69–006 

115TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 115–17 

INNOCENT PARTY PROTECTION ACT 

FEBRUARY 24, 2017.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. GOODLATTE, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 725] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 725) to amend title 28, United States Code, to prevent fraudulent joinder, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 2 

Background and Need for the Legislation ............................................................. 2 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 3 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 3 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 3 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 4 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 4 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 4 

Duplication of Federal Programs ............................................................................ 6 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings ..................................................................... 6 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 6 

Advisory on Earmarks ............................................................................................. 6 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 6 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 15 

Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 17 


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1 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914). 

2 Alabama Great Southern Railway Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 218 (1906). 

3 E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court Based 

on Fraudulent Joinder, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 189, 206–207 (2005). 4Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 Am. U.L. Rev. 49, 64 (2009). 5Peter G. Neiman, Root, Root, Root for the Home Team: Pete Rose, Nominal Parties, and Diversity Jurisdiction, 66 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 148, 156 (1991). 

Purpose and Summary 

Congress has the authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the 

lower Federal courts. As an exercise of that authority, the Innocent 

Party Protection Act establishes a uniform standard for determining whether a defendant has been fraudulently joined to a lawsuit in order to defeat Federal diversity jurisdiction. It also makes 

clear that Federal courts may consider evidence outside the pleadings when deciding a motion to remand a case that has been removed to Federal court, as well as whether the plaintiff has shown 

a good faith intent to pursue a judgment against a non-diverse defendant. 

Background and Need for the Legislation 

Current Federal court rules allow trial lawyers to keep their 

cases in state court if they sue a defendant from another state, as 

long as they also sue a local defendant in the state in which they 

are filing the case. Not surprisingly, these rules have been abused 

by trial lawyers who fraudulently sue local defendants, not because 

those local defendants have any real connection to the lawsuit, but 

because suing them allows the trial lawyers to keep their case in 

a preferred state court forum. 

If a local defendant has ‘‘no real connection to the controversy,’’ 1

joinder of that defendant is referred to as ‘‘fraudulent joinder.’’ The 

Supreme Court has recognized, since the early 1900’s, the fraudulent joinder doctrine as an exception to the complete diversity rule. 

The doctrine allows the district court to disregard, for jurisdictional 

purposes, the citizenship of certain nondiverse defendants under 

certain circumstances. The doctrine of fraudulent joinder prevents 

plaintiffs’ ‘‘attempts to wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in 

the Federal courts of the protection of their rights in those tribunals.’’ 2 However, despite its importance, the Supreme Court has 

not clarified or elaborated upon the fraudulent joinder doctrine 

since first recognizing it in several cases in the early 1900’s. 

Without guidance from the Supreme Court or Congress on the 

contours of fraudulent joinder, lower Federal courts, as described 

by one commentator, have been forced to grapple ‘‘with several 

issues raised by the doctrine, and in doing so, have created conflicts among the circuits with respect to the standard and procedure used to evaluate allegations of fraudulent joinder.’’ 3 Indeed, 

another commentator has observed that, ‘‘[p]resently, courts take 

divergent approaches when analyzing claims of fraudulent joinder. 

Predicting what test a court will apply to determine fraudulent 

joinder is difficult, as the standards can shift, even within the same 

opinion.’’ 4 According to another commentator, the present standards are ‘‘poorly defined and thus subject to . . . inconsistent interpretation and application.’’ 5 Yet another commentator has written 

that, ‘‘[r]ather than adopting one universal approach, courts atVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:46 Feb 24, 2017 Jkt 069006 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR017.XXX HR017

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6Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816). 

tempt to discern fraudulent joinder by applying a collection of 

amorphous approaches.’’ However, one aspect is consistent across 

different applications of the doctrine, and that is that in every 

court, the burden of proving fraudulent joinder is one of the heaviest burdens known to civil law. 

The Framers included Federal diversity jurisdiction in the Constitution to provide a neutral Federal forum in which interstate 

controversies could be adjudicated. Accordingly, as the Supreme 

Court has held, the Constitution ‘‘presume[s] . . . that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, 

might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or 

control, the regular administration of justice.’’ 6 This legislation will 

help ensure that Congress’s extension of Federal diversity jurisdiction is living up to the Framers’ intentions in a manner fair to everyone. 

Hearings 

The Committee on the Judiciary held no hearings on H.R. 725. 

Committee Consideration 

On February 2, 2017, the Committee met in open session and ordered the bill H.R. 725, favorably reported, with an amendment, by 

a rollcall vote of 17 to 4, a quorum being present. 

Committee Votes 

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the following 

rollcall votes occurred during the Committee’s consideration of H.R. 

725. 

1. Motion to report H.R. 725 favorably to the House of Representatives. The motion was agreed to by a rollcall vote of 17 to 

4, a quorum being present. 

ROLLCALL NO. 1 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman ................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI) .....................................

Mr. Smith (TX) ..........................................................

Mr. Chabot (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Issa (CA) .............................................................. X 

Mr. King (IA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Franks (AZ) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert (TX) ......................................................

Mr. Jordan (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Poe (TX) ...............................................................

Mr. Chaffetz (UT) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Marino (PA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Gowdy (SC) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Labrador (ID) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Farenthold (TX) ..................................................


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ROLLCALL NO. 1—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Collins (GA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. DeSantis (FL) .....................................................

Mr. Buck (CO) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Ratcliffe (TX) ....................................................... X 

Mr. Bishop (MI) ......................................................... X 

Ms. Roby (AL) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Gaetz (FL) ...........................................................

Mr. Johnson (LA) ....................................................... X 

Mr. Biggs (AZ) ........................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member .................

Mr. Nadler (NY) .........................................................

Ms. Lofgren (CA) .......................................................

Ms. Jackson Lee (TX) ................................................

Mr. Cohen (TN) ..........................................................

Mr. Johnson (GA) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Chu (CA) .............................................................

Mr. Deutch (FL) .........................................................

Mr. Gutierrez (IL) ......................................................

Ms. Bass (CA) ............................................................

Mr. Richmond (LA) ....................................................

Mr. Jeffries (NY) ........................................................

Mr. Cicilline (RI) ........................................................

Mr. Swalwell (CA) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Lieu (CA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Raskin (MD) ........................................................ X 

Ms. Jayapal (WA) ......................................................

Total ............................................................. 17 4 

Committee Oversight Findings 

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures 

Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does not provide new 

budgetary authority or increased tax expenditures. 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate 

In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to 

the bill, H.R. 725, the following estimate and comparison prepared 

by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 


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U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Washington, DC, February 10, 2017. 

Hon. BOB GOODLATTE, CHAIRMAN, 

Committee on the Judiciary, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 725, the ‘‘Innocent Party 

Protection Act.’’ 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Robert Reese, who can 

be reached at 226–2860. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL, 

DIRECTOR. 

Enclosure 

cc: Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 

Ranking Member 

H.R. 725—Innocent Party Protection Act. 

As ordered reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary 

on February 2, 2015. 

H.R. 725 would require Federal courts to deny a motion to transfer a case to state court under certain circumstances. The bill also 

would amend the procedures under which Federal courts consider 

a motion to remove a case to state court by permitting parties to 

amend their pleadings. 

Under current law, plaintiffs can choose to bring certain claims 

in Federal or state court. In some cases, plaintiffs may view state 

courts as more favorable because of litigation strategy or timing, 

whereas, defendants may view Federal courts as more desirable. In 

such cases, courts must determine which jurisdiction is proper. 

Under H.R. 725, Federal courts would have to deny a motion to 

transfer a case from Federal court to a state court if they find that 

the plaintiff has misrepresented a defendant’s state of citizenship 

or made a claim against a specific defendant that is not possible 

or plausible under state law or that is not made in good faith. 

