IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-10055

Summary Calendar 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

MICHAEL CHARLES REED, 

Defendant-Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas 

USDC No. 5:02-CR-94-3 

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Michael Charles Reed, federal prisoner # 28753-177, moves for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. He seeks to challenge the denial of 

his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion in which he sought a sentence reduction 

pursuant to Amendment 782 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. His motion for leave to 

proceed IFP constitutes a challenge to the district court’s certification that his 

appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 5, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-10055

2 

Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into an appellant’s good faith “is limited to whether 

the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not 

frivolous).” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

We review the district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence 

pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion, and its interpretation of the 

Guidelines de novo. United States v. Henderson, 636 F.3d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 

2011). An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court bases its decision upon 

an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Id. 

Amendment 782 retroactively lowered most drug-related base offense 

levels in § 2D1.1(c) by two levels. The district court implicitly held that Reed 

was eligible for a reduction in his sentence, but denied his motion after 

considering the original and reduced guidelines ranges, a synopsis of his 

behavior while incarcerated, the information from his original sentencing 

(including his criminal history and offense conduct), and the factors under 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) that were relevant to the potential modification of his sentence 

(including his criminal history, public safety issues, offense conduct, and postsentencing conduct). 

On appeal, Reed argues that the district court abused its discretion 

because it (i) declined to hold an evidentiary hearing; (ii) declined to appoint 

counsel for Reed; and (iii) failed to properly analyze the § 3553(a) or discuss or 

explain its consideration and application of the § 3553(a) factors. 

Reed has failed to raise a nonfrivolous argument that the district court 

abused its discretion in denying his § 3582(c)(2) motion. First, Reed has 

identified no factual dispute that would have been resolvable by the district 

court; therefore he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See FED. R.

CRIM. P. 43(b)(4); United States v. Patterson, 42 F.3d 246, 248-49 (5th Cir. 

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3 

1994). Second, Reed was not entitled to the appointment of counsel as a matter 

of right, see United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1995), and 

Reed has not established that the interests of justice militated in favor of 

appointing counsel, United States v. Robinson, 542 F.3d 1045, 1052 (5th Cir. 

2008). Finally, the district court “was under no obligation to reduce [Reed’s] 

sentence at all,” and need not mention the § 3553(a) factors—or any of its 

reasons—when ruling upon a § 3582(c)(2) motion, even though the record 

makes clear that the district court did consider the § 3553(a) factors. United 

States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 672-73 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Reed’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. See Henderson, 696 F.3d at 717. Because the 

appeal lacks arguable merit and is therefore frivolous, Reed’s motion for leave 

to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED as 

frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; Howard, 707 F.2d at 220; 5TH CIR.

R. 42.2. 

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