"If you want to know what the Next Generation Airman may look like, or want to begin your 

one, answer Sawtelle's six questions:' 

-Co

"Jonathan Sawtelle's work on leadership and resilient organizations is exceptional research

unforgettable. Take this book with you and prepare to thrive in any environment:' 

-Co

Jonathan D. Sawtelle is an active duty Air Force officer with deployments 

Africa, and other locations. He has served as an operations officer, m

aide-de-camp to the commander, Air Force Special Operations Comm

executive officer to the Headquarters Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for 

selected for the 2017 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DAR

Fellowship. Connect with him now at Resilient.Effective.Adaptable@gma

Orders: Contact AU Press by e-mail at afri.aupress@us.af.mil and by phone at (334) 953-2773. 

<ontact information, email and phone. 

http://aupress.au.af.mil 

ISBN 978-1-58566-268-5 

--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Resilient

Effective

Adaptable

Leadership

Jonathan D. Sawtelle

With James Young, PhD, and Brent Chisholm

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

November 2016
AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

AIR UNIVERSITY PRESS

Director and Publisher

Dale L. Hayden, PhD

Editor in Chief

Oreste M. Johnson

Managing Editor

Dr. Ernest Allan Rockwell

Design and Production Manager

Cheryl King

Project Editor

James Howard

Copy Editors

Carolyn Burns

Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations

L. Susan Fair

Composition and Prepress Production

Michele D. Harrell

Print Preparation and Distribution

Diane Clark

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Sawtelle, Jonathan D., 1980- author. | Air 

University (U.S.). Air Force Research Institute, issuing 

body.

Title: Resilient effective adaptable leadership / Jonathan 

D. Sawtelle.

Description: First edition. | Maxwell Air Force Base, 

Alabama : Air University Press, Air Force Research 

Institute, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references 

and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016043991| ISBN 

9781585662685 | ISBN 1585662682

Subjects: LCSH: Leadership—United States. | 

Organizational behavior—United States. | Strategic 

planning—United States. | United States. Air 

Force—Anecdotes.

Classification: LCC HM1261 .S3625 2016 | DDC 

355.6/84—dc23 | SUDOC D 301.26/6:L 46/2

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.

gov/2016043991
iii

Published by Air Univeristy Press in November 2016

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of 

the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the organizations 

with which they are associated or the views of the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, 

United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. This 

publication is cleared for public release and unlimited distribution.

Air University Press

600 Chennault Circle, Bldg. 1405

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6010

afri.aupress@us.af.mil

http://aupress.au.af.mil/

http://afri.au.af.mil/

AFRI

Air Force Research Institute
iv

“Today, commanders are prepared better than ever to lead units through crisis. But 

what if the commander is taken out? Who will fill the void and continue the mission? 

You will. Be ready. And who would replace you? Get them ready. Now.”

Lt Gen Eric E. Fiel, USAF, Retired

“Jonathan Sawtelle’s work on leadership and resilient organizations is exceptional research—easy to read and unforgettable. Take this book with you and prepare to thrive 

in any environment.”

Col Stephen A. Rose, USAF

“A terrific read! Major Sawtelle provides an excellent foundation for leaders at every 

level. In this era of explosive technological growth and disruptive change, and everincreasing risk, stress and uncertainty, every leader needs help understanding how 

they can ‘think and lead more.’ Major Sawtelle’s emphasis on trust is particularly important and relevant in light of troubling signs of an erosion of trust across our military 

and throughout society. He does a superb job describing the certainty of uncertainty in 

today’s world, offering insightful ideas for leaders to cope with the unexpected while 

learning how to embrace a world of Fat Tails and Black Swans.”

Lt Gen John M. Shanahan, USAF
v

“Major Sawtelle tackles a wide array of leadership challenges in this wide-ranging 

monograph; he does so in more than simply descriptive terms, however. In his work on 

Resilient Effective Adaptable Leadership he brings together insights from a disparate set 

of sources and fields of study in a way that challenges leaders to ask themselves six deceptively simple questions. The self-reflection generated by these questions is sure to 

improve the mindfulness with which leaders approach the challenges they face.”

Maj Gen James C. Slife, USAF

“Jonathan Sawtelle asks questions that leaders of all levels should ask. This book is a 

valuable tool for self-analysis of your vector as a leader, which will enable you to take 

your organization to the next level.”

Brig Gen R. Gwyn Armfield, USAF

“All too often, leaders either establish a repressive risk culture causing skill-set atrophy, 

or they apply a rogue mentality and overlook trip wires by confusing enthusiasm for 

know-how. Either path leads to fragile and unprepared organizations. To counter this, 

pay attention to Jonathan’s careful argument: cultivate a risk culture built on consistent 

trust and capability at every level of the chain of command.” 

Lt Col Joseph T. Benson, USAF, Retired
vi

“If you want to know what the Next Generation Airman may look like, or want to begin 

your journey to become one, answer Sawtelle’s six questions.”

Col Larry Broadwell, USAF

“Major Sawtelle’s work in leadership and resilience is both distinctive and insightful; 

truly a valuable resource for any leaders. He masterfully connects the dots between a 

leader’s focus on resiliency and organizational effectiveness.”

Lt Col James A. Young, PhD, USAF 
vii

In memory of Bill, and to Abby, Noah and Mason.

Resilient leaders whom I will always follow.

ix

Contents

Illustrations and Table xi

About the Author and Collaborators xiii

Foreword xv

Acknowledgements xvii

Abstract xix

 1. An Evolved Leadership Culture 1

 2. Why Don’t I Trust My People? 6

 3. What Is My Problem with Risk? 12

 4. What Do I Do with all this Free Time? 28

 5. Who Is the “They”? 48

 6. What Is Wrong with My Supply Chain? 53

 7. Am I the Leader I Want To Be—or the Leader

the Organization Needs Me To Be? 59

 8. Conclusion 63
Bibliography 69

Practical Exercises 77

Index 93
xi

Illustrations and Table

Figure 1. The Reflective Loop and Effective Actions List 31

Figure 2. Clearly understood vision and values 39

Figure 3. Unclear or unknown vision and values 40

Table 1. Common Risks Leaders Must Consider 17

xiii

About the Author and Collaborators

Jonathan D. Sawtelle is an active duty Air Force officer with numerous deployments to Southwest Asia, Africa, and other undisclosed 

locations. He has prosecuted the mission as a leader, special operator, 

problem solver, and as a risk advisor to senior military commanders 

and government leaders. This monograph was written while he was a 

Blue Horizons researcher for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and a 

resident student at the Air Command and Staff College. 

Jonathan has also served as aide-de-camp to the Air Force Special 

Operations Command (AFSOC) commander and executive officer 

to the Headquarters Air Force deputy chief of staff for Operations 

(A3). He has been selected for the 2017 Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA) Service Chief ’s Fellowship and continues 

to study the relationships between strategy, technology, and culture. 

Connect with him now at Resilient.Effective.Adaptable@gmail.com.
xiv

Dr. James Young is an active duty Air Force psychologist currently 

embedded with the Air Force’s Basic Military Training Instructor 

Corp at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Previous to this assignment 

he spent 5 years as an embedded operational psychologist for the Air 

Force Special Tactics community. In addition to his military specific 

training, he completed a one-year post-doctoral fellowship in human 

factors at NASA Ames Research Center.

Brent W. Chisholm is an active duty Air Force officer and instructor pilot with several deployments in support of multiple operations. 

He currently serves as the chief of Nuclear Training and Readiness at 

Headquarters Air Mobility Command (AMC) where he’s the course 

director for the first-of-its-kind AMC Nuclear Leadership Course. He 

provides operational nuclear expertise to multiple combatant commands and major command staffs and coordinates the nuclear training 

for over twenty Total Force wings. Brent authored three nonacademic 

articles in a professional journal for veterans; his fiction work earned 

him a place as a finalist in the Brookwood Press Writing Contest. 
xv

Foreword

Leadership traits paired with technical expertise can be honed to thrive 

in a known setting. Now change the context—change the environment—

change everything. How rapidly can a leader adapt? Is the organization 

resilient enough to respond effectively?

Resilience is cultivated over time by leaders at every levels who, as 

learners, mentors, collaborators, and innovators, seek to master their 

environment while preparing for the unexpected. Sawtelle masterfully 

addresses six questions every leader must ask themselves to succeed in 

this environment. Reflect on the unique angles and themes you might 

glean from his keen insight. 

The answers may surprise you. They will certainly impact your career and ability to cultivate and lead a rapidly adaptive organization!

Maj Gen Scott A. Vander Hamm, USAF

xvii

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank sincerely my wife, children, and Savior who give me 

strength and inspiration; the Air University Academic Year 2015 Blue 

Horizons cohort; Maj Thomas Kiesling for his superior ability to facilitate innovation and integrate concepts; retired Gen Gilmary M. Hostage III; retired Lt Gen Eric Fiel; Mr. James “Hondo” Geurts; Dr. Kamal 

T. Jabbour; retired Col Brett Nelson; Col Thomas McCarthy; Col Larry 

Broadwell; Col William “Dollar Bill” Young; Col Michael Flatten; Col 

Joseph Benson; LTC Owen Ray; Lt Col Colby Edwards; Lt Col Stewart 

Parker; LCDR David Foote; Maj John McCoy; Maj Dennis Borrman; 

Maj George Webb; Maj Jude Verge; Maj Tanya Frazier; Maj Michelle 

Gombar; Maj Paul Netchaeff; Maj Russell Badowski; Capt Gary Charney; Dr. Ronald Dains; Dr. James Young; Burke Race; Heather Ann for 

superior editing recommendations; and the men and women of the 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Air Force Research 

Labs, Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 

and the Secretary of Defense Strategic Capabilities Office.

xix

Abstract

Perhaps the most challenging environment a military leader operates 

within occurs when foundational technologies are suddenly denied 

use, degraded in capability, or destroyed.

The US military leadership culture must evolve to embody, enable, 

and achieve resilience of intent at a time, tempo, and level of effectiveness better than any adversary. This evolved leadership style acknowledges that it cannot prepare for everything, but through collaboration and rapid adaptation it will find solutions, maintain the 

advantage, and be able to effectively respond to almost anything.

In many studies, the measure of organizational resilience is tied to 

its ability to continue without its established leader(s). What is more 

effective, more challenging, and more relevant is the capacity to continue resiliently toward mission accomplishment when resources and 

technology are suddenly disrupted, rendered ineffective, or removed 

from well-established processes altogether. Resilient intent provides 
xx

an interesting and uncommon lens through which leaders can begin 

to view their organization.

There are six common blind spots in modern military culture inhibiting the development of more effective leaders to achieve resiliency: 

trust, risk, investment of time, ownership, technology dependence, 

and personal adaptability. Appropriately, six primary questions can 

serve as catalysts for reflection and dialogue to aid the evolution of 

modern leadership culture to best prepare for surprise, disruption, 

and crisis.
An Evolved Leadership Culture

Every day, in every task, our men and women in uniform deliver. But 

we should expect no credit tomorrow for what we did yesterday. We 

must continually adapt to meet current challenges and innovate to develop the capabilities we will need to win future fights.

—Gen Joseph F. Dunford Jr.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

We must commit to changing those things that stand between us and 

our ability to rapidly adapt. We owe our Airmen and our nation an 

institution that can unlock our potential to thrive in the environment 

ahead.

—America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future

A government’s most significant investment is in securing its national interests. 

Often, this requires tremendous military resources to decrease vulnerabilities, deter attacks, and provide the greatest advantage over potential adversaries. Historically, militaries have prepared for emerging threats and surprises by investing in (1) 

capability, (2) capacity, (3) technological innovation, (4) organizational design, (5) 

training, and (6) planning.1

 However, as the scope of pressures on national security 
2

expands—macroeconomic cycles, political volatility, natural disasters, and cunning adversaries with nontraditional tactics—military leaders are in increasingly 

demanding roles as they strive to manage expertly surprises, crises, and disruptions. These pressures can undermine the effectiveness of the very technologies, 

systems, and organizational structures upon which they have built their strategies. 

In combating these pressures, a military’s greatest resource will be its leaders. 

Military training enables forces to prevent or create surprise; it less directly prepares leaders to respond effectively to surprise. Investment in robust capabilities cannot eliminate all vulnerabilities. The tendency has been to develop risk-management 

practices to mitigate forecasted risks, rather than to acknowledge that surprises will 

occur and find opportunities to leverage and exploit them. Risk forecasts are inherently flawed because no amount of information or data can provide leaders with 

absolute certainty. In the end, however, from the tactical to the national level, effective response to surprise will be assured by a leader’s ability to develop and navigate 

resilient organizations through vast seas of acknowledged and unanticipated risks 

and opportunities. 

Leaders must have some critical attributes to achieve this. They must: 

•  acknowledge surprise as inevitable,2

•  effectively manage the emotional impacts that surprise creates,

•  facilitate the development and empowerment of creative problem solvers at all 

levels of their organization, 
3

•  establish a culture of trust to catalyze proper development of future leaders, 

•  think through the interplay of risk and opportunity in the short and long term, 

•  develop a training plan that enables their mission to continue in the event of 

disruption, degradation, or denial of their primary technological means (especially for communication, navigation, and timekeeping), 

•  define optimization as a function of efficiency, effectiveness, and resilient potential,

•  have an acute ability to build, strengthen, and collaborate within and across 

professional networks, and 

•  rapidly find and integrate solutions to achieve desired outcomes. 

Collaboration across a network of individuals can harness a range of people, 

each with their particular scope, talent, experience, biases, and diversity of opinion. 

