, because

you referred to it as a December 2011 memo and we understand there were

various drafts and iterations of that. So when you say he had a

objection, do you mean with the final or --

Ms. Jackson. With what was approved, yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Well, let me just follow up on that exchange. Unless there

was an objection, would the signer or the approver, such as Under

Secretary Kennedy, would they have seen the drafts, or would you grab

the consensus first and then send up one memo?

A I would not send a memo to Pat Kennedy if I didn't think

it had a good likelihood of him signing it. This was not just to put

me on the record that I thought we should be in Benghazi. This was

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to actually try to make sure we were in Benghazi.

And I don't know how or the various

components of M that signed off on -- that were part of the consensus

building. I don't know how they operate with Pat Kennedy. I don't

know if they showed him earlier drafts or not. I don't know. But I

do know that the draft evolved based on the conversations we had with

his office and the subcomponents under him.

Q Okay. And, again, just to wrap up this area, when all the

different agencies or subcomponents cleared on it, you understood that

to be their commitment to provide whatever resources were covered by

their world?

A Yes.

Q I want to switch gears to something that you mentioned in

passing before, and that is the Libyans were very resistant to having

any type of foreign partners having a military presence in their

country. And is that a correct recitation of what you said before?

A Yes.

Q Did our Department of Defense want to have a presence in

Libya post revolution?

A They wanted to have, you know, defense attache, that sort

of office, a traditional defense diplomatic presence. And we also

asked DOD for, you know, some security support. But DOD most

definitely did not want to have, quote, boots on the ground.

Q Are there other types of Department of Defense missions in

a country which they call like mill-to-mill relations or something like

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that, or is that what you're referring to when you talk about the defense

attache, or are those two different things?

A A typical embassy will have two defense components in it.

A defense attache, who is the head of all the defense activities, and

a defense attache is essentially the military advisor to the Ambassador

who represents DOD diplomatically with local counterparts who does

things like that.

The other component tends to be the part of defense that will work

on military sales, on military training. If you have an assistance

program with a certain country, it will go through the military

assistant's office, which typically falls under the DATT, but it's

somewhat independent. So that's a typical military presence is a

defense attache and a military assistance office.

Q And is the assistance office equipment or training or a

combination of both?

A It depends on the country, but it can be both. It can be

sales, it can be grants, it can be training. It depends on what the

country is.

Q Okay. I'm going to mark an email exchange as exhibit

number 2 and ask you to take a look at that.

And Ambassador Feltman, I'd like to note for the record that

Chairman Trey Gowdy has joined us here today.

[Feltman Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Feltman. Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. Gowdy. Ambassador, how are you?

Mr. Feltman. I'm fine, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And for the record, this is an email exchange dated July 26,

2011, between at the top, and . It's

subject line is "RE: ."

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Is it correct that this witness is not a

party on any of the issues?

Mr. Feltman. I'm not a party to the --

Ms. Jackson. Yeah. But he may be aware of the issues that are

discussed in here, and that will be my next question, if he is aware

of the issues discussed in this.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So if you would just take a couple minutes and look at that.

A Okay.

Q Ambassador Feltman, this email discusses generally a DOD

presence in Benghazi. Are you aware of that issue being discussed at

that time?

A I don't remember.

Q Okay. And in particular, on the second page of that email,

the one that is July 26, 2011, at 11:04 a.m. between and

, the third line says, "As you know, Chris and have

not welcomed the idea of DOD presence in Benghazi at this point, but

we can listen." And signed, " ."

Do you know what they would be referring to based on the review

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of this email exchange?

A I do not know the specific case in question. I do know that

there was great clamoring from all across the U.S. Government to put

personnel in Benghazi. And the facilities and ability to move people

around were quite limited, and so we were constantly, constantly trying

to resist a huge expansion or a huge surge in visitors. We had to manage

the visitor load because, you know, people wanted to be part of New

Libya, and they wanted to show that their department agency was there.

And so we had very complicated visitor rotation schedules to make

sure we weren't overwhelming a very small staff that had a very

important task. So I assume this is in that context, but I don't

remember the specific case.

Q Do you recall that was the DATT, the DATT,

liaison with Embassy Tripoli, or he was the Department of Defense

attache?

A The last time I was in Embassy Tripoli before the evacuation

was in December 2010, and yes, I met with the DATT there.

Q And was that at the time?

A I believe so. The name rings a bell. I believe so.

Because the name doesn't ring a bell from this email exchange. The

name rings a bell from something else from my distant past.

Q And just to tie the loop in here, was on your

staff at the time in NEA?

A Yes, she was the Libya desk officer.

Q Okay. And so she would have been the appropriate person

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to be having these conversations?

A Yes. If this issue reached my desk or my ears, it must have

been at the point of resolution, because I simply don't remember it.

Q And who's , if you know?

A was the head of the political section in

Embassy Tripoli, so she was part of what we sort of jokingly referred

to as Embassy Tripoli on the Potomac.

Q In exile often?

A Yes.

Q And so this being in July of 2011, it's when they were in

suspended operations from Tripoli and had been brought back here?

A By that summer, we were encouraging staff from Embassy

Tripoli to find onward assignments because we realized that the Embassy

Tripoli, as we had known it would not be going back in any form like

we had it. So we were encouraging people at that point to go.

and are both extremely talented professional officers.

Q And it's my understanding that the rotation process for

movement within the State Department typically occurs in the

summertime?

A Yes, and people have kids at school, people have, you know,

obviously their professional obligations are paramount but we also try

to keep into account family friendly policies.

Q Okay. During your time at NEA, was there a continued push

for a military presence at some level in either Tripoli once it reopened

or Benghazi?

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A What I remember is the -- again, is the trying to reconcile

the number of parts of the U.S. Government that felt they had a need

to be present in either place with the realities of the physical and

security resources available to us. I don't remember specific

discussions with DOD. I just remember the overall thing, that there

was an incredible pressure to find ways to move more people into both

of those posts. And we were always having to find ways to limit,

accommodate, whatever the answer was at the time.

Q Okay. DOD also provided security assets in Libya for you.

Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And that was in Tripoli?

A In Tripoli.

Q Okay. Do you know why there weren't DOD security assets

in Benghazi?

A I don't remember.

Q Okay. Were they ever considered?

A I don't remember.

Q Was there any legal or policy restriction on having the DOD

SST in Benghazi, for example, it wasn't an officially-recognized post?

A I don't know. I mean, I will say that reopening Embassy

Tripoli was seen as particularly problematic. We knew that there were

Qadhafi elements that were still around. The U.S. was obviously the

leading country in NATO that had led to the air strikes. There were

even, at that time, clashes between militias that were more Islamist

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and militias that were more secularist in the Tripoli area.

And an embassy traditionally is often the focus of popular

protests against certain policies. And so there was -- and an embassy

also -- the embassy also was going to have many, many more components

than Benghazi was, so there was a lot of discussion about how to provide

the type of security that would allow Gene Cretz to go back, and his

staff.

Q But you don't recall similar conversations regarding

Benghazi?

A There were security discussions on Benghazi, without

question. But I don't remember discussing DOD assets in terms of

Benghazi.

Q Okay. But then just to clarify, as -- you don't recall that

there was any legal or policy impediment to having an SST in Benghazi

such that it wasn't an officially-recognized post?

A I don't know. I don't remember, but I don't know if there

are or not.

Q Who would have an answer to that?

A I suppose Defense lawyers.

Q Department of Defense lawyers?

A I suppose. I don't know.

Q Was it your assessment that there was a higher anti-western

sentiment in Tripoli versus Benghazi in the fall of 2011?

A Yes.

Q And did that continue through your time until the end of

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May 2012?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there an anti-western sentiment also in

Benghazi?

A There was an anti-western sentiment in Eastern Libya,

particularly in the Derna area, which is something we can talk about

in another setting. But certainly my sense when I was leaving the

department, when I retired in May, was still perhaps wrongly that the

security risks were higher in Tripoli than in Benghazi.

Ms. Betz. Did that sentiment change, particularly end of 2011

into 2012?

Mr. Feltman. I would say that it changed but not fundamentally.

You know, that, yes, there were question marks we had over -- I had

over Benghazi as well. But, again, I could have been wrong about what

the real situation was like in May of 2012, my last month of

U.S. Government service, but I still assumed that the greater risks

were in Tripoli, certainly the greater exposure was in Tripoli. The

number of people, the type of facilities we had in Tripoli was far,

far greater exposure than in Benghazi.

So, you know, yes, I think that -- yes, my evaluation changed

somewhat from 2011 but not fundamentally.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Do you recall discussions in late 2011 and early 2012 of

having Chris Stevens go into Tripoli as the charge prior to his

nomination as ambassador?

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A It was a crazy idea I had. It did not get any traction

anywhere else, and it was right that it didn't get any traction. I

was wrong in proposing it.

Q Can you elaborate on that?

A You know, I was thinking of just how good Chris was and how

symbolically important it would be for Chris, who was there in Benghazi

when the revolution, as they called it, was unfolding and succeeding,

for having him in Tripoli, I thought that would be really, really

important symbolically. It would add more weight to the U.S. return

to Tripoli.

But Gene Cretz and are really good. They had

contacts. There was another type of symbolic importance to have them

return because they had been -- Gene had been more or less forced out

by Qadhafi in December 2010, to have him go back also had political

importance. So yes, the idea of sending Chris in to Tripoli was mine,

but others in the State Department, in hindsight, I think, rightly,

said no.

Q And who were those others?

A I don't think anybody else said yes.

Q Well, just on the off chance that someone else might have

said yes, I want to mark as Exhibit 3 -- if you could take a few minutes

and look at that.

[Feltman Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

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Q For the record, I would note that this is an email exchange

of October 22, 2011, between Cheryl Mills and H. The subject line is

"FW: Secretary in Tripoli." And I'm going to focus on the middle

exchange but take a few minutes and review this. And it also bears

document number State SCB 0045106.

Have you had an opportunity to review that?

A Yes, I have.

Q The middle exchange that is at 2:36 p.m. in the middle

sentence is from Cheryl Mills to Gene Cretz. And, again, Gene Cretz

was the then-ambassador in Tripoli at the time. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And Cheryl Mills was the chief of staff and counselor

to the secretary. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Middle line says, and I quote, "I think we will move

forward with seeking to have Chris become charge in January and then

nominate him subsequently so he can begin serving."

Do you understand this to be a reference to your idea of having

Chris Stevens go in as the interim head in Tripoli pending his

nomination?

A Yes.

Q And this is the secretary's chief of staff who is concurring

with your idea. Is that correct?

A It appears so.

Q Okay. You had not known that?

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A Well, if I had, I'd forgotten it.

Q Do you know why it didn't happen?

A I don't know why it didn't happen, but it could very well

be that somebody pointed out that if we knew we were going to nominate

Chris that we probably shouldn't be sending him there ahead of agrement,

of Senate confirmation, et cetera, et cetera; that it could have

been -- it could have had to do with the prerogatives of your sister

body up here.

Q And the country and the Libyans?

A I don't think that the Libyans would have had a problem with

Chris since they accepted the agrement later.

Q Do you recall any discussions that you had regarding

interfering with the prerogatives of the Senate and confirmation as

the reason, and if so, who were those conversations with?

A I would suspect -- I don't remember, but I would suspect

that both H. and Pat Kennedy would have said, Jeff, you're crazy.

Q Do you recall specific conversations where they said that?

A No, I do not.

Q Do you recall specific conversations with Pat Kennedy

alone?

A Not on this subject.

Q Okay. It's our understanding that Ambassador Stevens or

soon-to-be Ambassador Stevens came out of Benghazi in late

November 2011 and then returned to Libya as ambassador in late May

of 2012. Does that coincide with your understanding?

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A Yes.

Q And, in fact, he went in just as you were leaving the State

Department. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Did you have contact with him in that period between

November of 2011 and May of 2012?

A Periodically through the, you know, through the

confirmation process, yes, and then particularly in May, because I'm

still sick that I had to miss his swearing-in ceremony because I needed

to go to a White House meeting on something or other. And so we were

communicating about that.

Q Was Chris Stevens kept involved with what was happening in

Libya during that period when he left his envoy before he went back

as ambassador?

A I don't remember what he did when he came back -- when he

came back from Benghazi, but once he was nominated he was in a very

special spot that all nominees to be chiefs of mission are in, which

is that you have to prepare for your confirmation hearing. You have

to have consultations on the hill. You need to stay informed about

what's happening in Libya so you can answer questions, but you no longer

can take decisions because you're not yet confirmed.

It would be presumptuous of any ambassador or nominee to play a

decision-making role on an issue for which you've been nominated but

haven't yet been confirmed. So Chris would have had to be kept informed

of Libya, but he no longer would have been in a key decision-making

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role in Libya until confirmation.

Q Okay. Why was he brought out in November?

A I mean, he'd been there since April. You know, the

conditions were very, very difficult in Benghazi. We knew in

November -- we hoped -- I don't remember when the White House agreed

to nominate him. I don't remember the chronology. But we, by

November, hoped that he would become the nominee for the -- to be the

ambassador and we hoped that he would get confirmation. And we were

just being humane, that he needed to have some kind of break to have

a little bit of normalcy in his life. It was not -- it was far from

a normal existence, the life he lived in Benghazi.

Q So Chris Stevens comes out in November of 2011 and then the

extension memo to Pat Kennedy is not submitted until late December.

Did Chris Stevens have any role in crafting that? I mean, when he came

out, did he come back to Main State? Did he take a vacation for a month?

What was his role, if any, in the extension of Benghazi?

A Certainly, the intellectual arguments mustered in that memo

were influenced by, in some cases authored by, Chris Stevens. At what

point I don't know, but it was before his nomination, so it was not

inappropriate for him to be playing that kind of role. He had some

personal things he needed to take care of as well. He took some time

off for health reasons.

Q Do you know if he, prior to his nomination, had any meetings

with DS or OBO regarding the amount of security that was needed in Libya

or the physical security that was required both in Tripoli and Benghazi?

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A It would have been typical for an ambassadorial nominee to

go around to talk to all the various parts of U.S. Government that

played a role in the post he or she was assumed to take after

confirmation, but I don't know his specific calendar.

Q Okay. But that would occur after his confirmation?

A No. It can -- after his?

Q Confirmation.

A No. You can talk -- the rules are that you can talk to

people about your post once you've been nominated as long as you're

not assuming confirmation, like you can't be taking decisions as if

you're going to be confirmed. But once you're nominated, you're free

game to talk to people about the post you're going to receive inside

the U.S. Government. You don't talk to foreign interlocutors about

your post until confirmation, but you can talk to U.S. Government

officials about it.

Q Okay. What about that period prior to nomination? He

comes out in November. He's not nominated until January sometime.

What about that time period? What are -- are there any rules governing

what he can and cannot do then?

A I don't remember what he did, if he went back to his -- we

had snatched Chris out of an office in State Department. I believe

it was INL. We had taken Chris back in the spring for Benghazi. And

I don't remember if he went back to that office or what he did, but

I am confident that we talked to him about his experience, about his

thoughts, about his analysis.

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We would have been very shortsighted not to use him as a resource

as we were trying to analyze various aspects of Libya policy given the

fact that he had the type of on-the-ground experience in Benghazi that

the rest of us lacked.

Ms. Jackson. I see that I am almost out of time, but I would ask,

Mr. Gowdy, do you have any questions for the witness?

Mr. Gowdy. No, ma'am.

Ms. Jackson. Then we will conclude our second hour of

questioning and go off the record and take a short break to at least

discuss logistics.

[Recess.]

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Ms. Jackson. By agreement of the parties, the majority staff is

going to continue asking questions, hopefully until we're done,

hopefully in about 30 minutes or so. And then we'll turn it over to

our minority colleagues, and then we're going to recess to a brief

classified session this afternoon.

So what I want to do first is hand you a document that I'm going

to mark as exhibit 4, and it is document C05579435.

[Feltman Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And it's marked unclassified in an action memo for Under

Secretary Kennedy, and dated May 1, 2012. The subject line is "Request

for permission for TDY travel of USG personnel to Tripoli, Libya." And

I'll give you a minute or two to review that essentially 1-page

document.

A Okay.

Q During the course of our investigation, we have learned that

it was not unusual when an embassy went on authorized departure or

ordered departure, that Under Secretary Kennedy would take over making

certain decisions regarding that overseas post during the time period

of ordered departure. Is that in keeping with your understanding of

how State Department would operate?

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A Yes. I have been at many posts on authorized ordered

departures over the years given places where I've served, and the rules

are that M approves travel to those posts.

Q What I'm unsure about and what I'd like to ask you about

is, this is a memo dated May 1, 2012, when Embassy Tripoli had

resumed -- and in fact, the memo says that operations were

reestablished on September 22, 2011. However, it remains an

unaccompanied status. If, on May 1, 2012 -- Ambassador Cretz was

there, was he not?

A I believe so.

Q And is it typical that the Ambassador is the person who

authorizes travel to a particular embassy?

A Yes.

Q Do you know why this and what we have seen are other memos

were still going to Under Secretary Kennedy in May of 2012?

A I don't remember why.

Q Is there anything in the procedures or rules of the State

Department that take away this authority from an Ambassador?

A I'm not aware, but I want to refer back to an answer I gave

earlier, which was the incredibly tight constraints on housing, beds,

logistical support at Embassy Tripoli. And if I had been Gene Cretz

at that time, which of course I wasn't, I would be telling agencies,

my own as well as others across the board: I'm sorry, I can't take

your TDY right now because there is not a bed. Agencies don't like

to hear that. Each agency or part of agency would believe that its

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mission is more important than anybody else's mission, so

perhaps -- I'm speculating here -- there was some internal decision

that M could help on this, could help insulate Gene, who had other things

to do, with very limited staff, than trying to sift through who were

the most important visitors at a post that could not receive everyone

who wished to go.

Q Well, I guess I'm just a little confused about that, or it

sort of begs the question because Under Secretary Kennedy had 11 offices

and bureaus to supervise, and he had a myriad of -- I think at the time

the number was 275 overseas posts. It seems like very sort of

in-the-weeds decisions to be making given that the Embassy had been

reopened for 7, 8 months at the time.

A I'm not copied on this memo. I don't remember seeing this

memo, but I have full confidence that , who did work

for me, who was really good at her job, would have been following some

understanding that we collectively had about how to deal with this.

Q So she would be a person who would maybe have some better

understanding or clarity on this particular memo and why these

decisions were still going to Under Secretary Kennedy?

A I don't preclude that I knew about this. I simply don't

remember.

Q Who else in the NEA front office would have insight on why

this was still occurring?

A I would assume that her boss, , who was the EX

director and who she was acting for according to what's written here

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on this memo, would have been aware, and perhaps the PDAS. Again, I

may have been told about this. I may have been briefed about this,

but it's not something that 3-1/2 years later, 3 years, or several years

later, I remember.

Q I also want to return to the December 2011 memo that extended

Benghazi operations into the end of 2012, and I have a copy of the memo

if you would like to review it, but I just wanted to ask you, do you

recall that that memo called for a principal officer and an IMO, or

a management officer and five DS agents?

A I don't recall the exact wording of that memo.

Q Let me pull out that memo.

A Something now 4 years old.

Ms. Jackson. So I'm going to mark this as exhibit 5.

[Feltman Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Deck. Just to be clear, when we spoke about the December 2011

memo to Pat Kennedy earlier today, this is the memo that was being

referred to. Is that right?

Ms. Jackson. Yes. At least we were.

Ms. Deck. That was my understanding?

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And for the record, exhibit 5 does not bear a document

number, but it is an action memo for Under Secretary Kennedy dated

December 27, 2011, from NEA, Jeffrey Feltman. Subject: Future of

operations in Benghazi, Libya. And I'll allow the witness a few

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minutes to review this. And just for direction, the second full

paragraph on page 2 discusses the staffing.

A Okay.

Q And reading from page 2, the second paragraph, the second

sentence, it says: Headed by an FS-02 or GS-14 officer, this office

would work in close coordination with Tripoli on political and economic

reporting; public diplomacy; and commercial work in the eastern part

of Libya and serve as, quote, "host," end quote, for the activities

of USAID, PM, and any other government TDY personnel in Benghazi.

Because this would be a smaller operation, Benghazi would continue to

be supported by one IRM TDYer for communications and management issues

and one NEA TDY reporting officer in addition to the TDY head of

operations.

And then the last sentence reads: "With a full complement of five

special agents, our permanent presence would include eight U.S. direct

hire employees, two slots for TDY PM and USAID officers, and one LES

program assistant."

Does that refresh your recollection as to what the staffing was

suggested for the expansion?

A I can read what I approved at the time. I don't remember

the specific numbers, but I can read what's in this memo.

Q Can you tell us what an FS-02 or and GS-14 officer is?

A And FS-02 or GS-14 officer I would say would fall in the

upper ranks of the mid-level of career professionals. These are not

senior Foreign Service officers. It's not even threshold of being

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senior Foreign Service officers, but it's someone who has more than

entry level experience. It's someone who has had some management

experience before, someone who would be, probably had been head of a

section of an embassy before, had this person served overseas, so

somebody who is past the midranks going upward.

Q And in this memo that is extending the operations in

Benghazi through the end of 2012, where it's talking about needing five

Diplomatic Security agents, is that then the considered assessment of

what was needed to protect the people as outlined in this memo?

A Could you repeat the question, please?

Q Okay. The number of five DS agents, was that the then

considered opinion that you needed five DS agents to provide security

for this mid-level reporting officer, the IRM TDYer and the NEA

reporting officer?

A It would be the considered opinion of those that contributed

to this memo who are listed on the clearance page of what was needed

in terms of the American security personnel.

Q Okay. And then if the post is also augmented by host nation

security?

A In general, that is the case. In a country like Libya, or

any number of other countries, diplomatic missions often have to create

their own local guard force if the hosts are unable to provide the type

of security that we would require.

Q Is it your experience that an ambassador generally requires

greater security than a FS-02 or GS-14 officer?

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A You know, this varies widely from place to place what the

security requirements are. If you're asking me, in general, does an

ambassador require more security than an FS-02 officer, the answer

would be yes because of the visibility of the Ambassador, the political

importance of the Ambassador, the targets to those who might not like

the U.S. Government. But I cannot speak about the specific

requirements of anybody in Libya past May 30, 2014.

Q But prior to May 30 --

A 2012, I'm sorry.

Q 2012. Yes.

A I'm sorry.

Q Prior to your departure from the State Department, was it

your understanding that the Ambassador, whether it was Ambassador Cretz

or Ambassador Stevens in those few days that he was there in those few

days as Ambassador, would have required a higher level of security than

a political reporting officer in the country of Libya?

A It's not something that the NEA Assistant Secretary is going

to get involved in unless an ambassador or Pat Kennedy asks the NEA

Assistant Secretary to get involved in. These decisions are made by

the Ambassador with his chief security officer, the head DS agent on

the ground, based on evolving circumstances. I don't think that

we -- I think that one should assume that in any post, including Libya,

there's an ongoing discussion between whoever is the senior American

and whoever is his or her senior security officer about what's the

appropriate posture given the circumstances as understood at the time.

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Q Do you recall that when he was in Benghazi, then Envoy

Stevens had 10 Diplomatic Security agents assigned to his personal

protection?

A I don't remember how many he had. Obviously, I would have

been a beneficiary when I visited, but I don't remember how many he

had.

Q When you would go to visit, would the security detail be

augmented in any way? Would you bring DS agents with you when you

traveled, or would they be augmented from Egypt or Tunisia or elsewhere?

A When I went to Libya, there was no augmentation because of

my presence. If I went to some post that had a lower security profile

but I had a higher security threat, there was higher security threat

information, DS may send someone there. But in the case of Libya, I

relied on what was available on the ground when I visited.

Q When you were visiting with Libya, did you always attend

meetings with Envoy Stevens?

A Yes. In May of 2011, my meetings included

because Chris Stevens was back. But in all of my meetings in Libya,

when I was working for the U.S. Government and all of my meetings as

Assistant Secretary of State -- and that was before my retirement -- I

would naturally include whoever was the lead American in those

meetings.

Q So there was no sort of divide and conquer, and you each

were doing different meetings at the same time that would necessitate

there being two teams of security?

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A No, we did not divide and conquer, no.

Q Did you have conversations with Chris Stevens regarding the

security in Libya and in Benghazi in particular right before he left

in November? So let's focus on the time period of your trip there in

August through the end of the year?

A I don't remember any security conversations between my trip

in August and November with Chris Stevens on security. If there were,

they were nothing significant that sticks in my head.

Q During the time when he had been nominated and pending going

back to Libya as the then Ambassador, do you recall having discussions

with him regarding the security situation in Libya?

A No.

Q Do you recall having conversations with Ambassador Cretz

regarding the security in Libya?

A Yes, but they were general conversations. Things like, I

could ask Gene: Are you getting what you need? Are you getting along

with your DS colleagues? Do you share the same assessments of what's

needed? Those are the sorts of conversations that the Assistant

Secretary has with chiefs of mission, and those are the sorts of

conversations I had with Gene Cretz after he went back to Tripoli.

Q Did he express frustration with you that he was not getting

what he asked for in Libya?

A I don't remember. I don't categorically say no, but I

simply don't remember. What I remember is his frustration with the

number of people who wanted to come to Libya that he could not

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accommodate.

Q Would you read cables that were issued by Embassy Tripoli

if they pertained to security matters or requests for security?

A Mixed because sometimes I would; sometimes I wouldn't. I

knew that others on my staff were monitoring this, and I would, you

know, rely on others to alert me if there was something that they felt

was not being addressed that should be addressed. They were, as I said

before, I was monitoring developments in 19 countries during a time

when the region was in turmoil, and I tended to read in many cases

summaries of cables rather than entire cables.

Q And who would have been that person that would have kept

you apprised of issues?

A It would have been , , Ray

Maxwell. It would have come up the system to me. We had morning

meetings every day with the senior leadership of NEA, and that was an

opportunity, those were operational meetings. Those were not policy

meetings. Those were meetings where we could say: Okay, what has to

happen? It could be operations. Like what's the paper we need to get

from the Secretary of State because she's traveling today, or it could

be about how do we make sure that this congressional visitor to Benghazi

is going to be well taken care of. And security issues would come up

in those meetings if those working for me felt that I needed to engage

on something -- I needed to call Pat Kennedy, I needed to call Eric

Boswell, I needed to make decisions -- things like that when I was

Assistant Secretary.

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Ms. Jackson. I'm going to hand you what I've marked as exhibit

6, which is an email exchange at the top, but it includes a cable, which

is known as 12 Tripoli 130.

[Feltman Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q The email exchange at the top is from a , dated

March 29, 2012. And the subject line is: "Request for DS TDY and FTE

support." It bears document No. C05389197. I'll give you as much time

as you need to review that.

A This cable reminds me of one thing that Chris Stevens was

doing after his deployment after November 2011 in Benghazi. He took

the FACT course. I remember he took the FACT course before he went

out to Tripoli as Ambassador.

Q Is that the Foreign Affairs Counterterrorism Training

course?

A Yes.

Q Was that a requirement for individuals who were going to

serve in Libya?

A Libya and other posts of similar problematic security

profile, yes.

Q The high-threat posts?

A Yes.

Q Was that generally restricted to war zones, near war zones?

A War zones, near war zones, places that had a particular

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security threat against American personnel.

Q And how long was that course? Do you recall? Was it a

matter of a week, or more like 4 weeks or 6 weeks?

A It was an evolving course. When I took it myself, I think

it was only a week, and I think it was expanded to 2 weeks, I believe.

Q Going back to exhibit 6, this is a -- would you agree with

the summary that this is a cable sent in by Embassy Tripoli for security

support for the U.S. State Department personnel at the Embassy and in

Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q And in particular, on the third page of this, it says, in

the paragraph entitled DS Agent Support in Benghazi, it reads, Post

requests continued supported for five TDY DS agents in Benghazi on

45- to 60-day rotations.

Do you know, are you aware that this cable was not granted in full

by DS?

A No.

Q This was never brought to your attention?

A Not that I recall, but I would be very surprised if people

in the bureau were not working on this, working on the basis of this

cable. It's a very well-argued cable. It reflects many of the issues

I have raised today, such as the incredible number of people wanting

to go on VIP visits and TDY, so it reflects the reality that I remember

more than 3-1/2 years ago, so I'd be very surprised if my staff, who

I had full confidence in, weren't working on this at DS.

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Q But would it surprise you that the State Department, given

what you've told us about the Ambassador is the person on the ground

and is supposed to know the situation on the ground and what security

resources are needed to protect his people, that the Ambassador did

not get what he requested, given that you've described this as a very

well-reasoned cable?

A I can't speak for this cable because I don't remember the

work -- I don't remember the cable or the work that was done afterwards.

I do know that when I was Chief of Mission in Beirut, I asked for lots

of things, including regarding security, that I did not get. There

was constantly a dialogue and discussion between what our essential

needs were, what we thought would make it easier or safer to do our

jobs, and what was available in Washington. When I was Ambassador in

Beirut, I would have loved to have had more armored vehicles to allow

more Embassy officers to get off the compound more frequently. That

just wasn't possible because of cost issues. So I suspect that there

was an ongoing discussion between DS, NEA, and Embassy Tripoli, about

which of these could be met, how security needs might otherwise be

addressed through alternative means. I think this is a very

well-argued cable, but it doesn't mean that I think that everything

in here was absolutely essential to Tripoli security. I don't know.

I wasn't part of those discussions.

Ms. Betz. Then going back to exhibit 5, when there is a specified

number of agents, would that be the essential number of agents that

you or NEA with DS concurrence felt was a minimum number of agents or

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essential to the operating of the mission? I guess the bottom line

is trying to reconcile what was cleared here, what was being requested

here, and then, you know, ostensibly not being fulfilled when an

Ambassador was making these requests.

Mr. Feltman. I do not remember and perhaps didn't know at the

time, but I certainly don't remember what were the exact numbers of

people in different areas of Benghazi or Tripoli's work in spring of

2012. I simply don't remember. It's been a long time, and I've done

a lot since that time. But, yes, I see the number five on a memo I

approved in terms of DS agents in Benghazi, and I see that number five

repeated here, so there's a consistency between these two memos that

reflect what must have been an NEA, DS, Embassy Tripoli understanding

of what Benghazi needed for support. But how this was followed up on,

I simply don't remember.

Ms. Jackson. And I guess what we're trying to understand is why

if DS was cleared on five, does an Ambassador have to write a cable

saying we want five?

Mr. Feltman. I can't speculate on what happened in 2011 and 2012.

Ms. Jackson. And just again, using documents to go back in time,

since it is difficult to remember, I'm handing you an email exchange,

dated February 9, 2012, from to , bearing

document No. C05390170, and the subject line is, RE: Draft email for

your clearance, lack of security staffing at Benghazi undermining

mission. I'll give you a few minutes to review that document.

[Feltman Exhibit No. 7

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Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Feltman. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Do you recall that, in February of 2012, that this issue

was brought to your attention?

A I recall this was brought to my attention at some point,

but I don't know when it was brought to my attention.

Q Okay. As we read the bottom of page 1 of this document,

it appears that has drafted an email for you to send

on and/or perhaps drafted an email for to send on to you.

Is that your reading of this memo?

A It's my reading of the memo, but I note that I'm not copied

on this, and I don't remember receiving this email. I remember the

issue. I don't remember receiving the email. Perhaps you have

documentation I did.

Q We don't, which is why we're asking the question as to

whether you recall receiving this?

A I don't recall receiving the email. I remember the issue,

but I, again, point out that this has been now nearly 4 years ago.

Q Was this a recurring problem that was brought to your

attention?

A It was a recurring problem that was brought to my attention

across NEA. I don't remember it being specific to Libya. This memo

has a particular critical need in Libya, but we were always having to

look for the resources. Whether it was security resources, financial

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resources, OBO resources, or Embassy, there was a constantly looking

across a rapidly change NEA region to figure out how in a time of frozen

or declining resources overall for the State Department, we could have

what we needed, what we felt we needed.

Q Do you recall elevating this issue to Under Secretary

Kennedy as is suggested in this email exchange?

A I talked to Pat Kennedy about many issues. He initiated

discussions. I initiated discussions. I talked to Eric Boswell about

many of these issues, but I simply don't remember whether this specific

issue was raised. I suspect it was. This is a pretty serious one.

Q Why is this a serious issue?

A If we're talking about having the presence that, according

to , is on lockdown because of lack of security resources, well,

then there is no reason -- one could question why we're there. And

that would, of course, concern me.

Q And was and some of your most

trusted employees in NEA?

A I had many trusted employees of NEA, but, yes, they were

among the people who I had full confidence in.

Q At the top of this email, writes to

, she goes: "Also, the Secretary asked last week if we still

had a presence in Benghazi. I think she would be upset to hear that,

yes, we do but because we don't have enough security, they are on

lockdown."

Were you ever in a meeting where the Secretary asked if we still

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had a presence in Benghazi?

A No. That part of the memo surprises me.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that would

have misspoken in any way?

A No.

Q Was she a very careful person?

A In my experience, yes.

Q One last area, and then I'll conclude. Did you know an

individual by the name of ?

A I met him when I was in Benghazi.

Q What was his role or association or affiliation with the

Benghazi mission, if he had one?

A In terms of his contractual relationship with the Benghazi

mission, I don't recall. I think there was something -- I don't know

that he was a locally engaged staff or he had some contractual

relationship. We eventually had some contractual relationship with

him, but I don't remember what it was. But, in general, he was someone

that is familiar to all of us who had served overseas working for the

Foreign Service, which is someone who befriends a mission and has the

ability to open doors, provide contacts, provide analysis. It's

important not to be over relying on any of these people because you

never know what their agendas may be, but it's also important to take

advantage of any help that they could have in providing local contacts,

local understanding, local context. He was one of those that every,

every American who serves overseas has, the type of contact every U.S.

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diplomat serving in a political and leadership role would have.

Q He's the person who sort of has his ear to the ground, if

you will?

A Yes, he would have his ear to the ground. But, again, one

cannot, and Chris did not, over rely on any one person. Nobody has

a monopoly on information in any country.

Q Were there other Libyans that you're aware of that had a

contractual relationship with the Benghazi mission?

A I mean, I met other locals when I was there, so we must have

had some other local staff in some relationship because I did meet with

locals there. These are not the sorts of things that the Assistant

Secretary is going to get concerned about, unless it's brought to his

attention that one needs to.

Q Actually, let me rephrase. In the relationship or

undertaking the duties that did, being sort of your eyes

and ears and making introductions, was there any other Libyan under

contract or being paid in any way that you're aware of in Benghazi?

A No, I'm not aware of any others, but if the question is

intended to suggest that we only talk to people who would set

up for us, that answer is clearly no.

Ms. Jackson. That was not the intent of the question at all.

That's all the questions I have. Let's go off the record.

[Recess.]

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Let's go back on the record.

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A I would like to mention something again about exhibit 7,

which was an email exchange between and

about Benghazi and Benghazi being on lockdown. Because as I said, this

surprises me. It surprises me that this was written in this particular

way, because, A, I have total trust in and based on the

experience I had working with them. But, B, I also had sort of an

ongoing conversation with Secretary Clinton about developments in the

Middle East and North Africa, and I don't know what the explanation

is for what's written here, but I can't imagine that she would have

been surprised at having a presence in Benghazi. So I'm not quite sure

what to make of this. I want to make that clear because the decisions

of personnel -- not numbers -- but where people were in the Middle East

was something that interested the Secretary greatly, and I'm convinced

that she knew that we had maintained a presence in Benghazi beyond the

return to Tripoli in the fall of 2012 -- the fall of 2011.

Q Okay. So just to make the record clear, we're looking at

exhibit 7, and the part that you were finding surprising was the

statement in here written by to that,

and I'm quoting, that "also the Secretary asked last week if we still

have a presence in Benghazi." That's the part that you're talking

about?

A Yeah. I don't know because I wasn't part of this exchange,

but I can see the Secretary saying: Hey, we still have those people

in Benghazi, don't we? I could see something like that, that she's

affirming the knowledge that she had, but this more than any of the

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other exhibits that you guys have shown me today sort of surprises me,

and I don't quite understand it because I know the Secretary knew that

we still had people in Benghazi.

Q I wouldn't worry about it too much. I think we have already

spoken to about it, and it doesn't seem that there was

very much to it.

Let's stay on that document, though, because we're on it anyway,

and I want to draw your attention to the lower part of it, not that

upper part that you were talking about, but the original sort of email

from to with the subject line, "Draft

email for your clearance," ostensibly for clearance.

Within that email, which you never received and you have already

explained you don't recall, she is talking about issues with being able

to, issues with not having enough security such that posts could travel

off of post. Is that right? So it's, and I'll quote: "Post needs

a minimum of three agents to facilitate one movement at a time in town

and one to remain on compound." I'll quote: "DS staffing has dropped

to two agents several times over the last few months between rotations,

which has prevented the PO from leaving the compound. DS tells post

it is unlikely they can fully staff Benghazi due to broader staffing

challenges across NEA and has suggested we adjust our expectations

about movements and outreach."

So is it fair to say that this is a discussion about whether

there's enough DS agents to fulfill the mission in terms of exiting

the post and meeting and engaging with individuals off post?

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A That's exactly what it's about. I also do want to

underscore that people also come to us. When I was in Benghazi visiting

Chris in August -- visiting Chris -- when I was in Benghazi having

meetings with Chris in August of 2011, we combined going off compound

to see certain officials with receiving others on the compound. So

this is -- the idea of not being able to move off compound is a severe

constraint without question, but it doesn't preclude contacts all

together.

Q And, also, is it fair to say that nothing in this email is

raising a specific concern about the security of the people on compound,

as in we don't have enough agents to defend the compound and keep our

people safe?

A This memo, as I read it, is about getting people off

compound, what is required to get people off compound to meetings

elsewhere.

Q Around this same time period, came into D.C.

and met with Deputy Assistant Secretary Lamb about some of these issues.

Were you aware of that?

A I may have been at the time. I don't remember.

Q And if she was meeting with DAS Lamb, is it possible then

that that conversation was being worked at a lower level below you,

that it never got brought to your attention?

A I mean, yes. In general, the State Department, like other

organizations, tries to address problems, overcome challenges, come

to solutions, at lower levels. If it can be done at the desk officer

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level, it doesn't go higher. If it can't be done there, it goes office

director and on up. So if and Charlene Lamb were working on

something, it wouldn't necessarily have come to my attention. Even

if they had reached an absolute block in the ability to reach consensus,

it would have gone to the DAS or PDAS level before coming to me.

Q Do you recall whether anyone, Ambassador Stevens,

, Ambassador Cretz, or anyone else asked you for help to

intervene and ensure that they received more security assistance in

Benghazi?

A I simply don't remember.

Q And if they had done that, what would you have done?

A I would have started by talking to Eric Boswell. I would

have referred back to the memo that we talked about today, the December

memo, in which there was a clear consensus of what the needs were in

Benghazi and how to address them at that time. And I would have, had

Eric and I not been able to come to agreement between ourselves, which

would have been rare -- Eric and I usually could -- then I would have

asked to see Pat Kennedy.

Q Do you recall having that experience happen?

A I don't recall this. It happened a lot where I would talk

to Eric or Pat about issues, but what the specific subjects were that

I talked with them each time 4 years ago, I don't remember.

Q And would you recall if it had not gotten resolved,

essentially so -- if this issue in Libya had gone on, you would have

talked to Eric Boswell; he would have told you no. Or you would have

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talked to Pat Kennedy, and he would have said no to you. Would you

recall if that had not gotten resolved in any way?

A I don't recall. I don't recall one way or the other, but

I think I would have recalled if we had had a big fight about it.

Q And did anyone in Benghazi or Tripoli ever tell you that

they thought that the security situation in Benghazi had gotten so

dangerous that they recommended evacuation?

A No.

Q And if they had, would you have taken the request seriously?

A It would have depended on the source, and I would have wanted

others to look across the spectrum of information we had available to

us to evaluate in the context of what else we knew. But it is a serious

allegation, so I would not have just dismissed it without further

consideration.

Q And certainly if the Ambassador, Ambassador Cretz or later

Ambassador Stevens, had recommended evacuation?

A Oh, had they recommended -- I thought you meant just the

random Muhammad on the street. Had Chris Stevens or Gene Cretz made

such a recommendation, that would have been extremely serious. It

would have been taken seriously by all of us in Washington.

Q Let's go back up to essentially the top of that exhibit 7,

talking about the Secretary. There have been some allegations to the

effect that Secretary Clinton's attention shifted to neglect of Libya

or that her level of care or concern fell in 2012. In your view, did

Secretary Clinton essentially check out on Libya in 2012?

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A No.

Q Did she turn a blind eye to Libya in 2012?

A No.

Q Did she turn a blind eye to Benghazi in 2012?

A No.

Q Did she ever say or do anything that suggested to you that

she did not care about the Department's personnel in Libya?

A Oh, Heavens, no.

Q Or that she didn't care about the Department's personnel

who were assigned in Benghazi?

A No.

Q And you say, "Heavens, no," I assume because --

A She was always asking me how people were doing. She knew

how hard it was for people at these posts in this time of great turmoil.

She knew how hard NEA was working. She came down to NEA a couple times

just to give us sort of a morale boost. I don't remember her

specifically asking about this or that post. I just know that she was

always asking me: How are your people doing, Jeff?

Q And in her conversations with you, it was your impression

that she took the safety and security of American personnel overseas

seriously?

A Yes.

Q Let me turn your attention to exhibit 6. This went over

in the last round too, and I just want to bring your attention to the

sort of DS agent support in Benghazi. So this is a cable that I believe

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you said in the last round you don't recall whether you ever saw, from

March 28, 2012, from Tripoli to D.C., to provide extra security in D.C.

In that first line, it reads, and this is the sort of first full

paragraph on the second page of the cable: "DS Agent Support in

Benghazi: Post requests continued support for five TDY DS agents in

Benghazi on 45- to 60-day rotations." Is there anything about that

sentence that implies to you reading it now that they were not getting

the support for five TDY DS agents? I mean, it says "continued

support."

A I read what I read, which is continued support, that there

must have been some concerned that at some point, given the limitations

on DS resources globally, that there was a worry that at some point,

DS may say: We can't do this any longer.

So, to me, this reads as putting down a marker. You know, those

people you agreed to back in that December 27 memo, we still need them.

Q I now want to shift quite a bit to your time at the U.N.,

and I'm not going to ask you about conversations or discussions at the

U.N., but I do want to just briefly talk so we can sort of draw some

lines around your actions at the U.N.

When you were in your position at the U.N., you had already retired

from the U.S. Government in May. Is that right?

A I left the U.S. Government entirely in May. I retired and

took a break, took a break in service before I was hired by the U.N.

of 5 weeks or something. So as of May 30, 2012, my only -- I have two

connections with the U.S. Government. One is I'm a retiree. I have

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a Foreign Service pension like my colleagues who have retired from the

Foreign Service. And, second, the United States is an extremely

important member state of the United Nations, and in that context, I

continue to engage with U.S. officials on issues on which the U.N. is

working, as I engage with Russian, South African, and Brazilian

officials.

Q But from your capacity in the U.N., would your statements

from a position at the U.N. be on behalf of the U.N. or behalf of the

U.S.?

A I work for the United Nations. I do not work for the

U.S. Government. I have taken an oath of office to the United Nations

that I do not represent the interests of any member state. I represent

the principles and the values of the charter of the United Nations,

to the best of my ability.

Q So just two quick followups from exhibit 6, which is the

cable from March 28, 2012. Are you aware of whether or not this cable

was responded to by Diplomatic Security?

A I am not aware.

Q And do you see any action items for NEA within this cable?

A I would hope that my staff would be following up with DS

on this cable. The action itself is in DS' purview. But Embassy

Tripoli personnel are in Tripoli. NEA staff is in Washington, so I

would have expected my staff to be representing Embassy Tripoli's

interests in seeing some of these issues followed up on, so I hope that

the very fine staff that worked for me was following up on these issues

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once this cable came in.

Q So, at this point, I'm just going to move to something that

we do with all the witnesses. I'm going to ask you a series of questions

that we ask every witness about a series of public allegations that

have occurred since the attacks.

A These are identical questions?

Q Identical questions to every witness. It's our

understanding that even where the questions may have been answered by

another investigation, that our colleagues in the majority are still

pursuing some of these allegations, so we ask the same questions to

everybody just to make sure that we have covered them. What I'm asking

for is not sort of an opinion, but just whether you have firsthand

information, and if you don't, we'll just simply move on to the next

one, and there's about a dozen, so please bear with me.

It's been alleged that the Secretary of State, Secretary Clinton,

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta

to stand down, and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending

more assets to help in Benghazi. Do you have any evidence that

Secretary of State Clinton ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to

stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

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A No. I, again, had left the U.S. Government service months

before the attack.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it, quote, "Four

Pinocchios," its highest award for false claims. Do you have any

evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable

denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instructions on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations Libya in the

spring of 2011?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton --

A No.

Q Let me just ask it, sir. Do you have any evidence that

Secretary Clinton misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the

risks posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support

for military operations Libya in spring 2011?

A No.

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Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and that they found,

quote, "no support for this allegation," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to, quote, "stand down" but that instead there were tactical

disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart. Do you have

any evidence that would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's

finding that there was no standdown order to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether or not you personally agree with the

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decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask the questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

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in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or misleading evidence to Congress about the Benghazi talking

points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks. Do you have any evidence that Ambassador

Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on

the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was, quote, "missing in action," end quote. Do you have

any evidence to support the allegation that the President was virtually

AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action on the night of the

attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

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to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four officials were instead ordered to remain

in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location. A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed

Services Committee found that, quote, "there was no standdown order

issued to military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight

in Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no standdown order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of

the attacks, after which, he stated, quote, "Given where the troops

were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated,

we probably couldn't have done more than we did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

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to deploy?

A No.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Thank you. Let's go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 2:19 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed

session.]

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INTERVIEW OF

CHIEF OF OPERATIONS

FOR THE

NEAR EAST DIVISION

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, DECEMBER 10, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

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INTERVIEW OF

THOMAS NIDES

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JULY 23, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel

ERIN O’BRIEN, Minority Detailee

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ERIC SNYDER, Senior Counsel

***

FOR THOMAS NIDES

RUSSELL ANELLO

RAUL YANES

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(1)

INTERVIEW OF THOMAS NIDES

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI,

Washington, DC.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room HVC–205,

Capitol Visitor Center, commencing at 10:08 a.m.

Present: Representatives Gowdy, Jordan, Brooks, and Roby.

Appearances:

For the Select Committee on Benghazi: Dana Chipman, Chief Investigative Counsel; Mac Tolar, Senior Counsel; Sheria Clarke,

Counsel; Kim Betz, Member Outreach Liaison; Susanne Sachsman

Grooms, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel; Heather Sawyer,

Minority Chief Counsel; Ronak Desai, Minority Counsel; Erin

O’Brien, Minority Detailee.

For the U.S. Department of State: Eric Snyder, Senior Counsel;

***

For Thomas Nides: Russell Anello, Raul Yanes.

Ms. BETZ. So I’m just going to go over a few ground rules that

will sort of guide our discussion today. This is a transcribed interview of Thomas Nides conducted by the House Select Committee on

Benghazi. The interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of

the committee’s investigation into the attacks on the U. S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant

to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress, and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Would the witness please state his name for the record?

Mr. NIDES. Thomas Nides.

Ms. BETZ. We appreciate your willingness to appear at this interview. My name is Kim Betz with the committee’s majority staff,

and I will ask everyone around the room to go ahead and introduce

themselves.

Ms. CLARKE. Sheria Clarke, majority staff.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I’m Susanne Sachsman Grooms, minority staff.

Mr. DESAI. Ronak Desai with the minority staff.

Ms. O’BRIEN. Erin O’Brien with the minority.

Mr. SNYDER. Eric Snyder, State Department.

Ms. * * *. * * *, State Department.

Mr. ANELLO. Russel Anello with Mr. Nides.

Mr. YANES. Raul Yanes, Mr. Nides’ attorney.

Mr. CHIPMAN. Dana Chipman with the committee staff.

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Ms. BETZ. Thank you. I want to discuss a few process details that

will guide our discussion today. Generally, the way that the questioning has worked, a member from the majority will ask questions

first for up to an hour. And then the minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal period of time if they choose.

Questions may be asked only by a member of the committee or designated staff.

It has been our practice to alternate back and forth, 1 hour per

side, until we are out of questions and the interview is over, but

in some cases, we deviated from this practice. Unlike testimony or

a deposition in Federal Court, the committee format is not bound

by the rules of evidence. The witness or their counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review by the chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot be resolved in the interview, the

witness can be required return for a deposition or hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. This

has not been an issue we encountered in the past, but I wanted to

make sure that you are clear on the process.

This session will start as unclassified. If any question calls for

a classified answer, please let us know, and we will reserve its answer until we move into a classified setting, and we will move

downstairs if necessary to a classified setting.

As I said earlier, we want to make this process as easy as possible for you. You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time

throughout the interview. If something needs to be clarified, just

ask us, and we will try to clarify it for you. If you need to discuss

anything with your counsel, we will go off the record, and stop the

clock to provide you with this opportunity. We would like to take

a break whenever it is convenient for you. This can be after every

hour of questioning, after a couple of rounds, whatever you prefer.

During a round of questioning, if you need anything, a glass of

water, use of the facilities, time to confer, you know, just please let

us know, and we will go off the record and stop the clock. Like I

said, we want to make this as easy as possible.

As you can see we have an official reporter that is taking down

everything you say to make a written record, so we ask that you

give verbal responses, yes or no, as opposed to nods of the head.

I’m going to ask the reporter to please feel free to jump in if you

do respond nonverbally so that we can clarify your answer. Do you

understand this?

Mr. NIDES. I do.

Ms. BETZ. Also, we should both try not to talk over each other,

so it is easier to get a clear record. I’m guilty of that. So we want

you to answer our questions in the most complete and truthful

manner possible, so we will take our time and repeat or clarify our

questions if necessary. If you have any question, or if you do not

understand any of our questions, please let us know. We will be

happy to clarify or repeat our questions.

If you honestly don’t know an answer to a question, or do not remember, it is best not to guess. Just please give us your best recollection, and if there are things you do not know or can’t remember,

just say so. And please inform us who, to the best of your recollection, may be able to provide a more complete answer.

736
You are required to answer questions from Congress truthfully.

Do you understand this?

Mr. NIDES. I do.

Ms. BETZ. This also applies to questions posed by congressional

staff in an interview. Do you understand this?

Mr. NIDES. I do.

Ms. BETZ. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or making false

statements. Do you understand this?

Mr. NIDES. I do.

Ms. BETZ. Is there any reason you are unable to provide truthful

answer to today’s questions?

Mr. NIDES. No.

Ms. BETZ. That’s the end of my preamble. I will ask the minority

if they would like to add anything.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. No. Thank you for coming.

Ms. BETZ. So the time is now 10:13, and we will start with our

questions.

EXAMINATION BY MS. BETZ

Q: Mr. Nides, is that what you prefer?

A: No, Tom is—Tom, I would prefer.

Q: That is very formal. Your position at the State Department,

Deputy Secretary for Management, is a relatively or was a relatively new position. The Secretary talked a little bit about the position earlier this fall when she testified before the committee. So

I just wanted to get a sense from you what the reporting structure

was, vis-a-vis your position, the Under Secretary for Management,

and how the decisionmaking worked. What was in your purview?

What was in the Under Secretary’s purview?

A: Well, first, thank you for having me. I think, as you probably

know, that the job—I was only the second occupant of the job. Jack

Lew was the first; I was the second. So it is a work in progress,

as I like to say. As you know, I think it was Hal Rogers who actually come up with the idea of a second deputy. It wasn’t until Hillary Clinton determined to actually fill the job and called Paul, debated it, and then ultimately decided not to. And I think Secretary

Clinton was the first one to actually fill the job.

The job was, obviously, new. It is going to take many years, I

think, for—to get clear about what—who is responsible for what,

and the structure the State Department needs to, obviously, shake

out as it relates to that.

But as I—my primary responsibility as the Deputy Secretary for

Management and Resources was really focusing principally on the

resource side of it. I was the point person on the budget for the

State Department. I managed—not only managed the State Department budget, but I was the chief advocate for the budget up

on the Hill. I spent an enormous amount of time on areas that

were focused on large sums of money or people. I spent an enormous amount of time in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, and Iraq because those were the three areas where we were spending huge

amounts of resources. We had the structure. I obviously reported

to Secretary Clinton.

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The Under Secretary for Management reported to me. Although,

to be honest, it was a work in progress. I think it still is a work

in progress, because when you look at a work chart, although he

is under the Deputy Secretary, the exact solid lines, or dotted lines,

were somewhat vague. But that job, his job had been around for

50 years, so many of the actual functions reported directly to that

individual and, obviously, he reported to me.

Q: So it was—would you say a case-by-case sort of situation as

to the decisions that you made versus the decisions that he made?

A: Yeah, I would be—I would probably clarify to say that he

would make, you know, he is a 30-year veteran of the State Department, so, I never second-guessed, in many cases, the expertise of

someone who had been around for that many years, especially as

related to security, or building operations, or technology, having

been there as long as he had been.

But I think where I would get involved is if there was a conflict,

if there was a decision that couldn’t get made, or there was a question of conflicting disagreements among the careerists. But I was

very focused, as Secretary Clinton was, to make sure that the career people, the people who were the professionals who were making the decisions, and ultimately we were, you know, responsible

to—would come up to us only as those decisions were actually implemented or close to being implemented.

Q: Would there ever been a time where you would resolve any

management issues that were going on, sort of within his division?

A: You know, I think that, you know, again—I, again, as someone who had been there, I had only just gotten there. You know,

I was, obviously, not a—I was a political appointee and only just

arrived, and I had been there for 2 years. I would say a great preponderance of the decisions that were made were made by the career professionals, and rarely did those decisions ultimately come

up to me to basically be the judge and jury on the decisions. I

mean, obviously, I signed off on decisions, on some decisions, but

many of those decisions were made by the career people who were

actually on the ground making them.

Q: Okay. Just taking a step back to the afternoon and night of

the attack on September 11, how were you first notified?

A: Well, I just returned from Egypt. I was in Egypt on Monday.

I think, you know, on the seventh floor, I don’t really—so obviously,

3 years ago, I don’t recall exactly the chain of events. I’m presuming that either the watch ops or the ops center may have notified us that there was something going on—remember that something first was going on in Egypt——

Q: Right.

A: [continuing]. Which I had just left and I realized that that had

just occurred. So that was going on, you know, the Middle East was

kind of chaotic at this point. There was lots of concerns about this

video, about all the kind of concerns around that. So we were all

kind of heightened, somewhat heightened alert vis-a-vis that. But

I think ultimately I was—I probably was—I was probably notified

by the ops center. I don’t recall.

Q: Do you remember what your next step was once you were notified? Did you talk to the Secretary right away? Did you talk to

Cheryl Mills, Jake Sullivan?

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A: You know, I don’t really recall exactly the chain of events. It

was kind of a bit of a blur. We didn’t know how serious it was. We

didn’t know the capacity of—we were also still trying to figure out

what happened in Egypt, because that was protesters who had

jumped over the fence and we saw how serious that was.

I think ultimately we got together at some point, midafternoon,

to try to assess it and try to get, you know, clear information because at that point information was coming quite erratically, and

ops center was the collection of all of that. So I don’t remember the

chain of events between 3 o’clock, or 4 o’clock, or 5 o’clock, but I

know we were all communicating.

Q: Did you reach out to anybody? Did you reach out to your contacts at the NSC, CIA, DOD that afternoon?

A: You know, I know there was a flurry of conversations. I just

can’t remember, you know, who talked to who when. I’m sure there

is a log from the ops center.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: But I know we were all, you know, there’s not that many of

us on the seventh floor. We were—at this point, we were just trying to gather information. We didn’t know if this was—something

was happening in Benghazi, or what was going on in Tripoli. You

know, there’s a lots in the Middle East—North Africa was a little

bit inflamed at this point. So I don’t really recall who I actually

talked to. I’m sure I talked to a lot of people. A lot of people were

talking to us, and we were just, you know, they use this word, the

fog of war. I don’t know, I guess some people talk about that. It

was actually—there’s some truth to that, right, especially when you

are talking about people’s lives. And I think that was what we

were basically focused on.

Q: Did you—were you on the call when the Secretary talked to

Director Petraeus that afternoon?

A: No.

Q: Were you on the call when she talked to President Magarief?

A: No.

Q: Did she update, or did anybody update you as to what was

discussed on those calls?

A: You know, I don’t recall. I don’t recall. I may have seen the

readouts, but I don’t recall it.

Q: Well, later that evening, I believe there was a 7:05, or around

the 7 o’clock call, conference call that the Secretary convened, I

think, with some State Department principals. Do you remember

who was on that call?

A: All I remember is she was at the State Department, so I was

physically there. She was there quite late. So if she had a call, I

don’t know, I must have been on the—I don’t remember, to be honest with you.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: [continuing]. But she was there quite late that night. So I

don’t know if she went into another room to have another call, but

I was certainly in the room during most of those activities.

Q: Was Jake Sullivan on the call?

A: I don’t—I have no idea who was on the call. I mean, Jake, obviously——

Q: Right.

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A: [continuing]. And Cheryl, and many of those people were all

on the seventh floor. I don’t know who was in and who was out and

I don’t know when the call took place, but——

Q: But it was a call or a meeting that sort of prefaced the later

7:30 SVTC? Correct?

A: To be honest with you, I just don’t remember. I don’t—you

know, it was 3 years ago. I know we had dozens of meetings and

dozens of conference calls, and dozens of trying to find out what

was going on. So I don’t know the 7 or 7:30, I just don’t know.

Q: Well, let me ask you this: When you talked, when you convened and discussed what was going on, did you discuss the status

of the Ambassador?

A: Oh, yeah, I mean, I think, well, we didn’t know, unfortunately.

We didn’t know if he was—unfortunately, we didn’t know if he was

dead or alive. We were told he was missing. We weren’t sure where

he was. We didn’t know where the other Americans were. We

didn’t know the situation on the ground. It was quite confusing. We

were getting all sorts of information that we couldn’t figure out if

it was fact or fictional. So those reports continued to come in

throughout the evening.

Q: Did you discuss evacuating personnel?

A: Again, I don’t remember exactly the conversation. I assume—

remember, there was a very structurally small group of people in

Benghazi at that point. I think we were really trying to figure out

the status of the people that were there, and the safety of those individuals that were there. And I don’t recall exactly what the

words were used about getting people in or out. Clearly, they wanted to get people out if they could, at least save their lives. So I

don’t remember the specific, you know, what was the word, ‘‘evacuate.’’ I think the question was, can we, you know, save these people’s lives.

Q: Did you discuss the deployment of the FEST?

A: Not to my knowledge. I know there was conversations could

we get resources to Benghazi, and those conversations were going

on. But I don’t recall that particular team. The question was, was

there resources either in Tripoli or somewhere else we get to help?

I’m sure those conversations were going on.

Q: Did you discuss, there must have been some sort of discussion

on strategy, though, in addition to trying to acquire information as

to how to identify the whereabouts of the Ambassador?

A: Well, sure. I mean, the strategy was how, if this consulate or

temporary facility is under attack, how are we going to save people’s lives? Right?

Q: Uh-huh.

A: So certainly, there was—that was first and foremost in everyone’s mind. First of all, how serious was it? What was going on?

We were trying to get—we couldn’t—the problem was, you know,

sadly, we just didn’t have enough information, right?The communication was being done through a cell phone, I think, in Benghazi

to the office in Tripoli, who were then communicating with us. It

was very confusing of what was actually happening.

So I don’t recall exactly—I guess, strategy, strategy was we needed more information on what was actually going on. Because quite

frankly, no one knew what was going on until very late.

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Q: Did the Secretary discuss her conversation with President

Magarief with you all in terms of obtaining country clearance, or

just putting him on notice for any types of clearance, that any type

of potential military deployment of assets would be needed?

A: To be honest with you, I don’t recall the specific conversations.

I think we were trying to figure out anything and everything we

could do to save the lives. If, in fact, what was going on was what

we are seeing or hearing, that they are under attack. I don’t recall

who had what conversations and what were asked for and what

wasn’t asked for.

Q: So we just—we talked a little bit—you just mentioned the

7:30 White House SVTC. Do you recall being on the SVTC?

A: I really—I mean, I really don’t. I mean, I’m sure I was on—

my assumption is I was on most of the calls, but I can’t tell you

if it was 7:30, or 7:45, or—the calls all were a blur at that point,

because we were getting called by a lot of people at different points,

so I have no idea. I’m sure there is a manifest somewhere if I was

there or not so I assume. I assume if you ask that, I was there,

but I don’t remember.

Q: Do you remember talking to DOD Panetta’s chief of staff, Jeremy Bash?

A: I don’t remember it. I have been told that I did. Or somehow,

I had seen an email and I guess I did, or he sent me an email, but

I don’t remember talking to him, but I could have. I don’t know.

Q: Do you remember any potential conversations, or conversations with the CIA on that SVTC?

A: Again, I just don’t remember. To be honest with you, I don’t

remember. I assume they were on the call, but I can’t, to be honest

with you, I can’t tell you what was said or wasn’t said. I can’t remember.

Q: Was there ongoing conversations with the CIA that night?

A: I—as I think about it, I assume there was, but I can’t tell you

when they were. I assume Secretary Clinton reached out to the

head of the CIA at that point. But I can’t tell you for sure when

those conversations happened, but, again, I just, you know, it was

a—it was a pretty distressing few hours, and a lot of calls were

happening, a lot of meetings were happening, a lot of people were

trying to figure out what was going on. So I don’t recall the specifics of who talked to who when.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: But my assumption is there was a lot of conversations going

on among all the players at the table.

Q: Did you, in that discussion, talk about what you saw while

you were in Cairo vis-a-vis the beginning of any potential protests

or——

A: No, I had taken a business delegation with me. We met with

the new president and there was no—it was, quite frankly, I left

before the disruption happened.

Q: Okay. Do you remember having any later calls with Jake Sullivan or Under Secretary Kennedy later that evening, around 10:00

o’clock?

A: You know, I don’t. I mean, I assume we had lots of calls, but

I don’t remember specific calls of when I had them, but we were

all, we were all sitting in the Secretary’s conference room, you

741
know, for 9 hours, and eating Indian food or something, and trying

to figure out what was going on and trying to make sure that we

were doing the right thing.

Q: Was the strategy at that point to wait and see what you could

do or what information you could glean about the Ambassador before any sort of additional steps were taken?

A: No. I think there was—I think we were trying to get—one,

they were trying to assess the seriousness of the situation in

Benghazi. I think we then started worrying about the operations

in Tripoli.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: We then started being concerned about the rest of North Africa of what these other embassies—I mean, there was concerns

about what was potentially going to happen in Pakistan. So at that

point, we were, you know, somewhat concerned about this spreading very quickly to all parts of the Middle East, and I think that’s

what we were becoming concerned about.

So now we were concerned about saving the lives of the guys in

Benghazi. We were also worried about what was happening in the

rest of the Middle East.

Q: So that’s what I’m trying to nail down at what—sort of what

was the strategy with regard to Benghazi, putting aside what

was—what potentially happened later in the week with regard to

other Arab Spring nations? So, do you understand what I’m trying

to say?

A: So——

Q: So I understand, you know, that the, sort of that area, that

region, was sort of in turmoil?

A: Yeah.

Q: But at that point, that night, there were, you know, your personnel——

A: Sure.

Q: [continuing]. On the ground, what was being done to, A, either

get them out? What was the decisionmaking process at that time

among the senior staff?

A: Well, I think principally, we were relying on the Diplomatic

Security operations to help us figure out what could or couldn’t be

done. I know there was lots of calls to the militia that had actually

protected us in the past.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: So there was lots of communication trying to get them to go

to the consulate. Again, I’m using the word consulate. It wasn’t a

consulate. It was a temporary facility, differentiations that you all

know now, probably better than most. And so I think there was

lots of ongoing—I wasn’t a party to that, but I know there were lots

of conversations. Because again, as you are well aware, we count

on, because the Vienna Convention, for the host countries to protect these facilities. We can only have so many DS agents and facilities. We count on the country to help us protect. In this particular case, the militia, the local militia had been previously quite

helpful in protecting our facilities.

Now, ultimately, what happened, I’m not exactly sure what conversations were taking place, but I know there was some of that.

I think we were trying to get more information from the Diplomatic

742
Security, whatever feeds we were getting in from them on actually

what’s happening. So I think it was really a resource gathering,

and then trying to communicate as much as we could with the governments to try to get as much help as we could.

Q: Well, let me ask you this:Because the mission wasn’t officially

notified to the Libyan Government, so technically, those individuals

on the ground weren’t technically covered under Chief of Mission

authority?

A: Yes.

Q: So they were really in an unprotected status. Would you

agree?

A: Well, again, I think the ARB, as you know, looked at those

issues, and the recommendations were, quite frankly, to think

about in the future, you know, what decisions get made to actually

put facilities in those kinds of high-risk areas. And we can obviously have a long conversation about how we made those decisions

to have the facility in Benghazi at that point. But again, so the

government was somewhat confusing part of our—part of the security was given, in some cases, by the militia that were in the area

who had protected the embassy directly and indirectly for quite a

while. But we, obviously, had our Diplomatic Security officials over

there.

Q: Were you still at the State Department when the second attack occurred?

A: Second attack, I don’t——

Q: The attack on the Annex?

A: The attack on the Annex? The second, that night?

Q: The CIA.

A: That night?

Q: Yes.

