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22–298 2016

INTERVIEWS OF WITNESSES

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

THE EVENTS SURROUNDING

THE 2012 TERRORIST

ATTACK IN BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, 2012–2016

VOLUME 4 OF 11

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the

2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi

(

Available on the Internet:

www.fdsys.gov
(II)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman

LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PETER ROSKAM, Illinois

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama

SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland

Ranking Minority Member

ADAM SMITH, Washington

ADAM SCHIFF, California

LINDA SA ́ NCHEZ, California

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director
CONTENTS

Page

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #12 ......................................................... 1

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #16 ......................................................... 119

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #8 ........................................................... 289

Interview of Principal Officer #4 ............................................................................ 559

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #21 ......................................................... 753

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #13 ......................................................... 931

Interview of GRS Agent #1 ..................................................................................... 1011

Interview of GRS Agent #2 ..................................................................................... 1013

Interview of GRS Agent #3 ..................................................................................... 1015

Interview of CIA Official ......................................................................................... 1017

Interview of Deputy Chief of Base ......................................................................... 1019

Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal ........................................................................... 1021

Interview of Communications Officer .................................................................... 1315

Interview of GRS—Tripoli ...................................................................................... 1317

Interview of Director, Information Resource Managment, Executive Secretariat ..................................................................................................................... 1319

Interview of State Department Chief Records Officer .......................................... 1421

Interview of Chief of Station ................................................................................... 1495

(III)

INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #12

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 9, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel

BRENT WOOLFORK, Minority Senior Professional Staff

DANIEL REBNORD, Minority Professional Staff

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

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Ms. Barrineau. We'll go on the record.

This is a transcribed interview of conducted by the

House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted

voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks

on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related

matters pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House

Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Could the witness please state your name for the record?

Mr.

Ms. Barrineau. The committee appreciates your appearance at the

interview this morning, Agent

Good morning. My name is Sara Barrineau, with the committee's

majority staff. And I'll let everyone else in the room introduce

themselves,too.

Ms. Jackson. I'm Sharon Jackson with the majority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority.

Mr. Woolfork. I'm Brent Woolfork on the minority staff.

Mr. Rebnord. Dan Rebnord with the minority.

Mr. Desai. Ronak Desai with the minority.

Mr. Davis. I'm Carlton Davis, and I work for Mr. Gowdy.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman. I'm with the minority staff.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke with the majority staff.

Mr. Chipman. Did I say "minority"?

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Ms. Clarke. You did.

Mr. Chipman. I meant majority. Thank you. I apologize.

Ms. Betz. I'm Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers for the State Department.

Ms. Barrineau. Thank you.

Before we begin, I'd like to go over the ground rules and explain

how the interview will proceed.

The way the questioning proceeds is that a member from the

majority will ask questions first for up to an hour, and then the

minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal period

of time if they choose. We firmly adhere to the 1-hour time limit for

each side. Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee

or designated staff member. We will rotate back and forth, 1 hour per

side, until we are out of questions, and then the interview will be

over.

Unlike a testimony or a deposition in Federal court, the committee

format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness or their

counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review by the

chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot be resolved in

the interview, the witness can be required to return for a deposition

or hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. This has

not been an issue we've encountered in the past, but we just want to

make sure you're clear on the process.

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This session is to begin as unclassified. If any question calls

for a classified answer, please let us know, and we'll reserve its

answer until we move into a classified setting, usually after lunch.

You're welcome to confer with counsel at any time throughout the

interview. And I see that you've brought your counsel with you. But

if anything needs to be clarified, we ask that the witness make this

known. If you need to discuss anything with your counsel, we will go

off the record and stop the clock to provide you this opportunity.

We'll take a break whenever is convenient for you. It can be

after every hour of questioning, after a couple of rounds, whatever

you need. If you need anything -- water, sweet tea, use of the

facilities, or to confer with your counsel -- just let us know, and

we'll go off the record and stop the clock. We just want to make this

as easy and comfortable for you as possible.

As you can see, an official reporter is taking down everything

you say to make a written record, so we ask that you give verbal

responses to all questions, "yes" and "no," as opposed to nods of the

head.

I'm going to ask the reporter to please feel free to jump in if

we respond nonverbally or if I start talking too fast. We should also

be careful to not talk over each other, as it makes it harder for them

to get a clear record. And I'm as guilty of that as anyone.

We want to make sure you answer our questions in the most complete

and truthful manner possible, so we will take our time and repeat or

clarify if necessary. If you have any questions or do not understand

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any of our questions, please let us know. We'll be happy to clarify

or repeat.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or don't

remember, it's best not to guess. Please just give us your best

recollection, and if there are things you don't know or can't remember,

just say so, and tell us if you know who might be able to answer those

questions.

You're required to -- I know you know this as an agent, but you're

required to answer questions from Congress truthfully. Do you

understand that?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Barrineau. Do you understand that this also applies to

questions posed by congressional staff in an interview?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Barrineau. And do you understand that witnesses that

knowingly provide false testimony could be subject to criminal

prosecution for perjury or making false statements?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Barrineau. Is there any reason you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. No.

Ms. Barrineau. Okay. That's the end of the preamble.

Heather, do you guys have anything?

Ms. Sawyer. No, thanks.

Ms. Barrineau. Okay. The clock reads 10:04, and we'll start

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with the first round.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Agent could you tell us a bit about your

professional background before you joined DS?

A Sure. , I was a United States Marine. I served

as a Marine security guard in and in .

After separating from the Marine Corps honorably, I went to college

at in . After my studies

were complete , I worked for a private security contractor in

Iraq and joined Diplomatic Security in 2006.

Q And what have your assignments been with DS?

A With DS, I've served domestically. I started in 2006 at

the field office. After , I served as assistant regional

security officer in . After , I was

assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI's Joint Terrorism

Task Force .

After that assignment, I served 1 year at the resident

office -- Diplomatic Security's resident office in

. I then went to Arabic language training for 1 year and

served a permanent assignment in -- well, I'm currently assigned to

the U.S. Embassy in .

Q Where during that timeline did you find out and then serve

in Benghazi?

A While I was serving in , so 2012 -- so 2011-2012.

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Q Did you volunteer? Did they ask you to go?

A I volunteered to serve in Benghazi.

Q How did you find out about it?

A As I recall, there was a broadcast message, which is typical

for these type of assignments, for the Bureau or the Department to ask

for volunteers, and I answered the call.

Q Do you remember -- and I know this was several years ago.

Do you remember how much time from when you said, "Yes, I'll go," till

when they had you on a plane?

A I don't recall the exact timeframe. I can speculate to say

30 days.

Q Okay. That's good.

I guess at that point you had already completed high-threat

training?

A Correct.

Q Was it required at the time for everyone going into Benghazi

to have completed the high-threat training?

A As I recall, I think it was required for everyone to

serve -- or to have that training, the high-threat training.

Q Before you left to go to Benghazi, did DS provide you with

any kind of security briefing or information or meetings or anything

like that?

A I was assigned to work criminal investigations in

I had limited access to classified systems. If I needed

to read something on the classified side, I would generally ask the

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I can't recall if I went over and read anything -- any

classified, you know, security assessments or anything prior to my

departure.

I do recall having email correspondence and maybe even had a phone

call with personalities at post -- by "post," I mean Benghazi -- and

also people -- I'm certain I corresponded with International Programs

here in DS.

Q Do you remember who in International Programs you were

talking to?

A Certainly, the desk officer, and I think the

region director at the time was .

Q So based on what they had told you, both at post and in D.C.,

what did you understand the situation in Benghazi to be in terms of,

kind of, what you were getting into, if that makes any sense?

A I can't recall exactly what our conversations -- it was over

3 years ago. However, I'm confident to state that it was a high-threat

post. I knew that if I needed the training to be a high-threat -- you

know, high-threat-trained, that the situation -- or that the post

required those type of skills from an agent going out there. So it

wasn't, for example, Paris, where you wouldn't need that type of

training.

Q Okay. Let me ask this. Did you know before you got there

if the facility had the traditional diplomatic status or official

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diplomatic status that you were used to, say, during your time in

Did you know it to be any different?

Mr. Evers. Do you understand what she's asking?

Mr. Could you maybe elaborate a little bit more?

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Sure.

So, because you've done some time overseas, you understand, you

know, what an embassy or consulate is and the official diplomatic

status that comes it. Were you given any indication before you got

to Benghazi that it might be a different type of facility?

Does that make sense?

A I mean, what I can ‐‐ how I can answer that is, you know,

I read the message ‐‐

Q Uh‐huh.

A ‐‐ I volunteered to serve at the post. And Idon't really

ask too many questions following what I'm being asked to do, which

is provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct of

diplomacy.

So when I answered that, understood that was going to serve that

purpose.

Q Okay.

So when you got to Benghazi, what was the security environment

both at the compound and in the city at large?

A When Iarrived off the plane, landed in Benghazi, you know,

there was no uniformed police on the streets. Militias were the flavor

of the day, who provided security services to the city. You generally

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can move freely. We didn't incur any problems from my experience at

the airport to when I arrived at the compound.

Q Could you identify a militia from a civilian or additional,

like, various militias from one another? Does that make sense? You

know, in this country, the police are all wearing uniforms that look

the same. Could you tell --

A My initial -- you know, upon my initial arrival, no, I

couldn't tell you who worked for who, and I don't know if that changed

throughout my stay. Again, they were nonuniformed, you know -- when

I say "nonuniformed," there was no standard uniform. The militia

members, if you will, generally wore whatever they wore. I guess

that's the best answer.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So not even like battle fatigues, camouflage, anything like

that? There wasn't even an unofficial uniform or insignia of any kind?

A Certainly, they wore fatigues, camouflage, utilities, as

we would call them in the Marine Corps. But there was no

standardization in uniform, which we are familiar with through our

Armed Forces. I'm, you know, a former Marine. I know by different

patterns of camouflage what each servicemember -- or he or she belongs

to. There was not that.

Q Or even in the police department --

A Correct.

Q -- you know the difference between the brown of a

sheriff's deputy versus the blue of a trooper or city police officer

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or things like that. You saw no regularization, shall we say?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

A I did not see uniformity in the appearance of -- again, I'm

trying to recall, you know, what happened 3 years ago the best I can,

but I don't recall, you know, this unit wearing this particular set

of camouflage utilities or this unit wearing this

particular -- identifying them as such.

Q Could you distinguish at all between one militia and

another? Flags, other emblems, things like that? Were you at any

point able to distinguish between sort of a friendly militia and a less

friendly militia, if there was such a thing?

A Again, I can't recall, you know, who was friend from -- which

militia group we would have had any concerns about. I mean, we had

four or five at the time, 17th February Martyrs Brigade soldiers, we'll

call them, that were associated with the compound. And they had been

with -- or with the American presence there. They had been with us

and provided us a quick-reaction-force-type of a capability at the

compound, and they were part of the, for lack of better terms, loyal

militia. The predominant militia that was in Benghazi at the time was

the 17th February guys.

They helped us determine who were friendly from who weren't

friendly. And I can't recall a time where we ever had any unfriendly

militias that we encountered during my period of time there. I can't

recall a time where we encountered any unfriendly militia.

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BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Do you remember when you got to Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q When did you get to Benghazi?

A February 1st, I believe.

Q And --

A I say that so matter-of-factly, but I think it was

February 1st.

Q -- do I understand correctly that you started as an ARSO

for about a week and then you became the RSO when Agent left?

Is that right?

A When I was asked to go, in my initial volunteer -- when I

volunteered for the position, I volunteered knowing that I was going

as the regional security officer. I volunteered for the job.

International Programs said, hey, you know, we'd like for you to be

the temporary regional security officer there.

When I arrived, it was my understanding that the previous RSO and

I would turn over for a couple of days, which is customary --

Q That makes sense.

A -- in my previous positions, and then he would go on.

Because, again, these were temporary assignments.

Q So when you arrived and it was you and it was the RSO at

the time, how many ARSOs were there?

A Including myself, I traveled with another agent,

. and I traveled together into Benghazi. When we arrived,

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there were three agents on the ground. That's including the RSO, so

a total of five agents. We brought the total number of agents on the

ground to five when we arrived.

Q Do you remember how long it stayed at five? Or were several

of those rotating out?

A The dates and times when people left, you know, escapes me.

However, I know that it was only a short period of time while we were

all together there.

Q And then during the time you were there, what was -- and,

obviously, I don't expect you to remember who came and left when, but

what was the average number of agents you had on the compound while

you were there, including yourself?

A The number fluctuated, so I don't know if I ever had an

average.

Q Did you ever get back to -- once some of those agents rotated

out, did you ever have five agents again?

A No.

Q Do you remember if you ever had four agents?

A Yes.

Q You did have four agents --

A Yes.

Q -- at some point. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was that early on or later on?

A It would have been later on, towards the end of my time in

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Benghazi.

Q Was it a situation again where agents were coming in to

replace agents on the ground so you had the overlap again?

A As I recall, that's probably -- that was the situation.

Q Okay.

A Again, you know, personnel would travel to Benghazi,

transition with the person that they were replacing, and then the other

agents would then depart.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q But so, for the most part, once the transitions kind of

settled, in between transitions, you generally had three or less RSOs

on the compound? Is that fair?

A Again, you know, as I reflect on it, I don't know if I want

to generalize and say that I only had four or three. You may know better

than I do, but four was the maximum number of agents that I had on the

ground in Benghazi, including myself. So three agents working with

me was the maximum number, so four together.

Q Okay.

So when you got to the compound, what did the compound look like?

What was the compound when you got there?

Ms. Jackson. Before that, can I ask --

Ms. Barrineau. I'm sorry.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was there ever just you at the compound?

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A Without other agents, you mean?

Q Yes.

A No.

Q Okay. So there was always at least one other person?

A Yes.

Q Did you always have at least two other people?

A Including myself?

Q No. In addition.

A So three.

Q Yes, three.

A So three agents on the ground. Did I ever have -- I'm

sorry, could you ask again?

Q I guess what I'm asking is, was there ever a point where

there was just two of you, you and one other agent? Or was it always

you and two other agents?

A Again, I believe there was a period of time there was just

two of us in Benghazi.

Q Okay.

Ms. Barrineau. Good?

Ms. Jackson. Yeah.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Okay. So when you got to Benghazi, what was the compound

like? What was the nature of the compound?

A Could you be more specific about "the nature"?

Q What did it look like? You had some villas.

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A Okay. When I arrived, after, you know, not -- we've

already said that the arrival to the compound, there was militias, an

assortment of militias, no police, but we could move freely about.

When I arrived on the compound, it was 13 acres -- I remember this

pretty vividly -- 13 acres. We occupied three dormitories, I will say.

We named them Villa A, B, and C. There was a building that we considered

as, you know -- it was referred to by, you know, us and the other folks

there as the tactical operations center, also as the office.

And then we had another outlying building on the 13-acre compound,

which really was three separate, you know, residences, which housed

the quick reaction forces I've described before, the 17th February

guys, who also lived on compound with us.

Does that answer your question?

Q Uh-huh.

A Okay.

Q So what did you think about -- especially considering you

had already served in Islamabad, which was high-threat, what did you

think about the physical security of the compound when you arrived?

A The facility itself -- I mean, I'll just say the compound

itself, the wall was in poor condition. There was, you know, several

things that I have become accustomed to, serving in the Marine Corps

overseas, serving as an ARSO in Islamabad, that were absent in Benghazi.

You know --

Q Like what?

A The lack of any -- you know, the setback was not what we

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had come -- again, that I've become accustomed to and which I know were

standards that we try not to deviate from. There was no anti-ram

vehicle barriers, if you will, to provide us that protection.

Those were some of the initial impressions. You know, those are

some of the -- when you get there, you do see that the wall was in poor

condition --

Q Right.

A -- and that there was none of those, you know, those

countermeasures, if you will, the countermeasures that are usually

outside a diplomatic facility. Well, I shouldn't -- you know, what

I have come to understand are outside a diplomatic facility, the vehicle

barriers, those were absent when I arrived.

Q So during your turnover with the RSO, did you discuss any

of that?

A Again, as I recall, with --

Q Understood.

A -- speaking with you know, we identified

various weaknesses, various projects, various things that he either

wanted to start or things that he had asked for funding to start, things

that he did while he was there, and, you know, where to kind of go during

my -- where to go or what's in the queue for the next couple of months.

So, yes, we did turn over, you know, some of those projects that

we both wanted to -- that we both, I think, felt were necessary to

improve our situation there.

Q Do you remember what requests maybe you inherited that he

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had already made that you were still waiting on?

A I believe requested funding for a drop-arm. And when

I say "drop-arm," that was supposed to prevent people from being able

to just drive up right into the front gate of our facility.

He had also asked for some funding for some sandbags.

Again, none of these -- again, he had asked for the funding, but

it took a while for the -- when you add -- you know, the process is,

you ask for money, and then it comes to you. There is some, you know,

making sure that, you know, our requests are adequate, appropriate,

and then the money is disbursed to Tripoli. And then it's -- you know,

it was a cash economy at the time, so that money had to get to us before

we could identify contractors and work to be under way.

So those are the two projects that I can readily recall that he

started.

Q Did you make any additional requests while you were there

for physical security upgrades?

A Certainly.

Q What did you request?

A Again, you know, I carried forward with some of the things

that wanted.

When the money was appropriated for the sandbags, we identified

places to deploy these sandbag fighting positions, as we called them,

you know, to give us these concentric -- you know, our security, you

know, developed around a concentric rings theory. You've probably

heard it over the period of other folks talking about it, but we wanted

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to improve our ability to either defend from -- you know, to take the

compound back or, you know, to give ourselves an opportunity for a fight

and retreat. And that was the idea between the sandbags.

They're not, you know, in most -- in my experience, sandbags are

not deployed at, you know, diplomatic facilities, but we believed they

were important to give ourselves an opportunity to defend the compound

if need be.

I also -- again, had asked for the drop-arm. Well, we were

able to get -- with the money that he had asked for, we were able to

get another, so two drop-arms. And that work was performed while I

was there.

You know, you don't need to be an expert in physical security,

which I don't claim to be at all, but knowing that the wall was a major

source of concern for myself, for my predecessor -- I don't want to

speak for him, but I know when we were walking around, that was obviously

a concern for all of us. So, you know, I worked with Diplomatic

Security to improve the wall.

And there were obstacles to improving the wall. The answer

was -- the short answer was OBO, Overseas Building Office, because it

was a short-term lease, we couldn't improve the wall. We had to ask

the landlord to improve the wall. And up until that point, my amount

of confidence in getting the landlord to do anything was absent. There

just wasn't any. We had other projects, the generator, you know, that

the landlord just didn't pay attention to.

So we, myself and DS, the physical security experts back in

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Washington, came up with a plan to build a temporary chain-link fence

that would bring a -- you know, specifications were something that we

all agreed upon, and it gave us some type of a level of comfort for

an antipersonnel measure, so that if people were able to get over the

wall, they would also have to defeat a chain-link fence with razor wire

around it. Again, this is the concentric rings theory, was to kind

of delay, you know, someone from intruding on the compound.

Q Did that temporary chain-link fence ever -- was that ever

built while you were there? I don't know if "built" is the right word,

but --

A I understand.

The work began roughly 2 weeks before I departed. Again, we'd

identified the problem, requested the amount of funding, identified

a contractor to perform the work -- which, again, it's a cash economy.

There weren't a lot of -- you know, it's not like you can pick up a

phone and go through the Yellow Pages there and find someone. You know,

it's really word of mouth or you're relying on, you know, your locals

to help you with it.

We identified a contractor to do the work, agreed on a price of

the work, and the money was allocated. We paid him 20 percent. He

began the work prior to me leaving. A couple of weeks after -- you

know, we agreed upon a plan, blueprints, if you will, and the work began.

Q Aside from the fact that it was a cash economy, did you have

other funding issues back in D.C., with it being a temporary mission?

A The money that I requested to Diplomatic Security I

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received. Today, if I want to reflect on it, would I have been -- I

felt, you know, that if I had the money in my pockets, I could have

been able to -- the work would have been performed earlier.

The work was performed, however, not as timely as I wanted it to

be, I guess is the way that I want to characterize that.

Q So, essentially, if the money had been at post instead

of -- is that what you're saying? Instead of having to go through D.C.

and Tripoli and then get cash? I just want to make sure I understand

what you're saying.

A I think that's fair, yes. If we had the money at post

and -- if I had the money at post, you know, if I was able to spend

the money -- you know, I'm an official for the U.S. Government. I'm

entrusted with a lot as a DS special agent. You know, I wanted the

ability to go ahead and perform work, pay for that work, and then on

the back end be able to tell people, "This is what I spent it for,"

and be able to -- you know, justify it that way, because it just made

sense in my mind. Not necessarily -- I don't know if that's the

appropriate way to do it, but for me, that was some of my frustration.

I can also discuss some of the other projects my team --

Q Absolutely.

A -- undertook while we were there aside from the fence.

We also -- again, I don't know if it was necessarily my team's

brainstorming or, you know, a combination of the previous regimes and

myself, but we also knew that there was bars. If you travel abroad,

you often see bars on windows because the crime -- you know, to prevent

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people from breaking in. Well, they don't always think that you need

to get out of those in a fire. So we identified that there was a

weakness, that you couldn't get out if there was a fire.

So, again, we identified some -- you know, identified a contractor

to come in and cut those window grilles off and then replace them with

a system that was very, very, you know, rudimentary, but it worked,

to get out in case of a fire. We strategically located those in

different buildings so, you know, there was at least one or two in each

of the buildings so that if there was a fire you could escape from the

building.

And, you know, that was one of the more -- you know, we took a

lot of pride to get that done and then, after the fact, know that that

was used.

Q Uh-huh.

A We also identified that, you know, there was no protection

once -- you know, the methodology is to kind of bunker up -- at that

point, the methodology was to kind of consolidate forces, bunker up,

and then try to see what the situation was going on. Because we did

have personnel on compound that were not -- you know, they didn't -- they

weren't, for lack of better terms, gun-toters. They weren't DS agents,

they weren't responsible for security. Those persons were the

information management officer and the principal officer or any other

TDYers that had come to post.

So we devised a very, you know, rudimentary safe haven, for lack

of a better term, a gate, you know, that was inside

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of the marble that, you know, protected, something that we could lock

that would, again, delay adversaries to getting to our people. And

we slept behind that, and I think in one of the villas.

Since that worked so well, I sought funding to create, you know,

the same type of model in each one of our other -- the TOC and also

one of the other dormitories. I sought funding for it. I don't know

if the work was completed or not.

There were some other -- again, the other projects that we

undertook. I mean, a visiting technical security team from Cairo came

out and, you know, improved cameras, improved the lighting on the

compound. There used to be vineyards on the compound. We just

demolished all of the vegetation that had overgrown where people could

find cover and concealment on the compound to make it easier for us

to see what's going on at night.

You know, and my team -- and, I mean, really, the guys that I worked

with there were very helpful, allowing me to accomplish some of these

tasks. Because we all had, you know, a commitment to make things better

for the next team that came in. And I think that that's just not -- you

know, just not us that were thinking about that, you know. People

before us were doing the same, and, you know, people afterwards, I'm

certain, were doing the same.

Q Even with those upgrades that you made -- and it sounds like

you made a lot of progress in 2 months -- did the compound then look

like something you were more accustomed to in an overseas high-threat

environment, or was it still lacking and you were essentially making

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do with the best you could?

A In my experience --

Q Yes.

A -- Benghazi, the Special Mission Compound or facility did

not look like other places I had been.

Q Did you make any requests that were just flat-out denied

or refused?

A I can't recall.

Q Do you remember if anyone in D.C. ever put parameters on

what you could request? "You can request these field-expedient

things, but don't even bother requesting these things."

A Yeah, I can't recall if I was told that.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Other than the wall?

A Right.

Q Right.

A Other than the wall. And, again, to clarify, the wall, you

know, there was a -- you know, DS, we wanted to find a solution for

that. The guys back in Washington, you know, we created a solution

over email. Said, hey, this was a weakness, this was the restriction,

let's get over that obstacle. I think, you know, we had a common, you

know, approach to let's fix this, because we identified it as a

vulnerability.

Q Right.

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26

So were there any other issues that you identified, like the wall,

where you had conversations with Washington where they said we're not

going to fund that so let's go think of another way to get around this

issue?

A The wall is the one thing that sticks out in my mind. And,

again, I just want to -- you know, I do want to, you know, make sure

that's clear that we did find a solution.

Q Right.

A It wasn't, you know, what we originally intended, which was

improving the walls, but it was a solution.

Q Uh-huh.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Did you at least feel comfortable in making requests back

to D.C.? Does that make sense?

A Yeah. I felt comfortable.

Q Okay. Let's go back to the staffing on the compound. And

we talked about the DS agents. Tell me about the local -- what did

you think of the local guard force when you arrived? What was your

impression of them?

A Could you be more clear, I guess, who -- local guard force?

Q Okay, let's do both. Let's do the unarmed guards, for lack

of a better word, and then we can talk about the 17th Feb QRFs.

A Okay. And the original question? I'm sorry.

Q Just what was your impression of the local guard force in

terms of your other overseas experience and then what you thought of

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those guys specifically.

A I'm going to base my answer off of what I've experienced

in . I had a contract guard force in , which was, you

know -- contract guard force, I believe it was G4S at the time,

1,000-plus guards on a contract. They were trained by the guard

contractor and given to us trained, ready to assume their positions.

So I was familiar with guard forces prior to coming to Benghazi.

Now, when I arrived to Benghazi, we were in the midst of

formalizing our guard force there. I was on the selection process for

the guard contractor.

The guards, my impression was the question, of the guards that

were there?

Q Uh-huh.

A They wanted to help. They needed the training to do their

job. I think that's a good answer for that.

Q Did you feel the same way -- after you got the contract with

the Blue Mountain Group and you started that, did that help any? Was

that better? Or did you still feel that they were lacking training?

A As I recall it, many of the guards that we had under the

previous -- before there was a contractor were absorbed by the guard

force. I was more than elated when we professionalized the guard

force, meaning we had standards to hold the guard contractor to, but

we allowed them a certain amount of time to, you know, assume their

roles as this professional guard force.

So with that came training on how to stand post. I mean, you know,

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28

they started from, you know, the grassroots before we -- but they were

still working as guards while we were there. I mean, this was something

that we agreed to, you know. This was an expeditionary mission, and,

you know, we were cognizant of the fact that we needed guards, they

knew that we needed guards, and they wanted to train them. We met

together that we wanted -- we had a common objective to make sure that

the guards were professionals standing post.

And, you know, I was happy with the choice that we made to go with

this contract guard force, to go with the group that we

eventually -- that the Department eventually solicited the contract

to.

Q Could you tell a difference as the training went on that

the service that the guards were providing was getting better?

A Again, I can't recall, but there -- I mean, one instance,

you know, comes into my mind. This was after the guard force was handed

over to Blue Mountain, that the guards did what we expected them to

do. You know, they initiated an alarm, and they sought cover. And

that initiating alarm allowed us to react a certain and appropriate

way.

So I was impressed with that, and I always commended my guards

on doing that type of a job, because it was difficult in those type

of circumstances. You know, guarding American diplomats in Benghazi

is not something that's easy to do, and especially when we're asking

people that are not formerly police officers or military, you know,

to do this type of a job. It's just different standards, you know.

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29

It's not asking somebody out here who knows what, you know, a mall -- for

instance, we know what mall security guards do, you know, and so we

kind of grow up in this idea of what a security person professional

does. There they didn't have that. These guys were -- you know, some

of them were educated, you know. They went, you know, and they were

just finding employment at our facility.

So they did what we expected them to do under some tough

circumstances.

Q So you said that you expected them to sound an alarm and

seek cover. Was that essentially their role?

A Varying roles, right? So each position has different post

orders, if you will. And I can't recall directly which post did what.

But, you know, one of my agents or both of them that worked with me,

you know, identified guard orders for each of the posts, you know.

But, essentially, you know, if you're a guard, you're supposed

to observe and report, you know. We're not asking you to do -- they're

unarmed guards. We're not asking them to put themselves in any more

harm's way than they already were, being assigned to an American mission

overseas.

Q So then let's discuss the other half of that. What did you

think about the 17th Feb QRF that you had that were living there? What

was your impression of --

Ms. Jackson. Before we go to 17th Feb, I've got just a couple

of questions --

Ms. Barrineau. Okay.

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30

Ms. Jackson. -- on the local guard force.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You said that many of your existing guards were absorbed

by the Blue Mountain contract. Do you have a sense of how long they

had been there prior to being absorbed by this contract? I mean, had

they been there a matter of a couple of weeks or a couple of months?

The facility had opened in the summer of 2011, so it's 6, 7,

8 months in existence by then.

A Ma'am, I don't recall who stayed and who went when the new

guard contract came on board. I know that some of them were absorbed.

Some of them were let go, either because of performance issues or

because they couldn't pass the, you know, strict, you know, HR process

of Blue Mountain. There was a number of reasons why some of them stayed

and some of them didn't stay, so I couldn't recall exactly what some

of those were.

Q Okay. I just want to try to get your assessment of, if they

had been there for 6 months, why did they not know the rudimentary tasks

that were expected of them -- asking visitors who they were, screening

vehicles, sounding the duck-and-cover alarm? You know, why is it that

there was this basic training that was required if guards had been there

for at least 6 months prior to your arrival?

A I don't want to say that the training or the nature of the

work that they did was rudimentary. Some of those, you know, tasks

are -- you know, they seem to us to be kind of standard for a guard,

but for, you know, others who perform these security tasks, they are

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31

quite involved.

And I think that, you know, training is a big -- is something that

is constant. And if throughout that process -- again, I can't speak

for what happened before I got there. What I can speak for in my

experience was that when a guard was on the contract -- or the guard

was assigned to our facility, we took an interest in developing that

particular guard to make sure that he -- it was a he; they were all

males -- that he knew what his job was and that there were disciplinary

actions for when they didn't.

If that disciplinary action before the Blue Mountain folks got

there was termination, they were terminated. We would tell them

they're not coming back. I can't tell you how many times that occurred.

But, you know, if we found them not performing their job, we would take

corrective action, because it was important for us.

And, again, my experiences with another guard force in

was that was a good remedy, to train them how to do their job and then

take corrective action when they fail. And if need be, termination

may have been an option.

We didn't want people working there that weren't enthusiastic

about keeping us safe.

Q Right.

A And we expect these local guards, like we do in many other

places, to provide us that level of comfort.

Q Now, you talked about the fact that when you got there they

were changing the contract, and you were involved in that selection

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process. What were the problems and issues with the prior contract?

Because there was some sort of a contract there, right?

A As I understand it, ma'am, there was what's called a life

services contract. I don't know or I can't recall what those problems

were. I know I was pretty happy when we said we're professionalizing

the guard force by hiring a contractor to perform the services. I'm

comfortable with that, I'm used to it, as I was in a very

large contract guard force.

So getting this contract guard force is something I was ready to

absorb. And I don't know -- I can't recall what the problems were with

the previous guard force.

Q All right. Very good.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Okay. So tell us a little bit about the QRF and what your

impressions of them were and their role on the compound.

A Maybe you could better describe "impressions." I'm hard

at giving feelings. Maybe just, did they perform this, or what

was -- maybe --

Q Okay. So you had four to five 17th Feb guys living on the

compound.

A Uh-huh.

Q What was their role?

A Okay. What I and my team expected of the 17th February guys

were to provide a quick-reaction-force type of capability, which,

basically, if we needed -- if we got into a situation where we needed

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33

extra guys with guns, they would assist us in mitigating whatever that

threat was.

Now, to give you some examples, when we employed them, we employed

them on motorcade movements at times. We employed them to help us

respond to incidents on compound where we believed someone may have

accessed the facility unauthorized, jumping the wall.

There's other times where we used them basically to just do things

that we couldn't get done, menial tasks, if you will. "Go to the store

and pick this up for us." "Find me two or three contractors to perform

this type of work." They did that. And we couldn't have done what

we needed to get done out there without those guys.

Q So you thought they had the capability and appropriate

training to do what you were expecting them to do?

A When I assumed my role as the RSO, I had knowledge that they

were trained in some form or fashion throughout their time at this

special mission compound by other DS agents.

When we were there, we trained them. And when I say "trained

them," we trained them on protective security, PRS, if you will, the

movement security. We also trained them on reaction to contact, how

to, you know, bound and over-watch these military-type small-unit

tactics, things that we get in our high-threat training that all the

agents are comfortable explaining to this force.

I observed their training. The other agents observed their

training. We observed them in the field when we were doing these type

of things. And I was confident that they stuck their neck out for us

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on quite a few times.

And, again, I don't want to discount the fact that working with

the Americans anywhere, you know, much less in Libya, is probably, you

know, a scary endeavor for some. And these folks were brave enough

to step up and say, we're going to help you here.

And they worked for 17th February. 17th Feb, as I've explained,

was the predominant militia force that was in Benghazi at the time.

They seemed to have the most representation with other -- they were

the most powerful, I guess, for lack of a better term, and they could

get things done.

Q Did you trust that if you needed them that they would respond

in some kind of a security incident?

A It was my experience that when we needed them they showed

up. When I say "they," the four, five, or whoever was on compound.

Again, they wanted to help. They were eager to help us.

Q Did you have any issues with them at all?

A When you say "issues"?

Q Well, in general, but specifically an issue with stipends

and host nation not paying them so they were somewhat disgruntled?

A Again, I can't recall, you know, exact moments in time where

they had problems getting paid. I know that we paid them a stipend

for being there, which is, in my experience, customary with other police

forces that provide us protection. But that stipend is to offset the

cost of meals and other incidentals for them having to, you know, live

and work with us. We pay them so that they can go pay for a meal away

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35

from their homes.

I do recall some problems with their government, the

transitioning government at the time, not being able to pay for them

for their service either after the revolution or during the revolution.

I think there were some problems with them getting paid.

Q But did it affect the level of performance, for lack of a

better word, that you were getting from them?

A I don't recall if that affected them. Again, my general,

you know -- when I asked them to help, they helped.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was it your understanding that they were going to be, if

need be, augmented by the larger Feb 17th Brigade?

A When you say "augmented"?

Q So if an incident happened at the compound or you're in a

movement and there's an issue at a checkpoint and it appears that it

may be more than you can handle, whoever's there, was it your

understanding that they could call in more reinforcements to assist?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there an agreement to do that?

A I met with one of the, I guess, for lack of better terms,

a sub-commander at the 17th February on a number of occasions. Maybe

I met with a couple of people maybe. I'm certain I met with some of

the leadership, you know. And through, you know, an interpreter -- I

didn't speak Arabic at the time -- we were able to, you know, come to

some level of agreement that if we needed assistance they were but a

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36

phone call away. And that phone call typically would be from our QRF

guys. The QRF guys were subordinate to the sub-commanders that I spoke

to.

With that said, I also -- you know, there's at least one incident

that, you know, these guys did show up and help us out.

Q Can you tell us about that?

A There's two incidents, one I'd prefer to speak about, you

know, in a classified setting, and the other incident was when we

had -- the guards did exactly what we explained before. They initiated

the duck-and-cover, and it was a militia -- there was a disturbance

outside of our gates. The guards initiated duck-and-cover. We

reacted, and our 17th February QRF guys on the compound, you know, were

able to coordinate to this other element of, I believe, 17th Feb outside

of the compound that was interested in a fire that we had on our compound

by one of the local guards.

This other force was investigating, what's this fire on this

compound for? And then the guard initiated the duck-and-cover because

these guys came up to the gate. And our 17th February guys were able

to coordinate with their higher elements there, and they were able to

deconflict. The situation mitigated.

The other topic we can talk about in another setting.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Okay. Aside from the other situation we can discuss in a

classified setting, did you have any other security incidents while

you were at post?

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37

A Oh, there were several, and, again, I can't recall specifics

on each, but they were reported to DS, you know, using our spot reports.

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Mr. And, you know, I think I explained, the one was the

intruder on the compound. I think we had a couple of those while we

were there. It turned out we didn't, so we never, you know, found

anybody that reported had climbing over the walls. And we collectively

responded together.

I am trying to recall. You know, there was one instance that we

reported where myself and another agent were detained for a short period

of time by, you know, a local militia. And it turned out that local

militia was somehow associated with the 17th February guys. And,

again, this is another example where the QRF was able to ensure that

we, you know, escaped the situation with, you know, handshakes and

smiles.

We were in an area doing some advance work, and we were detained

by guards, essentially, that had no idea who we were, what we were doing

out there. And then it moved to, you know, a more -- an escort, if

you will, to another katahb, another camp, down the road, where we were,

you know, told to wait here until we figure this thing out.

You know, that, of course, elevated our response. "How are we

going to get out of this? What are we going to do?" But the 17th

February guys were able to communicate, you know, what we were doing,

that it was, you know -- part of what we do out there was make sure

that the place where the principal officer wanted to go was safe. And

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39

we were able to eventually mitigate the situation. But it kind of

highlights the 17th February guys' work and how they were effective

in doing their job for us.

I mean, Benghazi, at that time -- I mean, it is just not -- you

know, I say "Paris," but, you know, it was an environment where there

had just been a war, and there was no security and -- no formidable

security. We had freedom of movement. We could get around using

basic, you know, precautions during the day. You know, we stayed off

the road at night. But -- so I can't recall any other security

incidents that we were involved in.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q So what was the general response on the compound? Because

it seems like a lot of the incidents fell into the, kind of, category

of someone who shouldn't be on the compound trying to come onto the

compound or allegedly trying to come onto the compound. When something

like that happened, what was the response on the compound?

A I'll approach it two ways.

So, one, as I explained to you, the guard initiated what we call

the duck-and-cover, that he has a pendant on his person, on his neck,

and he initiates that. That sends an alarm throughout the whole, the

facility.

Now, we would -- again, during my time, we would respond by

isolating personnel within the safe haven, which was in our primary

dormitory. One of the agents would stay with the non-DS personnel in

the facility. One of the agents at that point was living inside of

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40

the TOC. We had some communications equipment in there that we slept with,

as well as our arms. And that agent would then coordinate, you know, with

what available resources we had to investigate the situation.

Now, if we had agent personnel, that would involve, you know,

utilizing the CCTV cameras that we had. That may require local guards

investigating the compound. That may require, you know, the QRF

investigating. It may combine ourselves, QRF and the local guard,

investigating the area. I can recall an occasion where we did go out,

methodically, you know, clear the 13‐acrefacility to ensure that there was

nobody on the grounds. When I say "methodically clear," that is, going out

there with guns and moving tactically to ensure that nobody was out there,

no threats remained to ourselves or to others.

That's typical. That was a ‐‐ I shy away from "typical" because

every situation is so different and depending on 1hat we had at the

time. But we responded‐‐ we had a, you know, plan to respond to those

types of internal defense situations.

Q So what you just described took a minimum of three agents,

because you said you have an agent in the TOC, which makes sense, an agent

with the non‐DS personnel, which makes sense, and a third person

who would be helping the QRF or whatever clear the compound.

Would you have felt like you were at a tactical disadvantage or had

insufficient resources with less than three agents? Because it seems

like if you dont have three agents you have to give up something off

that list.

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41

A I don't know if I gave a number of how many agents it

required. And sometimes we didn't ‐‐ you know, again, I'm trying to

recall exactly the instances. But, you know, I believe our intention was to

keep always someone with the principal officer or other persons and one

person to, you know, manage the situation inside the TOC.

Now, depending on the number of people that we had, DS or other

shooters in Benghazi, we would likely attach them to the QRF.

Look, Im not going to put my folks out there if I dont have to. If

the QRF is willing to go do a job and we are confident that they can go

out there and clear this compound and that we have, you know, CCTV

coverage, you know ‐‐ I mean, it sounds, you know, heartless a little

bit, but if my local guards who are getting paid to do a job can

investigate something, if the QRF or their government at the time is

expecting them to help provide us protection, I'm going to have them go do it

instead of sending a OS agent out there to respond to this type of stuff.

Ideally, if a DS agent was there and I was concerned enough that

they couldn't investigate that, I would attach a OS agent out there. I

can't recall, you know, with any specificity when I attached a OS agent

with these guys or if I attached myself to go out there and investigate

this.

Again, I would have you look at the reports that ‐‐ I am operating

under the assumption that you've seen some of these spot reports that I

drafted or that my team drafted. And I think that they would probably give a

better understanding of how we responded to each of those.

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Q I see my time is up. I just want to ask one followup

question.

I guess what I'm asking is not necessarily for every specific

response, but with less than three agents, did you feel like you were

able -- would you have felt like you were able to adequately respond

to an event, or would you have felt like you didn't have enough

resources?

Mr. Evers. You're asking him to speculate?

Ms. Jackson. Give his opinion. He is a trained official, a

trained expert in security.

Mr. I don't consider myself an expert. I

consider -- certainly, I'm learning every day.

It's no mystery that we had personnel, resource limitations out

there. I can tell you, when those people came over the wall, we did

our job and made sure that the facility was safe for us to continue

to be there. I don't want to, you know, say that if we had more people

we could have done a better job. The job was performed, and that's,

I guess, what I was concerned with.

Ms. Barrineau. Let's go off the record.

[Recess.]

Ms. Jackson. The time is now 11:26.

And by agreement of the staff and with the witness' concurrence,

the majority is going to continue their questioning and hopefully

finish up in a half-hour, 45 minutes, and then we're going to turn it

over to the minority staff to do their questioning, and then we hope

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43

to be done.

So, with that, we will continue, hopefully not for another hour

but some amount of time less than that.

Mr. Okay.

BY MR. BARRINEAU:

Q Okay. When we finished up, we were talking about staffing

and security incidents. Did you, while you were there, make any

requests for additional staffing, be it DS agents or hiring locals or

military support from Tripoli or anything like that?

A Yes. I think all of the above.

Q Were any of those requests granted while you were there?

A Again, I received -- well, not "again" -- I received support

from a special forces team that was based out of Tripoli. A couple

of folks came down and visited with me and helped me augment security

during the lead-up to the 1-year anniversary of the February 17th

revolution. And then also I requested additional DS personnel while

I was there.

Q Did you get any additional DS personnel?

A I guess maybe you could define "additional" for me. I

requested -- there was a suggestion -- not a suggestion -- there was

an expectation of having five agents on the ground. I requested, you

know, the five agents.

Q But aside from the turnover at the beginning, that was

never -- I don't want to say "granted," but that never happened again,

right?

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44

A During my time there?

Q Right.

A No.

Q What did the special forces team from Tripoli -- were they

are helpful? What did they do?

A I don't know if I'm comfortable talking about their

particular presence in this setting.

Q Okay. Then let me ask this. Did you find them to be an

asset to the compound?

A Yes.

Q And did you request that they be able to stay longer?

A Yes.

Q And was that request granted, or did they end up going back

to Tripoli?

A I can't recall if I requested that they stay longer as part

of their trip down to visit with me. I do recall requesting that they

come to Benghazi in some form of temporary or permanent fashion while

we were there.

Q Did that ever happen?

A Not while I was there. The request happened.

Q Right.

A But they never visited Benghazi during my time again after

they departed.

Q Do you know who made the decision for them not to visit

Benghazi again?

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A I can't recall if that was ever intimated to me.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Can you describe for us in a little more detail the benefits

that the SFT brought?

A I'd prefer not to do it in here, I think, just because I

don't know how sensitive their presence in Libya was. I'm just more

comfortable maybe describing what they had.

[Discussion held off the record.]

Mr. Yeah. They were there to augment our security. My

understanding when I requested them from Tripoli was that they would

come down and give us security support. And that entailed them being

an additional security resource. When we did movement security, they

would jump in the motorcade with one of the other agents.

You know, they were also beneficial to our compound defense, if

you will, identifying things that they thought, you know, may be helpful

to provide more security for the compound. "You can do this. This

may be helpful."

They also helped provide medical training to my DS agents. You

know, we're always doing that type of stuff. In my experience, when

you have a military somewhere, you, you know, do cross-training, and

that's what we did. We showed them how to do personal security, and

they showed us some advanced medical training.

Q Okay. And, obviously, SFT was all military.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

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46

And I just missed it. How many agents came from Tripoli, or how

many, SST members came from

A Two.

Q Two?

A Uh‐huh.

Q Okay. And it was your understanding that ‐‐ do you know

how many, typically, are in an SST team?

A Ma'am, I don't know.

Q Okay. But you requested SFT support for Benghazi. A

Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

A Let me clarify that. I requested security support during

the revolution. The SFT was what was offered, and that was what was

accepted.

After they departed is when myself and the SST agreed to work

within our respective chains to see if we could get a more permanent or a

temporary solution down there after they departed.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Do you know what they thought about the Special Mission

Compound? "They," the SST

A I couldn't begin to speculate what they thought.

Q Okay.

Let's switch gears just a little bit. I know you didn't have any

security issues, you said, when you were leaving the airport. But did you,

upon arrival in Benghazi, have some issues with some gear being

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lost?

A Yes. I don't know if it was lost or if it was just -- it

didn't make it there when I was there.

Q Did it ever make it there, or were you without that gear

the entire time you were there?

A I had -- it wasn't just gear. It was my, you

know -- everything that I brought with me. Two suitcases were

misplaced or lost for several days when I first arrived.

Q So was there additional gear -- because I assume that in

your suitcases would have been some gear that you would take to a

high-threat post.

A Can we define "gear"? That'd be helpful. Or you define

"gear" for me, what you think "gear" is.

Q Aside from clothes and personal items, were there things

in your suitcase that you would've used to do your job in a high-threat

environment that you were missing? I mean, magazine holders, vests,

personal protective equipment.

A Yes. I traveled with my personal protective equipment with

me to Benghazi.

Q And was some of that not there when you arrived?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Was there sufficient equipment at the compound for

you to be able to use until yours showed up? Or was it just, since

every agent brought there own, there was no extra? Does that make

sense?

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A Again, as I recall, there was equipment in Benghazi for me

to do my job, which, I mean, we can define as the personal protective

equipment. There was that equipment there. Yes.

Q Okay.

What kind of weapons did you have at the SMC?

Mr. Can I talk to Austin?

Ms. Barrineau. Uh-huh.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. And the reason I -- obviously, you know, the

sensitivity of having weapons at a diplomatic facility is something

that we, you know -- or, you know, there's concern we could talk about.

But we had a sidearm, which was a Sig Sauer 9-millimeter, and M4 carbine

rifles, 223 or 556, weapons system. We had, you know, other, you know,

diversionary devices -- the flash-bangs, smoke, if you will, signal

smoke. That's what I recall. We had that, and we had ammunition for

all of the weapons systems that were there.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q So I assume that DS agents, that you guys were all trained

on all of those things. Did you ever take the initiative to familiarize

the principal officer or the IMO with any of the weapons on site?

A Yes. I can't recall if it was both the IMO and the principal

officer or one or separate or who I exposed to the weapons systems that

we had, but I did show them. I vividly remember it was myself and

another agent showing them how the proper employment of those weapons

was.

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Q What made you take the initiative to do that?

A I can't recall why I felt it necessary at a particular moment

in time. But it's my understanding that foreign service officers go

through FACT training, so this wasn't something uncommon for them to

know, how a weapon works overseas. And "FACT" being the foreign

affairs counter-threat training.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was it your understanding that the political officer or IMO

had, in fact, had the FACT training?

A I recall not -- the non-DS personnel, which are the PO and

the IM or the IMO, that somebody did not have that training, did not

have the foreign affairs counter-threat training. But I can't tell

you which one had it or which one hadn't had it, so --

Q Did one actually have it?

A I believe --

Q Just your recollection.

A Again, my recollection is one person had that.

Q Okay.

A And I think it's important to note that I had two principal

officers during my time and the same management officer while I was

there.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q That's a good transition. Let's talk about the principal

officers while you were there. Who were your principal officers while

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you were in Benghazi?

A was my principal officer when I arrived. And

was the principal officer that took over for ,

and she remained there until after I departed.

Q Were they generally cooperative? And by that I mean, did

they defer to your security expertise and recommendations?

A From what I can recall, we worked on solutions together.

I mean, it's usually, you know -- "usually." In my experience, it has

been, if there's an objective that someone needs to go -- I can give

an example -- if someone needs to go somewhere, you know, I may or may

not say, "This is something we can execute; let me gather some

information," or I may go to the extreme and say, "No, we can't do that,"

but somewhere usually it falls in the middle. We compromise on what

we can reasonably expect to pull off.

And I think that we found, you know, solutions to problems. Or,

I shouldn't say "problems." You know, I prefer to, you know -- we found

solutions. If I was to say, "We shouldn't do this," they may counter

and say, "Why can't we do this?", and I explain myself, and then we

agree or we disagree. And then, if it comes to we can't find, you know,

some common ground, then, you know, we may ask for an intermediary,

someone outside the problem to kind of weigh in.

But I think it is important to note that the principal officer

is ultimately, you know, the person in charge of the mission. So, you

know, I worked at the pleasure of the principal officer and, ultimately,

the Ambassador in Tripoli and Diplomatic Security.

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Q Were there any movements or overnight trips or anything like

that that you felt uncomfortable doing or -- I guess we'll just stop

there. Were there any that you felt uncomfortable doing?

A Yes.

Q And did you express that?

A Yes.

Q And can you give us an example of something you felt

uncomfortable and said, I don't think that's a good idea for X reason?

A What comes to my mind is a trip that the principal officer

wanted to take to the eastern city of Derna. And I can't recall

specifics as to why I said this isn't something that we can reasonably

execute, but I recall saying, you know, we can't do this.

And, again, I don't know what the reaction was. It's hard to,

you know, remember what his response was. It was that wanted

to go there. But we didn't go. So, in essence, my advice was what

stopped us from going out there.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Do you recall why the principal officer felt it was

important to make that trip?

A I can't recall, ma'am.

Q Do you recall who the principal officer was reporting to?

A Ma'am, I can't recall. In my experience, the principal

officer generally reports to the Ambassador, and that would be in

Tripoli.

Q Do you recall whether the principal officer was reporting

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back to anyone in Washington at either State Department headquarters

or any other agency?

A I can't recall.

Q I have just a couple of followup questions. I'm going to

jump around just a little bit.

You said during your service with the Marine Corps you were a

Marine security guard?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And, again, where were you assigned as an MSG?

A I was assigned to, first, the American Embassy in ,

and after that I was assigned to the Embassy in

Q Okay. And neither of those were high-threat posts, were

they?

A No, ma'am.

Q Okay. So you had --

A If I can correct, the term "high-threat post" I think was

used, you know, after the Benghazi attack. The "high-threat post" term

became synonymous with maybe dangerous places. That's just my

opinion.

Q Okay. But there certainly were embassies that were

considered much more of a security risk than others back then? Paris

versus Pakistan --

A Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am.

Q -- big difference in --

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A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Can you compare and contrast for us Benghazi versus

these other experiences that you had either as a Marine or as a DS agent,

in particular, the security of the post and places?

A I guess it's important -- as a Marine, you know, you're

concerned about, you know, internal defense of the mission. You're

kind of -- you're outside of the security decision matrix. You know,

you're standing a post, you're responding to events at the embassy.

I guess it's for -- at the time, it was for protection of information

and -- while I was there -- and of the personnel in the compound.

To compare, you know, my experiences in and in

and then with Benghazi, I think they're different. You know, it's a

different point in time, different regions. The threats in those all

very different locations with the threat in Benghazi was also

different.

So I guess it's hard for me to -- you know, maybe if you kind of

maybe went step by step how I should -- you know, if you were as a Marine

here, you know, compare that, you know, in this particular instance,

for when you were in Benghazi, what was the differences, I guess is --

Q Would a Marine Security Guard contingent have been

beneficial in Benghazi?

A Again, I think that that would cause me to speculate. I

know through my experience we didn't have Marines in Benghazi while

I was there. Would a DS agent -- and I would always enjoy having -- I'm

a Marine. Would I always enjoy Marines being around? Yes. But

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that's --

Q Uh-huh.

A It's hard for me to say. I mean, it was -- it's hard for

me to say that they would have helped me do my job any better while

I was there. They bring a level of comfort that I did miss.

But, again, I'm also not -- I'm also aware that there are certain

standards that we expect our Marines to live in. As I was a young

Marine, I expected to live in a certain way, and those things were just

not in Benghazi at the time.

Q And what are some of those things?

A Housing. I mean, housing is a big thing. You know, access

to, you know, a gym facility, access to some of those creature comforts

that we all enjoy. And then also, you know, the security

infrastructure, as well. So, you know, locks and alarms, things that

we train Marines to monitor were absent during the time I was in

Benghazi.

But there are other posts where they -- not Marines, you know.

So, in my experience, it's not uncommon to go to a place where there's

not Marines at an embassy or diplomatic facility.

Q You also mentioned earlier that you were able to move fairly

freely around the city during the daytime but you generally did not

do night moves. Is that correct?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And what was the increased security risk that was

there during the nighttime that wasn't present during the day or was

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exacerbated at night?

A As I sit here, I can't recall any particular instances why

I would say we shouldn't travel at night. I know from my experience

serving overseas that things kind of happen at night that don't happen

during the day because people are -- "people" I'm saying -- our

adversaries, for lack of a better term, are able to move freely under

the cover of darkness. So, as a general precaution, not isolated only

to Benghazi, I have become accustomed with us reducing our movement

at night in places such as that.

And, again, I think it's important that we didn't have police to

rely on. We didn't have some -- there wasn't, you know, any formidable

security force there. We were dealing with 17th -- we were working

with the 17th February guys, but, again, you know, we don't want to

extend, you know, their resources to do things at night where we can't

always, you know, be certain what's out there. I guess things happen

at night that -- and it happens here in the United States, too.

So I think that we generally, as a precaution in Benghazi, wanted

to remain off the roads unless for a very good reason. And there were

times where we went, you know, to places within Benghazi at night. But,

as a general precaution, we stayed off the roads at night.

Q After the attack in Benghazi in September of 2011 and

outside of the Accountability Review Board, did anybody within DS come

and talk to you about your experience in Benghazi, any recommendations

you had, sort of an after-action or lessons-learned?

A Did somebody come to me and ask me --

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Q Uh-huh.

A I spoke with -- I was requested to speak to the FBI and to

our Protective Intelligence about the attack. And that was about the

attack, and I think that was from an investigative standpoint.

Q Okay. But that was limited to the attack?

A Again, I can't recall the question-and-answer session I had

with both, but it was related to the attack. Maybe -- I know I was -- I

provided some level of, kind of, on-the-ground knowledge when I was

talked to by both entities, what this was, what that was, during my

time.

But, you know, I was several months removed from being there. So

I tried to give them some type of, you know, maybe more of a consultant

as to what I saw when I was there. This was where this building was,

this was where this building was, type of a conversation I had with

both.

Q Were you reviewing video, or were you looking at aerial

photos? Or what type of -- any other information, when you say they

were giving you some overview background information?

A I'm cognizant there's investigations. I'm not --

Q Uh-huh.

A I did review video of the attack that night.

Q Okay.

A And that was with Diplomatic Security I reviewed that video.

Q With Diplomatic Security?

A Yes, ma'am. Protective Intelligence is part of Diplomatic

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Security, so I did review the video with them.

Q Okay. And do you recall who was in the room at the time?

A I recall being in the room with one of the DS agents I served

with there, and maybe one or two DS PII agents. I can't

recall the name, who I reviewed the tape with.

Q Okay. But, again, that was related to the attack?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

Were you ever questioned by anybody within DS or within the State

Department, and, again, outside of the Accountability Review Board,

regarding the physical security or staffing issues in Benghazi?

A No, ma'am. I mean, I spoke to the High-Threat Protections

Director, Bill Miller. This was after the ARB. And I sought that,

I sought that out, just to talk to him, to let him know that if, you

know -- that I was on the ground in Benghazi. But that's the only other

conversation that I can recall having outside of the ARB and outside

of the two investigations.

Q And can you describe that conversation with Bill Miller?

I mean, was it just your offer of future assistance, or did you actually

discuss substantive issues?

A Ma'am, I can't recall the exact discussion that we had. But

I would say that now-Director Miller opened his office to talk to me

about my time and experience in Benghazi.

Q Okay. And you sought that out?

A Yes, ma'am.

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Q Okay. And do you recall, just ballpark, how long that was?

Was it a 10-minute conversation? A 30-minute conversation? A

half-day conversation?

A I can't recall the length. It was certainly -- he provided

me ample amount of time to discuss whatever I wanted to discuss.

Q Uh-huh.

A And I was appreciative for being there.

Q But, again, I mean, was it a half-day?

A No, ma'am.

Q Okay. Less than that.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Something less than that.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

To your knowledge, did other agents have a similar discussion with

Mr. Miller?

A I'm unaware of any of that.

Q Okay.

Now, you spoke to the Accountability Review Board.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Did they seek you out, or did you seek them out?

A I sought them out.

Q Okay. And do you recall why you did that?

A Similar to the request for volunteers to go to Benghazi,

there was a department-wide message describing the Accountability

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Review Board and that they were seeking people who had information

or -- I believe that's what it was -- that had information related to

Benghazi. And I requested an appearance in front of the ARB.

Q Had you provided any documents prior to your appearance

before the ARB?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And was that in that same request that came out, a

request to gather any relevant documents?

A Ma'am, I recall there being several requests for documents.

I can't recall -- certainly, prior to my appearance, there was a request

for documents. And those were afforded -- those were provided to the

ARB at the time.

Q How did you actually go -- how did you physically gather

those documents? I mean, were they all electronic? Did you have some

hard copies? How did you do your search?

A My experience, what I can recall is I sent everything

electronically. I don't know if I provided any hard copies of

documents because, I mean, everything that I had was electronic-based.

So I believe I provided everything electronically.

Q Okay. So most everything was in email form?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And did you, like, put them in a folder and forward the

folder or forward each one individually?

A As I recall, I forwarded both individually or attached many

documents to an email and sent it along.

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Q Okay.

And can you describe your interview with the ARB? Were you the

only agent there? Were there other agents there? How many people

questioned you? How many people were in the room? Can you describe

that process for us, please?

A I was the only agent in the room. I met with a panel of

interagency seniors that was convened. And it was generally similar

to this, a question-and-answer period. I was in there for, you know,

maybe an hour and a half, and there was an opportunity for me to discuss

my experience in Benghazi.

Q And that was fairly close -- that was much closer in time

than us sitting here today. Is that correct?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So it would have been some time between September and

December of 2012?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. Well, the report came out December 18.

A Yes, ma'am. Okay.

Q Putting it in a timeline for you.

And would you say that your recollection and recall was much

better back then as to all of the events that you've discussed with

them as well as things we've asked you about today?

A For me, time has been a killer, trying to recall exactly

how I felt, some of the questions about my impressions. I was certainly

closer connected to Benghazi events in September, October, November

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of 2012 than I am today.

Q Now, you said this group, the panel, was interagency

seniors. Can you elaborate on that and further describe who was on

the panel?

A Again, the notable person was the former Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen. Ambassador Pickering was not

present. There was a former CIA Executive Service representative and

then an outside, I think, outside-of-government expert that was on the

panel, as well as the staffers that were present. But those were the

main players who asked me questions.

Q Were there any senior-level people from the State

Department present?

A I believe there was some -- there was an executive assistant

of maybe someone that assisted me in arranging the interview, but I

can't recall being asked any questions from them.

Q Uh-huh. Did you review any documents before your

appearance before the ARB?

A I reviewed my own documents that I had prior to meeting with

the ARB.

Q And these would've been the documents that you had

submitted?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Anything else? Did you review anything else?

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A Not at the ARB, no.

Q Okay. Prior to coming here today, did you review any

documents?

A I've been -- I've seen some documents. I've had documents

to the same documents that I provided to the different requests for

information. Those are what I've used to help refresh my memory. But,

again, that's the extent of it.

Q Did you see any summary of your conversation with the ARB?

A No, ma'am.

Q You did not see that?

A No.

Q Okay.

When you spoke with the ARB, did they touch upon some of the same

things that we've touched upon today?

A Again, the gap of time, but generally around some of the

same questions. I believe so. I mean, my experience, I can summarize

it as they asked me about my experience there, and they asked generally

the same questions that you're asking today.

Q And you felt you were able to be truthful and candid with

them about --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- your experience?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And was there anything that they didn't ask you about

that you thought they would ask you about?

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A There was an opportunity for me to -- at the end for me to

discuss anything that they hadn't asked me. I can't recall exactly

what that was, but I know that that opportunity was afforded to me,

to kind of, you know, discuss anything else that I wanted to say before

the panel. I can't pinpoint what it was that I discussed.

Q You believe you did bring up something?

A As I sit here today, I feel like I was able to say what I

was needed to say in front of the panel.

Q Well, I think Austin can tell you I'm not adopting their

idea, because I have done this in the past, but that is usually my final

question.

A Okay.

Q Is there anything that you thought we would ask about today

that we have not brought up? Or is there any other topic that you think

it would be important for this committee to know, given that, like the

ARB, we will be making recommendations down the road?

A The one recommendation that I proposed to the ARB was the

creation of an under secretary for diplomatic security. And the reason

I provided that recommendation -- I don't have any intimate knowledge

of what goes on at the upper echelons of my agency. I think, generally,

we are all trying to keep people safe abroad. I just -- I believe that

it would elevate security within the Department to a more appropriate

level.

I am no expert on what the machinations of leadership within my

bureau and within the Department are regarding that creation of that

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or if it would give us better access or if it would put us in a better

position. But, as I sit here today, I feel that an under secretary

for State is the right direction, and it would, in my mind's eye, give

us a better position, seat at the table, when we head to future

Benghazis.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

I think that may be all the questions we have, so we'll go off

the record.

[Recess.]

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Mr. Desai. The time is about 12:21.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. DESAI:

Q Special Agent , good afternoon. My name is Ronak

Desai. I am one of the counsels with the minority here at the Select

Committee. I'm joined here by my colleagues today, Heather Sawyer,

Daniel Rebnord, Brent Woolfork and Susanne Sachsman Grooms. And I know

you have flown a long way to be here. I also understand that you have

waiting for you back at home. And I just want

to say on behalf of the committee, thank you so much for your appearance

and thank you so much for your service.

A Thanks.

Q And we will do our best to try to get you out of here as

expeditiously as possible.

So in the last hour, I believe you told us that prior to coming

to Benghazi, you had been in . Is that right? Not immediately

prior, but prior --

A Yes, correct.

Q -- with some intervening time in between for Arabic language

training and some other things. Is that right?

A I was in Benghazi following but prior to Arabic

language training.

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Q Right. And , what was your -- I think you were an

ARSO. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And just for the purposes of the record, that's an Assistant

Regional Security Officer?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And then you then get to Benghazi. And you said you

volunteered for that position. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And you heard about that position through a department-wide

message?

A Yes.

Q And did Benghazi specifically have any particular meaning

to you, or resonance that you decided to volunteer for this?

A No.

Q I believe in the last hour or so you described the mission

there as an expeditionary mission. Is that right?

A I don't know if I described it, but I -- it's a term that

we -- that we did refer to Benghazi as an expeditionary mission. And

that wasn't something that I created. That was a term that was used

in association with Benghazi.

Q And could you just explain what that term means to you?

A For me, it was going to Benghazi and it being an

expeditionary mission was being outside of the normal creature comforts

that we enjoyed at other posts. I guess you're going somewhere

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where -- you know, going somewhere where no one's gone before, and

that's what it was: reintroducing ourselves into Benghazi.

Expeditionary mission was kind of that. I think it -- you know, people

coined the term, you know, I'm familiar with it from my time in the

Marine Corps, expeditionary force, going somewhere that, you know,

other forces may or may not be operating in, but most likely not

operating in, so going back to a place where there aren't -- where no

one else has been for a while.

Q Right. In your personal experience, the fact that a

mission is expeditionary or not, does that make it more or less

attractive for you to want to go there and serve?

A For me at the time?

Q Yes.

A It made it attractive for me to want to serve there, but

it being Benghazi or it being another place, what would -- that may

have been -- again, I didn't -- in the broadcast, I don't know what

it -- you know, what the description of Benghazi or if it was -- it

could have been an announcement to go to Tripoli, and Benghazi was the

place that I ended up, but being in that area of operations did attract

me to volunteer for the job.

Q And you arrived in Benghazi on or about February 1.

A Yes.

Q Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And your title there then was RSO?

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A I'm going to say yes. We assumed the title of the Regional

Security Officer. Whether or not that was formally designated an RSO

position, I'm not quite sure.

Q And your predecessor was still there for a few days?

A Yes.

Q Mr. ? Is that your predecessor --

A Yes.

Q -- ? And you arrive on or about February 1.

And just provide briefly some background. You know, as the RSO of

Benghazi or anywhere, what are your primary responsibilities?

A Broadly?

Q Yes.

A My responsibilities is to provide a safe and secure

environment for the conduct of our foreign policy. Now, breaking that

down, it's, you know, to ensure that the office spaces that we live

in, the places that we live -- the office spaces that we work in, the

places that we reside are an environment of -- you know, there is

relative safety behind, you know, certain security measures. And we

try to create that sense of normalcy as best we can so that people

aren't -- don't have, you know -- they're not walking around with flak

jackets and helmets on. That's -- you try to create that sense of

security.

Q And as the RSO, are you effectively the primary individual

responsible for security at that place?

A In Benghazi --

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Q Yes.

A -- I viewed myself as the primary adviser for law

enforcement and security to the principal officer in eastern Libya,

in Benghazi.

Q And you arrived on or about February 1. Do you recall when

you departed Benghazi?

A My departure was just short of 60 days. March 27 or 28.

Q I think at a certain point, you actually extended your tour

of duty there. Is that right?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. If you can provide me with some insight into the

reporting structure as the RSO. So you arrive into Benghazi. Who do

you report to, if anyone, at Benghazi? Let's start there.

A Okay. For -- for Mission Benghazi, I reported to

Diplomatic Security/International Programs, which I mentioned before,

the desk officer, and the regional director,

. I also reported to the regional security officer in

Tripoli, .

Now, I don't know if that's something I created or if it was passed

down to me, but that's who I would make sure that I informed of what

I was doing out there.

Q Okay. So in Tripoli, it would have been, you said,

, who was the RSO there.

A Uh-huh.

Q And then sort of beyond Tripoli or outside of Tripoli,

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, who was, you said, the desk officer?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And then also ?

A Uh-huh.

Q Am I pronouncing that correctly?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. Did you ever interact with anyone outside of DS or

outside of this structure that you just told me about?

A Could you explain "interact"?

Q Sure. If there was ever an incidence, whether it was

someone outside of DS or not one of these three gentlemen that you just

identified, was there, you know, contact, interact, communicate with

about your responsibility as an RSO?

A I guess I -- maybe a little firm -- another -- maybe some

more clarification. I mean, I talked to people as part of my job, so --

Q Beyond these three.

A Beyond these -- absolutely. Sure.

Q And if you ever felt like you needed to talk to anyone about

your responsibilities beyond these three gentlemen, you felt

comfortable and free to do so?

A Absolutely.

Q Now, in the last hour or so, my colleagues from the majority

discussed with you staffing shortages --

A Okay.

Q -- in Benghazi. Is that right?

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A Yes.

Q And I think one of the things that came out of that

discussion was that the staffing levels during your tenure as RSO

fluctuated between a different number of agents. Is that right?

A Correct.

Q The thing that I'd like to discuss with you is some of the

reasons behind that fluctuation, and one thing specifically that I want

to talk to you about are visa issues, and whether or not difficulties

surrounding visas or obtaining visas for agents that were supposed to

be on the ground actually caused delays and ultimately shortages.

A During my time, I can think of at least one occasion, two

occasions where visas were an issue.

Q An issue in what way?

A Delayed agents' arrival to post; and post being Benghazi.

Q And the two occasions that you do recall, can you tell me

about those?

A I can't tell you who the -- there was one agent the last

name . I don't recall his first name. He was identified to

come to post, and for some reason, visa-related, he didn't end up

showing up.

Q He didn't show up at all or his arrival was delayed?

A He never -- he never arrived. I don't know -- to be clear,

I don't know if that was the only reason why he didn't arrive. I know

a visa issue was associated with .

I said two occasions. I believe the -- my successor,

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, also incurred visa issues, but I can't be completely

accurate.

Q So Mr. and Mr. -- and Ms. . Is that

right, Ms. ?

A Yes. .

Q And did she ultimately ever arrive that you're aware of?

A arrived. At what point, I'm not sure.

Q But her arrival wasn't delayed. Is that right?

A I would like to, you know, I think, for the record to make

it a little more clear. I know that didn't show up because

of a visa issue. I think I'm speculating there that didn't show

up because of the visa issue, so I'd like to make sure that

that's -- that that's either clarified that I'm not quite sure if

was a visa issue.

I know that wasn't -- didn't arrive because of a visa

issue and maybe another issue that compounded that.

Q And who ultimately, at that time, is responsible for issuing

visas to individuals like Mr. and Ms. ?

A From my experience, the process is I send my passport,

diplomatic passport to the State Department, and the State Department

then works with the government, at that time, the government of Libya,

to issue a visa to enter the country.

Q So it's the government of Libya that ultimately issues the

visa to these individuals that are trying to come?

A Yes.

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Q And the sole responsibility lies with the Libyan

Government. Is that right?

A That's my understanding.

Q And what steps, if any, could U.S. officials, either in

Libya or back in D.C. or elsewhere, take to help expedite that process?

A It's been my experience that when there is an issue with

a visa for a person on a diplomatic assignment, that American personnel

and inside the country, we'll say Libya, for instance, can bring this

to the attention of the gov- -- their counterparts inside of Libya.

Say, we have -- has a visa issue. Whether or not that was done,

I can't recall, but it's been my experience that's -- traditionally

if -- where there's a visa issue, post can bring that up to the

government, their counterparts inside the country.

Q And do you recall if your American colleagues did -- you

know, supported these efforts to help expedite the issuance of these

visas so you could get the staffing levels up to where you wanted them

to be?

A I can't recall the conversations that may have transpired

regarding visa issues.

Q And do you recall how big of a problem the visa issue was

generally, in your experience?

A Right. Certainly. I mean, if I remember that Manning had

a visa issue, it must be something that stuck in my head. I don't know

quite certain whether or not, you know, it was a huge deal that affected

many people or just particular arrival to Benghazi, but it

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does -- when you said visa issue, I immediately thought of, you

know -- of a person that was selected to come that didn't arrive because

of a visa issue.

Q Another topic that we discussed briefly in the last session

focused on physical security upgrades. And the picture that emerges

from the conversation that you had with my colleagues on the majority

as well as some documents that I reviewed is that you arrived at Benghazi

and, you know, you had some concerns about how hard Benghazi's security

posture was, and that you worked pretty diligently and pretty hard to

take existing requests for physical security upgrades that you had

inherited from your predecessor or predecessors as well as generating

your own to address some of these concerns. Is that right? Is that

a fair representation?

A When you said -- when you described it as hard, could you

maybe elaborate? Hard -- when we say hard, it's -- we describe things

as soft and hard targets, so soft being a -- you know, a more vulnerable

place to attack and a hard target being something, you know, more

fortified.

Could you just maybe restate what you --

Q Right. So would it would be fair to say that when you came

to Benghazi, one of your objectives was to make Mission Benghazi harder,

as the way you just described it?

A Yes.

Q To make it less vulnerable to attack?

A Yes.

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Q And one way that you wanted to do that was by making certain

physical security improvements to Mission Benghazi. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And we talked, I think, in the last session about what some

of those were with respect to obtaining funding and then in terms of

completing them. So it sounds like -- you had mentioned drop arms.

Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall if the drop arms were funded and completed?

Is that your recollection?

A Yes. I was able to -- we had two drop arms in place in

Benghazi while I was there.

Q And then you mentioned the temporary perimeter fence as

well. And you recall that you had obtained funding and that -- maybe

even started construction on that project as well?

A That's correct.

Q And do you recall guard booths being requested, funded, and

ultimately completed while you were there?

A The guard booths were requested, they were funded. There

were issues with the construction, the fabrication of the guard booths.

I wasn't happy with their construction. And, again, I identified that

problem with the local contractor and left that work to be completed

after I departed.

Q Now, part of the -- of getting these physical security

improvements made was obtaining funding?

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A Yes.

Q And one of the things that, again, you discussed in last

session was that funding was sometimes delayed, that you were somewhat

frustrated with the pace of funding in order to complete some of these

projects that you had both inherited and that you had requested get

completed. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And with respect to the funding, it was specifically the

pace of funding. Is that right? So if I understood your conversation

with my colleagues on the majority during the last session, the funding

would come, it would just take a long time for that funding to arrive

in order to complete the projects. Is that correct?

A I think it's fair to say that I was frustrated in the delays

of me identifying projects, requesting funding and that -- for that

money to come to me to spend, yes.

Q Right. And despite those delays, I think you said that you

created solutions with the guys in D.C. to still complete some of these

requests and projects that you had in mind. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And can you just elaborate on some of these solutions that

you created with the folks back in Washington or other relevant places?

A I think we -- in the previous session, I explained the

process about the fence, and I -- unless you want me to go into the

fence again, if that's what you're asking. You know, I identified the

problem with the restriction for improving the wall height. There was

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an obstacle to overcome, and we -- when I say "obstacle," a funding

challenge, right, that they weren't -- they wanted us to -- the

expectation was to ask the landlord to improve the wall. That wasn't

going to happen. When I say, "that wasn't going to happen," the

landlord wasn't going to improve the wall. We're asking a landlord

to go into his pockets to build a wall, and that just -- that

conversation didn't get started.

So, we identified a solution to build the fence. And, again, when

I requested it, I worked with DS physical security experts to, let's

come up with a solution to, again, impede someone's, you know, access

to the facility. And they helped me. I -- again, I found a

contractor. I entertained several contractors, because that's the

process, you know. The suggestion was, you know, to find contractors

to help build this fence. So we worked -- we found a contractor that

he was performing the same work in Tripoli, or he was performing

physical security upgrades in Tripoli. He came down, gave us a plan,

and we started moving. And then that brown -- the ground was broken

on that project prior to my departure.

Q And do you recall any other instances where you came up with

solutions with DS and folks in D.C. to get projects completed, or at

least get started?

A Certainly. I mean, the -- the egress grills on the

facilities to escape during a fire, the safe haven, the -- you know,

the drop arms, the -- I think the procurement of Jersey, these

Jersey-style barriers to, again, improve the setback of the facility.

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Money was requested, and it was allocated. That took some time. And

I think I've explained my misgivings with the ability of not being able

to identify a problem and effect a solution right there. A number

of -- I mean, those are the -- other projects that may escape me at

the moment.

Q And so you were there from early February to about late

March. Would you say that things improved over time with respect to

this process in obtaining funding and getting the mission hardened?

A I don't know if the process improved or if I just became

comfortable with the process. I was -- you know, I know I have a

limited amount of time to make an impact and to keep the -- I wanted

to make the place a better place for the people that followed me, you

know, and I think that's carried from the people before me to the people

after me. We have a common understanding that we want to make sure

people are safe. So I don't know if I can say that, you know, things

got better. I just became more comfortable with the appropriations

and allocation of funds.

Q So through your efforts and your collaboration with folks

at DS and D.C. or elsewhere, you felt that you were able to take the

existing process and still deliver results for the mission. Is that

right?

A I identified a problem. I learned how to work with the

contractors. We had a contractor that we'd identify a piece of work,

and he would give me a quote. He figured out that I needed a quote,

he'd give it to me, we sent it to Washington. They would then send

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me monies for that project.

Q So if I can at this time, I'm going to show you one or two

documents just to help guide our discussion --

A Okay.

Q -- and maybe refresh your memory on some of these issues.

I will mark as Exhibit 1 this email between yourself and .

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Okay. I haven't seen this for some time, so it's

going to take me --

BY MR. DESAI:

Q No. Please. Take as much time as you need to review.

A Okay.

Q Good to go?

A I think so, yeah.

Q So this is Exhibit 1. Just for the record, this is document

number C05393639.

Do you recall this email?

A It looks like something I would -- I drafted, yes.

Q And the subject of this email is, questions for Libya

meeting, and this is an email from you to Mr. with some others

cc'd, dated from March the 6th. And what it looks like in this email

is Mr. has written to you to inquire about the status of the

drop arms bars in Benghazi. You reply a short while later. You

provide that status update. You write, I think in the first paragraph

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here, good evening, . The drop arms are near completion. You

then discuss how you'd like to perhaps re-program some funding from

this project to another.

And if I can just direct your attention to the fourth paragraph

in that document where you've written, we are extremely pleased with

the recent funding decision of our temporary fence -- for our temporary

fence. Couple that with sandbag deployment, safe haven door

fabrication, and emergency egresses on the windows, Benghazi is rapidly

finding a sense of security.

A Okay.

Q If I can just ask you about that briefly. So it looks like

you've mentioned here the funding decision for the fence, the sandbag

deployment, safe haven door fabrication, emergency egresses on the

windows, and these are some of the things that you just told me about

a few moments ago. You conclude that sentence by writing, "Benghazi

is rapidly finding a sense of security."

If you could just tell me, if you recall, what you meant by that

in this context, given your experience at the mission at the time.

A It would be difficult for me to recall what exactly I meant

when I made this statement. It could be, you know -- if I start from

the beginning of this sentence, I can tell you I was happy that we had

found a solution to the wall. When we -- and when I say "we," that

I agreed with working on this with the physical security experts in

International Programs.

I'm also probably pat -- I can tell you I'm patting my team on

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the back here by doing all of these things to improve the situation

we were in out there. And I think that has something to do with me

suggesting Benghazi -- probably should have maybe wrote Special

Mission Benghazi. I'm not quite certain what I felt and meant by that

last part of the sentence there, but I was, you know, proud of the team

that I had out there. And I think that has a lot to go with some of

the improvements that were on -- that we made, again, with this -- you

know, we wanted to set -- this is a couple of weeks before I departed.

You know, I wanted to make sure that we did -- we made meaningful -- you

know, we took meaningful efforts to make the place a little bit better

than we may have found it. And that's what we all can expect, given

that there's a lot of things going on in Benghazi and, you know, things

always kind of detract you from, you know, what you set out for the

day to do.

I don't know if that's a good answer for that, but that's what

I can provide.

Q Did you find that when you would make these funding requests

and you were trying to find solutions, as you just identified, that

for the most part, the folks at DS back in D.C. were receptive to

your -- when there were concerns or requests or your desire to work

with your team to make things better?

A I think the people that I worked with,

and it looks like, you know, , he goes by,

were receptive to the requests that I provided. And they had an

understanding -- they had a better understanding, a more informed

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understanding of what was done previous to me being there and during

my time there. Of course, that's my assumption right now. We go into

their thinking, you know, that there's a strategic level of thinking

that -- we're there on the ground, we're going to handle these tactical

decisions, but folks that are above us, you know, generally make

decisions for us. They really have an informed opinion, and it carries

a lot of water.

So I had faith and confidence in my -- my leadership and the folks

that I was dealing with here to help us find solutions and fund those

solutions, because they knew that it was a tight spot we were in, you

know. We wanted -- everybody wanted to make the place better.

Q And you mentioned just a few minutes ago that, you know,

part of this email perhaps and the sentiment behind it was that you

were patting your team on the back that they had done a good job and

had worked fairly assiduously to make things better and safer.

And if I can just show you another document that I will mark as

Exhibit 2.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Okay.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q Great. So Exhibit 2 carries with it a document ID number

of C05393467. And this is an email that originally is dated, looks

like, March 8, 2012, with subject line, "Meritorious honor award for

U.S. Mission Benghazi." And you've written here to Mr.

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-- pronounce that correctly still?

A Uh-huh.

Q "Sir, I'd like to nominate my team for a group meritorious

honor award. They've done a heck of a job working long hours to improve

the physical security of post, stand up a new local guard force, and

create continuity in programs (turnover binders, establishing written

doctrine, how much each program works) which has previously been

absent."

And then you go on to say later on, I'm now on the -- page 4 of

the document, "Our big push here has been to make life better for the

TDY agents that follow us. I believe that we have done an incredible

job doing just that while also creating a safer environment for those

who work here."

So this email that you write appears to reflect what you just told

me a few moments ago, that you were, you know, quite pleased with the

work that your team had done in improving physical security of the

mission, and that given the circumstances, you guys had made things

a lot better than where they were at least when you came to Benghazi.

Is that fair?

A In the -- when I'm drafting this, yes. I think, you know,

when I read through this, this exhibit here, it is a little troubling,

because I'm patting -- patting myself and my team on the back for -- and

there's a loss of life, you know, after -- several months after this,

and I think it's, you know -- you know, I think we all reflect on, you

know, after the incident, you know. I'm asking for an award for my

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team, and, you know, it's kind of -- brings a level of, you know,

dissatisfaction to know that people lost their life, you know, and

friends were injured.

So I just wanted to, you know, suggest that, you know, it is

difficult to read about a -- you know, an award that I put my team up

for, and, you know, several months later, somebody was -- people were

killed, you know, that we were charged to protect, so -- but in this

email, yes, you know, I'm looking for recognition for my team for doing

a good job.

Q And at the time, again, based on where physical security

was through your efforts and the efforts of those you collaborated with

at DS and elsewhere, things had improved, relatively speaking, from

when you had arrived, correct?

A We made an earnest push to get things done, to make the

place -- like, create a safer environment for those who worked there

and overcoming, you know, some obstacles along the way, funding and

others, to make it, you know, a relatively safe place to be. Benghazi

was a tough, tough place to be at, you know, post-war. And that's what

I'm asking for -- that's what I'm, you know, suggesting in this.

Q So this gets forwarded on. There's some email traffic, I

think Mr. -- I'm back on page 1 now.

A Okay.

Q -- on March 9 said, send it right up. I'll submit it.

And then a few weeks later, it looks like on March 23rd, 2012,

you write back to Mr. , saying, "Good morning, sir. Looks

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like will be here just in time."

And then down a few lines and at the last paragraph, "It's been

a good ride and one that I learned a tremendous amount from. I

appreciate IP support and look forward to joining the NEA team next

year when I head to Cairo as an ARSO 1."

Who's that you mentioned in the first line here?

A , the RSO in Tripoli.

Q Okay. And this was Friday, March 23 that you wrote this,

so this was just a couple days or a few days before you left Benghazi.

Is that right?

A Correct.

Q And this last line when you say, "It's been a good ride and

one that I learned a tremendous amount from," can you just elaborate

on that a bit, if you can recall?

A I can't recall exactly what I'm referring to, but, I mean,

I'm comfortable with saying that, you know, my experience in Benghazi

was career enhancing and I think, you know, that I learned -- again,

what exactly it's, you know, saying there is that I learned a tremendous

amount from it, it's going to carry -- it's going to help me be a better

agent and help me make decisions as I further my career with Diplomatic

Security.

Q And the -- you write, "I appreciate IP support."

Remind me who IP is again?

A International Programs, and that's -- that's

was the regional director for NEA International Programs.

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Q Okay. And the support you were referring to that you

appreciated, do you recall what that was?

A I mean, it's from the entire time that I was there.

Q I see.

A Things that we've already talked about, you know, funding

support, finding, you know, solutions to obstacles. That's the type

of support that I'm referring to.

Q Okay. Great. And just returning sort of more broadly to

staffing shortages and physical security sort of together, and I think

in the last session, my colleagues had asked you if you felt comfortable

going to your superiors with any concerns that you had or whether you

felt comfortable asking for physical improvements or for funding for

them, and you indicated that you were. Is that right?

A I was comfortable, absolutely, asking for help.

Q Did you ever feel like during your time in Benghazi from

February to the end of March that you could not be totally forthcoming

and honest in your opinions to your superiors about the mission's

physical security or anything else?

A I don't recall feeling that way.

Q Do you recall if anyone ever discouraged your advocacy

efforts to improve the mission's physical security through upgrade

requests?

A If someone at the -- within DS or at the mission discouraged

my --

Q Your superiors or anybody.

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A Discouraged me from improving the physical security.

Q Discouraged your efforts, right? So as we talked about,

you were pretty assertive and resourceful in creating solutions to

getting things done. At any point during your time in Benghazi, did

anyone discourage you from doing that?

A Not that I recall.

Q And were you ever told by anyone, superiors or otherwise,

about keeping your mouth shut about Mission Benghazi's physical

security or the staffing shortages that were afflicting the post?

A No.

Q And did anyone at any point, either directly or indirectly,

indicate to you that you would suffer consequences or penalization or

repercussions of any kind for expressing any of your concerns with

respect to the shortages or the physical security of the mission?

A No.

Q And did anyone ever tell you that you shouldn't rock the

boat, or not make waves, and that you should just keep to yourself and

not express your opinions to anyone about staffing shortages or

physical security?

A No.

Q Do you recall if you ever faced retaliation or adverse

employment consequences by expressing your concerns and being so

resourceful in creating solutions with the guys in DS to make the

mission safer?

A No.

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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And let me just ask with regard to that, I know that you

hesitated around the note about the commendation. And certainly I

think, you know, from our perspective, what that showed was what you've

described, kind of this atmosphere of a very earnest effort by people,

both on the ground and sounds like people you were working with.

Kind of to the flip side of what my colleague was asking is it

sounds like certainly at least you felt with regard to your colleagues

that they should be commended for their very sincere efforts to harden

the security posture.

Did you feel like your efforts were similarly recognized by your

superiors, not necessarily by commendation, but that they appreciated

your efforts to do all that you could to work with them to harden the

posture?

A I believe that my -- as it's stated in the email, that

International Programs was appreciative of our efforts, and that's why

they went ahead and awarded all of us, they gave us an award for our

efforts out there. I don't know if that's customary for the folks

before me or after me. I know that they applauded our efforts in such

a way of giving us a group award for what we did out there.

You know, as I stated before, as we reflect on it now, it does

seem -- you know, it does bring a bit of discomfort knowing that I was

awarded for something that, you know, people ended up losing their lives

and getting seriously injured for, but I guess at the time, it seemed

that we had made improvements to our posture out there, security

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posture.

Q And both your efforts and the people who surrounded you,

you felt like, I think you described it as, you know, as earnest push

to get things done. And did you feel like that was just a shared

commitment up the chain -- so it sounds like most of your interaction

was with and Mr. -- a shared commitment to kind

of earnest effort and push to get things done?

A I would -- I certainly -- every email or every phone call

was answered, so I believe that everyone had a shared commitment in

keeping people safe in Benghazi, most certainly in Diplomatic Security.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q So I'm going to switch focus again. And you had a pretty

exhaustive discussion, again, in the last session about the QRF and

the 17 February militia. And just for the record, what does QRF stand

for?

A Quick Reaction Force.

Q And what relationship, just to provide, again, a brief

background, does the QRF have to the 17 Feb militia? What's the

difference between those two things?

A They're one and the same. We just -- we used it

interchangeably. And Quick Reaction Force, we -- was made

up -- comprised of the 17 February guys.

Q I see. And based on your discussion in the last session,

it sounded, and please correct me if I'm wrong, that you were fairly

positive on the QRF with respect to the role that they played in

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supporting the security of Mission Benghazi. Is that right?

A I was happy to have them, to have extra guys on the compound

to help us in security situations.

Q And one of the things that you said was, We could not have

gotten done what we needed to get done without these guys. And could

you just elaborate on what you meant by that specifically in terms of

the things that the mission needed to get done and the role that 17

Feb played in fulfilling that role?

A Previously I think the -- when the question was asked, you

know, that we needed them to get things done, was -- I was referring

to the building of some of these field-expedient measures that we used

out there, the egress windows. I used the 17 February guys to help

me find someone to build these temporary measures, or field-expedient

measures.

They also -- you know, they're local, so they can give -- they

pick up on things that you certainly, being an American in eastern

Libya, are not going to pick up on. So they were, you know,

instrumental members of our team out in Benghazi.

Q And so you've mentioned construction, some other things,

physically on the mission. I think in the last session also, you had

referenced a security incident where some other forces had, I think,

approached the Mission Benghazi gate, and you had said it was the QRF

that had ultimately come and resolved that. Is that right, from what

you recall?

A The QRF was on compound with us, so they responded to, you

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know, and conversed with this group that was outside our gate. They

both identified each other, and that's how they de-escalated the

situation. That's -- I mean, that was a perfect example of how they

provided assistance to us.

Q And the fact that they live on the compound that's inside

the compound walls, that indicates a certain level of trust with these

guys that the mission would actually have them onsite. Is that right?

A When I took over as the temporary duty RSO, they were living

on compound. Their mission was explained to me. I didn't see any

reason to take them off of -- you know, ask them to remove -- ask to

remove them from the compound. For my level of comfort, I made sure

that these individuals -- we did necessary background checks on them,

so I knew who was working for me, so that -- I mean, there was no reason

for me at the time to remove them, and I didn't have any discomfort

with them initially being on the compound.

Q I see. And when an incident happens, as the one that you

had referenced previously, they respond, is that standard protocol or

practice that if there is an incident of some sort, that it's QRF that

is alerted, in some capacity, to arrive at the scene and provide

assistance?

A In Benghazi, that's what we -- that's how we -- that's what

we worked with in Benghazi, that was our -- you know, part of our

approach to investigating or mitigating a situation.

Q And during your time there, that process worked well, the

one that you described?

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A Yes.

Q Did you have confidence while you were there that they would

respond as required when something would happen, that if you were to

call them, they would be there?

A They proved that they would show up when I needed them to,

so I didn't have any reason to doubt that they would be helpful.

Q And is there a difference between internal and external

February 17th militia, the QRF on the one hand that, you know, we've

been talking about, versus other folks?

A Again, it was my understanding that they were part of the

same group; just, we had four to five guys that lived with us on the

facility. They were a subordinate force to the larger 17th February

Brigade.

Q Okay. And just the reason I ask that is we've heard 17 Feb

be described as a larger umbrella organization, if you will, comprised

of different militias. Is that a fair characterization based on your

experience there and what you knew about them while you served in

Benghazi?

A I don't know the composition of 17 Feb, and I can't recall

if I ever did know the composition. I know that they were the largest

or most powerful militia in eastern Libya, to include Benghazi, while

I was there, and during my time there.

Q So let's switch gears again. You indicated in the last

session support for Under Secretary of Diplomatic Security. Is that

right?

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A Yes.

Q And are you aware oftheindependent panel on best practices that

was formed in response to one of the recommendations enumerated

by the Accountability Review Board?

A Vaguely familiar. Ive been away from ‐‐ from this for a

while, but I do know some of what was ‐‐ what came out of that.

Q Right. So the Independent Best Practices Panel was formed

as a result of this recommendation by the ARB. It's five members,

chaired by former Secret Service Director Mark Sullivan. The five

members of the panel have, I think it's something like 168 years of

collective security experience.

One of the members ofthe panel is Todd Keil , who was in Diplomatic

Security in various capacities for 25‐plus years. Are you familiar with

him or know him at all?

A No, I don't know him.

Q So the panel put out a number of recommendations in its

August 2013 report, and one of these recommendations was the creation of an

Under Secretary for Diplomatic Security. And the Department, at this

time, has not accepted it, and one of the concerns that they have

surrounding the creation of such a position is that it would further

exacerbate existing stovepiping or isolation of DS within the larger State

Department organization. And I just wanted to see if you had any thoughts

on that or if, you know, you would find that to be a reasonable concern,

given the way the Department wasoperating prior.

A When I spoke to the ARB about the creation of an Under

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Secretary, again, I am absent any knowledge on what actually occurs

at, you know, the upper echelons of my organization. I felt it

would -- the creation of an Under Secretary for Diplomatic Security

would elevate, you know, the security and law enforcement arm, branch

of the Department of State to a position where they had direct access

to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary.

When we look across the board at other -- I'm basing this off of

just my very, very vague knowledge of maybe the Department of Defense,

or within our organization, you have several Under Secretaries for

political affairs, from other -- for other bureaus, if you will, and

other disciplines. And, of course, I'm home team guy, I wanted to see

the best for our organization, which -- and elevate the life safety,

security of our personnel, who serve in really, really tough situations

overseas to an appropriate position within the Department.

That's where I was -- that's where the suggestion came from.

Irregardless of what actually occurs, I wanted to make sure that

we -- that people remain safe overseas, and that I thought by offering

that as a recommendation would appropriately elevate Diplomatic

Security in the grand scheme of things in the operation of the

Department.

Q Okay. And turning to the ARB, so you had mentioned that

you had, in fact, spoken with them --

Ms. Sawyer. Can I ask a question about that?

Mr. Desai. Sure. Please.

BY MS. SAWYER:

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Q One of the things that did happen, and on the timing, I'm

not sure if it was after the Accountability Review Board, or if State

had affirmatively done, it was to kind of have an Assistant Secretary

for Diplomatic Security, who the current person serving in that

position is Greg Starr. He testified at a public hearing before the

committee about the rationale for creating his position being to assure

direct access to kind of those upper echelons you're talking about,

including the Secretary, and talked about his relationship with the

current Secretary, Secretary Kerry, as being very favorable in granting

direct access.

If that was the kind of solution to get, it sounded like your

concern was direct access and a seat at the table, would you feel that

that would kind of address some of the concerns that you had had, that

seat at the table?

A Ma'am, I'm a bit confused.

Q It's a very long question.

A The Assistant Secretary position existed before the ARB.

I mean, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security has always

been -- as long as my tenure with the Department, there's always been

that. Maybe somebody else?

Q Yeah. I think there was a new reporting relationship

created. It's not -- I misspoke by saying the title --

A Okay.

Q -- but a reporting relationship to allow that person to have

more direct access. So I think that was the sense of getting the seat

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at the table.

A Okay.

Q So maybe what I'm trying to get your sense of is whether

your concern was -- was one of finding direct access, finding a seat

at the table, and less kind of how structurally that was done.

A I may have done a poor job of -- again, I don't -- explaining

it before. I don't know what the level of access previous Assistant

Secretaries And previous principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, the

director of our service have had with the different bureaus or with

the Deputy Secretary or with -- the Deputy Secretaries or with the

Secretary.

I was purely making my recommendation based on what I thought was

occurring or what I think the creation of that position would mean for

my bureau. So, again, I'm only speaking to what I think would be best,

and from a very -- you know, a guy that's been on, you know, 9 years-plus

with the Department, with Diplomatic Security.

Q And that end goal, really, from your perspective, is the

seat at the table, getting the access that you think Diplomatic Security

needs and deserves?

A I chose the term "seat at the table," I think, but I would

be -- I don't know if I'm comfortable saying that my seniors should

have a seat at the table. I think that -- I think that having an Under

Secretary, again, would elevate it to the other Under Secretaries and

make it just a little bit -- make it more of a priority for the

Department, safety and security of our diplomats and family members.

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BY MR. DESAI:

Q Great. So with respect to the Accountability Review Board,

you didn't talk to them, you sought out the appearance. Is that right?

A I did seek out the appearance.

Q And did you feel as if you were provided the opportunity

to share all the information you deemed pertinent, based on your

experience and based on their work?

A Yes.

Q And did you feel like you were fully forthcoming and were

able to be fully forthcoming with the ARB?

A I felt that I was able to discuss everything I needed to

discuss about my experience there in Benghazi.

Q So there are a couple of just very brief allegations that

have been put out there with respect to the ARB that I want to ask you

about --

A Okay.

Q -- and just dispense with.

Were you ever asked or ordered not to provide information to the

ARB?

A No.

Q Were you ever asked or ordered to conceal or destroy

information from the ARB?

A No.

Q If I can just refocus your attention now onto some of the

ARB's findings and recommendations. And I think, as was pointed out

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in the last session, some of the issues that we've discussed in our

conversation today were also identified by the ARB in their report,

which was issued in December 2012.

Have you had an opportunity to read the ARB report?

A I read the unclassified version of the ARB report.

Q Okay. So just the unclassified?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And in general, did you feel that the report

accurately captured your experience at Mission Benghazi?

A I don't believe that it was a verbatim explanation of my

experience there. I did take -- I don't know if "pride" is the right

term, but there were things that I suggested as a best practice or a

recommendation to the panel that ultimately ended up in the report.

Q Do you recall what some of those things were that ultimately

were reflected in the report that you provided to the panel?

A I -- training was one of them, training, not necessarily

Diplomatic Security agent training, but the training between DS agents,

DS personnel with the Foreign Service Officers specialists that we

serve with abroad. There seemed to be, you know, I think,

misunderstandings on both sides as to what our collective missions are

overseas, and I thought that improving opportunities for training prior

to getting in those situations would be beneficial to all of us.

Q Was there anything else besides training that you can recall

that you told the board that was ultimately reflected in the report?

A There were several, but, you know, without looking at it

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right now, I couldn't go through which ones I thought were -- that I

hit in my explanation to the panel.

Q Okay. Great. So if I can turn to the ARB's findings on

staffing shortages and other specifics. I'll just read --

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Yeah. Actually --

Mr. Desai. Go ahead.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q -- could I just ask you a quick question about, you had

indicated in the last hour that you had reached out -- you had gotten

the notice that the ARB, the Accountability Review Board, would be stood

up, and you reached out affirmatively to them to share your experience.

Did you get any sense when you did reach out to them that they

were not interested in speaking with you or other DS agents?

A I don't recall having that feeling. There was a process

to undertake. You would -- I responded to the notice and I was called

back. My understanding was that they felt that it was necessary to

speak to me because of my experience there and my role there. I didn't

have any issues getting in front of the ARB.

Q So no one, certainly from the ARB, indicate -- because I

know my colleague asked you about whether you had been discouraged,

but no one from the ARB ever indicated to you that the ARB did not want

to hear from you?

A No.

Q It was just the process of getting it scheduled --

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A Sure. Sure.

Q -- after you had contacted them?

A Yes.

Q Did you hear from any of your other colleagues, DS agent

colleagues, that they had reached out to the AR -- the Accountability

Review Board, but that the Accountability Review Board had refused to

speak with them?

A I can't recall any instances where somebody reached out and

was not offered an opportunity. On the contrary, I know agents that

served before me and after me that talked to the ARB. Now, whether

or not they sought out that opportunity or the ARB sought them out,

I'm not certain, but I know that there are other DS agents that of course

spoke to the ARB.

Ms. Sawyer. We'll go off the record just for a sec.

[Recess.]

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Mr. Desai. Let's go back on the record. The time is 1:26 p.m.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q So, before we left off, we were briefly discussing the

Accountability Review Board and some of their findings and

recommendations. And one of the things that they talk about in their

report are staffing shortages, and that's, of course, something that

we've talked about during our conversation today. The Board, of

course, found that staffing shortages were a problem and had enumerated

various reasons behind this.

And in order to address some of those issues, the ARB made several

recommendations to address this. And the first thing it did is it

endorsed the Department's request for increased Diplomatic Security

personnel for high- and critical-threat posts, as well as for

additional mobile security deployment teams, as well as increase

domestic DS staffing in domestic locations as well.

Do you agree with that recommendation generally?

A Yes.

Q And you think it would be helpful?

A Yes.

Q The other thing the ARB recommended in this capacity was:

Key policy program and security personnel should be assigned for a

minimum of at least 1 year at various posts, and there should be at

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least a 120-day minimum for temporary duty, or TDY, assignments across

the globe at various posts.

Do you agree with that recommendation, as well?

A Could you be -- the recommendation I'm familiar with, but

are we speaking solely with DS or across the board, both the entire

Foreign Service family?

Q DS.

A With DS. And the question was, do I agree with -- I think

there's two questions in there. Do I agree that key personnel should

be there for a year?

Q Uh-huh.

A Yes.

Q That's one, and the second is TDY service --

A For 120 days. I don't have any problems with that

recommendation.

Q Okay.

Lastly, from where you sit and given your experience -- and you

said you've been at DS for, I think, 9 years. You served in Benghazi

for, you know, close to 60 days. And there's been the ARB report, and

you spoke at the Accountability Review Board. There's been an

independent best practices panel and report. There's been an

independent best practices of management panel, as well. We're now

the eighth congressional investigation looking into the Benghazi

attacks.

Based on your experience and based on where you sit, do you think

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there are any other questions that have, you know, been left unanswered

in connection with the Benghazi attacks?

A Sir, I don't have an opinion on the matter. I think looking

into the events surrounding Benghazi has been a good thing for my

agency. How that occurs and what format that occurs in,

investigative-wise or otherwise, is unimportant to me. I just think

that it's been a good review of our -- because I take it so very

seriously. This is my career. And anything that this body or previous

bodies can do to improve security and our operations overseas is very

important to me.

Ms. Sawyer. And to help us, you know, do that -- because, in part,

we're very committed, I think, as a full committee, to make sure that

this is indeed the last investigation into the Benghazi attacks -- are

there, just from where you sit, and there may not be any, but are there

any particular questions that you have that you feel that we should

be looking into or that remain unanswered?

Mr. No, ma'am.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q Very good.

So I'm going to shift gears, and I'm going to ask you a series

of questions about several public allegations that have been made with

respect to the attack. And it's our understanding that the committee

is looking into some of these allegations, or all of these allegations,

rather, and, as a result, we are compelled to ask everyone all these

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questions.

Just to be very clear, though, even though I'm asking you these

questions about these allegations, I don't want you to think that anyone

on the minority staff or the minority members believe that these

specific allegations have any merit.

What's going to happen is I will describe the allegation to you,

I will ask you if you if you have any information or evidence to support

any of these allegations, and if you do not, I will move on to the next

allegation until we're done.

A Okay.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta

to stand down and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending

more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton ordered Secretary

of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April of 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The

Washington Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four

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Pinocchios, its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Colonel Qadhafi to his

own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Colonel Qadhafi to his

own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in spring 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms

from Libya to Syria, and they found no support for this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

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A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause and

appropriateness of that delay.

The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report

concluding that the team was not ordered to stand down but that,

instead, there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how

quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that, in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

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damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he had then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA faithfully performed our duties in

accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

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A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain

in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location.

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A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that there was no stand-down order issued to U.S.

military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi.

Do you any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of

the attacks, after which he stated, "Given where the troops were, how

quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did."

Do you have any evidence to contradict Chairman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you any evidence that the Pentagon had military assets

available to them on the night of the attacks that could have saved

lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decide not to

deploy?

A No.

Mr. Desai. Do my colleagues have any questions?

I think, with that, we're all done. And, again, thank you so much

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for appearing and for your service. We're very grateful.

Mr. Thank you.

Mr. Desai. We can go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:36 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #16

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 13, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel

BRENT WOOLFORK, Minority Senior Professional Staff

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

FOR DS AGENT #16

ZLATANA BADRICH, Deputy General Counsel

American Foreign Service Association

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Mr. Grider. Let's go on the record. This is a transcribed

interview of Agent , conducted by the House Select

Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily

as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks us the U.S.

diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters,

pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House

Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Special Agent , could you please state your full name?

Mr. . .

Mr. Grider. On behalf of the Committee, we appreciate your time

and willingness to come and talk to us today. My name is Mark Grider,

I am one of the counsels on the committee's majority staff.

I am going to have every one in the room introduce themselves as

well.

Ms. Jackson. I am Sharon Jackson. I am one of the attorneys with

the majority staff.

Mr. Desai. Ronak Desai, with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer, with the minority staff.

Mr. Woolfork. Brent Woolfork, with the minority staff.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Ms. Badrich. Zlatana Badrich, AFSA.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clake, majority staff.

Ms. Barrineau. Sara Barrineau, majority staff.

Mr. Grider. Thank you, everyone. I would like to go over some

ground rules and explain how the interview will proceed today. The

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way the questioning proceeds is that a member from the majority will

ask questions for up to one hour, and then the minority will have an

opportunity to ask questions for an equal period of time as they choose.

As we talked before, we may sort of change that up a little bit, but

we will take a break in an hour.

We will adhere to the 1-hour time limit. Questions may only be

asked by a member of the committee or designated staff members. We

will rotate back and forth, 1 hour per side until we are out of questions

and the interview will be over.

During your career as a law enforcement officer, you may have

testified in a deposition or in State court or Federal court. As you

may know, this is a little different. The committee format is not bound

by the rules of evidence. So we may ask your opinion on things, we

may ask hearsay. All of that is admissible in a transcribed interview

before a congressional committee.

You or your counsel may raise objections for privilege subject

to it the review by the chairman of the committee. If these objections

cannot be resolved in the interview, the witness can be required to

return for a deposition hearing or a hearing. Members and staff of

the committee however are not permitted to raise objections when the

other side is asking questions. This has not been a problem or an issue

in the past, and I don't anticipate it to be.

This session is to begin as unclassified. If any questions call

for a classified answer, please let us know, and we will reserve the

answer until we move into a classified setting.

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In preparing for your interview, I don't believe any of my

questions will go into a classified information based on the documents

that I have reviewed, but if you feel it does, please confer with your

counsel, and we will handle that as it comes up.

Mr. . Okay.

Mr. Grider. You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time

throughout the interview. But if something needs to be clarified, we

ask you to make this known to me. If you need to discuss anything with

your counsel, we will go off the record, stop the clock, and provide

you this opportunity.

We will also take a break whenever it's convenient for you. This

could be after every hour of questioning or whenever you need or after

a couple of rounds. During a round of questioning if you need a glass

of water, coffee, to confer with counsel, just let us know. We will

go off the record, and we will make that happen.

As you can see to your right, an official court reporter is taking

down everything you may say to make a written record. So we ask that

you give verbal responses to all questions, yes and no and not a nod

of the head. I am going to ask the reporter to feel free to jump in

in the case that he does not respond verbally. And so do you understand

that?

Mr. . Yes, I do.

Mr. Grider. This is the issue that I need to work on; also, we

should both try not to talk over each other so it is easier to get a

clear record. So I welcome the court reporter to say, Hey, slow down,

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and I will try to slow down a little bit so we can make sure we get

a clear record.

We want your answers and our questions to be in the complete and

truthful manner as possible. We will take our time to repeat or clarify

our questions if necessary. If you have any questions, you don't

understand our questions, please let us know, be happy to clarify or

repeat our questions.

We also want a clear understanding of what you know from your time

in Benghazi, Libya. So we are going to ask you to give us your best

recollection. And I think everyone here understands a numbers of years

have passed, so things may not be crystal clear. So if you honestly

don't know the answer to a question or you do not remember, it is best

not to guess. Please give us your best recollection. And if these

are things that you do not know or can't remember, just say so and please

inform us who or to the best of knowledge may be able to provide a more

complete answer to the question.

Mr. . [Nonverbal response.]

Mr. Grider. A few questions here for you. Do you understand

that you have an obligation to answer questions from Congress

truthfully?

Mr. . Yes, I do.

Mr. Grider. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand this?

Mr. . Yes, I do.

Mr. Grider. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

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could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes, I do.

Mr. Grider. Is there any reason you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. . No reason.

Mr. Grider. That is the end of my preamble.

Does the minority have anything that they want to bring up?

Does anybody else?

EXAMINATION

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q It is 10 after 10, and I am going to jot that down. And

we will get the questions started.

Agent , can you give us, just start from the beginning of

your career and give us your background prior to DS?

A Well, I joined DS in of 2011. Prior to that, I

served 22 years in the United States Marine Corps, approximately

10 years Active, 12 as a reservist. I was an infantryman. I was also

part of human intelligence, counterintelligence, and I was an MSG under

the embassy duty program.

In addition to that, prior to joining DS, I have approximately

13 years of Federal law enforcement experience, FPS, the Federal Air

Marshal Service, and 1 year with NCIS. With DS, I initially served

at the field office, did several TDYs out of there. My TDYs

include 2 months in Guadalajara, Mexico, .

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Q May I ask you a question?

A Sure.

Q Just to get the chronology. So you joined in 2011.

A Correct.

Q Can we walk in a chronological aspect of your TDYs, and then

you can even touch on the Benghazi if there was something after?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

A After training, approximately in 2011,

probably in the August timeframe, I went to Mexico for approximately

2 months,

in Guadalajara, Mexico. I came back for some time, and I did my TDY

to initially the Secretary of State for approximately -- I don't

remember at this time. It was 60 or 90 days where I served in the

protection of Secretary Clinton.

Afterwards, approximately from March 6 through April 21, I did

an approximately 45-day TDY in Benghazi, Libya, where I served

initially as an ARSO. Later on, I was the acting RSO. I came back

again to the field office, and approximately in the summer

of 2013, I did another 90-day TDY in as the ARSOI, which

is the Assistant Regional Security Officer for Investigations.

Approximately 1 year and a half ago, I was assigned to the American

Embassy, , where I now serve as the ARSOI. I am

basically in charge of all the State Department investigations in

.

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Q Thank you very much. Before we get to that March 6, April

21 timeframe, I just have a question about the ARSOI.

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you explain what that is?

A It is a new program that DS started approximately 10 years

ago, sir. Basically, it is a DS agent that serves in an overseas post

and does investigations. We are talking visa fraud, passport fraud.

We are talking human trafficking and smuggling. We are also in charge

for the fugitive program for the U.S. Marshals. So we capture

fugitives of the American legal system and bring them back to justice.

Q Very good. So was that program in place when you were in

Benghazi during that time period?

A Yes, but Libya did not have such a position at the time.

Q Okay. Let's direct your attention back to the March 6

timeframe.

A Yes, sir.

Q With respect to that TDY, was it -- were you recruited? Did

you volunteer? How did that come about? Can you explain to us?

A Well, DS was looking for volunteers to fill that position,

and I volunteered.

Q Are you familiar with the term high-threat training?

A Yes, I am, sir.

Q Can you explain to us what it is?

A Well, sir, it is -- in my own words, I would put it as a

protection under high-threat environments/military type training that

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10

agents -- DS agents receive. I don't -- I have never heard of another

agency that has a program of this sort, and I think it is a very good

program. They have got some of the best instructors I can think of.

Most of them are former U.S. Marines.

Q And did you take the high-threat training course?

A Yes, I did, sir. It was one of the requirements as I

understand it to get an assignment to Benghazi, Libya.

Q Do you recall about when you took that course?

A Yes, sir, it was pretty cold, so I do recall. It was in

January of 2012.

Q Okay. Let's talk a little bit more about your time in

Benghazi. Can you walk me through sort of the chronology prior to March

6? Obviously, they were looking for volunteers.

A Yes, sir.

Q So we are not familiar with the process. So how did you

volunteer? What information did they give you? And we will talk about

how you got there and what you took with you, does that make --

A Yes, sir. An announcement went out looking for volunteers

to fill this now position for TDYs. I thought it would be a challenging

experience so I volunteered for it. They had several requirements,

one of them was to take the high-threat training. I immediately

contacted people at that school to see when the next availability was

that they would have. Upon completion of the training, I spoke to the

desk officer for Benghazi, Mr. . Mr. initially

scheduled me to go to Benghazi in mid to late February of 2012. And

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did some reading up on Libya, on the revolution. I was also briefed

by Mr. on the situation on the ground and what the duties and

responsibilities out there would be. I also spoke to another agent

from the Washington field office who was currently -- who was in

Benghazi prior to my arrival.

Q Great. Can you give us some of the -- what was the contents

of the briefing from , was that formal, informal, was it by

telephone, by email?

A It was in person, sir. I went to his office. We sat in

his cubicle for, I don't know, approximately 1 to 2 hours. He showed

me pictures, maps, explained to me what the compound consisted of, spoke

to me of the personnel over there as to what our mission was in Benghazi.

Q And you mentioned that you had talked to someone that was

currently on the ground in Benghazi?

A That is correct. At this point, I believe we might have

had one phone call, and the rest of them might have been through email,

sir. Basic questions as to what are the Libyan accommodations, what

is your daily routine, that sort of thing.

Q Do you recall who that person is?

A Yes, . He is currently assigned as the ARSOI,

in Brasilia, Brazil.

Q Do you recall what his title was at that point?

A He was also an ARSO in Benghazi at the time.

Q Very good. Before you got on the plane, what were your

impressions of the situation you were getting into? What was your

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sense of why you were going there and what was going to be the

environment that you were walking into, if you recall?

A Well, sir, as I recall, I knew that the country had just

gone through a revolution. I knew that there were several armed groups

in Benghazi. I knew that the government had little control of

security, and I was expecting to provide the safest environment I could

for diplomats to conduct their business.

Mr. Grider. Do you have any questions?

Ms. Jackson. Sounds like it was going to be a challenge.

Mr. . Yes, ma'am.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Can you tell me how you got there, and what, if anything,

did you take with you?

A I took all the high-threat gear that I was issued. I took

extra military survival type gear and protection gear that I thought

I would need. And I initially flew in through -- I went to Istanbul,

Turkey, and then spent one night there, and from there, I continued

my trip to Benghazi, Libya.

Q Did you go out of New York or out of Dulles?

A You know what, sir, I believe I flew from Dulles

International to Istanbul, and from -- and because there was no flights

until the next day, on the next day, I flew to Benghazi.

Q Right.

A I take that back, sir. And I would need to go back, but

it is possible that I could have flown to Frankfurt, from Frankfurt

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13

to Istanbul, and from there to Benghazi.

Ms. Jackson. You have probably been on one or more international

flights in your career.

Mr. . As a Federal air marshal for 9 years, I have been

on plenty of them, yes.

Ms. Jackson. How do you like that Frankfurt airport?

Mr. . It's great because they have a grocery store

downstairs that -- they sell just about everything. It is a good

airport, ma'am.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. Once you landed in Benghazi, can you tell me if you

can walk me through sort of who was on the ground, you know, from DS,

all the different individuals and levels?

A There was three agents on the ground, sir. The RSO at the

time was . One of the ARSOs was . And there

is a third ARSO, and I cannot recall his last name. His first name

was . He was an ARSO in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, at the time but was

TDY to Benghazi.

Now this number of three did not stay like that for long.

Approximately one week later, left.

Q So he left in the March timeframe?

A Yes, sir.

Q Fair enough. What about , how long, do you recall?

A must have stayed there for another 2 weeks, 2 to 3

weeks; same thing with .

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Q That's the DS agents that were on the ground?

A Yes, sir.

Q Any other State Department employees?

A Yes, sir, , who was our principal officer.

And we had one communicator -- and I just cannot remember his name.

There was -- he was replaced by another communicator, -- I am

terrible right now with those names, I am sorry.

Ms. Jackson. Was one named ?

Mr. . Yes, was the initial communicator there, and

then he was replaced by .

Ms. Jackson. Was it, like, ?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Recognition is so much better than recall.

Mr. Grider. So we have got the DS agents that are covered, State

Department. Any other agencies on the ground?

Mr. . Well, sir, in order to give you any details on that,

I would probably need to be in a secure environment to discuss that.

Mr. Grider. From a yes or no?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Any other U.S. Government like U.N. or USAID, other

State Department officials, other than the one.

A None that I -- the U.N. was there. I don't know -- and I

know that they were there. I had contact with their security people.

I know the attacks that they went through, but I don't know if there

was any Americans assigned to them. I imagine that there were. As

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to USAID, I am not aware of them. It's possible. I just never had

any contact with them.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q One other presence, were there any other countries that may

have been there?

A Yes, sir, we had a very close relationship with the U.K.

The U.K. had a representative there, and they had a house similar to

ours. They also had security personnel. I belive their people were

contractors, though. They eventually left. As a matter of fact, they

left some of their vehicles and their gear with us, but yes, they were

initially there.

Q Very good. I am just going to ask you just, are you familiar

with the name ?

A Yes.

Q What, if anything do you recall. What was his role, if you

recall?

A Again, my memory may fail me, sir. If I am not -- if I am

not mistaken, he was an in Benghazi, and he also did

part-time work for us as interpreter and assisting the principal

officer with certain things. I also believe he was involved -- the

reason why we were -- had a relationship with him is he was involved

in saving a U.S. pilot during the revolution. I am not sure if I am

talking about the same .

Q When you were present in Benghazi, was Mr. there

as well?

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A Yes, he was. He would visit us at the compound and have

meetings with Mrs. . I also remember times that we would -- I

would accompany Ms. to his school.

Ms. Jackson. Were there any other Libyans that worked on the

compound either full time or part time?

Mr. . Yes, ma'am. We had members of the 17th February

Militia. They were part of our QRF. Initially there was three of

them. Later on, there was four of them. Also, the guard force, they

were all Libyans. We had people that worked in the kitchen. However,

I don't believe they were Libyans. I believe they were third-country

nationals. I know that there was Egyptians there, but there could have

been a Libyan there too.

Ms. Jackson. Was there anybody else in the position like Mr.

that helped with the political office or helped arrange --

Mr. . Yes, , cannot recall last name now.

She basically did clerical work. She also did some logistical work

for the compound, and that is the only other person I can think of at

this time.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Let's talk about -- you had mentioned your gear that you

had brought over with you. Was that gear given to you from the State

Department, or was that gear given to you prior to?

A Well, sir, I love gear and the State Department is great

in giving out gear. After going through high threat, they give you

some of the best gear that I have seen. So I had all of that gear.

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And, you know, after a military career, you also end up with a lot of

gear too. So I took some of my personal gear too.

Q One you landed in Benghazi, did they give you additional

gear?

A Yes, I do believe they had different vests available with

more low profile that we were able to use. We also had gear we could

put into the vehicle in case you needed it, additional vests for the

principal officer in case she needed it, that sort of thing. So other

protective gear was available in the compound.

Q Fair enough. What type of firearms did you have to do your

job?

A Well, I took my issued pistol, which is a

millimeter. In addition to that, they made available for me a shotgun,

as well as an M4 Bushmaster rifle.

Q Are you familiar with the M249?

A Yes, it's a squad automatic weapon. We did not have those.

Q Have you been trained on that?

A Yeah, like I said, I was in the infantry, and I was a machine

gunner, So yeah. In addition to that in high threat, you also go

through the training for the SAW.

Q We are going to move to another section, but before we do,

you had mentioned low-profile gear. I am new to that. What does

that -- what, if anything, does that mean?

A Well, I guess what I am trying to say, sir, a lot of the

vests that I was taking with me, they are pretty thick. They stand

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out. You can't wear it really underneath civilian clothing. And the

low-profile stuff is stuff that you really don't see and maybe just

the vest with the plate, metal plate, in the front and the back.

Q And that was State Department gear?

A That is correct, sir.

Q Let's turn to just your role in Benghazi, what you did.

Sounds like you were in two different roles, my understanding. You

were acting RSO for some point or -- just why don't you take me through

your role?

A Well, sir, when I initially got there, as you probably know,

the responsibilities of an RSO are pretty broad. There is the physical

security. There is the guard force, the fences, the alarms, the

protection of the principal officer, a lot going on. So what they did

was they divided that up amongst of the different agents there on the

ground.

What I initially ended up with the protection of the principal

officer. And that was my main role. Obviously, you would help out

with other things. I started helping out with the training of the guard

force and the training of the QRF, helping with upgrading security

around the compound, but my main responsibility was protection of the

principal officer.

Q So when you arrived, obviously, there were two DS agents?

A It was initially three, sir.

Q That's correct. They were leaving. Did your role stay the

same during your entire time period?

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A Well, in a way, yes, in a sense that I still had the

protection of the principal officer, but as more agents leave, more

responsibilities fall upon you.

Ms. Jackson. Did any other agents come to replace them?

Mr. . No, they did not, sir -- they did not, ma'am. And

as I understand it, one of the problems was that there was a visa

issuance issue; the Libyans were not issuing Americans visas.

Mr. Grider. So to follow on that, was there a time period when

you were in Benghazi that there were less than three, less than two,

less than --

Mr. . Yes, sir, there was a time when there was two of

us, and myself, maybe for a 2, 3-day period agents were supposed

to -- at least one agent was supposed to arrive to replace him. They

never made it. There was a, perhaps -- I don't recall the exact number

of days right now. It could be up to 2 weeks where I was the sole DS

agent in Benghazi.

Ms. Jackson. And this timeframe would have been sort of the end

of March if --

Mr. . That is correct, ma'am, the end of March through,

you know, mid April. Towards the end, I -- two other agents arrived.

So, yeah, it would have been end of March, early April.

Mr. Grider. We may get into this a little bit later, but I want

to ask what were your feelings -- what was your opinion about being

the sole agent on the ground during that 2-week time period from a

security standpoint?

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Mr. . Well, sir, you know, we can always hope for the best

situation. And we can plan for the bust situation, but Murphy is going

to be around; something is always going to go wrong. So I planned to

do the best with what I had available. I, obviously, requested more

assistance, sent up the request up my chain of command and did all that

I could with what I had available on the ground.

Mr. Grider. If you don't mind me asking, so that -- I appreciate

you bringing that up in requesting more assistance. Do you recall,

was that when Mr. was there still on the ground or after he left

or when you anticipated him leaving?

Mr. . Well, when Mr. was on the ground, sir, we

were expecting the agents to arrive. Agents were supposed to arrive

on certain dates, okay, but it didn't happen. And it didn't happen

as I understand it because no visas were being given to American

personnel. So I continued asking for this assistance, but it is no

time for feelings or to complain about stuff, you still have a daily

mission that you must accomplish during that time. And of course we

had longer days, you know, 20-hour days or whatever, but I -- I believe

we were providing the best security that we could at the time.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Given the adage of the squeaky wheel will sometimes get

oiled, were you a squeaky wheel? I mean, were you sending in daily

requests for additional agents? Were you on the phone with

or others? I would assume that you obviously needed -- to have

a secure environment. You needed assistance.

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A A long time ago, ma'am, I learned something from, you know,

my Muslim colleagues, and it is a saying that says that the baby that

cries the most gets the most milk. Of course, every day I would send

in, as part of my request, questions as to when they would be arriving.

But that did not stop us from fulfilling our requirements to provide

a safe environment for our principal officer and the communicator.

Q Were you communicating with the Embassy in Tripoli at the

time?

A I was communicating with the Embassy in Tripoli. I am not

sure if you are familiar with this, ma'am, but the RSO for the country

is always located at the -- most of the time at the embassy. So the

RSO for all of Libya was located in Tripoli, and I would communicate

with him in requesting agents from the Embassy to come and assist me,

and I was communicating with my desk officer, in D.C.,

requesting updates as to when those visa issues would be taken care

of so that the agents could arrive.

Q And who was that RSO in Tripoli at the time?

A Um.

Q We are taxing your brain.

A Yes, you are, ma'am. Golly, I know him, he testified.

Q Would the name m sound familiar?

A Yes, Mr. , correct.

Q And can you describe some of the conversations that you had

with Mr. and Mr. regarding the request for additional

agents?

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A Well, you know, I could be -- I could sound a little forceful

and strong in my request, but you know, it's just my style, but they

were -- there was no animosity there. Maybe you could sense some

frustration, but I understood what the situation was. And what I got

was that they could not send anyone from the States at the time because

of the visa issues. And Mr. was -- had other requirements

in Tripoli and could not let his agents leave from there, yeah.

Q I assume Mr. -- and correct me if I am

wrong -- was also waiting for additional agents from Tripoli?

A I am not sure what his situation was, ma'am. I do know that

he would say that he had a lot of requirements out there too, and

therefore, he could not let any of his agents go down to assist me.

Q Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Your primary responsibility was to protect the PO, and that

was Ms. . Is that correct?

A When I arrived as an ARSO, that is correct.

Q Did you ever inform her of or did you ever enlist others

to articulate that additional need for security?

A Oh, yes. I had a very open relationship with the principal

officer. And I remember being included in emails where she also

requested the additional manpower.

Q I am not sure how to get to this question, so this may be

a narrative. When you had three DS agents on the ground, the

responsibilities were divvied up.

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A Yes, sir.

Q So two things, one, when there was a movement, so let's say

the PO was going off, can you explain to me when there were three agents

on the ground how that would at times play out with respect to three

agents?

A Well, I would have the opportunity to go do an advance of

the location where we were going. I would concentrate my time and

making liaison with the primary agency perhaps responsible for the

security there. I would have more time to plan things out than to

accompany the principal officer to whatever location we were going to.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q When you have three agents on the ground when you first

arrived, would all three agents go on a movement or how did that work?

A No, ma'am, because we had so many other responsibilities,

most of the time, it would only be one agent. However, if it was a

location that we considered, you know, very unsafe or unsecure, we would

send an agent in advance. And he would do the advance, and then I would

accompany Ms. . If it was a movement of let's say to another

compound that, you know, has good security, then we may not need that.

But, yeah, that's how we did it when we had three agents.

Q I want to make sure I have this correct. If it was a riskier

environment, it would be your process to have an agent go in advance.

Would one or more members of the QRF go with the agent?

A Yes.

Q And they would go ahead of time and report back, stay there

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until the rest --

A Correct.

Q And then you and Ms. would arrive later?

A Correct.

Q Would you have one or more QRF with you?

A I would have one with me, correct.

Q And then you would have the third agent remain at the

compound?

A That is correct.

Q And what would that agent be doing?

A Well, he would manage communications. He would answer any

questions from the guard force. He would manage any security type

issue that would arise while we were gone.

Q Would that agent generally be in the Tactical Operation

Center or TOC?

A That's correct.

Q And is that where the communication system was located?

A That is correct.

Q So the agent that was left behind was in charge of security

the compound as well as being the communication hub for you all?

A That is right.

Q Okay, and in your opinion, was that what you needed to have

three agents, one to do the advance, one to travel with the principal

officer, and one to remain back?

A Well, ma'am we can always -- of course, more agents, it's

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going to provide better service, better coverage. So three agents for

that was good. Five agents would have been so much better. And, of

course, you are going to be able to do a better job when you have more

people, yes.

Q In your opinion, is it important to have that person who

is back at the Tactical Operations Center?

A Yes, it is very important.

Q Why is that?

A Well, first of all, he has a longer range of communications.

He has a computer right there. He has radios with longer reach. He

has a better phone system. In addition to that, there is someone there

to deal with any security issue that might arise at the compound.

Q Did the IMO usually stay back when the principal officer --

A The IMO always stayed back. I cannot think -- I can count

with one hand the times that the IMO left the compound.

Q During the time that it was you and Mr. there, just

the two of you, would one of you remain behind in the Tactical Operations

Center?

A Yes, one of us would normally one would remain behind, and

what we would do is we would use the QRF, the members of the militia,

quite more than we did when he had three agents.

Q And then when you were the only agent there, what was the

ramification of that? Did movement stop, or did the compound have to

remain without an agent while you did a movement?

A Ma'am, well, obviously, my mission is to provide a safe

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environment for our diplomats, and the diplomats' mission is to do

diplomacy. And, for that, they do need to leave the compound; they

do need to have meetings. The arrangement that the principal officer

and myself came up with is that we would minimize those movements. So,

whenever they were necessary, what I did is I would accompany her; we

would shut down the compound. The QRF as well as the guard force would

know that no one would be coming in or out during that time. I was

in constant communication with our IMO, and we would make them as quick

and fast as we could possibly do it.

Mr. Grider. So the IMO would remain at the compound, the shutdown

compound?

Mr. . That's correct, sir.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So simple things like even deliveries would have been

curtailed if you weren't there?

A Yes, ma'am?

Q And this lasted for approximately a 2-week period?

A Two weeks at the most, ma'am. I would have to count the

days, but somewhere between 10 and 14 days.

Q Was there any other steps that you decided to take either

on your own or in consultation at the direction of someone else to

enhance the security when you were the only agent there?

A Well, 10-hour shifts or 10-hour days turn into 20-hour days.

We would spend a whole lot more time attempting to train our QRF and

our local guard force. We had a plan of, besides our concentric rings

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of security, we also had fighting positions throughout the compound.

I gave familiarization training of our weapon systems to our principal

officer and our IMO, and we were just much more careful in the way we

did things.

Q Okay. And when you talk about weapons familiarization

training, what is that?

A Well, both the IMO as well as the principal officer had gone

through, you know, fan fire. They were already somewhat familiar; they

had fired pistols and shotguns and rifles. And sometimes those are

perishable skills; you forget things. So I took the time to

individually train them, remind them, you know, how the sights work,

how to take off or put on the safety, how to load, reload either a shotgun

or pistol or rifle that we had, yeah.

Q Did anyone express to you displeasure over your doing that,

or did you hear from either the principal or IMO that others had

expressed my type of displeasure over that training?

A They did not to me. I never heard of it. I think they

understood the situations we were in. I was never asking them to step

into a security role, but I wanted them to be able to protect themselves

in the event that they needed to. It didn't mean that -- they did not

carry a weapon with them, but they knew where the weapons were.

Ms. Jackson. Good.

Mr. Grider. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

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Q In light of this line of questioning, I have some other

generic questions, but I am going to move those to the back end and

get to some of the security incidents during your timeframe there.

A All right.

Q Can you -- I am trying to figure out the security incident,

is that my phrase or is that a phrase that DS would normally use?

A No, we would normally use that.

Q Can you -- maybe I picked it up out of reading. Can you

sort of define what a security incident is?

A Well, I guess it would be any incident in which the security

of the compound or the security of any American can be in jeopardy or

could be of interest to us.

Q How did you report -- if there was a security incident, was

there is a way to communicate that to your higher ups, to others on

the ground?

A The correct way of doing so is to write a Spot Report or

some other report like an information report, an IIR, Information

Investigation Report. So that is one way of doing it. The other way

is when it it's something that's taking place right there or right now,

you can always pick up the phone and call our communications center

here in Washington, D.C.

Q And usually who would pick up, is that that

you recall?

A Well, he's got a normal job from 8 to 5. So, no, we have

a center that's open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and there is always

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someone there from DS to pick up.

Q Is it that the command?

A The command center, yes.

Q Okay. Based on that definition of security incidents, I

just want to -- can you -- during your timeframe there, do you recall

anything that would sort of fall into that definition? If we can mark

it chronologically -- if you can't, you can't?

A Well, I would like to say what could be a security incident

here in Washington, D.C., would be completely different as to what we

learned was a security incident in Benghazi, Libya. We heard small

arms fired every day. You know, you have got to determine when it was

celebratory fire and when, you know, different armed groups were having

a fire fight.

We have heard explosions also constantly. So, again, you became

acclimatized to what was normal on the ground and what wasn't. We had

several incidents in the city where different groups would engage in

combat against each other. I believe I might have written something

on that. Then there was also an attempt against the U.N. Special Envoy

outside of one of the security headquarters there in Benghazi. There

was also an attack against the U.K. representative on his visit. There

was one attempt to climb over the fence into our compound. And then

I guess the biggest event that we had was a bombing of the compound

while I was there.

Q So we will come back to those other ones. Let's take a look

I believe it was probably around April 6?

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A That's correct.

Q So can you sort of describe the events prior to what happened

during the attack and any reports that you sent up and any

communications?

A Okay. On April 6, at approximately 2230 perhaps, I will

just gone into our house where the Americans stayed, considered in Villa

C. And shortly after I went inside, I know the principal officer and

the IMO had already retired. I was sitting there, and I just turned

on the TV, and I heard a very loud explosion. And, as I told you before,

you heard explosions throughout, but you would know by the force of

this explosion, not only the noise but also the way it rocked the

building, I knew that it was inside the compound.

At that point, I was sitting in the living room. I had my weapons

with me. I did not have my vest. I ran into my bedroom, grabbed my

vest. I spoke to the IMO and to the principal officer. I instructed

them to allow me out, lock themselves -- lock the door and lock

themselves in the safe haven. I had an extra pistol and an extra

shotgun. I left it there for them. I left two radios. One that is

communication for them and me and communications for them and

. I told them that I would be constant contact with them on

the radio or on the phone; if they did not hear from me, then to contact

for assistance.

I also called our QRF, basically reacted them. We had a plan:

On a situation like that, they would take up positions throughout the

compound. One of the positions would be outside of our building. As

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I stepped outside, one of the QRF members was already out there waiting

for me. This is possibly, I don't know, 3 minutes after the bombing.

At some point, the guard finally activated the alarm. Our guard

force had a push button alarm; in case of any attack, they would activate

it. As I step outside, the QRF member is there. We cleared our way

to the TOC. Went inside the TOC. I turn off the alarm, and I use our

camera system to view or to try to determine if there was any other

people, any other attackers in the compound. That took approximately

3, 4 minutes.

I did not see anybody in our camera system. There are some blind

spots, but we did have a pretty good system throughout the compound.

I thought that with that, I would be able to determine something,

something blatant, something that would really stand out.

Afterwards, I stepped outside of the TOC. I had two QRF members

with me, and we commenced on clearing the compound.

While we were doing that, I heard two shots. It sounded to me

like rifle fire, something bigger than an M4, which is what I had. So

I thought initially that it was shooting in the compound. One of the

QRF members received, if I am not mistaken, a call that told him that

a third QRF member was outside and had detained someone.

Q Question. I'm sorry. I just want to get clarity. When

you heard the rifle shots, did you think they were shooting inside the

compound or someone over the wall was shooting -- I just wasn't --

A The shots were very nearby. So I thought that the shooting

was possibly inside of the compound.

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Q Okay.

A Okay.

There was a third QRF member, first name , who was outside

of the compound and had detained two Libyan nationals. Eventually I

found out that he's the one who fired the two shots. It is common;

it is standard operating procedure for Libyans to shoot warning shots,

and that is what he did.

So we were clearing the compound when I learned that he was outside

and he was possibly engaged with the attackers. I kept one of the QRF

members guarding the entry to our house. I communicated with the

principal officer that everything was still okay; we are still

clearing. I went outside, and had two people on the ground.

Shortly afterwards, reinforcements from the 17th February

Militia arrived. They took them away. I requested from the militia

to provide a security ring outside of the compound. I made contact

with . And I asked them to hold off on sending

reinforcements to prevent a blue-on-blue situation -- the Militia did

not know who they were; they did not know who the Militia were -- but

to be on standby in case we needed additional assistance.

At that time, all QRF members and myself cleared the whole

compound. It took us several hours to do so. We did not find evidence

of any other intruders, attackers, enemy on the grounds. I went back

inside, and I briefed the principal officer as to what had taken place.

She and I then commenced our notifications to D.C. and our report

writing.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q When the first explosion occurred, how many -- on the

evening of April 6, how many QRF and how many local guard force did

you have on compound?

A Ma'am, there was only one explosion on April 6, and we had

three members of the QRF available that day as I recall. And we must

have had maybe eight members, six to eight members of the local guard

force. As well, remember, that the bombers were members of the local

guard force. So I am not including them in that number.

Q So you would have had 8 to 10 --

A No. Well, with the two suspects?

Q Yes, yes.

A Yes, 8 to 10.

Q And then six to eight that were --

A Please allow me to correct myself. One of the local guard

members had been fired days earlier. So I take that back; there was

only one active local guard member. So there would have been seven

to nine.

Q Okay, okay. And I believe you said that you had -- I am

just trying to get the sequence correct -- you had put the principal

officer and the IMO in the safe haven, you had called for the QRF and

were outside all before the duck-and-cover alarm was activated?

A The duck-and-cover alarm was finally activated possibly 2

minutes after the explosion. It could have been activated right as

I was walking out -- no, it was activated before I walked out.

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Q Okay.

A Because it was -- it was difficult to communicate with once

it was on.

Q Okay. And do you know who activated it?

A One of the guards at the main gate, yeah.

Mr. Grider. While you are looking, just to be clear, with respect

to the rings of security: Three members of QRF; seven to nine members

of local guard force; and then, with respect to DS agents, how many

were there?

Mr. . Me, one.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And then you said other members of the 17th Feb Brigade

arrived. This was in addition to your QRF members?

A That is correct, ma'am. The agreement that we had with the

17th February Brigade is that if we ever requested -- if we ever needed

assistance because due to a security incident such as this one, that

they would provide reinforcements, and they did that night.

Q And approximately how many arrived?

A Two vehicles full of people. I would estimate up to 15 to

20 people.

Q Okay. And approximately how long did it take them to

arrive?

A They were there within 10 minutes, I would estimate.

Q And what type of -- what type of weaponry did they bring

with them?

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A Well, the weapon that's issued to them is the AK-47. I

recall most, if not all, had an AK-47. I don't recall whether they

had any larger weaponry.

Q And what type of vehicles did they come in? Did they have

any weapons on their vehicles?

A You know, those vehicles were very common, ma'am. The

technicals, as they are called, the truck with the machine gun back,

I don't recall seeing one of those, but, then again, it was nighttime,

and I was not paying much attention to that them.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q About 5 more minutes. We may have to come back to this in

a little bit. I appreciate walking through. So let's turn to sort

of the report writing and sort of the notification process up. Can

you explain -- you stated that you briefed the PO and then?

A Yes.

Q And then you move towards report writing?

A Yes.

Q How did you communicate? What occurred?

A Well, as I recall, I initially made a phone call to the

command center to notify them of the attack, and then I wrote what we

call a Spot Report. I sent out -- I take that back, I sent out a quick

email, and then I wrote a Spot Report.

Ms. Jackson. Did you communicate with Tripoli?

Mr. . Yes. The report doesn't only go to one person or

one entity. I included Tripoli on that Spot Report, yes.

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Ms. Jackson. I was wondering, did you have a phone call with

Tripoli, or had the principal officer or IMO --

Mr. . I know that the principal officer did have a phone

call with Tripoli. I don't recall at this point if I also spoke on

the phone with Mr. or not. Three years ago, my memory is

bad, I am really sorry.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So earlier we talked about sort of the need to have

additional personnel.

A Uh-huh.

Q And you communicated that you had had discussions perhaps

with Tripoli as well as D.C.

A Uh-huh.

Q What, if anything, did this security incident do to your

continued discussions for a need? Was it coupled or did you just sort

of say it's obvious? How did you -- what, if anything, was it connected

to sort of saying, Hey, this is a case in point, or did you just let

it lie?

A Well, sir, of course, any time there is a security incident,

they are going to see the need for more personnel and this -- I would

say this definitely showed the need that we had for more personnel.

Ms. Jackson. Why don't we just find a stopping place?

Mr. Grider. I believe this is a safe place to stop.

Mr. Jackson. Let's go off the record.

[Recess.]

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Mr. Grider. I think we're back on the record. I'm confident

we're back on the record.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Special Agent, prior our break, we were discussing the

April 6 incident.

A Correct.

Q Before we get back into that incident, I want to just touch

on a quick question with respect to movements just generally.

During your timeframe there, was there ever a time that you

traveled, took movements, with the PO outside of Benghazi?

A Yes, there was. Towards the end of my time there, there

was a movement that we did to Derna.

Q Okay. And can you tell us more about that.

A Yes. The principal officer had an important meeting with

certain members of the security forces in Derna. Prior to that,

knowing that it's a -- it's a challenging trip, given the distance and

the location where we are going, I made arrangements to get extra

personnel to assist me with the move.

Also, by then, we had two more agents on the ground, the RSO,

, and ARSO . In addition to that, we -- we also

got three members of the U.S. Army Special Forces that were stationed

in Tripoli to assist us with that move. I was in charge of the -- of

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the overall move, but I had their assistance for that day.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So what was it about Derna that needed -- in your opinion,

why you requested the extra assistance?

A Well, ma'am, you know, Marines have been fighting the

Barbary pirates out there since, you know, the early 1800s. So Derna

has always been a troublesome spot.

There was certain armed groups that operated in Derna at the time,

and just the distance alone of a drive between Benghazi and Derna

required more vehicles, more personnel.

Q Uh-huh.

And what type of armed groups were in or around Derna?

A I would have to go back to notes to tell you right now, ma'am.

But I do know that there was a particular radical Islamic group that

had ties to Derna. Please excuse my memory.

Q Uh-huh.

So they were more insurgent groups as opposed to a criminal

element?

A As far as I recall, yes, ma'am.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q In light of the time that we have, it's going to appear that

we're sort of jumping around a little bit.

A No problem.

Q I think you can stay with me. We'll stay on security

incidents.

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Let's go back just to April 6.

A Yes.

Q Based on what you communicated to me, it appeared that some

of the perpetrators perhaps were a local guard force?

A They were.

Q So can you explain that. Who was the local -- who were they

with? And what did you find out in your investigation with respect

to the perpetrator?

A Well, sir, if you may allow me, I would like to also correct

myself on the numbers that I used on guards.

Q Uh-huh.

A As I was thinking about this, we had three different gates

where we had people manning those gates. The front gate had two people,

and the other two gates had one person each. That is four people right

there.

Then we also had a rover, which would be five, and a supervisor,

which would be six. So I'm talking about local guards on duty that

day should have been six -- should have been approximately six.

Q Okay.

A As to -- would you please again repeat your question.

Q Right.

With respect to the -- it was my understanding that there were

at least two individuals that perhaps were apprehended.

A Yes, sir. One of the individuals had been fired by me

earlier that week for vandalism. We've already had several incidents

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with members of the guard force. And he had -- I believe he did some

graffiti in the property, and I got him fired. The other individual

had been demoted from supervisor to a regular guard.

Again, you know, this is not a -- this was not a professional

outfit. These were not trained or people that came to the job with

a particular military police or that sort of background.

Q Okay. All right. What we call -- not able do this in

court, but I'm going to do some leading questions to get us going.

A All right, sir.

Q So it was your understanding that it was the Blue Mountain

Group? Was that the local guard force?

A That is correct, sir.

Q So when you say "you," what was the issue with respect to

vandalism? I mean, what concerned you such that he was fired?

A Well, sir, less than professional to be on duty and graffiti

the place where you work at.

Q Okay. Was that his first offense, to your knowledge?

A No, it was not. He had fallen asleep before, he had been

late, those sort of discipline problems.

Q Had -- in your career, had you worked with local guard

forces before?

A Yes, I have, sir.

Q And based on your opinion, with respect to the Blue Mountain

Group, what was their standard, in your opinion, showing up with respect

to BMG?

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A Very low standard.

Q When you communicated -- I should probably ask more

questions about that, but let's get moving.

When you communicated sort of the -- when you got him fired, to

whom did you communicate that? Who did you have to call? Or did you

have the power to do that yourself?

A We communicated that to -- at the time, the company had a

representative from the U.K. there who took care of that.

However, on matters of security, those type of matters like that

one right there, we also had the power to fire them ourselves. Yeah.

Q Did you have to talk to the RSO in Tripoli? Did you need

to talk to or was it --

A I don't recall having to do that, sir, but I may be wrong.

Perhaps I sent them a notification, an email, on it. But I know that

the British company representative there took care of it on the spot.

Q And I'm just trying to think -- by any chance, was that

person Pat Niles -- Nigel?

A No. Nigel was actually the owner --

Q Okay.

A -- of the company.

Q Okay.

A And he was on the ground for several days, but not during

that timeframe.

Q Okay. And then the other individual who was with the Blue

Mountain Group was demoted.

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Was that during your tenure or --

A Yes, sir. In my tenure, I demoted him.

Q Okay. Do you have any knowledge of who handled some of the

procurement process with respect to the local guard force?

A Because of the contract or because of the arrangements that

we had with them, that was something that was supposed to be done through

their company, procurement of uniforms, equipment, that sort of thing.

By the time I left, they were finally getting in their uniforms and,

you know, flashlights, that sort of thing.

Q I guess, when I mention procurement, I'm suggesting who was

in charge of actually hiring the -- you know, the bid process of BMG?

Were you -- did you have any visibility on which security company was

coming in?

A No, sir. I did not. I am not sure who -- who made that

determination. I would imagine that the RSO in Tripoli was involved

in that process, but I do not know who did it.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you make any recommendations while you were there that

that contract ought to be terminated?

A I made recommendations for bettering the guard force that

we had. Yes. I spent numerous hours trying to train them to do their

job properly, and I sent out several emails that perhaps detailed the

type of problems that we were having with them.

Q And were you aware that agents before you who had been the

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acting RSOs and ARSOs had also tried to instill training on them?

A I am aware that there was other people that had had problems

with them. I'm aware that we did not expect much from them, that we

wanted them at least to be our eyes and ears and to press that alarm

button when it was necessary. Our expectations were not very high on

them.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. In order to expedite our timing, I'm just going to

direct your attention to some dates that I may or may not -- it's

not -- you know, I may or not -- may or may not have accurate with respect

to security incidents.

A Okay.

Q And I just want to see if you recall or, if not -- I mean,

so these aren't set in stone here.

So direct your attention to March 8, 2012. Apparently, there was

a loud explosion, a Fish bomb. You may have not even --

A Well, I would have been on the ground by then. I don't

recall that incident, sir.

Q Okay. March 18, 2012, approximately six armed men wearing

military fatigues robbed some teachers.

A I don't recall the incident, sir. It's very possible it

happened.

Q Absolutely.

A So many things --

Q Okay. That's -- absolutely. That's fine.

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March 22, 2012, there may have been some gunfire and militia

wanted in on the compound, but later apologized.

A I do recall that, sir.

Q Can you give me just a brief overview of that.

A If I'm correct on the incident, sir, there was a guard that

decided it was a good idea to make a fire in the compound to keep warm.

The -- one of the militias -- and let me explain.

There was several armed groups in Benghazi that acted as the

police. They patrolled the area and they enforced whatever laws they

felt they wanted to enforce.

They saw the fire. They stopped. Although the fire was inside,

they attempted to jump over the fence to come into the compound. And,

yes, I recall making a big deal of it the next day with the militia.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q At that time, were you the only agent on ground or were

there -- was Mr. still there?

Mr. . Could you give me that date again.

Mr. Grider. Approximately March 22, 2012.

A I don't recall, ma'am. It's possible Mr. was still

there at the time.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You don't have any recollection of having any assistance

that evening or conversations with any colleagues?

A You know what. Mr. was there at the time. He -- he

was. Yeah.

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Q Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. Like I said, these are -- these are dates that I've

picked up. So I'm not expecting you to recall.

On this March 23, 2012, soldiers and -- I got police protesters.

Maybe a minor protest after that incident?

A We had a protest outside of our compound at some point. I

don't know this is the one that you're referring to.

Q Sure. Sure.

A We had two protests outside of our compound. One

was -- could have been that one. And we also had another one with local

guard force, our guard force protesting.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Tell us about that.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Go ahead. As my colleague --

A Apparently, the company was -- they wanted to be paid in

cash. The company tried to bring in cash, and the security personnel

at the airport tried to take that cash. So the cash was not -- they

were not being paid on time and payment was one week late and they wanted

to be paid.

Q Just as a point of reference, do you think that happened

after the April 6 incident or before?

A Before.

Q Okay. And when that protest occurred, were you the only

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one -- DS agent or do you think there may have been you and others?

A I believe I was the only one there at that time.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have any advance notice that they were going to

protest that day?

A No. They got off duty, they finished their shift, and then

they began their protest.

Q Okay. And did they have signs? Did they -- was it inside

or outside the compound?

A It's outside the main entrance, but in the area where we

search vehicles. It still could be considered within the -- within

our grounds.

Q And it was 4 to 6 people? 6 to 10 people? Do you --

A More 6 to 10, because some guards that were off duty came

in that day --

Q Okay.

A -- including the guard that I had fired.

Q Okay. Did you see any weapons on them in any way?

A Oh, no. No. No. No weapons.

Q Signs? Carry signs?

A I don't remember signs. No.

Q Okay. Did they just do a little protest circle?

A Yeah. They just gathered right there in the entrance and

intervened with, you know, vehicles coming in and that sort of thing.

Q Sort of like a blockade-type thing?

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A Well, I wouldn't call it a blockade, but they were

definitely in the way.

Q Okay. And can you describe this other protest for us.

A You know, ma'am, I don't remember the details of it, but

I do remember that there was some kind of gathering outside of the

compound.

Q Again, at the main entrance?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you remember approximately how many?

A No, I don't. And it must have been a short one because -- or

else we would have written more -- more on it -- or I would have written

more on it.

Q Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q In your duties, did you come across cables? Would you have

read cables?

A Normally, at a -- at a typical embassy, you would. But we

were so busy that you had very little time to be in the office doing

the typical duties that you have as an RSO.

I don't remember spending much time reading cables. However, it

doesn't mean that the principal officer or the IMO did not have access

to cables and were constantly reading them.