A master integrator can leverage collaboration and focus the range of creativity, 

insight, awareness, and talent to tailor a solution. Leaders may feel alone when facing tough challenges—a common adage is that “leadership is lonely.” Leadership 

should have moments of quiet for thinking and making tough decisions as well as 

for when failure must be borne. Otherwise, a leader’s time should not be lonely at 

all. A wide net cast to collect data, insight, and wisdom makes for less loneliness 

and more effective and responsive leadership. 
4

This book assumes the following: that a leader alone will not have all the answers, creativity, insight, awareness, and talent to lead an organization through 

shock, disruption, surprise, or crisis. The organization one leads will also not always have all the resources or corporate knowledge to succeed. Ultimately, individual organizations are inherently limited in their capability and must cultivate 

interdependence with one another long before crisis occurs. 

Surprise, disruption, and crisis create a gap between initial shock and the reaction of leaders and organization. This gap must be quantified, studied, and understood as the sudden emergence of opportunity, rather than as a risk, roadblock, or 

problem. Ways, means, and effectiveness of the response must be better understood 

and reshaped for that to happen. “Resilient intent” is an organization’s ability to 

achieve desired outcomes despite rapid and chaotic disruptions and the leader’s 

discomfort with risk. This ethos assumes the following premise from Peter C. Mastro’s “Operational Resilience for 2040”: 

Uncertainty and surprise will remain inherent in the nature of competition between creative 

humans dedicated to accomplishing their goals against an adversary. The combination of the 

enduring nature of surprise and increased adversary capability calls into question the United 

States military’s ability to create sanctuaries to protect critical vulnerabilities; a current necessary condition for it to maintain a capability edge over its adversaries. These changes require the 

United States to develop a military that can operate through disruption and even thrive in it 

(emphasis added).

3
5

Attaining resilient intent requires adoption of postindustrial thinking. Efficiencies and capabilities by themselves are no longer the keys to success. The rate of 

change within the operating environment and the spectrum of risks within operating environments are easily capable of overwhelming a well prepared organization 

without resilient leadership. Resilient intent also requires post-information age 

abilities to exploit enormous amounts of data. However, these abilities alone can 

both empower and encumber. Threats or risks to an organization’s survival or mission effectiveness can “hide in the open” in cyberspace through data disaggregation. Many adversaries and competitors already leverage disaggregation to disrupt 

and reorder, to move and countermove.4

Modern military culture has six common blind spots that inhibit the comprehensive development of more advanced leaders: trust, risk, investment of time, 

ownership, technology dependence, and personal adaptability. Appropriately, six 

primary questions can serve as catalysts for reflection and dialogue to aid in the 

evolution of modern leadership culture to best prepare for surprise, disruption, and 

crisis. These questions can be read and discussed separately or as an entire work. 

US military leadership culture must evolve to embody, enable, and achieve resilience of intent in time, tempo, and level of effectiveness better than any adversary. 

An evolved leadership culture will acknowledge that it cannot prepare for everything. Collaboration and rapid adaptation will produce solutions, maintain the advantage, and respond effectively to anything.
6

Why Don’t I Trust My People?

You lead to the extent you trust and are trusted. The rest is just management, the kind nobody misses when it’s gone. 

Many leaders genuinely believe they trust their people. Some leaders do not trust 

their people. Some leaders abide by the “trust but verify” dictum, but their verification methods are emotional, driven by cynicism, paranoia, or a quest for vindication. 

Some leaders lack trust because they fail to measure accurately and assume risk prudently. Some leaders lack professional intimacy with their people while others base 

trust on experience. The importance of a culture of trust is widely reported.5

 According to the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Martin Dempsey, “trust is 

required at every echelon of the [military], and . . . building trust with subordinates 

and partners may be the most significant action a commander will perform.”6

 Morale, 

potential, and creativity suffer when members of an organization do not feel their 

leadership’s trust. If trust is fundamental to the success and morale of an organization 

in times of relative stability, it is critical when communications are disrupted or when 

other unexpected crises arise. Leaders must practice trust—then they can rely on it 

when the operations tempo, complexity, and scope of efforts increase and frequency, 

consistency, and reliability of communications technology decrease. Leaders must 

set the conditions for cultivating trust and verifying performance without vindictive 
7

intent. Mission command, process-oriented operations, and mission control are 

three operational models for leaders to accomplish this.7

Mission command enables disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent 

and is set by clearly communicated and understood vision and values.8

 Simply put, 

mission command empowers subordinates to achieve desired outcomes by choosing 

their own ways and means and by accepting prudent risks within the boundaries of 

their leaders’ expressed vision and values. Success depends on the freedom to conduct actions deemed necessary that are within the defined—but not constricting—

bounds of the stated intent of the mission. 

A second model is a process-oriented operating environment. This environment 

typically occurs when technology is central to the mission of the organization. The 

boundaries and limits of a given technology’s performance are established through 

process checklists, emergency procedures, or changes in circumstances and through 

operational and maintenance technical orders and publications. This culture is founded 

on explicit specifications. Individuals or organizations not in accord with these specifications are acting “at variance” with designs. Therefore, training and preparation tend 

to become centered on perfect adherence to formulated process procedures.

The third model is mission control.

9

 Effective leaders may determine that operational constraints—such as time-sensitive requirements or political considerations—

require strict adherence to their singular direction. Less effective leaders depend on 

mission control because they do not accurately think through risks and opportunities. 
8

They may focus solely on directing others how to do their jobs or simply not trust 

their subordinates to complete tasks. 

Incorrectly imposing one operational model when the other is better suited impedes optimization and can cause interpersonal strife. For example, when two leaders are collaborating, and one is personally or culturally dependent on a missioncommand paradigm and the other a process-orientated paradigm, they will talk past 

each other and much frustration can arise. Successful leaders must have the mental 

agility to work with all three models and even hybridize from each of them to optimize their problem solving and the effectiveness of their organizations. Within these 

three models, leaders can develop a reasoning for whom they trust, to what extent, 

why, and how they validate or adapt their rationale. Three foundational concepts 

critical to this approach are loyalties, memories, and professional intimacy. 

Loyalties are the starting point for many decisions. Loyalties can be granted to 

people, organizations, capabilities, functions, or programs based on the level of a 

leader’s familiarity or past emotional investment. Other loyalties emerge from a 

leader’s personal values and convictions. Loyalty to one’s friends or career can shape 

calculations of trust and risk and levels of advocacy for justice, additional resources, 

or expedited processes. For these reasons personal and professional relationships 

play substantial roles in shaping decisions and outcomes.

Memories, particularly of both “scars and superstars,” often shape a leader’s 

trusting judgments. Scars come from events or people associated with times of 

frustration, strife, or pain. Without clear recognition of the degree of independence 
9

of present events have from the past, leaders can incorrectly project those scars 

onto the present and inhibit the cultivation of trust. Memories of subordinate superstars are a relief because they excelled with each challenge and accomplished 

everything that was required. The memories can catalyze blind trust in what, or 

who, is familiar and neglect changes not easily recognized.

Finally, trust is calibrated to the level of professional intimacy with subordinates 

and “owners” (i.e., the individual who is truly responsible for a task, function, program, or people). Col Kurt Buller, retired, formerly the commander of the US Air 

Force 720th Special Tactics Group, made this a top priority for himself and all subordinate commanders and leaders. Professional intimacy was a top priority to be 

maintained with each unit member despite high operations tempo or physical distance between supervisors and members. Professional intimacy empowered all 

personnel and families to support each other through times of significant grief due 

to personnel killed or wounded in action. Much like trust, building professional 

intimacy takes time. It should not only be sought after an emergency occurs. Organizational resilience requires that professional intimacy all the time.

A genuine understanding of the subordinates’ attributes and talents also comes 

from professional intimacy. Leaders are enabled to develop their subordinates’ 

qualities, adapt accurately, and to motivate better. Leaders may not trust because 

they may not be familiar with all of the relevant owners—inside and outside of their 

organization—and their unique priorities, capabilities, and potential. Trust enables 

leaders to organize owners effectively within their organization and synchronize 
10

processes to determine clearly the distribution of responsibilities. Leaders are wise 

to invest in developing a professional intimacy with the people around them and 

evaluate the trust “centeredness”—rather than verification centeredness—of their 

organizational culture.

Professional intimacy is brought about by and fosters a level of communication 

that provides leaders with insight to perform critical analysis, reflection, and actions that can continually improve the organization, its people, and the mission. It 

is important that the practice of “trust but verify” be executed without naïve optimism or lingering cynicism. For example, subordinates working to innovate and 

solve problems within the bounds of a leader’s clearly articulated and understood 

vision and values should not fear punitive disciplinary actions for failure. Rather, 

leadership requires deliberate investment in facilitating the success of subordinates 

and advocating on their behalf. Aside from the immediate benefits of a trust culture, this works toward building a necessary reserve of future leaders better prepared to demonstrate resilient intent.

Leaders who limit the trust placed in their people limit their growth. These leaders 

tend to approach problems as a manager who prefers to do rather than delegate and 

direct subordinates at every step, fostering a culture of dependence on the manager.10

This approach is a “do/direct” philosophy, and it is the typical approach of leaders 

who are seen as micromanagers. It is typical of micromanagers, “one who [tries] to 

control or manage all the small parts of (something, such as an activity) in a way that 

is usually not wanted or that causes problems.”11 As leaders rise to encompass more 
11

responsibilities driven by complex and layered processes far beyond the scope of 

personal expertise and capacity, they must step back, adopt a different perspective 

and derive a new appreciation for results altogether. The need for increasingly rapid 

and complex actions, processes, and tempo is simply too important to be held back 

by untrusting managers.

Many leaders demonstrate technical or tactical mastery of their craft early in 

their careers. Immature doer/directors can have a “been there, done that, did it better than you” attitude with their subordinates. Micromanagers may also be unwilling to risk failure when they see subordinate actions or processes at variance with 

their narrow focus because of unfortunate personal experiences. This approach 

makes the leader indispensable in processes that should be nearly autonomous. 

Organizations dependent on doers/directors are rigid and fragile. They face significant roadblocks to rapid adaptation and resilience when the unexpected occurs, 

and owners and subordinates are not empowered or prepared for crises.

It is critical for leaders to think clearly and deeply about the extent to which one 

trusts and is trusted. This thinking is the foundation for a trust culture—by reflecting 

upon successes and shortcomings to drive investment in junior leader development. 

Finding the time for this is tough, especially when burdened with incessant doing 

and directing, strict mission control processes, leader-dependent subordinates, mistrust, or even contempt. Once there is a trust culture, leaders can, and must, deeply 

explore the fears, concerns, threats, and challenges that inhibit opportunities for 
12

success, innovation, development, and adaptability—they must weigh and accept 

risk. Then they must take action.

What Is My Problem with Risk?

One universal truth about successful innovation is that it is inextricably 

linked to the risk of failure––and cannot truly exist without it.

—Air Force Call to the Future

Now, more than ever, we need bold leaders at every level who encourage 

innovation, embrace new thinking, and take prudent risks to achieve 

mission success.

—The World’s Greatest Air Force, Powered by Airmen, Fueled by Innovation

The genesis of this inquiry is a result of personal mentorship from retired Col 

Brett Nelson, during a deployment to a special operations task force in Afghanistan 

in 2010. Then-Lieutenant Colonel Nelson asserted that one of the most important 

leadership responsibilities is to measure correctly and assume risk. Leaders promote creative problem solving when they properly train junior leaders to anticipate 

and discern risks and opportunities, a crucial skill set for rapid and efficient re-
13

sponses to disruption or surprise. Also, poor and dangerous decisions can be made 

when risk and opportunity are not considered independently.

One can practice this through simple exercises: View leadership decisions 

through a risk lens, then break down every decision into the simple forms of outcomes and consequences. Keep options within the bounds of higher headquarters’ 

vision and values and select actions to take. With practice this thought process becomes less mechanical and more seamlessly integrated into the leader’s decisionmaking framework.

The International Organization for Standardization defines “risk” as the “effect 

of uncertainty on objectives.”12 “Risk management” is the “identification, assessment, and prioritization of risks followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability and/or impact 

of unfortunate events or to maximize the realization of opportunities.”13 Risk, then, 

describes potential, a future event, or something that might or might not happen.14

Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens authored seminal works on the concept of a 

“risk society,” one that organizes itself around the question, “How can the risks and 

hazards . . . be prevented, minimized, dramatized or channeled?”15 Beck described 

the risk society as “the modern approach to foresee and control the future consequences of human action.”16 Leadership can, indirectly through culture (better) or 

directly through command, achieve a consensus in addressing risk.

Successful “risk consensuses” require common training and education for all the 

organization’s leadership in discerning, measuring, and assuming risks and capitaliz-
14

ing on opportunities. Junior leaders often learn their approaches to risk through 

interactions with their leaders during the formative years of their careers. Without a 

common culture, risk collaboration will generate friction within organizational 

leadership. Within and across organizations, inconsistent approaches to risk can be 

exacerbated by diverse character traits exclusive to sub- and microcultures,17 such as 

boldness or timidity within disparate leadership styles, or inherent dangers unique 

to each unit’s normal operations. In her book Risk: Negotiating Safety in American 

Society, Arwen Mohun provides insight into the origins of these differences by observing that “both contemporary psychological research and historical evidence also 

suggest that risk perception varies from individual to individual and between different social groups. These differences reflect personal experience, but also cultural 

values held in common and reinforced by others.”18 Because of individual paradigms 

and proficiencies in risk management, collaboration among and within networks 

(like sections, groups, wings, centers, commands, services, agencies, and career 

fields) can fail if some leaders are willing to assume risk and others are not.

