S. HRG. 114–485 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

STRATEGY, AND DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JANUARY 21, 27, 29; OCTOBER 22, 2015 

( 

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22–944 PDF 2016

S. HRG. 114–485 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

STRATEGY, AND DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JANUARY 21, 27, 29; OCTOBER 22, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

JANUARY 21, 2015

Page 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY .......................... 1 

Scowcroft, Brent, President, The Scowcroft Group and Former U.S. National 

Security Advisor ................................................................................................... 5 

Brzezinski, Dr. Zbigniew K., Counselor and Trustee, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies and Former U.S. National Security Advisor ......... 7 

JANUARY 27, 2015

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY .......................... 37 

Mattis, General James N., USMC (Ret.), Former Commander, United States 

Central Command ................................................................................................ 41 

Keane, General John M., USA (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army ...................................................................................................................... 50 

Fallon, Admiral William J., USN (Ret.), Former Commander, United States 

Central Command ................................................................................................ 58 

JANUARY 29, 2015

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY .......................... 105 

Albright, Dr. Madeleine K., Chair, National Democratic Institute and Former 

Secretary of State ................................................................................................. 107 

Shultz, Dr. George P.; Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, 

Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Former Secretary of State ........ 112 

Kissinger, Dr. Henry A., Chairman of Kissinger Associates and Former Secretary of State ...................................................................................................... 131 

OCTOBER 22, 2015

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, AND DEFENSE

ORGANIZATION ....................................................................................................... 149 

Cohen, Professor Eliot A.; Robert E. Osgood Profession Of Strategic Studies, 

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies ............................... 152 

Mahnken, Professor Thomas G., Senior Research Professor and Director of 

the Advanced Strategy Program, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies ................................................................................................... 160 

Mead, Professor Walter Russell, Distinguished Scholar in American Strategy, 

The Hudson Institute ........................................................................................... 166 

Hicks, Dr. Kathleen, Senior Vice President; Henry A. Kissinger Chair; Director, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies .................................................................................................................. 176 

(III) 

(1) 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL 

SECURITY STRATEGY 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 21, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, 

Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 

Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The committee hearing will 

come to order. 

To start with, I would like to welcome our new members, Senator 

Tom Cotton, Senator Joni Ernst, Senator Thom Tillis, Senator Dan 

Sullivan, Senator Mike Rounds, and Senator Martin Heinrich. For 

the benefit of our new members and all, this committee has a long 

tradition of working in a bipartisan fashion, of which we are very 

proud. 

I have had the opportunity of working with Senator Reed for 

many years. Despite his lack of quality education, he has done an 

outstanding job here as a ranking member of the committee [laughter]. 

For those who are political trivia experts, my staff tells me this 

is the first time that we have had a chairman and ranking member 

from the two oldest service academies, and so I welcome the opportunity of working closely, as I have for many years, with the Senator from Rhode Island. 

Today, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) begins a 

series of hearings on global challenges to U.S. national security 

strategy. I am pleased to have as our first witnesses two of America’s most respected strategic thinkers and public servants, General 

Brent Scowcroft and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. Each served as National Security Advisor to the President of the United States, their 

collective experiences of laying critical foundations for the United 

States-China relationship, confronting the ayatollahs in Iran, negotiating arms treaties with Moscow, and making tough choices on 

United States strategy in the Middle East, have clear salience for 

this committee today. 

2 

We are grateful to each of you for allowing us to draw on your 

wisdom. 

Four decades ago, Secretary of State Dean Acheson titled his 

memoir on the construction of the post-World War II order, 

‘‘Present at the Creation’’. Looking out at the state of that order 

today, it is fair to ask if we are now present at the unraveling. 

For 7 decades, Republican and Democratic leaders alike have 

committed America’s indispensable leadership and strength to defending a liberal world order, one that cherishes the rule of law, 

maintains free markets and free trade, provides peaceful means for 

the settlement of disputes, and relegates wars of aggression to 

their rightful place in the bloody past. 

America has defended this order because it is as essential to our 

identity and purpose as it is to our safety and prosperity. 

But the liberal world order is imperiled like never before. In a 

speech riddled with unrealistic, wishful thinking, President Obama 

told the Nation last night that the shadow of crisis has passed. 

That news came as quite a surprise to anyone who has been paying 

attention to what has been happening around the world. 

A revisionist Russia has invaded and annexed the territory of a 

sovereign European state, the first time that has occurred since the 

days of Hitler and Stalin. 

A rising China is forcefully asserting itself in historical and territorial disputes, and alarming its neighbors, all the while investing 

billions of dollars in military capabilities that appear designed to 

displace and erode United States power in the Asia-Pacific. 

A theocratic Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon, which could unleash a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and collapse the global nonproliferation regime. 

A vicious and violent strain of radical Islamist ideology continues 

to metastasize across the Middle East and North Africa. 

In its latest and potentially most virulent form, the Islamic 

State, this evil has the manpower and resources to dissolve international borders, occupy wide swaths of sovereign territory, destabilize one of our most strategically important parts of the world, 

and possibly threaten our Homeland. 

In Yemen, the country President Obama once hailed as a successful model for his brand of counterterrorism, al Qaeda continues 

to facilitate global terrorism, as we saw in the barbaric attacks in 

Paris. Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have pushed the country to the 

brink of collapse. 

All the while, American allies are increasingly questioning 

whether we will live up to our commitments, and our adversaries 

seem to be betting that we won’t. 

It does not have to be this way. Working together, this Congress 

and the President can immediately begin to restore American credibility by strengthening our common defense. American military 

power has always been vital to the sustainment of the liberal world 

order. It enhances our economic power, adds leverage to our diplomacy, reassures our allies, and deters our adversaries. 

Yet despite the growing array of complex threats to our security, 

we are on track to cut $1 trillion out of America’s defense budget 

by 2021. Readiness is cratering across the Services. Army and Marine Corps end-strength is falling dangerously low. The Air Force’s 

3 

aircraft inventory is the oldest in its history. The Navy’s fleet is 

shrinking to pre-World War I levels. Top Pentagon officials and 

military commanders are warning that advances by China, Russia, 

Iran, and other adversaries mean United States military technological superiority can no longer be taken for granted. 

This state of affairs is dangerous and unacceptable, and represents a failure to meet our most basic constitutional responsibility to provide for the common defense. We must have a strategydriven budget, and not a budget-driven strategy. We must have a 

strategy based on a clear-eyed assessment of the threats we face, 

and a budget that provides the resources necessary to confront 

them. 

But crafting a reality-based national security strategy is simply 

impossible under the mindless mechanism of sequestration. There 

would be no clearer signal that America intends to commit to the 

defense of our National interests and the international system that 

protects them than its immediate repeal. 

I would hasten to add, while a larger defense budget is essential, 

it will be meaningless without the continued pursuit of defense reform, rethinking how we build, posture, and operate our forces in 

order to maintain our technological edge and prevail in long-term 

competition with determined adversaries who seek to undermine 

the economic and security architecture we have long championed. 

This hearing will be the first in a series on how we build a national security strategy that can sustain the American power and 

influence required to defend the international order that has produced an extended security, prosperity, and liberty across the 

globe. 

I am pleased we have with us such a distinguished panel of 

American statesmen to help us begin that conversation. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me join you in welcoming our new members and our 

colleagues who have returned. 

Also, let me congratulate and commend you, Mr. Chairman, on 

your leadership role. I think the committee is in very strong and 

very capable hands, and I look forward to working with you. 

To underscore your comment about the nature of this committee, 

its bipartisan, thoughtful approach to problems which we will continue, I’m sure, under your leadership. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Scowcroft, Dr. Brzezinski, welcome. Both of you have 

been leading American practitioners of diplomacy and strategic 

thinkers for several decades. We thank you for your service to your 

country and for your agreeing to be here today. 

Let me again commend Chairman McCain for calling this hearing, as a series of hearings to look at the challenges he outlined 

so articulately that face the United States today, and how we may 

respond to those challenges. 

This hearing and those that follow will provide us an opportunity 

to hear from leading experts, retired military commanders, and key 

leaders in our country about the National security issues that we 

face. 

4 

I welcome a chance to take this broad perspective and broad 

view. The number and breadth of these challenges seems unprecedented, from Russia’s aggressive and destabilizing actions in Europe; to the breakdown of nation-states in the Middle East and the 

rise of non-state actors like al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant (ISIL) that threaten the integrity of states throughout the region; to Iran’s continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons 

program and the proliferation risks associated with that; to the 

growing assertiveness of China, both regionally and globally; and 

to cyberthreats from North Korea and other malign actors. 

General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski, we would be interested in 

hearing your perspectives on each of these challenges and the principles that you believe should guide us in addressing them. 

They include, and this is not an exhaustive list, but it is a 

lengthy list, with regard to the Middle East, first, how would you 

define the near- and long-term United States interests in the region; second, what do you believe will be required to defeat the 

threats from violent extremist groups like ISIL, both in terms of 

United States policy and international collaboration; and third, 

what role, if any, do you believe nations outside of the Middle East 

should play in addressing centuries-old divisions in that region, including the Sunni-Shia divide, ethnic rivalries, and political and 

ideological divisions? 

With regard to Iran, there are a variety of ongoing developments. 

Another round of negotiations just wrapped up over the weekend. 

A July deadline looms. While it is a few months away, it is approaching quickly. The Senate Banking Committee is working on 

legislation that it hopes to mark up as early as next week that 

would impose additional sanctions. 

The committee would be interested in your assessment of the 

likelihood that these negotiations will succeed or fail, and the value 

of giving this process an opportunity to play out, and your assessment of Iran’s regional ambitions and how an Iran would, with or 

without a nuclear weapon, change the dynamics in that region, and 

also the broader Sunni-Shia conflict. 

In regard to Europe, how should the United States and its allies 

contend with an aggressive, revanchist Russia, while reassuring 

our allies and respecting the aspirations of the people of Eastern 

European to draw nearer to our community of nations in Europe? 

With regard to China, how should the United States keep the relationship from spiraling into conflict, while still demonstrating to 

its allies and partners in the region that it will help to counterbalance China’s assertiveness? 

Finally, regarding the cyber problem, our society appears to be 

very vulnerable to destructive attacks from even small states like 

North Korea, who currently have no other means of threatening 

the Homeland militarily. What are the implications of this vulnerability, not just from there but from many other sources? 

Let me, again, commend the chairman and join with him, finally, 

in underscoring, echoing, and reinforcing his very timely and critical comments about sequestration effects on our military, and the 

need to couple sequestration with reform of purchasing. 

5 

With that, I can think of no more thoughtful gentlemen to ask 

to come forth than General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski. Thank 

you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. In other words, if you both would take seats 

and proceed. However you choose to speak first is fine. Who is oldest? 

Senator REED. Who went to a real college? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Go ahead, Brent. 

[Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF BRENT SCOWCROFT, PRESIDENT, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP AND FORMER U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 

General SCOWCROFT. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, 

members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to present 

some of my views on issues that the Chairman and Ranking Member have laid out in a world which is difficult for all of us. 

My opening comment I hope can contribute to your deliberations 

over some very vexing issues and choices that we have. The world 

we live in is full of problems. Some of them seem to result from 

new or novel forces and influences, and I intend to focus on them. 

Let me begin my comments with just a few words about the Cold 

War. The Cold War was a dangerous period in our history where 

problems abounded. A mistake could have resulted in a nuclear 

war, but the Cold War had one advantage. We knew what the 

strategy was. We argued mightily over tactics, but we were always 

able to come back to what is it we were trying to do, and that was 

to contain the Soviet Union until such time as it changed. That 

helped enormously in getting us through the Cold War. 

With the end of the Cold War, that cohesion largely disappeared. 

But shortly thereafter, we were subjected to globalization, the 

blending of many worldwide trends of technology, trade, other 

kinds of things, and with it, an undermining of the Westphalia 

structure of most of the world’s nation-state systems. 

The Westphalian system was created in the 17th century after 

the 30 Years’ War and the devastation it caused. It made the Nation-state the element of political sovereignty in the world. Totally 

independent, totally on its own, each one, all equal technically. 

It was a tough system and for many have claimed it was responsible for World War I and World War II. But it is basically the 

structure of our Nation-state system today, as modified in the 

Westphalian system. Because the United States has spent much of 

its national interest focus softening the harsh independence of the 

Westphalian system, like the United Nations, like laws that apply 

to everybody, like bringing us together rather than having these 

unique cubicles who are law in themselves but do not relate outside. 

Now we have something new to confuse the international system, 

and it is called globalization. Two aspects of it are particularly difficult to manage in this Westphalian world. Globalization says that 

modern technology, modern science and so on, is pushing the world 

together. The Westphalian system says nonsense, we are all 

unique, separate, sovereign. 

6 

Two of the globalization efforts are particularly intrusive, if that 

is the right word. One is communications, and another, in a different way, climate change. 

Communications is connecting the world and connecting people 

to the world like never before in history. For most of history, most 

of the people of the world didn’t participate in the politics of their 

system, didn’t participate in anything except their daily lives. They 

were just like their parents, they expected their children to be just 

like them, on and on and on. 

Now, they are surrounded by information. They are responding. 

They are reacting to it. ‘‘It is not that kind of a world at all. I am 

not just chattel for the boss down the street to use any way he 

wants. I am a human being, and I have unity.’’ This is sweeping 

throughout the world and altering our system in ways that it is difficult for us to cope with. 

One of the ways, of course, is the impact of cyber on our societies, 

which could be enormous, as deadly as nuclear war, not deadly to 

the person, but deadly to the society. 

Those are the kinds of things that we face now. It focused, most 

importantly, on the Middle East. I think one of the things we have 

seen, that if you want to object, like in Egypt, for example, you go 

out and you parade in the square. That is a difficult thing to do, 

ordinarily. You have to find people who will go out with you. You 

have to avoid the police, so on and so forth. 

But now, globalization has made it really easy. All you have to 

do is pick up your cell phone and say, ‘‘There will be a rally tomorrow in Tahrir Square at 10 o’clock,’’ and you can get 10 million 

people. 

This is a very, very different world, where the Westphalian system is blocked down. It used to keep out information it didn’t want 

its people to see. 

That is basically what we are facing, and we have barely begun 

to deal with it. 

I add climate change to it, because it demonstrates what we cannot do, the Nation-state, alone. No nation-state can deal with climate change. We have to cooperate to make it work. It is just that 

way. 

These are new impacts on our system, and they make governance 

more difficult, and more so for the United States, because we have 

been at the forefront in liberalizing the Westphalian system, in 

making a more just world for all. 

To help us in this difficult task, we should look to our alliances, 

especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). I think 

NATO, in many ways, is as valuable as it was during the Cold 

War. In a world where the relationship of the individual to the 

state is frequently under attack, an alliance of states to whom that 

personal relationship to the state is sacred is valuable. NATO has 

many areas where it can deal with these new forces on us in a cooperative way, which negates the independent sovereignty and 

atomizing the world. 

The impact of globalization on communications seems most dramatic in the Middle East where the impact of the Arab Spring was 

very heavy and still very much being felt. It has brought Sunni and 

Shia differences to acrimony and even combat. 

7 

The ISIL issue in Syria and Iraq is an excellent example of the 

devastation that communication can create in the Nation-state system. It is attempting to transform political state systems into a caliphate or religious order. 

I don’t think the Nation-state system is under gross attack, but 

this is a new and very different development, which could be dangerous or painful for all of us. 

Also in the Middle East, however, besides chaos, are some situations where it is conceivable that real progress toward peace and 

stability might be made. One of these areas is Iran. 

The Iranian nuclear issue is excruciatingly complicated. But resolution, I don’t think, is out of the question. A resolution of this difficult issue could open the way to discussions of other issues in the 

Middle East region, which we used to have with Iran when it was 

a very different state. It might serve to change some of the SunniShia issues in the region to benefit all of us. 

Another enduring issue in the Middle East region has been the 

Palestinian peace process. Many would say that expecting progress 

is grasping at straws but a determined effort from the top, including the U.S., might bring surprising results. 

Just a word about the nuclear arsenal. As more and more nuclear delivery vehicles reach replacement condition, the discussion 

about numbers and types required becomes more voluble and more 

difficult. One way to calculate nuclear needs could be to create a 

balance, and I am talking particularly between the United States 

and Russia. That means that nuclear weapons would never be 

used. That is that our numbers and character of the force is such 

that no one can reasonably calculate that in a first strike, he would 

destroy his opponent’s systems and escape unscathed. If we look at 

that, it gives us guidance in numbers and characteristics of the system, which we need. 

One other nuclear comment, in order to avoid a world demand 

for nuclear reactor fuel creating other Iran-like states, I think the 

U.S. should consider establishing a nuclear fuel bank, where states 

can check out fuel for reactors, return it after it has been used, and 

thus avoid what could be almost endless moves toward nuclear 

power. 

Mr. Chairman, I focused remarks on aspects of world development I thought most vexing and unique. I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank you very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, General. 

Doctor? 

STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI, COUNSELOR 

AND TRUSTEE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND FORMER U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

ADVISOR 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee, thank you for the invitation to address you. I 

will be very brief, and I generally agree with what General Scowcroft has just said. We did not consult on our statements. 

My hope is that your deliberations will shape a bipartisan national security strategy. Such bipartisanship is badly needed, and 

I think we all know that, given the complexity and severity of the 

8 

challenges that America faces in Europe, in the Middle East, and 

potentially in the Far East. Together, they pose an ominous threat 

to global security. 

In Europe, Putin is playing with fire, financing and arming a 

local rebellion, and occasionally even intervening directly by force 

in order to destabilize Ukraine economically and politically, and 

thereby destroy its European aspirations. Given that, the current 

sanctions should, certainly, be maintained until Russia’s verbal 

commitments to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty are actually implemented. 

In the meantime, NATO and especially the United States should 

make some defensive weaponry available to Ukraine, something 

that I have been urging since the onset of the crisis. Not to provide 

them simply increases Russia’s temptation to escalate the intervention. 

At the same time, I have also advocated, and do so again today, 

that we indicate to the Kremlin that the United States realizes 

that a non-NATO status for a Europe-oriented Ukraine could be 

part of a constructive East-West accommodation. Finland offers a 

very good example. 

The preservation of peace in Europe also requires enhanced security for the very vulnerable Baltic states. In recent years, and we 

should really take note of this, Russia has conducted menacing 

military maneuvers near the borders of these states and also in its 

isolated Kaliningrad region. 

One of these exercises quite recently involved even a simulated 

nuclear attack on a neighboring European capital. That surely 

speaks for itself. 

Accordingly, the only credible yet peaceful way to reinforce regional stability is to deploy now in the Baltic states some tripwire 

NATO contingents, including also from the United States. 

Such deployments would not be threatening to Russia because of 

their limited scale. But they would reduce its temptation to recklessly replay the scenario that transpired recently in Crimea. 

Prompt pre-positioning of United States-NATO military equipment 

in nearby Poland would also significantly contribute to enhancing 

regional deterrence. 

Turning to the Middle East, again, very briefly, we should try to 

avoid universalizing the current conflict in Europe into a worldwide 

collision with Russia. That’s an important point. It is both in America’s and Russia’s interest that the escalating violence in the Middle East does not get out of hand. Containing it is also in China’s 

long-range interest. 

Otherwise, regional violence is likely to spread northward into 

Russia—don’t forget that there are some 20 million Muslims living 

in Russia—and northeastward into Central Asia, eventually even 

to Xinjiang, to the direct detriment of both Russia and China. 

America, Russia, and China should, therefore, jointly consult 

about how they can best support the more moderate Middle East 

states in pursuing either a political or a military solution. In different ways, America, Russia, and China should encourage Turkish 

engagement; Iranian cooperation, which is much needed and could 

be quite valuable; Saudi restraint, somewhat overdue; Egyptian 

9 

participation in seeking, if possible, some form of compromise in 

Syria; and the elimination of the regional extremists. 

The three major powers should bear in mind that there will be 

no peace in the Middle East if ‘‘boots on the ground’’ come mainly 

from the outside and especially from the U.S. The era of colonial 

supremacy in the region is over. 

Finally, with the President soon embarking on a trip to India, let 

me simply express the hope that the United States will not unintentionally intensify concerns in Beijing that the United States is 

inclined to help arm India as part of a de facto anti-Chinese Asian 

coalition. That will simply discourage the Chinese from becoming 

more helpful in coping with the volatile dangers that confront us 

in Europe and in the Middle East. 

To sum up, in my preliminary statement, global stability means 

discriminating and determined, but not domineering, American 

engagement. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you both. Those were very strong 

words, and that gives us a lot of food for thought. 

I guess to begin with, would you both agree that sequestration, 

given the events as we see them in the world today, is something 

that we need to repeal? 

Would you agree, General Scowcroft? 

General SCOWCROFT. Absolutely, I would. It is a terrible way to 

determine force structure, strategy, anything like it. It is undermining our ability to do what we need to do to retain, as Zbig says, 

alert for the contingencies of the world. Yes, I am very much opposed to sequestration. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Doctor? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree with Brent. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It seems to me that if we are going to develop a national security strategy, given the myriad complexities of 

the challenges we face, as both of you pointed out, it seems to me 

that we have to have— 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Cyberattack. [Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. That we need to set some priorities. Would 

you give us your view, both of you, of what our priorities should 

be? 

General? 

General SCOWCROFT. In foreign policy, I presume? 

Chairman MCCAIN. In order to develop a national security 

strategy. 

General SCOWCROFT. I believe we need, first of all, to pay attention to our nuclear structure and nuclear relations with Russia, because we do not want, above all, a nuclear war to erupt. 

I think we also need to look carefully at how the world is changing and what we can do to assist that change, to produce a better, 

not a worse world. 

One of the big challenges in this world is cyber. I am not intellectually capable of dealing with the cyber issue, but it is a worldwide 

issue and, as I say, could be as dangerous as nuclear weapons, and 

there is no control anywhere about it. 

10 

I think I agree with Zbig that the United States has areas where 

it can work with both the Chinese and the Russians, and sometimes both of them. I think we should not neglect those. 

The Chinese especially didn’t participate in the Westphalian 

world I was talking about. Their system is very different. There is 

China and there is anybody else. We need to learn, with the Chinese, how to communicate to them so that we have the desired effect. 

I think Russia is a very difficult case right now, but I think the 

Cold War is not returning, and we should not aid and abet its return. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Brzezinski, on the issue of Russia, there 

are some that believe that because of the price of oil and its effect 

on the Russian economy, it’ll lead Putin to be more conducive to 

lessening some of his aggressive and confrontational behaviors, 

such as you described, not only in Ukraine but with the Baltics and 

Moldova, et cetera. There are others that say because of this, it will 

make him more confrontational in order to maintain his standing, 

not only with the Russian people, but in the world. 

I wonder what your assessment is, and I know it is a very difficult question. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, but could I comment very briefly on the previous one? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yes, anything, Doctor. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. First of all, about the nuclear confrontation, obviously, we confront each other, and we have had some crises in 

the past. I think we have learned a great deal from them, and I 

hope the Russians have, as well. 

But what is somewhat alarming is the fact that in recent times, 

during this current crisis, which is a limited, ground-based crisis, 

Putin has invoked the threat of nuclear weapons. People haven’t 

paid much attention to it, but he has publicly commented on the 

fact that we have the nuclear weapons, we have the capability, and 

so forth. He has then matched that with highly provocative air 

overflights over Scandinavia, over parts of Western Europe, even 

all the way to Portugal. 

I am a little concerned—when I say ‘‘little,’’ I am underestimating my concern—that there may be a dangerous streak in 

his character that could push us to some possibly very dangerous 

confrontations. In that respect, he reminds me a little bit of Khrushchev. We all recall where that led, at one point. 

This is why it is terribly important that he have no misunderstandings as to the nature of our commitment and our determination. This is why doing something on the ground that deters him, 

first, from trying to leapfrog on the ground with a military solution, 

is needed, and I alluded to that in my opening comments. 

Insofar as China is concerned, I think probably the Chinese have 

some genuine interest from the standpoint of the enhancement of 

their international power in the acquisition of cyber-capabilities of 

a confrontational type. 

I don’t want to overexaggerate this, and I am searching for words 

that don’t create some impression of an imminent danger, but part 

of their military strategic history is the notion that you don’t preVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
11 

pare to fight your opponent at that given stage of weaponry. You 

leapfrog and then you engage in some offensive activity. 

I am concerned that the Chinese may feel that they cannot surpass us in the nuclear area, and note at their very significant nuclear restraint, in terms of nuclear deployments. They have hardly 

any nuclear weapons, really, targeted at us. We have many times 

over nuclear weapons targeted on China. But the cyber issue may 

pose, at least at this stage only theoretically but at some point really, the possibility of paralyzing an opponent entirely without killing 

anybody. 

That could be a very tempting solution for a nation that is increasingly significant economically, but does realize that there is 

an enormous military disparity between China and us. That, I 

think, suggests we have to be far more inclined to raise those 

issues with the Chinese, which we have done to some extent, but 

even more important, to engage in deterrence by having a capability to respond effectively or to prevent an attempt from being 

successful. 

Now, on the point you’ve just raised, which was about Putin and 

how to contain him, right? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Basically, yes. His reaction to this economic 

crisis that he is confronting. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. He is confronting a very serious economic crisis, 

which he is trying to deny. I think he is in a denial phase. But it 

is quite interesting how many of his former immediate associates, 

political allies, express growing concern. 

Now here the real question is not only how severe is the crisis 

in Russia, but the real question internationally is, will the Russian 

economy implode in some significant, geopolitically significant fashion first, or will Ukraine implode in some significant geopolitical 

fashion first? Because a great deal of what Putin is doing is not 

part of a comprehensive military invasion of Ukraine, other than 

the specific seizure of Crimea, but it is to sow discord, disorganization, economic tensions and costs, and the demoralization, as a consequence, in a regime which is expressing the will of the Ukrainian 

people for a closer association with the West, but as a regime that 

came to power after 20 years of very significant mismanagement of 

the Ukrainian economy. 

The kind of needle-sticking in which Putin is engaging against 

Ukraine produces not only blood in some relatively moderate fashion, both annoying and painful, but could produce a much more serious economic crisis in Ukraine itself. 

This is why I think we have to, in a sense, more credibly convince Putin that it is in his interest not to engage in this needlesticking, because we can make it unpleasant for him by, for example, arming the Ukrainians, while at the same time reassuring him 

that we are not trying to engage the Ukrainians in membership in 

NATO. The arrangement we worked out together with others, and 

the others were more important than us, with Finland in 1945– 

1946 has worked pretty well. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, gentlemen, not only for 

your testimony but for your extraordinary service to the country. 

12 

About 2 years ago in 2013, I believe you coauthored an open letter about the Iranian negotiations, suggesting it was time now to 

support these negotiations, and specifically saying additional sanctions now against Iran with the view to extracting even more concessions in the negotiation will risk undermining or even shutting 

down the negotiations. 

Let me ask General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski, is that still 

your position? If Congress adopted sanctions, do you feel that 

would undermine negotiations and perhaps miss an opportunity 

not only in the nuclear realm but in the other areas of concern? 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, Senator, it is. I think that the system, 

the regime in Iran, is different. We don’t know how different, and 

we don’t know what the results will be. But their behavior is quite 

different from when Ahmadinejad was the head of the government. 

It seems to me that we ought to try to take advantage of that. 

The foreign minister has served in the United Nations (U.N.), in 

NATO. He is familiar with the West. They are talking different, 

and the mullahs are not nearly as vociferous as they were before. 

Does that mean anything? We don’t know, but it seems to me it 

is worth testing. 

I think two things are likely to happen if we increase the sanctions. They will break the talks, and a lot of the people who have 

now joined us in the sanctions would be in danger of leaving, because most of the people who joined us in sanctions on Iran didn’t 

do it to destroy Iran. They did it to help get a nuclear solution. 

Senator REED. Dr. Brzezinski? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Basically, I have a similar perspective. I would 

only add to what Brent said, so as not to repeat, that in addition 

to what he said, I think the breaking off of the negotiations or the 

collapse of the negotiations would arrest and reverse the painful 

and difficult process of increasing moderation within Iranian political life. 

We are dealing with an old generation of revolutionaries, extremists, and so forth. But there is in Iranian society a significant 

change, which every visitor to Iran now notices, toward a more 

moderate attitude and more moderate lifestyle and a more tempting inclination to emulate some Western standards, including how 

in Tehran women are dressed. 

All of that I think indicates that Iran is beginning to evolve into 

what it traditionally has been, a very civilized and important historical country. But we have to be very careful not to have this dramatically and suddenly reversed, not to mention the negative consequences for global stability that this would have, and the reduction in any willingness, Iranian willingness, in some fashion to prevent the extremists and fanatics that are attempting to seize control over the Muslim world from prevailing. 

Senator REED. Thank you. Dr. Brzezinski, turning very quickly, 

because my time is expiring, last September, you were asked to 

comment about the situation in Syria, and you indicated that an 

American role is definitely required, but that role essentially has 

to be very carefully limited. Is that your view today, or do you have 

any other comments? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. That is still my view. It probably goes even further. 

13 

I never quite understood why we had to help or at least endorse 

the overthrow of Assad. I am not really sure we knew what we 

were doing when we made the statement, because there wasn’t any 

real action following on that. 

What has happened, however, in the last 2 years or so since that 

happened is a demonstration of the fact that, whether we like it 

or not, Assad does have some significant support in Syrian society, 

probably more than any one of the several groups that are opposing 

him. That has to be taken into account. 

I don’t think that those who oppose him, perhaps with the exception of the relatively small and weakest group among the resisters, 

who favor us—he has a better standing than any one of them. 

Combined, maybe there is some division in the country across the 

board, but he is still there. 

I think if we want to, in some fashion, promote the end of the 

horrible bloodletting and the progressive destruction of that country, not the promotion of democracy, I think we have to take that 

reality into account. 

Senator REED. General Scowcroft, quickly, your comments, if at 

all, on this topic? 

General SCOWCROFT. I pretty much agree with Zbig on Syria. I 

wouldn’t rule out that at some point we can get some support for 

resolving the most difficult situation from the Russians. They have 

a big stake in Syria, and it seems to me that somewhere there is 

the possibility that we could have a ceasefire and Assad maybe 

steps aside, and we would agree that Russia would play an important role with us in resolving that. 

Among terrible choices, it is one we ought to examine. The Russians have made a few comments in the last few days that they 

might be interested. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. May I just add one more point? I think the existing borders in the Middle East have run out of life. They were 

never authentically historic. They were created largely by West colonial powers. 

I think part of the complication we face, particularly in view of 

this intense violence, not only just in Syria, is the problem of stabilizing a region that has different, so to speak, different preconditions for different borders or arrangements than the ones that 

were imposed right after World War I by the West. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

this hearing. I look forward to serving with you on the committee. 

There is no one in the Senate, almost no one in America, who has 

traveled and has the depth of experience as Senator McCain. It is 

an honor to serve with him and hear his ideas on so many important issues of today’s life. 

While reading Dr. Kissinger’s book, ‘‘World Order’’, General 

Scowcroft, he talks about the Westphalian system. Your remarks 

touched me a bit. 

You mentioned China not being part of that history. At least the 

people of the Middle East were also not part of any understanding 

of what went on with the Peace of Westphalia. 

14 

Do we have a miscommunication, and I’ll ask both of you, in the 

sense of our understanding of the Nation-state and the reality of 

the Nation-state in that area, and a better understanding might 

make us more effective in responding to the challenges we face 

there? 

General SCOWCROFT. I think that is possible, but I think the 

Middle East is a unique place. 

For centuries, it belonged to the Ottoman Empire, which loosely 

governed it. Then with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after 

World War I, the Middle East was redrawn. The map was redrawn. 

The Sykes?Picot Agreement quite arbitrarily, to pursue the interests that the British and the French had in it, as Zbig said, those 

borders are in danger. They are tenuous. They don’t represent 

much of anything. 

It is a very difficult region now, and unique in it is not participating, basically, in the European or Western system, the Russian 

system, or the Chinese. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do you think, as Dr. Brzezinski has indicated, 

that we may be moving toward redrawing some of those boundaries 

or boundaries being altered in the next decade? 

Either one of you, if you would like to comment on that. 

General SCOWCROFT. I don’t think we ought to engage in that. 

One of the things I think we should do, though, is to start mending 

our relationships with Egypt. 

Egypt is a big player in the region, and because of its domestic 

problems, it has fallen off. They played a small role in the recent 

uprising, but I think we need help. Hopefully, we can get more 

from Turkey, but I think the chances of our making it worse rather 

than better are worrisome. 

Senator SESSIONS. I thank both of you for your insights. It is 

very valuable to us. 

With regard to strategy, Dr. Brzezinski, I believe it was mentioned earlier that we had a Cold War strategy. Everybody bought 

into it in a bipartisan way. The reality is I think it is much harder 

for us to have a strategy in this more complex world. Maybe not, 

but it seems to me that it is. 

I would share your concern, as I have been here now 18 years, 

that we need to be a bit more humble in what we can accomplish. 

The world is complex. People are not able to move from one century 

to the next overnight. We need to be more responsible and thoughtful about how we exercise American power. 

In developing a strategy, Dr. Brzezinski, do you see some things 

we might all agree on in the next decade or so that would be positive for the United States? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I can, certainly, think of a lot of things we 

should agree on. I am not sure we will agree. But in order to agree, 

we have to talk to each other. 

I am not quite sure that in recent years, particularly in the face 

of the novelty of the challenges we face, that there has been 

enough of a bipartisan dialogue about these critical issues at the 

highest level, including obviously you, members of this very distinguished committee, irrespective of who actually controls the executive office. 

15 

I think we have to ask ourselves, how is the world different 

today? I am a little more skeptical of the Westphalian system as, 

so to speak, being in any way relevant, because the Westphalian 

system emerged in Europe when they were already being different 

countries with some territorial definitions. This is not the case in 

many parts of the world. China was unique in having a real advanced state, so to speak, earlier than Europe. 

But the rest of the world is now coming into being, politically 

into being. That contributes to much of the instability and uncertainty of what is happening. 

What are the real borders in the Middle East? A lot of the countries in the Middle East speak the same language, for example. 

Why should they be here or there? Or should they have a single 

state if they all speak the same language? Or should religion be the 

only determinant for a nation-state? 

I am afraid this process will take a long time before it settles 

itself. I think we should not be directly involved in imposing a solution. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you both. I appreciate that. 

I would say, with regard to Members of Congress, particularly 

members of the Senate, I believe we talk together more collegially 

and with more common understanding about international relations and defense issues than we do about most any other subject. 

I think we have not the kind of intensity of disagreement as some, 

some pretty big intensity going back, I guess, to the Iraq war and 

so forth. But I think we are getting past that. Hopefully, we can 

be more effective in working as a united country, because that is 

the essential. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Heinrich? 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Scowcroft, Dr. Brzezinski, welcome. I read last year a piece 

by Thomas Friedman that I found was very interesting, where he 

described the Islamic State and the situation in the Middle East 

today by saying that there were really three civil wars raging in 

the Arab world today. One, the civil war within Sunni Islam between the radical jihadists and the moderate or mainstream Sunni 

Muslims and regimes; two, the civil war across the region between 

Sunnis funded by Saudi Arabia and Shiites funded by Iran; and, 

three, the civil war between Sunni jihadists all other minorities in 

the region, the Yazidis, the Turkmen, the Kurds, the Christians, 

the Jews, and the Alawites. 

He wrote that when you have a region beset by that many civil 

wars at once, it means that there is no center, only sides. When 

you intervene in a middle of a region where there is no center, you 

very quickly become a side. 

I am curious if either of you would agree with that assessment, 

and if you would also return to what you spoke about a little earlier regarding how important it is that the fighting on the 

frontlines against the Islamic State be conducted by Iraqis and 

other regional partners and members of the coalition, as opposed 

to Western or United States troops. 

16 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree basically with it. I think there are, fortunately, several states in the Middle East that do show signs of a 

capacity for conducting a responsible role. We have to rely on them. 

I doubt they are going to prevail very quickly. These are the 

countries that were mentioned. But I don’t think we have any other 

choice. I think getting involved in the internal dynamics, religious 

conflicts, sectarian animosities of the region is a prescription for a 

protracted engagement of the kind that can be very destructive to 

our National interests. 

Now to be sure, there are some circumstances in which we have 

to act. When we were attacked on 9/11, we had to respond. 

But I remember being called in with, I think, Brent and Henry 

Kissinger, to the session that made the basic decision. We were, of 

course, not participants in making the decision, but we would say 

something. I fully endorsed taking military actions against Osama 

and his associates, al Qaeda. 

But I walked up to the Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald 

Rumsfeld, and said, look, let’s go in. Let’s knock them out, do what 

we can to destroy the Taliban, which held government control in 

the country, and then leave. Don’t get engaged in development of 

democracy. 

Now maybe I was wrong. Maybe time will demonstrate that I 

was wrong. But, certainly, I don’t think anybody anticipated it 

would be 10 years, and it might be still another 10 years. Certainly, in the rest of the Middle East, if we were to try that, it 

would be far, far longer. 

I think we have to face the fact that the region will probably be 

in some serious turmoil for a long time to come, and our bets ought 

to be on those countries, which, like the European countries in the 

era of formation, have already acquired some cohesion as states, 

and I mentioned them in my comments, but not try to do the heavy 

lifting ourselves. 

If we could get the Russians and Chinese to be more cooperative, 

and they have a stake in being more cooperative, we would be better off, and each of them, in fact, be tempted to sit on the sidelines 

and think, well, the Americans will get more engaged, and this will 

improve our interests in competing with us here or there. 

I don’t think that is a smart solution in the long run for them. 

But it takes someone like us to indicate to them that we would like 

to collaborate with them in some limited steps in helping the moderates in the Middle East in different ways, because they have different aspirations. 

Senator HEINRICH. Mr. Scowcroft, do you want to add to that? 

General SCOWCROFT. I largely agree with Zbig on that. 

I think we have to be a participant in the Middle East, but we 

should not want to be an owner. We ought to help those states that 

we think are trying to produce, if you will, a modern system. 

That is why I mentioned Egypt, because Egypt is a serious 

power, and they are of the region, and they do have great capability. We don’t have much of a discussion going on with them now, 

but there is a new government. I think that is one we should look 

to. 

Turkey is an ally of ours. The Turks are in a very difficult position now with Syria. 

17 

But it seems to me that we ought to be careful and use force 

where it accomplishes specific ends. For example, try to go in and 

end the Syrian war, I don’t think we want to own Syria. It is a very 

complicated country, as are some of the others in the Middle East. 

I agree with Zbig, basically. We have to be in the Middle East 

but not of the Middle East. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, both. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank both of you for being here, and 

thank you so much for everything you’ve done for the country. 

I wanted to follow up on your comments, Dr. Brzezinski—I found 

them very interesting—about Putin and that, in fact, you are concerned about some of the statements that have been overlooked 

that he has made that have referenced nuclear weapons, including 

some of the overflights that Russia has undertaken in Scandinavia, 

west Portugal, and other areas. 

I wanted to follow up in light of the potential and I think actual 

violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty 

that we have seen, that I know, General Scowcroft, you have written about as well. 

In fact, General, you wrote in an op-ed in August of 2014 that 

this should be a real concern to NATO because they have embarked on an across-the-board modernization of their nuclear 

forces. Of course, if Russia has developed a nuclear groundlaunched cruise missile, in violation of the 1987 INF treaty, obviously that type of system could virtually reach all of NATO Europe. 

How do you view, both of you, the idea of the violation of this 

treaty, in light of where we are right now and some of the statements you have heard Putin make? What should our concern be 

about that? 

I appreciated your comments, Dr. Brzezinski, that we have to 

show commitment and determination to Putin, and that will hopefully help him stop being so escalatory with what he is doing with 

Ukraine, and also this treaty. 

I would like to get both of your thoughts on this violation, what 

it means for their nuclear programs, our interactions with them. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don’t think he will go all the way in violating 

the nuclear treaty. I am more concerned about his misinterpreting 

what has happened recently. 

Let’s go back a little more than a year. I wonder how many people in this room or on this very important senatorial committee 

really anticipated that one day Putin would land military personnel 

in Crimea and seize it. I think if anybody said that is what he was 

going to do, he or she would be labeled as a warmonger. 

He did it, and he got away with it. I think he is also drawing 

lessons from that. 

I will tell you what my nightmare is. One day, and I literally 

mean one day, he just seizes Riga and Tallinn, Latvia and Estonia. 

It would literally take him 1 day. There is no way they could resist. 

Then we will say how horrible, how shocking, how outrageous. 

But, of course, we can’t do anything about it. It has happened. We 

are not going to assemble a fleet in the Baltics and then engage 

in amphibious landings and then storm ashore like in Normandy 

to take it back. We will have to respond in some larger fashion, 

18 

perhaps. But then there will be voices, ‘‘Well, this will plunge us 

into nuclear war.’’ 

I think deterrence has to have meaning. It has to have teeth in 

it. It has to create a situation in which someone planning an action 

like that has no choice but to anticipate, ‘‘What kind of resistance 

will I encounter?’’ 

This is why I recommend what I do recommend, pre-positioning 

of some forces, limited forces, so it is not provocative. 

An American company in Estonia is not going to invade Russia, 

and Putin will know that. But he will know that if he invades Estonia, he will encounter some American forces on the ground and, 

better still, some Germans, some French, some Brits, of course. 

I think if we do that kind of stuff, we are consolidating stability, 

including nuclear. The same goes for the ongoing conflict in Russia 

and Ukraine. 

I don’t think Putin plans to invade Ukraine as a whole, because 

that would be too dangerous. You cannot simply predict what 

would happen. 

But this continuous pinpricking can involve some escalation. It 

has already involved escalation. There are Russians, at least in the 

hundreds, according to some NATO accounts, in terms of several 

thousand, fighting in Ukraine against an established country. This 

is something that cannot be ignored. 

Economic sanctions, yes. In the long run, they create an attitude, 

a concern in Russian society, which will deprive Putin of his popular support, and this ecstatic sense that we have become a superpower again. But in the short run, we have to deal also with his 

motivations. 

The only way to do that is to indicate to him by tangible steps, 

such as defensive arming of the Ukrainians, that we will be involved in some fashion in making that military engagement more 

costly. At the same time, to indicate to him we are prepared to settle, send him a signal about non-NATO participation for Ukraine. 

That to me is a strategy of responding to the possibility that you 

very rightly raise. 

Senator AYOTTE. Without taking those steps, obviously, as I hear 

you saying you believe the economic sanctions alone will not deter 

him. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I am afraid that economic sanctions alone will 

damage, in the meantime, because of what he has a free hand in 

doing, Ukraine then Russia. 

There is a kind of implicit race of which economy will collapse 

first. The Ukrainian Government is still not in full control of its entire society. It is putting together rapidly a makeshift army, and 

it is getting very little support in that regard from the outside. 

I am not suggesting that the Ukrainians be armed to wage an 

offensive war against the Russians, but I do urge that we do something to make Putin ask himself, before he escalates, ‘‘Am I going 

to be in something much bigger? And what will that do to me?’’ 

That is all that is involved, but it is essential. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this 

hearing you are having for all of us, and the information. 

19 

I am so sorry that you see some of us running back and forth. 

We have a Veterans Affairs Committee meeting, and they overlap 

sometimes. I’m very sorry. I hope I don’t ask the same questions 

that have been asked. 

My main concern is that I am trying to learn as much as humanly possible about Syria, Iran, the whole sanctions on Iran. As 

you know, we are kind of in a tug-of-war right. Should we, should 

we not? The President has been very emphatic that, absolutely no 

sanctions, don’t sign it now. You will mess up the deal if we do. 

I understand that my colleagues are concerned about all the time 

that has gone by, and we really haven’t had a secure briefing telling us where they are. Have they succeeded? Are they moving forward? Are they taking their centrifuges out? Should we keep the 

pressure on? Should this be something the President should be able 

to use that if they don’t follow through and do what they are supposed to do, this is where the sense of the Senate and United 

States Congress is, and they will follow through, so it’s best to 

work with me? 

These are all things that I haven’t made up my mind on yet, and 

I’m trying to. A little bit of help there. 

Also, Syria, I know we have an awful lot of people who feel 

strongly. I believe that America has to be strong. I don’t think they 

can succeed unless they have what seems like our direct leadership 

in kind of prodding them. Also, our airstrikes can’t be as effective 

as they could be if we don’t have ground intelligence and support. 

I understand all of that. I just don’t believe we should have massive forces on the ground as we have had in the past. That is my 

belief. I know some of my colleagues differ with that. 

I think, strategically, with our Special Forces, black ops, we can 

do certain things. But unless they want to take the ground war in 

that part of the world, it is never going to be cured. 

But make no mistake, if they make to fool with America, we 

should hit and hit hard. 

With all that being said, do you believe that with Syria trying 

to train and arm some of the Syrians at $500 million is what we 

have set aside for that, does that have the possibility of being successful? Could we do something different with that to be more successful? 

What about the Kurds? They seem to be the only people who 

want to fight in that part of the world, that want to defend, and 

want a country, and want identity. Are we doing enough there? 

Could we do more? How in the world do you get the Turks to participate and the Saudi’s to participate? That’s a big thing. 

But Syria and Iran are the two things that would be very helpful 

to me. Whoever wants to start, I think I need both of your opinions, 

if possible. 

General SCOWCROFT. On Iran, I don’t think anybody knows 

whether or not negotiations will work, but we are in the course of 

negotiations now. I think we should see them out and not take 

steps, which would destroy the negotiations. 

Senator MANCHIN. In all due respect, we were told the first time 

that if we would sign a letter showing that we intended that these 

sanctions take place, it would weaken the President’s hand. We 

went ahead and signed it anyway, and it hasn’t weakened the 

20 

hand, but there have been extensions that we really don’t know 

where we stand as far as the negotiations. 

That is the hard thing I am having a problem with. 

General SCOWCROFT. It is hard, but I think the outlines are sufficiently clear now—very complicated, but clear—that I think we are 

in the home stretch. To change our strategy now might work, but 

I wouldn’t do it at this stage. 

Senator MANCHIN. I understand. 

General SCOWCROFT. I would wait and see if the administration 

is successful. 

Senator MANCHIN. Dr. Brzezinski, your thoughts on Syria, our 

training and the commitment that we have there and if it might 

be a better investment somewhere else, in a different direction. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I am not sure whom we would train, because, in 

fact, the groups hostile to Assad are much stronger than those who 

seem to be inclined to rely on us. After what has happened over 

the last couple years, I think there are not terribly many Syrians 

who want us to wage a more intense war, because they don’t know 

what that war would be. The other groupings have an advantage 

over us of either being more sectarian and specifically identified as 

such, or identified with specific regional goals that have some historic connection to the world as the Syrians perceive it. 

I think some sort of ceasefire and discussions about the future 

would be the better outcome for us than an intensification of the 

war. 

As far as Iran is concerned, don’t forget that we are not the only 

negotiator with Iran, and all of the parties negotiating, including 

our closest allies, as well as the Russians and Chinese, favor a continuation of the negotiations for reasons specific to their own interests. 

If the negotiations broke down, the whole process would collapse, 

and then what would be the alternative? Should we then attack 

and bomb them and thereby make the war in the Middle East even 

more explosive? We have to ask ourselves, why should we do this? 

‘‘Cui bono’’ is a very good, simple, practical question to ask. I 

don’t see any benefit to the United States in that transpiring. 

We have made some progress. Whether we have made enough 

progress, I don’t know. Whether the negotiations have been perfectly conducted or not, I don’t really know either, because I 

haven’t been there. But I do have a feeling that there has developed a common stake with key countries in the world, which we 

shouldn’t unilaterally abandon just because we are being pressured 

to do so. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you both so much. I appreciate it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am sure you noted yesterday the signing of 

an agreement between Iran and Russia, a military cooperation 

deal, to confront United States interference in regional and international affairs. 

Senator Tillis? 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My question is more broad in nature. With the changing of the 

administration, there were clearly some changes in foreign policy 

strategy. I am interested in your view over the past 5 or 6 years, 

more or less, if you were engaged in the strategy formulation, what 

21 

things do you suggest that we stop doing? What things do you suggest that we start doing? What should we continue to do? 

In other words, an objective assessment, in your view, of things 

that are working and things that need improvement in the Middle 

East. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. In the Middle East? Wow. 

For one thing, I think we have to continue doing what we have 

perhaps started doing, which is encouraging those states in the 

Middle East that have some historical identity and some capability 

to act, rather than to wait for us to do the job overall. I think the 

countries that we have mentioned, in varying degrees, are tempted 

to have something done, but would prefer us to carry the heavy 

water and are not very clear about their aspirations. 

That leaves us in a very difficult position, because if we undertake to do what is necessary, we buy the whole shebang. We buy 

the whole conflict, and it becomes our baby. If we sit back, obviously, it may deteriorate. We have to find some formula in between. 

I happen to be an admirer of Secretary Kerry. I think he has 

been trying really very energetically to find some viable compromise. It is difficult as hell to achieve it in these conditions. 

Perhaps this very painful process that we are now witnessing in 

that region will continue for some time to come. But the better part 

of wisdom in these circumstances, in my judgment, is the one that 

Brent and I have been both advocating, which is a policy of very 

selective engagement, which prevents the other side, particularly 

the killers, the sadists, the fanatics, the extreme sectarians, from 

winning. 

I think we can do that. But we don’t have to do much more than 

that to maintain that. 

Senator TILLIS. Can you give examples of what selective engagement would look like, in your view? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Somewhat along the lines of what is currently 

being practiced, in fact, which is airstrikes, probably some Special 

Forces, intelligence, political assistance, financial assistance, and a 

willingness, perhaps, to change our position on some issues, such 

as, to me, the still unclear motives for trying to get rid of Assad. 

I don’t quite understand why we are so eager to get him out of 

office. Is he that much worse than some other regimes in the area? 

What is it? Was he our enemy? Was he conspiring against us? 

There were specific regional reasons why the war started, by 

countries in the region. I don’t think that was our cup of tea, and 

we sort of got involved in it, and now have the whole problem. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski. 

Mr. Scowcroft, you made the comment that we need to be in the 

Middle East, but not of the Middle East. Can you give me an example of what that means in terms of policy execution? 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I think it means we should guide, help, 

assist, but not be a player in ourselves, that is, ground troops. I 

think what we are doing in Syria, it’s okay. It was an emergency. 

I think that we should not carry the burden on that, much less 

being of the region, ground troops. 

22 

We don’t know what the best outcome for Syria is. It is very complicated. We need to help our friends. We need to encourage others 

to be more helpful. 

The Turks, for example, have a heavy interest in the Kurds, not 

necessarily the kind of interest that the Kurds want them to have. 

We need to be careful all the way through, but help those who 

want to do what we think would improve the situation without it 

belonging to us. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join 

in thanking you for holding this hearing to provide some intellectual and conceptual context to the very challenging work we are 

going to have ahead of us in these next 2 years. 

I want to thank both of our witnesses not only for being here 

today but for your longstanding service to our Nation in uniform 

and as National Security Advisor. Each of you has contributed 

enormously to the readiness and the preparedness and the performance of our Armed Forces in protecting our National security. 

I want to focus on an area you mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Scowcroft, cyber, a new, emerging form of warfare, perhaps very difficult to imagine in the days that each of you served 

as National Security Advisor, illustrating how the nature of warfare is changing. 

Perhaps I could ask each of you how you think we need to be better prepared not only in the mechanics of cyber-intelligence and 

cyber-warfare but also in the education of our country as to the importance of this very complex area, which is also probably going to 

be of increasing importance. 

General SCOWCROFT. I think that cyber is of increasing importance. I believe we are just touching the surface and that we could 

profit by some innovative thinking about how we can approach that 

problem and how we can get other countries, like the Chinese, for 

example, involved in ways that are helpful. 

We may have to try several different things, but the potential 

danger of cyber, not just to us, but to those who are practicing it 

now, should enable us to have some serious discussions with other 

countries. But we also need a serious discussion within the United 

States, too, because the government and some of our industries are 

not cooperating in the way, at least to my understanding, are not 

cooperating in the way which could really move the ball forward. 

This is a ball that looks different to different people. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you think our response, for example, 

to the Sony attack should be more robust and vigorous? Let me 

pose that question to both of you. 

General SCOWCROFT. I think you need to know more about it before you answer the question, because it depends who really 

pushed the attack, and what kind of reaction is best to move the 

ball forward and to give us a better grip on how we can deal with 

this difficult situation. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Dr. Brzezinski, do you have any observations? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don’t have an answer. I have a comment. 

23 

This is a hypersensitive issue, both in terms of what it involves 

and the need for secrecy in dealing with it. Basically, we have to 

seek two objectives. 

One is to develop some predictable immunity against some preemptive action by a hostile force. I alluded to that possibility. That 

will require a major effort and major expenditure, and probably 

move us into a field that we haven’t fully, sufficiently explored. 

The second is to have a preemptive capability, a preemptive capability to preempt some action of that sort or matches some action 

against us tit-for-tat instantly. 

I don’t want to be too specific about who the enemy might be. I 

don’t think we need to create public hysteria on the subject. But 

it, certainly, stands to reason that there are some countries in the 

world that might think that cyber-warfare against the United 

States is the best way to preempt the whole issue and to change 

the balance of power. 

I think we are still in the very early phases of responding to 

that, something like the United States was in 1943, 1944 when we 

started getting really serious about the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I want to thank you. My time has expired. 

We barely touched, let alone scratched, the surface. But I would 

just offer the observation that our private sector probably is less 

prepared than it should be. Our military, or at least our civilian 

leadership, has the opportunity to provide more incentives, and 

maybe more compulsory measures, to ensure that we are better 

prepared in the private sector against these kinds of attacks, because certain kinds of attacks are as much a threat to national security, whether they are to our financial system, our utilities, even 

a corporation like Sony—I shouldn’t say, ‘‘even a corporation like 

Sony’’—which employs and has such an important impact on our 

society. 

Thank you very much for your responses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both very much. 

Some observations and conclusions that you’ve made seemed a 

bit—don’t reconcile for me, but we will talk about that in a moment. 

As to the Iranian situation, do you agree with me that whatever 

chance there is to get a deal with Iranian nuclear ambitions, we 

should take? Whatever opportunity we have to get a peaceful resolution of their nuclear ambitions, we should pursue that diplomatically? Just say yes. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes. 

[Laughter.] 

General SCOWCROFT. I think, if I understand the question. 

Senator GRAHAM. I am not trying to trick you. 

I agree with that. But one thing we should never allow to happen 

is for Iran to get a nuclear weapon. 

Do you both agree with that? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes. 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes. 

24 

Senator GRAHAM. That would open up a nuclear arms race in the 

Middle East. The Sunni Arabs would want a weapon of their own, 

right? 

General SCOWCROFT. That’s right. 

Senator GRAHAM. Whatever problem we have today would get exponentially worse. How we find a peaceful resolution to the Iranian 

nuclear ambitions is the primary goal I share with you and everybody else in the world. 

Do you agree that the Iranians in the past have been trying to 

build a bomb not a peaceful nuclear power program? Their past behavior would suggest they have been trying to get a weapons capability. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes. 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I think there was a phase. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Do you agree with me that Congress 

may actually make things worse if we pass sanctions, but we 

should have a say about the final outcome through a 123 nuclear 

review process under the Atomic Energy Act? Does that make 

sense? 

Let the negotiations go forward without sanctions, but when a 

deal is reached, would it be okay with both of you if Congress, 

under the 123 section of the Atomic Energy Act, had a chance to 

review it to see if it was, in fact, a good deal? Would that be a good 

outcome? 

General SCOWCROFT. I don’t know that I am equipped to say 

that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. We have in the past approved 24 agreements regarding civilian nuclear programs between the United 

States and foreign powers. All I am suggesting is, let the administration pursue a deal with the P5-plus-1. If they reach an agreement, bring it to Congress for our review and our approval. 

Do you think that makes sense? Would that be a good check and 

balance? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think that depends a little bit also on the other 

partners in the negotiations. We are not the only ones. 

Senator GRAHAM. Congress is not going to let the French or Iranians tell us what to do. 

What we are trying to say to you and the administration is that 

we don’t want to disrupt the last best chance to get a deal, but we 

don’t want to be dealt out either. We would like to have a say. 

Under the Atomic Energy Act, section 123, in the past, Congress 

has reviewed deals between the U.S. and foreign powers regarding 

civilian programs. 

Would that be a provocative thing for Congress to do, look at the 

deal after the fact? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Let me take a stab at this. I think you will do 

it anyway, won’t you? 

Senator GRAHAM. The question is, should we do it? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think that depends a little bit on the nature 

of the relationship with the other powers and how much you are 

informed. You will make the judgment yourself, if you want to do 

it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Fair enough. 

25 

Let’s get back to Syria. This whole conflict started when people 

went to the streets in Syria petitioning Assad to have a better life 

within Syria. Do you agree with that, that’s how this all started? 

General SCOWCROFT. That is one of the things anyway, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. You just made an observation that most people 

now are going to say, ‘‘I have dignity. I am not going to let the guy 

down the street tell me how to live. We can now read and see how 

life could be.’’ 

That is a good thing. Do you both agree that the individual in 

the world being empowered and knowing the difference between a 

good life and a bad life is, overall, a constructive thing? 

General SCOWCROFT. It certainly is for humankind. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you like to live in Assad’s Syria? Can 

you understand why millions of Syrians believe that Assad’s Syria 

is not what they want to pass on to their children? Can you understand why people throughout the world no longer want to live in 

totalitarian dictatorships for our convenience? 

I can understand that. There is a complication here I get. 

But the big theme sweeping the world, to me, is that young people have enough living a life that none of us would adopt, for our 

convenience. I would like to help those young people, and in the 

process, not blow up the world. 

Do you agree with the President that the goal should be to defeat 

and destroy ISIL, degrade and destroy? 

General SCOWCROFT. Destroy what? 

Senator GRAHAM. Defeat, degrade, and destroy ISIL, that should 

be the United States’ goal? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I will speak for myself. I think it is important 

that we do what is necessary from the standpoint of our National 

interests. 

Senator GRAHAM. I agree with that. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. If ISIL kills our people, we certainly should act. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with the goal the President has 

stated that it is in our national interest to degrade and destroy 

ISIL? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I support that, but it depends on how we do it. 

Senator GRAHAM. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don’t want us to be the only protagonists and 

others to sit back in the region. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, General? 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think the strategy in place today is 

working to achieve that goal? 

General SCOWCROFT. No. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, so I agree with you, General. 

Would you like to comment, Doctor? Is it working? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don’t know if it is working. I think it is going 

to take a long time, because we are in a situation where there is 

a mix of motivations in the region. 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. Two good answers. 

I just got back from the Mideast. Nobody believes it is working. 

The best solution, from my point of view, would get an Islamic coalition together. It doesn’t have to be all Arab. An Islamic coalition 

to go in on the ground in Syria and take ISIL down in the name 

26 

of Islam, saying, ‘‘You do not represent this great religion. We are 

here to take you on and destroy what you stand for.’’ 

Does that make sense? Would that be a good outcome, to have 

religion, a coalition of the willing within the religion, to go in and 

take ISIL down? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. If it is spontaneously formulated in the region 

and not created by us, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. I couldn’t agree more. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think if we tried to create it, it wouldn’t work. 

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, should we support such an effort giving capacity to that will where we have unique capability? I am not 

advocating 100,000 American troops on the ground in Syria, but I 

am advocating that the longer this problem goes, the more likely 

we are going to get hit here. I am advocating that America cannot 

sit on the sideline and let 300,000 Syrians get slaughtered because 

it is complicated. I am advocating that we defeat this enemy to 

mankind, not just to Islam, and that we get the Islamic world engaged, but we provide capacity when they have will, that we provide airpower, that we provide Special Forces, intelligence capability. 

Gentlemen, what I will not accept is the status quo, that it is 

okay to not go after these guys because it is not. At every level in 

the world, it is not okay. 

So my only plea is that you would have an open mind to a 

ground component where we play a role, not the leading role, before it is too late. 

Thank you both for your great service to this country. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Would you like to make a response to that 

tirade? 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I wouldn’t call it a tirade. I thought it was very 

sincere and impassioned, but I don’t think it deals sufficiently with 

the complications of the region. 

There are different countries in the region. There are some regimes we can work with. There are some that are playing a double 

game. 

Last but not least, there is, unfortunately, unexpectedly, much 

more support for Assad in Syria than we would have wished or 

probably anticipated. Otherwise, why is he still there and has not 

been overthrown? 

Chairman MCCAIN. General, would you like to make a comment 

on the exchange that just took place? I think it is important. 

General SCOWCROFT. Syria is a most difficult place. Next to Lebanon, it is probably the most mixed up in terms of physical mixup of different groups of any area in the Middle East. 