Q So if there was a cable sent -- on March 28, 2012, from the

Ambassador sent to Secretary Clinton requesting security assets and

the continued deployment of the mobile security detachment teams, would

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you have seen that possible cable or --

A I probably would have heard of it. I probably would have

maybe seen an email on it or had access to the cable. But, like I said,

I just had very little time to spend in the office dealing with, you

know, those sort of things.

Q So let's state that there was a cable.

Were you aware -- would you have been aware or do you recall

hearing the Ambassador possibly asking for more security assets?

Ms. Sawyer. I -- in the vein of not objecting, but wanting to

clarify the record, I mean, I do think, if there was such a document

that you want to assert existed, then you need to show it to the witness

and to us if you find it --

Mr. Grider. Sure. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. -- without saying that it did actually exist.

Mr. Grider. Sure. Fair enough.

And we can talk more about it over the break. Okay. Is that

fine?

Ms. Sawyer. Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q All right. Moving right along, April 2, 2012, are you

familiar with a possible demonstration -- I think you mentioned

this -- the British armored diplomatic vehicle attacked?

A Yes. And I spoke to the security personnel that were on

duty that day, the British personnel. Apparently, there was a

movement. They were either going to or coming from a meeting. There

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was a demonstration, as they occurred all the time in Benghazi.

They ran into the demonstration because there was no other way

for them to drive. The demonstrators, I understand, attacked the

motorcade not with small-arm fires or anything like that, but with

stones, perhaps, or sticks or something like that.

So there was an attack on a motorcade. The British did not

believe that they targeted them because they were British. They just

believed that they targeted them because they wanted to do damage to

someone or something.

Q What, if anything, occurred after that attack on the

British? Did the Brits do anything different?

A I don't recall what -- if they changed their security

posture. I do know that they were more careful on their movements as

to where they went to. That's all that I remember.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you undertake or recommend any changes in the security

posture for the principal officer?

A Well, yes, ma'am. Well, I got to tell you that our

principal officer was always very careful as to not -- and we were very

careful as to not go anywhere where there was going to be a

demonstration. Unfortunately, sometimes demonstrations started, you

know, from one minute to the next. There was always many people out

in the streets.

We continued doing what we were doing. We send our members of

our QRF in advance to notify us to see if there is any demonstrations

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taking place. But, yeah, it's something that I reported and it's

something that we took seriously.

Q And how would you get reports of impending demonstrations

when you could?

A Well, normally, you would talk to the local security forces

and they would tell you about it. Obviously, there was two security

forces -- two official security forces on the ground in Benghazi, but

they did not always have the best of information.

Sometimes we would use someone like, for example, that

worked there to go through the Internet to see if there was any -- any

planned demonstrations on a particular day. We would stay away from

certain specific dates that meant something for Benghazi or for Libya.

And, more than anything, we send out members of our QRF to give

us any advance notification or one of us, if we had the time, would

actually drive out through the streets to see if there was any possible

indicators of a demonstration.

Q So monitored social media like Twitter and things like

that to see if there was sort of a call to demonstration?

A She would.

Q Okay. And you said there were two main security forces,

I believe you described them, in Benghazi?

A Al-Shorta is one of the police forces, and the other one

was the Security -- Supreme Security Council.

Q What role did the 17th February Martyrs Brigade play, if

they did, in overall security in Benghazi?

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A It is a difficult question, ma'am, because there were

several militias on the ground and it is difficult to -- for, let's

say, Al-Shorta or the Supreme Security Council to tell them that they

did not have the right to enforce laws or to be armed when these militias

had more people, more personnel, and more weapons than the official

security forces.

What was their role? It's difficult to tell. I know that they

were supporting us with the QRF members. I knew that they supported

us with extra security whenever we had an incident. But I don't know

if constitutionally or by law they were given certain rights or certain

powers.

Q To your knowledge, did the 17th Feb provide similar support

to other countries, such as the Brits, the French, the -- to Turkey,

to Italians?

A I remember having a conversation with one of the members

of our militia, , and he told me that, prior to him being

assigned to us, he had been assigned to the French.

So I know that 17th February at some point provided security to

the French. I do not recall what militia the British had an agreement

with.

Q But they had an agreement with a militia as opposed to the

Supreme Security Council or the other quasi-official --

A Well, you see, the Supreme Security Council did not come

into power until possibly during the time that I was there or right

before I was there. Their leader was not named until I was there.

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And I started -- you know, I met him then and I worked a certain

relationship with him because of who he was, but this is a brand-new

agency that was maybe in operation in other places around Libya, but

not in Benghazi.

Q Okay. And would you -- I believe you also said that you

would rely on the -- your QRF members to alert you when there were

planned or possible protests.

A That is correct, ma'am. And there is particular streets,

let's say, downtown Benghazi, where there was always people out at

night, and we would try to avoid those places, you know, at certain

times of the evening.

Q And was that known as Freedom Square?

A Freedom Square was one of the places where they gathered.

Yes.

Q Okay. So there were defined areas where demonstrators or

protesters would gather?

A That is correct, ma'am. However, they carried that

demonstration from there to other places.

Q Okay. And was there a particular time of the day that they

would usually occur, like end of the workday, over the lunch hour, first

thing in the morning?

A Definitely not first thing in the morning, ma'am. I would

say that it depending on -- it depended on the day. On Friday, you

know, it could have been at any time. On the other days, it's normally

in the afternoon and the evenings.

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Q Okay. Would it be early evening or late evening?

A I've seen them both, ma'am; so, I don't know what was more

common.

Q And was -- and why was Friday a common day?

A It was their day of rest.

Q So it was essentially their weekend?

A Correct, ma'am.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Go ahead.

Mr. Grider. Thank you.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q A few other. April 10, 2012, IED was thrown at a

four-vehicle convoy.

A U.N.?

Q Yes. Correct.

A Yes, sir. I had a very close relationship with U.N.

security, and they notified me minutes after it happened. I also went

to the place where the attack took place, took pictures, did

a -- somewhat of an investigation there.

It was right outside of the headquarters for the Supreme Security

Council where this took place. And, yeah, this was a -- I wrote up

a -- an investigation and report. I got pictures of the vehicle.

According to the security officials for the U.N., if that vehicle

wouldn't have been armored, there would have been -- that's

in -- because -- due to the attack.

And, as I understand, what was used was the same device that was

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thrown over our wall. A "gelateena" is what they called it. And, yes,

I'm aware of that security incident.

Q And what, if anything -- after that security incident, were

there any changes that you made or --

A Well, sir, we took -- we exercised certain precautions that,

in my mind, they did not. They parked right out in the street. They

did not have a lead person that was there waiting for them.

They did not request assistance or did not instruct the Supreme

Security Council as to how to receive them, how to provide a ring of

security around the motorcade.

But, yeah, it made us more aware of the risks that were out there

and that, you know, we could be a target at some given time.

Q Okay. I would like to direct your attention to April 11,

2012, possible gun battle, individuals trying to steal new vehicles.

A Yes. Right outside of the Al-Shorta headquarters, which

was the police force that was in place during Qadhafi's time, there

was an open lot that I don't know if Al-Shorta had taken possession

of these new vehicles or who had, but the vehicles were stored out there.

As I understand it, one of the militias decided that those

vehicles should belong to them and they got into a firefight with

Al-Shorta to take possession of them.

What we did on situations like that, I activated our QRF. We

stayed on high alert. We would provide -- we would basically occupy

the fighting positions made of sandbags around the house where we

stayed. And until the fire -- the fighting went down or died down,

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we would then retreat for the night.

Q Okay. And then the last one that I have, April 12, 2012,

armed clashes between militia. Maybe this is a spillover.

A And these are -- and, yes, it was a spillover. And it's

amazing how many shots they fire and the next day you hear that -- you

know, very few deaths or that sort of thing.

So a lot of it -- I'll tell you that the Libyans, although they

fired at each other, they did not want to kill each other. So, yeah,

there was a lot of that.

Like I said, we activated -- anytime we actually gave it, you know,

importance, this was one of them --

Q Okay.

A -- because of the amount of weapons used, their lack of

expertise in using them, and the amount of people involved.

And during those times, we shut down the compound. No one came

in, no one went out, that sort of thing. And the principal officer

was very supportive of those types of security policies.

Q Good.

So with this April 11 stealing of new vehicles and then this

April 12, would those be considered security incidents?

A Yes. Yes. Because -- because of the number of people

involved, because of the weapons being used, and because something like

that can spill over into other parts of the city.

Q Fair enough.

A And, plus, not only that, we're talking 1 kilometer away,

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maybe.

Q Right. Absolutely. Okay.

Just for the good of the order, I have probably two more chapters.

One is just some emails that I think we talked about.

A Okay.

Q And then I have just some general -- some generic or general

questions.

A Uh-huh.

Q I'll let you decide. Would you rather go to the emails or

just let's get through the generic questions and we'll save the emails

for last?

A However you'd like to do it, sir.

Q All right. Let's --

Ms. Jackson. Before we get there, may I ask --

Mr. Grider. Yes, please.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was there any other security incident that comes to mind

that was significant to you while you were in Benghazi that we haven't

touched upon?

A Nothing specific comes to mind, ma'am. You know, you had

your daily things where -- like, for example, we noticed that we were

being followed on several occasions, that sort of thing. Obviously,

we have the -- there is -- there is an incident that cannot be discussed

here.

Q Uh-huh.

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A And I wrote a report on it. And that's the only other one

that comes to mind.

Q Okay. When you were in those incidents when you believed

that you were following and you were being followed, would you be going

anyplace in particular? Was it a general movement with the principal

officer? Were you visiting with any other western countries or other

U.S. Government persons?

A I remember one time specifically that we were either going

to or coming back from the British compound.

Q And did you ask your QRF members to, you know, ask around,

provide you with any intelligence over who was being responsible for

following?

A We did that, ma'am. And I also came up with a plan. What

I did is came up with a code and a certain thing that they would have

to do with a -- what I would do is I'd call them on the radio, give

them the code and give them one of three streets that we had in mind

where they would go and set up a road stop.

I would drive by there and they would stop the second vehicle

behind me. This way, they could, first of all, you know, get them off

my tail and, third, be able to identify who's following us.

Q And what did you find out?

A Well, unfortunately, after we came up with that great plan,

it never happened again.

Q Well, then, it obviously worked.

Ms. Jackson. All right.

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BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. Let's walk through some questions here.

With respect to intelligence reports -- and we touched on this

before -- prior to coming to Benghazi, were there any intelligence

reports that you reviewed or were given?

A You know, sir, I did do a lot of reading. I don't recall

at this point if I did read any particular intelligence reports. I

know I read on Benghazi, but I can't tell you whether --

Q While you were in Benghazi, did you receive any intelligence

reports from the State Department?

A There was one -- well -- yes. There was -- there was some

reports that I -- that I read. And I also wrote at least one report.

Q Did you have access to any other intelligence reports from

any other agencies while you were there?

A Yes, I did.

Q And did you read the -- did you read those?

A I would -- yes, sir.

Q And do you recall if those reports were daily? Weekly?

A Well, I'm sure the reports were daily. I was not able to

read them daily, but I -- I went to a place where I could once a week,

maybe.

Q Can you just tell us what a SITREP is.

A Situation report.

Q That's correct.

Can you explain to us what --

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Ms. Jackson. The purpose.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Purpose.

Mr. Grider. Thank you.

Mr. . Well, it's -- it's a little bit like a Spot Report

in the sense that you are -- you are reporting information taking place

there. Perhaps it's not at that level of importance.

It's more routine stuff as to what has been taking place. Those

you can write daily if you have the time to do so. I tried to provide

one to my desk officer on a daily basis, but it didn't always happen

that way.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So that's a DS product as opposed to a principal officer

product?

A You know what. The principal officer might have something

similar that she would report to the State Department. Mine went to

DS.

Q Okay. And when we say EAC, do you -- what's an EAC?

A Could you --

Q Emergency Action Committee?

A Oh.

Q One of those.

A Yes. We -- I'm more familiar with an EAC, for example, at

the Embassy where I'm at right here in -- not here --

.

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Q Uh-huh.

A You have to see how many people we had in Benghazi and the

size of that compound.

Q You could have an EAC daily in Benghazi, given the limited

number of people there?

A Yes, you could.

Q Do you recall if you ever had a formal EAC while you were

in Benghazi?

A Well, I do recall having formal meetings with the principal

officer and the IMO when the three of us were the only ones there in

which we discussed the security situation and we discussed, you know,

what to do about the incidents that we were facing.

Q And these would be some of the incidents that we've talked

about?

A That is correct, ma'am. Like I said, there was constant

communications between myself and the principal officer. All that I

knew about security was shared with her. And, as far as I know, the

efforts that she was working on to better the situation were shared

with me, too.

Q Was there ever occasions where you would have a formal

meeting with other U.S. Government personnel in Benghazi regarding the

security situation?

A That is correct, ma'am. But in order to give you any

details, we would have to be in a different matter.

Q Right.

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But they did occur?

A They did. They did.

Q Did they occur on a regular basis, like weekly or just as

needed?

A Oh, no. We -- I think both. You know, we -- we had a

somewhat close relationship.

Q Uh-huh. Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Touch on briefly just the communication system. I know

we've sort of talked about that.

Can you just sort of tell me, what were the different types of

communication systems -- do you have enough water there? --

A I got it.

Q -- you know, landlines. Can you just sort of walk me

through the different communication systems.

A Yes. We had landlines. We had some sat phones. We had

cell phones. We had Motorola radios. We had access to unclassed

Outlook email and, you know, classified communications, too. So yeah.

Q And, in your opinion, did those communication systems

individually or corporately work satisfactorily?

A Well, sir, you know, they did. But Murphy is always going

to be around. So anytime something can go wrong, something will go

wrong.

So you know, from time to time we had problems. We only had one

repeater in Benghazi located , I believe.

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So it wasn't always the best, but, you know, make do with what you have.

Q All right. Let's turn to -- and we've touched on this, but

I want to get it -- just clarity on sort of the physical layout. I

know you talked about Villa A. So never been there.

So can you just sort of give us a brief understanding of the

physical layout of the compound.

A Can I give you a map?

Q You have one on you?

Ms. Jackson. Sure.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Even better.

Ms. Jackson. We'll mark it.

Mr. . This right here is the compound.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. For the record, we are going to mark this as

Exhibit 1.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. . Okay. All right. So --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Can we -- just one second. I am just going to show --

A Sure.

Q Just so you guys can get a physical look at it.

A And I'm showing you the map because it's so much easier for

me to show it to you on paper than it is to try to explain it to you.

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Q Uh-huh.

A Okay. So this is -- number 1 right here is where -- the

villa where we all lived. Okay? This is where -- number 4 is where

our QRF is. Okay? We have --

Q Did you refer to number 1 as "number 1" or did you call it

something else?

A We called it several names. We called it "the villa." We

called it "the American house." No. I just put it as number 1 just

to be able to refer to it in the map.

Q Okay.

A We had three different gates in the compound. We

had -- this was the main gain, which was Charlie 1 gate. We did refer

to that as Charlie 1. Right across we had Charlie Three gate. Okay?

And on this side -- you see, these are two different villas that

were united. Okay? On this side we have Bravo 1 gate. Okay? So

that's the compound right there.

We have -- on this side, we had the American flag right here.

Number 2 right here is where we had the chow hall, the dining facility,

whatever you want to call it. They also had some TDY rooms here. And

across from it we had the TOC.

Q So was number 2 -- the building marked as number 2, was that

also known as the cantina?

A Well, I guess -- remember, we went through there quite a

bit, different agents. Different agents called it different things.

As a former marine, I called it the chow hall.

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Q Chow hall. All right.

And is this a map that you were provided before you got there?

When you got there?

A It's a map that I made as part of a report.

Q And would that have been the time when the IED was thrown

over the wall?

A That is correct.

Q And is that depicted here on Exhibit 1 on the left side of

the page?

A Right there.

Q Yes.

And that has the date of April 6, 2012, at 2238 hours?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. Which probably explains why you remembered that it

was that hour. Okay.

So you made this map contemporaneous -- or shortly after the

incident and submitted it as part of your report?

A That is correct.

Q Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Were there vehicles that you kept close to the villa that

resided in the evening hours, by any chance?

A When I was there, we had a plan -- an evasion plan. There

was two different doors to the villa. One of the doors was right where

I'm marking the X. Okay?

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q On Building 1?

A On Building 1.

The other door was approximately in the second X over here. So

what I did is --

Q Would you actually put a double X there so that we can, for

the record, know --

A What I did is I parked one of the vehicles facing outboard

right here and one of my other vehicles approximately right here. This

way, I had two plans of escape and evasion.

If they came in from -- from this side, I could come out here,

jump in the vehicle and go out one of these two gates. If they came

from this side, we could come out this door, go in one of the -- there

was usually two to three vehicles parked right here -- go in one of

these vehicles and go out this gate.

Q Okay. So just to summarize, if someone had come from the

area of B1, you would go out -- go out of Building 1 -- I'm trying

to -- which would be southwest?

A Well, it was a flexible plan, ma'am. Depending on where

the threat came from, I would -- I would use the opposite exit to take

out my principal officer. Also, you know, any plan changes. If I had

bad guys on Charlie 3 or on Charlie 1, obviously, I would go out Bravo

1.

Q Okay.

A So depending on where the threat would come from.

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Q Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q I think you may have touched on this.

REACT procedures or plans, was that the same thing?

A Yes, sir.

Q You have those, evac?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. Let's turn --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And how many different REACT plans did you have?

A Well, it was -- it was one with different modifications to

it, ma'am, depending on where our principal officer would be.

Now, remember, in the TOC, in the number 3 over here, this is also

where the principal officer has her office. Her office was more or

less in this area.

If she is right there, we would use one of the vehicles right here.

And depending on where the threat was coming from, we have three

different gates to go out. So it would be something flexible that we

would change, depending on what the situation on the ground was.

We also had the different fighting positions throughout the

compound. One that comes to mind is this -- what I'm marking as a circle

right here. We had sandbags right here. We also had them right here.

We had them right here. And we had them right here.

So we would utilize those to either fight off the enemy or to

protect our principal officer until we can get her inside one of the

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vehicles.

We also used the vehicles as safe havens. They were armored

vehicles. They were open so that anybody could jump in there. And

that was the plan that we had during my time there.

Q Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q With respect to -- let's call them security upgrades.

A Uh-huh.

Q So when you landed on the ground, what, if anything, did

you notice needed to be upgraded or was sort of deficient?

A Well, the walls. Some of the walls around the

compound -- you have to see that these were homes. These were

villa -- homes and villas. They were not made for the -- or with the

security standards that we've gotten used to using around the world

for a diplomatic compound.

So some of the walls were too low. Obviously, sometimes you felt

that you were too close to the street. But what we started doing is

upgrading those walls, bringing them up at a higher level. We've also

incorporated fencing around the compound.

Things don't always happen as fast as you want them to. The money

is not always available as fast as you want it to be available. So

it's a slow process. But there was work going on at the time.

If you can see right here where the explosion took place, we were

already working on making a higher fence around that whole area. So,

you know, those were some of the upgrades that come to mind.

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We also changed our camera systems around so that they would have

a better -- better view of the compound, and we also incorporated

vehicle gates on all three gates.

In the outside of gate Charlie, we put barricades around to

protect vehicles as they're coming in. So we were -- we were making

modifications at the time.

Q Did you make any specific request or had the request already

been put in?

A Both -- , who is the one that initiated this

process, had made a lot of those requests. However, during my time

there, I became the person in charge of implementing them.

So the request had already been made. I was the one dealing with

the -- with engineer, with the construction personnel that were

implementing the changes.

Q I think you would agree there is physical security

requirements for overseas posts in the State Department. Correct?

A I agree with that. Yes.

Q Do you believe that Benghazi -- the Benghazi compound met

those requirements or were on the way to meeting those requirements

at the time you were there?

A Sir, I'm no expert on those requirements and on these type

of security upgrades. I know that Benghazi did not meet the

requirements that I see now or that I've seen at other

embassies.

But I don't know what the specifics are as to how Benghazi

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functioned, what type of diplomatic mission was it or if there's any

requirements that are different for diplomatic missions than there are

for consulates and embassies.

Q Okay. You had mentioned some of the budget issues.

Had you ever communicated or had ever communicated

to you about the funding issues? How did budget come up?

A The first time that budget came up was when I was supposed

to go to Benghazi. I was supposed to go there on a 60-day TDY. I was

told that I was being held back 2 weeks because they did not want an

overlap of too many agents out there due to budget cuts or to budget

issues. I was also told that the money for upgrades at the compound

was not always available or was not readily available due to budget

issues.

And those are the two incidents where I now recall that being

mentioned. And, yes, it was mostly through and also

through a conversation that I had with the RSO, with Mr. ,

when he visited us to view what was taking place on the construction

part of the compound.

Q Earlier you had mentioned --

Ms. Jackson. Can I ask a couple of followups on the budget

question?

Mr. Grider. Yeah. I was going there.

Ms. Jackson. Oh. So were you going --

Mr. Grider. You can tell me --

Ms. Jackson. I thought you were changing topics.

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Mr. Grider. No. No. No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q With respect to -- you had mentioned about DS agents having

visa issues.

A Yes.

Q But you also mentioned that there may have been some

communication about DS agents -- the timing of DS agents with respect

to budget -- budget issues. Is that correct?

A Correct. I was never told that the agents that were

supposed to assist me were being held for budget issues.

Q Right.

A What I was told was that they were being held for visa

issues. I was told, however, that we did not have five agents and that

I was being held back 2 weeks from going there because of budget issues.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Let me make sure I understand that.

So you were initially delayed because of the budget issues.

A Correct.

Q Is that correct?

A That is what my desk officer told me.

Q That would have been ?

A Correct.

Q And they didn't want too many agents there at one time?

A Correct.

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Q Okay. And when you arrived, you became the fourth -- third

or fourth agent?

A I was the fourth for approximately a week.

Q Okay. And just to make sure I understand, were you also

saying that the reason that you never got five agents in Benghazi was

because of budget issues?

A That's what I was told by my desk officer.

Q Again, Mr. ?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Did he indicate to you where he got that information?

A He specifically told me that he got it from Charlene Lamb.

Q And did he indicate to you in any way that -- at what level

that decision had been made within the State Department?

A No. He -- he did not mention anybody else. He -- the

highest level that made the decision at IP was Charlene Lamb. So, yeah,

he mentioned that to me.

Q Were you aware that Benghazi was supposed to have five

agents?

A I was -- I was told before I got there and I told -- and

I was told when I got there that it was a five-man post.

Q Okay.

A There is a -- an EER that I have, an evaluation or perhaps

an award that talks about, you know, it being a five-man post.

Q And you got an award because you were the only man standing

there for awhile?

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A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. I mean, in the write-up, did it say that?

A Somewhere -- somewhere it says that it was a five-man post.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q And was it or someone else who told you it was

to be a five-man post before you arrived in Benghazi?

A told me. The RSO at the time, ,

told me. Also, the RSO in Tripoli told me.

Q Mr. ?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And when you -- at the time that you were going into

Benghazi, had you also been told that there was never going to be five

men there -- or five agents there?

A Well, I don't recall someone, let's say, at headquarters

telling me that. Just the situation on the ground told me that I wasn't

going to see five men during the time I was there.

Q And that, you were told, was due to budget reasons?

A Well, like I said, ma'am, there's two issues right here that

I was told. One was the visa issue, and the other one was the budgeting

issue.

Q Was the visa issue a matter of timing in that the visas would

come eventually, you just had to wait for them?

A That is correct, ma'am. That's what I was led to believe.

Q So at no time were you led to believe that there was a

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moratorium or a ceasing of issuing any visas to Americans?

A The specifics that I was told, ma'am, was that we were not

issuing a visa to the Libyan Ambassador to the U.S. and that he had -- or

to his family and he had to keep his family in Canada, as I understand,

and, because of that, he was not happy with us and then, therefore,

not issuing visas to us.

That was -- that is what I was told specifically when I kept on

insisting on why we were not getting visas. I don't know the truth

of that. Again, that also came from my desk officer, .

Q Okay. Good.

Ms. Jackson. Go ahead. Because we have about 5 minutes.

Mr. Grider. Yeah. I know. We got to move.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Are you familiar with the term "turnover notes"?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. What, if anything, did give you or

communicate to you?

A Well, did a fantastic job while he was over

there. He's the one who started this whole security upgrades that were

taking place in the compound.

You know, I spent -- I don't know -- 2 to 3 weeks with before

he left, and there was really not the need for him to turn over any -- any

notes to me.

But what -- one thing he did convey to me was to make sure that

the security upgrades kept on -- kept on taking place. It was a big

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concern of his. And, you know, I made sure that they did.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And when -- then, when you were replaced, did you do the

same thing? First of all, did you have overlaps so that it was verbal

or did you do any write-up report?

A Yes, ma'am. I had an overlap where it was -- it was verbal.

took over as the RSO. She is a very experienced

senior agent who had been an RSO before in Syria and several hot spots.

But, yeah, she was very willing to listen to what I had to say, and

we had that -- that overlap opportunity.

Q Okay. To your recollection, were there any write-ups that

were done as to the security environment in Benghazi --

A Yes.

Q -- as to the things that had been requested and was in

progress?

A Yes, ma'am. There was an overall write-up that one RSO

turned over to the next. And, you know, that write-up was then modified

by the next RSO.

Unfortunately, the TDYs were very short, in my opinion, should

have been longer, and, you know, what was your plan and what was your

strategy changed drastically because, you know, 45 days later a new

agent takes over. So -- but, yeah, there was a -- there was always

a write-up. Yeah.

Q Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

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Q I would like to do some quick leading questions here.

Is it your opinion that Libyans had ready access to weapons and

explosives and other types of items that can harm people?

A Yes, they did.

Q I think you communicated earlier that you did hear gunfire

routinely.

A Almost on a daily basis, sir.

Q And could you distinguish between the handgun fire and

AK-47?

A Yes, sir.

Q Obviously, there were -- were there anti-aircraft

artillery?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what about RPGs?

A Yes, sir.

Q And with respect to tripwires -- are you familiar with that

term?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you explain briefly what a tripwire is.

A Well, if -- are you referring to tripwire as to an event

that is indicative of something else to happen or what -- what exactly

are you referring to?

Q I guess what is your understanding with respect to the State

Department when they use the term "tripwire"?

A I cannot -- I'm no expert with State Department stuff, sir.

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I can tell you what --

Q I'm sorry. DS. I apologize.

A No. No.

Q Well, you have experience -- it sounds like you have

experience, and tripwires have been in more of your -- in your prior

experience as well.

A Yes, sir.

Q And was that term used during the DS -- during your DS

experience, has it been used?

A I think -- I think it has been used more on the policy side,

sir. You know, us, as agents out there on the ground, we can -- we

can only observe a particular incident.

For example, the attack on the U.N., the attack on the British

Ambassador, that, to us, is indicative of, if it happens to them, it'll

happen to us if we're not careful. So I guess we could use it like

that. I don't know what our policymakers or supervisors here in D.C.

use it as.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Well, let me ask you this: Did either of those events or

any other events that occurred in Benghazi when you were there cause

you to consider or recommend to the principal officer that you depart

the country?

A No, ma'am. I think that's a decision that's way above my

pay grade. My job is to go over there and make it as safe as I possibly

can.

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A lot of it -- you know, we operate around the world, ma'am, in

very difficult places. That's what makes us different than, let's say,

the Secret Service or another agency that operates in a sterile

environment.

What I recommend is modifications to mitigate the risks. It is

not up to me to decide whether, you know, we should be in a particular

spot or not. So I never made such recommendations.

I did make recommendations such as, "No. We cannot go out

tonight" or, "We cannot got to that place." And she was always very

willing to listen to me on that.

Q Did the principal officer ever discuss with you the

possibility of leaving the country because of the incidents?

A We always believed -- and this is in conversation with her

and with other personnel -- that this was a temporary facility, that

we would be in Benghazi temporarily. And they -- we always believed

that, you know -- or the person before us believed that they were going

to shut it down during their time.

But I never heard it from her saying, "Hey, we're going to leave

next month" or, "We're going to shut this place down soon" or -- it

was just a belief of something that we had.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Are you done?

Mr. Grider. Do you have any idea -- any other --

Ms. Jackson. Just follow-up.

Mr. Grider. Go ahead.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You know that there was an Accountability Review Board --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- on this incident.

Did you ever speak to the ARB?

A I did not.

Q You did not.

Did you ask to?

A I did not.

Q Did you provide any documentation to the ARB?

A I provided documentation to the FBI's JTTF. I was

interviewed by them. I also provided documentation to my supervisors

at the field office, and I'm not sure who they provided it

to.

Q Okay. And when you provided information to your

supervisors at the field office, what was that in response

to? Was it their request or did you get a request?

A No. I believe all of DS got a request to provide whatever

documents you had from your time in Benghazi. I kept my emails. So

I printed them all out, and I passed them on to them.

Q What about the report that you wrote?

A That was -- that was also supplied. Yes, ma'am.

Q That was part of an email?

A That was part of an email. Yeah.

After I came back -- I sent in several emails explaining what had

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happened and everything. But after I came back that first week, I sat

down and I organized all my emails, all the information, and put it

together with the pictures that I had and the map of the compound. And,

yes, I provided that.

Q So that would have -- you put it all together in April

of 2012?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And so you had essentially a Benghazi file?

A Yes. Well, Benghazi report. Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Of this event or of your entire experience in

Benghazi?

A Of this event.

Q Okay.

A And what I provided my supervisors were all the emails that

I had on Benghazi.

Q Okay. And who was your supervisor at the time that received

those?

A was the SAC, special agent in charge, of the

field office, and I guess it went to him.

Q And that was in response to something that came out

department-wide?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. We are out of time.

Mr. Grider. Yeah. Let me check with -- counsel, I have 5 emails

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that -- I think they are pretty -- you know, pretty quick. So we can --

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. Well, do you guys need a break?

Mr. Evers. Why don't we take a quick break. Let's just take a

quick break.

Ms. Jackson. The witness was saying no.

Mr. Evers. I could use a break.

Ms. Jackson. We'll go off the record.

Mr. Grider. Go off the record.

[Recess.]

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Mr. Grider. We are ready to go back on the record.

Special Agent, I have given you some exhibits. We are going to

go one by one, and I will identify each exhibit. We are going to start

with -- I will call it government exhibit No. 2, document No. Charlie

05390467.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q The best way that I have worked through this before is

that -- and have you had a chance to sort of review this document?

A I did.

Q As I communicated to you before, obviously, we know that

emails, there's a lot of context in emails. I think there's some

specific areas that I just wanted to touch on and maybe you can sort

of give us a little bit more context, and then we will move to the next

one.

I'm going to let you just sort of identify just -- we are going

to talk about some of the first two emails, and maybe you can read this

email. First, can you say who is -- the date, you know, who it

was -- who you sent it to, and then --

A Okay. The first email is on Friday, April 6. This is

taking place at 4:26 a.m., which could be right. I'm sending it to

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, which is my desk officer located here in Washington, D.C.

Basically, I'm probably answering one of his emails. He is -- I'm

responding to him telling me that I'm going to have to be alone a few

more days. I'm just reminding him that I have a flight back on the

16th, and that's it.

Q So let's go ahead and read the first, just the first email.

?

A , lots of work, but it's been a good experience thus

far. No problem on the solo a few more days. I can do this until the

16th when I need to catch a bird home.

Q And just generally for the record, "solo" means?

A Alone.

Q That you were there --

A Alone.

Q Okay. And, in an earlier email, did indicate that

you are going to be flying solo a few additional days?

A That is correct.

Q And did he ask you, you know, let you know if you had any

questions or concerns?

A Yes, he does.

Q And, just out of curiosity, you had stated here that you

can do this until the 16th when you need to -- what did you have some

other obligations, or --

A Yes, I was going to , and

that was my obligation.

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Q There you have it. Any other?

Mr. Grider. All right, let's move to government exhibit No. 3,

document No. Charlie 05390489.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Can you walk us through this email and let's, you know, start

with the first two, but let's start with the number one on top, who

it is from, to whom, and the date, and then we can walk through it.

A This is an email from -- on the top, it says, ,

but it says it is from . And it is addressed to me.

It says, , thanks for keeping us updated and excellent work

over the weekend handling this by yourself. This has the front

office's attention, so let us know about any developments. Regards,

.

Q Let's -- can we move -- I'm going to come back to that, but

can we move to the second email on Monday, April 9, 2012, at 9:54 a.m.?

A That's correct. It's addressed to , and --

Q Go ahead and read that one for us, please.

A Okay: Upon examination of all recordings from compound

cameras, I found that it captured part of the flash of the explosion

as well as the smoke. This confirms the statements by the guards of

the location and force of the explosion. It did occur within the

grounds of the mission, and it was a powerful blast. From what I can

gather, the device must have exploded in the air prior to hitting the

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ground. Not much out there to damage either.

Q Okay. And who is ?

A You know, sir, as I recall, he is part of IP. He is one

of supervisors. But I did not have much contact with

them until this incident. So I don't know exactly what billet he had

at IP.

Q And IP?

A International Posting, is it? International Programs?

Ms. Jackson. Something like that.

Mr. Grider. Okay, fair enough.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q And was he located in -- or do you know where he was located?

A I knew he worked in the same building that did.

Q More than likely in Washington, D.C., is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And what was your understanding of his statement, "This has

the front office's attention"? What was your understanding of why he

would say that about that particular --

A Well, I guess he is trying to convey to me the importance

level that this incident had.

Q And what was your understanding -- "front office" -- that

means?

A I have heard two different meanings to it. I have heard

that it has the attention of the Director or the attention of the

Secretary of State.

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Q Okay, and it's your understanding that , if I'm

pronouncing his name correctly, was above , is that

correct?

A Correct.

Ms. Jackson. Following this email, did you get any clarity on

whether it meant -- the front office meant the director of DS or the

Secretary of State?

Mr. . I did not.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q This email is referring to the April 6?

A It is referring to the bombing of the compound, yes.

Q And, at that time, you were there -- obviously, you were

there flying -- you were there by yourself, is that correct?

A That is correct, sir.

Mr. Grider. Okay, let's turn to government exhibit No. 4,

please, document No. Charlie 05390477.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

Q If you can just walk us, you know, it's from you, the date,

and then just give us a brief --

A Okay. This is from me to my desk officer , as

you said, on April 7, at 5:51 a.m. In it, I'm advising him of the

situation out there. And I wrote, Neither the RSO nor the local

security forces in Benghazi have the capability to conduct a proper

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post-blast investigation. The information below is only my initial

assessment. The investigation is still underway, and the suspects are

still under custody.

Q Okay. Well, let's walk through that one. Go ahead.

A Well, I named the two suspects, which had been erased from

the email. And I state, you know, what their status were with the Blue

Mountain Security Company, and then I move on to talk about the -- what

I found on the IED that was used.

Q Okay, here you say it was -- point two, it says, It was

compact enough to throw over a 10-foot high wall, but powerful enough

to create a very loud blast.

What was the height of the wall at the time?

A It was approximately 10 foot.

Q Okay. Going back to the first paragraph, what was

your -- what did you mean that neither the RSO nor the local security

had the capability to conduct a proper post-blast investigation?

A Well, the local security forces did not have the expertise

to investigate these type of events. In other words, they did not have

the training or the equipment to be able to tell me what type of

explosives were used or, you know, what fragmentation were used with

them, that sort of thing.

I -- my knowledge of explosives is making them blow up, not

investigating them. So I also did not have the expertise to do a proper

investigation.

Q And this is 1 day after the April 6 incident that occurred.

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And you were essentially conducting the investigation by yourself, is

that correct?

A That is correct. I did take members of the investigative

team later on to view the post-blast site, but I determined that they

were not -- they did not have the capabilities.

Mr. Grider. Let's go ahead and turn to government exhibit No.

5, document No. Charlie 05392123.

[ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Let's just -- we can focus our attention on the first

section. If you can just walk us through the date, the time, who it

is from, and your understanding.

A This is from , which was the RSO in Tripoli,

on April 7, at 12:04 a.m. I have cc'd Principal Officer

.

And it says, , will you give more details on the type, makeup

of the IED. Please forward. I guess there's a reason walls are

supposed to be 9-foot high. .

Q What's your understanding?

A Well, I think he is asking for more information on the IED.

And he is also -- because we have walls in the compound that were not

9-foot high, he is also stating that, you know, there is a reason why

the walls need to be higher.

Q Right. So, relating back to government exhibit 1, where

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you were discussing with us sort of there was a building project of

the walls going up?

A Yes.

Q I guess, you know, my question, was the wall at sort of the

9- or 10-foot height at the time, or was it in the process of being --

A Well, the wall that they threw the device over was 10-foot

high, and that's the reason why I refer to that in my email. However,

there were other walls around the compound that did not meet that

height.

Q Okay. All right, let's turn to government exhibit No. 6,

document No. Charlie 05392846. And I guess, prior to going over this,

I guess -- going over this email, was there a process? I think we talked

about the communications. Was there a process that you had been

briefed on or communicated -- how to communicate via email, to your

knowledge?

A Yes. However, this did not apply to us in Benghazi. And

I will tell you why. We did not have the appropriate system in place

to be able to do the spot reporting that other, you know, more

established diplomatic posts do have. So, whereas, now, I would go

into our Web site and it will allow me to conduct a -- or to do a Spot

Report with a particular -- with particular settings, and I put in

different parts of the Spot Report into this program; we did not have

this in Benghazi. What we were doing is, we were taking a regular Word

document, and we were -- we would write the Spot Report with a similar

format, and then we would send it out to -- we were given a list of

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people to send it out to. The previous Spot Report by the previous

RSO had been sent to those same people because Outlook, the system that

we use, you know, in the State Department, was not always operational

in Libya. Some people -- and in this case one person -- had provided

a Gmail account because it had been used in the past multiple times.

I just cut and paste the same addresses it had been sent to, and those

are the people that I sent this to.

Apparently, someone at headquarters saw that and, you know,

realized that that was not proper. They corrected me. And I took that

address out of there.

Q Can we just walk through who it is from, the date and --

A Sure. It is from , my desk officer. The date

is April 2, 2012, at 4:40 p.m. It is a response to Benghazi RSO Spot

Report: , excellent report. In the future, do not send these to

Gmail accounts as they are considered SBU and should stay on our DOS

open net system. I will send you additional information on the class

net. FYI, no visas. I'm extremely doubtful about tomorrow. Not sure

what is going on. Foils are here, but no visas yet. Regards,

.

Q And SBU is sensitive but unclassified?

A Yes, exactly.

Q Okay, anything?

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Who had you sent this to on a Gmail account?

A Someone at the Embassy in Tripoli, as I recall. One of the

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personnel on the distro list instead of putting a State Department

account, put down the Gmail account because they were having, I guess,

similar problems that we were with no access to open net.

Q Okay. So because you were having electronic mail

communication problems, you had set up -- these Gmail accounts had been

set up prior to you getting there.

A Correct. And not by me, not by us. They were set up from

Tripoli as I recall.

Q Okay. Do you recall the first, when we go down to the bottom

of page 1 of exhibit 6, where it says, on the cc line, "Benghazi RSO,"

do you recall that that was also a Gmail account?

A Where is "Benghazi RSO" again?

Q On the bottom of the page 1, where it is an email from you,

sent Monday, April 2, at 4:17 p.m. It has "to" line and then it has

a cc line and the first one is a --

A Benghazi RSO.

Q Right. A truncated email address. Do you recall that that

was also a Gmail account?

A I don't recall, but what I'm seeing here is the Tripoli TOC

as well as the RSO Tripoli, they are both Gmail. They say Gmail, and

I guess I would imagine Benghazi RSO would -- you know, what, I don't

know.

Q Okay, all right. Fair enough. Thank you.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay, I just want to point out for the record, I think we

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talked about, you know, going back through emails. On all of the emails

from your colleague and supervisor on government exhibit No. 6,

excellent, they say excellent report.

Government exhibit No. 3, they say, , thanks for keeping us

updated. Excellent work over the weekend handling this by yourself.

And it looks like, once again, in government exhibit

No. 2 is thanking you for your hard work and being in a difficult

situation over there by yourself.

So I want to point that out for the record. And, also, I believe

you articulated that you received some level of commendation. Can you

tell us about that?

A I believe it was a meritorious honor award that I received

on that.

Q For your time in --

A In Benghazi.

Q -- in Benghazi. Those are all the questions I have.

Just -- until we address a few other matters a little bit later, but

I want to, on behalf of the majority and the committee, and

uniquely -- how you were uniquely situated in a time period by yourself,

and point out for the record how the commendations and also how your

colleagues congratulated you and appreciated the good work that you

did in a very tough situation. And so I want you, as I communicated

off the record to you, to know that your professionalism, your hard

work, and this is not an easy situation, and I want to thank you for

your service, and really appreciate, you know, our dialogue here and

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the information that you have given us.

A Thank you, sir.

Ms. Jackson. Thank you. Okay. Let's go off the record. It is

1:03.

[Recess.]

Mr. Desai. Let's go back on the record. The time is

approximately 1:47. Special Agent , good afternoon. Let me

just take this opportunity to introduce myself. I am Ronak Desai. I

am one of the counsels with the minority staff of the committee. I'm

joined by my colleagues this afternoon, Heather Sawyer, and Brent

Woolfork.

And on behalf of the minority, both the staff and the members,

we want to thank you for your appearance here today on such a beautiful

afternoon, and I want to thank you for your longstanding and ongoing

service to this country. So thank you so much.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. DESAI:

Q I'm just going to jump right into it so we can try to be

efficiently -- get you out of here as possible.

So if I can redirect your attention to the April 6 IED attack.

And the question I wanted to ask you is, did that attack trigger any

changes to the mission security posture that you can recall?

A Well, we continued with requesting more personnel, and

eventually, we did receive temporary additional personnel. I'm not

sure what that did to speed up the visa process. We continued on with

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what we were already working on, the fence line, and other than that,

we were just even more extra careful in our movements, and we minimized,

you know, the outside movements. Another thing is the Principal

Officer used to run the perimeter line sometimes within the compound.

She stopped doing that as I asked her to. And we were just at a higher

alert.

Q Okay, and the additional personnel that you received, do

you remember how soon after the attack you received that personnel?

A I do not remember how soon, no. It could have been 1 week

later. What happened was is, eventually, the two people slotted to

go to Benghazi, which was and ,

arrived. In addition to that, we had a planned movement to Darnah,

and I had requested -- I take this back. I just remembered.

The RSO and a reservist lieutenant colonel from Benghazi -- I'm

sorry, from Tripoli, visited me in Benghazi. What I don't recall were

the dates on that. But going back to what I was saying earlier,

and did arrive in country. In addition

to that, I had requested more people for a movement that I had to Darnah,

and I received three Special Forces soldiers that were stationed in

Tripoli at the time.

Q And if I can just ask you with respect to that incident on

April 6 about, first, the adequacy of the LGF if we can start there.

And one thing, during the last session, you were talking to my

colleagues in the majority. So the device comes over the wall. There

is an explosion, and then, after a certain period of time, you said

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the duck-and-cover alarm is activated, the IDNS?

A Correct.

Q And if I recall correctly, it was one of the local guards

that activated that alarm, is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q And I believe you had said that they finally activated that

alarm. How much time passed from when you heard the explosions to when

the alarm was activated?

A I'm estimating here, but it could have been 2 to 3 minutes,

2 minutes, maybe. I guess you expect it to go -- for them to press

a button right away, but yeah. About 2 minutes.

Q And, in terms of their role in supporting the response to

that incident, I know you had said that expectations for the LGF weren't

particularly high?

A They were not.

Q But, with respect to this incident, did they perform as you

would expect them to given what their role is supposed to be?

A No. What they basically did is, some of them went and hid.

Others just stood by. I was -- you know, out of a professional guard

force, you expect their support in manning their posts and searching,

helping you search for any intruders, that sort of thing. But like

I said, our expectations were low.

Q And let me turn to the QRF then. So there were a certain

number of QRF that were already on the compound, is that correct?

A That is correct.

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Q And what was the adequacy of their response if you had to

describe it to me?

A You know, I am amazed at how loyal they were to certain

Americans. I don't believe that they had this loyalty specifically

to the United States, but they did have a loyalty to some of those agents

that spent time with them, training them, working out with them, sharing

a meal with them. And on all of the different situations that we had

while I was there, they were always present.

I will tell you, they were not professionally trained. They had

not gone through a military academy or anything like that. They had

had different levels of experience as members of the militia that fought

against Qadhafi, but one thing I could count on while I was there is

that if I needed their help, they were going to be there. Perhaps,

you know, they wouldn't use the tactics that you would expect a

professional QRF to use or that sort of thing, but they were there.

Q So the alarm is activated. I think you had told us during

the last session that some of these QRF members took defensive positions

in the compound. Is that right?

A That is correct. We had -- I had trained them on the

different positions I wanted them to take in a situation like this.

And that is what two of them did. The third one at some point was told

by the guards that there was a car outside, or he took it upon himself

to go patrol the outside of the perimeter, but yeah, they all responded.

Q And you mentioned training. How, in your view, when you

did train, whether it was either the LGF or the QRF, how responsive

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were they to that training?

A The members of the QRF were very responsive. That varied

at different levels with the Local Guard Force.

Q So QRF, the members take up defensive positions inside the

compound, and I think you had also said that, outside the compound,

there was already one of these QRF individuals waiting for you is that

right?

A The individual outside of the compound reacted to a vehicle

that was parked somewhat on the -- on one of the perimeter -- well,

somewhere on one of the side streets. And, yeah, he apprehended the

two individuals out there.

Q Okay, so if we can talk about those two individuals. So

the QRF member apprehends these guys. You say they fired a warning

shot?

A Two warning shots.

Q Two warning shots. And this was standard operating

procedures amongst the Libyans, is that right?

A For the Libyans, yes. Not only in Libya, but in other

countries, they still use warning shots.

Q Okay, and the two individuals that he had detained --

A Yes.

Q -- one was a former member of the LGF, is that right?

A Correct. One that had been fired for vandalism.

Q So one is an individual that you had fired a week before

for vandalism?

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A Yes.

Q And then the second one was a current member of the LGF,

is that right?

A That is correct, one that had been demoted as a supervisor

to a normal guard.

Q Okay. So one is a recently fired member, and one is, at

that time, a currently demoted member of the LGF?

A Correct.

Q The question I want to ask you with respect to that then

is, this IED comes over the wall and in terms of the motivation of that

attack, from what it appears to be with these two individuals, these

are suspects who are -- you know, allegedly have done this. This looks

like an employment dispute to a certain extent -- right -- that they

had -- one had been fired. One had been demoted. And, as a result,

they decided to throw this device over the wall?

A Well, I look at it as a terrorist attack on a U.S. Government

compound. Like I said, I was unable to question them myself. And I

don't believe the locals did a very good job in doing so. I don't know

what their affiliations might have been to other groups or other

organizations. So what may look to us as a typical work dispute, could

be something else, but I don't know that.

Q Do you have any information, or did you at that

time -- again, you said you didn't have the ability to interrogate these

suspects individually -- that would have made you think that this was

motivated by terrorism, extremism, or something else based on the

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information available to you at that time or even now?

A Well, regardless of whatever motives they were, to me, this

was a terrorist act. But I have nothing that would point to me, or

that is indicative that they were acting as part of another group or

organization.

Q Okay. And we also talked about, I guess, the protest that

had taken place before the IED attack. Is that right, where these

guards after their shifts were over, one was sent to the vehicle

clearing area --

A Correct.

Q -- and decided -- that was also, I think you had said,

connected to the fact that they had not been paid, is that right?

A That is correct, yes.

Q Okay, and was there any other indication that you had at

the time or now that that was linked to something else beyond the fact

that they hadn't been paid by their employer?

A No. I went out there myself to try to investigate as to

what was going on, taking place. And I asked them directly what the

problem was, and they told me about it. The British supervisor that

was in country at the time showed up. I asked him if there was any

validity to what they were saying. He said yes. He told me the reason.

And, yeah, that's -- as far as I know, that's the reason why they were

protesting.

Q Do you remember that gentleman's name, the one that was

from -- the representative from the U.K.?

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A I do not.

Q And no problem?

A He would be in one of my emails or one of my reports, but

I do not remember.

Q And after this protest had happened, I think you had said

during the last session that a representative from Blue Mountain had

gotten in touch with you, and you said he had taken care of it.

Do you remember what that entailed, and, you know, what those

efforts were to address this situation?

A Well, it was the same -- same individual.

Q Okay, it was the same --

A Somehow they managed to get the money in earlier. Again,

the guards wanted to be paid in cash, and you know, they had to fly

in the money. And so, yes, somehow they got the money in their end,

and they took care of it by the next day, I believe.

Q So they were generally responsive within a relatively short

period of time?

A Yes.

Q Okay. After you communicated your concerns over what had

happened?

A That's correct. I believe that they were embarrassed as

to what happened.

Q Moving on from April 6 to April 10 -- oh, please.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I just had a couple of quick questions about that. First,

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just the local guard force. You had indicated that they did not perform

well on that particular night. So I was just -- you said that some

hid, and others simply stood by.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Did you attempt during the incident at all to provide them

with direction, or did you have a chance to do that?

A Well, ma'am, as we moved throughout the compound, we would

run into -- there was three gates being manned, and there was a -- at

least two rovers, a supervisor and another rover. And you try to engage

them as to, hey, do you see anything here, have you spotted any movement,

that sort of thing. And, you know, what you find is that they

either -- they froze, they don't want to talk or cooperate, or -- did

I specifically tell someone at that point, you go over here, or you -- I

don't recall. I imagine I could have. I don't know.

I was too concerned about clearing the compound. However, they

had already had instructions as to, in an event like this, to secure

their zone and to notify us, you know, of the status of it. And that

is something that we did not get. We also did not get -- that explosion

and that alarm shouldn't have been so far apart. As the explosion goes

off, your finger is pushing that button.

Q Yes. And so did you have a chance then to raise some of

these concerns with their supervisor or directly with them after the

fact? Did you get that chance?

A Yes, ma'am. You know, I learned throughout the years, you

use the carrot and the stick. And I tried it all. You know, I tried

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to motivate them in many ways throughout my time there, and I also,

you know, I fired one. I demoted another one. You know, I go around

and check on them and, you know, make sure they are not sleeping at

night, making fires, that sort of thing. So everything was always

addressed. It's -- they needed to know when they did something right

and when they did something -- something wrong. If you go through my

emails, on several of them, I'm going to be talking about the guard

force and about the different issues with them. I spent a lot of my

own time training them on simple things, such as searching a vehicle,

searching people as they come in, that sort of thing. So whatever it

was that we did not agree as to what they did, they knew about it. And

their supervisors knew about it.

Q And I think you had indicated with my colleagues that you

felt their supervisor was pretty responsive, that at least the time

when you raised the vandalism, I think the way you described it was

he fired that person on the spot. Did you feel that the supervisors

were responsive when you would raise other performance-related

concerns?

A Yes, ma'am. I think that they were. But there is a problem

when the supervisors are based in, let's say, the U.K., and the

employees are there in Benghazi, and that is perhaps the reason why

they felt compelled to send a representative. The initial supervisor

that they sent out there was a retired British Army sergeant major who

is now living in Thailand. But the problem is that this is a for-profit

company, and they also don't want to waste a lot of time in their

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training. So what they were doing is after every shift, they wanted

to train them for a half-hour to an hour. And someone that has a

background in training will tell you that when you do not have a trained

force with that -- or with that background, half an hour or an hour

a day after shift is not enough. And I think our complaints made it

all the way to their top management, and that's probably the reason

why one of the owners went out there to see what the situation was.

Q Yeah, I would just direct your attention briefly to

exhibit 2, which I think I'm going to have to borrow back, which

is -- which you discussed with one of my colleagues last hour. And

some of what you were just discussing if you take a look, I will just

direct your attention to page two of that, where you are talking about

the guard force. And I think you have captured for us very nicely what

some of the challenges you faced in a lot of the work you were doing.

But it does indicate the issue you talked about the training --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- and it not being --

A Fifteen minutes.

Q Yeah, and it indicates there that it looks like they were

sending out a new trainer. And it just says, I will just read to you.

It says, We will meet this guy tomorrow and give you my take on him

then.

So I was just wondering if you did have an opportunity to meet

with him, what your view of him was, whether he helped with some of

the issues around training up the local guard force or helping them

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perform better?

A Well, ma'am, I can tell you that the first trainer that they

sent out there, the gentleman that was there when this guard was fired,

he was eventually removed by the owner because he was not -- the owner

of the company was not happy with the changes taking place. Another

trainer was sent there who did a much better job. But, again, I go

back to -- perhaps it's not so much the trainer. Perhaps, it is the

people that they have to work with. And in addition to that -- well,

the people he has to work with that don't have that -- the discipline,

or the background in something like this, and someone like that needs

to go through a longer training phase than, you know, 1 day or

15 minutes or that sort of thing.

Q And you felt with regard to the QRF which -- at least the

internal ones worked directly with you and the other DS agents -- did

better in responding to the training that you would provide for them?

A Yes, ma'am. First of all, they had no training prior to

that. They were your typical Libyan citizens living their life and

then joined the revolution at some point, and that's what made them

part of the militia. So I thought that it was important that they learn

some basic, you know, security basic techniques, learn between lethal

and nonlethal force, how to clear rooms, that sort of thing. So they

responded very well to it. It was a way for us to build stronger bonds

with them, and you know, if they are going to have your back, you need

to spend time with, you know, sharing some of the knowledge or skills

that you have.

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Q And when you were talking to my colleague just a minute ago

and you were talking about that April 6 incident, and you described

it as a terrorist act because it had been an act of violence, a bomb

thrown at a U.S. facility, and you said -- I think the way you described

it was you didn't know of anything to indicate that the individuals,

at least initially apprehended and suspected of being involved, were

part of a terrorist organization.

A Well, ma'am, so I'm not sure I understand what the question

is.

Q Yeah, I haven't asked one yet, but I thought maybe -- but

that's okay. That was my preamble.

A Okay.

Q So did you at any time when you were there with regard to

the QRF individuals you were working with on compound, did you come

to have a suspicion that any of them were affiliated with a terrorist

organization or an extremist organization?

A Any of the individuals working on the compound, is this QRF

and local guard force, or --

Q Yes. Both, either.

A No, ma'am. We had no such information. If we would have,

we definitely -- they wouldn't have been working there. As to, you

know --

Q So let me just stop you there.

A Uh-huh.

Q They wouldn't have been working there because?

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A We wouldn't have -- if we knew that someone was affiliated

with a terrorist organization, they would not be employed by the U.S.

Government, or at least not us.

Q And if you had had those suspicions, would you then have

also reported them either to your colleagues -- you said earlier that

you had a close relationship with the . So

would you, for example, have reported that to ?

A Yes, ma'am. There is a particular case that we will

probably discuss later on that came close to that. And I reported it

to my colleagues.

Q Okay. But with regard to any of the local guard force and

the QRF, you did not report any suspicions?

A Well, I don't know if I -- if I might have written something

that I'm just not recalling right now, ma'am, but I don't recall that.

Q Not to my knowledge. I'm not asking you based on -- I'm

just asking you based on your recollection.

A No. If something like that would have taken place, ma'am,

I definitely would have shared that information with them. I did not

suspect anyone in particular that worked for us to belong to a terrorist

organization or anything like that. But in a place like Libya, post

revolution, with so many armed groups and our limited access to conduct

the proper investigation, you just -- you just never know.

As to the attack that took place that day, ma'am, you know, I don't

know what it's being categorized as, but me, on the ground, regardless

of who did it and regardless of their affiliation to any organization,

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I still considered it -- or I considered it then and I do now a terrorist

attack.

Q Do you know if anyone ever was -- I don't know if we had

covered it -- I know those two individuals were initially apprehended.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Do you know if anyone was ever charged?

A And that's a point of frustration out there, ma'am. With

a broken legal system, the only system in operation in Benghazi at the

time was their legal -- I'm sorry, their military prosecutor's office.

I worked very hard to get them to take this seriously because initially

they tried to tell me that it was just, you know, celebratory bomb

throwing, I guess you can call it. And although all of the elements

of a terrorist act, of a crime of that sort, were there, they

demanded -- what did they call it -- solid evidence. And to them, solid

evidence was a piece of the device, and when it blows up, there's no

pieces left.

So I, during the time that I was there, the case was still in

process. I know that their family made a lot of demands for them to

be released. We maintain a political pressure on them to hold them.

To be honest with you, I doubt that they were eventually prosecuted.

They even tried to come after the militia member that apprehended them

with legal charges against him. But I don't know what became of it.

Once I left Benghazi, I lost track as to what happened out there.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q And in terms of the QRF or LGF, what were the alternatives

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on the ground as opposed to employing these folks?

A You know, sir, I will tell you, I think the alternatives

were pretty narrow, pretty small. I guess, you know, former police

members could have been an alternative, but then again, they worked

under Qadhafi in that type of environment. So I don't know. Other

people brought in other guards from overseas, I guess, but, you know,

locals, very slim alternatives.

Q So moving to April 10th, and this is the attack on the U.N.

Special Envoy, just briefly, you had mentioned that the U.S. Mission

security posture did not change following this particular attack, and

one reason that you advanced for that is because the U.S. Special

Mission took precautions that the U.N. did not. And I think you gave

us some examples of that. How would you compare the security posture

of the U.S. Mission in Benghazi to the other, let's say, Western powers

that had a presence in Benghazi during your time there?

A Well, if you compare our posture with the U.N., it was quite

different. The U.N. basically went everywhere in Libya. They also

had, you know, the white vehicles with the big U.N. and the big antennas.

They saw them coming a mile away. They did have a much bigger compound

with many more people. I would say that in comparison to the British,

we had a bigger compound with more security features, such as cameras,

more guards, fencing, that sort of thing. What they did have, though,

is they had more British personnel. They had British contractor

security personnel that did their security.

Q Do you recall that any of the others, the French or the

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Italians --

A Yes, I also accompanied the principal officer to the French

compound or to the French house. There was only two of them.

So, yeah. I also accompanied her to

the Egyptians,

. So, in comparison, it was

different and, in some ways, better.

Q So I'm going to switch gears a little bit. I think in the

last session as well you had spoken with respect to staffing shortages

about you were making a request for additional personnel you said almost

on a pretty regular basis, is that right?

A That's right.

Q I think you described those efforts as forceful and strong,

is that right?

A That's correct.

Q Did you ever feel when you were making these requests

whether it was to Tripoli or to Washington, to anywhere, that you

couldn't be totally forthcoming in your opinions and your requests

about what you needed and what you wanted?

A I never -- never felt that, sir, but then, again, I'm talking

to the RSO in Tripoli. And I'm talking to my desk officer. I'm not

the politically correct fella type, so I told them as I saw it. So

and no one at any point told me to stop voicing my request for my opinion.

BY MS. SAWYER:

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Q And, again, your desk officer was Mr. ?

A Correct, ma'am, .

Q So most of these -- a lot of these conversations anyway were

with Mr. ?

A That is correct, ma'am. I would say that 90 percent of my

emails, it is either for -- addressed to him or he is cc'd on them,

that sort of thing.

Q Did he ever indicate to you that you should kind of stop

rocking the boat, stop making waves, not voicing your concerns in the

most robust, I think as you put it, not politically correct manner?

A No, ma'am, I think he was frustrated himself from, you know,

his conversations with me as to not being able to help more. But at

no point did he ever tell me to stop bugging him with my request.

Q And did you ever feel, either, you know, from Mr.

or anyone else, that you might suffer retaliation or some other adverse

job consequence by speaking your mind as to what your requests were?

A No, ma'am. At the time, I was an untenured FS-5, which is

probably the lowest that you will be in DS, and it would have been so

easy to retaliate against me, but it did not happen. And I was never

told that that could happen.

Q And, in fact, I think it came up during the morning session,

that you were actually commended --

A put me in for an award, and yes, ma'am, I

received it.

BY MR. DESAI:

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Q If I can briefly go back to a document that you were shown

during the first session. I think it is exhibit 2, the one that we

just looked at. And if I can just focus your attention, just on the

beginning portion of that document where you write to .

And it says here, , lots of work. It has been a good

experience thus far. No problem on the solo a few more days. I can

do this until the 16th when I need to catch a bird home. .

And I know we discussed this briefly with my colleagues during

the last session, but when you write here, "no problem on the solo a

few more days," what were you trying to convey there exactly?

A Well, he is basically telling me that it is going to take

a few more days to get me more help out there. And he has already

explained to me why he is having trouble getting me help out there.

And I'm trying to convey to him that I can handle it. It doesn't mean

that I don't want the additional people there. Of course, I want them,

but also don't want them to think that, you know, things are going to

come crashing down because I'm there alone.

Q And the first sentence: It has been a good experience thus

far.

A Well, sir, I take pleasure in an assignment when you are

given a certain amount of not only responsibility but the ability to

make decisions and changes that you see necessary. And, you know,

it -- Benghazi, for all it was during the 45 days that I was there,

for as challenging as it was and it was no perfect environment, you

know, it was an experience. It gave me the -- it allowed me to use

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different skills that I had, and I was able to keep my principal officer

safe and the compound safe during that time.

Q I think I recall in other documents you described it as

rewarding as well, and do you still feel that's the case today, 3 years

later?

A During the 45 days that I was there, yes, sir, the

experience was rewarding. You know, it doesn't say that there were

not problems or things that could have been better.

Q Sure.

A But I'm a security professional. If you send me to Paris

and there's no challenges there on the professional side, I may not

find that rewarding. You put me in a challenging position, and I'm

able to make things work; that, on the professional side, is rewarding

to me.

Q We spoke in the last session as well about the

Accountability Review Board.

Ms. Sawyer. Can I ask a quick question?

Mr. Desai. Sure.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Before we jump to that, can I just ask you a quick question?

Because it came up during the morning session during the time you were

the sole DS agent.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And you talked to us about the adjustments that that

required you make to the workflow and you talked about the importance

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of getting off compound, but that you limited those moves as much as

possible?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q You did say that you did have to do some.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And that during that time, in essence, I think you said the

compound was shut down and that it didn't receive visitors, et cetera.

Just to clarify, you know, for the record so that we are perfectly

clear, so when you were doing that particular adjustment and making

those moves off compound, was there ever a security incident that

occurred with you and the principal officer that you were off compound

with?

A No, ma'am. Not that -- not one that I can recall. What

we would do is our -- two to three members of the QRF stayed behind.

They managed the gates to make sure no one would come in through there.

The guards were instructed not to let any vehicles or personnel in or

out. Our IMO would call us constantly, every 15 minutes, every

half-hour, giving us a SITREP as to what was taking place, or I would

call him, and I do not recall any incident during those times.

Mr. Desai. What about back at the compound, like while you guys

were out and no incident occurred, was there ever an instance that

something happened at the compound while you -- you know, once you

closed it down?

Mr. . I can't think of any. Possibility, you know,

something might or could happen. I just don't recall.

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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And then when you were describing earlier the April 6, you

had said that you made a call at one point to ?

A Yes.

Q And to ask them or to tell them or inform them that they

should not come. And I think, as you described it, you said you wanted

to make sure, you wanted them to hold off to prevent blue on blue -- a

blue-on-blue incident?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So can you explain, had you alerted them already that there

was an incident?

A Yes, ma'am, I had.

Mr. Evers. We may want to talk about this --

Ms. Sawyer. Let's talk about the substance, but can you just

explain in a generalized sense since we have you here --

Mr. . There was constant communication, ma'am. Maybe

there was at least three -- three or four communications, radio, and

phone.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And when you said blue -- when you were describing to us

you wanted to prevent a blue-on-blue, what does that mean?

A It's a law enforcement terminology for friendlies,

unfriendlies. So as I mentioned before, you know, neither group know

each other. So, in order to prevent something, friendly fire, I

thought it was best at that time.

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Q So that risk, the risk of friendly fire in certainly that

incident or any incident, is a very real risk that has to be considered?

A Very real, ma'am. Especially, you know, when they don't

speak the same language, when it's at night, when these people don't

know each other. Yeah.

Q So you would have wanted to make sure that both your

and certainly anyone who was friendly at your

compound were fully aware of what the situation was before they

came -- would have come over to try to avoid that risk?

A Well, you know, with any decision, there is, you know,

there's pros and cons. Some would say, Hey, why not get more people

on board right away? Then, you know, there was my thinking that that

could also create a problem. But I can go into more details in a

different setting on this, ma'am.

Q Great. Thanks.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q So, turning to the ARB, I think we said in the last session

you did not talk to the ARB, is that correct?

A I did not, sir.

Q Is there a particular reason you did not want to talk to

them?

A Oh, I had no problem talking to anyone, sir. Just I just

was never called.

Q And were you ever asked or ordered at any time not to provide

information to the ARB?

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A No, sir.

Q And were you ever asked or ordered to conceal or even destroy

information from the ARB?

A No, sir.

Q If I can just turn to a couple of the findings and

recommendations of the ARB, and I believe the report, which was issued

in December of 2012, touches upon and discusses at length some of the

issues that we talked about today, staffing shortages, and so on. Have

you had an opportunity to read the ARB's report whether the classified

or unclassified version?

A I have not.

Q One of the things that the ARB found was that staffing

shortages were a chronic and persistent problem, and they enumerate

several reasons why that was the case in their view. And they make

a number of recommendations to address this issue. And of the things

that they said was that the ARB endorsed the Department's request for

increased Diplomatic Security personnel for high- and critical-threat

posts, and for additional mobile security deployment teams as well as

an increase in DS domestic staffing.

Do you think that recommendation would help and address some of

the issues that you had while you were in Benghazi?

A Oh, most definitely.

Q One of the other things that the ARB recommended was

increasing the TDY durations for folks that are coming into posts like

this. And I think it says, 120 days for key policy, program, and

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security personnel, a year for them and 120 days for less critical

folks. Do you think that that is something that would also help this

issue as well?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, in addition to the ARB, there had been a couple of other,

like Independent Best Practices Panel -- the Independent Best

Practices Panel for Management, there have been seven congressional

investigations. And I think one of the purposes of this particular

committee is to make sure that, hopefully, this is the last

investigation into Benghazi and make this the definitive one, given

all the work that has been done so far. And to assist us in reaching

that goal, do you have any specific issues or questions that you still

think need to be investigated that haven't been investigated thus far?

A No, I do not, but I have a suggestion.

Q Please.

A Let's use this information to ensure that it doesn't happen

again. One of the things that I love about the Marine Corps is that

when you make mistakes, you put it into training and that will prevent

future generations from doing the same thing. Things happen, you know.

They always do. Let's just not let it happen again. That's all.

Q So, Mr. , I'm going to shift focus. We are almost

at the end, at least of this session. I want to ask you a series of

questions about several allegations that have been made, public

allegations related to the Benghazi attacks. And we understand that

the committee is investigating all of these allegations, and as a

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result, I have to ask you about every single one of them.

A Okay.

Q But by asking you about them, I do not want you to think

that the minority staff or the members believe that there is any degree

of merit into any of these allegations.

A Okay.

Q There are quite a few of them and what I will do is I will

describe the allegation to you and then ask you if you have any

information or evidence to support the allegation that is being

advanced. And if you don't, I will just move on to the next one until

we are finished.

A Okay.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta

to stand down. And this resulted in the Defense Department not sending

more assets to help in Benghazi. Do you have any evidence that

Secretary of State Clinton ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to

stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

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signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims. Do you have any evidence in

Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying

security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Colonel Qadhafi to

his own people in order to garner support for military operations in

Libya in spring 2011. Do you have evidence that Secretary Clinton

misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Colonel

Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military

operations in Libya in spring 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or other countries. A

bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms

from Libya to Syria and that they found no support for this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

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arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that U.S. facilities in Benghazi

were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria

or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound. There

have been a number of allegations about the cause and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to stand down, but that instead there were tactical disagreements on

the ground over how quickly to depart. Do you have any evidence that

would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's finding that there

was no standdown order to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decisions to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q The State Department officials were -- let's see, excuse

me. A concern has been raised by one individual that in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board, damaging

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documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed

or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were provided

to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA faithfully performed their duties in

accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship. Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director

Mike Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to

Congress about the Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points to Congress for political reason?

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A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks. Do you have any evidence that Ambassador

Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on

the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks,

and he was missing in action. Do you have any evidence to support the

allegation that the President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief

or missing in action on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to crease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain

in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that there was no standdown order issued to U.S.

military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House Armed

Services Committee that there was no standdown order issued to U.S.

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military in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attacks that would have saved lives.

However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the

former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, concluded a

review of the attacks after which he stated, Given where the troops

were, how quickly that things all happened, and how quickly it

dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did. Do you

have any evidence to contradict Chairman McKeon's conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

to deploy?

A No, sir.

Q Any other questions from my colleagues?

Ms. Sawyer. I don't think so.

Mr. Desai. Thank you so much. We can go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m.,the interview proceeded in classified

session.]

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EXHIBIT 7

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INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #8

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 15, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel

SHANNON GREEN, Minority Counsel

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

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Ms. Betz. We'll go on the record. Good morning. This is a

transcribed interview of conducted by the House Select

Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily

as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S.

diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant

to H.Res. 567 of the 113th Congress and H.Res. 5 of the 114th.

Could the witness please state your name for the record?

Mr.

Ms. Betz. The committee appreciates your appearance today at

this interview. My name is Kim Betz with the committee's majority

staff, and I'll take this opportunity to have everyone at the table

introduce themselves as well as around the room.

Ms. Jackson. And I'm Sharon Jackson. I'm with the minority. I

switched sides -- so, yeah, with the majority staff. Let me go back.

Mr. Desai. I'm Ronak Desai with minority staff.

Mr. Missakian. Craig Missakian with the majority staff.

Ms. Green. Shannon Green with the minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm Susanne Sachsman Grooms with the

minority.

Mr. Davis. I'm Carlton Davis. I work for Chairman Gowdy.

Ms. Barrineau. I'm Sara Barrineau with majority staff.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke with the majority.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Ms. Betz. Before we begin, I would like to go over the ground

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rules and explain how the interview will proceed. The way the

questioning proceeds is that a member from the majority will ask

questions for the first hour, and then the minority will have the

opportunity to ask questions for an equal period of time if they choose.

We will firmly adhere to the 1-hour time limit for each side.

Questions may be asked only by members of the committee or

designated staff. We will rotate back and forth, 1 hour per side,

until we are out of questions and the interview will be over. Unlike

a testimony or a deposition in Federal court, the committee format is

not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness or their counsel may

raise objections for privilege subject to review by the chairman of

the committee. If these objections cannot be resolved in the

interview, the witness can be required to return for a deposition or

a hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to raise questions or objections when the other side is asking

questions. This has not been an issue we've encountered in the past,

but I wanted to make sure you were clear on the process.

This session is beginning as unclassified. If any question calls

for a classified answer, please let us know, and we will reserve this

answer until we move into a classified setting. You are welcome to

confer with counsel at any time throughout the interview, but if

something needs to be clarified, we ask that the witness make this

known. If you need to discuss anything with your counsel, we will go

off the record and stop the clock to provide you with this opportunity.

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We'd like to take a break whenever it's convenient for you. This

can be after each hour of questioning or after a couple of rounds,

whichever you prefer. During your round of questioning, if you need

anything, water, coffee, use the facilities, or confer with your

counsel, just please let us know, and we will go off the record and

stop the clock. We really want to make this process as easy and as

comfortable for you.

As you can see, an official court reporter -- or an official

reporter is taking down everything you say to make a written record

so we ask that you give verbal responses to all questions, yes and no,

as opposed to nods of the head. I'm going to ask the reporter to please

feel free to jump in in case you do respond nonverbally. Do you

understand this?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Betz. Also, we should both try to not talk over each other

so that it's easier to get a clear record. We want you to answer our

questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible, so we will

take our time and repeat or clarify our questions, if necessary. If

you have any questions or if you do not understand any of our questions,

please let us know. We're happy to clarify or repeat the question.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or don't

remember, it's best not to guess. Please give us your best

recollection, and if there are things you do not know or can't remember,

just say so and please let us know to who -- to whom, to the best of

your knowledge, may be able to provide the information or a more

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complete answer to a question.

You are required to answer truthfully from Congress. Do you

understand that?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Betz. This also applies to questions posed by congressional

staff in an interview. Do you understand this?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Betz. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand that?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Betz. Is there any reason you are unable to provide truthful

answers to today's questions?

Mr. No.

Ms. Betz. Okay. That's the end of my preamble or bramble. Does

the minority have anything they'd like to say or add?

Mr. Kenny. I would like to take the opportunity to thank the

witness for appearing here today and thank you for your service and

we look forward to your testimony.

Ms. Betz. So the clock now reads what 10:09, 10:10.

Ms. Jackson. 10:08.

Ms. Betz. Okay. 10:08. So we'll now begin with our first hour

of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. BETZ:

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Q What did you do prior to assuming your post in Benghazi?

What's your experience or experiences?

A From when I started with the State Department?

Q Uh-huh.

A I joined State department in 2008, and I served 2 years in

our field,

I then did 2 years in as the assistant regional

security officer. During that time, I did a TDY to Yemen and also TDY

to Benghazi. After that, I served a 1-year tour in Tripoli, Libya,

and currently

Q And did you do any or did you receive any type of training

before assuming these posts such as high-threat training?

A Yes. Before going to , I completed the basic

regional security officer course and then as well as the high-threat

protection course.

Q And were these both required for assuming these posts?

A High-threat was not required for , but it was

for Yemen and Libya.

Q Other than these two courses, were there other types of

training or classes that you took such as firearms training?

A Separate than just the basic special agent course?

Q Uh-huh.

A Not in addition to the basic special agent course. There

was some investigative courses I took, for instance, money laundering.

I took two training sessions in that, but I don't know if that was really

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relevant to what I was doing in or Libya.

Q Right. And how did you first learn about the position, the

TDY position in Benghazi?

A The desk officer for NEA contacted me and said, You did a

good job in Yemen; would you like to go to Benghazi?

Q So they reached out to you?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Did you know anyone that had previously served as the RSO

in Benghazi?

A One of the other ARSOs in with me had done a TDY to

Benghazi as an ARSO there.

Q And were you -- given that the desk office reached out to

you, so they knew you personally from previous positions?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And do you know, were they looking for someone with specific

experience to serve in this capacity or qualifications?

A I know they were looking for someone that had the

high-threat training. I don't know what sort of other additional

requirements they might have had.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have any prior military experience before becoming

a DS agent or any other type of law enforcement experience before

joining DS?

A No, ma'am.

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Q And who was the desk officer who reached out to you?

A I believe it was .

Q Okay. And you said there was another agent from

that had served in Benghazi. Who was that?

A

Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And he had served previously?

A In Benghazi?

Q In Benghazi.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q What sort of conversations then did you have before you

left? Did you talk to ? Did you talk to

before you left about the position about?

A I'm sure I did.

Q About the environment?

A I remember at least talking to about it, but I don't

remember what was said.

Q Okay. Did you read any intelligence reports or threat

assessments before you left either from the State Department, CIA, DOD?

A I was reading intelligence reporting, threat reporting

weekly, if not daily. I can't -- I don't remember if there was

something specific on Libya or Benghazi I was reading.

Q Did the previous RSO give you any turnover documents or any

notes to help you when you came into the position?

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A Yes, there is a turnover document.

Q And did it describe -- what did it describe?

A It described the resources that were available to the RSO,

sort of our standard operating procedures, provided contact phone

numbers, who to call for various scenarios, gave a readout on, you know,

the guard program, the QRF force there, some of the other programs that

were running there.

Q Okay. So it was a pretty comprehensive document, would you

say?

A Yes.

Q When you -- when you left to travel, were you informed what

to bring with you? Did you bring your own firearms? Was that

something that was issued when you arrived at the compound or arrived

in Benghazi?

A I could not bring my own firearm, so that was issued when

I got there.

Q And what was issued to you?

A I had an M4 and a pistol.

Q And were those the only firearms that were on the compound?

Were there others?

A Yes, there were other firearms.

Q Elaborate in a different setting?

Ms. Jackson. Just ask.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Okay.

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A The British who had left Benghazi left some of their

firearms with us.

Q Okay.

A British security.

Q And were they similar in type?

A I never saw them. They were in the safe.

Q Okay.

A Which we didn't have access to.

Q Okay. Did you -- when you came into Benghazi, did you have

any problems coming into the country, visa issues, any other issues?

A No.

Q You're laughing.

A It's always just hit or miss going in there.

Q Okay.

A At that time, it worked out great.

Q Did you travel alone, or did you travel with anybody else?

A Just by myself.

Q Just by yourself. And when you arrived at the airport, who

were you -- who met you at the airport?

A I don't remember specifically. I would assume it was the

other DS agents and some of the QRF members, but I can't say for certain

who was there.

Q Okay. And did you have any conversations on the way back

traveling to the post with those -- any conversations about the

security environment? Were they concerned traveling from the airport

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to post? Did you travel in a convoy or fully armored vehicle?

A I traveled in an armored vehicle, but I don't remember what

the security package was, what sort of motorcade setup there was.

Q Okay. So when you left or in your conversations with

, were you -- what was the reporting structure? Were you to

report to ? Were you to report to Tripoli? Both in tandem?

A Both. If was asking me something specific, I would

respond to him and probably CC the RSO in Tripoli.

Q Uh-huh.

A As well as one of the other ARSOs in Tripoli. Otherwise,

most of my reporting was directly to the RSO in Tripoli, oftentimes

in consultation with the principal officer in Benghazi.

Q And did you have conversations with daily? Would he

ping you weekly? Daily?

A Weekly.

Q Weekly. And was he the only one that you were in contact

with? Were there others?

A As far as stateside?

Q Stateside.

A is the only one I can remember.

Q I want to shift gears a little bit. So when you arrived

to the compound or at the compound, and you know, obviously you were

aware of security issues. I want to talk a little bit about the

reliance on Libyans for security, and specifically, was this something

that was typical in your experiences for a post?

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A Relying on host-nation nationals for security?

Q Uh-huh.

A In my experience, in , we had our guard force,

there was about 200 of them, some of them armed and they were all

third-country nationals, Sri Lankans, Indians, and Nepalese. And it

worked well. We trusted them. They performed heroically in the

attack . In Yemen, also we had local Yemenis providing

security, so it wasn't uncommon.

Q Okay. In the capacities that Libyans were asked to serve,

is that different than -- was it different than in and

Yemen?

A No. They were serving sort of as a bodyguard capacity in

Libya, which is also not uncommon. It's done at other posts.

comes to mind.

Q Was it your feeling that they were replacing American

agents, DS agents?

A I can't answer that. I don't know.

Q Okay. The local guard force, what were they hired to do?

A Local guards provide access control essentially for

visitors as well as us moving on and off the compound, and they also

serve as the first line of defense in the event of an attack or some

other sort of security incident would happened on the premise.

Q Were they armed?

A No.

Q So what did they -- how did they perform their work? So

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you say they are the first line of defense. Would you elaborate a

little bit more?

A Well, one is the first line of defense for who gets on to

the compound.

Q Uh-huh.

A So they are checking badges, they are checking license

plates, that sort of thing. They'll often itemize the vehicles to make

sure there aren't explosives in the vehicles. If something were to

happen, for instance, a mob or bomb or some sort of scenario like that,

they have the IDNS pendants, which sound our alarm, and then they also

have radios so they are instructed to call out a certain thing, DS

agents, to alert us what type of attack it is and where they are.

Q Were there issues with radios, the LGF radios that you were

aware of?

A I can't remember any specific issues. That doesn't mean

there weren't. I just can't -- can't remember.

Q Problems getting radios into the country or other type of

technical equipment into the country?

A I can't think of the example where that was an issue.

Q Okay. Were the LGF reliable? Were they trustworthy?

Loyal?

A They were -- I would trust them to do the job that they were

hired to do. I wouldn't trust them to put their lives on the line to

defend us in an attack or something like that.

Q Is that something that would differ from -- I mean, from

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having additional American sort of security agents on the ground?

A Well, I'm always going to trust an American more than I would

a third country, you know, another national.

Q Right. Do you know how members of the LGF were selected?

A I do not, no.

Q So you weren't involved in hiring or selecting them?

A No. They were hired through Blue Mountain.

Q Okay.

A Which was the contractor.

Q Right.

A And I don't remember what sort of hiring process or vetting

they did on the guards.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. So did you see anybody vetting documents when you

were there that vetting had occurred of the local guard force?

Mr. . I don't remember seeing any. I know when I was

hiring somebody, I vetted them through one of my contacts back in

to do name checks and that sort of stuff, but I don't know what

the guards that were on compound, how they had been vetted.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So you had done this on a previous capacity, worked and hired

LGF?

A Yes. But not in Benghazi.

Q Not in Benghazi. Who was responsible for this in Benghazi,

the LGF? I mean, Blue Mountain --

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A Hiring them?

Q Yeah. Blue Mountain Group, but was there an ARSO or who

sort of monitored Blue Mountain Group or worked with?

A I can't -- we divided the DS programs up amongst the ARSOs

and the RSO, myself. I can't remember who specifically had the LGF

program because they are in portfolios --

Ms. Jackson. But you did hire one local guard force while you

were there?

Mr. . Oh, it was a driver.

Ms. Jackson. It was a driver.

Ms. Betz. Okay. Okay. I'll come back to that.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. Was the driver part of the local guard force or the

QRF?

A No, no.

Q Okay. And is that the person that you described as you

vetted through a contact in ?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And just walk us through how that worked. How is

it that you can vet someone through as opposed to contacts

in Libya?

A This contact I have worked . They have access

to a lot of the systems we use when we conduct background checks or

do vetting of employees, so I gave him a name and date of birth to run.

Ms. Betz. This particular.

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Mr. Particular person.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was this person like dual U.S./Libyan national, or I guess

I'm asking why -- how and why would have information on a Libyan

if the person was solely a Libyan national?

A Well, has access to State Department records as well.

So, in addition to any records they may generate

They would also have records that are generated

by consular officers or either through lookouts or through information

they glean during interviews of visa applicants or --

Q Were you able to vet this person through the normal

checklist that you would vet a member of the host nation support?

A No.

Q And can you elaborate on what was different?

A Typically, if you're vetting a local national, you would

go through various different agencies.

Q Such as?

A

Q Would you do any local vetting normally --

A Yes.

Q -- like through the local law enforcement, financial

institutions, and credit checks, things like that?

A I've never -- I'm not aware if we do credit checks and

financial institution checks, but we do do local police checks.

Q Were you able to do any of that in Libya? In Benghazi, in

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particular?

A I don't remember because we also had an assistant, Libyan

assistant that was serving in sort of a management human resources

capacity. I don't know -- I honestly can't remember if she submitted

the names for local police checks.

Q And who was that person?

A I don't remember her name.

Q Does sound --

A

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Sorry.

Ms. Betz. No.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Just sort of following up on that. So were you aware of

any type of background check that the Blue Mountain Group was conducting

on these individuals? Would they go through something similar or as

rigorous as what you did, or what is the standard vetting process?

A I can't remember what their vetting process was.

Q Okay. Would the person -- would the ARSO who was

monitoring or working with the Blue Mountain Group know that?

A I don't know. I mean, I feel like I would know this at some

point, but I just don't. I don't remember.

Q Were you aware of the contract issues that the Blue Mountain

Group was having at the time that you were in Benghazi --

A No.

Q -- with the Libyan partners?

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A No.

Q So you wouldn't notice -- you didn't have -- weren't aware

of any impact that the contract dispute was having on the performance

of the LGF at the time?

A Not that I'm aware of.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So you don't recall any dispute between the Libyan BMG and

the U.K. parent company?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. All right. I have another question, but it escapes

me. Go ahead. Oh, you know what, I do. We need to just establish.

When were you in Benghazi?

A I was there the month of August 2012. I arrived July 30th

and left September 1st.

Ms. Betz. So you weren't aware of the contract issues with D.C.

Anybody else aware of contract issues or -- if you weren't aware, who

would be aware of those contract issues?

Mr. Evers. Aware of -- who would be aware of things that he's

not aware of?

Ms. Betz. Yeah. Well, I meant would D.C. know? I'm just trying

to understand who would -- if he didn't know, does he have an idea of

who may know a contract --

Ms. Jackson. Who was responsible?

Ms. Betz. Who was responsible for the contract. Would it have

been the ARSO that was communicating about the contract dispute?

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Mr. Evers. If you know.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q If you know.

A Typically a contracting officer is in charge of the

contracts. I would have to assume that that person was strictly, but

I don't know who is in charge of the contract.

Q Okay. So the QRF, the Quick Reaction Force, who were they?

A They were Libyan nationals who were members of the 17th

February Brigade.

Q Were they -- were the members that were on the compound,

were they loyal, trustworthy, did you believe them to be?

A I think loyal and trustworthy, I have to separate. That's

two different things. Loyal, I believe that they weren't do anything

to harm us and they would do their best to protect us, so they are loyal

in that sense. Trustworthy, in that particular environment under the

Qadhafi regime, counterintelligence issues are an issue, and we would

have to assume that all Libyans would be pressured to provide

information on us to the host nation.

Q Was the service that the QRF provided the post, was that

something similar? Was it similarly provided to other Westerners or

organizations in Benghazi?

A I could not speak about what sort of protection the other

organizations had. I don't know if I ever saw it actually.

Q Was there precedent in your previous experiences for using

a militia or brigade to serve in these capacities?

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A Now that I'm aware of. There is precedent to use locals

in a bodyguard capacity. I'm not -- I can't speak about all the other

high threat posts around the world, whether they are using people that

are attached to a militia or brigade for protection.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q In and in Yemen when you were there, who

provided -- what were the QRFs in those countries? I mean, where did

they come from? Were they a local police? Were they military? Can

you compare and contrast what you had in Benghazi with what you

experienced in and Yemen when you were there?

A Sure. has a competent security force of

that would respond to events. Our own personal Embassy QRF in

consisted of their country nationals .

In Yemen, our bodyguards, which we would consider a QRF, we also had

a QRF element where Yemeni nationals, and they also have host nation

security support on the perimeter that could respond. Benghazi does

not -- did not have much of a security -- much security -- many security

capabilities that I saw. You didn't typically see police. You didn't

see military.

Ms. Betz. Were those typical security elements, did you

envision -- did you rely on them as part of sort of this concentric

ring of security? I mean, were they integral to your plan on paper?

Mr. The QRF?

Ms. Betz. The QRF, the police.

Mr. Evers. And in which country?

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BY MS. BETZ:

Q I'm sorry. Back into Libya.

A The QRF were certainly part of our security plan.

Q Okay.

A And you would say they are one of the rings of security.

Q Okay. Do you know how they were selected to serve on the

compound?

A I don't know how the ones that were there were selected.

I can only speak to when I was there, we -- they attempted to give us

a new QRF member and I can only speak to how that person was selected.

Q How did that --

A One of our QRF members resigned, so we requested a new one

from the 17th February, which they sent us, and we didn't accept him.

Q Do you know why the initial QRF member resigned?

A He was having personal issues with the QRF leader,

Q Okay. And why was the initial replacement not acceptable

to you?

A It was my understanding that he had already been a member

of the QRF in Benghazi and he had been fired previously. I never got

the full story on why he was fired, but it was either related to drug

use or some counterintelligence issues.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So he had been previously a member of the QRF on the U.S.

compound in Benghazi, not just a member of the militia? I just want

to make sure I understand.

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A Yes. I was told that he had been a member of the QRF and

the compound in Benghazi, but I did not -- I wasn't there when he was

a member.

Q But you were told that he had been a member of the QRF and

had been previously terminated?

A Yes.

Q And then he came back for round two, but that was rejected?

A He was sent back to us for round two, yes.

Q Yes. Did you ever get a replacement for him, for the one

who left?

A Not that I recall.

Q So how many QRF members did you have?

A Three.

Q At that time, after the one left?

A Yes. We had --

Q Were you at three and went down to two, or were you at four

and went down to three?

A I can't say with certainty. I remember three specifically.

I can't remember when I left if we were down to two or we had three.

Maybe somebody else can.

Q And did that number include ?

A Yes.

Q Tell us about What was his role?

A was the QRF leader for the group that was on the

compound. He -- I guess that describes him.

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Q Okay.

A Or his role at least.

Q If you know, was he selected to -- and sent to you as the

supervisor, or did you or prior agents have some say in who was going

to act as the supervisor of the QRF?

A I do not know how he was selected, if that was done by us

or if he was sent that way.

Ms. Betz. And did he play a role in the replacement coming back

for round two? Do you know?

Mr. I believe the replacement was related to him

somehow.

Ms. Betz. Was related to ?

Mr. Yes. I'm not positive, but I believe that I

remembered that that was the case.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And why, again, was this person rejected?

A Like I said, I never got the full story, but there were

rumors that it was related to drug use that he was released. The other

rumor was that he was a CI concern, sharing information with host nation

about us.

Q And who made the decision not to hire him?

A I did.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Would you have consulted in the conversation -- or in

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the decision to reject him? Was he aware?

A Yes.

Q So he was aware that you had made the decision not to hire --

A Yes.

Q -- this individual.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Were there any similar concerns with ?

A Similar concerns. Sorry, can you be more specific?

Q Either nonperformance because of drug use or

counterintelligence concerns, or were there any concerns that were

raised to you regarding ?

A Well, I have counterintelligence concerns over every Libyan

employee I worked with both in Tripoli and there, but no concerns

related to drug use, no.

Q Okay. Did anyone consult with you or confide in you that

there were -- beyond your natural suspicions of local Libyans, that

there were any concerns with or any other member of the QRF?

A If I remember correctly, before who was the QRF

member that resigned when I spoke with him during his resignation, I

believe he said that was spreading rumors about him back at the

Brigade, basically accusing him of being a spy for the Americans. That

was all I remember really about that incident, I think.

Q Okay.

Ms. Betz. So, just to follow on your concerns about

counterintelligence, I mean, did you have anything specific that you

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were aware, or were these just speculations, just given your previous

experiences?

Mr. Evers. This about or --

BY MS. BETZ:

Q . I'll --

A I just -- I think we, or at least I assumed that he was

sharing information with Brigade about what he was doing on the compound

and what we were doing. I can't think of a specific example of why

I would have thought that.

Q Did you share these concerns with anybody?

A Yes. I shared them with the desk officer, as well

as the ARSO in Tripoli, maybe the RSO in Tripoli.

Q Would that be --

A

Q So he was aware of these concerns

with regard to --

A Yes.

Q -- and counterintelligence?

A Yes.

Q So other Westerners and their interactions with Feb 17, did

they share similar -- for example, the U.K., did they share similar

concerns with the Feb 17th with you?

A I don't know if I ever talked to other Western groups about

Feb 17.

Q Okay. Apart from , the other members that were on the

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compound, how did they perform? Similarly?

A In my opinion, Feb 17 wasn't a particularly professional

fighting unit like you would think of an American military unit. They

struggled with even basic tasks.

Q Uh-huh.

A But they were attached to the largest brigade in the city.

They served as a buffer, I guess, to some of other militias, so there

was value in that.

Q Was the Ambassador concerned? Do you know if these

concerns about Feb 17 were communicated to the Ambassador?

A I don't know if they were.

Q Was the PO at the time concerned?

A Yes. He shared the same concerns I did about CI issues.

Q And did --

Ms. Jackson. Who was the PO?

Ms. Betz. Who was the PO?

Mr.

Ms. Jackson. And PO is principal officer?

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And at the time, was there discussions about the contract

with Feb 17 and keeping this relationship?

A Discussion between me and the PO or --

Q Or just general discussions. Do you know if the officer

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was having conversations with the Ambassador as well about keeping the

contract moving forward? Were you a part of this -- any of these

discussions?

A I wasn't a part of any contract discussions. Contract, I

guess, is a strange way to think about it.

Q MOA, a memorandum of agreement with --

A Okay. Yes --

Q -- the government?

A -- I was involved in drafting and working on the memorandum

of agreement between us and Feb 17?

Q Was one ever executed while you were there?

A There had been one that had expired, and based on QRF's

performance, some other issues, myself and one of the ARSOs drafted

a new 1, a new MOA, and we presented it to the QRF on compound. I don't

know if that got presented to the actual Brigade or the host nation,

but we used it as an agreement between us and the QRF on the compound.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So they agreed to the terms?

A Reluctantly.

Q How did it differ from the initial agreement?

A I don't -- I don't recall what the initial agreement said.

The agreement that we wrote up basically detailed what was expected

of them as far as performance. We were having trouble getting them

to work.

Q Show up at all or --

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A They were showing up. They were just -- there was pushback

when we'd ask them to go on moves with us, to serve in the follow car,

or you know, where their static position should be around the perimeter

providing security. So we drafted something up that clearly explained

what was expected of them and what their duties were and that this is

why they were getting their stipend of $35 maybe. I don't remember

what it was.

Ms. Betz. So you gave them a list of work requirements?

Mr. Yes, I believe so.

Ms. Betz. So we are going to mark this as exhibit 1.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Evers. When you're ready to go, can we read the doc number

into the record whenever we're ready to go?

Ms. Betz. So, just for the record, the witness is looking at doc

No. C05397229.

Mr. Evers. And the cover page?

Ms. Betz. Cover page, which is CO5397228.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. And just for the record, it is unclear to

me from the production that although it appears to be that this is the

attachment to that email, I think, that all of the documents that follow

in the production, document numbers of this exhibit, they are a little

off, are the correct attachments to the email, so it would probably

just be helpful if you could authenticate that.

Ms. Betz. Okay. So, moving to the second page, is this

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30

something -- is this document -- the email that you sent or that

sent you which reflects the QRF work requirement, is this

something that you were aware of? Were you involved in

drafting -- drafting this document?

Mr. I am aware of it. I don't know if I would have

drafted any of this. I certainly would have reviewed it.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Were these the work requirements that you just referenced

a little while ago regarding the new memorandum of agreement with the

QRF in Benghazi?

A As far as I know they are, yes.

Q They look familiar to you?

A They look familiar, yes.

Q The cover page is an email from a to you with

others cc'd. Do you know who is?

A Yes, he was an ARSO that I supervised.

Q Okay. So he was an ARSO in Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And on the cc line, are these other ARSOs who were also in

Benghazi at the time you were there?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. So this is a document that was being sent around

between the core group of the DS agents in Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. So it's possible that Mr. was the initial

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drafter of this document?

A If I remember correctly, the QRF was his portfolio before

it was , I believe, so, yes, it would seem likely that he

drafted it.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And did you oversee the drafting, given your involvement

in the contract or the MOA, in the drafting of the MOA?

A Well, I was the acting RSO at the time, so I would have been

in charge of all the programs as well as supervising the agents there.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Then do these requirements, to the best of your

recollection, detail what the QRF was required to do once you entered

into this new agreement?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And, in particular, which of the 10 requirements

here did they have any issues with that were brought to your attention?

A I'm not sure I can state specifically which one of these

10. I can tell you what their issues were. I don't know if I could

narrow it down to one of these 10, though.

Q Okay. Could you just tell us again then what the issues

were?

A Sure. They didn't want to do movements necessarily off the

compound with us, particularly short-notice movement. They also did

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32

not want to do essentially static positions at the front gate. I guess

that would speak to number two.

Q Did they say why they didn't want to do movements with you,

especially on short notice?

A No, they didn't. In my experience with Libyans, they were

just a little bit lazy.

Q You didn't feel that it had a counterintelligence purpose

or basis in any way?

A No, I did not.

Q Okay. Go ahead.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And the reason for elaborating these work requirements was

that they were having -- this was to give them a set of basically

benchmarks or measures so that they knew specifically what their

responsibilities were?

A That's correct.

Q And they were having trouble sort of defining what their

responsibilities were?

A They're just a little bit sort of like petulant children

that you have to give them guidelines and guidance, I guess.

Q And the guidance, was that, in your experience in previous

posts, was something that was not necessary? For example, in

or Yemen, did you have to spell out work requirements for the

QRF or any security that a host nation might provide?

A Well, as part of a disciplined security force, you always

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33

have work requirements and guard statements, but in my other posts,

we didn't have those statements and guard orders as a result of problems

with the guards. Whereas, in Benghazi, we drafted these because we

were having issues with QRF.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q During the time that you were there in August of 2012, did

the QRF continue to make movements with you after this agreement was

reached?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So at any time at the -- towards the end of your

tenure, had they refused to go on any movements with you?

A I think they complained about movements that we had asked

them to go on, but I don't remember them ever outright refusing to go

on a movement.

Q And did you have any conversations or discussions with the

leadership of Feb 17th over this memorandum of agreement?

A I don't recall ever meeting anybody in leadership in Feb

17.

Q Okay. So you didn't try and get this agreement signed off

on by anyone other than the guard force that was on compound?

A Correct, I believe so.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Was the leadership aware of these work requirements; do you

know?

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34

A I don't know.

Q So, shifting from the QRF, some of the other security forces

that the post might have relied on might have been the SSC. Were you

aware of the SSC?

A I knew it was an organization that existed. I don't recall

ever seeing them.

Q And for the record, what is the SSC?

A It's the Supreme Security Council.

Q So they were not an integral part of your security plan?

A In the time that I was there, they were not a part of the

security plan. My understanding was prior to my arrival, there were

one or two SSC officers that were detailed to the mission, but they

had not been paid, so they stopped showing up.

Q So they weren't reliable?

A No.

Q Did post have any interactions with the Libyan Shield?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q And what about the local police? Were they of assistance

in any -- at the post? Were they contemplated as part of the security

plan?

A They were contemplated. I drafted a DIP note requesting

daily 24/7-hour police support at the mission. We got that briefly,

I believe, for a couple of hours one day. I instructed the guards that

if they see a police car going past the mission, to just flag it down

and I'll come out there and talk to them and try and cajole them and

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35

sweet talk them into staying of they could, but that was sporadic at

best.

Q Had they been reliable, what security would they have

provided to the post?

A The only issue or incident I'm aware of where we requested

local police support, I don't know if it was police or SSC, was an

incident that happened a couple of days before my arrival, which was

a possible hostile surveillance incident at the south gate. I can't

remember if it was SSC or police investigated these people that were

possibly conducting surveillance and did not have the authority to

arrest them or -- and didn't seem to have any either desire or

capabilities to further investigate.

Q So, not having authority or desire, that was pretty much

standard among the police or the police force in your experience?

A Yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q How did you want to compensate for that? You know, you go

into a country and you want host-nation support, you want local law

enforcement to be, you know, functional, and you don't have that,

how -- in your opinion, how would you want to compensate for that?

A I have unlimited resources?

Q Or reasonable resources.

A Reasonable. Okay. Well, with the resources that we had,

the best way that we could compensate for it was, one, increase training

to our own QRF. We try and do some physical security upgrades to

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36

increase the physical security of where we were at,

. In a world where perhaps we had

more resources, I would always prefer to depend on American security,

whether that be DS or the military or contractors.

Q Was there -- given the size of the compound and the number

of Americans on the compound, was there a minimum number of agents that

you thought were needed?

A I guess that would depend on what other Americans were

there, like who we were charged with protecting. I don't know if I

can give an answer about how many agents I would feel comfortable with

as a minimum.

Q How many did you have? How many Americans did you have to

protect on the compound while you were there in August?

A Two.

Q The principal officer and the IMO?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did you feel like you had the minimum number of

agents you needed for the protection of those two persons, the other

agents that were there, given the size of the compound?

A Based on the threat reporting at the time

, I felt

it was appropriate. The only time I wished we had more people was when

we were doing off -- more Americans -- is when we were doing off-compound

moves. So we would have, for instance, the DS agent is always going

to We probably prefer

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37

.

Q And you didn't have that when you were there?

A No, ma'am.

Q Now, you said that, given the resources you

felt like you had enough to secure the compound.

A I don't know if I would say that I felt we had enough to

secure the compound. I don't know if I ever felt that we could secure

the compound,

BY MS. BETZ:

Q What were your initial impressions of the compound?

A It did not appear -- it was not like the other compounds

that I had seen. It appeared to be more of a low-profile building,

lower footprint than your typical embassy or consulate. It didn't have

the signs up saying "U.S. Embassy" or "Consulate." It didn't have some

of the physical security features you would typically see at an embassy

or consulate, such as Delta barriers or chicane. There wasn't the

host-nation police presence, the military presence that you would find

at your typical embassy or consulate.

So my impression was, it was a lower -- or a lower profile mission,

and it would be difficult to defend it in the event of a coordinated

attack based on our resources there.

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Q Was the lower profile, as you describe it, is that something

that was communicated to you before you arrived, or these are your first

impressions of the compound?

A These would have been my first impressions of the compound

when I saw it.

Q Were you aware of the physical security deficiencies when

you arrived? Were there some of the observations that you made upon

your arrival?

A I don't know if I was aware of any of the deficiencies. Like

I said, one of the other agents that was in had been there, and

he might have mentioned to me some deficiencies that were deficiencies

in his opinion. Most of the deficiencies, in my opinion, that I saw,

were generated through my own experience.

Q What were some of them?

A There wasn't a lot of setback between the main road on the

south and our walls. Our walls were not constructed in the same manner

that you would see at other embassies. The gates were -- did not appear

to be reinforced and did not seem that you could easily get in and out

of them with some of them. There wasn't a Delta barrier. There was

vegetation growing over the walls.

So we didn't have any sort of host-nation security support on the

perimeter. There was only one true wall around the compound, so you

don't -- you didn't have a complete interior wall or at least C-wire

on the inside to prevent people from coming over the -- where the fence

is and advancing, so to speak.

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39

Ms. Jackson. Is that concertina wire?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. C-wire. Razor wire, as I would call it.

Mr. Razor wire.

Ms. Betz. Did you communicate these concerns to Tripoli, to

D.C.?

Mr. I told the desk officer in D.C. as well as the RSO

in Tripoli that I didn't think we could defend it, the compound, and

then the RSO asked for a wish list of security upgrades, which I provided

to him at some point during my time there.

Ms. Betz. Okay. I'm going to enter in exhibit No. 2.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Jackson. Why don't we go off the record because this is

rather lengthy, and it might take awhile to go through it. Take your

time.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. We can take a break.

[Recess.]

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40

Ms. Jackson. We'll go back on the record. It is about 11:23.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

MS. JACKSON:

Q , you have before you now three exhibits

marked 2, 3, and 4.

And, for the record, exhibit 2 is State Department document No.

C05474918. And it is, at the top, an email from dated

August 29, 2012, sent to , and the subject is "Fwd: RSO

Turnover Docs."

Exhibit 3 is a series of pages from State Department document No.

C05578292, and it is a series of pages, at the top dated 8/22/2012,

and has a heading of "Security Requests for U.S. Mission Benghazi."

It's followed by some photographs and then a page marked "Equipment

Requests" and then some -- appears to be spreadsheets of names of agents

and perhaps a diplomatic note in Arabic. And then it appears that all

the pages have been repeated again.

And then exhibit 4 is State Department document No. C05391853,

a document entitled "Regional Security Officer Turnover" notes,

bearing a date of August 28, 2012.

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41

Agent , are you familiar with these documents?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

The email, I read the heading at the top, but it has embedded in

it an email that appears to be from you to on August

27, where you reference that you are attaching four documents to assist

in the turnover.

Are exhibits 2 and 3 comprising what you recall to the best of

your ability the documents that you attached or a version thereof? I'm

sorry, 3 and 4.

A Yes, they are.

Q Okay.

And when you say in your email to on exhibit 2,

"You will find four documents to hopefully assist in the turnover,"

why were you sending them to ?

A He was the acting RSO that was replacing me.

Q Okay. So he was coming in in early September.

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And so did you prepare any of these documents or assist in

preparing any of these documents?

A Yes. All of them.

Q All of them? Okay. And so these would have been the

information that you were conveying to as he was going

to resume the position of the acting RSO.

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42

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. I think that's all the questions I have on these

documents. Our time is now up at the end of 1 hour, so we're going

to turn the questioning over to the minority. Why don't we just go

off the record as we change seats.

[Recess.]

Mr. Kenny. We'll go back on the record. I note the time is

11:28.

Agent , I just want to thank you again for appearing

today. On behalf of the Select Committee's minority staff, I just want

to thank you again for both your service and for appearing here today.

I'll just take a moment to reintroduce myself. My name is Peter

Kenny. I'm a counsel with the Select Committee minority staff. I'm

joined here by some of my colleagues. To my right is our staff

director, Suzanne Sachsman Grooms.

And I just would like to say at the outset here, we understand

that appearing before Congress can seem to be a daunting experience,

so we want to assure you that we'll work with you to make this experience

as straightforward and as simple as possible for you.

We also do understand and want to acknowledge again at the outset

that you and your colleagues lost friends and fellow patriots on the

night of the attacks. So, again, just thank you for your service, and

thank you for being here.

EXAMINATION

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BY MR. KENNY:

Q I'd like to begin briefly returning to the beginning of the

discussion at the last hour. We were talking about your background,

your experiences.

You had indicated that you were contacted by the desk officer for

the position in Benghazi. And I would just like to ask, you were

offered a role in Benghazi, and it sounds like you accepted that role.

Can you just explain for us why you accepted the TDY in Benghazi? What

did you hope to gain through your experience?

A I don't know if there was anything I necessarily hoped to

gain professionally from the experience, but I do enjoy seeing new

cultures, new environments. Benghazi or Libya in itself at that time

was an interesting place based on the revolution. So I can't really

specifically think of a reason why I really wanted to go there, but

I did, and I went.

Q Okay.

You had also mentioned that you had served in a TDY capacity in

Yemen. I'd just like to ask you, where specifically were you posted

in Yemen?

A Sana'a, the capital.

Q And how long was that TDY for, roughly?

A Two and a half months, I think.

Q Okay. And did that TDY precede your time in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall about what the sequence or the timing

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44

was between the two?

A I think there would have been about a year in between, but

I can't remember the exact dates.

Q Okay. That's fine.

And you had mentioned that the desk officer had contacted you

specifically because of your TDY posting to Yemen. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And what was it about that experience, to your

understanding, that would have been helpful for the Benghazi posting?

A Well, Yemen was going through the Arab Spring. They just

were in the process of going through a revolution. It was a dangerous

environment with a terrorist presence and threat there and also

Arab-speaking, so I would assume that there were some similarities in

Yemen to what had happened or was happening in Libya, Benghazi.

Q Okay. And based on the description of your assignment in

Benghazi, also based on your previous experience, did you feel up to

the task at that time?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And just, again, a foundational question. I don't recall if this

was asked of you in the last hour. But what specifically was your role

and your responsibilities in Benghazi?

A In Benghazi, I was the acting RSO, so you're in charge of

the security for the mission and the people in Benghazi. You would

advise the political officer on security issues and then also report

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45

intelligence and security issues to Tripoli. Either they would report

it to Washington or, occasionally, I would report things to the desk

officer in Washington.

Q Okay. Thank you. That's very helpful.

I'd like to shift now and pick a specific point in time. You

mentioned as part of your role as acting RSO that you would report on

the security environment. Are you familiar with the term "emergency

action committees"?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what is an emergency action committee?

A The Emergency Action Committee consists of members of the

embassy community. When there is an emergency or security incident,

the committee will convene and discuss the incident as well as steps

forward either to mitigate the incident or resolve the incident.

Q Okay. And do you recall participating in any Emergency

Action Committee meetings, or EACs -- we'll use the abbreviation

"EAC" -- meetings while you were in Benghazi?

A Yes. I participated in one.

Q Okay. And when did that particular EAC occur, to the best

of your recollection?

A Mid-August, I believe, to -- somewhere between mid-August

and the end of August.

Q Okay. And do you recall who participated in that

particular EAC?

A It was myself, the principal officer,

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46

Q Okay. Did any of the other ARSOs participate in the EAC,

do you recall?

A I don't believe so, but I don't know for certain.

Q Okay. So you recall an EAC in the mid-August timeframe.

Does the date August 15, does that sound about right to you?

A I honestly can't remember. It could be. I don't remember

the specific date, though.

Q Okay. In the run-up to that EAC, was there a specific

incident or a catalyst that caused post to hold that EAC?

A I had reviewed the tripwires we had at post and made some

comments on tripwires I believe we had broached, and I forwarded that

document to the RSO in Tripoli, who shared it with the front office.

I believe the Ambassador then requested that we hold an EAC as a result

of that document.

Q Okay. So you mentioned the front office. By "front

office," do you mean the front office in Tripoli?

A Front office in Tripoli.

Q Okay. Who would that include?

A It would be the DCM and the Ambassador. I don't know if

it was shared with both of them. I just remember it was the front

office.

Q Okay. Thank you. That's helpful.

I think at this point it makes sense to go ahead and enter into

the record exhibit 5.

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47

[ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And for the record, I'll just note that this is an email

from you to , dated August 14, 2012. Subject reads,

quote, "Tripwires," close quote. The document ID is doc No. C05578623.

I'll give you a moment to review this document.

Do you recall this particular document?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And I'll just also note for the record, I had read from the header

of the email. The email indicates that there is an attachment, quote,

"Benghazi assessment of tripwires broached as of August 13.docx," close

quote.

This was produced as part of the same document, so it appears that

the document here is the attachment to this email. Do you agree? Does

this look familiar to you?

A Yeah, it still looks familiar.

Q Okay.

So, within the attachment, which is where I'll focus, there

appears to be a list of tripwires. And under certain tripwires, there

appear to be comments.

And a moment ago you just referred to both the tripwires and the

comments. I just would like to ask, do you see that in this document?

I know the copy is not the best, so I just want to make sure that you're

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48

able to discern the comments from the tripwires.

A Yes, I think I can do that.

Q Okay. And we can help you, as well, here as we work through

this, and I can direct you to some specific portions.

A Your version looks easier to read than mine.

Q When we walk you through it, I'll point out specific

portions for you.

But, first, I'd like take a step back here, because you were

describing a sequence of events that led up to the mid-August Emergency

Action Committee meeting. You had indicated that you had prepared a

set of tripwires and an assessment that was then forwarded on and that

that somehow led to Embassy Tripoli requesting that post hold an EAC.

Is this the set of tripwires and the assessments that you prepared

that led to those events, or led to the EAC?

A They are. But I would clarify that I did not prepare all

these tripwires. We already had this tripwire document. At some

point, I modified the tripwires, in consultation with the PO, to better

reflect the environment at the time. But I definitely wrote the

comments that are highlighted.

Q Okay. So that's helpful. So there was a previous set of

tripwires that was in place, to the best of your recollection?

A Yes.

Q There were. And you mentioned that you had

modified -- we'll just focus on the tripwires for now before moving

to the comments -- that you had modified some of those tripwires. Do

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49

you just generally recall what categories or maybe specific tripwires

that you modified and perhaps why you made those modifications?

A Some of them were not relevant to the current either

political or security environment. For instance, they might have made

reference to, like, a congress or something that was not in formation

anymore. They weren't substantive revisions. They were revisions

just to reflect the current political and security situation.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So we'll note here at the top that this appears to be the

assessment of tripwires broached as of August 13, 2012. When you refer

to modifying the tripwires, were some of the modifications that you

just recalled for us, did those appear to be reflected in this document?

A I can't remember if these modifications were in this

document or a document that we modified after the EAC.

Q Okay. That's fair.

In making the modifications, whether before or after -- you

mentioned you can't recall -- is there some sort of best practices that

guides you to developing them? Do you just use your judgment as an

RSO, in this instance, to do that?

A Well, I consulted with the principal officer, because

typically your creation of tripwires is something that is done more

on the political side of the house as opposed to the security side of

the house. But in reviewing and modifying these tripwires, I was

drawing upon experience with tripwires I had looked at in Yemen, when

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we held EACs there, as well as in .

Q Okay.

And I guess, at this point, it would be helpful just to take a

step back again and just ask what tripwires are, what their role is.

A Okay. Tripwires are lines that are helpful in guiding

decisionmakers to determine if it's appropriate to change, one, the

security posture in country or, two, the footprint of the U.S. Mission

in that country.

Q Okay.

You mentioned a moment ago that you couldn't recall if this

particular set of tripwires reflected modifications that you made.

Looking at these tripwires now, do you think that these tripwires were

tailored to reflect the current conditions in Benghazi at that time?

Let me ask it this way. Do you feel that this set of tripwires

was appropriate for Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Why do you feel that way?

A Well, substantively, these are similar tripwires that you

would see at other places in the world that we use. They're referencing

actions that you may want to take if you have restricted freedom of

movement, if there are disruptions to infrastructure, if there are

weaknesses or deficiencies in the police or security services in the

country. I don't see anything on here that seems out of place.

Q Did you feel that this specific set of tripwires captured

the range of relevant security concerns that one could face in Benghazi?

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A Yes.

Q Okay.

The tripwires -- we'll refer to the document now -- appear to be

organized in three categories. The first one is, quote, "events

triggering a heightened security posture," close quote; the second one,

quote, "events triggering consideration of authorized departure,"

close quote; and, third, quote, "events triggering consideration of

ordered departure," close quote.

Can you just explain the meaning of each of those categories?

A "Heightened security posture" would mean that you would

not -- American personnel under chief of mission authority would not

be leaving the country, but you may increase your security posture.

For instance, perhaps you restrict movements or creates guard presence

or police presence.

"Authorized departure" would be voluntary departure for certain

noncritical members of the embassy community.

And "ordered departure" would be mandatory departure for

noncritical members of the embassy community.

Q Okay. And could you just elaborate further on what is meant

by "critical" versus "noncritical"?

A Critical members of the embassy community would be your

security personnel, your front office, your political section.

Typically, your consular section is critical. Your communications is

critical, the management officer. I'm sure I'm forgetting others, but

that's the ones I can remember.

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Q Sure. Is it fair to say that the three of these categories

here, that they fall along a continuum from less serious to more

serious?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

The latter two categories, both refer and use the term

"consideration." So they say, events triggering consideration of

either authorized or ordered departure. Can you explain for us what

your understanding of that term is in this context?

A Well, the EAC will convene, and they will consider the

tripwires and which tripwires may have been broached. And then that

is presented to the front office, who, in coordination with

headquarters, determines whether or not to go on authorized departure

or ordered departure, for example.

So it's a consideration that post isn't making the specific

decision whether or not to go on one of these departures but is providing

that information to decisionmakers in headquarters, in consultation

with the Ambassador, about the appropriate step to take.

Q And would that decisionmaking process, would that include

input from the RSO?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

We'll refer now to some of the specific comments in here. So

these are underneath -- the best of our understanding is there are going

to be dashes on the left side, and then, where there's text below, it

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appears to be a comment. And there is some highlighting, but, again,

the copying and the way the documents were produced, it's a little bit

of a challenge to discern.

I'd just like to refer you -- we'll go under, first, the

"authorized departure" section, the very last tick. There's a quote

there that reads, quote, "Security forces appear unable/unwilling to

proactively address U.S. Mission Benghazi security needs. SSC members

have not been paid and have ceased showing up at the U.S. Mission. RSO

requests for a police presence outside the mission have gone unanswered

thus far. Host-nation security does not appear to have the

ability/desire to prevent/mitigate threats against the mission," close

quote.

And I'll just note that that comment appears to be repeated in

various places throughout this document. I'd just like to ask you,

these repeated references to the willingness and the capacity of the

host-nation security forces to assist the mission, is that a topic that

you closely tracked?

A Yes. I mean, I wrote this statement that you just read.

Q Okay. So you were generally aware of --

A Yes.

Q Okay. And can you just explain for us what steps you were

taking or others at the mission were taking to address those concerns?

A I had tried to get a contact within the Libyan security

apparatus that I could liaise with, which is typical for RSOs wherever

they're posted around the world, and I had been unable to do that. I

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had requested police presence through a diplomatic note, but that had

gone unanswered. I was resorting to, you know, flagging police cars

down and talking to them to try and get them to stay, and that didn't

seem to work.

There wasn't any sort of information-sharing, which is typical,

or at least in my experience has been typical, at other embassies or

consulates. Where, you know, we provide law enforcement security

information to the host nation, they would then, in return, supply us

information.

And then just the incident -- the fact that the prior incident

we had with the gelatina or alleged gelatina bomb at the mission had

not been resolved, and it did not appear that local law enforcement

was actively pursuing investigation of that, as well as their inability

to pursue the possible hostile surveillance incident that was outside

our south gate.

All those things I just mentioned led me to believe that they

didn't have the ability/desire to prevent/mitigate threats.

Q Okay.

And you mentioned in the last hour, I think, some of the steps

that you were taking to mitigate the lack of the capacity or the

willingness. Could you explain further what steps the mission took

to address specifically those concerns?

A Well, because we couldn't count on the host-nation security

to provide us any sort of security support, we were forced to look

inward, to depend on ourselves. So we increased our training with the

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QRF as well as the guard force.

We took some creative steps as far as physical security went -- for

instance, erecting a, sort of, makeshift chicane outside the north

gates or at least the main gate.

Q Thank you. That's helpful.

I'll refer you to, real quickly as we move through this document,

the middle of the first page of the assessments. There is a tripwire

that reads, quote, "armed attacks on political candidates or election

commission offices," close quote. Then underneath it says, quote --

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. We're in the "events triggering a

heightened security posture" section.

Mr. Oh, okay. I see it.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And it reads, quote, "There have been a spate of

attacks/assassinations/kidnappings on former Qadhafi loyalists in the

past month," close quote.

Regarding attacks, assassinations, kidnappings, that's another

theme that seems to run throughout this document. What can you tell

us about those events?

A I would say that, according to my memory, it was almost a

daily occurrence, or at least a couple times a week, where there was

an attack, assassination attempt, or kidnapping attempt on various

Libyans within the Benghazi area.

Q Was your sense that that particular string of events was

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targeting mostly Libyan nationals at that time?

A No. There were kidnappings of non-Libyans, I believe the

Red Crescent. There were some Iranians that were kidnapped. And I

believe there was an American, maybe a dual-national, lady that was

kidnapped at one point.

Also, I can't state for certain that this happened while I was

there or just prior to when I got there. I would have to look at a

list of the incidents.

Q Okay.

So you mentioned a kidnapping of some Iranian ICRC members as well

as possibly a dual-national. Were any of those kidnappings, that

violence -- to the best of your recollection, were any of those events

being directed towards Westerners because of their Western

affiliation?

A Not that I know of, no.

Q Okay.

Just flipping back to the cover email here, you indicate in the

body of this email, quote, "My comments are in yellow in the attached

document. Perhaps we can use some of these as talking points in the

EAC," close quote.

And, again, you are writing to the principal officer here --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- when you said that.

The "EAC," again, refers to the Emergency Action Committee

meeting. And you mentioned that you personally attended that EAC

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meeting. Was this document used in the EAC?

A I can't say for certain. I most likely would have brought

this with me, but I can't say for certain that we used it.

Q Okay.

A I can say we certainly touched upon themes within this

document.

Q Okay. Do you recall specifically discussing whether any

tripwires had been broached or crossed in the EAC?

A I don't remember, no.

Q Okay. Do you recall if the EAC determined that any specific

tripwires had in fact been broached or crossed?

A I don't remember.

Q Okay.

What was your role in the EAC as the acting RSO?

A My role was to share some of the security concerns I had

with the embassy community, as small as it was, and see if there were

others that were sharing those concerns or if they had ways that we

could perhaps mitigate some of those concerns.

Q And you mentioned a few moments ago some of the participants

in the EAC. Is it fair to say that the EAC brings together the relevant

security experts and decisionmakers at posts to make decisions?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

To the best of your recollection, did the EAC discuss the security

situation in Benghazi?

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A Yes.

Q Okay. How carefully or closely did the EAC consider the

security situation in Benghazi?

A Very carefully.

Q All right. Do you recall sharing specific concerns in the

EAC?

A Yes.

Q What were those?

A I recall being concerned that I didn't have a host-nation

security contact that I could liaise with. I was concerned that we

would not be able to defend our compound, the Embassy compound, for

a variety of reasons.

I was concerned that it was becoming more dangerous in Benghazi,

and, although we weren't specifically being targeted, I was worried

we might be in the wrong place at the wrong time, so to speak, and be

a victim of violence.

Q Okay. When you say "wrong place at the wrong time," are

you referring to off-compound moves?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Can you just share with us generally -- you had raised these

concerns. Was there a discussion about the concerns?

A Yes, there was discussion about the concerns.

Q How would you characterize that?

A A robust discussion about the concerns.

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Q And they sound like they were serious concerns that you

raised.

A Yes, they were serious.

One of the other members of the EAC said they didn't -- if I

remember correctly, they said they didn't think it was likely that I

would be able to find a host-nation security liaison.

Q And why was that?

A Either there wasn't one or they wouldn't have had the

ability to or the power to do anything in that fractured environment

even if I had wanted them to.

Q And when you say "host-nation liaison," are you referring

to a specific subcomponent of the government -- the Ministry of the

Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? You referred to some other

elements earlier, such as the Supreme Security Committee.

A Uh-huh.

Q Did you have contacts with any of those entities?

A I didn't have any contacts with any of them.

Q Okay.

So there was a discussion, a robust discussion, to use your term,

within the EAC. Did the EAC discuss what potential course of action

the mission should take with respect to its security?

A There was a discussion that, if we thought the security

situation trended negatively enough,

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Q Okay. And I think we'll flesh that out in a few moments,

but were there any specific recommendations that came out of the EAC,

do you recall?

A I believe that we determined that we would send some of our

physical security recommendations to Embassy Tripoli.

Also, could I clarify the previous question?

Q Uh-huh.

A I didn't have a direct contact with host-nation security,

but through February 17, they were our liaison to the February 17

militia leader, brigade commander.

Q That's a helpful clarification. I think you also mentioned

that there were some locally employed staff on the compound, as well.

Did they also help facilitate your contacts with --

A I mean, they tried, but they didn't get an answer.

Q Okay. Is that just because you didn't hear anything

specific in response from the staff, or they told you specifically they

couldn't find anybody to contact, for instance?

A No. They submitted our DIP notes; they just didn't get a

response.

Q Okay. You did mention, though, at one point, that there

was a DIP note that was submitted and there was some response to that,

though. Is that correct?

A I don't know if I could say that that police presence that

showed up was a response to that DIP note.

Q Okay. But did the timing of it suggest that it was somehow

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a response? Did you submit a response one day and the next day a police

unit showed up?

A I don't remember, but I don't think it was the next day that

it would've showed up, no. And when it did show up, it certainly didn't

show up in the capacity that we asked for, which was 24/7 support.

Q I'd like to go ahead and mark exhibit 6.

[ Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And I'll give you a moment to review that. As I do, I'm

just going to read a brief description of this into the record.

This is an email from you to , dated August 15, 2012.

The subject is, quote, "Re: 8/15 update," close quote. Document No.

is C05578627.

There is an email embedded within exhibit 6 at the bottom. It's

from to Gregory Hicks and . It appears

to be forwarded from Gregory Hicks to and then on to you.

Do you recall this email exchange?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And in case we haven't already touched on it, who

is ?

A He is the RSO -- was the RSO in Tripoli.

Q Okay. And is the principal officer in

Benghazi?

A Yes.

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Q And who is ?

A I can't remember her specific title, but she was a

high-ranking person, I believe, in D.C. that asked me to

occasionally send emails to.

Q So, in this underlying email, I'll just quote from a portion

of it. And I'm on the second page. Here the principal officer appears

to summarize the Emergency Action Committee meeting that appears to

have been held in the mid-August time period. He states the following:

Quote, "We convened the EAC today, including all USG elements present,

to review the situation and security posture. Will write up the

minutes on the high side, but, briefly, we: agreed to review/revise

the existing tripwires which date to before the elections to reflect

present concerns; concluded the situation merits concern and prudent

risk management, particularly in light of recent incidents involving

internationals as well as locals advocating priority issues such as

human rights and women's participation; recommended continued

heightened security measures now in place," close quote.

And then, dropping down to the next bullet, it says, quote,

"recommended expansion of some precautionary measures," close quote.

The next bullet, quote, "agreed to request a number of specific

items/actions which we will spell out in the cable; and agreed to meet

at least weekly in the future in light of the pace of developments on

the ground," close quote.

The Tripoli RSO writes to you, quote -- this is farther up in the

chain -- "Did you see this email? Do you concur? I don't see any RSO

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comments," close quote.

You then responded, quote, "I'm actually writing the EAC cable

today, although the computer problems here are frustrating our efforts

of completing it in a timely manner. I do agree with the comments

highlighted in this email," close quote.

I would just like to first ask, recognizing the EAC documents off

the cable is classified, as for this unclassified email, the principal

officer's descriptions that I read to you of the recommendations that

came out of that EAC, is that accurate?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And so his descriptions of decisions that were made

and some of the materials discussed in the EAC is accurate?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

We were talking a moment ago about some of the recommendations

that came out of the EAC. You had mentioned -- sending physical

security requests to Tripoli was one of the examples you gave.

We would like to ask you, did the EAC recommend that posts should

be closed or evacuated?

A Not that I recall, no.

Q Okay. And do you recall why that recommendation wasn't

made?

A I remember there was discussion that we couldn't draw down

any more than we were, or else the post would no longer be operationally

effective.

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Q Okay. And can you just elaborate a little further on that

remark?

A Uh-huh. Well, if you withdrew the political officer, there

would be no reason for us to be there, because they're the ones doing

the reporting and the actual diplomacy.

If you started to take away some of the DS personnel, which are

actually, you know, considered critical members of the mission, then

you would have -- I would always have some security concerns moving

about the city.

If you withdraw the IMO, or the management officer, you lose some

of your administrative abilities. Or you don't lose them; they become

much harder.

Q Okay.

A So I would say we were operating at a barebones --

Q Uh-huh. So that there couldn't be a further drawdown, for

instance.

A Not in my opinion.

Q Okay.

And was the recommendation, was this recommendation, the other

recommendations of the EAC, was that unanimous among the participants

there?

A Yes. I don't remember anyone having any disagreements with

these recommendations.

Q Okay.

The summary prepared by the principal officer discussed -- and

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I read through, there were six bullets there, including, you know, the

situation merits concern and prudent risk management. There's a

recommendation for continued heightened security as well as an

expansion of some of the precautionary measures.

Can you just walk us through, to the best of your recollection,

what each of those mean?

A Each one of these bullets?

Q So we could focus -- because I believe we already

talked -- the first refers to tripwires.

A Uh-huh.

Q So maybe with the second, third, and fourth.

A Well, the second one is talking about risk management and

monitoring the situation, which was not something that we needed to

change. We were already doing that pretty aggressively.

The third one recommended continued heightened security

measures. That's almost sort of a boilerplate statement that you would

recommend after any sort of EAC, which doesn't mean that we weren't

doing it. We were.

Expanding some of the precautionary measures,

. Reduction of classified materials was

already minimum. And

we did map areas of particular concern within Benghazi.

The next bullet, agreeing to request specific items, actions --

Q And you --

A Go ahead.

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Q No, please continue.

A Oh. We did send requests for security upgrades or security

recommendations by separate cover, I believe, from that cable. So we

did that one.

And agreed to meet at least weekly, depending on what was

happening on the ground. We had a close relationship with ,

and we were, at the very least, meeting weekly with them.

Q Okay. Thank you. That's very helpful.

At some point down the road, we may return to revisit the

discussion in Benghazi.

A Uh-huh.

Q You mentioned just a moment ago that one of the specific

activities was mapping areas of concern. Can you just explain why you

did that? Was that, for instance, to assist your off-compound moves

to avoid certain problematic areas?

A Yes. In general, there were certain areas that we were

concerned with, based on who was occupying those areas, and so we

obviously did not want to be driving near or around those areas. I

can speak more in detail in a classified setting.

Q Okay.

On that point, I'll just note, back to the top of exhibit 6, you

do state, quote, "I would caution that this is just a small part of

what was discussed at the EAC today and arguably not the most meaty

parts. I think you'll find the EAC draft cable I'm writing will present

a more robust view of the security situation here as well as the next

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steps," close quote.

I assume when you refer to the more "meaty parts," did you mean

you were going to provide more detail regarding some of the security

specifics in a classified EAC cable?

A I think what I meant is that political officers will look

at an EAC from a political standpoint, and security officers would look

at it from a security standpoint. So what I would consider meaty would

be more of the security issues, which is what was included in my side

cable -- my thoughts on the security situation, our abilities to

mitigate those threats, and then what those specific threats were.

Q Okay. And when you say "political," do you mean some of

the undercurrents or underlying causes of those security incidents?

A Yes. Well, I mean, a political officer, an economic

officer is looking at a situation from one particular lens. It's not

the right or wrong lens, it's just that's the lens they look at it

through, where a security officer is looking at it through a security

lens. And they may just -- you know, I don't want to say disagree,

but, I guess, disagree over what the most important part of the message

was, I guess.

Q Okay. And do you recall whether a cable was ultimately

written --

A Yes --

Q -- on this?

A -- I wrote it.

Q Okay, you wrote that. Did you clear that with the principal

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officer?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So when you mentioned that there may be different

perspectives at the table, did that cable reflect a consensus view of

both the security concerns, security issues, as well as the

recommendations of the EAC?

A Yes, as well as it reflected the, sort of, political

situation on the ground.

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Mr. Kenny. Okay. And just to be clear, did it reflect your

views?

Mr. Yes.

Mr. Kenny. On the ground. You mentioned you drafted the cable.

Mr. Yes, it did reflect my views.

Mr. Kenny. Moving on, I'd like to mark exhibit 7.

[ Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q This is an email from you to . It's dated

August 16, 2012. The subject is, quote, "RE: EAC cable," close quote.

The document No. is C05397233. It is marked unclassified. Give you

a moment to review it.

So I would just like to start from the bottom of the email and

read up. In an earlier email in this thread, you write to

and stated the following, quote, "Boss, I just forwarded the draft EAC

cable to you on the high side," close quote.

The Tripoli RSO then responded to you, quote, "Thank you for doing

that. It was well done. The DCM responded with some questions," close

quote.

And, finally, you replied, quote, "We have revised some of the

wording in response to their questions, and I believe Tripoli will make

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the revisions to push it out. And there's a parenthetical, if this

is not the case, please let me know so I can make the revisions," close

quote.

Do you recall this email exchange?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And just can you help us understand, you mentioned

here that you submitted a draft of the EAC cable to Tripoli RSO; was

that requested of you? Was that standard practice? Why did you send

it to the Tripoli RSO?

A Well, we were drafting the cable, but for the cable to go

out, it needs the approval of various other people. The RSO is one

of them, but ultimately the front office has to sign off on it before

it can go out. As to why they were sending it out, we didn't have the

SMART cable system in Benghazi that would enable us to send it out,

so we had to send a draft cable to them.

Q Okay. And, again, when you refer to "front office," you're

referring to certain individuals at Embassy Tripoli?

A Yes. The front office is the DCM and the Ambassador.

Q Okay. The RSO's response to you, the RSO in Tripoli's

response to you indicated that the DCM had responded with some

questions. When he refers to the DCM, who is that referring to? Who

was the DCM at the time?

A I believe it was Gregory Hicks.

Q Okay. And, again, here it indicates that the DCM responded

with some questions. Do you recall what questions DCM Greg Hicks posed

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for you?

A I remember one of the questions. I don't remember if it

was the DCM or Ambassador who posed the question, but I do remember

one of the questions.

Q Okay. And what was that question that you remember?

A We should probably speak about that in classified --

Q Okay.

A -- I think.

Q Maybe this will help facilitate our discussion.

So, before we move on, just a minor bit of housekeeping, a

follow-up question in our discussion of what occurred or transpired

in the EAC. You had mentioned that there was not a specific

recommendation for post, for the special mission to close or be

evacuated. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Did anyone make that recommendation at the EAC?

A No. I don't believe so.

Q Okay. So when the EAC did not make a recommendation that

post should be evacuated or closed, did you agree with the omission

of that recommendation?

A The -- in my experience, the RSO typically doesn't make the

decision whether or not we stay or leave a post or why we're even at

that post in the first place. We do what D.C. and the Ambassador tell

us to do and, you know, make the best of whatever situation we have.

Q But certainly if the security situation had degraded to such

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a point, would the RSO have been empowered to make such a

recommendation?

A Certainly.

Q Okay. And, in this instance, did the RSO or anyone in the

RSO shop make that recommendation?

A I don't know if the RSO made that recommendation. On

previous conversations with me, he said that he was not happy that we

were in Benghazi. Whether or not he shared that with the front office,

I couldn't say.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q But you didn't?

A I did not, no.

Q And did you feel that the security situation in Benghazi

had gotten so bad that you needed to leave?

A No. I wouldn't put it that way.

Q Did you feel that the recommended next steps that came out

of that EAC, did you agree with those?

A Yes, I agreed with them.

Q And you thought that those would mitigate the danger?

A They would certainly make our situation safer, in my

opinion. I don't know if they ultimately would have changed anything,

any of the outcomes that happened there.

Mr. Kenny. I see we have a few moments left. I'd like to move

forward and introduce, this will be exhibit 8, into the record.

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[ Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Kenny. We can go off the record for a moment.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q This is exhibit 8. It is marked unclassified at the top

and appears to have gone through some sort of review process. It does

have redactions. It is marked unclassified/noforn, so we will note

that for the record.

The top of the email is from Christopher Stevens, it's to you,

Gregory Hicks and . Doc No. Is C05391814. We'd just

like to read a brief portion of this and ask for your response. This

appears to be an outgrowth of the thread we just read in exhibit 7.

You can see the email below. Well, I apologize. Actually, this is

a new thread. This is similar to other documents.

Here Gregory Hicks writes to you at the bottom, "Thanks, .

I had a couple of questions and a couple of suggested edits. Looping

in the Ambassador," close quote.

And then the Ambassador responds and says, "Good cable."

And a little bit below that, "concur in Greg's question re the

term 'terrorist organizations,'" close quote.

A little bit above that, there's an email from you to Chris

Stevens, Greg Hicks, . And it reads, In lieu of terrorist

organizations, what if we try to capture the spectrum of actors here

with criminal elements, Islamist militias, and violent extremists.

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And then it is marked there.

And then, finally, there's a response from Christopher Stevens

that reads, quote, "perfect," close quote.

We were briefly talking about how you would send a draft cable

to Tripoli for their review, their approval. This appears to be some

specific feedback that you received from Tripoli from the Deputy Chief

of Mission. And I would just -- does this help refresh your

recollection of what the specific edit that the Deputy Chief of Mission

made to your draft EAC?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what was that edit?

A The major point, as I understood it, was I had referred to

a certain group as a terrorist organization, and the front office didn't

necessarily agree that that was the correct classification for that

organization.

Q And, again, when you say, "front office," where are you

referring to?

A The DCM and the Ambassador.

Q Okay. And so there was a disagreement over whether

"terrorist organizations" was the appropriate term to use in the EAC

cable. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. All right. Do you know the basis for that concern?

A Can -- could you ask that a different way, maybe?

Q Yeah. And perhaps we can reserve some of this for later

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this afternoon, but I guess we can just fast forward and ask, do you

recall if that specific edit was made to the EAC cable?

A Yes, it was.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Was the concern with using the term "terrorist

organization" that that specific group was not a designated terrorist

organization?

A Yes.

Q And who are terrorist organizations designated by?

A The Department of State.

Q Okay. So there's some specific list of groups, and that

group was not on it?

A That was my understanding, yes.

Q Okay. And so, in lieu of using the term "terrorist

organization," they went with criminal elements, Islamist militias,

and violent extremists? Is that accurate?

A Yes. And maybe the final cable has slightly different

wording than that, but it would be that sense.

Q And that would have described fundamentally the same -- the

same thing?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Is there, in your view, a significant difference

between describing it as a terrorist organization or a violent

extremist, Islamist militia?

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A Not in -- not in my opinion, not from a security standpoint.

Mr. Kenny. And, just finally, I see we are running low on time,

the second email here ends, , though it appears to have been sent

from your email alias. It says above. Do you recall

why or what that means?

Mr. Can we do one off the record?

Mr. Kenny. Sure. We can go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Kenny. We will go back on the record. And just to reiterate,

the question had been posed about what appears to be initials, ,

at the bottom of an email sent from your email account. And we've asked

what your understanding of what that was or why that came to be.

Mr. So we had one classified laptop in Benghazi. And

I was logged in and writing -- or reading the responses from the front

office. And I had asked to read it as well for his insight and

then I asked him to -- since he was assisting me with it, to respond

since it was from the Ambassador, and I thought it would be more

appropriate for the principal officer to respond to the Ambassador.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Did you -- I mean, did you read it at the

time?

Mr. I was sitting in the -- right there with him.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Okay. And did you agree with it?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Okay.

Mr. Kenny. Thank you. That concludes our hour. We'll go off

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the record.

[Recess.]

Ms. Betz. The time is 1:31. Glad you're back with us.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q In the last hour, we discussed tripwires, and I was curious

as to whether or not D.C., whether it was or somebody at

NEA, was aware of possible tripwires being crossed and the need to have

them reviewed?

A I'm almost positive that that tripwire document with my

revisions on it went to the -- went to .

Q Do you know of any discussions about drawdown occurring in

D.C. around that time?

A Drawdown in Benghazi or in Tripoli?

Q Benghazi.

A I do not know.

Q In the last hour --

Ms. Jackson. What about Tripoli?

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Oh. Tripoli.

A I don't know that.

Q No. Go ahead.

A I was just saying because we had established that it would

be difficult to drawdown anymore in Benghazi, I don't perceive that

being a discussion.

Q In the last hour, you also talked about tripwires being

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politically driven versus more security driven. I just wanted you to

elaborate more on that. Doesn't it seem sort of contrary to the point

of tripwires, which seem more security driven?

A I don't know if I would say that they're more politically

driven, but -- and there are certain -- certainly tripwires that are

security related or provided by the security people at post, so a lot

of the tripwires relate to the political environment where, you know,

other members, including the security people at post, just wouldn't

have the same sort of in-depth background that the political officers

would have.

Q And when you talk about political environment for Benghazi,

would that be the benefits of being in Benghazi?

A I'm sorry. Say it again one more time.

Q So, in terms of being politically driven and being concerned

about the political environment, for Benghazi, would that political

lens be focused more on the benefits of being in Benghazi, the need

to be in Benghazi?

A I'm sorry. Is there a way you could ask it a different way?

Q Sure. Was, for example, the PO, -- I mean,

his purpose in being there was to really communicate what was going

on sort of politically, economically in Benghazi, the point -- the

benefits of being in Benghazi.

A I don't know if he was communicating the benefits of being

in Benghazi. I don't remember seeing anything like that. But he's

certainly communicating, you know, the security situation, the

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political situation, basic, you know, diplomatic programs that we would

run there back to Washington and Tripoli.

Ms. Jackson. So when you say "political environment," are you

referring to the civility of the Libyan government or are you talking

about the need for U.S. diplomacy in that area, or some combination

thereof of the two of them?

Mr. . Some --

Mr. Evers. Are we still talking about tripwires?

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Ms. Betz. Yes.

Mr. Evers. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. Evers. I just wanted to make sure.

Mr. . The -- in answer to your question, he would have

been saying, one, yes, what was the political situation in

Tripoli -- or, sorry -- in Benghazi, in the country, and also what are

some of the benefits of us being in Benghazi? He would have reported

on that and his opinions on that. I don't necessarily know if those

are reflected in the tripwires.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So going back to -- staying sort of on the tripwire theme,

going back to exhibit 5 --

A Okay.

Q -- the document, I believe, that you edited. Correct? Was

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it your opinion that specific tripwires had been crossed?

A Yes.

Q And in your -- let me ask it this way. In your opinion,

what should happen when tripwires are crossed?

A You should hold an EAC meeting, and then the results of that

discussion should be forwarded to the front office, who -- as also as

well as D.C. through a cable, and they make a decision based on your

recommendations and what was the information you provided to them, to

the EAC.

Ms. Betz. So I'm going to hand you now what will be exhibit 9.

[ Exhibit No. 9

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. And for the record, the document that the witness is

reviewing is State Department document No. C05397236. And it is titled

"Mission Libya Tripwires, updated as of August 13, 2012." And I'll

give you a moment to review it.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So this document differs than the previous tripwire

document that we discussed in that it has certain measures to consider

under each of the sort of the categories of different security postures

or positions. Were these measures to consider preexisting your

tenure?

A I believe they were, but I would have taken them out, because

the purpose of my email was just to alert those that needed to know

that I thought we'd crossed some of the tripwires, and they didn't

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necessarily need to know what measures to consider.

Q On the bottom of page 3, there is a paragraph or a bullet,

and it says, consideration of, quote, "suspended operations," and it

reads, "U.S. mission Benghazi is staffed solely with mission critical

personnel and as such cannot draw down further while remaining

operational. Therefore, post has added a suspended operations

category to the tripwire matrix. Under this scenario, post would stop

all movement outside the mission. Meetings with host nation could

continue, but must be conducted at the mission only."

Was this a category or a measure to consider that was part of the

EAC discussion, or was it an outcome of the EAC?

A It -- I could say it was certainly an outcome of the EAC.

I don't remember if it was discussed in the EAC.

Q Could you clarify?

A When I say "outcome," I don't know if this was brought up,

this suspended operations category, was brought up in the EAC or

would have brought it up after the EAC in discussion with the front

office in Tripoli.

Q So was this a measure that you were aware of or had discussed

with --

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you agreed with the consensus -- or the addition

of a suspended operations?

A Yes.

Q How would the suspended operations be any different

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than -- let's say, for example, with previous incidents either in

Benghazi or Tripoli, the compound went sort of, I don't want to say

lockdown, but for lack of a better way to describe it, off-campus or

off-compound movements were curtailed. Would this be the same type

of procedure, or how does this differ than what typically would happen

if there were incidents in which caused the compound to limit its

off-campus -- or off-compound movement?

A Typically when you go on what you would label as lockdown,

you know, that's for --

Q Sorry. It's fresh in mind because we just went on lockdown,

or the Capitol did.

A It would be for a finite period of time --

Q Okay.

A -- so maybe a couple hours or maybe a couple days, something

like that. Typically, the authorized -- these categories, the

authorized departure and ordered departure are for, like, 30-day

periods. So my assumption would be if we were to do suspended

operations, that would mean more than just 2 hours or a day, and maybe

a 30-day chunk of time.

Q So for an extended period of time?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. And was this term, "suspended operations,"

something that you had encountered prior to Benghazi in the course of

your Diplomatic Security career?

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Mr. No, it was not.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Had you ever -- during your training as an

agent or in your high-threat training, had this concept been discussed?

What I'm getting at, was this new and novel, or had you been trained

to consider this?

Mr. It wasn't new and novel in that I think it was

explained to me they had done something similar to this, I believe when

they had the previous gelatina bomb incident at the front gate and they

had labeled it as suspended operations, but, no, in my training and

experience, I had not seen a suspended operations category before.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Would it be something that you contemplated?

A I'm sorry. Would what be --

Q In your previous positions, I mean, is this suspended

operations something that you would have contemplated?

A Well, we -- I had been to places where we had done lockdown,

so to speak, for a set period of time, and this seems like a logical

outflow of that idea.

Q So staying with the EAC, in the last hour, one of the items

that you had mentioned that was discussed . Was that

something that was immediate, that could happen immediately?

A Yes.

if we felt the security situation warranted it.

Q You also discussed briefly that the RSO in Tripoli,

, was unhappy about being in Benghazi. Do you remember having

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that conversation with him about evacuation?

A At one point I forwarded our -- the copy of our evacuation

plan, and I believe it was to him and he had asked for it.

Q Did he review the plan, then?

A I don't know.

Q Did you review it?

A Yes.

Q And what were your thoughts on the plan?

A It seemed like it was a logical plan. I've never -- I mean,

any time you do an evacuation, it's probably not going to go down just

how it is laid out in the plan, but the basic plan, the ideas, the

strategy in that plan seemed sound.

Q Were you concerned about a strike at the airport so that

there was only really one sort of viable plan at the time? Was a plan

B being contemplated?

A Let me break that up into two sections. So, first, yes,

we're always concerned with any sort of airport closure or rumor of

an airport closure because it affects your freedom of movement,

obviously. In this case, I don't know if we ever got confirmation that

the airport was closed or it was just rumors at that point. I don't

recall the airport closing and affecting our airport operations.

The second question -- oh, the second part of that is if the

airport was closed, we would still have multiple options for getting

out of the country, including an overland route to Egypt, water route

out of the port, or flying in either military aid, we could also

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charter -- well, I think there's only one airport in Benghazi, so we

wouldn't be able to charter, but flying in military assistance or, you

know, the full-blown MEU, if it was necessitated, with Marines.

Q For the record purposes, what does MEU standpoint?

A Marine Expeditionary Unit.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. And that's an exfiltration plan?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. They basically drop in, scoop you up and get you

out of there?

Mr. They drop in, cut a swath to the Embassy, and then

cut a swath back out.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Were you aware of a memorandum that was being drafted for

the secretary at the time regarding security incidents in Libya?

A I don't believe so, no.

Q So you weren't asked to -- you weren't asked for your input

from an on-the-ground perspective as to what was going on?

A Can you -- I don't think so, but are there any more details

that you have about this memo?

Q So there was a memo that was being drafted and --

Ms. Jackson. Well, you know what? Let's mark it and ask him if

he ever saw it. Oh, never mind.

Ms. Betz. Yeah.

Ms. Jackson. Next session.

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Ms. Betz. I can elaborate later. So I just generally wanted to

ask about your awareness?

Ms. Jackson. See, mine's not so good.

Mr. Well, generally, then, I am not aware. Maybe if

there were more specifics, I would be aware.

Ms. Betz. Okay. And we can do that in a different setting.

I think this is a good opportunity to segue into or to restart

our discussions, you had mentioned in the EAC issues about the compound

not being able to defend itself. We ended during our last hour talking

about physical security vulnerabilities of the compound, and we had

asked -- or put into the record a document that I believe that you had

put together.

Mr. Evers. Exhibits 2 and 3?

Ms. Betz. Exhibits 2 and 3, yes.

Ms. Jackson. Two, 3 and 4.

Ms. Betz. Two, 3 and 4, yes. I'm looking at exhibit 3 right now.

Thank you.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And just to refresh our memory, we had talked a little bit

previously about the physical security vulnerabilities of the

compound, one being its vastness, 13 acres, issues with the fence and

the wall, among others. I don't know if you want to elaborate again.

A Not if I don't have to.

Q Okay. That's fine. That's fine.

So you had drafted a list of physical security upgrades. To whom

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were those submitted?

A They were sent to the RSO in Tripoli and also to , who

was my replacement in Benghazi.

Q And was it your opinion that had all of these security

upgrades occurred, would the post would have been OBO compliant?

A I definitely wouldn't be able to answer that. There's a

lot that goes into OBO compliance.

Q Well, let me ask you another. Would it have met minimum

security standards?

Mr. Evers. What minimum security standards?

Ms. Betz. Just vis-à-vis other posts that he has --

Mr. Evers. I don't know if you're referring -- you just referred

to specific OBO standards, and I don't know if you're meaning to refer

to specific standards by when you say "minimum standards."

Ms. Betz. Well, let me rephrase.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Would those have made -- would -- if all of these upgrades

occurred, would that have made the compound able to withstand -- defend

itself, to use your words?

A I think it would have made -- it would have been safer, but

I can't say for certain that if all these upgrades were in, the results

would not have been the same.

Q And to your knowledge, what -- were you aware of any of these

upgrades occurring or being contemplated while you were there or while

you were leaving?

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A Are you talking about just the physical security or all of

them?

Q Well, I mean, I was going to get to some of the technical

upgrades as well. We can go down the list. I can ask you if certain

things had been approved or not approved.