The legislation could have an effect on litigation strategies and 

lead to changes in the number of cases filed in state and Federal 

courts. However, based on information from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, CBO expects that any change in the number of claims filed in Federal courts would not have a substantial 

effect on the workload of the Federal courts. Therefore, CBO estimates that any changes in discretionary costs to implement H.R. 

725 would not be significant. 

Enacting H.R. 725 would not affect direct spending or revenues; 

therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO estimates 

that enacting H.R. 725 would not increase net direct spending or 

on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028. 


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H.R. 725 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Robert Reese. The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

Duplication of Federal Programs 

No provision of H.R. 725 establishes or reauthorizes a program 

of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report from the 

Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 

21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings 

The Committee estimates that H.R. 725 specifically directs to be 

completed no specific rule makings within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 551. 

Performance Goals and Objectives 

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 725 is designed 

to prevent the fraudulent joinder of parties to lawsuits. 

Advisory on Earmarks 

In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, H.R. 725 does not contain any congressional 

earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined 

in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of Rule XXI. 

Section-by-Section Analysis 

The following discussion describes the bill as reported by the 

Committee. Following the text of the various provisions of the bill 

as reported is some commentary on those provisions. 

Sec. 1. Short title. Section 1 sets forth the short title of the bill 

as the ‘‘Innocent Party Protection Act of 2017.’’ 

Sec. 2. Prevention of Fraudulent Joinder. Section 2 contains the 

following provisions. 

‘‘(f) Fraudulent joinder. (1) This subsection shall apply to any case 

in which—(A) a civil action is removed solely on the basis of the 

jurisdiction conferred by section 1332(a);’’ 

Since fraudulent joinder is only a problem in a subclass of cases 

involving diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, this provision makes 

clear that the bill applies only in cases that are removed under the 

general diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which states as follows: 

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 

civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the 

sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, 

and is between—(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens 

of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except 


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7 Byrd v. TVI, Inc., 2015 WL 5568454, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2015) (emphasis added). Accord, In re Ethicon, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., 2013 WL 6710345, at *3 n.2 (S.D. 

W. Va. Dec. 19, 2013) (‘‘In Musewicz, the issue is diversity of citizenship, while in Hammons 

and Delacruz, the issue is the home state defendant rule. However, the fraudulent joinder analysis remains the same in both instances.’’). There are some district court cases on the other side, 

primarily in the Southern District of Illinois. 

that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction 

under this subsection of an action between citizens of a 

State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are 

lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United 

States and are domiciled in the same State; (3) citizens of 

different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state, 

defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States. 

‘‘(B) a motion to remand is made on the ground that—(i) one or 

more defendants are citizens of the same state as one or more 

plaintiffs, or—(ii) one or more defendants properly joined and 

served are citizens of the state in which the action was brought; 

and’’ 

When a case is removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), there can be 

many grounds for a motion to remand other than those that implicate the fraudulent joinder doctrine. Some are jurisdictional like 

the amount-in-controversy requirement; others are procedural. If 

even one of those other grounds is well-taken, the case should be 

remanded whether or not the joinder is fraudulent. Paragraph 

(1)(B) specifies that the new provision applies when there is a motion to remand on the ground that the joinder of a co-defendant either destroys complete diversity or violates the forum defendant 

rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 

Subparagraph (B)(ii) deals with situations where the objection to 

removal is based on violation of the forum defendant rule. This provision is necessary because courts apply the fraudulent joinder doctrine when a plaintiff who is not a citizen of the forum state names 

a citizen of the forum state as a defendant, implicating 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(b)(2), which prohibits removal of a diversity case ‘‘if any of 

the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is 

a citizen of the State in which [the] action is brought.’’ 

District courts apply the fraudulent joinder doctrine to forum defendants in the same way that they do to defendants who share 

citizenship with the plaintiff. As a district court in Missouri observed last year, ‘‘[t]he standards for determining whether a resident defendant is fraudulently joined are the same as the standards for determining whether a diversity-destroying defendant is 

fraudulently joined.’’ 7

Paragraph (1)(B)(ii) codifies this line of cases because it represents sound policy. It would be very confusing to create a situation in which courts apply two different standards to two kinds of 

alleged fraudulent joinder, with a less rigorous standard for determining whether an in-state defendant has been fraudulently joined. 

This would be particularly anomalous in view of the fact that in 

most cases the defendant whose joinder is challenged is both a cocitizen of the plaintiff and a citizen of the forum state. In most instances the plaintiff would raise both objections; it would make no 


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8See, e.g., Breitweiser v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 2015 WL 6322625, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 

20, 2015) (collecting cases and referring to the practice as ‘‘snap removal’’). 9 Jennings-Frye v. NYK Logistics Americas Inc., 2011 WL 642653, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 

2011) (citing cases). 10The distinction between the two doctrines was helpfully summarized by the court in In re 

Plavix Prod. Liab. & Marketing Litig., 2014 WL 4544089, at *5 (D. N.J. Sept. 12, 2014): 

Fraudulent misjoinder, otherwise known as ‘‘procedural misjoinder’’, occurs when a 

plaintiff attempts to defeat removal by misjoining the unrelated claims of non-diverse 

party plaintiffs against a defendant. Geffen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F.Supp.2d 865, 869 

(N.D. Ohio 2008). While fraudulent joinder tests the viability of the claims against the 

defendant, fraudulent misjoinder tests the procedural basis of a party’s joinder. 

sense to apply different standards to each of the two. Nor would 

it make sense to apply different standards depending on which objection the plaintiff chose to raise. 

Paragraph (1)(B)(ii) uses the exact language of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(b)(2), including the limitation to defendants ‘‘properly joined 

and served.’’ This avoids any implication that the provision resolves 

the ongoing dispute in the lower Federal courts over the propriety 

of removal before service of process on resident defendants.8 However, the limitation is not included in paragraph (1)(B)(i), because 

‘‘a defendant who is a citizen of plaintiff’s state destroys complete 

diversity, regardless of whether that defendant was properly served 

prior to removal.’’ 9

‘‘(C) the motion is opposed on the ground that the joinder of the defendant or defendants described in subparagraph (B) is fraudulent.’’ 

Since fraudulent joinder is only a problem in a subclass of cases 

involving diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, this provision makes 

clear that the bill applies only in cases that are removed under the 

general diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and where the motion 

to remand is opposed solely on the ground that the joinder of the 

defendants described by subparagraph (B) is fraudulent. This provision is necessary because it confines the application of the bill to 

opposition to remand on grounds of fraudulent joinder, which is the 

subject of the bill. The bill does not apply, for example, to the related but distinct doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder.10

‘‘(2) The joinder of the defendant described in paragraph (1)(B) is 

fraudulent if the court finds that—’’ 

Paragraph (2) sets forth four situations in which a court should 

find joinder to be fraudulent and should, under paragraph (4), deny 

the motion to remand. With the exception of the adoption of a uniform ‘‘plausibility’’ standard in subparagraph (B), paragraph (2) is 

largely a codification of current fraudulent joinder practice. Subparagraph (C) resolves a conflict in the lower courts and makes 

clear that a plainly meritorious affirmative defense, whether under 

state or Federal law, can be the basis for finding fraudulent joinder. 

H.R. 725 does not alter the burden of proving fraudulent joinder. 

As uniformly recognized by courts, the removing party must show 

Federal jurisdiction, and in cases covered by H.R. 725 this means 

showing that the in-state defendant has been fraudulently joined. 

The removing party does this by persuading the court that one or 

more of the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) are satisfied. If the 

removing party establishes this, then the district court must deny 

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11 No inference is intended with respect to the use of a presumption in removal cases not involving fraudulent joinder. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 

554 (2014) (‘‘We need not here decide whether [a purported ‘‘presumption’’ against removal] is 

proper in mine-run diversity cases.’’). 12See, e.g., Boyer Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990); Green v. Amerada 

Hess Corp., 707 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir.1983); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 

(5th Cir.1981)). 13 927 F.Supp.2d 427, 434–35 (E.D. Tex. 2013). 14 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 15Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2013). 16See, e.g., Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 49, 64 (2009) (‘‘Presently, courts take divergent approaches when analyzing claims of fraudulent joinder. Predicting what test a court will 

apply to determine fraudulent joinder is difficult, as the standards can shift, even within the 

same opinion.’’). 

ing party does not carry its burden, then the motion to remand 

must be granted. 