I think I understand the concern. I am reluctant, sitting here, to 

get into executive-legislative struggles, but I think we ought to do 

what we can without getting ownership again. We have not only 

the Syrians to worry about. We have to worry about the Turks, too, 

because the Kurds are very heavily engaged there. They have different notions about their own future. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you support a no-fly zone that Turkey has 

been asking for, to protect the Free Syrian Army and the popuVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
27 

lation from further destruction, a no-fly zone to give people a 

chance to regroup? 

General SCOWCROFT. I would consider that. But I would not use 

airpower to do it. There are some 20 airfields in Syria. We could 

bomb the runways of all of them with missiles and keep bombing 

them, and, in effect, ground their air force. I would have no problem doing that. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Doctor? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, I probably would have no problem. But I 

don’t think that solves the larger problem. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you. I think it has been a very important exchange. 

Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, I apologize for coming in and out. I had a meeting 

with Mr. Carter, who, as you know, has been nominated by the 

President to be Secretary of Defense. 

Dr. Brzezinski, you mentioned something very interesting, which 

suggested that, given the threat of terrorism to Russia as well as 

other parts of the world, does this create an opportunity for an alliance with Russia to deal with an issue like ISIL that might be an 

opening to a more general settlement in Syria, that we have a common interest in dealing with this terrorist threat? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, but I wouldn’t use the word ‘‘alliance,’’ because that goes too far. I think a regional accommodation, regional 

cooperation, might be in their interest and our interest, for reasons 

I’ve mentioned. They have potentially exposed themselves, and it 

would make it more difficult for the Russians to simply sit on the 

sidelines and watch us getting bogged down alone. They own part 

of the responsibility for the problems in the Middle East, in terms 

of previous policies. Much of the same applies to China. 

Senator KING. I would think the Russians would see this in their 

own national interest. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. One would have to assume that is the case, because they have a national interest. 

Senator KING. A second question, partially a statement, partially 

a question. I was delighted to hear you, General Scowcroft, talk 

about the threat of cyber. I feel like we are England before World 

War II, ignoring a threat that is right in front of us. 

What if Sony, instead of a movie production company, had been 

the New York Stock Exchange or a gas pipeline? I have never seen 

an issue where we have had more warnings and we’re doing less. 

I hope you would concur with me that this should be one of Congress’ highest priorities, to deal with this cyber-threat and develop 

our cyber-strategy. 

Would you agree with that? 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I do agree with that. I think we are 

still at step one, and I think we need the very serious analysis of 

what the character of the problem is, what our alternatives to take 

a more positive role can be, and which one we should select. 

Senator KING. I thought one of your interesting suggestions was 

kind of a reprise of the mutually assured destruction strategy of 

the 1950s in the cyber area, to create a deterrent, not only a defensive posture, but a deterrent posture. 

28 

Could you elaborate on that a bit? 

General SCOWCROFT. I used that only to show how serious a 

threat I think cyber is. It is on the par with nuclear weapons. It 

doesn’t kill people itself, but it can destroy the sinews of a country. 

Senator KING. General, I just hope what you said today and that 

analogy is a headline tomorrow, because we have to deal with this 

issue. 

One other area of concern, Dr. Brzezinski, I’m very interested in 

developing a strategy beyond ad hoc military intervention to deal 

with ISIL and the whole issue of jihadists and extremism. 

Could you talk about what you would think would be the elements of an anti-extremist strategy beyond just military response? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Some form of cooperation with the more moderate and more established states in the region in creating viable 

outcomes that consolidate well-being, permit their political evolution, and so forth. The list has been mentioned. It is Turkey. It 

could be Iran, under some circumstances. It could be Saudi Arabia, 

which otherwise might face serious international problems. It, certainly, is Egypt. On a more limited basis, it includes Lebanon and 

Jordan, with the latter being close to an explosive situation given 

the number of refugees that have flowed into the country. 

There is some potential commonality of interest here, but it 

should not be focused primarily on American military action as 

such, though we have the right of self-defense and we have the 

right to deal with threats that become extensive enough to the possibility of destabilizing the region. 

Last but not least, if I may say so, we should be very careful not 

to proclaim our actions are somehow or other anti-jihadist. You 

used the term. Because we don’t want to convey to that part of the 

world that we in any way are engaged in a religious war against 

them. 

Jihad means holy war. And so we don’t— 

Senator KING. Anti-extremist might be a better term. 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, exactly. Something along those lines. 

Fanatics. In some cases, sadists, like those beheadings. But certainly, avoid saying we are engaged in a struggle against jihadist 

terror, because that, frankly, attracts some people to engage in 

what they say is holy war. 

Senator KING. That is a very good point. I appreciate that. 

I think the other side of that is we have to be very careful in this 

country to not lump in the Muslim world with these extremists. I 

think that also is a recruiting poster for them, if we do that. This 

cannot be a war between the West and Islam. 

General SCOWCROFT. That is right. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Rounds? 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to our country. 

I apologize for not being here for the entire discussion this morning. We had several different committee hearings going on, as 

usual, it appears. 

I did have one question that I’d like to focus on, and perhaps in 

a little different vein than I heard in the last 15, 20 minutes, and 

29 

that has to do with the National Security Strategy that was last 

presented in 2010. 

My understanding is that normally that would be updated or had 

been expected to be updated in 2014. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was presented and completed based upon the 2010 

strategy that was in place. 

I don’t understand but I was hoping you might give us your 

thoughts a little bit about whether or not that strategy that was 

completed in 2010, whether or not, with all of the changes today, 

particularly those issues in the Middle East, changes in terms of 

Russia and what has happened since 2010, whether or not the 

QDR that we currently operate with and the strategy that was proposed in 2010 that we operate with today, whether or not we are 

missing something here and does it really matter? Is it time for 

Congress to take a different approach in terms of looking at the 

overall strategy when it comes to our National defense? 

General SCOWCROFT. That is a very difficult question to answer. 

I think my answer is both. 

Congress is responsible for providing funding for a particular 

strategy for the military themselves. The President is in charge of 

the Armed Forces. That is the kind of cooperation that is getting 

increasingly difficult, but it still is the way we have to proceed. 

When you do unilaterally the kind of things like sequester, it destroys what is needed, which is consent between Congress, who’s 

responsibility is the Armed Forces, and the President, who runs the 

Armed Forces. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would only add to this, and maybe this is not 

what you have in mind, that I think there is a bit of a problem in 

that the State Department has a policy planning council that presumably plans for diplomacy. The Defense Department has similar 

agencies in terms of defense capabilities and needs. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has its own view on how the world is 

changing. I am not aware of any large-scale, systematic effort in 

the National Security Council to define national objectives and to 

help the President think it through and eventually endorse it as a 

kind of overall national security planning mechanism. I think we 

could use that, and perhaps that would be helpful in clarifying 

some issues. 

Senator ROUNDS. Would you consider that to be new in terms of 

how we have operated, or is that something that have you both 

seen. You have both seen the interactions between the administration and Congress over a period of literally decades. Is this new? 

Is this something that people have looked at and said that is the 

way it is, or is this something that clearly presents a threat in 

terms of how we do systematically the planning for the defense of 

our country that has not been there before? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think we ought to take a look. I don’t know if 

it is new or not. But I think we ought to take a look at the existing 

system. 

My sense is we don’t really have in the White House a service 

to the President when he makes his decisions, a deliberate effort 

at creating what might be called a national security plan for 4 

years or whatever an administration is in office. The other agencies 

30 

do that. I think that creates, perhaps, some of the uncertainties as 

to what exactly we are doing. 

Senator ROUNDS. I just have one more thought on this. It seems 

to me that, in business, when we talk about those issues that we 

are concerned about as being important versus on a day-to-day 

basis, those issues that come up as being urgent and in front of 

us—we tend sometimes to focus on the urgent as opposed to the 

critical or important. Would you care to comment? 

Right now when we look at the defense of our country, we look 

at the issues that our military men and women face on a daily 

basis around the world today, of those items that all appear to be 

in front of us regularly, those urgent issues, have they clouded our 

ability to keep in front of us those important issues that we are losing sight of? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don’t know how to answer that. 

General SCOWCROFT. I think the answer is probably yes. But it 

is not an easy thing to do, to bring all the elements of the government together on such a thing as our National military strategy. 

We have tried different things. Some worked better than others. 

But it is also a political exercise as well as a strategic exercise. I 

don’t think we have developed anything that goes beyond bureaucratic to genuine steps forward. But I think we ought to keep trying. 

Senator ROUNDS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to 

working on this committee and continue working with my colleagues. 

I thank both of the witnesses for their presence today. 

What is each of your opinion about the need for Congress to expeditiously work on an authorization of military force to cover the 

war on ISIL, which is now in its sixth month? 

General SCOWCROFT. I’m not sure how to answer that. I think we 

should not be more involved in the ISIL exercise. I believe that this 

is a case where the region is being threatened, and the powers of 

the region are being threatened. The states of the region are being 

threatened. We ought to encourage and help them to respond, but 

not respond for them. 

That is a difficult line, but I think it is an important one, because the Middle East does belong to the Middle East countries. 

We ought to encourage them to be behave responsibly. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Brzezinski? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. In different ways, I think we ought to strive, 

first of all, to engage the other major powers in the world to be involved. It shouldn’t be our baby only. I have in mind particularly, 

and I have said this this morning, Russia and China. 

Second, I think we have to minimize the visual involvement in 

the problem of other powers who could be helpful but whose record 

in the region is so negative because of their involvement with colonialism that they in fact handicap the effort of dealing effectively 

with the region. 

Third, we have to try to involve, and that’s a difficult process, 

those states in the region that have both viability of sorts and some 

inclination to be moderate. 

31 

Senator KAINE. You each answered my question in the strategic 

and tactical sense, and I actually meant it in the institutional and 

constitutional sense. 

The President started a unilateral military campaign against 

ISIL on the 8th of August that is now in its 6th month, justifying 

that based on the two previous authorizations that were done in 

2001 and 2002. The President last night said Congress should do 

an authorization and weigh in and vote about whether this mission 

is in fact in the National interest. 

Do have you an opinion on whether that is an important matter 

for Congress to take up? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. If he asks, and since he’s acting as Commander 

in Chief, I should think that he’s entitled to make that request, 

and probably Congress should consider it, if for no other reason 

that it helps to consolidate national unity on that delicate but terribly complicated issue. 

Senator KAINE. I think, as I understood your last answer, on the 

tactical side, let me do a follow-up question, there has been much 

discussion about the role of ground troops as necessary in Iraq or 

Syria to defeat the threat of ISIL, ground troops broadly defined, 

regional ground troops, the Peshmerga, the Iraqi Security Forces, 

Syrian-trained Syrian moderate. 

What do each of you think about the wisdom of using United 

States ground troops in the mission against ISIL in Iraq or Syria? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Except in very special individual circumstances 

where the use of ground forces would be very limited in terms of 

its mission, I’m basically against what is called boots on the 

ground, as far as the United States is concerned. I think the political and historical climate is so uncongenial to us doing it, that we 

will simply become involved in a protracted conflict, which will be 

extremely costly, and which will be very difficult for us alone to 

win. 

Senator KAINE. The President has announced a plan to withdraw 

United States forces completely from Afghanistan by the end of 

2016. Should the United States actions with respect to its forces in 

Afghanistan be based on a date on the calendar? Or should it be 

based on conditions on the ground and whether there is sufficient 

stability to allow us to withdraw without plunging the country back 

into a chaos that could affect the region and the world? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. You can’t entirely separate the two, but you 

have to take into account that at some point a prolonged engagement at the very least begins to create its own emphasis and you 

begin to be stuck with growing resentment on the part of the people in the region itself. I think some end line is absolutely necessary. 

General SCOWCROFT. I think in the particular case of Afghanistan, an end line right now is not the right way to go. It is my 

sense that Afghanistan has made considerable progress, that the 

new leadership shows great promise, and that what their military 

security forces really need is a sense of a U.S. hand on their shoulder. ‘‘We are back here. We will give you some advice. We will help 

you here. We are not bailing out on all the effort we have put in, 

in past years.’’ 

32 

I believe I don’t know how many, but a few thousand forces 

would pay us back big dividends if Afghanistan moves forward in 

the direction that it seems to be moving. It is, certainly, worth a 

few thousand troops to be that hand on their shoulder. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, gentlemen. This has been very 

helpful. 

Let’s talk about Russia and NATO. When Russia invaded Georgia, about all we could do was talk about it and denounce it. When 

Russia took the action they took in Crimea, a treaty ally of ours 

whose border we had promised to defend if they gave up nuclear 

weapons, military action was clearly off the table. Presumably, 

Russian action in Transnistria would not call for military action by 

the United States. 

But, Dr. Brzezinski, you draw a line when it comes to the Baltic 

states. I’d, certainly, want to agree with you there. 

Let me ask you this. Could you explain a little more your idea 

about working with NATO on tripwires in the Baltic states? 

General Scowcroft, what do you think about that idea as you understand it having been described? What can we do to get our 

NATO allies to take national defense and Western defense responsibilities seriously? We asked them to spend a mere 2 percent of 

their gross domestic product (GDP) on the military and, frankly, it 

is only two or three of those NATO allies who actually do that. 

If you would comment on that, and, Dr. Brzezinski, you can 

begin. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. First of all, on your last question, I think we 

should address that in NATO, and perhaps some device, some procedure could be formulated, whereby NATO members that fail to 

meet that 2 percent standard lose some of their entitlement to participate in key decisions. I don’t know precisely how to work that 

out, but it seems to me, if you don’t pay, you don’t decide. That at 

least might make them a little more conscious of the fact that collective obligations should be treated seriously. 

Insofar as the guarantee itself of the Baltic countries, what I said 

earlier I’ll simply repeat. I think the Russians really don’t know 

how active we would be in saving them for one reason or another. 

The leader of the Russian Federation decided that he can get away 

with a seizing, with a quick action, which altogether alters the situation that he finds so abhorrent, namely the creation of independent states or the re-creation of independent states in the place 

that the Soviet Union occupied in the late 1930s and early 1940s. 

If he were to do that, we would be faced with a horrible situation, because we don’t have the means to stage an amphibious warfare that results in the landing of our forces and then gradual 

ground war, presumably in the territory of the Baltic states under 

expulsion. The only sensible step we can now take, I think, is to 

pre-position some tripwire type forces, forcing Putin to consider seriously whether he’s prepared to go into major conflict with us. 

If he does that, then we have no choice but to respond, not only 

in the Baltic republics but perhaps elsewhere. For example, impose 

a worldwide embargo on any movement of Soviet ships or airVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
33 

planes, other actions of semimilitary type, which would be a response designed to impose further costs, and including perhaps 

some occasional military engagements chosen elsewhere, if we 

couldn’t do something directly in the Baltic. 

Senator WICKER. If we wouldn’t defend our NATO allies in the 

Baltics, I don’t know what our word would be worth. 

General Scowcroft, what do you think of this topic? 

General SCOWCROFT. First, I think that we don’t want to re-create the Cold War, and I don’t think it is necessary. I think if we 

want to do something, tripwires—NATO is the tripwire, to me. I 

think if we want to tell them what we will do if they do certain 

things, then they better not, I don’t have a problem with that. 

But I can see Putin just trying to provoke us to spend more efforts. I’m not sure it is necessary. I believe the contribution of some 

of the Europeans to NATO is deplorable. 

There are two facts. First of all, they don’t feel threatened. Secondly, they are basically exhausted after two wars, and they are 

just happy to leave everything up to us, including paying for it. 

There, I think we ought to give it some thought, but my sense 

is we would get greater European support if we had ideas about 

how to use NATO usefully now that, to me, a threat of a march 

of Russian troops into Western Europe is not a reasonable thing to 

happen. 

Senator WICKER. Let me ask you briefly, if the chair will indulge, 

do you have any comments for this committee about the adequacy 

of our naval fleet at the present time? The chair in his opening remarks talked about the size of our military being roughly the 

equivalent to what it was after World War I. Do we have enough 

ships? Are we building enough ships? Is our fleet adequate to protect national interests? 

Dr. Brzezinski? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I have not looked into that specifically, so I can’t 

give you a straightforward answer. 

General SCOWCROFT. I don’t think any one of us has examined 

that kind of question. I simply don’t have an answer to that. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here. ISIL has said that they are establishing a caliphate. Their caliphate that they want to establish is 

a whole lot bigger than where they are right now. Can we simply 

watch this? Can they be left in place, if this is their goal, when 

their goal also, if you don’t share their religion, you either convert 

or you are killed? They intend to expand. 

How does the United States watch this when—and I don’t want 

to get into exact historical references, and I don’t mean to by this, 

but we have seen this kind of thing before. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The danger is that if we get involved directly in 

opposing them, we will make it easier for them to promote the 

whole concept. 

Senator DONNELLY. I don’t mean directly. I mean as a partner. 

Mr. Scowcroft, you were talking about not getting more involved 

in ISIL actions. With training an Arab army or advising, providing 

34 

that kind of assistance, helping them to plan, helping them to 

train, do you think those are appropriate actions? 

General SCOWCROFT. I have no problem with training as appropriate action. But let’s remember that ISIS or ISIL, whatever you 

want to call it, is in the Middle East. There are a number of our 

friends and allies who live in the Middle East. Would they be 

happy to just sit back and have us deal with the problem? Maybe. 

But this is a problem that is a potential threat to other Middle 

Eastern countries. 

Senator DONNELLY. Do you see us having a role though as a 

partner? 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I think a role in doing the kinds of 

things that they can’t do, and encourage them in the things that 

they can, we can help them know how to do, yes, absolutely. But 

that is training. 

Senator DONNELLY. Right. I don’t think anybody is looking at our 

troops being the ground troops, but being somebody who can help 

provide with the backbone, the planning, the training. Does that 

make sense to you? 

General SCOWCROFT. Absolutely. 

Senator DONNELLY. Because it strikes me as no matter what we 

hope, and being from Indiana where we have suffered from them 

already, we have already lost citizens who have been kidnapped 

and killed by them. They continue to put plans together to cause 

other activities. 

With their stated goals of further establishment of this and taking activities elsewhere, it would seem to me that we have to be 

engaged in some form with partners. It seems that the goal, it’s not 

something that is going to stay static. It either grows or gets eliminated. 

Would you agree with that? 

General SCOWCROFT. Yes. 

Senator DONNELLY. Dr. Brzezinski? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I also agree with that. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. As we look at Putin, what do you 

think his endgame is in Ukraine? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. My own estimate is to reverse what transpired 

a year or so ago, namely the decision by the Ukrainian people to 

associate themselves and their long-range identity with the West. 

I think he views that as a major intrusion of a historically significant component of the larger Russian empire. 

I think he has this general concept of imperial restoration as 

guiding him. If you look at some of the things he has done to define 

the presidency, the symbolism associated with it, and so forth, it 

has a lot of imperial trappings. 

He is prepared to use force to make that happen. Our position 

has been that we have no desire to intrude into Russian security 

aspirations, but that a nation has a right to define itself voluntarily. 

That is a very complicated issue. As a consequence, we now have 

this very serious problem between us and the Russians regarding 

the future of Ukraine. He’s clearly striving to destabilize Ukraine, 

not risking an all-out invasion, but to destabilize it from within. 

35 

Senator DONNELLY. If he takes similar action in Latvia, his little 

green men and all those things, going into Latvian territory, and 

NATO does not respond, is that, in effect, the end of NATO? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would say so, because NATO is meant to be a 

collective alliance. If the United States does not respond, that certainly would be the result. 

Now, conceivably, we could let him do it, let him take Latvia or 

Estonia, and then we would mobilize NATO to counter this somehow, either on the spot or on the larger world front. But that would 

be a much more risky enterprise than doing what I advocate, which 

is simply to create a tripwire in Latvia and Estonia, which communicates clearly to Russia that NATO would be involved, that the 

United States, in particular, is present, and therefore, the risks you 

are taking are much, much higher than you might calculate in 

light of the ease of the operation in seizing Crimea. 

Senator DONNELLY. General Scowcroft, would you also see that 

as, that is the end of NATO? 

General SCOWCROFT. Certainly, it would be the end of NATO if 

the Soviet Union moved into a NATO member and we did nothing. 

Absolutely, it would. 

But I don’t see that happening. Putin is a nasty piece of work. 

I probably should not have said that. But I don’t think he is evil 

incarnate. I think if we tell him quite clearly what we won’t stand 

for, in terms of NATO members, especially, there won’t be such an 

action. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The best way to tell him is to do something to 

make him think about it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I appreciate your 

service very much. 

Today, we have talked a lot about ISIL and the Middle East, and 

the fact that we do need partners in that region. We do need those 

Arab allies to come forward. You have mentioned it, both of you, 

as more of an aside comment. But I would really like to understand 

how can we can more effectively engage Turkey, which is an ally, 

which is a friend in that region. How can we engage them more 

to combat ISIL and those other threats that exist in the Middle 

East? 

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The Turks are playing a role. It is partly worrisome, a little, party very helpful. The Turks have a large minority 

in their country who are Kurd, so they have multiple concerns 

about what goes on. They also have very emotional feelings about 

Syria. 

But I think we can help the countries of the Middle East—Turkey is one—with great military capability. As I say, Egypt is another one. Egypt is a large country in any part of the world. 

They ought to want to shape their own region in the right direction. We ought to encourage that rather than taking their place in 

forming the region. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. I do agree. I would love to see more 

concrete methods of engaging them. They do have a lot at stake in 

that region, and I think they can be very valuable partners. I just 

36 

would love to know how we get them to play a more prominent role 

in the Middle East. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Could I say that I thank you both, not only 

for your appearance here, but for your many years of outstanding 

service to the country, your wise and knowledgeable advice and 

counsel that you have provided to many Presidents, and you have 

proven again before this committee. 

Obviously, there are some disagreements. In fact, I might make 

mention that the head of MI5 recently gave a speech, a week ago, 

saying that he believed that ISIL is planning an attack on the 

United States of America. I don’t disagree with him. 

I think that would change the outlook of the American people 

about the degree of our involvement, if there was such a thing, 

which we hope will not happen. But when you have thousands of 

young men going into this fight who will then be returning from 

the fight, I think it is something that is not beyond the realm of 

responsibility. 

But I would like to say that I am personally very honored to be 

in the company of two individuals who have served our country and 

continue to do so with such distinction. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(37) 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL 

SECURITY STRATEGY 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Kelly Ayotte presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Ayotte, Sessions, Wicker, 

Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed, 

Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, 

King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE 

Senator AYOTTE. The Senate Armed Services Committee meets 

today for its second hearing in a series on Global Challenges and 

U.S. National Security. 

Chairman McCain was invited to join the American Delegation 

to the funeral of the King of Saudi Arabia, and he asked that I 

chair this hearing in his absence. I know he regrets not being able 

to join all of us today. 

I request unanimous consent that Chairman McCain’s opening 

statement be entered into the record. 

Senator REED. Without objection. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman McCain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today for its second hearing in a 

series on global challenges and U.S. national security. I am pleased to welcome 

three of America’s most distinguished military leaders. General James Mattis, General Jack Keane, and Admiral William Fallon have each served at the highest ranks 

of our military. Critically important in the context of this hearing, each of our witnesses served at the nexus of military operations and strategic national security decision-making. 

After the struggles we faced in Afghanistan and Iraq, there’s been extensive discussion about the role of military power in United States strategy around the world. 

This is a healthy debate, in which this committee will be fully engaged. But too 

often, pundits and politicians—including President Obama—have adopted a cheap 

fatalism summed up in the Administration’s constant refrain, ‘‘there is no military 

solution.’’ 

Rather than stating the obvious and important point that our military cannot 

solve every foreign policy problem, this slogan is really an excuse to avoid taking 

even the most-limited military action that might shape and improve conditions for 

a political solution, and provide the nation with the flexibility to draw from all instruments of national power effectively to address the problem. While it may be true 

38 

there is no military solution, it is just as true there may be a military dimension 

to a political solution. But as problems fester and go from bad to worse, the Administration then claims its inaction was justified all along given the complexities of 

the situation. The consequences of this reactive bystander foreign policy are on full 

display around the world in places like Syria and Ukraine. 

I hope, with their background and expertise, our witnesses can offer their perspectives on the most basic element of strategy: matching military means to policy goals. 

In particular, what is the role of military power in a comprehensive United States 

strategy for a Middle East characterized by political instability as well as a 

daunting range of conventional and unconventional threats? And as we look at 

threats throughout the world, how should American policymakers use military 

power to address global challenges before they become crises? For example, the 

longer we wait to provide defensive weapons to Ukraine, the more entrenched the 

Russians become, and as we’ve seen in Georgia, the more difficult it will become 

to dislodge them and restore Ukraine’s sovereignty. 

The President was determined to turn the page on questions like these in his 

State of the Union address last week, but we remain stuck in a grim foreign policy 

chapter of his authorship. 

The President recently proclaimed the success of his limited-footprint counterterrorism approach by pointing to Yemen. Yemen is now in chaos, with the government 

deposed by Iranian-backed militants and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 

emboldened to facilitate and execute terrorist attacks around the world. 

President Obama has been applying the Yemen model in the fight against ISIL 

in Iraq and Syria with predictable results. The ISIL flag still flies over major cities 

in Iraq, such as Mosul and Fallujah. In Syria, ISIL has significantly enlarged its 

territorial control since United States strikes began last year. And despite the President’s stated goal of degrading and destroying ISIL, we have no strategy in place 

to accomplish it. Basic strategic questions remain unanswered: Is an ISIL-first 

strategy really feasible when our Syrian partners are at war with Assad, and his 

regime’s brutality feeds their power? Can we successfully defeat ISIL without even 

small numbers of American ground forces in both Iraq and Syria? Does the President still believe Assad must go, and do we have a strategy to achieve that goal? 

How will we protect brave Syrians we send back into Syria from Assad’s airpower? 

The fact is that President Obama’s delayed and feeble response is not degrading or 

destroying ISIL, nor is it inspiring confidence among our allies and partners. 

Underlying these conflicts is the broader challenge of Iran’s malign influence in 

the Middle East, a problem which the Administration has no strategy to address. 

Iran is not just an arms control problem. And as negotiations continue over its illegal nuclear program, the Administration is silent about Iran’s reckless behavior that 

destabilizes the region by providing weapons, funding, and training to terrorists and 

militant groups in places like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza, and Bahrain. 

There is not a military-only solution to all the world’s challenges. But as we have 

learned again in Iraq and Syria and hopefully won’t relearn in Afghanistan, the 

American military remains an indispensable element to bringing stability and securing United States interests. Military power should not be used lightly, but it should 

also not be used anemically or withdrawn precipitously. When we refuse to address 

global problems at an early stage, or remove troops too quickly, it is the men and 

women of our armed services who must face an even-more chaotic, challenging and 

dangerous environment in the future. 

I look forward to each of your views on how we can bring a coherent strategy to 

the complex global environment we now face. 

Senator AYOTTE. I am pleased to welcome three of America’s 

most distinguished military leaders: General Jim Mattis, General 

Jack Keane, and Admiral William Fallon. I welcome each of you 

today, and I thank you for your willingness to testify before us. 

Even more so, I thank you, on behalf of this committee and the 

American people, for your decades of brave and honorable service 

to our country. It is because of leaders like you and the men and 

women you’ve commanded and you continue to serve in uniform 

that Americans enjoy unprecedented freedom, security, and prosperity. Each of you commanded at all levels and ultimately served 

in positions that required not only a deep knowledge of tactical, 

operational, and strategic levels of military operations, but also an 

understanding of national security decisionmaking at the highest 

39 

levels. It is that experience at the nexus of military operations and 

strategic national security decisionmaking that is particularly relevant to our hearing today. 

There is a broad consensus among national security experts that 

the threats to the United States and our allies that we are confronting, are growing both in complexity and severity: 

In Ukraine, we have witnessed blatant Russian aggression that 

has forced the administration to undertake a belated reassessment 

of the nature of the Putin regime and question long-held assumptions regarding the security situation in Europe. 

In Iraq and Syria, ISIS [the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] has 

established a safe haven and training ground in the heart of the 

Middle East that it is using to destabilize the region and threaten 

the core national security interests of the United States and our allies. 

Meanwhile, the regime in Tehran seeks to use negotiations to 

achieve sanctions relief while avoiding a permanent and verifiable 

end to its nuclear weapons program. 

Simultaneously, Iran continues to oppress its own people, threaten key allies, like Israel, and support terrorist groups, like 

Hezbollah. 

Across the Middle East and into North Africa, emboldened alQaeda affiliates plot attacks against the United States and our allies. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula uses the horrible security 

situation in Yemen, a country the President cited as recently as 

September as a counterterrorism success story, to plot and carry 

out terrorist attacks around the world. 

In the Asia-Pacific, China is using historic economic growth to 

build military power that it is using to bully its neighbors and test 

international laws that are essential to the United States, and our 

partners’ international security and prosperity in the free waters in 

that region. 

While each of these threats and challenges are unique, with each 

of them there is a consistent and concerning gap between the strategies our National security interests require and the strategies that 

this administration is pursuing. Likewise, with defense sequestration set to return next year and the threats to our country growing, 

there is also an increasing gap between the military capabilities we 

have and the military capabilities that we will need to address 

these threats. 

The key question for this panel and for all of us remains: What 

is the best path forward to address these national security challenges? Few in our country have as much national security wisdom 

and real-world experience as the members of this panel. Between 

the three of you, you have more than 115 years of military experience, much of it at the most senior levels of our military. We look 

forward to hearing your best advice on how the Federal Government can fulfill its most important responsibility to the American 

people, and that is protecting the security of the United States of 

America. 

Thank you very much. 

And I would like to turn it over to Senator Reed. 

40 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Ayotte. 

Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses, extraordinary individuals who have served the Nation with great distinction and 

great courage, never broke faith with the men and women they led, 

which is the highest tribute that anyone can make to a soldier, 

sailor, and marine. Thank you very much. 

Let me also thank Chairman McCain for pulling together this series of hearings and briefings to examine the U.S. global strategy. 

These discussions will help us inform our consideration of the administration’s budget request, which will be coming to us in a few 

days. 

Last week, two of the most prominent U.S. strategic thinkers, 

Dr. Brent Scowcroft—General Brent Scowcroft and Dr. Zbig 

Brzezinski, discussed a number of issues with the committee. 

Among these was the need to give multilateral negotiation on 

Iran’s nuclear program sufficient time to reach a conclusion. They 

urged this body not to press forward with additional sanctions even 

if they are prospective in nature. This matter is being discussed at 

this very moment in the Banking Committee, only a few floors 

above us, and, indeed, I have to leave here and go there, because 

I’m a senior member of that committee also. And my colleagues will 

be taking up the slack, particularly Senator King. I want to thank 

him. I will return, I hope, to ask questions of the panelists. 

Much of last week’s discussion revolved around the administration’s strategy in Iraq and Syria for confronting the regional and 

global terror threat posed by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant, or ISIL. General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski stressed 

that efforts to take on ISIL require a comprehensive approach, 

which includes both political and military elements. 

We also received testimony last week from the Department of 

Defense on the administration’s program to train and equip the 

vetted opposition in Syria. This is just one aspect of the administration’s approach to the ISIL threat in Iraq and Syria which is 

built upon an international coalition, including regional Arab and 

Muslim states using economic tools to go after ISIL’s financing and 

a sustained campaign of airstrikes against ISIL leadership and facilities. 

This morning’s hearing provides an opportunity, in particular, to 

examine the military respects of our strategy of addressing the 

ISIL threat. All three of you have been thoughtful and outspoken 

in your recommendations to that strategy, some of the aspects of 

which are reflected in the actions the administration has taken to 

date. As of January, United States and coalition aircraft have flown 

16,000 sorties over Iraq and Syria, of which 5,866 have involved kinetic strikes against targets. President Obama has authorized the 

deployment of over 3,000 military personnel to Iraq to advise and 

assist Iraq and Kurdish security forces. 

At the administration’s request, the fiscal year 2015 National De- fense Authorization Act included $5.6 billion in overseas contingency operations funding for DOD activities in Iraq and Syria, including $1.6 billion for the Iraq train-and-equip program. 

Also in their testimony last week, General Scowcroft and Dr. 

Brzezinski emphasized the need to work with and through regional 

41 

partners in the international community to address the ISIL threat 

so that the United States does, in their words, end up owning the 

problem itself. So, I hope that our witnesses can bring their perspectives on this very challenging issue of strategy, as Senator 

Ayotte said, in both Syria, Iraq, and in the region. And again, I 

think it’s appropriate to focus on not only just the military aspect, 

but political and diplomatic initiatives, as well as economic initiatives. 

I want to, again, thank the witnesses. And I particularly want 

to thank Admiral Fallon, who made a tremendous effort to rearrange his schedule to join us. Thank you, sir, for your efforts. 

And, with that, Madam Chairwoman, thank you. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you so much, Senator Reed. 

I would like to start with General Mattis. General Mattis served 

42 years in the Marine Corps, including time as Commander of 

Central Command. We’re very glad that you’re here today. Thank 

you so much for being here. 

General Mattis. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC (RET.), 

FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND 

General MATTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking 

Member Reed, distinguished Senators of the committee. 

I have submitted a statement, and request it be accepted for the 

record. 

Senator AYOTTE. It will be. 

General MATTIS. During my Active Duty years, I testified many 

times before this committee and gained the highest regard for the 

manner in which you carried out your duties. Through good times 

and bad, I remain grateful for the support you’ve provided our military. 

I commend the committee for holding these hearings. As former 

Secretary of State George Schultz has commented, the world is 

awash in change. The international order, so painstakingly put together by the Greatest Generation coming home from mankind’s 

bloodiest conflict, that international order is under increasing 

stress. It was created with elements we take for granted today: the 

United Nations, NATO, the Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods, and 

more. The constructed order reflected the wisdom of those World 

War II veterans who recognized: no nation lived as an island, and 

we needed new ways to deal with challenges that, for better or 

worse, impacted all nations. Like it or not, today we are part of 

this larger world, and we must carry out our part. We cannot wait 

for problems to arrive here, or it will be too late. 

The international order, built on the state system, is not self-sustaining. It demands tending by an America that leads wisely, 

standing unapologetically for the freedoms each of us in this room 

have enjoyed. The hearing today addresses the need for America to 

adapt to changing circumstances, to come out now from our reactive crouch and take a firm strategic stance in defense of our values. While we recognize that we owe future generations the same 

freedoms that we enjoy, the challenge lies in how to carry out that 

responsibility. 

42 

To do so, America needs a refreshed national strategy. The Congress can play a key role in crafting a coherent strategy with bipartisan support. Doing so requires us to look beyond the events that 

are currently consuming the executive branch. There’s an urgent 

need to stop reacting to each immediate vexing issue in isolation. 

Such response often creates unanticipated second-order effects and 

even more problems for us. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee is uniquely placed in our 

system of government to guide, oversee, and ensure that we act 

strategically and morally using America’s ability to inspire, as well 

as its ability to intimidate, to ensure freedom for future generations. I suggest the best way to get to the essence of these issues 

and to help you crafting America’s response to a rapidly changing 

security environment is simply to ask the right questions. If I were 

in your shoes, these are some of the questions I would ask: 

What are the key threats to our vital interests? The intelligence 

community should delineate and provide an initial prioritization of 

these threats for your consideration. By rigorously defining the 

problems we face, you will enable a more intelligent and focused 

use of the resources allocated for national defense. 

Is our intelligence community fit for the—for its expanding purpose? Today, ladies and gentlemen, we have less military shock absorber in our smaller military, so less ability to take surprise in 

stride and fewer forward-deployed forces overseas to act as sentinels. Accordingly, we need more early warning. Working with the 

intel community, you should question if we are adequately funding 

the intel agencies to reduce the chance of our defenses being 

caught flatfooted. We know that the foreseeable is not foreseeable. 

Incorporating the broadest issues into your assessments, you 

should consider what we must do if the National debt is assessed 

to be the biggest national security threat we face. As President Eisenhower noted, the foundation of military strength is our economic 

strength. In a few short years, however, we will be paying interest 

on our debt, and it will be a bigger bill than what we pay today 

for defense. Much of that interest money is destined to leave America for overseas. If we refuse to reduce our debt or pay down our 

deficit, what is the impact on the National security for future generations, who will inherit this irresponsible debt and the taxes to 

service it? No nation in history has maintained its military power 

if it failed to keep its fiscal house in order. 

How do you urgently halt the damage caused by sequestration? 

No foe in the field can wreak such havoc on our security that mindless sequestration is achieving today. Congress passed it because it 

was viewed as so injurious that it would force wise choices. It has 

failed in that regard, and today we use arithmetic, vice sound 

thinking, to run our government, despite the emerging enemy 

threats. This committee must lead the effort to repeal sequestration that is costing military readiness and long-term capability 

while sapping our troops’ morale. Without predictability in budget 

matters, no strategy can be implemented by your military leaders. 

In our approach to the world, we must be willing to ask strategic 

questions. In the Middle East, where our influence is at its lowest 

point in four decades, we see a region erupting in crisis. We need 

a new security architecture for the Mideast, built on sound policy, 

43 

one that permits us to take our own side in this fight. Crafting 

such a policy starts with asking a fundamental question, and then 

the follow-on questions. 

The fundamental question, I believe: Is political Islam in our best 

interest? If not, What is our policy to authoritatively support the 

countervailing forces? Violent jihadist terrorists cannot be permitted to take refuge behind false religious garb and leave us unwilling to define this threat with the clarity it deserves. We have 

many potential allies around the world and in the Middle East who 

will rally to us, but we have not been clear about where we stand 

in defining or dealing with the growing violent jihadist terrorist 

threat. 

Iran is a special case that must be dealt with as a threat to regional stability, nuclear and otherwise. I believe that you should 

question the value of Congress adding new sanctions while international negotiations are ongoing, vice having them ready, should 

the negotiations for preventing their nuclear weapons capability 

and implementing stringent monitoring break down. 

Further question now, if we have the right policies in place, 

when Iran creates more mischief in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, 

Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the region, recognizing that 

regional counterweights, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 

Emirates, and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council can reinforce us if they understand our policy. 

In Afghanistan, we need to consider if we’re asking for the same 

outcome there as we saw last summer in Iraq, should we pull out 

all our troops on the administration’s proposed timeline. Echoing 

the same military advice given on this same issue about Iraq when 

we pulled the troops out, the gains achieved at great cost against 

our enemy in Afghanistan are reversible. We should recognize that 

we may not want this fight, but the barbarity of an enemy that 

kills women and children and has refused to break with al-Qaeda 

needs to be fought. 

More broadly, Is the U.S. military being developed to fight across 

the spectrum of combat? Knowing that enemies always will move 

against our perceived weakness, our forces must be capable of missions from nuclear deterrence to counterinsurgency and everything 

in between, now including the pervasive cyber domain. While surprise is always a factor, this committee can ensure that we have 

the fewest big regrets when the next surprise occurs. While we 

don’t want or need a military that is at the same time dominant 

and irrelevant, you must sort this out and deny funding for bases 

or capabilities no longer needed. 

The nuclear stockpile must be tended to, and fundamental questions must be asked and answered. We must clearly establish the 

role of our nuclear weapons. Do they serve solely to deter nuclear 

war? If so, we should say so. And the resulting clarity will help to 

determine the number we need. 

I think, too, you should ask, Is it time to reduce the Triad to a 

Diad, removing the land-based missiles? This would also reduce the 

false-alarm danger. 

Could we reenergize the arms-control effort by only counting 

warheads, vice launchers? Was the Russian test violating the INF 

44 

Treaty simply a blunder on their part, or a change in policy? And 

what is our appropriate response? 

The reduced size of our military drives the need to ask different 

questions. Our military is uniquely capable and the envy of the 

world, but are we resourcing it to ensure we have the highest-quality troops, the best equipment, and the toughest training? 

With a smaller military comes the need for troops kept at the top 

of their game. When we next put them in harm’s way, it must be 

the enemy’s longest day and worst day. Tiered readiness with a 

smaller force must be closely scrutinized to ensure we aren’t merely hollowing out the military. 

While sequestration is the nearest threat to this national treasure that is the U.S. military, sustaining it as the world’s best when 

it’s smaller will need your critical oversight. 

Are the Navy and our expeditionary forces receiving the support 

they need in a world where America’s naval role is more pronounced because we have fewer forces posted overseas? With the 

cutbacks to the Army and Air Force and fewer forces around the 

world, military aspects of our strategy will inevitably become more 

naval in character. This will provide the decision time for political 

leaders considering employment of additional forms of military 

power. Your resourcing of our naval and expeditionary forces will 

need to take this development into account. 

Today, I question if our shipbuilding budget is sufficient, especially in light of the situation in the South China Sea. While our 

efforts in the Pacific to keep positive relations with China are well 

and good, these efforts must be paralleled by a policy to build the 

counterbalance if China continues to expand its bullying role in the 

South China Sea and elsewhere. That counterbalance must deny 

China veto power over territorial, security, and economic conditions 

in the Pacific, building support for our diplomatic efforts to maintain stability and economic prosperity so critical to our economy. 

In light of the worldwide challenges to the international order, 

we are, nonetheless, shrinking our military. We have to then ask, 

Are we adjusting our strategy and taking into account a reduced 

role for that shrunken military? Strategy connects ends, ways, and 

means. With less military available, we must reduce our appetite 

for using it. Prioritization is needed if we are to remain capable of 

the most critical mission for which we have a military, to fight on 

short notice and defend the country. 

We have to ask, Does our strategy and associated military planning, as Senator Reed pointed out, take into account our Nation’s 

increased need for allies? The need for stronger alliances comes 

more sharply into focus as we shrink the military. No nation can 

on its own do all that is necessary for its own security. Further, 

history reminds us that countries with allies generally defeat those 

without allies. As Churchill intimated, however, the only thing 

harder than fighting with allies is fighting without them. This committee should track closely an increased military capability to work 

with allies, the NATO Alliance being foremost, but not our only 

focus. 

In reference to NATO, and in light of the Russian violations of 

international borders, we must ask if the NATO Alliance efforts 

45 

have adjusted to the unfortunate and dangerous mode the Russian 

leadership has slipped into. 

With regard to tightening the bond between our smaller military 

and those other militaries we may need at our side in future fights, 

the convoluted foreign military sales system needs your challenge. 

Hopefully, it can be put in order before we drive more potential 

partners to equip themselves with foreign equipment, a move that 

makes it harder to achieve needed interoperability with our allies 

and undercuts America’s industrial base. Currently, the system 

fails to reach its potential. 

As we attempt to restore stability to the state system and international order, a critical question will be, Is America good for its 

word? When we make clear a position or give our word about something, our friends, and even our enemies, must recognize that we 

are good for it. Otherwise, dangerous miscalculations can occur. 

When the decision is made to employ our forces in combat by the 

Commander in Chief, the committee should still ask, Is the military being employed with the proper authority? For example, are 

the political objectives clearly defined and achievable? Murky or 

quixotic political end states condemn us to entering wars we don’t 

know how to end. Notifying the enemy in advance of our withdrawal dates or reassuring the enemy that we will not use certain 

capabilities, like our ground forces, should be avoided. Such announcements do not take the place of mature, well-defined end 

states, nor do they contribute to ending wars as rapidly as possible 

on favorable terms. 

You should ask, Is the theater of war, itself, sufficient for effective prosecution? We have witnessed safe havens prolonging war. 

If the defined theater is insufficient, the plan itself needs to be 

challenged. 

Ask, Is the authority for detaining prisoners of war appropriate 

for the enemy and type war we are fighting? We have observed the 

perplexing lack of detainee policy that has resulted in the return 

of released prisoners to the battlefield. We should not engage in another fight without resolving this issue up front, treating hostile 

forces, in fact, as hostile. 

We have to also ask, Are America’s diplomatic, economic, and 

other assets aligned for the war aims? We have experienced the 

military, alone, trying to achieve tasks outside its expertise. When 

we take the serious decision to fight, we must bring to bear all our 

Nation’s resources. And you should question how the diplomatic 

and development efforts will be employed to build momentum for 

victory. And our Nation’s strategy demands that comprehensive approach. 

Finally, the culture of our military and its rules are designed to 

bring about battlefield success in the most atavistic environment 

on Earth. No matter how laudable, in terms of our progressive 

country’s instincts, this committee needs to consider carefully any 

proposed changes to military rules, traditions, and standards that 

bring noncombat emphasis to combat units. There is a great difference between military service in dangerous circumstances and 

serving in a combat unit whose role is to search out, close with, 

and kill the enemy at close quarters. This committee has a responsibility for imposing reason over impulse when proposed changes 

46 

could reduce the combat capability of our forces at the point of contact with the enemy. 

Ultimately, we need the foresight of this committee, acting in its 

sentinel and oversight role, to draw us out of our reactive stance 

that we’ve fallen into and chart a strategic way ahead. Our national security strategy needs your bipartisan direction. In some 

cases, you may need to change our processes for developing integrated national strategy, because mixing capable people with their 

good ideas and bad processes results in the bad processes defeating 

good people’s ideas 9 times out of 10. This is an urgent matter, because, in an interconnected age, when opportunistic adversaries 

can work in tandem to destroy stability and prosperity, our country 

needs to regain its strategic footing. We need to bring the clarity 

to our efforts before we lose the confidence of the American people 

and the support of potential allies. This committee, I believe, can 

play in a central strategic role in this regard. 

Thank you, Madam. 

[The prepared statement of General Mattis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Senators of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I request that my statement be accepted for the record. 

During my active duty years I testified many times before this committee and 

gained the highest regard for the manner in which you carried out your role. I also 

recall with gratitude your support for our armed forces through good times and bad 

and I’m honored to return here today. 

I commend the committee for holding these hearings. As former Secretary of State 

George Shultz has commented, the world is awash in change. The international 

order, so painstakingly put together by the greatest generation coming home from 

mankind’s bloodiest conflict, is under increasing stress. It was created with elements 

we take for granted: the United Nations, NATO, the Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods 

and more. The constructed order reflected the wisdom of those who recognized no 

nation lived as an island and we needed new ways to deal with challenges that for 

better or worse impacted all nations. Like it or not, today we are part of this larger 

world and must carry out our part. We cannot wait for problems to arrive here or 

it will be too late; rather we must remain strongly engaged in this complex world. 

The international order built on the state system is not self-sustaining. It demands tending by an America that leads wisely, standing unapologetically for the 

freedoms each of us in this room have enjoyed. The hearing today addresses the 

need for America to adapt to changing circumstances, to come out now from its reactive crouch and to take a firm strategic stance in defense of our values. While we 

recognize that we owe future generations the same freedoms we enjoy, the challenge 

lies in how to carry out our responsibility. For certain we have lived too long now 

in a strategy-free mode. 

To do so America needs a refreshed national strategy. The Congress can play a 

key role in crafting a coherent strategy with bi-partisan support. Doing so requires 

us to look beyond events currently consuming the executive branch. There is an urgent need to stop reacting to each immediate vexing issue in isolation. Such response often creates unanticipated second order effects and more problems for us. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee is uniquely placed in our system of government to guide, oversee and ensure that we act strategically and morally, using 

America’s ability to inspire as well as its ability to intimidate to ensure freedom for 

future generations. I suggest that the best way to cut to the essence of these issues 

and to help you in crafting America’s response to a rapidly changing security environment is to ask the right questions. If I were in your shoes these are some that 

I would ask: 

What are the key threats to our vital interests? 

– The intelligence community should delineate and provide an initial 

prioritization of those threats for your consideration. By rigorously defining the 

problems we face you will enable a more intelligent and focused use of the resources allocated for national defense. 

Is our intelligence community fit for its expanding purpose? 

47 

– Today we have less of a military shock absorber to take surprise in stride, and 

fewer forward-deployed military forces overseas to act as sentinels. Accordingly 

we need more early warning. Working with the intell committee you should 

question if we are adequately funding the intell agencies to reduce the chance 

of our defenses being caught flat-footed. We know that the ‘‘foreseeable future’’ 

is not foreseeable; your review must incorporate unpredictability, recognizing 

risk while avoiding gambling with our nation’s security. 

Incorporating the broadest issues in your assessments, you should consider what 

we must do if the national debt is assessed to be the biggest national security threat 

we face? 

– As President Eisenhower noted, the foundation of military strength is our economic strength. In a few short years paying interest on our debt will be a bigger bill than what we pay for defense. Much of that interest money is destined 

to leave America for overseas. If we refuse to reduce our debt/pay down our deficit, what is the impact on national security for future generations who will inherit this irresponsible debt and the taxes to service it? No nation in history 

has maintained its military power if it failed to keep its fiscal house in order. 

How do you urgently halt the damage caused by sequestration? 

– No foe in the field can wreck such havoc on our security that mindless sequestration is achieving. Congress passed it because it was viewed as so injurious 

that it would force wise choices. It has failed and today we use arithmetic vice 

sound thinking to run our government, despite emerging enemy threats. This 

committee must lead the effort to repeal the sequestration that is costing military readiness and long term capability while sapping troop morale. Without 

predictability in budget matters no strategy can be implemented by your military leaders. Your immediate leadership is needed to avert further damage. 

In our approach to the world we must be willing to ask strategic questions. In 

the Middle East where our influence is at its lowest point in four decades we see 

a region erupting in crises. We need a new security architecture for the Mid-East 

built on sound policy, one that permits us to take our own side in this fight. 

Crafting such a policy starts with asking a fundamental question and then others: 

Is political Islam in our best interest? If not what is our policy to support the 

countervailing forces? 

– Violent terrorists cannot be permitted to take refuge behind false religious garb 

and leave us unwilling to define this threat with the clarity it deserves. 

– We have potential allies around the world and in the Middle East who will rally 

to us but we have not been clear about where we stand in defining or dealing 

with the growing violent jihadist terrorist threat. 

Iran is a special case that must be dealt with as a threat to regional stability, 

nuclear and otherwise. I believe that you should question the value of Congress adding new sanctions while international negotiations are ongoing, vice having them 

ready should the negotiations for preventing their nuclear weapons capability and 

stringent monitoring break down. Further question now if we have the right policies 

in place when Iran creates more mischief in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Saudi 

Arabia and elsewhere in the region, recognizing that regional counterweights like 

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation 

Council can reinforce us if they understand our policies, clarify our foreign policy 

goals beyond Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 

In Afghanistan we need to consider if we’re asking for the same outcome there 

as we saw last summer in Iraq if we pull out all our troops on the Administration’s 

proposed timeline. Echoing the military advice given on the same issue in Iraq, 

gains achieved at great cost against our enemy in Afghanistan are reversible. We 

should recognize that we may not want this fight but the barbarity of an enemy 

that kills women and children and has refused to break with al-Qaeda needs to be 

fought. 

More broadly, is the U.S. military being developed to fight across the spectrum 

of combat? 

– Knowing that enemies always move against perceived weakness, our forces 

must be capable of missions from nuclear deterrence to counter-insurgency and 

everything in between, now including the pervasive cyber domain. While surprise is always a factor, this committee can ensure that we have the fewest big 

regrets when the next surprise occurs. We don’t want or need a military that 

is at the same time dominant and irrelevant, so you must sort this out and 

deny funding for bases or capabilities no longer needed. 

The nuclear stockpile must be tended to and fundamental questions must be 

asked and answered: 

48 

– We must clearly establish the role of our nuclear weapons: do they serve solely 

to deter nuclear war? If so we should say so, and the resulting clarity will help 

to determine the number we need. 

– Is it time to reduce the Triad to a Diad, removing the land-based missiles? This 

would reduce the false alarm danger. 

– Could we re-energize the arms control effort by only counting warheads vice 

launchers? 

– Was the Russian test violating the INF treaty simply a blunder or a change 

in policy, and what is our appropriate response? 

The reduced size of our military drives the need to ask other questions: 

Our military is uniquely capable and the envy of the world, but are we resourcing 

it to ensure we have the highest quality troops, the best equipment and the toughest training? 

– With a smaller military comes the need for troops kept at the top of their game. 

When we next put them in harm’s way it must be the enemy’s longest day and 

worst day. Tiered readiness with a smaller force must be closely scrutinized to 

ensure we aren’t merely hollowing out the force. While sequestration is the 

nearest threat to this national treasure that is the U.S. military, sustaining it 

as the world’s best when smaller will need your critical oversight. 

Are the Navy and our expeditionary forces receiving the support they need in a 

world where America’s naval role is more pronounced because we have fewer forces 

posted overseas? 

– With the cutbacks to the Army and Air Force and fewer forces around the 

world, military aspects of our strategy will inevitably become more naval in 

character. This will provide decision time for political leaders considering employment of additional forms of military power. Your resourcing of our naval 

and expeditionary forces will need to take this development into account. Because we will need to swiftly move ready forces to act against nascent threats, 

nipping them in the bud, the agility to reassure friends and temper adversary 

activities will be critical to America’s effectiveness for keeping a stable and 

prosperous world. Today I question if our shipbuilding budget is sufficient, especially in light of the situation in the South China Sea. 

– While our efforts in the Pacific to keep positive relations with China are well 

and good, these efforts must be paralleled by a policy to build the counterbalance if China continues to expand its bullying role in the South China Sea 

and elsewhere. That counterbalance must deny China veto power over territorial, security and economic conditions in the Pacific, building support for our 

diplomatic efforts to maintain stability and economic prosperity so critical to 

our economy. 

In light of worldwide challenges to the international order we are nonetheless 

shrinking our military. Are we adjusting our strategy and taking into account a reduced role for that shrunken military? 

– Strategy connects ends, ways and means. With less military available, we must 

reduce our appetite for using it. Connecting the dots is appropriate for this committee. Absent growing our military, there must come a time when moral outrage, serious humanitarian plight, or lesser threats cannot be militarily addressed. Prioritization is needed if we are to remain capable of the most critical 

mission for which we have a military: to fight on short notice and defend the 

country. In this regard we must recognize we should not and need not carry 

this military burden solely on our own: 

Does our strategy and associated military planning take into account our nation’s 

increased need for allies? 

– The need for stronger alliances comes more sharply into focus as we shrink the 

military. No nation can do on its own all that is necessary for its security. Further, history reminds us that countries with allies generally defeat those without. A capable U.S. military, reinforcing our political will to lead from the front, 

is the bedrock on which we draw together those nations that stand with us 

against threats to the international order. Our strategy must adapt to and accommodate this reality. As Churchill intimated, the only thing harder than 

fighting with allies is fighting without them. This committee should track closely an increased military capability to work with allies, the NATO alliance being 

foremost but not our sole focus. We must also enlist non-traditional partners 

where we have common foes or common interests. 

– In reference to NATO and in light of the Russian violations of international borders, we must ask if the Alliance’s efforts have adjusted to the unfortunate and 

dangerous mode the Russian leadership has slipped into? 

– With regard to tightening the bond between our smaller military and those we 

may need at our side in future fights, the convoluted foreign military sales sysVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
49 

tem needs your challenge. Hopefully it can be put in order before we drive more 

potential partners to equip themselves with foreign equipment, a move that 

makes it harder to achieve needed interoperability with our allies and undercuts America’s industrial base. Currently the system fails to reach its potential 

to support our foreign policy. 

As we attempt to restore stability to the state system and international order, a 

critical question will be, Is America good for its word? 

– When we make clear our position or give our word about something, our friends 

(and even our foes) must recognize that we are good for it. Otherwise dangerous 

miscalculations can occur. This means that the military instrument must be fit 

for purpose and that once a political position is taken, our position is backed 

up by a capable military making clear that we will stand on our word. 

When the decision is made to employ our forces in combat, the committee should 

ask if the military is being employed with the proper authority. I believe you should 

examine answers to fundamental questions like the following: 

– Are the political objectives clearly defined and achievable? Murky or quixotic 

political end states can condemn us to entering wars we don’t know how to end. 

Notifying the enemy in advance of our withdrawal dates or reassuring the 

enemy that we will not use certain capabilities like our ground forces should 

be avoided. Such announcements do not take the place of mature, well-defined 

end-states, nor do they contribute to ending wars as rapidly as possible on favorable terms. 

– Is the theater of war itself sufficient for effective prosecution? We have witnessed safe havens prolonging war. If the defined theater of war is insufficient, 

the plan itself needs to be challenged to determine feasibility of its success or 

the need for its modification. 

– Is the authority for detaining prisoners of war (POs) appropriate for the enemy 

and type war that we are fighting? We have observed the perplexing lack of 

detainee policy that has resulted in the return of released prisoners to the battlefield. We should not engage in another fight without resolving this issue up 

front, treating hostile forces, in fact, as hostile. 

– Are America’s diplomatic, economic and other assets aligned to the war aims, 

with the intent of ending the conflict as rapidly as possible? We have experienced the military alone trying achieve tasks outside its expertise. When we 

take the serious decision to fight, we must bring to bear all our nation’s resources. You should question how the diplomatic and development efforts will 

be employed to build momentum for victory and our nation’s strategy needs 

that integration. 

Finally the culture of our military and its rules are designed to bring about battlefield success in the most atavistic environment on earth. No matter how laudable 

in terms of a progressive country’s instincts, this committee needs to consider carefully any proposed changes to military rules, traditions and standards that bring 

non-combat emphasis to combat units. There is a great difference between military 

service in dangerous circumstances and serving in a combat unit whose role is to 

search out and kill the enemy at close quarters. This committee has a responsibility 

for imposing reason over impulse when proposed changes could reduce the combat 

capability of our forces at the point of contact with the enemy. 

Ultimately we need the foresight of this committee, acting in its sentinel and 

oversight role, to draw us out of the reactive stance we’ve fallen into and chart a 

strategic way ahead. Our national security strategy needs your bi-partisan direction. 

In some cases you may need to change our processes for developing an integrated 

national strategy, because mixing capable people and their good ideas with bad 

processes results in the bad processes defeating good peoples’ ideas nine times out 

of ten. This is an urgent matter, because in an interconnected age when opportunistic adversaries can work in tandem to destroy stability and prosperity, our country 

needs to regain its strategic footing. We need to bring clarity to our efforts before 

we lose the confidence of the American people and the support of our potential allies. This committee can play an essential strategic role in this regard. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General Mattis. 

Next, I would like to introduce General Keane. General Keane is 

a Vietnam combat veteran, the former Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army, one of the architects of the successful surge in Iraq, and the 

current chairman of the Institute for the Study of War. 

General Keane? 

50 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), 

FORMER VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY 

General KEANE. Madam Chairman, Senator Ayotte, and Ranking 

Minority, Senator Reed, members of this distinguished committee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify on such a critical issue as 

America’s global security challenges. 

It’s always a privilege to be with this committee—been 15-plusyears in association for me—and whose reputation for tackling 

tough issues has always been appreciated. I’m honored to be here 

with General Jim Mattis and Admiral ‘‘Fox’’ Fallon, both highly respected military leaders who I have known for years. 

Listen, I don’t know what the criteria for panel selection was, but 

obviously we have something in common: we’re all getting older 

and we’re four-stars, retired. But, the thing that we also have in 

common, we are very direct, we are very straightforward, and we 

sure as hell are opinionated. So, I’m usually sitting next to somebody’s who’s nuanced, circumspect, et cetera. You’re not going to 

get that from the three of us today. We don’t always agree, but 

you’re going to know what we’re thinking. 

Please accept my written testimony for the record, and I will 

briefly outline those remarks. I put some extra in there, because— 

congratulation to the new members who have joined this committee. There’s some background information in there that you 

may feel helpful to you. 

And I appreciate Senator McCain giving us a little extra time 

this morning on such a complex subject. 

You know, the United States is confronting emerging security 

challenges on a scale not seen since the rise of the Soviet Union 

to superpower status following World War II, with radical Islam 

morphing into a global jihad, Iran seeking regional hegemony and 

revisionist powers, Russia and China capable of employing varying 

degrees of sophistication, disruptive methods of war that will severely test the United States military’s traditional methods of projecting and sustaining power abroad. Given U.S. defense budget 

projections, the United States will have to confront these challenges without its longstanding decided advantage in the scale of 

resources it is able to devote to the competition. Indeed, the Budget 

Control Act, or sequestration, is not only irresponsible in the face 

of these emerging challenges, it is downright reckless. 

Let me briefly outline the major security challenges and what we 

can do about them: 

Radical Islam. As much as Naziism and Communism—both geopolitical movements, ideologically driven—were the major security 

challenges of the 20th century, radical Islam is the major security 

challenge of our generation. Radical Islam, as I’m defining it for today’s discussion, consists of three distinct movements who share a 

radical fundamentalist ideology, use jihad or terror to achieve objectives, yet compete with each other for influence and power. I’ve 

provided some maps at—behind my testimony, that you can use, 

and there’s also the—some display maps, here in the committee 

room, which you may be challenged to be able to see. 

First, the Shi’a-based Iranian-sponsored radical Islamic movement that began in 1979 with the formation of the Islamic of Iran. 

