ASYLUM

Additional Actions 

Needed to Assess 

and Address Fraud 

Risks

Report to Congressional Requesters

December 2015

GAO-16-50

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Gov ernment Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-16-50, a report to 

congressional requesters

December 2015

ASYLUM

Additional Actions Needed to Assess and Address 

Fraud Risks

Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, tens of thousands of aliens 

in the United States apply for asylum, 

which provides refuge to those who 

have been persecuted or fear 

persecution on protected grounds. 

Asylum officers in DHS’s USCIS and 

immigration judges in DOJ’s EOIR 

adjudicate asylum applications. 

GAO was asked to review the status of 

the asylum system. This report 

addresses (1) what DHS and DOJ data 

indicate about trends in asylum claims, 

(2) the extent to which DHS and DOJ 

have designed mechanisms to prevent 

and detect asylum fraud, and (3) the 

extent to which DHS and DOJ 

designed and implemented processes 

to address any asylum fraud that has 

been identified. GAO analyzed DHS 

and DOJ data on asylum applications 

for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, 

reviewed DHS and DOJ policies and 

procedures related to asylum fraud, 

and interviewed DHS and DOJ officials 

in Washington, D.C., Falls Church, VA, 

and in asylum offices and immigration 

courts across the country selected on 

the basis of application data and other 

factors. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ 

conductregular fraud risk assessments 

and that DHS, among other things, 

implement tools for detecting fraud 

patterns, develop asylum-specific 

guidance for fraud detection roles and 

responsibilities, and implement 

timeliness goals for pending 

termination reviews. DHS and DOJ 

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

The total number of asylum applications, including both principal applicants and 

their eligible dependents, filed in fiscal year 2014 (108,152) is more than double 

the number filed in fiscal year 2010 (47,118). As of September 2015, the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS) has a backlog of 106,121 principal applicants, of which 64,254 

have exceeded required time frames for adjudication. USCIS plans to hire 

additional staff to address the backlog. 

USCIS and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration 

Review (EOIR) have limited capabilities to detect asylum fraud. First, while both 

USCIS and EOIR have mechanisms to investigate fraud in individual 

applications, neither agency has assessed fraud risks across the asylum 

process, in accordance with leading practices for managing fraud risks. Various 

cases of fraud illustrate risks that may affect the integrity of the asylum system. 

For example, an investigation in New York resulted in charges against 30 

defendants as of March 2014 for their alleged participation in immigration fraud 

schemes; 829 applicants associated with the attorneys and preparers charged in 

the case received asylum from USCIS, and 3,709 received asylum from EOIR. 

Without regular assessments of fraud risks, USCIS and EOIR lack reasonable 

assurance that they have implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Second, 

USCIS’s capability to identify patterns of fraud across asylum applications is 

hindered because USCIS relies on a paper-based system for asylum applications

and does not electronically capture some key information that could be used to 

detect fraud, such as the applicant’s written statement. Asylum officers and 

USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) Directorate immigration 

officers told GAO that they can identify potential fraud by analyzing trends across 

asylum applications; however, they must rely on labor-intensive methods to do 

so. Identifying and implementing additional fraud detection tools could enable 

USCIS to detect fraud more effectively while using resources more efficiently. 

Third, FDNS has not established clear fraud detection responsibilities for its 

immigration officers in asylum offices; FDNS officers we spoke with at all eight 

asylum offices told GAO they have limited guidance with respect to fraud. FDNS 

standard operating procedures for fraud detection are intended to apply across 

USCIS, and therefore do not reflect the unique features of the asylum system. 

Developing asylum-specific guidance for fraud detection, in accordance with 

federal internal control standards, would better position FDNS officers to 

understand their roles and responsibilities in the asylum process.

To address identified instances of asylum fraud, USCIS can, in some cases, 

terminate an individual’s asylum status. USCIS terminated the asylum status of 

374 people from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for fraud. In August 2015, 

USCIS adopted a target of 180 days for conducting initial reviews, in which the 

asylum office reviews evidence and decides whether to begin termination 

proceedings, when the asylee has applied for adjustment to lawful permanent 

resident status; however, this goal applies only to a subset of asylees and 

pertains to initial reviews. Further, asylees with pending termination reviews may 

be eligible to receive certain federal benefits. Developing timeliness goals for all 

pending termination reviews would help USCIS better identify the staffing 

resources needed to address the terminations workload.

View GAO-16-50. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Letter 1

Background 10

The Number of Asylum Applications Filed per Fiscal Year Has 

Increased Every Year from 2010 to 2014 22

DHS and DOJ Have Limited Capabilities to Detect and Prevent 

Asylum Fraud 29

DHS and DOJ Have Implemented Mechanisms to Address 

Identified Fraud, but Use of These Mechanisms Has Been 

Limited 65

Conclusions 73

Recommendations for Executive Action 75

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 76

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 81

Appendix II Fraud Risk Assessment Process 89

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 90

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 95

Tables

Table 1: Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Applications, Fiscal 

Years 2010 through 2014 23

Table 2: Principal and Dependent Affirmative Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014 23

Table 3: Asylum Applications Filed with the Executive Office for 

Immigration Review (EOIR), Fiscal Years 2010 through 

2014 24

Table 4: Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) Fraud 

and Abuse Prevention Program Complaints Received and 

Case Files Opened, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014 31

Contents
Page ii GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Figures

Figure 1: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

Affirmative Asylum Process 14

Figure 2: Department of Justice (DOJ) Asylum Process 16

Figure 3: GAO’s Fraud Framework 21

Figure 4: Top 10 Countries of Nationality of Affirmative Asylum 

Applicants, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014 25

Figure 5: Top 10 Countries of Nationality of Asylum Applications 

Filed with the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 

Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014 26

Figure 6: Affirmative Asylum Applications Received by Asylum 

Office, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014 27

Figure 7: Affirmative Asylum Applications Adjudicated in More 

than 180 Days, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014 28

Figure 8: Key Elements of the Fraud Risk Assessment Process 89
Page iii GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Abbreviations

BFCA Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessment

BIA Board of Immigration Appeals

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOJ Department of Justice

EAD Employment Authorization Document 

EIC Earned Income Credit 

ELIS Electronic Immigration System 

EOIR Executive Office for Immigration Review

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FDNS Fraud Detection and National Security

FDNS-DS FDNS Data System

HSI Homeland Security Investigations 

IBFA Immigration Benefit Fraud Assessment 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

INA Immigration and Nationality Act 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

LPR lawful permanent resident

OPLA Office of the Principal Legal Advisor 

RAIO Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate 

RAPS Refugee, Asylum, and Parole System 

TOPS Table of Organization Position System 

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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Page 1 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

December 2, 2015

Congressional Requesters

U.S. immigration law provides that aliens within the United States may be 

granted humanitarian protection, in the form of asylum, if they 

demonstrate that they are unable or unwilling to return to their home 

country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 

persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion.1 According to the Office of the 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, because of the 

experience of seeking asylum, and the often traumatic events 

precipitating an individual’s flight from his or her home country, asylum 

seekers may experience psychological illness; trauma; depression; 

anxiety; aggression; and other physical, psychological, and emotional 

consequences.2 Asylum decisions can have serious consequences. 

Granting asylum to an applicant with a genuine claim protects the asylee 

from being returned to a country where he or she has been or could in the 

future be persecuted.3 On the other hand, granting asylum to an 

individual with a fraudulent claim jeopardizes the integrity of the asylum 

system by enabling the individual to remain in the United States, apply for 

 

1The law s governing asylum protection w ere first established in statute w ith the passage 

of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, tit. II, § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102-06 (1980) 

(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-1159). The Refugee Act provided, for the first 

time, a U.S. refugee policy that stated that persecuted aliens w ho are present in the 

United States and w ho meet the definition of a refugee can apply for asylum protection in 

the United States. The legal standard for a refugee and asylee are the same, but aliens 

must apply for refugee status from outside the United States and for asylum status from 

w ithin the United States. The final regulations implementing asylum and w ithholding of 

removal provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980 w ere issued in 1990.

2Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on the 

Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and 

Alternatives to Detention (Geneva, Sw itzerland: 2012).

3For the purposes of this report, an asylum claim is defined as the prospective asylee’s 

asylum application, as w ell as the totality of such asylum seeker’s support for his or her 

application, to include w ritten documentation, oral testimony, and any know n country 

conditions in the applicant’s home country, among other supporting evidence.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

certain federal benefits, and pursue a path to citizenship.4 Given the 

potential consequences of asylum decisions, it is important that the 

asylum system is not misused. This protects the integrity of the legal 

immigration process and avoids the potentially serious consequences that 

could result if an applicant is wrongfully returned to his or her country of 

persecution or if an applicant whose asylum claim is fraudulent or who 

poses a threat to the United States is permitted to stay.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of 

Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for the U.S. asylum system. 

Specifically, asylum officers within DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicate affirmative applications—that is, 

claims filed with USCIS at the initiative of the alien.5 An affirmative asylum 

applicant may be in the United States lawfully or unlawfully, and must file 

for asylum directly with USCIS within 1 year of his or her most recent 

arrival in the country unless he or she can demonstrate changed or 

extraordinary circumstances.6 Within USCIS, the Fraud Detection and 

National Security Directorate (FDNS) is responsible for determining 

whether individuals filing for asylum pose a threat to national security or 

public safety or are engaging in asylum fraud. If USCIS determines that 

the applicant is ineligible for asylum and does not otherwise have lawful 

immigration status in the United States, asylum officers are to issue a 

Notice to Appear before DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review 

(EOIR) for adjudication in removal proceedings.7 EOIR’s immigration 

judges adjudicate both affirmative asylum claims referred by USCIS and 

 

4

Subject to certain criteria, an individual w ho is granted asylum can remain in the United 

States and apply for law ful permanent resident (LPR) status after 1 year. 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1158(c), 1159(b). 

5

Within USCIS, the Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate (RAIO) is 

to provide, among other things, services for people w ho are fleeing oppression, 

persecution, or torture or facing urgent humanitarian situations. RAIO is made up of three 

divisions: Refugee Affairs, Asylum, and International Operations. 

6See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), (2)(B), (D). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(E), the 1 year filing 

deadline does not apply to an unaccompanied alien child, w hich is a child w ho (1) has no 

law ful immigration status in the United States, (2) has not attained 18 years of age, and 

(3) has no parent or legal guardian in the United States or no parent or legal guardian in 

the United States available to provide care and physical custody. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).

78 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (w here an applicant appears to be inadmissible or deportable, 

the asylum officer must refer the application to an immigration judge, together w ith the 

appropriate charging document).
Page 3 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

defensive applications for asylum, which are asylum claims first made 

during removal proceedings as a defense against removal from the 

United States.8 DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 

(ICE) Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) trial attorneys are 

responsible for representing the U.S. government in immigration court 

proceedings, including asylum hearings, before EOIR. ICE’s Homeland 

Security Investigations (HSI) is responsible for conducting criminal 

investigations regarding immigration-related document and benefit fraud, 

including asylum fraud referred by USCIS, OPLA, and EOIR.

The nature of the asylum system puts asylum officers and immigration 

judges in the position of adjudicating or ruling on asylum applications with 

what may be imperfect information. Specifically, U.S. asylum law states 

that testimonial information alone, without corroboration, may be sufficient 

for asylum applicants to meet the burden of proof for establishing asylum 

eligibility.9 In part, this is because applicants may not be able to present 

documents, such as passports or birth certificates, if they fled their 

countries of persecution without them; may have come from countries 

where documentary evidence was not available; or may have fled with 

fraudulent documents to hide their true identity or to otherwise facilitate 

escape from harm. As such, asylum officers and immigration judges must 

make decisions, at times, with little or no documentation to support or 

refute an applicant’s claim. These factors create a challenging 

environment in which adjudicators must attempt to reach the best 

decisions they can with the information available.

 

8An alien making a defensive claim may have been placed in removal proceedings after 

having been stopped at the border w ithout proper documentation, identified as present in 

the United States w ithout valid status, or identified as potentially removable on one or 

more grounds, such as for certain kinds of criminal convictions. Under 8 U.S.C. § 

1158(b)(3)(C), USCIS asylum officers have initial jurisdiction of any asylum application 

filed by an unaccompanied alien child, even w here such child is in removal proceedings.

9The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof w ithout 

corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s 

testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate 

that the applicant is a refugee w ithin the meaning of INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (8 U.S.C. § 

1101(a)(42)(A)). A trier of fact may determine that corroborating evidence should be 

provided in support of otherw ise credible testimony, and such evidence must be provided 

unless the applicant does not have and cannot reasonably obtain it. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1158(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
Page 4 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

In 2008, we reported on USCIS’s asylum adjudication process.10 Among 

other things, we found that USCIS had designed quality assurance 

mechanisms to help ensure the integrity of asylum adjudications, but that 

some of the mechanisms could be improved. For example, we found that 

USCIS did not consistently solicit asylum officers’ input on their training 

needs, local quality assurance reviews did not consistently take place in 

some asylum offices, and time constraints affected asylum officers’ 

adjudications. We recommended that USCIS, among other things, solicit 

information from officers on their training needs, develop a plan to 

implement local quality reviews in all offices, and determine how much 

time is needed to adjudicate an asylum claim in a manner consistent with 

procedures and training. USCIS concurred and took action to implement 

these recommendations, such as implementing a training needs 

assessment, developing and implementing a program to review a sample 

of asylum officers’ decisions in all offices, and revising asylum officers’ 

performance measures to focus on quality rather than productivity 

standards.

The report of the Senate Appropriations Committee accompanying the 

DHS Appropriations Act, 2015, included a provision, and Congress 

requested, that we review the status of the asylum system.11 This report 

(1) describes what DHS and DOJ data indicate about trends in the 

characteristics of asylum claims, (2) evaluates the extent to which DHS 

and DOJ have designed mechanisms to prevent and detect fraud in the 

asylum system, and (3) evaluates the extent to which DHS and DOJ have 

designed and implemented processes to address any fraud that has been 

identified in the asylum system.

To describe trends in the characteristics of asylum claims, we analyzed 

summary and record-level data from USCIS’s Refugee, Asylum, and 

Parole System (RAPS) on asylum applications, adjudications, and grants 

 

10GAO, U.S. Asylum System: Agencies Have Taken Actions to Help Ensure Quality in the 

Asylum Adjudication Process, but Challenges Remain, GAO-08-935 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 25, 2008).

11S. Rep. No. 113-198, at 132 (June 26, 2014). As part of the Senate Committee Report 

mandate, GAO w as also required to review EOIR’s asylum process. We have ongoing 

w ork in response to this mandate and expect to issue a report on that w ork in the summer 

of 2016.
Page 5 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

by asylum offices nationwide for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.12 To 

assess the reliability of the RAPS data, we reviewed USCIS documents 

about the design of RAPS, completed data entry and duplicate record 

checks, and discussed the reliability of the data with USCIS officials. We 

also analyzed two reports issued by EOIR’s Office of Planning, Analysis, 

and Statistics from fiscal years 2010 through 2014—Asylum Statistics and 

Statistics Yearbook. These reports contain data about the characteristics 

of asylum applications adjudicated through the immigration courts in the 

period of our analysis.13 To assess the reliability of the data in EOIR’s 

reports, we reviewed documentation on EOIR’s case management 

system and spoke with officials about how EOIR collects and monitors 

data. In fiscal year 2013, EOIR changed the methodology it used to 

compile its statistics in the reports; thus, data from previous fiscal year

reports are not comparable with those reported in fiscal years 2013 and 

2014 reports. As a result, we relied on the fiscal years 2013 and 2014 

reports for our analyses. We determined that the USCIS and EOIR data 

about the characteristics of asylum claims were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes.

To evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have mechanisms in place 

to prevent and detect fraud in the asylum system, we compared USCIS 

and EOIR’s asylum-related policies and procedures with, among other 

things, standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government and leading practices in GAO’s Framework for Managing 

 

12We selected fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014 as our period of analysis as this w as 

the most recent 5-year period for w hich data w ere available. 

13U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review , FY 2014 Statistics 

Yearbook, prepared by the Office of Planning, Analysis, and Statistics (Falls Church, VA: 

March 2015).
Page 6 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (the Fraud Framework).14 Regarding 

USCIS, we reviewed USCIS Asylum Division’s Affirmative Asylum 

Procedures Manual, FDNS’s Fraud Detection Standard Operating 

Procedures, and other USCIS policy documents. We reviewed past 

USCIS efforts to examine fraud in the USCIS asylum system and spoke 

with USCIS Office of Policy and Strategy officials who manage these 

efforts. We analyzed data from FDNS’s case management system about 

the number of benefit fraud cases associated with asylum applications 

that were opened from fiscal year 2010 through 2014 and the number of 

those cases in which FDNS found fraud. To assess the reliability of these 

data, we reviewed policies about how data are entered into the system 

and interviewed FDNS immigration officers and headquarters officials and 

observed FDNS immigration officers using the system. We discuss our 

findings about the reliability of these data later in this report. In addition, 

we reviewed Asylum Division workforce planning efforts against principles 

in Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning and 

interviewed Asylum Division officials about attrition among asylum

officers.15 We reviewed asylum officer attrition data from fiscal year 2010 

through 2014, which USCIS compiled manually at our request. We 

discuss our findings about the reliability of these data later in this report. 

We also reviewed USCIS quality assurance policy documents and spoke 

with Asylum Division and Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations 

Directorate (RAIO) officials about quality assurance mechanisms in the 

asylum program. Furthermore, we analyzed USCIS asylum officer basic 

 

14GAO, Internal Control, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999), and A Framework for 

Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs, GAO-15-593SP (Washington D.C.: July 28, 

2015). This framew ork is a comprehensive set of leading practices that serves as a guide 

for program managers to use w hen developing efforts to combat fraud in a strategic, riskbased manner. GAO identified these leading practices through focus groups w ith antifraud 

professionals; interview s w ith government, private sector, and nonprofit antifraud experts; 

and a review of literature. We used the leading practices in this framew ork to assess 

USCIS and EOIR efforts because, as the framew ork states, it encompasses control 

activities to prevent, detect, and respond to fraud, as w ell as structures and environmental 

factors that influence or help managers achieve their objective to mitigate fraud risks; thus 

this framew ork is applicable to USCIS and EOIR efforts to address fraud in the asylum 

system.

15GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning,

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003). We developed these principles through 

our prior w ork on strategic human capital management, review of studies by leading 

w orkforce planning organizations, and interview s w ith federal agencies. We applied these 

principles to the USCIS Asylum Division, as these principles are designed to apply to any 

agency’s human capital management and strategic w orkforce planning efforts.
Page 7 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

training materials, as well as training materials for FDNS immigration 

officers, and interviewed Asylum Division and RAIO headquarters officials 

about how asylum officers are trained to detect and prevent fraud. In 

particular, we reviewed USCIS Asylum Division quarterly training reports 

for fiscal year 2014 to analyze the weekly training activities in each 

asylum office for each week of the reporting quarter. We compared RAIO 

and Asylum Division training materials with material in GAO’s Guide for 

Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal 

Government.

16

To further evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed 

mechanisms to prevent and detect asylum fraud, we visited five of the 

eight asylum offices—Newark, New Jersey; New York, New York; Los 

Angeles, California; Houston, Texas; and Arlington, Virginia. We selected 

these offices for site visits based on a variety of factors, including their 

number of asylum officers, the number of asylum applications they 

receive, and geographic proximity to EOIR immigration courts. During our 

site visits, we also visited immigration courts in New York, Los Angeles, 

Houston, and Arlington and observed asylum hearings in New York, Los 

Angeles, Houston, and Arlington. In addition, we interviewed 

approximately 11 ICE OPLA attorneys and 10 ICE HSI investigators in 

the New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and Arlington offices. In each 

asylum office, we observed asylum interviews and spoke with supervisory 

asylum officers, asylum officers, training officers, and FDNS immigration 

officers to obtain their perspectives on asylum fraud and the associated 

risks. We also conducted telephone interviews with asylum officers, 

training officers, and FDNS immigration officers in the remaining three 

asylum offices—Miami, Chicago, and San Francisco. Across the eight 

asylum offices, we spoke with 35 supervisory asylum officers, 37 asylum 

officers, 24 FDNS immigration officers (including four supervisors), and 

 

16GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development 

Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G. (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). The 

guide summarizes elements of effective training programs and presents related questions 

on the components of the training and development process in four broad, interrelated 

components: (1) planning and front-end analysis, (2) design and development, (3) 

implementation, and (4) evaluation. These criteria remain useful today because they are 

the most recent relevant guidance available to assess how agencies plan, design, 

implement, and evaluate effective federal training and development programs.
Page 8 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

12 training officers.17 We spoke with supervisory asylum officers, asylum 

officers, and FDNS immigration officers in all eight asylum offices about 

the tools and systems that they use to identify and detect asylum fraud 

and the roles of asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers in asylum 

fraud detection. We also spoke with training officers in each of the eight 

asylum offices about how they develop and present training. Although the 

results of our visits and telephone interviews cannot be generalized to 

officers in all asylum offices or to all immigration courts, they provided 

first-hand observations on asylum adjudication practices and insights 

regarding policies and procedures to detect asylum fraud.

Regarding EOIR, we reviewed EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention 

Program guidance and policy documentation, including the regulation that 

established EOIR’s antifraud officer position. We also reviewed the 

Immigration Judge Benchbook, which includes tools, templates, and legal 

resources for immigration judges to use in their adjudications. We 

analyzed EOIR’s fraud-related training materials for immigration judges 

and spoke with the antifraud officer about the fraud detection and 

prevention activities associated with this role. In addition, we analyzed 

EOIR Fraud Abuse Prevention Program case files to determine the 

number of complaints received, number of case files opened, and number 

of asylum-related case files opened from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal 

year 2014 to evaluate their fraud detection activities. We also reviewed 35 

EOIR Fraud Abuse Prevention Program case files, which EOIR identified 

as being all cases associated with asylum fraud.18 While observing 

immigration court proceedings in New York City, Houston, and Arlington, 

including asylum cases, we spoke with court administrators and 

immigration judges about asylum fraud.

To evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed and 

implemented processes to address any fraud that has been identified in 

 

17The supervisory asylum officers, asylum officers, and FDNS immigration officers from 

w hom w e obtained input w ere not randomly selected from all officers in the 8 offices w e 

interview ed. Officers w ere selected to participate in interview s on the basis of w ho w as 

available during our planned site visits and w ho w as in a position to respond to our 

questions. Consequently, w e consider the interview results to provide insights on asylum 

adjudication practices and procedures to detect asylum fraud, but these view s cannot be 

generalized to all supervisory asylum officers, asylum officers, and FDNS immigration 

officers in these offices or to the Asylum Division nationw ide. 

18We selected fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014 as our period of analysis as this w as 

the most recent 5-year period for w hich data w ere available.
Page 9 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

the asylum system, we analyzed ICE HSI data on the number of asylum 

fraud-related indictments, criminal arrests, convictions, and administrative 

arrests as well as the number of asylum fraud cases initiated by HSI from 

fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. We also analyzed USCIS 

RAPS data to identify the number of individuals who have had their 

asylum status terminated because of fraud during this time period and 

any trends in asylum terminations because of fraud over those years. We 

used ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations data to analyze the 

outcomes for individuals whose asylum status was terminated for fraud 

from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. We assessed the reliability of these 

data by reviewing documentation about how data were collected; 

interviewing knowledgeable agency officials about the data; and 

conducting electronic testing for missing data, outliers, and obvious 

errors. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of analyzing the number of asylum terminations because of 

fraud and the outcome of those terminations. We reviewed USCIS policy 

documents related to asylum terminations, as well as certain U.S. Circuit 

Court of Appeals decisions that were identified by Asylum Division 

officials as influencing how USCIS pursues asylum terminations because 

of fraud. We interviewed officials at five HSI locations—New York, New 

York; Washington, D.C.; Houston, Texas; Los Angeles, California; and 

Fairfax, Virginia— about how they receive asylum fraud referrals and how 

they investigate allegations of asylum fraud. We also interviewed EOIR 

officials about mechanisms to address identified asylum fraud in the 

immigration courts and how those mechanisms are used. We interviewed 

officials in the eight USCIS asylum offices, as well as Asylum Division 

officials, to determine how USCIS handles cases with identified fraud, 

including cases in which fraud is identified after asylum has been granted, 

and how USCIS tracks, monitors, and adjudicates cases in which an 

individual’s asylum status is pending termination for identified fraud. We 

compared USCIS and EOIR mechanisms to address identified asylum 

fraud and the frequency of their use with our Fraud Framework to assess 

their likely effectiveness as a fraud deterrent.19

We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to November 

2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

 

19GAO-15-593SP. 
Page 10 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides 

additional information on our scope and methodology.

To adjudicate asylum claims, USCIS asylum officers and EOIR 

immigration judges determine an applicant’s eligibility for asylum by 

assessing whether the applicant has credibly established that he or she is 

a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. An applicant is eligible for asylum 

if he or she (1) applies from within the United States; (2) suffered past 

persecution, or has a well-founded fear of future persecution, based on 

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion; and (3) is not statutorily barred from applying for or being 

granted asylum.20 Among other things, the REAL ID Act of 2005 was a 

legislative effort to provide consistent standards for adjudicating asylum 

applications and to limit fraud.21 Consistent with the REAL ID Act, the 

burden is on the applicant to establish past persecution or a well-founded 

 

20See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158; 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13, 1208.13. Certain categories 

of aliens are statutorily ineligible for asylum even if they can demonstrate past persecution 

or a fear of persecution. The follow ing individuals are ineligible to apply for asylum: (1) 

those w ho have been in the United States more than 1 year w ithout filing for asylum, 

unless they can demonstrate changed or extraordinary circumstances; (2) those 

previously denied asylum unless they can show changed circumstances; and (3) those 

w ho may be removed to a third country w here they w ould have access to fair asylum 

procedures. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2). USCIS and EOIR are prohibited from granting 

asylum to the follow ing: (1) persecutors of others and certain criminals; (2) those w ho are 

described in the terrorist grounds of inadmissibility or deportability, or are reasonably 

regarded as a danger to the security of the United States; and (3) individuals w ho w ere 

firmly resettled in a third country prior to coming to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 

1158(b)(2)(A). The 1 year deadline and “safe third country” exceptions to asylum filing 

eligibility do not apply to unaccompanied alien children. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(E).

21GAO, U.S. Asylum System: Significant Variation Existed in Asylum Outcomes across 

Immigration Courts and Judges, GAO-08-940 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2008). See 

Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. I, § 101(a)(3), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 

1158(b)(1)(B)).

Background

Asylum Eligibility 

Requirements
Page 11 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

fear of persecution, and asylum officers and immigration judges have the 

discretion to require documentary support for asylum claims. 22 To 

determine whether an applicant is credible, the act requires that asylum 

officers and immigration judges consider the totality of the applicant’s 

circumstances and all relevant factors and states that a determination of 

the applicant’s credibility may be based on any relevant factor. 23 Such 

factors could include, among others, the applicant’s demeanor, candor, or 

responsiveness in the asylum interview or immigration court hearing, or 

any inaccuracies or falsehoods discovered in the applicant’s written or 

oral statements, whether or not an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or 

falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.24 However, an 

asylum officer or immigration judge may determine that an applicant is 

credible, considering the totality of the circumstances, even if there are 

inaccuracies, contradictions, or evidence of potential fraud. For example, 

an applicant may have lied to a U.S. consular officer in order to obtain a 

visa to travel to the United States when fleeing his or her home country, 

and still have a credible asylum claim.

To apply for affirmative asylum, an applicant submits a Form I-589, 

Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, to USCIS. An 

applicant may include his or her spouse and unmarried children under the 

age of 21 who are physically present in the United States as dependent 

asylum applicants.25 The applicant mails paper copies of the application 

and supporting documentation to a USCIS Service Center, which verifies 

that the application is complete, creates a hard-copy file, and enters 

information about the applicant, including biographic information as well 

as attorney and preparer information submitted with the application, into 

RAPS.26 Subsequently, using the applicant’s biographic data, RAPS 

initiates automated checks against other U.S. government databases 

 

228 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B).

23See id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

24Id. 

25When qualifying family members of an asylee are in the United States but w ere not 

included in the asylum application or are outside the United States, the asylee may, w ithin 

tw o years after asylum is granted, request accompanying or follow -to-join benefits for such 

family members. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 208.21.

26There are four USCIS Service Centers. All accept asylum applications via mail and 

forw ard them to one of the eight asylum offices. The Service Centers are located in Texas, 

California, Nebraska, and Vermont. 

Overview of the Affirmative 

and Defensive Asylum 

Application Processes
Page 12 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

containing criminal history information, immigration violation records, and 

address information, among other things. RAPS also schedules an 

appointment to fingerprint and photograph the applicant. The Service 

Center sends the applicant file to one of USCIS’s eight asylum offices 

based on the applicant’s residential address and the asylum office then 

schedules the applicant’s interview with an asylum officer. In adjudicating 

asylum applications, USCIS policy requires asylum officers to review the 

applicant’s hard-copy file; research country of origin information; verify 

that an applicant has completed fingerprinting requirements; and 

document the results of background, identity, and security checks, some 

of which are repeated in the asylum office to identify any relevant 

information that may have changed after the initial automated checks. 

Asylum officers are to use the information obtained through this process 

to (1) determine who is included in the application; (2) confirm the 

applicant’s immigration status, asylum filing date, and date, place, and 

manner of entry into the United States; (3) become familiar with the 

asylum claim and the applicant’s background and supporting 

documentation; (4) identify issues that could affect eligibility, such as 

criminal history, national security concerns, participation in human rights 

abuses, or adverse credibility or fraud indicators; and (5) identify issues 

that must be discussed in an interview with the applicant to determine 

asylum eligibility.27

During the interview, which is to be conducted in a nonadversarial 

manner, the asylum officer asks questions to assess the applicant’s 

eligibility for asylum and determine whether his or her claim is credible. 28

If the asylum officer identifies inaccuracies, inconsistencies, or fraud in 

the asylum application, the applicant must be given an opportunity to 

explain such issues during the interview, according to the USCIS 

Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual. An independent interpreter 

monitor listens to each affirmative asylum interview to ensure that the 

applicant’s interpreter is correctly interpreting and to notify the 

interviewing officer of any discrepancies in interpretation. After the 

interview, the asylum officer considers the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the applicant’s claim and prepares a written decision. The 

 

27See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), (b), (d).

28The affirmative asylum process is nonadversarial in that no government official argues in 

opposition to the asylum applicant, and the asylum officer is to be a neutral decision 

maker. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (Procedure for interview before an asylum officer). 
Page 13 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

decision is reviewed by a supervisor, who is to check for quality, 

accuracy, and legal sufficiency. After a supervisor has concurred with the 

decision, the decision notice is delivered in hard copy to the applicant.

If USCIS grants asylum to the applicant, the asylee is eligible to apply for 

adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status after 1 year. 29 If 

USCIS does not grant asylum and the applicant is present in the United 

States lawfully through other means, USCIS is to issue a Notice of Intent 

to Deny stating the reason(s) for asylum ineligibility and provide an 

opportunity for the applicant to respond. Whether or not asylum is 

granted, the applicant can continue living in the United States under his or 

her otherwise valid status. If USCIS does not grant asylum and the 

applicant is present in the United States unlawfully, USCIS is to refer the 

application to EOIR, together with a Notice to Appear, which requires that 

the applicant appear before an EOIR immigration judge for adjudication of 

the asylum claim in removal proceedings. Figure 1 provides an overview 

of the USCIS affirmative asylum process.

 

298 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (Statutory requirements for an asylee to adjust to LPR).
Page 14 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Figure 1: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Affirmative Asylum Process

EOIR follows the same procedures for defensive asylum applications and 

affirmative asylum referrals from USCIS. For affirmative asylum referrals, 

the immigration judge reviews the case de novo, meaning that the judge 

evaluates the applicant’s affirmative asylum application anew and is not 

bound by an asylum officer’s previous determination. EOIR asylum 

hearings are adversarial proceedings in which asylum applicants appear 

in removal proceedings for adjudication of the asylum claim, and may 

apply for other forms of relief or protection as a defense against removal

from the United States. First, the judge conducts an initial hearing 
Page 15 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

(referred to as a master calendar hearing) to, among other things, ensure 

that the applicant understands the court proceedings and schedule a 

hearing to specifically address the asylum application (referred to as a 

merits hearing).30 Second, during the merits hearing, the judge hears 

testimony from the applicant and any other witnesses, oversees crossexaminations, and reviews evidence. ICE trial attorneys represent DHS in 

these proceedings. An asylum applicant may self-represent or may be 

represented by an attorney at no cost to the U.S. government. The judge 

may question the applicant or other witnesses. Judges render oral and, in 

some cases, written decisions after the immigration court proceedings

end. If the judge determines that the applicant is eligible for asylum, the 

asylee can remain in the United States indefinitely unless asylum status is 

subsequently terminated.31 A grant of asylum from an immigration judge 

confers the same benefits as a grant of asylum from a USCIS asylum 

officer. If the judge determines that the applicant is ineligible for asylum, 

and is removable, the judge may order the applicant to be removed from 

the United States, unless the applicant seeks (and receives) another form 

of relief from removal. Judges’ decisions are final unless appealed to the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Figure 2 provides an overview of the 

DOJ affirmative and defensive asylum process.

 

30An applicant can apply for several types of relief or protection from removal in one 

hearing. For example, w e observed applicants applying for asylum, w ithholding of 

removal, and United Nations Convention against Torture protection all at the same 

hearing. Withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3) prevents removal to a country 

w here there is a clear probability that the applicant’s life or freedom w ould be threatened 

in that country based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 

particular social group. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Withholding or 

deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention against Torture prevents removal 

to a country w here the applicant establishes that it is more likely than not that he or she 

w ould be tortured if removed to such country. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17, 

1208.18. The immigration judge can, and typically does, grant continuances for additional 

master calendar hearings for a variety of reasons, such as to allow time for the individual 

to obtain representation or to obtain documents crucial to the case.

318 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.24, 1208.24.
Page 16 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Figure 2: Department of Justice (DOJ) Asylum Process

Asylees, or individuals who have been granted asylum, are considered 

qualified aliens for the purpose of eligibility for federal, and state or local, 

public benefits.32 Subject to certain statutory criteria, asylees may be 

eligible for a number of federal means-tested public benefits including 

Supplemental Security Income, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 

 

32See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621, 1641(b).

Eligibility for Federal 

Benefits
Page 17 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and Medicaid.33 In 

addition, asylees may also be eligible for federal student financial aid, 

among other benefits.34 Asylees are authorized for employment in the 

United States as a result of their asylum status and can receive an 

Employment Authorization Document (EAD) issued by USCIS.35 In 

addition, asylum applicants can receive an EAD after their applications 

have been pending, including in both the USCIS and EOIR adjudicative 

process, for 180 days, not including any delays requested or caused by 

the applicant such as requesting to reschedule or failing to appear at the 

asylum interview or, where applicable, the time between issuance of a 

request for evidence and receipt of the applicant’s response.36 Within 2 

years of receiving asylum status, asylees can request derivative asylum 

status for their spouses and unmarried children under age 21, a provision 

that allows family members to join the asylee in the United States. 37

 

33See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612, 1613(b)(1)(B). Under 7 C.F.R. § 273.4(a)(6)(ii)(C), an asylee is 

eligible for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and is not subject to the 

requirement under 7 C.F.R. § 273.4(a)(6)(iii) that the alien be in qualified status for 5 

years. An asylee is generally only eligible for the Supplemental Security Income program 

during the seven year period beginning on the date he or she w as granted asylum. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A). Asylees are also eligible for Medicaid until seven years after the 

date asylum is granted, at w hich point a state is authorized to determine the eligibility of 

an asylee for Medicaid. See id. § 1612(b)(2)(A)(i). In addition, asylees are eligible for the 

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and Social Services Block Grant programs; 

how ever, after the five year period beginning on the date asylum w as granted, a state is 

authorized to determine the eligibility of an asylee for these programs. See id. § 

1612(b)(2)(A)(ii).

34For example, asylees may be eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit, a refundable 

credit available to low income w orkers, provided they meet specific Earned Income Tax 

Credit requirements. See 26 U.S.C. § 32; Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Publication 519, 

U.S. Tax Guide for Aliens; and Publication 596, Earned Income Credit (EIC). 

35See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a).

36See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7(a)(1), (2), 274a.12(c), 274a.13(a)(2). 

According to the Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual, an applicant can apply for an 

EAD if his or her asylum application has been pending for 150 days, not including any 

delays requested or caused by the applicant, or if the applicant has received a 

recommended approval of asylum. USCIS cannot issue an EAD until the asylum 

application has been pending 180 days or more. An applicant w hose asylum application is 

denied w ithin the 150 day period is not eligible to apply for employment authorization. See 

8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1).

37See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.21, 1208.21.
Page 18 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Immigration benefit fraud involves the willful misrepresentation of material 

fact for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, such as asylum 

status, without lawful entitlement. Immigration benefit fraud is often 

facilitated by document fraud and identity fraud. Document fraud includes 

forging, counterfeiting, altering, or falsely making any document, or using, 

possessing, obtaining, accepting, or receiving such falsified documents in 

order to satisfy any requirement of, or to obtain a benefit under, the INA. 38

Identity fraud refers to the fraudulent use of others’ valid documents. 

Fraud can occur in the affirmative and defensive asylum processes in a 

number of ways. For example, an applicant may file fraudulent supporting 

documents with his or her affirmative asylum application in an attempt to 

bolster the facts of a claim. Or, an applicant may submit a fraudulent 

address in order to file for asylum within the jurisdiction of an asylum 

office or immigration court perceived to be more likely to grant asylum 

than another office or court. Further, an attorney, preparer, or interpreter 

can, in exchange for fees from the applicant, prepare and file fraudulent 

documents, written statements, or supporting details about an applicant’s 

asylum claim, with or without the applicant’s knowledge or involvement. 

For the purposes of this report, we define asylum fraud as the willful 

misrepresentation of material fact(s), such as making false statements, 

submitting forged or falsified documents, or conspiring to do so, in 

support of an asylum claim.39

It is possible to terminate an individual’s asylum status under certain 

circumstances, including where there is a showing of fraud in the 

application such that the individual was not eligible for asylum at the time 

 

38See INA § 274C, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (civil penalties for document fraud and criminal 

penalties for failure to disclose role as document preparer). ICE’s Benefit Fraud Unit 

defines document fraud, also know n as identity fraud, as the manufacturing, 

counterfeiting, alteration, sale, and/or use of identity documents and other fraudulent 

documents to circumvent immigration law s or for other criminal activity; and benefit fraud 

as the w illful misrepresentation of a material fact on a petition or application to gain an 

immigration benefit. Any alien w ho, by fraud or w illfully misrepresenting a material fact, 

seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a benefit under the INA, or 

w ho is subject of a final order for violation of INA § 274C, is inadmissible and deportable. 

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), (F), 1227(a)(1)(A), (B), (3)(C)(i). There are also criminal 

penalties associated w ith immigration-related fraud under Title 18, U.S. Code. See, e.g.,

18 U.S.C. §§ 1541-47.

39We developed this definition on the basis of an analysis of documentation from USCIS 

and EOIR, as w ell as through interview s w ith USCIS Asylum Division officials, USCIS 

FDNS officials, and EOIR officials w ho investigate allegations of asylum fraud. 

Fraud and Asylum
Page 19 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

it was granted.40 By regulation, USCIS may only terminate asylum 

granted by USCIS; however, EOIR may terminate asylum granted by 

either USCIS or EOIR.41 For cases granted by USCIS, except in the Ninth 

Circuit, USCIS issues the asylee a Notice of Intent to Terminate and 

conducts an interview in which the individual may present evidence of his 

or her asylum eligibility.42 If termination is warranted, USCIS then 

provides written notice to the individual of termination of his or her asylum 

status and is to initiate removal proceedings for the individual in 

immigration court, as appropriate.43 While in removal proceedings, the 

individual may reapply for asylum before an immigration judge.44 The 

judge is not required to accept the determination of fraud made by USCIS 

and determines the respondent’s eligibility for asylum anew. 45 For cases 

granted by an immigration judge, the BIA, or by USCIS in the Ninth 

 

40See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.24, 1208.24.

41Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a), an asylum officer may terminate asylum granted under the 

jurisdiction of USCIS. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24(f), “[a]liens w ho are currently in 

removal proceedings or w ere granted asylum by an Immigration Judge or the Board [of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA)] are under the jurisdiction of [EOIR].” See Matter of A-S-J-, 25 

I. & N. Dec. 893, 897 (BIA 2012) (citing Matter of K-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 661, 665 (BIA 

2004)). 

42In Nijjar v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that DHS does not have the 

authority to terminate asylum. 689 F.3d 1077, 1082, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Subsequently, in Matter of A-S-J-, the BIA stated that it w ould apply Nijjar only in the Ninth 

Circuit. 25 I. & N. Dec. at 894 n.2 (citing Matter of E.W. Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 784, 

788 (BIA 2012)). Therefore, USCIS lacks the authority to terminate an individual’s asylum 

status in the Ninth Circuit.

43See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.22, 208.24(c), (e).

44See Matter of A-S-J-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 896 (citing Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 

780-81 (5th Cir. 2011)). According to the BIA, “[a]n alien w ho timely filed an asylum 

application before the USCIS... is not time barred from filing the same asylum application 

before the Immigration Judge since the claim w as timely made at the outset.” Id. at 896 

n.7. How ever, the BIA also cites, as a contrary position, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 

Nijjar. Id. The court in Nijjar stated that w here asylum status is terminated for fraud, a 

“second asylum application w ould ordinarily be time-barred, quite aside from w hatever 

negative implication the fraud determination w ould have on the applicant’s credibility in his 

second attempt to obtain asylum.” Nijjar, 689 F.3d at 1081-82 & n.19. In Matter of A-S-J-, 

the BIA also noted that “[f]or different asylum claims, an alien w ho w as already granted 

asylum status w ould not previously have had reason to file another asylum application[,] 

[and] [s]uch later-arising claims based on a different fear of harm w ould be evaluated 

under the regulations for changed and extraordinary circumstances.” 25 I. & N. Dec. at 

896 n.7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4), (5).

45See Matter of A-S-J-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 896.
Page 20 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Circuit, ICE OPLA may petition the immigration court to re-open a case in 

which an individual has been granted asylum and request the termination 

of the individual’s asylum status because of fraud.46 In such a case, ICE 

OPLA must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that there was fraud 

in the asylum application that would have rendered the asylee ineligible 

for asylum at the time it was granted.47 The immigration judge has 

jurisdiction to conduct an asylum termination hearing as part of the 

removal proceeding, and if asylum status is terminated, the individual 

may be subject to removal from the United States.48

Our Fraud Framework is a comprehensive set of leading practices that 

serves as a guide for program managers to use when developing efforts 

to combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based manner.49 The framework 

describes leading practices for establishing an organizational structure 

and culture that are conducive to fraud risk management, designing and 

implementing controls to prevent and detect potential fraud, and 

monitoring and evaluating to provide assurances to managers that they 

are effectively preventing, detecting, and responding to potential fraud. 

