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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 111,915

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

CASEY M. BAKER,

Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. 

When a person is arrested in a public place, the arresting officer may take custody 

of personal effects that are with the arrestee at the time if it is reasonable under the 

totality of the circumstances. 

2. 

Standardized criteria or an established routine must regulate the opening of 

containers during a valid inventory search. 

Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed August 21, 2015. 

Appeal from Douglas District Court; PAULA B. MARTIN, judge. Opinion filed June 9, 2017. Judgment of 

the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed and 

remanded.

Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief

for appellant. 

Kate Duncan Butler, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Patrick J. Hurley, assistant 

district attorney, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the 

brief for appellee.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 

STEGALL, J.: Casey M. Baker appeals the denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence discovered through a warrantless search of his backpack at the time of arrest as 

well as his resulting convictions for possession of methamphetamine and possession of 

drug paraphernalia. The district court denied the motion, ruling the evidence would have 

been inevitably discovered during an inventory search. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 

We conclude the officers reasonably seized Baker's backpack but the State 

presented no evidence of an established inventory routine that would have inevitably led 

to the opening of the containers in which the evidence was found. Therefore, we hold the 

State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the contraband would have 

been inevitably discovered and the district court erred in denying Baker's motion to 

suppress. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The material facts are not in dispute. In July 2013, Detective Mike McAtee and 

Officer Kim Nicholson, with the Lawrence Police Department, were traveling to court in 

an unmarked police vehicle when they noticed Baker riding his bicycle and wearing a 

blue drawstring backpack. Detective McAtee called for assistance because he knew 

Baker had outstanding arrest warrants and was a suspect in other cases. Detective 

McAtee and Officer Nicholson spotted Baker's bicycle outside the Habitat for Humanity 

store in the 700 block of Connecticut Street in Lawrence. They found Baker inside the 

store holding the same backpack. 

When the officers approached, Baker dropped the backpack. They arrested Baker

on his outstanding warrants, and Detective McAtee instructed Officer Ryan Halsted to 

search the backpack. Officer Halsted searched the backpack at the scene and discovered 
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needles inside a Nintendo game case. He searched the backpack again in an evidence 

room and found a bag of crystal-like substance inside a cell phone carrier. The substance 

tested positive for methamphetamine. 

Baker moved to suppress this evidence, arguing the warrantless search of his 

backpack violated the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Baker claimed his backpack was 

searched without probable cause and the contraband would not have been inevitably 

discovered through an inventory search. He also argued law enforcement would not have 

had lawful custody of the backpack at the time of an inventory search. The State 

countered that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered through an inventory 

search at the arresting agency or jail and it was reasonable to seize the backpack instead 

of leaving it unattended in the store. 

At the suppression hearing, Detective McAtee testified the backpack was searched 

for evidence of crimes under investigation and collected for safekeeping as Baker's 

personal property. He explained the police have an obligation to collect personal property 

instead of leaving it unattended at the scene following an arrest. 

Two officers testified about inventory searches. The State asked Officer Halsted, 

"When you make an arrest of an individual on the street and you take that individual to 

the county jail, what do you do with that individual's belongings that are in that person's 

possession?" Officer Halsted testified:

"[Officer Halsted:] If there's a lot of items or a large bag or something like that, 

what we will do is put it into personal property [at the Lawrence Police Department]. 

Once it goes into personal property, then we have to inventory that so we know what's in 

our evidence room A and B, so we can protect the individuals and ourselves.

"[The State:] So if I understand your response correctly, there are two ways that 

personal property of somebody going into the jail can be handled.
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"[Officer Halsted:] Correct. For instance, if I can give you an example, say, for 

instance, I arrest somebody and they have, you know, two or three suitcases full of stuff 

or a large amount of items for stuff, the jail will not accept that and we have to put that 

into the personal property up in the evidence room here."

During cross-examination, Halsted testified the bag would have gone with Baker 

to jail and "been searched to inventory." 

Corrections Officer Phillip Weinmaster was working as a booking officer on the 

day Baker was arrested. He testified that when someone is booked into jail, officers take 

custody of "any items like cell phone, wallet, watch, money, loose change, pens, anything 

like that," but "[i]f it's a bag or anything bigger than that," they release the property to the 

arresting agency. The State asked Officer Weinmaster what would happen to a "purse or 

small bag." Officer Weinmaster explained:

"[Officer Weinmaster:] A small bag or a purse we usually accept. It just depends 

on the size. We just don't have the room out at the facility to house all the extra items. 

