NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS 

SUSTAINMENT

Improvements Made 

to Budget Estimates 

Report, but 

Opportunities Remain 

to Further Enhance 

Transparency

Report to Congressional Committees

December 2015

GAO-16-23

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-16-23, a report to 

congressional committees

December 2015

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUSTAINMENT

Improvements Made to Budget Estimates Report, but 

Opportunities Remain to Further Enhance 

Transparency 

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD and DOE are undertaking 

extensive efforts to sustain and 

modernize aging U.S. nuclear 

weapons capabilities, which are 

expected to take decades and cost 

hundreds of billions of dollars. Section 

1043 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 

as amended, requires submission of 

an annual report to congressional 

committees on DOD’s and DOE’s

plans for related matters and includes 

a provision that GAO review aspects of 

that report. In its reviews of the fiscal 

years 2014 and 2015 joint reports,

GAO recommended that future joint

reports provide more thorough

documentation of the methodologies 

used to develop the estimates and 

comparative information on changes in 

the estimates from the prior year.

GAO assessed the extent to which the 

fiscal year 2016 joint report provides 

(1) budget estimates that are 

consistent with the departments’ 

internal funding and modernization 

plans and (2) complete, transparent 

information on the methodologies used 

to develop those estimates. GAO 

analyzed the departments’ internal 

plans and budget estimates and 

interviewed DOD and DOE officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO believes its recommendations to 

provide more thorough documentation 

of methodologies and comparative 

information on changes in estimates

from the prior year have merit and is 

not making new recommendations in 

this report. DOD and DOE said they 

are working to include additional 

information in subsequent joint reports 

based on GAO’s prior 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

The fiscal year 2016 joint report, submitted to Congress by the Department of 

Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) in April 2015, includes 10-

year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons. 

These estimates are generally consistent with the departments’ internal funding 

and modernization plans—with some exceptions. GAO could not fully verify that 

DOD’s command and control estimates were consistent with its internal funding 

plans, because DOD did not document the methodological assumptions and 

limitations associated with these estimates, as GAO had recommended in June 

2014. 

Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) Fiscal Year 2016 10-Year Estimates for 

Sustaining and Modernizing the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent 

Note: DOD inadvertently reported an incorrect figure in its estimate for Nuclear Delivery Systems and 

the figure above reflects corrected data. 

a

DOD provides budget estimates for the nuclear command, control, and communications system, 

which includes early warning radars, aircraft, and communications networks, and for delivery 

systems, which consist of a variety of platforms such as heavy bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, 

and ballistic-missile submarines.

b

DOE provides budget estimates for the nuclear weapons stockpile (seven types of weapons), and 

the nuclear security enterprise (eight geographically dispersed sites). 

The fiscal year 2016 report includes information that was not included in the 

fiscal year 2015 report—such as general descriptions of the methodologies used 

to develop the budget estimates—but does not include thorough documentation 

of the methodologies used or comparative information about changes in the 

estimates that could improve transparency. Further, DOD did not ensure the 

accuracy of the estimates it reported, inadvertently over stating the 10-year 

estimate for the Air Force’s long-range strike bomber. As GAO reported in July 

2015, without thorough documentation of the methodologies used and 

comparative information on changes from year to year, it may be difficult for 

Congress to understand the basis for the estimates or assess long-term 

affordability when allocating resources. DOD partially agreed and DOE agreed 

with GAO’s July 2015 recommendations to develop thorough documentation, but 

DOD noted that information on changes is not required by Section 1043.

View GAO-16-23. For more information, 

contact Joe Kirschbaum at (202) 512-9971 or 

kirschbaumj@gao.gov or David Trimble at 

(202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Letter 1

Background 5

The Joint Report’s Estimates are Generally Consistent with Both 

Departments’ Internal Funding Plans and Long-Term Nuclear 

Modernization Plans, with Some Exceptions 9

The 2016 Joint Report Contains More Information than the Prior 

Two Years’ Reports, but Additional Information Could Improve 

Transparency 21

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 36

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 40

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Energy 41

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 42

Tables

Table 1: Department of Defense’s (DOD) Fiscal Year 2016 5-Year 

and 10-Year Estimates for Sustaining and Modernizing 

Nuclear Delivery Systems 13

Table 2: Department of Energy’s (DOE) Fiscal Year 2016 5-Year 

and 10-Year Nuclear Modernization Budget Estimates 16

Table 3: Comparison of Department of Energy’s (DOE) Fiscal 

Year 2016 Weapons Activities Budget Estimates and the 

Figures Identified by DOE As Associated with the 

President’s Budget for Fiscal Years 2021 through 2025 17

Table 4: Changes in Department of Defense’s (DOD) 5-Year and 

10-Year Budget Estimates for Sustaining and Modernizing 

Nuclear Delivery Systems from the Fiscal Year 2015 to 

the Fiscal Year 2016 Joint Report 28

Table 5: Changes in Department of Energy’s (DOE) 5-Year and 

10-Year Budget Estimates for Sustaining and Modernizing 

Contents
Page ii GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

the Nuclear Stockpile from the Fiscal Year 2015 to the 

Fiscal Year 2016 Joint Report 30

Figure

Figure 1: Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) 

Fiscal Year 2016 10-Year Estimates for Sustaining and 

Modernizing the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent 10

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

DOD CIO Department of Defense Chief Information Officer

DOE Department of Energy

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

FYNSP Future Years Nuclear Security Program

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

NC3 Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

SLBM Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile

SSBN Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (ballistic missile 

submarine)

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

December 10, 2015

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) 

are undertaking an extensive, multifaceted effort to sustain and 

modernize U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities, including the nuclear 

weapons stockpile; the research and production infrastructure; delivery 

systems; and the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 

system.1 The strategic missiles, submarines, and aircraft—and the 

nuclear weapons carried by these delivery systems—are aging and being 

deployed beyond their intended service lives. Many of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA)2 key facilities for nuclear 

weapons research, development, and production date back to the 1940s 

and 1950s and, according to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 

require modernization to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

arsenal for as long as such weapons exist.3 DOD and DOE estimates 

show that nuclear sustainment and modernization efforts are expected to 

cost billions of dollars over the next decade.

Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2012, as amended, requires the President, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, to submit a report on 

1

The nuclear weapons stockpile consists of seven weapon types. Nuclear delivery 

systems consist of a variety of platforms including heavy bombers, air-launched cruise 

missiles, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles 

operated by the Air Force as well as submarines and submarine-launched ballistic 

missiles operated by the Navy. The NC3 system consists of satellites, early warning 

radars, aircraft, communications networks, and other systems that are managed by the Air 

Force, the Navy, Defense Information Systems Agency, and other organizations. 

 2NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that is responsible for the 

management and security of DOE’s nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval 

reactor programs. 

3

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 

2010).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

the plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile, complex,4 delivery systems, 

and command and control system for each of fiscal years 2013 through 

2019.5 DOD and DOE developed this annual report, which we refer to as 

the joint report.6 This joint report is to include nuclear sustainment and 

modernization plans as well as associated budget estimates for the 10 

years following the date of the report and must also include a detailed 

description of the costs included in the budget estimates and the 

methodology used to develop the estimates.7 The fiscal year 2016 joint 

report, which DOD and DOE submitted to Congress on April 2, 2015, 

identified approximately $336.5 billion in estimated budget requirements 

from fiscal years 2016 through 2025.8 However, that estimate has been 

revised to $319.8 billion to correct an error in the 2016 joint report for the 

10-year long-range strike bomber estimate that was identified after the 

report had been submitted.

 4

Except when referencing the statutory requirement, this report hereafter refers to the 

“nuclear weapons complex” as the “nuclear security enterprise,” which consists of eight 

geographically dispersed government-owned, contractor-operated sites, such as 

laboratories and production plants.

5

See Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1043(a) (2011), amended by National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1041 (2013) and National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1054 (2013).The report is to 

be transmitted to the congressional defense committees, the Senate Committee on 

Foreign Relations, and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. § 1043(a)(1). The 

President has delegated this reporting function to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary 

of Energy. See 77 Fed. Reg. 12,721 (Mar. 2, 2012). 

6

DOD and DOE, Fiscal Year 2016 Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 

Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear Weapons 

Command and Control System Specified in Section 1043 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2015).

7

See § 1043(a)(2), (3).

8

We refer to the report as the 2016 joint report. In our previous reports, GAO, Nuclear 

Weapons: Ten-Year Budget Estimates for Modernization Omit Key Efforts, and 

Assumptions and Limitations Are Not Fully Transparent, GAO-14-373 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 10, 2014), and GAO, Nuclear Weapons Sustainment: Improvements Made to Budget 

Estimates, but Opportunities Exist to Further Enhance Transparency, GAO-15-536 

(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2015), we referred to the fiscal years 2014 and 2015 joint 

reports by the dates they were submitted—the July 2013 and May 2014 joint reports. In 

this report, we identify the joint report by the fiscal year it covers to better delineate 

between the subject of the report and the date it was submitted and to be consistent with 

the way DOD refers to these reports.
Page 3 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 included a 

provision that we review each joint report for accuracy and completeness 

with respect to the budget estimates and the methodologies that were 

used to develop the estimates.9 We reported on the fiscal year 2014 joint 

report in June 2014 and the fiscal year 2015 joint report in July 2015.10 In 

our July 2015 report, we found that DOD’s and DOE’s budget estimates 

in the fiscal year 2015 joint report were generally consistent with the 

departments’ funding and modernization plans through fiscal year 2024—

with a few exceptions—and that the report included information that had 

not been included in the fiscal year 2014 joint report. However, we 

identified shortcomings in the fiscal year 2015 joint report and 

recommended that, to improve the completeness and transparency of the 

budget estimates in future joint reports, and to provide decision makers 

with better information to identify significant changes from year to year, 

DOD and DOE include (1) more thorough documentation of the 

methodologies used to develop the budget estimates and ensure the 

accuracy and completeness of the information included and (2) 

comparative information on changes in the budget estimates from the 

prior year and the reasons for those changes. The agencies’ responses to 

and status of the recommendations are discussed later in this report. This 

report assesses the extent to which the fiscal year 2016 joint report 

provides (1) budget estimates for nuclear sustainment and modernization 

that are consistent with DOD’s and DOE’s internal funding plans and 

long-term11 nuclear modernization plans and (2) complete and 

transparent information about the development of the budget estimates 

for nuclear sustainment and modernization.