In 1980, Iran declared the United States as a strategic enemy, and 

51 

its goal is to drive the United States out of the region, achieve regional hegemony and destroy the state of Israel. It uses proxies primarily as the world’s number-one state sponsoring terrorism. Thirty-plus years, Iran has used these proxies to attack the United 

States. To date, the result is, United States troops left Lebanon, 

Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, while Iran has direct influence and some 

control over Beirut, Lebanon, Gaza, Damascus, Syria, Baghdad, 

Iraq, and now Sana’a, Yemen, as you can see on the map. Is there 

any doubt that Iran is on the march and is systematically moving 

toward their regional hegemonic objective? Iran has been a—Iran 

has been on a 20-year journey to acquire nuclear weapons, simply 

because they know it guarantees preservation of the regime and 

makes them, along with their partners, the dominant power in the 

region, thereby capable of expanding their control and influence. 

Add to this their ballistic missile delivery system and Iran is not 

only a threat to the region, but to Europe, as well, and, as they increase missile range, eventually a threat to the United States. And 

as we know, a nuclear arms race, because of their nuclear ambition, is on the horizon for the Middle East. 

Second, the al-Qaeda Sunni-based movement declared war on the 

United States in the early ’90s, desires to drive the United States 

out of the region, dominate all Muslim lands and, as the most ambitious radical Islamic movement, eventually achieve world domination. As you can see on the map, al-Qaeda and its affiliates exceeds Iran in beginning to dominate multiple country. In fact, alQaeda has grown fourfold in the last 5 years. 

Third, the Islamic state of Iraq and al-Sham, ISIS, is an outgrowth from al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was defeated in Iraq by 2009. 

After United States troops pulled out of Iraq in 2011, ISIS reemerged as a terrorist organization in Iraq, moved into Syria in 

2012, and began seizing towns and villages from the Syria-Iraq 

border all the way to the western Syria, from Aleppa to Damascus. 

After many terrorist attacks and assassinations in Mosul and 

Anbar Province in 2013, to set the conditions for follow-on operations, ISIS launched a conventional attack back into Iraq, beginning in 2014, with the seizure of Fallujah and culminating in the 

seizure of Mosul and many other towns and villages. 

Is it possible to look at that map in front of you and claim that 

the United States policy and strategy is working or that al-Qaeda 

is on the run? It is unmistakable that our policies have failed. And 

the unequivocal explanation is, United States policy has focused on 

disengaging from the Middle East, while our stated policy is pivoting to the East. 

United States policymakers choose to ignore the very harsh realities of the rise of radical Islam. In my view, we became paralyzed 

by the fear of adverse consequences in the Middle East after fighting two wars. Moreover, as we sit here this morning in the face of 

radical Islam, United States policymakers refuse to accurately 

name the movement as radical Islam. We further choose not to define it, nor explain its ideology. And, most critical, we have no comprehensive strategy to stop it or defeat it. We are reduced to a very 

piecemeal effort, using drones in Yemen and Pakistan—a vital tactic, but not a strategy—and air power in Iraq and Syria, while insisting an unproven indigenous ground force. Our partnering proVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
52 

gram with other nations is fragmented, with no overall strategy. 

This approach almost certainly guarantees we will be incrementally engaged against one radical group after another, with no end 

in sight. What can we do? 

To stop and defeat a global radical Islamic movement and Iranian regional hegemony requires a broad, long-term, comprehensive strategic approach with the strategic objectives, both near and 

long term, supporting that strategy. World leaders understood how 

formidable the—how formidable Communist ideology and the Soviet threat was to the world order, and formed political and military alliances. Forming similar alliances today offers the opportunity by member nations to develop a comprehensive strategy to 

discuss and set goals for necessary political and social reforms, and 

to share intelligence, technology, equipment, and training. The alliance is mostly about supporting countries in the region, to make 

internal changes, and to assist comprehensively encountering radical Islam. 

We should rely on some of the thoughtful leaders in and outside 

the region to assist in forming this alliance. This is not about major 

military intervention by the United States. It is about assisting alliance members with training their counterterrorism force and 

their conventional military and counterinsurgency, and, yes, conducting counterterrorism operations, as required. While killing and 

capturing terrorists is key, so is the strategy to organize an alliance-wide effort to undermine the radical Islamist ideology, to 

counter its narrative, to counter recruiting, and to target outside 

financing. 

On Iran—excuse me—on Iraq and Syria, the ISIS advance is 

stalled in Iraq, due to effective air power, with modest gains in retaking lost territory. However, a successful counteroffensive to retake Mosul and Anbar Province is a very real challenge. No one 

knows for certain how the indigenous force, consisting of the Iraqi 

Army, Peshmerga, Sunni tribes, and Shi’a militia, will perform. 

The United States should plan now to have U.S./coalition advisors 

accompany front-line troops with the added capability to call in airstrikes. Direct-action special-operation forces, both ground and air, 

should assist by targeting ISIS leaders. United States and coalition 

combat brigades should be designated for deployment and moved to 

Kuwait to be ready for employment if the counteroffensive stalls or 

is defeated. The alternative? We wait another couple of years and 

try again. 

The Syria policy is a failure. ISIS is continued to advance 

throughout Syria and is gaining ground, taking new territory. You 

can see that on the other map. And even approaching Damascus 

in attacking south of Damascus. The plans for training and assisting the Free Syrian Army is not robust enough—5,000 in one 

year—I know you received a classified briefing on it, so you know 

more about it than I—and permitting Assad to bomb the FSA faster than new members are trained makes no sense. The United 

States should heed the advice of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, and 

Turkey to establish a no-fly zone and to shut down Assad’s air 

power, and a buffer zone to protect refugees. 

On Iran, the long-term goal for any alliance that is formed 

should be Iran’s regime change or at least a collapse of the existing 

53 

government framework, similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

And the reason is clear. Iran’s stated regional hegemonic objectives 

are incongruous with the peace, prosperity, and stability of the 

Middle East. Iran cannot be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon 

or threshold capability allowing rapid nuclear development. Sadly, 

we are already about there. 

Congress should do two things now in reference to Iran: one, authorize increased sanctions now, with automatic implementation if 

talks are extended or fail; and, two, legislate ratification of any 

deal by the Senate. 

On Afghanistan, the political situation in Afghanistan has improved considerably with the reform leadership of Ashraf Ghani, 

but the security situation remains at risk. While the security situation in the south is relatively stable, the situation in the east is 

not. The problem is, the area generally from Kabul to the Pakistani 

border is a domain of the Haqqani Network. Haqqani Network has 

not been rooted out of their support zones and safe areas in Afghanistan. This is a serious problem for the ANSF. It follows that 

the ANSF needs the funding support to support as current troop 

levels of 352,000 and much needed U.S. and coalition troops to conduct counterterrorism and to advise, train, and assist the ANSF beyond 2016. We also need to target the Haqqani Network in its 

sanctuary in Pakistan, in the vicinity of Miramshah and the FATA. 

All we accomplished in Afghanistan will be at risk, as it was in 

Iraq, if the troops are pulled out not based on the conditions on the 

ground. How can we not learn the obvious and painful lesson from 

Iraq? 

The security challenges posed by revisionist Eurasian nations, 

Russia and China. In Europe, Russia’s recent behavior, I think, 

suggests that its 2008 military campaign against Georgia was not 

an aberration, but, rather, an initial effort to overturn the prevailing regional order. By seizing the Crimea, supporting trumpedup rebel forces in eastern Ukraine, and engaging in military deployments that directly threaten its Baltic neighbors, Moscow has 

made it clear that it does not accept the political map of post-coldwar Europe. I believe we need to realistically conclude that Moscow 

is also willing to challenge the very existence of NATO. 

What can be done? Given the dramatic drop in oil prices, Russia 

is beginning to suffer, economically, and is likely headed toward a 

recession, if not already there. Additional tough sanctions should 

be back on the table to coerce Russia to stop the Ukraine aggression. It is a disgrace that, once again, we have refused to assist the 

people being oppressed, when all they ask for is the weapons to 

fight. We should robustly arm and assist Ukraine. 

Additionally, NATO military presence in Central Europe—excuse 

me—NATO military presence from Central Europe should be significantly shifted to the Baltics and Eastern Europe, with plans for 

permanent bases. A clear signal of Article 5 intent must be sent 

to Moscow. These action—will strengthen our diplomatic efforts, 

which, to date, have failed. 

China’s continuing economic growth has fueled a major conventional buildup that is beginning to shift the local balance of power 

in its favor. As a result, Beijing has been emboldened to act more 

assertively toward its neighbors, especially in expanding its terriVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
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torial claims, which include not only Taiwan, but also most of the 

South China Sea islands and Japan’s Senkaku islands. China has 

embarked on a strategy of regional domination at the expense of 

United States interests as a Pacific nation and decades of partnership with allied countries in the region. 

What can be done? Develop a regional strategy with our allies to 

counter China’s desire for dominant control and influence. Recognize that China’s military strategy to defeat United States reliance 

on military information networks, which they believe, alone, may 

defeat the United States, militarily, which is quite interesting, and 

their exploding precision-strike capability threatens ground and 

naval forces, forward staging bases, and air and seaports of debarkation. The United States no longer enjoys the commanding position in the precision-strike regime that it occupied in the two decades following the cold war. We should stress-test United States regional military defense to counter China’s threat and recognize 

that a change in regional defense strategy and capabilities is likely. 

Lastly, sequestration. It must be repealed and reasonable resources restored to meet the emerging security challenges. All the 

services have a need to capitalize their investment accounts and to 

maintain readiness, which is rapidly eroding. 

In conclusion, given the emerging security challenges and limited 

resources, the need for well-crafted regional defense strategy in an 

overall integrated national security and defense strategy posture is 

clear, more so now than anytime, I believe, since World War II. 

Yet, this is not what we do. What we do is the QDR, every 4 years, 

which is largely driven by process and far too focused on the budget. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE

Mr. Chairman, ranking minority and members of this distinguished committee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify on such a critical issue as America’s global security challenges. Am honored to be here today with General Jim Mattis and Admiral 

Fox Fallon, both highly respected military leaders who I have known for years. 

The United States is confronting emerging security challenges on a scale it has 

not seen since the rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status following WWII, 

with radical Islam morphing into a global jihad, Iran seeking regional hegemony 

and revisionist powers capable of employing, in varying degrees of sophistication, 

disruptive methods of war that will severely test the United States military’s traditional methods of projecting and sustaining power abroad. Given U.S. defense budget projections, the U.S. will have to confront these challenges without its long standing decided advantage in the scale of resources it is able to devote to the competition. Indeed the Budget Control Act (BCA), or sequestration, is not only irresponsible, in the face of emerging challenges, it is downright reckless. 

Let me briefly outline the major security challenges and what can be done about 

them. 

1. RADICAL ISLAM

As much as nazism and communism both geopolitical movements, ideologically 

driven, were the major security challenges of the 20th century, radical Islam is the 

major security challenge of our generation. Nazism was defeated by overwhelming 

brute force and communism was defeated by better ideas. Radical Islam will take 

a combination of force and better ideas to ultimately add it to the trash heap of unrealized and unfulfilled ideological movements. 

Radical Islam as I am defining it for today’s discussion consists of 3 distinct movements, who share a radical fundamentalist ideology, use jihad or terror to achieve 

objectives yet compete with each other for influence and power. 

55 

– First, the Shia based, Iranian sponsored radical Islamist movement that began 

in 1979 with the formation of the Islamic State of Iran. In 1980 Iran declared 

the United States as a strategic enemy and its goal is to drive the United States 

out of the region, achieve regional hegemony and destroy the state of Israel. It 

uses proxies, primarily, as the world’s number one state sponsoring terrorism. Beginning in the early 1980’s it began jihad against the United States by bombing 

the Marine barracks, the United States Embassy and the United States Embassy 

Annex in Lebanon, the United States Embassy in Kuwait, the AF barracks , 

Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and attacking the United States military in Iraq 

using Shia militias trained in Iran with advanced IEDs developed by Iranian engineers. To date, the result is, United States troops left Lebanon, Saudi Arabia 

and Iraq while Iran has direct influence and some control over Beirut, Lebanon, 

Gaza, Damascus, Syria, Baghdad, Iraq and now Sana’a, Yemen (as you can see 

on the map.) 

Is there any doubt that Iran, is on the march and is systematically moving toward 

their regional hegemonic objectives. Iran has armed Hezbollah and Hamas with 

thousands of rockets and missiles in order to attack Israel, has propped up the 

Assad regime with Quds force advisors and fighters plus tons of military supplies, 

was the first to come to the assistance of the beleaguered Iraq government after the 

ISIS invasion and today has hundreds of Quds force advisors on the ground in Iraq, 

backing Iranian trained Shia militias, with Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds 

force, a frequent visitor and now using the Houthis, has managed to topple the 

Yemen government, an ally in the fight against al-Qaeda. 

The Iranian strategy of using proxies to conduct jihad and to launch conventional 

military attacks while propping up countries it desires to influence is a winning 

strategy. Despite 30 years of proxy attacks against American interests in the region 

and an almost 10 year kidnapping campaign in the 80’s resulting in the death of 

CIA station chief Buckley not a single American president, republican or democrat 

has ever countered. 

Iran also has been on a 20 year journey to acquire nuclear weapons, simply because they know it guarantees preservation of the regime and makes them along 

with their partners the dominant power in the region thereby capable of expanding 

their control and influence. Add to this their ballistic missile delivery system and 

Iran is not only a threat to the region but to Europe as well, and as they increase 

missile range, eventually a threat to the United States 

– Second, the al-Qaeda (AQ), Sunni based movement, declared war on the U.S. in 

the early 90’s, desires to drive the U.S. out of the region, dominate all Muslim 

lands, and as the most ambitious radical Islamist movement, eventually achieve 

world domination. The United States has a 20 year history with AQ who began 

its jihad in the early 90’s with the attack on the WTC, United States Embassies 

in Kenya and Tanzania, the USS Cole, the 9/11 attacks and a number of planned 

attacks since 9/11 that were either thwarted or bungled. As you can see on the 

map, AQ and its affiliates, exceeds Iran in beginning to dominate multiple countries. AQ has grown fourfold in the last 5 years. Unable to project power out of 

the region due to US drone attacks, in 

Pakistan, AQ central franchised out to AQAP in Yemen, by providing some key 

leaders, the responsibility to conduct out of region attacks e.g. in the United States 

and Paris, France. No one is suggesting that the red on that map is under the direct 

control and influence of AQ central. They are not. But what binds them together 

is a shared and common ideology using jihad to accomplish their political objective, 

which is the overthrow of their host governments. 

– Third, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is an outgrowth from alQaeda in Iraq which was defeated in Iraq by 2009. Conducting assessment visits 

for GEN Petraeus many times in Iraq, on one occasion in late 2008 I was shown 

a number of AQ message intercepts where AQ admitted defeat and was advising 

AQ central not to send any more ‘‘brothers’’ because it is ‘‘over.’’ In 2011 the U.S. 

unplugged its sophisticated intelligence capability, and pulled out the CT force 

whose main task was to hunt down AQ leaders. A week after the last troops left, 

General Caslen, then U.S. commander indicated, the first suicide bomb in over 

6 months went off in Baghdad. And so it began the beginnings of ISIS as a terrorist organization in Iraq, moved into Syria in 2012, and began seizing towns 

and villages from the Syria/Iraq border all the way to western Syria from Aleppo 

to Damascus. We tracked this by day and by week at the Institute for the Study 

of War (ISW) providing briefings to CIA, DIA, CJCS, DOS, congressional intelligence committees and to members of this committee. 

After many terrorist attacks and assassinations in Mosul and Anbar province in 

2013 to set the conditions for follow on operations, ISIS launched a conventional atVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
56 

tack back into Iraq beginning in 2014 with the seizure of Falujah and culminating 

in the seizure of Mosul and many other towns and villages. 

– Why Are We Failing: Is it possible to look at the map and claim that U.S. policy 

and strategy is working or that ‘‘AQ is on the run.’’ It is unmistakable that our 

policies have failed and the unequivocal explanation is United States policy has 

focused on disengaging from the Middle East. The Arab Spring, a strategic surprise, began in 2010 in a region where democracy does not exist in the Arab 

world, as the people in the streets were seeking political reform, social justice and 

economic opportunity. No one was in the streets advocating radical Islam or jihad 

but the radical Islamists saw political upheaval as an opportunity to gain control 

and influence. Meanwhile the U.S. in terms of policy emphasis was conducting 

the so called ‘‘pivot’’ to the east. We failed to see the Arab Spring as a United 

States opportunity to influence political reform and social justice. The radicals 

filled that vacuum as the Arab Spring became an accelerant for them. As such 

ISIS reemerged in Iraq, then Syria, after United States troops pulled out, the 

White House announced a similar pullout of all troops in Afghanistan. In Libya, 

the moderate regime, friendly to the United States, that replaced Qaddafi requested assistance to form an effective security force to safeguard the government 

and protect the people from the armed militant groups. We refused and the radical Islamists (AAS) tried to kill the UK Ambassador, burned down the United 

States consulate and killed Ambassador Stephens, and, now, the country is being 

taken over by the radical Islamists, forcing the shutdown of the U.S. Embassy. 

In Syria, in 2010, moderate rebels (now, the FSA) had the initial momentum 

against the Assad regime, many believed the regime was about to fall. Then Iran, 

Hezbollah and the Russians assisted the Assad regime thereby forcing the FSA 

to request arms and training assistance. They never requested any U.S. ‘‘boots 

on the ground’’ or even, at the time, any use of air power. As late as the summer 

of 2012 Director Petraeus, Secretaries Clinton and Panetta and General Dempsey 

recommended we assist the FSA, who the CIA vetted. The President of the United 

States refused and ISIS and other radical groups to include AQ moved into Syria 

while the Assad regime was systematically killing 200,000 Syrians and displacing 

more than 13 million from their homes, a human catastrophe by any definition. 

Even after the Assad regime used chemical weapons (CW) to kill Syrians by the 

thousands, thereby crossing the infamous United States ‘‘red line,’’ the U.S. failed 

to engage. Our allies in the region lost confidence in U.S. leadership and question, 

to this day, U.S. resolve. U.S. policy makers chose to ignore the very harsh realities of the rise of radical Islam. In my view, we became paralyzed by the fear of 

adverse consequences in the Middle East after fighting two wars. Moreover, as 

we sit here this morning in the face of radical Islam, US policy makers will not 

only accurately name the movement as radical Islam , we further choose not to 

define it, nor explain its ideology and most critical, we have no comprehensive 

strategy to stop it or defeat it. We are reduced to a very piecemeal effort using 

drones in Yemen and Pakistan, a vital tactic but not a strategy and air power 

in Iraq and Syria , while assisting an indigenous ground force. This approach almost certainly guarantees we will be incrementally engaged against one radical 

group after another, with no end in sight. 

– What Can Be Done: To stop and defeat a global radical Islamist movement and 

Iranian regional hegemony requires a broad, long term, comprehensive strategic 

approach with strategic objectives both near and long term supporting the strategy. We should be informed by the successful defeat and collapse of another ideology, communism. World leaders understood how formidable the communist, Soviet threat was to the world order and formed political and military alliances i.e., 

NATO and SEATO to counter it. The power and influence of countries working 

together against a common enemy is the preferred way to achieve a comprehensive and synergistic outcome. Forming political and military alliances or using a 

combination of existing alliances offers the opportunity by member nations to develop a comprehensive strategy to discuss and set goals for necessary political and 

social reforms, and to share intelligence, technology, equipment and training. The 

alliance is mostly about supporting countries in the region to make internal 

changes and to assist comprehensively in countering radical Islam. This is not 

about major military intervention by the U.S., it is about assisting alliance members with training their counter-terrorism force and their conventional military in 

counterinsurgency and yes conducting U.S. CT operations as required. While killing and capturing terrorists is key, so is the strategy to organize an alliance wide 

effort to undermine the radical Islamist ideology, to counter its narrative, to 

counter recruiting and to target outside financing. 

– ISIS/ AQ/ Iran in Iraq/ Syria: The ISIS advance is stalled in Iraq due to effective air power with modest gains in retaking lost territory. However, a successful 

57 

counter offensive to retake Mosul and Anbar province is a very real challenge. No 

one knows for certain how the indigenous force consisting of IA, Peshmerga, 

Sunni tribes and Shia militia will perform. The U.S. should plan now to have 

U.S./coalition advisors accompany front line troops with the added capability to 

call in air strikes. Direct action SOFs both ground and air should assist by targeting ISIS leaders. United States and coalition combat brigades should be designated for deployment and moved to Kuwait to be ready for employment if the 

counter offensive stalls or is defeated. 

The Syria policy is a failure. There is wide disagreement in DOD, DOS, and the 

NSC over the current Syrian policy. ISIS is continuing to advance throughout Syria 

and is gaining ground, taking new territory. The plans for training and assisting 

the FSA, is not robust enough, 5,000 in one year, and permitting Assad to continue 

to bomb the FSA faster than new members are trained makes no sense. The United 

States should heed the advice of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Turkey to establish a No Fly Zone (NFZ) to shut down Assad’s air power and a buffer zone to 

protect refugees. 

ISIS, AQ and Iran are competing in Iraq and Syria. Their competition raises the 

stakes for all of them. They do not cancel each other out. They make each other 

stronger and induce them to act with greater impunity. Their competition risks hijacking the internal struggles within Iraq and Syria. The longer these wars go on, 

the better off they will do. Their struggle will also raise the stakes for Saudi Arabia 

and disrupt the regional balance of power in the Middle East. 

The wars in Iraq and Syria cannot be contained. ISIS and AQ are trying to bring 

them to Europe. Not just through terrorist attacks, but through polarizing identity. 

They are deliberately working to radicalize sympathizers. Providing security against 

terrorism and stopping radicalization is a rising challenge for our European allies, 

and, fortunately, less for the United States. This is a war of ideas, but it is also 

a war in which military might matters. These groups have laid down stakes in Iraq 

and Syria. They will be very hard to lose without tipping the region into a sectarian 

war. The barriers to their entry have to hold. 

We are living through a time when the regional refugee crisis is out of control. 

13 million Syrians displaced. That’s well over 60 percent of Syria’s pre-war population displaced or killed. Iraq is on the rise with 3 million Iraqis internally displaced as of late 2014. This is not a stable system, and the chaos favors these three 

groups. 

– Iran: The long term goal for any alliance should be Iran’s regime change or a collapse of the existing government framework, similar to the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. And the reason is clear; Iran’s stated regional hegemonic objectives are incongruous with the peace, prosperity and stability of the Middle East. 

Iran cannot be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon or a threshold capability 

allowing rapid nuclear development. Sadly, we are already about there! Congress 

should do 2 things now in reference to Iran. 1) authorize increased sanctions now 

with automatic implementation if talks are extended or fail 2) legislate ratification 

of any deal by the Senate. 

– Afghanistan: The political situation in Afghanistan has improved considerably 

with the reform leadership of Ashraf Ghani but the security situation remains at 

risk. While the security situation in the South is relatively stable with some exceptions, the situation in the East is not satisfactory. The problem is the area 

generally from Kabul to the Pakistan border which is the domain of the Haqqani 

network (HQN). Because the White House provided 25 percent less surge forces 

than requested and then pulled the surge forces out prematurely, these forces 

were never applied to the East as they were, successfully, in the South. As such 

HQN has not been rooted out of their support zones and safe areas in Afghanistan. This is a serious problem for the ANSF. It follows that the ANSF needs the 

funding to support its current troop levels of 352K and much needed U.S. and 

coalition troops to conduct CT and to advise, train and assist the ANSF beyond 

2016. All we accomplished will be at risk, as it was in Iraq, if the troops are 

pulled out not based on the conditions on the ground. How can we not learn the 

obvious and painful lesson from Iraq? 

2. SECURITY CHALLENGES POSED BY REVISIONIST EUROASIAN NATIONS I.E. RUSSIA AND

CHINA

– Russia: In Europe, Russia’s recent behavior suggests that its 2008 military campaign against Georgia was not an aberration but rather an initial effort to overturn the prevailing regional order. By seizing the Crimea, supporting trumped up 

rebel forces in eastern Ukraine and engaging in military deployments that directly threaten its Baltic neighbors, Moscow has made it clear that it does not 

58 

accept the political map of post-Cold War Europe. I believe we need to realistically conclude that Moscow is also willing to challenge the very existence of 

NATO. 

– What Can Be Done: Given the dramatic drop in oil prices, Russia is beginning 

to suffer economically and is likely heading toward a recession if not already 

there. Additional tough sanctions should be put back on the table to coerce Russia 

to stop the Ukraine aggression. It is a disgrace that once again we have refused 

to assist a people being oppressed when all they asked for is the weapons to fight; 

that policy decision which the White House states could lead to an escalation in 

the conflict, makes no sense. We should robustly arm and assist Ukraine. Additionally, NATO military presence should be significantly shifted to the Baltics and 

Eastern Europe with plans for permanent bases. A clear signal of Article 5 intent 

must be sent to Moscow. These actions will strengthen our diplomatic efforts 

which to date have failed. 

– China: China’s continuing economic growth has fueled a major conventional military buildup that is beginning to shift the local balance of power in its favor. As 

a result Beijing has been emboldened to act more assertively toward its neighbors, especially in expanding its territorial claims, which include not only Taiwan, 

but also most of the South China sea islands and Japan’s Senkaku Islands. China 

has embarked on a strategy of regional domination at the expense of United 

States interests, as a pacific nation, and decades of partnership with allied countries in the region. 

– What Can Be Done: Develop a regional strategy with our allies to counter 

China’s desire for dominant control and influence. Recognize that China’s military 

strategy to defeat United States reliance on military information networks which 

they believe alone may defeat the U.S. militarily and their exploding precision 

strike capability threatens surface and naval forces, forward staging bases, and 

air and sea ports of debarkation. The U.S. no longer enjoys the commanding position in the precision strike regime that it occupied in the two decades following 

the Cold War. We should stress test United States regional military defense to 

counter China’s threat and recognize that a change in regional defense strategy 

is likely. 

3. SEQUESTRATION: 

It must be repealed and reasonable resources restored to meet the emerging security challenges. All the services have a need to capitalize their investment accounts 

and to maintain readiness which is rapidly eroding. 

In conclusion, given the emerging security challenges and limited resources, the 

need for well crafted regional defense strategies in an overall integrated defense 

strategy and posture is clear. Yet this is not what we do. What we do is the QDR, 

every four years, which is largely driven by process and far too focused on the 

budget. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you so much, General Keane. 

Admiral Fallon—thank you, Admiral Fallon, for being here—Admiral Fallon is a Vietnam veteran who served 40 years in the 

Navy, including as Commander of U.S. Central Command. 

Thank you for being here today, Admiral Fallon. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN (RET.), 

FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND 

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, Senator. 

Madam Chairwoman, Senator Reed, members of the committee, 

thank you, first of all, for your essential and enduring support of 

our men and women in uniform, certainly for the many years in 

which I was honored to serve with them, and continuing today. 

And thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished 

body and offer my perspectives on current threats to national security, American foreign policy, and national defense topics. 

There are certainly many areas of concern around the world. We 

see them most spectacularly highlighted regularly by the media, 

59 

and you’ve heard a long litany of these things mentioned already 

today. 

First of all, I believe that a coherent national security strategy 

requires a long-term focus with well-thought-out objectives. We 

should resist reactive responses and attempts to find near-term 

fixes to popup issues, which are going to arise continuously and 

compete for attention with what we should determine are the highest-priority national interests. 

In surveying the worldscape today, I’d suggest that we focus on 

where we, as a nation, want to be in the future. My vote would be 

for improving world security and stability, with more people 

around the world enjoying a better life in conditions of their choosing, with responsible elected leaders providing good governance and 

respect for human dignity. This scenario, clearly in our better national interest, is not going to happen without lots of hard work informed and guided by an effective national security strategy. 

The United States Government has provided, and must continue 

to provide, leadership, good example, and active political, economic, 

and military security assistance in working towards these desired 

objectives. The fundamental prerequisite for any successful U.S. 

national security strategy is a sound and strong domestic foundation. Our credibility in the world is based on the example of our 

actions and how people perceive we might act in current and future 

situations. It’s fair to wonder if people in other parts of the world 

take us seriously when they observe partisan political bickering 

that precludes agreement on fundamental issues like a national operating budget or cyber policies, and seemingly ever-changing policies and priorities. 

Our military capability is an essential element of national power 

and one of many key tools, which include diplomatic, development, 

economic, financial, political, and certainly moral leadership. We 

face tough choices today about if, when, and where to employ our 

military forces. We also face some tough choices on what to do, how 

to equip them, and what capabilities ought to be priorities. We 

can’t have everything. Some people would propose an endless list 

of things that we could never afford. We’ve got to make the choices. 

As we contemplate the myriad challenges to world stability and 

U.S. security, we should first acknowledge, distasteful as it might 

be, the reality that nuclear weapons and aspirations for them continue to proliferate. In this regard, it’s discouraging to note that, 

after more than two decades of counter-—of nuclear counterproliferation progress, fueled in large measure by the Nunn-Lugar Initiative, Russian-United States cooperation appears to have ground 

to a halt in the wake of dangerous Russian bad behavior. United 

States strategy in dealing with the potential use of these weapons 

of mass destruction has been heretofore successful with our National strategic deterrent force. But, the critical components of this 

force have been aging, without significant upgrade. Modernization 

of the force, particularly the survivability of the sea-based deterrent, should be a top-priority consideration for us to remain credible in deterring the worst-case scenarios. In my view, one of our 

most important strategic interests, with huge implications for national security and the stability of the vast Asia-Pacific region, is 

our long-term relationship with China. Mutually beneficial in many 

60 

respects, it has other dimensions, noticeably—notably in the areas 

of cybersecurity, military expansion, and regional disputes with 

neighboring countries which are a cause for concern and need to be 

addressed. 

The key focal point of this hearing is conflict in the Middle East 

and the spread of violent extremism in the region, and from it to 

other places in the world. The Middle East is an area of high interest for us, for many reasons, and continue to be buffeted by challenges which have vexed years of U.S. attempts to improve stability 

in the area. Nonetheless, I believe we should continue to engage in 

this region, using all aspects of national power, but with the understanding that we are not likely to be successful by mandating U.S. 

solutions. People in the region are, sooner or later, going to have 

to step up and address the issues which torment and divide them. 

We can and should assist, but we are not going to resolve their 

problems. 

Some recommendations for addressing the current challenges 

from the so-called Dayesh in Iraq and Syria, from my perspective, 

include, first, recognition that, in Iraq, success will rest on the ability of the new government of Haider al-Abadi to convince the majority of his countrymen and -women, particularly the Sunni minority, that they will get a fair shake, going forward. Absent this political foundation, nothing we do is going to be effective in the long 

term. 

Second, getting Islamic leaders, the elites of the Arab countries, 

to actively counter the extremist ideology, and to cut funding for 

Dayesh and other extremists. On a positive note, here, I would 

highlight the recent remarks by Egyptian leader, Abdel al-Sisi. 

And third, I think we should continue United States military efforts to work closely with the Iraqi military to enhance their capabilities, increase their combat effectiveness, and to support them 

with training, air power, and SOF, as required, to defeat Dayesh 

and to reclaim areas that were overrun last summer, simultaneously pressing Dayesh in rear areas to degrade and deny their 

ability to expand and to sustain operations in Iraq. 

No single one of these actions is going to result in success, but 

collectively we have a chance to achieve our general objectives. 

Combating violent extremism worldwide is going to be a long-term 

effort requiring close cooperation with allies and willing nations, 

especially in areas of intelligence-sharing, U.S. military training 

and assistance for our less capable colleagues. 

In summary, strategic coherence and foreign policy and national 

security would benefit from strong, credible, and consistent domestic policies and actions to return this great nation to a position of 

exemplary leadership that’s earned and kept for many years in the 

eyes of people around the world. Building on this position of domestic strength, a thoughtful, focused, and collaborative strategy formulation process to agree on a relatively few high-priority national 

security goals and objectives should set us on a fair course. 

At the international level, active engagement using all aspects of 

national power, underpinned with a strong forward presence by 

U.S. military forces with credible capabilities, is our best deterrent 

and response to security threats worldwide. 

61 

Thank you very much, and I’m pleased to address any specific 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Fallon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN (RETIRED) 

Madame Chairwoman, Senator Reed, members of the Committee. Thank you for 

your essential and enduring support for our men and women in uniform and the 

opportunity to address this distinguished body and to offer my perspective on current threats to national security, American Foreign Policy and National Defense topics. 

There are certainly many areas of concern around the world and we see the most 

spectacular and troubling highlighted regularly in the media. I believe that a coherent national security strategy requires a long term focus with well thought out objectives. We should resist reactive responses and attempts to find near term fixes 

for pop up issues which arise continuously and compete for attention with what we 

should determine are higher priority interests. 

In surveying the worldscape today, I would suggest that we focus on where we, 

as a nation, want to be in the future. My vote would be for improving world security 

and stability with more people around the world enjoying a better life in conditions 

of their choosing, with responsible elected leaders providing good governance and respect for human dignity. This scenario, clearly in our better national interest, is not 

going to happen without lots of hard work, informed and guided by an effective national security strategy. 

The United States government has provided, and must continue to provide; leadership, good example and active political, economic and military security assistance 

in working toward these desired objectives. 

The fundamental prerequisite for any successful national security strategy is a 

sound and strong domestic foundation. Our credibility in the world is based on the 

example of our actions and how people perceive we might act in current and future 

situations. It is fair to wonder if people in other parts of the world take us seriously 

when they observe partisan political bickering preclude agreement on fundamental 

issues like national operating budgets or cyber policies, and seemingly ever changing policies and priorities. 

Our military capability is an essential element of national power but only one of 

many key tools which include diplomacy, development, economic, financial and political and certainly, moral leadership. We face tough choices ahead, about when, 

where and if to engage our forces. We also face tough choices about capabilities and 

what to acquire. We cannot afford everything. 

As we contemplate myriad challenges to world stability and U.S. security, we 

should first acknowledge, distasteful as it might be, the reality that nuclear weapons, and aspirations for them, continue to proliferate. In this regard, it is discouraging to note that after more than two decades of nuclear counter proliferation 

progress, fueled in large measure by the Nunn-Lugar initiative, Russian-U.S. cooperation appears to have ground to a halt in the wake of dangerous Russian bad 

behavior. 

U.S. strategy for dealing with the potential use of these weapons of mass destruction has been our heretofore successful National Strategic Deterrent Force. But the 

critical components of this force have been aging without significant upgrade. Modernization of the force, particularly the survivability of the sea based deterrent, 

should be a top priority consideration for us to remain credible in deterring worst 

case scenarios. 

In my view, one of our most important strategic interests, with huge implications 

for national security and the stability of the vast Asia-Pacific region, is our long 

term relationship with China. Mutually beneficial in many respects, it has other dimensions, notably in the areas of cyber security, military expansion and regional 

disputes with neighboring countries, which are a cause for concern and need to be 

addressed. 

A key focal point of this hearing is conflict in the Middle East and the spread of 

violent extremism in the region, and from it, to other places in the world. The Middle East, an area of high interest to us for many reasons, continues to be buffeted 

by challenges which have vexed years of U.S. attempts to improve stability in the 

area. Nonetheless, we should continue to engage in the region, using all aspects of 

national power, but with the understanding that we are not likely to be successful 

by mandating U.S. solutions. People in the region are sooner or later going to have 

to step up and address the issues which torment and divide them. We can and 

should assist but we are not going to resolve their problems. 

62 

Some recommendations for addressing the current challenge from the so called 

Daesh in Iraq and Syria include; (1) Recognition that success in Iraq will rest on 

the ability of the new government of Haider al Abadi to convince the majority of 

his countrymen, particularly the Sunni minority, that they will get a fair shake 

going forward. Absent this political foundation, nothing we do will be effective in 

the long term. (2) Getting Islamic leaders, the elites of the Arab countries, to actively counter the extremist ideology and cut funding to Daesh and other extremists. 

In a positive note here, I would highlight recent remarks by Egyptian leader Abdel 

al Sisi. And (3) Continue U.S. military efforts to work closely with the Iraqi military 

to enhance capabilities, increase combat effectiveness and support them with training, airpower and SOF as required to defeat Daesh and reclaim areas overrun last 

summer. Simultaneously pressing Daesh rear areas in Syria to degrade and deny 

their ability to expand or sustain operations in Iraq. No single one of these actions 

will defeat the threat. All need to occur. 

Combating violent extremism worldwide will be a long term effort requiring close 

cooperation with allies and willing nations, especially in areas of intelligence sharing and U.S. military training and assistance for less capable colleagues. 

In summary, strategic coherence in foreign policy and national security would 

benefit from strong, credible and consistent domestic policies and actions to return 

this great nation to the position of exemplary leadership it earned and enjoyed not 

that long ago. Building on this position of domestic strength, a thoughtful, focused 

and collaborative strategy formulation process to agree on a relatively few high priority national security goals and objectives should set us on a fair course. 

At the international level, active engagement using all aspects of national power 

underpinned with a strong forward presence by U.S. military forces, with credible 

capabilities, is our best deterrent and response to security threats. 

Thank you. I will be pleased to address specific questions you may have. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you so much, Admiral Fallon. 

I want to thank each of the members of this panel. 

And I would like to, first of all, start with, General Keane, a 

question to you about the fight we face against radical Islam. You 

had said, in your testimony, that you believed that our policy has 

failed, that essentially al-Qaeda has grown fourfold in the last 5 

years. Can you help us understand what you think would be the 

strongest strategy, in terms of defeating radical Islam? And also, 

can you speak to the situation in Yemen and what you believe our 

strategy should be there? 

General KEANE. Yes. 

Well, as you noted, radical Islam is clearly on the rise. And, as 

I said in my testimony, I think our policy of disengagement from 

the Middle East has contributed to that rise. Obviously, this is a 

very ambitious movement, and they would be making moves in 

that direction regardless of our actions. 

Now, given the scale of it, which I tried to display on the map, 

which goes from northern and western Africa all the way to South 

Asia, as you look at all of that red on that map, al-Qaeda Central 

does not control all of those affiliates, but what they have in common, what their connective tissue is, is that they share a common 

geopolitical belief driven by a religious ideology to dominate their 

host-country governments which they are conducting an insurgency 

at. And as al-Qaeda Central, I indicated in my testimony, has a 

very ambitious geopolitical objective, and that is to dominate Muslim lands, initially, and then world domination. Given that, and 

given where they are and the swath of territory and countries that 

they’re involved in, there’s no way that the United States, in of 

itself, can deal with the scale of this problem. Nor should it. 

So, in my judgment—that’s why I’d look to—how did we deal 

with Communist ideology, which was a very similar movement— 

ambitious geopolitical movement, world domination? And we dealt 

63 

with it, I think, in a very wise fashion. We brought countries together who shared values, who shared political beliefs, and formed 

a political and military alliance. 

There is no other way, I believe, that you can cope with this scale 

of a problem without bringing the countries involved together, 

whether they’re in the region or have interests outside of the region, as many do because of the export of terrorism to their countries, and develop a strategy to deal with it. This isn’t about the 

United States driving a strategy. This is about bringing countries 

together, because much of what has to be done in the region where 

the radical Islamists are growing has to do with those countries 

themselves, has to do with the conditions that exist in those countries. 

The issues simply are—and what the Arab Spring was about, if 

you recall, it was about seeking political reform, social justice, and 

economic opportunity. Nobody was demonstrating in the streets for 

radical Islam, but the radical Islamists saw the Arab Spring as an 

opportunity, and it became an accelerant for them, because they 

saw political and social upheaval, and they could take advantage 

of it. So, using that as a backdrop, it drives you—those issues are 

still there—political reform, social injustice, and lack of economic 

opportunity. We have to bring those countries together to recognize 

some of those problems. Those are long-term answers. 

And then the near-term problems deal with what General Mattis 

was pointing out, as well. We have to share intelligence, we have 

to share technology, we have to share training. We can help a lot. 

We have been fighting this enemy for 13 years. We have learned 

a lot, and so have many of our allies. 

There’s much that we can do if we take a comprehensive, strategic approach to it, as opposed to what I think is a fragmented approach now, and it doesn’t get at the long-term problem. You have 

to see the long-term solution and then start approaching it with 

near-term and midterm objectives to accomplish it. That, I think, 

is the only answer that’s possible, given what we’re facing. Otherwise, we’re just going to protract this thing and take these things 

on—what, after ISIS? Will there be something after ISIS we’ll have 

to deal with? You betcha, if we don’t take a comprehensive approach to deal with it. 

In terms of Yemen, I mean, it’s very frustrating to watch what’s 

happened. We have been working with a host-country government 

in Yemen. We’ve been conducting direct-action missions with them 

against an insurgency in their country. This is AQAP [al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula], as we well know. This is the organization—given the pressure that the previous administration and this 

administration put on al-Qaeda Central, they knew that they were 

no—they no longer had global reach. And al-Qaeda Central always, 

always wanted to take the jihad to Europe and to the United 

States so they could drive us out of the region and, most importantly, drive our ideas out of the region, which are democracy and 

capitalism, which is an anathema to them. 

The fact is, they franchised out to AQAP, and they gave them 

some leaders to do it. And this is a force that’s not only conducting 

an insurgency to overthrow a government, but put together capaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
64 

bilities to conduct out-of-region attacks in the United States and, 

most recently, in Paris, France. 

I think we’ve got a big question mark on where we’re going forward. This is going to have to play out in front of us. There’s— 

there are serious challenges in Yemen, given what’s taken place 

with the Iranian-imposed overthrow of the government. They are 

also opposed to AQAP, but they are also fundamentally opposed to 

America and its interests. So, I think it begs the question whether 

we’re going to be able to have the kind of cooperation with the new 

government in Yemen that we had with the old government. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General Keane. 

I would call on Senator Reed right now. 

Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

General Mattis, you’ve made it very clear that we have capabilities, particularly with respect to the Middle East, in terms of military solutions, but you’ve also, last July in Aspen, pointed out that 

there are very high costs there. And if we choose to use military, 

we have to—you know, as you’ve said out there, if Americans take 

ownership of this, referring to Syria, this is going to be a fullthroated, very, very serious war, with large costs. That’s still your 

view, I assume? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir, it is. 

Senator REED. And can you give us an idea of the scale of those 

costs, I mean, in terms of forces and just the top line? Because, you 

know, we—I think your point’s very well made, which is, basically, 

if we’re going to go into something, we’ve got to go into it with the 

idea of—it’s going to be difficult and costly. 

General MATTIS. Senator, what you just quoted was something I 

had said in response to a question, as you recall. I think, in this 

case, we have to get to a very detailed level of understanding. What 

is the political objective we are out to accomplish? And, frankly, I 

don’t know what it is right now. Once we define that, I’d say, to 

a Jesuit’s level of definition, a very strict definition, at that point 

we then allocate the means. Those means would be covert, diplomatic, educational, economic, and military. And if we orchestrate 

this correctly, as has been pointed out by the other members of the 

panel, with allies, the clarity and the commitment of the United 

States can draw in the full commitment of others. We should not 

think that a tentative or halfhearted commitment on our part, or 

saying we are willing to go in, but we’re not willing to really do 

the fighting, would draw a full commitment from others. They’re 

going to be willing to match us, but, when you live right next to 

this terrible threat, they have to assume that we’re in fully, or 

they’re going to have to moderate their response. Once we show, I 

think, that level of commitment, our requirement would actually go 

down, because others would be willing to come in full-throated in 

our support. But, it would be a serious operation, no doubt, Senator. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

General Keane, do you agree with Admiral Fallon’s point that, 

unless there’s a political cohesion in Iraq, that the government recognizes and integrates the various sectarian groups, that military 

efforts will be probably ineffectual? 

65 

General KEANE. Yes, absolutely. I think we can—we can be a little bit encouraged by Abadi and his movements. I had some people 

from the Institute for the Study of War just return from Baghdad, 

meeting with government officials and military officials. Abadi is 

moving in the right direction. That’s good news. 

But, look it, let’s be honest here, that what—Maliki’s malfeasance and nefarious character and the way he undermined political 

inclusion, despite his rhetoric, in Iraq, particularly after we pulled 

out of there, was tragic. The Sunni tribes are key, as Fox pointed 

out. And right now, while some of them are fighting against ISIS, 

most of them are not. And the harsh reality is, to get them to 

move, actually to take ISIS on, they will have to be convinced that 

there is reckoning for long-term political inclusion in this new government. It is a major issue for us. 

Anbar Province will be largely Sunni tribes, with some Iraqi 

army assisting, to retake that river valley. Peshmerga will not participate. Sunni tribes will also be needed to participate in a counteroffensive to retake Mosul. While they will not be the main force, 

they will be a—they will need to be a supporting force because of 

the tribes that are up in that region. 

So, yes, it’s key. And I think we’ve known that from the outset. 

Senator REED. So, in effect, the politics will drive the military operations. I mean, if—without effective political reconciliation or signals from Baghdad, our military efforts, as strenuous as we may 

mount, are not—won’t be particularly successful. No? 

General KEANE. Yeah, I just—— 

Senator REED. Let me—— 

General KEANE. It would be hard to visualize a scenario with a 

successful counteroffensive to retake the territory that’s been lost 

without significant Sunni tribe participation in that. 

Senator REED. Let me switch gear again to Admiral Fallon. 

Thank you once again for making yourself available. But, you 

know, one of the points that was raised in the course of the testimony was the radical Islam. But, one of the complicating factors 

is, within this radical Islam, you have Sunni radicals—jihadists— 

and then you have Shi’a radicals. And they have a mutual animosity, which is—might be argued, is even greater than their animosity towards other groups. The Sunni—Shi’a—Sunni believe that 

Shi’a are apostates, et cetera. How do you reconcile that, in terms 

of our operations in the Middle East, particularly in terms of Iran? 

Right now, Iranian forces—or Shi’a militias, let me say, are paralleling our activities in Iraq, in terms of going after ISIL. How do 

we—you know, that complicates an already complicated situation. 

Any comments you have. 

Admiral FALLON. Piece of cake. 

Senator REED. Yes. 

Admiral FALLON. So—we wish. 

All right, I think the reality here, Senator, is that these things 

are really complex. There are a host of issues and interests in 

every one of these conflicts. You pick the country, pick the region. 

And I think that we might consider a couple of things. First of all, 

that in these really particularly vexing things that have so many 

aspects, we probably ought to step back and take a look at, again, 

our long-term large interests. So, Iran. 

66 

Iran has been a problem for us for decades. It’s exacerbated by 

the fact that we’ve had no interaction to speak of until very recently for these many decades. We find their activities extremely 

distasteful. We, basically, detest many of the things they’ve done 

and continue to do. They promote a brand of radicalism that has 

spread well beyond their borders. And we’ve been at our wits’ end 

to try to figure out what to do. 

And my thought here is that, sooner or later, we’re going to have 

to seriously sit down, as I think we’re trying to start, and have a 

dialogue with these guys. We’re not going to—we could. One option 

would be to invade Iraq. That’s—or Iran, rather. That’s been proposed before. At what cost? I mean, anybody here want to push 

that idea forward in a meaningful way? I doubt it. 

So, at some time, we’re going to have to figure out how to come 

to grips with this. So, how do you do that? You recognize that 

everybody’s got a dog in the fight, they all want something. And 

we ought to, I think, decide what things that we might accept— 

some role for them in the region, I would think—but some things 

we’re not going to accept. We don’t want any part of the nuclear 

weapons program that they seem to be embarked on. 

But, their time, I think, is being stressed right now. Certainly, 

the economic conditions. There has been a—apparently, a pretty 

notable effect of sanctions working against them. And, of course, 

the people that usually take the brunt of this are the common folk, 

not the leaders. But, nonetheless, they’ve had a dramatic impact on 

that country. I think the price of oil clearly is a detriment to them. 

And, frankly, they haven’t been particularly successful of late in 

other places of—where their surrogates are engaged in the region. 

I think that we can’t expect that we’re going to have one solution 

that’s going to solve all these problems. So, back to the—first 

things first. Let’s decide what we want for the long term. Can we 

accept Iran playing some kind of role in this region? If so, how do 

we get from where we are today to there? 

At the tactical level, allowing them to get away with instigations 

and things like they have done in the past in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

other places, we shouldn’t permit. Tactically, I think we act to 

block those things when we can. 

The fact that you’ve got Sunnis and Shi’as at each others’ throats 

in many places here, something that we’re not going to go in and 

say, ‘‘Okay, guys, sit down, stop this’’—we’re not going to solve it. 

But, I think we act strategically in trying to decide where we want 

our place to be in the region, and then we work hard against those 

things that—at the tactical level, that are real problems. 

So, Iraq today is a real problem. I think to let it just go isn’t 

going to be acceptable. We’re going to have to continue to do what 

we’re doing to try to take back the territory that they’ve lost. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I certainly appreciate 

your service on this panel today as well as your many years of 

service to the United States. We are very grateful for that. 

67 

I do agree that we have to have a national security strategy. And 

this is very important. What we have seen, all of you have mentioned, that, with sequestration, our effects, globally, have been diminished, and we are reacting in a knee-jerk way to threats as 

they come visible. So, we don’t have an overarching strategy anywhere today. And I think that’s a great detriment to all of the citizens here in the United States. 

But, what I’d like to focus on is, with what we have seen in 

Iraq—I served in Iraq from 2003 to 2004, at a very low, company 

level—but, we invested so much effort in that region, and we withdrew from that region before many of our military leaders believed 

we should withdraw. And I do believe we are seeing that in Afghanistan now, also. These are areas, especially when it comes to 

Afghanistan—it’s not talked about so much in the media anymore. 

Again, we seem to focus just on one issue at a time rather than 

looking at threats globally. 

With Afghanistan, we see that we have a proposed timeline for 

withdrawal. And, General Keane, you stated that perhaps we won’t 

be ready by 2016 to withdraw our troops. I just sent, on Saturday— 

was at a sendoff ceremony for the 361st Medical Logistics Company. They’re deploying to Afghanistan, and their mission is to assist in the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. How long, General Keane, do you believe that it will take for us, realistically— 

forget the timeline that’s proposed right now—for the Afghan National Security Forces to fill a role and be able to sustain and keep 

open those lines of communication, to maintain security within Afghanistan? Or are we repeating what’s happening in Iraq? 

General KEANE. Yeah. Well, that’s a tough question. 

Listen, I’m very empathetic to the American people’s frustration 

and many—maybe many of you here in the room today, as well. 

Look it, we’ve been at this thing for 13 years. And in 13 years, 

given the United States, you would think we’d be able to resolve 

this on favorable terms for ourselves and our National interests. 

Well, it hasn’t happened. The facts are, policy decisions drove the 

13-year war. It was policy that drove us to a war in Iraq and put 

Afghanistan on a diet for over 8 years. We never got back to it 

again until 2009, when the current President made a decision to 

increase the forces in Afghanistan. 

But, the—here’s the problem we’ve got, Senator. When we increased those forces in Afghanistan, the so-called ‘‘Afghanistan 

surge,’’ McChrystal and Petraeus got 25 percent less than what 

they needed to do the job. As a result of that, we were never able 

to apply the surge forces in the eastern part of Afghanistan as we 

did so successfully in the south. Another policy decision pulled 

those forces out, over the objection of then-General Petraeus serving in Afghanistan, in our judgment, prematurely, and no application of surge forces whatsoever dealt with the Haqqani Network in 

the east. The facts are, the Haqqani Network is in those safe havens in the east, they’re embedded in there, and the Afghan National Security Forces—this is my judgment—does not have the capability, currently, to be able to deal with that harsh reality. 

What makes this so serious strategically inside Afghanistan is 

Kabul’s presence to the Haqqani Network. Everything that gets lit 

68 

up in Kabul is done by the Haqqani Network, and they are in the 

environs right now with support infrastructure surrounding Kabul. 

The only thing that we can do to change that dimension is, one, 

increase the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces—and, 

by God, we’ve got to hold them at 352-. Anybody coming to you and 

telling you that we should put the Afghan National Security Forces 

on a decline after 2016 is absolutely foolish and irresponsible in 

that recommendation. So, we have to hold to that line, and this 

Congress has got to fund it. It’s got to probably fund it for at least 

4 or 5 more years after we pull out of there. Otherwise, we really 

don’t have a chance. 

Second, we have got to step up to what two Presidents have 

failed to do, and that is deal with these sanctuaries in Pakistan 

from which intelligence, support, and training for operations inside 

Afghanistan comes. This is Afghan Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. And specifically, the Haqqani Network should be targeted 

just like al-Qaeda. We will—in targeting them, we will disrupt it, 

disrupt their command and control, and disrupt their operations. 

Then we begin to have a chance. 

Second, we cannot pull out our counterterrorism forces at 2016. 

These are the guys who chased down high-value targets. When we 

did that in Iraq in 2011, it was a disaster. When al-Qaeda began 

to rise because we pulled out the intelligence capability to see it, 

we didn’t have—we couldn’t see it, and we couldn’t hit it. If we do 

that in Afghanistan, I think it’s a death knell for Afghanistan. 

Yes, 13 years is a very long time to be there. But, to squander 

those gains in the face of what we’re dealing with makes no sense 

to me. I don’t know how long we would need to keep those troops 

there. Right now, the plan is to pull them out after 2016. We are 

talking, likely, a number around 10,000 troops. Most of them would 

be in the train, assist, and advise role, which means they’re not in 

combat. A very small portion of them would be in combat, and that 

is our direct-action forces. 

I think if we educate and explain to the American people what 

this really is, I think they could possibly support it, and I would 

hope the Congress of the United States would support it. 

What drives their departure should be conditions on the ground 

and on the commanders’ assessment, as well. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. I do agree. And many sacrifices have 

been made there, and I think that we are falling into those same 

mistakes. I would rather see us fully engaged and defeat these 

threats rather than half-step, which is why we need an all-encompassing national security. 

So, thank you, gentlemen, very much. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thanks, to the witnesses, for the excellent testimony. I heard 

a lot I agreed with, a lot I disagreed with; and, as you say, that’s 

why you’re here, to provoke our thinking. 

It seems that there are two very solid points of agreement among 

the three sets of testimony—first, that we are taking a fragmented, 

reactive approach to global challenges now; and second, that that 

fragmented approach may be driven, or at least exacerbated, by 

69 

budgetary dysfunction and decision—indecision here in Washington. You know, ideally, we would have a strategy, and then we 

would build a budget to support the strategy. Secondarily, we 

would allow budget to drive strategy. But, we’ve been letting budgetary indecision drive strategy, which is, by far, the worst thing to 

do. So, I appreciate your comments about both. And I agree with 

you, I think our approach is a fragmented one, and I think it’s exacerbated by budgetary indecision. 

We had a overarching national security strategy, beginning with 

President Truman deciding to support Greece after World War II, 

the Truman Doctrine, and it explained a lot of what we did, even 

things like the creation of the Peace Corps or the race to the Moon. 

You might like the strategy, or not, but it was a unified strategy. 

When the Soviet Union collapsed, we went to a reactive, case-bycase. After 9/11, we had a strategy again, which was the war on 

terror. But, over time, that strategy was not a magnanimous 

enough, big enough strategy for a nation like us, and I think we’ve 

devolved, after 13 years of war and some fatigue, back into the 

case-by-case approach that is reactive and that is hard for our allies and even our citizens to understand. 

It seems like, in the world now, if you look at it in analogy to 

the post-World War II, it’s not a bipolar competition, it’s a tripolar 

one. There are the democracies of the world, led by the United 

States, but other democracies—India, where the President is visiting now, European nations, South American nations—there are 

many democracies, and we’re the leader. There are the authoritarian nations, with Russia and China chief among them, but 

North Korea and Iran and other nations in that category. And then 

there’s the jihadists. And the jihadists, some are nations, but many 

are nonstate actors. And that is a new challenge. So, the competition today is between democracies, authoritarian regimes, and 

nonstate jihadism, and that makes the challenge of forging a strategy critical. It’s difficult, but it’s critical. And you’ve raised important questions for us to grapple with. 

One of the things I’d like to ask you is, in tackling the jihadism 

threat that we have, each of you have been active in battling this 

threat using military means, but I think we all understand that 

part of the jihadism accelerant is disaffected young people and the 

allure of young people into a—kind of a nihilistic jihadist element 

because of the lack of their own opportunities. What should we be 

doing to try to counter the radicalization of young people in the region? How can we assist regional actors and others in doing that 

so that we can shut off the allure and the foreign fighters that are 

flocking to groups like ISIL? 

General MATTIS. Senator, I think that what you have to look at 

is a definition of the problem that is so rigorous that some of the 

solutions start coming forward. For example, there are two basic 

brands of jihadist terrorists. One comes out of Tehran. We know it 

as Lebanese Hezbollah, declared war on us back in 1983, blew up 

our Embassy in Beirut, blew up the French paratrooper barracks, 

the marine barracks, and we’ve seen them continue to march on 

basically unchecked by our counterterrorism efforts. The other 

brand comes from the Sunni. We know it as al-Qaeda and associated movements. And so, as we define these, we don’t lump them 

70 

together, we don’t give them any inadvertent support by giving 

them a cloak of legitimacy, and then we determine, if they’re not— 

this is not in our best interest, and what is feeding it is not in our 

best interests—political Islam—then how do we support the countervailing forces? 

President al-Sisi’s speech on the 1st of January at al-Azar University, where he said, ‘‘This has got to end’’—he’s talking to his 

own clerics, now—‘‘This has—we’ve got to quit doing this to the 

world with—and dressing it up in the guise of Islam.’’ There are 

people out there—United Arab Emirates, what we in the military 

call ‘‘little Sparta,’’ because they always stuck with us through everything—Jordan—there are countervailing people in the region, 

leaders in the region, thought leaders in the region, and we should 

be full—fully in support of them, not—but, if we don’t define this 

threat, break it out, identify the countervailing forces and come up 

with a strategy that supports exactly what you’re talking about, 

then we’ll continue to be spectators as this mutates and grows. 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask you this. I think you all are on the 

same page on another item, which is—Do you all agree that it is 

a mistake to use a calendar to determine the end date of our 

Afghanistani involvement rather than an assessment of the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan? Are you all in the same position on that? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

General KEANE. Yes, sir. 

Admiral FALLON. Yes, I’d like to—certainly, that’s the case. 

Senator KAINE. Right. 

Admiral FALLON. But, I think the—we need a little clarity and 

definition again, just like Jim tried to draw, between the Iranianinspired revolutionary—— 

Senator KAINE. Versus the Sunni. 

Admiral FALLON.—jihadists, versus disaffected bubbas, here, 

who—looking for help. 

So, we talk about withdrawal from Afghanistan—and I saw this, 

at least from my view—we got into the same morass in Iraq a few 

years ago—so it was this idea that we’re in or we’re out. You know, 

we’re going to withdraw we’re not going to withdraw. I think that 

the reality is, our best interests are served, not by withdrawing 

from many places in this world, but from continuing engagement. 

So, what we ought to be talking about is—what’s already, I believe, put in place—our major combat engagements have ceased 

and are not likely to be reengaged. However, we ought to be continually engaged with them in assisting them in training and supporting them and, in some areas, using Special Forces in areas that 

we have capabilities and they do not, when we see things that challenge our interests. So, I think we—we just need to be clear about 

this. It isn’t just ‘‘we’re in or we’re out.’’ We ought to be in, in my 

opinion, to do certain things, to continue to help this government 

to move along. And those things are not going to be successful on 

their own. But, if taken in concert with economic steps and political 

steps on the government, we may have a chance to actually see a 

long-term good outcome, here. 

Senator KAINE. Right. 

71 

Admiral FALLON. But, I think it’s this clarity in talk. Just stop 

the, you know, ‘‘blah, blah, blah.’’ Everybody gets confused, we 

get—end up with nothing. And the media just fuels this, because 

they’ll pick on a specific word somewhere, and here you go. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, thank you. I’ve really enjoyed this and 

have gotten a lot out of it, and it’s given me a lot to think about, 

quite frankly. 

I just regret—to our media friends who are here, thank you for 

coming. Maybe if we had Tom Brady, we’d fill up the room. But, 

that’s the world in which we live in. We’re talking about consequential things, and we’ve got a couple of reporters here. 

At the end of the day, let’s see what we do agree on. This is a 

generational struggle when it comes to radical Islam, Sunni, and 

Shi’a. Do you all agree? Somebody will be dealing with this long 

after most of us are gone. But, over time, we win, they lose, right? 

Admiral FALLON. If we can come up with a strategy for—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Let me tell you why I think they lose. What 

they’re selling, very few people actually want to buy. The ace in the 

hole for all of us, ladies and gentlemen, is that the radical Islamic 

view of life is not embraced by most people in the religion. We just 

need to provide them the capacity to fight back over there so we 

can be protected here. Does that make sense? Now, how do you do 

that? 

Sequestration. Do you all agree that it should be, if not repealed, 

replaced? 

Admiral FALLON. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. All agree. If we don’t replace sequestration, our 

capability to deal with the National security threats you’ve described is greatly diminished. Is that correct? 

