Interim Decision #2882 

MATTER OF MOURILLON 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A-19731000 

Decided by Board September 22, 1981 

(1) Under the law of Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, legitimation of a child born out of 

wedlock is effected by the subsequent marriage of the natural parents together with 

their prior or contemporaneous acknowledgment of the child. 

(2) An act of acknowledgment of paternity in Curacao without the marriage of the natural 

parents does not place the acknowledged child in the same status as a legitimated child 

and, therefore, the petitioner did not qualify as his father's "child" under section 101(b)(1)(C) 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(C). 

(3) In order to qualify as stepsiblings, either (1) the marriage which created the steprelationships must continue to exist, or (2) where the parties to that marriage have 

legally separated or the marriage has been terminated by death or divorce, a family 

relationship must continue to exist as a matter of fact between the "stepsiblings." 

(4) Since the petitioner and beneficiary once qualified as "children" of their stepmother/ 

mother and continue to maintain their family relationship, the beneficiary qualifies as 

the petitioner's "sister" under section 203(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(5), even 

though the record does not show whether the petitioner's father and the beneficiary's 

mother are still alive and remain married. 

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Mary L. Sfasciotti, Esquire 

815 — 57th Street 

Kenosha, Wisconsin 53140 

By: • Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Maguire, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members 

This matter is before the Board on appeal from the District Director's 

decision of April 9, 1980, denying the petition to classify the beneficiary 

as the sister of a United States citizen under section 203(a)(5) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(5). The appeal will 

be sustained. 

The petitioner is a 52-year-old citizen of the United States who was 

born out of wedlock in the British West Indies on December 16, 1928. 

His parents never married, and only a few months after his birth his 

mother left the household, never to return. The petitioner and his father 

subsequently immigrated to Curacao, Netherlands Antilles (Dutch West 

Incline). There, on July 22, 1942, his father married, and they all lived 

together as a family unit until the petitioner came to the United States 

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in late 1954. In September 1953, the beneficiary was born in Curacao to 

the petitioner's father and stepmother. The petitioner and beneficiary 

have apparently continued to maintain their family ties, with the record 

reflecting that the beneficiary came to the United States in 1971 as a 

nonimmigrant student and was residing with the petitioner at the time 

the instant petition was filed on October 30, 1974. 

The District Director correctly noted that in order to establish the 

existence of a sibling relationship the petitioner must show that he and 

the beneficiary are, or once were, "children" of a common "parent" 

within the meaning of section 101(b)(1) and (2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 

1101(b)(1) and (2). Matter of Huang, 15 I&N Dec. 145 (BIA 1974). The 

District Director then examined the relationship_ of the petitioner and 

beneficiary through their father, and concluded that they did not qualify 

as siblings under the Act because the petitioner was illegitimate and had 

not been legitimated by his father. Therefore, he denied the petition. 

On appeal, the petitioner asserts that he was legitimated by his father 

according to the law of Curacao, Netherlands Antilles. He also argues 

that he and the beneficiary are qualified siblings by virtue of their 

relationship through their other common parent, their stepmother/ 

mother. 

The petitioner has now submitted for the record certain provisions of 

Title XII, Book I of the Civil Code of Curacao ("the Code") which 

pertain to paternity and filiation in Curacao, Netherlands Antilles.' The 

petitioner contends that under either the legitimation provisions of Title 

XII, section 2, or the acknowledgment provisions of section 3 of that 

title, he qualifies as a legitimated child under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the 

Act.2A careful examination of these provisions reveals that this argument is without merit. 

These materials were prepared by Dr. Karel Weamink, Legal Analyst in the European 

Law Division, Law Library of the Library of Congress, and come from an 1875 translation, 

J.H.R. Beaujon, grans., Civil Code for the Colony of Curacao (1875). Dr. Wenninh 

indicates in his cover letter that, "The latest Dutch text available in the Library of 

Congress and at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Washington, D.C., is dated 1950, and 

a comparison of it with the translation shows that the appended text was still in effect in 

1929 and 1936." 

2"The term 'child' means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is— 

(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or under the 

law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if 

such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and the 

child Is In the legal• custody of the legitimating parent or vorr.nts at the thus of such 

legitimation." 

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Under section 2 of the Code, legitimation of a child born out of wedlock occurs only by the subsequent marriage of the natural parents 

together with a prior or contemporaneous acknowledgment of the child. 3 

Upon legitimation, the child acquires the same rights as if he were 

legitimate at birth 4Thus, it is clear that because the petitioner's natural parents never married he has not been legitimated under the law of 

Curacao, Netherlands Antilles. 

As for the petitioner's acknowledgment claim, we note preliminarily 

that the general rule outside of communist-bloc countries is that acknowledgment alone does not constitute legitimation; there must also be a 

subsequent marriage of the natural parents.' Matter of Van Pamlen, 

12 I&N Dec. 11, 13 (BIA 1966). See, e.g., Matter of Reyes, 16 I&B Dec. 

475 (BIA 1978); Matter of Quispe, 16 I&N Dee. 174 (BIA 1977); Matter 

of Mandewirth, 12 I&N Dec_ 199 (BIA 1967); Matter of The, 10 I&N 

Dec. 744 (BIA 1964). A "legitimated" child is one placed "in all respects 

upon the same footing as if begotten and born in wedlock." Pfeifer v. 

Wright, 41 F.2d 464, 466 (10th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 896 

(1931). Only where acknowledgment places the child In the same status 

as a legitimated child will acknowledgment be deemed the equivalent of 

legitimation. See Matter uf Reyes, 171&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1980). Such is 

not the case here. Acknowledgment under section 3 of the Code merely 

creates "civil rights" between the acknowledged child and his parents." 