A: Oh, sure, you mean physically at the State Department?

Q: Uh-huh.

A: Yeah, I don’t think I left until 2 or 3 in the morning. I don’t

remember exactly. Again, I can’t refresh my timelines of when. The

night was very long.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: But I assume I was in the facility at that point, or at the State

Department at that point.

Q: Would the ops center have notified you of the second attack,

or the attack on the Annex?

A: I assume. I assume.

Q: At that point, when you were notified of the attack on the

Annex, did anyone reach out to the CIA?

Mr. YANES. He said he doesn’t remember being notified of that,

and you are assuming that the ops center was—notified people. I

mean, they may have, but I don’t think he remembers being notified of that.

Mr. NIDES. Again, my assumption is the ops center, because I assume there’s reports from the op center, so I know I haven’t looked

at all the reports. The ops center was every half an hour, updating

things. Right. So I don’t know what I read or what I didn’t read,

or what I was notified or wasn’t being notified. So, again, I would

have to rely upon the communication from the ops center.

743
BY MS. BETZ

Q: The decision to evacuate all of the personnel from Benghazi,

is that a decision that the State Department, the Secretary, and

her senior staff made?

A: I think my assumption is—again, I would have to, again, it

is 3 years ago, we would rely upon the security professionals to

make the decision. Right? So I don’t think Secretary Clinton, nor

I, nor Bill Burns would make those decisions on our own, because

ultimately, you have people who really understand security, how to

get people out, how to move people.

I’m certainly not qualified to do that, nor do I think Secretary

Clinton was. So my assumption is, is that we relied upon the people who were part of the Diplomatic Security who protect our men

and women. They are the ones that would ultimately make that decision. They would make a recommendation to us, and I would say

in almost 100 percent of the cases, we would accept their recommendation.

Q: So let me just clarify. Were you—so you were consulted. So

did the security experts or professionals consult you on a decision

to evacuate all of the personnel?

A: I’m sorry, I would love to tell you I remember. I don’t remember. It was 2 years ago. Again, I would—traditionally, all of the security decisions that were made in any of our embassies are made

by the professionals within Diplomatic Security. And I would say

the vast majority of those——

Q: Uh-huh.

A: [continuing]. Are accepted by. So I assume in this case it was,

but to be honest with you, I don’t remember the decision tree at

that point, nor do I remember being part of the actual decision

about to evacuate folks from Benghazi.

Q: Do you recall being part of any discussion on any acquisition,

or any modes of transportation to get out of Benghazi to Tripoli?

A: I don’t—I don’t remember. I, to be honest with you, I don’t remember.

Q: So moving along, after the attack, there were a number of discussions on the Secretary’s appearance on the Sunday talk shows.

Were you involved at all in her decision not to appear?

A: No.

Q: Were you involved in any of the discussions regarding the

talking points that Ambassador Rice used to prepare for her appearance on the Sunday talk shows?

A: No.

Q: Having been in Cairo on that Monday before the attack, you

had, you know, you had experienced what was going on in Cairo,

and I think I understand from some of the documents, that you

had opinions as to the difference between what occurred in

Benghazi, and what occurred in Cairo. Is that——

A: Well, you know, all I know is what the facts were, which the

facts on the ground in Egypt I was well aware of because I was

briefed as soon as I got there. There was basically a nonviolent action. There were some protesters jumping over the fence and grabbing a flag, and they were escorted off the grounds. Obviously, that

was substantially different than, I think, what was going on in

744
Benghazi. So I think from that perspective, yes, I could at least

compare those two things.

Q: Okay, I would like to show you a document. And it’s number

2 in your tab.

[Nides Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.]

Ms. BETZ. And we will give the witness an opportunity to look

at the document. It is State Department document C05562242, produced to that House Select Committee on Benghazi. And while the

witness is not identified as a sender or a recipient, he is referenced

in the email.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: Okay. Have you had a chance to look at the document?

A: Sure.

Q: Who is Prem Kumar?

A: He worked at the White House. He was the, I think he must

have been the desk officer at the White House, I think. I don’t

know what he—he moved around a lot. I think he just left, actually, just recently.

Q: Okay, and who was * * *?

A: He worked for me. He was one of my assistants at the State

Department.

Q: And the prefacing email says, ‘‘* * *, * * *, I believe your

boss is going to speak with the new Egyptian Ambassador,’’ or

‘‘Amb today, re: Security of Embassy Cairo. Could I get a readout

from you when that’s happened. ’’

So then * * * responds, ‘‘Prem, Nides said he understood the difference between the targeted attack in Libya and the way the protest escalated in Egypt, but pushed the Egyptian Ambassador on

ensuring security, particularly with protests likely on Friday. Nides

also noted’’—this is, I believe, a mistake, ‘‘our request to get 10

visas processed today for extra diplomatic security agents out tonight. The Ambassador said he would expedite. ’’

Does the first sentence reflect your discussion with the Egyptian

Ambassador?

A: Again, it’s 3 years ago. I don’t—I guess, if he had written it,

I assume he was in the meeting with me. It’s his recollection of a

meeting. I’m not sure it was totally my recollection, but I don’t

have any objections to what was written.

Q: Okay. Thanks. So taking a sort of giant step back and looking

into 2011, and I want to talk a little bit about the then-envoy’s—

Envoy Stevens’ mission into Benghazi——

A: Uh-huh.

Q: [continuing]. And the decision to both ask him and send him

in. Were you involved in the decision to ask Ambassador Stevens

to go into Benghazi?

A: No.

Q: Was the NSC involved in that decision?

Mr. YANES. The National Security Council, NSC?

Ms. BETZ. Correct.

Mr. Nides. I have no—I don’t know. My assumption is I assume

there was some conversation, but I have no idea.

745
BY MS. BETZ

Q: Was there a request to send him a State Department decision

alone, or request?

A: Again, I don’t know.

Q: I was going to show you another document. This would be tab

4, I believe.

A: Tab 4?

Q: Tab 4.

Ms. BETZ. Can we go off the record for a second?

[Discussion off the record.]

[Nides Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: We will go back on the record. For purposes of identifying the

document, it is STATE–SCB0075262. It is from a * * * to you

dated Thursday March 24, 2011.

A: Got it.

Q: Just directing your attention to the last sentence, or last sort

of bullet. It says, ‘‘We continue to look at options for moving Chris

Steven into Libya. The pressure is on for this to happen soon. ’’

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Do you know where that pressure was coming from?

A: I don’t. I mean, my working assumption is is that the NEA

or the career people, the Ambassador on the ground, really wanted

more support. I mean, more embassy officials, and wanted to Chris

to come. So I assume that’s what she—and she was my staffer who

kind of was the officer in charge of this reporting to me on this particular topic. She was in charge of the decisionmaking. She was in

charge of reporting the conversation, so I was kept informed.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: So my assumption is that was a reflection of the career people

asking for Chris to come. But, again, I wasn’t in the meeting. I

don’t recall exactly when it was.

Mr. YANES. So you are not sure and the document doesn’t say.

Mr. NIDES. Yeah, that’s correct.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: Well, I’m just curious. Other documents suggest that the NSC,

NSS was pushing. I didn’t know if you had——

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I think that is a mischaracterization of

what other documents say, but if you have other documents, I

think——

Ms. BETZ. Well, I do, and those are in the safe. So but just move

along——

BY MS. BETZ

Q: So there weren’t any other discussions at the senior or principal level about sending the Envoy, pressure to send Envoy Stevens in, to your recollection?

A: Not to my recollection. No.

Q: One of the reasons we were very interested in speaking with

you was the detail that your staffer had with regard to the mission

logistics.

746
A: Uh-huh.

Q: * * * was a very descriptive and detailed emailer, and probably more so than anybody in the State Department, at least from

the documents that we have reviewed. Is there a reason why the

emails were so descriptive? Did you have a reason to have——

A: She is just really good.

Mr. YANES. I’m sorry, which emails?

BY MS. BETZ

Q: Well, there are a number of emails. I’m just saying generally.

A: I don’t know which emails you are speaking of, but, you know,

she is a talented career Foreign Service officer.

Q: Yeah. Were the email updates from her the only updates on

the Envoy’s mission that you received?

A: I can’t remember. I don’t, you know, again, it’s 3 years ago.

I’m not exactly sure what I received or what I didn’t receive.

Q: Well, were you briefed in person, daily, on the——

Mr. YANES. Again, on what? I’m sorry, about what?

Ms. BETZ [continuing]. On the Envoy’s mission into Benghazi?

Mr. NIDES. Yeah, again, I don’t recall how often I was briefed.

We had, obviously, 270 missions around the world. I don’t—you

know, again, I can’t tell you if I was briefed, you know, every other

week, every month. But most of my stuff that I was receiving was

received in written form.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: Do you—so you don’t recall getting an early-morning briefing

from those on the ground, from then-Envoy Stevens on the ground?

A: I don’t.

Q: What decisions, vis-a`-vis the Envoy’s mission did you make

versus Under Secretary Kennedy Did you make staffing decisions?

A: No. Ultimately, again, the practice has been to let the professionals make recommendations to the seventh floor.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: And I would say, in most cases, that’s what we did.

Q: How was the mission funded?

A: I—I have no idea. I mean, I assume it was funded through

our normal process, right, our normal funds. But I don’t know if

there was a specific—I assume it is through normal funds that we

had available, but I don’t recall.

Q: Was there concern when Envoy Stevens went in with regard

to the no-boots-on-the-ground policy? Was that something that you

discussed?

Mr. YANES. Do you know what that is, the no-boots-on-theground policy?

Mr. NIDES. I don’t know what you are referring to.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: That would be military support.

A: Yeah, I know what the word means, but I don’t know if you

are referencing some——

Q: Just the DOD’s support for Envoy Stevens in going in, in addition to the diplomatic security agents that accompanied him.

747
A: Yeah, I wasn’t aware of any—involved in those conversations.

Q: Was there concern, on the part of the State Department, that

leaving Benghazi, if security ever got so bad early on, that would

send a negative message to the TNC?

A: No.

Mr. YANES. By anybody in the State Department?

Mr. NIDES. Not by me. Are you asking for me?

BY MS. BETZ

Q: You, or did anybody express concern?

A: I have no recollection of that. Not by me personally, I don’t

believe. But I don’t—I have no idea what other people going could

have expressed views that I was aware of.

Q: Later in the spring, as part of our multilateral effort, I believe

the United States provided——

Mr. YANES. This is spring of 2011?

BY MS. BETZ

Q: We are still in spring of 2011, yeah. I haven’t deviated from

that—provided nonlethal assistance to the TNC. Correct? Like humanitarian aid?

A: Again, I don’t—it’s 3 years ago. If you say it’s the case, then

I assume it is, I don’t recall exactly.

Mr. YANES. Four years ago.

Mr. NIDES. Four years ago. I don’t recall exactly what was given

and what wasn’t given at that time.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: Are you aware of any discussions, or were you involved in any

discussions vis-a ́-vis, at some point in 2011, of changing the Envoy’s mission to a more permanent presence?

A: I don’t recall those conversations.

Q: Were you aware of concerns by Congress about the mission

and its resource implication?

A: Again, I’m sorry to say, I just don’t recall, you know, those

conversations if they occurred.

Q: I want to come back to the staffing.

A: Sure.

Q: So if you would look at tab 10. And I believe this is exhibit

3.

[Nides Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.]

Mr. DESAI. This is exhibit 3 for the record. Is that right?

Ms. BETZ. Yes. So for purposes of identifying the document, it is

STATE–SCB0061065. It is from the witness, to * * * . I will give

the witness a minute to look at the document.

Mr. NIDES. Yeah.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: And I would like to draw your attention to the last bullet

which says, ‘‘The Benghazi Mission is working with NEA on reverse tripwires that must be met before growing the mission. AID/

OEDA is interested in sending in more personnel. I reminded NEA

and USAID that all staffing increases must be approved by depu748
ties; Jeff’s request for an additional five people is on a hold until

further notice. ’’

Do you recall this email?

A: I don’t. But I assume that’s the case. Always happens where

the career professionals, which Jeff and some of the people you referenced here, generally want more personnel on the ground, and

there’s a tendency for us to push back on those requests, especially

on the career professionals; not on the security side. That’s decided

on a different level. But this was basically the desire for them to

add additional people. And we were constantly pushing back on the

idea of having more people on the ground than some of the career

people would have actually liked us to have.

Q: So ultimately, you were making decisions regarding staffing?

A: In this particular case, the decisions were coming to us, and,

ultimately, we were pushing back on this particular decision.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: As articulated in this memo.

Q: Right. Was that the case for a number of the staffing requests

throughout the Envoy’s mission in 2011?

A: The only issue that came to us would be issues around permanent FTEs. I mean, counsel, staff, if, in fact, the request would

grow beyond what we wanted to do, those questions that couldn’t

get resolved at the career level, they would be elevated to the deputy level. But that happened very rarely. I’m, obviously, clearly

concerned about making sure that the levels of career staff were

limited at the time.

Q: Do you know in the email, there is a reference to reverse

tripwires. Do you know what those reverse trip—first of all, what

is a reverse tripwire?

A: I don’t know what she is referring to.

Q: Okay. So you are not aware of any—if they were ever met?

A: Again, I don’t know what she is referring to.

Q: So this email is dated June 13. Moving forward a month

later——

A: Tab 11?

Q: No, in the document. The document.

A: Oh, moving on. Oh, sorry. I was moving forward.

Q: So that is June 2011. I want to fast forward to June 2011

when the United States recognized the TNC as the legitimate government of Libya. Was there concern at this time about formally

recognizing a presence in Benghazi and that it would somehow undermine our overall Libya strategy?

Mr. YANES. By Tom?

Ms. BETZ. Just a discussion. Again, this is your knowledge any

discussions that you might have had with the Secretary, or——

Mr. NIDES. To be honest with you, I just can’t recall those discussions.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: I’m going to draw your attention to tab 12. And this will be

Exhibit 4.

[Nides Exhibit No. 4 was marked for identification. ]

Mr. NIDES. Very small print.

749
BY MS. BETZ

Q: Very small print. And for purposes of identifying the document, it reads, ‘‘U.S. Department of State Doc# C05578334.’’ It’s a

document—there’s no heading. There’s no identifying information.

For purposes of just questioning, I want to discuss the first two

paragraphs and in particular, because your name is referenced——

A: Sure.

Q: [continuing]. In here. I wanted to ask you about that.

A: Go ahead.

Mr. YANES. Have you read it?

Mr. NIDES. Yeah, I just read it.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: The first paragraph, in short, basically says:’’The State Department does not intend to establish,’’—and it crosses out ‘‘a formal diplomatic mission’’—‘‘consular or diplomatic premise in

Benghazi at this point. (Tripoli remains the capital of Libya where

our embassy remains) despite the recent USG decision to recognize

the TNC as legitimate governing authority in Libya during this interim process. The United States Government and the TNC have

both stated their commitment to a unified, free Libya with Tripoli

as its capital; the establishment of a’’—‘‘formal’’ crossed out—‘‘diplomatic mission in Benghazi would undermine this commitment

and send the wrong political message. ’’And it goes on.

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Is that a position that was shared throughout the seventh

floor by you or others?

A: Again, I don’t recall the discussion. I don’t actually recall—obviously, I don’t recall the memo, or the—I guess this was in memo

form, so I don’t recall that. So to be honest with you, I have no idea

if this was a widely-held view or not widely-held view. I don’t know

where this went or if we met on it. I just can’t recall.

Mr. YANES. Did he get this document?

Ms. BETZ. I don’t know, and I’m conceding that I don’t know for

purposes of just questioning, his name is mentioned in the document.

Mr. YANES. Okay.

Ms. BETZ. So I wasn’t aware if it was shared with you or not.

Mr. YANES. Still on the second paragraph, right?

Ms. BETZ. Yes.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: Was this position discussed, or the future of the Benghazi

Mission discussed when Embassy Tripoli reopened, in later in September?

A: I’m really sorry. I just don’t remember. I just don’t remember

the conversations around the staffing. This is 4 years ago. I just

don’t know if we had conversations or no conversations.

Q: Did you have any discussion about the resource implications

of having both Embassy Tripoli and the mission operational?

A: Not to my—not to my recollection.

Q: Did you have any discussion about how both of them would

be funded?

750
A: Again, I just—I can’t remember exactly any conversations regarding this. You know, again, we had conversations about every—

again, we have 270 missions. So I’m not—I can’t really recall this

particular discussion on this particular staffing of this particular

non-consulate.

Q: Well, let me ask you this: Given that there were 270 sort of

facilities, how many did we send a special envoy into?

A: Again, I have no recollection of that. I don’t know.

Q: How many did we work the U.N. in to establish a no-fly zone?

A: Again, I can’t venture to say how many. I’m sure there were

a few, but I just don’t recall.

Q: So Libya was not unique in those——

A: Libya was always unique, but I can’t tell you that one was

more unique than the other, depending on what circumstances. I

was focused a lot on Iraq. I was focused a lot on Pakistan. I was

focused a lot on Afghanistan. They were quite unique since we had

tens of thousands of people in each one of those countries. So those

were, in itself, fairly unique, and I spent a huge amount of my time

focusing on those individuals.

Q: Okay. I’m going to show you another document, and this is

under tab 13.

[Nides Exhibit No. 5 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: So for purposes of identifying the document, it is State Department SCB0074167. It is sent from the witness to * * * . It is

actually an email conversation, and the underlying email is an ops

alert. And what I want to focus on is * * * email to you saying:

‘‘Latest on Libya. Also Paul Grove will be in Benghazi a few days;

he arrived today.’’ Who was Paul Grove?

A: You want to focus on how I told her she should take a day

off?

Q: Yeah.

A: Because I’m a nice guy.

Q: Some of these things are comical.

A: Yeah, sure I promise I will——

Q: Who was Paul Grove?

A: Paul Grove worked on the Appropriations Committee.

Q: Okay. So were you in contact with him after he returned from

Benghazi?

A: I don’t recall. I mean, I talked to Paul Grove a lot. I don’t

know if I talked to him then or not.

Q: So did he report back to you after his trip to Benghazi?

Do you have any recollection?

A: I’m sorry, I don’t.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I’m sorry. I think I just didn’t hear.

Did you say you worked on the Appropriations Committee in

Congress?

Mr. YANES. That he did; not that Tom did.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Paul Grove.

Mr. NIDES. Paul Grove. Yeah, I’m sorry.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: Okay. Turning to tab 14, which will be exhibit No. 6.

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A: We were on 14?

Q: Tab 14.

Mr. YANES. Tab 14.

Mr. NIDES. Same one.

Mr. YANES. Don’t worry about it. We were on 13 before.

Mr. NIDES. Same one. Okay. My tabs must be off. Anyway, it

doesn’t matter. Go ahead.

Ms. BETZ. Are they off?

Mr. NIDES. This is the same email I just had, right?

Mr. YANES. No.

Mr. NIDES. Oh, okay, I’m sorry about that.

[Nides Exhibit No. 6 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: For identifying purposes, this document is SCB0074157. It is

an email from the witness to * * * . Again, it’s an email chain. For

purposes of this discussion, I want to focus on the underlying

email, which describes an email that was sent out regarding NEA

posts and a heightened awareness during the 9/11 anniversary.

And specifically, it identifies the missions in Tripoli and

Benghazi, and regarding the unique requirements that they have

for additional security resources and personnel.

Do you recall receiving this email?

A: I don’t.

Q: So you are not aware of any special precautions that were

taken in 2011 regarding the 9/11 anniversary with either at

Benghazi——

Mr. YANES. He didn’t say that, but go ahead.

Mr. NIDES. No, I don’t recall the memo. And I don’t recall those

conversations, but my working assumption is any time the 9/11 anniversary came around, we were always on heightened alert.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: So were you aware of whether an email went out in 2012 that

was similar to this alert?

A: I don’t know. I have no idea.

Q: Are you aware of—fast forwarding again, to December 2011,

there was the discussion and eventual memo drafted for extending

the mission. Were you aware of that discussion and/or memo?

A: I don’t recall. I don’t recall the discussions.

Q: You don’t recall the discussions. Do you recall the memo?

A: No.

Q: No. Okay. So we should turn to tab 16. I mean. Just to help

your recollection.

A: No, no, I have no problem with it. Please, that’s fine.

That’s fine.

Q: So this will be Exhibit Number 7. Tab 16.

[Nides Exhibit No. 7 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: So for purposes of identifying the document, it is an action

memo for Under Secretary Kennedy, with the number, identifying

number 201123787. And we will just go off the record.

752
[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. BETZ:

Q: So have you had a chance to read the memo?

A: Sure.

Q: And as I said, it is an action memo for Under Secretary Kennedy. It is from Jeffrey Feltman out of NEA. But if you turn to the

last page, it was cleared by you, or your staff, * * * .

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Do you recall this document?

A: I don’t.

Q: So you are not aware whether or not your staff was consulted?

Were you consulted in the drafting of the memo?

A: I don’t recall. Looks like she signed off, and so she was consulted on it.

Q: Is this a memo that you should have been consulted on, given

the resource implications?

A: My working assumption is that if the head of the NEA and

Kennedy, who was the Under Secretary for Management including

facilities and security signed off on it, and my staff was a staff person who was working on it, my assumption is a lot of people in the

building probably reviewed it and came up with a conclusion.

MS. BETZ. And I think this memo is a point of contention. I guess

we’re trying to understand what the point of the memo is. Was it

intended to legitimize or make the mission official within the State

Department?

Mr. NIDES. Again——

Mr. YANES. I don’t know what you can tell from reading this.

Mr. NIDES. I think every time we expanded a facility, either created one or took one offline, there was an action memo that was

done and people need to approve it. The professionals who ran the

State Department need to approve it because they had implications, including money, security, resources, and I think this would

be common practice in any facility, not just Libya, but in London

or anywhere else we have a facility that would have either buying

a piece of property or adding facilities or adding people, so pretty

common format for those kind of decisions.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: Given, though, the fact that we still had—that we now had

Embassy Tripoli up and running, and we also now had this presence, the continued presence in Benghazi, there would be resource

implications such that it should have been brought to your attention?

A: No. Again, I think as I just pointed out, the individual who

manages facilities and the budget implications of this, okay, and

the career staff of the NEA who has got the political—not political

like politics, but political understanding, who is a career foreign

service officer, the combination of that and their staff is who we ultimately would respect for this kind of decision.

Q: If a bureau clears on it, do they have the responsibility to fulfill what their responsibility identified in the memo? So for example, if DS clears the memo and the memo states that there are five

753
special agents to be located at the facility, would they then be obligated to ensure that those five agents were at the facility?

A: Again, I don’t know because the context of how these decisions

get made, my assumption is circumstances on the ground change,

numbers of people change, the numbers of FTEs and how many security are associated with those FTEs change, so I’m not a security

professional, so I couldn’t really tell you the decision between 5 or

6 or 7 and how those decisions were made.

Q: Have you been to Libya?

A: Have I been——

Q: Do you travel to Libya?

A: I did.

Q: When did you go?

A: I think 2011. I don’t remember—when was I gone? I went to

Tunisia for 1 day. I don’t recall what day that that was. I did go.

Q: January 2012?

A: Is that when I went?

Q: Yes.

A: Okay. Thank you. I knew you could jog my memory. Yes, I did

go. January 2012 is when I went.

Q: Did you travel to Benghazi?

A: No, I didn’t go to Benghazi.

Q: Just stayed in Tripoli?

A: I hope—no, I don’t think I went to Benghazi.

Q: Did you have discussions with the Libyan Government regarding their ability to provide host nation support?

A: You know, I don’t recall my conversations. My assumption, I

met with government officials, and I assume that that topic would

come up because that topic came up in every country I visited, be

it Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan or any other interesting locations

I happened to travel with, that could come up. So I assume if I

were there, I discussed that with them, but I don’t recall the conversations.

Q: Do you recall discussing the contents of your trip with the

Secretary or anybody else at the State Department when you returned?

A: Common practice would be I would have a conversation or at

least a memo would go to the Secretary, but I don’t recall if I did

that and how I did it, but general practice would be to send something to her either verbally or by written form, but I don’t know

if it was done or not.

Q: Were you concerned after your discussions with the Libyan

Government about their ability to provide host nation support?

A: Again, it was almost 3 years ago. I don’t remember how I felt

about it. Obviously, it wasn’t Paris, so I understand it was not—

it was a difficult place, but I don’t recall my attitude or my state

of mind at that point when I came back from the trip.

Q: Sort of moving along in 2012. Were you notified of the April

attack on the facility in Benghazi?

A: On the April attack. I don’t know which attack you’re referring to. Is this the——

Q: It would be the first attack on the mission.

A: Is this before they moved into the facility?

754
Q: This would be in 2012, so they are at the temporary mission

facility.

A: I don’t—it could. I don’t recall. You know, if there was an attack, my assumption is I would be notified, but I don’t recall being

notified.

Q: So you did not take any steps—did you contact Under Secretary Kennedy regarding what steps DS was taking to bolster security at the facility?

Mr. YANES. When?

MS. BETZ. April 2012.

Mr. NIDES. Yeah, I’m sorry. I just can’t recall 3 years ago when

I—again, my assumption is if I was notified that something happened, I would probably respond to it, but I don’t recall being notified, and I don’t—that constant recall is what I said about being

notified.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: Do you recall being notified of the June attack?

A: Again, the same answer. I just don’t recall.

Q: June 2012?

A: Yeah. I don’t recall, sorry.

Q: Were you made aware of the attack on the U.K. Ambassador

later in June 2012?

A: Again, I’m sorry to say, I just don’t recall. I mean, again,

someone of that nature of that attack, I assume I was notified

but——

MS. BETZ. I see that my time has expired, so I will go off the

record.

[Discussion off the record. ]

Mrs. BROOKS. Just a couple of questions. Going back on record,

and I apologize having just walked in and only hearing a very narrow time period.

Can you tell me what your general recollection is, or actually any

specific recollection is, about your specific involvement with Libya

or Benghazi, and Benghazi

Mr. NIDES. Well, I think as has been clear—I went there, obviously. I was certainly consulted on staffing, which has been clear

by the record. Obviously——

Mrs. BROOKS. And who would have done that consulting?

Mr. NIDES. I think Under Secretary Kennedy certainly would

brief me on security matters or facility situations, but the decisions—obviously, those decisions are made at the under secretary

level or the security professionals level.

Mrs. BROOKS. Would that have been a one-on-one briefing?

Mr. NIDES. You know, Congresswoman, I don’t recall how—but

assuming I was briefed individually by groups, we had lots of meetings, this was obviously a very complicated period of time for us

leading up to the—during the crisis and prior to that and certainly

subsequently. As you know, I was heavily involved in the—after

the attack——

Mrs. BROOKS. Right.

Mr. NIDES [continuing]. By being a staff person in charge of the

ARB implementation, so I was keenly aware of the issues that were

raised.

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Mrs. BROOKS. But prior to the attack.

Mr. NIDES. Sure.

Mrs. BROOKS. Would your interactions with respect to conversations with Patrick Kennedy have been in tandem with a lot of conversations about a lot of other facilities, or do you recall ever having any specific discussions about Libya or any specific meetings?

Mr. NIDES. You know, again, I’m sorry, unfortunately, it’s been

3 years ago or 4 years ago, so I don’t recall who was in the meetings and what conversations. I’m sure I had multiple conversations

on Libya and multiple conversations about the situation there, but

I can’t—to be honest, I can’t tell you if they were individual or solely about that or it was a group of conversations.

Mrs. BROOKS. Were you interviewed by the ARB?

Mr. NIDES. No.

Mrs. BROOKS. And so is this your first time giving a statement

on——

Mr. NIDES. Well, actually I spent 8-and-a-half hours testifying in

front of the House and the Senate on this situation when Secretary

Clinton couldn’t come in December of 2012, and so Bill Burns and

I testified both in the House and the Senate for a long period of

time, so I spent a lot of time on the topic.

Mrs. BROOKS. And were you——

Mr. NIDES. This is the first time in this—obviously, in this setting.

Mrs. BROOKS. Okay. And were you asked specific questions during that 8 hours about what your personal involvement was with

respect to Libya?

Mr. NIDES. I think most of the questions were around what we

did after the fact. I think the focus of that hearing was about what

the action items were going to be so this doesn’t happen again, and

that was what they were focused on.

Mrs. BROOKS. And what was protocol with respect to the timing

as to when DS or Patrick Kennedy would bring you information

about attacks? What was the protocol?

Mr. NIDES. You know——

Mrs. BROOKS. Whether it was on Libya or any other facility in

the world.

Mr. NIDES. Well, thank God it didn’t happen very often.

Mrs. BROOKS. Yes.

Mr. NIDES. So I would say 99 percent of the time, this was never

an issue. This is unfortunately the one time it did happen, but as

you know, we are very fortunate that this doesn’t happen very

often at all, thank God.

So I think any time an attack or something occurred, we’d be notified through the watch officer or through the ops center. That

was, I think, the typical way, because it would happen in the middle of the night. Even in places like Iraq where there are rockets

were being launched constantly in our facilities in Iraq for the last,

you know, for 4 or 5 years. So we were notified continually about

activity. But yes, if there was an incident, the ops center would

generally notify all of us that this had happened.

Mrs. BROOKS. And, I don’t know where you are in questioning

and where you plan to go, but when that would happen and when

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you would receive that notification, would you receive it by text,

phone call, how would you receive that information?

Mr. NIDES. I think the standard operating procedure was is that

the ops center would send out a notification about an incident, and

we would be notified.

Mrs. BROOKS. By email or by how?

Mr. NIDES. By email, generally, by email.

Mrs. BROOKS. Okay.

Mr. NIDES. By your State Department email you get a communication from the ops center.

Mrs. BROOKS. Okay. I’m going to hold. I don’t want to go further

than what—but thank you.

Mr. NIDES. Oh, you’re welcome. Thank you.

Ms. BETZ. Off the record.

[Recess.]

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Let’s go back on the record.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS

Q: Hi. I’ll just reintroduce myself. I am Susanne Sachsman

Grooms. I work for Representative Cummings. I just want to start

by going over a couple of things that we went over in the last

round, and then I think we’ll move on.

Can I draw your attention back to exhibit 3, and so why don’t

we use the actual exhibits. That might be a little easier than the

tabs.

Mr. YANES. Is this just one set of everything?

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Yeah. I’m sorry. Those are the actual

exhibits. I’m not sure which tab exhibit 3 was——

Mr. NIDES. He gave us all the exhibits in this stack.

Ms. BETZ. I gave you all the exhibits.

Mr. YANES. Okay. I got it. So which one you start with?

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Exhibit 3.

Mr. NIDES. This one.

Mr. YANES. No. There you go.

EXAMINATION BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS

Q: And if you will recall, this is an email from * * * staffer to

you on June 13, 2011. We had discussed in the last round, it says,

‘‘I reminded’’—this is your staffer. ‘‘I reminded NEA and USAID

that all staffing increases must be approved by deputies. Jeff’s request for an additional 5 people is on hold until further notice.’’

You explained in the last round that was career people and not

security. I just want a little more clarification on that. So when you

were talking about your approval on these staffing decisions, this

was approval for nonsecurity-related personnel?

A: Correct.

Q: And were some of the constraints on approving more nonsecurity-related personnel the issue of the fact that there were not

enough security personnel and enough beds for those individuals to

be added?

A: I don’t recall the rationale for the reason, but everything is

a derivative of one another. So if you add more heads, meaning

more nonsecurity people, you by nature have to have more security

people. So the bigger the footprint, the security professionals will

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then dictate how many security people needed, vis-a ́-vis those numbers.

So we don’t opine on the security, but if you opine on the numbers of professionals, by the nature of the security footprint, is enlarged and the number of beds and food and costs also go up as

a derivative of that.

Q: And your role would not have been to opine on how much

would be the appropriate amount of security for that space?

A: Absolutely not.

Q: Okay. And you would rely on the diplomatic security professionals?

A: Without question.

Q: And in your experience with them, which I understand was

about 2 years of it, did you feel that they had sufficient expertise

and good judgment?

A: Absolutely.

Q: And you trusted them?

A: True.

Ms. BETZ. Can we just go off?

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. BETZ. All right thank you.

Mr. NIDES. Sure.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS

Q: Great. Thank you. So, I think there were a fair amount of

questions in the last round about the night of the attacks, and it

sounds like you don’t have a lot of specific recollection from the

night of the attacks. Is that a fair statement?

A: That is correct.

Q: I think you described it as a fog of war?

A: That would be a correct assumption or a correct articulation

of what I said.

Q: And—but you were at the State Department. You were with

Secretary Clinton for some portion of that evening?

A: As long as—all night I was there for most of the evening and

she was there for most of the evening as well.

Q: And from your memory, and I understand that you don’t have

a lot, but can you describe what the feeling and the sentiment was

in the room, right, was there a sense of urgency? Was there a concern about the safety of individuals? Was there an attempt to go

in and rescue them, that kind of a thing?

A: There was a sense of dramatic concern about the safety of the

men who were at that facility and a deep sense of concern that we

could do it—anything we possibly could do to secure their health

and wellbeing. This was a unbelievably chaotic evening. We were

trying to get information as quickly as we could. We were trying

to have calls with varieties of people to determine the situation.

We had no idea where Ambassador Stevens was. Some reports

were that he was alive at the hospital, some reports were that he

was still in the facility, but Secretary Clinton, Secretary Burns,

myself, Pat Kennedy, the whole 7th floor, we were engulfed in trying to figure out what we could do to potentially save these individuals’ lives.

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Q: And is it fair so say that your lack of specific recollection

about what you specifically did or what other people specifically did

doesn’t mean that you weren’t doing anything?

A: I would said say that’s a very fair characterization. And as

you know, obviously almost 3-and-a-half 4 years ago but in any crisis you are trying to, everyone is triage you’re trying to figure out

how to solve the problem at hand which we’re all doing what we

can to resolve it.

Q: I think you had said earlier that you recall that earlier in the

day there were—before the attacks in Benghazi, there were concerns about the video and the Embassy in Cairo and the protests

around that. Do you recall that?

A: Yes. As I mentioned earlier, I was in Cairo on Monday, and

I had just left Cairo and which at that point the protest broke out

in Cairo. I don’t know what the time was in Cairo where the protesters jumped over the fence, and so I was hypersensitive to that

issue.

And clearly, we worked, as has been reported, tirelessly for several weeks before the video to try to get this pastor in Florida not

to release the video because we knew it would inflame. It was a

depiction of Mohammed. It was obviously quite distasteful, so we

were trying to make sure that it didn’t get released. Not that we

were successful in doing that, unfortunately, so we were all

hypersensitive about the implication of that and September 11.

Q: And do you recall protests earlier in the day also in Tunisia?

A: I know there was, but I don’t remember at the time—what I

was thinking at the time, but I have to say I know that there was.

Q: And at the time when you were watching the protests in

Cairo, were you concerned about the fact that the—were you concerned about the safety of the U.S. personnel there?

A: In Cairo?

Q: Uh-huh.

A: Absolutely. In fact, I called in the Ambassador of Egypt on

that week, maybe it was Wednesday, to reinforce how concerned we

were to make sure that they were doing everything they could. As

again, as you know, under the Vienna Convention, we rely upon

our host countries to protect our personnel. We don’t have enough

people on the ground to protect them. We only have a handful of

Marines in each one of these facilities, so we’re very focused on

making sure. They understood that we were watching them to

make sure that they were protecting our people. We were going to

hold them accountable to protect them.

Q: And were you concerned that it might spread; that the protests might spread throughout the region?

A: We were very concerned.

Q: This committee spoke with Ambassador Jeff Feltman, who

was the assistant secretary of NEA at the time, and he told us

that—this is the way he described it. He described the entire Middle East region during that period when they were protests in

Cairo, Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, as being in, quote, ‘‘an uproar,’’ and

in, quote, ‘‘turmoil. ’’ Would you agree with that characterization?

A: Yes, I would.

Q: And why?

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A: Because it was. You had new democracies or fledging democracies, and you had huge amounts of anxiety in the social media

that we were watching. We had protests breaking out throughout

the Middle East. It was very unstable, and we were very much focused on this as being the contagion that would spread throughout

the Middle East.

So we had evidence of it, and had anxiety about it, and we were

doing everything we could to make sure it didn’t happen.

Q: So is it fair to say that in addition to both a primary concern

that night on September 11th of evacuating personnel and making

sure that they were safe and alive, that you and the senior leadership team were all thinking forward as to how to keep individuals

and other embassies safe?

A: Without question.

Q: And do you recall specific actions that you took at that point

to try and do that?

A: I recall reaching out, obviously, I mentioned to the Ambassador of Egypt who came to see me. I spoke to the Pakistanis, I

spoke to Tunisians. You know, I don’t recall, but I—my assumption, I spent a lot of time on the phone talking to these governments and making sure that they were providing us everything

they could provide us to make sure that we kept our people safe.

Q: It’s been alleged by some that Secretary Clinton was checked

out in the 2011 time period, and at times, that she just didn’t care

about the safety and security of the personnel in the ground. What

would be your views on that?

Mr. YANES. In 2011?

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS

Q: In 2011, 2012. I think the allegation was that from 2011 to

2012, she had been more engaged in 2011 and less engaged in

2012, but generally speaking, either to that or to her general engagement and concern for the safety and security of personnel?

A: It’s absurd. It’s not the case. And with all due respect to those

who might have that view, she woke up every day caring about the

safety of our diplomats. I mean, unfortunately, you know, luckily

we get it right 99 percent of the time, but I don’t think anyone was

more concerned and more worried about the safety of our people

than she was.

Q: And did she express that the evening of the attacks?

A: With great passion.

Q: Do you recall when Secretary Clinton left the State Department on the night of the attacks?

A: I don’t know exactly what the time was. All I know is it was

very late in the evening. I know we were all sitting in her conference room till late in the evening where we actually ordered food

in. We all sat around and tried to get information going on and off

the call, so I don’t know what time she actually departed. But it

didn’t really matter because I think once she left, be it midnight

or before, she was in constant communication, and she had a secure phone at her house, and I think she was back at the office

right away in the morning.

So, you know, the good news and the bad news about communication, it’s constant, so—and she only lives six blocks away or a

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mile-and-a-half away, whatever it is, very quickly, so she was in

constant contact.

Q: So if you had needed to reach her on the night of the attacks,

you could?

A: In a moment’s notice.

Q: What about Patrick Kennedy? Did he ever do or say anything

that suggested to you that he didn’t care about the safety of the

Department’s personnel in Libya or Benghazi?

A: Absolutely not.

BY MR. DESAI

Q: Secretary Nides, good morning. I wanted to switch gears just

slightly here. So I think in the last hour when you were talking to

my colleagues from the majority in enumerating some of your responsibilities and role as deputy secretary for management and resources, one of things that you said, correct me if I’m wrong, is that

you were the chief budget advocate for the Department on the Hill.

Is that right?

A: That’s correct.

Q: And I just wanted to unpack that with you a bit more and

explore that topic and specifically this idea of, you know, conducting effective diplomacy abroad while still confronting the reality of budgetary constraints.

And I know this is a topic that you had been thoughtful about,

had spoken about, and written about during your time as deputy

secretary, given some opinion editorials that I’ve come across and

some remarks that you had delivered.

The Accountability Review Board, I believe, speaks about this

issue specifically, and I just wanted to show you a portion of that.

So I’m going to go ahead and mark this as exhibit 8, I believe we’re

on. Is that right?

[Nide Exhibit No. 8 was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DESAI

Q: And what I’ve handed you here, Mr. Secretary, is a portion

of the Accountability Review Board’s final report. There’s no cover

page because I don’t believe there was one, but I have here about

the first 3 pages or so of the report, and I want to direct your attention to page 3 of what I just handed to you and specifically to

the first paragraph, and I’m going to just read that out loud to you

and ask that you bear with me as it’s a bit of a lengthy paragraph.

But it starts off saying, quote, ‘‘For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work with varying degrees of success. This

has brought about a deep sense of the importance of husbanding

resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable in the extreme in

any government department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a full State Department managers to favor restricting the

use of resources as a general orientation. There is no easy way to

cut through this Gordian knot, all the more so as budgetary austerity looms large ahead.’’

‘‘At the same time, it is imperative for the State Department be

mission-driven rather than resource-constrained, particularly when

being present in increasingly risky areas of the world is integral to

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U.S. national security. The recommendations in this report attempt

to grapple with these issues and err on the side of increased attention to prioritization and to fuller support for people and facilities

engaged in working in high risk, high threat areas. The solution requires a more serious and sustained commitment from Congress to

support State Department needs, which in total, constitute a small

percentage both of the full national budget and that spent for national security. ‘‘One overall conclusion in this report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge and provide necessary

resources to the State Department to address security risks and

meet mission imperatives,’’ end quote.

Now, this lengthy paragraph makes reference to how the State

Department’s budget is just a small percentage of the full national

budget. If you recall, what percentage is the Department’s budget

in the national budget?

A: One percent.

Q: One percent. Is that right?The last sentence of that paragraph

says, quote, ‘‘One overall conclusion in this report is that Congress

must do its part to meet this challenge and provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks and meet

mission imperatives,’’ unquote.

Do you agree with the ARB’s assertion given this conclusion?

A: I do.

Q: And why is that?

A: As you all know, we have—you know, 1 percent of the national budget is spent on diplomacy. That means everything we do,

270 missions, all of our consulate offices, all of our ambassadors,

all of our career foreign service officers, everything included, all the

assistants, okay, 1 percent. That is not a lot of money, right. And

we have to protect 270 facilities around the world, which is also

very complicated, and we live in a very dangerous world.

All those imperatives are coming to us at the right time. I’m very

conscientious of the constraints we are in financially as a country,

but I do think that we need to be focused on this, and one of the

recommendations with the ARB was on the appropriations process,

the speed in which we can do contracts, a variety of different recommendations of the ARB, which I was in charge of implementing

or beginning those streams to be implemented.

So I concur with the ARB’s assessment. It’s not all about money,

just to be clear, but money is very important in this discussion, and

it’s important for people to understand that.

Q: Now, prior to joining the Department, I believe it was in 2011,

you had come from the private sector. Is that right?

A: I did.

Q: And you returned to the private sector after your tenure at

the State Department ended. Is that right?

A: Yeah, I worked on Capitol Hill for multiple years working for

the Speaker of the House and the majority whip. I worked in the

administration as well, and I’ve been in and out of private sector

multiple times to serve our country.

Q: So you have pretty exhaustive government experience working

in the legislative branch as well as working in the private sector,

so one would assume that that gives you a fairly unique perspective on budgetary issues both inside and outside the government.

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And if you could just briefly describe for us, you know, what impact

do budgetary cuts, or even budgetary uncertainty have on the Department’s operation in its ability to conduct effective diplomacy?

A: Listen, you know, again, I’m also very aware of the constraints that the Congress, both on the Republican side and Democratic side, are grappling with with the budget, so I’m not unaware

or blind to the fact that money is very tight. And we have a lot of

demands on our money.

That said, the problems in the world are only getting greater,

and it can’t be just the military budget. It has to be a diplomatic

budget as well because, as people have said, you know, it’s a combination of both to make sure we keep ourselves safe.

So my concern, obviously, is when there are budget constraints

and there are going to be always budget constraints, but when the

budget constraints on occasion may in fact misalign with what our

missions are, that’s where I get—when I get worried. People are

pushing us to do more and to do more with less on things on occasion that that doesn’t always work out as well as we hoped.

Q: I want to show you another document, Secretary Nides, I’m

going to enter into the record as exhibit number 9.

[Nides Exhibit No. 9 was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DESAI

Q: And this is a transcript of remarks that you delivered at the

Center for American Progress on October—excuse me—August

31st, 2011. The remarks are titled, quote, ‘‘A Unified Security

Budget for the United States,’’ and just for the purposes of the

record, this transcript can still be found online at cdn.

americanprogress.org/wp.content/upload/event/2011/08/image/

securitybudgettranscript.pdf.

A: Can’t wait to see it again.

Q: You’re about to see it right now, yeah.

Do you recall delivering these remarks at the Center for American Progress?

A: I do now.

Q: And if you recall—I know it’s been a few years now, and we’re

going to go through some of the specifics here in a second, but just

before we do that, do you recall what the speech was about and

why you gave it?

A: I think it was in the context of our budget and our budget

submission and the importance of making sure that the State Department is funded appropriately.

Q: Okay. So we’re going to get into some of the specifics here. If

I can direct your attention to the third page of the document I just

handed you, and I’m looking kind of toward the bottom of that

third page. I know it’s not numbered as such, but the penultimate

paragraph on that page, the second sentence, you say, quote, ‘‘As

deputy secretary of state, I could be focused on many issues and

in many places. But few things are as important to me than fighting for the resources that our diplomats and development experts

need to enhance our national security and our economic security,’’

end quote.

And I know you’ve spoken about some of this already, but again,

why was this so important to write? Why was this, as you called

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it, you know, few things more important than fighting for the resources that was needed?

A: Listen, I spent a huge amount of time in Iraq and Afghanistan

and Pakistan, and I saw the commitment that the men and women

at the State Department were doing for our country, and understanding that they played a really important role to keep us secure

here at home, and you know, and if you just spent some time in

those countries and spent time around the world and spent time

with these diplomats, and I don’t care if—you know, your political

affiliation, you care about these people, and you want them to be

secure and you want them to have the resources to do their job.

That’s one piece.

The second piece, it works, okay. I mean, I don’t think—one of

the biggest advocates for us was Dave Petraeus, Mike Mullen, you

know, John Allen, all generals, one admiral, they were the biggest

proponents of the State Department budget because they understood you can’t just win these battles on the battlefield, and so having the resources for the State Department to do, you know, rule

of law, education, programs, that was the key part of what we did,

and so I was obviously passionate about making sure educating

people and the American people of the importance of State Department budget.

Q: Okay. On the next page of the document at the fourth paragraph, the first sentence, it says, quote, Secretary Clinton has

made the case that State and USAID are essential to our national

security and ought to be considered part of a national security

budget.

You’ve alluded to this, but if you can make the connection between State’s budget and national security more expressed, because I think that’s something that some may not see as obvious

or inherent, right, that we’re looking at national security in this

less traditional way. If you could just, again, elaborate further on

the connection between those two things?

A: I think it was best said when I was with Dave Petraeus in

Afghanistan where General Petraeus turned to me and said my job

is to clear, and your job is to hold, and that is, you know, very

poignant. You know, the reality is we are partners with the Defense Department, and I think Secretary Clinton, and I assume

Secretary Kerry and Secretary Clinton had a very strong relationship with the Defense Department.

First of all, it was important to have, but we are a partnership.

You cannot have one with the other, so the passionate connection

between the two, you know, that’s why there has been very little

conflict between the State Department and Defense Department

during the Clinton administration—Clinton term as Secretary of

State because we know we were intricately involved in the planning and the purpose, and so consequently having a strong USAID,

having a strong development program, critically important to the

security of the men and women in the country.

Q: Looking at the next page from the one we just discussed, the

top half, you go through some of the math surrounding the budget,

and I would be doing you a great disservice if I try to go through

that math with you, so I’ll skip it, but 4 paragraphs down, you told

the audience at CAP, quote, ‘‘We know that resources are necessary

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to advance our national security interests and prosperity around

the world, and we are at risk of not getting them,’’ end quote.

What were you referring to when you say we are at the risk of

not getting them?

A: The budget’s getting cut. Again, I understand—it’s not a political comment. I just understand the constraint because, quite

frankly, some of the biggest advocates for the State Department

budget were Republicans, so this is not a Democrat versus Republican. Money is tight, and that’s a problem. And it wouldn’t be as

big a problem if the world was getting safer, but as the world is

getting more dangerous and the monies are being cut, that is what

I was referring to.

Q: Okay. And on the previous page, you actually have given the

audience some numbers. If you can just turn back one page, and

again, this is the third paragraph. You said, quote, ‘‘In the fiscal

2011 budget, which has now been finished, State and USAID took

a massive hit, a 13.6 percent cut from what the administration believed we needed in 2011.’’

From what you recall, did those cuts actually take place?

A: I can’t recall what the actual numbers were. I know we—I

don’t recall.

Q: And do you recall if the budget was cut in any capacity,

whether it was 13.6 percent or some larger or smaller figure than

that?

A: I think it was cut. What the numbers were, I can’t recall, but

again, we were operating in a very constrained budget environment, so I don’t—ultimately those numbers were taken down in

some level.

Q: And would you have described then 2011 as a challenging

year for the Department with respect to budgetary constraints?

A: Sure.

Q: And what impact, from what you can recall, did those cuts

have, again, on the Department and on the ability of our diplomats

to conduct its work abroad?

A: Again, I think if you put it in context, the State Department

budget was 1 percent of the budget, of the Federal budget. The reality is, as we all know, we were going through a turmoil, as this

continued down the Middle East, right, so you are going through,

you know, chaos in Libya and Tunisia and Egypt, and things were

happening all over the region, and so the demand—and oh, by the

way, we are still having tens of thousands of people in Iraq and

Afghanistan, we had massive conflicts in Pakistan, you know, we

had, you know, democracy flourishing in some and reversing in others. So the reality is, just getting the numbers requested, even that

wasn’t going to be sufficient to answer the calls of what they were

demanding of us.

So that was the biggest issue. The dollar amounts you could live

with if the demands weren’t as high as they were, but the demands

were getting higher and higher and the problems were getting

more and more difficult, so the resources were a challenge.

Q: I just want to ask you one last question about these remarks

that you delivered, and again on the next page, just flip one over,

you said, quote, ‘‘And we need the resources to advance our economic agenda as well,’’ end quote.

765
And you spoke and articulated the connections between having

adequate resources and advancing national security. I just wanted

to ask you that same question with respect to economic interests

and American economic agendas in moving forward and how we

can—or how we strengthen and advance economic interests by giving the Department the resources it needs so that it can do the

work that it’s meant to do?

A: Listen, I champion, I think, on economic State craft, which

was the use of the State Department to advocate on behalf of U.S.

companies and advocate on behalf of U.S. jobs. The State Department is uniquely positioned to do that. We have ambassadors and

staff in every country in the world, some of our biggest training

partners, and it used to be that Just Made in America was good

enough. That’s not the case anymore, right. We’re being challenged

in every sector, in every industry to compete. We need all the tools

that we can have, including the advocacy of our embassies and our

diplomatic corps, and there’s no one better, and equipped than people who are on the ground holding the American flag to advocate

on behalf of U.S. companies and U.S. interests.

So I think obviously having a robust budget in that particular

area is important in the economic interest of the U.S.

Q: If I can switch gears again. So the Secretary convened the Accountability Review Board shortly after the Benghazi attacks. Is

that right?

A: That’s correct.

Q: And do you recall when she convened the ARB?

A: I don’t.

Q: From what we have, it was, I think, less than a month or so

afterwards, and isn’t it also correct that she entrusted you to oversee the ARB’s implementation once the ARB’s report was released,

I believe, in December of 2012?

A: That’s correct.

Q: Okay. So I want to ask you a few questions about that, but

before we turn to that specifically, I want to ask you just a couple

of questions about some of these steps the Department took after

the attack and once the board was convened but before the ARB

issued its final report in December 2012.

And I think you had talked about some of these steps during

your testimony to Congress in December of that year, but if you

could just speak to, if you recall, some of the steps that you

oversaw and that you know that the Department took in response

to the attacks?

A: The first thing we did is we convened a thing called ISAF,

which was basically a joint program between the State Department

and Defense Department to make sure we step back and look at

all the other potential hotspots that we need to reevaluate in the

wake of the new normal.

And this had never happened before, and we got the Secretary

of Defense and State to authorize it. We sent, I think it was, 17

teams or 18 teams around the world to evaluate each embassy in

these defined hotspots, determine if they had appropriate security,

appropriate facilities, probably as important as anything is, one of

the elements of the security of our people is the Vienna Convention, and the Vienna Convention, as you know, is the convention

766
that requires the host country to provide the security for the facilities.

But even if they’re required to, they may not have either the will

or the capabilities of doing that, and these teams were to assess

that as well. And we wanted it quickly done within 30 days. So to

try to pull that off in 30 days is not an easy accomplishment because many of our uniformed officers, in getting the permissions

from host countries to allow U.S. military to come in and evaluate

is not always easy, but that was really a principal step that we

took.

Because as I said earlier—I hate to use the word—the world is

on fire, okay, and chaos was breaking out, and we had to really determine at that time how serious this was going to be over the next

6 months to make sure what just happened in Benghazi never happened again. And so that was really the biggest—and we took a lot

of quick steps, right, but that, I think, was a very important action

step we took. That was even before the ARB actually presented

their final findings.

Q: So one of the steps was that you deployed these interagency

security assessment teams to these hotspots abroad. Was there

anything else that you recall that the Department did during this

time period?

A: Well, we obviously increased our security in all the countries

that we had the ability to do. We called for additional Marines

where we could. We asked the Defense Department to offer additional Marines. That is more difficult, I learned, than I thought, because you can’t just send Marines into a country because you have

to have places for them to live, you have to have places to operate.

I mean, it’s not as simple as just sending, you know, 500 Marines

to 30 countries. It just doesn’t work that way. You have to get permission from the host country.

So we sent Marines. We sent more additional DS staff. We asked

for additional funds from the Defense Department. There’s a joint

fund that we operate together to help us in some of the countries.

So you know, we did—again, to be honest with you, I can’t remember all the things I was doing. All I remember is there were 70-

some recommendations by the ARB, and Secretary Clinton accepted every single one of the recommendations, and we began implementing all of those before we left.

Q: Now, you just, I think, told us that when these ISAF teams

were deployed, they were deployed in a relatively quick amount of

time. Is that right?

A: My recollection is that’s correct.

Q: And do you recall how quickly they were deployed?

A: I think within like 48 hours or 72 hours. I mean, we were—

by the way, it was very hard to pull off. You had to identify the

people. You got to get them plane tickets and private—I mean,

it’s—you know, it’s complicated. You just can’t send, you know, 15

people into a country and have these people, Marines or Army,

Navy, and State Department officials start interviewing government officials in host countries. They don’t particularly like that

very much, and so, you know, it was complicated, and most of the

countries we were going to but in nature of where we’re—they

weren’t necessarily vacation hotspots. I mean, they were really

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complicated places to go. So we really felt that we needed to quickly assess how serious an issue we were dealing with.

Q: So this reflects the priority and the importance that the Department and top leadership at that time had placed on ensuring

that and making these assessments on our posts abroad in these

hotspots. Is that right?

A: Sure. And just to be clear, you know, it was a self-reflection

moment, too. So I mean, all the reports did not come back rosy to

say we did everything right, right. There were plenty of reports

that came back that the security needed to be improved here, or

you know, windows didn’t have the right bars on it or it wasn’t the

right fire equipment. I mean, they went down to the nitty-gritty of

what needed to be done, and when you do that, it’s kind of a selfassessment, you know.

You don’t always like what comes back in a self-assessment, but

no one told us to do that. That wasn’t the recommendation of the

ARB. That was Secretary Clinton demanding we do that and get

on top of it before another problem happened, so again, we weren’t

responding to some inquiry or someone saying go do it. We did it

on our own, and quite frankly, we didn’t know what we’d get back,

and there were plenty of things that needed to be resolved.

And then we had a checklist, we had a whole team of people who

then went down the checklist and made sure that every one of

those facilities that had things that needed to be done were actually done.

Q: Right. And just to be clear, this all happened before the ARB

issued its report. This is days after the attack. Is that right?

A: This was done very quickly. I can’t tell you exactly every date,

but this was taken on with the most important speed and efficiency.

Q: And even with the sense of self-assessment and this level of

granularity that you just described, there also seems to be a sense

of urgency, if I’m hearing you correctly. Is that right?

A: Urgency was the word of the day.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS

Q: Do you remember any specific conversations with the Secretary about this, about sending out the ISAF teams?

A: Well, she approved it, so she was involved in the discussion

of it. She also understood that what would come back wasn’t going

to be, hey, you guys are doing everything great, okay. So she was

well aware this self-assessment is a self-assessment. So yes, I don’t

recall specific meetings and what conversations I had with her, but

she certainly was aware that we were doing this because it had to

be jointly agreed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of

State, which never has occurred before. I mean, this was not—it

wasn’t like press a button and these teams get arranged. They’ve

never done this before, so it was a relatively new kind of program.

Q: And you spoke to one of the specific things that the ISAF

teams were doing, which was not only determining whether there

was a will in the host country to protect Americans but whether

they had the capacity to do it. Is that right?

A: That’s correct.

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Q: And that, ultimately, was really the problem in Libya, right,

in Benghazi. It wasn’t a problem of the will of the host country but

in fact a problem of the implementation and the ability. Is that sort

of accurate?

A: That’s correct.

Q: And so is that why that piece of the ISAF was sort of the

focus?

A: Yeah. I mean, again, as I said, I mean, there is—they’re

bound by the Vienna Convention. That’s great. However, that

doesn’t always translate into making sure that our people are secure.

Q: And I think in the last round you got asked a number of questions around the specificity of the recognition and chief of mission

recognition in Benghazi, and I think that’s probably something that

only experienced State Department lawyers truly understand.

I don’t recall whether you were actually able to speak to it, but

let me just bring you back to one of those documents for a quick

minute. It was exhibit 4?

A: Yeah.

Q: And so this is the document that was entitled, ‘‘Benghazi

Staffing Plans.’’ I think in the last round you said you didn’t recall

if you had seen it. It appears to be a draft document. Is that right?

A: Again, I don’t know if it was a draft document. I did not see

it, that’s correct. I mean, I’m not aware that I saw it. Let’s put it

that way.

Q: And in this particular document was—the discussion was

around, in the last round, staff in Benghazi—quote, ‘‘Staff in

Benghazi would remain without privileges and immunities under

the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, except for those already accredited to Embassy in Tripoli. We should consider receiving unilateral assurances from the TNC on privileges and immunities.’’

This document appears to have been from before the TNC was

officially recognized. At some point, the TNC was the—became the

officially recognized government. Is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And so initially when the Special Envoy went into Libya, as

I understand it, the TNC wasn’t the officially recognized government, and he was in Benghazi a little bit under the radar, to some

extent, and then at some point the TNC did become the formally

recognized government, and then at a later point there was actually a democratic election. Is that accurate?

A: I believe so, yeah.

Q: In the summer of 2012?

A: I believe so.

Q: And I think that there was some misunderstanding perhaps

in the previous round about whether the individuals in Benghazi

were in fact under a chief of mission authority.

As I understand it, the individuals in Benghazi were under the

chief of mission authority from the embassy in Tripoli and that all

individuals in the country, even if there isn’t an officially recognized embassy in a particular area, remain under the chief of mission authority of that—of that country. Do you have any knowledge

on this area?

769
A: I would let the lawyers determine that, unfortunately.

Q: But again, the problem specifically in Benghazi on the night

of the attacks was not a refusal from the host government to come

and save our individuals. It was a matter of an inability. Is that

accurate?

A: I think that’s a good characterization.

BY MR. DESAI

Q: So Secretary Nides, if I can just refocus your attention back

to the ARB and the Accountability Review Board’s work. And the

ARB interviewed approximately 100 witnesses to review documents, and they issued their report roughly 2 months after Secretary Clinton convened the board, and that report was issued

sometime in December 2012.

And there have been allegations surrounding the ARB that I just

want to quickly address with you before I ask the rest of my questions. And those allegations focus or allege, rather, that the ARB’s

investigation, and in particular, the co-chairs, Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Michael Mullen, that their work was not sufficiently independent and was not sufficiently objective.

And I just want to ask you that, in your experience at the time,

do you agree with these allegations or think they have any merit?

A: I do not.

Q: And why is that? What was your assessment of their work?

A: Well, first of all, the two individuals you just spoke about are,

in my view, true patriots and have phenomenal reputations.

Second, they did a very thoughtful and thorough review, among

with other members of the committee, not just them, but most importantly, we accepted every one of the recommendations, okay.

And some of those recommendations were pretty aggressive. So

these were not—so this was, you know, 29 individual recommendations, and we accepted all of them without debate.

And so consequently, they had total carte blanche to do and recommend anything they wanted to, and given what we did, we basically accepted those.

Q: You described Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen as

patriots. Both of these gentleman worked for Republican presidents

prior to their service on the Accountability Review Board. Is that

correct?

A: I think that is correct.

Q: And are you aware of an instance in which their work was

unduly influenced or that the integrity of their investigation was

in any way compromised?

A: None.

Q: Okay. Moving on, I think you confirmed for me just a few

minutes ago that once the ARB was convened, Secretary Clinton

tasked you with overseeing the implementation of the ARB’s recommendation. Is that correct?

A: That’s correct.

Q: Or rather, once the ARB issued its report in December 2012,

why were you specifically chosen for that particular task, Mr. Secretary?

A: Good question. Because obviously, I had management experience, I was the deputy secretary of management, but I also had

770
come from the private sector. I knew how to drive a process to get

things done, and I was given tasks in which to do it.

Q: And did Secretary Clinton give you any directions when she

gave you these tasks with respect to the objective, the purpose, conveying a certain amount of urgency with respect to the importance

of this?

A: Yeah. She said, ‘‘Get it done and get it done quickly.’’

Q: And in your view, did the Secretary move expeditiously to implement the ARB’s recommendation? You just mentioned that she

accepted all the recommendations that they made, which was

something like 29 specific recommendations, so in your view, did

she move expeditiously to implement them once they were accepted?

A: She did.

Q: Were you aware, Mr. Secretary, that in September of 2013—

and I recognize that this is after you left the Department, if I’m

not mistaken. I think your tenure ended in February of that year,

if I’m not mistaken. But in September of 2013, the Department’s

Office of Inspector General actually conducted an assessment of the

ARB process generally, and what that process entailed was doing

a review of the 12 or so ARBs that had taken place from the, you

know, east Africa bombings in 1998, all the way through the

Benghazi—the Benghazi ARB from December of 2012. Were you

aware that the IG did that?

A: I was not.

Q: And just as an initial matter, to be clear, the inspector general of the Department is an independent nonpolitical entity. Is

that right?

A: It’s supposed to be, yes.

Q: And what function does the IG—the IG supposed to have?

A: Supposed to be an independent investigative arm that has no

political affiliation and is totally independent.

Mr. DESAI. So what I want to do at this time, is just——

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. And I know you have a sense of humor,

but just for the record, the IG, you are not making an allegation

that the IG is not independent of the State Department?

Mr. NIDES. What did I say?

Mr. DESAI. You said it is supposed to be.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. It is supposed to be.

Mr. NIDES. Oh, of course, it is totally independent.

Mr. DESAI. And you have no instincts——

Mr. NIDES. No, absolutely none. That was——

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Yeah, I just didn’t want it to sound odd

later.

Mr. NIDES. Please, please. No, no, it is totally independent.

BY MR. DESAI

Q: At this time, I’m going to show you a portion of the IG’s report

which is titled the Special Review of the Accountability Review

Board Process. I’m going to mark this for the record as Exhibit 10.

[Nides Exhibit No. 10 was marked for identification.]

771
BY MR. DESAI

Q: So what we have here is the cover sheet of the State IG’s report titled Special Review of the Accountability Review Board Process. It is dated September 2013. I have the cover page and I have

a couple of additional pages attached to it, maybe two or three

pages that I wanted to go over with you.

And if I can direct your attention to the first page, page 1. The

first bullet under ‘‘Key Judgments.’’ And this is just something that

we discussed a few minutes ago with respect to the independence

of the ARB. And the IG under its Key Judgments, its very first Key

Judgment it says, quote, ‘‘The Accountability Review Board process

operates as intended—independently and without bias to identify

vulnerabilities in The Department of State’s security programs,’’

end quote.

And I think what you just told me a few minutes ago is that this

finding is, in fact, consistent with your experience with the ARB

with respect to its independence and its integrity, is that right?

A: Yes, it is.

Q: If I can direct your attention to the next page, and this is page

19, and under ‘‘Department Action,’’ the inspector general noted,

quote, ‘‘The Department’s handling of the Benghazi ARB recommendations represents a significant departure from the previous

norm in that Secretary Clinton took charge directly of oversight for

the implementation process,’’ end quote.

Is the IG’s assertion here also consistent with your experience

overseeing the ARB implementation team?

A: It is.

Q: Now, you had mentioned that the ARB had made 29 recommendations; the Secretary accepted all of them. With respect to

its actual implementation, the mechanics of it, if you can just briefly walk me through how that happened? How did the ARB implementation team go about implementing those 29 recommendations?

A: You know, we did it like you would do any major project. You

have individual tasks assigned by the individual people. You have

people accountable for milestones. You set up clear guidelines of

what you wanted to accomplish. And you constantly held people accountable for what they said they were going to accomplish.

It is not more complicated than that, but it’s obviously, execution

is the key, and obviously, holding people accountable, having someone at my level meeting with them weekly, and in many cases

daily to make sure that things got done, that’s how you drive a

process.

Q: And when you say someone at your level, you mean someone

at the highest level, the higher echelons of the Department. Is that

right?

A: I would.

Q: And do you think it made a difference that someone at your

level and others who were in the leadership, including Secretary

Clinton, took such an active role with respect to the ARB’s implementation to make sure that it was implemented effectively? Do

you think that made a difference?

A: Absolutely.

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Q: If I can redirect your attention back to the document I just

gave you, and the very last page, which I believe it’s page 20, the

second paragraph of that document, it says, quote, ‘‘High-level leadership has been critical in driving and sustaining implementation

of the Benghazi ARB recommendations and this approach establishes a model for how the Department should handle future ARB

recommendations,’’ end quote. So you would agree with what the

inspector general has said here. Is that right?

A: I would.

Q: How would you characterize the rate of implementation and

the speed at which these recommendations were implemented during the time you were overseeing the implementation team?