A The only -- I -- the only thing that I know that we had -- we

were working on actively, because it was something we could actually

do at post, was the creation of sort of this safe haven office villa,

which is under the physical security section, bullet nine, and also

under equipment requests, bullet one, Tripoli had sent us -- Embassy

Tripoli had sent us an engineer, who was attempting to fix some of these

power issues for us. But the rest are things that I had requested,

and I don't know which ones might have been forwarded on from Tripoli

for action.

Q And why do you believe there were some of these

vulnerabilities? Why, in your opinion, would D.C. or whomever not

employ or install these features initially at the facility?

A I don't know if I can answer why they weren't installed

initially. I would have to assume that a decision was made that it

was important that we were in Benghazi at that particular time, and

that outweighed having some of the maybe traditional security features

we would find at other embassies and consulates.

Why we continued to not have them, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't be

able to answer that. I don't know.

Q Was funding an issue? Were you aware of cost concerns?

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A In a limited capacity, I was -- I was aware of cost concerns.

We had difficulty, I believe, getting funding for some things, and we

were going off of a $500 limit for petty cash funds, I believe, to do

some of our projects, but as far as a larger funding issue, I don't

know.

Q Did anyone ever suggest that you should temper your

expectations as to requests made of D.C.?

A Yes. I remember hearing that. I don't remember how I

heard that, maybe where I read it, but for whatever reason, I had the

understanding that we -- that post had an uncertain future, maybe would

be closing soon, and therefore, we may not get expensive security

upgrades. I don't know if that's because I was told that or because

I had read something where previous RSOs or DS agents had tried to get

those things and it was declined.

Q So there was an unspoken or -- thought amongst many that

the facility was temporary in nature and/or would not support upgrades?

Mr. Evers. Is that what you meant to say?

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Is that what you meant to say?

A I can't say amongst many. I can say for me, and I don't -- I

don't remember why I thought this, but that it was a temporary facility

and that requests for funding for security upgrades may not be

forthcoming due to the nature of the temporary facility.

Q Okay. Just going back to the technical equipment and some

of the vulnerabilities there, were you aware of requests made by ARSO

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as to the need to upgrade the IDNS systems, issues with old

pendants for the IDNS, replacement camera, monitors?

A Yes.

Q Yes. And were those requests fulfilled?

A I know we had new cameras that we had received. They

weren't installed yet, at least at the time of me leaving. I don't

know if -- I can't remember if those were in response to him asking

for these cameras or something separate.

Q Okay. And we --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q What was the issue with the IDNS pendants?

A I believe it was typically when your IDNS is pushed, if you

have the proper panel, it'll tell you which pendant pushed it so you

know where on the compound the threat is coming from. And if I remember

correctly, in this instant, the alarm would go off, we would know there

was a threat, but we couldn't identify specifically which pendant had

triggered it.

Q Did you have -- so you had more than one pendant?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall how many you had?

A I believe we had two.

Q Okay.

A Or I should say two posts had a pendant.

Q I'm sorry. What was that answer?

A I can say -- I can say that we had two posts, two positions

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with a pendant.

Q Okay. You may have had more on compound, but two were being

used?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall whether others were not operational?

A I can't say for certain, but typically each one of your guard

positions would have a pendant, have IDNS, so my assumption would be

some of them were not working. I can't remember for sure.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And just to talk about the camera, elaborate a little bit

more on the cameras, were all the cameras functional at the time,

monitors?

A Boy.

Q Sorry.

A I wish you'd asked me this, like, 2 years ago. I

honest -- I don't remember.

Q Okay. Was the TOC door fixed? I understand that there

were issues with the door, the TOC door. Was that something that was

addressed by D.C.?

A I don't -- I don't know that it was addressed by D.C. per se,

but we were trying to create a safe haven door on the TOC, and we would

have had to send some sort of notification or memo to Tripoli reporting

to them that we were doing that, and we were in the process of modifying

that door to be more like a safe haven door when I left. I don't know

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if it ever got installed, though.

Q Just shifting a little bit away from the physical security

issues to talk a little bit, we talked -- alluded --

Ms. Jackson. Before we leave that --

Ms. Betz. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q -- I just noticed one thing. On the equipment requests on

exhibit 3, the sixth bullet point down is, belt-fed, crew-served

weapon, 240 Bravo or 249 with bipod.

Not being a firearms encyclopedia, could you tell us what that

is?

A Sure. It's a machine gun that has the capacity to shoot

many more bullets essentially than your typical handheld M4 machine

gun.

Q And why did you make that request? Well, first of all, is

that a weapon that is typically found at a high threat post?

A Yes.

Q But Benghazi did not have one?

A No.

Q Do you know if Tripoli had one?

A When I was in Tripoli, we had multiple ones of these. At

that time, I don't know if they had one at Tripoli.

Q Okay. Because you were in Tripoli after the attack in

Benghazi?

A Yes.

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Q And, in fact, when were you in Tripoli?

A , I believe, approximately.

Q Okay. Did you have belt-fed or machine guns when you were

in , when you did your TDY there?

A No. DS did not, but we had a fairly large contingent of

marines there that had those types of weapons, as well as other military

units that had those capabilities.

Q What about ?

A No, but also not classified as high threat.

Q High threat. Okay. And you obviously had no marines in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q Okay.

Ms. Betz. Was this something that members of the MSD might have?

Mr. . Yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And why is it that you asked for this weapon?

A In the event that you had to engage multiple targets, many

targets, it, in my opinion, would have been the most efficient weapon

to resolve the threat.

Q Does it have a deterrent value just by its -- just by seeing

it?

A If someone was to see it, it would -- I believe it would

have deterrent value.

Q And what was your plan for this weapon?

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A I would have liked to have put it in our safe haven in the

residential villa near the window, where it could have been taken up

to the roof facing the main gate.

Ms. Betz. And to that point, so it actually would help secure

sort of the perimeter or -- it would cover a lot -- a greater area than

specific individuals with sort of isolated weapons could address?

Mr. Yes. You would have been able to essentially kill

many more people much quicker.

Ms. Betz. Okay. And you may not know the answer to this, so I'll

preface it that way.

Mr. Evers. If you can answer it.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q If you can answer it. I --

A

I just don't recall.

Q So now going back to where I was going to go before that

conversation, just revisiting the staffing issue in Benghazi during

your time there, how many DS agents were there when you arrived?

A Two.

Q Two. In addition to yourself?

A Yes. So three total with me.

Q So three total with you. So three consistent throughout

your time there?

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A At a minimum, we would have had three. At the -- my last

day or two there, had come down, so we would have had four.

Q Did you make requests for additional agents?

A The only time I think that I would have made requests was

there was talk of the Ambassador coming down for a visit, and I would

have requested additional resources for that visit.

Q To that point, when the -- if and when the Ambassador would

travel to Benghazi, did you have an expectation that there would be

certain agents or groups accompanying him?

A I remember emailing the RSO in Tripoli at one point and

asking if MSD or additional DS agents would be accompanying the

Ambassador when he came. I'm certain he would have had more with him,

but what those numbers were or who they were, I don't -- I don't know.

Q Do you remember his response back to you?

A I don't.

Q Okay.

A No.

Q Do you -- in that same conversation, do you remember talking

about security being in-house, having to be conducted in-house during

his trip to Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what did you mean by that?

A I would have meant that we -- we wouldn't be able to depend

on host nation supplemental security, and therefore, all security would

have had to have been provided by the Embassy.

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Q Okay. And just to elaborate, were you concerned about QRF,

were you concerned -- the ability of QRF, local guard force, to do their

job?

A I wasn't -- I wasn't concerned with the LGF, their ability

to do their job, but once again, their job was not to defend in the

event of attack. QRF, I wasn't -- I also wasn't necessarily worried

about their ability to do their job, but the same -- same thing. There

was only three of them, and so I don't know -- they would be limited

in what they could do in response to an attack.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Were you aware of whether the QRF, as part of the compound's

security plan, that the QRF was to call on the larger February 17th

to augment them in security for the compound?

A Yes, that was the plan.

Q That was the plan?

A Yes.

Q Did you have confidence in that plan?

A I had never had to put the plan into action, but I -- having

talked with the desk officer, I was told in the past that that plan

had worked, that they had responded, the larger brigade, meaning they

had responded.

Q Okay. Were you aware of any changes in the either

leadership or the capability of 17 Feb over the time? Had any of that

been communicated to you that they were better than they were, worse

than they were, about the same, or no conversations regarding that?

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A No conversations regarding that.

Ms. Betz. So just to follow up, do you believe that the compound

was equipped staff-wise to handle the Ambassador's trip?

Mr. . Personnel-wise, we would need assistance. We

would need supplemental personnel from Tripoli if the Ambassador were

to visit.

Ms. Betz. Just --

Ms. Jackson. Are you moving on to a new topic?

Ms. Betz. I'm going to stay sort of in the topic. You go. Go.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I have one follow-up question on the issue of the machine

gun. Were you aware that there had been a prior request for a belt-fed

machine gun?

A No.

Q You were not?

A No.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So I want to turn back to what is now exhibit 4. Do you

need time to review it? No?

Is this a document that you prepared?

A Yes. I mean, this document was prepared -- was originally

written by somebody else, but I edited it before I sent it to so

it would be up-to-date.

Q So, in terms of substantive revisions, more just to reflect

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your experiences?

A That's -- I would say that's mostly accurate. There was

a couple things I did in here that maybe would be considered

substantive. I think some of the discussion about the QRF would be

considered substantive. I think somewhere in here I mentioned the

incident chart and the recent EAC cable. I would say the information

in there was substantive, that that was mentioned in there.

Q So it's a document you would say transcended RSO's --

A That was my understanding.

Q -- in Benghazi? On page 3, I just want to draw your

attention to sort of below the printing line, where it says, "Protection

(PRS) and Auxiliary Security Support." And in it you reference that

the PRS is one of the smoothest running programs because it's one

program that has remained consistent. Would you elaborate on that?

A I didn't write this part, but I understand what the writer

was saying. DS agents are trained to be interchangeable pieces in a

protection detail, and so someone if -- no matter where they were coming

from, they would have an understanding of where they would fit into

a protection detail.

Q Was this impacted at all by the few number of agents that

would be on the ground? Does it contemplate a certain number of agents

being present for it to run smoothly?

A It would certainly be different than maybe what they've done

in other environments or maybe the textbook way that they had learned

in the training school, but I don't think it would have been completely

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foreign to anyone, any DS agent.

Q Would you have to change it because of the low number of

agents on the ground? I guess let me rephrase. Would it -- would two

agents impact how the system would work, or the program would work?

A You would certainly want more agents, given that type of

environment, but there are other protection details we do where it is

just one agent or maybe just two agents, depending on the VIP that you're

protecting, their ranking. So, once again, I don't think it would have

been foreign. We may have wanted more people, but we -- we could

have -- we made it work with what we had.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You had mentioned just a minute ago textbook training, that

reality often differs than textbook training. In your -- I assume you

had protection training in your high-threat course. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. When you were making a movement with an ambassador

or principal officer in a high threat -- according to your high-threat

training, what was -- what was your textbook training on that? And

this is really like a pop quiz.

A We would have been using a full motorcade for the movement,

whether it was high-threat training or just our basic special agent

training.

So --

Q And the AIC would have been with --

A , I think. And the AIC, yes,

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would have been with the protectee.

Q And that's both in your basic training and in the

high-threat training was the textbook model of how to make a movement

in a high threat environment?

A I don't know if I would say it's the textbook model for how

to make a movement in a high threat environment. It's -- it's

the -- one of the preferred ways to do things if you have that many

resources. For instance, in other places we'll run low profile

movements because it doesn't draw as much attention to the protectee,

so maybe not a full motorcade, maybe not using black Suburbans; you

know, low pro car, less -- less agents involved.

Q

A I think for me to answer that, I would need to know who the

protectee was.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So, to follow on those questions, the modifications that

you had to make at post, were those based on experience, based on any

other type of training? Given that this is sort of the benchmark that

you learned, was there -- were there any benchmarks or any other -- was

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there any other training that you took to make these modifications to

ensure the security of those that you were guarding, the compound?

A Well, I mean, I've done what we would call escort details,

in the United

States. And I'd also done movements in and Yemen, where

it was just the follow car that we had and just a follow car that

consisted of local nationals.

Q Okay.

A So it wasn't a foreign concept to me. There are certain,

you know, ideas that you're -- you know, that you can't lose sight of

regardless of how many resources you're using, security ideas. And

I think, you know, we try and cover those, make sure they're covered.

Q In those -- in that training, would it also include how to

guard the compound? So, for example, would you discuss or simulate

with two agents how to divide up the compound between the two of you

or with the QRF? Is that something that you would have discussed

in this type of program?

A I remember in some of the scenarios in our high-threat

training, we were certainly protecting buildings in a compound while

the VIP was inside. Most of my experience in protecting a compound

came from protecting the compound at Yemen and and what

we were doing there, and then trying to apply that to Benghazi.

Q Moving away from exhibit 4 --

A Okay.

Q -- and shifting gears a little bit. I want to talk a little

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bit about the security environment and the change that I think was

evident from the time that you arrived to the time that you left. Were

you aware of the deteriorating environment when you arrived?

Mr. Evers. You just asked about the deterioration during his

presence and then asked about whether it had deteriorated before.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Yes. So I think there were -- my understanding is that

there were conversations when you arrived about how the incidents had

changed even from the previous month. So, one, were you aware of those

conversations? And then, two, you know, wanting to get your

observations on the changes that occurred in the month while you were

there. So really looking at a 2-month span.

A I was aware of the prior incidents, because we had a log

of them, and during my time there, there were certainly many more

incidents, so I would classify the security situation as deteriorating.

Q How did you typically receive your intelligence or updates

regarding security incidents?

A There were a variety of methods. Some was open source

reporting, so incidents mentioned on Facebook or in the local news or

Twitter. We had contacts, Libyan contacts, that would report either

maybe through 17th February Brigade or something, or, you know, ,

who worked with us, might report something. would give us

information, and then we had, for instance, like, a contact at the U.N.,

and maybe some organizations that would share information with us.

We weren't -- we weren't in downtown Benghazi, and some of our

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other contacts were, so they were helpful in giving us visibility of

what was going on within the city.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I want to backtrack just a minute, because when you

mentioned , it triggered something in my head. When you were

talking earlier today about reaching out to the local police, the

Supreme Security Council and others, for additional host-nation

support, I believe you said that you had relied on Libyan nationals

that worked for you to assist in that effort. And was one of those

individuals ?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there any other Libyan national who was employed

at the compound that assisted you in that endeavor?

A Yes.

Q Male or female?

A It was a male. I want to say his name starts with a .

Q Does the name --

A Yes, .

Q Okay. Did he go by or or something like that?

A I called him .

Q Okay.

A .

Ms. Betz. Did you interact with him while you were in Benghazi?

Mr. Yes. Maybe a handful of times.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q What role did he play in tying to increase the security

assets for the compound?

A If I remember correctly, he had various contacts within the

Libyan Government, whatever the government may have been at that point,

and was trying to work through those means to get us additional

security.

Q Would he also be a source of information for you and the

other agents regarding security incidents that were occurring in and

around Benghazi?

A Yes, he would have. I don't remember any specific things

he would have told us, but he -- I certainly would have listened to

him if he had told me a security incident.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Was he reliable?

A Reliable in was his information accurate?

Q Uh-huh.

A Once again, I don't remember any information that he gave

us, but any sort of information we got from any source, we would have

tried to vet against another source.

Q Such as?

A So, for instance, if we heard that there was a -- if the

U.N. had told us that there was an IED found at the Tibesti Hotel, we

would have contacted -- you know, we would have asked or somebody

in 17 February to see if he knew any security people at the hotel that

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could have confirmed it. We would have -- well, we certainly would

have alerted , seeing if they could have corroborated it.

Q But it's, I think, safe to say, to your point, that a lot

of -- most of your conversations went through Feb 17th, ?

A Conversations about what?

Q In terms of contacts into Libyan society or into the city

per se.

Let me ask -- let me rephrase it. So rather than directly

contacting organizations or individuals, you would work through -- you

primarily worked through Feb 17th to make these contacts to obtain the

information?

A If they were Libyan organizations, but most of our, you

know, incident reporting and threat reporting was coming through either

the other Western organizations in Benghazi .

Ms. Betz. I'm going to show you now what will be exhibit 10.

Exhibit No. 10

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. And just for the record, this is State Department

document C05396416, and it's titled "Benghazi Security Environment and

Threat Assessment, updated 8/14/2012."

Mr. I hope you're not going to tell me that I wrote

this one.

Ms. Betz. No.

Ms. Jackson. That was going to be the first question. Did you?

Ms. Betz. Did you -- did you write this assessment?

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Mr. . I don't remember this document, no.

Ms. Betz. Okay. So were you aware of the document or this type

of security environment, threat assessment being drafted?

Mr. . This document really doesn't ring a bell to me,

so, no, I can't say that I was aware of this.

Ms. Jackson. As you peruse this document and have had an

opportunity to review it, in your opinion, does it accurately summarize

the security environment that you experienced in Benghazi when you were

there in August of 2012.

Mr. Evers. Do you want to go off the record and let him read it,

and then I think we will spend a couple minutes before we start talking

about it?

Ms. Jackson. Sure.

Ms. Betz. Sure?

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Let's go off the record.

Ms. Betz. We'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

Ms. Betz. So looking at exhibit 10, I want to draw your attention

to the "Look Ahead" section --

Mr. . Okay.

Ms. Betz. -- and specifically the second paragraph that

discusses AQIM, Al Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb smuggling weapons and

explosives out of Libya to neighboring countries, AQIM and other

transnational terrorist groups could try to take advantage of a

deteriorating security environment in Benghazi or a post-Qadhafi power

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vacuum in Tripoli.

Were you aware of this type of intelligence when you arrived to

Benghazi?

Mr. I -- I don't -- I don't remember. I was reading

threat reporting, intelligence reports at least weekly while I was in

, and I don't know if I was aware of this before I arrived. I

may have been, you know.

Ms. Jackson. As of the date of this document, August 14, 2012,

you agree with this sentence and assessment in here in the Look Ahead?

Mr. As of what date?

Ms. Betz. August 14.

Mr. I don't know if I can say by that specific date,

but, yes, certainly some -- at some point within my time in Libya, I

would agree with this.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. I was aware of this.

Ms. Betz. Okay.

Do you believe this type of intelligence could be one of the

reasons that the Ambassador had canceled his trip in early August?

Mr. I -- I can't -- I couldn't -- I wouldn't even know

why he canceled his trip.

Ms. Betz. For security reasons?

Mr. I -- I don't know why he canceled the trip. At

least I don't remember why he canceled the trip.

Ms. Betz. So I'm going to show you what is now --

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A Okay.

Ms. Betz. -- exhibit No. 11.

[ Exhibit No. 11

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. So, for the record, the witness is looking at State

Department document C05390855, and it is an email in which the witness

is not copied but in which security issues are discussed.

Ms. Jackson. And the date.

Ms. Betz. I'm sorry. And it's dated August 2, 2012.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Have you had a chance to look at it?

So, in the email, after your -- after you've read -- had a chance

to read the email, does this bring back some recollection of the

ambassador canceling his trip?

A No. I know that he had wanted to come, but I -- I don't

remember ever learning a reason why he did not come.

Q So Mr. didn't discuss with you any security

reasons why the Ambassador may not have wanted to travel during the

time that he had anticipated coming?

A He very well may have, but once again, I just don't remember

why the Ambassador didn't come, what that decision was based off of.

Q Just one quick question. In regards to the declining or

deteriorating security environment, were you communicating these

incidents back to D.C. in addition to Tripoli?

A I cannot remember if they -- we had been creating an

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incident chart. I don't know if -- I can't remember if the desk would

have been copied on that at any point.

Q Do you believe -- or would you -- would it not be out of

the realm of possibility for to forward the incidents

to D.C.? Would he have communicated with about the

security incidents?

A He very well may have. It's entirely possible.

Q Did you communicate those events to him or incidents to him?

A To --

Q To

A Yes.

Q Daily?

A I think I would -- it's fair to say, any time we had a

significant security incident, I would have informed the RSO in

Tripoli.

Q Okay. So you're not aware of any inquiries by Jake Sullivan

to the Ambassador regarding any specific incident?

A I don't think I know who Jake Sullivan is.

Q With the secretary's office.

A I don't -- I don't know who that is.

Ms. Betz. So now that the witness is looking at what is now

exhibit 12 --

[ Exhibit No. 12

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. And for the record, it is State Department document

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C05396005, and it is an email from to .

Ms. Jackson. And it also has on it an attachment called an

incident chart, which pages 2 and 3 of this document have the

sequential -- the next sequential document number ending in 006. And

so our first question for the witness will be whether he believes that

the pages 2 and 3 are the attachment to the email.

Mr. Yes, I believe so.

Ms. Betz. And is this an email that you would have drafted to

copying ?

Mr. Yes.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And is this the incident chart that you referenced just a

few minutes ago?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So this is an internal document that you and other

DS agents kept in Benghazi.

A Yes. At least during my time in Benghazi.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And you updated this chart daily to -- or when necessary

to update or reflect the incidents that were occurring in Benghazi?

A Yes. But I had delegated this particular portfolio to one

of the other ARSOs. But, yes, in consultation with me, they updated

it regularly.

Q And it's a reflection of, at that point, to date, as of

August 21, it was a reflection of the incidents that you were aware

of and/or that occurred during your time there?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Ms. Betz. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Kenny. We'll go back on the record. I'll note the time is

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2:53. We'll hopefully do better this time.

Agent , I'd just like to thank you again. Appreciate

your patience and your indulgence here with us today.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I would like to pick up and continue our conversation about

the physical security platform in Benghazi during the time that you

were aware, or that you were there, and continue our discussion about

some of the security requests that were made by post to improve the

physical security at the Special Mission Compound.

I would like to begin by referring back to exhibit 4. This is

the "RSO Turnover" document. You said you prepared it. And I would

like to direct your attention to page 5. And at the top there, you

can see there is a section on physical security. And if you want to

reread that, I'm going to focus on the second point and the fourth point

under this section.

A Which two? The second and the fourth?

Q That's correct, sir. So "Safe Haven" and "Fighting/REACT

Positions."

A Okay. I read that.

Q Okay. Great.

So I'll just read a brief portion of this into the record. Under

"Physical Security," there is a section here that's entitled "Safe

Haven Gate/Day Cage." It reads, quote, "The 'safe haven' in the villa

is closed and locked every night and serves as the hold room in the

event of attack. Recently we have attempted to create a safe haven

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in the office villa as well," close quote.

The reference here to the safe haven, can you explain for us just

generally the importance of a safe haven and how that relates overall

to a post's security plan?

A A safe haven is an area you could go to that would provide

protection from bullets, fire, mobs, attackers. It typically has a

variety of features in it, to include some sort of communication,

typically radios. It will usually have a bathroom. It will have an

egress route. It's basically designed as a place you can hunker down

and await further help.

Q Okay.

And I'll note here that this paragraph from which I just read,

it mentions that there was, in fact, one safe haven and there was also

one that was under consideration.

The safe haven in the villa here, does that refer to the safe haven

in Villa C?

A The residential villa, yes.

Q The residential villa. So, to the best your understanding,

is that what is referred to elsewhere as Villa C?

A Yes.

Q Okay. All right.

Was that safe haven formally part of the post's security plan in

the event of an attack, for instance?

A Yes. But, once again, I would caveat that "safe haven" is

in quotation marks here when referencing that one.

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Q Okay. And perhaps you could elaborate on that. I think

you'd mentioned that, for instance, there are certain features of a

safe haven.

A Right.

Q So perhaps you could just walk us through this particular

safe haven.

A I wouldn't classify this as the same type of safe haven or,

at least, a safe haven in the traditional sense. One, the type of door

it had on it was not a typical safe-haven door. It had a gate on it.

Two, it had access to a lot of other rooms with windows in it.

And, typically, a safe haven would be somewhere on the interior of a

building. You wouldn't be able to access it from the outside.

Q Uh-huh.

A I guess those were the two main differences I would see

between what we were calling that particular room and a traditional

safe haven.

Q Okay. No, that's helpful.

And is there any reason why in this particular document, which

was the turnover document you would be providing to the incoming RSO,

that you didn't include, for instance, that description of the safe

haven?

A Your typical DS agent with overseas experience would

understand the difference between what we were using and what a

traditional safe haven looked like.

Q Okay.

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During the time you were in Benghazi, was there ever a time that

a plan to initiate the use of the safe haven, that that was ever

activated, do you recall?

A Yes. We used the safe haven -- in addition to some drills

we did, there was one incident close to the end of when I left Benghazi

where we used the safe haven.

Q Okay. And what can you tell us about that incident?

A I believe there had been some small-arms fire outside, and

then there was an explosion that shook the walls of the villa. We

instituted our REACT plan and went to the safe haven, or at least the

non-DS agents went to the safe haven. I believe one of the DS agents

was in the safe haven, and the rest of us responded per the REACT plan.

Q And so those specific responses were part of at least one

of post's REACT plans?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And, in that instance, the REACT plan called for

personnel, non-Diplomatic Security personnel, to be sheltered in the

safe haven; is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And you mentioned that post would run drills from time to time

related to the safe haven? Can you just elaborate on that for us?

A We would do at least weekly drills with the local guard force

and the QRF simulating various types of emergency situations, either

bombs or attacks. And we would also do drills with the entire embassy,

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or the entire mission.

Q Uh-huh.

A I remember we did one towards the end of my time there that

I believe was simulating an attack, if I remember correctly.

Q Okay.

And I'll just note, if you drop down under "Emergency Action

Planning," there is a sentence here that reads, quote -- this is the

end of the first paragraph -- quote, "We routinely conduct drills and

held a post-wide drill last week," close quote.

So can you just describe for us about how often these types of

drills would be held on the compound while you were there?

A We were conducting drills with the guards at least a couple

times a week, different types of drills. And I don't know how many

we would've done with the entire embassy.

I couldn't say with

certainty if we did other ones.

Q And you mentioned one of those drills was held to simulate

some sort of attack or some type of attack or assault on the compound;

is that right?

A Yes. I remember we used smoke grenades as part of that

simulation, so it would've been some form of an attack.

Q Okay. And, to the best of your recollection, would that

have been the post-wide drill that was held the week prior?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And why would you have done some sort of role-play

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or simulation for that type of event?

A Specifically for an attack?

Q Uh-huh.

A In that environment we were in, it seemed most likely that

the types of emergencies that we would deal with would either be a bomb

or an attack. And a typical bomb drill would involve more of the LGF

unit as opposed to the entire mission, and an attack scenario would

involve the entire mission.

Q Okay. And would that have been fairly common, for a post

to undertake different types of drills, for instance, whether it is

an IED, bomb-type attack or some sort of assault?

A Yes. You are required to hold X amount of drills in a

certain timeframe addressing various scenarios at any embassy you're

at.

Q Okay.

Just moving quickly along here, there is a section that's

"Fighting/REACT Positions."

A Uh-huh.

Q And it reads, quote, "We recently removed many sandbag

positions as the sandbags had disintegrated. We purchased new

sandbags and constructed three new fighting positions," close quote.

Do you recall this specific action?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And can you just briefly describe for us the

importance of having some sort of hardened fighting position at post?

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A Yes. If there is an attack, there needs to be a position

where you can return fire from that offers some sort of form of

protection. And so, in addition to some of our positions on the

buildings, we also had sandbag positions that would allow us to return

fire and also offer some form of protection.

Q Okay. And would that have been for the Diplomatic Security

staff, or was that for the QRF on the compound? Do you recall?

A It was for both.

Q It was for both. Okay.

And do you recall if there were more fighting positions at one

point in time and that number was reduced, or were the three --

A There were more sandbag positions. I don't remember

exactly how many. Almost all the sandbag positions had disintegrated,

so we put in three -- or three new positions or replaced three positions.

The reason that we only replaced three positions was, one, we were

operating with that $500 petty cash limit so that there was only so

much that we could get, and, two, with the limited amount of personnel

that we had on post, I was concerned that we couldn't man all the

positions, and we would essentially then been creating fighting

positions for the enemy were they to invade the compound.

Q Okay.

There was a brief discussion earlier about this concept referred

to as concentric rings of security. Can you just describe for us how

either the fighting positions or the safe haven, how that fits within

the concentric rings of security?

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A There is certainly a -- at least the safe haven is certainly

a part of the concentric rings of security.

So on the outside or outer ring would be typically host-nation

police or security, which we did not have there. So the next ring would

be our guards, then the wall, then the QRF, then typically the safe

haven -- or backup QRF, then DS agents, then the safe haven. Then the

final ring of security would be whichever DS agent was left with

protecting the safe haven.

Q Are each of these rings -- is part of the purpose of that

to increase the amount of time it would take for an attacker, for

instance, under that scenario to reach a protectee or some protected

part of the compound?

A That's certainly one of the benefits of that.

Q Okay. And so how would the local guard force, for instance,

fit into that?

A The local guard force would be essentially an early-warning

signal. So they would alert the rest of the mission to the fact that

there was an emergency, an attack or a bomb or something.

Q Okay. And in the absence of the local guard force, was

there any other early-warning detection system? Or was that the

primary system?

A That was the primary system. I mean, QRF had a rover

position, as well, as someone that was supposed to be out at the front

gate. So, in the absence of the guards, QRF could have also provided

the same sort of information.

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Q Okay.

You had mentioned, in the rings of security there, you had

mentioned the wall. And I would like to ask, because I recall you

saying in a prior round that you had concerns about setback of at least

one section of the wall from the street.

And perhaps you could just help us understand, since we are not

familiar with all the physical security standards, the concept of

setback, does that relate to the property itself? Does it relate to

the wall? Does it relate to the buildings that are on the compound?

A It relates to the buildings that are on the compound,

depending on an OVO classification.

Q Okay. And did you have any concerns about the location of

the buildings on the Special Mission Compound with respect to setback?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what were those concerns?

A My main concern was the office building was very close to

the south wall, and you could drive a vehicle right up to the south

wall, and given a large enough explosion, you could certainly tear

through the wall and hit the compound, or the office villa.

Q The office villa. Okay.

I would like to direct your attention to the first page of the

document. There was a brief discussion about this in the last hour,

but I wanted to draw your attention to some specific language in here.

The bottom of the third paragraph reads, quote, "The RSO should

be aware that requests for expensive security upgrades may be difficult

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to obtain, as headquarters is hesitant to allocate money to a post that

may be closing in a few months," close quote.

And I know we touched on this in the last round. I would like

to first ask just, is this your language that you inserted in this memo?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And why did you insert it?

A Once again, I don't know where I read that or who told that

to me or where I got that idea, but, at the time, I would have believed

that to be true, and that's why I would've written it in there.

Q Okay.

Do you have any specific examples of any security upgrades that

were considered to be too expensive and that were not funded?

A The only one I can think of off the top of my head was the

sandbags.

Q The sandbags were too expensive?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A I remember asking -- I don't remember what we asked for,

but it was very difficult to get the funding for that, and so we ended

up using the petty cash. There was a reason that we were using that

$500 petty cash limit --

Q Uh-huh.

A -- and it was because we were having difficulty getting more

funding than that. I don't remember why that we were --

Q So when you say "difficulty getting funding," where would

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the funding come from? Where were you seeking the funding?

A It would've had to come from the budget in D.C.

Q I'm sorry? "In D.C." you said?

A Funding approvals, you know, are granted from D.C. in

coordination with post. You know, you have your budget. So they

would've either approved or declined our funding request.

Q And the sandbag request that you recall as the one example

of something that was considered too expensive, do you recall about

how much was being requested for that project?

A I don't. I remember requesting it, and then we were getting

some pushback from Tripoli, I believe, asking -- I think they asked

if we thought we were still in a war zone or something.

Q Tripoli asked you if you thought you were still in a war

zone?

A Yeah.

Q Do you recall who asked you that?

A I don't remember.

Q Was it somebody -- the RSO? Was it --

A No.

Q -- a management officer?

A Yeah, management officer or somebody in that section.

Q Okay.

A I don't know specifically who.

Q So you received some pushback, to use your word, from

Embassy Tripoli, specifically the management office, regarding a

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request for sandbags.

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A But management office is a large position. That can

include, you know, financial management, includes the GSO, includes

facilities. I mean, there's a lot that falls under that, so I don't

remember which specifically it was.

Q So, just tying back to our discussion, did anybody in D.C.

tell you that the sandbags were too expensive, or was that relayed to

you by the management officer in Tripoli?

A My understanding is that our budget was controlled and

would've gone through Tripoli, Embassy Tripoli.

Q Okay.

Did there seem to be some sort of disconnect between your

experience on the ground in Benghazi, your understanding of the

security environment, and the management officer or whoever posed the

question to you, whether or not you thought you were still in a war

zone?

A Certainly, in that specific example, yes, there was a

disconnect, it would seem.

Q Okay. Do you recall following up at all with that? Did

you follow up with the RSO in Tripoli? Did you communicate to the

management officer that you needed this request?

A I don't remember what the followup was.

Q Okay.

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A I can't remember. I know that I must have gotten frustrated

and used the $500 in petty cash. I remember the sand truck showed up

and the employees got in a fight, so we had to kick them out, and then

we just loaded all the sandbags and built the positions ourselves.

Q I'm sorry, the employee unrelated to --

A The people that drive the sand truck that were there to put

the sand in the bags and stack them --

Q Uh-huh.

A -- they somehow got in a fight with each other, and --

Q Okay.

A -- so we just did it.

Q The challenges of operating and working in --

A It's just Libya.

Q But you found the petty cash sufficient, though, to fund

the three fighting positions that you referred to earlier that you --

A Yes.

Q -- thought were sufficient?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. Yes? Is that your answer?

A Yes. I can't remember if I would've wanted one or two more

fighting positions, but we made do with the three positions we had.

Q Okay.

And just to tie this back to the turnover memo, because here it

specifically refers to headquarters being hesitant to allocate that

money, in this one example that you recall, did you have any information

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that headquarters had denied that request?

A No, I didn't. "Headquarters" may have not been the most

appropriate term there. I don't know who the appropriate organization

would have been to put there, but I think "headquarters" was just an

easy term --

Q Okay.

A -- and sort of a generic term to use.

Q Could that have also, then, referred to the front office

at Embassy Tripoli, in your mind?

A I don't know if I would say the front office. They

typically aren't involved in the, sort of, funding issues. But maybe

the management section in Tripoli.

Q Okay.

I would like to move to page 6. And, again, there was a brief

discussion of this in the last hour. At the bottom of the page, there's

a section entitled, "Engineering Security Office."

And this section reads, quote, "You may seek the assistance of

the ESO in Cairo to come out and perform ESO work. He is tentatively

scheduled to arrive at the mission September 16-20. SA has a

list of projects for him. We recently received cameras and monitors,

and the installation of these is a priority. Time permitting, we would

also like him to repair the itemizer, reprogram the IDNS, as well as

a variety of other small projects," close quote.

And just for the record, what is the ESO, or who is that entity?

A The ESO is the engineering security officer. And they

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perform technical tasks, technical security tasks, for the RSO.

Q Okay. And, according to this, it sounds like there was a

visit that was planned for them to come to post to provide some type

of physical security assistance. Is that correct?

A That's what I wrote, so I believe it to be true, yes.

Q Okay. Okay. That's fair.

All right. We'll go ahead and mark -- this will be exhibit 13.

[ Exhibit No. 13

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Kenny. For the record, exhibit 13 is an email that's dated

August 7, 2012, from to It cc's

Benghazi RSO. The subject is, quote, "Re: Wish List of Equipment for

RSO Benghazi," close quote.

And I'll just provide you the opportunity to read that.

Mr. Evers. Can we go off the record for just a quick second?

Mr. Kenny. We can go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Kenny. We'll go back on the record.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Again, referring to exhibit 13, the doc ID, just for the

record, C05390265.

I'll note that your name does not appear in the thread, but the

email alias "Benghazi RSO" does.

A Uh-huh.

Q And we'll ask you about that just in a moment, but I would

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like to first read from the first email in this thread, where

writes to and states the following: Quote,

"Hey , hope all is well. Here's the wish list for new and upgraded

equipment that we discussed. Give me a call and let me know if you

have any questions or concerns," close quote.

The email then proceeds to list several items. You can see here

there's a new IDNS system listed there, replacement camera monitors,

old pendants for the current IDNS systems, camera/monitor sets for the

TOC and villa safe haven, additional cameras with visibility outside

the compound walls, upgrading critical cameras for night vision, and

louder IDNS alarms and hardening of the TOC door.

In the email following this in the string, responds

with certain comments. And, in the final email,

replies with additional information in response to Mr.

questions and states, quote, "Thanks again for all of the help man,

we all appreciate it out here," close quote.

Before just getting into the specifics of this request, I'd like

to ask who -- I don't recall if this was asked in the previous hour -- who

was ?

A He was one of the ARSOs there that I supervised.

Q Okay. And who is ?

A He is the ESO.

Q Okay. So the engineering security officer?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And where was he based?

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A Cairo.

Q In Cairo. Okay.

And when we see the alias here, "Benghazi RSO," what is your

understanding of who would receive those emails?

A It would have been a group email that would have included

the DS agents in Benghazi and possibly in Tripoli, but I'm

not sure.

Q Okay. And would you have been included on that list?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall this email exchange?

A No.

Q Okay.

You see here that there is a list of requests, the original wish

list that ARSO submitted. Do you recall at all whether these

are listed in order of importance? Is there any priority as to how

these requests are listed?

A I don't know.

Q Okay.

Do you know how this document was created? For instance, was

there a discussion about it? Did you review previous security

requests? Was there some sort of formal site survey done?

A Is there a date on this first document?

Q It's at the bottom here.

A Oh, okay.

No. very tech-savvy and would've been keen on identifying

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issues we might have had with some of our technical security features.

And I have no doubt that what he was identifying and was asking for

here would have been appropriate and necessary security upgrades.

Q Okay. And when he uses the term "wish list," did you

understand that to mean that that was everything that post thought it

needed at that time?

A It was everything that -- yes, I would say that's everything

we needed for that particular compound setup.

Q Okay.

Was your sense that the requests that were submitted here to the

ESO in Cairo -- during your time there, did you have a sense that these

specific requests were being worked on?

A I can't remember ever having a sense that these were being

worked on and that there was any followup to this.

Q Okay.

Perhaps to refresh your recollection, we can refer back to

exhibit 4 on page 6, where it refers to a trip that the ESO had planned.

A Uh-huh.

Q What did you know about that trip?

A Based on these documents, I would say that he was planning

a trip, and I would assume that he was going to address some of the

issues that are raised here.

Q Okay. For instance, you mentioned in a previous round that

there were cameras that had been delivered --

A Yes.

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Q -- to post. Would the RSOs have been able to install those

themselves, or would that have required some sort of technical

expertise?

A It would have required some sort of technical expertise.

Q Okay. And was it your understanding that the ESO office,

that they possessed that --

A Yes.

Q -- expertise? Okay.

A That's something they typically do at post.

Q And was your understanding of the trip that had been planned

for the ESO to, among other things, install those cameras?

A Logically, I would make that assumption, but I can't say

he was coming for that specific reason. I would say there's a good

chance he was, but I don't know that for a fact.

Q Okay.

And, again, just to reread from the turnover memo -- which I can

give you a moment -- it's page 6, where it says, quote, "We received

cameras and monitors, and the installation of these is a priority,"

close quote.

A Uh-huh.

Q Looking at this now, does that help refresh your

recollection?

A I would agree that they were a priority. Whether or not

that was something that he was going to be able to complete in his time

here, I don't know, or I cannot remember what the task was he was going

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to perform when he got to post.

Typically, ESOs, in my experience, when they have come to post,

we have a lot of tasks for them, and they just don't get to all of them,

so they prioritize them with what they can do. I would imagine, in

this case, the cameras, he would've worked on that. But I just don't

want to say certainly that's what he was coming here for.

Q And the last request that's listed in

request is the hardening of the TOC door. I believe you were asked

about this in a previous round, but, to the best of your recollection,

did that occur or had that happened before you left?

A No. We had gotten the approval to spend $500, maybe a

little bit more than that, on the door. We had the person that was

constructing the door come in and take measurements. But when I left

September 1, it had not been completed.

Q Okay. But it was in the process of being completed?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you have any reason to think it wouldn't be

completed?

A Well, it's Libya. I mean --

Q Fair enough. Okay.

A Who knows what's going to happen there.

Q What I would like to do now is I will introduce exhibit 14.

[ Exhibit No. 14

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

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Q This is a short one. It's just a one-pager.

Ready?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay.

Just for the record, exhibit 14 is an email that's dated

August 23. It's from you to , with the subject, quote,

"Re: Reports to system," close quote. The document number is

C05B391883.

Do you recall this email?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

I would like to note that in the attachment field it says that

this email contained an attachment. The attachment was

securityrequests.docx. Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall what that document was?

A I think it's the same one that you showed me earlier.

Q Does it look like exhibit 3?

A Yes, that one.

Q Okay. And I can give you a moment if you would like to -- and

I apologize that we've inundated you with paper here.

A Sure. Yes, 3.

Q Okay.

So, just to be clear, I think we established earlier that

this -- you thought that this document also was attached to exhibit 2.

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Does it look like this, which is exhibit 3 we're looking at, which is

the security requests for Mission Benghazi, was also the attachment

to exhibit 14?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And I think you had described a little bit earlier about the basis

for creating this document. But, specifically, was this a spinoff from

the EAC, do you recall, the security requests document?

A I drafted this because RSO had asked me to draft

a, for lack of a better term, wish list of what I thought we needed.

And I don't remember if that was a result of the EAC that he had asked

for that or he had asked for that separate of the EAC.

Q Okay. And when he asked you to do that, do you recall how

you went about doing it? For instance, did you, again, review previous

equipment requests? Did you consult with the other ARSOs at post?

A I consulted with the other ARSOs at post. I drew on other

information I would've had. So, for instance, some of these pictures

I didn't take; I would've had to pull them from other documents. But

quite a bit of this is information I would have generated on my own.

Q So without the input from the ARSOs?

A I think I generated, if I remember correctly, the majority

of this and then gave it to the ARSOs and asked for their input and

if there was anything else that they would like or that they thought

was critical that was missing.

Q Do you recall if they had any specific requests to add or

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remove certain content?

A I don't remember, no.

Q Okay.

Same question I'd like to ask you about this document I asked you

about the wish list. Were these requests in any particular

order? Were they listed in order of priority?

A No.

Q Okay.

And I would just like to note that the requests here do appear

to be different from the requests that were generated out of the

August 6 document, which was also referred to as a wish list. And I'd

just like to ask for your understanding of why that was the case.

A Exhibit 3 is the turnover document. Do you have the one

that was generated out of the EAC?

Q So, I'm asking for your help, and this is exhibit 3 that

we're in --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and comparing that with exhibit 13, which is the wish

list from .

A Oh, okay.

I would say that the items in exhibit 13 are technical security

upgrades, and, although that was a focus of our equipment request, I

was focused more on some of the physical security upgrades, manpower

requests, various other equipment requests.

Q Okay. Is that because --

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A And, additionally, was not at post anymore.

Q Okay. So it sounds like there were some other

considerations at play, and, also, you created this document, and

another ARSO created the other document. That's fair?

A Yes.

Q To the extent that the scope of this document is slightly

different from the other document, was that in part due to the request

that RSO made of you? What were his instructions to you?

A As I remember it, his instructions were, draft a wish list

of what you would like there for security requests. I remember asking,

can I put anything on there? For instance, can I request, you know,

Marine support? He was like, well, no; try and make it, you know,

reasonable.

So I think I probably would have had an understanding or at least

something in the back of my head saying, put down what you think is

most critical on this list. And perhaps that's why some of these other

items, although important, maybe I didn't view as critical --

Q Okay.

A -- as what made the final cut in exhibit 3.

Q Okay. That's helpful.

Do you recall whether the request that RSO made to you

to prepare this wish list, was that connected in any way to discussions

about the long-term presence in Benghazi?

A I don't believe it was.

Q Okay. So, knowing that, what was your expectation when you

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sent this list of requests in as to whether they could or would be met?

A My expectation was he would forward this or discuss this

back with DS headquarters and some, perhaps all, of the recommendations

would be approved.

Q Okay. Do you recall whether he did, in fact, or did you

ever learn that he did, in fact, submit this request back to anyone

in Washington or at main State?

A I never found out. I never followed up.

Q In the -- well, actually, before we move on, in exhibit 3,

the list of requests, on page -- we don't have page numbers here, but

the last page of the request, which talks about equipment request, there

was a discussion in the last hour about the belt-fed, crew-served

weapon, which you referred to as a machine gun. I would like to ask

you about that.

In the discussion of who added which component, do you recall,

was this your suggestion or was this another ARSO's suggestion?

A It was, I want to say, suggestion, but it

could've been .

Q Okay. But it wasn't your suggestion.

A I did not come up with it, but I agreed with it.

Q Okay. That's fair.

You've mentioned your intent to put a machine gun if this request

were to be granted, I believe you said, in a window in one of the

buildings. Which building?

A I would have put it in the residential villa, C Villa --

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Q Okay.

A -- where it could be transported to the roof if need be.

Q Okay. Was Villa C, was that clearly visible from outside

the compound, beyond the walls?

A It was certainly visible from the wedding hall across the

street. And it would be the first villa that you would come in contact

with, as well as the QRF villa, when you come through the front gate.

Q Okay. And the window that you were proposing putting the

machine gun in, which direction was that facing?

A I wouldn't put it in a window. I would put it on the roof

of that villa. But it would be facing the main gate.

Q Okay. So that wouldn't necessarily have been visible from

outside the compound, beyond the wall.

A The actual machine gun? I doubt you'd be able to see it

out there.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q And you would have left it inside of the building to be

transported to the roof if there was an emergency? Is that the idea?

A Yes.

Q And about how long would it take someone to do that, to move

it from the inside to the roof?

A Not very long. I mean, it's heavy, but it can be carried

by one person. I mean, it would take a minute to go out the window

and up the ladder to the roof.

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BY MR. KENNY:

Q I would like to refer you back to exhibit 14. This as an

email from you to , August 23.

And, again, this email, you had mentioned to us, included the

security requests document. I'll just read you right here a quote.

"Our Internet just came back up, so I have attached the

security/manpower/equipment requests. Some of them are long shots,

but it doesn't hurt to ask," close quote.

You had mentioned a moment ago some of your expectations about

whether requests would be fulfilled or not, and I just would like to

ask you what you meant when you said some of those requests were long

shots.

A A belt-fed weapon I would say was a long shot.

Q Why? Why do you think that?

A I'm trying to remember why. I believe it was with the desk

officer I mentioned that, the possibility of getting that, and I think

I was told that it was unlikely because of the residential area we were

in. That sort of weapon could do a lot of damage to surrounding houses,

people, cars. So that seemed like it would have been a long shot.

Some of these, based on the time it takes to construct and the

cost -- for instance, building a man trap, I thought that might have

been a long shot.

I mean, I don't know if you want me to go through each one of these

and say -- or is that enough -- what I think could have been a long

shot.

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Q I mean, if there are more that you thought were long shots

in the list.

And maybe just understand, when you send the request in, why

caveat that some are, some aren't and not identify which ones are or

aren't? Did you have some sort of understanding that RSO

would know what you meant by that?

A I think probably any DS agent that served overseas that

looked at this list would recognize that some of them are easy fixes

and some of them take either a little bit more effort or a little bit

more money. So, for instance, a Delta barrier is really expensive,

and any DS agent would look at that and know that that's an expensive

item, whereas shatter-resistant film on the windows is not particularly

expensive.

Q And, again, just to clarify, you recall only sending this

security requests list to the Tripoli RSO, is that correct, in this

timeframe?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did the RSO ever respond to any of these requests

directly?

A I don't remember a response, no.

Q Okay. And did you ever take any steps, or any of the other

ARSOs on the compound, to follow up on the status of any of these

requests?

A I didn't. I did not. All I remember is attaching it with

the email I sent for the turnover document, and I don't know if

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he followed up either.

Q And, to your knowledge, did you forward it or send it to

anyone at main State?

A I don't believe I did, but I don't know for sure.

Q Okay.

I'd like to turn our attention now to the discussion about the

February 17 Martyrs Brigade and the QRF. We had an extended

conversation about your opinions, your thoughts about the QRF, the

Brigade, and some of the individual members. And we're harking back

now to the first hour, so I appreciate your indulgence here as we walk

through some of these things, but I just would like to clarify or clear

up a few matters related to your opinions about the QRF.

You had mentioned that you'd heard rumors of a

counterintelligence concern related to one of the members of 17

February Martyrs Brigade; is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall if that rumor or that concern was

substantiated during your time there?

A It was not substantiated, no.

Q Okay. And just for the purposes of having as clean of a

record as possible, who was that person? Was that a QRF member who

was on the compound at any point in time?

A To my knowledge, he had previously served as a QRF member

on the compound.

Q Okay. But was that during your time in Benghazi?

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A No.

Q Okay. And it was --

A They tried to send him back during my time, but I refused

him.

Q Okay. That was going to be my followup question.

You'd also, in that discussion, talked about some general

concerns you had -- I don't want to mischaracterize what you say, so

please correct me if I'm wrong, but that you had perhaps some

generalized concerns just about any Libyans on the compound. Is that

a fair summary of your concerns?

A I would have CI concerns about any Libyans that were on the

compound. And that's based on the CI environment and the prior

environment under Qadhafi regime, where Libyans were almost forced to

report information to the host government out of fear, you know, for

their life or their family's safety.

Q And were those concerns, were they generalized concerns?

Were they specific concerns based on specific incidents or reporting?

A At other posts I had been to, I had seen plenty of these

CI concerns that were justified, turned out to be true, and it seemed

likely that I should take the same precautions related to the Libyan

employees we had.

Later on, when I served in Tripoli, many of my concerns were

justified with Libyan counterintelligence issues on the compound

there.

Q And when you say "counterintelligence," can you just

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explain for us what that means, a counterintelligence risk or concern?

A That would be Libyans reporting on us and our activities

Q Okay. And would that have been related -- why was that a

concern?

A Part of the concern is

knowing information about us and what we're doing makes us vulnerable,

the Americans vulnerable to intelligence pitches, for lack of a better

word, . It can also lead to

security vulnerabilities if they're providing that information to

people that maybe do not like the United States or wish to do us harm.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q You said that you had CI concerns, counterintelligence

concerns, also with foreign nationals from other countries; is that

right?

A Yes.

Q So that's common and generalized for foreign nationals,

period? Is that sort of an accurate way of understanding that?

A For me, there would only be a handful of countries in the

world where I would not have counterintelligence concerns with the

local nationals.

Q And you said you had some specific ones when you were in

Tripoli well after the attacks and some specific ones in other

countries.

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A Yes.

Q Did you ever have a specific one for someone who was on the

compound when you worked in Benghazi?

A Well, I had a CI concern about the QRF member they tried

to provide us. And I had a concern in a similar vein with , that

he wasn't necessarily being forthright with information with us.

That's different than spying on us or reporting on us, but I felt it

was somewhat in the same vein.

Q And what do you mean by "he wasn't being forthright with

information"?

A In the interview I had with , who was the member

of the QRF that resigned, I believe he had mentioned that perhaps

knew more information about the prior attack on the U.S. Mission and

was not sharing it with us.

Q And so that created suspicion that maybe that was accurate?

A It created suspicion that, if he's withholding that

information from us, it led me to question why he was holding that

information from us and what else might he be withholding from us.

Q And did you ever have any evidence or any sort of -- anything

ever happen to sort of prove your suspicions correct, I guess?

A No.

Q And you said in light of these generalized and sometimes

specific concerns about foreign nationals, you take precautions. What

are those precautions?

A If it's a specific person I have a concern with, I would

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offer to see if they have similar concerns and ask them

to run various checks on that person.

I would also -- I believe in this case I had instructed the other

people on the compound, the other Americans on the compound, to just

be careful about what sort of information we were discussing when we

were around the QRF.

Q So you took some specific precautions here. One of them

was instructing the other Americans to keep your information away from

the QRF. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q

A I'm almost positive I did. I can't say for certain, but

fairly positive that I discussed this with them.

Q

A I can't remember. I know I've discussed 17 February with

them. I'm almost positive I would've discussed both of these incidents

you said, but I can't say for certain.

Q Did you report both of those to Tripoli?

A I reported some of my concerns I had with CI issues with

the QRF to the desk officer, because I thought he would have more

institutional knowledge about the QRF. And I most likely would have

cc'd maybe in Tripoli or somebody, but I don't know for sure.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Do you recall ever recommending to that Embassy

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Tripoli hire a member of the QRF for their bodyguard program?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What can --

A .

Q -- you tell us about that?

A When resigned, or was telling me he was resigning,

he was asking if there was a position, a bodyguard position, for him

at U.S. Embassy Tripoli. And I asked if they had an opening, and,

as I recall, said they did.

Q And did you make a specific recommendation that they bring

or hire a former member of the 17 February Martyrs Brigade in Tripoli?

A I probably would have said something to the extent that he

was one of the more capable QRF members and, you know, a good guy,

somebody that we, you know, trusted probably more than the other ones.

Q So, just to differentiate at the individual level, it sounds

like you had at least some confidence in some of the QRF members. Is

that fair?

A I had the most confidence in . The others I didn't

have much confidence in.

Q Do you recall -- you mentioned that you reached out to the

desk officer -- is that at DS/IP/NEA? Would that be ?

A Yes.

Q Okay -- to ask whether he had any institutional knowledge

about this. Do you recall what he told you?

A I don't recall, no.

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Q Do you recall in your discussion with whether

you also inquired with him about the future relationship with the 17

February Martyrs Brigade?

A I remember suggesting that DS vet, hire, and train the

people that we wanted, that we had chosen, as opposed to 17 February

just providing us people that we were basically forced to take. I

thought that would be the better plan if we were going to use local

security. And I don't remember what the response was.

Q So was that a proposal you made?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall who you made that proposal to?

A , I believe.

Q Okay.

I would like to just real quickly here -- and I appreciate the

indulgence. We'll enter into the record exhibit 15.

[ Exhibit No. 15

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And just in the interest of time, I'll go ahead and read

some of the description. So this is an email dated August 6, 2012.

It's from you to . The subject is, quote, "Re: Bodyguard

position," close quote. Doc number is C05396698.

All set?

A Uh-huh.

Q So I'd just like to begin at the bottom. In an earlier

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email, you wrote to , quote, " , we're having some issues

with our QRF here, and at some point someone is going to have to make

some difficult decisions. In the meantime, though, one of our QRF

members" -- redacted -- "recently quit and would like to work as a

bodyguard at Embassy Tripoli. I told him I would ask if there were

any available positions or if you needed him for anything. He was our

best QRF member tactically, was the only one who reportedly fought in

the revolution, and speaks fairly good English. He would be a good

asset if you have a spot for him," close quote.

responds, quote, "Actually, , I would hire

him almost immediately. We just upped our Bodyguard detail to 35

members, and we need 20 bodies. All the help we can get here will be

appreciative.

"On another note, keep in mind that Benghazi is not a traditional

Consular nor Embassy post. The QRF there has helped keep security in

place for almost a year now. And Benghazi will not be closing down

anytime soon. Be as flexile" -- should be "flexible" -- "and as patient

as possible with the personnel there," close quote.

And we'll start just with that first chain. This seems to be a

continuation of the discussion we were just having, where you

recommended one of the members of the QRF. Does this refresh your --

A Yes.

Q -- recollection of that event? Okay.

And so, in that email, you had raised -- you mentioned that there

were issues. You were having some issues with the QRF and you might

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have to make some difficult decisions.

Were the difficult decisions you're referring to, is that in

reference to whether -- can you just explain what you meant by the

difficult decision?

A The difficult decision would have been whether or not we

were going to keep using this militia as our QRF. And, at some point,

I thought we were going to need to make the decision to go another route.

Q Okay.

A Training other people.

Q And response to you, he tells you to, quote,

"be as flexible and as patient as possible with the personnel there,"

close quote.

Did ARSO , to your understanding, did he also have specific

knowledge of the 17 February Martyrs Brigade, for instance? Had he

served in Benghazi?

A Yes, I believe he had.

Q Okay. And what did you interpret that line to mean when

he wrote that to you?

A I interpreted it as his opinion. I've disagreed with him

before on his opinion as it relates to Libyan bodyguard personnel. I

don't know what else I can say about that. I disagreed with it, but

that was his opinion.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Was there another group, other than 17 Feb, at the time that

you could've gone to for this kind of QRF support in Libya?

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A There may have been, but not that I'm aware of.

Q So if you had decided to -- if you had actually moved forward

with the recommendation to, sort of, stop using this QRF support, what

would you have been recommending to do?

A I think we could have done something similar to what Tripoli

had done, which is where your direct hire, Libyan nationals, and then

vetting them and training them through DS trainers. I think there's

some advantages to doing it that way as opposed to how we did it.

Q Did you ever communicate that to somebody at the time?

A I wrote it to in a previous -- oh.

Thanks.

In the equipment requests, or under "manpower requests" in

exhibit --

Mr. Evers. I think it's exhibit 3.

Mr. -- exhibit 3.

It says, "The use of a brigade QRF is not desirable for many

reasons. Request a minimum of four local bodyguards trained by DS to

use on movements as well as QRF duties."

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Do you what RSO position was on this matter?

A I don't know what his position was then.

Q With this email, were you seeking to initiate a discussion

about the QRF? Were you making a specific recommendation? Were you

seeking Embassy Tripoli's blessing or approval for a different course

of action? We're in exhibit 15.

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A I think I would classify that as I was putting out feelers

to see if they had some of the same issues or if they would be amenable

to choosing a different course of action resulting in QRF.

Q Did you ever feel any pressure from Embassy Tripoli not to

report on problems about the QRF to them?

A No.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. How about from headquarters? Did you ever

feel any pressure from them not to report about problems?

Mr. No.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Can we just go off the record for a second?

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Kenny. We'll go back on the record.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Just one final line of questioning before we hopefully move

to our next setting.

You had mentioned -- again, we're harking back here to the first

round, but I wrote that you felt that that there was pushback from

certain members of the February 17th QRF on the compound in regard to

supporting moves off the compound. Do you recall that discussion?

A Yes.

Q Okay. But do you recall or were you aware of whether there

were any discussions between those members and their parent command

about whether the scope of their work for the mission would include

off-compound moves? For instance, did you ever hear, did the parent

command ever express concerns about increased risks to their members

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in supporting off-compound moves?

A I don't remember that, no.

Q Okay.

And just to close that out, as a part of that discussion, of

whether they were supporting the moves -- and you mentioned or we talked

about the work requirements that were created for them -- was there

a worry or concern that they would not fulfill their internal defense

role at that time?

A My concerns were they were not competent or professional

enough to fulfill their internal defense role. They may have tried

to do it, but I don't know how -- I didn't have the confidence that

they would be effective in doing it.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q I just want to catch up on a couple things that came up during

the interview today. One of them was back to the Emergency Action

Committee in mid-August. I think, coming out of that, one of the

options that was discussed was if there is a dangerous

situation; is that right?

A Yes.

Q Did you ever recommend, during the time you were in

Benghazi, due to some kind of an emergency? And I mean

that in terms of, like, that kind of a instead of, like,

a long-term-view sort of --

A Right, like a short-term.

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Q Yeah.

A I think we had discussed it regarding maybe one of the

Qadhafi anniversaries one of my last few days in country, but we didn't

do it. I don't remember why we decided not to do it, but we didn't.

Q And if you felt that the situation had become dangerous

enough that you needed to do it, would you have recommended doing it?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And so, during the time that you were there, is it

fair to say it was never dangerous enough that you would have decided

to do it, ?

A I never felt that there was a -- it was certainly very

dangerous. I never felt that there was a specific enough threat to

us that would necessitate us moving to the compound.

Q That's helpful.

I think also during the interview you said what I think is the

same thing in two different ways, but I want to make sure that I'm not

misunderstanding.

One of things that you said, and tell me if I'm just misstating

this, but one of the things I believe that you said is that you didn't

think that you could defend the compound. And, in other instances,

you said you didn't think you could defend the compound against a

coordinated attack.

Is that essentially the same thing?

A It is. I was qualifying it. I think we probably could have

defended the compound if we were encountering one or two attackers,

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but in the event of a large-scale, coordinated attack, it would've been

difficult.

Q And did you have a specific warning that there was going

to be a coordinated attack against the compound in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Did you have reason to believe that a coordinated attack

was likely on the compound while you were there?

A No.

Q And if you had thought that it was likely or that the risk

level of a coordinated attack was going up, would you have recommended

taking steps at that point, such as or evacuation or

something?

A Yes, certainly. I would've most likely recommended that

we leave Benghazi.

Q Okay.

I think in another instance, I think a couple of times, you sort

of described the recommended security requests, the physical security

requests that you made, and you said that you didn't think that if you

had gotten all of those things that it necessarily would have made a

difference in the particular attack that happened on September 11. Is

that accurate?

A Yes. I can't say for certainty whether it would have made

a difference. We've been attacked at various posts around the world

with even more security than what I was asking for, and it didn't make

a difference. So, like I said, I think it would have been safer. I

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can't say that it would have changed the end result.

Q And, while you were there, is it fair to say that you and

the people that you worked with worked very hard to try and make it

a safer place?

A Yes. That's a fair statement.

Q And would that include the people that you were working with

in Tripoli? Were they also trying to make the Benghazi compound a safer

place?

A Yes.

Q And would that include the people you were working with in

headquarters? Were they also trying to make the Benghazi compound a

safer place?

A I can't say for certain what they were doing in

headquarters, but I would say that the person I talked to, the desk

officer, was concerned with our safety.

Q That's ?

A Right. Yes.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So, at this point, we'll just shift gears. And I'll try

to do this as expeditiously as possible, but I have a list of allegations

that have been publicly made about Benghazi. I'd just like to walk

through some of those allegations with you and ask whether you have

any evidence to substantiate any of these.

It has been alleged that the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton,

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

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155

Congressman speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon

Panetta to stand down," close quote, and this resulted in the Defense

Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to, quote, "stand down," close quote, on

the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It's also been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence Secretary Clinton personally signed an

April 2012 cable denying security resources in Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

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spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011?

A No.

Q It has also been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," close quote, and they found, quote,

"no support for this allegation," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that U.S. facilities in Benghazi

were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria

or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and

appropriateness of that delay.

The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report

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concluding that the team was not ordered to, quote, "stand down," close

quote, but that instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground

over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

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158

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has also been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael

Morell altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks

for political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has also been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made

an intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk

shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

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159

Q It has also been alleged that the President of the United

States was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote,

on the night of the attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action,"

close quote.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close

quote, or, quote, "missing in action," close quote, on the night of

attacks?

A No.

Q It has also been alleged that a team of four military

personnel at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were

considering flying on a second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their

superiors to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military

officials have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered

to, quote, "remain in place," close quote, in Tripoli to provide

security and medical assistance at that location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that, quote, "there was no stand-down order

issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the

fight in Benghazi," close quote?

A No.

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160

Q It has also been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, former chairman

of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the

attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were,

how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

to deploy?

A No.

Mr. Kenny. Thank you.

And that concludes our interview. We'll go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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UNCLASSIFIED

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

-- George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense (1905)

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Diplomatic and Antiterrorism Act of

1986, 22 U.S.C. § 4831 et seq., (the “Act”), Secretary of State Hillary Rodham

Clinton convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB) for Benghazi to

examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11-12, 2012,

killings of four U.S. government personnel, including the U.S. Ambassador to

Libya, John Christopher Stevens, in Benghazi, Libya. A series of attacks on

September 11-12, 2012 involving arson, small-arms and machine-gun fire, and use

of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), grenades and mortars, focused on two U.S.

facilities in Benghazi, as well as U.S. personnel en route between the two facilities.

In addition, the attacks severely wounded two U.S. personnel, injured three Libyan

contract guards and resulted in the destruction and abandonment of both facilities –

the U.S. Special Mission compound (SMC) and Annex.

Four Board members were selected by the Secretary of State and one

member from the intelligence community (IC) was selected by the Director for

National Intelligence. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering served as Chairman, with

Admiral Michael Mullen as Vice Chairman. Additional members were Catherine

Bertini, Richard Shinnick, and Hugh Turner, who represented the IC.

The criminal investigation of the September 11-12, 2012, Benghazi attacks,

for which the statutory responsibility rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI), was still underway at the time of this report. The Board enjoyed excellent

cooperation with the Department of Justice and FBI throughout preparation of this

report. The key questions surrounding the identity, actions and motivations of the

perpetrators remain to be determined by the ongoing criminal investigation.

As called for by the Act, this report examines: whether the attacks were

security related; whether security systems and procedures were adequate and

implemented properly; the impact of intelligence and information availability;

whether any other facts or circumstances in these cases may be relevant to

appropriate security management of U.S. missions worldwide; and, finally,

whether any U.S. government employee or contractor, as defined by the Act,

breached her or his duty.

EXHIBIT 19

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

A series of terrorist attacks in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11-12, 2012,

resulted in the deaths of four U.S. government personnel, Ambassador Chris

Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; seriously wounded two

other U.S. personnel and injured three Libyan contract guards; and resulted in the

destruction and abandonment of the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex.

FINDINGS

In examining the circumstances of these attacks, the Accountability Review Board

for Benghazi determined that:

1. The attacks were security related, involving arson, small arms and machine gun

fire, and the use of RPGs, grenades, and mortars against U.S. personnel at two

separate facilities – the SMC and the Annex – and en route between them.

Responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities

and property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the

attacks. The Board concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks,

which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity.

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels

within two bureaus of the State Department (the “Department”) resulted in a

Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly

inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.

Security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a “shared

responsibility” by the bureaus in Washington charged with supporting the post,

resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security. That

said, Embassy Tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with

Washington for increased security for Special Mission Benghazi.

The short-term, transitory nature of Special Mission Benghazi’s staffing, with

talented and committed, but relatively inexperienced, American personnel often

on temporary assignments of 40 days or less, resulted in diminished

institutional knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity.

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Overall, the number of Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) security staff in

Benghazi on the day of the attack and in the months and weeks leading up to it

was inadequate, despite repeated requests from Special Mission Benghazi and

Embassy Tripoli for additional staffing. Board members found a pervasive

realization among personnel who served in Benghazi that the Special Mission

was not a high priority for Washington when it came to security-related

requests, especially those relating to staffing.

The insufficient Special Mission security platform was at variance with the

appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards with respect to

perimeter and interior security. Benghazi was also severely under-resourced

with regard to certain needed security equipment, although DS funded and

installed in 2012 a number of physical security upgrades. These included

heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area egress windows,

concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the

Villa C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications,

security cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an

Internal Defense Notification System.

Special Mission Benghazi’s uncertain future after 2012 and its “non-status” as a

temporary, residential facility made allocation of resources for security and

personnel more difficult, and left responsibility to meet security standards to the

working-level in the field, with very limited resources.

In the weeks and months leading up to the attacks, the response from post,

Embassy Tripoli, and Washington to a deteriorating security situation was

inadequate. At the same time, the SMC’s dependence on the armed but poorly

skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) militia members

and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for

security support was misplaced.

Although the February 17 militia had proven effective in responding to

improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the Special Mission in April and

June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its reliability in the months

and weeks preceding the September attacks. At the time of Ambassador

Stevens’ visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special

Mission vehicle movements in protest over salary and working hours.

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central government influence and control in Benghazi. The Libyan government

did facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the

evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. The Libyan

government also provided a military C-130 aircraft which was used to evacuate

remaining U.S. personnel and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi to

Tripoli on September 12.

The Board determined that U.S. personnel on the ground in Benghazi

performed with courage and readiness to risk their lives to protect their

colleagues, in a near impossible situation. The Board members believe every

possible effort was made to rescue and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean

Smith.

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not

enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference.

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical

warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence

community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential

threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist.

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two

bureaus demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in

their responses to security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given

the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable host government

protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable cause to determine that

any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

With the lessons of the past and the challenges of the future in mind, the Board

puts forward recommendations in six core areas: Overarching Security

Considerations; Staffing High Risk, High Threat Posts; Training and Awareness;

Security and Fire Safety Equipment; Intelligence and Threat Analysis; and

Personnel Accountability.

OVERARCHING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

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1. The Department must strengthen security for personnel and platforms beyond

traditional reliance on host government security support in high risk, high

threat1 posts. The Department should urgently review the proper balance

between acceptable risk and expected outcomes in high risk, high threat areas.

While the answer cannot be to refrain from operating in such environments, the

Department must do so on the basis of having: 1) a defined, attainable, and

prioritized mission; 2) a clear-eyed assessment of the risk and costs involved; 3)

a commitment of sufficient resources to mitigate these costs and risks; 4) an

explicit acceptance of those costs and risks that cannot be mitigated; and 5)

constant attention to changes in the situation, including when to leave and

perform the mission from a distance. The United States must be self-reliant and

enterprising in developing alternate security platforms, profiles, and staffing

footprints to address such realities. Assessments must be made on a case-bycase basis and repeated as circumstances change.

2. The Board recommends that the Department re-examine DS organization and

management, with a particular emphasis on span of control for security policy

planning for all overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities. In this context, the recent

creation of a new Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary for High

Threat Posts could be a positive first step if integrated into a sound strategy for

DS reorganization.

3. As the President’s personal representative, the Chief of Mission bears “direct

and full responsibility for the security of [his or her] mission and all the

personnel for whom [he or she is] responsible,” and thus for risk management

in the country to which he or she is accredited. In Washington, each regional

Assistant Secretary has a corresponding responsibility to support the Chief of

Mission in executing this duty. Regional bureaus should have augmented

support within the bureau on security matters, to include a senior DS officer to

report to the regional Assistant Secretary.

4. The Department should establish a panel of outside independent experts

(military, security, humanitarian) with experience in high risk, high threat areas

to support DS, identify best practices (from other agencies and other countries),

and regularly evaluate U.S. security platforms in high risk, high threat posts.

1 The Board defines “high risk, high threat” posts as those in countries with high to critical levels of political

violence and terrorism, governments of weak capacity, and security platforms that fall well below established

standards.

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UNCLASSIFIED

5. The Department should develop minimum security standards for occupancy of

temporary facilities in high risk, high threat environments, and seek greater

flexibility for the use of Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)

sources of funding so that they can be rapidly made available for security

upgrades at such facilities.

6. Before opening or re-opening critical threat or high risk, high threat posts, the

Department should establish a multi-bureau support cell, residing in the

regional bureau. The support cell should work to expedite the approval and

funding for establishing and operating the post, implementing physical security

measures, staffing of security and management personnel, and providing

equipment, continuing as conditions at the post require.

7. The Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs’ report of January 1999 called for

collocation of newly constructed State Department and other government

agencies’ facilities. All State Department and other government agencies’

facilities should be collocated when they are in the same metropolitan area,

unless a waiver has been approved.

8. The Secretary should require an action plan from DS, OBO and other relevant

offices on the use of fire as a weapon against diplomatic facilities, including

immediate steps to deal with urgent issues. The report should also include

reviews of fire safety and crisis management training for all employees and

dependents, safehaven standards and fire safety equipment, and

recommendations to facilitate survival in smoke and fire situations.

9. Tripwires are too often treated only as indicators of threat rather than an

essential trigger mechanism for serious risk management decisions and actions.

The Department should revise its guidance to posts and require key offices to

perform in-depth status checks of post tripwires.

10.Recalling the recommendations of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs, the

State Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost

Sharing Program at its full capacity, adjusted for inflation to approximately $2.2

billion in fiscal year 2015, including an up to ten-year program addressing that

need, prioritized for construction of new facilities in high risk, high threat areas.

It should also work with Congress to expand utilization of Overseas

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Contingency Operations funding to respond to emerging security threats and

vulnerabilities and operational requirements in high risk, high threat posts.

11.The Board supports the State Department’s initiative to request additional

Marines and expand the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program – as well as

corresponding requirements for staffing and funding. The Board also

recommends that the State Department and DoD identify additional flexible

MSG structures and request further resources for the Department and DoD to

provide more capabilities and capacities at higher risk posts.

STAFFING HIGH RISK, HIGH THREAT POSTS

12.The Board strongly endorses the Department’s request for increased DS

personnel for high- and critical-threat posts and for additional Mobile Security

Deployment teams, as well as an increase in DS domestic staffing in support of

such action.

13.The Department should assign key policy, program, and security personnel at

high risk, high threat posts for a minimum of one year. For less critical

personnel, the temporary duty length (TDY) length should be no less than 120

days. The ARB suggests a comprehensive review of human resources

authorities with an eye to using those authorities to promote sending more

experienced officers, including “When Actually Employed” (WAE) personnel,

to these high risk, high threat locations, particularly in security and management

positions for longer periods of time.

14.The Department needs to review the staffing footprints at high risk, high threat

posts, with particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff

(LES) and management support. High risk, high threat posts must be funded

and the human resources process prioritized to hire LES interpreters and

translators.

15.With increased and more complex diplomatic activities in the Middle East, the

Department should enhance its ongoing efforts to significantly upgrade its

language capacity, especially Arabic, among American employees, including

DS, and receive greater resources to do so.

TRAINING AND AWARENESS

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16.A panel of Senior Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents should revisit

DS high-threat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival

as well as Chief of Mission protective detail training.

17.The Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute should

collaborate in designing joint courses that integrate high threat training and risk

management decision processes for senior and mid-level DS agents and Foreign

Service Officers and better prepare them for leadership positions in high risk,

high threat posts. They should consult throughout the U.S. government for best

practices and lessons learned. Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training should

be mandatory for high risk, high threat posts, whether an individual is assigned

permanently or in longer-term temporary duty status.

SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY EQUIPMENT

18.The Department should ensure provision of adequate fire safety and security

equipment for safehavens and safe areas in non-Inman/SECCA2 facilities, as

well as high threat Inman facilities.

19.There have been technological advancements in non-lethal deterrents, and the

State Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identifies and procures

additional options for non-lethal deterrents in high risk, high threat posts and

trains personnel on their use.

20.DS should upgrade surveillance cameras at high risk, high threat posts for

greater resolution, nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond post.

INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS

21.Post-2001, intelligence collection has expanded exponentially, but the Benghazi

attacks are a stark reminder that we cannot over-rely on the certainty or even

likelihood of warning intelligence. Careful attention should be given to factors

showing a deteriorating threat situation in general as a basis for improving

2 “Inman buildings” are diplomatic facilities that meet the mandatory minimum physical security

standards established after the 1985 Inman Report about the 1983 Embassy and Marine barracks

bombings in Lebanon. “SECCA” refers to the Secure Embassy Construction and

Counterterrorism Act of 1999, passed by Congress after the 1998 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam

Embassy bombings. SECCA mandated setback and other standards for newly acquired

diplomatic facilities.

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security posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and used to sharpen risk

calculations.

22.The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis should report directly to the

DS Assistant Secretary and directly supply threat analysis to all DS

components, regional Assistant Secretaries and Chiefs of Mission in order to

get key security-related threat information into the right hands more rapidly.

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY

23.The Board recognizes that poor performance does not ordinarily constitute a

breach of duty that would serve as a basis for disciplinary action but is instead

addressed through the performance management system. However, the Board

is of the view that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior

officials in relation to the security incident under review should be a potential

basis for discipline recommendations by future ARBs, and would recommend a

revision of Department regulations or amendment to the relevant statute to this

end.

24. The Board was humbled by the courage and integrity shown by those on the

ground in Benghazi and Tripoli, in particular the DS agents and Annex team

who defended their colleagues; the Tripoli response team which mobilized

without hesitation; those in Benghazi and Tripoli who cared for the wounded;

and the many U.S. government employees who served in Benghazi under

difficult conditions in the months leading up to the September 11-12 attacks.

We trust that the Department and relevant agencies will take the opportunity to

recognize their exceptional valor and performance, which epitomized the

highest ideals of government service.

557

INTERVIEW OF

PRINCIPAL OFFICER #4

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 8, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

BRENT WOOLFORK, Minority Senior Professional Staff

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

FOR PRINCIPAL OFFICER #4

RAEKA SAFAI

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Ms. Clarke. This is a transcribed interview of

conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview

is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation

into the attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya and

related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress

and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress. Could the witness please

state your name for the record.

Mr. .

Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. The committee

appreciates your appearance at this interview today. My name is Sheria

Clarke. I'm with the committee's majority staff, and we're just going

to take an opportunity for everyone in the room to introduce themselves.

We'll start with you.

Ms. Safai. Sure. Raeka Safai, AFSA.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Mr. Davis. I'm Carlton Davis. I work for Mr. Gowdy.

Mr. Woolfork. Brent Woolfork on the minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority.

Ms. Jackson. And I'm Sharon Jackson. I'm with majority staff

also.

Mr. . And the transcriber. Your name?

Court Reporter. Catalina.

Mr. Catalina, nice to meet you.

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4

Ms. Clarke. And before we begin, I'll go -- I'd like to go over

some ground rules and explain how the interview will proceed. The way

the questioning proceeds is that a member from the majority will ask

questions for up to an hour and the majority will have an opportunity

to do so if they choose. We firmly adhere to the 1-hour time limit

for each side. Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee

or designated staff member.

We'll rotate back and forth, 1 hour per side until we're out of

questions and the interview will be over. Unlike a testimony or a

deposition in Federal court, the committee format is not bound by the

rules of the evidence. The witness or their counsel may raise

objections for privilege subject to a review by the chairman of the

committee. If these objections can't be resolved, then the interview

of the witness may be required to return for a deposition or hearing.

Members and staff of the committee are not permitted to raise

objections when the other side is asking questions. This hasn't been

an issue we've encountered, but I just wanted to make sure you were

clear on the process.

Mr. Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. We are going to begin our discussion in an

unclassified setting. If there are questions that you're asked that

you believe will require a classified answer, please let us know, and

we will reserve it -- reserve the answer until we move into a classified

setting.

You're welcome to confer with your counsel at any time throughout

562
5

the interview, but if something needs to be clarified, we ask that you

make that known to us, and if you need to discuss anything with your

counsel, we're happy to go off the record and give you an opportunity

to do so.

Also, we'd like to take a break when it's convenient for you.

This can be after every hour of questioning or after a couple of rounds,

whatever you prefer. During a round of questioning, if you need

anything, some water, we have water here, we also have coffee available.

If you need to use the facilities, or again, confer with your counsel,

please let us know and we'll stop the clock and allow you do so.

As you can see, an official reporter is taking down everything

that's said today. We ask that you give verbal responses to all

questions, yes and no answers as opposed to nods of the head, and I'm

going to ask the reporter to feel free to jump in in case you do respond

nonverbally.

Mr. Sure.

Ms. Clarke. Also, we'll try not to talk over each other so it's

easier for the reporter to get a clear record. We want you to answer

our questions in the most complete and truthful manner, so we'll take

our time, repeat the questions if need be, or clarify the questions

as well. And if you have any questions or you don't understand

something that's being asked of you, please let us know, and we're happy

to clarify.

If you don't know the answer to the question or you don't remember,

it's best not to guess. So just give us your best recollection, and

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6

if there are things you don't know or can't remember, just say so and

inform us of someone who you think may be able to answer those questions

better.

You're required to answer questions from Congress truthfully.

Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Clarke. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Clarke. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Clarke. Is there any reason you are unavailable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. . No ma'am.

Ms. Clarke. Okay. So those are the end of my introductions.

Does the minority have anything that they would like to add?

Ms. Sawyer. Just briefly. It's our understanding and it was

conveyed to us and the majority that Ms. Safai, on behalf of her client,

would ask that we proceed in a classified setting from the get-go, and

that was the client's request, and certainly would help him not to have

to worry about policing the line between things that might be classified

or unclassified.

As with a prior request, the ranking member fully supports that

564
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request. Our primary goal here is to allow the witnesses, in a

comfortable environment, to answer fully all the questions that we

pose. It's our understanding as well, though, that we can move to a

classified setting whenever needed, so we would certainly encourage

you, Mr. , to let us know when you feel more comfortable

answering questions in a classified setting, and we will accommodate

that, and we'll go from there. And I don't know if you had anything

to add, Ms. Safai.

Ms. Safai. No, we would just reiterate our request to move to

a classified setting, but yes, we understand that there is one available

if we need to, so thank you.

Ms. Clarke. There is a classified setting available; however,

we've conducted three interviews of individuals that held the same

position as you have, Mr. , and we conducted the majority of

those interviews in an unclassified setting.

Mr. . May I ask what position was that?

Ms. Clarke. As principal officer in Benghazi.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. And we have also structured our questions today

around documents that are marked as unclassified, and so we hope to

be able to proceed through the majority of our questions in an

unclassified manner. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. And just to add for the record that the majority

staff is committed to not produce -- producing unnecessarily

overclassified and improperly classified information, and that is one

565
8

of the reasons it is a goal of this administration, it's a goal of the

State Department not to overclassify information, and we are fully

committed to following that path.

Mr. . Absolutely. One point on that, though, is I've

held more than one position in Libya.

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. . Including the deputy chief of mission position,

and so I'm going to have a difficult time jumping from one phase of

life into another while we go through 2 years or whatever period of

time we cover in this. So there is information that I have, compared

to the other two principal officers that you may have talked to, that's

probably classified above their levels.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. And that's fine. Again, if there are questions that

we ask and you feel that it requires a classified answer, we'll reserve

those for the classified setting later.

Ms. Jackson. All you have to do, is have to do is say, "I think

we should explore that in a different setting," and we'll take that

as our cue to reserve it at this time.

Mr. . And everyone in this room has a security

clearance?

Ms. Jackson. Everybody up to TS?

Ms. Sawyer. All three of us are TS/SCI.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And all of us are at least TS. This room

is only up to the secret level, though.

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Mr. Evers. But this transcript is unclassified.

Ms. Jackson. This part of it will be unclassified. We have the

option to moving to a location that will take up to TS/SCI for any

discussion that warrants that.

Mr. Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. Okay. With that, we'll begin our questions.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q I just wanted to start just a little bit with your

background, when you started with the State Department and kind of your

roles and assignments after you started.

A I started in March 2002 with the State Department. I was

assigned to Turkey as a political and consular officer. Then to

Armenia as a political and consular officer. I served in Armenia as

a Peace Corps volunteer before that, so it was a return to that country.

I came back to Washington and served on the Cuba desk in the Office

of the Coordinator for Cuban affairs. I went to the Foreign Service

Institute for a year of language training in Arabic here in

Virginia -- in Virginia, and then went to Cairo for 1 year. Then from

Cairo -- I'm sorry. Previous to that, I was in Iraq and Baghdad, and

then language training, then Cairo, then Libya.

Q Okay. And when did you begin your time in Libya?

A In 2000 -- in June of 2012.

Q And what was your position in Libya?

A My assignment was the -- to be the political chief, the

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10

political consular at the U.S. Embassy there.

Q And were you on a 1-year assignment to Libya?

A No, ma'am. That was a 2-year assignment.

Q 2 years. Okay. And during your time in Libya, did you

have the opportunity to spend -- to travel to Benghazi?

A I did.

Q Okay. Prior to going to Benghazi, what did you know about

the mission in Benghazi as far as its purpose and the role that you

would serve during your time in Benghazi?

A So the mission in Benghazi was separate and distinct from

the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. There had been short staffing, and I was

selected to go out to Benghazi to cover a gap in a series of acting

principal officers. It was more, however, an opportunity to do some

political reporting and to learn about the east of the country, which

is quite different from the west as you probably all have heard.

Different -- different opportunities to get a different perspective

from the country.

Q Now, your role in Tripoli was going to be the political

chief, but you were going to serve as the acting principal officer in

Benghazi. Can you kind of describe what the differences would be in

those two roles?

A Yes. The political officer in Tripoli at that time was in

charge of a roughly three- to five-person shop. Essentially it's

junior political officers, economic officers, and local employees.

The purpose of a political officer, as in any embassy, is to collect

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and report information about the political scene, the economic scene

in a country, especially in Libya. There was not a lot of -- after

a 35- or 40-year hiatus in reporting there, it was an important job.

I was very excited to take it.

And the -- in the role of acting principal officer, as with many

assignments in Libya, it was not just for one specific duty. It was

to continue the operations of the mission there, but it was to

capitalize on the opportunity to do the same types of political work,

political reporting that I'd done in Tripoli and to get a different

perspective of the country.

Like I said, Benghazi was the place where the revolution started.

It was an important and relatively unknown region of the country, and

so we were there to -- I was there to add a little more definition to

our understanding of what was going on in Libya.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You said that there was a separate and distinct mission in

Benghazi. Could you elaborate on that?

A Yes, ma'am. Let's see. So you know, from my

understanding, and I was not involved in the discussions about what

made the special mission a special mission, or what made it not a

consulate, but it was a different office. It was a satellite office,

and the lines of reporting and in other tours that I've been in, I've

seen many different formulas for how responsibility is -- is given or

taken by a mission, by a consulate in a country. This one seemed to

not be very clear to me. I didn't -- I wasn't clear on where the

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reporting lines were.

Q So would some reporting go straight back to D.C.?

A Yes, ma'am, and some would go back to -- well, all

would -- all would go to both places, I would say. I mean, in general.

The idea was to share -- was to share as much information with

Washington, which was helping monitor, track, and kind of task the

mission, and of course, Tripoli, which was also -- you know, and Libya

and working towards the same goals.

Q In other places you had been, would you see more of a

satellite or consulate office going back to the main embassy and then

up to Washington? I'm just trying to get a feel for how it was

different.

A So for example, I just traveled to Israel not too long ago,

and the consulate in Jerusalem, the principal officer there, the

consular general reports directly to the Department of State, not to

the Ambassador in Tel-Aviv. So I think it varies from place to place,

and you just have to understand those things when you go to a new

mission.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q When you arrived in Tripoli in June, did you serve in a

different role other than the political chief?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And what was that role?

A That role was Acting Deputy Chief of Mission while we waited

for the deputy chief of mission as the permanent assignee to come to

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13

Libya.

Q And how long did you serve in that role?

A Roughly from my arrival -- 4 or 5 days after my arrival,

there was a hand-off between the DCM at the time, , to

the arrival of Mr. Greg Hicks, who came in August maybe. I don't

remember the exact date that he arrived, but from that time where he

was -- when he was not there, I would be the acting.

Q And he -- but he arrived prior to your time in Benghazi,

correct?

A He did, yes.

Q Do you recall whether it was a significant amount of time

or close in time?

A We're talking August, right?

Q Uh-huh.

A And I was in Benghazi in September.

Q Right.

A So however you define significant, sounds like a matter of

weeks.

Q Okay. And in your role as DCM, we were just kind of

discussing the reporting and how items -- information from Benghazi

was reported back to Tripoli and back to D.C. In your role as DCM,

were you a conduit for information from Benghazi to D.C.?

A At points. In my role as Acting Deputy Chief of Mission,

there was generally, I would say, daily, almost daily, if not, three-way

phone call that happened where the NEA/MAG office, Maghreb Affairs

571
14

Office at NEA at the State Department hosted the phone call. Tripoli

reported on activities in Tripoli, which was usually my responsibility

to do. The principal officer in Benghazi, whoever that was at the time,

we can talk about different times, would also report to the office,

to the NEA/MAG office, and we would share that information. The

purpose was to keep the country team together.

Q And you said how often did these phone calls occur?

A Roughly daily. I mean, sometimes I think there was -- you

know, there might have been, for instance, a codel or something that

came into town that prohibited that -- that just didn't allow us the

time to do it, but it was -- you know, someone were to go back and look

at my Outlook, they would see a specifically scheduled time, 1:30 in

the afternoon, I think. I'm not sure about that, but repeating daily

calendar event that set that up for us.

Q So this phone call would have been you, an individual from

the Maghreb desk, and then, in June, possibly Ms. ,

?

A In June, that sounds right, yes, ma'am.

Q And then in August, ?

A , yes, ma'am.

Q Was there a period in time -- a gap in time between Ms.

departure from Benghazi and Mr. arrival in

Benghazi?

A Ma'am, I don't recall for sure.

Q Okay. Before going to Tripoli, were you required to

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15

complete the foreign affairs counterterrorism training?

A Yes, ma'am. However, I completed it for the trip to

Baghdad, for the tour in Baghdad, and it was still valid. I think it's

got a 5-year validity to it.

Q Okay. You said that you were selected to go to Benghazi

to fill in the gap of time between principal officers. Who selected

you to fill that role?

A Ultimately, it would have been Ambassador Stevens. There

was a lot of discussion around it, I think, as we tried to -- this was

a repeating theme for time in Tripoli and for Benghazi, who can we get

to cover this unstaffed position, whether it was in Tripoli or Benghazi,

and so there was always a discussion about how do we fill this, how

do we fill that, and so I don't remember the specifics. I don't

remember Ambassador Stevens, you know, presenting me a medal and

saying, "Please go to Benghazi," but there was an affirmative position

that I would -- and I volunteered to go. I was excited to go.

Q Did you overlap at all? Did your time in Benghazi overlap

with Mr. or did you have an opportunity to speak to Mr.

before he left Libya?

A So again, we were talking every day, roughly, by phone. I

delayed my departure, I think, a day so that he could transit through

Tripoli and I could meet with him so we could discuss the situation.

In a handover, that's a typical State Department practice, a person

leaving hands over a memo or a -- you know, at least the knowledge of

what they've gained while they've been there to the person who's coming

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16

in, so we set up a time to do that. I think there was some schedule

conflicts that turned up, and I ended up having to delay my departure

a day so that his delayed departure from Benghazi would overlap in

Tripoli, and so, yes, ma'am, we did meet.

Q And what was -- can you provide us details about that

meeting, what did you discuss about the situation in Benghazi as far

as the security environment, as far as your role, what your role would

be there?

A What we usually do is have a handover document that has

details about what the sitting officer, the departing officer thinks

are the most important things to cover. There was a -- we had an email

exchange a few times about those. I don't remember details from that.

You may have a document that has that in it, but I -- you know, we

discussed in general what he saw as important --

Q Okay.

A -- issues out there.

Q I do have the handover notes, and you can go ahead and take

a look at that. So I'm going to mark exhibit 1.

A It looks like rules of evidence there.

Q Just a way to keep track of it.

Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Evers. Should we get copies?

Ms. Clarke. Yes. Sorry. That's all I have.

Mr. Evers. Thanks.

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17

Ms. Jackson. Okay. I've read it.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So what I've handed you has been marked as exhibit 1, and

it's Doc ID No. 05390852. It's an email from to you

dated Wednesday, August 29, 2012, entitled "Benghazi hand-off Notes."

And do you recall receiving this document?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Have you had an opportunity to review this document recently

other than today?

A Yes, ma'am, I have.

Q And so is this the document that you're referring to as far

as hand-off notes that you would have discussed with Mr. ?

A Yes, ma'am, this is part of it. There is a separate section

that discusses a request for specific meetings. It's probably a reply

to this, to this email.

Q Okay.

A Asking for the mission there to help facilitate meetings

that I had been asked by both Ambassador Stevens to conduct, and also

meetings that I was interested in conducting myself.

Q Okay. And before we go into the document, let me step back

just a second, and as far as the calls that you had with the Maghreb

desk, who was the individual that you usually spoke with in D.C.?

A So there were two. One was , ,

and the other was . was the director of the

NEA/MAG office, and was the deputy director. And just as in

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18

Benghazi, just as in Tripoli, sometimes one day one was available, one

wasn't, so they covered for one another. I covered -- I conducted most

of the phone calls from Tripoli, but sometimes people covered for me

and same with Benghazi with .

Q Were the calls usually just with one of the individuals

or --

A Sometimes. This is when my memory is a little bit foggy

because later on, we instituted a system where we essentially did the

same type of call from Tripoli to Libya where we included all of the

political and economic officers. Sometimes we would bring in the

security officers. And in those times, right at the beginning, I don't

remember if we ever had a -- another party on the line. It would not

have been atypical to do that, but I don't -- I mean, I can't think

of a specific instance when I can think of someone.

Q You said you instituted a call from Tripoli to Libya, did

you mean from Tripoli to D.C.?

A I mean Tripoli to D.C., yes, ma'am.

Q Returning to exhibit 1, in the paragraph marked "Security,"

Mr. writes -- it talks about, discusses the local QRF. Can

you tell us who those individuals were or what the QRF was and what

their role was supposed to be in Benghazi?

A So there were two QRFs. The local QRF was the local members

of the February 17th militia, who resided on the Benghazi compound.

They also had a QRF at the February 17 main compound that was supposed

to be a second fallback security measure, as I recall.

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19

Q Do you recall how many individuals resided on the compound?

A Yes, ma'am. There was a constant number of four that may

vary by night, but it was -- there were four beds and they were supposed

to be four people.

Q So Mr. is discussing -- it says "The QRF was

originally retained under a contract with the 17 February militia, and

we have continued to operate under its terms, although it's lapsed

several weeks ago. This is a delicate issue as we are relying on a

militia in lieu of the central authorities, and 2/17 has been implicated

in several of the recent detentions."

Did you all -- did you have a discussion with Mr. about

his view on relying on militia in lieu of central authorities?

A Yes, ma'am, and it basically tracked what's written here.

Q And what did you -- what was your view about relying on the

militia?

A So part of being a political officer is always being

suspicious, always trying to answer questions, to ask the right

questions, and to get answers to the right questions. This was no

different. You know, he had expressed some concern. I entered -- I

stepped into that situation the same way and wanted to find out what

their role was, how they were operating, were they performing, were

they capable, but this was one of, you know, hundreds of different tasks

we had in the 7 days I was assigned to be there, so --

Q And you said 7 days you were assigned to be there. You were

initially assigned seven days but you extended your time?

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20

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And why did you extend your time or what prompted the need

for you to stay longer?

A So maybe to step back, you had asked me why I had gone out

there. I mean, there were multiple reasons, and I've explained some

of those already. The other was to advance the Ambassador's trip to

Benghazi, of course. I mean, that's what this was what all about.

The -- I'm sorry, I lost track of the question again.

Q What -- I asked you what your initial schedule was for

7 days --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- but you extended for 10.

A So for 7 days I was to be there and do reporting and help

set up meetings with the Ambassador in addition to my own work and -- so

I'm trying to remember the details. I'm sorry. It is a little bit

fuzzy. At one point, I went to the airport to return to Tripoli. The

plane just wasn't flying that day, and that was -- you know, that was

a typical -- it was a typical problem in Libya. I think it was a

mechanical failure or something like this. The next day I went back

and the pilot had overslept. And I think on the third day -- also,

complicating this trip, because of the limited number of security

officers in Benghazi, we had to make it such that we picked up the

Ambassador. We got me in the air first before the Ambassador came in

so that the security officers wouldn't have to be split watching me

at one terminal and the Ambassador coming in at another. You

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21

understand what I'm saying?

Q Yes.

A So there was a degree of coordination that made leaving

Benghazi even more difficult than the degree of difficulties with the

airlines, with the Libyan airlines. So that was on the beginning,

couple of delays. Then I think Ambassador Stevens asked me to stay

a little bit later when he -- you know, when he changed his plans. His

plans were kind of fluid, and he had been traveling, and there was a

lot going on in Tripoli, understandably, to keep him busy there, so

he didn't have a hard time to arrive and wanted me to stay until he

got there.

Q Was there any -- were you aware of any particular reason

why the Ambassador delayed his trip to Benghazi until the 10th?

A Any particular reason? Yes. I think he had -- he had

scheduled some personal travel, and he had attended a wedding somewhere

outside of Libya and was coming -- maybe came back late. I don't know

the details about it. I was in Benghazi and he was trying to get back

to Tripoli.

Also, I don't have details on this or I can't recall them, but

we had planned to have the Ambassador travel to Benghazi earlier, and

I don't remember how much earlier. I'm thinking weeks actually, and

then things came up. The national elections for the first time in the

history of modern Libya that required him to be in Tripoli, and there

were other reasons to put off. I don't know all of them, but -- so

things were moving. It was a very fluid time for 2 years in Libya.

579
22

Q Okay. So just going back to the QRF. You mentioned

earlier that as the principal and political officer, your role is

somewhat to be suspicious and to ask questions. When you arrived in

Benghazi, did you have an assessment of the QRF that are on the compound,

and what were your thoughts about them as far as their ability to fulfill

their role?

A Sure. So first of all, you know, Benghazi was completely

new to me. I had not traveled there before, so the first set of

questions is around the staff members who were there, the Americans,

and trying to assess their abilities. The State Department does not

always fill the best people in the world, I will say that. These were

the best people in the world. They were excellent, but it took a little

bit of time to -- you know, to get to know them. One acting -- the

acting regional security officer there -- so we're all acting, right?

The acting PAO, the acting PO, the acting regional security officer,

the acting assistant regional security officers were excellent. I

took a train walk with them the first day. We -- they introduced me

to the February 17th people. In fact, one of the February 17th QRF

individuals or officers was at the airport when they picked me up, so

I met him there.

And it was just -- you know, as when you walk into any new terrain,

you have to assess what the situation is. I talked -- I met with them,

we played football, we did some training, we talked about their roles

and what their responsibilities were in the case of an attack, and that

was one element of numerous different security elements that we had

580
23

there.

Q And what was your assessment of the QRF members during your

time in Benghazi?

A My assessment of the QRF members?

Q Yes.

A One, in particular, was very useful to us, and this

was -- I'm now parroting what I heard from our -- from the ARSOs who

I trusted completely. He was very helpful to us because he was not

only well-known throughout the city, he was also a member of one of

the main tribes that controlled a lot of the security checkpoints around

the -- around the mission there, and so he was able to jump out of the

car when we came up on the checkpoint and talk with his friends in most

cases who were manning the checkpoint and allow us to pass, and so he

was quite helpful in that respect.

In other terms, I'm not the person to judge the skills and

abilities of a specific bodyguard or a security officer. That's

not -- that's not something that I'm an expert in, so I'd hate to judge

that. I relied more on our assistant regional security officer who

was there who did not express any additional concerns to me other than

the ones that you've showed me in this document.

Q The one QRF member that you just described, do you recall

his name?

A .

Q And I understand as the principal -- acting principal

officer that it's not your role to assess their capabilities, but you

581
24

described how you trusted the RSO individuals that were there. Did

you share the same feelings towards the QRF members?

A No, ma'am, and I don't think anyone could have developed

that level of knowledge in 7 or 10 days out there. I didn't have

any -- I had nothing to point me in the direction of being suspicious

about their motives, but like I said, I mean, you're -- when you go

into a high threat post and when you are there essentially alone with,

you know, very few people, you do question everything, and I think

that's a natural response, and that's what I did.

Q When you arrived in Benghazi, can you kind of describe what

the mission -- the compound was like, kind of how you viewed it or your

assessment, the differences between the compound in Benghazi versus

Tripoli, or even just the -- what you had as resources in Benghazi versus

what you had as resources in Tripoli?

A You know, so the first thing that was apparent from arriving

at the airport is I don't remember the numbers, but whatever they were,

three of the ARSOs, or two of the ARSOs were at the airport and that

left only one or two back at the mission which has four walls, right,

so -- I mean, that's an initial question, how -- how are we manning

this? How are we able to support it? I had known already that we were

short on staff. It was my perception that we were short on staff out

there, and so, you know, I was -- I landed with the expectation that

I would limit my movements, that I would remain on compound when we

could hold meetings there. Some meetings we had to go off compound

for.

582
25

In terms of the security, I mean, I think there was -- there was

definitely a feeling that the compound was the safe place to be in in

Benghazi. Tall walls, you know, bars on the windows, heavy doors,

steel gates, T-walls outside, razor wire on top of the facility walls,

cameras, a beautiful garden, a beautiful lawn, three or four villas,

17 acres, something like that. I mean, I don't know the exact

dimensions but located on a dirt road in the middle of a fascinating

town.

Q You said your perception was that the mission was

short-staffed. Can you elaborate?

A That's a general feeling around the world, right. I have

not served in a mission where I have not had two jobs where there should

be two people doing those jobs, and this was the same there from the

security to the political officers to -- I mean, I was the acting

principal officer, the political officer, and the acting DCM at one

point, right.

After the evacuations, we lost our economics officer and we lost

our political officer, so I was essentially the political section for

most of the time I was there. That is a recurring problem in every

post that I've been to, except for Iraq.

Q But specifically regarding Benghazi, did you have

any -- regarding Benghazi and the number of security RSO agents that

were in Benghazi at the time, were you aware of a specific number that

should have been there versus the number that were there?

A So with the discussions, the number five was always floating

583
26

around. I don't know the origin of that number. That was what came

from the regional security officer, in the beginning.

I wasn't part of those discussions, but, you know, the -- what you see

in this document and I think what you probably heard from other people

is that the more robust the security, the better, right? And the more

trustworthy the security, the better. And I felt like, you know, we

don't know the environment around us. I was there to find out a little

bit more about it.

had done a good job. had done a good job. You

know, Libya had been closed to us for 40 years almost, so I didn't know

the environment well, and I didn't have a baseline to compare how many

people we should have. I just had come from Iraq, though, and I can

tell you in Iraq we were -- you know, we had 100 ARSOs at the time I

was there, 100. I had what, five on -- four on campus, three on campus

when I arrived? It just didn't feel right.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have discussions with the DS agents that were on

ground in Benghazi about their assessment as to the adequacy of their

numbers?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And could you describe those conversations for us?

A Not really. I mean, again, the general environment and the

general perception was we need more help on everything, not just

security, but if we're going to man this mission, we need more people

there. And so it was somewhere along those lines. I mean, the -- the

584
27

general practice there was drills, drills, drills. Drills for the QRF,

drills for the Blue Mountain Group guards, drills for the ARSOs,

readiness, preparedness; I mean, it was -- it's a high-threat post,

so there was a level of security that, you know, you don't -- for

instance, in , I rarely saw American security officers walking

around with M-4s. In Tripoli, we saw it much more. In Benghazi, those

guys had their weapons with them. In fact, checked me out on a 12-gauge

shotgun so --

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Well, and you just said that they checked you out a 12-gauge

shotgun. Did you carry that with you or was that in your --

A I was -- ready in the safe.

Q Where was the safe located? Was it in your quarters?

A It was in the same -- I've forgotten the villa designators,

A, B, and C. The TOC villa, whichever one it was, so there was a couple

of rooms. They were just getting a hard door put on it.

Q Did they provide that to you upon your arrival?

A I asked for it, and they facilitated, yes.

Q What prompted you to ask for it?

A Again, you know, I'm not -- I'm not going to take chances

that I don't have to. So I just felt like it would be something that

would be helpful to know.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Is that something you're proficient with, firearms?

A No, ma'am.

585
28

Q Did they undertake any training with you on that weapon?

A Yes, ma'am, just to show loading and unloading, things like

that.

Q I grew up in the country.

A I did, too.

Q We had guns around. So I mean, were you generally

familiar --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- with weapons?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. So it wasn't a totally new and novel experience --

A Right.

Q -- for you to have --

A That's correct.

Q -- to use a firearm. Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Returning to exhibit 1, under "Management Issues," it's

down at the bottom of your page. Mr. writes, "We're treading

water here. are looking at long-term options

for co-location and have had reps from agencies out here to conduct

site surveys." Did you participate in any discussions about extending

the length of the mission in Benghazi past December?

A Did I participate? No, ma'am. I mean, I knew that this

was a discussion point, but I was not part of the -- part of the

discussion.

586
29

Q Did you have any views about whether the mission should be

extended?

A No, ma'am. You know, I was in Benghazi to learn what I could

and hadn't had time to make an assessment.

Q Okay. So prior to your arrival in Benghazi, on -- I believe

on August 30th, the government of Libya announced a maximum state of

alert. Were you aware of that?

A Yes, ma'am. That was in reporting from Mr. .

Q And what was your understanding of that announcement? What

prompted that announcement?

A I think the general insecurity and instability in the city,

but I don't think that Mr. even had the full details. I mean,

we were trying to -- again, the Libyan government may just make an

announcement with no details and go into an emergency situation that

doesn't explain why or why they would come off of it, so there -- you

know, there had been assassinations, there had been protests, there

had been all types of instability in Benghazi, and I think the general

assumption was that the state of emergency was based on those spouting

activities.

Q Do you recall whether that state of emergency was still in

place upon your arrival in Benghazi?

A It was, yes, ma'am.

Q And when you arrived, did you have any discussion with the

security agents about the mission's response to that maximum state

of -- or maximum state of alert as far as how -- whether the mission

587
30

had changed its profile or whether it would no longer conduct meetings

off campus?

A Not specifically about that, no, ma'am. The general

environment, again, was such that there were assassinations and

protests and instability in the city, and the Libyan government loosely

announcing and hardly defining a state of emergency was not, was not

an indicator to us of, you know, additional problems. We were already

ramped up for security as much as we could be.

In terms of the off-compound movements, you know, it started out

with Ambassador Stevens asking me to take a couple of regional trips

from Benghazi out into some surrounding cities, and that was to be a

decision I would make once I got out there based on the security we

had at the compound, the general environment, and you know, it became

quite apparent to me very quickly that it was too risky to take a trip

off -- you know, outside of the city, and the return on that, meeting

a few local council members or meeting with security officials there

would not really justify those trips, so I canceled those.

Q Where were those trips to?

A Ambassador Stevens had some friends in Marj, which is a city

south, I believe. I didn't go there, so I'm not exactly clear on where

it is. Ajdabiya, those two cities later turned out to be kind of hot

beds of extremist groups, and it just was -- it was too far afield to

justify going to.

Q Did Ambassador Stevens give you an indication of why he

wanted you to travel to those cities?

588
31

A Again, the primary mission of the State Department, most

of these high-threat posts is to find out what's going on, and

especially in a place like Libya where it's been closed to us for

40 years, you know. An American, an official American hasn't been to

these cities in that time, probably longer, maybe even ever.

So it's a -- it's an opportunity to form relationships, to learn

about what's going on, to help the nascent government that's coming

up understand its own problems. I mean, there's a lot of reasons that

the State Department does what we do, and that was consistent with all

of them, representing America.

Q Returning back to the maximum state of alert. Was

there -- were you aware, or was there a discussion that it may have

been related to the September 1st anniversary regarding Qadhafi -- an

anniversary related to the Qadhafi regime?

A Loosely, yes, ma'am. No other details than that

essentially.

Q When you arrived --

A And again, that's one data point and daily assassinations,

all of the other problems.

Q When you arrived in Benghazi, did the RSOs indicate to you

that they had done anything differently regarding the September 1st

anniversary as opposed to how they usually responded?

A I don't recall. I will say standard practice is to -- you

know, when there is an understanding of a significant day or a -- you

know, a large problem in a city, the standard practice is to restrict

589
32

movement and to conduct meetings on the compound. September 1st was

probably my first day in Benghazi. I think I arrived then, so they

had to have gone to the airport to move off campus, but I don't recall

any very specific details about additional measures they had taken.

Q Do you recall them discussing staying up all night?

A I do, yes, ma'am.

Q And can you elaborate on that?

A No, ma'am.

Q Did they stay --

A They had stayed up -- no, ma'am. I don't have any other

details on that. They stayed up concerned about the security situation

and I suppose wanted to be awake to protect the mission. I don't know.

Q So upon your -- what I thought we might do is just walk

through your time period in Benghazi from when you arrived, and we'll

discuss different exhibits that relate to certain of the days.

So upon your arrival in Benghazi on the 1st, do you recall meetings

that you had or activities that took place on that first day that you

arrived?

A On the first day I arrived, we were met at the airport by

a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Protocol Office,

so I guess the moment I landed, I had my first meeting, said hello.

They were happy to have an official American from Tripoli.

In terms of other meetings, honestly, quite honestly, we went

directly back to the mission, and I don't recall the timeline of most

of those dates there. I mean, we conducted dozens of meetings, you

590
33

know, around specific themes, essentially, and security was certainly

one of them, probably the most important, but also the political

environment, the economic environment. So in general, I'd say we

conducted dozens of meetings, but --

Q So upon your arrival, you indicated that you thought there

were three RSO agents stationed in Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am. And I shouldn't say numbers. I don't -- I

remember and and .

Q And were there other -- we've discussed the QRF and you also

briefly mentioned the Blue Mountain Group, which were the local guard

force. Were there -- and just for the reporter, if you would respond

verbally?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Thank you. And then for the -- were there other individuals

employed by the mission during your time in Benghazi?

A Other mission employees. Yes, there were Americans in with

the embassy, were employed at the embassy with the mission.

Q And who were those individuals or --

A Gosh.

Q Were there -- were they Americans? You were the acting

principal officer. Were there other -- was there an IMO?

A Yes, ma'am, there was an IMO, and again, a temporary duty

person. I believe there might have been even two at different times.

I don't -- I don't recall. Other Americans, though, at the -- assigned

specifically to the Benghazi Special Mission run by the State

591
34

Department, there were -- I don't remember the Americans being there.

Sean Smith came later, but not when I was -- not when I first arrived.

Q Did you have a Libyan employee that helped arrange meetings?

A .

Q . And then were you -- were you aware of another

employee, ?

A .

Q . And so what were their roles, if you can

describe that?

A I think it's mentioned -- did I see it in here?

is an intermittent presence, more of a consultant than an employee.

That's how characterized him, and I -- again, you just ask

questions. Well, what does that mean? Who are you? He seemed to be

well connected in the community. He was a -- everyone was a friend

of Ambassador Stevens if you talked to them. also claimed to

be a good friend of the Ambassador. Ambassador Stevens did mention

him as a friend, so they had gone back a long way, and you know, his

tales of his help to American citizens in distress are quite renown,

including the pilot who was shot down during NATO operation, or the

pilot who ended up on Libyan soil during NATO operations.

But he was a facilitator, a helper, a translator, a -- you know,

that's what you normally have in an embassy, somebody like that who

can help out. So he was one and was the other. He was kind of -- I

saw her as an administrative assistant. She wasn't -- we generally

have a few types of people with embassies, like people who are very

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35

interested in the political environment, even among the locals, those

who provide security, those who provide general services.

Because the mission was so small there, she took on a little bit

of all of those roles, not security, but everything else. There was

a driver, but he -- he had reportedly been ill. I never got to the

bottom of the story about why he wasn't there, but the RSOs didn't seem

to mind that because they were doing the driving, and I think they liked

to drive anyway.

There was a local -- what we would call Char Force at the State

Department. It was a contracting company, ALEBDA, that provided life

support services like food and maybe -- and laundry. They did laundry

there. And those were made up of largely Bangladeshi employees.

Q So I want to show you another exhibit, mark it as exhibit 2.

Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Jackson. Go off the record so you have as much time as you

need to look at it and the court reporter doesn't have to stand at the

ready.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q We'll go back on the record. So what I've marked as

exhibit 2 as Doc ID No. 05474938, and it's a string of emails that began

on August 28, 2012, and end on September 2, 2012, and it appears that

the first email from you to Mr. may have been what you were

referring to earlier as a list of --

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36

A Yes, ma'am, that's correct.

Q -- a list of items that you are -- or list of meetings that

you were interested in participating in once you arrived. What I

wanted to ask you about -- first, one of the items -- one of the meetings

that you were interested in had to do with MANPADS contacts, and so

I wanted to ask you what your level of familiarity was with the MANPADS

program that was in Tripoli at the time you were there?

A So some of this we will need to move to a classified setting.

What I can tell you on the unclassified level is that

it was run by a State Department office, INL, I believe.

We contracted with a company that was tasked with locating, cataloging,

and helping the government of Libya secure ammunition storage areas,

which is the depots that Qadhafi had used to store the massive number

of weapons that he had collected. The idea was to -- in particular,

was to stop shoulder-fired rockets from getting into private hands that

could be used to bring down airliners or civilian targets or anything

else.

So this was a -- this was a State Department contract. I am not

part of that contracting mechanism, and they did not report to me, but

you know, on two levels, we're very interested in their success, and

so we would try to help them in any way we could, and on another level,

some of the contractors were American citizens, so we were concerned

for their security as well. So that was, you know, that was mainly

the purpose for -- for meeting with them, trying to, you know, get in

official State Department reporting channels, how many of these weapons

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37

and others they had been able to gain progress on, categorizing,

cataloging, securing, so --

Q Did you -- were you able to meet with the contacts in

Benghazi?

A I don't recall. I met with the contacts later in Tripoli

many times. I don't recall if I made the first contact there. Again,

Tripoli and Libya, in general. Tripoli, to some degree. Benghazi,

to a large degree. Everything is fluid, and most of these meetings

were, are you available right now for me to come to you or could you

come to the compound? There was -- we were trying to organize these

things as best we could. People just don't work on that kind of

schedule in that country, even the Americans who were contracting with

the State Department.

Q Were you able to get an idea of the number of American

contractors that were involved in the MANPADS program who were located

in Benghazi while you were there?

A I mean, specifics, no, I don't recall. There was -- again,

we may have to go into a classified setting to discuss this, but there

was a rumor -- and this I can speak about in the unclass level. There

was a rumor that some group of Americans had created problems somewhere

around Benghazi using -- they were seen using GPS's and taking

photographs of a weapons depot that's consistent with the story of what

these guys were there to do, but that had created some concerns

And I had a

brief conversation with a representative about

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38

whether or not this was the contractor that was -- had been -- that

the local authorities were concerned that Americans were running around

ammunition storage areas.

Ms. Jackson. Do you have a few more questions on this document?

Ms. Clarke. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Just to shut this document and then we'll break.

Ms. Sawyer. Then we'll talk.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So on the second page of the document -- I'm sorry.

Actually on first page, it's about the fourth email down that's on

September 1st. From you to Greg Hicks, you're writing about

supervising a local guard force drill, and then you talk about

going off for meetings. Did you actually have a meeting with

-- this would have been, I guess, your first day of arrival.

Do you recall if that meeting actually occurred?

A I have no cause to doubt that it happened, and one of the

main -- again, one of the -- I did meet with them while I was there.

I don't know that it was that 30 minutes later. I believe -- as far

as I can recall, I did that day, but that is generally the standard

practice, to get a briefing on the security situation in the area, and

you know, , so it was high on my priority list, and

if it didn't happen then, then it happened the very next day probably.

Q Do you recall whether you had more than one briefing

?

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39

A I'm not --

Mr. Evers. I just want to caution. In the event that your answer

calls for classified information, there is a space available, but if

you feel that you can talk in an unclassified way about this, go ahead.

Mr. Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Do you recall whether you had any additional meetings

?

A Yes, ma'am, I did have additional meetings .

Q And then with your initial meeting , once you

arrived, not discussing specifically what they disclosed to you, but

what was your assessment of the information that they provided? Were

you surprised by the information that they provided? Were you pretty

much aware, and they were just kind of confirming information that you

had? Can you kind of describe your assessment of that meeting?

A Yes, ma'am. From the -- from the information that I had

seen, and I have done many of these types of briefings in the past,

I came -- I was not surprised by anything. I came -- I left the meeting

with a sense that -- -- that the workers at

had not been in the country long enough to develop sources of

good and reliable information. There was no red flashing lights on

security, but there were discussions about the general environment,

which again, you know, things were going on in Benghazi, which you've

seen in these documents and I'm sure in other places, both

assassinations of locals and all the incidents that were quite

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40

frequently reported.

Q Upon your arrival, was there any discussion about the

,

was there discussion that there would be a for a period

of time?

Mr. Evers. I'm just going to caution you, again, on any event

that you can answer in an unclassified way, you certainly should.

Mr. . Can we hold off on these discussions until we go

on into a classified setting?

Ms. Clarke. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Do you have any other questions regarding this

document?

Ms. Clarke. No.

Ms. Jackson. Any other wrap-up question for this phase?

Ms. Clarke. No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. So I see that my time has expired, and you have

graciously allowed me a little time over. So what we'll do right now

is go off the record. We can take a break if need be and then it will

be time for the minority to begin their questions.

[Recess.]

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41

Ms. Clarke. We'll go back on the record. And, just for the

record, I'll note that we had a discussion with minority staff, and they

have agreed to allow us to continue questioning the witness at this time.

So we'll repeat for another hour. We'll take a break then and reassess

and then continue on.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So, Mr. , I just want to continue the questions

that we were walking through. So we had discussed kind of the day of

your arrival and some of the activities that took place then. And we

were looking at the document exhibit 2. I just had one other question

about it, or I just wanted you to elaborate regarding the last email

at the top of page 1 that discusses -- the last paragraph talks about

an eventful night last night and discusses a circuit box issue.

Can you kind of describe what happened and the response that

was -- that the mission had to that particular incident and then your

assessment of the adequacy of that response?

A I can, but it's limited by the fact that, you know, I

followed the instructions that were given to me, which was to safe haven

in villa -- I think it was villa C. So, you know, what I recall is

there was an alert that there was smoke on the wall that set into kind

of a chain reaction, the security protocol that we had set up, which

was for the acting principal officer or for the Americans that were

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42

not security-related to shelter in place.

One of the ARSOs met me at the shelter. I mean, it's a

small -- again, it's a small villa. So I don't remember an alarm bell,

but I'm sure -- there was some sort of alert that something was going

on outside that was unknown but potentially threatening. And so I

sheltered in place with -- I guess it was .

was on the TOC microphone announcing, you know, remain in place through

these things.

Q And did you have an opportunity to observe or have a

discussion with the RSO agents about the response by the Local Guard

Force?

A I did generally. I don't recall the details.

Q Do you recall whether the RSOs were satisfied or

dissatisfied with their response?

A Satisfied in general. You know, like I said, there was a

standard set of procedures that each security element was supposed to

follow. I didn't get any reports that anyone deviated from that. And

I had witnessed some of the drills and had seen that they had -- that

those elements, each one individually had responded generally as they

were instructed to do and according to the protocol. So that's really

all I recall.

Q Thank you.

You mentioned earlier that the practice was to have drills with

the Local Guard Force and the QRF. Do you recall how often those

drills -- I realize you were only there for 10 days, but in that 10-day

600
43

period, do you recall how often those drills took place? Were they

daily? Every other day?

A There were probably -- I can remember three or four drills

while I was there in 7 to 10 days. I don't know if we did them all

in the first 7 days or not, but that would work out to roughly one every

other day. There was not a scheduled timeline for these things because

part of it was the element of surprise for the responders. About three

or four drills probably.

Q And did those drills involve both sets of security elements

at either Local Guard Force and the QRF or --

A One or two of them did. One drill in particular, one of

the ARSOs installed something -- a suspicious IED-looking device and

the -- under the hood of the car, of the limo we were in. We drove

onto campus. Part of the drill for the -- the protocol for the guards

at the gate was to check the car for any IEDs or anything like that.

And they raised the hood, according to protocol, saw the device, hit

the button, and that started the REACT.

So, in that case, it was mainly just drill for the guards at the

gate. In another -- you know, with the February 17 guys, it was

calisthenics, and it was sports, PT, and discussions about where you

are to go, where you're supposed to go in the event of some sort of

need to REACT.

Q So, during your time there, you talked about you had many

meetings -- and I realize this was several years ago, so you may not

recall the exact date the meetings occurred. But do you recall having

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44

a meeting with -- and forgive me if I mispronounce his name -- Fawzi

Younis--

A Younis, yes.

Q Younis, thank you. And who was he?

A So Libya's layered with many different security elements,

ranging from militias to national police to quasi-governmental

groupings of former revolutionaries under an umbrella at that

time -- it no longer exists -- but it's the Supreme Security Council.

Each city had a security council. Fawzi Younis was the head of the

Benghazi security council. So, yes, I recall -- I recall meeting with

him.

Q And do you recall what your -- what you discussed during

your meeting?

A The general state of security in Benghazi; any ideas or any

information he could give me about who might be conducting the targeted

assassinations of Libyans; a request, as I made to every person I met

with who was in a position of security, to please keep the U.S. Special

Mission in Benghazi in mind; if we call for help, we would need it,

and those types of things. I mean, I don't remember specific details,

but those would be the general themes that I hit with most any security

representatives.

Q Did the SSC provide any type of security to the mission while

you were there?

A So I don't know the answer to that. In general, it's a

security organization made up of people who would QRF respond to crises.

602
45

Part of my meeting with him was asking him to be sure to keep us in

mind if there was a crisis.

The other problem in Libya is that you may be talking to one person

who is a member of the Libyan military and also the Libyan police and

also two or three militias and the SSC and, you know, other tribal groups

that provide security on their own. So the situation is fluid. And,

you know, whether or not the SSC was particularly responsible for

specific people at the mission, I don't recall.

Q So I'm going to show you another exhibit.

Ms. Clarke. I'm showing you what's been marked as exhibit 3.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So what I've marked as exhibit 3 is Document ID No.

05394398, and it's an email originally from an individual

to on September 2. And it's regarding an IED explosion

that reportedly left an individual dead. What do you recall about that

incident?

A Looking at this piece of paper, I didn't recall the time,

but now I see it was on the second day I was there. is a security

officer for the United Nations or was a security officer for the United

Nations Mission in Benghazi.

He was one of our best security contacts, someone

who -- you run across these folks in some of these high-threat posts

who aren't afraid of anything. And he would literally take pictures

603
46

from the point of impact of whatever explosion or, you know, event had

happened.

And so in particular had formed a very good relationship

with him, as well. We had him over to the mission several times

to discuss what he had been seeing as he was -- he had a degree of

mobility that was beyond what our RSOs had. So he was out on the city

quite a bit, and he was someone who regularly reported to us.

Also from -- any time there was an event that was, you know, that

had to do with security in Benghazi and it had made some sort of

international news, we would generally proactively get a request from

Washington to describe what had happened, give details about it, report

on the welfare and whereabouts of Americans who may have been in the

vicinity, casualties, was it targeting U.S. interests. All of those

types of questions that you try to answer so that you can get an

understanding of the security situation.

So this was one of those events. Many happened while I was there.

Q You mentioned that you had -- I'm sorry,

to the mission compound several times to discuss what he was seeing

in Benghazi. Can you elaborate on what he shared with you and those

at the compound?

A Uh-huh. I think his working assumption at the time, again,

you know, none of this is -- I mean, it was fluid. It was a situation

where no one had all the details and people were trying to determine

what was going on. In this case, there was a number of, you know,

hundreds, in fact, over months of former or existing or current security

604
47

officials who had served under the Qadhafi regime, Libyans, who were

being targeted for assassination.

And that was, of course, very interesting to us from our security

perspective. Is this just limited to Libyans, or is this something

that could expand to others? So working theory was that it was

limited; it was solely family retribution for wrongs under the Qadhafi

regime by these former and current security officials, Libyan security

officials, and families were taking retribution on them.

Q Did you agree with his assessment?

A Generally, yes. Yeah, until there was other -- until other

data would come along that would disprove it, and I don't have any that

did.

Q What -- did share with you what the U.N. footprint in

Benghazi was during your time there?

A Generally, yes. Of course, all the international

organizations like to keep in touch with one another to share security

information, political information, all of those types of things. And

I think at that time I was hoping to meet with the head of -- or I was

trying to set up a meeting with the head of the U.N. Mission there.

And we were working through to help set that up. I believe the

head was out of the city for the time that I was there.

Q Were you aware, did they have a large presence? A very

small presence? Was it --

A I don't recall. I didn't make it to their -- as far as I

remember, I didn't go to their compound.

605
48

Q All right.

Ms. Clarke. So I'm going to show you what we'll mark as

exhibit 4.

Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So I've handed you what's been marked as exhibit 4, Document

ID No. 05396634, and it's a string of emails that began on September 4,

2012, and end on September 5, 2012.

So the first email in this string is an email that you sent to

the RSOs at the time in Benghazi regarding upcoming events. And so

I wanted to ask you about, in particular, the last event, the diplomatic

dinner that was scheduled for the next day. What was the purpose of

that dinner?

A It was to get to know the heads of the -- of those diplomatic

missions that are listed here. Again, information being a really

valuable commodity there. The more people you know, the more

information you can get. There -- they have -- each one of them has

a unique insight into what's going on in Benghazi. Some had been there

longer than others. Others were native speakers of Arabic. So it was

essentially to establish diplomatic relations, which is what we do at

the State Department, and learn what we could.

Q And do you recall whether -- in this email, it lists about

six different countries that were supposed to be present. Do you

606
49

recall whether all of those attended this meeting?

A I don't recall. I can't say that all of them attended.

Most.

Q Okay. Did you have -- during your short time in Benghazi,

did you have an opportunity to visit any of their compounds or villas

where they were -- where any of these countries were residing?

A I don't recall any of these. Some of these, for example,

the Finnish consul . They

didn't have an office, as far as I remember. Others, I -- the British

Embassy was just in town visiting and did not have specific

accommodations there. Others, I don't recall. I don't think I did.

Q Okay. Do you recall any details from that meeting

regarding the assessment by these diplomats of the security environment

in Benghazi, whether they were going to make any changes regarding their

presence in Benghazi?

A No. I recall a general impression, though, that -- you

know, of most or all of these -- like I said, some were actually just

living out -- without security in the economy. Others were not as well

equipped as we were, it seemed like. And most were more mobile than

we were; that is, they were getting off of -- they were getting out.

They were meeting people. They were doing what diplomats usually do.

Q All right. So, on page -- the first page of this document

at the bottom, there's an email from you to Greg Hicks, just Benghazi

update. And, in that first paragraph, you discuss some issues

regarding a TDY IMO employee exiting Benghazi, and then you also discuss

607
50

a couple of things that were happening at the compound. One was

rearranging room assignments to accommodate incoming/outgoing TDYers.

Can you describe what -- if the room assignments were rearranged,

what was the room assignment prior to this rearrangement, and then what

was it following the rearrangement?

A If I understand the question, so there are -- there were

a set number of rooms. Some rooms were better than others, more

well-equipped, nicer beds, whatever it was. And that generally goes

along a pecking order of seniority, who gets assigned to those rooms.

For instance, I was staying in what became Ambassador Stevens' room,

the principal officer's bedroom. I don't think at this point I was

already making plans to move out of it because he wasn't -- well, maybe

I was. We expected him to get there a little earlier, so maybe I was

making plans for myself to move out to a separate room so that he could

have the principal officer room.

But this is just a standard problem, again, all over the world

for the State Department: How do we house the people who are coming

and going and the limited resources that we have? And so there's a

degree of musical chairs that happens as a result.

Q Were the TDYers housed in the same villa?

A No, ma'am. There were bedrooms. And, again, I forget the

designators for the specific villas, but essentially the main villa,

villa C, I think is what it is, and the canteen also had bedrooms. The

TOC had one bedroom and usually the watch officer -- I don't know that

it was a bedroom, but it was a bed that was there with the TOC. And

608
51

the watch officer who was on duty that night, 24-hour night watch, would

stay in that bed. So there were, you know -- there were several

possible lodging locations in the villas.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Were any of the decisions on who stayed where based on

security concerns?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. So were there DS agents in each of the buildings

residing in each of the buildings, or how did security play into who

stayed where?

A So stayed immediately next door to the

principal officer's bedroom, which was mine until Ambassador Stevens

got there. That was so that he could REACT immediately and quickly.

I think they kept their weapons in their rooms when they were sleeping.

So there was a conscious decision that was made to ensure that, you

know, security guys were spread out.

Q Okay.

Ms. Clarke. I'm going to -- I think we're up to 5 now -- hand

you an exhibit that I've marked as exhibit 5.

Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Exhibit 5 is Doc ID No. 05390145, and it's an email chain

between you and Greg Hicks on September 4, 2012. At the bottom you

write to Greg Hicks: Greg, on the first day returned to the

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52

office, yesterday, he said to me, quote, "So Chris gets here on the

7th and leaves on the 14th. We need to get to work scheduling his

appointments," end quote. Since then, I've asked to keep it quiet,

which I think he's done. Just a heads-up though. Guessing that

Ambassador Stevens may have told him directly.

What prompted you to notify Greg Hicks regarding

statement?

A We had planned from the beginning that the visit would be

unannounced, and we were trying to keep a very close hold on it. I

didn't know very well. I didn't know how trustworthy he was

on significant information like that. So I wanted to warn Greg that

the potential for the visit being public in advance of the arrival of

the Ambassador was there.

Q And when you refer to the visit, you mean the Ambassador's

visit?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And then you said, we had planned to keep it -- to not

disclose it. Who is "we" in that sentence?

A I mean, the decision came from Ambassador Stevens himself.

There were lots of discussions about it in preparation for the -- you

know, for the visit. But, in general, I think "we" is the Ambassador,

Greg Hicks, the RSO, myself, and any of the other American staff back

in Washington who had been informed of his plans. I couldn't comment

on the extent.

Q You said that you had had extensive discussions about

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53

keeping it -- his visit to Benghazi -- quiet. What were those

discussions, and why was the decision made to keep it quiet?

A So Ambassador Stevens was a rock star in Libya, right, and

we felt it just made it easier to facilitate a safe travel back and

forth to Benghazi without announcing it in advance. Again, that was

kind of a group decision. The Ambassador was the one who signed off

on it as far as I remember, but that's pretty standard practice as well.

Secretary Kerry just arrived in Somalia unannounced.

Q And that standard practice is used in what types of

situations?

A I can't speak to that. I mean, in this situation, it was

for the Ambassador traveling to Benghazi.

Q And the concern would've been security and safety?

A Yes. That's primary concern, sure.

Q You mention that you didn't really know and so you

weren't -- I guess you weren't sure if he was trustworthy. During your

time in Benghazi, did you have an opportunity to meet with him or to

spend any time with him?

A I did. He accompanied me to a few meetings. He was -- he

had a badge to come freely off and on campus. So, you know, he was

there at points. I used him to help me set up meetings. He had

contacts in the community. Again, that's a very standard use of a local

employee who is well connected to the, you know, to the environment.

You ask him to reach out to his friends, to reach out to their friends,

to get you a meeting that you want. And so that was the primary nature

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54

of our interaction.

Q When you said he had a badge, is it like an ID that he would

show at the gate --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- and it would allow him entrance into the compound?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Did you have -- during your interactions with him, did you

have an opportunity to build a further assessment about his

trustworthiness?

A His trustworthiness not necessarily; his abilities, yes.

And he was very good at getting us meetings, among the best I've seen

at any embassy I've been at before. Very well connected.

Trustworthiness, again, 7 days, 8 days. You know, the overriding, I

think, assumption was that Ambassador Stevens had trust in him. And

so that gave him, you know, an automatic baseline, I think, for many

people. I just don't approach it that way. I like to get to know

people myself.

Q We talked a little bit earlier about discussions you had

with you predecessor, Mr. . Did you all discuss his view of

Mr. ?

A I don't recall. I don't know. You know, I saw one of the

documents that you handed me that I asked for his direct phone number

so I could be in touch with . I asked of the direct phone

number, but that's about all I remember.

Mr. Evers. Can we go off the record for just a quick second?

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55

Ms. Jackson. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Clarke. We're back on the record.

So I'm going to hand you an exhibit that I'll mark as exhibit 6.

And I apologize, it's kind of grainy, but I think you should be able

to decipher the text.

Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. So ma'am, are there specific questions on this

one or should I read the whole thing?

Ms. Clarke. There are specific questions on this one. I would

want to discuss paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 -- I'm

sorry, paragraph 6. And the last one is paragraph 11.

Ms. Jackson. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So what I've marked as exhibit 6 is Doc ID No. 05457494.

And this is a cable that was sent on September 11, 2012. And I believe

off the record you mentioned that you authored this cable. Is that

correct?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And so I just want to -- this cable goes over a lot of

different topics, so I just wanted to discuss some of these topics with

you. Was this -- did you draft this cable -- when did you draft this

cable?

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56

A So standard practice on these things, this is something new

that we were introducing to the Embassy, both in Tripoli and in

Benghazi, was to do a weekly report of activities that was -- it got

into the official chain. Previously, most of the back-and-forthing

was emails between Ambassador Stevens and the desk, or something like

this. This is in the days of, you know, the first U.S. visits to Libya.

He was very keen on bringing things into the official reporting

channel, and this is kind of a standard format for weekly reports that

come from all over the world, from missions all over the world. In

these cases, it is general -- it is best practice to immediately leave

a meeting and type out what you remember from that meeting and keep

it -- save it somewhere for the end of the week when you put all of

these things together in eleven paragraphs. I mean, you can see that

it's quite a bit of information.

So the standard practice is to simply write these things as you

go. Sometimes you don't have the time to do that, so you, at the end

of the week, sit down and have a little more work to do. But, you know,

in general, my standard practice was to write fresh and as extensively

as I could in a format that I could just drop into a cable.

Q So we'll turn to some of the paragraphs. First, paragraph

3, it goes into a little more detail about your meeting with the Benghazi

SSC commander. And he's -- you are discussing your meeting with him.

And does this help refresh your recollection of your discussion with

him and the topics that you all covered?

A I didn't pay attention for that. It can, yes, I'm sure.

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Q If you look down, there's a sentence that begins, "Younis

expressed growing frustration with police and security forces" -- down

at the bottom -- "who are too weak to keep the country secure."

Can you elaborate on what his frustration was with police and

security forces, and did you understand that to be different than the

SSC that he was the head of?

A Yes, ma'am. And again, I understood it to be different,

but in Libya everything is related by 1 degree. And so many of the

SSC members were also, as I said earlier, members of the police force

as well as the military -- the official military forces. And what had

happened in the time after the revolution, many people were able to

draw paychecks from all of these organizations. Many Libyans were able

to draw paychecks from all of these organizations.

So part of the frustration for Younis was how do I get these 18,000

personnel off of my payroll and back into an official Libyan Government

capacity as police officers, security officials, or whatever it is.

Because there was so many different security organizations and none

of them were coordinated at the top, it made it hard for anybody to

be in charge of anything, especially when you had people under you who

were members of every organization.

Q On the second page, in paragraph 4, you're discussing a

meeting that you had with some of the militia commanders. Can you

describe that meeting for us? Who did you meet with? And then we'll

reference some of the information you provided in there.

A Yes, ma'am. So, in these days in Benghazi, there was

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a -- it was a growing and nascent group of commanders who -- militia

commanders who were just becoming kind of players on the security scene.

And some of the working assumptions were that they were doing this

mainly for personal profit; others for religious and ideological

reasons. It is trying to understand motivations of groups of people

who may or may not become future leaders for the city of Benghazi or

the country of Libya.

So these folks were identified as people who fit that billet,

essentially, security official officials who may or may not have

aspirations for larger roles in Benghazi.

Q These folks that you had the meeting with?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And so they were commanders of brigades. Do you recall

which brigades those were?

A Yes, ma'am. I mean, they're written in here, so Libya

Shield was a brand new organization at that time that was kind of

emerging from the ranks of the SSC and from other official

organizations. They had numbers to them. What I characterize in here

was what was the most fascinating part of the meeting to me. I was

sitting with Wissam bin Hamid and Jumaa and -- I forget his

name -- al-Gha'abi. They were debating which militias they belonged

to and who was in control of them and what their ideology was and what

their ambitions were. And they weren't -- you know, they disagreed

on many of those things.

And one member was -- one of the commanders was a member of the

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other commander's brigade under that commander, and that commander was

a member of that commander's brigade under that commander. So it was

really difficult to determine who was in charge, and I think they right

there in front of us were, you know, playing that out, which is a great

opportunity to really get a sense of what's going on in the rest of

the country.

Q Did you get a sense of how these individuals or, in general,

how commanders were -- you said earlier there was a growing group of

commanders that were becoming players. Did you get a sense of how those

people were building authority or acquiring authority to become the

commanders?

A Well, so, yes, it is detailed in this paragraph. Yes.

Q At the -- it looks like it's the second-to-last sentence

or third-to-last sentence, it begins: They criticized the USG for

supporting National Forces Alliance leader and prime minister

candidate Mahmoud Jibril.

Do you recall what their criticism of the U.S. Government was?

A Yeah. So "supporting" is in quotations, right, and which

is a false accusation against the United States. We don't support

candidates in a foreign government's internal domestic election. But

the general perception, because Mahmoud Jibril is an American citizen

as well as a Libyan, is that the United States Government was backing

him. He was a big political player, former prime minister and someone

who was gaining -- it seemed to be at that time -- someone who may end

up with another very high-ranking position in the Libyan Government.

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That did not meet these particular militia commanders' idea of a

beneficial Libyan structure for them, and so they were complaining

about it.

Q It goes on to -- you go on to write: If Jibril won, they

said they would not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi, a

critical function they asserted they were currently providing.

What was your understanding of what they meant when they said they

would not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi?

A Yeah, I did not take that as a threat against U.S. interest,

the U.S. compound, U.S. persons, or anything else. I took that more

as a general discussion of Benghazi, the security situation in Benghazi

in general deteriorating, if they -- at least their assertion that the

general condition in Benghazi would deteriorate if they withdrew their

security support.

Q Did you understand -- what did they mean by withdrew their

security support?

A Well, I mean, that's one of the questions I was asking,

right. What do you do? Who are you? Why are you Libya 1? Why are

you Libya 2? What's your role? How do you fit into the security

structure? And, as I said, you know, they didn't really have a very

good picture of it themselves, so I couldn't come out with one.

Q During this meeting, did they provide any advice or warning

to the U.S. presence in Benghazi or in Libya in general?

A No, ma'am. And that's kind of the, you know, that's the

irony of all of this. They talk about the possibility of deteriorating

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security but then ask to have U.S. persons and businesses and direct

foreign investment brought into Benghazi. So, you know, the dichotomy

they create there is a pretty difficult one to understand.

Q So the paragraph that I wanted us to discuss is paragraph

11. It's on the last page.

A Six or 11? Sorry.

Q We'll do 11. So 11 is that you brought up about the U.K.

presence and you talk about that there was a visit with the mission

and during their trip, and they were going to determine whether or not

conditions were appropriate for the reopening of the British consulate.

When you -- when visited with the mission in Benghazi, did

you all discuss his assessment of whether or not the consulate should

reopen?

A Yes, ma'am. And , female, she is -- she was the

deputy chief of mission, my equivalent of the acting deputy chief of

mission -- I guess not my equivalent, one rank ahead of me -- at the

British Embassy. So they were there for a couple of days. They asked

about the security situation. This reminds me now that -- to go back

to a previous question about who attended and who didn't and why did

I have diplomats from Benghazi get together for dinner, this was one

of the reasons, actually, to allow them to discuss with others in the

diplomatic community what they were seeing and the security situation.

Again, I had only been there at this point for, you know --

Q I believe this occurred on the 5th.

A September 5. So I had been there for 4 days. And this was

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an opportunity to, you know, to discuss with others who were more

knowledgeable than myself what they thought of the security situation.

As it turned out, you had also asked me if all or some did not

attend that dinner. I remember -- but not the details -- that

was either only able to attend the very beginning of that dinner and

then had to leave to get to the airport because they were not to stay

overnight in Benghazi, or if she was there at the end of the dinner.

They came with, you know, with a whole group of people, including

the -- I didn't write in here, but with her was the kind of the

equivalent of the British Mission who had served in Benghazi.

was his name. He was also there, and he was quite

knowledgeable on the politics in the security of Benghazi, so he was

also a resource for me. So he was helpful.

Q And you said that they were not to stay overnight. Was that

the policy of their -- of the --

A I don't know if that was an official policy or not, but their

plans were to arrive in the morning and depart in the evening. And

it was standard practice at that time for us to house some of their

vehicles, I think. So not only were they coming for the dinner and

for other, you know, and to talk to the whole of these people, they

were -- they came, and they left their weapons and their vehicles there.

Q So, once they departed that day on the U.S. Mission

Compound, there were still British vehicles and British weapons?

A As far as I recall, yes, ma'am. I mean, that was, I know

later, from future experience, I know that they had left vehicles there

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right before the attacks too, so --

Q And did you have an opportunity to discuss with her

assessment of the security situation and whether or not she would make

a recommendation or there would be a recommendation for a consulate

to reopen?

A Gosh, I remember discussing it, and I think they were

leaning -- she was leaning toward recommending that they come back.

was the biggest advocate for that, again, the person who

was their Benghazi representative and had been there working in their

Benghazi office for quite a while, I think. His recommendation was

to get back into the city. She was taking a more measured approach,

but I think that she had -- I recall that she was leaning toward

recommending that they do. I can't say that for sure though.

Q Were either of those individuals stationed in Libya? Were

they stationed in Tripoli and they would fly down to --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And for both and ?

A That's correct. So was the deputy chief -- they call

them Deputy Head of Mission at the British Mission, so she was

essentially the DCM at the British Mission in Tripoli. And had

left Benghazi and moved to Tripoli to work out of the Tripoli office

for the British Embassy.

Q Okay. So I skipped paragraph 6 inadvertently, so we'll

return back to that. And that paragraph deals with the expanding

Islamic influence in Derna. And I think we discussed earlier that

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there were -- that initially -- before your arrival or at your arrival,

you had planned to take trips outside of Benghazi. Was Derna one of

those locations that you were considering?

A No, ma'am.

Q And was there a reason why you didn't consider Derna?

A Derna was generally considered -- let me take a step back.

I'm sorry. The general knowledge that I had of Derna is a comparison

that I've only heard and can't lay claim to the truthfulness of it.

The rumor in Libya is that the city of Derna had contributed more

anti-American foreign fighters in Iraq than the rest of North Africa.

So it was perceived at least -- I perceived it at least as a place where

it would probably not be a smart idea to, you know, to take an American

security group into to simply meet with local leaders because the risk

was too much.

I'm not sure that it was ever a consideration. As I mentioned,

Marj and Adjdabia were both on our list of places to consider visiting.

Derna, at that point, was already a place that did not seem like it

would benefit us.

Q And so that paragraph mentions at the second-to-last

sentence: One email to the Ambassador asserts Abu Salim Brigade

members have undercut police presence by accusing the police of being

loyal to the former regime.

Do you recall seeing that email?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Actually, I have it here. I'll find it for you. I just

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wanted to discuss with you how that email would've been delivered to

the Ambassador, how the individual would've been able to contact the

Ambassador.

Ms. Jackson. While she's getting that out, do you recall how it

was delivered to either Tripoli or Benghazi, and did it get to the

Ambassador?

Mr. . I think we're going to see what email address it's

addressed to, but we did have a general public affairs account

where -- we also had a Facebook account and a Twitter account, I think.

You know, we had numerous ways for the general public to reach out to

the U.S. Embassy. Again, that's what we're there for, to collect

information. So we'll see how it got in.

Ms. Clarke. So I'll mark this as exhibit 7.

Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Evers. Off the record for just a quick second.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So we'll go back on the record. And just to note, for

exhibit 6, just for the record, we provided a copy to the witness, and

he has made a few markings, which are totally acceptable, but we just

wanted to have the record reflect that.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So exhibit 7, we had discussed that -- in exhibit 6, you

referred to an email. Does this -- oh, in exhibit 7, we've marked it

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as [] Document ID No. 05392981. Does this email reflect what you were

discussing in exhibit 6, the cable?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And so this is an email. It appears to be from a

private citizen, . If you look on the second page, there is

a "from" stamp at the bottom, , with a redacted email address.

Only the Yahoo.com is visible, and it's to John C. Stevens. Do you

recall how -- or would you have known or do you know how that individual

would've been able to email the Ambassador?

A No, ma'am.

Q Did the Ambassador have a, for lack of a better term, a

public email address? And I'll give you an example. The Members of

Congress have an email address that is accessible to everyone.

A Right.

Q And that kind of funnels information to them. Do you know

if the Ambassador had that type of --

A I don't know.

Q To your knowledge, was his email address, State Department

email address, the sole State Department email address that he had?

A From where I sit right now, yes, ma'am. I mean, you know,

did I get an email from him from some other account? I don't recall

that ever. But, you know, we've talked a lot about a lot of documents,

and this is just a small sample of correspondence, so --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q In the "To" line, to Ambassador Stevens from , on

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September 9, on page 2 of this document, does that appear to you that

it went to Ambassador Stevens' official email account by the way it's

constructed in the "To" line?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

A You know, it appears that way. Now, I could probably create

an account that makes it look like that too. I don't know. But it

appears to be that would be the standard convention for, you know,

, John C. Stevens. It's the same format.

Q Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So the next email in this chain is from you to -- and it's

redacted. And it's cc'd to Greg Hicks and some other individuals

asking that they translate it for the Ambassador.

First, do you -- it's not clear how you received this email. And

I know we're reaching back many years, but do you happen to recall how

this -- would this have been something that the Ambassador would have

forwarded to you?

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Mr. . I remember him having a hard copy of it and

showing me the hard copy, but I don't -- I don't remember how I got

into this chain. I don't know how I got it.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q During your time in Tripoli, had you received or been aware

of emails -- other emails similar to this where there's an email from

a Libyan citizen directly to the Ambassador, other than -- obviously,

he had a relationship with Mr. ? But for individuals that you

weren't aware of or that were not associated with the U.S. presence

in Benghazi, were you aware of other emails directly to the Ambassador?

A I can't think of any specific examples.

Q Did anything about this email being directed -- sent

directly to the Ambassador raise any alarm bells for you or the

Ambassador? Was there any concern that this person was able to contact

the Ambassador directly on his email address?

A No, ma'am.

Q So the substance of the email -- and this is a

translation -- but the individual writes about happenings in Derna.

And then, on the last paragraph on page 1, he writes: I ask your

Excellency, the Envoy, to alert the Libyan Government to this subject

because it's -- because it is a very important issue and also because

they threaten to shut down the university.

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And then he goes on to say: Please send someone to see the truth

for yourselves.

In your experience in Benghazi, was this -- did individuals reach

out to the Ambassador asking them to -- asking him to provide

information to the Libyan Government about the security environment

in Libya on behalf of Libyan citizens?

A Not at that specific level, no, ma'am. But I -- I know

that -- I mean, he was well connected. He had friends at every level

of society in Libya. And whatever they wanted, they could -- they

would reach out to him, I'm sure of. And he would respond to them.

That was his amazing characteristic. He was very good at keeping in

touch.

Q And do you recall if there was a response from the Ambassador

to this individual?

A No, ma'am. If I'm not cc'd on it, it doesn't mean it didn't

happen, but I don't --

Ms. Clarke. So I see that we've reached another hour in our time

together. If we could take a short break, and we'll confer with the

minority about plans to proceed, if that's okay with you.

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Clarke. We'll go off the record.

Ms. Jackson. Let's just go off the record for a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So just to pick up -- just to go back a little bit. In our

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discussion, we talked about your meeting with the commanders of the

two brigades.

Do you recall whether or not the commander of the 17th February

Martyrs Brigade was supposed to attend that meeting?

A Well, Wissam bin Hamid had been part of the February 17th

Brigade. I don't believe that we had any others lined up. I can't

say that for sure, though.

Q Did you have a separate meeting with the head of --

A I had one scheduled, yes, ma'am. It did not happen.

Q Was it canceled?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And do you recall why?

A Unavailability of Mr. --

Q Do you recall the reason why he was unavailable?

A No, ma'am. Again, it's -- I mean, unfortunately, it's

standard practice in Libya to commit to something and then change your

mind or have something else come up and reschedule later. So part of

my job was to be flexible and available when I could.

Q So we discussed earlier that it was going -- it was -- the

plan was to not alert, I guess, head of the Government of Libya entities

in Benghazi of the Ambassador's arrival until close in time to his

arrival?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And do you -- do you recall how you were going to notify

and who you were going to notify? And who were you going to notify?

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A So the notification generally -- again, standard practice

at the State Department and operating in foreign countries -- is we

work through the ministry of foreign affairs. It's a little bit

atypical to have a ministry of foreign affairs office in -- in a

satellite city. Usually it's almost exclusively in the capital city.

