DNN Sentinel

in this issue:

Vol. II, No. 2

 defense by other means

u.s. department of energy (doe)

national nuclear security administration (nnsa)

defense nuclear nonproliferation (dnn) National Nuclear Security Administration 

2 NNSA Releases 

New NPCR

3 China’s New Center of 

Excellence on Nuclear 

Security Opens 

4 Strengthening 

Safeguards through 

Regional Cooperation in 

the Asia-Pacific

5 Gray Awarded Hutcheon 

Fellowship at IAEA

6 U.S., ROK Committed to 

Peaceful Nuclear Uses

8 Competing for a Grade 

and Our Nuclear Security

9 Operation Sputnik—

First Remote Deployment 

of MPF

10 Expert Profile: NSDD 

Chief Scientist Retires

11 Take it to the Cloud—

Secure Computing

12 Training in Tbilisi Facility 

for IAEA Inspectors

14 Country Profile: Ukraine

16 FAQs: 2016 Nuclear 

Security Summit

ENERGY

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

BELARUS

HUNGARY

MOLDOVA

POLAND

ROMANIA

RUSSIA

SLOVAKIA

UKRAINE

Black Sea

Kiev

From the Deputy 

Administrator

The fourth Nuclear Security Summit—the last in the 

current format—is behind us, but the DNN work that 

made President Obama’s Summit series such a success proceeds 

apace. DNN’s core activities all began long before the Summits and 

remain central to implementing U.S. commitments. Because the 

Summits significantly expanded the international community engaged 

in nuclear security and accelerated the pace of work, DNN’s universe 

of opportunities to work with partners globally to achieve our shared 

goal of permanent threat reduction has expanded significantly. DNN’s 

active engagement with relevant international organizations serves as a 

multiplier in these efforts and enables us to build on the progress made. 

The newly-formed Nuclear Security Contact Group will serve as a focal 

point for those countries that choose to continue the process of meeting 

at least annually at senior levels to discuss how they are sustaining and 

expanding their nuclear security commitments. https://nnsa.energy.gov/

blog/nnsa-keeps-promises-borne-out-nuclear-security-summit 

We have highlighted in Congressional testimony and elsewhere the value 

of the political energy that the Summit series generated and nowhere 

was that more evident than in securing entry-into-force of the amended 

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities 

(CPPNMF). This Convention redefines international standards for the 

security of nuclear facilities, including insider threats and sabotage, and 

protection of nuclear materials in use, storage, and transit. Ensuring 

implementation of the CPPNMF will be an important next step in our 

global nuclear security engagement. Another vehicle that will enable 

DNN to advance the nuclear security agenda is the growing network of 

centers of excellence (COEs). COEs serve as centralized locations where 

a country or region can send professionals for training in various aspects 

of nuclear security. These centers broadly advance the global nuclear 

security agenda by addressing the need for capacity building, technology 

development, and coordination of assistance. DNN programs make 
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

DNN SENTINEL: 

DEFENSE BY OTHER MEANS

VOL. II, NO. 2

http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/

ourprograms/nonproliferation-0

Editor-in-Chief

Anne Harrington

Editorial Board

Sid Bartlett

Andrew Brown

Emily Eng

Jaci Dickerson

Erika Hunsicker

Michelle Livingston

Sarah Norris

John Wengle

Meghan Wool

Editorial Advisors

Corey Hinderstein

Andrew Hood

Editor

Elaine Specht

Graphics 

Mike Crew

Sarah Kaukeinen

Visit us!

Email us at DNNOutreach@nnsa.doe.gov 

to request to be added to the mailing list.

Check Out Our Latest Blog

NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Leaders 

Gather in Nation’s Capital

https://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa%E2%80%99s-defense-nuclearnonproliferation-leaders-gather-nations-capital-0

 National Nuclear Security Administration 

important contributions to all of these efforts. https://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/

factsheets/coe

New tools like the Contact Group, the amended CPPNMF, and COEs will be invaluable 

as DNN works with its partners to counter a formidable array of emerging threats and 

challenges, including technological developments such as additive manufacturing, 

unmanned aerial vehicles, and cyber attacks. Other threats and challenges relate 

to political and economic developments like the global expansion of nuclear power, 

increased opportunities for illicit nuclear material trafficking due to expanding global 

trade volumes, and eroded control within weak or failing states.

While we celebrate our Summit successes, DNN remains focused on the future. The 

leadership, technical expertise, and creativity found within the team that stretches from 

headquarters across the entire DOE technical complex will continue to be called upon 

to respond to emerging threats and to seize new opportunities. 

Anne Harrington

Deputy Administrator

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

2

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Mailing List!

NNSA Releases New NPCR

NNSA released the second edition of Prevent, Counter, 

and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear 

Threats (FY 2017–FY 2021) on April 1, an update to the FY 

2016 edition of the report. Also referred to as the “FY 2017 

NPCR,” the report summarizes significant developments 

within NNSA’s nuclear threat reduction mission and details 

the restructuring and integration of the programs responsible for preventing, countering, and responding to nuclear 

threats. Foremost among developments since last year’s 

inaugural report is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

(also known as the “Iran deal”), which blocks Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon, 

rolls back its nuclear infrastructure and nuclear material stockpile, and grants 

international inspectors unprecedented access to nuclear-related facilities and sites 

in Iran. The FY 2017 NPCR also highlights the implications to NNSA’s nuclear threat 

reduction programs from the emergence of new terrorist threats in Western Europe 

and the United States, as well as the Administration’s FY 2017 proposal to pursue the 

“dilution and disposal” approach for disposing of excess weapons-grade plutonium. 