Admiral FALLON. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. The enemy is on the rise, and our capabilities 

are going down. Is that a correct assessment? 

General MATTIS. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree that our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies are on a path to reduce their capability, not increase it? 

General KEANE. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, we’ve got two things going on. We’ve got 

the enemy on the rise, we’ve got America cutting her budget, and 

we’ve got our NATO allies reducing theirs—budgets to help us as 

partners. Is that a formula for disaster? 

Admiral FALLON. Pretty close. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. The 150 account. General Mattis, you 

said, if we cut State Department funding in our developmental accounts under the 150 account, Foreign Assistance, you’d better— 

you’ll need more ammunition. Do you still agree with that? 

General MATTIS. I do, sir. We need a comprehensive approach. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yeah. 

Senator GRAHAM. Admiral Fallon? 

72 

Admiral FALLON. For sure. Can I give you an example of something? 

Senator GRAHAM. Sure, please. 

Admiral FALLON. Back when I was at CENTCOM, one of my 

frustrations was an inability to delegate enough time to engage in 

Central Asia. And what I saw, back in those times there, about a 

half-dozen years ago, was that we had people who were looking for 

something other than what they had—the Soviet Union. They were 

concerned about being in a squeeze between a resurgent Russia 

and China, and we were kind of a lifeline. And we had almost no 

engagement, because we didn’t have the resources, the interest, the 

time to devote to things like telling people what things are really 

like in America. You know, we used to have these—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, sir. 

Admiral FALLON.—kind of storefront shops that—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I—— 

Admiral FALLON.—used diplomatic engagement. That’s all disappeared. 

Senator GRAHAM. I don’t—I couldn’t agree with you more, but Africa—we have a very light military footprint in Africa. Is that correct? 

Admiral FALLON. Very much so. 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s a continent very much up in the air, in 

terms of how it will turn out with the 21st century. 

I just want the members of the committee to know that I am the 

chairman of the Foreign Operations Account. And if you think sequestration is bad for the military, you ought to see what it does 

to our capability to engage the world peacefully. It absolutely destroys it, which is insane. We’ve—on the verge of eradicating malaria, not—well, we’re making great progress in AIDS and malaria 

and polio; and all this stuff really does matter, in my view. 

Iraq. General Mattis, how many marines did we have in the second battle of Fallujah to retake Fallujah, do you remember? 

General MATTIS. In the second battle, sir, it probably would have 

been somewhere around—including the supporting elements, firing 

and support, that sort of thing—probably around 10,000. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, we had Army personnel to assist in there, 

is that correct? 

General MATTIS. Absolutely. They were significant Army support. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, Fallujah is one-tenth the size of Mosul. Is 

that right, General Keane? Fallujah is about one-tenth— 

How in the world do we go into Fallujah—excuse me—Mosul— 

if the past is any indication of the future, if we had 10,000 marines—and I think it was about 9,000, actually—engaged in helping 

the Iraqi Security Forces liberate Fallujah from al-Qaeda in Iraq, 

who I think is weaker than ISIL—how in the world do we do this 

in Mosul without a larger American component? Can you envision 

that being successful without more American help, General Keane? 

General KEANE. I don’t know for sure. I mean, as I said in my 

remarks, we are advising, training, and assisting an indigenous 

force. We made a policy decision not to commit ground combat force 

to do that. I basically agree with that decision. 

Senator GRAHAM. I’m not saying that we need—you said we need 

brigades in the ready in Kuwait. 

73 

General KEANE. I believe—— 

Senator GRAHAM. You said—— 

General KEANE. I—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Excuse me. 

General KEANE. If—— 

Senator GRAHAM. You said we needed people on the front lines, 

embedded in Iraqi units. Is that correct? 

General KEANE. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. What number does that come out to, in your 

mind? 

General KEANE. Well, I think we get very close to a number, in 

train and assist and advising, something close to 10,000. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

General KEANE. And—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I just—— 

General KEANE.—not the few hundred that we’re currently doing. 

I’m talking about front-line advisors with companies and battalions—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I got you, and I’ve got 30 seconds left. 

So, we’ve got 3,000 on the ground today. We need 10,000, in your 

view. I think that’s correct. If we lose in Mosul—if we take ISIL 

on and lose, that’s a bad day for all of us. Do you agree? You’ve 

got to take these guys on and win. All of you agree? Don’t take 

them on if you can’t win. 

Syria. Do you all—how many of you support a no-fly zone, a buffer zone to allow the Free Syrian Army—— 

General KEANE. I do. 

Senator GRAHAM. General Mattis, no? 

General MATTIS. Not until we figure out what we want the end 

state to look like. 

Senator GRAHAM. Fair enough. 

Admiral? 

Admiral FALLON. No, I’ve been a part of a 10-year effort in Iraq 

that ended up being—— 

Senator GRAHAM. So—— 

Admiral FALLON.—basically, wasted. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Let me just ask this simple question. 

One of the reasons that ISIL was defeated in Khobani—and I want 

to tip my hat to the Kurds and to our coalition forces—is that you 

had the Kurds fighting ISIL on the ground, and you had American 

air power. What happens if we send the Free Syrian Army, trained 

up, into Syria to fight ISIL and we don’t neutralize Assad’s air 

power? Do you not believe that he will engage the Free Syrian 

Army through the air? How do they survive if he does that? 

General KEANE. Well, the facts are, he’s engaging the Free Syrian Army right now. The Free Syrian Army today, on the 

ground—— 

You know what’s so frustrating about this? When the moderate 

rebels took on Assad’s regime, back in 2010—do you remember 

this? They had the momentum. There were many predicting that 

the regime was about to fall. What happened? What happened? 

This is what happened. The Iranians jumped in with 5,000 

Hezbollah out of Lebanon. They jumped in with 3,000 Quds Force, 

plus they had top leaders on the ground to assist, and Russian airVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
74 

planes flying in with Iranian airplanes with military supplies, 

every single day. The Free Syrian Army came to us, the momentum shifted, and they said, ‘‘What?’’ And many of you were on their 

dance card when they came to town here. I—even I was on it, as 

probably my two colleagues? What did they want? They wanted 

simply this, ‘‘We need arms to be able to stop anti-—tank systems 

and antiaircraft systems to shoot down those airplanes. We don’t 

need your troops, we don’t even need your air power. Let us fight 

this war ourselves. We think we can win it.’’ And we said no. We 

have never recovered from that decision. 

That decision was revisited again with strong feelings by 

Petraeus, Clinton, Panetta, and Dempsey in 2012. Took it to the 

White House, said, ‘‘This is what we’ve got to do.’’ Petraeus vetted 

that force as the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Director. The 

President said no. We have never recovered from that decision. 

General MATTIS. I think we may have missed the opportunity to 

work with the Free Syrian Army. They’ve been ground down between—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General MATTIS.—al-Nusra and—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General MATTIS.—ISIS, on one side, Assad on the other. I—we 

may—we’re going to have to really look at what options we have, 

sir. 

Admiral FALLON. The only comment I’d make is that we can sit 

here and wring our hands and bemoan the past in lots of situations. We need to deal with the present. So, for now, forget the 

past, except for lessons learned for new strategies, but we need to 

figure out what it’s going to take right now to move forward. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, let me tell you what I think the presence 

is—present—is that Syria and Iraq are great platforms to attack 

the United States. And if we keep screwing around with this, and 

these guys get stronger and, a year from now, they’re still in place, 

we’re going to get hit. It’s time to put these guys on the run with 

a regional force that we complement. 

Because let me tell you about the end game, General Mattis. The 

end game is, America’s going to get attacked if we don’t deal with 

the threat in Iraq and Syria. That—do you agree with that? 

General MATTIS. One-hundred percent, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I want to thank all of you for your extraordinary service. We 

are so much in your debt. 

And America has already been attacked, in that we have lost a 

number of our young people already to ISIL. Tragically, in my 

home State. And this is—they’ve said they’re a caliphate, which 

means they either grow or they go. And in Iraq, I would like to get 

your best ideas. General Keane, you’re—you were really influential 

in working with the Sunni community there and in trying to push 

back, before. How do we coordinate with them, work with them, to 

push ISIS out of Iraq and then to get them in Syria? And then I’d 

like to, obviously, hear from General Mattis and Admiral Fallon, 

because of your hard work in this, as well. 

75 

General KEANE. Well, you know, when you think about the 

Sunnis, I mean, the Sunni tribes are not a homogeneous organization, to say the least, and all of us are very familiar with it at this 

table. 

Senator DONNELLY. Right. 

General KEANE. So, we have irreconcilable Sunni tribes—many 

of them are part of the former Saddam Hussein regime elements— 

who are fighting with ISIS, and they will continue to fight with 

ISIS. The rest of them, by and large, are reconcilable. And what 

happened before in Iraq informs of this. When they pushed back 

against al-Qaeda, beginning in Anbar Province, and moved into 

Diyala Province and other places where Sunnis lived—they know 

they have made a bed with strange fellows, here. They know that 

it’s not in their interest to support the long-term objective of ISIS, 

which—ISIS wants to govern the populations it controls, and impose seventh-century Talibanism on it. 

Right now in Mosul—this is what life is like—all universities and 

school systems are shut down. The only schools that are operating 

are the madrassas, indoctrinating radical Islamists, ISIS believes, 

and a medical school that they—they’re forcing students into to become doctors to take care of their wounded. 

Second, they do not run government services very well. Garbage 

is on the streets. Other government services aren’t provided. The 

people in Mosul are not recreating at all, they’re not even socializing with extended family members who don’t live in their immediate vicinity. Life as they knew it—teeming marketplaces, traffic 

jams, a thriving community—is gone. 

Senator DONNELLY. So, how would you push them—— 

General KEANE. So, what we know—— 

Senator DONNELLY. And I apologize if you already answered—— 

General KEANE. We know that that exists. We know that ISIS 

and reconcilable Sunnis are on a collision course. What we have to 

do is incentivize them more than what we are doing now, to get 

at your question. 

One of the things we can do. Obviously, Abadi is key to this, as 

Admiral Fallon laid out. And I strongly support that. 

Second, where—we need to go into Anbar Province—and we have 

some plans for this—to train and arm the Sunni tribes. But, we’ve 

got to take another step with that. We’ve got to be willing to be 

on the ground with them when they take the fight to ISIS. We 

need advisors with them. We need people to help coordinate fire 

support and close air support with them. That will incentivize 

them. We need to help to accelerate that timetable for them. 

The thing that we have working for us—again, to emphasize 

this—is ISIS itself. But, here’s the problem we have. The political 

leadership in Iraq does not want to wait, because the pressure they 

have on them from the people in Mosul—and the conditions that 

I am describing to you are very real, and they are accountable to 

those conditions—they want to go faster. The United States is pulling back and saying we’re not ready. The military in Iraq wants 

to go faster, because it’s answering to its national leadership. We’re 

not ready to do this yet. I’m not certain we’re going to be ready to 

do it by the summer. And—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Well—— 

76 

General KEANE.—the reason is, we’re not applying enough resources to it, Senator. 

Senator DONNELLY. I was just going to ask you. Are we not ready 

because we don’t have the ability to do it or because we don’t have 

the plan to do what’s necessary? 

General KEANE. Well, mostly, I believe—listen, we can craft a 

counteroffensive plan to take back Mosul and also to take back 

Anbar Province. We know how to do that. That’s tacking up the 

two great biblical river valleys. Most of this is about resources and 

dealing with what most of us believe is a relatively weak indigenous hand on the ground that we’re playing. If you’ve got a weak 

hand, then we should be strengthening that hand, not with the 

minimum amount of resources, but with all the resources it takes 

to strengthen that hand. And we’re not doing that. 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, here’s my fear, is that this is a hotbed. 

This is where they are communicating with people in our country 

to attack us, in Syria and in Iraq and with ISIS. And if we have 

resources, they ought to be used in this area, it seems to me, that 

we either eliminate them or there’s going to be a catastrophe in our 

own country. 

I would like to hear what you think about how we start to go on 

the move in Syria, as well. 

General Mattis? 

General MATTIS. Senator, the first thing—we don’t lack military 

capability. It’s been—sequestration has stressed it. What we lack 

is the political will and the definition of the political end state. If 

we get—if we figure out whose side we’re on, here, then when you 

look at what Maliki did to break trust with those tribes, I think 

the new Prime Minister has probably got a 50–50 chance of restoring that trust. It’s hard. Putting in the Sunni Minister of Defense 

was a great step, I think. But, we’re going to have to decide if— 

what the end state is, and then we’re going to have to commit resources that we’ve not committed yet. 

Senator DONNELLY. I am out of time, but I just want to thank 

all of you for coming here today, for continuing your service, because the people of our country continue to need your help. Thank 

you very much. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I, also, want to thank you, gentlemen, for 

your—for being here today, your great service, tremendous service 

to our country. 

So, I think there’s broad agreement that seems, certainly among 

the three of you, I think among all the panelists here, on the importance of a comprehensive strategy that integrates all elements 

of American power, all of our resources. And we’ve talked about 

economic, we’ve talked about diplomatic, we’ve talked about finance. Certainly, we are focused on military. 

One instrument of American power, though, that we haven’t really discussed, hasn’t really come up in the conversations yet—and 

maybe it’s because, 10 years ago, it didn’t exist as an instrument 

of power—is American energy. As you know, we are once again on 

the verge, if we haven’t already gotten there, on being the world’s 

energy superpower, a position that we used to occupy, several decades ago. And now we’re back. Oil, gas, renewables. 

77 

And, from the perspective of dealing with long-term national security threats, whether it’s Iran, whether it’s Russia, whether it’s 

China, whether it’s ISIS—I just want to start with two questions 

for you, General Keane. How critical and beneficial do you think 

it is, in dealing with these longer-term threats, that we now have 

a tremendous resource in America, which is energy, that—not only 

for our own citizens, but that we can be exporting to our allies? 

And do you think it undermines America’s security when we undertake policies, as the current administration does on a regular 

basis—this weekend is another example—where we undermine 

policies that enable us to responsibly develop our own energy resources that can benefit us as a nation and our National security? 

General KEANE. Well, certainly, energy independence for the 

United States and the rapid growth that’s taken place, you know, 

most recently, is certainly an added measure of our National security. And I’m delighted to see it. And my own view of it—I’m not 

an energy expert—is that certainly we should do whatever we can 

to ensure that independence—and I’m convinced we can still protect the environment while we’re doing it. 

Its relationship to the world is significant. I mean, you hit on it. 

Europeans are tied like an umbilical cord to Putin and Russia because of the energy dependence. We can help with that if we 

changed our policies, in terms of particularly exporting natural gas, 

as you know. 

But, also we have to be realistic. Radical Islam and what is taking place in these countries, laid out on this map, is a fundamental 

geopolitical movement, and they’re operating in countries where 

there are not democracies and where there are significant conditions that have—providing a groundswell for this kind of activity. 

They would be doing that, regardless of Saudi oil, or not. That— 

we’ve got to understand that. So, if we pull the plug of any dependence in the Middle East on oil, which we’re on the way to doing, 

it doesn’t change the harsh reality of Iran’s march to regional 

domination and radical Islamist march to geopolitical control of 

Muslim countries. That’s still there, and that threat to Europe and 

to the United States as a result of it would exist, regardless. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

I’d like to move from the strategic to the tactical. I’ve had the 

honor, the last 18 months, as serving as a commanding officer of 

6 ANGLICO in the Marine Corps Forces Reserves. In fact, I was 

just out with some of my ANGLICO marines, Fort Lewis, Washington, this past weekend. 

General Mattis, the marines of 6 ANGLICO send their greetings. 

As you know, that mission is—of the ANGLICO units is to deploying small forces with foreign armies, calling airstrikes, other 

supporting arms. 

General Mattis, this question is for you. To make progress on the 

ground against ISIL, is there any scenario that you could see that 

would not include integrated supporting arms firepower? And are 

there foreign forces that can do that, or is that something that is 

an area that is pretty much needed to have American troops, 

whether ANGLICO units or Special Forces units, doing that kind 

of mission? 

78 

General MATTIS. Senator, there are other forces—the Australians, Canadians, British, French—that can do the close-air coordination integration, but no one has the capacity or probably the 

frequency of training that permits us to do it best. I would only 

suggest that, as you look at this and the kind of forces that can 

work with allies, this committee should prioritize them, whether 

they be the Army Green Berets, the Marines ANGLICO, and even 

to the point of looking at our Army brigades today, our Marine battalions, differently than we looked at them as just conventional 

warfighters 10 years ago. They have capabilities to do much of this 

and to give a—kind of steel the spine of the allied forces if we have 

the political will to put them in. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Great. Thank you very much. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

And I want to thank all three of you for your very substantive 

and provocative testimony. 

General Keane, you described life in Mosul, where schools are 

just set up to radicalize the population, where just everyday life 

has changed. And one wonders how long ISIL can so-called ‘‘govern’’ in this way. So, you’re indicating that we need to be—‘‘we,’’ 

the United States—should have people on the ground, not in— 

boots on the ground, when the people in Iraq finally get to the 

point where they want to fight ISIL. Now, the question becomes, 

then, When is that time? And would you say that that is perhaps 

a major role for our intelligence community, to inform us as to 

when that critical point is that we need to be there to help the people fight back? 

And I’d also like to ask that question of General Keane, because, 

General Keane, you noted the importance of our intelligence community in establishing priorities. 

General KEANE. Yeah, the—listen, that’s a very tough question, 

Senator. The only thing I can—in helping you with that, is just 

look back a little bit. 

We had an insurgency begin in Iraq in the spring and summer 

of 2003. The al-Qaeda—led by Saddam Hussein and his people— 

the al-Qaeda fell in on that very quickly. And then in 2006, some 

2 and a half, 3 years later, Sunni tribes began to—who were 

aligned with them initially—began to push back. And much of it 

was literally driven by women, frankly, because the women were 

putting pressure on the tribal leaders, that they did not want their 

children and their grandchildren to live like this for generations to 

come, with seventh-century Talibanism, under the foot of what alQaeda was doing, controlling every aspect of their life, from diet to 

costume, behavior, Shari’ah law, et cetera. 

That frustration is already there. I do believe that, given the fact 

that, particularly in Anbar Province, this has existed before, the 

accelerant will be faster and not take 3 years. 

I’m going to make an assumption that our intelligence community, with the use of informants and others, are monitoring what 

is taking place, and we have some sense of what the conditions are, 

and, more importantly, what the attitude and behavior are of the 

people, themselves. 

79 

But, let’s also be honest, that there’s just so much those people 

in Mosul will be able to do against a well-armed and well-equipped 

force, as ISIS is, in Mosul and in its suburbs. To eject them out 

of there will take a conventional military force to do that, supported by air power and some pretty good intelligence on where 

people are. 

The attitude and support of the people will be a factor, but I 

don’t believe, in of itself, it will be decisive. What will be decisive 

is the use of military force to defeat that military organization 

that’s there. 

Senator HIRONO. And the conventional military force should be 

the Iraqi military, themselves, with—— 

General KEANE. Yes. 

Senator HIRONO.—possible air support from—— 

General KEANE. Yes—— 

Senator HIRONO.—from allies. 

General KEANE.—very much so. Well, it’s—Peshmerga, as you 

know, who is the militia from Kurdistan, who have the will to 

fight, and the skill—they don’t have all the weapons they need— 

Iraqi Army—and, by the way, the Iraqi Army probably is in a little 

bit better shape, based on some recent reports I just got this weekend from people who returned, than many of the media reports are 

suggesting. But, second—and thirdly would be the Sunni tribes. 

Now, the Shi’a militia are a part of this, and they have strengthened the Iraqi Army very considerably. The best fighters in the 

Shi’a militia are Iranian-backed Shi’a militia. 

Senator HIRONO. General, I’m sorry to cut you off. 

General KEANE. Go ahead, I’ll stop. 

Senator HIRONO. I have a couple of other questions, particularly 

with reference to the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. 

And, General Mattis, I think you indicated in your testimony the 

importance of the Navy. And clearly, Admiral Fallon, you have a 

familiarity with what’s going on in the Asia-Pacific area, because 

of your previous position. 

So, the Navy is intending to put 60 percent of our ships in the 

Asia-Pacific area. So, for the two of you, I’d like to know, How is 

this viewed by China? How is it—how is this kind of resource 

placement, due to our rebalance, seen by our allies and by our enemies? Just very briefly, if—please comment. 

General MATTIS. Senator, I think, very briefly—this is a little bit 

speculative, now—I think 60 percent of too few is probably still too 

few. But, I think that anything we can do to reassure our ally that 

their economic, territorial future is not going to be under the veto 

of the Chinese would be welcome out in the Pacific. 

Senator HIRONO. Admiral Fallon? 

Admiral FALLON. Aloha, Senator. 

Senator HIRONO. Aloha. 

Admiral FALLON. I think this whole discussion of the pivot has 

been distorted and not handled particularly well at all. So, just a 

couple of facts: 

So, 60 percent versus 50 percent, which is what we in the 

Navy—and we’ll just stick to the Navy now—the Navy was pretty 

well split 50–50 during the cold war. As soon as the cold war 

ended, internal Navy leadership started to press to rebalance, way 

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before this became a recent political slogan, and—because it made 

sense, because of the vast size of the Pacific, and so forth. But, that 

10 percent, if you just take one denomination—aircraft carriers— 

that’s one aircraft carrier, based on today’s fleet. And, by the way, 

that carrier is already in the Pacific. So, much of this is just chatter, pretty mindless. Again, take another measure, the entire fleet, 

at 280 ships, 10 percent of that’s 28. So, what are we really talking 

about? Not a whole lot. 

But, the perceptions are all over the place. And, depending on 

who you are and in what country you are in Asia—if you’re Chinese, you use this as a great example of, ‘‘See? We knew that you 

guys are coming to, you know, encircle us. It’s yet another blah, 

blah, blah,’’ and a justification, in some respects, for them to push 

to increase their military capabilities. 

So, I think it’s a—it’s overblown. The reality is, we need to be 

engaged in the Far East, in the Asia-Pacific. And, given the size 

and scope of the place, it makes all the sense in the world to have 

our fleet tilted that way, given the realities in the world. We need 

to work very closely with our long-term allies out there—the Japanese, the Australians, and others, and those who support us. But, 

at the same time, we have got to work this difficult task of trying 

to figure out how we collaborate, in ways that make sense, with the 

Chinese for the long term. It’s a huge country, huge impact, blah, 

blah, blah. You know the impact economically in this country. 

And so, we don’t need to have another cold war. We don’t need 

to have another road to conflict with these guys. We have very interesting, deep relationships in every aspect, except the military-tomilitary. That’s where the emphasis needs to be. I think our leadership, particularly the military leadership in our country, is working this right now, and we need to continue it. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much. 

My time is up. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership and 

your extraordinary record of service. 

General Mattis, you made a comment that we seem to be at 

about a low point with our Middle East policy or effectiveness over 

the last four decades. Can you point to anything, say, over the last 

6 or 8 years, that you think is something positive that we’ve done 

that we should build on, and in the context of the number of things 

that you’ve said that are not working? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir, I can. We’ve been somewhat in a strategy-free environment for quite some time. It didn’t start with this 

administration. And so, we’ve been wandering. We have policies 

that go on and come off. But, I think if you were to look at the fact 

that Maliki was pushed out of office, with our full support there inside Baghdad, I think that was a positive step. We cannot get Iraq 

to fight this enemy when they have a Prime Minister who’s basically declared Kurds and Sunni persona non grata in their own 

country. I think the engagement—the President going to Saudi 

Arabia as we speak is certainly a positive point. 

You know, I’d have to think more, Senator, but I’ll take it for the 

record. If I think of something more, I’ll get back to you. We’ve disVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
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appointed a lot of friends out there, from Tel Aviv to Riyadh, from 

Abu Dhabi to Cairo. 

Senator TILLIS. General Keane, you mentioned the need to 

equate, I think, radical Islamists to Nazis and Communists of the 

past. Why do you think it’s important to use those words? And why 

do you think it’s dangerous not to? 

General KEANE. Well, I use it because it’s something we coped 

with in the past rather successfully, and they were ideologies, 

themselves, you know, that another generation had to deal with. 

We built—we beat Naziism with brute force. And I think Communist ideology that expresses simplistically—it’s only more sophisticated than that—but, simplistically, I think we beat it with 

better ideas. I think it’s a combination of both of those that we 

need, to deal with radical Islam. We obviously need to use force. 

But, that alone will not solve this problem. 

And it—the ideology also has to be dealt with. After all, what 

they are running from and why they do not want the United States 

in the region, it’s not because—just because of our guns. It’s because of our ideas. It’s democracy and capitalism that is an anathema to them, and they don’t want our ideas polluting those governments that they’re attempting to overthrow so that they move in 

a direction of those ideas. 

So, that’s why I used that, because we want to run from the ideological aspect of this thing, and you have to face it, and you have 

to explain it, and you have to undermine it, and you have to 

counter it. 

Senator TILLIS. Admiral Fallon? 

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I think that one of the problems today 

with this radical jihadist stuff is that we give it unmerited credibility. I don’t view this problem in the same context as I view, for 

example, the need to make sure this country is fundamentally 

sound in its political, economic, and other aspects going forward for 

our future, nor do I think that it’s in the same relative merit as 

our long-term relationship with China. 

And the extent to which we hype everything that seems to happen with these characters, I think, is one of the reasons why 

they’re attractive to the disenfranchised and the folks who are 

struggling in other countries that see this as a chance to gain glory 

and go help out the crusade. 

So, I think we’d be well served to try to tamp this stuff down. 

This army, if you would, in Iraq and Syria is certainly not the 82nd 

Airborne or the 1st Marine Division, by any means. It’s a pickup 

band of jihadists that share blah, blah, blah—we’ve gone through 

that. They are not in the same league with our capabilities. And 

I think the extent to which we continue to hype them is really 

counterproductive to what we’re doing, or what we should be doing. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

You know, there’s been a lot of discussion in the Middle East. 

Some of you touched, in your opening statements, on Russia’s incursions. What more attention should we focus on, and what should 

we expect, if you had a crystal ball, to see in the Ukraine and other 

areas in that region if we don’t act? What specific steps should we 

be taking, beyond what we’ve done, to send the message—we 

talked about economic actions, but other actions—to send the mesVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
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sage to the Russians that what they’re doing is unacceptable and 

that we’re better positioned to react to them? 

General KEANE. Well, I said—mentioned some of those in my remarks. I think we have to admit that—to ourselves, that our diplomatic efforts, using sanctions as the mainstream, have certainly 

not dissuaded Putin from what he’s attempting to achieve, what I 

think is a new political order in Eastern Europe, post-cold war. You 

know, whether he’s a strategic thinker or a tactical thinker and 

he’s impulsive and he reacts to sort of current events, I think, is 

beside the point. I don’t think we should waste a lot of time about 

that. I mean, the fact of the matter is, he is acting, and he is taking advantage of the situation. It is a huge opportunity for him. He 

senses that Europe has feckless leadership and is probably not 

going to respond. And he also puts the United States in that category. And he’s advantaging himself as a result of it. 

What do we have to do? We have to convince him that we’re serious, that NATO really matters to us, that Eastern Europe does 

really matter to us. Otherwise, I think he keeps coming. And certainly, we want to avoid a military conflict with them. And I think 

there are steps that we can prudently take to do that. One is what 

was discussed before about helping with energy and removing some 

of the energy dependence that the Europeans have on them. But, 

second, listen, the threat has shifted. So, we have a threat in Eastern Europe, on NATO’s eastern flank. Let’s shift NATO forces to 

that area, not just temporarily in and out, but let’s put some permanent bases there and demonstrate to him that Article 5 really 

does matter. 

I’m absolutely convinced, in his conference room, he has people 

sitting around the table with him saying, ‘‘Do we really believe that 

Anglo-America will respond to a threat that we impose with disguised soldiers in Estonia?’’ And they’re answering that question. 

But, we don’t want that question on the table. We want to take 

that question off the table. And I think we can do that. 

Now, whether we put the missile defense back into where we 

took it out at the beginning of this administration, I think that 

needs to be relooked. I’m not confident that that was all right, to 

begin with, dealing with what that threat was. It was the Iranian 

ballistic missile threat. So, I think that needs to be relooked, in 

terms of where we place it. 

But, certainly, it is a disgrace that we haven’t been able to provide arms to the Ukrainians, who want to push back and have a 

history of courageous military interaction to protect their own people. They’re not asking for anything else. They’re not asking for our 

troops, they’re not asking for air power. All they wanted was some 

weapons. And we’ve stiffed them on it. Makes no sense to me whatsoever. What a message that sends to Putin. It’s not surprising he’s 

on the move again in eastern Ukraine. 

The—our diplomatic efforts have not worked, because they don’t 

have anything behind it. We need to put some things on the table 

that will strengthen our diplomatic efforts, and we haven’t been 

doing that. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you very much. 

83 

Let me thank all three of you for your service, but, more importantly, for the testimonies you’ve given today. You’ve been very 

frank and direct. 

I think that what General Fallon said—Admiral Fallon said, basically, is, we have to deal with the future in what we’re doing 

today and what we’re going to do in the future. But, hindsight 

being 20–20, you know, you look at the All-Volunteer military that 

we have today—I run into an awful lot of people in our little State 

of West Virginia who have served because they were drafted or because they enlisted, but they were serving. Today, that’s less likely, 

with the volunteer, and they all believe that if we had had some 

intermingling of a volunteer versus draft, that we wouldn’t have 

had a 13-year war, we’ve had better decisions, better direction, if 

you will, because the people would have demanded it. 

Hindsight being 20–20—I get this question asked a lot—we took 

out Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Should we have ever entered Iraq? 

Should we have declared war on Iraq? And we went in and took 

him out. Is Iraq better, safer than it was before? Qadhafi, we took 

Qadhafi out. Is Libya in better shape than it was before? And now 

we’re in this thrones of Syria. What do we do in Syria? Do we take 

out Assad? And what would that leave in Syria? 

Also, we’re going to be dealing the fact—do we sign on with the 

sanctions of Iran, double down? Do we give the President the ability to negotiate up to March 24th, then double down? 

And you all have been forthright with some of your comments, 

and I’d love to know what you think about the—first of all, Iraq. 

Should we, or should we have not? Should we in Syria? And how 

much effect do you think we’ll have trying to find people that’ll 

fight. ISIL will then turn and fight Assad. And our commitment— 

as I’m understanding it, the Saudis and the Turks and everybody 

else want us to commit to fighting and taking out Assad if they’re 

going to help us fight and take out ISIL. 

So, with that, I’ll open the door and see where you all go with 

it. And we’ll just start down the row—down the aisle—we’ll start 

with you, Admiral Fallon, first. 

Admiral FALLON. Well, Senator, I would not go back and speculate on the merits of how good or how bad each of those decisions 

were, based on where we are, except to say that—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Well, the reason I’ve asked that, sir, is because we have to make a decision of—Syria is close to making that 

same decision. Do you learn from whatever we’ve done? 

Admiral FALLON. So—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. 

Admiral FALLON. So, I think the lesson I would take is, okay, we 

made a decision, and where are we now? 

Senator MANCHIN. Gotcha. 

Admiral FALLON. And, you know, what are the chances that 

we’re going to be in a different place if we take a similar decision, 

whatever. 

But, I’d like to go back, if I could, to your opening comment, because I think it’s the most important thing, to me, that—maybe not 

the most important—the thing that concerns me the most for the 

long term as I look at our country and our ability to address national security issues and the future health of this nation. And that 

84 

is the very, very small percentage of this population that is in any 

way, shape, or form actively engaged with the uniformed services. 

So, we got a lot of rhetoric in the last, you know, half-dozen years 

or so about this, but, as we go forward, what I see that really concerns me is that there’s a growing gap between the few that are 

actively engaged in this—and I get the feeling that a lot of people 

kind of think, ‘‘That’s just—it’s a job. You know, this is their job. 

They’re going to go fight this thing.’’ So, is that what we really 

want to have in this country? And are—do you think we’re going 

to make better decisions if we have that view, that we have this 

paid professional army that goes off and takes care of business 

while everybody else does their own thing? I think that’s a huge 

problem, and we ignore it at our peril. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN. General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yeah. Starting with the All-Volunteer Force, I 

served, as Jim and Fox did also, in a draft military, and 

transitioned to our Volunteer Force, post-Vietnam. And, as a result 

of that, I think, by anybody’s judgment, that force is probably the 

best this country has ever put together, and there’s nothing quite 

like it anyplace else in the world. I attribute that to a couple of reasons. One, the force looks like America in its diversity, ethnicity, 

et cetera. And, two, they want to be there, and they want to accept 

the burden and the responsibility that goes with it. 

In that draft military, we had so many there that didn’t want to 

be there, it was frustrating to deal with them. We did a lot of social 

rehabilitation for people. I don’t believe that’s what a global power 

is about, frankly. I think the skills that are needed of the military 

today, it’s a prerequisite that we have the kind of people in the organization that are willing to make the sacrifice. 

I accept what Fox is saying. I have similar concerns. One percent 

are involved, and, you know, we’ve grown apart from the American 

people as a result of a Volunteer Force. But, nonetheless, I don’t 

think going back to revisit the draft and conscription is the answer 

to that. 

Second, on Iraq and Syria, Iraq itself—I was a four-star at the 

time. I didn’t think we should—I was shocked that, in the first 

week in December of 2001, we had made the decision to go to war 

in Iraq. Just after we toppled the Taliban, I was asking the question, ‘‘Why?’’ and ‘‘When?’’—et cetera. I could see the need for it, 

at some point, certainly, because of the WMD issue, but I—my view 

at that time was to stay on top of the al-Qaeda, which was the reason we were in Afghanistan, and run these guys into every hole 

that they’re in until we get rid of them. That’s kind of where I was. 

And if that meant dealing with Pakistan and their resistance, so 

what? But, after what took place here, that was my motivation. 

In Syria, listen, Syria is as complex a thing as we’ve had on our 

plate. And you can be on any side of this issue and make reasonable sense. The only thing that concerns me about this—and I respect Jim when he says, ‘‘I want to know what the political end 

state is.’’ I think what we try to achieve in Syria is, Assad goes, 

some form of that government stays, in partnership with moderate 

forces, to help run that country. So, you’re looking towards a political solution. 

85 

But, I just know that we’re on a collision course that—right now 

in Syria, with ISIS expanding control and dominance inside the 

country at the same time we’re trying to push back on them with 

our ground forces that’s being pounded by the Assad regime. And 

if we continue to let that happen, the Free Syrian Army and the 

force that we’re trying to support is going to go away. And that’s 

the reality of it. Do you do something about that? Do you try to 

make some attempts to do that, dealing with all of the geopolitical 

complications that that entails? My answer to that is yes. I think 

we should try. 

And listen, it is hard. I’m not suggesting it’s not. But, like most 

human endeavors, it’s not hopeless, either. 

Senator MANCHIN. Madam Chair, may I just indulge and ask 

the—General Mattis if he would— 

General MATTIS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator MANCHIN.—on the volunteer versus the— 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. Sir, I think the Volunteer Force has 

been good for the military. I think it’s been bad for the country. 

I would only add, on the decision to invade a country, to go into 

a—I don’t know what our policy is on Syria, I don’t know what the 

political end state is that people want to accomplish. And if you 

wander into a war without knowing that, you’re probably going to 

get lost on your way to somewhere. 

I would just tell you that the—we should never go into these 

countries unless we have a reasonable chance of a better outcome. 

And war is fundamentally unpredictable, so that means a longterm commitment with a clear political end state and a fully 

resourced, sound strategy to get there. And otherwise, don’t go in 

and then look at Libya in your rearview mirrors, anywhere else, 

and wonder what you’ve done. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Admiral FALLON. Senator, could—I don’t want to leave this with 

the impression that I endorse a return to conscription. I don’t, at 

all. But, I think that we ought to be seriously considering how we 

motivate people for service in this country, not just in the military, 

but in a range of things. But, the way we’re headed right now 

causes me a lot of concern. 

Senator MANCHIN. I keep thinking it can be a blend between the 

volunteer that we have now, with a pool of—draft, if you will—or— 

Admiral FALLON. If we had a—an atmosphere in which we encouraged service in this country, I think we’d have no difficulty filling the ranks of the Armed Forces with people that would volunteer. If that were the mindset of the majority of the people in this 

country. 

Senator MANCHIN. Well, people have just said that, basically, if 

we had—if we showed the volunteer—if we had an All-Volunteer 

Army during Vietnam, we’d still be in Vietnam. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Somebody asked me, up in Maine recently, what my job consisted 

of. And I thought for a minute, and I said, ‘‘It’s applied history with 

a minor in communications.’’ And your testimony today has been 

ample evidence that this is really all about history. And I’ve got a 

lot of favorite quotes from Mark Twain, but my alltime favorite is 

86 

that, ‘‘History doesn’t always repeat itself, but it usually rhymes.’’ 

And that’s what we’re talking about here today. 

Talking about history. Would you all agree—and I don’t need 

lengthy answers—that leaving Afghanistan prematurely would be 

a major strategic mistake for this country? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

General KEANE. Yes. 

Senator KING. Admiral Fallon? You agree? 

Admiral FALLON. Yes. 

Senator KING. I—to me, it’s—given all the progress—and I don’t 

think the American people realize the amount of progress that’s 

been made in Afghanistan, in terms of the lives of the people. It’s 

fumbling the ball on the 5 yardline. And a modest additional commitment, in terms of people and treasure, would maintain those 

benefits. And I think—General Keane, you testified—without that, 

it’s lost. 

Admiral FALLON. I think one of our problems—the legacy in Afghanistan is that we’ve already done this twice, been there and 

bailed out. And there’s a lot of concern that we could do it again. 

Senator KING. Well, particularly when we finally have a leader 

in the country that we can work with and has some hope of real 

political leadership in the country. 

Second question. I couldn’t help but hear echos—General Keane, 

particularly in your testimony—we’re talking about ISIS, we’re 

talking about radical Islam, and the—all the language could be applied to the Communists in the 1940s and 1950s—a radical ideology that was bent on world domination, putting America out of 

business, all of those kinds of things. The strategy then was essentially containment. We never invaded Russia. We didn’t have direct 

military confrontation. But, the—George Kennan’s famous strategy 

was containment until eventually it imploded because of—its ideas 

weren’t as good as ours. Isn’t that a guide, anyway, for a strategy 

with regard to this threat that we’re facing today? 

General KEANE. Well, I definitely agree with the—what a broad 

strategy and the political and military alliances that we form to 

deal with it. But, the facts are, this movement has attacked us, and 

it’s crushing our interests in the region, as well, by physical means. 

So, that has changed the dimension of it quite a bit. 

Senator KING. General Mattis? 

General MATTIS. Senator, I think that, in a globalized world 

today, where there—we’re perhaps one airline seat away from 

somebody exporting this right into Paris or wherever else—we have 

to be very, very careful thinking that we can contain this without 

having ramifications on our economy, on our friends. For example, 

we may be energy independent in North America, or will be very 

soon, but the global price of oil on a globally traded commodity will 

be set out of the Middle East. The world’s economy would—and it 

would immediately impact from Maine to California if it got, you 

know, the oil cut off there. The fact that we are oil independent, 

energy independent, would not change. So, the idea we could contain this in that region and let all hell break loose there, you know, 

I don’t think that would work in this case, even though you—I do 

agree with you that the internal contradictions inside Communism 

and the internal contradictions inside Islamic—political Islamic 

87 

jihadist thinking will rot them from the inside out, just like with 

the Communists. 

Senator KING. But, I—I think you’re right, the—where the historic parallel breaks down is the nonstate-actor piece of this, and 

also communications and—I think you mentioned seventh-century. 

I don’t know which century it is, but the danger we’re in now is 

that we’re dealing with people with seventh-century ethics and 

21st-century weapons. It strikes me that intelligence is absolutely 

one of the key elements in this battle, perhaps more so than ever. 

Let me conclude with a couple of questions about Iran. What 

are—what do you—we’re engaged in this negotiation that’s going to 

come to some kind of conclusion, we believe, in the next 2 or 3 

months. I don’t think there’s much likelihood of an additional extension. What if those negotiations fail? What are our next steps 

if we end up with either no deal or a deal that is just not acceptable, in terms of containing Iran’s ambitions? 

General MATTIS. Senator, we have to limit their ability to enrich 

fuel. That’s critical. And we have to have an—a rigorous inspection 

regime that ensures that we have confidence in it, knowing the denial and deceit they’ve used to hide this weapons program in the 

past. 

If it fails, I think we would have to reenergize and elevate the 

economic sanctions, perhaps even to the point of a blockade, to— 

and then we should move strongly against the situation with Lebanese Hezbollah and Syria. I think that a defeat of Iranian interests 

in that area could reverberate right back into Tehran, and the Iranian people would be in a position, like with the Green Revolution, 

perhaps to come out in the streets. But, the oppressive powers are 

strong, and the alternative to the economic and some of these peripheral efforts working would be—would probably end up being 

war. 

Senator KING. It was interesting—I was just in the Middle East 

last weekend, and—in talking with people in the Gulf states—it 

was interesting to me—again, in history—we know that we’re dealing, in some ways, with a—an ancient civil war between Sunnis 

and Shi’ites, but it—in—the Gulf states are very worried about 

Iran’s expansionism, even outside of the nuclear area. And we’re 

now talking about an ancient civil war between Persians and 

Arabs. I think many people don’t realize that Iranians are not 

Arabs and that this is—this goes back to Darius. I mean, you’ve 

got—in some ways, you’ve got people trying to recreate the Ottoman Empire, and other people trying to create the Persian Empire. 

And here we are, trying to wend our way through 2,000-year-old 

disputes. 

That’s not really a question, but, General Keane, your thoughts. 

General KEANE. Well, I think our behavior with Iran through the 

years has been pretty atrocious. Frankly, you know, they bombed 

our marine barracks, as Jim mentioned, using proxies. They took 

down our Embassy in Lebanon. They took down the Annex. They 

took down the Kuwait Embassy. They took down Air Force barracks in Khobar Towers. General Lloyd Austin, who commands 

CENTCOM, believes that Iranian-trained militia by battalion commanders in—from Hezbollah, who did it at two training bases in 

Iran—we knew where those bases were—are responsible for killing 

88 

close to 2,000 of the 4400 Americans killed in Iraq, because they 

developed an IED exclusively to be used only against Americans, 

not against Iraqi military and not against the Iraqi people. 

These are the things that we have already accepted. Not a single— 

Senator KING. Through a whole series of— 

General KEANE.—Republican or Democratic President has ever 

counted any of that. 

Senator KING. Yeah, I was going to make the point that it’s a 

nonpartisan nonresponse. A bipartisan nonresponse. 

General KEANE. It is a bipartisan nonresponse. 

So, here we go into negotiations by a regime that—whose stated 

objective is to dominate the region. They are beginning to do that. 

And they want nuclear weapons to guarantee their preservation 

and also to help in their geopolitical objectives. The beginning of 

these negotiations—we’ve already given up too much. We’re permitting the highly enriched uranium and thousands and thousands of 

centrifuges as the going-in deal. We’re already behind. The only negotiation that should have been done was, ‘‘Dismantle the program 

and we’ll take off the sanctions.’’ But, that’s not where we are. 

So, I believe, if it fails, we go back to tough, crippling economic 

sanctions, bring in the National Security Agency, have the Director 

there lay down in front of them what they could do to get after Iran 

to change its behavior. We’re on a collision course with them. I 

don’t agree with Fox, that we can sit down and have more dialogue 

with these guys and somehow we’ll work towards mutual interests 

in the region, when their stated interests are truly regional domination and we have already given up too much to them as we 

speak. 

Thank you. 

Senator KING. I want to thank these gentlemen, Madam Chair. 

This has been one of the most informative, provocative, and, I 

think, helpful hearings that I’ve participated in since I’ve been 

here. 

Thank you so much for your direct and honest testimony. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator AYOTTE. I couldn’t agree more with what Senator King 

just said. And appreciate all of you. I think we’ve got a couple of 

second-round questions, and appreciate all of you staying here. 

I wanted to follow up, General Mattis, on testimony that you 

gave about our detention policy. You had said, ‘‘We’ve observed the 

perplexing lack of detention—detainee policy that has resulted in 

the return of released prisoners to the battlefield. We should not 

engage in another fight without resolving this issue up front, treating hostile forces, in fact, as hostile.’’ 

Could you help us understand, What are the consequences of a 

lack of detention policy, in terms of our National security? And, as 

I count it, we know we’ve confirmed at least 107 terrorists, that 

were formerly detained at Guantanamo, have now been confirmed 

to have reengaged in terrorist activity, and an additional 77 are 

suspected of doing so. So, what are the implications of this lack of 

detention policy? Why does it matter to us? And also, what does it 

impact us, in terms of gathering intelligence, as it relates to interrogation policy? 

89 

General MATTIS. Ma’am, the implication, first and foremost, I believe, is that we go into a fight and we’re not even certain of ourselves enough to hold as prisoners the people that we’ve taken in 

the fight. For example, in 1944, we didn’t take Rommel’s troops, 

who were in POW camps in Texas, and let them go back and get 

another shot at us at Normandy. We kept them until the war was 

over. We didn’t start this war. And if an enemy wants to fight or 

be a truckdriver, we didn’t say his radio operators could be released because they didn’t have a significant role. If you sign up 

with this enemy, they should know, ‘‘We’re coming after you’’ if the 

President, the Commander in Chief, sends us out there, and, ‘‘If 

taken prisoner, you’ll be prisoner until the war is over.’’ I mean, 

this is pretty—this is not Warfighting 301 or Advanced 

Warfighting. This is kind of 101, ma’am. 

The biggest concern I have, having been in the infantry for many 

years—if our troops find that they are taking someone prisoner a 

second time and they have just scraped one of their buddies off the 

pavement and zipped him into a bag, the potential for maintaining 

the ethical imperative we expect of our Armed Forces is going to 

be undercut if, in fact, the integrity of our war effort does not take 

those people off the battlefield permanently if taken prisoner. In 

other words, they will take things into their own hands under the 

pressures of warfare. 

So, I think that what we have to do is have a repeatable detainee 

policy so that, when we take them, we hold them, and there’s no 

confusion about their future, not among the enemies’ minds, certainly not among our own. I would go by the Geneva Convention 

and maintain them, with Red Cross oversight, until the war was 

over. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General. 

I wanted to follow up. Let me just say, General Keane, I fully 

agree with what you have said about providing defensive arms to 

Ukraine. I think that it absolutely is a disgrace, and I can’t understand why this administration has not provided these arms so that 

they can defend themselves against Russian aggression. And I 

think we’re sending the wrong message there. 

And I think the other consideration for all of us in this is: In 

signing the Budapest Memorandum, why would any nation, again, 

give up its nuclear weapons when we won’t provide basic defensive 

arms when they are faced with aggression on their own territory? 

And I would like you to comment on, you know, What are the implications of that, as we ask, for example, other nations to give up 

their nuclear weapons? I don’t understand why they would do it, 

when they see our behavior here. 

General KEANE. Well, I totally agree. I mean, we went back on 

an agreement, we went back on our word. I believe that’s one of 

the reasons that Putin is looking at NATO, itself, and he’s saying 

to himself, ‘‘Is this still the organization that helped force the collapse of the Soviet Union back in ’91, or is—has this organization 

lost its moral fiber?’’ So, I think when we break agreements like 

that, even though Ukraine was not a member of NATO, clearly the 

deal that was made was in their interest as well as the world’s interest, and we foreclosed on it. And shame on us, you know, for 

doing that. And I do believe it has significant implications, not just 

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to the—to other countries who we’re—we believe are our friends, 

but because it does embolden and encourage Vladimir Putin. I 

mean, common sense tells you it does, and his behavior certainly 

underscores that. 

Senator AYOTTE. Wanted to follow up on the discussion on Iran. 

And looking at their behavior—I think, General Keane, you had 

said that we’ve already—we’re already behind on this deal, in 

terms of what we’ve agreed to. So, as we look at this, the negotiations that are going on, what does a good deal look like? And, given 

the implications of this for our National security, I firmly believe 

that Congress should have a say in that agreement and what is a 

result. But, what does a good deal look like, one that we can ensure 

that they can’t immediately gear up their nuclear weapons program again? 

And finally, I don’t see, in any of these negotiations, any resolution whatsoever to their missile program, their seeking IBM— 

ICBM capability that, obviously, can hit our East Coast, and also 

their activities as the largest state sponsor of terrorism. 

So, can you help us understand, What should we be looking for? 

And what about those two other issues that I think are very important to us, as well, in terms of their activities? 

General KEANE. Well, as I’ve said, I don’t think there is a good 

deal, here, at all, because what we’re arguing over is the technology 

that will drive the time to develop a weapon. So, our negotiators 

are trying to pull out some of those technologies to extend the 

amount of time it will take to develop a weapon. 

But, we’ve been in this dance step before with the Iranians, going 

back 15 years in these negotiations, and it’s always two steps forwards and one step back. And that’s where we are. I have absolutely no confidence that, if we made a deal, that the Iranians will 

not undermine that and move fast-forward to be able to develop a 

nuclear weapon much faster than what we think. And I think history is on the side of that argument, frankly. 

So, I am not optimistic at all about this. The—I will give the administration credit for well-intentioned motivations, because—I 

don’t want to get into that. And I can’t, because you have to get 

into people’s heads. But, the fact of the matter is, we should be 

very concerned about a bad deal, here, because I believe we’re on 

the path—on a path to it. 

Let’s be honest with ourselves. This regime is—the Supreme 

Leader is not giving up on having a nuclear weapon. Anybody that 

thinks that is incredibly delusional and naive. He is on a path to 

it. He will achieve it. He has got in charge now, not Ahmadinejad, 

you know, who most people had no respect for, even inside his own 

country. He has got a sophisticated leader that is working this very 

well to achieve his objectives, geopolitically. And I believe he is on 

that path. 

So, I’m not confident at all. And the only deal that makes any 

sense to me is, dismantle the program and verify it’s dismantled, 

and pull the sanctions. But, we’re not there. We will—this administration will not do that. We are already past that. 

Senator AYOTTE. I wanted to—yes, go ahead. 

General MATTIS. Madam Chair, I think the economic sanctions 

that drove them to the negotiating table worked better than I ever 

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anticipated, and the administration had to try. It gave us credibility with the international community. There wasn’t a rush to 

war. It also, I think, puts us in a position to define what a good 

deal is, which goes to the heart of your question. I think it’s a rigorous inspection regime that gives us confidence that they will not 

have a breakout capability and no ability to enrich uranium, beyond peaceful purposes, at all. Now, if that cannot be achieved, 

then we’ve got a bad deal. 

Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Fallon? 

Admiral FALLON. Somebody made the point earlier that history 

doesn’t exactly repeat itself. But, during the cold war, we were 

squared off against a Communist ideology that was based in the 

Soviet Union that was diametrically opposed to everything we believed and the political and economic and individual freedoms that 

we held very dear to ourselves. And yet, we recognized that we had 

interests to try to ensure that we didn’t get plunged into yet another conflict with staggering potential consequences in the negative. And so, we ended up negotiating with the Soviets. We didn’t 

trust them, they didn’t trust us, and—but, we thought that there 

were some longer-term higher objectives that needed to be 

achieved. 

And I think we’re not in a dissimilar situation, here. It’s not the 

Soviet Union. We shouldn’t give them that credibility. But, it’s a 

problem that we just can’t keep ignoring. If we come up with an 

agreement that the negotiators feel is reasonable, then the key 

thing is going to be an ability to verify the key aspects of that, to 

the best of our ability. And I think that’s what’s really important. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Reed. 

Thank you. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

And I will echo Senator King’s remarks. This has been extremely 

useful. And thank you, gentlemen. 

One of the thoughts I had, listening to Senator King’s question, 

was that, you know, this—that history always sort of drives us. 

And in the cold war, we had an existential enemy, the Soviet 

Union. They were engaged and doing a lot of provocative activities, 

sponsoring national liberation movements here and there, they invaded Hungary in the 1950s, they were attempting to establish offensive nuclear missiles 90 miles from our shore in the 1960s, et 

cetera. And yet, we continued to negotiate with them. And again, 

I think Admiral Fallon pointed out, we did it with the same kind 

of skepticism that we all have towards the Iranians. So, no one, I 

think, trusted Khrushchev that much and trusted his successors, et 

cetera. 

But, I think it’s important, as has been suggested by some—I 

think all of you—that we follow through on these negotiations with 

the Iranians until we get to a conclusion. I think General Mattis 

made a very excellent point. We’ve positioned ourselves now where 

we really are on the high road. You know, we’ve defined what the 

good solution is, we have international support. And if they cannot 

make that standard, then we’re in a much stronger position to 

move, collectively. I think that is important to note. 

But, let me ask a question which—it goes to this notion of what 

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eyed of when we start something, you know, where it’s going go, 

which, since you raised the issue of escalation, the notion that if 

we take a step, it’s going to—it’s the solution, we’ve solved the 

problem; when, in fact, many—in every situation I can think of, the 

first step will prompt a counter-response by—the other side will respond, counter-response by us, et cetera. 

So, with respect to the Ukraine, a simple question. If we were 

to give defensive weapons to the Ukrainians, which is something 

that’s being seriously considered, what do you think Putin would 

do? Simply pull his troops out and say, ‘‘Okay, you’ve seen—you 

know, I raised you, you saw me, I—and I fold?’’ Or do you think 

it would be something else? And again, will we get into an 

escalatory situation, where we find ourselves in a much more precarious position? 

And I’ll just ask all, and then I’ll yield to Senator Shaheen. 

General MATTIS. Senator Reed, every action has a reaction. It’s 

a fundamentally unpredictable situation, but we have to wargame 

it, look ahead. I think that, in light of the worsening economic situation, Putin’s ability to act independently with some of the things 

he’s been doing are going to start becoming circumscribed. But, 

they can take a lot more stoic view of this inside Russia, as I understand it. 

And so, I would—I believe that it may very well lead to a higher 

level of violence. But, at the same time, I think that it could become akin to Napoleon’s bleeding ulcer in Spain. The Ukraine could 

become the—kind of the—a fulcrum on which his foreign policy is 

now hammered back in line with the international order of respect 

for state boundaries and that sort of thing as he starts having a 

higher physical cost, more troops coming home dead from this sort 

of thing. 

But, it’s going to be a tragedy, so long as Russia decides to continue what they’re doing. And we’re just asking ourselves, ‘‘Are we 

willing to support the Ukrainian people, who want to defend themselves?’’ And on that one, I’m pretty one-way about it. Of course we 

support them. 

Senator REED. General Keane. 

General KEANE. Yes, I’m—and I think, you know, the Putin 

strategy is quite clever, and maybe even brilliant, when you think 

about it. You know, he’s using soldiers in disguise as special operations forces. They come in, in civilian clothes, they create an uprising that’s not even there. And then they appeal for more military 

assistance, and he provides people who don’t identify them—in uniform, but they don’t identify themselves as what country they come 

from, so-called soldiers in disguise. So, he’s trumped up everything, 

to include the requirement for a military response. And he puts the 

onus then on us, that it’s up to us to escalate, because this is really 

only this is—it’s an uprising. And it’s an interesting phenomenon, 

and I think we’re going to continue to see it again and again. 

So, one is, we need to deal with this strategy that he’s using, and 

what should we do about it? And, number two, I think the harsh 

reality is that Putin has done all of the escalation, himself. And he 

is the one that brought paramilitary forces in, he is the one that 

brought conventional military forces in. Very sophisticated equipment. He’s the one that brought multiple armor and mechanized 

93 

divisions and put them on the border, and then rushed them across 

the border—tanks, BMPs, artillery, antiaircraft. It is his forces that 

shot down an airliner—his weapon systems, at least. So, all of the 

escalation has really been done by him. 

And I believe that providing some assistance to the Ukrainians, 

as much as that would be material assistance, because I always believe that conflict is fundamentally a test of wills—and Sun Tzu 

taught us that, the ultimate objective of war is to break your opponent’s will—I’d give arms and assistance to the Ukrainians, not 

just for the physical capability that a—it enhances them, but also 

to demonstrate that we’re behind them, to help them with their 

will and their spine. And they have this natural fortitude, knowing 

their history, to stand up to it. 

So, that’s where I am on it. And I—and I’m not concerned about 

escalation, because Putin has done all of that already. 

Senator REED. Admiral Fallon, can you comment, please? My 

time is running out, but please. 

Admiral FALLON. Shortly. 

When we think about Russia, I think it’s a great example of a 

place where we ought to be thinking a little more strategically and 

not be channeling ourselves into, ‘‘He did this, and so we’re going 

to have to do this.’’ Sounds like the guy is very opportunistic. He 

took advantage of an interesting situation. He’s aggressive. He’s 

got ego. You could—whatever. 

But, what else might we do to get this guy’s attention? First of 

all, remember that this country has some very significant internal 

problems. Look at birth rates, look at health and longevity, look at 

the reality that it’s a one-trick economic pony, and right now the 

trends are not going in the right direction. 

So, it was highlighted earlier, we’ve got a phenomenal new energy card in our National capabilities, here. What—how might we 

think about using that, that might get this guy’s attention and get 

him to back it off? He thought he was pretty clever. He went to 

the Chinese and said, ‘‘Well, let’s go make a deal,’’ and the Chinese, 

‘‘Hey, you know, it’s a way to play off the Americans.’’ So, again, 

we might think about coming around and working things with the 

Chinese. 

So, I think there’s more than one way to skin the cat, here. Yes, 

we stand up for things that we think are important. But, I don’t 

think that the only solution, here, is just to go—to throw troops at 

it. We may think it’s in our—decide it’s in our best interest to give 

support to the Ukrainians. I think we might think very seriously 

about support to our other Eastern European NATO allies as a priority task. But, I think we ought to be thinking a little bit bigger 

in dealing with Russia, and a little bit longer-term. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, thank you all. And I was able to hear 

all of your opening statements. And I think there’s—a finer group 

of statements we’ve had here in a long time, and it goes to the core 

of decisions this Congress needs to make and, really, the administration, our Commander in Chief, needs to be making. And we are 

on a path that’s—it’s not going to be successful at the path we’re 

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on. And I want to thank you for your honest and direct statements 

about that. 

I am more hopeful than some, and I think we can make some 

progress here. General Keane, I think you acknowledged that it’s 

important that Iraq get its act together with regard to the Shi’a 

and the Sunni and the Kurds, and be more effective in working together. And that’s a critical part of it. But, I don’t take that to be 

a statement that we should not seek to be offensive as soon as possible, even right now. It seems to me that—you talked about will. 

I see a recent article by Major General Scales, who talks about will 

and diminishing hope, showing ISIS and ISIL that they’re not 

going to be successful. What are the prospects of us, in your opinion, beginning to retake more territory in Iraq and removing this 

hope that’s out there that seems to be attracting more soldiers from 

around the region to the ISIS cause? 

General KEANE. Well—I think I understand what you’re saying. 

I certainly agree with the policy that we should use local ground 

indigenous forces, as well as coalition air, to attempt to retake lost 

territory. There has been some modest retaking of territory already, but nowhere near what needs to be done to return the integrity and sovereignty to Iraq. That will only take place by a counteroffensive campaign up those two river valleys, one to the west and 

one to the north, to retake Mosul and Fallujah and Anbar Province. 

All that said, I do think it’s prudent to do that with those indigenous forces, but to be robustly assisted, not in the way we are planning to do now, with front-line advisors who will be down where 

the fighting takes place, which means they are at risk. They’re not 

in direct combat, but they’re in combat units that will be fighting. 

And that’s a given. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, that’s what you think has got to be done. 

General KEANE. Yes. I think that’s a prudent measure. Look it, 

can we retake Mosul and Anbar Province if we put combat brigades 

on the ground with some coalition brigades now? Can we do that? 

Yes. Yes, we can do that. But, here’s the problem with that. One 

is, I have great difficulty looking U.S. soldiers in the face again to 

go do something like that after what happened after 2011 and we 

pulled out of there, because policy decisions squandered the gains. 

Two, it’s not just the issue of retaking Mosul and Fallujah. It’s the 

issue of being able to hold it. ISIS will not stand down after we 

drive them out of there. We have known enough about this war in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. You drive an enemy out. That’s one thing. 

And then we have to make certain we hold it and prevent that 

enemy from coming back. 

And so, that is why I do believe it’s the right thing to try to use 

these local forces, even though we know that’s not a strong a hand 

as we would like. Strengthen that hand to the maximum capability 

we can without introducing ground combat forces, and then put 

emphasis on, once we clear it out, holding what is there. That will 

be the challenge, because ISIS will come back and undermine it. 