We performed our work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air 

Force, the Navy, the DOD Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO), and 

NNSA. To address our objectives, we followed a methodology similar to 

the one we used during our reviews of the fiscal years 2014 and 2015 

joint reports. Specifically, we examined the departments’ plans and 

budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear deterrent in 

 9

See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1041(a)(2) (adding § 1043(c)).

10GAO-14-373 and GAO-15-536.

11For the purpose of this report, we use the term “long-term” to refer to DOD and DOE 

plans that go beyond the five-year period of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) 

and the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) (in this case, beyond fiscal year 

2020).
Page 4 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

three areas: (1) DOD nuclear delivery systems, (2) the DOD NC3 system, 

and (3) DOE nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons complex. We 

applied the following approach:

First, to determine the extent to which the budget estimates in the 2016 

joint report are consistent (accurate and complete) with DOD’s and DOE’s 

internal funding and long-term modernization plans, we obtained and 

analyzed the plans and estimates from the 2016 joint report and 

compared them with each department’s funding plans, including DOD’s 

Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and DOE’s Future Years Nuclear 

Security Program (FYNSP). We compared DOD’s and DOE’s estimates 

in the joint report with the FYDP and the FYNSP, because these are used 

by the two departments to formulate projected budget requests for the 

current year and at least 4 subsequent years. In this report, we refer to 

the FYNSP and FYDP as “internal funding plans.” Because DOD has not 

prepared formal funding plans that it will use to develop projected defense 

budget requests beyond fiscal year 2020, and the 2016 joint report 

includes budget estimates through fiscal year 2025, we reviewed Air 

Force and Navy plans as well as Defense Information Systems Agency 

plans, which informed the DOD CIO’s NC3 estimates; we also discussed 

DOD’s long-term budget estimates in the joint report with relevant DOD 

officials. If the budget estimates in the 2016 joint report were consistent 

with the departments’ funding plans, including the FYDP and FYNSP, we 

determined them to be sufficiently accurate and complete. To assess 

budget estimates beyond fiscal year 2020 for DOE, we evaluated DOE’s 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which is updated annually 

and includes DOE’s budget estimates for nuclear weapons sustainment 

and modernization for the next 25 years.

Second, to assess the extent to which the 2016 joint report included 

complete and transparent information about the methodology DOD and 

DOE used to develop their budget estimates for nuclear sustainment and 

modernization, we drew on the work we had performed for our review of 

the fiscal years 2014 and 2015 joint reports.12 We identified changes in 5-

and 10-year estimates from the fiscal year 2015 joint report. Additionally, 

we discussed with relevant officials whether the guidance and 

methodologies DOD and DOE used to prepare their 10-year estimates for 

the 2016 joint report were the same as those they had used for the fiscal 

 12GAO-14-373 and GAO-15-536.
Page 5 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

year 2015 joint report. In instances where different methodologies were 

used, we discussed the reasons why with cognizant officials. For our 

2014 report, we derived general principles for developing and preparing 

long-term funding plans by reviewing key federal and departmental 

guidance, standards, and practices for cost estimating, budget 

preparation, financial planning, and public reporting.13 We then applied 

these derived principles as criteria for evaluating the information in the 

2016 joint report. To the extent that we determined there were differences 

between the principles we derived and the information in the 2016 joint 

report, we discussed the causes and potential effects of these differences 

with relevant DOD and DOE officials.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2015 to December 2015 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides more 

details on our scope and methodology.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report outlined the administration’s 

approach to maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability while 

showing its intent to make new investments in developing strategic 

delivery systems, upgrading the NC3 system, and modernizing NNSA’s 

government-owned, contractor-operated nuclear security enterprise.14 It 

 13GAO-14-373. Such federal guidance included the following: Executive Office of the 

President, Office of Management and Budget, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of 

the Budget, Circular No. A-11 (Washington, D.C.: July 2013); V 3.0 Capital Programming 

Guide: Supplement to Circular No. A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition of Capital 

Assets (Washington, D.C.: July 2013); and Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the 

Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 

accessed August 14, 2013, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_final_information_quality_guidelines; and GAO, 

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).

14Section 1070 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 

No. 110-181 (2008), required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary 

of Energy and Secretary of State, to conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear 

posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years. DOD published the conclusions 

and recommendations from that review in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. 

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2010).

Background
Page 6 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

identified long-term modernization goals and plans—including sustaining 

a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal by extending the lives of 

existing nuclear weapons; increasing investments to rebuild and 

modernize the nation’s nuclear infrastructure; and strengthening the 

science, technology, and engineering base.15

Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2012, as amended, requires that the annual joint report include 10-year 

budget estimates related to sustaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear 

weapons capabilities, among several other elements.16 The other 

required elements include detailed descriptions of DOD’s and DOE’s 

plans to

• enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear 

weapons stockpile;

• sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex;

• maintain, modernize, and replace delivery systems for nuclear 

weapons;

• sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons command and control 

system; and

• retire, dismantle, or eliminate any nuclear weapons, delivery systems, 

or silos/submarines that carry such weapons or delivery systems.17

 15Ibid.

16See Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1043(a)(2) (as amended). Specifically, section 1043 requires 

that the joint report include a detailed estimate of the budget requirements associated with 

sustaining and modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent and nuclear weapons stockpile, 

including the costs associated with various plans, over the 10-year period following the 

date of the report. § 1043(a)(2)(F). The budget requirements are to include applicable and 

appropriate costs associated with DOD’s procurement; military construction; operation and 

maintenance; and research, development, test, and evaluation accounts. Id. The joint 

report is also to include a detailed description of costs included in the budget estimates 

and the methodology used to develop the estimates. § 1043(a)(3).

17§ 1043(a)(2). The report must also include a detailed description of the steps taken to 

implement the plan submitted in the previous year, including difficulties encountered in 

implementation. § 1043(a)(2)(G).
Page 7 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Section 1043 was recently amended again, to require the Congressional 

Budget Office to submit to the congressional defense committees a 

related report for odd-numbered fiscal years, to include estimates of 

certain costs for nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The 

Congressional Budget Office report is to include an estimate of costs 

during a 10-year period associated with fielding and maintaining the 

current U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon delivery systems; an 

estimate of the costs during a 10-year period of any anticipated life 

extension, modernization, or replacement of those nuclear weapons and 

delivery systems; and an estimate of the relative percentage of total 

defense spending represented by these costs during that period.18

The FYDP is DOD’s 5-year funding plan; it is updated annually and 

provides DOD’s current budget request and budget estimates for at least 

4 subsequent fiscal years. The FYDP includes thousands of discrete 

program elements, each of which may include funding projections for 

DOD appropriations accounts—including operation and maintenance; 

research, development, test, and evaluation; and procurement. DOD’s 

Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation maintains the 

FYDP and works with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) to ensure that the data presented in annual budgetjustification materials match the FYDP at the appropriation account level.

The FYNSP is NNSA’s 5-year funding plan, encompassing programs for 

which it is responsible, including Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation, and Naval Reactors. The FYNSP is included in the 

budget justifications submitted in connection with the President’s budget 

request.19 NNSA develops the FYNSP with inputs from its subordinate 

 18See Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1643 (2014) (amending § 1043(b)). If the joint 

report submitted for an even-numbered fiscal year contains a significant change affecting 

the estimates that the Congressional Budget Office included in the prior year’s report, the 

Congressional Budget Office must submit a letter describing the changes. See § 

1043(b)(2) (as amended). The Congressional Budget Office submitted its latest report on 

projected costs of U.S. nuclear forces on January 22, 2015. See Congressional Budget 

Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015-2024 (Washington, D.C.: January 

22, 2015).

19NNSA refers to the cost figures included in its budget materials during the FYNSP 

period as “the budget” and those after the FYNSP as “budget requirement estimates.” We 

refer to both types of cost figures as “budget estimates” throughout this report. NNSA 

officials stated that both sets of figures are informed by cost estimates.
Page 8 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

offices, including the Office of Defense Programs and the Office of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. NNSA also describes its long-term 

modernization plans and budget estimates in its Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan—a more detailed planning document on which 

DOE’s portion of the 2016 joint report is based—and provides information 

on modernization and operations plans and budget estimates over the 

next 25 years.20

DOE’s major modernization efforts are centered on life extension 

programs and alterations21 for nuclear weapons and on major 

construction or refurbishment of facilities to modernize DOE’s uranium 

and plutonium capabilities. DOE has plans to conduct at least four life 

extension programs per year simultaneously during the FYNSP period 

and the five years beyond the FYNSP period. Construction efforts to 

complete DOE’s Uranium Processing Facility are scheduled to be 

completed by fiscal year 2025; these efforts include moving uranium 

processing activities from a decades-old building into new facilities. 