In this case, in Benghazi, there was a Ministry of Foreign

Affairs' office. There was a protocol officer. His name was

and -- as we say there, Mr. And there was a director of the

office. His name was Mr.

And the -- the general protocol for submitting any type of request

for assistance is through diplomatic note, which we drafted and I

hand-delivered to Mr. , a protocol, which is the appropriate

protocol step. Mr. recommended that I meet with Mr. .

Mr. had known Ambassador Stevens when Ambassador Stevens was

Envoy some years earlier, so he was very pleased to accommodate, very

happy.

So I held a second meeting with Mr. and perhaps a third

meeting. And I don't -- I don't recall this. I believe, at one point,

we discussed in general the idea was that I would try to get additional

security assets to the mission without notifying that the Ambassador

would be there. And then, as the days got closer to his arrival, then

we would -- then we would tell, at least, the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs that -- that he was coming and start the planning for the events

that he would hold.

Q Is the protocol officer, is that an office within the

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs or was that something separate?

A Yes, ma'am. It's within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It's a standard office. The State Department has one too.

Q So -- and you just mentioned a diplomatic note that was

requesting additional security.

Ms. Clarke. So I'm going to hand you what I'll mark as exhibit 8.

Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. . Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Okay. So what we've marked as exhibit 8 -- I will just note

for the record it's 4 pages of documents, and they have different doc

ID numbers.

But what I wanted to ask you was whether you recall these documents

and if they are related. The initial doc ID number is 05271665, and

it's a diplomatic note in English and it appears to be dated September

6, 2012. Following that is a document that appears to be in Arabic,

another document in English, and then a followup document in Arabic.

And, to your recollection, do these documents reflect what we were

discussing about a DIP note requesting security?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And -- and do you recall whether this was sent on

the 6th of September?

The date on the first page indicates September 6, 2012. To your

recollection, is that the correct date?

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A Yes, ma'am. In general. And the note that goes from the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the national police is dated the same

day, so --

Q So the diplomatic note requests that there will be a

police -- one police vehicle at each one of the mission's three gates

and guard the mission every day, round the clock from September 10 until

September 15, and you're also asked for a guard dog with a patrol unit

to be stationed at the main entrance to the mission.

Do you recall whether this request was actually granted?

A Okay. So the -- so the request went to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs.

Q Yes.

A The Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned around and submitted

the request to the security authorities. Right. So I don't know that

there was an official granting between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and the security authorities, but there was a car in front. I don't

think we got the dog, but I don't remember.

Q And then was that car in front of the mission 24/7, or was

it certain times of the day?

A So I couldn't speak to that because I was off campus at some

points, and I wouldn't -- you know, I wouldn't know.

This was the kind of delegation to a security professional at the

U.S. Mission that I would have done. Are you satisfied with how they

are responding? I'm not the security official on, you know, who can

assess that this is the right type or number or anything else.

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So I -- I don't -- I can't speak to whether or not they were there

24 hours a day.

Q Do you recall seeing them --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- on a regular basis?

A Uh-huh.

Q And do you recall having a discussion with the RSOs about

whether or not they were fulfilling the request?

A Again, in general, we were talking about security all the

time. As we were driving out of the mission to go to a meeting or coming

back, we would check to see if the car was there. I can't think of

specific times in my head that we, you know -- I can't recall any

specific conversations. But, you know, sure, it was always on the

radar.

Q And during those times where you're leaving and coming back

and you check to see if the car was there, were there ever any instances

where it was not there?

A I don't --

Ms. Safai. Can you just clarify for the record were we referring

to the 10th. Correct?

Ms. Clark. No. During -- following this request and during his

time in Benghazi from the day --

Ms. Safai. So between the 6th and the 10th?

Ms. Clarke. No. From the -- the requests asks that there will

be an office -- a police patrol unit posted outside of the mission --

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Ms. Safai. Beginning?

Ms. Clarke. -- from the 10th to the 15th.

Mr. . Okay. So that would have been overlapped with

my time there by 1 day.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Okay.

A On that one day, I don't know.

Q And so the patrol unit that you were referring to, was that

something that was in place when you arrived in Benghazi?

A Again, I can't say that it was 24/7, but periodically there

would be a patrol unit out there that -- periodically, from my point

of view. Sometimes I was on campus; sometimes I wasn't. Sometimes

I was driving to the gate. At other times, I was in a villa or

something, so I don't know.

Q You mentioned earlier a life services contractor that

provided services to the compound. Did you ever -- were you ever aware

of any issues with the life services contractor or with the drivers

that were employed by the compound?

A With the drivers, the day I arrived, the RSOs told me that

the main driver had fallen ill, and they did not know when he would

come back.

Q And how many drivers were employed when you arrived?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Were --

A It was one they were trying to hire or maybe who had been

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hired but had not yet gotten clearance to work. I'm not -- I'm not

clear on that.

Q Were you ever aware of a driver that had been employed by

the mission threatening any of the life services staffers?

A A driver employed by the mission who had been threatening

any life services staffers? No, ma'am.

I was aware of a driver who was employed by the contracting company

for the life services contract reportedly threatening some of the life

services contractors.

Q Was that driver -- did that driver have any role on the

compound?

A Just delivering and picking up the life services employees.

To my knowledge. I mean, I -- did they use them for something else,

to haul food? I don't know.

Ms. Clarke. If we could just go off the record for a moment.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Clarke. So we can go back on the record.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q I think we have covered most of our -- the questions that

we have leading up to your departure to Tripoli. So I just wanted to

talk with you -- initially, your plan was to leave on the 7th, and then

it got extended to the 10th. And then did you actually leave on the

10th, or did you depart on the 11th?

A I departed on the 11th.

Q Okay. And what -- can you explain the circumstances that

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led you to depart on the 11th?

A Yes, ma'am. And I mentioned this a little bit earlier.

So, on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th, I guess, there were -- you know,

okay.

So I believe I was supposed to leave on the 7th or the 8th

originally. One day, there was a malfunction with the plane, and the

next day there was a problem with the pilot, both delays. By the third

day, I was -- so we were driving early in the morning. The only flight

each day that the -- that Libyan airlines took was early in the morning.

So we departed the compound, went to the airport, learned -- that

was the only way to do it -- learned that the flight wasn't going that

day and returned. And we did that for a couple of successive days.

I think, then, Ambassador Stevens asked me to stick around a

little bit longer as his plans were developing and changing. So, for

a few days, we didn't go to the airport early in the morning. But,

then on the 10th, I think I tried to get out. And then, finally, on

the 11th, we went and another problem with the flight.

At that point, we had decided, though, that Ambassador Stevens

did not want additional staff on the compound, you know, me. And I

was supposed to return to Tripoli. So I walked down the aisle. I

mean, I can still picture this. I walked down the aisle, stepped over

the cage of chickens and found another airline that was going to Tripoli

and bought it with my personal funds. I bought a 60 euro ticket.

Q So -- so, on the 10th, when the Ambassador arrived, you were

still present in Benghazi. Correct?

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A [Nonverbal response.]

Q And did you meet the Ambassador?

A I did. And that was the reason I couldn't leave on the 10th.

Now I remember.

Q Okay.

A So, again, that coordination piece that I was talking about

earlier where the RSOs could not split up and keep me at one terminal

and pick up the Ambassador at the same time --

Q Yes.

A -- the flight did go that day on the 10th, but it was delayed

to a point that the Ambassador had already arrived. So the

determination was not to hold the Ambassador at the airport while we

waited on a flight for someone who worked for him, essentially, right.

So I -- so I canceled my flight then, even though it went later in the

day. But we couldn't stay at the airport all day with the Ambassador.

So I came back to the compound on the 10th and then tried again on the

11th.

Q And the day of the Ambassador's arrival, were there meetings

planned? Did he participate in any meetings on that day? And, if so,

did you accompany him to those meetings?

A I'm sorry. You said on the 10th?

Q On the 10th, yes.

A Do you have the schedule? I'm sure it exists. I would

refer to that.

Q Okay.

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A I did attend at least one meeting with him. That was a

meeting with the Benghazi Local Council, but I can't recall on what

day. I guess it would had to have been the 10th or the 11th, right.

Q Okay. And then did -- did the Ambassador have a

meeting -- you said earlier there was kind of standard protocol to have

a meeting , and you did so on your arrival.

Did the Ambassador do so as well? And, if so, were you -- did

you participate in that meeting?

A I did not participate in the meeting, but I scheduled it

for him.

Q Okay.

A Yeah. Again, that is -- that's what you do when you go to

new country, you try to figure out what's going on there.

Ms. Clarke. Okay. All right. I think that's it.

Ms. Jackson. Just a followup.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You said you went to the local council meeting that evening.

A I didn't say --

Q Would it be --

A -- that evening, but --

Q Oh. I'm sorry. That day?

A Sometime that day, yes, I did.

Q Okay. Do you recall if it was -- it included a dinner or

not?

A It did. There was a follow-on with the owner of the hotel

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the meeting was hosted in. I did not attend that dinner.

Q Okay. Was that at the Tibesti Hotel, if you recall?

A No.

Q Was it a different one?

A It was not. It was at the --

Q El Fadeel?

A Fadeel, that sounds right.

Q Okay. And who was present at that meeting of the local

council? I mean, approximately how many people?

A So -- well, it's described in paragraph 1 or 2 of the --

Q Of the cable.

A -- cable.

Q Okay.

A I don't know that I went into the numbers of the people

there, but it -- essentially, I had not seen this before. But the

Benghazi council was -- consisted of probably, I mean, dozens of elected

officials, dozens. Maybe 40. They were all around a very big

horseshoe table.

Q Right.

A He knew many of them from his previous time there.

Q Do you recall if there was a media presence at that meeting?

A There was. Yes, ma'am, there was.

Q So --

A We had not wanted --

Q Okay. And were any steps taken to minimize that media

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exposure of the Ambassador?

A Yes, ma'am. So I believe we had a public affairs officer

there.

Q Is that one who traveled in with the Ambassador? Or who

was the public affairs officer?

A is who I'm thinking of being there. I don't --

Q Did he travel back out with you?

A I don't remember.

Q Okay. All right. But anyway --

A It was his responsibility -- it was Public Affairs'

responsibility to -- the press was camped outside the meeting room.

And I think, by then, the Ambassador decided to stay in the meeting,

to not step out in front of the press. We had asked the press to depart.

We can't control the press, so --

Q Okay.

A Probably -- I don't recall the details of that. But I know

there was press there. I know they were camped outside the meeting

room.

Q Okay. Did the Libyan newspapers the next day then report

that the ambassador was in Benghazi? Or was there any social media

that you monitored or others monitored regarding the Ambassador being

in Libya?

A So probably. But I got on a plane at -- I left the compound

at -- early in the morning, probably 0600 or so. I don't remember the

exact time. But before, you know, I would have been privy to anything

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published that day in papers or social media.

Q Did you get any of that information once you arrived back

in Tripoli?

A I don't recall it.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. That's all the questions I have about that day. Do

you have any more?

Ms. Clarke. No. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Ms. Clarke. Go back on the record.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Mr. , where we left off was the end of September

10 in your departure on the early morning of September 11 back to

Tripoli.

So about the way we were going to approach this is allow you to

tell us about the first time that you became aware -- what you were

doing in Tripoli up until the time that you became aware of the attacks

and then just, from there, what you recall about your role and what

you were doing during the course of the attacks.

A Okay. So, you know, that period of time, maybe that's 24,

48 hours is -- number one, it was sleepless. Number two, it was chaos.

And, number three, we thought that we were also on the threat of attack

in Tripoli. So they -- just the extraordinary number of things that

happened in that period of time, I don't have a lot of detail on.

I can generally walk you through some of these things, but I think

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the thing to think about, the tactical operations center at Tripoli

was smaller than this room.

Q Okay.

A And it was in a villa that echoed like an echo chamber. And

so people jumped out of the TOC, and all of us were on our phones and

passing information, passively collecting information from listening

to other conversations. So, you know, some conversations I know a lot

about, but I wasn't the one having them, but I overheard them.

So I'm going to try to focus on stuff that is specific only to

what I did -- if that's what I understand you're asking me.

Q Yes. We'll start there. And then we will, I'm sure, have

followup questions, but I think that that would be a good way for us

to progress.

A So time-wise, I don't know the timeline. I got back to the

Embassy. It's a process getting to the airport in Benghazi, getting

on the airplane. The flight was several hours. Getting picked up at

the airport takes a long time, getting through security. It's a

different environment there.

So, by the time I got back to the mission, it was at least later

in the afternoon as far as I remember. You know, I had just been gone

for 10 days. I had -- again, I was the political officer and had just

been the public -- I mean, the acting PO in Benghazi. So I had stuff

that had backed up for 10 days in Tripoli that I needed to take care

of.

I mean, this -- the cable that you showed me earlier, the

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September 11 cable, I tried to send it that morning from the Benghazi

computers, and it didn't send. So the first thing that I worked

on -- like I said, I like to -- and the Ambassador was pretty clear

about getting weekly report out in the official reporting channels

weekly on, you know, at a certain time, certain day. And so I was trying

to get that out. And I was on the phone with Sean Smith for much of

the afternoon, trying to figure out how to do it essentially. So I

think -- I hit send at the -- in the computer in Benghazi. It didn't

send, and I had to go back and forth with the IMO to actually get that

to happen.

Obviously, checking emails that I had not seen in 10 days, I guess,

from Tripoli. There was a -- kind of a standard weekly meeting on

themes that we had with the political reporting officers in the DCM.

I attended that. I don't remember what it was -- you know, what it

was on.

And, at the time the attack started to break out, I mean, that's

when I kind of -- this is one crystal moment in my mind. I got a phone

call from a woman -- or from a student, a young girl, I had met in

Benghazi. I didn't remember who she was or where I knew her from. And

I figured out that I had spoken at a school in Benghazi a day or two

before. She was one of the students there. I handed out my card like

everyone does. And she called.

I answered the phone. I didn't recognize the phone number, and

she said: I hear the explosions; are you okay?

And so I went through the: Well, who is this, please? What

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explosions are you hearing because everything looks fine to me here?

And it took a minute to -- we have -- we have several compounds

in Tripoli. And -- and so, you know, my first thought was, well, maybe

the attack is happening -- it's not happening at the one I'm at right

now, so maybe it's another one in Tripoli. And then I kind

of -- where -- I talked to her a little bit more, got some more details,

and realized she was in Benghazi and realized it was an attack on the

mission that she was reporting to me.

So I ran to the TOC. Probably tried to call the DCM on the way.

He was already there when I arrived. So there was no need for that.

And kind of this mass chaos outside of the tactical operations center

was going on, had started, and gotten bigger and bigger.

And really we spent a lot of time just trying to determine what

was going on, you know, to get the facts. And I had one data point.

Some woman who lived -- some girl who lived on the street next to the

mission was reporting that there was an attack going on.

Other people were calling their contacts. It turned out that I

had -- you know, in those meetings that I had conducted in Benghazi,

I had a lot of people in my phone already. So I just started going

down the list of people to call: The 17th Brigade commanders, the SSC

head, anyone who could respond, provide quick reaction to the mission.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Can you give us a little more detail on the phone call with

this woman, the student that called you? How --

A I never even got her name.

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Q But how much detail did she give to you about

what -- actually what'd she say --

A "I hear the explosions. I see the smoke."

Q Okay. At any time did she mention a protest or protesters?

A No, ma'am.

Q Okay. She called it an attack?

A I don't specifically remember the word "attack."

Q But explosions?

A I mean, I -- that's why I understood it was an attack.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. All right.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So you said that you -- once you received a call from the

girl, you ran to the TOC. You attempted to call the DCM, ran to the

TOC, and realized he was there and, at that point, began making phone

calls. And you mentioned that you called head of Feb 17.

Can you walk us through what you recall about who you called and

their responses to your calls?

A Yeah. I think, more generally, the phone system in Libya

is terrible. So even if you can connect with people, it's hard to

sometimes understand.

The Feb 17 head, when there are crises in this part of the world,

sometimes they don't answer their phone when they know who's calling.

And that was the case with this guy, I feel sure.

Q Do you know --

A I finally reached him at maybe 3 o'clock in the morning,

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I think.

Stepping back on all of this, we were getting reports from -- you

know, from people in government in Tripoli and then reportedly the prime

minister that they had the Ambassador, and he was standing right beside

them, and he was fine and safe.

And, I mean, that's obviously not the case in the first place.

And, secondly, it was hard to understand what their motivation was for

saying that. So there was a lot of discussion about what -- you know,

how -- how is this? How come these things -- the facts on the ground

don't match with the facts that we're being told by the government

representatives?

Because I had been on the phone also with -- I'm

sorry. I had been on the phone with I don't remember who, but the ARSOs

at intermittent times when they had a chance to answer the phone.

So a lot of disparate and conflicting information that we were

trying to synthesize, all of us standing around outside in the dark,

which was essentially most of the night.

Q When you received your call from the girl, can you -- do

you know approximate time? Did you have an idea of how far along

they --

A I mean, you could -- you could vector it with when Greg

reported that -- Greg Hicks reported that he got the phone call from

the Ambassador at -- it must have been within minutes of that because

he had just gotten to the TOC, and I ran to the TOC. Very small

compound. So, I mean, you live and work with people in the same place.

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So minutes after the attack started.

Q And once you -- so you made the phone call to Feb 17th -- the

head of Feb 17 and didn't get a response.

Then who else did you recall -- did you call? And I know you may

not recall the order, but if you could -- if you remember other phone

calls that you made and the response to those?

A I mean, any security official I had met with, folks at the

Annex, the phone numbers for the -- for the ARSOs there, , who we

discussed earlier,

. Man, I probably placed hundreds of phone calls that night.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q With respect to , , did you make contact

with them?

A I did.

Q Okay. And what, if anything, did they report in to you or

did you request of them? What was the nature?

A Again, conflicting information on all counts: The

Ambassador is fine we're hearing from somebody here, and he's with one

of the security officials.

Q Who told you that?

A originally. But he was just reporting second and

thirdhand information he was getting. And this was the -- you know,

this was an echo chamber that was Benghazi.

So, again, I mean, that's the problem with all of it. Like we're

just collecting information, much of it conflicting -- and in chaos

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like that and in also learning that we may be under attack very shortly

as well creates this atmosphere of let's just figure what's going on

and get it done. So I don't -- I didn't take notes on who I was talking

to.

We did, though, establish a note-taker who did -- and I'm sure

you've got that document, and I handed it over -- who took

minute-by-minute notes where they could. Every time that I was on the

phone that I could get close to that person, I would do that so she

or he could hear my side of the conversation I was having. That was

a decision made by the defense attache. It's a really good one, I

think. They're used to these crises, and that's a standard operating

procedure to start mapping out what's going on.

But, for me, I mean, the moment came when I reached the --

, and he had already -- he had already hurt his hand, and he was

in a fighting position on top of one of the buildings. And he said,

We've lost the Ambassador.

And when you give him just a minute to talk and you get a little

bit more information: Fire, locked in the OC, he was right behind me

1 minute and then gone. We've gone in 10 times, 20 times to try to

find him, can't. Sean Smith is dead; his body is in the car.

I mean, you could draw conclusions pretty quickly from somebody

who has eyes on. So that, to me, was the -- the source that I was

referring to for the rest of the night as the definitive source. These

guys lost the Ambassador -- I mean, not lost, but -- and I don't mean

to say that at all. But I think they were heroic. They were fantastic.

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They did everything that they could. There's no question about that.

They're incredible men. Before they came into the State Department

have done incredible things.

But, you know, the Ambassador was separated and not found. And,

I mean, to me, that pointed to either his abduction or his death.

Q And did you have a sense as to which of those occurred?

A No, ma'am. You know, and, in fact, we were getting again

from the Prime Minister's discussion that the Ambassador was fine, he

was okay, and he was standing right beside the Prime Minister.

Q Did , , or any of the other agents

you talked to give you any details about the origin of the attack or

how they first became aware to --

A So I talked to early on. He might have been the first

person I reached. And he was -- he was counting on the phone how many

people were running through the front gate, and we got up to 30 or 40.

So --

Q Did he say anything about having any advanced notice?

A [Nonverbal response.]

Q Did he affirmatively say they had no advanced notice of it?

A I mean, would they have said that? No. I mean, there's

not -- you know, it's an emergency. They're getting shot at, and

there's things burning and --

Q Right.

A And they're not thinking about whether it was a protest or

whether it was an attack. And I think that was not the first question

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that I asked. Had it been a protest, I think I would have heard that

immediately.

Q And I think that's where I was getting to.

What excited utterances were -- were made at the time because,

you know, just as much detail as you can remember from your

conversations with the agents as to what did they describe was happening

on the ground?

A So different stages of the night. The first stage was armed

intruders coming through the front gate, up to however many he said,

dozens at least.

Then a little bit later in the night: We don't have the

Ambassador; he was with us one moment and no longer.

I don't remember the specific -- specific words.

But then, later in the night: We're considering leaving this

compound, going to another.

And later in the night: We're at another compound, and we're in

defensive positions on the roof.

I helped . He couldn't connect with her.

It's chaos.

Ms. Clarke. You mentioned that the defense attache had requested

someone to take notes, and so I have a timeline I wanted to --

Mr. . That is the one.

Ms. Clarke. Okay. Perfect. So I'm going to mark it as exhibit

9.

Exhibit No. 9

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Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Okay. I've marked Doc ID No. 05455716 as exhibit 9. And

is this the timeline that you were referring to earlier?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And this is just -- what you said that these are notes that

were taken by an individual who was inside of the TOC?

A Right. Two individuals at different times, much as this

group of people are doing such a good job over here.

Q And do you recall, how are they taking these notes? Was

it hand --

A On a laptop.

Q On a laptop.

Ms. Jackson. Were both of them trying to get everything down at

the same time or were -- did they rotate on and off?

Mr. . Yeah. I think, if you imagine everyone in this

room having a conversation on a phone right now, they were trying to

capture that.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. So they were both working simultaneously?

Mr. No, ma'am. No -- they were working serially.

One started, and the other relieved.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q And you also mention the phone system wasn't that great and

so a lot of times people would step outside of the TOC to place phone

calls.

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A Yes.

Q Did those individuals come back into the TOC and relay to

the note-takers what was happening?

A Sure. It would be the distance of coming from here to your

outside office there, yes.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. And then did someone review this to -- for accuracy

afterwards?

A No, ma'am.

Q So it was --

A Not that I'm aware of. The two people who typed it were

there and typing as fast as they could. But, I mean, there was no fact

checking or any of that.

Q Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So there are a couple of instances where -- it appears that

the individual who has spoken is identified by their title?

A Correct.

Q So there are a couple of instances that have -- like, on

the second page, down at time stamp 2303, there's an incidence that

says "POL." Would that be referring to your -- you or --

A That's me.

Q Okay.

A Yes, ma'am.

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Q And so this -- this particular instance is -- it states

"AMB," which I -- does that stand for "ambassador"?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Ambassador is fine. You sure? How you know that? Have

you seen him? called you and told you Ambassador is fine. He

told you that 5 minutes ago, he's fine and out of the compound. Who

is running the operation room? Libya Shield?

Do you -- do you recall who this conversation was with?

A That was

Q Okay. And did you have an opportunity to talk to ?

Is he referring to ?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And following this conversation with , did you have

an opportunity to talk with ?

A I certainly talked with him immediately upon his arrival

in Tripoli. That night, I don't believe so. He had given his phone

to Ambassador Stevens, I think. And that phone then went dead, and

I don't think he was really in a condition to talk anyway. But I don't

recall talking to him until he arrived in Tripoli the next day.

Q Okay. And when he arrived in Tripoli the next day, what

did you discuss with him? Did you discuss -- did you discuss the night

of the attack, or were your conversations regarding something else?

A Yes. Both of those.

Q And what do you recall about your conversation with him

regarding the attack?

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A He was covered in blood. He hadn't slept. It was obvious.

There was smoke coming out of his nostrils from inhaling. He was weak,

seemed not to be in great health, sad, distressed. I mean, just about

every emotion you can think of.

Q Did you have any discussion with him about the genesis of

the attack? Was it related to -- did you have any idea of what started

the attack?

A I don't recall that.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have any conversations with any of the other DS

agents once they arrived in Tripoli?

A With some of the GRS officers.

Q And what, if anything, did tell you about

the attack?

A He described to me the -- from his position in the TOC, how

he was able to monitor and do the cameras, what was going on outside.

You know, the -- essentially the same -- I don't remember the details.

Essentially the same account that I had gotten from -- from .

And I probably led some of that discussion: Well, do you remember

this part, or do you remember that part? Where was the Ambassador last

seen?

We were still trying to determine. I mean, it was clear he wasn't

in custody, the Prime Minister, the next day or we had -- I mean, we

had not, you know -- they had not produced him. I don't recall the

details.

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Q And was this a conversation with that night

of the attack or once he arrived in Tripoli?

A Once he arrived in Tripoli.

Q Okay. And they still -- they did not have the body of the

Ambassador at that time?

A Gosh, I don't recall the timeline.

Q Okay. And that's -- you know -- what, if anything, did

Agent tell you about how he first became aware of the attack,

if you discussed that?

A He saw it through the camera at the front gate.

Q Saw people -- the attackers coming through the front gate?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

A Since then, I have seen the video, so I'm kind of tainted

by the understanding of -- I mean, I saw what they did, and he

saw -- that was his eye point, that was his view. So --

Q But at the time when you first saw him in Tripoli, that's

what he related to you, how he was first notified the of the attack,

first became aware of it?

A [Nonverbal response.]

Q I have to ask you to answer out loud.

A Yeah. I'm sorry. I'm shaking my head, but I don't -- I

mean, I don't recall the details on any of it. I mean, again, we were

putting together pieces of a puzzle that were pointing in a really

terrible direction. And, you know, the longer the discussions went

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on, the more likely it seemed that something bad had happened to the

Ambassador.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So, turning back to be exhibit 9, on the third page down

near the bottom, at time stamp 2320, the position is POL or P-O-L. And

it says: Yes, ma'am, let me see if I can find him quickly.

Do you recall, did who -- no further information in this document,

but do you recall --

A Yeah. So the way we were doing this, is -- I at least -- it

was my practice to, whenever I connected with anyone, to walk over to

the person who was taking notes and carry the conversation on, many

times repeating what they said to me so that the person could take notes

on it.

In this case, what's the time stamp again? Where is it?

Q 2320.

A So it's Ambassador Jones, the Acting Assistant Secretary.

And she was looking for Greg Hicks. He had disappeared at some point,

and we just didn't -- weren't able to find him.

Q And then, down at the bottom of the page, at this time stamp

2323, again, POL and redacted name: It's . Have you heard

anything else? You're in touch with Let me know if you hear

anything.

Do you recall who you were speaking to at this point?

A Yeah. .

Q And do you recall who is?

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A I do. And we can talk about that later, probably.

Q Okay. "Later" meaning in the classified setting?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q All right. And then on the next page, you had mentioned

earlier that you had assisted one of the RSOs in speaking with

their wife.

The time stamp 2328, POL: , how are you?

Does this refresh your memory or does this --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Your recollection of that particular conversation?

A Yeah. This is the -- the beginning of it.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Go ahead.

Ms. Clarke. At what point in time -- well, actually, let's look

at the time stamp 2337 and it says PAO. Is that the political affairs

officer?

Mr. No, ma'am. It's the public affairs officer.

Ms. Clarke. Public affairs officer. I'm sorry.

Facebook page called Tripoli council is calling for attack on the

U.S. Embassy here.

Do you recall whether this is the first point in time that you

all -- or that you and the other individuals in Tripoli were alerted

of a potential attack on the Tripoli mission?

Mr. . Okay. I don't recall if that was the first time.

It seems likely that it was or it would have been captured someplace

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else.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And who was the public affairs officer again? Was that

Hepson?

A This was .

Q Okay.

A was his deputy.

Q Okay. And where was that night?

A He was typing some of this.

Q Okay.

Ms. Clarke. So the -- this document ends around 2350, so right

before the night.

Ms. Jackson. Well, did they stop taking notes or -- because you

said you were there till about 4 in the morning. Is that correct?

Mr. [Nonverbal response.]

Ms. Jackson. Is there another document, or is this the end of

the note-taking that you recall?

Mr. I don't recall anything after this. I mean, at

this point, you know, with indication or the threat or the possibility

of an attack on the mission in Tripoli kind of the -- the chaos increased

and the -- you know, and kind of the bowel rhythm changed to determining

whether or not we should evacuate, where we should go, how we should

do it, when we should do it. And in terms of the physical location

of the note-taker and their activities afterwards, I don't remember.

BY MS. CLARKE:

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Q During your -- do you recall -- you've said that you had

called -- may have placed a hundred or so calls. Did any of those

calls -- were any of those calls directed to individuals who were

located in D.C.? So, for example, anyone at the Maghreb desk or -- and

do you recall who you called?

A Uh-huh. I talked to , the director of the NEA

Maghreb office. I feel like for sure -- this is a general thing -- the

operations center at the State Department reaches out to people

proactively in case of a crisis, and I'm sure I fielded one or two of

those phone calls.

Q Okay. Once you all were alerted that there was the

potential for an attack on the Tripoli mission compound, what was the

response? Did you all move to a different location? Did more people

come to the TOC?

A So a central location on a small compound is where we were,

right.

Q Okay.

A We were already there.

Some people who weren't immediately responsible for the kinds of

things we were doing outside the TOC may have gone back to their rooms.

I don't really know.

But, for the most part, everyone on the mission was in or around

the tactical operations center for, you know, most of the night.

About -- a little while after we got that alert, there was -- there

must have been a decision to evacuate. I was not part of that

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discussion originally.

But a little bit later, they held a briefing, the DCM and the

regional security officer held a briefing outside the TOC -- in a room

in that same villa to talk about -- to organize logistics for moving

from the location we were at to another location.

Q So once you -- the night progressed. And, at some point,

you left the TOC. Can you walk us through what you did following

your -- following leaving the TOC?

A So knowing that we were going to evacuate, not knowing that

we were coming back, many people went to their rooms -- I did, to my

room -- and collected some things that I didn't want to abandon so I

could take them with me.

Also, with one other employee at the mission, went into Ambassador

Stevens' room and grabbed things that I thought -- that we thought he

might need if we were to get him back. It was medication, eyeglasses,

some money, computers and packed those things up. We had a central

location for collecting all of the luggage that we were taking with

us, took it down, and dropped it off there.

Q When the discussion began about -- or when the DCM provided

the briefing about the decision to evacuate, were you evacuating to

another location in Libya, or were you evacuating Libya?

A To another location in Libya.

Q And then did you act -- did you, in fact, evacuate to that

location?

A Yes. Yes, ma'am.

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Q Once you gathered some of the Ambassador's items and brought

it to the central location where luggage was being packed, were you

aware of what happened to those items, such as the computer and other

things that you had gathered for him?

A You know, they were left sitting beside mine. All of that

stuff got loaded into Suburbans. I got my stuff back. We set the

Ambassador's stuff aside.

And fast forwarding to the C-17 coming in to pick up the evacuees

and the bodies and those who were injured, that stuff made it onto the

airplane somehow.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And then you were ultimately evacuated to Germany?

A Many ultimately evacuated. I did not.

Q You stayed in Tripoli?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

Ms. Clarke. Do you recall --

Ms. Jackson. You have about 10 minutes left so --

Ms. Clarke. Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q What do you recall or when do you recall becoming aware of

the protests that were occurring in Cairo, Egypt?

A Sometime after I returned from Benghazi.

Q So, on the -- sometime on the -- September 11, on that day?

A Yes, ma'am. That sounds about right. I don't -- I mean,

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again, timeline-wise, I couldn't -- I shouldn't commit to a certain

time. I don't recall. It was part of the landscape.

Q Part of the landscape of everything that was happening that

day?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So you indicated that you did not evacuate to Germany, but

you stayed in Tripoli. Did the DCM evacuate to Germany?

A No, ma'am.

Q Did the DCM depart Tripoli at any point while you were still

there?

A No, ma'am.

At any time while I was still there for -- indefinitely until I

left?

Q Well, at some point he departed Tripoli. Is that correct?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And do you recall when he departed?

A It was a couple of months after the attacks.

Q So October, November of 2012?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Were you a part of any discussions

?

A Yes, ma'am. As a member of the country team, we had regular

meetings

.

Q And what were some of the issues

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?

A

Q

A

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q

A No, ma'am.

Q Okay. You weren't part of any of the discussions

regarding --

A Their arrival? I mean, I can't -- honestly, I can't

remember the day they arrived.

Q It wasn't the 13th. Is that correct? The 12th or the 13th

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of September?

A Well, I can't remember that.

Q Do you remember, was it within the week? Or did it take

a period of time ?

A Yes. It took a period of time. I don't know what that

period was. I'm sorry, I really do want to be --

Q No, no. No, no, no.

A -- helpful on this thing.

Q And we don't --

A I don't --

Q We just want to test the depth of your knowledge and your

recollection.

But you don't recall that there was any ongoing discussion or

frustration ?

A No. I think a better person to ask about that would be Greg

Hicks at that time.

Q Okay. He would have been the person involved in those

conversations or --

A I mean, all of us, in one way or another. But I would assume

that most of the discussion would be back here in Washington on whether

or not they would

That, to me, was -- was not part of my understanding. You know,

my participation in that, it was more facilitating their arrival when

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they were in the air and on the way.

Q Okay.

Ms. Clarke. So I think that those are all the questions that I

have for you in the unclassified setting. And, at this time, we'll

go off the record.

[Recess.]

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Ms. Sawyer. So you folks ready. Set. Okay. We can go back on

the record.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Mr. , just to introduce myself again, I'm Heather

Sawyer, one of the Democratic counsel. I'm joined this afternoon by

two of my colleagues, Peter Kenny and Brent Woolfork. We appreciate

your time today. We deferred several rounds of questioning in the

interest of moving through the questioning for the full committee in

an efficient manner, so we again appreciate your time, and we'll just

try to follow up on some of the topics that you've already discussed,

starting, again, with where you had been discussing and left off with

my colleague.

So I just had a few questions about, once you had returned to

Tripoli, and you were advised and learned of the attacks in Benghazi,

and you've described what was a very difficult, challenging

environment, trying to gain information from a location where obviously

none of you were located, and you've already looked at one exhibit that

you identified as an effort -- I think you described it as a timeline

log. I wanted to have you take a look at another exhibit, and I think

we're on exhibit 10. So we'll go ahead and mark this as exhibit 10

just for identification purposes.

Exhibit No. 10

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Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And I'm going to you some discreet questions about it, but

I want to give you an opportunity, and because it's an email chain,

the document is marked with Document No. C05391026. It's a four-page

email chain, and because it is an email chain, of course, the

first -- the beginning of the chain begins on that last page, page 4,

and that begins on September 11, 2012, 4:49 p.m. I believe that's here

in D.C. eastern daylight time. So that's what I was going to start

a little bit with, and I wanted to give you an opportunity, but I do

just have some particularized questions. So I'll start with those and

you just take time as you need to read it.

This chain that starts there, initially, do you know who

is?

A I know the name, but I couldn't place his office.

Q Is he somewhere here in D.C.?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Main State. That very first email indicates a Beth Jones,

who you mentioned a little earlier spoke with DCM Greg Hicks.

So during the course of the evening, was DCM Hicks the person

primarily communicating back with D.C. in addition to all of you?

A Yes, ma'am. I mean, he would have been -- he's the deputy

chief of mission at that time. In the event the Ambassador is out of

the country, he's the charge d'affaire, and he was -- he was leading

that night.

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Q And the email from Mr. has a number of individuals,

both that it's sent to and that it's cc'd. I would just note that you

are included on that cc line, so -- you know, I'm sure it's going to

your email contemporaneously, but I'm also assuming that you, given

that you were in the TOC at Tripoli at this point in time, or on the

way to the TOC, you would not have the opportunity in real-time to

monitor your emails?

A Yes, ma'am, that's correct, plus the email system is very

slow in Benghazi.

Q So this account, even though it included you throughout,

you would not have been checking it at that time. Have you had an

opportunity -- did you, in the days kind of right after, time right

after, have an opportunity to see this reporting chain?

A Yes, ma'am. This particular one, I don't -- I don't

recall. I haven't reviewed it all yet, but it certainly -- you know,

when things slowed down just a bit, we all got on our emails again and

started looking through them.

Q So this methodology, like the email chain that was going

out, recorded kind of conversations that Greg Hicks was having and

presumably other folks and then distributed through D.C., but it was

just one way of trying to spread the information in a similar way that

you guys were trying to get the information out. Would you agree with

that?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So that initial email kind of, at 4:49, indicates that DCM

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Hicks' initial update was just that he had been advised that, in that

first sentence, that a Libyan militia is responding to the attack, and

then it says in parens, "(we now know this is the 17th Feb Brigade,

as requested by Embassy office) is responding to the attack on the

diplomatic mission in Benghazi. The QRF is in the compound engaging

the attackers, taking fire, and working its way through the compound

to get to the villa where Ambassador Stevens is in safe haven for

extraction."

So do you remember receiving initial reports that the QRF was

responding, that the Ambassador was potentially in the safe haven?

A Yes, ma'am. I mean, from discussions with

directly, who said that the Ambassador was in a safe haven, that was

my first indication of that. Whether or not the QRF was coming, I don't

recall. The expectation was the QRF would respond, and that's the

standard protocol.

Q Right. And this email, at least, indicates whether it was

in fact happening or not, that there was some belief that had been

conveyed by Mr. Hicks to Beth Jones that that was, indeed, occurring.

Would that be accurate?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q The next email up in the chain is about 20 minutes later,

just an update. Again, reporting a discussion with Mr. Hicks, and

there's some information in there, including, in that final sentence,

that Hicks has been coordinating with COS. What's your understanding

of who COS is? Do you have a sense of that?

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A Yes, ma'am. Can we talk about that in a different setting,

in a classified setting?

Q Yes. And that that individual has learned that the -- from

the QRF about the status of the compound. Currently they are clearing

the compound and working again to access the party, I think presuming

the party on the mission. And so, again, not asking you to ascertain

factually whether that was the case, but this is some of the initial

reporting, certainly, was that there was an effort to clear the compound

and get to the Ambassador and that the Ambassador was in the safe haven

for extraction?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So a few emails up, at 5:32 -- so I think that's on the third

page, about three-quarters of the way down. Again, it's just an email

report from , so it's 5:32. I think that's about 45 minutes

after that initial email went out.

The first sentence there, the fighting has stopped. There is a

confirmation, they say, at that point of Mr. Smith's fatality, and that

they are still trying to find the Ambassador. Do you have a general

collection of that reporting, that there was a point in time --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- about 45 minutes in that the fighting had stopped and

they were still trying to --

A Yes, ma'am, I do.

Q Okay. And then I -- the very next email up that page, I

think, references what you did talk about a little bit, that at some

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point in time during the attack on the mission in Benghazi, there was

also a concern and a threat against Embassy Tripoli. And you'll see

that in the email right above, again, from Mr. , us -- and, again,

reporting information from Mr. Hicks, and that second sentence says

that the shop at Embassy Tripoli has found postings indicating that

this group, Tripoli Council, plans to carry out an attack. So you

talked a little bit about that.

So -- and you also talked, and we appreciate it, about your

communications with some folks in Washington, and in a general sense,

without the specificity of having you remember any particular

conversation, was your sense from both the people in Washington -- and

let's start with them, just the people in Washington. So you said you

spoke with -- you recall Mr. .

What was your sense? Was he being, you know, supportive in terms

of just trying to get information from you or get you what you needed,

or like what, in a general sense, was the flavor of those conversations?

A Generally, it was the flow of information from the Villa

to the Department.

Q So they were trying to gather information?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And did you ask Mr. or anyone else in D.C. to do

anything in particular in a kind of reverse support flow? Reach out

to anyone in particular? Make calls on behalf of either Embassy

Tripoli, which was, itself, now facing a potential threat, or the

mission in Benghazi?

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A Yes, ma'am. I mean, we were questioning. I asked at least

once what is -- is there a response coming from somewhere outside of

Libya from the U.S. Government to help people in Benghazi?

Q And what was the -- what answers were you given?

A I don't remember the specific answers. I mean, it was not

yes or no. It was we're working it, but I can't -- that's not a quote.

I was left with the impression that that was a consideration.

Q Okay. The reporting then continues up to the next email,

and at this point -- and this is at 6:58 p.m., so I think that's about

2 hours from the initial email report, and it indicates -- the first

half of that email is really about Embassy Tripoli. And do you see

that, Greg Hicks provided the following update about the three Embassy

buildings in Tripoli? So at this --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- point in time between the 5:55 email, and about an hour

later, 6:58 p.m., it appears certainly that there was a lot going on,

just to refresh your recollection, in Embassy Tripoli in terms of trying

to address the concerns about the specific threat to your own Embassy?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Does that seem right?

A Yes, ma'am, that's correct.

Q And it indicates there in that second paragraph that -- and

this one is actually from Beth Jones, the email sent out from Beth Jones,

not , and it says, quote, I passed on U, slash, S, and I

believe --

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A Under Secretary Kennedy.

Q Thank you. Recommendation that the personnel all moved

together to one compound in Tripoli.

Do you recall that recommendation coming down and whether people

agreed with that idea?

A I do recall it. Again, you know, we were all -- picture

the scene, we were all around and outside the TOC, and passively

collecting information that was -- again, people were talking on their

phones and hearing that, so I don't know where the source of that came,

but at one point, yes, it was -- it was clear that we were going to

move on to -- to a new compound, to a different compound.

Q Okay. And then there is a gap, a pretty significant gap

from 6:58 to the next morning, and at this point, the reporting is -- and

before we go to that, actually, that report that I was just asking you

about or the email, 6:58, the very last bullet indicates that there

is a -- there is reporting that, quote, "another mob has gathered in

Benghazi headed for the," redaction, "compound." They will ensure

extra protection there, too."

Do you recall a point of time around this point in the evening

where there was some reporting of a mob?

A I'm sorry, where were you quoting from?

Q Sure. It's page 3.

A Okay.

Q At the very top. It's the last bullet in an email that goes

at about 6:58 eastern time p.m.?

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A Okay. Yes, ma'am. I see it.

Q And it just -- as I said, it says, quote, "reports that

another mob has gathered in Benghazi headed for the," redaction,

"compound." They will ensure extra protection there, too."

Do you recall a point in time where you were hearing or reporting

up that there was a mob that was potentially headed for a different

compound?

A I don't have any specific references of the two of them in

my memory.

Q Okay. And then that final email -- well, the email that

I was referring to on page 2, which is 9:51, is several hours later,

and it doesn't really recount what then happened during that, you know,

time period, but it does indicate that at that point in time, and again,

it's a report of good news from the Mr. Hicks, that the wounded in the

hospital in Tripoli are doing much better. Is it your understanding

that that was a reference to the folks who had been brought from Benghazi

to Tripoli?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And you know, we've heard a little bit, and maybe you had

kind of insights into this or not, but we've heard a little bit about

how critical the resources in Tripoli were to really making sure those

people, as soon as they got there, could be stabilized and moved. Were

you -- did you have any experience directly in that? Can you explain

to us kind of who was critical to have on the ground there in Tripoli

to make sure that happened? Do you have a recollection of that?

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A Really the , kind of took

the lead on logistics and did an excellent job. He's trained for that

kind of thing, and he -- he helped organize. I mean, things were going

in different directions. When the -- so the answer is yes. I mean,

that's my recollection that was really kind of leading some of

the charge. I mean, the assets were from the other compound mainly,

but also from our RSO shop. There were moving parts because of two

different flights that came in, you know, varying degrees of injuries,

some that required immediate attention, others that kind of manifested

later.

So we had a couple of trips to the hospital, and, you know, picking

up the bodies at the hospital to get them on to the evacuation aircraft,

getting the Benghazi survivors, those who had not been injured, to that

aircraft at the same time with the injured people from the hospital,

along with the evacuees from the Embassy mission, from the State

Department mission. All coalesced around the C17 landing, you know,

sometime that evening.

Q Okay. And then I wanted to share with you just quickly

another exhibit, just from -- can we go off the record just for a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Okay. We can go back on the record. You can strike that

part.

So just talking a little bit about both exhibit 9 which you had

looked at before, which was the log, and then exhibit 10, which I've

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had you explain some of the details to us. You know, from where we

sit as a committee, these appear to be very, you know, genuine efforts

to both record what's going on, and to seminate information as best

people could on the ground, make sure that decision makers and resources

were being amassed to the best degree possible.

They're obviously not necessarily official timelines, you

indicated, and I just wanted to talk to you a little bit about exhibit 9

that you certainly have never fact-checked that for accuracy purposes.

Is that true?

A That's correct.

Q I presume that's also a little bit true of exhibit 10 that

you didn't fact check that for accuracy purposes?

A Right.

Q So to the -- is there anything about either document that

would make you think that to the extent there are discrepancies or

inconsistencies, those are anything other than someone in very

difficult circumstances trying to share the best information they have,

like anything that was purposefully admitted, changed, altered?

A No, ma'am.

Q And a couple of questions on exhibit 9. You were asked

specifically about a conversation. You identified -- so on page 2 of

exhibit 9. You were asked specifically about a conversation, and you

had identified this was indeed you speaking with , 23:03.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q You also indicated -- do you know where Mr. was at

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that time that he was having that conversation with you? Was he on

the compound, to the best of your knowledge?

A I'd have to go back. Let me -- so at this point in the night,

and referring to this particular note, he was at what the Libyans

uniquely called the joint operation center and joint operation centers

seemed to just pop up around crises and the jointness of them is rarely

known, and I -- it's hard to know who was forming -- who's leading,

who's following, who's involved, who's, you know, part of it. And

had --

.

I don't know the timeline of this, but I can place him, from these

conversations, being on his way to the joint operations center

, at whatever times, I can't say.

Q And when you described it, you said these kind of operation

centers, joint operation centers would spring up around a crisis. In

this particular instance, was it your understanding that it sprung up

around this crisis in order to try to help coordinate assistance?

A I think that's what I was asking him here, who was running

the operations room? What do you know about it? This is probably not

the full transcript of that conversation. I mean, that's -- even my

side of that conversation, but again, that's -- information was -- it

was unclear. It was fuzzy and what operation center, who's running

it, is it helpful, is it something that's controlling the attack, I

mean, you know, you don't know.

Q And do you recall getting a sense from him as to whether

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it was a friendly effort or a hostile effort?

A I got a sense that it was a grouping of those militia people,

some of whom we had met previously whose motivations varied by day,

by person, by group, so I didn't -- I wasn't prepared to make a call

that it was for or against us. The fact that he was going to it

indicated that he didn't feel threatened by it, I think, but I

don't -- you know, I don't -- I don't know any of the people who were

there besides him.

Q And did he indicate to you his belief at the time as to

whether these were folks who were going to be helpful in trying to

coordinate assistance?

A Generally, I think that was his thought that they

would -- this is where a reaction would come from.

Q Okay. So can you explain for us just in a general sense,

because you were then in Tripoli and you've clarified for the committee

that you actually were not in the group that was evacuated. You

remained in Tripoli. So it sounds like you really remained on the

ground throughout, which, you know, you said at one point when you were

describing -- I'm trying to walk us through this 48 hours that, you

know, that it was time driven by no sleep. So explain to us a little

bit kind of what your role and responsibility was on the ground and

kind of the immediate period after the attack.

A Sure. I think -- I mean, the mission was struggling to find

its leader, right, and I -- as the political officer, I had probably

the best Rolodex on the compound, and so that was -- I mean, that was

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my main -- that was the only way I could contribute from Tripoli to

a response in Benghazi is trying to motivate militia leaders and

security officials in Benghazi to respond to the event.

Q In terms of investigating it after the fact, is that -- just

to clarify?

A No, ma'am, I'm sorry. I misunderstood.

Q I was not talking about the particular night of. I -- you

know, which I appreciate, and I think you talked to us a little bit

about you just really calling everyone that you possibly could, and

we appreciate that.

I meant, and sorry if I wasn't clear enough, you then didn't

evacuate. You stayed and you were there on ground, so I was just trying

to get a general sense --

A Oh, I gotcha, I gotcha.

Q -- for the committee kind of what were your primary. I

think at that point you did then become deputy chief of mission.

A A little bit later, yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And Mr. Hicks, who would have been then charge or --

A He was the charge, that's correct, yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. So in that respect, like, what were your

primary -- likely, you were juggling a lot of tasks. So what were

those --

A Sure.

Q -- general tasks?

A So -- I mean, to take a step back, I was not -- I remained

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the political officer for several days after the attacks. Mr. Hicks,

I won't try to explain his motivation, was reluctant to appoint anyone

as a deputy, so he ran -- he ran the mission himself essentially. We

all tried to do everything that we could to fill the gaps, and part

of filling the gaps was working to -- let me take a second step back.

We evacuated what, half or three-quarters of our staff, so I went

from being the acting DCM, political officer, principal officer

Benghazi, to assistant management officer to consular officer, to

economics officer to whatever needed to be done at the time. We were

consolidating other -- so we had three satellite offices, I guess, in

Tripoli. Does that make sense? We had the residential compound,

the -- what was formerly the Ambassador's residence, but at that time

was the office space that the Embassy was using, so we were commuting

from the residential compound to the Embassy office space, and we had

the Annex.

So we were -- we were returning to the Embassy residential

compound. We'd made the decision not to go back to the Embassy offices

because we could not divide the security assets that we had, so not

enough security to provide security in both places, so we consolidated

back at the Embassy residential compound which had, in my memory, three

classified terminals that took 25 to 30 minutes to load up then to just

be able to email, and maybe four or five unclassified terminals.

So we were installing a brand new information management system

essentially. We were replacing -- organizing the replacement -- this

is all logistics, I guess, is what I would say. And we were replacing

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all of the equipment that we had destroyed in the event that it'd be

turned over to Libyans after we evacuated the compound. You know, I

mean, we were essentially setting up a mission from scratch again.

This time with a quarter of the people, a quarter of the staff.

Q And --

A If I could also.

Q Yes.

A Let me just say the command center -- some of the offices

that were at the other compound, we lost that. So we moved a long desk,

you know, with the length alongside the side of this wall here to the

Ambassador's bedroom, and that's where three or four of us worked at

the -- as the main office. We physically carried --

Q Right.

A -- a desk up there. I mean, we were -- that's the level

that we were at.

Q Sure. And during that time, how was DCM -- well, then at

that point, Charge Hicks' leadership of that team? I mean, that was

a challenging time. Was he really able to kind of lead you guys in

a way that you felt was helpful?

A

he was thrust into a really difficult situation.

Others, I think -- I mean, you probably talked to them.

I would guess that they would say the same.

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Q

A

Q And you had been the acting DCM before Mr. Hicks --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- came in. How did that transition go from you being the

acting to him being the acting? Like what steps did you take and were

they --

A So the --

Q Hold on a second. Were they just successful in acclimating

him, do you feel, to that position?

A So Mr. Hicks was delayed in his arrival, and that was the

whole reason that I was the acting deputy chief of mission. They asked

me to come out a little bit early to cover for the period of time while

he had some personal matters that he was taking care of, and I played

the role of acting deputy chief of mission and political officer

simultaneously until he arrived.

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When he arrived, and this is an example of the handover, I handed

him a very lengthy memo with all of the issues that we had kind of boiling

at the Embassy, from literally from paving the roads to removing sewage

to trying to find a new political officer to the security situation.

I hope that's a document that you all have. I handed him that document,

and he set it down on his desk and said he doesn't read memos and he

would call me back if he needed any clarification later on on any of

these issues. That's the last I heard of it.

Q So he didn't ever call you back, seek clarification, work

with you on any of those outstanding issues?

A No, ma'am.

Q

A We all have a professional job to

do, I

think most of the people at the mission were the same way,

professionals, committed, patriotic, you know, dedicated to government

service, and I don't doubt that Mr. Hicks was either. So you find those

places where interests aligned and you work with those, and when they

don't, you work around them.

Q Okay. Thanks. So I wanted to just talk to you about a

different topic entirely, also something that came up after the attack,

and there was some -- and you may remember it and I have an email chain

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here that I want to help refresh your recollection on, so you're

not -- and I'll mark this as -- I think we're up to exhibit 11 for

identification purposes.

Exhibit No. 11

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And this is a three-page email chain. It begins on that

third page on -- the last page is just a little holdover. The second

to last page it indicates it starts on, September 19 and all goes up,

and then you get included on the chain a little later. So that initial

email is from someone whose name is Elise Labott to Phillippe Reines.

Do you know who Phillippe is?

A I know who Phillippe is. I don't know him personally but --

Q And just generally, who is he, just by title at the time?

A Sure. The title would have been spokesperson or deputy

press secretary or something along those.

Q Okay. And then that second email on that same page

indicates him sending it on to Ms. Jones, and it just says there's been

an inquiry. He says the below is from our CNN reporter who says she

has sources in Libya claiming to have warned us about the deteriorating

security situation in Libya in the days before the attack.

The next email is then Mr. Hicks, Greg Hicks. Well, there's an

email, intervening email sending it on to Mr. Hicks because there's

a request that information be gathered from the Embassy about this

report. So there's an email relaying it to Mr. Hicks asking him to

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look into it, and then Mr. Hicks, on that next email that starts at

the bottom of page 1 dated September 20th, it cc's you where Mr. Hicks

is responding, and he indicates in that first sentence, "Beth, please

see 12 Tripoli 1098 paragraph 4." So 1098 -- 12 Tripoli 1098, I

believe, is exhibit 6.

A That's right.

Q And we had talked about that, or you had spoken about that

with my colleagues earlier in the day. And he goes on to indicate,

he indicates remembers, and that , to your recollection, you?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Had he spoken with you about it?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And he talks about the meeting, and he says, you

know, that, quote, "As you know, our reporting for the last month had

shown the security in Benghazi was in flux, but we believed that it

was Libyan on Libyan violence. Even the report in this cable indicated

that Benghazi citizens wanted foreigners to return. Please be assured

that no one told any COM personnel located in Benghazi or Tripoli that

our personnel and facilities might be directly targeted. This guy is

just another Monday morning quarterback. All the best, Greg."

So he is reporting back. Did you -- first of all, just that first

assessment, the reporting back had indicated that security was in flux,

but there was a belief that it was Libyan on Libyan violence. Do you

agree with that having been the assessment at the time?

A Yes, ma'am.

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Q He then goes on to refer to the report that you had made.

You said you authored it, which is captured in exhibit 6. And he says,

"Even that report indicates that some of these same people wanted

foreigners to return." So does that also accurately reflect both what

you reported and what you had experienced when you were in Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And you had said a little earlier when you were explaining

the cable and the notes that you would take after a meeting, you said

that best practice is generally I take notes contemporaneous or as close

to a meeting as possible and that was a practice that you yourself

followed. Is that the case?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And so this cable itself would have been a representation

of your best practice and would have been the contemporaneous record

of the meetings you were having while you were in Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Is that accurate?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And certainly that cable, as Mr. Hicks indicates, never

indicates anywhere in it there that was a specific warning. I think

it was reported -- a specific warning against American interests that

you were aware of it?

A There was not a specific warning.

Q And you had never been in a meeting where there had been

a specific warning?

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A That's correct.

Q And in fact, you then do clarify a little bit in the next

email, you do say, clarification, to Mr. Hicks, that this individual

who supposedly -- claiming that this occurred may indeed have been at

your meeting, but you said, it's in this second sentence, "I did speak

to him." You say RSO , ARSO , and ARSO

participated. "There was absolutely no discussion of

threats against us or our facilities."

So again, you had never been relayed any such threat?

A That's correct.

Q Now, Mr. Hicks, in his characterization of when he initially

responds, he kind of describes this as potential, quote, "Monday

morning quarterbacking." You know, that's sometimes a phrase that's

used when people a little bit after the fact, with the benefit of

hindsight, either second-guess or have particularized recollections.

Did you feel that certainly -- and not even with specific regard

to this, but to the extent you were there on the ground, have you felt

that, with regard to your experience, both in Tripoli and Benghazi,

that there has been an element of Monday morning quarterbacking about

what went on?

A Absolutely. Yes, ma'am.

Q And how has that impacted, kind of, your ability to kind

of move forward? Like, how did that impact you when you were in Tripoli

even in the aftermath? You were there for nearly -- up until July

of 2013. Is that accurate?

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A July of 2014.

Q Sorry. You know, kind of that level of scrutiny and Monday

morning quarterbacking, how did that impact you guys on the ground?

A Well, I mean, you know, we had lost our Ambassador, and

that's the business of diplomacy, though, these people making

accusations or changing the dynamics, or changing their recollections.

I didn't let it stop me from completing my task, and I stayed in Tripoli

for another year and a half after the attacks doing the mission.

Q You may recall that nearly a -- so these emails happened

in September of 2012. There was a New York Times article in December

of 2013, so nearly more than a year later, and I have a copy of that

as well. I'm going to mark it as exhibit 12 just for identification

purposes, and I just have for you what is the first section of the -- here

you go. And I just had a very quick question for you about that.

Mr. Davis. Is this the whole article you are passing out?

Exhibit No. 12

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Sawyer. I am only going to ask him about the first section.

Mr. Davis. How many pages are there?

Ms. Sawyer. I have no idea. This is section is a one, two,

three, four, five, six pages. It's titled -- the article itself is

titled "A Deadly Mix in Benghazi." It's almost 12 months, 13 months

after the incident we just discussed.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q On that first page, it speaks about a diplomatic having a

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meeting, and in the second paragraph it talks about Libyans warned of

rising threats against Americans. In the third paragraph there's a

quote, you know, since Benghazi isn't safe, better for you to leave

now from an individual, and I think his name came up earlier as being

someone who was in that meeting.

Just for clarification purposes, is it your understanding this

is referencing this very same we believe we've already talked about,

that you've been very clear that no such warning was given?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So again, from your perspective and so that it's very clear

for the committee, no such warning really was ever --

A No, ma'am.

Q -- conveyed to you?

A No, ma'am.

Q Now, I think as you're probably well aware, an

Accountability Review Board was convened in the immediate aftermath --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- of the attack, and you were interviewed by the

Accountability Review Board. Have you had a chance to read at least

the unclassified version, the one that's in the --

A I did.

Q -- public domain?

A After it was published, yes, ma'am, but not recently.

Q Okay. And at the time you were interviewed, were you able

to be fully forthcoming with the ARB about your experience in Benghazi?

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A Yes, ma'am.

Q Did you withhold any information about your experience at

all?

A No, ma'am.

Q Were you ever instructed by anyone at the State Department

not to be fully forthcoming with the Accountability Review Board?

A No, ma'am.

Q Speaking more broadly and then just the Accountability

Review Board, with regard to any -- we are now the 8th congressional

investigation.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q 7 preceded us. Were you ever instructed by anyone at the

State Department not the cooperate fully with any congressional

investigations?

A Yes, ma'am. There's one caveat to that. When Congressman

Chaffetz visited the Embassy compound after the attacks, we were

instructed by the Department to answer all of his questions fully except

with relationship to the FBI's investigation of -- ongoing

investigation of the attacks, in which case we were told to refer Mr.

Chaffetz to the Department of Justice for their discussion of the

investigation. They were the lead organization. We were not.

Q And was an explanation given to you as to why it would be

appropriate to refer any law enforcement specific questions to the FBI?

A I think just the, you know, the kind of the logical reason,

number one, we're not conducting the investigation at the State

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Department into the attacks; and number two, the FBI is, so they are

the resource that the Congressman should refer to. I don't

think -- there was never an explanation of why we would say that, but

I think that's the general understanding.

Q Now, to the extent that you indicated you had read the ARB

report, and going back to just the engagement, when the Congressman

was there, were there questions that you felt you could not answer and

that you needed to refer him to the FBI for?

A Myself personally, no. I was involved in most of the

briefings, and there were probably other discussions that happened that

I was not privy to, but for any of the questions that were directed

at me or anything I saw in my presence, you know, it was full and open

exchange.

Q Okay. So with regard to the ARB, I know you indicated that

you had read it and potentially not recently, but to the extent that

you can recall, did it accurately reflect, from your perspective, your

experience while you were in Tripoli and Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Now, that ARB made several recommendations, and I think

those recommendations were made in the report which issued in December

of 2012, went to then Secretary Clinton who indicated she wanted them

implemented with dispatch. I think you were still in Tripoli at the

time.

A Yes, ma'am, I had no part of that discussion, that specific

part.

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Q Do you recall how the recommendations were received in

Tripoli? Was there work to implement during the time you were there,

those recommendations?

A Yes, ma'am. So the ARB report kind of served as the

umbrella for several different mechanisms that the Department started

implementing. Now, the specifics of each one of those is something

that you should talk to diplomatic security about. The interagency

security assessment team came out shortly afterwards, which was a

recommendation of the ARB, looked at specific items at the mission and

made recommendations from that of which there were, to my recollection,

dozens, maybe hundreds, and we spent the next 2 years, or

year-and-a-half, essentially, implementing those. From

grilles -- new types of grilles on the windows to -- well, you know,

and one extreme, that's physical protection, to planting roses outside

the -- outside the mission walls called "defensive shrubbery," so I

think they -- from the grass to the sky, they kind of got everything

wrapped up in it.

And we had contractors, we had TDYers, we facilitated hundreds

of people to come in to make specific changes. At the same time, we

had the OBO project representative, the person who was building the

lower compound facility of the mission. That was still in construction

until just a few weeks before they evacuated in June of this year. That

was a multimillion dollar project. OBO had a designated

representative. I believe -- I can think of at least one, and this

goes back to the grilles that they put on the windows where the design

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of the grille had to change because the recommendations from the ISAT

were -- because it was inconsistent with those recommendations.

So the details were excruciating on all of this, on all of this

stuff, and there was a checklist. There was a matrix.

Q And was there any refusal or reluctance to implement, to

the best of everyone's ability, the recommendations that the ARB had

made?

A That the ARB had made? Those were -- I see those as more

general, so no. When it got into some of the specifics, like planting

the roses, there were some pushback in some cases, and I think

rightfully so, but very few recommendations that did not actually get

implemented and executed to the end, none that I can think of, except

for those roses.

Q And your concern about the roses was?

A Well, then we'd have to water them every day, so I'd have

to put staff outside the Embassy walls to take care of that. The

budget, how to we afford roses, I mean, you know, just on a kind of

realistic level, and no doubt that that would have happened later on,

but there were other things that seemed to be kind of priority-wise.

I mean, we were staffed at a quarter of our capacity, and so to get

people to just -- and we had to prioritize, and we prioritized the bigger

things that seemed to be much more in line with diplomatic security's

goals first.

Q And so one of the things that, you know, the members have

talked to some of -- both the witnesses who have come before the

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135

committee and some of the families of both of the victims is really,

from your perspective, and you obviously were someone who was there

and remained in Libya trying to carry out the mission, and from your

perspective -- and again, this is the eighth congressional

investigation. I think the committee is absolutely committed to

making sure it's the last. Are there particular questions, discrete

questions for you that remain unanswered?

A Yes, ma'am. I think there needs to be a decision at some

level about the role of diplomats in the world. It's as simple as that.

I served in Iraq. I've served in other high-threat posts, and in Libya.

And you cannot station diplomats abroad in high-threat posts without

the threat of something bad happening to them.

So, you either need -- somebody needs to take responsibility for

that decision, or you need to stop sending diplomats abroad to these

areas. I would vote that somebody takes responsibility for that

decision.

Q And did you agree with the recommendation that this is

something that the ARB did grapple with, the kind of appropriate

framework for assessing risk management certainly, and making the

recognition that you cannot eliminate 100 percent of the risk anywhere

that we operate in the world, some places being more dangerous. Did

you agree with the recommendations made by the ARB to try to address

and make sure the appropriate -- both risk assessment was taking place,

and the authority for decisions was both clear and appropriately

placed?

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136

A I agree with the general report, yes, ma'am. On specifics,

I think those will all play out in the real world and we'll have problems

with budget, we'll have problems with staffing, we'll have problems

getting visas for people who need to arrive to provide security. We'll

always have those challenges, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't take

them on.

Q And when you say we -- it doesn't mean we shouldn't take

them on, I mean, you have been a career diplomat. What would the -- you

know, from your perspective, you know, the other thing that the ARB

said is, you know, they didn't believe that the United States should

not engage in diplomacy at all. Is that also your position?

A I believe the United States should engage in diplomacy in

every possible opportunity, and that includes in high-threat places.

Q Okay. Thanks. I will just shift, if I could.

I have a series of questions that I would like to ask you. Some

of -- some of these are things that you may have direct knowledge of,

some you likely will not, but the committee is bringing before it folks

who have had the opportunity to at least have direct knowledge. There

has been a lot of speculation and a lot of allegations around

surrounding the attacks, so we are just going to take the opportunity

to ask you a series of questions about some of the allegations, ask

you if you have any knowledge or evidence of these allegations.

It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman

has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to

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137

stand down," end quote, and this resulted in the Defense Department

not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No, ma'am, I would not have any access to information.

Q It has been alleged --

A -- like that.

Q It has --

A -- like that. I'm sorry.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact-checker evaluated this claim and gave it Four Pinocchio's,

its highest award for false claims. Nonetheless, this allegation has

persisted.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No, ma'am.

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138

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Colonel Qadhafi to his

own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in spring 2011?

A No, ma'am. I was a student in Cairo, Egypt.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or they are countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria and that they found, quote, 'no

support for this allegation," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that U.S. facilities in Benghazi

were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria

or to any other foreign country?

A No, ma'am.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the special mission compound. There

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139

have been a number of allegations about the cause of and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to, quote, "stand down," but that instead, there were tactical

disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No, ma'am.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No, ma'am.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board, damaging

documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department removed

or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were provided

to the Accountability Review Board?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else to -- at the State Department, to remove or scrub

damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

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140

A No, ma'am.

Q Let me ask these questions for documents provided to

Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons, and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship."

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks. Do you have any evidence that Ambassador

Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on

the Sunday talk shows?

A No, ma'am.

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141

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," end quote, on the

night of the attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action."

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second flighting plane to Benghazi were ordered by their

superiors to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military

officials have stated that these those four individuals were, instead,

ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical

assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," end quote.

Do you any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. Former

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Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former chairman of

the House Armed Services Committee conducted a review of the attacks

after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were, how quickly

the thing all happened and how quick it dissipated, we probably couldn't

have done more than we did."

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to

deploy?

A No, ma'am.

Q Okay. I think that concludes our questions in the

unclassified setting. I think we'll go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the interview proceeded in classified

session.]

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REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

742
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 11

743
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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

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EXHIBIT 12

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Benghazi, Libya

BOYISH­LOOKING AMERICAN DIPLOMAT was meeting for the first time with the

Islamist leaders of eastern Libya’s most formidable militias.

It was Sept. 9, 2012. Gathered on folding chairs in a banquet hall by the Mediterranean, the

Libyans warned of rising threats against Americans from extremists in Benghazi. One militia

leader, with a long beard and mismatched military fatigues, mentioned time in exile in

Afghanistan. An American guard discreetly touched his gun.

“Since Benghazi isn’t safe, it is better for you to leave now,” Mohamed al­Gharabi , the

leader of the Rafallah al­Sehati Brigade, later recalled telling the Americans. “I specifically

told the Americans myself that we hoped that they would leave Benghazi as soon as possible.”

Yet as the militiamen snacked on Twinkie­style cakes with their American guests, they also

gushed about their gratitude for President Obama’s support in their uprising against Col.

Muammar el­Qaddafi. They emphasized that they wanted to build a partnership with the

United States, especially in the form of more investment. They specifically asked for Benghazi

outlets of McDonald’s and KFC.

The diplomat, David McFarland, a former congressional aide who had never before met with

a Libyan militia leader, left feeling agitated, according to colleagues. But the meeting did not

shake his faith in the prospects for deeper involvement in Libya. Two days later, he

summarized the meeting in a cable to Washington, describing a mixed message from the

militia leaders.

Despite “growing problems with security,” he wrote, the fighters wanted the United States to

become more engaged “by ‘pressuring’ American businesses to invest in Benghazi.”

The cable, dated Sept. 11, 2012, was sent over the name of Mr. McFarland’s boss, Ambassador

J. Christopher Stevens.

Later that day, Mr. Stevens was dead, killed with three other Americans in Benghazi in the

most significant attack on United States property in 11 years, since Sept. 11, 2001.

The cable was a last

token of months of

American

misunderstandings

and misperceptions

about Libya and

especially Benghazi,

many fostered by

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shadows of the

earlier Sept. 11

attack. The United

States waded deeply

into post­Qaddafi

Libya, hoping to

build a beachhead

against extremists,

especially Al Qaeda.

It believed it could

draw a bright line

between friends and

enemies in Libya.

But it ultimately lost

its ambassador in

an attack that

involved both

avowed opponents

of the West and

fighters belonging

to militias that the

Americans had

taken for allies.

Months of investigation by The New York Times, centered on extensive interviews with

Libyans in Benghazi who had direct knowledge of the attack there and its context, turned up

no evidence that Al Qaeda or other international terrorist groups had any role in the assault.

The attack was led, instead, by fighters who had benefited directly from NATO’s extensive air

power and logistics support during the uprising against Colonel Qaddafi. And contrary to

claims by some members of Congress, it was fueled in large part by anger at an Americanmade video denigrating Islam.

A fuller accounting of the attacks suggests lessons for the United States that go well beyond

Libya. It shows the risks of expecting American aid in a time of desperation to buy durable

loyalty, and the difficulty of discerning friends from allies of convenience in a culture shaped

by decades of anti­Western sentiment. Both are challenges now hanging over the American

involvement in Syria’s civil conflict.

The attack also suggests that, as the threats from local militants around the region have

multiplied, an intensive focus on combating Al Qaeda may distract from safeguarding

American interests.

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In this case, a central figure in the attack was an eccentric, malcontent militia leader,

Ahmed Abu Khattala , according to numerous Libyans present at the time. American

officials briefed on the American criminal investigation into the killings call him a prime

suspect. Mr. Abu Khattala declared openly and often that he placed the United States not far

behind Colonel Qaddafi on his list of infidel enemies. But he had no known affiliations with

terrorist groups, and he had escaped scrutiny from the 20­person C.I.A. station in Benghazi

that was set up to monitor the local situation.

Mr. Abu Khattala, who denies participating in the attack, was firmly embedded in the

network of Benghazi militias before and afterward. Many other Islamist leaders consider him

an erratic extremist. But he was never more than a step removed from the most influential

commanders who dominated Benghazi and who befriended the Americans. They were his

neighbors, his fellow inmates and his comrades on the front lines in the fight against Colonel

Qaddafi.

To this day, some militia leaders offer alibis for Mr. Abu Khattala. All resist quiet American

pressure to turn him over to face prosecution. Last spring, one of Libya’s most influential

militia leaders sought to make him a kind of local judge.

Fifteen months after Mr. Stevens’s death, the question of responsibility remains a searing

issue in Washington, framed by two contradictory story lines.

One has it that the video, which was posted on YouTube, inspired spontaneous street protests

that got out of hand. This version, based on early intelligence reports, was initially offered

publicly by Susan E. Rice, who is now Mr. Obama’s national security adviser.

The other, favored by Republicans, holds that Mr. Stevens died in a carefully planned assault

by Al Qaeda to mark the anniversary of its strike on the United States 11 years before.

Republicans have accused the Obama administration of covering up evidence of Al Qaeda’s

role to avoid undermining the president’s claim that the group has been decimated, in part

because of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

The investigation by The Times shows that the reality in Benghazi was different, and murkier,

than either of those story lines suggests. Benghazi was not infiltrated by Al Qaeda, but

nonetheless contained grave local threats to American interests. The attack does not appear

to have been meticulously planned, but neither was it spontaneous or without warning signs.

Mr. Abu Khattala had become well known in Benghazi for his role in the killing of a rebel

general, and then for declaring that his fellow Islamists were insufficiently committed to

theocracy. He made no secret of his readiness to use violence against Western interests. One

of his allies, the leader of Benghazi’s most overtly anti­Western militia, Ansar al­Shariah,

boasted a few months before the attack that his fighters could “flatten” the American Mission.

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Surveillance of the American compound appears to have been underway at least 12 hours

before the assault started.

The violence, though, also had spontaneous elements. Anger at the video motivated the initial

attack. Dozens of people joined in, some of them provoked by the video and others

responding to fast­spreading false rumors that guards inside the American compound had

shot Libyan protesters. Looters and arsonists, without any sign of a plan, were the ones who

ravaged the compound after the initial attack, according to more than a dozen Libyan

witnesses as well as many American officials who have viewed the footage from security

cameras.

The Benghazi­based

C.I.A. team had

briefed Mr.

McFarland and Mr.

Stevens as recently

as the day before

the attack. But the

American

intelligence efforts

in Libya

concentrated on the

agendas of the

biggest militia

leaders and the

handful of Libyans

with suspected ties

to Al Qaeda, several

officials who

received the

briefings said. Like

virtually all

briefings over that

period, the one that

day made no

mention of

Mr. Abu Khattala ,

Ansar al­Shariah or the video ridiculing Islam, even though Egyptian satellite television

networks popular in Benghazi were already spewing outrage against it.

Members of the local militia groups that the Americans called on for help proved unreliable,

even hostile. The fixation on Al Qaeda might have distracted experts from more imminent

threats. Those now look like intelligence failures.

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More broadly, Mr. Stevens, like his bosses in Washington, believed that the United States

could turn a critical mass of the fighters it helped oust Colonel Qaddafi into reliable friends.

He died trying.

751

INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #21

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 19, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel

KENDAL ROBINSON, Minority Detailee

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

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3

Ms. Betz. It's 10 o'clock, and we'll go ahead and get started.

This is a transcribed interview of Agent -- how

are you?

Mr. I'm doing great, ma'am. Thank you.

Ms. Betz. -- conducted by the House Select Committee on

Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of

the committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic

facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters, pursuant to H.Res.

567 of the 113th Congress and H.Res. 5 of the 114th.

Would the witness please state his name for the record?

Mr. My name is -- I'm also known as

--

Ms. Betz. The committee appreciates your appearance at this

interview this morning. My name is Kim Betz, with the committee's

majority staff. And I'll take this opportunity to ask everybody to

introduce themselves in the room, beginning with --

Mr. Westmoreland. I'm Lynn Westmoreland. I represent

Georgia's Third District.

Mr. Yes, sir.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke. I work for the majority.

Ms. Jackson. And I'm Sharon Jackson, and I work for the majority

staff.

Mr. Ma'am.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Ms. Robinson. Kendal Robinson, detailee to the minority staff.

755
4

Mr. Desai. Ronak Desai with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Ms. Barrineau. I'm Sara Barrineau with the majority staff.

Ms. Betz. Before we begin, I'd like to go over some of the ground

rules and explain how the interview will proceed.

Generally, the way the questioning has proceeded previously is

that a member from the majority will ask questions first for up to an

hour, and then the minority will have an opportunity to ask questions

for an equal period of time if they choose.

Questions may only be asked by a member or a designated staff

member. We will rotate back and forth, 1 hour per side, until we are

out of questions, and the interview will be over.

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. Unlike a testimony or deposition in Federal court, the

committee format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness

or their counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review

by the chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot be

resolved in the interview, the witness can be required to return for

a deposition or hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. This has

not been an issue we encountered in the past, but I wanted to make sure

that you are clear on the process.

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. This session is set to begin as unclassified. If any

756
5

question calls for a classified answer, please let us know, and we'll

reserve its answer until we move into a classified setting. Just so

you know, this room is cleared for up to Secret.

Ms. Jackson. But this session --

Ms. Betz. But this session will be unclassified.

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time

throughout the interview, but if something needs to be clarified, we

ask that the witness make this known. If you need to discuss anything

with your counsel, we will go off the record and stop the clock to

provide you with this opportunity.

We'd like to take a break when it's convenient for you. This can

be after every hour of questioning, after a couple of rounds, whatever

you prefer.

During a round of questioning, if you need anything -- a glass

of water, coffee, use of the facilities, to confer with

counsel -- please just let us know, and we will go off the record and

stop the clock. We want to make this process as easy and as

straightforward as possible.

Mr. Thank you, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. As you can see, an official reporter is taking down

everything you say to make a written record, so we ask that you give

verbal responses to all questions, "yes" and "no," as opposed to nodding

your head.

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

757
6

Ms. Betz. I'm going to ask the reporter to please feel free to

jump in in case you do respond nonverbally. Do you understand this?

Mr. Yes, ma'am, I do.

Ms. Betz. Also, we should both try to not talk over each

other -- I have a habit of doing that -- so it is easier to get a clear

record.

We want you to answer our questions in the most complete and

truthful manner possible, so we will take our time and repeat or clarify

our questions if necessary. If you have any questions or if you do

not understand any of our questions, please let us know. We will be

happy to clarify or repeat our questions.

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. And if you honestly don't know the answer to a question

or do not remember, it's best not to guess. Please give us your best

recollection. And if there are things you do not know or can't

remember, just say so, and please inform us who, to the best of your

knowledge, may be able to provide a more complete answer.

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. You are required to answer questions from Congress

truthfully. Do you understand that?

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. This also applies to questions posed by congressional

staff in an interview. Do you understand this?

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

758
7

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand this?

Mr. Yes, ma'am, I do.

Ms. Betz. Is there any reason you are unable to provide truthful

answers to today's questions?

Mr. Not at all, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. That is the end of my preamble.

Does the minority have anything to add?

Ms. Sawyer. We're all set. Thanks.

Ms. Betz. Good. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. I have one thing that I would like to add.

Ms. Betz. Yes?

Ms. Jackson. And that is sometimes this room gets a little

stuffy. It could be the number of lawyers that are in here talking

at any given time. So feel free to take your jacket off at any time,

because it does get warm in here.

Mr. Thank you, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. So the clock reads now 10:06, and we'll get started

with our first hour of questions.

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Why don't you start by just telling us a little bit about

yourself.

A Yes, ma'am. How far back?

759
8

Q Well, what did you do prior to joining DSS?

A Prior to joining DS, I was an police officer in

. I did that about a year and a month. Prior to that, I

was a New City police officer from 2000 to 2002. Prior to that,

I was in the hotel business.

Q Oh, really.

A And before that, I was in college. And before that,

.

Q Well, when did you join DSS, and what made you join?

A I joined DSS in of 2003, ma'am.

Q Okay.

A The reason why I joined was because, when I lived in

, I worked at a hotel called the , back

then, on , that is in front of the U.N.

One day, two gentlemen walked in. They said they had to pay for about

100 rooms. It blew my mind. Wow, 100 rooms in .

They introduced themselves as Diplomatic Security Service

agents. I never heard of them. And they asked me if I had finished

college, and I said, "Close to." So one of the gentlemen's name was

, and he gave me his card and said, "You should fill out

an SF1186," which is an OPM form, Office of Personnel Management. And

I said, "Okay. Not a problem."

At that time, I was actually waiting to be called for the

Police Department. I was on the list, on the hiring list. This

was 1999. And I never thought about it. One day, they called me to

760
9

do an interview, what they call a BEX panel, at the Pennsylvania Hotel.

I went, took it. They said, "You did great." I never thought about

it. I got called by the Police Department, and I never

gave it a second thought.

But after the September 11 attacks, I was a little burned out

and all the aftermath that

I'm sure everybody here knows. My called me, said, "Hey, why

don't you come to ," and I did.

And then I got the first call from Diplomatic Security about their

Basic Special Agent Course; I believe it was number 70. They called

me for number 72. Then they called me for number 75. And they finally

put a human resources officer, Ms. , and she said,

"Hey, do you want the job or not? We don't normally call three times."

And I took it.

That's how I got into DS, ma'am.

Q Where were your assignments?

A First assignment was the field office in . I

was there for about a year and 2 months.

Q Okay.

A I did three temporary duty assignments at what we call

high-threat posts: Kabul, Afghanistan; Kirkuk, Iraq; and Islamabad,

Pakistan.

And I enjoyed doing that type of work, so they told me to think

about going into our Mobile Security Deployment teams, which is our

high-threat -- basically SWAT teams. So I curtailed my assignment from

761
10

, and I went to MSD . And that's based out

of Dunn Loring, here in Virginia.

Q Okay.

A After that,

, so I had to go to a post

So I was lucky, and I got ,

. I was the assistant regional security officer.

I was there from 2008 to 2011.

I chose to go to after that. I didn't like after

coming back from all the time that I'd been gone --

Q Sure.

A -- so I requested an assignment that would get me out of

, the sooner, the better. And they said, "We're opening up

an embassy in Tripoli, Libya," and they said, "We need you there because

of your skills." So I was assigned to Libya -- Tripoli, Libya, as the

ARSO in 2012 to 2013.

And then, after I left Libya, they said, "Well, guess what? Let's

send you back to the ." So I am now the special agent in charge

of the regional office, what we call the resident office -- excuse

me -- in .

Q So are you an ARSO, or you're the AIC?

A kind of unique.

Q Right, yes.

A So we are considered RACs, resident agent in charge for the

762
11

resident office, that our administrative bosses are in the field

office.

Q Okay.

A But it's not an RSO spot because a United

States territory. It's not an overseas assignment.

Q Right. Okay.

So, just taking a step back, when you were talking about wanting

to go to Libya, so were you recruited to go, or did you volunteer? How

did you --

A Well, the way that our --

Q -- sort of, like, point to Libya?

A Well, the way that our bidding process works is, if there

is a post that they need someone to, we put it on a "now" list. They

call it, like, we need you now. And if you want to go, you can submit

a bid for that post. If you are the best qualified candidate, then

you're chosen. And that's how I was assigned to Tripoli, Libya.

Q And your assignment was not a TDY but a PCS?

A That's correct. That was the first permanent change of

station posted ARSO at post.

Q And did you request the PCS position?

A Yes, I did.

Q You did, versus a TDY.

A Absolutely. Why go TDY when I can spend the whole year?

Q There you go.

What did you know about Libya before going?

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12

A Well, I did my research, I mean, prior to getting to Libya.

I always do research on the post that I choose to go to. Primarily

I wanted to go there because I

love Roman history, and there's a lot of Roman ruins in Libya and all

of North Africa, and Rome is about a 45-minute flight. So I figured,

you know, at that time, it looked like it was going to be perfect,

because anytime that I would have any leave I would go to Rome, and

I had never been to Rome.

So I did my research prior to us arriving. The Embassy was in

the center of town, and it was under the Qadhafi regime back in those

days. I understood that the Embassy had been evacuated and that we

were not going to go back to that same compound, but that was not a

problem for me. It's a challenge I'm willing to take. And so that's

how I ended up in Libya.

Q And that was a 1-year --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- assignment?

A It was a 1-year assignment, yes, ma'am.

Q Did you know anyone who had served in Tripoli before going?

A Not personally. I'd heard names, but not that I had met

the individuals before.

Q So did you receive any special type of intelligence before

going? Were you in contact with anybody from the Embassy before you

went?

A Nothing at all, ma'am.

764
13

Q Nothing?

A All I did was contact HR about my whole movement, what was

going to take place, , I could

bring my orders -- the usual generalities that you take when you do

a movement, but that was about it.

Q Did you receive any special equipment before you left? Did

they give you a list of things to pack, what to bring, that kind of

thing?

A Yes, ma'am. Because it's a high-threat post, you have to

go through a high-threat training course. So, basically -- the

field office was kind of upset. They're like, well, you're

going to leave early. So I ended up paneling for that position sometime

in about November, December -- I'm not quite sure -- of 2011. And I

was set up for the high-threat training course on or about February

of 2012.

The high-threat training course at that time was about 6 weeks.

And that is from our ITF. I'm sorry; there's a lot of acronyms. I

forget what the exact words are, but the ITF. It's in Winches- -- well,

it's not in Winchester, it's in West Virginia, but we normally stay

in Winchester, Virginia. It's the Interim Training Facility. And

that's where we do most of our high-threat training.

Q Okay. And was that the only training? Did you have to do

FACT training or --

A Well, the FACT training that we took, I did that before I

even deployed. With MSD, it's a 6-month training course, which is

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14

basically all high-threat training. You do FACT training, survival

training. MSD prepares you for any of those posts.

Q Okay.

So when did you arrive in Tripoli?

A April of 2012. I want to say April 25. It's been a while.

Q I know.

A But it was in April. And I remember because

prior to leaving

for Libya, because I knew I was gone for a while

.

Q And when you arrived, how many agents were in Tripoli?

A Wow.

Q If you can remember.

A On the ground, there were about two MSD teams, each one

comprised of about five to six members. TDYers, about five. TDY is

a temporary duty assignment, so it can range from 30 days to 60 days,

depending. The RSO, . There were about 25, 26 SF,

Special Forces, from DOD.

Q SST?

A Yes. And that was about the whole contingent that I can

remember of armed individuals on the ground.

Q Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. Can --

Mr. Yes, sir.

Ms. Betz. Uh-huh.

766
15

Mr. Westmoreland: Were there any there?

Mr. On the ?

Mr. Westmoreland. Uh-huh.

Mr. But that -- I got confused. Our embassy was not

attached . There were two different compounds, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Mr.

Mr. Westmoreland. Now, did you know any of them?

Mr. Personally? Personally, one-on-one? No. We

tend to start learning about people once we start getting together in

meetings and -- and we basically, "Hey, we have something going on on

Thursday night," but --

Mr. Westmoreland. Uh-huh.

Mr. Evers. I just wanted to caution you about that this is an

unclassified space --

Mr. Right. I understand that.

Mr. Evers. -- and to the extent that you can provide answers,

you should.

Mr. And I'm sorry about that.

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Ms. Betz. We can move later into a classified setting.

Mr. Thank you. And I'm sorry about that.

Mr. Evers. If you can provide an unclassified answer --

Mr. Westmoreland. I shouldn't have asked the question.

767
16

Mr. I'm sorry.

Mr. Evers. If you can provide an unclassified answer, you

absolutely should do so.

Mr. Well, the unclassified answer is there were about

30 to 40 individuals in that compound. I can't provide names or any

other data.

Mr. Westmoreland. I gotcha.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And so, when you arrived, you were designated as an ARSO --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- is that correct?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And your supervisor was --

A , ma'am.

Q Okay.

Were there other, sort of, Western countries that you interacted

with while you were there?

A Oh, yes. Our -- well, our best friends, if I can say,

were -- number one was, believe it or not, the Canadians. We had a

very good interaction with the Canadians. The RSO was awesome; she

was really cool. They were based out of Palm City in a complex outside

of Tripoli proper, actually. The British -- I'm sorry, I was going

to say Brits, but, I mean, the British. Their compound was inside the

city.

Those were our two main friends in regards to security, but then,

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17

of course, we had the Dutch, the Germans, the Spaniards. And we would

meet on a regular basis with all the original security officers.

Q On a regular basis. So weekly?

A Yeah. Like, maybe 2 or 3 weeks --

Q Monthly?

A -- we'd set up, like, a little meeting to talk about

security.

Q Okay.

I want to shift a little bit and talk about -- so, at one point,

you were designated acting RSO while you were in Tripoli. Is that

correct?

A Yes, ma'am. How it works in DS is, if the senior agent

leaves for whatever reason, whether it's personal, medical, official,

he designates an acting RSO or an acting agent in charge. There is

no set policy that says that the senior guy on the ground has to be

it. It's just, hey, I'm going to designate this one individual for

A or B reason. So I was designated the acting RSO when

left.

Q And that was pretty soon after you had arrived --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- in Tripoli. How long did you serve as acting RSO?

A Oh --

Q If you can remember.

A Maybe 2 or 3 weeks, depending on his leave. I can't

remember exact dates.

769
18

Q And do you think you were chosen because of your previous

training, your MSD training? Why do you think they chose you?

A Well, I was the permanent RSO on the ground, so you

would -- I would think that he chose me because I was a permanent guy.

I'm not going to leave in 45 days or 20 days or 15 days. He doesn't

have to worry about me shipping out and then me leaving somebody else --

Q I gotcha.

A -- as acting.

Q Okay. And what were your responsibilities as acting RSO?

A Pretty much anything that falls within the RSO parameters:

security, information, training, being the advisor to the Ambassador

or the acting chief of mission, the DCM. Anything that's related to

security falls within those parameters.

Q And was it at that point that you started interacting with

the Benghazi Mission, or had you interacted with them as ARSO?

A Oh, yeah. No, we were interacting with the Benghazi

Mission on a daily basis from day one.

Q Okay. But your responsibilities and your interactions,

did they change when you became acting RSO?

A In the sense of being now the primary to give information,

yes.

Q Did you also interact -- I think following up on Congressman

Westmoreland's question, just generally, did you interact with the

more --

A Yes.

770
19

Q -- more as acting RSO?

A When the RSO is on the ground, he normally goes with the

Ambassador or the acting chief of mission or the DCM to the different

briefings, which are classified.

Q Right.

A So, as he's gone, then whoever's acting has to basically

represent, because you have to keep a chain of command and, as a matter

of fact, of information. You can't just not have information because

the head RSO is not on the ground.

Q Okay. So you were the recipient of that information?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Did RSO -- did you consult with him before he

left? Did he provide any notes for you to help assist you in your --

A Oh, absolutely.

Q -- in your capacity?

A Yes.

Q What kind of notes did he --

A Just a debriefing, and, you know, these are the things that

are of concern; these are, you know, the agents that are coming in;

you know, make sure that before you take any action you discuss it with

the chief of mission or the DCM; make sure that everything that we do

is going up the chain, you can't just take unilateral action.

Absolutely.

Q Uh-huh.

And, in your capacity as acting RSO in Tripoli, what was your

771
20

understanding of the relationship with the Benghazi Mission vis-a-vis

Tripoli?

A In what regards, ma'am? I'm sorry.

Q Was it sort of an extension of Embassy Tripoli, or was it

its own separate and distinct entity? For example, did the Benghazi

Mission run everything up through Tripoli to D.C., or would they have

their own conversations with D.C. independent of Embassy Tripoli?

A To better explain that --

Q Or what was the relationship that --

A There were two different missions.

Q -- as you understood it?

A There were two different missions, in the sense that the

personnel that were set to go to the Benghazi went directly from

wherever point they were coming to directly to Benghazi. They didn't

stop in Tripoli to pick up weapons or anything, briefings. They went

directly to Benghazi.

The Tripoli Mission was still the administrative hub because the

RSO was there. Whoever was in Benghazi was just an acting RSO for that

particular location. We knew it as a Benghazi office or as a Benghazi

diplomatic, you know, entity in the sense that the officers there were

all from the State Department.

To that point, when I got there originally, I didn't know about

that was in Benghazi, but we knew that the folks

that were in our compound were all DS agents. And that was it. They

were just directed there from their different locations, not from

772
21

Tripoli.

Q Okay. So it's safe to say the Benghazi Mission would make

their own decisions --

A They would still --

Q -- as it relates --

A -- have to run it through the RSO --

Q In Tripoli.

A Exactly. Because they were still under the RSO's

administrative duties.

Q Okay.

A They fell under the RSO.

Q Okay. But staffing decisions, would that come primarily

from --

A That came from D.C., ma'am.

Q From D.C. --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- and not Tripoli. Okay.

What was your relationship like in Tripoli with the Libyan

Government? Did you find them helpful? Reliable?

A Well, it depends.

Q As it relates to security.

A Well, it depends, I mean, because the problem that I saw

in Tripoli was it depends on who was running the Defense Ministry or

who was running the Interior Ministry or which tribe was in charge.

We had a really good rapport with the Defense Ministry because they

773
22

were Zintanis, and they had a really good relationship with the Embassy.

The Zintanis hated Qadhafi, so I guess they were our best friends, in

that sense.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Was the same true in Benghazi, to your knowledge,

the relationship with the government that was in Benghazi?

Mr. Same interaction. They were very keen to our

concerns in regards to, say, we needed a police officer here or a police

officer there or security, based on what they could give. I mean, their

biggest problem was there was no set government entity. The militias

really ran their own show. So it all depended on who was in charge.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Would you help facilitate requests on behalf of Benghazi

with respect to the Libyan Government, or would they make their own

requests?

A No. They would have to go through the chief of mission.

Q The chief of mission.

A Yeah.

Q Okay.

A The chief of mission was still in charge of --

Q Okay.

A -- anything that had to do with State Department entities.

Q Okay. So it would run up --

A Absolutely.

Q What kind of communication -- you said you were in daily

774
23

communication with the Benghazi Mission?

A Yes. I mean, over phone or Gmail. There was not really

a set account. I mean, back then, we were trying to set up both the

Embassy and maintaining this office open, so whatever we had available.

I don't even think -- I don't even remember that the radios worked all

the way over there, but the did --

Q Okay.

A -- which was very important.

Q Why?

A Oh, because we used them for movements, and you can see the

vehicles moving. Or you can

-- I'm just saying this --

Q No, no.

A -- and you can be seen over the screen. So the

actually worked.

Q So would Tripoli be able to track --

A Absolutely.

Q -- with this device in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Oh. Were there issues with the reliability? I think, at

some point, were there problems with the getting

an adequate number?

A Well, the , like any other technology,

are going to break down.

Q Okay.

775
24

A I mean, if you don't replace them on time or you don't get

replacement pieces or batteries, they're going to break. I mean, it's

not a -- how would I say it -- a full, 100 percent science.

So we did get replacements. Unfortunately, getting replacements

is not as easy as getting them from D.C. to New York. It all depends

on couriers, and it all depends on how fast you can get, you know, the

equipment shipped.

Q Where did you primarily get the equipment from? Other

posts in the area? Or --

A Sometimes. And one of our best friends was Cairo, so the

folks from Cairo would come around and help us a lot.

Q When you were acting RSO, did you have the opportunity to

travel to Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So what was your first trip, if you can remember?

A I don't know. It was in the summer, sometime in June. And

I can't remember exact dates. Probably late June, early July,

something like that, if I can remember. I was replacing

.

Q Okay.

A He was the acting RSO at that time. And I was in Tripoli

for about 3 or 4 weeks.

Mr. Evers. In Tripoli or Benghazi?

Mr. Oh, sorry. Excuse me. Benghazi. I keep

confusing.

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25

Ms. Betz. Okay.

Mr. Benghazi. I apologize about that.

Ms. Betz. Okay. And so you did not make a trip to Benghazi

before that?

Mr. No, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. So let me just --

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Just to clarify, going to Benghazi, the RSO was

already back on the ground.

Ms. Betz. Right. Yeah. Yes.

Mr. I would not have left to go to Benghazi and left

the major post unattended.

Ms. Betz. I just want to explore a document. And, for the

record, I'm handing --

Ms. Jackson. You need to mark it.

Ms. Betz. Oh, I need to mark it. Sorry. We'll mark it as

exhibit 1.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Evers. I think he gets the sticker. I get an unmarked.

Ms. Betz. Oh, that's right. Sorry.

Mr. Evers. So this one will --

Ms. Jackson. I'll take it.

Ms. Betz. And we'll just take a moment to let the witness review

the document. But, for the record, it is State Department document

777
26

C05411628, produced to the House Select Committee on Benghazi.

Mr. Yes, ma'am. I remember this document.

Ms. Betz. Okay.

Mr. This was the operations plan I set in place for a

mission to Benghazi.

Ms. Betz. Okay.

So, just for the record, this is an operations plan that was

drafted by the witness for travel to Benghazi, dated June 2, 2012.

Mr. Evers. Is all that accurate?

Mr. Yes, it is. I wrote this.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So you are familiar with this document?

A Yes, ma'am. I'm completely familiar with this.

Q Okay. What was the purpose of drafting this memo?

A So we wanted to bring some equipment to Benghazi, and there

were a couple of ways to do this. It was either ship it by boat, fly

it over, or drive. So, together with the military folks, the DOD folks,

and other security elements, we came up with what we thought was the

best scenario, which was to drive to Benghazi and bring the equipment.

And that's what this operations plan was all about. And it

basically delineated what equipment we were going to be bringing, which

were FAVs, radios, satellite phones, trackers,

, GPS, the weapons.

And I basically detailed in the summary the main points of the

operation. I wrote this up, and I sent it up to the DS command center.

778
27

Q Did this trip occur?

A No.

Q Why not?

A So, in between making the trip and the ops plan going up

the chain, there was a firefight in between Tripoli and Benghazi by

militia elements and their counterparts. It had nothing to do with

the U.S. Embassy.

And there was a buildup of military personnel, Libyan, halfway

through Tripoli to Benghazi, at that halfway point. I cannot remember

the name of the town or the city that the took place, but from Tripoli

to Benghazi I believe it was about 1,100 kilometers. Somewhere,

kilometer 500, I want to say, this firefight was taking place. And

we thought, if that's the case, the main highway to where that firefight

is taking place is less than 10 kilometers; we're not making this trip.

Q Were the firefights common?

A Oh, yeah. Absolutely. One every other 2 or 3 days.

Q Okay.

A But this was a major one.

Q A major one.

A So usually you'd have, like, three or four tribesmen taking

pops at each other. But this was a major military buildup, to the point

where we said, no, we're not taking this trip.

Q How did the FAVs and the equipment eventually get to

Benghazi?

A Oh, yeah, well, that's the best part. So we hired

779
28

contractors that had nothing to do with the Embassy, and we had them

transport the FAVs to Benghazi. The contractors know the place better

than we do. They have their contacts, and we don't involve any of our

personnel. So that was the best way to go.

Q So these were Libyan contractors?

A Libyan contractors, but the main boss was not Libyan. I

cannot remember if he was Dutch or German. But he was the one that

set it up and was able to bring those vehicles over to Benghazi.

Q Were they contractors that the Embassy typically used to --

A Whoever the contracting officer was would probably set that

up. I wouldn't know, ma'am.

Q Okay. And were the shipments made pretty soon after this

plan was put in motion?

A I don't recall, but while I was in Benghazi we received the

FAVs.

Q Okay. So fairly soon after.

A I don't recall when he put it in effect.

Q Right.

A It could have taken them 3 or 4 days to drive up there. I

don't know. But all I know is that when I was in Benghazi I received

the two FAVs.

Q Okay.

While you were RSO in Tripoli, the June 6 IED attack occurred on

the Benghazi Mission.

A Yes, ma'am.

780
29

Q What information did you receive about the attack? Were

you in constant contact with RSO ?

A Yes. So calls me and says, hey, we just had an IED

off the wall. "Off the wall." Basically, it didn't go over the wall.

It was placed on the wall. So "off the wall."

Q Okay.

A He said, there's video, there's, you know -- there was some

communication. The alarm system went off, so the IDA, IDS -- I can't

remember the acronym. But, basically, what happens is the guard sees

what's going on, he presses a button, boom, the alarm goes off, "Get

away from the walls, get away from the walls."

So they did everything by the book. They saw the vehicle, they

saw a man deploy from the van -- from the -- it was a truck. He

immediately pressed the alarm. Everybody pulled back. IED goes off,

takes out a good 5 or 6 feet of the wall.

Q Uh-huh.

A In a circumference. Not the whole wall down, but a major

hole --

Q Right.

A -- in the wall.

Q And RSO -- as you just said, everybody did

everything by --

A By the book.

Q -- the book. Were there any suggestions or changes that

he made to you regarding additional security?

781
30

A Well, the local guard force on the ground, he basically

alerted them, you know, said, hey, you know, we're going to double the

guard; if you have one guard at post, now you're going to have two,

three.

Q Uh-huh.

A The Martyrs' Brigade militia that was inside the compound

providing security was alerted. They had their guys now working

basically 24/7.

You know, we immediately sent out a contractor -- everything is

contractors there, so -- immediately sent out a contractor to rebuild

the wall as soon as possible. And we brought in elements from the

militia, because basically that was the government, to provide security

with police cars outside.

So he did everything that he needed to do to ensure that there

was no penetration into the compound.

Q So requested additional staff --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- and Libyan support, as well.

At that point, did you have concerns with the Blue Mountain Group?

Did you express concerns about the Blue Mountain Group?

A Yes. But there was a -- so the miscommunication came down

from that. Some folks took it out of context.

So, basically, he calls me and says, hey, you know, what -- I go,

what about those guards?

Where I came from, in the Dominican Republic, supervisors are all

782
31

armed. They carry shotguns, sidearms. Anyone below the rank of

supervisor does not carry weapons. But, again, different post,

different security elements. If you go to Panama City, they'll have

a different security element. Mexico City has a different security

element.

My understanding came from my experience as an ARSO in Santo

Domingo. So I said, hey, where are the weapons on these guards? And

they're like, they don't have weapons. I said, what? That got me a

little concerned, as the acting RSO. I'm like, wait a second, there's

no weapons on these guards?

The point being, I start making some inquiries, and I get the

information that the Blue Mountain Group has problems with the GOL,

which is the Libyan Government, in regards to their contractors. So

I believe the company is British and they have British oversight, but

the contractors are basically local employed staff. Well, the good

news, I think -- and these are foreign nationals or basically British

people doing security in their country without permission.

So they removed them from the Corinthian Hotel, which was a major

hotel in Tripoli for diplomats, and the Palm City complex that housed

the majority of the Western embassies. They said, we don't want them

there. So another company came and took over, a Maltese company.

My information to was, like, well, we shouldn't be using

these guys if they have problems with the Libyan Government, my concern

being we're the U.S. Embassy, we don't want to have issues with them.

So let's find out what's going on. All of a sudden, I get an email

783
32

back saying, hey, we use them only as local guard force, they are not

armed.

Q Uh-huh.

A I talk to the DCM and the chief of mission, and they're like,

you know, as long as they know, the Libyans know, that these individuals

are not armed and they're okay with that, we're good to go.

We don't have an issue with the contractors. We don't make

contracts. My concern was the local guard force not being armed. But

that was my concern as the acting RSO.

Q And just your concern --

A My concern.

Q And, just to clarify, so do you know why the major hotel

stopped using the Blue Mountain Group?

A No, I do not know.

Q And, to the best of your recollection, did Benghazi get the

additional local guard force and --

A Oh, yes, ma'am. I mean --

Q -- that they needed?

A -- you can have 30 local guards and you can put 20 to work

as many hours as you want them, you know, within a reasonable amount

of time so they can get some rest.

Q Okay.

A But whatever you have on the ground, you can double your

guard. So if you're using 5 for perimeter security, you'd use 10.

Basically, four eyes are better than two.

784
33

Q Right.

Was there any concern at that point in time about DS staffing in

Benghazi in terms of the numbers that they had on the ground and a

decrease in the number of agents that might have occurred after?

A Well, in Benghazi it was always a concern in regards to the

number of agents. If you're a security officer, you feel that the more

guns, the better, if I can say that. I'd rather have more in my team

than in your team.

Q Uh-huh.

A So if we see two agents on the ground for that compound,

we're going to say, hey, we should have at least five.

So my concern at that time was, if we need more agents, instead

of D.C. sending me 10 DS agents TDYers, why don't we reroute 2 agents

over there; I'll keep 8 here. You've got more bodies over there.

Q And did that happen?

A Yes, it did.

Q It did?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So, at a point when the numbers were supposed to drop in

June after the attack, additional TDYs were diverted to --

A Are we talking about Benghazi or Tripoli, ma'am?

Q Benghazi.

A In Benghazi, what we did was we supplemented with the agents

coming in TDYer, and we sent two over there to cover.

Q Okay.

785
34

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And who were those two that got sent over there?

A Ooh. They were actually there when I got there, one of them

was. was one that we diverted. And the other one, I'd

like to say, was .

Q And when you joined them, what was the total number, then,

in Benghazi in July of 2012?

A When I went to Benghazi, I had three agents on the ground

and myself; that was four. And before I left, I got another one, and

that was five.

Q And then when you left it dropped back down to four?

A It dropped down to four. And then they brought another one

in maybe a week later, and then they were back up to five.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q But I want to take a step back and talk about immediately

following the June 6 attack and the number of agents that were on the

ground.

A Other than the two --

Q Do you recall? In Benghazi.

A Okay. On the ground when the attack took place, I would

say there were probably three.

Q Okay.

A and two other agents.

Q Okay. And did they beef up those numbers after the

attack --

786
35

A Yes.

Q -- or did they stay constant?

A We diverted the TDYers from --

Q Okay.

A And, like I said, I get mixed up with the names because there

were --

Q That's fine.

A -- so many coming in. But we did send additional resources

to them based on the numbers of TDYers that were being assigned to

Tripoli.

Q Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. Can I?

Ms. Betz. Uh-huh.

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. When you said double the guards, the local

guards, these are the guards that were inside the compound, correct?

Mr. In Benghazi?

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes, in Benghazi.

Mr. The local guard force, yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yeah. Now, are you the one that doubled that

number?

Mr. No, sir. That was my recommendation speaking with

, who was on the ground.

Mr. Westmoreland. So that was your recommendation --

Mr. That's correct.

787
36

Mr. Westmoreland. -- but you don't know that they ever doubled

it.

Mr. I don't know what he did there when I gave him that

information, but I'm sure that he must have sent out an email saying

what he had done. If he reports to me that he's done the different

things --

Mr. Westmoreland. So you weren't in Benghazi --

Mr. I was not in Benghazi when the June 6 attack --

Mr. Westmoreland. Oh, okay.

Mr. -- took place. I came afterwards.

Mr. Westmoreland. So you suggested to him to double the local

guard force.

Mr. Not verbatim. I said, "Hey, double the security.

Do what you need to do."

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. And would he have had to get permission

or enter into a new contract to do that, or could he do that just based

on what authority you gave him?

Mr. No. He had full authority to do what he needed to

do to secure that compound. He didn't have to ask permission from

anybody.

Mr. Westmoreland. And he wouldn't have had to have negotiated

any kind of contract?

Mr. Not at all, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Mr. Not --

788
37

Mr. Westmoreland. But you don't know if he did that or not.

Mr. I don't know what he did.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q When you arrived in early July --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- how many guards were at each gate, or how many guards

were on ground at the compound when you got there in either late June,

early July?

A When I arrived in July, there were approximately 25 to 30

LGF.

Q Total that you could pick from.

A Total. Now, that's now my compound. I made sure that at

the front gate you had five and that every gate had at least one or

two. But that's me.

Q At the front gate, was that the local guard force or QRF

or both?

A That was the local guard force.

What the QRF did was they would do the walk around the compound,

armed, to ensure that everybody knew, hey, we got weapons in here, don't

mess with this compound. And they would come and talk to the guards

and say, hey, we're here.

And, at the very least, there were three Martyr Brigades

individuals walking that compound on a daily basis and, at night, two,

while I was there.

789
38

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So, going back to Tripoli, in your capacity as acting RSO,

right after the June 6 attack was this June 8 Islamist rally that

occurred in Benghazi. Does that sound familiar?

A Not that I can recall straight out.

Q Okay.

A There was a lot of different rallies. For example, the

airport in Tripoli was a major one.

Q Okay.

A And we had issues at the Tripoli airport almost at the same

time that we had that problem with Benghazi.

Q Okay. But a large --

A But I don't remember a large demonstration June 8, because

I was not in Benghazi.

Q No, but it's not something that RSO would have

mentioned to you, expressed concerns about?

A If there was a major concern, he would have sent an email

saying, hey, this is it, or he would do one of these, which are basically

spot reports or reports.

Q A situation report?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Exactly.

Q Okay.

[ Exhibit No. 2

790
39

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. For the record, this is exhibit No. 2.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Betz. And I'll give the witness a moment to read the

document. But, for the record, it is State Department document

C05389019, produced to the House Select Committee on Benghazi.

Mr. Yes. Ms. was the principal officer on the

ground in Benghazi at that time.

Mr. Evers. Have you read it?

Mr. No. I remember seeing this, but this wasn't sent

to me.

Ms. Betz. Okay.

Mr. But I remember seeing it.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So, for the record, this is the Benghazi situation report,

dated June 8, 2012, sent from to a number of

individuals, of which the witness is not listed. But --

A Yes.

Q -- in your capacity as RSO in Tripoli, would you have

received the Benghazi situation reports?

A I would have -- yes. We would have read all of this,

exactly. But, at that time, pretty much when she cc'd everybody, she

might not have been aware of, well, hey, you know, is the acting

RSO. Because she's the principal officer in Benghazi, she's writing

everybody that she's aware of, being . And he would

791
40

have -- we would have discussed this.

Q So he would have forwarded this to you --

A Yes.

Q -- or something --

A And I remember seeing this, but it's not something that I

received myself, personally.

Q Okay. But you did see a document --

A Yes.

Q -- similar to this.

A Yes.

And, in regards to these rallies, these rallies were not an

everyday occurrence. So that was what was a major, you know, point

of concern for her. It's not like it would happen on a Monday, it's

going to happen on a Tuesday. They would say, hey, we're going to do

a rally on whatever day a week from now, and they'd do the rally.

Q Okay.

So, for the record, we're going to focus on the first paragraph

that is identified as "Islamists Rally in Downtown Benghazi."

And so were you -- refreshing your memory, were you aware of this

rally that took place?

A Yes.

Q Did RSO express concerns to you about the rally?

A In regards to the rally? No.

Q No.

A No.

792
41

Q They didn't feel -- the mission didn't feel threatened or

wasn't concerned by the number of Islamists?

A Not that I recall. No.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. The fact that this was an Islamist rally, did that

pose any other concerns indirectly, as opposed to a direct concern as

to the security of the compound?

Mr. For us, in regards to the security, if we receive

a credible threat and they are saying, hey, you know, down with America,

you know, up with whoever, and we get that information, yes, it becomes

a major -- like, a tripwire kind of thing, like, you know, hey, pay

close attention because we're getting direct threats against American

interests. But there was no direct threats against American interests

based on them doing a rally.

And, again, their major thing in Benghazi and these areas is that

every militia, every group has their own agenda. So them gathering

around like this is obviously a security concern but not a security

concern that we're taking that they're going to go against us as

Americans or our compound.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Well, let me just clarify. To that point, would your

thoughts have changed in light of the June 6 attack on the U.S. --

A Oh, no, yes.

Q -- Mission in Benghazi? So you have a June 6 attack --

A We were already at a high --

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42

Q -- and the June 8 --

A We were already at a high threshold --

Q Okay.

A -- in regards to security, because we already had an IED

go off on our wall.

Q Okay.

A Absolutely. We didn't need this rally to get us already

ramped up that we needed, you know, additional personnel or we needed

additional guards.

Mr. Westmoreland. So it didn't really raise that much of a red

flag that al-Sharia was one of the groups at the protest along with

the 17th Martyr Brigade, which was the QRF, right?

Mr. Right. I mean, again, we didn't have an issue with

the Martyrs' Brigade, because they were actually helping us secure our

compound. There was not an issue in regards to them helping us.

So this, what we saw here, what they saw here, there was no report

that came back and said, hey, we feel that we've got to get rid of the

guards or the security inside because of this. We didn't receive a

report --

Mr. Westmoreland. Even though they were rallying with

al-Sharia?

Mr. And here's the other thing about this. We are

getting a report here. Who is bringing the report? I don't know, sir,

and I wasn't in Benghazi at that time. But you're going to get

different reports from different sources at different times. It's

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43

very hard to say, okay, this is accurate, this is not accurate, who's

doing it, what's not doing it, because we don't really have folks in

there among these rallies. So it's very hard for us to say, okay, yeah,

we know that they're in there.

So she's writing the report based on the information that she's

gathering. I don't believe in my -- I mean, I never saw -- I never

went in Tripoli or Benghazi to a rally to see something like this.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Would you have -- would one have confirmed the source --

A If we had a surveillance -- if we had a surveillance

detection team, yes.

Q Okay. But those were, I guess, to the best of your

knowledge, unconfirmed --

A Reports that were -- yes.

Q -- reports --

A Reports that were coming in.

Mr. Westmoreland. But having an Al Qaeda flag and the Islamic

flag, I mean, that --

Mr. In hindsight, sir, now, maybe. But, back then,

we're talking about June of 2012, it was all depending on how things

were on the ground. And the only thing she's giving us is a report.

And we don't really have any eyes or ears in those rallies.

Mr. Westmoreland. But do you think Ms. when she said that

Mission Benghazi local staff and post contacts at the scene reported

seeing the pro-Al Qaeda and black and white flags associated with

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44

Islamic militias, did you have any reason to believe that Ms.

would be reporting this if she didn't have good evidence of it?

Mr. I couldn't say about that, sir. I --

Mr. Westmoreland. But you didn't really believe it, did you?

Mr. No, no. It's not that I wouldn't believe it. I

really don't know who the individuals were from the mission --

Mr. Westmoreland. Right.

Mr. -- or who exactly is -- I mean, she's only giving

us a report based on what she's being told. Just like if one of my

contacts calls me and says, hey, I saw this happening at 2 o'clock in

the afternoon in the square, in the Libyan square, I'm going to report

that based on my contact giving me that information. That's how we

gather information.

But, from our sense, our own officers on the ground to see it,

to verify it, I couldn't talk about that because I wasn't there.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. And we do have emergency action committees that are

gathered that are brought in together by the chief of mission to discuss

all these reports. So the minute that there is an issue of security,

we gather all the senior staff from the Embassy to discuss what's going

on on the ground.

But, in regards to this, I couldn't say for certain what she's

writing about, who wrote it.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

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45

Mr. Sorry, sir.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You mentioned something about some sort of the surveillance

team. Could you tell us what that is again?

A Well, surveillance detection teams are basically locally

employed staff that we hire. We actually hire them directly from

either the guard force or bodyguards that work outside of the compound

in an undercover capacity to detect hostile surveillance against

personnel or the annexes or the compound itself.

Q Were there any such teams in Benghazi?

A We just didn't have the personnel at that time to set up

a surveillance detection team. It wasn't our primary focus at that

particular time.

Q And what do you mean you didn't have the personnel? You

didn't have the DS personnel?

A No. We will not use DS personnel for that. We use locally

employed staff, because our personnel doesn't speak the language nor

knows the culture outside of the compound walls.

Q I guess I'm just -- I want to explore why that couldn't be

in place in Benghazi. I mean, did you need people to supervise the

team, take their information, collate it? Or what does it take, from

DS's perspective, to have such a team?

A Priorities. Number one, you have to have the local guard

force fully stood up. So if you need -- and I'm just throwing out a

number -- 150 local guard force officers stood up, I can't stand up

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46

a team of 10 when I need to hire 150 for local

guard force. Then you have the Ambassador's protective detail.

So you have to prioritize what you can in regards to getting what

team available. This embassy was just opening. We were constantly

hiring. We've still got to vet the individuals that are coming in to

work for us. We have to run them through the system; we've got to find

how who they were. We don't want to hire a militant or an insider to

do something. So it takes a process, and it's not easy.

Then they got to pass exams. They got to pass English tests. You

can't have supervisors that can't communicate with the RSO or other

security or the chief of mission.

So, based on that whole hiring process and vetting process, we

just didn't have the bodies at the time to set up a surveillance

detection team.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Going back to something that you just mentioned, you

mentioned EACs that may result from a series of situations --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- such as an IED. Did an EAC occur around this time?

A I believe so. I just don't have a full recollection of when

and at what time they had set it up. But it would have been set up.

Q Would that have been something that you would have

participated in?

A Absolutely, as the acting RSO, yes.

Q Okay.

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47

Just to refresh your memory --

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. So I'm handing the witness what will now be exhibit

No. 3. And, for the record, this is State Department document

C05391161, produced to the House Select Committee on Benghazi.

And I'll give the witness a moment to review it.

Mr. Yes, ma'am.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So are you familiar with this document?

A Yes, ma'am, I am.

Q So was an EAC held on or around June 11?

A Yes. This --

Q -- 2012?

A -- email was prior to the EAC meeting, because the IP desk

officer, the International Programs officer, who had the Libya

portfolio, sent this to us. And, yes, this would have been brought

up in the EAC committee meeting.

Q Were you familiar with the tripwires that were --

A Yes.

Q -- discussed?

A The tripwires are basically -- some of these, not exactly

these -- these are recommendations. And they have to be put together

by the EAC committee, and the DCM or the chief of mission has to approve

that tripwire. And it gets sent up the chain to State through cable.

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48

This was a suggestion, or these are the tripwires that we are

considering based on whatever cable this came from originally, to go

over these and decide, hey, are we at this point now, based on this

event or events taking place.

Q Okay. So some of these tripwires were discussed in that

EAC. Do you remember which ones? Do any of these --

A I would have to see the cable, ma'am. I'm sorry.

Q Okay.

A I can't recall exactly, but I am more than sure that we

discussed several of these tripwires, including these events and the

IED on the wall.

Q Do you remember or have any recollection of the outcome of

that EAC, what next steps were discussed?

A Basically, at one point, I wrote a cable requesting

personnel and equipment based on all of this information. I would have

to see that cable to recollect exactly what I requested. And it went

through the chain, whether the RSO or the chief of mission, up to D.C.

Q Okay.

A But, yes, we requested additional personnel, equipment.

Our security posture was already on high alert based on this. This

would have all come out of the EAC.

Q Okay. Do you remember what specific staffing

recommendations you would have made?

A So, at this time, the SF folks were all leaving. Basically,

they were like, hey, we got other mission priorities. They were

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49

looking at this more like, okay, this is militia-on-militia infighting

going on, everybody's jockeying for power, not exactly looking to do

anything particularly to our embassy or our personnel.

They're jockeying for power, want to know who has more -- in

Benghazi, the whole point was oil. So they are the ones that have

probably, like, 60 percent of the oil in Libya. So there are some

people screaming for independence. They wanted to divide the country

into three different regions. I mean, this was ongoing.

I wrote a cable based on what I felt was personnel to make sure

that we had security on the ground both in Tripoli and Benghazi, whether

it was MSD teams, SF folks, weapons, equipment. We felt that since

the Embassy was not letting go of TDYers and SF personnel and the MSD

teams and this was going on, it's not going to be something that we

want to -- we want to draw down. We want to build up security.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And by "SF teams," you mean Special Forces?

A Right. The team that was in Tripoli was an SF team that

was there for training.

Q Also known as an SST?

A Yes, ma'am. I'm sorry.

Q No. You're fine.

A There are a lot of acronyms. Yes, ma'am.

Q Just want to make sure we're all talking about the same

thing.

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50

A Absolutely. Yes.

Ms. Betz. Can we go off the record for 1 second?

Ms. Jackson. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Betz. We'll go back on the record.

So I'm showing the witness what will be exhibit No. 4.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. And this is an email that sent to you

regarding staffing following the EAC in June regarding Benghazi.

Mr. Evers. Is there a reason that we're skipping the cable?

Ms. Betz. I'm going to come back to the cable.

Mr. Evers. Okay.

Ms. Betz. So --

Mr. Yes, I remember this email, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. So this is an email that is sent from ,

who is the desk officer in D.C., to , and the witness

is copied on the email. And it's in regards to staffing in Benghazi.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So you're familiar with this email?

A Yes, ma'am, I am.

Q And was this email with staffing recommendations the

product of the EAC, or a result of the EAC?

A Okay. Just to explain, this EAC here is a Benghazi EAC with

the principal officer and the RSO --

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51

Q Okay.

A -- on the ground and whoever the agents were on the ground

at that time. This is not the Tripoli EAC.

Q So there were two separate EACs?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay.

A Whatever happens at whatever post, whoever the principal

officer is and the RSO on the ground have to have their own EAC.

Q So you would not have participated --

A Not in this one.

Q -- in the Benghazi --

A No.

Q Were you made aware of --

A I was made aware by the email that, hey, this EAC took place

and this is what RSO is recommending for Post Benghazi.

Q Okay.

A It has nothing to do with Tripoli.

Q Okay. Okay. Would you have concurred in his staffing

recommendations?

A In his assessment?

Q In his assessment.

A Absolutely, yes.

Q Okay.

A Definitely.

Q And was this recommendation approved by D.C., do you know?

803
52

A I don't know about that, ma'am. All I know is that we were

also pushing for at least five agents in Benghazi based on staffing

patterns. But that's why we were trying to reroute agents from Tripoli

coming TDY to Benghazi to try to maintain that status, at least five

agents on the ground.

Q So this would have been the understanding regarding

staffing necessity for both --

A If we had the bodies, yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

Ms. Betz. We're close to the end of the hour, so I'll go ahead

and stop. We're off the record.

[Recess.]

804
53

Ms. Betz. So we'll go back on the record. The time is now 11:20,

and by agreement between the majority and the minority, the minority

will continue --

Ms. Jackson. Majority.

Ms. Betz. Majority -- I'm sorry -- the majority will continue

to interview the witness for another hour. We have got to get these

things straight.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Agent correct? I want to say it right.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q When we broke, we were talking about specific incidents in

Benghazi during your time as acting RSO in Tripoli?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And we had identified the June 6 IED attack on the facility,

the Islamist rally. Were there other attacks against Westerners that

you were aware of or made aware of in that timeframe?

A There were. I just can't remember specifically. There

was a diary that we kept specifying every attack that was major or had

any impact or anything to do with security on the ground. I don't have

access to that diary, but it would show by date any attacks during that

month or during that timeframe.

Q And is that a diary that you, yourself, kept, started, or

805
54

was that a diary that was kept by all the RSOs?

A It was started by RSO , who instructed me to keep

up with it, who I told to keep up with RSO . And, as far as

I'm concerned, during the whole time I was there, we kept it up,

including up to the attack on Mission Benghazi on September 11.

Q And just probing a little bit more, the diary, was it more

like an incident tracker? Or was this something where notes were kept

regarding specific incidents, like a true diary, or more like a list?

A Okay. So to give you a background, so it could be

understood about this diary, every embassy or every traditional post

or embassy setup has a system by which the RSO maintains a record of

incidents that will involve security, whether if there was a threat

against personnel or annexes or even housing. I don't recall the name

of the report off the top of my head, but it's in the system. It's

in the computer system for the RSO. It's under the RSO Web link. You

go in there. You put the date, name of the post, and you give a summary

briefing of what happened. We didn't have access to that for Tripoli.

Remember, we were setting up the system. So we kept a diary in the

computer system, which basically on whatever date it would happen, if

there was a major incident, we would say, okay, this major incident

took place at 0900 hours on the 12th of whatever date and give a brief

summary.

Q Was that a list that would have also been maintained in

Benghazi?

A No, not that I'm aware of because even while I was in

806
55

Benghazi, what I did was it was in my domain or I would email it to

myself, and I would keep the record myself. So whatever happened in

Benghazi, we would write it into that diary, so it didn't really matter

that it happened in Benghazi or anywhere else. It was going to go into

that diary.

Q It was recorded in Tripoli?

A That is correct.

Q So would this diary have included the attack against the

U.K. Ambassador's Envoy?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Is that something that ROS would have made you

aware of, or would somebody else have independently talked to you?

A We would have probably received that information not only

from RSO , but if it was the Brits, the Brits could have called

the Embassy and said: Hey, we just had an attack on our principal.

Q Were there other incidents that occurred during that

timeframe that you were aware of? Were there any threats against the

Ambassador that you were aware of?

A Which timeframe?

Q In your capacity as acting RSO in Tripoli before you went

to Benghazi.

A Are we talking about the threats against the Ambassador in

Tripoli, or anything that we were hearing from in Benghazi?

Q Either/or.

A If there was, it would be in that diary.

807
56

Q In that diary as well?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. During your time in Tripoli as acting RSO, were you

aware of the Department's weapons reductions program? Is that

something that you would be familiar with?

A No, ma'am.

Q MANPADS program?

A Okay. Now I understand what you are asking but that's

something that is --

Mr. Evers. It's classified.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q But you were aware of?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So now I'm shifting focus and talking about your time in

Benghazi --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- as acting RSO, when did you arrive to Benghazi?

A I can't recall the exact date, ma'am, but I know that I was

there for at least the July 4 celebration.

Q So around July 3 or 4?

A Yes. I'd say July 2, 3, if not late June. I know that I

was there for the July 4 because we cut a cake. We celebrated

Independence Day at the compound.

Q Were you recruited to go to Benghazi to serve as the acting

RSO?

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57

A Well, I volunteered.

Q You volunteered?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Why did you volunteer, just out of curiosity?

A I felt that the senior ARSO or the RSO on the ground should

be in Benghazi. It was a compound that was directly linked to Tripoli.

And, therefore, we should have the senior staff there.

Q What were your responsibilities in Benghazi as acting RSO?

A Pretty much the same responsibilities as you would have as

the RSO in Tripoli, which number one would be security of the compound,

security of the personnel, security of the information inside the

compound. At that time, there was a principal officer on the ground,

and I cannot say his last name.

Q ?

A That's him, yes, ma'am. And there was an IMO officer,

Q You had had conversations pretty much daily with RSO

Did you have any before he left regarding serving in this

capacity as the acting RSO in Benghazi?

A Well, we always debrief each other. Whenever you take over

the compound, if the RSO is on the ground, which is great, or anyone

that's acting, they give you a debrief. And they say: Hey, these are

the points of concerning currently. I suggest this, but now you're

the RSO, so you're in charge. And we have our, whether it's a 1-day

brief or an hour brief, and we go from there.

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58

Q So you did debrief with him before?

A Yes.

Q In Benghazi, before he left?

A Yes, I was there before he left. He left the next day.

Q Was there anything that he made you aware of that you were

not already aware of serving in Tripoli?

A Well, it's a difference when you're on the ground and you're

hearing everything from emails and phone calls. Once you're on the

ground, it's a whole different picture.

Q Exactly. And that was your first time in Benghazi?

A That's correct.

Q What were your first impressions when you arrived?

A Well, my first impression was getting on the plane in

Tripoli, Afriqiyah airlines. I was just praying that the plane didn't

go down. Sorry. I'd never heard of Afriqiyah airlines. So my first

impression was "Wow." Number one, they didn't assign seats. Then I

learned that Southwest doesn't do that either.

Ms. Barrineau. So it was just like Southwest.

Mr. Just like Southwest, yes.

I got to Benghazi, and they didn't pick me up on time, so I ended

up having an hour on the ground looking at everybody and people talking

to me in Arabic, and I had no idea what was going on. I was okay. I

mean, I had served in Baghdad, Kabul, Islamabad. It's not new to me.

You just make yourself small. And about an hour and a half later, they

picked me up.

810
59

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Who picked you up?

A So it was one of the local guard force officers. I want

to say and he picked me up with another local guard -- actually,

he was one of the 17 Martyr Brigade officers. Excuse me. And I believe

it was because I knew from Israel. We actually

served together. Well, he was an intern then. But I knew from

2006. So they picked me up, and I was like, thank you. It's about

time.

Q Did they have problems getting there? Did they say why they

were late?

A It was the traffic. They said: You're going to see how

far we are from the compound. Okay. Cool. Not a problem.

Again, my experience with Tripoli, the airport was about 2 and

a half miles. So you could get back to the compound within, what, 10,

15 minutes. But Benghazi, the airport was far. I think it took us

about 45 minutes to an hour to get back to the compound. So that was

my first impression of Benghazi. They let me wait there for about an

hour and a half, ma'am.

Q Did you bring anything with you that Benghazi needed or

didn't have?

A I don't recall what I brought. What I didn't bring was

weapons.

Q You did not bring?

A No, absolutely not.

811
60

Q Were you issued weapons when you arrived to Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q At the airport or at the compound?

A At the compound. The officers that picked me up, picked

me up, and we basically had the same standard in Tripoli as we did in

Benghazi, which is we do not leave the compound unarmed.

Q When you arrived at the compound, what were your initial

impressions of the compound?

A Based on my experience?

Q Yes.

A Wow. It's not an embassy compound that I'm used to.

There's no Delta barriers. There is no big walls. There is no metal

hard doors. I mean, the first impression that you get based on your

first view of the compound.

Q Were these all things that you were aware of in theory but

were different when you were on the ground, or were these new to you?

A Well, that's what I meant. It's different for you when you

get on the ground and you actually see the compound, as opposed to people

telling you: Hey, we don't really have those hardline doors. That's

the impression.

Q So it's not a compound or a post that was similar to other

posts where you had served?

A Absolutely not.

Q Were you aware of -- let me backtrack. A lot of these

physical security vulnerabilities I think were being addressed

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61

immediately prior to your arrival or during your arrival. Is that

correct?

A Yes, we were in the process of addressing the different

security vulnerabilities in both compounds, both in Benghazi and

Tripoli.

Q Would you elaborate on some of those vulnerabilities?

A Well, first of all, you want to secure the perimeter. You

want to make sure that the walls are high, that there is a way to not

allow penetration into the compound, whether you want to put barbed

wire on the walls, whether you want to put cameras up there, whether

the IDS -- excuse me, I remember -- system is working. Anything that

you can put out, we use, we call them bollards that are put against,

on the road, to try to maintain a certain offset. We're always aware

of IEDs or vehicle improvised explosive devices. Anything that can

mitigate perimeter penetration, we want to work on that.

Q Were most of these measures that were employed what one

would consider field-expedient measures?

A We work with what we have. At that compound, the front

entrance had a zigzag, so you would have these Jersey barriers. I don't

know if you're aware of Jersey barriers, but they're basically these

cement blocks that you would put in a way that you would slow down a

vehicle from, say, he's trying to ram it at 50 miles per hour. Well,

guess what? We'll zigzag those barriers in a way that you're going

to have to slow down to 3 miles per hour.

We had drop arms and a metal bore in the front gate, but there

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62

were three gates. So the main gate had a big, big metal bore, and the

other two gates had barriers inside the gates, but really we didn't

use them for entry or exit points unless there was some type of

emergency, or we wanted to change the way we would move out.

Q And just elaborating on some of the technological

equipment, were those pretty much standard as you would find in other

posts, or were these, again, sort of field-expedient measures?

A We didn't have those this Tripoli, so we wouldn't have them

in Benghazi. Cameras, we had, what, maybe five cameras in Benghazi.

We had an IDS system that actually worked. So, on the June 6 IED, it

was working. Other than that, perimeter lighting very limited. There

was a fence, a chain-link fence, that surrounded part of the compound

with an offset of, I would say, probably maybe 15, 20 feet from the

wall.

Q What recommendations or changes did you make while, if any,

during your time there?

A Well, security-wise, we had FAVs and light armored

vehicles. In reality, the best way that I thought to secure the

compound was to put those vehicles at the gates just to hold back, you

know, the gates from opening, or anybody trying to penetrate would have

to go through those vehicles first. So we put three vehicles every

night at the three different gates or two gates up front. There was

one in the back. We always had a fully armored vehicle ready to go

with the keys to egress. And we tried to put down one right next to

what we called the Ambassador villa, obviously, where the principal

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63

officer was, so we could egress to that vehicle and get out as quickly

as possible.

We had the QRF, Martyrs Brigade guys working nights. We also

trained them in how to deal with attacks and attack scenarios. The

local guard force, whatever had been put in place with stayed

in place, so at the very least five guards. We had one officer in the

TOC 24 hours, 7 days a week. He actually slept in the TOC. Those were

just some. Other than that, everything else comes up to commonsense

and luck.

Q Did you make requests of D.C. to help with some of these

needs in Benghazi?

A The requests always go through Tripoli to D.C., yes. And

those requests were for weapons and personnel and whatever security

parameters we can build on, walls, alarms, cameras. But that all was

a package. We were waiting for a lot of these things to come to post.

Q Were you aware of issues that may have been going on in D.C.

in terms of procuring --

A Not that I'm aware of, no, ma'am.

Q So there were no delays or issues with the procurement

process as it relates to --

A As far as I'm concerned, no, ma'am. I can just make a

request. I don't know what happens out in D.C. or anywhere else at

that point.

Ms. Jackson. Were there any funding limitations on the types of

upgrades that could be requested or additional security measures that

815
64

could be requested?

Mr. Whatever information I got, I would have put down

on an email, or they would have sent that to me. I cannot recall exactly

if they say: Hey, we can't do this now, or we cannot do that now. We

can only make requests. If the funding doesn't come through, it's not

something that we control. Sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Previously, had you seen any requests for

security upgrades that came through Tripoli?

Mr. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. So you had seen those?

Mr. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. And you had gotten to Tripoli in April of?

Mr. 2012, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. And this was July of 2012?

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. So, by the time you got to Benghazi, had any

of these security upgrades been accomplished?

Mr. That I can recall exactly what was upgraded, no.

Maybe adding a camera, maybe adding barbed wire to the walls, but I

cannot recall because I was not in Benghazi before July.

Mr. Westmoreland. Right. But when you got to Benghazi, did you

notice that any of those security things that had been requested had

been done?

Mr. I can't say that I saw that.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did you see the video of the June 6 attack?

816
65

Mr. Yes, I did.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did you think that camera was positioned in

the correct position? I mean, the quality of the --

Mr. I could clearly see the attack. So, to me, that

shows me that the camera was positioned in a way that you saw the attack,

but you didn't see the vehicle coming from whatever angle I would have

wanted to see it as a security officer. But the camera was positioned

in a place where we could see the attack.

Mr. Westmoreland. The other thing I wanted to ask you about was

any defensive positions. I know that when you're dealing with

security, you want to look at worst-case scenarios and especially with

the limited number of agents actually at that facility. I'm assuming

that if you're being attacked, you want to have some type of defensive

positions, whether it be barricades, walls, sandbags, whatever?

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. What type of defensive positions did you have,

if any, at the facility?

Mr. Well, we had sandbags. We had some sandbags, not

a full deployment of sandbags, in different locations. And I can't

recall exactly where they were off the top of my head. But my main

concern when I was there was, number one, the villa, the Ambassador's

villa, because your principal officer is there. And number two is the

TOC because that's where all your information is. Those two villas

to me were the main complex buildings that needed to be defended. If

it was up to me, I'd put T-barriers around those two compounds. And

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if I could put a sniper in position, I would. And any security agent

would tell you the same thing. Did we have that? No. So, whatever

we had, if I had 20 sandbags, I would deploy them around the building

perimeter so that I could have a firing position if anybody's coming

to that front gate, give enough time for my fellow agents to egress

to the vehicle and remove the principal officer. That would be the

best, but I cannot answer for anyone because that's just my ideal. If

we had that equipment, good to go.

It still doesn't mitigate the fact that we don't have 30 cameras

instead of 4 or 5. I don't have angles. It's one entry point with

an exit point. It's one long alleyway, basically, is what you had,

and behind those, you have tall buildings that overlook the compound.

Ms. Betz. So just following back on Sharon's question regarding

funding issues and issues in D.C., I'd like to show you an email that

was forwarded to you from . For the record, it's State

Department Document C5391732. It's labeled as exhibit No. 5, and I'll

give the witness a moment to read it, and it's the first email that

I want to ask you some questions about.

[ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Yes, I remember this, and I remember

BY MS BETZ:

Q So, for the record, this is an email that was forwarded,

like I said, from , who was an ARSO in Benghazi, to the

witness. And the subject is "Request and quote for additional security

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lighting." Specifically I'd like to talk about the email or in the

email the discussion on field-expedient method of making security

upgrades and using the embassy procurement process.

A Okay.

Q Were you familiar with these two distinctions that were

being made in D.C.?

A Absolutely. So this is not D.C., though. This is in

Tripoli.

Q Oh, this is in Tripoli. Okay.

A If I may explain?

Q Yes.

A Yes. So is a TDY agent coming out of the field

office who has no idea of being an RSO. So they send you to RSO school

so you learn exactly what to do in an embassy when you procure items

or funding. He thinks, in my opinion, which I can see from this because

I discussed this, hey, I need lighting. Absolutely. Here's lighting.

Because that's how we are as agents. We want the equipment; we need

the equipment. was the facilities management officer at the

Embassy in Tripoli. He's looking at it from the facilities management

officer procurement process. He wants us to put the funding through

a computer system to request to D.C. to get the money to the Embassy.

is doing exactly what he needs to do as an agent and requesting

the security upgrades. And is doing exactly what he's been

taught, to wait for the procurement. This is what we call bureaucracy.

And you cannot work this way when you have an agent who's TDY,

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who's never been through RSO school, who doesn't know what the Embassy

works like and has never dealt with the headache of asking for funding

and expect him to understand why writes an email saying: We

should use procurement processes instead of field expediency.

Q Would D.C. have required that you all use the procurement

process, or would they have responded to this field-expedient method?

A I don't know, ma'am.

Q Did you believe or feel as though you were hindered in your

ability to get the upgrades or security equipment that you needed to

fully secure the mission?

A In regards to this request, the frustration is if I want

lighting tomorrow and I'm not going to get it for another month because

I got to do a procurement, yeah, you'd be frustrated. But then, again,

this is the processes we have put in place based on policy and

regulations, and we don't dictate that, ma'am.

Q And would that have been one of the issues in Benghazi in

terms of better securing?

A Which is the reason why I requested to stay in Benghazi

because I had experience as an ARSO in Santo Domingo. I understand

what wants, and I agree 110 percent on what wants. And

I understand what is saying because I've been through that.

Then, again, in hindsight, would I rather have you give me a petty cash

of $10,000 and do my own upgrades? Absolutely. Would you give an

agent $10,000 to do it? No one would. We have to do this through

whatever systems are in place. The request was made. The lighting

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was coming, but the funding needed to be procured from D.C.

Q Were you aware of any specific funding, line-item funding,

made available specifically for Benghazi, or did everything have to

go through Tripoli?

A Again, everything going through Benghazi had to go through

Tripoli. Benghazi falls under the administrative, and, other than me

sending a personnel over there, which has no issue, but funding requests

cable, EAC, has to go through Tripoli. Tripoli is the Embassy.

Benghazi is just the office.

Q Going back to your discussion on the staffing in

Benghazi -- and I think you alluded to this earlier, but I want to

clarify -- how many agents were on the ground when you arrived in

Benghazi?

A If I recall correctly, there were three. And it would have

been -- and I'm sorry, it's been a while -- but at the very least,

. I don't recall if there was

a fourth one at this time, but eventually I got , who

wasn't there when I arrived. And then I had another agent that came

through, and I can't recall his name. All I know is he was about 6

foot 2 and would have punched me out with one punch he was so big.

Really nice kid. He was a sheriff's deputy prior to being on DS, but

I don't remember his name.

Q But would have left?

A left the next day. Right. We would have gone

back down to three.

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Q Were all of these agents each high-threat trained?

A High threat, I don't know. I don't know if went

through high-threat training or did before they deployed to

post. I don't know about that, ma'am.

Q All of them were at TDY?

A All the agents in Benghazi were TDYers. There was no

permanent agents stationed in Libya other than myself on that

particular timeframe.

Ms. Betz. Going back to your earlier discussion of the cable,

the staffing cable, I'd just like to show you, this is a July 9 cable.

This would be exhibit No. 6. And I'll give the witness a moment to

read it.

[ Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. And for the record, this is State Department Document

C05261891 produced to the House Select Committee on Benghazi.

Mr. Yes, I wrote this cable.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So you're familiar with this cable?

A Absolutely.

Q You wrote this cable?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q This cable came out of Embassy Tripoli?

A Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Betz. And, for the record, it is a cable regarding request

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for extension of TDY security personnel.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q What was the basis for writing this cable?

A Okay. With all the security situation on the ground going

on and putting everything in place, and all the transition taking place

in regards to American personnel leaving and coming in, and after

discussion with the RSO and chief of mission, this was a cable

suggesting at that time this is what we need to maintain operations

in the best safe manner as soon as possible. We wrote this cable on

July 9, prior to the Ambassador leaving for Benghazi.

At that time, MSD personnel were, when we started off with two

teams; now there was less teams on the ground. Actually, I don't

believe there was any MSD team on the ground. There was just TDYers

and two permanent ARSOs on the ground. This is in July. I'm sorry.

I'm confused on the dates. Not September. This is July 9. So, at

this time, we had another ARSO on the ground that was permanent and

myself and the RSO, which I believe at that time was .

Q So we wrote this in July because all these elements were

leaving. MSD was leaving. The SST team was leaving, or they were

going to change their mission from being in the Embassy to being outside

of the Embassy so they could train the Libyan government military. So

we came up with this as a suggestion, for example, in line 4, or

paragraph 4, under the current arrangement, and this was the main one,

34 U.S. security personnel, the 16 SSTs, the 11 MSD, the 2 RSOs and

3 TDY RSOs, that was the number that we had there, and it was going

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to drawn down to 27. And we said: Wait, we're basically losing

people. We need people, specifically because security is not in the

best position now.

We requested weapons permits and weapons for the local ambassador

bodyguard detail, and funding for security. Yes, and this was the

cable that we sent out in concurrence with the Ambassador?

Q Well, I would like to draw your attention to paragraph No.

5 and specifically the last sentence that says: Post anticipates

supporting operations in Benghazi with at least one permanently

assigned RSO employee from Tripoli. However, would request continued

TDY support to fill a minimum of three security positions in Benghazi.

A Yes.

Q So my question is, so that would be a total of four --

A At the very least.

Q -- at the very least?

A In Benghazi.

Q In Benghazi. So that would be consistent with the June 14

email regarding staffing?

A Well, we wanted five.

Q Five but a minimum of four?

A A minimum of four would be great.

Q So why didn't you request five in this memo or cable?

A Again, going based on the numbers of agents that were going

to Benghazi while we were averaging one, two, or three, and we never

actually had five, we're suggesting: Hey, international programs, how

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about you making sure that we always have three, and we're going to

put a permanent RSO on the ground, and that would give us at least four

if you cannot provide us with enough TDYers to do the job. That's

basically why we went with that number. It was an average of the amount

of agents that we had at any time at that post.

Q Was your thought also that Tripoli would be responsible for

sending TDYs or somehow that Tripoli's numbers would be impacted by

supplying Benghazi with TDYs?

A In regards to the numbers?

Q Uh-huh.

A Well, I was trying to separate Benghazi from Tripoli. I

don't want you to spend me a TDYer to Tripoli so that I can detour him

to Benghazi. Just give me my three TDYers in Benghazi, and I'll put

a permanent RSO on the ground where I will continuously have four guys.

If I can get two more detoured, that would be great; you're just giving

me more numbers. But permanently give me this. N.

Ow, these cables are the beginning of the funding request. You

got to pay for these guys and girls. So, again, we're trying to be

as diplomatic as possible, but who's going to pay for it? So if IP

gets this, they are going to have to come up with a budget to ensure

that we are constantly having three TDYers in Benghazi in addition to

the permanent RSO.

Q Which was included in the total number that you proposed?

A That is correct.

Q Vis-à-vis Tripoli.

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A Correct.

Q So Tripoli's numbers would have included Benghazi?

A Absolutely.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And was this something that was supported by the Ambassador?

A Yes, ma'am. The cable can never leave post without the

Ambassador okaying it.

Q Did the Ambassador express concerns to you regarding the

need to have this much staffing in Libya, both in Tripoli and in

Benghazi?

A Me personally, no.

Q To or ?

A I would not know that, ma'am.

Q But you put it in this cable knowing that the Ambassador

concurred with these recommendations?

A This cable gets drafted first, after concurrence of the RSO

and the Ambassador, who are the two principal officers, or two principal

officers or whatever EAC or whatever committee, him being the chief

of mission, and him being the head security agent on the ground.

I look at the numbers. I come up with my ideas. I run it through

them. They concur. We put it in a cable. I draft it. RSO concurs.

Ambassador signs off. This was based on the numbers that we saw. I

basically said, Hey, this is just minimum, ma'am. If it was up to me,

we would have 200 guys on the ground, but we have to go with reality.

Basically setting up an embassy, we're not going to be able to sustain

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without the housing, without the proper equipment, 100 people inside

that compound.

Q And what was the response from Washington after this cable

went in?

A I don't know, ma'am. I didn't get a personal response. I

just sent the cable out after concurrence with the RSO and the --

Q Did the bodies ever appear?

A No.

Q So the response was you didn't get what you asked for?

A I don't know, ma'am. I make a request. My request goes

up. We still continue to get the TDYers. The TDYer flow never

changed. We continued to get the TDYers into post and continued to

send whatever TDYers we could to Benghazi.

Q But your numbers did not increase?

A But the numbers did not increase based on this cable, not

that I'm aware of, no.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And I would just draw your attention to paragraph No. 3 and

specifically the second sentence: Despite field expedience, physical

security upgrades to improve both the temporary Embassy villa's

compound, neither compound meets OSPB standards.

Was this a concern in Benghazi as well or just solely in Tripoli,

the not meeting the OSPB standards?

A Well, when I got to Benghazi, yes, it was a concern to me,

and while I was in Tripoli, yes, it was a concern to me as well because

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the standards for an Embassy would have never been met. The standards

are 100 meters offset. You didn't have 100 meters offset anywhere.

I don't think that there's even an embassy in the world that meets that,

other than the new embassies. It's like being in Tel Aviv. The

Embassy in Tel Aviv is right off the beach and on the roadway. There's

20 different buildings overlooking the Embassy. It doesn't meet these

standards.

Q And the increase in danger pay from 25 percent to 30 percent?

A Based on all the attacks, based on all the things that were

going on, and totality of the circumstances, a request was made to

increase the danger pay, yes, ma'am.

Q And did you feel that that was an adequate increase. Did

it reflect --

A In pay? I would request 50 percent, but there is a limit,

ma'am. I request the highest.

Q But in terms of danger and the security environment?

A Based on what we follow and, again -- this is up to secret

here, right?

Mr. Evers. No this transcript is unclassified.

Ms. Betz. We can talk later. We'll come back.

Ms. Jackson. Was the danger pay increase granted?

Mr. Yes, it was, ma'am.

Ms. Jackson. So it was recognized that Libya was becoming a more

dangerous place and had a corresponding increase in the danger pay?

Mr. I can't speak for them, but I believe that I thought

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it was a dangerous place, yes, ma'am.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Okay. During your time as acting RSO in Benghazi, were

there frustrations in terms of getting DS agents to Benghazi?

A Me personally, yes, I was frustrated.

Q Was D.C. frustrated? Were there other frustrations?

A We're a small agency. We don't have 5,000, 10,000 agents.

It's very hard to get TDYers with everything else that's going on. It's

not that they're denying us agents; it's that we have to get the bodies.

We actually make fun of the body snatcher, the poor person doing that

job. But you have to protect the Secretary of State. You got to

protect the U.S./U.N. Ambassador. There's a lot of details going on.

There's a lot of work that has to be done. There's a lot of embassies

that have work to be done. We're fighting a fight getting bodies, and

we have to hire the best and brightest. Right? So I understand that.

I didn't feel that we were being denied. I just feel that we just didn't

have the personnel for it.

Q Do you know why -- let me ask you this. Was Benghazi a

priority for the desk to fill?

A Absolutely. It was considered a PSP post, which is a

priority staffing post, absolutely.

Q Do you know why there may have been problems in getting staff

to go to Benghazi?

A Other than shortage of personnel, no. Because a TDYer or

anyone serving in Benghazi or in Tripoli, they're all volunteers. You

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can't be directed to any of these posts. All of these individuals

wanted to be there.

Q Was there concern expressed about diverting resources or

staffing from Tripoli to Benghazi or vice versa in terms of how that

might appear to D.C.?

A No. No. Whatever we requested, they were trying to get

it for us, as far as I was concerned.

Ms. Betz. I would like to just show you an email of what you were

just copied on just to get some clarity. And this will be exhibit No.

7.

[ Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. For the record, this is State Department Document

C05396031. And I'll give the witness a chance to familiarize himself

with the document.

Mr. Yes, ma'am, I remember this email chain.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So this is an email regarding RSO TDY staffing for Libya,

and the email is sent from the witness to and

In it I want to refer you to an email inside the email chain

that is sent from to you and and

specifically the second, or what would be I guess third paragraph: If

we currently have five DS agents on the ground in Benghazi, then it

becomes hard to justify keeping resources in Benghazi when we have all

the TDY ARSOs working QRF and TOC due to the departure of the second

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MSD team.

Do you understand what he was referring to?

A Yes. And this is coming from me. I wrote the email prior

to that email, which was July 9, which is on the second page. And,

basically, I'm saying I'm volunteering to stay in Benghazi. I said

I don't have a problem filling in as the RSO here if the bosses agree.