In 2009, US Air Force Special Operations Weather Team Airmen developed a 

principle for planning and conducting highly specialized and necessarily dangerous training. The common approach to risk was simple: “Learn to discern and 

manage risk rather than fear, disregard, or mock it.” Gold Team operators, 10th 

Combat Weather Squadron, are the plank holders for this principle. “Learn to discern” acknowledges deliberate investment in the professionalism, maturity, and 

emotional intelligence of the operators on their journey to master their craft and to 
15

evolve as leaders. The goal was to cultivate a level of trust in subordinate leaders in 

a training environment in preparation for combat operations. Why? Cultivating 

trust during preparations and training is the principle catalyst for teamwork when 

uncertainty, surprise, chaos, and confusion ensue. Some leaders, certain about the 

future, will aim to buy down risk in training by limiting intensity or eliminating 

unexpected events. Effective leaders must also carefully weigh the complexities and 

challenges their people will face in real-world operations and embrace preparedness for uncertainty as well. Exercising imprudent “risk avoidance” policies during 

preparation and training may mitigate short-term risks but can exacerbate risk in 

combat operations. 

Developing a mastery of discerning and managing risk and opportunity begins 

with assessing risks. Once the practice of discernment begins, leaders can then develop their individual approaches to risk, practice adapting them to context, and 

then better understand others’ approaches risk. To simplify discernment analysis, 

Table 1 lists common risk considerations by category. The categories include: 

•  professional risk, risk to one’s own professional goals and needs; 

•  internal risk, risk required by an organization to sustain normal operations 

and processes; 

•  mechanical risk, the risk that occurs when the organization is in action and 

facing disruption, trying to progress, improve, or adapt; and
16

•  external risk, an estimation of factors that act upon an organization that cannot necessarily be influenced.

An effective exercise for leaders to develop risk discernment begins with assessing loyalties, operating environment, personal approach to risk, and the perception 

of their leaders’ approaches to risk. This exercise should not be prescriptive, but is 

an opportunity for leaders to examine fully the spectrum of potential risks and 

common personal or cultural habits, and relate them to the situation.

Questions that augment this discussion are: 

•  How does the organization understand and organize itself around risk? 

•  What has the leadership communicated about risks? 

•  What are some of the risks I have not considered? 

•  Why do people seem to find themselves in adverse consequences when they 

thought they understood the risks before making their decision?

Creating a notional basket of common decisions, together with a few that are 

personally difficult, allows leaders to determine the risks and opportunities that are 

most or least comfortable in assuming. A better-calibrated approach founded more 

on facts and less on assumptions or emotions is possible. Common risks that leaders must consider are delineated in table 1. 
17

Table 1. Common risks leaders must consider

Professional risk Internal Risk Mechanical Risk (The 

Org in Action)

External Risk

Legal Legal Legal Legal

Personal Integrity 

(Morals, Values, 

Beliefs)

Understanding of 

the Problem The Many Hows(Methods) 360° Continuity of Support (Perception 

Based)

Personal Bias* Orientation to the 

Problem†

The Many Whens 

(Tempo, Decision Points)

Adversarial Actions/

Reactions

Decision

Quality19

Mission Success Success of Processes Competitor Actions/

Reactions

Career Goals Fiscal Certainty Person or Organization 

Carrying Out the Task 

(Capability and

Proficiency)

Senior Leaders Biases

Continued

Employment

Protection of 

Resources

Financial Cost The Unforeseen

Finances Safety of Personnel Human Cost Long-Term

Implications

Credibility 360° Credibility Blowback Short-Term

Implications

Vision Surety Security Blowback
18

Professional risk Internal Risk Mechanical Risk (The 

Org in Action)

External Risk

Personal

Resilience Supply Chain

360° of Trust Mission Assurance

Blowback20 Information

Assurance

Organizational 

Fragility

Blowback

*Žižek called these “ ‘unknown knowns’. . . since risk is subjective its construction occurs through culturally biased 

lenses.” Coker, War in an Age of Risk, 91.

† Leaders in a crisis will be oriented to more than a singular threat or hazard before them. Proper orientation sets 

the stage for effective strategy development, the practical application of the strategy, and the personal fortitude 

required to achieve resilient intent in any circumstance.

Integrating risk and opportunity discernment into a leader’s decision-making 

framework can be challenging. Leaders dwelling on risks can get lost in “analysis 

paralysis” and slow their decision-making cycles with endless considerations and 

“what if ” scenarios. On the other hand, decisive leaders must ensure their framework is firmly grounded in the best possible understanding of the current and 

evolving conditions. Then the future can be confidently considered. Achieving the 

balance between risk discernment and prudent risk-assumption skills, required to 
19

adapt rapidly to disruption, cannot be “bolted on” to a leader once they take charge. 

The development of agile leaders requires risk-discerning mentors who trust and 

empower their people often and early.

Over time, thinking through short- and long-term risks and opportunities prepares leaders to be more rapidly adaptive. Leaders who cultivate an organization 

whose members consistently measure and anticipate risks and opportunities are 

going to be better prepared for surprise when a crisis occurs. Planning or anticipating is better than not planning anything at all because it softens the edge of unfamiliarity. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, “Plans are worthless, but planning 

is everything.”21 Confidence in any estimation of the future usually decreases in 

proportion to the distance from when a the decision was made to the time of its 

consequences. Indeed, once a plan is put into action, many independent variables 

will require adaptation to achieve success. The plan, the organization, and the leaders must be resilient because things will not necessarily go as expected. Plans rarely 

survive contact with reality, much less an enemy. Unexpected barriers or disruptions will create gaps that will increase response times and slow adaptation. Preparation for success must include preparation for surprise. Resilient leaders do not 

plan in certainty. They anticipate uncertainty and prepare for rapid adaptation.

The planning process generates other positive impacts:

•  active planning, in certainty and uncertainty, builds team cohesion and flexibility;
20

•  cohesion is improved thereby, through refined communications and teamwork; 

•  planning processes that include all team members capitalize on intellectual 

diversity and foster collaboration; 

•  collaborative environments cultivate shared visions, values, and purposes;

•  common purpose helps overcome team fragmentation;

•  flexible, collaborative teams with decisive leadership and common purpose at 

all levels are rapidly adaptable and resilient; and

•  rapidly adaptable and resilient teams succeed.

Leaders not sufficiently accounting for risk in their plans can quickly become 

encumbered during a crisis. In a reactionary state, they will increase the time required to mitigate ongoing problems and to find new opportunities in evolving 

conditions. Inaccurate or inadequate estimates of risk can even limit the effective 

communication between followers and leaders and lead to misapplied capabilities, 

under-resourced priorities, or loss of credibility.Three officers were especially instructive to this writer, USAF Col Joseph Benson, USAF Col Kurt Buller, and AF 

Special Tactics officer Col Michael Flatten. Colonel Benson fervently mentored on 

the necessity to advocate for organizations and people through measured audacity 

and boldness in communications. He asserted that many leaders shy away from this 

important responsibility because they place too much importance on the profes-
21

sional risks rather than the opportunities made available for the subordinates or the 

mission. Colonel Flatten also stated that many leaders prefer to try to tackle problems on their own or shy away from requesting help while others focus on what 

they fear––judgment, increased scrutiny, or rejection––if they ask their leaders for 

additional resources. Subordinates might try to present opportunities for mitigating risk, but the leader will demur fearing his professional risks.

It is, therefore, beneficial to consider risk and opportunity over the short- and 

long-term with discerning eyes. Recently retired from the special operations community, Col Brett Nelson states that discerning risk and opportunity, “allows consistent superior decisions to be made at or near real-time.”22 Simply stated, a leader 

has to identify and leverage opportunities arising from any given situation at hand. 

This is the essence of rapid adaptation. Minimizing the lag between disruption and 

response is critical. Anticipating that plans will naturally break down over time, 

and then comprehensively weighing risk and opportunity, will increase personal 

and operational resilience, agility, and readiness to adapt. 

Indeed, measuring risk can be difficult, overwhelming, and emotional. Organizational practices can be crude and inconsistent approaches to risk by leaders and 

personnel at all levels. Leaders’ personal approaches and responses to risk must be 

refined, deliberate, and calculated. A leader’s communicated risk approach sets 

conditions for the creative boundaries their subordinates will use to accomplish 

tasks and solve problems. It is important to analyze the concept of risk within the 
22

context of the three risk management models, as well as the four responses to risk 

common to many people. 

The three common models military leaders use to anticipate and mitigate risk 

are operational risk management, acquisitions/project risk management, and riskavoidance policy. The operator cultures of the USAF flying and battlefield Airmen 

communities use “operational risk” to discern and mitigate known risks or threats 

when conducting flying missions, parachute operations, and tactical training. 

Much of the literature delineates threats, hazards, and dangers from risk. These 

concepts are integrated here for simplicity—for example, threats can be considered 

in the category “risk to force.” Acquisitions/project risk focuses on cost overruns, 

achieving all timelines, and identifying actions at variance with legal and binding 

contracts and agreements. “Avoidance policies” can be quietly personal or published 

professional guidance developed to prevent or mitigate risk. Examples of policy 

norms include on- and off-duty safety; security of personnel, information, and 

equipment; professional risk (career); personal integrity (morals, values, and beliefs); and personal goals (e.g., the odds of getting what is desired). These norms are 

propagated by both the deliberate and indirect observations of leaders through 

speeches, on-the-job training, mentorship, inspections, and day-to-day interaction. 

Many people commonly use four default responses to organize their thoughts 

and make a decision. The first is “risk aversion,” which is an emotional state. Riskaverse leaders commonly invest significant time and energy to evade or avoid risk, 

without carefully weighing opportunity. Evading of risk is a simplistic response 
23

from a leader who has not examined all risk, is overwhelmed by new information, 

or is unfamiliar or uncomfortable with a particular situation, pace, or evolving context within which decisions must be made. Such leaders typically respond with a 

knee-jerk “no” or “you can’t do that” when approached by subordinates with new 

ideas or initiatives. Note that this is not the same as prudent risk adaptive leaders 

who use “risk avoidance” in an attempt to redirect or reconstruct the organization 

and processes to institutionalize and make permanent the avoidance of a particular 

risk altogether. Safety Investigation Board recommendations, which often drive institutional norms across existing operating procedures, are great examples of this. 

To appease their own or their supervisor’s emotional distress with risk, leaders 

often adopt a “zero-defects” mentality. Prudent toleration of mistakes, failure, ambiguity, creativity, randomness, and bad luck are difficult, if not impossible, for riskaverse leaders. Former Defense Secretary William J. Perry once publicly stated that 

“demanding such a rigid standard produces timid leaders afraid to make tough 

decisions in a crisis, unwilling to take the risks necessary for success in military 

operations. This zero defects mindset creates conditions that will lead inevitably to 

failure.”23 Blanket risk aversion does not allow subordinates to focus on addressing 

current risks or addressing future opportunities. Risks exist in every decision; there 

is a danger in every moment of indecision. Risk-averse leaders feel emotionally better off by not “rocking the boat,” but their logic is flawed. Hence the second default 

response: risk denial.
24

“Risk denial” is a most expedient means to organize the complexities of risk because risk is simply disregarded. Risk denial is reflected in four common concepts: 

•  fatalistic inevitability—what’s supposed to be is what will happen, 

•  superstition—fortune favors the bold, 

•  naiveté, and

•  emotional dissatisfaction with expected opportunities (not liking outcomes 

one thinks will happen).

Decision making can be constructed from random distributions of shades of 

risk denial, but leaders do not want random outcomes from their peoples’ judgments. Therefore, risk consensus is an imperative.

Shared purpose must be cultivated within a vision and values for promoting expertise, innovation, and risk-taking. Boundaries for behavior and risk-mitigation 

tools and processes are required. Unfortunately, these efforts can cause leaders to fall 

into yet another common trap—the default response of risk compensation. Author 

John Adams illustrated this trap in his discussion of the invention of automobile 

seatbelts to prevent injury or death during accidents.24 The resulting behavior by 

many drivers was that they could drive faster and more recklessly because seatbelts 

mitigated the risk of harm. This sort of response is called “risk compensation” and is 

an illogical way to simplify decisions to assume greater risks. Mitigation of risk and 
25

real decreasing of risk are not necessarily in one-to-one proportionality; three seatbelts do not guarantee the safety of passengers going three times the speed limit.

The fourth common default response is risk shift.25 Shifts in how much risk one 

will assume may not be a result of calculated risks against objective and static criteria; 

in fact, they are usually rooted in deeply personal loyalties, values, and emotions. 

“Risk shift” occurs when external forces influence leaders to shift the perception of 

risk and often decrease the amount of risk the leader is willing to assume. Examples 

include changes in the immediate family such as a pregnant spouse or new baby; 

the possibility to death or injury to friends; or proximity to promotion, appointment, 

retirement, or other critical times deeply related to personal desires. Conversely, internal or emotionally driven shifts can cause a person to “show off” by increasing the 

amount of risk accepted given the perceived opportunities made possible when 

someone of significance is understood to be watching.

These default responses to risk are natural, seemingly rational, and convincing to 

the individual decision maker. Indirectly, they also communicate the leader’s loyalties. It is critical for leaders to understand that these common responses are very 

real, exist within every person, and must be deliberately overcome through training 

and meaningful development. 

Leaders can demonstrate mastery of risk discernment in two ways. The first is 

the ability to adapt rapidly the amount and types of risk the leader is willing to assume. Leaders must be able to anticipate changes and adapt their decision-making 

frameworks to new visions and values within which they must operate—these re-
26

quire both action and agility. As the operating environment changes, risks will also 

change. A senior leader’s acceptance of risk can increase or decrease depending on 

a multitude of factors but must be consistent with the needs of the mission. As a 

leader’s approach to risk changes, there is also the responsibility to guide the organization through the changes. Subordinates who have been told “no” or “you can’t 

do that” many times over months and years may have overwritten certain possible 

courses of action or solutions out of their memory. This kind of leadership can limit 

ingenuity and innovative potential to find and leverage opportunities while overwhelmed with risks in increasingly complex tasks or with diminishing resources. 