DOE’s facilities to support its updated plutonium strategy—which include 

optimizing current infrastructure and providing additional space to support 

pit production—are scheduled to achieve a production capacity of 50 to 

80 pits per year by 2030.

 20The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan is NNSA’s formal means for 

communicating to Congress the status of certain activities and its long-range plans and 

budget estimates for sustaining the stockpile and modernizing the nuclear security 

enterprise. The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 

mandated that GAO study and report annually on whether NNSA’s nuclear security 

budget materials provide for funding that is sufficient to modernize and refurbish the 

nuclear security enterprise. Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 3113 (2011), as amended by Pub. L. 

No. 112-239, § 3132(a)(2) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2455).

21Life extension programs extend, through refurbishment, the operational lives of weapons 

in the nuclear stockpile by 20 to 30 years and certify these weapons’ military performance 

requirements without underground nuclear testing. Much like a nuclear weapon life 

extension program, a weapon alteration refurbishes components of a weapon to ensure 

that the weapon can continue to meet military requirements. However, an alteration 

generally refurbishes fewer components than a life extension program. NNSA officials 

consider three nuclear weapons refurbishment programs in particular to be major 

modernization efforts—the B61-12 and W80-4 life extensions programs, and the W88 

Alteration 370—however, this report includes all such refurbishment programs under way 

during the ten years covered by the joint report in its analysis.
Page 9 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

In the fiscal year 2016 joint report, DOD’s and DOE’s estimates for 

sustaining and modernizing nuclear delivery systems, the NC3 system, 

the nuclear stockpile, and the nuclear security enterprise are generally 

consistent with their internal funding plans and long-term nuclear 

modernization plans, with some exceptions. DOD’s estimates for 

sustaining and modernizing nuclear delivery systems are generally 

consistent with its internal funding plans, although it is unclear whether its 

estimates for the NC3 system are consistent with the FYDP. DOE’s 5-

year estimates for modernizing the nuclear stockpile and nuclear security 

enterprise are generally consistent with its internal funding plans, but its 

estimates beyond the FYNSP may not fully align with future budgets and 

cost estimates in its long-term modernization plans.

DOD’s and DOE’s estimates for sustaining and modernizing nuclear 

delivery systems, the NC3 system, the nuclear stockpile, and the nuclear 

security enterprise are generally consistent with their internal funding 

plans and long-term nuclear modernization plans. The 2016 joint report 

estimated the 10-year budget for sustaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear 

weapons capabilities at $336.5 billion; however, the total was revised to 

$319.8 billion to correct an error in the 2016 joint report for the 10-year 

long-range strike bomber estimate that was identified after the report had 

been submitted. This 10-year estimate comprises DOD’s estimates for 

nuclear delivery systems and the NC3 system and DOE’s estimates for 

the nuclear stockpile and the nuclear security enterprise. DOD’s portion of 

the revised estimate is approximately $216.3 billion, or about 68 percent 

of the total, and DOE’s portion is approximately $103.5 billion, or about 32

percent of the total. Figure 1 shows the total 10-year sustainment and 

modernization estimate.

The Joint Report’s 

Estimates are 

Generally Consistent 

with Both 

Departments’ Internal 

Funding Plans and 

Long-Term Nuclear 

Modernization Plans, 

with Some 

Exceptions

The Joint Report Includes 

Budget Estimates from 

Both DOD and DOE
Page 10 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Figure 1: Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) Fiscal Year 2016 10-

Year Estimates for Sustaining and Modernizing the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

Note: In the 2016 joint report provided to Congress in April 2015, DOD inadvertently reported an 

incorrect figure for the long-range strike bomber; the budget estimates for Nuclear Delivery Systems 

shown in this figure reflect corrected data. DOD provided an addendum to the 2016 joint report with 

corrected budget estimates for the long-range strike bomber and an explanation for the error on 

November 18, 2015.

a

DOD provides budget estimates for the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 

system, which consists of satellites, early warning radars, aircraft, communications networks, and 

other systems.

b

DOE provides budget estimates for the nuclear weapons stockpile, which currently consists of seven 

weapon types, and the nuclear security enterprise, which consists of eight geographically dispersed 

government-owned, contractor-operated sites, such as laboratories and test sites.

c

DOD provides budget estimates for nuclear delivery systems, which consist of a variety of platforms 

such as heavy bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, and ballistic-missile submarines.
Page 11 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

In the 2016 joint report, DOD provided budget estimates associated with 

sustaining and modernizing nuclear delivery systems—such as the 

Minuteman III, heavy bombers, and the Ohio-class submarine—and for 

the NC3 system. DOD’s $178.8 billion sustainment and modernization 

estimate for nuclear delivery systems is comprised of estimates 

developed by the Air Force and the Navy for the individual systems. We 

found that the combined Air Force and Navy budget estimates for nuclear 

delivery systems are generally consistent with DOD’s FYDP for specific 

accounts, such as procurement; research, development, test, and 

evaluation; operation and maintenance; and military personnel through 

fiscal year 2020. These estimates22 include

• $16.4 billion in procurement and military construction23

• Air Force: $3.4 billion

• Navy: $13.0 billion

• $26.4 billion in research, development, test, and evaluation

• Air Force: $20.7 billion

• Navy: $5.7 billion

• $31 billion in operation and maintenance and military personnel

• Air Force: $18.1 billion

• Navy: $12.9 billion

DOD provides its plans for sustaining and modernizing nuclear delivery 

systems in a variety of documents, including the joint report, budget 

justification materials, and other planning documents. These plans 

include maintaining current systems while developing new ones. For 

example:

 22The totals for these estimates may not match totals in table 1, due to rounding.

23This estimate does not include approximately $0.8 billion in NNSA funding for nuclear 

reactor design for the Navy’s Ohio-replacement submarine.

DOD’s Estimates for 

Nuclear Delivery Systems 

Are Generally Consistent 

with Its Internal Funding 

Plans and Long-Term 

Nuclear Modernization 

Plans, but It Is Unclear 

Whether the NC3 

Estimates Are Consistent 

with Those Plans
Page 12 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

• Heavy Bombers. The Air Force plans to maintain its long-range 

bomber capabilities through a combination of sustainment and 

modernization programs as well as a new bomber acquisition. 

Concurrently, the Air Force plans to modernize the B-2 and B-52 

bombers to enable them to retain long-range strike capabilities 

through the 2030s. The B-52—a 50-plus years old aircraft—is being 

modernized in areas such as communications, internal weapons bay 

upgrades, and replacement of various legacy systems, to keep it 

viable until at least 2040. For the B-2, the Air Force plans to 

modernize communications systems and upgrade armaments 

capabilities to integrate new or advanced weapons, among other 

areas, to maintain the B-2’s expected service life through 2058. The 

Air Force also plans to acquire 80 to 100 new long-range strike 

bombers in the mid-2020s, which it expects to perform both 

conventional missions and nuclear deterrence.

• Cruise Missiles. The Air Force plans to sustain the air-launched 

cruise missile through 2030, in part by performing service life 

extension programs, because some of the missile’s components are 

expected to become non-supportable prior to 2030. The Air Force is 

updating the missile’s software and associated test procedures and 

test equipment, among other things. The Air Force has stated that the 

continuing need for a standoff capability makes development of a new 

cruise missile, the long-range standoff missile, essential to the overall 

nuclear modernization effort. In fiscal year 2015, DOD delayed the 

long-range standoff missile program for three years, due to higher 

department priorities. However, for fiscal year 2016, the Air Force 

restored funding to a level that enables the program to meet U.S. 

Strategic Command’s24 operational requirements and realigns Air 

Force efforts with the NNSA life extension program to produce a longrange standoff missile warhead.

• Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN). Through its Ohio 

Replacement Program, the Navy plans to design and build 12 ballistic 

missile submarines to replace the current force of 14 Ohio-class 

submarines. The Navy wants to begin procurement funding in fiscal 

year 2017, with the first new submarine procured in fiscal year 2021. 

In the meantime, the Navy is performing intermediate maintenance 

 24The U.S. Strategic Command is a combatant command responsible for developing 

operational plans and identifying targets for nuclear forces.
Page 13 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

and industrial support for the incremental overhaul, repair, and 

refueling of the Ohio-class submarines, among other things. The Navy 

began a life extension program for the Trident II submarine-launched 

ballistic missile so that it would remain capable throughout the life of 

the Ohio class submarine. The program includes replacement of the 

solid rocket motors and redesign and replacement of missile guidance 

and electronic systems, among other things.

DOD’s 5-year and 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and 

modernizing nuclear delivery systems are summarized in table 1.

