COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Bumgardner 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

AMY C. WELLS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0782-98-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 JANUARY 26, 1999 

BILLY R. WELLS, JR. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY 

Ford C. Quillen, Judge 

 Martin Wegbreit (Client Centered Legal 

Services of Southwest Virginia, Inc., on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 Frederick W. Adkins (Cline, Adkins & Cline, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Amy C. Wells (wife) appeals the trial court's order denying 

her motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Because this order is interlocutory in nature and did not 

adjudicate the principles of the cause, we dismiss the appeal.1

 I. 

 On February 20, 1997, wife filed a Petition for Dissolution 

of Marriage in the Circuit Court of Hendry County, Florida, 

seeking a divorce, child custody, spousal and child support, and 

attorneys' fees.2

 Billy R. Wells (husband), a resident of 

 

 1On appeal, wife argues that the court erred: (1) in 

exercising jurisdiction over the divorce and the child custody 

proceedings and (2) in failing to afford the Florida orders full 

faith and credit under Virginia's provisions of the U.C.C.J.A., 

Code § 20-136. Because of the procedural posture of the case, we 

do not reach the merits of the second claim. 

 2The record before us provides no testimony regarding the 

underlying dispute between the parties. Rather, the parties have 
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Virginia, filed a motion to dismiss the Florida action for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties' four minor children 

have lived with wife for various time periods in North Carolina 

and Florida; however, the children currently reside in Virginia 

with husband. 

 On March 27, 1997, husband filed a Bill of Complaint in Wise 

County Circuit Court, Virginia, seeking a divorce and child 

custody. Wife entered a special appearance and moved to dismiss 

that bill of complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3

 Following a hearing, the trial court denied wife's motion. The 

trial court stated: 

 The Court having considered the 

arguments of Counsel and documents filed 

hereby finds . . . that the [husband] is in 

the proper jurisdiction to bring a divorce 

action and has filed a divorce action in Wise 

County which is proper jurisdiction; . . . 

that the children are presently living in 

Virginia and have lived in North Carolina and 

Florida. 

 THEREFORE, the Court doth ADJUDGE, ORDER 

and DECREE that the Motion of the [wife] be 

and is hereby denied and the Court retains 

the jurisdiction of the above-styled cause in 

Wise County, State of Virginia. The Court 

doth further ADJUDGE, ORDER AND DECREE that 

the Florida orders are not determinative of 

child custody. The Court also doth ADJUDGE, 

ORDER AND DECREE that the Court not only 

included only pleadings and orders of the trial court and the 

Florida court. 

 3In the trial court, wife filed a pleading entitled, 

"Special Appearance, Motion to Rehear, Motion to Dismiss Divorce, 

Objection to Jurisdiction over Child Custody and Visitation, and 

Motion to Grant Full Faith and Credit to Florida Orders." The 

trial court addressed each of wife's objections in its order 

dated April 3, 1998. 
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retains jurisdiction over the divorce case in 

Wise County, Virginia, but also claims 

jurisdiction over child custody and 

visitation in Wise County, Virginia. 

 This cause is retained upon the docket 

for further proceedings in this matter. 

Wife noted her appeal to this order. 

 II. 

 This Court has appellate jurisdiction over final decrees of 

a circuit court in domestic relations matters arising under 

Titles 16.1 or 20, and any interlocutory decree or order 

involving the granting, dissolving, or denying of an injunction 

or "adjudicating the principles of a cause." Code 

§ 17.1-405(3)(f) and (4), recodifying Code § 17-116.05(3)(f) and 

(4). A final decree is one "which disposes of the whole subject, 

gives all the relief that is contemplated, and leaves nothing to 

be done by the court." Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 390, 

451 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1994) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

 The parties agree that the trial court's order denying 

wife's objection to jurisdiction is a non-final, interlocutory 

order. Therefore, unless it constitutes an interlocutory order 

that "adjudicates the principles of the cause," we do not have 

jurisdiction to consider an appeal. 