A: Oh, rapid, and probably at warp speed for the government.

Q: And what do you attribute that to, just to be clear?

A: Attention from the top.

Q: Okay.

A: And I should say that the commitment among the career Foreign Service officers to get it right. So as much as we were imploring it to get done, the career people at the Department desperately

wanted to make sure this never happens again. And they were certainly willing to participate and make sure it didn’t happen again.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I think we are almost out of time.

Mr. DESAI. Yeah, we are just wrapping up. Thank you so much.

We will go off the record.

[Recess.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: So we will go back on the record. The time is 12:31, and we

will continue with our next hour. Thank you for your patience.

A: Please.

Q: So I wanted to follow up on some questions that our colleagues had the last hour and going back to the night of the attack.

And you had described a situation where you were engulfed in

identifying or trying to identify what you could do to help the situation in Benghazi. What were some of the specifics that were being

discussed during that time?

A: Well, as I said earlier, I don’t recall specific conversations, just

the atmospherics of what was going on, obviously. We were trying

to determine where Ambassador Stevens was; how many Americans were potentially hurt; what we could do to potentially help

them. So I think we were focused on the current situation, also,

what was happening at our Embassy as well in Libya.

So it’s hard for me to articulate specific conversations, but there

was an atmosphere of, we need to save these people’s lives. We also

need to understand potentially what other threats are out there,

and what we are going to do about them. So I think there was,

again, generically my—again, 3-plus years ago, not to use the term

I have been using a lot, but the fog of war, but I can’t really tell

you specifically, I said this, and they said that in response, but

there was a general sense of let’s resolve the issue as best we can.

Q: I want to go back to the discussion about the FEST. We had

mentioned the FEST in our first hour, and that is a State Department tool that is often recommended by the counterterrorism de773
partment. And it’s my understanding that it can be deployed within 4 hours of a deputy’s committee approval.

Why wasn’t the FEST considered?

A: I don’t recall. I mean, first of all, I wasn’t—I can’t recall, was

I a party to the discussion, so I can’t say it wasn’t deployed, or it

was deployed, or why it wasn’t deployed because I wasn’t—I don’t

recall those conversations.

Q: Do you recall conversations in terms of saving people’s lives

deploying any type of military asset?

A: I know there was conversations that were going on in an attempt to try to make sure that we get any resource we possibly

could get in to save lives. Specifically what those conversations

were, and who they were with, I can’t recall, but there certainly

was a view, is there any way we can get people there to help, including the local militia which really was the focus of people because those are the people that were blocks away, and they couldn’t

seem to get that to happen as well.

Q: How were you notified that the Ambassador was no longer

alive?

A: Again, I don’t remember all of the details, but I think I was

notified by the ops center in the middle of the night, maybe at 4

o’clock in the morning. I had gone home to shower. I may have gotten some confirmation that, in fact, he wasn’t at the hospital,

which some people had assumed that he was. But, originally, like

I said, they had taken him out of the facility, brought him to the

hospital and he was dead when he arrived at the hospital.

Q: And at that point a decision was made to evacuate the personnel, all personnel out of Benghazi?

A: Again, I don’t remember exactly what the chain of events

were, and what that order was, and how it was executed, but I

don’t recall what the timing of that was.

Q: In the last hour we had a significant discussion on the budget

constraints and budget cuts that were, I guess, Congress was

doing, if you will, or that was what was being suggested. Did Congress——

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I will object to that.

Ms. BETZ. You’ll object to that?

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. You don’t need to characterize what we

were suggesting.

Ms. BETZ. Okay. All right.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: Did Congress push you to go into Libya?

A: Again, I don’t have any insight into the decision on Libya,

Congress or not Congress. I don’t have any—I don’t have any insight to that. I don’t know if Members of Congress wrote Secretary

Clinton and asked her to go into Libya, so I know I wasn’t a party

to the discussions on the decision to go into Libya.

Q: Did Congress push the State Department to open two facilities

in Libya?

A: Again, I’m not a party to the decisions of who said what when,

and who asked for more facilities. So I can’t say yes or no because

I wasn’t aware of the conversations.

774
Q: If Congress wasn’t notified that the mission was taking place,

is it a fair assessment that it was more of a State Department initiative rather than a constraint or a budget implication that was

imposed by Congress?

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. That’s assuming that Congress wasn’t

notified.

Ms. BETZ. Well, Congress wasn’t notified.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Well, many, many Members of Congress

were aware that facilities——

Ms. BETZ. They were aware, but there was no official notification.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Yes, but HPSCI, and Armed Services,

lots of committees in Congress were aware.

Ms. BETZ. Aware is different than being officially notified that

there is an official presence in Benghazi.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Correct.

Ms. BETZ. Thank you.

Mr. NIDES. So again, unfortunately, my statement is the same

which is, I wasn’t aware of the conversations either by the Congress or the State Department and the decisionmaking to decide to

go into Libya, or to make a decision about going on Benghazi. I

don’t recall, to say it better.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: So we also spent a good deal of time talking about the ISATs

and the initiatives at the attack, and you mentioned that these

were put together within 48 hours of the attack. What precluded

you from putting the ISATs together before? What resources were

available that weren’t available before the attack?

A: Again, I’m not sure if it was 48 hours or 72 hours. It was very

quickly. I may have said 48 hours, may have been 24. I don’t know

exactly. But again, it was immediate. It was very quick. The constraints are, as you are aware, bringing a joint DOD-State Department identifying—it was, first of all it was over the Christmas holidays, right, so identifying people to go, to get them on planes, finding DOD military officials that could also meet up and go, setting

up the appropriate—you know, how hard it is to do just a codel.

So this was, obviously, hugely complicated. And so our view was

that we had to make sure that we had the right cooperations, and

we needed to make sure that the host country understood what we

were doing. You are sending military officials into the country with

uniforms on, which you have to get permission of which to do. So

logistically, it was very complicated to do and to do it successfully.

And these were, by the way, as I repeated, very hot spots which

equal dangerous spots in many cases, so making sure that those

people were secure once they got to the ground was also important

here.

Q: But it’s fair to say that the ISATs could have been put together prior to the attack?

A: Well, they were never set up in a way—the idea was for a preventive—to respond, to make sure what happened in Benghazi

doesn’t happen in another place. So you can’t—sure, you can’t predict what’s going to happen if you—it’s like a car, you hit a car,

you make sure you took the right turn you would have never hit

775
the car in the first place. Probably not a great analogy, but the reality of this is, is that the ISATs were never critical, it was a new

concept. We made it up. We basically said, we need to make sure—

Secretary Clinton said, we want to make sure that we are in a new

normal. We have a huge amount of countries that potentially are

in crisis mode. Let’s do a self-assessment as quickly as possible to

determine, to make sure this doesn’t happen again.

Q: No, I understand that. But the whole concept of an ISAT,

there was nothing to preclude you from putting these teams together prior to the attack in terms of preventing?

A: Well, we hoped the professional Diplomatic Security professionals that we have on the ground are doing that continually.

Right? Again, as you know, we have over 270 missions. You know,

we get this right 99 percent of the time. And obviously, when something like this tragically happens, we have got to step back and

learn from it. And one of the ways to learn from it is to have a selfassessment and go in and look at all of the countries that are potentially now in this high-risk category and assess that.

Q: And I think that’s fair. But I think just to sort of close this,

the Secretary was very focused on a 21st century expeditionary diplomacy?

A: Sure.

Q: So point being is if we are doing new ways of thinking with

diplomacy, there was nothing to preclude you from putting the

ISATs or executing the concept of an ISAT prior to the attacks;

21st century diplomacy with 21st century security?

A: There’s nothing to preclude us from doing anything. I mean,

the reality of this is, so but I—to be clear, the focus of the State

Department after attempting to try to make sure that we save the

lives of those Americans in Benghazi, then quickly shifted to make

sure it didn’t happen again in another country.

So we created a concept that never existed before, and as you

know, try to create something that has never existed before in the

government within 48 hours is not easy to do. It’s even more complicated when you are trying to do it with another very large department. So the State Department, and Defense Department had

never done anything like this before and certainly never done anything like this in the speed in which they did it. So, you know, that

was the recommendations that we came up with and executed.

Ms. BETZ. And I just wanted to note for the record that we were

joined again by Congressman Jordan.

Mr. JORDAN. Can I ask a question?

Ms. BETZ. Yeah, and I’m going to yield.

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Nides, in the Democrat hour, the last hour, you

said you were with the Secretary that entire night. I think your direct quote was, you were with her all night as long as she was at

the Department.

Mr. NIDES. As long as she was at the Department.

Mr. JORDAN. Okay, and were you with her when she communicated with the President?

Mr. NIDES. I was not. I mean, I was there. I don’t know when

the conversation—it was 2.5 years ago. She wasn’t—I wasn’t sitting

in the room when she was calling the President, I don’t believe.

776
Mr. JORDAN. She indicated that she didn’t meet with the President that night, but she talked to him on the phone. So you were

not in the room when she talked with him?

Mr. NIDES. I have no recollection.

Mr. JORDAN. Do you know how many times she talked with the

President that night?

Mr. NIDES. Again, I don’t have any recollection——

Mr. JORDAN. So you wouldn’t know how long the call was?

Mr. NIDES. I would not.

Mr. JORDAN. You won’t know what they discussed on the call?

Mr. NIDES. I would not.

Mr. JORDAN. Did she talk to you as one of her key advisors prior

to the call saying what she was going to convey to the President

on her conversation with the President?

Mr. NIDES. I don’t recall.

Mr. JORDAN. What time that evening did the call take place?

Mr. NIDES. Again, I’m sorry. I just don’t remember.

Mr. JORDAN. You don’t remember?

Mr. NIDES. I mean, again, it was almost 31⁄2 years ago. I don’t

know what time a call came in or didn’t come in.

Mr. JORDAN. Well, let me give you some context. Did the call

happen prior to the 10:08 statement that was announced by the

State Department that became the official statement of our government, or did it happen after the 10:08 statement?

Mr. NIDES. Honestly, unfortunately, I just don’t know. I don’t remember. I don’t recall.

Mr. JORDAN. Were you involved in putting the statement together, the statement that talked about the video, some of the stuff

to justify this behavior? Were you involved in putting that statement together?

Mr. NIDES. I was not.

Mr. JORDAN. Were you involved in talking at all about the video

that night prior to any statement going out with just, just the Secretary or some of the other key advisors, key people at the State

Department?

Mr. NIDES. I don’t recall I was.

Mr. JORDAN. How about with the Secretary’s conversations with

the Department of Defense, particularly Secretary Panetta? Were

you in the room when she talked with Secretary Panetta?

Mr. NIDES. I don’t recall that I was or wasn’t.

Mr. JORDAN. And do you know what time the calls with Secretary Panetta took place? Do you happen to know that?

Mr. NIDES. No, I’m sorry.

Mr. JORDAN. Same kind of answer, okay. Who did you talk with

that day at the White House, if anyone?

Mr. NIDES. You know, again, it was——

Mr. JORDAN. Did you talk to——

Mr. NIDES [continuing]. Three plus years ago. I don’t really recall

who I spoke to.

Mr. JORDAN. Okay.

Mr. NIDES. I’m sure I spoke to a lot of people because we were

all talking to a lot of people, but to be honest with you, I just I

don’t have a recollection of who——

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Mr. JORDAN. Who did you talk with at the Department of Defense? Did you happen to talk with Mr. Bash, Jeremy Bash that

day?

Mr. NIDES. I don’t—I have seen an email, I guess, that there was

an email of correspondence, and I could have talked to Jeremy

Bash. I could have talked to him on the phone. I just don’t recall.

Mr. JORDAN. What about James Miller? Did you talk with James

Miller on that day?

Mr. NIDES. Again, I talked to James Miller a lot, so the chances

of me talking to James Miller that day, it could have happened.

Mr. JORDAN. Do we have the email communications between Mr.

Nides and Mr. Miller, and Mr. Nides and Mr. Bash? Did you email

with Mr. Bash that day?

Mr. NIDES. I have seen an email.

Ms. BETZ. We did have those——

Mr. JORDAN. Okay, and we have all of those?

Mr. NIDES. I don’t know what you have.

Mr. JORDAN. Okay.

Mr. NIDES. Okay. I’m sorry. I wish I knew.

Mr. JORDAN. Okay, and your title is Deputy Secretary of Management and Resources?

Mr. NIDES. That’s correct.

Mr. JORDAN. Did you have anything, any say in, or in okaying

the email arrangement that Secretary Clinton had set up, her personal email?

Mr. NIDES. No.

Mr. JORDAN. Okay, and did you have any oversight, or influence,

or impact, or interaction with Bryan Pagliano?

Mr. NIDES. I did not.

Mr. JORDAN. Okay, that’s all I have got.

Mr. NIDES. Thank you.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: I want to followup again on the questioning on the ARB that

we discussed last hour and we talked about, a little bit about the

formation of the ARB.

Do you recall meeting with the ARB?

A: I do.

Q: And was the meeting before the report was issued?

A: I assume it was.

Q: Did you get a copy of the report before it was issued?

A: I don’t recall. I mean, I just don’t know. I don’t—I mean, I

have no recollection of it. I’m not saying I didn’t. I just don’t recall.

Q: Did Cheryl Mills talk to you about meeting with the ARB?

A: Sure. We had plenty of conversations about the ARB. I don’t

know about—communicated with her about the ARB.

Q: Was it your understanding that the ARB was sort of being put

together in the normal course of action the way ARBs typically

were?

A: Again, I have no insight to how ARBs were typically put together.

Q: Let me show you a document. Are we on 11?

Ms. BETZ. This would be your last tab. Tab 20.

Mr. NIDES. Last tab.

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Ms. BETZ. And this will be exhibit 11; very last tab in the notebook.

[Nide Exhibit No. 11 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: And specifically, it would be the last page of that document.

A: Is this the ‘‘Dear Colleagues’’ one?

Q: The ‘‘Dear Colleagues,’’ yes.

A: Okay.

Q: So for identification purposes, it is STATE–SCB0093144. The

witness is not a sender, nor is a recipient, but has talked about his

role in ARB. So I just want to refer you to the last page that says:

‘‘Dear Colleagues, just a reminder—the Federal Registry notice

takes three work days to be published which means that I will

need the names of the ARB members and the rest of the information by Wednesday morning if they will be starting work on Monday, October 1. I would appreciate knowing how this ARB is going

to work since it is not going in the normal way.’’

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Can I just—I’m sorry, can we just

pause? It’s a long document. Can you just show me where he is referenced in this?

Ms. BETZ. I said he is not referenced in it, but we have been discussing his role in the ARB.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Oh, okay. I thought you said he was referenced.

Ms. BETZ. No, he is not referenced in it.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: But I just wanted to get your comments on this last phrase

that the ARB is not going the normal way.

A: All right, I don’t have any idea what that refers to.

Q: So you don’t have any knowledge about how the ARB was

supposed to work?

A: I do not.

Q: Were you involved in any of the selection of the ARB panelists?

A: I was not.

Q: Were you consulted?

A: Not to my recollection.

Q: I think we will go off the record.

[Discussion off the record. ]

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS

Q: Let’s go back on. I will be brief. Just a couple of followups and

I think in one of the previous rounds, you had referenced the importance both to you, to the Secretary and to everybody at the

State Department, I think, that you all work together to make sure

nothing like Benghazi ever happens again. Is that accurate?

A: It is.

Q: And while I understand that that’s a goal, I think I just—I

just wanted to discuss for a moment the possibility of that as a

standard which is to say I think that’s—I think from my understanding from talking to, I think, all of the people that we have

779
spoken to, while that is the goal, it is to some extent an impossible

standard. Is that accurate?

A: Unfortunately, that’s true.

Q: And so as you had said, I think previously, you know, and

even if—and obviously, mistakes were made in this instance, but

even in circumstances where all individuals are doing their best efforts, you know, 100 percent of the time, there still can be an attack that’s successful against us. Is that accurate?

A: It is.

Q: And it is not necessarily true that if there is an attack that

that means that individuals acted poorly, or specifically made mistakes?

A: That is correct.

Q: Although we share the goal, and I think our members

have——

A: I’m sorry?

Q: We share the goal and I think our members have stated the

same goal——

A: Of course.

Q: [continuing]. Numerous times. I think there have been some

allegations and some discussion about the government presence in

Benghazi and whether that was something that the White House

demanded or the Secretary demanded, whether it was something

that sort of came from the top down as opposed to from the bottom

up, from what that means, I mean, the NEA Bureau or career Foreign Service officers, including Ambassador Stevens. I know you

don’t have a great recollection of the decision itself, but do you recall whether the discussions around Benghazi, the presence in

Benghazi and Libya policy was something that was bottom up or

top down?

A: Again, I can’t recall specific conversations about who said

what when. From the period of time of the 2-plus years that I was

there, there was always a constant push for more people, meaning

more Foreign Service officers to be on the ground to help on USAID

programs, on economic issues, and there is constantly a push by

the bureaus to get more head count into the countries in which

they are working in.

I don’t believe this was any different than that. But again, I can’t

recall specific conversations about who asked for what resources,

but it is traditional at the State Department, and quite frankly, at

DOD, for the commander on the ground, which is the equivalent

of an ambassador, to continue to ask for more resources and to ask

for more people on the ground; specifically, more program people,

career Foreign Service officers.

Q: And I feel like we have gone through the night of the attack

as extensive as we can. But I think in the last round you described

that on the night of the attack, that the sentiment was that—the

sentiment of the Secretary, and her senior advisors was that you

all wanted to get any resources that you possibly could into the

area to save lives. Is that accurate?

A: That is correct.

Q: And did that include military resources?

A: Absolutely.

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BY MR. DESAI

Q: We are toward the end, at least for this session. This is the

eighth congressional investigation into the Benghazi attacks and

we are hoping it’s the last one. And toward that end, we are going

to ask you about a series of allegations that have been made in

connection with the attacks that the minority feels have been

asked and answered. But it’s our understanding that some of our

colleagues on the other side are still pursuing them. So as a result,

we are compelled to ask every witness that we speak to about these

allegations.

So here is how I would like to proceed. I will tell you what the

allegation is, and then I will just ask you whether or not you have

any information or any evidence to support the allegation.

A: Got it.

Q: And I am not as interested in your opinion, but only whether

or not you have evidence or information about the allegation. And

if you don’t have any information or evidence, I will just move on

to the next allegation until we are out of allegations. And as you

will see, there are quite a few of these allegations. I’m going to ask

in advance just for your patience as we go through them.

I will start with the first one. It has been alleged that Secretary

of State Clinton intentionally blocked military action on the night

of the attacks. One Congressman has speculated that, quote, ‘‘Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down,’’ end quote, and

this resulted in the Defense Department not sending more assets

to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the

night of the attacks?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged Secretary Clinton personally signed an

April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington Post

fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios, its

highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day security

resources in Benghazi?

A: No.

Q: I will just pause for one second just to let the record reflect

that Chairman Gowdy has joined us.

Mr. NIDES. Mr. Chairman, how are you?

Chairman GOWDY. How are you doing?

Mr. NIDES. Great. Thank you.

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BY MR. DESAI

Q: It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or

fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Colonel Qadhafi to his

own people in order to garner support to military operations in

Libya in spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Colonel Qadhafi to

his own people in order to garner support for military operations

in Libya in spring 2011?

A: No, I don’t.

Q: It has been alleged to the U.S. Mission in Benghazi included

transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries. A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee

on Intelligence found that quote, ‘‘The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria,’’ end quote, and they found,

quote, ‘‘No support for this allegation,’’ end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee’s bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A: No, I don’t.

Q: Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in Benghazi

were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria

or to any other foreign country?

A: No, I don’t.

Q: A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the special mission compound

and there have been a number of allegations about the cause of

and the appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not

ordered to stand down. But that instead, there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House Intelligence Committee’s finding that there was no standdown order to

CIA personnel?

A: No, I don’t.

Q: Putting aside whether you personally agree with the decisions

to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do you have

any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind the

temporary delay of the CIA security personnel to depart the Annex

to assist the special mission compound?

A: I do not.

Q: A concern has been raised by one individual that in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed from that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that

were provided to the ARB?

A: I do not.

Q: Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or

scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided

to the ARB?

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A: I do not.

Q: Allow me to ask you these questions also for documents that

were provided to Congress.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that

were provided to Congress?

A: I do not.

Q: It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell,

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA, quote, ‘‘faithfully performed our duties in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship,’’ end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell

gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about

the Benghazi talking points?

A: I do not.

Q: Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points to Congress for political reasons?

A: I do not.

Q: It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made and intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk

shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday

talk shows?

A: I do not.

Q: It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, ‘‘virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief,’’ end quote,

on the night of the attacks and that he was, quote, ‘‘missing in action. ’’

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing

in action on the night of the attacks?

A: I do not.

Q: It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel at

Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors to stand down or to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to,

quote, ‘‘remain in place,’’ end quote. In Tripoli to provide security

and medical assistance in their current location. A Republican staff

report issued by the House Armed Services Committee found that,

quote, ‘‘There was no standdown order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi,’’ end

quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the

House Armed Services Committee that there was no standdown

order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to

join the fight in Benghazi?

A: I do not.

Q: It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets

on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon, the

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former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee conducted a review of the attacks after which he stated, quote, ‘‘Given

where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and

how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn’t have done more

than we did,’’ end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Chairman McKeon’s conclusion?

A: I do not.

Q: Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives; that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

deploy them?

A: I do not.

Q: I think with that, we will go off the record.

Mr. YANES. Well, hang on a second. Is the questioning over from

both sides in the nonclassified session?

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Is the chairman going to—are you good?

Chairman GOWDY. Yes.

Mr. YANES. Okay, the only thing I would like to say——

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Do you want to stay on the record?

Mr. YANES. Yeah, on the record, please.So we were contacted by

the committee staff shortly before Thanksgiving Mr. Chipman

called and asked that Mr. Nides come in and testify before Christmas. There was no way we could get our security clearances in

time for that to happen.

Mr. Nides didn’t want to delay the timing that the committee

wanted, so for the classified session, Mr. Snyder, and his colleague

from the State Department will represent Mr. Nides in the classified session. That’s all.

Mr. DESAI. Okay.Thank you.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. We can go off.

[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the interview proceeded in classified

session.]

Ms. BETZ. We’ll go back on the record. The time is 1:38.

And I should preface, we are in a classified setting now, and I

believe we’re cleared through—Secret? Top Secret?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, I think——

Ms. BETZ. I don’t know if we have limitations or if we had

set——

Mr. SNYDER. It’s probably best if we agreed to keep it as Secret,

unless somebody thinks something goes over Secret. Otherwise, it

becomes very unwieldy to deal with the transcript, if that’s all

right.

Ms. BETZ. And that’s fine.

Mr. SNYDER. And everyone here is cleared through at least Top

Secret.

Ms. BETZ. Okay. So everyone is cleared through TS, but we’ll try

to keep at Secret. Mr. Snyder. Okay.

EXAMINATION BY MS. BETZ

Q: Thank you for coming back down here. I want to pick up

where we left off. And I know that we sort of discussed in great

detail the night of the attacks, but I wanted to discuss with you

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in detail to try and better understand what the decisions were

made that night.

And if you would turn to tab 1, which will now be exhibit 12.

And you know what? I don’t have the exhibit tabs. Let’s just do

exhibit 12.

[Nides Exhibit No. 12 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: And I’ll give the witness a minute to look at the document.

A: Okay. I’ve seen it.

Q: For identification purposes, it’s document CO5562028.

It’s an email. At the top of the email chain, it’s from Jake Sullivan to Jeremy Bash, Wendy Sherman, and the witness, Tom

Nides.

Do you recall this document?

A: I do not.

Q: Just for purposes of discussing, it says, ‘‘After consulting’’—

and this is Jeremy Bash speaking to you all in the underlying

email.

‘‘After consulting with General Dempsey, General Ham, and the

Joint Staff, we have identified the forces that could move to

Benghazi. They are spinning up as we speak. They include a SOF

element that was in Croatia (which can fly to Suda Bay, Crete) and

a Marine FAST team out of Roda, Spain.

‘‘Assuming principals agree to deploy these elements, we will ask

State to secure the approval from host nation. Please advise how

you wish to convey that approval to us. Burns/Nides/Sherman to

Miller/Winnefeld would be my recommended course.’’

There is an email above that that says, ‘‘Thanks Jeremy plus

Cheryl. We are joining a SVTC with NSS colleagues at 7:30. Believe your team will be on as well. We should work through this

issue in that venue.’’

Does this help refresh your memory?

A: Sure.

Q: So, in that underlying email, you are tasked with a specific

do-out. Do you recall doing that? Do you recall getting country

clearance?

A: Well, first of all, I don’t think I was the one tasked with—it’s

emailed to all of us.

Q: Well, it’s emailed to all of you, but in that third paragraph,

it says, ‘‘Assuming principals agree to deploy these elements, we

will ask State to secure the approval from host nation. Please advise how you wish to convey that approval to us.’’ Burns, Nides,

and Sherman, you would be part of that group.

A: Yeah. So, first of all, I don’t recall, again, what I did that

evening vis-a-vis this. So the answer is I don’t recall if I made a

call or didn’t make a call. And I don’t know—in many cases, I

wouldn’t have been the person to do that call, even though I was

on this email. Either Bill Burns would do it or Wendy Sherman

would do it. I wouldn’t necessarily be the person to make the call.

Q: Did they make that call?

A: I have no idea.

Ms. BETZ. I guess we’ll go off the record for a minute.

[Discussion off the record.]

785
Ms. BETZ. We’ll go back on the record.

BY MS. BETZ

Q: So you believe that, just to pick back up, Burns and Sherman

would have made——

A: Again, I don’t know if anyone made the call. I mean, I don’t

recall what happened following that. So, from what I glean from

this, they were asking us to make the call, but we were going to

meet about this, I guess, after the SVTC at 7:30, right? Or after

the meeting. I don’t know whether it would fall on me—the followup memos were vis-a-vis this, but I don’t recall doing anything

in regards to this.

Q: Do you recall discussing this, the deployment of assets, in the

SVTC?

A: No. During the period of time between the attack and when

we found out that the Ambassador had died, there were lots of conversations about what we could do to help. My assumption, this

was part of that conversation, about are there things we can get

into the country to help.

So I assume that the general topic was discussed, but I just simply don’t remember what we did at that meeting. Did we call the

Defense Department? Did we spit up the assets? I just don’t recall.

Q: Do you recall DOD being on that SVTC?

A: I don’t. I’m sorry.

Q: You don’t remember Jeremy Bash being on the SVTC?

A: I don’t recall. You know, again, as I said before, we were having numerous calls, SVTCs all evening, so I don’t remember who

was on which call at which point.

Q: So I’m going to show you what will be now exhibit 13.

[Nides Exhibit No. 13 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: It’s not in a tab, so I will give it to you.

A: Thank you.

Q: And for purposes of our discussion, I’m looking at page 5 of

this email chain. And while you’re looking at it, I’ll go ahead and

identify it. It’s State Department document CO5580636. And it is

an email chain. The sender and the recipients are redacted.

A: Okay.

Q: So, just taking a step back, does this email help refresh your

memory as to whether or not you participated on the 7:30 SVTC?

A: Again, I’m sorry, but I just don’t—I participated in a lot of

meetings that evening. And I certainly could have been there, but

I don’t recall this particular conversation. So I would have to say

I just don’t—I wouldn’t call it a confirmation about whether I was

there or not.

Q: Okay. But the exhibit 12 that I just showed you identified

those individuals who were meeting with the Secretary——

A: Sure.

Q: [continuing]. And then those who would have been on the

SVTC, of which you would have been one of those individuals.

A: My assumption is I probably was in the room, but I can’t confirm that I was because, again, it was 31⁄2 years ago. I assume

786
there’s a manifest of the meeting, but I don’t—my assumption is

I presume I was there, but I have no idea.

Q: Well, this email sums up, I think——

A: Sure.

Q: [continuing]. Certain details of that SVTC. And it describes

Denis McDonough chairing with Secretary of State Clinton and her

team joining. Presumably you would be one of those——

A: Yeah.

Q: [continuing]. On her team? Would you——

A: Yes.

Q: Is that a fair characterization?

A: Yeah, sure. Absolutely.

Q: ‘‘DOD was represented by Jeremy Bash and Vice Admiral

Kurt Tidd.’’

A: Yeah.

Q: ‘‘* * *, our Libya desk officer, and I also participated, and

Lieutenant General Kelly sat in as well. Special thanks’’—redacted—‘‘for providing excellent support to Jeremy during the

SVTC and for the summary.’’

So you don’t have a recollection of discussing any deployment of

military assets with Jeremy Bash on the SVTC?

A: Again, I don’t. I mean, I’m not saying it didn’t happen. I

mean, obviously, the readout of the SVTC obviously had said that

those discussions were there, and presumably 3 years ago I was in

the room when that was happening, but I don’t directly recall the

conversation that took place.

Q: Do you recall the CIA being on the call?

A: Again, I’m sorry. I really don’t.

Q: Okay.

At the bottom of this email, there lists a number of do-outs, some

of which are for the State Department. Do you know who would

have been tasked with those do-outs, who would have been responsible or tasked with working with individuals to identify the location and status of Ambassador Stevens?

A: I assume Diplomatic Security, but I’m just making that assumption. So I know Diplomatic Security within the State Department would be tasked because those were the people that were on

the ground and had connectivity there. But I can’t say that for certain.

Q: Who within the State Department would have been responsible for engaging the Libyan Government for additional cooperation on potential U.S. military intervention?

A: In most cases, it would be the bureau, the NEA: bureau would

be the point of contact in that, or, obviously, the ambassador on the

ground. But since the ambassador on the ground wasn’t there, unfortunately, probably the bureau from Washington would be calling

the Libyan Government. That would be the normal protocol, but I

can’t confirm that’s actually what happened.

Q: The task-out for State goes on to state, ‘‘We’ll work directly

with Vice Admiral Tidd’s staff to get details of units on standby for

deployment to Tripoli and Benghazi.’’ Do you know who would have

been tasked to work with Vice Admiral Tidd and his staff?

A: I don’t, but, again, my assumption is any one of us could have

been. I don’t recall that I was, but I’m not saying that it couldn’t

787
have been possible. Again, it was pretty fast-moving. People were

taking tasks all over the seventh floor and resolving it. But, again,

I can’t say for certain that I wasn’t, but, certainly, I could have

been engaged in that process.

Please.

Q: And with all due respect, so what decisions did the senior

staff make that night? If everything is delegated to the Diplomatic

Security bureau, what were your tasks that night?

A: Well, again, I think as proven, I think, over the course of discussion, the way this works is that the professionals, the security

professionals, the people on the ground bring up recommendations

to the senior officials at the State Department, and decisions are

made that way. But the actual work determination is not put in

the hands of political appointees; it’s put in the hands of the career

Foreign Service folks who have been there.

So, again, depending what decision needed to be made, presumably much of that work was being done by the security professionals determining what we could do vis-a-vis the saving of individuals’ lives. And they would be engaged with the career people

that were involved.

Q: What recommendations were made that night, then, to you by

the career staff?

Mr. SNYDER. Just to be clear, I think you said you don’t have any

real recollection——

Mr. NIDES. Yeah.

Mr. SNYDER [continuing]. Or just don’t recall.

But are you saying typically?

BY MS. BETZ

Q: I mean, so I just want to be clear. So no recommendations

were made by the career staff to you that night as to what should

and shouldn’t be done?

A: Again, unfortunately, as I said, you know, again, this is 3

years ago. We had 10, 20, 30 meetings at different points, so I don’t

recall what recommendations were brought. This was an information-gathering exercise, as you can see by this, to try to find out

the facts on the ground. It was fast-moving—fog of war, all the

things that we have talked about before. So, again, I can’t articulate exactly what recommendations were brought up in this particular meeting.

Q: So, moving on from the night of the attack, I just want to follow up on some questions that we had in our first round regarding

decisionmaking. And we talked a little bit about decisions that

were made regarding staffing, and I just wanted to see if additional

documents would refresh your memory.

So if you could turn to tab 7.

[Nides Exhibit No. 14 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: For identification purposes, I’ll just go ahead and identify it.

It’s SCB0075032. And it’s from the witness to * * *.

A: Okay.

Q: First of all, does this email refresh your recollection of a discussion during the 2011 time period?

788
A: It was written to me, so, I mean, I don’t recall the memo, but

I certainly understand the topics.

Q: Uh-huh. Well, I would direct your attention to the underlying

email, which is from your staff to you and specifically updating you

on Ambassador Stevens. And, specifically, I’ll go to the start with

the second sentence in that paragraph.

‘‘There is a push for the mandate of Stevens’ trip (and the DART,

see below) to expand; the current mandate is for Stevens to stay

in Libya for up to 30 days, situation permitting, so that he can ‘get

to know the TNC.’ NEA: will be drafting a paper for Steinberg,

which essentially will ask for an expanded scope of work for Stevens—which will allow him to stay in Libya for longer (90 days or

more). Once NEA has some policy guidance about what Stevens

should be seeking to accomplish in Libya, it will devise a plan for

a new footprint on the ground—this will require needed resources

and could shift the mission from an envoy situation to a more permanent presence. We will need to watch this closely, and I’ve

flagged for P and D(S) staff that you and Pat should be included

in these discussions.’’

Did you have those discussions?

A: I don’t recall having discussions, but, again, long time ago. My

assumption is, if they said I should have a conversation, I assume

I had them.

Q: Uh-huh. Was there a conversation about changing the mission

to a more permanent presence?

A: Again, respectfully, I just can’t recall that specific conversation.

Q: Would you have any recollection, given resources within your

purview or your portfolio, budget implications, resource implications, would you have had that discussion about a more permanent

footprint and what that would mean?

A: Again, I don’t recall that. Obviously, there’s a continual push,

as I’ve discussed before, among career Foreign Service officers to

expand our missions in many of these countries. And this, again,

you know, foot-stomps what I had said recently, or previously, that,

again, there’s a constant view that we needed to have more resources on the ground, meaning more Foreign Service officers. And

I assume that was the context in which I would be meeting about.

Q: Is it fair to characterize you as a check on those discussions

that the career Foreign Service officers wanted to have regarding

increase in staffing?

A: Ultimately, I think we would try to look at the facts and have

a discussion. I don’t know if the word ‘‘check’’ is the appropriate

one, but we certainly would be able to weigh in if, in fact, we disagreed with the recommendations.

Q: I want to move and discuss a little bit about the CIA’s presence in Benghazi. Were you aware that the CIA: had a presence?

A: I was not.

Q: You were not. So did you ever have any discussions with

Morell about the presence of the CIA in Benghazi?

A: Let me rephrase that. I’m not aware that I did, okay? So I—

again, it was 3 years ago. I don’t believe I did, but, you know, I

don’t know if someone—if someone was in a meeting with me and

told me about. So I don’t want to overstate my knowledge.

789
Mr. SNYDER. And you’re saying prior to the attack, clearly.

Ms. BETZ. Correct. I’m sorry. This is in 2011.

Mr. NIDES. Yeah, I don’t believe I did. But, again, I—3, 4 years

ago, you know, someone could have briefed me on that and I wasn’t

aware of it or paid attention to it.

Ms. BETZ. This will be exhibit 15.

[Nides Exhibit No. 15 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: For identification purposes, it’s SCB0071180. It’s from Patrick

Kennedy to Jacob Sullivan, Joseph Macmanus, and—but the witness is copied on the email.

A: Okay.

Q: Do you recall this email?

A: I do not.

Q: Okay. So what I would like to focus on is the last sentence

that’s in brackets.

A: Uh-huh.

Q: * * *

A: Good thing I said I could have been told. Again, I——

Q: So you have no recollection——

A: No.

Q: * * *

A: I don’t.

Q: [continuing]. At that time?

A: I certainly don’t recall knowing it. I may have known it at the

time, but I certainly don’t recall knowing it right now.

Q: Okay.

I want to turn now to what would be exhibit 15 in your binder.

This will be exhibit 16.

[Nides Exhibit No. 16 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: It’s a long document, and I think, for our purposes, I just want

to focus on the first two paragraphs.

A: Okay.

Q: Or, actually, the second paragraph.

A: Okay.

Q: Do you recall receiving this note from Jake Sullivan, Assistant

Secretary Feltman, and Bill Taylor?

A: No, I don’t.

Q: So I’d like to focus on the second paragraph——

A: Please.

Q: [continuing]. Which discusses several broad goals for Libya.

‘‘We would like to see a Libya that is unitary and democratic, that

denies access to extremists, that has effective control over its weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, and that

maintains peaceful relations with its neighbors. We also have an

interest in ensuring that Libya can sell its oil and gas on the global

market. But post-conflict stabilization in Libya, while clearly a worthy undertaking at the right level of investment, cannot be counted

as one of our highest foreign policy priorities. Strategically for us,

Libya does not loom as large * * *.’’

Was that the prevailing view among the seventh floor?

790
A: Again, I wasn’t—I don’t remember any dialogue around the

memo. I don’t recall the memo. I think that parts of the paragraph,

obviously, were important. I don’t recall exactly the debate that

went on. This is obviously a memo that was for discussion purposes. This was not a decision memo. This was a discussion memo.

So I can’t recall if there was followup discussions based upon what

was in the paragraphs or in the sentences and if they were

changed or not.

So I can’t tell you what I believe was the prevailing view because

I don’t know exactly ultimately what we came up to in our conversations about it.

Q: But I think it would—is it fair to say that this would be a

viewpoint espoused by Jake Sullivan, Jeff Feltman, and Bill Taylor?

A: Well, I guess they wrote the memo, so I’d assume that they

believe in what they wrote.

Now, in many cases, memos are to begin as a baseline for a discussion ultimately with the two of us and the Secretary. So, again,

I can’t recall what the followup was, but, certainly, there’s much

in that paragraph no one would disagree with, obviously. So then

the question, obviously, is, did we have this dialogue around what

our goals should be in Libya and do those changes. I can’t tell you,

to be certain, when those meetings occurred and what was discussed at those meetings.

Q: But you don’t recall having a discussion that would refute,

sort of, those positions in that, characterizing this?

A: Either way, I don’t recall having a discussion that either confirmed or refute it. So, to be honest, I can’t remember on either one

of those scores.

Q: Okay.I would like to show you another document.This will be

exhibit No. 17.

[Nides Exhibit No. 17 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ

Q: It’s not in your binder.

A: Okay.

Q: So, for identification purposes, it’s State Department document C05578764. It’s an action memo for Deputy Secretaries Steinberg and Nides.And it’s from NEA: Assistant Secretary Jeffrey

Feltman.

Do you recall ever seeing this action memo? A: I do not.

Q: And I should preface, it’s neither approved or disapproved.

None of the boxes are checked.

But I was curious, given that your staff is listed on the cleared—

it doesn’t say okay, but your staff is listed—I assume that they

were consulted. Would they have been consulted in this?

A: Again, I mean, the standard operating procedure is that

when—again, I’m not saying—I don’t recall the memo, but the

standard operating procedure in a memo like this, they would have

okayed it. That’s why the—so, for some reason, the document, my

staff didn’t okay it. I’m not saying that they didn’t okay it, but

they’re not identified on this as having agreed to it.

And, second, as I indicated, I didn’t sign this memo. I’m not saying that I didn’t sign it for a different memo, but this particular

791
memo doesn’t have my signature on it. But, again, this is not an

uncommon memo to make a decision on increasing a presence at

a new facility.

Q: Correct. And that’s a fair characterization. I guess I wanted

to ask you whether or not an action memo had been approved or

disapproved by you—not necessarily this memo, any other memo

that described a type of presence for the mission in Benghazi.

A: Again, I don’t have a recollection of it. My assumption is, if

there were people there, the approval process had to take place at

some level for having our individual Foreign Service officers there.

I don’t recall the discussion or the meeting in which that was,

quote, ‘‘signed off on.’’

Q: Do you know, just by looking at the memo, if elements of the

memo were implemented?

A: Again, I would have to go back and look at the memo in great

detail and then determine what was done based upon the memo.

So I would be hard pressed to tell you what was implemented and

what wasn’t implemented. Obviously, they went through a great

amount of detail about what they wanted to accomplish, and,

again, I would have to go and look at what they actually did versus

what the memo said.

Q: Who else would have been consulted in discussions about the

memo or the contents of the memo regarding the presence or a

phased approach regarding the presence in Benghazi?

A: Well, it looks like everyone on the last page who cleared the

memo. So my assumption would be that would be the group of people who would be consulted with. But that would be a normal process.

I think it would ultimately—the bureau would normally initiate

a discussion around this, meaning that they want resources on the

ground, and do the work. They would consult with the Under Secretary, which would be Mr. Kennedy. And then he ultimately

would assign different parts of his department, including OBO,

which is the building operations, and would do leases. The security

professionals would do security. The technology people would do

technology. So every piece would be examined and reexamined to

make sure they were making the right decision.

So there was no lack of professionalism looking at these kinds of

decisions, but I really know individually who approved this one.

But the normal operating procedure is lots of hands on it and lots

of professional career Foreign Service officers examining these

issues to great detail.

Q: The memo, I think, and just by flipping through it, is very

specific as to some of the cost implications——

A: Sure.

Q: [continuing]. Of the presence. Would those cost figures or resource issues, would they have been discussed with you?

A: Again——

Q: Given that’s within your portfolio, correct?

A: Again, to the best of my knowledge, I don’t recall that discussion. I’m not saying, again, it didn’t occur. I just don’t recall this

specific incident or this specific number.

Now, I should say that not every dollar that was spent at the

State Department I approved. So, again, I’m not in any way sug792
gesting that I didn’t have a full-throated conversation about every

dollar that was going to be spent there, but I don’t recall that to

be the case.

Ms. Betz. I think I am done.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I have, like, a real quick followup, but it

won’t take but a minute. I don’t think that we need to move. I’ll

talk real loud.

Can you go back to exhibit 14?

Mr. SNYDER. Do you remember what tab that was or—was it this

one?

Mr. NIDES. Oh, thank you.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. This document. This is——

Mr. SNYDER. 7.

Ms. BETZ. 7. Thank you.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS

Q: And just for the record, this is exhibit 14. It’s the email from

* * * to you on April 14, 2011. And we just discussed a reference

in it to NEA: drafting a paper for Steinberg which essentially will

ask for an expanded scope for the work of Stevens.

When you just discussed the staffing approval process and the

way that the career individuals would ask for more staffing, in this

context, this document, I just wanted to confirm that it’s the same

as in the context that we discussed it previously, which is to say,

when you’re talking about people coming from the field up to you

and asking for and pushing for more presence and more staff of career Foreign Service officers in a particular area and that sometimes you would be the check on that, that what you’re talking

about is not security staff.

A: 100 percent correct. We make sure there’s a clear distinction

between security and nonsecurity personnel. The decisions of the

security is a decision of the RSO, who is usually on the ground, and

the security people in the bureau, the Diplomatic Security people.

So the decision of—in fact, it’s rarely that the diplomat or ambassador will overrule an RSO, who is the security expert on the

ground.

So, yes, all references about personnel was a reference of a nonsecurity personnel. The security footprint was a derivative of how

many bodies you had in the particular facility. So that is 100 percent correct.

Q: Okay. And to the extent that what we’re talking about is a

cost check regarding, you know, not wanting to increase too much

of a presence or not wanting to increase too much of a cost in Libya

or in Benghazi because there are budgetary constraints or whatever, from your perspective, you’re talking about bodies of Foreign

Service officers, not Diplomatic Security personnel. Is that right?

A: Again, 100 percent correct.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. That’s all I had.

Ms. BETZ. We are off.

[Whereupon, at 2:12 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

793
.

EXHIBIT 1

794
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 2

795
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 3

796
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 4

797
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

798
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

799
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

800
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 5

801
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

802
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 6

803
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

804
EXHIBIT 7

805
806
807
808
UNCLASSIFIED

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

-- George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense (1905)

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Diplomatic and Antiterrorism Act of

1986, 22 U.S.C. § 4831 et seq., (the “Act”), Secretary of State Hillary Rodham

Clinton convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB) for Benghazi to

examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11-12, 2012,

killings of four U.S. government personnel, including the U.S. Ambassador to

Libya, John Christopher Stevens, in Benghazi, Libya. A series of attacks on

September 11-12, 2012 involving arson, small-arms and machine-gun fire, and use

of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), grenades and mortars, focused on two U.S.

facilities in Benghazi, as well as U.S. personnel en route between the two facilities.

In addition, the attacks severely wounded two U.S. personnel, injured three Libyan

contract guards and resulted in the destruction and abandonment of both facilities –

the U.S. Special Mission compound (SMC) and Annex.

Four Board members were selected by the Secretary of State and one

member from the intelligence community (IC) was selected by the Director for

National Intelligence. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering served as Chairman, with

Admiral Michael Mullen as Vice Chairman. Additional members were Catherine

Bertini, Richard Shinnick, and Hugh Turner, who represented the IC.

The criminal investigation of the September 11-12, 2012, Benghazi attacks,

for which the statutory responsibility rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI), was still underway at the time of this report. The Board enjoyed excellent

cooperation with the Department of Justice and FBI throughout preparation of this

report. The key questions surrounding the identity, actions and motivations of the

perpetrators remain to be determined by the ongoing criminal investigation.

As called for by the Act, this report examines: whether the attacks were

security related; whether security systems and procedures were adequate and

implemented properly; the impact of intelligence and information availability;

whether any other facts or circumstances in these cases may be relevant to

appropriate security management of U.S. missions worldwide; and, finally,

whether any U.S. government employee or contractor, as defined by the Act,

breached her or his duty.

EXHIBIT 8

809
UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

UNCLASSIFIED

The Benghazi attacks represented the first murder of a U.S. ambassador

since 1988, and took place 11 years to the day after the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001. Ambassador Stevens personified the U.S. commitment to a

free and democratic Libya. His knowledge of Arabic, his ability to move in all

sectors of the population, and his wide circle of friends, particularly in Benghazi,

marked him as an exceptional practitioner of modern diplomacy. The U.S. Special

Mission in Benghazi, established in November 2011, was the successor to his

highly successful endeavor as Special Envoy to the rebel-led government that

eventually toppled Muammar Qaddafi in fall 2011. The Special Mission bolstered

U.S. support for Libya’s democratic transition through engagement with eastern

Libya, the birthplace of the revolt against Qaddafi and a regional power center.

The Benghazi attacks took place against a backdrop of significantly

increased demands on U.S. diplomats to be present in the world’s most dangerous

places to advance American interests and connect with populations beyond

capitals, and beyond host governments’ reach. With State Department civilians at

the forefront of U.S. efforts to stabilize and build capacity in Iraq, as the U.S.

military draws down in Afghanistan, and with security threats growing in volatile

environments where the U.S. military is not present – from Peshawar to Bamako –

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is being stretched to the limit as never

before. DS overall has done a fine job protecting thousands of employees in some

273 U.S. diplomatic missions around the world. No diplomatic presence is without

risk, given past attempts by terrorists to pursue U.S. targets worldwide. And the

total elimination of risk is a non-starter for U.S. diplomacy, given the need for the

U.S. government to be present in places where stability and security are often most

profoundly lacking and host government support is sometimes minimal to nonexistent.

The Benghazi attacks also took place in a context in which the global

terrorism threat as most often represented by al Qaeda (AQ) is fragmenting and

increasingly devolving to local affiliates and other actors who share many of AQ’s

aims, including violent anti-Americanism, without necessarily being organized or

operated under direct AQ command and control. This growing, diffuse range of

terrorist and hostile actors poses an additional challenge to American security

officers, diplomats, development professionals and decision-makers seeking to

mitigate risk and remain active in high threat environments without resorting to an

unacceptable total fortress and stay-at-home approach to U.S. diplomacy.

810
UNCLASSIFIED

-3-

UNCLASSIFIED

For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to

obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work, with varying degrees of

success. This has brought about a deep sense of the importance of husbanding

resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable in the extreme in any government

department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a few State Department

managers to favor restricting the use of resources as a general orientation. There is

no easy way to cut through this Gordian knot, all the more so as budgetary

austerity looms large ahead. At the same time, it is imperative for the State

Department to be mission-driven, rather than resource-constrained – particularly

when being present in increasingly risky areas of the world is integral to U.S.

national security. The recommendations in this report attempt to grapple with

these issues and err on the side of increased attention to prioritization and to fuller

support for people and facilities engaged in working in high risk, high threat areas.

The solution requires a more serious and sustained commitment from Congress to

support State Department needs, which, in total, constitute a small percentage both

of the full national budget and that spent for national security. One overall

conclusion in this report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge

and provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks

and meet mission imperatives.

Mindful of these considerations, the ARB has examined the terrorist attacks

in Benghazi with an eye towards how we can better advance American interests

and protect our personnel in an increasingly complex and dangerous world. This

Board presents its findings and recommendations with the unanimous conclusion

that while the United States cannot retreat in the face of such challenges, we must

work more rigorously and adeptly to address them, and that American diplomats

and security professionals, like their military colleagues, serve the nation in an

inherently risky profession. Risk mitigation involves two imperatives –

engagement and security – which require wise leadership, good intelligence and

evaluation, proper defense and strong preparedness and, at times, downsizing,

indirect access and even withdrawal. There is no one paradigm. Experienced

leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision making, and

adequate funding and personnel resources are essential. The selfless courage of the

four Americans who died in the line of duty in Benghazi on September 11-12,

2012, as well as those who were injured and all those who valiantly fought to save

their colleagues, inspires all of us as we seek to draw the right lessons from that

tragic night.

811
Center for American Progress

A Unified Security Budget for the United States

Introduction/Moderator:

Richard Verma,

Senior Fellow,

Center for American Progress

Keynote Speaker:

Thomas R. Nides,

Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources

Panelists:

Miriam Pemberton,

Center for American Progress

Lawrence Korb,

Center for American Progress

Location: Washington, D.C.

Time: 9:30 a.m. EDT

Date: Wednesday, August 31, 2011

Transcript by

Federal News Service

Washington, D.C.

EXHIBIT 9

812
LAWRENCE KORB: Good morning. My name is Larry Korb, and on behalf of our

president, John Podesta, my colleagues in the national security team, I’d like to welcome you to

this discussion, this event to talk about a unified national security budget.

Some seven years ago, I began working with some of my colleagues here, with Miriam

Pemberton on a unified national security budget. And our latest iteration is out there for you.

Please take as many copies as you’d like.

Our approach basically has been that when you’re looking at national security, you

should not look just at the Department of Defense -- or, as we call it, the offensive component --

you should also look at the defensive component, which is homeland security; and the

preventive, if you will, of State Department and AID. Some people call it the three Ds: defense,

development and diplomacy. And this is the way you need to look at it if you really want to

ensure that whatever amount of money you’re spending, you get the most bang for the – for the –

for the buck.

It’s interesting that over the years this concept – when we first started here back with

Miriam, myself and under the leadership of Bob Boorstin, our initial chairman here of our

national security division, most people did not pay attention to it and thought it was somewhat

naïve. But over the years, people have more and more accepted the – accepted the concept, even

people in the Department of Defense, like Admiral Mullen, who has said it’s time to invest in

other departments, such as Homeland Security, intelligence and the State Department, whose

budget pales compared to massive Pentagon funding.

And even recently, just recently this year, Admiral Mullen said, “My fear, quite frankly,

is that we aren’t moving fast enough in this regard. U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by

the military.”

And if you get a chance to look at our report, you’ll see that for every dollar we spend on

State and AID, we spend $12 for Defense. For every dollar we spend on homeland security, we

spend $11 on the Pentagon budget. And our fear this year is that things may get worse because,

as we deal with this situation, people – with our deficit situation, people might be more willing to

go after the State Department and AID rather than the Department of Defense.

Now, in addition to Admiral Mullen, other people who have embraced the concept

include the – when they had the Quadrennial Defense Review review by Steve Hadley and Bill

Perry, they said let’s have a unified national security budget. And of course it’s sort of good

news and bad news. On our first part of the deficit reduction package, they do talk about security

spending in terms of what they need to do.

Now, today we’re going to have – we’re going to have – our keynote speaker is going to

be the deputy secretary of state, Tom Nides, and he will speak for about 10 or 15 minutes. And

then we’ll have a panel, which will be composed of Miriam, our – who’s the leader in this

project and who’s a senior fellow at the Institute for Policy Analysis; and Rich Verma, who is

813
now a member of our team here at CAP and until recently was assistant secretary of state for

legislative affairs.

Now, I can’t think of a person more qualified to be the deputy secretary of state than our

speaker today. Secretary Nides has experience in the business sector with Morgan Stanley. He’s

worked over on the Hill, where he was a top aide to Tom Foley when Tom Foley was speaker.

He’s also – before this appointment worked in the executive branch as – working for the U.S. –

United States trade representative.

And if I can quote an interview he gave to The Cable, he said, “The DOD budget is”

“national security;” State and AID are likewise.

Please join me in welcoming Secretary Nides. (Applause.)

THOMAS NIDES: Thank you very much. Thank you, Larry. I want to thank everyone

for being here in August. I hope this is not considered a vacation day for those of you who are

sitting in the audience. If so, that’s quite sad.

I want to thank Larry and Miriam for, quite frankly, the hard work they have done on

thinking how we can better spend taxpayers’ money to protect and enhance our national security.

I also want to thank my pal Rich Verma. As you know, Rich has left a few months ago

as the assistant secretary for legislative affairs. I want to be clear. There’s probably no finer

assistant secretary this administration had than Rich Verma. You don’t have to ask me. You can

ask about anyone at the White House that will also attest to my good words.

We probably wouldn’t have a New START treaty, a defense trade agreement with the

U.K. or Australia; or sanctions against Iran; and much, much more without Rich’s fantastic

assistance. And I, along with about just every other senior official at the State Department,

wouldn’t have their job, either, because Rich was in charge of getting us all confirmed. And for

me, that was a heavy lift. So I am appreciative and thank Rich for all the work he’s done not

only on behalf of myself and my colleagues but on behalf of the American people.

And even though he’s not here, I want to thank my friend John Podesta because he’s built

one heck of an organization and he deserves an enormous amount of credit.

As I said, thanks to Rich, I have a great job that I’ve had for about nine months. As

deputy secretary of state, I could be focused on many issues and in many places. But few things

are as important to me than fighting for the resources that our diplomats and development

experts need to enhance our national security and our economic security. Few things are more

important than making the case for security, economic and humanitarian assistance. And few

things are more important than making sure that Washington appropriates funding in a rational

way.

Beginning in 2007, the Department of State and USAID’s budgets dramatically

increased, and credit starts with Secretary Condoleezza Rice. Secretary Clinton picked up where

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she left off and pushed forward a – strong budgets for the State Department and USAID. We

made great strides in getting additional resources to elevate diplomacy and development

alongside our military. As the three pillars of our national security, we added foreign service

officers and civil servants. We invested in programs to combat hunger, illness and poverty, and

we increased our diplomatic presence in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The reality is that State and USAID and the military are working more closely together in

places around the world than ever in our history. I saw it when I was – in travel to Iraq, in

Pakistan and early this summer in Afghanistan. You can see it when our diplomats and

development officers are working hand in glove with the military to respond to humanitarian

crisises [sic] in Japan and Haiti. Around the world, you will find representatives from across the

interagency and the security establishment working together on joint missions on behalf of the

country. They don’t think about which subcommittee funds them or what respective budget

allocations are. They really just don’t care. All they know is that they work together with a

common purpose and often in dangerous and deadly environments. We need a budget that

reflects this reality, but as everyone knows, we’re facing the process of major budget cuts. These

cuts could be the most significant we have had in two decades and they could have a devastating

impact on the work that we do.

Let me put our situation in clear and stark terms for you. In the fiscal 2011 budget, which

has now been finished, State and USAID took a massive hit, a 13.6 percent cut from what the

administration believed we needed in 2011. And although it’s unclear what’s going to happen in

2012, we could face more catastrophic cuts, which I’ll get to in a minute.

Secretary Clinton has made the case that State and USAID are essential to our national

security and ought to be considered part of a national security budget, which Larry and Miriam

recommended in their paper. Secretary Clinton and key allies – Secretary Clinton has very –

several key allies in making the argument – current, former defense secretaries; the chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and numerous senior military officials. Now, for the first time as part

of the debt-ceiling legislation just passed, State and USAID funding are included in a national

security budget alongside spending for defense, intelligence, homeland security, the veterans’

programs and military construction. That is the good news. But there is real risk that Congress

could decide to shield defense spending and other categories of spending by cutting everything

else. And that, my friends, is the bad news.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee already approved the State Department budget

that included substantial cuts, as well as potentially debilitating restrictions, on how we can

spend our money. The House Appropriations Subcommittee approved a bill that provides just

$36.9 billion of our core budget, which is an 18 percent cut. The House did accept the

president’s proposal for the for the “overseas contingency operations” account, or what you

might have heard of, called OCO, to pay for the temporary and extraordinary costs in Iraq,

Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the same approach that DOD takes. By isolating the

extraordinary costs from – for these three countries, OCO has the effect of showing that the core

budget for State and USAID – the core budget, which manages our day-to-day operations – is

relatively flat from 2010 to 2012.

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As we increase the cost in these three countries around $4 billion for State and USAID,

the Defense Department’s OCO spending is coming down by $45 billion. So to repeat: As our

cost of our OCO is going up by $4 billion in 2012 for our operations in Iraq, the DOD’s cost is

going down by $45 billion.

Now, in the business world, they call that leveraging an investment, investing $4 to save

45 (dollars). Although the OCO account is helpful – it is helpful – we cannot just fund our

efforts in the frontline states and gut our base budget for everything else we do in the world. So

the question is what do we do about it?

We at State and USAID are not trying to rob the Pentagon to pay ourselves. I am not

here today to talk about cutting military spending. Our goal is to match our spending on

diplomacy and development and the military with our national security challenges. I’ve said this

until I am blue in my face and I’ll repeat it again: The State Department and USAID make up

about 1 percent of the federal budget. Deep and disproportionate cuts in the State and USAID

won’t do anything or make any sense if our goal is to enhance our national security.

We know that resources are necessary to advance our national security interests and

prosperity around the world, and we are at risk of not getting them. This is no time to retreat

from the world, because as everyone knows, it is a critical moment in our foreign policy. We

have a chance to capitalize on opportunities in the Middle East and to be part of an historic pivot

point in the Arab world. We have the chance to invest in programs to curb and even prevent

humanitarian crisises [sic]. We need the resources to sustain our diplomatic presence and

effectiveness in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

And we need the resources to advance our economic agenda as well. Our economic

officers and our ambassadors work to open markets abroad and create jobs at home. They

facilitate trade and travel and tourism. This is especially important at this moment as our

economy recovers from a very long recession.

The reality is that if we don’t seize these opportunities, someone else will. As Secretary

Clinton has said, other countries will promote their own models and serve their own best

interests. They will create jobs elsewhere rather than in the United States. They will claim the

mantle of global leadership. We should not allow this to happen.

We recognize as well as everyone else that we get value from every dollar spent. We

have to be able to justify each dollar we spend every day, and we have to be fixated on

improving what I like to refer as our rate of return. That is why Secretary Clinton, with Rich,

undertook the QDDR, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, which is the first

of its kind, top-to-bottom review of how the State Department works and how it doesn’t work

and how we can operate more effectively and efficiently in the 21st century. To her credit, most

organizations wait until a crisis breaks out to undertake such an initiative. Secretary Clinton

started the QDDR when things were going pretty well.

With Secretary Clinton’s leadership, we’re undertaking more public-private partnerships

with NGOs and, yes, with the business community as well. Most importantly, in this difficult

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budgetary climate, we have to make our case to win it. Humanitarian security and economic

assistance in tough times and in not so tough times are often the first buckets of spending to get

thrown out the window. I understand that most Americans think that the foreign assistance

makes up 25 percent of our budget, even though, as I said, it’s only about 1 percent. The

positive side, however, is that when asked how much we ought to be spending on foreign

assistance, people say between 10 (percent) and 15 percent, which I’ll take. (Laughter.)

Finally, we’re not making this case alone, as Larry pointed out. There is bipartisan

support for what we do. Senator Lindsey Graham understands as well as anyone the importance

of State and USAID’s work for our national security. General Dave Petraeus, our new CIA

director; Admiral Mullen and Leon Panetta understand the role of diplomacy and development in

enhancing our national security. Bill Gates, Bono and the former Senate Majority Leader Bill

Frist, who just returned from the Horn of Africa with Jill Biden, all understand our mission.

NGOs, and just as importantly, the business community also understands that diplomacy and

development support are national security. They understand that our national security and

economic security and our leadership role in the world are at stake if these cuts are too dramatic.

We recognize the threat that the deficit and the long-term debt poses to our national

security, but there is a smart and balanced approach to deficit reduction. What we don’t need to

do is hammer at a bipartisan programs [sic] that over time have created safer, more stable and,

quite frankly, a more prosperous world.

I want to thank the Center for American Progress and Larry and Miriam and Rich for

giving me a chance to speak, and I’m more than happy to take a few of your questions. Thank

you very much. (Applause.)

MR. : (Off mic.) Now we’ll go to the second phase. We will ask a few questions to

the secretary, then, we’ll open it up to the audience if you will be with us – [inaudible] – says

until 10:28. So Jonathan – (inaudible) -- and then we’ll go.

All right. Miriam, do you have a question for the secretary?

MIRIAM PEMBERTON: Yeah, thanks a lot.

I really appreciated your remarks. One point that I especially noted was when you talked

about diplomacy and development aides working hand in glove with the military. So sometimes

unified security budgeting is sort of lumped with integrated operations. And, you know, when

one partner has most of the money, that partner tends to call most of the shots. And so I wonder

how you balance the need for working with the Pentagon on integrated operations while

preserving the integrity and the independence of the State Department as the lead agency in U.S.

foreign policy.

MR. NIDES: Well, it’s a – that’s a – first of all, thank you. That’s a very good question,

because I – as someone who is new to the world of diplomacy and realizing the sensitivity

between our prerogatives and making sure that our prerogatives are secured, this debate comes

up quite a bit. One of the things – it starts in the top. Hillary Clinton, when she came in,

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established a very clear, strong relationship with Bob Gates. And that has basically – has been

pushed down throughout both of our buildings.

She made it very clear that we were going to work hand in hand with them in

Afghanistan – the idea of kind of clear and hold, the idea that they would be clear that we’d be

holding with our diplomatic presence.

What we’re doing in Iraq – as you know, we’re about ready to embark into the largest

military-civilian transition since the Marshall Plan. What we’re doing hand-in-hand in Pakistan

is totally connected.

So first it started at the top. And I think, quite frankly, that relationship has created

unbelievable synergy. I would think – and again, I may be delusional but I would say that if you

asked people at the State Department, the relationship between us and the military has probably

never been as good as it is today for a variety of reasons: One, personalities; two, that there is a

need for coexistence, because, just as you point out, they can’t do it without us and we can’t do it

without them.

But make it clear: We -- the chief of mission authority is extremely strong. At the end of

the day – the role of Karl Eikenberry, having worked with General Petraeus and now with Ryan

Crocker working with General John Allen – that relationship is completely equal. There is – I

had a civits (ph) yesterday with both of them, and you can just sense from them the pure quality

of their relationship. So I’m – and I watch this closely, because I certainly understand the issues

around the State Department prerogatives, but if it’s FMF, which is foreign military sales and

activities, I feel that we, obviously, have an enormous say on how that proceeds – programs that

we’re working in Afghanistan, everything around transition.

There is a – there’s a mutual respect, but there’s also a mutual need. They need our help

and we need theirs. And so I believe – and I think you’d have to ask my colleagues at the State

Department but I think – I think we have the balance correct and I think, quite frankly, Leon

Panetta – Defense Secretary Panetta and Secretary – and Secretary Clinton also have a long

history of a relationship, as you know. And I think, again, that helps a great deal, because of a

lot of this is personality-driven as well, throughout the building. So I feel pretty good about it,

but Rich is – quite frankly, probably could even express views because he was – had been there

at the beginning of the term. But I feel very good about where that is and the prerogatives that

both buildings have.

MR. KORB: Rich, do you have a question for Tom? Or do you want to give us some of

your experience trying to deal with the Hill to get them, you know, to not be so tough on your

former employer there?

RICHARD VERMA: Sure. How long do you have to – for me to talk about this? I’ll

tell you, when we came in, we had a great team that knew the Hill. I mean, to have Jack Lew

that worked for the speaker of the House, to have Jim Steinberg that worked for Senator

Kennedy, and then to have Secretary Clinton, a former senator – these are people that not only

understood the intricacies of the budget and appropriations process and how OMB worked, they

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also understood what – the case they had to make to the American people and to their elected

officials in order to get the money, and the first two years that they were there were very

successful. And to have Tom come in right behind them and continue that obviously in a much

different environment, it’s definitely a tough go, but you know, this is, as you said, Larry, the

best guy for the – for the job.

I do have a question, Tom, though, about this idea of diplomacy and development as

national security. I know this is something that we’ve all argued for many years but now I

wonder, is there some kind of perhaps buyer’s remorse. Are we – is this a matter of be careful

what you’ve asked for? Because now we’re there, now the law has been changed so that security

spending, you know, is subject to the – to the budget framework that was laid out at the end of

July, early August. We are security spending: Still a good development, still the right thing to

argue for?

MR. NIDES: Oh, without question. Listen, I – it’s a question of which pot you want to

be in, right? So obviously there is a – the thematic notion that development alongside defense

and diplomacy alongside defense and development is a – is important symbolically, but in a

rational world in where – let’s be clear, Defense has substantially more money than the State

Department and USAID do. Obviously, over the years, the Defense budget has been shielded

from many of the cuts over the last five to seven years. So part of the strategy obviously is to be

in the bucket where obviously the cuts have been shielded and symbolically and realistically.