Read more and access both the FY 2017 and FY 2016 reports at http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/

aboutus/ourprograms/dnn/npcr.

Letter from the Deputy Administrator – Continued

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3

China’s New Center of Excellence on 

Nuclear Security Opens 

On March 18, 2016, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, 

accompanied by senior officials from DOE/NNSA and 

several DOE laboratories, the Department of Defense 

(DOD), and a host of international VIPs joined the China Atomic 

Energy Authority (CAEA) to commission China’s State Nuclear 

Security Technology Center (SNSTC), its new nuclear security 

center of excellence. The SNSTC—a significant Chinese deliverable 

for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit—was designed to meet 

China’s domestic nuclear security training requirements, provide 

a forum for bilateral and regional best practice exchanges, and 

serve as a venue for demonstrating advanced technologies related 

to nuclear security. CAEA is responsible for management and 

operation of the center. Development has been a cost-shared 

project between DOE/NNSA, DOD, and CAEA/SNSTC.

Learn more: http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa-deputy-administratorcreedon-travels-china

SNSTC Director General DENG Ge describes the Mock Facility capabilities 

to Secretary Moniz, while (L to R) DOE Beijing Director Helena Fu, 

Principal Deputy Madelyn Creedon, and U.S. Project Manager Nancy 

Peterson look on.

Main entrance to newly opened facility.

Secretary Moniz with the project leadership: (L to R) CAEA Deputy Director 

Liu Yongde, Secretary Moniz, CAEA Chairman Xu, U.S. Project Manager 

Nancy Peterson, and SNSTC Director General DENG Ge.

Secretary Moniz with the senior representatives of the 

U.S. National Laboratories involved in the project: 

(L to R) Dr. Tom Zacharia, Deputy Laboratory Director 

for Science & Technology, Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory; Ms. Jill Hruby, President and Laboratories 

Director, Sandia National Laboratories; Secretary 

Moniz; Dr. Steve Ashby, Laboratory Director, Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory; Dr. Terry Wallace, 

Principal Associate Director, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory. 

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4

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Regional Cooperation to Strengthen 

Safeguards in the Asia-Pacific

By Margot Minnini and Oksana Elkhamri

President Obama’s 

decision over four 

years ago to “pivot” 

toward Asia represented 

an important strategic shift 

in American foreign policy 

and a rebalancing of U.S. 

economic and security 

engagement with Asia-Pacific 

countries. The United States 

has since supported a 

variety of regional initiatives 

aimed at promoting nuclear 

security and safeguards in 

Asia. When a new regional 

organization, the Asia-Pacific 

Safeguards Network (APSN) 

was established in 2010, 

DOE/NNSA became an 

early member and enthusiastic advocate. Launched on the 

initiative of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and 

Indonesia, APSN members collaborate to strengthen the 

quality and effectiveness of safeguards implementation in 

the Asia-Pacific region. 

Under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 

each non-nuclear weapons state must submit its peaceful 

nuclear programs to inspections by the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA). Developing the technical expertise 

and infrastructure necessary to implement this international 

commitment can be daunting for national entities, particularly 

those with minimal nuclear infrastructures. 

The APSN offers a unique regional framework to address 

this challenge through sharing of experiences and lessons 

learned, training to address priority needs, and fostering 

peer-to-peer networks that build Member States’ confidence 

in their ability to support the nonproliferation regime. 

Surrogate material is used for simulated physical inventorytaking during an APSN regional Safeguards Inspections 

Workshop exercise hosted by Indonesia.

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Participants in the 6th APSN meeting held in Tokyo in 

November 2015. 

Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network

Members

Observers

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While its Members are government or governmentaffiliated entities, APSN ultimately is a professional network 

rather than a formal intergovernmental organization or 

a regional inspectorate. It has the flexibility to advance 

nonproliferation goals through meetings and technically-focused workshops that address matters of mutual interest, 

building bonds and collegial ties. To this end, APSN, with 

DOE/NNSA’s support, has played an important role in 

welcoming Myanmar into the regional safeguards community and has signed a Memorandum of Understanding 

with the European Safeguards Research and Development 

Association (ESARDA).

Today, 15 Member States comprise the APSN, with several others expected to join at the upcoming 2016 Plenary. 

The IAEA holds permanent observer status. The Australian 

Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) served for 

four years as inaugural Chair. In the words of the former 

Chair, Dr. Robert Floyd, “APSN is a wonderfully supportive 

community of practice where we assist one another in doing the best job we can at implementing safeguards in our 

national contexts. This is a good model for other regions of 

the world.” The Chair role has now transitioned to Japan 

by a unanimous vote. Current Chair, Mr. Kazutoshi Aikawa, 

Director-General of Disarmament, Non-proliferation and 

Science Department of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

has expressed strong motivation to broaden collaboration 

with other institutions for strengthening the safeguards 

system to secure nonproliferation goals. 

There are no fees to join the network; the APSN relies on 

the goodwill and financial support of its Members to host 

meetings, seminars, and training activities. Recognizing 

the importance of the APSN mechanism to build regional 

safeguards networks and know-how, DOE/NNSA will continue to work with the APSN Secretariat and like-minded 

partners to promote ASPN and foster inter-regional 

communication and capacity-building training.