If, however, the removing party carries its burden, no more is required. In particular, the removing party need not overcome any 

‘‘presumption’’ in order to carry its burden.11

‘‘(A) there is actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts with 

respect to that defendant;’’ 

Fraudulent joinder requiring denial of a motion to remand is defined by prong (A) as including a situation in which actual fraud— 

that is, the making of false allegations—exists in the pleading of 

jurisdictional facts. Courts have long recognized actual fraud in the 

pleading of jurisdictional facts as a basis for fraudulent joinder, although it is seldom asserted.12 In Coffman v. Dole Fresh Fruit 

Co.,13 for example, the court defined ‘‘actual fraud’’ as involving 

‘‘false allegations,’’ such as misrepresenting or concealing the citizenship of a party. The bill preserves this basis for finding fraudulent joinder. The bill’s language is taken directly from a two-part 

test articulated by the Fifth Circuit in the leading case of 

Smallwood v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.14 Since then, the same twopart test has been used by many courts to define fraudulent joinder. For example, the Tenth Circuit said in 2013: ‘‘To establish 

[fraudulent] joinder, the removing party must demonstrate either: 

(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the nondiverse party in state court.’’ 15

‘‘(B) based on the complaint and the materials submitted under 

paragraph (3), it is not plausible to conclude that applicable State 

law would impose liability on that defendant;’’ 

Fraudulent joinder requiring denial of a motion to remand is defined in prong (B) as including a situation in which, based on the 

complaint and materials submitted under paragraph (3), it is not 

plausible to conclude, as a legal matter, that applicable state law 

would impose liability on each co-citizen or in-state defendant. 

Prong (B) adopts a single uniform standard in place of the many 

different verbal formulations used by the courts today.16 In particular, prong (B) repudiates the ‘‘any possibility’’ standard adopted 

by some courts. Under that standard, ‘‘if there is any possibility 

that the state law might impose liability on a resident defendant 

under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, the Federal 

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17Florence v. Crescent Resources, LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis 

added). 18See, e.g., Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 426 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the 

‘‘any possibility’’ or ‘‘no possibility’’ standard requires remand if there a ‘‘glimmer of hope’’ for 

the plaintiff). 19 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 20 Id. at 555. 21 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 22Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 

1106 (7th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis added). 23For cases using the ‘‘reasonable likelihood’’ test in the Rule 8 context, see, e.g., 16630 Southfield Limited Partnership v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 

Twombly); Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). 24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 778. 25For example, some courts have used ‘‘no reasonable basis’’ interchangeably with ‘‘no possibility of recovery.’’ See, e.g., In re 1994 Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378, 385 (5th Cir. 2009) 

ulent.’’ 17 Some courts have phrased this standard as requiring remand unless there is ‘‘no possibility’’ that the plaintiff can establish 

a claim against an in-state defendant under applicable state law in 

state court or no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an 

in-state defendant.18

The term ‘‘plausible’’ is taken from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence interpreting Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

and the Court’s decisions provide substantial guidance as to the 

meaning of the term. Initially, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,19

the Court distinguished between plausible claims and claims that 

are speculative: ‘‘Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level.’’ 20 Later, in Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal,21 the Court distinguished between a probability requirement, which is not part of the law, and the plausibility standard: 

‘‘The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘‘probability requirement,’’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’’ Plausibility thus stands between possibility and probability. 

The Twombly opinion provided further guidance in the course of 

explaining why the Court was adopting the plausibility standard. 

Quoting from an opinion of the Seventh Circuit, the Court said: 

[T]he costs of modern Federal antitrust litigation and the 

increasing caseload of the Federal courts counsel against 

sending the parties into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can construct a claim 

from the events related in the complaint.22

The ‘‘reasonable likelihood’’ test, which is synonymous with the 

plausibility standard, can readily be adapted to the fraudulent joinder context.23 For challenges to the factual basis of the plaintiff’s 

claim against the co-citizen or in-state defendant, the court would 

look at ‘‘the complaint and [other] materials’’ and determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff can muster factual support for each element of the state-law claim. This ‘‘demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation’’ or ‘‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’’ 24 For legal 

challenges, the court would examine the ‘‘applicable state law’’ and 

determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the state 

courts would impose liability under the pleaded facts. 

The ‘‘reasonable likelihood’’ standard is quite different from the 

‘‘reasonable basis’’ and ‘‘reasonable possibility’’ standards used in 

some fraudulent joinder cases.25 ‘‘Reasonable likelihood’’ is another 


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(stating that in the Fifth Circuit the test for fraudulent joinder is ‘‘whether the defendant has 

demonstrated that there is no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant, which stated differently means that there is no reasonable basis for the district court to 

predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state defendant’’) (quoting 

Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004)). 26Martin H. Redish, ‘‘Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the Foundations 

of Modern Procedure,’’ 64 Fla. L. Rev. 845, 850 (2012). 27See E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court 

Based on Fraudulent Joinder, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 189, 192 n. 9 (2005). 28Markup of H.R. 3624 at 46 (Feb. 3, 2016) (unofficial transcript), https://judiciary.house.gov/ 

wp-content/uploads/2016/02/02.03.16-Markup-Transcript-1.pdf [hereinafter Markup Transcript] 

(remarks of Rep. Conyers). 29 International Energy Ventures Management LLC v. United Energy Group Ltd., 818 F.3d 

193 (5th Cir. 2016). 30 Id. at 208 (quoting language from the Supreme Court’s Twombly decision). 31Docket entry, July 13, 2016. 32 2016 WL 4061146 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2016). 

way of expressing the concept of plausibility, and that concept is 

drawn from Twombly-Iqbal jurisprudence, not fraudulent joinder 

cases. 

Professor Martin H. Redish, one of the nation’s foremost scholars 

of Federal court jurisdiction, has written that ‘‘the Twombly-Iqbal 

plausibility standard represents the fairest and most efficient resolution of the conflicting interests’’ in the context of pleading.26 It 

will similarly provide a fair and efficient approach in the context 

of fraudulent joinder. 

Further, the very same plausibility standard used in this bill was 

adopted by the Federal circuit court of appeals in which fraudulent 

joinder cases arise with the greatest frequency.27 Last Congress, 

Ranking Member Conyers said of the bill that it should ‘‘simply 

pick one of the existing articulations of the fraudulent joinder 

standard and codify [it] into law.’’ 28 At the time, the plausibility 

approach was applied by some district courts, but just last year the 

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the same plausibility standard this bill contains in a case called International Energy,29 in 

which the Fifth Circuit stated ‘‘we must consider whether [the 

plaintiff] pleaded ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’’’ 30 The plaintiff in that case petitioned for rehearing en banc, but that rehearing was denied, with not a single 

judge on the Fifth Circuit requesting a vote.31 In just the last year, 

district courts in the Fifth Circuit have issued more than 40 fraudulent joinder decisions, without any difficulty, and with results that 

indicate just the sort of reasonable reform that would occur nationwide were Congress to settle the conflicts in the Federal courts by 

adopting the plausibility standard—namely, roughly two-thirds of 

the decisions hold the joinder to be fraudulent and retain the case, 

while the others grant the motion to remand. There is no evidence 

that the judges have any difficulty applying Federal pleading 

standards to state claims; on the contrary, they appear to be engaging in a routine and familiar judicial task. One such case is Johnson v. The Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co.32 In that case, district Judge Gray Miller found that the allegations against an instate insurance adjuster didn’t satisfy the plausibility standard, 

stating: 

These factual allegations are not pled with enough specificity to distinguish particular facts from legal conclusions. 