I mean, go figure, of course, once we get that done, they start cutting some of the Defense

spending, but that’s – you know, that is obviously the reality of the world in which we’re living.

That said, if I had to ask the question would I rather be in the national security frame or could be

competing with – you know, against dollars for education, health, the environment, I’d like to be

where we are now. So I think that the argument you all made over the last few years is the right

– not only symbolic because it’s real and it’s real on the ground. And now having spent time in

Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iraq and these frontline states, I see it every day. I mean, I – when

I go to Kandahar and I met a PRT and I – and I had the military, the generals and the – and the –

and the military standing next to us and talking about the civilian importance of what they’re

doing within civil society, that’s what it’s all about. That’s a – that’s a combined national

security argument.

On the – on the money, listen, we’re going to have to – we’re going to have to convince

the Hill that the cuts need to be reasonable and they need to be balanced. And the good news is I

think Defense Secretary Panetta understands that as a former OMB head, as a former member of

Congress. Certainly – Admiral Mullen certainly has believed that and articulated that. So I

think, Ned (ph), I’m – obviously I’m worried, as anyone would be, because these budget cuts are

enormous and could have a devastating impact on what we do on health, on environment, you

know, economic development.

But again, I think it is the right choice. It is the reality in which we can make case. And

we’re going to have to fight for every dollar that we get. And I believe we’ll have a pretty good

shot at attempting to try to keep the base budget, which I think is really the important debate

here, at a reasonable level going into 2012.

819
MR. KORB: Rich, you want to follow up?

MR. VERMA: Yeah, I can just follow up on that. The other thing the agreement did is it

did set these hard caps for security versus non-security. I think security is about at 680 (billion

dollars) or 684 (billion dollars) for FY ’12. Now, when you prepare the president’s budget, you

get spend a couple years – all the agencies get to work together and they get to show up to the

Congress all singing off the same sheet of music as to how that budget should be allocated. Here

you are, you know, now with a new set of agencies to basically – to compete with for that same

allocation. Is there an agreement amongst the agencies in the security bucket as to how that 684

(billion dollars) should be divided or is that a work in progress? (Laughter.)

MR. NIDES: Oh, you know so much about this, Rich. (Laughter.) This is what we call

a loaded question.

The food fight hasn’t actually occurred yet. But, you know, we’ll have, I think,

reasonable discussions. Listen, let – I want to be – here’s what – I just want to put this in

perspective because I – it’s somewhat confusing because only in Washington would you be just

finishing ’11, haven’t even begun to fight about ’12, and we are presenting ’13 budget in

January. I mean, it’s – no one can imagine how this operates for those of you who’ve spent time

in the – in Washington on the budget process. It is something of an enjoyment to say the least.

So what we have to be under – what State and USAID are really going to be fighting for

in this budget is basically our base budget. Our base budget in 2011 was $47 billion, OK? We

wanted about 52 (billion dollars); we got 47 (billion dollars). We took a big cut in ’11. So it’s

$47 billion. And that $47 billion, just to be abundantly clear, pays – has paid for everything. I

mean, that’s all foreign assistance, that’s for all our billets for all our diplomats. It’s for

everything we do on health. It’s the PEPFAR money, at 8 billion (dollars). It’s everything, OK?

That’s the $47 billion, the base budget. That is what we had in ’11.

In ’12 we asked for 53 (billion dollars) to $54 billion, a fairly substantial increase in ’12,

for only one reason, which is Iraq. As you know, as I pointed out, we are taking on the transition

in Iraq. As the military goes down to zero – or about zero, depending upon what happens, but

basically virtual no military boots on the ground in Iraq, as under the agreement – State

Department’s picking up the diplomatic piece, so we have to pay for everything. It’s our

presence now in Iraq. And the cost of that is about an extra 5 1⁄2 (billion dollars) to $6 billion.

The State Department has to come up with that money. That is why our number went up from

’11 to ’12. And quite frankly, the Hill gets that.

And so what we have done is, is that in ’12 we got – because of Rich’s good work, we

got this thing called OCO, which I mentioned in my speech, which is a – which is a good thing,

which has basically let us take the money for Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan and put it in a

separate account called OCO. Defense Department’s been doing this for years, OK? So you can

see that our cost for the war costs are separate so when – as we draw down, that account becomes

slower and slower. We used to do this through supplementals and now we’re just going to be

OCO. So we have that in place, and it’s about $8 billion for our OCO account in 2012.

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Put that aside for a minute. We still have our base budget for everything else we do,

right? For all of our diplomats, for all of our health programs, for environment, for all – we call

ESF, all of our economic assistance around the world, for everything we do for Israel and Egypt.

And so that base budget still needs to be about $47 billion, OK?

Here’s what’s happened. The House took that $47 billion and took it down to $38

billion, OK, which is, as I pointed out in my speech, really enormously problematic and

devastating to many of our programs. Now, we hope, to be honest, that reasonable people will –

you know, the Senate will come in and they will work together and try to make sure that we take

that number in the House and move that number to something reasonable for our base budget.

So that is what we’re going to be fighting for.

It’s a very – you know, I will – (inaudible) – very simple: we must protect the base

budget or, quite frankly, the impact of a 18 percent cut in our base budget – you know, well,

those of you – you don’t have to be math geniuses to figure out we will have to make some

enormously compromising cuts, both with our diplomatic corps and our civil service corps and

quite frankly, in programs, at a time, I think, would be – is critical.

And again, we understand we need to make cuts. And Rich knows that we’re all practical

here. We’re all – we’ve already – we have to give, like everyone else has give. It’s a question

about rationality, and that’s what we’re dealing with.

MR. KORB: Let me follow up on Rich’s point, go back to the executive branch. Do you

think it would make sense if Jack Lew would come out and take whatever number is supposed to

be there for 2013 and then, before you send it up to the Congress, for the three secretaries –

Secretary Napolitano, Secretary Clinton, Secretary Panetta – to agree on a distribution, and if

there’s a disagreement take it up to OMB or to the White House? Because after all, that’s what –

the Department of Defense, when it first got started, it was War and Navy, and they each wanted

their own budgets, and eventually they were – you know, had to complete with each other.

MR. NIDES: Yeah, I – listen, I believe that that will happen at some level. How it

happens, the formality of it, I’m not an OMB expert. Many of you, probably, in the audience

are. There’s no question – they’re not going to throw the – they’re not going to throw the money

in a – in a room and lock the doors and let us all kind of like fight for it. You know, I think –

although that’d be kind of interesting, but – (laughter) – I’ll bet on Hillary Clinton – but I –

(laughter) – but that said, yeah, I think there’ll be a reasonable – again, we are – (chuckles) – you

know, it’s kind of – it’s, again, we are a very small percentage of not only the overall budget for

the federal government, we’re also a very small percentage of the national security budget, all

which is very important.

My belief is that the good news here, from a bipartisan perspective – this is not just – I

mean, I’ve been very pleased by the support we’ve had on the Republican side, especially in the

Senate but also in the House. But guys like Lindsey Graham and Richard Lugar, and there’s this

– you know, a huge amount of support of people saying we need a balanced approach. So

obviously that – also, listen, Hal Rogers has been a very big supporter of the State Department.

821
And I believe that he, along with other members of the Republican leadership, also understand

that we’re at a critical point here in how we divide up the pie, as we like to say. I think cooler

heads will prevail and we will be able to have a – to make sure our base budget is at a level to

sustain a funding level I think we all believe we need to.

MR. KORB: Good. All right, now, the secretary has to leave in about, I said, at 10:28.

So what I’d like to do now –

MR. NIDES: I don’t know where they came up with the 10:28, all right? (Laughter.)

He was just joking, I’m sure. I hope.

MR. KORB: (Laughs.) OK. What I’d like to do now is open it up to the audience and

get your questions directed to the secretary and then let Rich and Miriam chime in as necessary.

I’d like to first go to the press. Any members of the press have questions? Yes, ma’am. And

wait – please wait for the microphone and identify yourself.

Q: Hi. Kate Brannen, Defense News. I was curious if there is a State Department team

working with the Pentagon on their strategic review of roles and missions and how you see that

review influencing State’s future missions, if at all? Thanks.

MR. NIDES: We have – we have constant conversations and constant planning,

especially in those front-line states in particular. So we are working aggressively on a transition

plan in Afghanistan. As you know, the president has committed to a plan for 2014. The troop

withdrawal will obviously be happening this year, beginning. We have to begin transitioning a

plan for Afghanistan about what you’re – you know, what – where you’ll be physically located,

how many people will be in each location, where will the military be, where they will not be,

when can we withdraw our civilian numbers as we draw down our military.

So we have a – we have a very sophisticated planning process led by General Allen, who

is now our commander in Afghanistan, along with Ryan Crocker, who arguably is probably one

of the finest diplomats the world has ever seen, the combination of those two working with

Washington and the Pentagon. And we have deputies meetings at the White House every week

on transition. So that is on Afghanistan.

Iraq, I should tell you, I probably spend a couple hours a day working with the Defense

Department on the transition in Iraq. As you know, under the strategic agreement we will have

no forces at the end of the year in Iraq. That is a massively big transition.

We are probably– or probably have 50,000 troops there now that are going to be going

down. As they go down and withdraw, the State Department is stepping up the transition

between the handoff. I mean, the mission set’s obviously changing. The diplomats are not going

to be doing the same mission set as the military. We’re going to go back to a more normalized

diplomatic mission in Iraq, but we’re working hand in hand. You know, we all read what goes

on in Pakistan. We continue to work very closely with the military and our – obviously other

agencies as it relates to Pakistan.

822
So yes, we have very – by necessity and desire – I mean, necessity being you can’t do

these transactions without formal planning. And by desire, you know, you have to execute this

in an effective way. And quite frankly, I’ve been very pleased on the kind of cooperation, as I

said at the beginning of my talk, between the two departments. But they are ongoing on a daily

basis.

MR. KORB: OK, the floor is now open for questions. I’ll take a couple and then give

you a chance to – OK, here – let’s take – the hands that are up, Billy. Go to each of them. There

are three.

Q: I’m Mitzi – is this on?

MR. KORB: Yes.

Q: I’m Mitzi Werthheim, with the Naval Postgraduate School. Mr. Secretary, I was

really impressed with the way you talked about what the State Department offers and what the

return is to the American taxpayer. I don’t know that I’ve heard it expressed as well before, and

I keep wondering about the importance of having really simple – not simple stories – complex

stories told in a clear, simple way so the general public says, “My God, of course we need them.”

And we use too many words and not enough pictures. These are all flow diagrams, but I think it

would help if you could figure out how to let folks in the middle of the country know what

they’re getting for what you’re doing.

MR. KORB: OK. All right. Do you want to go ahead? Do you want to take each one?

(Laughter.)

MR. NIDES: Yeah, I just – yeah, but you know, I – you’re 100 percent – I was shocked.

OK, first of all, I didn’t – to be honest with you, I didn’t know how much money on – as a

percentage basis the State Department, USAID was part of the – of the – of the budget. You

know, quite frankly, I was probably one of the people who thought it was 25 percent. (Laughs.)

And so the ROI, you know, which – as someone who comes from the business world as –

I’ve been, you know, both in politics and business – is unbelievable. I mean, I just – I did

something – or I didn’t actually do it, Jonathan did it. But they put it on The Huffington Post a

couple of days ago, the 10 things you didn’t know about the State Department, which is basically

talking about everything we do, about job creation and – I mean, all – I mean, significant,

important things beyond what we’re doing on health and what we’re doing on the environment.

I can’t tell you how many people have called me. I mean, first of all, people must be – I mean,

The Huffington Post is great, obviously. If anyone’s here, it’s perfect. But I mean, who’s

reading this stuff in August, right?

I mean, the calls that I got from people saying, “I didn’t know that. I didn’t realize you

guys do that. I mean, I thought this was all – you know, I didn’t get that.” So I think you’re 100

percent right.

823
Listen, I’m also realistic and understand when people are hurting here at home, OK,

when people are worried about education and their health care and, quite frankly, their jobs, it’s

very hard to try to explain to someone the importance of what we’re doing in Somalia, OK? It’s

sometimes very hard to explain why we need to do what we do on the Horn of Africa, because

they’re like, “Well, we’ve got – we’ve got problems here.”

What we are trying to be clear to people is what we do is as much about defensive –

playing defense as it is offense, because you know, I talk about this: For every dollar – you

know, Mike Mullen will say, “For every dollar you guys spend, we save $5, because we don’t

have to put boots on the ground. We don’t” – you know, if there’s a crisis, the military’s going

in. The American people expect it. If we can somehow avoid the crisis by diplomacy, by stuff

like Feed the Future, which is – food programs, by things that we do around global health in

Africa, that has enormous benefits, economic benefits and practical.

And listen, people want to say, “OK, if you’re going to spend the money, tell me how this

money is being spent. If you don’t, don’t spend it.” So we have to be more practical, more

exact. And I think, quite frankly, Secretary Clinton is as good a spokesperson as any, but we

have to continually paint the picture.

Q: Is it on your website?

MR. NIDES: Yes.

MR. KORB: OK, let’s go over here. We’ll go back and forth. (Laughs.)

Q: (Off mic) – is this on? It is? OK. Charlie Henken (sp), C. Henken (sp) and

Associates. So my question is a follow-on to my seat partner here, which concerned roles and

missions and the strategy for – integrating a strategy towards holistic roles and missions on a

whole-of-government basis. Let’s take an example – Western Pacific driving the DOD budget.

Do you have a (C ?) control versus a power projection capability in 2025 or in 2010 or whatever?

And there’s just a host of multibillion-dollar implications in that area, but it’s hard because the

State Department has to manage the perceptions of the day-to-day relationship with the Chinese

on economic, political and so forth. So you can’t be too open. You can’t have all the

bureaucracy working on all of the details together, but my sense is there hasn’t been adequate

coordination in, say, the Western Pacific dimension of roles and missions, as opposed to the

Middle East.

MR. NIDES: Yeah, I don’t – you know, I – again, I would probably suggest that it is not

where it needs to be – (inaudible) – because listen, there needs to be clearly very defined roles

for – one of the things having come out of where I’ve come from and many of you in this room:

Someone needs to be responsible. One of the problems in government – group gropes is

interesting, but a lot of things don’t get done. And I think one of the ways – you have to have

clear responsibilities and clear lines of command and lines – you know, lines of control and

command, right? And, you know, that’s why the State Department’s prerogatives need to be

preserved and where we begin as chief of mission authority, which is dictated by the president,

824
and where the military has their roles and responsibilities. And we could have a long debate

about how that is formulated and especially in the areas where there’s complete integration.

So I think we’ve made material progress, but listen, I see it in Afghanistan, where the

Defense Department has enormous more money than the State Department has for many of the

development programs that we’re working on hand in hand and how that transitions back over to

the State Department, because one of the problems is when the military leaves, so goes the

money. That we’ve seen over and over again. And so there is a strong need for strong

integration, but I still believe there needs to be clear roles and responsibilities, which I think you

agree –would agree, too. But I think we’re making progress, but we’re nowhere near where we

need to be over the long haul, because as dollars get stretched, we need to make sure that we are

avoiding the duplication and, quite frankly, to make sure that the programs are actually being

validated to be successful.

MR. KORB: OK, anybody on that side? That gentleman back there.

Q: Thanks. Evan Coren from the Information Security Oversight Office. I was

wondering if this would also do away with the distinction between the 050 and -- function and

150 budget distinctions that they draw between defense and foreign policy budgets, and if the

NSC would also be considered lumped in with that rather than lumped in with the White House.

MR. NIDES: I’m not sure – I’m not sure I understand your question. What is your

question you’re asking?

Q: So right now the –

MR. KORB: Yeah, don’t move the mic, because when you move the mic, we lose your –

(laughs) –

Q: Right. So the Hill and the OMB put budgets into functions – function 050 –

MR. NIDES: Yeah, I know. Yeah, I know that. Yeah.

Q: Yeah, so will this go away with – do away with that distinction?

MR. NIDES: No.

Q: And also, is there any talk of including the national security staff within the lump of

DOD, AID, State or leaving it still within the White House?

MR. NIDES: No, I – no, I don’t think that – first of all, and Rich and I actually had this

conversation yesterday. I mean, this is real, the national security budget’s real, but let’s be clear.

We are not – they’re not changing the appropriations process on the Hill, OK? So we – you

know, Kay Granger is still the, you know, chairwoman of our appropriations committee.

They’re not changing the – how the Hill deals with our budget beyond, you know, a national

security framework where the budget allocations are due, but we’ll still have subcommittees,

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subcommittee discussions, markups within subcommittees and in the full committee. And those

will also be in the – in the Senate.

Again, I think this is the first year. Over the next few years, as we get to a clear feeling

of how this is working, you could potentially see other changes within the national security

framework. But right now I think we’re – we are at overall “chapeau,” as they like to say, of the

– of the overarching numbers. And then we’ll continue the normal appropriations process, as

they – as the committee process begins.

MR. VERMA: Larry, let me just follow up.

MR. KORB: Oh, go ahead.

MR. VERMA: Does it argue, though, for a new – without getting you in trouble with

your Hill colleagues, one of the things that I know Miriam and Larry called for in the report was

a different committee structure. And now that you’ve got one lump category, even though you

have the subcommittees, should there be kind of a super or select kind of committee on security

– (inaudible) –

MR. NIDES: You don’t really think I’m going to answer that, do you?

MR. VERMA: (Laughs.)

MR. NIDES: Would you have answered that if you were in my job?

MR. VERMA: No, and that’s why I’m asking you.

MR. NIDES: That’s right. OK, yeah. (Laughs.)

You know, listen, I think – and I know the brilliance on the Hill. They’ll figure it out, but

I think – I’m serious. Oh, God, I’m getting myself in trouble. But I think that the – oh, yeah, I

think over time they’ll have to see how this works. I mean, again, in – they’ll have to continue

relooking how the structures work on the committees. But having been a Hill rat in an earlier

part of my career, changing the appropriations processes and committees is a high order.

But if you would have told me that – you know, a year ago that the State Department and

USAID would be now under the (chapeau ?) of a national security budget, not on the domestic

side of the ledger, I would have said that was impossible, so anything is certainly possible in the

future.

MR. KORBA: You can see Rich has made the transition from government to –

MR. VERMA: Oh, totally. You’re going to get me in trouble. Perfect. (Laughter.)

Q: Serge Duss, International Medical Corps, international NGO – since my question is

regarding Congress, I’ll direct it away from Secretary Nides to the other panelists –

826
MR. NIDES: Thank you.

Q: – who were involved in writing this excellent report. What makes you think that the

Republicans in Congress, particularly the House, will be much more sympathetic to diplomacy

and development, just because this budget now comes in a new packaging?

MR. KORB: Miriam, do you want to –

MS. PEMBERTON: (Inaudible.) (Laughs.)

MR. KORB: I’ll go ahead while you’re thinking.

MS. PEMBERTON: OK.

MR. KORB: I think what you’re seeing is a change in – the Republican Party is not the

Republican Party of the neocons and George Bush, OK? You’re beginning to see the Republican

Party go back to some of its roots with the so-called tea party in many senses there, you know,

Robert Taft Republicans. And remember it was – the Republicans back in the late ‘40s,

Vandenberg and company, that supported the Marshall Plan when only 13 percent, you know, of

the Americans – the Americans did.

I think the fact of the cost of doing it with Defense, as opposed, as the secretary said, in

terms of, you know, what you can get for the – from the State – I think a key thing is going to be

– assuming we get out, you know, and Maliki yesterday said he wants us out, you know,

completely – when people take a look at how much we’re spending in Iraq next year as

compared to what we’ve spent this year, people say, why, that’s not a bad – you know, that’s not

a bad – that’s not a bad deal.

So I do think, you know, you’re seeing, you know, differences. Now, you still have the

neocons whose answer to everything is more military force, OK? But they’re becoming, I think,

a smaller and smaller portion of the – of the federal budget, and if you look at, you know, some

of the candidates, you know, some of the things that they’ve said in terms of, you know, using

military forces.

Now, you know, is there any guarantee? No, there isn’t. But I do think – you know, this

– you know, the very fact that the Republicans agree to lump security spending together –

remember this is a bipartisan agreement – shows that people are beginning to think in those

terms.

Miriam, do you want to –

MS. PEMBERTON: I guess I’d just add that, you know, we’ve all expressed the dangers

of doing it this way, you know, as have you. And I just think we have to make the case that –

you know, that the military increases unbroken for 13 years, that’s unsustainable; that the deficit

has been in part created by those increases, and that international affairs had nothing to do with

827
it; that if these people are really concerned about our security, we need to be looking at and they

need to be looking at, you know, what is the most effective way to achieve security with limited

dollars; and that those who are basically just concerned with the bottom line of defense

contractors, you know, they are not deficit hawks and they are not security hawks, and we just

need to call them out.

MR. VERMA: Can I add one point to that?

MR. KORB: Go ahead.

MR. VERMA: I think what the House did – if you talk to the House leaders, they’ll say

in their – even in their FY ’12 mark, they’ll say, look, we gave you everything – almost

everything you wanted in your OCO. And so we gave there but we cut everywhere else. And so

I think there’s a little bit of risk to OCO, too, which is that becomes the category of wars and

exigencies, and everything else – the Somalias, the Yemens, the Sudans – start to fall off the

radar screen.

So maybe a question back to you, Tom, is, can – do you see OCO as being something

beyond those three frontline states at some point down the road in order to maybe bootstrap some

of the other programs?

MR. NIDES: You know, the OCO’s got very clear parameters because – since you

helped write it. And Jack Lew, who is a Boy Scout, he, you know, wrote it – the way in which

was very defined about the frontline states. And we’re obviously sticking to those parameters.

The biggest fear I have, which is yours, which is – you know, you can’t – you know, talk

about robbing Peter to pay Paul. You know, you give us the money because these are war costs

that we all believe we need to spend. You know, for the transition in Iraq, we all believe we

need to get the troops out. We need to do our diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. We need to

get the troops out. Over a period of time, we need to transition. Pakistan is what we have talked

about for our national security purposes.

If we find ourselves in a situation, which is we get fully funded OCO, which has been

funded in the House and in – quite frankly, will be in the Senate, but if they just take those

dollars and take it out of our base budget, that is a disaster for us, OK? That is a disaster. And

we are making that case very clearly to the Hill that that can’t be done. I think people understand

that, will hopefully be focused on increasing that base budget.

What I don’t want to see happen is, is put money out of our base budget – if we can help

that – into a – the OCO account, because the OCO account is temporary by its nature. And as

you start shrinking your base budget over time, you’re going to wake up here – you know, I’ll be

long gone from this job, but for whoever has this job, you know, three or four years from now or

five years from now or whenever it is, I don’t want them to see a – they turn around and they

have no money to do our diplomatic missions around the world. And so we have a crisis. You

have the – you know, you have what’s going on in Egypt and Tunisia and the Middle East. And

I look around and I say, oh, I’ve got to take it of our base, but we have no base left. It’s all being

828
funded there. So that’s the balance we’re working in. But we have clear-defined mission set of

what the OCO needs to be, but we must, must make sure that the base budget is at a reasonable

level to fund the activities for the – for the rest of the world.

MR. KORB: OK, we got three to five minutes depending on when you have to leave.

What I’d like to do is get for the secretary – because Rich, Miriam and I will be staying until

11:00, when the program ends – succinct questions – you know, three to five, and you can

answer whichever ones you want and also use your remarks to sum up.

OK, yeah, quickly.

Q: Hank Gaffney from CNA – worked 11 years in all this business. So just to clarify,

we have the committee of 12, which is going to work the 684 (billion dollars) and make the

division. And that’s just for the year 2012, and then it all reverts to the usual 302(b) acquisition

appropriation divisions.

MR. NIDES: No, let me just – let me clarify that. I know I’m supposed to let everyone

speak, but – so I don’t – remember your question. The committee of 12 has one task, which is to

basically get a trillion and a half dollars out for – between ’12 and the year 2020. That is – that

is the goal of the committee, because remember they basically kick – not kick the can. They

basically got enough to get the $900 billion to get the debt ceiling raised, which they did. The

supercommittee’s role is to come up with that extra billion and a half – trillion and a half dollars.

If they do not achieve that, if they do not achieve that by Thanksgiving, a rescission takes

place in 2013, which is 50 percent for DOD and 50 percent for domestic, OK? For that

particular rescission, that does not have – the State Department is back in the – is back in the

domestic pile, OK, for that rescission. And the whole idea behind that was to put pressure on

everyone, right, including, you know, Republicans and Democrats. So that is the role.

Now, they could – and hopefully they’ll think about a much broader, bigger deal than just

trying to get the trillion and a half dollars that they’re required to do by Thanksgiving and

hopefully that they’ll think about other – you know, other things that they possibly could do. But

that is – for the sake of that conversation – I haven’t screwed that up, did I, Rich? Is that right?

OK.

MR. VERMA: (Inaudible) – the 684 (billion dollars) is still going to be managed by the

Appropriations Committee.

MR. NIDES: By the – that has nothing to do – the 684 (billion dollars) has nothing to do

with the supercommittee. They are not involved in that. That’s the deal of the – of the – so that

is totally disconnected.

MR. KORB: OK.

MR. NIDES: I’m sorry. I didn’t follow your rules, Larry.

MR. KORB: I got to – I got to try and make it easy.

829
MR. NIDES: Well, I’ve got a – I’ve got a few – I’ve got a few more – I’ve got a few

more minutes.

MR. KORB: All right. OK, go ahead. Please ask your questions.

Q: Karrye Braxton, Global Business Solutions, Inc. – as one of the companies from the

taxpaying side of the development business, I wanted to let you know about the Coalition of

International Development Companies. We have been putting together success stories to show

how certain countries have been able to phase out of international assistance from the U.S.

government. So you might want to take a look at what they’re offering in terms of pictures, as

opposed to words, because as we know, actually these days a picture’s worth 10,000 words.

And also particularly with regard to small businesses that are doing work in international

development, the Small Business Association of International Contractors are also putting

together success stories to show the American people how much the increases in American

assistance are helping bring down the deficit on this side. So I would take a look at those groups

to help provide some pictures. Thank you so much.

MR. KORB: Thanks. Thank you. Over here then right there in the back, the gentleman

in the back, and you will have the last question, sir.

Q: Larry Nowels with the Hewlett Foundation – a couple of weeks ago, OMB issued

new guidance on agencies putting their 2013 budgets together, requiring options for 5 percent

and 10 percent reductions from FY ’11. Two questions – one, some agencies appear that they

will be exempt from that exercise. I’m just wondering if you can comment on the position of the

State Department.

MR. : (Laughs.)

And regardless of that, you do have for 2013 now a new reality of a hard cap for the

security agencies that was not there a month ago. Is this going to change how you utilize these

last few months in preparing the 2013? Will it be more collaborative working with these

agencies so that you come – you come at that cap, rather than putting together a budget that you

feel the State Department and USAID needs and then later engage in that discussion at OMB

over how you make it all fit?

MR. NIDES: OK, yeah, I – let me just answer quickly. I think that the – I think the

game of, you know, what your number is (and told ?) and what gets delivered to OMB, I’m

learning that there’s a little – sometimes it slips between the cup and the lip between what you’re

told and what happens. So how the guidance is given to the departments and what they expect –

I mean, here’s a dirty little secret.

You know, we don’t know what will come out of the supercommittee. You know, who

knows exactly what the Congress will do on ’12 beyond what’s currently put in place? So we’re

actually forming – formulating right now our ’13 budget, and listen, I don’t think you can

830
assume that you’re going to be getting any more money than you got in ’11, right? That’s a

pretty good assumption, right? So that’s not – I think most people would wake up and say, that’s

probably assumption. And quite frankly, out of the – out of the ‘12 negotiations, they’ve

obviously thought about this over the next five to seven years as to how they got there, quite

frankly, how they got to $900 billion – (inaudible) – future savings as well.

Listen, I think we’re working closely with our colleagues over at the Pentagon and

Veterans Affairs. I should tell you, we’re not sitting around in meetings every day and dividing

up the pie. I think – I think it was the question that was asked earlier. I think there’s better

coordination. How it all works – this is the first time it’s happened. We hope there will be more

coordination and more conversation. But again, the good news is the cooperation between

certainly our departments and Defense has never been better, and I think that will help, I think, in

these discussions.

MR. KORB: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the audience and my colleagues here at CAP,

thank you very much for coming and sharing your thoughts with you (sic). (Applause.) We

wish you the best of luck as you deal with this.

MR. NIDES: All right. Thank you very much. And Miriam and Rich, thank you. I just

would make one last comment. The one thing that I have been enormously impressed with was

the quality of people at the State Department, and not just the foreign service officers but the

civil service officers, the locally engaged folks that I meet around the world. And for those of

you – not to get sappy, but for those of you who haven’t had an opportunity to spend time and

look at the – what goes on at AID and State, it really makes my job that much more – not only

more important, but it’s actually – it makes me feel like I’m actually doing something good to

support the men and women who are, quite frankly, putting their lives on the line and wake up

every day trying to make the United States a better place for the American people, but quite

frankly – and how we are looked upon around the world. So I’m honored by being invited, and

thank you all very much.

MR. KORB: Thank you. (Applause.)

All right. For those of you that would like to stay, we can get into more of these

particular issues that we did in the – in the unified – Jonathan, thank you very much.

All right. Miriam, do you want to add anything? You’ve heard the secretary talk and,

you know, you’ve been sort of the person who’s pushed this idea for a long time – things that

you might have said that, you know, the secretary wasn’t able to say?

MS. PEMBERTON: What he wasn’t able to say – well, what I was hoping to ask was –

referring to one of the recommendations in the report, we talked about, you know, the extreme

challenges of trying to change the congressional budget process. So I was more thinking of

focusing on our recommendations having to do with the executive branch.

One of the most important, I think, of our recommendations for the executive branch

would be the creation of a quadrennial national security review, which would include all of the

831
partners in the security portfolio that we’ve talked about. And it would also incorporate – you

know, we’ve talked about the importance of OMB, so it would be a joint NSC/OMB process that

would really do what the QDDR doesn’t do, what the QDR doesn’t do, which is to connect

strategy and budgets and to really think about the kinds of trade-offs that we’ve talked about in

this report, among different – you know, different ways of securing the nation.

So for example, you know, we talk about, you know, a trade-off between, you know,

funding missile defense, as opposed to funding the Coast Guard and, you know, container

security. So if – so if this body could look at, you know, how do we protect the country from,

you know, a nuclear bomb, you know, that group would then look at, you know, what is the

expert opinion on what’s the most likely way that a bomb is going to come to the United States.

And lo and behold, most experts believe that, you know, a missile threat is much less likely than,

you know, a bomb coming in on a ship.

So with that in mind, that kind of idea in mind, then that group might look at, you know,

shifting some of the budgetary resources, you know, from missile defense toward beefing up the

Coast Guard’s capabilities and the Homeland Security Department’s capabilities to do container

inspections. And so those are the kinds of trade-offs that we are – we think that – you know, are

really at the heart of this – of this proposal. And I think that sort of agency within the federal

government to link the budget people with the security people and to link strategy with budgets

would be – you know, it’s surprising that that really doesn’t happen, and this would be a useful

way to get it to happen, I guess.

MR. KORB: Let me add something to that, and the example – because we were talking,

you know, with the secretary – obviously the things in terms of aid that you can do in particular

countries. But when you take a look at this particular thing with the Coast Guard versus the

Department of Defense, last year the Coast Guard budget went down. Why? Because they’re in

the Department of Homeland Security and they’re competing against, you know, the 22 other

agencies there, but there was nobody to say, well, you know, if we’re worried about a nuclear

attack on the United States, is somebody going to shoot a missile with a return address, which is

what you’re spending on missile defense, as opposed to more – putting it in a container? Well,

the fact of the matter is we spend more on missile defense than the entire Coast Guard. And that

does not get – it does not get in. And so if you’re trying to, quote-unquote, “get more bang for

the buck,” this is really what you need to think about.

Similarly, the Defense Department says one of the major threats to national security is

climate change, OK? Well, if climate change is a threat, which agency can help you deal with

that? It’s not going to be the Department of Defense. You know, the Marines aren’t going to

change the climate. But if you’re taking a look, for example, at other ways you might fund that –

and until you start thinking holistically like that – and everybody says, well, the Congress will

change. Well, maybe it will. Maybe it won’t. But the executive can do that. They can sit down

and say, OK, we got 684 billion (dollars). All right, let’s sit down and see what we recommend

here, you know, in terms of these – of these – of these trade-offs.

The problem has been basically after – toward the end of the Clinton administration and

then after 9/11, it was very easy to just fund the military without thinking, whereas these other,

832
you know, programs had to, you know, fight for – you know, fight for every dollar. And as you

go into this period of austerity, the fact of the matter is the defense budget has so much more

room for reductions than the baseline State budget.

You know, for example, if you take – if the Defense Department should take the whole

trillion dollars in cuts, the 350 billion (dollars) in the first thing plus – worst case, the – you end

up with sequestration, and it’s like $950 billion, you would be back to where you were in real

terms in 2007.

So I mean, when – and yet I don’t remember too many people complaining about George

Bush’s next to last defense budget. And we need to do that and rather than go after the sort of

the baseline – the baseline budget. And unless I – and it ought to be tough with the Congress,

but unless the executive branch takes the lead in this when they send up the budget, I – you

know, I don’t think you’re going to have these – have these things happen. And it will be

fascinating to see what – you know, what they do with this first phase here. And I think that’s

the – you know, that’s the – that’s the key.

Rich, you want to have anything before we ask people in the audience?

MR. VERMA: Yeah, just a comment on this – having lived through the QDDR process

at the State Department, it is a fairly internal process at State and USAID. Meanwhile, the

Defense Department just finished its QDR, and the Department of Homeland Security finished

its own quadrennial review. And so you had three different QDDRs, QDRs and other review at

three major security agencies. The NSC of course tries to bring the agencies together at the

conclusion for sign-off. And then there’s also the National Security Strategy of the United

States.

But I think what you’re recommending, Miriam, is to bring those three agencies together

in a more holistic way but also assign budget priorities to the policies that are recommended in

the – in the particular reviews. And that really doesn’t happen holistically. OMB does the best it

can, but it – it’s really hard to make those kind of trade-offs because it is still stovepiped; then we

get to the Congress, and it’s even more stovepiped.

MR. KORB: All right. (Inaudible) – the floor is open.

Yes, sir. Wait for the mic, if you will.

Q: Thank you. Michael – (2:05 inaudible) – also a former Hill rodent. Talking about the

holistic approach and exigencies that are not yet foreseen but some that may be emerging and

also referring to the sparkling intellects on the Hill, recently a number of Chinese officials have

privately expressed amazement that national leadership, particularly in the House, was willing to

sacrifice what most people would consider national security interests or certainly national

standing for ideology. Now, in Chinese history in the ‘60s and ‘70s that’s a familiar exercise

that they’re trying to get away from. So that surprise is very likely to play out in ramifications in

their own policies.

833
So as the tea party – as you mentioned earlier, the revision – the sort of recidivism to the

Taft era, if there is in fact a new profile on the Hill regarding priorities regarding China, as they

perceive China, how did you find it? Whether some dimensions of it are a threat or whether or

not the more consensus Republican view that it should be stability through business at all costs,

how would a holistic approach survive the emergence of a virulent new, ideologically driven

attitude, particularly in the House?

MR. KORB: Go ahead, you --

MR. VERMA: Yeah, I kind of lived through this a little bit, too, so I think – look, I think

for those people that care about diplomacy and development, we have to do a better job making

the case. And for a lot of the House of Representatives, there are a lot of new members that have

no understanding or experience of what the State Department or USAID or NGOs around the

world might be doing with U.S. taxpayer money. They’ve got bases in their district. They’ve

got National Guardsmen and Reservists in their districts. They have – they may have military

service. They have a much better appreciation for what DOD does. They know what boots on

the ground does. But still, we have to admit that we’re dealing with remnants of kind of foreign

aid, of the past. And when people see State Department funding and AID funding, they think,

foreign aid – it’s going down a rat hole. It’s going to some dictator in some third-world place,

and that’s an easy place to cut.

When we actually go in and talk to new members and explain what the money’s actually

for – and when you sit next to, say, someone from the joint staff or someone from the intel

community, it’s – they are surprised and shocked that you would be here together talking about

the national security case. And what we try to talk about is national security as a continuum; not

just the offensive part where actual combat is taking place. But we’ve been trying to talk about

national security, as these guys do in the report, about a pre-conflict – a preventive – a preventive

phase and a post-conflict phase.

And that pre-conflict part of the continuum, where you put diplomacy and development

dollars at work, will hopefully save you lots of money down the road. And that’s the investment

case we’ve been making, and we – frankly, we need to do a better job of it. I think we can – we

can make that case, but it’s going to take a lot of work. And hopefully – you know, I understand

there’s a lot of ideological battles taking place right now. Hopefully, this is one that can

penetrate the ideology.

MS. PEMBERTON: I’d just – I’d just add that I suspect that the Chinese have also been

sitting back and looking in amazement as the U.S. for years has been looking at China as, you

know, our next Cold War adversary and, you know, seeing it as this emerging military threat.

Meanwhile, China is spreading its influence economically and, you know, kind of beating our

time with its – with its economic influence, which I think has far more importance than its – than

its military influence. And you know, I think they’re, you know, kind of chuckling to themselves

as each new person stands up in Congress and starts ranting about the specter of the Chinese

military threat.

MR. KORB: Yeah. Yes, ma’am.

834
Q: Ashley Stover, Joint Economic Committee. On that point – on the previous two

comments, it’s been said that the State Department has to show how it can save money but also

how it makes money for the United States in terms of what our economic officers are doing on

the ground. And in the report, there’s a part where you say there’s not enough staffing of

Foreign Service officers. And can you speak to the issue of staffing in the economic space in

terms of making sure that our global footprint when it comes to economics is felt? Because I

don’t think that is something that is identified as a – not just preventative measure but keeps the

United States and our national security at the top, where it is.

MS. PEMBERTON: (Inaudible) – defer to you.

MR. VERMA: Yeah, no, I’m – yeah, it would have been a great question for the deputy

secretary, because he’s got the actual specifics on where we’re short, but I can tell you, you

know, the plan was to grow the foreign service by about 20 (percent) to 25 percent, grow USAID

by – I think the number was somewhere around a thousand additional foreign service

professionals in AID. And Secretary Clinton is very good about making the case as to how –

when we don’t have an adequate number of people on the ground fighting for those kind of

economic opportunities for our companies, for our businesses in very competitive environments

in the world, where the Chinese, where the Russians, where the Europeans are out very

aggressively pushing their companies and their products, it does impact U.S. business.

I mean, you talk to any small-business owner in the United States, it’s very likely they

have some international connection. Either they have a supply chain that comes internationally

or they have a customer internationally. And it is the kind of quiet, behind-the-scenes work that

economic case officers do every day for U.S. businesses around the world. It’s an untold story. I

think we have to do a better job telling that story and really beefing up that capability and that

capacity.

MR. KORB: Yeah, we – you know, in the report, we try and get into this. We still have

80,000 troops in Europe. The Cold War ended 20 years ago. And so we say, “Take 800 out.”

And you could do that, 800 – (laughs) – out of the 80,000. And that’s the type of thing, I think,

where you need to get, you know, people’s – you know, people’s attention because if that base

State Department budget goes down, that’s going to hurt, make it more difficult to – you know,

to hire those folks. And remember this OCO money basically is to cover their operations, not to

hire, you know, extra FSOs over there.

So, yeah, I mean, that’s the type of thing – I mean, when you tell the American people –

go back to the question I was asked before -- and even Republicans, you know: 80,000 troops in

Europe 20 years after the end of the Cold War? People say, what, are you kidding? Europeans

are cutting their defense budget because they know we’re there. So they can do that to deal with

their – you know, their deficit and put the money into other things.

MS. PEMBERTON: And I’d just add – back to the OCO issue, I thought – I thought the

secretary did a good job of explaining, you know, the problems with this being where the money

for the State Department is going. It’s also, it seems to me, creating a different set of capacities

835
and a different set of skills to deal with, you know, mopping up after this – after this disaster.

And, you know, so I worry that we’re building capacities that are going to be of limited value to,

you know, preventing conflicts to, you know, expanding, you know, economic ties and influence

and all the sorts of things that you’ve been talking about. I don’t see the people coming out of –

out of Iraq as particularly having those kinds of skills that can be, you know, plugged right into

the broader conflict prevention, you know, kind of engagement with the world that we need and

that we’re trying to build.

MR. KORB: Okay. Yeah, back there, and then up here.

Q: Hi, thanks. Ben Freeman with the Project On Government Oversight – we do a lot of

work on contractors, and so I was sort of curious to not hear a lot about that so far and then get

your thoughts on that. The DOD’s budget, the majority of it actually, goes to contractors, and

even some individual contractors actually get more taxpayer dollars every year than the entire

State Department. So I was just curious to hear your thoughts on the contractor issue.

MR. KORB: Well, you know, if you read today – the report of the commission on, you

know, contracting came out, and they talk about the big waste and lack of control and the fact

that the Department of Defense didn’t plan for this. And you know, and I – you know, that’s a

really key issue, you know, going forward: how much you want to rely on the government, how

much you want to rely on the private sector, and have we crossed the line, I mean, you know,

with the private sector, giving them inherently governmental – you know, governmental, you

know, functions, not to mention the waste but the problems they’ve caused by – they basically

have ignored the directives of the people they’re working for.

Remember the big incident you had in Iraq were State Department contractors that, you

know, basically started, you know, shooting. And I remember when I was there in 2007 doing

some work for the State Department, they had this private security firm, and I had these two

fellows in front of their SUV driving us around, and they were former South African military

people who my guess is left when, you know, apartheid ended. And basically, you know, they

would shoot first and ask questions later. You know, I mean, it was really – I mean, and I do

think that’s a whole separate issue, and that goes back to the fact that if you cut government

people, which we did in the ‘90s when Senator Helms was, you know, ravaging the State

Department, then you’re going to have to – you know, have to do this when these emergencies

come up. And I think, you know, that that is – is a – is a key issue that until you get your budget

where it needs to be, you’re going to have to do that every time you have an emergency.

MS. PEMBERTON: I’d just add, the other issue with relying so much on contractors is

the political contributions that they put into our – you know, influencing the state of our politics

and, you know, the influence they have had and can have on, you know, shaping the budget;

preserving, you know, new increases in military spending that may not be in our – in our security

interest or our financial interest.

MR. KORB: OK, this young lady up here –

836
Q: Ellen Milhiser, editor of Synposis newsletter – I am very fascinated by the cuts you

suggest in the defense budget. And I just have two questions. First, the personnel you pull out

of Europe, you still have those people to deal with. You still have to pay for them here, you

know, also. An increasing portion of the defense budget has nothing to do with weapons, and

it’s personnel costs. It’s retirement. It’s health care, all of those costs. Do you have any

suggestions on dealing with that and on actually making our defense spending pay for defense

and not taking care of all the people who, thankfully, gave us their service but, you know –

MR. VERMA: Well, we put out other reports and we’ve done two things: One on the –

on you know, the – cutting defense. And we’re going to take half of those people out of Europe

and take them out of the force. That’s how you would save money. We’ve also – and we had a

very contentious meeting here with the head of the Military Officers Association in terms of

doing something about the military – you know, the military health care system. So, yes, we do

get into that.

And if you go on our website, we have compared our proposals to Tom Coburn, who by

the way – really very, very radical proposal; and the deficit commission, Simpson-Bowles; and

the Gang of Six, and we’ve shown all of the things that, you know, we have in common. But

you know, we do – we do – and your point is well-taken because, yeah, if you take them home

from Europe, you’re not going to save any money. You’ve got to – you’ve got to take them out

of – out of – out of the force.

Yes, sir. And you get the last question, and –

Q: My name is Jonathan (sp) – (inaudible) – from the Osgood Center for International

Studies. Mr. Korb, you mention that a trillion dollars in defense cuts over the next 10 years is

doable without significant harm to the – to the prowess of our national defense. Secretary Gates

critiqued that and said that anything over 350 (billion dollars) would harm it. And the main

argument – and I’ve seen it floated in sources such as The Weekly Standard – was that those

kinds of cuts on that scale don’t take into account the need to replace hardware that was

purchased in the ‘80s during the Reagan defense buildup. Do you mind commenting on that?

MR. KORB: Yeah, and of course – and Secretary Panetta’s also said the same thing, that

these cuts would be, you know, devastating. The problem with the Pentagon and in the

procurement area has not been the amount of money; it’s how well it has been managed. You

realize when we – you know, we pointed that out in our – in our recent report that you’ve had

$50 billion of – that they’ve spent on weapons systems, which they’ve cancelled, OK? They also

have cost overruns of three (hundred billion dollars) to $400 billion on the existing. That’s the

reason they’re not replacing it. It’s not a question of money, and I want to -- and I think it’s very

important to keep in mind, if you want to run the Pentagon well, it’s not the secretary because

that man and hopefully someday soon a woman, you know, has an awful lot of things, you know,

to – you know to do; it’s the deputy. And we’ve done studies and we showed how with a good

deputy, you can do this without it.

Nixon came in and basically he hired Melvin Laird, who was a political person, a

congressman from Wisconsin, as secretary. Who was the deputy? David Packard. Harold

837
Brown came in under Carter. Brown was a scientist. Who was his deputy? Charlie Duncan

from Coca-Cola, OK? Dick Cheney – you know, and after reading his book here, I hesitate to

say anything nice about him, but I think the fact he was a very good secretary of defense. And

you know why? Because before he took the job, the White House said, Don Atwood, the vice

chairman of General Motors is going to run the place. We haven’t had that. Wolfowitz – OK.

Gordon England was pretty good but he wasn’t there that long. And that’s what you need: a

big-time business executive to go in there and – that’s been the problem -- not the amount of

money -- because when the money was there, they didn’t have to make any – well, we’ll do this;

we’ll do that, you know; we’ll build this with – you know. And that was the – and that was the

problem.

So I know – I’ve heard all the arguments: Well, they haven’t replaced it, you know, since

the Reagan years, and all of that. The problem is that in fact you haven’t handled your money

well, and go – and that’s so to say, you go back and you look at those periods where the

declining – a defense budget that was $200 billion in real terms than you are now, and we seem

to do it.

Well, on that – OK, Rich and Miriam, you have any thoughtful words here?

MS. PEMBERTON: (Laughs.)

MR. VERMA: No, thank you very much for this – inviting me --

MR. KORB: Listen, I want to thank you all, A, for coming; and B, for staying –

(laughter) – after the secretary left. And I want to really thank my colleagues, particularly

Miriam, who has really – you know, started this, you know, program seven or eight years ago

when nobody was thinking about it and really has persevered, you know, to get this. And I think

we’re making some progress.

So thank you all very much. (Applause.)

(END)

838
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AND THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

ISP-I-13-44A Office of Inspections September 2013

Special Review of the

Accountability Review Board Process

IMPORTANT NOTICE: This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the

Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of

Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or

the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies of organizations, without prior authorization by

the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the

U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.

EXHIBIT 10

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19

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Implementation of the Benghazi Accountability Review

Board Recommendations

“All of us—from senior Department leadership setting strategic priorities to supervisors

evaluating the needs of individual posts to congressional committees appropriating funds and

providing oversight—have a responsibility to provide the men and women who serve this country

with the best possible security and support. Most of all, it is my responsibility as Secretary of

State.” - Secretary Hillary Clinton

The Department wasted no time addressing the recommendations of the Benghazi ARB.

It enlisted numerous bureaus and offices to assist in developing plans for implementation. It

formed working groups and committees, established panels of experts, and convened special

review boards. Senior Department leadership has been involved through information memos,

action memos, and the chairing of review committees. In seeking to fulfill the ARB

recommendations, the Department issued instructional and guidance cables, made changes to the

FAM and Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH), and modified position descriptions and

organizational structures.

The Benghazi ARB recommendations, when implemented, should significantly improve

the Department’s ability to provide better security for U.S. diplomatic missions and employees.

Although nearly half of the recommendations are directed at high-risk, high-threat posts, such as

Benghazi, the recommendations have worldwide applicability. Implementation of some

recommendations has only required reiteration of existing guidance cables or issuance of new

guidance. Other recommendations resulted in the establishment of special review panels, which

in turn offered more recommendations. The more difficult recommendations require researching

and developing new policies and practices, exploring the application of new technologies, and

entering into new or revised agreements with other agencies. A number of Benghazi ARB

recommendations, especially those that require expansion of existing programs or creation of

new programs, require new funding and an assured funding stream. The recommendations

requiring significant funding relate to construction, hiring of additional personnel, expansion of

information technology or other systems, enhanced language training, enhanced security and

other training, and the procurement of new equipment and technologies.

Department Action

The Department’s handling of the Benghazi ARB recommendations represents a

significant departure from the previous norm in that Secretary Clinton took charge directly of

oversight for the implementation process. She designated the Deputy Secretary for Management

and Resources as the coordinator for implementation with strict guidelines for a reporting

schedule. Initially, the Deputy Secretary held weekly meetings with under secretaries and

assistant secretaries to track implementation. Implementation continues, albeit on a less regular

schedule now that many of the recommendations have been addressed.

This high-level oversight of the Benghazi ARB implementation process has been

sustained through the transition from Secretary Clinton to Secretary Kerry. This level of attention

from both secretaries and their senior staffs is a reflection of their personal concern in this matter

and the unique scope of the Benghazi ARB recommendations. Approximately 90 percent of the

recommendations (26 of 29) in the Benghazi report focused on systemic management reforms.

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20

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Most senior officials interviewed by the OIG team have expressed their view that high-level

attention is essential to carrying out the institutional changes recommended in the ARB report.

Furthermore, they say that the gravity of the issues in the ARB report demanded a much more

robust implementation process. A number of Benghazi ARB recommendations mirror previous

ARB recommendations, further underscoring a need for the involvement of Department

principals to ensure that implementing actions are sustained.

High-level leadership has been critical in driving and sustaining implementation of the

Benghazi ARB recommendations, and this approach establishes a model for how the Department

should handle future ARB recommendations. The Department needs to change the FAM to

formalize the responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources in

overseeing the implementation process and clarify that M/PRI, in continuing to perform its

coordinating function, will report directly to the Deputy Secretary on matters involving the

implementation of ARB recommendations.

Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Administration should amend 1 FAM 30 to institutionalize

the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources’ responsibility for oversight of

implementation of the Accountability Review Board recommendations. (Action: A)

Recommendation 11: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should amend 12 FAM 032 to reflect

the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources’ oversight responsibility of the Office of

Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation for implementation of Accountability Review

Board recommendations. (Action: DS)

There has been some confusion because of the parallel process established in the

Benghazi case, with bureaus and offices in the Department reporting alternately to the Office of

the Deputy Secretary of State, the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Management, or

M/PRI, sometimes regarding the same tasking, without proper coordination or communication.

Informal Recommendation 5: The Office of the Deputy Secretary of State should work

in tandem with the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation to

streamline the Benghazi Accountability Review Board implementation process.

Implementation Challenges

As previously noted, the Department attempted to comply with the Benghazi ARB

recommendations by breaking each down into individual actions. The Department divided the 29

recommendations of the Benghazi ARB report and assigned them to offices for followup. DS

was the most heavily tasked bureau, charged with taking the lead on 25 of the 64 tasks, with a

supporting role for 23 others. Additionally, the Office of the Under Secretary of State for

Management and M/PRI have significant roles in the implementation process. Actions on a

number of recommendations continue, with planned implementation of some not due until

December 31, 2013, or later, as requested funding becomes available.

In some instances, the Benghazi ARB recommendations are worded in a way that leaves

latitude for interpretation. While the Department has taken implementation seriously, some

actions taken do not get to the core of the recommendation’s intent. For example, the

Department’s interpretations of the recommendations and its parsing of them into multiple tasks

do not always align with the ARB’s intent.

841
EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 11

842
843
844
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846
EXHIBIT 12 .

847
This exhibit was not cleared for public release.

EXHIBIT 13

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED September 28, 2011

NOTE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY BURNS AND DEPUTY SECRETARY

NIDES

FROM: S/P – Jake Sullivan

NEA – Jeffrey Feltman

D(B)/MET – Bill Taylor

SUBJECT: Parameters for U.S. Engagement in post-Qadhafi Libya

As the Transitional National Council (TNC) consolidates its control over Libya,

the U.S. needs to determine the parameters that will guide our engagement with

post-conflict Libya. While progress in Libya has thus far exceeded public

expectations, we should expect political transition to proceed in fits and starts. We

should also expect that the post-conflict stages will face waning support from the

public and the Congress—and that overly intensive U.S. efforts, if not supported

by the Libyans, could over time erode the goodwill we have built within Libya.

We have several broad goals for Libya. We would like to see a Libya that is

unitary and democratic, that denies access to extremists, that has effective control

over its weaponry including WMD, and that maintains peaceful relations with its

neighbors. We also have an interest in ensuring that Libya can sell its oil and gas

on the global market. But post-conflict stabilization in Libya, while clearly a

worthy undertaking at the right level of investment, cannot be counted as one of

our highest foreign policy priorities. Strategically for us, Libya does not loom as

large as Egypt or Syria.

This means that, for the United States, Libya must not become a state-building

exercise. The Administration has a primary interest in ensuring that others—the

Libyans, the UN, the EU, and NGOs—take overall responsibility for post-conflict

stabilization. We should not allow the momentum of our involvement to date in

the Libyan revolution to determine our strategy for longer-term assistance. We

need to judiciously consider priorities for our support to Libya in light of our

interests, our other priorities, and our very scarce resources. The most difficult

task will be deciding what not to do and resisting impulses to attempt to engineer

Libya’s transition through U.S. engagement.

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Toward that end, this memo lays out some criteria for assessing U.S. assistance

priorities and uses those criteria to prioritize the main areas of proposed transition

assistance to Libya.

CRITERIA

Any assistance that we give to post-conflict Libya needs to meet most, if not all, of

the following criteria (listed in order of importance):

Promotes Specific U.S. Interests – The primary criterion is that U.S. assistance

should be tightly linked to specific U.S. interests. While the U.S. clearly has a

broad interest in Libyan stability and democratic transition in general, assistance

should promote specific U.S. interests such as preventing terrorism or creating a

level playing field for U.S. businesses in Libya.

Unique -- U.S. assistance should provide

goods and services that are not available elsewhere. Other governments,

multilateral organizations, and non-governmental organizations have

substantial post-conflict capabilities. We expect that the UN and the EU

will take the lead in many areas. Libya’s own substantial wealth means that

the Libyan government will be able to self-fund certain types of technical

assistance, and that the private sector will be intensely interested in

providing such assistance. Post-conflict assistance in Libya is not a prize

and we need not compete for post-conflict roles if they are not necessary to

support core U.S. interests.

Core Competence -- U.S. assistance should

capitalize on core U.S. competences and be cost-effective. We should only

provide assistance in areas where we have a proven track record of

success and to which Congress is willing to devote resources. Congress

has made clear that it will support little, if any, supplemental funds for U.S.

assistance to Libya and limited reprogramming.

Requested -- Assistance must be requested

by the Libyan interim authorities or by Libyan civil society. Even if we

feel the Libyan government or its people are making a mistake in not

seeking our help, we should not ordinarily provide assistance which the

Libyans do not actively request. On the other hand, while the UN will play

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a critical role in coordinating international community assistance to Libya

and we should channel requests and offers through them, we should not

allow the UN a veto over U.S. assistance that makes sense to the United

States and to Libyans.

PRIORITY AREAS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE

The above criteria imply the following areas of priority longer-term assistance in

rough order.

High Priority

Securing Weapons – The United States has

a clear interest in making sure that Libyan weapons, especially chemical

weapons and man-portable air defense systems, do not fall into the wrong

hands. We have substantial and unique capabilities in this regard that we

have already begun to deploy and Congress has evinced support for this

assistance. The Libyans have also requested our help.

Democracy and Governance – The U.S.

has an important interest not only in ensuring an effective democratic

transition in Libya, but also in fostering Libyan civil society and

maintaining U.S. links to non-governmental Libyan actors. Other actors

will play an important role in this area, but U.S. government programs have

proven uniquely effective in developing the non-government social

institutions and processes necessary for democratic functioning: political

parties, monitoring elections and other political processes, and supporting

civil society. The Libyan interim authorities have indicated support for the

small U.S. efforts underway and some interest in getting help in the initial

stages of their transition, but they are very sensitive to the possibility that

such efforts will be seen as foreign interference.

Counterterrorism – The U.S. has a clear

and strong interest in ensuring that violent extremists do not seize control of

the Libyan revolution or otherwise use Libya as a platform for international

terrorism. Libya’s long and unsecured borders are a particular area of

concern. We have worked with other governments throughout the world on

this issue and have substantial, unique capacities for securing borders,

tracking movement, and training and countering extremist ideology and

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recruitment. While extremist ideology does not appear to be an immediate

problem within Libya and not something for which the Libyans are

requesting immediate help, we can expect challenges in this area over time

and we should take steps to get ahead of the game.

Public Financial Management – A level

playing field for U.S. businesses in Libya requires transparent and honest

government processes. While other international actors and private sectors

have an important role in fostering transparency, ensuring a level-playing

for U.S. businesses will require some direct U.S. involvement. In part

because of international prompting, the Libyans have recognized that PFM

will help their international and domestic credibility and help them unlock

OPIC and other support. The Libyans also have the financial resources to

hire outside expertise for this function, so U.S. involvement in this area

should be limited to what is necessary to satisfy our own requirements and

to ensure a level-playing field for U.S. business.

Medium Priority

Transitional Justice and Reconciliation –

Effective Libyan-owned reconciliation and justice processes will be critical

to a stable transition. If the interim authorities fail to get buy-in from a

broad array of Libyan stakeholders, including former regime elements, a

gradual break-down of political order becomes much more likely. The

Libyans have recognized that they need international assistance in this area

in general terms, but have not as yet been able to formulate any specific

requests. The TNC has not yet made clear how highly it will prioritize this

objective. Despite its overall importance, however, the U.S. does not have a

core competence in this area relative to other international actors and U.S.

interests do not require that the U.S. be directly involved.

Security and Justice Sector Reform –

Libya needs to create a judicial system, effective police forces and a

national army that can integrate the various militias and provide law and

order. While the U.S. has substantial and unique experience in this regard,

it is not clear that U.S. efforts have always been cost-effective or that U.S.

interests requires us to be directly involved in a major way. Some models of

past U.S. experience, such as our intensive efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan,

are likely to be untenable in Libya, while others, such as in the Palestinian

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terrorities, might be more applicable. SSR assistance is expensive and

implies a deep involvement in Libyan society that the U.S. may not be

prepared to undertake. We may instead prefer to allow the UN or other

countries to take the lead, with the U.S. providing some IMET funds.

Lowest Priority

Economic Revitalization – Libya clearly

needs to undertake a broad program of economic reconstruction and

diversification. Ultimately, the new Libyan authorities may be judged on

their ability to provide economic growth and employment for their

population. But the U.S. lacks unique expertise or a direct interest in this

area. Libyan resources, moreover, are adequate to this task, in contrast to

many other post-conflict situations.

Essential Services – In the short-term, the

new Libyan authorities will be judged on their ability to maintain delivery

of basic services (food, water, electricity, security) to all residents of Libya.

So far, however, the Libyans have done surprisingly well in this area

without substantial U.S. assistance and this may be an area in which the UN

and other actors can provide any needed assistance.

The chart below summarizes the discussion above. Green implies that the given

area satisfies the criteria, yellow that it does so with some important caveats, and

red that it does not.

U.S.

Interests

Uniqu

e

Core

Competence

Requeste

d

HIGH PRIORITY

Securing Weapons Green Green Green Green

Democracy and Governance Green Yellow Green Yellow

Counterterrorism Green Green Yellow Yellow

Public Financial

Management

Green Yellow Green Yellow

MEDIUM PRIORITY

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

856
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

-6-

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Transitional Justice and

Reconciliation

Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow

Security and Justice Sector

Reform

Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow

LOWEST PRIORITY

Economic Revitalization Red Red Red Yellow

Essential Services and

Infrastructure

Red Red Red Red

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

857
Approved: S/P – Jake Sullivan

NEA – Jeff Feltman ok

D(B)/MET – Bill Taylor ok

Drafted: S/P , ext. 7-9517 an

Cleared: NEA/FO – EDibble ok

NEA/FO – RMaxwell ok

NEA/FO ok

D(B)/MET r ok

NEA/MAG ok

NEA/MAG ok

S/P l ok

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

858
EXHIBIT 17

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INTERVIEW OF

BERNADETTE MEEHAN

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, DECEMBER 16, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

DANIEL REBNORD, Minority Professional Staff

ERIN O’BRIEN, Minority Detailee

FOR BERNADETTE MEEHAN

JAMES WALSH, Special Assistant to the President and Associate Counsel to the President

NICHOLAS MCQUAID, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Counsel to the President

ZAID ZAID, Special Assistant to the President and Associate Counsel to the President

866
3

Mr. Missakian. Ms. Meehan, my name is Craig Missakian. I'm one

of the lawyers for the majority staff on the House Select Committee

on Benghazi. Before we begin the questioning, I'm just going to go

over some ground rules. First, we're conducting this transcribed

interview pursuant to a resolution of Congress, and I just wanted to

make sure that you understand when you're answering our questions or

answering questions from Members of Congress, that you're subject to

the penalties provided for in 18 U.S.C. 1001 that requires to provide

truthful testimony, and if you don't, you could be subject to criminal

penalty. Do you understand that?

Ms. Meehan. I do.

Mr. Missakian. Is there any reason why today you can't give us

your best, most truthful testimony?

Ms. Meehan. No reason.

Mr. Missakian. Now, this is going to be a little different, and

I don't know if you've ever had your deposition taken before, but it

is going to be a little different than a deposition would occur in the

context of a Federal District Court proceeding, for example. Here,

there are no objections other than for privilege. To the extent that

an objection is raised for privilege and we can't resolve it here, it

will then go to the chairman of the committee, Trey Gowdy, and it will

be resolved at that level. So just to clarify, are you represented

here today by counsel?

Ms. Meehan. I am accompanied today by members of the White House

counsel staff. I do not have personal counsel here.

867
4

Mr. Missakian. So to the extent that Mr. McQuaid or the other

lawyers here from the White House counsel staff intends to raise

objections based on privilege, we can deal with those as they come up.

Ms. Meehan. Okay.

Mr. Missakian. The ground rules for this interview, it's also

a little different than a deposition. What happens is the majority

staff will begin the questioning, and we will go for an hour. Then

once we're finished, the lawyers from the minority staff will step in,

and they will go for another hour; and we'll go back and forth until

everyone is finished asking all their questions.

If at any time in the middle of an hour or at the end of an hour

if you want to take a break for any reason or no reason, just let us

know, and we'll do our best to accommodate that. Have I left anything

out?

Mr. Chipman. Perhaps if you could get a record of those who are

in attendance.

Mr. Missakian. Yes. Typically we go around the room and

introduce people. As I said, I am Craig Missakian from the majority

staff.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke from the majority staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm Susanne Sachsman Grooms from the

minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer from the minority.

Ms. O'Brien. Erin O'Brien, minority.

Mr. Walsh. James Walsh, White House counsel's office.

868
5

Mr. Zaid. Zaid Zaid, White House counsel's office.

Mr. McQuaid. Nick McQuaid, White House counsel's office.

Ms. Meehan. And Bernadette Meehan, witness.

Mr. Chipman. Dana Chipman with the majority staff.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Let's begin. Ms. Meehan, let's start with where did you

work and what was your title in September of 2012?

A In September of 2012, I was a foreign service officer on

detail to the White House National Security Council. My title was

assistant press secretary in the National Security Council Press

Office.

Mr. Missakian. For the record, we just had two additional people

join us. Gentlemen, could you state your name for the record?

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny for the minority staff.

Mr. Rebnord. Dan Rebnord for the minority.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q And when did that detail begin?

A My detail began in July of 2012.

Q How long did it last?

A I was a member of the NSC press team until June of 2015,

though my position within the NSC press office changed over those 3

years.

Q How did it change?

A I eventually became the deputy spokesperson and then

869
6

eventually the spokesperson for the National Security Council.

Q When did that first change in your title occur?

A I became the deputy at some point in 2013, summer of 2013,

I think.

Q And when were you promoted to be the spokesperson of the

National Security Council?

A In the summer/fall of 2014.

Q I've seen the National Security Council referred to

sometimes by a different acronym, NSS, sometimes NSS, sometimes NSC.

What do you prefer? What is it?

A It is currently NSC staff. When I started it was NSS staff,

but it has since gone back to being officially called NSC staff.

Q So if I refer to it as NSC, we'll all know what we're talking

about?

A Yes.

Q Prior to becoming a detailee to the NSC in July of 2012,

what were you doing at the State Department?

A I began my career as a foreign service officer in 2004. I

served a 2-year assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia,

from 2004 to 2006. In 2006, I volunteered to serve in Iraq. So from

September 2006 until September 2007, I was at the U.S. Embassy in

Baghdad, Iraq. I, then, returned to Washington and studied Arabic

full-time at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute in

Virginia. That was about 10 months. I, then, was deployed to the U.S.

Consulate General in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates. That was from

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7

the summer of 2008 until the summer of 2010.