See the APSN website for more information: 

http://www.apsn-safeguards.org/.

Margot Minnini currently is DNN’s International Nuclear 

Safeguards Engagement Program Manager for S.E. Asia. Oksana 

Elkhamri is a Senior Research Scientist at the Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory. She has supported DOE/NNSA’s safeguards 

engagement in Asia-Pacific for the past decade.

Asia-Pacific – Continued Gray Awarded 

Hutcheon Fellowship 

at IAEA

DNN has named Thomas Gray the first recipient of 

a fellowship established in honor of the late Dr. Ian 

Hutcheon, a longtime member of the scientific staff 

of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The 

fellowship supports a two-year assignment as a Junior 

Professional Officer in support of the International Atomic 

Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Division of Nuclear Security.

During his 22-year tenure at 

LLNL, Dr. Hutcheon made 

significant contributions 

as group leader for the 

Chemical and Isotopic 

Signatures Group in Nuclear 

and Chemical Sciences Division and deputy director of 

the Glenn Seaborg Institute, Physical and Life Sciences 

Directorate. He was a key developer of nuclear forensics 

as both a field of scientific investigation and as a scientific 

discipline applied to national security.

At the time of his selection, 

Gray was serving in DNN’s 

Front Office as part of the 

NNSA Graduate Fellowship 

Program (NGFP) administered by Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory. Over the 

course of the next two years, 

Gray expects to continue 

developing his experience 

in nuclear security, albeit 

with a broader international 

perspective at the IAEA. 

“This fellowship represents an exciting opportunity: the 

IAEA’s role in nuclear security continues to grow, and now 

that President Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit agenda 

is winding down, that role will be even more important” 

Gray said. He will be assisting with IAEA’s International 

Conference on Nuclear Security in December 2016.

To learn more, go to https://www.llnl.gov/news/nnsa-fellowshiphonor-ian-hutcheon and http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/secretarymoniz-awards-hutcheon-memorial-nonproliferation-fellowshipthomas-gray. 

Tom Gray practices using a 

handheld radiation detector 

during the NGFP orientation 

held at PNNL last summer.

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6

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Back to Table of Contents

United States and the Republic of Korea Share 

Commitment to Peaceful Nuclear Uses

T

he first meeting of the High Level Bilateral Commission 

(HLBC) between the United States and the Republic 

of Korea (ROK) took place in Seoul on April 14, 2016. 

This new coordination mechanism was established under 

the new Agreement for Cooperation Between the United 

States of America and the Republic of Korea Concerning 

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the U.S.-ROK 123 

Agreement). The HLBC is co-chaired by U.S. Deputy 

Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall and ROK 

Vice Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-Yul, and will 

meet annually to review progress under the U.S.-ROK 123 

Agreement. 

About the 123 Agreement 

The U.S.-ROK 123 Agreement entered into force on 

November 25, 2015. It allows for the continued export of 

nuclear material, equipment, and major components to the 

ROK and by ROK exporters to approved third countries, but 

does not provide the ROK with U.S. consent to enrich or 

reprocess U.S.-supplied nuclear material. The Administrative 

Arrangement (AA) to the U.S.-ROK 123 Agreement, signed 

by DOE Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and NNSA 

Administrator Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Frank Klotz and ROK Nuclear 

Safety and Security Commission Chair Un Chul Lee on 

April 1 on the margins of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, 

specifies the tracking and reporting procedures that the 

United States and the Republic of Korea will follow when 

implementing the 123 Agreement’s provisions.

About the HLBC

The HLBC was created as a senior-level forum to facilitate 

strategic dialogue and technical exchanges on peaceful 

nuclear cooperation between the United States and the ROK 

in the area of civil nuclear energy. It operates through four 

working groups that reflect the key priorities of President 

Obama and ROK President Park Geun-hye for the new 123 

Agreement: spent fuel management, promotion of nuclear 

exports and export control cooperation, assured fuel supply, 

and nuclear security. 

Accompanying Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall to 

the April HLBC meeting were U.S. delegation representatives from NNSA, DOE’s Offices of Nuclear Energy and 

Environmental Management, the Department of State, the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National Security 

Council. 

Chairman Un Chul Lee, left, of the Republic of Korea’s 

Nuclear Safety and Security Commission and DOE Under 

Secretary for Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator 

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Frank Klotz signed the Administrative 

Arrangement to the Agreement for Cooperation.

Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall and Vice Minister Cho 

announced the launch of the HLBC and established its four 

working groups during a meeting held in March 2016.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall and 

Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Korea Cho 

Tae-Yul co-chaired the first HLBC in April 2016.

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7

Long-Term Cooperation

The HLBC is another example of the long-term relationship between the United States and its Korean partners. 

Working with organizations such as the Korea Institute 

of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control and the Korea 

Atomic Energy Research Institute, the two countries have 

cooperated to develop, test, and deploy advanced nuclear 

safeguards technologies to improve nuclear verification 

capabilities. 