Without changed guidance, subordinates may not be able to recognize when the 

environment is conducive to try old ideas again. In a time of crisis, they might be 

critical to solving an unanticipated problem––if only they knew that old dead ends 

were now open roads.

Second, leaders must exercise wisdom and prudence in assuming short-term 

risks for long-term opportunities.26 Assuming long-term risk in exchange for shortterm opportunities is often the most comfortable decision. Short-term results are 

often immediately beneficial, tangible, and usually quantifiable, but there is also 

much less perceived professional risk on the leader who achieves immediate results.27 Sacrificing short-term gains can be an unpopular leadership practice because long-term opportunities for gains can be negated by numerous independent 

factors and are not guaranteed to succeed. 28 Therefore, assuming risk in the nearterm to realize long-term beneficial outcomes requires advanced risk-discernment 
27

skills, a mature assumption of risk, and harmonious relationships to ensure support 

from the organization.29

Inevitably, things change. Ideas once irrelevant can instantly become essential, 

and immoveable restraints can suddenly vanish. New technology, new leaders, and 

new contexts can render old tasks, functions, programs, and authorities irrelevant. 

Opened doors, new opportunities, new resources, and new solutions can replace 

them. The range of options can increase within the leader’s acceptable risk boundaries. The opposite can also be true. Sometimes opportunities and creative spaces that 

were once flexible, available, open, and possible can suddenly be unavailable, unrealistic, and irrelevant. Rapidly adapting one’s approach to risk either by seizing opportunities emerging from new constraints or by recognizing sudden acceptance of 

flexibility from one’s leaders indicates a high degree of resilience.

Awareness of one’s approach to risk is the first step to quality decision making.30

Decisions are based on the estimation of risk and opportunity and are often shaped 

by the amount of trust between leaders and the members of the organization. Once 

students of leadership become aware of their loyalties, trusts, and approaches to 

risk, they can continually refine them, take responsibility for their actions, and lead 

more effectively. Given the importance and complexities of trust and risk, it is critical that a leader has time to think and reflect on them. These analyses must be deliberate, comprehensive, and continually resulting in actions that improve an organization, its people, and the mission. A complete and predictable thought loop of 

analysis, reflection, and adaptation reinforces this framework. Despite the necessity, 
28

many have not much time to think. The next question provides an analysis of how 

leaders can invest their time to both think and act wisely.

What Do I Do with All this Free Time?

Theoretically, a leader’s first day on the job can be free of commitments. As a 

leader responds to the needs of his organization and superiors, managerial and 

leadership actions take shape and begin to fill up the schedule. Many leaders find 

that their schedules are so full that their workdays begin to expand into long nights; 

weekends and holidays vanish or were never really there. Most leaders never ask free 

time questions because they do not have any. It is not unusual to see leaders rushing 

through hallways, truncating conversations, and vigorously typing—truly believing 

that they are doing the best for the organization, the mission, and their career. Free 

time and down time are both rare and cherished, but they too are often replaced by 

tasks or meetings. Exhausted or relentless leaders would have difficulty perceiving 

their professional roles or what they would do if they had substantial free time. 

Understandably, many leaders are culturally and emotionally compelled to feel, 

or perceived to be, “busy.” Poor time-investment practices can promote fragile processes, benign neglect of people or functions, and inadequate anticipation of shortand long-term risks and opportunities. The better practice is a disciplined and 

comprehensive approach to investing time, setting the conditions for optimizing a 

resilient organization and its mission.
29

Answering the question, “What do I do with all this free time?” provides an opportunity to explore how leaders can invest their time so as to cultivate an effective, 

efficient, and resilient organization.31 That leaders could or should have time to 

think might be controversial. Many good leaders have a strong conviction that being busy is directly proportional to the relationship of productivity, effectiveness, 

and value. This agricultural- or industrial-era mindset is only sufficient when a 

leader’s “hard work” is making effective decisions as carefully as possible and as 

quickly as necessary. The 24th Special Operations Wing organizes, trains, and 

equips combat controllers, special operations weather teams, and pararescue operators. The Wing’s psychologist, Dr. James Young, states that 

Some of this behavior [staying busy] is a result of conscious processing of the idea that “if I’m 

not busy, I’m not earning my pay,” but other factors are likely at play. For example, organizations influence the degree to which we see this behavior by directly or indirectly valuing the 

person that is able to juggle the most. Because we work in an environment without a real bottom line [e.g., money earned], it’s often difficult to determine if juggling more actually translates into being more productive or effective. . . . So it’s just assumed that more is better. It’s the 

same reason, I think, some people show up early in the morning or stay late. . . . It gives the 

impression of greater productivity. 

Dr. Young pointed to studies that demonstrate the positive bias that supervisors 

have of employees who show up to work early. He posited that guilt is another factor. It is unacceptable for most leaders to come to the conclusion that they are not 
30

working as hard as their people. To compensate, leaders fill their schedule with a 

variety of things that will keep them busy. 

There is a similar phenomenon that exists in a leader’s inner monologue, along 

the lines of “the more ‘stuff ’ I did today correlates with how good I can feel about 

myself as a leader.” Consider the following: “If I worked in sales and I exceeded my 

quota every month working fewer hours, maybe the need to stay busy would be 

less? Or maybe I can work hard and further increase my profit . . .” Also, in a work 

environment where feedback is infrequent or less meaningful (vague or ego boosting), there is more likelihood of a perceived need to stay busy. Leaders must step 

back, adopt different perspectives, and make new assessments and appreciations 

for outcomes. The leader must construct a decision-making framework—one that 

includes time to reflect and assess.

Leaders must also be compelled to think. A sound decision-making framework 

should, at a minimum, account for the direction of the organization, organizational 

effectiveness, and the actualities of the overall improvement of the organization 

and reflect the leader’s effectiveness. These elements must be regularly analyzed and 

not permitted to atrophy through neglect. Neglect can lead to vulnerabilities that 

will limit performance and can be exploited by adversaries or competitors. Effective 

leaders optimize mission effectiveness by facilitating the success of their people and 

integrating ideas and functions to create greater impacts. Those who practice this 

are called “facilitator/integrators.”32
31

Leaders can divide available time into two components, the reflective loop (a 

leader’s thoughts) and activities––the effective actions list (fig. 1). These are interdependent, conducted simultaneously, and facilitated by a leader’s decision-making framework. The critical elements leaders must reflect upon and understand for 

decisions about the effective actions list comprise the reflective loop. Priorities will 

inevitably draw leaders to individual aspects of this cycle, and every effort must be 

made to avoid any regular omission of any element.

Leader’s Own

Effectiveness

Risks & 

Opportunities

People

Resources

Functions,

Tasks, Programs,

& Initiatives

Decision

Making 

Framework

Reflective Loop Effective Actions

Communicating Vision & Values

Investing in Relationships & Personal Growth

Collecting and Reporting Data & Information

Inspiring, Disciplining, & Rehabilitating Subordinates

Administrative Advocacy

Rest; Deliberate Pause

Doing & Directing; Facilitating & Integrating

Figure 1: Regular, comprehensive, and reflective analysis must be the starting point for a 

leader’s actions. These actions should also further inform reflection. A leader’s unique decisionmaking framework facilitates the complete process.
32

The reflective loop provides a continual path for the leader’s thoughts about important people (including the leader), functions, tasks, programs, resources, initiatives, 

risks, and opportunities. These thoughts include all elements of a leader’s scope of responsibility and those individuals that may be impacted by or benefit from in future 

collaborations. Comprehensive and in-depth analyses of each of these elements and 

adaptation opportunities are conducted later through each of the “six questions.” 

The components of the effective actions list must be informed by reflection and 

oriented in the direction of the leader’s vision and values. These actions are also not 

strictly accomplished in a linear fashion and are not meant to be independent of 

each other. Leaders increase their effectiveness when applying two or more elements concurrently. Less effective leaders fail to apply these elements consistently 

across all the aspects of their organization over time.

The most meaningful effective action a new leader must employ is to communicate vision and values. It is critical to confirm that all members, especially subordinate leaders and owners, understand and apply them. A leader’s vision and values 

must be in harmony with those of superiors and, yet, uniquely tailored to the organization and mission. As with risk and opportunity, vision and values must always 

be considered and communicated together. Vision and values provide boundaries 

and direction that develop subordinate behavior, process optimization, innovation, 

and organizational culture. 

Investing in relationships and personal growth is critical to building and 

strengthening one’s self, an organization, or a network. Relationships are proven to 
33

support personal resilience from emotional traumas such as post-traumatic stress.33

Striving for professional intimacy allows leaders to calibrate their understanding of 

the state of their environment, fine-tune risk measurement, broaden their perspective, and formulate plans. The ability of a leader to effectively inspire and discipline 

subordinates is largely dependent on the depth and quality of professional intimacy 

between them. Respect for a leader’s position grants a certain amount of credibility. 

However, it is the investment in relationships that empowers all members to achieve 

unity of purpose and effort within the established visions and values, especially 

across separate organizations. 

Investing in relationships and personal growth, especially when meeting with 

peers or superiors, requires time away from the organization. Face-to-face relationship building conveys the importance of professional intimacy; it says, “This relationship is so important that I am taking time away from my organization to invest 

in our relationship.”34 However, prolonged absence from the organization or absence during critical events can erode a leader’s credibility because they are “never 

around.” It can be an exercise in buying down professional risk while professional 

intimacy with subordinates helps build and sustain a leader’s credibility that can 

endure times of absence or crisis.

Professional intimacy combined with data and information collection empower 

leaders with situational awareness for honing effectiveness in evaluating the experience and applying lessons learned.35 Formal and informal individual or groups 

meetings are opportunities to bring together people, programs, and functions who 
34

otherwise may not be connected. Leaders can leverage other settings such as socials, coffee breaks, team-building activities, and professional development luncheons to facilitate networking opportunities and cross talk between organizations. 

Data and information collection and reporting can include meetings, reports, 

data calls, daily situation reports, after-action reports, weekly activity reports, 

monthly vector check reports, and quarterly budget reports. Many leaders collect 

data through spreadsheets and electronic means. Information is usually gathered 

through meetings. Conducting meetings efficiently and with purpose is an art in 

itself. Many meetings are called because a decision is required. Leveraging meetings for the secondary effect of cultivating resilience is challenging. Leaders must 

construct and guide meetings so as to reinforce the sustainability of all processes 

should they be suddenly taken out of action. If a particular meeting must regularly 

occur, leaders can use it to integrate elements from the effective actions list. For 

example, an otherwise dull staff meeting can be transformed when the senior leader 

invests in relationships with attendees, inspires them to higher levels of performance, 

and facilitates their success with decisive advocacy.

To the extent and speed that risk and authorities will allow, meetings are also 

opportunities for leaders to drive down subordinates’ dependence on them. Each 

meeting should present opportunities to increase subordinate proficiency, expertise, and problem-solving skills; to identify process deficiencies; and to reduce the 

need for a further meeting on the same subject. These opportunities should not 

encourage leaders to neglect to invest in relationships with subordinates. Leaders 
35

have a unique vantage point to address problems and facilitate short- and longterm solutions. They must also train and educate emerging leaders so they can do 

the same, thereby informing facilitation with data and information collection. 

All of this powerfully informs the ability to inspire, discipline, and rehabilitate. 

Truly effective leaders can achieve all three simultaneously. Rehabilitation is of particular importance for resilient organizations. Rehabilitating substandard performers or those with conduct issues requires focused efforts to leverage opportunities 

to improve performance, professionalism, and attitude. It is all too easy to avoid 

dealing with these leadership responsibilities. Misconduct, mishaps, casualties, or 

myriad other “bad news” can also arrive as surprises, testing a leader’s personal 

resilience. Bad news will usually require inspiration, disciplining, or rehabilitation. 

The emotions, thought processes, collaboration, and decision calculus responding 

to bad news will prepare for responses to crises on grander scales. Objective evaluation of one’s performance with peers, superiors, and subordinates can be extremely 

useful. Try to answer the following: “Did I demonstrate a positive attitude and effectiveness in my approach and commitment to inspire, discipline, and rehabilitate?” Experiences in disciplining, inspiring, and rehabilitating can become waypoints for future leadership guidance if they are properly recorded. 

The next element of the effective actions list is administrative advocacy, which includes tasks such as completing performance evaluation reports, presenting awards 

and decorations, and writing letters of appreciation or recommendation. It also includes highlighting achievements of the organization or specific personnel to senior 
36

leaders. Administrative advocacy is separate from other elements because these tasks 

require a leader to be out of the bustle of day-to-day business. These activities are an 

administrative expression of the leader’s judgment and require painstaking effort. 

It is important to reemphasize the interdependence of the elements on the effective actions list. For example, administrative advocacy and information collection 

and reporting can require a substantial time investment. Many leaders invest much 

time conducting these tasks, convinced that they are hitting home runs in support 

of their people. Consumed with these tasks, they fail to invest fully in relationships 

within their organization or to reflect upon elements of the reflective loop. All of 

this undermines leadership effectiveness and diminishes trust. 

Occasionally “doing or directing” a task or function can inspire a member or 

provide a quick solution when challenged by a particular problem. Unfortunately, 

when leaders too often “do” their subordinates’ tasks, trust is undermined, innovation hindered, and the development of future experts is stunted. Leaders who 

steadfastly default to mission control are commonly called micromanagers and are 

known for being perpetually stuck on the do/direct element of the effective actions 

list. They insert themselves in and between the decisions required of their subordinates, commonly resulting in frustration, low morale, and diminished trust. To 

greater detriment, micromanagement stifles critical thinking and abbreviates precious incubation time. Individuals trapped in this environment are unable to evolve 

their problem solving. Consumed with immediate results, they often fail to facilitate long-term solutions to problems common inside the organization. Damage 
37

caused by a leader’s incessant “doing and directing” is twofold: the organization 

becomes comprised of micromanagers and personnel unable to think critically, 

needing constant guidance, and cannot rapidly adapt when disruptions occur. Impressionable subordinates within this culture also grow to value a “do/direct” management style, perpetuating the rigidity of the organization and the culture.