In the summer of 2010, I returned to Washington and began a detail,

or an assignment, I should say, in the Department of State's Executive

Secretariat. That was approximately 10 months. I, then, became the

foreign service officer filling a special assistant position in the

Secretary of State's office. I did that for approximately 15 months,

until I was detailed over to the National Security Council in July of

2012.

Q And once you got to the National Security Council in July

of 2012, what were your duties?

A My responsibility, at that particular point in time, was

to handle press inquiries related to administration policy in the

Middle East and North Africa.

Q Could you give us a little bit of an idea what the structure

of the office looked like?

A Sure. At that point in time, we were four press officers

on detail from various national security agencies. We reported to both

the spokesperson at the time, and the deputy national security advisor

for strategic communications.

Q Who was the spokesperson at the time?

A At that time, it was Tommy Vietor.

Q Tommy Vietor was the spokesperson for the National Security

Council?

A That's correct.

Q And the deputy spokesperson you mentioned, who was that?

871
8

A The deputy spokesperson at the time was Caitlin Hayden.

Q Can you spell her name, please?

A C-a-i-t-l-i-n, and her last name is H-a-y-d-e-n.

Q Was Ben Rhodes employed at the NSC at that point?

A He was. He was the Deputy National Security Advisor that

I referred to.

Q Oh, okay. And where was Ben Rhodes in your chain of

command?

A I reported both to Tommy and to Ben. So Ben was Tommy's

direct boss, and the four press officers in the NSC press office

reported to Tommy and to Ben.

Q Physically, where were you all located?

A At this particular point in the time, the four press

officers were in the Executive Office Building, the Eisenhower

Executive Office Building. Tommy and Ben were located in the West

Wing.

Q Did that change?

A When I became the spokesperson of the National Security

Council, I, then, took a desk in the West Wing where Tommy used to sit.

Q Focusing on September of 2012, were you in the Old Executive

Office Building at that point?

A I was.

Q And what was your relationship, if any, to Denis McDonough

at that point in time?

A At that point in time, Denis McDonough was the Deputy

872
9

National Security Advisor handling policy, as opposed to Ben Rhodes,

who did strategic communications. So I would see him in meetings. He

was obviously sort of the deputy of the overall NSC, so I would see

him in meetings, but no direct reporting line to him.

Q Give us an idea of your day-to-day life in September of 2012

prior to the attacks.

A Sure. Well, I had been there for approximately 7 or 8 weeks

at that point in time, so was still new to the NSC. We would field

requests from reporters, both domestic and international, throughout

the day. We were also responsible for coordinating press guidance

throughout the interagency to help prepare any of the spokespeople at

national security agencies that would hold daily press briefings.

That would include, at the time, Jay Carney, the spokesperson for the

White House; Toria Nuland at the State Department; George Little at

the Department of Defense; and attend meetings as required to help

fulfill those duties.

Q Did anybody sit you down and explain the process of

coordinating the interagency messaging that you just talked about?

A So generally, when someone joined the press office, we had

a few days with our predecessor, so I had time to shadow that individual,

and then we have time, obviously, with the other members of the office.

It's often a staggered start, so I was the only person starting at that

particular point in time, and was able to work with the other members

of the office to understand how we were expected to carry out those

duties.

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10

Q Okay. What did you learn?

A Well, I learned how we coordinate, usually on a daily basis,

with other national security agencies to try and determine what we feel

will be, quote-unquote, “news of the day,” that may be raised in any

of the daily press briefings across the interagency. We coordinate

across the interagency press offices to work on incoming stories.

There's usually multiple equities involved and multiple agencies will

have a part of what a reporter is inquiring about, so we want to ensure

that every agency that has an equity is aware of that and is working

together to respond to an inquiry. So that is generally what I was

taught when I came in.

Q In the process of coordinating a message with the

interagency, does somebody have the final word on the message?

A It's a case-by-case basis. It depends on what the topic

is, whether the inquiry is, what the various equities are of each of

the agencies, so it would be a collaborative process among the

interagency to determine who will field that inquiry and what input

other agencies will have into it.

Q Can you give us an example of something in practice that

might shed some light on who has the final word on a particular issue?

A Sure. So, you can look at multiple scenarios that would,

perhaps, be different, but an example would be if there is military

action going on in Iraq, for example, and a reporter has an inquiry,

they may have an inquiry that has multiple parts. They may say, for

example, can you discuss what targets were struck in a particular

874
11

military action, and how does that relate to the President's overall

strategy to combat ISIS in Iraq.

We would then coordinate among the different agencies and say,

DOD, you would be best placed to handle inquiries about what the

military targets were, what the military action was in that instance;

whereas, the White House would be most appropriate, from the NSC staff,

to handle questions related to the President's overall policy with

regards to combating ISIS in Iraq. And if there was a role for the

State Department, we would draw them into that as well.

Q Okay. Aside from who would be the best agency to address

an issue, would it be fair to say that NSC has the final word on the

content of a message, or is that going too far?

A It's dependent. It's a case-by-case basis again. You

know, the military would be best placed to make a final decision on

how they're going to characterize military action, for example. The

intelligence community would be the provider and the final

decisionmaker on anything related to an intelligence assessment, for

example. Generally the NSC would have the final word on anything that

is characterizing the President's feelings, thoughts, or policy. So,

again, it's a case-by-case basis.

Q Speaking of the intelligence community, how would you

describe the relationship between the NSC and the intelligence

community?

A Well, I can only speak to the communications part, since

that was the channel that I worked in.

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12

Q Yes.

A But we had an excellent relationship. They were a part of

the daily coordination that we had across the interagency for

news-of-the-day items. I was in daily contact usually with my

counterparts at both the CIA and the DNI.

Q Were there any other members of the intelligence community

that you had this daily contact with, besides CIA and DIA?

A On occasion, NCTC. At this particular time related to

Benghazi, there were no other agencies that I was in direct contact

with the spokespeople. I can't speak to what the coordinating role

of the DNI and the CIA were in that.

Mr. McQuaid. Craig, I think you said DIA. I'm not sure if that's

the same.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q I'm sorry. You said DNI.

A DNI.

Q I did say DIA. Thank you. Who were your contacts at CIA?

This was in September of 2012.

A Right. I can't recall who the spokesperson was at that

particular time at CIA.

Q In talking about the CIA, are we talking about the office

within CIA that has the acronym OPA?

A Yes, that would be correct, the Office of Public Affairs.

Q Within the Office of Public Affairs, there was, obviously,

a spokesperson whose name you can't recall. Is that the person you

876
13

dealt with on a daily basis?

A It would be, generally from CIA, each member of their team

would participate in daily coordination. They had a relatively small

team.

Q Do you remember the name of anybody on the team?

A At that particular time, there was an individual named

Preston who was working there at the time. He's the one that comes

to mind. I don't recall who the other members of that team were at

that time.

Q Do you recall dealing with anybody in particular on the

issue of the attacks in Benghazi?

A On CIA, I don't. Most of the coordination was done through

the DNI, on the intelligence side.

Q In communicating with Preston or anybody else in the CIA,

OPA shop, was that done by phone or was it done by email?

A Both.

Q Both. And with regards to DNI, did they have their own

press office?

A They did.

Q Do you recall the names of anybody in the DNI press office?

A I do. The spokesperson at the time was Shawn Turner, and

he generally was the person that we coordinated anything related to

intelligence with.

Q Was there anybody else in that press shop that you recall?

A There were other members of the press shop. Shawn was my

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14

primary point of contact. At that point in time, I don't recall who

was working with him.

Q Do you recall dealing with Shawn with regard to the attacks

in Benghazi?

A I do.

Q Why don't we just go into that a little bit. What do you

recall about your interaction with Shawn Turner with regard to the

Benghazi attacks?

A He was a member, as I said, of the interagency

communications team, so I remember on a daily basis he was part of any

meetings that the interagency communicators convened, whether it was

email chains, SVTCs, conference calls; and he was, as I said, our

conduit for information that the intelligence community felt was

relevant as we formulated a public response to the attack.

Q Do you recall anything specific about your interactions

with Shawn Turner, or do all those meetings and email exchanges and

conversations just blend together?

Mr. McQuaid. Can we go off the record for one second?

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q During the off-the-record discussion, I want to make it

clear to the witness that the questions I'm asking you are really

focused on the period around the September 11, 2012 attack. To the

extent you remember events that occurred on a specific day, you can

provide that information to us. To the extent you don't and you just

878
15

have a generalized recollection of events during that time period, the

time period of the attack or the immediate aftermath, that's fine to

provide that information as well. But I'm not asking for your

recollection of events about Benghazi that may have occurred more

recently. We're just focused on that time period. Is that clear?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So back to the question about Shawn Turner, do you

recall any specific interaction you had with him during that September

11, 2012 time period?

A This is obviously more than 3 years ago at this point. I

remember lots of interactions with him. I am happy to answer questions

if there are questions about specific interactions, but I would sort

of need a little bit more context to be able to answer the questions.

Q Let's go in. What specific interactions do you recall, and

we'll start there?

A Well, again, I remember that Shawn was a participant on

daily conference calls that we would have, even prior to Benghazi as

a general rule that we held across the interagency to determine what

would news-of-the-day topics be that spokespeople or other agencies

would need to deal with. During the time period that we're discussing,

Benghazi obviously was the focus of most of the press during that time,

so I do recall that Shawn was the DNI representative on those calls.

Q Let me jump in to make it a little easier. I want to ask

you if you have any specific recollection. An example of that would

be on such-an-such a day, you remember getting on the phone with a Shawn

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16

Turner and discussing a specific topic. I know this was a few years

ago, so it may be difficult to recall that, but if you have any

recollections of any conversations that stick out in your mind or any

meetings that may stick out in your mind or any email exchanges, where

you can, not word for word, but give us the essential substance of what

was discussed, that's kind of what I'm asking for now. Does anything

stick out in your mind during that period, or does it all kind of blend

together in a more general way?

A It all kind of blends together in a more general way.

Q Okay. That's fair, so we'll try to get at it in a different

way. A couple background questions. At the time, did you have a

security clearance?

A I did.

Q To what level?

A TS/SCI.

Q And in your office, did you have a secure computer system

in your own office?

A I did.

Q Was there also a SCIF in the area where you worked?

A There was.

Q And during the period between 9/11, 2012 and the attacks

and the end of that week, do you recall reading any classified

information?

A I don't recall specific classified information, but as a

general rule, I would have access to classified information during that

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17

time, yes.

Q As you sit here today, you can't recall anything specific

that you read? And I'm just talking about physical pieces of paper

that you read.

A I do not recall specifically what classified information

I was reading at that time, no.

Q Do you recall if you read any classified information, other

than your general practice?

A Again, as I sit here today, I couldn't say with certainty.

Q Do you recall having any classified briefings during that

period?

A I don't recall having any classified briefings by the

intelligence community, for example. I would, as a general rule, have

been involved in meetings where classified information was discussed.

Q As a general rule, that may have occurred, but during that

period, do you recall anything specifically where you participated in

a classified briefing?

A I recall that in that period, there would have been

communicator SVTCs that are not necessarily classified in and of

themselves, but would have been held in a secure facility in the WHSR

at a TS/SCI level, and it is possible that classified information would

have been discussed in those meetings, yes.

Q Do you recall any of those SVTCs in particular?

A I don't.

Q We have seen evidence that there was a SVTC at 7:30 p.m.

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18

on the night of the attacks on September 11. Did you take part in that?

Do you recall?

A I don't recall as I sit here today.

Q Do you recall taking part in any specific SVTC during that

week?

A Specifically I don't. I know that I did, but if you're

asking for a specific sort of date, time, and topics, I don't recall.

Q When you say you know that you did, is that just based on

your own understanding of your own general practice, or does something

specific stand out in your mind? For example, did you review a calendar

prior to this interview today that jogged your memory?

A I did not review any calendars in preparation for my

appearance here today. It's a combination of as general practice, we

would hold those types of meetings among the interagency, classified

SVTCs, and I do recall that there were communicator SVTCs that were

held that week. I don't recall specific dates and times.

Q Did you review any documents prior to the interview here

today to prepare?

A I was shown less than 10 documents by White House counsel

in preparation for this appearance today, documents that they thought

might be raised during the questioning that they wanted me to

familiarize myself with, but, no, beyond that, I did not.

Q Let's talk a little bit about the night of the attacks on

September 11. Do you recall how you first heard about the attacks?

A I do not.

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Q Do you recall whether somebody told you, whether you saw

it on the news, whether you got an email, anything?

A I don't, unfortunately. I'm sorry.

Q Do you recall where you were at the time when you heard?

A I was at the NSC.

Q Do you recall about what time you heard?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall any discussions with anybody, and I'm not

talking about the whole night. I'm just talking about in relationship

to your first hearing about what had occurred?

A I can't say whether this is the first I heard, but I do

specifically remember receiving an email from Toria Nuland, who was

the spokesperson at the State Department at the time, wanting to ensure,

on her part, that I was aware that something was happening, and asking

that we remain in close touch as the situation developed in anticipation

of press inquiries.

Q In response to that email, did you do anything?

A I don't recall.

Q Take us through the night, as best you can reconstruct it

now a few years later, from the point where you heard about the attacks

until you went home that night.

A I recall being in contact with the State Department,

Department of Defense, the intelligence community, conversations with

Ben and Tommy. I would have been in touch also with policy members

of the NSC who had responsibility for Libya as well. I don't recall

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20

what time I left that evening, but I know it was quite late, and when

I returned home, I continued to work for a good portion of the night

on BlackBerry.

Q Let's start with the conversations you may have had with

people at the NSC that night. I think you mentioned Ben Rhodes and

Tommy Vietor. Aside from those two, did you speak to anybody else about

the attacks that you recall?

A I don't recall specifically. As a general matter when

there is something that occurs that I will need to be prepared to respond

publicly to, I would be in touch with whoever the policy person is at

the NSC that has responsibility for that particular issue.

Q Who was that?

A At this time, it would have been Ben Fishman, who was the

director for Libya.

Q During that night, can you say how many conversations you

had with Ben Rhodes?

A I don't recall.

Q Was it one, a dozen?

A I really couldn't say. I don't remember.

Q Do you have a best estimate? Was it at the point where you

were talking to them constantly, or were they all blending together?

A I wouldn't want to speculate.

Q That's fair. What, if anything, do you recall about any

of the conversations you had with Mr. Rhodes that night?

A I recall letting him know that I was in touch with my

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21

counterparts at the various national security agencies, that I was

working with MENA, which was the Middle East-North Africa Directorate

at the NSC, the policy side, which was customary and standard practice,

and discussing with him how we were going to work with the interagency

to determine what the press response, the public response, to this would

be.

Q And how did you first communicate with him? Was it by

email, by phone? Did you walk over to the West Wing? How did you do

it?

A I don't recall.

Q When you had your first conversation with Mr. Rhodes, did

you get the sense that he was aware of the attack?

A I don't recall that first conversation, so I couldn't say.

Q Do you recall whether you told him about the attack or

whether he was already aware of it?

A Again, unfortunately as I don't remember the first

conversation, I wouldn't want to speculate as to who told who.

Q As best you can recall, what did he say to you during that

evening about the attacks?

A I don't recall specific conversations. As a general

matter, it would have been conversations about what the public response

would have been. That would have been the responsibility of the press

team and the rest of the communicators in the interagency, so

discussions would have centered around that topic.

Q You phrased your answer by saying what would have occurred.

885
22

I don't want you to speculate. If you don't have a specific

recollection, that's fine, but do you recall, generally, anything that

he said that night?

A I do not.

Q So as you sit here today, you can't recall anything that

he said?

A On that specific day, no, I could not with certainty.

Q What about Tommy Vietor, did you have any conversations with

him the night of the attack?

A I don't recall specific conversations. Again, as a general

matter, he would have been involved in helping to determine what the

public response was.

Q Generally, do you recall anything that he said to you that

night?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall anything that Mr. Fishman, Ben Fishman, said

to you that night?

A I do not.

Q I believe you said that you communicated with the State

Department as well. Who at the State Department other than Victoria

Nuland, who you already identified?

A I was in touch with press counterparts in the Department

of State's Bureau of NEA Affairs. Specifically, I recall being in

touch with Aaron Snipe throughout that day. He was a press officer.

Q What do you recall discussing with Mr. Snipe?

886
23

A I recall that Aaron was the first person that morning to

inform me of an incident outside the U.S. Embassy in Cairo early in

the morning Washington time, having discussions with him about that,

and being in touch with him throughout the day as we were waiting for

more information about what was happening in Benghazi.

Q What did he tell you about Cairo?

A To the best of my recollection, he told me that there had

been an incident in Cairo outside the Embassy with individuals who were

protesting the production of an anti-Muslim video, and that there were

attempts to reach the compound walls.

Q What, if anything, did you do with regard to Cairo?

A Me personally?

Q Yes.

A I told him to keep me apprised. I asked him if the State

Department had already issued a comment. And to my recollection, they

had already publicly spoken and addressed what was going on in Cairo.

Q The State Department, or the Embassy in Cairo?

A The State Department said that the State Department had

responded, whether that referred to the Embassy in Cairo or the Main

State Department, I couldn't say.

Q Okay. Did you have any conversations with Tommy Vietor or

Ben Rhodes about what was occurring in Cairo?

A Not that I can recall at that point in time. I do recall

that what had happened in Cairo certainly came up once we were aware

that there was an incident outside of the facility in Benghazi, but

887
24

I don't recall speaking to them in the morning about it as a separate

matter.

Q Okay. So you do recall there was a time between what

occurred in Cairo and what occurred in Benghazi? They were not

happening at the same time?

A That is my recollection, yes.

Q And what, if anything, do you recall discussing about the

relationship, if any, between what was occurring in Cairo and what was

occurring in Benghazi?

A I don't recall the specifics of those conversations, simply

that there was a discussion that there had been an incident in Cairo

earlier in the day as we were learning about what was unfolding in

Benghazi.

Q Beyond that, do you recall anything else that was said?

A I do not.

Q Did you do anything with regard to Cairo? In other words,

did you prepare a draft message or anything like that? Did you do

anything?

A To the best of my recollection, before I was aware of what

was happening in Benghazi, we deferred to the State Department to

address what was happening in Cairo, which would have been standard

practice at that point.

Q It sounded like your conversation with Mr. Snipe was focused

on Cairo. He was giving you a heads up on that incident. Is that fair?

A That's my recollection, yes.

888
25

Q Did you have any conversations with Mr. Snipe or anybody

else at the State Department about Benghazi?

A I do recall that I was in touch with Aaron and his office,

the NEA press office, again, as we became aware that there was an

incident in Benghazi, yes.

Q Was it just Mr. Snipe that you communicated with or was it

other people in his office?

A I don't recall specifically. Generally it would be more

than one person in that office.

Q And you've told us what you and he discussed about Cairo.

Do you recall what you and he discussed about Benghazi?

A I do not.

Q Did you take any notes of any of your conversations with

him that we could look at, anything like that?

A I don't recall taking notes. I, generally, as a practice,

wouldn't. Most of my conversations with him probably took place over

email.

Q Do you recall any of your conversations with anybody else

at the State Department besides Ms. Nuland and Mr. Snipe about Benghazi,

the night of the attack?

A Specifically September 11?

Q Yes.

A I do recall later that night, very late that night, emailing

Jake Sullivan to ask him whether Chris Stevens was dead.

Q Did you ever have any conversations, like phone

889
26

conversations, with Mr. Sullivan?

A I don't recall whether I did on that day.

Q Do you recall generally having any conversations with him

that week? Or in the immediate aftermath of the attack, that general

period of September 2012?

A I do recall having one phone conversation with him. I don't

know whether it's in the scope of the 4 to 5 days that we're discussing.

Q Okay. What was discussed in that conversation?

A He raised that he had been unaware before Matt Olsen

testified on the Hill, that Matt Olsen was going to make a link publicly

to Al Qaeda in reference to the Benghazi attack.

Q Why did he raise that issue with you?

A I can't say why I was the individual that he called. I don't

know.

Q Did he ask you to do anything?

Mr. McQuaid. Craig, as I think you're aware, I think that is

postdating what we were here to talk about.

Mr. Missakian. No, it's not. Let's go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Let's go on the record for the

conversation.

Mr. Missakian. Let's go on the record.

Mr. McQuaid. So on the record, we had a very clear understanding

that's memorialized in an email that we were here to talk about

September 12 through the 16, and that what you're talking about, again,

890
27

Ms. Meehan wouldn't know those exact dates, but I know from being aware

of the record of the investigation, that it's the 18th, so I'd ask you

to, again, direct your questions to the 12th through the 16th.

Mr. Missakian. Can we go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Alright. Let's go back to the list of people you

communicated with that night. You also mentioned you communicated

with the Department of Defense, I believe?

A Correct.

Q Describe that for us.

A That would have been George Little and/or other members of

his team that would be the press office at the Department of Defense,

again, as part of the interagency coordination efforts to determine

what the initial press posture would be.

Q Again, you say it would have been George Little and/or. I'm

just asking you about what you recall. If you don't recall who you

communicated with, that's fine. That's an acceptable answer. So do

you recall specifically communicating with anybody from the Department

of Defense that night?

A I do not recall specific conversations, no.

Q So would it be fair to say that the communications you had

with DOD were email communications where they may have been on an email

chain?

A Certainly, email would have been one method of

891
28

communications, yes.

Q Do you recall having phone conversations with anybody at

the Department of Defense?

A I recall that we had an interagency conference call. DOD

was a party to that call. I don't remember who specifically

represented DOD on that call.

Q Do you recall when that conversation occurred?

A I do not.

Q What do you recall about that interagency phone call?

A Again, only that it was to coordinate what the initial press

response would be.

Q What do you recall generally about what was discussed?

A I don't want to speculate, per your instructions. I don't

recall specifically what that conversation was.

Q Okay. Do you recall anything generally?

A It would have been a determination. It was a determination

of which agencies had equities, and that it was basically a decision

about whether the State Department or the White House would be the first

to speak about what was occurring.

Q What do you recall about how that decision was made as to

whether or not it should be the State Department or the White House

to speak initially?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q What do you recall generally?

A Generally, I recall that Toria Nuland had drafted holding

892
29

lines that she recommended on behalf of the State Department. I

couldn't speak to who was involved in that decision at the State

Department, but that Toria, in communicating it to us, recommended that

the State Department put out initially as holding lines.

Q What is a holding line?

A A holding line is generally information that we put out to

the press when there's great interest in a particular issue, and we

don't have a complete understanding of what is occurring at a particular

point in time, but there is a need to provide a response, so that is

generally something that acknowledges what the issue is, and saying

that as we have more information, we will make it available.

Q And do you recall when during the evening that phone call

occurred?

A I do not.

Q Was there any information that was being provided back and

forth about what was going on in Benghazi during that call?

A I don't recall.

Q As best you can recall, how did you get the information about

the attack that you had that night?

A Again, I don't recall how I initially found out about the

attack.

Q Now I'm going to break my own rule. How would you have

learned about it?

A There are multiple possibilities. It's possible that I

heard from someone internal to the NSC. It's possible that I heard,

893
30

first, from someone at the State Department who knew about it directly

from the Mission in Benghazi, but I just don't recall who it was that

first told me.

Q Okay. If you had received information that was being

passed from the Mission in Benghazi or the Embassy in Tripoli, how would

that chain have looked?

A So without saying that that's what occurred --

Q Sure.

A -- generally, on matters that contain information that's

coming from a post overseas, I would receive that through the

communicators office at the State Department. That was my primary

channel of communication, so it would have come either through Toria

Nuland in the spokesperson's Office of Public Affairs, or through the

press office in the NEA Bureau.

Q And sitting here today, as best you can recall, what did

you personally believe had occurred in Benghazi on the night of

September 11?

A As I recall, there was a great deal of confusion about what

was occurring in Benghazi. I remember that there were questions in

my mind about whether this was related to what had happened earlier

in Cairo, which was a result of protests based on this video that we

knew had been put out in the public sphere.

So I recall, you know, when I went home and went to sleep that

night not having a clear understanding really of what had happened.

Q How did you come to the conclusion that the protests in Cairo

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31

occurred over the video?

A As I recall, that was publicly stated by people that were

protesting and acting out against the Embassy at the time.

Q So you were relying on open media reports?

A Well, certainly there were open media reports stating that,

and that, as I am a press officer, is something that I would be watching

throughout the day, yes.

Q But would you have relied on that, in other words, accepted

it as truthful?

A I would not have made any public comment without receiving

information about a U.S. Government assessment, no.

Q Why is that?

A Because as a general rule, we don't speculate when we speak

to the public. We rely on an assessment developed by members of the

interagency community to provide facts. We are driven in any public

response by factual information, not speculating on what we personally

think may have happened in a particular instance.

Q So would it be fair to say that if you read something in

an open media news report, you would not have relied on it because it

may not be true?

A That's correct.

Q Do you have a specific or general recollection of anything

you discussed with anybody at the Department of Defense, either that

night or that week up to the 16th?

A I do not.

895
32

Q I think you also mentioned that you had communications with

the IC or the intelligence community. Tell us what you meant by that?

A So during that broader period that we're discussing, the

12th through the 16th, the IC was responsible for feeding into the

drafting of press items that would be used by members of the

U.S. Government in public response, and they would have been

responsible for providing us the assessment of what the U.S. Government

believed to have happened in the attack in Benghazi.

Q So you would have been interacted with them for them to

provide the assessments that would have then been used in, I think you

said, statements by members of the U.S. Government?

A They would have fed in information to the press guidance

that was then provided to people like Jay Carney, for example, Victoria

Nuland, Department of Defense spokespeople, others in the U.S.

Government who would be speaking publicly about the attack, yes.

Q So to specifically focus on your interaction with the

intelligence community, what do you recall about that?

A So I recall that in the days that we are speaking about,

I played my standard role of coordinating the interagency communicators

group, so I would have been one of the repositories for gathering inputs

from different agencies related to their equities and their

responsibilities as it relates to what occurred in Benghazi. And I

recall interacting with Shawn Turner at DNI in that regard, receiving

information from him that represented the assessments of his building

and others that DNI would have coordinated with, and feeding that into

896
33

the overall press guidance package that would have been provided.

Q Can you remember any specific days when you received an

assessment from the DNI or the CIA?

A I can say that the DNI and the CIA, every single day, would

have been part of the drafting, clearing, and approving process of press

guidance. Whether they were providing new material each day, I can't

say specifically.

Q Tell us a little bit about that. How does the NSC work with

the DNI and the CIA to review, vet, and approve press guidance? How

does that work?

A So as a general rule, the NSC helps to coordinate among the

interagency, so on a case-by-case basis, depending on what the issue

or the topic is, there are various people who would have a hand in

drafting press guidance. Because there were so many equities involved

in what had happened in Benghazi, there would have been original inputs

coming from multiple agencies, so the NSC generally takes on the role

as compiling those and circulating them to ensure that any agency that

has an equity in what happened has an opportunity to provide input into

the drafting, has an opportunity to review during the clearance

process, and ultimately gives a final approval before that is used by

any member of the U.S. Government publicly.

Q Let me give you an example that might give a little more

context. Let's say both the DNI and the CIA provide an assessment of

what occurred in Benghazi. Do those assessments come to you, to the

NSC, initially?

897
34

A Are you talking about press guidance or the actual

intelligence itself?

Q Right. My understanding of what you said, and I may have

misunderstood was the intelligence community, the DNI, the CIA, they

provide intelligence assessments. That information is then used to

provide press guidance. That press guidance is, in turn, then sent

back to the DNI or the CIA to review and approve?

A Uh-huh.

Q Is that the process? In other words, are they doing the

press guidance first then sending it along with the assessment, or do

you, at the NSC, take the assessment and use that to prepare the press

guidance, which you then send back?

A I wish it was a linear process. The truth is, it's not,

and that's not just in the case of Benghazi. It's often the scramble

of just how the interagency works when we're responding to queries.

It's not linear in the sense that it's not that DNI provides something,

CIA provides something, State Department provides something. Often

those agencies are working simultaneously on various parts of press

guidance. It would come together in one document, and oftentimes be

circulated multiple times before we have a clear product. It's not

something that would sort of come over once and then be cleared.

To answer your more specific question, anything that we use

publicly that refers to an intelligence assessment would use the exact

language that the intelligence community provided. We would not

generally fiddle with that type of language. We may put context around

898
35

it, but the intelligence community would provide what they believe to

be an unclassified assessment suitable for public use.

Q So the intelligence community would have the final word on

that language; are we talking about the analyst side at the CIA, or

are we talking about the press shop at the CIA, if you know?

A I do not know. My counterpart, obviously, is in the press

shop. They would be responsible for sending me a DNI- or a CIA-cleared

product, but what their internal process is for clearing that with

policy folks and senior leadership, I couldn't speak to that.

Q Let's try to dig in a little bit on the specifics of how

it played out with regard to Benghazi. Do you recall receiving any

specific intelligence assessments from the DNI?

A So are you asking about press guidance related to

intelligence assessments or actual?

Q No, actual intelligence.

A I don't recall that I had access to those.

Q Do you recall if you had access to the actual intelligence

assessments provided by the CIA?

A I don't recall.

Q Did anybody, to your knowledge, at the NSC, receive it and

review the actual intelligence assessments that were being provided

during this period?

A I wouldn't want to speak to what access other people had

at the NSC.

Q So you don't know?

899
36

A I don't know.

Q But you did not -- well, it sounds like you would have had

access, but you don't recall if you actually reviewed it that week?

A That's correct. It is possible that I would have had

access. I can't say either way, because I don't recall.

Q And when you said “for use by members of the

U.S. Government,” I mean, there's been a lot of talk about the CIA

talking points that were prepared ostensibly for use by the House

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In your answer, when you

referred to the members of the U.S. Government, were you including

those talking points and HPSCI as well?

A Yes, that would go through the same review process that

press guidance for members inside the administration itself would use,

yes.

Q We'll get into that a little more specifically later. I'm

sure you said this already, but who was your contact at the DNI?

A Shawn Turner.

Q Shawn Turner, okay. You did say that. Thank you. Did you

ever have any conversations with Ben Rhodes or Tommy Vietor about the

content of any of the intelligence assessments that were being provided

about the attack in Benghazi during that period?

A I do recall that I did ask Tommy and Ben to review the press

guidance as part of the clearance process, and the intelligence

assessments that were cleared for public use, if you will, as part of

the press guidance, would have been part of what they reviewed.

900
37

Q Do you know one way or the other whether they reviewed the

actual assessments, like the raw assessments that were coming from the

intelligence community about the attacks?

A I don't know.

Q Did you have any interaction with the White House situation

room on the night of the attacks?

A We did convene an interagency conference call. I can't

recall whether we used WHSR to set up the call or not.

Q What is WHSR?

A Sorry. The White House situation room.

Q If you had used it, would the call have occurred in the

situation room?

A Yes, it would have been a SVTC. It would have been a video

screen SVTC.

Q Do you recall having any conversations with anybody in the

situation room that night about what had occurred in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Is that something you would have done?

A No.

Q Take us through the process of how you personally collected

information about the attacks in Benghazi?

A During this period of time, I would have had several

channels that I would work through. One would have been the

communicators at each agency who are receiving information from

multiple sources within their own buildings on the policy side

901
38

generally, about what had occurred. We often shared information

within that channel with each other. I would have had conversations,

and I recall having conversations with Ben Fishman, who would have been

the person responsible, or one of the people responsible for dealing

with Libya policy within the NSC.

And the others would have been Tommy Vietor and Ben Rhodes,

because both were more senior to me at the time and sat in the West

Wing. It would not be uncommon that they would have more information

from other channels that I was not privy to, so I would check in with

them to ensure that I was, in any of my work, had access to the most

updated information and the most accurate information. Those would

be the general three channels.

Q That night, do you recall receiving any information from

Ben Rhodes or Tommy Vietor that was new information to you, that you

had not heard from those other channels you just described?

A I don't recall.

Q Do you recall, generally, that they were, essentially, on

the same page with you when it came to understanding what had occurred

in Benghazi?

A I do.

Q And if I understood you correctly, that was just confusion

about what had occurred?

A In the early hours of the attack, yes, absolutely. And as

people gathered more information, people, you know, the thinking sort

of advanced with the information as it was collected.

902
39

Q Describe that process for us, going from confusion to

collecting more information to the evolving understanding. Over what

period of time did that play out, what did you learn? How did the

assessments change?

A Well, that's a process that went on for several days, if

not weeks. I couldn't say specifically, but as a general rule, and

this was the case with Benghazi as well, when there was updated

information from any agency, that was fed in through the communicators

at each agency, so that press guidance could be updated to ensure that

anything that we were saying publicly represented the most factual

assessment at that given point in time. We also tried to make clear

that initial information in these situations is frequently incorrect

or incomplete, and that it was likely that assessments would evolve

over time as more information was available.

Q Focusing on the night of the attacks, do you recall the

understanding of what had occurred in Benghazi evolving that night,

or was it essentially confusion from the beginning to when you left

that night?

A Well, I can only speak for myself, and obviously, I'm not

privy to all of the information that policymakers and senior leadership

would have had access to, so I can only say that when I went home that

night, there was still confusion about exactly what had occurred. When

I left the NSC to go home, I still was not aware that Chris Stevens

had been killed, nor that others had been killed. So it is accurate

to say that when I left, there was not a full understanding in my mind

903
40

of what had occurred. I can't speak for what anyone else was thinking

at that point.

Q So your best recollection as you sit here today is you

learned of Mr. Stevens' death after you had left for the day?

A Yes.

Q Did you work on anything? I think you said you were working

on your BlackBerry throughout the night. What were you working on?

A I was, as I said, in touch with Jake Sullivan, asking if

he knew whether Chris had been killed. So that was one particular chain

that stands out in my mind, and in communication with Ben and Toria

Nuland at various points to see if there was any change in posture and

to begin preparing for the next day.

Q Do you recall taking part in any statements that were issued

by the State Department on the night of September 11?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q Do you recall generally?

A I don't. I mean, as a general matter, I would be on chains

related to the clearance of such statements, but I don't recall

specifically whether I provided edits or other comments on those.

Q Do you recall any discussions about any military response

to the attacks in Benghazi the night of the attacks?

A I don't recall being party to any such discussions.

Q Were you a party to a discussion about whether or not the

State Department should issue a statement about Benghazi and issue a

statement about Cairo? Let me be more specific. Eventually, the

904
41

State Department issued a statement a little after ten o'clock that

night, and the statement covered both -- we'll get to the statement.

I don't want to characterize it. Did you ever recall any discussions

about issuing two statements, one about what had occurred in Benghazi,

and one about the video?

A I don't recall specific conversations. As I said earlier,

there was, when we became aware of the attack in Benghazi, of course,

discussion about whether it was related to what had occurred in Cairo,

given that there had been a large protest and an attempt to breach that

compound that same day.

Q What do you recall about that discussion, about whether it

was connected to Cairo?

A Well, I recall that that was a discussion that was simply

that, a discussion about whether it was possible that those two events

were related, that it would seem irresponsible to not consider the

possibility given what had occurred in Cairo earlier that day.

Q Were there people just speculating: I wonder if these two

are connected; obviously there's a relationship in time, or were they

discussing specific items of fact from which you might draw an inference

that there was a connection?

A I cannot speak to what policymakers or intelligence

officials were discussing. I was not a party to those conversations.

On the press side --

Q Yes.

A -- we were certainly discussing how we would have questions

905
42

about both, and certainly, it was pretty obvious that the press would

likely ask about whether there was a connection, so we would have to

be prepared to answer that question. But, again, we would not be the

ones to provide the answer to that question. That would come from

others inside the interagency.

Q I'll show you a document that I'll mark as exhibit 1 to your

interview transcript.

[Meehan Exhibit No. 1

was marked for identification.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Okay. Now this is an email from you sent at 9:32 p.m. on

September 11 to a number of people. Do you recall sending this email?

A As I sit here today, I don't recall sending it, but I

certainly don't doubt the authenticity of it.

Q Is this one of the emails you reviewed in preparation for

your interview here today?

A It is not.

906
43

[11:05 a.m.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Now to focus first on the first paragraph, it says, the

second sentence there, “The State Department will release a statement

tonight regarding the events and we ask that . . .” sentence. Seeing

that, does that refresh your memory at all regarding the discussion

about who would be issuing a statement that night about the attacks,

the White House, the State Department, anything like that?

A It does not. Only that there were conversations throughout

the day that Toria earlier had sought approval for the use of holding

lines, while we were figuring out what sort of the more formal response

would be, but no, not beyond that.

Q And the folks in this recipient list, there are a number

of them. Did you select this list at the time or is this a list that

existed in your Outlook address book? Looking at it, who are these

people and how did they end up on this email?

A Sure. So would you like me to go individually?

Q You don't have to go individually. Let's start with, did

you compile this lists on the spot, or is this something that existed

at the time?

A This, from what I can tell from looking at this now, would

have been a list of the primary communicators within the interagency.

I would have, in compiling this list, pulled from a larger list based

907
44

on the agencies that had an equity. So for example, Treasury is often

included on interagency communicator emails. I don't, at first glance

here, see Treasury listed, and that would be because there wasn't

necessarily a Treasury link at this point in time. So it would have

been culled from a bigger list.

Q Take a look at the second paragraph, it begins, “on an

important note." And the last sentence there says, "Please do not

refer anyone to the Embassy Cairo statement, which is causing

significant negative backlash.” Do you recall the statement that you

are referring to this in this email?

A I do generally, yes.

Q What do you recall?

A I recall that Embassy Cairo released a public comment. I

cannot recall what the format of that was. And this was, again, going

back to what I said earlier what Aaron Snipe had apprised me of earlier

in the day.

Q And what did you mean by “significant negative backlash”?

A As I recall from where I am sitting today, that statement

made -- used language that some folks construed to be the United States

Government apologizing -- apologizing for a video that the U.S.

Government had not produced, and it had generated some negative

backlash.

Q Do you recall how you became aware of that negative

backlash?

A From Aaron Snipe, who was my point of contact on the press

908
45

response and anything related to Embassy Cairo throughout the day.

Q What did Mr. Snipe tell you?

A Again, that there had been some negative response to what

was released by Embassy Cairo, the statement in whatever form that was

released. That there was some concern about it within the State

Department and that it had not been cleared by the State Department

before the Embassy released it.

Q Did you have any conversation with either Mr. Vietor or

Mr. Rhodes about the negative backlash that the Embassy Cairo statement

had caused?

A I don't recall specific conversations.

Q Alright.

Mr. McQuaid. Just for ease of record, do you want to just put

the Bates number or something about the document, the time stamp, things

like that.

Mr. Missakian. Sure. For the record, this document has a

document control number of C05390724.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. And for the record, it says at the bottom

that it was produced to the House Oversight and Government Reform

Committee in August of 2013.

Mr. Missakian. I have been told I am at the end of my hour so

I will go off the record.

[Recess.]

[Meehan Exhibit No. 2

was marked for identification.]

909
46

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q I have just given you a 1-page document which we have marked

as exhibit 2. It is a series of emails, the document control number

is 05578259. When you have had a chance to read it over, please let

me know.

A Okay.

Q And when we were off the record after last session, we had

a little bit of a discussion related to my asking you whether or not

you had seen any of these documents that I am now showing you. And

the agreement we reached is that if you are asked a question during

the interview, and you are able to answer that by the fact that you

had reviewed a document that was shown to you by one of the lawyers

from the White House, that you will then say, yes, I saw this document,

and this helped me remember certain things that are part of your answer.

Is that fair?

Ms. McQuaid. Yes. I think what we agreed is if you don't -- if

there is something that Craig asks you that you -- otherwise you would

not have had a recollection but you do have a more recollection because

you had seen the document that has shaped, kind of influenced that

recollection, then you should reference that that is part of what your

memory is based on is the document.

Ms. Meehan. Okay.

Ms. McQuaid. Or represent whatever the role that had and that

is appropriate.

Ms. Meehan. Okay.

910
47

Mr. Missakian. Is that understood?

Ms. Meehan. Yes.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q So let's get back to exhibit No. 2. This is a series of

emails. The first one at the bottom is from Victoria Nuland on

September 11th, 6:10 p.m.; you are one of the recipients. Can you tell

us what we are looking at in that bottom email?

A Sure. So for the record, I don't recall this email chain.

I certainly don't doubt its authenticity. So my answer will be based

on the context as I read it now, versus a recollection of sending the

chain at the time.

So from the context of this, this is from Victoria Nuland who was

the spokesperson at the State Department at the time. These would have

been some of the holding lines that I referred to earlier, based on

numerous inquiries seeking sort of an initial response to what was

unfolding in both Cairo and Benghazi at the time.

Q When you say these are the hold lines, you are referring

to the statements in the bottom email? And I will just read them into

the record. "We can confirm that our office in Benghazi, Libya, has

been attacked by a group of militants, we are working with the Libyans

now to secure the compound. We condemn, in the strongest terms, this

attack on our diplomatic mission." And then below a series of dash

lines. It says, "In Cairo, we can confirm that Egyptian police have

now removed the demonstrators who had entered our embassy grounds

today." And then below that, another series of dashes "For press duty

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guidance, if pressed whether we see a connection between these two."

Then below that, the sentence reads, “We have no information

regarding a connection between these two incidents.”

A Correct.

Q So what are the hold lines in what I just read?

A So the hold lines would have been the sentence that begins

with “we can confirm.”

Q Okay.

A And ends with the second sentence, "We condemn in the

strongest terms." The second hold line would be the sentence that

begins with "In Cairo" and ends at the end of that sentence. The third

sentence that you read with the instruction for press duty guidance

would not have been something that was proactively put out with the

other two, but would have been in response to that specific question,

if asked.

Q Okay. Do you have any understanding of why that last

sentence, the third sentence, would not have been included in the hold

lines above?

A I don't recall what the conversation was regarding that at

this time, no.

Q And to the best of your recollection, did the statements

made in this email, were they accurate as of 6:10 p.m. that night?

A These would have been accurate, yes. This would have

reflected the best information that the U.S. Government had at that

time regarding what we understood to be the situations in those

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locations at that particular moment in time.

Q Did you get any information, either that night or later that

week to call into question the truth of the statement, “We have no

information regarding a connection between these two incidents”?

A Can you repeat that?

Q Sure. Focusing on the third sentence, “We have no

information regarding a connection between those two incidents.”

A Uh-huh.

Q Assuming that you believe that statement to be true as of

September 11th at 6:10 p.m., did you get any information later that

night or later that week to call into question the truth of that

statement?

A I don't recall as I sit here. If we did, we would have

amended the statement to update -- to reflect an update in the

assessment that was presented here.

Q So if there was no amendment, can we conclude from that that

there was no information to call into question that statement?

A If there was no publicly updated information, you can draw

the conclusion that the U.S. Government assessment had either not

changed, or the information that was available in an unclassified

setting and was therefore usable with the public had not changed.

Q Let's move up the chain a little bit. Victoria Nuland, in

the second email from the top says, and I will quote, "We are holding

for Rhodes clearance, BMM please advise ASAP." I gather the BMM is

you?

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50

A From the context of this email, yes.

Q You don't recall being referred to by those initials back

in September of 2012?

A Generally, I prefer not to use my initials, so, no, but it

is not uncommon. I have a long name and I know Toria well, so.

Q So you gave her a pass.

Then at the very top you write back, "Ben is good with these and

is on with Jake now too." Having read that, does that refresh your

memory at all as to the interaction between the NSC and the State

Department with regard to these hold lines?

A Again, I do recall that there was coordination throughout

the day on what the public response would be, but no, it does not jog

any more recollection of what the specifics of those conversations

were, only that there were frequent conversations between the agencies

on how we would -- how we would make the first public comment.

Q So the fact that you are saying that Ben is good with these

and is on with Jake now too, I assume, tell me if I am wrong, that when

you said Ben is on with Jake, that they are on the phone together?

A From the context of this email, yes, that is how I interpret

this.

Q How do you think you knew that if you were in one building

and Mr. Rhodes was in another building? Is it possible at this point

in the evening, you were in the same location in the West Wing with

Mr. Rhodes?

A No, because I wouldn't have access to email if I was in the

914
51

West Wing, so it could be that I emailed Ben and he said I am on the

phone with Jake. It could be that I called down to Ben's office, and

his secretary answered the phone, and he said he's on the phone with

Jake, he can't take your call. It could be that Tommy told me that

he was on the phone with Jake. There are multiple reasons I could have

known that, but I don't recall specifically how I knew.

Q Do you have any understanding of what the two discussed,

Mr. Jake Sullivan and Mr. Ben Rhodes?

A I do not recall.

Q Going back down to the bottom portion, did you get any

information to call into question the truth of any of the statements

made in the press hold lines that are reflected there?

A Again, I don't remember the specific discussions around

these lines. What I can say is as a general matter, we would not release

anything to the public that we did not believe should be truthful or

accurate at the particular time that we released it.

Q A few questions ago you said that if there was no amended

public statement, that we could take from that either that the

information did not change, and the statements were still true, or there

might be some classified information that could be shared publicly.

Would that analysis hold true with these two statements at the bottom

as well?

A Yes, it would. We, as a rule, would go back on any issue,

and Benghazi was no exception, multiple times throughout the day, when

we are answering inquiries, to ensure that any agency that has new

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52

information or feels that press guidance should be updated for any

reason, that that agency has an opportunity to weigh in and make the

appropriate edits so the press guidance reflects the most updated and

accurate information at that point in time.

Q Thank you. You can put that aside.

[Meehan Exhibit No. 3

was marked for identification.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Ms. Meehan, I just handed you a document that has been marked

as exhibit 3. It is a one-page document with document control number

C05578215. Once you have had a chance to review it, please let me know.

A Okay.

Q Do you recall this email?

A As we sit here today, I do not recall this email chain, but,

again, I certainly don't doubt its authenticity.

Q The bottom of email chain contains what I believe to be a

draft of the statement that the State Department issued at about 10

o'clock p.m. on September 11th. Were you involved at all in the

drafting or the review of the statement that was essentially put out

by the State Department?

A I was involved in reviewing it. I am a party to the second

part of this email chain asking for a review of this statement.

Q And do you recall anything specific about that review

process?

A I do not.

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Q Do you recall having discussions with anybody inside the

NSC, outside the NSC, anywhere, about the content of this statement?

A I do not recall specific discussions about this statement,

no.

Q Now this statement, in the second to last paragraph, refers

to inflammatory material originating in the United States, which I

believe to be the video that you referred to earlier. Do you recall

any discussion about putting out two statements, one essentially

condemning the video, and one explaining or condemning or addressing

the attacks in Benghazi?

A I do not recall any such conversations.

Q Do you recall any conversation either with Mr. Vietor or

Mr. Rhodes about the content of this statement?

A I do not recall any specific conversations at this time.

Q Do you recall generally?

A I do not, again, other than to say I was in communication

with them throughout the day and the evening regarding public response,

but specific comments about this statement I do not recall.

Q As you sit here today, did you have any role that you can

recall in drafting the statement issued by the State Department?

A Not that I recall, no.

Q Did you take part in drafting any statement that was issued

about Benghazi? For example, on the morning of the 12th, the very next

day, the White House issued a written statement. And then after that

statement went out, the President made some remarks in the Rose Garden.

917
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Do you recall that?

A I do.

Q Were you involved in drafting, reviewing, commenting on the

initial written statement issued by the White House?

A I recall being involved in the clearance process for that

statement. I do not recall whether I had a drafting role.

Q How did you participate in the clearance process?

A The clearance process would have been done, or was done,

I should say, over email. It would have been circulated to relevant

parties within the NSC who would have had some knowledge that would

have been brought to bear in ensuring what the President was going say

was accurate as we understood it to be at that point in time.

Q Were you receiving information about what had occurred so

you could take that information and then marry it up to the statement?

I mean, how were you analyzing the accuracy of the statement?

A Well, again, consistently and continuously throughout

those days, I was in contact with my counterparts at other agencies.

Q Let me stop you right there: if you want to finish, you can.

A Sure.

Q I just want to make this is an efficient as possible. You

said throughout those days, I am really just focused now on the next

morning, September 12. There was the written statement by the White

House, and then the Rose Garden remarks that the President, which were

also in writing, but the President delivered orally.

From that night, from the moment you left your job the night before

918
55

on the 11th, to the moment that the first statement went out from the

White House, I mean, were you receiving information about the attacks

in Benghazi that you would then use to evaluate against the accuracy

of the statement or, were you just essentially reading the statement

for grammar?

A Again, I don't recall specific conversations or email

chains from that specific, very, very precise period of time, as it

was more than 3 years ago at this point. So if you are looking for

a specific answer as to who I had conversations with, or what email

chains I was on, and what information was contained in those email

chains, I couldn't say, because I don't recall.

Q Well, it would be fair to say that you weren't receiving

any classified information on your BlackBerry, if that's how you were

getting information. And I assume you don't have a secure telephone

at your residences?

A That is correct.

Q Do you recall making any trips to a SCIF that night to

receive information about what had occurred?

A Well, again, are we talking about the night of September

11th?

Q Yes. Into the morning of the 12th?

A I was there quite late and would have returned very early

the next day, but, no, I would not have made separate trips back to

the office after I left and before I arrived the next day.

Q Do you recall getting any classified information prior to

919
56

your review of that first White House statement?

A I don't recall.

Q And what do you recall, specifically or generally, about

the review process of that first statement?

A Again, I don't recall.

Q Do you recall conversations with people? Do you recall

making specific changes? Take us through the process of what you,

personally, did to review the statement?

Ms. McQuaid. When you ask the question, please let her finish

the answer. You keep stepping on it.

Mr. Missakian. That is fair.

Ms. Meehan. Again, as I said, I don't recall specific email

chains or conversations from that morning regarding this statement,

this written statement and verbal statement that the President

delivered that you asked about.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Do you recall anything that you did with regard to that first

statement?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall the second statement that the President read

from the Rose Garden?

A I recall the statement, yes.

Q And there is one part of it that I want to ask you about.

I read both statements, unfortunately I don't have them here, but it

has been well -- well, not reported, but in the second statement that

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57

the President read in the Rose Garden, he used the phrase "act of

terror." Do you recall that?

A I do.

Q Now that phrase does not appear in the first written

statement. Do you recall any discussion about including that

statement in the second Rose Garden statement?

A Again, I don't recall specific conversations related to

these two statements.

Q Do you have any understanding of how that phrase made it

into the second statement?

A I do not.

Q Do you know who put it in?

A I do not.

Q Do you know when it was put in?

A I do not.

Q Do you know anything about that second statement?

A Again, if you are asking me to recount specific

conversations, how it was cleared, what my role was, the answer is,

as I sit here, no, I don't recall the specifics of that.

Q Do you recall generally anything? Like, for example, were

you at your job when you were reviewing it? Were you still at home

doing it on your BlackBerry, anything about it?

A I do not recall.

Q You can put that aside.

921
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[Meehan Exhibit No. 4

was marked for identification.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Just so we are clear here, not your lawyer, but Mr. McQuaid

asked me to allow you to finish your answers. I cut you off at one

point. Was there anything you wanted to add to that answer that you

weren't able to?

A No. I am fine with what I have said.

Q It happens occasionally, where we will talk over each other.

It is not intended to cut you off, it is just intended to make sure

that you understand the question.

A Yes, no problem, thank you.

Q Alright. What I have given you is a multipage -- a 2-page

document with document control number CO5578242. Once you have had

a chance to review it, please let me know.

A Okay.

Q Let's kind of start with the basics here. We have got a

couple of emails, actually three that are part of this 2-page document.

The first one from you on September 14, 2012, at 3:46 p.m. to Benjamin

Rhodes and Tommy Vietor, the subject is "Libya for Toria." What is

the purpose of this email?

A So I will start by saying in regards to the earlier

conversation, that this is one of the emails that I did review in

preparation for my appearance here. So my memory has been jogged by

922
59

having the opportunity to see that. It is not otherwise an email chain

that I recall. So if you could just repeat the question.

Q Sure. What was the purpose of the first email that appears

at the bottom where the subject is "Libya for Toria"?

A So as I look at this today, through the context of the email,

the purpose of this would have been, as I mentioned earlier, one of

the responsibilities of the NSC press office is to help coordinate press

guidance throughout the interagency, especially as it relates to press

briefings that different agencies may give. The White House, for

example, has a daily press briefing, as does the State Department, and

Toria was the spokesperson for the State Department at the time.

So it would be normal for Toria to reach out before she briefs

to ensure she has the most recent and updated information, and it would

be the NSC that would generally have that collated from among the

interagency.

So from the context of this email, it looks like, based on the

timing of it, that Jay Carney would have briefed probably at his normal

time in the middle of the day, and Toria was gaggling at 4:30, which

would have been later in the day than usual for her. And her office

would have either reached out to me to ensure they have the most updated,

or I proactively wanted to ensure that she had the most updated.

So this represents the press guidance from that day related to

this topic. And I sent it to Tommy and Ben to ensure that there was

no information that they had through channels that perhaps I was not

privy to that would have necessitated an update of the press guidance.

923
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Q And did you draft the body of the very first email on page

1?

A I don't recall who the drafter of that information was.

Q Having read through it, do you have an idea whether you

drafted it, does it have your style?

A So I would say this press guidance is often a compilation

of inputs from across the interagency. So there are certain things

I would have drafted. For example, I can tell the third paragraph where

it makes reference to a conversation that the President had with

President Hadi, that would have come from me, because I would be

responsible for drafting something that refers to the President. And

the rest, likely a compilation of other agencies.

When I look at, for example, on the second page, the first question

on the second page, the second question overall, where it talks about

intelligence 48 hours in advance of the Benghazi attack having been

ignored. That would have been provided by the intelligence agency,

because it represents a comment on intelligence received in an

intelligence assessment, so that language would have been provided by

the intelligence agency.

Q When you say "the language would have been provided," you

are talking about the answer to the question?

A That is correct. Where it says "We are not aware of any

actionable intelligence indicating that an attack on the U.S. mission

in Benghazi was planned or imminent. We also see indications that this

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61

action was related to the video that has sparked protests in other

countries."

Q Who came up with the question? Let's use that one as an

example. Your best belief is that statement came in some form from

the intelligence community?

A Uh-huh.

Q I assume it is possible that it could have been revised at

the NSC?

A The NSC generally would not revise anything related to an

intelligence assessment. It is certainly possible that the NSC added

the first phrase, this story is absolutely wrong, but we would, as a

rule, generally not tweak language provided by the intelligence

community related to an intelligence assessment.

Q And, I mean, if we were to go look at all the emails out

there, would we expect to find an email from someone in the intelligence

community that has that language in it, beginning with we are not aware

of, that would have come from someone in the intelligence community;

is that your best belief?

A Yes, that is my best belief. And may I just go back and

answer your other question also, about where the questions came from?

Q Yes.

A So this is part of the process that I described earlier where

the interagency coordinates throughout the day, not only in press

guidance, but in sharing information about what we believe will be

questions related to news of the day. So someone in the interagency

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62

was likely contacted by the Independent, or would have seen that story

and flagged for the rest of the interagency that this is something that

we are likely to be asked about.

Q So not only the information that goes into answering the

questions could have been the end product of the interagency process,

but the questions as well?

A That is correct.

Q As you sit here today, you can't really tell one way or the

other where any of the questions or information came from, other than

what we spoke about specifically where you said it came from the

intelligence community?

A And again, references in the first question and then in the

question on the second page, can you explain to us again the President's

comments about why Egypt was not an ally? That would have been likely

drafted by me, because, again, it is characterizing the President's

comments and that is generally something the NSC would have the lead

on. There are other answers here that look to me like they reflect

State Department input in addition to NSC input.

Q Let's go to the very first paragraph of your email to

Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Vietor. I will read into the record, "I think a

lot has been spinning down there that I might not be looped into,

especially after the discrepancy between Jay's points and the Hill

comment, Toria gaggles at 4:30, so I want to make sure she is on point

with us.”

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Let's break that down a little bit. First who is the Jay that

you refer to in that sentence?

A From the context of this email, I believe that would refer

to Jay Carney, who was the White House spokesperson at the time.

Q Do you know any other Jays that it might refer to?

A I do not.

Q What points were you referring to when you referred to Jay's

points?

A I don't recall specifically. My best guess from the

context of this is that it refers to comments made by Jay Carney during

the White House press briefing that day.

Q This would have been on Friday, September 14th?

A It could have been that day, it could have been the day

previous, I can't tell, which it would have referred to, but generally,

it would have referred to the White House press briefing.

Q And I know you said this, but what time does he typically

do his press briefing?

A He typically briefs sometime between 12:00 and 2:00 p.m.,

it would depend on whether the President was traveling. If the

President was traveling, it is possible that they gaggled instead of

having a full briefing earlier in the morning, or a little bit later

in the information. I don't know where they were on that particular

day.

Q And what did you mean when you said “the Hill comments”?

927
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A I do not know which comments that refers to. I don't

recall.

Q What did you mean when you said “the discrepancy between

Jay's points and the Hill comments”?

A From the context of this email, that there obviously was

a discrepancy, as I wrote, between something that Jay Carney said, and

something that someone on the Hill said, but I don't recall specifically

what that was.

Q When you say "someone on the Hill said," what do you mean

by that?

A Well, Members of Congress are out in the media quite

frequently, so it could have been something that someone, a Senator

or a Representative said in an interview, or in comments to the press.

Q Is it possible that you could have also been referring to

a briefing provided by somebody to Members of Congress? For example,

we have information to suggest that Patrick Kennedy gave a briefing

about the Benghazi attacks on the evening of September 12th.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you recall knowing about that?

A I do not recall that briefing, no.

Q So as you sit here today, you are not, if I understand you

correctly, you are not sure what you meant by “the Hill comments”?

A That is correct.

Q Is there anything you could review to help you remember what

you meant?

928
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A No. I mean, I would have to look back over any public

comment, or testimony, or anything related to the Hill over a period

of several days to be able to make a judgment on that.

Q If somebody had given a briefing to the Hill, for example,

Mr. Kennedy, would you have been aware of that possibly?

A Possibly, yes.

Q How would you have become aware of it?

A It depends, it's a case-by-case basis. I generally am made

aware when there is going to be open testimony on the Hill, because

we want to ensure that spokespeople are prepared to handle questions

about what is discussed in an open session. Generally, if there is

a closed session, I am made aware in case there are leaks from a closed

session on the Hill, and the press has inquiries about that as well.

Q What role, if any, would the NSC play in preparing for a

Hill briefing? Would that be based on the subject matter? Would that

automatically involve someone like Mr. Rhodes or Mr. Vietor? Was

there any pattern or practice to that?

A Well, again, I can only speak to the role that the press

office plays. If there is preparation on sort of the policy or the

leg side, that is not something I can speak to.

Q I apologize, I meant on the press side.

A But on the press side, it is common practice that we would

receive a copy of an opening statement, for example, to act as the

logistical coordinator to clear those remarks within the NSC with

policy folks, legal folks, leg folks as appropriate.

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Q Aside from an opening statement that would be typically

given at a formal congressional hearing, would the NSC be involved in

reviewing or vetting any other information that another agency would

be providing to Congress?

A Generally, from the press point of view, in my experience,

not related to Benghazi, but other general experience at the State

Department, individuals who go up to testify up on the Hill often have

a hard Q&A packet, or most recent press guidance, things like that.

So that would often be pulled in part, if not wholly, from products

coordinated from among all the agencies, sometimes through the press

office.

Q As you sit here today, you don't remember anything

specifically about the attacks in Benghazi and any statements that may

or may not have been to Members of Congress about the attacks?

A As it relates to this particular email, that is correct.

Q Just putting the email aside, do you recall any information

about the statements that were made, either by the White House, the

NSC, anybody in your interagency about the attacks to Congress?

A I recall that there was the provision of what is commonly

known to as the HPSCI points from the CIA, I believe, to Members of

Congress who requested them.

Q We will get into that in a little bit. But beyond that,

during this period from September 11th through that weekend, do you

recall anything about providing information to Congress about the

attacks?

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A During this period of time, no.

Q Let's work our way up to the next one. This is an email

from Tommy Vietor to you and Benjamin Rhodes, September 14th, at 3:50

p.m. Mr. Vietor says, "No changes. Jay leaned further into the

premeditated stuff." Do you have any understanding of what Mr. Vietor

meant by the second sentence in that email?

A No, I do not recall.

Q Do you recall any discussion involving whether or not the

attacks in Benghazi were either spontaneous or premeditated during that

period of time?

A Generally, yes. Can I recall specific conversations? No.

But generally, yes. As I said earlier, there were questions about

whether this could have been related to what had occurred earlier on

the morning of September 11th in Cairo. I think generally in

conversations, people were looking at all possibilities as they sought

to figure out what had happened.

Q Do you recall there ever being a resolution of that issue

during that period about whether or not the attacks in Benghazi were

spontaneous, or whether they were premeditated?

A Well, I recall initial assessments indicated, as you've

seen in some of the other materials that you have provided to me, were

that this was a protest that had grown out of a reaction to what had

occurred earlier that day in Cairo, yes, and that that assessment

evolved over time.

931
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Q What document, just so the record is clear, what document

are you referring to?

A So I think from some of these earlier -- for example,

deposition exhibit 3, where it refers to, in this statement from the

State Department, "Some have sought to justify this suspicious behavior

as a response to inflammatory material." It references our commitment

to religious tolerance. And then in the holding statement in

deposition exhibit 2, where Toria is putting out information, or the

State Department is putting out information related to the attacks in

Benghazi and the attacks in Cairo.

Q Let's flip to page 2 in the exhibit you have in front of

you. The paragraph that begins "Fourth," the last sentence of that

paragraph says, "The President has personally spoken to the leaders

of Egypt, Libya, and Yemen and also sent a personal message to Prime

Minister Erdogan." Assuming this is something that would have come

from the NSC because it involves statements by the President. Do you

recall any detail about how you obtained this information if you are,

in fact, the person who wrote that portion of it?

A Sure. So when the President has spoken to a foreign leader,

the press office is generally aware that such a conversation has taken

place, either so we can prepare a written readout, or provide a readout

to the press and the public, or if that is a conversation that is not

going to be made public, we are aware of it in case it happens to leak

so that we are aware that the conversation has taken place.

I will say that I do recall, if you look at the date of this

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particular press guidance -- this is Friday, September 14th -- and just

sort of give a little clarity around why we would have felt it was

important to include that the President had spoken to these leaders.

Q You know, just for the clarity of the record, anything you

write on the document is going to end up in the record, because this

is the actual exhibit. You can do it, but I just want to let you know --

A Okay, thank you.

Q -- that it will be preserved for all of all time.

A Thank you, I appreciate it. So just to provide a little

context, this press guidance was compiled on September 14th, and at

that particular point in time, we had seen following the incident in

Cairo on September 11th, the incident in Benghazi on September 11th,

that there were violent attacks against multiple diplomatic outposts,

and against personnel, in, off the top of my head, remembering Tunisia,

in Yemen, in Sudan, a protest in Pakistan. So this press guidance does

not solely address what occurred in Benghazi or Cairo for that matter.

It reflected, on September 14th on that Friday, a series of attacks

against diplomatic facilities overseas, and a very real worry that we

had that on that particular Friday, that there would be more violence

in that region in particular, in the Middle East-North Africa region,

since Friday after prayers is often a time when we see increased

demonstrations and violence in the region.

So just for the context of it, I wanted to make clear that the

reason we would have included calls that the President made to those

leaders is because we were incredibly worried about attacks against

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diplomats in multiple areas, not just what had happened in Benghazi

at the time.

Q Just to clarify the statement, was intended to include

Benghazi as well?

A This press guidance addresses what occurred in Benghazi,

but it is broader than that. So it also takes into account what we

had seen in terms of violence against multiple diplomatic facilities

throughout the region.

Q Okay. I think I know the answer to this, but in that next

section, the paragraph that begins the story is absolutely wrong. The

last sentence there said, "We also see indications that this action

was related to the video that has sparked protests in other countries."

Do you have any idea what indications are being referred to in that

statement?

A I do not.

Q You can put that aside.

[Meehan Exhibit No. 5

was marked for identification.]

Mr. McQuaid. I will give Bernadette a non-exhibit copy that she

can doodle on.

Ms. Meehan. That is my inclination is to highlight.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Ms. Meehan, I have just handed you a 2-page document, the

control number is C05562051. It is a series of emails. Once you have

had a chance to look it over, please let me know.

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A My second page is blank.

Q So is mine. I am not sure why that is, but my best belief

is the document is complete.

A Okay.

Q Let's start at the top this time. So you have got an email

from you to Edgar Vasquez, Patrick Ventrell, Aaron Snipe, this is your

reaction to receiving the tragic news about Ambassador Stevens. And

this is -- you have an 11:07 response to Mr. Vasquez, 11:07 email, 11:07

p.m. Does this help you place in time where you were on that night,

because I believe you said you were already at home when you heard the

news?

A I don't know where I was when I received this email. I do

know that I was at home when I received the email from Jake Sullivan

confirming that Chris was dead.

Q So in your mind, you had pegged the time you were at home

versus at the office based on Mr. Sullivan's information. Do you

believe that information came before? It seems like it would come

after.

A I believe it came after, yes.

Q Okay. So then looking at this, you can't tell where you

were at this point in the evening?

A I cannot by looking at this, no.

Q You may have still have been at the office?

A It is possible, yes.

Q Let's look at the email you sent. This is 11:04 p.m., and

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I will quote, "Just the opening of what I think we will get tomorrow,

there is a SVTC at 7:00 a.m. As I mentioned earlier, we will need fully

State-cleared guidance here by about 9:00 a.m." And then there is a

series of lines that begin with a Q: And they appear to be a series

of questions that you, or somebody, is anticipating getting from the

press about Benghazi and Cairo. Is that a fair characterization of

what we are looking at here?