Many elements in the Department of Energy support collaboration with the ROK. The U.S. National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 

(DNN) partnered with the ROK in establishing its nuclear 

security Center of Excellence, the International Nuclear 

Security Academy (INSA). INSA represents the realization of 

a high-priority commitment made by the ROK at the 2010 

Nuclear Security Summit and reinforced during the 2012 

Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul. DNN provided key 

support throughout the design of the physical protection 

test bed at the facility and development of the training 

curriculum now being offered in the areas of safeguards, 

physical protection, and export control. Together, DNN and 

INSA reach out to third countries to participate in courses 

at INSA. Additionally, although they do not possess highly 

enriched uranium (HEU) themselves, the ROK has been 

an outstanding partner in HEU minimization efforts, both 

at the government and technical levels. The ROK’s leadership in international HEU minimization, highlighted in its 

active participation at the Nuclear Security Summits, also 

is evident in ROK’s work with the Europeans and United 

States to help develop a new high-density low enriched 

uranium fuel that can be used to convert high performance 

research reactors.

Finally, DNN and the Korean Customs Service (KCS) work 

together to combat nuclear smuggling. The radiation 

detection system, installed with support from DNN and 

now operated by KCS at the port of Busan, screens cargo 

passing through one of Asia’s largest seaports. 

See related press releases at:

http://energy.gov/articles/statement-first-meeting-united-statesrepublic-korea-high-level-bilateral-commission

http://energy.gov/articles/statement-launch-us-republic-koreahigh-level-bilateral-commission-pursuant-agreement 

http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/

statement-signing-administrative-arrangement-agreementcooperation-between

U.S. and the ROK – Continued

The Nuclear Security 

Summit and HLBC: 

Bringing Things Full Circle

The United States and the ROK share much in 

common, particularly in the area of nuclear security. 

The ROK took up the mantle of nuclear security by 

hosting the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. 

At the most recent Summit, the ROK continued 

its leadership role by sponsoring the “Supporting 

Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Preparedness 

and Response Capabilities” Gift Basket, which was 

signed by 24 countries plus the United Nations and 

INTERPOL. Through the Gift Basket, 24 countries 

plus the United Nations and INTERRPOL agreed to 

a number of measures related to nuclear terrorism 

preparedness and response capabilities within their 

borders and in partnership with the international 

community. The Gift Basket also recognizes that 

ensuring adequate nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities contributes to 

strengthening the interface between nuclear safety 

and security, an additional deterrent to attack. In 

keeping with the spirit of this Gift Basket, NNSA’s 

Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation 

continues to work with the ROK as a partner to 

strengthen preparedness and response capabilities 

to reduce risks and protect the public. The Nuclear 

Security Working Group of the HLBC may prove to 

be a venue for bilateral engagement to help meet 

Gift Basket commitments.

President Barack Obama and then President Lee 

Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea shake hands during 

their press conference before the 2012 Nuclear Security 

Summit. (Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy)

Back to Table of Contents
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

8 Back to Table of Contents

Competing for a Grade and Our Nuclear Security

By Vicki Hinkel, Photos by Lance King

J

oining forces, Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC and 

the University of Tennessee (UT) offer well-rounded 

training—both on the Knoxville campus and at Y-12 

National Security Complex—for our nation’s next generation 

of nuclear security decision makers. Y-12 recently hosted a

tour and 3-D battle board challenge for graduate students. 

Like a chess game, the exercise involved strategic moves 

by a team protecting a mock nuclear facility and a team 

attacking the facility to seize control of the stored nuclear 

material. 

The blue team’s leader (Michael Moore, nuclear engineering student, 

seated) described his team’s next move to protect the virtual cache 

of enriched uranium. At the end of the day, Moore’s team prevailed, 

successfully defending the stored nuclear material.

When UT’s Nuclear Security Science and Analysis class and Y-12 

nuclear security subject matter experts conducted a day-long tour 

and battle board challenge in Oak Ridge, students caught a valuable 

inside-the-fence glimpse of the kinds of nuclear security they had 

studied in the classroom.

After the event, in preparation for the next semester, standing left to 

right, Y-12’s Greg Verner, Howard Hall (UT), Jeff Knott, and John Gill 

(UT) summarized the battle board event and the lessons learned. 

Ground rules were set before the battle board engagement—a 

simulated attack on an enriched uranium storage facility—began. 

Back to Table of Contents
9

Operation Sputnik—

First Remote 

Deployment of Mobile 

Plutonium Facility

When a country finds itself in a position where 

it will dismantle a nuclear weapons capability 

(sometimes termed a “rollback”), the United States 

might be required to rapidly deploy capabilities to support 

and verify the dismantlement. The Mobile Plutonium Facility 

(MPF) is being developed for such a foreign rollback scenario 

to characterize, stabilize, and repackage plutonium-bearing 

materials. It is housed in a series of rapidly deployable 

modules configured in intermodal shipping containers like 

those seen on railcars and container ships. The MPF was 

developed by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) 

under the auspices of DNN’s Office of Nuclear Material 

Removal, with nondestructive assay characterization support 

provided by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) under the 

guidance of DNN’s Office of Nuclear Verification. 

In December 2015, the three national laboratories and two 

offices in DNN conducted the first-ever exercise involving 

partial deployment of the MPF. The exercise focused on 

deploying the MPF’s “transportainers” (shipping containers) 

that house the radiography, nondestructive assay, power, 

and satellite communications units. Dubbed “Operation 

Sputnik” because it represented the first satellite deployment 

of MPF modules, the measurement campaign exercise went 

off without a hitch. 

Held at LANL, the measurement campaign exercised the 

nondestructive assay and radiography capabilities on actual 

sealed special nuclear material standards and sources. 