For example, Johnson alleges that Nice performed an ‘‘outcome oriented and unreasonable investigation,’’ but this allegation merely states a conclusion without identifying any 


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33 818 F.3d 193, 208 (5th Cir. 2016). 34 Id. at 201. 35Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 36See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. State Farm Lloyds, 385 F.3d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 2004). 37 781 F.3d 693, 705–06 (4th Cir. 2015). 

specific way in which Nice’s investigation was ‘‘unreasonable.’’ The remainder of Johnson’s allegations simply track 

the statutory language of [various provisions of the Texas 

Insurance Code] without alleging any case-specific facts 

. . . Johnson’s formulaic recitation of the statutory language is insufficient to fulfill Johnson’s obligation to provide the grounds on which he is entitled to relief. 

The court therefore denied the motion to remand the case back 

to state court. Courts in the Fifth Circuit are now reviewing the 

joinder of innocent parties to cases for forum shopping purposes 

with more scrutiny, which should be the case in courts nationwide. 

The Fifth Circuit also recognized that the plausibility standard 

is easy for district courts to apply and appellate courts to review, 

and avoids inconsistency. As the Fifth Circuit stated in its decision, 

‘‘there are good practical reasons for Federal courts to use a Federal test, chief among which is that our district courts are intimately familiar with that test. They are able to apply it uniformly, 

and we are able to review their applications uniformly.’’ 33 The 

Fifth Circuit also recognized that applying different standards, as 

district courts within the Fifth Circuit had done previously, have 

‘‘engendered confusion’’ and ‘‘uncertainty.’’ 34 The Innocent Party 

Protection Act would remedy that confusion. 

In most cases, there will be no dispute as to which state’s law 

is the ‘‘applicable state law.’’ If there is a disagreement, the court 

must perform a choice of law analysis. Under the Klaxon rule, a 

Federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law rules of 

the state in which it sits.35 The ‘‘reasonable likelihood’’ standard 

can be helpful here also. If there is a reasonable likelihood that the 

state court in which the Federal court sits would apply law that 

would impose liability on the co-citizen or in-state defendant, joinder is not fraudulent. 

Applying the plausibility standard to fraudulent joinder does not 

require the court to decide any claims on their merits. Prong (B) 

uses the term ‘‘impose liability on,’’ drawn from fraudulent joinder 

jurisprudence.36 And paragraph (4) makes clear that claims against 

defendants found to have been fraudulently joined must be dismissed without prejudice. 

‘‘(C) State or Federal law clearly bars all claims in the complaint 

against that defendant; or’’ 

Fraudulent joinder requiring denial of a motion to remand is defined by prong (C) as including a situation in which state or Federal law clearly bars all claims in the complaint against the nondiverse or in-state defendants. This would occur, for example, 

through the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations expiration, Federal preemption, or state or Federal laws that provide immunity from suit. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Johnson v. 

American Towers, LLC,37 held that the non-diverse defendant was 

fraudulently joined because ‘‘the Communications Act clearly preVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:46 Feb 24, 2017 Jkt 069006 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR017.XXX HR017

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38 In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 219 (3d Cir. 2006). 39See, e.g., City of Columbus, Ohio v. Sunstar Columbus, Inc., 2015 WL 5775532, at *5 (S.D. 

Ohio Oct. 2, 2015) (‘‘Res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses’’ that a court 

may not address when considering fraudulent joinder); Huitron v. U.S. Foods, Inc., 2014 WL 

4215656, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2014) (‘‘Consent [is] is an affirmative defense to defamation’’ 

that is ‘‘not considered’’ in the fraudulent joinder inquiry). Some courts have mistakenly applied 

the ‘‘well-pleaded complaint’’ rule—a rule developed for federal-question jurisdiction—in the context of fraudulent joinder. These decisions too should no longer be followed. 40 385 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (9–7 decision). 41Other flaws are discussed in Case Note, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1086 (2005). 42See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 98 (1921) (‘‘[T]he joinder was a sham 

and fraudulent—that is, . . . without any purpose to prosecute the cause in good faith against 

the [defendant]’’ and ‘‘with the purpose of fraudulently defeating the [other defendant’s] right 

of removal.’’). 43 849 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1331 (M.D. Ala. 2012). 

empts the [plaintiffs’] state-law tort claim against [that defendant] 

as a matter of law.’’ And in the leading case of In re Briscoe, the 

Third Circuit stated: ‘‘Courts have . . . recognized that a statute 

of limitations defense is properly considered in connection with a 

fraudulent joinder inquiry.’’ 38 However, some courts have held that 

affirmative defenses cannot be considered as a basis for finding 

fraudulent joinder; those decisions should no longer be followed.39

Subparagraphs (B) and (C), taken together, abrogate the ‘‘common defense’’ doctrine associated with the Fifth Circuit decision in 

Smallwood v. Illinois Central R. Co.40 Under that doctrine, no matter how clear it is that the plaintiff’s claim against the in-state defendant is barred, the case must be remanded to the state court if 

the same defense also bars the claim against the out-of-state defendant. For reasons given by the dissenting opinions in 

Smallwood, the doctrine is seriously flawed.41 Mandatory language 

in subparagraphs (B) and (C) make clear that in determining 

whether joinder is fraudulent, the court should consider only the 

claims against the defendants described in paragraph (B); the court 

should not examine the case against the diverse, out-of-state defendants. 

‘‘(D) objective evidence clearly demonstrates that there is no good 

faith intention to prosecute the action against that defendant or to 

seek a joint judgment including that defendant.’’ 

Prong (D) codifies a proposition that the Supreme Court has long 

recognized: that in deciding whether joinder is fraudulent, courts 

may consider whether the plaintiff has a good-faith intention of 

seeking a judgment against the non-diverse defendant.42 Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, courts continue to find 

fraudulent joinder requiring denial of a motion to remand when objective evidence clearly demonstrates there is no good faith intention to prosecute the action against all defendants or seek a joint 

judgment against them. As the Federal court in Faulk v. 

Husqvarna Consumer Outdoor Products N.A., Inc. 43 said, ‘‘[w]here 

the plaintiff’s collective litigation actions, viewed objectively, clearly 

demonstrate a lack of good faith intention to pursue a claim to 

judgment against a non-diverse defendant, the court should dismiss 

the non-diverse defendant and retain jurisdiction over the case.’’ 

That is what Federal courts mean when they describe ‘‘objective 

evidence’’ in the context of fraudulent joinder, namely ‘‘collective 

litigation actions.’’ The Federal court decision in In re Diet Drugs 


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44 220 F.Supp.2d 414, 420–22 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 45 448 F.3d 201, 216 (3rd Cir. 2006). 46See, e.g., Herkenhoff v. Supervalu Stores, Inc., 2014 WL 3894642, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 18, 

2014) (citing authorities). 47Mills v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 178 F.Supp.2d 1, 5–6 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing cases). 48 428 F.3d 1317, 1320–23 (11th Cir. 2005). 49 Id. at 1322–23 (internal quotations, citations, and emphasis deleted). 

Prods. Liab. Litig.,44 also illustrates how a court can find a lack of 

good faith intention based on a careful analysis of objective evidence. 

The language of this provision is taken almost verbatim from an 

often-cited decision of the Third Circuit. In In re Briscoe,45 the 

court said that joinder is fraudulent if ‘‘there is . . . no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against the defendant or 

seek a joint judgment.’’ This language has been quoted in decisions 

throughout the country, and prong (C) codifies it, with added language to make clear that the court should not inquire into the subjective intent of the plaintiff or his or her lawyer, but rather look 

to objective evidence. 