Leaders should assume the roles of facilitator and integrator. Facilitation requires 

clear and continuous communication of vision and values, delegating, and advocating. Advocating subordinates’ ideas requires leaders to say “yes” and inspire them to 

explore new initiatives. Leaders must weigh the risk of loss in time and energy (taken 

away from “primary” tasks) when it is directed toward innovation and consider that 

pursuing and nurturing innovation boosts morale, motivation, team building, and 

overall professionalism. While the idea may ultimately fail, so much more has been 

accomplished to improve individuals members and the organization. This sort of 

risk-opportunity consideration is called “decision support analysis.” All leaders 

should learn and teach decision support analysis to facilitate successful preparation, 

packaging, and presentation of information when advising senior leaders. Decision 

support analyses improve the ability to integrate new ideas with existing practices.

Integrators habitually seek opportunities for collaboration. They can bring together individuals, sections, and organizations that may have never connected before. 

This network can then be activated to produce more options, to anticipate or prevent 

disruption, for much better outcomes than might have been achieved by a single or-
38

ganization. Integrators also coordinate and synchronize capabilities, functions, tasks, 

and programs for unified efforts to realize vision and values they all work within.

An example of a facilitator/integrator practice of encouraging innovation is the 

Palchinsky Principle whereby using sample results in a small area is used before 

risking widespread and unpleasant damage. If the outcome is satisfactory or better, 

then consider facilitating the success of the initiative as a new status quo across the 

organization (fig. 2).36

Leaders can facilitate new ideas with resources, link people to others with similar challenges, or help them find to digital or print resources with relevant lessons 

learned. Some ideas may need advocacy for additional resources or funding and 

leaders can prudently assume the short-term risk for potential long-term gain and 

facilitate the success of subordinates. Clear vision and values empower subordinates approaching problems and developing initiatives that leaders should advocate because they are within the accepted boundaries. New ideas should not be 

immediately dismissed because they fail to produce maximum unattainable benefit 

with zero risk. Poorly communicated vision and values will likewise stifle innovation. After several rejections, junior leaders can accede to the status quo, quickly 

becoming a part of the problem rather than actively facilitating solutions. In 2005, 

then-Col Darren W. McDew, commander of the 43d Air Wing at Pope AFB, North 

Carolina (later, the commander of Air Mobility Command and US Transportation 

Command), greeted all inbound personnel newly assigned to his base. He said that 

their fresh perspective and ideas would contribute to innovations for the first six 
39

months. In the following six months on station, most personnel become a part of 

the problem. See figure 3 for a conceptual example of this hypothesis.

Idea 4

Idea 2

Idea 5

Idea 3 Idea 1

Scale and Impact of Benefit

Short Term Cost

Clearly Understood Vision and Values

Figure 2. The shaded area identifies the clearly understood vision and values of the 

leader. This domain and range can concentrate the innovative ideas from people in an 

organization. They should not strive for a bull’s eye. Also, a disruptive or transformative concept may be somewhere in the shaded domain, but it is off the page entirely.
40

Figure 3. Unclear or unknown leader’s vision and values are represented by both 

axes to infinity in all directions. Innovative ideas will emerge, but common answers 

from the leader are often no, no for now, maybe, or try again. Eventually, the innovative spirit of the organization will wither.

Idea 4

Unclear or Unknown Vision and Values

Idea 2

Idea 3

Idea 1

Unclear Risk Approach Unknown Values Unknown Vision Unclear Opportunities Sought
41

Organizational resilience, redundancy, and creativity in lower-level leaders, distribution of control, and optimized processes all free up leaders’ time and enable 

more thinking and leading. Processes and people are no longer powerlessly dependent on the leader, and these organizations are better prepared to self-heal in unexpected disruptions. There is no independence from, and dissonance with, the 

shared vision and values. Enmity is avoided, and strong professional relationships 

are evinced. Adopting a concept from Stephen Covey’s Seven Habits of Highly Effective People, leaders and people in an organization must be interdependent upon 

each other for what value they bring to the overall effort.37

Facilitators/integrators can achieve this interdependence much more easily than 

doers/directors. They approach problems with the facilitator’s mindset, striving to facilitate successful problem solving by lower-level leaders. Doing and directing should 

be kept to a minimum. Leaders cultivating a resilient organization must exercise prudence when determining when and to what extent it must be “done” to solve problems 

by themselves, or to make specific “direction” for subordinates to solve them. 

The leadership interventions in broken processes ought to be limited to debriefing, 

publishing lessons learned, or training and education to improve subordinates’ problem-solving skills and to approach problems with a facilitator’s perspective. Learning 

and practicing this requires profound changes to common leadership approaches to 

problems. There are three barriers to developing a facilitator/integrator culture.

The first challenge is selecting and developing the right leaders. Often prospective leaders and commanders are identified for increased responsibility in the US 
42

military by demonstrating technical and tactical mastery in the early years of their 

careers. General officers often mentor young lieutenants and captains to master 

their crafts and strive to be the experts in their fields of work. Seniors do this because mastery of skills is the “tip of the spear” of mission accomplishment. Tactical 

effectiveness can be quantified or validated for an individual and a team’s credibility. 

Credibility can earn trust and buy down risk, resulting in increased deliberate development, investment, career vectoring, and promotion. It is critical to acknowledge that there exists a leadership development quandary at a point in one’s career 

development because technical and tactical mastery is not necessarily a critical attribute of a master facilitator/integrator. In fact, this type of mastery is only one 

element of many attributes that can be used to identify someone for a position of 

leadership. In times of crisis or degraded communications, any leader or subordinate of any organization can suddenly become a facilitator/integrator of many 

pieces of other organizations, engage in mass collaboration, and sustain his or her 

aspect of resilient command and control.

Retired Air Force Gen Gilmary Hostage, formerly the commander of Air Combat Command, and Lt Col Larry Broadwell published an article on resilient command and control (C2).38 The intent was to present a new C2 paradigm, shifting 

away from centralized control and decentralized execution toward centralized 

command, distributed control, and decentralized execution. In a personal interview, and in collaboration with, Colonel Broadwell, commander of the 1st Fighter 

Group, we established definitions of these terms within the context of resilient in-
43

tent. “Centralized command” is the legal authority to publish overarching vision, 

values, and priorities within which all subordinates must apply their capabilities. 

“Distributed control” is the synchronized application of all available resources to 

address common problem sets. “Decentralized execution” assures that each player 

operates in concert with the commander’s vision and values, is capable of rapid 

adaptation, and is empowered and authorized to integrate capabilities with maximum effectiveness given the unique context of a particular problem set.

Then there is the second challenge: building thinking capacity beyond the paradigms and loyalties exclusive to the sub- or microculture of one’s tactical upbringing. Leaders in positions of responsibility, requiring high-orders of mass collaboration and rapid adaptation, must be able to transcend the cultures where they spent 

their formative years. The ways that one learns and grows to master a single craft or 

capability are different from how leaders evolve, and this must also be acknowledged. Growth in leadership must be a reflection of the imperative of facilitating 

solutions by linking unconnected people or capabilities for the mission to succeed.

Third, leaders must transcend a military leadership culture slow to adapt to rapid 

information technology (IT) developments. Lt Col Greg A. Roman concluded that 

military adaptation to C2 in the information age all too often gives in to the “the 

seductiveness of information technology” by rapidly centralizing vast quantities of 

information and decision-making authority. This centralization builds rigid hierarchies that focus information flow toward greater central control creates glaring vulnerabilities.39 He somberly concluded that the result is a military unprepared for 
44

the operations tempo of information-age warfare.40 A problem of trust and risk arises 

to determine which leaders, at what levels, ought to have the appropriate authorizations to make particular types of decisions. Centralization occurs when a leader presumes that amassing all the right information will drive certainty, and that will inform 

excellent decisions. The inference is that subordinate leaders who will have less information will have less certainty and make decisions with unacceptable risks.

Addressing the challenge of certainty, Martin van Creveld concluded in Command 

in War that, theoretically, there are only two ways to achieve absolute certainty, total 

centralization (100 percent do/direct management) or complete decentralization 

(100 percent facilitation/integration) of information and decision-making responsibility.41 Van Creveld’s analysis of 2,500 years of command in war indicates that a commander’s intent is achieved more prudently when he leans toward centralization.

However, in an operating environment where communications are denied or 

disrupted, high degrees of centralization may become unattainable. Agile leaders 

must, therefore, determine to what extent they should centralize or decentralize 

decision making based on the level of trust in their operational culture, their ability 

to discern and anticipate risk and opportunity, and the constraints of the operating 

environment. In environments where communications are intermittent or denied, 

leaders may not have the luxury of relying on traditional hierarchies and architectures. A living and fluid network of distributed facilitators/integrators closely collaborating to address similar problem sets must create solutions on the fly. Inflexible reliance on the mission-control model will limit the breadth of solutions with 
45

leaders overwhelmed by helplessly doing/directing. Other leaders separated by 

communications disruptions may need to direct hasty actions prudently. Wisdom 

and flexibility can come from training that instills the ability to anticipate surprise.

These three challenges must be addressed through more thoughtful leadership 

selection, training, development, and placement. Senior leaders must also value the 

ability to collaborate as a part of job performance and subsequently organize, train, 

and equip the force to do that better. Rapid adaptation of communication and organizational information management processes may require reaching outside 

military circles to learn from corporations, small-business entrepreneurs, and nongovernmental organizations operating on the cutting edge of the digital revolution.

The final element of the effective actions list is rest and deliberate pause. First, it 

is important to highlight the relationship between rest and resilience. Research indicates that periods of stress followed by appropriate rest effectively increase resilience and strength of individuals and organizations. Dr. James Young stated,

Based on my professional experience and the related literature, I would suggest that rest or recovery is the most overlooked variable when it comes to understanding the impact of stress. It’s 

typically not the stress that has a negative effect on our emotional/psychological state or level 

of performance; rather, it’s the lack of recovery from these stressors. We must consciously seek 

rest and recovery following significant stressors. If we do, we actually grow from the stressful 

experiences. We see a similar process with physical stress (e.g., working out) in that we have to 

recover from the workout to grow stronger physically.42
46

Dr. Chad Morrow, chief of Psychological Applications at an Air Force special 

tactics squadron, advises that all professionals must “take recovery as seriously as 

any energy expenditure.”43 He explained that personal resilience, whether from 

work- or trauma-related stress, is significantly dependent upon deliberate and 

structured investment in rest and recovery. At the time of this writing, few training 

aids address how to invest downtime optimally. Military professionals usually default 

to their normal training level after high levels of stress and rest is not a consideration. 

Most military personnel practice habits to feel “disengaged” from the demands of 

their duty. The habits can include many healthy and unhealthy practices that ultimately may or may not improve personal and family resilience.

Rest allows the mind to process complex memories, enhancing a leader’s clarity 

and creativity. In his book The Mission, the Men, and Me: Lessons from a Former 

Delta Force Commander, retired US Army Col Peter Blaber explains that rest allows 

the brain to incubate and illuminate information and experiences that have “saturated” a leader’s thoughts. The incubation and illumination phases most often occur when a leader takes advantage of rest, pause, and good sleep. The brain can sort 

through concepts and find patterns that lead to “Eureka!” or “aha!” illuminating 

moments that result in innovation and higher-order problem solving.44 The implication is that leaders sustaining a rigorous and grinding professional lifestyle of 

continual “saturation” may be unable to mature their ability to solve increasingly 

complex problems.
47

Many leaders strive to project an appearance of sustained superior performance 

despite the lack of rest. Leadership by example when rest is not an option is one 

thing, ignoring the importance of rest is another. These leaders set the example for 

junior leaders and subordinates, inadvertently stunting their natural cognitive processes and limiting short-term effectiveness and long-term adaptability. Less resilient leaders force the members of their organizations to “sustain a surge” of relentless pace without appropriate periods of rest, depleting morale, motivation, energy, 

and family support. When a crisis occurs, these leaders and the organization will 

need a further surge to respond, attempting to access depleted reserves that are 

simply not there to meet required objectives. True professionals will strive even 

when physical, mental, and emotional gas tanks may already be nearing empty. 

Unfortunately, the aim is to thrive in crisis, not strive for survival.

Deliberate pause, restraint, and exercising patience are often seen as taking no 

action at all, but there is a difference between prudence and indecision. Deliberate 

pause should not be an excuse to slow down the tempo of an organization that 

needs to act quickly. A leader who has prepared for the unexpected by thinking 

through risks and opportunities will recognize patterns as they emerge and know 

when to demonstrate restraint. For example, a tactical pause can provide an excellent opportunity for soldiers in a firefight to regroup to maintain the initiative. 

However, a tactical hesitation is a failure to execute when it comes out of uncertainty of the situation or overwhelming emotion. Similarly, an organization will 

hesitate because it (or its leader) is not prepared for surprise.
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Focusing on effective actions will improve an organization’s effectiveness, performance, and resilience. Most leadership effort, especially during collaboration, requires engaging and influencing others within and outside the organization. During 

data and information collection, leaders will hear subordinates identifying limitations or restraints, often imposed by an elusive “they.” Leaders must understand who 

“they” are and identify the best ways to communicate with, and influence, them.

Who Is the “They”?

This question, verbatim, is one continually asked by retired USAF Lt Gen Eric 

Fiel, during his tenure as the commander of AF Special Operations Command, 

2011–2014. It was a method of finding out exactly who had ownership of the restraining aspect of a particular activity—he could, therefore, determine whether he, 

a subordinate, or his leadership was required to weigh in to overcome specific limiting factors and accomplish the mission. “Theys,” then, are the owners of the authorities, processes, programs, functions, or tasks a leader would like to collaborate 

with or influence. Effective leaders within and across organizations must, therefore, 

invest in building and strengthening a network by first asking, “Who is the ‘they’?” 