Together, these two analysis techniques provide rapid, 

real-time, and non-intrusive characterization of an unknown 

or suspect radioactive material so that the best technical 

path forward for removal can be identified.

The radiography and nondestructive assay modules, or 

transportainers, of the MPF deployed at LANL during Operation 

Sputnik.

Team members working inside an MPF transportainer during 

Operation Sputnik.

Members of the SRNL/LANL/PNNL team after successfully 

completing Operation Sputnik in December 2015.

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10

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Expert Profile: NSDD Chief Scientist Retires

Dr. Mark Abhold retired from Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL) in March 2016 after 30 years 

of dedicated public service. Over the course of 

his career, Dr. Abhold made contributions in many areas, 

including nuclear safeguards, development of nuclear threat 

detection instrumentation, and countering nuclear smuggling. 

Most recently, he served as Chief Scientist to DNN’s Nuclear 

Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) Program. 

NSDD works with international partners around the world to 

enhance their capabilities to deter, detect, and investigate 

the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials.

When asked what first piqued his interest in the field of 

nuclear security, Dr. Abhold explains that it “happened by 

chance when one of my college professors assigned me to 

a special project on the health consequences of radon buildup in homes.” The professor encouraged Mark to consider 

a graduate degree in nuclear engineering. A few years later, 

Mark finished his PhD and moved forward on the path that 

eventually brought him to NSDD. 

Along the way, Dr. Abhold helped develop and install safeguards systems in Japan, developed equipment standards 

used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 

helped train IAEA inspectors, and assisted with deploying 

nuclear threat detection equipment at the Port Authority of 

New York and New Jersey.

During his tenure with NSDD, Dr. Abhold led efforts to 

conduct performance testing on radiation detection systems, 

such as radiation portal monitors, mobile detection vans 

and handheld equipment. “Mark’s work was instrumental in 

helping NSDD understand detection equipment performance 

and maximize its effectiveness in detecting special nuclear 

materials, such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium,” 

said NSDD Director Laurel Cotton. “Mark helped ensure 

that we have a sound technical and scientific basis for all 

that we do.” 

While with NSDD, Dr. Abhold also led threat analyses, 

provided technical reachback for radiation alarms, mentored 

countless junior staff, and briefed key stakeholders—including Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and 

the Government Accountability Office—on the technical 

aspects of radiation detection systems. “Mark’s ability to 

communicate complex technical topics to any audience is 

truly remarkable,” said Ms. Cotton.

Honors and 

Achievements

•	 Commendation from 

the U.S. House of 

Representatives Select 

Committee on 

Homeland Security

•	 Los Alamos Distinguished Performance 

Award (two-time recipient) 

•	 Los Alamos Achievement Award

•	 Outstanding Teaching Award, 

University of Washington

•	 Numerous publications

•	 Co-authored the textbook, Nuclear 

Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation; 

Achieving Security with Technology and Policy

Distinguished Service

•	 Los Alamos National Laboratory

- Advanced Technology Group, Chief Scientist 

for the NSDD Program

- Rad/Nuc Threat Reduction at the Center for 

Homeland Security, Associate Director 

- Advanced Technology Group at the TA-18 

site—developed nuclear threat detection 

instrumentation

- Safeguards Science and Technology 

Group—Measured the remaining uranium 

content in high level uranium fuels provided 

by the United States to foreign countries 

under the Atoms for Peace program

•	 TRW Inc.

- Developed requirements for the Yucca 

Mountain high-level waste repository

- Worked on classified spacecraft and ballistic 

missiles designing electronics and spacecraft 

structures that would survive radiation from 

a nuclear burst in or above the atmosphere; 

helped design a military satellite now 

displayed in the Smithsonian National Air 

and Space Museum’s Udvar-Hazy Center

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11

Take it to the Cloud—

A Secure System for 

Export-Controlled 

Computing Technologies 

By Timothy E. Valentine 

T

hanks to support from NNSA’s Office of Defense 

Nuclear Nonproliferation and DOE’s Office of Nuclear 

Energy, certain foreign nationals working or studying 

in the United States and participating in bilateral or 

multilateral activities can access computer modelling codes 

critical to their work in nuclear physics, mathematics, and 

engineering through a secure cloud system. The Radiation 

Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC) at 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory developed and deployed 

the secure cloud system to provide approved foreign 

nationals access to export-controlled computing tools. 

This system addresses the concern of providing access 

to export-controlled modelling and simulation tools while 

also fostering international cooperation in the interest of the 

U.S. Government. RSICC’s secure cloud server contains 

the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code and the 

Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP) 

code, both under the jurisdiction of the NNSA, as well 

as the SCALE code system under the jurisdiction of the 

Department of Commerce. The server has a peak theoretical 

performance speed of 24.6 teraflops that can easily 

accommodate 100 to 200 simultaneous users. Approval 

to gain access to the system depends on the requester’s 

citizenship, location, and end use. 

RSICC is an information analysis center that collects, 

archives, evaluates, synthesizes, and distributes information, 

data, and codes used in various nuclear technology applications. RSICC retains more than 2,000 software packages 

provided by code developers from various federal and 

international agencies. RSICC’s customers include scientists, 

engineers, and students from around the world who require 

access to such computing codes (source and/or executable versions) and data to promote ongoing research and 

education programs, help ensure nuclear and radiological 

safety, and advance nuclear technology. However, in light 

of nonproliferation and national security concerns about 

sharing codes and data that could be diverted from their 

intended purposes, NNSA helped develop alternatives—

such as the secure cloud server.