While this term is apparently not defined, the acknowledgment provision, unlike the preceeding legitimation provision, does not declare that 

an acknowledged child enjoys the same rights as if he were born 

legitimate. Therefore, it must be said that because the law of the Netherlands Antilles does not place an acknowledged child in the same status as a legitimated child, it does not make acknowledgment the equivalent of legitimation. This conclusion also finds support in the fact that 

because the law of the Netherlands Antilles specifically differentiates 

between acknowledgment and legitimation in the two statutory provisions it is reasonable to presume, absent an affirmative showing to the 

contrary, that the law does not create-a distinction without a difference. 

See Zeigler Coal. Co. v. Kleppe, 536 F.2d 398, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1976) —

("[A] statute should not be construed in such a way as to render certain 

provisions superfluous or insignificant."); EA D. Sands, Satkerland 

Statutory Construction, section 46.06 (Rev. 3d ed. 1973). 

' Title XII, § 2, art. 321. In the event that the parents neglected to acknowledge their 

natural child at or before the time of their marriage, or where one of the parents dies 

before their intended marriage, legitimation can occur by a "letter of legitimation" issued 

by theGovernor, after consultation with the "high court of justice." Title XII, § 2, arts. 

323 and 324. 

Title XIL 4 2. art. 326. 

5Or, in some instances, a royal or presidential decree of legitimation will suffice. 

6Title XII, § 3, art. 329. 
Interim Decision #2882 

land Statutory Construction, section 46.06 (Rev. 3d ed. 1973). 

In view of the foregoing, we find that the petitioner does not qualify 

as a legitimated child under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act. Therefore, 

he and the beneficiary do not qualify through their father as "brother" 

and "sister" under section 203(a)(5) of the Act. 

Turning next to the issue of the petitioner's relationship to the beneficiary through their stepmother/mother, it is clear that the beneficiary 

once qualified as the legitimate "child" of her mother under section 

101(b)(1)(A) of the Act. As for the petitioner, section 101(b)(1)(B) defines 

the term "child" as an unmarried person under the age of 21 years who 

is a "stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child 

had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage 

creating the status of stepchild occurred." Here, the petitioner's natural 

father married when the petitioner was 13 years of age, thus giving rise 

to a valid stepmother/stepchild relationship under the Act. Matter of 

McMillan, 17 I&D Dec. 605 (BIA 1981). Therefore, pursuant to Matter 

of Hem', supra, at the time of the beneficiary's birth she and the 

petitioner were qualified siblings as the "children" of a common "parent." 

See Matter of Ferreira, 16 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 1978); cf. Matter of 

Bourne, 16 I&N Dec. 367 (BIA 1977). 

One further issue remains. Unlike consanguineous relationships, steprelationships can be terminated by the death 'or divorce of the parties 

whose marriage created the step-relationship.' Thus, in the case of 

stepsiblingssit is appropriate to determine not only whether the petitioner and beneficiary were once the "children" of a common "parent," 

but also whether the marriage which created the step-relationships still 

exists at the time the visa petition to accord the stepsibling classification 

is being considered. Where that marriage does still exist, the stepsibling 

'relationship likewise continues to exist. Difficulties arise, however, where 

this is not the case. 

In the context of stepparent and stepchild, we recently held that 

where the parties to the marriage which created that step-relationship 

have legally separated or where the marriage has been terminated by 

divorce or death, the appropriate inquiry is whether a family relationship has continued to exist as a matter of fact between the stepparent 

and stepchild. Matter of Mowrer, 17 I&N Dee_ 612 (BIA 1981); accord, 

7 See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive F. & S. v. Hogan, 5 F. Supp. 598, 605 (D. Minn. 

1934): "The relationship of stepchild and stepparent is predicated on marriage, as are all 

other relationships of affinity. . . . The entire structure of relationship by affinity is based 

on a subsisting marriage, not a dissolved one." 

" While the petitioner and the beneficiary are indeed also half siblings by virtue of their 

common father, they cannot qualify as brother and sister through him. See pp. 3-5, supra. 

Therefore, they can only seek to qualify as stepsiblings through the petitioner's stepmother. 

the beneficiary's mother. 

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Brotherhood of Locomotive F. & E. v. Hogan, supra; see also Matter of 

Pagnerre, 13 I&N Dec. 088 (BIA 1971). A similar inquiry is no less 

appropriate in the case of stepsiblings. Accordingly, we hold that in 

order to qualify as stepsiblings either (1) the marriage which created 

the step-relationships must continue to exist, or (2) where the parties 

to that marriage have legally separated or the marriage has been terminatea by death or divorce, a family relationship must continue to exist 

as a matter of fact between the "stepsiblings." Whether the stepsiblings 

continue to maintain a family relationship is a question of fact which 

must be determined under the particular circumstances of each case. 

Here, the record does not clearly show whether the petitioner's father 

and the.beneficiary's mother are still alive and remain married. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the record reflects that the petitioner and the 

beneficiary do continue to maintain their family relationship, including 

the fact that the beneficiary has lived with the petitioner during her 

stay in the United States as a nonimmigrant student. Therefore, it has 

been established that they were "children" of a common "parent" and 

that their relationship as stepbrother and stepsister continues to exist. 

Accordingly, the beneficiary qualifies as the petitioner's sister under 

section 203(a)(5) of the Act. 

ORDER The appeal is sustained and the petition is approved. 

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