Table 1: Department of Defense’s (DOD) Fiscal Year 2016 5-Year and 10-Year 

Estimates for Sustaining and Modernizing Nuclear Delivery Systems 

Then-Year Dollars in Billionsa

Delivery system

Fiscal years 

2016-2020

Fiscal years 

2016-2025

Heavy bombers

B-2 and B-52 13.7 25.3

Long-range strike bomberb 13.9 41.7

B61-12 tail kit assembly 1.1 1.1

Cruise missiles

Air-launched cruise missile 0.4 0.7

Long-range standoff missile 1.8 4.7

Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)

Minuteman III 7.8 14.1

Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 0.9 8.4

ICBM fuze modernizationc 0.8 Merged with 

Ground Based 

Strategic 

Deterrent

Dual-capable aircraftd 1.6 3.2

Fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)

Ohio-class submarine 9.3 18.5

Ohio-replacement program 10.6 35.3

Ohio-replacement program reactor design 

(NNSA)

0.8 1.0

Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 

(Trident II)

11.8 24.8

Totale 74.5 178.8

Source: DOD data. | GAO-16-23

Totals may not add due to rounding.
Page 14 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Note: In the 2016 joint report provided to Congress in April 2015, DOD inadvertently reported an 

incorrect figure for the long-range strike bomber, and the budget estimates in this table reflect 

corrected data.

a

Estimated amounts include military personnel; operation and maintenance; research, development, 

test, and evaluation; and procurement and ship construction. DOD activities do not include overhead 

costs such as personnel assigned to higher headquarters who work on nuclear deterrence-related 

issues.

b

The long-range strike bomber is expected to perform both conventional and nuclear deterrent 

missions.

c

DOD expects to merge fuze modernization with Ground Based Strategic Deterrent starting in fiscal 

year 2021. It does not expect subsequent reports to separately report fuze modernization.

d

Dual-capable aircraft are fighter aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. These figures 

include operation and maintenance funding for the F-16C and F-15E squadrons based overseas and 

nuclear weapons storage as well as funds for F-35 dual-capable aircraft research, development, test, 

and evaluation. The 10-year projections were computed using inflation rates of 1.8 percent for the 

military personnel appropriations account and 2 percent for other appropriation accounts.

e

Amounts shown may include nuclear command and control system integration costs, which are also 

included in NC3 amounts.

The 2016 joint report shows that the 5-year estimate for the NC3 system 

for fiscal years 2016 through 2020 totals $19.9 billion, and the 10-year 

estimate for fiscal years 2016 through 2025 totals $37.5 billion. The DOD 

CIO prepared the plans and budget estimates for the NC3 system. The 

fiscal years 2016 through 2020 estimates include

• $2.1 billion in research, development, test, and evaluation;

• $7.7 billion in procurement; and

• $10.1 billion in operation and maintenance.

However—as we found for the fiscal years 2014 and 2015 joint reports—it 

is unclear whether these estimates for the NC3 system are consistent 

with DOD’s internal funding plans. We were able to verify some of the 

calculations that DOD used to develop its estimates, but we were not able 

to compare the estimates with the FYDP, because the DOD CIO did not 

always link projects and activities with specific FYDP programs. While the 

DOD CIO did provide some information in the 2016 report about the 

methodology used to develop the NC3 budget estimates, it did not clearly 

document all of the assumptions used in developing those estimates or 

the limitations associated with the data from which the estimates were 

derived. In our June 2014 report, we recommended that for future joint 

reports the Secretary of Defense direct the DOD CIO to document in the 

report the methodological assumptions and limitations affecting the 
Page 15 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

report’s estimates for sustaining and modernizing the NC3 system.25 DOD 

agreed with our recommendation and stated that in future joint reports it 

would include all key assumptions and potential limitations of the 

methodology used to develop NC3 system estimates; however, the fiscal 

years 2015 and 2016 joint reports do not include this information. We 

continue to believe that our June 2014 recommendation has merit and 

should be fully implemented. Because the 2016 joint report does not 

provide clear documentation of the methodological assumptions and 

limitations, it was not always possible for us to determine how a given 

estimate was developed. We discuss the limitations of the DOD CIO’s 

methodology for developing the estimates later in this report.

In the fiscal year 2016 joint report, DOE provided budget estimates for 

sustaining and modernizing the nuclear stockpile and nuclear security 

enterprise. NNSA developed these budget estimates through preparation 

of the FYNSP and the fiscal year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan, which formed the basis for the $103.5 billion budget 

estimates included in the joint report. The DOE estimates in the joint 

report match those reported in the FYNSP and the Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan. However, in the 5 years beyond the FYNSP, the 

DOE budget estimates for modernization in the joint report exceed figures 

referred to in the joint report as the President’s budget figures, raising 

questions about the alignment of NNSA’s modernization funding needs 

with potential future budgets. In addition to this overall alignment concern, 

we found that several individual modernization program budget estimates 

may not fully align with NNSA’s internal cost range estimates.26 DOE’s 5-

year and 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing the

 25GAO-14-373.

26We have ongoing work examining NNSA’s modernization efforts in more detail as part of 

our annual review on whether NNSA’s nuclear security budget materials provide for 

funding sufficient to modernize and refurbish the nuclear security enterprise. Specifically, 

we are assessing (1) the extent to which NNSA’s budget estimates and plans for 

modernization activities reflected in its fiscal year 2016 nuclear security budget materials 

differ, if at all, from those in its fiscal year 2015 budget materials and (2) the extent to 

which the fiscal year 2016 nuclear security budget materials align with modernization 

plans. We plan to issue a final report in early 2016.

DOE’s Estimates in the 

Joint Report May Not Fully 

Align with Future Budgets 

and Cost Estimates in Its 

Long-Term Modernization 

Plans
Page 16 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

nuclear stockpile and nuclear security enterprise are summarized in table 

2.27

Table 2: Department of Energy’s (DOE) Fiscal Year 2016 5-Year and 10-Year Nuclear 

Modernization Budget Estimates

Then-year Dollars in Billions

Category Fiscal Years 

2016-2020

Fiscal Years 

2021-2025 Total

Directed Stockpile Work 17.6 21.8 39.4

Research, Development, Testing, and 

Evaluationa 9.4 10.6 20.0

Infrastructureb 13.7 17.2 30.9

All other weapons activitiesc 6.5 6.7 13.2

Total 47.2 56.4 103.5

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. | GAO-16-23

Totals may not add due to rounding.

a

The fiscal year 2014 joint report used the term “Science, Technology, and Engineering Capabilities”

for this category, but the fiscal year 2015 joint report changed the name to Research, Development, 

Testing, and Evaluation.

b

Activities that had been funded in Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities in past years are now 

funded in either Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities or in Infrastructure and Safety. The 

“Infrastructure” total combines both these amounts.

c

All other weapons activities include budget estimates associated with nuclear weapon security and 

transportation as well as legacy contractor pensions, among other things, that are also included in 

DOE’s Weapons Activities.

Note: The Directed Stockpile Work category includes DOE activities to ensure the reliability of the 

nuclear weapons stockpile. Among other things, this includes the nuclear weapon life extension 

programs. The Infrastructure category includes DOE activities to operate, maintain, and refurbish 

infrastructure in the nuclear security enterprise, including major construction projects, such as those 

to modernize DOE’s uranium and plutonium capabilities.

In the 2016 joint report, DOE estimated a total of $47.2 billion for 

modernization activities during fiscal years 2016 through 2020 and a total 

of $56.4 billion for fiscal years 2021 through 2025. These modernization 

budget estimates match those reported in NNSA’s FYNSP and Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan over the 10-year period. However, 

DOE’s budget estimates in the 2016 joint report for fiscal years 2021 

through 2025 exceed what the joint report described as the President’s 

 27DOE’s NNSA’s fiscal year 2016 budget consists of four appropriation accounts: (1) 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, (2) Naval Reactors, (3) Federal Salaries and Expenses, 

and (4) Weapons Activities. DOE’s estimates in the joint report and in the Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan represent the Weapons Activities appropriation 

account.
Page 17 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

budget figures for nuclear modernization and sustainment activities over

the same time period. Specifically, in addition to DOE’s budget estimates, 

the joint report included information on estimates described as the 

President’s budget figures for Weapons Activities for fiscal years 2016 

through 2025.28 DOE’s overall budget estimates for fiscal years 2021 

through 2025 total $56.4 billion, but the estimates identified as the 

President’s budget figures included in the joint report total $52.2 billion 

during those years, or $4.2 billion less than DOE’s budget estimates (see 

table 3).

29

Table 3: Comparison of Department of Energy’s (DOE) Fiscal Year 2016 Weapons Activities Budget Estimates and the Figures 

Identified by DOE As Associated with the President’s Budget for Fiscal Years 2021 through 2025 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. | GAO-16-23

Totals may not add due to rounding.

Note: DOE stated that amounts identified in the joint report as President’s budget figures were 

provided by the Office of Management and Budget.

The differences between DOE’s estimates and the estimates described 

as the President’s budget figures raise questions about the alignment of 

DOE’s modernization plans with potential future budgets. According to an 

NNSA official who coordinates production of the Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan, the President’s budget figures were included in 

the fiscal year 2016 joint report at the request of the Office of 

Management and Budget. This official told us that the figures DOE 

included in the joint report represent the department’s evaluation of what 

modernization activities will cost for these years, based on current plans 

 28According to officials, these figures were provided by the Office of Management and 

Budget. These figures were escalated by 2 percent in the years beyond the FYNSP.

29This information described as President’s budget figures was not included in prior 

versions of the joint report. 