In the military, the “they,” or the owner, is the one with the authority, the one with 

the resources, or the one who will likely be fired because of a significant failure 

within their scope of responsibilities. The ability to truly influence outcomes depends on a leader’s ability to find and influence the owner. To influence people, one 
49

must find (or become) the boss. To influence tasks, projects, or processes, for example, one must locate the section chiefs, production supervisors, floor managers, 

or engineers. However, influencing programs and initiatives is more complex.

Many programs are created to preserve precious resources and the people who use 

them. Examples of some of those programs are sexual assault awareness and prevention, diversity in the workplace, safety, physical security, or regular maintenance 

checks. Commanders own programs, and it is their responsibility to integrate the 

values of the program into the culture and fundamental decision-making processes 

of the people within the organization. A program point of contact (POC) is typically 

the person most engaged in addressing questions and concerns from members of the 

organization, but the commander bears the responsibility for facilitating the success 

of the program in an interdependent relationship with the POC.

Initiatives are the investments in ideas within the mission, vision, and values of 

an organization but are usually outside (or at variance with) the standard procedures. Talented junior leaders usually own initiatives—because they originated the 

idea or have been delegated to develop it. Leaders can add credibility to initiatives 

by openly communicating support for the owners while providing advocacy, resources, and freedom to maneuver as needed.

Leaders either pay for or reap the benefits of past decisions. So keep in mind that 

the “they” could be former leaders, influencers, or owners whose circumstances, 

approaches to risk, or personal judgment seemed appropriate at the time of the 

decisions. Leaders cannot influence the past; they must exercise their reflective loop 
50

to gather information, think critically about the present, and determine the benefits 

of influencing or transforming the status quo.

Leaders seeking to know who the “they” are may unexpectedly find themselves 

to be the owners. To prevent this surprise, leaders must quickly and thoroughly 

explore and clearly understand the depth and breadth of their authorities once assigned the position of responsibility.

When someone outside of the organization is identified by a subordinate as an 

owner, the leader may be asked to engage because of their superior authority. If the 

initiative exists inside the established vision and values, the leader can simply engage the owner directly or “go over their head” to someone with even greater authority. Leaders can have an opportunity to advocate for their people and request 

action, and many three- and four-star generals pride themselves in being “action 

officers” for important initiatives.

Leaders must consider the importance of communication with all the various 

owners within their organization. Foremost, these are critical opportunities to listen and learn. They can also be used to reinforce visions and values and to inform, 

inspire, guide, and mentor.

All leaders must strive to build a professionally disciplined yet highly networked 

organization, but their ability to engage owners outside of an organization is largely, 

but not exclusively, dependent on command relationships. Researching and understanding organizational charts that denote hierarchies, leaders, offices, and desks 

build one’s understanding of where owners are within and across large organiza-
51

tions. Without professional relationships or familiarity, the names and duty titles 

alone have little to no meaning. However, once leaders begin to populate the charts 

with names and faces (investing in relationships) by establishing personal connections (developing professional intimacy), the charts become living things. The 

powers of personal connections are significantly enhanced by cultivating professional intimacy rather than strict reliance on transaction-based relationships driven 

by self-interest.

Many junior leaders ignore charts and rely much more exclusively on chains of 

command and established procedures. Often this behavior is directed by commanders; sometimes it is simply driven by unfamiliarity with the organization and 

how it works. (Please note that subversion or deception is not advocated—all leaders must not compromise personal integrity.) Influence and collaboration suffer 

where there is dissonance in loyalties, authorities, or risk management. The best 

way to engage a higher-placed “owner” for advocacy might be adherence to formal 

processes, because most internal business lives in the process-oriented model.

Formal processes and relationships act like a cardiovascular system. They pump 

life in prioritized, but consistent, ways to the whole body. They also promote healing 

or rebuilding from minor injuries. Informal relationships act like a nervous system, 

collecting and disseminating information and understanding. They decide, synthesize, and transform with information from sensory inputs. Neither system can operate without the other. Both need nurturing, training, maintenance, and exercise.
52

Serious and life-threatening injuries are almost always surprises. Sometimes, like 

combat wounds, risks might be anticipated and mitigated with tactical medical 

training and preparations for timely patient delivery to hospitals with specialized 

staffs. Extending the injury analogy, injuries threatening life, limb, or sight (surprise, 

crisis, disruption, or denial of a capability), require more and faster intervention 

than the cardiovascular system alone can manage. These events require external intervention by a surgeon or specialist—collaboration with outside expertise.

A master facilitator’s/integrator’s network may span organizations, hierarchies, 

owners, leaders, agencies, departments, bureaucracies, and cultures. These highorder networks of collaboration can cross resource and funding lines, even when 

the money and owners are unrelated in mission but tied together in the defense of 

the nation. Leaders who rise to fill positions of great responsibility must coordinate 

and collaborate with individuals from nongovernmental organizations, officials 

from other countries, and multinational coalitions with constantly changing geopolitical dynamics and disparate views on ways, means, and risks.45 In all of this, 

the principles of organizational resilience remain the same. Find and influence 

owners, facilitate and integrate their capabilities and ideas, extend collaboration to 

the farthest reaches of the network, focus on responding to the crisis or surprise, 

and achieve the mission.

Even with the most meticulous collaborative efforts, leaders and organizations 

are always put to the test in sudden disruptions and crises. Preparing for these requires a balance between building robust preventative measures and responsive 
53

adaptation. The next question in this book examines how an organization can carry 

out its mission when its technology is disrupted or degraded or fails entirely.

What Is Wrong with My Supply Chain?

In many studies, resilient organizations are most often tied to an ability to continue the mission after the loss of leadership.46 More challenging and more important is the capacity to continue toward mission accomplishment when resources 

and technology are suddenly disrupted, rendered ineffective, or lost. 

A significant challenge to most line commanders is that they are only responsible for a short link of their supply chain—day-to-day care, sustainment, and preventive maintenance. In the US military, the responsibility of supply surety belongs 

to experts in offices and depots usually working some distance away from the “line” 

or operational units.

Many junior leaders feel about as responsible for their technology as a tourist on 

a commercial airliner feels responsible for flight safety. It is easy for many leaders 

embedded in complex processes not to ask “What Is Wrong with My Supply 

Chain?” because the equipment is usually someone else’s responsibility. Not asking 

the question forms a blind spot critical in cultivating resilient intent. The connective tissues in the body of a military endeavor are synchronized and sequenced 

operations. The cellular composition of any operation is in the employment of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Ultimately, TTPs usually rely on the best 
54

technology available. Thus, any improvement or degradation of equipment can result in a significant modification of tactics, operations, and strategies. The more 

one’s suite of TTPs relies on a particular technology, the more they are vulnerable 

to crisis or disruption and the harder and slower it may be to adapt.

Leaders and the users of technology are issued equipment with guidance on 

proper use and care. When the supply chain fails or requires improvement or modification, those questions or actions only seem to become someone else’s problems. 

IT specialists deal with hardware issues, the system administrator deals with network issues, and the maintenance personnel take care of equipment failure, but the 

leader is still responsible for completing the mission. The intent must be met even 

when primary ways and means are of limited use, unreliable, or irrelevant.

Resilient intent provides an interesting and extraordinary lens for viewing an organization. Create a theoretical “basket” of critical equipment: government-issued 

laptops and commercial, off-the-shelf global positioning system (GPS) watches, 

and so on. Risks to the laptops include possible industrial espionage against the 

hardware or software and attacks on, or exploitation of, the laptops by hackers. 

Consider the conclusions drawn in a Center for New American Security.

Digital technologies, commonly referred to as cyber systems, are a security paradox: Even as 

they grant unprecedented powers, they also make users less secure. Their communicative capabilities enable collaboration and networking, but in so doing open doors to intrusion. Their 

concentration of data and manipulative power vastly improves the efficiency and scale of operations, but this concentration in turn exponentially increases the amount that can be stolen 

or subverted by a successful attack. The complexity of their hardware and software creates great 
55

capability, but this complexity spawns vulnerabilities and lowers the visibility of intrusions. 

Cyber systems’ responsiveness to instruction makes them invaluably flexible, but it also permits small changes in a component’s design or direction to degrade or subvert system behavior. 

These systems’ empowerment of users to retrieve and manipulate data democratizes capabilities, but this great benefit removes safeguards present in systems that require hierarchies of 

human approvals. In sum, cyber systems nourish us, but at the same time, they weaken and 

poison us.47

Off-the-shelf GPS watches do not have anti-spoofing safeguards, and GPS signals can easily be jammed or modified to indicate an incorrect location. There are 

unique entities that deal with “enterprise-wide” technology that has been prescreened and vetted by labs and in acquisitions testing. There is some physical risk 

in the supply chain vulnerability: faulty contracts, engineering flaws, deliberate deception, wear and tear, standard loss rates, and changing operational environments 

can compromise supply surety. To reduce risk, leaders often rely on reducing loss 

rates by publishing a risk-evasive training policy. The result is a bench stock of 

mission-ready equipment that personnel avoid using or experimenting with because there is a higher value placed on averting the risk of loss than on opportunities for innovation. It could be symptomatic of a narrow approach to addressing 

risks and opportunities or that the leader simply cannot accept the risk associated 

with innovation.

With recurring damage or loss, or the need for rapid adaptation to respond to 

emerging problems, leaders can try to modify standing procedures without sacri-
56

ficing mission effectiveness. Then leaders must facilitate rapid resilient research, 

development, and resupply. 

In significant disruptions to technology, such as a broken supply sustainment 

chain, jammed communications equipment, hacked computers, spoofed navigation, or unsynchronized clocks, leaders must find ways for the mission to continue. 

While many think that military professionals have become too dependent on technology, maintaining a “tech proficiency balance” of expertise within an organization is prudent regarding risk and opportunity. Simply stated, leaders must maintain a balance between the development and sustainment of trained experts 

proficient in the latest technologies and a bench of experts proficient in operating 

older technology or methods. Maintaining a spectrum of well-practiced TTPs can 

integrate the tech-proficiency balance at the small organization level. Designing 

and practicing TTPs to sustain this balance help assure more rapid adaptation to a 

compromised supply chain. As in the earlier above, it is relatively easy to spoof or 

degrade GPS hardware, but it is much more challenging to keep compasses from 

finding magnetic north. A tech proficiency in maintaining land-navigation expertise balances opportunities for more innovative training with likely risks. This approach to training also cultivates operators—and future leaders—who can flexibly 

prosecute the mission despite the disruption of their advanced technology.

Leaders who value maintaining a tech-proficiency balance can also facilitate 

idea sharing and foster flexible planning, optimizing processes, and creative solu-
57

tions to potential problems, thereby enhancing all members’ professional and emotional readiness.

Achieving this balance can be tough. Time spent training to less advanced and 

seemingly relevant tasks can be seen as being wasted. Some organizations have 

such a significant training burden that adding additional training to their schedules 

comes at a very high cost. Leaders must include operational resilience as parts of 

their vision and values and rely on junior leaders to design elegance into training 

plans to achieve the tech-proficiency balance. 

Tech-proficiency balance can be difficult to find and maintain. For example, in 

the office, if networked computers fail, it probably means work stoppage. However, 

older methods of processing information, reconsideration of the organization’s 

processes, or even mission reorientation might keep things going. People must 

maintain competence on both older and leading-edge technologies to provide necessary flexibility and agility. Practice and the necessary training must also be a priority in the vision and values.

All of this can lead to organizational turmoil. Training, planning, and preparations using “outdated” TTPs might be seen as detrimental to the “real” mission. 

Disregard for the possibilities and probabilities of technological disruption or poor 

risk analyses can lead to a flood of planning “what ifs.” Without leadership backing 

of tech-proficiency balance, these can lead to the organization being emotionally 

and functionally unprepared for sudden technological disruptions. Leaders can 
58

mitigate all this with a clearly established vision and values that are optimizing a 

balance of efficiency, effectiveness, and resilience.

Defining optimization in this way means assuming a significant professional risk 

if leaders overemphasize the efficiency portion of the optimization. Anticipating 

long-term risks requires preparing for when the corporate memory or experience 

is inadequate for a particular situation and mature leadership is needed. Near-term 

external risks may often be too imposing to allow concentration on resilience while 

optimizing processes, organizations, and technology investments. An example 

would be when external economic considerations impinge on acquisitions and research and development decisions. If the economy is declining and budgets are 

shrinking, the investment in resilience potential may seem to be too costly. Fortunately, a resilient culture of intent can be underwritten by a tech-proficiency balance with a diversity of platforms, equipment, and tools for accomplishing the mission. Results- and efficiency-driven leaders can view this as futile, “nice to have” but 

out of reach, and a “no, for now.” However, winning and overcoming sudden disruptions or crises will be for the most resilient organization, not necessarily the 

most technologically advanced.

As emerging technology improves the TTPs, technology and proficiencies must 

be rebalanced. Technological dependencies engrained in normal business can create blind spots in risk analysis. A network must be built and activated to increase 

awareness, share best practices, and rapidly create effective solutions.
59

Leaders preparing for surprise face significant challenges from within their organizations. Inertia, tradition, personalities, and friction are a few such obstacles. 

However, the risks of surprise are too significant to ignore, and when crises occur, 

members will look to leaders for guidance, direction, and solutions. The final question addresses a leader’s effectiveness and ability to facilitate effective adaptation of 

the organization.

Am I the Leader I Want To Be—or the Leader the Organization 

Needs Me To Be?

The speed of change and uncertainty in the future will create an even 

greater demand for innovative, adaptive Soldiers and leaders who 

thrive amidst ambiguity.