‘‘(3) In determining whether to grant or deny a motion under paragraph (1)(B), the court may permit the pleadings to be amended, 

and shall consider the pleadings, affidavits, and other evidence submitted by the parties.’’ 

Paragraph (3) codifies the widely followed judicial practice of considering affidavits and other materials outside the pleadings when 

determining whether joinder is fraudulent.46 As one court aptly put 

it, ‘‘[i]n analyzing a claim of fraudulent joinder, a court is not held 

captive by the allegations in the complaint.’’ 47 For example, in 

Legg v. Wyeth,48 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a district court 

erred in refusing to consider affidavits submitted by local sales representatives supporting the assertion that the representatives were 

fraudulently joined as defendants. 

Paragraph (3) also makes it clear that the district court may 

allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint to meet objections to remand. This provision addresses any concern that the plaintiff, having filed a complaint in state court under state procedural rules, 

may not have anticipated application of a ‘‘plausibility’’ or other 

Federal standard. 

The two provisions of paragraph (3) work in tandem. Thus, in 

Legg v. Wyeth, supra, the court said: 

The determination of whether a resident defendant has 

been fraudulently joined must be based upon the plaintiff’s 

pleadings at the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.’’ The proceeding appropriate ‘‘for resolving a claim of 

fraudulent joinder is similar to that used for ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b).49

H.R. 725 codifies this approach, with one important modification: 

the determination need not be based on the plaintiff’s pleadings at 

the time of removal; the plaintiff may amend the pleadings to meet 

objections to remand. However, the bill does not authorize any discovery beyond that which is permitted by existing rules and court 

decisions. 


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50See Wivell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 773 F.3d 887, 896 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing cases from 

Third and Tenth Circuits). 51Walton v. Bayer Corp., 643 F.3d 994, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 2011). 

‘‘(4) If the courts finds that all defendants described in paragraph 

(1)(B) have been fraudulently joined under paragraph (2), it shall 

dismiss without prejudice the claims against those defendants and 

shall deny the motion described in paragraph (1)(B).’’ 

Paragraph (4) makes clear that when a district court determines 

that a defendant has been fraudulently joined, the court should dismiss the claims against that defendant without prejudice, thereby 

allowing for a refiling of those claims in state court, to be decided 

on the merits. In providing that the claims against the in-state or 

non-diverse defendants should be dismissed without prejudice, 

paragraph (4) adopts the position of all but one of the courts of appeals that have addressed the issue.50 Only one court of appeals 

has ruled otherwise, in a single sentence without explanation.51

That decision should no longer be regarded as authoritative. 

With the dismissal of the fraudulently joined defendants, the district court can and should deny the motion to remand described in 

paragraph (1)(B). 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported 

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italics 

and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE 

* * * * * * * 

PART IV—JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 89—DISTRICT COURTS; REMOVAL OF CASES 

FROM STATE COURTS 

* * * * * * * 

§ 1447. Procedure after removal generally 

(a) In any case removed from a State court, the district court 

may issue all necessary orders and process to bring before it all 

proper parties whether served by process issued by the State court 

or otherwise. 

(b) It may require the removing party to file with its clerk copies of all records and proceedings in such State court or may cause 

the same to be brought before it by writ of certiorari issued to such 

State court. 

(c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect 

other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 

30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 


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1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the 

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment of just 

costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as 

a result of the removal. A certified copy of the order of remand 

shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The 

State court may thereupon proceed with such case. 

(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which 

it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except 

that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it 

was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be 

reviewable by appeal or otherwise. 

(e) If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the 

court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action 

to the State court. 

(f) FRAUDULENT JOINDER.— 

(1) This subsection shall apply to any case in which— 

(A) a civil action is removed solely on the basis of the 

jurisdiction conferred by section 1332(a); 

(B) a motion to remand is made on the ground that— 

(i) one or more defendants are citizens of the same 

State as one or more plaintiffs; or 

(ii) one or more defendants properly joined and 

served are citizens of the State in which the action was 

brought; and 

(C) the motion is opposed on the ground that the joinder of the defendant or defendants described in subparagraph (B) is fraudulent. 

(2) The joinder of a defendant described in paragraph 

(1)(B) is fraudulent if the court finds that— 

(A) there is actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts with respect to that defendant; 

(B) based on the complaint and the materials submitted under paragraph (3), it is not plausible to conclude 

that applicable State law would impose liability on that defendant; 

(C) State or Federal law clearly bars all claims in the 

complaint against that defendant; or 

(D) objective evidence clearly demonstrates that there is 

no good faith intention to prosecute the action against that 

defendant or to seek a joint judgment including that defendant. 

(3) In determining whether to grant or deny a motion under 

paragraph (1)(B), the court may permit the pleadings to be 

amended, and shall consider the pleadings, affidavits, and 

other evidence submitted by the parties. 

(4) If the court finds that all defendants described in paragraph (1)(B) have been fraudulently joined under paragraph 

(2), it shall dismiss without prejudice the claims against those 

defendants and shall deny the motion described in paragraph 

(1)(B). 

* * * * * * * 


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Dissenting Views 

H.R. 725, the ‘‘Innocent Party Protection Act,’’ is the latest attempt by the Majority to tilt the civil justice playing field in favor 

of corporate defendants by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to 

pursue state law claims in state courts. The bill would dramatically 

alter existing law by overriding the century-old doctrine of fraudulent joinder, under which Federal courts must remand a diversity 

case to state court if one defendant that is a citizen of the same 

state as the plaintiff (hereinafter ‘‘in-state defendant’’) was joined 

and where there is a reasonable basis under state law for a claim 

against that defendant. H.R. 725 also effectively repeals a statutory 

exception to diversity jurisdiction where a properly-joined out-ofstate defendant is a citizen of the state in which the suit is originally brought, known as the ‘‘local defendant’’ exception. The bill 

would impose burdensome and vague new requirements on a Federal court when considering a motion to remand in a case that was 

removed to Federal court solely on the basis of diversity of citizenship and where there is both an in-state and an out-of-state defendant present or where there is a local defendant. Specifically, before 

a Federal court could grant a motion to remand, the bill would require the court to find, among other things, that there is no actual 

fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, that the addition of the 

in-state or local defendant to a case is based on a ‘‘plausible’’ state 

law claim against that in-state or local defendant, and that the 

plaintiff has a good faith intention to pursue the action against the 

in-state or local defendant or to seek a joint judgment. 

H.R. 725 raises several serious concerns that, taken together, 

threaten to delay and possibly deny justice for plaintiffs with meritorious state law claims. First, as with many civil justice measures 

that the Majority has proposed, the bill is a solution in search of 

a problem. As noted, current law already establishes a standard for 

courts to determine whether a party has been improperly joined, a 

standard that has been in place for a century. Tellingly, the U.S. 

Supreme Court has not seen fit to change this standard, and H.R. 

725’s proponents offer no evidence that Federal courts have routinely failed to properly address fraudulent or otherwise improper 

joinder. Moreover, a defendant may be able to move to dismiss a 

claim in state court against an in-state defendant before removing 

the remaining claims to Federal court. 

Second, by applying a vague and undefined ‘‘plausibility’’ standard to state law claims, H.R. 725 will generate tremendous uncertainty, complexity, and additional cost to the consideration of a motion to remand, which is ordinarily a common procedural matter 

considered at a nascent stage of a diversity case. The difficulty in 

applying a ‘‘plausibility’’ standard in the pleadings context is instructive in this regard, as this plausibility pleading standard has 

spawned much litigation over what constitutes a ‘‘plausible’’ claim. 

Similarly, the bill further heightens uncertainty and complexity by 

requiring a court to inquire into the ‘‘good faith’’ of the plaintiff’s 

subjective intentions during this jurisdictional stage of the case, 

providing no guidance as to what constitutes ‘‘good faith.’’ These 

various requirements would effectively mandate a trial on the merits of a state law claim against a state defendant at the early procedural stage of a case when a court is ill-equipped to make such 


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1Letter from 54 consumer groups to Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), Chairman, and Rep. John 

Conyers, Jr.(D-MI), Ranking Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 1, 2017) (on file with 

the Democratic Staff of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 2 Id. 