Then-year dollars in billions

Fiscal Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

2021-2025 

(Total) 

Joint Report Budget Estimates Total for Weapons 

Activities

10.8 11.0 11.2 11.5 11.8 56.4

President’s Budget Figures Total for Weapons 

Activities

10.0 10.2 10.4 10.6 10.9 52.2

Amount by which Joint Report Estimates Exceed 

President’s Budget Figures Estimates

0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 4.2
Page 18 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

and available information. However, according to this official, the 

estimates beyond the FYNSP have not undergone the same 

programming scrutiny as those in the FYNSP. This official stated that he 

believed the President’s budget information was included in the joint 

report to show that the Administration has not yet adopted NNSA’s 

budget estimates beyond the FYNSP. These differences could require 

NNSA to reevaluate its estimates beyond the FYNSP in future planning 

cycles. In addition, NNSA officials stated that there is a high level of 

uncertainty in the budget estimates beyond the FYNSP, which makes 

planning beyond 5 years difficult.

In addition, we found several instances where NNSA’s budget estimates 

for major modernization efforts may not fully align with cost range 

estimates for each life extension program. As noted above, NNSA’s 

budget estimates from the FYNSP and the fiscal year 2016 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan formed the basis for the budget 

estimates included in the joint report. The joint report contains high-level 

budget estimates for activities such as Directed Stockpile Work, which 

includes life extension programs and stockpile service activities, among 

other things. The Directed Stockpile Work category in the FYNSP and the 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan contains more detailed 

budget information on life extension programs that includes specific 

budget estimates for each life extension program as well as high and low 

cost range estimates that NNSA developed for them.30 Because the joint 

report does not include this level of budget detail, we analyzed the budget 

estimates and the cost range estimates for the life extension programs 

from these sources. Specifically, we analyzed NNSA’s budget estimates 

in the FYNSP and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan for 

each life extension program over the 10-year period—the W76-1, the 

B61-12, the W88 Alteration 370, the W80-4, the Interoperable Warhead1, and the Interoperable Warhead-2—by comparing them against the high 

and low cost range estimates that NNSA prepared for each.

 30Because the W76-1 life extension program is the only weapon program that has been 

through the development phase and the majority of the production phase, DOE uses it as 

the primary basis for modeling cost range estimates for all future life extension programs. 

As a result, NNSA does not prepare high and low cost range estimates for it.
Page 19 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

For each life extension program, we assessed the extent to which the 

budget estimates aligned with its high-low cost range estimates.31

Specifically, we examined instances where the low end of the cost range 

estimates for the life extension program was greater than the budget 

estimates. In general, over the 10-year period covered by the joint report, 

we found that NNSA’s life extension program budget estimates aligned 

with (i.e., fell within) the high and low cost range estimates for those 

programs. However, for some years, the low cost range estimates that 

DOE developed exceeded the budget estimates for some life extension 

programs, suggesting the potential for a funding shortfall for those 

programs in those years. For instance, we found that

• The B61-12 life extension program’s budget estimates during the 

period covered by the FYNSP generally align with NNSA’s cost range 

estimates. However, the low cost range estimate of $195 million for 

the final year of production in fiscal year 2025 exceeds the budget 

estimate of $64 million. An NNSA official said that this difference is 

not a concern, because this shortfall occurs during the final year of the 

life extension program effort and represents a difference in the 

expected rate at which the program could wind down.

• The low cost range estimate for the W88 Alteration 370 exceeds its 

budget estimate for fiscal year 2020. The budget materials report that 

the budget estimate for the program that year is $218.3 million; 

however, the low point of the cost range is $247 million. An NNSA 

official stated that this shortfall is not a concern because there is 

flexibility to address possible shortfalls in future programming cycles.

• The W80-4 life extension program’s low range cost estimate of $476 

million exceeds its budget estimates of $459 million for fiscal year 

2020. An NNSA official stated that because the budget estimates for 

this life extension program are above the low point of its estimated 

cost range during other years, the shortfall in fiscal year 2020 

represents a small incongruity in an otherwise sound life extension 

program profile.

 31Because NNSA does not prepare high and low cost range estimates for the W76-1, we 

compared the budget estimates for each fiscal year with the internal cost estimates NNSA 

developed for the life extension program.
Page 20 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

• The budget estimates for the Interoperable Warhead-1 and 

Interoperable Warhead-2 life extension programs are both within the 

high and low estimated cost ranges for most years. However, the low 

cost range estimate of $175 million for the Interoperable Warhead-1 

exceeds its budget estimate of $113 million in fiscal year 2020, which 

is its first year of funding. A DOE official said that shifting dollars 

projected for fiscal year 2021 into 2020 could keep the Interoperable 

Warhead-1 budget estimates within the low end of the cost range.

For the W76-1 life extension program, we compared the budget estimates 

in the FYNSP and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan for 

each fiscal year with the internal cost estimates NNSA developed for the 

life extension program. We found that the budget estimates for all years 

within the FYNSP, except for fiscal year 2018, are below NNSA’s internal 

cost estimates for that program, raising questions about whether the 

budget for the life extension program is aligned with anticipated costs. 

According to an NNSA official, the W76-1 life extension program is 

nearing completion, and the model used to develop internal cost 

estimates for the W76-1 is predicting the life extension program’s end-ofprogram costs in a way that may not reflect the rate at which the program 

winds down.

NNSA officials stated that their intent in providing budget estimates and 

cost range estimates for each life extension program is to show general 

agreement between the two sets of estimates. Notwithstanding the 

differences we identified between budget estimates and low-end cost 

range estimates for certain life extension programs in certain years, 

NNSA officials believed the budget estimates and the cost range 

estimates are in general agreement for each life extension program in 

terms of total costs and trend, and they attributed the differences to 

separate teams involved and methodologies used in preparing the 

estimates. In addition, NNSA officials stated that there is some flexibility 

in the funding for the life extension programs, and that the programs may 

carry over some funds from one year to the next if needed to cover costs, 

depending on the reason for the shortfall, among other things.

In our August 2015 report on NNSA’s nuclear security budget materials,32

we found that shortfalls in life extension program budget estimates 

 32GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA Increased its Budget 

Estimates, But Estimates for Key Stockpile and Infrastructure Programs Need 

Improvement, GAO-15-499 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2015).
Page 21 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

compared with the life extension program cost range estimates can pose 

risks to the achievement of program objectives and goals, such as 

increases in program costs and schedule delays. NNSA agreed with our 

recommendation from that report to provide more transparency in its 

budget materials with regard to shortfalls. Specifically, NNSA said that it 

would include, as appropriate, statements in future Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plans on the effect of funding a life extension program 

effort at less than the amount suggested by a planning estimate cost 

range. NNSA plans to incorporate this recommendation, among others, 

into the agency’s fiscal year 2017 budget materials.

The 2016 joint report contains some information that was not included in 

the fiscal years 2014 or 2015 joint reports, but it does not include explicit 

information on methodological assumptions and limitations, and DOD did 

not ensure the accuracy of its fiscal year 2016 budget estimates. Further, 

the report does not include comparative information on the budget 

estimates or explain why some of the estimates had changed from those 

in the prior year’s report.

The 2016 Joint 

Report Contains More 

Information than the 

Prior Two Years’

Reports, but 

Additional Information 

Could Improve 

Transparency

The 2016 Joint Report 

Describes the 

Methodologies Used to 

Develop Budget 

Estimates, but the 

Descriptions Lack Detail 

and DOD Did Not Ensure 

That Its Estimates Were 

Accurate
Page 22 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

In the 2016 joint report, both departments describe the methodologies 

they used to develop their estimates for sustaining and modernizing 

nuclear delivery systems, the NC3 system, and the nuclear security 

enterprise, as DOE had done in the previous joint report. In our July 2015 

report,33 we recommended that DOD and DOE provide more thorough 

documentation of the methodologies they used to develop the budget 

estimates—including information that may also be available in related 

planning documents. DOD and DOE agreed with our recommendation, 

and DOD stated that it had included in the 2016 report information on the 

methodologies it used to develop the estimates and would consider 

including further information in subsequent reports.

In the 2016 joint report, DOD provided general information on the 

methodology the Air Force, Navy, and DOD CIO used to develop their 5-

and 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing nuclear 

delivery and NC3 systems. For example, the report notes that the Air 

Force based its 10-year budget estimates on the Air Force long-range 

programming plan,34 while the Navy developed its 10-year operations and 

sustainment estimates using a 1.8 percent inflation factor for pay and a 2 

percent inflation factor for non-pay accounts. The report further specifies 

that the Navy’s budget estimates for the Ohio Replacement Program 

were developed separately, taking into account factors unique to the 

naval ship building environment. However, the information lacks detail 

regarding some of the assumptions and potential limitations of the 

methodologies. DOD officials said that providing more thorough 

information could further clarify the methodologies used to develop the 

budget estimates, and DOD is considering including additional 

information in the fiscal year 2017 joint report.

In addition, DOD included in the 2016 joint report information on the 

methodology the DOD CIO used to develop its $37.5 billion estimate for 

sustaining and modernizing the NC3 system through fiscal year 2025. 

 33GAO-15-536.

34The Programmed Force Extended, a force structure and resource allocation plan, is a 

result of the annual Air Force strategic planning process, which merges prior plans, 

current programs, adjustments in strategic and fiscal guidance, and senior leader priorities 

in a constrained budget environment. The only exception is the U.S. Air Force squadron 

component in Europe, for which the Air Force used a 1.8 percent inflation factor for pay 

and 2 percent inflation factor for non-pay accounts, because the Programmed Force 

Extended does not include specific planning data for major commands.