"[The State:] And is it a situation where it just depends on the judgment of the 

booking officer as to whether or not something is too big or not?

"[Officer Weinmaster:] Yes. I mean we have guidelines like anything like a 

backpack or a duffle bag, anything like that will be given back to the arresting agency.

"[The State:] Now, if a smaller bag is deemed to be okay to be accepted by the 

jail, what is done with the bag?

"[Officer Weinmaster:] It is opened up, searched out in the vehicle sally port, and 

if anything is found in that that's deemed contraband, that item is given back to the 

arresting agency. Then whatever is allowed to come in, we take that in and put it into our 

property room." 
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The district court denied Baker's motion to suppress, finding (1) officers did not 

have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the backpack; but (2) the evidence

was nonetheless admissible because it would have been inevitably discovered through a

valid inventory search. The court reasoned:

"As far as the State's basis that the bag was searched for evidence of crimes that 

were currently under investigation, which Officer McAtee testified about at the 

[suppression] hearing but he did not certainly at the preliminary hearing. At the 

preliminary hearing there was no mention as that being a basis for the search of the bag 

nor was there any mention that other crimes were being investigated. That wasn't even 

included in the State's brief. Then at the hearing Mr. McAtee testified as to other and new 

reasons that he thought he had the right to search the bag, and that was that he had 

probable cause to search for evidence of crimes under investigation. And the Court finds 

that there was insufficient evidence to show that that was the reason for the search or that 

they thought that there would be evidence of other crimes in that bag. 

"Which then takes us to what the State argued in its brief, and that was the 

inevitable discovery doctrine . . . . And that's really the real issue here and the one I 

wanted to think about. 

. . . . 

"So here the defendant is in a retail store. He's not at a home or a place where he 

had some control over the premises or relationship with individuals there. . . . He was 

alone in a retail store. He really didn't have any reasonable options of what else he was 

going to do with that bag.

"And so the Court finds that it wasn't necessary to ask, 'What do you want to do 

with your bag,' because he didn't have any options. Again, it may be different had he not 

been in a retail space where he had no connection or control over the space, but because 

of that, the Court finds that it was inevitable. That bag was going to go with him to the 

jail and would either have been searched there or at the training center, depending on the 

size of the bag, to do an inventory search."
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Following a bench trial, Baker was convicted of possession of methamphetamine 

and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the beginning of the trial, Baker moved for 

reconsideration of his motion to suppress, preserving it for review. See State v. Spagnola, 

295 Kan. 1098, Syl. ¶ 1, 289 P.3d 68 (2012) ("When the same judge considers a motion 

to suppress and then conducts a bench trial, and the defendant objects before the 

introduction of physical evidence that was the subject of the motion to suppress, the issue 

of whether the introduction of that evidence was proper is sufficiently preserved to allow 

appellate review.").

Baker appealed his convictions and the denial of his motion to suppress. The 

district court's first finding—that there was no probable cause to search the backpack—is 

not in dispute. The sole issue on appeal is whether the contraband would have been 

inevitably discovered through a valid inventory search. In other words, the State concedes 

that an unconstitutional search occurred but argues the inevitable discovery doctrine—as 

an exception to the exclusionary rule—preserves the admissibility of the evidence.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding, "The officers arrested Baker in a public 

place and, thus, it was reasonable for the officers to seize Baker's backpack for

safekeeping," and "the Lawrence Police Department would have inevitably discovered 

the evidence through lawful means because law enforcement may, without a warrant, 

search any article in the possession of an arrested person in accordance with routine 

inventory procedures." State v. Baker, No. 111,915, 2015 WL 5036761, at *5-6 (Kan. 

App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). 

ANALYSIS

The State claims the evidence was lawfully seized and would have been inevitably 

discovered as part of a valid inventory search because it was the jail's policy and practice

to search arrestees' bags. Indeed, the State presented testimony to this effect. However, 
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Baker contends a policy of merely searching bags is insufficient to prove that an 

inventory search would have inevitably included a search of the containers in which the 

evidence was found. We agree. 

When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence,

"'an appellate court determines whether the factual underpinnings of the district judge's 

decision are supported by substantial competent evidence. The ultimate legal conclusion 

to be drawn from those facts raises a question of law requiring application of a de novo 

standard. An appellate court does not weigh evidence to find facts.'" State v. Sprague, 

303 Kan. 418, 434, 362 P.3d 828 (2015) (quoting State v. Ransom, 289 Kan. 373, Syl. ¶ 

1, 212 P.3d 203 [2009]).