Managers may perceive a conflict between their priorities to fulfill the 

program’s mission, such as efficiently disbursing funds or providing 

services to beneficiaries, and taking actions to safeguard taxpayer dollars

from improper use. However, the purpose of proactively managing fraud 

risks is to facilitate, not hinder, the program’s mission and strategic goals 

by ensuring that taxpayer dollars and government services serve their 

intended purposes. Figure 3 illustrates our Fraud Framework.

 

468 C.F.R. § 1208.24(f). Where an alien is in removal proceedings, DHS may serve a 

Notice of Intent to Terminate asylum and the immigration judge w ould have jurisdiction to 

decide the issue. Matter of A-S-J-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 897. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24(e), (f). 

478 C.F.R. §§ 208.24(a)(1), (f), 1208.24(a)(1), (f). Matter of A-S-J-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 896-

97; Matter of P-S-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 329 (BIA 2014).

488 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.24(e), 1208.24(e).

49GAO-15-593SP. 

GAO’s Fraud Framework
Page 21 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Figure 3: GAO’s Fraud Framework

The Fraud Framework includes control activities that help agencies 

prevent, detect, and respond to fraud risks as well as structures and 

environmental factors that influence or help managers achieve their 

objectives to mitigate fraud risks. The framework consists of four 

components for effectively managing fraud risks: commit, assess, design 

and implement, and evaluate and adapt. Leading practices for each of 

these components include the following:

• Commit: create an organizational culture to combat fraud at all levels 

of the agency, and designate an entity within the program office to 
Page 22 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

lead fraud risk management activities;

• Assess: assess the likelihood and impact of fraud risks and determine 

risk tolerance and examine the suitability of existing controls and 

prioritize residual risks;

• Design and implement: develop, document, and communicate an 

antifraud strategy, focusing on preventive control activities; and

• Evaluate and adapt: collect and analyze data from reporting 

mechanisms and instances of detected fraud for real-time monitoring 

of fraud trends, and use the results of monitoring, evaluations, and 

investigations to improve fraud prevention, detection, and response.

The total number of asylum applications (principal applicants and their 

eligible dependents), including affirmative and defensive applications, 

increased from 47,118 in fiscal year 2010 to 108,152 in fiscal year 2014, 

an increase of 130 percent. During this time, affirmative asylum 

applications filed directly with USCIS increased by a total of 131 

percent.50 Defensive asylum applications filed with EOIR increased 125 

 

50For the purposes of this report, references to the number of asylum applications include 

both principal applicants and their eligible dependents unless otherw ise noted. Asylum 

decisions apply to the applicant and the applicant’s dependents if included on the 

applicant’s asylum application and the applicant established a qualifying relationship to 

them by a preponderance of evidence. An asylum applicant may include as dependents 

on the asylum application his or her spouse and unmarried children under the age of 21 

w ho are present in the United States. Dependent applicants are not required to establish 

refugee status, and are not subject to the exceptions to asylum filing eligibility, but must 

prove that they are not barred from receiving asylum. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.21(a), 

1208.21(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i)-(v).

The Number of 

Asylum Applications 

Filed per Fiscal Year 

Has Increased Every 

Year from 2010 to 

2014

The Number of Asylum 

Applications Filed in Fiscal 

Year 2014 Is More than 

Double the Total Filed in 

Fiscal Year 2010
Page 23 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

percent.51 Table 1 shows the number of affirmative and defensive asylum 

applications filed each year for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

Table 1: Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Applications, Fiscal Years 2010 through 

2014

Fiscal year

Affirmative 

applications

Defensive 

applications

Total applications 

filed

2010 34,374 12,744 47,118

2011 43,148 17,861 61,009

2012 53,293 19,648 72,941

2013 60,076 22,535 82,611

2014 79,485 28,667 108,152

Total 270,376 101,455 371,831

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) data. 

| GAO-16-50

Note: Defensive applications do not include applicants who applied affirmatively with USCIS and were 

referred to EOIR. Also, according to USCIS officials, USCIS does not include dependents when 

counting affirmative asylum applications.

The number of principal affirmative applications and their eligible 

dependents has increased each year from fiscal years 2010 through 

2014. The number of principal affirmative applications filed has increased 

from 28,108 in fiscal year 2010 to 56,959 in fiscal year 2014, a 103 

percent increase. The portion of affirmative asylum applicants noted as 

dependents increased from 6,266 in fiscal year 2010 to 22,526 in fiscal 

year 2014, a 259 percent increase. Table 2 shows the number of principal 

and dependent affirmative asylum applications filed each year for fiscal 

years 2010 through 2014.

Table 2: Principal and Dependent Affirmative Asylum Applications, Fiscal Years 

2010 through 2014

Fiscal year

Dependent 

applications

Principal 

applications

Total affirmative 

applications filed

2010 6,266 28,108 34,374

2011 8,473 34,675 43,148

2012 11,838 41,455 53,293

 

51These defensive applications do not include applicants w ho applied affirmatively w ith 

USCIS and w ere referred to EOIR. 
Page 24 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Fiscal year

Dependent 

applications

Principal 

applications

Total affirmative 

applications filed

2013 15,888 44,188 60,076

2014 22,526 56,959 79,485

Total 64,991 205,385 270,376

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services data.| GAO-16-50

Asylum applications (including principal applicants and their eligible 

dependents) filed with EOIR—affirmative applications referred from 

USCIS and defensive applications—increased from 32,830 in fiscal year 

2010 to 41,920 in fiscal year 2014, an increase of 28 percent. Table 3 

shows the number of affirmative and defensive asylum cases EOIR 

received from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. The number of affirmative 

applications USCIS referred to EOIR increased from 20,086 in fiscal year 

2010 to 25,907 in fiscal year 2012, and decreased from fiscal year 2012 

to fiscal year 2014. Asylum Division officials attribute the decrease in 

affirmative asylum cases referred to EOIR to the increased number of 

credible fear and reasonable fear cases USCIS has received, which has 

caused USCIS to divert resources away from affirmative asylum cases 

and adjudicate fewer affirmative asylum cases overall. The number of 

credible fear and reasonable fear cases increased from 11,019 in fiscal 

year 2010 to 60,085 in fiscal year 2014, an increase of 445 percent.52

Table 3: Asylum Applications Filed with the Executive Office for Immigration 

Review (EOIR), Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014

Fiscal year

Affirmative applications referred

to EOIR from U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services

Defensive 

applications filed 

with EOIR Total

2010 20,086 12,744 32,830

2011 24,949 17,861 42,810

2012 25,907 19,648 45,555

2013 17,394 22,535 39,929

2014 13,253 28,667 41,920

Total 101,589 101,455 203,044

Source: GAO analysis of EOIR data. | GAO-16-50

 

52Credible fear cases involve individuals subject to expedited removal w ho express an 

intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution or torture. Reasonable fear cases 

involve individuals subject to administrative removal or reinstated orders of removal w ho 

have expressed a fear of persecution or torture if removed. Credible and reasonable fear 

data represent individuals, not cases.
Page 25 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014, China accounted for the 

largest number of affirmative asylum applicants (26 percent), followed by 

Mexico (13 percent) and Egypt (6 percent). Figure 4 shows the top 10 

countries for affirmative asylum applications filed with USCIS.

Figure 4: Top 10 Countries of Nationality of Affirmative Asylum Applicants, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014

Asylum Applicant 

Characteristics Vary By 

Country of Nationality and 

Location

Country of Nationality
Page 26 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014, China accounted for the 

largest number of asylum applicants filing with EOIR (20 percent), 

followed by Mexico (20 percent) and El Salvador (9 percent). Figure 5 

shows the top 10 countries for asylum applicants filing with EOIR.

Figure 5: Top 10 Countries of Nationality of Asylum Applications Filed with the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 

Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014

USCIS has eight asylum offices across the United States and, as of April 

2015, 353 asylum officers who are responsible for adjudicating affirmative 

asylum claims. The number of affirmative asylum applications filed per 

USCIS office varied widely. From fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the 

New York and Los Angeles asylum offices accounted for 45 percent of all 

affirmative asylum applications filed. The number of affirmative asylum 

Location Filed
Page 27 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

applications filed in Newark and Los Angeles has grown more than in any 

other asylum office during this time, with a total increase of 8,352 and 

9,070 applications. Figure 6 shows affirmative asylum applications 

received by each USCIS asylum office from fiscal year 2010 through 

fiscal year 2014.

Figure 6: Affirmative Asylum Applications Received by Asylum Office, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014
Page 28 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Final administrative adjudication of an asylum application, not including 

administrative appeals, is to be completed within 180 days after filing, 

absent exceptional circumstances and not including any delays requested 

or caused by the applicant, or, where applicable, the amount of time 

between issuance of a request for evidence and the receipt of the 

applicant’s response.

53 USCIS’s backlog of principal affirmative asylum 

applications as of September 2015 was 106,121. Of those pending cases, 

64,254 (61 percent) have exceeded the 180-day requirement. In addition, 

the number of affirmative asylum cases that were adjudicated in more 

than 180 days has increased from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Figure 

7 shows the number of affirmative asylum applications adjudicated from 

fiscal years 2010 through 2014 where USCIS’s adjudication exceeded 

180 days.

Figure 7: Affirmative Asylum Applications Adjudicated in More than 180 Days, 

Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014

Note: This figure includes only those applications that USCIS adjudicated and does not include 

applications still pending adjudication as of September 2015.

 

53See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii); 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(2) (an applicant failing, w ithout 

good cause, to follow the requirements for fingerprint processing, w ould constitute delay 

not counted as part of the 180 day time period w ithin w hich the asylum application is to be 

adjudicated).

USCIS Has a Backlog of 

More than 100,000 

Principal Affirmative 

Asylum Applications, Most 

of Which Have Exceeded 

Required Time Frames for 

Adjudication
Page 29 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

According to Asylum Division officials, several factors have affected 

USCIS’s ability to adjudicate affirmative asylum applications in a timely 

manner. For example, officials stated that they have diverted resources to 

address the growth in credible fear and reasonable fear cases, which 

increased by over 400 percent from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 

2014. In addition, these officials stated that they had prioritized 

applications from unaccompanied alien children based on the time 

sensitivity of such cases.54 Asylum Division officials said that this 

diversion of resources and prioritization of these claims contributed to the 

increasing backlog of affirmative asylum applications. Asylum Division 

officials stated that the increasing number of affirmative applications in 

recent years has also had significant implications for the workload of 

USCIS’s asylum offices, and that USCIS plans to hire additional staff to 

help address the current level of applications and the increasing backlog.

Both DHS and DOJ have established dedicated antifraud entities, a 

leading practice for managing fraud risks. Our Fraud Framework states 

that a leading practice for managing fraud risks is to establish a dedicated 

entity to design and oversee fraud risk management activities.55 Within 

DHS, USCIS created FDNS in 2004 to help ensure immigration benefits 

are not granted to individuals who pose a threat to national security or 

public safety or who seek to defraud the immigration system. As of fiscal 

year 2015, USCIS has deployed 35 FDNS immigration officers and 4 

supervisory immigration officers working across all eight asylum offices. 

FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices are tasked with 

conducting background checks to resolve national security “hits” and 

fraud concerns, which arise when asylum officers conduct required 

background checks of asylum applicants; addressing fraud-related leads 

provided by asylum officers and other sources; and liaising with law 

 

54See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(C).

55GAO-15-593SP. 

DHS and DOJ Have 

Limited Capabilities to 

Detect and Prevent 

Asylum Fraud

DHS and DOJ Have 

Established Dedicated 

Antifraud Entities
Page 30 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

enforcement entities, such as HSI, to provide logistical support in law 

enforcement and national security matters.56

In September 2007, DOJ established an EOIR antifraud officer through 

regulation.57 The regulation states that the antifraud officer is to (1) serve 

as a point of contact relating to concerns about fraud, particularly with 

respect to fraudulent applications or documents affecting multiple removal 

proceedings, applications for relief from removal, appeals, or other 

proceedings before EOIR; (2) coordinate with DHS and DOJ investigative 

authorities with respect to the identification of and response to fraud; and 

(3) notify EOIR’s Disciplinary Counsel and other appropriate authorities 

as to instances of fraud, misrepresentation, or abuse related to an 

attorney or accredited representative.58 The activities of the antifraud 

officer (also known as the Fraud Prevention Counsel) and supporting staff 

collectively are referred to as the Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program. 

According to EOIR’s Fraud Prevention Program fact sheet, the goal of the 

program is to protect the integrity of EOIR and other immigration 

proceedings by promoting efforts to deter fraud and provide a systematic 

response to identifying and referring instances of suspected fraud and 

abuse. In practice, according to the Fraud Prevention Counsel, they 

collect data and review records of proceedings in response to reports of 

suspected fraud. In addition, through the program, EOIR coordinates with 

law enforcement agencies to refer appropriate matters for investigation 

and assist in fraud investigations and prosecutions. Further, the program 

provides training for EOIR staff, including immigration judges, and 

distributes a monthly newsletter about fraud related activity. Table 4 

shows the total number of complaints received, the number of case files 

opened, and the number of asylum-related case files opened from fiscal 

year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention 

Program tracks the number of complaints it receives about potential 

fraud, but does not create a formal case file if the complaint or request for 

 

56FDNS does not have readily available data on the number of asylum fraud cases it has 

investigated, as w e discuss later in this report.

57Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review , and 

the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673, 53,675-76 (Sept. 20, 2007) (codified at 

8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1240). 

58See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(e)(2). 
Page 31 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

assistance can be closed quickly with minimal investment of staff time. As 

a result, not every complaint has a corresponding file. 59

Table 4: Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) Fraud and Abuse 

Prevention Program Complaints Received and Case Files Opened, Fiscal Years 

2010 through 2014 

Fiscal year

Complaints 

received

Case files

opened

Asylum-related case 

files opened

2010 92 53 9

2011 98 38 4

2012 88 21 7

2013 66 16 3

2014 71 25 7

Source: GAO analysis of EOIR data and EOIR Fraud Prevention Program case files. | GAO 16-50

Note: EOIR’s Fraud Prevention Counsel creates a case file if the Fraud and Abuse Prevention 

Program performs substantive work pursuant to a complaint. As a result, not every complaint has a 

corresponding case file.

This table includes complaints received, and requests for assistance made to the Fraud and Abuse 

Prevention Program. Prior to March 2010, EOIR did not track all complaints received, or requests for 

assistance; therefore, the number of complaints in fiscal year 2010 may be greater.

USCIS has not assessed fraud risks across the affirmative asylum 

application process. The Fraud Framework states that it is a leading 

practice for agencies to create an organizational culture to combat fraud 

at all levels and designate an entity to lead fraud risk management 

activities, such as planning regular fraud risk assessments to determine a 

fraud risk profile for their program.60 There is no universally accepted 

approach for conducting fraud risk assessments, since circumstances 

among programs vary; however, assessing fraud risks generally involves 

five actions: identifying inherent fraud risks affecting the program, 

assessing the likelihood and impact of those fraud risks, determining 

fraud risk tolerance, examining the suitability of existing fraud controls 

and prioritizing residual fraud risks, and documenting the program’s fraud 

risk profile. Depending on the nature of the program, the frequency with 

 

59According to EOIR officials, the Fraud Prevention Program revised its criteria for 

opening a formal case file in calendar year 2010, an action that resulted in a decrease in 

the number of case files opened in in fiscal year 2010. The Fraud and Abuse Prevention 

Program no longer creates case files for complaints or requests for assistance that can be 

closed quickly w ith minimal investment in staff time. 

60GAO-15-593SP. 

USCIS Has Not Assessed 

Fraud Risks across 

Affirmative Asylum Claims
Page 32 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

which antifraud entities update the assessment can range from 1 to 5 

years.61

USCIS officials stated that USCIS has not conducted an enterprise-wide 

fraud risk assessment, as the agency has implemented individual 

activities that demonstrate that it is conducting risk assessments. 

According to USCIS officials, such activities include the prescreening of 

asylum applications by FDNS immigration officers in advance of asylum 

interviews, security and background checks of applicants, information 

sharing agreements between the United States and other countries to 

access records related to persons of interest, fraud training for asylum 

officers, and mechanisms for the referral of cases to FDNS and to other 

investigative entities. Investigations of fraud are usually conducted after 

fraud has occurred and asylum may or may not have been granted. While 

these efforts can help USCIS detect and investigate potential fraud in 

individual asylum applications, they do not position USCIS to assess 

fraud risks across the affirmative asylum application process. The 

mentioned mechanisms are all tools with which to support a fraud risk 

assessment; however, an enterprise-wide fraud risk assessment would 

provide further information on the inherent risks across all applications. 

For example, asylum officers face fraud risks because they must make 

decisions, at times, with little or no documentation to support or refute an 

applicant’s claim. As noted in the Fraud Framework, fraud risk 

management activities such as a fraud risk assessment may be 

incorporated into or aligned with internal activities and strategic objectives 

already in place, and information on fraud trends and lessons learned can 

be used to improve the design and implementation of fraud risk 

management activities.62 Further, regular fraud risk assessments will help 

identify fraud vulnerabilities before any actual fraud occurs, and allow 

management to take steps to strengthen controls for fraud. Various cases 

of asylum fraud demonstrate ways in which applicants and preparers

have sought to exploit the asylum system and help illustrate fraud risks in 

the affirmative asylum application process, especially risks associated 

with attorney and preparer fraud. For example,

• As of March 2014, a joint fraud investigation led by the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office for the Southern District of New York, the Federal Bureau of 

 

61App. II provides additional information on the fraud risk assessment process.

62GAO-15-593SP. 
Page 33 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Investigation (FBI), the New York City Police Department, and USCIS, 

known as Operation Fiction Writer, resulted in charges against 30 

defendants, including 8 attorneys, for their alleged participation in 

immigration fraud schemes in New York City. According to 

discussions with USCIS officials and a FBI press release, allegations 

regarding these defendants generally involved the preparation of 

fraudulent asylum applications that often followed one of three fact 

patterns: (1) forced abortions performed pursuant to China’s family 

planning policy; (2) persecution based on the applicant’s belief in 

Christianity; or (3) political or ideological persecution, typically for 

membership in China’s Democratic Party or followers of Falun Gong. 

Attorneys and preparers charged in Operation Fiction Writer filed 

5,773 affirmative asylum applications with USCIS, and USCIS granted 

asylum to 829 of those affirmative asylum applicants.63 According to 

EOIR data, 3,709 individuals who were connected to attorneys and 

preparers convicted in Operation Fiction Writer were granted asylum 

in immigration court; this includes both affirmative asylum claims 

referred from USCIS as well as defensive asylum claims.

• An asylum fraud investigation prompted in 2009 and led by the Los 

Angeles asylum office resulted in the indictment and subsequent 

conviction of two immigration consultants. The indictment alleged that 

the two consultants charged approximately $6,500 to prepare and file 

applications on behalf of Chinese nationals seeking asylum in the 

United States. These applications falsely claimed that the applicants 

had fled China because of persecution for their Christian beliefs. HSI 

investigators have linked the consultants to more than 800 asylum 

applications filed since 2000.

In 2002, we reported that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS) did not know the extent of immigration benefit fraud. 64 In 

response, INS initiated the Benefit Fraud Assessment program in 2002 to 

measure the integrity of specific nonimmigrant and immigrant applications 

by conducting administrative inquiries on randomly selected cases, but 

later discontinued the effort because of competing priorities after the 

 

63Although these applicants may have been connected to attorneys and preparers w ho 

w ere convicted on fraud-related charges, the number of these applications that w ere 

fraudulent is unknow n. 