Obviously, I can't make that decision. These decisions have to be made

by the RSO. I don't rule myself. Chain of command. And I'm writing

to as the IP desk officer and the RSO, and I'm saying I defer

to and to make that decision. I'm telling them I'm

going to be taking leave from the 14th to the 1st, but I'm willing to

say here -- you know, continuity, senior RSO on the ground. His answer

is not based on the fact that they're trying to take resources out,

but the fact that when I leave, there's going to be five guys still

on the ground in Benghazi, and the new RSO coming in needs to be

debriefed. So is saying: I want you two permanent guys to be

here in Tripoli when the RSO comes in because all I have to work with

is TDY agents who do not understand the full concept of embassy

operations, while you both have gone through RSO school. doesn't

have all the experience, but you do. And I want you here to brief

.

That's basically what he was trying to say. I volunteered to

stay, but they needed me in Tripoli in order to brief the new incoming

RSO, who was .

Q So there wasn't concern about numbers on the ground and the

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appearance of having too many in Benghazi --

A No.

Q -- vis-à-vis Tripoli?

A No. His whole thing was: Hey, you are the senior ARSO.

I want you here to brief about what's going on, including

what's going on in Benghazi. And, once you're here, we'll determine

how this is going to break down.

And that's basically what his reply is to me, and that's how I

understood it.

Q Okay. So there wasn't concern about resources?

A Not at this time.

Ms. Betz. We'll go off the record for one second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Betz. So we'll go back on the record.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Just moving away from the staffing because I think we have

hit that pretty hard, one of the main events while you were in Benghazi

was the July 7 election?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q How did that go?

A It went great. I couldn't think of anything better. It

went great.

Q So no issues, no anything that you made note of, informed

Tripoli regarding security incidents, that kind of thing?

A No. Well, we were always letting Tripoli know what was

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going on. You have to let the RSO know what's going on. Our biggest

concern with the elections, because you're talking about several

election polling sites, thousands of people -- I'm sorry, sometimes

I do the agent lingo -- all the crazies come out.

Mr. Westmoreland. That's our lingo too.

Mr. We are always concerned that these are the places

of opportunity for them to create chaos and death and anything else

that they want to bring upon us. So what we did was we looked at the

sites that we were going to bring the principal officer to.

I took this job because I believe in what we do, and I wouldn't

do the job if I didn't think we could do it. So to me is if the boss

wants to go to the site and we can take him to the site, after we advance

it, we take him. If we can't take him, we wont take him. And if he

wants to go on his own, he can sign a form that says: Hey, I take this

upon myself to do it.

That's as far as I was trained. So I personally went out to the

sites. I took the advance agents. I looked at the sites. I looked

at the locations. I determined how many bodies in regards to

protection we needed for him, and we took him to, I believe, about seven

or eight sites that whole day, and we did great. And we rolled heavy.

What we call heavy is a full follow limo, advance agents. Every site

had someone there to say, hey, this is safe; this is not safe. It was

a good day.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Great. Was the Ambassador supposed to travel, or was there

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any intent on the Ambassador travelling to Benghazi while you were there

serving as acting RSO?

A There might have been some talk specifically for that

particular date because it was a, you know, it was election day, and

he really liked Benghazi, but that didn't materialize.

Q Do you know why?

A I cannot recall exactly why, but I'm glad he didn't.

Q Why?

A More bodies -- if you bring in the Ambassador, now instead

of me going out with -- and I don't mean to say the principal officer

is not important enough -- everybody knows who the Ambassador is.

Nobody really knows who is. Now you're putting more cameras,

like, "Oh, my god, the Ambassador of the United States is coming over,"

and now instead of utilizing 10 guys, now I got to utilize 50. To me,

as the security officer, I'd rather have the Ambassador stay home.

Q Was there any concern about -- I think during that time there

may have been the Facebook posting on threats to the Ambassador?

A Yes.

Q Did that play into the decision?

A It could have played into the decision in Tripoli. It

didn't play into my decision in Benghazi.

Q Okay. Let me ask you this. I think you might have moved

back to Tripoli. Did you go back to Tripoli from Benghazi straight?

A Yes, I left I think the 24th -- the 24th I left.

Q The maximum state of alert that was issued I think toward

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the end of July, beginning of August, did that state of alert prompt

either you or Tripoli to anticipate engage in any additional heightened

security measures?

Mr. Evers. Do you know what she's referring to?

Mr. No.

Ms. Betz. Okay. So that you don't have a recollection of the

Libyan state of alert that was issued?

Mr. Not that I can recall, no.

Ms. Betz. So moving back to Tripoli, I just want to talk

briefly --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Before that, if I can just interject, did you have any VIP

visitors to Benghazi while you were there, such as the Deputy Secretary

of State or anyone from the White House?

A To Benghazi --

Q To Benghazi. Or were there any VIP visits to Tripoli that

you were aware of?

A As far as the compound and as far as our protection detail,

it didn't go beyond . I don't remember moving anybody or come

anywhere near doing a protection detail for anyone else.

Q Do you remember any VIP visitors to Tripoli while you were

in Benghazi?

A No, ma'am.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Following on Sharon's question, when you were in Tripoli,

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were you interacting with any senior, or was the RSO interacting with

any senior State Department officials, that you're aware of?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q What would you say that your relationship was, now that

you're back in Tripoli as an ARSO, were you in greater constant contact,

if I can say that, with Benghazi given your role there previously? Did

you feel like you were in, had a greater sense of what they were

experiencing, being the primary contact with regard to issues?

A Yes. Obviously, once you're on the ground, you can say:

Hey, let me go back and say we need this. We need that. We need

personnel. It just reemphasized what we wrote in that cable in July.

Q And would the RSO, , would he refer or rely

on you with regard to what you knew from your time in Benghazi, just

to some of the issues that they were experiencing?

A I can brief the RSO daily and say, "Hey, this is what's going

on," but I don't know what decisions the RSO takes or who he would talk

to about it.

Q I'll try to move along here. So you went on leave between

August 14 and September 1?

A That is correct.

Q And so you were there the night -- you were in Tripoli in

the Tripoli TOC?

A I came back about September 5 or 6, if I can recall. And,

yes, I was in the TOC after the attack happened.

Q Not during?

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A Now, during the attack, yes. But the attack started at a

certain time. I got the call. I reported to the TOC after the attack

started.

Q And can you take us through what you remember of being in

the TOC during the attack?

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q If we could take one step back, what were you initially told

when you were told to report to the TOC? Who called you, and what did

they say to the best of your recollection?

A Okay. Well, that evening I got a call from a contact saying

that there were some issues going on in Cairo, in Egypt, and I relayed

that message to the RSO and said there's stuff going on in Cairo. It's

not like we sat down in front of the television and watching anything

that's going on. You got your contacts. They call you. The

individual that called me was my APD bodyguard head, the head of APD.

His name is . The gentleman goes: Hey, we're looking at the

news, and there's stuff going on in Cairo, Egypt.

Q Was he a Libyan contact?

A Yeah. He was the head of the Ambassador's Protective

Detail. We had been working with him for a long time. He had been

working for the Embassy way before -- he probably worked for the Embassy

more than 7 or 8 years.

Q So he was a locally employed staff?

A That is correct. So he gave me that call because I ran the

APD, and I ran the guard force. So my instructions to my supervisors

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were if you hear the minimum thing, you better call me and let me know

what's going on. So he calls me. I called the RSO and said: Hey,

there's stuff going on in Cairo. You may want to call the guys in

Benghazi because it might end up spilling up over there. The RSO goes:

Hey, good call. Go ahead and call Benghazi. So I called

about 7:30 that night.

Q When you say "spilling over," what do you mean by that?

A Again, that's law enforcement lingo. You think that if it

happens here, the proximity to where we are, it's going to come over.

Something like that. I mean, there's no direct knowledge. It's just

like: Hey, just be aware. This is going over there, and it's close

to where you guys are at because Benghazi is here; Cairo is here. The

border is closer to Benghazi than it is to Tripoli.

Q Was that the only conversation that you had about Cairo?

A That's the only conversation that I had with , just

letting them know that information was coming in.

Q And what was response?

A He said that he was looking at it and that he was aware,

and he would do whatever he needed to do.

Q Any inkling that something similar was going to be happening

in Benghazi?

A No. He didn't give me any other detail.

Q Any other social media reporting, either at your end in

Tripoli or on his end in Benghazi, that protests were planned in Libya?

A Nothing like that, no, ma'am.

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Q Were you aware that in Cairo, that there had been prior

planning of the protests?

A No, ma'am. The only thing I heard from Cairo was that there

was a lot of commotion, and they were at the Embassy or something. And

from what he told me, I said: Hey, you know what, let me tell the RSO

so he could tell Benghazi. That's all the information I got on that

call.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So just going back, so after the Cairo call --

A He said, you know, he was aware of it. He was looking at

the TV. I guess it was in the channels or something. I said, Okay,

not a problem. I went to check on the TOC. The TOC was operational.

The guards were operational. Everybody was where they were supposed

to be. I went to my villa.

Q And then what happened after that? You were in your

villa --

A I'm in my villa, and at 9:30 comes an RSO knocking.

Benghazi is under attack. Get up. I'm ready to roll in about a minute

and head right to the TOC.

Q So when he said Benghazi is under attack, is that all he

said to you?

A Yeah. This is not a drill. Benghazi is under attack.

He's on the phone talking with -- I don't know exactly who was talking

with on the phone, but he was on the phone saying Benghazi is under

attack. I assume that he's talking to one of the agents that is calling

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back saying, Hey, they're rolling in.

Q So you report to the TOC?

A I report to the TOC.

Q And what happened from there?

A Commotion. Everybody is coming into the TOC. I couldn't

tell you how many people were in the TOC. I couldn't tell you exactly

who was in the TOC. I can tell you everybody who was anybody in that

Embassy was in the TOC in 5 minutes.

Q Does anything stand out in those conversations during that

time while you were in the TOC?

A So, hey, commands are coming in: Call , the Annex.

Call the Annex over there. Call QRF. How do I respond? These guys

are taking fire. One agent was, there were two agents on the computer

systems looking at the screens, making calls to the command center.

The RSO was trying to talk to the agents on the ground in Benghazi.

The comms of the radios are not working. There's no comms between

radios from there. The only way to communicate is via phone line or

shooting a quick email, and that all depends on if the power is on.

My first thought was, if it's happening in Benghazi, it's going

to happen in Tripoli. So I immediately called the guard force

commander. I called the Ambassador's head bodyguard. I said: I want

everybody on the grounds ASAP. Call the militia. Call the Defense

Ministry. Call the Interior Ministry. I want perimeter security now,

now, now.

Q Did you have a reason to believe that would happen in

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Tripoli, or just this was your hunch?

A This is my hunch, and I've seen it, and so, to me, it's

coming. I don't take chance.

Ms. Jackson. You said that two agents were looking at a computer.

What were they watching or monitoring on a computer?

Mr. Well, so we have this major screen, which you

probably see in any command center, that has the

of any movement that's outside of the Embassy. And because we can

actually see movement in Benghazi, they focused their attention on the

Benghazi, reading them to see if those were going

to be up and running or what was going to go on. That's about as best

as you can go to. We're not talking about live-feed satellite or

anything. It's just the .

Ms. Jackson. And were those working?

Mr. They were working, but I couldn't tell you if there

was any movement in Benghazi because I was not at that screen. I was

more concerned about perimeter security for the Embassy in Tripoli.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Given that you were recently in Benghazi and had some

contacts, did you make any calls to anyone in Benghazi?

A I called the QRF at the Annex.

Q You called the QRF? At what time was that about? At the

Annex?

A That's correct.

Q Not at the mission?

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A No. In Benghazi.

Q In Benghazi?

A The QRF in the Benghazi Annex.

Q And why did you make that call?

A Because it's Benghazi getting hit and not Tripoli.

Q No. I understand that, but why the Annex QRF?

A Because if the agent is on the ground talking to the RSO,

he's not going to pick up a phone call from me. He is dealing with

that issue right there. I'm calling the Annex to see if they're going

to have people --

Mr. Westmoreland. Not the Annex. You're talking about the

mission?

Mr. No.

Mr. Westmoreland. You're talking about the Annex?

Mr. The Annex.

Ms. Jackson. You were asking for additional support from the

Annex to go to the mission?

Mr. We wanted to know if they were responding and they

had received the call. Right. If I may clarify, there were two

annexes. There was one in Tripoli, which was next, close to us; and

there was the Annex that was in Benghazi, which was about, without

traffic or concern, you get in within 5 minutes. Both annexes had QRF

personnel that could respond to an emergency. That Annex, I called

this one in Benghazi immediately after getting to probably about 2200

hours.

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Ms. Betz. I'm over my time.

Ms. Jackson. Let's just go off the record for a minute and talk

about logistics for a while.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Betz. We'll go back on the record.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Where we left off we were talking about you being in the

TOC during the night of the attack and specifically a phone call that

you made to the Benghazi Annex. Were there any other calls that you

made during that time?

A No, other than to the local guard force commander to make

sure that the supervisor has guards on the ground, the APD head officer

to make sure that he had bodyguards on the ground. No. That was it.

Q So in Tripoli.

A That was Tripoli.

Q Any other calls to Benghazi.

A That was it.

Q Did you have any conversations with any of the others

regarding Benghazi, vis-à-vis their phone calls to Benghazi?

A No, no.

Ms. Jackson. From your time in the TOC, what did you learn of

the attack?

Mr. So the RSO is on the phone with whoever it is that

he's on the phone with, and then you have the -- I can't remember his

name, but he could have been an officer in the Marine Corps. I mean,

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this guy was great. He was a political officer. I mean,

he took charge of the situation too. And there was a Mr. Hicks. So

all three of them are on phone calls, but I don't know who they're

talking to. You're getting the blowback from the conversation, and

I believe that Mr. was talking to one of the agents on the

ground in addition to the RSO talking to another agent on the ground.

So there were two simultaneous phone calls at the same time, and I

believe Mr. Hicks was calling everybody that he could to get government

support for the guys there. Those were the three most interactive

conversations you could have heard going back and forth.

Ms. Betz. Do you know who was talking to, or RSO

? Was he on the phone as well?

Mr. He told me he was talking to . That

I recall. Then all of a sudden, about -- it was 2200 hours, I still

remember 2200 hours -- someone had the great idea, which was it was

a great idea, to start keeping a diary of the whole situation going

back from the first time that they heard about the attack through that,

you know, through that long night. And so this one person -- I can't

remember his name, but he was taking notes. And it was like a lot of,

"Hey, I'm talking to this guy," "I'm talking to this guy."

Mr. Westmoreland. , did anybody ever call the TOC from

Benghazi?

Mr. From Benghazi to our TOC? Yes, absolutely. We

would have never known --

Mr. Westmoreland. But you wouldn't have answered that?

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Mr. I would have not answered that, sir, because I was

not in the TOC. When the original attack started, I wasn't there.

Mr. Westmoreland. But after you were in the TOC, did anybody from

Benghazi ever call and talk to you in the TOC?

Mr. Personally, no.

Mr. Westmoreland. So there was not any communication from TOC

to TOC. It was from --

Mr. Evers. I'm sorry. I was just being too expressive.

Ms. Jackson. Not to him but to others.

Mr. Westmoreland. But I thought he was working the TOC in

Tripoli?

Mr. No, sir, I was not working the TOC in Tripoli.

There were already agents in the TOC assigned for that evening.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Mr. All I did was check up on them, and then I went to

my villa, after making my calls to Benghazi about -- excuse me, I don't

want to go into military time -- 7:30 at night. After that initial

call to Benghazi telling them, "Hey, there's something going on in

Egypt, just be aware," which was very basic and to the point, I went

to my villa. At 9:40 p.m., the RSO comes knocking on my door

and says: Get up, get up, there's an attack in Benghazi -- somewhere

along those lines, not verbatim -- this is not a drill. Let's go.

That's when I responded to our TOC.

Mr. Westmoreland. And so you went to the TOC then, but you were

not manning the TOC?

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Mr. That is correct, sir. No, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. You were just in there?

Mr. That is correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. And you were hearing these comments?

Mr. This is all going on at the same time. There's a

lot of commotion, a lot of confusion. However, during that particular

first 10 minutes in the TOC, I called our local guard force commander

to ensure that we have perimeter security and bring everybody in. That

means if they're available, bring them in. I called the bodyguard head

to bring his guys in, whoever was available, and also to make calls

to the different Libyan government entities that can provide security

for the compound in Tripoli.

Mr. Westmoreland. I guess where my confusion is, is who was head

of the, I mean the TOC is the control kind of officer, I guess?

Mr. Right.

Mr. Westmoreland. So there was a TOC officer in Benghazi?

Mr. That's right.

Mr. Westmoreland. And there was an officer, I'm assuming, in

Tripoli?

Mr. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. But that guy was there, and do you know who

he was talking to?

Mr. Personally, no, sir.

Ms. Jackson. But would have been in

charge -- overall responsibility and in charge that night because he

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was the RSO.

Mr. He would have been the incident commander because

he is the RSO, but in charge of the compound itself would be Mr. Hicks

because he's the DCM. So whatever happens, the RSO as the incident

commander has to coordinate with the deputy chief of mission since the

Ambassador is not on the ground.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And so your role that night was really focused on Tripoli?

A That's correct.

Q And the phone call to Benghazi Annex was the only call that

you made?

A That is correct because, at the same time, I was concerned,

and I wanted to know if they were responding to the attack ongoing on

the compound. I also had my contacts.

Q Did you call -- and were those the only contacts you called

that night?

A That was the only individual I called at that time, and he

probably shut the phone and said: Hey, we're taking fire, click.

And that was the last time I called because you can't call if

you're under fire.

Q Does anything else from that night stand out for you?

A Besides the whole commotion, confusion, running around,

checking the walls?

Q Uh-huh.

A At some point during that evening, a decision was made to

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evacuate that compound and take all personnel to the Annex compound,

which is about a mile and half down the road, down the main highway.

Q Do you know who made that decision?

A No, ma'am.

Q But you were a part of making that decision?

A Whatever the RSO tells me to do, that's what I'm going to

do. When he said to secure the compound, whether he tells me that or

not, my first thought is going to be what is it that I can secure here

that's more important. To me it was weapons, ammunition, personnel

and information. So I went to the vault, and we took out all the weapons

and all the ammo and threw it into a Suburban to make sure that we didn't

leave anything for the bad guys.

Q When the decision was made to evacuate the Annex and come

and bring everybody to Tripoli, were you a part of the --

A Evacuate the Embassy.

Q To the Annex, sorry. Were you a part of that decision?

A No.

Q So, subsequent to the attack, how long was everybody in

Tripoli; the evacuees from Benghazi came to Tripoli?

A Are we talking after the attack?

Q After the attack; correct.

A Okay. After the second attack, because we got information

about that, so after everything is over, we are standing by inside the

Annex, and about -- I can't say don't quote me on this, but I'm going

to think I didn't sleep, but I would say early hours because of the

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dawn. The sun was coming out. I would say about 0700, between 0700

and 0800, the DCM, Mr. Hicks, gathers and confirms that both Sean

Stevens, the IMO, and -- excuse me, both the Ambassador, Ambassador

Stevens and Smith, the IMO, are confirmed dead. That's what he said,

and maybe more casualties. And everybody was shell shocked right

there.

Q Did he say anything else about the attack?

A He didn't go into any more details, and if he did, my mind

wasn't on those details. Just on the fact that we had now two confirmed

casualties.

Q Did he happen to mention anything about a protest or

anything like that?

A Nothing like that, no, ma'am.

Q Did you talk to anyone in that timeframe from Benghazi? Did

you happen to talk to any of the ARSOs --

A I had no comms with Benghazi.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q At some point everyone was evacuated from Benghazi and came

to Tripoli. Is that correct?

A Yes, ma'am, it is.

Q Were you part of the contingent that met them at the airport

and brought them to the Annex in Tripoli?

A Yes, I was.

Q Did you have any conversation with any of the agents who

were on the ground in Benghazi.

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A Yes, I did.

Q Did they or anyone else who had been in Benghazi that evening

relate to you what had happened?

A Yes.

Q And who related something to you?

A I spoke with , and he said that he didn't know

where they came from, that he lost the Ambassador, and they were in

the grounds in seconds. He was shell shocked. I don't know if what

he was telling me was accurate or not because, going through one of

those situations, I'm not one to determine whether he was in his right

mind or not.

Q Did you talk with anyone else?

A I spoke with .

Q What did tell you?

A He said the same thing. He said: Man, I saw them coming,

and we just couldn't react.

Q Did you talk with anyone else?

A Besides and , no.

Mr. Westmoreland. Were you in the TOC the whole time in Tripoli

during the first attack and the second attack, the whole time?

Mr. Yes, but with interim times out to make sure the

local guard force was on the ground and make sure we did a whole compound

check. We had to walk the perimeter. We wanted to make sure there

was nobody trying to come up those walls. Then I would come back to

the TOC, and I would go back out.

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Mr. Westmoreland. When the team left Tripoli to go to

Benghazi --

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- and they caught a plane and landed in

Benghazi, then it was about an hour and a half or maybe a 2-hour delay

of them being able to leave the airport in Benghazi to go to the Annex.

Who was supposed to pick them up at the airport? Do you know?

Mr. No, sir. No idea about that.

Mr. Westmoreland. But you knew who the QRF guy was at the Annex.

Correct?

Mr. Which annex, sir, at Benghazi?

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes, in Benghazi. Because you called him to

make sure?

Mr. Yes, sir, he was one of my contacts, yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. But you don't know who the contact

would have been to escort these guys from the airport?

Mr. To the compound.

Mr. Westmoreland. To the compound?

Mr. No, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Was there any conversation going on in there,

in the TOC?

Mr. In the Tripoli TOC?

Mr. Westmoreland. Uh-huh.

Mr. That I'm aware of or that I remember like that, no.

Mr. Westmoreland. So there wasn't anybody calling saying, "Hey,

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we can't get any cover to go"?

Mr. I didn't hear any of that, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So, after the attack, after you met folks at the airport,

they were eventually evacuated to Germany. Were you involved in that

evacuation?

A Yes.

Q Did you help? And you had the conversations. So did you

remain in Tripoli after they left to go to Germany?

A Yes, ma'am, I did.

Q And what sort of conversations occurred with regard to the

attack after they left, if any?

A Well, none of the individuals involved in the attack

remained in Tripoli.

Q Right. But, with RSO did you have a conversation

with him about the attack?

A There was a lot of conversation. I can't tell you verbatim

what the conversations were, but they were not typical "Let's go out

for coffee." It was just a whole: Hey, what the hell just happened?

Q Did anything stand out from those conversations?

A You know what --

Q From what he heard and what he then conveyed to you?

A He said: Hey, be ready to go back to the airport. We're

going to get, you know, support coming in.

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We started discussing this FAST team coming in. He said: Be

aware of all these individuals. You're on the ground now.

There were no other RSOs except for the TDYers. We needed them

in the TOC for security. We weren't going to leave any of the gates

without armed personnel because we didn't have armed personnel. None

of the guards were armed. So it was on the TDYers. So I got ready

to take the convoy back to the airport to pick up the Marines.

Q And brought them back to --

A That's right. We brought them back. We went right to the

Annex because the Embassy was still red zone. So, once in the Annex,

we spoke with the captain, and he said: All right, I want to go and

clear the compound because we got to bring these people back.

So I went with the Marines, and we cleared the Tripoli compound.

There was no penetration into the compound. No one came in through

the gates. Everything was just like we left it other than, of course,

the burnt paper and whatever it is. There was no hostiles in the area.

There was nothing. The perimeter security was being held by the

Ministry of Defense, which were the Zintanis. They had big guns. They

brought out an army almost. It was probably about 50, 60 guys manning

the whole perimeter. So we came back with the Marines, did a whole

compound check. And, once we cleared it, we decided to bring everybody

back the next day.

Q Were you involved at all with the FBI. Were you a point

of contact with the FBI coming in to do their investigation?

A

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, I had

nothing to do with the FBI.

Ms. Betz. So we'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

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Mr. Desai. Let's go back on the record. The time is

approximately 1:46.

Agent good afternoon.

Mr. Good afternoon, sir.

Mr. Desai. Let me reintroduce myself. I'm Ronak Desai. I am

one of the counsels with the Democratic staff. I am joined today by

my colleagues Heather Sawyer --

Mr. Ma'am.

Mr. Desai. -- and Kendal Robinson.

Mr. Ma'am.

Mr. Desai. And on behalf of the entire minority, we want to thank

you first for your appearance here today and also want to thank you

for your service. You have a very distinguished record, and we're very

grateful for your time and what you've done.

Mr. Thank you, sir.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. DESAI:

Q Let's jump right into this. One of the things that you said

in the last session that struck me was that, you know, you believe in

what you do, you believe in the job, and that if you can get the job

done, you'll do it. And, in those instances where you can't, you can't

in the context of security. And I think you were saying this with

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respect to the July 7 election when you provided security and did all

this advance work and took the PO around.

And it appears as if that sentiment was consistent with what

happened in the June 2012 ops trip, where there was this plan to

effectively drive from Tripoli to Benghazi to drop off some equipment,

and it appears that you and your team were monitoring the security

situation, amending the security plan as necessary. And at some point,

you guys received some very specific intelligence and there were some

developments with respect to some militia fighting. And as a result,

there was a call that was made that effectively resulted in the trip

being cancelled. Is that right?

A That's correct.

Q So security was a primary reason for the trip being

cancelled?

A Absolutely.

Q And who makes that call? Is that something that you do

unilaterally, is there a group of folks?

A You can't really make unilateral decisions, especially in

a setting like that, because security is not only through the RSO and,

say, the Diplomatic Security staff, but also through local law

enforcement, whether it's the military, whether it's the police, and

also other military assets that we may have in country. So it's not

just, Hey, we're going. No. You have to ensure that everyone is on

the same page so that if something happens, you have enough assets on

the ground to respond.

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Q So the decision to cancel -- or the decision to put on the

trip and the decision to cancel are collective decisions --

A That's correct.

Q -- that are based on security? And once that decision was

made to cancel that trip, did you ever get any pushback? Was there

anyone that disagreed with the decision, that challenged the decision,

or were folks generally supportive on the ground of that ultimate call?

A That comes down to the folks on the ground deciding whether

we can move or we cannot move, whether what we need or not need, it

has to come from the ground.

Q So folks in Tripoli, folks even in D.C. were just supportive

and agreed with your collective assessment that the trip should be

cancelled?

A Pretty much on that, yes.

Q Okay. If I can refocus your attention to exhibit 6, and

this is one of the documents that my colleagues in the last hour had

introduced. And my colleagues in the last hour reviewed with you

various paragraphs. One portion of the document that I wanted to

refocus your attention was the first paragraph of exhibit 6, the very

first paragraph. And if you could just take a few moments to read that

first paragraph.

A Okay.

Q Great. One thing that you conveyed to us in the last

session was that the way these cables are written is that there's

initial drafts that are authored by someone like yourself that are in

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the Embassy that are involved with security, the Ambassador then gets

involved with the draft, but ultimately, the final version will not

be sent out without the concurrence of the Ambassador. Is that right?

A That is correct.

Q So he has the final signoff?

A He has to have the final signoff, him or the DCM, depending

on who is the Chief of Mission at that particular point in time.

Q So the DCM or the Ambassador. Very good. If you recall,

with this specific cable, exhibit 6, how involved was Ambassador

Stevens in its drafting?

A That, I don't recall. My direct concern with this

particular document was with the RSO after conducting assessment with

other security folks on the ground, but after that, I don't go beyond

that. That's the RSO and the Chief of Mission.

Q And would it be fair to say that if the Ambassador has any

feedback, any thoughts, wants to make any changes, that those changes

will be incorporated into a draft, which will then be reflected in the

final version?

A Well, again, I cannot talk about the Ambassador. If the

Ambassador feels that he cannot agree with this draft, then it's not

sent out.

Q Okay. So I had -- I would focus your attention to the first

paragraph. And what this first paragraph says is there's requests for

various things, security-related personnel for Tripoli. And the

second sentence here says: Post assesses a minimum of 13 TDY U.S.

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security personnel, either DS MSD, domestically assigned HT-trained

DS agents, DS SPS, or DOD/SST personnel, or a combination of these

personnel, are required to maintain current transportation security

and incident response capability while we transition to a locally based

security support structure.

Now, the way I read this is that you've enumerated, or the cable

enumerates several things that are going to be required for security,

and it's some combination thereof. So it's not necessarily saying we

absolutely need X number of DS agents and X number of DOD SST, but here

are the numbers generally. We want to provide you with the flexibility

to provide us with some combination thereof of these security related

personnel. Is that right?

A The number that we have here is just minimum requirements.

Q Yes.

A Obviously, if it was up to the RSO through me, I request

100 personnel.

Q Right.

A But we know we can't get that just based on the fact that

we just don't have that personnel. So what we're looking for in this

cable is officers that have experience or that have gone through a

certain training. For example, DS MSD -- that's most secure

deployments -- that is your top of the line DS agents that are trained

an additional academy, basically, because it's 6 months. The HT is

the high-threat training course, which when I went through it, like

I said, was between 5, 6 weeks, if I can recall, for DS agents. The

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DS SPSers, those are the security specialists that came out of places

like Baghdad, Kabul, Islamabad, that used to be contractors that stayed

incorporated into a DS mission specifically for the reason we don't

want them to be contractors. And DOD/SST, those were those personnel

that were already on the ground.

So basically saying if you give us a minimum of these individuals

with this training, we can support operations.

Q Okay. So it's: If you give us these numbers with this

training, we can support operations, and it can be the portion that

says or a combination of these personnel --

A Absolutely.

Q We leave up to you what combination of these folks.

A As long as they are trained --

Q Right.

A -- like this, in this particular scenario, yes, we can do

this operation.

Q Okay. If I can now refocus your attention to the night of

the attacks themselves. And, again, this is a topic that my

colleagues -- oh, please.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Just before we leave this, I'm just -- I know you talked

a little bit about it in the last hour.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Were you then involved in the subsequent discussions about

kind of what combination and who would be sent and when they would be

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sent?

A Yes, ma'am, I was.

Q Okay. And who did you have those conversations with?

A With the RSO.

Q Okay. And do you recall how it was worked out?

A Specifically, no, but our discussions would be just like:

Hey, I'm your assistant. This is what I'm asking you for, you know.

My primary concern with the Embassy in Tripoli and Benghazi was

having enough personnel that were trained to conduct the security

operations. We needed to stand up a local guard force, which we're

still working on during this time. I mean, we were still working on

it when I left. The bodyguards and a sustainment of training, we just

don't train you, and then put you on the side, give you a gun and go

out. No. You have to sustain the training.

So, in order to do that while the Embassy was being built up,

whether the walls, whether the perimeters, we needed this type of

individual to be there to help us.

Q And you were working primarily with Mr. at the

time, or who --

A Well, this particular cable, Mr. was still on the

ground, yes.

Q And those efforts would have, then, continued after

Mr. went with Mr. ?

A Absolutely. It would have been taken over by the new RSO,

.

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Q And were those efforts amongst your staff and the folks

working on it supportive and collaborative?

A Yes.

Q And did you -- did you feel that way throughout the range

of folks you were working with on trying to get the appropriate

staffing?

A Yeah. I mean, the -- in regards to getting all of this

together, the RSO that was leaving, who had started to put this whole

work together in concurrence with the new RSO, everybody was on the

same page. The new RSO didn't really change any of this. He actually

built on it.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q So to refocus your attention to the night of the

attacks -- and my colleagues got into some of this with you, and if

I ask a question that you've already answered, apologies. It's just

to clarify for the purposes of the record.

So the attacks began. You described the atmosphere in the TOC

as there was commotion going on, folks were rushing in as this is

unfolding. And I believe, and please correct me if I'm mistaken, you

said in the last session that you made one phone call to personnel in

Benghazi. Is that right?

A To the QRF at the Annex in Benghazi.

Q So it was one phone call to the QRF in the Annex located

in Benghazi?

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A That is correct.

Q Did you make any phone calls to any American personnel in

Benghazi on this evening?

A Just the first call that I made to at 7:30

that night.

Q Right. And that was before the attack had begun. Is that

right?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. So there were no discussions or phone calls with

anyone -- American personnel -- on the night of the attack?

A No.

Q To the extent that you can talk about that phone call you

had with the members of the QRF at the Annex in Benghazi, did they ever

indicate to you that they would not go to assist the mission that was

currently being attacked by -- that was under attack that evening?

A No. It was a short call: Hey, hey, we're taking fire.

We're getting fire.

Q And that's all they said?

A That's it. So that tells me that they were taking fire.

Q Right.

A I wasn't going to call back.

Q Fair enough.

Another thing that you indicated in the last session was that this

commotion's beginning in the TOC and you then focus your attention on

Tripoli's security, that your primary priority at that point becomes

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ensuring that Mission Tripoli is safe, that the post there is safe and

secure. Is that right?

A That's correct.

Q And one reason behind that was because your concern was

you've gotten this phone call at 7:30 that same evening about possible,

I think the term you used was spillover, that there could be spillover

from Cairo to Libya, which is what prompted you to phone Benghazi in

the evening to say, Hey, be aware of this. And now that Benghazi has,

in fact, been attacked, your concern is about spillover from Benghazi

to Tripoli. Is that fair?

A No. And the call was not at 7:30. I got a call about 7:15.

Q Okay.

A I called the ARSO in Benghazi at 7:30. It's not about a

spillover at Tripoli. As a security officer, if I feel that one post

is under attack, automatically I'm going to assume that we're all under

attack. You're attacking one of my compounds, you basically have

something else in mind.

So I am not in Benghazi. I am in Tripoli. I need to ensure that

Tripoli is safe and secure. So my focus from those initial calls and

the initial entry into the TOC then -- went back to the Tripoli compound.

That's when we called the local guard force commander, the Ambassador,

Protective Detail, our FSNIs, who are Foreign Service National

Investigators: Hey, get everybody onboard, let's go, let's go, let's

go. I mean, there is no, you know, what-ifs. It's happening.

Q Right. So that's the assumption you make, and you then

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initiate -- or take a number of steps to ensure the safety of Tripoli.

Is it reasonable for Washington to take a similar perspective;

that is, they're getting information from the TOC in Benghazi or the

TOC in Tripoli that one attack is now taking place in Benghazi, it's

reasonable for them to make the same assumption that this could also

take place in Tripoli as well?

A I wouldn't know, because I don't know what D.C. is watching

or what they're hearing or what they're going -- I can only attest to

what's going on in Tripoli.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So just about the call that you had made to your contact

in Benghazi, you said it was a QRF at the Annex. Was that a QRF who

was a member of the February 17th? Like, who are the QRF contacts that

you have?

A No. The QRF's are American personnel.

Q So it was an American --

A That's correct.

Q -- person that you had called? I --

A Right.

Q -- misunderstood that based on --

A Both the QRF in Benghazi at that Annex and the QRF in Tripoli

at the Annex are Americans. Our QRF inside our compound were Martyrs

Brigade individuals. We are the only ones that had those inside our

compound.

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Q And do you recall the approximate time that you made that

call to U.S. personnel who were acting as QRF?

A In Benghazi?

Q In Benghazi to the mission.

A I would say about 2200 hours.

Q And, at that point, their response was just a quick, we're

taking fire?

A We are getting -- we're under fire. Shots fired. You

know, it -- the -- all I heard was bullets going and the gentleman

screaming. I said, good to go. He hanged up the phone. I never

called back.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q I will redirect your attention again. If we can now talk

about the Accountability Review Board. When was the first time you

learned that Secretary Clinton had convened the Accountability Review

Board in response to the attack in Benghazi?

A That is a good question. I don't have an exact date --

Q Okay.

A -- but it was some time after maybe a few days after the

attack and after all the personnel had left to Frankfurt.

Q Okay.

A All the personnel that were involved or nonessential

personnel left for Frankfurt.

Q Okay. And what was your understanding of the purpose of

the ARB?

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A Well, there was an email that came out and said: Hey, you

know -- the basic email, and I don't know verbatim -- again, you know,

we're going to investigate, you know, the -- what happened this evening

or whatever happened that night, and come up with a conclusion, like

a normal ARB. I mean, it's not the first one. That's basically what

we do when we have an incident of this nature.

Q Okay. And did you speak with the ARB?

A Yes, I did.

Q And do you recall approximately when you spoke with them?

A That's a good question, too, sir. I'm sorry. I don't have

exact dates.

Q No.

A But I did speak with them via VTC.

Q VTC just for the record is?

A Video teleconference. So I didn't go back to D.C. for the

ARB. I did the ARB interview at post via teleconference.

Q So it was done remotely?

A I'm sorry?

Q It was done remotely?

A That is correct.

Q And do you recall who you spoke with and who was present

when you did this over VTC?

A I don't recall their names. And I tell can you it was

approximately about five folks, and it was something like this, five

individuals sitting in front of a conference table, big glass behind

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them, and right in front. That's about it. I don't remember their

names. And I'm sure they introduced themselves, I'm just -- I'm sorry.

Q No problem.

Once you spoke with the ARB, did you find that the Accountability

Review Board was receptive to what you had to tell them and receptive

to the information that you provided them during your VTC?

A Well, I read the ARB report, but it's a report based on a

lot of interviews and conclusions. I mean, there's -- I can't say:

Hey, I said that, it's in there. I couldn't tell you.

Q No, no. Fair enough. And --

A But, based on their whole conclusion, it appears that they

took everybody's interview and incorporated it into the report.

Q So you never felt as if they weren't receptive to what you

had to say. Forget about the report generally, but even during your

VTC with them, you felt --

A Well --

Q -- as if they were listening and intent?

A -- I believe that they took what maybe I said, and I saw

it in the ARB. And one of the things that I said was that you needed

to have experienced agents, which is basically what we requested, for

posts like these, PSB or high-threat posts, which are HTP posts.

Q Okay. And you just mentioned that you read the

unclassified version of the report?

A That's correct.

Q And at least for -- from what you just articulated, you felt

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as if it did reflect some of the things that you --

A It's been a while since I read that report. I couldn't tell

you if I remember the first sentence or the last. It's a long report,

and it's been almost 2 years.

Q Sure.

A I'm sorry.

Q And the portion -- that experience that you just were

talking about --

A I do recall that because that was incorporated into that

report.

Q Okay. And you felt as if you were fully forthcoming with

the ARB?

A Yes, I was.

Q And you didn't withhold any information from the ARB?

A None at all.

Q And did you ever withhold any information from Congress in

connection with this attack in Benghazi?

A No.

Q At any point, Agent were you ever asked or ordered

not to provide information to the ARB?

A No, sir.

Q And you were never asked or ordered not to provide

information to Congress at any point. Is that right?

A No, sir.

Q One of the things that my colleagues discussed with you in

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the last session focused on some of the staffing issues that the

mission in Benghazi was experiencing at various points during the

year, and this was one of the areas that the ARB also examined and looked

into. And the ARB made a number of findings that directly sought to

address the staffing issue that was taking place in Benghazi and made

a number of recommendations in connection with that. And, again,

something that just stuck out at me from the last session, if I can

redirect your attention to exhibit 7. And if I can turn your attention

to page 2, and at the top of that page, it appears that there's an email

being sent from yourself to and to . Is

that right?

A That is correct, sir.

Q And if you could just, let's see, read for me what's

effectively the fourth paragraph starting with, "I will advise"?

A I will advise a senior agent be sent here as acting RSO for

at least 60-day TDYs to have some type of continuity and overall

supervision of the security situation on the ground.

Q Wonderful. And this was, in your view, a way to address

and mitigate some of the staffing issues that were taking place and

to really help encourage continuity in between TDY assignments. Is

that right?

A Yes, and furthermore, to have someone with experience based

on that particular compound. This compound, in my opinion, and this

is why I sent this email, should not have just TDYers staffing it.

Q It should be folks with more experience?

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A Or in --

Q In requisite --

A Permanent RSO on the ground.

Q And the reason I just found that striking was because the

ARB made a handful of recommendations in connection to staffing

shortages. One of the things that it recommended was that it, you

know -- well, first of all, it endorsed the Department's request for

increased DS personnel for high- and critical-threat posts and for

additional mobile security deployment teams as well as an increase in

DS domestic staffing in support of such an action.

The other thing the ARB said is that it recommended that key policy

program and security personnel should be assigned for a minimum of

1 year and a minimum of 120 days for temporary-duty assignments. And

it sounds in a lot of ways that if you were -- you're on top of this,

you know, several months even before the ARB came out. So, based on

what the ARB has recommended here, do you think what they've enumerated

would be helpful in addressing some of these staffing shortages and

promoting experienced agents, having continuity there on the ground?

A For a PSB post or an HTP post, based on that, yes.

Q Okay. Are there any other recommendations that you think

we should think about or we should consider with respect to staffing

shortage?

A Hire another 5,000 agents.

Q Yep.

A But that's not up to me, sir.

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120

Q Okay. I'm going to switch gears now. We've come to the

end. I'm going to go over -- I'm going to ask you about a series of

allegations that have been made in connection with the Benghazi

attacks. And these allegations have been made publicly, and it's my

understanding that the Select Committee has been looking into these

allegations for quite a bit of time. And, as a result, we ask every

witness that we interview about these allegations. There is a handful

of them. And the way that I want to proceed is I will convey to you

what the allegation is and then I'll ask you whether or not you have

any information or any evidence that would support the allegation. And

if you do not, we'll just move on to the next one until we finish.

A Okay, sir.

Q Great. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta to stand down. It has been alleged

that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally blocked military action

on the night of the attacks. One Congressman has speculated that

Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down, and this resulted

in the Defense Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No, sir.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No, sir.

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121

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact checker evaluated this claim and give it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A Sorry, sir. I got thrown over the Pinocchios.

Mr. Evers. Do you want him to repeat the allegation?

Mr. I'm sorry. I just -- I got lost in that.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q The Pinocchios are confusing, yeah.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No, sir.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No, sir.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Colonel Qadhafi to

his own people in order to garner support for military operations in

Libya in spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Colonel Qadhafi to

his own people in order to garner support for military operations in

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122

Libya in spring 2011?

A No, sir.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms

from Libya to Syria and that they found no support for this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A I don't know anything about that, sir.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A I don't have any information about that either, sir.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the special mission compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to stand down, but that instead there were tactical disagreements on

the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no standdown order to

CIA personnel?

874
123

A Not at all, sir.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A Which annex are we talking about, sir, Tripoli or Benghazi

Annex?

Q The Annex in Benghazi.

A Can you repeat the question now?

Q Sure. So putting aside whether you personally agree with

the decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision,

do you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No, sir.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No evidence, sir.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

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124

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A Not that I'm aware of, sir.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No, sir.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons, and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that "the CIA faithfully performed our duties in

accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship."

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No, sir.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No, sir.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

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125

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No, sir.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that

President -- that the President was virtually AWOL as Commander in

Chief or missing in action on the night of the attacks?

A I wasn't there with the President, sir.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down. Military officials have stated that those four

individuals were instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to

provide security and medical assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that there was no standdown order issued to U.S.

military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion the House

Armed Services Committee report that there was no standdown order

issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the

fight in Benghazi?

A None, sir.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

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126

assets on the night of the attack that could have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard Buck McKeon, the former chairman

the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the attacks,

after which he stated, given where the troops were, how quickly things

all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have

done more than we did.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Chairman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No, sir.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

been -- that could have saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership

intentionally decided not to deploy them?

A Not that I'm aware of, sir.

Mr. Desai. Unless my colleagues have anything else.

Ms. Sawyer. I think we're set.

Mr. Desai. Thank you very much for your time, sir.

We can now go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 2:18 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #13

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 21, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel

BRENT WOOLFORK, Minority Senior Professional Staff

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

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Mr. Grider. Let's go on the record.

I'm going to read through some information here, a prelude here.

This is a transcribed interview of Agent

conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview

is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation

into the attacks on U.S. Diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and

related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress

and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Special Agent , could you please state your full name for

the record.

Mr. . .

Mr. Grider. On behalf of the committee, we're happy that you're

here today. We appreciate you coming.

My name is Mark Grider. I'm one of the counsel on the committee's

majority staff. And we're going to take a moment and go around the

room and let everybody introduce themselves.

Ms. Jackson. Good morning. I'm Sharon Jackson. I'm also one

of the counsels on the majority staff.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff as well.

Ms. Barrineau. I'm Sara Barrineau with the majority staff.

Mr. Desai. Ronak Desai with the minority staff.

Mr. Woolfork. Brent Woolfork of the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Mr. Grider. So these are some general ground rules, and

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4

sometimes they move a little bit just based on timing. But, generally,

the way the questioning proceeds is that a member from the majority

will ask questions first for up to an hour. We may not do that hour

timeframe. We may go on. But we'll figure that out.

And then minority will have an option to ask questions for an equal

period of time, if they so choose. Questions may only be asked by a

member of the committee or a designated staff member. We'll rotate

back and forth until -- we possibly will rotate back and forth. We'll

figure that out.

So let me move to sort of the testimony aspects. During your

career as possibly a law enforcement officer, you may have testified

in a deposition or in Federal court. This is a little different.

The committee format is not bound by the Rules of Evidence. So

we may ask your opinion on things. We may ask hearsay. And all of

that is admissible in a transcribed interview before the congressional

committee.

Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes.

Mr. Grider. At any time you or your counsel may raise objections

for privilege subject to review by the chairman of the committee. If

these objections cannot be resolved in this interview, the witness can

be required to return for a deposition or hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. This has

not been an issue we encountered in the past, but I'll make sure you're

934
5

clear on the process.

This session is to begin as unclassified. If any questions call

for a classified answer, please let us know. We'll reserve that answer

until we move into a classified setting or you can talk to your counsel

during the break and we can sort of figure it out from there.

In preparing for your interview, I don't believe any of my

questions will go into classified information, based on the documents

that I reviewed. But if you feel it does, please feel free to confer

with your counsel.

As you know, you're welcome to confer with your counsel at any

time that you'd like. But if something needs to be clarified, we ask

that you make this known to me. If you need to discuss anything with

your counsel, we'll go off the record, stop the clock, and provide you

this opportunity.

We'll also take a break whenever it's convenient for you. This

can be after every hour of questioning. It can be in 30 minutes. It

can be in 5 minutes. So we just want to make sure that you're

comfortable. So if you ever need a break, just let us know. We'll

stop. Once again, during the round of questioning, if you need to go

to the facilities, if you need a cup of coffee, please just let us know.

As you can see, to your right an official reporter is taking down

everything you say and I say to make a written record. So we ask that

you give verbal responses to all questions, yes and no, as opposed

to -- you know, I think some of us do nods of the head or whatever.

So I'm going to ask the reporter -- I think I told her this

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6

before -- please feel free to jump in if you do not respond, if you

give nonverbal responses, or if I'm talking way too fast. So she'll

let us know if we're doing things correctly.

Also, we should try not to talk over each other so it's easier

to get a clear record. We want you to answer our questions in the most

complete and truthful manner possible. We'll take our time and repeat

or clarify our questions, if necessary. If you have any questions or

don't understand any of our questions, we'll be happy to clarify those

points.

As you know, we want a clear understanding of what you know from

your time in Benghazi, Libya. So we're going to ask you to give us

your best recollection. We fully understand that a few years have

passed so that things may not be crystal clear. So feel free take your

time.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question, if you do

not remember it, it's best not to guess. Please give us your best

recollection. And if there are things you do not know or can't

remember, just say so, and please inform us to the best of your

knowledge. And you may be able to provide a complete answer to the

question at a later point or something to that effect.

Do you understand that you have an obligation to answer questions

from Congress truthfully?

Mr. . I do.

Mr. Grider. This also applies to questions posed by a

congressional staff in an interview.

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7

Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes.

Mr. Grider. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements.

Do you understand that?

Mr. . I do.

Mr. Grider. Is there any reason you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. . No.

Mr. Grider. Okay. I believe that's the end of my preamble.

We always like to give the minority a chance. Anything?

Ms. Sawyer. We're set.

Mr. Grider. Excellent.

Mr. Grider. Okay. The clock reads 9:08. Okay.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Do you mind if I say "Agent "? Is that the best?

A That's fine. Whatever.

Q Agent , can you just give us just your law

enforcement -- your background history before prior to DS.

A I have a bachelor's in criminal justice from .

Former Marine, U.S. Marine Corps. I was in the infantry, and then I

was in the MSG program, Marine Security Guard Program.

Q What years? Can you give me that just so I have a --

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8

A Sure. College, . Marine Corps, . I was in

Kuwait when the African bombings took place. So I put my application

in with Diplomatic Security at that time. So I ES'd in January 1999

and started Diplomatic Security in of 1999.

Since I've been in Diplomatic Security, I started out in the

Dallas resident office. I was there for a year. I went to the

Secretary's protective detail for 3 years, guarded Secretary Albright

and Secretary Powell.

I went to , as the Assistant Regional Security

Officer in 2003. I curtailed from there after about a year and a half

to serve in in 2005 as the Deputy of the High Threat Protection

Office. I served a year there. And then I went to the Joint

Terrorism Task Force, and I served in for 3 years.

I then moved and then moved myself to

and became the RSO in for a year. I returned

to and served 2 years in the resident office. And

while I was in is when I did the TDY to Benghazi.

Q Two questions.

I understand 2003 you were in --

A Sorry.

Q That's fine. That's fine.

I just want to know -- you were on the Secretary's detail with

Albright and Powell.

What timeframe was that?

A 2000 to 2003.

938
9

Q Okay.

A So I went back into Secretary Albright's tenure and then

did the transition.

Q Okay.

A And then was May '05 to '06. And then would

have been May '06 to May '09. And then would have been '9

to '10. And was '10 to '12.

And then I was the Assistant Special Agent in Charge in .

I got to go up there and deal with the from 2012 to

2014. And then I came to , July of 2014.

Q I'm always going to pause a little bit because I have an

excellent co-counsel here that's helping me.

Mr. Grider. Anything that you need clarification on that

timeline? Okay.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So let's -- very impressive service. And not just

impressive, but we really appreciate your service on a number of key

issues here.

But I want to direct your attention to sort of your time in

Benghazi. You were in in 2010. Is that correct? Can you

tell us, how did the Benghazi assignment come about? Was it TDY? Just

if you can start with that piece.

A Yeah. At that time, Benghazi was relatively fresh, and

they were looking -- headquarters would send out emails soliciting TDY

support.

939
10

If I remember correctly, I was slotted for -- UNGA was in that

time period, U.N. General Assembly in New York. So I had already been

slotted for a detail there.

And I think I got an email from one of my partners in crime from

headquarters asking if I would be interested in going to Benghazi for

a short duration. So I figured it seemed interesting, and I didn't

have to wear a suit. So I chose to go to Benghazi.

Q By any chance, do you recall who --

A It was someone from one of our headhunters, one of our IP

desktop servers. I don't recall the name.

Q Okay. Can you give me the dates that you accepted, and then

sort of -- can you walk us through sort of the process. And

approximate. I mean, I think I recall the time that you were there.

A Yeah. I arrived in Benghazi on or about mid-September, the

12th, 15th, something like that.

Q Of 2011?

A Of 2011.

It was a pretty quick turnaround time, if I remember. Because,

like I said, I was already slotted for UNGA and I had to pull chocks

to do this different assignment. So it was a pretty fast -- you know,

get your passport ready and pack out.

I didn't have to pack much, but I had to get some gear and reach

that post. So it would have been maybe a month window tops prior to

that, so August.

Q Perfect. So three things with that.

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11

Can you just sort of tell me just generally the gear that you

packed to get ready to go. Can you tell me how you got there, sort

of once we're in country. Then we can go from there.

A There was a bit of an anomaly with my gear issue. I guess

we'll call it that. Leaving , I wasn't able to bring my

high-threat gear. So I ended up leaving it in for my

successor.

So when I went to , I didn't figure I was going to need

the high-threat gear. Who would have thought about the recent riots

in , though?

But, nonetheless, when the Benghazi thing came downrange, I

reached out to DAV. DAV is our, for lack of a better term, defensive

equipment, armored vehicle program. That's where we get all of our

body armor and stuff like that, helmets.

So I reached out to a friend there to see if I could get a

supplemental pack just to go to Benghazi. So I was in the process of

that. And then, in my coordination with Benghazi at the time, my

predecessor, he advised that there was sufficient gear there that I

could mooch from.

I think there was a hiccup in the shipment of the gear. Something

got lost in the sauce or UPS misplaced it or something. So I ended

up going in without it. But I had -- like I said, there was gear in

country.

Now, that said, I didn't go straight to Benghazi. I went to -- I

want to say Souda Bay or Crete. It was one of the military bases out

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12

there. That was our hub. So I was there for a couple days and then

took one of our flights -- our support flights into Benghazi 3 or 4

days later.

Q Excellent.

One last thing before we get in country. You had mentioned that

you had contacted someone at post when you were at St. Louis.

Do you recall who?

A Email? Just email through my successor -- or my

predecessor was .

Q And what -- . What was his title?

A He was who I was following. So at the time I thought I was

going to be an AIC, agent in charge, of the presidential envoy at the

time. But I think there -- we call ourselves RSOs over there, but he

was a senior agent there.

Q All right. Very good.

When you landed in Benghazi, what was your first impression?

What was your sense? You've done -- you've been in a number of

different countries. What was sort of your first impression or your

thoughts?

A I guess the same that I got in other environments, similar

to . You know, it's not Kansas. I can tell you that.

It seemed like we had -- I don't recall how to place it. It was

normal. I didn't have any -- no sense of alarm at the time when I got

there. And literally left. I met him at the airport.

So we basically did a little handoff at the airport. He gave me

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13

his helmet. I took it. He hopped on a plane, and I went on to post.

Q Did he give you any turnover notes or anything else?

A We had a few emails exchanged, just kind of a baseline of

what the day-to-day operations were. Nothing too elaborate. We had

maybe 10 agents there at the time. So each person had their own, I

would say agenda, programs.

Q Let's walk through -- so let's go in country.

Can you sort of walk me through who was there. Who were the

employees? Were they all DS?

A No. We had, I think, 10 agents, counting myself. We had

the Envoy, Ambassador Stevens. We had a political officer. I don't

recall his name. We had an IMO. I can't think of his name either.

And then we had -- I can't think of the name either, but there

was a guy there for , whatever it was, some kind of a -- he was

there to support some kind of or something.

Q ?

A . I don't remember if it

was a White House thing or a congressional thing, but he was out there

to support and -- what's the word I'm looking

for? --

.

Q So that sort of covers the State employees, generally.

?

A ?

Q .

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14

A ?

Q Yeah. At the compound. Or let's say in Benghazi, to your

knowledge.

Mr. Evers. To the extent you can answer in an unclassified

setting.

Mr. .

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q I want to back up real quick.

Did you take high-threat -- are you familiar with the term

"high-threat training"?

A Uh-huh.

Q Did you have a chance to --

A Yes. I took one of the initial high-threat training

courses in '05 prior to , 8 weeks. And then, prior to ,

I took another -- a refresher course from mid- to senior level, which

is about 4 or 5 weeks. So that would have been in '09. And I hadn't

taken it since. '09 was the latest I had.

Q Okay. Very good.

There are some terms that I've just read that I don't know. So

I'm just going to ask you.

Are you familiar with the term SPS?

A Uh-huh.

Q Can you explain to me, who are they? What do they do?

A SPS is a contingent of Diplomatic Security. They're not

944
15

agents, but they're -- Special Protective Services I think they're

called. They're given credentials. They're not given badges, I

think.

It was kind of a way -- this is my recollection of the program.

It was a method that we were bringing in, I would say, more senior

personnel to cover what we traditionally would have done as

contractual.

So, like, not phasing Blackwater and DynCorp and Triple Canopy

out, but this was a component to bring in some of those personnel, those

skill types, under the State Department or Diplomatic Security

umbrella, give us a little better management tool than sending them

to a contracting arm, a lot cheaper.

Those personnel go to high threat. That's all they do. They go

to high-threat arenas and do close protection and then they supplement

the RSO shop.

Q So they're similar to contractors like Blackwater, I mean,

security --

A The concept was that they're similar to. I mean, the fact

that we pulled them away from the Blackwater arm or the DynCorp arm,

they had the skill sets. They're very similar to us.

It gets their foot in the door. It's a lot easier to get into

the SPS arm. And then a lot of them actually come onboard with us,

become agents down the road.

It at least gets their foot in the door. It gives them a

government paycheck. It's a little bit more actually fulfilling than

945
16

a contractual basis where they can get pulled anytime.

Q Sure.

In your mind, what was their primary purpose? I mean, is it

security?

A From my understanding of the program, it's primarily close

protection. So they're augmenting what a regional security officer

would do in a high-threat environment.

We put a lot of ownership on close protection under the SPS

umbrella. That's their purview. That's their specialty. When they

go through basic SPS course, that's all it is. It's geared towards

high-threat and close protection.

Q When you were present there, was there anyone from SPS?

A Two of my 10 were SPS. I didn't delineate them between us

and them.

Q Sure.

But State-wide, from a personnel perspective with respect to the

State Department, if anybody said, "Raise your hand if you're a DS

agent," would they raise their hands?

A Yes.

Q They would?

A Yes. Well, if they didn't raise their hand, I'd make them.

Q Sure. Fair enough. I understand.

But there was a distinction between a DS agent and essentially --

A From my understanding, there is a distinction. Yes. It's

all personality-driven.

946
17

Q Sure. Fair enough.

To your knowledge, do you know, once you got into 2012 -- and I

realize that you left in 2011 -- this is more just wondering if you

know this or not -- do you know if SPS was continued or do you know

if they sort of stopped the SPS program at some point?

Mr. Evers. Do you mean in Benghazi or across DS?

Mr. Grider. In Benghazi.

Mr. . I don't know what -- manpower-wise, I don't know

who they -- would have filled those positions.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So during your time, the two individuals with SPS, when you

left, were they still there?

A I believe one was still there when I left, if I remember.

They were TDY'd as well. So they were TDY'd from where ever. I think

Kabul was one of them. One was maybe Iraq or something like that. But

I don't recall. But I think one of them had left.

Q Do you recall those names?

A Yeah. I say yes. Last name was .

Q You said ?

A, .

Q Okay.

A I can't think of the first name offhand.

And the other one was , . , first name.

Q And, as you recall, when you left, was it or that

still remained? If you recall.

947
18

A I don't recall. I think one of them left, and I'm trying

to think who left first. Because there was kind of -- I want to say

mass exodus. But when I left, out of the 10 bodies, we went down to,

I think, 6 right about the same timeframe. So one of them might have

left before me and one left the day after. I don't recall, though.

Q I just want to establish -- I think I know.

But when approximately did you leave in country?

A Right before Halloween in 2011, 30th or 29th, something like

that.

Q Are you familiar with the name ?

A Uh-huh.

Q Can you tell us what you know about him and his role.

A I think, if I recall right, -- I'm much better with

faces. I believe he was kind of our -- what we would have called our

local hire at most embassies.

He would have been kind of our conduit to whatever government

we're in, the TNC or whatever it was in Libya at the time. He was our

eyes and ears, if I remember correctly. In other words, he was wired

for the city, and we would use him as such.

Q You mentioned, obviously, the PO. You mentioned the Envoy.

How much interaction did you have with the PO, the IMO, and the

Envoy?

A I had a lot of interaction with the Envoy. Chris and I

shared a hooch or shared a villa together. The political officer, I

would see him frequently. It was a small compound.

948
19

Q Sure.

A And the IMO as well. We had day-to-day interaction. But

I couldn't tell you the names. I apologize for that.

But, yeah, some of what my office did when we did security for

the political officer, we would go out. And, once again, I'm good with

faces, but I don't remember his name.

Ms. Jackson. Does the name --

Mr. Yep. . Yep. That name rings a bell.

We had USAID there, too, I think. It's coming back to me.

Female. She was there. I mean, people were phasing in and out all

the time. So it was -- but I remember because we used some of their

vehicles, from what I remember.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q I want to say this on the record, I mean, as I continue on

my questions. I fully understand some of these

questions -- obviously, there were four Americans that passed away.

And I'm attempting to gather as much facts and recall as possible.

So I want to tread very lightly about the relationship that you

have, and I fully understand that. So please let me know if you need

to pause or if the question is not coming out correctly. But I want

to do everything with full respect for your service and the four

Americans. So I just want to make sure that that's clear.

A Sure.

Q You mentioned -- in light of that, you mentioned that you

shared a hooch, a villa, with the Ambassador.

949
20

What, if anything, in your own opinion, was the reason why we were

there? Did you have a sense of the purpose of being in Benghazi?

A I guess my sense, from a knuckle-dragger point of view, the

Ambassador -- he was there because, if I recall correctly, he had been

there before, I believe. I'm pretty sure of that.

And then he had had some pretty good contacts. And because of

the way the country was evolving, if you will, at that timeframe, he

seemed like the right person to be breaking bread and establishing a

foothold for the U.S. Government.

My perspective of that, watching him interact, spot on. I think

he had a lot of friends and allies in country, and he knew exactly what

buttons to push during my timeframe there. He was highly regarded.

If anything, it made my job difficult because he was such a -- you

could call him a rock star at the time. Knowing his mission or his

intent and what he was going to get accomplished, it was difficult to

provide a safe passage for him, if you want to call it that. But we

made it happen. We made it work.

Q So can you give me, if you can -- I fully understand what

you're stating of him being sort of a, quote-unquote, rock star and,

from a security standpoint, it was difficult because you have to sort

of discern.

So can you paint the picture a little bit of -- can you think of

a scenario, like he wanted to go X and --

A Well, there was a couple -- I don't remember what exactly

the days were. But there was a couple big days where there was a lot

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21

of Libyan nationals.

He was invited to a couple larger -- I say functions. They were

at a soccer field, so a massive amount of people. Anytime you put that

many people in there, that 10 percent grows and it's difficult to

secure.

And because we didn't have the traditional assets in place as far

as the who's who in police and security infrastructure, we had to kind

of adapt on our own. And there were some times where he wanted to go

to certain things for a certain period of time.

So we would adjust his visits accordingly just to minimize our

time in place, particularly, and if there was a potential threat, to

ensure that they were on their heels instead of on their toes.

You know, after Qadhafi was caught and captured and killed, there

was a lot of hoopla. There was a lot of fireworks, AK-47 rounds being

shot and what have you, but a lot of visitors at the time. And we kind

of welcomed that because I think, from the U.S. Government standpoint,

we were involved with that.

And I understood from his point of view that he needed to be

involved. So we made it work as well. We had a guest list and we

brought people in, and we coordinated with people that we could

coordinate with.

Q Now, I'm not following my traditional outline because I

think what you're telling me is just fascinating and riveting. So I'm

sort of jumping off and just sort of going with what you're telling

me here.

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22

So you had the 10, including yourself, DS agents that I imagine

were doing movements with the Ambassador. Was there a local guard

force, Feb. 17? Was there anybody else assisting from a security

standpoint?

A So we had 10 bodies on compound, nine plus myself. All 10

did not go strictly with the Ambassador at all times. We changed up.

We changed our footprint up and our packages up.

Plus, we had to support the USAID mission there as well as

movements periodically as well as the other general -- I can't think

of his name -- .

The 17th Feb. guys, we only had three, but we used them as best

we could. Traditionally speaking, in the RSO function, we would have

what we would call an FSNI, Foreign Service National Investigator,

there.

It was not an official RSO shop. So we adapted. So I used one

of the upper ranked -- I don't know what his rank was -- but the most

senior of the three -- I used him periodically as a pseudo-FSNI.

Ms. Jackson. And what's the role that an FSNI would play?

Mr. . Well, RSOs are assigned to about 275 posts

worldwide. And so FSNIs -- because we rotate so often, we hire a local

national that is wired to the city. But, normally, he's a former police

officer for that particular country or for the city.

And he is our -- I'd say our eyes and ears, but he also -- he's

the facilitator for whatever we need as far as from the U.S. Government

standpoint, whether it be investigation purposes, supporting the

952
23

AMCITS that come in and get mugged or intel driven, like, "Hey, there's

a potential demonstration coming" or whatever else.

So that's the traditional norm. We normally have one or two per

post. And Benghazi -- because it was somewhat of a quasi-RSO office,

I didn't have that resource or ability. So I used this guy

because -- and there was a transition there. I mean, no one knew who

was who. They seemed to have much more of an arm hold onto Benghazi

itself. So I used him and his counterparts to facilitate movement at

that time.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Do you recall that name?

A If you had a picture.

Q For some reason, I have a name in my head, and this may just

be from .

or anything like that? Does that right --

A was one of them.

Q ?

A I think it's . That might be my Missouri-talk,

too.

Ms. Jackson. Was there another name, ?

Mr. . was another. Yeah.

Ms. Jackson. But neither one of them was the guy in charge.

Mr. . I think was the younger one, if I remember

correctly. I think was the older one. He might have been

the one in charge.

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24

.

But, once again, managing 10, I had an agent that strictly that

was his program. So I didn't have a lot of face-to-face with him other

than when I met with his bosses.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Two questions.

Let's just stay on the Feb. 17. Were you present when that sort

of agreement or arrangement with Feb. 17 sort of came about?

A No. They were there before I got there. So there was

already somewhat of an agreement. Most of our agreements there were

verbal. Might have been just kind of a known entity.

Q To your knowledge, do you recall if there was an MOU or some

type of --

A I know that there was an MOU being drafted, but I don't know

if there was technicalities -- but there were some issues there -- that

we did not sign during my timeframe.

Q So while you were there, do you know if the MOU -- it was

being drafted during your timeframe?

A I know it was being drafted. It wasn't, I would say, high

on our priority list. We were going day to day there, and I was just

hoping to put a roof on their head.

Q And where did the three members of the Feb. 17 -- where were

they located? Where did they stay?

A We initially had them in my hooch. At the villa, there was

a little guard shack, if you want to call it that, a squatter house.

954
25

It had a little kitchenette in there and a patio. But I think

they -- don't quote me on this, but I think we got them moved to a

vacant -- more of a structure, a more villa-oriented house, on the

compound.

Q And were they armed?

A They were armed.

Q Do you recall what --

A What kind? I think AK-47.

Q Just to clarify your role maybe -- and you may have said

this already, but what was your -- so you had the 10.

Were you in charge of the 10?

A Yes.

Q Can you sort of explain just from -- what was sort of the

chain of command? So you came in. Nine people reported up to you.

So can you just sort of walk me through just generally. This is just --

A I think I was just the senior guy there. I was one of those

guys. I volunteered too quickly. I was clearly the senior, time and

service, age, the whole gamut.

As far as the -- like I mentioned earlier, when I got solicited

to go out, I was supposed to be the agent in charge of this detail.

So I assumed -- as you know, you don't want to do that too often -- that

the 10 would be part of my bodyguard staff and that's all I would have

to deal with.

So when I got close to the drop date or the day I arrived, they

basically said, "We don't know how long we're going to be here. So

955
26

we're going to make you the RSO, and we're going to make your number

two the AIC," at which time I tried to get back on the airplane.

But, nonetheless, it was myself and my number two. Rank-wise,

he was senior. He did more of the movement portion with Ambassador

Stevens, but I did the overall security aspects of the job, access

control and all the policy crap.

Q Sure.

Who was the number two -- you made mention of that -- if you

recall?

A .

Q Is he still with DS, to your knowledge?

A Yeah. I couldn't tell you where he's at. He was in

Atlanta, but we move every 2 years.

Q I understand.

I think we covered prior to you going to Benghazi, but let me just

ask this again.

Any intelligence reports? Any reading prior to being in country?

A No. Unfortunately, we were just trying to keep the home

fires burning. So when I got the call saying I was going to go there,

most of my logistics were either curtailing from my UNGA assignment

and/or prepping my family for a 60-day hiatus.

Q What about once you were in country? Any weekly intel

reports? Any documents that you were reading?

A I don't know how weekly. I think it was just sporadically

as needed. The Envoy, he would get reporting from different places,

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27

and he would make me apprised of it when he thought it necessary. I

wasn't in that pipeline, unfortunately. But we had a good relationship

with those that were in country.

Q Sure.

Are you familiar with the SITREP, situation report?

A Uh-huh.

Q Were there ever any prepared? Did you ever have to prepare

any?

A I don't recall during my timeframe anything reaching to the

level of the SITREP. I'm pretty open book. So when something were

to happen, I let headquarters know just to keep them apprised. But

I don't recall any major instances when I was there that reached the

level of what we called a spot report.

Q Spot report. Very good.

When you talked about letting headquarters know, who was sort of

your primary point of contact at headquarters?

A We had what we call a desk officer. My desk officer was

and then .

Q ?

A , or .

Q How often did you communicate with ?

A I think as needed. I didn't -- you know, I wasn't Chicken

Little out there, but I would let him know if there was issues or

considerations to who's arriving when, departure notices, per diem

issues, chow hall issues, things like that. But I didn't have a set

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28

time to coordinate with him.

Q Was it sort of a two-way street? Would he be giving you

information or asking you questions?

A That's what they normally do. Yes.

Q What types of information would he be feeding you?

A Well, most of it had to do with manpower, as far as -- like

I said, because there were 10 of us and we were on these 60-day

rotations, we didn't all rotate at the same time.

So in a given week, I had somebody either coming in or going out.

So a lot of the logistics part of that was coordinated through him.

He would be my point person for requests for whatever upgrades and

whatever as well.

Q Based on your training, experience and -- you know, you

stated there were 10 agents, including yourself, there.

Do you feel like that was too many or would you -- let the record

reflect that the witness raised his eyebrow when I asked that question.

So let's talk manpower. What was your opinion? Did you need

less, did you need more, or the status quo was fine?

A Depending on the day. We were trained to do with what we

had. We can Monday-morning-quarterback it all you want and say we

added extra people. If those people aren't trained properly, then

those 10 people -- you might as well leave them on the airplane.

We made do. The 10 people wasn't based on our footprint in

Benghazi at the time. I think if we would have raised our profile much

more, then it would have been insult to injury.

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29

Q I'm sorry. You would have been what?

A It would have added insult to injury by adding people

because, one, we didn't have the facilities and I think we would have

been stepping on each other. It's much easier to run lean in a place

like that, from my perspective.

Q Sure.

A There's different agents out there that would tell you the

more the merrier. There's other agents who would say "I'd rather go

in there with a team of five." I appreciated the people I had; so,

I used them accordingly.

As we downsized to a lesser number, it's more difficult to run,

keep up with the off-tempo. That's where the 10 bodies kind of helped

because, with additional bodies there, I could farm them out to support

USAID interests or and what have you.

But as you start reducing those resources, then you have to

prioritize your missions. So I don't know. I couldn't tell you what

the golden number is --

Q I understand.

A -- for an environment like that.

Q Good.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You stated that, when you left, the numbers reduced to 6?

A I think it was 6 or 7.

Q Was it going to stay at that level or was it going to go

back up to 10?

959
30

A No one seemed to know. If I recall correctly, we were still

in this situation where we didn't know how long Benghazi was going to

be. Tripoli was kicking off. And so there was a lot of interest in

supporting that. So we were trying to figure out -- or headquarters

was trying to figure out where to prioritize our deficiencies, if you

want to call it that. So no one knows.

I mean, we were planning for the worst, phasing people out and

trying to figure out how best to support the mission there. If I

remember correctly, with the Embassy being opened -- it opened towards

the latter part of my tenure there. So the Envoy lost his,

quote-unquote, status because there was now an Ambassador in country.

And I remember -- I think Ambassador Stevens actually left right

before I did -- I'm pretty sure of that -- for a vacation, but he'd

just gotten appointed as the Ambassador down the road. So nobody

really knew. I think they were going to bring in a political officer,

probably my rank. I'm pretty sure he was my rank. He was going to

be the foothold there in Benghazi for the short term, but no one knew

how long.

And because of that -- my perspective again -- this next person

probably didn't have the rock star status as Ambassador Stevens. So

you're not going to put all your eggs in that basket if your rock star

is moving now as well and if you want to minimize your equipment.

That's why we were kind of doing the dance.

Q So was it your assessment that, when Stevens was there

because of his being well known, that required additional protection?

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31

A I don't know if it required additional protection. I think

at the time when we were there, we were the only active USG role. And

then, once they opened the embassy in Tripoli, he lost that -- I don't

want to say --

Q Focus?

A Well, I don't know if it was focus either. I think he was

still doing what -- he was now being managed by Tripoli. And so, when

you're away from the flagpole, it -- he didn't want to overstep his

bounds when there was an Ambassador in country.

So I'm sure that he took the vacation at the time to figure out

where we, as an embassy -- I'll call it a mission -- what our priorities

were or what our function was.

And I think, for the most part, our priority in Benghazi was just

to be the eyes and ears for that new government that was supposedly

developing there, if I remember right.

Q In your perspective, the Ambassador then needed -- was the

focus as the U.S. Government presence in country?

A In Tripoli?

Q Well, in Libya, just overall.

A Well, I think that's what normally is the case. So, I mean,

you wouldn't want -- you definitely wouldn't want a country with two

Ambassadors in it. I think it would cause some conflict. That's my

perspective.

I know he -- once that opened up, I know that the mission itself

in Benghazi -- they were trying to figure out from a headquarters

961
32

perspective what we were. I mean, looking at the reports, they didn't

know whether to call us a consulate or a mission or whatever, an annex.

I know that they wanted to keep the position there because -- or

they were talking about keeping the position there because of the

foothold we already had and because that was the -- I can't

remember -- the TNC or the government stronghold, if you will, and

figured that was a good, influential place to be, but no one knew how

long.

Q And was the Envoy part of those discussions back at Main

State regarding what was the future of Benghazi?

A I couldn't tell you that. I don't know. I know -- I mean,

I'm sure he had his own agenda as well. I don't know who he was dealing

with, whether it was Main State or --

Q Did he have regular and routine contact with people at Main

State? I mean, was there a daily call? Was there a weekly call?

A I recall him having quite a lot of interaction. But I

don't -- whether they were -- not videoconferences, but telecoms and

stuff like that. But I don't recall how often it was or how scheduled

it was.

Q And were you aware of who he was talking with?

A No. No, ma'am.

Q Was he able to communicate in writing in any way through

email? As I recall, you may not have had the ability to send cables

from Benghazi.

A I don't recall doing a lot of cables from there. I don't

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33

know why. That was not the place, but we had emails set up and -- I

don't recall.

Maybe some of the high-side emails were shut down periodically

just for system failures. I think, for the most part, we all maintained

some kind of connectivity with headquarters.

Q Was the Envoy a prolific writer? I mean, did he spend hours

at a laptop or computer screen?

A He wrote me a nice evaluation.

I think he was. I think he was pretty savvy across the board.

From my perspective, I think he was much more of a personal person.

But I'm sure he wrote plenty of papers and whatever else. I mean, you

don't get to that position and not.

Q By "personal," you mean he was a talker?

A He's a talker. Articulate, intellect, yes.

Q Once Tripoli was reestablished as the active embassy in

country, do you recall if there was any change in the reporting that

you all did in Benghazi, meaning did it then start flowing through

Tripoli and up to Main State, or did you, as the acting RSO, continue

to report directly to Main State? And, as a corollary, did you notice

any change in the Ambassador's reporting?

A That was a long one.

Q I know. Very complex. Let's start with your --

Ms. Sawyer. Sharon, just to clarify, are you asking the Special

Envoy? Because the Ambassador would not have been Mr. Stevens at that

point. I don't know which one --

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34

Ms. Jackson. Oh. I may have --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Let's start over. And in the words of Peter Kenny, we're

going to unpack this a little bit. Let's talk about your reporting

as the acting RSO in Benghazi.

Once Embassy Tripoli reopened while you were there, did you

continue to report directly to Main State or did you start reporting

through Tripoli?

A Well, with Tripoli opening, that, too, affected my purview,

if you want to call it that. So now, with Tripoli opening, there was

an RSO in Tripoli, . So I did what I could to support

his interests as well, very similar to what I would imagine Ambassador

Stevens was doing -- or Envoy Stevens was doing.

Did I go through him all the time? Probably not. Should I have?

Maybe. I don't know. He was cc'd on everything I did when I was there.

But I think opening the shop, especially in Tripoli with the focus

and the limelight, it's difficult, to say the least. So I used -- my

interaction with him was just to augment his needs.

So whether we were looking at upgrading my facility or his, we

tried to kill two birds with one stone, whether it be equipment -- you

know, I just plussed the equipment request up by 10 or 6 or whatever

we had to make it a little easier, more efficient.

Q And then, if you were in a position to know, did you notice

any change in Envoy Stevens' reporting? Did he talk only with the

Ambassador in Tripoli or did he continue to have conversations with

964
35

persons directly at Main State?

A I don't recall. I mean, I think -- I would presume that

they were pretty joined at the hip, I would presume. I mean, knowing

what I know of him, I think he wasn't going to be on his own agenda.

While I was there, the Ambassador did come up maybe twice, and

it was mainly just to meet and greet with some of -- Ambassador -- or

Envoy Stevens' contacts. But I think they were two of the same.

Ms. Jackson. Back to you.

Mr. Grider. Thank you.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Ten more minutes. Are you okay? Do you want to take a

break?

A I can handle it.

Q I know you can. Ten more minutes before we probably just

take a break.

Are you familiar with any other procurement process as it relates

to sort of the contracting of security guards? I think we have already

addressed the Feb. 17 and the possible, you know, MOU that was being

developed. Was there any other contracting going on with security?

Was there another contract -- life services contract?

A There was a life services contract or some sort of, but it

wasn't -- and I don't know all the particulars on it. But I recall

one of our little issues with Benghazi was the chow hall.

If I remember correctly, the guy that was in charge of the life

services, the local national that was in charge of that contract,

965
36

oversaw the chow hall as well as the LGF component that was there when

I was there.

Q And was --

A What?

Q Go ahead.

A I don't recall the contractual, what we paid. Between us,

we didn't get what we paid for. I can guarantee that. But I ended

up sitting in on a couple of the meetings with them regarding the

guards -- the equipment of the guards.

Q So let me just be clear just in my own mind.

You're saying the local person that was there over the life

services contract -- obviously, he was over the chow hall, and then

you're saying the LGF as well?

A I believe the LGF --

Q And excuse my ignorance here. So the Feb. 17, that's

different.

A Completely different.

Q So when you say LGF, who were the --

A I don't remember the name of the contract, and I don't

remember the name of this gentleman either. But there was an LGF

contract, if you will, or a component there when I was there. I don't

know if it was -- the numbers, I want to say 10, 12, something like

that, unarmed guards.

Q Unarmed guards. Okay. All right. Good.

So where were they stationed on the compound or were they?

966
37

A They were posted on the grounds.

Q Okay. Yeah. Posted.

So where were they posted?

A They put them at -- I would say vulnerabilities -- but our

access control gates.

Q And were you privy to any discussions that this contractual

arrangement would change in the future? I think later -- this is all

public knowledge -- later I think they ultimately hired Blue Mountain

Group.

A Correct.

Q Did you know about BMG? Did you put any recommendations

in to sort of say, "Hey, we're not getting what we're paying for"?

A No. I mean, while we were there and probably my successor,

there was not issues, but there was -- LGF always gives you issues.

I mean, if you're not on top of them, they're going to give you issues,

no matter where you're at. So that's always, I would say, a thorn,

but that's always a program you've got to stay mindful of.

But knowing this particular person and the way the contract was

we were paying, I remember several times that the guards were not

equipped like they were supposed to be per contract. But, once again,

you're only there for 60 days. You don't have the time to delve into

contractual baloney.

So you make it happen. You get your 17 Feb. guys to peruse the

grounds periodically to make sure to keep them honest, and you get some

of your ambitious agents to do the same thing. And it keeps them awake,

967
38

usually.

Q And this is more just a broad State Department -- you were

in ?

A I was.

Q Did they have sort of LGF there and then sort of -- I don't

know what the term for Feb. 17 would be. So if I said rings of security,

I mean, would the outer ring be sort of LGF?

A The inner ring would have been LGF.

Q And then host nation?

A Correct. Usually.

Q Usually. Not always. And then would you say DS?

A Well, if you had the best of everything, you'd have the

Marines and then you would have DS as the core.

Q And them, within DS, you would have sort of the SPS or

whatever you talked about?

A Depending on what post. I mean, out of the 275, you're

looking at maybe 30, 35 posts that have SPS.

Q So not all posts have SPSs?

A Correct.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You've said a couple times that there wasn't the traditional

host nation support. Can you elaborate on that.

A Well, we were a quasi-RSO office at best, so -- meaning

Benghazi was unique in the fact that Benghazi really didn't know who

they were either. I mean, from my point of view, they were still

968
39

jockeying to figure out who was going to be in power and who wasn't.

So, normally speaking, you would have already known that when you

go into an environment. If you were going to establish yourself or

an embassy, you'd already know who your minister of security is or who

your DOD counterparts would be.

There it was a little different because you had different -- I'll

say tribal, for lack of a better term. But you had different groups

there and sects that you were trying to figure out who were friendly

and who weren't.

And, I mean, for all intents and purposes, we thought everybody

was friendly at that time. But, from my perspective, we didn't want

to befriend one group versus somebody else without -- you know, we

didn't want to cause an international incident.

At the time, 17 Feb. had already stepped up and said that they

were going to be the point people for diplomatic interests or security

purposes under this function.

So my interest while I was there was trying to plus that contingent

up because -- knowing they only had a LGF contingent of 10 people or

12 or whatever it was, unarmed and poorly equipped and poorly trained,

I wanted at least some firepower. At least I could put them to at least

have a presence.

But we only had three at the time. So I was trying to befriend

them, trying to get more activity, more interest, additional bodies,

because three bodies on 24/7 is long days, long weeks.

Q And were you able to accomplish that in the time that you

969
40

were there?

A I pushed a lot of buttons and I squeaked a little bit, but

I never saw six additional bodies come, no, while I was there.

Q Were you in contact with any of your successors?

A We periodically were. I don't think the first -- I didn't

stay in touch with the next successor, but I knew some others that went

downrange after the fact.

Because a lot of the stuff that I had kind of laid the groundwork

on was now being resurfaced. Like I said, it's all personality-driven.

We're not all cut from the same cloth.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Before we take a break, I just want to make sure I have my

notes -- so the general range of security, local guard force, host

nation, Marines, DS, SPS, generally? I'm not saying that was in

Benghazi. But anything I'm missing on that?

A Yeah. I mean, if you're looking at general, I would even

leave SPS off. SPS is -- I don't want to say an anomaly, but there

are very few posts.

Mr. Grider. Okay. Why don't we take 5 minutes.

Ms. Jackson. Let's go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

970
41

Mr. Grider. We're back on record.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Let's turn to any security incidents during your time there.

To your knowledge, were there any minor or significant security

incidents during your time in Benghazi?

A I don't recall anything that was hair-raising.

Q And just so we're clear, what would be your definition of

a security incident? I know you've been over in different countries.

A Well, I don't recall any specific threat information that

was dictated towards us during the timeframe I was there. I don't

remember any surveillance activity that would've been something that

would've been a sense of alarm for my outfit or for the headquarters.

I don't even remember any real major security incident with any

of our allies or counterparts, the Brits and whatever. We had a pretty

good relationship with them, and I don't recall anything that was

alarming or their concern at the time. I don't recall.

Q Once you left Benghazi, did you stay in touch, or, sort of,

were you apprised generally about what took place in 2012, you know,

in January, February? Did you sort of stay in contact?

A No, I -- unfortunately, no, I didn't. It's one of those

things you kind of, you have to respect the guy that follows you.

971
42

Q Sure.

A You don't want to be micromanaging from afar, or, "If I

would've been there, I would've done this" kind of thing. So,

professionally speaking, we normally don't do that.

I have friends that were there after the fact, and occasionally

there would be, you know, an email or two coming out, "hey, you remember

this," or, you know, "what did you do about this," kind of thing, but

just randomness.

Q Were you aware -- not discussing what happened in

September 11 -- prior to that, in 2012, of just general security

incidents that took place?

A No.

Q Okay.

You had mentioned that there was, you know, fireworks. You

called it fireworks. Can you just explain what was that?

A One of their, I'd say, their pastimes was they would,

whether it be a soccer game or, you know, whatever, they would shoot

the AK-47s up in the air. It's fairly common in that environment, in

that part of the world. We call it fireworks because it sounded like

fireworks. And periodically you would see tracer rounds go up.

Q Do you think that -- in your opinion, was there any

correlation between the amount of agents that you had, 10 agents, and,

sort of, the amount of security incidents? Would you make a

correlation or not?

A No. No. I don't know who came up with the 10 number. Like

972
43

I said, I was the second or third group boss, RSO or AIC, that came

through there, I think. And I think it just evolved. There's a

system. Prior to me, prior to -- I think they were in the hotel at

one point, and, you know, we slowly gravitated towards the villa. And

whether we had 10 or 6, I don't know. I don't know if there was a reason

why they had that particular number.

Q All right. So you had the QRF, LGF, host-nation support

on the security ring. I'm just going back to that briefly --

A The QRF?

Q Quick -- no? Quick response?

A That's what it called --

Q Okay.

A -- but I didn't say I had a QRF.

Q Right. You didn't. You didn't. I --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have a QRF?

A No.

Q Okay.

A Not in the traditional sense, no.

Q And what would be the traditional sense of a QRF?

A Well, I don't know if there is a traditional sense,

honestly. In different environments, you of course have a component

that we call QRF, whether that be our MSD guys or our -- in ,

we had a contingent of Blackwater guys that we would call our QRF. But,

in different environments, you would have a QRF in your E&E plan, your

973
44

security framework.

But there, I guess we used as somewhat of our QRF

per se. They weren't the -- that was a contingency upon a contingency

kind of thing. And that was, once again, developed over personalities,

depending on who was there at the time and what kind of relationship

you would build.

Q Would the SPS officers have filled that role? Could they

have filled that role?

A Like I said, the SPS guys, I didn't delineate them between

the SPS and one of my agents. We were all part of the

one-team-one-fight kind of concept. And so, no, they wouldn't

have -- traditionally speaking, no.

From my point of view, SPS, most of those guys are what we call

the trigger pullers or operators, and you would want to rely on them

more so than you would your generalized special agent in class.

Because you know what you got with them, for the most part.

Q Did you make any distinction between your unarmed guards

and the February 17 guys?

A "Distinction"?

Q Were they all considered local guard force by you?

A No. No, no.

Q Okay.

A We have an LGF component, and we had the 17th Feb.

Q Okay.

A They were a separate entity.

974
45

Q And what was the distinction between their duties and

responsibilities?

A Well, the LGF, knowing that they were under a contract, I

had a little bit more of a thumb on them, or responsibility, you know.

Because I was paying them day to day, I could at least hold whatever

his name was accountable.

17th Feb was more of a diplomatic dance, I guess, from my point

of view, because you didn't want to tick them off. I mean, they could

easily walk, and I had no say at the time. So, if anything, I was trying

to build alliances with them, from our perspective.

Q At many embassies, are there armed bodyguards that are

locally employed staff?

A I don't know if "many" is a good word, but several. Several

embassies have -- sometimes the local host country will provide you

a guard or a bodyguard contingent, primarily for your chief of mission,

and then the government will pay them a stipend. But it's not -- I

wouldn't say it's the norm. It's occasional, at best.

Q Was the 17th Feb sort of in that role? I'm trying to

understand the role that they played, as you saw it, at the time that

you were there.

A The time I was there, we used 17th Feb as a force multiplier.

With no armed guard presence, 17th Feb, knowing how the country was

evolving or the perception of how it was evolving, I wanted somebody

that at least could reach out and touch somebody in their government

or the militias or whoever, somebody I could rely on to, if the shit

975
46

hit the fan, I could rely on them to at least call some of their buddies

and help, you know, support our interests.

The LGF component, they were strictly there for that outer ring

or that mid-level ring, just to give a perception of security, if you

want to call it that, and maintain that access control component.

Because my ARSOs, we didn't have time and we were busy doing other

things, we couldn't post ourselves out on the gates. And nor would

we normally do that. We wouldn't do that anyway.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. There are about five to seven points that I just want

to sort of blow through.

Budget issues. With respect to , your desk officer,

did budget issues ever come up requesting -- was any communication,

to your knowledge, about budget issues? That's sort of broad, but

we're trying to move it along here.

A Yeah. I mean, I didn't get into the intricacies of, you

know, how much funding was going to be allocated to us. There was,

based on our timeline of how long we were going to be there, there was

things, as an RSO, that you would like -- you know, there was things

you would like to have and want to have or need to have, kind of thing.

And we'd push that out periodically and just say, hey, if we're going

to be here for a little longer, we need to fortify this or that.

So I didn't get into the weeds as far as how much money is being

allocated to Benghazi and how much is going towards Tripoli or, you

know, the big scheme of things. But I would show them that these are

976
47

some vulnerabilities, and if we're going to be here for an extended

period of time, we need to maybe reinforce the gates, or maybe we need

to put the planters down, or maybe we should buy gym equipment for our

agents. But --

Q And that was my second question. With respect to requests,

you said reinforce the -- you know, do you recall some of the requests

that you made based on your overview there?

A Yeah. I mean, we had, when I was there -- it was much

different than what it developed into, but I had a large, 3-acre -- or

it was more than 3-acre compound; it was 13 acres I think is what it

was, three villas. So we tried to -- you know, from headquarters'

perspective, we were trying to maintain this low profile, but if you

look at the villas, it wasn't a low profile. We didn't have a flag

flying, but anybody who was anybody knew that that was where the

Americans were.

So we tried to do what we could as far as, you know, I remember

asking for some planters -- we call them big, big box planters -- to

put down in somewhat of a serpentine just to slow down any potential

attempt to progress the building.

I remember asking for some reinforced kind of gate mechanism to

put on the inside of our gate. I didn't want to fortify the outside

and make it look like we're trying to keep people out, but I wanted

to put it on the inside of the gate. And it was cost-effective.

Lighting, I remember lighting was a big concern just because of

the size and scope of what we were trying to defend. When push came

977
48

to shove, it was pretty dark there. There was a vineyard, there was

an orchard, there was a variety of -- it was a nice place, but very

partially lit.

I wanted to have some fighting -- or I wouldn't say fighting

positions, but some lookout positions, because we were surrounded by

a wall, but you could easily have a bunch of people outside of the wall

and no one would know. So I wanted to put some LBs, just little

platforms above, you know, so a normal-size person could see over the

wall.

Just some basic stuff.

Q And just to be clear, so you're saying approximately

13 acres?

A I don't recall. It seems like that number was in my head

for some reason.

Q Sure.

A I know there was three villas and it was pretty large.

Q And then, in 2012, it's your understanding that it was

reduced. It wasn't 13 acres anymore; it was sort of reduced to smaller

size. Is that correct?

A From what I know. I know it went down to -- I think they

pushed the -- where I actually live, they cut that out of lease, I think.

Q Right.

And with respect to these requests -- I know you were only there

for a short period of time. Were these requests fulfilled during your

time or --

978
49

A I know they weren't filled during my time.

Q Okay.

A I remember, actually, one of my last things I did was shake

the branches again to see where we were on it. I think there was

funding -- I believe that there was funding allocated for some of those

upgrades.

Q Sure.

A But, once again, the rotation, that component of our job,

the new RSO that came in, maybe he had different priorities. Maybe

he knew that there was a -- that they there were on a downsize. So

if I wanted to upgrade this particular gate and we're not going to use

that villa, it would be silly to spend money on that gate.

Q But lighting --

A But lighting would be a key one, you know, and maybe

fortifying the walls.

Q Gate mechanism, fortifying the walls.

A Yeah.

Q And those were requests in 2011. And there possibly

could've been requests -- you wouldn't know this or not -- in 2012 of

the same type and same nature.

A Correct.

Q Okay.

Tripwires, did you all have any background on that or --

A "Tripwires," that's a phrase that we always use. As far

as I know, none of us ever tripped any tripwires while we were there.

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Q Okay.

A That gives us the framework, the tools to do our daily

duties, but I don't recall anything that was alarming to the nature

that we needed to pull chocks --

Q Right.

A -- or reinforce things.

Q Was there a general evacuation plan in place?

A One of the things we actually did -- that was one of the

policies, if you will, or one of the frameworks of a traditional RSO

shop, you would come up with different E&E plans or EAP plans, emergency

action plans. So I did have one of my SPS guys do an E&E contingency

plan that dealt with, you know, the QRF concept, dealt with rally points

and dealt with LZs and, you know, even overland moves to -- we were

going to go to Egypt, I think.

But, yeah, there was a -- the framework was there.

Q Sure. Sure.

A We never rehearsed it. I don't think I ever got it actually

approved. But we at least did the due diligence during that 60 days

to figure out what our vulnerabilities were and how we would mitigate

to the best of our ability.

Q And I've just got about two more, and I'll have my colleague

help me on this last one.

But, you know, the SPS, you mentioned just the word "trigger

pullers." The basic question is: There's a distinction between the

SPS, trigger pullers, and LGF, the local guard force, correct?

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51

A Is there a distinction between them?

Q Yes.

A I would hope so, yeah.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q Okay. And then would you say there's a distinction

between, sort of, the SPS and the host-nation Feb 17?

A Well, for sure, yes. Same distinction with the agent and

the Feb 17.

Q Right.

And, as an RSO, would you prefer to have the SPS in a high-threat

location, or would you prefer to rely on the local guard force or the

host-nation security?

A Oh, I think without a doubt I would rather have an S -- I

mean, he's a cleared American, and you know what their training

background is. So you don't have that initial -- not liability, but

you already know what his framework is. I mean, like I always say,

everyone has that 10 percent, but at least you know where that

10 percent is coming from.

From an LGF component, sometimes you're getting the bottom

feeder, so then you have to do -- then you have to stay on them on

training and stuff. So SPS, you already know they've been trained.

Most of them have a pretty graphic background, so you already know what

you got, kind of. You can steer them. It's a lot easier to steer

somebody than prod them.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q What was your assessment of the capability of the Feb 17th

guys that you had?

A I think they were understaffed. I think, at the time we

were there, they seemed to be extremely loyal to us, to our interest.

I mean, you'd have been hard pressed to find someone else, even an

American, to stand out there for 8 hours a day and have no days off

for, you know, an indefinite amount of time.

Q Uh-huh. What about their capabilities and skills?

A Average compared to most, but I'd much rather have someone

with average capabilities than no capabilities.

So we brought them into our security team and tried to offer

training as much as we could. I think I even had one of my agents that

did some marksmanship training or at least some basic concepts of, you

know, sight picture and, you know, point A and point impact kind of

thing, but we didn't actually shoot. We gave them the fundamentals.

We also gave them some bodyguard training, if you will, just to

include them in part of the team. I think it's a big thing when you're

in an environment like that. You have to develop your team, and you

have to ensure that everybody's part of it.

Q Did you run drills with them in addition to the training?

A Didn't really do a lot of drill rehearsing with them. But

we did get them involved with some of our guard oversight just

because -- I would say language, but I think the guards responded to

them a little bit more than they would from me just because -- I don't

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53

know why. But we incorporated them into the -- not drills but checking,

oversight, the guards.

Q Uh-huh.

Let me switch gears on you a little bit. You stated that the

Ambassador from Tripoli came twice while you were there?

A I believe he came twice. I think he came once when Envoy

Stevens was there, and then I think he came again when -- what was his

name? -- so he brought in somebody else to fill in for Ambassador Stevens

right after he left, a guy named maybe? Ambassador ?

And I believe he came up during that timeframe, as well, just a day

or two.

Q Okay. Was that Ambassador Cretz?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Uh-huh.

Q Did you have any other VIP visitors, Members of Congress,

other people from the State Department, anyone from Department of

Defense, the White House, any other VIP visitors in Benghazi while you

were there?

A Short answer, no. I think there was a -- Secretary Clinton

was supposed to come out. And I don't recall -- you know, maybe she

did. I guess I should've known that. I don't think she came

to the -- I know we had an MSD team come up because they stayed in my

house to supplement her visit. But I think she ended up just going

to -- goddamn, I should know that. I think they just went to Tripoli,

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54

if I recall.

Q But it was planned for Benghazi?

A Initially, it was, yeah. And she very well may have came,

but I don't recall her coming up. But I do remember there was people

there from MSD to support a visit, and I think that's when the Ambassador

just came up instead. It was right before I left.

Q Okay.

A Like, literally the day before or a few days.

Q So it would've been mid- to late October?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. That's all.

Mr. Grider. Okay. Checking with my colleagues, looking at the

minority staff.

Heather, are you doing okay? On time, are we okay? I don't know

where I am. Like, do I have 5 more minutes, 10 more minutes, or --

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah, just finish. Take the time you need to

finish.

Mr. Grider. All right. Let me just consult with my colleague

real quick.

Ms. Jackson. Let's go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Grider. All right, back on the record.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q I'm foregoing just, sort of, some issues here. I think

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you've touch on just some of the manpower concerns, and we've already

addressed that issue. We talked about the funding.

And then the only last -- the only thing pertaining to what I have

in my hand, an email, is your knowledge of when the mission was ending

in Benghazi. Was that clear for you during your time period?

A No. I mean, I think it was kind of -- well, I know it was

up in the air, because there was some email back and forth regarding,

you know, one, if we're going to be asking for equipment and stuff,

why are we going to put money into it if we're going to be leaving next

week?

So no one really knew. There was some uncertainty in

headquarters. And I remember Ambassador Stevens, or Envoy, was -- I

remember him saying that we were going to probably keep this open as

long as we can because, like I said, this is a foothold already, we're

already established here, this is where their government is being

seated, if I remember right.

So I would go back to headquarters and say, listen, it sounds like,

from boots on the ground, it looks like we're going to be here a little

longer than not. But I don't recall. There wasn't a drop-dead time

of when we were going to get out or pull out or downsize, for that matter.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Do you know who back at main State would be making that final

call?

A No. It wasn't any of my people. It was --

Q Right.

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56

A We were --

Q Uh-huh. I just didn't know if, in conversation with Envoy

Stevens, that he made any mention of --

A No. I mean, he just, more of a generalized, you know, we'd

like to stay here as much as possible. I mean, just in the same breath

when he said, you know, FYI, I just got Ambassador to Tripoli; would

you like to be my RSO there? Just one of those, in hindsight, maybe

surreal moments, but --

Q Uh-huh.

A I don't remember how long we were --

Q And he never mentioned who he was talking to back at main

State?

A No.

Q Okay.

You mentioned that you were in when the embassies in East

Africa were bombed.

A Uh-huh.

Q What, if any, awareness did you have, role you played in

that?

A I don't even remember what I did yesterday. 1999 --

Q Sometimes long-term memory is better than short-term

memory.

A -- I was an MSG at the time. So, other than being a Marine

Security Guard in a relatively high-threat environment, was

pretty -- on somebody's radar at the time. I remember it being a little

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57

bit more of a secured compound during that timeframe.

But regarding the African bombings, it was just an instance where

we all kind of rallied the troops here in . It didn't really

impact us, other than I remember we changed some of our SOPs, more of

our operational -- you know, we had to stay on compound for extended

periods of time. And I don't remember having -- we didn't have any

extra military or anything like that. It wasn't a full-blown security

concern for us.

But I do remember that, at that timeframe, when it happened, I

remember being somewhat on the radar. And I thought that it

was -- the potential was hitting Kuwait, as well, at the time. Being

a young Marine, I was going, oh, okay, enthusiastic, very energetic

about that.

But, you know, things happen for a reason. That's the only reason

why I'm in security now. If that hadn't happened, I'd have probably

stayed in the Corps or maybe done something else, played professional

rugby or something.

Q In your years with Diplomatic Security, from Marine

Security Guard to now being a DS agent, can you sort of compare and

contrast Diplomatic Security from the time of the East African embassy

bombings to then Benghazi or other events, major events, attacks that

have gone on? Any changes that you've seen in Diplomatic Security?

Any shortcomings that you still see?

One of the things this committee is going to do is make

recommendations for improvement.

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58

A Uh-huh.

Q You've lived through a lot in your career at Diplomatic

Security, so we'd be interested in your suggestions, opinions.

There's always room for improvement.

A Sure.

I'd say Diplomatic Security has changed a lot. When I came on

in 1999, there was 760 of us. We had approximately 16 offices

domestically. Now we have 2,200 of us, more or less, and we have about

32 offices domestically. We're stationed at 275 posts worldwide.

I think I'd say our professionalism, our training is, bar none,

better than anyone else in the Federal law enforcement. I'm a little

biased, but the training packages that we have in place, some of the

stuff we get to do is, you know, something you should write about because

it's pretty impressive.

I think, like any other democracy or any other Federal law

enforcement or, you know, any other agency, you're going to have some

growing pains here and there. I think, you know, personally speaking,

we have some of our hierarchy or some old-timers, as we call it, that

haven't lived through -- or they've lived through the changes, but they

didn't experience some of the changes. There were different levels

on that totem pole, and they didn't get to actually take part in some

of the training initiatives that we have in place. Maybe they're not

as well-versed in our investigative portfolio now.

But I think we're evolving. I think we've got young agents, my

level guys, who are starting to put our thumb on things, and I think

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59

we're starting to develop those skill sets that will, you know, further

our missions down the road.

Regarding the training aspect, I think we're constantly evolving.

The post-Benghazi deal, after the ARB, they came out and they recruited

some of us to come back and revamp the high-threat training. So it

went from -- I mentioned I did the high-threat training post-'05 in

Iraq, so it was pretty aggressive, but we still didn't know where we

were going with it. And some of the old-timers got involved, and they

phased some of the stuff out, or they condensed it into a 4-week package.

It was cheaper, quicker to get out and do God's work overseas. But

I think, in doing that, it kind of marginalized some of our scopes,

I guess, if you will.

So we took a hard look at it, and we bumped it up to 10 weeks again.

And we've put in things that there's pass/fail. It used to not being

pass/fail. It used to be you attended and you muscled it out for

4 weeks and you got your gear and you went on. Now you actually have

to pass the course, which I think is good. It goes back to that concept

that we're not all cut from the same cloth.

Personally speaking, I don't think we need -- we should be able

to go into cones like the rest of the Foreign Service. They have cones,

specialties. You know, you have your pol cone, your com cone, econ,

and a variety. Diplomatic Security doesn't have that. We have a

variety of scopes, if you will. We have investigative. We have

overseas, RSO work. We have high-threat. We have training; our

training contingent is huge. And we have protection, of course.

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60

And I think if we were allowed to specialize, I think that would

be a win-win for all of us. I mean, because we're -- a lot of us

knuckle-draggers, we call ourselves jacks of all trades because we move

so much. And I think if they allowed us to do a 10-year cycle where

you actually got a flavor of everything after 10 years or so, and then

you could specialize and say I want to be a law enforcement agent or

I want to be a trigger puller in high-threat or I want to be protection

guru and work on the Secretary's detail, I think there's mechanisms

there that we should be able to focus our career paths on.

But, all in all, I think DS is -- one of our main, major strengths

is our diversity. I mean, we recruit across the globe, and we pull

skill sets from all different climes and places. But one of our

weaknesses is our diversity, as well, because we're -- because of

that -- if they don't allow us to bring those trigger pullers for a

trigger-puller environment and they put in a guy that's, you know, a

schoolteacher or, you know, a creative writing specialist into an

environment like that, I think it sets us up for failure.

And so, if I was king for the day, that's what I would --

Q Okay.

One of the recommendations of past ARBs -- and it, in fact, came

out of the East African embassy bombings ARB -- was that Diplomatic

Security should be elevated within the bureaucracy of the State

Department and that there should be an Under Secretary for Diplomatic

Security so that security has an equal seat at the table.

What's your feeling on that recommendation?

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61

A I highly support it. I think we've been marginalized, so

to speak, under management. I think it would definitely give us much

more juice at the table. It would give us more interaction with some

of our counterparts.

And we already have that, but like I've mentioned before, that's

all at post level. It's personality-driven. And most of us, in my

era and below, have developed those relationships at post level, but

I think by bringing this up to that level at the table, it would allow

us to have direct lines with DOD and with our intel counterparts and

what have you. So I think it would streamline some of our effectiveness

and information flow.

Ms. Jackson. That's all I have.

Mr. Grider. Okay.

We do thank you for your time and for coming, and we sincerely

appreciate all of your service. I have family that live in Boston.

Appreciate your commitment, your service there, as well.

So, for us, that's all the questions that we have, so I think we

can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Woolfork. So we'll go ahead and go back on the record. It's

currently 11:10 a.m.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q And, Agent , my name is Brent Woolfork. And I'm

joined this morning by Heather Sawyer and Ronak Desai on the minority

991
62

staff.

A Okay.

Q So we certainly appreciate you coming this morning. I

understand that you came from ; is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. And, like, how long a trip is that?

A Three-and-a-half hours to and to here, so --

Q Okay. And then, given that you're out, are you having to

find a replacement to kind of cover for you while you're there?

A I have ARSOs and ARSO-I.

Q Okay.

And given that, you know, the attack was a few years ago, 3 years

ago, it probably took some time for you to kind of review the

documents --

A Pardon me?

Q Given that the attack was a few years ago and your time in

Benghazi was actually even further, did you have to take time to review

documents, or not too much?

A Unfortunately, I don't have a lot of -- no documents,

actually, but --

Q Okay.

Well, I want to kind of go through as expeditiously as possible

some issues that have already been covered. And the first one is

dealing with your relationship with Ambassador Stevens and your

discussions as it related to the security environment.

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63

Earlier, I believe you said that Ambassador Stevens, then-Special

Envoy Stevens, was a rock star, and that made passage difficult. Is

that correct?

A I'm not sure that it made passage difficult. It just -- it

increased our footprint more than most security experts would -- or

security professionals would want. Because he's well-known and

well-liked, anywhere he went he was -- it was like guarding Colin

Powell. I mean, he was very similar. But in an environment like

Benghazi, it's a little more hinky. So, yeah, that caused some added

concern.

Q Okay.

And given the environment that you were just describing, I guess,

what were the discussions that kind of took place between you and

Special Envoy Stevens?

A "Discussions"?

Q In terms of, perhaps, possible movements on a particular

day?

A I think he knew or he understood where I was coming from.

I go back to the time and place predictability. Minimizing our

footprint, he understood my concerns for that.

I mean, living there with him, our discussions were not as formal

as maybe some RSOs and ambassadors are. I mean, we discussed over

coffee in the morning, watching TV, basketball or whatever on TV, or

during our daily runs.

But I kind of got the gist of where he was wanting to go with

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64

things, and then I would assess things as much as we could at the time

based on our resources. And then we would just try to mix it up. We'd

roll the dice, and we made it work.

Q And if you provided a particular security assessment, did

Special Envoy Stevens heed that advice?

A Every time.

Q Every time. Okay.

And during the course of your period, you had mentioned that when

you first arrived you had about 10 agents; is that right?

A Uh-huh.

Q And you had about six when you left?

A I think there were six when I left. I don't know the

particular number or the exact number. Like I said, people were

shuffling about, and some people got extended based on flight

itinerary, whatever. But there was six or seven of us, I think, when

we left.

Q Just given the number of agents that you had, was it your

sense you were able to carry out your mission in terms of providing

security?

A Like I mentioned before, you know, we deal with what we have.

And, you know, it's mission first. I mean, we're there for a reason.

We're not there just to draw a paycheck. So we would prioritize our

missions based on resources and manpower, focusing primarily on what

the Ambassador, or the Envoy, wanted to do, and then we would work our

way down from there.

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65

Q So, essentially, you had to change, I guess, what you said

earlier, the operational tempo?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay.

And earlier when you were describing, I guess, the personnel that

were in Benghazi at the time, you had mentioned that there's an

individual in Benghazi ; is that right?

A Yeah. And I apologize, I don't remember his name. I think

and I'm pretty sure that he was contractual. He was there on some kind

of, you know -- way above my pay grade, whether it be a White House

initiative or congressional initiative, I don't remember. But it was

something

.

But I'm pretty sure he was a of some sort. A nice fellow,

.

we tried to support where we could.

Q I just want to step back for a second. So what are MANPADs?

A That's something that -- for layman's terms, I think MANPADs

is a surface-to-air rocket that was used by -- well, it's used by

numerous people, but there was apparently an abundance of these things.

I mean, I don't know numbers, and I don't know what nomenclature they

were or whatever, but there was a lot there, and they didn't want it

to fall in the wrong hands.

Q Okay. I guess, what type of threat do MANPADs pose?

A I think they can pose a variety of threats. I mean, you

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could use them for whatever you wanted. I mean, the sky's the limit,

no pun intended.

Q And you said you think it's the number in Libya that was,

I guess, a focus?

A I don't -- once again, I don't know all the particulars on

it. I know that there was some concern on the Hill or the White House.

I don't know what it was. But they wanted to make sure that we had,

we, the U.S. Government, had some kind of oversight on the numbers,

. I don't know all the particulars,

--

Q Okay.

And just given that understanding, were you aware of -- did you

have any evidence that any illegal, kind of, gun-running was happening

from Libya to Syria or anything like that?

A No.

Q Okay.

Now, I wanted to ask -- because you had said you came in

mid-September of 2011; is that right?

A Yes.

Q And then you left shortly before Halloween?

A Right before Halloween, yes.

Q Okay. So that was about --

A About 45 days, 50 days, something like that.

Q Okay.

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A Well, I thought it was closer to 60, but I think the hiccup

was that I had to stay in Souda Bay, or wherever it was, Crete, on the

way through, so I think I was there for 5 days on the way in. So I

don't think I actually landed, but I don't remember. But I think there

was a 5-day window that I had to stay somewhere else other than Benghazi.

Q Okay. So that was about maybe 11 months before the attacks

on September 11, 2012, roughly speaking?

A Give or take.

Q Okay.

And you had also said earlier that you had some friends that

succeeded you in Benghazi; is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And I'm just going to run through a few questions,

hopefully easily and quickly.

So, after you left in October 2011 -- and I'm just doing this to

kind of make sure I have a clean record on this -- any firsthand

knowledge about the security resources, you know, requests that might

have come up, staffing or equipment in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Okay. Any firsthand knowledge, again, about the means of

communication in Benghazi?

A "Means of communication"?

Q The types of communications that might have been available?

A No.

Q Information about, kind of, the availability of certain

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types of intelligence regarding, kind of, conditions on the ground?

A No.

Q Okay. And any firsthand knowledge about, kind of, militias

or any other entities that were acting in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q You were asked a fair amount about SPS, and I think you

said --

A Security protective services?

Q Security protective services. Once you had left in

October, did you have any awareness about any discussions of whether

there would be additional SPS staffing in Benghazi?

A No. No.

Q You also acknowledge that there was conversation ongoing

or decisions certainly had yet been made about the continued presence

of the U.S. in Benghazi. And I think you acknowledged earlier, but

I just want to make it clear, that once you left, you also had no

involvement in those conversations?

A That's correct. I had no involvement, right. We were

aware that the situation was changing, but we didn't know how fast or

what.

Q And once you had left, you left at a time where then-Special

Envoy Stevens was not yet the Ambassador. Did you have any ongoing

contact with Special Envoy Stevens after you left?

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A Not that I recall. I think there was maybe an email

exchange between he and I about a letter of reference of some sort or

something like that with one of my other agents who was there. He was

trying to identify where he was or something, but I don't recall the

particulars. It was just a very baseline, "Hey, , do you happen

to know where such-and-such went?"

Q And beyond that, you don't recall any particular contact

with the Ambassador?

A Unfortunately not, no.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q Now, I know after the September 11, 2012, attacks, as you

were discussing earlier, there was an Accountability Review Board that

was convened. I'm just going to ask you a couple of questions regarding

that board.

Were you ever asked or ordered to not provide information?

A To not provide?

Q To not provide information to the ARB.

A No.

Q Okay. Were you ever asked to conceal or destroy

information from the ARB?

A No.

Q And I was wondering, just given what you had talked about

in terms of the changes that you've seen in DS during the course of

your time within the Department, did you ever have an opportunity to

read or review the ARB?

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A I did, yes.

Q Okay. And did you have anything that you thought should

be, I guess, included within that or things that were not sufficiently

covered?

A I read it a while ago, and --

Q I understand.

A -- I didn't retain a lot of it. I mean, I think, for the

most part, they hit some things on the head.

Like I mentioned, I was part of the revamping of the high-threat

training, so I think, you know -- not to say that that's going to be

the best training ever, but I think it's definitely evolving, and I

think there's a lot of positive takeaways on that.

I think there was a 160-day, a mention of, minimum requirement

for TDY. I think that's a little excessive, but I think the big

takeaway on the -- I think what they're trying to do, or my

understanding or my perception of it, was that the issue of the lack

of overlap that I mentioned. When my predecessor was leaving, we met

at the airport, so there was no overlap, per se. And I think that was

one of the key takeaways that we probably could have focused on instead

of the extended period of time.

It's hard enough to get people that are engaged in other

activities to do a 60-day TDY, let alone 120. So there's really no

incentives to do that, and it's hard to uproot your family and leave

your family for that period of time. So I think the 60-day would've

been sufficient as long as they incorporated a 10-day window when

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they're there. But that was just -- that's me talking.

But other than that, there was some -- I don't know all the other

specifics, but those are two areas that I thought was a little bit of

a knee-jerk.

Q Given that you're an RSO in right now, do you think

that there's been overall improvement since the report came out?

A Yeah. I mean, I think there's definitely -- it's

unfortunate that we have to go through a situation like that, but I

think it's -- it will take some time to really see if those improvements

pan out, but at least it brought things to head, to surface. I think

it takes a situation like this, i.e., 9/11/2001, to really take a hard

look at what we do.

And Diplomatic Security, we are spread thin at times, and we're

forced to react. We're much more reactive than proactive. So I think,

if anything, hopefully that will allow us to be a limit bit more

proactive in the future.

Q I appreciate that. And, you know, as my majority

colleagues had mentioned, one of the tasks of this committee is to kind

of look at possible recommendations to the Department. So the

recommendations provided earlier are certainly helpful in that regard.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Can I ask you a general question? You know, one of the

things the ARB recognizes is that there is no way to eliminate

100 percent of the risk and that we do sometimes operate and presumably

need to continue operating in places that are high-threat.

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There have been a lot of questions about, certainly posed in

hindsight, why were we in Benghazi. But, certainly, the ARB's

recommendation was that we should all work together to try to make

places as safe as possible, understanding that we can't eliminate

100 percent of the risk.

You've had a vast amount of experience at DS and in law

enforcement. Do you agree with that perspective? Do you think we

should be abandoning places that are high-threat?

A I don't like to use the word "abandoning." I think

we are -- I mean, that's what we've been paid for. We're paid to assess

the situation, and if it's dictated that we need to be in a certain

clime and place, then we'll make it happen.

I think giving us the tools that we're requiring, I mean, the

baseline, that helps us do that. Manpower helps us do that. But, at

the end of the day, if the government wants us to be someplace, then

we ought to probably do that. I mean, people that are much higher above

my pay grade determine why we're in certain spots. And if it needs

to be that way, that's why they have us, or some of us, that are willing

to go do that. We just need the support.

Q And while you were in Benghazi, you had indicated certainly

vis-à-vis Ambassador, then-Special Envoy Stevens that he was, sounds

like, quite respectful of your on-the-ground assessments?

A Sure.

Q Did you have any feeling while you were in Benghazi that

anyone was not respectful of your on-the-ground assessment and

1002
73

recommendations?

A No. I don't think "respect" is the word. I think

there's -- at times, we jokingly said, you know, after Tripoli opened

up, we were "Ben Who?", not "Benghazi." So if you call it respect or

call it what you will, it's prioritizing. And based on the interests

of the government or State Department or whatever, that's where DS and

whoever will focus their efforts on.

So if you're fortunate or unfortunate to be in Benghazi during

that timeframe, you just have to do a different dance. You have to

figure out what buttons to push and then make it work, you know. That's

what we get paid for. If we didn't make it work, then there's no point

in going out there.

Q And it was your understanding that the government had valid

reasons and wanted to continue to be in Benghazi as well as Tripoli?

A That's my perspective of it. I mean, it makes sense, I

guess, at the time, with, like I said, the government seat being in

Benghazi, or that's where the takeover initiated from. So I think

there was a stronghold already there, and I think it was good or it

behooved us being involved and kind of, I won't say manipulating, but

at least moving eyes and ears in one spot versus -- it made sense to

me, but it doesn't mean it's the right thing to do.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Agent , I'm going to go through a series of public

allegations that have made over the course of the last few years. And

so these are not allegations that I or my colleagues or members of the

1003
74

minority side necessarily believe to be true, but as part of this

committee, which is apparently investigating these allegations.

So I'm going to kind of go through them as quickly as possible.

So this is just whether or not you have any firsthand knowledge or

evidence regarding these allegations. So please bear with me.

It's been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman

has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to

stand down," end quote, and this resulted in the Defense Department

not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It's been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington Post

Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it, quote, "Four

Pinocchios," it's highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A Not that I know of, no.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

1004
75

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and that they found,

quote, "no support for this allegation," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

1005
76

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the causes and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to, quote, "stand down," but instead that there were tactical

disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down ordered

to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q Concern has been raised by one individual that in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board damaging

documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No.

1006
77

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q And let me ask these questions as for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that

were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

1007
78

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," end quote, on the

night of attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action."

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

of Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to, quote, "stand down," meaning to cease all operations.

Military officials have stated that these four individuals were

instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and

medical assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi."

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

1008
79

Benghazi?

A No.

Q It's been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets

on the night of the attack that would have saved lives.

However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the

former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a

review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the

troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it

dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of attacks that could have saved

lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to

deploy?

A No.

Mr. Grider. Okay. Well, thank you very much.

And then we'll go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the interview was concluded.]

1009

INTERVIEW OF GRS–1

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 22, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

1012
INTERVIEW OF GRS–2

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 22, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

1014
INTERVIEW OF GRS–3

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 29, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

1016
INTERVIEW OF

CIA OFFICIAL

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JUNE 2, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

1018
INTERVIEW OF

DEPUTY CHIEF OF BASE

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JUNE 4, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

1020
DEPOSITION OF SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JUNE 16, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

CHRIS DONESA, Deputy Staff Director

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

BRIEN A. BEATTIE, Investigator

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

LINDA COHEN, Minority Senior Professional Staff

DANIEL REBNORD, Minority Professional Staff

FOR THE WITNESS

MICHAEL BORDEN,

SANA MUNASIFI,

JAMES COLE,

Sidley Austin LLP

1022
5

Mr. Davis. Let's go on the record.

This is a deposition of Sidney Blumenthal conducted by the House

Select Committee on the events surrounding the 2012 terrorist attack

in Benghazi.

This deposition is occurring under a subpoena issued by Chairman

Trey Gowdy as part of the committee's investigation into the attack

on U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, that resulted in

the deaths of four Americans, including Ambassador Christopher

Stevens.

Could you please state your name for the record?

The Witness. Sidney Blumenthal.

Mr. Davis. Good morning, Mr. Blumenthal. My name is Carlton

Davis, and I am a counsel for the committee's majority staff.

I will ask everyone around the room very quickly to introduce

themselves as well, starting to my right.

Mrs. Brooks. Congresswoman Susan Brooks from the Fifth District

of Indiana.

Mr. Jordan. Jim Jordan, Ohio 4.

Mr. Donesa. I'm Chris Donesa. I'm the deputy staff director for

the committee.

Ms. Jackson. Sharon Jackson, and I'm with the majority staff.

Mr. Westmoreland. Lynn Westmoreland, Georgia 3.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with the majority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

1023
6

Mr. Rebnord. Dan Rebnord with the minority staff.

Ms. Cohen. Linda Cohen, minority staff.

Mr. Missakian. I'm Craig Missakian, majority staff.

Mr. Borden. Michael Borden, Sidley Austin.

Ms. Munasifi. Sana Munasifi, Sidley Austin.

Mr. Cole. James Cole, Sidley Austin.

Chairman Gowdy. Trey Gowdy, South Carolina.

Mr. Roskam. Peter Roskam, Illinois.

Mr. Pompeo. Mike Pompeo of Kansas.

Mrs. Roby. Martha Roby, Alabama.

Mr. Davis. Sir, the committee appreciates your appearance at

this deposition. As we continue to gather facts surrounding the

attacks in Benghazi and Libya, your relationship with Secretary Clinton

offers unique insight that is extremely valuable to this committee.

Some of the questions asked today may appear basic. This is not

intended to demonstrate disrespect for your experience or your time,

as members and staff are well-versed on these issues. Rather, these

questions are intended to provide a clear record that can help inform

all members and staff about specific areas we are exploring in our

investigation.

Before we begin, I would like to go over the ground rules and

explain how the deposition will proceed.

The way the questioning proceeds is the majority will ask

questions first for up to 1 hour, and then the minority will have an

opportunity to ask questions for an equal period of time if they choose.

1024
7

We will firmly adhere to the 1-hour limit for each side. Questions

may only be asked by a member of the committee or a designated staff

attorney. We will rotate back and both, 1 hour per side, until we are

out of questions and the deposition will be over.

Unlike a deposition in Federal court, the committee format is not

bound by the rules of evidence. You or your counsel may raise

objections for privilege or classified information, subject to review

by the chairman of the committee after the deposition has adjourned.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted to raise

objections when the other side is asking questions.

You are welcome to confer with your counsel at any time throughout

the deposition, but if something needs to be clarified, we ask that

you make this known. If you need to discuss anything with your counsel,

we will go off the record and stop the clock to provide you this

opportunity.

We'd like to take a break whenever is convenient for you. This

can be after every hour of questioning, after a couple of rounds,

whatever you prefer.

During a round of questioning, if you need anything -- a glass

of water, use of the facilities, to confer with counsel -- please just

let us know, and we'll go off the record and stop the clock. We would

like to make this process as easy and as comfortable for you as possible.

This deposition is unclassified, so if a question calls for any

information that you know to be classified, please state this for the

record as well as the reason for the classification. For example,

1025
8

please state whether it is classified for national security reasons.

Once clarified, to the extent possible, please respond only with the

unclassified information. If we need to have a classified session

later, that can be arranged.

There will likely be votes called during the course of this

deposition. If votes occur, we will break until votes are completed

and the members return.

We encourage witnesses who appear before the committee to freely

consult with their counsel. And your counsel is present today.

And could your counsel please state his name for the record?

Mr. Cole. James Cole.

Mr. Davis. Thank you.

As you can see, an official reporter is taking down everything

you say to make a written record, so we ask that you give verbal

responses to all questions, "yes" and "no," as opposed to nods of the

head. I'm going to ask the reporter to please feel free to jump in

in case you do respond nonverbally.

Do you understand that?

The Witness. Yes, I do.

Mr. Davis. Also, we should both try not to talk over one another

so it is easier to get a clear record.

We want you to answer our questions in the most complete and

truthful manner possible, so we will take our time and repeat or clarify

questions as necessary. If you have any questions or if you do not

understand any of our questions, please just let us know. We will be

1026
9

to happy to clarify or repeat our questions.

If you honestly do not know the answer to a question or do not

remember, it is best not to guess. Please give us your best

recollection. And if there are things you do not know or you cannot

remember, just please say so and inform us who, to the best of your

knowledge, may be able to provide a more complete answer to the

question.

This deposition is under oath. You are required to answer

questions from Congress truthfully. Do you understand that?

The Witness. I certainly do.

Mr. Davis. This also applies to questions posed by congressional

staff in a deposition. Do you understand this?

The Witness. Yes

Mr. Davis. Witnesses who knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand this?

The Witness. I do.

Mr. Davis. Is there any reason you are unable to provide truthful

answers to today's questions?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Davis. Pursuant to committee rules, the witness will be

sworn in before providing testimony during a deposition.

Chairman Gowdy. Mr. Blumenthal, I'm going to ask you to raise

your right hand.

Do you swear or affirm to tell the truth in your testimony, the

1027
10

whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

The Witness. Yes, I do.

Chairman Gowdy. May the record reflect the witness answered in

the affirmative.

Mr. Davis. Okay. That is the end of my preamble. I will ask

the minority staff if they have any opening remarks they would like

to make.

Ms. Sawyer. Only welcome, Mr. Blumenthal. Thank you.

The Democratic members hope to join during the course of the day.

There were several scheduling conflicts, between hearings and matters

that are scheduled to be on the floor a little later today, but it is

their hope that they will be able to attend at various portions of the

day.

So we thank you for being here.

The Witness. Thank you.

Mr. Davis. Okay. The clock now reads 10:41. So we will get

started with the first hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I was hoping you could start off by walking us through some

of your professional history up until the time when you served in the

White House.

A Before I was in the White House?

Q Before you were in the White House, yes, sir.

A Well, I was a journalist. I worked in Boston for many years

1028
11

as a journalist after I graduated from college. I went to Brandeis

University, and then I became a journalist in Boston. Worked for a

number of newspapers. I wrote feature articles at one point for the

Boston Globe Magazine. I wrote some articles for the New York Times

Magazine.

And then I worked in the '83-'84 campaign for the New Republic

as the national political correspondent. And, at the same time, I

worked for the NBC "Today" show. I was an on-air commentator.

I was then hired to work on the national staff of The Washington

Post, and I worked at the Post until 1989. And then I went back to

the New Republic as a senior editor and worked there until, I'd say,

December 1992 and then worked at The New Yorker Magazine.

And I worked at The New Yorker -- well, I also worked at Vanity

Fair as a contributing writer in the early '90s. And then I worked

at the -- I worked at The New Yorker, and then I went to work at the

White House.

Q During your time as a journalist with all these

organizations, did you come into contact with many high-level officials

in European governments, as your role?

A I did.

Q Okay. Can you explain some of those contacts and how you

came to make them?

A Well, living in Washington, I met a lot of people in the

normal course of events. I was invited to various events. But, in

particular, I became friendly with Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.

1029
12

I was invited by the political attache of the British Embassy,

Jonathan Powell, to a lunch with them in, I'd say, February of 1993.

We had a very long lunch. They had come to Washington as younger

members of the Labour Party interested in the election of Bill Clinton.

And there were -- and Jonathan Powell had arranged a lunch for them

to discuss what had gone on. And we became very friendly. Jonathan

and I were friends, and Tony and I became friends.

I went over to London a number of times. Working at The New

Yorker, Tina Brown, who was English, staged various events in London

and elsewhere in England, including debates. We held debates in Oxford

at the Cheltenham Literary Festival. We would debate members of

British news organizations.

And I'd see my friends in London. I had many friends there. I've

been there over the years since 1972. And I would see Tony and meet

his staff and see Gordon. And that developed into a friendship.

I encouraged Tony, who was then the Interior Minister -- Home

Minister, it was called -- to come to the U.S. and meet with Justice

Department officials and discuss policy and see what American policies

were. When he came over, I held a dinner at my house for him. It was

attended by Tom Foley, other Members of Congress, members of the press.

And I stayed in touch with Tony. Jonathan -- you're interested

in all this?

Jonathan became his chief of staff --

Q I read it through your interview with the Miller Center

several years ago --

1030
13

A Yeah.

Q -- so I'm familiar with a lot of what you're saying.

A Yeah.

Jonathan became his chief of staff. And I went back and forth

a lot to London. I wrote for The New Yorker a very long piece about

British politics and Tony when he became Labour leader.

A So --

Q And then -- if I may --

Q Sure, sure.

A -- I introduced Tony to Bill Clinton.

Q So, outside of your relationship with Mr. Blair, with

Mr. Brown, what other contacts did you make, you know, as a journalist

in Western European or Eastern European countries at that time?

A I had contacts in Germany. I had gone to Germany for the

Aspen Institute of Berlin in 1986 to participate in seminars. I was

then on the staff of The Washington Post. It was then that I went over

into East Berlin at the suggestion of a friend of mine who was a

Georgetown law professor who was at the Wissenschafts-Kolleg in Berlin

named Norman Birnbaum.

He had been banned from the East because of his contacts with

dissidents, and he asked me to go over there, which I did. I don't

speak German. I made my way and found my way in the darkness to their

apartment. I spent all evening with them. I'm happy to tell you all

about it.

These became the leaders of Neues Forum, who overthrew the East

1031
14

German regime. I sat with their children. I happened to have a pocket

of American change. I went through every coin and explained the

picture of every American President and what he had stood for.

When I came back, I was incarcerated inside a cell in the Berlin

Wall. I was held; my notes were taken. I had been followed by the

Volkspolizei. These people were spied on by the Stasi. I wrote it

up in The Washington Post. You can find the story.

During that trip, I became very friendly with a German, a member

of the foreign service there named Wolfgang Ischinger. Wolfgang

became a friend of mine. He eventually became the director of the

entire German foreign service and eventually the German ambassador to

the United States.

So he was my principal German friend. Over time, I became friends

with many Germans, including Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister,

and others.

Q Moving south geographically just a bit, what type of

relationships were you able to build with people in the Middle East

up until the mid-'90s? Were there individuals in the Middle East that

you came in contact with through your role as a journalist either here

in D.C. or while you were --

A In my role as a journalist, I have not been to the Middle

East.

Q Okay. And what about Africa or Northern Africa? Had --

A No.

Q -- you spent any time there?

1032
15

A No.

Q Okay.

Between the time you left the White House up until the 2007 or

2008 timeframe, approximately that 6 or 7 years time period --

A Which period is this?

Q Between the time that you left working at the White House --

A Yes.

Q -- up until 2007 or 2008, that was roughly 6, 7 years --

A Right.

Q -- can you talk about what your employment was at that time?

What different sources of income did you have?

A I worked as a journalist. I worked for The Guardian of

London as a columnist, as the American columnist. It's a daily British

newspaper. I worked for Salon.com as the Washington editor.

I was for 6 years a senior fellow at the New York University Center

on Law and Security -- and I would go back and forth to New

York -- principally on issues on the war on terror.

I made two movies. The first movie I made with a Dutch-born

English friend of mine named Menno Meyjes, who was the -- who had won

an Academy Award for writing "The Color Purple," and a Hungarian

American named Andras Hamori. And the movie is called "Max." It's

about the rise of Hitler. It's a feature film, and it stars John

Cusack. We made this in Budapest. You can see it on Netflix or -- I

think it's a really interesting movie.

Then I made a documentary with Alex Gibney, the documentary

1033
16

filmmaker. It's called "Taxi to the Dark Side." It's about torture.

I was the executive producer; I originated and organized this. And

this movie won the Academy Award and the Emmy.

And that all happened in this period.

Q Is "Taxi to the Dark Side" something that we would find on

Netflix, as well?

A Absolutely. I hope so. The distributor was really bad,

I will say, if I can testify truthfully for the record.

Q Let me ask, during this time period where you were work at

Salon.com, you were working with The Guardian, you were making you

movies, can you describe your relationship with Hillary Clinton, I

guess then-Senator Clinton at the time? How often did you see her?

What were the nature of those contacts?

A I'd been in regular contact with Hillary since before she

was First Lady. It's been intermittent sometimes, but the contact's

been pretty regular. When she became a Senator, I would see her in

her Senate office, and I would talk to her on the phone from time to

time.

Q Did you see her outside of the Senate office much during

that time period?

A I had her to dinner.

Q Over --

A At my home.

Q At your home? Okay. Are they neighbors? Is their house

in Washington close to where you live in D.C.?

1034
17

A Their house is -- yeah, it's about 10, 15 minutes from where

I live. And I would -- I visited her a couple of times. And I was

friendly with her mother, as well.

Q How often would you see her in her Senate office?

A Very intermittently.

Q And how often would you speak with her on the phone during

that time period?

A I couldn't say. Not infrequently but not frequently.

Q Okay.

A From time to time. She's busy, but we would talk, and we

maintained our relationship.

Q Once a week? Once a month? It varied depending on --

A It would depend -- depend on the period. And it was up to

her.

Q What do you mean, "It was up to her"?

A She would initiate the calls.

Q Okay. You never called her on the phone during that time

period --

A No.

Q -- that you remember?

A No.

Q At some point she announced her candidacy for President.

Did you work on her campaign?

A I did.

Q And can you explain what your role was on the campaign?

1035
18

A It was a senior advisor, working on strategy.

Q So did your interactions with her become more frequent as

a result of your role in the campaign?

A Yes.

Q And would you talk with her? Would you email with her?

Would you see her in person? All of the above? How would you describe

the content of those relationships?

A Almost exclusively telephone calls.

Q Were you located here in D.C.?

A I was.

Q Okay. And did you work in Arlington? Did you work out of

your house? Did you have another office?

A I mainly worked out of my house.

Q Did you ever travel with her to different campaign stops?

A I was in New Hampshire briefly, and that was about it. I

mainly stayed in D.C.

Q At the time that you were working on her campaign, did you

have any other concurrent employment at the same time?

A No.

Q Okay. So you worked for her campaign exclusively.

A Yes.

Q At the conclusion of her campaign in the summer of 2008,

what did you do for employment at that point in time?

A After the campaign ended, I returned to journalism. And

I worked with Tina Brown, who had been my editor at The New Yorker,

1036
19

on the startup of what became The Daily Beast -- Newsweek. And I was

an editor there.

Q And when did you start working with Tina Brown, if you can

remember? 2008?

A I think -- I think likely. I don't remember precisely.

Something like that.

Q And did you spend --

A Yeah. Whenever it started up. We -- we had initial

conversations.

Q And that was your only employment at the time post the 2008

campaign?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

After the Presidential --

A I think so. I think -- I didn't -- I didn't go back to

Salon. I didn't go back to writing. So it was just editing. That's

as I recall it.

Q Okay.

After the Presidential election in 2008, at some point in time

did you learn that Hillary Clinton would be nominated for Secretary

of State?

A Yes.

Q And how did you learn that piece of information?

A From her.

Q Okay. And did she call you to inform you of that fact?

1037
20

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall approximately when that phone call

took place?

A No.

Q Okay.

A Whenever she was offered that position.

Q So do you recall how long that phone conversation lasted?

Was it brief? Did you have an extensive conversation?

A We had an extensive conversation.

Q Okay. And, during the course of that conversation, did she

mention to you at all that she would like you to work for her at the

State Department?

A No.

Q Did you have any subsequent conversations where she

mentioned that she would like you to work for her at the State

Department?

A Much later.

Q Okay. And what were those conversations? What did she

tell you she would like you to be doing?

A She asked me to work at the State Department as a consultant

to the State Department on European issues.

Q Was she the only person that you spoke with about this

position, or was there anybody else?

A I spoke to Cheryl Mills.

Q And do you know how many times you spoke with Cheryl Mills

1038
21

about this position?

A I'd be guessing.

Q A handful? A dozen?

A No. Maybe two or three.

Q Okay. Do you know how many times you spoke with Secretary

Clinton about your possible employment at the State Department?

A Not much. We just had a conversation or two.

Q So, after that initial conversation, you might have had one

or two additional conversations with her about that topic of your

employment at the State Department?

A Yes.

Q But you never ended up working at the State Department.

A That's right.

Q Can you explain how that happened?

A What I understand is that there were members of the

political staff in the Obama White House who still held some feelings

left over from the 2008 primary campaign, and they felt that I was on

the political side. And that's what I understand.

Q How was that information conveyed to you?

A In a phone call from Cheryl Mills.

Q Did you ever speak with Secretary Clinton, Hillary Clinton,

about this issue, you not working at the State Department?

A I did.

Q Okay. And can you describe that conversation, to the best

that you remember it?

1039
22

A She thought that I should work there, that I could

contribute a lot on these issues involving European policy given who

I knew and contacts and so on, and that she regretted that this had

happened.

Q In your conversations with Secretary Clinton and Cheryl

Mills, did you have any -- this is when you were still being considered

for the position -- did you have any conversations about payment from

the State Department or how that would work, with your role as a

consultant?

A It never -- to my recollection, it never got there.

Q Okay. So you don't know whether or not you would have been

a full-time State Department employee or whether you would be a special

governmental employment or a separate consultant?

A You know, I think it was consultant.

Q Okay.

A I think that's how it was supposed to be.

Q At the time this was occurring -- and this is around late

2008, early 2009 timeframe? Does that sound right?

A No. More like 2009.

Q 2009.

A Not 2008 at all.

Q 2009. Okay. Do you recall whether or not you had a

security clearance at the time?

A I did not.

Q Okay. Did you ever fill out any paperwork for a security

1040
23

clearance?

A I had never filed any paperwork.

Q Okay. Did you file any type of paperwork for your

employment at the State Department?

A I never filed any.

Q Okay. Did you ever receive any?

A I received it, but it never went anywhere.

Q Okay. Did you fill it out, if you recall?

A Never got to the end.

Q Okay.

A Never got there.

Q Did you ever suggest, either to Hillary Clinton or to Cheryl

Mills, anybody that you thought might be a good fit in their State

Department?

A No.

Q Okay. So you don't ever recall recommending anybody for

employment to Cheryl Mills or to Hillary Clinton at the State

Department?

A No.

Q Did you recommend anybody for employment at the State

Department to anybody else that you can recall?

A Yes.

Q And who was that individual that you recommended?

A I recommended a young man named , who had

been at the NYC Center on Law and Security. He would have been a law

1041
24

student at NYU.

He was a brilliant young man and knew a great deal about energy

policy. He was involved in the seminars at NYU. And he spoke multiple

languages -- spoke Arabic, Farsi, romance languages. Incredibly

brilliant young man.

And I suggested that he should work on the energy issues. And,

eventually, he was hired as a deputy assistant on Central Asian energy

issues in the Special Envoy on Energy's Office, as I recall.

Q So who did you suggest -- who did you make the suggestion

to that Mr. would be a good employee of the Department?

A I suggested it to him.

Q Oh, to him?

A To him. Yeah.

Q Did you make a recommendation on his behalf to anybody?

A I may well have, but I don't recall it.

Q You say at some point he was hired to the Special Envoy's

Office?

A Yes.

Q Was that shortly after you had made the suggestion to him,

or was that at any other point?

A I don't know the dates.

Q So, while this was occurring, you were being considered for

a position at the Department, you were still working with Tina Brown

at this point?

A Yes.

1042
25

Q And then did you at some point begin receiving any

compensation from any other source?

A No.

Q At some point, you started -- I'm sorry.

Have you ever received any compensation from the Clinton

Foundation?

A Yes.

Q And when did that compensation begin?

A That began in the fall of 2009.

Q Okay. And how did that come about, that you started

receiving compensation from them?

A I had had a discussion with people at the foundation about

new programs involving educational programs about the Clinton

Presidency that they wanted to start.

Q Okay. And who did you speak with at the foundation?

A Doug Band, then the president of the foundation.

Q Okay. And how much was the compensation you were receiving

at that time from the Clinton Foundation in the fall --

A Well, when I was hired, I was paid 120 a year as a salaried

employee.

Q And has that since changed?

A Well, I don't work at the foundation anymore.

Q So you no longer work at the foundation.

A No.

Q And when did you cease your employment at the foundation?

1043
26

A Earlier this year.

Q Was your salary at the foundation, 120,000 a year, was that

consistent from the time you began working there up until earlier this

year?

A It changed about a year and a half ago when I turned 65 and

I went on Medicare and I went off the proper payroll of the foundation

and became a consultant. But nothing changed except that, instead of

receiving the medical benefit from the foundation, I went on Medicare.

Q So at the time --

A That's what happened.

Q Sure. So, at the time you began working for the foundation

in 2009, they provided you health insurance?

A Yes.

Q And did provide you any additional benefits on top of health

insurance that you can remember?

A I know that there were other benefits, and I don't think

I took advantage of them.

Q Okay.

Did you have a written agreement or a written contract with the

Clinton Foundation?

A I'm sure I did.

Q Did the Clinton Foundation provide you with an office from

which to do work?

A I worked from my home.

Q So, during the 4 years that you worked at the -- how long

1044
27

did you work at the Clinton Foundation? Was it 4 years? Five years?

Some time in between?

A I'd say about 5 years.

Q Okay. Had you received any other sources of income during

those 5 years that you worked at the Clinton Foundation?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what were those other sources of income?

A The sources of income were payment for books from Simon &

Schuster.

During this time, I have been also writing on my own a very large

work on the political life of Abraham Lincoln. I have written about

a million words. And Simon & Schuster seems to think that this is

something they want to publish, right now in four volumes. They're

very long books. The first volume will be published in April of 2016.

And I received advances on those books from Simon & Schuster.

Q So, in addition to the advances that you received, in

addition to your salary at the Clinton Foundation, were there any other

sources of compensation for you between 2009 and 2014?

A No.

Q Did you ever receive any payment from an organization called

Media Matters?

A Oh, yes. I did -- I did receive payment in that period from

Media Matters.

Q Okay. And what was your relationship with Media Matters

at that time period?

1045
28

A I was a consultant to Media Matters. I'm sorry I --

Q That's okay.

A I overlooked that.

Q When did you become a consultant for Media Matters?

A I would say the very end of 2012.

Q Okay. And how did that come about, that you became a

consultant for Media Matters?

A I have had a very long friendship with the chairman of Media

Matters, whose name is David Brock, from before he founded this

organization, and I have sustained that friendship. And he asked me

to help provide ideas and advice to him and his organizations.

Q So you began your relationship, your paid relationship,

with Media Matters at the end of 2012.

A Right.

Q Does that continue to this day?

A It does.

Q Okay. And what is your salary or your contract with Media

Matters? How much money are you earning from them?

A I'd say it's about $200,000 a year.

Q And has that been roughly consistent from when you began

receiving payment from Media Matters?

A I would say it's -- I'd have to check. I think it's

increased a little bit. It's increased some.

Q Okay.

Are you familiar with the organization American Bridge?

1046
29

A Yes.

Q Have you received any compensation from American Bridge

over the last 5 years?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And how much compensation have you received from

American Bridge?

A Well, when I talk about that amount of money, I mean all

of those organizations.

Q So all of David Brock's entities --

A Right.

Q -- combined are 200,000?

A About.

Q Okay.

A Something like that.

Q Okay. So there's American Bridge.

A Yes.

Q There's Media Matters.

A Right.

Q Are there any other organizations on which you have done

work for Mr. Brock?

A Correct the Record --

Q Okay.

A -- is another organization.

Q Okay.

A And then there's the American Independent Institute, which

1047
30

is a journalistic foundation.

Q So, when you receive your paycheck, who signs the paycheck?

Where does that come from?

A It's deposited directly. I imagine it comes from David

Brock.

Q Okay. Not David Brock personally but one of his --

A Whoever -- whoever is responsible for that payment.

Q Okay.

When you were working at the Clinton Foundation, did you have any

financial disclosure requirements you were required to submit?

A I don't know.

Q Did you ever submit any financial disclosure requirements

to the Clinton Foundation?

A No.

Q When you were working at the Clinton Foundation, were you

required to vet through the foundation any other sources of income that

you may have had?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Did you vet the additional source of income from

David Brock through the Clinton Foundation while you were working

there?

A I would say that people at the foundation knew about my

relationship with David Brock and that I advised him, but there was

no discussion about any money.

Q Okay. And when you say the people at the foundation knew

1048
31

of your relationship, are you talking specifically about Mr. Band, or

are you talking about anybody else?

A I think Mr. Band certainly knew.

Q Before the end of -- the very end of 2012, when you started

drawing a paycheck from Media Matters, did you have any type of informal

relationship with the organization?

A I've always had a friendship with David Brock.

Q Okay.

A I have written about it publicly in a memoir called "The

Clinton Wars," and he has written about it in his memoir. It's not

a secret relationship.

Q Sure.

Mrs. Brooks. I have a couple questions.

Mr. Blumenthal, can you describe for us your work at the Clinton

Foundation? What was the nature? What was the portfolio of your work?

What kind of work did you do?

The Witness. Yeah. Thank you.

I did educational work for the Clinton Foundation. I began by

designing, framing, and implementing programs on the nature of the

Clinton Presidency. The Clinton Library is part of the foundation,

so when we say the Clinton Foundation, it includes the library. And

I was the one who wrote and then helped implement programs to educate

people about what had happened.

We had seminars. We had panels. There were lectures. There

were large events. There were small events. Universities were

1049
32

involved. Various think tanks were involved. And this went on all

the way to the end. And I can talk to you about those various events.

Mrs. Brooks. So who did you report to at the Clinton Foundation?

The Witness. I reported to Valerie Alexander, who was the

communications director.

Mrs. Brooks. And so, besides the educational programming, were

you also involved in the communications side of the Clinton Foundation,

the messaging side, so to speak?

The Witness. Well, I would talk to her.

Mrs. Brooks. And that was her role?

The Witness. Yes.

Mrs. Brooks. And did you have employees who worked for you

during --

The Witness. No.

Mrs. Brooks. -- that time?

The Witness. I had no one working for me.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

And, during that time, in putting on these programmings, did you

have interactions with others in Europe or the Middle East in putting

on any of the programs?

The Witness. I'd say -- I would say not.

Mrs. Brooks. Did you have focuses on U.S. foreign policy --

The Witness. There was one --

Mrs. Brooks. -- at the Clinton -- under the Clinton Presidency?

The Witness. Yes. We staged, for example, at NYU, in February

1050
33

of 2011, a day-long event of a series of panels about Bosnia-Kosovo

War and the Dayton Peace Accords. And it involved many of the principal

actors from the administration, and there were Bosnian officials,

journalists like Christiane Amanpour, President Clinton participated,

Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger.

Mrs. Brooks. And you arranged those days and those --

The Witness. This whole idea was mine.

Mrs. Brooks. And did you have regular interaction with President

Clinton and Secretary Clinton during that time that you were working

for the Clinton Foundation?

The Witness. I had -- I had occasional contacts with President

Clinton, and I was in touch with Secretary Clinton.

Mrs. Brooks. Would you confer with them about what your role was

and what kind of programming, maybe asked them for what kind of

suggestions they wanted to see in the educational programming?

The Witness. With President Clinton. Only with him.

Mrs. Brooks. Directly?

The Witness. Yes. Sometimes.

Mrs. Brooks. When, specifically, did you leave the foundation?

You --

The Witness. March.

Mrs. Brooks. -- said earlier this year.

The Witness. March.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. In March.

I don't think I have any more questions.

1051
34

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Did the Clinton Foundation provide you with a cell phone

with which to work?

A No.

Q Did they provide you with any other type of electronic

device?

A No.

Q Did they provide you with an email address?

[Voting system bell tolls.]

The Witness. You all okay?

Mr. Davis. We're okay. We're used to it.

Mr. Cole. It's sort of like Pavlov.

The Witness. They provided me with an email address, but I never

used it.

Mrs. Brooks. What email address did you use during that time that

you worked for the Clinton Foundation?

The Witness. I used two email addresses. I used one, an AOL

account, which I more or less stopped using after I was hacked by a

foreign criminal operating from a Russian server who stole my emails,

which is the subject of a Federal criminal suit of which I am a victim

with Colin Powell and Dorothy Bush, the sister of President Bush.

Mrs. Brooks. And what email was that?

The Witness. That was -- you want the address?

Mrs. Brooks. Uh-huh.

The Witness. It's sbwhoeop

1052
35

Mr. Davis. What does that mean, "sbwhoeop"?

The Witness. It was the long-term address I had had from the

time I had been in the White House. It was not a White House address,

but it contains an acronym of various White House words that I kept

just out of convenience and also because no one knew what it was.

And then I switched to a account after I was hacked.

Mrs. Brooks. And so what did that acronym stand for?

The Witness. Sidney Blumenthal, White House Office, Executive

Office of the President.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And then you switched, and what was the next

email address?

The Witness. A little less obscure.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Chairman Gowdy. Carlton, do you have a lot of questions about

the circumstances surrounding Mr. Blumenthal's separation from the

foundation?