And that’s why I don’t think combat forces now is the right answer—United States combat forces. But, if we have any lack of confidence that we’re going to be able to retake that lost territory, and 

we still believe it’s strategically important for us in Iraq to do that, 

then I would have combat brigades on Reserve in Kuwait as a 

95 

backup to accomplish the mission if the mission does fail. And that 

would be coalition brigades, as well. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, the three of you have commanded 

CENTCOM. It just strikes me as—let’s compare this to Libya—it 

strikes me, we’ve got a—quite a different situation. We stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the Iraqis. We lost thousands of American 

troops in this effort. And, to me, to say that we won’t even embed 

a few soldiers, not in the front of the advance, at this point, to preserve what I think you agree is possible, and to oust ISIL, would 

be a colossal mistake. 

General Mattis, do you feel a special strategic bond with the 

Iraqis that we worked with for over a decade? 

General MATTIS. Senator, I do. However, in giving you strategic 

advice, I try to divorce myself from it. We have to be very pragmatic about this. I would tell you that the military—the senior 

military officers, we all explained that the successes we had 

achieved by 2010–2011 were—and this is a quote—‘‘reversible,’’ 

that the democratic processes and the military capability were too 

nascent to pull everyone out at one time. What has happened here 

was foreseeable. The intelligence community was actually very 

blunt about this potential. 

And so, what we have to look at now is, we play the ball where 

it lies. And right now, I believe we should embed our forward air 

controllers and our—those who can help plan these operations. 

We’re going to have to put them together— 

Senator SESSIONS. And that could present gains? I mean, doing 

that would, in your professional opinion, allow us to see gains occur 

from that. It’s not a—— 

General MATTIS. I would, sir, because you’re—— 

Senator SESSIONS.—hopeless effort. 

General MATTIS.—because you’re integrating the air and ground 

effort right at the point of contact, so you would see a much faster 

decision process. So, yes, sir, it would. 

Senator SESSIONS. My time is up, thank you. And I certainly 

share the view that it was a colossal error in 2011 to completely 

withdraw. And this was predictable, as Senator McCain and others 

predicted. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Madam Chairwoman. 

And I want to join in my thanking Senator McCain for convening 

this hearing, which I think has been extremely valuable. I’ve been 

following it while here and then while in a variety of meetings 

away. And I think your insights and experience reflect your—each 

of your extraordinary service to our Nation. And I thank you for 

what you’ve done to make sure that we are strong and that our security is as robust as possible. 

And I agree with the point that’s been made, I think, fairly repeatedly, that we should be doing more to assist Ukraine. The Congress agrees, as well, because we passed, and the President signed, 

the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, which as yet, to my 

knowledge, really has not been implemented. 

So, my question to each of you, because this act is very broad in 

what it authorizes by way of weaponry and defensive services and 

training, using that $350 million, what specifically do you think 

96 

would be most helpful to the Ukrainians? You know, there’s a lot 

of artillery that’s being used against them. You’ve made reference 

to the Russian troops disguised as civilians. What specifically can 

we provide? Is it antitank missiles? Is it more body armor? Can you 

be more specific as to what you would advise the President to provide? 

General MATTIS. Senator, I cannot—I am not familiar enough 

with the specifics on that battlefield. I think that something that 

gives them more intelligence about where they’re being fired 

from—counterartillery radar, for example—might be very helpful. 

But, I’m not the right person to answer that, I’m sorry. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Keane? 

General KEANE. What they have been asking for is, they want 

more intelligence than what they currently have. And I believe we 

have begun to help them with some of that. They do want antitank 

weapons. And those are shoulder-fired missiles, essentially. And 

they also want heavy crew-served weapons. 

One of the problems we have here is, under the previous regime 

in Ukraine, because of the significant amount of corruption that 

took place in all the agencies of government, what took place inside 

the Ukraine military is outrageous, in terms of the rip-off of funding and the capabilities that they used to have and no longer have. 

I mean, they’re a mere shadow of their former self, to be frank 

about it. 

So, while I know some of their desires, I don’t know the entire 

list of what they want. 

Admiral FALLON. Nor do I, Senator. I have no idea what the 

laundry list is or what really makes sense. I would just caution 

that, again, whatever we decide to do, here, will be effective or not, 

in large measure based on what the people in the Ukraine do. And 

what they do is going to be based on the confidence they have, and 

the leadership. It’s been abysmal up to now. I’m not sure where 

they are. But, absent that, we could dump stuff in there all day 

long, and we’re probably not going to be successful. So, understanding what’s really going on in that country at the political level 

is really an essential prerequisite to any of this stuff. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral, I’d like to ask you, on a different 

area—and the premise of my question is that you’ve done a fair 

amount of work on climate change and environmental issues. But, 

in light of your experience—and I’d open this question to others, as 

well—how big a threat to our National security is, potentially, 

what we see happening in climate disruption, the impacts on the 

availability of sea lanes and water resources in the Middle East, 

and food resources in Africa? To what extent is climate disruption 

a national security threat? 

Admiral FALLON. I think it’s a very, very important national security issue. It’s one that we understand very little about, in my 

opinion. Ramifications of the continuation of the current trends 

provide all kinds of interesting scenarios. So—and one that we’ve 

talked about here, the revanchist Russia and Putin’s opportunism 

and what the Russians—what Putin may have in mind for us. He’s 

going to have some significant options pretty soon. When the Arctic 

continues to lose its icepack and become, basically, accessible 12 

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ties to move things around and act in ways that they were significantly inhibited in, in the past. It may give them some other opportunities, economically, who knows? 

The melting of the icecaps, rising sea levels, you pick your scenario here, but the trends are pretty clear that water’s coming up 

and land’s going to disappear, and the implications for us in this 

country—more importantly, probably, for those that are really in 

danger, places like Bangladesh that are marginally above sea level 

right now—and the turmoil that that—because— 

So, all these problems we deal with, almost every single one of 

them, has its roots in instability and insecurity at a very basic 

level—not armies, not ISIS running around, and pick-me-up trucks 

with 50-caliber guns. It’s what people feel very close to them. And 

so, if they feel threatened in their livelihoods, in their families, in 

their ability to—then things start to get unraveled. And that’s the 

potential that I think we face. 

I don’t want to, you know, lie awake at night, wringing my hands 

over all this stuff. However, are there things we could be doing, I 

think, to try to reverse the trends that appear to be moving on 

pretty strongly? So, that’s probably another topic for hours’ discussion. 

But, it gets back to one of my points about credibility, our credibility as a country. As the world grapples with these things that 

apply to all of us, I think that U.S. leadership ought to be paramount, ought to be in the forefront. And, in fact, sometimes we’re 

not there. We’re not there. We’re not voting, we’re—you know, 

whether we’re denying or avoiding or just defaulting to somebody 

else. And, despite the sometimes incessant gnawing of people, 

‘‘Well, the U.S. is always trying to get into this and push’’—on another hand, they really need—the world needs our leadership and 

involvement. And this is an area where we could actually probably 

do some good if we put our minds to it. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much for that answer, 

and to all of you for being here today. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you all very much. I know that you’ve been here a 

long morning. And so, we very much appreciate that. 

I have just one fundamental question for each of you. And I had 

a chance to hear your opening statements, but not—was not here 

for most of the questioning. So, I don’t think anybody has covered 

this aspect of my question. 

You all are probably aware that DOD recently released a study, 

done by the RAND Corporation, that is titled ‘‘Improving Strategic 

Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War.’’ And there have been 

a number of fairly high-profile articles that have addressed this 

question, as well. And one of the conclusions from the study, as you 

all know, is that the types of war that the U.S. has fought since 

World War II have changed. They’re no longer conventional combat 

wars against state actors, but they’re more unconventional, irregular warfare by joint forces against nonstate actors. 

And the report—one of the statements in the report says, and I 

quote, that, ‘‘The joint force and the U.S. Government as a whole 

98 

have displayed an ongoing ambivalence about, and a lack of proficiency in, the noncombat and unconventional aspects of war and 

conflict against nonstate actors.’’ The report goes on to point out 

seven lessons from its review, and I won’t go through all of them, 

but the first two seem particularly relevant, I think, to today’s discussion. One is that the U.S. Government displays a persistent 

weakness in formulating national security strategies, and that this 

weakness is due, in part, to the lack of an effective civilian/military 

process for effective national security policymaking. 

So, I wonder if each of you could comment on whether you agree 

with this conclusion and whether this is something that can be addressed by changing personalities, or do we really need to improve 

our process for national security decisionmaking? And if you have 

thoughts about how to do that. 

Admiral Fallon, you want to go first? 

Admiral FALLON. Sure, I’ll throw myself in front of this train. 

I agree with it. And I think that—my observation of several 

changes in Washington—you get to be this old, you hang around 

for enough time, you see a lot of transitions—and one of the weaknesses, I believe, is a belief that an effective national security policy can be created after things are settled down and people get in 

their places. And, you know, it all sounds nice. Let’s get a Secretary of State, let’s get a Secretary of Defense, and get it in there. 

But, my experience is, it’s too late. There’s no way you’re going to 

be able to come up with—that I’ve seen—to come up with comprehensive, long-term, thoughtful, effective policies once the gun 

goes off and that—once the inauguration starts, you’re off and running. And the reality is, something happens all the time, every single day. Look at all these things, in the communication, blah, blah, 

blah. So, all these pressures make it virtually impossible to think 

strategically, in my observation, once you get in the game. 

And so, a prerequisite for this is a very thoughtful process in advance, using whatever resources are available. A lot of smart people around this country and the world that can inform some pretty 

good decisions. Again, can’t solve everything, but pick a few big 

ones, decide they’re the ones you’re going to focus on, would be my 

advice, and go for it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

General Keane? 

General KEANE. Yes, sure. 

Well, there’s a couple of things that aren’t correct. First of all, 

the most predominant form of warfare since war started is unconventional warfare. And that’s been well documented. And, interesting enough, the prosecutors of unconventional warfare usually 

lose far more than they win. That is best documented, if you want 

to see the best reference on it, by Max Boot’s sort of history of all 

of this. He’s out of the Council on Foreign Relations and is a prolific, articulate, thoughtful writer. 

In terms of your comment in dealing with the application of force 

and also government, dealing with this kind of experience that 

we’re facing today, I agree that we have not taken a whole-of-government approach in dealing with some of the challenges we face. 

What is—what I observed, in countless visits over the 13-year experience, you know, in Iraq and Afghanistan, that much of the nonVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
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kinetic things that needed to be done in dealing with an unconventional enemy defaulted, not to other parts of our government, but 

largely to the United States military. Even though they—while 

they’re intelligent and have enormous personal attributes and skill 

sets that they can apply against anything to be successful, it’s not 

something they were trained and necessarily had experience in. 

But, they became very good at it. And we would always be looking 

around, Where is the rest of our government, here, to help us do 

some of these things? 

So, in that regard, I do believe there’s much that we can learn 

from this 13-year experience, in how to take a more comprehensive 

approach and to recognize, while kinetic actions have a value all 

of their own, certainly—and that’s blatantly obvious—nonkinetic 

actions do, as well. And we can do much better at that than what 

we have done. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

General Mattis, I—my time is up, but do you have anything you 

want to add to that? 

General MATTIS. Just very quickly, Senator. I would just point 

out that we have to improve the process, assuming there is a process. I’ve been unable to identify one recently. I think it starts with 

the essential—we must develop a sound strategy or we’re going to 

waste lives and our treasury and our country’s future. 

I think, two, we need to move authority back to the Senate-confirmed Secretaries of State and Defense, and not concentrate it in 

a small, but mushrooming at the same time, national security staff 

that does not have the Foreign Service officers and the trained 

military officers who can actually develop what you’re looking for, 

here. 

I don’t think we can adopt one preclusive form of warfare. And 

here—my point is, the enemy will always try the kind of warfare 

they think we’re less—least ready for. One of the reasons you can 

say—or the RAND study can say we did not have state-on-state 

warfare is because we probably prevented it. That’s a pretty great 

war, from my point of view, the one that never happened, because 

we were ready for it. 

And last, I would just point out that unconventional warfare always takes a long time. The United States Cavalry against the 

American Indian, from 1850 to 1905, was decades long. And this 

sense of rushing things—for example, setting withdrawal dates and 

telling the enemy in advance when we’re leaving—probably contributes to the endless wars that we get into. And we’re engaged in a 

violent political argument with political Islam right now, and we 

need the diplomatic and developmental tools alongside our military. And for a country that could put up Voice of America and 

send the truth right inside the Iron Curtain, we’re not fighting the 

war anywhere near as smartly as we did back during the cold war. 

I think you’re—you should aggressively go after these areas that 

you’re bringing up, ma’am. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all very much. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

100 

You all have really probably—we probably have violated the Geneva Convention, when it comes to the three of you all. But, you’ve 

been terrific. I’ve really enjoyed this. 

Back to Iraq, looking forward. Let’s assume that we can get a 

more cohesive government, that the new Prime Minister is better 

than the old, that we can get a Iraqi-trained force, the Kurds help 

us, eventually we take back Mosul, Anbar Province gets solidified 

once again. That’s a big ‘‘if.’’ If they ask us, in the future, to leave 

a residual force, would you recommend that we honor that request? 

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. Oh, absolutely. 

General KEANE. Absolutely. 

Admiral FALLON. I mean, they’re going to ask, for sure, Senator. 

And how could we say no to that, given the circumstance? 

Senator GRAHAM. And what I want to tell the American people, 

the best I can, it’s in our interest for Iraq to turn out well. Do you 

all agree with that? Whether we should—going in or not is behind 

us. We’re there. And I guess my theory of all of this is—a line of 

defense for America is best achieved by having allies in the region 

that we can work with, that will fight this radical ideology at its 

core. And the hardest part of getting this war won, I believe, is just 

the patience—strategic patience that comes from investing in others. As unreliable as they are and as frustrating as they are, the 

alternative is fortress America, and I just don’t believe that works. 

Now, as we get ready to go into Mosul, I think, General Keane, 

you said that the Iraqi timetable is probably different than ours. 

Just imagine for a moment, as an American politician, that there 

was a town in your State occupied by a foreign force, and the Federal Government was telling you, or some outside entity was telling 

you, that it may be a year or two before you can go back in. I think 

the new Sunni Defense Minister is in a real spot, here. How long 

is he going to allow his people in Mosul to suffer under the hands 

of a vicious enemy? 

So, we have to realize, politically, that an Iraqi politician has a 

different calculation than an American political leader, here. But, 

it is in our advantage, don’t you—in our interest—to make sure the 

Iraqis do this right. Is that correct? 

General KEANE. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. They’re not ready by this spring, are they? 

General KEANE. I’m not on the ground, but, talking to people 

who are, I don’t think so. Not even close. 

Senator GRAHAM. Admiral Fallon, would you be worried about a 

spring offensive? 

Admiral FALLON. I don’t know what the timing is, because I 

haven’t been in dialogue with these guys. But, my sense is, there 

are probably things we can do in advance if you accept— 

Senator GRAHAM. Sure. 

Admiral FALLON.—that they’re not ready in a large force. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Admiral FALLON. I think there are some things we can continue 

to do. And, just last week, it’s—the sense is that the—you know, 

we’re starting to go back and claw back. When I say ‘‘we,’’ our allies over there. So, maybe they’re not ready for the big thing. But, 

then again, I have a hard time, frankly, envisioning the kind of activity that we saw when we had to retake Fallujah for the second 

101 

and third times, going in there, street-to-street. I’m not sure that’s 

what’s—that’s a scenario that makes a lot of sense. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah. I agree. But, somebody’s going to have 

to take Mosul back, right? And we want it to be Iraqis. 

Do you agree with the idea of—maybe 10,000 is the right number 

to have, in terms of support? General Mattis, does that make sense 

to you? 

General MATTIS. I’d look more at the capabilities, sir. But, we’ve 

got to have enough forward air controllers, enough trainers, enough 

advisors— 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

General MATTIS.—to actually make a difference. 

Senator GRAHAM. Does that make sense to you, Admiral Fallon, 

whatever—— 

Admiral FALLON. Yeah, I have—— 

Senator GRAHAM.—‘‘enough’’ is? 

Admiral FALLON.—no idea what the exact number is, but you’ve 

got have people with the right skill sets to—— 

Senator GRAHAM. So, just—to the American people, we’re going 

to have some boots on the ground if we want to get this right. The 

hope is that we don’t have to have the 82nd Airborne going back 

in. 

Real quickly with Syria. I can understand how we get there in 

Iraq. I really don’t understand how we’re going to get there in 

Syria, unless we have a regional force to supplement whatever Free 

Syrian Army we can muster. Very quickly, how do we dislodge ISIL 

from Syria? And, if you don’t, how can you sustain your gains in 

Iraq? 

And finally, the end game is a real problematic situation in 

Syria. How do you salvage a Syria with Assad still in power? 

So, how do you go in and get them out on the ground? Who does 

it? And should we leave Assad in power as an end state? And, if 

we do, what can we expect from that? 

General KEANE. Well—I’ll try to answer that as—we’ve tried to 

answer it in the past, and—and this is tough, complicated, and 

very uncertain. But, here’s what I believe. 

First of all, the mission that we have right now is not to destroy 

ISIS in Syria. It is to degrade it, but to destroy ISIS in Iraq and 

retake lost territory. I believe that is not a very good mission, because I don’t think you separate Syria and Iraq. I think you see 

them as a whole cloth, in terms of what you have to do against that 

enemy. 

All that said, if you—if our intent is to destroy ISIS in Syria, the 

only way that can be done will be with ground force supported by 

air power. And there is no ground force in sight with the capability 

to do that. And you know better than I, because of the briefing you 

got from General Nagata, at the pace we’re doing that, 5,000 or so 

a year, we’re not going to get there. We’re not even close. 

So, in my mind, you have to push back on Assad, because of 

what he’s doing to the—what exists of the Free Syrian Army. That 

brings in the coalition very strongly in support of what’s taking 

place in Syria. Then you bring Turkey to the table, you bring UAE 

to the table, you bring Jordan to the table, and you bring Saudi 

Arabia to the table. Now they’re at the table, and you’ve got their 

102 

interest. They have got to be the coalition force that’s going to drive 

ISIS out of there, with our assistance. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do the other—do the two of you agree with 

that? 

Admiral FALLON. The question is, How do you convince these 

people to actually go do that—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Right, right. 

Admiral FALLON.—is going to be the real challenge. 

Senator GRAHAM. General Mattis, do you agree with that concept? 

General MATTIS. I do, Senator. But, the devil’s in the details. 

And we have got to figure out what it looks like, or what we want 

it to look like at the end. Is Assad still there, or not? There are 

some who say we can’t put Syria back together if Assad’s part of 

it. There’s others who say he’s the best of the worst options. We’ve 

got to get this straight in our heads first, and then we can give you 

a lot of answers, sir, about how best to accomplish it. 

Senator AYOTTE. Senator King. 

Senator KING. I’m fine, thank you. 

Senator AYOTTE. You’re all set? Thank you. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

And this has been an extraordinarily useful hearing. 

I just have one comment to make. And we have repeatedly talked 

about the need for residual forces in a condition-based situation in 

Afghanistan and other places when we commit ourselves. And, in 

looking at 2011—we’re all looking back—and I think it’s important 

to note that the stage was probably set in 2008, when the United 

States and the Government of Iraq entered into a formal agreement to remove all troops by 2011. That was signed by President 

Bush and Prime Minister Maliki. And it was signed under the 

threat that, if they didn’t, our troops would be out even sooner. I 

think, December 31st of 2008, our international protections expired. And it goes to General Mattis’ point, is—when we sign something formally saying, you know, ‘‘We’re out,’’ even though there 

was an expectation that we might be able to negotiate, it’s awful 

tough, once you get a deal between the U.S., our President, their 

Prime Minister, signed by—ratified by their Parliament, to reverse. 

Also particularly difficult if we signed in ’08 with 100,000 troops 

on the ground and we’re already down to a much smaller figure by 

2011. 

And I think it’s important to put this in context, because this 

issue of residual forces with a condition-based sort of level is something we have to, you know, consider as we look—again, as Senator 

Graham suggested—going forward in Iraq, and also going forward 

in Afghanistan. 

And I want to thank you. I don’t necessarily need a comment. 

You can write me—mail me, email me. 

I want to thank the chairwoman for running an excellent hearing. 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank Senator Reed. 

And I appreciate all three of you being here today. I think it was 

evident, your tremendous military experience. And all of us appreciated a very substantive hearing and your best advice, and we 

103 

really appreciate everything that you’ve done and continue to do for 

our country. So, thank you all. And thank you all—we’re very impressed with your endurance, as well. 

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(105) 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE UNITED 

STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, 

Graham, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 

Blumenthal, Donnelly, and Kaine. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning, all. 

[Audience disruption.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. The committee will stand in recess until the 

Capitol Police can restore order. I ask the police to restore order. 

Could I ask our Capitol Police to help restore order here? Can 

someone find out where the Capitol Hill Police is? 

I would like to say to my colleagues and to our distinguished witnesses this morning that I have been a member of this committee 

for many years, and I have never seen anything as disgraceful and 

outrageous and despicable as the last demonstration that just took 

place about—you know, you are going to have to shut up or I am 

going to have you arrested. If we cannot get the Capitol Hill Police 

in here immediately—get out of here you low-life scum. 

[Applause.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Kissinger, I hope on behalf of all of the 

members of this committee on both sides of the aisle—in fact, from 

all of my colleagues, I would like to apologize for allowing such disgraceful behavior towards a man who served his country with the 

greatest distinction. I apologize profusely. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony on global challenges and U.S. national security strategy. 

This is the third hearing in a series designed to examine the strategic context in which we find ourselves, one characterized by multiplying and accumulating threats to our National security, and 

how that should inform the work of this committee and Congress. 

We have had previous testimony from General Brent Scowcroft, 

Dr. Brzezinski, General Mattis, General Keane, and Admiral William Fallon, and we have heard consistent themes: 

Our foreign policy is reactive. 

106 

We need to repeal sequestration. 

We should not withdraw from Afghanistan on an arbitrary, calendar-based timeline. 

We need a strategy that matches military means to the President’s stated goal of degrading and destroying the Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria [ISIS]. 

We will explore these topics and many more with today’s outstanding panel of witnesses. I am honored to welcome three former 

Secretaries of State, among our Nation’s most admired diplomats 

and public servants: Dr. Henry Kissinger, Dr. George Shultz, and 

Dr. Madeleine Albright. 

Our Nation owes each of these statesmen a debt of gratitude for 

their years of service advancing our National interests. Secretary 

Shultz has held nearly every senior position of importance in our 

Federal Government during his illustrious career. Dr. Albright was 

an instrumental leader during key points in our Nation’s history, 

influencing policies in the Balkans and the Middle East. 

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the personal 

debt of gratitude that I owe to Dr. Kissinger. When Henry came 

to Hanoi to conclude the agreement that would end America’s war 

in Vietnam, the Vietnamese told him they would send me home 

with him. He refused the offer. ‘‘Commander McCain will return in 

the same order as the others,’’ he told them. He knew my early release would be seen as favoritism to my father and a violation of 

our code of conduct. By rejecting this last attempt to suborn a dereliction of duty, Henry saved one of my important possessions, my 

honor. For that, Henry, I am eternally grateful. 

Thank you again to all of our witnesses for being here today and 

I look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me join you in welcoming Secretary Kissinger, Secretary 

Shultz, and Secretary Albright. You have provided extraordinary 

leadership to this Nation in so many different capacities, and we 

are deeply appreciative that you are joining us this morning. It is 

an extraordinary opportunity to hear from individuals who have 

witnessed and shaped history over the course of many, many years, 

and thank you again for joining us. 

I also want to commend Senator McCain for this series of hearings that have allowed us to look very carefully at the strategy of 

the United States in view of many complex problems that face us 

today. You all have done so much. Again, let me reiterate our appreciation and our thanks. 

Each of you throughout your careers have demonstrated an indepth understanding of the historical, economic, religious, ethnic, 

and political factors affecting foreign policy and international security. Each of you emphasized the need to use all instruments of national power, not just military power, but also diplomacy and economic power, to address the challenges facing the United States. 

The breadth and complexity of challenges to the international 

order and the United States today seem as complex and vexing as 

any we have faced previously. We would be interested in your perVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
107 

spective on these challenges and the principles that should guide 

our security strategy. 

On Iran, in a recent hearing that Senator McCain mentioned 

with General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski, both of them urged 

Congress to hold off on additional sanctions in order to give multilateral negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program sufficient time to 

reach a conclusion. Indeed, the Senate Banking Committee is considering that issue in a few moments, and I will have to depart and 

participate in that markup. But we would certainly be interested 

in your perspectives on this critical issue. 

Regarding the Middle East, during a hearing Tuesday on the 

military aspects of the United States security strategy, General 

Mattis emphasized the need to have a clear understanding of what 

our political objectives are in the region. He also made clear that 

any attempt to impose a purely military solution to these conflicts 

would come at a very high cost. General Scowcroft and Dr. 

Brzezinski talked about the importance of the region but also 

warned against the United States, in their words, ‘‘owning it.’’ We 

have to be very careful going forward. 

All of these issues and many, many more from Russia’s behavior 

in Crimea to the impact of cyber on national security policy—I 

think we would benefit immensely from your advice and from your 

wisdom. Thank you very, very much. 

Again, thank you, Senator McCain. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. We will begin with Dr. Albright. 

Welcome, Dr. Albright, and thank you for being here today. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, CHAIR, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE AND FORMER SECRETARY 

OF STATE 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I am delighted to be here, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the committee. Thank you very much 

for inviting me to participate in this important series of hearings. 

I am very pleased to be here alongside with my distinguished colleagues and very dear friends, Secretaries Kissinger and Shultz. 

I want to commend this committee for initiating this timely discussion of U.S. national security strategy because these hearings 

embody this chamber’s best traditions of bipartisanship and foreign 

policy, and I think they can be tremendously helpful in framing the 

issues facing our country. 

As someone who began her career in public service working as 

chief legislative assistant to the great Senator from Maine, Ed 

Muskie, I have long believed that Congress has a critical role to 

play in our National security. When I became Secretary of State, 

I valued my regular appearances before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then headed by Senator Jesse Helms. He and I 

did disagree on many things, but we respected each other and built 

an effective partnership because we both believed America had a 

unique role to play in the world. That belief still shapes my 

worldview and informs the perspectives that I bring to our discussion today. 

It does not take a seasoned observer of international relations to 

point out that we are living through a time of monumental change 

across the world. We are reckoning with new forces that are pushVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
108 

ing humanity down the path of progress while also unleashing new 

contradictions on the world scene. 

One of these forces is globalization, which has made the world 

more interconnected than ever before but also added new layers of 

complexity to the challenges of statecraft. With globalization, it is 

impossible for any single nation to insulate itself from the world’s 

problems or to act as the lone global problem-solver. 

Another force is technology, which has unleashed unprecedented 

innovation and benefited people the world over while also amplifying their frustrations and empowering networks of criminals and 

terrorists. 

Globalization and technology are reshaping and disrupting the 

international system which is struggling to keep pace with change. 

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Middle East where century-old state boundaries are unraveling, a rising wave of violence 

and sectarianism is producing the world’s largest refugee crisis in 

70 years, and a dangerous competition is playing out between Iran 

and Saudi Arabia for regional primacy. 

Another key test lies in Europe where Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally changed security calculations on the continent and marked the first time since World War 

II that European borders have been altered by force. Events of recent days have shown that what many have assumed would become a frozen conflict is still in fact red hot. 

Meanwhile, in Asia, the region’s growth and the rise of new powers are creating new opportunities for the United States in areas 

such as trade, but these developments are also testing security arrangements that have ensured peace and stability since the end of 

World War II. 

None of these challenges pose an existential threat to the United 

States, but the intensity and complexity of them can seem 

daunting, particularly after we have been through more than 13 

years of protracted war and threats such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, disease, and food and water shortages also 

looming on the horizon. 

Still, they cannot be ignored. The American people may be tired, 

but we must avoid another danger lurking in this new era, the 

temptation to turn inward, because for all the turmoil this young 

century has brought, America remains by far the world’s mightiest 

economic and military power with a resurgent economy and an energy revolution giving us newfound confidence in our future. We 

are the only nation with not just the capacity and will to lead but 

also the ideals to do so in a direction that most of the world would 

prefer to go towards liberty, justice, peace, and economic opportunity for all. 

As the President said last week, the question is not whether 

America should lead but how it should lead. That in many ways 

is the focus of today’s hearing. Let me just suggest a few basic 

principles that might help guide this discussion. 

First, we are the world’s indispensable nation, but nothing about 

the word ‘‘indispensable’’ requires us to act alone. Alliances and 

partnerships matter, enhancing our power and the legitimacy of 

our actions. Our national security strategy must always encompass 

109 

the security of others and, where possible, we should work through 

coalitions of friends and allies. 

Second, given the fluid nature of today’s threats, we must make 

wise use of every foreign policy option from quiet diplomacy to military force to protect America’s national interests. 

Third, the foundation of American leadership must remain what 

it has been for generations: our belief in the fundamental dignity 

and importance of every human being. We should not be shy about 

promoting these values, and that is why I am proud to be chairman 

of the National Democratic Institute. I know you, Mr. Chairman, 

are very proud of your leadership of the International Republican 

Institute and the things that we do together. Working with allies 

and partners, balancing our diplomatic, economic, and military 

tools of national power, staying true to our ideals, these will all be 

critical in navigating today’s challenges. This means in the Middle 

East, we must continue working with European and regional allies 

to apply direct military pressure against the Islamic State while 

making clear that these violent extremists are guilty not of Islamic 

terrorism but of crimes that are profoundly un-Islamic. We must 

aid the millions of innocent refugees in Syria and its neighbors that 

have fled both the terror of ISIS and the depravity of the Assad 

regime. 

Another key challenge in the region remains Iran. The President 

has rightly made it the policy of the United States to prevent Iran 

from obtaining a nuclear weapon. He has taken no options off the 

table to achieve that goal, and the administration is exploring a 

diplomatic resolution. If these negotiations fail or if Iran does not 

honor its commitments, then the United States should—and I believe will—impose additional costs on Tehran with strong support 

internationally. But I believe it would be a mistake to do so before 

the negotiations run their course. 

In Europe, we must reinforce our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and stand united and firm against Putin’s aggression even as we continue to engage Russia as a global power 

on issues of shared interest. But until Russia honors its commitments and withdraws its forces from Ukraine, there can be no 

sanctions relief. If Russia continues its pattern of destabilizing actions, it must face even more severe consequences. 

On economic reforms, the administration has made strong 

pledges with Ukraine to work with our allies, however, to secure 

more commitments in the areas on banking and energy, but we do 

have to help them in terms of military assistance so that they can 

defend themselves. We should not make the road forward harder 

by suggesting that we see Ukraine’s future subject to Russia’s veto. 

I have many other comments but I would like to Reserve the rest 

to put in the record. I thank you very much for your kindness in 

asking all of us to come and speak. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Albright follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MADELINE K. ALBRIGHT

Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of the committee: thank you for inviting me to participate in this important series of hearings. 

I am pleased to be here alongside my distinguished colleagues and dear friends, 

Secretaries Kissinger and Shultz. 

110 

I want to commend this committee for initiating this timely discussion of U.S. national security strategy. These hearings embody this chamber’s best traditions of bipartisanship in foreign policy, and I think they can be tremendously helpful in framing the issues facing our country. 

As someone who began her career in public service working as chief legislative 

assistant to Senator Ed Muskie, I have long believed that Congress has a critical 

role to play in our national security. 

So when I became Secretary of State, I valued my regular appearances before the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee—then headed by Senator Jesse Helms. 

He and I disagreed on many things, but we respected each other and built an effective partnership because we both believed that America had a unique role to play 

in the world. 

That belief still shapes my worldview, and informs the perspective I bring to our 

discussion today. 

It does not take a seasoned observer of international relations to point out that 

we are living through a time of monumental change across the world. 

We are reckoning with new forces that are pushing humanity down the path of 

progress, while also unleashing new contradictions on the world scene. 

One of these forces is globalization, which has made the world more interconnected than ever before, but also added new layers of complexity to the challenges of statecraft. 

With globalization, it is impossible for any single nation to insulate itself from the 

world’s problems, or to act as the lone global problem solver. 

Another force is technology, which has unleashed unprecedented innovation and 

benefited people the world over, while also amplifying their frustrations and empowering networks of criminals and terrorists. 

Globalization and technology are reshaping and disrupting the international system, which is struggling to keep pace with the change. 

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Middle East, where century-old state 

boundaries are unraveling, a rising wave of violence and sectarianism is producing 

the world’s largest refugee crisis in 70 years, and a dangerous competition is playing 

out between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional primacy. 

Another key test lies in Europe, where Russia’s ongoing aggression against 

Ukraine has fundamentally changed security calculations on the continent—and 

marked the first time since World War II that European borders have been altered 

by force. Events of recent days have shown that what many have assumed would 

become a frozen conflict is still, in fact, red hot. 

Meanwhile, in Asia, the region’s growth and the rise of new powers are creating 

new opportunities for the United States in areas such as trade, but these developments are also testing security arrangements that have ensured peace and stability 

since the end of World War II. 

None of these challenges pose an existential threat to the United States, but the 

intensity—and complexity—of them can seem daunting . . . particularly after we 

have been through more than 13 years of protracted war, and threats such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, disease, and food and water shortages also loom 

on the horizon. 

Still, they cannot be ignored. The American people may be tired, but we must 

avoid another danger lurking in this new era—the temptation to turn inward. 

Because for all the turmoil this young century has brought, America remains by 

far the world’s mightiest economic and military power—with a resurgent economy 

and an energy revolution giving us newfound confidence in our future. 

We are the only nation with not just the capacity and will to lead, but also the 

ideals to do so in a direction that most of the world would prefer to go—towards 

liberty and justice, peace and economic opportunity for all. 

As the President said last week, the question is not whether America should lead, 

but how it should lead. And that, in many ways, is the focus on today’s hearing. 

Let me suggest a few basic principles that might help guide this discussion. 

First, we are the world’s indispensable nation, but nothing about being indispensable requires us to act alone. Alliances and partnerships matter, enhancing our 

power and the legitimacy of our actions. Our national security strategy must always 

encompass the security of others, and where possible we should work through coalitions of friends and allies. 

Second, given the fluid nature of the today’s threats, we must make wise use of 

every foreign policy option—from quiet diplomacy to military force—to protect America’s national interests. 

Third, the foundation of American leadership must remain what it has been for 

generations—our belief in the fundamental dignity and importance of every human 

being. We should not be shy about promoting these values, and that is why I am 

111 

proud to be the Chairman of the National Democratic Institute, and I know that 

you, Chairman McCain, are equally proud of your leadership of the International 

Republican Institute. 

Working with allies and partners; balancing our diplomatic, economic, and military tools of national power; staying true to our ideals—these will all be critical in 

navigating today’s challenges. 

That means in the Middle East, we must continue working with European and 

regional allies to apply direct military pressure against the Islamic State, while 

making clear that these violent extremists are guilty not of Islamic terrorism but 

of crimes that are profoundly un-Islamic. 

We need to help the people of the region build governing institutions that offer 

legitimacy and an alternative to violence. That includes continuing to support the 

people of Afghanistan through NATO’s Resolute Support mission. And we must aid 

the millions of innocent refugees in Syria and its neighbors that have fled both the 

terror of ISIS and the depravity of the Assad regime. 

Another key challenge in the region remains Iran. The President has rightly made 

it the policy of the United States to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

He has taken no options off the table to achieve that goal, and the Administration 

is exploring a diplomatic resolution. 

If these negotiations fail, or if Iran does not honor its commitments, then the 

United States should—and I believe will—impose additional costs on Tehran, with 

strong support internationally. But it would be a mistake to do so before the negotiations run their course. 

That would fracture the international coalition and let Iran avoid its responsibility, leaving the United States and our closest allies isolated. 

In Europe, we must reinforce our NATO Allies and stand united and firm against 

Putin’s aggression, even as we continue to engage Russia as a global power on 

issues of shared interest. But until Russia honors its commitments and withdraws 

its forces from Ukraine, there can be no sanctions relief. And if Russia continues 

its pattern of destabilizing actions, it must face even more severe consequences. 

Our support for Ukraine must enhance its security capabilities and support the 

new government’s ambitious reforms, because Ukraine will need to restore security 

and implement dramatic economic changes to emerge from the current crisis. 

On economic reforms, the Administration has made strong pledges and worked 

with our allies to secure more commitments in areas such as banking and energy. 

However, we must remember the lessons we learned in the Balkans and in other 

post-conflict states: aid and technical help in good governance must be accompanied 

by political guidance to avoid side deals that can subvert reform. 

Ukraine has chosen to make its own path. It wants a future with Europe, while 

maintaining a relationship with its neighbor. We should not make its road forward 

harder by suggesting that we see Ukraine’s future as subject to Russia’s veto. 

The United States should also stay vigorously engaged in Asia, where the administration’s rebalance has reinforced commitments to allies such as Japan and the 

Republic of Korea, built stronger partnerships with India and the nations of Southeast Asia, created new opportunities for regional trade, and helped expand engagement with China on economic, diplomatic, and military issues. The President’s historic trip to India this week cemented the positive progress we are making in 

strengthening another vital relationship in the region. 

In Africa we should help nations such as Nigeria and Cameroon deal with the 

challenges of terrorism, and invest in the continent’s unmatched potential for 

growth and opportunity. And in Latin America, we should pursue the opening to 

Cuba but keep issues of human rights and democracy front and center in all discussions with the regime, while expanding our partnerships throughout the hemisphere 

in order to deal with threats to human security such as transnational crime. 

On a global level, the United States must also seize the opportunity of this year’s 

UN Conference in Paris to assert our leadership on the issue of climate change, 

which the Pentagon recently highlighted as an urgent national security threat. 

While more tough work lies ahead, the agreements reached with China and India 

have laid the groundwork for global action on this defining challenge of our time. 

Trade presents another area of enormous opportunity for the United States. The 

agreements under negotiation by the administration in the Pacific and in Europe 

would not only benefit our economy, they would strengthen our national security 

and should be viewed through that lens as well. 

In his speech to the nation last week, the President appealed to the American people not to let our fears blind us to the opportunities that this young century presents. 

For all the anxieties and turmoil that surround us, I must say that I remain an 

optimist—tough I am an optimist who worries a lot. 

112 

Around the world, America remains the brightest beacon of human liberty. We are 

diverse, we are entrepreneurial, and we are resilient. No other country is in a better 

position to succeed in this new era than we are—but to succeed, we must stay globally engaged. 

The greatest danger is becoming so intent on enjoying our freedom, that we neglect our responsibility to defend it. 

That brings me to an area of special concern to this committee—the steep cuts 

to defense spending that will take place under the sequester mechanism later this 

year, jeopardizing our military’s global reach. 

The President, military leaders, and congressional leaders of both parties have all 

said that these cuts would cause undue harm to our national security. 

I agree, and so I urge Congress to repeal these cuts. 

But I would be remiss if I did not also mention the troubling gap in funding between military and non-military foreign affairs programs that have persisted for far 

too long. 

For any strategy to be successful, we must provide all elements of our national 

security establishment—defense, diplomacy, development, and democracy promotion—with sufficient resources. Both the administration and Congress must come 

together and make the tough compromises necessary to renew and revitalize all of 

our instruments of power. A close partnership between the executive and legislative 

branches of government is the only way to protect our interests and sustain our 

leadership in this dangerous world. 

Thank you again for the invitation to be here today. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary Shultz? 

STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, THOMAS W. AND 

SUSAN B. FORD DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY AND FORMER SECRETARY OF 

STATE 

Dr. SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I think you have to push the button. 

Dr. SHULTZ. I appreciate the privilege of being here. You can see 

I am out of practice. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. SHULTZ. I have not been here for 25 years. I used to appear 

a lot. We had the idea when I was in office, if you want me with 

you on the landing, include me in the takeoff. We did lots of consultation, and I found I always learned from it. I appreciate the 

chance to appear. 

What I thought I would do is start by setting out basic ideas that 

we used and President Reagan used in thinking out his foreign policy and defense policy and then try to apply those ideas to four 

areas that are important right now. 

First of all is the idea of execution. You have to arrange yourself 

and the way you go about things so that you execute the ideas that 

you have in mind, make them effective. 

I remember when I returned to California after serving. President Reagan knew I had served as Secretary of Labor and Director 

of the Budget and Secretary of Treasury. I knew him somewhat, 

and I got a phone call inviting me to Sacramento. He was Governor 

then. I got a 2 and a half hour drilling on how the Federal Government worked. How do you get something to happen? How does the 

President set up his policy? How does he get people to follow that 

policy? How does the budget get put together? What does the President do? What do the cabinet officers do? What does the budget diVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
113 

rector do and so on? I came away feeling this guy wants to be 

President but he wants to do the job and make things work. 

I remember not long after he took office, you may recall the air 

controllers went on strike—the air traffic controllers. People came 

running into the Oval Office saying, Mr. President, Mr. President, 

this is very complicated. He said, it is not complicated. It is simple. 

They took an oath of office and they violated it. They are out. All 

over the world, people said, is he crazy firing the air traffic controllers? But he had surrounded himself and he had over in the Transportation Department a man named Drew Lewis who had been the 

chief executive of a large transportation company and Drew knew 

how to keep the planes flying, which happened. So all over the 

world, the message went, hey, the guy plays for keeps. You better 

pay attention. But it was execution. 

The second thing in his playbook was always be realistic. Do not 

kid yourself. No rose-colored glasses. Describe the situation as it is. 

That does not mean you are afraid to recognize an opening when 

you see it, but do not kid yourself. A very important principle. 

Then next, be strong. The military, of course. I do not know, sequestration seems to me like legislative insanity. You cannot run 

anything on a percentage basis. You have to be able to pick and 

choose. You better get rid of that. 

But at any rate, we need a strong military, but we need a strong 

economy, something vibrant, something going to draw on. We need 

to have that kind of self-confidence that Madeleine talked about. 

Do we have the winning hand? Do we have the right ideas? All of 

that adds to your strength. 

The next thing, of course, is to think through your agenda so 

when you get to negotiating, you know you are negotiating from 

your own agenda not the other guy’s agenda. Do not spend any 

time thinking about what he might accept or she might accept. 

Stick to your agenda. Figure it out what it is and that is what you 

are after. 

I remember when President Reagan proposed the so-called zero 

option on the the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). 

People said you are crazy. The Soviets have 1,500 missiles deployed. We have none. You are out of your mind. We went through 

a lot of pain and agony, but we wound up with 0–0. Our agenda 

won. We stuck to it. 

I think it is very important to be very careful with your words. 

Mean what you say. Say what you mean. I remember, Mr. Chairman, at the start of World War II, I was in Marine Corps boot 

camp. The sergeant hands me my rifle. He says take good care of 

this rifle. This is your best friend. Remember one thing: never 

point this rifle at anybody unless you are willing to pull the trigger. 

Senator Sullivan, you went through the same experience, I am 

sure, in boot camp. No empty threats. You can translate that into 

when you say you will do something, do it. If you have that pattern 

of behavior, people trust you. They can deal with you. If you do not 

do what you say you are going to do, they cannot deal with it. They 

do not trust you. I think this has been a very important principle. 

Then once you have all these things in place, negotiate, engage 

with people. Do not be afraid to engage with your adversaries, but 

do it on your agenda and from your strengths. That is the outline. 

114 

Now, let me turn first to something that I do not know whether 

it is really on your agenda or not but I think it should be and that 

is our neighborhood. I always felt and President Reagan felt that 

our policies start in our neighborhood. This is where we live. Canada and Mexico. It is worth pointing out that since the North 

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed 20 years 

ago, trade between these three countries has blossomed. Canada is 

our biggest trading partner. Mexico is third. We are their biggest 

trading partner. Listen to this, our imports from Canada are 25 

percent United States content, and our imports from Mexico are 40 

percent United States content. There is an integrated process going 

on here. 

Furthermore, in terms of people, there are a million Canadians 

living in California. That is fine. There is no problem. 

Fertility in Mexico now is down to a little below replacement 

level. When we had that crisis not long ago with all these kids 

showing up on our border, none of them were Mexican. It only underlines the point that the border that we need to be worrying 

about is Mexico’s southern border, and we need to be worrying 

about how can we help them. Why is it that conditions are so bad 

in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala that parents send their 

children north to see if they cannot get something better? We have 

to pay attention down there. That is all a part of this problem of 

illegal immigration. It is not just ranting about our border. It is 

much more diverse than that. 

I want to turn to Iran. What is the reality? Let us start with reality. The first point to remember is Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism. It started right away when they took people in our 

embassy hostage for close to a year. One of their first acts also was 

to try to blow up the Grand Mosque in Mecca. They act directly. 

They act indirectly through Hezbollah. I think it is probably a fair 

statement to say that if it were not for Hezbollah, Assad would not 

be in Syria right now. But Hezbollah is an Iranian entity, and we 

should not kid ourselves about that. They perpetrate terror. That 

is point number one about what they are like. 

Point number two, they are developing ballistic missiles. They 

are pretty advanced in that as far as I can figure out. That is a 

menacing military item. 

Number three, internally there is a lot to be desired in the way 

they run themselves. There are lots of political executions in Iran 

and that continues. 

Fourth, they are trying to develop nuclear weapons. There is no 

sensible explanation for the extent, the money, the talent they have 

devoted to their nuclear thing other than that they want a nuclear 

weapon. It cannot be explained any other way. We are negotiating 

with them. At least as far as I can see, they have not the table set 

yet. There is nothing going on about ballistic missiles, nothing 

going on about terrorism, let alone their internal affairs. It is just 

about the nuclear business. We had innumerable United Nations 

(UN) resolutions in the Security Council calling on Iran to dismantle its nuclear capabilities. Now we seem to have granted that. 

As I say, we have granted the right to enrich. Already they pocketed that and we are just talking about how much. 

115 

I think it is also the case if you said to yourself what is their 

agenda, their agenda is to get rid of the sanctions, and they are 

doing pretty well. The sanctions are eroding. The more you kick the 

can down the road, the more the sanctions erode. They are not so 

easy to put back. I hear people talk about snap-back. There is very 

little snap-back. If you have ever tried to get sanctions imposed on 

somebody, you know how hard it is. You are trying to persuade 

people who are making a perfectly good living out of trade with 

somebody to stop doing it, and it is not easy. 

I am very uneasy about the way our negotiations with Iran are 

going on. I think it is not a bad thing if they are reminded that 

sanctions can be put on and will be tough. 

Then let me just say a word. Madeleine has covered it already 

well about Russia. I think, in addition to the obvious things about 

it, Russia is showing a lack of concern about borders. It is, in a 

sense, an attack on a state system. It is an attack on agreements. 

Remember when Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons, there was an 

agreement with us, with the Russians, and with the British that 

they would respect the borders of Ukraine. You do not even hear 

about that agreement anymore. It does not mean a thing. All their 

neighbors are nervous. Why? Because they are showing a disrespect for borders. 

I want to come back to this issue because—and let me just turn 

to the question of terrorism and ISIS because it is related in an odd 

way to what Russia is doing. I think the ISIS development is not 

simply about terrorism. It is about a different view about how the 

world should work. They are against the state system. They say, 

we do not believe in countries. In that sense, there is an odd kind 

of relationship with what Russia is doing and what they are doing. 

What do we do about it? First of all, I think we do have to understand the scope of it. It is the scope that matters. 

We had at the Hoover Institution at Stanford where I work the 

other day the guy who is the head military person in Pakistan. He 

was more worried about terrorism than he was about India. He 

was worried about ISIS establishing itself in Pakistan. It was not 

just the Middle East. This idea of no countries is something that 

is their ideology. They are trying to pursue it. 

So what do we do? I think we, obviously, need to recognize that 

this has been around a long time. I brought along—perhaps I could 

put it in the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection. 

Dr. SHULTZ. A speech I gave in 1984 just to make the point that 

terrorism has been around a while. In this speech—I will read a 

couple of things from it. 

‘‘The terrorists profit from the anarchy caused by their violence. 

They succeed when governments change their policies out of intimidation. But the terrorist can even be satisfied if a government responds to terror by clamping down on individual rights and freedoms. Governments that overreact, even in self-defense, may only 

undermine their own legitimacy.’’ 

I am saying we have to figure out how to react but not give away 

the store in the process. 

I say, ‘‘The magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism is so 

great that we cannot afford to confront it with half-hearted and 

116 

poorly organized measures. Terrorism is a contagious disease that 

will inevitably spread if it goes untreated.’’ 

‘‘We cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, 

worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond.’’ 

But we have to be ready to respond. What should we do? 

A pretty good set of proposals is by your friend, Mr. Chairman, 

former Senator Joseph Lieberman. I do not know whether you saw 

the piece he had in ‘‘The Wall Street Journal?’’ recently. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I did. 

Dr. SHULTZ. It was a very good piece. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We will include it in the record. 

Dr. SHULTZ. He sets out things that we should do, which I agree. 

If you could put this in the record, I think that would be helpful. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection. 

Dr. SHULTZ. But in addition to military things that we should be 

doing, I think we also have to ask ourselves how do we encourage 

members of the Islamic faith to disavow these efforts. The President of Egypt made reportedly a very important speech that we 

need to build on. 

But I would like to call your attention to something that has 

come out of San Francisco. Of course, I am a little oriented that 

way. I know you people on the East Coast think we are a bunch 

of nut balls, but we have a good time. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. SHULTZ. But there is a man in San Francisco named Bill 

Swing. He is the retired Episcopal bishop of California. He started 

something called the United Religion Initiative. His idea is to get 

people—he found it was hard to get the people running these religions, but if you get the people together and getting them to talk 

together about subjects of interest to them, they basically forget 

about their religion and they try to get somewhere with these subjects. By this time, he has what he calls cooperation circles in 85 

countries. He got millions of people involved. He has a big list of 

religions involved. The most important in numbers are Christians 

and Islam, and that is followed by Hinduism and Jewish, but a 

whole bunch of others. The kind of things they talk about are like 

economic development, education, health care, nuclear disarmament, refugee and displacement issues, and so on. 

I think things like this are to be encouraged because they get 

people from different religions and say there are things you can get 

together on and work on together, and that tends to break things 

down. 

He has given me a little handout on it, and I would like to put 

that in the record also, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection. 

Dr. SHULTZ. So thank you for the opportunity to present some 

views. 

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Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Kissinger? 

STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, CHAIRMAN OF 

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE 

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this invitation and 

to appear together with my friend of 50 years, George Shultz, from 

whom I have learned so much, and with Madeleine, with whom I 

have shared common concerns for many decades and who put me 

in my place when she was appointed as Secretary of State. I introduced her at a dinner in New York, and I said, welcome to the fraternity. And she said, the first thing you have to learn that it is 

no longer a fraternity. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. KISSINGER. Now a sorority. 

Mr. Chairman, I have taken the liberty—I agree with the policy 

recommendations that my colleagues have put forward—to try to 

put forward the conception statement of the overall situation, and 

I will be happy in the question period to go into specific policy 

issues. 

The United States finds itself in a paradoxical situation. By any 

standard of national capacity, we are in a favorable position to 

achieve our traditional objectives and to shape international relations. 

Yet, as we look around the world, we encounter upheaval and 

conflict and chaos. 

[Audience disruption.] 

Dr. SHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, I salute Henry Kissinger for his 

many efforts at peace and security. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Doctor. 

[Standing ovation.] 

Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you very much. 

The United States has not faced a more diverse and complex 

array of crises since the end of the Second World War. One reason 

is that the nature of strategy has shifted from an emphasis on objective power to include also psychological contests and asymmetric 

war. The existing international order is in the process of being redefined. 

First, the concept of order within every region of the world is 

being challenged. 

Second, the relationship between different regions of the world is 

being redefined. 

Third, for the first time in history, every region now interacts in 

real time and affects each other simultaneously. 

The problem of peace was historically posed by the accumulation 

of power, the emergence of a potentially dominant country threatening the security of its neighbors. In our period, peace is often 

threatened by the disintegration of power, the collapse of authority 

into non-governed spaces spreading violence beyond their borders 

and their region. This has led to the broadening of the challenge 

of terrorism from a threat organized essentially from beyond borders to a threat with domestic networks and origins in many countries of the world. 

132 

The current international order, based on respect for sovereignty, 

rejection of territorial conquest, open trade, and encouragement of 

human rights is primarily a creation of the West. It originated as 

a mechanism to end Europe’s religious wars over 3 centuries ago. 

It spread as European states advanced technologically and territorially. It evolved in the decades since World War II, as the 

United States became its guarantor and its indispensable component. 

In key regions of the world, that order is in the process of 

change. In Europe, after two cataclysmic wars, the leading states 

set out to pool their sovereignty, and crises cast the question of Europe’s identity and world role into sharper relief and, along with 

it, the definition of the transatlantic partnership, which in all the 

post-World War II period has been the keystone of American foreign policy. Europe is suspended between a past that it is determined to overcome and a future still in the process of redefinition, 

with a willingness to contribute to so-called soft power and a reluctance to play a role in the other aspects of security. The Atlantic 

partnership faces the challenge of adapting from an essentially regional grouping to an alliance based on congruent global views. 

Russia, meanwhile, is challenging the strategic orientation of 

states once constrained in its satellite orbit. The West has an interest in vindicating the independence and vitality of these states that 

ended their satellite status. But Russia is now mounting an offensive on the border on which paradoxically it is least inherently 

threatened. On many issues, especially Islamist extremism, American and Russian interests should prove compatible. We face a dual 

challenge to overcome the immediate threats that are posed along 

the borders, especially of Ukraine, but to do so in a manner that 

leaves open a context for Russia’s long-term role in international 

relations where it is needed to play an essential role. 

In Asia, many economies and societies are flourishing. At the 

same time, there exist local conflicts for which there is no formal 

arrangement to constrain the rivalries. This introduces a measure 

of volatility to seemingly local disputes. 

A special aspect of any Asian system will be the relationship between the United States and China. It is often described as one between a rising power and an established power analogous to the relationship between Germany and Britain before the war. Two successive American and Chinese presidents have announced their 

joint aim to deal with this matter on the basis of cooperation. Yet, 

it is also true that significant spokesmen have stressed the adversarial aspect in both countries. 

Now, India is entering this equation. With its vast economic potential, a vibrant democracy, and cultural links to Asia, the Middle 

East, and the West, India plays a growing role that the United 

States will naturally welcome. The emphasis should be on social 

and political alignments, not strategic groupings. 

In the Middle East, multiple upheavals are unfolding simultaneously. There is a struggle for power within states, a conflict between states, a conflict between ethnic and religious groups, and an 

assault on the international system as it was constituted. These 

various conflicts often merge, and they have produced the phenomenon of ISIS, which challenges all established institutions and 

133 

which in the name of a caliphate is establishing a territorial base 

explicitly designed to undermine all the existing patterns of legitimacy. The continuation of a territory under terrorist control that 

avows its aim the overthrow of all existing institutions is a threat 

to security, and the conflict with ISIS must be viewed within that 

context and not within the context of individual episodes and the 

ability to overcome that. 

Iran has exploited this turmoil to pursue positions of power within other countries beyond the control of national authorities and 

sometimes constituting a state within a state, for example, in Lebanon and Iraq and elsewhere, and all this while developing a nuclear program of potentially global consequences. Nuclear talks 

with Iran, which I welcome, began as an international effort by 

three European countries buttressed by six UN resolutions. The 

United States joined in only in 2006. Their avowed purpose has 

been of all these countries, together with the six resolutions of the 

Security Council, to deny Iran the capability to develop a military 

nuclear option. 

These negotiations have now become an essentially bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability, not its existence, 

through an agreement that sets a hypothetical limit of 1 year on 

an assumed breakout. The impact of the exchange will be to transform the negotiations from preventing proliferation to managing it 

and from the avoidance of proliferation to its limitations. These 

stages need to be considered in assessing whatever agreement 

emerges. 

In all of these regions, the old order is in flux while its replacement is uncertain. 

The role of the United States is indispensable. In a time of global 

upheaval, the consequence of American disengagement is magnified 

and requires larger intervention later. The United States, working 

together with Mexico and Canada in an economic partnership and 

with its other allies, can help shape the emerging world in both the 

Atlantic and Pacific regions. 

All this calls for a long-term bipartisan definition, and we should 

ask ourselves the following questions. What is it we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? What do 

we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve or prevent only if supported by 

an alliance? What should we not engage in, even if it is urged by 

other groups? What is the nature of the values we seek to advance? 

The answers require a process of public debate and education. But 

we must understand that the answers will be determined by the 

quality of the questions we ask. 

American military power has and will continue to play an essential role in upholding a favorable international balance, restraining 

destabilizing rivalries and providing a shield for economic growth 

and international trade to follow. The sense of basic security that 

a strong and consistent American political presence provides has 

made possible many of the great strides of the post-World War II 

era. It is even more important today. 

The United States, as your chairman has often pointed out, 

should have a strategy-driven budget, not a budget-driven strategy. 

134 

In that context, attention must be given to the modernization of 

our strategic forces. 

America has played in its history a role as stabilizer and it is a 

vision for the future. All great ideas and achievements are a vision 

before they become a reality. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, for conducting hearings that hopefully lead us in this direction. 

I am happy to answer your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed: 

Thank you for this invitation to address the Committee as a new Congress begins. 

The United States finds itself in a paradoxical situation. By any standard of national capacity, we are in a position to achieve our objectives and to shape international affairs. 

Yet as we look around the world, we encounter upheaval and conflict. The United 

States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of 

the Second World War. 

One reason is that the nature of strategy has shifted—from an emphasis on objective strength, to include a major component defined by psychological contests and 

asymmetric war. A second reason is that the existing international order itself is 

being redefined: 

• First, the concept of order within every region of the world is being challenged 

or revised. 

• Second, the relationships between the different regions of the world are being 

redefined. 

• Third, for the first time in history, every region now interacts in real time and 

affects each other simultaneously. 

• And finally, the nature of security threats has expanded and become more fluid. 

The problem of peace was historically posed by the accumulation of power—the 

emergence of a potentially dominant country threatening the security of its 

neighbors. In our period, peace is often threatened by the disintegration of 

power—the collapse of authority into ‘‘non-governed spaces’’ spreading violence 

beyond their borders and their region. This has led to the broadening of the 

challenge of terrorism—from a threat organized essentially from beyond borders, to a threat with domestic networks and origins. 

The current international order—based on respect for sovereignty, rejection of territorial conquest, open trade, and encouragement of human rights—is primarily a 

creation of the West. It originated as a mechanism to end Europe’s religious wars 

over three centuries ago. It spread as European states advanced technologically and 

territorially. And it evolved in the decades since World War II, as the United States 

became its guarantor. 

Yet for most of history, the other regions of the world were ordered by different 

patterns. Their experience was central empire (such as classical China), or universal 

theocracy (as in the Islamic caliphate), or a hybrid system of authoritarianism (for 

example, czarist Russia). 

In key regions of the world, the present order is in the process of change: 

• In Europe, after two cataclysmic wars the leading states reconceived their objective. They set out to pool their sovereignty and turned to tasks of internal construction. Now crises cast the question of Europe’s identity and world role into 

sharper relief—and along with it, the definition of transatlantic partnership. 

Europe is suspended between a past it is determined to overcome and a future 

still in the process of redefinition. The Atlantic partnership faces the challenge 

of adapting from an essentially regional grouping to an alliance based on congruent global views. 

• Russia meanwhile is challenging the strategic orientation of states once constrained in its satellite orbit. The West has an interest in vindicating their independence and vitality. Still, Russia is mounting an offensive on the border on 

which, paradoxically, it is least inherently threatened. On many other issues— 

for example, Islamist extremism—American and Russian interests may prove 

compatible. We need to address the immediate challenges Russia poses while 

also defining a context for its long-term role in the international equilibrium. 

135 

• In Asia, many economies and societies are flourishing. At the same time, a 

number of these countries are contesting with each other over territorial claims, 

so far without clear limits or arrangements to constrain their rivalries. This introduces a measure of volatility to even seemingly local disputes. 

A special aspect of any Asian system will be the relationship between the 

United States and China. It is often described as one between a rising power 

and an established power. Two successive American and Chinese presidents 

have announced their joint aim to deal with this matter on the basis of cooperation. Significant spokesmen in both countries have stressed the adversarial aspect. The direction taken will play a defining role in our period. 

Now India is entering this equation. With vast economic potential, a vibrant democracy, and cultural links to Asia, the Middle East, and the West, India plays 

a growing role that the United States will naturally welcome. The emphasis 

should be on social and political alignments, not strategic groupings. 

• In the Middle East, multiple upheavals are unfolding simultaneously. There is 

a struggle for power within states; a contest between states; a conflict between 

ethnic and sectarian groups; and an assault on the international state system. 

One result is that significant geographic spaces have become ungovernable, or 

at least ungoverned. 

Iran has exploited this turmoil to pursue positions of power within other countries beyond the control of national authorities, such as in Lebanon and Iraq, 

and while developing a nuclear program of potentially global consequences. Nuclear talks with Iran began as an international effort, buttressed by six UN resolutions, to deny Iran the capability to develop a military nuclear option. They 

are now an essentially bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability 

through an agreement that sets a hypothetical limit of one year on an assumed 

breakout. The impact of this approach will be to move from preventing proliferation to managing it. 