64GAO, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, 

GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002).
Page 34 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. USCIS reinitiated the Benefit 

Fraud Assessment program through FDNS in 2005 and, in November 

2009, FDNS drafted a Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessment 

(BFCA) on asylum for internal USCIS discussion. The assessment was 

intended to study the scope and types of fraud associated with the Form 

I-589, determine the relative utility of a number of fraud detection 

methods, and assess the extent to which asylum officers were using the 

fraud detection measures that were part of the adjudication process at the 

time. However, FDNS did not release the report to external parties 

because of questions about the validity and soundness of the 

methodology used in the BFCA. In 2010, USCIS’s Office of Policy and 

Strategy assumed responsibility for future BFCAs. USCIS contracted for a 

review of the BFCA on asylum, and in September 2012, the contractor 

reported that USCIS should not release the BFCA and made 

recommendations to improve future studies. For example, the contractor 

reported that the assessment process was not well planned and had 

methodological problems and issues with clarity. 65

As of September 2015, officials from the Office of Policy and Strategy 

stated that USCIS is renaming the BFCA as the Immigration Benefit 

Fraud Assessment (IBFA). USCIS officials stated that under the new 

IBFA program, they plan to design rigorous research methods to provide 

fraud rates for selected benefit types. Office of Policy and Strategy 

officials did not provide a timeframe regarding the completion of future 

IBFA studies, and stated that USCIS has no plans to conduct an IBFA on 

asylum because they are still working to develop a framework for 

selecting which immigration benefits to study in the future. Office of Policy 

and Strategy officials said that the IBFA is not a fraud risk assessment 

and that their efforts will not be used to assess the risk of fraud in benefit 

types but will, instead, estimate the fraud rate of a given benefit. USCIS 

officials stated that they do not view the IBFA as a fraud risk assessment 

and that asylum is more difficult to study than other immigration benefits 

because asylum claims are generally based on testimonial evidence, 

 

65Booz Allen Hamilton, An Evaluation of the Unpublished Report on the I-589 Asylum 

Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessment, Contract Number: HSSCCG-11-F-00539 

(Sept. 18, 2012).
Page 35 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

making it more difficult to prove fraud than with other claims, and involve 

confidentiality restrictions.66

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 

entities should comprehensively identify risks at both the entity-wide and 

activity levels. A risk assessment will help to determine how risks should 

be managed through the identification and analysis of relevant risks 

associated with achieving agency objectives.67 Because USCIS must 

balance its mission to protect those with genuine asylum claims with the 

need to prevent ineligible individuals from fraudulently obtaining asylum, 

USCIS could benefit from assessing fraud risks across its asylum 

adjudication process, particularly to assess the fraud risk tolerance of the 

asylum system—a leading practice for assessing fraud risks. The Fraud 

Framework states that managers who effectively assess fraud risks 

attempt to fully consider the specific fraud risks the agency or program 

faces, analyze the potential likelihood and impact of fraud schemes, and 

document prioritized fraud risks. The aforementioned examples of fraud 

investigations further illustrate the need for preventive measures of fraud 

detection within the asylum program. In addition, risk tolerance reflects 

management’s willingness to accept a higher level of fraud risk based on 

the circumstances and objectives of the program. For example, to protect 

genuine asylum applicants who may be unable to provide documents 

supporting their applications, asylum law states that testimonial 

information alone can be sufficient for asylum applicants to meet the 

burden of proof for establishing asylum eligibility. 68

According to USCIS training materials for new asylum officers, asylum 

officers are to interview applicants in a nonadversarial manner and 

assume a cooperative approach as the applicant seeks to establish his or 

 

66See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (an asylum applicant’s credible testimony may be 

sufficient to sustain the burden of proof, w ithout corroboration; how ever, the trier of fact 

may require corroborating evidence in support of otherw ise credible testimony, unless the 

applicant does not have such evidence and it cannot be reasonably obtained); 8 C.F.R. §§ 

208.6, 1208.6 (w ith certain exceptions, information contained in or pertaining to any 

asylum application, or other records indicating that a specific alien has applied for asylum 

shall not be disclosed to third parties).

67GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

68Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), uncorroborated testimony must be credible, 

persuasive, and refer to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a 

refugee.
Page 36 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

her eligibility.69 USCIS instructs asylum officers, when assessing whether 

an applicant has provided sufficient detail about his or her claim, to 

account for the amount of time that has elapsed since the events 

occurred; the possible effects of trauma; the applicant’s background, 

education, and culture; and any other factors that might impair the 

applicant’s memory. The Asylum Division Branch Chief said that while 

this cooperative approach aims to protect genuine asylees, it can also 

create favorable circumstances for ineligible individuals who seek to file 

fraudulent claims, and asylum officers in seven of the eight asylum offices 

we spoke with told us that they have granted asylum in cases in which 

they suspected fraud.70 For example, three asylum offices said that it was 

difficult to prove fraud existed in the asylum application. Although there 

are individual efforts in place to detect fraud, an enterprise-wide 

assessment of fraud risk could better inform asylum officers when 

adjudicating cases, and influence training materials regarding such 

subjects as country conditions. Without regularly assessing fraud risks 

and determining the fraud risk tolerance of the USCIS asylum 

adjudication process, USCIS does not have complete information on the 

inherent fraud risks that may affect the integrity of the affirmative asylum 

application process and therefore does not have reasonable assurance 

that it has implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Moreover, given 

the growth in affirmative asylum applications in recent years, and the 

USCIS pending caseload of over 100,000 affirmative asylum cases to 

adjudicate, assessing program-wide fraud risks could help USCIS target 

its fraud prevention efforts to those areas that are of highest risk in 

accordance with its fraud risk tolerance.

 

69The purpose of the asylum interview is to elicit all relevant and useful information 

bearing on the applicant’s eligibility for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b).

70Asylum officers in the other office did not provide a response regarding granting asylum 

w hen fraud w as suspected. Asylum officers must have legally sufficient evidence in 

support of a finding of fraud, in order to deny or terminate asylum on that basis. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b), (c)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13, 208.14, 208.24; Matter of Chawathe, 25 I. & 

N. Dec. 369 (AAO 2010); Matter of P-S-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 329 (BIA 2014). 
Page 37 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

EOIR has not assessed the fraud risks associated with asylum 

applications across immigration courts. EOIR’s immigration judges serve 

as the sole adjudicators for all defensive asylum claims made in the 

immigration courts and affirmative asylum applications referred by 

USCIS’s asylum officers.71 Asylum fraud-related cases mentioned below 

have demonstrated that EOIR faces fraud risks in these claims. The 

Fraud Framework states that it is a leading practice for agencies to create 

an organizational culture to combat fraud at all levels and designate an 

entity to lead fraud risk management activities, such as planning regular 

fraud risk assessments to determine a fraud risk profile for their 

program.72 EOIR officials told us that the Fraud and Abuse Prevention 

Program has not assessed fraud risks across asylum applications in the 

immigration courts because it lacks financial and human resources. 

EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program is composed of one fulltime fraud prevention counsel, who serves as the antifraud officer 

pursuant to EOIR’s regulations, one part-time attorney, and several 

student interns. Therefore, according to EOIR’s antifraud officer, the 

Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program has primarily served as an inhouse referral system for EOIR employees. EOIR officials also stated that 

it would be difficult to conduct a fraud risk assessment across immigration 

courts because fraud is difficult to measure.

EOIR has efforts in place to assess fraud identified and referred to the 

Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program, such as reviewing fraud referrals 

once received, reviewing records of proceedings, and making referrals to 

law enforcement entities for investigation. However, recent asylum fraud 

cases identified in the program’s case files illustrate the presence of fraud 

risks across asylum applications in immigration courts. For example, 

according to EOIR data, immigration judges granted asylum to 3,709

individuals who were connected to attorneys and preparers convicted in 

 

71Immigration judges are authorized to respond to fraud in the immigration process on a 

case-by-case basis. 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,675 (citing Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 

517 (2d Cir. 2007)). An immigration judge may consider significant inter-proceeding 

similarities in making an adverse credibility determination, provided that certain procedural 

steps are undertaken to preserve fairness. Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA 

2015). In this case, the BIA stated that it w as “not address[ing] w hat procedural 

protections are sufficient to offer an adequate opportunity to explain similarities betw een 

asylum applications absent a confidentiality w aiver.” Id. at 663 n.4.

72GAO-15-593SP. 

EOIR Has Not Assessed 

Fraud Risks across 

Asylum Applications in the 

Immigration Courts
Page 38 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Operation Fiction Writer.73 In addition, almost 20 percent (30 of 153) of 

EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention Case files opened in fiscal year 

2010 through fiscal year 2014 were related to asylum fraud. Further, 17 of 

the 30 case files we reviewed contained multiple types of immigration 

fraud, including document fraud and benefit fraud, as well as potential 

fraud in connection with the unauthorized practice of law. 74 As discussed 

above and in appendix II, the Fraud Framework states that it is a leading 

practice for agencies to plan regular fraud risk assessments and 

determine a fraud risk profile for their programs.75 Managers who 

effectively assess fraud risks attempt to fully consider the specific fraud 

risks the agency or program faces, analyze the potential likelihood and 

impact of fraud schemes, and document prioritized fraud risks. The Fraud 

Framework states that it is a leading practice for an agency to designate 

an antifraud entity as a repository of knowledge for fraud risk, and to tailor 

its fraud risk assessments process to the program in question. Factors 

such as size, resources, maturity of the program, and experience in 

managing fraud risks can influence how an agency plans its fraud risk 

assessment. Although quantitative techniques are generally more precise 

than qualitative methods, when resource constraints, expertise, or other 

circumstances prohibit the use of statistical analysis for assessing fraud 

risks, other quantitative or qualitative techniques can still be informative. 

For example, the Fraud Framework discusses the use of risk scoring to 

quantify the likelihood and effect of particular fraud risks. Our analysis of 

the Fraud and Abuse Prevention case files indicate that there are multiple 

types of fraud that could be assessed through a fraud risk assessment 

such as benefit fraud, marriage fraud, and fraud in connection with the 

unauthorized practice of law.

We recognize that it can be difficult to measure or assess fraud risks and 

that EOIR has limited resources for assessing and addressing such risks. 

However, as noted in the framework, fraud risk management activities 

 

73Although these individuals may have been connected to attorneys and preparers w ho 

w ere convicted on fraud-related charges, the number of these individuals w ho filed 

fraudulent asylum claims is unknow n.

74We review ed a total of 35 Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program case files provided by 

EOIR. During this review , EOIR classified 2 files as unauthorized practice of law rather 

than asylum fraud, and opted not to include a case file re-opened in fiscal year 2012 

because of a prior case closure in fiscal year 2008.Tw o case files w ere outside of fiscal 

year 2010 through fiscal year 2014, w hich w as the time period of our review . 

75GAO-15-593SP. 
Page 39 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

such as a fraud risk assessment may be incorporated into or aligned with 

internal activities and strategic objectives already in place, and 

information on fraud trends and lessons learned can be used to improve 

the design and implementation of fraud risk management activities.76

Proactive fraud risk management would also mitigate the risk for fraud so 

that it is less likely to occur. Without regularly identifying and assessing 

fraud risks and determining the fraud risk tolerance in immigration courts, 

EOIR does not have complete information on the inherent fraud risks that 

may affect the integrity of the defensive asylum process and therefore 

does not have reasonable assurance that it has implemented controls to 

mitigate those risks.

In addition, as noted in our framework, fraud risk assessments can 

provide partners and stakeholders with information that can also assist in 

their operations and efforts. Managers who effectively manage fraud risks 

collaborate and communicate with internal and external stakeholders to 

share information on fraud risks, emerging fraud schemes, and lessons 

learned related to fraud control activities.77 ICE OPLA attorneys are 

responsible for presenting evidence of and proving fraud in immigration 

court, and ICE HSI investigates cases of asylum fraud that are referred 

from the immigration courts. EOIR officials said that its Office of Planning 

Analysis and Statistics has previously provided data for OPLA attorneys 

to assist in court proceedings and investigations when requested. ICE 

OPLA attorneys we interviewed at all four of the field offices we visited 

told us that if asylum fraud is detected, it is difficult to prove in immigration 

court. Attorneys at two of the offices we visited stated that, in their 

experience, proving fraud requires an immense amount of time and 

evidence. ICE OPLA attorneys in one location stated that, as a result of 

factors such as these, there is no incentive for them to litigate asylum 

fraud cases. An EOIR fraud risk assessment could help ICE OPLA, for 

example, better educate OPLA attorneys about fraud risks as they 

represent the government in immigration court proceedings. Moreover, 

managers can use the fraud risk assessment process to determine the 

extent to which controls may no longer be relevant or cost-effective. Thus, 

a fraud risk assessment would help EOIR ensure that it is targeting its 

limited fraud prevention resources effectively.

 

76GAO-15-593SP. 

77GAO-15-593SP. 
Page 40 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Within USCIS, FDNS does not have complete or readily available data on 

fraud referrals and requests for assistance from asylum officers and on its 

asylum fraud-related investigations and the outcomes of those 

investigations. First, with regard to data on fraud referrals and requests 

for assistance from asylum officers, such data are not consistently 

entered into the FDNS Data System (FDNS-DS), which is USCIS’s 

agency-wide database for maintaining data and information on all FDNS 

activities, including activities associated with asylum fraud investigations. 

According to training materials for new asylum officers, if an asylum 

officer has questions about a potential fraud indicator while adjudicating 

an affirmative asylum claim, he or she can submit a request for 

assistance to the FDNS immigration officers in his or her asylum office. 

For example, FDNS may be able to provide additional information about 

an asylum applicant by conducting searches of databases that asylum 

officers cannot access. In addition, FDNS immigration officers can 

conduct document reviews and analyses of the application to determine 

whether fraud may exist. According to USCIS training materials for new 

asylum officers, each asylum office may have a different process for 

requesting assistance from FDNS. According to the training materials, as 

well as FDNS immigration officers we spoke with in asylum offices, 

officers typically deliver their responses to a request for assistance 

informally, such as by orally communicating the results of their reviews to 

asylum officers without supporting documentation. FDNS’s fraud 

detection standard operating procedures state that requests for 

assistance are to be entered into FDNS-DS.78 However, according to 

FDNS officials in headquarters and field offices, these requests are not 

consistently entered into FDNS-DS. Additionally, while the requests may 

be tracked at the office level within individual asylum offices, they are not 

otherwise tracked across individual offices by either the Asylum Division 

or FDNS.

Moreover, according to the training materials for new asylum officers, in 

cases where a fraud indicator cannot be quickly resolved by FDNS, such 

as a suspicion of fraud or a complicated case needing more research by 

FDNS, the asylum officer is to complete a Fraud Referral Sheet. After 

receiving a referral, FDNS is to determine whether the referral has 

sufficient information to warrant further investigation. According to 

 

78There is an exception to this policy for classified cases or requests. If a request for 

assistance refers to a classified case or requests classified content, that information 

cannot be entered into FDNS-DS.

USCIS Does Not Have 

Complete or Readily 

Available Data on FDNS’s 

Efforts to Combat Asylum 

Fraud
Page 41 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

FDNS’s fraud detection standard operating procedures, FDNS 

immigration officers are to enter all fraud referrals, including those that 

they will decline, into FDNS-DS to accurately record the number of 

referrals received, track their processing, and support quality assurance. 

However, in practice, FDNS headquarters officials stated that officers 

typically enter referrals into FDNS-DS as “leads” only if they warrant 

additional investigation. While some FDNS immigration officers track 

referrals at the asylum office level, not all referrals are entered into the 

agency-wide FDNS-DS. As a result, FDNS-DS does not have complete 

data on the number of fraud referrals or requests for assistance in each 

asylum office or across asylum offices, making it difficult to determine the 

extent to which asylum officers request assistance from FDNS on fraudrelated questions or suspicions in adjudicating asylum applications.

Second, FDNS does not have readily available data on the number of 

asylum fraud cases it investigates, the number of asylum fraud cases in 

which FDNS immigration officers find asylum fraud, or the number of 

asylum fraud cases that FDNS refers to HSI for further investigation. 

According to FDNS’s fraud detection standard operating procedures, if 

FDNS immigration officers determine that a referral warrants additional 

investigation, they are to enter that referral into FDNS-DS as a fraud lead. 

If, after conducting research and analyzing the information associated 

with a lead, the immigration officer determines that a reasonable 

suspicion of fraud is articulated and actionable, the lead is elevated to a 

case. FDNS immigration officers may also enter a referral into the 

database directly as a case if a reasonable suspicion of fraud is 

articulated and actionable. According to FDNS officials, FDNS data entry 

rules require that all immigration forms associated with an individual 

under investigation be included with the individual’s FDNS-DS case. Not 

every immigration form associated with an individual or case is the basis 

for fraud in that case and a case may include multiple immigration forms. 

For example, if FDNS opened a case about an individual who was 

legitimately granted asylum, but who later committed marriage fraud, the 

FDNS-DS case record would include both the legitimate asylum 

application and the fraudulent marriage-based benefit application.79

Furthermore, according to FDNS officials, when an immigration officer 

first enters a case into FDNS-DS, he or she is to categorize the type of 

 

79The crime of marriage fraud is to know ingly enter into a marriage for the purpose of 

evading any provision of the immigration law s. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c).
Page 42 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

fraud that is the subject of the case. For example, the officer would 

categorize an asylum fraud case as “benefit fraud—asylum” in FDNS-DS. 

However, FDNS officials stated that, because of the limitations of FDNSDS, each case record can only reflect one type of fraud at a time, 

although the system does have the capacity to record and report updates 

if, for example, the type of fraud associated with a record is changed. 

FDNS officials stated that a case that begins as an asylum fraud 

investigation might ultimately result in a fraud finding or referral to HSI 

based on another type of fraud, such as marriage fraud. FDNS officials 

stated that if asylum fraud is not the most egregious type of benefit fraud 

in a particular investigation, the investigation may not be categorized as 

asylum fraud in FDNS-DS.

Because of the limitations of FDNS-DS, FDNS headquarters officials 

stated that the number of FDNS-DS records categorized as “benefit 

fraud—asylum” may not accurately represent the number of asylum fraud 

investigations completed by FDNS or the number of asylum fraud cases 

FDNS referred to HSI. FDNS headquarters officials stated that making 

such a determination would require a manual review of each case record 

in FDNS-DS categorized as “benefit fraud—asylum” or associated with an 

I-589, the asylum application. Both of these data fields indicate that the 

case record could be, but is not necessarily, related to an investigation of 

asylum fraud. Without this manual review, a process that would be 

extremely labor-intensive, FDNS cannot determine which immigration 

forms or benefit types are the subject of an investigation or of a referral 

from FDNS to HSI. According to FDNS data from FDNS-DS, in fiscal year 

2014, FDNS opened 336 cases in which the individual implicated was 

associated with an asylum application, either as the applicant or as an 

attorney, preparer, or interpreter assisting the applicant, and FDNS found 

fraud in 210 of those cases. However, FDNS cannot readily determine 

how many of those cases involved asylum fraud without manually 

reviewing each individual case. 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 

agencies must have relevant, reliable, and timely information to determine 

whether their operations are performing as expected.80 Without complete 

data on the number of requests for assistance from asylum officers to 

FDNS, the number of referrals that asylum officers submit to FDNS, and 

 

80GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
Page 43 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

the number of FDNS investigations that result in a finding of asylum fraud, 

USCIS officials cannot determine how often the fraud referral process is 

used or how often it results in a finding of asylum fraud. Complete data on 

these matters would also help support a fraud risk assessment, as 

previously discussed, by giving USCIS additional information about fraud 

schemes and trends from fraud detection activities so that officials can 

ensure that fraud detection activities are appropriately tailored to the 

agency’s risk profile.

USCIS uses various tools to attempt to identify fraud in specific 

affirmative asylum applications. USCIS uses some of these tools, such as 

biometric identity verification and biographic and biometric background 

and security checks, on all asylum applications. These tools help asylum 

officers identify fraud by confirming the applicant’s identity and identifying 

prior criminal convictions, among other things. Further, the Asylum 

Division and FDNS have some additional tools available that officers can 

use to address cases with indicators of fraud; however, our analysis of 

HSI and USCIS data indicates that some of these tools are of limited 

utility and use. Specifically, USCIS guidance for FDNS immigration 

officers discusses the use of two fraud detection tools for verifying 

applicants’ claims and supporting documents—the ICE HSI Forensic 

Laboratory and overseas verification. HSI’s Forensic Laboratory 

specializes in determining the authenticity of documents and identifying 

the presence of alterations within those documents. In particular, the 

Forensic Laboratory specializes in verifying travel and identity documents, 

such as passports, visas, driver’s licenses, and identification cards. 

However, according to Forensic Laboratory guidance for document 

submission issued in 2010, the Forensic Laboratory prioritizes matters of 

national security, criminal violations, cases involving people who have 

been detained, and cases involving multiple incidents related to organized 

fraudulent activity. According to Forensic Laboratory officials, the 

Forensic Laboratory may accept non-priority requests on a case-by-case 

basis. Asylum applications, which are not criminal cases and usually 

involve nondetained applicants, therefore generally do not fit within the 

laboratory’s priorities, according to USCIS and ICE officials. Furthermore, 

both FDNS and Forensic Laboratory officials stated that the Forensic 

USCIS Has Limited 

Capability to Detect Fraud 

in Affirmative Asylum 

Applications

USCIS’s Capability to Identify 

Patterns of Fraud across 

Asylum Applications is Limited
Page 44 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Laboratory generally cannot verify some types of documents commonly 

submitted as support for asylum claims, such as foreign police reports 

and medical records. Forensic Laboratory officials told us that these 

documents are difficult to authenticate because the laboratory does not 

have genuine exemplar documents for comparison purposes and 

because the documents are typically not standardized and do not have 

security features that can be verified by forensic examination. According 

to HSI and Asylum Division officials, neither the Forensic Laboratory nor 

the Asylum Division tracks submissions to the Forensic Laboratory 

specific to asylum applications; however, according to HSI data, USCIS 

submitted 60 cases to the Forensic Laboratory in fiscal year 2014 across 

all immigration benefits. Asylum officers we interviewed in all eight asylum 

offices said that they rarely use the Forensic Laboratory, in part because 

of untimely and inconclusive responses.

Asylum officers may also submit documents for overseas verification, 

either by USCIS officers overseas or, in areas where USCIS does not 

have an overseas presence, by State Department consular officers. 

Overseas verification refers to the verification of events, education, or 

work experience that occurred in a foreign country or the authentication of 

a document or information that originated overseas. From fiscal years 

2010 through 2014, asylum offices submitted 111 requests to either 

USCIS officers or State Department consular officers for overseas 

verification. Asylum officers we interviewed in all eight asylum offices 

stated that they rarely use overseas verification, in part because they do 

not receive responses to their requests in a timely manner. In addition, 

asylum confidentiality restrictions limit the extent to which asylum officers 

can verify information overseas; USCIS and State Department personnel 

generally cannot share information contained in or pertaining to an 

asylum application outside the U.S. government in a manner that would 

disclose the fact that the individual applied for asylum in the United 

States. Furthermore, asylum officers told us that the outcome of asylum 

adjudications rarely hinges on the authenticity of a single document, so 

document verification may not change the outcome of a case.