Documentation of 

Methodologies
Page 23 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

However, DOD did not make its methodology fully transparent, because it 

did not document some of the assumptions and potential limitations of 

this methodology in the report. As in the prior two joint reports, the DOD 

CIO prepared the plans and the 10-year budget estimates for sustaining 

the NC3 system.35 DOD notes in the 2016 joint report that the DOD CIO 

applied weighted analysis to program elements and budget line items in 

the fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget. DOD further noted that the 

estimates for the five years beyond the FYDP (fiscal years 2021-2025) 

were calculated using a 2 percent inflation factor.

As we reported in June 2014 and again in July 2015, the DOD CIO used 

Defense Information Systems Agency’s October 2011 Nuclear Command, 

Control, and Communications (C3) System Program Tracking Report36 as 

a source to identify relevant programs in the FYDP and for determining 

how much funding from each of these programs should be allocated to 

the NC3 mission.37 In our prior reports we found that the use of the 2011 

Defense Information Systems Agency report led to a key methodological 

limitation, because that report did not link all projects and activities with 

specific FYDP programs. For example, we found in 2014 that the Defense 

Information Systems Agency report did not link any operation and 

maintenance activities with FYDP programs, and it did not link 28 percent 

of the procurement activities directly with FYDP programs; as a result, the 

DOD CIO did not have a direct way to prepare budget estimates for these 

projects and activities. DOD did not disclose this limitation in the fiscal 

years 2014 or 2015 joint reports. The DOD CIO made certain 

assumptions to overcome the limitation, thereby covering affected NC3 

activities in the 10-year estimate. However, DOD did not document in the 

2014 and 2015 joint reports the assumptions that had been made in 

developing these estimates. In our 2014 report, we recommended that 

the Secretary of Defense direct the DOD CIO to document in future joint 

reports the methodological assumptions and limitations affecting the 

 35The NC3 system consists of satellites, early warning radars, aircraft, communications 

networks, and other systems that are managed by the Air Force, Navy, Defense 

Information Systems Agency, and other organizations. Many systems that make up the 

NC3 system also support nonnuclear military operations. 

36Defense Information Systems Agency, Nuclear C3 System Program Tracking Report

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2011).

37GAO-14-373 and GAO-15-536.
Page 24 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

estimates.38 DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated that in 

future reports it would include all of its key assumptions and the potential 

limitations of the methodologies it used in developing its NC3 system 

estimates.

DOD CIO officials said that for consistency within the department and for 

external consumers of funding information, they continued to use the 

same methodology in preparing the 2016 joint report that they had used 

for the fiscal years 2014 and 2015 joint reports. Officials added that while 

their methodology remained the same in that they continued to use the 

2011 Defense Information Systems Agency report to identify relevant 

activities from which to allocate projected estimates to the NC3 system, 

they used the fiscal year 2016 FYDP data to develop the estimates. 

However, in the description it provided in the 2016 joint report, DOD did 

not document the Defense Information Systems Agency report’s limitation 

and the potential effect of that limitation on the estimates. The usefulness 

and transparency of the joint report could be further improved if DOD 

implemented our previous recommendation to document the 

methodological assumptions and limitations affecting the NC3 system 

estimate. Therefore, we continue to believe that this recommendation has 

merit and should be fully addressed.

The 2016 joint report also provides some information on how DOE’s 

estimates were generally prepared. For example, the report states that 

the estimates used for the FYNSP were generated as part of the DOE 

planning and programming process that informed the development of 

DOE’s portion of the fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget. The report 

states that these estimates were developed in part with input from nuclear 

security enterprise contractors and federal program managers, and were 

based on both historical costs and the most current plans for programs 

and projects. For fiscal year 2016, NNSA included contributions from 

these subject matter experts for planning life extension programs, which 

was a change from how the agency had prepared estimates for fiscal 

year 2015. NNSA officials said that input from these experts helped 

NNSA address program uncertainty.

However, the joint report does not clearly describe the methodologies 

used to develop DOE’s estimates for major modernization efforts.

 38Ibid.
Page 25 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

• Life Extension Programs. The fiscal year 2016 joint report indicates 

that the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan contains 

information regarding the life extension program budget estimates and 

the methodologies used to develop them.

• Construction Projects. The fiscal year 2015 joint report does not 

include information on the methodology used to develop the budget 

estimates for the major construction projects, nor does it reference the 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan or other documentation 

that might describe them.

An NNSA official told us that the department does not provide more detail 

in the joint report because additional detail is available for review in the 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan and DOE’s budget 

justification materials accompanying the President’s Budget request and, 

therefore, the level of detail that DOE currently provides in the joint report 

is responsive to the requirements.

Section 1043, as amended, requires that the joint report include a 

detailed description of the costs included in the budget estimates and the 

methodology used to develop these estimates.39 Key principles for 

preparing funding plans, which for our June 2014 report we derived from 

several federal guidance documents, indicate that potential 

methodological limitations should be disclosed in order to enhance the 

quality of the funding plan by improving transparency.40 These principles 

further indicate that including all relevant costs can help to enhance 

accuracy and completeness. We continue to maintain, as we concluded 

in prior work,41 that unless explicit information on the methodologies used 

to develop the budget estimates is explained in the joint report—including 

 39§ 1043(a)(3).

40Such federal guidance included the following: Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing 

the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal 

Agencies, accessed August 14, 2013, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_final_information_quality_guidelines; GAO, GAO 

Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing 

Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009); and Executive 

Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Preparation, Submission, and 

Execution of the Budget, Circular No. A-11 (Washington, D.C.: July 2013); V 3.0 Capital 

Programming Guide: Supplement to Circular No. A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and 

Acquisition of Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: July 2013). 

41GAO-14-373 and GAO-15-536.
Page 26 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

any potential limitations associated with the methodologies—it may be 

difficult for Congress, as it assesses long-term affordability when 

allocating resources, to readily understand the basis for the estimates and 

be assured of the estimates’ accuracy and completeness.

DOD did not ensure the accuracy of the budget estimates it reported in 

the 2016 joint report, and it unintentionally over stated the 10-year 

estimate for the Air Force’s long-range strike bomber by $16.7 billion. In 

the 2016 joint report, DOD reported that the 10-year estimate for the longrange strike bomber was $58.4 billion, an increase of about 76 percent 

(approximately $25.3 billion) over the $33.1 billion estimate in the fiscal 

year 2015 report. In response to our inquiry regarding the significant 

increase in the 10-year estimate, Air Force officials explained that the 

estimate had been reported incorrectly as a result of an administrative 

error. DOD subsequently provided Congress with an addendum to the 

2016 and 2015 joint reports with corrected budget estimates for the longrange strike bomber and an explanation for the error on November 18, 

2015.

42 The addendum shows that the fiscal year 2016 10-year estimate 

for the long-range strike bomber should have been $41.7 billion instead of 

$58.4 billion. Furthermore, the addendum shows that the 10-year 

estimate for the long-range strike bomber in the fiscal year 2015 report 

was also incorrect and should have been reported as $41.4 billion rather 

than $33.1 billion, an increase of $8.3 billion or about 25 percent.43

 42DOD, Air Force Addendum to the Fiscal Year 2015 and Fiscal Year 2016 Reports on the 

Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons 

Delivery Systems, and Nuclear Weapons Command and Control System Specified in 

Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 18, 2015).

43In July 2015, we reported that the fiscal year 2015 10-year estimate for sustaining and 

modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent was $298.1 billion, based on the budget estimate 

reported by DOD and DOE in the fiscal year 2015 joint report; however, DOD’s revision to 

the fiscal year 2015 long-range strike bomber estimate increases this figure to $306.4 

billion.

Accuracy of Budget Estimates
Page 27 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Key principles that we derived from federal budgeting and cost-estimating 

guidance (e.g. GAO Cost Estimating Guide)44 indicate that long-term 

funding plans should include all relevant budget estimates for a program, 

in order to assist decision makers as they determine how to allocate 

resources. These principles also indicate that agencies should develop a 

process to ensure that high quality information is included in records they 

disseminate. High quality information is accurate and complete. By not 

ensuring the accuracy and completeness of the budget estimates, DOD 

over stated the total anticipated cost of its sustainment and modernization 

activities.45 In our July 2015 report, as part of the recommendation that 

DOD and DOE provide more thorough documentation on the 

methodologies they used to develop the budget estimates, we also 

recommended that they ensure the accuracy and completeness of the 

information included in the report. Both departments agreed with the 

overall recommendation; however, neither stated in its response what 

steps it would take to ensure accuracy and completeness as it develops 

future reports. We continue to believe it is important that the information 

included in the joint reports be accurate and complete and that the 

Departments fully implement this recommendation.

 44Such federal guidance included the following: Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing 

the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal 

Agencies, accessed August 14, 2013, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_final_information_quality_guidelines; GAO, GAO 

Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing 

Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009); and Executive 

Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Preparation, Submission, and 

Execution of the Budget, Circular No. A-11 (Washington, D.C.: July 2013); V 3.0 Capital 

Programming Guide: Supplement to Circular No. A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and 

Acquisition of Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: July 2013).

45DOD’s addendum to the fiscal year 2015 and 2016 joint reports shows it also under

stated the total anticipated cost of its sustainment and modernization activities in the fiscal 

year 2015 joint report.
Page 28 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Although some of the budget estimates changed from the fiscal year 2015 

to the fiscal year 2016 joint reports, DOD and DOE did not report these 

changes or the reasons for them in the 2016 joint report.46 Specifically, 

DOD provided some information on changes to programs, but it did not 

directly link the information on changes to programs with the budget 

estimates it provided in the report or provide comparative information 

regarding the change in budget estimates across years. Table 4 shows 

changes from the fiscal year 2015 joint report to the 2016 joint report in 

DOD’s 5-year and 10-year estimates for sustaining and modernizing 

nuclear delivery systems.