A Yes, it is.

Q Looking at this now, do you recall whether or not you were

the person that drafted these questions?

A I don't recall specifically. But it is likely that I

probably drafted these questions, yes.

Q Let's drop down to the fourth question. “Is the U.S.

repositioning U.S. military assets in response to the attacks in

Benghazi?” Do you recall why you included that question?

A Because this is a question, one of the first questions we

would get from the press. They often inquire about military action

when there is a threat against embassies.

Q And the next question is, "Were the attacks in Cairo and

does Benghazi link/coordinated," and the next question is "Can you

confirm reports that Egyptian Copts were involved in the projection

of the video?"

A Uh-huh.

Q And you are sending this email to Edgar Vasquez, Patrick

Ventrell and Aaron Snipe. Why were you sending the questions to them?

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A Eddie Vasquez and Aaron Snipe were press officers in the

Department of State's Bureau of -- NEA Bureau, so they would have been

my primary contacts into that bureau at the State Department; and

Patrick Ventrell at this particular point in time, was one of Toria

Nuland's deputies in the spokeperson's office, and would have been one

of my points of context there if I wasn't going directly to Toria.

Q Did you view Mr. Vasquez and Mr. Snipe as subject matter

experts in the area of Libya and Benghazi?

A Aaron Snipe was a foreign service officer who had served

in the region, but no, they would have been my contacts because they

were press officers, and they would have been responsible for

circulating this to policy and substantive experts within the State

Department as they saw it to be appropriate.

Q I guess what I am trying to understand is why were you

including Mr. Ventrell -- I'm sorry, Mr. Vasquez and Mr. Snipe both

in the NEA Bureau at the State Department?

A Correct.

Q Why were you including this versus sending this straight

to Victoria Nuland's office?

A Because press guidance within the State Department isn't

generally compiled by the spokesperson's office; it is compiled by the

bureaus who have responsibility for the policy that is being discussed.

So they would be the action officers on circulating this for drafting,

clearing, and approving within the State Department.

Q Where did you get the information about the Egyptian Coptic

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Christians as referred to in the question that I read? Do you recall?

A I do not recall.

Q Do you recall any discussions generally about that video

and trying to get YouTube to take it down?

A I do recall, generally, that there were discussions related

to concerns of the outbreak in violence in Cairo, yes.

Q And you refer here to SVTC at 7:00 a.m., I assume that means

the morning of the 12th, do you recall attending or participating in

that SVTCs?

A I don't recall that specific SVTCs, but I would have been

there, yes.

Q You can put that document aside. We talked a little bit

about what we both refer to as the HPSCI talking points, the talking

points that were prepared primarily by the CIA for purposes of

distribution to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Have you ever reviewed those talking points?

A At the time, I do recall being on email chains during the

drafting, clearing process, yes.

Q Have you reviewed them since then?

A I have, in preparation for this appearance here today,

reviewed one document related to that email chain, yes.

Q Just take us through your role in preparation, review, and

circulation of those HPSCI talking points.

A My recollection, as I sit here today, is that the CIA had

the lead on drafting those talking points, but they were circulated

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within the interagency for input review clearance. I remember in this

particular instance, Tommy Vietor having more of a lead role at the

NSC than I did on this particular set of points, but that I was on many

of the email chains related to, as I said, the drafting of the clearance.

Q How did you first hear that the talking points were in the

works?

A I don't recall.

Q And do you recall having any discussions with Mr. Vietor

about the talking points?

A I don't recall.

Q And whenever I use the term "talking points," I am referring

to the HPSCI talking points, just so we are clear.

A Understood.

Q What was the nature of Mr. Vietor's role with regard to the

talking points?

A As I recall today, Tommy took the lead on the NSC side in

clearing them in our building, with people who would have had an equity

in taking a look at ensuring that the information was accurate and

factual as we understood it to be at that point in time.

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[12:14 p.m.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Okay. And do you have any understanding of how Mr. Vietor

took the talking points and ensured that they were accurate?

A From what I recall, in terms of email chains, he would have

circulated them, or he did circulate them on email. Whether there were

other channels of communication he had with people in the NSC, I don't

know.

Q Okay. Do you know if he reviewed any documents in the

process of ensuring the talking points were accurate?

A I don't know.

Q Did you have any conversations with anybody in the Office

of Public Affairs at the CIA about the talking points?

A I don't recall.

Q Do you recall having any conversations, putting aside

email, about the talking points with anybody during that period of time?

A I don't recall.

Q Do you recall having an understanding of what the purpose

was of the talking points?

A I do. My recollection is that members of the HPSCI had

requested points from -- from the U.S. Government, in this case,

directly the CIA, for use when they spoke to the public or the media

about what had transpired in Benghazi, and that is not an unusual

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request. We get requests from the Hill on a frequent basis for -- for

requests like that.

Q Can you give me any other examples of such request?

A Outside of that timeframe, yes. One example would be

during the Iran deal, we would frequently receive requests from Members

of Congress for talking points that they might use when discussing the

deal publicly or in TV interviews. Cuba would be another example where

we would have Members of Congress reach out to ask for press guidance

or talking points that they could use to discuss the administration's

position on that particular policy.

Q Are these requests coming to the NSC, or those requests are

going directly to the CIA as in this instance?

A It depends. It depends on who the Member of Congress is,

it depends on what the policy is. It's a case-by-case basis.

Q Okay, do you recall being part of any discussion about the

talking points in any way?

A Aside from remembering that I was on emails, email chains

related to the clearance of the HPSCI talking points, no, I don't

remember any specific conversations.

Q Do you have any understanding of whether or not those

talking points were used by Ambassador Rice to prepare for her

appearances on the Sunday talk shows?

A I can say that press guidance that would have been provided

to Secretary -- or to Ambassador Rice at that time would have been based

on press guidance developed throughout the week and updated at the time

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that it was presented to her. And as the HPSCI points would have

reflected what the administration was saying publicly, yes, those would

have been part of the same process for creating the points that

eventually went to Ambassador Rice.

Q Okay. So if I understand you correctly, it sounds like you

are saying as a general practice, you believe that HPSCI talking points

would have ended up in a package given to Ambassador Rice. Is that

fair?

A They would have been part of the process, but they would

have been -- I can't recall what date the HPSCI talking points were

provided to the HPSCI, versus the date that Ambassador Rice received

her press guidance. But whatever Ambassador Rice received would have

reflected the press guidance that was updated and accurate at the point

in time she received it. And if the HPSCI points were before that,

yes, they would have been part of that package. But I don't recall

the specific dates.

Q Right. So as you sit here today, you don't know one way

or the other whether or not Ambassador Rice ever saw those HPSCI talking

points?

A I do not.

Q Were you involved in any way in preparing Ambassador Rice

for her appearances on the Sunday talk shows?

A I was, again, part of the interagency process that compiled

press guidance that would have been used in a preparation package for

her as she prepared for the Sunday shows.

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Q Okay. Let's break it down a little bit. Do you have any

firsthand knowledge, again, not what would have been done, but do you

have any firsthand knowledge of the stack of information that

Ambassador Rice received to prepare for the Sunday talk shows?

A Yes. The package of press guidance that she received was

the product of interagency coordination and reflected the updated

talking points at that point in time as cleared by all agencies with

an equity.

Q Okay. So now I'm a little bit confused. I thought you said

you don't know one way or another whether or not Ambassador Rice

received the HPSCI talking points?

A That's right.

Q I think you just said, unless I misheard you, that the

talking points, the updated talking points would have been -- were

included in the material she received?

A So let me take a step back.

Q Please.

A I am not familiar with what date the HPSCI talking points

were finalized and provided to the HPSCI. Secretary, or Ambassador

Rice, received press guidance that was worked through the interagency,

and cleared by any agency that had an equity in what had occurred in

Benghazi on September 11. Those points that Ambassador Rice received

would have overlapped in some way, if not have been identical to the

HPSCI talking points, depending on when they were developed. I don't

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know what the difference in dates was, so I can't say with certainty

whether they were the same or different.

I have no idea whether Ambassador Rice received the final HPSCI

talking points in that form. I have no idea. But she did receive press

guidance that would have been developed the same way the HPSCI talking

points were, and would have reflected the same information, but updated

for the date that she received them.

Q How do you know how the HPSCI talking points were developed?

A Well, as I have been saying, I was on the email chain where

they were cleared and drafted.

Q But you said HPSCI talking points followed the same process

as all of the other press guidance that we -- how do you know that?

I mean, how do you know what the CIA did to prepare those talking points?

A I was on the interagency chain.

Q Right. Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt you. Go ahead.

A I was on the interagency chain for the clearance of press

guidance used by Toria Nuland, by Jay Carney, by George Little, by

others in the administration during that week. I was also separately

on the chain where the HPSCI talking points were going through drafting

and clearance. That was a similar process, meaning that any agency

that had an equity was involved in drafting and/or clearing, and/or

approving any public points that were provided on the topic of Benghazi.

Q You would agree with me, wouldn't you, that the process of

drafting and revising HPSCI talking points, I mean, only a portion of

that, maybe a very small portion of that is reflected in the email

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exchange is about it. And much of that work may have occurred within

the four walls of the CIA. Is that fair?

A Yes, absolutely. The same way with --

Q Okay, how did you --

A -- with press guidance --

Q I'm not finished with my question.

A -- is developed inside an agency, and then once an agency

has a compiled answer or product to provide, it's then fed into the

interagency process.

Q I understand that, but you said HPSCI talking points were

developed using the same process as the press guidance. How do you

have an insight into what was going on at the CIA with regard to the

HPSCI talking points?

A I don't. I can only talk to the interagency process writ

large, and the interagency process was the same in both cases.

Q And going back to Ambassador Rice. It sounds like you know

exactly the documents she was given to prepare. Is that true, or am

I just --

A I am familiar with one of the documents that she received.

If she received other materials from her spokesperson as part of her

preparation, I would not be privy to that.

Q Okay. What is the one document that you know she received?

A It was the compiled press guidance that was the result of

the interagency clearance process. I recall that it also had top lines

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that were added in at the end of that process to give it sort of an

overall frame.

Q And how do you know she received that?

A Because I received -- was forwarded in an email that

contained that press guidance.

Q Was she included on that email?

A It was the email that went to her spokesperson. I can't

recall if Susan specifically was on that email personally.

Q So do you have any -- I will just ask this: Were you in

the room when she was prepared for her talk shows appearances?

A I was not.

Q So you don't know, one way or the other, what document she

actually reviewed, or the people that prepared her were using to prepare

her, you just know what was sent to her?

A Correct.

Q Did you have any discussions with anybody about that

preparation?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. Did you have any discussions with anybody about her

appearance and the statements she made on the Sunday talk shows?

A Following her appearance?

Q Yes.

A I don't recall.

Q You don't recall any such discussions?

A I don't. You're asking me to recall discussions on a

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specific day more than 3 years ago, and I don't recall those discussions

now.

Q No, I'm certainly not doing that. I'm asking you if you

recall any discussions about her appearance on the talk shows, whether

it occurred on that Sunday, or another day. Do you recall any

conversations?

A I don't recall specific conversations, no.

Q Do you recall generally anything that was discussed about

her appearances on the talk shows?

A Well, we would, as a general rule, on a Monday, have to

prepare Jay Carney and Toria Nuland and other spokespeople across the

U.S. Government for their daily press briefings. And we would

anticipate that appearances of U.S. Government officials on Sunday

shows would often be asked about in those press briefings, so yes.

Q I don't want to get into like the next day, because that's

outside the timeframe that was discussed. I'm just talking about

conversations about her appearance on that Sunday.

A Right, and I'm sorry if I'm unclear, but as I've said, I

don't recall specific conversations on that day about Susan's

appearances.

Q Again, I'm not talking about that day. I'm talking about

her appearance on that day.

A Uh-huh.

Q So we understand she appeared on the Sunday talk shows. She

made certain statements about Benghazi?

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A Uh-huh.

Q Do you recall generally any conversations about statements

she made, whether you had the conversation on that day, or another day,

we are not going to know that because you can't remember. But do you

recall the conversations?

A No, as I've said, I do not recall specific conversations

related to Ambassador Rice's appearance on the Sunday shows.

Q Do you recall anything generally that was said in

conversation about the appearance?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall being involved in any way in preparing the

President for his appearance, his interview with Steve Kroft on

September 12?

A I do not recall being part of any of that preparation, no.

Q Okay. Who would have been involved in that?

A Generally, Ben Rhodes from the NSC press side. I can't

speak to who from other offices would have been involved.

Q Do you recall that appearance, that interview with Steve

Kroft on the 12th?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall any discussions about statements Jay Carney

made during that week from September 12 to the end of the week?

A Specific discussions, no.

Q Do you recall that week being informed that the FBI had

opened up an investigation into the attacks in Benghazi?

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A As a general rule, I'm aware that the FBI always opens an

investigation into a suspicious death of an American citizen abroad.

I was familiar with that from my time at the State Department, so --

Q So as you sit here today, you don't recall a specific

investigation being opened that week?

A Again, I would -- I have that general knowledge, so I

don't -- I don't know whether I was informed specifically with regards

to Benghazi, or whether that's just something I would have assumed.

Q Fair enough. Do you recall being told by anybody that in

light of the FBI investigation that you should or should not say

anything about the Benghazi attacks, in other words -- that was a bad

question.

In other words, were you told by anybody that the pendency of the

investigation should, I think, affect, in any way, the public

statements about the attacks?

A I do recall, at least one email chain where either someone

from the FBI or DOJ did ask whether folks within DOJ and/or FBI were

involved in clearing guidance because of equities related to the

investigation, yes.

Q Do you recall ever being told that you could not make a

statement about the attacks in Benghazi because of the pendency of the

FBI investigation?

A I don't recall.

Mr. Missakian. I understand I'm at the end of my hour. I just

have one last document. Should I mark it and question her and then

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I can turn it over to you?

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. That's fine with us. Are you okay?

Ms. Meehan. I'm okay, yeah.

[Meehan Exhibit No. 6

was marked for identification.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Ms. Meehan, I have just marked as exhibit No. 6, a

multi-paged document, with document control number C05415285. Once

you have had a chance to review it, just let me know.

Mr. McQuaid. You are not marking the one that is the exhibit.

Ms. Meehan. No. Okay.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Okay?

A Yep.

Q Alright. Let's start with the basics. We are looking at

what appears to be one email. Well, no, multiple emails. Start at

the back and work our way forward. The email beginning on the second

to last page, this is an email from Dag Vega, dated September 14, 2012,

at 7:11 p.m. I don't see you being a recipient on this email. Having

read it, do you recognize it as something you received back then?

A I can see that I'm not a party to the email. I do recall

being forwarded a copy of this email from one of the recipients, but

do not recall ever being added in as a participant on the chain.

Q Okay. Do you recall being forwarded a copy of Mr. Vega's

email?

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A Of the overall email in some form or another.

Q Okay. And how do you recall that?

A In my preparation to appear today, I was provided a copy

of an email that appears to be this email that was forwarded to me by

one of the recipients of the email, if that makes sense.

Q It does make sense. Who forwarded the email to you?

A Erin Pelton.

Q And do we have that email?

Mr. McQuaid. I don't know.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q And did you have any conversation with Ms. Pelton about the

email prior to you receiving it?

A Prior to her forwarding me the email?

Q Yes.

A Not that I recall, no.

Q Do you know why she sent it to you?

A My recollection, my recollection based on the context of

the email, as I was able to review it, was that she noticed that I was

not included on the email and was forwarding it for situational

awareness.

Q I see. Alright, let's go through the sender and the

recipients here in a little more detail. This email -- now we are on

the first page. This email is coming from Ben Rhodes on September 14,

2012, at 8:09 p.m.

A Uh-huh.

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Q And let's just go through the recipient list. Who is Dag

Vega?

A Dag Vega was a member of the White House communications

staff who was the liaison between the White House and the networks as

it related to things like Sunday shows appearances and interviews.

Q And then there is what appears to be a title or possibly

a group, NSC Deputy Press Secretary. Who is that?

A At this particular point in time, I believe that would have

been Caitlin Hayden.

Q Is there a reason why her name wouldn't appear, as opposed

to her title?

A That's a technical question. I don't know.

Q And who is David Plouffe?

A David Plouffe at the time was a member of the White House

staff. I didn't have any interaction with him and don't know what

specifically his job was.

Q Did you have any interaction with him at all regarding

Benghazi during the period we have been talking about?

A I did not.

Q We know who Jay Carney is. Jennifer Palmieri, who is that?

A At this point in time, she was the Deputy Communications

Director within the White House Communications Office.

Q And Joshua Earnest, what was his title at the time?

A At the time, he was Deputy Press Secretary.

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Q Okay. And then the next name, and I'm sure I will

mispronounce it, Ferial Govashiri.

A Yes, that's actually spot on. At the time, Ferial was Ben

Rhodes's administrative assistant.

Q And Howli Ledbetter?

A At the time, I believe that Howli was Jay Carney's

administrative assistant.

Q And Dawn Selak?

A I don't know who that is.

Q Daniel Brundage?

A I don't know who that is.

Q And we know who Erin Pelton is, and Mehdi Alhassani?

A Mehdi Alhassani, I believe at the time, was one of the

administrative assistants in Denis McDonough's office.

Q To your understanding, what are we looking at in this email

from Mr. Rhodes?

A Well, again, just for the record, I'm not a party to the

email. But based on the context, it appears to be the press guidance

that would be provided to Ambassador Rice to use as the basis for

preparation for her appearance on the Sunday show.

Q And you're basing that on the fact that the subject line

reference to "prep call with Susan Saturday at 4 p.m. Eastern"?

A Yes, and the context of what is included in the email, and

the originating email from Dag Vega, which includes all of the

logistical information for her appearance on the Sunday shows.

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Q Do you have any insight as to how Ambassador Rice was

selected to appear on the Sunday talk shows as opposed to Secretary

Clinton or anybody else?

A I do not. I do not believe I was a party to those

discussions.

Q Do you recall reviewing this document at the time? I mean,

you recall it being forwarded to you, but do you recall doing anything

with it once you received it?

A I certainly don't recall doing anything with it once I

received from it Erin Pelton, no.

Q And prior to this going out, would there have been a

discussion with Ambassador Rice about the types of questions that she

could be expected to receive on the Sunday talk shows, or was that just

assumed based on the course of events that week what would be talked

about?

A I wasn't part of any prep that Susan did, so I can't say

specifically, but generally, when we are prepping for the Sunday shows,

yes, we would, much like I had described in the process earlier, when

coming up with and compiling press guidance, we would discuss what we

think are likely questions to be asked.

Q Would those, the likely questions that would be asked, would

those be informed by the actual questions, for example, Jay Carney had

been receiving at his press conferences during the week?

A They could be, yes.

Q So you folks would be aware of what he was asked and what

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he was saying, and would you all have transcripts of those press

conferences?

A Transcripts are available. Whether Ambassador Rice had

them, I couldn't say.

Q In the first section, "goals," is this a typical format for

this type of document where you have goals and I know you had used the

term "top lines" previously in the interview. And then you've got Q&A

that follows. Is this a typical format that the NSC press office would

follow in this kind of circumstance?

A Yes, it is.

Q Okay. So what does the "goal" section mean?

A So, generally, goals would be the purpose of why the

individual is appearing on the Sunday shows, what sort of the end goal

is of the appearance, and what you're trying to convey.

Q And what are the top lines? How do you define top lines?

A So top lines, the best way to describe them is to also

reference the Q&A. Q&A would be specific questions that we think an

individual may be asked. Top lines are more general, sort of context

for the overall issue at large.

Q And let's look at the goals section. One part of this that

has received quite a lot of attention is the second bullet point there.

And I will quote it: "To underscore that these protests are rooted

in an Internet video, and not a broader failure of policy."

Do you have any understanding of what Mr. Rhodes meant to convey

by that statement?

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A I certainly don't want to speak for Ben. I can say more

generally, looking at the date, this was Friday, September 14, and

looking, again, as I reviewed the press guidance here, that the context

of this particular point in time is that, again, we had seen multiple

outbreaks of violence against multiple diplomatic facilities in Cairo,

in Benghazi, in Tunisia, and Yemen, and Sudan, and Pakistan, and

elsewhere, so this would have been -- this entire package would have

been designed to address not only what had happened in Benghazi

specifically, but the administration response to these outbreaks of

violence and threats against American citizens more broadly across the

region.

Q And from the context, do you have any understanding what

he was referring to when he says "and not a broader failure of policy"?

A Again, from the context of this, yes, that this would have

been to say that there was a specific reason that there was an outbreak

of violence in these particular areas. And that it was not a broader

failure of the President's policies in the region.

Q Okay, what policies do you believe he was referring to? In

other words, for example, this could be referring to the policy behind

going into Libya in the first place. It could be the policy relating

more generally to the war on terror. Do you have a sense of what policy

he was referring to here?

A I don't want to speculate because I don't know what Ben was

referring to in particular.

Q Okay. Thank you. I don't have any further questions on

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this document. And if you give me a moment to go over my notes, I may

be done completely.

A Sure. Of course.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Just one followup question. My colleague wanted me to

clarify something, and it's a good point. I believe you testified that

you know for certain that Ambassador Rice at least received one document

for her preparation for the talk shows. Is this what we have marked

as exhibit 6, that one document you know she received?

A So to clarify, to the point that you and I discussed, I can

confirm that Erin Pelton, who was her spokesperson, received this

document. In looking at the document, I do not see Ambassador Rice

personally listed in the recipient line. And Rexon, who was also on

her staff, obviously received this document, as he is the person that

produced it. So I can't say whether this was presented to her, but

I would have a hard time believing that this wouldn't have been passed

on to her by her staff.

Q Okay. Thank you. Anything else?

Ms. Clarke. No.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

EXAMINATION

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Let's go back on. Just to reintroduce myself, my name is

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Susanne Sachsman Grooms. I'm with the minority staff, and we wanted

to thank you for coming in voluntarily for the transcribed interview.

I want to start by going through a couple of these exhibits that

you have already been through.

A Okay.

Q So let's start with exhibit 3.

A Okay.

Q And for the record, exhibit 3 contains an email from Jacob

Sullivan to Ben Rhodes, you, and various others from September 11th

of the night of the attacks at 9:32, with a statement which was a

proposed statement for Secretary Clinton for that evening.

A Uh-huh.

Q I want to call your attention to the language that was

discussed in the previous round. "Some have sought to justify" -- and

I'm quoting -- "Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior as

a response to inflammatory material originating in the United States.

The United States deplores any intentional effort to denigrate the

religious beliefs of others. Our commitment to religious tolerance

goes back to the very beginning of our Nation."

When Secretary Clinton testified before the committee on

October 22, she testified about that language, which was included both

in that statement the night of the attacks, and in the following day.

And she said, and I quote -- and I will just quote a long thing. "During

the day on September 11, as you did mention, Congressman, there was

a very large protest at our Embassy in Cairo. Protesters breached the

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walls, they tore down the American flag, and it was of grave concern

to us because the inflammatory video had been shown on Egyptian

television, which has a broader reach than just inside Egypt. And if

you look at what I said I referred to the video that night in a very

specific way. I said, quote," -- and she is quoting -- “Some have

sought to justify the attack because of the video.” I used those words

deliberately not to ascribe a motive to every attacker, but as a warning

to those across the region that there was no justification for further

attacks."

Is Secretary Clinton's explanation consistent with your

understanding of the time -- at the time of what that statement was

meant to mean?

A It is.

Q Okay. And what did you think the purpose of the language

was, and what do you think it conveyed?

A I think, as I sit here today and recall, it was in response

to the fact that there had not only been the attack against the facility

in Benghazi, but a large and frightening attack against our Embassy

in Cairo. There was also, as I recall it now, a great deal of worry

inside the administration that there would potentially be further

attacks, or protests, or incidents outside of other diplomatic

facilities in the region. It's, obviously, a very volatile region.

And part of what we were doing in our public language was seeking to

tamp down inflammatory rhetoric in the region and do everything we could

to ensure that there was an environment that would not lend itself to

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further attacks based on this video or people using this video as an

excuse.

Q I'm going to move off of that exhibit.

A If I could just note one thing for the record.

Q Sure.

A You know, as we sort of discussed in one of the earlier

sessions, I think that was somewhat prescient in the sense that there

were, in fact, quite violent attacks against multiple other diplomatic

facilities in the region as that week went on, and that was, you know,

always a concern in our mind was how do we do everything that we can

to ensure that there wasn't further loss of life, you know, of American

life in these other areas.

Q Let's talk for just a couple of minutes and I know we have

gone through it in great detail, about the night of the attack. I

understand that you don't have specific recollection at this point of

detailed conversations, but can you give us a sense of the feeling that

was in the building on the night of the attacks, and sort of the

sentiment, your primary focus, the focus of your colleagues?

A Sure. So I will sort of break that down into a couple of

separate answers. My responsibility and my primary responsibility was

to help coordinate among the interagency what the public response would

be to incoming inquiries from the press, and then as time went on and

it became clear how serious the situation was, at that point, it becomes

not an issue of simply responding to incoming inquiries, but, you know,

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the need for the President and others to proactively go out and address

the American people.

So my primary role would be to interact with my counterparts at

various national security agencies that had an equity in what was

occurring, and to work with others internally to ensure that as there

were public products, that the appropriate people had the opportunity

to review them. With regards to the sentiment overall, you know, there

was a lot of anguish and sadness.

There was a lot of confusion in the sense that you have a lot of

information coming in. You had two foreign service officers who were

unaccounted for -- for a period of time, trying to track down where

they were and what had happened to them. For me personally, you know,

I interact, obviously, with the press secretaries at the State

Department. Those were individuals who worked in the same bureau as

the two foreign service officers who were killed. So there was a lot

of sadness, anxiety, confusion, anger on that end as well.

Q Was there -- and perhaps your role was really more on the

communications side, but was there a sense of urgency within the

building to make sure that the United States, as a whole, responded

in a way that was quickly to save the people who were there and to protect

human life?

A Yes, absolutely. I can say that as I noted earlier, I don't

recall specific meetings and conversations, but I do recall very

clearly that the sentiment passed down from Ben was that everything

that could be done was being done; that there was an urgency, again,

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in not only trying to resolve the situation in Benghazi, but doing

everything that we could as a government to look across the region to

see if there were other facilities that would be in need of assistance,

and doing everything we could to ensure that we would not be faced with

the same situation, you know, at other diplomatic facilities across

the region.

Q And we saw your emails from the night of the attacks.

They -- it's clear that the deaths impacted you personally,

emotionally. I don't want to go into that in detail. But is that a

fair description?

A Yes.

Q And once you learned of those things, you, despite an

emotional reaction, you continued to work. Is that right?

A That's correct.

Q And I know there were a lot of questions about what time

you went home. Certainly, we saw emails from you well into the night

and the early morning until maybe 12:42 a.m. on September 12, and then

it looks like the email traffic started back up again around 5:00 a.m.

on September 12. Does that sound right?

A Yes, I don't recall specific times, but yes, the general

timeframe sounds accurate.

Q So I don't want there to be a misimpression that you weren't,

you know, still working. You were working very hard and diligently

that night. Is that accurate?

A That is accurate, and thank you, yes. I think it was part

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of the difficulty in recollecting specific conversations and affixing

them to certain moments in time is that there was very little sleep

across, you know, an extended period of days, as I mentioned. There

was a lot of concern and a lot of action being taken to prevent similar

occurrences at other places across the region. So it was pretty much

a nonstop effort for an extended period of time, and that tends to bleed

together when you look back 3 years ago.

Q And you're speaking for yourself on that, but was that sort

of a shared feeling that you have about all of the -- all of your

colleagues?

A Based on, you know, what I observed, yes. That would be

accurate.

Q I want to shift to exhibit 4. And exhibit 4 is, just to

remind the record, is an email from you on Friday, September 14 at 3:46

to Ben Rhodes and Tommy Vietor with Libya -- subject line, "Libya for

Toria." We spent a lot of time on this before, so I don't want to

belabor the point, but there, in that first sentence you say, "I think

a lot has been spinning down there that I might not be looped into."

I know sometimes people hear the word "spinning" and they start

wondering what exactly that means. Can you maybe explain to us what

you meant by that?

A Sure, in looking at this now from the context what I was

referring to, as I said earlier, Ben Rhodes and Tommy Vietor, to whom

this email is addressed, both sat in the West Wing, whereas I sat in

the EEOB, you know, sort of across the street, if you will. So, by

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nature, of both of their positions and their physical location, they

would have had access to information, people perhaps stopping by their

office that I would not have had access to. So when I said I think

a lot has been spinning down there, that simply means meetings,

information, conversations that they would be aware of that I wasn't.

And wanting to ensure that before any information was passed back to

the State Department, that I had done my diligence in ensuring that

people who had access to information that I may not have had access

to, had an opportunity to review this to ensure that there was nothing

that, based on their prerogative, needed to be updated.

Q And there is a line in here that says "Especially after the

discrepancy between Jay's points and the Hill comments." I understand

you can't remember what exactly that's about. I'm going to show you

a document. We will see if this refreshes your recollection, or if

it's not the right thing. We are marking this exhibit 7.

A Okay.

[Meehan Exhibit No. 7

was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q And for the record, exhibit 7 is State Department document

number C5579559.

A And just so I am clear for the record, the second page is

blank.

Q Yes.

A Okay.

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Q I believe we will never fully understand all of the State

Department's document production, but it does seem to have some kind

of a --

A Identifying number.

Q Something on it, yes. Gibberish language.

A Okay.

Q This is an email from Kimberly Dozier from AP to Shawn Turner

at ODNI on Friday, September 14, at 10:34 a.m. The subject line is:

"Representative Jeff Duncan, R-North Carolina said State Department

had warnings of the attack 48 hours."

And it appears that it gets forwarded to you by Shawn Turner at

DNI, as well as some other individuals. The question from AP was, and

I'm quoting, "Hey there -- at a hearing on Fort Hood just now, Rep.

Jeff Duncan, R-N.C., said State Department had warnings of the attack

48 hours -- apparently repeating the claim in the Independent, but he

didn't source it to the Independent -- just said it as if it were fact.

Can you clarify again?"

It says, underneath that, "Also, I understand you guys reached

out to Matt Lee last night telling him the Independent report was wrong.

Unfortunately, that didn't get to me until I wasted some time chasing

it, so please loop me in too." And then that was sent on to you by

Shawn Turner "FYI," he says, "Trying to find out where this is coming

from."

So this appears to me to be a reference to a statement that

Representative Jeff Duncan had said repeating the claim in the

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Independent story about the State Department having warnings of the

attack 48 hours beforehand. Does that seem right?

A Yes, that's an accurate characterization of the email, yes.

Q Does this refresh your recollection as to what you were

talking about when you referenced Hill comments?

A Unfortunately, it does not. I don't -- I truly don't recall

what I was referring to. It's possible this was it, but I just don't

remember.

Q The --

A I would say that it does appear that in the email chain that

you're referring to, the one where I emailed Ben and Tommy, there is

a question in that press guidance that does specifically address the

email chain from the AP reporter.

Q Yeah, so in exhibit 4, in that press guidance below where

you say "Especially after the discrepancy between Jay's points and the

Hill comments." There is a question, and the question is: "What's

your response to the Independent story that says we have intelligence

48 hours in advance of the Benghazi attack that was ignored?"

And then answer, and I believe you said in the previous round,

that you would have obtained the answer to that question from DNI?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. I'm going to -- we spent a fair amount of time in

the previous round talking about the HPSCI talking points, so I just

want to introduce exhibit 8, which is on that vein.

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[Meehan Exhibit No. 8

was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Exhibit 8 is a long chain of emails. I'm mostly going to

point to the beginning ones, but why don't you read through the whole

thing.

A Okay.

Q It is Bates Stamped STATE-SCB65819.

A Okay. Thank you.

Q And so this is, at its beginning, an email from John Tomczyk,

T-o-m-c-z-y-k, Chief of Media Relations from the CIA Office of Public

Affairs to Tommy Vietor, Ben Rhodes, you, Caitlin Hayden, cc'ing Shawn

Turner. The subject is the "Revised HPSCI Talking Points for Review."

It was sent at 5:09 p.m., and it has HPSCI talking points with a line,

"The currently available information suggests that the demonstrations

in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S.

Embassy in Cairo, and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S.

consulate and subsequently its Annex."

In a subsequent chain, Tommy Vietor sends an email around at 6:21.

His statement is: "John, I know you're trying to move these fast, so

here's an initial round of edits. One small tweak in sentence 3 of

bullet 1 for added clarity. Denis would also like to make sure the

highlighted portions were fully coordinated with the State Department

in event that they get inquiries." And it -- and then the response

from the CIA is: "Thanks very much for your prompt response. Tommy,

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we will send over to State." And then the exchange continues.

When you were discussing in the previous round that Tommy Vietor

took the lead on the NSC side in clearing the HPSCI talking points for

the building to ensure that they were accurate and factual at that time,

is this what you were referring to?

A Yes, it is. And for the record, per the early agreement,

I did see a version of this email chain in advance of this hearing.

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[1:17 p.m.]

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q And so, from this, it appears that what happened was that

Tommy Vietor got in a version at 5:09 and then that he edited it, and

that was his initial round of edits at 6:21. Is that an accurate

reading?

A Yes, it is.

Q The email exchange goes on. And, at some point, Ben Rhodes,

now on the first page, at 9:34 p.m., sends an email around that says,

"All, sorry to be late to this discussion. We need to resolve this

in a way that respects all of the relevant equities, particularly the

investigation." And, at that point, they decide to loop in Department

of Justice on this email.

Is that a good description of what the NSC's role was in this

process?

A Yes. In fact, the first line that Ben writes -- well, the

second line -- "We need to resolve this in a way that respects all of

the relevant equities, particularly the investigation." The NSC takes

a coordinating role to ensure that anyone throughout the interagency

who, as I said earlier, has an equity is able to review, to provide

input, to clear on it.

In this case, you know, DOJ was eventually looped into it because

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they obviously have equities as related to the investigation. So, yes,

that is an accurate representation of the NSC role.

Q Let's go to the Ben Rhodes email. It's going to be exhibit

6.

[Meehan Exhibit No. 6

was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q The email that came in with the HPSCI white paper talking

points for use with the media comes in at 5:09. On September 14, it

looks like Ben Rhodes sends out the email that's exhibit 6, subject

line, "RE: PREP CALL with Susan, Saturday at 4:00 p.m. ET," at 8:09

p.m.

And it looks like in the second page there's a question: "What's

your response to the Independent story that says we have intelligence

48 hours in advance of the Benghazi attack that was ignored? Was this

an intelligence failure?"

And the answer to that question says, "We are not aware of any

actionable intelligence indicating that an attack on the U.S. Mission

in Benghazi was planned or imminent. The currently available

information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were

spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo

and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. consulate and

subsequently its annex."

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My read is that the sentence was cribbed in some version of the

first sentence from that HPSCI talking points. Does that look right

to you?

A Yes, it does. Uh-huh.

Q And that wasn't the final version of the talking points,

but it was, in fact, the one that was the most recent one at the time.

A That's correct, yes.

Q And is that the process that you've been basically

explaining to us throughout the day, right? You would get in

additional information from different agencies that was substantive,

and you would then add that additional cleared information into

whatever was the most recent updated version of the guidance that was

going out?

A Yes, that's absolutely correct. We would incorporate any

updated information from anyone in the interagency who had relevant

information and requested to make an update. And it would be our

responsibility to ensure that that information is included in any of

the multiple versions of press guidance or talking points that are being

circulated at any given point in time.

Q And once information like a talking point gets cleared

through the interagency, do you then need to reclear it every time you

use it, or do you just use the cleared information until you have an

update?

A So, in an instance like this where there's rapidly changing

information, we would clear, certainly, at a minimum, on a daily basis

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before each of the daily press briefings. That would be recirculated

to everyone within the interagency that had a role in initially

drafting, editing, or clearing, even if they did not provide inputs

the last time around because they may now have information that's

relevant. And, generally, before individuals are doing an appearance,

for example, the Sunday shows, that's information that we would ensure

is up to date before someone uses it in that capacity, yes.

Q Now, I'm going to assume that there were very often during

this whole time period time constraints and you all were working very

quickly to get out press guidance. Is that accurate?

A Yes, that is accurate.

Q And sometimes the news had stories and you were responding,

and that would accelerate your timeframe?

A Yes, absolutely, particularly in cases like the Independent

story, which was referenced earlier, where there is information that

we know to be incorrect or believe to be incorrect at a certain period

of time. We do everything we can to correct that so it doesn't, sort

of, harden in the minds of people, when we know that it is not accurate

to the best of our knowledge at that point in time.

Q And that Independent story -- you know, we have seen email

chains where DNI, Shawn Turner was pushing back very aggressively

against that. Is that accurate? Does that reflect your recollection?

A Based on, sort of, the emails that I've seen today and my

recollection, yes.

Q As you were working quickly, how seriously did you

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personally review the accuracy of the statements and the talking points

that you were working on with respect to the attacks in Benghazi?

A Well, I take my work very seriously. It's ultimately my

responsibility to ensure that anyone who has knowledge or an equity

has an opportunity to review it. So, certainly, I do a close review,

but I rely on policy experts, on intelligence experts, substantive

experts, to ensure that the underlying substance of whatever we're

saying publicly is accurate and factual.

Q And so is it fair to understand that your role is not in

personally determining whether the information is accurate but instead

in making sure the information gets to the relevant agency so that they

can check on whether the information is accurate?

A Yes, to an extent. Certainly, if I see things within a

statement or a press guidance that contradicts information I've seen

in another area, it would be my responsibility, not necessarily to be

the arbiter of that, but to raise the contradiction to someone's

attention and say, there appears to be a difference of opinion, or,

this does not appear to have kept up with changes I've seen in other

documents. And someone would need to ultimately weigh in and provide

a decision based on their substantive knowledge.

Q So you would flag things, but would you rely on the agencies

that were providing the information pursuant to their, sort of,

substantive areas for the overall substance of the information

ultimately?

A Yes. Each agency would be responsible for clearing

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whatever the overall package is. That does include substantive

experts from the NSC who would have an opportunity to weigh in on it,

as well. But, yes, there would have to be clearance from each of those

relevant agencies.

Q Did you have a concern or any concern that anyone else at

the NSC was not adequately concerned about ensuring the accuracy of

any statement or speech that was related to the attacks in Benghazi?

A Absolutely not. In fact, every sort of instruction that

we received -- you know, the instruction always when we're dealing with

the public is that information needs to be factual, it needs to be

accurate. If we think that things might influence what an assessment

is leading to a change, we should be up front and say that this is likely

to change as we gather more information.

But I do recall, on that particular day and in the days after,

there was a sense of not only urgency with regards to what was happening

on the ground but also, sort of, an extra-meticulous look at everything

that we were putting out. Because there was a lot of information coming

in; you know, there were contradictory press reports, information

coming from all sorts of sources. And we had a particular

responsibility to ensure that what we were putting out was an accurate

reflection of what the U.S. Government believed to have happened and

not, sort of, based on open sources and other information.

Q In any of the statements and the talking points related to

the attacks in Benghazi that you cleared on or drafted, did you ever

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intentionally insert information that you knew to be inaccurate or

misleading?

A No.

Q Were you ever asked or ordered to intentionally insert

information that you thought would be inaccurate or misleading?

A No.

Q Did you ever remove any accurate information that you knew

caused the remaining information to be inaccurate or misleading?

A No.

Q Were you ever asked or ordered to remove any inaccurate

information that you knew caused the remaining information to be

inaccurate or misleading?

A No.

Q It's been alleged that the administration created a false

narrative, that the YouTube video mocking the Prophet Mohammed played

a role in the attack in Benghazi. What's your response to that

allegation? Did the administration create a false narrative?

A No, absolutely not. I can say that, from my time working

there, you know, this was a situation where you had a lot of information

coming in; there were a lot of emotions. You had had a large

demonstration and penetration of the compound wall in Cairo. As the

days went on, there were, as I said, violent attacks against multiple

other diplomatic facilities in the region.

And this was a group of people throughout the interagency, across

multiple agencies, doing their best to provide accurate information,

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updating that information as new information became available. And

to the extent that there were comments that needed to be updated based

on new information, that was a result of the situation and certainly

not any deliberate attempt to mislead. Nothing could be further from

the truth, in fact, based on what I saw.

Q And with specific respect to Ben Rhodes and his role in

messaging around the attack, there have been allegations that he

crafted a false narrative or tried to mislead the American public.

From your communications with him the night of the attack and the days

following, can you speak to that?

A Sure.

I would say, as a general matter, I've worked for Ben for 3 years

and have never, in any experience on any issue I've worked on, had him

ask me to do anything other than produce accurate, factual information.

I can also say that, specific to Benghazi, the information that

was provided regarding the assessment of what had occurred in Benghazi

was information that was provided by the interagency, specifically the

intelligence community, as a result of their efforts. What

information they put into that I can't speak to, but Ben Rhodes was

not the creator or the origin of that information. So any allegation

that Ben was creating a narrative that was false or misleading, it just

doesn't hold up.

Q And you were at the NSC, but you are a career foreign service

officer. Is that right?

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A That's correct. I was on detail to the NSC from the State

Department at the time.

Q So you are not a political appointee for this

Administration?

A I am not.

Q I'm going to keep belaboring the point. Did you or anyone

else -- that's what we do here. Did you or anyone else you worked with

on any statement, talking points, or any other remarks about the

Benghazi attacks make any changes that were known at the time to be

false?

A No.

Q Did anyone ever pressure you to make any changes to any

statement, talking points, or other remarks about the Benghazi attacks

that you believed to be false?

A No.

Q And did anyone else working on any statement, talking

points, or other remarks about the Benghazi attacks ever tell you that

they had been pressured into making changes that they believed to be

false?

A No.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that anyone, yourself

included, working on any of the speeches, talking points, or remarks

about the Benghazi attacks did anything other than convey as clearly

and completely as they could the facts based on the best available

information at the time?

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A No.

Q At this point, I'm going to switch over to asking you a

series of questions that we ask every witness that comes in. As you

know, this is the eighth congressional investigation into the Benghazi

attacks, and there have been a number of allegations about the attacks.

Since we continue to investigate them, we continue to ask these

questions to everyone and see if they have any evidence to support them.

There is a long series of them, so I'll apologize in advance and

ask you to bear with me. If you don't have any evidence, then you can

just say that; we'll move on. If you have any, obviously, please speak

up.

A Okay.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

Congressman has speculate that, and I quote, "Secretary Clinton told

Leon Panetta to stand down," end quote, and this resulted in the Defense

Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

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signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it Four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on the

day-to-day security resources in Libya?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and they found, quote,

"no support for this allegation," end quote.

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Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations on the cause of and the

appropriateness of that delay.

The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report

concluding that the team was not ordered to, quote, "stand down," end

quote, but that, instead, there were tactical disagreements on the

ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q And putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

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A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that, in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q I'm going to ask the questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the CIA Deputy Director, Michael

Morell, altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks

for political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

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false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks. Do you have any evidence that Ambassador

Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on

the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain

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in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance to their

current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

the U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight

in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives.

However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the

former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a

review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the

troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it

dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

to deploy?

983
120

A No.

Q Thank you very much. Let's go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Ms. Meehan, I just have a few followup questions based on

what you were just asked. Let's start with exhibit 3, if you could

find that somewhere.

Counsel asked you a series of questions about this document, which

began with her reading you a portion of Secretary Clinton's testimony

from her recent hearing before Congress. And, in that testimony,

Secretary Clinton offered an explanation of the purpose for this

statement. And I think you were then asked about your understanding

of the purpose, and you gave one.

What is your understanding of the purpose of this statement based

upon? Did you have a conversation with the person who drafted it, Jake

Sullivan?

A I don't recall having a conversation with Jake Sullivan,

but, certainly, it is indicative of the general sense of purpose of

what we were trying to convey in those initial remarks.

Q Okay. And this general sense of purpose, where did you get

that from? Was it in a phone conversation the night of the attacks?

Was it in a meeting? Where did that come from?

A It would have been a --

Q Again, not "would have been." Do you have a specific

recollection?

984
121

A It was a compilation of what we had been working on

throughout the day. I could not point to any specific conversation

or any specific individual who would have said it in these exact terms.

As I said, I don't believe that I was a party to drafting the specific

language. But, certainly, it is an accurate reflection of what I

recall to be the sentiments at that point in time.

Q Right. And I understand the sentiment that is expressed

in the document. But you were asked about the purpose of issuing the

statement that included that language. What is your understanding of

the purpose based upon?

Like, for example, the person that drafted the statement may have

had a purpose in his mind at the time he was drafting it. Do you have

any insight into the purpose that Jake Sullivan had in his mind at the

time?

A I certainly can't speak to what was in Jake Sullivan's mind.

But, as I have said several times throughout this interview, something

that was in the back of all of our minds at that time, following on

not only what had happened in Benghazi but, again, the attack or the

protest, the incident at the embassy in Cairo earlier that day, was

a concern that there was the potential for further violence and a

spreading of this violence to other facilities in the region and that

there was a general need to do anything we could to tamp down the

rhetoric and prevent that from happening in the region.

Q Okay.

You were also asked some questions about whether or not you

985
122

believe that the United States Government or Ben Rhodes perpetuated

a false narrative about the attacks, and you said that you didn't

believe that occurred.

A Correct.

Q In my mind, in order to reach the conclusion that you

reached, you would have to know everything that Ben Rhodes knew about

the attack or you would have to know everything that the State

Department knew about the attack to reach that conclusion. Were you

privy to all the information about the attacks?

A So I would say a couple things about that.

Number one, I don't know whether I was privy to all the information

about the facts because I don't know what that universe of all the

information is, so it would be impossible for me to say.

Certainly, it is accurate to say Ben would have been privy to

conversations and briefings that I may not have been privy to. But

I would also say that, again, my responsibility as one of the

coordinators of the interagency means that I would see anything that

was being provided by other agencies. So when we received assessments

from the intelligence community, that was given from their public

affairs officer directly to me. That's not something that went from

Shawn Turner to Ben Rhodes and then I received a version from Ben Rhodes.

I saw those direct inputs from the agencies.

So I don't see any circumstance that would make it feasible for

Ben Rhodes or anyone else, frankly, at the NSC or the White House to

986
123

have made up information or modified information in a way that you're

suggesting.

Q I don't believe I suggested that. If you heard that, then

you misunderstood what I was saying. I'm not suggesting that anyone

made up information.

I'm just saying you reached a conclusion that neither Ben Rhodes

nor the U.S. Government had perpetuated a false narrative. And, in

my mind, maybe not in yours, in order to draw that conclusion, you would

have to know all of the information that Ben Rhodes had or that the

U.S. Government had. And I'm asking you if you were privy to all that

information. You said you don't know.

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. Let's focus on some specific items.

Were you privy to all of the information that was being conveyed

from the facility in Benghazi to the Embassy in Tripoli and then back

to the State Department?

A I have no way to know.

Q Were you privy to any of that information?

A I was certainly privy to information that was incorporated

in talking points and press guidance and other materials that would

have been passed to me by my counterparts at the State Department.

Q Okay. So would it be fair to say that the information you

were privy to would be circumscribed by the information you were

receiving via email?

A I would have received it via email; perhaps during the SVTCs

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124

that we've referred to in the past, where the interagency communicators

gather on the same SVTC just for ease of process; or phone

conversations -- any of those methods.

Q Okay. But as you sit here today, you can't say one way or

the other whether you were privy to all the information known about

the attacks in Benghazi.

A Correct.

Q And you were asked some questions in the litany of questions

at the end about the President's actions the night of the attack. Do

you have any firsthand knowledge of the President's actions or

movements the night of the attack?

A The only firsthand knowledge I have is that he, if I remember

correctly, conducted a very lengthy phone call with Prime Minister

Netanyahu of Israel that evening.

Q This is on the evening of September 11.

A I believe, to the best of my recollection.

Q Okay. Were you present for that conversation?

A I was not, but I was responsible for helping to coordinate

the drafting of the public readout of that conversation.

Q Were you present to witness any of the President's movements

or actions during the night of the attack?

A I was not.

Q Alright.

Mr. Missakian. I don't have any further questions.

Okay. Great. Off the record.

988
125

[Whereupon, at 1:47 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

989
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 1

990
This exhibit was not cleared for public release.

EXHIBIT 2

991
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 3

992
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 4

993
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

994
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 5

995
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

996
EXHIBIT 6

997
998
999
1000
1001
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 7

1002
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1003
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 8

1004
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1005
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1006
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1007
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1008
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1009

INTERVIEW OF

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF

MAGHREB AFFAIRS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, DECEMBER 17, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel

DANIEL REBNORD, Minority Professional Staff

ERIN O’BRIEN, Minority Detailee

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ERIC SNYDER, Senior Counsel

LAURA E. DECK, Attorney-Adviser

FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MAGHREB AFFAIRS

RAEKA SAFAI

1012
3

Ms. Clarke. Good morning. This is a transcribed interview of

Ms. conducted by the House Select Committee on

Benghazi.

This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the

committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic

facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant to House

Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th

Congress.

Could you please state your name for the record?

Ms. . My name is .

Ms. Clarke. Thank you. And, again, the committee appreciates

your appearance at this interview today.

Ms. . Yes.

Ms. Clarke. My name is Sheria Clarke. I'm with the majority

staff. And we'll just take a moment to go around the room and have

everyone introduce themselves.

Mr. Missakian. I'm Craig Missakian. I'm also with the majority

staff.

Mr. Desai. Ronak Desai with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Mr. Rebnord. Dan Rebnord with the minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Mr. Snyder. Eric Snyder, State Department.

Ms. Deck. Laura Deck, State Department.

Ms. Safai. Raeka Safai, AFSA.

1013
4

Ms. Clarke. Okay.

Before we begin, I just want to go over the ground rules and

explain how the interview will proceed.

Ms. . Sure.

Ms. Clarke. Generally, the way the questioning proceeds is that

a member of the majority will ask questions for up to an hour, and then

the minority will also have an opportunity to ask questions.

Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee or

designated staff members. We'll rotate back and forth, 1 hour per

side, until we are out of questions, and that's when we will conclude

the interview.

Ms. . Okay.

Ms. Clarke. Unlike a testimony or deposition in Federal court,

the committee format is not bound by the rules of evidence, and the

witness or their counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject

to review by the chairman of the committee.

Ms. . Okay.

Ms. Clarke. If these objections cannot be resolved in the

interview, the witness may be required to return for a deposition or

a hearing. Members and staff of the committee, however, are not

permitted to raise objections when the other side is asking questions.

This session is going to begin in an unclassified setting.

Ms. . Okay.

Ms. Clarke. We have arranged a classified setting for this

afternoon should there be questions that the answers to those questions

1014
5

call for a classified setting.

Ms. . I understand.

Ms. Clarke. You're welcome to confer with counsel at any time

throughout the interview. And if something needs to be clarified, just

let us know. We'll do our best to clarify the questions.

Ms. . Okay.

Ms. Clarke. If you need to discuss anything with your counsel,

just let us know. We can go off the record and give you a moment to

do so.

Ms. . Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. We'd like to take a break whenever it's convenient

for you. This can be after every round of questioning or whatever you

prefer. If you need anything, a glass of water, coffee, just let us

know, and we'll take a break and allow you the opportunity to get that.

Ms. . Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. We just want to make this as comfortable a process

as possible.

As you can see, an official reporter is taking down everything

you say today to make a written record. So we ask that you give verbal

responses to all questions, yes and no, as opposed to nods of the head.

Ms. . Uh-huh.

Ms. Clarke. And I'm going to ask the reporter to jump in if you

do respond nonverbally.

Ms. . Got it.

Ms. Clarke. Also, I'd ask the reporter to remind us, if we begin

1015
6

talking over each other, not to do so so that we'll have a clear record.

If you have a question, again, or if you don't understand any of

our questions, let us know. Again, we're happy to clarify or repeat

the questions. And we just want you to -- if you don't honestly know

the answer to a question, we just ask that you give us your best memory,

but we don't want you to guess. If there are things you do not know

or can't remember, just say so, and please inform us who, to the best

of your knowledge, may be able to provide the answer to our questions.

Ms. . I understand.

Ms. Clarke. You are required to answer questions from Congress

truthfully. Do you understand that?

Ms. . I do.

Ms. Clarke. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in an interview. Do you also understand that?

Ms. . Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Clarke. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand that?

Ms. . Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Clarke. Is there any reason you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

Ms. . No.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you.

That's the end of our introduction. Does the minority have

anything they'd like to add?

1016
7

Ms. Sawyer. We just thank you for being here. We appreciate

your willingness to appear voluntarily.

It is my understanding, are you currently posted in the United

States?

Ms. . . I had to fly back this

week.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. So you flew back in order to be able to appear

before the committee?

Ms. . I did.

Ms. Sawyer. So we appreciate that very much.

Ms. . Of course.

Ms. Sawyer. We also appreciate the work of the State Department

to help make that happen.

Ms. . Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. Thank you for being here.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you.

The clock now reads 10:09, so we'll go ahead and get started.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q If you could, Ms. , could you just give us a brief

overview of your career at the State Department?

A Okay. Sure. I am a foreign service officer, ma'am. I

joined the State Department as an FSO in 1999. I am a political officer

by specialization, but, like all foreign service officers, I've done

a variety of assignments both in Washington and overseas.

1017
8

I began my career as a consular officer in Thailand; then we moved

on to Kosovo. My early Washington assignments were as a country desk

officer for Armenia and Georgia. Then I worked for an office that no

longer exists called -- it was in the Office of the Secretary for

stabilization and reconstruction operations that's since become the

SCO Bureau, Conflict and Stabilization Operations. I was then a

special assistant to the Deputy Secretary when it was Bob Zoellick.

I was fortunate to have the opportunity to be sent back for Arabic

language training for 2 years and then served in Cairo and Baghdad,

then the State Department Operations Center as a senior watch officer.

Following that assignment, I was the Deputy Director for Maghreb

Affairs, 2011 to 2013, as you know.

Then I went up to Boston as the diplomat in residence for New

England, where I spent a year. It was, you know, an academic and

recruiting assignment.

And, since June of 2014, I have been as the Deputy

Director of our .

That's right. And I'm assigned to be

.

Q How long were you a senior watch officer in the Ops Center?

A Thirteen months, ma'am. That's the normal Ops assignment.

Q Okay. Did your time overlap with ?

A It did. Yes, ma'am.

Q Was it concurrent time? Or how much time did you overlap?

A If I recall correctly, we probably overlapped for about

1018
9

9 months, 9 or 10 months.

Q And when you began as the Deputy Director of the Maghreb

Affairs, was that at the beginning of 2011, or was it --

A No, ma'am. It was in middle of August 2011.

Q So your time in the Ops Center ended sometime in

July-August 2011?

A Right. Right at the beginning of August, yeah.

Q So I want to talk to you in a little bit of reverse chron

order, so --

A Okay.

Q -- I want to talk with you -- we are going to start with

what you were doing, what you heard, what you learned on the night of

the attacks. So if you could just walk us through what you recall about

the night of the attack. When did you first learn about it? How did

you learn about it? What did you do in response to what you learned?

A Okay.

On September 11 of 2011, I was in my office that afternoon in

NEA/MAG, and the first I recall of hearing about the attack was late

afternoon around 4 p.m. I got a call from a friend and colleague who's

the Deputy Director of the Executive Office of NEA. She called me and

she's like, "Hey, I saw something in the press. Sounds like there is

an attack on the mission in Benghazi. What are you hearing?" And I

said, "Look, nothing yet. I'll get back to you."

So I shouted out to the office. I sat kitty-corner from the

Director of the office and the Libya desk officers. And, like, "Hey,

1019
10

guys, have we heard anything from post? You know, is hearing

this in the press."

We started checking all the news sources, and that's when the

information from different press sources started coming in about what

appeared to be an attack on the special mission in Benghazi.

Q And did you receive any alerts from the Ops Center or any

other alerts from within the State Department?

A I recall receiving an alert from the Operations Center, but

I don't recall exactly what time that came in, ma'am. So it was

sometime late afternoon, early evening.

Q And once you became aware of the attack, what did you do?

A It was a very trying day. So we, as a team, kind of huddled

and were like, okay, how do we want to approach this within NEA/MAG.

And my director went up to work with Assistant Secretary Jones in her

office. They were reaching out to our DCM in Tripoli.

The team in our office, not just the Libya desk officers but the

desk officers for our other three countries in Maghreb Affairs, started

looking at the press, started pulling information from Twitter, you

know, Arabic language social media, et cetera.

We were all fielding calls. People across the State Department

and friends of ours who knew Ambassador Stevens started calling us.

They're like, "What's going on, guys? Do you know anything?"

In the early evening, I suggested that go upstairs, go back

up to the Operations Center since she and I were both experienced with

the practices of the Operations Center. One of the key

1020
11

responsibilities of the Ops staff is to help conduct the Secretary's

telephone diplomacy.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you. We'll pause right there. Just for the

record, let it reflect that Mr. Westmoreland has joined us.

Mr. Westmoreland. How are you?

Ms. . I'm well, sir. Thank you.

Mr. Westmoreland. Thanks for being here.

Ms. . Thank you, sir.

So went up to the Operations Center to help the team there

prepare what we call a call sheet. We were aware that the Secretary

of State would want to start calling Libyan officials as soon as

possible, reaching out to get clarification from them, seek assistance,

et cetera. And so she helped prepare the call sheet for the Secretary's

phone call to Magariaf.

And she was on the call. It's the practice of the Operations

Center to be -- several colleagues on the floor listen to the

Secretary's phone call. We don't participate, obviously, in her

conversations, but just help with the notes and the notes for the

record.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q And did you also listen in on the call?

A No, ma'am. It's not appropriate. You must be on the

Operations Center floor --

Q Oh, understood.

A -- to be part of that.

1021
12

Q Okay.

And was in the Ops Center for the remainder of the night?

A I don't recall how long she was up there. I mean, frankly,

a lot of what I was doing was fielding calls from -- and reaching out

also. You've got to recall, this was a really, really tough week. The

region was generally in turmoil during the Arab Spring. I was reaching

out to my other three embassies in the region to find out if they were

okay, if they were concerned about security developments.

And one or two of those DCMs and ambassadors reached out to me

proactively to be like, hey, you know, good luck with what's happening.

Let us know if we can help in any way from the region if the team needs

help, if there's going to be any evacuations, if we can provide any

support, et cetera.

So it was just that kind of -- so it's a little bit foggy,

exactly -- but I was there until early hours of the morning. I think

my office director and a couple of desk officers went home and showered

and ate, so I stayed behind. And then we swapped out so everybody could

freshen up and come back.

Q So was there someone from the office there throughout the

night?

A Yes. Absolutely. Yeah.

Q Once you were alerted to the attack, did you reach out to

1022
13

anyone outside of the State Department? Did you talk to anyone with

the White House or the NSS?

A I don't recall. Our focus was internal, our team in Libya

and my other posts in the region. I did have a number of emails from

friends around the world, you know, friends, other diplomats from

around the world, not Americans, people who were reaching out that were

like, "Are you okay? We're just hearing this in the press." Or, "Do

you happen to be in Libya right now?" They weren't sure what my role

was. So yeah.

Q After you received the initial alert or the initial

information that there was an attack, did you receive subsequent

updates from the Ops Center or from about what was happening on

the ground?

A Frankly, a lot of the updated information was coming in from

the media. And then we started receiving information, as well, from

our DCM in Tripoli, Mr. Hicks, as well as information was coming in

on the classified system, not very much. But colleagues, different

agencies were checking on different avenues to look for more

information on the Ambassador's whereabouts.

Q And did you have access to that? Is it classified

information?

A Ma'am, we -- yes. For -- I don't want to say most, but as

the Deputy Director of NEA, I had two computers on my desk. I had access

to unclassified email and classified email. And we were receiving,

you know, updates or questions on both sides.

1023
14

Q I think earlier you mentioned that the Director, Mr.

, went upstairs to the Assistant Secretary's office --

A Yes.

Q -- and that at some point during the night she began to have

conversations with the DCM in Tripoli?

A I believe so. Yes, ma'am.

Q Did you receive any information about the substance of those

conversations? Were they providing updates to the rest of the NEA

staff about what they were learning from the people on the ground?

A If I recall correctly, yes. You know, Mr. Hicks and our

team were trying to figure out what was happening in Benghazi, trying

to engage with Libyan officials, engage with contacts across Libya,

and seek the assistance of the Libyan authorities.

Q And, if you recall, at that time in the evening, what was

your understanding of what was transpiring and what had transpired at

the mission in Benghazi?

A Ma'am, at that time in the evening, that evening was very

unclear. I mean, there was conflicting information in the press and

on social media. We were just trying to figure out exactly what was

going on. I had no definitive understanding that evening.

Q And did the reports that were coming in from Tripoli on the

ground, was there anything relayed by those individuals about what they

thought had occurred?

A I don't recall that. I think I and my colleagues in the

field were trying to figure out what was happening. I don't think

1024
15

anybody ventured a specific guess. It was just, let's figure out

what's happening.

Q Did you personally talk to anyone that was in Libya that

night?

A I don't think I did, ma'am.

In my role, I mean, we had thought about, okay, how do we divvy

this up. You know, I'll field the calls from Washington and from our

colleagues, and I'll focus on email. went up to Ops. Other desk

officers were looking at media. was up helping Assistant

Secretary Jones and reaching out to post.

So I don't recall calling anyone in Libya. And they were pretty

much flat out, so --

Q And when you say you fielded calls from others in

Washington, was that from other agencies? Or who were you fielding

calls from?

A A lot of the calls were from friends of Ambassador Stevens

and other colleagues who were in Libya at the time, as well as other

friends in NEA or, you know, friends who had once been a foreign service

officer. Just people calling to see how we were doing. "I just heard

this in the press. How are you guys doing?"

A lot of calls with the Executive Office in NEA that work on, you

know, remembering, okay, we have this many folks here, you know,

thinking about how do we do the best we can for this post. Do we need

to think about an evacuation? Is there a security concern in Tripoli,

as well? Do we need to worry about our colleagues there? Do we need

1025
16

to evacuate? Once folks come out of Benghazi to Tripoli, how do we

get them -- so a lot of the practical, like, what are our next steps,

what are our checklists for our next steps.

Q And so that was kind of your responsibility that evening,

to field those types of calls?

A Yes. And just in general, I mean, we were all trying to

support one another. And we had a wider concern, you know, and

I, for what else was happening in the region with our other posts, but

primarily for Libya that evening.

Q Did you have any discussions within NEA about whether to

and how to evacuate the individuals in Benghazi?

A That was already underway. I mean, DCM Hicks and our

regional security professionals in Tripoli had already made a game plan

for how folks were going to come out and come back to Tripoli.

And then we were looking at the, you know, core diplomatic staff

we had in Tripoli, like, okay, who should we send out? Does everybody

still need to remain here while we assess the circumstance? Do we need

an order of departure to get them out? So those were some of the

conversations we were having.

But, again, I'm on the policy side. I was not directly involved

with decisions about planes or -- I was there to help the resources

people think about, okay, if we had, like -- I don't recall exactly

how many, ma'am, but if we have -- okay, the DCM is going to need this

person. He's got really good Arabic; he can engage with the press and

do the reporting support. These other people are not emergency staff

1026
17

for this -- you know, kind of helping that discussion.

Q So I just want to understand, were you a part of the

discussions to determine who were going to be evacuated and at what

point? Or were you just relayed that information and then you would

relay it on?

A No. I was explaining, kind of, the different roles of the

staff there to the Executive Office folks, the guys who were doing

resources and planning. And I was not -- it was the DCM and the NEA

leadership who ultimately made the call, like, who do we evacuate at

this time, who do we get to Germany, and who stays to support the

DCM -- who, unfortunately, became charge the next day.

Q And when you say the NEA leadership, is that at --

A The Assistant Secretary.

Q Okay.

A Yeah. Yeah.

Q Thank you.

During that night, did you participate in any conference calls,

interagency conference calls?

A I don't remember participating in those. I'm sorry.

Q Okay. Do you remember participating in any SVTC calls?

A I don't remember that that evening, ma'am.

Q There was a SVTC around 7 p.m. on the evening of September

11, and do you recall hearing about the SVTC or being updated about

what was discussed during that SVTC?

A No, I don't. I don't. No, I don't.

1027
18

Q Okay.

I want to show you an exhibit. We'll mark this as exhibit 1.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q And just take your time to read it.

A Okay. Do you have copies for --

Q Yes.

A Thank you, ma'am.

Q For the record, this is exhibit 1. It has a document number

SCB 000029, and it's an email chain on September 11, 2012. And it

begins with an email from Ben Fishman to you and and

about a statement from the GNC.

And, for the record, who is Ben Fishman?

A Ben was our Libya director at the National Security Council

at the time.

Q And we've seen other emails on this evening where you're

corresponding back and forth with Ben Fishman about various aspects

of the attack. Does this refresh your memory about some of the people

that you may have corresponded with on that night?

A Yes, it does. It looks like Ben and I had several exchanges

that evening.

Q And can you explain to us, kind of, your relationship,

working relationship, with Mr. Fishman and what would have prompted

his reaching out to you and your reaching out to him on that evening?

1028
19

A Well, in general, you know, as the Deputy Director of

NEA/MAG, my role was to kind of mentor our country desk officers for

the four countries, you know, as having some Washington experience,

having been a desk officer myself, and helping make sure they were

supporting our posts properly in the field, writing the right paper

to support our Assistant Secretary and the State Department principals,

and occasionally you know, weighing in on particular substantive areas

in support of the Director if he needed my help in a particular area.