NNSA’s support of the secure cloud server benefits U.S. 

educational programs and important international collaborations. Currently, there are approximately 50 individuals 

actively using the secure cloud server for a variety of 

applications including nuclear security, nonproliferation, 

reactor design, medicine, and fusion. Most of the users are 

foreign nationals studying at U.S. universities. An example 

of a significant international collaboration is with ITER, the 

international nuclear fusion megaproject under construction 

in the south of France. Access to the secure cloud has been 

provided to allow ITER contributors to use the MCNP code 

for the design of shielding and safety systems. Development 

of the shielding for ITER is important to ensure safety while 

minimizing excess conservatism in the design that could 

drive up its costs. Without access to the secure cloud server, 

the project participants would not be able to meet their 

obligations to design the shielding and safety systems.

RSICC Director Dr. Timothy E. Valentine is responsible for leading 

and expanding the services and operations of the center as well 

as international collaborations with the Nuclear Energy Agency of 

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and 

the Japanese Research Organization for Information Science and 

Technology. Prior to his role at RSICC, Dr. Valentine was detailed to 

the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and the Natural Resources 

as a science and nuclear policy advisor. 

Conceptual design of the ITER Fusion Reactor. Approved project 

participants are using nuclear simulation codes available through 

RSICC’s secure cloud to aid design of the ITER shielding and safety 

systems. 

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12

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Training in Tbilisi Facility Provides New 

Perspectives for IAEA Inspectors

By Cornelia Brim

T

he Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) 

sponsors training at the Andronikashvili Institute 

of Physics (AIP), a “cold” nuclear facility in Tbilisi, 

Georgia, to provide International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) inspectors with a new perspective on environmental 

sampling strategies. IAEA inspectors verify the correctness 

and completeness of a State’s declared nuclear materials 

and nuclear-related activities by conducting 

inspections of nuclear facilities or locations 

through which nuclear material is expected to 

flow. The training at AIP prepares inspectors 

to develop and carry out sampling plans for 

facilities they visit, making the most of limited 

resources.

Since 2011, NPAC has supported Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) experts 

to conduct an annual week-long class for IAEA 

inspectors in a now-closed nuclear facility. The 

AIP training opportunity is unique: the Sovietera plant was built in the 1960s for medical 

isotope production. It processed materials with 

short half-lives, and was shuttered in the early 

1990s. The facility still has all the processing 

infrastructure in place—from hot cells with 

operational manipulators, to gloveboxes, and 

the transfer trolley—but there are no radiological concerns and class participants can access 

the shielded areas of the facility that they would 

not be able to access during their inspections 

of operating nuclear facilities.

“During the training students are able to crawl 

into a hot cell. Once inside, they are able to 

examine the inside features and they get a 

perspective they never would be able to get on 

the outside looking in,” said Bruce Reid, one of 

the PNNL instructors of the course. “We also 

teach them what to look for if a facility is trying 

to conceal undeclared activities.” 

The type of environmental samples studied in the class 

are “swipe” samples—a piece of cotton cloth or a swab 

is swiped over a surface, bagged, and analyzed for trace 

materials associated with nuclear-related activities. If an 

inspector can only take a limited number of samples, that 

inspector has to be judicious about selecting locations for 

sampling in a facility. If a facility is suspected of conducting 

Pairs of inspectors work together to sample a waste tank.

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13

clandestine activities, having a more detailed hands-on 

understanding of the equipment and typical processes in 

nuclear facilities might inform decisions about sampling 

locations. 

Each class consists of 10 students selected by the IAEA and 

a training coordinator, who provides feedback for next year’s 

course. To make the training realistic, students are paired 

and wear protective gear for the exercises in the Tbilisi 

facility, even though there are no radiological concerns.

“It’s wonderful to interact with the IAEA inspectors. We teach 

them new techniques and skills, but this training enables all 

of the instructors and students to benefit from one another’s 

experiences,” said Joel Tingey, a PNNL instructor. 

Instructors also work to instill situational safety awareness 

among their students. “IAEA inspectors visit many different 

types of facilities during their careers. We hope that this 

training will reinforce the message to be observant, think 

about the mission, and watch out for your fellow inspectors,” 

said Reid.

The week of instruction culminates in an exercise during 

which pairs of students plan and carry out the environmental 

sampling based upon a scenario developed by the instructors. The instructors deliver the analysis results to each pair, 

based on the sampling strategy. Students then present their 

plan and results to the class. 

Cornelia Brim is a senior communications specialist at PNNL.

Class participants prepare to take samples (top) and an IAEA 

inspector works the manipulators (bottom) and in the Tbilisi facility.

Using the manipulators inside a hot cell to take an 

environmental sample.