3 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy—H.R. 3624, Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016 (Feb. 24, 2016). 4 Id. 

determinations and could even involve a defendant over which a 

Federal court may not have jurisdiction. In addition to adding burdens on litigants, these new requirements will strain already-limited Federal judicial resources. 

Finally, H.R. 725 deeply intrudes on state sovereignty by denying 

state courts the ability to decide, and thereby shape, state procedural and substantive law; and by shifting that power to Federal 

courts. Indeed, it is out of respect for federalism and recognition 

that Federal courts are supposed to be courts of limited jurisdiction 

that the Supreme Court added the requirement of complete diversity and Congress specified a minimum amount in controversy requirement in order for a state case to be removed to Federal court. 

Respect for federalism is also why Federal courts developed the 

practice of construing removal statutes narrowly, as reflected in the 

current fraudulent joinder doctrine, which favors remand to state 

courts except in very limited circumstances. The bill runs counter 

to this fundamental constitutional value, while also denying plaintiffs the prerogative to choose a state forum for the adjudication of 

state law claims. 

Given the bill’s serious flaws, a broad coalition consisting of 54 

consumer, environmental, and workers’ rights organizations, including the Alliance for Justice, the Asbestos Disease Awareness 

Organization, the Center for Justice & Democracy, the Consumer 

Federation of America, the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumer Law Center, the National Employment Lawyers Association, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 

Public Citizen, and the Sierra Club, oppose H.R. 725.1 They warn 

that the bill ‘‘would upend long established law in the area of Federal court jurisdiction’’ and ‘‘would result in needless micromanagement of Federal courts and a waste of judicial resources.’’ 2 In addition, the Obama administration issued a strong veto threat with respect to a bill considered in the last Congress that was substantively identical to H.R. 725.3 The Administration observed that 

the measure would ‘‘add needless complexity to civil litigation and 

potentially prevent plaintiffs from raising valid claims in State 

court.’’ 4

For the foregoing reasons, and those discussed below, we strongly 

oppose H.R. 725. 

DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND

DESCRIPTION

H.R. 725 would impose a series of new requirements on courts 

considering motions to remand in certain types of diversity cases. 

As a general matter, all of these requirements will make it harder 

for plaintiffs to successfully have cases solely raising state law 

claims remanded back to state court. 

Section 2 of the bill would add a new subsection (f) to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447, the Federal statute governing remands of cases that have 


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5 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 

6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 

been removed to Federal court from state court. New section 

1447(f)(1) specifies that the bill’s requirements apply in cases 

where: (1) a civil action has been removed only on the basis of diversity jurisdiction (i.e., all plaintiffs are citizens of different states 

than all defendants); (2) a motion to remand the case back to state 

court is made on the ground that at least one of the defendants is 

a citizen of the same state as at least one of the plaintiffs (i.e., that 

there is no complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, as 

required by the diversity statute) or that one of the defendants is 

a citizen of the state in which the state court action was brought 

(such cases are currently an exception to diversity jurisdiction, provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2)); and (3) the motion to remand 

is opposed on the ground that the joinder of an in-state or local defendant is fraudulent. 

New proposed section 1447(f)(2) specifies the circumstances pursuant to which a court can find that joinder was fraudulent. These 

circumstances include a case where the court finds that there is actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts or where state or 

Federal law clearly bars all claims against in-state or local defendants. A court can also find that joinder of a party was fraudulent, 

based on evidence, if ‘‘it is not plausible’’ to conclude that state law 

would impose liability on an in-state or local defendant or where 

objective evidence ‘‘clearly demonstrates’’ that the plaintiff lacked 

the ‘‘good faith intention’’ to pursue the civil action against such a 

defendant or to seek a joint judgment. 

The plausibility standard for determining whether remand would 

be appropriate appears to import the heightened pleading standard 

articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 5 into the remand context. Additionally, the bill fails to define ‘‘good faith intention,’’ a term that is not 

used in any other provision in title 28 of the U.S. Code. Such a determination would inherently require a subjective inquiry into the 

plaintiff’s intention in adding the in-state defendant, rather than 

the objective inquiry under current law asking whether the plaintiff had a reasonable basis for pursuing such a claim. 

New section 1447(f)(3), among other things, requires a court to 

consider pleadings, affidavits, and other evidence submitted by the 

parties in assessing whether joinder was fraudulent when considering a motion to remand. 

BACKGROUND

Diversity jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction of Federal courts 

over cases where the underlying claims arise solely under state 

law, but the parties are citizens of different states. A plaintiff may 

file a case in Federal court on diversity grounds or a defendant 

may remove a case filed in state court to Federal court on such 

basis. 

The diversity jurisdiction of Federal courts is rooted in Article 

III, section 2 of the Constitution, which provides, in pertinent part, 

that the ‘‘judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to . . . 

Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States. . . .’’ 6

Congress’s statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction is narrower than 

the scope of this constitutional provision, requiring, for example, a 


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7 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2017). 

8Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 

9 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2017). 

10 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2017). 11 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2017). 12 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2017). 13 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2017). 14The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R. 3624 Before the Subcomm. 

on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3 (2015) 

(written statement of Lonny Hoffman, Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Houston 

Law Center) [hereinafter ‘‘Hoffman Statement’’]. 15 Id. at 3–4. 

minimum amount in controversy.7 The Supreme Court has further 

limited the scope of diversity jurisdiction by requiring ‘‘complete’’ 

diversity—i.e., that no defendant can be a citizen of the same state 

as any plaintiff.8

The Federal diversity statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 

provides, among other things, that Federal district courts shall 

have jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of different 

states.9 Section 1332(c)(1) specifies that for purposes of the diversity statute and the Federal removal statute, a corporation is 

deemed to be a citizen of every state and foreign state where it is 

incorporated and where it has its principal place of business.10 For 

class actions, section 1332(d)(2) requires at least $5 million amount 

in controversy and recognizes diversity where any class member is 

a citizen of a different state than any defendant, among other 

things, making it relatively easier to remove class actions from 

state to Federal court.11

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), a defendant may seek to remove any 

civil action filed in a state court to a Federal court in the district 

where the state action is pending based solely on diversity jurisdiction, but the court must disregard the citizenship of defendants 

sued under fictitious names, and a case may not be removed if any 

of the parties properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen 

of the state in which the action is brought (the ‘‘local defendant’’ 

exception).12 Section 1447 of title 28, United States Code, outlines 

procedures for the Federal courts to follow after removal.13

The judicially-created doctrine of fraudulent joinder is an exception to the requirement for complete diversity. Under the doctrine, 

a case may be removed to Federal court even if there is an in-state 

defendant in the case because the plaintiff failed to state a case 

against the in-state defendant. 14 In seeking to remove a state case 

to Federal court, defendants often assert that a plaintiff has fraudulently joined an in-state defendant solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. 

The test for determining whether joinder is improper under this 

doctrine is whether the defendant has demonstrated that there is 

no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against the in-state defendant or no reasonable basis for a claim against such defendant, 

an extremely difficult and often impossible standard for a defendant to meet.15 If the Federal court finds, upon removal, that the 

fraudulently joined party was not properly joined to the case, it 

must dismiss that party from the case. 