—US Army Vision—Strategic Advantage in an Uncertain World

This inquiry often leads to somber reflections. Most leaders want their talents 

and strengths to resonate in their organizations. However, leaders usually have limited ability to choose their workforce, especially in the military. They must rely on 

and adapt to external factors such as the recruitment, assessment, and selection 

processes; the effectiveness of previous training and education; and the investments 

previously made in the growth and development of the individuals they will lead.
60

At the onset, most leaders also do not get to choose their organization’s internal 

and external contexts. Military organizations may find themselves in combat, disaster relief operations, restricted budgets, or challenging geographic locations.

Though they can influence attitudes and practices over time, leaders do not initially choose the culture and subcultures of their organization. Neither can leaders 

choose the initial condition of the organization. This inability can be sobering when 

seeing their vision for the organization effectively blocked by things like effects of 

poor talent management, incompetence, low morale, or emotional wounds left by 

previous leaders or conditions.

Leaders should strive for a natural style in crisis or major disruption. The emotion and friction in unsettling realities can deeply affect people; even the most 

trusted members can lose credibility through misconduct or unprofessionalism. 

Personal problems inside and outside of work can even propagate throughout the 

organization. Crises and disruptions can include loss of a key leader or a respected 

person, a death of or harm to someone in the organization, and decreased resources 

with increased expectations. Leaders must have the stability, professional intimacy, 

and vision to see the mission and the people through all of these.

Effective leaders must demonstrate resilient intent, embrace the cumulative effect of partial solutions, energize their network and advisors, and perform careful 

analyses of the elements of the reflective loop. The reflective loop enables leaders to 

create effective strategies to employ the necessary components of the effective actions list (in fig. 1).
61

Many organizations are not rife with these sorts of dramatic problems. Leaders 

must, nevertheless, accept that they might have to find ways to advocate for and 

motivate others sometimes outside of their comfort zones, to push them beyond 

the edge of familiarity. The necessary approaches may be contrary to how the leader 

normally interacts with people. Demeanor, as much as anything else, will also need 

to be adapted. During a crisis or its aftermath, temperament, patience, and personal sources of strength may require significant recalibration. Patience must be 

practiced with a realization that most information reporting from the results of 

actions may come very slowly, if at all. When attempting to construct or reconstruct an organization, a leader must ask, “Is this the organization I want, or the 

organization the mission needs?”

In crises, communication disruptions can create significant problems. Internet 

connections, radio, or cell phone communications can be slow, intermittent, or 

nonexistent. The tempo of decision making and the consequences of decisions may 

be extremely high, but getting timely data and information may not be possible. 

Technological issues, adversary or competitor actions, or even severe weather can 

upset the flow and quality of information. At the very least, this results in frustration and feverishly working people.

Catastrophic equipment failure is a crisis, but it can also present new opportunities. For example, consider a flying squadron facing catastrophic technology failure 

in all of its aircraft. With the loss of primary capability, pilots, crews, and support 

personnel can still be an incredible source of talent and brainpower. The larger 
62

network may find added resilience by leveraging this grounded unit. Temporarily 

repurposed as a talent depot, these people can answer questions, provide analyses, 

or generate solutions to complex problems that otherwise simply cannot be managed. In the larger network, this is the embodiment of resilient intent; despite sudden changes in ways, means, and risks, the desired outcomes remain. Therefore, 

leaders must also ask, “Is this the mission we want or the mission that is needed?”

When sudden and significant disruption happens, leaders may have to reexamine every aspect of the organization, its functions, programs, tasks, people, resources, and effectiveness. There also may not be much time to do this. Leaders 

who have prepared themselves and their organizations to exercise resilience have 

sustained, consistent, and disciplined analyses of all the elements in the reflective 

loop. By demonstrating resilient intent, leaders reaffirm their loyalties; reconsider 

and reflect on risks; scale and adjust the vision and values for the organization; 

prioritize functions, programs, and initiatives; and facilitate efficiency and resilience in all. Most processes following significant disruption will experience a loss in 

efficiency. Circumstances may require leaders and process owners to assume a mission-command mindset. They may need to adapt trust validation practices and 

assume that some will be at variance with the original guidance. Resilient leaders 

distribute control to relevant process owners, continue to develop emerging leaders, and guide the new organization with clearly stated vision and values.

Aside from the adaptive actions necessary in response to an “everything has 

changed . . . for now” event, leaders must also adapt their management styles. Doers/
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directors and their organizations may not be the first to fail but will likely be the slowest to recover. Doers/directors, underinvesting in their people, cultivate a rigid and 

fragile organization with minimal resilience. They commit a mistake of omission—

failure to devise strategies and integrate initiatives, such as the tech-proficiency 

balance, into their usual culture with resilience as a priority. Resilient organizations 

simply cannot be created after an emergency. In a contest to effectively close the gap 

brought on by surprise, those who are most resilient have the advantage.

Organizations developed by facilitators/integrators may still fail at the onset, but 

they are prepared to recover much more quickly. People in these organizations can 

grasp the power of persistence and the cumulative effects of partial solutions. Once 

integrated, people across a network, carefully developed to be creative thinkers and 

problem solvers, can create synergies and exponential ways and means for facilitating the mission. Creative and adaptive process owners are required for mission 

survival and mission success. Facilitators/integrators may never be able to prepare 

for every setback, but they can be assured that their investment in personnel and 

networks will prime their organization for quicker, more effective recovery.

Conclusion

National and military leaders make significant efforts to prevent surprise using 

all the instruments of national power. Some ways and means include superior intelligence collection and analysis, innovative technology and strategy, partnerships 
64

with industries, creating alliances, and global economic interdependence. Still, surprise can never be completely prevented, and not all risks can be anticipated.

The nature of conflict and competition is now strategic surprise, disruption, degradation, and denial of technological advantage. Sometimes surprise can occur 

suddenly with immediate effects. Sometimes surprise is slow burning and localized, operating just below cause for escalation. Both can challenge the intent of one 

nation or many nations. Effectively closing the gap between crisis realization and 

effective response, either localized and tactical in nature or widespread and strategic in scope, will require a leadership culture that embraces resilient intent.

Transitioning new operators from specialist “doers/directors” to generalist leaders and “facilitators/integrators” requires careful selection and development. However, specialization of expertise within an organization is also necessary and must 

be equally nurtured and maintained. Balance is a consistent theme in a resilientintent culture. 

Developing facilitators/integrators requires senior leaders who can appraise junior leaders largely upon the ability to collaborate successfully, sustain sound judgment, and remain decisive. Developing resilient command-and-control architectures requires intensive training and exercises that empower all participants to 

work through gaps caused by disruption, degradation, and denial of technology. 

Facing likely mission failure is required to verify mastery of the craft critical in 

preparing for surprise. Therefore, senior leaders must value certain types of failure 

during training. The right kind of failures during training and exercises will stimu-
65

late debriefing sessions rife with frustrated and shocked operators and leaders in 

the formative parts of their professional lives. These failures should occur often 

enough that surprise becomes a comfortable presumption, real-time innovation 

becomes expected, and scalable collaboration—even at the tactical level where 

young leaders desire independence—becomes a cultural norm. Once excellence in 

expertise is verified, the force must be validated for surprise.

•  Why Don’t I Trust My People?

•  What Is My Problem with Risk?

•  What Do I Do with all this Free Time?

•  Who Is the “They”?

•  What Is Wrong with My Supply Chain?

•  Am I the Leader I Want To Be––or the Leader the Organization Needs Me To 

Be?

These six questions are relevant for any leader, formal or informal, in any organization, in any role. Use them to push yourself and your organization beyond the 

edge of familiarity. Cultivate resilience in your people. Optimize their mission effectiveness. Prepare them to adapt and grow stronger. That is REAL leadership.
66

Notes

1. This is a synthesis of concepts from Lind et al., “Changing Face of War.”

2. Lt Col (Select) Stewart Parker, special tactics officer, interview by author, 9 March 2015.

3. Mastro, “Operational Resilience,” 5.

4. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Strategic Capabilities Office, interview by the author, January 

2015. Information obtained under conditions of nonattribution.

5. Fairholm, Leadership and the Culture of Trust; Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Mission Command White Paper; and Scaife and Mills, Paradigm of Trust and Dialogue.

6. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mission Command White Paper.

7. An excellent analysis of the type of military branches and cultural approaches for these models 

can be found in Groysberg, Hill, and Johnson. “Which of These People Is Your Future CEO?”

8. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command, 1.

9. Gen Joseph Votel, commander, US Special Operations Command, lecture and interview by the 

author, 23 March 2015.

10. The progression of dependence, independence, and interdependence is derived from Covey, 

The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People.

11. Merriam–Webster Dictionary, s.v. “micromanage,” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/micromanage, accessed 24 February 2015.

12. International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Guide 73:2009, Risk Management—Vocabulary, s.v. “risk management,” https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:guide:73:ed-1:v1:en.

13. Hubbard, Failure of Risk Management, 49.

14. Mohun, Risk, 4.

15. Beck, Risk Society, 19.

16. Beck, World Risk, 4.

17. A concept adapted from Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership.

18. Mohun, Risk, 5.
67

21. Statement of the President to the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference in Washington, DC, 14 November 1957, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951.

22. Col Brett Nelson, USAF, retired special tactics officer, interview by author, 11 March 2015.

23. Kozaryn, American Forces Press Service, 6 August 1996.

24. See Adams, Risk.

25. This was originally entitled “risky shift” by James A. F. Stoner in 1961. The proven concept is 

that people make different decisions about risk when they are alone and is discussed in an operational 

context in Atkins, “Human Factors in Avalanche Accidents.”

26. For a concise discussion on delineating wisdom and prudence, see Miller, “The Military Ethos 

and the Hero.”

27. Col Brett Nelson, USAF, retired special tactics officer, interview by author, 11 March 2015.

28. These are called “wicked problems” as opposed to “tame problems.” For a simplified discussion see Seidensticker, Future Hype, 45–48.

29. Nelson, interview.

30. Palaoro, “Decision Superiority and Information Operations.”

31. This section assumes the anonymous adage, “Time should never be spent, but ever invested.”

32. For excellent vignettes on facilitators/integrators at the operational and strategic levels, see 

Kennedy, Engineers of Victory, and Sheehan, Fiery Peace in a Cold War.

33. Dr. James Young, psychologist, interview by author, 2 April 2015; and Nelson, interview.

34. Capt Gary Charney, interview by author, 5 May 2015.

35. The idea that the evaluation of personal experiences leads to growth is from Pastor Andy 

Stanley of Northpoint Church in Atlanta, Georgia, from his lecture series entitled Starting Over.

36. Captured elegantly in Hartford, Adapt.

37. Covey, Seven Habits of Highly Effective People.

38. Hostage and Broadwell, “Resilient Command and Control.” 39. Roman, Command or Control 

Dilemma, 2.
68

40. Ibid., 3.

41. Creveld, Command in War.

42. Young, interview.

43. Personal interview with Dr. Chad E. Morrow, psychologist, interview by author, 22 July 2015.

44. Blaber, Mission, the Men, and Me, 70.

45. Air Command and Staff College Lecture on Civil-Military Coordination Centers, International Security Studies, September 2014.

46. This is excellently captured by Mastro, “Operational Resilience.” Creating an organization that 

positively responds to volatility or crises is discussed at great length in Talib, Antifragile.

47. Center for a New American Security (CNS) Report, “Surviving on a Diet of Poisoned Fruit,” 

executive summary.
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Practical Exercises

Surprise

1. What is surprise?

2. Historically, militaries have prepared for emerging threats and surprises by 

investing in ?

3. What is resilience and does it matter?

4. Why does resilient intent require postindustrial-age practices? Provide two 

original examples.

5. Why does resilient intent require post-information-age practices? Provide 

two original examples.

Trust

1. Answer the question in 250 words: To what extent do I trust my people? Why 

is trust important in the workplace? Is it more, less, or equally important in 

combat or deployed environments?

2. List three significant events in your life or career that shaped the extent to 

which you trust others.
78

3. To the extent that I do not trust, what work-arounds have I practiced to overcome this?

4. Do those work-arounds limit my leadership ability because I become more 

saturated with tasks?

5. Does the lack of trust inhibit innovation in my organization?

6. In 250 words, reflect on the quote, “Leaders must practice trust—then they 

can rely on it when the operations tempo, complexity, and scope of efforts 

increase and frequency, consistency, and reliability of communications technology decrease.”

7. What are the problems (if any) with trusting too much?

8. How can I verify the performance of those I supervise without being malicious or distrusting? Do formal inspections help or hinder this? If they hinder, what kind of verification practice can improve trust without diminishing 

morale?

9. Compare the “mission-command” operational model with “process-oriented” and “mission-control” operational models.

10. Which works best in your work environment? What other work environments have you seen where one was more appropriate, but where the limits 

of trust shaped the use of a less-than-optimal operational model?
79

11. List 10 reflections or experiences from any time in your life that have shaped 

your loyalties.

12. Reflect upon past leaders and your perception of their loyalties; did their 

loyalties help or hinder the mission?

13. List five memories of “scars”: What did they do to frustrate or hurt you? As 

you reflect on them, were there any weaknesses they had in common?

14. List five memories of “superstars.” What did they do to impress you? As you 

reflect on them, were there any common strengths?

15. In 100–200 words, reflect upon the term “professional intimacy” and its relevance to your effectiveness as a leader.

16. Discuss the following point: Leadership requires deliberate investment in 

facilitating the success of subordinates and advocating on their behalf. Aside 

from the immediate benefits of a trust culture, this works toward building a 

necessary reserve of future leaders better prepared to demonstrate resilient 

intent.

17. Discuss this idea: “Leaders who limit the amount of trust placed in their 

people limit the growth of their people.”