Training in Tbilisi – Continued

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14

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

country profile: ukraine

Nuclear accident at 

Chornobyl Nuclear 

Power Plant (while still 

part of the Soviet Union)

Became independent 

from the Soviet Union 

and elected the first 

president of Ukraine

Signed the Lisbon 

Protocol, agreeing 

to transfer nuclear 

warheads and 

missiles to Russia

Completed removal 

of all highly enriched 

uranium from within 

its borders

Completed 

construction of 

Neutron Source Facility

1986

1991

1992

2012

2014

Ukraine’s 

Nuclear 

History 

in Brief

BELARUS

HUNGARY

MOLDOVA

POLAND

ROMANIA

RUSSIA

SLOVAKIA

UKRAINE

Black Sea

Kiev

1993 Established the STCU

Acceded to the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) as a non-nuclear 

weapons state

1994

Ratified the IAEA 

Additional Protocol 2005

The United States established 

diplomatic relations with Ukraine in 

1991, following its independence 

from the Soviet Union. Since then, 

DOE/NNSA and Ukraine have 

cooperated on a wide range of 

nuclear security and nonproliferation 

projects. Ukraine has long played 

an important role in global nuclear 

nonproliferation. Ukraine voluntarily 

gave up its inherited stockpile of 

Soviet nuclear warheads (which 

in 1991 made Ukraine owner of 

the third largest nuclear warhead 

stockpile in the world). At a strategic 

crossroads between Russia and 

Western Europe, as well as between 

the Middle East/Black Sea region 

and Europe, Ukraine has cooperated 

with the United States and others to 

strengthen its capabilities to counter 

illicit nuclear material smuggling 

across its territory. And having a 

civilian nuclear power infrastructure 

that also is marked by the long-term 

damage of the 1986 Chornobyl 

nuclear reactor accident, Ukraine is 

active in the global effort to strengthen nuclear security and ensure the 

safe, secure, and safeguarded use of 

nuclear power. 

DNN Deputy Administrator Anne 

Harrington recently visited Ukraine to 

celebrate the 20th anniversary of the 

Science and Technology Center in 

Ukraine (STCU). Learn more about 

NNSA’s collaboration with the STCU 

and Harrington’s visit at http://www.

nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa-deputyadministrator-travels-ukraine.

Neutron Source Facility

While in Ukraine, Harrington, along 

with representatives of DNN’s 

Office of Material Management 

and Minimization (M3) visited the 

state-of-the-art Neutron Source 

Facility at the Kharkov Institute of 

Physics and Technology (KIPT) that 

was constructed in cooperation 

with M3 in exchange for the removal 

of all highly enriched uranium from 

Ukraine in 2012. The experimental 

facility consists of an acceleratordriven subcritical assembly using 

low enriched uranium fuel and will 

allow for advanced research and 

medical isotope production when 

fully operational. 

Since construction was completed 

in March 2014, DOE/NNSA and 

KIPT have been cooperating on 

actions needed to make the facility 

fully operational, such as fabricating 

and installing supporting equipment. 

Ukraine started commissioning the 

facility in March 2016. 

Combatting Nuclear Smuggling

DNN’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling 

Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) 

has been working with the State 

Border Guard Service of Ukraine 

since 2005 to address illicit 

trafficking in nuclear and other 

radioactive materials. NSDD has 

installed radiation detection systems 

at 68 points of entry across Ukraine, 

with 12 new sites scheduled for 

completion in FY 2016, bringing the 

total to 80 equipped points of entry. 

The State Border Guard Service 

has assumed responsibility for 

maintaining its systems on schedule. 

Committed to its Non-Nuclear Status

Entered safeguards 

agreement under 

1998 NPT into force

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15

15

NSDD also delivered 12 mobile 

detection systems to the State Border 

Guard Service of Ukraine for use along 

green borders and near the contested 

border regions. During FY 2016, NSDD 

will provide the State Security Service 

with two mobile detection systems and 

associated training. 

Radiological Security 

DNN’s Office of Radiological Security 

(ORS) has worked with Ukraine to 

provide physical protection upgrades 

at 71 active buildings that use and 

store radioactive and nuclear material, 

including 48 medical facilities, 15 

storage facilities, 5 research facilities, 

and 1 industrial facility. In addition, 

ORS has provided training in physical 

protection and security management 

principals to the State Nuclear 

Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine 

(SNRIU) and several of its licensees 

that use and store radioactive sources. 

Future ORS cooperation in this area will 

include additional physical protection 

upgrades at high priority sites, 

physical protection training for SNRIU 

inspectors, alarm response training 

for first responders to a security 

incident, and centralized monitoring to 

monitor high priority alarms for security 

incidents at radiological facilities. ORS 

also works closely with organizations 

in Ukraine to locate disused and 

orphaned radioactive sources and 

consolidate those sources at secure 

storage facilities.

Licensing, Export Control, 

and Enforcement

Since 1996, with support from the 

U.S. Department of State’s Export 

Control and Related Border Security 

Program (EXBS), DNN’s International 

Nonproliferation Export Control 

Program (INECP) has helped establish 

and train a core group of technical 

experts to support the State Service 

for Export Control of Ukraine. 

In 2001, INECP launched—with 

the State Customs Service 

of Ukraine—development of 

Commodity Identification Training 

(CIT) using technical experts at 

the State Customs Academy in 

Dnepropetrovsk and Ukraine’s 

nuclear institutes. Subsequently, the 

Academy incorporated CIT into its 

cadets’ curriculum and developed a 

professional development course for 

active Customs inspectors. Since the 

CIT cadet course was first offered 

in the fall of 2004, approximately 

900 active inspectors have attended 

CIT either through regional training 

workshops or the week-long course at 

the Academy. The Ukrainian national 

CIT program reached a milestone in 

September 2014 when the CIT was 

fully delivered by the new trainers from 

the Directorate for Specialized Training 

and Canine Support and the Customs 

Central Lab.