The Supreme Court has recognized that federalism issues are always implicated in the removal context and, therefore, has made 

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16Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941). 17 Hoffman Statement at 5. 18 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2017). 19See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (2017) (providing that a case is removable within 30 days after 

initial pleadings if case has become removable within that time period). 20 Hoffman Statement at 6. 

preted to resolve all doubts and ambiguities against removal.16 The 

doctrine of fraudulent joinder reflects this general policy.17

CONCERNS WITH H.R. 725

I. H.R. 725 IS A SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM

While seeking to further stack the deck against plaintiffs by 

making it harder to pursue state law claims in state court, the bill 

does not address any actual existing problem. H.R. 725’s proponents offer no credible evidence that Federal courts are systematically ignoring improper joinder of in-state defendants in diversity cases or that the fraudulent joinder doctrine is ineffective. Ostensibly, the bill’s proponents seek a uniform fraudulent joinder 

standard. Nevertheless, all articulations of the current century-old 

standard embody the same principle that unless there is no reasonable basis or possibility of recovery against an in-state defendant, 

the court should allow the in-state party to remain in the case and 

remand the case to state court. The fraudulent joinder doctrine is 

well-settled and is the same standard in substance in every circuit, 

whatever the semantic variances among different courts. Moreover, 

proponents offer no evidence that there is any problem with the 

way that Federal courts have applied the ‘‘local defendant’’ exception to diversity jurisdiction,18 which H.R. 725 effectively repeals. 

Additionally, a defendant has the option of seeking to dismiss a 

non-meritorious claim against an in-state defendant in state court 

prior to removal to Federal court.19 In short, H.R. 725 does not address an actual problem, but would, instead, create problems by 

upending longstanding rules and potentially wreak havoc on the 

Federal courts. 

II. H.R. 725 WILL DRAMATICALLY INCREASE UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY, AND COSTS RELATED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF REMAND

MOTIONS

A. The application of a vague and undefined ‘‘plausibility’’ standard will require a determination on the merits of a state law 

claim at a point in the case when a court is ill-equipped to do 

so. 

H.R. 725 requires that, prior to granting a motion to remand, a 

court must find that it is ‘‘plausible to conclude that applicable 

State law would impose liability’’ on an in-state or local defendant. 

Although this plausibility standard is inherently vague, the bill 

does not define ‘‘plausible’’ or provide any guidance as to how a 

court should apply the term. As Professor Lonny Hoffman, the Minority witness who testified last Congress at the Constitution Subcommittee hearing on this bill warned, this vague term ‘‘would 

force courts to struggle with determining what ‘plausible’ means for 

purposes of deciding whether to grant remand.’’ 20 Professor Hoffman further noted that in addition to being ambiguous, the ‘‘plausibility’’ requirement is a new one, making it even more problematic 


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21 Id. at 7. 22 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 23 Rule 8 requires, among other things, that a complaint must contain ‘‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .’’ Fed. R Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 24 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957) 25 Herman Schwartz, The Supreme Court Slams the Door, THE NATION, Sept. 30, 2009. 26 556 U.S. at 679. 27 Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009. 28 Although the Supreme Court first established the notion of a ‘‘plausibility’’ pleading requirement in 2007 in the antitrust case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), it 

was in Iqbal that the Court expanded the ‘‘plausibility’’ pleading requirement to all civil suits. 

This new pleading requirement has been described as ‘‘an open door to judicial bias’’ and a ‘‘padlock on the courthouse door.’’ Tony Mauro, Plaintiffs Groups Mount Effort to Undo Supreme 

Court’s ‘Iqbal’ Ruling, THE NAT’L L. J., Sept. 21, 2009. It is a significant departure from the 

‘‘bare-bones complaint’’ and ‘‘mechanical’’ approach that had been established in the previous 50 

years. Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 

2009. 29 Hoffman Statement at 7. 

by making it hard for courts to apply the standard in a consistent 

and coherent way.21

The bill seeks to import the Federal plausibility pleading standard into the standards for granting remand motions. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its 2009 Ashcroft v. Iqbal decision, established a 

new standard for judging the sufficiency of facts alleged in a civil 

complaint. 22 Prior to Iqbal, the Court had made clear that, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,23 which governs 

pleadings in civil cases, a civil action should not be dismissed ‘‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’’ 24

According to commentators, the pre-Iqbal view was that Rule 8 

should be ‘‘interpreted liberally’’ because ‘‘until the plaintiff can remain in court long enough to have an opportunity to examine those 

files and to question defendants and others, the merits of a case 

cannot be determined.’’ 25

The Court’s holding in Iqbal reflected a decision to abandon more 

than half a century of established civil litigation practice. In Iqbal, 

the Court put forward a new test under which Federal judges are 

to determine which civil complaints will withstand a motion to dismiss. First, a complaint must contain factual allegations, rather 

than legal conclusions, and second, the factual allegations must be 

plausible, with plausibility ‘‘a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 

sense.’’ 26 Later, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, in her comments 

about the decision, observed that the court’s ‘‘majority messed up 

the federal rules.’’ 27 Not surprisingly, Iqbal has spawned much litigation over what constitutes a ‘‘plausible’’ claim for purposes of 

pleading under Rule 8.28

The experience of Federal courts in attempting to apply a ‘‘plausibility’’ standard to pleadings is instructive. Iqbal has spawned 

numerous inconsistent and incoherent decisions attempting to define what constitutes a ‘‘plausible’’ pleading. As Professor Hoffman 

noted, the ‘‘attempt to incorporate plausibility into jurisdictional 

law would raise identical difficulties to those that now plague the 

cacophony of Rule 12(b)(6) decisional law [addressing whether 

pleadings raise ‘‘plausible’’ claims]. Yet, the proposed amendments 

[in H.R. 725] are oblivious to this danger and silent on how district 

courts are to determine whether the claims asserted against a nondiverse defendant are plausible.’’ 29 Seven years after the Supreme 

Court required that a ‘‘plausibility’’ standard be applied to Federal 


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30 Hoffman Statement at 7. 

pleadings, Federal courts still struggle with its application, and 

there is little reason to think that the same difficulties would not 

arise with respect to the application of such a standard in the context of remand motions, with tremendous time and money spent 

litigating the question of plausibility. 

In addition to being vague and difficult to apply, H.R. 725’s plausibility standard would force a court to conduct a mini-trial on the 

merits of a plaintiff’s state law claims at a jurisdictional stage of 

the case, in the absence of discovery or the opportunity to fully develop the factual record and before the court’s jurisdiction (i.e., the 

court’s power to decide the case in the first place) is even established. For these reasons, current fraudulent joinder law does not 

impose such a requirement for merits review and instructs courts 

to avoid merits determinations. The fraudulent joinder doctrine requires a court only to take a limited look outside the pleadings and 

to avoid crossing the line from jurisdictional inquiry to a decision 

on the merits. Thus, in yet another way, H.R. 725 would dramatically change current law and practice. 

In sum, H.R. 725’s plausibility standard would introduce tremendous uncertainty and complexity into Federal courts’ determinations of remand motions because of its inherent vagueness and the 

difficulty of its application. Moreover, the standard requires a Federal court, as part of a jurisdictional inquiry, to engage in an extensive merits review of a plaintiff’s state law claims against an instate or local defendant. These factors will spawn a tremendous 

amount of litigation over the application of what currently is a simple procedural motion, potentially making many state law cases 

cost-prohibitive for many plaintiffs to pursue. 

B. The requirement that a court determine a plaintiff’s subjective 

‘‘good faith intention’’ and some of the bill’s other requirements 

are ambiguous, difficult to apply, and represent a significant departure from current law. 

As with its plausibility requirement, H.R. 725’s mandate that a 

court find that a plaintiff had a ‘‘good faith intention to prosecute 

the action against’’ an in-state or local defendant or to seek a joint 

judgment is likewise vague and undefined. The bill provides no 

guidance as to the meaning of ‘‘good faith intention’’ or how such 

a standard is to be applied. The term ‘‘good faith intention’’ is not 

used anywhere in Title 28 of the United States Code. Moreover, 

like the plausibility requirement, the requirement that a court inquire into a plaintiff’s subjective intentions is one that a court is 

ill-equipped to apply at a jurisdictional stage of the case. 