So Ben, as the director for Libya, was responsible for

coordinating all of the USG agencies working on that country on those

issues, so calling meetings, et cetera. He would occasionally reach

out to the desk informally or to me informally and say, "Hey, how are

things? I saw that cable from post. That was interesting. Do you

guys have further" -- so, you know, it was very informal.

In this case, I don't recall reaching out to him. It looks like

he wanted to make sure we were aware of information he got from this

contact.

Q Okay.

About halfway down on the first page, he emails you and asks if

there has been any thought to reach out to Turkey about what they may

have present in Benghazi.

A Sure.

Q And then your response was, "I'll check in with Ops."

Do you recall checking in with Ops about Turkey or any other

countries that were in Benghazi and what their presence was like and

1029
20

whether or not they could provide any information or provide

assistance?

A I don't remember in depth. What I remember is, internally,

in our team, in NEA/MAG, and then Ops asking what other countries have

diplomatic missions there, who else might know what's happening on the

ground. So it was just a very brief -- and I didn't pursue it further

after that.

Q Did you have any other discussions with anyone, with

or Assistant Secretary Jones, about the other diplomatic

presence in Benghazi?

A I imagine -- and I don't recall exactly -- but I imagine

I probably forwarded this chain to , as well, and to consider -- I

had not visited Benghazi myself, but we were aware that the Turkish

Government had several consulates, several commercial facilities in

Libya.

Q And I will note for the record, at the very top you do

actually forward it to and .

Outside of this email, do you recall any other interaction with

Mr. about the presence of other countries in Benghazi and the

resources or information that they may have had about what was

happening?

A I don't recall that, ma'am.

Q At the very top, you write, "Ops tells us Jeff is already

on the phone with Beth." I assume this is referring to the Assistant

Secretary, Beth Jones?

1030
21

A Yes, that would have been Beth Jones.

Q And who is Jeff?

A If I recall correctly, it would be Jeff Feltman, who had

been our Assistant Secretary recently and who had moved on to the U.N.

I'm pretty sure that's what I was referring to.

Q And it indicates that she had gleaned some information from

him, and it also indicates that Qatar might be a good avenue.

Do you recall any further discussion with or with Assistant

Secretary Jones about the information that Mr. Feltman provided?

A I do not. I do not.

Q If you look back on the first page, at the very, very top,

it's an email from Ben Fishman to you. And on the first page, it says,

"I don't know why Pat Kennedy is so concerned about what extra security

folks are wearing. Does that come from Greg?"

And then your response is, "I bet Kennedy is worried about further

repercussions and attacks if U.S. military is too obvious."

What did you base your response to Ben Fishman on?

A I based my response on the recent historical context. So,

in Libya, as with many other countries, we're very sensitive to

host-nation concerns about whether U.S. military are in uniform or not.

And Libya, if I recall correctly, they were -- the folks who were there

were not in uniform. They wore civilian dress suits to sort of blend

in.

And I think that's what I was referring to, you know, people were

blending in more.

1031
22

Q So it was based off of recent events, and it wasn't

necessarily a conversation that you had had with Secretary Kennedy --

A No, no, no.

Q -- or any discussion that you may have?

A No. Certainly not. My role was not to have special

conversations with the Under Secretary about that, yeah.

Q So it wasn't a remark that he made during a meeting or

anything that you were privy to.

A No, ma'am. Well, if there was, I wasn't privy to it. I

was referring to the historical context of what our military -- you

know, how people looked in the field at that time.

Q And, within NEA, did the individuals within NEA share Under

Secretary Kennedy's concern about whether or not these individuals that

evening were dressed in military attire versus civilian attire?

A I wouldn't necessarily know.

Q Did you share the same concern?

A I'll be honest with you, ma'am; that wasn't my focus that

evening. My focus was are our people okay, what exactly is happening,

you know. So I don't recall having that conversation with anyone.

Q Okay.

During the evening, were you aware or were you updated on any

deployment of any military assets to assist in Benghazi?

A I'm not comfortable discussing that here. Is it possible

to discuss that in a different setting?

Q Yes.

1032
23

A Okay.

Q Can you share with us here how you became aware of that

information?

A If I recall correctly, I received an email on my classified

email beginning to discuss that issue -- not in great depth, again,

as I was the policy person, I was not the military advisor. So, yeah.

Q And did you participate in any phone calls discussing that

issue?

A I don't recall being on a phone call. I apologize. I don't

recall that. No.

Q Later in that evening, there was a subsequent attack on the

CIA Annex in Benghazi. And were you made aware of that incident, as

well?

A Yes, I was, ma'am. I believe I and my team first heard of

it through the media because it was very public very quickly. Yeah.

Q And what did you do in response to that information?

A I don't recall exactly what I did in response to that

information. People knew about it very quickly throughout our

building because every press outlet -- it was widely covered.

Q Did that change any of your responsibilities for the

evening? I think before you said you were fielding calls and email

requests about, kind of, the people who were there and who might need

to stay and who might need to be evacuated. Once you learned about

the attack on the Annex after all of the State people had been moved

to the Annex, did that change any of your responsibilities for the

1033
24

evening?

A I think the immediate goal was to figure out what the heck

is going on and who's still around to help. That was sort of the

immediate goal. Once we saw that news, I saw that news, I'm like, okay,

let's keep focused on what we've been doing and see what else

transpires.

Q And so did you reach out to any additional people for more

information, anybody within the interagency? Did you brief Assistant

Secretary Jones about any more information you gleaned? I am just

trying to understand, once you received this information, what were

you doing following that?

A We continued, ma'am, what we continued to do, was track

different local media sources and international media sources to try

to figure out what we could piece together about what happened.

I did not personally need to reach out to other agencies for

information because, if I recall correctly, that started feeding in

to the Assistant Secretary and to NEA, like, "Here is what we're hearing

from different sorts of people in the field."

Q Were you privy to that information?

A I don't recall exactly what -- I don't remember what I was

privy to. I mean, I -- I apologize.

Q Throughout the evening, what -- what I'm trying to

understand is kind of how the evening progressed in NEA. So,

throughout the evening, did you all have subsequent meetings where you

gathered and said, "This is what we're learning"? How were people

1034
25

updated in NEA throughout the evening about what was happening on the

ground, what were the decisions being made about the people on the

ground, et cetera?

A If I recall correctly, what we were doing was the folks

in -- you know, our desk officers and others who were tracking the media

were feeding that information, help the Ops Center pull together alerts

on what was being heard and what was being learned through the media.

And that information was coming in. The DCM, the defense

attache, and others in Tripoli were sending back information to

Assistant Secretary Jones, so we were receiving information on what

the Libyans were doing and on what they were seeing on the ground in

Tripoli.

I mean, any bit of information we were receiving was, you know,

forwarding that back up to, kind of, the NEA command center, to

Assistant Secretary Jones and to . NEA/EX, our Executive Office,

was doing, kind of, the logistics to help people as they needed to be

moved.

Q Are you familiar with the FEST?

A Can you remind me? Is that an acronym for a military team?

Q I think it's a State Department asset, the Foreign Emergency

Support Team?

A Okay. So it's a Diplomatic Security team?

Q I believe it has --

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. . Okay. Yeah, I'm not completely familiar with it.

1035
26

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Okay. Do you recall if you were involved in any discussions

that evening regarding deploying the FEST in response to the attack?

A I recall -- it was probably with Executive Office

colleagues -- the discussion of, we'll post requests for additional

Diplomatic Security or other resources for Tripoli once people have

left Benghazi that are in Tripoli and then for the remaining presence

in Tripoli. But I don't recall exactly how those conversations went.

Again, I'm not a DS professional, so our Executive Office folks

would have consulted directly with -- like, we're expecting to get this

information, if we get this request from post or people in Washington

are thinking this is a good idea. So I would not have been privy to

all of those discussions.

Q Do you know who Mark Thompson is?

A If I recall correctly, he was a colleague in the

Counterterrorism Bureau.

Q Do you recall having a discussion with him that evening

about whether or not the FEST should be deployed?

A I don't recall a specific conversation. I believe that I

exchanged several emails with him or with others in the CT Bureau that

evening about the situation in Benghazi.

Q In the days following the attack, what was your awareness

of or any role that you played in helping to put together what has come

to be known as the "talking points" -- the talking points that were

issued by the CIA and that were subsequently used by Ambassador Susan

1036
27

Rice on the Sunday morning talk shows? Did you have any input into

that process?

A No. No role.

Q During that timeframe, did you draft any other type of

talking points for the Director or for the Assistant Secretary

regarding NEA's view about what happened that night?

A No.

So, ma'am, as the Deputy Director, normally our press office

colleagues in the regional bureau took a lead on directing press points.

Our role in NEA/MAG, my role and my desk officers' role, would have

been making sure they had accurate information, the latest information

we have, to make sure the talking points are as complete as they could

be, keeping in mind -- or flagging sensitivities like, hey, we don't

want to put that out to the press yet because it's sensitive, you know.

So that would have been our role. It's unlikely that I would have

been drafting talking points directly.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q All right.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q I think you just said, you described generally what your

role would be in giving information and guidance to the NEA press shop.

Do you recall specifically what occurred in this instance with regard

to any press points they may have drafted about the Benghazi attacks?

A No, I don't remember exactly. Really, press guidance and

1037
28

talking points are, at that time and in general, a very small part of

what we were responsible for. I know we were barraged, our press office

was barraged with questions from the media. So I recall we were

constantly passing them updates, and they were sending us language to

clear, to look at, like, do you think this is accurate. But I don't

recall drafting anything myself.

Q What updates did you send them?

A Any information we were receiving from post that was -- you

know, just making sure that our colleagues in NEA who were responsible

for every aspect of this were -- you know, we were all on the same page

about what we were hearing from post, from Libyan contacts.

Q Take us through that, just the process of getting

information from post and then passing it on to your press people. How

did that work on September 11?

A On the day of?

Q Yeah.

A On the day of, our press colleagues were -- if I recall

correctly, they were cc'd on, they were copied on -- either they were

copied on or I or one of our desk officers would have forwarded -- if

I recall correctly, would have forwarded them updates from post,

including from the public affairs officer in Tripoli at the time, who

was, himself, beginning to receive questions from press outlets, local

and Western.

Q Again, you used the term "would have."

A Yeah.

1038
29

Q I'm asking what you specifically recall.

A I don't recall specifically, sir. I'm sorry. It was a

very traumatic day.

Q I understand that.

So, for example, do you recall information being passed by

somebody on the phone in Tripoli to somebody on the phone in the State

Department and having that information put into an email and then sent

to the press people in NEA? Do you recall that happening?

A I do not recall exactly how we engaged the press shop that

night.

Q Okay. So, as you sit here today, you have no general or

specific recollection of how information that was received from field

was conveyed to the press shop in NEA. Is that fair?

A It is fair, sir.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. On September 16, Ambassador Susan Rice appeared on

the Sunday morning talk shows. Did you watch those talk shows when

they first aired?

Ms. . I remember we were working all weekend. And so

all I recall is scrolling through, you know, kind of, the channels that

morning. I noticed that she was on, and then I turned off the TV and

tried to get some rest before I went back to office. So I didn't watch

the shows.

Mr. Westmoreland. Excuse me. I've got to go vote.

Ms. . Thank you, sir.

1039
30

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q And, following the shows, did you receive and read the

transcripts of the shows?

A I remember seeing not full transcripts but, kind of, just

snippets the next day. They were excerpted by either our press office

or some State Department, like, here's what the principals said on the

Sunday morning talk shows.

Q Do you recall having any discussions with NEA about the

substance of what was said on the talk shows and whether there was an

agreement or disagreement with what was conveyed?

A Yes, ma'am. I recall that I was a little bit surprised.

The description of what was said -- and, again, I didn't watch the

program myself -- it just sounded more definitive of what potentially

had happened. But, again, I didn't watch the show myself, and I didn't

read the full transcript. I was too busy that day to do that.

Q When you say you're a bit surprised, what were you surprised

regarding?

A I was surprised in the way that they were described in the

press clips, that there was an indication that there was some connection

to the anti-Muslim video of concern that had been circulating online,

that there was some connection to that. In the press clips that I read,

I remember seeing, like -- okay.

Q And I think, before, you just said that that was a pretty

definitive statement.

A In the way that I saw it excerpted in the press clips, it

1040
31

seemed like the connection had been made to the video more definitively.

Q Were you concerned about there being a definitive

connection to the video?

A Ma'am, at the time, what I was most concerned about was that

we didn't know exactly what had happened and that there was an ongoing

investigation. We knew the FBI was about to have an investigation.

So I think our job as, you know, kind of officers in NEA and my job,

specifically, is to be like, okay, let's not speculate, let's let the

professionals do their jobs, the intel and the law enforcement folks.

So we were very, you know, mindful of that.

Q Did you feel that, based on what you had seen in the clips,

the press clips, and the description that had been given to you about

what was said, that that was a bit of speculation that Ambassador Rice

had stated on the talk shows?

A Ma'am, I can't speak for other people. I can just speak

for what -- you know, I was a little bit surprised. And, at the time,

I remember thinking, "Oh, maybe there's other information I'm not privy

to." But that was just my reaction at the time.

Q Right. And my question was, did you think there was

speculation?

A At the time, I thought there was some speculation going on.

Q Thank you.

I'm going to mark this as exhibit 2.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

1041
32

Ms. Clarke. And just take your time to read through it.

And just for the record, this is document number C05580617.

And for the witness, I believe it's an email chain of some language

that was forwarded. I don't think that you are on the email chain until

the second page, near the top, when it's forwarded to you.

Ms. . Okay. I got it. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Just a moment. Just to double-check, I mean, the

first email is NEA Libya desk. Would you have received that?

Ms. . No, I would not have received NEA/Libya desk.

That was just the desk officers.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. Thanks.

Ms. . If I remember correctly, yeah, I don't think I know

about this. We all got way too many emails.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q All right. So just to take you back to the second page,

it's an email response that you -- you respond to this chain. You

address it to . And you said, " -- per my call. Not

sure we want to be so definitive. What does Assistant Secretary Jones

say?"

And do you recall, when you say, "per my call," do you recall what

your discussion with was that evening?

A I don't remember exactly what we said on the call, but I

suspect, just based on, you know, this chain and what would have been

in my mind at the time, just trying to figure out, you know, are we

ready to be this definitive, you know, should we walk it back a bit,

1042
33

make it more -- because we didn't have the investigation yet. We didn't

know exactly what had happened.

Q And for the purpose of the record, who is , or

?

A , ma'am, I think he was the Deputy Director

of the NEA press shop at the time. He worked for .

Q You also ask him what the Assistant Secretary had to say

about such a definitive statement. Do you recall whether you received

a response or whether you were made aware of her view of a statement

as definitive as the one that had been made?

A I don't remember, ma'am. I don't remember.

I'm going to be frank. There was so much going on; press

guidance, talking points was the least of our worries on the regional

desk. We had awesome press colleagues. We trusted them to kind of

get the guidance they needed. We helped with information and let them

run with it.

Q So, previously, when we were having our discussion, you said

that, based on the press clips you received, that you were concerned

about there being such a definitive statement, and then you also used

the same word in this email. Could you explain to us what you were

referring to when you said, "Not sure we want to be so definitive?"

What part of the press guidance that was forwarded to you were you

concerned about?

A I don't remember exactly at the time. But, in looking at

it now, I mean, it's good that we say that information is being collected

1043
34

and analyzed. The first point would have been the point of concern,

"The currently available information suggests the demonstrations were

inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo." The

investigation was just beginning at the time. I don't think we knew

enough to say that at the time.

Q At the time, did you have any information to indicate that

this statement may not have been true? In other words, at the time,

did you have any indication that there was something other than what

had occurred in Cairo that may have --

A At the time, we weren't sure what was true. We didn't know

exactly what had happened. And, again, I'm a cautious person. I'm

like, let's let the FBI, let's let the intel guys do their

investigation. That wasn't my role.

Mr. Missakian. I just want to ask a followup question.

This is now September 17, 2012.

Ms. . That's right.

Mr. Missakian. Did you have any information by that date to

suggest there was a protest in Benghazi prior to the attack?

Ms. . No. No.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Do you recall around this time there being a disagreement

amongst agencies, the interagency, about whether or not the attack was

preplanned or spontaneous?

A I don't recall an argument. I recall discussions about

what happened and people feeding in information, not speculating in

1044
35

press but speculating amongst us about what could have happened. But

I don't recall an argument about this. I recall a normal kind of debate

about it.

Q When you say "amongst us," do you mean amongst the

individuals within the NEA Bureau?

A Within NEA and with colleagues at -- you know, kind of, the

normal interagency colleagues we'd work with -- the DOD, et cetera.

Q And was this discussion via email? Was this discussion

during a meeting? How was this discussion conducted?

A There was a lot of email. Of course, you know, we love email

in this profession.

I don't recall. We must have had -- I don't recall what meetings

we were having, but we must have been having meetings at that time to

kind of hash out, like, here's the information we have. You know, we

would have been keeping updated on the intel that was coming in, reading

the stuff from our colleagues across the river.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q I just want to make sure I understand your answer.

Regardless of whether it rose to the level of a fight, do you

recall a disagreement within the intelligence community about whether

or not the attack in Benghazi was preplanned or spontaneous?

A No. No, not the intelligence community. What I

recall -- and if I may provide a bit of other context, sir.

In the region, the day of Benghazi and throughout the region,

there were protests in other places. There were demonstrations.

1045
36

There was violence. There was an attack on several of our missions

around the world, in Yemen, in Cairo, et cetera. So there was a lot

of speculation in the press and a lot of speculation about what various

extremists groups in all these countries were doing.

So I think -- I don't recall -- if there was an argument in the

intel community, I, as Deputy Director of MAG, would not have been privy

to it. But what I was seeing was, you know, in, kind of, the intel

book that I had access to and, kind of, the various emails, information

about what potentially could have happened. I don't recall seeing an

argument.

Q Again, don't get hung up on the word "argument" or "fight."

A Sure.

Q I'm just talking about, did you see a disagreement in the

opinion within the intelligence community over whether or not the

attack was spontaneous or preplanned. I believe you said you were not

aware of any disagreement within the intelligence community.

A No, I was not aware. I was not aware.

Q So how about within the State Department? Were you aware

of any disagreement between individuals or factions of individuals as

to whether or not the attack in Benghazi was spontaneous or preplanned?

A No. I don't remember a disagreement.

What I remember was we were all sifting through a lot of

information from our posts, you know, different Libyan contacts

offering their speculation and theories about what had happened to our

defense attache, to our political officer, to Greg, et cetera, and

1046
37

different folks speculating in the media and elsewhere about what had

happened.

I think it was that barrage of information, with an inability to

go back and see exactly, you know, what had happened that night in

Benghazi.

Q So you got this barrage of information that you and others

within the State Department are receiving and sifting through, as you

say.

A Yeah.

Q Do you recall people coming to different conclusions about

whether or not the attack was spontaneous or preplanned among the people

in the group that you were communicating with?

A I can't speak for the wider group. I think my position was,

okay, we've got a lot of information coming in. We were doing our best

at the time to try to get the FBI out to Libya and try to get the

professionals who were going to do the investigation to do the

investigation. That was our focus at the time, not making a decision

ourselves.

Q That's fair. I'm not asking you to speak for others. But

to the extent you were involved in the discussion --

A Yeah.

Q -- about what the information you received meant, do you

recall a difference of opinion among the people that you were discussing

it with about whether the attack was spontaneous or preplanned?

A I don't recall disagreements.

1047
38

Q Okay. So what was the opinion?

A My opinion, sir, or --

Q No, no, the opinion of the people that you were talking about

it with. If there was no disagreement, what was the opinion?

A I mean, again, my opinion at the time was -- I did not have

information that indicated there was a demonstration at the special

office, so my opinion was some terrorist group has targeted us. That

was my opinion at the time.

Q Okay. Did anybody else express an opinion? Again, I know

you can't speak for somebody. I'm not asking you to read their mind.

But to the extent you participated in discussions --

A No.

Q -- where they expressed an opinion about the information

they had received, do you recall any of those?

A I don't recall that.

Q Okay.

A I don't recall that.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Okay. Switching to a different topic, a somewhat related

topic, did you play any role in assisting the FBI in their

investigation, whether that's helping them get into Libya or helping

them get visas or any type of clearance that they may need to get into

Libya?

1048
39

A So, ma'am, I did not help them with the investigation

proper. What I did was, early on, the Libya desk and I both helped

them figure out, okay, you need visas; what else do you need from the

Libyan Government to get in, and how do you coordinate with Embassy

Tripoli once you were there. So we helped facilitate -- connected them

with the DCM. and the desk helped with, you know, figuring out

how to apply and get their visas from the Libyan embassy.

So it was really the logistics of getting them in. I did not

participate in their investigation.

Q And were there any issues with them getting their visas from

the Libyan Government?

A As I recall, we wanted to get them there as soon as possible,

and I think -- I don't recall exactly. might have asked the

Libyan embassy to open on the Sunday. That was the 16th, I think. But

I don't recall exactly. I remember there was just the logistics of

it. The timing was tough to make it work with the Libyan embassy in

Washington. So trying to push, you know, to make the logistics work

as quickly as possible.

Q And was there any delay in the FBI arriving into Libya?

A I don't recall exactly.

Q Was there any delay in them obtaining their visas to travel

to Libya?

A I don't recall exactly. I think that we pushed pretty hard.

I believe, if I recall correctly -- again, this was a very busy

time -- there was a discussion -- I think the FBI had to figure out

1049
40

who they wanted to send, and that took them a few days, as well. So

it was, you know, which experts from where, which field offices. So

that took a couple days to sort out, for them to get back to us.

Q After you assisted and some of the other individuals in your

office assisted in them obtaining their visas and other logistics of

actually getting to Libya, did you provide any other assistance to the

FBI team that went to Libya?

A No. No. That would not have been my role.

Q Would that have been anyone in NEA's role?

A I don't recall that. I don't recall that.

Q I'm going to mark exhibit 3.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q For the record, this is document number C05580192. And

it's a chain of emails that begins on September 14 from Greg Hicks to

the witness and other individuals. And he's discussing several

matters, including the FBI's trip to Benghazi -- or trip to Libya.

A Right.

Q What I wanted to focus on was the top half of the first page.

Well, first, he makes note in his information that he relays to you

that when individuals visited the compound from the Libyan Government,

they indicated a safe had been removed.

And then -- you're still on the chain -- follows up and asks

if he knows of what classified information or any sensitive information

1050
41

had been taken from Benghazi. His response was that an individual was

heading to Washington today or tomorrow and that he believed that person

was most likely to know what was contained in the safe.

My question is, first, do you know who the person was that he is

referring to?

A No, I don't know.

Q Do you recall whether may have known about

the contents of the safe?

A No.

Q Do you recall whether or not there was any information

obtained subsequent to this email about the contents of the safe?

A I don't recall that, ma'am.

Q Would that have been something -- indicates that there

is great interest here on what computers and classified or sensitive

information might have been taken from Benghazi.

A Yes.

Q Was that something you all would have followed up on?

A I believe that's something the Diplomatic Security would

have followed up on with the agents.

1051
42

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Okay. And why is relaying that information to Greg

Hicks versus Diplomatic Security?

A Because -- again, I can't put words in her mouth, but this

was -- we were all very concerned about, obviously, the people had been

lost but also what was left behind. So, since we had received this

email from Greg, she relayed that. That is the only reason why I can

imagine she relayed that information with "we're concerned, do you

know."

Q And so when she says "we're concerned," is she referring

to NEA or is she referring to Diplomatic Security?

A I don't know.

Q In the normal procedure of responding to information like

this, would she have been responding on behalf of Diplomatic Security?

A No. No. She would not have been responding on behalf of

them.

Q So, typically, she would have been expressing concerns that

were held within NEA?

A If I may be frank, this would have been all of our concerns.

You know what I mean? You want to make sure you know what was left

behind. So it was the State Department's concern what was left behind,

but it would have been DS's responsibility to follow up.

1052
43

Q And once DS had followed up, would they have provided that

information to anyone within NEA about what information was contained

in the safe?

A Ordinarily, I think that they might have in the course of

duties if they required our help in identifying, like, what were these

documents, were they personal records, whatever the case may be. I

just don't recall learning what was in the safe.

Q Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. I see that I am close to the end of my hour. I think

now is a good time to take a break. So we can go off the record.

[Recess.]

1053
44

Mr. Kenny. The time is 11:23.

And, Ms. , again, thank you for appearing here today, just

on behalf of the select committee minority staff, the ranking member

and our Democratic members. Thank you for your appearance for coming

voluntarily to speak with us today. We appreciate your willingness

to appear, both voluntarily and, again, want to thank you for your

continuing service to the country.

Ms. . Thank you.

Mr. Kenny. This may have been mentioned at the outset of the last

hour, as well, but we do understand that appearing before Congress is

a daunting process. So we just want you to be sure that we want to

work with you to make this as simple and as straightforward as possible.

Ms. . Thank you.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So, while the discussion is still fresh, I would like to

return to exhibit 2.

You were asked a series of questions in the last round about your

specific response to this threat, which was an email that you wrote

at 1:59. It appears at the bottom of the first page and continues on

the top of the second page. And I thought you'd very helpfully

explained for us what your understanding was at the time of what you

wrote.

A Right.

Q But one of the things I was hoping to return to and

1054
45

clarify -- because there was both a discussion about what appears to

be press guidance included in this email, as well as Ambassador Rice's

statements and some other talking points that may have been generated

over the course of that week.

And I would just like to ask if we can connect up your comments

here, where you say, "Not sure we want to be so definitive," whether

that was specifically in reference to the points that were included

in the email two emails previous in the chain.

A Yes, sir, I was referring to what was offered earlier in

the chain as NEA press guidance.

Q Okay. And so that would be the 12:36 p.m. email --

A That's right.

Q -- where it says "Libya: Update."

A That's right.

Q Okay.

And specifically, then, there are three key points that are listed

there. Do you see that?

A I do.

Q Okay. And I think you had also indicated that your specific

concern had to do with the first point here. Is that correct?

A That's right, sir.

Q Okay.

And you were asked also in the last round about your awareness

or familiarity with what has been referred to as the HPSCI talking

points. Those were talking points requested by and prepared for

1055
46

Congress by the intelligence community.

A Yes.

Q Do you recall that discussion?

A I do.

Q Okay. And I had it noted here, but I just wanted to make

sure that the record was absolutely clear on this, but you did not

participate in any way in the drafting --

A No.

Q -- or preparation of those talking points?

A I did not. I did not.

Q Okay.

And, at this point in time -- so this is September 17, so this

is several days, actually, after those talking points had been

prepared, or, as we understand it, they were prepared at that time -- did

you have an awareness at this point in time that the IC had provided

an assessment to Congress?

A No. I was unaware of that.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. With regard to that language in the email, that "key

point" language, did you have an understanding of where that language

came from, who had crafted that language?

Ms. . No, I was not aware of where that specific

formulation came from.

Mr. Kenny. I think that is all the questions I have on this

particular exhibit. I think we would like to move our discussion

1056
47

forward, and, in order to do that, we will introduce exhibit No. 4.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I will give you a moment to review this document.

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. And, just for the purposes of the record, I am going

to read some identifying information.

A Yes.

Q So exhibit 4 is an email from to you. It's

dated February 9, 2012. The subject is, quote, "RE: draft email for

your clearance: (SBU) Lack of Security Staffing at Benghazi

undermining mission." The document ID here is CO5390170-MOU.

And this is an email that was used as an exhibit at the select

committee's October 22nd hearing with Secretary Clinton. It's also

a document that now appears on the majority's Web site.

Do you recall this email?

A I do.

Q Okay.

And, again, this is February 2012. I would just like to clarify

at the outset here, Ambassador Cretz was the Ambassador to Libya at

this time?

A He was, sir.

Q Okay.

And I would like to focus the first part of the discussion on the

1057
48

beginning of this email chain, where you wrote to . And

I'd just like to ask generally if you could describe for us what this

email is.

A My email to you mean?

Q Yes.

A My email to was just suggested points for him to use

with the NEA front office and with the Executive Office with regard

to the needs for a temporary mission in Benghazi, sort of a

justification about why we were there, some of the things that we would

like to try to do from there, and some concerns that post had expressed

about their ability to pursue their mission.

Q Okay. And so, just to summarize, this is a draft note that

you had prepared --

A For my director.

Q -- for Mr. ?

A That's right, in case he wanted to move that discussion

forward.

Q So, just to summarize, this is an email with a cover, and

then there appear to be hashmarks. Below the hashmark are a draft note

that you prepared for your director to send to either NEA/EX or the

NEA front office. Is that correct?

A That is correct, sir.

Q And you mentioned that you raised some concerns in this

draft note, and we'll get to those in a moment. I would just like to

begin, though -- you had mentioned that you started with a

1058
49

justification, and I'd like to just discuss or walk through that with

you.

I note that in the first paragraph here there is some

language -- and I would just like to ask -- and I will preface this

by saying that there have been some lingering questions about the

purpose or the role of the special mission in Benghazi --

A Yes, sir.

Q -- in 2012. And, at least here, there appears to be some,

as you described it, justification. And I was hoping you could just

explain for us why it was important to be in Benghazi in 2012.

A Yes, sir.

It was our opinion in 2012, in early 2012, that even with the move

of the Libyan interim government to Tripoli there was an important need

to understand both halves of the country. The revolution had begun

in eastern Libya. A lot of the key people, the key actors who led the

revolt against Qadhafi remained in the east. A lot of the grievances

that led eastern Libyans to seek to overthrow Qadhafi lingered, such

as the lack of resources for eastern Libya and the preponderance of

natural resources like oil and gas in the east.

So the United States had an interest in understanding the

political actors in eastern Libya, the economic issues, particularly

because we had a lot of American companies who were interested in doing

business in eastern Libya, American oil and gas companies who had been

there before and who wanted to go back.

It is very hard to cover such a big country from just the capital.

1059
50

You know, it is very hard to meet all the people that you need to meet.

In addition, there were some other national security issues, such

as nonproliferation concerns because of the issue with various types

of weapons that Qadhafi had stockpiled for years.

So we wanted to make sure we understood what the various weapons

concerns were and what the concerns of the civil society were, as well,

whether this attempt at a new political process was moving forward.

So that was our justification for remaining in the east.

Q All right.

And we have heard eastern Libya described, to us at least, as it's

separate. Historically --

A Yes.

Q -- it's part of Libya, eastern Libya being very much

different from western and southern Libya. But we've also heard it

described as sort of a barometer of sorts for Libya writ large. And

I was wondering if had you a similar sense of eastern Libya, the role

or influence that it played to the country writ large?

A Yes, I would agree with that assessment. And because a lot

of the key actors or the key phenomena that would shape Libya writ large

came from the east. So a lot of the most educated Libyans, a lot of

the universities, a lot of the core -- I won't say institutions, but,

you know, there's a very strong lawyers' association that sort of formed

in revolt to Qadhafi over time. That was centered in eastern Libya,

and they were one of the key players in the revolution. A lot of the

oil and gas resources were in eastern Libya. So the presence of a lot

1060
51

of very strong tribes was in eastern Libya, who had grievances with

tribes in western Libya.

So you had to understand -- you had to take the pulse in eastern

Libya to kind of have a sense of what was, like, going to happen across

the wider country.

The eastern Libyans had a lot of connections with Egypt, as well.

So, I mean, there were other relationships they were cultivating, as

well.

Q And you mentioned a few moments ago that it was something

that would have been difficult to observe or measure, I think, from

Tripoli.

A That's right.

Q Could you just explain that dynamic for us?

A Yes, sir.

The responsibilities of an embassy are frequently to make sure

they understand what is happening with the host government and, kind

of, the new interim institutions that were centered in Tripoli.

However, a lot of the important actors in Libya's future that pushed

for the revolution, that were important in the future, remained in

Benghazi and remained in eastern Libya, cities like Tobruk, Derna, et

cetera. A lot of the weapons depots that we were concerned about were

in eastern Libya.

So, with a very small -- because we had evacuated in February of

2011, we went back in September of 2011, we had a very small embassy

in Tripoli. We didn't have a big, robust mission where we could send

1061
52

a bunch of public diplomacy officers and political officers, economic

experts, defense attache personnel to Benghazi on a regular basis. It

was skeleton staffing in Tripoli, as well.

So if you wanted coverage in the east, if you wanted to engage

contacts in the east, if you wanted to be influential and shape

developments in the east, it was more appropriate and more feasible

to do it with a presence in eastern Libya, in Benghazi.

Q You had also mentioned nonproliferation concerns coming out

of eastern Libya.

A Yes, sir.

Q And, at a very high level, could you just explain for us

why it would have been important for the U.S. Government to pursue

nonproliferation objectives in Libya?

A Yes, sir.

The United States had been quite interested in weapons and

nonproliferation concerns in Libya for many years prior to the Libyan

revolution in 2011 because Qadhafi's government had possessed chemical

and other forms of nonconventional weapons and had stockpiled weapons

throughout the country. The United States Government was always

concerned about the ability of Qadhafi's security services to store

and control these weapons.

So, following the revolution and, sort of, the dissolution of

Qadhafi security services, the question was, who's got eyes on these

things? Who's controlling them? Can we help make sure they don't fall

into the wrong hands?

1062
53

And the interim Libyan Government didn't have one national army,

one good national police force. So various security groups were

forming and coalescing. So the same concerns we had about

nonconventional weapons in the early 2000s and conventional weapons

flowing out of Libya to other groups in the region we continued to have

in 2011 and 2012.

Q Okay.

And, again, this is February of 2012 --

A That's right.

Q -- at the time of this draft note. Do you recall at this

time whether there were discussions or any expectations about a planned

or upcoming national election in Libya?

A If I recall correctly, sir, the plan was for a parliamentary

election to happen in the spring, early summer of 2012.

Q Okay. Did that have any implications for eastern Libya?

A It did, sir. It had implications for eastern Libya because

it was very important to the success of a democratic and kind of a secure

transition for all parts of Libya to be appropriately

represented -- minority groups, tribes, all of the major cities. And

so there had to be an ability for the nascent political parties and

groups to campaign, to get their message out, to caucus with one

another.

And so what our colleagues -- one of things we were doing in

eastern Libya at the time was trying to meet with new political groups,

meet with political candidates, encouraging civil society to play a

1063
54

good role as watchdogs to the process, election monitors, talking to

women's groups, like, you know, encouraging -- you know, there should

minorities, women, others running for this new legislative assembly.

So that was one of the roles we were taking in the east, as well.

Q Were there any concerns that if eastern Libya were

disenfranchised, say, in the national election that that would have

implications for the future of the Libyan state?

A Yes, sir, it did. Since the impetus for overthrowing the

Qadhafi government came from the east, eastern Lib is -- one of their

grievances and one of the reasons why they revolted against Qadhafi

was the lack of resources, the lack of jobs, the lack of money, the

lack of opportunity in eastern Libya and for the groups traditionally

from eastern Libya. So there with a worry that western Libya and the

areas around Tripoli and Misrata would be disproportionately

represented in new government institutions such as a legislature.

That was a very particular concern of easterners.

Q Okay.

In the draft note below the hashmarks, it starts off, "We

determined early on that it was important to make a presence in Benghazi

to engage with the TNC and keep an eye on political and security

developments in the east," close quote.

I would like to ask just for your personal opinion on whether you

felt it was important for the U.S. Government to remain present in

Benghazi in 2012.

A Yes, sir, very much so. So, as a foreign service officer

1064
55

and a diplomat myself and a person with a long interest in the Middle

East, from my shoes, I understood what Ambassador Cretz and what Special

Envoy Stevens and others were saying at the time, which is there is

so much happening across this country; if we don't have eyes on what's

happening in the east, we're going to miss something, we're going to

miss an opportunity to influence these actors, get to truly understand

what the security situation is as well.

So I know, having served in Iraq and other places like this, it

is very hard to understand what is happening outside of the wire if

you don't get out and actually meet people and be open to hearing what's

going on. So I agreed 100 percent.

Q And "outside the wire" in this context would mean outside

of Tripoli?

A Outside of Tripoli, outside of the capital.

Q Do you recall Ambassador Cretz's views on a continuing U.S.

presence in Benghazi at this time?

A He agreed with continuing the presence to some extent. I

mean, the question that we all had was what should it look like. You

know, he agreed, as did I, that it needed to be open from the short

to medium term. Nobody had decided at that point what the needs would

be very long term because things were still evolving.

Q Okay. That's helpful.

And can you just help us understand, because State Department

planning processes might be slightly different --

A Sure.

1065
56

Q -- how far out those discussions were going, in terms of

time?

A At the time, our discussions were going through the end of

2012, early 2013, to get us through the elections that were anticipated

that summer and 6 months out to see, okay, will the election be

successful, will a legislature be seated, you know, what happens as

a result. Are these remaining revolutionary institutions that have

been set up in Derna and Benghazi and other parts in the east, will

they move to Tripoli? Will these different Libyan actors who were

opposition, who opposed Qadhafi, but who aren't necessarily tied

together, will they be tied together by the end of 2012 or early 2013?

Q I see. So the discussion to extend through 2012 and into

2013 or discussions about continuing the presence for that time period,

those incorporated or had some build-in for some sort of buffer? Is

that right?

A Exactly, following the election.

Q Okay. Just in case things didn't go exactly as planned?

A Exactly, sir.

Q Okay.

I would like to return to exhibit 4, and this will be on the second

page here.

A Okay.

Q And, actually, before we move on to the exhibit, I did just

want to ask one more question about discussions about the mission.

A Yes, sir.

1066
57

Q Though he wasn't in Libya at the time, were you aware of

Chris Stevens' views on whether the U.S. should continue its presence

in Benghazi?

A Yes, sir. He had left Libya in November, but he was very

much involved in discussions within NEA about the region and about Libya

specifically.

Q And what do you recall of his views?

A His views were very much in favor of maintaining a presence

in Benghazi.

Q All right.

So, within at least your office, NEA/MAG, it sounded like there

was a general agreement that -- and please correct me if I --

A Yes, sir.

Q There was some agreement -- I just want to summarize -- some

agreement that the U.S. should maintain a presence in Benghazi, but

it was unclear exactly what the staffing footprint would look like.

A Exactly. That's right.

Q Okay.

And so now on the second page here, the second paragraph down

reads -- and I am going to read a portion of this into the record.

Quote, "Unfortunately, DS staffing is becoming a recurring

problem in Benghazi. At the current security threat level, Benghazi

needs a minimum of four agents to support moves out of town (3 to

accompany the Principal Officer or TDY officer, and 1 to remain on

compound with the IRM/management person). Post needs a minimum of

1067
58

three agents to facilitate one movement at a time in town, and one to

remain on compound.

"DS staffing has dropped to two agents several times over the last

few months between rotations, which has prevented the PO from leaving

the compound," close quote.

And I would like to first ask, why was it at this time that you

felt that DS staffing was becoming a recurring problem in Benghazi?

A Sir, I'm not completely sure. I'm not responsible for DS

staffing at this post or any other post.

What we heard from DS -- again, this was a temporary mission, and,

you know, in my role in NEA/MAG, as Deputy Director, you know, I helped

ensure, kind of, the assignment process and filling assignments for

our normal posts across the region in the normal Foreign Service

personnel cycle.

We didn't have a normal Foreign Service personnel cycle for

Benghazi. So we had to pull -- we, as policy, wanted to pull temporary

duty, you know, Foreign Service officers from other posts to support

the mission. And it was my understanding Diplomatic Security had to

do the same thing, but I don't want to speak for them.

Q Okay. But that was a concern that was conveyed to you at

some point in time?

A Yes, you know, that it was the same situation we were facing

on the policy side they were facing on the DS side.

Q Okay.

Again, there's an indication here that DS staffing had dropped

1068
59

two agents several times in the past few months. There is a line at

the very end that reads, quote, "There is very little reason to

maintain the expense if our people are going to be trapped on the

compound and unable to get around," close quote.

And I'd just like to ask, from a mission perspective, why was the

ability of the principal officer to leave the compound a concern?

A From a mission perspective, the principal officer had

responsibility for keeping in close touch with contacts -- the Benghazi

security services, the people campaigning for office, various

political parties, the civil society leaders such as the head of lawyers

association, who was one of the people who was a driving force behind

the revolution, business contacts, you know, American and other

business contacts who sought meetings. Some of those meetings could

happen on the compound; some, more appropriately, would happen outside

of the compound.

So if the principal officer did not have a security detail, they

would not be able to leave the compound.

Q Sure. Okay. And that makes sense.

And this appears to us to capture some sort of reality that if

the mission is only staffed with two DS agents at a time that the

principal officer wouldn't be able to leave the compound to conduct

that outreach that you just described. Is that accurate?

A According to my -- again, I'm not a security expert, so this

information -- I didn't make up the number four. So that information

I would've received from an RSO colleague from DS.

1069
60

Q Okay.

A So that was their assessment.

Q Okay. But that assessment, again, you would have received

from somebody within Diplomatic Security, not, for instance, NEA or --

A No, we would not -- I mean, I do not have the expertise to

determine how many agents you need to secure a road, for example.

Q Okay.

And then, by the flip side, you're not expressing a concern here

that while on the compound the principal officer lacks adequate

security coverage. Is that --

A No, that's not what I was expressing here. That was not

a concern that we had at the time.

Q Okay. But if it was a concern you had time at the time,

do you think you would have acknowledged it in this note?

A Again, I -- perhaps. I don't recall exactly. I can't

speak for what -- you know, what I did at the time, my recollection

is I packaged together our core justification, our core concerns to

move forward to the NEA front office.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And is it a fair characterization to say that the

justifications that you are expressing there about the mission and the

importance of the mission and the desire to have a presence is something

within the core expertise of your bureau?

A Yes, ma'am, I would agree with that. NEA is the regional

1070
61

bureau with responsibility for guiding and developing the policy

towards the Middle East and the policy recommendations to the Secretary

on the Middle East.

Q And then both the factual information that you're providing

as well as the assessment as to the security needs would have come to

you from the experts within the Diplomatic Security Bureau?

A Yes, ma'am. The language that I put together here was

derived from, you know, conversations with post, kind of, discussions

in Washington with the Executive Office of NEA, and DS and other

colleagues who are responsible for how we were staffing the mission

on the ground.

The last sentence is my assessment. That was my opinion at the

time. That was purely my analysis and my commentary. So when I

figured there is little reason to maintain the expense if our people

were going to be trapped on the compound, that was purely my commentary.

Q Your commentary as to the potential negative impact on the

mission.

A Exactly. Exactly. So you could have a mission where

everybody stays inside, or you could have a mission where people can

get out.

Q And having a mission where everyone was required to stay

inside and have meetings solely on compound, as you have indicated

earlier, from your perspective, would have made it more difficult to

do the outreach that individuals within the bureau, including

Ambassador Cretz, including Special Envoy Stevens, believed was

1071
62

critical to be able to conduct out of Benghazi.

A Yes, ma'am, that is right.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So you had indicated that you didn't have a lot of visibility

into the DS staffing side of things. And I'd just like to ask, I mean,

you are here preparing a note to send onward, to send up to your

superior, raising these concerns. And I appreciate you had discussed

some of the TDY staffing challenges, I think, across the board. Do

you recall preparing any similar note related to staffing challenges

for the IRM position, for instance?

A No, I do not.

Q Okay.

A I do not.

Q And is that because, while they may have had their own

challenges staffing an IRM position on a TDY basis in Benghazi, was

your sense that DS had a more acute problem with staffing at this time

period than, say, other bureaus that were also staffing on a TDY basis?

A The IRM requirement was only one individual, which is less

of a burden on the IT experts to provide. So the DS was required to

provide more individuals, so a heavier lift.

Q Okay.

I'd like to move just to the top portion, your cover note to

, where you write, quote, " , let me know if this works and

whether you want to consult with or EX before sending this to the

FO," close quote.

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And, again, just for the record, does " " here refer to DCM

?

A Yes.

Q And "the FO" here refers to the front office?

A That's right.

Q Okay.

Do you know if ever consulted with DCM

regarding the concerns raised in this note at this time?

A I don't recall if they discussed this language, but he did

have a few phone calls a week with our DCM, with . But I don't

know precisely.

Q Okay.

And do you know whether he would have also had some conversations

with in EX around this period regarding these concerns?

A I don't know.

Q Okay.

Do you know whether sent this note to -- there is

a reference to "JDF" here.

A Right.

Q I assume that means the Assistant Secretary?

A That's right, at the time.

Q Okay. Do you know whether sent this note to

the Secretary?

A I don't recall, sir. I don't recall.

Q Do you know whether the Assistant Secretary raised this

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issue to -- there's reference here to "M" -- to the M Bureau?

A I don't recall. I don't recall.

Q Okay.

And, in a circumstance like this, why would it have been

useful -- you make the proposal to possibly go to M, but why would that

have been useful, to appeal directly to the M Bureau regarding a DS

staffing concern?

A Okay. The rationale for putting this together and making

the suggestion to was because ultimately Under Secretary Kennedy

and the M world are responsible for our resources and big-picture

strategy and policy on human resources, on personnel cycles, on

facilities. That's within their bailiwick.

So the idea was to kind of remind our colleagues we're responsible

for resources, here's our policy justification again, here's what seems

to be lacking on the resource side, can we square the circle, if

possible. So you have responsibility for policy, you have

responsibility for resources, let's try to make the best of it.

Q Okay. And, again, you don't recall if Assistant Secretary

Feltman did raise this issue with the Secretary?

A I don't know if he did. I don't know.

Q Okay.

Do you recall whether there were any other steps in this timeframe

taken that were designed to address the concerns raised here? For

instance, do you recall if DCM was back in Washington, D.C.,

and may have set up meetings, met with the DAS in DS?

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A I believe did come back to Washington that spring, you

know, for normal consultations. And she did include meetings with

Diplomatic Security, as well as our Executive Office, as well as other

agencies, like USAID, while she was in Washington.

Q Do you recall anything specific about her discussions with

DS when she was back for consultations?

A I do not. I do not.

Q Okay.

And, again, referring to the sentence that you indicated that you

had included at the bottom of the draft note -- I'm sorry, the sentence

before there, where it reads, "If there is no recourse, we should

reconsider whether we keep the mission going," close quote, do you

recall whether that conversation was ever had?

A No. I don't remember. I don't remember.

Ms. Sawyer. And, again, with regard to that particular sentence,

was that because of the concern that, with regard to the policy

objectives, you would not be able to fulfill them in the way that you

had hoped and others had hoped in Benghazi?

Ms. . Yes, ma'am. And to reiterate, that is my

commentary, that is my opinion that I am expressing there, if there

is no recourse. It was driven by a concern that we would not be able

to meet our objectives with the staffing situation being what it was.

Ms. Sawyer. It was not intended to reflect and it did not reflect

a belief that it was unsafe otherwise for individuals on the ground

in Benghazi to remain there and you should reconsider the presence

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because just simply being there was too dangerous?

Ms. . No. It was purely reflecting my opinion. As a

diplomat, I want to get out and meet people and shape policy and be

influential on the ground and show the flag, because that's what we're

there for. That reflected my firm opinion on that.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So if I could just direct your attention to the top email

here, the discussion seems to shift in a slightly different direction,

and I would just like to ask you about that.

This specific portion of the email, again, was discussed during

the select committee's October 22nd hearing with the Secretary, and

Ms. was also asked for her recollection of what are, in effect,

her words here and not yours. But I would just like to read it for

the record.

Ms. wrote, quote, "Also, the Secretary asked last week

if we still have a presence in Benghazi -- I think she would be upset

to hear that yes we do but because we don't have enough security they

are on lockdown, "close quote.

And just first I would like to ask you if you recall having a

conversation about this with Mr. at this time.

A I do.

Q Okay. And what do you recall about that conversation?

A What I recall is that this email was -- again, I don't want

to put words in mouth, but my recollection of this was this

was a slightly sarcastic email, this was a slightly sarcastic

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conversation -- ha ha, you know? Of course the Secretary knows we have

a presence in Benghazi, you know? I mean, so it was a slightly

sarcastic exchange.

I think we were all frustrated working long hours and that that

came out a little bit in the tone of this email.

Q Sure. And so when you say that there was some sarcasm that

you perceived here, that refers to the first sentence, that the

Secretary asked last week if we still have a presence in Benghazi?

A Yes, exactly. Yes.

Q Okay. And do you recall just the basis for your belief?

You said of course the Secretary knew that we had a presence there.

A Again, so I can't put myself in the Secretary's shoes at

that time, but there was a lot of information coming from our team in

Benghazi and from Tripoli reporting back to Washington. There was a

lot of information that we know was filtering up to senior officials.

So it was my opinion at the time, my assumption, that the Secretary

knew that we still had a physical presence in Benghazi because of all

of the information that our team was sending forward back to Washington

from Benghazi.

Q And do you recall how that reporting was received in

Washington, at least within your office, reporting specifically from

the special mission? Was it viewed as generally helpful --

A Yes. So --

Q -- to policymakers?

A I'm sorry to interrupt.

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Q Please.

A Yes, sir. It was viewed as very helpful because it was

giving us eyes on kind of a situation and a range of

contacts -- political contacts, civil society contacts, business

folks, you know, folks with opinions of what different militia groups

and tribes were up to.

People were commenting -- we were asking, you know, do you think

this election will be a success? Do you think this political process

will succeed? What are your thoughts on whether there is going to be

a constitution, and what should be in this constitution? What are your

thoughts on the economic circumstances?

And so there was a lot -- the reporting that was feeding back was,

you know, people still have legitimate concerns, and they were really

worried that with the TNC and, kind of, institutions moving to Tripoli

that they were going to be left behind again. So, you know, that was

a big concern on everybody's mind.

So the reporting was considered very helpful to piece in

everything we were hearing from the media and other sources.

Q Thank you. I think that's a helpful clarification for us.

This email, again, it seems to have become a little bit of

political fodder --

A Right.

Q -- and, at least to us, appears that it's been used or cited

as evidence that the Secretary's level of interest in Libya dropped

or fell off in 2012. And I would like to just ask you, was there a

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drop in the Secretary's interest level in Libya and Benghazi in 2012?

A Sir, I don't know.

What I know is that the seventh floor, what we refer to as the

seventh floor, keep asking NEA/MAG for memos and for reporting on what's

happening across North Africa, particularly in Libya and Tunisia, which

were the states that had undergone revolutions in 2011.

So, from my perspective as the NEA/MAG Deputy Director, it seemed

that the Secretary and all the senior officials were still very focused

on Libya. But I can't put myself in her shoes.

Q Okay. So, referring to the seventh floor writ large,

though, was it your sense that they were closely following Libya

matters?

A Yes, it was.

Q Okay. And that continued in 2012?

A Yes, very much so.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Just that portion of the remark there that says, "I think

she would be upset to hear that yes we do but because we don't have

enough security they are on lockdown," you know, there has been some

implication -- and it was certainly was raised at the hearing with the

Secretary -- that the Secretary was either disregarding or

disinterested in resource issues with regard to Benghazi.

Was that the sense from where you were sitting, that there was

a disinterest in whether or not adequate resources -- both to be able

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to do the mission, which we have already talked about, but certainly

with a deeper question of just sufficient security for personnel on

the ground?

A May I ask you to clarify? Was it whose concern that the --

Q Was it just your impression? You know, the implication was

been that the Secretary was either disregarding or disinterested in

whether or not her post, in particular Benghazi post, had sufficient

resources. We've talked about resources to be able to do the mission.

A Right.

Q You know, the deeper question is even just security

resources at all.

A Yes.

Q Was it ever your sense, just from where you sat, that the

Secretary was either disregarding or disinterested in making sure the

post had resources?

A No, it was not my sense.

Q Were you aware of any specific requests on the resource

front that went to the Secretary?

A No, I'm not aware of resource requests to the Secretary.

As NEA/MAG Director, my responsibility on resources was limited, but

resource requests normally went through the chain to M.

Q But certainly there was nothing in your experience that

would have led you to believe that she would have ignored or disregarded

any requests, had they gone to her?

A No. I have no information to that regard.

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BY MR. KENNY:

Q I'd just like to ask one clarifying question based on a

discussion I was having with you.

A Yes.

Q So you had mentioned you didn't have any specific knowledge

of the Secretary's level of involvement or interest in Libya, but you

had an understanding that the seventh floor was closely tracking it.

Is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. And when you say "seventh floor," who does that refer

to?

A When I say "seventh floor," I mean the Under Secretary for

Political Affairs, definitely the Under Secretary for Management, the

special assistants for -- we use acronyms at the State Department -- so

P, M. The deputy secretaries were very key on the cables and the emails

that came from post.

People were tracking it very closely. And, in particular, they

were interested in all of North Africa because it was a sensitive

region, but Libya was getting a lot of requests for information all

the time.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So I would just like to briefly, if I may, return to the

discussion we were having about the days and weeks following the attacks

and some of the public statements, the press statements, and some of

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the press guidance that was developed during that time.

I had written down in my notes that the press guidance was one

focus, not the only focus, of what you were working on in the days and

weeks after the attack. I was wondering if you could just elaborate

for us, for those countries in your portfolio, what was happening during

this time period and how busy was that period for you and your office.

A Sir, the September and October, particularly following the

Benghazi attack, September and October were extraordinarily busy.

You'll recall on September 14 there was a very violent attack on Embassy

Tunis, where our colleagues were in the safe haven for hours while they

were waiting for additional Tunisian security services to come to their

assistance. There were violent demonstrators that had crossed the

walls into the embassy.

The Tunisia desk officer and I were unable to go to the ceremony

at Andrews Air Force Base on September 14 to welcome home Ambassador

Stevens' and our other colleagues' remains because Tunis was literally

on fire and we were working to figure out what was happening and then

supporting the Secretary and senior officials on that day.

There were demonstrations in Morocco and Algeria. We didn't

cover Egypt per se, but I had served in Cairo, I had good friends in

Cairo at the time. So the wider region was of deep concern to us, and

the security of our colleagues across the region was a deep concern.

So there were daily meetings to talk about what do we know about is

happening; do our other posts, meaning, you know, Tunisia, have what

they need to protect our personnel; do we need to think about drawing

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down staff in those places, as well.

On Libya, we were extraordinarily busy because we had evacuated

the bulk of civilian colleagues from Tripoli up to Germany, and one

of the issues I was dealing with in the aftermath of the attack was

figuring out what to do with our personnel in Germany. Do we bring

them back to Washington and give them temporary assignments here while

we wait out and see what happens in Tripoli? Do we keep them in Germany

a little bit longer and have them work remotely from the consulate in

Frankfurt, you know, give them assignments, have the political officer

keep working on the human rights report, for example, remotely?

You know, so I was closely involved in, kind of, giving them

taskings, keeping people busy, you know, waiting for the security

colleagues and others to be like, okay, some people can come back, or

better to break some assignments and give people new assignments.

So the immediate personnel picture for the traditional diplomatic

stuff and then the security situation of those other posts were, kind

of, my overwhelming focus.

Q Okay. So it sounds like it was an incredibly busy period.

A It was a very busy period, yeah.

Q Okay. And so the responses to press inquiries and the

development of press guidance, that was only a portion of the work that

you were working on.

A That was a very small portion, honestly. In general, as

I mentioned to your colleagues earlier, we had a very strong press

office in NEA. They did a good job of recommending the best way to

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respond, you know, to kind of be prepared for press inquiries in as

fulsome a way as possible.

So they would turn to us for help in understanding what is too

sensitive. Should we include that, or is that too sensitive for

whatever policy reason? So that was our role.

And, frankly, the desk officers, Libya, Tunisia, other desk

officers, were very good. They did the bulk of it themselves. It was

rare that it needed to come back to or myself. Sometimes we would

take a quick look at it to make sure we were aware of what was going

forward.

Q Thank you. That's helpful.

Part of the reason why I'm asking that question is, you know, we're

more than 3 years removed from the attacks, and there has been a

significant amount of attention and scrutiny paid to some of the public

statements, the press statements, made by the administration in the

days and the weeks after the attacks --

A Yes, sir.

Q -- and to include Ambassador Rice's comments on the five

Sunday talk shows on September 16. I would just like to ask you a series

of questions about that period generally.

Did you have a sense or ever get the sense that State Department

spokesperson Ambassador Nuland or anyone else in her press shop was

trying to conceal facts for political advantage?

A No.

Q Did you ever have the sense that they were concealing the

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truth in order to avoid embarrassment or perpetuate a false narrative

about the attacks?

A No.

Q Okay.

What about press officers in the White House? Did you get a sense

that they were trying to conceal facts for political advantage?

A No.

Q Did you ever have the sense that they were concealing the

truth in order to avoid embarrassment or perpetuate a false narrative

about the attacks?

A No.

Q Were you ever pressured to conceal facts about the Benghazi

attacks?

A No. And I'd like to add that I'm not particularly easy to

pressure. So I just wanted to put that on the record.

Q That's certainly admirable.

Were you ever asked or pressured to conceal the truth about the

attacks?

A No. No.

Q Okay. Were you ever asked to perpetuate a false narrative

about the attacks?

A No.

Q With specific regard to some of the statements made by

Ambassador Rice, you had raised some concern about what was said or

your reading of excerpts of what was said. Did anyone ever instruct

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you or tell you to be quiet about any of those concerns?

A No.

Q Okay.

Do you have any reason to believe that anyone else in the press

shop, whether in NEA or the White House press office, was doing anything

other than their best, good-faith effort to determine the truth and

convey that information accurately without divulging sensitive

information?

A No.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Just returning to something you were explaining to us about

the region and you indicated -- you specifically mentioned Tunis and

the attack on the 14th where personnel were in a safe haven for hours.

I think you mentioned Morocco, you mentioned --

A Algeria.

Q -- Algeria.

A Uh-huh.

Q What was your understanding and the understanding within

the Department as to what was causing the unrest and what -- you know,

we can speak specifically to Tunis -- what caused that, you know, what

happened there, what was the cause of what happened there?

A Our understanding in those early days was that there were

a lot of grievances in Tunisia, as well, following that revolution.

And there were a lot of complaints about the interim government and

about the role of the United States, in particular, some Islamist groups

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that felt the United States was playing an inappropriate role or that

the West was playing an inappropriate role in Tunisia's political

transition.

In Tunisia and across the region, there was a lot of discontent

because of the anti-Islam video that had been posted, I believe it was

the previous week, online and a lot of anti-Muslim propaganda and

messages that were floating around online. That created a lot of

anger. If I recall correctly, there was a protest that was inspired

by a burning of Korans. They harkened back to Pastor Jones in one of

those incidents, which was deeply offensive to people.

And there were emerging -- you know, kind of the political

changes. And Tunisia, in particular, had weakened security services.

I mean, the security services had been singled out for abuse -- police

and army -- abuse of citizenry. So they were far more cautious. You

know, they were being reorganized, and they were far more cautious about

responding. So there was a concern about the rise of Islamist

extremist groups like Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, as well.

Q And then, in Egypt and Morocco, what was the sense of the

unrest there? And what had sparked or triggered the unrest, in

particular, you know, kind of, that week of September 11th through the

16th?

A Again, ma'am, I didn't have specific responsibility for

Cairo. It was not in our portfolio. I kept an eye on it because I

had served there. I had good friends in Cairo, and we are friends to

this day.

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My understanding of what sparked the specific attack on the

embassy was a demonstration fueled, in part, by that video. People

were very upset about the anti-Islamic video.

In Morocco, there were smaller protests -- you know, much stronger

security services, much more organized government. But there were

protests about the lack of an Arab Spring response in Morocco. You

know, do we need more reform in our country? Do we need more help for

young people in our country?

So there was some concern about the anti-Muslim propaganda

online, but there was also concerns about, are we getting anything out

of the Arab Spring ourselves? You know, have we had the constitutional

reforms? Have we had the jobs, the economic growth that we needed?

So it was just a morass of good and bad things that were motivating

people to be very angry in that period.

Q And in discussing that generalized regional unrest, would

it have been surprising to you that, in discussing the region in

general, that there would have been discussions of protests and

protests related to the anti-Muslim video?

A That did not surprise me. That did not surprise me.

Mr. Kenny. With that, I think that concludes our round. We'll

go off the record.

[Recess.]

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BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Ms. , I wanted to continue our discussion that in

the last hour we left off in early February 2012 talking a little bit

about the mission in Benghazi. I just wanted to talk with you a little

bit more about the spring of 2012 and the summer of 2012.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And some of the events that occurred in Benghazi and in

Libya.

A Yes.

Q Were you aware of some of the incidents that occurred at

the mission in Benghazi. For instance, the April 5 incident, IED

attack, and then the June attacks in Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am. Our colleagues -- excuse me.

Q Go ahead.

A Our colleagues reported those incidents to us.

Q By "colleagues," are you referring to the principal

officer?

A To the principal officer in Benghazi, yes.

Q And when you became aware of those incidents, were there

any actions taken within NEA regarding what was happening on the ground?

A Insofar as Washington was concerned, insofar as NEA MAG was

concerned, we ensured that kind of our leaders in the NEA office and

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the operations center had all of the updates we received as well to

ensure there was a familiarity with what had happened on the ground.

Q And were you concerned about the violent incidences that

had begun to occur in Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am. I was concerned, and we kept in very close

touch with our colleagues in Benghazi and with Tripoli to keep a close

eye on what happened at those times and of the mood on the street

following all those incidents.

Q And following those incidents, did you ever have a

discussion with an NEA MAG about whether or not there needed to be a

pause in the mission or whether or not the mission should close, given

the number of incidences that had occurred in Benghazi?

A Ma'am, could I ask you to specify which incident?

Q Following -- so you have the April attack, and then

subsequently there are additional incidences that aren't necessarily

against the mission, but then there is the June attack against the

mission as well as the U.K. Envoy attack. Following that particular

incidence, were there any discussion between yourself and others in

NEA MAG about whether or not the mission should pause to assess the

security environment or whether or not the mission should close?

A Yes, ma'am. We had discussions within my office. So, as

you know, there were a series of incidents, and in June we had an talk

on the U.K. Ambassador and some damage to the wall at our mission in

Benghazi, and we asked the question -- you know we had a 2- or 3-week

break between principal officers, and I recall my boss at the time

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asking Ambassador Stevens the question like is this a good time to take

a break, reassess, see how security is playing out in Benghazi. So

that discussion was had, or there was an email exchange with post about

that issue in June.

Q And did you take advantage of the natural pause in the break

between the principal officers?

A As I recall, we did, ma'am, for several weeks.

Q And was there an assessment done regarding the security

environment and the decision to determine whether or not the principal

officer should return?

A I don't recall specifics, ma'am. I would direct you to

Diplomatic Security for specifics of an assessment. I don't remember.

Q Was there anything relayed to you that you were aware of

was relayed to Mr. about whether or not the concerns had been,

the concern that there was a decline in the security environment had

changed, whether that had improved? Since you had asked for a pause,

why was there a decision to continue to send the principal officers

to Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am. Our understanding, my understanding of the

situation at the time and what we were getting from our colleagues in

Libya was that the east was very unpredictable. There were security

incidents, but they weren't tied to one specific focus, or they weren't

tied to anti-Americanism. It was a degraded security environment in

part because the whole country was undergoing a lot of uncertainty

following -- you know, there was an interim government; there was an

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election, you know; figuring out what next steps were. Again, I don't

recall specifics of a security assessment at the time.

Q Do you recall any other discussions within NEA MAG about

whether or not there should be any additional pauses or breaks in

between the principal officers to again reassess the environment in

late July or early August?

A No, ma'am, I don't recall that.

Q Did you express your concerns about the security

environment to anyone outside of NEA MAG? Following the June attacks,

did you relay any of your concerns to maybe Diplomatic Security

counterparts or anyone outside of NEA MAG?

A I don't recall.

Q Did you have any concerns about the number of Diplomatic

Security agents that were going to Benghazi during that timeframe?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q Following, we discussed exhibit 4, which was in the February

timeframe, and there was some discussion in that exhibit about

Diplomatic Security not providing the number of DS agents that had been

indicated would be provided. Did that issue continue to occur

throughout the remaining of the spring and the summer of 2012?

A I recall that -- again, I don't remember specifically. I

recall that throughout that entire period, that summer, the issue of

staffing both on the DS side and on our side, on the policy side,

remained a challenge because of the TDY nature of the assignments, but

I don't recall specific numbers.

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Q If there were concerns by the principal officer regarding

whether or not they were able to conduct movements, et cetera, because

of the number of DS agents that were present, they would have relayed

those concerns to you, correct?

A Yes, on several occasions, principal officers replayed

concerns to NEA MAG about their ability to move.

Q And outside of exhibit 4, where you are proposing talking

points to about the information that could be shared to

the front office and potentially to M, did you have any discussions

with your counterparts in DS about the number of TDY DS agents that

were going to Benghazi?

A I don't recall specifically, no.

Ms. Clarke. I'm going to mark this as exhibit 5.

[ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q And if you'll take a moment to look at this?

A Yes. If I could have a moment to read through this, ma'am.

Q Sure.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q For the record, this is document No. C05390124, and it's

an information memo for the Secretary, dated August 17, 2012. Do you

recall this memo?

A I do recall this memo, ma'am.

Q And did you participate in drafting this memo?

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A No, I did not draft this memo. One of my colleagues did,

and I cleared the memo.

Q And when you say "you cleared the memo," what does that mean?

A What that means in our context is that we review the

information in the memo and make sure the drafters included all the

relevant information and also that it reflected, you know, kind of our

priority concerns. Information memos for the Secretary are not meant

to be laundry lists or exhaustively long. They are meant to be key

issues, priorities, topic information the Secretary needs to know.

Q And what were your priority concerns expressed in this memo?