18. When is micromanagement a good idea?

19. How can leaders better develop their people in order to move away from the 

micromanagement or mission control model?
80

20. Answer the question in 250 words: How can I cultivate a culture of trust in 

my organization?

Risk

1. Answer the question in 100 words: What is my approach to risk?

2. When rapid and effective responses are required, where can leaders draw new 

ideas and creative solutions from?

3. Should a leader’s efforts to gather creative ideas be limited to certain types of 

people or certain service member career fields? Can the best ideas and solutions come from individuals outside traditional organizational structures?

4. What are my problems and concerns with risk? Which one of the following 

four examples best fits me? Which concern me at work? With friends?

•	 risk aversion

•	 zero-defects mentality

•	 risk denial

•	 risk shift.

5. Are there any key events in my life that influenced my perspective on risk?

6. Discuss the importance or irrelevance of considering “opportunities” along 

with risk when making leadership decisions.
81

7. How can leaders develop their people to “learn to discern and manage risk 

rather than fear, disregard, or mock it”?

8. When is trust a necessity?

9. Consider any examples from yourself or other leaders who treated trust as a 

luxury versus a necessity. What was their approach, if any, to developing 

trust?

10. Create a notional “basket” of five common decisions in the workplace and at 

home. Select at least two that are personally difficult for you each time you 

approach the common situation.

11. One at a time, select the appropriate risks from Table 1, page 17. Assign as 

many as are relevant to each of the five decisions in your “basket.” Discuss 

opportunities along with each decision in 100 words or less.

Decision 1: 

•	 Professional

•	 Mechanical

•	 Internal

•	 External

•	 Opportunities
82

Decision 2: 

•	 Professional

•	 Mechanical

•	 Internal

•	 External

•	 Opportunities

Decision 3: 

•	 Professional

•	 Mechanical

•	 Internal

•	 External

•	 Opportunities

Decision 4: 

•	 Professional

•	 Mechanical

•	 Internal
83

•	 External

•	 Opportunities

Decision 5: 

•	 Professional

•	 Mechanical

•	 Internal

•	 External

•	 Opportunities

12. Consider this idea: “Plans rarely survive contact with reality, much less an 

enemy. Unexpected barriers or disruptions that will increase response times 

and slow adaptation.” How do leaders prepare themselves and their organizations for surprise?

13. Reflect on this: “Leaders not sufficiently accounting for risk in their plans 

can quickly become encumbered during a crisis. In a reactionary state, they 

will increase the time required to mitigate ongoing problems and to find 

new opportunities in evolving conditions.” Recalling or imagining a realworld example, explain in 75–150 words why being a leader in a reactionary 

state does not maximize personal or operational effectiveness.
84

14. What are the three most common risk-management models military leaders 

use?

15. Referencing your decision “basket” above, what type of common risk response (if any) do you default to when a tough decision must be made? 

Why?

16. How are your loyalties and values related to the type and extent of risk you 

will assume? How much risk do you expect your subordinates to accept as 

compared to your own?

17. Referencing the quote, “Leaders must be able to anticipate changes and 

adapt their decision-making frameworks to new visions and values within 

which they must operate—these require both action and agility. . . . Rapidly 

adapting one’s approach to risk either by seizing opportunities emerging 

from new constraints or by recognizing sudden acceptance of flexibility 

from one’s leaders indicates a high degree of resilience.” For what types of 

evolving operational work environments would you consider adapting your 

risk discernment?

18. Discuss a decision where a leader must commonly weigh short- and longterm risks and opportunities.

19. Answer in 500 words: How can I cultivate a culture of risk-right approaches 

in myself and my organization?
85

Free Time

1. What types of activities fill up your work schedule? List no fewer than 30 

workday activities, to include personal time such as email, exercise, restroom 

breaks, smoke breaks, and social media.

2. Is the following quote true for you? “Many good leaders have a strong conviction that being busy is directly proportional to the relationship of productivity, effectiveness, and value.”

3. Is there a relationship between the amount of free time available to leaders 

and the extent to which leaders trust their subordinates?

4. “Leaders must also be compelled to think. A sound decision-making framework should, at a minimum, account for the direction of the organization, 

organizational effectiveness, and the actualities of the overall improvement of 

the organization and reflect the leader’s effectiveness.” Consider current or 

past experiences; how thoroughly do you or your leaders consider these elements when making decisions?

5. Below are the elements of the “reflective loop.” Reflect upon your present or 

most recent assignment.

•	 People

•	 Functions, tasks, programs, initiatives
86

•	 Resources

•	 Risks and opportunities

•	 Leader’s own effectiveness

6. What are/were your vision and values? How often and what methods did you 

use to communicate them? What could have been more effective?

7. How much value did/do you place on investing in relationships? In personal 

growth?

8. Is your organizational effectiveness limited largely by the health of the individuals within it?

9. What mechanisms did/do you collect and report data and Information?

10. List top five examples of how you have or another leader has inspired, disciplined, and rehabilitated subordinates:

11. Discuss what tasks you as a leader actually have to do and those that you can 

facilitate.

12. How have you or how can you better integrate people, ideas, capabilities, or 

initiatives? What are the risks and opportunities associated with integrating 

across organizations?
87

13. Do you subscribe to the idea that individuals and organizations are made 

stronger and more effective by strategic “pauses” or deliberate recovery periods?

14. How do you prioritize rest? When have you taken or ordered your organization to slow its pace? Taken a deliberate pause?

15. Reference figure 2. Consider your current or most recent leader’s vision and 

values. Were they clearly communicated early and often? List five innovative 

ideas that would’ve fallen within their vision and values domain (shaded 

area, figure 2, page 39). List five ideas that would not fit in the shaded area.

16. Elaborate on the following: “Organizational resilience, redundancy, and creativity in lower-level leaders, distribution of control, and optimized processes all free up leaders’ time and enable more thinking and leading.” Applying a relevant example, how does this relate to short- and long-term risks 

and preparing for surprise? 

17. Consider the importance of not reinventing the wheel at your workplace. 

Are lessons learned effectively integrated into processes and decisions to improve operational effectiveness? If not, why not?

18. According to the book, what are the three primary barriers inhibiting the 

development of facilitator/integrator culture?
88

19. Leaders must acknowledge that the ways in which one learns and grows to 

master a single craft or capability are different from how a leader must 

evolve. At what point in your career does this event take place? How will you 

begin to transcend the cultures within which you spent your formative 

years?

20. Martin van Creveld’s analysis of 2,500 years of command in war indicates 

that a commander’s intent is achieved more prudently when leaning toward 

centralization of decision-making. Does this remain true when conducting 

operations when communications are disrupted or denied?

Who is the “They”?

1. The ability to truly influence outcomes depends upon a leader’s ability to find 

and influence the _____________.

2. What is the difference in roles from a point of contact and the owner if the 

two are separate individuals or organizations?

3. “Once leaders begin to populate the charts with names and faces (investing in 

relationships) by establishing personal connections (developing professional 

intimacy), the charts become living things. The powers of personal connections are significantly enhanced by cultivating professional intimacy rather 

than strict reliance on transaction-based relationships driven by self-interest.” 
89

Is this a true statement, or should organizational structures be adhered to 

with such discipline that informal relationships are discouraged?

4. A significant barrier to influence or collaboration with an owner exists when 

loyalties, authorities, or risk management are dissonant. In cases like this, 

formal processes to engage a higher-placed “owner” to advocate on the leader’s behalf may be necessary. Leveraging the chain of command in this manner can be very useful if your initiative falls within the boss’s vision and values 

and especially when the boss is willing to assume the risk. List examples of 

initiatives when you or past leaders advocated these sorts of initiatives and 

three examples when they did not.

5. What Is Wrong with My Supply Chain?

6. Reflect upon the key technology required to complete your day-to-day tasks. 

To what extent is your mission dependent upon this technology working?

7. Within a properly secured facility, concisely list five tactics, techniques, or 

procedures (TTP) fundamental to your primary mission.

8. List an alternate method for each TTP if your primary technology fails.

9. Consider the scope of your organization’s mission. Do you have a techproficiency balance that continues the mission, given risks associated with 

combat operations against a technologically advanced adversary?
90

10. What about humanitarian operations in a communications-denied environment?

11. Define the term “optimization” according to the book:

12. How can the organization you are responsible for be optimized for both its 

primary mission and surprise?

13. The author asserts that “winning and overcoming sudden disruptions or crises will be for the most resilient organization, not necessarily the most technologically advanced.” Have you or your leaders integrated preparation for 

surprise in their vision and values? If not, how could they? What would be 

the cost in training and time?

14. What are the risks and opportunities associated with deliberately preparing 

for surprise?

15. What are the risks and opportunities associated with not preparing for surprise at all?

Am I the Leader I Want To Be—or the Leader the Organization

Needs Me To Be?

Answer the following questions in 1–500 words each:

1. Am I the leader I want to be—or the leader the organization needs me to be?
91

2. Is this the organization (structural design and processes) I want or the organization the mission needs?

3. Is this the mission (are we doing business the way) we want or the mission 

that is needed?

4. What are the three primary areas I need to focus on or enhance to make myself and my organization more resilient?

5. What are the specific or concrete steps I can take to start enhancing resiliency 

in those specific areas?

6. Whose help do I need to enlist to speed the change process outlined in those 

areas?

7. What are the indicators that I have been successful in making the changes 

above?

acquisitions/project risk management, 22

adaptation, 5, 11, 19, 21, 27, 32, 43, 45, 53, 55, 

56, 59, 83

administrative advocacy, 35, 36

authority, 43, 48, 50

centralization, 43, 44, 88

certainty, 2, 17, 19, 44

change, 5, 26, 27, 59, 91

collaboration, 3, 5, 14, 20, 35, 37, 42, 43, 48, 51, 

52, 54, 65, 89

compensation, 24

consensus, 13, 24

culture, 1, 3, 5-7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 32, 37, 41, 43, 

44, 49, 58, 60, 63, 64, 66, 79, 80, 84, 87

data and information collection and reporting, 

34

decision making, 24, 27, 44, 61

deliberate pause, 45, 47, 87

denial, 3, 23, 24, 52, 64, 80

do/direct, 10, 36, 37, 44

effective actions, 31, 32, 34-36, 45, 48, 60

external, 16-18, 25, 52, 58-60, 81-83

facilitate/integrate, 52

failure, 3, 10-12, 23, 47, 48, 54, 61, 63, 64, 66

hesitation, 47

illuminate, 46

incubate, 46

influence, 25, 29, 48, 49, 51, 52, 60, 88, 89

innovation, 1, 12, 24, 32, 36-39, 46, 55, 65, 78

internal, 15, 17, 18, 25, 51, 60, 81-83

link, 39, 53

loyalty, 8

management, 6, 13, 14, 22, 37, 44, 45, 51, 60, 

62, 66, 89

mechanical, 13, 15, 17, 18, 81-83

memory, 26, 58

micromanagers, 10, 11, 36, 37, 79

mission assurance, 18

mission command, 7, 66

nervous system, 51

network, 3, 32, 37, 44, 48, 52, 54, 58, 60, 62, 63

operational resilience, 4, 21, 57, 66, 68

operational risk management, 22

optimization, 3, 8, 32, 58, 90

owner, 48, 50, 51, 88, 89

Palchinsky Principle, 38

Index
94

plans, 19-21, 33, 57, 83

point of contact, 49, 88

professional intimacy, 6, 8-10, 32, 33, 51, 60, 79, 

88

professional risk, 15, 17, 18, 22, 26, 33, 58

prudence, 26, 41, 47, 67

reflective loop, 31, 36, 49, 60, 62, 85

relationships, 8, 27, 32-34, 36, 41, 50, 51, 86, 88, 

89

resilience, 4, 5, 9, 11, 18, 21, 27, 32, 34, 35, 41, 

45, 46, 48, 52, 57, 58, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 77, 

84, 87

resilient intent, 4, 5, 10, 18, 53, 54, 60, 62, 64, 

77, 79

rest, 6, 45-47, 87

risk-avoidance policy, 15, 22, 23, 80

shift, 25, 67, 80

status quo, 38, 39, 50

supply surety, 53, 55

surprise, 2, 4, 5, 13, 15, 19, 45, 47, 50, 52, 59, 

63-65, 77, 83, 87, 90

tactics, techniques, and procedures, 53, 54, 56, 

57, 89

tech-proficiency, 56-58, 63, 89

thinking, 3, 5, 11, 12, 19, 36, 41, 43, 47, 87

training, 1-3, 7, 13-15, 22, 25, 41, 45, 46, 51, 52, 

55-57, 59, 64, 90

trust, 3, 5, 6, 8-11, 15, 18, 19, 27, 36, 42, 44, 62, 

65, 66, 77-81, 85

values, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17, 20, 22, 24, 25, 32, 33, 

37-41, 43, 49, 50, 57, 58, 62, 84, 86, 87, 89, 

90

vision, 7, 10, 13, 17, 24, 32, 37-41, 43, 49, 50, 

57-60, 62, 86, 87, 89, 90

vision surety, 17

wisdom, 3, 26, 45, 67
"If you want to know what the Next Generation Airman may look like, or want to begi

one, answer Sawtelle's six questions:' 

"Jonathan Sawtelle's work on leadership and resilient organizations is exceptional re

unforgettable. Take this book with you and prepare to thrive in any environment:' 

Jonathan D. Sawtelle is an active duty Air Force officer with deploy

Africa, and other locations. He has served as an operations offi

aide-de-camp to the commander, Air Force Special Operations 

executive officer to the Headquarters Air Force Deputy Chief of St

selected for the 2017 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agenc

Fellowship. Connect with him now at Resilient.Effective.Adaptable

Orders: Contact AU Press by e-mail at afri.aupress@us.af.mil and by phone at (334) 953-

<ontact information, email and phone. 

http://aupress.au.af.mil 

ISBN 978-1-58566-268-5 

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