Further, USCIS’s tools for detecting patterns of fraud across affirmative 

asylum applications are limited because USCIS relies on a paper-based 

system for asylum applications. After the applicant submits a paper Form 

I-589 to USCIS, Service Center personnel input certain biographic 

information, such as the applicant’s name, date of birth, and nationality, 

from the paper application into the RAPS database. Asylum office 

personnel use RAPS to track the application’s status and facilitate 

interview scheduling. In some cases, FDNS immigration officers can use 
Page 45 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

information from RAPS for fraud detection by creating reports of cases 

with certain biographic characteristics, thereby identifying cases for 

potential review. However, RAPS does not have the capability to detect 

fraud trends because, while it captures biographic data about an asylum 

applicant, it does not capture other key information that could be used to 

detect fraud. Such information could include the applicant’s written 

statement, the reason for the applicant’s claim, or the name of the 

applicant’s interpreter. Asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers told 

us that they can identify potential fraud by manually analyzing trends 

across asylum applications they review. Because of USCIS’s reliance on 

paper asylum applications, asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers 

use ad hoc, labor-intensive methods to detect such trends among asylum 

cases. For example, FDNS immigration officers at three of the eight 

asylum offices stated that they photocopy asylum applications and 

maintain hard-copy case files for analysis.81 In our 2008 report on the 

asylum adjudication process, we surveyed asylum officers across all 

asylum offices and found that 61 percent of asylum officers stated that 

scanning all I-589s and using software to identify boilerplate language 

and trends was “greatly needed,” and 16 percent said it was “moderately 

needed.” 82

According to the FDNS Branch Chief for USCIS’s RAIO Directorate, 

automated analytic capabilities for asylum applications, such as tools to 

detect fraud indicators, would lead to significant increases in efficiencies 

for fraud detection and investigation. For example, since 2014, FDNS has 

been reviewing the asylum applications associated with Operation Fiction 

Writer. FDNS does not have automated analytic tools to review 

information. Rather, FDNS immigration officers must manually review 

hundreds of asylum applications, requiring large investments of time and 

resources. In our interviews with asylum officers, officers in all eight 

asylum offices stated that they would benefit from greater access to 

analytic tools. According to the FDNS Branch Chief for RAIO, an 

 

81FDNS immigration officers in the five other asylum offices did not discuss this fraud 

detection practice.

82GAO-08-935. 
Page 46 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

automated analytic capability for asylum applications is a “critical need” 

for fraud detection.83 

As we previously reported, in 2005, USCIS embarked on its multiyear 

Transformation Program to transform its paper-based immigration 

benefits process to a system with electronic application filing, 

adjudication, and case management.84 The main component of the 

program is the USCIS Electronic Immigration System (ELIS), which is to 

provide case management for adjudication of immigration benefits. 

However, USCIS has faced longstanding challenges in implementing its 

Transformation Program, which raise questions about the extent to which 

its eventual deployment will position USCIS to collect and maintain more 

readily-available data. In May 2015, we reported that USCIS expects the 

Transformation Program will cost up to $3.1 billion and be fully deployed 

no later than March 2019, which is an increase of approximately $1 

billion, and a delay of more than 4 years from its initial July 2011 

baseline.85 USCIS’s most recent Life Cycle Cost Estimate for the 

Transformation Program states that USCIS will not complete deploying 

functional capabilities for USCIS’s humanitarian mission, which includes 

asylum, until September 2018. Officials from USCIS’s Transformation 

Program told us that, as of June 2015, they have not yet developed 

business requirements for asylum adjudication in USCIS ELIS or 

determined how USCIS ELIS implementation will affect asylum 

adjudications because they are currently focused on developing and 

deploying USCIS ELIS for other immigration benefits.

Because USCIS has not yet developed business requirements for asylum 

in USCIS ELIS, it is too early to assess how the information contained in 

USCIS ELIS could facilitate USCIS’s asylum fraud detection efforts. 

Additionally, as we reported in May 2015, USCIS’s ability to effectively 

monitor USCIS ELIS program performance and make informed decisions 

 

83In their comments on a draft of this report, DHS stated that, as of November 2015, 

USCIS had approved funding to obtain such a capability in fiscal year 2016. How ever, the 

Asylum Division and FDNS w ere still w orking to develop requirements and identify tools 

for acquisition.

84GAO, Immigration Benefits: Consistent Adherence to DHS’s Acquisition Policy Could 

Help Improve Transformation Program Outcomes, GAO-12-66 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 

22, 2011).

85GAO, Immigration Benefits System: Better Informed Decision Making Needed on 

Transformation Program, GAO-15-415 (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2015).
Page 47 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

about its implementation has been limited because department-level 

governance and oversight bodies were not using reliable program 

information to inform their program evaluations.86 The Fraud Framework 

states that it is a leading practice for agencies to use data analytics to 

identify and monitor trends that may indicate fraud and use information to 

improve fraud risk management activities, such as addressing control 

vulnerabilities and improving training.87 Identifying and implementing 

additional fraud detection tools, such as automated analytic software, 

could enable FDNS and asylum officers to detect fraud more readily while 

using limited resources more efficiently. Without such tools, FDNS 

immigration officers are not well positioned to identify cases associated 

with particular asylum fraud rings or aid in the investigation and 

prosecution of the attorneys, preparers, and interpreters who perpetrate 

asylum fraud.

Some asylum offices have strengthened their capability to detect and 

prevent fraud by using FDNS immigration officers to prescreen affirmative 

asylum applications; however, the use of this practice varies across 

asylum offices. Prescreening applications, that is, reviewing the 

application for potential fraud indicators in advance of the asylum 

interview, allows FDNS to identify fraud trends and detect patterns that 

may not be evident in a small sample of asylum applications. Asylum 

officers we spoke with in all eight asylum offices stated that they face time 

constraints in adjudicating asylum applications. For example, asylum 

officers we spoke with in three asylum offices stated that they have 

limited time to review the details of the applications that they are 

adjudicating in advance of the applicant interview. Additionally, each 

asylum officer adjudicates approximately eight affirmative asylum 

applications per week. Therefore, an individual officer might not see 

patterns of fraud in single applications that would be visible if he or she 

were reviewing the entire universe of applications in each asylum office. 

For example, asylum officers or supervisors we spoke with in six of eight 

 

86GAO-15-415. We recommended, among other things, that to improve governance of its 

Transformation Program, DHS should ensure that its Acquisition Review Board is 

effectively monitoring the program’s performance and progress tow ard a predefined cost 

and schedule and relying on complete and accurate program data to review the 

performance of the program against stated expectations. DHS concurred w ith these 

recommendations and identified planned actions to address them, such as approving a 

rebaseline of cost, schedule, and performance expectations for the remainder of program.

87GAO-15-593SP. 

FDNS Prescreens Asylum 

Applications in Some, but Not 

All, Asylum Offices
Page 48 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

asylum offices stated that FDNS prescreening was, or would be, helpful in 

identifying fraud indicators or fraud trends.88

USCIS training materials state that it is important to identify indicators of 

fraud before the applicant’s interview so that asylum officers can ask 

appropriate questions during the interview. Before an interview, asylum 

officers can consult with their supervisors or FDNS about indicators of 

potential fraud in an application; however, they are not required to do so. 

As previously discussed, consistent with the REAL ID Act of 2005, 

credible testimony from the asylum applicant may be sufficient, without 

corroboration, for the applicant to receive asylum.89 Asylum officers are to 

raise discrepancies, inconsistencies, or identified fraud in the asylum 

application during the interview, and upon completion of the interview, the 

applicant or the applicant’s representative must have an opportunity to 

respond to the evidence presented.90 When FDNS does not prescreen 

applications, the asylum officer is responsible for identifying potential 

fraud in the application prior to the interview and using that information 

during the interview to assess the applicant’s credibility unless he or she 

temporarily pauses the interview to seek support from supervisors or 

FDNS. After an interview, the asylum officer may call applicants back to 

answer additional questions before a decision is rendered or conduct a 

full reinterview with applicants. However, in two asylum offices, 

supervisory asylum officers we spoke with stated that they prefer not to 

reinterview applicants because doing so adds to their adjudication 

backlog. Supervisory asylum officers we spoke with in three asylum 

offices stated that they conduct reinterviews when needed or in particular 

circumstances.91 In three offices where FDNS prescreens asylum 

applications for indicators of fraud, FDNS immigration officers we spoke 

with stated that FDNS provides information to the asylum officer about the 

nature of the potential fraud in the application in advance of the applicant 

interview. This allows the asylum officer to ask relevant questions during 

the interview; gives the applicant the opportunity to provide an 

 

88Asylum officers in the remaining tw o asylum offices did not comment about w hether 

prescreening w as helpful.

89Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. I, § 101(a)(3), 119 Stat. at 303 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 

1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)).

90See 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(d).

91Supervisory asylum officers in the other three asylum offices did not comment about 

reinterview practices.
Page 49 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

explanation for any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or identified fraud in 

the file; and ensures that the asylum officer is in the strongest position to 

assess the credibility of the applicant. According to FDNS immigration 

officers we spoke with in two asylum offices, prescreening also allows 

FDNS to identify applications that are affiliated with attorneys, preparers, 

or interpreters under FDNS investigation.

FDNS immigration officers we interviewed in five of the eight asylum 

offices stated that they prescreen some affirmative asylum applications; 

one asylum office prescreens all applications; and two asylum offices do 

not prescreen applications.92 FDNS officials stated that staffing and 

resource constraints, coupled with the increase in affirmative asylum 

applications in recent years, have made it difficult for FDNS to prescreen 

all asylum applications. For example, in January 2015, immigration 

officers in one asylum office that does not prescreen asylum applications 

developed a plan to begin prescreening, but were unable to implement 

the plan because of a lack of administrative resources. In the five offices 

that prescreen some applications, officers may select applications for 

prescreening at random or based on certain characteristics such as the 

applicant’s country of origin. Immigration officers set their own 

prescreening priorities in most of these offices. In both offices that do not 

prescreen affirmative asylum applications, FDNS officials stated that 

prescreening would be helpful and is an effective system for identifying 

fraud patterns but that resource constraints and national security priorities 

have limited their ability to prescreen asylum applications. However, the 

asylum office that prescreens all asylum applications is also the office that 

received the most affirmative asylum applications from fiscal years 2010 

to 2014, and from fiscal years 2010 to 2013, this office was staffed with 

two full-time FDNS immigration officers, which is equal to or less than the 

staffing of all other FDNS immigration officers in asylum offices in that 

time period. This office was able to prescreen all asylum applications 

even though it had similar staffing resources and a higher volume of 

asylum applications than any other asylum office. Moreover, the head of 

the Asylum Division stated that FDNS prescreening is helpful to asylum 

officers and that he would like FDNS to prescreen all asylum applications 

prior to the interview. The FDNS Branch Chief for RAIO also stated that 

she supported more robust prescreening of affirmative asylum 

 

92In comments on a draft of this report, the FDNS Branch Chief for RAIO stated that one 

additional office began prescreening applications in October 2015.
Page 50 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

applications and noted that the process would need to be tailored to the 

specific needs and resource levels for each office.

According to the Fraud Framework, designing and implementing specific 

control activities to prevent and detect fraud is a leading practice for 

managers.93 Additionally, the framework states that preventive control 

activities generally offer the most cost-effective investment of resources 

and that, while targeted controls, such as prescreening, may be more 

costly than agencywide controls, such as general fraud detection 

responsibilities, targeted controls may lower the cost of identifying each 

instance of fraud because they are more effective than controls that are 

not targeted. Although prescreening asylum cases may require additional 

time from FDNS immigration officers, it could ultimately help save time 

and resources by helping FDNS officers build large-scale asylum fraud 

investigations and detect new fraud patterns in a timely manner. 

Moreover, prescreening could help save resources by identifying 

indicators of fraud before the asylum interview. This would allow asylum 

officers to ask relevant questions during the interview and reduce the

need for time-consuming reinterviews, in which the asylum office requests 

that an applicant return for a second interview to address issues not 

covered in the initial interview. Requiring that FDNS immigration officers 

prescreen all affirmative asylum applications for indicators of fraud, to the 

extent that it is cost-effective and feasible, would allow FDNS to better 

detect any such indicators at the point where that information is most 

useful for preventing asylum fraud.

FDNS has not established clear responsibilities related to fraud detection 

for its immigration officers in asylum offices, and FDNS fraud detection 

activities vary widely by asylum office. In March 2011, FDNS issued 

standard operating procedures for fraud detection, which describe the 

procedures that FDNS immigration officers are to follow when 

investigating referrals related to immigration benefit fraud, as well as the 

process for referring immigration benefit fraud cases to HSI or other 

government or law enforcement agencies. These standard operating 

procedures are intended to guide fraud detection in all USCIS 

adjudications, including those at Service Centers and Field Offices, in 

addition to asylum offices. However, the standard operating procedures 

 

93GAO-15-593SP. 

FDNS Has Not 

Established Clear 

Responsibilities for Fraud 

Detection in Asylum 

Offices
Page 51 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

do not provide further details or guidance on the roles and responsibilities 

of FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices. According to 

RAIO officials, FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices face 

unique fraud detection challenges and the standard operating procedures 

state that immigration officers working in asylum offices must be sensitive 

to the unique legal requirements and issues involved with asylee 

processing, such as confidentiality requirements. FDNS immigration 

officers we spoke with in all eight asylum offices stated that they have 

limited guidance about their roles and responsibilities with respect to 

fraud detection, and officers at seven of the eight offices stated that the 

limited guidance creates challenges for them in addressing asylum 

fraud.94

Further, some of the processes outlined in the standard operating 

procedures differ from the processes we observed FDNS immigration 

officers following during our site visits to asylum offices. For example, the 

procedures state that FDNS will refer single-scheme cases—that is, 

individual cases of fraud—to HSI when they involve an attorney, 

interpreter, or preparer. FDNS immigration officers we spoke with at 

seven of eight asylum offices told us that they generally do not submit 

single-scheme cases to HSI.95 HSI officials we spoke with confirmed that 

they rarely accept single-scheme asylum fraud cases for investigation 

because single-scheme cases are difficult to prosecute, and the penalties 

for individual instances of fraud are low. In addition, FDNS immigration 

officers at three asylum offices expressed confusion about whether they 

were permitted to conduct site visits for asylum fraud investigations, 

which the standard operating procedures list as one of the duties of an 

immigration officer.96 Site visits allow FDNS immigration officers to verify 

information presented in an asylum application, such as an applicant’s 

home address. According to FDNS officials, immigration officers may 

have been confused because they were not permitted to conduct site 

visits in the past because of limited resources and concerns about officer 

safety. However, in September 2015, FDNS headquarters officials stated 

 

94FDNS immigration officers in the other asylum office stated that the limited guidance 

allow s them flexibility to focus on areas of need in that office. 

95FDNS immigration officers in the other asylum office did not comment about w hether 

they submit single-scheme cases to HSI. 

96FDNS immigration officers in the five other asylum offices did not specifically discuss 

FDNS guidance on site visits.
Page 52 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

that officers are permitted to conduct site visits, as appropriate for casespecific needs, and the additional FDNS officers hired in 2014 helped 

address prior resource constraints. Further, the standard operating 

procedures do not discuss prescreening asylum cases in advance of the 

asylum interview; however, as we previously stated, we found that 

immigration officers at six of the eight asylum offices were prescreening 

at least some asylum applications.

Additionally, FDNS’s fraud detection activities varied widely across the 

eight asylum offices. For example, one asylum office we visited was 

responsible for submitting 87 of the 111 total overseas verification 

requests submitted by asylum offices from fiscal years 2010 through 

2014. FDNS immigration officers at this office told us that they regularly 

prescreened asylum cases for potential fraud indicators, tracked potential 

fraud indicators in internal spreadsheets, submitted fraud referrals to HSI, 

and testified about asylum fraud in immigration court at the request of ICE 

OPLA trial attorneys. In another asylum office we visited, FDNS 

immigration officers we spoke with told us that they devote “very little 

time” to fraud detection and investigation because they focus on national 

security priorities. Immigration officers at this office did not submit any 

overseas verification requests from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, nor 

do they regularly prescreen applications. Asylum officers from one asylum 

office we spoke with said they report identified fraud trends to FDNS 

immigration officers in their office, but FDNS does not take action on the 

referrals or disseminate fraud trends or feedback regarding fraud 

referrals. In another asylum office, asylum officers said that fraud referrals 

and fraud trends are discussed informally between individual asylum and 

FDNS officers.

USCIS issued guidance in December 2014 detailing FDNS’s priorities for 

immigration officers in the field for fiscal year 2015. The guidance states 

that FDNS will develop, implement, and monitor policies and programs 

that enhance USCIS’s ability to detect and resolve fraud issues. 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that a 

good internal control environment requires that the agency’s 

organizational structure clearly define key areas of authority and 

responsibility and establish appropriate lines of reporting. 97 Furthermore, 

the Fraud Framework states that effective managers of fraud risks 

 

97GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
Page 53 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

establish roles and responsibilities for fraud detection activities and 

describe the fraud risk management activities intended to prevent, detect, 

and respond to fraud as part of an overall antifraud strategy.98 According 

to FDNS officials, FDNS did not think it was necessary to issue asylumspecific guidance for some fraud detection activities, such as site visits, 

because the number of immigration officers assigned to asylum was so 

small in the past that immigration officers had very little time for fraud 

detection activities. However, between fiscal years 2014 and 2015, the 

number of FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices more than 

doubled, from 18 to 39. This increase in staffing levels will allow FDNS 

immigration officers to devote more time to detecting asylum fraud, 

according to FDNS headquarters officials. Developing asylum-specific 

guidance on the fraud detection roles and responsibilities of FDNS 

immigration officers working in asylum offices would better position those 

officers to understand their fraud detection roles and responsibilities, tools 

that are available to them in carrying out those roles and responsibilities, 

and features that are unique to the asylum system.

USCIS training for asylum officers includes basic training for new asylum 

officers and weekly training for all asylum officers; however, these 

trainings include limited information on fraud as compared to other topics. 

The training program for asylum officers is comprised of three main 

components. First, new asylum officers participate in 3 weeks of selfpaced RAIO Directorate and Asylum Division distance training in their 

respective asylum offices. Distance training consists of webinars and 

video teleconference presentations, and asylum officers are expected to 

read the training materials and complete exercises and quizzes in 

preparation for residential training. Second, asylum officers participate in 

 

98GAO-15-593SP. 

USCIS Provides Limited 

Fraud Training for Asylum 

Officers and Does Not 

Have a Mechanism for 

Conducting Ongoing 

Training Needs 

Assessments

USCIS Provides Limited Fraud 

Training for Asylum Officers
Page 54 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

a 6-week residential basic training program, which includes 3 weeks of 

RAIO Directorate training and 3 weeks of Asylum Division training. Both 

courses include classroom instruction, practical exercises, and mock 

interviews on a variety of topics, such as national security, case law, 

children’s claims, gender-related claims, human trafficking, and 

interviewing. At the end of the residential training courses, new asylum 

officers must pass final exams about the course with a score of at least 

70 percent. Third, USCIS policy requires asylum offices to allocate 4 

hours per week for formal or informal training for asylum officers and 

supervisory asylum officers. The training can range from classroom 

instruction by the asylum office’s Training Officer to individual study time 

that asylum officers can use to study case law, research country 

conditions affecting prospective asylees, and read new USCIS 

procedures and guidance. The Asylum Division requires Training Officers 

to track the date and topic of each weekly training session and report that 

information to Asylum Division headquarters on a quarterly basis.

Regarding the distance training and residential training for new officers, 

USCIS’s training materials include some information related to identifying 

and addressing potential fraud. Specifically, the RAIO distance training 

includes a webinar about fraud, and during the RAIO residential training 

sessions, asylum officers receive classroom instruction on various topics 

such as interviewing, evidence, and gender-related claims. Asylum 

officers also participate in mock interviews. In addition, the Asylum 

Division residential training includes in-class instruction on the topics 

mentioned above, as well as on fraud-related issues. Asylum officers 

participate in practical exercises and mock interviews related to various 

topics. Specifically, during the Asylum Division residential training 

session, new asylum officers receive four hours of fraud training delivered 

via PowerPoint slide presentations taught by various FDNS officials. 

During this session, asylum officers also complete practical exercises 

related to the fraud referral sheet. According to USCIS officials, although 

each instructor has his or her own set of slides and may present the 

information in different formats or use different asylum case examples, 

the content of these slides does not vary among FDNS instructors and 

the instructors teach a core set of principles in each class. We analyzed 

the RAIO distance training webinar regarding fraud, as well as two 

presentations that USCIS provided to us as examples of those used 

during the Asylum Division’s training session. We found that the slides 

contained information on fraud indicators and the fraud referral process 

and, in particular, one PowerPoint presentation defined fraud, listed types 

of asylum fraud, highlighted the FDNS fraud referral sheet, and provided 

examples of prior fraud investigations. 
Page 55 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

While the distance and residential training sessions include materials 

related to asylum fraud, these materials do not include the same level of 

detail, depth, or breadth as the written training modules for other RAIO 

and Asylum Division training sessions. These materials serve as 

reference materials for asylum officers after they begin to adjudicate 

cases. In particular, RAIO’s written training modules on other topics, such 

as the modules on human trafficking and gender-related claims, provide 

more robust discussions of each topic, contain links to relevant laws, and 

include suggested supplemental reading materials. For example, the 

human trafficking module and Asylum Division supplement contains lists 

of suggested interview questions, a sample memo that asylum officers 

can use to document human trafficking concerns, and a sample asylum

decision. The gender-related claims module contains substantive 

definitions of eight types of gender-based harm, proposed interview 

considerations and sample questions, and an extensive legal analysis of 

such claims. The materials used for RAIO and Asylum Division training on 

fraud provide useful information on how fraud is defined and how to make 

referrals of suspected fraud to FDNS; however, these materials do not 

include extensive definitions of fraud, a sample memo, a sample decision, 

or sample interview questions. For example, our review of RAIO and 

Asylum Division training materials showed that these materials do not 

explain how asylum officers are to interview applicants when they suspect 

fraud or document fraud when writing asylum decisions. Moreover, 

supervisory asylum officers and asylum officers at six of the eight asylum 

offices we spoke with stated that they need additional fraud training.99 In 

particular, asylum officers in three offices cited a need for training on 

interviewing applicants in cases where they suspect fraud, and officers 

we spoke with at two offices cited a need for training on how to document 

and substantiate fraud in asylum decisions. 