A Our concerns here was making sure that there was an

understanding of the, you know, kind of the spike in violence in the

east, but also kind of the context. You know, the lack of the new

government's ability to consolidate security services, competing

elements still present in the country, you know, causing some

instability. It was key to kind of convey it is an unsettled situation,

but there is not one specific driving factor driving instability.

There are many sources that are contributing to this, following the

election.

Q And do you recall what prompted this memo to be drafted?

A No, I don't recall specifically.

Q Was it typical to send an information memo? Was that a

recurring type of way you relay information on a quarterly or a monthly

basis, or were they sporadic and usually prompted by some event or some

request by the front office in NEA perhaps?

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A Yes. So, in general, information memos are not like

decision memos where you're asking the Secretary or another Under

Secretary to take a specific action. We sent them fairly regularly

on countries where there is a lot of change. So it is very normal to

send an information memo to update the Secretary and senior leaders

after an election when there is a significant change in a political

or security situation. So this is in line with that. We had an

election that had happened in early July, and we wanted to make sure

the Secretary was aware of the different elements in place following

the election. The security services had not consolidated. The

government was still struggling to pull things together following the

election.

Q Following the election, did you have any discussions with

post about their view of how the security situation was shaping, given

the government's inability to kind of coalesce the different security

elements?

A May I ask you to specify? You're asking me if I had

conversations with Tripoli?

Q With anyone in Tripoli or even anyone in Benghazi about

their view of what was actually happening on the ground.

A So what our -- I recall that throughout the summer that both

Benghazi and Tripoli were sending frequent updates, frequently daily

emails and occasional cables on what their context, what different

influential people in Libya were thinking about the security situation,

about the political situation, so that post was updating us really

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regularly with their reporting.

Q Were there any additional requests for security equipment

or security personnel as a result of this information?

A I don't recall specific requests for equipment or

additional personnel.

Q Would you have been aware of such requests?

A Yes. Ordinarily, I would have been copied by email, of

course, because we love email in this institution, on requests that

would have gone to the executive office of NEA.

Q Once this memo was submitted, did you receive any requests

from seventh floor principals or even from NEA office to follow up on

the information that was provided?

A I don't recall a specific request, ma'am.

Q I think in the last hour there was a discussion about your

view of whether or not it was necessary to have a presence in Benghazi,

and you talked about at least through a short-term and a midterm

presence.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q In August or in the fall of 2012, was there any discussion

within NEA MAG or between NEA MAG and post about the view of whether

or not the presence of the mission in Benghazi should continue past

2012?

A Yes, ma'am, there was. There was an email, a communication

with Ambassador Stevens, laying out the case for continuing the mission

in Benghazi beyond the end of 2012, and I don't recall exactly the full

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depth of kind of all of the elements of why, but there was a concern

that because the government was not consolidated, there were still a

lot of factions in the south, in the east, in the west. There were

a lot of -- there was a lot of churn across Libya. There were a lot

of U.S. interests that we wanted to make sure we could effectively

represent on, and the Ambassador made the case at the time that we needed

to remain present and very involved in Benghazi to understand what's

happening in the east. It's not enough to cover it from the capital.

Q Did you and others within NEA MAG agree with his

recommendation?

A Yes, we did agree with his recommendation. At the time,

he laid out a very good case. I think that and my opinion as the Deputy

Director was there's a lot of resources involved in setting up a

permanent presence anywhere or asking for or figuring out how long you

needed to be somewhere, so my opinion was really important now that

we're there, that we can be there, that we can do this important work.

Not sure how long we're going to need to be there. It may be in 5 years,

things will be very settled, and we can work very effectively out of

an embassy. So my thing at the time was the Ambassador is absolutely

right. There is so much happening now; we need to understand this and

be present, and I'm going to keep saying, show the flag, because it

meant a lot that we were there, and we were present and trying to

influence events. It was my personal opinion that we couldn't predict

into the long term how long we would need to have a presence there.

Q So once Ambassador Stevens had laid out the case for a more

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permanent presence in Benghazi, what would be the natural next steps

for there to be a decision whether or not to actually approve a permanent

presence in Benghazi?

A There's no one process, ma'am, but his request would have

prompted and did prompt, I believe -- I don't recall exactly -- but

should have prompted a discussion with our executive office and with

the Bureau leadership and then moving on to the other relevant parts

of our team, obviously Diplomatic Security, obviously the intelligence

community and the interagency parts that would be involved in deciding,

do we need to be there in the longer term, and how do we do it?

Q And do you recall if there was a discussion with Diplomatic

Security about extending the presence of the mission in Benghazi?

A I don't recall that, ma'am.

Q Do you recall if anyone within NEA MAG or the larger NEA

Bureau disagreed with having a more permanent presence in Benghazi?

A I don't recall a disagreement.

Q So fast forwarding in time to after the attacks, were you

ever asked to provide documents to the Accountability Review Board that

was stood up to look into the attacks?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And did you, in fact, provide those documents?

A Yes, yes.

Q And were you ever asked to review documents of any other

individuals who provided documents to the Accountability Review Board?

A May I ask you to clarify your question?

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Q Were you asked to look, to review, or sift through documents

that other individuals may have gathered to provide to the

Accountability Review Board?

Ms. Safai. So you're specifying only to the Accountability

Review Board? Can you give us a timeframe maybe that you're thinking

about?

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So just to step back, did you ever collect documents that

you may have had possession of in response to requests for documents?

A I responded to the request for documents, and I sent that

forward.

Q And then did you ever assist other individuals in collecting

documents and reviewing those documents in response, the request for

documents?

A I never assisted in collection of other documents. I did

assist in a document review in early October. It was my understanding

this was the document production for the ARB.

Q And you said that you recall that this happened in early

October, and your understanding was that this was a document production

for the ARB?

A Yes. If I may clarify, I believed it was for the ARB and

potentially other subsequent purposes, but I wasn't sure kind of the

length of what exactly the document production was going to be used

for.

Q And how do you recall that happened in early October?

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A So, yes, I received a call from our Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary in NEA. It was Columbus Day weekend. I recall

it because I changed my plans for the weekend very quickly as a result

of her request. And she noted that I believe it was a group in H, was

the Legislative Affairs Bureau, was reviewing all of the -- was

preparing documents to be provided for, I thought it was the ARB, and

then whatever subsequent use, presumably congressional review or

whatever the case may be. But I wasn't sure. They were going through

the documents for release, and she said could I join the group the

following day and look at, you know, kind of looking whether we needed

to redact any sensitive information. That was my role to help in the

release of those documents, and she indicated that night, you know,

depending on how big of a task it is, could you help me setting up a

work flow like other officers from NEA who could be involved in, you

know, going through and looking for sensitive information that we might

recommend for redaction.

Q And you said, you recall that it was Columbus Day weekend?

A Or close to Columbus Day weekend, because I had plans

that I cancelled.

Q And so you cancelled plans. Did this document review occur

on the weekend, during the weekend?

A Yes. It had started before that weekend, but DAS Dibble

learned of it, or she realized there wasn't an NEA participant on that

Saturday, so she called me and I went in the following morning, yeah.

Q And did you go any other days other than that Saturday

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morning? Were you also there on Sunday? Did you continue on Monday?

A I went in on Sunday and Monday and then through that first

week, and then I helped develop a rotation schedule for other colleagues

from NEA to kind of make sure we had an NEA colleague. There were

colleagues from DS and IRM. You know, other subject matter experts

were in the room as well, kind of looking and looking at documents for

I can't recall how long that lasted, but I helped develop the work

schedule.

Q So when you arrived on Saturday --

A Sunday, Sunday, ma'am.

Q So you did not go on Saturday?

A Saturday night is when Deputy Assistant Secretary Dibble

called. I remember because I had plans the following

day.

Q Okay. So you arrived on Sunday. Do you recall the number

of people that were participating in this document review?

A I don't recall.

Q Do you recall any particular individuals that were

participating in this document review?

A No. Just that I knew there were colleagues from DS. There

were colleagues from IRM. There were colleagues from H.

Q And you said that you helped assist in putting together sort

of like a workflow to ensure that there was always an NEA representative

during this process?

A Yes, ma'am.

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Q Do you recall how long the process of reviewing those

documents took?

A I know that it lasted into November. I don't recall how

long overall it lasted.

Q And did you ever have another opportunity, other than the

first Sunday on Columbus Day weekend, to participate in reviewing those

documents?

A Yes. I believe, if I recall correctly, I was there the

whole first week, through Friday or the next Saturday.

Q And then following the whole first week, did you participate

in this document review following that?

A I might have one or two times after that, but I was so busy

in NEA MAG, our other colleagues throughout NEA stepped up. Every

other NEA regional director stepped and offered us desk officers to

help us cover that duty so that myself and NEA MAG could focus on our

core job.

Q Can you explain when you arrived on that first Sunday, can

you kind of walk us through how the process was developing? Was there

someone who was in charge of reviewing and did they provide instructions

to you and to other people about what specifically you were reviewing?

A If I recall correctly, and it's my understanding that H was

in charge of this, we were doing this down in the A Bureau, and my

guidance was, you know, we're going through -- my guidance was we need

an NEA subject matter expert to explain to folks in the room who were

not Foreign Service officers what do certain things mean, like what

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is a SITREP? Literally, what is a diplomatic cable? Why did post send

this email? So it explained, okay, the political officer met with a

representative of an American company who was interested in doing

business in Libya. He didn't know how to go about it because there

is an interim government. He was asking for mission's thoughts on,

is there an economic ministry? Who does one engage to get whatever,

start a new business, for example, or to resuscitate what they had

before? So I would tell them, this is perfectly normal. It's

something we do all around the world is meet with American business

representatives and talk about local conditions, risks of doing

business in a country or whatever. That was partly my role, was

explaining like: Here is what we do at an embassy. Here is what this

post was doing. And, you know, recommending like: Okay, this is a

private American business person, or this is a Libyan activist. These

are names that I would recommend be redacted if materials are going

to be made public because you don't want to endanger people who continue

to live in Libya or need to do business in Libya.

Q And you said it was your understanding that H was in charge.

What were you basing that understanding on?

A To be honest, I knew it wasn't the A Bureau that normally

does FOIA requests. I thought there were staffers from H that were

helping organize us. That's what led me to believe that it was H who

was organizing.

Q You also said you received guidance about looking for things

that should be redacted. Who gave you that guidance?

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A I don't recall exactly who. It was when I arrived, you

know, people like: Here, this is the document production. We want

your expertise on what things mean, and if there's issues here that

you have with if something is publicly released, what would you be

concerned about being publicly released? That was my role.

Q You said that you arrived on Sunday morning?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Was it your understanding that this document review had

already been taking place, or was Sunday morning the first day that

everyone had begun reviewing the document?

A It was my understanding from PDAS Dibble the previous

evening. She's like: You know, this has started. They just realized

they didn't have an NEA person.

And of course, they called me, and of course, I said yes. Of

course, you need an NEA person to explain if there's substantive

questions and to help determine what's sensitive, what should be

redacted if it's publicly released.

Q Do you recall whether there was an indication about how long

this process had been going on before the NEA person arrived?

A I don't recall, but it was my sense that it was pretty new.

"New" meaning a couple of days. I didn't have the sense that it was,

you know, really well-established, but I'm not sure.

Q So you worked from, you indicated you worked from Sunday

through the following Friday?

A Or the following Saturday up to the next weekend, if I recall

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correctly.

Q And that was my question. Did the document reviews

continue throughout the weekend to your knowledge through the rest of

the process?

A I don't recall. I think there were limited hours. I think

they did long days during the weekday and limited hours during the

weekend. It was mainly on the weekdays.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Just a few followups. I just want to understand the

chronology. If I understood you correctly, Liz Dibble gave you a call

on Saturday night and asked you to participate in this document review?

A That's correct. Yes, sir.

Q As best you can recall, what did she tell you about the

nature of the review and your role in it in that first call?

A I think she wasn't completely clear. She was like: This

is, they're looking at the documents that everyone has contributed for

the document production, and they realized they didn't have an NEA

person in the room, and they realized we need subject-matter experts

from the kind of people that would be at post. And they wanted

expertise of people who work in NEA, in DS, and IRM. She's like: Can

you start it off tomorrow and then help me if this has got to continue?

Let me know what you recommend in terms of any representation. I'll

back you up. I'll make sure we have a roster of people to help carry

this task on if it needs to continue. I don't recall, and understanding

initially was that I likened it to a FOIA request in that when we're

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reviewing, when the A Bureau sends us things for FOIA review, we look

at documents, and we say, okay, what has national security or

sensitivity, or what would we recommend be redacted before public

release of a document?

Q Did she give you any specifics about the type of information

that would be considered sensitive in the documents you were going to

be reviewing, or did she rely on your past experience?

A I think she relied on, you know, trust your judgment. I

do recall calling on her the following day or my DAS, who was Ray

Maxwell, speaking to them the following day to say one of my concerns

personally was that I thought it was appropriate to redact the names

of drafting officers of junior officers at post, everybody below the

level of Ambassador. Ambassadors are confirmed by the Senate.

They're a very senior rank. They have a public presence. Other more

junior people at post from the State Department, I thought their names

and phone numbers and titles should not be included and should be

redacted. That was my recommendation, and it continued to be my

recommendation. I don't know if that's ultimately what happened or

not.

Q So did anybody, putting Ms. Dibble aside, did anybody give

you any guidance on what type of information would be considered

sensitive and that should be redacted or protected as well?

A No. We looked at the FOIA guidance, and I forget exactly

what that is now, but to the best of my recollection I was going over

what is sensitive in terms of where it would compromise U.S. interests,

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what is deeply sensitive because the individual mentioned is a private

citizen, whether they're American or Libyan. We knew that the security

situation following Ambassador Stevens and our other colleagues, the

attack on the mission, was very difficult. So like these were, there

were cables and emails that included information from our contacts who

were still in Libya. You don't want to expose people to harm if it's

known that they're talking to American diplomats, right. There's a

sensitivity there, like we saw after WikiLeaks. So it is what can harm

us, U.S. interests, and what could harm individuals, or what is not

germane as well.

Q Explain that to me. Did you on your own initiative go get

the FOIA guidelines and apply those guidelines in your review of the

documents, or was it somebody that was part of this broader team provide

those guidelines to you and say, "This is what we should be following"?

How did the FOIA guidelines make its way into this review?

A I don't recall exactly. It was either -- honestly I don't

recall. I don't recall if I looked at it that morning on my own volition

or if it was provided in that first day.

Q One thing I'm just not understanding is if your belief was

these documents were going to the ARB, in other words, this was an

internal panel constituted by the Secretary of State, the documents

were not going to be released publicly, why would the FOIA guidelines

be relevant to what you were doing? Why would you use those guidelines

to protect information that was going to the ARB?

A Sir, if I can recall my --

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Ms. Safai. Do you want to clarify?

Ms. . As I clarified, I didn't know what the ultimate

document production, whether it would be just ARB or subsequent to other

investigations, other government investigations.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q If you disagree with me, just tell me. If they were just

going to the ARB, then the FOIA guidelines would not be relevant.

Correct?

A That's right, because presumably the ARB would keep it in

house.

Q Correct. So were you preparing two sets, one for the ARB,

and one that might potentially be released to the public?

A No, not to my knowledge were we preparing two sets. I was

not completely clear on the purpose of this document review, but my

limited understanding was this was a document review for ARB and any

other investigations of the incident.

Q To your knowledge, did the documents that the ARB received,

did they have FOIA redactions in them, or were they clean?

A I don't know, sir.

Q You don't know one way or the other?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Take us through the process of how you did this

review physically. In other words, did you look at documents on a

computer? Did you have a stack of physical documents? How did you

do the review?

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A To my recollection, I had a stack of physical documents and

highlighters, and I highlighted any information that I thought should

be redacted, and then I wrote on a sticky note, if I recall correctly,

the reason for the redaction, either name of private citizen, name of

junior USG official, not germane. And there were a lot of emails in

these piles of paper that were a cable about, you know, I can't remember

exactly, but things that were not relevant to Benghazi in any way.

There was a cable from Tripoli about, you know, economic roundtable

in Tripoli, whatever, a few months before the attacks. It didn't seem

germane to our operations in Libya.

Q So when you suggested that information should be redacted

that wasn't germane, were you, again, applying your own personal

standards, or were there common standards that everybody was applying?

A I was applying my understanding as the NEA person.

Ms. Safai. Can we get one second? I apologize.

Mr. Missakian. Sure. Do you recall the question?

Ms. . I believe if you could repeat the question.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Sure. It sounded like at some point you suggested that

information should be redacted based on what I would refer to as

relevance?

A Yes.

Q So, in your mind, relevant to what?

A And, again, my responsibility was just recommending

production. There wasn't anything else.

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Q I understand.

A It was my standard as the NEA person at the table was, is

this relevant to the way we operated in Libya, to kind of embassy and

special office operating to attacks of the security situation, and

there were documents in there, there was an email of, you know, holiday

closing schedule for example, or the kitchen; somebody had copied

someone on kitchen equipment for the Embassy. There were things like

that that did not seem germane.

Q Did not seem germane to the issue --

A To me as an NEA MAG officer.

Q These are documents that you're not going to be using.

These documents are going to be going to the ARB and possibly to others?

A Right.

Q I'm just trying to understand how you decided what was

relevant and what wasn't. Was it as broadly as saying you were going

to suggest redacting everything that did not relate to security at the

facility, or was it some other standard?

A My recollection, sir, of the standards was anything to do

with embassy and mission operations, day-to-day operations, anything

to do with the wider security situation in Libya at the time, and

anything to do specifically with the attacks in Benghazi. If I recall

correctly, because I haven't thought about this in some time, those

were the standards I was applying.

Q Right. And where did you get those standards?

Ms. Safai. If you remember.

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Ms. . I don't remember, no. I'm sorry.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Do you have a sense of whether you personally reviewed all

the documents that were being produced, or did you just review a subset

of all the documents that were being produced?

A I reviewed a subset.

Q Approximately how many documents?

A It felt likes millions at the time, millions of pages of

email. I don't know, sir. I was there for about a week.

Q Okay. As best you can, can you recall the types of

information that you suggested should be redacted from the documents

that was --

A Yes, sir. I was primarily focused myself on redacting

names and titles of individuals who were private citizens, either

Libyan, American, U.N. staff, other internationals who were in Libya

doing work, because they were talking to American diplomats. That's

a sensitive thing that could endanger people if that's generally known

in some circumstances. So that's primarily what I was recommending

redacting. And then I also recommended redacting the names of junior

people who were drafting emails or cables as well.

Q I'm sure you're aware of some allegations made by a

gentleman by the name of Ray Maxwell regarding the review of documents

that were produced to the ARB. Are you familiar with those

allegations?

A If I could specify, sir, what you're referring to.

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Q You're not aware of any allegations that he has made with

regard to the review of the documents produced at the ARB?

A I'm aware of an article with an interview with DAS Maxwell,

but I don't recall specifically what the content of the article was.

Q Have you ever read the article?

A I did, about a year ago, but I don't recall anything

specific.

Q I haven't read it in a while either. My best recollection

is that his allegation is that you participated in a review of documents

that were being produced to the ARB, and in the course of that review,

removed documents that might be, for lack of a better word, embarrassing

to the State Department?

A That is not accurate. People can correct me if that's not

an accurate summary.

Mr. Snyder. I don't know if he specifically alleged that she

removed.

Ms. Safai. Right. I don't know if there were any names in there.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q If there weren't any names, I'll withdraw that part, but

that's the allegation, that documents were removed from documents

produced to the ARB. So you are aware of that allegation generally?

A I recall reading the article. I recall that he touched on

document production. I don't recall exactly what was in his statement.

Q Let's just go into some of the specifics then.

A Sure.

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Q In the course of the review of the documents you did, did

Raymond Maxwell ever, was he ever there with you during that review?

A Yes, sir. He visited on the Sunday. I let him and

and the Libya desk officers -- was the office director. He was

in Libya at the time. He was on temporary duty in Libya helping after

the attack. I let them know, look, Liz asked me to do this. I'm going

to start helping, and I'll probably call on the desk officers and others

to help as time goes by. He's like, can I help in any way? Can I drop

by? I'm like, yeah, please. He dropped by to see what was going on,

, so he was checking in with me to see

how I was doing.

Q Is that the Sunday immediately after the Saturday where you

spoke to Liz Dibble and she asked you to do this?

A Right. I got in on Sunday morning, as I recall. He stopped

by during the day on Sunday.

Q Again, I'm not familiar with the layout of the State

Department. Where were you doing this review?

A It was a room somewhere in the basement of the State

Department. I believe it was somewhere in the A Bureau.

Q Can you give me any more details about the room?

A It was a large room with a bunch of computers and desks in

it, coffee pots, like a big conference room sort of thing with a lot

of computers.

Q Approximately how long did Mr. Maxwell stay with you that

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day?

A I don't recall. It wasn't very long, maybe an hour.

Q About an hour?

A Maybe half an hour, maybe an hour.

Q Under an hour?

A Yeah, if I recall correctly.

Q Was there anybody there with you at the time when Mr. Maxwell

showed up?

A I mean, there were other people around us, but I don't

remember who exactly.

Q Do you know the name (ph), I believe his name

is?

A Yes. was one of my colleagues in NEA MAG.

Q At any time did Mr. (ph) take part in this document

review?

A I don't recall.

Q It's possible, but you don't recall?

A It's possible because we set up an NEA roster of desk

officers to come in and help, but I don't recall if he was one of the

people that supported.

Q Was he in NEA at the time, Mr. (ph)?

A Yes, he was.

Q What was he doing at the time?

A He was our regional desk officer in NEA MAG, meaning he was

supporting all four country desks and looking at transnational issues.

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Q After you reviewed the documents that you reviewed and you

made your highlights and wrote your notes, did you see them after that?

A No, I did not.

Q Where did they go, to your knowledge?

A I'm not sure. I don't know where they went.

Q Did you ever review documents on a computer as opposed to

a physical copy of the document?

A I don't recall reviewing documents on a computer, only in

hardcopy.

Q Tell us the process by which you personally collected the

documents that you contributed to this project?

A There was a request to produce documents, and I don't recall

exactly. I think that we were given, you know, kind of the general

search terms to look for and scan in our computer and files.

Q So you eventually, did you produce a PST file, or did you

produce hard copies in response to that request?

A We produced hardcopies in response to that request.

Q So you physically would have identified the documents that

were responsive, printed them out from your computer, and then handed

that stack over to somebody?

A That's what I recall.

Q Do you believe that's how the document collection occurred

for everybody, if you know?

A I'm not sure. I don't know.

Q Do you recall any conversation that you had with Mr. Maxwell

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on that Sunday when he stopped by the document review?

A I don't recall our conversation.

Q At any point during the time that Mr. Maxwell was there with

you, do you recall either Cheryl Mills or Jake Sullivan stopping by?

A I recall seeing them at other times in the document review

room. I don't recall seeing them on that day.

Q So it's possible that they did show up that day. You just

don't know as you sit here today. You can't remember?

A Right. Right.

Mr. Missakian. Thank you.

Ms. Safai. Sheria, can I ask you how much you guys anticipate?

Ms. Clarke. Not much longer. In fact, we're finished. I think

those are all the questions that we have. Thank you. We can go off

the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Kenny. Back on the record. The time is 1:17 p.m.

Ms. , again, thank you for your patience today. We're

hoping we can conclude with this round, at least our portion of the

questions, and then have you back on your way, return you to your post

as quickly as possible.

Ms. . Thank you.

Mr. Kenny. I'd like to pick up where we left off in the last round

of discussion about a document review session, a series of document

review sessions that is you participated in in the weeks after the

attack, and there was a reference to an article that you indicated you

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may have read a year or so ago, and we thought it would be helpful if

we just went ahead and introduced that article into the record.

This is going to be exhibit 6. There you go.

[ Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. . Thank you.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I'll give you a moment to review the article.

A Thank you.

Q Just for the purposes of the record, I'm going to identify

this document. This is exhibit No. 6. This is an article dated

September 15, 2014 that appeared in the online publication The Daily

Signal. It's entitled, quote, "Benghazi Bombshell: Clinton State

Department Official Reveals Details of Alleged Document Review," close

quote. And according to this article, Ray Maxwell, former DAS for

Maghreb Affairs, came forward with a, quote, "startling allegation,"

close quote, and this is from the first paragraph specifically that,

quote, "Hillary Clinton confidants were part of an operation to

separate damaging documents before they were turned over to the

Accountability Review Board," close quote. You indicated again that

you are familiar with this article. Is that right?

A Yes, I am.

Q I just would like to read a portion of it into the record

and ask for your response because there are some fairly specific

allegations in here. The article describes the document review

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session from the perspective of Mr. Maxwell, and I'm going to read from

the middle of the page under the section "Basement Operation." The

second paragraph there begins, quote, "When he arrived, Maxwell says

he observed boxes and stacks of documents. He says the State

Department office director, whom Maxwell described as close to

Clinton's top advisers, was there. Though the office director

technically worked for him, Maxwell says he wasn't consulted about a

weekend assignment. She told me, 'Ray, we are to go through these

stacks and pull out anything that might put anybody in the [Near Eastern

Affairs] front office on the seventh floor in a bad light,' says

Maxwell. He says "seventh floor" was State Department shorthand for

then Secretary Clinton and her principal advisers. I asked her, 'But

isn't that unethical?" She responded, 'Ray, those are our orders,'"

close quote.

And I'd first like to ask, there is a reference here to an office

director. It indicated that your office director at the time was in

Libya?

A That's right.

Q Backfilling at Embassy Tripoli, is that accurate, as the

CDA?

A Yes.

Q Is your understanding of this article that Ray Maxwell or

that this article is referring to you when it refers to the office

director?

A That's my understanding. That's what it appears to be.

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Q Okay. And there's a direct quote from Mr. Maxwell that's

included in here where he states that you told him that the purpose

of the document review was to, quote, again, quote, "go through these

stacks and pull out anything that might put anybody in the [Near Eastern

Affairs] front office of the seventh floor in a bad light," close quote.

Is that accurate?

A No, it is not accurate.

Q And do you know what may have given him this impression that

you said these words to him?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Did anyone ever order you to pull out any information

that might put the NEA front office or the seventh floor in a, quote,

"bad light," close quote?

A No.

Q And was this review process part of any effort to withhold

or conceal information from the Accountability Review Board, to your

understanding?

A That was not my understanding.

Q Okay. And we discussed in the last round your

understanding of what the purpose of this document review was. You

indicated that you were somewhat unclear, but you applied some

standards that I think you had through your experience in performing

FOIA reviews. Is that accurate?

A That's right, sir.

Q So you had performed document reviews in the past?

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A A few limited ones with regard to FOIA requests.

Q Okay. And in those types of document reviews, what sorts

of information were you asked to review and flag?

A In the FOIA reviews, you're referring to?

Q Yes.

A We were looking for, as subject-matter experts, information

of sensitivity that would be damaging if it was released publicly.

Q So that would include information like the names of Libyans

that might be working with the U.S. Government?

A Exactly, or pre-decisional information. If it was

information about something that was, the deliberations between

government officials before a decision was made.

Q Okay. And you indicated that you applied some of that

guidance to this document review, which started on a Sunday and I

believe ended within that week for you personally?

A For my purposes, yes. I believe it extended beyond that.

Q And did you apply any other guidelines other than the ones

that you describe for us in conducting that review?

A No, that's basically what I was relying on. That's my

recollection, but that's it. There was nothing such as what is being

implied here.

Q And you mentioned that you had raised a concern that one

type of information be redacted, that of the names of junior officers?

A Exactly, the names and their contact information and

titles.

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Q Okay. Did you make a recommendation for any other type of

information to be redacted from the documents you were reviewing?

A Basically, I mean, kind of my memory is most of what I

highlighted and recommended for redaction was, again, names of Libyan

American, other international contacts that the mission or Tripoli had.

That was the bulk of it, yeah.

Q And you mentioned that you performed some limited FOIA

reviews in the past?

A Yes.

Q And you applied similar guidelines when conducting this

review. Did you have any specific concern about performing the review

that you were performing in reviewing for the sensitive information

that you were looking for?

A No. It made sense to me. We were preparing information

to be released.

Q Okay. And when you say prepared to be released, did you

have an understanding that this information would be publicly released?

A No, I did not. At the time, I wasn't clear on where the

document production was going, to the ARB, beyond the ARB. But, again,

I was thinking about FOIA, and if things are publicly released, would

there be damage to the United States Government or to individuals that

we should protect.

Q You mentioned it was your belief that the H Bureau had led

this effort or was participating in this effort in some way?

A I thought it was H.

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Q Can you describe what H is?

A H is the Bureau of Legislative Affairs at the State

Department.

Q Would H typically be involved in a process of reviewing

documents that would be turned over to the Accountability Review Board,

to your understanding?

A I don't know. I've never been involved in an ARB before.

Q Okay. That's helpful. Were you aware that there was a

congressional request for information that preceded the convening of

the ARB?

A No. I was not aware of that, or I don't recall that.

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Mr. Kenny. Returning to the article, one of the implications in

what Mr. Maxwell describes here is that you didn't notify him about

your weekend work beforehand. The one implication there being that

you were probably participating in some sort of covert, possibly

nefarious document review. Would that been an accurate

characterization?

Ms. . No.

Ms. Safai. Did you say "accurate" or "inaccurate"?

Mr. Kenny. Accurate.

Ms. . No, that's not an accurate description.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And why not?

A I recall notifying not just Ray, but my Libya desk officers

and that I'm like: Look, called me, and I'm going to be

involved in this, and I'll probably have to rope more people in from

any to help as time goes by.

So -- and I can't recall exactly when -- if I emailed the folks

that morning or after I arrived, but I let them know.

Q Did you ever receive any feedback or instruction back that

you were not to inform others of the existence of this document review?

A No. I know no one listed had asked me to do that; no one

in the room asked me to do that.

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Q Okay. So you didn't understand this to be some secret

operation --

A No.

Q -- that was secretly going to be done?

A Certainly not. No.

Q Okay. And the fact that it was scheduled outside of

business hours or began outside of business hours, it wouldn't be fair

to then assume that this was done to conceal or hide this activity?

A To be frank, we worked every weekend anyway, so to me -- I

don't mean to make light of this. It didn't strike me as unusual.

Q Okay. Also, according to this, there is a direct quote here

where Maxwell seems to describe a quote to you.

A Uh-huh.

Q He raises an ethical concern or claims to raise an ethical

concern to you. Do you recall him doing that?

A I don't recall him raising an ethical concern, but again,

I don't remember the specifics of our conversation, but I don't recall

that.

Q Okay. If he had raised a concern about the ethics of the

activity, what -- how would you have dealt with that?

A I was not uncomfortable with what I was asked to do in that

room, my understanding of what I was supposed to do or the fact that

asked me to help out to represent NEA in this process, so I would

not -- had he asked me about it, I probably would have said: This seems

perfectly normal or this seems like we want to -- we want NEA to be

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involved if there is -- if we're looking at information and recommending

redactions, then we should be here.

Q Uh-huh.

A Yeah.

Q And do you recall if anyone else, to include people

participating in the review whom you may have been working alongside,

whether any of them expressed any concerns about the document review?

A No. I mean, again, not to make light of it, people were

quite tired. It was the weekend. That was the only --

Q It was a holiday.

A It was griping. It was the holiday weekend. There was a

bit of griping. A lot of plans changed that weekend, but that's all

I recall.

Q Okay. A little later in the article, I'll direct you to

the third page in. The top of the page there, the second sentence

reads, "He views" -- quote, "He views the after-hours operation he

witnessed in the State Department basement as an 'exercise in

misdirection,'" close quote.

A Yes.

Q Do you agree with Mr. Maxwell's characterization here?

A I do not, no.

Q Okay. Again, can you just explain for us? And I

appreciate your indulgence.

A No. In terms of what I had done before with FOIA, I mean,

there's always a need for subject-matter experts to -- if there's going

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to be a document production for any purpose and that could potentially

make documents public, you want to make sure that you take a very careful

look at what the documents are to protect people or information that

could do damage to the United States or could endanger people. That's

always something. And I think I'm even more sensitive to that after

WikiLeaks, to be frank, what had occurred just a few -- a year before

this, you know, the incident in Benghazi.

So we're very sensitive to, you know, if documents are made

public, are people going to be endangered, or are there national

security issues here that we don't want known?

Q Sure. You were asked in the last round about whether the

Secretary's chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, was ever present

for a document review session, and I believe you indicated at some point

they may have showed up --

A Yes.

Q -- during the week.

A Yes.

Q But you couldn't recall exactly when. This article spawned

a series of spinoff articles where the allegation was that Cheryl Mills

had somehow ordered the destruction and removal of documents before

they were turned over to the Accountability Review Board, and it's a

serious allegation, so we'd just like to follow up with you --

A Yes.

Q -- and ask if you have any information or evidence. So do

you have any evidence that Cheryl Mills or Jake Sullivan personally

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removed or destroyed or ordered anyone else to remove or destroy

documents related to Benghazi?

A No.

Q Did you see anyone destroy, remove, or attempt to destroy

and/or remove any Benghazi related information?

A No.

Q Did anyone, including the Secretary, ever ask you or order

you to remove or destroy potentially damaging documents about the

attacks in Benghazi before they were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q And you had indicated that you did speak with the ARB in

the course of its investigation. Is that right?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Did you ever feel that you couldn't be as forthcoming

with the ARB as you wanted or felt you needed to be?

A No, not at all.

Q Okay. Did anyone ever ask or instruct you to withhold any

evidence from the ARB?

A No.

Q And this is a more broader question.

A Uh-huh.

Q And we may have touched on it, so I'm just getting at it

a different way.

A Sure.

Q But did anyone ever ask or instruct you to withhold

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documents or any other evidence in response to a congressional request

for information related to the Benghazi attacks?

A No.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So before we leave this article, I did just want to ask you

a couple of quick questions. My colleague touched on it, but there

is, on that front page, a direct quote wherein Mr. Maxwell indicates,

quote, "I asked her," meaning you, "but isn't that unethical? She

responded 'Ray, those are our orders.'"

You indicated earlier that certainly nothing like what is implied

here happened?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q That goes beyond an implication. It actually indicates

that you may have engaged in something unethical. What is your

response to that potential charge?

A My response to that is it's completely nonsensical and

inaccurate.

Q And you would --

A And I would embellish that if there wasn't a court reporter

in the room, but this article made me extremely angry.

Q And you indicated earlier in the day, you kind of pointed

out in response to another question that, on another issue entirely,

that you are not the type of person who would succumb to pressure.

A That's right.

Q Had you felt that someone was asking you to do anything that

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was unethical, what would you have done at that point in time?

A I would have, frankly, told that person that I felt

uncomfortable and that I needed to consult with my colleagues and that

I would leave the process, that I would not participate in the process

if I thought there was something wrong with the process, what we were

being asked to do.

Q So certainly with regard to this document review, had you

felt there was anything unethical or inappropriate, you would have

raised that as an issue up the chain?

A I would have raised that, and I would have gotten up to

leave.

Q Aside from this article, have you ever heard this allegation

from any other source that there was a document review and documents

were reviewed for the purposes of determining whether or not it was

painting the NEA or the seventh floor in a bad light?

A No, I've never heard that allegation separately. Only in

this article.

Q And did Mr. Maxwell himself ever raise this allegation to

you, other than when you saw it appear in this article?

A No.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I'd like to redirect your attention.

A Yes.

Q Back to exhibit 5, which is the information memo to the

Secretary, dated August 17th. And, again, in the last hour, I think

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you touched on this, but I just wanted to ask if you could explain for

us a little bit -- in a little bit more depth, for those of us outside

of the State Department -- or bureaucracy, rather, that this is an

information memo, and we've seen a series or examples of what I refer

to as action memos, and if you could just explain for us what the

difference is between the two.

A Sure. An information memo is something that we send up to

provide an update, additional background information on a country or

a development, you know, the Syria peace negotiations, whatever may

happen. A decision memo is you tee up specific decisions for the

Secretary or the relevant Under Secretary to -- and you provide a

recommendation for each decision you're recommending. Like so, for

example, this IM, this info memo, has no specific trigger points or

decisions. We're not asking the Secretary to make specific decisions.

We are getting her up to speed on what happened following the election.

The decision memo always triggers a kind of decision, a kind of

action item with our recommendations inside.

An action memo can be just from one bureau that's cleared through

others, or it could be multiple bureaus seeking action.

Q No, thank you, that's a helpful distinction for us.

So if there had been a specific recommendation for the Secretary

to take based on the information presented here, that would have been

more appropriately packaged in an action memo?

A That would have been packaged in an action memo. That's

right.

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Q Okay. And my colleagues had asked about some of the

specific content in here. I would just like to ask about the -- both

the subject line as well as the first line, and also, just to be clear

on the record, so this is a -- this document has been recently

declassified, so you may see --

A It has been declassified?

Q This is declassified, yes. We're in an unclassified

setting.

A Of course, yes.

Q Sure. It's undergone a sensitivity review, so I just want

to make sure the record is clear because there are some markings that

appear in here.

A Yeah.

Q And so I'd just like to direct your attention to the subject

itself is presented as a question, and the very first paragraph begins,

quote, "Libya has experienced an upward trend in violence, primarily

but not exclusively in the east, since May. It is not yet clear if

this trend will reverse itself as earlier ones have over the past year

or if in eastern Libya, at least, it constitutes a new normal," close

quote.

A Uh-huh.

Q And what I'd like to ask you is, at this point in time, which

is the middle of December -- the middle of August --

A Right.

Q -- rather, of 2012, whether it was unclear that the security

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situation would naturalize, would improve itself over time in Libya

or if it would remain. Is that -- was it unclear at this time what

would happen with the security situation?

A It was unclear.

Q Okay. And we'll direct you to the last page -- sorry, the

second page, the very bottom, the last paragraph begins, quote,

"Despite the worrisome aspects of this increase in violence, there is

no coordinated organization behind the incidents," close quote.

I believe you touched on this a little bit in your explanation

in the last round, but again, just at this point in time, it was unclear

whether the security incidents were connected or linked in any way.

Is that correct?

A That's right. That's right.

Q Okay.

Mr. Kenny. So at this point we'd like to introduce what will be

marked as exhibit 7.

[ Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. . Thank you. Is this missing a page? Oh. Oh, I

see. Yes, sir.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And for the purposes of the record, to identify this

document, exhibit 7 is an email, dated August 29, 2012, from Gregory

Hicks to Ambassador Stevens. Subject line reads, quote, "Draft

Benghazi Proposal," close quote. It then appears to contain a 3-page

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attachment bearing document No. C05578322-MOA, and again, for the

purposes of the record, this is a document that has been recently

declassified by the State Department.

I would like to begin just reading the first line of this email,

which is from Gregory Hicks. It reads, quote, "Chris: Attached is

the draft proposal. It's not quite final, but I think it's close,"

close quote.

And I'd just ask, what was your understanding of what this

proposal was?

A So my understanding, we knew that Ambassador Stevens and

post were preparing a memo justification for extending the presence

in Benghazi, making it more permanent in some aspect, and it -- this

was information that post, we knew, was pulling together to justify,

you know, kind of why we needed to remain in the east and what the

staffing requirements would be to cover it.

So this includes, you know, kind of the policy justifications as

well as a snapshot about what kind of personnel you would need to do

this job, and it touches on, you know, the beginning of discussion they

were having with DOD on who else would be there.

Q Okay. And this appears to be a draft, as you described.

A Yes.

Q Do you recall that a draft was at one point sent to NEA/MAG?

Is that correct? Or submitted by post?

A I remember conversations with post, that they were going

to send us a draft. I don't recall -- I don't recall getting the draft.

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Q Okay.

A The specific draft from Greg.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q But it's possible that Ambassador Greg may have send it to

Director , for instance?

A It's possible, yes.

Q And the date here, this is August 29?

A That's right.

Q So this is a couple of weeks after the information memo is

sent up to the Secretary. Is that right?

A That's right.

Q Okay. I would just like to direct -- direct your attention

to the third page.

A Uh-huh.

Q And attempt not to spend the --

A The third page of the memo?

Q Third page of the document, so second page of the memo.

Ms. Safai. Peter, can we put on the record that Ms.

name is not on this?

Mr. Kenny. Yes.

Ms. Safai. Did you want to establish --

Mr. Kenny. Of course.

Ms. Safai. -- for the rest of the document?

BY MR. KENNY:

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Q That's right. So the email is between DCM Hicks,

Ambassador Stevens. Your name doesn't appear on here, but you were

aware of discussions ongoing at the time?

A Yes, I was aware that post was going to send us a memo.

Q Okay. And I'd just like to ask, the third paragraph,

there's a quote here, reads, quote, "A permanent Embassy branch office

in Benghazi would enable us to continue to monitor political activity

in this extremely important region in the country. It would allow us

a base from which to track Islamist and other extremist terrorist

activities at and to develop effective countermeasures against them,"

close quote.

And what I'm hoping to understand or -- first of all, I'll just

ask, do you recall that specific justification ever being made by post

to NEA/MAG?

A Not the specific justification. The wider justification

of needing to be present to understand security developments in the

absence of kind a national army, a national police force, you know,

kind of unified security, like what's going on out there that could

be of concern.

Q Okay. And the reason I'm asking about this --

A Yeah.

Q And I realize there's a lot of content here, and I keyed

in on a specific section?

A Yeah.

Q But --

1135
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A Yeah.

Q -- what we're trying to understand is you have an

information memo that the desk office, through NEA/MAG, sends up to

the Secretary --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and several weeks later, you see a justification for

continuing the presence. One of the things we're hoping to link up

is what the understanding of -- at post was of the threat, not just

at Main State.

A Uh-huh.

Q And from here, it seems to at least, to us, that there was

a desire to continue U.S. presence in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Despite the security situation in Libya. Is that a fair

reading?

A That's right.

Q Okay. And, in fact, it appears that this memo, at various

points, there's references to AQ and AQIM.

A Yes.

Q It does acknowledge that there was a security concern in

Libya and eastern Libya.

A And the presence of extremist groups, yes.

Q So one of the things I was hoping you could help us

understand is, it may sound a little counterintuitive, but you know,

some may want to argue that because you had a challenging security

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situation in eastern Libya, that was a reason to close post there;

whereas, here, it seems to be the opposite, perhaps somewhat

counterintuitive rationale being put forward that we need to be there

because of those developments. And maybe you could help us understand,

is that -- am I clear?

A If I could ask you sort of to clarify. You're pointing out

that there's two contrary opinions.

Q Yes.

A Yes.

Q Yes. So can you help us just explain that other view that

is important or why it would be important for the U.S. to be present

in an area where there is extremist activity?

A Yes. So kind of my understanding and kind of the our role

from NEA/MAG, we were -- we were aware that the Ambassador and our team

in Libya were very -- very much understood the balance, you know, how

the risks-rewards balance or interests-risks balance that we have to

constantly think about for every diplomatic post in the world in a

country that's undergoing change.

I mean, it's not Mexico. It's not France. It's a country

undergoing significant changes after a revolution where we have a now

Rolodex, new contacts we have to make contact with. It's not the normal

set of people that you work with as diplomats.

So it was clear to us through, you know, what post was reporting

and what the media was reporting, what other, you know, international

partners were advising us that there were extremist groups present in

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Libya. Some of those guys were connected to Al Qaeda, right. I mean,

that was -- some were connected to Islamist groups that had been

fighting Qadhafi for a long time but that he had managed to repress

pretty violently but that they had risen -- you know, they had a

presence, again, following the revolution, as Qadhafi's security

services and kind of his repressive rule dissipated.

So the point that -- again, I don't recall seeing this memo in

this form specifically until today. I knew it was coming, but the

argument is, in addition to kind of the political context and the women

leaders and kind of the -- you know, the academics, you are also talking

to security services when you're in a country and people that have

knowledge of who's doing what in a country.

So it's better to be present and active and listening to what's

going on and sharing that information back with Washington, and you

know, with Washington's instruction, you know, taking specific

actions. That it was worth it to us to be in Libya at this time and

in eastern Libya as well as in Tripoli to have a better understanding

of the security as well as the other developments.

It is very hard to track terrorism from -- just from ISR, right,

just from intelligence resources or just from Washington or just from

capitals, yeah.

Q And just to clarify one point. So at this point in

time -- and again, this is a few weeks after the info memo goes up.

A That's right, sir.

Q The discussion at post was not whether to close the Special

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Mission in Benghazi, but it was to in fact extend it and make it a

permanent presence. Is that --

A There was no discussion of closing Benghazi from post. It

was all like it is more important than ever that we get a handle on

what's going on and that we are influential and present to understand

what's going on and to influence what happens in eastern Libya.

Q Okay. So at this point -- and this will just take a few

minutes.

A Sure.

Q So I'll ask you to please bear with us.

A Sure.

Q We are going to shift gears a little bit.

A Okay.

Q And I'll preface by saying that this is -- I'll let her ask

one more question.

A Yes.

Ms. Sawyer. Give me a moment, and I'll always think of one other

question.

Ms. . Give us a minute, we'll always write another

email. Sorry.

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. Let the record reflect we were just joking.

You know, there have been some allegations. This memo indicates

a pretty active effort on the part of the individuals on the ground --

Ms. . Uh-huh.

Ms. Sawyer. -- to be advocating a particular recommendation to

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both keep and then extend the presence.

Ms. Safai. Heather, I apologize. Are you still referring to 7?

Ms. Sawyer. I'm sorry, I'm referring back to exhibit 7.

Ms. Safai. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Toward the end of August 2012.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q You know, there have been allegations that the both presence

in Benghazi and the desire to remain in Benghazi did not come from the

ground up but instead came from the top down, that it was truly -- that

the Secretary of State at the time, Hillary Clinton's desire to be there

and her directive to be there, or if not Secretary Clinton, then someone

in the White House or the White House National Security Council.

A Right.

Q Is that true? Is that allegation true?

A No.

Q That it was being driven from the top down?

A No, not at all. It was very much, you know, from -- from

early -- from 2011 onwards through 2012, it was post really leading

the charge and making -- because they were on the ground. They saw

how important it was, and they had the hunger to be like: There is

a lot going on here. We need to be responsible diplomats and stewards

of American interests. We have to understand what's happening. We

have to be present to understand what's happening.

And it was not a fun place to live, so it's not like -- I don't

mean, again, to make light of this, but we took this very seriously.

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And obviously, the Assistant Secretaries and the seventh floor always

take seriously the recommendations of our ambassadors because it's not

like he was asking to open up a Club Med or something. This was a

difficult place in which to work, but it was worth to us to make the

case to remain in Libya and to make sure we stay in eastern Libya as

well as Tripoli to keep the mission going.

Q And on the very last page of this exhibit 7.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Down in that bottom paragraph, there's just a mention in

the first few -- in the first sentence right there: "The Embassy's

facilities manager and," redacted," colleagues, have conducted site

surveys in multiple compounds that could properly house a co-located

mission."

So in terms of discussing that and just at a high level, not in

detail --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- the ability to co-locate different entities from U.S.

Government, to me, indicates that enhancing security for folks on the

ground --

A Yes.

Q -- was being considered and being considered very

seriously, and steps were actually proactively being taken in that

direction.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Was that accurate? Is that accurate?

1141
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A Yes, that is absolutely my understanding.

Q So it's not that individuals were unaware of the security

challenges or ignoring the security challenges.

A No. They were very much aware, and this memo -- this

discussion reflects to me that post was thinking very clearly about

the risk-reward, the risk-interest balance, like: If we do this, we

will need RSOs; we will push for publication; we will -- you know, these

are what we'll recommend to Washington, the steps that we take.

Q So those steps and that discussion was well under way and

ongoing at the time that the attacks then occurred?

A It was beginning. It wasn't -- you know, post had

just -- and the Ambassador and his team had had the discussion with

their interagency colleagues in Libya, and they were coming back to

Washington to say -- the Ambassador was like: This is my concerted

recommendation of where we need to go forward.

Q And just from a personal perspective, you know, hindsight

is always 20/20 vision, but at the time, did you agree with the

recommendations that were being made to continue a presence and extend

it, you know, with the considerations that were under way, the presence

in Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am. I agreed 100 percent. As I stated earlier,

that as a Foreign Service officer and someone who has worked in the

Middle East and tough places, you know, I saw the immediate benefit

of contact building and being present and meeting people and kind of

helping to shape, you know, decisions on the ground or activities on

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the ground and pushing American perspectives and interests along the

way.

So I agreed with this 100 percent. To be frank, when I -- when

they first mentioned this memo to me, and we knew the Ambassador was

a strong proponent, but my stomach sank a little bit because there is,

bureaucratically, until we had the bureaucratic agreement that this

would be extended for a period of time, I knew that the difficulty of

staffing would continue, kind of the TDY, the need to pull people from

other places. Mainly, I'm a policy sec because that was what I was

responsible, not the DS staffing, so I'm like, absolutely, 100 percent,

and like 5 percent was like -- you know, to reflect to the court

reporter -- 5 percent of me was like: Wow, this is -- we're going to

have to think very carefully bureaucratically with our resource people

how this would -- how we try to regularize the staffing for this.

So a little bit of me was a scrooge, was uncomfortable, but not

for any security reasons, mainly for the bureaucracy itself. The

logistics are tough.

Q And despite the fact that you realized that there would be

some period of time where those logistics would remain a challenge --

A Absolutely.

Q You still thought --

A Absolutely, 100 percent. This absolutely had to be done,

and I believe that to this day, despite our losses.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And just a moment ago when you were referring to the

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difficulties of the TDY, were you referring to that in the context of

the December 2011 decision to extend for 1 year?

A No. Well, I was more referring to this, the 2012, the

beginning of the discussion to continue to extend because at the end

of 2011, when the memo came out, you know, we're like: Okay, we're

going to keep this going for a year. It's fine. We've got our game.

I know how to do this. I know how to -- who to draw from to do our

principal officers and the policy staff.

Q But to be clear, this exhibit 7 is a recommendation to make

a permanent post, not to re-extend. Is that how you viewed it?

A Yes, sir. That's what the Ambassador -- it looks like

that's what they were setting forth in the cable. Of course,

Washington ultimately makes the decision. They take the Ambassador's

recommendation into -- absolutely, it's a very strong element of this,

but it also takes time to determine that you set up a permanent mission.

So in the interim, it doesn't happen overnight.

Q Okay. And this was the beginning of that process?

A This was the beginning of that process. That's right.

Q Okay. So shifting gears a little bit.

A Yes.

Q This will be our last portion of our interview, and I'll

just preface by saying that this is the eighth congressional

investigation into the Benghazi attacks. It's our intent and hope that

it's the last, and we, therefore, have been asking every witness a

series of public -- about a series of public allegations that have been

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made about the attacks. And while anybody can speculate about the

Benghazi attacks, plenty of people have, there is only a limited

universe of people who have direct specific knowledge of what happened

both before, during, and after the attacks, and so what I'm asking for

here is not your speculation, not your opinion but whether you have

any firsthand knowledge on these allegations. If not, we'll just move

on to the next allegation.

So there's several of them, so it takes a little bit of that time

to get through those, but I appreciate --

A I understand.

Q -- your patience. First, it has been alleged that

Secretary of State Clinton intentionally blocked military action on

the night of the attacks. One Congressman has speculated that, quote,

"Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down," close quote, and

this resulted in the Defense Department not sending more assets to help

in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya. The

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Washington Post Fact Checker evaluated the claim and gave it Four

Pinocchio's, its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No, I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Next. It's been alleged that Secretary Clinton

misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi

to his own people in order to garner support for military operations

in Libya in the spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

the spring of 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote "CIA was not collecting and shipping

arms from Libya to Syria," close quote, and that they found, quote,

"no support for this allegation," close quote. Those were the

unclassified findings from the report.

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Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to, quote, "stand down," close quote, but that instead there were

tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no standdown order to

CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay them temporarily or think it was the right decision,

do you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

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Q Concern has been raised by one individual in the course of

producing documents to the Accountability Review Board damaging

documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q I'll ask these questions for documents provided to

Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

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A No, I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence CIA Deputy Director Morell altered

the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q Next. It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made

an intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk

shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, on

the night of that attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action,"

close quote.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close

quote, or quote, "missing in action," close quote, on the night of the

attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks were considering flying

on the second plane to Benghazi, were ordered by their superiors to,

quote, "stand down," close quote, meaning cease all operations.

Military officials have stated that those four individuals were

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instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and

medical assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "There was no standdown order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no standdown order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q Last one.

A Okay.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of

the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were,

how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on night of the attacks that could have saved

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lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to

deploy?

A No.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Thank you for the time that you've given us today.

You came a long way to answer our questions. We appreciate it very

much, and I just wanted to give you an opportunity if there is anything

that we didn't ask or that you felt would be important to this committee

for us to understand or to know, to give you the opportunity to, you

know, explain anything further.

Ms. . Thank you. I have nothing further to offer with

regard to the investigation. I think the one thing that I'd like to

say, since it's on the record, is that, you know, for better or for

worse, I think we're going to continue living and working in a very

unpredictable world, and ultimately, our resources come from you, from

Congress. And so I'd like to say that as a Foreign Service

officer -- and I hope I'll continue to have the privilege to work in

positions of greater responsibility. I hope at some point to

potentially be DCM or, you know, a leader in a bureau.

It's very important that we have the ability to surge and flex

as we need to in the field. It is not just the military that has to

surge for crises, but it's also your civilians. That will entail -- I

think it's going to be -- it's difficult. We're going to -- and it's

difficult for Congress to address these changing resource requests,

but it shouldn't be a surprise to any of the staffers here today or

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to your Members that this is a very unpredictable world we live in.

We will continue to want to represent the American people and

defend our interests in places that change. I have never served in

Western Europe, you know. I've never served in a garden post, other

than Thailand early in my career, and so I anticipate that I will

probably continue to have the opportunity to work on the Washington

side and overseas in places that are slightly unpredictable. And we

welcome kind of the dialogue with Congress and the flexibility and the

resources that we need to change staffing as needed.

And it's a tall order, but we can't predict exactly what's

happening in the world, but I believe it's very important that in

addition to military intelligence and other colleagues, that diplomats

are in the lead in representing the United States and interpreting and

shaping what happens overseas, so I -- Ambassador Stevens was an amazing

diplomat and an amazing friend, and he understood the Middle East like

very few other people.

It was very important that the United States had his leadership

there, and there are many -- this is very hard to go through again,

but it's worth it that we continue to do this work. And it's very

important that we continue to have that dialogue with the Congress on

what's needed to make this work possible because, ultimately, the money

doesn't come from within the State Department.

So thank you very much, and thank you very much to my colleagues

from the State Department as well, and Raeka.

Ms. Sawyer. Well, thank you. We truly appreciate it. You

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know, on behalf of all the members of the committee, we thank you both

for being here today, obviously, but also for the tremendous service

that you have given to the country, that you have pledged -- and it

is on the record -- that you will continue giving to the country.

It is very much appreciated, and we certainly do hope that

Congress will continue to partner in a meaningful way with the State

Department to help continue the really important work that you all do

and that you all do on our behalf, as you said, not in garden situations,

but in ones that are not garden-like and can be very unstable, so thank

you.

Ms. . Thank you, ma'am.

Mr. Kenny. Thank you. We'll go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 2:10 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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EXHIBIT 1

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 2

1158
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1159
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1161
EXHIBIT 3 .

1162
C05580192.

1163
EXHIBIT 4

1164
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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 5

1166
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1167
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

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11/3/2016 Benghazi Bombshell: Clinton State Department Official Reveals Details of Alleged Document Review ­ The Daily Signal

http://dailysignal.com//print?post_id=157483 1/7

Benghazi Bombshell: Clinton State Department Official Reveals Details

of Alleged Document Review

Sharyl Attkisson / September 15, 2014

As the House Select Committee on Benghazi prepares for its first hearing this week, a former State Department diplomat is coming forward with a

startling allegation: Hillary Clinton confidants were part of an operation to “separate” damaging documents before they were turned over to the

Accountability Review Board investigating security lapses surrounding the Sept. 11, 2012, terrorist attacks on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya.

UPDATE: Hillary Clinton’s chief of staЂ allegedly present at aЃer-hours document review.

According to former Deputy Assistant Secretary Raymond Maxwell, the aЃer-hours session took place over a weekend in a basement operations-type

center at State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C. This is the first time Maxwell has publicly come forward with the story.

At the time, Maxwell was a leader in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern AЂairs, which was charged with collecting emails and documents

relevant to the Benghazi probe.

Raymond Maxwell, former State Department deputy assistant secretary (Photo: Sharyl Attkisson)

“I was not invited to that aЃer-hours endeavor, but I heard about it and decided to check it out on a Sunday aЃernoon,” Maxwell says.

EXHIBIT 6

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He didn’t know it then, but Maxwell would ultimately become one of four State Department oЂicials singled out for discipline—he says scapegoated—

then later cleared for devastating security lapses leading up to the attacks. Four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, were

murdered during the Benghazi attacks.

‘Basement Operation’

Maxwell says the weekend document session was held in the basement of the State Department’s Foggy Bottom headquarters in a room underneath

the “jogger’s entrance.” He describes it as a large space, outfitted with computers and big screen monitors, intended for emergency planning, and with

small oЂices on the periphery.

When he arrived, Maxwell says he observed boxes and stacks of documents. He says a State Department oЂice director, whom Maxwell described as

close to Clinton’s top advisers, was there. Though the oЂice director technically worked for him, Maxwell says he wasn’t consulted about her weekend

assignment.

‘Basement operation’: The Department of State in Washington. (Photo: Wayan Vota/Creative

Commons)

“She told me, ‘Ray, we are to go through these stacks and pull out anything that might put anybody in the [Near Eastern AЂairs] front oЂice or the

seventh floor in a bad light,’” says Maxwell. He says “seventh floor” was State Department shorthand for then-Secretary of State Clinton and her

principal advisers.

“I asked her, ‘But isn’t that unethical?’ She responded, ‘Ray, those are our orders.’ ”

A few minutes aЃer he arrived, Maxwell says, in walked two high-ranking State Department oЂicials.

In an interview Monday morning on Fox News, Rep. Jason ChaЂetz, R-Utah, named the two Hillary Clinton confidants who allegedly were present: One

was Cheryl Mills, Clinton’s chief of staЂ and a former White House counsel who defended President Bill Clinton during his impeachment trial. The other,

ChaЂetz said, was Deputy Chief of StaЂ Jake Sullivan, who previously worked on Hillary Clinton’s and then Barack Obama’s presidential campaigns.

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Benghazi Bombshell: Fox News Reports on Sharyl Attkisson's...

“When Cheryl saw me, she snapped, ‘Who are you?’” Maxwell says. “Jake explained, ‘That’s Ray Maxwell, an NEA deputy assistant secretary.’ She

conceded, ‘Well, OK.'”

Maxwell says the two oЂicials, close confidants of Clinton, appeared to check in on the operation and soon leЃ.

Maxwell says aЃer Mills and Sullivan arrived, he, the oЂice director and an intern moved into a small oЂice where they looked through some papers.

Maxwell says his stack included pre-attack telegrams and cables between the U.S. embassy in Tripoli and State Department headquarters. AЃer a short

time, Maxwell says he decided to leave.

“I didn’t feel good about it,” he says.

Cheryl Mills, leЃ, was Hillary Clinton’s chief of staЂ and a White House counsel who defended President Bill Clinton during his impeachment trial. (Photo:

Newscom)

We contacted Mills and Sullivan to ask about the allegations and the purpose of the described separation of documents, but they did not return calls or

emails. We reached out to Clinton, who declined an interview request and oЂered no comment. A State Department spokesman told us it would have

been impossible for anybody outside the Accountability Review Board (ARB) to control the flow of information because the board cultivated so many

sources.

‘Unfettered Access’?

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When the ARB issued its call for documents in early October 2012, just weeks aЃer the Benghazi attacks, the executive directorate of the State

Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern AЂairs was put in charge of collecting all emails and relevant material. It was gathered, boxed and—Maxwell says

—ended up in the basement room prior to being turned over.

In May 2013, when critics questioned the ARB’s investigation as not thorough enough, co-chairmen Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Adm. Mike

Mullen responded that “we had unfettered access to everyone and everything including all the documentation we needed.”

Maxwell says when he heard that statement, he couldn’t help but wonder if the ARB—perhaps unknowingly—had received from his bureau a scrubbed

set of documents with the most damaging material missing.

An attacker celebrates as buildings and cars burn at the consulate compound in Benghazi

late Sept. 11, 2012. (Photo: Getty Images/Newscom)

Maxwell also criticizes the ARB as “anything but independent,” pointing to Mullen’s admission in congressional testimony that he called Mills to give

her inside advice aЃer the ARB interviewed a potential congressional witness.

In an interview in September 2013, Pickering told me that he would not have done what Mullen did. But both co-chairmen strongly defend their probe

as “fiercely independent.”

Maxwell also criticizes the ARB for failing to interview key people at the White House, State Department and the CIA, including not only Clinton but

Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides, who managed department resources in Libya; Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military AЂairs Andrew

Shapiro; and White House National Security Council Director for Libya Ben Fishman.

“The ARB inquiry was, at best, a shoddily executed attempt at damage control, both in Foggy Bottom and on Capitol Hill,” Maxwell says. He views the

aЃer-hours operation he witnessed in the State Department basement as “an exercise in misdirection.”

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Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were murdered in

Benghazi. (Photo: Newscom)

Sullivan did not respond to emails or to messages sent to him through his current teaching job at Yale Law School. Mills did not respond to a message

passed to her through Black Rock, a major global investment firm where she is on the board of directors. Clinton’s press oЂicer ultimately referred us to

the State Department, though none of the three currently works there.

State Department Response

A State Department spokesman, Alec Gerlach, calls the implication that documents were withheld “totally without merit.” Gerlach says: “The range of

sources that the ARB’s investigation drew on would have made it impossible for anyone outside of the ARB to control its access to information.”

Gerlach says the State Department instructed all employees to cooperate “fully and promptly” with the ARB, which invited anyone with relevant

information to contact the board directly.

“So individuals with information were reaching out proactively to the board. And, the ARB was also directly engaged with individuals and the [State]

Department’s bureaus and oЂices to request information and pull on whichever threads it chose to,” Gerlach says.

Benghazi Select Committee

Maxwell says he has been interviewed privately by several members of Congress in recent months, including ChaЂetz, a member of the House

Oversight Committee, and Rep. Trey Gowdy, R-S.C., chairman of the House Select Committee on Benghazi.

Rep. Jason ChaЂetz, R-Utah, speaks with Rep. Trey Gowdy, R-S.C., chairman of the Benghazi

Select Committee, (Photo: Newscom)

When reached for comment, ChaЂetz told me that Maxwell’s allegations “go to the heart of the integrity of the State Department.”

“The allegations are as serious as it gets, and it’s something we have obviously followed up and pursued,” ChaЂetz says. “I’m 100 percent confident the

Benghazi Select Committee is going to dive deep on that issue.”

Former Obama Supporter

Maxwell, 58, strongly supported President Barack Obama and personally contributed to his presidential campaign. But post-Benghazi, he has soured

on both Obama and Clinton, saying he had nothing to do with security and was sacrificed as a scapegoat while higher-up oЂicials directly responsible

escaped discipline.

Maxwell spent a year on paid administrative leave with no oЂicial charge ever levied against him. Ultimately, the State Department cleared Maxwell of

wrongdoing and reinstated him. He retired a short time later, in November 2013.

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Maxwell worked in foreign service for 21 years as the well-respected deputy assistant secretary for Maghreb AЂairs in the Near East Bureau and is a

former chief of staЂ to the ambassador in Baghdad. Fluent in Portuguese, Maxwell is a Navy “mustanger,” which means he successfully made the leap

from the enlisted ranks to commissioned oЂicer.

Raymond Maxwell speaks with investigative correspondent Sharyl Attkisson in Washington. (Photo:

Courtesy Sharyl Attkisson)

Maxwell also is a prolific poet. While on administrative leave, he published poems online: allegories hinting at his post-Benghazi observations and

experiences.

A poem entitled “Invitation” refers to his placement on leave in December 2012: “The Queen’s Henchmen / request the pleasure of your company / at a

Lynching — / to be held / at 23rd and C Streets NW [State Dept. building] / on Tuesday, December 18, 2012 / just past sunset. / Dress: Formal, Masks and

Hoods — / the four being lynched / must never know the identities/ of their executioners, or what/ whose sin required their sacrifice./ A blood sacrifice

— / to divert the hounds- / to appease the gods — / to cleanse our filth and /satisfy our guilty consciences...”

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In another poem called “Trapped in a purgatory of their own deceit,” Maxwell wrote: “The web of lies they weave / gets tighter and tighter / in its deceit

/ until it bottoms out — / at a very low frequency — / and implodes...Yet all the while, / the more they talk, / the more they lie, / and the deeper down

the hole they go... Just wait.../ just wait and feed them the rope.”

Maxwell in Algiers in 2011 as deputy assistant secretary for the Maghreb region. (Photo: YouTube

via U.S. Embassy in Algiers)

Several weeks aЃer he was placed on leave with no formal accusations, Maxwell made an appointment to address his status with a State Department

ombudsman.

“She told me, ‘You are taking this all too personally, Raymond. It is not about you,’ ” Maxwell recalls.

“I told her that ‘My name is on TV and I’m on administrative leave, it seems like it’s about me.’ Then she said, ‘You’re not harmed, you’re still getting

paid. Don’t watch TV. Take your wife on a cruise. It’s not about you; it’s about Hillary and 2016.’ “

Since retiring from the State Department, Maxwell has obtained a master’s degree in library information science.

Fox News: Hillary Clinton Aides Allegedly Witnessed Benghaz...

This is a Daily Signal special feature.

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