Table 4: Changes in Department of Defense’s (DOD) 5-Year and 10-Year Budget Estimates for Sustaining and Modernizing 

Nuclear Delivery Systems from the Fiscal Year 2015 to the Fiscal Year 2016 Joint Report

Then-year Dollars in Billions

Delivery system

5-Year 

Dollar 

Change

5-Year 

Percent 

Change

10-Year 

Dollar 

Change

10 Year 

Percent 

Change

Heavy bombers

B-2 and B-52 0.4 3 0.9 4

Long-range strike bomber 2.5 22 0.3 1

B61-12 tail kit assembly -0.1 -8 -0.2 -15

Cruise missiles

Air-launched cruise missile 0.1 33 0.1 17

Long-range standoff missile 1.6 800 1.9 68

Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)

Minuteman III 1.1 16 2.5 22

Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 0.9 Not previously 

reported

2.4 40

 46In July 2015, we recommended that in future joint reports DOD and DOE provide 

comparative information about changes in the budget estimates from the prior year and 

explain the reasons for those changes. However, the 2016 joint report was issued in April 

2015, before we published our review of the 2015 joint report. As a result, DOD and DOE 

were not able to incorporate any changes to the joint report based on the 2015 

recommendations. 

DOD and DOE Did Not 

Include Comparative Data 

or Explain Why Some 

Budget Estimates in the 

Joint Report Had Changed 

from Those in the Prior 

Year’s Report
Page 29 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Then-year Dollars in Billions

Delivery system

5-Year 

Dollar 

Change

5-Year 

Percent 

Change

10-Year 

Dollar 

Change

10 Year 

Percent 

Change

ICBM fuze modernization 0.1 14 -1.4 Merged with 

Ground Based 

Strategic 

Deterrent

Dual-capable aircraft 0.4 33 0.5 19

Fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)

Ohio-class submarine -0.1 -1 -0.5 -3

Ohio replacement program 0.6 6 0.1 0

Ohio replacement program reactor design (NNSA) 0 0 -0.1 -9

Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 

(Trident II)

0.2 2 0.6 2

Total 7.7 12 7.1 4

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. | GAO-16-23

Totals may not add due to rounding.

Note: In the 2016 and 2015 joint reports, DOD inadvertently reported an incorrect figure for the longrange strike bomber; the budget estimates in this table reflect corrected data from DOD’s addendum 

to the fiscal year 2015 and 2016 joint reports.

DOD’s 10-year estimate of $178.8 billion for nuclear delivery systems 

reflects an increase of about 4 percent (or $7.1 billion) over the estimate 

in the fiscal 2015 joint report of $171.7 billion.47 According to DOD 

officials, the greatest increase in the 10-year estimate was due to DOD 

accelerating the long-range standoff missile program by two years. In 

fiscal year 2015, DOD delayed the long-range standoff missile program 

for three years, due to higher priorities.

The biggest change to the Navy’s estimates was an increase in the 

estimate for the submarine-launched ballistic missile, Trident II, of about 2 

percent (approximately $600 million)—from $24.2 billion in the prior report 

to $24.8 billion in the 2016 joint report. Navy officials said the budget for 

Trident II funding remained effectively the same over the FYDP (fiscal 

years 2016-2020); however, there were some programming adjustments 

made, as the Navy developed its estimates relative to the fiscal year 2015 

President’s Budget. For the following 5 years (fiscal years 2021-2025), 

 47In July 2015, we reported that DOD’s 10-year estimate for nuclear delivery systems was 

$163.4 billion; however, DOD’s revision to the fiscal year 2015 long-range strike bomber 

estimate from $33.1 billion to $41.4 billion increases this figure to $171.7 billion.
Page 30 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

the Navy applied DOD’s common inflation factor of 1.8 percent for pay 

and 2 percent for non-pay costs for each of its delivery system estimates, 

except for the Ohio-replacement submarine. Therefore, the 10-year 

estimate in the 2016 joint report showed a slight increase.

DOD’s 10-year estimate of $37.5 billion for nuclear command and control 

systems reflects an increase of about 8 percent (or $2.9 billion) over the 

estimate in the fiscal 2015 joint report of $34.6 billion. This increase is 

primarily attributable to the addition of procurement estimates for satellite 

communications systems, including a classified program and the family of 

advanced beyond line-of-sight terminals program. The family of advanced 

beyond line-of-sight terminals program is intended to provide a family of 

satellite communications terminals for airborne and ground-based users, 

to replace many program-unique terminals. The terminals are designed to 

work with current and future communications capabilities and 

technologies, and are expected to provide voice and data over military 

satellite communications networks for nuclear and conventional forces.

In addition, DOE’s portion of the 2016 joint report does not explain 

changes from the 2015 joint report. However, NNSA describes key 

changes in the 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, the 

more detailed planning document on which DOE’s portion of the 2016 

joint report is based. Table 5 shows changes in budget estimates from the 

fiscal year 2015 joint report to the 2016 joint report in DOE’s 5-year and 

10-year estimates for modernizing the nuclear stockpile and the nuclear 

security enterprise.

Table 5: Changes in Department of Energy’s (DOE) 5-Year and 10-Year Budget Estimates for Sustaining and Modernizing the

Nuclear Stockpile from the Fiscal Year 2015 to the Fiscal Year 2016 Joint Report

Then-year dollars in billions

Category 

5-Year Dollar 

Change 

5-Year Percent 

Change 

10-Year Dollar 

Change 

10-Year Percent 

Change

Directed Stockpile Work 2.3 14.9 5.5 16.4

Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation -0.2 -1.7 0 -0.3

Infrastructure 1 8.1 1.1 3.6

All other weapons activities -1.6 -20.1 -3.2 -19.3

Total 1.5 3.3 3.4 3.4

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. | GAO-16-23

Totals may not add due to rounding.

In the fiscal year 2016 joint report, DOE’s 10-year estimate of $103.5 

billion for its nuclear modernization efforts reflects an increase of about 
Page 31 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

3.4 percent (or $3.4 billion) over the estimate of $100.1 billion in the fiscal 

year 2015 joint report. According to the Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan, part of that is due to an increase in the budget 

estimates for some individual programs, including increases in estimates 

for some life extension programs as a result of shifts in schedule, among 

other things, which in turn led to an increase in the budget estimates for 

Directed Stockpile Work. However, the actual increase in these budget 

estimates is greater, as a result of a structural change in the NNSA 

budget for fiscal year 2016, which is not discussed in the joint report. 

Specifically, in the fiscal year 2016 budget documents, DOE shifted two 

counterterrorism programs—which had been included in the fiscal year 

2015 budget estimates and which together totaled $2.7 billion over 10 

years—from the Weapons Activities account of the NNSA budget to 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. As a result, the overall net increase in 

DOE’s budget estimates in the 2016 joint report totals $6.1 billion.

In our July 2015 report, we recommended that in future joint reports DOD 

and DOE provide comparative information about changes in the budget 

estimates from the prior year and explain the reasons for those changes. 

DOE agreed, and DOD partially agreed, stating that Section 1043 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 does not require

a comparative year-to-year analysis, and it recommended that Congress 

amend the existing Section 1043 language to require that the report 

include an additional subsection providing a quantitative comparison of 

current budget estimates with the previous year’s estimates. However, we 

noted that while Section 1043 does not require a comparative year-toyear analysis, the departments are not restricted from including such 

information in the joint report. The 2016 joint report was issued in April 

2015, before we published our review of the 2015 joint report. As a result, 

DOD and DOE were not able to incorporate any changes to the joint 

report based on the 2015 recommendations. We maintain that providing 

comparative information on changes in the estimates from year to year 

and explanations for the changes would be beneficial to congressional 

decision makers. Further, had DOD provided comparative information 

about changes in the budget estimates from the 2015 joint report to the 

2016 joint report, it might have identified the error in its 10-year estimate 

for the long-range strike bomber.

As we reported in July 2015, key principles for preparing long-term 

funding plans stress the importance of including all relevant costs in the 
Page 32 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

plan, clearly documenting any assumptions and limitations, and disclosing 

when possible any errors or omissions in the supporting data that affect 

the quality of the plan’s estimates.48 In the 2016 joint report, DOD and 

DOE continued to omit thorough descriptions of the methodologies they 

used to develop the budget estimates, such as key methodological 

limitations for NC3 estimates. Additionally—as we found DOE had done 

in the fiscal year 2015 joint report by omitting budget estimates for 

planned programs—DOD inadvertently made an error that affected the 

accuracy and completeness of the budget estimates it included in the 

2016 joint report. Furthermore, the 2016 joint report does not include 

comparative information on changes in budget estimates from the 

previous year. We believe that fully implementing our June 2014 and July 

2015 recommendations would help ensure that DOD and DOE improve 

their estimates and provide more accurate and complete information to 

decision makers, and this recommendation should be considered as the 

departments develop their joint report for fiscal year 2017.

We are not making new recommendations in this report. We provided a 

draft of this report to DOD and DOE for review and comment and we 

received written comments from both departments, which are reprinted in 

appendixes II and III, respectively. Both departments also provided 

technical comments that have been incorporated as appropriate.