Prior to 2012, USCIS had a written fraud training module. USCIS 

redeveloped its asylum officer training in 2012 and, since that time, 

neither the RAIO Directorate nor Asylum Division distance or residential 

basic training course have been guided by a written module on asylum 

fraud. Other USCIS materials refer asylum officers to the pre-2012 written 

fraud training module, which is no longer in place. For example, the 

Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual refers asylum officers to the basic 

training materials for further guidance and instruction on various subjects, 

 

99With regard to USCIS’s fraud training, supervisory asylum officers and asylum officers in 

the other tw o offices did not provide a response.
Page 56 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

including how to address fraudulent evidence in an asylum application. 

Further, five of the RAIO training modules on other topics—such as the

modules covering the affirmative asylum process and procedures, 

decision making, and evidence—refer asylum officers to the pre-2012 

fraud module for more details on how to address and detect fraud in 

asylum applications. In September 2015, Asylum Division officials told us 

that they were working to finalize an updated fraud training module, but 

stated that the module required additional review before being finalized. 

Officials were unable to provide a time frame for finalizing the module. 

Officials previously attributed these delays to vacancies in the senior 

FDNS positions overseeing RAIO and the Asylum Division who would 

need to approve the updated module. As of March 2015, those positions 

have been filled. In technical comments that USCIS provided to us on a 

draft of this report, USCIS stated that it expected to finalize the written 

training module by March 2016 and provide this training to asylum officers 

by September 2016. While these plans are a positive step, it is too soon 

to tell the extent to which the finalized module will address the limitations 

we and asylum officers identified. 

Regarding ongoing training for asylum officers, according to Asylum 

Division officials, USCIS complements its basic training program by 

providing weekly training sessions on a variety of topics, including fraud 

issues. However, our analysis of quarterly Training Officer reports for all 

eight asylum offices in fiscal year 2014 found that 8 of 408 training 

sessions were reported as being dedicated to fraud, and four of the eight 

asylum offices did not report providing dedicated specific fraud training in 

fiscal year 2014. According to Asylum Division officials, many of the 

weekly training sessions in fiscal year 2014 focused on credible and 

reasonable fear because of the increased number of those cases. 

According to our analysis of the training reports, the most common use of 

weekly training time was staff meetings or cancellations of formal training 

for the week, and the second most common use was information on 

country conditions.100 According to Asylum Division officials, training on 

country conditions can provide asylum officers with information they can 

use to detect fraud in interviews; however, these trainings are not directly 

focused on identifying fraud. Weekly training topics also included security 

checks, immigration and asylum law, and USCIS policy changes. Three 

asylum offices we spoke with said that weekly training was not helpful for 

 

100The staff meetings or a cancellation of a formal training category does not include office 

closures because of federal holidays or inclement w eather. 
Page 57 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

asylum adjudications. In one office, for example, officers stated that the 

weekly training was not helpful for identifying fraud, and was a burden at 

times because of their adjudication workload.

The Fraud Framework states that it is a leading practice for agencies to 

design and implement specific controls to prevent and detect fraud, which 

include fraud awareness initiatives such as training.101 Increasing 

managers’ and employees’ awareness of potential fraud schemes 

through training and education can serve a preventive purpose by helping 

to create a culture of integrity and fraud deterrence. Providing asylum 

officers with additional training on asylum fraud, including finalizing the 

fraud training module and asylum division supplement for new asylum 

officers, would better position to USCIS to ensure that asylum officers 

have the training and skills needed to detect and address fraud indicators.

USCIS has taken steps to assess training needs among asylum officers; 

however, USCIS has not conducted an agencywide training needs 

assessment for asylum officers since 2010. In 2008, we recommended 

that the Chief of the Asylum Division develop a framework for soliciting 

information in a structured and consistent manner on asylum officers’ and 

supervisors’ respective training needs.102 In response to our 

recommendation, USCIS delivered an online training needs assessment 

to asylum officers and supervisors in July 2010 and committed to creating 

a training agenda by soliciting and evaluating training needs and priorities 

annually thereafter. However, USCIS has not conducted regular training 

needs assessments since 2010. In 2012, as part of an effort to redesign 

its training programs, RAIO hired an independent contractor to identify 

critical skills for RAIO officers, develop strategies to deliver training 

content, and support the development of new officer exams. 103 However, 

the exercise was a one-time effort, not an ongoing mechanism. As of April 

2015, RAIO and Asylum Division officials stated that they collect feedback 

from new asylum officers immediately following each basic training 

course using an online survey collection tool. Asylum officers are 

encouraged to fill out a questionnaire related to the course and the 

 

101GAO-15-593SP. 

102GAO-08-935. 

103RAIO’s three divisions include the Asylum Division, the Refugee Affairs Division, and 

the International Operations Division.

USCIS Does Not Have a 

Mechanism for Regularly 

Assessing Asylum Officer 

Training Needs
Page 58 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

instructor after each basic training module. At the conclusion of distance 

and residential training, RAIO officials compile the feedback and discuss 

ways to improve future sessions. However, both Asylum Division and 

RAIO officials stated that they review survey results as they are collected 

after each session rather than tracking trends across multiple classes of 

participants. Furthermore, asylum officers cannot use this feedback 

mechanism once they return to their asylum offices and begin 

adjudicating cases. According to RAIO officials, in June 2015, RAIO 

began developing a new post-training survey to assess the effectiveness 

of basic training for new officers. As of September 2015, the survey 

instrument is in draft form and undergoing internal review. RAIO officials 

said they plan to survey participants from the calendar year 2015 basic 

training program, and may include participants who attended basic 

training prior to 2015. However, RAIO officials stated that, like the online 

surveys following basic training modules, this survey will be limited to new 

asylum officers. 

Asylum Division officials stated that they collect information on training 

needs through monthly calls with Training Officers in each asylum office, 

as well as a recently implemented Quality Workplace Initiative to allow 

asylum officers to provide feedback within asylum offices on any topic or 

issue. However, the Asylum Division does not request information on 

training needs from the officers themselves on a regular basis and has 

not formally analyzed officer training needs over time. Further, the Asylum 

Division does not specifically solicit feedback on training needs through 

the Quality Workplace Initiative. Asylum Division officials stated that they 

previously collected feedback from new officers several months after they 

returned from basic training, but they discontinued this practice because 

of low response rates and a lack of resources. Asylum Division officials 

stated that it is difficult to devote resources to assessing the training 

needs of existing asylum officers when much of the Asylum Division’s 

training resources are devoted to training newly hired asylum officers. 

GAO’s Guide for Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the 

Federal Government states that evaluating training can aid decision 

makers in managing scarce resources and provide agencies information 

to systematically track the cost and delivery of training and assess the 

benefits of these efforts.104 Further, Standards for Internal Control in the 

 

104GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the 

Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington, D.C.: March 2004).
Page 59 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Federal Government states that effective management of an 

organization’s workforce includes relevant training and that management 

must continually assess and evaluate its internal control activities to 

ensure that the control activities being used are effective and updated 

when necessary.105

During our interviews with asylum officers and RAIO and Asylum Division 

officials, the perspectives regarding the effectiveness of the training 

program varied. Both RAIO and Asylum Division officials said that the 

asylum officer basic training was sufficient and thoroughly prepared 

officers to adjudicate cases; however, officers we spoke with in six of 

eight asylum offices stated that the basic training was insufficient.106

Specifically, asylum officer perspectives on the sufficiency of their training 

on credibility differed from those of RAIO and Asylum Division officials. 

According to Asylum Division officials, training on credibility provides 

information to asylum officers on how, for example, they can ask 

questions during interviews to determine whether an applicant’s claim is 

credible. Suspected contradictions in an applicant’s testimony may 

indicate credibility concerns or fraud. Therefore, officials stated that 

ongoing training related to credibility is crucial for new officers. However, 

asylum officers we spoke with in seven of the eight asylum offices stated 

that USCIS’s credibility training is insufficient for asylum officers.107 Both 

RAIO and Asylum Division basic training includes modules on credibility; 

however, as of June 2015, the Asylum Division’s credibility training 

materials were under revision. Although the draft credibility training 

materials we analyzed discussed legal standards of credibility and case 

law analysis, the lesson plan contained blank sections, and unlike other 

RAIO and Asylum Division training materials, did not include sample 

decisions, or memos asylum officers can use to document such concerns. 

According to our analysis of the weekly training reports, 11 of 408 training 

sessions were reported as being dedicated to credibility determinations.

The Guide for Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal 

Government states that agencies should be able to evaluate training and 

 

105GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

106With regard to USCIS’s basic training, one asylum office did not provide a response, 

and the other asylum office said that basic training w as helpful.

107With regard to USCIS’s credibility training, asylum officers in the other office did not 

provide a response.
Page 60 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

development programs and demonstrate how these efforts help develop 

employees and improve the agencies’ performance.108 Additionally, 

because the evaluation of training and development programs can aid 

decision makers in managing scarce resources, our guide notes the 

importance of agencies’ need for developing evaluation processes that 

systematically track the cost and delivery of training and development 

efforts and assess the benefits of these efforts. USCIS does not have 

mechanisms in place to allow asylum officers to provide feedback about 

training needs after they begin adjudicating cases, making it difficult for 

Asylum Division headquarters officials to regularly obtain perspectives 

from asylum officers and supervisory officers about asylum officer 

training. In addition, asylum officers at one asylum office we spoke with 

said that a training feedback loop would improve training for asylum

officers by allowing them to make suggestions for future training. Asylum 

officers within that office said they have made training requests to 

supervisors in the past, but did not see any follow-up or improvements as 

a result of their suggestions. Developing and implementing a mechanism 

to regularly collect feedback from asylum officers and supervisory asylum 

officers on their training needs would provide USCIS with insights to help 

the agency better evaluate its training program, and enhance the training 

courses based on asylum officer feedback.

According to the Chief of the Asylum Division and other senior division 

officials, it has been difficult for USCIS to retain asylum officers because 

of the challenging nature of the position and the variety of other career 

opportunities available to asylum officers; however, USCIS does not 

systematically collect or analyze attrition data for asylum officers—a key 

component of strategic workforce planning. Asylum Division officials told 

us they use DHS’s staffing database, the Table of Organization Position 

System (TOPS), to track net asylum officer staffing changes for each 

fiscal year.109 However, these officials stated that this database does not 

capture comprehensive asylum officer attrition rates. For example, 

Asylum Division officials stated that TOPS does not track total hiring for 

each position type within the division and does not record departures from 

the asylum officer position when officers transfer within USCIS. Asylum 

 

108GAO-04-546G. 

109According to Asylum Division officials, DHS’s Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer 

maintains TOPS. 

USCIS Does Not Have 

Readily Available Data on 

Asylum Officer Attrition
Page 61 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Division officials also stated that they collect information monthly from 

each asylum office on all personnel changes, including new hires, 

transfers, and departures. However, Asylum Division officials told us that 

they do not collect these data in a systematic manner and rely on asylum 

offices to manually collect and report them to headquarters. In April 2015, 

we requested asylum officer attrition data from the Asylum Division for 

fiscal years 2010 through 2014. At the conclusion of our audit work, in 

September 2015, the Asylum Division provided updated attrition data that 

officials stated were reliable. These data differed significantly from the 

initial data provided in August 2015. Asylum Division officials stated that 

they had compiled these data by manually reviewing all personnel 

changes in the Asylum Division for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, a 

process that was labor-intensive and required several weeks to complete.

Asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers we interviewed stated 

that, from their perspectives, attrition is high among asylum officers and 

this poses several challenges in effectively adjudicating asylum 

applications. For example, they stated that attrition has increased time 

pressures on each officer as asylum officers resign or transfer out of the 

Asylum Division. Officers we interviewed at all eight asylum offices told us 

that they face pressure from time constraints, which affects their ability to 

devote time to detecting fraud in asylum applications. In addition, 

according to senior Asylum Division officials, attrition requires USCIS to 

hire new, inexperienced officers who are not as knowledgeable about 

how to detect asylum fraud as more experienced officers. Supervisory 

asylum officers we spoke with told us that fraud detection is a skill honed 

through experience, and that newer asylum officers hired as a result of 

increased attrition are less skilled at being able to detect fraud in asylum 

applications. Asylum Division officials told us that they have faced 

challenges because of attrition and are working to reduce attrition among 

asylum officers. For example, Asylum Division officials told us that they 

created a new “senior asylum officer” position in 2014 to provide greater 

opportunity for advancement and have worked to support staff through 

training and mentoring programs. However, without reliable attrition data, 

it is difficult for USCIS to assess the effectiveness of these efforts in 

retaining staff.

Key Principles of Effective Strategic Workforce Planning states that 

federal agencies should develop a strategic workforce plan that 

incorporates management, employee, and stakeholder input, and 
Page 62 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

identifies critical skills and competencies needed to achieve 

programmatic goals.110 Further, the strategic workforce plan should 

address gaps in the number of staff, ensure that administrative and 

educational requirements are supporting workforce planning strategies, 

and monitor and evaluate progress toward programmatic goals. Without 

reliable, readily-available attrition data, USCIS does not have the 

information needed to develop an effective workforce planning strategy to 

determine the number of staff needed to address the increase in 

affirmative asylum applications and the applications backlog.

USCIS has implemented some quality assurance procedures for asylum 

decisions that are designed to ensure asylum officers’ decisions are 

legally sufficient. However, USCIS’s random quality assurance reviews of 

asylum cases do not include examination of potential indicators of fraud in 

the case file. USCIS has a three-tiered framework for conducting quality 

reviews of asylum decisions.

• First, the Asylum Division requires a supervisory asylum officer to 

review every case file to assess whether the asylum officer’s decision 

is supported by law and the asylum officer followed proper 

procedures. For fiscal year 2014, USCIS also released new guidelines 

for asylum officer performance evaluation, which specify that 

supervisory asylum officers are to evaluate and provide feedback on 

whether asylum officers appropriately referred fraud indicators to 

FDNS and submitted fraudulent documents to the Forensic 

Laboratory or for overseas verification.

• Second, the Asylum Division’s Quality Assurance Branch requires that 

asylum offices submit certain types of cases to Asylum Division 

headquarters for review. According to Quality Assurance Branch 

officials, these reviews focus on sensitive asylum cases, such as 

cases involving complex issues of law or cases that could result in 

particularly negative outcomes if the applicant is improperly denied 

asylum, such as cases involving a juvenile. For example, as of July 

2015, the Quality Assurance Branch requires asylum offices to submit 

to headquarters all cases for which the principal applicant is under 18 

 

110GAO-04-39. 

USCIS Could Enhance Its 

Quality Assurance 

Processes by Examining 

for Indicators of Fraud
Page 63 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

years of age and the officer had decided not to grant asylum. 111 Our 

review of Quality Assurance Branch data found that, from fiscal years 

2010 through 2014, the Quality Assurance Branch reviewed 5,696 

applications. The most common type of application reviewed (3,213) 

involved juvenile applicants. The next most common reviews were of 

applications granted by an asylum officer for applicants from a country 

contiguous to the United States (Canada or Mexico) that relate to 

“novel” legal issues or criminal activity by the applicant in the United 

States or abroad (829 cases), applications that USCIS determined are 

likely to be publicized (425), and applications involving potential 

national security or terrorism risks (414).

• Third, each asylum office has a Training Officer, who, in addition to 

developing weekly training for asylum officers, also plays a quality 

assurance role. However, the extent of this function varies from office 

to office. Training Officers in six of the eight asylum offices stated that 

they generally review cases that are required to be submitted for 

headquarters review. None of the Training Officers we interviewed 

conducted random reviews of asylum applications and none reviewed 

applications for indicators of fraud, according to our interviews and 

observations.

In 2008, we reported that although the Asylum Division had a quality 

review framework to ensure the quality and consistency of asylum 

decisions, local quality assurance reviews did not always occur. 112 We 

recommended that USCIS develop a plan to more fully implement its 

quality review framework to, among other things, ensure that a sample of 

decisions was reviewed for quality and consistency. DHS concurred with 

the recommendation and, in response, in April 2009, the Asylum Division 

developed a program plan for reviewing a sample of asylum officers’ 

decisions and subsequently piloted the materials it developed for 

implementing the program. Over a 2-year period in 2012 and 2013, the 

RAIO Directorate reviewed a sample of decisions from each of the eight 

offices. Since that time, USCIS has not reviewed further samples of 

asylum decisions because it is still implementing the action items that 

resulted from the previous review and because RAIO plans to study 

 

111In September 2015, Asylum Division officials told us that they are w orking to transition 

to a random review of all cases involving juvenile principal applicants, including cases in 

w hich the officer decided to grant asylum.

112GAO-08-935. 
Page 64 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

credible fear in its next review. RAIO officials told us they tentatively plan 

to conduct another review of a random sample of affirmative asylum 

cases in 2017.

However, USCIS’s random quality assurance reviews of asylum 

applications do not include examination for fraud or fraud indicators. 

RAIO’s 2012-2013 random review of asylum decisions did not include 

fraud because, according to RAIO officials, asylum officers should have 

referred any cases with fraud indicators to FDNS. The Asylum Division’s 

reviews of specific types of asylum applications are not random and do 

not include a review for fraud indicators. Asylum Division officials told us 

that they do not conduct random reviews of all asylum cases because 

they have already implemented 100 percent supervisory review of asylum 

decisions in the field. Furthermore, the Asylum Division’s review does not 

include a review for fraud indicators because, according to Asylum 

Division officials, fraud is not a component of legal sufficiency in asylum 

decisions. The Fraud Framework states that ongoing monitoring and 

periodic evaluation provide assurances to managers that they are 

achieving the objectives of fraud prevention, detection, and response. For 

instance, monitoring and evaluation activities can support managers’ 

decisions about allocating resources and can help managers to 

demonstrate their commitment to effectively managing fraud risks. 

Although supervisory review is an important step in fraud detection and 

quality assurance, it does not position USCIS to ensure quality and 

consistency across supervisors and asylum offices, does not provide 

insight into quality concerns across the Asylum Division, and does not 

allow USCIS to evaluate whether supervisors are reviewing cases for 

fraud appropriately. Given USCIS’s plans to conduct future random 

reviews of asylum applications, including an examination of possible fraud 

indicators in such reviews would help strengthen USCIS’s oversight of 

officers’ adjudication of asylum applications and supervisory asylum 

officers’ reviews of the officers’ adjudications. Random reviews for fraud 

would also help USCIS evaluate how effectively supervisory asylum 

officers are implementing the new fiscal year 2014 performance

evaluation guidelines for addressing fraud.
Page 65 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Law enforcement agencies can pursue criminal charges against 

individuals who commit asylum fraud; however, according to an official 

from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, individual asylees who 

commit asylum fraud may be subject to removal proceedings, but are not 

generally criminally prosecuted. Under the terms of a memorandum of 

agreement between USCIS and ICE, HSI has the right of first refusal to 

investigate all FDNS fraud referrals. However, FDNS immigration officers 

we interviewed in six of eight asylum offices reported that HSI rarely 

accepts asylum fraud referrals from FDNS, or that HSI accepts asylum 

fraud referrals and then does not pursue them or closes them without 

further investigation.113 In four of the eight asylum offices, FDNS 

immigration officers referred 0 or 1 asylum fraud cases to HSI from fiscal 

years 2010 to 2014.114 In one asylum office, FDNS immigration officers 

reported that HSI had not accepted a referral from FDNS in the previous 

2 years, and that the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which is responsible for 

prosecuting asylum fraud cases, does not generally accept asylum fraud 

referrals. The understanding of these FDNS officers was that the U.S. 

 

113In the other tw o asylum offices, FDNS immigration officers stated that they have good 

relationships w ith HSI, but that HSI is constrained because, according to the FDNS 

immigration officers, prosecuting asylum fraud is a low priority for the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office.

114In the other four asylum offices, there w ere 2, 3, 4, and 28 asylum fraud cases referred 

to HSI from fiscal year 2010 to 2014.

DHS and DOJ Have 

Implemented 

Mechanisms to 

Address Identified 

Fraud, but Use of 

These Mechanisms 

Has Been Limited

DHS and DOJ Rarely 

Pursue Criminal Penalties 

or Discipline Attorneys for 

Fraud

Criminal Penalties
Page 66 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Attorney’s Office in that district prefers to have at least 100 asylum 

applicants connected to an asylum fraud case before the office will 

consider prosecution. According to FDNS officials, fraud cases 

associated with 100 or more asylum applicants provide for sentencing 

enhancements, which is one of the factors that influence the willingness 

of HSI and U.S. Attorney’s Offices to accept a case. In another asylum 

office, FDNS immigration officers reported that HSI had not accepted an 

asylum fraud case for investigation since 2010. From fiscal years 2010 to 

2014, FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices referred 40 

cases to HSI; however, as discussed above, FDNS cannot determine 

how many of these cases involved asylum fraud. In fiscal year 2014, HSI 

initiated 37 asylum fraud investigations, which resulted in 7 criminal 

arrests, 6 indictments, and 4 convictions.