In each of these critical regions, the old order is in flux while the shape of the 

replacement is uncertain. 

The role of the United States is indispensable. Especially in a time of global upheaval, the consequence of American disengagement is greater turmoil. This tends 

to require intervention later, but as an emergency measure and at heavier cost. The 

United States, especially working together with Mexico and Canada in an economic 

partnership, can help shape the emerging world in both the Atlantic and Pacific regions. 

All this calls for a long-term, bipartisan definition of the American national interest and world role. So we should ask ourselves: 

• What do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? 

• What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? 

• What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance? 

• What should we not engage in, even if urged by a multilateral group or an alliance? 

• And what is the nature of the values we seek to advance? Which applications 

of them are absolute, and which depend in part on circumstance? 

The answers require a process of public debate and education. But we must recognize that the answers will be determined by the quality of the questions we ask. 

Let me close with a few words on a topic at the heart of this Committee’s mission. 

American military power plays an essential role in upholding a favorable international balance, restraining destabilizing rivalries, and providing a shield for economic growth and international trade to flourish. The sense of basic security that 

a strong and consistent American political presence provides has made possible 

many of the great strides of the post-World War II era. It is no less important now. 

Therefore the United States should have a strategy-driven budget, not budgetdriven strategy, as your Chairman has emphasized. And serious attention must be 

given to the lagging modernization of our strategic forces. 

I know that this Committee will make important contributions to the understanding of these issues, and to the strong American defense that underpins so 

many of our great aspirations and achievements. Thank you, and I welcome any 

questions you may have. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Doctor. Thank you for 

your compelling statement. I thank all the witnesses. 

136 

I will be brief so that my colleagues can have a chance to answer 

questions. We will probably have to break within about a half hour 

or so since we have votes on the floor of the Senate. 

Secretary Albright, should we be providing defensive weapons to 

the Ukrainian Government? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we should. I think 

that they are moving forward with a reform process, which I think 

can be healthy, but their security needs to also be ensured. I do believe that countries have a right to defend themselves. We should 

be careful about a confrontation ourselves, but I do think that we 

should be providing defensive weapons to the Ukrainians. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Kissinger, you described it—you and Secretary Shultz—rather well. But I am not sure that the average 

American understands the Iranian ambitions, and maybe both of 

you could explain perhaps to the committee and to, frankly, the 

American people what are the Iranian ambitions and why should 

we care? Maybe beginning with you, Secretary Shultz. 

Dr. SHULTZ. Their ambitions are to have a dominant role at least 

in the Middle East to continue their pattern of terrorism directly 

and through Hezbollah and to enhance their position by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. They give every indication, Mr. Chairman, that they do not want a nuclear weapon for deterrence. They 

want a nuclear weapon to use it on Israel. It is a very threatening 

situation, I think. Actually a nuclear weapon used anywhere would 

dramatically change the world. Everybody would say we have to do 

something about these awful things. But it can wipe out a state 

like Israel. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Kissinger? 

Dr. KISSINGER. Every country is in part a result of its history, 

and there are three strengths in Iranian history. As a national 

state in the region, in this capacity its interests and those of the 

United States are quite parallel, and the United States and previous Iranian governments found a reliable partner and that is a 

goal towards which one can strive. 

Secondly, Iran reflects a history of empire that spreads across 

the entire Middle East and that was one of the major themes of 

its history, extending into the 19th century. 

Third, Iran was the first state advocate of the Islamic jihad uprising that sweeps away national borders and based its foreign policy on the domination of the particular interpretation of religion. 

Iranian foreign policy since the event of the Ayatollah regime has 

been a combination of the religious and imperial element and has 

asserted a dominant position towards neighboring states and towards states well beyond it, and of course, with respect to the 

eradication of Israel. 

With respect to the current negotiations, insofar as they are 

state-to-state negotiations, they have a positive basis, but the existing Iranian regime has never disavowed its policies that include 

Persian imperial and religious domination. It is supporting now 

groups like the Hezbollah which are states within the state in 

other countries. We have just heard this week of a Hezbollah attack from Syrian territory into an Israel border patrol. 

When one speaks of political cooperation, the question is whether 

the political orientation of that regime has been altered. It cannot 

137 

be judged alone by the nuclear agreement in which the removal of 

sanctions is a great Iranian interest. That is the challenge we face 

and that we can only assess when we know the terms of the outcome of the negotiations. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all very much for your service to the country and for 

being here today. 

I want to begin with a report that was asked to be done by the 

Department of Defense that the RAND Corporation did looking at 

the last 13 years of war and what lessons we have learned from 

those 13 years. The report draws a number of conclusions. I will 

not go through all of them. 

But first it suggests that the U.S. Government has displayed a 

weakness in formulating national security strategies and that the 

weakness is really due to a lack of effective civilian-military process for national security policymaking. You all talked about the 

need to have a clear strategy for what we are doing. 

I wonder if you could comment on whether you think those conclusions are going in the right direction in thinking about how we 

address future foreign and military policy or if you think that is 

totally off base. Secretary Albright, do you want to begin? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here. 

Let me just say I have not read the RAND report, but I do think 

that one of the bases of our Government are civilian-military relations, the control of the civilian controlling the military. I think 

that the decision-making process is one in which the military has 

to be heard, in which there may be different opinions, but the 

whole basis of the National security system in the United States 

is that different voices are heard. I think that there needs to be a 

process whereby—and I agree in this in terms of what George 

Shultz said—is there have to be ideas and then execution. While 

there may be voices at times that disagree, ultimately it is important to get a common policy. 

I do think the last 13 years have been particularly difficult in 

terms of determining why we were in two wars and try to figure 

out what the decision-making process really was in getting into 

those wars, not in terms of rehashing them but in terms of trying 

to figure out what the appropriate decision-making process is, what 

the channels are. Are there those that operate outside the channels? I do think I am very much in favor of a process where civilian 

and military opinions are both regarded, but ultimately civilian 

control over the military. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Dr. Shultz? 

Dr. SHULTZ. I recall a time when President George H.W. Bush 

deployed forces, along with coalition forces, to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. That was a clear mission, endorsed by votes in 

Congress, as well as in the UN. When that had happened, he 

stopped. It was one of the most dramatic examples of not allowing 

mission creep to control what you are doing. There was a mission. 

It was accomplished and he stopped. He took a lot of heat for that. 

Oh, you should have gone on to Baghdad or you should have done 

138 

this or should have done that. But I thought it was a very important moment. 

If you take Afghanistan, I think after 9/11 it was practically a 

no-brainer that we should go and try to do something there. We did 

and we succeeded brilliantly. Then our mission changed and we are 

there forever because of mission creep. I think to a certain extent 

we failed to take some advice on Iraq of some of the generals who 

said you have to have a greater amount of manpower there so that 

you have some control. If there is looting, it shows you are not in 

control, and there was a lot of looting. I think that was a case of 

we would have been better off if we had taken more military advice. 

But in terms of the decision to go ahead in both cases, it would 

seem to be very well taken because the evidence, at least—it 

turned out not to be so, but the evidence seemed to be clear that 

Iraq was moving on weapons of mass destruction and we had, of 

course, 9/11 in Afghanistan. 

I think we have to be very careful in these things. I sat in the 

situation room many times and there is a mission and the military 

say you have to tell me more precisely what the mission is. Then 

I can tell you what it takes to do it. That gets decided and then 

you go and you are successful. Then you have to be careful that the 

mission does not change into something that you did not provide 

for to begin with. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

My time has ended. I do not know, Dr. Kissinger, if you had anything you wanted to add to that. 

Dr. KISSINGER. The question has two aspects. Is the organization 

adequate to give every significant group an opportunity to express 

itself? 

But the second challenge we have faced in defining a national 

strategy is that we in our National experience have had a different 

experience than most other nations. We have been secured behind 

two great oceans. For Americans, security presented itself as a series of individual issues for which there could be a pragmatic solution, after which there was no need for further engagement until 

the next crisis came along. But for most nations and for us now 

more than ever, the need is for a continuing concept of national 

strategy. We think of foreign policy as a series of pragmatic issues. 

Other countries, for example, the Chinese, do not think in terms 

of solutions because they think every solution is an admissions 

ticket to another problem. 

It is a question of national education in answering the question, 

what are our objectives. What are the best means to achieve these 

objectives? How can we sustain them over a period of time? 

I have lived now so long that I have experienced six wars, and 

in the five wars after World War II, we began them with great enthusiasm and then had great national difficulty in ending them. In 

a number of them, including the last two especially, withdrawing 

became the only definition of strategy or the principal definition of 

strategy. We have to avoid that in the future. We must know the 

objective when we start and the political strategy with which to 

culminate it. That I think is our biggest challenge. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

139 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I just have to say I am just overwhelmed to be before 

the three of you. There is nothing I can say that would thank you 

enough for all that you have done. Thank you so much. 

The only major thing I wanted to accomplish at this hearing was 

to try to describe to the American people, because they do not 

know. You probably assume they do know the current condition of 

our military. Now, I am going to read something that you will remember, and this is going to be to Dr. Shultz and Dr. Kissinger. 

This is 1983. It was Ronald Reagan. He was talking about how 

we should budget for our National security. I am going to quote 

him. ‘‘We start by considering what must be done to maintain 

peace and review all of the possible threats against our security. 

Then a strategy for strengthening peace, defending against those 

threats must be agreed upon. Finally, our defense establishment 

must evaluate to see what is necessary to protect against any and 

all potential threats. The cost of achieving these ends is totaled up 

and the result is the budget for national defense.’’ 

Does that sound good to you? 

Dr. SHULTZ. Right on the mark. 

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with the statement 

in 1983 of President Reagan? 

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. 

The problem we are having right now is we have watched what 

is happening to our force structure and people do not realize. In a 

minute, I do want to ask you about the Ukraine. But when you 

think about the places where we should be and we could be and 

all of that, we have to consider that we do not have the capability 

that we have had in the past. We have always had that capability. 

Our policy has been to be able to defend America on two regional 

fronts—roughly that. They changed the words around a little bit— 

at the same time, two regional conflicts at the same time. We are 

not where we can do it right now. 

I would like to ask the two of you how you evaluate our current 

condition of our military capability, starting with you, Dr. Kissinger. 

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to Ukraine? 

Senator INHOFE. No, no. Our overall military capability of our 

United States military. End strength. 

Dr. KISSINGER. I think our capability is not adequate to deal with 

all the challenges that I see and which some of the commitments 

into which we may be moving and needs to be reassessed carefully 

in the light of the shrinkage that has taken place on budgetary 

grounds in the recent decade. 

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Shultz, do you agree with that? 

Dr. SHULTZ. I think you have to recognize that a prime responsibility of the Federal Government is to provide for our security. 

That is number one. As you read from Ronald Reagan, one of the 

things he did was build up our military. He got a lot of objections 

from his budget director. But he said this is the number one thing. 

As our economy improved, things got better budgetarily. But still, 

140 

let us build up our military. When he took office, we had the Vietnam syndrome, and our people were not even wearing their uniforms into the Pentagon. He said stand up straight, be proud of 

yourself, wear your uniform. Then we had a military buildup of 

considerable size. The statement was peace through strength. We 

actually did not use our forces very much because it was obvious 

to everybody that if we did, we would win. So you better be careful. 

Do not mess with us. 

Senator INHOFE. An excellent statement. 

Dr. Albright, I do agree with your position on Ukraine for probably a different reason. I happened to be there at the time of the 

election in November. A lot of people do not realize what really 

happened, not just Poroshenko but Yatsenyuk and the rest celebrating the first time in 96 years that they have rejected any Communist seat in the parliament. It has never happened before. 

Now, in light of that, the free world is looking at what is happening in Ukraine. What effect do you think that has on many of 

our allies, the action that we have not taken there? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I think that we do need to help them defend themselves. Senator Ayotte and I were there also for elections, and they 

took very many brave steps. The people of Ukraine had been disappointed by what had happened after the Orange Revolution in 

terms of their capability of being able to bring reforms into place. 

I think that generally—and the larger question—people do look 

at how we react when one country invades another and takes a 

piece of territory. As both my colleagues here have said, it is breaking the international system. Therefore, I do think that it is important to take a strong stand there by providing capability of Ukrainians to defend themselves, but also that NATO, in fact, can and is 

taking steps in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe of providing some forces that move around, and NATO has been a very 

important part. 

I do think, if I might say to the questions that you asked the others, that I am very concerned about sequestration and the deep 

cuts that have been taken, and I hope very much that this committee really moves on that because I do think it jeopardizes America’s military reach. 

As somebody who worked for Senator Muskie at the beginning of 

the budget process, I do know about function 150 and 050, having 

defended 150 a long time. I also admire what Secretary Gates had 

said about the importance of providing some money for the foreign 

policy aspect of our budget because in answer to many questions 

here, I think we are in the Middle East for a long time. The military part of this is important, but we also have to recognize—and 

it is a little bit to what you said, George—in terms of longer-term 

aspects there where we need to figure out what the environment 

is that has created this particular mess and be able to use other 

tools of our policy to deal with that. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

If I could just ask one question for the record from Dr. Shultz. 

You outlined, I thought, a very good course of behavior for us in 

the United States. I would like for the record for you to submit how 

we are doing relative to that course of behavior that you recommend. Thank you very much. 

141 

Dr. KISSINGER. Could I say a word about the military? In considering the Ukraine issue, in my view we should begin with the definition of the objective we are trying to reach and then see which 

measures are the most suitable. I am uneasy about beginning a 

process of military engagement without knowing where it will lead 

us and what we are willing to do to sustain it in order to avoid the 

experience that I mentioned before. Ukraine should be an independent state, free to develop its own relationships with perhaps 

a special aspect with respect to NATO membership. It should be 

maintained within its existing borders, and Russian troops should 

be withdrawn as part of a settlement. 

But I believe we should avoid taking incremental steps before we 

know how far we are willing to go. This is a territory 300 miles 

from Moscow and therefore has special security implications. That 

does not change my view of the outcome, which must be a free 

Ukraine. It may include military measures as part of it, but I am 

uneasy when one speaks of military measures alone without having 

the strategy fully put forward. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Shultz, do you want to add to that? 

Dr. SHULTZ. Yes, I would like to add to that. I am totally with 

Henry’s statement of where we want it to wind up as a free, independent Ukraine. But I think we have to be active in trying to help 

that come about, and I would point to two particular things that 

we should be doing. 

Number one, we should be organizing an energy effort to see to 

it that the countries around Russia are not totally dependent on 

Russian oil and gas, which has been used as a weapon. I am interested to know that there is an LNG receiving ship in a port in Lithuania, and I think they are getting their LNG from Norway. But 

we have a lot of gas in this country. We should be ready to have 

LNG and get it there. There is plenty of oil around that should get 

there. We want to relieve those countries of this dependence on 

Russian oil and gas, and maybe it would teach them a little bit of 

lesson because, in addition to the low oil prices, they will lost market share probably permanently. 

Then I would not hesitate—I think I am here in Madeleine’s 

camp. Let us do everything we can to train and equip decently the 

Ukrainian armed forces. They have boots on the ground. They are 

their boots, but let us help them be effective because there are Russian boots on the ground. Don?t anybody kid themselves about 

what is going on. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Albright, I will suggest that you become a member of the 

Budget Committee again. We can use your expertise and experience. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this outstanding hearing. 

Thank you for attending, the three of you. It is just such an 

honor to have you all here with your expertise and your knowledge 

and the history of where we are as a country and hopefully help 

us get to the place we need to be. 

142 

With that, Dr. Kissinger, you said in your testimony the United 

States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises 

since the end of World War II. I look around at all of our generations. My generation is Vietnam. The generation of today is 9/11, 

Afghanistan, Iraq. It has kind of gone into another direction of concern that we all have. 

I would like to hear from the three of you. I think you all have 

touched on it and about how we would approach it. But when you 

start looking at where is the United States of America truly willing 

to spend its treasure and contribute its blood, which is a horrible 

thing for any of us to have to ask Americans to do, but if we are 

going to be doing treasure and blood of where we are going to be 

addressing the greatest threats that we have and we are limited 

in such an array of complex problems that we have, which ones 

would you identify first? 

I would ask simply this, we had gone to Afghanistan because of 

9/11. We turned left and went to Iraq, and we can talk about that 

all day. We have Iraq that did not do what we thought it would 

do, and we have ISIS in Syria. We have all of that going on right 

now and we have Ukraine and Russia. Do we try to do a little bit 

of everything, or should we really be pinpointing something that we 

should be focused on right now? Whoever would like to start. Dr. 

Kissinger, if you would like to start on just pinpointing what you 

think our greatest concerns may be and where our efforts should 

be put. 

Dr. KISSINGER. My thinking on international relations was 

formed during the Cold War. In terms of danger, the conflict between a nuclear-armed Russia and a nuclear-armed America was 

greater than any single danger we face today. The most anguishing 

problem one could face was what happens if the strategic plans of 

both sides had to be implemented or were implemented by accident 

or whatever. But it was a relatively less complex issue than we 

face today where we have a Middle East whose entire structure is 

in flux. 

As late as the 1973 Middle East war, American policy could be 

based on existing states in the region and achieve considerable successes in maneuvering between them. Today Middle East policy requires an understanding of the states, of the alternatives to these 

states, of the various forces within the states, a situation like Syria 

where the two main contenders are violently opposed to America, 

violently opposed to each other, and a victory for either of them is 

not in our interest. 

The rise of China, apart even from motivations of leaders, presents a whole new set of problems, an economic competitor of great 

capacity, a state that is used in its tradition of being the central 

kingdom of the world as they knew it, that by its very existence 

we and they are bound to step on each other’s toes, and the management of this—but it is a different problem from the Middle East 

problem. 

Senator MANCHIN. The Middle East is the most dangerous one 

that you think we are facing right now, a nuclear Iran? 

Dr. KISSINGER. And then we have nuclear Iran. I would say the 

most immediate, short-term problem is to get rid of a terror-based 

143 

state that controls territory. That is ISIS. We must not let that degenerate into another war that we do not know how to end. 

But more long-term problems also exist. The challenge to our 

country is not to switch from region to region but to understand 

the things we must do and separate them from the things we probably cannot do. There is a novel challenge in that magnitude for 

the current generation. 

Senator MANCHIN. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible that Dr. 

Shultz might answer? Dr. Shultz, would you just give us your idea 

of what you think our most greatest concerns are right now? 

Dr. SHULTZ. Of course, I agree with what Henry has said, but let 

me put some additional points in it. 

I think we tend to underestimate the impact of the information 

in the communication age. It changes the problem of government 

because people know what is going on everywhere. They can communicate with each other and organize, and they do. You have diversity everywhere, and it has been ignored or suppressed but it 

is asserting itself. 

Remember in Iraq with Maliki was he had to govern over diversity, but he wanted to stamp it out. He did not understand at all 

how you govern over diversity. 

You have that problem which tends to fragment populations and 

make governments a little weaker, just as that is happening, the 

problems that demand international attention are escalating. 

I think as Henry said, as I said in my initial testimony, there is 

an attack on the state system going on. The attack on Ukraine is 

part of it. ISIS is a major part of it. They are a major challenger 

to the state system. They want a different system. 

I have a sense, Henry, that China is drifting into a kind of 

sphere of influence and way of thinking. That is different from the 

state system. So that is a challenge. 

I see nuclear weapon proliferation coming about. That is devastating. A nuclear weapon goes off somewhere. Even my physicist 

friends say that the Hiroshima weapon was just a little play thing. 

Look at the damage it did. A thermonuclear weapon would incinerate the Washington area totally. The spread of nuclear weapons 

is a really big threat. We were making progress but that has been 

derailed and we are going the wrong way right now. 

I think and I gather in Washington it is very controversial, but 

I have a friend at Hoover who is a retired Chief of Naval Operations, Gary Roughead. We have started a project on the Arctic. 

Senator Sullivan knows about the Arctic. There is a new ocean 

being created there. That has not happened since the last Ice Age. 

There are big melts all over the world taking place. The climate is 

changing. There are consequences. So that is happening. We will 

never get anywhere with it unless we are able to somehow have actions that take hold on a global basis. 

I might say sort of parenthetically I have the privilege of 

chairing the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) advisory 

board on their big energy initiative, more or less the same thing 

at Stanford. I see what these guys doing research and development 

(R&D) and girls doing R&D are doing, and it is really breathtaking. We had an MIT scientist come to Hoover the other day, and 

I think he has cracked the code on large-scale storage of electricity. 

144 

That is a game-changer because it takes the intermittency problem 

out of solar and wind. Also, we must know how vulnerable our grid 

is, and if you have some energy stored where you can use it, you 

are much safer. At any rate, I think these energy R&D things are 

beginning to get somewhere. But that is a big threat. 

These three things are huge concerns of ours, and we need to 

have a strong military. We need to have a strong economy, and we 

need a strength of purpose in our country. 

We have probably done the best job with all our problems of 

dealing with diversity because we started out that way. We are the 

most diverse country in the world, and our Constitution provided 

that. I have been reading Lynn Cheney’s book on Madison. It is a 

wonderful book. It is clear that George Washington, having suffered because the Continental Congress would not give him the 

money to pay his troops, wanted a strong government. But he and 

his colleagues saw that they would never get the Constitution ratified unless they provided a lot of role for States and communities. 

So our Federal structure emerged, and it is a structure that allows 

for diversity. It is very ingenious. You can do something in Alaska. 

We do not have to do it in San Francisco, and they certainly do not 

want to do the same thing in New Mexico. There is a difference. 

Let the differences prevail. 

We have these big problems, and then in a sense you look at 

them and say tactically how do we handle Iran, how do we handle 

Ukraine, how do we handle ISIS. It falls within this broader framework. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Can I just say a word? I do think the biggest 

threat is climate change and its national security aspects, as has 

been described. It leads me to say the following thing. Our problem 

is that not everything can be handled militarily and that we also 

have a short attention span. These are very long-term problems. 

Also, Americans do not like the word ‘‘multilateralism’’. It has too 

many syllables and ends in an ‘‘ism’’. But basically it is a matter 

of cooperating, and if you look at these issues, it will require American leadership within a system that other countries play a part in. 

Otherwise, I agree with everything that both Henry and George 

have said. But I do think short attention span and multilateral 

ways of dealing with it. 

Senator MANCHIN. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Not at all. 

Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Thank you all. 

It is time for us to think about our role, what our strategy will 

be, and what we can realistically accomplish in the future. The 

longer I have been around these issues, the more less dreamy I become. 

Dr. Kissinger, I am reading ‘‘World Order,’’ and thank you for 

your contribution to the world with that book. I think you quote 

Bismarck. Maybe you can get it correctly. Unhappy is the statesman who is not as happy after the war as he was before the war, 

something to that effect. We just have to be careful about power 

and how we use it. Sometimes long-term thinking can avoid shortterm problems. I thank all of you for contributing to that. 

145 

Our subcommittee, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, deals 

with nuclear weapons. I am very concerned about proliferation, Dr. 

Shultz, as you indicated. I am worried that our allies are losing 

confidence in our umbrella and they may expand. Of course, Iran 

will clearly likely kick off proliferation if they achieve a weapon. As 

one of you noted, I think Dr. Kissinger, you have indicated we 

move from Iran not having a nuclear weapon to Iran could get close 

to having a nuclear weapon but not have one. You expressed some 

concern about that. Would you expand on that a little bit? Yes, Dr. 

Kissinger? 

Dr. KISSINGER. I am concerned, as I pointed out, the shift of the 

focus of negotiations from preventing Iran from having the capability of building a nuclear weapon to a negotiation which seeks to 

limit the use of their capability in the space of 1 year. That will 

create huge inspection problems. But I will Reserve my comment 

on that until I see the agreement. 

But I would also emphasize the issue of proliferation. Assuming 

one accepts the inspection as valid and takes account of the stockpile of nuclear material that already exists, the question is what 

do the other countries in the region do. If the other countries in the 

region conclude that America has approved the development of an 

enrichment capability within 1 year of a nuclear weapon and if 

they then insist on building the same capability, we will live in a 

proliferated world in which everybody, even if that agreement is 

maintained, will be very close to the trigger point. I hope and I 

would wish that this proliferating issue be carefully examined because it is a different problem from not having a capability at all 

to having a capability that is within 1 year of building a weapon, 

especially if it then spreads to all the other countries in the region 

and they have to live with that fear of each other that will produce 

a substantially different world from the one that we knew and from 

the one in which the negotiations were begun. 

Dr. SHULTZ. It should be pointed out that a bomb made from enriched uranium is much easier to make. The Hiroshima bomb was 

an uranium enrichment bomb. It was not even tested. The Nagasaki bomb was a plutonium bomb. That was tested. But you can 

make an unsophisticated bomb from enriched uranium fairly easily. That is not a big trick. The enrichment process is key. 

Senator SESSIONS. In the short term then, Dr. Kissinger, I think 

I hear you saying—short term being the next several years—this 

could be one of the most dangerous points in our foreign policy, this 

Iranian nuclear weapon, because it goes beyond their capability to 

creating proliferation within the area, the threat to Israel, and a 

danger that we do not need to be facing, if we can possibly avoid 

it. 

Dr. KISSINGER. I respect the administration’s effort to overcome 

that problem, but I am troubled by some of the implications of 

what is now publicly available of the implications of the objective 

on the future evolution of nuclear weapons in the region and the 

impact of all of this on an international system where everybody 

is within a very short period of getting a nuclear weapon. Nobody 

can really fully trust the inspection system, or at least some may 

not. That is something that I would hope gets carefully examined 

before a final solution is achieved. 

146 

Dr. SHULTZ. We have historically tried to draw a strong line between access to the technology to produce a nuclear power plant 

and access to enrichment technology. We have tried to put that line 

in there very strongly. We have cast that line already in the Iran 

negotiations. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses for the very instructive testimony. 

Really just one question. A week from Sunday, we begin the seventh month of a war, the war on ISIS, as described by the President and by others in the administration. American service personnel have lost their lives in Operation Inherent Resolve and 

those from coalition partners have as well. There has been no congressional debate or vote upon this war. I think all agree that it 

will likely last for some period of time. It was justified by the administration based on two authorizations for use of military force 

that were passed at different times under different circumstances 

under slightly different geographies under a different administration and under a vastly different Congress. 

As former Secretaries of State, would you agree with me that it 

is more likely that the Nation will sustainably support a war if 

there is a full debate on it before Congress and if Congress, in fact, 

weighs in as constitutionally contemplated with respect to any war 

being waged by this country? 

Dr. SHULTZ. My experience is, as an administration official, you 

get a much better policy and you get a much better ability to execute that policy if it is discussed and there is consultation between 

the administration and Congress. As I said in my testimony, our 

watchword was if you want me with you on the landing, include 

me in the takeoff. I think the consultation will provide a better policy and a better execution. 

But I would say this war that we are now talking about—it started a long time ago. I read testimony from 1984. That is 30 years 

ago. I think this is a deep problem that goes beyond terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic. The object is to change the state system. We 

need to understand what these people are up to, and that will help 

us design the kind of policies that are needed. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. The President has asked in his State of the Union 

message that there be an authorization of the use of military force. 

I do agree that there needs to be discussion of it and consultation. 

I think it is very important for there to be more education of the 

American public as to what the stakes are. 

Dr. KISSINGER. I agree with what my colleagues said. Congressional authorization should be sought. But I want to reemphasize 

the point I made earlier. We should not let this conflict with ISIS 

slide into the pattern of the previous wars which start with support 

and after a while degenerate into a debate about withdrawal, especially since the existence of a territorial base for terrorists, which 

has not existed before. A country that asserts that its global objective is the eradication of the state system—once America has engaged itself, victory is really an important objective. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

147 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank each of you for all that you have done for the 

country and your leadership. 

Secretary Albright, it was a privilege to be in Ukraine with you 

during the presidential elections. So thank you. 

I wanted to follow up to ask you about NATO presence in the 

Baltics. We had Dr. Brzezinski before the committee the other day, 

and he had talked about putting a small number of United States 

ground combat forces, in conjunction with NATO obviously as part 

of a NATO contingency, in the Baltics to ensure that there would 

be a trip wire, but the force would obviously be of a size that would 

not be one where we are trying to send a conflict message. I wanted to ask you what you thought about that in terms of NATO’s 

presence in the Baltics and what you think we should be doing in 

addition to providing defensive arms to Ukraine to help buttress 

NATO? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I do think that when we were in Kiev and 

Ukraine generally together, I think we understood, as we together 

met with the leadership, the importance of American support for 

what they are doing there. 

On NATO in the Baltics, I agree with Dr. Brzezinski. I do think 

that it is important, the Baltic countries are members of NATO, 

and I think it is very important to show that kind of support. The 

question is whether they are kind of rotating troops or there permanently. I do think that the United States needs to be a part of 

a grouping which also requires other countries from NATO to be 

there. I know Dr. Brzezinski spoke about the importance of the 

Germans, the Brits, et cetera also being there. I do think that it 

is an important aspect of our common approach to this through 

NATO. 

I also do think that NATO is at a stage where—we were talking 

about organizations that have been started many years ago—that 

our support for NATO and getting the other NATO countries to pay 

up what they are obligated to do under the 2 percent of the GDP 

for activities. But I think, as I have understood the new SecretaryGeneral, he is talking a lot about the necessity of this rapid reaction force really making NATO more capable to deal with the kinds 

of problems that are evident in the region. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Secretary Shultz, I wanted to follow up on what you said about 

Iran’s program, particularly their intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) program. I wrote a letter with others on this committee to 

ask the President to include in the negotiations the missile program because our estimates are that they will have ICBM capabilities—what we have heard from our defense intelligence leaders— 

perhaps by this year. I wanted to get your thoughts. As we look 

at these Iran negotiations, do you believe that their missile program, their ICBM capability, should be included as part of a result 

that is important in terms of our National security interests? 

Dr. SHULTZ. Certainly. I think their support for terrorism should 

also be on the table because you get a weapon and you are going 

to use it. 

Senator AYOTTE. As I look at these negotiations, those two pieces 

are missing, and they are very important. 

148 

I was also very interested to hear what both you and Secretary 

Kissinger have said in terms of concessions that have already been 

made on enrichment that make, I think, a very difficult outcome 

for a good result that does not lead to some kind of race within the 

Middle East, a Sunni-Shia race, in terms of a nuclear arms race 

if we are going to allow a certain amount of enrichment. 

Dr. SHULTZ. You have to remember the Iranians are not known 

as rug merchants for nothing. They are good bargainers. They have 

already crossed lines. They have already out-maneuvered us in my 

opinion. We have to watch out. 

Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Kissinger, I wanted to follow up on 

something that you had testified before the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START) and you had called attention to the disparity between Russian and American tactical nuclear weapons at 

the time. I wanted to get your thoughts on what we have learned. 

According to the State Department, Russia is developing a new 

mobile nuclear ground-launched cruise missile in direct violation of 

the 1987 INF Treaty that, of course, Secretary Shultz has referenced as well, and that this missile was likely in development 

even during these New START negotiations, if you look back in the 

time window. I wanted to get your thoughts on what our response 

should be to the development of this ground-launched cruise missile. 

As I look at this, in our response, it is not just a response of a 

treaty violation, but what are the Russians? interests in developing 

this type of cruise missile. 

Dr. KISSINGER. The direction, motivation for developing this 

weapon is that—as I said in my statement, I have said that the 

western border is the least threatened border of Russia paradoxically, but it has a long border with China with a huge inequality 

of population and a long border with the jihadis? regions of the 

world. The motivation undoubtedly is to use nuclear weapons to 

balance the numerical inferiority of Russian forces along many of 

its borders. 

But to the extent that it is incompatible with signed agreements, 

the United States, even if it theoretically understands the motivation, cannot accept that nuclear arms control treaties are violated 

because a new strategic opportunity develops. I believe that we 

have to be very firm in insisting on carrying out these agreements. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you all. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I want to say to the witnesses—I have asked 

you to stay longer than I originally bargained for, and I apologize 

for that. This has been a very important hearing not only for this 

committee but also for the Members of Congress and the American 

people. With the benefit of your many years of wisdom and experience, you have provided us with important not only information 

but guidance as to how we should conduct not only this hearing but 

our National security policy. We are honored by your presence, and 

we thank you. 

This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(149) 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES, U.S. NATIONAL 

SECURITY, AND DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room SDG50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte, 

Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, 

Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, good morning. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to build 

upon the major oversight initiative we have begun on the future of 

defense reform. 

Yesterday, Dr. Robert Gates provided an excellent overview of 

the many issues we intend to cover in this series of hearings. 

Today, we will start at the highest level with a geopolitical outlook and net assessment that can help to establish the strategic 

context for our inquiry. We will assess America’s enduring national 

interests and role in the world, the long-term threats and opportunities we face and how they should be prioritized, the roles and 

missions of the U.S. military in achieving these priorities, how to 

mobilize our ways and means to achieve our policy ends, and perhaps most importantly, how well our current defense organization 

is positioned to achieve our objectives now and in the future. 

These are the fundamental questions that must be considered before there can be a meaningful discussion of defense reform. If we 

do not understand what we need a military and defense organization to do for our Nation, it is impossible to know how to set them 

up to be maximally successful. Our witnesses are ideally suited to 

help us better understand the strategic predicament we now confront and what it means for our defense policy, strategy, and organization. 

Professor Eliot Cohen, a military historian at Johns Hopkins 

School of Advanced International Studies and former Counselor to 

the United States Department of State from 2007 to 2009, is one 

of the Nation’s foremost experts on civil-military relations and military strategy. 

Professor Walter Russell Mead of Bard College, the Hudson Institute, and The American Interest, is one of the keenest observers 

150 

of geopolitics today and has written eloquently about U.S. national 

security policy for decades. 

Professor Thomas Mahnken is Senior Research Professor at the 

School of Advanced International Studies and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning from 2006 to 2009, 

where he supervised the Quadrennial Defense Review and National 

Defense Strategy for Secretary Gates. 

Finally, Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Senior Vice President and the 

Henry A. Kissinger Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served from 2009 to 2013 as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces where she led the 

development of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2012 

Defense Strategic Guidance. 

Yesterday, Dr. Gates noted that while today’s national security 

threats are incredibly complex and daunting, such threats have 

been the norm rather than an aberration in our Nation’s history 

since World War II. He also observed that any coherent strategy 

to address the threats must begin with an assessment of our interests, what we must protect, what we must choose to do without, 

and how we balance today’s urgent requirements and tomorrow’s 

strategic imperatives. 

Unfortunately, the United States is not succeeding in this basic 

task. This is certainly true today. But as Dr. Gates also observed, 

it is also largely true that our country has not had a coherent national security strategy since the Cold War. 

Part of this failure is material, the imposition of arbitrary caps 

on our national defense spending through the Budget Control Act 

and sequestration, a flawed acquisition system, and a defense organization that has grown bloated with overhead and bureaucracy 

while its war-fighting capacity has steadily reduced. 

We are also challenged, however, at the level of ideas and imagination. Part of this is what Dr. Gates mentioned yesterday, our Nation’s perfect track record of failure in predicting the type and location of the next war, but worse than that, our cyclical belief that, 

having finished with a present conflict, we can take a holiday from 

history, pull back from the world, slash our spending on and preparations for our own defense, and that somehow disaster will not 

seek us out yet again. 

In addition, there is the problem that plagues us now, the seeming inability or unwillingness to think about our national security 

challenges as anything other than a litany of individual crises requiring ad hoc, micro managed responses. Indeed, as our witnesses 

all make clear in their prepared testimony, the major challenges 

we face, Russian aggression and expansionism, an increasingly assertive China, the collapse of order in the Middle East, the rise of 

an even more virulent form of violent Islamist extremism, escalating cyber attacks from state and non-state actors, none of these 

challenges are limited to individual regions of the world, and they 

are becoming entangled in dangerous ways. 

Three decades ago, this committee led a comprehensive review of 

our national defense organization that resulted in one of the most 

sweeping reforms of the Department of Defense in its history. 

Much about our world and our country has changed since then. We 

must ensure that the Department of Defense is positioned to be the 

151 

most agile, innovative, effective, and efficient organization it can be 

now and in the future. That is the purpose of our work now. 

We thank our witnesses for graciously offering us the benefit of 

their thoughts today. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me thank you for scheduling this important hearing to 

discuss the global strategic environment, the challenges facing the 

United States, and the appropriate role of the Defense Department 

in addressing these challenges. The committee will be conducting 

a series of similar hearings throughout the fall to gain greater insight and understanding on these critical issues. I believe these are 

questions that we must ask ourselves regularly, and I look forward 

to working with the chairman and his staff and this committee on 

this extraordinarily important endeavor. 

I would also like to thank our witnesses for their participation 

in today’s hearing. You all are superbly prepared as national security scholars and practitioners, and I welcome your ideas and your 

insights today very much. 

Yesterday, as the chairman pointed out, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified before this committee. As always, his 

astute assessment of the current state of our Department of Defense was insightful and candid. His thoughtful observations for 

how to streamline and reform defense structures and processes 

have merit, and I know the committee will give them careful consideration in the months ahead. 

As General Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor, 

testified earlier this year, again at the invitation of the chairman, 

the international security environment has changed significantly 

since the end of the Cold War. The centuries-old nation-state structure and the international institutional order, which the United 

States helped put in place following World War II, are increasingly 

challenged by the forces of globalization, the flow of goods, people, 

and most importantly, communications and technology across borders. 

In the last few years, we have seen how the ability of people to 

connect using social media has empowered individuals on the street 

to express their desire for democratic social change, whether in the 

Maidan in Ukraine, in Dara’a, Syria, or across the Middle East and 

North Africa. Yet, we have also seen that in the absence of capable 

institutions at the nation-state level, these upheavals have resulted 

in massive instability and insecurity, as in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere. 

We have also seen how these forces of globalization have been 

harnessed by violent extremist organizations to promote their destructive agendas and carry out attacks against the United States, 

our allies, and our respective interests. Non-state actors like al 

Qaeda and the Islamic State have been able to take advantage of 

ungoverned or under-governed spaces in South Asia, the Middle 

East, and North Africa to seize territory and control the population 

through brutality and an extreme ideology promoted through the 

Internet. 

152 

In Iraq and Syria, the breakdown of the nation-state system has 

allowed the reemergence of centuries-old divisions, creating a vastly complex situation. Syria presents us with a series of intermingled conflicts, including the counter-ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant] fight, a Syrian civil war, a regional proxy war between the Gulf States and Iran, a sectarian Sunni-Shia conflict, 

and with the intervention of Russia, a great powers struggle. Our 

top priority must be ensuring that ISIL’s expansion and external 

plotting is halted. Of course, I would welcome the witnesses? recommendations and insights regarding this very complex situation 

in Syria and throughout the Middle East. 

Probably no country has been more destabilizing to the international security environment than Russia, not only in Europe but 

also in the Middle East, the Arctic, and elsewhere. Russia continues its provocative behavior in Europe while at the same time 

deploying Russian troops and military equipment to Syria to directly support the failing Assad regime. Putin has shown his willingness to use all the tools at his disposal, including economic pressure, an intensive propaganda machine, and military power to 

achieve his goals. We would, of course, be interested in hearing 

from the witnesses on this important topic also. 

China presents a number of strategic challenges. Again, your insights would be extremely appreciated, as it asserts itself in the 

South China Sea and many other areas, including cyber operations. 

We are also in the age of nuclear proliferation. Regional nuclear 

arms races in South and East Asia threaten to increase instability 

globally. Of course, at the same time, North Korea has demonstrated its capacity at least to detonate a nuclear device. That 

is another issue of concern. 

Cyber complicates our lives dramatically, and again, we would 

expect you are able to weave all of these into a coherent response 

to our perhaps less than coherent questions. 

We are all facing these challenges. We have to face them together and thoughtfully. That is why the chairman’s plan, so far 

extraordinarily successful, to bring scholars first and then to bring 

practitioners and then to think creatively together is very important. I look forward to working with you on this important task. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

I welcome the witnesses. Professor Cohen, welcome back before 

the committee. 

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR ELIOT A. COHEN, ROBERT E. 

OSGOOD PROFESSION OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator McCain. Thank you for inviting 

me here, Senator Reed. It is really an honor to be at a set of hearings which I think have the potential to be at least as consequential as those of, say, the Jackson committee in 1960 or the hearings 

that led to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

I have a longer written testimony which I would like to submit. 

I just thought I would touch on some of the highlights. 

Senator MCCAIN. Without objection. All written statements will 

be made part of the record. 

153 

Dr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. 

I would like to start a little bit differently in some ways than 

Secretary Gates suggested, and that is by starting with the nature 

of the military that we have today because I think understanding 

just how deeply geopolitical assumptions from years past are embedded in that military is really indispensable if we are then going 

to think about how do we adjust to the challenges of today and tomorrow. 

I would say that today’s military is the product chiefly of 75 

years of history in three phases: the first, World War II; the Cold 

War; and then the relatively brief period of uncontested American 

supremacy. 

World War II is still with us. It is why we have the Pentagon. 

It is why we have a Marine Corps which is much larger than any 

other comparable organization in any other military. 

But I think it is primarily the 45 years of the Cold War and the 

period thereafter, the period of unchallenged American preeminence, that have most left their mark. 

Our military hardware is, as you know, platforms that were 

largely acquired during the Cold War or designed in it. That is, of 

course, even true of platforms such as the F-35, whose design parameters reflected assumptions about a very different world than 

the world in which we now find ourselves. 

I think even deeper than that are certain assumptions about 

what war is and how it should be waged. The Cold War military 

was largely, obviously not entirely, a deterrent military. Its conventional tasks, in particular, were assumed to be extremely intense 

but short, nothing like the multiyear wars of the mid-20th century. 

Our conception of naval power is very different from what it will 

probably be in the future in a world in which the United States 

Navy was really unquestionably supreme around the world. 

When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union fell apart, a period of unchallenged supremacy began, which lasted about 15 

years. It too has left legacies chiefly of thought and of action but 

also of organization, the rise, for example, of our special operations 

forces. 

Somewhat more troubling to my mind are a set of mind sets on 

the part of senior military commanders to include a tremendous 

amount of emphasis on military diplomacy and what the military 

sometimes calls phase 0 as opposed to phase III, war. I think to 

some of the mind sets that were developed during that period, we 

can attribute what were to my mind very poor decisions such as 

importing a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] command 

structure into Afghanistan when it was clearly not suited for it. 

So I think we need to be quite self-conscious about the extent to 

which we are dealing with a legacy military whose technology and 

in many ways whose ideas are very much rooted in our recent past. 

Most of those assumptions I think have to be cast aside. Instead 

of the Cold War when we faced one major enemy with a set of clients and supporters, we face four major strategic challenges today. 

The first is China because the sheer size and dynamism of its 

economy causes it to pose a challenge utterly unlike that of the Soviet Union and in a very different environment than in Europe. 

154 

Secondly, our jihadist enemies in the shape of al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and similar movements have been at war with us for 

at least a decade and a half and they will be at war with us for 

decades to come. We will be operating in a state of chronic war I 

think through the rest of my lifetime, and that is very different 

from where we have been in the past. 

Our third set of challenges emerge from the states that are hostile to us, hostile to our interests, and often in a visceral way to 

our institutions, and that would include at the moment countries 

like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, all of which have or will have, 

I believe, nuclear weapons that can reach the United States. 

Our fourth strategic challenge is securing, as the great naval historian and naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan once said, ‘‘the 

great commons,’’ the ungoverned spaces. Now, those are no longer 

just the physically ungoverned spaces in places like Yemen but includes outer space, cyberspace, the High North. Our ability to control or at least exercise some sort of benign influence over those 

ungoverned spaces has really been critical to world order. 

This means that our strategic problems are quite unlike those of 

the previous two periods in a profound way. For example, I think 

we now live in a world, we will be living in a world in which we 

cannot assume that the United States itself, the continental United 

States, will not be at risk from conventional attack and certainly 

from terrorist attack. 

We live in an era when our old strategic partners are in many 

cases getting much more weak. You have only to look at the case 

of Great Britain, whose military has been in a sad state of decline 

for quite some years now. 

Of course, our domestic politics is even more deeply divided than 

it has been—in some ways than it has since the Vietnam War. 

I could extend this analysis indefinitely but will not. After the 

Cold War, there was a resizing of the military, a reconfiguring of 

its basing structure and some realignment, but the sheer busyness 

of that period of American preeminence when we were doing many 

things in the world in many ways deferred a fundamental rethinking of what kind of military we need and to what ends. Now, it 

seems to me, is really the time for that. 

Well, let me offer just four thoughts about directions that the 

committee might go. I know you will have a very wide set of hearings, and what I want to do is just emphasize those which do not 

involve a lot of money. Naturally, of course, most of the focus, quite 

understandably, in both government and outside of it is on the bigticket items. I would like to suggest that the real importance may 

also lie in some things that do not cost much money at all. So I 

have four thoughts. 

One is that we review our system for selecting and promoting 

general officers. When we look at the great periods of military creativity in our past—think, for example, of the early Cold War—we 

think of people like Arleigh Burke or Bernard Schriever or Jim 

Gavin. Our problem today is that our promotion systems, partly because of the natural tendencies of bureaucracies and partly because 

of the wickets that we ourselves have created, to include Congress, 

make it much harder than it was in the past to find exceptional 

general and flag officers and promote them rapidly. Think of it. 

155 

General Curtis LeMay, who, whatever one thinks of his politics, 

was a great military leader, became head of Strategic Air Command at the age of 42. I recall, as I am sure many here do how 

President Carter was able to pass over the heads of scores of generals in the United States Army to promote General Edward C. 

‘‘Shy’’ Meyer to the position of Chief of Staff in 1979. I am not sure 

that we could do those things today. I am not sure that we could 

find, for example, a Hyman Rickover to design a completely different approach to naval power. So I think that would be one thing 

to look closely at, what kind of general officers and flag officers are 

we growing and how do we bring them up. 

My second thought is it would be a very good thing to overhaul, 

in fact, to scrap, our current system for producing strategy documents on a regular basis. I say this knowing that at least two of 

my colleagues seated to my left bore direct responsibility for this. 

But I believe as an outside observer that the Quadrennial Defense 

Review [QDR] system, which consumes vast amounts of labor and 

emotional energy, is pretty much worthless. The reason why it is 

worthless is because the world does not cooperate with our planning cycle. The year 2000 QDR was obsolete as soon as it hit the 

streets because of 9/11. I think a much more useful system would 

be to imitate the Australian or, dare I say it, the French white 

paper system, which is much more irregular in terms of its scheduling but much more in depth and much more thoughtful, and 

those documents really repay a look and a thought about whether 

we might be able to do that. 

A third thought, the rediscovery of mobilization. When one looks 

back at the grand sweep of American history back to colonial times, 

we have always understood that the military that would wage the 

next war would not be a simple minor, plussed-up version of what 

we already had. We understood that we would need not only to 

grow more of what we had, we would have to grow different kinds 

of forces. Mobilization thinking in that sense died pretty much in 

the 1950s. We encountered a great success and Secretary Gates by 

sheer force of personality was able to increase the production of 

MRAPs [Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected]. That is not mobilization or adding a couple of brigade combat teams to the United 

States Army. That is not mobilization. I think there is room to 

think much more creatively about how we bring different kinds of 

people into the military and intelligence system once a crisis occurs, how we grow new and different kinds of organizations. But 

it really requires an art that we have not really practiced, although 

we did until, as I said, the 1950s. 

Finally, I would like to suggest that you look closely at our system for professional military education at the very top. I have 

taught, as has my colleague, Dr. Mahnken, at the Naval War College. I lecture regularly at the others. Our war colleges do a capable job at the mission of broadly educating senior officers at the 

O–5 and O–6 levels and helping to create a network of foreign officers who have been exposed to our system. But they do not create 

a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners from all the services in 

the civilian world. 

To do that, you would need a different educational system, or at 

least a different insert into the current educational system. You 

156 

would have to do things that would be anathema to the current 

military personnel system. For example, something that we do at 

Johns Hopkins and indeed any decent university, competitive examinations to get in, small class size, no foreign presence. 

I think does this point in the direction that people have always 

shied away from, the idea of a joint general staff of some sort? Perhaps it gets closer to it than some might wish. But the fact is that 

our current professional military education system, with some notable exceptions, produces extremely able tacticians. It produces 

well-rounded military officers. But it has not produced in significant numbers officers who have made their name as deep thinkers 

about the nature of modern war. Yet, surely that is at the heart 

of the military profession. While it is flattering to think that academics or think tanks can fill that void, the fact is that we cannot. 

These are but preliminary thoughts. I just want to conclude by 

saying that I am quite convinced that although we have always 

faced uncertainty, our country faces a much more turbulent international environment than at any time since the end of World War 

II. It is in some ways a more dangerous world in which our children or grandchildren may live to see nuclear weapons used in 

anger, terrorism that paralyzes great societies, war in new guises 

brought to the territory of the United States, as has indeed already 

happened, the shattering of states, and the seizure of large territories by force. 

As in the last century, the United States will be called upon to 

play a unique role in preventing those things from happening, 

maintaining some sort of standards of order and decency and leading a coalition of like minded nations. We have and we will have 

a strong hand because of the Government under which we live and 

the spirit of the American people. But that does not mean that we 

can take our military power for granted or neglect thinking hard 

and creatively about how to mold it in the interval of peace that 

we now have, such as it is. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. ELIOT A. COHEN* 

Senator McCain, Senator Reed, thank you for inviting me here today. It is an 

honor to be asked to speak at these hearings, which have the potential to be at least 

as consequential as those held by Senator Henry Jackson in 1960 on national security organization, or those which gave birth to previous major legislation such as 

the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. 

Our task on this panel, as I understand it, is to bring together three things: a 

view of our international circumstances and American foreign policy; an assessment 

of the adequacy of our defense organization; and suggestions for directions this committee might pursue in exploring the possibilities of reform. This is a daunting assignment: I will do my best to approach it from the point of view of someone who 

has studied and worked with the American military in various settings for over thirty five years, drawing on what I know as a military historian and what I have seen 

during service at senior levels in government. 

———— * Eliot A. Cohen is Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 

In addition to having taught at Harvard University and the Naval War College, he has served 

in various government positions including as Counselor of the Department of State, 2007–2009. 

His books include Supreme Command (2003) and Conquered into Liberty (2011); The Big Stick, 

a study of military power and American foreign policy will appear in 2016. 

157 

THE ROOTS OF OUR CURRENT DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGIC POSTURE

The theory taught at our war colleges—and I have taught at them myself—would 

say that we should begin by looking at our interests and policies, and then design 

a military to meet them. I am going to start the other way, with what kind of forces 

we have, for two reasons. First, as we all know, you do not get to redesign your 

forces afresh unless you experience utter calamity, and some times not even then. 

Secondly, because it is important to recognize the ways in which the military experiences and geopolitical assumptions of the past shape even seemingly technical questions today. It will be helpful to begin by appreciating how peculiar, from an historical point of view, many of the features of the armed forces that we take for granted, 

really are. 

Today’s military is the product chiefly of seventy-five years of history. World War 

II, of course, not only provided a great deal of its physical infrastructure, to include 

the Pentagon, but has left organizational legacies. No other country in the world, 

to take the most striking example, has a Marine Corps remotely sized like ours— 

today, it is larger than the entire British army, navy, and air force put together. 

That is a result of the Marines’ performance in World War II, and the legacy of raising a force six divisions strong for that conflict. 

But it is primarily the roughly forty five years of the Cold War, and some fifteen 

years of unchallenged American preeminence thereafter, that have most left their 

mark. 

The Cold War has left us many, indeed most of the platforms that equip the military today, M–1 tanks, B–2 or B–1 bombers, or AEGIS class cruisers. Even weapon 

systems coming into service today such as the F–35 reflect Cold War assumptions 

about which theaters we planned to fight in, what kind of enemies we thought we 

might encounter, what kind of missions we would be required to conduct. From the 

Cold War as well emerged our highly professional career military built on the ruins 

of the draft military of the Vietnam war. Our weaving together of reserve and National Guard units with the active duty military reflects ideas first expressed in the 

late 1970’s. 

Even deeper than these things go certain assumptions about what war is, and 

how it should be waged. The Cold War military was largely a deterrent military, 

designed to put up a credible defense against Soviet aggression, while taking on 

lesser included tasks such as peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. 

The conventional tasks were assumed to be extremely intense but short—nothing 

like the multi-year wars of the mid-twentieth century. The result was an Army, for 

example, that honed its skills in armored warfare at installations like the National 

Training Center to a level never seen in a peacetime military, even as it shunted 

aside the tasks of military governance that had characterized it through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this world, a large nuclear arsenal was designed 

for deterrence of more than use against the USSR. Naval power was to be used 

chiefly to protect the sea lanes to Europe and to project power abroad, not to contest 

command of the seas with a major naval power. 

When the Soviet Union fell and the Cold War ended, a period of unchallenged supremacy began: it has lasted barely fifteen years, and although the United States 

is still the world’s strongest power, that supremacy is now contested. I doubt we will 

ever get it back. But it too has left legacies of thought and action. With great reluctance, a military that had pledged to itself after Vietnam that it would not do counterinsurgency again (as it similarly pledged to itself after Korea that it would not 

do land war in Asia) embarked on a mission that it found strange and distasteful 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. It learned, or rather re-learned old lessons, but at a cost. 

One organizational legacy of this period has been the rise of special operations 

forces, particularly after the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing conflicts. Others include 

the tremendous emphasis placed by combatant commanders on the conduct of military diplomacy, giving rise to multinational exercises that are less substantive than 

political in nature. Similarly, today’s senior officers often dwell on the importance 

of what they call Phase 0 operations—acts of military diplomacy to set the conditions where we might fight. I believe that much of this focus has come at the expense of hard thinking about Phase III—war. 

From the transitional period between Cold War and the age of supremacy arose 

strategic doctrines too, characterized by terms such as ‘‘end state’’ and ‘‘exit strategy’’ that previous generations would have found meaningless and that today are 

downright dangerous. In this period, as in the past, the heart of America’s strategic 

alliance system was to be found in Europe. Thus, it was (absurdly) with a NATO 

command structure that we have attempted to fight a war in Afghanistan. Thus too, 

it was that officers dismayed by the unfamiliar challenges of irregular warfare came 

to blame all other departments of government for failing to be able to understand 

158 

problems and provide capabilities that, history should have taught them, would 

have to be found within the military itself. 

THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

The assumptions of both the Cold War, and the brief period of American supremacy must now be cast aside. Instead of one major enemy, the Soviet Union, and its 

various clients and supporters, we face four major strategic challenges. 

1. China, because of the sheer size and dynamism of its economy poses a challenge utterly different than that of the USSR, and, unlike the Soviet Union, 

that challenge will take place in the Pacific, in an air, sea, and space environment unlike that of Europe. 

2. Our jihadist enemies, in the shape of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and like 

movements, are at war with us, and we with them. This will last at least a 

generation, and is quite unlike any other war that we have fought. 

3. We face as well an array of states that are hostile to our interests and often, 

in a visceral way, to our political system as well: these include, most notably 

Russia, Iran, and North Korea, but others may emerge. All of these states are, 

or will be, armed with nuclear weapons that can reach the United States. 

4. Finally, while our policy in the past has been to secure ‘‘the great commons,’’ 

as Alfred Thayer Mahan once put it, for the use of humanity, today ungoverned 

space—to include outer space, the high North, and cyberspace—poses new and 

deepening problems for us. 

This means that our strategic problems are quite unlike those of the previous two 

periods. We can imagine, for example, conventional conflict with China that might 

not end after a few days, or be capped by nuclear threats. We are, right now, engaged in protracted unconventional warfare that is likely to spread rather than be 

contained. New technologies, from cyber-weapons to long range cruise and ballistic 

missiles and unmanned aerial and maritime vehicles mean that defending the 

homeland against conventional, or semi-conventional attack must again be a mission for the armed forces. 

We live in an era when our old strategic partners are weakening. One need only 

look at the appalling decline of the British military—the Royal Navy, which struggles to man the ships it does have, has a fleet less than half the size of semi-pacifist 

Japan’s just now—to measure the self-inflicted weakness of old allies. At the same 

time, new partners are emerging, particularly in Asia, with Japan, Australia, and 

even India coming into closer association with us. 

It is not just the external politics of security that has changed: our domestic politics is more deeply divided by questions of the use of force today than at any time 

since the worst periods of the Vietnam War. On the one hand, every President from 

now into the indefinite future has to accept that he or she will be a war President, 

ordering the pinpoint killing of terrorists in far corners of the earth, and probably 

sending our armed forces into harm’s way every few months. On the other, at no 

time since the 1970’s have the American people been so reluctant to commit large 

forces abroad, or rather, so uncertain about the purposes that would justify it. 

I could extend this analysis indefinitely, but will not. After the Cold War there 

was a resizing of the military, a reconfiguring of its basing structure, and some realignment, but the sheer busyness of the post 1989 period has in many ways deferred a fundamental rethinking of what kind of military we need, and to what 

ends. Now is the time for such a rethinking. 

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEFENSE POLICY AND ORGANIZATION

The time, then, is ripe for what you are undertaking. Of course, one scholar can 

only offer so much by way of recommendations, but I would like to suggest four, 

which flow from this fundamental diagnosis: that our problems will be so complex, 

so large, and so different from the past that we need to design a system that is 

much better at redesigning and reinventing itself than what we have got. It will not 

do, in other words, to conceive a new pattern of organization and impose it upon 

the Department of Defense. We will assuredly fail to foresee the crises and opportunities to come. We need, rather, to recover the creativity and institutional adaptability that produced in astonishingly short time the riverine flotillas of the Civil 

War, the massed bomber and amphibious fleets of World War II, the Polaris program and espionage from space of the early Cold War. 

Here, then, are four ideas. 

First, remake our system for selecting and promoting general officers. Nothing, but 

nothing is more important than senior leadership—the creative leaders like Arleigh 

Burke or Bernard Schriever in the early Cold War. Our problem is that our promotion systems, in part because of the natural tendency of bureaucracies to repVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00164 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
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licate themselves, and in part because of the wickets (including joint service) all 

have to pass through, is making it hard to reach deep and promote exceptional talent to the very top. 

We take it for granted that some of the best leaders of World War II were field 

grade officers when it began. For some reason, however, it does not occur to us that 

maybe there was something good about such a system that we should be able to 

imitate. Other large organizations—businesses and universities, among others—can 

seek out exceptional young leaders and bring them to the top quickly. We are long 

past the day when General Curtis LeMay could become head of Strategic Air Command at age 42, after having led one of the most important campaigns of World War 

II in his late thirties. It was a minor miracle when President Carter passed over 

scores of Army generals to make General Edward C. ‘‘Shy’’ Meyer Chief of Staff of 

the Army in 1979—I am not sure whether we could even do that today. Moreover, 

we need to find ways to promote and retain general and flag officers who are so 

unorthodox, so off the usual career path, that the system left to its own devices 

would crush them. Where would the nuclear Navy be without that unique, exceptionally difficult man, Hyman Rickover, for example? And where will the next one 

come from? 

Second, overhaul the current system for producing strategy documents on a regular 

basis. The Quadrennial Defense Review system, which consumes vast quantities of 

labor in the Pentagon and much wasted emotional energy as well, seems to be predicated on the notion that the world will cooperate with our four year review cycle. 

It does not. The 2000 QDR, to take one example, was invalidated as soon as it hit 

the streets by 9/11. So too will any document that has a fixed schedule. Moreover, 

most public documents, to include the National Security Strategy of the United 

States are the vapid products of committees. A much better system would be something like the White Papers produced by the Australian and French systems, not 

on a regular basis but in reaction to major international developments, and composed by small, special commissions that include outsiders as well as bureaucrats. 

Third, re-discover mobilization. Throughout most of the history of the United 

States, and into its colonial past, a key assumption was that the forces we would 

have at the outbreak of war would be insufficient in number and composition for 

the challenges ahead. Since the 1950’s, mobilization thinking and planning has languished. To be sure, under pressure from an active Secretary of Defense the Department can acquire mine-resistant vehicles or speed up the production of some critical 

guided weapon, but that is hardly the same thing. 

Serious military planning not only for expansion of the existing force, but for the 

creation of new capabilities in event of emergency, would be a worth while effort. 

For example, had serious thought been given before 2003 to identifying civilians 

who might contribute to military government in an occupied country, and thinking 

through the organizations needed, the Iraq war might have looked very different in 

2004 and 2005 than it did. Mobilization thinking and preparation would require a 

willingness to contemplate unorthodox measures (direct commissioning, for example) 

on a scale that the Department is unwilling to consider in peacetime. Worse yet, 

it would require some brave thinking about the kinds of crises that might require 

such measures. 