Mr. Davis. You can ask those questions if you would like to.

Chairman Gowdy. No, no, no. You do it. I just want to make -- I

just want to understand, if you left in March, I want to understand

the circumstances behind the separation.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So you just testified that you left in March --

A Yes.

Q -- of 2015. Do you recall the exact day where you severed

your relationship with the Clinton Foundation?

1053
36

A I don't.

Q Okay. And how did that severing occur? Was that on their

end or on your end?

A The programs that I was working on had come to an end. We

had just stopped doing those educational programs.

Q Are there any specific educational programs that had come

to an end?

A Well, the ones about the Clinton Presidency and its legacy.

Q Okay. And when exactly did those programs come to an end?

A I would say my contribution to them came to an end in -- they

came to an end with his last lecture at Georgetown, which he gave in

April.

Q And that was in April --

A And that was, I think --

Q -- of 2015?

A -- the third or the fourth in a series that I had

participated in helping him with.

Q So, when the relationship with the Clinton Foundation

ended, did you pick up the phone and call the Clinton Foundation and

say, my work here is finished? Did they call you and say that your

work here is finished? Can you describe the conversations you had with

the folks at the Clinton Foundation regarding your separation?

A It came from their end.

Q It came from their end. And who called you?

A Valerie Alexander.

1054
37

Q Okay. And what did she tell you, as you recall?

A That these programs had come to an end, and thank you very

much, you know, but -- that's it.

Q Okay. You don't remember exactly when in March 2015 --

A I don't.

Q -- this occurred?

A I don't.

Q Okay.

Mrs. Brooks. A couple more questions.

Did you do speechwriting for the President? When he was

addressing, for instance, in April, was that part of your work, as well?

The Witness. I suggested some of the topics for these university

lectures that were related to this program. I was not involved in any

of his other speeches.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Would you communicate with the President or the Secretary during

this time about the work that you were doing and copy the other or copy

others if you emailed them about the work?

The Witness. I copied people at the foundation who I worked with

on this. There were a group of people. There were weekly conference

calls. There was a lot of work. There were other people who were

full-time on this. Same time that I left, there were other people who

had worked over a similar period who also ceased working.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q And do you recall who those people were?

1055
38

A Tom Friedman, who was a former -- another assistant to the

President, to President Clinton, who was in the White House and former

colleague of mine, and he had been involved in this program also.

Q Was there anybody else in addition to you and Mr. Friedman?

A Mark Dunkelman is, I think, still at the foundation doing

other work. He was involved in this. Valerie was involved. But

there were many other people involved in this program.

Q Is Mr. Friedman still at the foundation?

A No.

Q So he left around the same time that you did?

A Well, I don't think he -- he was a consultant to the

foundation. He had his own private business.

Mrs. Brooks. Do you have any idea how many employees the

foundation has?

The Witness. No, I don't.

Mrs. Brooks. Any idea how many they had in March when you left?

The Witness. No, I don't.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

The Witness. I could only guess. I don't know.

Mrs. Brooks. Any all-team meetings ever take place?

The Witness. No. The foundation's pretty vast.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

The Witness. I think it's more than 1,000 people.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

The Witness. So the calls that I were on were, you know, a dozen

1056
39

or so.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Have you had a chance to review your emails that have been

produced to us by the State Department in the course of our

investigation?

A The State Department emails?

Q Correct. Have you had a chance to review those?

A No.

Q Okay.

Chairman Gowdy sent you a request for additional documents on May

29 of this year. On Friday, your lawyer responded with 179 pages of

emails. Do these 179 pages comprise every responsive page pursuant

to Chairman Gowdy's request?

A Yes.

Q We have seen some documents and communications -- I believe

there are five -- that we have received from the State Department that

are responsive to the request that Chairman Gowdy sent you, but your

lawyer did not produce them last Friday. Do you know why that is the

case?

A I don't know specifically.

I do know that I only have what I have, what I saved. I was hacked,

as I told you. I got rid of my previous computer. I was visited by

the FBI, the Secret Service, and the Diplomatic Security of the State

Department. And I was very unhappy about having my privacy invaded

1057
40

by somebody who the FBI told me was probably part of a foreign

intelligence operation.

And I had kept my emails, as far as I knew, from Hillary and deleted

a lot of -- most of my account and switched to a different computer.

And I'm not tech-savvy. I did this all on my own. I didn't have anyone

helping me. I was very unhappy and disconcerted.

Q Why did you keep your emails from Hillary?

A I thought that at some -- even though they had been hacked,

I thought that, at some point, given that I'm a historian, I might write

about this, and it might be significant at some point as a historical

matter.

I kept emails from . But the

rest just -- it was not a rational process that I dealt with in this

immediate aftermath of being hacked. And I was visited by the FBI and

the Secret Service, and I was very upset.

Q The production that your lawyer made on Friday, looking at

that side-by-side with the production that we received from the State

Department, it's relatively clear you and Secretary Clinton had

significant communications regarding Libya in 2011 and in 2012.

Do you recall having any other -- or any communication with

anybody else in the executive branch in that timeframe, 2011 to 2012?

A About Libya?

Q About Libya, yes.

A No.

Q So she was the only person in the executive branch that you

1058
41

were interacting with?

A Yes.

Q Did you have any communications with Andrew Shapiro about

Libya in 2011-2012?

A Thank you for reminding me of that. I -- this involves a

lot of explanation.

Q Sure.

A I made a phone call to him in, as I recall it, early 2012

asking where to receive -- where I could find information about ITAR.

Q And why were you interested in finding information about

ITAR?

A Let me give you his answer. His answer was to go to the

Web site.

I had been involved in a so-called business interest, and I say

"so-called" because it began as an idea from a Libyan in a conversation

to someone I knew for humanitarian aid in the middle of the Libyan

revolution. Tens of thousands of people were being killed and wounded.

There was a lot of violence. There was a lot of distress about the

absence of medical care. He raised this idea. I discussed it with

another friend. And we can go into it if you like.

But what happened was that they set out to try and provide this

humanitarian care, medical care. I thought it was a wild idea. I

thought -- I had minimal involvement beyond acting as an early

facilitator in this. There were some conversations. There were some

emails. I had a very limited, marginal role. I had no expectations

1059
42

this would ever work out in such a crazy environment as Libya. I didn't

really know these people. And it never got off the ground.

And even when it never got off the ground, I'd forgotten about

it, and a person who was in touch with one of these people said they

had thought that they might bring medical supplies that somehow might

be covered by ITAR and did I know anybody. So, as a friendly gesture,

I made a call to Andrew Shapiro and asked where to find that information.

That's what I did.

Q So why did you call Mr. Shapiro and not ask Secretary

Clinton?

A Well, I knew that -- I knew Andrew Shapiro from Hillary's

Senate office. He had been an aide, and I knew that his position

was -- involved that area. We had been friendly. We were

acquaintances. And I just was seeking information.

Q Okay.

You mentioned that -- mentioned that there was an idea that was

started by a Libyan contact. And who was that individual?

The Witness. What do you want to do about this name?

Mr. Cole. I think you can give him the name, and then we can talk

about the redactions if we need to.

The Witness. Okay.

This Libyan's name was . He was a Libyan

businessman. I think he was living Amman, but he was Libyan.

Mr. Davis. Okay.

The Witness. He was someone who was known by someone I knew whose

1060
43

name was Cody Shearer. Cody Shearer was a journalist and had been

involved in an education -- international education program in

Washington, which he had students from around the world.

One of them was a Libyan who happened -- and this person was the

father of this student. And when the Libyan revolution broke out, the

student and the father got in touch with Mr. Shearer. And that's how

I learned about this.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q And Mr. was the father of one of the students --

A Of one of the students --

Q -- in Cody Shearer's programs?

A That's right.

Q Okay. All right.

And you mentioned, I believe, that you discussed this venture with

another individual?

A Yes.

Q Was that Mr. Shearer, or was that somebody else?

A That individual was Tyler Drumheller.

Q Okay. We'll come back to this during our next hour of

questioning.

A Sure.

Q We can explore it a little more in depth.

1061
44

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q You mentioned the phone call that you placed to Mr. Shapiro

about ITAR. Did you ever have any type of email communication with

him about Libya in the 2011 to 2012 timeframe?

A I don't know because I don't have those emails. I just,

you know, my emails were a catastrophe.

Q But it's possible you did have email communications with

him during that time?

A Well, yes, it's possible.

Q You mentioned, back in early 2009, when you were being

considered for a position at the State Department, you talked with both

Hillary Clinton and Cheryl Mills at that time. Do you recall ever

exchanging any emails with Cheryl Mills about the topic of Libya in

the 2011 or 2012 timeframe?

A I did not.

Q And how can you state so definitively?

A I know I didn't.

Q You didn't. Okay. So the 179 pages we received from your

lawyer on Friday is the universe of everything that you have that is

responsive to the chairman's request?

A Yes.

Q But there might be other emails that are responsive to the

chairman's request that you do not have as a result of the hacker? Is

1062
45

that possible?

A It's conceivable. I'll just say I've done my best here.

Q Sure. The emails you produced, did you look at the

production before your lawyer sent it to Chairman Gowdy?

A I turned it over to my lawyer.

Q So the emails don't have any header information, to or from,

subject, time. It's extremely limited compared to most other email

printouts that we have seen. What is the reason for that?

A It's just how I save things over time. It's just -- I have

not done this on, I guess, on a systematic basis. It's just what I

did.

Q So when you say it's how you saved things over time, did

you save your entire email file? Did you save individual emails? How

did you save these emails?

A I cut and paste things in a folder, and this is what there

is.

Q And so you cut and paste -- did you cut and paste the emails

into a separate Word document and save them as Word documents? What

do you mean you cut and paste?

A I'm almost out of my technical expertise here. I just cut

and paste things. I put them in a folder, and a lot of them were Word

documents, and that's what they were.

Q So that's why the associated header information is not

available because you printed off Word documents that you had saved?

A This is just what I did.

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Mrs. Brooks. Can I ask a clarifying question? In some emails,

did you cut and paste just part of the email and save it in a folder?

Or when we are seeing these emails, is that the entirety of the email

in all likelihood?

The Witness. In all likelihood, you're seeing what there is.

Mrs. Brooks. So you didn't cut and paste certain parts of an

email and put it in a folder?

The Witness. Right.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Did you personally review every email that you had, or did

you have your lawyer do that on your behalf?

A Well, I compiled this myself and submitted it to my

attorney.

Q Is there anything responsive to the request that you did

not submit to your attorney?

A No.

Q We only have about 6 minutes left before our hour is up.

So, very briefly, I was hoping we could discuss the hacking incident

that you have alluded to on several occasions. Were any emails from

your account, were any of them publicly disclosed as a result of the

email hack?

A Yes.

Q And how many of your hacked emails were publicly disclosed?

A I don't know.

Q Have you seen any of these emails that had been publicly

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47

disclosed?

A Some of them.

Q And were they, in fact, your emails?

A Yes.

Q Did any of these emails include emails sent to Hillary

Clinton?

A Yes.

Q Following the discovery of the hacking, did you notify

Secretary Clinton about the hack?

A Yes.

Q And why did you notify her?

A Because her emails had been hacked also.

Q Her emails, you mean your emails to her?

A Yeah. But I believe she had already been notified because

I was contacted by the Secret Service and the FBI, and they would have

contacted her immediately. And I was not the only one who was hacked.

Colin Powell was hacked. Dorothy Bush was hacked.

Q How did you find out that your email account had been hacked?

A Well, I was sitting at home, and I got a phone call from

somebody from a Web site called SmokingGun.com. And he said: I'm

calling you up to let you know your email account has been hacked by

somebody named Guccifer.

And I said: What can you tell me about this?

He says: Well, he's hacked your email account, and we're going

to report it.

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And then my emails were the next day published on the account on

the Web site of Russia Today, coincidentally, the propaganda organ of

the Putin government, and on Gawker.com, those two Web sites. I was,

as I said, very upset. And then, subsequently, if I may add, there

were other emails that kept coming out that I had not seen.

And I was in contact with the FBI, DS of the State Department.

They came to see me. They were very upset themselves. They regard

me as if -- they intend to extradite this criminal, who is sitting in

a Romanian prison right now, under a Romanian sentence, and try him

in the Federal Court in Alexandria in the Eastern District of Virginia.

There's an indictment of him. And they were very solicitous of me as

somebody who would testify in that trial and wanted to protect me. And

I had appreciated that.

And I asked them what could be done about this. They said that

there was very little that could be done, but that the media

organizations that had published this material had been investigated

by the Federal Government as part of this hacking and that that might

be introduced as evidence if there were a trial. So that's what I was

told by the Federal investigators.

Q So after your account had been hacked, were you able to log

back into your account at some point?

A It was a mess. You know, I switched almost all my personal

emails to . And it took me a while to do that because I had so

many people who communicated with me by email, just like everybody else.

Q What do you mean you switched almost all of your personal

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49

emails to ?

A Well, I only have personal emails. I'm a private citizen.

Q Sure. But did you transfer everything from your

account to ?

A No, I didn't transfer a thing.

Q Did you print out any emails that you wanted to save?

A No.

Q You cut and paste?

A I have these folders, and that's what I have.

Mr. Davis. We're coming up on 59 minutes. So we'll stop the

clock and go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Sawyer. We'll go back on the record. It's 11:55.

Again, Mr. Blumenthal, I'm Heather Sawyer. I'm one of the

counsel for the minority members of the select committee. I am joined

here today by my colleagues Peter Kenny, Susanne Grooms, and Linda

Cohen, Dan Rebnord. As I mentioned earlier, many of the Democratic

members were hoping to be able to attend. We're fortunate that the

scheduling worked out.

Representative Schiff is here. He's going to have to leave for

a matter scheduled for the floor today in a few minutes. So, while

he was here, I certainly wanted to open by giving him an opportunity

to speak with you and ask you some questions.

Mr. Schiff. Thank you very much.

And thank you for being here today, Mr. Blumenthal. I'm not sure

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I've ever started questioning of a witness by making an apology, but

I feel, on behalf of several members of the committee, we have to

apologize to you for the manner in which you were brought before the

committee, which I want to ask you a bit about. But I understand that

you never had a chance to volunteer to appear before the committee and

were subpoenaed without any prior notice. And I think that is a course

of action that should never have taken place.

So I wanted to start out by expressing my regret for how you were

brought before this committee. So let me begin by asking you a bit

about that. Would you have been willing to appear voluntarily in the

absence of a subpoena?

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Schiff. Were you ever given the chance, or were you ever

called to ask whether you'd be willing to come in and meet with the

committee?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Did you ever receive a letter asking you to come and

appear before the committee?

The Witness. I did not receive that letter before I received a

subpoena.

Mr. Schiff. So the first invitation you got to appear before us

was in the form of compulsory process?

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Schiff. Had you ever indicated, prior to receiving that,

that you were somehow unwilling to cooperate with the investigation?

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51

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Let me ask you about the service of the subpoena

itself. Who was it that came to your home to serve the subpoena?

The Witness. Two U.S. marshals came to my home.

Mr. Schiff. Were the marshals armed?

The Witness. I don't know. I didn't see them. My wife answered

the door.

Mr. Schiff. And did they end up serving your wife?

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Schiff. The committee could have come and either sent you

the process or delivered it to your home. Did you ever give the

committee any reason to believe that you would not have willingly

accepted service from the committee instead of U.S. marshals?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Well, I guess I just want to reiterate that I think

serving you a subpoena without any effort to invite you to come before

the committee as a willing witness is a terrible disservice to you.

And I think utilizing the marshals when that was unnecessary is a waste

of taxpayer resources. And I deeply regret that it happened. And I

want to extend apologies on behalf of several of my committee colleagues

to you and your family.

The Witness. Thank you. If I can add one thing. My wife is an

elected official in the District of Columbia. She's elected by voters,

by constituents. She's an advisory neighborhood commissioner. She

represents our neighborhood, which is Glover Park. And as

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52

inappropriate as it was for her to be handed the subpoena, she's also

a public official. She's elected. And they came in the middle of the

day. There were neighbors walking by. They didn't know what this was

about. It could have been anything involving her. There could have

been an aspersion of wrongdoing about her and her public service. So

I was doubly unhappy that there was any cloud cast over my wife.

Mr. Schiff. Thank you for sharing that experience with us. And,

again, my profound regret that it had to happen at all.

You have been subpoenaed here to testify as part of the

subcommittee's investigation of the September 2012 Benghazi attacks.

The committee has conducted a series of interviews since February and

publicly prided itself on interviewing eyewitnesses to the attacks or

people on the ground who could relay firsthand knowledge of security

in Benghazi or the attacks.

I take it, Mr. Blumenthal, you're not in that category of the

percipient witness of these attacks? You weren't present at the time?

The Witness. I was not.

Mr. Schiff. Were you ever in Benghazi between the spring of 2011

and the night of the attacks?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Were you involved in any way in discussing,

formulating, or implementing security for U.S. facilities or personnel

in Benghazi?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Did you receive any warning before the attacks in

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53

Benghazi that an attack was imminent?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Were you involved in any way in the administration's

military response or readiness on the night of the attacks?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. So there have been a number of issues over the last

couple years that have been raised about Benghazi that, notwithstanding

all the evidence to the contrary, we seem hard-pressed to put to rest.

So let me ask you if you have any firsthand knowledge about any purported

military standdown order, that military assets were ordered not to

intervene when they could have intervened?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. One of the other myths about Benghazi is that there

was illicit gunrunning by the CIA. Do you have any personal or

firsthand information about any illegal gunrunning by the CIA in Libya

or Benghazi?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Do you have any firsthand knowledge about who

perpetrated the attacks in Benghazi?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Any light you can shed from any personal experience

you might have on those who either planned or participated in the

attacks?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. In May of 2014, we adopted a resolution in the House,

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54

567, that set up this select committee. The Speaker at the time

explained the select committee was needed because there were, quote,

"so many unanswered questions," unquote, about the attacks.

Specifically he said there were three areas the select committee would

investigate.

The first he said were the events leading up to 9/11/2012, the

number of requests for more security and why it was not provided. Do

you have any firsthand knowledge of the number of requests for more

security and what was done with those requests for more security?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. So you can't add any personal information, firsthand

information, as to the Speaker's first stated purpose of the committee?

The Witness. I have no such information.

Mr. Schiff. Second, the Speaker said the select committee would

investigate, quote, the events of the night of September 11, 2012, what

happened, and why there was no response.

I think you already said you had no firsthand knowledge prior to

the attacks that they were going to take place. Right?

The Witness. Yes, that's what I said.

Mr. Schiff. Do you have any firsthand knowledge about what kind

of military response the U.S. provided or failed to provide on the night

of the attacks?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. The Speaker then listed the last question he wanted

our committee to answer as, thirdly, why did the White House describe

1072
55

this in a way I believe they knew was false?

Do you have any firsthand knowledge about the White House's

formulation of how they would describe the attacks?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Were you involved in crafting the infamous talking

points for Susan Rice or anybody else in the administration?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Were you involved in crafting how Secretary Clinton

would speak about the Benghazi attacks?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Similarly, when the select committee was stood up,

our chairman identified other questions he believed the select

committee should answer in addition to those the Speaker posed. One

of those questions was: I would like to know why we, number one, were

still in Benghazi when everyone else pulled out?

Mr. Blumenthal, do you have any firsthand knowledge of why the

U.S. or why Ambassador Stevens was in Benghazi on the night of September

11, 2012?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Our chairman had a second question, which was: Why

was our security footprint so light despite the repeated request for

more security?

Do you have any firsthand knowledge about our security footprint

in Benghazi or repeated requests for more security?

The Witness. No.

1073
56

Mr. Schiff. I have to say I'm not surprised by any of your

answers. It does surprise me that you would be the first witness that

we would subpoena to depose, given that you don't have firsthand

information, through no fault of your own. And I have to say it just

highlights the concern I have that our select committee's focus is not

on trying to get at the facts of what happened that tragic night, which

we know all too well, but rather trying to get at any facts that can

be used in the Presidential campaign against a likely Democratic

nominee. And that is I think a terrible abuse of this select committee

process.

Let me ask you a little bit about one other aspect of the select

committee's work. Initially the select committee was supposedly to

focus on the events of that night in Benghazi. I think failing to find

anything particularly new about the events of that night, the select

committee is attempting to broaden its jurisdiction to look at all of

Libya policy.

This seems to me a strange use of an investigative select

committee. We might as well have a select committee on what's

happening in Yemen or a select committee on what's happening in Syria

or Iraq or countless other places, in Egypt. That's really not what

the select committee was supposed to be about. And, indeed, the very

beginning of our meetings, some of the first meetings we held were with

those who lost family members that night. And what we committed to

do was to uncover any facts yet to be uncovered about the tragic events

of that night.

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So I'm not sure why a broader look at Libya policy is in order

here, except for, I suppose, the degree that it can be utilized during

a Presidential campaign. But, nonetheless, we are where we are. And

so I suppose we're going to spend some part of our committee time looking

at policy decisions that were made more than 4 years ago in the spring

of 2011 to support U.N. intervention against the former Libyan

dictator, Muammar Qadhafi. That U.N. intervention was nearly a year

and a half before the attacks in Benghazi. And I think we need to also

remember what was going on on that evening of September 11 in other

capitals of Muslim countries around the world. But at the time, many

high-profile Members of both parties, high-profile Republicans,

including Senators McCain and Graham, urged the United States to

support the rebels. And Congress asked for and received information

on the administration's policy decisions back in 2011. Secretary

Clinton's policy stance was public at the time, so it's not as if we

need a select committee to investigate what the public policy was.

I understand that several of the recently announced Republican

candidates for President have expressed an interest in debating whether

these foreign policy decisions were the right ones. And there's an

appropriate place for that. In my view, that is not here, in a

committee entitled the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the

2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, Libya.

That said, because the select committee is going beyond, in my

view, its clear mandate, let me ask you to confirm a few things on the

record about your involvement or lack of involvement.

1075
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Mr. Blumenthal, were you directly involved in formulating the

Secretary's or the administration's policies regarding Libya?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Clinton or any

of her staff the decision to have a diplomatic presence in Benghazi?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Do you have any evidence that the information that

you sent to Secretary Clinton actually influenced any of the decisions

that she or the administration made related to Libya?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Apart from your longstanding relationship to the

Clintons, Mr. Blumenthal, do you have any idea why you're here?

The Witness. Hope to find out.

Mr. Schiff. You and I both.

The Witness. I hope to clarify some matters if I can and any

questions people have. That's why I'm here. I'm here to answer the

questions.

Mr. Schiff. There have been leaks from the select committee that

in addition to the emails that were produced by the State Department,

that there were additional emails that you produced that had not yet

been produced by the State Department. Do you have personal or

firsthand information why the State Department would not have produced

the emails that you produced?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. Were you at all a part of the State Department's

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document production?

The Witness. Could you repeat?

Mr. Schiff. Apart from providing your own emails, were you at

all involved in the State Department's vetting of their own emails to

determine what was relevant to preparing document requests from this

committee?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Schiff. That I think exhausts the questions that I had. I

think I will turn it back over to staff. And, once again, I appreciate

your being here. I apologize for the manner in which you were brought

here.

And I hope once the select committee satisfies itself that you're

not a percipient witness, don't have any firsthand information about

the events of that night, that it will allow the Presidential political

process to do its job and restore the focus of this committee on the

events of that tragic night and get out of the Presidential campaign

business.

Thank you for the opportunity to ask you questions.

The Witness. Thank you, Congressman.

Ms. Sawyer. Again, good morning, I have some questions for you.

And it's our hope that the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, will also

be able to join us for a few minutes during our round of questioning.

We were advised via press release of a possible intent by the

chairman and the majority to release the emails that you have produced

to the committee publicly. Now, with the production that was given

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to this committee, your attorney, Mr. Cole, had sent a letter asking

that before documents be released publicly, there be an opportunity

to clarify a few items in those emails that there was concern about

being publicly released because of potential risk to particular

individuals with regard to personally identifiable information.

Ms. Sawyer. Mr. Cole, has anyone reached out to you about your

request?

Mr. Cole. Yes, the chairman told me that requests would be

honored.

Ms. Sawyer. And did he, when he told you that, did he also advise

you of the intent to release the emails publicly?

Mr. Cole. He said, before anything was released, we would make

sure that those redactions were taken into account.

Ms. Sawyer. Well, the first that any Democrats -- Ranking Member

Cummings was not advised of the intent to release the documents, nor

were any of the other Democratic members or staff. The first we had

heard of it was in the public release. We just wanted to confirm that

that had been your request. And certainly our intent on our side of

the aisle to honor the request that before there be any public release,

there be a discussion with you, on behalf of Mr. Blumenthal, to ensure

that nothing that is released publicly by this committee puts anyone

at risk, and we honor your request.

Mr. Cole. Thank you.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. SAWYER:

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Q Now, a quick question before I shift gears a little bit.

In the last hour Representative Brooks had asked you a question. When

you were describing your production to your lawyer so that they could

produce documents in response to Chairman Gowdy's request. And she

had asked you whether or not when you preserved those documents, whether

they had been changed in any way from how you believed you had

potentially sent them to Secretary Clinton or anyone else. And I think

you said that you did not recall having altered any of the documents.

Is that the case?

A To my knowledge, I'm not aware that I altered anything.

That's what I had. I turned over what I had.

Q Okay. Sitting here today with us, would you be able to,

looking at any of those documents -- many of them don't bear the

typical, to the extent they were sent by email -- and sitting here today

can you even tell us whether each and every one was sent by email that

you have turned over to this committee?

A Yes, they were sent.

Q Could you tell us, sitting here today, looking at those

documents, which ones, whether or not they are in the exact format that

they were sent to whoever they were sent to?

A They were sent to -- how I preserved them. I mean, they

were -- how I sent them to the committee is how I had them in their

preserved state.

Q Okay. Thank you. Now, I think, as my colleagues

indicated, that we haven't gotten actually to the communications that

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you did produce, but I wanted to ask you in the last hour, but I did

want to ask you some general questions about those. You have said very

little publicly about both the request that you appear, not the request

but your compulsory appearance here, or the documents. But you did

indicate in a public statement just released by your attorney that you

had sent this information as a private citizen and friend. What did

you mean by saying that you were sending this information to Secretary

Clinton as a friend and private citizen?

A I sent them to her because I thought they were possibly

helpful or useful to her and for her to use as she saw fit and for her

to have evaluated any information that was there on her own.

Q Now, many of the emails or documents that you produced are

styled in a manner that's like a memo, and they contain a fair amount

of information in them. Did you write, author those actual -- I'm going

to just call them memos -- that you sent to Secretary Clinton? Were

you the author of those?

A No.

Q Who was the author?

A Tyler Drumheller.

Q Can you explain to us who Mr. Drumheller is and your

relationship with him at the time that you were sending. First, who

he is if you could explain, give us a little background on who Mr.

Drumheller is.

A Tyler Drumheller is the former chief for Europe of the CIA.

He has held many responsible positions in the CIA, had a lifetime career

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63

in the Agency, received its most distinguished awards. He is an old

friend of mine.

Q And you described him as an old friend. Is he also in any

way a business associate of yours? It has been alleged in some of the

press reporting about the emails that he potentially was a business

associate of yours. Was he writing these memos in particular as part

of some kind of business venture that you were engaged in together?

A The memos that he wrote began before there was any

discussion of the so-called business interest, which was a humanitarian

idea, concept.

He had initially shared with me a memo of the Egyptian situation,

which I thought was very interesting, and I sent it on to Secretary

Clinton. So there were a number of memos on Egypt that I sent. And

then when the Libyan revolt broke out in the so-called Arab Spring,

he shared with me his information on Libya. And this preceded any

discussion of this, as I put it, so-called business interest.

Q And what was your understanding, to the extent you had one,

of why Mr. Drumheller was writing and collecting this information and

who he was doing that for?

A Mr. Drumheller has spent his lifetime inside the CIA. He's

been a station chief in various places. He was chief of all of Europe,

operational and analytical. And he collects information. He gathers

information from his many sources. He has clients. I don't know who

they are. And he also simply collects information.

Q And at the time -- let's just limit this to the time period

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of spring that's covered by the production that you sent the committee,

which I believe starts in February of 2011 and goes through 2012, so

just during that time period. What was your understanding? Was Mr.

Drumheller, when you said he has clients, are these private persons?

To the extent you know, are these governmental entities?

A I don't know what they are, but my understanding is he has

large corporate clients, American clients, but I couldn't tell you who

they were. He has not shared that with me.

Q And you indicated that Mr. Drumheller provided these

informational memos to you. You then passed them on to Secretary

Clinton. Did Mr. Drumheller know that you were passing the information

to Secretary Clinton?

A Yes.

Q And he had no objection to you doing that?

A No.

Q Did he ever ask for any attribution for you to indicate to

the Secretary that these had come from him?

A She knew their source, that they came from Tyler Drumheller.

Q To the extent you know, what was her understanding of who

Mr. Drumheller was and why he was producing these informational memos?

A I introduced Tyler Drumheller to Hillary Clinton when she

was a Senator. I brought him into her Senate office to brief her at

great length in 2007 on the intelligence that had led up to the Iraq

war. He had an intimate knowledge of that, was directly involved. And

I thought it would be useful for her to hear firsthand from him, given

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his central involvement in this, what had happened. So she knew Tyler

Drumheller, and she knew that these memos were written by Mr.

Drumheller.

Q So Mr. Drumheller was the author of the memos and not you.

Were you involved in any way in gathering the underlying information

that was contained in the informational memos that were sent to the

Secretary?

A No.

Q So you have no firsthand knowledge of any of the information

that was contained in the memos that you sent on to the Secretary?

A I have none.

Q Now, some of those memos that were sent bear a mark at the

top, a number of them, the informational memos, that just say in block

letters the word "confidential"?

A Uh-huh.

Q What is your understanding of why that stamp was on some

of those memos?

A Thank you. It was not a stamp.

Mr. Drumheller would send me his reports. And I would cut and

paste them into an email. And I would just write "confidential" on

them. It didn't mean they were classified. It didn't mean anything

like that, just that I was sending them to Hillary and for her and her

use only. That was my intention.

Q So just to be absolutely clear on the record, the fact that

that word was on some of these informational memos was in no way meant

1083
66

to signify nor did it actually mean that the Federal Government had

classified any of the information in the memos or the memos themselves?

A That's correct.

Q What did you expect? What was your expectation as to what

Secretary Clinton was going to do with the information that you sent

her?

A I don't know. I simply sent it on to her for her to use

if she found it helpful, to do what she saw fit with it.

Q And do you know what she actually then did do with any of

the informational memos or documents that you may have sent on to her?

A No, I do not. I was never told.

Q Now, in some of the documents that we have seen, there is

sometimes a brief note back from the Secretary to you that says a thank

you or keep it coming. Beyond those exchanges, do you recall having

any discussions with the Secretary about the content of the information

contained in the documents that you've provided to the committee?

A We had no such discussions.

Q Now, when asked about the emails that you sent her,

Secretary Clinton has described those emails as, you know, unsolicited

emails that she passed along in some instances. Do you generally agree

with her characterization of the communications as unsolicited?

A They were unsolicited in the sense that she wouldn't know

she was receiving them or when she was receiving them. I would simply

send them. And they would also be intermittent.

Q And did she, to the best of your recollection, ask for you

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to cover a particular topic in any of the memos that you sent? Did

she task you to do particular research?

A No.

Q Now, when Representative Schiff was here, he asked you,

touched on this question, and while it is, you know, probably true that

some of the information that you were sending her was consistent with

or may have been inconsistent with other information that she was

receiving, I just wanted to ask you whether or not you had any evidence

that the information that you were providing to the Secretary changed

her mind on any particular policy decision or was really the tipping

point or the factor on issues that she was considering with regard to,

let's say, in particular, Benghazi, the subject matter that this

committee is supposed to be investigating?

A I have no idea what her decisionmaking was. She never

communicated that with me.

Q And would your answer be the same, speaking more broadly,

to policy of the Secretary or the administration in Libya, more broadly?

A Yes.

Q Now, there has been speculation in the press that you asked

for, received, expected, some sort of benefit in exchange for providing

information to Secretary Clinton. Was that the case? Did you expect

to receive any sort of benefit back from Secretary Clinton?

A Not at all.

Q And did you, in fact, receive a benefit back from Secretary

Clinton?

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A No.

Q Now, one of the implications in the press -- and you have

been questioned in the last hour about your association with the Clinton

Foundation -- and one of the allegations in the press seem to be

that -- at least the implication is that your employment with the

Clinton Foundation was somehow meant to be an end run around the

inability to be hired into the State Department directly. Was that

in any way the reason why you're sending these memos, the relationship

that had been established?

A There was no relationship between my sending emails to

Hillary and the educational work I did at the Clinton Foundation. The

position I had been offered at the State Department was about European

affairs, and the work at the Clinton Foundation was very different.

It had no overlap whatsoever.

Q We touched on this briefly, and your kind of more broad

response covers it, but I do want to because it has been alleged widely

in the press, I do want to talk with a little bit greater specificity

about what you have referred to as the potential -- and I'm probably

misquoting it -- but the business venture that was considered with

regard to some folks who wanted to potentially provide -- I think you

had indicated it was humanitarian aid -- in Libya post the fall of

Qadhafi.

According to some press reports, the memos, the informational

pieces that you sent to Secretary Clinton came from a group of business

associates. Now we spoke just moments ago about your understanding,

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and you indicated that you did not know whether or not Mr. Drumheller

had, in particular, been creating these informational memos for any

particular group of clients. Is that true?

A That is true. Mr. Drumheller, as I said, began sending

memos before there was any discussion of humanitarian assistance. And

I didn't know the sources in any of his reports.

Q And did he continue -- I don't know when that business

venture ceased having any kind of realistic expectation of being

successful. Do you recall when that was?

A Well, I believed at the beginning it had no prospect of being

successful. It seemed completely improbable and implausible to me.

At the start, I was involved in some of these conversations. And there

were emails. And then some people went off. I didn't know much of

what they did. And it never got off the ground. It was completely

undeveloped.

I never had any expectation. No money was ever exchanged. I

never made a penny. I invested nothing, and I received in the end what

I thought I would receive in the beginning, which is nothing. Nothing

happened. I was not surprised.

Q And two businesses in particular have been identified in

the press. One is Osprey Global Solutions. Did you have any formal

arrangements with Osprey Global Solutions?

A No, I had no contract with them.

Q Did you ever, to the best of your knowledge, have any direct

contact with them about the work they hoped to do in Libya?

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A I knew about it.

Q But did you yourself ever speak with them about that work.

A I had one encounter with the head of Osprey, is a retired

general named David Grange. I had met him when he was very briefly

in Washington. And he indicated he wanted to do this. And that was

my contact with him. And I had no financial arrangement with him or

his organization.

Q Did he in particular ask you to reach out in any way to

Secretary Clinton on his or Osprey's behalf?

A No.

Q Did he ask you to reach out, to the best of your

recollection, to anyone else in the State Department on his or Osprey's

behalf?

A No.

Q The other business group that's been mentioned in the press

is Constellations Group. Did you have a formal business relationship

with Constellations Group?

A I had no contract with Constellations Group.

Constellations Group, as I understand it, is a group run by a man named

Bill White, who was the director of the USS Intrepid Museum in New York.

And I've never met him and never spoken with him.

Q Did you ever ask Secretary Clinton to do anything on behalf

of Mr. White or Constellations Group?

A No.

Q Did you ever ask anyone else in the State Department to do

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anything on behalf of Mr. White or the Constellations Group?

A No. I asked for nothing.

Q Now, just more broadly speaking, I'd just like to give you

the opportunity to answer a charge that has been made in, among other

places, on Fox News, the senior editor at large, Peter Schweizer, kind

of alleged with regard to you -- and when I quote the "he" in this is

you, Mr. Blumenthal -- says, quote: And so he's providing these so

called intelligence reports in an area he is not expert for while at

the same time he's working with this company that is seeking contracts

from the Libyan Government, and Sid Blumenthal was pushing them. I

mean, talk about a massive conflict of interest. If this isn't one,

I don't know what one would be.

I'd just like to give you an opportunity to respond to that

allegation that, one, you were pushing business on behalf of business

associates and, two, that this was a massive conflict of interest?

A Well, I never pushed anything. I never requested anything.

There was no relationship between my emails, sending emails to Hillary

and either my work at the Clinton Foundation or this misbegotten

venture.

Q Some of the press reporting, including press reporting as

late as this morning, indicated in different ways as it's described,

that you had set up and were running in essence a shadow intelligence

entity for Secretary Clinton. Was that the case? Had you set up and

were you running kind of a shadow intelligence agency for the Secretary?

A No.

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Q One of the other issues that this committee has -- at least

the majority of the committee has indicated an interest in

investigating is Secretary Clinton's use of a personal email address.

The documents you were sending, it appears went to a personal email

address. With regard to that, I just wanted to ask you, do you have

any reason to believe that Secretary Clinton set up or used that email

account in order to circumvent Federal laws regarding preservation of

Federal records?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that Secretary Clinton

set up or used that email account in order to circumvent State

Department or broader administration rules or regulations relating to

the preservation of Federal records?

A Again, not that I'm aware of.

Q And was your intent when you communicated with Secretary

Clinton at the email address that you had for her to cause or to assist

her in any way in circumventing requirements for Federal records?

A No.

Q Excuse me for my delay. I just want to mark these for you.

Ms. Sawyer. Mr. Blumenthal, I'm going to show you what I have

just marked as deposition exhibit 1 for purposes of identification.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

The Witness. Yes.

BY MS. SAWYER:

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Q That document for identification purposes in the bottom

right-hand corner bears the number State-SCB0045280. It's a 3-page

document.

A Right.

Q At the top, it has a to/from email that is from "hrod" to

an individual @state.gov. Do you know who that individual is?

A Yes. That should be , who was Hillary's

secretary and personal assistant.

Q Understood. And that email just has the communication in

the body that says PLS, presumably "please print," and right below that

is an email indicating from Sidney Blumenthal, and it has your email

address, to H. Was this a communication that you had sent to the

Secretary?

A It is.

Q And the time sent on that says September 12, 2012, 12:50

a.m. Do you recall sending this to Secretary Clinton?

A I don't recall sending any particular report to Secretary

Clinton. I recall sending reports, but I don't recall individual ones.

Q Okay.

A But I'm sure I sent this.

Q And we had talked more generally about some of the

information that you had sent Secretary Clinton, and I had indicated

during that discussion that some of the emails that you sent were kind

of in a memo style?

A Right.

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Q This one seems to be in that type of memo style, and we talked

a little about those. Was this one of the informational memos that

Mr. Drumheller had authored?

A Yes. Mr. Drumheller is the author of this memo.

Q And he had passed it along to you?

A Yes.

Q And then you in turn passed it along to Secretary Clinton?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall with regard to -- so you had no firsthand

knowledge, as you indicated for the others, of the information

contained in this particular email that you sent the Secretary?

A That's right.

Q Now, in that, I'm just going to direct your attention to

the body of the first page there. And it says in that first paragraph

that the new interim President of Libya, Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf

, spoke in private with senior advisers, including the members of the

Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, to discuss the attacks by demonstrators on

U.S. missions in Tripoli and Benghazi. That's in that first sentence.

The third sentence down goes on to say: During this session, a

senior security officer told el Magariaf that the attacks on that day

were inspired by what many devout Libyans viewed as a sacrilegious

Internet video on the Prophet Muhammad originating in America. The

Libyan attacks were also inspired by and linked to an attack on the

U.S. Mission in Egypt on the same day.

Now, you likely have heard because it has been alleged on several

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occasions in the time since the attacks, the allegation that the

administration fabricated and perpetuated a false narrative that the

attacks in Benghazi were somehow related to an Internet video or the

protests in Cairo, which had been inspired by the Internet video?

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that Mr. Drumheller

fabricated the information that he included in this memo that he sent

to you that you then sent to the Secretary?

A No.

Q And do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton read

this particular memo -- and specifically the description and the

sentences that I just read to you -- and relied on that in formulating

her view of or response to the attacks in Benghazi?

A I don't know that.

Ms. Sawyer. Now I'm going to show you what we have marked as

deposition exhibit 2 for identification purposes.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Sawyer. That document bears, down in the bottom right-hand

corner, the identifying information State-SCD0045280.

Mr. Cole. 2877?

The Witness. It says 6 here.

Mr. Cole. First page is 286.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I picked up the wrong exhibit. Yes. Thank you.

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76

SCD0045286, and it's a 2-page document. At the top of that document,

it does have the email stamp. It says, "From Sidney Blumenthal to H."

I assume, like the first exhibit we discussed, this was an email that

you sent to Secretary Clinton?

A Yes.

Q And that email indicates it was sent Thursday, September

13, 2012. Do you recall sending this particular email to the

Secretary?

A No.

Q As with --

A But let me add, I'm sure I sent it.

Q Understood. As with exhibit 1, did you author this?

Again, it is styled as kind of in a memo format. It has the

"confidential" that we talked about earlier. That was not meant to

indicate that this was classified information by the Federal

Government. Is that correct?

A Not classified.

Q And I assume that was also true about exhibit 1. It bore

that mark of "confidential." That also was not meant to indicate that

it had been classified by the Federal Government?

A It was not. I had no classified information nor any ability

to classify information nor access to any.

Q Turning back to exhibit 2, did you author the email

information that you sent to the Secretary that's represented in

exhibit 2?

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A No.

Q And did Mr. Drumheller, was he the author of this

information?

A Yes.

Q So, again, you had no firsthand knowledge of any of the

information contained in this document?

A That is correct.

Q I just want to draw your attention substantively to that

first paragraph that's in the actual body on page 1, and in the second

sentence there it says, quote: "Libyan security officials believe

that the attack was carried out by forces of the Islamist militia group

calling itself the Ansar al-Sharia Brigade; working out of camps in

the eastern suburbs of Benghazi," end quote.

The very end sentence of that same paragraph says: These

officials do believe that the attackers, having prepared to launch

their assault, took advantage of the cover provided by the

demonstrations in Benghazi protesting an Internet production seen as

disrespectful to the Prophet Muhammad.

The second paragraph goes on to say: The immediate events were

set in motion by a statement made by a Muslim cleric in Egypt saying

that the Internet film was going to be shown across the United States

on September 11 in an effort to insult Muslims on the anniversary of

the attacks on the New York World Trade Center in 2001. This statement

inspired increasingly hostile demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy in

Cairo and at diplomatic facilities in Libya.

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78

Now, again, as I indicated you likely had heard, there had been

allegations since the Benghazi attacks that the administration

fabricated a false narrative that the attacks in Benghazi were somehow

related to an Internet video or the protests in Cairo that had been

inspired by an Internet video. Do you have any reason to believe Mr.

Drumheller fabricated the information that I have just read to you from

that memo?

A No.

Q So Mr. Drumheller was just reporting on what sources had

reported to him. Is that the case?

A My understanding is that he was simply reporting what

information he learned at that time.

Q And beyond sending this email, which you indicated you

believed you had done, did you have any discussion about this particular

email with Secretary Clinton?

A No.

Q And do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton read

this particular memo -- and specifically the description that I just

read to you -- and relied on it in formulating her view or response

to the attacks?

A No.

Ms. Sawyer. I think we're almost at the end of our hour, so I

just want to consult quickly with my colleagues, and then we'll have

a discussion with our majority colleagues about whether -- and with

you guys, of course -- as to whether now makes sense for a time to break

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79

for lunch or to press forward.

Mr. Blumenthal, I think we don't have questions for now. I did

want to give Mr. Cummings his chance to thank you for being here with

the committee. He was able to get here from a hearing that had been

scheduled in conflict over in -- the deposition was in conflict with

a hearing over in Oversight and Government Reform, so I was glad that

he got an opportunity to join us at least for this portion of the day.

Mr. Cummings. I just wanted to take a moment to say thank you.

I know that you were cooperative, and you were subpoenaed. And I

understand the marshals came to your home, and I just want to thank

you for your cooperation. I've not heard anything ever that said you

weren't cooperative. And to you and your wife, I want to thank you.

The Witness. Thank you very much, Congressman.

Ms. Sawyer. Thank you. I think it is certainly our, the hope

of the Democratic members, that to the extent your emails are released

publicly, that they are done so in conjunction with the transcript of

this deposition because we do think it provides valuable context to

what anyone in the public domain might be thinking about the documents

that the committee might like to release.

So, again, thank you. At this point, we'll go off the record.

And we can discuss what makes sense.

[Recess.]

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Mr. Westmoreland. Mr. Blumenthal, I'm Lynn Westmoreland,

again, from Georgia, and I kind of sympathize with you. I just turned

65 last month. So I've been through the Medicare and the insurance

and the whole thing. But I am from the same generation about emails

and technology and different things. So I just wanted to ask you just

a couple questions about the emails.

The Witness. All right.

Mr. Westmoreland. Mr. Drumheller, were you on a -- like, was

this a newsletter he sent out? Because, you know, you're just a private

citizen. Was this a newsletter that he sent to different people? Or

how did you get on that email list, I guess is my question.

The Witness. It was not a newsletter. He wrote these reports

and sent it to me.

Mr. Westmoreland. Just one day you woke up and there it was?

The Witness. Well, I was a friend of his. I'd known him for many

years.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did he email you about a lot of other stuff

going on too or just --

The Witness. Yes, he did.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Did you ever email him back?

The Witness. I'm sure I emailed him. But I didn't send him

reports.

Mr. Westmoreland. No, I know that, but, I mean, did you email

him with any response that you might have to some of his reports?

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The Witness. I don't recall --

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

The Witness. -- doing that.

Mr. Westmoreland. The other thing I was going to ask you about

is you said you were a historian.

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. And that at some point in time you saved these

emails because you might want to write about it. Now, you know, if

you go buy an antique or something and some of it gets an adjustment

or a repair or something, that antique's not worth near as much if it

was in its original state. And I would think, from a history

standpoint, that would be true with these emails. I mean, you know,

why wouldn't you take the email as it was written so people could see

who it was from, who it went to, what time and what date versus the

cut and paste? Because I've cut and paste too, and I -- you know, it

took me forever to figure it out because the only time I did it was

to keep somebody from seeing who the email had originally come from

and who all it had went to, and I'm not saying that was the case of

yours.

But why -- from a history standpoint, why would you want to cut

and paste rather than keep the actual email, especially if you were

going to write about it or, you know, do some type of historical value?

Wouldn't the original emails have been worth more to the validity or

the realistic part of this?

The Witness. Well, I just -- I did what I did. And that's how

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I did it. And that's what I kept, and the -- that's the information

I have.

Mr. Westmoreland. But from a historical or, historian point of

view, would it be the same value no matter if you were writing about

it and you --

The Witness. Well, I think what matters is not so much

unless -- you know, emails are not like original letters. I deal with

original letters. I've worked in the Library of Congress and the

Archives and I've seen -- and they're not quite like that. They're

very -- digital forms are very different. Not that I had given it any

thought when I did this, I just did what I did. But what was important

was just that it existed and had information, and I had no idea, you

know, what I would ever do in the future.

Mr. Westmoreland. And the other thing, talking about our

generation and technology is, it's so much easier just to hit forward

and put H than it is to do all the cutting and pasting and all the other

things. I mean, that would be, in my opinion, just from my standpoint,

if I want to give something to somebody, I'll just hit forward and punch

the button.

The Witness. Well, I think that's good advice. I do. Thank

you.

Mr. Westmoreland. No. Thank you.

Mr. Roskam. Mr. Blumenthal, Peter Roskam. Just a couple

questions. This is following up on the discussion from the last hour.

What was your understanding of the nature of the work that

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Mr. Drumheller was putting together? And this is what I mean: He was

preparing a document that was going to you. Was that a work product

that he was giving to other people as well? Did he have a group of

paying clients, for example, or were you the exclusive beneficiary of

that information?

The Witness. I don't know the answer to that.

Mr. Roskam. Do you have -- have you come to an opinion about it?

The Witness. I could only guess.

Mr. Roskam. What's your guess?

The Witness. My guess is sometimes, and I couldn't tell you

which.

Mr. Roskam. What is it that made you come to that opinion?

The Witness. Just because I -- you're asking me to engage in --

Mr. Roskam. Total speculation.

The Witness. -- total speculation. I don't know who his clients

are, but I do know he has clients. That's all I know. So I assume

that if you have clients, you produce information. It may not even

be in that forum. I don't -- I really don't have a clue.

Mr. Roskam. So you never had a discussion with him about it, for

example?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Roskam. And you mentioned early in your testimony -- or I

wrote down in my notes, and I want to make sure that I'm understanding

what your testimony was before the break.

You said that you had no discussion with Secretary Clinton about

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the memos. Was that your testimony?

The Witness. I had no discussion with her about those reports.

Mr. Roskam. About the reports. The emails that we've been

largely discussing for the past couple of hours. Is that right?

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Roskam. But you did have discussions with her about Libya.

Isn't that right?

The Witness. I don't recall specific conversations with her

about Libya.

Mr. Roskam. Whether or not you recall the specific discussions

about Libya, you recall having discussions with her and the subject

being Libya.

The Witness. I'd be speculating, honestly.

Mr. Roskam. Do you recall seeing her for the first time after

the Benghazi attacks, for example? Do you remember seeing her for the

first time after the attack of September --

The Witness. Do you mean on TV?

Mr. Roskam. No. Seeing her personally.

The Witness. I didn't see her for months after that.

Mr. Roskam. And there is no discussion that you had with

Secretary Clinton about the events of Benghazi?

The Witness. I had no discussion with her about what happened

in those events.

Mr. Roskam. And we've already established that you had no

discussion with her about the memos, the emails, the Drumheller

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documents. Is that right?

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Roskam. You mentioned before that there -- shifting gears

now to the Clinton Foundation. You said that there was no subject

matter overlap between the job that was proposed to you at the State

Department and this job that you subsequently took at the Clinton

Foundation.

The Witness. Right.

Mr. Roskam. Why does that matter?

The Witness. It means that there was no relationship between the

position I was offered at the State Department, the kind of work I would

have done there, and the work that I did at the Clinton Foundation.

Mr. Roskam. Isn't it a possibility that someone could have

offered you a position at the Clinton Foundation as compensation for

not getting a job in the State Department regardless of the subject

matter? Isn't that possible?

The Witness. Well, the reason I got the job was to perform

specific tasks --

Mr. Roskam. I know, but you --

The Witness. -- to engage in a specific program that had begun,

and I thought I was well-qualified to do so.

Mr. Roskam. But you asserted this earlier in the hour before the

break, and I just thought it was a curious thing to assert. And so

I was asking you why you asserted that.

The Witness. I think I --

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Mr. Cole. As a point of order, could we see what question he was

asked when he answered with that assertion. Because I think

that -- putting it in context, Congressman, may make all the

difference.

Mr. Roskam. Fair enough. That's why I asked him to recall his

own testimony, but if we --

Mr. Cole. Well, but you're not putting it in context of what the

question is.

Mr. Roskam. Well, fair enough. We need to go back to the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Roskam. Let's go back on the record.

The Court Reporter. Question: Now one of the implications in

the press, and you have been questioned in the last hour about your

association with the Clinton Foundation, and one of the allegations

in the press seemed to be, at least the implication, is that your

employment with the Clinton Foundation was somehow meant to be an end

run around the inability to be hired into the State Department directly.

Was that in any way the reason why you're sending these memos other

than the relationship that had been established?

Mr. Roskam. And what was his response?

The Court Reporter. Answer: There was no relationship between

my sending emails to Hillary and the educational work I did at the

Clinton Foundation. The position I had been offered at the State

Department was about European affairs, and the work at the Clinton

Foundation was very different. It had no overlap whatsoever.

1104
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Mr. Roskam. So my question is: Why would you make an assertion

about the overlapping subject matter as an answer to a criticism of

the Clintons taking care of you?

The Witness. It was a response to the question of whether it was

an end run, and the short answer is no.

Mr. Roskam. You said that you didn't expect or receive a benefit

from Hillary Clinton. That's my memory of what your testimony was

Hillary Clinton before the earlier hour as a result of sending the

emails or the memos.

Counselor, are you okay if I characterize his question in that

way? I'm going to ask him a question about it.

Mr. Cole. Keep going.

Mr. Roskam. Did you receive a benefit from anyone other than

Hillary Clinton?

The Witness. A benefit from other than Hillary Clinton for?

Mr. Roskam. Sending the emails or the memos to her.

The Witness. No.

Mr. Roskam. So there was no implied promise?

The Witness. None.

Mr. Roskam. Was there an expectation on your part?

The Witness. None.

Mr. Roskam. Was this just something that you were taking the

initiative and trying to be helpful and that's all?

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Roskam. You said that the memos -- or Hillary Clinton has

1105
88

said that the memos were unsolicited and that you agreed with that.

This was in the prior -- the break before the lunch. Do you recall

that general --

The Witness. Generally.

Mr. Roskam. Okay. And you said that, in part, they were

unsolicited because they were intermittent.

Couldn't something be solicited and intermittent?

The Witness. Theoretically. By "unsolicited," I meant that she

didn't know what she would receive or when she would receive it.

Mr. Roskam. Did she have an expectation that she was going to

be receiving something from you?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Roskam. Okay. Thank you.

The Witness. Thank you.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I want to go back a minute. We were discussing your hacked

emails in our last hour. When you made reference to the fact that you

had seen some of these hacked emails on the Internet, and then you made

another comment about how other emails started showing up, can you

elaborate on what you meant by "other emails started showing up"?

A Yes, I can. There was an article in Gawker Magazine,

qawker.com, about 2 months ago. I don't know the exact date, but

possibly -- fairly recently, and it contained emails that had not

appeared before. And I was disturbed by this because it seemed to me

that somebody had collected these emails and had them, and I called

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the FBI because they asked me to cooperate with them, and I spoke with

the agent who I had originally spoken with, and he told me to tell the

media organizations not to publish material that had been illegally

obtained. And I said I didn't think that was going to do much good,

telling the media to behave.

So then I got a call from the Bureau and asked if they could come

by and see me, and an agent came by, different agent, and someone from

DS, from the State Department Diplomatic Security, who, it turned out,

I had not known before had been involved centrally in the international

part of this Federal investigation, because it involves more than me.

It involves some other people like Colin Powell and Dorothy Bush and

a former member of the joint chiefs. And this was a very extensive

thing. And I've told you what happened at that meeting.

Q All right. The emails, the new emails, the ones that you

recently discovered within the last couple months, were those, in fact,

emails that had come from your account?

A They appear to.

Q They appear to. Okay. Do you have a Clinton email dot com

email address?

A No.

Q Were you ever offered a Clinton email dot com address?

A No.

Q Have you ever been to Libya?

A No.

Q Never?

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A No.

Q Okay. When did you first become interested in Libya?

A Well, I'm interested in international affairs. So I've,

from time to time, been somewhat interested in Qadhafi. I remember

when President Reagan bombed Libya. I remember it very distinctly.

I remember the Lockerbie bombing. I remember what Qadhafi has done.

I pay some attention to this. I'm a member of the Council on Foreign

Relations, and I was a journalist who sometimes wrote on international

affairs. So, you know, Libya appears, from time to time, as an issue.

Q When did you first start closely tracking what was occurring

in Libya in early 2011?

A Well, in early 2011.

Q But that's not something you had on your radar in 2010?

A No.

Q Okay. Do you recall when you sent your first email to

Secretary Clinton about Libya?

A Well, you should have it. So I don't know what the exact

date of it is.

Q Okay. Well, let's take a look at it.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q This is exhibit 3. Do you recognize this document?

A It is -- it's a document that I produced for this committee,

yes.

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Q And is this, in fact, your first email that you sent to

Secretary Clinton about Libya?

A Must be.

Q Must be. But it's the first one that you had in your records

that you sent to her?

A Yeah. Must be it.

Q Okay. So let's look at this email for a minute. "I just

received this. More to come." The very first line of your email.

Was this something that she had asked for, intelligence on Libya?

A No.

Q Was this something that she was expecting?

A No.

Q Okay. So you just decided to send it to her out of the blue?

A Correct.

Q Did you receive any type of response from her about this

email?

A No.

Q Okay. Had you been sending her intelligence on other

countries prior to this initial email?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And which countries were those?

A Egypt from Mr. Drumheller. I think that was the first one.

She and I often talked about European affairs. I certainly wrote her

emails about Britain, Northern Ireland, subjects of which I knew

something.

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Q Did you know much about Libya at the time?

A No.

Q Okay. The second line of this email says, "This is just

in from Italian intel." How were you able to acquire this reporting

from Italian intel?

A This is Mr. Drumheller's report?

Q Yes. But you ultimately sent it to Secretary Clinton.

A Yes.

Q So you acquired it from Mr. Drumheller, and he acquired it

from Italian intel?

A It's what it says.

Q Okay. But you don't know for a fact whether he acquired

it from the Italian intel.

A I couldn't tell you what his sources are.

Q Did you ask him whether or not this came straight from

Italian intel?

A No.

Q Okay. Did Secretary Clinton ask you how you were able to

obtain information from Italian intel?

A No.

Q Are you aware of the general nature of the relationship

between our intelligence community and the Italian intelligence

community?

A No.

Q Okay.

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A Other than we're NATO allies.

Q Sure. Did you tell anybody at the CIA that you were passing

along information from the Italian intelligence community when you sent

this email to Secretary Clinton?

A No.

Q Okay. Do you recall what email address you sent this to?

A To the email address I was provided.

Q Okay. And who provided you that email address?

A Hillary Clinton.

Q Okay. And how many email addresses did she provide you?

A One.

Q Was that hdr22@clintonemail.com?

A Well, I believe that was it.

Q You believe that was it. Okay. Might there have been

another one that she could have provided you?

A No, I only sent it to one email address.

Q Okay. Did you ever email her on an official State

Department account?

A No.

Q Okay. Were you aware that she had a private server for her

email?

A No.

Q Did you ever ask her why she was not using an official State

Department address?

A No.

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Q Did you find it odd that you were sending her information

in her role as Secretary of State and she was not using a private email

address?

A No.

Q I'm sorry. She was not using a public email address?

A No.

Q Okay. So you had no qualms about sending her this

information on her own private email address?

A I did not.

Q Okay.

Chairman Gowdy. Carlton, can I ask a question?

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir.

Chairman Gowdy. Mr. Blumenthal, had you ever emailed Secretary

Clinton prior to this Drumheller intelligence memo that you sent?

The Witness. About anything?

Chairman Gowdy. About anything.

The Witness. Yes.

Chairman Gowdy. What were the circumstances under which she gave

you a new email address? Because this email address came into

existence, I believe -- well, I don't know when it came in. Is that

the one that you always used?

The Witness. I used one email address.

Chairman Gowdy. One for the entire time you corresponded with

her?

The Witness. Well, until I was hacked. After I was hacked, she

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changed her email address, too.

The Chairman. Okay.

The Witness. So it was that -- that one address.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Did you use that same email address prior to her becoming

Secretary of State, or was there another email address you corresponded

with her on?

A I don't recall at all.

Q What prompted you to send this piece of intelligence to her?

A I thought it might be helpful or useful. Seemed

interesting.

Q Okay. Did she ever ask you to gather intelligence for her

on Libya?

A No. No.

Q Did anybody ever ask you to gather intelligence for her or

for them on Libya?

A No.

Q Did anybody at the State Department ask you to gather

intelligence on Libya?

A No.

Q So you just sent an email out of the blue to the Secretary

of State about Libya. An email that came -- the information came from

the Italian intelligence service?

A I did.

Q Okay. And her response was what?

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A I didn't get a response.

Q Okay. But you continued to email her this intelligence?

A Yes.

Q Okay. She -- Secretary Clinton has stated in the press

that your emails to her were unsolicited.

Why would you send emails about intelligence in the Libya to

somebody who did not want to receive them?

A Well, I don't know that "unsolicited" means unwanted.

Q Okay. Do you know that she did want to receive these emails

from you?

A I didn't know that she wanted them in particular. I just

sent them.

Q Okay. Did she ever tell you not to send them?

A No.

Q Did she ever tell you to send more emails?

A No.

Q Did she ever tell you to send fewer emails?

A No.

Q Okay. Did she ever thank you for sending any of these

emails on Libya?

A She may have in an email.

Q Okay.

A There may be one where --

Q Did she ever suggest any avenues of inquiry for you to gather

intelligence on as it relates to Libya?

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A I don't recall. I don't believe so at all.

Q Okay. You don't recall, but it's possible that she could

have asked you to gather intelligence on a particular area?

A I'm searching my mind.

Q Sure.

A And there may have been -- and I could be wrong, but you

ought to have the documents where -- there was one document where she

was skeptical, and it may have been interpreted or seemed to be, you

know, get more intel or -- but I never sent anything. Never. There

was no -- there was no more.

Q So you never followed up on that one particular inquiry that

she gave you where she was --

A I don't know if it was an inquiry, but whatever it was, I

never followed up.

Q Okay. Her response to you --

A It would be in the documents.

Q Okay. We'll get to those.

A Yeah.

Q Okay. You said that you were not paid for these -- for

these emails that you were sending. Is that correct?

A Right.

Q Okay did you receive any type of compensation whatsoever

other than monetary compensation for these emails that --

A I didn't receive monetary compensation.

Q Other than monetary compensation. Did you receive any

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compensation other than monetary?

A No. Hillary Clinton is a friend of mine of 28 years.

Q But what about from anybody else other than Hillary Clinton?

A No.

Q You never received any type of compensation?

A For sending these emails? No.

Q Okay. Did you ever discuss these emails, these memos you

were sending her outside of the email setting? Did you ever discuss

them in person or over the phone?

A The contents of these emails here?

Q Correct.

A No.

Q Not just this one in particular from February 21, 2011, but

any of the -- any of the, you know, 60, 70, 80 emails that you may have

sent her.

A The Libya emails?

Q The Libya emails, that's correct.

A That's what you're referring to?

Q I'm talking specifically about the Libya emails.

A I don't believe so. No.

Q Did you ever text with Hillary Clinton --

A Never.

Q -- during Libya?

A Never.

Q Were you aware of anybody else that may have been sending

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her emails regarding Libya from outside of the State Department

organization?

A No.

Q Are you aware of anybody else sending her unsolicited emails

in regards to Libya?

A No.

Q Were you aware of anybody else outside of official

government channels sending her intelligence reports as they related

to Libya?

A No.

Q Were you aware of anybody outside of the official State

Department structure sending her intelligence reports relating to any

other country?

A I was not, but I always assumed, having been in government

myself, that she spoke to a wide network of people about all sorts of

matters.

Q Do you have any idea who these -- do you have any other names

of individuals you feel she may have been talking with about Libya

outside of the State Department structure?

A No, I don't.

Q Okay. Did you stand to benefit in any way from any decision

she made with regards to Libya?

A No.

Q How about any other actions she might have taken in regards

to Libya?

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A No.

Q How about from any referrals she may have made to you or

anybody else in regards to Libya?

A No.

Q How about any connections she may have had in regards to

Libya? Did you stand to benefit in any way from any of those?

A No.

Q Okay. I'm going to introduce exhibit 4.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q This is exhibit 4. So this appears to be an email. The

bottom email, it's -- this is a production from the State Department

document SCB-0045588 through 0045591. It is an email originally from

you to Secretary Clinton, Saturday, October 6, 2012 at 6:18 p.m. And

then she responded the following morning. And then you responded 9

minutes later.

So the subject of this email -- is this an email exchange that

you had with Secretary Clinton, to the best of your knowledge?

A It is.

Q So the subject of this email says, "H: Great to see you.

Drop in again. Here's Libya. Sid." Did Hillary Clinton drop by to

see you on or about October 6, 2012?

A She did.

Q Okay. You had just testified in an exchange with Mr. Roskam

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that you hadn't seen her for months after the Benghazi attacks?

A Oh.

Q Does this refresh your recollection on a conversation you

may have had with her?

A It does. It does.

Q Okay. Now where did she drop in to see you?

A At my home.

Q Okay. And how long did that conversation take place for?

A She had been to a high school football game of a nephew of

hers, and she had come by afterwards.

Q Okay. And --

A And she was there for an about hour or so.

Q About an hour.

A It was a social visit.

Q And did you discuss Libya in any way during this visit?

A I have -- no, not that I recall.

Q Do you recall discussing the Benghazi attacks in any way?

A No.

Q So you had sent her dozens of emails on Libya up until this

point. The attacks had occurred 3 to 4 weeks prior. You didn't

discuss this with her?

A No. My wife was present, and my wife had been the -- knows

the Clintons as well. We're very friendly with them. My wife had been

the director of the White House Fellows Program in the Clinton

administration, and Hillary came over and we had pretty much a social

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talk.

Q Did you have any conversations between the time of the

Benghazi attacks on September 11 and the date of this email, October

6, 2012, with Secretary Clinton about the Benghazi attacks?

A No.

Q Did you ever have a conversation with her about the attacks?

A No. I did not have any conversation with her about the

attacks themselves.

Q Okay. Did she stop by frequently to see you at your home?

A No.

Q Do you recall the last time you saw her prior to this email,

October 6, 2012?

A Probably a long time before.

Q So before the Benghazi attacks?

A Well, I may -- yes. Before. Long before.

Q During this conversation, did she ask you to stop sending

her intelligence reporting on Libya?

A No. She never brought it up.

Q Okay. Did she ask you to keep sending her intelligence

reports on Libya?

A No. She never discussed it.

Q Okay. So she never thanked you for sending intelligence

reports on Libya?

A No. We gave her some tea. She thanked us for that.

Q Do you ever recall having any discussions with Secretary

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Clinton about any frozen assets from the Qadhafi regime?

A I believe that there is one email about that.

Q Okay. But that discussion would have taken place only over

email?

A Yes.

Q And that -- you would not have had a phone discussion with

her?

A No.

Q What about an in-person discussion?

A No.

Q Okay. You mentioned a friend of yours, Cody Shearer, in

the first hour.

A Yes.

Q Can you talk about your relationship, how long you've known

Mr. Shearer?

A I have probably known Cody Shearer about 40 years.

Q Okay. And --

A His --

Ms. Sawyer. I'm sorry. Can I pause for a moment just to check

in on the propriety of the presence of non-committee members or staff

at a deposition called by the Select Committee on Benghazi.

Chairman Gowdy. Yeah. Let me speak to Chairman Issa outside.

Mr. Davis. Could we go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Davis. We'll go back on the record.

1121
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BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I'm sorry. So you said you had known Mr. Shearer for 40

years?

A Something like that.

Q Have you ever had any type of business relationship with

Mr. Shearer?

A No.

Q Okay. You currently don't have any business relationship

with him?

A No.

Q You never had a business relationship with him in the 2011

or 2012 timeframe?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you ever ask Mr. Shearer to send you any

information on Libya?

A He did.

Q But did you ask him to?

A Did I ask him to? We -- I was -- I think I introduced him

to Mr. Drumheller, and initially we had lunch in Georgetown to discuss

Mr. Drumheller's memoir. Cody has many ideas about how to do things,

and he had an idea he would somehow turn this into a movie, which never

happened.

Q And that meeting took place around what timeframe?

A Oh, maybe 2007.

Q Okay.

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A Years earlier.

Q Have you ever been part of an organization or worked for

an organization that had any business relationship or partnership with

Mr. Shearer?

A No.

Q What about a -- have you ever worked for an organization

that had a business relationship or partnership with an organization

that Mr. Shearer worked for?

A No.

Q How often did you communicate with Mr. Shearer in the 2011,

2012 timeframe?

A Occasionally.

Q Occasionally. And did you ever discuss Libya with him?

A Yes.

Q Libya-related issues with him?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What specifically?

A Well, he, as I mentioned, knew -- had this Libyan student

and he had a father, and so he was interested in Libya as a result.

Q So he was interested in Libya solely because he had a Libyan

student who had a father?

A And the events were happening. They were -- it was a big

story. He was a journalist, and he was interested in these events.

Q Okay. Do you recall ever having any conversation with Mr.

Shearer about frozen assets in Libya?

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A No.

Q Okay. Have you ever paid Mr. Shearer a salary for any

reason?

A No.

Q Have you ever provided him with any type of compensation

for any reason --

A No.

Q -- over the course of your 40-year relationship?

A No.

Q Not that you can remember?

Let's go back for a minute. Can you explain is

again?

A He is the father of the Libyan student who was in the

program, international student program, Cody directed.

Q Okay. Mr. lived where?

A From what I gathered, he lived in Amman.

Q Okay. And why did you gather that he lived in Amman?

A I believe that's that Cody Shearer told me.

Q Okay. Do you know if Mr. was affiliated in any way

with the Transitional National Council in Libya?

A I don't really know.

Q Do you know if he was affiliated in any way with the Libyan

National Council?

A I don't know.

Q So what is the relationship, to the best that you can share,

1124
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between Cody Shearer and ?

A He was someone he knew.

Q Just someone he knew?

A That's as far as I know.

Q Okay. Do you know if they ever met?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know how long they knew each other for?

A No.

Q Do you know if they had any type of business relationship

with one another?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you ever communicate with ?

A No.

Q Do you know if Tyler Drumheller knew who was?

A I believe he did.

Q Okay. And how do you -- why do you think that he knew who

was?

A Because I had introduced him to Cody Shearer.

Q You had introduced Mr. Drumheller to Cody Shearer.

A Drumheller to Cody Shearer, and I believe Cody Shearer

mentioned him and --

Q Mentioned him to Mr. Drumheller?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So that's why you believe that Mr. Drumheller and --

A Yes. That is why I believe that.

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Q Introduce deposition exhibit 5.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So this is an email that was produced to us last Friday.

The Bates number is BLU-030. It's a single page.

Do you recognize this email?

A Yes.

Q An email that you sent to Secretary Clinton --

A Right.

Q -- on March 6, 2011?

A Yes.

Q Okay. I would direct your attention to the very bottom of

the email. The very last sentence, "He left the madman's government

within past year when he realized he was completely deranged."

Who is the madman?

A The madman refers to Qadhafi. This is the language of Cody

Shearer.

Q Okay.

A This is a note from Cody Shearer.

Q Okay. So the very first line of the email, very first

sentence, it reads "Cody, on his own, still at heart an indefatigable

journalist simply picked up the phone, dialing the number given by

Khalifa Sharif and had a conversation with one of the key figures in

the Libya National Council that seeks to become an interim government."

1126
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You sent this to Secretary of State Clinton. Did she know who

Khalifa Sharif was?

A I believe no.

Q Why do you believe the answer is no?

A She -- to my knowledge, she had no reason to know who --

Q Okay. You just mentioned Khalifa Sharif's name in the

email?

A I just mentioned it, yes.

Q There are no qualifiers in there as to who this individual

is?

A Right.

Q Why did you not qualify who that individual is to Secretary

Clinton?

A Well, I guess it's faulting reporting on my part.

Q Okay. Would she have been -- should she have known who

Khalifa Sharif is if you're referring to him just as an individual with

no qualifiers?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you think about alerting her to who this

individual was?

A It didn't occur to me.

Q Did she ever ask who Khalifa Sharif was?

A No.

Q So you just mentioned the name Khalifa Sharif in an email

with no follow-up on who that individual is?

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A Yes.

Q Okay. The note from Cody Shearer, is that the second and

third paragraphs?

A Yes.

Q That's the note. And is that a direct cut and paste from

something that Mr. Shearer sent to you?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So the first sentence reads, "So I spoke to Dr.

Mahmoud Jabril." In parentheses, "He's on Khalifa's list today."

What is Khalifa's list?

A No idea.

Q Did you ever ask Mr. Shearer what Khalifa's list is?

A No.

Q Did you ever ask Khalifa Sharif what his list is?

A No.

Q Did you ever try to explain to Secretary Clinton what

Khalifa's list is?

A No.

Q So you cut and paste an email from Cody Shearer to Secretary

Clinton without given additional context?

A That's right.

Q And you just mentioned Khalifa Sharif's name without giving

additional context as to who Khalifa Sharif is?

A That's what I did.

Q The last line of the first paragraph reads, "Cody said that

1128
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Jabril said he has not been contacted by anyone from the U.S.

government." Do you see that? The last line of the first paragraph.

Last sentence of the first paragraph.

A Yes.

Q And then at the very bottom, look at the last paragraph now,

first sentence. "Someone should contact Mahmoud Jabril."

A Umm-hmm.

Q And this was all encompassed in an email to Secretary

Clinton?

A Right.

Q Do you know if Secretary Clinton ever contacted Mahmoud

Jabril?

A I believe she did meet him.

Q Okay. And do you know when that meeting took place?

A I couldn't tell you offhand. But he did become the interim

prime minister of Libya, and I believe she met with these leaders.

Q Okay. So she met with Mr. Jabril on March 14, 8 days after

this email. I can provide a New York Times article if you want to go

that route, which is 8 days after you sent this email. And the article

noticed that this meeting was, quote, "Hastily arranged," and occurred,

quote, "Behind closed doors."

Did you have any involvement whatsoever in setting up this meeting

between Secretary Clinton and Mr. Jabril?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you ever talk with Secretary Clinton about her

1129
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meeting with Mr. Jabril?

A No.

Q Did you ever talk with her before the meeting occurred

with --

A No, I did not.

Q Did you ever talk with her after the meeting occurred about

her meeting with Mr. Jabril?

A I did not.

Q Do you know anybody else who attended the meeting between

Secretary Clinton and Mr. Jabril?

A No.

Q Did you pass along any other information about the upcoming

meeting to Secretary Clinton before her meeting with Mr. Jabril?

A No. Unless there are further documents that I've sent on.

Q Okay.

Mrs. Brooks. I have a couple questions.

Did Cody Shearer, when he sent you the note, what -- do you know

what he thought you were going to do with the note?

The Witness. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Did he know you were sharing his messages with the

Secretary?

The Witness. No. I never discussed any conversation or message

or email with Secretary Clinton with anybody.

Mrs. Brooks. Well, I'm sorry. I thought you said that this was

a note in exhibit 5, or -- 5 that Cody had shared with you.

1130
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The Witness. He had shared this with me, but I don't tell him -- I

did not tell him that I shared any particular thing with Hillary

Clinton.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And had he -- as you were a senior policy

advisor for the Secretary in her presidential campaign, had he been

involved on the campaign as well?

The Witness. He was not part of campaign.

Mrs. Brooks. Was your role as a senior -- did you have a specific

role as a senior policy advisor in the campaign?

The Witness. I was a strategic advisor, and I worked with other

people in the campaign on a -- in meetings and talking to people.

Mrs. Brooks. Did you have a focus on foreign affairs?

The Witness. I didn't -- I did not.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Did you ever talk with Cody Shearer about

the fact that you -- maybe later did you ever talk with Cody Shearer

about the fact that you shared his email communications with Hillary

Clinton?

The Witness. I never told him that I ever shared anything

specific with Hillary Clinton.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Okay. Thanks.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I introduce exhibit 6.

Mr. Roskam. Can we just go back to one of the points. You said

that -- did he come to an understanding that you were sharing them,

whether you told him or not? That is, Cody Shearer.

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The Witness. I don't know what he thought.

Mr. Roskam. Was the nature of the communication with you and Cody

Shearer limited just to verbal communications, or were you emailing

him as well?

The Witness. I'm sure that there were some emails. But we

mainly spoke on the phone.

Mr. Roskam. Thank you.

Mr. Westmoreland. Just out of curiosity, I know you all

mentioned before any of these things was released, you wanted some stuff

redacted. Would that be their cell phone numbers?

Mr. Cole. Cell phone numbers. There is one that has some cell

phone numbers in it and some being being identified as

the source of certain information, for his own protection.

Mr. Westmoreland. Now, Mr. Blumenthal, I'm just talking to you

as a common guy. I'm not an attorney. But if I ever put in an email

to somebody his or her or their phone number is such and such, such

and such, such and such, that is kind of -- you know, I guess just by

just commonsense kind of thing giving it out there with basically

saying: Here it is if you want to call him. Or it's inferred that

you need to call him. Did you get that out of this?

The Witness. I thought it might be helpful. It's up to her. It

was information that I had gathered. I didn't know if she had it or

not. It came my way, and I just threw it over the transom to her. She

could do with it what she wanted. It's up to her.

Mr. Westmoreland. Do you think that either Mr. Jabril or the Red

1132
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Crescent Society doctor, do you think they would have been surprised

to pick up the phone and say hello and somebody on the other end say:

This is Hillary Clinton?

The Witness. I would imagine so.

Mr. Westmoreland. They would not have been expecting --

The Witness. No.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- a call from her?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Westmoreland. And they wouldn't have known why she was

calling. They would have just been: Oh, my God. This is the

Secretary of State.

The Witness. I don't know. Speculating.

Mr. Davis. Now I'm going to introduce exhibit 6.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So this is exhibit 6. The Bates number is SCB-0045000 to

002. It's an email from you to Secretary Clinton, Thursday, March 3,

2011 at 9:45 p.m.

Is this an email that you sent to Secretary Clinton on that date

and time?

A Yes.

Q All right. The very first line of the report, "During the

afternoon of March 3, advisors to Muammar Qadhafi stated privately that

the Libyan leader has decided that civil war is inevitable."

1133
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Did you obtain the information contained in these reports

directly from these advisors to Muammar Qadhafi?

A No. This is a report written by Tyler Drumheller.

Q Do you know who did obtain the information directly from

the advisors to Muammar Qadhafi?

A No. I have no idea who any of his sources were.

Q So do you know if Mr. Drumheller received the information

straight from an advisor to Muammar Qadhafi?

A I have no idea.

Q Do you know if there's one intermediary between the advisors

to Mr. Qadhafi and Drumheller?

A I don't know.

Q Could there have been multiple intermediaries between

advisors to Mr. Qadhafi and Tyler Drumheller?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Did you pay these advisors to Mr. Qadhafi for this

information?

A I did not.

Q Do you know if anybody paid these advisors to Mr. Qadhafi

for this information?

A I'd have to say I don't know. But I'd also have to say that

seems highly implausible.

Q And why is that highly implausible?

A Because this is a report by Tyler Drumheller, and I find

it implausible that he paid advisors to Muammar Qadhafi.

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Q Could somebody else have paid -- paid the advisors to Mr.

Qadhafi for the information contained in this report?

A Well, I'll just say I don't know.

Q Okay. But you don't know if Mr. Drumheller did?

Okay. Is that a no?

A That's a -- that's right.

Q Okay. How did you know that the information in this report

that came from these advisors to Mr. Qadhafi was reliable?

A I didn't.

Q What did you do to vet this information from these advisors

to Mr. Qadhafi before you sent it along to Secretary Clinton?

A Nothing.

Q And what was your expectation of what Secretary Clinton

would do with this information?

A I had no expectations.

Q Okay.

A I was just sending it along and hoped it might be useful,

and I, having been in government, I knew that whatever I was sending

was just a very small percentage of what I knew she was seeing on Libya.

Q Do you know what else she was seeing on Libya?

A I do not know what else she was seeing.

Q How do you know that this was a small percentage of what

she was seeing on Libya?

A Because having been in the government, I know that there's

a great volume of information provided to high decision makers from

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118

State Department and intelligence community and the Defense Department

and elsewhere on these subjects.

Q Have you ever worked at the State Department before?

A I've not worked at the State Department, but I was assistant

to the President.

Q Do you have any idea what types of information are given

to the Secretary of State?

A I don't know specifically what was given to Hillary Clinton.

Q So you don't know for sure that your reports was just -- were

just a small percentage of what she was reviewing regarding Libya.

A Given my experience, that's my conclusion.

Q So who wrote this report?

A Tyler Drumheller.

Q Do you know for a fact that he wrote the report?

A I do.

Q And how do you know that he actually wrote the report?

A He sent it to me.

Q But does that mean that he actually wrote the report, or

is there somebody else who could have written the report?

A He wrote the report.

Q Okay. And why did he send you the report?

A He thought the information might be helpful to the United

States Government.

Q Okay. So he knew exactly what you were going to do with

it when you received the report from him?

1136
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A At this point he did.

Q Okay. When you say "at this point," what does that mean?

A Well, once I had begun to send his reports on to the

Secretary, he knew that I would send further reports on to the

Secretary.

Q And so in the March 3 timeframe, he knew by that point that

you were sending them on to the Secretary?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you pay Mr. Drumheller for these reports?

A No.

Q Do you know if anybody paid Mr. Drumheller for these

reports?

A No.

Q Is it possible that somebody paid Mr. Drumheller for these

reports?

A It's possible.

Q You mentioned earlier that you didn't know what

Mr. Drumheller's interests are, but that he has some large American

corporate clients. Do you recall saying that?

A Yes.

Q And do you know who any of these large American corporate

clients were?

A I don't know.

Q Is it possible that one of these large American corporate

clients paid for Mr. Drumheller to create this report?

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A It's possible.

Q Is it possible that there was another interest that paid

for Mr. Drumheller to prepare this report?

A I doubt it. I think he just had corporate clients, from

what I understand.

Q Do you know if this report that he sent to you was the same

report as he sent to one of his corporate clients if, in fact, he was

providing this report for a corporate client?

A No.

Q Or do you have any sense that he altered the report before

he sent it to you?

A No.

Q Okay. Why would -- do you know for a fact that

Mr. Drumheller was being paid for this report?

A I don't know that.

Q Okay. Why would he have created the report if he was not

being paid for it?

A He gathered information and he wanted to help the United

States government in some way. He thought it might be useful. He

spent his whole life working for the CIA.

Q Was he filling a void that the CIA was incapable of filling

at this point?

A He never said that to me.

Q How long have you known Mr. Drumheller?

A Probably since 2006, I'd say.

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Q Do you know if Osprey Global Solutions, or Osprey Security

Group, was a client of Mr. Drumheller's?

A I don't know.

Q Have you ever had any business relationships with

Mr. Drumheller?

A I have not here.

Q I'm talking about ever. Have you ever had any business

relationships with Mr. Drumheller, or partnerships with

Mr. Drumheller?

A Recently.

Q Recently. And can you describe what that business

relationship is?

A He brought the former head of the Central Bank of the Congo

to the United States who wanted to be introduced to some prominent

people in the United States who might hear his views on things, and

I introduced him to the Podesta Group. I just referred him to the

Podesta Group.

Q Okay.

A I told him that's where he should go.

Q At the time you sent this memo in March 2011, did you have

any business relationship or partnership with Mr. Drumheller at that

time?

A No.

Q And prior to this time period in March 2011, did you have

any business relationship or partnership with Mr. Drumheller?

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A No.

Q Between the time this memo was sent in March 2011 and this

situation you just described regarding the Congo, did you have any

business relationship or partnership with Mr. Drumheller?

A No.

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BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Are you familiar with Tyler Drumheller, LLC?

A Yes.

Q And how are you familiar with that entity?

A I believe that's the name of his private business.

Q Current or past?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Have you ever had an association with this company?

A No.

Q Okay. Have you ever been an advisor to this company?

A No.

Q Have you ever been an employee of this company?

A No.

Q Have you ever been an interested party of this company?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you ever share Mr. Drumheller's intelligence

reporting on Libya with Mr. Shearer?

A I don't believe so.

Q Okay. And why don't you believe so?

A That's my memory.

Q Okay.

What was your knowledge of Mr. Drumheller's intelligence network?

A My knowledge was simply of his past history in the CIA. I

was unfamiliar with his sources.

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Q Okay. You said he was the head of NCS Europe; is that

correct?

A He was chief of Europe for CIA. He was -- he had been a

station chief in various places.

Q Okay. Do you know if he ever served in Libya?

A I believe he had not.

Q Do you know if he had ever served anywhere in the Middle

East?

A I believe he had not.

Q So what is your understanding of Mr. Drumheller's

intelligence network in the Middle East?

A I have no idea.

Q What about your understanding of his intelligence network

in Libya?

A I don't know.

Q So you knew he had a great intelligence network, but you

have no understanding of what that intelligence network was regarding

Libya or the Middle East.

A I don't know who he spoke to.

Q Did you ever ask him who he was talking to in the Middle

East?

A No.

Q Did you ever ask him who he was talking to in Libya?

A No.

Q Okay.

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I have 1 minute left. Just a brief question. You mentioned the

Congo a minute ago. Is that the Democratic Republic of Congo?

A Yes.

Q Okay. DRC. Okay.

Before we dive into another topic, we'll stop for this hour.

Mrs. Brooks. I have one question on that. I'm sorry.

Were you compensated for that introduction?

The Witness. I was.

Mrs. Brooks. And who were you compensated by?

The Witness. I was compensated by Mr. Drumheller.

Mrs. Brooks. Had you been compensated by Mr. Drumheller

previously?

The Witness. No. I received no money from him.

Mr. Pompeo. Can I ask one question?

Do you know -- Mr. Drumheller knew by March -- you said Mr.

Drumheller was aware that you were passing his wand to Secretary

Clinton.

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Pompeo. Is it possible that he shared the fact that he had

a conduit to Secretary Clinton with some of his clients?

The Witness. I don't know.

Mr. Pompeo. You don't know, but it's possible he could have,

because he had the knowledge that if he sent you something it would

get to Secretary Clinton. He could have shared that with others,

potentially for remuneration. It's possible.

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The Witness. He never told me that.

Mr. Pompeo. But it's possible.

The Witness. I don't know.

Mr. Pompeo. Thank you.

Mr. Davis. Okay. Thank you. We'll go off the record, take a

break.

The Witness. All right. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. Davis. Okay. We'll go back on the record.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Do you know a retired Army officer named David Grange?

A Yes.

Q And how do you know Mr. Grange?

A I met him once in Washington.

Q Did you have any other communications with Mr. Grange other

than that one meeting in Washington?

A Not that I recall.

Q Okay. Did you ever email with Mr. Grange?

A I don't believe so.

Q Okay. The meeting you mentioned in Washington, did that

take place at the Washington Hilton?

A Yes.

Q Did it take place -- so -- okay. Who else was at that

meeting?

A Mr. Drumheller. Some people with Mr. Grange who I don't

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remember.

Q Okay.

A Mr. Shearer.

Q Okay. And was this in a conference room in the Washington

Hilton or where in particular?

A The bar.

Q At the bar. Okay. Approximately when did this meeting

take place, if you can remember?

A I can't remember. Sometime in 2011, in the -- maybe the

spring.

Q Okay. So Mr. Shearer was there.

A Yes.

Q Mr. Drumheller was there.

A Right.

Q Mr. Grange was there.

A Right.

Q And some other individuals were there.

A Right.

Q Was there anybody else at that meeting?

A Not that I recall. No.

Q Okay.

Did you ever go to the Libyan Embassy --

A I did.

Q -- around that time period?

A I did.

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Q Okay. Did you meet with Mr. Grange at the Libyan Embassy?

A Well, he went along.

Q Oh, he went along.

A Yeah.

Q So the meeting wasn't just at the Washington Hilton.

A Well --

Q -- the Libyan Embassy.

A It was not a meeting.

Q Okay. What was it exactly?

A It was a public reception.

Q A public reception. Okay. So who else attended the public

reception besides yourself and Mr. Drumheller and Mr. Shearer and Mr.

Grange?

A Probably a couple hundred people. It was open. There were

members of the media there.

Q Okay. And this was at the Libyan Embassy?

A It was.

Q Okay. But you had a preliminary meeting at the Washington

Hilton.

A We had drinks there.

Q Okay. So you had drinks at the Hilton, and then did you

walk over to the Embassy? How did --

A Yes.

Q -- you get there?

A We walked.

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Q Okay. Did you encounter anybody along the way?

A Not that I remember.

Q Okay. Did you speak with Secretary Clinton around this

time that you can recall on the telephone?

A I can't recall.

Q Okay. Do you know if Mr. Jabril was at this meeting?

A I believe he was.

Q Okay. And that would be Prime Minister Jabril?

A Yes. He was there.

Q Okay. And was he at the Libyan Embassy?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was he at the Washington Hilton?

A No.

Q Okay. But you saw him at the Libyan Embassy.

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you have any conversations with Mr. Jabril at

this meeting?

A I did not.

Q Okay. Do you know if Mr. Drumheller had any conversations

with Mr. Jabril?

A I don't recall that he did.

Q Okay. Do you know if Mr. Shearer had any conversations with

Mr. Jabril?

A I don't recall that he did.

Q Okay. Do you know what the purpose of this reception was?

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A It was a public reception for people in Washington.

Q Okay. Who in Washington?

A There was a couple hundred people there.

Q Okay. But --

A There were members of the media who I recognized.

Q Okay.

A And so it was a very open event. It was a cocktail party.

Q Who did you recognize from the media that was there?

A Andrea Mitchell.

Q Andrea Mitchell was there.

A Yes.

Q Okay. But that was at the party?

A Yes.

Q And you don't recall when this took place?

A Not exactly.

Q Okay. Was it the spring of 2011?

A I think so.

Q Could it have been summer of 2011?

A I don't remember.

Q Okay.

A I think it was the spring.

Q You think it was the spring?

A I think. I don't know.

Q Okay.

Do you know what the State Department's relationship was with the

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Libyan Embassy in the spring of 2011?

A No.

Q They had suspended relations with the Libyan Embassy early

in February of 2011. But yet they were holding a public reception for

people from Washington at their embassy in the spring of 2011?

A They were.

Q Okay.

Are you familiar with a company called Osprey Global Solutions?

A Yes. I know of it.

Q Okay. And how do you know of it?

A I know of it because it was raised as a company that was

headed by David Grange that might provide humanitarian assistance.

Q So in your meeting at the Washington Hilton and then

subsequently the Libyan Embassy, did you talk about Osprey Global

Solutions with Mr. Grange?

A I did.

Q Okay. And do you remember what those discussions were?

A He was interested in providing that service to Libya.

Q The humanitarian service?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So how did you discuss about how he might be able

to provide the services to Libya?

A He didn't have concrete ideas.

Q Okay. Did you have any concrete ideas?

A No, I certainly did not.

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Q Okay. So it was more of a theoretical conversation at that

point?

A Highly speculative.

Q Okay.

A It seemed a little --

Q What was Mr. Grange's -- I'm sorry -- relationship with

Osprey?

A He -- as I understand it, he is the head of Osprey.

Q Have you ever provided any type of salary or compensation

to Mr. Grange for any reason?

A No.

Q Okay. Has he provided any type of salary or compensation

to you for any reason?

A No.

Q Do you know if Osprey has provided any type of salary or

compensation to you for any reason?

A No.

Q Okay.

Mrs. Brooks. Have they provided compensation to Mr. Drumheller?

The Witness. To my knowledge, no.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q How did this meeting at the Washington Hilton come about?

A I don't recall. I think it came about because of this

reception. And I forget who got an invitation. And a lot of people

showed up. So, beforehand, someone said to me, why don't you come to

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the Washington Hilton, and then you can meet these people.

Q And who said that to you, why don't you come to the

Washington Hilton?

A I don't -- I don't recall. Maybe -- either Mr. Shearer or

Mr. Drumheller.

Q Okay. So it was sort of a spur-of-the-moment thing, that

you came to the Washington Hilton?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did Mr. Drumheller or Mr. Shearer tell you to come

to the Washington Hilton minutes before the meeting or hours before

the meeting or days before the meeting?

A It might have been a couple days before, a few days before.

Q A few days before. Okay. And did you know who you would

be meeting with at the Washington Hilton when it occurred?

A I don't know. I don't know. Just, you know, "We're going

to go to the Libyan Embassy. Let's meet there."

Q Okay. "Let's meet at the Washington Hilton and walk over"?

A Yeah. It's nearby.

Q Okay. How long were you at the bar before you went to the

Embassy?

A I don't remember. Maybe 20 minutes, a half-hour.

Q A pretty brief meeting?

A It was brief.

Q Okay.

Do you remember if you took a phone conversation while you were

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at the bar?

A No.

Q Okay. You don't remember if you were on the phone or not?

A No.

Q Were you talking to the lady when you were at the

phone -- when you were at the bar?

A Who is "the lady"?

Q The lady? Do you know who the lady is?

A I don't know what you're referring to.

Q Okay. Had you ever suggested that anybody refer to

somebody as "the lady" in email conversation?

A No idea.

Q You don't know who the lady is? Did you ever request that

people refer to a certain individual as "the lady"?

A No.

Q So "the lady" means nothing to you?

A Well, if you're referring to Hillary, that's the

first -- that's what I assume you're referring to. I don't know why --

Q I'm just asking you if you know who "the lady" is.

A No.

Q So you've never referred to anybody as "the lady"?

A That's not the way I refer to Hillary Clinton.

Q Do you know who Gene Cretz is?

A No.

Q You've never met an individual named Gene Cretz?

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A Not to my knowledge.

Q Okay.

Bill White, you had talked about him earlier. You never met Mr.

White?

A Never.

Q Have you ever emailed with Mr. White?

A I don't think I've ever emailed him. He may have been on

email chains of some people, but that's -- I don't recall specifically.

Q Okay. Do you know if you have any mutual friends or

acquaintances with Mr. White?

A The only one I know is Tyler Drumheller.

Q But nobody else in addition to him?

A That's all I know.

Q Okay.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So we're going to introduce exhibit 7. This is exhibit 7.

Do you recognize this email?

A I don't recognize it, but I assume it's one of the stolen

emails of mine.

Q Why do you assume it's a stolen email of yours?

A It's got my email address on it.

Q Does that mean that the email was stolen?

A Yes.

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Q Was this an email that Mr. Shearer sent to you or forwarded

to you?

A Appears to be.

Q Okay.

A Appears to be something he forwarded to me.

Q From ?

A Appears to be.

Q Okay. Do you know if you responded to this email from Mr.

Shearer?

A No.

Q Why would Mr. Shearer have forwarded you this email?

A I don't know. To send me information.

Q So what did you do with this information that Mr. Shearer

sent to you?

A Nothing.

Q Do you know how often Mr. and Mr. Shearer spoke?

A No.

Q Do you know how often Mr. Shearer and Mr. emailed?

A No.

Q Do you know why Mr. was passing this information to

Mr. Shearer?

A No.

Q Do you know what Mr. expectation was of where this

information was going?

A No.

1154
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Q Did Mr. Shearer have an expectation that you would do

something with this email when he forwarded it to you?

A No.

Q Okay.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I'll hand you exhibit 8. This is an email. Do you

recognize this email?

A Not particularly, but it appears to be another one of the

emails that were illegally obtained by the hacker.

Q Okay. But this is an email that Mr. Shearer sent to you

on March 20, 2011?

A Appears to be.

Q Okay.

The first line of the email says, "Spoke to the gang this morning."

Who is the gang?

A Well, reading the email, it appears to be he's -- Cody

Shearer is referring to the gang as the Libyans, the Libyan rebels.

Q Are there any Libyan rebels in particular that comprise the

gang?

A Search me. He knows , as far as I know.

Q Do you know if was a Libyan rebel, though?

A Well, he is talking to -- whoever -- you know, I don't know

who Cody is referring to, but I assume that he is referring to somebody

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who is a Libyan --

Q Okay.

A -- when he says "the gang." This is his way of doing things.

I can't account for his language.

Q You said earlier that Mr. , you believed, lived Amman,

Jordan, at the time?

A That was my -- that was what I thought.

Q Okay. So the gang, is that one individual or is that

multiple individuals?

A You know, I don't know what Cody thought.

Q Okay. Did you ask him who the gang was?

A No.

Q Okay. Why didn't you ask him who the gang was?

A I often didn't ask Cody a lot of the things that he sent.

Q Okay.

A He came up with all sorts of things.

Q Okay.

The next line of the email: "Of course, they are wondering when

the West will official recognize their council." What council is Mr.

Shearer referring to?

A I assume the Libyan Council. That's an assumption on my

part from reading this email.

Q Sure. Do you know if the council and the gang are the same

set of individuals, or are they different sets of individuals?

A I don't know. I don't know what he's referring to.

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Q Okay. Did you ask Mr. Shearer what the council was?

A No.

Q Do you know if you forwarded this email along to anybody?

A I don't.

Q Do you know if you cut and paste the contents of this email

and sent it anywhere else?

A I don't know that.

Q Okay.

Do you know if you ever communicated information provided by Mr.

Shearer about this council to anyone at the State Department?

A I did not that I know of.

Q So Mr. Shearer refers to a gang, and you don't know who that

gang is. Is that correct?

A Well, my assumption from reading this stolen email is that

the gang -- this is his way of talking about Libya. And I wouldn't,

you know, try and be too precise about Mr. Shearer's definitions about

things in the world.

Q Okay.

Do you know what his connection was to this particular gang or

to the council that is referred to in this email?

A No. I don't know -- I don't know.

Q So he's sending you information that he received, and you

never asked who he's receiving the information from?

A I'm not his fact-checker, no.

Q You were never curious who he was receiving this information

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from?

A I didn't ask.

Q Okay.

The last line of the email says, "Off to meeting with Flynt

shortly." Who is Flynt?

A I don't know.

Q Is that Larry Flynt?

A Might be.

Q Okay. Why might it be Larry Flynt?

A Might be. He lives in Los Angeles, Cody, often. And might

be.

Q Do you know where Cody was at this particular time, on March

20, 2011?

A I don't know. You know, I couldn't tell you what his

itinerary is at any particular time, but he may have been in Los Angeles,

where he usually lives.

Q Do you know if Mr. Shearer ever traveled to Libya?

A I believe he did.

Q And do you know approximately when that trip took place?

A I don't know. I don't know. I do not know.

Q Okay.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 9

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I'm going to hand out another document. This is exhibit

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9.

This is exhibit 9. The date is Saturday, May 14, 2011, and the

top of the email is from Cody Shearer to yourself.

Is this an email that you recognize?

A Oh, this is another stolen email.

Q But it is one of your emails?

A Appears to be.

Q Okay. Do you know if this email string occurred before or

after the meeting that you had at the Washington Hilton?

A I don't know.

Q Okay.

A Probably after.

Q And why do you say probably after?

A Because it appears from reading it that "the general," who

would be Grange, is trying to get together his -- whatever his mission

is to pursue this humanitarian assistance idea.

Q Okay.

Mrs. Brooks. Can we go back to the meeting at the Libyan -- I

don't recall if you called it "embassy."

What happened with the people that you went over to the reception?

Who did you visit with, and who, if you know, did the others visit with?

The Witness. I heard General Grange say to Mr. Jabril, you know,

what is it that you want? What do you want? And I stood in the

background, and I heard him say that he wanted humanitarian aid and

not military training. That's what I recall. That's the conversation

1159
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I recall.

Then I remember social conversations. I said hello to Andrea

Mitchell, who I know.

Mrs. Brooks. And do you recall any other conversations that

General Grange had with others there, but that being the most

significant?

The Witness. That's all I remember.

Mrs. Brooks. And, after the reception, did you and General

Grange and Tyler -- I'm sorry. Was Tyler Drumheller at the reception?

The Witness. Yes.

Mrs. Brooks. And Cody Shearer? Did you all visit after the

reception?

The Witness. No. I went home.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

And then, after they had that conversation, when was the next time

you visited with General Grange about what his conversation had been?

The Witness. I never saw him or spoke with him again.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So this particular email, exhibit 9, I'm going to start at

the bottom of the email. It's from you to Tyler Drumheller, and the

contents appear to be cut off. That's right. The exhibit is just a

single page.

So, moving up one, it's from Tyler Drumheller to yourself. It

says, "Sid, you are doing great work on this, well done. It is going

1160
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to be around $60,000, covering r/t business class airfare to Tunis,

travel in country to the border and back, and other expenses for 7-10

days for 4 guys. Talk to you tomorrow. T."

I want to focus on the first sentence, "Sid, you are doing great

work on this." What is the "this" that Mr. Drumheller is referring

to?

A I have no idea what he is referring to.

Q Okay. Were you working on something at that time with Mr.

Drumheller?

A I don't know what "this" refers to.

Q Okay.

"It is going to be around $60,000." What is going to be around

$60,000?

A I believe this refers to Grange's effort to go to Libya and

his effort to raise expenses. That's what I think it refers to.

Q Okay.

"Covering r/t business class airfare to Tunis, travel in country

to the border and back." Do you know what border Mr. Drumheller is

referring to here?

A I can infer that it's Libya.

Q Okay. And -- okay. But you don't know what "this" is that

you are doing great work on?

A I was doing nothing but facilitating messages between Cody

Shearer and Tyler Drumheller. So it was just -- I don't know what it

refers to.

1161
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Q Did Mr. Shearer know Mr. Drumheller?

A I introduced them.

Q So why would you need to be facilitating messages between

the two of them?

A That's apparently what I did. That was my role in this.

Q But why would they need to go through you if they know each

other on their own?

A Well, I was just talking to both of them at the time,

apparently. And that's what I think this is.

Q So you were a middle man between Mr. Shearer and Mr.

Drumheller.

A I wouldn't call myself a middle man. I'd say a facilitator.

I'd pass something -- information or a conversation on.

Q So you were a facilitator, but do you know what you were

facilitating?

A Well, the subject here is Grange trying to raise money to

go to Libya. Here's what I know, which is: No money was ever provided,

that this discussion came to nothing. Like everything else involving

this project, nothing developed.

Q So this trip never took place?

A This money was never raised, was never given. I don't know

when Grange went to Libya. I don't know about the trip.

Q Did Mr. Grange go to Libya?

A I had heard he had.

Q And how had you heard that he had gone to Libya?

1162
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A I don't recall.

Q Okay.

You said that no money was exchanged here for his trip to Libya.

You said you had never spoken with him again after the Washington

Hilton. Yet you know he went to Libya, and you don't recall how you

know he went to Libya. Is that correct?

A I believe I heard about it later.

Q All right. Who did you hear about it from?

A Possibly Mr. Shearer or Mr. Drumheller.

Q Okay. Do you know how many times Mr. Grange went to Libya?

A No.

Q Okay.

I want to look up at the top of the email here.

"Sid, do you think the general has to send four guys? He told

us three guys yesterday, a translator and two other guys. I understand

the difficulty of the mission and realize that will be repaid, but

I am going to need an itemized budget for these guys."

Who is that Mr. Shearer is referring to in this email?

A I believe it is .

Q Okay. What is the mission that Mr. Shearer is referring

to in this email?

A I believe it is going to Libya to try and develop the

humanitarian assistance idea.

Q And what was so difficult about that mission?

A I thought it was impossible. I wouldn't call it difficult;

1163
146

I'd call it completely impossible. That's what I thought at the time.

Q Why did you think it was impossible?

A Because the idea was, as you can see from this email, so

underdeveloped, and they didn't have any means to do this. It seemed

they were -- it was -- they didn't really know what they were doing.

And the conditions in Libya were getting worse and worse, more chaotic.

There was -- no one knew who was in charge. It seemed completely

improbable to me.

Q So the difficulty of the mission that Mr. Shearer was

referring to, that's the overall business possibilities for Osprey

Global Solutions and not this trip? Is that your understanding of what

the mission is?

A Could be both.

Q Okay.

Mr. Shearer later says he realizes that will be repaid. Is this

in reference to the $60,000?

A I don't know.

Q Was financing Mr. Grange's trip to Libya?

A I don't know.

Q Was the expectation that would be repaid in

some other way?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know if was familiar with this

expected trip to Libya?

A I don't know.

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Q Why was Mr. Shearer concerned about the cost of the trip?

A I don't know.

Q Where was the money coming from, the $60,000?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Do you know why Mr. Shearer needed an itemized

budget?

A No.

Q Did you ever provide him an itemized budget?

A No.

Q How do you know you did not provide him an itemized budget?

A Because I know I didn't.

Q Okay.

Did you ever have any further conversations with Mr. Drumheller

about this trip, aside from this email?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. Did you ever mention this trip to Secretary Clinton?

A No.

Q And this trip, as you mentioned earlier, did not take place;

is that correct?

A I don't know. I don't know.

Q Why would Mr. Shearer have asked you for an itemized budget?

A I don't know why he asked me.

Q Okay. Was it because you were facilitating the mission?

A No. I was not.

Q Do you know if Mr. Shearer ever asked Mr. Drumheller for

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an itemized budget?

A I don't know.

Q Did you ever ask Mr. Drumheller for an itemized budget?

A No.

Q Are you aware of any other trips to Libya from anybody

representing Osprey Global Solutions, aside from this one trip that

was planned?

A I don't know. I wasn't privy to it.

Q Okay.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 10

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Let me hand out exhibit 10.

So this is a memorandum of understanding between Osprey Global

Solutions and another entity.

Have you ever seen this document before?

A I've seen this recently in the stolen emails that have been

reproduced, as I recall.

Q Is that the first time you've ever seen this document?

A I may have seen it before, sometime after this memorandum

of understanding was negotiated.

Q So, at the time --

A But I don't -- I can't recall.

Q But you may have seen it at the time it was negotiated.

A No, not at the time.

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Q Shortly after the time it was negotiated?

A After the time.

Q When you say "after the time," are you referring to a matter

of days, weeks, months, or years?

A Maybe weeks.

Q Okay.

The very first line, "Per meetings held 13 July and 20 Aug 2011

in Dubai with Dr. Aref Ali Nayed and in Amman on 23 and 24 August with

Mohammad Kikhia, this agreement is entered into the 24th day of August

of 2011 between the National Transitional Council of Libya (hereinafter

referred to as 'NTC'), now recognized by the United States Government

of America as the legitimate and sole government of the Republic of

Libya (ROL) and Osprey Global Solutions, LLC, a limited liability

company duly organized and existing under the laws of Delaware, having

its principal offices in Wilmington, North Carolina (hereinafter

referred to as 'Osprey')."

I'm going to direct your attention to the very first line of the

email. Dr. Aref Ali Nayed, do you know who that individual is?

A No.

Q Have you ever met that individual?

A No.

Q Have you ever spoken to that individual?

A No.

Q The second line of the email, Mohammad Kikhia, do you know

who that individual is?

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A Yes.

Q And who is that individual?

A He is a Libyan.

Q Okay. And how do you know him?

A I met him in 2013 or '14 when he was a member of a delegation

of Libyans to the State Department. And, at the invitation of Mr.

Drumheller, I had drinks with him after his meeting at the State

Department.

Q Was that the first time you met Mr. Kikhia?

A I believe so.

Q So, in 2011, when this memorandum was agreed to, you did

not know who Mr. Kikhia was?

A I don't believe I did.

Q And you had never met him at that point?

A I don't believe I did.

Q Did Mr. Drumheller know who he was at this time?

A I don't know.

Q The meetings described in this document on 13 July and 20

August 2011, were you aware of these meetings?

A I was not part of this negotiation at all and unaware of

this agreement that was -- this memorandum of understanding.

Q But were you aware of the meetings that took place on July

13 and August 20?

A I don't believe so. I believe I was unaware of them.

Q Were you aware of Osprey's desire to seek a business

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arrangement with the NTC?

A Yes. I believe it was interested in that.

Q I'm sorry. You said you were interested in that?

A No. They were interested.

Q They were interested in that.

A Yes. I believe they were.

Q And how were you aware that they were interested in seeking

a business relationship with NTC?

A Well, I had met with David Grange, who wanted to provide

humanitarian assistance, and he wanted to go to Libya. That's what

I was aware of.

Q But were you aware that he wanted to seek an arrangement

specifically with the Transitional Council of Libya --

A Oh, I didn't --

Q -- or another entity within Libya?

A I don't know who he wanted to make a deal with. I don't

have a clue.

Q Okay. Did you facilitate an introduction between Osprey

and either Dr. Nayed or Mr. Kikhia?

A No.

Q Do you know if Bill White played any such role?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know if the Constellations Group played any such

role?

A I don't know.

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Q Do you know if Mr. Drumheller played any such role?

A I don't know.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 11

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So I'm going to pass out Deposition Exhibit 11.

So this is an email from yourself to Secretary Clinton on August

31, 2011. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And this is document No. BLU-102 through 104.

A Yes. This is an email, but this is a report written by Tyler

Drumheller.

Q It was written by Mr. Drumheller?

A It is.

Q Okay.

I want to turn your attention to page 103 and specifically the

bottom of page 103. And I want to read the paragraph at the bottom

of page 103.

"In the opinion of a source with excellent access to the NTC

leadership, Jabril and his advisors are working to bring in private

firms to meet their pressing humanitarian needs. The Prime Minister

believes that if they wait for foreign governments to provide this

assistance the death toll among the wounded and injured will continue

to rise, and the NTC will be held responsible for failing to bring in

emergency and battlefield medical support. To this end, they have

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signed an agreement with the Osprey Security Group (OSG), a U.S. firm

specializing in emergency medical care and humanitarian assistance.

OSG is prepared to deliver the aid immediately upon receiving the funds

from the NTC. Jabril's advisors believe that the use of this American

firm will not only allow the NTC to meet a pressing need but will also

serve to cement good relations with the U.S. government and business

community. One NTC official noted that OSG's ability to provide this

medical and humanitarian support sets it apart from firms like the

French security group SECOPLEX, which look to provide foreign fighters

to support the rebel's NLA. Jabril continues to emphasize that, unlike

the Qadhafi army, the NLA does not and will not use foreign mercenaries

for military operations."

Let me ask, what is your understanding of the reference to Osprey

Security Group at the bottom of page 103?

A That just seems like the name of the group.

Q So, at the beginning of the paragraph, it says "source

comment." What does "source comment" mean?

A I don't know. That is a phrase that is used by Tyler

Drumheller.

Q Okay. But you don't know what "source comment" means?

A No.

Q Have you ever asked him what "source comment" means?

A No.

Q Have you ever seen "source comment" in reports not authored

by Tyler Drumheller? In any intelligence reporting perhaps?

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A No.

Q Do you know if "source comment" has a specific meaning?

A No.

Q "Source comment," is that Mr. Drumheller's comment, or is

that one of the source's comments?

A I don't know. All I know is that this report is written

by Mr. Drumheller.

Q So you don't know if "source comment" was a comment by the

source with excellent access to the NTC leadership?

A Don't know.

Q Do you know if "source comment" was a comment by Prime

Minister Jabril?

A No, I don't know.

Q You don't know who the source comment came from?

A No.

Q Was it a comment by the author of the report?

A Could be.

Q Do you know who the advisors were? Line 2, "Jabril and his

advisors are working to bring in private firms to meet their pressing

humanitarian needs."

A No.

Q So you don't know who the advisors were that believed the

use of Osprey would serve to cement good relations with the

U.S. government and business community?

A I do not know.

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Q Are these advisors the same or different from the source

with excellent access to the NTC leadership?

A I don't know.

Q Who is the NTC official who noted that OSG's ability to

provide this medical and humanitarian support sets it apart from French

firms?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know if this NTC official was the same or different

from the advisors in the source mentioned above?

A No.

Q No, you don't know? Or, no, it is not?

A No, I don't know.

Q Okay.

Mr. Pompeo. Can I ask a question here?

So you're reading these memos, Mr. Blumenthal --

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Pompeo. -- and they're written by Tyler Drumheller. And

with respect to almost everything that's been asked, you say -- you

read them now, even today, and you say you don't know.

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Pompeo. Yet you chose to pass them along to the Secretary

of State. How was she supposed to know?

The Witness. Well --

Mr. Pompeo. You can make no sense of them. You say, I don't know

who this is, I don't know who that is. And now we're getting one

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level -- and yet you felt it imperative to send these on to the Secretary

of State as intelligence reports.

I'm trying to understand how you thought she would know more than

you did about what was in Mr. Drumheller's report. I find that -- I'm

curious as to why you thought she'd know all these things when you -- you

just -- you were just forwarding stuff.

The Witness. I believed that if she found the information useful

she could have it evaluated, and people could determine on the inside

whether it was useful to them or not.

Mr. Pompeo. Did you make it a practice to send things that you

had no idea what they were, on the hope that someone else might be able

to figure them out and create value from them?

The Witness. I sent all of these on in that way, all of them.

Mr. Pompeo. Thank you.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q This last paragraph here, doesn't it read a little bit like

an infomercial for Osprey Security Group?

"They are a U.S. firm specializing in emergency medical care and

humanitarian assistance. They are prepared to deliver the aid

immediately upon receiving the funds from the NTC. Jabril's advisors

believe that the use of this American firm will not only allow the NTC

to meet a pressing need but will also serve to cement good relations

with the U.S. government and business community."

And then, on top of that, "One NTC official noted that OSG's

ability to provide this medical and humanitarian support sets it apart

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from firms like the French security group SECOPLEX."

I couldn't have written it any better myself if I were trying to

advertise that firm.

A Well, I read that as -- not as an infomercial but as a form

of information in a long report about many other things and without

any request for anything.

Q Do you know if there are any other American firms mentioned

in this particular report that you passed along?

A I'd have to read the whole report, but I think that's the

only American firm mentioned here.

Q Do you know, in any of the other reports that you sent to

Secretary Clinton, do you know how many other American firms were

mentioned in those reports?

A I don't. All I know is that these reports are written by

Tyler Drumheller, and he communicates the information he has. That's

all I know.

Q So I'm going to pass out --

Chairman Gowdy. Can I ask one question?

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir.

Chairman Gowdy. Mr. Blumenthal, I'm looking at an email that you

sent on January the 23rd, 2012, with the subject, and it's "H" with

a colon -- semicolon.

I'm assuming the "H" is Secretary Clinton.

The Witness. Yes.

Chairman Gowdy. And it says "V good intel internal Libya." What

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would the "V" stand for?

Mr. Cole. Could we see the document?

Mr. Davis. Yeah. Let me --

Mr. Cole. Do you want to mark it?

Mr. Davis. Yeah. I'll mark it as exhibit -- I'll mark that as

exhibit 12, actually.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 12

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Cole. Do you want to talk about this?

Mr. Davis. Yeah. That's exhibit 12 for you.

Mr. Cole. Take a moment?

Chairman Gowdy. Sure.

Mr. Davis. Would you like to take a moment to review it?

Mr. Cole. Yes.

Mr. Davis. Oh, okay. I'm sorry. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Davis. All right. We'll go back on the record.

Chairman Gowdy. Is there any chance I could get that piece of

paper back? Thank you.

My question is very simple. The "V" stands for what in that

subject line?

The Witness. Mr. Chairman, I believe that stands for "very."

Chairman Gowdy. So it would be "very good intel internal Libya.

Sid."

The Witness. Yes.

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Chairman Gowdy. All right.

I thought you had just told Mr. Pompeo that all you did was pass

the intel on to Secretary Clinton. And when you say "very good intel,"

that makes me think that you are offering an editorial comment on the

efficacy of the intelligence. Is that the way you interpret that?

The Witness. What I think I meant here is that there's a lot of

material here. There's just a lot of information here. And that's

what I refer to as "intel," is just -- there's a lot here.

Chairman Gowdy. But why wouldn't you say "large amount of

intel"? Why say "very good"?

The Witness. Well, that's what I meant. I was not evaluating

it, because I had no means of evaluating it.

Chairman Gowdy. Could you possibly see how a reader might

interpret "V good" as offering an editorial comment on the efficacy

or reliability of the information?

The Witness. Might be misinterpreted. But I don't think the

Secretary of State would have simply dealt with this except by handing

it to people who might evaluate it.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, if that's true, why put it in there?

The Witness. That's what I did.

Chairman Gowdy. I know. I'm just trying to understand why.

Because, initially, my understanding was all you were was a conduit --

The Witness. Yes.

Chairman Gowdy. -- of information from Tyler Drumheller to the

Secretary. You were not expressing any opinion on the reliability or

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credibility of the information.

And then I see this subject line, where the reader very well could

interpret that you were commenting on the reliability of the

information. Is that a reasonable reading of that subject line?

The Witness. That was not my intention, I believe. It was, I

was just sending on a lot -- a lot of information.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay.

I'm done.

Mr. Davis. So set that aside for a moment. We'll come back to

it.

The Witness. Okay.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 13

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I want to hand out exhibit 13. So this is Bates Nos.

SCB0045117 through 119.

And, in this particular memo, I want to direct your attention to

page 2 of this memo. In paragraph 3, I'm going to start in the middle

of the paragraph.

It says, "In the opinion of well-informed individuals, el-Keib's

closest and most influential advisors are experts with economic

backgrounds and experience dealing with Western firms and governments.

The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben

Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, National Oil Company chief

Nuri Berrusien, and Ngeb Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange."

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Notwithstanding my mispronunciation of those names, do you know

if Ngeb Obeda was, in fact, one of the most influential advisors to

Prime Minister el-Keib?

A I don't know. All I know is what I am reading here. This

is just information.

Q You took no actions to ensure the accuracy of this

particular report, your January 5 report?

A I took no actions to determine the accuracy of any report.

Q Were you familiar with the name Ngeb Obeda prior to Mr.

Drumheller sending you this report?

A No.

Q You'd never heard of that name before?

A No.

Q Were you aware of any --

A I mean, these names are sort of just a series of names to

me.

Q Sure. You never heard of Mr. Obeda before?

A No.

Q Were you aware of Mr. Drumheller's connection with Mr.

Obeda?

A I didn't know he had one.

Q Were you aware as to whether or not Osprey Global Solutions

had a connection with Mr. Obeda?

A I didn't know that.

Q Okay.

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[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 14

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I'm passing out Deposition Exhibit 14.

This is a letter, dated January 4, 2012, addressed to Mr. Shapiro,

Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political

Military Affairs, signed by David Grange.

Have you ever seen this letter before?

A Not to my knowledge. Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay.

I'm going to direct you to the second paragraph of this letter.

It says, "We are keen to support the people of Libya under the

sponsorship of the Ministry of Finance and the Libyan Stock Exchange,

specifically in the person of Ngeb Obeda, who has agreed to secure our

visas and host our travel to Tripoli and Benghazi in the next

two weeks."

And then later on, the letter says, "We very much look forward

to presenting Ambassador Cretz our credentials and a capabilities brief

and to invite him to contact myself and/or our EVP, Richard Vandiver,

at any time."

Are you aware as to whether a meeting between Mr. Grange and

Ambassador Cretz ever took place?

A I am not.

Q You mentioned earlier in your testimony that you had called

Mr. Shapiro about an ITAR matter.

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A Right.

Q Was this that ITAR matter that you called Mr. Shapiro about?

A I asked him where I could receive information, learn

information about ITAR, and he referred me to the State Department Web

site.

Q But you didn't check the State Department Web site before

calling Mr. Shapiro?

A Well, you know, I did not.

Q Do you know when this conversation with Mr. Shapiro took

place?

A I would say it took place around the time of this letter.

Q Did you call Mr. Shapiro on behalf of Osprey Global

Solutions?

A I didn't call on behalf of -- well, probably

Mr. Drumheller, as I recall, asked me if I could find information and

that -- I was surprised that Grange was still out there, from what he

said. And nothing had happened, nothing appeared to me to be

happening. And it was a request for information, and that's all.

Q Did you have any conversations with anybody from Osprey

Global Solutions about this letter?

A No.

Q You had never seen this letter before until today? Is that

correct?

A As far as I'm aware right now, yes.

Q Did you have any knowledge of this letter being sent to Mr.

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Shapiro prior to it being sent to Mr. Shapiro?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Do you know if you were cc'd on this letter?

A I don't know.

Q Is it possible you could have been cc'd on this letter?

A I don't know.

Q So it is possible that you were cc'd on this letter.

A I don't know.

Q Going back to exhibit 13 for a second, the January 5 email,

were you aware that this email was forwarded to Gene Cretz for his

assessment of the intelligence?

A No.

Q I asked you earlier if you knew who Gene Cretz was; you said

no. Does this ring a bell at all?

A Well, now I know, because I see from this that he's the

Ambassador, but I didn't -- it rang no bell before.

Q Okay.

A So it was just as a result of your questioning that I'm aware

of who he is.

Q Okay. But you don't know if a meeting between Osprey Global

Solutions or Ambassador Cretz ever took place?

A Can you repeat the question?

Q But you do not know -- I'm sorry. Do you know if a meeting

between Osprey Global Solutions --

A I don't know. I don't know.

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Q Would it surprise you to learn that a meeting did take place

between Osprey Global Solutions and Ambassador Cretz?

A I don't know.

Q You don't know if you would be surprised if a meeting took

place?

A I don't know if a meeting ever took place. I don't know.

Q Okay. Would you be surprised if a meeting took place?

A Would I be surprised? I don't know if I'd be surprised.

Q Why wouldn't you be surprised?

A I just don't know. Nothing ever happened here, and -- I

don't know.

Q What do you mean, "Nothing ever happened here"?

A Nothing ever came of any of this.

Q But you don't know if a meeting took place. A meeting

could've happened.

A I don't know of a meeting.

Q Okay. But it could have taken place.

A I have no way of knowing that.

Mr. Cole. The sky could have fallen.

The Witness. I have no way of knowing. I don't know.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So, 5 hours after you sent this email along exhibit 13,

Secretary Clinton wrote back and said, "Thanks, as always, and Happy

New Year!" And you wrote back 7 minutes later and said, "Happy new

year! Talk when you get a chance..."

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What did you want to talk with her about?

A Nothing specifically.

Q Okay. Not about this memo?

A No. We didn't discuss these memos.

Q Okay. Not about this Ngeb Obeda? You did not want to speak

with her about that?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you want to talk with her about foreign contracts

or business in Libya?

A I have never spoken with her on that subject.

Q Do you know if you ended up speaking with her as a result

of your email back to her at 5:29 p.m.?

A I don't recall.

Q I want to hop back to exhibit 12, which is the one I said

we would come back to, that you set aside. So this is your January

23, 2012, memo.

Mrs. Roby. Which one? January 23?

Mr. Davis. Yes.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I'd like to draw your attention to paragraph 4 on the second

page. And I don't think I introduced this exhibit. The page numbers

were SCB0045132 to 45133.

So, in this memo, paragraph 4, it says, "Following the discussion

with Jalil, el-Keib ordered Ziglam and Ngeb Obeda, the head of the Stock

Exchange, to move with all possible speed to address the issue of

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foreign contracts and arrange for new vendors to provide the services

demanded by the veterans and students. In this discussion, he pointed

out that if they cannot deal with this situation they will not have

to worry about the national elections for 2012."

I want to ask you in particular, how do you know that el-Keib

ordered Ziglam and Ngeb Obeda, the head of the stock exchange, to move

with all possible speed to address the issue of the foreign contracts?

A I don't know that. This is a memo written by Tyler

Drumheller.

Q But you cut and pasted it in an email to the Secretary of

State, correct?

A I did.

Q Okay. But you don't know that the information you provided

to her was in fact correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

Do you know who the particular source of this information was,

that Mr. Keib ordered Ziglam and Ngeb Obeda to move with all possible

speed?

A I do not.

Q Did you ever communicate with Ngeb Obeda in any way?

A No.

Q Okay.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 15

Was marked for identification.]

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BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I'm going to introduce exhibit 15.

So this is an email from you to Secretary Clinton, February 1,

2012, BLU-122 to BLU-123.

I'd like to turn your attention to the second page, paragraph 5.

A Uh-huh.

Q Second page, paragraph 5, you write, "While the President

recognizes that the oil industry is the key to Libya's future, he also

needs to be able to deal with foreign firms regarding the supply of

day-to-day necessities. Jalil and el-Keib agree that the best path

for foreign firms to use in gaining a foothold in Libya is through the

Stock Exchange, headed by Ngeb Obeda, under Minister of Finance Hassan

Ziglam. The President and Prime Minister feel that by working through

the Stock Exchange the Government can maintain transparency in foreign

contracts and avoid charges of Qadhafi-like corruption."

Paragraph 6, "Source Comment: According to a very sensitive

source, el-Keib complained to Jalil that Belhaj continues complicate

every aspect of the process of dealing foreign firms and governments."

Do you know why the President and Prime Minister felt that

transparency would occur working through the stock exchange?

A No.

Q Do you know why they singled out the stock exchange as

opposed to any other government entity?

A No.

Q Paragraph 5 of this email, did it have anything to do with

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the letter sent by Osprey Global Solutions to Assistant Secretary

Shapiro a month prior mentioning Ngeb Obeda's sponsorship of Osprey?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay.

Did you ever meet or speak with Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam?

A No.

Q Do you know if Tyler Drumheller did?

A I don't know.

Mr. Davis. We're coming close to the end of our hour, so we will

go off the record.

We will remain on the record for an additional minute.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I'd like to go back just briefly to exhibit 9. This is the

Saturday, May 14, 2011, email.

A Uh-huh.

Q In the middle of the page, it says on Friday, May 13, 2011,

at 10:32 p.m., you wrote -- and then it's blank underneath. And then

the original message says from Tyler Drumheller to you, and then

underneath the original message from you to Tyler Drumheller.

That blank area between Friday, May 13, 2011, at 10:32 p.m. and

the Friday, May 13, 2011, at 10:05 p.m., do you know if you forwarded

that email to anybody?

A All I know about this email is that this is a stolen email

by the foreign criminal hacker. That's what I know. If it's formatted

this way, it's because of how it was stolen and reproduced by the hacker.

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Q So this email is an alteration of the original email that

you had?

A It may well be. I don't -- all I know is this is a stolen

email.

Q I understand that, but you testified earlier that you do

believe it was one of your emails.

A It seems to be.

Q Okay. But you don't know on Friday May 13, 2011, at 10:32

who you were writing to or what you contained in that message.

A No.

Q Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. Can I just ask a question?

The first email is from you to Mr. Drumheller, and that's at

Friday, on May 13, 2011, at 2:21 p.m.

The Witness. Uh-huh.

Mr. Westmoreland. Then the next email from Mr. Drumheller to

you, it says it's Friday, May 13, at 10:05 p.m.

The Witness. Uh-huh.

Mr. Westmoreland. Were y'all -- and then the one from Cody to

you is at 10:32 p.m.

Were you all in different countries, or was there some confusion

about when all this was done?

The Witness. I don't know what accounts for these different

times, Congressman. I do know that Cody Shearer is often in Los

Angeles, so that might account for his different time. But I don't

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know.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, I think --

The Witness. All I -- I do know this is a stolen email, and it

could have been -- I don't know what the hacker did to it.

Mr. Westmoreland. But you don't remember what your email was at

2:21 p.m. -- and I'm assuming that's eastern time. Would that be

correct; that would be eastern time?

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Mr. Westmoreland. Well, it was pretty slow getting to

Drumheller. It took it 4 hours and -- 3 and a half hours.

The Witness. I can't account for any of this so --

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. I gotcha.

The Witness. Thank you.

Mr. Westmoreland. I didn't know if it was a time change.

Mr. Davis. Okay. Our hour is complete, and we will go off the

record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Cole. Mr. Chairman, we've been here since 10:30 this

morning. We have been answering every question that's been put to us

without any wavering at all. It is now 4:30 in the afternoon. We are

being told that there may be another 2 hours or more of questioning

left.

What I have noticed is that a great many of the questions,

particularly in the last hour or two, have been going into the details

of memos which the witness has stated unequivocally that he did not

write, that he did not verify. And yet the bulk of the questions and

the bulk of the time that we have spent has been going through a series

of emails to ask just those questions of the witness when he has already

stated quite clearly and quite categorically that he did not write the

email and did not vet the sources of the email.

It would seem to me, as a courtesy to the witness and an efficient

way of conducting the hearing, to try to cut back on a number of those

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questions and get to the meat of what is being sought in these questions

as opposed to going over and over and over again questions which, with

all due respect, I believe counsel is asking. And when we are talking

about going until almost 7:30 at night when we've been here since 10:30

in the morning borders on abusive to a witness when questioned for that

length of time and in areas that are well known what the answers are.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, I certainly do not want to be abusive to

this or any other witness. Would you be more amenable to our breaking

and reconvening in the morning?

Mr. Cole. No. Because I don't want to have to go through

questions that, frankly, are cumulative, and with all due respect,

unnecessary because the questions have been answered in a much broader

sense.

Chairman Gowdy. I can appreciate the fact that you may view them

as cumulative. But the reality is, counsel for the majority is going

through different documents. And for him to merely assume that the

answer is going to be the same for every one, when at least in some

instances the subject line is very different, I think it is -- this

is the only opportunity that the majority and maybe minority is going

to have to pose questions to Mr. Blumenthal.

I am appreciative of his patience. I'm appreciative of his time.

I want to be a good steward of it. I've been in the room just as long

as you and Mr. Blumenthal. So we're happy to try to ask the questions

as quickly as we can, but what I cannot do is cut down on the number

of questions we have because this is the only opportunity we have to

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talk to Mr. Blumenthal.

Mr. Cole. I understand that. And I don't want the committee to

not ask questions that they feel are important. But I do feel that

there is some ability to be able to tailor the questioning at this point,

based on the historical record that we've got in the record to date,

to be able to expedite this a bit.

Mr. Davis. It sounds as though you would like my questioning to

steer away from some of the contents of the memos, which, in your view,

have been well established he has not written the memos; he's not

reviewed the memos; he did not vet the source of the memos.

Mr. Cole. Correct. Because, I mean, if you want so say, "Have

you ever met with so and so, have you ever net with so-and-so," that's

fine. Go right ahead.

Mr. Davis. And you believe that that will cut down on the number

of questions and time.

Mr. Cole. I don't know what else you have left, but if that will

help cut down, that's a request I would make.

Mr. Davis. We can do that.

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. And I would just say on behalf of the ranking

member, I feel like the witness and his counsel have been incredibly

patient. I think the ranking member's sense at the outset was that

this deposition in particular, it's been the only one that we've had

in the entire year, it's been a tremendous risk of going well beyond

the scope of this committee's investigation.

We deferred an hour of questioning with the hope that the majority

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would pick up the pace. I specifically asked my counsel from the other

side to really try to move it more toward the subject matter that we

are charged with investigating, which are the attacks in Benghazi.

We have now been here for 2 hours. There has not been a single

question about Benghazi or the attacks in Benghazi, and I think if this

is going to proceed this way, I would just ask the chairman to ask his

counsel to lay the foundation for how any of these questions do go to

the subject matter that we are supposed to be investigating instead

of some allegations about business opportunities that from the outset

in our hour of questioning the witness made clear never came to

fruition, he never benefitted from, and he never asked the Secretary

or anyone in the State Department to provide a benefit for. Even if

he had, I'm not sure how that relates to the attacks in Benghazi.

So, you know, I do think that the counsel and the witness have

been incredibly patient, but they do deserve to have an understanding

of how this relates to why they've been asked to come here.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, consistent with the inception of the

committee, we disagree about what the jurisdiction is for this

committee. And we're going to abide by what's in the House resolution.

And I think every question that's been asked has a factual basis or

there is a reason for it being asked. So we just fundamentally disagree

on that.

However, we do agree that the witness and his counsel have been

patient. And Carlton has already offered to the extent he can to

expedite it. But what I'm not going to have happen is for this

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deposition to be over and there to be questions that we have missed

our only opportunity to ask. That is not going to happen. So we can

continue to disagree about the scope of the investigation, as we do

a number of issues related to the investigation, but I'm not going to

ask him to short-circuit his questions.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Okay. At that point, why don't we take a

break so that you guys can have a little break, and then we'll take

our time.

We can go off the record. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Ms. Sawyer. Go back on the record.

Okay. We're back on the record. It's 5:01. And it's Heather

Sawyer on behalf of the minority members of the committee.

And we're just taking our second opportunity to speak with you,

Mr. Blumenthal. Again, we appreciate your patience.

It's our understanding that during the break, there was a

discussion and agreement reached. The deposition rule that governs

the House and this committee as well requires at a deposition the

presence of a Member at all times.

We understand there are some votes coming up, but you have now

been here since 10:30. So I think there was a conversation about

whether you would be willing to waive the requirement that a Member

is here. It's our understanding that you've agreed. Is that the case?

Mr. Cole. That's correct. On behalf of Mr. Blumenthal, we will

waive the requirement of a Member during the times of votes.

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Ms. Sawyer. Okay. The rule itself formally requires your

waiver to be in writing. So if you could just submit a very short note

to the committee just confirming, that would be much appreciated.

Mr. Cole. Will do so.

Ms. Sawyer. Great.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Mr. Blumenthal, I want to try to be as quick as possible.

I just had a few followup questions based on some of the questions you've

been asked, and then a few questions that we wanted to cover with you.

Just to start, I wanted to have you direct your attention back

to what has been marked for purposes of deposition as exhibit 11.

A Yes. I have that.

Q Okay. And that was the August 31, 2011 --

A Yes.

Q -- communication that you confirmed you had sent to the

Secretary.

A Right.

Q You were asked some questions, and I'll just direct your

attention to the second page of that document.

A Yes.

Q Look down at the bottom on the right-hand corner for

identification just has BLU-103.

You had been asked some questions about that source comment at

the bottom of the page there. And I think it was described by my

colleague in the majority as reading as a, quote, "infomercial." Do

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you recall him characterizing it that way?

A Yes.

Q And I think you indicated that you didn't know who the source

of this comment was.

A Correct.

Q Okay. And that was -- that discussion was that this

description in particular was ostensibly an infomercial for the Osprey

Security Group. Do you recall that part of the conversation in the

last hour?

A Yes. Yes.

Q Okay. And this was sent, once again, on August 31, 2011.

Does that seem accurate? That's what the document says. Do you

remember sending it around that same time?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Then I just wanted to direct your attention to

exhibit 10. That was discussed in the last hour.

A Yeah. Okay.

Q Okay.

A I got it.

Q And that was an exhibit that you discussed with my

colleagues in the majority as relating to a memo of understanding that

appears to have been -- you said you didn't recall when you saw this.

It didn't seem --

A Right. I don't -- I don't recall.

Q Okay. Now, just directing your attention to the second

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line there, it says, quote: "This agreement is entered into this 24th

day of August 2011." Do you see that reference just in the document

itself? Sorry. Exhibit 10.

A Yes.

Q In that second line, just on its face, it says, quote:

"This agreement is entered into this 24th day of August 2011." Do you

just see that?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So August 24 would have come some week or 7 days or

so before you sent the -- what is exhibit 11 dated --

A Right.

Q -- August 31, 2011. Is that not --

A Right.

Q -- just by sheer calendar. Correct?

A Yes.

Q So to the extent there's some implication that your memo

that came after exhibit 10 that relates to a memo of understanding

ostensibly between Osprey that you indicated you don't know if you saw

at the time was in some way supposed to influence, how could you possibly

have done so by sending this information 7 days after an agreement had

been entered into? Even had that been -- and I'm just saying, pure

speculation -- how is that possible? The timing just seems impossible

if you're trying to influence in some way?

A As a matter of logic, it is not possible.

Q So to the extent exhibit 11 actually references this, the

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Osprey Group -- and, again, just in that source comment, which, again,

you are not the actual source of -- it references the note that, and

I will just read on page 2 of exhibit 11: To this end, they have signed

an agreement with the Osprey Security Group, OSG, a U.S. firm

specializing in emergency medical care and humanitarian assistance.

At that point in time, that actually is a statement of fact, is

it not, if indeed the memo of understanding has been entered into as

of 24th day of August 2011 and, again, understanding that you are not

the source of that information?

A It's -- this is Mr. Drumheller's memo. The source comment

may or may not be him, but it is a statement of fact as he understood

it when he wrote it.

Q So to the extent that it had already occurred, it was

relaying that fact. And, in any event, you are not the source of that

information. Is that the case?

A That is the case.

Q And, certainly, as you have indicated with regard to all

of the information passed along, you are in no way passing along that

August 31, 2011, information to ask the Secretary to take any action

on behalf of Osprey. Were you?

A I was not.

Q To in any way bring them in particular to the Secretary's

attention?

A I was seeking no benefit whatsoever.

Q And I'm not sure that you can -- when you sent this, it was

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characterized in the last hour as an infomercial, I use that term to

talk a little bit about it, but when you sent it, did you consider it

to be an infomercial for the Osprey group?

A I considered this memo to be exactly like all the other

reports that I had sent from Tyler Drumheller as an informational report

to be used or not used as she saw fit and to be helpful or not helpful.

Q Now, you did discuss both with me in the first opportunity

I had to speak with you and then several times in the last 2 hours the

fact that you had in essence just passed along information the way that

you just characterized it --

A Yeah.

Q -- that you might be helpful.

From your perspective and to the best of your knowledge, is there

anything unlawful about a private citizen, and in your case a friend,

passing information to a public official, including the Secretary of

State, for them to handle as they see fit?

A No. And I don't want to engage in a long conversation, but

I think that citizens have throughout American history had relations

with responsible government officials and passed on information to them

and that that is essential to the character of our democracy. And it

is helpful, in my view, for officials to seek information wherever they

might find it so that they can form a full view in their decisionmaking.

Q Okay. Thank you.

And, just quickly, if I could turn your attention to exhibit 15.

That was discussed in the last hour. A very quick question for you

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on this, and I may have simply misheard. So I just want to make it

absolutely clear for the record.

I had thought that one of the questions that was asked of you had

a premise in it that asked when you wrote this memo, but I thought you

had indicated that this, like many of the others, was not actually

something you yourself had authored. And I just wanted to make it clear

for the record whether this exhibit 15 was something you had authored

or was this something that Mr. Drumheller had authored?

A Mr. Drumheller wrote this memo, as he wrote the other

reports.

Q And, again, like the other reports, you just passed it along

to the Secretary?

A That's correct.

Q You were asked questions about in particular three exhibits

in the last hour, and they were exhibit No. 7, exhibit No. 8 --

A Yeah.

Q -- and exhibit No. 9.

A Nine somewhere. Yes.

Q Those documents do not bear any kind of identifying marks

down in the corner. A lot of the documents that we have shown you do

bear identification numbers that indicate they've either been produced

to this committee by the State Department or produced to this committee

by you in response to the request from the chairman. These do not bear

any of those identifying marks. Just to make it clear for the record,

these were not produced by you -- by you to the committee. Is that

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correct?

A These were not produced by me to the committee, nor to my

knowledge by the State Department, nor could they have had them. These

were illegally hacked emails that are part of the Federal criminal case.

Q Okay. So --

A And they have been brought into this matter.

Q Right. And do you have -- do you sitting here have any idea

how the majority came to have these particular emails?

A I do.

Q And can you explain how it is they have come to have these?

A These --

Q Or at least your understanding of why they have them.

A My understanding of how they have them is that after

the -- is that the hacker, as it was explained to me by the Federal

investigators, worked with media organizations, in particular Russia

Today and Gawker, and that he established a Web site specifically to

upload stolen emails from me and others, and that they then were told

what these new Web sites were. They took down the stolen material and

they cached them themselves. It's not a matter of freedom of the press.

And that's where these come from.

These media organizations such as they are, like Russia Today and

Gawker, then threw these out in public. I can't -- I understand I'm

speaking a little at length, but the Federal investigators told me they

believe it's possibly a Russian intelligence operation.

Q So it's your belief and understanding that these would have

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come somehow off the Internet?

A These came off the Internet on the sites that were complicit

with the foreign criminal.

Q And you had indicated earlier that in light of that, you

could not necessarily vouch for whether or not each and every one of

them appears exactly as it was sent or reproduced by you or --

A I can't tell.

Q And you were in particular asked some questions. I'll just

direct your attention to exhibit 9. You were asked a number of

questions about the timing of when things were sent to whom and in

particular about -- and I'll just direct your attention to the middle

of that page, something that indicated, on Friday, May 13, 2011, at

10:32, and then your email address, "wrote," and then there's some blank

space.

So you can't really, sitting here today, indicate whether or not

there actually was writing in there or there was nothing in there. Is

that the case?

A I cannot indicate anything. I have no idea.

Q Right. And looking at just that email, it's also just

simply possible, is it not, that all that line signifies is you

forwarding on the communication that Mr. Drumheller had sent to you

to Mr. Shearer who was then responding to you at the top? So it could

be as simple and benign as well as that. Could it not?

A It could be. Yes.

Q And the bottom line is, sitting here today, you simply

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cannot tell us because these were not documents currently in your

possession?

A I can't. That's correct.

Q I'm going to shift gears, and I'm going to ask you a series

of questions.

I want to explain, first, as you probably are well aware, this

is now the eighth congressional investigation into the Benghazi

attacks.

A I thought you were going to say eighth hour.

Q It may also be drawing very close to the eighth hour of your

time with this particular investigation into the Benghazi attacks.

We want to make sure it's the last. I think all of the members

of the committee are very committed to doing that. We are, therefore,

asking every witness that has come before the committee about a series

of public allegations that have been made since the attacks.

It's our understanding that even where these allegations have

been answered by other investigations, our colleagues in the majority

are persuing them. That's why we're asking about them. And certainly

it's true while anyone can speculate and have opinions about the

Benghazi attacks -- and certainly plenty of people have in the 2 years

since the attacks -- only a limited universe of people have actual

firsthand knowledge or evidence of what happened before, during, or

after the attacks.

Based on what we have heard in the now nearly 7 hours I think that

you've been with us, we do not believe that you are one such person,

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but we do, while we have you here with us, we do want to run through

and ask you these questions. There's about a dozen of them. So please

bear with me.

It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman

has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to

stand down," end quote, and this resulted in the Defense Department

not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims. Nonetheless, the allegation and

claim has persisted.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

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security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011. Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton

misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi

to his own people in order to garner support for military operations

in Libya and spring 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and that they found,

quote, "no support for this allegation," end quote. Do you have any

evidence to contradict the House Intelligence Committee's bipartisan

report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound. And

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there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to stand down but that, instead, there were tactical disagreements on

the ground over how quickly to depart. Do you have any evidence that

would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's finding that there

was no standdown order to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA's security personnel who departed the

Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

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Q Let me ask you these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons, that he then misrepresented his actions when he told

Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties in

accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," end quote. Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy

Director Mike Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony

to Congress about the Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks. Do you have any evidence that Ambassador

Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on

the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that President of the United States was,

quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," end quote, on the night

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of the attack, and that he was, quote, "missing in action." Do you

have any evidence to support the allegation that the President was

virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain

in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "there was no standdown order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi." Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of

the House Armed Services Committee that there was no standdown order

issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the

fight in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee conducted a review of

the attacks, after which he stated, "Given where the troops were, how

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quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did," end quote. Do you have

any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

to deploy?

A No.

Q Okay. I think for now that would conclude the questions

we have for you for this round. We will turn it back over to our

colleagues in the majority to continue with the hope that we will be

able to conclude, you know, with all of our questions from the committee

as expeditiously as possible.

Mr. Davis. Going off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

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Mr. Davis. We'll go back on the record. It is 5:58.

So I want to introduce exhibit 16 to you. So exhibit 16 is a

State Department-produced email, SCB0045274 through 278.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 16

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q This is an email. The top reads, "from H," sent Wednesday,

September 12, 2012, 11:26 p.m., to sullivanjj@state.gov with the

comment, "We should get this around ASAP." And there is a forward from

you, Mr. Blumenthal, of an email you sent to H on Wednesday, September

12, at 6:16 p.m.

A Uh-huh.

Q So, on this particular email, you sent it to the Secretary

and you included the message, "Sending direct. Just in." What does

that mean?

A It meant that I just forwarded it directly from Tyler

without the usual formatting that I had given it.

Q So why did you do that on this particular occasion?

A Seemed more urgent information that she might find

valuable.

Q And why was the information more urgent on this particular

occasion?

A Because it had to do with the Benghazi attack.

Q Okay. And I know we've talked about this before, but did

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you vet any of the information or any of the sources in the report that

you forwarded along to the Secretary on this particular occasion?

A I did not.

Q Okay. The bottom header, the original message, subject,

"more on Libya," from Tyler Drumheller to yourself and J.T. Caulfield.

Who is J.T. Caulfield?

A He is a legal consultant, a friend of Tyler's.

Q Okay. Do you know if they worked together on any occasion?

A I believe they have.

Q Okay. Does the firm DNC Worldwide ring a bell?

A I don't know what that name means.

Q Were all intelligence reports from Mr. Drumheller usually

sent to you and Mr. Caulfield?

A No.

Q Do you know why Mr. Caulfield was included on this

particular occasion?

A I do not.

Q Okay. Did you ever have any conversations with

Mr. Caulfield about Libya?

A No.

Q I want to go back to exhibit 1. I think it's at the top

of your pile, I believe.

A I have it.

Q Before we get to exhibit 1, let me ask, when do you recall

first learning about the attacks in Benghazi?

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A I don't know. Probably -- well, didn't it take place in

the middle of the night? You know, I'm --

Q I'm just asking you for your best recollection of what you

remember that took place.

A My recollection is that I would have learned about it from

news reports.

Q Okay. Do you remember where you were or what you were doing

when you first heard about it?

A I would have been at home, probably.

Q Okay. Do you know how long after the attack, the first

attack took place, when you learned about it?

A No.

Q Okay. You don't remember what media outlet you first

recall hearing it from?

A No.

Q Okay. But you're confident you learned about it from media

reports?

A Yes.

Q Exhibit 1 references -- let's read exhibit 1 there. The

first paragraph: During the afternoon of September 11, 2012, new

interim president of Libya Mohammed Yussef el Margariaf spoke in

private with senior advisers, including the members of the Libyan

Muslim Brotherhood, to discuss the attacks by demonstrators on U.S.

Missions in Tripoli and Benghazi. According to a sensitive source,

el Magariaf was shaken by the attacks and gave permission to commanders

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on the ground for security forces to open fire over the heads of the

crowds in an effort to break up mobs attacking the missions. During

this session, a senior security officer told Magariaf that the attacks

on that day were inspired by what many devout Libyan viewed as a

sacrilegious Internet video on the Prophet Mohammed originating in

America.

I take it from your prior testimony, you did not read that before

you forwarded this along to Secretary Clinton?

A I may have read it. I usually -- I often read the reports.

Q You often read the reports?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there anything about this particular reporting

there in paragraph 1 that struck you as particularly accurate or

inaccurate?

A No.

Q Okay. Have you since learned that the sentences I just read

to you were inaccurate?

A My understanding is that the attack was planned and that

the video was a cover, to the extent it was, and that's my understanding

of it. I could be wrong.

Q Well, let me ask about this: The first sentence, "During

the afternoon of September 11, 2012, new interim President Magariaf

spoke in private with senior advisers, including the members in the

Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, to discuss the attacks by demonstrators on

U.S. Missions in Tripoli and Benghazi." Do you know what time the

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attacks actually occurred?

A You know, my knowledge of it even now is spotty.

Q Okay. Did Secretary Clinton ever ask you to acquire any

additional information about the attacks themselves?

A No.

Q Okay. Are you familiar with the Foreign Agents

Registration Act?

A I am.

Q Have you registered under the Foreign Agents Registration

Act?

A No.

Q Okay. Have you ever received any notification or

communication from the Department of Justice about the Foreign Agents

Registration Act?

A I have.

Mr. Cole. Point of order, Mr. Chairman, what this has to do with

attacks in Benghazi.

Mr. Davis. We'll move on.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q The reports that you received from Mr. Drumheller, did you

ever forward or cut and paste any of those reports to anybody else other

than Secretary Clinton?

A Within the time period that we're discussing about?

Q I'm sorry. Yes, regarding Libya in 2011 and 2012. Did you

ever forward or cut and paste any of Mr. Drumheller's reports to anybody

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else other than Secretary Clinton?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. So nobody else in the United States Government that

you're aware of?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q What about any private individual?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. So you only sent reports provided to you by

Mr. Drumheller to Secretary Clinton?

A As I recall.

Mr. Pompeo. Thanks.

Mr. Blumenthal, I don't want to belabor this, but you would

consider yourself a trusted adviser of Secretary of State Clinton. Is

that true?

The Witness. I consider myself a long-time friend.

Mr. Pompeo. But you would consider yourself a trusted adviser.

She would value things that you sent to her and trust that the

information you provided her was correct. Do you believe that?