INECP also conducts workshops and 

conferences to raise awareness of 

Ukrainian manufacturers of nuclear 

and dual-use commodities. Resources 

for enterprises developed with INECP 

oversight include newsletters and 

publications on nonproliferation and 

export control and a dedicated website 

to deliver information to exporters 

about export controls and changes in 

Ukrainian export control legislation.

Safeguards Cooperation

Since 2009, DNN has cooperated 

with Ukraine to strengthen Ukraine’s 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) safeguards infrastructure and 

address its facility-specific safeguards 

challenges. To date, much of DNN’s 

safeguards work has focused on 

tackling complex material accountancy 

issues arising from the catastrophic 

accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear 

Power Plant (ChNPP). This material 

remains subject to IAEA safeguards. 

Major construction work on a new 

facility to more safely enclose the 

damaged reactor unit unearthed 

nuclear fuel debris. DNN led the 

development and implementation of 

an optimized radiation measurement 

system (the Chernobyl Drum Assay 

System, or CDAS) to help Ukraine 

characterize and declare this material 

to the IAEA. CDAS jointly serves 

both Ukraine’s domestic regulatory 

responsibilities and the IAEA’s 

safeguards work. Following up on this 

successful activity, DNN is partnering 

with Ukraine to address other 

safeguards challenges associated with 

unique remediation facilities at ChNPP 

and is supporting training activities 

to strengthen the effectiveness of 

Ukraine’s state system of accounting 

for and control of nuclear material.

Country Profile: Ukraine – Continued

President Poroshenko of Ukraine (center) 

inspects a Mobile Detection System van 

provided by NSDD in 2014.

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16

FAQs: 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

T

he fourth Nuclear 

Security Summit 

(NSS) concluded 

on April 1 where it 

began six years ago, 

in Washington, D.C. 

The Summit process, 

first announced by 

President Obama in his April 2009 speech in Prague, 

afforded unique opportunities for leaders to engage on, 

and reinforce their commitment to, addressing the threat 

of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The Summits also 

catalyzed and accelerated national and international actions 

in the intervening years, leading to tangible, meaningful, 

and lasting nuclear security accomplishments.

How many delegations participated in the 2016 NSS?

Fifty-two countries attended the Summit. Most were 

represented at the Head of State or Government level. 

Four international organizations participated as observers. 

See the list of the delegations that attended at http://www.

nss2016.org/attending-delegations/. 

What were the key outcomes from the 2016 Nuclear 

Security Summit? 

The 2016 NSS resulted in a high-level Communiqué, five 

institutional Action Plans, and several new Gift Baskets. The 

Communiqué reinforced the fundamental commitments of 

states to key nuclear security principles and noted that the 

conclusions of all four Summits would guide States’ actions 

going forward. Early on, participants identified strengthening the international nuclear security architecture for nuclear 

and radiological security issues as an important method to 

sustain and build on the Summit process and its accomplishments. The five Action Plans describe how Summit 

participants can support key international organizations and 

institutions—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 

INTERPOL, United Nations, Global Partnership Against the 

Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, 

and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Gift 

Baskets contain national and multilateral nuclear security 

commitments on specific topics that do not apply to all 

participants or for which there was not consensus support. 

All agreed NSS 2016 documents plus national statements, 

progress reports, joint statements, and fact sheets for key 

initiatives can be viewed at http://www.nss2016.org/.

How did DNN help achieve commitments set 

throughout the NSS process? 

DNN made significant contributions to many of the most 

visible Summit deliverables, in cooperation with our 

international partners. For example, since April 2009, more 

than 3.2 metric tons of vulnerable HEU and plutonium 

material have been removed or disposed of; 14 countries 

and Taiwan have become HEU-free; physical security 

upgrades have been completed at 32 buildings storing 

weapons-usable fissile materials; and radiation detection 

equipment has been installed at 328 international border 

crossings, airports, and seaports to combat illicit trafficking 

in nuclear materials. 

The complete list of U.S. accomplishments throughout 

the NSS process is available at: http://www.nss2016.org/

document-center-docs/2016/3/31/national-progressreport-united-states-of-america. DNN’s ongoing work is 

evident throughout the list. 

How will the activities initiated through the Nuclear 

Security Summits continue? 

In addition to the activities called for in the Action Plans, 39 

participants in the 2016 NSS agreed to sustain action and 

ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 NSS to address 

continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, including by establishing a Nuclear Security Contact Group. The 

group will convene at least once per year on the margins 

of IAEA’s annual General Conference or other multilateral 

meetings. Read the full statement about the Nuclear 

Security Contact Group at https://www.whitehouse.gov/

the-press-office/2016/04/01/joint-statement-sustainingaction-strengthen-global-nuclear-security. 

What will be DNN’s role in supporting follow on 

activities to the Summits?

DNN’s core activities remain central to implementing U.S. 

commitments and making it possible for our international 

partners to achieve their goals. DNN will continue active 

engagement with our counterparts and remain engaged 

with the relevant international organizations to ensure 

we continue to build on the progress made through the 

Summit process. 

To learn more about NNSA’s support to the 2016 Nuclear 

Security Summit, go to http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/

nnsa-keeps-promises-borne-out-nuclear-security-summit 

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