In their comments, both departments said they are working to include 

additional information into subsequent joint reports based on the 

recommendations made in our June 2014 and July 2015 reports. For 

example, DOD reiterated that it plans to include additional information on 

the estimating methodologies utilized in subsequent reports.

 48The federal guidance from which we derived these principles included the following: 

Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of 

Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, accessed August 14, 2013, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_final_information_quality_guidelines; GAO, GAO 

Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing 

Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009); and Executive 

Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Preparation, Submission, and 

Execution of the Budget, Circular No. A-11 (Washington, D.C.: July 2013); V 3.0 Capital 

Programming Guide: Supplement to Circular No. A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and 

Acquisition of Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: July 2013).

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 33 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

We are sending this report to the appropriate congressional committees 

and to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff; Secretary of the Air Force; Secretary of the Navy; Secretary of 

Energy; and Administrator of NNSA. This report is also available at no 

charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 

contact Joe Kirschbaum at (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov, or 

David Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to the 

report are listed in appendix IV.

Joseph W. Kirschbaum

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

David C. Trimble

Director

Natural Resources and Environment
Page 34 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Chairman

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 35 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

The Honorable Mike Simpson

Chairman

The Honorable Marcy Kaptur

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 36 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

To conduct our work, we reviewed the April 2, 2015 joint report to 

Congress from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of 

Energy (DOE). The joint report describes the departments’ plans and 10-

year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear 

weapons capabilities. Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended, includes a provision for us to 

review each joint report for accuracy and completeness with respect to 

the budget estimates and the methodologies used to develop them.1 We 

assessed the extent to which the joint report provides (1) budget 

estimates for nuclear weapons sustainment and modernization that are 

consistent with DOD’s and DOE’s internal funding plans and long-term2

nuclear modernization plans and (2) complete and transparent 

information on the methodology used to develop these budget estimates. 

To address our objectives, we followed a methodology similar to the one 

we used during our review of the fiscal years 2014 and 2015 joint 

reports.3 We assessed the accuracy and completeness of the budget 

estimates in the report by determining whether they were consistent with 

the departments’ internal funding plans and whether the report provides 

complete information and includes a transparent methodology for how the 

estimates were developed. We examined the departments’ plans and 

budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear deterrent in 

three areas: (1) DOD nuclear delivery systems, (2) the DOD NC3 system, 

and (3) DOE nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons complex.

To determine the extent to which the budget estimates in the fiscal year 

2016 joint report are consistent (accurate and complete) with DOD’s and 

DOE’s internal funding and long-term modernization plans, we compared 

the plans and estimates in the 2016 joint report with each department’s 

funding plans. For our review of DOD’s estimates for nuclear delivery 

systems and the NC3 system, we compared the estimates in the fiscal 

 1

See Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1043(c) (as amended).

2 For the purpose of this report, we use the term “long-term” to refer to DOD and DOE 

plans that go beyond the five-year period of the FYDP and the FYNSP (in this case, 

beyond fiscal year 2020).

3

We previously reported on the fiscal year 2014 joint report in June 2014 and the fiscal 

year 2015 joint report in July 2015. GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Ten-Year Budget Estimates 

for Modernization Omit Key Efforts, and Assumptions and Limitations Are Not Fully 

Transparent, GAO-14-373 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2014). GAO, Nuclear Weapons 

Sustainment: Improvements Made to Budget Estimates, but Opportunities Exist to Further 

Enhance Transparency, GAO-15-536 (Washington, D.C.: July, 30 2015).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 37 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

year 2016 joint report with funding plans in the Future Years Defense 

Program (FYDP).4 Because DOD had not prepared internal funding plans 

beyond fiscal year 2020 to be used to project estimated budget requests, 

and the fiscal year 2016 joint report includes budget estimates through 

fiscal year 2025, we reviewed DOD plans for Air Force delivery systems, 

Navy plans for its delivery systems, and Defense Information Systems 

Agency plans—including the Nuclear Command, Control, and 

Communications (C3) Program Tracking Report—and we discussed 

DOD’s long-term budget estimates in the joint report with relevant DOD 

officials. At DOD, we met with officials from a range of offices responsible 

for developing the department’s contributions to the joint report. In 

addition to the Air Force, Navy, and Department of Defense Chief 

Information Officer (DOD CIO), we met with officials from the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller); Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and 

Program Evaluation; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics); Joint Staff; and U.S. Strategic 

Command. For our review of DOE’s plans and estimates, we compared 

DOE’s estimates in the joint report with National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s (NNSA) funding plans in the Future Years Nuclear 

Security Program (FYNSP) and the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan, which includes estimated funding 

requirements for NNSA’s modernization plans that cover the time 

required for the joint report and beyond.5 We determined the estimates in 

the fiscal year 2016 joint report to be sufficiently accurate and complete if 

they were consistent with the departments’ funding plans, including the 

FYDP and FYNSP.6 We have previously reported on DOD’s and DOE’s 

 4

The FYDP is a centralized DOD report that is updated annually and provides DOD’s 

current budget request and budget estimates for at least 4 subsequent fiscal years. The 

FYDP includes thousands of discrete program elements, each of which may include 

funding projections for DOD appropriations accounts, including research, development, 

test, and evaluation; procurement; and operation and maintenance.

5

Department of Energy, Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: March 2015). The Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan is NNSA’s formal means for communicating to Congress the status of 

certain activities and its long-range plans and budget estimates for sustaining the stockpile 

and modernizing the nuclear security enterprise. The Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan includes 25-year budget estimates for NNSA’s plans.

6

We did not assess the overall reliability of DOD’s and DOE’s internal funding plans 

themselves or the departments’ underlying budget-estimating process, because such 

analysis exceeded the scope of the mandate. We also did not independently verify the 

reliability of DOD’s or DOE’s specific budget estimates.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 38 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

challenges in generating reliable budget estimates and programming 

data.7

To assess whether the fiscal year 2016 joint report includes complete and 

transparent information from DOD and DOE for nuclear sustainment and 

modernization budget estimates, we drew on work we performed for our 

review of the fiscal years 2014 and 2015 joint reports.8 At DOD, we 

obtained Air Force, Navy, and DOD CIO documentation of the 

methodologies they used to develop DOD’s 10-year estimates for 

sustaining and modernizing nuclear delivery systems and the NC3 

system. We also obtained guidance in the form of a briefing from the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as tasking 

documents from the Joint Staff, and we interviewed officials from that 

office and from the Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command. For DOE, we 

drew upon our current work reviewing the fiscal year 2016 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan to assess estimates in the joint report 

for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear security enterprise and 

nuclear weapons stockpile.9 We also asked NNSA officials for information 

on how the joint report was prepared. We then compared the information 

in the joint report with key principles for developing and preparing longterm funding plans that we derived for our 2014 report by reviewing key 

federal and departmental guidance, standards, and practices for cost 

estimating, budget preparation, financial planning, and public reporting. 

Such federal guidance included Circular No. A-11, Preparation, 

Submission, and Execution of the Budget,10 Capital Programming Guide 

 7

GAO, Department of Energy: Observations on Project and Program Cost Estimating in 

NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management, GAO-13-510T (Washington, D.C.: 

May 8, 2013); Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA’s Reviews of Budget 

Estimates and Decisions on Resource Trade-offs Need Strengthening, GAO-12-806 

(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2012); DOD Weapon Systems: Missed Trade-off 

Opportunities During Requirements Reviews, GAO-11-502 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 

2011); and Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA Increased its Budget 

Estimates, But Estimates for Key Stockpile and Infrastructure Programs Need 

Improvement, GAO-15-499 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2015).

8

GAO-14-373 and GAO-15-536.

9

We have ongoing work looking at whether NNSA’s nuclear security budget materials 

provide for funding that is sufficient to modernize and refurbish the nuclear security 

enterprise. As we finalize work in this area, we plan to issue a final report in 2016.

10Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Preparation, 

Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Circular No. A-11 (Washington, D.C.: July 

2013).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 39 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Version 3.0,11 and Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, 

Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal 

Agencies,12 all published by the Office of Management and Budget, as 

well as the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.13 To the extent 

that we determined there were differences between the principles we 

derived and information that was provided in the fiscal year 2016 joint 

report, we discussed the causes and potential effects of these differences 

with relevant DOD and DOE officials. At DOD, we met with officials from 

the Air Force; Navy; DOD CIO; the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Policy); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); 

Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics); Joint Staff; and U.S. Strategic Command. At DOE, we met with 

officials in the Office of Defense Programs.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2015 to December 2015 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 11Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, V 3.0 Capital 

Programming Guide: Supplement to Circular No. A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and 

Acquisition of Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: July 2013).

12Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines for 

Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information 

Disseminated by Federal Agencies, accessed August 14, 2013, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_final_information_quality_guidelines.

13GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 40 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

GAO received DOD’s 

letter on November 12, 

2015.

DOD's technical 

comments attachment is 

not included in this 

appendix, but 

incorporated where 

appropriate in this report.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 41 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Energy
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 42 GAO-16-23 Nuclear Weapons Sustainment

Joseph W. Kirschbaum, (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov

In addition to the contacts named above, Penney Harwell Caramia, 

Assistant Director; William Hoehn, Assistant Director; Jennifer Andreone, 

Colin Chambers, Jennifer Echard, Bridget Grimes, Aaron Karty, Joanne 

Landesman, Amie Lesser, Steven Putansu, and Michael Shaughnessy 

made key contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(352033)
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