ICE headquarters officials stated that criminal investigations for asylum 

fraud are more likely to be brought against attorneys, preparers, and 

interpreters who perpetrate large-scale asylum fraud than against 

individuals. For example, in April 2014, an immigration consultant who 

was linked by HSI to more than 800 asylum applications filed since 2000 

in the Los Angeles Asylum Office was sentenced to 4.5 years in federal 

prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy, immigration document fraud, 

and aggravated identity theft. HSI began investigating this individual’s 

business in 2009. HSI agents in all four of the locations we visited stated 

that they face challenges in investigating asylum fraud cases, such as 

competing priorities, confidentiality restrictions, and low interest from the 

U.S. Attorney’s Offices that prosecute these immigration-related criminal 

cases. The FBI has also pursued asylum fraud investigations such as 

Operation Fiction Writer; according to FDNS officials, the asylum office 

sent repeated referrals to HSI about the asylum fraud ring associated with 

Operation Fiction Writer from 2005 to 2009. In 2009, HSI requested that 

the asylum office stop sending it information about Operation Fiction 

Writer, at which time the asylum office began working with the FBI to 

pursue the case. As of March 2014, 30 individuals had been charged in 

connection with Operation Fiction Writer. According to HSI field office 

officials, asylum fraud prosecutions are time and labor-intensive and 

typically do not result in lengthy prison sentences; as a result, both HSI 

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office tend to focus on large-scale asylum fraud 

rings, such as those involving attorneys, preparers, and interpreters, 

rather than individual applicants. Because HSI does not prioritize 

investigations of single instances of asylum fraud, FDNS immigration 
Page 67 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

officers we interviewed in seven of the eight asylum offices stated that 

they generally do not submit single-scope cases, in which only one 

individual is implicated in the fraudulent activity, to HSI. 115

EOIR’s Disciplinary Counsel can pursue a variety of penalties against 

attorneys who perpetrate asylum fraud in immigration courts. 116 However, 

as of June 2015, the EOIR Disciplinary Counsel has not taken action to 

publicly discipline any attorney for having committed immigration fraud 

who had not already been disbarred by his or her state bar authority. 

EOIR’s Disciplinary Counsel has jurisdiction over the regulation of 

practitioners, who are private immigration attorneys, and other accredited 

representatives authorized to practice before the BIA and the immigration 

courts.117 The Disciplinary Counsel investigates complaints about 

practitioners who may be engaging in criminal, unethical, or 

unprofessional conduct or in frivolous behavior before EOIR and takes 

disciplinary action, as appropriate. The Disciplinary Counsel works closely 

with EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program, although the 

Disciplinary Counsel seeks to impose disciplinary sanctions against 

 

115FDNS immigration officers in the other asylum office did not comment about w hether or 

not HSI accepts single-scope cases from the office. They stated that HSI typically accepts 

cases from their office, begins w ork on the cases, and then closes them w ithout 

resolution.

116See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.101, 1003.104(c). Attorneys and representatives practicing 

before the BIA, the immigration courts, or DHS may be subject to the imposition of 

disciplinary sanctions in the public interest. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.3 (DHS disciplinary 

procedures), 1003.101 to 1003.109 (EOIR disciplinary procedures), 1292.3. While DHS 

and EOIR receive and investigate complaints of misconduct separately under their 

respective rules of professional conduct, Disciplinary Counsel for DHS or EOIR may 

initiate formal disciplinary proceedings before the BIA. Disciplinary Counsel for DHS or 

EOIR may, upon receipt of a disciplinary complaint or on their ow n initiative, perform 

preliminary inquiries, and w here sufficient evidence of professional misconduct exists, w ill 

issue a Notice of Intent to Discipline and file such a notice w ith the BIA, charging a 

practitioner w ith professional misconduct as set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102, and seeking 

to impose disciplinary sanctions such as immediate suspension from practice (8 C.F.R. §§ 

292.3(c), 1003.103). Where EOIR initiates disciplinary proceedings against a practitioner 

seeking to impose disciplinary sanctions such as immediate suspension from practice 

before EOIR, DHS may ask that such practitioner be similarly suspended from practice 

before DHS, and vice versa.

117In October 2015, EOIR issued a proposed rule w hich w ould, among other things, 

update the disciplinary process to make recognized organizations, in addition to 

accredited representatives, attorneys, and other practitioners, subject to sanctions for 

conduct that contravenes the public interest. See Recognition of Organizations and 

Accreditation of Non-Attorney Representatives, 80 Fed. Reg. 59,514, 59,515 (proposed 

Oct. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1001, 1003, 1103, 1212, and 1292).

Attorney Discipline and 

Disbarment
Page 68 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

practitioners, while the Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program can refer 

cases to ICE HSI or other law enforcement agencies for criminal 

investigation. The Disciplinary Counsel may choose to resolve potential 

disciplinary issues prior to issuance of a Notice of Intent to Discipline by 

taking certain confidential actions against a practitioner. Such confidential 

discipline includes warning letters or informal admonitions for low-level 

misconduct or for first-time offenders. According to EOIR’s Disciplinary 

Counsel, confidential discipline is intended to educate the lawyer about 

what he or she did wrong and how to improve conduct in the future. 

Public discipline imposed by the BIA includes a range of disciplinary 

actions, such as public censure, suspension, or disbarment. Disbarment, 

in which an attorney is prohibited from practicing law before EOIR’s 

immigration courts and the BIA, is the most severe disciplinary sanction 

that the BIA can impose. According to the Disciplinary Counsel, to date, 

the Disciplinary Counsel has not prosecuted any original jurisdiction 

cases to the point of disbarment, which means that the Disciplinary 

Counsel has not requested disbarment for any attorneys who engaged in 

asylum fraud and who were not already disbarred by their state bar or a 

federal court. Disciplinary Counsel officials stated that they have not 

initiated any original jurisdiction disbarments against attorneys in part 

because of a lack of administrative resources to pursue such cases. The 

Disciplinary Counsel has completed reciprocal disciplinary cases, in 

which attorneys who may have engaged in fraud and have already been 

suspended or disbarred by their state bar or by a federal court, or who 

have been convicted of a crime, are also disbarred by EOIR. An attorney 

who has been disbarred by a state bar or a federal court is permitted to 

practice before the immigration courts until EOIR takes the proper 

reciprocal action.

Asylum terminations due to fraud are not common and have decreased in 

recent years. USCIS data indicate that USCIS terminated the asylum 

status of 374 individuals for fraud from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. In 

the same time period, USCIS granted asylum to 76,122 individuals. The 

number of USCIS asylum terminations for fraud has decreased in recent 

years, from 103 in fiscal year 2010 to 34 in fiscal year 2014. If a final 

order by an immigration judge or the BIA specifically finds that the 

individual knowingly filed a “frivolous” asylum application and the 

individual initially received a warning regarding the consequences of filing 

Circuit Court Rulings and 

Agency Priorities Play a 

Role in Recent Decreases 

in Asylum Terminations 

due to Fraud
Page 69 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

a frivolous application, then he or she will be barred from receiving future 

immigration benefits.118

Asylum Division officials attributed the decrease in asylum terminations 

due to fraud from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014 to several factors.119

First, according to Asylum Division officials, USCIS made several policy 

changes in order to comply with two decisions of the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, the court 

noted the BIA’s conclusion that asylees who adjust to LPR status no 

longer qualify as asylees and held, among other things, that an alien who 

has previously adjusted to LPR status retains that status unless he or she 

receives a final order of removal.120 Accordingly, a former asylee who had 

already adjusted to LPR would no longer have asylum status to 

terminate.121 According to Asylum Division officials, USCIS changed its 

policy nationwide in June 2012 and no longer pursues termination of 

asylum status for fraud after someone has adjusted to LPR.

In June 2012, USCIS developed a process, called Post Adjustment 

Eligibility Review, for addressing suspected fraud with respect to former 

asylees who have already adjusted to LPR. Under the Post Adjustment 

Eligibility Review process, an FDNS immigration officer reviews adverse 

information about the individual, documents a summary of findings, and 

 

118See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(4), (6). An asylum application is frivolous if any of its material 

elements is deliberately fabricated. Such finding shall be made only if the judge or BIA is 

satisfied that the applicant, during the course of the proceedings, has had sufficient 

opportunity to account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of the claim. A finding 

that an alien filed a frivolous asylum application does not preclude him or her from seeking 

w ithholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.20, 1208.20.

119According to the Program Manager for asylum terminations, the overall number of 

terminations has decreased from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014. How ever, the 

Program Manager also noted that termination for fraud has alw ays been the most 

prevalent ground for w hich USCIS has terminated asylum status. 

120Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1051, 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009, amend. Jan. 11, 

2010). Subsequently, in Matter of C-J-H-, the BIA concluded that, like refugees, aliens 

w hose status w as adjusted from asylee to LPR no longer qualify as asylees. 26 I. & N. 

Dec. 284, 285 (BIA 2014).

121Under INA § 246(a), rescission of adjustment of status may occur if, at any time w ithin 

5 years after adjustment, it appears that the person w as not in fact eligible for such 

adjustment; how ever, nothing in INA § 246(a) requires that the alien’s status be rescinded 

prior to commencement of removal proceedings under INA § 240, and an order of removal 

issued by an immigration judge is sufficient to rescind the alien’s status. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1256(a), 1229a.
Page 70 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

forwards the file to an asylum officer. An asylum officer then reviews the 

evidence to determine whether sufficient evidence of fraud exists, and, if 

a preponderance of the evidence supports the finding of fraud, forwards 

the case to ICE OPLA, which reviews the case and determines whether 

the individual should be placed in removal proceedings.

Additionally, in Nijjar v. Holder (August 2012), the Ninth Circuit held that 

only the Attorney General has the authority to terminate asylum status 

because Congress did not confer authority to terminate asylum on 

DHS.122 On the basis of this ruling, USCIS does not have the authority to 

terminate an individual’s asylum status in the Ninth Circuit, which includes 

the Los Angeles and San Francisco asylum offices. Subsequently, in 

August 2012, the BIA noted that no other circuits currently share the Ninth 

Circuit’s position that DHS lacks authority to terminate asylum, and the 

case before it arose within the Second Circuit; as a result, it would “only 

apply Nijjar within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.” 123 Therefore, 

Asylum Division officials stated that USCIS applied the Nijjar ruling only in 

the asylum offices located within the Ninth Circuit—San Francisco and 

Los Angeles. Asylum Division officials stated that these two decisions in 

the Ninth Circuit resulted in a decrease in the number of terminations 

conducted by USCIS because, prior to these decisions, USCIS would 

pursue termination of the asylum status of individuals who had adjusted 

to LPR nationwide and was able to terminate asylum status in the Ninth 

Circuit.

Second, Asylum Division officials stated that increases in the number of 

affirmative asylum, credible fear, and reasonable fear applications in 

recent years have strained resources in the Asylum Division, the 

immigration courts, and ICE OPLA. Terminations are time and laborintensive, according to Asylum Division officials, and there are fewer 

resources available to pursue them than in the past because of the 

 

122689 F.3d at 1082, 1085-86. Therefore, “[t]he regulations pursuant to w hich the 

Department of Homeland Security terminates asylum status, 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a) and 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.24(a), are ultra vires because the governing statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2), 

confers that authority exclusively on the Attorney General.” Id. at 1085-86.

123Matter of A-S-J-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 894 n.2. In this decision, the BIA determined that 

“[a]n Immigration Judge lacks jurisdiction to review the termination of an alien’s asylum 

status by the Department of Homeland Security pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a).” Id. at 

893.
Page 71 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

increased asylum caseload. In seven of the eight asylum offices, asylum 

officers we spoke with stated that terminations are not a priority. 124

Third, Asylum Division officials stated that individuals who lose their 

asylum status because of fraud generally would not fit within the 

Secretary of Homeland Security’s enforcement priorities, making the 

likelihood very low that they would be removed from the United States 

after their asylum status has been terminated. DHS’s enforcement and 

removal priorities focus on the removal of aliens who pose a threat to 

national security, border security, and public safety.125

On the basis of our analysis of USCIS, EOIR, and ICE Enforcement and 

Removal Operations data, we found that 14 of the 374 people who had 

their asylum status terminated for fraud from fiscal years 2010 through 

2014 were indicated as having been removed from the country by ICE 

Enforcement and Removal Operations as of March 2015; 4 were granted 

voluntary departure; and 20 had been ordered removed by an 

immigration judge, but ICE had not yet removed them.

USCIS has taken some steps to address asylum cases pending 

termination due to fraud but has not tracked these cases or established 

goals for completing termination cases. The Asylum Division receives 

information about potential asylum fraud from a variety of sources, 

including USCIS offices that adjudicate asylees’ applications for other 

immigration benefits such as adjustment to LPR and naturalization, and 

information arising from criminal investigations into attorneys, preparers, 

and interpreters suspected of engaging in asylum fraud. After receiving 

such information, the asylum office with jurisdiction over the asylee’s 

place of residence reviews the case to assess whether to pursue 

potentially terminating the individual’s asylum status, and, if a 

preponderance of the evidence supports a finding of fraud, sends the 

asylee a Notice of Intent to Terminate and schedules a termination 

interview. However, the Asylum Division does not begin to track cases 

pending potential termination until the asylum office issues a Notice of 

 

124Asylum officers in the other asylum office estimated that, on average, the office 

completes tw o terminations per month. 

125Jeh Johnson, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented 

Immigrants, Washington, D.C. November 20, 2014.

USCIS Has Not Tracked 

Asylum Cases Pending 

Termination Due to Fraud 

and Has Limited Goals for 

Terminations
Page 72 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Intent to Terminate. The implementation of asylum office procedures for 

addressing terminations across asylum offices varies. For example, in 

one office, asylum officers maintain hard copies of the files pending 

termination in a particular area of the office’s file room. In another office, 

asylum officers maintained a spreadsheet of pending termination cases. 

In other offices, there is an asylum officer responsible for handling 

terminations, typically on a part-time basis. However, the Asylum Division 

does not track the number of cases that are pending review for potential 

termination across asylum offices, making it difficult for USCIS to know 

how many of such cases exist and are pending review. The Fraud 

Framework states that it is important for agencies to ensure that the 

response to fraud is prompt and consistently applied.126 Moreover, the 

Fraud Framework states that monitoring response activities helps ensure 

that the response to identified fraud is prompt and consistently applied. 

Monitoring fraud response activities, such as tracking asylum cases 

pending termination due to fraud, could help the Asylum Division ensure 

that cases pending termination due to fraud are managed promptly and 

consistently. Asylum Division officials told us that they have identified a 

need for greater tracking of cases pending termination review to better 

address requests for the asylees’ files from other USCIS offices. In May 

2015, Asylum Division officials requested a modification to RAPS that 

would give asylum officers the capability to record that a case is pending 

review for termination. As of September 2015, Asylum Division officials 

stated that this modification would be released in November 2015.

In addition, the Asylum Division has limited goals or metrics for reviewing 

termination cases, such as goals or metrics for the completion of 

terminations. According to USCIS officials, USCIS faces progressively 

higher burdens of proof to address potential asylum fraud as the asylee 

receives additional immigration benefits, which requires more time and 

resources. In August 2015, the Asylum Division adopted a new target of 

180 days for conducting initial termination reviews that applies solely for 

cases with pending applications for adjustment to LPR. 127 This goal is a 

positive step, but it addresses the subset of pending terminations for 

individuals with pending applications for adjustment to LPR and it applies 

only to initial termination reviews rather than termination completions. 

 

126GAO-15-539SP. 

127This target does not apply to Post Adjustment Eligibility Review cases, or to termination 

cases that are not pending adjustment to LPR.
Page 73 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Furthermore, asylees who have not applied for adjustment to LPR may be 

eligible to receive certain federal benefits, such as Supplemental Security 

Income, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Temporary 

Assistance for Needy Families, and Medicaid; the new 180-day target will 

not apply to these individuals unless and until they apply to adjust to LPR. 

Asylum Division officials stated that they periodically review the number of 

terminations pending review in each asylum office to assess staffing 

needs, and asylum offices may also choose to prioritize certain 

termination reviews, as needed. However, Asylum Division officials stated 

that the division has not adopted goals or metrics for the completion of 

terminations because termination proceedings are extremely laborintensive and asylum offices have limited resources to allocate to 

terminations. Asylum Division officials also stated that terminations are 

not a priority for their officers given increases in their adjudicative case 

load of affirmative asylum, credible fear, and reasonable fear cases as 

well as the prioritization of certain time sensitive cases, such as those 

involving unaccompanied minors.

According to the Fraud Framework, the likelihood that individuals who 

engage in fraud will be identified and punished serves to deter others 

from engaging in fraudulent behavior. Timely reviews of potential asylum 

terminations can also help the Asylum Division use its resources more 

effectively because, according to Asylum Division and FDNS officials, 

USCIS faces progressively higher burdens to address potential asylum 

fraud as the asylee receives additional immigration benefits. USCIS’s new 

180-day target for conducting initial termination review for cases with 

pending applications to adjust to LPR is a positive step; however, 

developing and implementing timeliness goals for all pending termination 

reviews of asylees granted affirmative asylum would help USCIS to better 

identify the staffing resources needed to address the terminations 

workload and better utilize existing resources to address potential fraud 

before asylees adjust to LPR or receive other immigration or federal 

benefits.

The U.S. asylum process is designed to protect those who legitimately 

fled persecution, affording them the opportunity to prove their eligibility 

and credibility. Adjudicating asylum cases is a challenging undertaking 

because asylum officers do not always have the means to determine 

which claims are authentic and which are fraudulent. With potentially 

serious consequences for asylum applicants if they are incorrectly denied 

asylum balanced against the importance of maintaining the integrity of the 

Conclusions
Page 74 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

asylum system, asylum officers and immigration judges must make the 

best decisions they can within the constraints they face.

Both DHS and DOJ have established dedicated antifraud entities—an 

important leading practice for managing fraud risks—but these agencies 

have limited capability to detect and prevent asylum fraud and both 

agencies’ efforts to date have focused on case-by-case fraud detection 

rather than more strategic, risk-based approaches. DHS and DOJ could 

be better positioned to assess and address fraud risks across their 

asylum processes. Specifically, regularly assessing fraud risks across 

asylum claims would help provide DHS and DOJ with reasonable 

assurance that their fraud prevention controls are effective and 

appropriately targeted to their fraud risks. Further, developing and 

implementing a mechanism to collect more complete and reliable data on 

FDNS’s fraud detection activities, including the number of referrals that 

asylum officers submit to FDNS and the number of FDNS investigations 

that result in a finding of asylum fraud, would help USCIS officials 

determine how often FDNS officers have identified and pursued fraud 

indicators. In addition, identifying and implementing tools for identifying 

fraud patterns in asylum applications, such as automated analytic 

software and prescreening, would better position FDNS immigration 

officers to identify cases associated with particular asylum fraud rings and 

aid in the investigation and prosecution of the attorneys, preparers, and 

interpreters who perpetrate asylum fraud. Moreover, developing asylumspecific guidance on the fraud detection roles and responsibilities of 

FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices would help those 

officers better use the tools that are available to them. By providing 

additional fraud training for asylum officers and regularly assessing 

asylum officer training needs, USCIS could better ensure that asylum 

officers have the training and skills needed to detect and address fraud 

indicators in the asylum applications they adjudicate. Additionally, 

including an examination of possible fraud indicators in future USCIS 

random reviews of asylum decisions would help strengthen USCIS’s 

oversight of officers’ adjudication of asylum applications and supervisory 

asylum officers’ reviews of the those adjudications. Last, developing and 

implementing timeliness goals for all pending termination reviews of 

asylees granted affirmative asylum would help USCIS better utilize 

existing resources by addressing potential fraud before asylees adjust to 

LPR or receive other immigration or federal benefits.
Page 75 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

To provide reasonable assurance that EOIR’s fraud prevention controls 

are adequate, we recommend that the Attorney General direct EOIR to 

conduct regular fraud risk assessments across asylum claims in the 

immigration courts.

To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS’s fraud prevention 

controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that 

asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to 

detect and prevent fraud, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security direct USCIS to take the following ten actions: 

• conduct regular fraud risk assessments across the affirmative asylum 

application process;

• develop and implement a mechanism to collect reliable data, such as

the number of referrals to FDNS from asylum officers, about FDNS’s

efforts to combat asylum fraud;

• identify and implement tools that asylum officers and FDNS

immigration officers can use to detect potential fraud patterns across

affirmative asylum applications;

• require FDNS immigration officers to prescreen all asylum 

applications for indicators of fraud to the extent that it is cost-effective

and feasible;

• develop asylum-specific guidance on the fraud detection roles and

responsibilities of FDNS immigration officers working in asylum 

offices;

• develop and deliver additional training for asylum officers on asylum 

fraud;

• develop and implement a mechanism to regularly collect and

incorporate feedback on training needs from asylum officers and 

supervisory asylum officers;

• develop and implement a method to collect reliable data on asylum 

officer attrition;

• include a review of potential fraud indicators in future random quality

assurance reviews of asylum applications; and

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 76 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

• develop and implement timeliness goals for all pending termination 

reviews of affirmative asylum cases.

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and DHS for their review and 

comment. DOJ did not provide official written comments to include in this 

report. However, in an e-mail received on November 12, 2015, a DOJ 

audit liaison official told us that DOJ concurred with our recommendation 

that the Executive Office for Immigration Review conduct regular fraud 

risk assessments across asylum claims in the immigration courts. DHS 

provided formal, written comments, which are summarized below and 

reproduced in full in appendix III. DOJ and DHS provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

DHS concurred with our ten recommendations and described actions 

under way or planned to address them. With regard to our first 

recommendation that USCIS conduct regular fraud risk assessments, 

DHS indicated that the Asylum Division and RAIO FDNS plan to develop 

an assessment tool and implementation plan for completing regular fraud 

risk assessments of the affirmative asylum process, with the first 

assessment to be completed no later than the end of fiscal year 2017. 