The Witness. Well, I hope that on these reports, that she would

have them evaluated properly on the --

Mr. Pompeo. Let's go to -- it's in the Blumenthal production,

page 112. This is a different email. It's just page 112. This is

an email. I'll just grab it while they're looking for it. It's dated

October 15, 2011. Looks like one that you wrote about --

Mr. Cole. 2000 and what? I'm sorry.

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Mr. Pompeo. I'm sorry. October 15, 2011. Did I say 2001? I

apologize. October 15, 2011. It's about Qadhafi's location.

Anyway, let's get it in front of you so you can see it. I apologize.

Here, I'm happy to actually -- I'll pull it out.

The Witness. May I see it?

Mr. Davis. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. As soon as we put a sticker on it.

Mr. Davis. We'll mark it as deposition exhibit No. 16.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 16

Was marked for identification and

corrected to Blumenthal Exhibit No.

16A.]

The Witness. Here, why don't you mark it up and then you can

properly give it to me.

Mr. Davis. Deposition exhibit No. 16, BLU dash --

Mr. Pompeo. And I apologize for not having copies for everyone.

In any event, is this an email that you actually wrote? This is not

Mr. Drumheller's work. It's kind of a different format. Looks like

it's your voice.

The Witness. I wrote this.

Mr. Pompeo. So you would be the source for this particular

document?

The Witness. I was a source of -- I was not the source of this

information.

Mr. Pompeo. But you were -- from Secretary Clinton's

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perspective, you were the source -- there's no other source identified.

You don't refer to any place from which you received the information.

You were the sole source -- you were the only individual that provided

this information to her. Is that correct?

The Witness. On this -- on this score, I am.

Mr. Pompeo. So this email you would have read, right, because

you wrote it?

The Witness. I wrote this email.

Mr. Pompeo. And you would have believed this information, unlike

some of the others that had just passed them on. This one, you wrote

this. So you wouldn't write something you didn't believe, correct?

The Witness. I didn't know if it was true. It was interesting.

And it's like everything else. It didn't mean that it was always true.

It was -- I considered this in the realm of gossip.

Mr. Pompeo. You didn't write that. You said "was approached."

That's a -- you're a writer, right? That's your profession. If you

were conditioning it, if you thought this was a rumor -- in fact, I'll

show you another email where you do describe it as a rumor, but you

chose not to here. So you wrote this as if this was a factual statement?

The Witness. Well, I didn't know what Sey Hersh would wind up

doing.

Mr. Pompeo. You may not have. But you present it to Secretary

Clinton this is a factual statement. You're a good writer. I've read

much of what you've written. You're a good writer.

The Witness. Yes, I wrote this.

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Mr. Pompeo. Great. Did it turn out to be true; do you know?

The Witness. I have no idea.

Mr. Pompeo. So you don't know if Qadhafi was actually in Chad

on October 15, 2011?

The Witness. No idea.

Mr. Pompeo. Do you know that he was actually killed in Libya

5 days later?

The Witness. Yes, he was.

Mr. Pompeo. In Sirte, Libya. But you don't know if this turned

out to be true or not?

The Witness. Right.

Mr. Pompeo. And you never corrected -- if it turns out it was

wrong, you didn't ever send her a subsequent email correcting that,

saying: Hey, turns out something I told you wasn't right.

The Witness. What I reported here is, according to a close friend

of Hersh and what Hersh told this friend, so that's what it is. And

it's Sey Hirsch's account to a friend, so --

Mr. Pompeo. I'm just trying to figure out what you expected her

to think about the emails that you sent her. Did you expect her to

think they were just random thoughts and rumors, or did you think you

were providing her intelligence of some value? Those are the two

options.

The Witness. I think she could judge for herself.

Mr. Pompeo. Fair enough. I'm going to jump around a little bit.

You said I think earlier this morning that you still are working for

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Correct The Record?

The Witness. I am.

Mr. Pompeo. And tell me what the mission of Correct The Record

is.

The Witness. Correct The Record is pretty much what it says, to

correct -- it's a nonprofit organization to Correct The Record about

public misstatements about prominent Democrats.

Mr. Pompeo. Including this committee. If this committee said

something, Correct The Record might comment on things that it said

incorrectly and indeed it has?

The Witness. That may well be so.

Mr. Pompeo. Have you written any of that?

The Witness. No.

Mr. Pompeo. Yeah. So you haven't made any comments as part of

your role in Correct The Record related to this committee's work? You

haven't written any --

The Witness. I have not written those.

Mr. Pompeo. You also appear in a couple of these emails to have

a different role other than just facilitator. Can you go to -- let's

see, we'll do this first. We'll do 107.

Mr. Davis. This is deposition exhibit No. 17.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 17

Was marked for identification.]

Mrs. Brooks. May I clarify one question, Mike?

Mr. Pompeo. Sure.

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Mrs. Brooks. While you didn't write and haven't made any

comments with respect to Benghazi Committee, have you edited any work

that has been written?

The Witness. I have not.

Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.

The Witness. I have not edited.

Mr. Davis. This is deposition exhibit 17.

Mr. Pompeo. So, Mr. Blumenthal, this appears to be an email from

you?

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Pompeo. To Hillary?

The Witness. Right.

Mr. Pompeo. And the subject line says: Per our conversation,

Jamie writes editorial.

The Witness. Right.

Mr. Pompeo. Tell me what was going on there.

The Witness. This is an editorial in Bloomberg News written by

Jamie Rubin, who is the former Assistant Secretary of State for Public

Affairs under the Clinton administration. He is a close, personal

friend of mine. And he was then the editorial director of Bloomberg

News, and that's what we were discussing.

Mr. Pompeo. So did you ask -- so you spoke with Mrs. Clinton,

Secretary Clinton, it appears. Is that true? It says, "per our

conversation." I assume you're speaking about a conversation between

you and the Secretary?

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The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Pompeo. So you spoke with her. And what did you say in that

conversation? What was that conversation about?

The Witness. I don't recall the conversation.

Mr. Pompeo. You can't recall the conversation in the context

even of seeing what you attached?

The Witness. I can guess.

Mr. Pompeo. All right.

The Witness. But I --

Mr. Pompeo. So you probably spoke about getting this written by

Mr. Rubin and getting this placed --

The Witness. No.

Mr. Pompeo. -- because you say, "Jamie writes editorial" -- you

tell me.

The Witness. I'm guessing, you know. I don't think it's -- I

think it was a general conversation.

Mr. Pompeo. You don't think it had anything to do with Mr. Rubin

writing an editorial that supports Secretary Clinton's role in Libya?

The Witness. I don't think I spoke to her about that beforehand.

Mr. Pompeo. You don't think that you did?

The Witness. No. I don't think I did, about Jamie doing this.

Mr. Pompeo. Okay. Could you get 172, please?

Mr. Davis. Deposition exhibit 18.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 18

Was marked for identification.]

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The Witness. Yep.

Mr. Pompeo. Mr. Blumenthal, this is an email, dated October 10,

2012, subject line, "Got all this done." What does that mean? What

does "got all this done" mean?

The Witness. It means that media matters got all this done and

that they had published all these articles.

Mr. Pompeo. Then you add, "Complete refutation on Libya smear."

What were you talking about there?

The Witness. I don't have these articles in front of me.

Mr. Pompeo. Okay.

The Witness. But --

Mr. Pompeo. Happy to provide them if you'd like, but I'm most

interested in what you were communicating to Secretary Clinton in your

email.

The Witness. Well, I think it's that it was wrongdoing on the

part of her or the Obama administration, and these were factual

refutations.

Mr. Pompeo. So you were engaged in information management with

respect to Secretary Clinton after the events in Benghazi?

The Witness. I wouldn't regard it in information management with

her in her official capacity. I was outside operating with an outside

group as a private citizen.

Mr. Pompeo. And then who is Philippe?

The Witness. Philippe.

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, Philippe. Who is Philippe?

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The Witness. Philippe Reines.

Mr. Pompeo. What does he do?

The Witness. He was her press secretary, I believe it's called.

Mr. Pompeo. I see. So he was inside?

The Witness. He was.

Mr. Pompeo. And why do you say Philippe can circulate these

links? Is that because you weren't involved in information

management?

The Witness. No. It was something he could do.

Mr. Pompeo. You were just proffering it as something he might

do or --

The Witness. He could do it.

Mr. Pompeo. Okay. So if I have it right, you informed Secretary

Clinton that there were a bunch of articles favorable to her written

about her role and what happened in Benghazi, Libya, then you wrote

to her press secretary -- or you wrote to her saying that your press

secretary can circulate these?

The Witness. I don't know that they were favorable to her so much

as they were factual articles about the facts as they were understood.

In one of them, it says: Myths and facts about the Benghazi attack.

Mr. Pompeo. Right.

The Witness. So I think that's what the subject was -- is, from

what I can tell here.

Mr. Pompeo. Can you find 94, Blumenthal 94, please. 094.

Mr. Davis. Deposition exhibit 19.

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[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 19

Was marked for identification.]

The Witness. Yep.

Mr. Davis. Sorry. It's 2 pages.

The Witness. Thank you.

Mr. Pompeo. Do you have it in front of you? Yes, sir.

So this one is a little different than the Drumheller one. This

you wrote as well. Is that correct?

The Witness. This is me.

Mr. Pompeo. So what does, "First, brava!", what were you

referring to there --

The Witness. That's -- I was praising her.

Mr. Pompeo. For what?

The Witness. For the conclusion of the Libyan war and the NATO

mission.

Mr. Pompeo. So this was immediately in the aftermath of the fall

of Qadhafi?

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Pompeo. And then, beneath that, there are a series of -- I

won't characterize them, but you provide recommendations or guidance

on how she ought to behave in the aftermath, things she ought to do?

The Witness. This is suggestions on public relations. It's

advice on public relations. I think that's fair.

Mr. Pompeo. Yeah. And did you find yourself often doing that

for the Secretary of State? I mean, she had Philippe Reines, who was

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a paid professional, to do that.

The Witness. I think there are very few of these. I think I did

this rarely.

Mr. Pompeo. Do you still consider Libya a historic success?

The Witness. I think it is a chaotic, violent, divided society,

very complex situation. I'd be very hesitant to characterize our

policy for our -- or where it's come in a definitive way. I think it's

too early to tell.

Mr. Pompeo. Fair enough. But you believed at that time it was

a historical success and thought that Secretary Clinton should get out

in the driveway, even though she was on vacation, and she should get

out there and --

The Witness. I thought the NATO mission and the -- and work with

the United Nations and what it had done here was successful, yes.

Mr. Pompeo. And the very last sentence, very last line,

second-to-last word is Clio.

The Witness. Yes.

Mr. Pompeo. Who or what is Clio?

The Witness. History.

Mr. Pompeo. History?

The Witness. History. Clio is history.

Mr. Pompeo. So it's just a word that you --

The Witness. Clio is --

Mr. Pompeo. Yeah, got it.

Chairman Gowdy. Mr. Blumenthal, thank you again for your

1225
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patience. I've been sitting here like you've been sitting here

listening to your questions and answers. I just have some that I want

a little more depth on if we can, and then we'll be done.

I'm going to try to go chronologically. I think it'll be easier

for you to remember it and certainly easier for me to ask it.

I want to go back to your decision to send the very first email

to the Secretary of State. What was your thought process?

The Witness. The first about -- the very first email I ever sent

her?

Chairman Gowdy. Very first one. You were not asked to send

emails to her on Libya or any other foreign policy matter, I assume?

The Witness. Are you discussing Libya or any email?

Chairman Gowdy. No, I'm talking about Libya. Did you send

emails on other countries to her?

The Witness. Yes, I've testified to that.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay. The first Libya one. You go back to

February of 2011. What prompted you to send -- you've already said

that you were not an expert on that country.

The Witness. Right.

Chairman Gowdy. What prompted you to send a top diplomat in our

country an unsolicited email?

The Witness. I had been sending her reports for Mr. Drumheller

on Egypt, and when the Libyan revolt broke out, he began writing these

reports on Libya. So I sent the Libyan reports, as I sent the reports

on Egypt. There were reports on Egypt that I sent her in the same period

1226
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and on other countries.

Chairman Gowdy. I guess, I'm just trying to have an appreciation

for sending an unsolicited, unvetted intelligence briefing to the top

diplomat in our country no matter what your relationship with her was.

I guess I'm just trying to understand what prompts someone to send an

unsolicited, unvetted intelligence briefing to our country's top

diplomat.

The Witness. I thought they might be helpful to her.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. Well --

The Witness. That's what I thought.

Chairman Gowdy. -- when you say "helpful," did she ever ask you

who your sourcing was?

The Witness. It wasn't my sourcing. She knew that Tyler

Drumheller wrote those reports.

Chairman Gowdy. And she knew that how?

The Witness. When I first sent the Egyptian report, she knew that

it was Mr. Drumheller. And he was someone she knew because I'd

introduced her to him some years earlier.

Chairman Gowdy. Did she ever inquire about the reliability or

credibility of his sourcing?

The Witness. Well, she did not do that with me, but from what

I have learned subsequently, she did that internally.

Chairman Gowdy. Learned from whom?

The Witness. From the news stories that have appeared in which

there have been other emails that have been released that I never saw.

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Chairman Gowdy. Well, you may know something I don't know. Tell

me what you're talking about.

The Witness. The State Department emails that have been released

that contain comments of people from inside the State Department about

various reports. I did not see any of those at the time.

Chairman Gowdy. So your --

The Witness. -- at the time --

Chairman Gowdy. -- that she did have an opinion on -- that she

knew that Tyler Drumheller was the source, and she had an opinion on

the reliability of his sources?

The Witness. I think she turned it over -- what I gather is that

she turned it over to people to evaluate.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know how Tyler Drumheller may have vetted

the reliability of his own sources?

The Witness. I don't.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know why Tyler Drumheller didn't just

send her his intelligence memo? Why go through you?

The Witness. Well, she did not widely disseminate her email

address, and --

Chairman Gowdy. Well, I'm not asking for a wide dissemination.

I'm asking for one more person.

The Witness. Well, I understand, but he was a friend of mine,

and I had --

Chairman Gowdy. But you said she knew him as well.

The Witness. Through me. She had met him --

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Chairman Gowdy. Did she have an opinion on his experience, his

acumen, his ability to produce credible work?

The Witness. She knew his background and his record.

Chairman Gowdy. Did she have an opinion on his ability to produce

credible work?

The Witness. Well, she knew that he had held many high positions

in the CIA and that she would turn over whatever his work was to others

inside the government.

Chairman Gowdy. If she thought highly enough of him to rely on

his work, why didn't she think highly enough of him to give him her

email address?

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. At this point, I think I just have to

object. Mr. Chairman, respectfully, you have asked a whole series of

questions now about what is in Hillary Clinton's mind. And this

witness just simply could not have the capacity to answer those

questions.

Chairman Gowdy. With all due respect, he's been asked to

speculate a lot today on what was in other people's minds. If he

doesn't know the answer, he's welcome to say. And he's got one of the

most competent lawyers in America sitting right beside him. So if he

would like to pose an objection, he's welcome to. If he doesn't know

the answer to the question, he's welcome to say that as well.

Mr. Davis. Susanne, as I mentioned at the start of the

deposition, we will not stop questioning to address objections raised

by anyone other than witness or his counsel. Thank you.

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Chairman Gowdy. Do you know why she did not give Tyler Drumheller

her email address?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know why you were used as a conduit

between Tyler Drumheller and Secretary of State?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know whether she took any steps to

evaluate the credibility or reliability of any of Mr. Drumheller's

sources?

The Witness. I had no knowledge at the time.

Chairman Gowdy. Did you take any steps to evaluate the

reliability or credibility of any of Mr. Drumheller's sources?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay. Did he know that you were forwarding his

memos onto her?

The Witness. Yes.

Chairman Gowdy. Did he know that she was forwarding those memos

onto other people within the Department of State?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Did you?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, I think you had testified that part of the

reason you felt comfortable sending raw intelligence data is you knew

that she would have it vetted. So would that not be an expectation

that she was going to send it onto someone else?

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The Witness. I didn't know what she did.

Chairman Gowdy. I'm trying to reconcile the discrepancy there.

I thought you had testified that your expectation was she would send

the material onto other people?

The Witness. That was -- I had been in government. I thought

she might do that, that it might be useful. It was up to her to use

as she saw fit. But I had no knowledge at all what she did with them

once she received them.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you have any reason to know why she would have

scrubbed off your name as the source of the memo?

The Witness. Well, I wasn't the source of the memo. I was --

Chairman Gowdy. Well, you were her source for the memo.

The Witness. Well, I was the source of the email.

Chairman Gowdy. You weren't the author.

The Witness. I was not the author. I had -- I don't know why

anything appears in the format it does in the State Department emails

and how it -- why or how it appears.

Chairman Gowdy. Were are you personally familiar with any of

Tyler Drumheller's sources?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. I think you've already testified

you didn't investigate their credibility.

Do you know o=if any of Mr. Drumheller's sources had a pecuniary

interest in Libya or the region --

The Witness. No.

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Chairman Gowdy. -- sources?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know if any of Mr. Drumheller's clients

had a pecuniary interest in Libya or the region?

The Witness. Not to my knowledge, no.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know who any of his clients were?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know that he had clients?

The Witness. It's an assumption of mine. He told me he had large

clients, American clients.

Chairman Gowdy. I guess, what I'm trying to get my head around,

having never served in government much and not being a diplomat, is,

was he sending the material pro bono? Was he just being a good citizen?

These are exhaustive memos. Why was he doing it?

The Witness. I believe, my view is that he was being a good

citizen.

Chairman Gowdy. And that was the sole motivation?

The Witness. That's what I believe.

Chairman Gowdy. And what forms the basis of that belief?

The Witness. Knowing that he had spent a lifetime in the service

of United States Government and the CIA.

Chairman Gowdy. Which is a good point. I'm glad you raised it.

Why didn't he give the intelligence to the CIA?

The Witness. I don't know.

Chairman Gowdy. You just said he was a lifetime CIA person. He

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had contacts in the CIA, right? Why go through you? Why go through

a journalist, an author? Why not give it to the CIA and let them compare

and contrast and see how it aligns with other intelligence they have?

The Witness. I don't know.

Chairman Gowdy. Is it implausible for one to ask why he would

go the route he went as opposed to his old colleagues?

The Witness. I didn't ask him.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. You are not the author of the word

"unsolicited," but you were asked about it earlier. What is your view

of the word "unsolicited" when the former Secretary said that these

were unsolicited emails sent by an old friend. What did you take the

word "unsolicited" to mean?

The Witness. I believe I said here that they were --

Chairman Gowdy. I think you said they were "intermittent," which

I don't think is a synonym for "unsolicited," but if that's what you

took it.

The Witness. That she would not know what she would receive or

when she would receive it, and she would receive it intermittently.

Chairman Gowdy. But you would not define "unsolicited" the way

the dictionary would define it as unwanted?

Mr. Cole. I would raise a point of order, whether or not there

is a dictionary definition that matches that.

Chairman Gowdy. Fair enough. There is a definition of the word

"unsolicited." We'll look at it later on. For purposes of what I want

to ask you, when someone says, "Greetings from Kabul, and thanks for

1233
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keeping this stuff coming," is that consistent or inconsistent with

the word "unsolicited"?

The Witness. I don't know what -- whether she thought of saying

that in regards to the words "unsolicited." She was just --

Chairman Gowdy. Have you spoken to her since she said that your

emails were unsolicited?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. "Thanks. I'm going to Paris tomorrow night and

will meet with TNC leaders, so this and additional info useful." Does

that strike you as being a commentary on the unsolicited nature of the

material? She told you it was useful, right?

The Witness. The word "unsolicited" doesn't appear in there.

My view of unsolicited is that it came as I sent it.

Chairman Gowdy. How about another keeper. "Thanks and keep 'em

coming," with 'em being an apostrophe e-m, keep 'em coming. Is that

consistent with the word "unsolicited" or inconsistent to you?

The Witness. Well, once again, I sent these things as -- these

reports as I had them. She didn't know what she would receive or when.

Chairman Gowdy. Did she ever ask you to stop sending them?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Did she ever ask you to slow down?

The Witness. I received no instructions from her whatsoever. I

was never tasked by her to either send or not send.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, when you get an email that says, "Keep 'em

coming," how did you interpret that email?

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217

The Witness. As just friendly.

Chairman Gowdy. I was referring more to --

The Witness. But certainly not as -- I never felt that I was

being tasked by her.

Chairman Gowdy. I'm not asking whether you were tasked. I'm

asking whether or not you viewed your correspondence with her as being

unsolicited.

The Witness. Well, I guess we're arguing over what's in the

dictionary or not.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. Do you continue to receive memos

from Tyler Drumheller?

The Witness. Not for quite a while.

Chairman Gowdy. What's "quite a while"?

The Witness. Several months. He's been .

Chairman Gowdy. When did you receive your last email from him?

The Witness. I don't know. He's, as I said, he's .

Chairman Gowdy. Do you still send the memos onto anyone that is

in the current State Department?

The Witness. I communicate with someone in the State Department.

Chairman Gowdy. That actually wasn't my question. Do you still

send these memos to someone at the current State Department?

The Witness. I have sent Mr. Drumheller's reports to someone at

the State Department in the last year.

Chairman Gowdy. Who?

The Witness. Jonathan Winer.

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Chairman Gowdy. Who is Mr. Winer?

The Witness. He is the, as I understand, the Special Envoy for

Libya.

Chairman Gowdy. Did he solicit those memos from you, or did you

send those unsolicited as well?

The Witness. I sent them unsolicited. I asked him if he

would -- was interested in receiving them, whether he found them

useful, and he could use them as he wished as one of -- as he's told

me -- many sources of information.

Chairman Gowdy. How did you get his email address?

The Witness. He gave it to me.

Chairman Gowdy. The conversation you had with him about whether

or not he wanted to receive those memos, help -- walk me through that

conversation.

The Witness. He is an old friend of mine. I've known him for

many, many years. He had this position. I said: Mr. Drumheller

produced these reports that may or may not be useful to you. You can

use them as you wish, if you wish to receive them. Take a look at it.

See what you think. It's up to you.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know if Secretary Kerry knows that you

were sending those memos?

The Witness. No, I don't know.

Chairman Gowdy. Are you also sending them to anybody in the CIA

so they can vet or gage the reliability of the information?

The Witness. No.

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Chairman Gowdy. Why would you send them to the State Department

and not to the CIA?

The Witness. Because I have a channel there.

Chairman Gowdy. Tyler Drumheller has channels at CIA.

The Witness. I don't know why he doesn't. I can't speak for him.

Chairman Gowdy. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Drumheller the

increasing episodes of violence in Libya and Benghazi in particular

leading up to the attack on our facility?

The Witness. Not that I'm aware of.

Chairman Gowdy. When you say "not that I'm aware of," would you

have remembered it if you all had discussed it? And I'll give you some

for instances. There was an attack on the British Ambassador. Do you

recall discussing that with Mr. Drumheller?

The Witness. No, I don't recall that.

Chairman Gowdy. The International Red Cross or Red Crescent.

Do you remember --

The Witness. I don't recall that.

Chairman Gowdy. Previous, although much smaller attacks on our

own facility, do you remember discussing that with Mr. Drumheller?

The Witness. I don't.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. You said you were not paid -- there

was no financial relationship between you and Mr. Drumheller until you

were asked to introduce or you did introduce somebody to the Podesta

Group. Is that right?

The Witness. Yes.

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Chairman Gowdy. And when did you -- when was that introduction?

The Witness. Two months ago.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. And how much were you paid?

The Witness. $5,000 as a kind of finder's fee.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay. How long have you been emailing

Secretary Clinton at the clintonemail.com email address?

The Witness. I don't know exactly. Since -- maybe since 2009,

I'm guessing. I think so. I don't know if it was earlier. I don't

know when that -- I don't know when that email address was created.

Chairman Gowdy. And that's what I was asking earlier, and I asked

the question inartfully when we first started because I thought I

understood the former Secretary to say that she had created this email

address when she became Secretary of State.

The Witness. That's my recollection, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay. All right. So and I stand to be

corrected, but I had thought she had said that, that when she received

word that she was going to be the Secretary of State, this email address

was created, which then prompted me to ask you, how did you contact

her prior to that? What email address did you use prior to the

clintonemail.com?

The Witness. I believe there were very few, if any, emails

between me and Hillary. There may have been none before she created

that email address.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. So you don't recall emailing her

before she would have assumed office as a Secretary of State? And the

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emails, according to her, were unsolicited. How did you get her email

address?

The Witness. She gave it to me.

Chairman Gowdy. In what context? How? Because she had not

given it to you before. Did you have -- did you email her when she

was a United States Senator?

The Witness. As I said, I have no memory of emailing her when

she was a Senator.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. You've been friends a long time.

You communicate a lot. It just wasn't via email until 2009. I'm not

going to hold you to the date. But 2009.

The Witness. Well, that's when I believe.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay. And walk me through the circumstances

under which she gave you her email address, something that she had not

done to a long-time friend previously.

The Witness. I don't recall the exact conversation, but she

would have told me on the telephone.

Chairman Gowdy. Were you at all surprised that it did not end

in dot-gov?

The Witness. I didn't think about it.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay. I'm going to jump around a little bit.

I apologize for that. Almost done.

Did you talk to anyone at the White House about your potential

employment there?

Mr. Cole. There at the White House?

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Chairman Gowdy. Yes. There at the White House. No, no. I'm

sorry. Not the White House. Department of State.

You were, if I understood your testimony earlier, you were under

consideration for a position at the Department of State. Someone in

the political arm, the White House, nixed that. Did you ever talk to

them about their nixing of your employment prospect?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know who made the decision to do it?

The Witness. Not really.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. You were asked about an email. I

want to go back through it again because I do think it's important.

You were asked about an email where it said, "Sid, you're doing great

work on this." That's a pretty specific email. Do you have any idea

what "work" they were referring to?

The Witness. I do not.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you have any idea what "this" was referring

to?

The Witness. Not really.

Chairman Gowdy. Did you email back and say, "What the hell are

you talking about?"

The Witness. Not that I'm aware of, no.

Chairman Gowdy. Doesn't that seem like a strange email to get

if you are not doing work, great or otherwise, and there is no "this"?

The Witness. I don't know what it refers to.

Chairman Gowdy. The phrase "well done," again, which would, I

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guess, modify the work, do you know what that was referring to?

The Witness. I do not.

Chairman Gowdy. "It's going to be around $60,000." Any idea

what that was referring to?

The Witness. I believe from the email, it referred to the amount

of money that General Grange sought.

Chairman Gowdy. But that email was directed to you, was it not?

The Witness. It was -- it may have been, yes. What number is

it? Okay. We will find it. Okay. Hold on. It will be here. A lot

of exhibits here. Here it is. Okay. I have it in front of me.

Chairman Gowdy. And that email is to -- I actually don't have

it in front of me, but that email is to whom?

The Witness. To me.

Chairman Gowdy. All right. And it's from Tyler Drumheller, who

you know well. "You're doing great work on this. Well done." And

your testimony is you have no idea what he is saying when he says -- uses

the phrase "great work"?

The Witness. Yes, that's right.

Chairman Gowdy. And you have no idea what he's saying when he

says "this"? Is that correct?

The Witness. Right.

Chairman Gowdy. And you have no idea what he's referring to when

he says "well done"?

The Witness. Right.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know what he's referring to when he says

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"it's going to be around $60,000"?

The Witness. It seems to refer in the sentence to travel and

expenses.

Chairman Gowdy. Yeah, it does seem to refer to that.

The Witness. That's what it refers to. I do know that no money

was ever exchanged, no money invested.

Chairman Gowdy. I'm not asking that. I'm asking what were they

planning on doing? What was the purpose of this exercise?

The Witness. I think the purpose of this exercise was to see what

could be done about humanitarian assistance. That is my view of it.

Chairman Gowdy. And your view is instructed and informed how and

why?

The Witness. I thought that's what they were interested in

doing, in providing that to the Libyans at the expense --

Chairman Gowdy. Had you been helping them on that project?

The Witness. I engaged in some conversations. I engaged in some

emails. This is one of them. And it never got off the ground. It

never went anywhere.

Chairman Gowdy. The email right above it said, "Do you think the

general has to send four guys? Send four guys for humanitarian aide?

The Witness. I don't know the answer to this. This is -- I don't

know. I don't know why this is written to me. My role was extremely

limited, and I played no role in implementing any of this.

Chairman Gowdy. And you did not email back, "Look, guy, I have

no idea what you're talking about"?

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The Witness. I don't know what he emailed back.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you recall emailing them back?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Responding?

The Witness. No, I don't recall.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you know if their humanitarian work would

have been not for profit or for profit?

The Witness. It would've been for the Libyans to pay for.

Chairman Gowdy. You say "Libyans," who, with specificity?

The Witness. You know, they never found anybody to do this work.

Chairman Gowdy. Government? Would the government have paid for

it?

The Witness. The Libyan Government presumably, but it was so

undeveloped, and it was so vague, and they didn't really know what they

were doing. I thought the thing was a wild goose chase from the

beginning. I just didn't put -- as I said, I thought this whole thing

was completely an implausible thought, and it never progressed.

Chairman Gowdy. I guess what I'm trying to get my head around

is you would introduce Drumheller to somebody for $5,000. This is a

multiple of that. And you don't have any idea what they're talking

about.

The Witness. Well, I never thought -- I had no expectations that

this would ever amount to anything. That was my feeling.

Chairman Gowdy. But when you say "this would never amount," what

are you referring to when you say "this"?

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The Witness. A humanitarian assistance idea would ever amount

to anything. I never thought it would amount to anything.

Chairman Gowdy. All right.

The Witness. This all seemed kind of crazy to me. This was all

a footnote to me.

Chairman Gowdy. I had asked you previously about the subject

line where you said, H: The good intel, internal Libya, Sid.

We were discussing the fact that I thought your testimony was you

were merely a conduit. You did not express an opinion on the

reliability or credibility of the information. Do you remember us

discussing that earlier?

The Witness. That's right.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay. Did you have any reason to believe that

the intel in that memo was any better than intel in any other memo?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Had you investigated the efficacy of that

intelligence any differently than you had other memos where you didn't

include a subject line?

The Witness. Well, I didn't investigate it at all.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, then what would prompt you to say very good

intel?

The Witness. Well, as I replied -- answered earlier, I thought

it meant that there was a lot of information here. That was my sense

of it. And she could go over it.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, I think you had, on other occasions, just

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said "latest intel" or "new intel," without using any modifier. Am

I quibbling over straws there, or do the words -- is there some meaning

attached to the word? I mean, there's a difference between saying "new

intel," "lots of intel," and "good intel."

The Witness. Well, to me it just meant a lot.

Chairman Gowdy. Okay. There's an email, I believe, that you

sent to the Secretary where you wrote "progress" with a question mark.

Mr. Cole. Do you have a copy of it?

Chairman Gowdy. I'm going based on memory right now, but --

Mrs. Brooks. While you're searching for that, can I clarify a

couple of questions about the email?

Chairman Gowdy. Go right ahead.

Mrs. Brooks. With respect to, from Tyler to you, said you were

doing great work on this, "well done, it's going to be around $60,000,"

why is Cody Shearer on this email chain at all?

The Witness. Cody had gotten himself in this escapade, and he

was sending emails back and forth.

Mrs. Brooks. Who brought him into this escapade?

The Witness. I introduced him, as I said, to Tyler. So they were

emailing back and forth. And he had also, as I said, known a Libyan,

who he refers to in this email.

Mrs. Brooks. And at any time, as you refer to this escapade,

which then didn't go anywhere, and you were -- was there ever any

discussion about if it had gone anywhere, that there would be

compensation in the future if the escapade had worked?

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The Witness. It never reached that point.

Mrs. Brooks. So there was never any discussion about any

compensation for work done in order to make the humanitarian effort

happen in Libya?

The Witness. There was not only no agreement; there was no

compensation. There was -- nothing appeared. There was no money at

all, at any point.

Mrs. Brooks. No, I understand. But let me just clarify. If

this had been successful, if the plan had come to fruition, was there

a possibility of getting paid at the conclusion of the work or at some

point once the work had commenced?

The Witness. To my knowledge, there was no business plan. This

never had a business plan.

Mrs. Brooks. I understand that. But among all of these

individuals, Tyler, Cody, yourself, and others, General

Grange -- Granger? -- had this plan worked -- and I understand there

was no formal business plan, but was there a discussion that people

would be compensated if the Libyan Government, whatever that might be,

hired Osprey?

The Witness. You know, to my knowledge, it never got to that

point.

Mrs. Roby. Can I ask a question? Would you have had an

expectation that if it happened, that you would have been compensated?

The Witness. I never thought this was going to go anywhere.

This was so loosey-goosy and people --

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Mrs. Roby. Right. But when you involve yourself in discussions

with other people about a potential -- I mean, you're not doing it pro

bono. You're doing it because, as a businessman, you would have

expectations that, in fact, if it did get off the ground that you, in

fact, would be compensated.

The Witness. I didn't -- my -- it never really got that far with

me. I had no expectations from the beginning. I never thought this

would go anywhere. I got involved in some conversations and some

emails, and that's all I was involved in.

Chairman Gowdy. Couple more questions. We'll be out of here.

Mr. Davis. Exhibit 15. You already have it.

Chairman Gowdy. I'll give him a chance to look it over.

Mr. Davis. The date is February 1, 2015, exhibit 15.

The Witness. Yes, I have that.

Chairman Gowdy. You have it?

The Witness. Yeah.

Chairman Gowdy. At the top of the copy I'm looking at, it says,

"H: Latest intel Libya turmoil. Progress?"

What are you asking her?

The Witness. I'm not -- I don't think I'm asking her any pointed

question so much as a question about how the situation is going in Libya.

That's my interpretation of it, which is that it's not going well.

Chairman Gowdy. Did she respond?

The Witness. No, I have no response.

Chairman Gowdy. Neither via phone or text or email?

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The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. It just represents one of the very few times that

you actually ask a question of her. Most of it you were just passing

on information.

The Witness. Correct.

Chairman Gowdy. It just struck me as a departure. I was

wondering why you were asking the question about --

The Witness. Yeah, I think it referred to kind of the generation

of being there.

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Chairman Gowdy. Last little segment.

You've already answered this, but I want to make sure I got it

right.

"Got all this done," four links to Benghazi-related articles,

some of which are very critical of a colleague of ours by the name of

Jason Chaffetz.

What do you mean by "got all this done"?

The Witness. That the material was published.

Chairman Gowdy. Did you draft any of the material?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Did you edit it?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Did you help place it?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, then what did you do?

The Witness. I -- that's a good question. I probably did very

little about this.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, then why would you take credit for

something you didn't do?

The Witness. Well, maybe I shouldn't have.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, far be it from me to be judgmental.

You're sure you didn't draft any of it?

The Witness. No, I did not.

Chairman Gowdy. Didn't edit it?

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The Witness. No, I didn't.

Chairman Gowdy. Did you direct it?

The Witness. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Orchestrate it?

The Witness. I did not orchestrate it.

Chairman Gowdy. Read it before it went out?

The Witness. No. I'm not an editor there. But I may have

discussed it with people there after it appeared.

Chairman Gowdy. Did you help place those articles?

The Witness. Well, they just appear in that organization.

That's what that organization does. It writes pieces like that.

Chairman Gowdy. You were still working for Media Matters at that

time?

The Witness. I don't know what the date is on that.

Chairman Gowdy. October of 2012.

The Witness. I don't believe that I was working for them at that

time as a consultant.

Chairman Gowdy. How were you able to get it done? Who were you

working for in October of 2012?

The Witness. I was working for the Clinton Foundation.

Chairman Gowdy. How were you able to get it done if the Clinton

Foundation doesn't place negative stories about Republican Members of

Congress?

The Witness. As I explained, I had a long friendship with David

Brock, who was the chairman of that organization.

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Chairman Gowdy. Last point. We'll go through it one more time.

August 30, 2011. You're welcome to pull it out. I'm not going to ask

you about the substance of it. I'm just going to tell you what the

subject line was.

The Witness. August --

Chairman Gowdy. August 30, 2011, memo.

The Witness. What number is that?

Chairman Gowdy. August 30, 2011.

The Witness. There's an August 31 I have. Is that it?

Chairman Gowdy. Could be. I've got a zero by it, but I could

certainly stand to be corrected if I'm wrong.

The Witness. I don't know.

What do you think?

Mr. Davis. Sure. We'll introduce it as exhibit 21, and that

way --

The Witness. I have exhibit 11. Maybe --

Mr. Davis. We're going to introduce this as exhibit 21.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 21

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Davis. It's going to be BLU-096.

Mr. Cole. 096?

Mr. Davis. Yes.

Mr. Cole. We didn't have an 096. Okay.

Chairman Gowdy. Do you have it in front of you, Mr. Blumenthal?

The Witness. I do. Thank you.

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Chairman Gowdy. Do you see the subject line?

The Witness. "Very good intel" again.

Chairman Gowdy. To whom?

The Witness. To Hillary Clinton.

Chairman Gowdy. Right. So it's similar to what you had said

earlier; it's just you went ahead and spelled out "very."

The Witness. Right. It's the same idea, that there's a lot

here.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, and that caused me to want to go to March

27 of 2011, that memo.

Mr. Cole. Do you have a number?

Chairman Gowdy. I was never a good documents lawyer.

[Blumenthal Exhibit No. 22

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Davis. Deposition Exhibit 22, BLU-057.

Mr. Cole. I would just note for the record that we're over an

hour.

Chairman Gowdy. Last question.

Mr. Davis. This is Deposition Exhibit 22.

Mr. Cole. May I see these?

The Witness. Yeah?

Chairman Gowdy. Could you read that subject line to me?

The Witness. "Lots of new intel."

Chairman Gowdy. So there's a difference between new intel and

good intel?

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The Witness. Well, to me, it could be the same.

Chairman Gowdy. Under what theory are "new" and "good" synonyms?

The Witness. Well, just that it means "a lot" to me. "Good" is

"a lot."

Chairman Gowdy. Can you understand why a casual observer might

think that you were commenting on the reliability of the information

by use of the word "good intel"?

The Witness. Well, I didn't mean that it was -- mean anything

except to pass this on to her.

Chairman Gowdy. Right. And what you meant is very important,

but also what she read is very important. And she read "good intel,"

right?

The Witness. She would have read that word, but my intention was

that it meant "a lot."

Chairman Gowdy. I'm done.

Mr. Davis. Okay. We're finished with our questioning. Thank

you very much.

The Witness. Thank you.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. So we will have a couple questions, not very

long. Do you guys want to take a little break, or do you want to move

on?

Mr. Cole. Just do it.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q All right, Mr. Blumenthal, thank you again. We'll try to

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be very brief. We just want to follow up on a couple of matters.

A Yes.

Q You were pressed and asked quite a bit in the last hour about

the term "unsolicited." And the Secretary has described briefly and

in public statements only that we're aware of that your emails and

information you sent was unsolicited.

Taking that word to depict, quote, "given or supplied without

being requested or asked for," end quote -- that's the quote from

dictionary.com. Alternate quotes are "given or done voluntarily." I

think that's the Oxford definition.

Taking that as a potential description of what the term

"unsolicited" means, did Secretary Clinton request or ask you to send

any of the emails that we have discussed today or any of the information

on the memos that we have discussed today?

A She never asked me to send any specific email.

Q "Thank you." Some of the emails you were asked about

indicated that she had responded on some occasions with a "thank you."

That was one example.

Is a "thank you" after the fact inconsistent with you having given

or supplied the information that you gave or supplied without her having

asked or requested it?

A It is not inconsistent.

Q Is her saying to you after the fact, encouraging you by

saying "keep them coming," is that phrase, sent to you in response to

you sending a particular piece of information, is that inconsistent

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with you having given or supplied whatever information or email that

you gave or supplied without her having requested or asked for it?

A What's the verb here? I'm getting a little tired.

Q Understood.

Some of the other examples that you were given was that, on

occasion, maybe one or two occasions, the Secretary in response to an

email said, "Thank you. Keep it coming" --

A Yes.

Q -- or "keep these coming" or "very useful."

Are any of those phrases, sent to you after the fact, once you

had sent something, inconsistent with you having given or supplied

whatever information you gave without the Secretary having asked for

or requested it from you?

A It's not inconsistent.

Q Was your sending an information or an email contingent on

getting a "thank you" from the Secretary?

A Never.

Q Was it contingent on her encouraging you to continue sending

it?

A Never.

Q And then I'd just like to briefly direct you back to exhibit

19.

A Okay.

Q And I apologize, because I've got the wrong exhibit number.

I don't want to look at exhibit 19. I actually want to look at what

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I believe is exhibit 20. My apologies.

A Okay. Exhibit 20. I found it.

Q 18.

A 18.

Q My apologies. I'm getting confused with the numbering.

A Okay. I got it.

Q Okay, exhibit 18.

A Yes.

Q That's a document you were asked about --

A Yes.

Q -- quite a bit.

A Right.

Q It's an email you sent, "Got all this done," and with links

to various pieces, apparently, that were in Media Matters.

A Right.

Q With regard to that slew of pieces, did Secretary Clinton

or anyone in the State Department ask or request that you or anyone

at Media Matters produce those pieces?

A No.

Q Now, you were asked at one point about the second part of

your email there, suggesting -- or stating, not suggesting but just

stating, quote, "Philippe can circulate these links." And you

indicated that you understand this to be -- refers to Philippe Reines,

who was with the communication staff for the Secretary.

A Yes.

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Q Based on your experience working in the government, is it

unusual at all for communications staff to gather and circulate press

clips on topics of interest?

A That is part of the job of communications.

Q Yes. We get press clips every day from our communications

folks, collecting for us clips and circulating both to the members and

staff. Does a similar thing happen within the executive branch?

A Yes, it does, having done so.

Q And just to make perfectly clear for the record, did you

receive any payment from the Clinton Foundation -- because I think your

testimony was that, during this time period, October 10, 2012, was part

of the time you were working on --

A Right.

Q -- various matters for the foundation.

Were you paid in any way by the foundation for any of the work

that -- any of the -- it wasn't even work. You said you may have had

a discussion with Mr. Brock. But any outside work that could have

possibly been associated with this exhibit, exhibit 19?

A It had nothing to do whatsoever with my work with the Clinton

Foundation.

Q And then I would like you to take a look at what was I believe

marked as Deposition Exhibit --

A 19?

Q -- 19.

A Okay.

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Q Thank you very much. You had been asked about this. This

was something you indicated you actually were the author of?

A Yes.

Q It's an email/memo sent August 22, 2011.

A Uh-huh.

Q Did Secretary Clinton ask or request for your advice on

this? Did she ask or request this email from you?

A No.

Q Do you recall whether you had, once you sent this, whether

you had any discussion with Secretary Clinton about this email or any

of your statements in it?

A As far as I recall, I had no discussion with her about this.

Q In your view, just from your perspective as a private

citizen but one who, I think, follows the news very closely, do you

think that Secretary Clinton has ever made a secret of her stance on

support for the rebels against Muammar Qadhafi?

A No.

Q Do you think that she has ever shied away from explaining

her role or explaining why she took the stance? And, again, just as

a private citizen reading the press and learning what you learned in

the press, do you think she shied away from explaining what her stance

was --

A No.

Q -- in support for the rebels?

You were asked with regard to Mr. Drumheller and the information

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he passed to you whether -- I think you were asked a number of questions

about why he may or may not have sent those memos to the CIA.

Do you have any information as to whether, in fact, he actually

did or did not send them to the CIA?

A I have no information.

Q So you don't know -- it's possible that he, in fact, did

send the information or some version of that information to colleagues

at the CIA?

A I don't know.

Q All right.

And then, in general, I think you were asked to give your opinion

as to Secretary Clinton's views on a number of things, including her

view of Mr. Drumheller's reliability, why she may have relied on the

information or may not have relied on the information.

To the extent you've been asked to speculate in that regard, is

there any way that you would know, really, what Secretary Clinton's

opinion or the view inside her mind might have been?

A No.

Q So, to the extent those are issues we need to explore or

want to explore, it would be appropriate to explore them with the

Secretary in that case?

A I can't speak for her in this matter.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Well, again, thank you very much for your patience.

It's 7:15. You've been here since 10:30. We do appreciate the time

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you've taken with us, and thank you very much for that. I know the

ranking member very much appreciates it, as well as the other members

of the committee. Thank you.

The Witness. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 7:20 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

1260
EXHIBIT 1

1261
1262
1263
EXHIBIT 2

1264
1265
1266
1267
CONFIDENTIAL

February 21, 2011

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Libya intel

I just received this, more to come:

This is just in from Italian intel.

Just in, we are getting good reporting from Libya, the sourcing is from the ruling family,

the highest levels of the military, and diplomats/intel. Mostly via Italy.

As of this hour, some units of the Peoples Militia have gone over to the demonstrators in

Benghazi, and that is the origin of the report of mutinies. This is a possibility and the

government no longer controls Benghazi, but it is too early for large scale mutinies.

There are two subplots, tension between the eastern (Benghazi) and western (Tripoli)

parts of the country, and tension between the two oldest Qaddhfi sons. In the east there

is support for the former royal family, and modern reforms. This area also supports Saif

al Isalm Qaddhafi (second son, living in London/Vienna.) At the same time there is a

violent conflict between those portions of the Presidential Guard loyal to Saif, the bulk

of the Peoples Militia which is loyal to his older brother, national security advisor

Motasem Qaddahfi.

Sisme is reporting that the Militia is firing on demonstrators who area attempting to

surrender. Military officers, and the hospitals report that many of the wounds are being

inflicted from close range.

Sisme believes that once the regime resorts to extreme violence they have set the stage

for their downfall; the people, particularly in the east, are enraged. The violence is

following the coast highway moving from town to town toward Tripoli.

These sources say that the situation is completely unpredictable and quite

dangerous. They advise that all Americans should leave the country as soon as possible,

as the Embassy has warned.

BLU-001

EXHIBIT 3

1268
While rumors of Qaddahfi's departure for Venezuela are apparently not true, it is

important, however, that at this early stage in the struggle they are being taken seriously

by some of his supporters. (Qaddahfi is a friend of Hugo Chavez.)

BLU-002

1269
EXHIBIT 4

1270
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1272
1273
H: Crucial contact. Sid

Mar 6 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 6, 2011

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Crucial information for Libya

Cody, on his own, still at heart an indefatigable journalist, simply picked up the phone,

dialing the number given by Khalifa Sharif, and had a conversation with one of the key

figures in the Libyan National Council that seeks to become an interim government.

Cody’s notes, including Jipreel’s phone numbers are below. Cody says that Jipreel said

he has not been contacted by anyone from the US government.

The note:

So I spoke to Dr. Mahmod Jipreel (he's on Khalifa's list) today. He was the former

minister of planning but is now the point man between the reformist government in

waiting and the West. I spoke to him in Cairo. He will fly tomorrow morning to Rome

and then on to Strausborg, France, where he plans to address the European Parliament

on Wednesday morning. His cell phone numbers are as follows: 00-201-22-166927 or

011-201-01-19-55-30. Mahmod seems very smart, level-headed, has no desire to serve

in a future government, only wants to help in the transition. We talked for 20 minutes

and he emphasized how important it is that any help from the West, not to be perceived

as interference by the heroic young people who are losing their lives in fighting the

madman. He thinks it is going to be a protracted battle but the West must recognize the

temporary opposition government ASAP......He told me that the chief medical director

from the Red Crescent Society is Dr. Muftah Twilib--cell number --011-21891-209-

2704, who is coordinating all medical relief efforts; obviously difficult to reach him on

cell.

Someone should contact Mahmod Jipreel. He is balanced, level-headed and understands

current situation well. He left the madman's government within past year when he

realized he was completely deranged.

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H: New intel on NTC politics of humanitarian aid. Sid

Aug 31 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

August 31, 2011

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: NTC politics of humanitarian aid

During the morning of August 31, 2011, sensitive sources with excellent access stated in

strict confidence that Prime Minister Mahmoud Jabril, President Mustafa Abdul Jalil,

and the other leaders of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) continue to

debate how best to organize their efforts to deal with foreign governments and firms in

an effort to address the humanitarian and security needs of the Libyan people, as they

attempt to form an effective government. The recent success of the rebellion against the

regime of Muammar al Qaddafi has surprised these NTC leaders, and they are now

struggling with the divisions inside of the movement. Jabril and Jalil realize that the

real success or failure of their rebellion depends on their ability to form an

administrative structure that can deal with other governments and major foreign business

interests on behalf of the people of Libya.

(Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, the NTC leadership is

increasingly concerned over the failure of the rebel National Libyan Army (NLA) to

capture Qaddafi or his remaining family members, particularly his son Saif al-Islam

Qaddafi. They are especially worried that the former dictator may take advantage of

tribal loyalties in the Southern and Western parts of the country, in order to carry on a

guerrilla war against the new NTC government. At the same time they believe that

certain governments will continue to hold back full recognition and cooperation until the

Qaddafis are removed from the scene. In this regard Jalil is pressing the idea of asking

the United Nations to provide experts to organize and administer any humanitarian aid

the NTC receives, believing that this will give the new regime greater credibility as a

national government. Jabril has not yet commented on this idea, and it has not been

fully debated in the NTC.)

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At present, these sources note that various European governments and firms are working

with their particular friends on the NTC to gain favorable positions for future business

opportunities. These sources believe that the private talks between NTC members and

these foreign officials and businessmen involve discussions regarding how best to meet

the needs of the population. For his part Jabril is concerned that many of the tentative

offers of assistance appear to be linked to business concessions for the donor countries,

particularly in the oil industry. One advisor to Jabril has stated in private that if the

NTC accepts this assistance without question, Libya will become a client state of the

major European powers.

At present, senior NTC officials believe that the government of the United Kingdom is

working to strengthen the position of British Petroleum (BP), pointing out that, while in

the past BP was forced to deal closely with the Qaddafi regime, the UK was among the

first of the major powers to come to the aid of the rebels. By the same token, the

French government has quietly but forcefully continued to remind Jalil and other NTC

leaders that they were the first major country to support the rebels. At the same time,

the French, who feel that in the past firms like TOTAL/ELF were not fairly treated by

the Qaddafi regime are looking for the NTC to open up a greater percentage of the

Libyan oil fields to their operations.

The NTC continues to maintain a correct but cool attitude toward the Italian government

and the Italian oil firm ENI. The NTC leadership believes that the Italians quietly dealt

with Qaddafi regime well into the rebellion, and the new government will continue to

move very carefully in dealing with either the Italian government or ENI.

At the same time, both Jabril and Jalil are particularly suspicious of the intention of the

government of German Chancellor Angela Merkel toward the new Libyan regime, and

have taken steps to monitor the activities of German diplomats and businessmen in the

rebel stronghold of Benghazi. By the same token, the NTC has received unconfirmed

reports from their security officers and military commanders in the field that officers of

Germany’s external intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst – BND) are

maintaining clandestine contact with Qaddafi’s forces in and around the city of

Sirte. These NTC officials believe strongly that the Germans continue to hedge their

bet on Libya, in the event that Qaddafi can continue to fight until the political, tribal, and

regional divisions on the NTC weaken their efforts to form a government.

(Source Comment: In the opinion of a source with excellent access to the NTC

leadership, Jabril and his advisors are working to bring in private firms to meet their

pressing humanitarian needs. The Prime Minister believes that if they wait for foreign

governments to provide this assistance the death toll among the wounded and injured

will continue to rise, and the NTC will be held responsible for failing to bring in

emergency and battlefield medical support. To this end they have signed an agreement

with the Osprey Security Group (OSG), a U.S. firm specializing in emergency medical

care and humanitarian assistance. OSG is prepared to deliver the aid immediately upon

receiving the funds from the NTC. Jabril’s advisors believe that the use of this American

firm will not only allow the NTC to meet a pressing need, but will also serve to cement

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good relations with the U.S. government and business community. One NTC official

noted that OSG’s ability to provide this medical and humanitarian support sets it apart

from firms like the French security group SECOPLEX, which look to provide foreign

fighters to support the rebel’s NLA. Jabril continues to emphasize that unlike the

Qaddafi army the NLA does not and will not use foreign mercenaries for military

operations.)

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H: Latest intel Libya turmoil. Progress? Sid

Feb 1 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

February 1, 2012

For: HRC

From: Sid

Re: Libya turmoil

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as

well as the highest levels of European governments, and Western intelligence and

security services.

1. On January 30, 2012, following a discussion with the other members of the

National Transitional Government (NTC), Libyan President Mustafa Abdul Jalil stated

privately that within the next two months he and Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib

must support each other as they deal with private firms that can provide the medical

assistance and basic needs of daily life for the Libyan people, or risk the country falling

into civil war. According to a source with access to the highest levels of the NTC, Jalil

is somewhat recovered from the shock of the January 21 attack on his office and the

NTC headquarters in Benghazi by demobilized militia fighters from the revolution, and

is searching in earnest for a way to finalize contracts with private firms and aid

providers.

2. According to this well informed individual, Jalil did not explain his mention

of a two month time line, but, in the opinion of this individual, the President fears that

crucial medical supplies and other badly needed daily necessities of life may be used up

completely in this time frame. This sensitive source noted in confidence that, in late

January discussions with el-Keib, Jalil advised that they must also ignore their

frustration over, what they see, as the failure of Western European states to provide

these supplies in the form of aid, and focus on the crisis at hand.

3. According to this individual, Jalil believes that the NTC’s problems in

supplying these items lie in the general chaos involved in setting up a new government,

complicated by a steady stream of charges from Islamist leaders, that any government

official dealing with foreign companies is following the same corrupt path as their

predecessors in the government of deposed dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. Jalil believes

that el-Keib and the cabinet must take these hard steps, supported by the NTC

leadership. At present he is concerned that they have no concrete plan to reach this

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point. This individual noted that, Jalil, in an effort to strengthen the resolve of the NTC,

decided to make a firm statement in response to the attempted resignation of Abdel –

Hafidh Ghoza, the deputy chief of the Council. Ghoza announced his resignation in the

wake of the January 21 incident, noting that he was one of the principal targets of the

militiamen’s anger. In the opinion of this individual, Jalil, after consultation with elKeib, informed Ghoza that he is not accepting his resignation. Ghoza, has been keeping

a very low profile in Benghazi, and has apparently not yet agreed to stay on at the NTC.

4. (Source Comment: Concern over a potential civil war continues to grow in

the el-Keib cabinet. An extremely sensitive source added that, in the same time period,

Minister of the Interior Minister Fawzi Abd Ali informed the Prime Minister that, for all

intents and purposes, the country is dividing along ancient traditional lines. Ali stated

that former militia forces, many of whom are loyal to Islamist general Abdel Hakim

Alamin Belhaj, control much of Triopli and the Western portion of the country, and are

in regular conflict with militia and regular army troops in the Eastern region and

Benghazi, which remain under the rather unsteady control of the NTC. According to

Ali, much of the arid Southern portion of the country is under the control of tribal

groups nominally loyal to Saif al Islam Qaddafi, the imprisoned son of the former

dictator. For his part el-Keib is increasingly frustrated with Minister of Defense Osama

al Juwali, who was a commander of forces in the Western stronghold of

Zintan. According to this individual, el-Keib believes that Juwali has been unsuccessful

in dealing with this situation. Ali added that there is an ongoing series of clashes

between heavily armed militiamen from Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as forces of the

NTC National Army under General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar.)

5. In the opinion of this individual, during late January 2012 Jalil informed elKeib of his frustration over the fact that the majority of foreign interest in Libya since

the revolution has revolved around the disposition of the oil industry. In this regard he

cited the planned visit of a French warship to assist in removing mines placed in Libya’s

harbors by the Qaddafi regime during the 2011 revolution. El- Keib noted that that,

while this effort is needed, it is intended primarily as a move to facilitate the shipment of

oil from the Libyan ports. While the President recognizes that the oil industry is the key

to Libya’s future, he also needs to be able to deal with foreign firms regarding the

supply of day to day necessities. Jalil and el-Keib agree that the best path for foreign

firms to use in gaining a foothold in Libya is through the Stock Exchange, headed by

Ngeb Obeda, under Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam. The President and Prime

Minister feel that by working through the Stock Exchange the Government can maintain

transparency in foreign contracts and avoid charges of Qaddafi-like corruption.

6. (Source Comment: According to a very sensitive source, el-Keib complained

to Jalil that Belhaj continues to complicate every aspect of the process of dealing foreign

firms and governments. He noted that Belhaj is now attempting to file a law suit against

a former senior British intelligence officer who is an advisor to British Petroleum (BP)

citing claims that this former officer facilitated his past detention by United States antiterrorism forces. El-Keib noted that this is the type of activity that raises concerns

among foreign firms looking to operate in Libya.)

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H, Q's location. Sid

Oct 15 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

October 15, 2011

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Qaddafi’s location

Seymour Hersh, the investigative journalist for The New Yorker, was approached within

the last 48 hours by a source who was a former financial beneficiary of the Qaddafi

regime asking him whether he wished to conduct an exclusive interview with fugitive

former Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi, according to a close friend of Hersh. Hersh

was told that Qaddafi is in Chad. He was also told that Qaddafi intends to wage endless

war from his new location. Qaddafi helped install the Chad president, Idriss Deb y,

supporting him when he overthrew Hussein Habre in the fall of 1990.

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H: Per our conversation. Jamie writes editorial... Sid

Sep 8 2011

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-09-08/hillary-clinton-deserves-credit-forthe-positive-u-s-role-in-libya-view.html

Hillary Clinton Deserves Credit for U.S. Role in Libya: View

By the Editors - Sep 7, 2011

The unsung hero of the Libya drama in the U.S. is Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Clinton’s actions were critical for several reasons. Most important, she overcame

Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s caution about using military force in Libya and his

reluctance to support an operation led by France and Britain. Clinton also personally

managed the unorthodox partnership with French President Nicolas Sarkozy that proved

so crucial to joint action to defeat the Qaddafi regime.

Despite the unusual arrangement in which the U.S. was a supporter rather than a leader

of NATO’s military operation, she defended intervention before a skeptical Congress

and performed the hard slog of daily diplomacy around the world, helping Arab

countries, the Europeans and the U.S. work together with a minimum of friction and a

maximum of determination.

Aside from the killing of Osama bin Laden, the decision to support NATO military

action in Libya is probably the Obama administration’s most important achievement in

international affairs. Although Muammar Qaddafi is still at large and the country is a

long way from having a stable, representative government, there is little doubt that the

Qaddafi regime has been defeated as a result of an internal revolt led by the Transitional

National Council. History will surely judge that, by intervening on the side of the

rebellion, the West -- primarily the governments of France, the U.K. and the U.S. --

made a unique and invaluable contribution to the democratic aspirations of the people of

the Middle East.

That said, the Obama administration’s decision-making process remains opaque. The

veteran journalist Bob Woodward’s next book, due out in the fall of 2012, may shed

some light on the question of whose voices were decisive this past March, when

President Barack Obama decided to support a United Nations resolution and a NATO

military operation for Libya.

Based on our discussions with administration officials, as well as the public record,

some preliminary conclusions about the decision are possible. First, while we argued for

a more active U.S. military role in NATO’s operation, it is now clear that Obama’s

unprecedented approach -- in which Washington supported, rather than led, a NATO

operation -- was successful in the end.

Second, by breaking with Gates, Clinton tipped the balance within the administration in

favor of action. Without her strong argument to support the Europeans’ call for

American help, Washington probably would not have acted. The president’s national

security adviser, Tom Donilon, was declaring freedom in Libya to be outside the U.S.

national interest, and both military and civilian officials in the Pentagon were reluctant

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to endorse or even opposed U.S. intervention. But Clinton’s push for the U.S. to act in

support of Britain and France appears to have been decisive.

In retrospect, the fears of Gates and other military officials that action in Libya would be

a slippery slope, perhaps leading to U.S. involvement on the ground in a third war in the

Middle East, seem wildly overblown. Obama said the U.S. would play a limited role by

offering unique military assets, such as aerial refueling and air-defense suppression

capabilities. Congress not only opposed sending in ground troops but mostly opposed

any U.S. involvement. Obama wisely resisted.

For better or worse, the Libya model is not likely to be repeated anytime soon. This is

not, as some say, because NATO will never again intervene in a situation like Libya’s.

After the Kosovo war, many also said NATO would never again act against a dictator to

save lives. The Libya model is no guide for the future because such a unique set of

circumstances in favor of military action is not likely to happen again.

Think about the conditions: A despised dictator threatened mass murder; an open desert

provided a decisive advantage for air power; a rebel army on the ground sought

democratic change and espoused Western values; the UN at least loosely endorsed

NATO air operations; the Arab League called for the West to intervene militarily in an

Arab country; and U.S. allies prepared to do all the heavy lifting. Given those

circumstances, it is still hard to explain why there were determined opponents, primarily

in the Republican Party, to this mission in the first place.

Throughout most of Obama’s term in office, only a few administration officials have

commanded respect and political power on national security matters: Clinton, Gates and

General David Petraeus, the most decorated and admired officer of recent times. With

Gates now gone and Petraeus in a non-policy role as director of the Central Intelligence

Agency, Clinton’s power will only increase as the president’s re-election campaign heats

up. We hope she recognizes her opportunity and uses it well.

To contact the Bloomberg View editorial board: view@bloomberg.net.

®2011 BLOOMBERG L.P. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

-----Original Message-----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

To: 'sbwhoeop@aol.com' <sbwhoeop@aol.com>

Sent: Sat, Sep 10, 2011 4:39 pm

Subject: Re: H: Per our conversation. Jamie writes editorial... Sid

It was very welcome and gave me reason to sit down and talk w Jamie who is such a

good friend. Hope to talk soon—H

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H: Got all this done. Complete refutation on Libya smear. Philippe can circulate

these links. Sid

Oct 10, 2012

http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/10/10/right-wing-medias-libya-consulate-securitymyth/190508

http://mediamatters.org/research/2012/10/10/fox-favorite-jason-chaffetz-and-the-rightwing/190517

http://mediamatters.org/research/2012/09/26/myths-and-facts-about-the-benghaziattack-and-p/190150

http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/10/09/will-the-media-help-romney-surrogatecatapult-b/190480

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H: Post-Q. Sid

CONFIDENTIAL

August 22, 2011

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Your statement post-Q

Just a quick note:

First, brava! This is a historic moment and you will be credited for realizing it.

When Qaddafi himself is finally removed, you should of course make a public statement

before the cameras wherever you are, even in the driveway of your vacation house. You

must go on camera. You must establish yourself in the historical record at this moment.

The most important phrase is: “successful strategy.”

Just a few points:

*The US has pursued a successful strategy in Libya. We did not know how long it

would take, but we knew it would not be easy, and that it would require steadiness and

persistence. This was the right course, based on our interests and principles. And it has

worked.

*Do not skimp on the reasons in the US interest behind the successful strategy: We

prevented a humanitarian tragedy on a vast scale. Qaddafi, who had already killed 2,000

people in April, threatened to massacre the residents of Benghazi, tens if not hundreds of

thousands of people. We worked closely with our NATO allies, proving that cooperation

within the Western alliance can achieve our mutual goals. The US has demonstrated its

principled belief in the rule of law and acted on the basis of the United Nations

resolution. We have supported the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people for

democracy and freedom. We have ousted a murderous dictator who has been a source of

terrorism, civil war throughout Africa and a prop for dictators elsewhere. By acting in

Libya we have helped advance the cause of democracy and freedom throughout the Arab

world. We have provided an important support for neighboring Egypt. We have put

Assad on notice that the sands of time have run out for him as well. Our successful

strategy in Libya stands as a warning that our strategy will work again. Etc.

*Be aware that some may attempt to justify the flamingly stupid “leading from behind”

phrase, junior types on the NSC imagining their cleverness. To refute this passive

construction on US policy and help remove it as an albatross from the administration as

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it enters the election year, do not be defensive but rather simply explain that the US had

a clear strategy from the start, stuck with it and has succeeded.

*Then you can say whatever on future policy—but only after asserting the historic

success and explaining the reasons why.

*This is a very big moment historically and for you. History will tell your part in it. You

are vindicated. But don’t wait, help Clio now.

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H: Very good intel re: inside NTC. Sid

Aug 30 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

August 30, 2011

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Inside NTC latest

As of August 30, 2011, the leaders of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC)

are adjusting to their success in fighting against the forces of Muammar Qaddafi in

Tripoli and throughout the country. According to a knowledgeable source, the

numerous tribal, regional, political divisions within the 31 member NTC are

complicating the process of moving from a revolutionary movement focused on

Qaddafi, to a new, established government.

In the opinion of this source, there is a danger that governments of the United States,

France, the United Kingdom, and the other major powers will identify allies on the

NTC, expediting the formation of rival groups among the council members. These

sources believe that Prime Minister Mahmoud Jabril, and General Khalifa Haftar lead a

faction that is well disposed toward the U.S. government. Their principal rivals in the

NTC appear to be President Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and General Suleiman Mahmoud, who,

in the opinion of one sensitive source have well established relationships with the British

and French governments respectively. In light of the dangerous situation that exists

throughout Libya, all of these leaders are remaining as discreet as possible regarding

their relationships with foreign governments and firms.

(Source Comment: Generals Haftar and Suleiman Mahmoud are rivals for the overall

control of the National Liberation Army (NLA). This is the continuation of the struggle

between Haftar, and General Abdel Fatah Younis, the previous commander of the NLA,

who was detained and secretly executed by NTC security personnel on orders from

Jalil. The President ordered this execution after receiving evidence that Younis was

carrying on a secret dialogue with Saif al-Islam Qaddafi. Several members of the NTC

pressed for Jalil’s removal from office after this incident, but he was able to hold on to

his position as Chairman of the NTC and President of the new Libya.)

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A separate sensitive source adds that, in their opinion, the various leaders of the NTC

are well aware of which governments and firms supported them during the rebellion,

including the major oil companies and international banks. As the new government

takes shape, its leaders will factor this information into decisions they make regarding

future business relationships, including oil leases. This source adds that the Libyans

will, of course, weigh these concerns against the practical advantages offered by

particular relationships with foreign governments and firms. That said, the source notes

that the feeling of animosity toward certain countries and firms is particularly

pronounced.

In the opinion of this individual, Italy, and the Italian oil firm ENI are in especially

problematic positions. Jalil and his supporters are convinced that the Italian

government and ENI did not fully support the rebellion against Qaddafi’s rule, hedging

their bet against the contingency of a victory by the old regime. According to this

source, the recent meetings in Rome between Prime Minister Jabril and Italian Prime

Minister Silvio Berlusconi did not produce the definitively positive results the Italians

had hoped for.

(Source Comment: According to a very knowledgeable source, the Italian government

and ENI found themselves in an impossible position during the rebellion, with much of

their investment in Libya located in the Western part of the country, which was held by

Qaddafi’s forces throughout the fighting. This source believes that in the end, given the

longstanding cultural and political links between Italy and Libya, the NTC will have

positive business and diplomatic relationships with Rome, however; given their

frustration over the Italy’s role in the rebellion, the Libyans can be expected to demand

highly favorable terms in any future business dealings with Italian firms. This source

adds that while U.S., British and French firms will most likely have positive positions

under the new government, the final details of any major business arrangement will be

subject to serious debate in the NTC. This is particularly true in terms of contracts

related to the oil industry and international bank. )

In addition, during the afternoon of August 28, 2011 sources with direct access to the

highest levels of the NTC stated in confidence that the new Libyan regime would resist

efforts by the United States and its allies to arrange the extradition to any country of the

convicted organizer of the Lockerbie bombing, Mohmed Ali al-Megrahi. In a private

discussion, these senior NTC officers reacted forcefully to questions regarding this

possibility, pointing out that such a move "will never happen, and even so, Megrahi was

just a captain in the Libyan Mukhabarat (Security/Intelligence service)." They explained

that as a captain he was of no particular importance and was "just following Muammar

Qaddafi's orders." This matter has been discussed at some length within the

NTC. These officials stated that many NTC members blame the Bush administration for

accepting $2.7 billion in "blood money" as compensation from Qaddafi for the

Lockerbie bombing. One particularly senior official said that act "dishonored the dead"

and caused the Libyan people to “lose respect for America,” especially after the U.S.

Department of State lifted sanctions against Libya.

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At the same time, these individuals added that the International Criminal Court (ICC)

was in contact with the leadership of the NTC, requesting that Muammar Qaddafi, Saif

al-Islam Qaddafi, and other senior officers of the regime be turned over to the ICC for

prosecution when they are captured. Speaking in strict confidence, the NTC officials

replied that Saif al-Islam and any other officials would, if capture alive, be extradited to

The Hague for trial. However; they added that a majority of the NTC had decided that

Muammar Qaddafi would be held for trial in Libya if he is captured by forces under the

direct control of NLA central command. That said, they added that it was very likely

that if Muammar Qaddafi is captured by one of the regional militias that make up the

bulk of the NLA, he will be summarily executed. The ICC representative protested this

stance but was rebuffed.

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H: Lots of new intel; possible Libyan collapse. Sid

Mar 27 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

March 27, 2011

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Lots of new intel; Libyan army possibly on verge of collapse

Latest:

During the evening of March 27, 2011, individuals with direct access to the military

committee of the National Libyan Council (NLC) stated in confidence that while the

rebel forces continue to have organization and communications problems, their morale

has improved drastically, and they believe the Libyan Army is on the verge of

collapse. Under attack from allied Air and Naval forces, the Libyan Army troops have

begun to desert to the rebel side in increasing numbers. The rebels are making an effort

to greet these troops as fellow Libyans, in an effort to encourage additional defections.

(Source Comment: Speaking in strict confidence, one rebel commander stated that his

troops continue to summarily execute all foreign mercenaries captured in the

fighting. At the same time Colonel Khalifa Haftar has reportedly joined the rebel

command structure, in an effort to help organization the rebel forces. Haftar was the

commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), a 1500 man force of anti-Qaddafi

troops based in N’djamena, Chad, until current President Idryss Debi overthrew Chadian

President Hussein Habre in the fall of 1990, with the assistance of Libyan and French

troops. Haftar and his troops fled to a country in central Africa and many, including

Haftar, later settled in the United States.)

An extremely sensitive source added that the rebels are receiving direct assistance and

training from a small number of Egyptian Special Forces units, while French and British

Special Operations troops are working out of bases in Egypt, along the Libyan

border. These troops are overseeing the transfer of weapons and supplies to the rebels.

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(Source Comment: The rebels are moving back into areas that they lost in mid- March

fighting, and using the allied air cover, they are confident they can move into the Tripoli

district in a matter of days. One rebel source reported that they had reliable intelligence

that people were evacuating Qaddafi’s hometown, Sirte, anticipating its capture by the

rebels. Sirte is located mid-way between Tripoli and Benghazi; its loss will be a

psychological blow for Qaddafi.)

Separately, a sensitive European source stated in strict confidence that French military

commanders anticipate a complete collapse of the Libyan military command and control

structure in the next week. These officers, who have experience with the Libyan Army

during its invasion of Chad in the late 1980s stated that the Libyan troops did not

perform well under concentrated fire from troops armed with modern weapons.

This source also noted that information from Tripoli has become increasingly difficult to

obtain, but there are reports of deaths among some Qaddafi’s senior security officials,

including Mansour Daw, and that the Libyan leader himself may have experienced a

health problem. Unfortunately, the European Intelligence services have been unable to

confirm or discredit these reports. This situation has become increasingly frustrating for

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who, according to knowledgeable individuals, is

pressing to have France emerge from this crisis as the principal foreign ally of any new

government that takes power.

Sarkozy is also concerned about continuing reports that radical/terrorist groups such as

the Libyan Fighting Groups and Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are

infiltrating the NLC and its military command. Accordingly, he asked sociologist

Bernard Henri Levy, who has long established ties to Israel, Syria, and other nations in

the Middle East, to use his contacts to determine the level of influence AQIM and other

terrorist groups have inside of the NLC. Sarkozy also asked for reports setting out a

clear picture of the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the rebel leadership.

These sources note that French diplomats and intelligence officers in Egypt are in

contact with the following rebel figures in Benghazi:

MESMARI Nouri (Qaddafi’s former head of protocol, who along with Mousa Kousa

was considered the Libyan leaders most loyal follower. Nouri currently lives in France;

Gehan (GHEHANI) Abdallah (colonel);

CHARRANT Faraj,

BOUKHRIS Fathi,

General Abdelfateh Younis (commander of the rebel forces)

(Source Comment: Senior European security officials caution that AQIM is watching

developments in Libya, and elements of that organization have been in touch with tribes

BLU-061

1313
in the southeastern part of the country. These officials are concerned that in a postQaddafi Libya, France and other western European countries must move quickly to

ensure that the new government does not allow AQIM and others to set up small, semiautonomous local entities—or “Caliphates”—in the oil and gas producing regions of

southeastern Libya.)

These knowledgeable sources add that the insurgents have the following weapons

stockpiled in Benghazi:

82 and 120 mm. mortars;

GPZ type machine guns;

12.7mm. machine guns mounted on 4x4 vehicles;

some anti-aircraft batteries type ZSU 23/2 and 23/4 as well as Man-Portable AirDefense Systems (MANPADS) type SAM7;

some tanks type T-72;

Possibly some fixed wing aircraft, and some light transport/medium helicopters.

A seemingly endless supply of AK47 assault rifles and ammunition (even for systems

ZSU 23/4 and 23/2). French, British and Egyptian Special Forces troops are training the

rebels inside of western Egypt, and to a limited degree in the western suburbs

of Benghazi.

(Source Comment: These sources add that the MANPAD SAM7 systems appear to be

old and badly preserved, and have been judged useless by the rebels.)

BLU-062

1314
INTERVIEW OF

COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JUNE 19, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

1316
INTERVIEW OF GRS—TRIPOLI

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JUNE 23, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview transcript were cited in the

Report of the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the

interview transcript.

1318
INTERVIEW OF DIRECTOR,

INFORMATION RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JUNE 30, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

KRISTA BOYD, Minority Senior Counsel

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

FOR DIRECTOR, INFORMATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE

SECRETARIAT

RANDALL J. TURK,

KYLE CLARK,

Baker Botts LLP

1320
4

Ms. Jackson. Good afternoon. This is a transcribed interview

of or --

Mr.

Ms. Jackson.

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Conducted by the House Select Committee on

Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of

the committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic

security facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant

to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5

of the 114th Congress.

Sir, could state your name for the record, please?

Mr. Sure. I'm

Ms. Jackson. And would you spell your last name for us?

Mr. Sure. as in

Ms. Jackson. Okay. We appreciate your being here today and

answering our questions this afternoon.

Mr. Sure.

Ms. Jackson. Again, my name is Sharon Jackson. I am one of the

counsel for the majority staff of the committee. And I'm going to ask

everyone to go around the table and introduce themselves so that you

know who we are.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. I promise you there will not be a quiz at the end

as to everybody's name.

1321
5

Mr. Good. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Just for your lawyer, we will have a quiz for him.

And he cannot pass it off to his associate either.

Mr. Turk. And speak slowly, okay?

Ms. Jackson. But we'll start with the counsel that is here with

you today.

Mr. Turk. I'm Randy Turk from Baker Botts here in Washington,

and I represent , along with my colleague, Kyle Clark.

Mr. Clark. And I'm Kyle Clark from Baker Botts, also represent

.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers. I work at the State Department.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm Susanne Sachsman Grooms with the

minority staff.

Ms. Boyd. Krista Boyd with the minority staff.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke with the majority staff.

Mr. Davis. My name is Carlton Davis. I work for Chairman Gowdy.

Mr. Chipman. And I'm Dana Chipman with the majority staff.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. We were talking right before we went on the

record, and it is my understanding, Mr. Turk, that you would like to

raise an issue on the record.

Mr. Turk. I would. Thank you. mother in Florida

received a telephone call yesterday from a reporter from The Washington

Post, and we believe that the likelihood that this reporter was calling

1322
6

about anything other than appearance here today is extremely

unlikely, and we're concerned about it. We don't want The Post to know

anything about what happens today, even if they already know he's

appearing today.

And we ask not only that people in the room not speak to reporters,

but that their staff, that they make sure their staff is not doing that.

Because clearly I think it's pretty obvious that somebody let The

Washington Post know that was testifying today, and we don't want

to see another story or any story in the Post about that.

So I make that request. And I thank everybody on the staff for

listening to us and hopefully following through.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Turk.

Mr. Turk. Can I put one more point on the record?

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. Turk. And that is, I want to note that retired from his

position at the State Department back in 2012, I think within a couple

of weeks of the events in Benghazi. So it's been a while now, several

years, almost 3, since he was there, and I think that should be something

in the background as we go forward in terms of memory and involvement

in things.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Turk. So that said --

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Thank you.

Before we begin with the questioning, there's obviously rules and

procedures that we will follow this afternoon, and so I just wanted

1323
7

to outline those to you. Your attorney may have had conversations with

our chief counsel about this, but I just want to set them out for us

here today.

The way that we proceed is that a member -- and for the majority

staff it will be for the most part me -- will ask questions for up to

an hour, and then we'll stop, we'll switch, and the minority staff will

be able to ask questions for up to the next hour. And we will proceed

back and forth until each side has asked all the questions that they

have of you.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Questions can only be asked by a member of the

committee, a Member of Congress assigned to this committee, or a staff

member.

And additionally, in this interview, which is a voluntary

transcribed interview, it is unlike testimony or a deposition in

litigation, so we are not bound by the rules of evidence. So we may

ask your opinion, we may ask what you've heard from other people, and

the like. And also, because we don't follow the rules of evidence,

that it's rare that we have any objections to any of the questions.

The witness or his counsel may raise objections for privilege,

and those are then subject to the review of the chairman of the

committee. If these objections cannot be resolved in the context of

this interview, you can be required to return to answer those questions

after the chairman has ruled on that. But Members of Congress and the

staff that is here today are not permitted to raise objections when

1324
8

either side is asking questions. So this has not been an issue that

we've had in the course of our interviews, but I just want to put it

out there that we are all clear on the process.

We are in an unclassified setting today and we anticipate that

there will be no question posed to you or answer given that would go

into any type of classified materials.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. If for any reason you think that an answer you would

be called upon to give would go into that realm, please just let us

know and we can reserve that question until another time or just decide

to go on and not have it --

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. -- have the answer as part of our proceedings.

You are welcome to confer with your counsel as often as you would

like and for as long as you would like today. But if it's a mere matter

of you need a question clarified or restated or perhaps simplified in

some way, please just say so, and we'll try and take care of that at

the time. But, again, at any time if you want to confer with the counsel

that you've brought today, we will afford you the opportunity to do

so. We'll simply go off the record, we'll allow you a private

opportunity to talk with one another, and then we'll come back

and resume.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. We will also take a break whenever it's convenient

for you. Typically we do this at the end of every hour, as we have

1325
9

to change seats and things like that, it's just a good opportunity to

break. But if you need a break before then, please, again, just let

us know, and we'll afford you whatever time you need for a break. We

have water here. We have chocolate here. And if you need anything

else, please just let us know. We're going to try and make this process

as easy as possible of you.

As you see, we have an official reporter here that's taking down

everything that is said so that we can have a record of these

proceedings. So one thing that is important is that we give verbal

responses, or that you give verbal responses to the questions, because

it's very difficult for the reporter to be taking everything down --

Mr. A nod.

Ms. Jackson. -- and watching nods of the head, shakes of the

head, and things like that.

The other thing that the reporter asks of us is that only one

person talks at a time. And so I will try and be very good at not

starting my questions before you've finished your answer, and if you

could wait to provide an answer until the question is completed, the

reporter will love us both at the end of the proceeding. Otherwise,

we might get chastised during the proceedings.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. And, again, if you need any question repeated,

clarified, I know sometimes my mind wanders and I don't hear all of

the question, so, please, we just want to make sure that you understand

the question before giving an answer. We'll be happy to clarify or

1326
10

repeat anything.

We will be asking you to give your best recollection of events.

And as your counsel noted, it has been some years since you've been

with the State Department. So, you know, we don't want you to guess,

but we do want you to give us the most complete and truthful answer

that you can.

If we pose a question to you and you don't know the answer but

you know someone who would know the answer or is likely to know the

answer, we will ask that you give us that information so that we can

then go and turn to that person to seek the answers to the questions

that we have.

This is a congressional committee conducting an investigation

into certain events. Do you understand that you are required to answer

the questions posed to you by Congress truthfully?

Mr. I am.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And do you understand that this also applies

when questions are asked to you by a committee of Congress?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Do you understand that witnesses who

knowingly provide false testimony could be subject to a prosecution

for perjury or for making false statements? Do you understand that?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Is there any reason as you sit here today

that you would not be able to give complete and truthful answers to

this committee's questions?

1327
11

Mr. No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. All right. That's the end of my preamble.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Do you have any questions for us at this time?

Mr. I don't.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. I'm going to ask if the minority has

anything that they would like to add at this time.

Ms. Sawyer. We'd just like to welcome you. Thank you for

coming, thank you for appearing voluntarily. I think my colleague

indicated that we're a committee investigating certain events. They

are the events surrounding the attacks in Benghazi. So we appreciate

your counsel's clarification as to when your tenure ended with regard

to those attacks in particular. So thank you.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. With that, I see that the clock is now at

2:25, and I'll start the first hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Mr. , how long were you at the State Department?

A I was at the State Department 38.9 years.

Q You couldn't make it to 40?

A No.

Q And when did you retire?

A I retired November 2 in 2012.

Q Okay. And what was your last position at the State

1328
12

Department?

A I was director of the Systems Office on the seventh floor.

Q And would that be what we have come to know as the seventh

floor principals of the State Department?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Yes. We handle that system.

Q And who were -- or what positions were in the system that

you handled? You know, was it Secretary, the deputy secretaries? How

far down did it go?

A It was all of those, all of the top officials at State.

Q Okay. Did that include the under secretaries of State?

A Yes.

Q Did it go below that level to assistant secretaries?

A Possibly. I just can't remember off the top of my head.

But we may have had an assistant secretary on our staff, though those

were usually handled by Bureau. So I don't think so.

Q Okay. But certainly from under secretary level upward?

A Above, yes.

Q Okay. And did that include the staff that worked for those

principals?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And part of your answer to a question indicated that

you had a separate network or server for those seventh floor principals?

A Yes.

1329
13

Q Okay. Can you explain how that operated?

A There were two systems, classified and unclassified. So

I'm not sure exactly which --

Q But there were separate -- there was a separate classified

and a separate unclassified system that serviced only the seventh floor

principals and their staffs?

A Correct, to a degree.

Q Okay. Could you explain that degree to me?

A The degree, the classified was, as far as I remember, that

it was -- we were the sole caretakers of that. The unclassified

system, we worked with big IRM, the big Systems Office, and so they

had a view into our system.

Q Okay. Did the network or server for the unclassified

system for the seventh floor principals, did it only service them even

though you coordinated with big IRM?

A Yes. What we handled and serviced them, that's what we did.

Q From what position did you retire from the State Department

in November of 2012?

A I retired as the director.

Q Okay. Of IRM?

A Not IRM. S/ES. S/ES is the designation, the Executive

Secretariat, S/ES-IRM.

Q Okay. And what does IRM stand for?

A Information Resource Management.

Q Okay. So would it be safe to say that you were the head

1330
14

tech guy for the seventh floor principals?

Mr. Turk. The what?

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Head tech guy.

A Yes, for -- yes.

Q Okay. What were your duties and responsibilities? What

did you do on a day-to-day basis?

A I handled the running of the office. We had teams with team

leaders, and I had a couple of deputies, and we had roughly 1,000 users

on our network. So just keeping things operational.

Q Okay. And we're talking the technology side, keeping

things operational?

A Yes, keeping the systems up and running, absolutely.

Q Now, you said there were about 1,000 users?

A Yes, at a given -- any given time. I mean, some would come

and go depending on -- we were actually working with big IRM to -- they

took some of the users that we had.

Q Okay. So you would have the Secretary of State and her

staff. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And the deputy secretaries of state and their staffs?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And then the -- I can't remember if there were six

or seven.

A S, D, P, E, T, M, C were the acronyms: Secretary, the deputy

1331
15

secretary, the under secretary for political affairs, economic

affairs, it used to be security assistance, science and technology,

but I think that has changed, and then under secretary for management,

and then counselor of the Department.

Q Okay.

A Those were the big ones that I recall.

Q Okay. And so you were in charge of making sure all the

technology systems were running and operational for these offices and

positions?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And how long were you in that position as the

director of IT for the Executive Secretariat-IRM?

A I took that position, I believe it was June 2008, and then

retired in November 2012. So a little over 4 years.

Q Okay. Let me just step aside for a minute. When did you

learn that this committee wanted to talk to you?

A I learned when I was in New England, taking a vacation in

New England. And I just happened to check my email, and there was an

email that had sat in my in-box for a while. I just hadn't been thinking

about it. And then I immediately called the HR person who had tried

to contact me and gave them my phone number, my mobile, and said, "Please

call me."

Q And approximately when was that? When were you on

vacation?

A That -- I got back to D.C. around the 17th, and we were gone

1332
16

8 days, so roughly the 9th, May 9, through the 17th or 18th, roughly.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q Okay. So during your entire tenure as director of IT for

the executive-level leadership, did they always have a separate network

or server for the unclassified system?

A Yes, yes.

Q Do you know how long -- I mean, how long it had been in effect

prior to your taking over in 2008?

A I believe it was while Colin Powell was in office and said

that we should have -- I believe that's when it was the unclassified

system. Yeah.

Q Were you still working in information technology in the

State Department when Secretary Powell was --

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q And what was your position back then?

A I was a deputy director.

Q Of what office?

A Oh, in Information Resource Management, S/ES. My entire

career was in the Executive Secretariat. But I worked in the Document

Branch at the beginning for -- of 12 years, and then --

Q But you've always worked in the --

A I have, yes.

1333
17

Q All right. And do you know why it was that a separate

network -- well, let me back up and make sure we have the right

terminology, because I am not a technical person.

Is a network and a server kind of synonymous terms or do they mean

something different to you as an expert in the technology field?

A I would say they're very similar. You have to have servers

to make up part of the network.

Q Okay.

A So I think that's a safe assumption.

Q So I can use them interchangeably in my questions and you'll

know what I'm talking about?

A Sure.

Q Okay. Do you know why it was that Secretary Powell decided

to implement a separate network for the executive leadership?

A And we're talking unclassified side?

Q Yes.

A Oh. I'm not so sure that it was a deliberate thing. It's

just that the classified side was separate. And then we pride

ourselves on giving great customer service to the principal officers

and have an understanding of their mission. So --

Q Was there any concern about the protection of information

that is transmitted at that level?

A Yes.

Q And did the executive leadership network provide additional

protections for the information that was transmitted on that system?

1334
18

A Could you clarify that?

Q By segregating out the flow of information to and from the

senior leadership of the State Department, did that protect it in any

additional way from other systems in the State Department?

A I believe there were firewalls in place that would provide

extra protection.

Q Okay. Were the systems backed up in any way?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And can you describe those for us?

A My recollection is that they were backed up

Q And it may be an obvious question, but what's the importance

of having backups to a system?

A In case something happens, if the system crashes, for having

an extra copy.

Q Okay.

Were there ever times when there was, like, a snapshot

of the entire network taken and preserved, say, at the end of the year,

end of the fiscal year, anything like that?

A A snapshot? I'm not sure what you mean of --

Q Like a backup tape preserved for time immortal.

A I don't know. I don't know.

Q Okay. And where were the backup systems located, if you

1335
19

recall? And if you want, just focus on 2011, 2012, the last 2 years

you were there.

A Okay.

Q For a variety of questions, if in doubt, let's just -- if

I don't give a timeframe, let's talk about 2011, 2012.

A And 2012.

Q Okay?

A Okay.

Q Yeah.

A

Q Okay. ?

A Yes.

Q ?

A No.

Q Okay.

Mr. Evers. Sharon, I know that there's an agreement on

protecting information from public release, but I think especially in

light of the IT security issues in the executive branch recently, that

the information that you're going into now, while maybe it's not

classified, Mr. the right judge for that, I think it would

be particularly prudent to protect this information from public

disclosure. It's certainly sensitive.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. We'll take that into due consideration.

Mr. Evers. Thank you.

1336
20

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Were there intrusion detection systems in place on the

seventh floor principals network?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. Were you in charge of that?

A In charge meaning -- yes. I was in charge of everything,

but we certainly had the experts who were more technical than I who

handled that.

Q That's understood. So it was under your umbrella --

A Sure.

Q -- but you weren't the one who was physically monitoring --

A Exactly.

Q -- the systems? Okay.

Did the Department have email in 2011, 2012?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you know when the State Department had widespread

use of email, when they first started?

A This is going way back.

Q Way back.

A Oh. Well, we had limited just interoffice in the 1980s --

Q Okay.

A -- the Wang Office Systems.

Q I remember Wang. I'm dating myself, but I remember Wang

rooms, yes.

A And then we had Wang minicomputers late '80s, early '0s,

1337
21

and then we went to client-server architecture the end of the '90s.

Q Do you know when you had Internet-based email?

A We had very -- when Secretary Powell came onboard, we had

very limited -- we had, like, a PC in each office, a walkup PC, and

people could use that for the Internet. But we did not have them at

everyone's desktop until Secretary Powell said we need to deploy those.

Q So would you say that based on your experience in the State

Department, that Secretary Powell made you take a giant step forward

in technology use in the State Department during his tenure?

A Yes, I would -- by giving everyone unclassified networks

and Internet access, absolutely.

Q Okay. In 2011, 2012, what type of email system was being

used on the unclassified side?

A Gosh, I believe it was XP. Is that what you're asking, the

operating system?

Q It was Microsoft?

A Yes.

Q Outlook?

A Yes.

Q Okay. You didn't have Gmail or Hotmail or --

A No.

Q -- commercially available --

A No.

Q -- things like that? Okay.

Did the State Department's computer systems get a major upgrade

1338
22

at any time after 2005?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay.

A We -- I would imagine it went to the latest version of the

operating system.

Q Do you recall at any time in perhaps 2009 that an outside

company came in to completely overhaul the State Department's computer

systems?

A I don't recall that.

Q Okay. Do you recall whether the Foreign Affairs Manual or

Foreign Affairs handbook was revised in 2009 with regard to email use

or Internet use?

A I don't know that.

Q Would you have had any involvement in that process if it

occurred?

A The involvement would have been chopping off on the

language. There was probably suggested language, and do you agree with

this. But I just don't recall that I did that personally.

Q Okay. There are some terms that we have heard, and we want

to make sure that we have a full understanding of them. And some of

the terms are S-A-S, or perhaps SAS, Freedoms, smart, POEMS, STARS,

and Everest. Do any of those terms mean anything to you?

A Sure.

Q Okay. Well, could you describe each of those either

systems or programs and what they do and whether they were in place

1339
23

while you were there, and specifically 2011, 2012 timeframe?

A Could you give me one at a time so I could --

Q Well, let me ask --

A Okay.

Q Let me do it this way --

A Okay.

Q -- so it might help categorize them. Are some, like,

network hardware things and others more software programs on how to

manage information, or do they all do kind of the same thing?

A I would need to hear those again.

Q Okay.

A Sorry.

Q S-A-S, SAS.

A I don't recall what that --

Q The State Archiving System?

A Okay.

Q Okay?

A I just don't --

Q How about Freedoms?

A Freedoms?

Q F-r-e-e-d-o-m-s.

A I don't --

Q Recall that one?

A -- know about that one, no.

Q POEMS? Yes --

1340
24

A That was --

Q -- you know that one?

A -- seventh floor.

Q And what was it about, what did POEMS do?

A It stood for Principal Officers Executive Management

System.

Q Okay.

A So it was basically email and some databases and the like.

Q Did it house the directories or documents of the principal

officers?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there a shared network or individual -- did each

principal have, like, an individual directory that he or she

controlled, as well as a shared directory among all the principals,

if you recall?

A From what I do recall, yes, area responsibility, and then

there was a collective archive, I believe.

Q Okay. So there was some sort of shared directory that all

of the principals could access?

A I don't know that for sure. They could access certainly

their documents, but I'm not sure about sharing documents of other

principals.

Q Okay. But POEMS also managed their email system, their

email traffic?

A Yes.

1341
25

Q Would POEMS be the network or what you call the network or

server for the principal officers?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What about STARS, S-T-A-R-Z? Do you recall that?

A Secretariat Tracking and Retrieval System.

Q Oh, it probably ends in an S, not a Z, right?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q And would you tell us that again, Secretariat --

A Secretariat Tracking and Retrieval System.

Q And what was it used for?

A That housed the documents of the principals, things that

were tasked and tracked by the seventh floor.

Q And so that would be information memos, action memos, other

decisions of the principals?

A Decision -- yes. Letters to sign and the like.

Q Okay. And how was the information within STARS organized?

A Well, there were various ways to call it up. Is that what

you're asking?

Q Yes. If you wanted to go into STARS and find out all the

information about Libya, how would you do that?

A You could do a search on that.

Q By country?

A Yes.

1342
26

Q Okay. Could you do a search by individuals, say, you wanted

all the information regarding a particular ambassador?

A Yes. That was in the system.

Q And what do you mean by --

A Things that were put into the system.

Q Okay. And other than action memos, information memos,

correspondence, were other type of information put into the system,

such as cables or schedules of the principals?

A I don't believe cables were put in there as a rule, unless

they were attached to perhaps one of these memos.

Q Okay. If the FAM or some other policy -- if the FAM was

being revised and it was being sent out to the field to say, here's

the latest section of the FAM, would you find that memo in STARS?

A I'm not sure.

Q Okay.

A I'm not sure.

Q One other system or name we heard was Everest. Do you know

what Everest is?

A I do. That was the replacement for STARS.

Q Okay. So Everest was the system that was in place when you

left the Department to handle the documents of the seventh floor

principals?

A Yes, yes.

Q And, again, did it categorize documents in a same or similar

manner as STARS?

1343
27

A Yes.

Q Okay. So it did it by topic or subject or country, that

type of thing?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q I saw you nodding. I was going to make you say yes.

A Yes. Sorry.

Q You know.

A Okay.

Q Within the State Department, is there something known as

TAGS, T-A-G-S?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What are TAGS?

A TAGS are Department-approved symbols, I believe they're

four letters. For instance, if something was administrative, it would

be A and then four letters. And I actually did not use TAGS that much,

so I'm not overly familiar with them, but I know it's a handbook, and

you would go in there and it's a way of retrieving things. So --

Q For example, did Diplomatic Security have one or more TAGS

that they would use to categorize the information that came to or from

that Bureau?

A Probably.

Q Okay. Did all of the substantive bureaus have one or more

TAGS that they would used to categorize their information?

1344
28

A I believe they did.

Q Okay. You in your work didn't use them on a regular basis?

A No, I didn't.

Q All right. Of the email accounts of the seventh floor

principals at the time period of 2011, 2012, I believe you said that

they used some version of Microsoft Outlook. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Was Outlook a searchable database, if you will, of

information?

A I need a little clarification. Searchable by?

Q You've got an in-box and it's got 450 emails in there and

you've got to go look for one. Can you go find it?

A Theres a search feature within Microsoft Outlook, yes.

Q Okay. And the State Department had a version of Outlook

that had that feature in it?

A I believe so.

Q All right. Was there any type of automatic archiving of

the emails of the seventh floor principals in 2011, 2012?

A I do not believe so.

Q Okay. So if someone deleted an email from their in-box or

their outbox or their sent items box, it would just be gone?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And was that true for the entire time that you were

at the State Department? You didn't, like --

A Would you repeat --

1345
29

Q You didn't have --

A -- just to be sure I'm clear on --

Q Yeah. You didn't have automatic archiving and then got an

upgrade and didn't have it anymore or anything like that?

A No.

Q Okay.

A No.

Q When one of the principals departed the State Department,

left, what, if anything, would happen to their electronic information,

their email account, their directory, anything that they may have had

on a CD, memory stick, DVD?

A That would be looked at by the records people, I believe,

to see what needed to be -- go to the official archive.

Q Did you and your team undertake any steps to capture the

electronic information so that it could be reviewed for archiving?

A We did the mechanics of taking the snapshot, is my

understanding, of the in-box.

Q Of just the in-box?

A I believe so. Yeah. I don't recall exactly what all in

it -- what it all included, but I know it would have been the in-box.

Q Okay. What about the sent items box?

A I don't know.

Q If the individual principal had set up folders within their

email system, would it have captured those folders?

A It would be a guess on my part.

1346
30

Q Okay.

A I don't remember.

Q Who would have physically done this during the last 2 years

of your tenure at the State Department?

A That would have been our, I believe, primarily our

administrative team, and perhaps our technical team if they needed

additional help.

Q And who were the heads of your administrative team and your

technical team in the last 2 years of your tenure?

A You want names?

Q Uh-huh.

A Okay.

Q Could you spell that for us, please?

A Sure. It's And then the

team lead of the technical team was .

Q Common spelling?

A Yes.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, are they still with the State

Department?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were the directories of the seventh floor principals

retained in some way when they departed the State Department, make a

snapshot of those? So if they had a drive where they had documents

stored, was that also --

A I don't know that for sure. Well -- yeah.

1347
31

Q Again, would the administrative or technical team be the

people who would have physically done that?

A Probably.

Q Okay.

Mr. Turk. If it were done.

Mr. If it --

Ms. Jackson. Yeah. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q During your tenure, and in particular at least 2011, 2012,

but before that if necessary, did you ever have to reinstall or

reestablish an email account or a directory from any type of backup

tape or because someone's system crashed or something like that?

A I don't recall any specifics, just -- probably, but I

don't -- it could be something that happens in the system.

Q I've never known a system not to crash or do --

A Yeah.

Q Have you ever had to reinstall a PST file?

A I haven't.

Q You haven't. Okay. Who would have done that in the State

Department under your supervision for the senior leadership?

A That would have been the two teams that I just gave you.

Q Okay. Do you have an estimate of the average size of what

an email account would be in a 2-year period for one of the seventh

floor principals?

A I do not. I do not.

1348
32

Q Okay. Do you know how large the universe was for all of

the seventh floor principals? What was the size of the network or

server that you had?

A I don't know that answer.

Q We talked a little bit just a few minutes ago about the

search feature of Microsoft Outlook. Do you know how extensive that

search feature was? Could you do a date range search?

A I don't recall what the searchable fields were.

Q Yeah. Do you use Microsoft Outlook today?

A I do very little.

Q You really --

A Actually I don't use Outlook.

Q You really retired from the technical field?

A I did, I did, yes.

Q Okay. We talked about an automatic or periodic archiving

process, and you don't recall there being one for the seventh floor

principals in 2011, 2012. Is that correct?

A No, I don't recall.

Q Okay. So there wasn't any mechanism to automatically

capture the emails of any of the principals and retain them for

posterity or review for records-retention purposes?

A Not that I can recall.

Q Okay. Do you recall if there was any archiving, periodic

or otherwise, of the directories, memos, letters, things that were kept

in the individual directories?

1349
33

A Are you talking part of the Everest system or you're

talking individual --

Q Apart from Everest.

A I don't know.

Q Let me ask you a few more things about STARS and Everest

then.

A Okay.

Q Were drafts and other documents kept within those systems

or did STARS and Everest only maintain the final copy of something?

A It could be a work in progress, so it could be a draft.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q Do you know the frequency in which drafts were kept as part

of the official recordkeeping of the seventh floor principals?

A It depends on subject matter and -- yeah, if there were

bureaus involved. And so it's --

Q So, in other words, like the more widespread a particular

memo was sent out, the more likely that drafts and comments would be

maintained as opposed to just the final product?

A I don't believe the comments would be -- usually the system

had things pretty much in final form, is what I recall.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So just going back to the STARS and Everest.

1350
34

A Okay.

Q Would searches be contingent on how those records or

documents were entered into the system?

A Absolutely.

Q And so that would really be dependent on the person --

A Yes.

Q -- how the person entered. And is there any type of -- were

there any type of records kept as to how that person entered those

documents into the system?

A We, meaning the IT people?

Q The IT people, yes.

A We didn't get involved in that.

Q You didn't get involved into that. But someone within the

Exec Sec administrative would have?

A You're asking me now about another office --

Q Correct.

A -- so I would --

Q So within Exec Sec.

A I would imagine so.

Q Imagine. Okay.

A Yeah.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I want to move on to Secretary Clinton's use of a personal

email account that was housed on a private server, so I have a series

of questions about that.

1351
35

A Okay.

Q You were in your current position as of mid-2008. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So you would have been the head IT guy when she came

into office in January of 2009. That's correct?

A Yes, for the seventh floor, yes.

Q Okay. Did you or did anyone at your direction set up an

official email account for her before her arrival?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. Do you know if one was set up at the time of her

arrival?

A I don't know definitively if there was or was not.

Q What is your belief?

A If she wanted one, we would have set up one for her.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q And who would have done that?

A That would have been our administrative team.

Q And that would have been --

A Yes.

Q -- whose last name I cannot pronounce?

A yep. Yes.

Q

A Yes.

1352
36

Q Okay. I'm going to practice that.

Are you aware of any conversations that Secretary Clinton or a

representative on her behalf had with or anyone else in her

division about establishing an official email account?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. If the Secretary did not want an official email

account, would that be something that would have been brought to your

attention?

A Not necessarily.

Q Okay. When did you first learn that Secretary Clinton was

using a personal email account to conduct official business?

A In the papers whenever it came out, yeah.

Q So you had no knowledge of that --

A No.

Q -- during the time that you worked for the State Department

and she was Secretary of State?

A Again, when it came out in the papers. And I just didn't

follow that a whole lot. So --

Q Okay. So you as the director of the IT services for the

principals of the State Department was not -- you were not consulted

in any way regarding her use of a personal email account for official

business?

A No.

Q Were you aware that any other member of the senior

leadership, the principals, did not use an official government account,

1353
37

email account?

A I was not aware.

Q Okay. Were official government accounts set up for the

other senior principals during Secretary Clinton's tenure?

A Certainly they were afforded that.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q During Secretary Clinton's tenure and the time that you were

there, were you aware of whether other principals of the organization

used both official and personal email accounts to conduct official

business?

A I do not know that.

Q When did you become aware that Secretary Clinton's personal

email address was being maintained on a -- had been maintained on a

private server?

A When it came out in the papers.

Q And that would have been earlier this year?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So at no time during your tenure at the State

Department?

A No.

Q Okay. Were you aware that on President Obama's first day

in office he issued an executive order on open and transparency in

government?

A I don't recall that.

1354
38

Q Was it a directive of the State Department that you have

an open and transparent government while you were there?

A I'm not sure I exactly understand the question.

Q I'll move on and ask another one. It was kind of an odd

question.

A Okay.

Q At any time did Secretary Clinton or her representatives

explain to anyone on your staff why she believed her private email

system was necessary or preferable to using an official State

government account?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q If she did not have that -- if she or her representative

did not have that conversation with you, who would they have had a

conversation with, if it did occur?

A Someone above my pay grade.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q And who would that be?

A I'm guessing the Executive Secretary.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q All right. Do you have any knowledge of anyone at the State

Department who was aware that she exclusively was using a personal email

account during her tenure?

A No.

1355
39

Q Do you know of anyone within the State Department who knew

that her personal email account was housed on a private server?

A No.

Q Have you come to learn that?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what have you come to learn?

A What I've read in the papers. And I honestly haven't

followed it that closely. I did walk away when I walked away and

just --

Q Okay. So you haven't had any conversations with any former

colleagues or anything like that?

A Not to any degree about this, no.

Q Okay.

A No.

Q So neither you nor any member of your staff was asked to

take any steps to determine whether Secretary Clinton's decision to

use the personal email and a private server complied with any applicable

laws, regulations, or policies within the State Department?

A No.

Q Do you know whether Secretary Clinton or anyone on her

behalf conferred with the State Department's cyber intrusion team

regarding her use of a personal email account on a private server?

A I don't know that answer.

Q Did the State Department have a cyber intrusion team?

A Yes, yes.

1356
40

Q And did they do monitoring of the State Department's

systems?

A It's another office, but, yes.

Q And was that 24/7?

A I don't know for sure. I would imagine.

Q Okay. I want to show you something that you probably wish

you'd never see again in your life, but I'm marking as Deposition

Exhibit No. 1, or exhibit No. 1, a copy of the specific provision of

the Foreign Affairs Manual and ask you -- what I've put before you as

exhibit No. 1 is 12 FAM 540, which is part of the Foreign Affairs Manual

on Sensitive But Unclassified Information.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And specifically going to ask you about 12 FAM 544.3, which

is on page 5 of 7. So why don't we go off the record for a minute and

I'll let you review that, because it may have been a time or two since

you've read that. But specifically 12 FAM 554 -- actually, I'll

probably ask you a couple questions about 554.2 and .3, so why don't

you take a minute or 2 and review those?

A I notice they were, looks like, revised in 2013, office of

origin Diplomatic Security.

Q Would this mean that this one has not been revised since

2005? Is that what that means?

A I would imagine that Diplomatic Security drafted this at

1357
41

that time.

Q Right. So these provisions would have been the same?

[Witness reading document.]

Mr. Turk. How far did you want him to read?

Ms. Jackson. 544.2 and .3.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Have you had a chance to --

A Oh, .2?

Q .2. It's very short.

A Okay.

Q Have you had enough time to look that over?

A I have.

Q Okay. We'll go back on the record.

As to exhibit 1 and 12 FAM 544.3, which is entitled "Electronic

Transmission Via the Internet," right under that subheading in

parentheticals is (CT:DS-117; 11-04-2005). Can you decipher that for

us and what that means, or generally what that means?

A I don't know. I would imagine the DS is Diplomatic

Security. The CT --

Q Would that be counterterrorism?

A Could be.

Q Okay.

A Computer technology. It's a guess.

Q Okay.

A It was a guess.

1358
42

Q And what appears to be a date of 11-04-2005, would that be

the date that this particular provision was implemented?

A That would make sense that it was.

Q Okay. So as you read 12 FAM 544.3, do you recall, was this

the policy in place when you were the director of IRM for the Executive

Secretariat?

A As it's written, it must have been.

Q And if I read from subsection a of that, and it is, I quote,

"It is the Department's general policy that normal day-to-day

operations be conducted on an authorized AIS, which has the proper level

of security control to provide nonrepudiation, authentication and

encryption, to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of

the resident information," end quote, end of the first sentence.

That's a mouthful of a sentence. I'd like to examine the various

components and parts of it, if I could. It says, "It's the department's

general policy that normal day-to-day operations be conducted on an

authorized AIS." What's an authorized AIS?

A It's an Automated Information System, I believe.

Q So that means it's a State Department-issued computer or

network or --

A Yes.

Q -- information system?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So the general policy -- and did this general policy

apply to everyone in the State Department?

1359
43

A I don't -- I don't know that.

Q Okay. Certainly no one's excluded by this provision. Is

that correct? No one's expressly excluded in the language here.

A Right.

Q Okay.

A If it's part of the FAM.

Q Okay. And then it goes on to say that the reason that you

want to conduct the normal day-to-day operations on an authorized

system within the State Department is to, quote -- or to ensure that

it has, quote, "the proper level of security control to provide

nonrepudiation, authentication and encryption." And then let's just

stop there. What is meant by "nonrepudiation"?

A I don't know.

Q Okay.

A I wasn't the author of this, and I don't --

Q What about authentication? What does that mean in

technical terms? Does it mean that the person is who they say they

are, because of passwords and recognition?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. And as to encryption, was there encryption on the

State Department systems? Were they encrypted in some way?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. In 2011, 2012, were they encrypted in some way?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Then it goes on to say, "to ensure confidentiality,

1360
44

integrity, and availability of the resident information." So let's

break that apart a little bit. Were there mechanisms in place to ensure

the confidentiality of communications that were transmitted on the

Department's system?

A In general, yes.

Q Were there mechanisms to ensure the integrity of the

information that was transmitted across the State Department systems?

A Yes.

Q They were monitored in some way?

A I don't know that.

Q Okay. And then the last phrase is to ensure the

availability of the resident information. And does that mean to ensure

that the State Department's records reside on State Department networks

and systems?

A I don't know.

Q Okay.

A I don't know.

Q Subpart b of this section says, and I quote, "The Department

is expected to provide, and employees are expected to use, approved

secure methods to transmit SBU information when available and

practical." What does this provision mean to you?

A To use State Department systems.

Q Okay. And were approved secure methods available to the

seventh floor principals for their use to transmit SBU information?

A Yes.

1361
45

Q Okay. And particularly in 2011, 2012, what kind of devices

were available to the seventh floor principals? Were they each

provided a laptop? Were iPads in use at the time, BlackBerrys,

iPhones? In particular, what type of portable devices were available

and used by the seventh floor principals?

A From what I recall, BlackBerrys and laptops.

Q And the laptops have the ability to be connected to the State

Department networks?

A They could, yes.

Q Okay. And how did they do that? What was the mechanism

that you had to follow to do that?

A There was software that would be the entry point into the

Department's system. And I'm not sure --

Q When I was at the Justice Department, we called that remote

access.

A Yes. Exactly.

Q Okay. So the State Department had some sort of remote

access?

A Remote access.

Q So if you were traveling and you had a State

Department-issued laptop, you could connect to the State Department

networks?

A [Nonverbal response.]

Q Is that correct?

A Yes.

1362
46

Q Okay. Would those laptops also allow you to connect to the

Internet if you needed to do a Google search or something like that?

A I don't know for sure.

Q Okay. Wouldn't they have to have some sort of Internet

connectivity in order to do remote access?

A They would --

Q Okay.

A -- I believe, yes.

Q So they would have had to connect to the Internet --

A Internet for the transmission lines to get -- yes.

Q To get back.

A Yes.

Q And then did it have what was known as a VPN or Virtual

Private Network?

A I don't know for sure.

Q Okay. But the laptops had Internet connectivity. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So they would have allowed someone to go to Google

or go to MSN and check personal email?

A I don't know that for sure.

Q Did you have a laptop at that time?

A No.

Q Oh, okay. What about the BlackBerrys that were used by the

seventh floor principals at that time? Were they able to connect to

1363
47

the Internet?

A From what I recall, the BlackBerrys served as the -- you

got your messages on the BlackBerrys.

Q So you got your internal emails?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q Do you know if they had the capability of accessing a

personal email account?

A I don't know that.

Q Okay. We talked just a minute ago about remote access.

And I'd like to direct your attention to 12 FAM 544.2, where it talks

about -- the second sentence starts, quote, "Where warranted by the

nature of the information, employees who will be transmitting SBU

information outside of the Department network on a regular basis to

the same official and/or most personal addresses, should contact

IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/PKI" -- I don't know how you all get so many

letters -- "to request assistance in providing a secure technical

solution for those transmissions. Availability of a Public Key

Infrastructure (PKI) solution for a home computer will depend upon the

computer's operating system," end quote.

What is this saying?

A I am by no means expert on that. I didn't draft that.

Q Is this saying that you have to be careful when you're

transmitting SBU information because of the level of sensitivity that

1364
48

it entails?

A As the way it's written, yes.

Q Okay. And did the Department have available to it ways in

which people could transmit SBU information when they were outside of

the State Department and its networks?

A According to this, you had the Public Key Infrastructure.

Q Okay. Is that the way that you get that secure remote

access, is through those PKI keys?

A That would be my understanding --

Q Okay.

A -- according to this.

Q Who instituted these -- in other words, who is

IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/PKI?

A IRM is -- what I would term the big IRM, handling most of

the people in State and overseas. OPS is operations. I'm not sure

what ITS, I'm not sure what SI is, and of course PKI is pretty obvious

on that one.

Q To your knowledge, did any of the seventh floor principals

in 2011, 2012 avail themselves of these PKI solutions?

A I don't know about the principals.

Q Okay. Who would know in your department? Who would have

known?

A The mobile -- I believe it was the mobile solutions

unit that would --

Q And were they part of your group?

1365
49

A Yes, yes.

Q And who was in charge of the mobile --

A That would have been --

Q Okay. I'm sorry. Let me --

A Oh.

Q Mobile solutions unit?

A I believe that's what they were.

Q And in 2011, 2012, who was in charge of that group?

A That would have been .

Q

A

Q

A

Q I get.

A yes.

Ms. Jackson. That went fast. I see that I have reached the end

of my first hour. I do have -- I'm more than halfway through. But

we will go off the record, take a short break, and resume after we've

had a few minutes.

[Recess.]

1366
50

Ms. Jackson. Again, it's Sharon Jackson, and I am going to

continue questioning of the witness. It is now 3:40 in the afternoon,

and we will continue.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You have before you exhibit No. 1 again, which I would like

to direct your attention to 12 FAM 544.3, and then d(6), which is on

page 6 of 7 of this document at the top of the page.

It states, and I quote, "SBU information resident on personally

owned computers connected to the Internet is generally more susceptible

to cyber attacks and/or compromise than information on

government-owned computers connected to the Internet," end quote.

Do you agree with that statement, Mr. ?

A I'm sorry, I wasn't following the correct --

Q On page 6.

A Page 6 at the top, okay.

Q At the top. "SBU information resident on personally owned

computers connected to the Internet is generally more susceptible to

cyber attacks and/or compromise than information on government-owned

computers connected to the Internet."

Do you agree with that statement?

A Generally, yes.

Q Okay. And why would government-owned computers connected

1367
51

to the Internet be safer than personally owned computers connected to

the Internet?

A There would be safeguards from the whole network to protect

the network.

Q And ongoing monitoring?

A Yes.

Q We've talked about whether anyone on the technical side of

the house was consulted before Secretary Clinton set up a private server

to house her personal email account. To your knowledge, did anyone

in the records management part of the State Department know about her

arrangement?

A I couldn't answer that because that's a totally different

office.

Q Okay. So --

A We provided the network to them to house documents and all,

but I have no --

Q Okay. No meetings, no conversations, no discussions?

A I wouldn't know any of that.

Q Okay. I assume the answer to this is no. Do you know

whether Secretary Clinton or any of her representatives got any legal

advice before they implemented this arrangement?

A I wouldn't know that.

Q Okay. So you don't know whether State's general counsel

was consulted, private counsel, or anything?

A I do not know that.

1368
52

Q Okay. Did you or your staff or your superiors have any

awareness or involvement in the planning and procurement of the private

server?

A Would you read that again, please.

Q Did you or your staff or your superiors have any awareness

or involvement in the planning and procurement of the private server

for Secretary Clinton?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Do you know who was actually responsible for carrying out

the planning, procurement, and setup of the private server?

A No.

Q Do you know if there was any vetting done of the contractors

or individuals providing the hardware and software for the server?

A I don't know that.

Q Is vetting important?

Let me ask this.

A Yes.

Q Are contractors that work on the State Department's systems

vetted in any way, vetted and approved?

A Are you talking about security clearances and the like?

Q Or people who come in and work on your information

technology systems.

A Sure, they're cleared individuals.

Q Do you know whether the State Department paid for any part

of the establishment or maintenance of the private server for Secretary

1369
53

Clinton?

A I don't know any of that.

Q Do you know where the server and associated equipment were

physically located?

A No.

Q Do you know who controlled and provided the physical

security for the server and related equipment that she used?

A No.

Q Are you aware of any of the safeguards that were provided

at the facilities where the server was housed?

A No.

Q At any time were you or your staff asked to confer with those

who were responsible for maintaining her private server?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. Do you know what, if any, encryption software was

used on her private server?

A No.

Q Do you know if there were any mechanisms in place that would

identify potential cyber threat information on the systems that she

used?

A No.

Q Does the State Department conduct periodic or episodic

checks on its system for cyber intrusions or attempted intrusions?

A I am sure they do.

Q And who -- what --

1370
54

A It would be another office.

Q And what would that office be?

A Diplomatic Security.

Q Okay.

A And perhaps IRM too.

Q Would Diplomatic Security be the component that would have

been asked to review any security standards or protocols for a private

server or would that be your office or would that be some other office?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know whether there were any security breaches to her

private server?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know whether there were any data losses?

A I do not know.

Q Do you know what type of portable devices Secretary Clinton

used during her tenure? By this I mean BlackBerrys, iPads, laptops,

any type of portable electronic device.

A I don't know what she used.

Q Okay. None were issued by your section?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Who would know?

A .

Q And that was the mobile security unit?

A Mobile Solutions.

Q Solutions?

1371
55

A Yes.

Q Okay. So Mobile Solutions is probably just like its name

said, but what all types of equipment would they be able to provide?

A BlackBerrys and laptops.

Q Were iPads in use before you left?

A I don't believe so. We may have gotten one or two to

experiment with, but I don't believe so.

Q Okay. Did the Secretary have a desktop computer in her

office?

A I don't know.

Q You don't recall ever being called up there to work on it?

A No. No.

Q Would it be you or office who would be

called upon if Secretary Clinton had a problem with any of her personal

devices or mobile devices?

A That would have been the correct place to go, but it depends

on what the problem was and if somebody else could help, another

level --

Q And reported to you?

A Yes.

Q Okay. At any time in your tenure as the director, did

ever report to you that she was fixing any type of device

or monitoring any type of device for the Secretary?

A Not that I recall.

Q I'm going to ask a couple questions about managing

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electronic documents in general.

So someone creates a memo on their computer and they put it in

a directory. Did the systems for the seventh floor principals allow

staff to access directories and emails and things like that? I mean,

can you set up permissions to allow other people to have access to your

directories so that they can assist you in the execution of your duties?

A Yes.

Q Okay. How broadly could that be done? Could you do it as

broadly as you wanted or was there a finite number? Were there any

restrictions on the number of individuals that you could select to have

permissions?

A I don't know that.

Q Okay. So were you aware of whether there were any

designated individuals, such as special assistants, that were charged

with managing Secretary Clinton's documents and other electronic

information?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. What about for the other seventh floor principals,

for the deputy secretaries and for the under secretaries?

A I don't know factually if they did.

Q Who would have been in charge of setting up these

permissions, if you will, to allow special assistants or other staff

members to have access to directories and email accounts, calendars,

and the like?

A Our help desk could assist in giving guidance on how that's

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done.

Q And who was in charge of your help desk in 2011, 2012?

A Let's see. That would have been -- at the time I left it

was . In 2011 it would have been someone different,

and it just escapes me right now. I don't remember his last

name. He was the team leader over Mobile Solutions' help desk.

Q Okay. Good enough for 3 years down the road.

A Thank you.

Q Without describing how it was done, did the State Department

receive any type of assistance from other government agencies, such

as the NSA, other intelligence agencies, to assist in the monitoring

of its technology systems for possible breaches, intrusions, or

attempted intrusions?

A I don't know.

Q Who would know within the State Department?

A Probably Diplomatic Security.

Q How long have you been in the -- how long were you

professionally in the IT field?

A I started, roughly, 1987.

Q And what's your educational background? Was it in the

technology sciences or romance literature or --

A Actually, I was an English major.

Q You were?

A I was. And I got my undergraduate degree, and then I went

back when I transitioned into IT and took some IT courses just at the

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local university. And then later on I went to -- I did a few courses

at George Washington University, graduate level. I didn't complete

that. And then I went to National Defense University.

Q I'm sorry, national what university?

A Defense University. And they had liaison programs with

other universities. I earned a half a master's degree there and a CI

certificate and then went to Syracuse University and finished my

master's there in management information systems.

Q It's a far cry from being an English major in college. And

what intrigued you about information management that took you in that

direction? I would much rather read books all day.

A Being honest, I just kind of fell into the field because

they needed people. And where I was in the secretariat I saw a great

opportunity to be at the beginning of bringing up systems, and it was

a whole different -- the nature of systems changed during that time.

Q And approximately when did you complete your master's?

A I completed my master's in -- from Syracuse, it would have

been around 2004 or 2005, roughly.

Q So you've had sort of ongoing and continuous education?

A Exactly, yeah.

Q Do you have an opinion as to whether the use of a personal

email account on a private server put Secretary Clinton's information

at greater risk of being hacked, intercepted, or monitored than would

her use of a State Department account on its networks?

A Would you repeat that?

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Q Do you have an opinion or belief that the use of a personal

email account on a private server put Secretary Clinton's electronic

information at greater risk of being hacked, intercepted, or monitored

than if she had used a State Department-issued device on the State

Department networks?

A I don't know.

Q Who do you think would have an opinion as to that within

the State Department?

A Probably Diplomatic Security.

Q Is there a particular part or component of Diplomatic

Security that deals with cyber intrusions?

A Yes.

Q So that office?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. We've talked about some of the monitoring that goes

on with the State Department networks. Are these the same networks

that monitor BlackBerry transmissions, iPhone transmissions, or do

they just monitor what I would call the intranet of the State

Department?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Did you or any of the offices that you supervise

advise the seventh floor principals regarding security risks when they

traveled overseas with respect to use of technology?

A Somebody on my staff?

Q Uh-huh.

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A There was a security officer assigned to the Bureau, and

that person, my understanding is, specifically for travel would advise

principals about the risk overseas.

Q So you said there's a security person on the Bureau?

A At the Bureau level assigned to the Executive Office.

Q In what bureau?

A S/ES-EX, Executive Secretariat, Executive Office. And

then that's a -- is it BSO, bureau security officer, something like

that -- and they would be the ones to -- sometimes we worked with

them -- to flesh things out. They would be the ones liaisoning, is

my understanding, with the principals.

Q In 2011, 2012, do you recall who that individual was?

A The name escapes me. I know what he looks like, but I

can't --

Q It was a "him"?

A Yes.

Q Did your office or any of the offices that you supervise

ever issue different devices to any of the seventh floor principals

when they undertook foreign travel for security reasons? For example,

a clean BlackBerry, a clean laptop?

A I would say probably. I don't know any specifics, but

probably.

Q Would that be the Mobile Solutions unit?

A Mobile Solutions, yes.

Q Are you aware of whether travel to certain countries poses

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a higher risk of cyber intrusion, cyber attack than other countries?

A It does.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I am going to hand you another exhibit. Only two?

Shocking. How is that possible? And I have put before you something

from chapter 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and particularly

if I could direct your attention to section 1236.22, which is there,

and in particular on the back page, on the page marked as 884, subsection

(b). If you could read that particular sentence or paragraph. It's

just one sentence.

Mr. Turk. What's this from?

Ms. Jackson. The Code of Federal Regulations, 36 CFR 1236.22.

Mr. Does it start off "Agencies that maintain"?

Ms. Jackson. Uh-huh.

Mr. Evers. Is there a date on the regulation, Sharon? Or do you

know the date?

Ms. Jackson. It became effective in 2009, I do know the date.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I'm going to read from subparagraph (b) of 36 CFR section

1236.22, subsection (b), which says, I quote, "Agencies that allow

employees to send and receive official electronic mail messages using

a system not operated by the agency must ensure that Federal records

sent or received on such systems are preserved in the appropriate agency

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recordkeeping system," end quote. Do you see that?

A I do. I was reading along with you.

Q Do you recall that this was in effect since 2009, and thus

in effect during Secretary Clinton's tenure?

A I don't know. That's actually outside my area of

expertise.

Q Okay. Were you asked in any way to ensure or assist in

ensuring that email traffic and messages used on her private server

that contained Federal records were preserved in the appropriate agency

recordkeeping system?

A No.

Q Apart from this regulation, do you recall whether the State

Department had any policies in place that prohibited or discouraged

the use of personal email accounts for official business?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. We did look at one, which was exhibit 1, 12 FAM

544.3, that was discouraging the use of personal email accounts, was

it not?

A As it's written, but I believe in that it also said if you

needed to go outside those, here's what you needed to do.

Q And that was to use the --

A Hence PKI.

Q -- get the PKI?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were there other mechanisms in which the Department

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communicated its discouragement of using personal email accounts to

conduct official business?

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I don't believe the witness has actually

testified that they, quote, "discouraged the use of personal email

accounts."

Ms. Jackson. If you think another word is appropriate, you

should feel free to supply that word.

Mr. Turk. Can you ask the question again?

Mr. Yeah, ask it again.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Tell you what, let me ask it this way. During your tenure

with the State Department, did occasionally cables go out advising the

employees of the State Department regarding the appropriate use of

information technology systems?

A I believe so.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Jackson. Okay. I've marked something as Exhibit 3, and if

you would like to take a look at that. We can go off the record for

a minute.

[Witness reading document.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Let's go back on the record.

Exhibit 3 that has been put before you is a cable issued by the

State Department that I believe is numbered 11 STATE 65111. Is that

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the number of the cable, the top number?

A It is.

Q And it was issued on June 28th, 2011. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And did it go to everyone within the State

Department?

A On the action line it does say "All Diplomatic and Consular

Posts Collective," so it should have been available to everyone.

Q Okay. So it would have been a directive applicable to

everyone?

A As it's written. As it's written, it would be applicable

to the State Department.

Q And what is the subject of this cable? What is on the

subject line?

A "Securing Personal E-mail Accounts."

Q Okay. I would like to direct your attention to the bottom

of the cable under subsection (e), where it states -- -- I'm sorry,

subsection (d), where it states, quote, "Avoid conducting official

Department business from your personal e-mail accounts," end quote.

Do you see that?

A I do.

Q Do you remember this cable?

A I don't.

Q Okay. As you've read it and reviewed it, did it refresh

your recollection as to what happened that precipitated the issuance

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of this cable?

A I don't.

Q Let me read paragraph 2 to you, and I quote: "Recently,

Google has asserted that online adversaries are targeting the personal

Gmail accounts of U.S. Government employees," end quote.

Do you recall that that was an issue in 2011, that there were

attempted intrusions into -- intrusions or attempted intrusions or

hacked into personal email accounts of Google?

A I don't know that specifically.

Q Do you recall whether or not you or any of your staff or

any of those that you supervised took any actions in response to this?

Did your mobile security unit have any meetings with the seventh floor

principals or their staff regarding this?

A Not that I can recall.

Q Okay. But it does advise that Department employees are to

avoid conducting official business from their personal email accounts,

does it not?

A That's how it's written, yes.

Q Okay. Was that admonishment to avoid conducting official

business from personal email accounts sound advice, in your opinion?

A As it's written, yes.

Q Okay. As you look at this cable, were there any groups of

people that were excluded from its mandate or directive?

A No, because the first sentence is "Department of State

users."

1382
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Q Do you recall that the inspector general issued a report

in 2012 regarding the embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, in which the Ambassador

was criticized in part for establishing a commercial email system at

the embassy and not using the State Department system?

A I don't recall.

Q You don't recall that?

A No.

Q You don't recall any discussions generating from that

report?

A I don't recall.

Q As the IT director for the Executive Secretariat, were you

or any office that you supervised involved in the search of electronic

records of the Secretary and other principals in response to

congressional inquiries or FOIA requests or litigation-related

requests?

A On occasion.

Q And how would that come to your attention?

A That would usually be a tasking from the -- talking about

FOIA requests -- from the Office of Administration, I believe, the

documents section, because they would ask us to search our system for

documents. But it would also come through our records officer on the

seventh floor because he would be the one who we would assist and give

him the information.

Q Okay. About how often would that occur?

A I don't know. It could be -- I just -- I don't even have

1383
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a guess.

Mr. Turk. Can I clarify one thing, whether you were talking about

FOIA or litigation or congressional investigations?

Ms. Jackson. All of the above.

Mr. Turk. Okay. Any?

Ms. Jackson. Any of them.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Does your answer change whether it's a FOIA request or --

A No, I don't recall the frequency of how often we got these.

I think sometimes it could be more than less, but what that is I don't

recall.

Q And who under your supervision would have been tasked with

fulfilling that or who would have received the tasking from the FOIA

office or Legislative Affairs or whomever sent it?

A Probably our administrative team.

Q And, again, was that whose last name I cannot

pronounce?

A Yes,

Q Okay.

Following the attacks on the diplomatic facilities in Benghazi,

Libya, the Secretary convened an Accountability Review Board. Were

you or anyone under your supervision tasked with looking for records

of the seventh floor principals in response to that ARB?

A I don't know that.

Q Do you recall that happening?

1384
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A I don't. I was one foot out the door in September of 2012.

Q Were you retired in place in September 2012?

A No, no, no, no. I'm not one of those. Oh, no. No, I

wasn't retired in place. But I just had a little leave to use, and

then I went to the retirement seminar. So --

Q So you were not at the State Department on a day-to-day

basis?

A Not in October. In September, I know I took a week's leave

the end of September, so I don't -- I think a lot of it -- I was

transitioning to a deputy, meaning until they filled the position for

someone filling in and briefing them.

Q Who took your place?

A Who got the position?

Q Uh-huh.

A A gentleman named . He's now the director.

Q Okay. So you don't -- ARBs are unusual. They don't happen

very often. But you don't recall any one of your units being tasked

with looking for records responsive to the ARB?

A I don't know.

Q Did your office play any role -- let me start again. When

a seventh floor principal would leave the State Department, we talked

before about whether your office played any role in taking a snapshot

of their electronic records, and I believe you said there was a snapshot

taken of their at least in-box. Is that correct?

A Yes.

1385
69

Q And remind me again what your answer was regarding whether

their directory or other type of electronic records were retained or

maintained?

A I don't know that answer.

Q And, again, who would have been tasked with that?

A Our administrative team.

Q Okay. When you retired, was a snapshot of your electronic

account, email account, or records created?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. Did you do that?

A I don't do it. Our administrative team would have done that

upon my departure.

Q Okay. And do you know how extensive that snapshot was of

what they took a snapshot of your records when you left?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Do you recall whether you had to sign any type of

separation statement when you left the State Department certifying that

all official records were left with the State Department?

A I don't recall.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Let me show you an example of one, and let me show you what

I've marked as Exhibit 4 and see if perhaps seeing one might jog a memory

as to whether you filled out such a statement.

1386
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A It actually looks like a very old form because the first

USIA went away in the 1990s. State-USIA Separation Statement, and the

very first says, "I make the following statement in connection with

my separation from employment in the Department of State of the United

States Information Agency."

Q So you think if this form still exists --

A This is old.

Q -- it may exist in an updated form?

A Perhaps.

Q Okay.

A And I did a security debrief, so I don't know if this would

be very similar with that. When you go outside, you have to leave the

stuff inside, you know. So I don't -- I may have done this, but I don't

know for sure. And like I say, this looks like a very old, and it could

have been updated. I just don't -- I don't know in my exit.

Q Do you recall during your exit process whether you received

any briefing from anyone affiliated with the records management

division about leaving behind the official records of the State

Department or ensuring that --

A Not that I recall. I didn't do records, I didn't do policy

stuff, so I'm not sure how germane that would have been to me.

Ms. Jackson. I believe that is all the questions that I have.

I see that it is 4:20. I have not taken an entire hour, I'm pleased

to say, for you and for me and for my colleagues in this room. So why

don't we go off the record, take another short break, and we will turn

1387
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it over to our colleagues.

[Recess.]

Ms. Sawyer. We can go back on the record. It's 4:30.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. BOYD:

Q So my name is Krista Boyd. Again, I'm with the minority

staff. Thank you again for being here. It's been a couple hours now,

we haven't talked yet.

You described your professional history, but I have to admit, I'm

not sure I remember exactly where you were when, so if you could help

me out. Were you working in IT at the time that former Secretary Powell

was in office?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you know whether Secretary Powell used an

official email account during his tenure?

A I don't know that for sure. I don't know.

Q Okay. This is a followup that you also may not know, but

do you know if he was issued an official email account?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Secretary Powell has talked about the fact that he

used personal email for official business during his tenure. Are you

aware of whether anyone in your office was consulted before he set up

his personal email account or started using it for official business?

A No, I'm not aware.

Q Do you recall whether Secretary Powell had a computer in

1388
72

his office?

A I believe he did.

Q Okay. He has talked about -- in his autobiography he talks

about actually setting up a laptop in his office in addition to his

State Department computer. Do you have any recollection of him having

a laptop in his office?

A I don't remember that.

Q Okay. Were you aware of whether Secretary Powell was -- at

the time, during his tenure -- was he using any kind of particular

security software protections on his laptop?

A I don't know that. I don't know.

Q Okay. Do you know whether Secretary Powell used any kind

of mobile device?

A I don't know, no.

Q All right. Let's move to former Secretary Rice.

A Okay.

Q Do you know, during her term in office, whether she

had -- whether she used an official email account?

A I believe she did.

Q Okay.

A I don't know that for sure, but I just -- I believe that

she had an account.

Q Do you have any -- go ahead.

A No, that's all. That's all.

Q Okay. Do you have any recollections of an official account

1389
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being set up for her?

A I don't.

Q Do you recall whether former Secretary Rice had a computer

in her office?

A I don't recall.

Q Do you remember whether Secretary Rice used any kind of

mobile device?

A I believe she did.

Q Do you remember what kind of device she might have used?

A I believe we were using BlackBerrys then.

Q Do you recall any other kind of mobile device she might have

used?

A I don't.

Q And do you have any specific recollection of whether she

was using a BlackBerry, what kind of email it would have had on it,

like whether she would have been using an official account or a personal

account?

A I don't know that. I don't know.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So I was going to ask you to take a look back at one of the

exhibits that you were shown during the prior round. And I'm going

to ask you to take a look at what was marked for identification purposes

as exhibit 1, which on its front says "12 FAM 540 Sensitive But

Unclassified Information (SBU)."

A Okay.

1390
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Q So you had a fair amount of discussion about section 12 FAM

544.3 that starts on page 5 of that exhibit. I wanted to ask you a

couple of questions about what is -- it looks like paragraph c of 12

FAM 544.3, and I'll just read that first sentence. "Employees should

be aware that transmissions from the Department's OpenNet to and from

non-U.S. Government Internet addresses, and other .gov or .mil

addresses, unless specifically directed through an approved secure

means, traverse the Internet unencrypted."

I am not a technology person at all, so I need your help in

understanding exactly what this means. So if I am -- and let's just

take Secretary Rice for an example. If she did, indeed, have an

official email account at State.gov, if someone sent her an email that

came from outside that government Internet address, like from a Gmail

account, or a personal server or some different server, would that have

traversed the Internet unencrypted to get to her?

A You said from a Gmail account or --

Q Yeah, anything that is to and from non-U.S. Government

Internet addresses.

A Okay.

Q So we can take Gmail.

A I don't know for sure. I don't believe there's any

encryption on the Gmail. It's just a guess, though.

Q So something that someone sent her that was sent from their

personal, nongovernment Internet address, a Gmail account, a Yahoo!

account, a personal server, personal account, would have traversed to

1391
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her or anyone else sitting in the government unencrypted?

A Assuming they had encryption software on their device, if

they had encryption software, then --

Q So the originating -- it's possible that the originating

server for a personal email would have --

A Possibly.

Q -- an encryption mechanism?

A [Nonverbal response.]

Q But there would be no way for you to know?

A I wouldn't know that, no. I wouldn't know that.

Q And if she then hit reply and said, "Thanks for sending,

this is useful," her reply to a nongovernment email address would have

traversed, even from a State.gov address, would have traversed the

Internet unencrypted?

A I don't know. I don't know.

Q So just in terms of emails to and from individuals who are

not within the State system, the risk of it passing over the Internet

unencrypted is potentially the same whether or not you are receiving

it -- let's just take a concrete example. If I, Heather Sawyer, at

a Gmail.com address send to Secretary Clinton an email, and she gets

it at a SecretaryClinton@state.gov, there is a risk, unless my account

has encryption, that it passed unencrypted. Is that true?

A To her account, that description sounds like a yes.

Q And there would potentially be a risk that if I sent it to

Secretary Clinton, not at a State.gov account, but at a Clinton.email

1392
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server, there is also a risk that it could pass unencrypted unless my

server had an encryption?

A The way you painted it, yes.

Q So there is, in essence, the same risk whether I am emailing

her as someone outside the government using a nongovernment Internet

address that it will pass unencrypted?

A I believe so.

Q And that would be true -- it's not just something like a

Gmail, right? It says, "and other .gov or .mil addresses." So if I'm

sitting in Congress and I'm Heather Sawyer and I send an email to

Secretary Clinton at State.gov, there is also a chance it's going to

pass unencrypted even though I'm sending it to her official account.

Is that correct?

A Yes, sounds that way.

Q Now, you indicated, I think, something that could

potentially mitigate that, which is if my email server that I am

personally using has an encryption device. Now, you answered a number

of questions in the last hour that I think made it very clear, but I

just want to make it additionally clear for the record, you don't know

one way or the other whether the device that Secretary -- a server -- I

think it was called a server at sometimes, it was called a network at

others -- a server or network she may have been using had any kind of

an encryption mechanism.

A I don't know that answer.

Q And I'd just direct your attention back to exhibit 1 on page

1393
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6 of that document, there's a subsection h. I'll just give you a moment

to read that.

I'm just going to read, the first sentence says, "All users who

process SBU information on personally owned computers must ensure that

these computers will provide adequate and appropriate security for that

information."

Now, again, this deals specifically with SBU, which is sensitive

but unclassified. That certainly doesn't mean every communication

that occurs from a computer either at State or here it's talking about

personally owned. So this is specific to SBU, is that accurate?

A Yes.

Q So with regard to that particular class, it does certainly

contemplate the notion that someone is going to potentially use a

personally owned computer, does it not?

A The way it's written, yes.

Q And the term is, "All users who process SBU

information...must ensure." As it reads, it would indicate to me that

that is placing on the individual user a responsibility to make sure

that these steps have been taken. Do you think that's a fair reading?

A I would agree with that.

Q And it has, I think, four particular things that it asks

the user to determine. Number one is disabling unencrypted wireless

access. Two is maintenance of adequate physical security. Three, use

of antivirus and spyware software. And then, four, ensuring all

operating systems and other software security patches, virus

1394
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definitions, firewall version updates, and spyware definitions are

current.

So with regard to those four things that it asks the user to do,

you do not know, do you, whether Secretary Clinton had, indeed, taken

these steps with regard to any personal computers?

A I don't know. I don't know that.

Q So it's very possible that she had completed all of these,

you just don't know one way or the other?

A I don't know.

Q And the same would certainly be true of former Secretary

Powell if he had been using a personal computer and he had, as the user,

undertaken these or similar steps, you just wouldn't know one way or

another on that?

A I don't know that.

Q Now, one other, I think, pretty quick. And then I just

wanted you to take a look at what has previously been marked as exhibit

2 for identification purposes, and that was a provision of the CFR.

And you had been asked to take a look at page 884, subsection (b) by

my colleague. And I think you made this clear earlier, I just want

to make sure I am particularly clear. That provision talks about

ensuring that Federal records sent or received are preserved.

Your role, duties as the head of IT or involved in IT before that

did not involve preservation of Federal records specifically, did it?

A No.

Q And then that, on its face, I think my colleague read it

1395
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to you, but it says, "Agencies that allow employees to send and receive

official electronic mail messages using a system not operated by the

agency must ensure that Federal records sent or received on such systems

are preserved in the appropriate agency recordkeeping system."

So, again, understanding you're not a Federal records officer --

A Officer, yes.

Q -- on its face it at least contemplates that an agency would

allow or that it happens that employees send and receive official

electronic mail messages using a system not operated by the agency.

A The way it's written, it does.

Q And I think there was some question about whether or not

this could be or should be perceived as encouraging, discouraging, or

otherwise making a statement about the use of a personal email address

or a personal server. To me this reads as a statement of fact, not

a statement of encouragement or discouragement. Would you agree?

A And when you say statement of fact, the entire paragraph

there or --

Q Yes, and only that paragraph, that it says agencies that

allow employees to send and receive must take certain steps to make

sure Federal records are preserved. A statement of fact, asking them

to do that.

A I am not an expert, but it sounds like it would be a fact.

BY MS. BOYD:

Q Returning to the issue of sensitive but unclassified

information, what I heard you describe earlier is that the State

1396
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Department has two systems, one for classified information and then

one for unclassified information.

A Correct.

Q So would sensitive but unclassified information be

contained in the system for unclassified information?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So there not like a -- there's not a third system?

A A third system, no.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And just to be clear, that was true for the S/ES system that

was not fully part of the broader IRM?

A That we have on the seventh floor, then it would be --

Q That there would both be a classified and an unclassified?

A Yes, and an unclassified, that's correct.

Q And the SBU, for purposes of that S/ES separate, would

traverse and be included in the unclassified?

A In the unclassified.

Ms. Boyd. I want to go back to just a couple things that you said

much earlier, just to make sure we're completely clear on the record

about what you have direct personal knowledge of.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Boyd. One of the things you were asked about, whether there

were, I'm paraphrasing, but whether there are 24/7 cyber intrusion

protection efforts. It would actually be -- and you said, you imagine

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that there would be, but I just want to make clear because that actually

would be rather surprising during that time period had there been

because most agencies are just now moving toward that. Those of us

who work in this area, much to our frustration, we seem to have been

a little slow in that area. So I just wanted to --

Ms. Jackson. You know, we're going to object to that. That's

adding information to the record that may or may not be accurate.

Ms. Boyd. I will say some people -- some people, some Members

of Congress have raised concerns about the pace of agency compliance

with moving toward around-the-clock protection.

So I just want to ask whether you have direct personal knowledge

of whether the State Department during -- I think the time period you

were speaking of then was 2011, 2012 -- whether they had

around-the-clock --

Mr. I don't know.

Ms. Boyd. -- cyber intrusion protection.

Mr. I don't know.

BY MS. BOYD:

Q Okay. And then another area where you -- you talked about

encryption. And then you said, at least as I wrote it down, you said

you believe so, that the State Department systems are encrypted.

Do you have direct personal knowledge about which systems may or

may not have been encrypted and how they were encrypted?

A I believe I answered that just in a general sense, that the

unclassified system would have some encryption available on it. But

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I don't -- I don't have -- are you talking about the architecture or

the software or --

Q Any of it.

A I don't --

Q Yeah, I mean, like, whether there were certain programs that

did and certain, you know, systems or records that didn't or --

A I don't know that.

Q Okay, thank you.

Just generally, I guess I'm interested in hearing your

perspective, in your experience, whether agency systems can sometimes

be vulnerable to outside intrusion, that even if whatever protections

are in place, in your experience, were there times where there were

security incidents, IT-related security incidents?

A I would imagine there were. I just don't have a specific

example at my fingertips. I don't.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q I think right now we're living in the world of the OPM's

recent incident, right?

A Oh, yes.

Q So I feel like we're all very cognizant of the dangers of --

A Continually targeting.

Q -- of even government systems, right? So, I mean, can

government systems be vulnerable to attack, I guess is the question.

A Sure.

Q And sometimes they can actually be successfully attacked,

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regardless of the fact that they're government systems?

A Sure.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q You did mention when you were answering that question that

there's the potential also for targeting. Is it the case that

government --

A For targeting?

Q Targeting for attack. I'm sorry, I apologize.

A That's okay.

Q I thought you said that -- and maybe you didn't.

In your experience, was there the potential that official

government accounts and servers would be targeted specifically for

potential hacking by outside entities?

A Yes, I'm sure they would.

BY MS. BOYD:

Q I'm now going to ask you a series of questions that we're

asking all witnesses.

A Okay.

Q If you can just please speak to whatever you have personal

knowledge of.

A Okay.

Q I'm not asking you to speculate in these questions?

A Okay.

Q This is now the eighth congressional investigation into the

Benghazi attacks, and we want to make sure that this is the last one.

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We are therefore asking every witness about a series of public

allegations that have been made since the attack. It is our

understanding that even whether these questions have been answered by

other investigations, our colleagues in the majority are pursuing these

allegations, and so we want to ask about them.

While anyone can speculate about the Benghazi attacks, and plenty

of people have, only a limited universe of people have actual knowledge

or evidence of what happened before, during, and after the attacks.

What I'm asking here is, again, not for your opinion, but just what

you have firsthand information of. There are about a dozen of these

questions, so please bear with me as I go through them. If you need

me to repeat any of them, let me know.

A Okay.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attack. One

Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta

to stand down, and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending

more assets to help in Benghazi. Do you have any evidence that

Secretary of State Clinton ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to

stand down on the night of the attack?

A I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attack?

A I do not.

1401
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Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims. Do you have any evidence that

Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying

security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011. Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton

misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi

to his own people in order to garner support for military operations

in Libya in spring 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms

from Libya to Syria and that they found no support for this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

1402
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Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A Could you just read that again? My mind wandered a little

bit.

Q Sure. I won't take it personally.

A Okay.

Q Do you have any evidence to contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was

not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to stand down, but that instead there were tactical disagreements on

the ground over how quickly to depart. Do you have any evidence that

would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's finding that there

was no stand-down ordered to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

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decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask you these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA faithfully performed our duties in

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accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship. Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director

Mike Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to

Congress about the Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks. Do you have any evidence that Ambassador

Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on

the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was, quote, "missing in action." Do you have any evidence

to support the allegation that the President was virtually AWOL as

Commander in Chief or missing in action on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain

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in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," unquote. Do you have any evidence to contradict the

conclusion of the House Armed Services Committee that there was no

stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who

sought to join the fight in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of

the attacks, after which he stated, "Given where the troops were, how

quickly the things all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did," unquote. Do you have

any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives, but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided

not to deploy?

A No.

Ms. Boyd. Thank you.

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Ms. Sawyer. Thank you. I think that concludes the questions

that we had for you this afternoon. Again, we really do appreciate

you taking the time, your willingness to appear voluntarily, and for

your service for so many years with the government.

Mr. Sure. Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. We do appreciate it very much. So thank you.

Ms. Jackson. We join in thanking you.

Mr. Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. We can go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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12 FAM 540

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION (SBU)

(CT:DS-190; 03-05-2013)

(Office of Origin: DS/SI/IS)

12 FAM 541 SCOPE

(CT:DS-190; 03-05-2013)

a. Sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information is information that is not classified

for national security reasons, but that warrants/requires administrative control

and protection from public or other unauthorized disclosure for other reasons.

SBU should meet one or more of the criteria for exemption from public

disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (which also exempts

information protected under other statutes), 5 U.S.C. 552, or should be

protected by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a.

b. Types of unclassified information to which SBU is typically applied include all

FOIA exempt categories (ref. 5 U.S.C. 552b), for example:

(1) Personnel, payroll, medical, passport, adoption, and other personal

information about individuals, including social security numbers and home

addresses and including information about employees as well as members

of the public;

(2) Confidential business information, trade secrets, contractor bid or proposal

information, and source selection information;

(3) Department records pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas, other

permits to enter the United States, and requests for asylum;

(4) Law enforcement information or information regarding ongoing

investigations;

(5) Information illustrating or disclosing infrastructure protection

vulnerabilities, or threats against persons, systems, operations, or facilities

(such as, usernames, passwords, physical, technical or network specifics,

and in certain instances, travel itineraries, meeting schedules or

attendees), but not meeting the criteria for classification under Executive

Order (EO) 13526, dated December 29, 2009;

(6) Information not customarily in the public domain and related to the

protection of critical infrastructure assets, operations, or resources,

whether physical or cyber, as defined in the Homeland Security Act, 6

EXHIBIT 1

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U.S.C. 131(c);

(7) Design and construction information;

(a) Certain information relating to the design and construction of

diplomatic missions abroad, such as graphic depictions of floor plans

and specifications for foreign affairs offices and representational

housing overseas, as outlined in the DS Security Classification Guide

for the Design and Construction of Overseas Facilities, dated May

2003; and

(b) Certain information relating to the design and construction drawings

and specifications of General Service Administration (GSA) facilities, as

outlined in GSA Order PBS 3490.1A, dated June 1, 2009.

(8) Privileged attorney-client communications (relating to the provision of legal

advice) and documents constituting attorney work product (created in

reasonable anticipation of litigation); and

(9) Inter or intra-agency communications, including emails, that form part of

the internal deliberative processes of the U.S. Government, the disclosure

of which could harm such processes.

c. Designation of information as SBU is important to indicate that the information

requires a degree of protection and administrative control but the SBU label

does not by itself exempt information from disclosure under the FOIA (5 U.S.C.