 An interlocutory decree adjudicates the 

principles of a cause where "`the rules or 

methods by which the rights of the parties 

are to be finally worked out have been so far 

determined that it is only necessary to apply 

those rules or methods to the facts of the 

case in order to ascertain the relative 

rights of the parties, with regard to the 
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subject matter of the suit.'" 

Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 227, 231, 481 S.E.2d 482, 485 

(1997) (quoting Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 851, 407 

S.E.2d 339, 341 (1991) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 142 Va. 244, 252-53, 

128 S.E. 524, 527 (1925))). An interlocutory decree that 

adjudicates the principles of a cause is one which must 

"determine the rights of the parties" and "would of necessity 

affect the final order in the case." Erikson, 19 Va. App. at 

391, 451 S.E.2d at 713. "[T]he mere possibility that an 

interlocutory decree may affect the final decision in the trial 

does not necessitate an immediate appeal." Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

 An interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles of a 

domestic relations dispute "must respond to the chief object of 

the suit," id., which is to determine the status of the parties' 

marriage and the custody of the parties' children, and, if 

appropriate, to award spousal and child support. See id. (child 

support modification); Nenninger v. Nenninger, 19 Va. App. 696, 

697, 454 S.E.2d 45, 45 (1995) (divorce decree and equitable 

distribution). 

 In the present case, the trial court's order, which denied 

wife's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, fulfilled 

neither requirement. No final custody determination or decree of 

divorce has been entered. The specific language of the trial 

court's order establishes the need for further hearings to 
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resolve these issues. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction 

to consider the appeal. See Uninsured Employer's Fund v. Harper, 

26 Va. App. 522, 527-28, 495 S.E.2d 540, 543 (1998) (holding that 

the commission's determination of jurisdiction does not 

constitute a final order appealable to this Court). 

 Our holding is consistent with the holdings of many of our 

sister states who have held that a trial court's decision on a 

challenge to jurisdiction is a non-appealable interlocutory 

order. See Atlanta Hanggliders & Ultralights, Inc. v. Rountree, 

314 S.E.2d 679, 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an "order 

of the trial court denying [a] motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction . . . is an interlocutory order which is not 

appealable without a certificate of immediate review"); Duke 

Univ. v. Bryant-Durham Elec. Co., 311 S.E.2d 638, 639 (N.C. Ct. 

App. 1984) ("A trial judge's order denying a motion to dismiss 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is interlocutory and not 

immediately appealable."); Burry v. Raisbeck, 605 N.Y.S.2d 204, 

204 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993) (dismissing an appeal from an 

interlocutory order denying motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction); Ratz v. Ratz, 518 A.2d 317, 319 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 1986) ("[A] party challenging an order sustaining 

subject matter jurisdiction may not appeal the interlocutory 

order as a matter of right."). 

 In those states where courts have allowed an appeal from an 

interlocutory order denying an objection to jurisdiction, a state 
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statute or court rule specifically grants such a right of appeal. 

See, e.g., Parrish v. South Bank, N.A., 657 So.2d 1189, 1190 n.1 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (court rule authorizing "a non-final 

appeal from an order relating to jurisdiction over the person"); 

Torborg v. Fort Wayne Cardiology, Inc., 671 N.E.2d 947, 948 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1996) (court rule allowing an appeal from interlocutory 

order addressing personal jurisdiction over the parties); County 

of Bexar v. Garcia, 974 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. App. 1998) (state 

statute authorizing an "appeal from an interlocutory order that 

grants or denies governmental unit's plea to jurisdiction"). 

 Neither Code § 17.1-405, recodifying Code § 17-116.05, nor 

any Rule of the Supreme Court authorizes an appeal here. Rather, 

the code limits our appellate jurisdiction to final decrees in 

domestic relations matters arising under Titles 16.1 or 20, or 

interlocutory decrees or orders "adjudicating the principles of a 

cause." Code § 17.1-405(3)(f) and (4), recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.05(3)(f) and (4). No other statutory provisions 

authorize an immediate right of appeal from a trial court's order 

on a jurisdictional challenge. Consequently, we are without 

jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. 

 Dismissed.