With regard to our second recommendation that USCIS develop and 

implement a mechanism to collect reliable data on FDNS’s efforts to 

combat fraud, DHS noted that FDNS plans to update user guidance and 

training materials and conduct training to clarify FDNS-DS data entry 

rules for asylum fraud referrals, leads, and cases and plans to complete 

these efforts by the end of fiscal year 2016. 

With regard to our third and fourth recommendations that USCIS identify 

and implement tools to detect fraud patterns across applications and 

require FDNS immigration officers to pre-screen all asylum applications 

for indicators of fraud, DHS noted that USCIS recently approved a fiscal 

year 2016 budget request for such tools and stated that the Asylum 

Division and FDNS are coordinating with the Office of Information 

Technology to develop requirements and identify tools for acquisition. As 

part of this acquisition process, the Asylum Division and RAIO FDNS are 

also discussing the acquisition of software that would aid FDNS 

immigration officers in prescreening all asylum cases. DHS also stated 

that the Chiefs of the Asylum Division plan to issue a joint memorandum 

and companion guidance for asylum offices that will establish the

framework for a national prescreening program. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 77 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Regarding our fifth recommendation that USCIS develop asylum-specific 

guidance on roles and responsibilities for FDNS immigration officers 

working in asylum offices, DHS stated that USCIS plans to issue a 

memorandum to clarify its guidance on the fraud-related roles and 

responsibilities of FDNS officers working in asylum offices by the end of 

fiscal year 2016. 

Regarding our sixth recommendation that DHS develop and deliver 

additional fraud training for asylum officers, DHS stated that the Asylum 

Division is in the process of finalizing an updated lesson plan about fraud 

in asylum claims to be ready for asylum officer training by the end of 

March 2016. DHS also stated that it would provide this training to its

asylum officers by the end of fiscal year 2016. In commenting on our draft 

report, DHS also stated that the draft did not reflect all of the fraud 

training currently provided to new asylum officers. In response to this 

comment, we clarified our discussion of USCIS’s existing fraud training 

for new officers. Specifically, we added additional details about the fraudrelated training sessions USCIS delivers as part of RAIO and Asylum 

Division basic trainings. 

Regarding our seventh recommendation that USCIS develop and 

implement a mechanism to regularly collect and incorporate feedback on 

training needs from asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers, DHS 

stated that USCIS is in the process of preparing a division survey to be 

delivered to officers and supervisors to gather feedback on training needs 

in fiscal year 2016, and stated that officers and supervisors will be 

surveyed on training no less than once every 2 years. 

With regard to our eighth recommendation that DHS develop and 

implement a mechanism to collect reliable data on asylum officer attrition, 

DHS stated that, beginning in September 2015, the Asylum Division has 

expanded the scope and frequency of its tracking of asylum officer 

attrition data. DHS stated that, moving forward, the Asylum Division plans 

to update its data on asylum officer transfers, promotions, moves to other 

USCIS offices, moves to outside employment, and departures from the 

labor force on a biweekly basis and confirm the accuracy of those data 

through regular validation. Based on this information, DHS requested that 

we consider this recommendation closed. While these are positive steps 

toward addressing our recommendation, USCIS needs to demonstrate 

that it has implemented its plans to update and validate its asylum officer 

attrition data to fully address the intent of our recommendation. 
Page 78 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Regarding our ninth recommendation that USCIS review for potential 

fraud indicators in future random quality assurance reviews of asylum 

applications, DHS stated that, in October 2015, the Asylum Division 

added a fraud-specific question to the Asylum Division quality assurance 

review checklist. DHS stated that this change will ensure asylum cases 

selected for Asylum Division quality assurance will be reviewed for fraud 

indicators to determine whether those indicators were properly identified, 

analyzed, and processed. Based on this information, DHS asked us to 

consider this recommendation closed. While DHS has taken positive 

initial steps toward addressing this recommendation, to fully address the 

intent of our recommendation, DHS needs to demonstrate the extent to 

which this change allows them to review for fraud indicators in a random 

sample of all asylum cases, rather than in only the specific categories of 

cases that the Asylum Division headquarters currently reviews. As we 

note in our report, the Asylum Division does not currently conduct random 

reviews of all asylum cases. 

Regarding our tenth recommendation that DHS develop and implement 

timeliness goals for pending termination reviews, DHS stated that the 

Asylum Division plans to revise its case management system, RAPS, to 

improve tracking of termination processing. The Asylum Division then 

plans to analyze the resulting data to develop timeliness goals for 

termination cases by the end of fiscal year 2016 and plans to implement 

those goals during fiscal year 2017. These and other actions that DHS 

indicated are planned or under way should help address the intent of our 

recommendations if implemented effectively. DHS also noted that judicial 

constraints imposed by Nijjar v. Holder (9th Cir. 2012) have foreclosed 

DHS’s ability to terminate asylum status for fraud in the Ninth Circuit, and 

stated that a legislative change would be necessary to restore USCIS’s 

authority to terminate asylum status in the first instance.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Attorney General of the United States, appropriate 

congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the 

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 79 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Should you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV. 

Rebecca Gambler

Director

Homeland Security and Justice
Page 80 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

List of Requesters

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Barbara Mikulski

Ranking Member

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Harold Rogers

Chairman

The Honorable Nita Lowey

Ranking Member

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte

Chairman

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

The Honorable Trey Gowdy

Chairman

Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

The Honorable Lamar Smith

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectiv es, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 81 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Our objectives were to (1) describe what Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) data indicate about 

trends in the characteristics of asylum claims, (2) evaluate the extent to 

which DHS and DOJ have designed mechanisms to prevent and detect 

fraud in the asylum system, and (3) evaluate the extent to which DHS and 

DOJ have designed and implemented processes to address any fraud 

that has been identified in the asylum system.

To describe trends in the characteristics of asylum claims, we analyzed 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Refugee, Asylum, 

and Parole System (RAPS) data on asylum applications, adjudications, 

and grants by asylum offices nationwide for fiscal years 2010 through 

2014.1 In addition, we analyzed record-level data from RAPS for asylum 

applications adjudicated from fiscal years 2010 through fiscal year 2014. 

To assess the reliability of the RAPS data, we reviewed USCIS 

documents about the design of the RAPS system, completed data entry 

and duplicate record checks, and discussed the reliability of the data with 

USCIS officials. We also analyzed two reports issued by the Executive 

Office for Immigration Review’s (EOIR) Office of Planning, Analysis, and 

Statistics from fiscal year 2010 through 2014—Asylum Statistics and 

Statistics Yearbook. These reports contain data about the characteristics 

of asylum applications adjudicated through the immigration courts in the 

period of our analysis. To assess the reliability of the data in EOIR’s 

reports, we reviewed EOIR documentation about the management of 

EOIR cases and appeals and spoke with officials about how EOIR 

collects and monitors data. The EOIR Office of Planning, Analysis, and 

Statistics changed the methodology it used to compile EOIR statistics in 

the reports issued in fiscal year 2013, and data from previous fiscal years 

are not comparable with those reported in fiscal year 2013 and 2014 

reports. As a result, we relied on the fiscal years 2013 and 2014 reports 

for our analyses. We determined that the USCIS and EOIR data about 

the characteristics of asylum claims were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report.

To evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed 

mechanisms to prevent and detect fraud in the asylum system, we 

identified the antifraud entities responsible for detecting and preventing 

 

1We selected fiscal years 2010 to 2014 as our period of analysis as this w as the most 

recent 5-year period for w hich data w ere available. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectiv es, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 82 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

asylum fraud within USCIS and EOIR and reviewed their asylum fraud 

data, policies and practices. We analyzed data from the Fraud Detection 

and National Security Directorate’s (FDNS) case management system, 

FDNS Data System (FDNS-DS), about the number of benefit fraud cases 

associated with asylum applications that were opened from fiscal years 

2010 to 2014 and the number of those cases in which FDNS found fraud. 

To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed policies about how 

data are entered into FDNS-DS, such as the Fraud Detection Standard 

Operating Procedures and the FDNS Basic Training presentation that 

FDNS uses to introduce FDNS-DS to staff. We interviewed FDNS 

immigration officers and headquarters officials about their use of FDNSDS and observed FDNS immigration officers using FDNS-DS. We 

discuss our findings about the reliability of the FDNS-DS data in this 

report. We also analyzed the extent to which the data captured in RAPS 

can be used to identify and detect asylum fraud. We compared FDNS 

immigration officers’ reported use of the FDNS-DS system and FDNS-DS 

data capabilities with procedures in the Fraud Detection Standard 

Operating Procedures and standards in Standards for Internal Control in 

the Federal Government.

2

To assess USCIS policies and procedures to prevent and detect fraud in 

the USCIS affirmative asylum process, we reviewed USCIS Asylum 

Division policy documents such as the Affirmative Asylum Procedures 

Manual, FDNS policy documents such as the Fraud Detection Standard 

Operating Procedures and FDNS Field Priorities FY15, and guidance 

such as the 2015 memorandum of agreement between FDNS and the 

Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate (RAIO) 

regarding the governance structure for FDNS. We reviewed Asylum 

Division workforce planning efforts to address asylum fraud and 

interviewed Asylum Division officials about attrition among asylum 

officers. We reviewed the Asylum Division Staffing Allocation Models, 

which officials stated were used to support Asylum Division workforce 

planning efforts, for fiscal years 2012 through 2014, the most recent years 

available, as well as the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year 2015. We 

also reviewed staffing levels for Asylum Offices, including asylum officer 

staffing and FDNS immigration officer staffing, from fiscal year 2010 to 

2014 and compared actual staffing levels with estimates in the Staffing 

 

2GAO, Internal Control, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
Appendix I: Objectiv es, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 83 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Allocation Models. We reviewed asylum officer attrition data, which 

USCIS compiled manually at our request. We compared Asylum Division 

workforce planning efforts with principles in GAO’s Key Principles for 

Effective Strategic Workforce Planning to assess how USCIS workforce 

planning efforts align with the key principles.3 We also reviewed USCIS 

quality assurance policy documents such as the Quality Sampling 

Reference Guide and the Quality Handbook and spoke with Asylum 

Division and RAIO officials about the extent to which these reference 

materials are used in asylum quality assurance. We reviewed documents 

associated with the random quality assurance reviews that RAIO 

conducted in each asylum office in 2012 and 2013, including the 

checklists used to evaluate asylum adjudications and the quality 

assurance results. We evaluated the extent to which these quality 

assurance reviews included reviews for fraud. We reviewed performance 

evaluation documents for asylum office staff, including asylum officers 

and supervisory officers, and examined the extent to which fraud 

detection efforts are reflected in staff performance evaluations, including 

the extent to which supervisory asylum officers evaluate the fraud 

detection efforts of asylum officers. We spoke with Asylum Division 

headquarters officials about ongoing Asylum Division headquarters 

quality assurance reviews of certain asylum adjudications. We reviewed 

past USCIS efforts to examine fraud in the USCIS asylum system and 

spoke with officials in the USCIS Office of Policy and Strategy about past 

efforts and plans for future efforts to examine asylum fraud. We compared 

these policy documents and their role in preventing and detecting asylum 

fraud with standards in GAO’s A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in 

Federal Programs (Fraud Framework) andStandards for Internal Control 

 

3GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning,

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003). We developed these principles through 

our prior w ork on strategic human capital management, review of studies by leading 

w orkforce planning organizations, and interview s w ith federal agencies. We applied these 

principles to the USCIS Asylum Division, as these principles are design to apply to any 

agency’s human capital management and strategic w orkforce planning efforts.
Appendix I: Objectiv es, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 84 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

in the Federal Government.4 To learn about FDNS policies and 

procedures to detect and prevent asylum fraud, we reviewed FDNS 

guidance such as the Fraud Detection Standard Operating Procedures 

and training materials for FDNS immigration officers about asylum fraud 

as well as training materials for asylum officers about how to refer 

potential fraud to FDNS. We reviewed the extent to which asylum officers 

and FDNS immigration officers used other fraud detection tools such as 

overseas verifications and HSI’s Forensic Laboratory. We compared 

USCIS efforts to prevent and detect fraud with leading practices in GAO’s 

Framework for Effective Fraud Risk Management. We reviewed USCIS 

asylum officer basic training materials from RAIO and the Asylum 

Division, as well as training materials for FDNS immigration officers. We 

reviewed USCIS Asylum Division quarterly training reports for fiscal year 

2014 and used them to analyze the weekly training activities in each 

asylum office for each week of the reporting quarter. We compared RAIO 

and Asylum Division training materials with material in GAO’s Guide for 

Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government. 5

We visited five of the eight asylum offices — Newark, New Jersey; New 

York, New York; Los Angeles, California; Houston, Texas; and Arlington, 

Virginia. We selected these offices for site visits based on a variety of 

factors, including their number of asylum officers, the number of asylum 

applications they receive, and geographic proximity to EOIR immigration 

courts. During our site visits, we visited immigration courts and observed 

 

4GAO, A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs, GAO-15-593SP 

(Washington D.C.: July 28, 2015). This framew ork is a comprehensive set of leading 

practices that serve as a guide for program managers to use w hen developing efforts to 

combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based manner. GAO identified these leading practices 

through focus groups w ith antifraud professionals; interview s w ith government, private 

sector, and nonprofit antifraud experts; and a review of literature. We used the leading 

practices in this framew ork to assess USCIS and EOIR efforts because, as the framew ork 

states, it encompasses control activities to prevent, detect, and respond to fraud, as w ell 

as structures and environmental factors that influence or help managers achieve their 

objective to mitigate fraud risks; thus this framew ork is applicable to USCIS and EOIR 

efforts to address fraud in the asylum system. GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

5GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the 

Federal Government, GAO-04-546G. (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). The guide 

summarizes elements of effective training programs and presents related questions on the 

components of the training and development process in four broad, interrelated 

components: (1) planning and front-end analysis, (2) design and development, (3) 

implementation, and (4) evaluation. These criteria remain useful today because they are 

the most recent relevant guidance available to assess how agencies plan, design, 

implement, and evaluate effective federal training and development programs.
Appendix I: Objectiv es, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 85 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

asylum hearings in New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and Arlington. In 

addition, we interviewed approximately 11 ICE OPLA attorneys and 10 

ICE HSI investigators in the New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and 

Arlington offices. In each asylum office, we observed asylum interviews 

and spoke with supervisory asylum officers, asylum officers, training 

officers, and FDNS immigration officers to obtain their perspectives on 

asylum fraud and the risk of asylum fraud. Although the results of our 

visits cannot be generalized to officers in all asylum offices or to all 

immigration courts, they provided first-hand observations on asylum 

adjudication practices and insights regarding policies and procedures to 

detect asylum fraud.

We conducted in-person interviews during our site visits and telephone 

interviews with supervisory asylum officers, asylum officers, training 

officers, and FDNS immigration officers in the remaining three asylum 

offices –Miami, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; and San Francisco, California. 

Across the eight asylum offices, we spoke with 35 supervisory asylum 

officers, 37 asylum officers, 24 FDNS immigration officers (including four 

supervisors), and 12 training officers.6 We spoke with supervisory asylum 

officers, asylum officers, and FDNS immigration officers in all eight 

asylum offices about the tools and systems that they use to identify and 

detect asylum fraud and the roles of asylum officers and FDNS 

immigration officers in asylum fraud detection. We spoke with Asylum 

Division and RAIO headquarters officials about how asylum officers are 

trained to detect and prevent fraud, and how training needs are assessed. 

We also spoke with training officers in each of the eight asylum offices 

about how they develop and present training, as well as evaluate training 

needs. We spoke with Asylum Division and RAIO Performance 

Management and Planning officials about quality assurance mechanisms 

in the asylum program, such as 100 percent supervisory review of asylum 

officer decisions, and about the extent to which fraud detection and 

prevention is part of the Asylum Division quality assurance process.

 

6The supervisory asylum officers, asylum officers, and FDNS immigration officers from 

w hom w e obtained input w ere not randomly selected from all officers in the 8 offices w e 

interview ed. Officers w ere selected to participate in interview s on the basis of w ho w as 

available during our planned site visits and w ho w as in a position to respond to our 

questions. Consequently, w e consider the interview results to provide insights on asylum 

adjudication practices and procedures to detect asylum fraud, but these view s cannot be 

generalized to all supervisory asylum officers, asylum officers, and FDNS immigration 

officers in these offices or to the Asylum Division nationw ide. 
Appendix I: Objectiv es, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 86 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

The EOIR antifraud officer and the EOIR Fraud and Abuse Prevention 

Program are responsible for detecting and preventing asylum fraud within 

the immigration courts. We analyzed EOIR Fraud Abuse Prevention 

Program case files to determine the number of complaints received, 

number of case files opened, and number of asylum-related case files 

opened from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014.7 We also reviewed 

35 EOIR case files, which EOIR identified as being all cases associated 

with asylum fraud. During this review, EOIR classified two of these files 

as unauthorized practice of law rather than asylum fraud, and opted not to 

include a case file re-opened in fiscal year 2012 due to a prior case 

closure in fiscal year 2008.Two other case files were outside of the fiscal 

year 2010 through fiscal year 2014, which was the time period of our 

review. We reviewed EOIR’s Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program 

guidance and policy documentation, including the regulation that 

established EOIR’s antifraud officer position. We also reviewed the 

Immigration Judge Benchbook, which includes tools, templates, and legal 

resources for immigration judges to use in their adjudications. We 

analyzed EOIR’s fraud-related training materials for immigration judges, 

and spoke with the antifraud officer about the fraud detection and 

prevention activities associated with her role. While observing immigration 

court proceedings in New York City, Los Angeles, Houston, and Arlington, 

including asylum cases, we spoke with court administrators and 

immigration judges about asylum fraud.

To evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed and 

implemented processes to address any fraud that has been identified in 

the asylum system, we analyzed Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) data on the number of 

asylum fraud indictments, criminal arrests, convictions, and administrative 

arrests as well as the number of asylum fraud cases initiated by HSI from 

fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. We also analyzed USCIS 

RAPS data to identify the number of individuals who have had their 

asylum status terminated because of fraud from fiscal years 2010 through 

2014 and any trends in asylum terminations because of fraud over those 

years. We used ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations data to 

analyze the outcomes for individuals whose asylum status was 

terminated for fraud from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. We assessed 

 

7We selected fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014 as our period of analysis as this w as the 

most recent 5-year period for w hich data w ere available.
Appendix I: Objectiv es, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 87 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

the reliability of these data by reviewing documentation about how data 

were collected; interviewing knowledgeable agency officials about the 

data; and conducting electronic testing for missing data, outliers, and 

obvious errors. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable 

for the purposes of analyzing the number of asylum terminations due to 

fraud and the outcome of those terminations. We reviewed USCIS policy 

documents related to asylum terminations, such as the Affirmative 

Asylum Procedures Manual, which details termination policy and 

procedures that are to be followed for asylum terminations. We also 

reviewed U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decisions that were identified by 

Asylum Division officials as influencing how USCIS pursues asylum 

terminations due to fraud and USCIS policy documents related to asylum 

termination, such as the Post Adjustment Eligibility Review memo, that 

reflect USCIS policy changes made as a result of circuit court decisions. 

We visited five HSI locations – New York, New York; Washington, D.C.; 

Houston, Texas; Los Angeles, California; and Fairfax, Virginia –-and 

interviewed officials about how they receive asylum fraud referrals and 

how they investigate allegations of asylum fraud. We interviewed officials 

from EOIR about mechanisms to address identified asylum fraud in the 

immigration courts and how those mechanisms are used, including 

disciplinary measures available to EOIR for attorneys and other 

practitioners who commit asylum fraud, and how frequently they are used. 

We interviewed officials in the eight USCIS asylum offices as well as 

Asylum Division officials to determine how USCIS handles cases with 

identified fraud, including cases in which fraud is identified after asylum 

has been granted, and how USCIS tracks, monitors, and adjudicates 

cases in which an individual’s asylum status is pending termination for 

identified fraud. We compared USCIS and EOIR mechanisms to address 

identified asylum fraud and the frequency of their use with mechanisms in 

GAO’s Fraud Framework to assess their likely effectiveness as a fraud 

deterrent.8

We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to November 

2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

 

8GAO-15-593SP. 
Appendix I: Objectiv es, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 88 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Fraud Risk Assessment Process

Page 89 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

GAO’s A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs

notes that managers who effectively assess fraud risks attempt to fully 

consider the specific fraud risks the agency or program faces, analyze the 

potential likelihood and impact of fraud schemes, and then ultimately 

document prioritized fraud risks.1 Moreover, managers can use the fraud 

risk assessment process to determine the extent to which controls may 

no longer be relevant or cost-effective. There is no universally accepted 

approach for conducting fraud risk assessments, since circumstances 

vary among programs; however, assessing fraud risks generally involves 

five actions, as noted in figure 8.

Figure 8: Key Elements of the Fraud Risk Assessment Process

 

1GAO, A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs, GAO-15-593SP 

(Washington D.C.: July 28, 2015).

Appendix II: Fraud Risk Assessment Process
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 90 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 91 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 92 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 93 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 94 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 95 GAO-16-50 Asylum Fraud

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet, Assistant 

Director; Ashley Vaughan Davis; David Alexander; Dominick Dale, Imoni 

Hampton; Grant Mallie; Mara McMillen; Linda Miller; Jan Montgomery; 

Jon Najmi; and Mary Pitts made significant contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(441255)
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