Fourth, renew professional military education at the top. Our war colleges do a capable job at the mission of broadly educating senior officers at the O–5 and O–6 

level, even as they help create a network of foreign officers who have been exposed 

to our system. But they do not create an elite cadre of strategic thinkers and planners from all the services and the civilian world. To do that, measures would have 

to be taken that would be anathema to personnel systems today: competitive application to attend a school, rather an assignment to do so as a kind of reward; extremely small class sizes; no foreign presence, or only that of our closest allies; work 

on projects that are directly relevant to existing war planning problems. A two year 

institution would graduate no more than thirty or forty top notch officers a year who 

would, in all but name, help constitute a real joint general staff. Of course, to manage the careers of such officers would require further departures from our current 

personnel system. 

Our current professional military education system produces extremely able tacticians and unit leaders; it does not produce, at least not in large numbers, officers 

who make their names as deep thinkers about the nature of modern war. Yet surely 

that is the heart of the military profession. You will see very few books or even 

deeply serious articles on modern war written by serving officers; fewer yet that 

transcend a service perspective. That is a pity, and a deficiency. 

While it is flattering to think that academics or think tanks can fill that void, the 

truth is that they can only do so much without the current knowledge, exposure to 

the most sensitive secrets, and sense of professional responsibility of top notch offiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00165 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
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cers. In the long run, a revitalized American armed forces requires that senior leadership, in Congress as well as the executive branch, pay a great deal of attention 

to military education, whose budget is trivial, but whose impact is, potentially tremendous. 

These are, inevitably, but preliminary thoughts which will not be welcome in 

some quarters. But of this I am quite convinced: our country faces a more turbulent 

world than it has at any time since the end of World War II. It is, in many ways, 

a more dangerous world, in which our children or grandchildren may live to see nuclear weapons used in anger, terrorism that paralyzes great societies, war in new 

guises brought to the continental United States, the shattering of states and seizure 

of large territories by force. As in the last century, the United States will be called 

upon to play a unique role in preventing those things from happening, maintaining 

some general standards of order and decency, and leading a coalition of like minded 

nations. As ever, we will have a strong hand, thanks to the institutions of government under which we live, and the spirit of the American people. But that does not 

mean that we should take our military power for granted, or neglect thinking hard 

and creatively about how to mold it in the interval of peace that we have, such at 

is. New crises await, and alas, may not be far off. 

Senator MCCAIN. Professor Mahnken? 

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR THOMAS G. MAHNKEN, SENIOR 

RESEARCH PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF THE ADVANCED 

STRATEGY PROGRAM, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Senator McCain, Senator Reed, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify before the committee today. You are embarked on an important effort, and I am honored to be a part of 

it. 

As with Professor Cohen, I have longer written remarks, but I 

really want to, in the time I have, focus on three things. 

First, I would like to address the challenges that the United 

States faces in an increasingly contested global environment, and 

these include not only the threats posed by adversaries and competitors, but also the structural impediments that we must overcome if we are to develop an effective strategy to safeguard U.S. 

interests in an increasingly threatening world. 

I would also like to talk for a few minutes about some of the 

United States? enduring strengths—and I think they are considerable—and the opportunities that they provide us. 

Then I would like to conclude by offering some thoughts on what 

we might do to improve our strategic position. 

First, as to challenges, the United States faces a growing and increasingly capable set of adversaries and competitors, including 

great powers such as China and Russia, as well as regional powers 

such as Iran and North Korea. United States defense strategy 

needs to take into account the need to compete with these powers 

over the long term and in peacetime, as well as to plan for the possibility of conflict with them. 

Great powers. The tide of great power competition is rising 

whether we like it or not. China and Russia possess growing ambitions and, increasingly, the means to back them up. They possess 

sizeable and modernizing nuclear arsenals and are investing in 

new ways of war that have been tailored, at least in part, to challenge the United States. I think the challenges posed by these powers are only likely to grow over time. 

We also face regional challenges, challenges from states such as 

Iran and North Korea. North Korea appears to be developing a 

161 

sizeable nuclear arsenal and the ability to deliver it against the 

United States. Pyongyang has also demonstrated a willingness to 

sell nuclear technology to other states such as Syria. Iran has 

growing reach and influence in the Middle East, and its nuclear 

program is at best frozen. Its missile program continues apace. 

Third, we face a long war with al Qaeda and its affiliates. We 

remain engaged in a war, whether we choose to call it that or not, 

with al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other jihadist groups that threaten 

the United States and its allies. I agree with Professor Cohen. It 

is a war that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. 

Then finally, we face the challenge of an uncertain future, 

threats to our security that we either do not see or cannot recognize today. History is a strong antidote to those who confidently 

predict the contours of the future. 

As if these global challenges were not enough, we face a series 

of internal, structural barriers that will need to be addressed if we 

are to have the resources to shape and respond to an increasingly 

challenging security environment. These barriers include a sharpening tradeoff between guns and butter. The tradeoff between national security and social spending is already painfully apparent 

and is likely to become even more acute over time as the U.S. population ages. 

As if that were not enough, we face cost growth in weapon systems. Most new weapon systems provide increased capability but 

often at increasing cost. As a result, we can afford fewer of them 

for a given expenditure. 

This is further magnified by long-term cost growth in personnel. 

As I need not remind the members of this committee, we face longterm growth in personnel costs, which further exacerbates these 

other trends. 

So even as the international environment is becoming more 

threatening, we face real constraints, internal constraints, on our 

abilities to meet it. 

Now, all is not beyond hope, however. The United States has a 

series of enduring advantages. If I have a criticism here, it is in 

our imperfect ability to tap into what are some substantial advantages. These include our strategic geography. As an insular power, 

we have enjoyed security from attack throughout most of our history. With friendly powers to the north and south, we have not had 

to worry about the threat of invasion for 2 centuries. Our alliances 

compound this advantage, allowing us to work together with our 

friends to meet the threats that we face far from our shores. 

We also possess great economic strength, the world’s largest 

economy and the world leader in innovation. 

American society is also the source of great advantage. For example, we possess demographic strengths that are nearly unique in 

the world. Our population includes immigrants from literally every 

country in the world who speak the full breadth of the world’s languages. More importantly, ours is one of only a handful of states 

that has the ability to bring new immigrants to its shores, weave 

them into the fabric of our society, and make them full members 

of that society within an individual’s lifetime. That gives us unique 

advantages. 

162 

Our military power remains a source of strength, the world’s 

largest nuclear force, and the world’s most capable army, navy, marine corps and air force, a combination that is historically unique, 

I would point out. Great powers in the past have had strong navies 

but weak armies or strong armies but weak navies. We have the 

world’s best army, navy, marine corps, and air force. 

Last, but certainly not least, our alliances and our partnerships. 

Our allies include some of the most prosperous and militarily capable states in the world in Europe and in Asia. 

All too often, however, we fail to exploit these strengths to the 

extent that we could or we should. Rather, we have focused on how 

others, including our adversaries, can leverage their strengths 

against our weaknesses rather than how we can best use our 

strengths to exploit the weaknesses of our competitors. 

Well, where does that take me in terms of implications? I have 

three implications I would like to draw from this. 

First, given both the increasingly threatening security environment and the limits that we face at home, we need to think more 

seriously about risk than we have in recent years. Strategy is all 

about how to mitigate and manage risk. However, over the past 

quarter century, we have grown unused to having to take risks and 

bear costs. We have become risk averse. All too often, however, the 

failure to demonstrate a willingness to accept risk in the short 

term has yielded even more risk in the long term. As a result, our 

competitors increasingly view us as weak and feckless. 

Among other things we need a serious discussion of risk within 

the United States Government and with the American people because I think we are entering a period where we are going to have 

to begin to take actions that are risky and costly both to demonstrate to our competitors that we are serious but also to demonstrate our resolve to our allies. We need to start having that discussion about risk now. 

Second, as I noted at the beginning of my remarks, we face a series of long-term competitions with great powers and regional powers. China and Russia, Iran and North Korea have been competing 

with us for some time. We have not been competing with them. As 

a result, we find our options constrained and we find ourselves reacting to their initiatives. 

If we hope to achieve our aims over the long term, we first need 

to clarify what those aims are and to develop a strategy to achieve 

them. Such a strategy should seek to expand the menu of options 

available to us and constrain those that are available to our competitors. It should seek to impose costs upon our competitors and 

mitigate their ability to impose costs upon us. It should give us the 

initiative, forcing them to respond to our actions, not the other way 

around. Now, that is, of course, easier said than done in Washington in 2015, but it must be done if we are to gain maximum leverage with our considerable but limited resources. 

As part of this effort, we need to do a better job of understanding 

our competitors. To take just two examples, the Chinese military 

publishes a vast number of books and articles on how it thinks 

about modern war, strategy, and operations. These books are freely 

available for purchase in Chinese bookstores and can be ordered on 

the Chinese version of Amazon.com, but they remain beyond the 

163 

reach of scholars and officers who do not read Mandarin Chinese 

because the United States Government has yet to make translations of them broadly available. 

Similarly, in past decades, the United States Government invested vast sums in building intellectual capacity on Russia and 

the Russian military. Today it is painfully apparent that that capital has been drawn to dangerously low levels. So we are surprised 

or misunderstand Russian actions that should be neither surprising nor mysterious. Additional investments in this area are 

sorely needed. 

Finally—and here, some of my comments will echo what Professor Cohen has said—we need to take seriously the possibility of 

great power competition and potentially great power conflict. This 

means that we need to think seriously about a host of national security topics that we have ignored or neglected for a generation or 

more. These include the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national 

security strategy. It includes how best to mobilize the Nation’s resources for the long term and the need to wage political warfare 

and to counter the propaganda of our competitors. We will also— 

again, I agree with Professor Cohen—need to rethink the educational requirements of an officer corps that has experienced little 

but counterinsurgency throughout its career and to reeducate policymakers who came of age after the Cold War. 

In short, we face mounting challenges but we also have great opportunities if we can only seize them. Part of the answer, no doubt, 

will consist of acquiring new capabilities, but a substantial part of 

it will lie in developing intellectual capital and formulating and implementing an effective strategy to harness the considerable 

strengths that we possess in the service of our aims. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mahnken follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THOMAS G. MAHNKEN* 

Senator McCain, Senator Reed, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the 

Committee today. In the time I have I would like to address the challenges that the 

United States faces in an increasingly contested global environment. These include 

not only the threats posed by adversaries and competitors, but also the structural 

impediments that we must overcome if we are to develop an effective strategy to 

safeguard U.S. interests in an increasingly threatening world. I would also like to 

examine some of the United States’ enduring strengths and the opportunities that 

they provide us. I would like to conclude by offering some thoughts on what we 

might do to improve our strategic position. 

I. CHALLENGES

The United States faces a growing and increasingly capable set of adversaries and 

competitors, including great powers such as China and Russia as well as regional 

powers such as Iran and North Korea. United States defense strategy should take 

into account the need to compete with these powers over the long term in peacetime, 

as well as plan for the possibility of conflict with them. 

———— * The views that follow are mine and mine alone and do not reflect those of any organization 

with which I am affiliated. 

164 

Great Powers 

The tide of great power competition is rising. China and Russia possess growing 

ambitions and, increasingly, the means to back them up. They possess sizeable and 

modernizing nuclear arsenals and are investing in new ways of war that have been 

tailored, at least in part,to challenge the United States. 

Regional Powers 

Iran and North Korea. North Korea appears to be developing a sizeable nuclear 

arsenal and the ability to deliver nuclear weapons against the United States. 

P’yongyang has also demonstrated a willingness to sell nuclear technology to other 

states, such as Syria. Iran has growing reach and influence in the Middle East. Its 

nuclear program is at best frozen; its missile program continues apace. 

The War with al-Qaeda and its Affiliates 

We also remain engaged in a war,whether we choose to call it that or not, with 

al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other jihadist groups that threaten the United States 

and its allies. That war is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. 

An Uncertain Future 

Finally, we will face threats to our security that we either do not see or cannot 

recognize today. History is a strong antidote to those who confidently predict the 

contours of the future. 

As if the global challenges we face were not enough, we also face a series of internal, structural barriers that will need to be addressed if we are to have the resources to shape and respond to an increasingly challenging security environment. 

• A sharpening tradeoff between guns and butter: The tradeoff between national 

security and social spending is already painfully apparent, and is likely to become even more acute as the U.S. population ages. 

• Cost growth in weapon systems: Most new weapon systems provide increased capability, but often at increasing cost. As a result, we can afford fewer of them. 

• Cost growth in personnel: Similarly, as I need not remind the members of this 

committee, we face long-term cost growth in personnel, which further exacerbates the trends I have outlined above. 

II. ENDURING ADVANTAGES

All is not beyond hope, however. The United States enjoys a series of enduring 

advantages, including those provided by our strategic geography, economic strength, 

society, military power, and alliances and partnerships. 

Strategic geography 

As an insular power, the United States has enjoyed security from attack throughout much of our history. With friendly powers to the north and south, we have not 

had to worry about the threat of invasion for two centuries. Our alliances compound 

this advantage, allowing us to work together with our friends to meet threats far 

from our shores. 

Economic strength 

We possess the world’s largest economy and are also the world leader in innovation. We produce culture that much of the rest of the world finds attractive. 

American society 

American society is the source of other advantages. For example, we possess demographic strengths that are nearly unique in the world. Our population includes 

emigrants from literally every country in the world who speak the full breadth of 

the world’s languages. More importantly, ours is one of only a handful of states that 

has the ability to bring new immigrants to its shores, weave them into the fabric 

of the society, and make them full members of that society within an individual’s 

lifetime. 

Military Power 

We possess the world’s largest nuclear force, the world’s most capable Army, 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force—a historically unique combination. We have 

been able to exploit space for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance; communications; and precision navigation and timing. The US space capability has multiplied the effectiveness of US ground, sea, and air forces. We are also the world leader in exploiting the cyber dimension to support military operations. 

165 

Alliances and partnerships 

U.S. allies include some of the most prosperous and militarily capable states in 

the world. These include the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 

North America and Europe as well as Japan, Australia, South Korea,the Philippines, and Thailand in the Pacific. Beyond formal allies, the United States also 

possesses friendly relationships with a number of key states. 

All too often, however, we have failed to exploit these strengths to the extent we 

could or should. We have focused on how others can leverage their strengths against 

our weaknesses rather than how we can best use our strengths to exploit the weaknesses of our competitors. 

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE POLICY AND ORGANIZATION

Three main implications flow from this assessment. First, we need to think more 

seriously about risk than we have in recent years. Strategy is all about how to mitigate and manage risk. However, over the past quarter century, we have grown unused to having to take risks and bear costs. We have become risk averse. All too 

often, however, the failure to demonstrate a willingness to accept risk in the short 

term yields even more risk in the long term. As a result, our competitors increasingly view us as weak and feckless. 

Among other things, we need to have a serious discussion about risk within the 

United States Government and with the American people. And we are going to have 

to begin to take actions that are risky and costly to us to demonstrate our resolve 

to both our allies and our adversaries. 

Second, we face a series of long-term competitions with great powers and regional 

powers. China and Russia, Iran and North Korea have been competing with us for 

sometime; we have not been competing with them. As a result, we find our options 

constrained, and we find ourselves reacting to their initiatives. 

To achieve our aims over the long term, we first need to clarify what our aims 

are and then develop a strategy to achieve them. Such a strategy should seek to 

expand the menu of options available to us and constrain those that are available 

to our competitors. It should seek to impose costs upon our competitors and mitigate 

their ability to impose costs upon us. And it should give us the initiative, forcing 

them to respond to our actions and not the other way round. That is, of course, easier said than done in 2015 Washington, but it must be done if we are to gain maximum leverage from our considerable but limited resources. 

We need to do a better job of understanding our competitors. For example, the 

Chinese military publishes a vast number of books and articles how it thinks about 

modern war, strategy, and operations. These books are freely available for purchase 

in Chinese book stores and on the Chinese version of Amazon.com, but remain beyond the reach of scholars and officers who do not read Mandarin Chinese because 

the United States Government has yet to make translations of them broadly available. Similarly, in past decades the United States Government invested vast sums 

in building intellectual capital on the Russian military. Today that capital has been 

drawn down to dangerously low levels, so that we are surprised by or misunderstand Russian actions that should be neither surprising nor mysterious. Additional 

investments in this area are sorely needed. 

Finally, we need to take seriously the possibility of great power competition and 

conflict. This means that we need to think seriously about a host of national security topics that we have ignored or neglected for ageneration or more. These include 

the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, how best to mobilize 

the nation’s resources for war, and the need to wage political warfare and counter 

its use by our competitors. We will also need to re-think the educational requirements of an officer corps that has experienced little but counter-insurgency and policymakers who came of age after the Cold War. 

* * * * 

In short, we face mounting challenges, but also have great opportunities, if we can 

only seize them. Part of the answer, no doubt, will consist of acquiring new capabilities, but a substantial part of it will lie in developing intellectual capital, and formulating and implementing an effective strategy, to harness the considerable strengths 

that we possess in the service of our aims. 

Senator MCCAIN. Professor Mead? 

166 

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR IN AMERICAN STRATEGY, THE HUDSON 

INSTITUTE 

Mr. MEAD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, thanks for the invitation to appear before this committee. The work that the Senators 

on this committee do is of immense consequence not only to the 

safety, the security, the prosperity, and the liberty of people in this 

country but to hundreds of millions and billions of people outside 

our borders. The hard work and dedication that this committee 

puts into its tasks is a real inspiration. It is an honor to be here 

again before you today. 

When I think about the American strategic debate since the end 

of the Cold War, I am reminded of an old hymn that I used to sing 

in church as a kid in the South, ‘‘Shall I be carried to the skies 

on flowery beds of ease while others fought to win the prize and 

sail through bloody seas?’’ Since 1990 in the United States, that 

has no longer been a question. Many people in our intellectual and 

policy worlds have thought, ‘‘I shall be carried to the skies on flowery beds of ease.’’ All of that difficult defense of liberty, all of those 

risks, all of those painful tradeoffs—that is in the past. In the future, the inexorable laws of history, the spread of prosperity and 

democratic institutions will smoothly carry us to the skies. We can 

kick back, sip on a margarita as the rising tide lifts us on up to 

paradise. That has been one side of our strategic debate. 

The other side has been it is all over, we are in decline. The 

world of the 21st century is too complex, the challengers too aggressive, the threats face too dire, and so we really have to scale 

back our commitments, settle for less. The old ambitions of trying 

to build a world order are too much. 

If you have followed a lot of our political debates over the last 

25 years, I think you will just see a rapid oscillation between those 

two extremes that says more about the mood swings of our political 

and intellectual elite than it does about realities on the ground. 

It seems to me the truth is actually less dramatic, in some ways 

perhaps more hardening, though there are perhaps bloody seas 

ahead. That is, at the end of the Second World War, the United 

States rather reluctantly came to the conclusion that we needed to 

replace Great Britain, what Woodrow Wilson’s friend, Colonel 

House, once called the gyroscope of world order. We were not doing 

this as some kind of philanthropic project, though it is philanthropic, it is beneficial to many people who are not Americans. We 

were doing it because a sober assessment of American economic 

and security interests told people in both political parties that we 

need—for our economy to prosper, we needed an open global trading and investment system where we could enjoy the benefits of 

trading with people all over the world. Particularly in a nuclear 

era, our security interests required we could no longer ignore 

threats overseas until they reached some kind of critical mass and 

then intervene. We had to take a more forward-leaning posture, try 

to nip problems in the bud before they became global threats. 

That I think remains the case. Those still are our interests. It 

is not, again, because we seek some kind of global power. Most 

Americans would be only too happy to spend less time worrying 

about, thinking about, spending money on, and taking risks over 

167 

things that are happening beyond our frontiers. But it is still the 

case that the prosperity of the American economy and the security 

of the American people are intimately bound up with events overseas. Let me take one example. 

We have heard some talk in the last few years, particularly as 

the situation in the Middle East has grown, as Senator Reed I 

think very explicitly and wisely pointed out, far more complex and 

dangerous than in the past. There has been some talk, well, do we 

really need to pay so much attention to the Middle East, in part 

because with United States unconventional gas and shale resources 

we seem to becoming more energy independent, and that is true. 

But I would say to the committee so far we have been able to 

watch war spread in the Middle East and the price of oil is $45 a 

barrel because the war has been in some parts of the Middle East 

and, by and large, the oil has been in other parts. 

But it is not written in any heavenly books that I am aware of 

that that is going to remain the case. If the security situation in 

the Middle East continues to deteriorate, the supply of oil not so 

much that we physically depend on but our allies in Europe and 

Japan and others around the world depend on, our trading partners—and I ask this committee what would happen to all of our 

economic and security problems if instability in the Middle East 

pushed the price of oil up to $200 a barrel, if instability in some 

of the large oil-producing countries interrupted either the production or the supply, or if, for example, the Saudi Government, losing 

faith in our willingness to defend it, decided it would not have a 

better bargain by reaching an agreement with Russia and Iran on 

production cutbacks in order to raise the price. 

For those who wonder why is Putin in the Middle East? What 

possible objective could he have other than propaganda victories at 

home and making Russia look like a great power? Think what it 

would mean for Putin’s prospects and Russia’s prospects, shortand medium-term, if his foreign policy could engineer a substantial 

increase in oil. 

I am not prophesying that these things are going to happen tomorrow, but I am trying to remind the committee and others who 

will follow these hearings that we cannot write off regions of the 

world simply because they are inconvenient or difficult or it is hard 

to know exactly what to do. American foreign policy planning, 

American strategic planning has to keep these unpleasant but very 

real facts in mind. 

So if the situation is in fact so difficult and we are still committed to this global foreign policy, global strategic vision, why am 

I confident that the United States retains the ability to act, that 

we do not have to resign ourselves to an inevitable decline in the 

face of competition, in the face of growing complexity? My colleagues on the panel have noted some of these, but American society remains extraordinarily inventive and adaptive. Our technology 

continues to lead the world. Our resource base is unmatched. No 

country in the history of the world has had the kind of network of 

alliances and bilateral relationships that the United States does. 

No country has had military forces of such a high capacity. No 

country has had the ability to integrate people who come to us from 

all over the world into a united body of citizens. The strengths of 

168 

this country are immense. In fact, the conditions of the 21st century, the rapid transformation of social and economic institutions 

in the face of unprecedented technological change are uniquely favorable to the classic strengths of the United States. For 200 years, 

we have been a country which prospers and adapts to change, even 

difficult change, in a way that other countries find it difficult to do. 

With 50 different States, we explore 50 different avenues into the 

future. We reform. We change our institutions as conditions 

change. Over time, this means the United States somehow manages to stay ahead. I do not see any sign in this country that we 

have lost the ability or the will to do that. 

Well, what could we do given the painful reality that we can no 

longer count on being carried gently to the skies on flowery beds 

of ease? How do we raise our game? How do we develop the ways 

of thinking? How do we organize our military, our foreign policy in 

order to adjust and adapt to these changes? 

I would leave the committee, which I know is at the beginning 

of a long process of deliberation, with three things to think about 

that I hope you will add into your thoughts. 

First, we do need to invest in the future. We need to continue 

to renew our military. The technology and the acceleration of technology around the world forces us to continue to invest. We cannot 

get locked into a model where we are simply trying to hold onto 

what we have. 

Second, the thought about the future cannot just be about technology. Societies around the world are changing. People are online. 

They are connecting to each other. People around the world, as 

their own economies are disrupted by the force of changes, as migrant flows change the makeup of countries—societies change. Conflict is a social act, and changing in society will force us to think 

about new kinds of conflicts, new strategies, new tactics. Again, we 

have to keep investing in understanding and preparing for the future. 

Finally, we should look at our military and realize the immense 

variety of missions that we ask our armed services to carry on. At 

one and the same time, our military may be working with Nigerian 

armed forces in trying to deal with Boko Haram. Maybe on the 

next tour of duty, an officer will go from the back country of Nigeria to the halls of Brussels or Paris or Berlin working in a completely different context or be in Okinawa or preparing to face the 

Chinese navy in a very high-tech and high-stakes competition. 

What kind of organization, what kind of training—it will not look 

very much like the World War II Army, like the Cold War Army, 

like the Army that we developed in the last few years with 

counterinsurgencies. Our armed forces are going to continue to 

need to evolve. This committee will have a great deal to do with 

that. 

The second large area is we need to think—again, as some of my 

colleagues have pointed out, the spaces between have historically 

been key to our strength and the strength of Great Britain before 

us. Think of Great Britain in the 18th century assuring the safe 

communication of trade and goods across the seas and the role of 

the British navy. In the 19th century, the British add to that the 

development of a world economic system under the gold standard 

169 

based in London, of a world communications system based on international undersea cables with instantaneous telegraphic communication. In the 20th century, there is a further proliferation in the 

complexity of these spaces between and in their importance to 

international life. 

The fact that we cannot pick up the paper today without reading 

about some new unbelievable and hideous breach of security of 

some of this country’s most important secrets suggests that at the 

moment we are not doing an adequate job of protecting some of the 

spaces in between, and we need to think very hard. These challenges are not going away and the cost of failing to address these 

challenges is not diminishing. 

Finally, let me close by suggesting to this committee that the 

United States Congress in the 21st century is going to need to 

equip itself with a much stronger capacity for oversight and engagement in the realm of strategic policy. I have suggested the formation of something almost analogous to the Congressional Budget 

Office [CBO], a congressional office of strategic assessment where 

Congress can get the kind of depth of analysis and reflection—a 

nonpartisan, may I say, analysis and reflection—access to the best 

advice, deepest knowledge in a way that even a committee staff 

and certainly the individual staff of Senators and Members just 

cannot do. Given the complexity of the issues that you must engage 

with the executive with, given the vast disparity in the size of the 

executive branch activities that you are expected to oversee, and 

the thin resources, and as you are all much more familiar than me, 

the many demands on the time of Members and staff, it is well 

worth thinking about how can Congress do a more effective job of 

oversight. How can Congress provide itself with the resources and 

the depth of expertise and knowledge that could make, I think, restore the ability of the legislature to play its role. 

The legislature plays an immense role not simply by opposing 

the executive on this or that issue. But the public debate on American strategic policy, on American foreign policy is carried primarily by the Representatives and the Senators, not simply a 

speech from the President. It is your communication with the 

American people, with your constituents that helps build the public 

opinion, the consensus that allows the United States to undertake 

some of the very significant investments that need to be done for 

the common good and security. Deepening the Congress? capacity 

to play this role I think can result in the construction of a stronger, 

deeper, and more effective consensus behind a smarter, more effective policy. 

But thank you again, Senators, for offering me the opportunity 

to speak today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY WALTER RUSSELL MEAD

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee: 

It’s a great honor to be invited to testify again before this august committee and 

its distinguished members. It is also encouraging to know that in a time of decreasing attention spans and in a political climate increasingly focused on ‘‘winning the 

news cycle’’, members of both parties are taking seriously the long-term strategic 

planning needs of the Republic. My aim today will be to clarify the geopolitical situation we face in the early 21st century, the challenges and opportunities that are 

170 

likely to arise going forward, and the grand strategy concerns of the United States 

that derive from these. 

BACKGROUND

After the Second World War, the United States replaced Great Britain as, in Col. 

House’s phrase, the ‘‘gyroscope of world order.’’ The U.S. assumed the burdens of 

global leadership not because we desired power—in fact, we had spent twenty years 

before the war, and two after it, trying to avoid global responsibilities—but because 

Americans needed the benefits of a stable world order to be safe and prosperous at 

home. Maintaining an open global economic system is vital to continued American 

prosperity. Maintaining a stable geopolitical order is vital to continued American security. And promoting values of freedom and self-determination worldwide is a critical element of these two missions. 

These realities are still the basis of American foreign policy and national strategy 

today. While there are many disagreements about how these principles should be 

translated into policy, and while some Americans seek to turn their backs on the 

difficult tasks of global engagement, on the whole, the commitment to the principles 

of liberal world order building that have framed American foreign policy since the 

Truman administration continues to shape our thinking today. As the world becomes more integrated economically, and as new threats like cyberwar and jihadi 

terrorism combine with old fashioned geopolitical challenges to create a more dangerous environment, this postwar American foreign policy tradition is more important than ever, but we must think long and hard about how we address our vital 

interests in an increasingly turbulent and dynamic world. 

The question before us today is whether we can continue to afford and manage 

the global commitments this policy requires. If, as I believe, the answer is that we 

can, we must then address questions of strategy. How do we harness the means we 

possess to secure the ends we seek, what priorities do we need to establish, what 

capabilities do we need to cultivate, and to what allies can we look for help as we 

seek to promote a peaceful and prosperous world amid the challenges of the 21st 

century? 

We can begin by examining some of the advantages and disadvantages that the 

United States and its allies have as we consider how to adapt a 20th century strategy to the needs of the contemporary world. 

DISADVANTAGES & ADVANTAGES

Surveying the global landscape, we can see several disadvantages that make it 

difficult to maintain the global system we’ve built into the 21st century. At the most 

basic level, one of the chief disadvantages facing the U.S. is the never-ending nature 

of our task. America’s work is never done. Militarily, whenever the United States 

innovates to gain an advantage, others quickly mimic our developments. It is not 

enough for us to be ahead today; we have to continue to innovate so we are ready 

for tomorrow and the day after. 

The U.S. is challenged by the products of its own successes in ways that extend 

far beyond weapons systems. The liberal capitalist order that the United States supports and promotes is an engine of revolutionary change in world affairs. The economic and technological progress that has so greatly benefitted America also introduces new and complicating factors into world politics. The rise of China was driven 

by the American-led information technology revolution that made global supply 

chains possible and by the Anglo-American development of an open international 

economic system that enabled China to participate on equal terms. The threat of 

cyberwar exists because of the extraordinary development of the ‘‘Born in the 

U.S.A.’’ internet, and the revolutionary advances that it represents. 

In this way, American foreign policy is like a video game in which the player 

keeps advancing to new and more challenging levels. ‘‘Winning’’ doesn’t mean the 

end of the game; it means the game is becoming more complex and demanding. This 

means that simply in order to perform at the same level, the United States needs 

to keep upping its game, reforming its institutions, improving its strategies, and 

otherwise preparing itself to address more complex and challenging issues—often at 

a faster pace than before, and with higher penalties for getting things wrong. 

America’s competitors are becoming more capable and dynamic as they master 

technology and refine their own strategies in response to global change. The world 

of Islamic jihad, for instance, has been transformed by both the adaptation of information technology and adaptation to previous American victories. In both these regards, al-Qaeda represented a great advance over earlier movements, al-Qaeda in 

Mesopotamia yet another advance, and ISIS a further step forward. 

171 

In the world of international geopolitics, Russia has also made much of information control and its current leadership possesses a keen eye for the weaknesses of 

American-fostered successes such as the European Union. And China is also emerging as new kind of challenge, one that on the one hand plays ‘‘within’’ the rules 

much more than Russia or ISIS, but on the other, is still willing to break the 

rules—viz. the OPM hack or industrial espionage—when Beijing feels it is necessary. Far more than America’s other competitors, China has used this combination 

to develop its own economy and to lay the foundations for long-term power. 

Meanwhile, many of America’s traditional allies in Europe are losing ground in 

the global economic race, and NATO, the most successful military alliance in world 

history and the keystone of the worldwide American alliance network, is in trouble. 

Many of Europe’s leading economies—which is to say, many of the top-ten economies of the world by GDP—are stagnating, and have been for some time. This has 

corrosive, follow-on effects on the social fabric of nations like France, Italy, and 

Spain. Further, the EU’s organizational mechanisms have proven inadequate to 

both the euro monetary crisis and the current refugee crisis, and secession movements (whether from the EU itself, as in ‘‘Brexit’’, or within EU nations, e.g. Scotland or Catalonia) are likely to strain them even more going forward. Finally, prospects for European adaptation to the 21st century tech economy are dimmer than 

one would like. Entrenched interests are using the force of government to repress 

innovation, start-ups are thin on the ground, and major new tech companies—‘‘European Googles’’—are nowhere to be seen. 

Since the Great Recession, the European members of NATO cut the equivalent 

of the entire German military budget from their combined defense expenditures. 

Many of our mainland European allies are also at least somewhat ambivalent about 

the extent of their commitment to defend other NATO members, particularly the 

new member-states in the Baltics—a fact that has not escaped Russia’s notice. 

More broadly, the international security system promoted by the United States is 

based on two principles, alliance and deterrence, that greatly amplify our military 

capacity—and which we have undermined in recent years. Our alliances allow us 

to do more with less; they also repress competition between our allies. For instance, 

mutual alliances with America help to keep Japanese-South Korean tensions in 

check today just as the American presence helped France and Germany establish 

closer relations based on mutual trust in the past. Deterrence is key to the alliance 

system and also to minimizing the loss of U.S. lives as we fulfill our commitments 

around the world. 

Recent events in the Middle East demonstrate what happens when alliances fray 

and deterrence loses its force. Iranian and Russian adventurism across the region 

has undermined the confidence of American allies and increased the risks of war. 

American allies, like Saudi Arabia, who fear American abandonment, have grown 

increasingly insecure. Saudi freelancing in Syria and Yemen may lead to great trouble down the road; Riyadh is not institutionally equipped to take on the burdens 

it is attempting to shoulder. 

Another significant disadvantage facing U.S. policymakers is that the international order is based on institutions (like the UN) that are both cumbersome to 

work with and difficult to reform. As we get further and further from the circumstances in which many of these institutions were founded, they grow more unwieldy, but for similar reasons, nations who were more powerful then than now 

grow more deeply opposed to change. The defects of the world’s institutions of governance and cooperation are particularly problematic for an order-building, allianceminded power like the U.S. 

Meanwhile, many of our domestic institutions relating to foreign policy are not 

well structured for the emerging challenges. From the educational institutions that 

prepare Americans for careers in international affairs (and that provide basic education about world politics to many more) to large organizations like the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Pentagon, the core institutions on which we need to rely are not well suited to the tasks they face. 

In the Cold War era, the challenges were relatively easy to understand, even if 

developing policies to deal with the threats was often hard. Today, the policy challenges are no less difficult, but the threats themselves are more diverse. A revanchist Russia, competing radical Sunni and Shia jihadist movements, and a rising 

China all represent important challenges, but they cannot be addressed in the same 

way or with the same tools. Americans, particularly those in public service but also 

the engaged citizens whose votes and opinions sway foreign policy, will have to be 

more nimble and nuanced in their understanding of the problems we’re facing than 

ever before. 

In spite of these serious disadvantages and problems, the United States is much 

better positioned than any other country to maintain, defend, extend and improve 

172 

the international system in the 21st century. We should be sober about the tremendous challenges facing us, but we should not be pessimistic. We cannot do everything, and we will not do everything right, but we can be more right, more often 

than our adversaries. 

The United States remains an adaptable society that embraces change, likes innovation, and adjusts to new realities with enthusiasm (and often, an eye to enlightened self-interest). Indeed, in many ways, these truisms are more true now than 

ever. We remain on the cutting edge of technological development. We’re better suited than our global competitors to weather demographic shifts and absorb new immigrants. And despite significant resistance to change among some segments of society 

(in particular, ironically, the ‘‘public-service’’ sector), we are already starting to reengineer our institutions for the 21st century. 

One of the United States’ greatest advantages is our exceptional array of natural 

resources. We possess a tremendous resource base with energy, agriculture, and 

mineral wealth that can rival any nation on earth. Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal well drilling have fundamentally transformed the American energy landscape 

overnight. Oil production is up 75 percent since 2008, and new supplies of shale gas 

have millions of Americans heating their homes cheaply each winter. New U.S. oil 

production has been a big part of the global fall in oil prices, and shale producers 

continue to surprise the world with their ability to keep up output, even in a bearish 

market. In 2014, the U.S. was the world’s largest producer of oil and gas, according 

to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Energy policy debates have shifted 

from issues of scarcity to those of abundance: we’re now discussing what to do with 

our bounty. Do we sell LNG abroad? End the ban on crude oil exports? These are 

good problems to have. 

The United States also retains the most advantageous geographical position of 

any of the world’s great powers. We have friendly, resource-rich neighbors; Canada 

is a rising power with enormous potential, and Mexico and many other countries 

in Latin America have made substantial progress. We face both of the world’s great 

oceans, which allow us to engage in trade while still insulating us from many of 

the world’s ills. 

The United States has an unprecedented network of alliances that gives us unmatched global reach and resilience. The vast majority of the world’s developed nations are U.S. allies. In fact, of the top 50 nations by GDP according to the World 

Bank, only four—China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran—are adversaries. Likewise, 

only two of the top fifteen military spenders are not friendly to the U.S. Largely, 

we have the kind of friends one hopes to have. 

Moreover, the world can see that The United States stands for something more 

than its own power and wealth. The democratic ideals we honor (even if we do not 

always succeed in living up to them) resonate far beyond our frontiers. The bedrock 

belief of American society that every woman and every man possesses an innate and 

inalienable dignity, and our commitment to ground our institutions and our laws 

on that truth inspire people around the world. The American creed is one that can 

be shared by people of all faiths and indeed of no faith; our society’s principles stand 

on common ground with the world’s great religious and ethical traditions. This 

American heritage gives us a unique ability to reach out to people in every land and 

to work together to build a more peaceful and prosperous world. 

The United States also has a favorable climate for investment and business that 

ensures we will remain (if we don’t screw up) a major destination for investment. 

These factors include: America’s traditional devotion to the rule of law; long, stable 

constitutional history; excellent credit rating; large internal market; 50 competing 

states offering a range of investment possibilities; rich science and R&D communities; deep financial markets adept at helping new companies grow; stable energy 

supplies (likely to be below world costs given the advantages of pipeline gas compared to LNG); and an educated workforce. We’re not at the top of every one of 

these measures globally, but no country can or likely will match our broad strength 

across them. 

This might not be the most popular thing I’ve ever told a room full of politicians, 

but one of the biggest ways in which America is fortunate is that, as I’ve written 

elsewhere, ‘‘the ultimate sources of American power—the economic dynamism of its 

culture, the pro-business tilt of its political system, its secure geographical location, 

its rich natural resource base and its profound constitutional stability—don’t depend 

on the whims of political leaders. Thankfully, the American system is often smarter 

and more capable than the people in office at any given time.’’ 

One way to look at our position is this: at the peak of its global power and influence in the 1870s, the United Kingdom is estimated to have had about nine percent 

of the global GDP. America’s share today is more than double that—and likely to 

remain at or close to that level for some time to come. 

173 

American power today rests on strong foundations. Those who argue that the 

United States must accept the inevitability of decline, and that the United States 

can no longer pursue our global interests do not understand America’s strengths. 

The United States, in association with its growing and dynamic global alliance system, is better placed than any other country or combination of countries to shape 

the century that lies before us. 

OPPORTUNITIES & CHALLENGES

The U.S. has several opportunities in the coming years to significantly advance 

its interests around the world. In Asia, a large group of countries want the same 

kind of future we do: peaceful, full of opportunities for economic growth, and with 

no one country dominating the rest. Two generations ago, this was a poor, dictatorship-ridden region; today, it’s full of advanced, high-income economies and contains 

many more stable democratic states than in the past. The regional response to China’s assertive policies in the East and South China Seas demonstrated that many 

countries are willing and indeed eager to work with the United States and with 

each other to preserve the way of life they have created from regional hegemonic 

threats. 

In Europe, despite some quarrels and abrasions, our longstanding allies have 

worked together to build the kind of zone of democratic, peaceful prosperity that the 

U.S. hopes the whole world will someday enjoy. But what we’re finding, not for the 

first time in our history, is that Europe works best when America remains engaged 

with it. While it’s tempting to think that a bunch of first-world, prosperous democracies can handle their own corner of the world (and perhaps some of the neighboring bits, please?), America is the secret ingredient that keeps this historically 

contentious, rivalry-ridden area, full of states of differing size and capacity, with different attitudes toward economics, defense, social organization, and much else, 

working together. When Europe works well, it’s the best advertisement for the 

American vision to the rest of the world. It offers us the chance to work together 

with partners who share our belief in rule of law and human rights. And fortunately, the fixes that our relationships with European nations need are relatively 

cheap, easy, and even pleasant: more time, more engagement, more mutual cooperation. 

Perhaps the biggest opportunity in the 21st century is not geopolitical, however, 

but economic and social. The tech revolution has the potential to boost standards 

of human happiness and prosperity as much as the Industrial Revolution did. It will 

likely give our grandchildren a higher standard of living than most of us today can 

imagine. 

We should not underestimate either the extent of this coming transformation, or 

the enormous power it has to make our lives better. Take, for instance, the environment: 21st-century technology is moving the economy into a more sustainable mode. 

The information service-driven economy is rising even as the manufacturing economy becomes less environmentally problematic and shrinks as a portion of the total 

economy. From telework to autonomous cars, innovations are likely to cut down on 

emissions in the new economy, even while improving standards of living across the 

world. 

The information economy will be more prosperous, more environmentally friendly, 

and more globally interconnected than what came before it. The U.S. can lead this 

transition—not by hampering economic growth or by instituting expensive subsidies, 

but by promoting and accelerating the shift toward a greener but richer and more 

satisfying economy. 

Filled with opportunity as it is, the new century also contains threats: conventional threats like classic geopolitical rivals struggling against the world order favored by the United States and its allies, unconventional threats like terror movements spurred by jihadi ideology, regional crises like the implosion of much of the 

Middle East and a proliferation of failed and failing states, emerging threats like 

the danger of cyber war, and systemic problems like the crises in some of the major 

institutions on which the global order depends—NATO, the EU, and the UN for example. The United States government itself is not exempt from this problem; whether one looks at the Pentagon, the Department of Homeland Security or the State 

Department one sees organizations seeking to carry out 21st-century missions with 

20th or even 19th-century bureaucratic structures and practices. 

Additionally, the United States faces a challenge of strategy. While the United 

States has enough resources to advance its vital interests in world affairs, it does 

not have the money, the military power, the know how or the willpower to address 

every problem, intervene in every dispute, or to dissipate its energies in futile pursuits. 

174 

The United States faces an array of conventional and unconventional threats, as 

well as several systemic dangers. Our three principal conventional challengers are 

China, Russia, and Iran. All aim to revise the current global geopolitical order to 

some extent. In the years to come, we must expect that revisionist powers will continue to challenge the existing status quo in various ways. Moreover, the continuing 

development of ‘‘second generation’’ nuclear weapons states like Pakistan ensures 

that geopolitical competition between regional powers can trigger global crises. 

Meanwhile, we are also confronted by an array of unconventional threats. Despite 

the fondest hopes of many Americans, Sunni jihadism has not proven to be a passing phase or fringe movement. Al-Qaeda was more resourceful and ambitious than 

the previous generation of radical salafi groups; its Mesopotamian offshoot (AQIM) 

was still more effective; today, ISIS has leaped ahead to develop capabilities and 

nourish ambitions that earlier jihadi groups saw only in their dreams. Unfortunately, the radical movements have lost inhibitions as they gained capacities. 

Wholesale slaughter, enslavement, barbaric and spectacular forms of execution: 

these testify to a movement that becomes more depraved, more lost in the pornography of violence, even as it acquires more resources and more fighters. This movement could become significantly more dangerous before it begins to burn out. 

Yet radical jihadis may well prove to be less of a threat than the emerging dangers of the cybersphere. Cyber conflict is a new arena of action, one in which nonstate, quasi-state and state actors are all present. With almost every day bringing 

stories of utterly lamentable failures of American cyber security, it must be clearly 

said that the United States Government has allowed itself to be made into a global 

laughingstock even as some of our most vital national security (and corporate and 

personal) information is captured by adversaries with, apparently, impunity. 

But problems like these are pinpricks compared to the damage that cyber war can 

cause. Not only can industrial sabotage disrupt vital systems, including military 

command and control systems as well as, for example, the utilities on which millions 

of Americans depend for their daily necessities, cyberwar can be waged anonymously. Threats of retaliation lose their deterrent power when the attacker is unknown. Worse, the potential for destabilizing first strikes by cyber attacks will complicate the delicate balance of terror, and leaders could find themselves propelled 

into conflict. Cyber war could accelerate the diplomatic timetable of the 21st century 

much as railroad schedules and mobilization timetables forced the hands of diplomats in 1914. 

Beyond that, one can dimly grasp the possibility of biologically based weapons as 

a new frontier in human conflict. It is far too soon to know what these will be like 

or how they will be used; nevertheless one must postulate the steady arrival of new 

kinds of weapons, both offensive and defensive, as the acceleration of human scientific understanding gives us greater access to the wonders of the life sciences. 

Finally, there are systemic or generic threats, which is to say, dangers that are 

not created by hostile design, but emerge as byproducts from existing and otherwise 

benign trends that are likely to pose significant challenges to the United States’ interests and security in coming decades. We do not usually think of these as security 

problems, but they can create or exacerbate security threats and they can degrade 

our abilities to respond effectively. 

For all its promise, the tech revolution entails an accelerating rate of change in 

human communities that has destabilizing effects. In the United States, and especially in Europe, these take the relatively benign, but still problematic, form of the 

breakdown of what I have called the ‘‘blue social model’’—a tightly integrated economic-social model built during the 21st century that linked lifetime employment 

and fixed pensions into a socio-economic safety net. Now, the structures that were 

designed to secure prosperity and economic safety in the 20th century are often constraining it in the 21st. 

But elsewhere, the strains of the modern economy may yet be worse, and produce 

more malign results. In the Middle East and North Africa, government institutions 

and systems of belief are overwhelmed by the onslaught of modernity. For better 

or worse, the pressures of modernity will increase on societies all around the world 

as we move deeper into the 21st century. To date, the United States has demonstrated very little ability to help failed or failing states find their feet. Failing 

states provide a fertile environment for ethnic and religious conflict, the rise of terrorist ideologies, and mass migration. The United States will need to be ready to 

deal with the fallout—fallout that in some cases could be more than metaphorical. 

Finally, the United States and its allies must recognize and overcome a crisis of 

confidence. The West’s indecision, weak responses, mirror imaging of strategic competitors who do not share our values, and our tendency to rely upon process-oriented 

‘‘solutions’’ in the face of growing, violent threats have encouraged a paradox: our 

enemies and challengers have become more emboldened, and disruptive to the world 

175 

order, exploiting the opportunities that the open order supported by the United 

States and its allies provides. 

Western societies have turned inward, susceptible to ‘‘there’s nothing we can do’’ 

and ‘‘it’s not our problem’’ political rhetoric. As history shows, the combination can 

carry a very high cost and take many years to unwind. Grand strategy has to take 

this into account: American leadership is critical to highlighting and thwarting problems that may fester into major global threats. Even the best strategic planning and 

the best procurement of equipment to meet serious strategic threats is insufficient 

should current Western leaders lack the wit to recognize and the will to meet challenges as they arise. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

What can the United States Congress and the armed services do to prepare the 

country for the strategic challenges of the future? The Committee invited me to look 

beyond the day to day problems and to take a longer view. Here are some thoughts: 

1. Invest in the future. 

The apparently inexorable acceleration of technological and social change has 

many implications for the armed services of the United States. It is not just that 

weapons and weapon platforms must change with the times, and that we must continue to invest in the research and development that will enable the United States 

to field the most advanced and effective forces in the world. Technological change 

drives social change, and conflict is above all a social activity. Military forces must 

develop new ways of organizing themselves, learn to operate in different dimensions, 

understand rapidly-changing cultural and political forces and generally remain innovative and outward focused. 

New tech does not just mean new equipment on the battlefield. As tech moves 

into civil life, the structure of societies change. Insurgencies mutate as new forms 

of communication and social organization transform the ways that people interact 

and communicate. 

The need for flexibility is heightened by the diversity of the world in which the 

Armed Forces of the United States, given our country’s global interests, must operate. American forces must be ready to work with Nigerian allies against Boko 

Haram, maintain a base presence in Okinawa while minimizing friction with the 

locals, operate effectively in the institutional and bureaucratic culture of the European alliance system, while killing ruthless enemies in the world’s badlands. Our 

combat troops must work in a high tech electronic battlefield of the utmost sophistication even as they work to win the hearts and minds of illiterate villagers. 

The armed services must continue to reinvent themselves to fit changing times 

and changing missions, and they must be given the resources and the flexibility necessary to evolve with the world around them. The bureaucratic routines of Pentagon 

business as usual will be poorly adapted the kind of world that is growing up 

around us. A focus on re-imagining and re-engineering bureaucratic institutions is 

part of investing in the future. Private business has often moved more quickly than 

government bureaucracy to develop new staffing and management patterns for a 

more flexible and rapidly changing environment. Government generally, and the 

Pentagon in particular, will need aggressive prodding from Congress to adapt new 

methods of management and organization. Investment in better management and 

organizational reform will be vital. 

2. Address the interstitial spaces and the invisible realms. 

The United States, like Great Britain, is a power that flourishes in the ‘spaces 

between’. In the 18th century, think of sea power and the world markets that sea 

power guaranteed. Britain rose to world power by mastering the ‘spaces between’ 

the world’s major economic zones. In the 19th century Britain added telegraph and 

cable communications to its portfolio, developing and defending the world’s most extensive network of instantaneous communications. Similarly, the British build a 

global financial system around the gold standard, the pound, and the Bank of England. Again, the focus was less on dominating and ruling large land masses than 

on facilitating trade, communications and investment among them. 

In the 20th century, the nature of this space changed again: air power, radio and 

television broadcasting, satellites and, in the century’s closing years, the internet 

created new zones of communication. The United States was able to retain a unique 

place in world affairs in large part because it moved quickly and effectively to gain 

a commanding position in the development and civil and military use of these forms 

of communication. Whether it is the movement of goods or of information or of both, 

Anglo-American power for more than three centuries has been less about controlling 

176 

large theaters of land than about securing and expediting trade and communication 

in the ‘spaces between’. 

This type of power, most evidently present today in the world of cyberspace, remains key not only to American power but to prosperity and security in the world. 

Information is becoming the decisive building block of both economic and military 

power. 

American defense policy must remain riveted on the developments in communications and information processing that are creating the contemporary equivalent of 

the sea lanes of the 18th century and the cable lines of the 19th. The recent series 

of high profile hacker attacks against key American government and corporate targets suggests that we have lost ground in one of the most vital arenas of international competition. 

This needs to change; cyber security is national security today and at the moment, 

we don’t have it. 

3. Establish a Congressional Office of Strategic Assessment. 

In order to perform its oversight functions more effectively, the Congress should 

consider establishing a professional, nonpartisan agency that can be a source for 

independent strategic research and advice, and which can evaluate executive branch 

policies in a more systematic and thorough way than current resources allow. Similar in some ways to the CBO, a COSA would provide in-depth analysis and other 

resources to members and staff. Such an office would ideally be able to analyze anything from the strategic consequences of a given trade agreement to the utility of 

a proposed weapons system. This office would also allow a much more sustained and 

effective form of Congressional oversight, restoring a better balance to the relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches of government. 

The intersection of military, political, social, technological and economic issues in 

our world is constantly creating a more complex environment for both military and 

political strategic policy and thought. Even the most dedicated members with the 

hardest working staff cannot fully keep up with the range of problems around the 

world and their impact on American interests and policy. Yet effective Congressional 

oversight is necessary if the American system of government is to reach its full potential in the vital field of national security policy. 

A non-partisan office under Congressional control that had a strong staff and the 

ability to engage the best minds in the country on questions of national strategy 

would help Congress fulfill its responsibilities in this new and challenging environment. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Hicks? 

STATEMENT OF DR. KATHLEEN HICKS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT; HENRY A. KISSINGER CHAIR; DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC 

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. HICKS. Good morning. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity 

to testify before you today. 

The scope of this hearing, to discuss the global security environment, the national security strategy, and defense organization, is 

a daunting one. I will focus my opening statement on the implications of a changing U.S. role in the world, on our national security 

strategy, and our general strategic approach. I think you will find 

a remarkable degree of consistency between my remarks and 

thoughts and those expressed already. 

Every day it seems Americans awaken to a new international crisis or other sign of a world out of their control. In Europe, our allies and partners are coping with Russian aggression, which is taking forms as diverse as cyber attacks, energy coercion, political subversion, all the way to conventional military might and a renewed 

emphasis on nuclear weapons. 

177 

At the same time, Europeans grapple with the world’s most significant migration crisis since World War II. 

In Asia, satellite images of China’s aggressive island-building activities are widely viewed as corroborating that nation’s designs to 

control the air and sea space far from its shores. 

Meanwhile, Kim Jung-un continues his family’s legacy of dangerous provocations and nuclear ambition. 

As significant as the security situation is in these two regions, 

no area of the world is in greater turmoil than the Middle East. 

From the destabilizing role of Iran, to the chaos of Libya, to the 

complete destruction of Syria and its implications for Iraq, Jordan, 

Turkey, and beyond, the upheaval seems endless. 

The international system is shifting and in ways not yet fully understood. The well-worn frames of ‘‘the unipolar moment,’’ ‘‘the 

post-9/11 era,’’ or even ‘‘globalization’’ cannot singularly explain the 

seeming growth of coercive tactics from major powers, manifest as 

provocations that fall short of conventional war, or the upheaval 

and appeal of a quasi-state espousing militant Islamist ideology. 

Indeed, no single compelling frame may exist that adequately captures the complexity and breadth of the challenges that we face. As 

we seek to understand more fully the implications of changes now 

underway, however, we can already identify several important insights that should help guide policymakers devising a national security strategy and the structure that supports it, and I will talk 

about five today. 

The first key factor is the paradox of enduring super power status combined with lessening global influence. The United States 

will likely remain the world’s sole super power for at least the next 

15 years. As has already been stated by several others, the Nation 

boasts enviable demographics, economic and innovative capacity, 

natural resources, cultural reach, and of course, military power. At 

the same time, our Nation’s ability to shape the behavior of other 

actors is lessening. How well the United States can wield power 

and how much it chooses to do so will vary by region, issue, and 

leadership. Non-state problems, for instance, are particularly difficult to tackle with existing U.S. foreign policy tools. 

A second factor that shapes the likely U.S. role in the world is 

the constancy of American public support for international engagement. If there is one theme in American grand strategy that has 

persisted for at least the past 70 years, it is that taking a leading 

role in the world is generally to the benefit of U.S. interests. Those 

U.S. interests have themselves remained remarkably constant: ensuring the security of U.S. territory and citizens; upholding treaty 

commitments, to include the security of allies; ensuring a liberal 

economic order in which American enterprise can compete fairly; 

and upholding the rule of law in international affairs, including respect for human rights. Each presidential administration has 

framed these interests somewhat differently, and of course, each 

has pursued its own particular path in seeking to secure them. But 

the core tenets have not varied significantly. An isolationist sentiment will always exist in American politics, but in the near future, 

it is unlikely to upend the basic consensus view that what happens 

elsewhere in the world can affect us at home and therefore requires 

our attention. 

178 

Equally important is a third factor that policymakers should take 

into account when thinking through the U.S. role in the world: a 

selective engagement approach to U.S. foreign policy is almost unavoidable. Despite the enduring, modern American consensus for 

international engagement, the United States has never had the 

wherewithal nor the desire to act everywhere in the world, all the 

time, or with the same tools of power. We have always had to 

weigh risks and opportunity costs and prioritize, and the current 

budget environment makes this problem even harder. Realizing 

greater security and military investment through increased budgets and/or more aggressive institutional reforms and infrastructure 

cost cuts should be pursued. I am encouraged by this committee’s 

attention to the connection between reform and realizing strategic 

ends. 

Another imperative for U.S. national security strategy is to pursue an engagement and prevention approach. Driving long-term solutions, such as improved governance capacity in places like Iraq, 

takes a generational investment and typically a whole-of-government and multinational approach. Problems are seldom solvable in 

one sphere nor by one nation alone. The United States needs all 

instruments of power, diplomatic, economic, informational, and 

military, to advance its interests. It also needs to work closely with 

the private sector, NGOs [non-governmental organizations], as well 

as allies and partners abroad. The United States has proven neither particularly patient for nor adept at such lengthy and multilateral strategies in part because it is difficult to measure the success of such approaches in ways that can assure taxpayers and 

their representatives of their value. Our national security strategy 

needs to put action behind a preventative approach, to include developing ways to measure the results of such efforts. 

A fifth insight we are learning about the security environment is 

that opportunism by nations and other actors is alive and well. Although we have an excellent record of deterring existential threats 

to the United States, we face the deterrent challenge for so-called 

‘‘grey area’’ threats. The United States must be better able to shape 

the calculus of states and actors that wish to test our response to 

ambiguous challenges. This will mean clearly communicating our 

interests and our willingness and capacity to act in defense of 

them. It also means carrying out threats when deterrence fails. 

Without that commitment, the value of deterrence will continue to 

erode and the risk of great power conflict will rise. 

The five insights I list here are realities that American policymakers would be wise to take into account. They create imperatives for national security strategy and for the tools of foreign policy. Discerning the shifting nature of the international system and 

designing an effective set of American security tools within it are 

monumental tasks, but they are not unprecedented. It is the same 

task that faced the so-called ‘‘wise men’’ who helped shape the U.S. 

approach to world affairs at the end of World War II. Our circumstances today are equally challenging, requiring a similar reexamination of our strategies and capabilities for securing U.S. interests. Self-imposed burdens, especially sequestration, threaten to 

undermine our defense policy from within. Ensuring the Nation is 

prepared to lead effectively and selectively will require adequately 

179 

resourcing any strategy we choose to pursue. Finally, successful national security strategy necessitates leadership from Washington 

and partnership with like minded nations and entities around the 

world. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hicks follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY KATHLEEN H. HICKS

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the 

committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. The scope of this 

hearing—to review the global security challenges, the national security strategy, 

and defense organization—is a daunting one. I will focus this written statement on 

the key challenges to the international security environment, the implications of a 

changing US role in the world, and the key takeaways for national security strategy 

development. I will end by emphasizing that whatever strategy the United States 

chooses to pursue, it must resource that strategy. 

KEY CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Every day, it seems Americans awaken to a new crisis signifying a world out of 

their control. In Europe, our Allies and partners are coping with Russian aggression, ranging from cyberattacks and energy coercion to conventional military might 

and a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons. There are two important doctrinal 

trends occurring in Russian military thought. First, it has shifted its doctrine over 

the past five years to the high-risk proposition of relying on its significant strategic 

capabilities—nuclear, cyber, and space—at the outset of conflicts. Its goal is to deter 

US and NATO intervention by adopting an early escalation strategy. In short, Russia may seek to de-escalate conflicts quickly by escalating them to the strategic 

realm at the outset. Second, Russia has been steadily improving its means for unconventional warfare, as we saw in Crimea. This includes extensive information operations capabilities, development and use of proxy forces, and funding for sympathetic local movements. The seeming goal, successful in the case of Crimea, is to 

achieve Russian security objectives without need for a costly and domestically divisive traditional military campaign. 

At the same time, Europe grapples with the world’s most significant migration crisis since World War II. The prospects for European political cohesion are uncertain. 

The debt crisis has fueled popular support for extremist political parties, including 

some with strong ties to Moscow. Freedom House’s 2014 Nations in Transit report 

found that only two out of ten Eastern and Central European countries (Latvia and 

the Czech Republic), which joined to the EU in 2004 and 2007, have improved their 

overall democracy ‘‘score card’’ since their accession.* Russia’s annexation of Crimea 

to NATO’s east and its military maneuvers in Europe’s north compete with the 

threats posed by ISIS and others to NATO’s south for priority. All this is occurring 

in an overall environment of declining resources, although since NATO’s Wales 

Summit, there have been modest defense spending increases among some allies. 

NATO leaders hope that the Alliance can ‘‘walk and chew gum’’—attending to disparate threats in various geographical regions—but the real test for European cohesion is occurring over migration, which is less directly a NATO issue and more centrally a test for the European Union. 

In Asia, satellite images of China’s aggressive island building activities are widely 

viewed as corroborating that nation’s designs to control the air and sea space far 

from its shores. These efforts by China are significant. China has been schooling the 

United States about its territorial interests in East Asia for some time and has 

slowly eroded international norms regarding freedom of the air and seas along its 

periphery. It has also embarked on an extensive military improvement plan, focused 

largely on air and maritime capabilities. China will be the pacing challenge for the 

United States in most areas of high-end military capability over the coming decades, 

although Russia is likely to be at least an equal challenges in nuclear, cyber, and 

space capabilities. Meanwhile, Kim Jung Un appears to be building on his family’s 

———— * Sylvana Habdank-Kolaczkowska, Nations in Transit 2014: Eurasia’s Rupture with Democracy (Washington DC: Freedom House, 2014) 19. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ 

NIT2014%20booklet_WEBSITE.pdf 

180 

legacy of dangerous force provocations and nuclear ambition. Although North Korea’s large conventional military is probably no match for South Korean combined 

armed forces, and certainly no match for the United States military, the North Korean threat today is worrisome not because of its sizable manpower but because of 

its increasing missile capability, emergent nuclear technology, special operations 

forces, and likely reliance on chemical and biological weapons. 