552b). Rather, exemption is determined based on the nature of the

information in question.

12 FAM 542 IMPLEMENTATION

(CT:DS-117; 11-04-2005)

This policy is effective 11-04-2005.

12 FAM 543 ACCESS, DISSEMINATION, AND

RELEASE

(CT:DS-161; 03-01-2011)

a. U.S. citizen direct-hire supervisory employees are ultimately responsible for

access, dissemination, and release of SBU material. All employees will limit

access to protect SBU information from unauthorized or unintended disclosure.

b. In general, employees may circulate SBU material within the Executive Branch,

including to locally employed staff (LE staff), where necessary to carry out

official U.S. Government functions. However, additional restrictions may apply

to particular types of SBU information by virtue of specific laws, regulations, or

international or interagency agreements. Information protected under the

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Privacy Act, can only be distributed within the Department of State on a “needto-know” basis and cannot be distributed outside the Department of State

except as permitted by specific statutory exemptions or “routine uses”

established by the Department of State.

c. Before distributing any SBU information, employees must be sure that such

distribution is permissible and, when required, specifically authorized. (See 5

FAM 470.)

d. SBU information must be marked whenever practical to make the recipient

aware of specific controls. While some documentation, such as standard forms

and medical records, does not lend itself to marking, many documents, such as

emails, cables, and memoranda, can, and must be marked in accordance with 5

FAM 751.3, 5 FAH 1 H-200 and 5 FAH-1 H 135.

e. SBU information that is not to be released to non-U.S. citizens, including locally

employed staff, must be marked SBU/NOFORN (Not for release to foreign

nationals (NOFORN)). The specific requirements for SBU/NOFORN are

identified in 12 FAM 545.

f. Information obtained from or exchanged with a foreign government or

international organization as to which public release would violate conditions of

confidentiality or otherwise harm foreign relations must be classified in order to

be exempt from release under FOIA or other access laws. The SBU label

cannot be used instead of classification to protect such information.

g. Where an individual has expressly authorized his or her personal information to

be sent unencrypted over any unsecured electronic medium, such as the

Internet, fax transmission, or wireless phone, such information may be

transmitted without regard to the provisions and policies set forth in this

subchapter. See 5 FAH-4, H-442 for guidance on obtaining an individual’s

authorization to transmit personal information in this manner.

12 FAM 544 SBU HANDLING PROCEDURES

(CT:DS-117; 11-04-2005)

a. Regardless of method, the handling, processing, transmission and/or storage of

SBU information should be effected through means that limit the potential for

unauthorized disclosure.

b. Employees while in travel status or on temporary duty (TDY) assignment should

ensure that SBU is adequately safeguarded from unauthorized access in light of

the threat conditions and nature of the SBU (see 12 FAM 544.1 d.) (This

applies regardless of whether the information is being transported in paper

form, CDs, diskettes and other electronic readable media, or on a portable

digital device; such as a laptop, wireless or wired, or PDA.)

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12 FAM 544.1 Fax Transmission, Mailing,

Safeguarding/Storage, and Destruction of SBU

(CT:DS-117; 11-04-2005)

a. Unintended recipients can intercept SBU information transmitted over

unencrypted electronic point-to-point links, such as Voice over Internet Protocol

methodology (VoIP), telephones or faxes.

b. Employees transmitting SBU information should consider whether specific

information warrants a higher level of protection accorded by a secure fax,

phone, or other encrypted means of communication. Employees transmitting

SBU information via non-secure fax must ensure that an authorized recipient is

ready to receive it at the other end.

c. SBU information may be sent via the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) or a

commercial delivery service, e.g., Fed Ex, DHL. SBU information, except

SBU/NOFORN, (see 12 FAM 545) mailed to posts abroad should be sent via

unclassified registered pouch or to a Military Postal Facility (MPF) via USPS,

whenever practicable. Use of foreign mail services is authorized, if required.

Except in those cases where the pouch is utilized, mail must be packaged in a

way that does not disclose its contents or the fact that it is SBU.

d. During non-duty hours, SBU information and removable electronic media in

U.S. Government facilities must be secured within a locked office or suite, or

secured in a locked container. Employees in possession of SBU outside U.S.

Government facilities must take adequate precautions that afford positive

accountability of the information and to protect SBU information from

unauthorized access such as storage in a locked briefcase or desk in a home

office. SBU should not be left unsecured (e.g. lock in room safe) in unoccupied

hotel rooms or unattended in other public spaces.

e. Custodians of medically privileged information must ensure that it is secured

when not in use.

f. Destroy SBU documents by shredding or burning, or by other methods

consistent with law or regulation.

12 FAM 544.2 Automated Information System (AIS)

Processing and Transmission

(CT:DS-117; 11-04-2005)

The requirements for processing SBU information on a Department AIS are

established in 12 FAM 620 and 5 FAM 700. Where warranted by the nature of the

information, employees who will be transmitting SBU information outside of the

Department network on a regular basis to the same official and/or most personal

addresses, should contact IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/PKI to request assistance in providing a

secure technical solution for those transmissions. Availability of a Public Key

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Infrastructure (PKI) solution for a home computer will depend upon the computer's

operating system (e.g., Windows(r) XP). Employees participating in the home PKI

and telework program must complete the requisite training and sign an

acknowledgement statement prior to being issued the approved security

measures/equipment.

12 FAM 544.3 Electronic Transmission Via the Internet

(CT:DS-117; 11-04-2005)

a. It is the Department’s general policy that normal day-to-day operations be

conducted on an authorized AIS, which has the proper level of security control

to provide nonrepudiation, authentication and encryption, to ensure

confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the resident information. The

Department’s authorized telework solution(s) are designed in a manner that

meet these requirements and are not considered end points outside of the

Department’s management control.

b. The Department is expected to provide, and employees are expected to use,

approved secure methods to transmit SBU information when available and

practical.

c. Employees should be aware that transmissions from the Department’s OpenNet

to and from non-U.S. Government Internet addresses, and other .gov or .mil

addresses, unless specifically directed through an approved secure means,

traverse the Internet unencrypted. Therefore, employees must be cognizant of

the sensitivity of the information and mandated security controls, and evaluate

the possible security risks and then decide whether a more secure means of

transmission is warranted (i.e., secure fax, mail or network, etc.)

d. In the absence of a Department-provided secure method, employees with a

valid business need may transmit SBU information over the Internet

unencrypted after carefully considering that:

(1) SBU information within the category in 12 FAM 541b(7)(a) and (b) must

never be sent unencrypted via the Internet;

(2) Unencrypted information transmitted via the Internet is susceptible to

access by unauthorized personnel;

(3) Email transmissions via the Internet generally consist of multipoint

communications that are routed to their destination through the path of

least resistance, which may include multiple foreign and U.S. controlled

Internet service providers (ISP);

(4) Once resident on an ISP server, the SBU information remains until it is

overwritten;

(5) Unencrypted email transmissions are subject to a risk of compromise of

information confidentiality or integrity;

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(6) SBU information resident on personally owned computers connected to the

Internet is generally more susceptible to cyber attacks and/or compromise

than information on government owned computers connected to the

Internet;

(7) The Internet is globally accessed (i.e., there are no physical or traditional

territorial boundaries). Transmissions through foreign ISPs or servers can

magnify these risks; and

(8) Current technology can target specific email addresses or suffixes and

content of unencrypted messages.

e. SBU information must not be posted on any public Internet website, discussed

in a publicly available chat room or any other public forum on the Internet.

f. To preclude inadvertent transmission of SBU information prohibited on the

Internet, AIS users must not use an “auto-forward” function to send emails to

an address outside the Department’s network.

g. SBU information created on or downloaded to publicly available non- U.S.

Government owned computers, such as Internet kiosks, should be removed

when no longer needed.

h. All users who process SBU information on personally owned computers must

ensure that these computers will provide adequate and appropriate security for

that information. This includes:

(1) Disabling unencrypted wireless access;

(2) The maintenance of adequate physical security;

(3) The use of anti-virus and spyware software; and

(4) Ensuring that all operating system and other software security patches,

virus definitions, firewall version updates, and spyware definitions are

current.

12 FAM 544.4 SBU Transmission Between State

Department Facilities

(CT:DS-117; 11-04-2005)

All SBU transmissions between Department facilities must be encrypted to current

NIST, DS, and IT CCB standards.

12 FAM 545 SBU/NOFORN INFORMATION

(CT:DS-117; 11-04-2005)

a. SBU/NOFORN information is information determined by the originator or a

classification guide to be prohibited for dissemination to non-U.S. citizens. It

must be labeled SBU/NOFORN.

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b. As the NOFORN caveat indicates, this type of SBU information warrants a

degree of protection greater than that of standard SBU information. Therefore,

employees must:

(1) Process and transmit SBU/NOFORN information only on a system

authorized by the Department for classified information transmission,

storage and processing;

(2) Fax or discuss (over telephone lines) SBU/NOFORN information only via

encrypted telephone lines;

(3) Mail SBU/NOFORN information to posts via classified pouch or to a MPF via

USPS registered mail. Mail sent via USPS registered must be packaged in a

way that does not disclose its contents or the fact that it is SBU/NOFORN;

(4) Secure SBU/NOFORN information during non-duty hours following the

same guidelines for CONFIDENTIAL information; and

(5) Destroy SBU/NOFORN documents in a Department-approved manner, such

as by shredding, burning, or other methods consistent with law or

regulation for the destruction of classified information.

12 FAM 546 THROUGH 549 UNASSIGNED

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National Archives and Records Administration § 1236.22

electronic records created in them. Retention of record functionality and integrity requires:

(1) Retaining the records in a usable

format until their authorized disposition date. Where migration includes

conversion of records, ensure that the

authorized disposition of the records

can be implemented after conversion;

(2) Any necessary conversion of storage media to provide compatibility

with current hardware and software;

and

(3) Maintaining a link between

records and their metadata through

conversion or migration, including capture of all relevant associated

metadata at the point of migration (for

both the records and the migration

process).

(c) Ensure that migration strategies

address non-active electronic records

that are stored off-line.

Subpart C—Additional Requirements for Electronic Records

§ 1236.20 What are appropriate recordkeeping systems for electronic

records?

(a) General. Agencies must use electronic or paper recordkeeping systems

or a combination of those systems, depending on their business needs, for

managing their records. Transitory email may be managed as specified in

§ 1236.22(c).

(b) Electronic recordkeeping. Recordkeeping functionality may be built

into the electronic information system

or records can be transferred to an

electronic recordkeeping repository,

such as a DoD–5015.2 STD-certified

product. The following functionalities

are necessary for electronic recordkeeping:

(1) Declare records. Assign unique

identifiers to records.

(2) Capture records. Import records

from other sources, manually enter

records into the system, or link records

to other systems.

(3) Organize records. Associate with

an approved records schedule and disposition instruction.

(4) Maintain records security. Prevent

the unauthorized access, modification,

or deletion of declared records, and ensure that appropriate audit trails are

in place to track use of the records.

(5) Manage access and retrieval. Establish the appropriate rights for users to

access the records and facilitate the

search and retrieval of records.

(6) Preserve records. Ensure that all

records in the system are retrievable

and usable for as long as needed to conduct agency business and to meet

NARA-approved dispositions. Agencies

must develop procedures to enable the

migration of records and their associated metadata to new storage media or

formats in order to avoid loss due to

media decay or technology obsolescence.

(7) Execute disposition. Identify and effect the transfer of permanent records

to NARA based on approved records

schedules. Identify and delete temporary records that are eligible for disposal. Apply records hold or freeze on

disposition when required.

(c) Backup systems. System and file

backup processes and media do not provide the appropriate recordkeeping

functionalities and must not be used as

the agency electronic recordkeeping

system.

§ 1236.22 What are the additional requirements for managing electronic

mail records?

(a) Agencies must issue instructions

to staff on the following retention and

management requirements for electronic mail records:

(1) The names of sender and all addressee(s) and date the message was

sent must be preserved for each electronic mail record in order for the context of the message to be understood.

The agency may determine that other

metadata is needed to meet agency

business needs, e.g., receipt information.

(2) Attachments to electronic mail

messages that are an integral part of

the record must be preserved as part of

the electronic mail record or linked to

the electronic mail record with other

related records.

(3) If the electronic mail system identifies users by codes or nicknames or

identifies addressees only by the name

of a distribution list, retain the intelligent or full names on directories or

EXHIBIT 2

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§ 1236.24 36 CFR Ch. XII (7–1–11 Edition)

distributions lists to ensure identification of the sender and addressee(s) of

messages that are records.

(4) Some e-mail systems provide calendars and task lists for users. These

may meet the definition of Federal

record. Calendars that meet the definition of Federal records are to be managed in accordance with the provisions

of GRS 23, Item 5.

(5) Draft documents that are circulated on electronic mail systems

may be records if they meet the criteria specified in 36 CFR 1222.10(b) of

this subchapter.

(b) Agencies that allow employees to

send and receive official electronic

mail messages using a system not operated by the agency must ensure that

Federal records sent or received on

such systems are preserved in the appropriate agency recordkeeping system.

(c) Agencies may elect to manage

electronic mail records with very

short-term NARA-approved retention

periods (transitory records with a very

short-term retention period of 180 days

or less as provided by GRS 23, Item 7,

or by a NARA-approved agency records

schedule) on the electronic mail system itself, without the need to copy

the record to a paper or electronic recordkeeping system, provided that:

(1) Users do not delete the messages

before the expiration of the NARA-approved retention period, and

(2) The system’s automatic deletion

rules ensure preservation of the records

until the expiration of the NARA-approved retention period.

(d) Except for those electronic mail

records within the scope of paragraph

(c) of this section:

(1) Agencies must not use an electronic mail system to store the recordkeeping copy of electronic mail messages identified as Federal records unless that system has all of the features

specified in § 1236.20(b) of this part.

(2) If the electronic mail system is

not designed to be a recordkeeping system, agencies must instruct staff on

how to copy Federal records from the

electronic mail system to a recordkeeping system.

(e) Agencies that retain permanent

electronic mail records scheduled for

transfer to the National Archives must

either store them in a format and on a

medium that conforms to the requirements concerning transfer at 36 CFR

part 1235 or maintain the ability to

convert the records to the required format and medium at the time transfer

is scheduled.

(f) Agencies that maintain paper recordkeeping systems must print and file

their electronic mail records with the

related transmission and receipt data

specified by the agency’s electronic

mail instructions.

§ 1236.24 What are the additional requirements for managing

unstructured electronic records?

(a) Agencies that manage

unstructured electronic records electronically must ensure that the records

are filed in a recordkeeping system

that meets the requirements in

§ 1236.10, except that transitory e-mail

may be managed in accordance with

§ 1236.22(c).

(b) Agencies that maintain paper

files as their recordkeeping systems

must establish policies and issue instructions to staff to ensure that

unstructured records are printed out

for filing in a way that captures any

pertinent hidden text (such as comment fields) or structural relationships

(e.g., among worksheets in spreadsheets or other complex documents) required to meet agency business needs.

§ 1236.26 What actions must agencies

take to maintain electronic information systems?

(a) Agencies must maintain inventories of electronic information systems and review the systems periodically for conformance to established

agency procedures, standards, and policies as part of the periodic reviews required by 44 U.S.C. 3506. The review

should determine if the records have

been properly identified and described,

and if the schedule descriptions and retention periods reflect the current informational content and use. If not,

agencies must submit an SF 115, Request for Records Disposition Authority, to NARA.

(b) Agencies must maintain up-todate documentation about electronic

information systems that is adequate

to:

0 12:12 Sep 29 2011 Jkt 223139 PO 00000 Frm 00894 Fmt 8010 Sfmt 8010 Y:\SGML\223139 XXX 223139

1416
From: svcsmartmfi

Sent: 6/28/2011 6:42:47 PM

To: SMART Core

Subject: Securing Personal E-mail Accounts

UNCLASSIFIED

MRN: 11 STATE 65111

Date/DTG: Jun 28, 2011 / 282223Z JUN 11

From: SECSTATE WASHDC

Action: ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVEROUTINE

E.O.: 13526

TAGS: APCS, ASEC, AADP, AMGT

Subject: Securing Personal E-mail Accounts

UNCLAS STATE 065111

E.O. 13526: N/A

TAGS: APCS, ASEC, AADP, AMGT

SUBJECT: Securing Personal E-mail Accounts

Reference:

A) 12 FAM 544.3

1. Department of State users are encouraged to check the

security settings and change passwords of their home e-mail

accounts because of recent targeting of personal e-mail

accounts by online adversaries. Security guidelines have

been posted on the DS/SI/CS Cyber Security Awareness web page:

https://intranet.ds.state.sbu/DS/SI/CS/Awareness1/Content/Pers

onal%20Email.aspx.

2. Recently, Google asserted that online adversaries are

targeting the personal Gmail accounts of U.S. government

employees. Although the company believes it has taken

appropriate steps to remediate identified activity, users

should exercise caution and follow best practices in order

to protect personal e-mail and prevent the compromise of

government and personal information. The DS/SI/CS Cyber

Security Awareness web site contains guides to help secure

the web-based e-mail accounts of users and their families.

This information can be accessed at:

https://intranet.ds.state.sbu/DS/SI/CS/Awareness1/Content/Pers

onal%20Email.aspx.

3. What can you and your family members do?

(a) Follow the personal e-mail guides posted on the Awareness

site to change your password, to ensure that messages are not

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1 of 2

Page 1 of 2

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT 3

1417
auto-forwarding to an unintended address, and to verify that

other security settings are properly configured.

(b) Beware of e-mail messages that include links to password

reset web pages. These can be easily faked.

(c) Create strong passwords for all of your online accounts,

change them often, and never use the same password for more

than one account.

(d) Avoid conducting official Department business from your

personal e-mail accounts.

(e) Do not reveal your personal e-mail address in your work

"Out of Office" message.

(f) Do not auto-forward Department e-mail to personal e-mail

accounts, which is prohibited by Department policy (12 FAM

544.3).

4. Questions regarding cyber security awareness should be

addressed to awareness@state.gov

CLINTON

Signature: CLINTON

Drafted By: DS/SI/CS: SVAN BRACKLE -- 06/23/11 571-345-2574

Cleared By: DS/DSS:JCULVER, DS/SI: MSHOLLAND, DS/SI/CS: BLITTEER, DS/SI/CS: MCHANDLER,

AF/EX: LANDRE, WHA/EX: JBERTOT, NA-SCA/EX: ATEPLITZ, EUR/EX: JARBIN, EAP/EX:

DCHRISTENSEN, IRM/OPS: STAYLOR, IRM/IA: JSTREUFERT, S/ES-O: NLMACKLIN

Approved By: DS:EBOSWELL

Info:

XMT: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

Attachments: metadata.dat

Action Post:

Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2 of 2

Page 2 of 2

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

1418
I, make the following statement in connection with my

separation from employment in the Department of State of the United States Information Agency. As used herein, the term "employment" includes

all periods of assignment or detail, as well as any periods of temporary, part-time or intermittent employment therein, and the term "separation"

includes suspension for any period in excess of 30 days, retirement from active duty, transfer to another agency, resignation, furlough to enter

military service, etc.

1. I have surrendered to responsible officials all classified or administratively controlled documents and material with which I was charged or which

I had in my possession, and I am not retaining in my possession, custody, or control, documents or material containing classified or administratively

controlled information furnished to me during the course of such employment or developed as a consequence thereof, including any diaries,

memorandums of conversation, or other documents of a personal nature that contain classified or administratively controlled information.

2. I have surrendered to responsible officials all unclassified documents and papers relating to the official business of the Government acquired by

me while in the employ of the Department or USIA.

3. I shall not publish, nor reveal to any person, any classified or administratively controlled information of which I have knowledge, or any other

information transmitted to me in confidence in the course of my official duties, except as may be authorized by officials of the employing

Department or Agency empowered to grant permission for such disclosure.

4. I have been advised by the interviewing officer whose name appears below and understand the criminal penalties relating to U.S. Government

records and information and the use thereof:

(please type or print)

STATE-USIA

SEPARATION STATEMENT

These restrictions are consistent with an do not supersede, conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by

Executive Order 12356; Section 7211 of Title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); Section 1034 of Title 10, United States

Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety

threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government

agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including Sections 641, 793, 794, 798 and

952 of Title 18, United States code, and Section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. Section 783(b)). The definitions,

requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement

and are controlling.

5. I reaffirm that the provisions of the espionage laws, other federal criminal laws and executive orders applicable to the safeguarding of classified

information have been made available to me; that I have returned all classified information in my custody; that I will not communicate or transmit

classified information to any unauthorized person or organization; that I will promptly report to the Federal Bureau of investigation any attempt by an

unauthorized person to solicit classified information, and that I (have)(have not) (strike out inappropriate word or words) received a security

debriefing.

6. I have been advised by the interviewing officer whose signature appears below and fully understand that Section 1001 of Title 18, United States

Code, provides criminal penalties for knowingly and willfully falsifying or concealing material fact in a statement or document submitted to any

department or agency of the United States Government concerning a matter under its jurisdiction.

Title 18, U.S. Code

Section 641 - Public Money, Property or Records

- Gathering, Transmitting or Losing

Defense Information

- Gathering of Delivering Defense

Information to Aid Foreign Govt.

- Disclosure of Classified Information

- Diplomatic Codes and Correspondence

- Disclosure of Confidential Information

- Concealment, Removal, or Mutilation of

Records

793

794

798

952

1905

2071

Title 50, U.S. Code

Title 42, U.S. Code

Section 783 (b) - Communication of Classified Information

by Government Officer or Employee

- Penalties for Violation

- Violation of Specific Sections

- Violation of General Sections

- Communication of Restricted Data

- Receipt of Restricted Data

- Tampering With Restricted Data

- Disclosure of Restricted Data

783(d)

Section 2272

2273

2274

2275

2276

2277

(Signature of Interviewing Officer)

(Date)

(Typed Name of Interviewing Officer)

(Post, Department or Agency)

(Signature in Presence of Interviewing Officer)

(Date of Birth)

(Date Signed)

(Typed Name of Employee)

(Other Names Used During This Period of Employment)

OPTIONAL FORM 109

994

STATE-USIA

EXHIBIT 4

1419

INTERVIEW OF STATE DEPARTMENT

CHIEF RECORDS OFFICER

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JUNE 30, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

KRISTA BOYD, Minority Senior Counsel

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CATHERINE DUVAL, Senior Advisor

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

1422
Ms. JACKSON. All right, good morning. This is a transcribed

interview of * * *, conducted by the House Select Committee on

Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of

the committee’s investigation into the attacks of the U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant to

House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress, and House Resolution

5 of the 114th Congress. Mr. * * *, would you give us your full

name, please.

Mr. * * *.

Ms. JACKSON. And would you spell your last name, please?

Mr. * * *. * * *.

Ms. JACKSON. I knew there was an unusual spelling. So——

Mr. * * *. I like to say I spell it the right way.

Ms. JACKSON. The correct way, okay. Mr. * * *, we appreciate

your voluntarily coming in to talk with us today, and good morning. Again, my name is Sharon Jackson. I am one of the counsels

with the majority staff of this committee. I’m going to ask everybody in the room to go around and introduce themselves so the official reporters can note who is all in the room, and so you have an

idea of who is who today. And the cast of characters. And we will

start with the State Department counsel that has accompanied you

today.

Mr. EVERS. Austin Evers, State Department.

Ms. BOYD. Krista Boyd with the minority staff of the select committee.

Ms. SAWYER. Heather Sawyer, minority.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I’m Susanne Sachsman Grooms with

the minority.

Ms. BETZ. Kim Betz with the majority.

Ms. CLARKE. Sheria Clarke, majority.

Mr. DAVIS. And I’m Carlton Davis, I work for Mr. Gowdy.

Ms. JACKSON. Before we get started here with the questions this

morning, Mr. * * *, as with anything there are procedural rules

and ground rules and things like that so I would like to take a couple of minutes and go over those with you. I’m sure Mr. Evers has

talked to you generally about our process here today. But I want

to go over them with you again.

The way that questioning will proceed is that a member of the

majority, and that will be me to start out with, will ask you questions for up to an hour. And then we will afford our minority colleagues the next hour to ask you questions. In the past we have

deviated from that hour by hour, but that’s—those are our ground

rules that we have agreed to prior to coming in here. So we are

each afforded an equal period of time to ask you questions until we

have exhausted all of our questions. And we have a few for you

today.

Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee, a

Member of Congress assigned to this Committee, or a member of

1423
the staff. And so the people in this room are all authorized to ask

you questions.

Unlike testimony or a deposition that would be used for court,

our committee format is more informal. We are not bound by the

rules of evidence. We can ask your opinion about things. We can

ask you to opine, or speculate about things. We can ask you about

things other people may have discussed with you even though they

are not here in there.

The only thing that we will consider in objections to any of our

questions is one for privilege. And that is something that the chairman of the committee would then review. If any objections cannot

be resolved in this interview, we can ask you to return and then

answer the question at that time.

Members and staff of the Committee are not allowed to raise objections to questions, so it is only you or personal counsel can raise

an objection. This hasn’t been an issue that we have had, but it is

one of the rules that guides our proceedings here today.

We are in an unclassified setting in this room. We don’t expect

to go into any classified information today. We think that all of our

questions and the areas that we want to explore are going to be

in the unclassified realm. However, if you think that any answer

would delve into an area of classified information, just please alert

us to do so. We have other facilities. We would probably have to

recess, and come back at another time to go into that, but again,

we don’t expect to go into any type of classified information here

today.

I would note for the record that Katherine Duvall from the State

Department has entered the room and joined the proceedings here

today.

State Department counsel is here with you today. They are here

representing the State Department, and you are a current employee of the State Department. You are welcome to confer with

them throughout this interview. But if something needs to be clarified, if you don’t understand a question, or you just need to ask it

to be repeated, please ask us to do so. It is very important. We

want you to understand what we are asking before you give an answer, so if you need something repeated, clarified, broken apart because it has too many parts in it, just ask us and we will be happy

to do that.

But if you would like to confer with counsel we will take a break,

go off the record, and afford you a private opportunity to do so. We

will also take a break whenever it is convenient to do for you. So

please don’t hesitate if you need a comfort break, if you need a little more coffee, a little more caffeine to get you a little more juiced

up today. We have water out. I don’t think we will run out, but if

you need more water, just say so.

We usually take a break after every hour of questioning for 10

minutes or so. But if you need one in-between then, just let us

know because we would like you to be as comfortable as possible

in this rather strange and unusual setting you find yourself in.

As you see, we have an official reporter here that is taking down

everything that I say and you say to make a written record of these

proceedings. So it is important that we get verbal answers to our

1424
questions. We tend to nod, and shake our heads, and we are communicating, but it is difficult for the reporter to get those down.

One of the other things that I need to be mindful of, is to not

start a question before you finish an answer so that we are not

talking over each other either in giving answers or asking questions because that really does make the official reporters crazy.

And I try and stay on their good side at all times.

And again, if there is any question that you don’t understand or

need to have it repeated in any way, please ask to do so. Because

what we are hoping to get today is your complete, candid, and

truthful answers to the questions that we pose. So it is very important that we make sure you understand what we are getting at and

so that you can give us the full information that you have.

If you honestly don’t know the answer to some questions, there

are several questions that we are going to pose to you today that

we are going to say, if you are not the person that knows the answer to it but you know who might or who does, we will ask you

to identify that person. So, but if you honestly don’t know the answer to a question, or don’t remember something, please let us

know. It’s best not to guess, but we do ask that you give us your

best recollection or the most thorough information that you have on

any question that we pose to you.

And now, do you understand that you are required to answer

questions from Congress truthfully?

Mr. * * *. Yes.

Ms. JACKSON. Okay. And do you also understand that that applies to questions that are asked by a committee of Congress?

Mr. * * *. Yes.

Ms. JACKSON. Okay. Do you understand that witnesses that

knowingly provide false testimony could be subject to criminal

prosecution for perjury or for making false statements? Do you understand that?

Mr. * * *. Yes.

Ms. JACKSON. Okay. Is there any reason that you can think of

today that you would not be able to give us complete and truthful

testimony today?

Mr. * * *. No.

Ms. JACKSON. Okay. Well, that’s the end of my preamble and the

ground rules. I note that it is 9:10. Does the minority have anything that they would like to add to that?

Ms. SAWYER. Nothing at this point. Just thank you for being with

us and we look forward to hearing from you today.

Ms. JACKSON. All right, at 9:10 we will begin the first hour of

questioning. Yes, sir.

Mr. * * *. I have a question. If I would like a break or feel like

I need a time out, do I just say that?

Ms. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. * * *. Okay.

Ms. JACKSON. You can just say, I would like a break or could we

go off the record for a few minutes? Just, would you like one now?

Mr. * * *. I would like to stand and stretch.

Ms. JACKSON. Sure. We will go off the record then. Absolutely.

[Discussion off the record.]

1425
EXAMINATION BY MS. JACKSON

Q: It’s 9:12. We will go back on the record. Mr. * * *, what is

your current title with the State Department?

A: I am the Division Chief of the Records and Archives Management Division, and I also have the role as the agency records officer. I started in this position formally with the approval of the

SF50. I think the actual EOD date was September 1st, October 1st,

somewhere, September, October of 2014.

Q: Okay.

A: Okay.

Q: And EOD is enter on duty date?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you have some military background?

A: No, just civil service lingo.

Q: Okay.

A: So prior to that, I was working as the division chief of our 25-

year Automatic Declassification Review Program, and then I started as the records officer, essentially, you know, late summer, early

fall of 2014 with the departure of the previous records officer in,

I think it was June.

So as records officer, that title gives me the authority to transfer

records to the National Archives as well as submit records disposition schedules to NARA. Is it fine to use NARA for now?

Q: Uh-huh.

A: Okay, and that is under the CFR what those requirements

are. You notify the National Archives who in the agency is responsible for transferring and submitting schedules.

Q: So up until the summer of 2014, who was the records officer

before you?

A: * * *.

Q: Could you spell the last name?

A: Yes, * * *.

Q: Okay. And how long had Ms. * * * had that position prior to

your assuming that? Approximately is fine.

A: I believe she started in 2007 through 2014.

Q: Okay. And your other duty is the division chief of the, essentially, archiving process?

A: Yes. So——

Q: Could you tell us what you do in that role?

A: Yeah, so the way it works, the Office of Information Programs

and Services in the Department of State, a bureau has the delegated responsibility for overall information programs and policies.

This would include the full range of Federal information policy

whether we are talking about FOIA, the mandatory declassification

review process, Executive Order 13256, privacy records management, and so, IPS, Information Programs and Services, has this

records responsibility and me as the division chief of the Records

and Archives Management Branch coordinates and conducts the

Records Management Program.

Q: So what do you do on a day-to-day basis?

A: I mean, what I referred to as our bread and butter work in

records management is really disposition schedules, and retention

related issues, and transferring records.

1426
Q: Okay.

A: Okay, we have a Records Service Center as well, so there is

a big piece of it that is involved with retiring records, sending them

to Federal Records Centers, authorizing disposition, destruction,

transferring permanent records to the National Archives once they

reach their final retention, going through the auto-declass process.

Q: And what are disposition schedules?

A: A disposition schedule is a legal instrument that is approved

and authorized by the Archivist of the United States, that governs

the retention for Federal records. So I may be wrong here, but I

think I’m right that the signature authority of the Archivist of the

United States is to approve disposition schedules, to approve retention.

So, you know, a big part of the job is ensuring that records disposition schedules are adequate and up to date; that all offices or

programs within an agency has adequate and up-to-date record

schedules, and if not, my division, the staff, works with bureaus,

for example, or offices to develop record schedules and then we coordinate and liaise with the National Archives. We submit those

record schedules to NARA, work through their appraisal process,

and then we publish approved record schedules in our agency directive, which you can find online. We have an internal Web site that

posts all of our record schedules but they are also on the FOIA Web

site for members of the public.

Q: And so just generally, there are sort of rules and regulations

that require certain types of records to be maintained permanently,

some for a set number of years, and some others for a lesser set

of years, and then other records, or information that doesn’t have

to be kept at all. Is that just generally what you are talking about

when you talk about disposition schedules?

A: Yeah, you basically have three flavors, okay, you have temporary records and permanent records, which are all under the

overarching umbrella of Federal records. They meet the definition

of a Federal record. Some of those Federal records, they are temporary. They may have a very short term.

The trade, the term of art is transitory retention which under

NARA general record schedules amounts to 180 days as a minimum, okay, but that’s something very ephemeral. Then you have

other program-related temporary records where the basic standard

there is 3 years for retention.

Okay, but then you also have another standard beyond that, if

the records document legal rights, or interest, or financial interests,

the basic rule of thumb there is 7 years you maintain those

records. Beyond that, we do have a large series and volumes of

temporary records with long-term retention.

So if, for example, Diplomatic Security investigative case files

have 75-year retentions; visa case files for non-immigrant refusals

have 75-year retention. So we have long-term recordkeeping requirements for some of that kind of stuff. But then—and generally,

temporary records relate to administrative activities, okay. So if

you take a look at an organization, you can sort of map out who

is doing what here. If it’s a support role, generally speaking those

records end up being temporary, and then the retention may be

anywhere from, like I said, 3 years up to 75.

1427
When you look at program offices, generally what you are looking

at is, okay, what is essential here to document, you know, the overarching policies, decisions, activities that would be of historical significance or have some sort of enduring value to the government

and the citizens of this country. And those are your permanent

records.

By the way, I should mention at this point I was an appraisal

archivist at NARA before I came to the Department of State, so

this is what I did for a living before that, was appraise records.

So you have the Federal records, you have temporary. You have

permanent, and then you have a category called non-record materials. These are materials owned by the government, but they do

not have record status and in the law, the basic rule of thumb

there is library materials, reference copies of, you know, I don’t

know, catalogs or whatever, as well as, I don’t know, I’m drawing

a blank there. There’s some other items in there.

Q: Sort of background materials that may have been used to formulate a decision or policy?

A: No.

Q: No?

A: No.

Q: Okay.

A: Background material gets really tricky, okay, because you are

into the area of working files and drafts. And under the law, there

is a two-part test. Was it circulated? And the second part, was it

circulated, distributed, whatever, for others to review, edit, anything, okay.

But then the second part of it is, does it add substantively to the

meaning, the understanding of the decisionmaking process? Okay,

so——

Q: And if those two things happen, what are you supposed to do

with the record?

A: Well——

Q: Are you supposed to keep it?

A: Well, if it meets the definition, then it becomes a record, okay.

Q: Uh-huh.

A: But then what you do with it depends on the records retention

schedules governing that particular office, that program, that section, that post, whatever it is. Okay, so it sort of depends where

you are at, you know.

My records, if they meet that part, that test, they are working

papers, but they have record status. And I need to file them away

as part of my, you know, an accounting of my decisions and actions

as a division chief and the records officer, and I need to file those

away with my files, and then the retention governing that is what

finally happens there.

Then you have personal papers, of course, but this is outside of

the realm of the Federal Records Act, although it is defined very

clearly, purely personal, basically amounts to nothing to do with

conducting official business. Okay. So——

Q: So those are your duties and responsibilities as the division

chief. Are they the same or similar duties and responsibilities that

you have as the records officer for the State Department, or can

1428
you tell us what additional duties are ascribed to being the records

officer?

A: They are the same duties. I wear both hats. I’m not sure

where one begins and the other ends with this exception, that

whenever I submit a records disposition schedule to NARA, they

have a little dialogue box and their ERA system that says, are you

the authorized representative of the agency under U.S. code, whatever, to transfer these records to NARA, or to submit a records

schedule on behalf of the Department of State or your agency? And

so in those two areas, I mean, it’s different than just being a regular records officer.

Q: Now, you have touched on this just a little while ago, but how

is this your avocation and passion? You said you had a prior professional experience at NARA. Can you sort of walk us through how

this became your life’s work?

A: I have a bachelor’s, master’s and Ph.D. in U.S. history, so I

have a love and passion for U.S. history, and like a lot of Ph.D.s

in history, the job market was terrible when I was looking for

work, so I found myself at the National Archives.

Q: That’s why I went to law school.

A: Okay, so there are a lot of my compatriots who did that. Okay,

so I found myself at the National Archives and realized when I was

there, well, you know, I have used Archives a lot, and I like the

work, and this is okay, and it pays the bill, and it is better than

being on the, you know, the adjunct circuit trying to patch together

a career. So here I am at the National Archives. I worked in electronic records. I was a processing archivist and a reference archivist and then I took a promotion and went to work in the appraisal

and records management staff. So then I spent time there working

as an appraisal archivist.

Q: And what does an appraisal archivist do?

A: An appraisal archivist evaluates, or appraises the value, the

informational value of Federal records. So you are not looking at,

you know, onesies and twosies, one document on its own. But when

a Federal agency submits a record schedule to NARA, okay, they

have it arranged by what is called a record series. Okay, it is a

term of art, just to describe a grouping of information or records,

okay, based on a program, or administrative offices, line of business, their program, function, whatever it is they do.

And when we received one of these schedules at NARA, we would

focus on permanent records, primarily. So for example, if you got

a schedule from the Department of State, and there were permanent records identified on there, we would conduct an appraisal

visit, which amounts to going out, visiting with the actual program

office, and whoever is involved with those records to see how they

are being maintained to conduct an evaluation of the actual information value, and then we would write an appraisal report, make

our recommendations to the Archivist of the United States. And

then after the Federal Register process, and public comments, that

schedule could be approved.

So you’re basically looking at a couple of things: Are there any

legal interests at stake in these records that would demand, say,

a 7-year disposition retention requirement, versus say, the agency

said no, we can get rid of this stuff in 6 weeks and, you know, it

1429
may be very obvious to a records manager or somebody who is an

appraiser who says, well, I’m sorry, but this documents the legal

rights and interest of the government, so you can’t just get rid of

this stuff in 6 weeks. Okay, you need at least an 6- or 7-year retention.

You also are looking at the historical research value and significance of the records. I happened to be assigned to the Department

of State’s account, the work group at NARA that dealt with the Department of State, so I worked on Department of State record

schedules going back to 2006, I think it was. And prior to that I

was the accessioning archivist at NARA who was involved in the

first transfer and then uploading of Department of State cables

which really, you know, despite our imperfections in records management, it really was a great achievement. And I still stand by

that, that we have our electronic cable traffic available on the

NARA Web site.

Q: Okay, and how long were you with NARA?

A: Ten years.

Q: And from when to when?

A: I think it was October of 1999 until it was 2008, 2009, I came

to the Department.

Q: And you have been with the Department of State since then?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And have you always worked with——

A: In 1998, excuse me. I started at NARA in the fall of 1998, and

I came to the Department of State in the fall of 2008.

Q: Okay. And you have always been working in the records division, Records Management Division at the Department of State?

A: No.

Q: Okay.

A: So——

Q: Take us through your State Department professional background.

A: Okay. So I was hired by the Department of State to work in

the Records Management Division. I was a program manager.

Okay, and I worked very heavily with records scheduling activities

and big scheduling projects. I did that for 4 years. And then I was

promoted and received a new position in declassification, so I did

2 years in our Systematic Review Program Division, which is 25-

year automatic declassification, which amounts to, for your permanent records under Executive Order 13526, those permanent

records, if they are classified, undergo an auto-declassification at

25 years, unless the agency has gone through those records prior

to that and exempted documents because they have enduring sensitivities. Okay, so we would do that.

I was also overseeing the branch that managed the foreign relations, the United States series declassification process, this is a big

red book that the Office of the Historian produces, and we manage,

IPS, managed the declassification process for those as well as we

would do mandatory declassification review cases for primarily

Presidential libraries.

Q: Okay. And then after your 2-year stint in the declassification

arena, did you return to records management?

A: Yes.

1430
Q: Okay. And when was that?

A: So technically, the EOD date I believe was—I don’t have the

exact date, but it was the end of September, the first part of October, something in there.

Q: Of last year?

A: Yes, but I knew that—yes, of 2014. But I knew that I was

going in there because I had applied for the position and so I took

a 3-week vacation.

Q: Good for you.

A: In August, yeah, it was great. I took a 3-week vacation. So

when I left like July 31st, or something, I knew that this was coming, and I took a 3-week break, came back at the end of August,

and started into my duties in an acting or temporary role, and then

officially became the records officer when the EOD date came

around.

I also maintained—I was the acting division chief of our 25-Year

Review Program during the same period until we were able to post

a vacancy and hire somebody which didn’t occur until, I think it

was, January or February of this year. So I was wearing a lot of

hats.

Q: And quite busy.

A: In the fall of 2014, yes.

Q: So when did you first learn that we wanted to talk with you?

A: I don’t remember. I mean, it was a couple of months ago.

Okay, there was—Kate Duvall showed me a letter from Congressman Gowdy requesting to speak with me, but I honestly can’t remember if that was in May or June. I can’t remember. It wasn’t

that long ago.

Q: Okay.All right.We have touched on a couple of statutes, executive orders, regulations, and things like that, and I would like to

just take a few minutes and talk with you about some of those governing provisions that are out there to make sure that we understand how you as the records officer for the State Department interprets those statutes, applies them to the State Department.

A: Uh-huh.

Q: So I first want to talk to you about the Federal Records Act.

A: Uh-huh.

Q: I’m assuming that it is a statute that you are well familiar

with.

A: Yes.

Q: Yes. And can you tell us just generally what that statute or

series of laws requires of the Federal executive agencies?

Mr. EVERS. The whole thing?

Ms. JACKSON. Let’s start with, you know, is there an affirmative

duty that is imposed by that statute?

Ms. DUVAL. On whom?

Ms. JACKSON. On the Federal agencies.

Mr. * * *. Each agency is required under the law to maintain

adequate and proper documentation of its functions, decisions, as

evidence of the agency’s organizations, policies, decisions, activities.

I can’t remember the litany of things, but it basically amounts to

adequate and proper documentation of official business.

1431
BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Okay. And that documentation of official business is then in

the definition of what is a Federal record?

A: This is my simplified version, okay.

Q: Thank you.

A: A simple version of the Federal record—of the Federal—the

legal definition of a Federal record is it was created and received

and filed for appropriate preservation as evidence of the organization, the policies, the decisions, the actions.

So an agency has to identify. I mean, if you are working on the

government’s dime, you must be creating some sort of records, is

what we tell an office when we go in to visit. I mean, if you tell

us you don’t have any records, the question is, well, what are you

doing? I mean, why are you being paid? What is going on here?

Okay, folks? So if you—so we go into an office and find out about

what they are doing, and then—well, I lost my train of thought.

Q: Yes, so you work with all of the various departments and bureaus and offices within the State Department?

A: Yes. But there is a qualifier here, because——

Q: Then please give that to us.

A: Okay so, I have the responsibility as the division chief in my

division, and IPS as a whole has the responsibility to develop

record schedules for offices, for overseas posts, working with them,

coordinating, and then liaising with the National Archives. But

where the ‘‘but’’ comes in, is that it really is a decentralized organization and operation.

So every bureau has an assigned bureau records coordinator and

every overseas post has an assigned records coordinator. Overseas

the senior management officer has that responsibility. They generally delegate it to an Information Management Officer. In the domestic bureaus, it’s a bureau records coordinator in the executive

offices of each functional or regional bureau.

Q: Okay. But your office is there to develop the policies and issue

guidance to those individual bureaus and departments and ensure

compliance department-wide?

Mr. EVERS. For the sake of clarity, since there’s so system acronyms and divisions, you might want to be precise about which office you are asking for. Because there is a bunch—I’m calling your

attention to it. You might want to be precise.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Did you understand my question?

A: So, we provide guidance. We have our internal Web site. We

explain what the rules of the road are, what are the recordkeeping

requirements, and generally speaking, we get brought in when a

bureau or a post needs to retire records. If they have a question

about something, we have a help desk, and then at that point, we

assess and evaluate what their needs are, whether they need new

schedules, or whatever it may be.

As far as implementation goes, it’s the bureaus and the posts

which are responsible for implementing the guidelines, the regulations, the FAM provisions in the law.

1432
Q: Do you do any monitoring or compliance checks with any of

the departments or bureaus, overseas posts, anything like that? Do

you have sort of the check-on-them responsibility?

A: Compliance is a Records Management Program responsibility,

and it’s a weakness of our program. Okay, there is a FAM provision that allows for and supports overseas inspections for records,

but that hasn’t been done since long before I started at the Department of State. And I believe that was a budgetary issue, but

we——

Q: What about the bureaus within State Department headquarters?

Ms. DUVAL. He was right in the middle of a sentence, Sharon,

when you started asking that question. Please let him finish his

sentence.

Ms. JACKSON. Did you have anything more that you needed to

add to that?

Ms. DUVAL. He said, ‘‘when we’’—can you read back what he was

saying.

[The reporter read back the record as requested.]

Mr.* * *. So we don’t have an active compliance program, okay.

But I would like to make some qualifications there because my

predecessor, to her credit, back in 2012, 2013, conducted what we

call a GAPS project. I wasn’t directly involved with that, but what

she did, and this was a good program.

She, under her direction, developed an inventory, a retired

records inventory management tracking and control system, okay,

so it was all paper-based prior to this, and then she helped create

this electronic system, which allows you to track and control retired records. It allows you to figure out, okay, who has been

naughty, and who has been nice, you know, who is retiring and

who isn’t. And the focus was on permanent records at overseas

posts. So we were able to—I say ‘‘we’’ collectively, but I wasn’t directly involved with it.

The Records Management Division analyzed the data to figure

out, okay, what are the permanent records disposition authorities

covering the overseas posts, and are we receiving records from

them? Okay, and then so what they did was, they figured out,

okay, embassy such and such hasn’t retired records in 10 years. So

what’s going on? And so then that allowed the records officer and

staff to reach out to those overseas posts to try to bring them up

to date and make sure that they were retiring records.

In a couple of other cases, one thing we did was—and this is very

common, okay. I think this would be common across the Federal

Government. Nobody calls records management until they have a

problem. Okay. And that problem usually is, we are moving. We

need more space. What do we do with these records? Okay, so we

get a lot of those sort of inquiries when an office is moving.

And one thing that I did lead and direct was in the past, we had

bureaus contact us about moves, and we wanted to turn that into

more than just going and telling them how do you retire your

records, but also look at it as an opportunity to, you know, evaluate

the records management practices, and say look, you can improve

here. Okay, we need to get your schedules up to date and you need

to improve your retirement practices.

1433
And we did that for a couple of bureaus. But and we, in fact, we

reported this. We were very proud of this in our records management self-assessments that we submitted to NARA and that we

tried to work proactively with certain offices and certain bureaus

in order to improve their recordkeeping practices.

Q: You have touched——

Mr. EVERS. Can I just have a second?

Ms. JACKSON. Let’s go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. EVERS. We can go back on. Thanks.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: You touched upon this, but I wanted to explore this just a little bit more. Apart from overseas posts, embassies, and the like,

and focusing on the various bureaus within what I recall Main

State, or headquarters, do you identify gaps or ensure compliance

of various departments and bureaus that I would call at your home

base, at Main State?

Mr. EVERS. Can you just be clear on what you mean by ‘‘you’’?

I mean, said he joined—he is in his current position only since the

fall—whether you are talking about the department or his division,

or are you talking about * * * in particular?

Ms. JACKSON. I’m talking about his department, what he knows

about what has been done in the past. And what he inherited.

Ms. DUVAL. Since he came to his position, or beforehand? Are

you asking for his knowledge of——

Ms. JACKSON. Mr. * * *, do you think you can answer that question?

Mr. EVERS. It is about whether he can answer it precisely, and

I just want to make sure the record is clear about who ‘‘you’’ is and

when you are asking about, because it could be at any time, and

by anyone. I don’t want you to think that he was doing this, the

25-year declassification authority.

Ms. JACKSON. Well, Mr. * * * has described what he inherited

as a GAPS thing that his predecessor engaged in, and so my question, if he is aware of it being done during that time that he inherited that in his current position, I think he is perfectly—he can answer it in that way. Just like he has answered the other questions.

Mr. EVERS. Sure. I just want to make sure the record is clear.

So maybe you could break it up?

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Do you——

A: Okay, so we don’t have a staff dedicated to compliance.

Q: Okay.

A: Okay. So the people who work in the Records Management Division wear many hats. All right. So the only, technically speaking

I guess, what you would consider a compliance activity, or I don’t

even know if compliance is the right word, but followup activity to

ensure what people are doing has been in my recent memory,

whether I was there or not there, that I’m aware of, was the GAPS

project, these office evaluations that I was involved in, and then a

big one that came up in the recent past, was, I don’t know exactly—I guess it was the Bureau of Administration, but I could be

1434
wrong about this, was criticized in an OIG report on the SMART

System about not conducting compliance reviews on how people are

using record email.

Okay, so in my opinion, the thrust of that is that the OIG was

telling us, we need you to be doing something more here, at least

in the area of SMART and who is using it, why aren’t they using

it? There is a complicating factor, and that is that in the middle

of this whole SMART thing, the Department is also engaged in a

working group study process to figure out how do we meet the

President’s 2016 deadline for having all temporary and permanent

email in an accessible fashion? So I don’t know, exactly know

where that is going to end, how we are going to do that for sure.

Q: Are you or your office consulted when departments or bureaus

are changing their records retention mechanisms or procedures in

any way? Do you have an approval process? Do you understand

what I’m asking?

A: They must consult us if we are talking about a retention activity. Okay. So if it involves a records disposition schedule, it is submitted to the National Archives, approved by the Archivist of the

United States. They must come through my office, okay. Because

IPS, my home office, and then me, I have the responsibility to submit those to the National Archives. So an office, a bureau, a post,

whatever, is not allowed to go off willy-nilly and come up with their

own retention and—or their retention schedules.

And we get consulted by posts primarily. IMOs, an Information

Management Officer, is primarily a tech guy, okay, so they end up

with this collateral responsibility for records management overseas,

and they will often contact us and say, okay, what exactly are our

roles? What is my role? What is my responsibility? How do I do

this? And we usually will point them to, if we are not pointing

them directly to the FAM, to explain what their roles and responsibilities are, we will put that into some sort of simplified language.

Q: You have talked a bit about permanent records. Can you give

us some examples of what falls under the umbrella of permanent

records?

A: The Department of State probably has the highest percentage

of permanent records overall in the U.S. Federal Government.

Okay, that was always the view we had at the Archives, and I

would still stand by that. Okay, so at NARA, if you take a records

management training class, they will say 3 percent of the overall

universe of Federal records are probably permanent.

At the Department of State, I’m making up this number, okay,

so don’t hold me to this, I bet 25, 30 percent of our records are designated as permanent. Our records also happen to be the most

accessed and requested at the National Archives. So permanent

records, what it amounts to, you know, are documents, documentary materials that document, you know, significant historical

events, activities of the U.S. Government. And in our case, the

NARA appraisal policy 1440, talks about one specific type of permanent record is something that documents the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. So that’s us.

Q: So just so I’m clear on this, I just want to make sure I understand, documents, whether it’s electronic documents, or hard-copy

documents, that deal with the foreign relations of the United

1435
States are considered permanent records. Am I understanding that

correctly?

A: Yes.

Mr. EVERS. All of them?

Mr. * * *. I can’t think of any series of records in a disposition

schedule for the Department of State that touches on, you know,

significant foreign relations activities that isn’t permanent. I will

say this, though, the regional bureaus, say EAP, East-Asian and

Pacific Affairs, they have—a lot of their materials are permanent.

Okay, but they also have temporary items for program files. And

those would be for program records that don’t document, you know,

significant activities or something, so they make a cut and this is

all approved by NARA.

So I do want to not exactly retract my, you know, sort of emphatic ‘‘yes’’ but point out that you could go to those bureaus. And

those bureaus are clearly involved in foreign relations activities,

but they do have temporary items in there, schedules.

Q: And as it pertains to the principals of the State Department

and let’s first make sure we understand what we are talking about.

When I say a principal of the State Department, do you know is

that a term of art?

A: A term of art I know.

Q: Okay, and what do you understand principal to be?

A: Well, the basic meaning is the principal officers of the Department of State occupy offices on the seventh floor, okay, which

amounts to the Secretary, Deputy, and the Under Secretaries.

Okay, I don’t know that it actually technically applies to an Assistant Secretary or not, but they are high-ranking officials.

Overseas a principal officer would be at a consulate general or

a mission below the status of an embassy, I believe, where they

have responsibility.

Q: Okay. So is your personal working definition of a principal of

the State Department is the Assistant Secretary level and higher?

Or is it a smaller group of people? It is just the seventh-floor principals, or just seventh-floor individuals, I should say?

A: When I use the term ‘‘principals,’’ I think of the seventh floor.

When I refer to a broader universe of high-level officials, I use the

term ‘‘senior officials.’’

Q: Okay. So I will try throughout my questions to differentiate

between seventh-floor principals and high-level officials. I may not

always get it right, but I’m going to try and use your terminology

so that we are all on the same page, okay?

A: Okay.

Q: All right. As it pertains to the seventh-floor principals, is the

information that is generated on the seventh floor generally considered a permanent record?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And it is required then by law to be retained?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. All of the information generated on the

seventh floor?

Mr. EVERS. Yeah, can we be a little bit more precise about the

seventh floor?

1436
Ms. DUVAL. What principals are we talking about? He just said

people on the seventh floor. There are all kinds of people on the

seventh floor. We don’t have——

Mr. EVERS. I don’t think that—that may be a term of art.

Ms. DUVAL. If you have someone in particular you are talking

about, you should specify so that we can get——

Ms. BETZ. I think he just defined seventh-floor principals for us.

Ms. DUVAL. Not with any specificity.

Mr. EVERS. There’s a lot of people who sit on the seventh floor

including——

Ms. DUVAL. Literally, we can send you a floor plan. You are not

going to have a transcript that——

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: So we will go back to the questioning. Of the information that

is generated for the seventh-floor principals, the Secretary, Deputy

Secretaries, Under Secretaries, or people who manage their information for them, does that generally result in Federal records

when it, again, goes to the organization, functions, policies of the

State Department?

A: I would look at—I would go by the record schedules, okay, and

you could use those, you could view those on our FOIA Web site,

and if you look for the chapter that covers the Secretary, I think

the first items in that schedule are all permanent. Don’t hold me

to this, but I think there is one or two temporary items, one for

thank you notes, or something like that. I can’t remember, okay,

I would have to look at it.

And then, generally speaking, that holds true for all of the Under

Secretaries, okay. I can’t think of a temporary disposition authority

covering the programmatic mission-related records of any of the top

officials. Okay. Obviously, every office, every bureau, whether it’s

the Secretary, or me, is going to have administrative files and you

have clerks doing different things. Those I’m not talking about. I’m

talking about mission-related program records and all of the paper

that passes through the seventh floor goes through a system called

Everest.

Okay, not all the paper because of the classification issues, that

system in toto is not permanent. It is not the only records series

there, but the seventh floor program-related records are, for all intents and purposes, permanent.

Q: Okay, and when you are talking program related, you are

talking about the conduct of foreign affairs, is that correct?

A: Yes. And the high-level administration of the department.

Okay, so——

Q: So one of the ambassadors, for example?

A: Yes. As well as, you know, I will use this guy as an example,

Under Secretary Kennedy. He is the, you know, Undersecretary for

Management. At his level that type of information is permanent.

Okay.

Q: The information that he deals with?

A: Well, if he is talking—if they are dealing about real estate,

okay, so it is administrative in nature. It is not the conduct of U.S.

foreign relations, but you would be hard pressed to find a NARA

1437
appraisal archivist that would consider something at the top level

of an agency temporary.

Q: So generally then, I just want to make sure I’m capturing

this, if it is information that is being exchanged at those levels, at

the Under Secretary level and above, regarding the conduct of the

State Department, you would consider that a permanent record, or

a record that needs to be maintained permanently?

A: I would.

Q: All right. You mentioned earlier Executive Order 13526. Can

you tell us what that is, again, just elaborate as to what that is.

A: It governs classification and declassification overall.

Q: Okay, and is Executive Order 13526 applicable to State Department information?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And how so?

A: Well, if we are going to classify information, it has to be done

within the framework of 13526 and the same goes for declassification. So it governs anything we do in the realm of national security

information——

Q: Okay.

A: [continuing]. The classification system.

Q: And in particular for national security information as it pertains to the State Department, are we primarily talking about foreign government information, or information that might cause

harm to foreign relations?

A: The State Department—okay, so let me put on my old declass

hat, okay. So when we are reviewing older historical documents at

25 years, you are looking for several things.

One, you are looking for referrals, so what is a referral? That is

another agency’s equity, okay, so we may not, we don’t own, so to

speak, the defense and military planning exemptions or classification authority, okay. The Department of Defense would. So we

would refer something like that.

But we own the foreign relations exemption piece as well as what

you would classify stuff under, so the Department of State material

that is classified generally would be because we are protecting foreign government information or foreign relations.

Q: And if information doesn’t rise to the level of requiring classification, but otherwise deals with foreign relations, or foreign government information, would the State Department put it in a category that requires a little more sensitivity than just simply unclassified? What I’m getting at, is there a classification level, or a

category called sensitive but unclassified?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, and what is the distinction in your mind between sensitive but unclassified and simply unclassified information?

A: Classified information must provide—must—I’m trying to

think of the definition there. It has to be demonstrated to cause

harm to the national security of the United States. Okay, I can’t

remember——

Q: And then it is like——

A: Yeah, confidential, secret, and top secret. Okay, I can’t remember the exact definition.SBU, sensitive but unclassified, usually what I’m thinking of here, and I think this is standard for, you

1438
know, FOIA practice, is you are looking at the FOIA exemptions,

minus B–1, which involves classified national security information.

Why do I say minus? It is not to disregard it, but it is to say that

that B–1, you have already met the threshold under the executive

order that it should be classified in that system.

So the remaining FOIA exemptions are to protect information

that may not be classified national security information, but it has

some sort of sensitivity. Probably the most common one that people

think of is B–6, which protects personal privacy information. Okay,

so——

Q: So phone numbers, Social Security numbers, addresses that

kind of information?

A: Well——

Q: B–6?

A: Well, it has to describe somebody’s personal information and

provide—I’m not an expert on the Privacy Act, or FOIA B–6, so I

don’t want to get into what all of the different, you know, if it is

a mosaic something standing on its own or whatever, but that

should be protected. Privacy stuff is very sensitive.

Q: Okay, so just to make sure I understand, your definition of

sensitive but unclassified would be that information that would be

subject to the FOIA distinct—the FOIA exemptions other than classified?

A: Yes. If it warrants withholding under a FOIA exemption, it’s

SBU.

Q: Okay. I have a couple of technical questions. And answer

them if you can. Did the Secretary and the seventh-floor principals

use a network or server that was separate and distinct from the

network and servers of the other departments and bureaus in the

State Department.

Mr. EVERS. Can you specify which secretary? You said the Secretary.

Ms. DUVAL. Or which principals, what timeframe are you asking?

Mr. EVERS. It sounds like you have a specific one in mind. You

said did the Secretary, and I just want to know which one you are

talking about.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: No, just in general, does the Secretary and seventh-floor principals, is their electronic information kept on a server or network

separate from, essentially, the rest of the State Department employees?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And how long has that been the practice?

A: I don’t know. I don’t know. They have a system they call

POEMS, the acronym is POEMS, principals—I don’t know. But I

don’t know how far back that goes, but this——

Q: Has it been there since you have been with the State Department?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, so at least 2008 forward, there has been a separate network and server. And let me ask this: Is network and server the

same term to you, or different terms?

1439
A: I’m not an IT guy, so what I would—the way I would understand this question is like this, okay. The executive secretariat

which is separate from where I work, this is S/ES okay. They have

their own administrative operations and one of those administrative operations is S/ES–IRM, information resources. So that is their

dedicated IT staff. And that S/ES–IRM manages the network, and

whatever hardware, software, whatever goes into SES’s functions.

Ms. DUVAL. So do you know whether it’s a separate network, or

a separate server?

Mr. * * *. In all of the meetings I have ever been in, they have

always said it’s a separate system.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Okay.

A: And in the IRM wing, the electronic records management

working group, this is one of the major issues, you know, how do

we ensure that S/ES is also in the same boat as the bureaus and

posts that are managed by basic IRM, the IRM bureau.

Q: Okay, and what are some of those challenges that are discussed in that working group? And making sure that they are

aligned properly?

A: The overall concern is meeting the President’s requirement

that all email is managed in an electronic fashion that is searchable, accessible, and that the permanent material can be managed

in, you know, a recordkeeping system that meets recordkeeping

definitions under the CFR and NARA has also in one of the bulletins that came out, I think it was in 2014, said that you need to

also have a minimum timeframe for your temporary email as well,

even if it is just a year, you must be able to maintain that in an

accessible electronic fashion. So these are the challenges we are

under. We still have a print and file policy. People are incredulous

about that, but print and file is still the law of the land.

Q: Within the State Department?

A: Within the State Department, yes.

Q: Okay. All right. You mentioned that this network that applies

to the Secretary and other seventh-floor principals is known as

POEMS, is that correct, P–O–E–M–S?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, and that’s what the network is called?

A: That’s my understanding.

Mr. EVERS. I think he said, and—I think he sort of said network,

or software, or I think what we boil it down to is system. I think

he expressed some uncertainty about the IT specifics. Is that fair,

* * *?

Mr. * * *. I don’t have any IT-specific knowledge, so when I say

POEMS, I’m referring to their hardware, their software. It’s something distinct from OpenNet, which I use, okay.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: You also mentioned something called Everest. Can you tell us

what that is?

A: It’s a tracking and control system that allows paper, action

memos, info memos, something that goes to the seventh floor for

some sort of action, okay, to be entered into the system, tracked

1440
and controlled electronically, and then later preserved as a record

copy of what the final decision was by the principal officer.

Q: So that’s a management tool, that’s an information management tool?

A: It’s an information system that’s used for—I don’t use it. I

don’t use it. My only direct experience with Everest is meeting with

the bureau records coordinator, and officials from S/ES–IRM to

help them develop a schedule for it, okay. And also to instruct

them about what the recordkeeping requirements are for an electronic information system that contains permanent records.

Q: Now, you have described some various meetings and working

groups and stuff that you have been a part of regarding this separate network or system for the Secretary and the seventh-floor

principals. Do you know why, or what is your understanding as to

why there is a separate network, or system for the executive leadership of the State Department?

A: One clarification. The electronic records management working

group is not established just to deal with S/ES, or POEMS issues,

okay. This was something that Under Secretary Kennedy established. It would have been, I’m thinking, the winter after the

NARA bulletin, or the President’s Managing Government Records

Directive came out. And the Department came together to come up

with some sort of strategy to meet the requirements under the

Managing Government Records Directive. So it was tasked with

trying to figure out how do we manage email overall, whether

that’s on the seventh floor, me, whoever.

Q: Okay.

A: But obviously, that plays into it, you know. Ensuring if you

have the same system, or different systems, that they all meet recordkeeping requirements.

Q: Okay. But in all of these various meetings, and based on your

tenure with the State Department, have you come to understand

why there’s a separate network, or server, or system dedicated to

the executive leadership of the State Department?

A: I don’t think I have ever heard any sort of, you know, thesis

on that. But sensitivity is a special matter. There are certain types

of documents that are captioned that they need to manage and

keep a close hold on.

Q: Okay. I have just a few minutes left before we are at the end

of our first hour. And so let me just end by asking you a few more

questions about the Federal Records Act, in particular. And then

we will at least go off the record and take a break, and I will confer

with my minority colleagues about how we are going to proceed

after that, okay.

Under the Federal Records Act who is charged with the responsibility for records management within an agency or department?

A: The head of the agency, according to the law of the CFR.

Q: Okay, and within the State Department that would be the

Secretary? Is that correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And does the Federal Records Act require that safeguards be

implemented?

Mr. EVERS. If you know.

1441
Mr. * * *. I’m trying to think about, I mean, there are lots of different provisions in the CFR to ensure adequate and proper documentation. I can’t point to a particular provision.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Okay. Under the Records Management by Federal Agencies in

section 3105.

Mr. EVERS. Do you have a copy of the laws that you are reading

from?

Ms. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. EVERS. Do you want to maybe instead of quiz him on it, have

it for him?

Ms. JACKSON. If we need to, we will go to that, but let me

just——

Mr. EVERS. Well, * * *, I just want to make sure, you know, if

you don’t know all of the text of the Federal Records Act, or the

associated CFR, they have copies of them, and they can show them

to you and you don’t have to know them by heart.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Do you know that the Records Management by Federal Agencies Act which is in 44 U.S.C. 3101 and other provisions, covers the

alienation of records?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And what is your understanding of alienation of

records? What does that mean?

Ms. DUVAL. Would you like to take a look at the statute?

Mr. EVERS. Or the regulation, or the FAM, or NARA regulations?

Mr. * * *. Can I take a look?

Ms. JACKSON. You know what, we are just approaching the end

of our first hour. Why don’t we go off the record, take a break, and

we can come back to this when we have our next hour. Okay. Is

that okay?

Mr. * * *. Fine with me.

Ms. DUVAL. Are there documents that you would like him to review so that he can be ready to answer your questions?

Ms. JACKSON. Yes.

Ms. DUVAL. Would you like him to do that on a break or on the

record?

Ms. JACKSON. Well, let’s first, I want to talk—it depends on

whether we are going to continue, or whether we are going to turn

it over to our colleagues. So, do you want to—do you guys want to

consult about that?

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I think we will take our time, but why

don’t you just go take your break.

Mr. * * *. Yeah, why don’t we take a break.

Ms. JACKSON. We will take our break and we will just have him

review it before we resume again.

[Recess.]

BY MS. BOYD

Q: My name is Krista Boyd. I am with the minority staff of the

Select Committee.

1442
Thank you again for being here today. I am now going to go into

our period of questioning. I may go over some things that sound redundant, but if you can please bear with me because some things

I just want to make sure that we have the right understanding of

what it is that you are saying.

The one thing I wanted to go back and visit is, you said something that I am concerned could be construed differently than the

way you meant it. And that was I want to make sure that what

you were saying wasn’t that every scrap of paper or every email

that comes out of the seventh floor would be considered a permanent record.

And if we could just kind of walk through what it is to piece together what you were saying about how decisions are made about

whether something is or isn’t a record and how it falls into a schedule.

So, one of the things you talked about was a two-part test. It

sounded like that was your sort of best explanation or guidance for

how you decide whether something is a permanent record, is that

right? Is that a fair characterization, that there is sort of an evaluation of whether something meets the criteria of being a permanent record or not a permanent record?

A: I believe that the two-part test I was referring to was in the

definition of a working file.

Q: Okay.

A: And then there is also essentially, in my simplified view, a

two-part test for the Federal Records Act, which both of those

things are totally different from whether or not a record, once you

have established that it has record status, then you apply a different set of criteria to whether or not it is permanent or temporary. And the criteria there is established by NARA policy.

Q: Okay. And the first evaluation, which is whether something

is a record or isn’t a record, would that fall to the individual employee to make the determination as they are creating or saving a

document to evaluate whether that is a record?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And then if something is evaluated as being a record,

then there is a later determination of whether it falls as a category

that would be a temporary record or a permanent record or something else?

A: The independent employee does not have that discretion, okay.

So an individual employee should be making their decisions based

on the records management policies for an end requirement for

their particular section, branch, office, or whatever. And once they

have established based on the framework, and the overarching

framework here are the approved records disposition schedules,

okay.

So if what you are doing fits within the records schedules, then

the employee should be managing them accordingly. And the employee has no discretion over whether they decide, well, this memo

should be permanent and this memo should be temporary. That is

established by the framework of the records disposition schedule.

Q: And did I understand it correctly when you were using the

word ‘‘appraisal,’’ is that the appraisal is part of the evaluation of

whether a type of record should be temporary or permanent, and

1443
is that something that comes later in the process? So meaning not

at the time the employee is creating the record.

A: The appraisal is a part of the records disposition schedule approval process. That is a process owned by the National Archives.

Okay so agencies submit, NARA approves. And so generally speaking, you develop new records schedules within an agency when a

new program office is established and they don’t have a schedule,

or for whatever reason they never had a schedule. In that case

those records would be called ‘‘unscheduled.’’And unscheduled

records are considered permanent until there is an approved schedule. So even if these records had a 3-year temporary retention after

approval, until the time of approval, they are considered permanent because they are unscheduled.

Okay so when an agency submits, then NARA takes that, essentially, a draft schedule that was submitted by the agency and they

review that. And NARA is looking at a couple of different things.

They are appraising the informational value of the information contained in the various records series. They are also looking at the

adequacy of the retentions, okay.

So they are saying, the two key pieces to a records retention

schedule, in addition to the description, the series description, are

permanent or temporary—what is the flavor, what is this stuff,

okay? And that is going to be based on NARA appraisal policy

1440, I think is the number. Do these records meet the definition

of what permanent records should or should not be? If they don’t

meet the definition of a what a permanent record should be, then

you get a big temporary up there, okay.

And then the final piece for temporary would be, what is the actual retention, okay? And that is the other thing that NARA considers. And in my experience as an appraiser, 90 percent of the

agencies get their retention right. They know how long they should

keep things. If anything, they err on the side of keeping things too

long that could be kept for a much shorter period of time, because

a corollary to what we have been talking about in terms of adequate and proper documentation is the other aspect of records

management is economical and efficient management of information. So a big part of that is don’t keep things too long that could

be disposed of sooner. Okay, but the ground rules are you can’t dispose of this stuff until you have a disposition schedule to authorize

and approve that.

Q: So talking about emails specifically, are there emails that an

employee can dispose of that are not records? For example, personal emails. Is it possible a sender receives an email that would

not be considered a Federal record?

A: Yes. Personal email. And if the Department—and I am not

aware of any agency, although I can’t speak for other agencies at

the Department you have the discretion of identifying what is personal and you are allowed to delete that.

Q: Okay. Thank you.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS

Q: And by you, you mean the individual who sends or receives

the email has the discretion to decide this is a personal email and

just delete it?

1444
A: Yes.

Q: And is that a standard practice throughout the government?

A: I don’t want to speak on behalf of the whole government, but

NARA accepts that.

Q: So that is a NARA standard practice that the individual gets

to say, this is my personal email and just delete it and it doesn’t

go into any kind of a system?

A: I don’t want to say a NARA practice. But according to the

NARA regulations in the C.F.R., if—and regardless of medium,

whether we are talking about email, whatever—if it is purely personal, the employee can delete it.

BY MS. SAWYER

Q: I am going to ask a couple of questions. We don’t mean to be

confusing by having different folks. But I personally am a little

confused because I am just trying to puzzle out which portions. You

said in your answer to my colleague, Krista, that certain determinations were within the individual employee’s discretion and

then others were not and then NARA gets involved at some point

as well. I am just trying to figure out how.

You said there is a concept records management criteria that, it

sounded like, would govern individual employee decisions as to

whether to even at the first cut designate something as a potential

Federal record, is that correct?

A: I think you have to understand this whole thing in the framework or context of records management overall in the agency. So

if you are a new employee, you come on board. If you are in the

civil service, you get a brief records management briefing when you

are going through your employee orientation, which basically

amounts to making you aware of the fact that you are going to be

creating, receiving, and managing Federal records, okay. And if you

need more information, here is where you can find it, all right.

If you enter the Foreign Service at the Department of State, you

get the same sort of briefing as part of your orientation, okay. Then

when you get to an office or a post or wherever you are going, the

way it is supposed to work is we have these delegated, you know,

this—I am losing track of my thoughts here—delegated people with

responsibility, bureau of records coordinators and others.

And when you go to work in a particular office your supervisor

should make you aware of, okay, you are performing this type of

function.And they may not use the term ‘‘recordkeeping requirements.’’

But let’s use an example. If you are working in Consular Affairs,

there are certain requirements that would go into a visa case file.

You must file this document, that document, and everything so

that you can manage that particular case, okay. So when you

would go to work in Consular Affairs, somebody should be instructing those employees about what are the recordkeeping requirements.

Okay. And then those overarching requirements are governed by

Federal law, NARA regulations, our own internal policies and procedures, the records disposition schedule. Again, I mean, the

records disposition schedule is really the bread and butter instrument, okay, the basic instrument that governs what should you be

1445
keeping, how should you be keeping it, how long must the agency

keep it.

Q: So for an individual employee with all that guidance, you had

indicated for working papers and files it sounded like one of the

principles you would apply was kind of was it circulated and does

it add substantively to the decisionmaking process.

So for the individual, if they are dealing with something that is

in their files, is it that individual that then assesses, in that particular example, those particular criteria and decides, yes, this discrete email does qualify, in my mind, I am going to designate it for

potential Federal records retention, is that accurate?

A: The two-part test that I pointed to is in the C.F.R. So I want

to put it on the record that if I missed it somehow, I don’t want

to be held responsible for having that memorized, okay. But it basically amounts to, you know, it has gone beyond yourself, all right.

So you have consulted others, you have advised others, you have

done something to circulate this particular draft. And if the draft

comes back and you said, well, you spelled principle wrong, it

should have been L–E rather than A–L, I wouldn’t consider that

a substantive change, okay.

But if the draft comes back and it says, you know, our policy position is X and we did that, then that meets the test of all of a sudden that material, that working file, meets the definition of a Federal record, okay. But beyond that, what happens to it, how do you

manage it, how do you retain it, that is governed by the schedules.

Q: Okay, so let’s just go back to what you just explained because

I want to make sure I understand clearly.

So at that level you just gave a very nice example where you said

there was one type of change that you would not have considered

substantive. So that, in that instance, would be up to the individual employee’s discretion to decide this is a substantive change

versus something else that might not be, is that accurate? Interpretation or an employee’s interpretation.

A: It would be accurate within the context of the record schedules, okay. So I want to point out that those record schedules are

really what govern what a person should or shouldn’t be doing.

Q: Okay. And the record schedule, just explain how that would

interact with the example you gave me. Do you mean in terms of

it is a particular type of document?

A: A schedule has several different pieces and parts to it. So it

has a series description, which describes the records. And so if that

description indicates something that it should be a guide to the creator, they must follow it. It may not indicate anything, you know.

This goes back to every office, every bureau, every post section

needs to be aware of their recordkeeping responsibilities. And that

is overall based on these schedules that are approved by NARA.

Q: So the——

A: But individuals are the ones that are carrying this out, you

know. Okay, so employee X, or whoever, is the one who is carrying

out these instructions, and they are the ones filing and supposed

to be saving.

Q: So the individuals have to assess both what a retention schedule might provide to them in terms of guidance, as well as what

the underlying substantive document might indicate to them in

1446
terms of, whether it is the type of record that has to be changed

with regard to each and every document, email, scrap of paper

schedule, and so it is going to be different criteria that they have

to then interpret and decide whether or not to designate it as a potential Federal record?

A: This is the heart and soul of why email management in the

Federal Government is a disaster, okay. Why? Because you find

somebody who wants to think about every message and whether it

meets the definition of a record or not.It is very difficult to find

those people, okay. Which I think is also the reason why NARA

proposed this Capstone solution, just capture everything at certain

levels because people either aren’t, won’t, whatever, make these

sort of decisions.

Q: And we will probably get to Capstone, but Capstone came into

kind of being at what point in time? Is it now——

A: September 2013 I think is when the bulletin was issued or

August.

Let me say something for the record. I used the word ‘‘disaster,’’

which is very categorical. But I think you would be hard pressed

to find records managers anywhere in the Federal Government who

didn’t say email is a serious problem and challenge, okay. So you

can’t hold me to that speaking on behalf of the entire Federal Government, but it is a challenge.

Q: And for a few different reasons I just want to piece out.

One, there is a tremendous volume of email, would you agree

with that?

A: Yes.

Q: Two, if you were going through somewhat, if you were really

doing this diligently, you would have to contemporaneously go

through each and every one, that would be accurate, right?

A: Yes.

Q: And then thirdly, you would have to apply, it sounds like, an

overlay of criteria and considerations for each and every one? That

the individual employee would have to consider some of the criteria

you talked about in terms of was it circulated and was whatever

change got made actually substantive, is that accurate, in addition

to the retention schedules potentially?

A: Okay. So the Department does have a system, SMART, which

allows employees to send messages that would be deemed a record,

and all you have to do is use that SMART system and retention

and disposition is taken care of automatically.

Okay so if you are not using the SMART system, you are responsible for making that decision, is this a record or not. Under the

laws of the land, the law is still print and file if you believe it is

a record.

Our FAM provision under 5 FAM 440, I can’t remember the

point about when is an email a record or not, sort of explain some

of the nuance here and how you need to go about doing that. But

you do have that individual responsibility, okay. So if you are an

employee, does this message, is it a record, is it not, if it is what

do I do with it, do I print and file it, am I saving it in a PST, do

I have my folder structure in order?

An individual employee shouldn’t be, in my professional judgment, making decisions about whether this thing is permanent or

1447
temporary, okay. The employee should merely be worried about, is

this a record and make sure I put it in the right place.

Disposition should be a separate matter, whether it is temporary

or permanent, okay. And, in fact, in our SMART system, the disposition is controlled by tags terms. You don’t identify what the retention is for those tags terms to the employee. That is behind the

scenes. You should be applying it based on the informational content or value.

Q: So just explain to me, currently, is the employee responsible

for both of those decisions? You said in your ideal world the employee is responsible only for, you know, making that initial cut.

Does this even qualify as a Federal record, we will figure out down

the line is it a permanent, is it a temporary, is it apparently a decision could even be made at that level that it didn’t qualify as a

Federal record?

A: No. The employee has no discretion over the permanent or

temporary and they shouldn’t be in the business of figuring that

out.

Q: So the employee is really just responsible for I am going to

designate this as a potential Federal record. So there is discretion

there. And then at the next level where there is a determination

is it a permanent, is it a temporary, is it not a Federal record at

all, there is also an assessment in some interpretation or discretion?

A: No.

Q: I mean, someone has to decide whether it is permanent or

temporary?

A: The National Archives has made that decision based on the

records disposition schedule that the agency has submitted to cover

the series of records.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. But someone has to interpret whether

it applies under that.

BY MS. SAWYER

Q: NARA does it and the Bureau comes to them. It sounded to

me as if that was the appraisal; that the Bureau just sends everything?

A: The Bureau comes to us. The Records and Archives Management Division, or we come to them. Whatever—you know, however

it comes to somebody’s attention. We need a records schedule to

cover these case files, okay.

Usually the way this works, an office, a bureau, a post, will send

us an email to our help desk and they will say, we have American

Citizen Services case files dating back to 19, pick your year, what

do we do with these things, how do we retire them, okay. And nine

times out of ten this is very easy because you say, okay, records

disposition schedule X, Y, or Z applies to these records, these are

the instructions for retiring them, apply the schedule, follow the

procedures for retiring them, and we move on, okay.

You do sometimes come into situations where there is no records

schedule. So we have to at that point say, ah, we need a records

schedule, or maybe they told us, who knows. And so at that point

we, in the Records Management Division, work with the Bureau,

or if you are working with a post you would work through the exec1448
utive office in the relevant regional bureau, okay. And we would go

in and work with them, explain, you know, what are the basic—

what is the basic framework of a schedule. We would work with

them to develop it. At the end of the day, they are responsible for

concurring with the recommendations that we are going to submit

to NARA. And we submit that schedule to NARA for final approval.

NARA has the authority to switch a designation, so we propose

something is permanent. They may turn around and say, no, we

don’t want this stuff, it is temporary. They also have the authority

to say, no, 3 years isn’t long enough, you should be keeping it for

7 years, okay.

They will send out an appraisal archivist to actually look at and

inspect the records when you are talking about permanent series,

okay. And then they will write up an appraisal report. They have—

I think all their appraisal reports are available online now, in fact,

which justifies their decision about the actual value and retention

of those records.

And then we get notice of that and we inform the particular bureau or office, your schedule has been approved, this is how you

must manage your records in accordance with it, and we also post

it on our Web site.

Ms. BOYD. At the point where the bureau or office is coming to

the Records Management Division to say, hey, we have these

records that need to be dealt with, who is making the decision of

whether they fall into the temporary or permanent category? Is it

the Records Management Division that looks at the record and says

they fall under this category or does that fall to the bureau or office.

Mr. * * *. It is based on the records schedule. So if it is American Citizen Services and they say, we have case files relating to

lost citizen passports, we go to our records schedules and say, okay,

this appears to describe those records. We go back and we say, is

this what you are talking about? And nine times out of ten they

say, yes. And then we say, okay, apply this records schedule to

those records.

BY MS. SAWYER

Q: And then the body of documents that actually populates that

record collection, that body of documents is what the individual employees are then putting into the Federal records, is that accurate?

So they come to you with a body of documents.

Those documents are the documents that the individual employees at some point have made the cut on that these are potential

Federal records, is that accurate?

A: I don’t think you are quite—it is not quite there. So, for example, there is a term of art that NARA uses. Each office should have

a records custodian. Okay. And this would generally be somebody

who has administrative functions, and one collateral duty would be

records. So at the Department, an OMS, office management specialist, oftentimes has these kind of custodian duties.

And when somebody is departing, leaving, they are moving,

whatever, this person would be responsible, if we are talking about

paper records, making sure the file cabinets are emptied, they are

boxed, and retired properly. And the individual should be man1449
aging their records accordingly throughout their tenure, whether

you are a rotating foreign service officer or whatever, whoever you

are.

Q: I am just trying to—I think it has been very helpful to try to

figure out what criteria the individual employee has to apply to

even—you have said the individual employee will be managing

their records and then those records eventually will go to the custodian, the custodian will then gather them, presumably, for a body

of employees within that Department, and that eventually will

move up the chain until they get to the archives. So I think I understand at a 10,000-foot level.

I just want to focus a little bit, because the part that I think

caught me off guard from the last hour was when you kind of categorically said, any information being generated by the seventh

floor are permanent records. Because that doesn’t square in my

mind with the notion that there is criteria to be applied for working files, for emails, to make a determination.

A: And when we talked about it, you said, you, * * *, could look

at a document and say substantively this wasn’t a change that

makes it a Federal record—you gave one example of that—versus

another change that you, * * *, and an individual would say, yes,

that is a substantive change. So I am just trying to square how

that need for an individual to apply criteria around doesn’t substantively add to a decisionmaking process and potentially other

criteria—that was one example—could possibly square with the notion that every scrap of paper or every email being generated on

the seventh floor is automatically a permanent record.

Because that just didn’t seem to really capture both the difficulty

that makes it a potential, I know you used the term ‘‘disaster,’’ because it does sound like there are threshold questions that need to

be answered that would require some interpretations both by individuals and then it seems like lesser so vis-a`-vis each and every

document as it moves up it becomes more global.

So is that accurate? Like is it that the notion about records, even

on the seventh floor, you can’t categorically claim it is permanent

because it does require an assessment as to substantive adding to

decisionmaking, as one example?

A: As a basic rule of thumb, you need to consider the office, the

position, the role in the agency, discretion diminishes the higher

you go. And rather than speaking in hypotheticals, we should figure out, are we talking about the Secretary of State, are we talking

about the Under Secretary for Management, are we talking about

the motor pool clerk here. Because the motor pool clerk, beyond the

records that they have to maintain to, you know, check out a car

and get it back in, has much more discretion about what type of

email would warrant retention, okay.

So I am speaking now as a former NARA appraisal archivist, a

professional records manager, and working at the Department of

State, there is not much that passes through the Secretary’s hands

that would not meet the definition of a Federal record and be permanent, okay. And that’s——

BY MS. BOYD

Q: Can’t even the Secretary create a personal email?

1450
A: Yes, that is correct.

Q: So even the Secretary?

A: I am talking about just work-related matters, okay, not personal. I am not talking about purely personal.

Q: So you are not talking about every email ever drafted by a

Secretary would be a permanent record?

A: I am not saying that—okay, now, look, you guys also have to

understand that since last fall Under Secretary Kennedy approved

a Capstone pilot so every email on the POEMS system is being

journaled right now, okay. So that, essentially, made the decision

that everything following a Capstone model of a senior official in

SES is worthy of permanent preservation.

Q: And that is a preservation method, but that doesn’t change

the initial determination of whether something is a record?

A: The employee does not have a determination under a Capstone model. Everything is journaled.

Q: But the agency has made the decision to put in place the system that will save basically everything, right? I mean, that is a decision that has been made to preserve.

But in terms of under the Federal Records Act, what would be

a record and what wouldn’t be a record. I mean, if someone is creating a personal record or something—I mean, I am sorry, I used

the word ‘‘record.’’ If someone is writing a personal email or something that doesn’t fall under the definition, I mean, I think taking

aside—I completely understand what you are saying—but taking

aside the decision that has been made as far as the system being

used to preserve things, as far as just whether a personal email is

or isn’t a record, I mean, that determination would still be the

same under the Federal Records Act, right?

A: You could still have personal email that is not a Federal

record. That is very clear.

Ms. SAWYER. So Capstone certainly is a capture method that

takes some of the difficulties you have explained to us just about

the difficulty in collecting everything, so it certainly addresses that.

Mr. EVERS. I’m sorry, can we have a quick break for a second.

[Recess.]

Ms. SAWYER. We are back on the record. It is 11:18.

I just want to take a step back for a moment and just ask you

if you feel comfortable just talking to us a little bit about you seem

very nervous to be here with us at the committee. Is that an accurate description of how you are feeling in this setting?

Mr. * * *. I did not expect that question.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I mean, it is an uncomfortable setting.

BY MS. SAWYER

Q: Yes. To the extent you feel comfortable talking a little bit with

us about it. It is helpful to the committee, both at a staff level and

a Member level to understand what it feels like. We always get to

sit on this side of the table, we get to ask the questions, we don’t

have to answer the questions. So it is helpful to us to understand

what that experience feels like. So to the extent you are comfortable——

1451
A: It is like coming into a job interview. It is unfamiliar terrain.

So, yes, I would like to point this out, I am a career Federal civil

servant and I do not spend much time up here at all.

Q: And to the extent—I do feel like we have asked you a number

of questions about a number of different principles, laws, regulations, guidance. I think you have done your best to answer us to

the best of your recollection.

But to the extent there may be inconsistencies or, I think you

said it to me at one point when I was talking to you, you said, I

think that guidance is in the C.F.R., I don’t want to misstate it,

please go to the C.F.R., so to the extent there is clear guidance in

the law or an executive order, is it fair to say that we would be

better served relying on that than what you have tried to educate

us based on kind of your memory and familiarity?

A: Yes, that is the authoritative source, not me.

Q: And to the extent that the committee might seek to have you

come and do something a little less formal than a transcribed interview, a briefing for us or for our members, would that be something

that you would be potentially in consultation, obviously, with representatives that you have with you, willing to have done or do for

the committee?

A: I would be willing, but I am not interested in volunteering

myself.

Mr. EVERS. The record should reflect everyone is laughing.

BY MS. SAWYER

Q: Yes. And laughing I think to reflect that we understand that

this is not easy or comfortable. As I said, we get to sit on the side

where we get to ask questions, not answer them. So we do appreciate, we appreciate that you have asked for breaks when you felt

you needed them to feel a little more comfortable. We encourage

you to continue doing so. And we, in that vein, are going to give

you an opportunity to stretch your legs again for another 5 minutes.

One quick question before I do give you that opportunity. I was

trying to understand in terms of where you sit within your department division, kind of—where are you and what is the kind of, to

the extent there is one, reporting chain up?

A: As a division chief, I report to an office director, the Office Director of the Office of Information Programs and Services, that is

IPS; who in turn reports to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Global Information Services; who in turn reports to the Assistant

Secretary for the Bureau of Administration; who in turn reports to

the Under Secretary for Management; who in turn I guess reports

to the Secretary of State.

Q: And in terms of what you spend the bulk of your time doing,

it sounds like you have pretty primary responsibility for, it sounds

like you do a lot of the liaison with NARA. Is that accurate or did

I miss that?

A: Yes, that is a big part of my job is liaising with NARA on the

transfer of permanent records and schedules. And I am very proud

we transferred 40 cubic feet of permanent records last week.

1452
Q: I am horrible at a lot of things, but math is one of them. What

does that translate to like in terms of a truckload, is that a truckload, or is that five boxes?

A: I wish. But it is 40 Federal records center cartons, so a white

box.

Q: Okay. Still impressive.

So we will give you an opportunity to stretch your legs. We are

going to go off the record. We are going to have the majority resume some questioning after that. And then once they are done, we

will just assess, obviously, taking another break, maybe a lunch

break, whatever we need.

[Recess.]

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: It is 11:29, and we will go back on the record.

A: And, Mr. * * *, I am back again for a few more questions.

How are you doing with us today? Are you doing all right?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. One of the things that we wanted to talk with you

about was when you first became knowledgeable or aware that all

or part of Secretary Clinton’s records were not on premises with

the State Department. And can you tell us when that was?

A: The end of July 2014.

Q: And how did you become aware that some of her records were

not on premises?

A: I was getting ready to enter my new position and one of my

colleagues mentioned that in FOIA litigation the issue had come

up, but I had no idea about the full circumstances.

Q: And who was that colleague?

A: The Division Chief of the Programs and Policies Division.

Q: And, in particular, what is that person’s name?

A: * * *.

Q: * * *?

A: Yes.

Q: And is she still with the State Department?

A: Yes.

Q: And still in that same position?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And can you relate to us the nature of the conversation

you had with her at that time? Why was she imparting that knowledge? Was it just a simple discussion among colleagues, or did you

need to know that information for your new position that you were

going to assume, or both?

A: In the new position I was going to assume, involved dealing

with records issues, and so she brought it to my attention.

Q: Okay. And what did she explain to you?

A: If I remember correctly, it was that email has turned up in

FOIA litigation from a personal account.

Q: Okay. And these were emails of the Secretary?

A: I don’t remember.

Q: Okay. Do you recall whether it was emails of more than one

person from the State Department?

A: I don’t recall that either.

1453
Q: Okay. And did you have subsequent conversations with Ms.

* * * regarding this?

A: After it became common knowledge that we were going to be

getting a collection back, the conversation comes up in leadership

meetings and just in my daily interactions with her.

Q: And approximately when was this when it was common

knowledge that you were going to get a production back?

A: Early December of 2014.

Q: And what type of meetings would you be having wherein this

topic was discussed?

A: We have a weekly leadership meeting where the office director

and the division chiefs come together, and just in the context of

that.

Q: Okay. And so this would be people within the Bureau of Administration, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Would it be other division chiefs within, I believe it is GIS?

A: It is IPS.

Q: IPS.

A: GIS is the mother organization.

Q: Okay. So it would be all the IPS division chiefs that meet

weekly?

A: That is who attends the leadership meetings, yes.

Q: Okay. All right.From your position as the records officer of the

State Department, was it a concern to you that records of the Secretary were not on premises at the State Department?

A: I didn’t know how to understand it. It surprised me.

Q: And why did it surprise you?

A: Because I had no idea how it was being handled.

Q: At any time prior to July of 2014, were you aware that Secretary Clinton was conducting official business on a personal email

account housed on a private server?

A: No.

Q: So July of 2014 was the first time you ever learned of that?

A: Yes.

Mr. EVERS. I am sorry, that is inconsistent with his testimony.

He said he learned that there was a personal email account had

come up, but not the personal server or official business.

Mr. * * *. That is true, that is true, that is true.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Okay. Well, let’s clarify that.

A: Sorry.

Q: That is okay. Up until July of 2014, were you aware of whether or not Secretary Clinton was using a government State Department email account?

A: I did not know what she was or was not using.

Q: So you had no knowledge one way or the other?

A: No.

Q: In July of 2014, you learned that there were some personal

emails, is that correct?

A: I learned that email messages from a personal account had

turned up in FOIA litigation. That is my understanding, yes.

1454
Q: And it was not personal records, it was information pertaining

to the conduct of the State Department or the business of the State

Department?

A: That I don’t know for sure. I mean, I didn’t look at the documents. So the only thing that I remember coming up in the conversation was a personal email account.

Q: Did you have any discussion or did Ms. * * * tell you about

the extent of the information in this FOIA litigation?

A: No, I don’t believe so.

Q: You had no knowledge that it was 8 emails or 20 emails or

55,000 pages of documents. Was there any quantity to what was

discussed at that time?

A: I don’t remember any quantity.

Q: I want to make sure that I understand. Was what Ms. * * *

was telling you was that within State Department records a personal email address was identified, or was it that the State Department was going to receive back documents from Secretary Clinton,

something else, or both of those? I am just trying to understand

what was the nature of what had been discovered.

Ms. BETZ. If you remember.

Mr. * * *. It was a FOIA case. It had nothing to do with receiving everything else back that I am aware of.

Ms. JACKSON. So it was your understanding at the time that a

personal email address had been discovered in State Department

records?

Mr. EVERS. If you have that understanding.

Mr. * * *. I don’t know where it came from. I really don’t.

I don’t know how it turned up as part of the FOIA discovery

process.

Ms. JACKSON. Correct. But I am asking you what you recall of

what Ms. * * * told you at that time, whether, you know, was it

a personal email address discovered in State Department records?

Mr. EVERS. I think he told you that——

Ms. JACKSON. Please let the witness——

Mr. * * *. I don’t know. I don’t remember really.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: : Okay. When did you learn that Secretary Clinton exclusively

used a personal email account during her tenure as the Secretary

of State?

A: I learned most of what I knew in the period from probably late

September through October—actually, probably in October through

December, based on just the tasks that I performed or was involved

with.

Q: Okay. Because as I recall what you said is that you were to

assume your current position in or about the end of July, but then

you had like a 3-week vacation, is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: So you basically stepped into your new office right before

Labor Day or thereabouts?

A: Correct.

Q: Do you recall the date?

A: No. I took the first three weeks of August off, came back the

following Monday, whatever that was, I guess it was, I don’t re1455
member the date, and then I was there from September through

December of 2014.

Q: And when you took on these new duties and responsibilities,

had this been one of the issues that you worked on?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And can you describe for us what your initial role and

responsibilities were?

A: My initial role was to receive the actual records from the law

firm. So it was Secretary Clinton or someone, I don’t know, contacted the Department, not me, and has records and you are the

guy who is going to go pick them up.

Q: So you literally was the guy that went and picked them up?

A: I was part of it, yep, with our record service guys, center guys.

Q: Okay. Do you have any knowledge or understanding of how

the request was made for Secretary Clinton to return her records?

Was there a letter, was there a phone call, were there discussions

with her or her representatives regarding return of records to the

State Department?

A: There was a letter that went out in October, I think it was,

2014.

Q: Okay. Are you aware of whether there were any discussions

prior to that letter going out? Did anybody pick up the phone and

call Secretary Clinton or one of her representatives regarding that

before the letter went out?

A: I don’t have any direct knowledge of that. I was not involved

and nobody told me that.

Q: No one has told you that, that there were any type of——

A: No, I don’t——

Q: Okay. Did you ever see the letter that went out?

A: Yes, I have seen the letter.

Q: Okay. And you believe that that was in the end of October?

A: I think so, but don’t hold me to an exact date here. Maybe it

was November, I can’t remember. October 13, November 14, I can’t

remember.

Q: Sure.

[* * * Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: I am going to hand you what I have marked as Deposition Exhibit 1. It is two-sided.

And I will state that my understanding is there was a typographical error in the first letter and that this is a recent letter

and that an initial letter went out on October 28th. Do you have

any knowledge or understanding of that?

A: I think I have the same understanding as you.

Q: Okay. So although Deposition Exhibit Number 1 is dated November 12th, I believe it is everyone’s understanding in this room

that the initial letter would have gone out on October 28th, but

then there was a correction made and this was the subsequent letter?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Is that your understanding?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. All right. Is this the letter to which you are referring?

1456
A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And so it was sent out by Under Secretary for Management, Patrick Kennedy?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Do you know who would have been involved in the formation and sending of this letter? Would it have been solely Secretary Kennedy or would there have been others involved too?

A: I would have to defer that question to Under Secretary Kennedy. It went out under his signature, I wasn’t a drafter, I don’t

know all the particulars.

Q: Do you know whether anyone within the Bureau of Administration worked on this letter before it went out?

A: I don’t know.

Q: And just forgive me, because I have forgotten your answer

from before, but I believe I asked you, when did you learn that Secretary Clinton exclusively used a personal email account, is that

correct, is that what I asked you before? Because I think as opposed to the private server question.

A: I can’t remember.

Q: Okay. Let me ask you this. When did you learn then—let me

just ask again—when did you learn that Secretary Clinton did not

have an official State dot-gov account and did use a personal email

account when she was Secretary of State?

A: In this timeframe. I can’t remember like an exact specific

date, but it would have been in the November to December timeframe. And it wasn’t—the full extent of what we were going to receive wasn’t made apparent to me until, I don’t know, I would say

December 1st, okay, after contact had been made between Secretary Clinton and the Department, and then the instructions filtered down to me to pick it up.

Q: Okay. When did you learn that Secretary Clinton’s personal

email account was housed on a private server?

Mr. EVERS. If you remember.

Mr. * * *. I don’t know for sure. I mean, it could have been

when she made her press statement in February, was it. I don’t

know.

Q: Ms. JACKSON. For purposes of reference, in early March, there

was a New York Times article that disclosed it, and she did hold

a press conference at some point after that. Given that time frame,

did you know before it was publicly disclosed?

Mr. * * *. No.

Mr. EVERS. If you remember.

Mr. * * *. I think I need to make a distinction here.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Sure.

A: I was not thinking in terms of a server, okay, I was thinking

in terms of personal email account. So I don’t even know that the

idea of a server crossed my mind.

Q: Well, let me ask this. From your state-issued computer in

your office, can you access a personal email account? Can you go

to the Internet and call up gmail or hotmail or something and access a personal email account?

A: Yes.

1457
Q: So using a personal email account is separate and distinct

from what server it is on, is that correct?

Mr. EVERS. If you know.

Mr. * * *. I am not a technical guy, but I have no idea.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: But you can send and receive personal email on your government computer, is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Could you do that in 2012?

Mr. EVERS. If you know.

Mr. * * *. You could—as long as I have been in the Department,

you could access the Internet and you could go to gmail, I guess.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Okay. And you have been with the Department since 2008, is

that correct?

A: Correct.

Q: So based on your answers, I believe that your answers to the

next series of questions are going to be no, but I want to ask them

anyway, just to clarify.

You had no awareness or involvement in the discussion or authorization for Secretary Clinton to use a personal email account

for State business?

A: No.

Q: Do you know if anyone within the State Department did?

A: No.

Q: You have not learned that subsequently?

A: No.

Q: Not in conversations with anyone?

A: No.

Q: Has anyone speculated to you? I am just asking.

Mr. EVERS. Your question is?

Mr. * * *. I don’t want to speculate about this.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: I am not asking you to speculate.

A: But you have to understand, in the office I work in and in the

entire Department, everybody is talking, gossiping, thinking about

all these sort of things, but I never heard anybody give me any sort

of, you know, bona fide real information like that. I don’t have that.

Q: Okay. To your knowledge, and I believe that answers this

question, but just to be sure, to your knowledge, was anyone in the

IT department, information technology, or the technical people, involved in the establishment of her personal email account?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: What about in the establishment or use of the private server

at her home?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Who would be the person, if you know, who handled IT matters at the Secretary’s level?

Mr. EVERS. At what time?

Ms. JACKSON. During her tenure, Secretary Clinton’s tenure.

1458
Mr. EVERS. Do you know?

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Either by position or name?

A: I know that the position would have been an SES IRM.

Q: Okay. I want to take a step back and ask about the various

systems that are there for managing information in the State Department. We talked earlier about POEMS. And I believe we discussed that is a network or server, but it is a mechanism that manages information, is that correct?

A: I don’t want to misspeak about this. I understand it to be

hardware, software, an infrastructure supporting the Executive

Secretariat.

Q: Okay. And you have mentioned Everest, which is a mechanism to manage email of the executive leadership, is that correct?

A: No.

Q: Okay. Then could you tell me what Everest does?

A: Based on an outsider working on a records schedule, it is a

tracking and control system for official documents requiring action

or information to the seventh floor principal officers.

Q: Does that work in conjunction or did it replace something

called STARS?

A: It replaced something called STARS, is my understanding.

Q: So STARS was the program that the State Department had

before Everest?

A: Yes.

Q: And you talked before about something called SMART?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: And what is SMART again?

A: SMART is the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Tool.

Q: Tool or toolset?

A: I don’t remember.

Q: And what is SMART supposed to do?

A: It is a messaging system for cables and email, and it allows

for one to send what is termed a record email.

Q: So does SMART allow someone to, essentially, check a box

and say, this is a Federal record, it ought to be kept, for whatever

period of time?

A: If you send an archive message, that is essentially what is

happening.

Q: And how does the user designate something as an archive

message?

A: There is an icon that you press to set it up. And then you have

to go through a series of events designated tags term sensitivity or

not.

Q: And is SMART available to everyone in the Department of

State?

A: No.

Q: Who has SMART available to them?

A: I don’t know who has SMART available to them. I know that

SES never implemented SMART.

Q: Do they have a different system similar to SMART?

A: Not that I know of.

1459
Q: So SMART, from who we described as the seventh floor principals, they did not have access or availability of SMART?

Mr. EVERS. If you know.

Mr. * * *. I don’t know that to be the case because, perhaps,

they also have open net access, I am not sure. But SES was not

running SMART.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Did the inspector general undertake a review of the SMART

system?

A: Yes.

Q: Did they find problems with it?

A: Yes.

Q: And just generally, what was the major problem, if there was

one, to your knowledge?

Mr. EVERS. And if you can speak about it authoritatively. Or

maybe you want to ask sort of—what his connection with the

SMART IG report was.

Ms. JACKSON. Well, why don’t we answer this question first and

then we will see if we need any follow-up questions.

Mr. * * *. Well, there are two recommendations that affect my

area. One being training. But I believe the recommendation of the

report was directed to the director general, so human resources, to

ensure that there is an adequate training for using it. But the second one was doing compliance checking.

Ms. JACKSON. Because was the problem that was found that various departments and bureaus were not designating information as

Federal records when they should be?

Mr. EVERS. Do you have a copy of the IG report he can refer to?

Mr. * * *. I was going to say that I want to be careful about

quoting from that report because I don’t have it committed to memory.

Ms. JACKSON. Right. Then let me ask it this way.

Mr. EVERS. Would you like a copy of it?

Mr. * * *. If it is necessary.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: You don’t think it is necessary?

A: If it is necessary.

Q: What areas were you to conduct training on?

A: A Records management and using SMART.

Q: And what areas were you to conduct compliance on?

Mr. EVERS. Can he just clarify, again, the ‘‘you’’ in your sentence?

Ms. BETZ: Can we go off the record for just a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Mr. * * *, before we went off the record, we were talking

about your statement earlier that your office or division had been

tasked with training and compliance in response to the inspector

general’s report. And I believe my question before we went off the

1460
record was, what type of compliance were you charged with conducting, compliance reviews?

A: Okay. So without the benefit of the actual report and the recommendations present to me, the recommendations are directed at

the A bureau in general, and then in the training one it is directed

at Human Resources with coordination with the A bureau, okay.

So the way those things work, they get directed at the bureau

and then they come down to whoever has an equity stake, some

sort of role in that. And the Record and Archives Management Division, obviously, has a role in helping with the records management training aspect of this and working with the other partner

with compliance with IRM to help get a handle for record email

usage.

Q: Now, I want to return to the return of Secretary Clinton’s

records to the State Department. And I believe that you said that

that occurred in early December, is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you had a personal role in that?

A: Yes.

Q: Would you tell us how it is that you knew you had to go pick

up these records? What were the steps before, and then I am going

to ask you a series of questions about the steps afterwards? I basically want you to explain to us the sequence of events that occurred.

A: I was told by my management chain that Secretary Clinton

had responded to the letter and they were ready to provide us with

email records and that I should make the plans to, the plans, when

I talk about the plans—I should step back and say, part of my responsibilities is a record service center where we stage or store

temporary and permanent records, and so we have a staff that actually will, you know, go around and pick up records, so we have

a van that we can use to do that.

So it was given me this job of, okay, coordinate with the driver

who handles that to pick up these records. And I believe it was the

date was set for December 4—don’t hold me to that, okay. And

then there were some complicating factors. I don’t remember what

it was. Somebody wasn’t available or something.

I don’t remember, okay. And then it turned out to be, I think it

was December 5 that we actually went and picked up the material

and then brought it back to the Department.

Q: Prior to going over there, were you told what the volume of

information was going to be?

A: I was told that there were boxes of paper records to pick up

and bring back.

Q: Did you have a sense of how many? I mean, there is a difference between two boxes and 20 boxes versus 100 boxes. Were

you told what the actual number of boxes would be; you need one

van or two vans or three vans or a wheeled cart going down the

street?

A: I was told that there were 14 boxes. And then at pick up—

this may have come out in a conversation during the day with my

point of contact, I can’t remember, but there were 12 picked up.

1461
BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Okay, and who instructed you to go over and pick up these

boxes, or coordinate the return of these records?

A: The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Global Information Services.

Q: And who was that person?

A: * * *.

Q: And she is still with the State Department, is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Once you picked up these records—and so you and one

or two others went over to a location in the District of Columbia?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, was it to a law firm?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you remember what the law firm was?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, and what was the name of the law firm, and where was

it located?

A: Williams & Connolly. I don’t remember the address.

Q: Okay, and who did you meet with to pick up the records? Who

transferred them to you?

A: An attorney.

Q: Okay, do you recall who?

A: I may get this wrong. I don’t want to be quoted here, but I

think it was Tanya Abramson.

Q: Okay. Did you sign any type of receipt or anything like that

when you got them?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And what did you do with the records once you received

them? I assume you brought them back to the State Department?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, and then what did you do with them?

A: I turned them over to our DAS and her assistant.

Q: Okay. So * * *?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And who was her assistant?

A: * * *.

Q: Okay. And did you have any further role with these records

after that point?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And did you—at the time that you picked them up, did

you know what your role was going to be?

A: I thought I knew—I thought that the role would be to retire

the records.

Q: Okay.

A: Which, ultimately, that’s what I ended up doing.

Q: Okay. So take us through those steps. Once the records are

back, what happened to them?

A: They left my control, and they were with AGIS GPS, okay,

that’s where * * * was. And then the original intact copy of the

records came back to me January. I can’t remember for sure. It was

probably in January, maybe early February, and at that point, I instructed my staff to just do basic record archival functions with the

1462
records, which amounted to gaining better physical and intellectual

control over them which amounts to, okay, we prepare a DS693.

That is a form which is a retirement inventory and a basic manifest of what we have. We refoldered—well, they weren’t foldered.

So we put them in accordion folders, the documents, and then put

them in boxes, arranged the same way that the original order was.

Q: Okay. Between the time that the records were—when you

first picked up the records, and until you got them again in, I believe, you said January or February, is that correct?

A: Yes. I want to be able to verify that, but it was—I’m pretty

sure it was in January. It was after Christmas, and——

Q: Uh-huh. Do you recall whether it was early January or late

January?

A: No.

Q: Okay. Would you have some record of that somewhere?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. What type of record would you have?

A: I would have something in my files to say, okay, they are coming into my control again.

Q: Okay. What was happening to the records between the time

you picked them up in early January and when you got them

back—I’m sorry, in early—I can’t talk—in early December of 2014,

until you got them back in or around January of 2015? Do you

know what was happening to them?

A: Copies were made.

Q: Okay. And do you know where the copies went?

A: Yes.

Q: Where did they go?

A: The executive secretary received a copy, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs received a copy, and my office, IPS, received two copies.

Q: And then you also got the originals back?

A; Correct.

Q: Okay. At any time did you or to your knowledge anyone else

ask for these records in an electronic form?

A: Would you repeat that?

Q: Let me take a step back first. These were 12 boxes of records,

is that correct?

A: Paper, yes.

Q: Paper copies. Did—was there an electronic copy of these

records also provided such as a flash drive, or DVD, or anything

like that?

A: No.

Q: Okay. To your knowledge, did you or any other person or component within the State Department ask for those records in electronic format?

A: I did not, not to my knowledge.

Q: To your knowledge, no one else did?

A: No.

Q: And then after you received the originals back, you and your

staff took steps to inventory them, record them in some way, and

prepare them for archiving, is that correct?

A: That’s exactly what we did, foldered, boxed, sealed-up boxes,

prepared a DS693, and retired them to our Records Service Center.

1463
Q: So is that where they are physically locate right now?

A: Yes.

Q: And where is your Records Service Center?

A: Springfield, Virginia.

Q: Does your office still retain your two copies?

A: Yes.

Q: And what is your office doing with those copies?

A: One was used to do a personal correspondence review, to determine if there’s any personal correspondence and to remove that

if it meets the definition of purely personal.

Q: Did you find any?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay.

A: And the idea was to have a backup since we don’t want to go

to the original intact version; if we made some sort of mistake, we

have a backup to work off of. And it was also used to prepare electronic copy—an electronic copy for FOIA.

Q: Okay, and so you scanned these documents in. Is that correct?

A: I did not. Our IT shop did that.

Q: Okay. And were the records then indexed in any way once

they were put into electronic format?

Mr. EVERS. If, you know.

Mr. * * *. The standard FOIA process is to, when you scan them

in, to index them for FOIA.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Okay, and do you recall approximately how long that process

took?

A: I was not involved in that process. I don’t know.

Q: Who oversaw that process?

A: It comes under the authority of the director of IPS.

Q: IPS?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, and who was that at the time?

A: The acting director at the time, now director, is * * *.

Q: Okay. As you reviewed the records that came in from this production, in your opinion, did they contain Federal records?

A: Yes. Are you talking about what I received——

Q: The 55,000 pages, yes.

A: Yes.

Q: Was it your assessment that the majority of those records

were—those pieces of paper were Federal records?

Mr. EVERS. If you made an assessment.

Mr. * * *. We identified 1,400-odd documents, not pages, documents that were purely personal in nature.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: And the rest then were deemed to be a Federal record?

A: We consider it Federal.

Q: Okay. Do you know the methodology that was used to select

those 55,000 pages of records to return to the State Department?

A: No.

Q: Okay. So you were never consulted about that as to what’s a

Federal record and what’s not?

1464
A: No.

Q: Okay. Do you know if anyone from the State Department was

consulted in any way?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Okay. So, to your knowledge, there was no—you don’t know

of any individual who was consulted in the State Department regarding how those records were selected before they were returned?

A: I have no knowledge of that, no.

Q: Okay. In your work with the National Archives, are you aware

whether they were consulted in any way regarding the selection of

the records to return to the State Department?

A: No, I’m not aware of that.

Q: Okay. Do you know the—do you know any of the parameters

of the electronic universe that was searched for responsive records?

And by that, I’m thinking about, was it an inbox, an outbox, a deleted items, sent items, anything like that? Do you know the universe of areas that were searched for responsive records?

A: No.

Q: Okay. To your knowledge, was Secretary Clinton’s server ever

forensically examined to ensure that all data was recovered?

A: I have no knowledge of that.

Q: Do you know what the term ‘‘metadata’’ means?

A: I understand what it means, in a records and archival context.

Q: And what does it mean in a records and archival context?

A: In records management, it is analogous to an old library card

catalog. Okay, it’s certain fielded data that describes a record and

points you to where that may be.

Q: Okay.

A: Information about information is——

Q: Okay. Can metadata also include editorial comments or

changes in drafts of documents?

Mr. EVERS. If you know.

Mr. * * *. I guess it could, but I’m not—I never think of

metadata that way.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Okay. I believe when we talked earlier today, you talked

about if someone makes substantive comments regarding a draft

saying—I think the example was ‘‘this provision isn’t in keeping

with our policy,’’ that would be something in a working paper that

could be considered a Federal record. Is that correct?

A: Could you repeat that, please?

Q: Okay. Yeah, that was a little complicated, so let me try and

do that. So you got drafts of memos that are going back. And one

supervisor’s comments are: I don’t think this is in keeping with our

policy. Our policy says X. I need you to change it to be in conformity with that policy.

In your opinion, would those comments need to be kept as a Federal record?

A: Generally speaking, yes.

Q: Okay. Are you aware that in electronic versions of documents,

those type of comments can be in the margin and readable by others who have access to the electronic copy but not the hard copy?

A: I’m familiar with track changes in Microsoft Office.

1465
Q: Okay, and comments, the comment boxes?

A: And comment boxes.

Q: If there is those type of comments electronically, are they required to be kept as a Federal record, substantive changes in the

comment boxes?

A: Generally speaking, if you were to apply that test, if they were

circulated and substantive, they would probably meet the definition

of a Federal record.

Q: Okay. In any of the documents that you reviewed in the

55,000 pages that you were given, did you see any type of track

changes or comments or anything like that?

Mr. EVERS. If you can remember.

A: I don’t remember that.

Q: Okay. Do you recall affirmatively seeing any of that?

A: There were very few—I don’t want to be inaccurate here.

In the email, I mean, obviously not. But in terms of attachments,

I can’t ever remember seeing anything like that. I wasn’t focused

on it either.

Q: Okay.

A: We were doing a personal correspondence review, so the focus

was personal, purely personal. If not, just move on. I mean, I

wasn’t looking for——

Q: Okay. Did you look for any other type of records?

A: No.

Ms. JACKSON. Okay. Can we go off the record for just a minute?

I just want to consult because I’m getting to the end.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. JACKSON. Let’s go back on the record.

Mr. * * *, just a few final questions for you, but to go back first

to the period of July 2014, when you were first informed that there

was an issue with Secretary Clinton’s personal emails.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I’m not sure that he said he was informed that there was an issue with Secretary Clinton’s personal

emails. He talked about that a lot of times. He has repeatedly said

the same sentence. He said the sentence—and I don’t want to misquote it—my general understanding was that the sentence was

somebody told him that in FOIA litigation, somebody had discovered some emails of Secretary Clinton that were from a personal

account.

Ms. SAWYER. And I don’t even think that——

Ms. JACKSON. Mr. * * *, let’s just go back and get it in your

words. Back in July of 2014, what were you told?

Mr. * * *. That personal email turned up in a FOIA litigation

case.

Ms. JACKSON. Okay. And did you interpret that to mean personal

email regarding, that involved Federal records, or Federal information?

Mr. EVERS. If you made that determination.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I mean, I actually know the answer to

this because you asked the question in the last round.

Ms. JACKSON. Then let’s just let the witness answer that so we

can set the stage.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. You said 5 more minutes, and you asking the same set of questions that you asked him the last round.

1466
Ms. JACKSON. I’m setting the stage to ask some followup questions, so if you would just please allow me to ask my questions so

that we can conclude, that would be helpful.

Mr. EVERS. Would you ask the question again?

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Let me ask it this way: Mr. * * * there would be no problems

with personal emails with personal information, would there?

A: You mean, to be produced for a FOIA case?

Q: Yes.

A: No.

Q: Okay. So was the implication to you——

Ms. Duval. Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. I don’t think that

the witness meant to say that there would be no problem with personal emails being produced for a FOIA case, did you, Mr. * * *?

Mr. * * *. Here is what I’m thinking, this is in general, okay.

If a FOIA tasker goes out, then whoever is the records owner is

supposed to produce relevant documents. So, in a general sense,

I’m not imaging anybody producing personal correspondence as relevant to a FOIA. Okay. That’s——

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Okay.

A: [continuing]. What I’m thinking here.

Q: Okay, exactly.

A: Just the overall process, is what I’m talking about.

Q: So in the relevant information that was being reviewed for

this FOIA litigation, information sent from a personal email address of Secretary Clinton was discovered. Was that your understanding?

A: My understanding was personal—an email—I don’t know if it

is one, or two, whatever—turned up in a FOIA case, so somebody—

I don’t even know what the case was. I don’t know where it came

from or anything.

Q: But you’re certain that it was FOIA litigation and not a congressional response or inquiry?

A: I’m pretty certain it was FOIA litigation, but, you know, I

don’t know. You throw that at me, and I’m not exactly, you know,

I’m—I couldn’t guarantee it 100 percent. Okay?

Q: Okay. Let me ask this then. Is FOIA handled by a separate

and distinct group of individuals than handle congressional responses, if you know?

A: H* * *, which is the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, liaises

with Congress. IPS, which is where I’m at, handles basic FOIA, but

we task out FOIA requests to the relevant offices and bureaus.

Q: And, again, who is Ms. * * * associated with or affiliated with

at the time?

A: Ms. * * * oversees the Programs and Policies Division, which

has one branch is the FOIA litigation branch, so she would be overseeing that. There is also a special projects branch, but that would

be for, an example, I don’t know, some Presidential thing to review

documents relating to Brazil human rights abuses, or something.

Q: When you had this initial discussion with * * *, did she indicate in any way that this was a new and novel issue that she was

1467
dealing with and that you would be involved in, or was it a recurring issue or problem, if she indicated in any way?

A: I don’t remember her indicating anything one way or the

other, but it was something that turned up in litigation. I’m almost

certain it has to be litigation since she oversees it. But, you know,

it’s not my area, and I didn’t see the FOIA case.

Q: Okay.

Ms. JACKSON. I’m going to hand you what I have marked as deposition exhibit 2 and ask you to take a look at that, and then I’m

going to ask you if you have ever seen that before, or are aware

of it.

[* * * Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Have you seen this letter before?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Do you recall when you saw this letter?

A: Since it went out under—or wait. Excuse me. This came from

Paul Wester. Yeah, I saw it probably on March 4th or 5th when

it was sent to me. Electronically. There was—NARA sent the hard

copy, and then they also sent an electronic version as a courtesy.

Q: And were you copied on that electronic version? Or you were

one of the recipients of that electronic version?

A: No, I don’t think so. It went to Deputy Assistant Secretary

* * *, and I believe she forwarded it to me.

Q: And what, if any, role did you play in advising her, or responding to this letter?

A: I participated in—this—oh, I participated in drafting the response letter, okay, so like an initial first-cut draft that went forward to probably my office director and then Mrs. * * *. And then,

beyond that, the letter went out under Under Secretary—no, actually—I can’t remember now. Do you have the letter? The response

went back, I guess, under Ms. * * * signature.

Q: Okay. Given your history with NARA, and your work at the

State Department, what did you understand was NARA’s concern

that was communicated in this letter?

A: Their second paragraph sums up what their concern was.

Q: And that’s alienation of records from the State Department’s

official recordkeeping systems?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And, in fact, for the record, let’s read that paragraph

2, it says, quote, ‘‘based on this article and other news reports,

NARA is concerned that Federal records have been alienated from

the Department of State’s official recordkeeping systems,’’ end

quote.

Ms. SAWYER. I don’t think you put the ‘‘may’’ in that sentence.

Ms. JACKSON. ‘‘May have been. ’’ Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Is that what you referred to earlier, paragraph 2?

A: Yes. This is my understanding of what NARA’s concern was.

Q: Again, what is alienation of records?

1468
A: Without the benefit of having the CFR in front of me, my understanding of alienation is something is removed without proper

authorization.

Q: Okay.

A: But to be precise, I would want to be looking at the CFR here

and how everything is written.

Q: Okay. And in your duties and responsibilities, is it your understanding that records cannot be removed from the official recordkeeping system when they are Federal records?

A: Federal records may not be removed without authorization.

Q: Okay. And your knowledge, awareness, and work on this

issue, did Secretary Clinton ever receive authorization to remove

the 55,000 pages of records?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: To your knowledge, did anyone at the National Archives authorize her to remove those records?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: To your knowledge, is there a requirement to notify the National Archives that there has been an alienation of records?

A: There is a requirement in the CFR. I think it’s under the unlawful removal of records provision.

Q: Okay. And prior to this letter being issued, did the State Department take any steps to notify the National Archives regarding

the alienation of records with respect to the 55,000 pages that you

had received in December?

A: I don’t think our response letter said anything about alienation. So, as far as I know, we were—a letter went out by Patrick

Kennedy requesting any potential email, and then I picked up and

received what former Secretary Clinton offered up, or gave to us.

Q: But between the time of early December, December 5, I believe you recall is the date that you picked up the record, and receipt of this letter on or about March 3rd or 4th, did the State Department ever affirmatively notify the National Archives that there

had been an alienation of records of Secretary Clinton?

A: I never participated or was aware of anything like that.

Q: Okay. You weren’t part of any draft of any letter or memo to

the National Archives?

A: No.

Q: Weren’t copied on any of them?

A: No.

Q: Have any conversations with anyone from the National Archives that they received such a communication?

A: No.

Ms. BETZ. What would have been the impetus for this letter by

NARA then, if you can opine, having worked at NARA and liaising

with them on a daily if not weekly basis? What would have been,

in your opinion, the basis for writing such a letter?

Ms. DUVAL. Are you asking him for his opinion why NARA wrote

the letter beyond what NARA said why they were writing the letter?

Ms. BETZ. Yes. Yes. But there has to have been a premise for

NARA, and it is in this letter but in his expertise in dealing with

records and having records transferred from the agency to a

1469
Records Service Center, there must be a reason why NARA thought

that there was a potential alienation of records.

Ms. DUVAL. I think they state it in the first paragraph here. I

don’t know why you are asking him why NARA wrote the letter.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. You guys are well over that 5 minutes,

and now we are——

Ms. BETZ. Well, let’s just see if the witness can answer. If not,

then we can move right along.

Mr. EVERS. So the question is, aside from what is stated in the

letter, are you aware of any reason NARA sent this letter?

Mr. * * *. No. Just all—my only contact was through this letter.

So just——

Ms. BETZ. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: And, again, you were involved in the drafting of the response

to this letter?

A: Yes.

Q: All right. And then the final followup question, maybe two,

you previously stated that you found about 1,400 pages of personal

correspondence or what was deemed to be personal correspondence

in the 55,000 pages. Is that correct?

A: 1,400 documents. I don’t know page. I’m not sure. I mean——

Q: Documents. What happened to those records?

A: We have them.

Q: They are segregated?

A: We have these personal correspondence, yes.

Q: So, of the records, documents that went to the Federal

Records Center, they would have been documents minus these

1,400 documents?

A: No.

Q: The whole 55,000 pages went to the Federal Records Center?

A: The original, intact, complete version went in toto.

Q: Okay, I think that’s all the questions we have. Let’s see if the

minority has any questions.

Ms. SAWYER. Yeah, we do. I don’t think we have—we will concur

but——

Ms. JACKSON. Shall we take a 5-minute break?

Ms. SAWYER. Yes.

[Recess.]

Ms. SAWYER. So we will go back on the record at 12:40. And then

it was our understanding that you had wanted to maybe clarify

something for the record or something that you wanted to share?

Mr. * * * Yes. I made a factual inaccuracy on the number of personal correspondence documents. I was saying 1,400, and I think

it’s on the order of 1,200. Okay. So this was just me speaking off

the top of my head under stress here. So I just wanted to be clear,

I didn’t want to suggest that there may be more than what we considered personal.

BY MS. BOYD

Q: Okay, I want to go back to exhibit 2, which is the letter from

Paul Wester, on March 3rd, 2015. And I just wanted to make clear

that there is, the first paragraph, last sentence says, ‘‘the article,’’

1470
since this is referring to the March 2, 2015, New York Times article, ‘‘the article also suggests potential issues with the Federal

email records created or received by former Secretaries of State

dating back to Secretary Madeleine K. Albright.’’ Is that the way

you read that?

A: Yeah.

Q: So I just wanted to be clear, that the letter from Paul Wester

was not just about Secretary Clinton but also covered other Secretaries of State.

And to that end, I also wanted to go back, you talked about the

letter that went out in the fall of 2014 to representatives for Secretary Clinton, but I wanted to just make clear, there also were letters sent to other Secretaries of State, is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, can you talk to us about that? My understanding, it

was dating back to former Secretary Albright, so including also

Secretary Powell, and Rice?

A: Yes.

Q: Is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: Those three?

A: Yes.

Q: So that would be the universe is those four Secretaries?

A: Yes.

Q: Did any representatives or the Secretaries themselves, any of

the other Secretaries contact the State Department, to your knowledge, to ask for guidance in responding to that request?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, explain what—who contacted the State Department?

A: Madeleine Albright’s representative contacted the Department. Rice’s did, but I was not the person that they contacted.

Even though my name is on the letter, they didn’t contact me. And

Powell’s representative contacted the Department.

Q: Okay, so this was before their responses, the responses from

those former Secretaries came into the Department, do you know?

I want to be clear that we are talking about——

A: I think this was in response to the letters.

Mr. EVERS. Do you want to re-ask?

Mr. * * *. Could you repeat the question?

Ms. BOYD. Sure. So I’m asking whether—so the State Department sent letters to representatives for these four Secretaries. Did

the representatives or the Secretaries themselves contact the Department for guidance before they sent a response or gave an official response back to the Department?

Mr. * * *. Not that I know of.

Ms. BOYD. Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER

Q: And just to be clear, you had been shown a copy of what’s

been marked for identification purposes as exhibit 1. So if you

would pull that out just for a moment. That’s a particular letter

that is addressed to ‘‘Dear Cheryl.’’ Is it your understanding that

that was the representative for Secretary Clinton?

A: Yes.

1471
Q: Do you know whether, other than the addressee, the same letter was sent to either Secretary Albright or a representative; Secretary Powell or a representative; or Secretary Rice or her representative? Was it the same letter in substance?

A: Yes.

Q: So it would have indicated you as the person to contact for

assistance in determining what should be returned or guidance on

that front?

A: Yes.

Q: And you personally weren’t contacted by either Secretary

Albright or a representative; Secretary Powell or a representative;

or Secretary Rice or a representative?

A: Someone for Secretary—

Q: For assistance.

A: Someone for Secretary Powell tried to contact me, but I didn’t

return the call. And they found somebody I think in S/ES before

I could or would return the call. So I didn’t deal with it directly.

Q: And with regard to—you talked to a large extent about the

return from Secretary Clinton?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Did you receive—I don’t want to jump ahead of you—let’s just

start with——

Ms. BOYD. We can use the response from the State Department

to Paul Wester, I think we will mark that as exhibit 3, and just

use that to kind of walk through the different responses that were

received.

[* * * Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.]

Ms. SAWYER. And we will just go off the record. Take your time.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. BOYD

Q: Go back on the record. So let’s just start with former Secretary Albright. So this—and reading from this, it is dated April

2, 2015, a letter from * * * to Paul Wester, the chief records officer

for the government at the National Archives. And the letter says—

so this is the response back to NARA’s March 3rd letter. Right?

And it says, for Secretary Albright, quote: ‘‘In March 2015, former

Secretary Albright advised the Department of State that she never

used U.S. Government email or personal email account during her

tenure as Secretary of State and did not have a personal email account until after she left government service,’’ end quote.

Do you know whether Secretary Albright personally communicated this information to the State Department, or whether that

came through a representative? If you don’t know, that’s fine. I’m

just asking if you know.

A: I don’t know exactly who it was. A representative talked to

my office director.

Q: A representative for Secretary Albright?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. All right, let’s move on to Secretary Powell. So this

same April 2nd letter says, and quote: ‘‘In March 2015, former Secretary Powell’s representative advised the Department of State

that although former Secretary Powell used a personal email ac1472
count during his tenure as Secretary of State, he did not retain

those emails or make printed copies.’’

So as far as—to your knowledge, Secretary Powell communicated

with the Department through a representative rather than personally. Do you know?

A: To my knowledge. Really, all I really know about this is what

I’m reading here.

Q: Okay. That’s not something of your personal knowledge.

A: And something was lost on me, a distinction in this last sentence.

Q: Okay.

A: That I blurred together, the difference between representatives and the Secretary herself. I have no idea if Secretary Albright

talked to who or what. Okay.

Q: Okay.

A: She could have. She could not have. I don’t know. I didn’t talk

to her.

Q: Okay. Do you know whether Secretary Powell or a representative for Secretary Powell provided any documents to the State Department in response to the State Department’s fall 2014 letter?

A: No.

Q: So the State Department received no documents from Secretary Powell?

A: I’m not aware of anything.

Q: Do you know whether the State Department took any steps

to follow up with Secretary Powell other—so once the communication had been received back about in response to the fall 2014 letter, do you know if any further steps were taken to communicate

with Secretary Powell?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Okay. To your knowledge, did the State Department ask for

a third-party audit of Secretary Powell’s service provider or take

any other steps to ensure that his emails could be recovered?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Do you know whether Secretary, former Secretary of State

Powell had an official unclassified State Department email address?

A: I received an email from S/ES–IRM saying that he did not. I

believe that’s the case that he did not have an official email account. But I would like to be able to consult my records to make

something, you know—if I had to stand by that, I would want to

look at it, but I’m pretty sure that’s what they told us.

Q: Other than what you have just read in the letter, are you

aware of any personal—do you have personal knowledge of Secretary Powell’s use of a personal email account during his tenure

as Secretary of State?

A: No.

Q: Does the State Department have any email records from

former Secretary Powell that were sent to or received from an official unclassified State Department email address?

A: Not that I know of.

Q: Does the State Department have any email records from Secretary Powell that were sent to or from his personal email account?

A: Not that I know of.

1473
Q: Thank you.

Ms. BOYD. I’m going to pull from something, so I will mark it as

exhibit 4.

[* * * Exhibit No. 4 was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BOYD

Q: This is from former Secretary Powell’s autobiography. So the

title of the autobiography, ‘‘It Worked for Me,’’ is at the top of the

page. I will be quoting from page 109. So it says, quote: ‘‘To complement the official State Department computer in my office, I installed a laptop computer on a private line. My personal email account on the laptop allowed me direct access to anyone online. I

started shooting emails to my principal assistants, to individual

ambassadors, and increasingly to my foreign minister colleagues

who, like me, were trying to bring their ministries into the 186,000

miles per second world,’’ end quote.

Secretary Powell’s representative in the response back to the

State Department had said that he no longer had any emails, personal email records—let’s quote the exact language—‘‘did not retain

those emails or make printed copies,’’ is his exact language.

So former Secretary Powell said from the quote I just read from

the book that he used his personal email address to communicate

with his principal assistants. In your estimation, could those communications possibly have fallen within the definition of the Federal record, his emails to his assistants?

Is it possible that he was creating Federal records is what I’m

asking?

A: Yes.

Q: He also said that he was communicating by personal email

with, quote, ‘‘individual ambassadors.’’ I assume that means U.S.

Ambassadors to other countries. Would a Secretary of State’s communications with U.S. Ambassadors, communications presumably

addressing various policy issues, possibly qualify as a Federal

record, those communications qualify potentially as Federal

records?

A: Yes.

Q: I understand that you are not looking at a specific record

right now.

A: Uh-huh, uh-huh.

Q: But just, is it possible?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: He also—former Secretary Powell also said that he was communicating by personal email with, quote, ‘‘foreign minister colleagues.’’ To the extent the former Secretary was conducting U.S.

policy business with foreign dignitaries by emails, is it possible

that those communications would have qualified as Federal records

that should have been preserved?

A: Yes.

Q: To the extent these communications happened, the State Department has, from what I’m hearing you say, to your knowledge,

no email records of any of those dealings? Is that right?

A: Correct, to my knowledge.

Q: Okay. Having worked with Federal records for the extent of

the amount of time that you have, do you have any thoughts on

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the potential impact this would have on the historical record, not

having any of these records?

A: I don’t know. I don’t know.

Q: All right, so now we are going to turn to former Secretary

Rice. So going back to, I think it was exhibit 3, which was the letter to the Archives. The letter—this is the April 2nd letter. It said,

quote: ‘‘Last December, former Secretary Rice’s representative advised that Secretary Rice did not use a personal email account for

official business.’’ So I expect you may have the same answer, but

I’m going to ask the question anyway. Are you personally aware of

whether Secretary Rice personally communicated with the Department or whether communication was done through a representative?

A: My only knowledge is the sentence there. I don’t know.

Q: Okay. Thank you. Do you know whether any documents were

provided by Secretary Rice or a representative in response to the

State Department’s fall 2014 letter?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Are you aware of any steps that were taken by the State Department to follow up with former Secretary Rice after her representative asserted to the Department that former Secretary Rice

did not use a personal email account for official business?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: To your knowledge, did the State Department—did anyone at

the State Department ask former Secretary Rice or her representative whether anyone had conducted a comprehensive review of

former Secretary Rice’s personal email to ensure that there were

no emails related to official business?

A: Personal—could you repeat that?

Q: Sure. It was long. To your knowledge, did anyone at the State

Department follow up with either Secretary Rice or her representative to ask whether any sort of review had been done of her email

accounts to ensure that there were no Federal records in there? We

are talking about her personal email account. Was there any further followup of that?

A: No, there was no followup that I’m aware of.

Q: Okay. Are you aware of whether former Secretary of State

Rice had an official unclassified State Department email address?

A: Again, this goes back to what I learned about Secretary Powell. My understanding is she had no official State Department address.

Q: Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER

Q: So I just want to be clear. Of the four Secretaries that were

encompassed by these requests, I want to make sure the committee

fully understands, Madeleine Albright indicated she neither used

an official State Department or an personal email account at all,

correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Secretary Powell indicated that he used a personal email account for, in essence, official business; did not have any records; did

not turn anything over to the State Department or the government,

is that correct?

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A: Correct.

Q: Secretary Rice indicated that she did not use personal email

for official business, but also did not have an official account, so

she did not use email apparently as Secretary of State. Is that accurate?

A: That’s my understanding. That’s correct.

Q: And the only former Secretary from whom you have received

any records is Secretary Clinton?

A: Yes.

Q: In response to the November 2014 letter?

A: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. But if we asked you today to go back

into in systems to tell us if you could find any records of emails

of former Secretary Powell, would you find any?

Mr. * * *. I don’t know. I mean, that—could you repeat that? I’m

confused a little bit.

BY MS. SAWYER

Q: Yes, it’s a confusing question. There is a possibility, and I just

would direct your attention back to exhibit 1, and I think it’s captured in that letter that you all sent to the former Secretaries, and

if you take a look at page 2, the top of that second sentence.

A: Uh-huh.

Q: We asked that a record be provided to the Department if there

is reason to believe that it may not otherwise be preserved in the

Department’s record-keeping system.

A: Uh-huh.

Q: So I will ask the question slightly differently. If Secretary

Powell in some of his communications from a personal account sent

it to an official State Department address, it is possible that within

the State Department’s records, there are records that capture

communications from Secretary Powell. Is that accurate?

A: Yes, that’s possible.

Q: And it would also have been true of Secretary Clinton to the

extent she may have communicated with someone on the official

system that could be captured within the Federal system and preserved in that regard. Is that accurate?

A: Yes.

Q: So it’s possible that there is no alienation of a Federal record

if that occurs in those instances. Is that accurate?

A: That whole alienation thing again, I would like to look at this,

the law, about how this works before I——

Q: And with regard to—understood. We don’t want you to characterize for us if you don’t feel comfortable.

A: Uh-huh.

Q: But just with regard to, as a practical matter, what the State

Department has done, I mean you were asked very specifically with

regard to Secretary Clinton if the Department had reached out affirmatively to NARA to say that there was a concern about alienation?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: With regard to Secretary Clinton.

A: Uh-huh.

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Q: Has the Department reached out to NARA with regard to any

of the other four—three Secretaries that we have been talking

about, Secretary Albright, Secretary Powell, or Secretary Rice, to

indicate an affirmative concern about alienation of records?

A: No.

Q: I also, just while we are with exhibit 1, wanted to ask a question of you. On page 1, I just direct you back to that, in that second

paragraph, just starting in the second sentence, it references a bulletin that went out, looks like bulletin 2013–03. I assume 2013 is

just the year designation?

A: Correct.

Q: And then I would just read it. It says, quote, ‘‘clarified records

management responsibilities regarding the use of personal email

accounts for official government business,’’ end quote. It then further references additional guidance. I don’t want to get into the details because we—I don’t have those documents before me to put

before you. I just want to ask a particular question about the use

of—this says ‘‘clarified use of personal email accounts for official

government business.’’ Did the law—and let’s just start with the

time Secretary Clinton was serving as the Secretary of State.

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Did the law prohibit, outright prohibit, the use of personal

email for official government business?

A: Not to my knowledge. I don’t think so. And, in fact, the

amendments to the Federal Records Act that were just recently

passed don’t outright prohibit it. I don’t have the law in front of

me, but you have to take certain measures if you use it.

Q: To ensure that it’s captured for purposes of Federal records

retention preservation. Is that accurate about the amendments?

A: That’s my understanding.

Ms. BOYD. For them to——

Mr. * * *. But I’m not reading the laws right here, but

that’s——

Ms. SAWYER. And then I just want to acknowledge in this letter

that went out to both Secretary Clinton and Albright, that third

paragraph, I just want to read into the record. It says, quote: ‘‘We

recognize that at some period of time has passed since your principal served as Secretary of State and that the NARA guidance

postdates that service,’’ end quote. So the guidance we were talking

about, that they also included also postdated all of these Secretaries’ time of service. Is that accurate?

Mr. * * *. Yes.

Ms. SAWYER. And you did clarify that with regard again to Secretary Clinton, during her tenure, and even the law as it stands

today does not outright prohibit the use of personal email for official government business. That’s accurate?

Mr. * * *. Without the benefit of reading that law, I think that’s

accurate.

BY MS. BOYD

Q: So I want to go back, this is I think a little bit different than

what Heather was asking you. Just to be clear, I’m going back to

Secretary Rice. To your knowledge, does the State Department

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have any email records from former Secretary Rice that were sent

to or from an official unclassified State Department email address?

A: Not that I know of.

Q: And to your knowledge, does the State Department have any

email records from former Secretary Rice that were sent to or from

her personal email account?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Thank you.

BY MS. SAWYER

Q: Can I just ask a generalized question? In a lot of the discussion that I feel like we have had with you, seems to me the focus

seems a little as if your goal as State Department record-keeper,

not yours, but the Department’s, is somewhat kind of punitive with

regards to going back. I’m just trying to get a sense, it seems that

what have you tried to convey to us is that the goal here is just

to make sure that, to the greatest extent possible, you have captured what should and could be captured as a Federal record, not

to go out and punish people after the fact. Is that accurate?

A: We want a full and complete record of, you know, Department

operations and business.

Q: So, in that regard, with regard to the notion of alienation,

from your perspective, is the goal to kind of cure any potential gaps

that may have been—that may exist in the Federal records by, I’ve

heard the term ‘‘clawback,’’ ‘‘collect,’’ ‘‘use,’’ by taking efforts affirmatively to go out and get back or ask someone to undertake their

own review of their records and ensure they have turned over what

could be deemed a Federal record?

A: I’m still a little confused about the question.

Q: I’m trying to get a sense of the State Department’s perspective

on when an issue has been identified about the potential that there

are Federal records that are not in your possession?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Whether the goal is to just then cure that potential gap in

Federal records by reaching out—in this case, you reached out to

four former Secretaries and asked them to conduct a personal review and turn over whatever documents they believe may qualify.

A: So is that a normal practice that we go out and do that?

Q: Well, let’s just say with regard to what you guys did for these

four Secretaries, just limit it to that, was that your goal was to

have them each either them or through a representative, conduct

a personal review and return to the Department all of the documents they deemed might be Federal records?

A: I believe so.

Ms. BOYD. We can go back on the record.

Some people have called for a third-party audit of former Secretary Clinton’s server to assess what emails might be found on it.

To your knowledge, has the State Department ever run an internal audit on any former Secretary of State’s email account to determine what, if any, emails it contained or whether those emails

were appropriately designated as Federal records?

Mr. * * *. Not to my knowledge.

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BY MS. SAWYER

Q: I am going to shift gears now and I am going to ask you a

series of questions as a little bit of preface. As you might be aware,

this is now the eighth Congressional investigation into the

Benghazi attacks. We on the committee, and I think all Members,

are very committed to ensuring it is the last. We are, therefore,

asking a series of questions of everyone that appears before the

committee.

This series of questions is an attempt to capture what have been

the very common allegations that have been made over time. It is

our understanding that our colleagues in the majority intend to

pursue these allegations. They haven’t been taken off the table. So

we are, therefore, asking you about them.

What we are interested in hearing about here is whether or not

you have firsthand knowledge or evidence of any of these allegations. A lot of people have opinions, a lot of people can speculate,

but what we are really after is firsthand information.

I would just ask you to bear with me. There is about a dozen.

And I will just read through them in a manner that I hope is very

clear. If you don’t hear me, I will repeat it.

It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attack. One Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to

stand down, and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the

night of the attacks?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it ‘‘4 Pinocchios,’’

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day security

resources in Benghazi?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or

fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in spring 2011?

A: No.

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Q: It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence found that ‘‘the CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria’’ and they found no support for

this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee’s bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in Benghazi

were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria

or to any other foreign country?

A: No.

Q: A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission compound

and there have been a number of allegations about the cause of

and the appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not

ordered to ‘‘stand down,’’ but that instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House Intelligence Committee’s finding that there was no stand down ordered

to CIA personnel?

A: No.

Q: Putting aside whether you personally agree with the decision

to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do you have

any evidence that there was a ‘‘bad’’ or ‘‘improper’’ reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA’s security personnel who departed

the Annex to assist the Special Mission compound?

A: Could you repeat the beginning of that?

Q: Putting aside whether you personally agree with the decision

to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do you have

any evidence that there was a ‘‘bad’’ or ‘‘improper’’ reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA’s security personnel who departed

the Annex to assist?

A: No.

Q: A concern has been raised by one individual that in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that

were provided to the ARB?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or

scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided

to the ARB?

A: No.

Q: Let me ask these questions also for documents that were provided to Congress.

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Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that

were provided to Congress?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA ‘‘faithfully performed our duties in

accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and nonpartisanship.’’

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell

gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about

the Benghazi talking points?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on a Sunday talk show

about the Benghazi attack.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attack on a Sunday talk

show?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the

attack and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing

in action on the night of the attack?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel at

Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attack who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered

to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that there was no stand down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the

House Armed Services Committee that there was no stand down

order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to

join the fight in Benghazi?

A: No.

Q: And finally, it has been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives.

However, former Republican Congressman Howard Buck McKeon,

former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the attack after which he stated, ‘‘given where

the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how

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quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn’t have done more than we

did. ’’

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon’s

conclusion?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military assets available to them on the night of the attack that could have

saved lives, but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided

not to deploy?

A: No.

Q: I think that concludes our questions. Again, we very much appreciate your time and willingness to answer all of our questions.

We know that it is not an easy thing to come and testify, but we

do appreciate you coming up voluntarily to do so.

A: Thank you.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: There has been recent press reporting that there was no automatic archiving of emails of other senior leaders within the State

Department and that a request similar to that that went out to the

former secretaries have gone out to some other former senior leaders of the State Department. Are you familiar with that?

A: Could you get more precise with the question just so I make

sure I answer it correctly?

Q: All right.

Ms. SAWYER. Sharon, can I just ask a quick question since we are

up on time?

Is this related to the scope of our investigation? Are we talking

about senior officials involved in?

Ms. JACKSON. Yes.

Ms. SAWYER. So can you clarify?

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: So there has been recent press reporting that there was no

automatic archiving of emails of other senior leaders within the

State Department and that a request went out recently for them

to search their own records for information responsive or Federal

records that they may have in their possession.

Are you familiar with that generally? And then I am going to ask

you specifically, what is your understanding, because press reporting may be inaccurate?

A: I would like to see the actual article, because I am a little unsure of myself.

Q: The thing is we don’t have it.

Ms. BETZ. It is hard to understand from your question what you

are talking about. I don’t know what you are talking about from

your question.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I don’t know what automatic archiving

is.

If you know what automatic archiving is and he has some concept of automatic archiving, I would be curious to hear what that

is.

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BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Let me ask this. Are you aware of any letter that went out

to former principles of the State Department that is similar in nature to the letters that went out to the four former Secretaries of

State?

A: I can’t remember for sure, but something related to a subpoena from you guys to a number of individuals. But I am not—

I am not aware that we—I have never heard of that we sent out

a letter like this to, are you talking about ambassadors, assistant

secretaries or——

Q: This would have been former deputy secretaries, other seventh floor under secretaries, other individuals on the seventh floor

such as the chief of staff, deputy chief of staff. Was there any letter

that went out requesting that they review their personal records to

see if they had any official records in their possession, to your

knowledge?

Mr. EVERS. If you know.

Mr. * * *. Well, something happened in relationship to that subpoena, but I am not directly involved with that.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Who would be involved in that?

A: I was sent the copies of the subpoenas, and I think letters

were sent, but I am on shaky ground here. I can’t.

Q: Who sent you the copies of the subpoena?

A: It would have come from Under Secretary Kennedy’s office.

Q: And you believe letters were sent?

A: I think letters were sent in response to this subpoena, but I

can’t remember all the details about this.

Q: And to the best of your recollection, would those letters have

been sent from Under Secretary Kennedy’s office?

A: Yes, to the best of my recollection.

Q: Okay. That is all the questions I have.

BY MS. SAWYER

Q: And then just one question.

Did you ever see a subpoena that had been issued that these letters were supposedly sent in response to?

A: Yes.

Q: You did.

A: They sent me—I received an email, I believe it was a copy of

a subpoena, from this committee.

Q: And have you seen any of the actual letters that went out?

A: I can’t remember.

Q: Okay. Fair enough. What, if any, steps were you supposed to

do in response to this subpoena that was sent to you?

A: I think my name was on the letters is possible, so I think that

is why they were sent to me. But, you know, I would really like

to do my own fact checking before I say with absolute certainty.

Ms. JACKSON. Then we would make a request that you go back

and look for that information and produce it to this committee.

Could you do that for us?

Ms. DUVAL. What information are you requesting?

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Ms. JACKSON. The email that was sent to him with the subpoena,

if there was any copy of the letters that were sent, and produce

that.

. Why do you need it?

Ms. JACKSON. It has to do with Congressional oversight.

. Of what?

Ms. JACKSON. Of the State Department’s compliance with the request.

. Okay. So Congressional oversight of the State Department’s compliance with Congressional requests?

Ms. JACKSON. Yes.

Ms. SAWYER. And I would just state for the record I am not sure

that we are actually entitled to internal correspondence about how

they respond to a subpoena issued by Congress. This is a conversation, Mr. * * *, that doesn’t directly involve you, so I am not directing a question at you. I would just state for the record that I

think that may be well beyond not only the scope of the investigation, but scope of normal practice about internal communications,

so we can have that.

. And to be clear, my okay meant I understand what

Sharon is asking for and that she is asking for it because she

wants information about how the State Department is responding

to Congressional oversight requests. That was what my okay responded to. It was not an assent that that is part of the Benghazi

committee’s investigation or anything that the executive branch

generally turns over.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: And one final issue. It has been a long morning into the early

afternoon. As you sit here before we depart for the day and as you

reflect on the questions that have been asked and the answers that

you have given, is there anything that you would like to clarify, retract, or add to any of your answers that you have given today?

A: I can’t think of anything at the moment.

Q: And again, Mr. * * *, I join in with my colleagues in thanking

you for your time.

Yes?

A: I do have something to say. That I have strived to be as truthful and honest and accurate as I can be, okay.

Q: And this committee very much appreciates that.

A: And I am a career Federal civil servant trying to do my job

and support records in the Federal Government.

Q: Okay. And thank you for your service. You have a good day.

[Whereupon, at 1:27 p. m., the interview was concluded. ]

Ms. DUVAL

Ms. DUVAL

Ms. DUVAL

Ms. DUVAL

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EXHIBIT 1

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EXHIBIT 2

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EXHIBIT 3

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EXHIBIT 4

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INTERVIEW OF CHIEF OF STATION

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JULY 16, 2015
Excerpts of the foregoing interview transcript were cited in the

Report of the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the

interview transcript.

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