Because the material facts are undisputed, only a question of law remains over 

which we exercise plenary review. State v. Sanchez-Loredo, 294 Kan. 50, 54, 272 P.3d 

34 (2012). 

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the 

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill 

of Rights prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, and a warrantless search is per se 

unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception." State v. Ramirez, 278 Kan. 

402, 404-05, 100 P.3d 94 (2004); see State v. Ryce, 303 Kan. 899, 913, 368 P.3d 342 

(2016). One "well-defined" exception to the warrant requirement is the inventory search, 

which "is not an independent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step 

following arrest and preceding incarceration." Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643-44,

103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1983). In short, "[a]n inventory search is the search of 

property lawfully seized and detained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure 

valuable items . . . and to protect against false claims of loss or damage." Whren v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 n.1, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996) (citing South 

Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 [1976]).
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The justification for an inventory search "does not rest on probable cause, and 

hence the absence of a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the search." 

Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 643. Instead, "[t]o determine whether the search . . . was 

unreasonable we must 'balanc[e] its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment 

interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.'" 462 U.S. at 644 

(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 

[1979]). As in Lafayette, "standardized inventory procedures are appropriate to serve 

legitimate governmental interests at stake here," such as safeguarding the owner's

property and protecting police against possible false claims of theft. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 

at 647; see Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 

(1987) ("[I]nventory procedures serve to protect an owner's property while it is in the 

custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and 

to guard the police from danger."). 

The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that prohibits the introduction 

of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in order to deter future 

violations. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-38, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 

2d 285 (2011); State v. Powell, 299 Kan. 690, 694-95, 325 P.3d 1162 (2014). One 

exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery doctrine, which "allows for 

the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the 

unconstitutional source," Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059, 195 L. Ed. 

2d 400 (2016), because "punishment for an act that does no harm is not required in order 

to deter harmful acts," State v. Ackward, 281 Kan. 2, 18, 128 P.3d 382 (2006). See United 

States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The 'inevitable discovery' 

doctrine allows the government to use evidence that it obtained illegally but would have 

obtained legally in any event."). The State must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that "the unlawfully obtained evidence would have ultimately or inevitably been 

discovered by lawful means"—in this case, through an inventory search. State v. Walker, 

283 Kan. 587, Syl. ¶ 8, 153 P.3d 1257 (2007). 
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As a preliminary matter, inventory searches are only valid if law enforcement has

lawful custody of the property that is inventoried. See State v. Teeter, 249 Kan. 548, 550, 

819 P.2d 651 (1991) ("It is a well-known rule of law that an inventory search of a vehicle 

cannot be valid unless the police first obtain lawful possession of the vehicle."). Baker 

contends the backpack would not have been in lawful custody of the police at the time of 

any inventory search because the officers did not ask Baker what he wanted to do with 

his backpack.

Analogizing his backpack to a vehicle, Baker asks us to extend State v. Fortune, 

236 Kan. 248, 689 P.2d 1196 (1984), to the facts of this case. In Fortune, we stated:

"If the person responsible for the vehicle desires that the vehicle be left lawfully parked 

upon the streets or that it be turned over to some other person's custody, then, absent 

some other lawful reason for impounding the vehicle, his or her wishes must be followed. 

Only when a vehicle is found illegally parked and unattended, or where the person 

responsible for its possession is unable (as in the instant case) or unwilling to instruct the 

arresting officers as to the vehicle's disposition or some other legal reason justifying 

impoundment exists should the officers assume control over the vehicle." 236 Kan. at

257. 

However, we clarified Fortune's holding in State v. Shelton, 278 Kan. 287, 293, 93 

P.3d 1200 (2004), stating, "The Fourth Amendment does not require police to allow an 

arrested person to arrange for the disposal or removal of his or her vehicle to avoid 

impoundment." Instead, the Fourth Amendment requires "that the impoundment be 

reasonable under the totality of circumstances." 278 Kan. at 293.

Likewise, officers could lawfully take custody of Baker's backpack if it was 

reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. "When a person is arrested in a place 

other than his home, the arresting officers may 'impound the personal effects that are with 

him at the time to ensure the safety of those effects or to remove nuisances from the 
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area.'" United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Cabbler v. 

Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, 528 F.2d 1142, 1146 [4th Cir. 1975], cert. 

denied 429 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 60, 50 L. Ed. 2d 77 [1976]). When Baker was arrested, he 

was alone in a retail store. As the Court of Appeals astutely observed, "It would be 

unreasonable to simply leave Baker's backpack unattended at the scene of his arrest or 

expect someone at the store to take possession of the backpack not knowing what might 

be in it." Baker, 2015 WL 5036761, at *6.

We concur and conclude the seizure of Baker's backpack was reasonable under the 

totality of the circumstances. See State v. Demontiney, 374 Mont. 211, 217, 324 P.3d 344 

(2014) (defendant's purse, which was on the floor next to her when she was arrested at 

Wal-Mart, was in her immediate possession, such that it was subject to a valid inventory 

search to safeguard persons and property); LaFave, 3 Search & Seizure § 5.5(b) (5th ed. 

2016) ("[W]hen a person is arrested in some public place while carrying a suitcase or like 

object . . . it would be clearly improper for the police to simply leave the container 

unattended at the scene of the arrest."). 

We now turn to the question at the heart of this case: whether the State proved by 

a preponderance of the evidence that a standardized inventory policy or routine, when 

followed, would have inevitably led to the opening of the containers—a Nintendo game 

case and a cell phone carrier—housing the contraband. Simply put, Officers Halsted and 

Weinmaster testified that a small bag or backpack would have been "searched" or 

"inventoried" at the arresting agency or jail—and nothing more. The failure to present 

any evidence of standardized criteria or an established routine governing the opening of 

closed containers during inventory searches is fatal to the State's inevitable discovery 

claim. 

"[I]t is not 'unreasonable' for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to 

incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article in his possession, in 
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accordance with established inventory procedures." Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648. However, 

the United States Supreme Court has cautioned:

"Our view that standardized criteria . . . or established routine . . . must regulate 

the opening of containers found during inventory searches is based on the principle that 

an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover 

incriminating evidence. The policy or practice governing inventory searches should be 

designed to produce an inventory. The individual police officer must not be allowed so 

much latitude that inventory searches are turned into 'a purposeful and general means of 

discovering evidence of crime.'" Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L. 

Ed. 2d 1 (1990) (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376 [Blackmun, J., concurring]).

See Shelton, 278 Kan. at 299.

In Wells, law enforcement had "no policy whatever with respect to the opening of 

closed containers encountered during an inventory search." 495 U.S. at 4-5. The Supreme 

Court held that "absent such a policy, the instant search was not sufficiently regulated to 

satisfy the Fourth Amendment." 495 U.S. at 4-5. 

The Wells rule applies here—standardized criteria or an established routine must 

regulate the opening of containers found during inventory searches. Opening all 

containers, no containers, or opening only those containers "whose contents officers 

determine they are unable to ascertain from examining the containers' exteriors" are all 

constitutionally permissible practices so long as they are standardized and well 

established. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. A written policy undoubtedly has the advantage of 

providing certainty as to the established practices, but it is not required. People v. 

Williams, 20 Cal. 4th 119, 83 Cal. Rptr. 275, 126-27, 973 P.2d 52 (1999) ("Wells does 

not require a written policy governing closed containers . . . but the record must at least 

indicate that police were following some 'standardized criteria' or 'established routine'

when they elected to open the containers."); State v. Wilson, 116 N.M. 793, 797, 867 P.2d 
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1175 (1994) ("Inventory search procedures must be standardized, but need not be 

written.").

However, producing no evidence of a policy with respect to the opening of 

containers—as occurred here—does not pass constitutional muster. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-

5; see United States v. Mendez, 315 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002) (law enforcement may 

open closed containers during an inventory search as long as they act in good faith 

pursuant to established procedures); United States v. Richardson, 121 F.3d 1051, 1055 

(7th Cir. 1997) (searching closed containers as part of an inventory search is permissible 

so long as standardized criteria or established routines exist regarding the opening of 

closed containers); United States v. Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (10th Cir. 1991) 

(search of defendant's carry-on bag was a valid inventory search in accordance with 

department policy directing officer to open locked containers before booking). We find 

nothing in the record before us to establish that the search which occurred here was 

anything other than general rummaging.

Consequently, we hold the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the contraband would have been inevitably discovered through a valid inventory 

search of Baker's backpack. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Baker's motion 

to suppress, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

Reversed and remanded.