In addition, the ‘‘good faith intention’’ requirement is a significant departure from current law. Under the fraudulent joinder doctrine, the term ‘‘fraudulent’’ is a term of art that does not require 

the proof of actual fraudulent intent on the plaintiff’s part.30

‘‘Fraudulent’’ joinder typically refers to any improper joinder, regardless of the plaintiff’s intent, and the court’s inquiry is limited 

to whether there was some basis in law for the plaintiff’s claim 

against the in-state defendant. Yet, H.R. 725 mandates that a court 

determine that a plaintiff joined an in-state or local defendant with 

the ‘‘good faith intention’’ of pursuing a claim against such a deVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:46 Feb 24, 2017 Jkt 069006 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR017.XXX HR017

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31P.L. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4 (Feb. 18, 2005). 

fendant, changing longstanding law and introducing additional uncertainty into the consideration of remand motions. 

Similarly, H.R. 725’s requirement that a court find no ‘‘actual 

fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts’’ misdirects the court’s 

attention toward a plaintiff’s subjective intent when determining 

whether to grant a remand motion. As noted, current law requires 

a court only to look at whether there was a reasonable basis for 

the plaintiff’s claim, regardless of the plaintiff’s intent in naming 

a particular defendant. The ‘‘actual fraud’’ standard, like the ‘‘good 

faith intention’’ standard, is a major change to current fraudulent 

joinder law, one that would be very cumbersome to implement. 

As with the plausibility requirement, the ambiguity and novelty 

of the ‘‘good faith intention’’ and ‘‘actual fraud’’ standards will 

spawn increased litigation over their meaning and application, 

leading to increased uncertainty and costs for litigants and unnecessary and harmful delay in resolving threshold jurisdictional questions. 

C. The bill’s requirements open the door to dilatory tactics by defendants to further delay resolution of a case, deny plaintiffs the 

prerogative to choose the forum for their claims, and strain Federal judicial resources. 

Justice delayed is justice denied, and H.R. 725’s various requirements will have the effect of significantly delaying the ultimate resolution of many plaintiffs’ state law claims against in-state or local 

defendants. This factor may further incentivize out-of-state defendants to remove cases to Federal court and to prolong proceedings 

on motions to remand, knowing that the burden of sharply increased costs and length of litigation will fall disproportionately on 

plaintiffs, who typically have fewer litigation resources than the average out-of-state corporate defendant. This potential outcome may 

even have the effect of dissuading plaintiffs from filing suit in state 

court in the first place. 

H.R. 725 also denies plaintiffs the prerogative to select the forum 

in which their claims will be heard by making it much easier for 

an out-of-state defendant to remove a case to Federal court, leaving 

the choice of forum in the defendant’s hands in many more cases 

than currently. Additionally, the bill, if enacted, could result in a 

significant increase in the workload of Federal courts, straining already limited judicial resources. 

This legislation must be seen as part of a longstanding effort to 

make it easier for defendants to remove purely state law matters 

to Federal court. For instance, more than a decade ago, Congress 

passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).31 Among 

other things, CAFA expanded Federal diversity jurisdiction for 

class actions, including eliminating the requirement for complete 

diversity in class actions, making it easier for defendants to remove 

class and ‘‘mass actions’’ from state to Federal courts. CAFA opponents—including Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) and 

Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY)—argued that it was a blatant attempt to tilt the playing field in favor of defendants. They 

opposed expansion of Federal diversity jurisdiction as an unwarranted effort to make it ‘‘far more burdensome, expensive, and 


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32See H. Rep. 108–144 at 157–76, 108th Cong. (dissenting views to Committee report accompanying H.R. 1115, Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, which the House passed by a vote of 253– 

170). 33 Id. at 166–70. 

time-consuming for groups of injured persons’’ to use the class action mechanism to vindicate their rights under state law.32 They 

expressed concern that CAFA would undermine state law by divesting state courts of the ability to interpret and develop state 

procedural and substantive law and that it would increase the 

workload of already over-burdened Federal courts.33 H.R. 725 simply would continue to exacerbate this problem. 

III. H.R. 725 OFFENDS FEDERALISM AND REPRESENTS A SERIOUS

INTRUSION INTO STATE SOVEREIGNTY

H.R. 725 raises serious federalism concerns by denying state 

courts the ability to shape state substantive and procedural law 

and by instead transferring that power to Federal courts. Indeed, 

many of us raised very similar federalism concerns in opposing 

CAFA more than 10 years ago, but H.R. 725 ignores these concerns. 

Removal of a state court case to Federal court always implicates 

federalism concerns, which is why the Federal courts generally disfavor Federal jurisdiction and read removal statutes narrowly. As 

noted earlier, this is why the fraudulent joinder doctrine places a 

very high burden on a defendant opposing a remand motion to 

show that there was no reasonable basis for the addition of an instate defendant, thus favoring remand to state courts except under 

very limited circumstances. By replacing this well-settled doctrine 

with sweeping and vaguely-worded new standards for the determination of when a state case may be remanded to state court, 

H.R. 725 denies state courts the ability to decide and, ultimately, 

to shape state law. 

In addition, the bill further infringes state sovereignty by giving 

Federal courts the power to shape state pleading law. This is particularly true with respect to the application of the bill’s ‘‘plausibility’’ standard. When a suit is maintained in state court, the applicable pleading standard may not be the plausibility pleading 

standard articulated in Iqbal. Yet, when a Federal court is required 

to review a state law claim in the context of a remand motion, it 

will effectively be applying the heightened Iqbal pleading standard 

to the plaintiff’s claims against an in-state or local defendant, progressively undermining the authority of state courts to set their 

own pleading standards for state court cases. As a practical matter, 

any plaintiff who chooses to add an in-state defendant to a case 

filed in state court must meet the Iqbal pleading standard to support a remand back to state court should the case be removed to 

Federal court. 

Finally, by effectively repealing the local defendant exception to 

diversity jurisdiction provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), H.R. 

725 further chips away at state sovereignty, expanding the power 

of Federal courts to decide state law matters. This is particularly 

egregious in the case of repealing the local defendant exception because the principal concern justifying diversity jurisdiction—the 

risk of prejudice against an out-of-state defendant by a state 

court—is absent in the case of a defendant that is a citizen of the 


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state where the suit was filed, as Congress clearly recognized by 

putting the local defendant exception into statute. 

CONCLUSION

H.R. 725 is a blatant attempt to tilt the playing field in favor of 

corporate wrongdoers by making it far more burdensome, expensive, and time-consuming for injured people to obtain justice from 

such wrongdoers. The bill’s proponents have failed to offer any 

credible evidence that there is a need to replace the well-settled 

fraudulent joinder doctrine. Moreover, the bill will impose novel, 

highly ambiguous, and difficult-to-apply requirements on Federal 

courts considering remand motions in certain circumstances. These 

new requirements will create tremendous uncertainty and introduce unnecessary complexity into the remand process. They will 

also increase the length and cost of litigation, delaying adjudication 

of potentially meritorious claims and burdening plaintiffs to the 

point where future plaintiffs may even be dissuaded from filing 

suit. Finally, the bill represents a serious intrusion into sovereignty 

by denying state courts the ability to shape state law and inappropriately shifting that power to Federal courts. 

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully dissent and urge our 

colleagues to stand on the side of justice and to join us in opposing 

H.R. 725. 

MR. CONYERS, JR. 

MR. NADLER. 

MS. LOFGREN. 

MS. JACKSON LEE. 

MR. COHEN. 

MR. JOHNSON, JR. 

MR. DEUTCH. 

MR. GUTIERREZ. 

MS. BASS. 

MR. RICHMOND. 

MR. JEFFRIES. 

MR. CICILLINE. 

MR. SWALWELL. 

MR. LIEU. 

MR. RASKIN. 

MS. JAYAPAL. 

Æ 


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