As significant as the security situation is in these two regions, no area of the 

world is in greater tumult than the Middle East. From the destabilizing role of Iran, 

to the chaos of Libya, to the complete destruction of Syria and its implications for 

Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and beyond, the upheaval is dramatic. Iran has some impressive conventional military capabilities, especially with regard to conventional missiles, but they are currently not on par with the United States. 

The most concerning threat posed by Iran today is instead its use of unconventional capabilities, manifest largely in its support for terrorist groups, to threaten 

US interests throughout the greater Middle East and beyond, and its ability to create a crisis in the Arabian Gulf due to its strategic position along the Strait of 

Hormuz. 

Beyond those regional challenges, the global interconnectedness of peoples will 

continue to grow. However, the very tools that support globalization, especially social media, will also facilitate increasing segmentation along ideological, religious, 

familial, and other lines that individuals and small groups may choose to create. 

Moreover, individuals and small groups who are bent on using violence will more 

easily be able to acquire the means to do so, with militarily-relevant technology increasingly coming from the commercial sector, in accessible ways, and at accessible 

prices. 

Moreover, we should expect to see some national security effects from climate 

change by the middle of this century, particularly the potential for conflict over 

changing natural resources and food and attendant migration patterns as well as 

worsening natural disasters. The growth of megacities on the littorals is a particular 

concern in this regard, as they are more at risk from disasters. The United States 

will also need to address challenges that arise when the Arctic begins to experience 

greater commercial, scientific, and military traffic. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

As this brief recitation of the international security environment demonstrates, 

the international system itself is shifting in ways not yet fully understood. The wellworn frameworks of ‘‘the unipolar moment,’’ ‘‘the post-9/11 era,’’ or even 

‘‘globalization’’ cannot singularly explain the seeming growth of coercive tactics from 

major powers—manifest as provocations that fall short of traditional war—or the 

appeal of a quasi-state espousing militant Islamist ideology. Indeed, no single, compelling frame may exist that adequately captures the complexity and breadth of the 

challenges we face. As we seek to understand more fully the implications of changes 

now underway, we can already identify five important insights that should help 

guide policymakers devising a national security strategy. 

Changing Power Dynamics The first key factor shaping the role of the United 

States today is the paradox of enduring superpower status combined with lessening 

global influence. The United States will likely remain the world’s sole superpower 

for at least the next fifteen years. The nation boasts enviable demographics, economic and innovative capacity, natural resources, cultural reach, and of course military power. At the same time, its ability to shape the behavior of other actors is 

lessening. How well the United States can wield power, and how much it chooses 

to do so, will vary by region and issue. Non-state problems, for instance, are particularly difficult to tackle with existing United States foreign policy tools. On the other 

hand, where there is an assertive nation-state competitor—such as Iran, Russia, 

North Korea or China—traditional United States security strengths tend to be more 

influential. Even in these cases, however, the United States has had difficulty deterring a wide range of provocations and coercive actions that run counter to its security interests. 

Enduring American Support for Engagement A second factor that shapes the likely U.S. role in the world is the constancy of American public support for international engagement. If there is a theme in American grand strategy that has persisted for the past seventy years, it is that taking a leading role in the world is generally to the benefit of U.S. interests. Those interests have themselves remained remarkably consistent: ensuring the security of U.S. territory and citizens; upholding 

treaty commitments, to include the security of Allies; ensuring a liberal economic 

order in which American enterprise can compete fairly; and upholding the rule of 

law in international affairs, including respect for human rights. Each presidential 

181 

administration has framed these interests somewhat differently, and of course each 

has pursued its own particular path in seeking to secure them, but the core tenets 

have not varied significantly. An isolationist sentiment will always exist in American politics, but it is unlikely to upend the basic consensus view that what happens 

elsewhere in the world can affect us at home and, therefore, requires our attention. 

The Reality of Selective Engagement Equally important is a third factor that policy-makers should take into account when thinking through the U.S. role in the 

world: a selective engagement approach to U.S. foreign policy is unavoidable. Despite the enduring, modern American consensus for international engagement, the 

United States has never had the wherewithal nor the desire to act everywhere in 

the world, all the time, or with the same tools of power. We have always had to 

weigh risks and opportunity costs and prioritize. The current budget environment 

makes this problem harder. Realizing greater security and military investment, 

through increased budgets and/or more aggressive institutional reforms and infrastructure cost cuts, should be pursued. Nevertheless, when it comes to the use of 

American force to achieve our ends, we should be prepared to surprise ourselves. 

As Robert Gates famously quipped in 2011, we have a perfect record in predicting 

our next crisis—we’ve never once got it right. Democracies, including the United 

States, can prove remarkably unpredictable. Policy-makers need to understand this 

reality and not lead the public to expect a universal template that governs when 

and where the nation may act in support of its interests. 

IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTATIVE APPROACHES

Another imperative for US national security strategy is to pursue an engagement 

and prevention approach. Driving long-term solutions, such as improved governance 

capacity in places like Iraq, takes a generational investment and typically a wholeof-government and multinational approach. Problems are seldom solvable in one 

sphere nor by one nation alone. The United States needs all instruments of power— 

diplomatic, economic, informational, and military—to advance its interests. It also 

needs to work closely with the private sector and non-governmental partners as well 

as allies and partners abroad. The United States has proven neither particularly patient for nor adept at such lengthy and multilateral strategies. It is also difficult 

to measure the success of such approaches in ways that can assure taxpayers and 

their representatives of their value. Our national security strategy needs to put action behind a preventative approach, to include developing ways to measure the results of such efforts. Importantly, a whole-of-government approach also means ensuring sufficient funding for intelligence, diplomacy, and development. This is why 

the uniformed military is often the most vocal proponent for adequately resourcing 

the intelligence community, United States State Department, USAID, and other 

non-military foreign policy tools. 

CHALLENGES TO DETERRENCE

The March 2014 events in Ukraine were a stark reminder that state-based opportunism is alive and well. If the United States ignores the challenges posed by major 

powers such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, it does so at its own peril. 

Although we have an excellent record of deterring existential threats to the United 

States, we face a deterrence challenge for so-called ‘‘grey area’’ threats. The United 

States must better shape the calculus of those states that wish to test our response 

to ambiguous challenges. This will mean clearly communicating those interests and 

our willingness and capability to act in defense of them. It also means carrying out 

threats when deterrence fails. Without that commitment, the value of deterrence 

will continue to erode, and the risk of great power conflict will rise. 

CONCLUSION

The paradox of superpower status yet lessening influence, the American inclination toward international engagement, and the near-inevitability of selective engagement are realities that American policy-makers and prospective presidents would be 

wise to understand. They create imperatives for national security strategy and for 

the tools of foreign policy. Discerning the shifting nature of the international system, and designing an effective set of American security tools within it, are monumental tasks, but they are not unprecedented. It is the same task that faced ‘‘the 

wise men’’ who helped shape the U.S. approach to world affairs at the end of World 

War II. Our circumstances today are equally daunting, requiring a similar re-examination of our strategies and capabilities for securing U.S. interests. Self-imposed 

burdens, especially sequestration, threaten to undermine our defense policy from 

within. Ensuring the nation is prepared to lead effectively—and selectively—will require adequately resourcing any strategy we chose to pursue. Finally, successful naVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00187 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
182 

tional security strategy necessitates leadership from Washington and partnership 

with likeminded nations and entities around the world. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

I guess to pick up on what you just said, Dr. Hicks and members 

of the committee, sequestration is doing not irreparable but would 

you say most serious harm to our ability to address the challenges 

which you all have described? Would you agree, Dr. Hicks? 

Dr. HICKS. I do agree. I enjoyed Professor Cohen’s comments on 

the QDR. I actually agree with them mostly. But the biggest problem with strategic planning today is not the failure of our QDR 

process, it is the inability to have any stability of foresight on what 

that funding profile looks like to create a strategy against it. It is 

paralyzing this Nation’s ability to plan. 

Senator MCCAIN. Professor Mead? 

Mr. MEAD. I would agree. It is very difficult to think of any positive things on sequestration. I would also emphasize that countries 

around the world are looking at that as a—you know, can the 

Americans govern themselves’ Can they actually adopt a serious 

strategy? How seriously should we take them? The message that 

we are sending by this paralysis is the worst possible one. 

Senator MCCAIN. Professor Mahnken? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. I completely agree. It is not just the budget cuts 

but also the consciously thoughtless way in which they are structured almost to cause the greatest damage to the Department as 

possible. 

Dr. COHEN. Without question. My colleagues have put it better 

than I could. 

Senator MCCAIN. Before the committee, several witnesses were 

asked an interesting question. I have forgotten which Senator 

asked General Dunford, our new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

what is our greatest area of risk or challenge. Some of us were interested to hear General Dunford, not the first one, saying Russia. 

I wonder, beginning with you, Professor Cohen, if you would agree 

with that. 

Dr. COHEN. I would say Russia is a big problem, but I do not 

think you can actually do that. In fact, I would say the fundamental challenge that we have is that we have got multiple, major 

strategic challenges, Russia, Iran, North Korea, China, and the 

jihadists in particular, and not all the forces that we have to bring 

to bear on one are fungible against the other. I think coming to 

terms with that fundamental fact that we are not really going to 

be able to say this is absolutely the number one is going to be particularly helpful. 

I think I would probably say actually as problematic as Russia 

is, I worry even more about China in terms of a great power competitor. But my main point would be we have got a bunch of problems. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. I think it is a difficult question to answer in a 

succinct manner. Russia remains the only country capable of annihilating the United States with its nuclear arsenal. So that qualifies. But Russia’s power is waning, not waxing. So I would agree. 

Over the mid- to long-term, I think China is a much greater challenge, a much greater multidimensional challenge to American 

power than Russia. 

183 

Then there is the growing rank of lesser actors that are, nonetheless, going to be able to do us great harm and may face much lower 

inhibitions to harming us, whether it is al Qaeda, its affiliates, a 

nuclear-armed North Korea with ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic 

missiles], or Iran through its various proxies. So they are varied 

threats and they require varied responses. 

Senator MCCAIN. Professor Mead? 

Mr. MEAD. Well, long-term I think I would agree that China certainly has greater power potential. But the very fact that Russia 

is a waning power means that I am afraid that President Putin is 

a man in a hurry. For him, the clock is ticking. China can look at 

any unresolved issue and say, you know, we can come back to this 

in 10 years or 20 years and be in a better position. The Russians— 

I do not feel that they have that luxury and also for President 

Putin himself and the security of his regime, I think there is a closer connection between foreign policy success and the stability of the 

regime. So that while Russia is not in potential the greatest threat 

to the United States, at the moment Russia is the great power 

which is devoting the most time and attention and is on the most 

aggressive timetable to try to compete with American power and 

displace it where possible. 

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Hicks? 

Dr. HICKS. I think that is a very good way to put it. China clearly has the most power potential over the long term, but the actions, 

the intent being displayed by Russia currently is a far greater concern in the near term even though there are things that the Chinese are doing that are problematic to say the least. What Russia 

is doing in the near term creates significant problems for the 

United States with regard to its interests, particularly in terms of 

Article 5 commitments to NATO, but then also beyond that in the 

Middle East. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank the panel for an extraordinarily thoughtful presentation. Thank you very much. 

Professor Cohen, one of the comments you made intrigued me. It 

is about the need or the ability to mobilize, and let me tie that to 

something else, which is, you know, phase III operations were incredibly effective. No one, I think, does it as well. Phase IV, putting 

things together again, is where we see to fall down dramatically, 

and that is the longest and maybe most expensive part of the operation. 

So when you are talking about mobilization, is that a subtle reference to the draft? Is it in the context of going forward, not individual soldiers and sailors, it is technicians, cyber specialists, engineers, all those people that can do phase III? 

Dr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator. I do not think we are going to 

need a draft. I do not think it would be practicable. 

But I think you have hit on a very good example of what difference mobilization thinking might have made. I think we should 

have clearly anticipated before the Iraq War that we were going to 

need major capacity in terms of military government. You know, 

during World War II, we did a wonderful job of getting city managers, politicians, even future Senators into uniform in pretty short 

184 

order, you know, 3 months, 6 months of training, and then they 

were out there doing it. There is no reason why you could not have 

done it in 2003-2004. 

You know, I was struck right after 9/11. After that crisis, there 

is no question in my mind the United States Government could 

have tapped the service of just about any citizen in this country. 

As Dr. Mahnken pointed out, we have got an amazing array, unparalleled array, of talents. Our system was just incapable of doing 

that in the intelligence community, in the military. It is not as 

though we have not done it before. We did it in World War II. 

Senator REED. Dr. Mahnken, Professor Mead, then Dr. Hicks, 

any comments? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. No. I would agree. I think historically our military has been based on a relatively small active component and the 

ability to expand as needed. But in recent years, we have gone to 

a highly proficient, highly capable standing capability with not 

much behind it. That is true when it comes to phase IV, as you 

talked about. It is also true with the industrial base. Just think 

about when we needed to mobilize in World War II, all the industry that we were able to tap into to build tanks, to build bombers, 

to build ships. I hazard a guess that if we had to do that today, 

if we had to mobilize for an era of a protracted war involving precision weapons and cyber, we would have a much more difficult time 

doing it. We have just gotten out of the habit of thinking in those 

terms. For better or worse, we are going to need to get back into 

that habit. 

Senator REED. I would love to entertain comments, but my time 

is short. 

One point that you raised, Professor Mead—and I will get Dr. 

Hicks? comments also—is that you made the comment, you know, 

what would be the consequences of the $200 a barrel oil? One 

would be that President Putin would be in much better shape. So 

that sort of drives the other side of the argument, bluntly how do 

we keep oil at $45 so his aspirations are not funded by huge oil. 

That raises the issue of part of the national security policy has to 

be a whole-of-government, including energy policy, proactive diplomacy, et cetera. If you and Dr. Hicks would comment on the general themes I would appreciate it. 

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir, Senator. I think there is a connection in a 

way between the first part of your questions and this part, that the 

strength of the United States has been the strength of our society 

which, through a representative system of government, is not completely separate from what the government wants or does. This is 

the American people speaking and acting through many different 

institutions. 

But absolutely the success of American energy policy, of regenerating our position as a major world producer of oil and gas, is an 

extraordinary example of the kind of strength that the United 

States brings to this multilevel, multifaceted strength. We do need 

to think consciously what is the connection between our energy policy and our foreign policy. How do we, for example, ensure that 

some of our allies in Europe and Asia can rely on North America? 

We talk about our Canadian and Mexican friends also. North 

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carbons for the 21st century. This can be an extraordinarily beneficial geopolitical reality. But our Government needs to be thinking 

together about what are the policies that make that possible. This 

is partly, sir, why I think some kind of office of strategic assessment in Congress that could pull together these very disparate 

ideas and considerations would be of enormous benefit. 

Senator REED. Could I ask for a quick comment from Dr. Hicks? 

Dr. HICKS. Sure. I also think there is a lot of consistency both 

with your first question in framing it about phase IV, which is one 

of the clearest examples of how inadequate we are as a Nation 

pulling together the different threads of capability because phase 

IV operations are the place where you are trying to bring together 

the military instrument with development, diplomacy, one of those 

places where we try to do that. We really struggle. 

Similarly, we really struggle anytime the issue set demands that 

we cross our traditional stovepipe cultures inside either the executive branch or even committee structures and try to build coherent, 

integrated approaches. 

It is a real challenge for us and it is getting worse, as I tried to 

point out in my statement, because the problem sets are increasingly testing us in those areas. We are not fast at it, and we are 

also not great at it even over a long period of time. But it is what 

the future will require. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, with this committee’s—I would say the chairman— 

I compliment him on the quality of people coming forth. My gosh, 

we had the very best minds in Kissinger, yesterday Bob Gates, the 

four of you. I have to say this about your opening statements. Confession is good for the soul I guess. It is the first time that I have 

ever started reading opening statements and I could not put them 

down. It was like a scary but true novel. I appreciate the straightforwardness in which you have done this. 

It is very clear I think to me—and I will not ask you—well, I will 

ask you to respond. We are in a weakened condition right now that 

we have not been in relative to the threat that is out there, at least 

in the 20-plus years that I have been here, when you have the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff talking about how the risk 

is so great and we are so unready that it would be immoral to use 

force and you have the Vice Chairman saying that for the first time 

in my career, we could be met with a crisis and we would have to 

say we cannot. So these things are going on now, and I really believe it is true. 

I like one of the quotes, many of the quotes, of President Reagan. 

One of them is none of the four wars in my lifetime came about 

because we are too strong. It is weakness that invites adventurous 

adversaries to make mistaken judgments. 

Going across from you, Professor Cohen, do you agree with that 

statement? 

Dr. COHEN. I certainly would. The only thing, though, I would 

say, unfortunately, is President Reagan did an extraordinary job 

presiding over a major defense buildup and very clearly and powerfully articulating American values. 

186 

Senator INHOFE. The question is strength. 

Dr. COHEN. Right. 

The one caution I would add is although I am very much of a 

view that we need some major plus-ups in the defense budget and 

I am very much in favor of Presidents articulating American values, we are not going to have something like the Reagan recovery. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. I will not ask the rest 

of you that. 

Professor Mead, you wrote back in 2013—I mentioned this to you 

before—that Putin and Khamenei believe—and the quote was— 

they are dealing with a dithering and indecisive American leader. 

That was 2 years ago. Do you still think they believe that? Is that 

still true today? 

Mr. MEAD. Senator, I am afraid they do believe that, and that 

I think is a factor in some of the risks they have been willing to 

run. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I think so too. 

Dr. Kissinger, when he was here, he said the role of the United 

States is indispensable. At a time of global upheaval, the consequences of American disengagement magnifies and requires larger intervention later. 

Professor Mead, are you not saying about the same thing in your 

statement when you said America is the secret ingredient that 

keeps this historically contentious rivalry-ridden area full of states 

of differing size, capacity, with different attitudes toward economics, defense, social organizations, and much less working together. 

Is that not simply what—you are agreeing with Dr. Kissinger? 

Mr. MEAD. I am agreeing with Dr. Kissinger. I think if we look 

back at the 20th century, sir, we can see that even if we look at 

times the United States intervened and perhaps it was unwise and 

the results were not successful, overall far more people die, far 

more damage is done when the United States evades responsibility 

than when it moves forward. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you also for bringing up in your statement and restating it verbally when you talk about one of the 

United States? greatest advantages is our exceptional array of natural resources. You go on and talk about our shale revolution, 

things that we are in the middle of right now, and horizontal fracturing—hydraulic fracturing and horizontal well drilling. By the 

way, the first hydraulic fracturing was 1948 in my State of Oklahoma. You probably knew that. 

But with that being significant—and then you end up that statement by saying do we sell LNG [liquid natural gas] abroad. Do we 

end the ban on crude oil exports? I say resoundingly yes, because 

we want to keep this thing going. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir. I think it is good national economic policy 

and good strategic policy. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. 

Professor Mahnken, my time is running out here. You talked 

about sharpening the tradeoff between guns and butter. I like that 

statement. I like the way you are saying that because that is exactly what we are doing right now with sequestration. Yesterday 

when Gates was in here, he talked about in 1961 defense consumed 

51 percent of the budget in 1961. Today it is 15. Now, when we try 

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to do something about sequestration, there is a demand by this administration that you are not going put one more nickel back into 

defense unless you also put it into the social programs. 

So I would ask each one of you the question. Do you think we 

have too much butter and not enough guns? Let us start with you, 

Professor Mahnken. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. I think one of the core duties of the Government 

is to provide for the common defense. Nobody else can do that. 

Senator INHOFE. That is what the Constitution says. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. So I think national security spending is key. Now, 

we can try to get more bang for our buck, and we can do that also 

on the butter side as well through reform. But it is an inescapable 

responsibility of the United States Government to defend the 

United States and its people. 

Senator INHOFE. Professor Cohen? 

Dr. COHEN. I do not know whether or not we are spending the 

right amount of money on butter, but I am quite sure we are not 

spending enough on guns. 

Senator INHOFE. A good way of putting it. 

Professor Mead? 

Mr. MEAD. I think Professor Cohen had it exactly right, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Hicks? 

Dr. HICKS. I agree with that. Dr. Gates also had a saying he 

liked to use both here on the Hill and also with his staff, which 

is we are a rich Nation. We are a capable Nation. We should be 

able to provide for the common defense at the same time we are 

providing for the citizens? needs at home. 

Senator INHOFE. I thank all four of you. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you. 

On behalf of Senator McCain, Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Gates yesterday and the panel today both acknowledged I think the elephant in the room, which is basically congressional dysfunction and our inability to eliminate sequester and to 

provide the kind of long-term decisions with regard to the budget 

that enable good planning to be done both on the defense and nondefense side. So that is our responsibility. 

I was interested in Dr. Cohen’s suggestion that we overhaul the 

current system for producing strategy documents because, as you 

all indicated today in your testimony, we are really living in an unpredictable environment and lots of things happen. If we are just 

relying on a Quadrennial Review and those kinds of approaches, 

that may not be the best way to go. 

So I would like to start with Dr. Hicks because I believe that you 

were involved in crafting the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and 

the 2010 QDR. So would you agree that we should create a more 

flexible way to develop strategic documents to enable all of us to 

make better decisions? 

Dr. HICKS. The Department absolutely needs a flexible way to 

plan. 

I would say that the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance process 

was an example of essentially what Dr. Cohen is arguing for, which 

is an incident- or situation-dependent desire and then creation of 

a strategy and associated budget outside of the QDR process. So 

188 

the QDR process can keep going along if it is helpful for it to exist, 

but it cannot constrain strategic thinking in the Department. In 

point of fact, it does not. I think the key question is what is most 

useful in terms of documents or processes that the Hill would like 

to mandate upon the Department for its use. But in terms of the 

Department’s own agility and ability, it needs to be doing that, and 

the DSG I think was an example of where it recognized that it 

could not wait for the next QDR to do a major strategy review. So 

it did one. 

Senator HIRONO. Well, that was in 2012. We are in 2015 now 

and lots of other things have happened. So has there been an update of the Defense Strategic Guidance? 

Dr. HICKS. There has. There was a 2014 QDR. So you had a 2010 

QDR, a 2012 DSG, and a 2014 QDR. So basically at this point, we 

are on an every 2-year schedule. 

Senator HIRONO. Dr. Cohen, do you think that that is adequate? 

Dr. COHEN. No. First, I think it is actually good to get rid of reports that consume an enormous amount of time and energy from 

people like my very talented colleagues, Dr. Hicks and Dr. 

Mahnken. 

But also, I think there is a lot to be said for a white paper kind 

of system for two reasons. First, if you look at both the Australian 

and the French examples that I mentioned, they do a very good job 

of integrating both civilians and military together as opposed to 

having a process that is much more divided. The French, in particular, also do a much better job of holding some open hearings, 

getting some outside experts involved, and then producing a large 

and really quite serious document. The Australians have done this 

as well. I think it is important some part of this be an open process, some part of it be a closed process. You probably need something that would force the Government to do it at least once 

every—I do not know—5 or 7 years, something like that. But I 

would be in favor of a much radical restructuring of how we do 

this. 

Senator HIRONO. So that relates to external to Congress? ability 

to engage in this kind of strategic assessment, although that is 

what this hearing and hearings like this are supposed to do. 

Dr. Cohen, do you have any response to the idea that we should 

establish a congressional office of strategic assessment as a tool for 

us? 

Dr. COHEN. That is hard for me to say. You have the Congressional Research Service, which I have got a lot of respect for, and 

the CBO as well. I suppose the one thing I would be somewhat concerned about is how do you really keep things like that truly nonpartisan. Now, in some ways, just this very panel, which includes 

both a former Obama administration official, two former Bush administration officials, and one genuinely nonpartisan expert—and 

there is a lot of consensus here—might be encouraging. But I think 

if I was in your shoes, that would be one concern that I would 

have. 

Senator HIRONO. I am running out of time. But I was very interested in all of you acknowledging that while Russia is moving 

ahead right now, maybe in the long term they are not as much of 

a challenge or concern for us as China. Although I am running out 

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of time, I perhaps would like to ask you all, what do you think is 

the long-term strategy for China? Because if their intention is to 

become the preeminent power in the world from a multidimensional standpoint, diplomatically, economically, militarily, how long 

is it going to take them to overtake the United States? If I can 

frame it in that way. Very briefly. 

Dr. COHEN. Well, just real quickly, we need to remember the 

Chinese have some great weaknesses as well as strengths, demographic, economic, societal and so forth. But I would say the key 

for us is really three things. One, we really do need a robust military presence in Asia. You cannot substitute for things like gray 

hulls. 

Secondly, it is working on a different set of alliance relationships 

than in the past to include developing a relationship particularly 

with India but also deepening the relationship with Japan and 

Australia. 

I think, thirdly—and this gets to something that Dr. Mahnken 

said earlier—it is very important to articulate American values. I 

am not sure whether the phrase ‘‘political warfare’’ is right or 

something like that. We need to be much more forceful, I believe, 

than we have been in laying out those basic values of human rights 

and representative government and rule of law that everybody, 

Democrats and Republicans alike, really believe in. That is a very 

important part of our power in the world, and we should never forget that. 

Senator HIRONO. Well, if you do not mind, Mr. Chairman, can I 

have at least one other panel member just respond? Who? Dr. 

Mahnken. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. First off, I am not willing to concede that China 

is going to surpass the United States. I think we have had in our 

past all sorts of predictions along these lines that have not come 

true. But I think we should focus on what the aspects of China’s 

rise are that really do concern us. I actually do not think it is economic growth per se. I think it is the fact that China is a non-status quo power. It is the fact that China has expanded to its maritime littorals and threatened our territory and that of our allies. 

It is a whole pattern of behavior, and ultimately it is an authoritarian political system. I think if you were to get China to buy into 

major aspects of the status quo, to focus much more of its attention 

on the Asian continent rather than offshore Asia, and to be more 

pluralistic, the economic part of it would not matter nearly as 

much. So if I am thinking about United States strategy for addressing China, I would be focused on those aspects of Chinese behavior and not merely China’s rise or Chinese growth. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

On behalf of the chairman, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much, Chair. 

I want to thank you all of you for being here. This is very helpful 

and especially your written statements as well. 

Professor Cohen, I was struck in not only your testimony here 

today but in your prepared statement that you predict that Iran 

will be armed with nuclear weapons that can reach the United 

States. So can you explain to me why you believe that conclusion 

is in light of what we have been told, that there has been a deal 

190 

entered into that somehow is going to prevent Iran from having 

that capacity? 

Dr. COHEN. Senator Ayotte, when I was at the State Department, 

I kept on my desk a 50,000 rial note, an Iranian bank note. When 

you hold it up to the light, what you see is the watermark. The watermark is the sign of an atom right over the center of the country, 

which tells you something about the nature of their commitment. 

I think everything that we know about the Iranian program is 

they have had not just a very active enrichment program—we all 

know about that, including clandestine dimensions—but a very active warhead development program at Parchin and, of course, a 

very active ballistic missile program. I understand the different positions people have taken on the current agreement. But under the 

best circumstances—under the best circumstances—15 years from 

now, they really are out there free. They will be able to build a nuclear arsenal. I believe that is what they will do. All of their behavior supports only that interpretation. That is under the best set of 

assumptions. We can have a long discussion, of course, about the 

agreement. I think that is the optimistic assumption. 

Senator AYOTTE. Can I also follow up with you, Professor 

Mahnken, related to Iran based on a statement that you have in 

your testimony that essentially says that Iran’s missile program 

continues apace? One thing I have been very interested in and focused on is the recent October 10th test by Iran of the ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Of course, that has also 

been confirmed by Ambassador Power, our U.S. Ambassador to the 

United Nations, as a clear violation of UN [United Nations] Security Council 1929. 

I have written the President about this, along with Senator Kirk. 

I wanted to get your thought on their testing. If they do not believe 

that there are any consequences for currently violating UN resolutions on this topic that under this agreement apparently will not 

be lifted till 8 years, what are your thoughts on this violation and 

how should it be addressed? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Well, in a way the violation is not surprising. It 

is part of an ongoing pattern of behavior by Iran. We could extend 

this and talk about North Korea as well. They are both building 

intercontinental ballistic missile capability. In the case of North 

Korea, they have the nuclear weapons, and in the case of Iran, they 

will at some point likely get the warheads to go atop—— 

Senator AYOTTE. I mean, just so we are clear, they want ICBM 

capability—right—because ‘‘I’’ is ‘‘intercontinental,’’ as Secretary 

Carter shared with us, so they can hit us. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. Or Europe. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. They do not even need that to hit Europe. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Yes. They can already hit Europe. 

Iran and North Korea have a pattern of cooperation on a variety 

of matters as well. 

So, yes, whether they get the warheads now or a few years from 

now, they will have the means. 

Senator AYOTTE. So here is my question I guess to everyone on 

the panel. Should there not be some consequences for if they are 

191 

already testing in violation of the UN resolutions, which, I mean, 

there was—I disagreed with the administration lifting the missile 

resolutions whatsoever in the 8 years. In fact, the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff said that this should not be done under any 

circumstances. But there does not seem to be any response from 

the administration. Should we not have a response? I would like 

to get everyone’s thought on this. 

Dr. HICKS. I will start on that. Obviously, I do not represent the 

administration. 

But I think there is absolutely no doubt, whether it is Iran or 

others that we are trying to prevent from proliferating to nuclear 

weapons, we have to demonstrate that they are better off without 

nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea, I think that has 

failed. I think the fact of the matter is North Koreans believe they 

are better off with nuclear weapons. That makes the challenge with 

Iran that much harder. 

So putting aside the deal—I am happy to talk about that, but 

putting that aside for the moment, I am in favor of the deal, but 

I do think there needs to be absolutely consequences to demonstrate that Iran sticking to its agreement and staying, if you 

will, inside parameters that are non-nuclear are very important to 

the United States and are important to Iran’s own security. 

Senator AYOTTE. Other thoughts? Also, I do not view the ICBM 

issue as non-nuclear. Let me just say that. 

Dr. COHEN. The Supreme Leader was very clever. He just announced that any kind of sanctions of any sort would invalidate the 

deal. So clearly, what the Iranians would like to do is to kind of 

be able to engage not just in this but in other nefarious activities 

without any consequences whatsoever. So I think even as a symbolic statement that we are not going to accept that construction 

of this agreement, we need to do something. 

Senator AYOTTE. Any other comments on that? I know my time 

is up, but I know it is an important issue. 

Mr. MEAD. Well, I do think that in a sense the problem with the 

nuclear deal is that it does not solve our most urgent problem with 

Iran, which is its geopolitical ambitions in the region and, in fact, 

may provide Iran with more economic resources to pursue a destabilizing policy in the region, which it is clearly doing. If we add 

then that we do not, at the moment, seem to have an active strategy of containing or offsetting or checking Iran in the region and 

then we add to that that we seem unable to come up with a response to a violation of a UN Security Council resolution, we are 

really inviting the kind of behavior from Iran that is very dangerous and would be very unwelcome. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. I agree. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you all. 

Senator REED. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all 

very much for your very thought-provoking testimony this morning. 

I just wanted to follow up a little bit on some of the budget uncertainty concerns that have been raised. Most of you talked about 

it in the context of sequestration and the potential impact that that 

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tainty about our willingness to raise the debt ceiling and to invest 

in things like our infrastructure and our research and development, our educational system also contributes to our ability to address national security threats to the country? Professor Cohen? 

Dr. COHEN. I guess I would say two things. 

One, I think it is generally—first, I think the core issues in some 

ways, in addition to the specific damage to defense planning, it is 

the reputational cost abroad, which I think is very real. Most people do not understand our system of divided powers. So they are 

frequently baffled by that. But I think, to the extent that there is 

a national security issue, what they are focused on, what they really notice is our inability to really have defense budgets and make 

long-term decisions. As a citizen, do I care about the nature of the 

political deadlock that we have here at home? Absolutely. But I 

think if you were to ask me in terms of the reputational issue 

abroad, that I am not as sure about. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Yes. What I get when I am abroad when I am 

speaking to allies and friends is that this reflects poorly on—appears to reflect poorly on our ability to get things done. Now, historically we have been able to get a bipartisan consensus on defense, even when there have been very profound disagreements on 

other things. I think if we are unable to do that, if we are unable 

to push a defense budget forward and get it signed, that will be yet 

another distressing sign to many of our allies and maybe comforting to those who wish us ill. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Do either of you disagree with that? 

Dr. HICKS. I do not disagree. I just wanted to add that the— 

which I think will be shared by others, that the long-term security 

of the country also relies on having strong education systems and 

innovation and a tech sector that is vibrant, infrastructure that 

functions and is above a D grade level for the Nation. All those 

things also matter in the long term, as does the debt ceiling, the 

national debt. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Professor Mead? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes. I think there is a certain reputational damage 

internationally that we seem—you know, if we are unable to agree 

on a basic budget, but it becomes much more focused when defense 

is part of that general imbroglio. So we need to think about how 

do we—well, we may also need to sort of try to carve up the defense budget a little bit. There are sort of payment of past wars, 

which would be veterans benefits and pensions and things like 

that, and then what do we need to do to fulfill our needs right now 

and possibly there are ways to think about those things in budget 

terms. I am not sure. 

But in any case, there is a reputational damage to us and to the 

idea of democracy when the United States appears unable to manage its own affairs well, but it is exacerbated when our defense 

budget is made a kind of a political football. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

The 2015 National security Strategy states that—and I am 

quoting—climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our 

national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and water. 

Do you all agree? I was surprised that nobody mentioned this as 

193 

part of potential threats to not only our national security but to the 

global world order. Does anyone wish to comment? Dr. Hicks? 

Dr. HICKS. Thank you. It is in my written statement. I did not 

highlight it in my brief oral statement. But in my written statement, I do talk about the effects of climate change increasingly as 

a national security issue. I might use different adjectives than were 

used in the National Security Strategy, but for certain, there will 

be increasing conflicts over natural resources. Of course, we have 

the effects on the Arctic, especially as it becomes ice-free over the 

summers by mid-century as predicted. That creates a whole new 

challenge space with scientific and commercial vessels and, of 

course, military—the possibilities of military use in the Arctic. 

Then to the extent that you have at the same time the effects 

of mega-city growth and urbanization happening, which is largely 

happening along waterways—on the littorals is where those megacities are going. To the extent that countries and states are not 

able to control and govern those areas well when disaster hits, I 

do think it greatly increases some of the risks in areas that the 

United States may decide it needs to care about with military force. 

Dr. COHEN. If I could, I think I actually disagree in that not all 

really important issues are national security issues. Environmental 

degradation is important. Climate change is important. Education 

is important. But I think there is a real danger—we can end up 

just diluting what we mean by national security and take our eye 

off the ball. 

I remember when the Commander of Pacific Command got up 

and said climate change is the most important national security 

threat we have got, my reaction was, you know, your job is really 

to be focused on China and let other people deal with climate 

change. 

So I think particularly if this committee is going to stay focused 

on the central task, I think it should be focused on issues which 

really involve the use or potential use of force. Although they may 

be indirect connections between climate change and use of force, I 

think we run the risk of blurring our focus if we extend it too widely. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I am out of time, but I would respectfully disagree with you. I think when we have reports that come out that 

show that China is losing its wetlands at a rate that means that 

it is no longer going to be able to feed its population, that it is 

going to look elsewhere to do that and that that will have significant security risks. So while I appreciate what you are saying, I 

think if we are talking about a national security strategy that focuses on things like energy, that we certainly ought to be focused 

also on the impact of the threats to our climate. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, panelists. It is a really, really impressive display of 

knowledge here. 

Professor Cohen, just to be clear, you mentioned what the Supreme Leader had recently said. It is actually in the agreement 

that any type of reimposition of sanctions allows Iran to walk away 

from the deal. That is in the agreement. So our administration neVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00199 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
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gotiated that. The Senators who voted for this agreement agreed 

with that. I think it is outrageous, but it is in the agreement. It 

is not just what they are saying. So I just wanted to be clear on 

that. 

I really appreciated all of you talking about the advantages that 

we have, the comparative advantages that we have. I do not think 

that is emphasized enough. 

Professor Mead and others, your focus on energy is also one. You 

know, we have had General Jones, former NATO Commander, 

Commandant of the Marine Corps. Even Secretary Carter has come 

here and talked about how important energy is. Yet, we cannot put 

together an energy strategy at all with this administration because 

I just think they do not like hydrocarbons. They do not like talking 

about exporting LNG and oil. It is not only a way to create jobs 

and energy security in America but to dramatically increase our 

national security. So I think we need to do that. I appreciate all 

of you talking about that. 

You know, the other issue that I was surprised did not come up 

at all—as a matter of it, it is something that as a new Senator I 

do not think we talk about nearly enough—is economic growth and 

the importance of that. You know, we have had this recovery which 

is by any historical measure the most anemic recovery in U.S. history, about 1.5 percent, maybe 2 percent GDP [gross domestic product] growth if we are lucky. They call it the ‘‘new normal’’ here in 

Washington, which I think is a very dangerous comment, dangerous idea that we should be satisfied with growth that is so traditionally off the 4 percent GDP growth standard that we have had 

for at least 100 years in this country. 

How much better would our national security be if we were able 

to bust out of this 1.5 percent growth and get back to traditional 

levels of American growth, 3.5-4 percent GDP growth? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Quite honestly, Senator, at those levels of growth, 

many of the discussions that we are having in 

Washington, D.C. right now about guns versus butter would not 

exactly go away, but would become much less pressing. I mean, 

what has enabled China’s tremendous military buildup? It has 

been a booming Chinese economy. What has stymied the Russian 

military since the end of the Cold War? It has been variable economic growth. So you get economic growth up. It is a lot more resources, including for national security. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I am going to address a much more specific 

issue. We have been talking a lot about China, and we have had 

a number of—the PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] Commander 

and Secretary Carter talking about the importance of being able to 

sail, fly anywhere we want. The Secretary gave a very good speech 

in Singapore. The chairman and the ranking member and I were 

there at the Shangri-La Dialogue where he talked about that submerged rocks do not provide sovereignty that we need to respect. 

So there has been a lot of discussion about sending Navy ships 

within the 12-mile zone of these islands. As a matter of fact, you 

probably saw last week a lot of leaks in the paper—I am not sure 

where they are from—saying we are going to do this any moment. 

Yet, we are here—and I at least heard a rumor that maybe SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 Dec 16, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00200 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\22944.TXT WILDA
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retary Kerry vetoed that because they want to get better negotiations in the climate change negotiations with China. 

If that is true, if we are saying we are going to do this, we are 

going to do this, we are going to do this—the military clearly wants 

to do this Admiral Harris pretty much implied in testimony here. 

Then they leak it. We are going to do it any minute. Then we do 

not. What is that going to do to our credibility in Asia and what 

is that going to do with our credibility with regard to the Chinese? 

But importantly, what is that going to do to our credibility with regard to our allies in the region who, to be honest, are quite supportive of a little more American leadership in the South China 

Sea? I open that up to everybody. 

Dr. COHEN. I completely agree with that. It is going to be very 

important for us to sail within 12 miles of those new Chinese 

bases. I think what your comment brings out is there are really 

two dimensions to think about these strategic issues. You know, 

there is the material side, how many ships were deployed, war 

plans, that sort of stuff. But there is also a reputational side. I 

think we need to understand that reputational dimension of our 

national security posture and pay attention to it because it has 

taken a beating in recent years. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. I agree. You know, whether we should be trumpeting the fact or not, we should be doing it. We should have been 

doing it all along. The United States has a decades-long commitment to freedom of navigation, and the United States has during 

that period undertaken objectively must riskier operations to demonstrate freedom of navigation, including against the Soviet navy 

in the height of the Cold War. The fact that we appear unwilling 

to do it under these circumstances does not serve us well. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Professor Mead? 

Mr. MEAD. Certainly freedom of navigation is a key to America’s 

global position, to our vital interests, to those of our allies. We cannot leave anybody in doubt around the world about how seriously 

we take this. If you look at the history of American wars, the single 

largest cost of America entering into foreign wars historically has 

been a tax on our shipping abroad, really going back to the War 

of 1812. If we seem uncertain or hesitant about this, people overseas may well conclude that we are hesitant about many other 

things. It is a bad signal to send. 

Dr. HICKS. I completely agree, and I would particularly associate 

myself with the way that Dr. Mahnken formulated it. You do not 

wait for a crisis. You need to be routinely exercising this freedom 

of the seas. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. We have a couple of our members who are on 

their way back as well, including one of the more older and senile 

members. So we want to keep this open. 

But in the meantime, Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to all of you. Your written testimony was very, very good. 

Because of other committee hearings, I missed a lot of the Q and 

A. 

196 

But I just kind of wanted to get you all to address an issue. Sunday, this Sunday, is the 70th anniversary of one of my favorite moments in presidential history. Harry Truman, who was a great 

wartime President, nobody’s softy by any means, on the 25th of October 1945 called the press corps into his office, and he showed 

them that he had redesigned the seal of the presidency of the 

United States. The seal had changed over time, but the basic features of the seal were the eagle with the olive branches of diplomacy and peace in one claw and the arrows of war in the other. 

FDR had actually started the project, but he had completed it to 

create a seal where the eagle faces to the position of honor to the 

right but faces the olive branches of diplomacy and peace instead 

of the arrows of war. That was a change from earlier tradition. 

Now, Harry Truman was nobody’s softy. He had fought in World 

War I. He had made very difficult decisions, especially maybe the 

most momentous single decision a President has had to make, 

which is whether to use the atomic bomb with respect to Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki. But he definitely believed that America is the kind 

of nation that should always lead with diplomacy, that strong diplomacy actually increases your moral authority if you have to use 

military action. But he also believed it the other way too, that 

strong military power increased your ability to find diplomacy. 

I would wonder if each of you would just address—and then Truman, you know, true to form—and other Presidents since this have 

done that—have really viewed the levers of American power to include in a significant way multilateral diplomacy, whether it was 

his role moving forward with the UN or the creation of NATO or 

the creation of the International Monetary Fund. We see issues 

today. We go up to the Trans-Pacific Partnership or a deal with 

Iran that is a multilateral deal. The U.S. has been the principal architect of the post-World War II edifice of rules, norms, and institutions. We have benefited from that, but the whole world has benefited from it. I sometimes worry that our commitment to these sort 

of multilateral, broadly diplomatic efforts is either fraying or 

maybe we do not completely get the benefits that we have achieved 

by it. 

But I would just like as an element of kind of the way we should 

look at the challenges that you each laid out in our National Security Strategy, if you would talk about the role of the U.S. plain 

leadership in kind of broad, multilateral—this post-World War II, 

multilateral, diplomatic effort. 

Dr. COHEN. Senator, if I could add a little gloss to that story. 

Winston Churchill traveled with President Truman across the 

United States in the presidential train to give the Fulton Address. 

President Truman showed him the redesigned seal, and Winston 

Churchill’s response was, I see the point but I think the eagle’s 

head should be mounted on a swivel—— 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. COHEN.—to point either to the arrows or to the olive branch 

as required. I think actually that is really the right approach. 

Diplomacy is a very important tool. It is a tool of foreign policy, 

as indeed is military power. 

More immediately to your point, I think it is really important to 

remember that multilateral diplomacy is not an end in itself. That 

197 

is all it is, a tool. I think a kind of reflexive multilateralism could 

get us in trouble. Again, I would cite, as I did in my testimony, the 

example of introducing NATO into Afghanistan, which was a big 

mistake. 

The challenge I think we are going to have, particularly in Asia, 

is going to be knitting together a different set of multilateral relationships particularly with partners that we have not worked as 

closely with before, and the key one is India. That is a matter of 

personal interest. So I think there are going to be a lot of challenges for American diplomats ahead, working very much in conjunction with the American military. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. I think multilateral diplomacy is most effective 

and has been most effective historically when it is backed by military strength. I am concerned today that the fraying of multilateral 

diplomacy I think can be traced back to some of the erosion of our 

military strength. Look at NATO today. Is NATO more healthy 

today with or without strong U.S. support? We were talking about 

the South China Sea just a minute ago. We support multilateral 

resolution of competing claims in the South China Sea. Is that 

more likely if we choose not to challenge China’s creation of artificial features, or is it more likely if we do respond vigorously? I 

think the latter is the case. 

Mr. MEAD. Well, Senator, when I think about this and actually 

that image of the eagle and the two claws with different offerings, 

it struck me earlier in this hearing this morning that if we think 

about the American position vis-a-vis China, to take one of the 

issues we have discussed, I think we need to be presenting as a 

country to China the idea that there are two choices. There is the 

olive branch, that is, if China chooses a path of peaceful integration, trade with the world, becoming more and more a responsible 

member of the international system, the door is open to a kind of 

continued growth of prosperity, security, respect, influence that is 

extraordinary for China in the same way, say, for Germany and 

Japan after World War II. The option of integration and cooperation gave them a future brighter than could have been imagined. 

Then, on the other hand, there is the other choice, and that other 

choice is risky, dangerous, costly, ugly. 

The eagle needs to make both of those statements as clearly as 

possible, not letting one overshadow the other, but the Chinese and 

others need to understand cooperation with the United States will 

make your life significantly better for you, your people, your country’s place in the world. Opposition will make no one happy. As 

long as we can send that message, then I think we have a reasonable chance that things may go well. 

Dr. HICKS. So I am not willing to give up any tools of national 

power. I do not think any of the other folks are either. I want as 

many as possible. So I put as many arrows and I would pull those 

claws together more frequently so that they are integrated and we 

are thinking through how the various instruments can operate together. 

To draw on Dr. Cohen’s comment, we really do have to be thinking about the multilateral structures that we have developed under 

U.S. leadership, adapting them where we can, but also going beyond them where we need to. Asia is a place where we can start 

198 

to build, I think, some new approaches with our allies and partners, and we do need to have a strong NATO in Europe but think 

through how that transatlantic relationship might have to go beyond simply the NATO piece which is confined somewhat to the 

military sphere. 

So I would rather have all the instruments together, and they do 

mutually reinforce one another, as you suggest. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Cotton? 

Senator COTTON. Thank you all very much for your very important and quite interesting testimony this morning. 

Professor Mead, I want to go back to an answer you gave in response to Chairman McCain’s question about our gravest threat in 

the world. Many generals and admirals, as you know, have said 

that Russia is our number one enemy and that is in part, implicitly 

they have said, explicitly they have said, because of Russia’s nuclear arsenal also because of Putin’s highly personalized source of 

autocratic power. Many of the witnesses this morning said that it 

is China that is the rising power, that China is going to be the 

long-term challenge that we face. 

I heard a little bit of a dissent from you, that Russia, because 

of the highly personalized power, because of their nuclear arsenal, 

but also they are a declining power actually poses a more immediate threat to the United States. Is that correct? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes, Senator. You know, it is that Russia is in a 

hurry. A power that can afford to be patient, can delay provocative 

actions, can time its strategy, and can actually sort of temporize 

and make agreements, but a country that feels it does not have 

time on its side is a country that is going to move quickly. For 

President Putin, I think he feels if he does not act now, when can 

he act. When he began this process, the price of oil was much higher. He sees the European Union in disarray because of the euro crisis and other things. He sees the United States perhaps turning 

away, at least temporarily, from some of the global engagement 

that we saw in the past. So I believe he saw an opportunity and 

felt he had no choice but to seize it. 

While the Chinese might—for example, suppose we are successful in demonstrating our commitment to freedom of navigation in 

the South China Sea. They might move away. We have seen actually the Chinese have moderated vis-a-vis Japan and have stopped 

being quite so provocative in the north, even as they continue to 

push in the south. So there is a little bit more flexibility there. 

Senator COTTON. You said that he has got a limited amount of 

time. He is in his early 60s. The last time I watched him playing 

hockey or riding a tiger in a judo outfit, he seemed to be in pretty 

good health. Given the longevity of dictators, maybe we can be 

looking at another 20 to 25 years of Vladimir Putin. So could you 

say a little bit more what you mean about a limited amount time? 

Mr. MEAD. He is not worried about term limits curtailing his period in the Kremlin, no, or his own old age. But his concern is actually for Russian national power. Russia, since the Cold War, has 

failed to develop an effective modern economy. It remains a gas 

station rather than an integrated economy. Without hydrocarbons, 

it does not have levers. 

199 

At the same time—and we should not forget that the rise of 

China is a much more worrisome thing for Russia than it is for the 

United States. We can think about historical claims that China has 

to Russian territory in the Far East. We can think just in general 

about an empty Siberia facing a rising China that Russia is concerned. The rise of jihadi ideology is a much greater threat to Russia with not only a large internal minority of sometimes alienated 

Sunni Muslims, but also its interest in Central Asia, its historical 

concerns there. 

So Russia looks at a threatening international environment. 

From Putin’s point of view, if you are going to have a kind of a center of geopolitical power somewhere between Berlin and Beijing, he 

feels he has a limited amount of time to build this. The odds are 

not in his favor. He needs to move quickly. He needs to move aggressively. One could compare him in some ways to General Lee in 

the American Civil War who felt that in a long war, his side would 

lose. So even though he was strategically on the defensive, he had 

to try things like the attacks at Antietam and Gettysburg to have 

a hope of winning the war. He had to be a dazzling tactician to 

overcome the balance of forces which was not in his favor. I think 

President Putin is thinking in those terms, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. The long-term confrontation that we have with 

Russia—today we have it. We had it throughout the Cold War. But 

the clash of interests has been clear. I mean, Tocqueville wrote at 

the end of the first book of ‘‘Democracy in America’’ that because 

of our modes of thought and our social organization and points of 

departure, it is inevitable that we would each hold half the world’s 

hands in our futures. 

Given that long-term rivalry, what would an ultimate integration 

of Russia into the world system look like? How might the United 

States help bring that about? 

Mr. MEAD. Well, I think the most interesting possibility is that 

if we can help the people in Ukraine who want to modernize and 

build a modern, law-based, commercial free state in Ukraine and 

free society, that would demonstrate to millions of people inside 

Russia that Orthodox Slavs do not have to accept dictatorship, poverty, hostility, that kind of thing, that in fact the ideas that have 

created prosperity in France and Germany, Poland can also work 

in Russia. There is a place where we could show the Russian people that they have a different choice. The future can be different. 

I think it is in Ukraine. I think it would be a tragedy if we do not 

do what we can to help the Ukrainian people build the kind of future they seem to want. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator King? 

Senator KING. I want to welcome you as unpaid faculty members 

of McCain University. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KING. I want to compliment the chair, seriously. Abraham Lincoln was once asked what he would do if he were given an 

hour to split a cord of wood, and his answer was I would spend the 

first 15 minutes sharpening my axe. These hearings have been the 

sharpening of our intellectual axes rather than just doing and voting and working on the details to give us a chance to reflect and 

think with you on some of these larger issues. Secretary Gates, 

200 

Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, Brzezinski—has been really 

illuminating and very helpful. 

Mr. Mead, I want to take off on something you just said, which 

I think is incredibly important, and it goes to this issue of sequester and how we balance the relief from sequester. It has been characterized that it is defense or social programs. I do not consider the 

FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] a social program or the Department of Homeland Security or NIH [National Institutes of 

Health] or the infrastructure of our country, law enforcement 

across the country. You made the point that ultimately the power 

is in the strength of the economy and the strength of the society, 

not just in guns and jet airplanes. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir, I would. I think, though, you are going to 

have to—in Congress you have to think about this, that we might 

talk about there are essential costs. I do not think all of those essential costs are necessarily defense costs. But are we going to say 

that every dollar the Federal Government spends is of equal importance to every other dollar, that there is nothing that cannot be 

treated—— 

Senator KING. Of course, not, and I do not think anyone asserts 

that. 

But Dr. Hicks used one of the most wonderful phrases. It is going 

to become part of my lexicon, that the sequester was consciously 

thoughtless. ‘‘Consciously thoughtless.’’ What a wonderful phrase. 

We need to go back to the history of the sequester. It was designed 

because in 2011, they could not figure out where to get the last trillion dollars of deficit reduction. So they said you, Congress, through 

the special committee, will find the solution, and if you do not, we 

will give you this consciously thoughtless, really stupid alternative 

that no one will want to have happen, and therefore, you will find 

a solution. Somehow over the years, it has metamorphosed into 

holy writ that somehow the sequester is part of the deficit reduction strategy when in fact it was a part of the incentive to drive 

us to a better solution involving all sides of the equation. That was 

why it was developed that way. 

But I think the idea that we have to choose between defense and 

non-defense—and the point I was making about the FBI and 

Homeland Security is there are national security items that will be 

affected by the sequester. 

Dr. Hicks, you talked about migration in Europe as being a national security threat, the greatest migration. I worry that looking 

into the future, migration, not necessarily because of Syria but because of economic conditions in the developing world, can be a huge 

national security problem for this country and for Europe. People 

are going to want to get from poor places to rich places. We dealt 

with this on the Mexican border a year or so ago with these undocumented immigrants from Central America trying to escape 

dangerous, hopeless places. 

Do you see this as a long-term issue? I just see pressure building 

up as people can see how much better it is and they look around 

and they say my government does not work and it is hopeless and 

there are no jobs and I am going to get out of here. 

Dr. HICKS. I do think it is a long-term issue. It has also obviously 

been an issue throughout the course of human history. So we 

201 

should not expect that the future will be better in this regard. It 

depends so much on the strength of the societies into which these 

migrants are moving and, of course, the strength of the societies to 

keep them from wanting to move. That gets to the point I was trying to make in my statement about having these long-term approaches, to be able to think long-term about where you might see 

such an impetus and how the United States, along with likeminded 

nations, can help nations strengthen themselves against that kind 

of tendency or current of migrants is important and then on the receiving end. 

Senator KING. Interestingly, illegal immigration from Mexico has 

declined over the last several years, mostly because of improving 

economic conditions in Mexico. I think that is exactly the point that 

you are making. 

I have to mention that I recently learned—we talked about 

China, a lot of talk about China and what their society is like— 

that their government will not allow the Magna Carta to be publicly displayed, and to fear an 800-year-old document written in 

medieval Latin strikes me as a real indictment of their confidence 

in their system. 

I want to thank you all again for your testimony. Very illuminating, very helpful. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator King. 

I would just like to ask one kind of mechanical question. As you 

know from your testimony today, many of these challenges transcend international boundaries. I think it was much simpler 30-40 

years ago when we set up these various combatant commands 

[COCOMs]. Do you think that that is now applicable? Should we 

look at a reorganization of this kind of situation, which was really 

far more effective in the days of the Cold War when we had a European Command, a Pacific Command. Now we have a proliferation 

of commands actually. Every time there seems to be a crisis, we 

create another command and, by the way, another four-star general. But maybe we could ask if you have specific thoughts on that, 

beginning with you, Dr. Hicks. 

Dr. HICKS. Sure. As I know you know, no less than every 2 years, 

there is an effort inside DOD [Department of Defense] to look at 

the unified command plan. But the effort that goes into the strategic piece of that, I would say, is not—I guess the word ‘‘anemic’’ 

might come to mind, which is a little unfair. But I think it is very 

good for you to think about this issue strategically. Too often people think of this as a budget cutting issue, and there is not a lot 

of money to be made on the combatant command side. So coming 

at it from the strategic perspective of what is the presence that the 

United States needs in the world and what is the role and responsibility of the unified commands is important. 

Having said that, every time we have played with changing the 

UCP [Unified Command Plan] tremendously in a way to take down 

commands, I think there has always been a little bit of a regret factor. This goes overall with any kind of structural changes that you 

think through, you always have to be thinking to second and third 

order effects, you know, what are the downstream consequences 

that break more value than I gain by the rework. 

202 

So we did things like stand up, of course, U.S. Northern Command. There has been talk over time about taking that down. We 

have talked about taking down AFRICOM [U.S. African Command] 

or even merging EUCOM [U.S. European Command], because Europe was not important, into AFRICOM, and then suddenly the 

Russians are important, and in the case of NORTHCOM [U.S. 

Northern Command] or SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command], 

the same type of thing can happen. 

So I do not have a particular change I would recommend right 

now. I think it is important to always be thinking about it, to be 

open to changes, but to be thinking about, much as I think Professor Mead said about not being able to discount a region of the 

world—you know, life is going to surprise us. We should have combatant command structures that are flexible and adaptable to the 

future. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you. 

Before you answer, Professor Mead, I think probably the most 

graphic example of this is NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. When 

we have an immigration problem or a drug problem that begins in 

Colombia, should the problem be handed off from the GuatemalanMexican border to those that look at Mexico, I mean, and Canada? 

That to me is a graphic example of redundancy. Maybe I am 

wrong. 

Go ahead, Professor. 

Mr. MEAD. Well, Senator, I am no expert on military organization, but I just would say that when the world is changing as 

quickly as it is and the kinds of issues that we face are becoming 

more difficult, more complicated all the time, it would be unusual 

if we had invented in the past a structure of organization that 

never needed to be reformed. I also think that from inside a bureaucracy, it is unlikely that the kind of reform that one would 

seek would naturally emerge. So I think without committees like 

this one and external reviews, I think it is unlikely that our military structure would be suitable to what we need. So I wish you 

every success as you think about this. 

Senator MCCAIN. Professor? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Like Dr. Hicks, I am the grizzled veteran of multiple unified command plan revisions, and I am also a survivor of 

the creation of AFRICOM. I would actually urge you, I think, and 

the committee that it might be worthwhile to take a look at the 

birth and the growth of AFRICOM because that was a command 

that was intended from birth to be different, to be small, light footprint, and yet I think as it has evolved—and I think this is a very 

understandable tendency—it has come to be much more of a command just like any other. So I think there are very real tendencies 

that drive these commands to be bigger, more expansive. 

Senator MCCAIN. More staff. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Exactly. More aircraft flying around various 

places. So any reform effort I think really needs to take those very 

real considerations into account. 

Look, I think the challenges that we have outlined—many of 

them are truly global challenges. Our concerns about China are not 

solely focused in the USPACOM AOR [area of responsibility]. They 

extend to Africa. They extend to the Central Command region. 

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They extend to EUCOM, also to NORTHCOM as well. The same 

thing with Russia. It is worth remembering that in the Cold War, 

when we were focused on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union itself 

was not part of a combatant command. 

So I think we do need to rethink these things, and I would certainly commend you and the committee for their efforts to do that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

Professor Cohen? 

Dr. COHEN. I would agree that one of the sure indicators of military sclerosis is a multiplication of headquarters. Just look at 

NATO. Every time there is a crisis, including the recent crisis, the 

response is let us create another headquarters. You know, what is 

at the point of the spear may be an armored company going on a 

driving holiday somewhere in Eastern Europe, but it is not generating real military power. 

I would add a couple of things. One is we are increasingly moving into a world in which regional powers have global reach, and 

this segmentation actually gets in our way. This is not new. Think 

about the Iranians and the Buenos Aires bombing. But this is just 

going to get worse. So we are going to be dealing with regional actors who will be operating across multiple commands. 

The third point I would make—and I am sorry Senator Kaine is 

not here—the multiplication of these COCOMs with rather grandiose headquarters and fleets of G-5s and so forth actually diminishes in many ways the potency of our diplomacy because the assistant secretary gets kind of dumped out of tourist class in the 

back of a commercial flight. The COCOM comes in with a fleet of 

airplanes, you know, a vast retinue. Guess who the locals pay more 

attention to? So I think that is a third issue. 

The last thing I would say is, as you can tell, I think this is very 

much worth looking into. DOD will flinch from this because of all 

the equities involved. So this is something that really needs to be 

looked at from the outside. It would have to be a very, very serious 

look. It would not, I think, be the kind of thing you could do in this 

setting, but something that would be really worth commissioning 

a hard look at, perhaps coming up with multiple options. Absolutely, I think it would be a great idea. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I thank you. I want to apologize to the 

witnesses that we are having votes on the floor, which accounts for 

the rotating presence here. 

It has been very helpful, and we will continue these series of 

hearings. At some point probably I would imagine, maybe in the 

month of December, we will start floating some proposals on this 

whole issue of reform, and we will be calling on you to give us your 

best advice and counsel. 

It is my intention—and I am happy to tell you that this committee, as you know, has a long tradition of bipartisan behavior— 

that we will be working together to try to address these issues that 

cry out for reform. When we look at the numbers, the hearing that 

we had with Secretary Gates showed some very interesting trends, 

decreases in brigade combat teams, increases in staff, personnel 

costs, all of those things. It is a little bit like in some ways our entitlement programs overall. We all know that by 2035, or whatever 

it is, we will be paying for the entitlement programs and interest 

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on the debt. If we do not stop this dramatic increase in non-essential, non-warfighting costs, we are going to be facing a similar situation. 

By the way, I also have been and will be working closely with 

Chairman Thornberry in the House. Despite our superior feelings, 

we do have to work in a bicameral fashion. 

So I thank all of you for being here. It has been very helpful, and 

we will be calling on you in the future. Thank you. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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